-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

ELIZABETH BUDROS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

October 5, 2017

v No. 334189

Grand Traverse Circuit Court

WOMENS’ FLAT TRACK ROLLER DERBY 

ASSOCIATION and TRAVERSE CITY ROLLER 

DERBY,

LC No. 2015-031272-NI

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: TALBOT, C.J., and O’CONNELL and O’BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Elizabeth Budros, appeals as of right the trial court’s grant of summary 

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (waiver) and (10) (no genuine issue of material fact) to 

defendants, Womens’ Flat Track Derby Association (WFTDA) and Traverse City Roller Derby 

(TCRD). Budros alleged that the negligence or gross negligence of defendants caused her injury 

during a roller derby practice at TCRD’s facility. We affirm. 

I. FACTS 

TCRD is a roller derby league and was a member of WFTDA, which is a national 

association of women’s flat track roller derby leagues. WFTDA published a safety protocol that 

establishes safety guidelines for its members. Compliance with the guidelines is a necessary 

condition for WFTDA insurance coverage, but compliance is not necessary for a league to be a 

member of WFTDA. 

TCRD leased space at an outlet mall that it used as a roller derby rink. TCRD admitted 

that a portion of the wall outside of the roller derby track was within fewer than five feet of the 

track and thus did not meet WFTDA’s safety guideline requiring five feet of clearance between a 

wall and the outside edge of the track. The purpose of the five-foot clearance was to create a 

buffer zone for skaters’ safety because skaters aim to land outside the track when they fall. 

Budros went to the TCRD rink and participated in a non-contact pace drill called “fast to 

fastest.” Budros purchased WFTDA insurance before skating, which included a waiver of 

liability. TCRD’s athletic director, Angela Stricker, showed Budros around the track. Stricker 

maintained that she pointed out the wall that was too close to the track edge, as well as other 
-2-

potential hazards. Budros denied that Stricker did so. During the drill, the skater behind Budros 

fell, causing other skaters to pile up. When Budros swerved to avoid hitting the piled-up skaters,

she hit the wall while trying to stop. As a result, she broke her arm. 

Budros filed a four-count complaint that alleged one count of ordinary negligence and 

one count of gross negligence against each defendant. The trial court granted summary 

disposition on all claims. The trial court concluded that Budros’s signed waiver extinguished her 

claims of ordinary negligence and that defendants’ actions did not rise to the level of gross 

negligence. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review de novo a grant of summary disposition. Xu v Gay, 257 Mich App 263, 266; 

668 NW2d 166 (2003). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is proper if there is a 

valid release of liability. This Court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and construes them 

in the light most favorable to her, unless documentary evidence contradicts her claims. Id. 

When we review a grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider the 

pleadings and the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and we will 

affirm the grant of summary disposition if no genuine issue of material fact remains. Id. at 267. 

B. ORDINARY NEGLIGENCE 

We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition against Budros’s ordinary 

negligence claims because Budros’s waiver was effective. 

A valid waiver or release of liability defeats an ordinary negligence claim. Id. at 269. 

We examine the parties’ intent to evaluate the validity of the waiver. Paterek v 6600 Ltd, 186 

Mich App 445, 449; 465 NW2d 342 (1990). A valid waiver must be “fairly and knowingly 

made.” Id. A release is invalid if the party signing the release was dazed or shocked, if the party 

requesting signature of the release misrepresents its contents, or if the circumstances reflect 

fraud. Id. We agree with the trial court that the language of the electronically signed waiver 

included in the WFTDA insurance purchase agreement was clear and extinguished Budros’s 

ordinary negligence claims. 

Budros argues that the release is invalid because it was part of an insurance purchase 

agreement and not a separate document clearly labeled a release. We rejected a similar argument 

in Paterek, in which the plaintiff described the waiver as part of a document that an official told 

him was an official team roster that he had to sign to play in the softball league. Id. at 449-450. 

The plaintiff’s argument in Paterek that he did not know what the document contained did not 

invalidate the release. Id. at 450. 

In the case at hand, the page showing Budros’s electronic signature bears the caption 

“2014 Release and Waiver of Liability, Assumption of Risk, and Indemnity Agreement.” In 

alternating ordinary and boldface font, the passage informed Budros about the risks of the 

activity and clearly stated that she assumed the risks of her own negligence. The passage 

additionally provided that Budros shall: 
-3-

HEREBY RELEASE, DISCHARGE, AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE the 

sanctioning organization(s), their administrators, directors, agents, officers, 

members, volunteers, and employees, other participants, officials, rescue 

personnel, sponsors, advertisers, owners and lessees of Premises on which the 

Activity is conducted, (each of the forgoing shall be considered one of the 

RELEASEES herein) FROM ALL LIABILITY, CLAIMS, DEMANDS, 

LOSSES, OR DAMAGES ON MY ACCOUNT CAUSED, OR ALLEGED TO 

BE CAUSED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE 

RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE, INCLUDING NEGLIGENT RESCUE 

OPERATIONS . . . .

Budros argues that the waiver was ambiguous and thus invalid because it did not name the 

WFTDA or the TRCD as releasees. We rejected a similar argument in Dombrowski v City of 

Omer, 199 Mich App 705, 707-708; 502 NW2d 707 (1993), in which we concluded that a 

release need not name each party because the waiver’s general reference to all participants was 

sufficient. Similarly, the waiver in this case is comprehensive enough to cover both defendants 

without naming them specifically, particularly because Budros completed the document at the 

TCRD facility, which is dedicated to roller derby activity. 

Budros contends that defendants misrepresented the nature of the document by 

instructing her to purchase insurance without advising her that the insurance purchase agreement 

contained a waiver. This Court rejected a parallel argument in Paterek. In that case, plaintiff

argued that the recreational facility misrepresented the nature of the document as a team roster 

when it also included a waiver of rights. Paterek, 186 Mich App at 448-449. Paterek explained 

that misrepresentation connoted intent to deceive, but the plaintiff offered no evidence of 

deceitful intent. Id. at 449. 

In this case, accepting as true Budros’s claim that no one told her that the insurance 

agreement included a waiver of liability, Budros did not claim that defendants attempted to 

deceive her about the agreement’s contents, conceal its contents, or prevent her from reading its 

contents before signing. Further, Budros did not claim that she would not have signed the 

insurance purchase agreement or that she would have declined to participate in the drill if she 

had been aware of the form’s contents. 

Finally, Budros’s argument that defendants did not advise her that the contents of the 

insurance purchase agreement included a waiver amounts to an admission that she did not read 

the purchase agreement before signing it. Failing to read an agreement, in the absence of fraud 

or mutual mistake, does not render it invalid and unenforceable. Paterek, 186 Mich App at 450. 

C. GROSS NEGLIGENCE 

We affirm the trial court’s summary dismissal of Budros’s gross negligence claims 

because the evidence does not raise a factual question on whether defendants disregarded 

Budros’s safety. To avoid summary disposition on her gross negligence claims, Budros must 

show that defendants acted so recklessly that they demonstrated “a substantial lack of concern 

for whether” she suffered an injury. Xu, 257 Mich App at 269. 
-4-

Accepting as true Budros’s claim that Stricker did not warn her about the wall, Budros 

still has not shown a reckless disregard for her safety. Defendants did not contest that the 

placement of the wall with respect to the track edge violated the safety protocol. Indeed, 

defendants admitted that the wall was too close to the track edge. However, this knowledge 

alone does not constitute gross negligence. Defendants explained that it was not possible to 

move the wall or build the track differently because of the shape and size of the space. 

Accordingly, TCRD took other measures to mitigate the risk posed by the wall’s proximity, 

including taping stripes on the floor where the outside referee lane was narrower by the wall, 

warning skaters about the wall, and having skaters shout “wall” to warn other skaters to avoid 

contact when approaching the area. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition on 

Budros’s gross negligence claim. 

We affirm. 

/s/ Michael J. Talbot

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell

/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien