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ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN EUROPE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND 

EMERGING THREATS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 27, 2005

Serial No. 109–34

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 
(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

PETER T. KING, New York, Vice Chairman 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

TED POE, Texas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

RICHARD MEREU, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Peter Bergen, Fellow, The New American Foundation ................................. 5

Mr. Matthew Levitt, Director, Terrorism Studies Program, The Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy ............................................................................. 10

Mr. Lorenzo Vidino, Deputy Director, The Investigative Project ......................... 23

Mr. Claude Moniquet, President and Director General, European Strategic 

Intelligence and Security Center ........................................................................ 31

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Elton Gallegly, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging 

Threats: Prepared statement .............................................................................. 2

The Honorable Robert Wexler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida: Prepared statement ........................................................................... 3

Mr. Peter Bergen: Prepared statement .................................................................. 6

Mr. Matthew Levitt: Prepared statement .............................................................. 12

Mr. Lorenzo Vidino: Prepared statement .............................................................. 25

Mr. Claude Moniquet: Prepared statement ........................................................... 33

APPENDIX 

Responses from Mr. Lorenzo Vidino to questions submitted for the record 

by the Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 49

Response from Mr. Matthew Levitt to question submitted for the record 

by the Honorable Ted Poe ................................................................................... 50

(1)

ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN EUROPE 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:19 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I call to order the Subcommittee on Europe and 

Emerging Threats. Today the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats is holding a hearing on the growing problem of Islamic 

extremism in Europe. 

Let me say at the outset that the title of the hearing does not 

in any way suggest that Islam lends itself to extremism or that 

most Muslims, whether they live in Europe or anywhere else in the 

world, support terrorism or hold extremist views toward the Western society or the United States. 

However, we must face the fact that a small but growing number 

of people in Western Europe have joined jihadist groups. These 

groups pose a serious threat to the United States, U.S. interests in 

Europe and Europe itself. 

This hearing will examine the nature and extent of this threat. 

I am particularly interested in assessing which European countries 

face the greatest threat from Islamic extremist groups, the causes 

of religious extremism, the ties of groups in Europe to al-Qaeda 

and other Middle East and North African terrorist groups and the 

ability of these groups to carry out attacks. 

I view the cooperation between the United States and Europe as 

one of the bright spots in the transatlantic relationship. But I believe that we can and must do more, especially with respect to the 

sharing of intelligence on extremist groups, curtailing the travel of 

terrorists and the cutting off of their fundraising capacity. I also 

support a top-down review of the visa waiver program and on our 

border security program to make sure that the State Department, 

the Department of Homeland Security and the airlines are doing 

everything they can to prevent terrorists from entering the United 

States. 

In this regard, last year as part of the National Intelligence Reform Act, I included several provisions that were aimed at making 

it more difficult for terrorists to enter the United States. Two of 

these provisions—expanding pre-inspection by DHS at foreign airports and placing DHS agents at foreign airports to assist airline 

personnel in the detection of fraudulent documents—were designed 
2

to stop terrorists, including those who might be coming from Europe, from even boarding flights bound for the United States. I believe that the immediate implementation of these two provisions is 

something our Government can do right now to help keep America 

safer. 

Finally, I would also like our witnesses to discuss the potential 

of extremist groups in Europe to obtain or develop weapons of mass 

destruction. Given the continued problems in securing our border 

with Mexico and Canada, I am concerned that dangerous weapons 

originating in Europe can pose a direct threat to our homeland. 

With that, I would now defer to my good friend from Florida, the 

Ranking Member, Mr. Wexler. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS

Today, the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats is holding a hearing 

on the growing problem of Islamic extremism in Europe. 

Let me say at the outset that the title of the hearing does not in any way suggest 

that Islam lends itself to extremism or that most Muslims, whether they live in Europe or anywhere else in the world, support terrorism or hold extremist views toward Western society or the United States. 

However, we must also face the fact that a small but growing number of people 

in Western Europe have joined jihadist groups. These groups pose a serious threat 

to the United States, U.S. interests in Europe and Europe itself. 

This hearing will examine the nature and extent of this threat. I am particularly 

interested in assessing which European countries face the greatest threat from Islamic extremist groups, the causes of religious extremism, the ties of groups in Europe to al Qaeda and other Middle East and North African terrorist groups and the 

ability of these groups to carry out attacks. 

I view the cooperation between the United States and Europe as one of the bright 

spots in the transatlantic relationship. But I believe we can and must do more, especially with respect to the sharing of intelligence on extremist groups, curtailing the 

travel of terrorists, and cutting off their fundraising capacity. I also support a topdown review of the visa waiver program and our border security system to make 

sure that the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security and the airlines are doing everything they can to prevent terrorists from entering the United 

States. 

In this regard, last year as part of the National Intelligence Reform Act, I included several provisions that were aimed at making it more difficult for terrorists 

to enter the United States. Two of these provisions—expanding pre-inspection by 

DHS at foreign airports and placing DHS agents at foreign airports to assist airline 

personnel in the detection of fraudulent travel documents—were designed to stop 

terrorists, including those who might be coming from Europe, from even boarding 

flights bound for the U.S. I believe the immediate implementation of these two provisions is something our government can do right now to help keep Americans safer. 

Finally, I would also like our witnesses to discuss the potential of extremist 

groups in Europe to obtain or develop weapons of mass destruction. Given the continued problems in securing our border with Mexico and Canada, I am concerned 

that dangerous weapons originating in Europe can pose a direct threat to our homeland. 

I will now turn to Mr. Wexler for any opening statement he may wish to make.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses, and thank you for being so patient. I will be brief. 

I do not think there could be any more timely discussion than we 

are having today. When I was in France visiting with some of the 

leaders of the Islamic community there, I was overwhelmed with 

the sense of alienation that the Muslim community feels. Is this 

rightfully so or not? My understanding of a recent poll of European 

Muslims is that 80 percent of European Muslims feel victimized by 
3

discrimination and harassment. Whether that is an accurate portrayal of the conditions in which European Muslims live or not, it 

is obviously significant if that is the perception that those residents 

have. 

I was struck by the fact, if I understand it correctly, that a strategic decision was made—which I believe is shared by most, if not 

all, of the European countries—that there be no training of Islamic 

clerics within France or within Europe and that most, if not all, of 

the religious leaders in those communities are imported in. Therefore, the hope that there would emerge a moderate clerical base 

educated and brought up in France or any other western European 

country seems to have not materialized. I would be curious if you 

could address that aspect of what the problem is in terms of Islamic extremism. 

Could you also expand on whether there is any tie to be made 

in terms of Turkey’s entrance and negotiations regarding the European Union? Is there any connection between Turkey’s entrance 

into the European Union and the process that will be undertaken 

and Islamic efforts of assimilation and/or then ultimately leading, 

if there is no assimilation to extremism? Or is the Turkey experience just entirely separate from Moroccans or Algerians or anyone 

else that may feel that they have been discriminated against? I 

would be very curious to hear what the speakers have to say. 

If I could conclude with this; what role does the United States 

have, if at all, in helping, assisting, and/or commenting with respect to the failure, at least in many respects of the Muslim community, to be adequately assimilated into the European nations? 

What role do we have? 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing 

and giving me this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today’s hearing on Islamic extremism in Europe. I would also like to thank our distinguished guests for joining us today. 

Despite significant policy disagreements between the Bush Administration and 

some European allies surrounding the Iraq War, transatlantic cooperation in the 

war against terror has deepened, and is certain to grow stronger in the months and 

years ahead. As shared victims of terror, the United States and Europe must stand 

united in formulating a joint response. 

Events, such as the Madrid bombing; the 2003 suicide bombing in Israel by two 

British citizens; the 2003 arrest of Richard Reid; and the recent assassination of 

Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, all demonstrate that terrorist organizations in Europe remain active. This has significant implications for America because the most 

pressing threats from groups like Al Qaeda stem from affiliated organizations in Europe and European individuals, organizations and cells. 

European governments must do more to address the alienation of Islamic communities, where over 80 percent of European Muslims feel victimized by discrimination 

and harassment according to a recent poll. This, in turn, provides fodder to those 

who exploit Islam to promote their narrow political goals. The result has been increased support for terror, and rising anti-Americanism, anti-Israel sentiment and 

anti-Semitism in Europe commensurate with ongoing violence in the Middle East. 

This is most clear in France—home to Europe’s largest Jewish and Muslim populations—where Islamic extremism has been cited as a root cause of increased antiSemitism in the past five years. I have previously commended the French for steps 

taken to curb anti-Semitic hate crimes, though I am deeply concerned about recent 

studies indicating that anti-Semitic incidents have increased by more than 50% in 

France in 2004. 
4

Last year, I met with the head of the Muslim community in Paris to discuss this 

and other related matters. In our meeting, he outlined factors contributing to the 

rise of Islamic extremism, such as the influx of foreign imams preaching fundamentalism in the mosque and inadequate government assistance to the community as 

whole. These problems are indicative of a larger issue surrounding some European 

governments’ handling of rapidly changing demographics. It is clear that the threats 

emanating from isolated Muslim communities may decrease through enhanced integration of Muslims into Europe—including the accession of Turkey to the EU. 

Mr. Chairman, despite some success in the war on terror, the United States and 

Europe remain vulnerable to impending security threats. Europe served as the 

nerve center for Al Qaeda prior to 9/11 and is still used as a haven for affiliates 

of Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Ansar-Al-Aslam. As such, the EU and individual Member States must take a stronger stance against terrorist organizations such as 

Hezbollah, which—according to Palestinian sources—poses the greatest threat to 

the tenuous situation in Gaza and the West Bank. In the past month alone, the 

House of Representatives passed a resolution urging the EU to add Hezbollah to its 

terrorist and the EU Parliament passed a similar resolution recommending that the 

EU Council take ‘‘all necessary steps to curtail’’ Hezbollah given its ongoing support 

of terror. Despite such action, the EU has failed to add Hezbollah to its terrorist 

list, leaving operatives and finances freely flowing throughout the EU. At this precarious time in the Middle East, I hope the EU will heed the calls of Congress and 

the EU Parliament and add Hezbollah to its terrorist list, which—in my mind—is 

long overdue. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses as they outline the scope and severity of this global threat and present options for eradicating Muslim extremism in 

the future.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman from Florida. 

At this point I would like to introduce our witnesses. Our first 

witness is Peter Bergen, who is a Fellow at The New American 

Foundation where he researches and writes on international terrorism and the al-Qaeda network. He is also Adjunct Professor at 

the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins. 

Mr. Bergen is CNN’s Terrorism Analyst and author of Holy War, 

Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden. In addition, Mr. 

Bergen has written articles for such numerous publications including the New York Times, Washington Post, The Washington Times

and Foreign Affairs. 

The second witness is Matthew Levitt, who is a Senior Fellow 

and Director of the Terrorism Studies Program at The Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy. Mr. Levitt has also worked as an 

FBI Analyst for counterterrorism operations. In that capacity Mr. 

Levitt earned letters of commendation and five awards in recognition of superior service. Mr. Levitt currently serves on the Council 

of Foreign Relations focusing on terrorism financing issues. 

Our third witness is Lorenzo Vidino, who is the Deputy Director 

for The Investigative Project. Mr. Vidino is an expert on terrorism 

in Europe and al-Qaeda. His articles on terrorism and Middle Eastern affairs have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, National Review On-Line, The National Interest and several European newspapers. Mr. Vidino has also been a commentator on terrorism 

issues on MSNBC, Fox News and NBC. 

Our fourth witness is Claude Moniquet, who is the President of 

European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, a think tank 

based in Brussels specialized in counterterrorism, intelligence and 

international security issues. Mr. Moniquet has also had considerable experience covering terrorism as a journalist for over 20 years 

and is a Reserve Intelligence Officer in the French Army. Mr. 

Moniquet has written several books on religious extremism and 
5

terrorism and has worked as an Intelligence and Terrorism Consultant for CNN. 

Gentlemen, I know that there is a lot that you would like to 

present today to provide us with a wealth of information, but in the 

interest of time I would ask unanimous consent that your entire 

statement be made a part of the record, and if you could condense 

and limit your statements to as close to 5 minutes as possible, I 

would appreciate it. 

With that, Mr. Bergen, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MR. PETER BERGEN, FELLOW, THE NEW 

AMERICAN FOUNDATION 

Mr. BERGEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for giving me 

this opportunity to testify. In my view, the greatest threat from alQaeda and its affiliated groups come from Europe today. There are 

four strands to this argument. One, we have not really seen much 

evidence of real al-Qaeda sleeper cells in the country since 9/11. 

The second strand is the significant terrorist attacks we have seen 

in the past decade have had a European dimension to them in this 

country. Thirdly, we have seen, with the Madrid attacks and also 

the recent terrorist plots uncovered in London, that there is a serious group of sleeper cells in Europe who have the capacity and the 

motivation to attack us in the United States. Finally, this threat 

will increase over time. We have the unfortunate confluence of rising Muslim immigration into Europe, a certain amount of European racism and a certain amount of Muslim alienation. 

This problem is going to increase over time because Europeans 

have very expensive social welfare retirement programs, and they 

are basically going out of business. I mean, Italians as a group are 

not reproducing fast enough to replace themselves. They are going 

to have to import a lot of labor to pay for their programs and to 

do their jobs, so this feeling of alienation is going to increase very 

strongly. 

There were only 1 million Muslims in Europe in 1945. Now there 

are as many as 20 million. There were no Muslims in Spain under 

Franco. Now there are a million. There were no Muslims in Germany until after World War II. Now there are 5 million. These people are not integrating. As Congressman Wexler indicated, there is 

a real feeling of alienation. 

In my presentation I am focusing on Britain, where there is a 28 

percent unemployment rate for people between the ages of 16 and 

24. When you ask the question, ‘‘What is the war on terrorism?,’’ 

80 percent of British Muslims say it is a war against Islam. When 

you ask the question, ‘‘Would you be in favor of another attack by 

al-Qaeda against the United States or an al-Qaeda-like organization?,’’ 13 percent of British Muslims say that they would approve 

of that. That is a pretty astonishing figure. 

My presentation will largely focus on Britain because I think the 

problem there is particularly high. I also have some personal experience, having grown up there. 

I think you will see, if you look at the cases since 9/11, who has 

actually attacked us in any meaningful way. Richard Reid was not 

an American sleeper cell, he was a British citizen; the so-called 

‘‘Shoe Bomber’’ who got a case of cold feet on the American Airlines 
6

flight from Paris to Miami. His colleague was recently also charged 

in London, another British citizen, a week ago who is going to 

serve 13 years for his part in the shoe bomb plot. 

Omar Sheikh, who kidnapped and murdered Danny Pearl in 

Pakistan, is a British citizen who went to London’s School of Economics; a highly educated guy. 

We have also seen recently in Britain some very serious plots. 

One example is the ammonium nitrate plot. Half a ton of ammonium nitrate, the very material that was used in Oklahoma City 

and also in the Bali attack, was found near Heathrow Airport. This 

indicated a serious attack. An attack in London, by the way, is not 

only an attack on the English, it is an attack on us. If you blew 

up a significant bomb in the City of London in the financial center, 

that would have a devastating effect on global markets and, of 

course, the American economy. If you detonated a radiological device—the Chairman was interested in the WMD question. A readily 

simple dirty radiological bomb in the City of London would basically close down world markets. 

We do not need to be concerned about it just being a European 

problem: (A) We have seen that it is the Europeans, and particularly British, that have done a lot of these attacks; and (B) A certain kind of attack in Europe would have a devastating effect in 

the United States. 

I just wanted to mention a couple people by name as being indicative of the problem that Congressman Wexler talked about, the 

fact that so many of the religious figures in Europe are not coming 

out of some European system. They are imported from other countries. 

Abu Hamza was the imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque where 

both Zacarias Moussawi and Richard Reid worshipped. He has finally, after many years, been arrested both on an American extradition warrant and also the British finally got around to their own 

charges against him. He is indicative of the kinds of extremist 

mullahs and imams that we have seen in England. Unfortunately, 

there is another one who has not been arrested as yet, Omar Bakri 

Muhammad. He is implicated in the ammonium nitrate plot I just 

described, and he is also implicated in the Mike’s Place attack in 

Tel Aviv, which I think is very significant. Two second-generation 

British middle-class people go into Mike’s Place, an Israeli jazz 

club, blow themselves up; a suicide attack. This is the very first 

time a Brit has ever been involved in a suicide attack. If a British 

person can do a suicide attack in Israel 2 years ago, they certainly 

can do one here. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bergen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. PETER BERGEN, FELLOW, THE NEW AMERICAN

FOUNDATION

The greatest threat to the United States from al Qaeda, its affiliated groups, or 

those animated by al Qaeda’s ideology, emanates today from Europe. There are four 

strands to this argument which will be amplified in my testimony. The first, is that 

there is little or no evidence of American ‘‘sleeper cells’’ found in the US since the 

9/11 attacks. Secondly, the most significant Islamist terrorist plots in the United 

States in the past decade have generally not involved ‘‘sleeper cells,’’ but rather terrorists who have come into the U.S. from abroad, often from Europe. Third, in 2004, 

we saw with the Madrid attacks and the disruption of serious terrorist plots in London that there are European sleeper cells that have the ability and motivation to 
7

carry out major terrorist operations, and even, perhaps, to attack the United States 

itself. Fourth, the European threat from militant jihadists will likely increase over 

time as declining European populations are replaced by rising Muslim immigration 

into Europe, a combination of circumstances that is generating, and will continue 

to generate, rising Muslim alienation in many European countries, and a significant 

amount of backlash against Muslim immigrants in countries such as the Netherlands. 

Since the 9/11 attacks we have seen little evidence of US sleeper cells. The terrorism cases that American officials have prosecuted since 9/11 have often followed 

the trajectory of an initial trumpeting by the government only to collapse, or to be 

revealed as something less than earth shattering, when the details emerge months 

later. Remember Chaplin James Yee the ‘‘spy’’ at Guantanamo who turned out to 

be cheating not on his country, but on his wife? Or, the unfortunate Oregon lawyer 

who was busted for his role in the Madrid bombing attacks, but was, in fact, thousands of miles from Spain at the time of the bombings? Or how the Justice Department held a press conference to announce the disruption of a Buffalo, New York ‘‘al 

Qaeda terrorist cell,’’ when in reality those arrested had made the dumb mistake 

of lying to federal investigators about briefly attending a Taliban training camp? 

There was no evidence that that those arrested in Buffalo were involved in terrorism of any kind, or had ever been part of al Qaeda. 

Indeed, an authoritative survey by NYU’s Center on Law and Security released 

in February found that of the hundred and twenty criminal cases that the Bush administration has pursued under the rubric of the war on terrorism since 9/11, ‘‘the 

courts have indicted relatively few individuals on the charge of direct acts of terrorism and convicted only one (Richard Reid),’’ the so-called shoe bomber who, of 

course wasn’t a ‘‘sleeper cell’’, but a British-Jamaican who tried to blow up an American Airlines flight he boarded not in Paris, Texas, but in Paris, France. (Since the 

NYU report was published, French citizen Zacarias Moussawi has also pled guilty 

to planning to attack the White House.) 

The American sleeper cell phenomenon has been exaggerated by both US officials 

and overheated stories in the media, but that is not to say that such sleepers have 

not existed in the past. Ali Mohamed, a member of al Qaeda who played a role in 

planning the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Kenya, for instance, was a US 

Army sergeant in the late ’80s who married a Mexican-American woman, and was 

working as a computer network specialist in California when he was finally arrested 

after the Kenya embassy attack, fourteen years after he first settled in the States. 

However, since 9/11 there has been no evidence of sleepers like Ali Mohamed operating in the U.S. At a certain point these sleeper cells are either so asleep that they 

are effectively dead, or they simply don’t exist. The onset of the Iraq war and the 

presidential election both offered perfect symbolic occasions for the supposed cells 

to strike, but nothing happened. The 9/11 Commission concluded, building on the 

work of the largest criminal investigation in history, that the hijackers did not plug 

into a support network in this country. This fact, taken together with the tiny number of real terrorism cases post-9/11 and the absence of terrorist attacks in the US 

over the past three and a half years, leads one to surmise that there are no American sleeper cells. And support for this view came from an unlikely quarter in March 

2005: The FBI, in a leaked report, concluded that ‘‘US Government efforts to date 

also have not revealed evidence of concealed cells or networks acting in the homeland as sleepers.’’

That’s the good news. But is that the real problem, anyway? There have indeed 

been a small number of terrorist sleepers that have embedded themselves in American society for many years such as Ali Mohamed, but the real threat from Islamist 

terrorism in the U.S. has historically come from visitors to the country. That was 

the case in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, the mastermind of which, 

Ramzi Yousef, arrived from Pakistan intent on attacking American targets, and it 

was also the case of the 9/11 attackers. And it was also true of Ahmed Ressam, who 

was stopped at a Canadian border crossing in December 1999 on a mission to bomb 

Los Angeles airport, and of the shoe bomber, Richard Reid, and also of Zacarias 

Moussawi. 

Today, the Islamist terrorist threat to Americans largely emanates from Europe, 

not from domestic sleeper cells or, as is popularly imagined, the graduates of Pakistani madrassas who can do little more than read the Koran and so do not have 

either the linguistic or technical skills to make them a serious threat. Omar Sheik, 

for instance, the kidnapper of Wall Street Journal reporter, Danny Pearl, is a British citizen of Pakistani descent who graduated not from a madrassa, but from the 

academically rigorous London School of Economics. Richard Reid is also British, as 

is Saajid Badat who last week pled guilty in London to training in Afghanistan to 

use a shoe bomb similar to Reid’s to blow up a transatlantic flight in late 2001. 
8

(Badat got cold feet and bailed out of the plot). Similarly, al Qaeda member Zacarias 

Moussawi is French; Ahmed Ressam became radicalized in Italy, and the 9/11 pilots 

turned to the most militant form of Islam while living in Hamburg. Indeed, last 

month, at a conference marking the first anniversary of the Madrid bombing, Robert 

Leiken, of the Nixon Center, presented his study of 373 radical Muslim terrorists 

arrested or killed in Europe and the United States from 1993 through 2004, of 

which an astonishing 41 percent were Western nationals, who were either naturalized or second generation Europeans, or were converts to Islam. Leiken found more 

terrorists who were French than the combined totals of Pakistani and Yemeni terrorists! 

Future terrorist attacks that will be damaging to American national security are 

therefore likely to have a European connection. Citizens of the European Union who 

adopt al Qaeda’s ideology can both move around Europe easily and also have easy 

entre ́e into the United States because of the Visa Waiver Program that exists with 

European countries. European members of al Qaeda, for instance, could either come 

to the US to launch a significant attack on the scale of what took place in Madrid 

last March, or they could launch a major terrorist strike in Europe—such as a radiological ‘dirty’ bomb attack in the City of London, a key financial center—that would 

have a devastating effect on the global economy, and by extension the American 

economy. 

As the eminent French scholar, Gilles Kepel, has pointed out: ‘‘The war for Muslim minds around the world may turn on the outcome’’ of how European Muslims 

deal with Islamist militancy in their midst, and the extent to which European Muslims can be truly integrated into their host societies. This will not be something that 

can be achieved quickly. First, there is the matter of numbers. France alone is host 

to some five million Muslims, about as many Muslims as live in the United States. 

And while only a handful of American Muslims have proven susceptible to al 

Qaeda’s ideology (in this instance, the American Dream seems to really work) that 

is not so with a substantial minority of Europe’s Muslims, many of whom are relatively recent arrivals. In 1945 less than one million Muslims lived in Europe. 

There are now as many as 20 million, a good number of whom are having problems 

integrating into their host countries because, by and large, Muslims in Europe are 

more discriminated against than Muslims in the United States. Algerians in France 

and Pakistanis in Britain, for instance, are often treated as second-class citizens. 

A survey of Islamist militant groups and Islamist extremism in Europe would 

merit a book in itself, so my testimony will focus on the threat emanating from Britain, a country that illustrates many of the features of the wider European problem, 

and where the threat from Islamist extremists is especially high. In 2004 Sir John 

Stevens London’s former Metropolitan Police Commissioner warned that an Islamist 

extremist attack in London was ‘‘inevitable,’’ while a government report estimated 

that between ten and fifteen thousand British Muslims are supporters of al Qaeda 

or related groups. The estimate was based on intelligence, opinion polls, and a report that eight thousand Muslims last year attended a conference held by Hizb-utTahir, which the Home Office describes as an extremist organization. British authorities believe that between three and six hundred British citizens were trained 

in al Qaeda and Taliban camps in Afghanistan. And several hundred men are believed to have fought in Kashmir and returned to Britain in the 1990s. In March, 

Sir Ian Blair, the present Metropolitan Police Commissioner, told a radio interviewer ‘‘I agree with the Prime Minister’s assessment . . . that there are hundreds 

of people who came back from the [Afghan training] camps and are now in the 

United Kingdom, and that is a very dangerous issue.’’ Indeed, Sir Ian recently cautioned that terrorists could see the upcoming British general election on May 5th 

as ‘‘a real opportunity.’’

Most British Muslims are young and many are poorly integrated into society and 

therefore vulnerable to extremism. Seventy percent of them are under thirty years 

old, compared to forty-five percent for the UK as a whole. The unemployment rate 

among the British Muslim community runs ten percentage points above the national 

average of 5%. In the case of 16–24 year old Muslim men the unemployment rate 

is 28% And, unsurprisingly, a sense of anger shows up in polling data among British 

Muslims. Eight out of ten believe that the war on terrorism is a war on Islam, while 

a poll conducted last year under the auspices of The Guardian newspaper found a 

surprising 13% who said that further attacks by al Qaeda or similar organizations 

on the United States would be justified. This sort of sentiment can be found in a 

rap video that surfaced last year called ‘‘Dirty Kuffar’’ the lyrics of which included 

the following verse, ‘‘OBL [bin Laden] pulled me like a shining star! Like the way 

we destroyed them two towers, ha-ha!’’

London—known for these purposes as Londonistan—has attracted a wide range 

of Islamist militants in the past decade who are inspired by the actions and rhetoric 
9

of bin Laden. One of the most well known is the one-eyed cleric, Abu Hamza, who 

until 2003 was the imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque, where both Zacarias 

Moussawi and Richard Reid worshipped. Serious Arab opposition figures in London 

regard Abu Hamza as a self-publicizing joke, as he is neither a profound scholar 

of Islam, nor an important political figure. But, as we shall see, sometimes jokes 

can turn deadly serious. And the story of Abu Hamza is also emblematic of how 

young British men are incited to acts of terrorism, and the somewhat slow response 

of the UK authorities to clamp down on those who abuse its honorable tradition of 

tolerating dissident views. 

In late 1998, after Abu Hamza had called for the killings of ‘‘non-believers’’ in 

Yemen, a group of eight second-generation British Muslims of Asian and Middle 

Eastern parentage, several of whom had ties to Abu Hamza, responded to that call. 

One was his son, Mohammad; another was his son-in law. The eight Britons, aged 

between 17 and 33, grew up in the Midlands or the London area. Most of them had 

gone to school for courses in business studies, computers or accounting, and those 

who had jobs, worked in unexceptional lines of work like the insurance business. 

They told those who asked that they were on vacation to Yemen to visit family 

members, or pick up some Arabic. But a routine traffic stop by a Yemeni cop near 

Aden on December 24, 1998 unraveled a far more interesting tale. Inside the car 

were three of the Brits who sped away, only to be quickly arrested. Their arrests 

led the Yemeni government to a house where they found a trove of items not normally associated with a quiet vacation: mines, rocket launchers, computers, and 

encrypted communication equipment. The Yemeni government said that the Brits 

were planning a veritable festival of Christmas bombing attacks in Aden, directed 

at a church; the British consulate, and an American demining team working in the 

area. Five days after the Brits were arrested, eighteen tourists from the United States, 

Britain, and Australia vacationing in Yemen were seized by a group of jihadist kidnappers who were hoping to spring their British colleagues from jail. The leader of 

the kidnappers was in touch by phone with Abu Hamza during the operation. A 

botched rescue effort by the Yemeni army led to the deaths of four of the tourists. 

It took six years until Abu Hamza was finally arrested in the spring of 2004 on extradition charges from the United States on the grounds that he had provided recruits to al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and that he was involved in the 1998 Yemen attack. Last August, British authorities also belatedly brought charges against Hamza 

for inciting racial hatred. 

Another flamboyant, London-based Islamist militant is Sheik Omar Bakri Muhammad, a Syrian who styles himself the judge of his own sharia court. In 1997, 

Bakri founded Al-Muhajiroun, an organization that attracted much media attention 

before its official disbanding in October 2004. Just as Abu Hamza influenced some 

impressionable second-generation British Muslims to try and attack western targets 

in Yemen in 1998 so too Bakri seems to have been a spiritual mentor for two second-generation, college-educated, middle-class men of Pakistani heritage who, on 

April 30, 2003, walked into Mike’s Place, a busy jazz club near the US embassy in 

Israel, on a suicide mission. Once inside the club, the younger of the two men succeeded in detonating a bomb, killing himself and three bystanders, while the other 

man fled the scene. Bakri told the Daily Telegraph that he knew one of the Mike’s 

Place attackers, Omar Sharif, ‘‘very well and he used to attend regularly at my sessions. He was my brother and I am very proud of him and any Muslim who will 

do the same as him.’’

The Mike’s Place bombing was highly unusual; it was the first time that a UK 

citizen had committed an act of suicide terrorism in Israel. If such an attack can 

happen in Israel it can also happen in the United States. The Mike’s Place attack 

demonstrates that the US might be vulnerable to suicide attackers who are British 

or are nationals of other European countries. 

Omar Bakri has also been connected to a recent significant terrorist plot; the alleged plan by a group of young Islamic men to use half a ton of ammonium nitrate 

stored near Heathrow to blow up targets in the UK. Ammonium nitrate was the material used in the Oklahoma City bomb that killed 168 people and also in the attack 

on the discothe`que in Bali that killed 200 tourists. In March 2004, nine suspects 

were arrested in Luton, west London and Sussex in raids on twenty-four homes, following two months of surveillance. Eight of the nine arrested are of Pakistani descent. All were born and raised in Britain, and many are middle class. The uncle 

of two brothers charged in the plot told reporters that it had been Bakri’s AlMuhajiroun that had radicalized his nephews. The trial of five of those arrested is 

due to start in September 2005. 

Also in 2004, police arrested twelve other terrorist suspects, aged nineteen to thirty-two, including senior al Qaeda operative, Issa al-Britani. Many of the suspects 
10

were British citizens of Pakistani descent, and some had fought in Kashmir in the 

1990s. Raids were conducted in north London, Watford, Luton, and Blackburn, and 

police seized an estimated $360,000 worth of equipment, including one hundred 

computers and two hundred mobile phones. The U.S. accuses al-Britani of casing 

financial targets in New York and Washington between August of 2000 and April 

of 2001. Those targets included the IMF, the World Bank, the Prudential building 

in Newark and the New York Stock Exchange. Al-Britani’s arrest resulted in the 

Department of Homeland Security elevating the threat level to orange this past 

summer. 

Al-Britani, age thirty-two, was born in Britain or moved there when he was 

young. He fought in Kashmir in the 1990s after converting to Islam (from Hinduism) in his twenties, instructed militants in al Qaeda’s Afghanistan camps, and 

later wrote ‘‘The Army of Madinah in Kashmir.’’ The book details strategies for conducting jihad, including the use of ‘‘germ warfare.’’ The 9–11 Commission concluded 

that Al-Britani traveled with Tawfiq bin Attash, one of bin Laden’s bodyguards, to 

Kuala Lumpur in January 2000. This visit occurred several days before the Kuala 

Lumpur meeting where the September 11 attacks were discussed. From interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) U.S. investigators believe that bin Laden 

told al-Britani through KSM to conduct surveillance of financial and Jewish targets 

in New York and Washington in 2001. British investigators also believe that alBritani began planning to attack a British target in January 2000, potentially the 

Heathrow Express, which connects Heathrow airport with downtown London. 

Since 9/11 British citizens have planned the kidnapping-murder of American journalist Danny Pearl, attempted to bring down U.S. airliners with shoe bombs, contemplated additional attacks on financial landmarks in New York and Washington, 

and have carried out suicide operations in Israel. This record demonstrates that 

Islamist militant groups in the United Kingdom, as is the case in several other 

major European countries, represent a threat not only to their own homelands, but 

also to the United States.

Mr. BARRETT [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Bergen. I appreciate 

that. 

Mr. Levitt, welcome. I am excited to hear your testimony today. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW LEVITT, DIRECTOR, TERRORISM STUDIES PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 

FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. LEVITT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member of the Committee. It is a pleasure to be here. 

The rise of global jihadist movements in Europe is alarming not 

only because of the threat such movements pose to our European 

allies, but because Europe has served as a launching pad, as Peter 

noted, for terrorist operatives planning attacks elsewhere; not only 

for those behind 9/11, Richard Reid and other individuals, but 

other groups as well. I would like to highlight the non-global 

jihadist groups because you have before you, in my colleagues here, 

some experts on the global jihadist movement. 

Hezbollah operatives have launched attacks against Israel from 

Europe. Hamas operatives have plotted and funded suicide and 

other attacks against civilians in Israel from Europe as well. While 

terrorist groups remain the central structural unit in international 

terrorism, terrorist groups today are better described as networked 

groups tied together by individual relationships than as clearly defined organizations that are structured and discrete. 

The relationships between individual terrorists affiliated with 

different groups are paramount, especially when operating in Diaspora communities like Europe and, for that matter, the United 

States. This crossover, this cross-pollination, facilitates cooperation 

among groups, including operational cooperation, but even more so 

interconnectivity at the logistical and financial support levels, in-
11

cluding among groups that are not part of the global jihadist movement. 

It is important to highlight a few themes. First, there is a common ideological and theological jihadist foundation and world view 

among groups that belong to al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda affiliates and even 

groups like Hamas. Consider someone like Muhammad Zouaydi, 

who is one of the heads of the al-Qaeda cell in Madrid. On top of 

financing the Hamburg cell and several of the individuals who are 

now on trial in Spain, he was also sending money in at least two 

instances to Hamas. 

Consider Sheikh Muhammad al-Moayad, who was recently convicted in a court in Brooklyn following a joint operation with the 

Germans. Allow me to quote from one of the transcripts entered in 

that case. Asked by a cooperating witness who was posing as a 

jihadist financier if the money he was purportedly going to be giving would go to Hamas or al-Qaeda, because he really wanted it 

to go to fighting, not just to social services, Sheikh al-Moayad said, 

‘‘Look, any organization. Anything. Hamas, al-Qaeda or whatever. 

As long as it is for jihad.’’ The jihadists themselves do not make 

the distinctions that we sometimes make between al-Qaeda and 

Hamas. 

Sheikh Abdullah Azam, for example, was not only one of the first 

Palestinian terrorists to have a world view of a major jihad against 

Israel, but of course teamed up with Osama bin Laden to create 

the Maqtabol Kidma, the backbone of what became al-Qaeda. 

Second, it is just a small step from justifying terrorism in some 

circumstances, terrorism against Israel or terrorism that is perhaps 

‘‘resistance’’ to justifying it in other scenarios. Consider the Saudi 

experience of tolerating jihad abroad, which created an atmosphere 

that bred jihad at home. Consider also Khalid Sheik Muhammad, 

who we now know was extremely motivated by the Palestinian 

question in particular, but chose to express that by attacking the 

United States. 

Third, the EU, as a member of the Quartet, has a special obligation. Beyond whatever threat groups like Hamas or Hezbollah pose 

directly in Europe or whatever threat they pose by creating a 

jihadist environment in Europe, they have a special obligation to 

stop any financial support, certainly operational activity in Europe 

that can undermine the peace process. 

Just in the past few weeks not America, not Israel, but the Palestinians have complained to the Europeans that Hezbollah and 

certain Palestinian groups are the greatest potential threat to the 

peace process, and that is something that we need to pay attention 

to, especially in light of the case of Mike’s Place, that Peter just 

highlighted. 

Finally, such groups do pose threats to Europe as well. In the 

case of Hezbollah, almost every international cell has direct ties to 

Iranian intelligence. Cells are multi-tasking. To quote a U.S. intelligence official that I interviewed for a project I am working on, almost all Hezbollah cells he knows of he said are ‘‘a bit operational.’’

If we could put those slides that I gave you up on the screen for 

a minute? I would like to highlight from a case here in the United 

States that you cannot necessarily identify Hezbollah or Hamas 

operatives by someone who wears a headband on their head. Here 
12

you are looking at a picture of three members of a Hezbollah cell 

in Canada. 

Next slide, please. Here you are looking at members of the Charlotte Hezbollah cell that came into the United States via Cyprus, 

which granted is at the periphery of Europe, but Europe nonetheless. 

Next slide, please. Here you are looking at the leader and one of 

the members of the Charlotte cell posing outside the White House. 

You know, people blend in, and if we do not pay very close attention to the presence of such groups in the United States, in Europe, 

we are going to have a problem especially in the case of Hezbollah 

if they are in fact all ‘‘a bit operational.’’

There is a history of Hezbollah conducting operations in Europe 

and elsewhere. I go into them in my written testimony. Germany 

is currently concerned over the presence of some 800 Hezbollah 

members there. Hezbollah has used Europe as a launching pad for 

operations in Israel. 

In the case of Hamas, Bank al-Taqwa headquartered out of Europe has been known to finance Hamas and several global jihadist 

groups. The al-Aqsa International Foundation headquartered in 

Germany with offices throughout the world, including Yemen, 

where it was headed by Sheikh Moayad, who I just mentioned, financed Hamas and al-Qaeda. In the case of Ismael Elbarasse in 

the U.S., the FBI highlighted its concern that al-Qaeda, lacking 

mid- and senior-level operatives, has begun to recruit trained 

Hamas operatives. I guarantee you that if that is what they are 

doing in this country, we need to be concerned about it happening 

in Europe as well. 

Finally, failure to pay attention to all terrorist groups that are 

based on a global jihadist’s ideology is a critical barrier to effective 

international counterterrorism cooperation. It is like being in a 

rowboat with two holes and only plugging up one of them. There 

are so many overlapping relationships, especially at the logistical 

and financial support levels, that if we do not look at the macro 

picture we are going to fail to wrap up all the necessary cells to 

bring greater security to our citizens. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW LEVITT, DIRECTOR, TERRORISM STUDIES

PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

INTRODUCTION

The rise of global jihadist movements in Europe is alarming, not only because of 

the threat such movements pose to our European allies but because Europe has 

served as a launching pad for terrorist operatives plotting attacks elsewhere. As the 

9/11 trial just begun in Spain highlights, the 9/11 hijackers and their logistical and 

financial collaborators plotted and planned their operations in Europe. Similarly, 

Richard Reid’s failed shoe-bombing of a U.S. airliner was plotted and launched from 

Europe; Hezbollah operatives have launched attacks against Israel from Europe; 

and Hamas operatives have plotted and funded suicide and other terrorist attacks 

against civilians in Israel from Europe as well. 

While terrorist groups remain the central structural unit in international terrorism, terrorist groups today are better described as networked groups tied together by individual relationships than as clearly defined organizations that are 

structured and discrete. The relationships between individual terrorists affiliated 

with different groups are paramount, especially when operating within Diaspora 

communities in places like Europe and the United States. This crossover and polli-
13

1 Central Trial Court No. 5, Spanish National High Court (Audiencia Nacional), CASE 35/

2002 (ordinary procedure), Don Baltasar Garzon Real, Magistrado Juez del Juzgado Central de 

Instruccio ́n, July 19, 2002 2 Central Trial Court No. 5, Spanish National High Court (Audiencia Nacional), CASE 35/

2002 (ordinary procedure), Don Baltasar Garzon Real, Magistrado Juez del Juzgado Central de 

Instruccio ́n, July 19, 2002 3Statement of John B. Taylor, US Department of the Treasury, November 7, 2001, http://

www.treas.gov/press/releases/po771.htm 4 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). P. 69; Confirmed in conversations the author held with European intelligence 

officials in September 2003. 5Testimony of Juan C. Zarate, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Terrorism and Violent Crime, U.S. 

Department of the Treasury, House Financial Subcommittee Oversight and Investigations, February 12, 2002 6Lucy Komisar, ‘‘Shareholders in the Bank of Terror?’’ Salon.com, March 15, 2002; and Mark 

Hosenball, ‘‘Terror’s Cash Flow,’’ Newsweek, March 25, 2002 7Lucy Komisar, ‘‘Shareholders in the Bank of Terror?’’ Salon.com, March 15, 2002; and Mark 

Hosenball, ‘‘Terror’s Cash Flow,’’ Newsweek, March 25, 2002

nation facilitates cooperation among groups, including operational cooperation but 

far more often interconnectivity at the logistical and financial support levels. Such 

links exist even between groups that do not share similar ideologies, leading to cooperation between religious zealots and secular radicals; between ideologically- or 

theologically-driven terrorists and criminal entities (as has been the case in several 

terrorist attacks in Iraq, where criminal elements played critical roles in return for 

monetary compensation); between Sunni and Shi’a groups; and between individuals 

whose person-to-person contacts require no agreement between their respective 

headquarters. 

As such, it should not surprise that several investigations into al-Qaeda 

operatives in Europe and elsewhere revealed significant crossover to terrorist elements tied to Hamas. A particularly interesting example is the Madrid Al-Qaeda 

cell, perhaps the most important cell broken up since 9/11. Around April 2002, 

Spanish authorities searched the home and offices of Muhammad Zouaydi, a senior 

al-Qaeda financier in Madrid. Investigators found a five-page fax dated October 24, 

2001, revealing that Zouaydi was not only financing the Hamburg cell responsible 

for the September 11 attacks, but also Hamas. In the fax, which Zouaydi kept for 

his records, the Hebron Muslim Youth Association solicited funds from the Islamic 

Association of Spain. According to Spanish prosecutors, ‘‘the Hebron Muslim Youth 

Association is an organization known to belong to the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas which is financed by activists of said organization living abroad.’’ 1

Spanish police also say Zouaydi gave a total of almost $6,600 marked ‘‘Gifts for Palestine’’ to Sheikh Helal Jamal, a Palestinian religious figure in Madrid tied to 

Hamas.2

The al-Taqwa banking system—with offices in Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Italy 

and the Caribbean—also facilitated the financing of multiple terrorist organizations, 

including Hamas. Bank al-Taqwa was added to the U.S. Treasury Department’s terrorism list in November 2001 for ‘‘provid[ing] cash transfer mechanisms for Al 

Qaida,’’ 3 and European intelligence services confirm ‘‘al-Taqwa used Hamas funds 

in the late 1990s.’’ 4 Subsequent investigation has determined al-Taqwa was established in 1988 with financing from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. According to 

the U.S. Treasury Department, ‘‘$60 million collected annually for Hamas was 

moved to accounts with Bank al-Taqwa.’’ 5 Al-Taqwa shareholders include known 

Hamas members and individuals linked to al-Qaeda.6 Ghalib Himmat, noted for his 

ties to the International Islamic Charity Organization (IICO), another charity suspected of financing Hamas, is also an executive of the al-Taqwa banking network. 

Moreover, a 1996 report by Italian intelligence further linked al-Taqwa to Hamas 

and other Palestinian groups, as well as to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and 

the Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya.7

Beyond the presence in Europe of global jihadists tied to the al-Qaeda network, 

the activities of groups like Hamas and Hezbollah also pose significant national security risks. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, these risks are not limited 

to the terrorist attacks these groups plot against Israel, they include risks to the 

countries in which they are operating and to the United States as well. 

HEZBOLLAH IN EUROPE

Highlights of Hezbollah’s record of terror attacks include suicide truck bombings 

targeting US and French forces in Beirut (in 1983 and 1984) and U.S. forces again 

in Saudi Arabia (in 1996), its record of suicide bombing attacks targeting Jewish 

and Israeli interests such as those in Argentina (1992 and 1994) and in Thailand 
14

8 ‘‘Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,’’ Hearing Before the 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, February 6, 2002 (see response 

number 3 to ‘‘Questions for the Record’’ on page 339 of GPO print edition) 9 ‘‘Threats to National Security,’’ Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee of the 

United States Senate, February 12, 2003 10 ‘‘Treasury Designates Six Al-Qaeda Terrorists,’’ US Department of the Treasury press release (JS–757), September 24, 2003. Available online: http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/

js757.htm 11 ‘‘Treasury Designates Six Al-Qaeda Terrorists,’’ US Department of the Treasury press release (JS–757), September 24, 2003. Available online: http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/

js757.htm 12The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States, available online at http://www.9–11commission.gov/report/index.htm 

(attempted in 1994), and a host of other plots targeting American, French, German, 

British, Kuwaiti, Bahraini and other interests in plots from Europe to Southeast 

Asia to the Middle East. 

According to U.S. authorities, concern over the threat posed by Hezbollah is well 

placed. FBI officials testified in February 2002 that ‘‘FBI investigations to date continue to indicate that many Hezbollah subjects based in the United States have the 

capability to attempt terrorist attacks here should this be a desired objective of the 

group.’’ 8 Similarly, CIA Director George Tenet testified in February 2003 that 

‘‘Hezbollah, as an organization with capability and worldwide presence, is [alQaeda’s] equal, if not a far more capable organization.’’ 9 To be sure, Hezbollah is 

highly qualified, and capable of carrying out attacks not only in the U.S.—where 

it has never carried out operations before—but in Europe as well—where it has 

been active in the past. 

US intelligence officials have also expressed concern over possible links between 

Hezbollah and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, highlighting the ad hoc tactical relationship 

brewing between Iran’s shi’a proxy and the loosely affiliated al-Qaeda network. In 

September 2003, when US authorities designated Zarqawi and several of his associates as ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’ entities, the Treasury said that 

Zarqawi not only had ‘‘ties’’ to Hezbollah, but that plans were in place for his deputies to meet with both Hezbollah and Asbat al-Ansar (a Lebanese Sunni terrorist 

group), ‘‘and any other group that would enable them to smuggle mujaheddin [sic] 

into Palestine.’’ 10 To this end, Zarqawi received ‘‘more than $35,000’’ in mid 2001 

‘‘for work in Palestine,’’ which included ‘‘finding a mechanism that would enable 

more suicide martyrs to enter Israel’’ as well as ‘‘to provide training on explosives, 

poisons, and remote controlled devices.11

Similarly, while the 9/11 Commission found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah 

had advance knowledge of the September 11 plot, the commission’s report does note 

that Iran and Hezbollah provided assistance to al-Qaeda on several occasions. For 

example, al-Qaeda operatives were allowed to travel through Iran with great ease. 

Entry stamps were not put in Saudi operatives’ passports at the border, though at 

least eight of the September 11 hijackers transited the country between October 

2000 and February 2001. The report also noted a ‘‘persistence of contacts between 

Iranian security officials and senior al-Qaeda figures’’ and drew attention to an informal agreement by which Iran would support al-Qaeda training with the understanding that such training would be used ‘‘for actions carried out primarily against 

Israel and the United States.’’ Indeed, al-Qaeda operatives were trained in explosives, security, and intelligence on at least two occasions, with one group trained 

in Iran around 1992, and a second trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley 

in the fall of 1993.12

In the final analysis, whether suspected ties between Hezbollah and global 

jihadist elements such as Zarqawi and the 9/11 plotters are proved or not, Hezbollah 

warrants being designated a terrorist group of global reach on the merits of its own 

activities. 

On top of its efforts to cripple the peace process, Hezbollah warrants European 

attention for its operations there. In the 1980s Hezbollah operatives carried out 

bombings in France and assassinations in Germany, and killed French peacekeeping 

forces in Beirut. But the group continues to operate out of Europe today. Consider 

some of Hezbollah’s operations in Europe: 

In 1989, Bassam Gharib Makki, a Hezbollah operative and student in Germany, 

collected intelligence on Israeli, Jewish and American targets in Germany. In 1989 

and 1990, authorities apprehended a Hezbollah cell operating in Valencia, Spain. 

The cell was caught smuggling weapons in a ship from Cyprus so that they could 

be pre-positioned and cached in Europe. After tracking that shipment, authorities 

found additional explosives that had already been stashed in Europe. It was determined that the cell had been targeting US and Israeli targets in Europe. In 1997, 
15

13 United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al. United States Court of Appeals for the 

Fourth District. 14 ‘‘Germany Bans A Charity Organization Close to Hamas and Will Possibly Ban another 

Close to Hezbollah,’’ Asharq al Awsat, August 6, 2002 15 ‘‘Germany Surprised to Learn From Press of Plan to Kill Israeli Envoy,’’ Spiegel Online 

(Hamburg), 3 January 2003, translated by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 4 January 2003; 

‘‘Hezbollah (part 1): Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria,’’ Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the 

Center for Special Studies, Israel, June 2003; and author interview with intelligence sources, 

July 2003

Hezbollah was found to be collecting intelligence on the US Embassy in Nicosia, Cyprus. During the same period, members of a Hezbollah cell in Charlotte, North 

Carolina, paid indigent Americans to travel to Cyprus at Hezbollah’s expense and 

engage in sham marriages so additional operatives could get visas to come to America.13 Throughout the mid- to late-1990s, Hezbollah recruited Palestinian students 

studying in Russia, and collected intelligence on Israeli, Jewish and American targets there. 

Today, German intelligence estimates that 800 Lebanese Hezbollah members live 

in Germany. The organization publishes a weekly newsletter in Germany, al-Ahd, though it scaled back its overt presence there after September 11, fearing a 

clampdown. An investigation in the summer of 2002 led German authorities to monitor the activities of an organization in Berlin suspected of being tied to Hezbollah 

and of establishing a ‘‘training center.’’ 14

Over the past few years, Hezbollah has used Europe as a launching pad from 

which to infiltrate operatives into Israel to conduct surveillance and carry out attacks. In 1996 Hussien Makdad left Lebanon for Europe where members of a 

Hezbollah logistical support network provided him with a stolen British passport 

which he used to enter Israel on a flight from Switzerland. A few days later Makdad 

was badly injured in an explosion in his East Jerusalem hotel room where he was 

assembling a bomb made of RDX explosives. In 1997, Hezbollah operative Stephan 

Smyrek, a German convert to Islam trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon, left Lebanon 

for Europe and then flew from Amsterdam to Israel on his own German passport. 

He was tasked with photographing prospective targets for attacks but was arrested 

at Israel’s Ben Gurion airport. In 2000, Hezbollah dispatched Fawzi Ayub, a Canadian of Lebanese decent, to infiltrate Israel from Europe. He traveled from Lebanon 

on his own Canadian passport, and then sailed to Israel on a forged American passport he received in Europe. Ayub is described as a hardened Hezbollah operative, 

and is believed to have been sent to conduct attacks in Israel. And in 2001 

Hezbollah operative Gerard Shuman, a dual British-Lebanese citizen, flew from 

Lebanon to Britain on his Lebanese passport and then on to Israel on his British 

passport. Arrested in Israel, Shuman is believed to have been sent to conduct surveillance operations. 

In some of these cases, the authorities have determined that the operatives entered Israel to conduct operations, while in other cases it remains unclear whether 

they entered Israel just to collect pre-operational surveillance, assist other 

operatives already there, or conduct attacks themselves. Significantly, each of these 

operatives relied on European logistical support networks to carry out their missions. Moreover, each is also believed to have been trained by elements tied directly 

to Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah’s chief operations officer. 

In at least one case, Hezbollah’s European operations and the group’s efforts to 

undermine the peace process intersect. In mid-2003, Israeli forces arrested Ghulam 

Mahmud Qawqa, a member of an al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades cell tied to Hezbollah, 

for his role in several al-Aqsa bombings in Jerusalem. According to information discovered after his arrest, Qawqa was in the process of engineering attacks on Israeli 

interests in Europe and Asia on behalf of Hezbollah. In late 2002, Qawqa tasked 

a Lebanese woman he knew in Germany to photograph the Israeli embassy in Berlin from multiple angles for a possible attack.15

The above is just a sampling of Hezbollah activity in Europe. Intelligence experts 

maintain that Hezbollah operatives are located throughout the European continent, 

including Belgium, Bosnia, Britain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, 

Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. 

Perhaps what should concern European officials most is the fact that one of the 

most significant modus operandi that runs through all Hezbollah global activities—

financial, logistical and operational—is that at some level all Hezbollah networks 

are overseen by and are in contact with senior Hezbollah and/or Iranian officials. 

Moreover, Hezbollah cells are adept multi-taskers, responsible for a variety of 

logistical, financial and operational duties. They raise funds, recruit new members, 
16

16 Author interview with US intelligence official, Washington, DC, July 2003. 17 United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al. United States Court of Appeals for the 

Fourth District. 18Phlippino judicial and intelligence documents, author’s personal files, including: People of 

the Philippines versus Pandu Yudhawinata, Criminal case No 99–2013, Republic of the Philippines, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 117, Pasay City, November 1999. 19 USA vs. MOHAMMED ALI HASAN AL–MOAYAD, Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, 

E astern District of New York, January 5, 2003; Hizbullah (Part I): Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria,’’ Special 

Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special 

Studies, (CSS), Israel, June 2003, available online at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/

hizbullah/hezbollah.htm. 20 Hizbullah (Part I): Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach 

Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria,’’ Special Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, (CSS), Israel, June 2003, available 

online at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/hizbullah/hezbollah.htm. 

conduct preoperational surveillance, provide logistical support, procure weapons and 

dual use technologies (for both Hezbollah and Iran), and conduct operations. 

Investigators in several countries have concluded independently that security 

services should avoid looking for cells that are strictly engaged in fundraising, 

logistical support or terrorist operations. Indeed, cells known only to have raised 

funds have later been found to have played active roles in terrorist operations, as 

was the case, for example, in the 1992 and 1994 suicide bombings in Argentina. In 

the words of one U.S. intelligence official, ‘‘Hezbollah cells are always a bit operational.’’ 16 They are always in contact with senior operatives. For example, 

Hezbollah operatives in Charlotte, North Carolina, responded directly to Sheikh 

Abbas Haraki, a senior Hezbollah military commander in South Beirut. At the same 

time, Hezbolllah procurement agents in Canada who coordinated with the Charlotte 

cell worked directly with Haj Hasan Hilu Laqis, Hezbollah’s chief procurement officer who operates closely with Iranian intelligence.17 Similarly, in Southeast Asia, 

members of the Hezbollah network behind a failed truck-bombing targeting the 

Israeli embassy in Bangkok in 1994, as well as a series of other terrorist plots in 

the region throughout the 1990s, were intimately tied to Iranian intelligence agents. 

Comprised almost entirely of local sunni Muslims, the network was led by Pandu 

Yudhawitna who was himself recruited by Iranian intelligence officers stationed in 

Malaysia in the early 1980s.18

Hezbollah uses charities and front organizations to conceal its fundraising activities worldwide. Take, for example, the al-Aqsa International Foundation, a terrorist 

front organization banned by the United States, Germany and Great Britain 

(though not the European Union). While al-Aqsa primarily served as a Hamas front 

organization, Sheikh Moayad, the head of the the al-Aqsa office in Yemen, was arrested in Germany and extradited to the United States for providing financial support to al-Qaeda. Moayad proudly told an undercover FBI informant that he not 

only funded Hamas but also raised millions of dollars, recruited operatives, and provided weapons to al-Qaeda. According to one report, one of the foundation’s offices 

in Europe also raised funds for Hezbollah.19

According to a research report based on declassified Israeli intelligence Hezbollah 

receives funds not only from Iran but from charities that are radical Islamist organizations and donate to Hezbollah out of ideological affinity, even if they are not 

themselves run by Hezbollah operatives. ‘‘Besides operating a worldwide network of 

fundraisers, funds are also raised through so-called ‘charity funds.’ Some of these 

are extremist Islamic institutions that, while not directly connected to Hezbollah, 

support it, albeit marginally, in view of their radical Islamic orientation.’’ 20 The report cites many such charities worldwide, including four in the Detroit area alone: 

The Islamic Resistance Support Association, the al-Shaid Fund, the Educational Development Association (EDA) and the Goodwill Charitable Organization (GCO). Also 

cited are the the al-Shahid Organization in Canada, the Karballah Foundation for 

Liberation in South Africa, the Lebanese Islamic Association and al-Shahid Social 

Relief Institution in Germany, and the Lebanese Welfare Committee, The Help 

Foundation and The Jam’iyat al-Abrar (Association of the Righteous) in Britain. 

The United States and Israel have long pressed their European allies to take action against Hezbollah, but France in particular has refused to follow America, 

Israel, Canada and Australia in banning Hezbollah, ostensibly for fear of upsetting 

the domestic political balance in Lebanon where members of the group hold seats 

in Parliament. 

The issue of banning Hezbollah in Europe—where the EU is a member of the 

peace process Quartet—is now back on the table, this time at the request of Palestinian officials. ‘‘We know that Hezbollah has been trying to recruit suicide bombers 
17

21Khaled Abu Toameh, ‘‘PA worried Hizbullah, Iran may target Abbas,’’ The Jerusalem Post, 

February 10, 2005 22 Jean-Luc Bardet, ‘‘France Ccondemns Lebanese Hezbollah’s ‘Terrorist Attacks’,’’ AFP, February 24, 2000 23 Interview given by M. Michel Barnier, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Israel’s ‘‘Second Television Channel,’’ Jerusalem, February 7, 2005 24 ‘‘France seeks EU debate after banning Hezbollah-linked TV channel,’’ Agence France 

Presse, 15 December 2004 25 Roula Khalaf, ‘‘French court blocks way for Hizbollah TV: Jewish groups are outraged at 

‘anti-Semitism’ but al-Manar claims freedom of speech,’’ Financial Times, 15 December 2004 26 ‘‘Lebanese Hezbollah official forced to leave Germany,’’ Agence France Presse, 5 January 

2005. 

in the name of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades to carry out attacks which would sabotage 

the truce,’’ stated one Palestinian official. Indeed, just hours after the most recent 

ceasefire announcement, al-Aqsa members fired on a car near an Israeli settlement 

in the West Bank and then attacked the army unit sent to investigate the shooting. 

Another PA official cited intercepted email communications and bank transactions 

indicating that Hezbollah has increased its payments to terrorists: ‘‘Now they are 

willing to pay $100,000 for a whole operation whereas in the past they paid $20,000, 

then raised it to $50,000.’’ Indeed, in a late January meeting in Beirut, even as 

ceasefire negotiations were well underway, Hassan Nasrallah and Khaled Mishal, 

the leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas, respectively, declared that resistance against 

Israel was the only option until ‘‘all of Palestine’’ was liberated. A Palestinian official concluded, ‘‘Hizbullah and Iran are not happy with Abbas’s efforts to achieve 

a cease-fire with Israel and resume negotiations with Israel. That’s why we don’t 

rule out the possibility that they might try to kill him if he continues with his policy.’’ 21

Despite this, Hezbollah remains markedly absent from the European Union’s list 

of banned terrorist organizations. On May 3, 2002, the EU added eleven organizations and seven individuals to its financial-blocking list of ‘‘persons, groups, and entities involved in terrorist acts.’’ The action was significant because it marked the 

first time that the EU froze the assets of non-European terrorist groups. But in an 

effort to maintain a distinction between terrorist groups’ political and charitable activities on the one hand, and their direct terror wings on the other, the EU placed 

several individual Hezbollah terrorists on its list, but not the organization itself. 

The decision implied Hezbollah operatives are somehow independent of the group 

that recruits, trains, and funds them. 

At the time, the EU decided not to ban the social-welfare or political wings of 

Hamas either. But in August 2003 the EU reversed its decision, recognizing the entirety of Hamas as a terrorist organization and banning its political and social wings 

as well. Despite this history of whitewashing Hezbollah terrorist activity, there are 

small signs that change may be in the offing. While visiting Israel in February 2000, 

then-French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin referred to Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. ‘‘France condemns Hezbollah’s attacks, and all types of terrorist attacks 

which may be carried out against soldiers or possibly Israel’s civilian population,’’ 

he said.22 Jospin was stoned by Palestinians in Jerusalem and received grief at 

home for his comments. Reverting to its traditional position, French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier stated in February 2005 that ‘‘Hezbollah has a parliamentary 

and political dimension in Lebanon. They have members of parliament who are participating in parliamentary life. As you know, political life in Lebanon is difficult 

and fragile.’’ 23

But both France and Germany have taken recent action against Hezbollah, suggesting the possibility that European officials may seriously consider the Palestinian 

request to ban Hezbollah, though likely not until after Lebanese elections. In December 13, 2004, after a year-long debate, France’s highest administrative court ordered France-based satellite provider Eutelsat to discontinue all broadcasts of the 

Hezbollah’s satellite channel, Al-Manar.24 The ban was finally instituted after a 

guest asserted there were Zionist attempts to spread AIDS among Arabs.25

And in January 2005, a German court upheld a lower court’s deportation order 

against a Hezbollah representative who had lived in Germany for some 20 years. 

The Dusseldorf court denied the Hezbollah member a visa saying he ‘‘is a member 

of an organization that supports international terrorism.’’ In a statement, the court 

said that ‘‘Hezbollah is waging a war with bomb attacks against Israel with ‘inhumane brutality’ against civilians.’’ The court also ruled that Germany should not be 

bound by the absence of Hezbollah from the EU terrorism list.26

Now that the PA has joined the chorus of those calling on Europe to take action 

against Hezbollah, Washington should press the EU collectively, and its constituent 

members individually, to add Hezbollah to the EU terrorism list. While some Euro-
18

27Language Specialist el-Touni, FBI Translation of Saturday session, Session ID: mtgb—

19931002—5, Saturday 93–10–02, Washington Field Office, April 24, 2001, p. 3 28 ‘‘An Important Step in the Struggle against the Financing of Terrorism from Europe: A German Court Upholds a Government Decision to Outlaw the German Office of the Al-Aqsa Charitable Foundation, Used by Hamas as a Front for Fundraising,’’ Special Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (CSS), December 

2004, available online at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1—05/german.htm 29 ‘‘Britain Freezes assets of charity with suspected terror links,’’ AFP, May 29, 2003 30 ‘‘Terrorist Group Profiler,’’ Canadian Secret Intelligence Service (CSIS), June 2002, Author’s 

personal files; See also Stewart Bell, ‘‘Hamas May Have Chemical Weapons: CSIS Report Says 

Terror Group May be Experimenting,’’ National Post (Canada), December 10, 2003 31 USA vs. Mohammed Ali Hasan Al-Moayad, Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, Eastern 

District of New York, January 5, 2003 32 ‘‘An Important Step in the Struggle against the Financing of Terrorism from Europe: A German Court Upholds a Government Decision to Outlaw the German Office of the Al-Aqsa Charitable Foundation, Used by Hamas as a Front for Fundraising,’’ Special Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (CSS), December 

2004, available online at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1l05/german.htm 

peans point to Hezbollah representation in Parliament and resist banning the 

group, the fact is that Hezbollah operatives are active throughout Europe and pose 

a security threat to Jewish, Israeli, American and European targets as well. 

Moreover, Israelis and Palestinians agree that the organization represents the 

single most dangerous threat to the peace process. Hezbollah is the only so-called 

political party that finances suicide bombings and has an arsenal of 13,000 rockets; 

its terrorist operations must not be forgiven for its parallel political activities. As 

a member of the Quartet, and in light of calls throughout Europe for more proactive 

attention to the peace process, the EU should do everything in its power to ensure 

that the ceasefire holds. Banning Hezbollah would go a long way toward facilitating 

Israeli-Palestinian peace. 

HAMAS

Hamas front organizations in Europe started to receive increased attention in 

2003, in large part due to the fact that in April of that year two British Muslims 

of South Asian descent from Derby and Hounslow carried out a Hamas suicide 

bombing in Tel Aviv after being recruited by the global jihadist group al-Muhajiroon 

in Britain and instructed by Hamas leaders in Syria. The following month, U.S. and 

British authorities both froze the funds of the al Aqsa International Foundation. But 

the U.S. alone listed Hamas front organizations such as Britain’s Interpal, France’s 

Commite de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (CBSP), Switzerland’s Association de Secours Palestinien, and Austria’s Palestinian Association. The fact 

that groups like Hamas run charities in Europe should not surprise: a 1996 CIA 

document widely reported on in the press reveals that authorities were aware even 

then that Hamas fronts like Human Appeal International and Human Relief International were operating offices in London. 

At a 1994 Hamas planning meeting in Philadelphia, one participant stressed that 

the U.S. ‘‘is a secure place for the movement’’ and noted that ‘‘Europe also can play 

the same role.’’ 27 To be sure, similar Hamas support networks are indeed active 

across Europe. 

For example, over the course of 2003, authorities in the United States, UK, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Switzerland took action against 

the al-Aqsa International Foundation (also referred to as the al Aqsa Fund or the 

al Aqsa Charitable Foundation), a Hamas front organization operating throughout 

Europe, South Africa, Pakistan, and Yemen that ‘‘raised millions of dollars a 

year.’’ 28 The organization had already been outlawed in Israel in 1997 and declared 

a terrorist organization there the following year. According to a statement issued 

by Britain’s Treasury Ministry in May 2003, ‘‘strong evidence from international law 

enforcement agencies links al-Aqsa Foundation with terrorist activity.’’ 29 A Canadian intelligence report also lists al-Aqsa as a charity providing ‘‘fundraising and 

propaganda activities for Hamas.’’ 30 In January 2003, the head of al-Aqsa’s Yemen 

office, Shaykh Mohammad Ali Hassan al-Moayad, was arrested in Germany. According to court documents filed in support of his arrest warrant, Moayad offered an 

FBI informant a receipt showing that he had transferred $70,000 to Interpal, the 

Hamas front in London, as proof of his ability ‘‘to get money to the Jihad.’’ Moayad 

also told FBI informants he had provided $3.5 million to Hamas and $20 million 

to al-Qaeda.31 A Palestinian intelligence document dated July 2000 and seized by 

Israeli authorities two years later included the al Aqsa Charitable Foundation in a 

list of foreign institutions that support Hamas.32 Documents seized from the offices 

of Hamas charities in the West Bank revealed significant funding was received from 
19

33 Index of documents seized by IDF forces in Operation Defensive Shield, April 2003, Author’s 

personal files 34 ‘‘An Important Step in the Struggle against the Financing of Terrorism from Europe: A German Court Upholds a Government Decision to Outlaw the German Office of the Al-Aqsa Charitable Foundation, Used by Hamas as a Front for Fundraising,’’ Special Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (CSS), December 

2004, available online at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1l05/german.htm 35 ‘‘An Important Step in the Struggle against the Financing of Terrorism from Europe: A German Court Upholds a Government Decision to Outlaw the German Office of the Al-Aqsa Charitable Foundation, Used by Hamas as a Front for Fundraising,’’ Special Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (CSS), December 

2004, available online at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1l05/german.htm 36 ‘‘An Important Step in the Struggle against the Financing of Terrorism from Europe: A German Court Upholds a Government Decision to Outlaw the German Office of the Al-Aqsa Charitable Foundation, Used by Hamas as a Front for Fundraising,’’ Special Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (CSS), December 

2004, available online at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/1l05/german.htm 37 ‘‘U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas and Six Senior Hamas Leaders as Terrorist Entities,’’ Office of Public Affairs, Department of the Treasury, August 22, 2003, http:/

/www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js672.htm 38 ‘‘Australia lists six Hamas leaders as terrorists and freezes charity assets,’’ AP, November 

21, 2003 39 ‘‘Terrorist Group Profiler,’’ Canadian Secret Intelligence Service (CSIS), June 2002, Author’s 

personal files; See also Stewart Bell, ‘‘Hamas May Have Chemical Weapons: CSIS Report Says 

Terror Group May be Experimenting,’’ National Post (Canada), December 10, 2003 40Gideon Maron and Yuval Karni, ‘‘The Secret Intercepts of Shaykh Salah,’’ Yediot Ahronot

(Hebrew), Weekend Supplement, August 29, 2003

the al Aqsa Foundation.33 While some documents refer to otherwise innocuous donations such as ‘‘food packages’’ and ‘‘holiday packages,’’ many specifically note ‘‘The 

project of assistance to the families of the martyrs, the wounded and those who sustained damage.’’ 34 In one case, a document found at the al-Islah Charitable Society 

in Bethlehem documented donations for thousands of dollars earmarked for the families of martyrs from the al Aqsa offices in Germany, Holland, South Africa, as well 

as from Interpal (which also coordinated the donations).35

One of the clearest pieces of evidence tying al Aqsa and its most senior officers 

to Hamas comes from the 1993 interrogation of Abd al-Hakim Muhammad abd alFatah Abd al-Rahman, a Hamas activist from the Palestinian village of Bir 

Naballah near Jerusalem. Abd al-Rahman revealed that before he left for Germany 

to pursue his studies, he approached Sheikh Jamil Hamami—a senior Hamas leader 

in the West Bank—about joining Hamas. Hamami instructed Abd al-Rahman to 

contact Mahmoud Amru, the head of the al Aqsa Foundation in Germany, who 

Hamami described as a senior Hamas activist in Aachen, Germany. Abd al-Rahman 

contacted Amru though the local Islamic Center, and continued to be in touch with 

him throughout the course of his studies in Germany. Amru served as his contact 

with other Hamas activists in Germany, provided him with ideological materials, 

and helped him contact Hamas activists in Jordan.36

The al Aqsa International Foundation, like many European charities tied to 

Hamas, has operated in close cooperation with Interpal, a designated Hamas front 

in London. On August 22, 2003, the U.S. Treasury Department added Interpal and 

Hamas front organizations in Austria, France, Switzerland, and Lebanon to its terrorism list. The other charities were the Commite de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux 

Palestiniens (CBSP) in France, the Association de Secours Palestinien (ASP) in 

Switzerland, the Palestinian Association in Austria (PVOE), and the since defunct 

Sanabil Association for Relief and Development in Lebanon.37 On November 21, 

2003, Australia followed suit and listed these same Hamas fronts, along with six 

Hamas leaders, as terrorist entities and seized their funds.38 The Canadians also 

cited Interpal (Palestinian’s Relief and Development Fund) and the Comite de 

Bienfaisance et de Soliarity avec la Palestine, a charity in France, as Hamas 

fronts.39 Interpal has been linked to a host of Hamas front organizations in the 

West Bank, Gaza, and Israel, not only through receipts found in Hamas charities, 

but also via telephone intercepts introduced in the case of Sheikh Raed Salah, an 

Israeli-Arab leader charged with funneling money to Hamas. Transcripts reveal 

Salah engaged in conversations with Interpal officials and other Hamas financial 

supporters throughout Europe.40

Despite extensive public evidence of its ties to Hamas, on September 24, 2003, 

Britain’s Charity Commission for England and Wales gave Interpal a clean bill of 

health. While the Commission came to the same conclusion after investigating 

Interpal in 1996, the group has since been widely recognized as one of largest 

Hamas front organizations operating in the West. For example, already in 1996, authorities determined that the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and 
20

41 ‘‘US Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas and Six Senior Hamas Leaders as Terrorists,’’ Office of Public Affairs, U.S. Treasury Department, August 22, 2003, available online at 

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js672.htm 42Timothy L. O’Brien, ‘‘Charity Said to Have Paid Terrorists Is Under Investigation by the 

Saudis,’’ The New York Times, September 25, 2003 43Matthew Levitt, ‘‘Turning A Blind Eye to Hamas in London’’ Wall Street Journal Europe, October 20, 2003 44 ‘‘Palestinians Relief and Development Fund, Registered Charity No. 1040094 (Interpal), 

Charity Commission for England and Wales, http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/investigations/inquiryreports/interpal.asp 45 ‘‘Palestinians Relief and Development Fund, Registered Charity No. 1040094 (Interpal), 

Charity Commission for England and Wales, http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/investigations/inquiryreports/interpal.asp 46 ‘‘Palestinians Relief and Development Fund, Registered Charity No. 1040094 (Interpal), 

Charity Commission for England and Wales, http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/investigations/inquiryreports/interpal.asp 47 ‘‘Interpal, Part I,’’ Special Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information 

Center at the Center for Special Studies, Israel, December 2004, available online at http://

www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/12l04/interpal.htm 

the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), both humanitarian organizations involved in funding global jihadist groups, were funding Hamas through Interpal. In 

documents confiscated at the time, recipient Hamas organizations were asked to 

send thank-you letters directly to the IIRO and WAMY rather than Interpal. Authorities now know the trend continued after the Charity Commission last cleared 

Interpal of charges linking it to Hamas in 1996. Interpal featured prominently in 

the index of documents seized by Israeli forces from Hamas charity committees 

across the West Bank in April 2002. Donations from fronts like Interpal came in 

droves, usually transferred through local branches of Middle Eastern banks. 

It was just a few weeks before the Charity Commission’s decision to clear 

Interpal, on August 22, 2003, that the United States announced its designation of 

Interpal and several other groups with which it is affiliated as ‘‘Specially Designated 

Global Terrorist.’’ 41 Against this backdrop, and coming on the heals of the European 

Union’s long overdue decision to include Hamas on its list of banned terrorist 

groups, a decision it finally took on September 6, 2003, the Charity Commission’s 

ruling to unfreeze Interpal’s accounts was a particularly unwelcome setback to the 

international effort to sideline Hamas and resurrect the peace process. 

Though the Charity Commission claimed U.S. authorities failed to provide evidence to substantiate their charges, a senior US Treasury Department official testified before the US Congress the day after the Commission’s decision that the US 

provided definitive proof of Interpal’s financial ties to Hamas.42 Moreover, evidence 

of Interpal’s terror connections comes from a variety of open and classified sources 

and from several countries, not just the United States.43 Additionally, the Charity 

Commission’s failure to account for the plethora of open source evidence linking 

Interpal to Hamas was only half the problem. The Commission did not investigate 

whether Interpal funded Hamas charities or organizations, only whether Interpal 

was linked to the group’s ‘‘political or violent militant activities.’’ 44 The Commission 

concluded that, ‘‘in the absence of any clear evidence showing Interpal had links to 

Hamas’ political or violent military activities’’ its accounts deserved to be 

unfrozen.45 Though the Commission found that Interpal received funds from The Al 

Aqsa Foundation in the Netherlands, banned as a Hamas front by several countries—including Britain—it excused the transaction because ‘‘the funds received 

were in respect of humanitarian work already carried out by Interpal and then 

invoiced to The Al Aqsa Foundation.’’ 46

Clearly, a major factor that inhibited Commission action against Interpal was the 

popular and alluring though erroneous theory that one can distinguish between the 

charitable, political and military ‘‘wings’’ of terrorist groups like Hamas. In fact, 

Interpal is tied to Hamas political and violent activities. But even were it not, its 

support for the group’s social service infrastructure—which itself supports Hamas 

terror—should have been reason enough to ban Interpal as a Hamas front. Consider, for example, a Palestinian General Intelligence report entitled ‘‘Who Finances 

Hamas?,’’ written in the late 1990s, which estimated that Hamas’ annual income 

was between $60–$70 million. The report estimated that of this total, $12 million 

came from Britain.47

Hamas operatives in Europe have also played hands-on roles in the groups’ terrorist attacks. Mohammed Qassem Sawalha, a Hamas activist and longtime Muslim 

leader in Britain, was appointed a trustee of the radical Finsbury Park mosque in 

London in February 2005. The mosque was closed in 2004 because it had come 

under the influence of Abu Hamza al-Masri, a radical Islamic cleric arrested in Britain and charged of some sixteen ofenses, including incitement to murder and pos-
21

48 Nick Fielding and Abul Taher, ‘‘Hamas link to London mosque,’’ The Times (London), February 13, 2005. 49 US v Marzook et al. US District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Special August 2003 Grand Jury, Second Superseding Indictment unsealed August 2004. 50 US v Marzook et al. US District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Special August 2003 Grand Jury, Second Superseding Indictment unsealed August 2004. 51 US v Marzook et al. US District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Special August 2003 Grand Jury, Second Superseding Indictment unsealed August 2004. 52 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper 

Collins, 2003), p. 253 53 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper 

Collins, 2003), p. 211 54 Radu Tudor, ‘‘Terrorism in Romania (II)—The Terrorist Organizations Muslim Brothers and 

Hamas Have Dozens of Members in This Country,’’ translation by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Eastern Europe (FBISEEU–2002–0212), February 12, 2002. Original article published in Bucharest Ziua, February 12, 2002 55 ‘‘Treasury Designates Al-Aqsa International Foundation as Financier of Terror: Charity 

Linked to Funding of the Hamas Terrorist Organization,’’ Department of the Treasury, Office 

of Public Affairs, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js439.htm 

sessing a document that would be useful to someone plotting terrorism, among other 

counts. The mosque was shut for a period after al-Masri’s arrest, and Sawalha was 

named one of five trustees to lead the mosque when it was reopened in early 2005.48

Sawalha’s appointment, however, marked little if any improvement upon al-Masri’s 

leadership given Sawalha’s own history of supporting Hamas terrorist operations for 

well over a decade. An August 2003 indictment against Hamas activists in the 

United States named Sawalha as a co-conspirator and a Hamas activist who provided assistance to those indicted for racketeering and conspiracy, among other 

charges.49 The indictment, in the case of United States of America v. Mousa Mohammed Abu Marzook et al., states that before Sawalha moved to London in the 

early 1990s he was ‘‘a Hamas leader in the West Bank’’ and goes on to cite several 

cases in which Sawalha conspired with others to support Hamas terrorist operations.50

For example, while in London Sawalha met and conspired with Mohammad Salah 

(one of the defendants) and Mohammad Jarad (another co-conspirator) who were 

passing through London on route to Israel. According to the indictment, Sawalha 

provided the two men with instructions on ‘‘Hamas-related activities they were to 

carry out while in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.’’ The indictment further explains how, in August 1992, Sawalha met with Marzook and Salah to discuss 

the need to ‘‘revitalize Hamas terrorist operations in the West Bank.’’ At that meeting Sawalha suggested specific Hamas members in the West Bank who Salah and 

Jarad could rely on to help revitalize Hamas’s terrorist activities. Less than six 

months later, in January 1993, Sawalha and Salah met yet again in London. At this 

meeting Sawalha specifically directed Salah to ‘‘provide money to various Hamas 

members in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.’’ 51

The presence of Hamas operatives in Europe is especially disconcerting given the 

extent of the financial, logistical and even operational links Hamas maintains to a 

wide array of international terrorist groups. For example, a Hamas delegation participated in the 1995 Islamic People’s Congress in Sudan where they met Osama 

bin Laden and representatives of Algerian, Pakistani, Tunisian and other groups.52

In Pakistan, the leader of a jihadi organization there openly admitted to having 

‘‘person-to-person contacts’’ with other groups, adding, ‘‘sometimes fighters from 

Hamas and Hezbollah help us.’’ Asked where contacts with groups like Hamas and 

Hezbollah are held, the Pakistani answered, ‘‘a good place to meet is in Iran.’’ Offering insight into the importance of interpersonal relationships between members of 

disparate terrorist groups, he added, ‘‘We don’t involve other organizations. Just individuals.’’ 53

In another sign of the group’s global reach, in 2002 Romanian intelligence was 

reportedly investigating seventy-three Hamas supporters there, mostly on university 

campuses. Hamas operatives in Romania were said to operate there ‘‘under the 

screen of the Islamic and Cultural League in Romania.’’ According to their investigation, Romanian intelligence concluded, ‘‘Hamas benefits from the logistics of the 

Islamic and Cultural League.’’ Romanian intelligence feared Hamas posed a ‘‘potential threat’’ in Romania, ‘‘fueled by the possibility of [Hamas] carrying out attacks 

on Israeli and U.S. interests or objectives worldwide.’’ 54 Similarly, U.S. officials 

noted in May 2003 that the Islamic League in Norway sent funds, gold and jewelry 

it raised to the al Aqsa International Foundation offices in Sweden ‘‘to be provided 

to Hamas.’’ 55 Unlike many other Hamas fronts whose leaders are publicly circumspect about the final destination of the funds they solicit for Hamas, the Islamic 

League openly acknowledged such funds were intended to support terrorism. At its 
22

56 ‘‘Treasury Designates Al-Aqsa International Foundation as Financier of Terror: Charity 

Linked to Funding of the Hamas Terrorist Organization,’’ Department of the Treasury, Office 

of Public Affairs, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js439.htm 57 Affidavit in Support of a Search Warrant, In re Search Warrant of 4502 Whistler Court, 

Annandale, VA and Infiniti QX4, VIN JNRAR07Y6XW060359, United States District Court, 

Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, August 20, 2004 58 ‘‘Hamas-Trained Terrorist, Canadian National, Arrested by ISA,’’ Communicated by the 

Israeli Government Press Office (GPO), December 8, 2003, available online at http://

www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=19092 59 ‘‘Hamas-Trained Terrorist, Canadian National, Arrested by ISA,’’ Communicated by the 

Israeli Government Press Office (GPO), December 8, 2003, available online at http://

www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=19092 60Stewart Bell, ‘‘Arrest ‘prevented terror attack’: Rebutting Ottawa’s skepticism, Israel alleges 

Akkal was bound for New York to kill Jews,’’ National Post (Canada), December 9, 2003 61Stewart Bell, ‘‘Arrest ‘prevented terror attack’: Rebutting Ottawa’s skepticism, Israel alleges 

Akkal was bound for New York to kill Jews,’’ National Post (Canada), December 9, 2003 62 Jeff Sallot, ‘‘Canadian is Hamas Assassin, Israel Says,’’ Globe and Mail (Canada), December 

5, 2003 63 ‘‘Hamas-Trained Terrorist, Canadian National, Arrested by ISA,’’ Communicated by the 

Israeli Government Press Office (GPO), December 8, 2003, available online at http://

www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=19092

May 2002 annual conference, the League’s secretary general called on ‘‘all Muslims 

to provide support and to participate in continuing the suicide operations against 

Israel.’’ 56

Finally, there are increasingly disturbing signs that elements within Hamas are 

seriously considering conducting attacks targeting Western interests. In some cases 

Hamas operatives are being recruited into al-Qaeda; in at least one case Hamas 

trained a Palestinian living in Canada to conduct operations in North America. This 

activity, though focused on North America, must be assumed to parallel Hamas activity in Europe as well. 

In its August 2004 affidavit for a warrant to search Ismael Elbarasse’s car, the 

FBI noted that while Hamas does not typically target U.S. interests, a 1993 plot 

to bomb New York landmarks was carried out by conspirators from several jihadist 

groups, including Hamas. It also noted that ‘‘al Qaeda commanders and officials stationed in western countries, including the United States, have recruited operatives 

and volunteers to carry out reconnaissance or serve as couriers.’’ The post-9/11 

crackdown on al-Qaeda has produced ‘‘a renewed emphasis by al Qaeda to find confirmed jihadist supporters in the United States by trying to enlist proven members 

of other groups such as Hamas to make up for the vacuum on the field level.’’ 57

In at least one other case, Hamas members themselves plotted potential attacks 

against Western targets. Jamal Akal, a Palestinian with Canadian citizenship, was 

charged by Israeli authorities with using the ruse of visiting family in Gaza to be 

trained by Hamas for operations in Canada and the U.S. According to an Israeli 

press release, Akal admitted he was trained in explosives production and taught to 

use an M–16 by recently recruited Hamas operative Ahmed Wahabe.58 Wahabe 

tasked Akal to return home and ‘‘gather information (via the media) on a senior 

Israeli official who was arriving in the U.S. Wahabe instructed him to then monitor 

the senior Israeli official’s movements and attempt to assassinate her in a sniper 

attack. Wahabe also asked Akal to attack members of the US and Canadian Jewish 

communities, either by shooting or by bombing their homes and/or cars.’’ 59 Akal’s 

lawyer, Jamil al-Qhateb, confirmed Akal was approached by Hamas and underwent 

small arms training in Gaza, but insisted Akal never agreed to conduct attacks in 

Canada.60 According to information released by Israeli authorities, ‘‘Wahabe told 

Akal (inter alia): ‘New York is an easy place to find Jews’.’’ 61 In a statement issued 

by the Israeli Embassy in Ottawa an Israeli official confirmed that Akal was to use 

his Canadian passport to ‘‘cary out terrorist attacks in North America against 

Israeli and Jewish targets . . . Some of the scenarios for those terrorist attacks 

were assassinating a high-level Israeli official during his visit to North America, 

booby-trapping cars that belong to Israeli officials—diplomats—and killing a Jew 

who would come across Mr. Akals’s way.’’ 62

Akal was specifically instructed to draw on the support of Hamas sympathizers 

in Canada to fund his attacks. In typical dawa tradition, Akal was told to approach 

people in the mosques he frequents in Canada and ‘‘raise funds, ostensibly for the 

families of suicide bombers, which he would actually use for purchasing a weapon 

and financing his expenses in monitoring his prospective targets and in perpetrating 

attacks.’’ 63 In another sign of the link between Hamas political and military leaders, at the time of Akal’s arrest he and Wahabe were reportedly awaiting approval 

from the Hamas political leadership to conduct the attacks under al-Qaeda’s name, 
23

64 ‘‘Hamas-Trained Terrorist, Canadian National, Arrested by ISA,’’ Communicated by the 

Israeli Government Press Office (GPO), December 8, 2003, available online at http://

www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=19092

not Hamas, in an effort to evade the potential blowback of conducting such attacks 

in the West.64

CONCLUSION

The foreign funding of subversive domestic organizations linked to designated terrorist groups poses immediate dangers to the national security of the United States 

and our European allies alike. This much is clear: should Western democracies fail 

to adapt the culture of our law enforcement and intelligence communities, to enact 

appropriate laws and procedures, and to commit the necessary resources and resolve, we will find the war on terror that much harder to fight, lasting that much 

longer in duration, and exacting that much higher and tragic a cost in human life. 

Counterterrorism is not about defeating terrorism; it is about constricting the environment in which terrorists operate—making it harder for them to do what they 

want to do at every level: conducting operations, procuring and transferring false 

documents, ferrying fugitives from one place to another; financing, raising, and 

laundering funds. It is about making it more difficult for terrorists to conduct their 

operational, logistical, and financial activities. Only with greater international coordination will authorities succeed in targeting Hezbollah’s international financial 

support network and constricting the operating environment in which this designated terrorist organization currently thrives.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Levitt. We really appreciate that. 

Mr. Vidino, welcome to the Committee today. 

Mr. VIDINO. Thank you. 

Mr. BARRETT. We look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MR. LORENZO VIDINO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, 

‘‘THE INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT’’

Mr. VIDINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and 

thank you for the opportunity today to discuss the situation in Europe. 

The March 11, 2004, train bombings that killed almost 200 commuters in Madrid shocked most Europeans as the attacks represented the first massive strike by Islamist terrorists on European 

soil. The bombings nevertheless did not surprise security officials 

on both sides of the ocean as the intelligence community was well 

aware that it was just a matter of time before Europe would become a target. 

Over the last 10 years, in fact, Europe has seen a troubling escalation of Islamist terrorist and extremist activities on its soil. This 

disturbing phenomenon is due to a combination of several factors 

and chiefly to: Lax immigration policies that have allowed known 

Islamic radicals to settle in Europe, the radicalization of significant 

segments of the continent’s growing Muslim population, and thirdly, the European law enforcement agencies’ inability to effectively 

dismantle terrorist networks due to poor attention to the problem 

and/or the lack of proper legal tools. 

Given this premise, it should come as no surprise that almost 

every attack carried out or attempted by al-Qaeda before and after 

9/11 has some link to Europe, and, as we all know, the effects of 

9/11 themselves were partially planned between Germany and 

Spain. Investigations in these cases reveal that different cells operating throughout Europe were involved in the planning. The European-based Islamists also play an essential role in raising or laundering money, supplying false documents and weapons, and re-
24

cruiting new operatives for the global Islamist network. It is therefore not farfetched to speak of Europe as a new Afghanistan, a 

place that al-Qaeda and others have chosen as headquarters for 

their operations. 

The foundations for this security disaster were laid in the 1980s 

when many European countries either granted political asylum or 

allowed entrance to hundreds of Islamic fundamentalists, many of 

them veterans of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviets. 

Europeans mistakenly thought that once in Europe these committed radicals would have stopped their violent activities. To the 

contrary, as soon as they settled on European soil most Islamic 

radicals exploited the continent’s freedoms and continued their efforts to overthrow Middle Eastern governments, and it was in Europe that Islamic radicals from different countries forged strategic 

alliances. Originally intending only to fight the secular regimes of 

their own countries, top members of various terrorist groups joined 

forces in European radicals’ mosques where bin Laden’s vision of 

a global jihad came to life. Moreover, the mosques and networks established by radicals who had been given asylum played a crucial 

role in what can be considered Europe’s biggest social and security 

problem, the radicalization of its growing Muslim population. 

Europe is facing a monumental problem in trying to integrate 

the children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants who have 

come to the continent since the 1960s. For many of them, radical 

Islam has become a vehicle of protest against their problems of unemployment and discrimination. While Europe needs to face its social problems, it also needs to address the inefficiencies of its legal 

systems in effectively fighting Islamic terrorism. The excellent 

work done by European intelligence and law enforcement agencies 

has often been squandered by the courts, first to enforce laws with 

the insufficiently banished individuals who associated themselves 

for terrorist purposes or imposed extremely elevated evidentiary requirements. Germany’s inability to convict Mzoudi and 

Motassadeq, the two Moroccans who provided support to some of 

the 9/11 hijackers, is just the most known example of a series of 

failures to convict terrorists or terrorism sympathizers throughout 

Europe. 

The high threshold that has to be met in order to make an arrest 

or even monitor a known fundamentalist has recently created painful consequences. Some of the perpetrators of the Madrid train 

bombings had been known to Spanish intelligence as radical 

Islamists since 1999. Some of them had had their phone conversations intercepted and their apartments searched, but no charge 

could be brought against them since they had committed no crime. 

Similarly, Mohammed Bouyeri had been monitored by Dutch intelligence for more than a year before he assassinated Dutch 

filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004. Even though he had 

posted death threats against members of the Dutch Elite on the 

Internet and was associated with known terrorists, Dutch authorities had no legal power to detain him. Hundreds of Islamist terrorists carry European passports either by birth or through naturalization and can therefore enter the United States without a visa. 

It is not a coincidence that the three men, who have been charged 

just 2 weeks ago for their role in a plot to attack various financial 
25

institutions in the United States, were all British citizens from alQaeda, dispatched on several surveillance missions to the States, 

counting on the fact that their British passports would have made 

their entrance into the United States easier. 

As the effects of 9/11 have painfully shown, events that occur 

overseas can have a direct impact on the security of this country 

and its interests abroad. It is therefore crucial for the United 

States to follow carefully the events taking place in Europe and to 

closely cooperate with European counterparts. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vidino follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LORENZO VIDINO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ‘‘THE

INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT’’

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice-Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity today to discuss the threat posed to Europe by Islamist extremism. 

The deadly train bombings that killed almost 200 commuters in Madrid on March 

11, 2004, shocked most Europeans, as the attacks represented the first massive 

strike by Islamist terrorists on European soil. The Madrid bombings, nevertheless, 

did not surprise security officials on both sides of the ocean, as the intelligence community was well aware that it was just a matter of time before Europe, one of the 

terrorists’ favorite bases of operations, could become a target. 

Over the last ten years, in fact, Europe has seen a troubling escalation of Islamist 

terrorist and extremist activities on its soil. This disturbing phenomenon is due to 

a combination of several factors and chiefly to:

• lax immigration policies that have allowed known Islamic radicals to settle 

and remain in Europe,

• the radicalization of significant segments of the continent’s burgeoning Muslim population, and

• the European law enforcement agencies’ inability to effectively dismantle terrorist networks, due to poor attention to the problem and/or the lack of proper 

legal tools.

Given these premises, it should come as no surprise that almost every single attack carried out or attempted by al Qaeda throughout the world has some link to 

Europe, even prior to 9/11. A Dublin-based charity provided material support to 

some of the terrorists who attacked the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 

1998. Part of the planning for the thwarted Millennium bombing that was supposed 

to target the Los Angeles International Airport was conceived in London. False documents provided by a cell operating between Belgium and France allowed two al 

Qaeda operatives to portray themselves as journalists and assassinate Ahmed Shah 

Massoud, the commander of the Afghan Northern Alliance, just two days before 

9/11. And, as we well know, the attacks of 9/11 were partially planned in Hamburg, 

Germany, where three of the four pilots of the hijacked planes had lived and met, 

and from where they received extensive financial and logistical support until the 

day of the attacks. 

After 9/11, as the al Qaeda network became less dependent on its leadership in 

Afghanistan and more decentralized, the cells operating in Europe gained even additional importance. Most of the planning for the April 2002 bombing of a synagogue 

in the Tunisian resort town of Djerba that killed 21 mostly European tourists was 

done in Germany and France. According to Moroccan authorities, the funds for the 

May 2003 Casablanca bombings came from Moroccan cells operating between Spain, 

France, Italy and Belgium. And cells operating in Europe have also directly targeted 

the Old Continent. Only after 9/11, attacks have been either planned or executed 

in Madrid, Paris, London (in at least 4 different circumstances), Milan, Berlin, Porto 

and Amsterdam. 

However, while investigations in all these cases revealed that different cells operating throughout Europe were involved in the planning of the operation, the role 

of these cells extends beyond the simple planning or execution of attacks. Europeanbased Islamists raise or launder money, supply false documents and weapons and 

recruit new operatives for a global network that spans from the United States to 

the Far East. Within the last decade, their role has become essential to the mechanics of the network. It is, therefore, not far-fetched to speak of Europe as ‘‘a new Af-
26

ghanistan,’’ a place that al Qaeda and others have chosen as its headquarters to direct operations. 

Origins and developments of Islamist terrorism in Europe 

The foundations for this security disaster were laid in the 1980’s, when many European countries either granted political asylum or allowed the entrance to hundreds of Islamic fundamentalists, many of them veterans of the war in Afghanistan 

against the Soviets facing persecution in their home countries. Moved by humanitarian reasons, for decades countries like Britain, Sweden, Holland and Germany 

have made it their official policy to welcome political refugees from all over the 

world. But blinded by their laudable intentions of providing protection to all individuals suffering political persecutions from autocratic regimes throughout the world, 

most European countries never really distinguished between opponents of dictatorships who wanted to spread democracy and Islamic fundamentalists who had bloodied their hands in their home countries with heinous terrorist acts. As a consequence, some of the world’s most radical Islamists facing prosecutions in the Middle East found not only a safe haven but also a new convenient base of operation 

in Europe. 

Many European governments thought that, once in Europe, these committed 

Islamists would have stopped their violent activities. Europeans also naively 

thought that, by giving the mujaheddin asylum, they would have been spared their 

murderous wrath. All these assumptions turned out to be completely wrong. In fact, 

as soon as they settled on European soil, most Islamic radicals exploited the continent’s freedom and wealth to continue their efforts to overthrow Middle Eastern 

governments, raising money and providing weapons and false documents for their 

groups operating in their countries of origin. 

And it was in Europe that Islamic radicals from different countries converged and 

forged strategic alliances. Originally intending only to fight the secular regimes of 

their own countries, top members of various Islamist terrorists groups, drawn to the 

radical mosques of Europe, joined forces with their colleagues who all adhered to 

the same Salafi/Wahhabi ideology and shared the common dream of a global Islamic 

state. It was between London and Milan, for example, that the strategic alliance between Algerian and Tunisian terrorist groups was conceived. Europe, along with al 

Qaeda’s Afghan training camps, was the place where Bin Laden’s project of ‘‘global 

jihad’’ came to realization, as various Islamist groups progressively abandoned their 

local goals and embraced al Qaeda’s strategy of attacking America and its allies 

worldwide. 

Moreover, the mosques and networks established by radicals who had been given 

asylum played a crucial role in what could be considered Europe’s biggest social and 

security problem, the radicalization of its growing Muslim population. Europe is facing monumental problems in trying to integrate the children and grandchildren of 

Muslim immigrants who have come to the continent since the 1960s. Dangerously 

high percentages of second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants live at the 

margins of European societies, stuck between unemployment and crime. While they 

hold French, Dutch or British passports, they do not have any attachment to their 

native land, feeling like foreigners in their home countries. 

‘‘After things didn’t work out with work, I decided to devote myself to the Koran,’’

explained an Islamic fundamentalist interviewed by the German magazine Der Spiegel. As they perceive themselves with no economic future, trapped in a country that 

does not accept them and without a real identity, many young European Muslims 

turn to their fathers’ religion in their quest for direction. While some of them find 

solace in their rediscovered faith, others adopt the most belligerent interpretation 

of Islam, embarking on a holy war against their own country. According to a French 

intelligence report, radical Islam represents for some French Muslims ‘‘a vehicle of 

protest against . . . problems of access to employment and housing, discrimination 

of various sorts, the very negative image of Islam in public opinion.’’

Whether this troubling situation is due to the European societies’ reluctance to 

fully accept newcomers or on some Muslims’ refusal to adapt to new customs is hard 

to say. Nevertheless, given the burgeoning numbers of Muslim immigrants living in 

Europe, currently estimated between 15 and 20 million, the social repercussions of 

these sentiments are potentially explosive. 

While it is true that the situation in the immigrant suburbs of many European 

cities is dramatic and that it is difficult for the children of Muslim immigrants to 

emerge in mainstream European society, the popular paradigm that equates militancy with poverty is simplistic and refuted by the facts. An overview of the European-born Muslim extremists that have been involved with terrorism, in fact, shows 

that many of them came from backgrounds of intact families, with financial stability 

and complete immersion in mainstream European society. The example of Omar 
27

Sheikh—the British-born son of a wealthy Pakistani merchant who attended some 

of England’s most prestigious private schools, led a Pakistani terrorist group and 

was jailed for his role in the beheading of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel 

Pearl—shows that the causes of radicalization are deeper for many individuals. 

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that young, disaffected Muslims living at the margins of European societies are the ideal recruits for terrorist organizations. The recruitment takes place everywhere, from mosques to cafes in Arab neighborhoods of 

European cities to the internet. As in the US, European prisons are considered a 

particularly fertile breeding ground for radicalism, a place where young men already 

prone to violence can be easily turned into terrorists. In France, for example, where 

unofficial estimates indicate that more than 60% of the inmates are Muslims (while 

Muslims represent only 10% of the total French population), authorities closely 

monitor the activities of Islamic fundamentalists, aware of the dangers of the 

radicalization of their jail population. Officials, who estimate that 300 militants are 

active in the Paris prisons alone, have seen cases of radicals who seek to get arrested on purpose so that they can recruit new militants in jail. 

Similarly, in Spain, where one in ten inmates is of Moroccan or Algerian descent, 

Islamic radicals have been actively recruiting in jail for the last ten years. In October of 2004, Spanish authorities dismantled a cell that had been planning a bloody 

sequel to the March 11 Madrid bombings, intending to attack the Audiencia 

Nacional, Spain’s national criminal court. Most of the men, who called themselves 

‘‘The Martyrs of Morocco’’, had been recruited in jail, where they had been detained 

for credit card fraud and other common crimes and had no prior involvement with 

Islamic fundamentalism. 

Current trends of terrorism financing in Europe 

If the European criminal underworld provides an excellent recruiting pool, crime 

also constitutes a major source of financing for terrorist organizations. Islamic terrorist groups operating in Europe have resorted to all kinds of crimes to finance 

their operations, including robberies, document forging, fraud and the sale of counterfeited goods. But more alarming is the fact that Islamist groups have built strong 

operational alliances with criminal networks operating in Europe. 

Over the last few years, Islamic terrorists have been actively involved in one of 

Europe’s most profitable illegal activities, human smuggling. The GSPC, a radical 

Algerian Islamist group operating in the desert areas of North Africa, is actively involved in smuggling large groups of Sub-Saharan migrants across the desert and 

then to Europe, where the group can count on an extensive network of cells that 

provides the illegal immigrants with false documents and safe houses. In 2003, German authorities dismantled a network of Kurdish militants linked to Ansar al 

Islam, the terrorist group led by Abu Musab al Zarqawi that is battling US forces 

in Iraq. The Kurdish cells had organized a sophisticated and profitable scheme to 

smuggle hundreds of illegal Kurdish immigrants into Europe, raising hundreds of 

thousands of dollars. Considering that, on average, a migrant pays about $4,000 to 

his smugglers and that around 500,000 illegal immigrants reach Europe every year, 

terrorist groups have all the reasons to get involved in the human smuggling business. 

Likewise, the terrorists’ use of drug trafficking is also considered a particularly 

serious problem by European authorities, which believe that terrorist organizations 

have infiltrated around two thirds of the $12.5 billion-a-year Moroccan hashish 

trade. Evidence from recent terrorist operations reveals that profits from drug sales 

have directly financed terrorist attacks. According to Spanish authorities, Jamal 

Ahmidan, a known drug dealer and one of the operational masterminds of the Madrid train bombings, obtained the 220 pounds of dynamite that were used in the 

attacks in exchange for 66 pounds of hashish. And Ahmidan also flew to the island 

of Mallorca shortly before March 11 to arrange the sale of hashish and ecstasy, 

planning to use the profits for additional attacks. The scheme is not new to Moroccan groups, which have used profits from the drug sales to finance the thwarted attacks against American ships in Gibraltar in 2002 and the Casablanca bombings. 

European authorities are confronting criminal activities with relative success, but 

are facing an uphill battle when they have to prove the links to terrorism. Severe 

evidentiary requirements and the secretive nature of terrorism financing have prevented Europeans from effectively tackling known networks that financed terrorist 

activities. The most commonly used legal tool, the designation as a ‘‘terrorism financier’’, has had only modest results. In fact, since the various terrorism financing 

resolutions allow authorities only to freeze the bank accounts of suspected terrorism 

financiers, businesses, residential and commercial properties belonging to the designated individual cannot be touched. 
28

The case of Youssuf Nada and Ahmed Idris Nasreddine is illustrative. Nada and 

Nasreddine operated a bank, Bank Al Taqwa, and a network of companies between 

Italy, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and the Bahamas. The US Treasury Department, 

which designated Al Taqwa and both men as terrorism financiers in the aftermath 

of the 9/11 attacks, claims that, since its foundation in 1988, Al Taqwa financed 

groups such as the Palestinian Hamas and the Algerian GIA. Moreover, according 

to the Treasury Department, Al Taqwa provided funding to al Qaeda until September of 2001 and granted a clandestine line of credit to ‘‘a close associate of 

Usama Bin Laden.’’ European authorities have also designated the bank and the 

two financiers, but with scant results. Both men, financial experts with decades of 

experience, have devised a system of front companies, figureheads and secret bank 

accounts in off-shore banking paradises that allowed them to circumvent resolutions 

and shelter their finances from the authorities’ action. And while Nada still maintains business interests in Switzerland and Liechtenstein, Nasreddine still owns a 

luxurious hotel in downtown Milan. 

Legal obstacles 

The problems faced by European authorities in tackling terrorism financing are 

the same that prevent them from successfully prosecuting and dismantling terrorist 

networks operating on the continent. In many European countries, laws prevent intelligence agencies from sharing information with prosecutors or law enforcement 

agencies unless they follow a lengthy and complicated procedure. With few exceptions, the monitoring of individuals has to be authorized by a judge based on extremely strong evidence of the suspect’s guilt presented to secure the order. Severe 

evidentiary requirements often prevent prosecutors from using information obtained 

by intelligence agencies in their cases. And prosecutors also have to prove the specific intent of an accomplice in a terrorist act, showing that he knowingly provided 

support to the person who carried out a terrorist attack. 

These provisions are the product of centuries of democratic legal tradition and are 

meant to defend the citizen from the creation of a police state. They epitomize Europe’s success in creating a civil society where the government cannot unduly interfere with its citizens’ lives. But, at the same time, they create an ideal shelter for 

the terrorists. European laws need to be adapted to the new threat that it is facing. 

‘‘There has to be a balance between individual liberty on one hand and the efficiency of the system to protect the public on the other. In an ideal world, I would 

choose the first, but this is not an ideal world, and when dealing with Islamic extremists we have to be brutal sometimes,’’ is the view of Alain Marsaud, a member 

of the French Parliament and an anti-terrorism magistrate. Marsaud’s views represent France’s attitude towards terrorism, as the French legal system provides investigators and anti-terrorism magistrates with powers that have no equal in Europe and in the United States as well. 

But France is an isolated case. The aftermath of 9/11 showed that most European 

legal systems are not prepared to efficiently face the new legal issues that have arisen with the war on Islamic terrorism. The excellent work done by European intelligence agencies and law enforcement has often been thwarted by the courts, which 

are forced to enforce laws that do not adequately punish individuals that associate 

themselves for terrorist purposes. The German trials of Abdelghani Mzoudi and 

Mounir El Motassadeq, two of the accomplices of Mohammed Atta and the other hijackers in Hamburg, revealed how Europe often finds itself legally impotent against 

terrorism. 

Mzoudi and Motassadeq, the only two men to go on trial in Europe in connection 

with the 9/11 attacks, have been engaged in a complicated legal battle against German authorities for more than three years. According to prosecutors, Mzoudi’s Hamburg apartment served as the meeting place for a group of Islamic radicals who, 

bound by a common hatred for the United States and Jews, planned an attack that 

would shock the world. After countless meetings at Mzoudi’s apartment, some members of the Hamburg cell went to the United States to attend flight schools and 

carry out the lethal 9/11 plan; others remained in Hamburg providing logistical help 

and wiring them money. Prosecutors assert that while the men who worked from 

Germany may not have known every detail of the plot, they were well-aware of the 

fatal intentions of their U.S.-based cohorts. For instance, Mounir Motassadeq allegedly told a friend, ‘‘[The 9/11 hijackers] want to do something big. The Jews will 

burn and we will dance on their graves.’’

Motassadeq and Mzoudi were charged in Hamburg with being accessories to the 

murder of more than 3,000 people and being members of a terrorist organization. 

Motassadeq was initially found guilty and sentenced to 15 years. Mzoudi’s trial was 

more complicated, as, by the time it began, Ramzi Binalshibh, one of the key members of the Hamburg cell, had been arrested in Pakistan. Mzoudi’s lawyers de-
29

manded that they could examine Binalshibh, whose testimony they alleged was essential to uncover Mzoudi’s real role. Since the US government, which has detained 

Binalshibh since his arrest, refused to even disclose Binalshibh’s location, German 

judges reluctantly acquitted Mzoudi. ‘‘Mr. Mzoudi, you are acquitted, but this is no 

reason to celebrate,’’ said the presiding judge, adding that the court was not convinced he was innocent and that he had been acquitted only because the prosecution 

had failed to prove its case. A month after Mzoudi’s acquittal, an appeal court ordered a retrial for Motassadeq, claiming that the he had been denied a fair trial 

because the US had refused to allow the testimony of Binalshibh. 

The difficulty faced by German prosecutors in the case of both Mzoudi and 

Motassadeq lies in the fact that the two were facilitators, sending money and providing apartments to terrorists but not actually carrying out terrorist acts themselves. Indeed, the lawyers for both men have argued that their clients believed they 

were simply helping fellow Muslims. When asked why he wired money to 9/11 pilot 

Marwan al-Shehhi, Motassadeq explained: ‘‘I’m a nice person, that’s the way I am.’’

Great Britain, America’s closest ally in Afghanistan and Iraq, has similarly tied 

its own hands. Radical imams openly preach hatred for the West and incite worshippers in the mosques of London to carry out attacks inside England. And recruiters 

have operated freely in Britain for more than a decade, as the story of Hassan Butt 

proves. With British forces still battling the Taliban in Afghanistan, the British 

public was shocked to read in the tabloids the interview with Hassan Butt, a British-born Muslim who bragged: ‘‘I have helped to bring in at least 600 young British 

men. These men are here to engage in jihad against America and its allies . . . That 

there are so many should serve as a warning to the British government. All of them 

are prepared to die for the cause of Islam.’’ Despite his activities and his not-soveiled threats to the British government, Butt was allowed to return to England undisturbed. 

Upon his return to England, Butt was contacted by a reporter from The Mirror

and agreed to be interviewed for the price of 100,000 Pounds. When The Mirror’s 

reporter informed British counter-terrorism officials of the meeting and asked them 

if they wanted to interview Butt themselves, their response was shocking: ‘‘I know 

this sounds ridiculous,’’ said a detective from the Anti-Terrorist Squad, ‘‘But we 

can’t get involved. All our checks, all our intelligence, show that he is not wanted 

for any offences in the UK.’’ Since recruiting for a foreign terrorist organization operating overseas was not a crime in Britain, Butt could not be charged with any 

crime. 

Another example of this frustrating situation and of its dangerous consequences 

is represented by the results of a 2003 Dutch intelligence investigation on a group 

of 40/50 young North African radicals. Dutch intelligence had collected important 

information on the men, revealing their ties to some of the masterminds of the May 

2003 Casablanca bombings and other terrorists throughout Europe. Moreover, some 

of the men had expressed their desire to die as martyrs and to kill prominent members of the Netherlands’ political and cultural establishment. In the fall of 2003, 

some of the men were arrested. Nevertheless, the men had committed no crime and 

the Dutch legal system forbade the use of information obtained by intelligence agencies in a trial. As a consequence, the men had to be released. 

Predictably, after a few months, the group decided to go into action. Last November, one of its members, Mohammed Bouyeri, who had been under surveillance for 

months, gunned down and tried to ritualistically behead in the middle of one of Amsterdam’s busiest streets Theo van Gogh, a popular Dutch filmmaker who, according 

to Islamists, had dared to offend Islam with a controversial movie about the treatment of Muslim women. 

A similar situation occurred in Spain, as some of the key planners and perpetrators of the Madrid train bombings had been known to Spanish intelligence as radical Islamists with ties to terrorism since 1999. Some of them had had their phone 

conversations intercepted and their apartments searched, but no charge could be 

brought against them since, technically, they had committed no crime. 

Unfortunately, the results in the cases in Britain, Holland and Spain are not the 

exception, but the rule. The legal systems of most European countries do not have 

provisions that provide authorities with preemptive measures that can be taken 

against a known fundamentalist who is overheard saying he wants to ‘‘die as a martyr,’’ unless evidence of a specific plan is also uncovered. Moreover, the laws of few 

European countries adequately punish activities that, while not directly harming 

people, are instrumental and necessary to the execution of a terrorist attack. Enabling a terrorist to enter the country by supplying him with a false document is 

equally important as providing him with the explosives, but few countries punish 

the two crimes with the same severity. 
30

The Iraqi conflict and other repercussions for the United States 

Before 9/11, recruiting individuals for a terrorist organization, as long as the 

group operated outside of the country, was not a crime in most European countries. 

While some countries have recently changed their laws to allow prosecution, the 

phenomenon of recruitment in Europe is taking place with even greater intensity 

than it did prior to 9/11, and its consequences are dire for both Europe and the 

United States. Shielded by the fact that recruitment for a terrorist organization is 

difficult to prosecute, and exploiting the widespread opposition to the Iraqi war 

within Muslim communities in Europe, recruiters have been sending hundreds of 

European Muslims to Iraq, joining the ranks of the insurgency that is fighting US 

and Iraqi forces on the ground. 

In 2003, an investigation launched by Italian authorities dismantled a network 

that recruited more than 200 young Muslims in Germany, France, Sweden, Holland 

and Italy to train and fight with Ansar al Islam, the al Qaeda-linked group led by 

Abu Musab al Zarqawi that has carried out dozens of attacks against American and 

Iraqi civilian targets. Reportedly, five young Muslims recruited in Milan have died 

in suicide operations in Iraq, including the attack against the Baghdad hotel where 

US deputy secretary of defense Paul Wolfowitz was staying. The investigation revealed that the network that had sent the volunteers to Iraq was the same that had 

recruited hundreds of militants before 9/11 for the al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, showing the continuity and adaptability of terrorist networks that have 

been operating in Europe for more than a decade. 

The Iraqi war is also presenting evidence of a different phenomenon, the involvement of extremely young European Muslims who do not belong to any organized 

network or terror group, but who, nevertheless, feel the sudden urge of fighting ‘‘the 

infidels.’’ While the Italians dismantled a very sophisticated network that had close 

links to Zarqawi and al Qaeda’s leadership, investigators throughout Europe have 

noticed that many of the volunteers who leave for Iraq are groups of teenagers, 

high-school students and petty criminals from the continent’s poor immigrant neighborhoods with no connections to a terrorist group, who seemingly decide to act on 

their own. 

This phenomenon is the direct consequence of the social crisis that is affecting Europe, as local governments are struggling to integrate the continent’s soaring Muslim population. And while it is true that only a minority of the millions of Muslims 

living in Europe espouse radical views or support violent activities, the dangerous 

consequences of the actions of this minority cannot be overstated. Every act of violence or foiled terrorist plot increases the rift between Muslims and the native European population. The brutal killing of Van Gogh, for example, brought turmoil to 

the Netherlands, traditionally one of Europe’s most tolerant and peaceful societies. 

Mosques and Islamic schools were firebombed in the wake of the filmmaker’s assassination and a poll conducted after the attacks revealed that 40% of Dutch hoped 

that Muslims ‘‘no longer felt at home’’ in Holland. In retaliation, groups of Dutch 

Muslims attacked churches, igniting a spiral of hatred. 

The spread of Islamic radicalism and terrorism in Europe needs to be closely monitored by the United States and not only for the historical and cultural links between the US to Europe. Hundreds of Islamist terrorists have, either by birth or 

through naturalization, European passports and can, therefore, enter the United 

States without a visa and with just a summary scrutiny once they attempt to enter 

the US borders. It is not a coincidence, for example, that the three men who have 

been charged just two weeks ago for their role in a plot to attack various financial 

institutions in the United States were all British citizens whom al Qaeda had dispatched on several surveillance missions to the States, counting on the fact that 

their British passports would have made their entrance into the US easier. 

As the attacks of 9/11 have painfully shown, events that occur overseas can have 

a direct impact on the security of this country and its interests abroad. It is therefore crucial for the United States to follow carefully the events taking place in Europe and to closely cooperate with its European counterparts, as only a global effort 

can defeat this global enemy.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Vidino. 

Mr. Moniquet? Is that right? 

Mr. MONIQUET. Yes. 

Mr. BARRETT. I am from South Carolina. I did pretty good on 

that one. Welcome to the Committee today. Thank you for being 

here. We are looking forward to your testimony. 
31

STATEMENT OF MR. CLAUDE MONIQUET, PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR GENERAL, EUROPEAN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE 

AND SECURITY CENTER 

Mr. MONIQUET. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you to the Members of the Committee for giving me the opportunity today to testify in the center of the American democracy and 

to give a view on the problems of Islamic extremism and terrorism 

and the threat they represent for Europe and the United States. 

I ask also your patience because English, as you are aware, it is 

not my native language. I promise to do my best to make it understandable. 

When I read some newspapers or analysis, even of European origin, I frequently see Europe as a continent where Islamists occupy 

the streets and advocate radical Islam’s tribunals, jihads, and so 

on. Another common view, especially in Europe, is that we have no 

problems with the Muslim community; that integration is quite a 

success, extremists are a very small minority, and the jihad is a 

kind of primateur opposing Mr. bin Laden to Mr. George W. Bush. 

In this second view, it will be sufficient to keep a distance with the 

United States and their policy to avoid terrorist attacks on European soil. However, those two extreme positions are equally wrong, 

and the reality is somewhere in between. 

First of all, it is true that at the moment the large majority of 

the European Muslims are quiet and different people, just willing 

to lead a very normal life and hoping to build the best future for 

their children. Many of those people come from non-democratic 

countries and know perfectly well that they enjoy not only Europe 

prosperity, but also democratic and civil rights they could never 

enjoy in their country of origin or in the countries of their parents. 

But a strong minority has a very different meaning and a very different agenda. They think that they must oppose democracy. They 

rally around radical preachers, they press extremist views of Islam, 

and some of them choose to fight the so-called Western enemy by 

arms and by bombs. 

Nobody could say exactly how many of those extremists live in 

Europe, but given a statistical formula used by one of the French 

intelligence services—if necessary, I could explain you the formula 

later—we can take an average Muslim population and we will find 

about 5 percent fundamentalists. Of those 5 percent, 3 percent will 

be dangerous people. That means for a Muslim population of, on 

average, 12 million people in Europe, we will find 600,000 fundamentalists and about 18,000 people that must be counted as dangerous. 

The causes of why Islamist extremists are in Europe are many 

and various. The first, of course, is a lack of integration. Racism 

and exclusion sadly existed, and still exist, in many European 

countries. So Muslims from the so-called second generation and 

from the third generation feel excluded from the society in which 

they live. 

Some ‘‘lifestyles’’—for instance polygamy or the birth rate—reinforce the rejection of the Muslim community by the European society. The economic and social crisis is another issue. This crisis hit 

the Muslim community very hard. The average unemployment in 

France or Belgium, for instance, is around 10 percent. It is com-
32

monly 20 percent within the Muslim communities and even 40 percent among the Muslim youth, the famous third generation. This, 

of course, reinforces the feeling of exclusion. 

The third point, another cause of this emergence of Islamic extremism in Europe, will be the so-called ‘‘vicarious humiliation.’’ Democracy, globalization and a communication culture give people in 

Europe direct access to information. Events in Bosnia, Somalia, 

Chechnya, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or Iraq lead some young 

Muslims to create what the French sociologist, Farid 

Khosrokhovar, called ‘‘an identity of vicarious humiliation.’’ Feeling 

excluded in the country they are living in, they develop a kind of 

empathy with all the Muslim victims in the world. They convince 

themselves that their own exclusion and the persecution of their 

brothers have the same roots; the rejection of Islam by the Western 

world. 

Last, but not least of course, the influence of the extremist clerics. Most Muslim clerics, even those who are not radicals, come 

from abroad and are frequently trained in Saudi Arabia or by 

Saudi clerics. They have no real knowledge of the society in which 

their followers live and often, as shown by an investigation in 

France or in the Netherlands, they do not even speak the local language so they cannot take a role in easing the tension or helping 

integration. 

Is the threat real? Yes, I think so, and the threat is both political 

and terrorist. On the political level Islamists are trying to subvert 

Western society by contesting humanists values such as sexual 

equality, freedom of religion, freedom of speech and so on. On the 

terrorist level the Islamists organize logistical and operational 

cells. Since September 11, around 20 major terrorist attacks have 

been averted in Europe, but two were successful—the Madrid 

bombing of March 11, 2004, of course, and the murder of the Dutch 

filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, on November 2, 2004. The last one we 

saw a qualitative revolution in the threats. Most of the Islamist 

terrorists in Europe were of the age between 25 and 40 in the past. 

We could see no very young people between 18 and 20 years engaged in terrorist activities, for instance, in Iraq. What we are 

awaiting is the emergence of the new generation of terrorists in 

Europe, kids who are 12 to 15 years old on September 11th, grow 

up in the middle of jihads and see Osama bin Laden as a model. 

The threat against the interest of the United States from European terrorists is, of course, very real. American intelligence in Europe—Embassies, consulates, military personnel, hotels, American 

companies—are natural targets for the Islamist terrorists, but very 

small. Most of the second generation people and almost all of the 

third generation now hold European passports so those people can 

travel freely to the United States and anywhere as they want to. 

I do not need to remind you that the September 11 attacks were 

planned in Germany, Great Britain and Spain and I do not need 

to remind you of the case of Richard Reid, the so-called Shoe Bomber. 

Given the current situation, that I have tried to describe to you, 

it is hard to be optimistic. The threats both against Europe and 

from Europe to the United States will remain at a very high level 

in the foreseeable future. I am afraid that a tragedy will be nec-
33

essary to force the European authorities to face reality and to really address the problem posed by Islamists. The question in my view 

is no more and no longer if the tragedy will happen, but when it 

will happen. 

I thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moniquet follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. CLAUDE MONIQUET, PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR

GENERAL, EUROPEAN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER

1) An overview of the problem 

For various reasons, it is quite difficult to draw a general view of Islamic extremism in Europe. This question has not yet been really addressed by academics, and 

we lack scientific data. Even the real number of Muslims living in Europe is open 

to question. For instance in France, various figures are circulating: 4 million, 5 million, 6 million or more. But we could reasonably say that, without any doubt, the 

problem is real. Some concrete signs underline this reality:

• Before 2000, it was extremely rare to see a public demonstration by Islamists 

in the streets of Europe. Since September 11, we have seen this kind of street 

demonstration in countries like France and Belgium. Thousands of people 

took part in those demonstrations, for Instance one at the beginning of 2004 

in Paris, to protest the law banning the Islamic veil from public schools;

• Ten years ago, the Islamic veil was mainly worn by older women. Now at 

least half of the female Muslim population wear the veil. In some municipalities in France, the figure is about 80%. From field investigation we know that 

in most cases those girls and women didn’t really choose to wear the veil but 

were ‘‘forced’’ to do so by family or community pressure. In some European 

cities, a Muslim girl who refuses to wear the veil leaves herself open to insults, physical aggression, sexual harassment and even collective rape. In 

France, those aggressions happen regularly;

• Before the end of the nineties, Islamist political parties didn’t exist in Europe. 

Now you can find them in France or Belgium. Of course, they’re still small 

parties, with no representation in Parliament. But, to take the case of Belgium, in May 2003 the ‘‘Parti de la Citoyennete ́ et Prospe ́rite ́’’ (PCP, ‘‘Party 

of Citizenship and Prosperity’’) which advocates a radical Islam, won more 

than 8 000 votes in Brussels. If we reckon that approximately 200 000 Muslims live in Brussels, that means that approximately 4% of those people gave 

their vote to the PCP. Now, if we consider only old enough to vote, the figure 

is more than 4%. Last but not least, if we consider that most of the votes 

were registered in the same municipality, where approximately 50 000 Muslims live, that means that between 10 and 16% of those people gave their vote 

to a party advocating radical Islam;

• Police and intelligence services know that fundamentalist and hate preaching 

are common in many mosques;

• Youth associations acting as front organisations for the Muslim Brothers are 

extremely popular;

• Since 2000 the number of anti-Semitic aggressions has dramatically increased; these acts—hundreds of which have been recorded over the last 4 

years—are mainly the work of young Muslims;

• In schools attended by young Muslims, some kinds of teaching are becoming 

more and more difficult. For instance it’s quite impossible to teach the history 

of the Shoah; in biology, young men and girls openly question the theory of 

the origin of life and the evolution of species and humanity;

• In the same schools there is frequently a de facto sexual segregation. For instance, in a class room it is common to see the boys grouping themselves in 

one part of the room and girls in the other;

• In hospitals, the refusal of treatment by a man on a woman or by a woman 

on a man is becoming more and more common;

• The Islamic presence in European prisons, where the Muslim population is 

frequently in the majority, is a reality observed in various countries;

• Since September 11, hundreds of suspected terrorists have been arrested in 

Europe (in France, Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, The Neth-
34

erlands etc). But each week police arrest new suspects. This demonstrates 

that the number of people willing to go from ideas to action is growing;

• Last but not least, dozens if not hundreds of young people—some very 

young—have been recruited since the summer of 2003 and sent to Iraq;

But the exact scale of the threat is still difficult to determine. The French domestic intelligence service, les Renseignements Ge ́ne ́raux, has tried to establish a formula to calculate the number of fundamentalists in a given population. Based on 

an extensive screening of the French scene, the formula is as follows: normally, in 

a given Muslim population, we’d find an average of 5% of fundamentalists. And, of 

those 5%, 3% could be considered as dangerous. That means, if we take France and 

a Muslim population of 6 million people, we’d have 300 000 fundamentalists. And, 

of those fundamentalists, 9 000 are potentially dangerous. 

The most exposed countries are France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, 

Great Britain, and Germany. Outside the European Union, Bosnia is at high risk. 

Obviously, it is in those countries that we’ll find the highest number of Muslims. 

That doesn’t mean, of course, that the average Muslim population is fundamentalist 

or dangerous. Most Muslims, even if the trend of a return to the religion is clear 

and massive, want to live a normal and decent life. But of course, the presence of 

a large Muslim community offers both better statistical chances of recruitment and 

places to hide. 

But countries that don’t have a large Muslim community are still not immune. 

I was told very recently that in Slovakia—where there is virtually no Muslim community—, a propaganda and financing cell of Hezbollah is in place at the University 

of Bratislava. 

2) The causes of Islamic extremism in Europe 

The causes of Islamic extremism in Europe are many and various. 

First; Muslim communities vary from one country to the next. In France, for instance, most Muslims are of Algerian descent, and as you know Algeria was a 

French colony for more than 130 years. In 1962, Algerian communities were established in France, and the number of Algerians grew as more came to Europe to find 

jobs and a better life. After a few years, in the seventies, the French government 

authorized the ‘‘regroupement familial’’ (the reunion of families) and so hundreds of 

thousands of new immigrants were transplanted into France. In Belgium, Germany 

and Italy Muslim immigration was not traditional, but was brought about for economic reasons: in the sixties, heavy industry and construction sites needed a work 

force that was extremely difficult to recruit locally. That was the beginning of immigration in those countries. 

When we speak of immigration, we use the concepts of First, Second and Third 

generation. The First generation is made up of people who initially came to Europe 

to work. They are now aged 60 or more. The Second generation is made up of the 

children of those people. They were born outside Europe and came at a very young 

age, or they were born in Europe. They are aged between 30 and 50. The Third generation is made up of the children of the Second generation. They were born in Europe and they are less than 30 years old. 

Sadly we must observe that, historical or not, Muslim immigration was not welcomed in Europe. Racism and exclusion were a reality, and with the beginning of 

economic decline in the seventies, and the slowing of European economy, problems 

increased. 

So today, parts of the Second and Third generations make no effort to integrate 

into European society and adopt European humanist values. But it has to be pointed out that, until very recently (in fact in the nineties) absolutely nothing was done 

to help them integrate. This is the European reality and the European shame. We 

must live with it and we are paying for it. 

To be brief, we had no problems with the First generation. Most of the problems 

until the very recent past were concentrated in the Second generation, and we had 

no real intelligence on what was going on with the Third generation. But over the 

last three to five years, we have been receiving a lot of very negative signals from 

the Third generation. For instance: violence at school, the rejection of ‘‘European 

values’’ such as sexual equality, etc. 

There is not, obviously, a single explanation for the appearance of Islamic extremism in Europe. We could, nevertheless, try to work towards an explanation:

• The lack of integration and racism lead to some Muslims feeling excluded 

from the society in which they live;

• Some ‘‘lifestyles’’ (for instance polygamy or the birth rate) reinforce the rejection of the Muslim community by European society:
35

• The economic and social crisis hit the Muslim communities very hard. If average unemployment in France or Belgium is around 10%, it is commonly 20% 

within Muslim communities and even 40% among Muslim youth—the famous 

‘‘Third generation’’. This reinforces the feeling of exclusion;

• Democracy, globalisation and a communication culture give people in Europe 

direct access to information. Events in Bosnia, Somalia, Chechnya, or the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict lead some young Muslims to create what the 

French sociologist Farid Khosrokhovar called ‘‘an identity of vicarious humiliation’’. Feeling excluded in the country they’re living in, they develop a kind 

of empathy with all the ‘‘Muslim victims in the world’’ and convince themselves that their own exclusion and the ‘‘persecution’’ of their brothers have 

the same roots: the rejection of Islam by the Western world;

• Most Muslim clerics, even those who are not radicals, come from abroad and 

are frequently trained in Saudi Arabia or by Saudi clerics. They have no real 

knowledge of the societies in which their followers live and, often, as shown 

by investigations in France and the Netherlands, they don’t speak the local 

language. So they cannot take a role in easing tensions or helping integration;

• Many European Muslims reject these clerics, accusing them of preaching an 

‘‘Islam of the rich’’ and turn to non-official mosques. But this could be a bad 

idea: in what we call the ‘‘Islam of cellars and garages’’ (after the places 

where these informal communities meet) clerics are for the most part self-proclaimed. Their knowledge of religion is extremely questionable;

• In all the countries concerned radical clerics took advantage of the above facts 

to advocate a radical Islam and to attack western values, or European and 

U.S. policy which they denounce as ‘‘anti-Muslim’’ or pro-Zionist;

• They are helped by the presence in Europe (in the universities and high 

schools) of refugees who fled their native country because of repression for 

their Islamist activities. In the universities we find cells of Islamist or terrorist movements such as the Muslim Brothers, Hezbollah or Hamas, Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian or Turkish groups etc.

• Some of the existing groups were created out of solidarity with ‘‘persecuted 

Muslims’’ in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia etc. In most cases, these movements were not spontaneous but were launched and manipulated by front 

organisations for the Muslims Brothers;

• The ‘‘last generation’’ of European Islamism was born with the war in Iraq 

in 2003. This very young generation is starting to show up in various judicial 

inquiries into terrorist activities; 

3) The reality of the threat 

The threat is very real and is both political and terrorist. 

On the political level, Islamists are trying to subvert western society by contesting 

humanist values such as sexual equality, freedom of religion, freedom of speech etc. 

They advocate the creation of religion-based political parties, they advocate the creation of Sharia tribunals to judge civil and personal matters etc. 

They know, of course that they will not win those battles, but their hope is to 

create or deepen the cultural and social divide between Muslims and non-Muslims. 

The idea in doing so is to radicalise Muslim communities. 

On the terrorist level, the Islamists organize logistical and operational cells. 

Here, we have quite precise facts and figures. 

Since September 11, approximately twenty major terrorist attacks have been 

averted in Europe. Nevertheless, two terrorist actions were successful:

• The Madrid bombing on March 11, 2004;

• The murder of Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam on November 

2, 2004;

If we take the date of March 11, 2004 as a reference, we see that numerous attacks have been averted:

• In April 2004, the action of the Belgian federal police prevented two attacks 

in preparation, one against a Jewish school in Antwerp, the other against an 

inauguration ceremony open to the public of a TGV tunnel in the same city;

• In spring 2004, still in Madrid, an attack against the National Audience (the 

highest jurisdiction of the country, where the well known antiterrorist judge 

Baltazar Garzon works) was averted;
36

• In June 2004, an attack of the GICM in Lisbon targeted several prominent 

people, among them Jose ́ Manuel Baroso, president of the European Commission;

• The HOFSTAD cell (responsible for the Van Gogh Murder) planned a series 

of attacks, in particular several targeted murders including that of Somaliborn representative Ayaan Hirshi Ali—as well as attacks by booby-trapped 

vehicle or bomb on Parliament, the security service HQ, Schiphol airport etc. 

Only the dismantling of the cell following Van Gogh’s murder prevented these 

criminal acts;

• In November, 2004, several men were arrested in Germany while preparing 

the murder of Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi;

• Terrorists arrested in France as part of the so-called ‘‘Iraqi connection’’ had 

planned attacks on French soil, particularly on Jewish targets;

• Etc.

This brief run-down, and the number and quality of the planned ‘‘targets’’ show 

clearly that, contrary to general understanding, striking Europe is still an objective 

for the Jihadists. And it is not only a question here of hitting European countries 

allied with the United States in Iraq, as too many Europeans think. 

The attacks of March 11 were already being prepared in 2000–2001: at that time, 

the war in Iraq had not started, and Spanish troops were not present on the ground. 

When the National Audience was targeted, Spain had already withdrawn from Iraq. 

Besides, France or Belgium are not in Iraq and both condemned American intervention. Attacks were nevertheless planned in those two countries. 

The ‘‘need’’ for the Jihadists to attack Europe is not innate in them, but it is 

bound to the essence of the old continent. Even if differences exist between the 

United States and Europe, these two entities, with some other countries (Australia, 

Canada, Japan, Korea) belong to the same ‘‘camp’’—that of a ‘‘western world’’ (this 

qualifier having no ethnocentric character, which is why we can include Asian countries) which shares the same essential democratic values. It is these values which 

make us the ‘‘enemies’’ of the Islamists. Besides, even if not present militarily in 

Iraq, many European nations are or were in Afghanistan, and the European Union 

gave a political undertaking to the new Iraq to help in its reconstruction and stabilization. 

These last twelve months also saw a ‘‘qualitative’’ evolution of the threat: more 

than ever, Islamism is asserting itself as a ‘‘mutant virus’’. Where since 2001 (and 

even before) security services faced terrorist structures mostly made up of experienced Jihadists, often with Afghan experience in common, between 25 and 40 years 

old, more and more we now find very young people, who by definition have no ‘‘past’’ 

in Islamist circles: French Jihadists killed or arrested in Iraq are from 18 to 20 

years old; Samir Azzouz, one of the members of the ‘‘cell HOFSTAD’’ was 18 years 

old at the time of his arrest and was tracked down after he tried to go to fight in 

Chechnya at the age of 16. What we are now awaiting is the emergence of a new 

generation of terrorists: kids who were 12 to 15 years old on September 11 2001, 

and who have taken a year or two to make the same ideological progress that leads 

to violence, and which took around their elders ten years or more. 

These small groups are more and more often made up of people with strong local 

ties, able thus to count on the solidarity of local communities and families. These 

groups are also connected to society’s marginal groups and crime circles, which increases the danger they represent: ‘‘new Jihadists’’ have no problem getting hideouts, weapons or explosives. They are, despite their youth, initiated into the ‘‘underground’’ and have been used to thwart police traps. Occasionally, they manage even 

to infiltrate the law as organized crime does: one of the members of the HOFSTAD 

cell was employed as a translator by the AIVD, Dutch civil intelligence. 

Finally, the ‘‘new’’ terrorist cells are even more imbricated than before: the 

HOFSTAD cell based in the Netherlands prepared its attacks while it was also involved in the economic planning of other attacks in Portugal or Spain. A fall in the 

average age, links with crime, and internationalization are all causes for anxiety 

among experts. 

The threat against the interests of the United States from European terrorists is 

also very real. Of course, American interests in Europe (embassies, consulates, military personnel, hotels, American companies) are natural targets for Islamists. 

But there is more: most of the Second generation people and almost all of the 

Third generation now hold European passports. So these people can travel freely to 

the United States or anywhere else they want to. I don’t need to remind you that 

the September 11 attacks were planned in Germany, Great Britain and Spain. And 

I don’t need to remind you of the case of Richard Reid, the so-called ‘‘shoe-bomber’’. 
37

4) Links between European Islamists and Al Qaeda 

I think a common mistake is to try to link each and every terrorist attack or plot 

to Al Qaeda. 

Al Qaeda had an ‘‘historical role’’ to play: to build an international terrorist coalition uniting dozens of organisations. Now that this has been achieved, an ‘‘International Islamist Terror’’ exists. And it is very effective. Information, arms and 

funds are exchanged among groups Moroccan, Algerian, Chechen, Pakistani, Saudi, 

Iraqi and other organisations. Often these organisations collaborate in very sophisticated projects. The only role of Al Qaeda is to set the general framework of the 

Jihad, designate targets and give lawful authorization (Fatwa) to act. Of course all 

those organisations or most of them are or were linked to Al Qaeda at one time or 

another. They take part in the global Jihad ‘‘against the Jews and the Crusaders’’

but they concentrate also on their own local problems—just as Al Qaeda concentrates mainly for the moment on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq 

and, of course, the United States. 

Most of these cells were linked in the past to regional organisations such as the 

Algerian GIA or GSPC and the Moroccan GICM. But since 2003, with the appearance of the ‘‘new Jihadists’’, we can see the arrival of new cells which are mostly 

not connected to those organisations, and are directly implanted in European society. 

5) Ability to carry out attacks 

All of these groups and cells must be considered able to carry out terrorist attacks. The fact that the majority of attacks in recent years failed means that police 

and intelligence services are working well, and not that the groups concerned are 

unable to carry out attacks—even though we can sometimes see a kind of amateurism in their modus operandi, at the level of the security of the operations they 

plan to carry out. 

More worrying: some of the failed attacks in Europe (in France and in Great Britain) were WMD attacks intending to use chemical products to produce high casualties. 

The intelligence we have—notably the fact that some suspected terrorists have 

shown great interest in recent years in nuclear facilities—suggests they are also 

thinking of using a ‘‘dirty bomb’’. 

6) Europe scores some successes but continues to act in a disorganized manner 

Faced with these changes to the threat Europe, as a geopolitical entity, seems 

hardly any better-armed that it was a year ago. Certainly, the official rhetoric is 

everywhere the same: the fight against terrorism is a priority and numerous means 

are being deployed to face it. The reality is sometimes very different. For obvious 

reasons, I will not dwell on this aspect of things. 

At the level of the European Union, progress was certainly made with the appointment of Gijs de Vries as antiterrorism coordinator, but the means he has been 

given are derisory and his mission essentially symbolic: in reality, antiterrorism remains a matter for the member states. Some work well, but others are not sufficiently aware of the reality of the danger. In any case, a major effort is needed to 

harmonize legislation and introduce more successful cooperation. 

7) The threat will not diminish in the foreseeable future 

Since March 11 2004, European intelligence and law enforcement services have 

been keeping up the pressure. Dozens of arrests have been made in Spain, France, 

Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and some other countries where GICM (Groupe 

Islamique Combattant Marrocain) networks were broken up. These arrests prevented several attacks, some of which could have had dramatic consequences. 

The paradoxical result of this efficiency in the antiterrorist fight has been to 

anaesthetize part of European public opinion which, though shaken a year ago by 

the Madrid bombs, now thinks the threat is behind us ‘‘because nothing else has 

happened’’. Besides, the massacre of March 11 having been attributed to the fact 

that Spain was at the time an ally of the United States in Iraq, many people think 

being a national of a country which is not militarily present in Iraq is a guarantee 

against terrorism in itself. 

Three different elements lead us to believe that the threat will not diminish by 

in the predictable future. 

— The situation in Iraq is still a powerful factor for mobilization 

The elections at the end of January marked an important stage in the evolution 

of Iraq, but the toughest part of the job has still to be done. The stabilization of 

Iraqi society must be stopped at all costs—from the point of view of the Jihadists. 

Europe and NATO are committed to supporting this stabilization. To divert Europe 
38

from its commitment by the use of violence, and to isolate the new government and 

the coalition troops, is a strategic objective for the Islamists; 

— Developments in Morocco are of real concern 

The most well-established Islamist organisation in Europe—and the most dangerous—is at present the GICM. The group suffered losses in Europe and in Morocco, but the battle is far from being over in this country where numerous reforms 

are still needed to fight terrorism. Developments in Morocco in years to come will 

have a major influence on the situation in Europe. If terrorism is not eradicated, 

if it remains vigorous, the consequences will be seen on the old continent, and it 

would be because of the importance of Moroccan communities established there, 

within which terrorists can recruit new sympathizers. 

— The ‘‘ new generation ‘‘ of Islamist terrorism in Europe is only starting to 

appear 

This ‘‘ new generation ‘‘ of terrorism which we hinted at above has hardly begun 

to appear on the terrorist scene. Recruits come from the ‘‘Third generation’’ of immigration, who we know has identity problems and feels itself the victim of imperfect 

integration. These problems can push many young people towards violence. We are 

then confronted with a new situation where diffuse and informal networks of young 

people who were born in Europe, who know it well and who have scores to settle, 

could serve as a relay to more structured international organizations, or even try 

to lead its own ‘‘jihad’’ to take revenge for the real or supposed humiliations felt 

by these young people. 

Given the current situation I have tried to describe to you, it’s hard to be optimistic. The threat both against Europe and from Europe to the United States will 

remain at a very high level for the foreseeable future. And I’m afraid that a tragedy 

will be necessary to force the European authorities to face the reality of the problem 

and to really address the problem posed by Islamism. 

The question, in my view, is no longer ‘‘if’’ a tragedy will happen, but ‘‘when’’ it 

will happen.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Moniquet. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony today. Some 

very sobering thoughts. We really appreciate it. 

Let me ask a couple of questions. I am using the assumption that 

Islamic extremism is growing in Europe. I mean, I think that is 

kind of what I gathered. Tell me, is that a correct assumption? 

How fast is it growing? 

I know, Mr. Moniquet, you said that this second generation is 

coming on or the new generation, the younger ones, that we have 

to really worry about. Talk to me a little bit about the pecking 

order. 

What do I mean by that? I mean is al-Qaeda the big kid on the 

block? Is it Hezbollah? Who is the chief organization out there that 

is the one that we need to be the most concerned with? Who is the 

second, and are there other factions that are growing? 

I will open it up to anybody, anybody that wants to try to answer 

that. 

Mr. MONIQUET. I can try to give you the first answer. In the past 

we had in Europe people linked with precise organizations. Sometimes it was al-Qaeda, or it was the Algerian GSPC, Le 

Groupement Salafiste Pour La Predication Et Le Combat, which 

was a part of the GIA, the struggling Islamist group of Algerians. 

We had people from various other organizations, but now that is 

changing. Instead we have, I think, one very dangerous organization well represented in Europe, and this is the Moroccan GICM. 

Because Le Groupement Islamique Combattant Marocain—I do not 

know in English, so I cannot translate it. 

Mr. VIDINO. Moroccan Combatant Group. 

Mr. MONIQUET. Moroccan Combatant Group. 
39

The GICM is extremely dangerous and lethal for Europe because, 

of course, we have important Moroccan communities in Europe. 

That does not mean that all Moroccans want to perform jihad 

against Europe or the United States, but in fact, it will give the 

terrorists the possibility to hide and to have closer contacts. 

The main choice now, I think, comes from self-designated 

jihadists growing up in Europe which have no direct links with 

other organizations or external organizations and try to find their 

own way in jihad, they have to settle with the society in which they 

live. 

Mr. BARRETT. Are these organizations that you are talking about, 

and of course we are talking about the ones in Europe, are they 

primarily planning just operations in the European theater, or are 

they doing both? Are they planning in Europe and using that as 

a staging area for the United States? 

Mr. BERGEN. Can I just say about the hierarchy of groups? 

Mr. BARRETT. Yes. Yes, please. 

Mr. BERGEN. Al-Qaeda scores a 10 obviously. I mean, Richard 

Reid was an al-Qaeda operative. Al Britani, the guy who was casing the IMF and the World Bank in this city and also Prudential 

in New Jersey, et cetera, was an al-Qaeda agent. Omar Sheikh, 

who killed Danny Pearl, was very close to al-Qaeda, so they score 

10. 

Al-Qaeda the organization has taken a huge hit post 9/11. AlQaeda the ideology has done rather well unfortunately, partly because of the Iraq war and the unpopularity of that war amongst 

a lot of Muslims. 

When you look at the Mike’s Place attack, which we have talked 

about and which I think is a very interesting kind of model of what 

could happen in this country when you have 2 second-generation 

middle-class Brits walking in and doing a suicide attack in Israel, 

they attended a sort of al-Qaeda support group in London called Al 

Muhajiroun. That is probably where they were radicalized. They 

went to Damascus and hooked up with Hamas. That is probably 

where they made the move into the suicide terrorism realm. 

Unfortunately this is the future. It would be great if we could 

say, ‘‘Hey, it is just al-Qaeda or this organization out there,’’ but 

if it is this wider ideological movement that is a lot more amorphous, and that is, I think, what we are facing in the future. 

The good news about the ideological movement is it is less organized. The Madrid attacks only took several months to plan and 

was funded by the marijuana trade. These guys organize very 

quickly. The 9/11 attacks took 5 years to plan, basically. 

If we talk about March 11 as being a 3/11, we are going to see 

a lot more 3/11s. I do not think we are going to see a lot more 9/11s 

for all sorts of obvious reasons. That is the future. 

Mr. BARRETT. One last question, and then I am going to turn it 

over to my Ranking Member. A couple of things. 

Number one, do you see a coordination between the groups from 

Hezbollah and al-Qaeda? I mean, are the larger groups and the 

smaller groups starting to realize that there are, for lack of better 

words, strength in numbers? They are starting to communicate 

with each other? 
40

Talk to me just briefly about if something major does happen in 

the European Union, is there a coordination between the European 

Union to have some type of consistent response, a coordinated response between the countries? 

Mr. LEVITT. There is little, if any, coordination when you get to 

groups that are not considered al-Qaeda affiliates, which include 

groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, especially those which are not 

part of the al-Qaeda affiliate concentric circles. There is no kind of 

headquarters-to-headquarters memorandum of understanding, you 

know, hashed out between their leaders as to how the cooperation 

will exist, but there is increasing interpersonal relationships between jihadists who cut across group lines. And so the kind of perfect little square boxes that we used to think about with Hamas 

here, and al-Qaeda there, do not fit so much. Hamas is not part 

of al-Qaeda or Hezbollah, which gets at least $100 million a year 

from Iran and tends to be more separate and aside than other 

groups in terms of its relationships to other global jihadists. 

There are relationships between individuals, and they tend to 

primarily come from two specific areas. The first is the Muslim 

Brotherhood international network and so you will have people 

who are more closely affiliated with the global jihad, al-Qaeda, 

funding Hamas, Islamic Jihad. We have seen it in this country—

investigations not 8 miles away from where we are sitting as the 

crow flies in northern Virginia. We have seen it throughout Europe 

as well. 

The second is the training camps, most recently of course and extensively in Afghanistan, but not only training camps. Also in 

Sudan, in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, in Iran, et cetera. What 

we saw in 3/11—the attacks in Madrid—is a perfect example of the 

latest generation, the latest iteration where people are being put 

in touch with other people to carry out near term attacks. I would 

say that this is not entirely new because in its heyday even alQaeda, the central core, would plan long-term attacks over a long 

period of time, the most spectacular attacks, but would fund and 

train others. 

Consider Ahmed Ressam, who is being sentenced today for his 

role in the millennial plot, to conduct smaller scale, but still very 

large and deadly attacks, you know, during that time period. I 

think Peter is right. I think we are going to see many more 3/11s. 

I do not think we can discount the 9/11s, but when we do see attacks, whether they are the 3/11- or the 9/11-type, we should expect 

them not to be run out of some central headquarters, but rather 

to be a conglomeration of regional networks that are put together 

and work on something together. 

Mr. BARRETT. So they are very effectively morphing into something that is ever changing. 

Yes, Mr. Moniquet? 

Mr. MONIQUET. Yes. If I may add some more to what Matthew 

has said? 

If we take the Hofstad cell—the Hofstad cell is the terrorist cell 

who assassinated Sir van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004. 

They planned a series of very high-level attacks in the Netherlands 

against the MPs, against the security service of the Schipol Airport, 

which is one of the most important. But they were also involved in 
41

the planning of an operation in Portugal, in Spain. They were also 

thinking about the possibility to attack in the United States. 

This small cell of approximately 15 people was connected to other 

cells in Madrid, in Lisbon, and even in Russia, in the Chechen Republic—or the Chechen area, excuse me. So those small groups try 

to find a way to connect with other organizations and to get or give 

some help from or to those organizations and to find those ways 

usually. 

Mr. BARRETT. Gotcha. Let us go back to one of the questions that 

Chairman Gallegly specifically kind of threw out there. Weapons of 

mass destruction. 

I know that most of the attacks thus far have been on a, you 

could say, smaller scale. Some of them not to small, but relatively 

speaking to weapons of mass destruction on a smaller scale. 

Tell me about the possible use, the coordination. How close are 

we, in your opinion, to a major attack with a weapon of mass destruction? 

Mr. BERGEN. I think that the cases we have seen in Europe since 

9/11 involving WMD, many of them have been less important than 

you might imagine. There was a plot perhaps to introduce cyanide 

into the water supply of the United States Embassy in Rome. It 

seems that that plot was not very serious. 

There were some people experimenting with ricin in London in 

2003. This would be a very effective assassination tool. The case 

against the people involved in this has sort of collapsed. 

There were some indications that people arrested in Britain recently were trying to extract something called americium out of 

smoke alarms in an effort to make a dirty radiological bomb. Scientists agree that this would not be particularly effective, this particular ingredient. 

However, since radioactive material suitable for radiological 

weapons are so widely dispersed, I think it is only a matter of time 

before somebody works it out. As I indicated, a radiological bomb 

attack in a major European capital would have a 9/11 effect, I 

think. Even if it did not kill a lot of people it would cause so much 

panic. 

Mr. LEVITT. If I could just add to that? 

Mr. BARRETT. Sure. 

Mr. LEVITT. First of all, what we have learned from the past few 

weeks and months about the AQ Khan smuggling network should 

give raise to concern. You know, the intelligence community traditionally defines threat in its most simplistic equation as intent plus 

capability. No one doubts their intent or willingness, certainly 

among the most radical of the global jihadists, to inflict as much 

pain on us as possible. It is their capability that tends not to match 

that intent. 

In those few instances where they seem to have had some beginning capability, we investigated it thoroughly and found it not to 

be as scary as originally thought. The ricin case in London is a case 

in point. Having said that, this is something, an issue on which we 

let down our guard at our peril. 

Mr. BARRETT. Gotcha. Talk to me about another subject. Do you 

see any connection, a major connection between some of the radical 

groups in Europe and the Gulf in Iraq and the area? 
42

Mr. LEVITT. Yes. 

Mr. BARRETT. Is Europe becoming a training ground for Iraq and 

vice versa? 

Mr. VIDINO. Yes. Absolutely. Actually, what we have been seeing 

over the last 2 years is a very effective recruiting effort by various 

Islamist groups in Europe for Iraq. Zarqawi’s organization or network, which is mostly a loosely connected network, has cells 

throughout Europe. There have been reports that at least 10 suicide bombers who blew themselves up in Iraq came from Europe 

and were recruited between Germany, France, and Italy. 

One interesting thing about Iraq is that we see what we were 

talking about before, the fact that we have both organized groups 

acting—al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Islam—and at the same time we see 

that young Muslims from Europe’s ghettos without connections to 

known terrorist organizations travel on their own to Iraq and just 

carry out their attacks. There was a group of 10 teenagers from the 

suburbs of Paris without known connections to terrorist groups 

who just traveled to Iraq on their own. Five of them were killed 

in suicide attacks. Two of them are detained. They were found in 

Fallujah fighting United States forces. So this is what we see in 

Iraq, both the organized groups and the loose cannons, the lone 

walks in a certain way. 

Mr. MONIQUET. We could add a nice story on the recruiting of 

people in France for the jihad in Iraq. In March 2004, some people 

were arrested in a suburb of Paris for terrorist-related activities. 

The judge could keep them 4 days without charging them under 

the French law, and he just found one thing. They were recruiting 

people for the jihad in Iraq. As it was not considered by the judge 

as a direct threat against the French interests, he just released 

those men after the 4 days. That is the way Europe takes the 

threat against the allies in Iraq. 

Mr. BARRETT. Interesting. 

Mr. VIDINO. That is a problem in most countries. Recruiting for 

jihad in Iraq, but not doing any act against France or Germany, 

is actually not considered a crime. Sometimes we try to get them 

for some other minor crimes, be it, you know, false documents or 

smuggling———

Mr. MONIQUET. Arms. 

Mr. VIDINO [continuing]. Of arms———

Mr. BARRETT. Right. 

Mr. VIDINO [continuing]. But not for recruitment. That is the 

problem. We have known recruiters still recruiting individuals in 

Europe and the authorities cannot touch them. 

Mr. BARRETT. Wow. 

Mr. BERGEN. Can I add one thought to that? 

Mr. BARRETT. Absolutely, Mr. Bergen. 

Mr. BERGEN. Which is, I mean, we have to keep this in perspective on the European front. The number of people recruited in Europe to go to Iraq—I think we are looking at, you know, dozens, 

scores, not hundreds. 

If you look at the people who actually have died in Iraq, something like 61 percent of the foreign fighters who are dying are from 

Saudi Arabia. Obviously this is worrisome that there is recruitment 
43

in Europe, but as a percentage of the actual foreign fighters, I 

think it is a relatively small percentage. 

Mr. BARRETT. Gotcha. 

Mr. VIDINO. True. But at the same time, the problem is about 

these people going back to Europe with training, with experience, 

with links to other people. Once back from the battlefield, they 

have a certain position of importance within the radical Muslim 

community in their own countries like what happened with Afghanistan or Bosnia or Chechnya, and therefore they can recruit 

new people, being in a certain position of authority. 

Mr. BARRETT. Battle-tested veterans with greater communications with greater people. Interesting. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. I am going to turn it back to 

the real Chairman. Chairman Gallegly? 

Mr. GALLEGLY [presiding]. I thank the gentleman for pinch hitting here. I had a briefing over in Intelligence. I figured out, in my 

19 years here, how to be in two places at once, but I have not figured out how to be in three places at once when they are in different States. We are making progress, and I appreciate your patience very much. 

I do have just a couple questions here, and maybe I could give 

the first one off to Mr. Bergen. Recent publications have talked a 

lot about how Europe might be used as a staging ground for attacks on the United States. I know that there has been some discussion on that before. Maybe you could just elaborate a little bit 

for the record for me? 

Mr. BERGEN. Yes. I think we have seen, historically, that has always been the case, whether it was the 9/11 plot, whether it was 

Richard Reid. Ramzi Yousef, who was the mastermind of the first 

Trade Center attack in 1993, studied electrical engineering in 

Wales. We have seen, historically, that the most significant terrorist attacks in the last decade have this strong European component. 

As we have discussed, with the increasing alienation amongst 

European Muslims, I think that trend can only accelerate. We 

know from history that this was true, and we can make, I think, 

a fairly accurate prediction in the future that this will be the case. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Vidino, maybe you could try this for me. 

Recognizing that there is a transition taking place in the Balkans, I would like to get your opinion as to how much of a terrorist 

threat exists in the Balkans today. How can it be countered when 

you consider the weak institutions and the declining United States 

troop commitments in the region? We see that as an ongoing issue. 

Maybe after you have a response to that, maybe Mr. Moniquet 

could give us a———

Mr. VIDINO. Sure. I think the threat is not that big because the 

numbers are relatively small. There is a number of people who are 

basically foreign fighters, Arab fighters who have remained in Bosnia and some of them in Kosovo after the end of the war. They 

gained Bosnian citizenship. The reports say they have established 

terrorist training camps. Nevertheless, between what the U.N. and 

what the European forces and what the United States forces have 

been doing, I do not think the threat is that large. 
44

The other thing where Islamists have failed in Bosnia is the 

radicalization of the Bosnian population. One attempt was made by 

the Islamists to radicalize the local population as they did in other 

conflicts, for example, in Afghanistan. I think mostly we can say 

the attempt failed because the Bosnian population, the Bosnian 

Muslims, are pretty much secularized, and they did not follow the 

radical interpretation of Islam that was trying to be spread. Definitely there are some activities where there was a fear that something might have happened during the Olympics. There were reports of some cells operating in Bosnia and Kosovo trying to carry 

out an operation during the Olympics in Athens, but nothing happened. 

I would say I would put the numbers at a few dozen individuals 

who are carrying out activities there. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Moniquet, do you have any other———

Mr. MONIQUET. Yes. Basically I agree with Mr. Vidino. I will just 

say that, in December 2001, the Bosnian Government deported, approximately, between 100 and 200 people who were living in Bosnia and which were European or non-European jihadists. It seems 

now that some of those people came back to Bosnia and it seems 

we have some signs that Bosnia was used as a transit place for 

going to Italy and to Iraq for some people in the last months since 

May or April 2003. Of course, the figure is small, approximately 

some dozen people. Another point is that it seems that we have a 

concern in Macedonia with the presence, not of jihadists, but for 

training and an ideological center near Skopje which seemed to be 

involved in extremist activities. 

As you pointed out, the States are extremely weak in Bosnia and 

in Macedonia. It could, in the future, be a serious threat. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I guess my main concern is the fact that it is 

pretty common knowledge that we have a declining presence there, 

and in view of that declining presence, does that present a greater 

potential concern that we should be addressing? Do you see that 

in and of itself? 

While the current status is not as significant as it potentially 

could be, do you see that potentially escalating as a direct result 

of the declining presence? 

Mr. MONIQUET. Do you mean in the Balkans? 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Yes, in the Balkans. 

Mr. MONIQUET. Yes. I think the Balkans must be scrutinized in 

the future both by the United States and Europe because the problem is that nothing is fixed in the Balkans. The Dayton process and 

the so-called peace process seem to work at the moment. They 

seem to work at the moment, but I would not be so affirmative in 

the future. 

If something is going wrong in the Balkans in the coming years 

it could be a new field and a new territory for the jihadists in Europe. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Yes. I had the opportunity to travel to that region 

just last fall, and it was a real eye-opener for me to see the dynamics of what is going on in the Balkans. It is not like we have here 

in the United States or in most places in Europe, as you know all 

too well. 
45

Mr. Levitt, do you think that incidents like the van Gogh murder 

or the Madrid train bombings have had a lasting impact on Europeans, or do you think they really realize the extent of the threat 

in their society today as a result of those incidents? 

Mr. LEVITT. There is no question that it has had a tremendous 

impact on Europeans. Both these attacks, the 3/11 attacks more 

than anything else, but what that is going to mean operationally 

in terms of changes in legal systems, greater cooperation bilaterally, and strengthening Interpol, is yet to be determined. Bureaucracies are powerful and resistant to change, and we can see 

in our own country how 9/11 sparked tremendous change and certainly affected us and how far we have yet to go. So I think that, 

unfortunately, 3/11 has not cured everything. 

It is indicative also, unfortunately, of what has yet to come in 

terms of further acts of terrorism. That it has had a serious impact 

on the Europeans, on us for that matter too, is irrefutable. That 

there is movement in the right direction is certainly the case and 

that there will be more attacks before all the proper changes are 

made is also, I think, unfortunately a given. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Vidino, do you have any comments on that? 

Mr. VIDINO. I agree. Unfortunately, for example, the Madrid 

bombing was widely perceived as a punishment for Iraq, for staying a supporter of the Iraqi war. I think just the timing of the attack was because of Iraq. 

For many other reasons, some of them even religious—the fact 

that al-Qaeda perceived Spain as the mythical land that was in 

Arab hands centuries ago. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. So you think Europeans may have looked at that 

as a one-shot type? 

Mr. VIDINO. Europeans may have. It was clear with the outcome 

of the elections. It was clearly revealed that most Spaniards at 

least, but a lot of people in Europe, perceived that as a punishment 

for Iraq. Holland might have been a different thing because we 

have probably Europe’s most tolerant society and still it is attacked 

by the Islamists. Actually, somehow I probably feel that Holland 

was perceived and had a larger impact than Madrid, even though 

it was just the killing of one person instead of 200, but somehow 

it gave a bigger shock to Europe. 

What is this going to mean? I probably have to agree with Matt. 

I do not know if this is going to have a big impact. Holland itself 

declared that it was going to, and I am quoting what the Prime 

Minister said, ‘‘fight a war against Islamic terrorism.’’ No laws 

have been changed. Yes, Holland introduced a law where they were 

going to train imams in Holland; teach them to speak Dutch. There 

have been two trials, actually one trial and one administrative 

trial, against some members of the Hofstad group. They were acquitted because Dutch laws are among the most liberal in Europe, 

and most of the intelligence provided by Dutch agencies was not accepted by the judge. 

Not much has changed. I have to agree with Matt. It probably 

will take a long time. Incorporation among European countries has 

partially improved after that, but still the bureaucracy, problems 

with the languages, the reluctance of most European intelligence 
46

agencies to share information with others. It is difficult to overcome. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. The one issue though would be clear and undeniable to me is not so much the issue that it was retaliation or otherwise, but the vulnerability and how do you protect yourself from 

every potential threat? How many people can be exposed in the 

case of the Madrid bombing with such a relatively low funding of 

money to create such horrific damage? 

Has that not given a greater awareness of vulnerability, or is it 

kind of a denial thing? 

Mr. VIDINO. It has, but it is probably kind of a denial. I remember the day after the election there was an interview with a Spanish voter in The New York Times, and he said, ‘‘I changed my mind 

and I voted for the Socialist party because now probably al-Qaeda 

will forget about us now that we changed the Government.’’

Mr. GALLEGLY. Do you see any of these incidents—and maybe 

Mr. Bergen can jump in on this—having an effect on the way that 

Europe looks at their immigration policies? 

Mr. BERGEN. No doubt that is true in the Netherlands where 

there is a huge backlash. The Netherlands thinks of itself as a very 

liberal place, and they now feel that their culture is sort of being 

besieged. 

It is just human nature to only react to things that are in your 

neighborhood. The Indonesians did not think they had a problem 

until Bali. We really did not grasp the problem until 9/11. I think 

the English, for instance, will not entirely grasp the problem until 

an attack happens in London. I think that is just human nature. 

Madrid was sort of a wake-up call, but not sufficient. 

The Europeans have done some concrete measures. They now 

have a counterterrorism czar whose powers are sort of like the 

drug czar in this country; not particularly much, but they recognize 

that there is something that they need to do. The Europeans have 

a firewall problem, but they have 25 firewalls because they are different countries. 

The evidentiary sharing is also a problem, but I think that they 

are making some bureaucratic efforts to actually reorganize themselves in such a way that they can deal with the problem. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Moniquet, does the U.S. visa waiver program 

pose any security risk, in your view? 

Mr. MONIQUET. I am in a very delicate position to answer this 

question because as a European, I profit from this program of 

course, but I will say Europe now is a dangerous place with dangerous people. Not a lot of dangerous people, but at least a few 

thousand in all Europe. That means that if I was American, I 

would scrutinize very, very deeply this program and would think 

about it, but I am not American. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. It is really interesting to me. Maybe, Mr. Bergen, 

you could give us your assessment of that and maybe Mr. Levitt 

as well of course from a different perspective. How do you view our 

visa waiver program? 

Mr. BERGEN. As an American citizen, I do not benefit from it, but 

I think the visa waiver program needs to be looked at very carefully. The problem of course is that it would be a public diplomacy 

disaster to make it very arduous as a European to come to this 
47

country. On the other hand, there might be a targeted approach 

where DHS could have agents posted in certain European countries 

who might actually do some formal face-to-face interviews with a 

number of the people who are applying. Obviously you would only 

target those people based on some reasonable intelligence that they 

needed to be targeted for an interview, so I think it needs to be 

reviewed, but not to be massively changed because I think that 

would be very counterproductive. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I am delighted you are supporting my proposal. 

Mr. Vidino, would you like to give a shot at that? 

Mr. VIDINO. I agree because the financial and the diplomacy impact of changing the program completely would probably be too big. 

The thing that probably both the United States and Europe has 

to improve is sharing information. The United States probably 

should know in advance who the people flying in from Europe are, 

even if they carry European passports. There should be more intelligence sharing. That is the only way to avoid probably just changing completely the visa waiver program. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Levitt? 

Mr. LEVITT. I think we are all in agreement. There is nothing 

more important than making sure that we keep the right people 

out of this country. The second half of that equation, however, is 

making sure that we let the right people in. We are doing ourselves 

no favors if we accomplish the former but not the latter, and so it 

is extremely important to balance out the need to keep bad people 

out with the need to let the right people in. 

Some of the testimony given earlier suggests that we have a particular interest in Europe given the fact that extremists have 

moved to Europe and have married people there. A lot of extremists are first, second, or third generation Europeans of Middle Eastern descent. If you look at people like Richard Reid, the Shoe 

Bomber, and others, there is significant reason to be concerned 

that we should not be letting into the country anyone who has a 

European passport. That does not mean that the waiver program 

itself is flawed. It means we have to figure out a way to implement 

it smartly. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Well, I think I was speaking more specifically to 

the waiver program the way it exists today, not to eliminate immigration. 

For those of us that have been around here for a while and, in 

fact, I think most Americans recognize that we are a nation of immigrants, and that is what makes this country great, but we are 

also a nation of laws, and it is a delicate juggling act to balance 

those two. But there is growing concern, at least in my view, that 

if we have erred it has not been always on the side of caution. 

Mr. LEVITT. No, absolutely not. If I may add, it is not just people 

with operational intent that we need to be concerned about. You 

know, there is no doubt that there are people in this country today 

who may not be radical today. Maybe they are, but they are going 

to be on our watch lists sometime in the future. 

To think about people who have gone through American schools 

and who come back to bite us, they include people like Khalid 

Sheikh Muhammad from al-Qaeda, Musa Abu Mazook from 

Hamas, Mazen Najar from Islamic Jihad. We do not have enough 
48

time to go through the entire list. It is not just people with operational intent today, but people who are going through our schools 

and are getting an education here often in technical sciences and 

engineering and are going home and becoming radicals. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Well, all too often it appears that number is 

growing rather than declining, and of course that is really the 

major purpose of this hearing today. 

I want to thank you for being here. I apologize for the fact that 

we did not have greater participation on the part of our Subcommittee, but as it just worked out today with the voting schedule 

and everything. I am not apologizing, but I am trying to explain. 

I am a victim of that myself. 

As you just heard, the bells went off for another vote. Nevertheless, I want to express to you my appreciation for your testimony, 

for answering the questions very candidly, and I look forward to 

working with all of you in the near future. This issue is not going 

to go away, and it is going to give us great cause for continued vigilance. 

I stand ready at any time any of you would like to throw a tidbit 

of your thoughts toward me or any Member of this Subcommittee. 

I welcome it, and I thank you all. 

With that, the Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(49)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

RESPONSES FROM MR. LORENZO VIDINO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ‘‘THE INVESTIGATIVE

PROJECT’’ TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED

POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Question: 

We know from various reports that Saudi Arabia funds extremist Islam known as 

Wahhabism all over the world. Here in the United States, reports reveal that even 

the Saudi embassy had pamphlets encouraging religious bigotry, and Saudi funded 

mosques carried inflammatory, anti-American literature paid for and printed by the 

government of Saudi Arabia. What role has Saudi Arabia played in funding extremist, fundamental Islam through mosques and organizations in Europe—especially in 

the Balkans where religious tensions are perhaps the highest? What can Western nations do to discourage outside funding of Islamic extremism? 

Response: 

As in every part of the world, the Saudi government and Saudi charities have 

richly financed the spread of Wahhabism and Salafism in Europe. Saudi-financed 

mosques, Islamic centers, conferences, books, and tapes have influenced and 

radicalized thousands of European Muslims, creating the ideal breeding ground for 

fundamentalist activities. 

In 2004 the AIVD, Holland’s internal security agency, perfectly portrayed the role 

played by Saudi Arabia in a report by the telling title ‘‘Saudi influences in the Netherlands. Links between the Salafist mission, radicalization processes and Islamic 

terrorism’’: 

‘‘The combination of charity and missionary activities for a long time marked the 

financing activities of the Saudi government. Within the Saudi government an important role was played by the Ministry for Islamic Affairs that via the Saudi diplomatic representations abroad made funds available to the Muslim communities residing in these countries. Often even more important in volume was the financial 

support from prominent Saudi private benefactors and large organisations, which 

since the 1960s and 1970s have undertaken worldwide charity and missionary activities (in itself, incidentally, a legitimate combination which also applies to many 

Western religiously inspired aid organisations). These institutions, such as the Muslim World League (also known as Rabita Trust), Al-Haramain, World Assembly of 

Muslim Youth (WAMY) and International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO), are officially known as ‘non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but in fact maintain 

close ties with parts of the Saudi establishment. Although to the outside world they 

strongly emphasise their strong humanitarian aims, these organisations are primarily focused on propagating the Salafist interpretation of Islam. They concentrate 

on setting up and supporting mosque centres with an orthodox persuasion, hiring, 

training and subsidising imams with a like persuasion, publishing and disseminating Salafist literature, et cetera.’’

The AIVD also described the effects of the spread of Salafism within the Dutch 

Muslim community: 

‘‘Present-day Salafism works like a magnet on some sections of the Muslim communities in Western countries, in particular on some groups of Muslim youngsters, 

the main reason being that it offers seemingly simple solutions to the problem of 

identity that many of them struggle with. As said before, basically Salafism seeks 

to restore ‘pure Islam’, i.e. Islam as it was practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and 

his first followers. Present-day Salafism provides these Muslims with a kind of new 

identity as a ‘pure Muslim’, propagating a simple formula for this purpose. It contends that it is possible to become a ‘pure Muslim’ by banning, sometimes even com-
50

1 As stated in a January 2002 letter to Claude Nicati, Switzerland’s deputy chief federal prosecutor, from George Wolfe, then US Treasury deputy counsel. Fidler, Stephen. ‘‘Al Qaeda suspect ‘had envoy’s passport’ TERROR FINANCING.’’ Financial Times. 28 April 2005. 2Fidler, Stephen. ‘‘Al Qaeda suspect ‘had envoy’s passport’ TERROR FINANCING:’’ Financial 

Times. 28 April 2005. 

bating, anything that is considered ‘un-Islamic’. The interpretation of this doctrine 

may lead to radical views in some followers, namely when ‘un-Islamic’ is equated 

with other religious convictions and social views. Exceptions apart, present-day 

Salafism, in its two manifestations discussed, is to a large extent determined by this 

intolerant position. A direct link can therefore be made between present-day 

Salafism and the radicalisation processes within some sections of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands.’’

The process described by the AIVD is not limited to Holland, but is common to 

any European country. Over the last two/three years, most Western European countries have decided to at least examine the negative influence of mosques and schools 

that espouse Wahhabi/Salafi views. Nevertheless, a widespread reluctance in interfering in religious issues has stopped many European countries from effectively 

cracking down on radical mosques. 

Question: 

Since 1999, 120 ancient churches and monasteries have been destroyed by Islamic 

mobs in U.N. controlled Kosovo. How can the United Nation’s presence in Kosovo 

and the Balkans be more effective in dealing with Islamic extremism in Europe? 

Response: 

[As of press time, no response was received.] 

RESPONSE FROM MR. MATTHEW LEVITT, DIRECTOR, TERRORISM STUDIES PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, TO QUESTION SUBMITTED

FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Question: 

What role has Saudi Arabia played in funding extremist, fundamental Islam 

through mosques and organizations in Europe—especially in the Balkans where religious tensions are perhaps the highest? What can Western nations do to discourage 

outside funding of Islamic extremism? 

Response: 

Saudi funded institutions in Europe, including the Balkans, continue to fuel radicalism and teach a fundamentalist variation of Islam that is often then used to recruit new terrorists and justify acts of terrorism. 

Just last week The Financial Times reported on the case of Ali-bin Mussalim, a 

Swiss-based businessman who had ‘‘been providing indirect investment services for 

al-Qaeda, investing funds for bin Laden, and making cash deliveries on request to 

the al-Qaeda organization.’’ 1 Mussalim was linked to Bank Al-Taqwa (since closed) 

and its founder, Youssef Nada, both of which have been designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists by the Treasury Department and as Al Qaeda associates 

by the UN 1267 Committee. Interestingly, Mussalim carried a Saudi diplomatic 

passport. Mysteriously, a month after these claims later emerged, Mr. bin Mussalim 

was found dead in his residence in Laussane in June 2004.2

A particularly revealing case involves terror incitement at the King Fahd Academy in Bonn, Germany. 

In October 2003, the Saudi-funded King Fahd Academy near Bonn, Germany, 

came under investigation for its alleged link to militant Islamic extremism. At the 

urging of German authorities, the school suspended one of its teachers who allegedly 

implored students to wage a holy war against the west, using Friday prayers at the 

school mosque to urge students to take part in jihad. 

German education officials noted that the academy was becoming a magnet for 

those who support Islamic militancy as more and more ‘‘hardline’’ Muslims moved 

near Bonn to enroll their children at the academy, including several parents who 

were under investigation for suspected links to al-Qaeda. The parent of one student 

was put on trial in September 2003 on charges of being linked the al-Tawhid group 

and its plot to attack Jewish targets in Germany. 

Juergen Rotors, who heads the city government of Cologne, western Germany, 

wanted to close the academy, but in the end agreed to allow the school to remain 

open. However, Rotors stated that the school would be subject to strict oversight 
51

3 ‘‘Germany orders curbs on Saudi-funded school linked to extremists,’’ Agence France Presse, 

October 28, 2003. 4Matthew Levitt, ‘‘The Two Faces of Saudi Arabia,’’ Weekly Standard, June 30, 2003, http:/

/www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=479 5Sebastian Rotella, ‘‘A Road to Ansar Began in Italy: Wiretaps are Said to Show how al-Qaeda 

Sought to Create in Northern Iraq a Substitute for Training Camps in Afghanistan,’’ The Los 

Angeles Times, 28 April 2003. 6 Alexandar S. Dragicevic, ‘‘U.S. Embassy in Bosnia Reopens,’’ Associated Press, March 25, 

2002. 7 ‘‘Al-Qa’ida Terrorists Planned Bosnia Attack, Official Says,’’ Associated Press, March 23, 

2002. 8 ‘‘Al-Qa’ida Terrorists Planned Bosnia Attack, Official Says,’’ Associated Press, March 23, 

2002. 9Matthew Levitt, ‘‘The Two Faces of Saudi Arabia,’’ The Weekly Standard, June 30, 2003, 

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=479 10Matthew Levitt, ‘‘Tackling the Financing of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia,’’ PolicyWatch # 609, 

March 11, 2002, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1487

measures, which would be monitored by a supervisory committee to ensure compliance. Teachers and staff with connections to extremists would be replaced, as would 

those who preached violence or aggressive fundamentalism.3

International investigations continue to tie Saudi charities to terrorist activity the 

world over. Several Islamic extremists have been linked to the Saudi-funded al Nur 

Mosque in Berlin. One of them, Tunisian al Qaeda associate Ihsan Garnoaui, was 

believed to have been plotting an attack in Berlin. Muhammad Fakihi, chief of the 

Saudi embassy’s Islamic Affairs Section in Berlin, confessed to doling out embassy 

funds according to the instructions of ‘‘close friends’’ of bin Laden.4

An Italian wiretap first publicly reported by the LA Times revealed that in one 

intercepted phone conversation, a senior al Qaeda operative in the Middle East is 

overheard assuring his subordinate in Europe about funding, saying, ‘‘Don’t ever 

worry about money, because Saudi Arabia’s money is your money.’’ 5

Saudi supported charity organizations in Bosnia have also served as a base for 

financing and organizing attacks. 

There have been several cases of Saudi charities using their offices in Bosnia as 

fronts for supporting terrorism. In March 2002, Bosnian police raided the offices of 

an Islamic charity called Bosnian Ideal Future, which is the local name under which 

Benevolence International Foundation (a Saudi-based charity) operated in Bosnia. 

Officials seized weapons, plans for making bombs, booby-traps and false passports.6

A day later, the U.S. Embassy in Bosnia was shut down for four days, from March 

20–24, after Bosnian officials informed the embassy of a possible threat. According 

to a Bosnian official, al-Qaeda terrorists reportedly met in Sofia, Bulgaria, where 

they decided that ‘‘in Sarajevo something will happen to Americans similar to New 

York last September.’’ 7 Two days before the Embassy reopened, Bosnian police arrested Munib Zahiragic, the head of the local Benevolence office and a former officer 

in the Bosnian Muslim secret police. 

In December 2001, U.S. authorities raided the Chicago offices of the Benevolence 

International Foundation. The foundation’s videos and literature glorify martyrdom, 

and, according to the charity’s newsletter, seven of its officers were killed in battle 

last year in Chechnya and Bosnia. In March 2002, Bosnian officials investigating 

foreign humanitarian organizations reported funds were missing from the Bosnian 

office of Benevolence International.8

However, these Saudi links to Bosnia-based charities should not surprise, as a recently disclosed 1996 CIA document indicates that as early as 1994 Washington was 

warning that in 1992 Saudi nationals gave some $150 million to Islamic charities 

active in Bosnia and implicated in terrorism.9

Furthermore, evidence was found that indicates that the Saudi High Commission 

for Aid to Bosnia supports terrorist acts perpetrated against U.S. targets. In October 

2001, NATO forces raided the Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia, a charity 

founded by Prince Selman bin Abdul-Aziz and supported by King Fahd. Among the 

items found at the Saudi charity were before-and-after photographs of the World 

Trade Center, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the USS Cole; maps of 

government buildings in Washington; materials for forging U.S. State Department 

badges; files on the use of crop duster aircraft; and anti-Semitic and anti-American 

material geared toward children.10

Additionally, six Algerians were incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay’s Camp X-Ray 

for plotting an attack on the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo, including an employee of 

the Saudi High Commission for Aid to Bosnia and another cell member who was 

in telephone contact with Osama bin Laden aid and al-Qaeda operational commander Abu Zubayda. Authorities are now trying to track down $41 million of the 

commission’s missing operating funds. While there is no information suggesting the 
52

11Matthew Levitt, ‘‘Tackling the Financing of Terrorism in Saudi Arabia,’’ PolicyWatch # 609, 

March 11, 2002, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1487 12Matthew Levitt, ‘‘Combating Terrorist Financing, Despite the Saudis,’’ PolicyWatch # 673, 

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 1, 2002, http://

www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1551

involvement or knowledge of senior Saudi officials, this is not the only Saudi charity 

linked to terrorist activity.11

Yet another example of a Saudi-based charity using Bosnia as a base for terror 

fundraising is the al-Haramain Foundation. In March 2002, a joint U.S.-Saudi order 

froze the accounts of al-Haramain’s Bosnian and Somali offices, which were linked 

to the al-Qaeda-associated Egyptian al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and Somali al-Itihad alIslamiyah, respectively. But in August 2002, Saudi pressure led Bosnian authorities 

to release the assets of the Bosnian office and renew its operating license. By September, the Saudi press reported that al-Haramain’s operations in Bosnia and Somalia were actually expanding.12

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