This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15 - 1254 A15 - 1323 Robert Anderson, Respondent,

vs. State of Minnesota, Appellant. Filed April 25, 2016 Affirmed Johnson , Judge Washington County District Court File No. 82

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- 221 Lynne Torgerson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Richard D. Hodsdon, Assistant County Attorney, S tillwater, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Schellhas , Presiding Judge; Johnson , Judge; and John P. Smith , Judge

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 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N JOHNSON , Judge Robert Anderson petition ed the district court for the restoration of his right to possess a firearm. The district court granted the petition. We affirm. FACTS Anderson ’s ineligibility to possess a firearm arose from two convictions of third

degree assault . The facts underlying those convictions are described below based on Anderson’s petition

. The stat e has not disputed Anderson’s allegations concerning the underlying facts of his prior disqualifying convictions. Anderson’s first conviction , aiding and abetting third

- degree assault , is based on an incident at a Perkins restaurant in 1992

. A diner at a nearby table used a slur in reference to Anderson’s mother. Anderson and a friend got into a physical altercation with the other diner . Anderson , who was 21 at the time, punched the other diner in the face

. Anderson’s friend beat the other diner more severely outside the restaurant . The victim of the assault sustained serious injuries

. In 1994, a fter t he state charged Anderson with several offenses, Anderson pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting third

- degree assault , in violation of Minn. Stat. § § 609. 05, subd. 1, .223, subd. 1 (1992)

. T he district court imposed a misdemeanor sentence of one year of probation. See Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(1) ( 1992 ). Anderson successfully completed and was discharged from probation in 1995

. Anderson’s second conviction of third

- degree assault arose from a motor

- vehicle accident in 2001. After a Fourth of July party, Anderson was driving several passengers home in his vehicle . One of the passengers grabbed the steering wheel, which led to a3

physical struggle , which caused A nderson to drive off the road , causing injury to an other passenger. The state charged Anderson with third

- degree assault , in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2000)

. In 2002, Anderson pleaded guilty. The district court stayed imposition of sentence and placed Anderson on probation for five years. Anderson successfully completed and was discharged from probation in 2007 , and his conviction was deemed a misdemeanor

. See Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (2000)

. Because a state statute imposes a lifetime ban on the possession of a firearm for persons convicted of a crime of violence, s ee Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (201 2 ) ; 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28, art. 3, § 8 at 294

- 96 (applying lifetime ban to offenders discharged from sentence or court supervision after August 1, 1993) , and because each of Ander son’s prior convictions is considered a crime of violence for purposes of that statute, see Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2 01 2 ) , Anderson was ineligible to possess a firearm. See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) ; State v. Moon , 46 3 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Minn. 1990) ; s ee also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) ( 2012 ) (barring persons convicted of crime punishable by more than one year from pos sessing firearms in or affecting interstate commerce)

. In March 2014, Anderson petition ed the district court for the restoration of his right to possess a firearm. See Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d (201 2 ). In a memorandum accompanying the petition, And erson argued that restoration would be appropriate because neither of his two assault convictions involved the use of a firearm, because he had successfully completed probation after each of his prior convictions, because he had not committed any additional crimes in the 11 years since his second assault conviction, and because he had made positive changes in his life. Anderson ’s petition noted that he would4

like to use a firearm for hunt ing. The state filed a mem orandum in which it opposed Anderson’s petition. The state argued that restoration would be inappropriate because of Anderson’s criminal history, including the two assault convictions and a felony DWI, because of the legislative intent that persons convic ted of crimes of violence should be subject to a lifetime ban on the possess ion of firearms, and because a desire to hunt is an in sufficient reason for restor ation. In May 2015, the district court conducted a hearing on Anderson’s petition. Anderson tes tified that he successfully completed chemical

- dependency treatment in the mid

- 2000s and had not committed any crim e since his 2002 conviction. Anderson also testified that he had graduated from college and had been married and gainfully employed for appr oximately four years. Anderson further testified that he would like to hunt , do target

- shoot ing , and possess a firearm for purposes of self

- protection. In August 2015, the district court issued a three

- page order in which it granted Anderson’s petition. T he state appeals. D E C I S I O N The state argues that the district court erred by granting Anderson’s petition and restoring his right to possess a firearm. A person who is ineligible to possess a firearm may petition a district court for restoration of the right . Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d. The district court may restore the person’s right to possess a firearm “if the person shows good cause to do so and the person has been released from physical confinement.” Id. In thi s context, “ g ood cause is a reason for taking an action that, in legal terms, is legally sufficient, and, in ordinary terms, is5

justified in the context of surrounding circumstances.” Averbeck v. State , 791 N.W.2d 559, 561 (Minn. App. 2010). Public safet y is t he primary consideration for a district court considering a petition for restoration. Id. Whether a petition er has shown good cause for restoration is a mixed question of law and fact

. Id. at 560. This court applies a clear

- error standard of revie w to a district court’s factual findings concerning good cause and a de novo standard of review to a district court’s legal analysis concerning good cause

. Id. at 561. If a petitioner has shown good
cause, a district court has discretion to grant or deny the petition, and this court a pplies an abuse

- of

- discretion standard of review to th at discretionary decision

. Id. In this case, t he district court found that Anderson had shown good cause for the restoration of his right to possess a firearm. The district court ’s finding of good cause is based on the district court’s recitation of certain undisputed facts : neither of Anderson’s disqualifying convictions involved the use of a firearm, he complet ed chemical

dependency treatment, he has not committed any crimes since completing treatment, he has been married for several year s, he completed his college education and is gainfully employed, he is a homeowner, his other civil rights have been restored , and he wishes to hunt

. On appeal, t he state does not challenge these underlying fact s , which are supported by the record. Rather, the state argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that there is good cause for the restoration of Anderson’s right to possess a firearm

. The state makes several specific contentions in support of its argument
. First, the state contends that Anderson’s interest in hunt ing is not a valid reason for restoration or is not sufficiently weighty to justify restoration in this case . The state points6

out that the petitioner in Averbeck wished to “ go hunting with family and friends” but that this court ruled against him. See id. at 562. In Averbeck , the district court denied the petition for various reasons, and we affirmed the district court’s decisi on. Id. at 561

- 62. We did not state in Averbeck that a desire to hunt is not a valid reason for restoration. See id. at 562. In fact, we did not expressly comment on the petitioner’s interest in hunt ing

. See id. Our affirmance in Averbeck can be expl ained by, among other things, the petitioner’s interest in using a firearm for other purposes in other situations, which the district court described as “emotionally charged situat ions in which the presence of firearms could escalate risks in already dange rous circumstances,” thereby threatening public safety. Id. at 562. No similar facts are present in this case. Thus, the district court in this case did not err by consider ing Anderson’s interest in hunt ing to be a factor supporting the petition for res toration. Second, the state contends that the district court erred by relying on evidence that Anderson had been married for three year s, was a homeowner, and had complet ed college

. Specifically, t he state contends, “ H aving legal authority to possess a firearm has nothing to do with one’s marital status, home ownership or education.” The state cites no legal authority for this contention. Because the primary consideration on a petition for restoration is public safety , see Averbeck , 791 N.W.2d at 561, a petitioner’s marital status, homeownership status , and education al attainment might be relevant to the inquiry , depending on the circumstances. A district court is in the best position to assess a petitioner’s credibil ity and to assess the factors most relevant to the determination whether

a person who previously committed a crime is a threat to public safety. Cf

. In re Civil7

Commitment of Ince , 847 N.W.2d 13, 23

- 24 (Minn. 2014). A district court is not precluded from considering whether success or s tability in a petitioner’s private life or employment might make the petitioner less likely to be a threat to public safety. Thus, the district court in this case did not err by considering Anderson’s marriage, homeownersh ip, and educational attainment to be factors supporting the petition for restoration. Third, the state contends that the district court erred by relying on the fact that neither of Anderson’s disqualifying convictions involved a firearm. The state contend s that the district court’s reasoning “unduly minimized the extremely serious nature of what those underlying offenses were.” We do not agree with the state’s characterization of the district court ’s reasoning. The district court ’s order identif ies the disqualifying criminal offenses and acknowledge s that those offenses impose a lifetime ban on the possession of

a firearm , absent restoration

. Common sense suggests that a person who previously used a firearm to commit a crime of violence may be more likely to t hreat en public safety after restoration than a person who previously committed a crime of violence without the use of a firearm. Again, a district court is in the best position to determine the pertinence and weight to be given such facts. See i d. In any event, a district court is not precluded from considering whether a petitioner used a firearm in the commission of the crime of violence that led to ineligibility. Thus, the district court did not err by considering such facts in this

case. F ourth, the state contends that the district court erred by ignoring the “strong legislative intent against restoration of firearms.” Again, we disagree with the state’s characterization of the district court’s reasoning. The district court’s order recogn izes both8

the general rule of a lifetime ban on the possession of a firearm and also the exception of restoration of the right to possess a firearm in certain circumstances. The existence of the exception and the statutor y process to petition for restorat ion impl ies that a person previously convicted of a crime of violence may be redeemed in certain circumstances

. The district court considered factors relevant to the restoration determination. Thus, the district court did not contradict legislative inten t by granting Anderson’s petition. Fifth, the state contends that the district court erred because the facts of this case are similar to the facts of Averbeck , in which the petition er did not achieve the restoration of the right to possess a firearm

. But Averbeck is di stinguishable, primarily because it came to the court of appeals in a different procedural posture. In Averbeck , the district court deni ed the petition for restoration. Id. at 562. In this case, the district court granted the petition, and the state’s appeal raises different issues. A deferential standard of review applies. Id. at 561

. Furthermore, as noted above, the petitioner in Averbeck presented evidence and arguments that gave rise to a c oncern that, despite the passage of time, he would be a threat to public safety if he were permitted to possess a firearm

. Id. at 561

- 62. Anderson’s petition do es not give rise to such a concern. Moreover, t he state has not contradicted Anderson’s evide nce that he has matured, has successfully completed chemical

- dependency treatment, and has changed his lifestyle. Thus, this court’s opinion in Averbeck does not require us to reverse the district court’s finding that good cause exists for the restoration of Anderson’s right to possess a firearm. As stated above, if a petitioner has shown good cause, a district court has discretion to grant or deny the petition. Id. at 56 1 . The state does not argue that the district court9

erred in exercising that discret ion. Therefore, i n light of our conclusion that the district court did not err in its good

- cause finding , we conclude that the district court did not err by granting Anderson’s petition. Aff irmed.