NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOEL ELIAS SANCHEZ, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

JEFFREY A. BEARD, 

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 15-56369 

D.C. No. 

5:13-cv-01448-MMM-VBK 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 13, 2018**

Pasadena, California

Before: GOULD and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and AMON,*** District Judge.

Joel Sanchez was convicted in California state court of second-degree murder 

for the shooting and killing of Manuel Torres. In this habeas petition, Sanchez 

challenges the exclusion of a toxicology report during his murder trial. The 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

NOV 16 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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toxicology report showed that Torres was under the influence of methamphetamine 

and alcohol at the time of the shooting. Without offering any expert testimony to 

explain the toxicology results, Sanchez sought to introduce the report to corroborate 

his claim of self-defense that he shot a “crazed” and “maniacal” Torres out of fear for 

his own life. Sanchez unsuccessfully appealed the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2254, and we affirm.

Our review of the state court’s decision denying Sanchez’s appeal is governed 

by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). Sanchez argues that the toxicology report constituted “critical” evidence 

that directly corroborated his self-defense theory. He claims that the exclusion of the 

report violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense, and was 

therefore contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.

However, unlike the excluded evidence in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 

284 (1973), which directly corroborated the defendant’s main defense that a third 

party in fact had killed the victim, the toxicology report in this case by itself provided 

little support to Sanchez’s theory that he shot Torres in self-defense. Sanchez wanted 

the jury to infer and speculate, based solely on the toxicology results, that the amount 

of drugs and alcohol in Torres’s body caused Torres to act in an aggressive manner, 

justifying Sanchez to shoot Torres out of fear. Yet, Sanchez offered no expert 

testimony and no evidence to suggest that it is common knowledge that the combined 

effect of methamphetamine and alcohol causes an individual to act aggressively or 
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violently. This is not the type of “critical, corroborative” evidence the Supreme Court 

has held leads to a constitutional violation when erroneously excluded. DePetris v. 

Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302 

and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1967)). 

Even assuming the toxicology report constituted relevant defense evidence,

Sanchez still fails to overcome AEDPA deference. The Supreme Court has never held 

that evidence excluded on relevancy grounds violates a defendant’s constitutional 

rights. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326–27 (2006) (“While the 

Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve 

no legitimate purpose . . . , we have stated that the Constitution permits judges to 

exclude evidence that is repetitive, only marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of 

harassment, prejudice, or confusion of the issues.”) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted; alterations incorporated). Thus, the state appellate court’s decision 

to affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling “cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.” Moses v. Payne, 555 

F.3d 742, 759 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124–26

(2008)). 

AFFIRMED.