United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Management, 

Investigations, and Oversight, Committee 

on Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT 

Observations on DHS’s 

Preparedness for 

Catastrophic Disasters 

Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr. Director 

Homeland Security and Justice 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Wednesday, June 11, 2008 

 

GAO-08-868T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

June 11, 2008

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Observations on DHS's Preparedness for 

Catastrophic Disasters

Highlights of GAO 08-868T, a report to 

Subcommittee on Management, 

Investigations and Oversight, Committee 

on Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives 

The Homeland Security Act was 

enacted in November 2002, 

creating the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) to 

improve homeland security 

following the September 11, 2001,

terrorist attacks on the United

States. The act centralized the 

leadership of many homeland 

security activities under a single

federal department and,

accordingly, DHS has the dominant

role in implementing this national

strategy. 

This testimony discusses the status

of DHS’s actions in fulfilling its 

responsibilities to (1) establish 

policies to define roles and 

responsibilities for national 

emergency preparedness efforts 

and prepare for the transition 

between presidential

administrations, and (2) develop

operational plans and performance 

metrics to implement these roles 

and responsibilities and coordinate 

federal resources for disaster 

planning and response. This 

testimony is based on prior GAO 

work performed from September 

2006 to June 2008 focusing on 

DHS’s efforts to address problems

identified in the many post-Katrina 

reviews. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making any new 

recommendations in this 

testimony. GAO has made

recommendations in the prior 

reports identified in this testimony,

and DHS has generally concurred 

with these recommendations and is 

taking action to implement them. 

DHS has taken several actions to define national roles and responsibilities 

and capabilities for emergency preparedness efforts in key policy 

documents and has begun preparing for the upcoming transition between 

presidential administrations. DHS prepared initial versions of key policy 

documents that describe what should be done and by whom (National 

Response Plan in 2004), how it should be done (the National Incident 

Management System in 2004) and how well it should be done (the interim 

National Preparedness Goal in 2005). DHS subsequently developed and 

issued revisions to these documents to improve and enhance its nationallevel policies, such as the National Preparedness Guidelines in 2007 which 

was the successor to the interim National Preparedness Goal. Most 

recently, DHS developed the National Response Framework (NRF), the 

successor to the National Response Plan, which became effective in March 

2008. This framework describes the doctrine that guides national 

response actions and the roles and responsibilities of officials and entities 

involved in response efforts. Clarifying roles and responsibilities will be 

especially critical as a result of the coming change in administrations and 

the associated transition of key federal officials with homeland security 

preparedness and response roles. To cope with the absence of many 

political appointed executives from senior roles, DHS has designated 

career executives to carry out specific responsibilities in the transition 

between presidential administrations and recently provided information to 

this Committee on its transition plans. To assist in planning to execute an

efficient and effective administration transition, DHS has also contracted

with the Council for Excellence in Government to identify key roles and 

responsibilities for the Department and its homeland security partners for 

responding to disasters during the transition between administrations. 

DHS is still developing operational plans to guide other federal agencies’ 

response efforts and metrics for assessing federal capabilities. Two essential 

supplements to the new National Response Framework—response guides for 

federal partners and an integrated planning system—are still under 

development. Also, DHS is still establishing a process to measure the nation’s 

overall preparedness based on a list of targeted capabilities and has not yet 

completed an inventory of all federal response capabilities. The measures and 

metrics associated with these targeted capabilities are not standards, but 

serve as guides for planning, training, and exercise activities. However, DHS 

policy does not direct development of these capabilities to address national

priorities for federal agencies. For example, for the national priority to 

“Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities” the 

National Preparedness Guidelines state that communications capabilities are 

developed to target levels in the states, tribal areas, territories, and designated 

urban areas that are consistent with measures and metrics established for 

targeted capabilities; federal agencies’ interoperability is not addressed. To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-868T. 

For more information, contact William O.

Jenkins, Jr., at (202) 512-8777 or

jenkinswo@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) preparedness to lead federal

efforts to prepare for, prevent, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and 

recover from all domestic disasters, whether natural or man-made, 

including acts of terror. My remarks today focus on the preparation for 

and response to major and catastrophic disasters which require 

substantial federal coordination with and assistance to state and local 

responders. My statement is grounded in the work GAO has done to-date 

on DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 

preparing for, responding to and recovering from major disasters and 

catastrophes. 

The need for federal leadership in homeland security efforts was never 

greater than in the hours and days following the attacks of September 11, 

2001, which ultimately led to the creation of DHS and the establishment of 

the Department’s roles to provide strategic, national leadership as the 

focal point for federal response and coordination. This role is defined in 

law and executive order and described in federal emergency management 

strategies, policies, and procedures. In order to provide the coordinated 

national homeland security effort directed by the Congress and the 

President, DHS must provide leadership across a broad spectrum of 

stakeholders including: federal agencies and departments, and DHS’s own 

components; state, local and tribal governments, their emergency 

management agencies and other state agencies; sector-specific businesses 

and industry; voluntary organizations; and academia. It is an enormous 

challenge and responsibility. In leading national preparedness efforts, DHS 

through FEMA is responsible for developing national-level policies and 

doctrine to guide the efforts of these stakeholders to establish operational 

plans to carry out their roles and responsibilities and build, measure, and 

sustain their ability to do so effectively. 

The effectiveness of DHS and FEMA in assuming these responsibilities 

was severely tested—and in some cases clearly found wanting—in the 

aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season and its catastrophic impact on the 

Page 1 GAO-08-868T 
Gulf Coast. Numerous reports,1

 along with our own observations,2

identified concerns about leadership of the federal response to Hurricane 

Katrina and questions regarding the roles, and responsibilities of DHS, 

FEMA and other federal agencies, as well as state and local officials and 

non-governmental organizations. As we reported in September 2006, 

effective preparation and response for catastrophic disasters requires that 

roles and responsibilities be clearly defined and understood and that 

responsible officials know what capabilities are needed to fulfill their roles 

and responsibilities, develop the operational plans to implement those 

roles and responsibilities, and establish, realistically test, and maintain the 

needed capabilities. To address many of the issues and problems 

highlighted by the Katrina response, Congress passed the Post-Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act of October 2006 (Post-Katrina Act), 3

which charged FEMA with the primary responsibility for coordinating and 

implementing key aspects of federal emergency preparedness and 

response. 

The Post-Katrina Act defines a catastrophic incident as any natural 

disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster that results in 

extraordinary levels of casualties or damage or disruption severely 

affecting the population (including mass evacuations), infrastructure, 

environment, economy, national morale, or government functions in an 

area. Effective federal preparation for and response to such an event 

requires planning, coordination, cooperation, and leadership within DHS 

and between DHS and other federal agencies—civilian and military— as 

well as state and local governments, and the private and nonprofit sectors 

who have resources and capabilities needed for the response.

 1

See reports: A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane Katrina 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006), U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: 

May 2006), White House Homeland Security Council The Federal Response to Hurricane

Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006), Department of Homeland

Security’s Office of Inspector General A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster 

Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 31, 2006). 

2

GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability 

Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and

Recovery System, GAO-06-618, (Washington, D.C., Sept. 2, 2006). 

3

The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006). 

Page 2 GAO-08-868T 
Today, I’d like to briefly discuss the status of DHS’s actions in fulfilling its 

responsibilities to: 

• establish policies to define roles and responsibilities for national 

emergency preparedness efforts and prepare for the transition between 

presidential administrations; and 

• develop operational plans and performance metrics to implement these 

roles and responsibilities and coordinate federal resources for disaster 

planning and response 

My observations on DHS’s and FEMA’s development of policies, plans and 

metrics to lead federal efforts in this statement are based on our prior 

work, focusing on DHS’s efforts to address problems identified in the 

many post-Katrina reviews from September 2006 to June 2008, as well as 

related work by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). We have 

issued a number of GAO reports that have examined a wide variety of 

operational and management issues, made observations and 

recommendations, and followed up on our reports assessing DHS’s 

leadership capabilities in working with other federal agencies. Examples 

relevant to the hearing today include our reviews of emergency 

communications interoperability,4

 evacuations of disadvantaged 

populations,5

 national preparedness for pandemic flu,6 and coordination 

with the Department of Defense (DOD).7

DHS has taken several actions to define national roles and responsibilities 

and capabilities for preparedness and response in key policy documents Summary 

 4

GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications 

Interoperability, GAO-07-301 (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007). 

5

GAO, Status of Implementation of GAO Recommendations on Evacuation of 

Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations and Patients and Residents of Health Care

Facilities, GAO-08-544R (Washington, D.C. Apr. 1, 2008). 

6

GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Clearer Leadership 

Roles and an Effective National Strategy, GAO-07-781 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2007). 

7

GAO, Homeland Defense U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but Needs to

Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues, GAO-08-251 

(Washington, D.C., Feb. 16, 2008), Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve 

U.S. Northern Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau,

but Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252 (Washington, D.C., April 16, 2008), and Homeland Security: 

Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend on DOD’s 

Implementation of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. GAO-08-311 

(Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008). 

Page 3 GAO-08-868T 
and has begun preparing for the upcoming transition between presidential 

administrations. However, it needs to better integrate stakeholders in its 

revision of key policy documents, particularly the National Response 

Framework. To implement requirements of the Homeland Security Act of

2002 and HSPDs 5 and 8,8

 DHS issued initial versions of key policy 

documents in 2004 (NIMS and the National Response Plan) and 2005 

(National Preparedness Goal) and has developed and issued revisions 

intended to improve and enhance its national-level policies. Most recently, 

the National Response Framework (NRF), the successor to the National 

Response Plan, became effective in March 2008; it describes the doctrine 

that guides national response actions and the roles and responsibilities of 

officials and entities involved in response efforts. Clarifying roles and 

responsibilities will be especially critical as a result of the coming change 

in administrations and the associated transition of key federal officials 

with homeland security preparedness and response roles. To cope with 

the absence of many political appointed executives from senior roles, DHS 

has designated career executives to carry out specific responsibilities in 

the transition between presidential administrations and recently provided 

information to this Committee on its transition plans. To assist in planning 

to execute an efficient and effective administration transition, DHS has 

also contracted with the Council for Excellence in Government to identify

key roles and responsibilities for the Department and its homeland 

security partners for responding to disasters during the transition between 

administrations. 

DHS’s efforts to develop operational plans to guide other federal agencies’ 

response efforts and metrics for assessing federal capabilities are 

incomplete. In addition, DHS is still establishing a process to measure the 

nation’s overall preparedness based on the Target Capabilities List (TCL)9

and has not yet developed a complete inventory of all federal response 

capabilities. For example, for the national priority to “Strengthen 

 8

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and HSPD 5 required DHS to develop a comprehensive 

National Incident Management System (NIMS) and a comprehensive National Response 

Plan. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) of December 17, 2003 directed

the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national domestic all-hazards 

preparedness goal. 

9

The TCL is a comprehensive catalog of capabilities to perform homeland security 

missions, including performance measures and metrics for common tasks. The 37 

capabilities referenced in the Guidelines span the full spectrum of homeland security 

missions. While the listing does not yet encompass every function that must be 

accomplished to prevent, protect against, respond to, or recover from a major event, it 

nonetheless offers a comprehensive starting point for planning. 

Page 4 GAO-08-868T 
Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities” the National 

Preparedness Guidelines state that communications capabilities are 

developed to target levels in the states, tribal areas, territories, and 

designated urban areas that are consistent with measures and metrics 

established for targeted capabilities; federal agencies’ interoperability is 

not addressed. 

DHS’s federal leadership role and responsibilities for emergency 

preparedness as defined in law and executive order are broad and 

challenging. To increase homeland security following the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002,

10 and signed the

Homeland Security Act in November 2002 creating DHS. The act 

centralized the leadership of many homeland security activities under a 

single federal department and, accordingly, DHS has the dominant role in 

implementing the strategy. As we noted in our review of DHS’s mission 

and management functions, the National Strategy for Homeland Security 

underscores the importance for DHS of partnering and coordination.11 For 

example, 33 of the strategy’s 43 initiatives are required to be implemented 

by 3 or more federal agencies. If these entities do not effectively 

coordinate their implementation activities, they may waste resources by 

creating ineffective and incompatible pieces of a larger security program. 

In addition, more than 20 Homeland Security Presidential Directives 

(HSPDs) define DHS’s and other federal agencies’ roles in leading efforts 

to prepare for and respond to disasters, emergencies, and potential 

terrorist threats. Directives that focus on DHS’s leadership role and 

responsibilities for homeland security include HSPD-5 and HSPD-8 which 

are summarized below: 

Background 

• Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), issued on February

28, 2003, identifies the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal 

federal official for domestic incident management and directs him to 

coordinate the federal government’s resources utilized in response to or 

 10White House Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security

(Washington, D.C., Jul. 16, 2002). 

11GAO Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission

and Management Functions GAO-07-454 (Washington, D.C.: August 17, 2007). 

Page 5 GAO-08-868T 
recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies.12

The Secretary of DHS, as the principal federal official, is to provide 

standardized, quantitative reports to the Assistant to the President for 

Homeland Security on the readiness and preparedness of the nation—at 

all levels of government—to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover

from domestic incidents and develop and administer a National Response 

Plan (NRP). To facilitate this role, HSPD-5 directs the heads of all federal

departments and agencies to assist and support the Secretary in the 

development and maintenance of the NRP. (The plan was recently revised 

and is now called the National Response Framework. 

• Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8), issued in December 

2003, called for a new national preparedness goal and performance 

measures, standards for preparedness assessments and strategies, as well 

as a system for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness. According to 

the HSPD, the Secretary is the principal federal official for coordinating 

the implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the United States. In 

cooperation with other federal departments and agencies, the Secretary 

coordinates the preparedness of federal response assets. In addition, the 

Secretary, in coordination with other appropriate federal civilian 

departments and agencies, is to develop and maintain a federal response 

capability inventory that includes the performance parameters of the 

capability, the time (days or hours) within which the capability can be 

brought to bear on an incident, and the readiness of such capability to 

respond to domestic incidents. Last year, the President issued an annex to 

HSPD-8 intended to establish a standard and comprehensive approach to 

national planning and ensure consistent planning across the federal 

government.

After the hurricane season of 2005, Congress passed the Post-Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, that, among other things, 

made organizational changes within DHS to consolidate emergency

preparedness and emergency response functions within FEMA. Most of 

the organizational changes, such as the transfer of various functions from 

 12 If and when any one of the following four conditions applies: (1) a Federal department or

agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary; (2) the 

resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been

requested by the appropriate State and local authorities; (3) more than one Federal 

department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to the incident; or

(4) the Secretary has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the domestic 

incident by the President. 

Page 6 GAO-08-868T 
DHS’s Directorate of Preparedness to FEMA, became effective as of March 

31, 2007. According to the act, the primary mission of FEMA is to: 

“reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all 

hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made 

disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, 

comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, 

protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.”13 The act kept FEMA 

within DHS and enhanced FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy 

within DHS.14 As a result of the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA is the DHS 

component now charged with leading and supporting the nation in a riskbased, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, 

protection, response, recovery, and mitigation. 

DHS Has Issued and 

Revised NationalLevel Preparedness 

Policies to Define 

Roles and 

Responsibilities 

 13 6 U.S.C. 313(b)(1). 

14 GAO Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO-07-395T 

(Washington, D.C. Mar 9, 2007). 

Page 7 GAO-08-868T 
DHS has taken action to define national roles and responsibilities and 

capabilities for preparedness and response which are reflected in several 

key policy documents: the National Response Framework, (what should 

be done and by whom); the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 

(how it should be done), and the National Performance Guidelines (how 

well it should be done). To implement requirements of the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 and HSPDs 5 and 8,15 DHS issued initial versions of 

these documents in 2004 (NIMS and the National Response Plan) and 2005 

(National Preparedness Goal) and has developed and issued revisions 

intended to improve and enhance these national-level policies. Most 

recently, the National Response Framework (NRF), the successor to the 

National Response Plan, became effective in March 2008; it describes the 

doctrine that guides national response actions and the roles and 

responsibilities of officials and entities involved in response efforts. The 

NRF also includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex, which describes an 

accelerated, proactive national response to catastrophic incidents, as well 

as a Supplement to the Catastrophic Incident Annex—both designed to 

further clarify federal roles and responsibilities and relationships among 

federal, state and local governments and responders. Together, these 

documents are intended to provide a comprehensive structure, guidance,

and performance goals for developing and maintaining an effective

national preparedness and response system. 

Because there are a range of federal and nonfederal stakeholders with 

important responsibilities for emergency preparedness and response, it is 

important that FEMA and DHS include these stakeholders in its 

development and revisions of national policies and guidelines. Today we 

are issuing a report on the process DHS used to revise the NRF, including

how DHS integrated key stakeholders. DHS included non-federal 

stakeholders in the revision process during the initial months when issues 

were identified and draft segments written, and during the final months 

when there was broad opportunity to comment on the draft that DHS had 

produced. However, DHS deviated from the work plan it established for 

the revision process that envisioned the incorporation of stakeholder 

views throughout the process and did not provide the first full revision 

draft to non-federal stakeholders for their comments and suggestions 

DHS Has Taken Action to 

Revise National 

Preparedness Policies But 

Should Plan for Better 

Integrating Stakeholders in 

the Future 

 15The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and HSPD 5 required DHS to develop a

comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS) and a comprehensive 

National Response Plan. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) of

December 17, 2003 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a national 

domestic all-hazards preparedness goal.

Page 8 GAO-08-868T 
before conducting a closed, internal federal review of the draft. DHS’s 

approach was also not in accordance with the Post-Katrina Act’s 

requirement that DHS establish a National Advisory Council (NAC) to 

incorporate non-federal input into the revision process. Although the NAC 

was to be established within 60 days of the Act (i.e., December 4, 2006), 

FEMA, which assumed responsibility for selecting members, did not name 

NAC members until June 2007 because of the additional time needed to

review hundreds of applications and select a high quality body of advisors, 

according to the FEMA Administrator. The NAC’s first meeting took place 

in October 2007 after DHS issued the revised plan for public comment. We 

are recommending that, as FEMA begins to implement and eventually

review the 2008 National Response Framework, the Administrator develop

and disseminate policies and procedures describing the conditions and 

time frames under which the next NRF revision will occur and how FEMA 

will conduct the next NRF revision. These policies and procedures should 

clearly describe how FEMA will integrate all stakeholders, including the 

NAC and other non-federal stakeholders, into the revision process and the 

methods for communicating to these stakeholders. FEMA agreed with our 

recommendation. 

The importance of involving stakeholders, both federal and non-federal, 

was underscored in our review of The National Strategy for Pandemic 

Influenza (National Pandemic Strategy) and The Implementation Plan for 

the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (National Pandemic 

Implementation Plan) which were issued in November 2005 and May 2006

respectively, by the President and his Homeland Security Council.16 Key 

non-federal stakeholders, such as state and local governments, were not 

directly involved in developing the National Pandemic Strategy and 

Implementation Plan, even though these stakeholders are expected to be

the primary responders to an influenza pandemic. While DHS collaborated

with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other 

federal agencies in developing the National Pandemic Strategy and 

Implementation Plan, we found that there are numerous shared leadership 

roles and responsibilities, leaving uncertainty about how the federal 

government would lead preparations for and response to a pandemic. 

Although the DHS Secretary is to lead overall non-medical support and 

response actions and the HHS Secretary is to lead the public health and

 16GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Clearer Federal

Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy, GAO-07-781 (Washington, D.C.: Aug 

14, 2007). 

Page 9 GAO-08-868T 
medical response, the plan does not clearly address these simultaneous 

responsibilities or how these roles are to work together, particularly over 

an extended period and at multiple locations across the country. In 

addition to the two Secretaries, we observed that the FEMA Administrator 

is now the principal domestic emergency management advisor to the 

President, the Homeland Security Council, and the DHS Secretary, 

pursuant to the Post-Katrina Act, adding further complexity to the 

leadership structure in the case of an influenza pandemic. Most of these 

leadership roles and responsibilities have not been tested under pandemic 

scenarios, leaving it unclear how they will work. We therefore 

recommended that DHS and HHS work together to develop and conduct 

rigorous testing, training, and exercises for pandemic influenza to ensure 

that federal leadership roles are clearly defined and understood and that 

leaders are able to effectively execute shared responsibilities to address 

emerging challenges, and ensure these roles are clearly understood by all

key stakeholders. We also recommended that, in updating the National 

Pandemic Implementation Plan, the process should involve key nonfederal stakeholders. DHS and HHS agreed with our recommendations, 

and said that they were taking or planned to take actions to implement our 

recommendations. 

As we noted in our report on the preparation for and response to 

Hurricane Katrina issued in September 2006,17 clearly defined and 

understood roles and responsibilities are essential for an effective, 

coordinated response to a catastrophic disaster. 

In any administration, the number of political appointees who depart rises 

as the President’s term nears an end. Many cabinet secretaries and agency 

heads —in addition to the DHS Secretary and the FEMA Administrator—

have response responsibilities in a major or catastrophic disaster, which 

could occur at any time. As political appointees depart, it is therefore 

essential that there be career senior executives who are clearly designated

to lead their respective department and agency responsibilities for 

emergency response and continuity of operations. It is also important that 

they clearly understand their roles and responsibilities and have training 

to exercise them effectively. 

Presidential Transition 

Period Poses Challenges 

for DHS Leadership of 

National Preparedness 

Efforts 

 17GAO-06-618. 

Page 10 GAO-08-868T 
DHS has designated career executives to carry out specific responsibilities 

in the transition between presidential administrations and recently 

provided information to this Committee on its transition plans. DHS has 

also contracted with the Council for Excellence in Government to map key 

roles and responsibilities for responding to disasters during the transition 

between administrations. The Council is to produce a visual mapping of 

these roles, plus supplementary documentation to support/explicate the 

mapping. Once those materials had been developed, the Council plans to 

hold a series of trainings/workshops for career civil servants in acting 

leadership positions and nominated political appointees based on the roles

mapped out by the Council. In addition, the project includes training and 

workshops for those in acting leadership positions outside DHS. 

DHS is responsible for, but has not yet completed, leading the operational 

planning needed for an effective national response. Two essential 

supplements to the new National Response Framework—Federal Partner 

Response Guides and DHS’s Integrated Planning System—are still under 

development. The partner guides are designed to provide a ready 

reference of key roles and actions for federal, state, local, tribal, and 

private-sector response partners. According to DHS, the guides are to 

provide more specific “how to” handbooks tailored specifically to the 

federal government and the other non-federal stakeholders: state, local 

and tribal governments, the private sector and nongovernmental 

organizations. DHS has not established a schedule for completing these 

guides. 

On December 3, 2007, President Bush issued Annex I to HSPD-8, entitled

National Planning. The Annex describes the development of a national 

planning system in which all levels of government work together in a 

DHS Has Not Yet 

Developed 

Comprehensive 

Operational Plans and 

Metrics to Coordinate 

Federal Response 

Resources 

DHS Still Developing Ways 

to Lead National Planning 

Page 11 GAO-08-868T 
collaborative fashion to create plans for various scenarios and requires 

that DHS develop a standardized, integrated national planning process. 

This Integrated Planning System (IPS) is intended to be the national 

planning system used to develop interagency and intergovernmental plans 

based upon the National Planning Scenarios. The National Response 

Framework states that local, tribal, state, regional, and federal plans are to 

be mutually supportive. Although the Annex calls for the new system to be 

developed in coordination with relevant federal agencies and issued by 

February 3, 2008, DHS has not yet completed the IPS, and HSPD-8 Annex 1 

(i.e. the White House) does not lay out a timeframe for release of the IPS.

According to FEMA’s Administrator, the agency’s National Preparedness 

Directorate, in coordination with its Disaster Operations Directorate and

the DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination, has begun to develop a 

common federal planning process that will support a family of related 

planning documents. These related planning documents will include 

strategic guidance statements, strategic plans, concept plans, operations 

plans, and tactical plans. The Annex to HSPD-8 is designed to “enhance 

the preparedness of the United States by formally establishing a standard

and comprehensive approach to national planning” in order to “integrate 

and effect policy and operational objectives to prevent, protect against, 

respond to, and recover from all hazards.” According to the Administrator, 

FEMA continues to be a significant contributor to the draft IPS, and will 

also be involved in developing the family of plans for each of the national

planning scenarios as required by the Annex. 

In following up on the status of recommendations we made after 

Hurricane Katrina related to planning for the evacuation of transportation 

disadvantaged populations,18 we found that DHS’s leadership in this area 

had led to the implementation of some, but not all of our 

recommendations.19 For example, we recommended that DHS clarify 

within the National Response Plan that FEMA is the lead and coordinating 

agency to provide evacuation assistance when state and local governments

are overwhelmed, and clarify the supporting federal agencies’

 18GAO, Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance for Health

Facilities Should be Addressed, GAO-06-826 (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2006) and 

Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify Responsibilities

and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations, GAO-07-44 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2006). 

19GAO, Status of Implementation of GAO Recommendations on Evacuation of 

Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations and Patients and Residents of Health Care

Facilities, GAO-08-544R (Washington, D.C., Apr.1, 2008). 

Page 12 GAO-08-868T 
responsibilities. In April 2008, we noted that DHS’s draft Mass Evacuation 

Incident Annex to the National Response Framework appears to clarify 

the role of FEMA and supporting federal agencies, although the annex is 

still not finalized. Similarly, we recommended that DHS improve its 

technical assistance by, among other things, providing more detailed 

guidance on how to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the evacuation 

of transportation disadvantaged populations. DHS had developed basic 

guidance on the evacuation of transportation disadvantaged populations 

and was currently working on targeted guidance for states and localities. 

However, we had also recommended that DHS require, as part of its grant 

programs, all state and local governments plan, train, and conduct 

exercises for the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged populations, 

but DHS had not done so. DHS agreed to consider our recommendation. 

We also recommended that DHS clearly delineate how the federal 

government will assist state and local governments with the movement of 

patients and residents out of hospitals and nursing homes to a 

mobilization center where National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) 20

transportation begins. DHS and HHS have collaborated with state and 

local health departments in hurricane-prone regions to determine gaps 

between needs and available resources for hospital and nursing home 

evacuations and to secure local, state, or federal resources to fill the gaps. 

Based on this analysis, HHS and DHS contracted for ground and air 

ambulances and para-transit services for Gulf and East Coast states. 

At a more tactical level of planning, FEMA uses mission assignments to 

coordinate the urgent, short-term emergency deployment of federal 

resources to address disaster needs. Mission assignments may be issued 

for a variety of tasks, such as search and rescue missions or debris 

removal, depending on the performing agencies’ areas of expertise. 

According to DHS, the Department has agreements and pre-scripted 

mission assignments with 31 federal agencies for a total of 223 

assignments that essentially pre-arrange for the deployment of health 

equipment, a national disaster medical system, military equipment, and a 

whole host of other services in the event that they are necessary to 

support a state or a locality. FEMA officials said these assignments are 

 20Under the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, primary authority for the 

National Disaster Medical System was transferred from DHS to HHS in January 2007. HHS 

and DHS are collaborating to implement this recommendation. 

Page 13 GAO-08-868T 
listed in the operational working draft of the “Pre-Scripted Mission 

Assignment Catalogue,” which FEMA intends to publish this month. 

We have previously made recommendations aimed at improving FEMA’s 

mission assignment process and FEMA officials concurred with our 

recommendations and told us that they are reviewing the management of 

mission assignments.21 In addition, reviews by the DHS OIG regarding 

mission assignments concluded that FEMA’s management controls were

generally not adequate to ensure that deliverables (missions tasked) met 

requirements; costs were reasonable; invoices were accurate; federal 

property and equipment were adequately accounted for or managed; and 

FEMA’s interests were protected. 

According to the DHS OIG, mission assignment policies, procedures, 

training, staffing, and funding have never been fully addressed by FEMA, 

creating misunderstandings among federal agencies concerning 

operational and fiduciary responsibilities and FEMA’s guidelines regarding

the mission assignment process, from issuance of an assignment through 

execution and close-out, are vague. Reflecting upon lessons learned from

Hurricane Dean, the California wildfires, and the national-level 

preparedness exercise for top officials in October 2007, FEMA’s Disaster 

Operations Directorate formed an intra/interagency Mission Assignment 

Working Group to review mission assignment processes and procedures 

and develop recommendations for the management of mission 

assignments, according to the OIG. Most recently, we reported22 on 

mission assignments for emergency transit assistance and recommended 

that DHS draft prescripted mission assignments for public transportation 

services to provide a frame of reference for FEMA, FTA, and state 

transportation departments in developing mission assignments after future 

disasters. DHS agreed to take our recommendation under consideration. 

 21GAO, Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and Consolidate

Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for the 2005 Gulf Coast

Hurricanes, GAO-06-834 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

22GAO, Emergency Transit Assistance: Federal Funding for Recent Disasters, and

Options for the Future, GAO-06-243 (Washington, D.C., Feb. 15, 2008). 

Page 14 GAO-08-868T 
DHS issued an update to the national goal for preparedness in National 

Preparedness Guidelines in September 2007 to establish both readiness 

metrics to measure progress, and a system for assessing the nation’s 

overall preparedness and response capabilities. However, DHS has not yet 

completed efforts to implement the system and has not yet developed a 

complete inventory of all federal response capabilities. According to the 

September 2007 Guidelines, DHS was still establishing a process to 

measure the nation’s overall preparedness based on the Target 

Capabilities List (TCL), which accompanies the Guidelines. Our ongoing 

work on national preparedness and the national exercise program is 

reviewing DHS’s plans and schedules for completing this process. 

In the Guidelines, the description for each capability includes a definition, 

outcome, preparedness and performance activities, tasks, and measures 

and metrics that are quantitative or qualitative levels against which 

achievement of a task or capability outcome can be assessed. According to

the Guidelines, they describe how much, how well, and/or how quickly an 

action should be performed and are typically expressed in a way that can

be observed during an exercise or real event. The measures and metrics 

are not standards, but serve as guides for planning, training, and exercise 

activities. However, the Guidelines do not direct development of 

capabilities to address national priorities to federal agencies. For example, 

for the national priority to “Strengthen Interoperable and Operable 

Communications Capabilities” the Guidelines state that interoperable and 

operable communications capabilities are developed to target levels in the 

states, tribal areas, territories, and designated urban areas that are 

consistent with measures and metrics established in the TCL; federal 

agencies’ interoperability is not addressed. 

Prior disasters and emergencies, as well as State and Urban Area 

Homeland Security Strategies and status reports on interoperable 

communications, have shown persistent shortfalls in achieving 

communications interoperability. 23 These shortfalls demonstrate a need 

for a national framework fostering the identification of communications 

requirements and definition of technical standards. State and local 

DHS Still Developing Ways 

to Define and Measure 

Federal Agencies’ 

Capabilities 

 23According to the National Preparedness Guidelines, communications interoperability is 

the ability of public safety agencies (including police, fire, EMS, etc.) and service agencies 

(including public works, transportation, hospitals, etc.) to talk within and across agencies

and jurisdictions via radio and associated communications systems; exchange voice, data, 

and/or video with one another on demand; and do so in real time, when needed, and when

authorized.

Page 15 GAO-08-868T 
authorities, working in partnership with DHS, need to establish statewide 

interoperable communications plans and a national interoperability 

baseline to assess the current state of communications interoperability. 

Achieving interoperable communications and creating effective 

mechanisms for sharing information are long-term projects that require 

Federal leadership and a collaborative approach to planning that involves 

all levels of government as well as the private sector. In April 2007, we 

reported24 that DHS’s SAFECOM program intended to strengthen 

interoperable public safety communications at all levels of government 

had made limited progress in and had not addressed interoperability with 

federal agencies, a critical element to interoperable communications 

required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004.

25 We concluded that the SAFECOM program has had a limited impact 

on improving communications interoperability among federal, state, and 

local agencies. The program’s limited effectiveness can be linked to poor 

program management practices, such as the lack of a plan for improving 

interoperability across all levels of government, and inadequate 

performance measures to fully gauge the effectiveness of its tools and 

assistance. We recommended, among other things, that DHS develop and 

implement a program plan for SAFECOM that includes goals focused on 

improving interoperability among all levels of government. DHS agreed 

with the intent of the recommendation and stated that the Department was 

working to develop a program plan. 

DHS had also not yet developed a complete inventory of federal 

capabilities, as we reported in August 2007,26 in assessing the extent to 

which DHS has met a variety of mission and management expectations. As 

a result, earlier this year Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Committee sent letters requesting information from 15 agencies 

with responsibilities under the National Response Framework to respond 

in the event of a nuclear or radiological incident. The committee asked for 

information on a variety of issues—for example, about evacuation, 

medical care, intelligence, forensics, and tracking fallout—to assess 

agencies’ current capabilities and responsibilities in the event of a nuclear

attack. Other federal agencies also need this information from DHS; in 

 24GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications 

Interoperability, GAO-07-301 (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007). 

25Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, section 

7303, 118 Stat. 3638, 3843-44, Dec. 17, 2004. 

26GAO-07-454. 

Page 16 GAO-08-868T 
reviewing the Department of Defense’s (DOD) coordination with DHS, we 

reported in April 2008 that DOD’s Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has 

difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in part 

because NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from DHS 

on the specific requirements or capabilities needed from the military in the 

event of a disaster. 

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions that your or other members of the subcommittee may have at

this time. 

For further information about this statement, please contact William O. 

Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202) 512-

8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above the 

following individuals from GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice Team 

also made major contributors to this testimony: Chris Keisling, Assistant 

Director; John Vocino, Analyst-in-Charge, and Adam Vogt, 

Communications Analyst. 

Page 17 GAO-08-868T 

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