Number 159, March 1999

A Comprehensive Approach toNorth Korea

**by Richard L. Armitage***

Since the Agreed Framework (AF) was signedby the United States and North Korea on October 21, 1994, the security situation on theKorean peninsula and in Northeast Asia has changed qualitatively for the worse. Thediscovery last year of a suspect North Korean nuclear site and the August 31 launch of aTaepo Dong missile have combined to raise fundamental questions about Pyongyang’sintentions, its commitment to the agreement, and the possibility of North-Southreconciliation. These developments also raise profound questions about the sustainabilityof current U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula. 

The Agreed Framework successfullyaddressed a specific security problem—North Korea’s plutonium production at theYongbyon and Taechon facilities. Under the agreement, operations were frozen at the twofacilities and Pyongyang was prevented from obtaining fissile material from the fuel rodsof the reactor core for five to six nuclear weapons. Had the program continued unabated,North Korea might have been able to produce enough fissile material for a substantialnuclear arsenal. Arguably, the Agreed Framework was a necessary but not sufficientresponse to the multiple security challenges posed by North Korea. Indeed, the developmentof the Taepo Dong missile poses an expanding security threat to Northeast Asia and,increasingly, to the Middle East, Europe, and even the United States itself.

| *****Ambassador    Richard L. Armitage is President of Armitage Associates and a former Assistant Secretary    of Defense for International Security Affairs. He chaired a working group on U.S. Policy    Toward North Korea whose members included: Johannes A. Binnendijk, Institute for National    Strategic Studies; Peter T.R. Brookes, House Committee on International Relations; Carl W.    Ford, Ford and Associates; Kent M. Harrington, Harrington Group L.L.C.; Frank S. Jannuzi,    Minority Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Robert A. Manning, Council on    Foreign Relations; RADM Michael A. McDevitt, USN (Ret.), Center for Naval Analyses; James    J. Przystup, Institute for National Strategic Studies; GEN Robert W. RisCassi, USA (Ret.),    L-3 Communications Corporation; and Ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz, Paul H. Nitze School of    Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University.
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in    this paper are solely those of the working group and do not represent the views of the    National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other government agency or    nongovernment organization.**Changing Assumptions**
Experience in dealing with Pyongyang sincethe Agreed Framework was signed challenges several critical assumptions on which publicand Congressional support for U.S. policy has been based. 
- The first is the assumption made by some    senior administration officials that the Agreed Framework had ended North Korea’s    nuclear program. 
- The second is that North Korea is a    failed state on the verge of collapse and that a "hard landing"—collapse    perhaps accompanied by aggression—should be avoided.  
- The third is that the Agreed Framework    would induce North Korea to open up to the outside world, initiate a gradual process of    North-South reconciliation, and lead to real reform and a "soft landing." 

These assumptions suggested that, even iflittle progress was made on other political/security issues, the Agreed Framework was aneffective, time-buying strategy. At a minimum, North Korea’s conventionalcapabilities would continue to degrade (as they have). Optimally, the North would solveour problems by ultimately reconciling or uniting with the South. These assumptions arenow open to question.
**Reality Check**
The disclosure of at least one suspectsite—on which construction began prior to the agreement—reinforces thepossibility that Pyongyang has frozen only a portion of its nuclear program or is seekingto develop a covert nuclear weapons program. The Agreed Framework was structured to becomestronger over time in constraining the North’s nuclear weapons capability. This meantdeferring the requirement for the North Korean nuclear program to come into fullcompliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full-scope safeguards untilroughly 2002-03. In effect, the agreement accepted the possibility that North Korea mighthave one or two nuclear devices. Since 1994, it is also possible that Pyongyang could haveacquired additional nuclear weapons technology and/or fissile material from externalsources.

Moreover, the core assumption of imminentcollapse is seriously flawed. Despite severe hardships, there are no signs ofregime-threatening social or political unrest, or military disaffection. As underscored inits 50th anniversary celebration last year, the North Korean regime appears to haveconsolidated itself under Kim Jong Il. 

There are also no signs that the regime iscontemplating any radical market-oriented reforms. Instead, forced by necessity, it isexperimenting at the margins with modest reform to alleviate food shortages at the locallevel and gain hard currency. With Chinese aid and a variety of hard currencyschemes—missile exports, counterfeiting, narcotics trafficking, selling overflightrights—the regime has been able to keep urban areas minimally functioning. By allappearances, the regime may be able to stagger on indefinitely. 

Starvation has not politically weakenedthe regime. As demonstrated in the cases of Ukraine under Stalin and China under Mao,there is not necessarily a connection between human misery and the stability of the regimein a totalitarian system. The regime has been willing to destroy an entire generation topreserve its power.

At the same time, Pyongyang has spurnedthe political overtures of the most conciliatory president in the history of the Republicof Korea, Kim Dae Jung. President Kim has written volumes on Korean unification, includingplans for reunification that are similar to those offered by the late Kim Il Sung. Theunwillingness to deal seriously with Kim Dae Jung suggests a fundamental fear thatNorth-South reconciliation would undermine the legitimacy of the regime in Pyongyang.

President Kim’s Sunshine Policy (nowknown as the Engagement Policy) has established a formula for reconciliation on thepeninsula, while deferring the ultimate goal of reunification as a practical matter. Todate, Pyongyang has responded to Seoul’s economic, social, and culturalnongovernmental overtures, but has rejected any political reconciliation with South Korea.Moreover, as evidenced by recent incidents of military infiltration, it continues itsaggressive behavior.
**Who Is Buying Time?**
The notion that buying time works in ourfavor is increasingly dubious. A growing body of evidence suggests that it is North Koreathat is buying time—to consolidate the regime, continue its nuclear weapons program,and build and sell two new generations of missiles, while disregarding the well-being ofits 22 million people. Kim Jong Il’s assumption of the post of Chairman of NorthKorea’s Military Commission has raised the influence of the armed forces. Thesedevelopments have created an increasingly dangerous security environment in NortheastAsia. 

Indeed, North Korea’s nuclear weaponsprogram and the development of missile delivery systems have combined to pose an enhancedthreat to the security of Japan. This threat has grown even as Japan has continued tosupport the Agreed Framework and its light-water reactor project. Yet we cannot expectTokyo’s continued support for approaches to Pyongyang that fail to addressJapan’s security concerns.

North Korea’s provocative actions andbelligerent posture have challenged—and taken advantage of—our interest instability. For Pyongyang, the lesson of the past four years is that brinkmanship works.
**Foundation for a New Approach**
A Congressionally mandated review has madeit clear that current policy toward North Korea is politically unsustainable. Similarpolitical pressures are today evident in Japan and may soon surface in the Republic ofKorea. The appointment of former Secretary of Defense William Perry to conduct a review ofpolicy toward North Korea is an important step in fashioning a policy that is politicallyviable and protects the vital interests of the United States and its allies.

A new approach must treat the AgreedFramework as the beginning of a policy toward North Korea, not as the end of the problem.It should clearly formulate answers to two key questions: first, what precisely do we wantfrom North Korea, and what price are we prepared to pay for it? Second, are we prepared totake a different course if, after exhausting all reasonable diplomatic efforts, weconclude that no worthwhile accord is possible? 

Current policy is fragmented. Eachcomponent of policy—implementing the Agreed Framework, four-party peace talks,missile talks, food aid, POW-MIA talks—operates largely on its own track without anylarger strategy or focus on how the separate pieces fit together. In the absence of acomprehensive policy, North Korea has held the initiative, with Washington responding asPyongyang acts as *demandeur*. 

A successful approach to North Korea mustbe comprehensive and integrated, and must address the totality of the security threat. Thestakes involved should make Korea a matter of the highest priority for the President. Thiswill require sustained attention to manage the issue with Congress, our Korean andJapanese allies, and China. The diplomacy leading to the Agreed Framework had such focuswhen Robert Galucci was named special coordinator, reporting directly to the Secretary ofState and the President. Unfortunately, after Ambassador Galucci left his Korea post in1995, no successor was named. 

The logic of the policies pursued by theUnited States, its allies, and China has been one of muddling through. This has allowedNorth Korea to obtain economic benefits while maintaining its military threat. Given theopacity of North Korea’s totalitarian regime, its decision-making process isunknowable. Only by fairly testing Pyongyang’s intentions through diplomacy can wevalidate policy assumptions. If a diplomatic solution is not possible, it is to ouradvantage to discover this sooner rather than later in order to best protect our securityinterests. If North Korea leaves no choice but confrontation, it should be on our terms,not its own.

One cannot expect North Korea to take U.S.diplomacy seriously unless we demonstrate unambiguously that the United States is preparedto bolster its deterrent military posture. This can be done without appearing to threatenPyongyang. At the same time, policy should provide an adequate incentive structure to anyforces inside the North Korean elite who may be inclined to believe that the least badchoice for survival is one of civil international behavior and opening. To convince theNorth to modify its posture, we need a larger conceptual framework, with greaterincentives and corresponding disincentives.

The first step toward a new approach is toregain the diplomatic initiative. U.S. policy toward North Korea has become largelyreactive and predictable, with U.S. diplomacy characterized by a cycle of North Koreanprovocation (or demand) and American response. The intention is to be proactive and todefine the agenda. 

This begins with setting new terms ofreference. Diplomacy must fashion an initiative that integrates the entire spectrum ofsecurity challenges, while enhanced deterrence must address what we are prepared to do,should diplomacy prove inadequate.

Our strategy must be closely coordinatedwith our allies. It must integrate Tokyo’s interests and assets, as well asSeoul’s Engagement Policy and defense capabilities. Such integration, at a minimum,would strengthen the U.S. alliance structure, while positioning Washington to deal moreeffectively with Pyongyang. 

A new approach to North Korea willnecessarily test China’s intentions. Beijing was helpful in the process leading tothe Agreed Framework, and the United States publicly cites that cooperation as a majorpayoff of its China policy. 

But China is also pursuing its own agenda.Beijing is sustaining North Korea with aid, despite Pyongyang’s apparentunwillingness to heed its advice. China has resisted active cooperation—with theKorean Peninsula Energy Development Organi-zation, with the World Food Program, and onmissiles. Its independent actions pose a challenge to any successful U.S. policy. Noapproach to North Korea is likely to succeed absent some modicum of active cooperationfrom—and clear understanding with—China. Beijing must understand that it willeither bear a burden for failure or benefit from cooperation.
**Operational Elements of A NewComprehensive Approach**
We would propose a new comprehensiveapproach for management of the problems posed by North Korea. The package should combinethe elements of deterrence and diplomacy cited below. This package is not offered with anyunwarranted optimism regarding what is possible vis-�-vis North Korea. Thus, thestrengthening of deterrence is central to this package.

To make a comprehensive approachsustainable politically, it is critical to start with and maintain close coordination withCongress. To be successful, policy toward the Korean peninsula requires a foundation ofstrong bipartisan support. A regular mechanism for executive-legislative interactionshould be developed. The former Senate Arms Control Observer Groups on U.S.- Sovietrelations can serve as a model. 

To protect U.S. and allied interests, astrengthening of deterrence must support diplomacy. Deter-rence depends essentially on theproper blend of diplomacy, declaratory policy, and demonstrable military capability. As aresult, if diplomacy fails, North Korea should be faced with the consequences of itschoice: isolation or containment in an environment in which U.S. leadership and alliancestructures have been reinvigorated and strengthened, allowing the United States, theRepublic of Korea, and Japan to act together.

The following steps are critical tobolstering credible deterrence:
- The United States should encourage    Japanese leaders to accelerate the timetable for Guidelines Legislation, and to underscore    the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance to Tokyo’s security interests in the region    and beyond. 
- The United States should call for a    trilateral (the United States, Republic of Korea, and Japan) defense ministers    consultative meeting to address a range of peninsula contingencies. In particular, this    meeting should consider actions to implement force enhancement options, which might    include agreements to increase counter-battery radar around Seoul and deploy more Patriot    batteries to Japan from Europe and the continental United States. Public statements should    also focus on deepening missile defense cooperation, as well as a spectrum of military    exercises to deal with a variety of North Korean actions.  
- "Red Lines" should be drawn.    The United States, together with the Republic of Korea and Japan, should clarify what is    unacceptable behavior and underscore that provocative military action by North Korea will    not be tolerated and will provoke a response. 
- The Pentagon should undertake a review    of the American presence in South Korea, not with a view to reduction, but to ensure that    U.S. forces can optimally deal with the evolving nature of the North Korean threat.  
- As a separate but related action, the    Pentagon and the commander in chief of Combined Forces Command in the Republic of Korea    should conduct a review to determine what mix of surveillance, radar, and other weapons is    required to improve the defense of Seoul against bombardment or surprise attack. To    underscore alliance commitments, the United States should also announce that it is    prepared to augment forces in theater. 

To enhance the prospects for thecomprehensive package and to advance U.S. and allied interests, diplomacy must be closelycoordinated with Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing.
- The U.S. point person should be    designated by the President in consultation with Congressional leaders and should report    directly to the President. This step also aims to move the issue to the highest possible    level of decisionmaking in North Korea.  
- Diplomacy should seek to align South    Korean and Japanese policies to influence positively North Korean behavior as well as to    reinforce military deterrence. 
- The United States should propose a    trilateral (United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan) foreign minister-level    consultative meeting. The goals should be to name high-level point persons, establish    coordinating mechanisms, and raise the issue to the level of a presidential national    security priority. Trilateral coordination should reach understandings on a division of    responsibilities for the comprehensive proposal. 
- China’s active cooperation is    vital. Because the United States and China share common interests with respect to the    Korean peninsula, we expect China to act in a positive manner. Active cooperation will    enhance Sino-American relations. However, if conflict occurs as a result of inadequate    cooperation, Beijing will bear a heavy responsibility. Moreover, the burden of keeping    North Korea on "life support" will fall squarely on China if our diplomatic    initiative fails.  
**The Comprehensive Package**
United States objectives should bemaintaining and as necessary strengthening deterrence, and eliminating through peacefulmeans the military threat posed by North Korean nuclear, chemical, biological, andconventional weapons and missiles. Our goal is to reduce the risks to the United States,the Republic of Korea, and Japan. To the extent the threat cannot be eliminated, the goalis to contain the residual threat. In addition, the United States seeks to facilitateSouth-North reconciliation. 

Washington should table an offer thatmeets Pyongyang’s legitimate economic, security, and political concerns. This wouldallow the United States to seize the diplomatic initiative as well as the moral andpolitical high ground. It would also strengthen the ability to build and sustain acoalition if North Korea does not cooperate. Most importantly, the failure of enhanceddiplomacy should be demonstrably attributable to Pyongyang. 

The objective of negotiations should be tooffer Pyongyang clear choices in regard to its future: on the one hand, economic benefits,security assurances, political legitimization, on the other, the certainty of enhancedmilitary deterrence. For the United States and its allies, the package as a whole meansthat we are prepared—if Pyongyang meets our concerns—to accept North Korea as alegitimate actor, up to and including full normalization of relations. 

Negotiations would address the following:

**1. The Agreed Framework**: We shouldmake clear our intention to honor existing commitments, but also underscore that thepolitical and security environments have deteriorated significantly since October 1994because of North Korea’s actions.**To sustain support for the agreement, it isimperative that the issues regarding the suspect site(s) and missiles be addressed.
- ***Sites:***We should note that    suspect sites are covered in the "confidential minute" to the Agreed Framwork.    Our objective is to have a credible mechanism to increase on-going transparency of the    present site—but not be limited to that site. The United States should make it clear    in a unilateral statement that the comprehensive package encompasses any suspect site in    North Korea. 
- ***Plutonium:***To bring North    Korea promptly into compliance with IAEA safeguards, we need to prepare for IAEA    inspections under the agreement. North Korean cooperation in preserving the historical    record of its past nuclear activities is critical. In addition, a new bargain should    include early removal from North Korea of the nuclear spent fuel currently in storage at    Yongbyon.  
- ***Quid pro quo****:***    Accelerating the process of resolving site questions, and the issue of IAEA compliance,    could likely require a U.S. commitment to expedite the construction of the two light-water    reactors, and negotiation of a United States-North Korean nuclear cooperation agreement.  

**2. Missiles:**North Korean missileshave become a far more prominent problem than was the case when the Agreed Framework wassigned. It implicitly puts the missile problem on the agenda. Our near-term objectives areto end testing and exports, and, over the long term, to obtain North Korean adherence tothe Missile Technology Control Regime limits. However, if missile exports continue and theUnited States can identify them, we should do what we can to intercept those shipments. Wewill make it clear that we will act under the UN Charter’s right of self-defense.

**3. Conventional threat**: The UnitedStates should table a proposal for confidence building measures to begin a process aimedat reciprocal conventional force reductions. Any new peace mechanism should be linked tothe reduction of the conventional threat. 

**4. Food/economic assistance/sanctions:**TheUnited States should continue to provide some humanitarian food and medical aid with thecaveat of increased transparency on distribution. But, our emphasis would be on assistingNorth Korean economic restructuring. We would support actions that open its economy tomarket forces. We are prepared to further ease sanctions and support its membership in theinternational financial institutions, recognizing that this requires change on the part ofPyongyang. If the North takes the necessary steps, the United States, with its allies,should consider establishing a Korean reconstruction fund within the World Bank or AsianDevelopment Bank.

U.S. diplomacy must integrate Seoul’sEngage-ment Policy (e.g., government approval of investment projects, particularly largeindustrial investment by major firms known as*Chaebol)* with the broad policyobjectives of the comprehensive package. 

As a step-by-step roadmap to a morecooperative relationship, economic benefits beyond humanitarian aid should be phased in asNorth Korea implements threat reduction measures. In the context of an economic assistancepackage, the United States could consult with North Korea to review theenergy component of the Agreed Framework to develop alternate energy sources.

**5. Security assurances:** The UnitedStates, along with the Republic of Korea and Japan, should propose a six-party (the UnitedStates, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea) meeting to deal with thesecurity of North Korea. A multilateral commitment should be based on the pledges made inKim Dae Jung’s inaugural address—that we have no intent to implode North Korea,to absorb North Korea, or to force North Korea to change its political system. Assurancescould run the gamut from a pledge of nonaggression to a commitment to respect thesovereignty and territorial integrity of North Korea. Our goal should be to foster anenvironment making it as easy as possible for Pyongyang to choose reform. The UnitedStates and its allies should make it clear that we are prepared to coexist with a lessthreatening regime in the North. 

**6. Normalization:**If North Koreasatisfies our security concerns, the United States should be prepared to move toward fullnormalization of relations.
**Should Diplomacy Fail**
The one enduring element of thisinitiative—irrespective of North Korea’s response—is the reinforcing ofU.S. leadership in maintaining stability and enhancing security in this critical region.The U.S. effort to strengthen security cooperation with our key allies—the Republicof Korea and Japan—is an integral part of this leadership and becomes even morecentral to regional security. 

The virtue of this initiative is that itwill test North Korea’s intentions, discover whether diplomacy holds any realpossibility of yielding positive results, and, in the process, restore U.S. leadership.This would enable us to bolster a coalition to deter and contain North Korea. It is aimedat leaving Pyongyang significantly worse off than if it had chosen a future of cooperationon mutually beneficial terms. 

Should diplomacy fail, the United Stateswould have to consider two alternative courses, neither of which is attractive. One is tolive with and deter a nuclear North Korea armed with delivery systems, with all itsimplications for the region. The other is preemption, with the attendant uncertainties.
- **Strengthened deterrence and    containment.** This would involve a more ready and robust posture, including a    willingness to interdict North Korean missile exports on the high seas. Our posture in the    wake of a failure of diplomacy would position the United States and its allies to enforce    "red lines." 
- **Preemption.** We recognize the    dangers and difficulties associated with this option. To be considered, any such    initiative must be based on precise knowledge of facilities, assessment of probable    success, and clear understanding with our allies of the risks. 

We are under no illusions about theprospects for success of the comprehensive package outlined above. The issues are seriousand the implications of a failure of diplomacy are profound.

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

Editor in Chief - Hans Binnendijk

Editor - Jonathan W. PierceNOTE

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