UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JOAN E. FARR, a/k/a Joan Heffington, 

 Petitioner - Appellant, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL 

REVENUE, 

 Respondent - Appellee. 

No. 18-9002 

(CIR No. 002746-15) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, McKAY and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Joan E. Farr appeals pro se from a Tax Court decision that sustained the 

Commissioner’s assessment of excise taxes. Exercising jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7482(a), we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

 In 2015, the Commissioner issued Farr a notice of tax deficiency for engaging in 

excess benefit transactions with her § 501(c)(3) organization, Association for Honest 

 * After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

October 1, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
2 

Attorneys (AHA).1

 “The term ‘excess benefit transaction’ means any transaction in 

which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization directly 

or indirectly to or for the use of any disqualified person if the value of the economic 

benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance of 

services) received for providing such benefit.” 26 U.S.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A). 

 As for the specific excess benefit transactions, the Commissioner determined that 

during 2010, 2011, and 2012, Farr used AHA’s checking account to make personal 

purchases from various grocery, retail, automotive, and home-improvement stores, as 

well as to make tuition payments for her son and to cover the costs of exhuming her 

father’s remains for DNA analysis. Based on transactions totaling $39,495.34 over the 

three-year period, the Commissioner assessed a first-tier excise tax of $9,873.83 and a 

second-tier excise tax of $78,990.68. 

 Farr then disputed the assessments in Tax Court, arguing that the AHA funds she 

withdrew were used to further AHA’s business purpose, to compensate her for services 

rendered to AHA, and to repay loans she made to AHA. The Tax Court upheld the 

assessments, prompting Farr’s appeal to this court. 

DISCUSSION

 Excess benefit transactions are taxed in two tiers—first, at a rate of twenty-five 

percent, and second, at a rate of two-hundred percent if the first tier is not paid within the 

taxable period. See id. § 4958(a)(1), (b). These taxes apply to “disqualified person[s],” 

 1

 According to Farr, AHA “tries to discourage litigation, improve the legal 

system and seek ‘justice for all.’” Aplt. Opening Br. at 1. 
3 

meaning “any person who was, at any time during the 5-year period ending on the date of 

such transaction, in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the 

organization.” Id. § 4958(f)(1)(A). 

 The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner’s assessment of first- and second-tier 

excise taxes because Farr failed to submit any credible evidence showing that the 

economic benefits she derived from using AHA’s funds were traceable to any 

consideration she provided AHA. Indeed, “an economic benefit shall not be treated as 

consideration for the performance of services unless such organization clearly indicated 

its intent to so treat such benefit.” Id. § 4958(c)(1)(A).2

 We review the Tax Court’s legal 

conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Lewis v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 

1272, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008). 

 On appeal, Farr advances no cogent argument with record support showing that 

the Tax Court erred in determining that she engaged in excess benefit transactions with 

AHA. Rather, she accuses the Tax Court and the Commissioner of, among other things, 

“engag[ing] in unethical acts and . . . conspiracy/collusion, fraud and intentional fraud, 

and tort of outrage.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 10. Although we liberally construe a pro se 

 2

 In the Tax Court, Farr did not dispute that AHA was a tax-exempt 

organization, that she was a disqualified person, or that she had not corrected the 

first-tier tax deficiency in order to avoid the second-tier tax. Any attempt to do so 

now is waived. See Tele-Commc’ns., Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 

(10th Cir. 1997) (“[A]n issue must be presented to, considered and decided by the 

trial court before it can be raised on appeal.” (brackets and internal quotation marks 

omitted)); Mitchell v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1243, 1248 n.3 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting that 

arguments forfeited before the Tax Court and unaccompanied on appeal by assertions 

of plain error are waived). 
4 

litigant’s filings, we nevertheless require a pro se litigant to provide “succinct, clear and 

accurate” arguments, together “with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on 

which [she] relies.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840-41 

(10th Cir. 2005). This, Farr has not done. It is not our role to “serv[e] as the litigant’s 

attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Id. at 840. Thus, her bald 

assertions of fraud/conspiracy are insufficient to invoke appellate review. See id.

(holding that a pro se litigant forfeits appellate review by advancing arguments that are 

scurrilous instead of substantive). 

 To the extent Farr has complied with her briefing obligations by complaining that 

the Tax Court did not appoint counsel for her and would not let her plead the Fifth 

Amendment, we note that there is no “right to counsel in a Tax Court proceeding,” 

Shamrock v. Comm’r, 860 F.3d 433, 434 (7th Cir. 2017) (emphasis omitted), and the

privilege against self-incrimination “cannot [be] invoke[d] in a Tax Court case to satisfy 

[the taxpayer’s] burden of proving that the government miscalculated h[er] tax 

deficiency,” Kosinski v. Comm’r, 541 F.3d 671, 678 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Anaya v. 

Comm’r, 983 F.2d 186, 188 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[t]he taxpayer carries the burden of 

proving [that] the Commissioner’s assessment is incorrect”). 
5 

CONCLUSION

 We affirm the decision of the Tax Court, and we grant Farr’s motion for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis. 

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge