J-S18006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHRISTIAN WOMACK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1416 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 5, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0002911-2006

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 5, 2023

Christian Womack appeals from the order dismissing his petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. Additionally, Womack’s appointed counsel, Stephen Molineux, Esq., has 

requested permission to withdraw from this matter and filed a 

Turner/Finley1letter brief. After careful review, we grant attorney Molineux

permission to withdraw and affirm.

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation is required to 

proceed under Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). Counsel must 

review the record, submit a “no-merit” letter evaluating the issues the 

petitioner wishes to address and explaining their lack of merit, request 

permission to withdraw, and send the “no-merit” letter and petition to 

withdraw to their client along with an explanation of their right to proceed pro 

se.
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On August 13, 2007, Womack pled guilty to receiving stolen property 

and criminal conspiracy. See Judgment of Sentence, 8/13/07. He was 

immediately sentenced to ten months to twenty-three months’ incarceration 

to be followed by two years of probation, and was scheduled to report for his 

sentence on September 4, 2007. See id. Womack filed pro se petitions for a 

writ of error of coram nobis on May 8 and June 15, 2020. The court treated 

the filings as a PCRA petition and appointed Scott Galloway, Esq., to represent 

Womack. Attorney Galloway filed an amended petition and the PCRA court 

dismissed the petition without a hearing. 

Womack filed a pro se appeal, and the PCRA court subsequently granted 

attorney Galloway permission to withdraw his appearance in this matter.2

Upon receipt of Womack’s pro se appeal, this Court noted that there was no 

indication that Attorney Galloway had withdrawn pursuant to Turner/Finley, 

and directed the PCRA court to determine whether Womack was entitled to 

counsel on appeal. See Order, 7/18/22, at ¶ 2. 

The PCRA court subsequently appointed attorney Molineux as counsel

for this appeal. See Trial Court Order, 10/17/22. As noted, attorney Molineux 

then filed a letter brief pursuant to Turner/Finley and an application to 

withdraw as counsel. Womack then filed an application to proceed pro se. This 

Court denied that application, permitting Womack to file a response to 

____________________________________________

2 Womack’s notice of appeal constitutes an exception to the general prohibition 

against “hybrid” representation. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 

621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2016). 
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counsel’s Turner/Finley brief and application to withdraw. See Order, 

3/6/23. Womack did not file a response. 

In counsel’s Turner/Finley letter brief he evaluated the one issue that 

Womack wished to raise: whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to be 

present at the time of Womack’s guilty plea. See Turner Letter at 3. 

Before addressing the merits of the issue, we will address attorney 

Molineux’s request to withdraw. Counsel seeking to withdraw under 

Turner/Finley must complete a comprehensive review of the case before 

submitting a brief to this Court, detailing their review, explaining why the 

petitioner’s intended issues lack merit and asking to withdraw. See 

Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 140 (Pa. Super. 2014). Counsel 

must send the petitioner a copy of the brief, their petition to withdraw and an 

explanation of their right to proceed pro se or with new counsel. See id. When 

we find counsel has satisfied the technical demands of Turner/Finley, we 

must conduct our own review of the merits of the case. See id. 

Our review of the record shows that attorney Molineux complied with 

the Turner/Finley requirements. He evaluated the merits of Womack’s 

ineffectiveness claim despite finding it time-barred and finding Womack 

ineligible for PCRA relief because he is no longer serving his sentence in this 

case. See Turner Brief at 6-8. Attorney Molineux then sent all the required 

materials to Womack. 

We therefore turn to the merits of Womack’s petition. When we review 

an order dismissing a PCRA petition we determine whether the decision is 
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supported by the record and free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. 

Jarosz, 152 A.3d 344, 350 (Pa. Super. 2016). Here, the PCRA court 

determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider Womack’s petition because the 

petition was untimely, and he was not eligible for relief because he was no 

longer serving his sentence in this case. See PCRA Court Opinion, 6/1/22, at 

3-4. 

A PCRA petition must be filed within the one-year period immediately 

following the date on which the judgment of sentence becomes final. See 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). This 

time-bar implicates our jurisdiction, we may not ignore it to assess the merits 

of a petition. See id. A judgment of sentence becomes final when the direct 

review is complete or the time for seeking direct review expires. See id. 

Our review of the record reflects that Womack’s judgment of sentence 

was imposed on August 13, 2007, and became final on September 12, 2007, 

when he failed to file a direct appeal to this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). He 

then had until September 12, 2008, to file a timely PCRA petition. Womack’s 

pro se petitions were filed in May and June of 2020, making them patently 

untimely.

Nevertheless, a petitioner may overcome the time-bar when they allege 

in the petition and prove one of three exceptions. See Hernandez, 79 A.3d 

649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). These exceptions include: that the claim was not 

raised previously due to interference by government officials; that the 

petitioner previously did not know, and could not have known through due 
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diligence, the facts of the claim earlier; and that the petitioner is asserting a 

right which has been recognized since the judgment of sentence became final 

and has been held to apply retroactively. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545 (b)(1)(i)-

(iii). In order to successfully avail oneself of an exception to the time-bar, the 

petitioner must show that he raised his claim within sixty days of discovering 

the claim. See Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 652 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Here, Womack’s pro se petitions and PCRA counsel’s amended petition 

fail to make any reference to the untimeliness of the petition or any attempt 

to plead or prove an exception to the time-bar. See Petition for a Writ of Error 

of Coram Nobis, 5/4/2020; Amended Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition, 

1/11/2022. As Womack therefore failed to plead the existence of any 

exception to the PCRA’s time-bar, the PCRA court correctly determined it 

lacked jurisdiction over Womack’s petition. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 

65 A.3d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Further, the PCRA court noted Womack is no longer serving his sentence 

in this case. Womack’s sentence of ten to twenty-three months’ incarceration 

followed by two years of probation commenced on September 4, 2007. See

Judgment of Sentence, 8/13/07. Accordingly, Womack was no longer serving 

this sentence by 2011. PCRA relief is not available to Womack as he is no 

longer serving the sentence for the crime in this case. See Commonwealth 

v. Plunkett, 151 A.3d 1108, 1112 (Pa. Super. 2016). 

Application to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/5/2023