U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Region III Office of Public Affairs

801 Warrenville Road, Lisle IL 60532-4351

NEWS ANNOUNCEMENT: RIII-96-76 December 26, 1996

CONTACT: Jan Strasma 630/829-9663

Angela Dauginas 630/829-9662

E-mail: opa3@nrc.gov

NRC STAFF ISSUES REPORT OF INDEPENDENT SAFETY INSPECTION

AT DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has issued the

report of the NRC Independent Safety Inspection at the Dresden

Nuclear Power Station. The plant, operated by Commonwealth

Edison Co., is near Morris, Illinois.

The 20-member inspection team conducted its onsite

inspections at Dresden between September 30 and November 8. The

team evaluated plant activities and the effectiveness of

corrective actions taken by the utility to improve performance.

The inspection also focused on maintenance activities and the

conformance of the plant to design and licensing criteria.

The team presented its findings in a meeting with utility

representatives on December 12. The meeting was open to public

observation.

Attached is a letter from NRC Executive Director for

Operations James Taylor to the utility, discussing the report. A

copy of the report's executive summary is available on request

from the Region III Office of Public Affairs.

The letter, executive summary, and full report are available

for review on the NRC's internet web site at:

<http://www.nrc.gov/OPA/reports>.

#####
December 24, 1996

Mr. James J. O'Connor

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

Commonwealth Edison Company

Post Office Box 767

Chicago, Illinois 60690

SUBJECT: INDEPENDENT SAFETY INSPECTION OF DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER

STATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-237/96-201; 50-

249/96-201)

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

I am forwarding the report on the Dresden Nuclear Power Station

by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Independent

Safety Inspection (ISI) team. The purposes of the ISI were: to

evaluate the effectiveness of your corrective action programs; to

provide an independent assessment of conformance with the design

and licensing bases; to evaluate the conduct and effectiveness of

maintenance activities, including work processes,

post-maintenance testing, and implementation of maintenance rule

activities; and to provide an independent assessment of

operational safety performance.

The ISI team was large and multi-disciplined in order to provide

a thorough, in-depth review. The team, which consisted of 21

members, was managed by a senior NRC manager and included an

observer from the state of Illinois. During the two onsite

inspection periods, team members also conducted interviews at

Commonwealth Edison's (ComEd's) corporate offices in Downers

Grove and Chicago. To ensure an independent perspective, the NRC

members were selected from NRC offices other than Region III.

Additionally, only persons with no significant prior

responsibility for regulating ComEd facilities were chosen, and

the team manager reported to me.

The ISI was conducted in response to the NRC's concern about the

long history of poor performance at Dresden Station. Dresden

Station was first placed on the NRC Watch List as a Category 2

plant in 1987. Improved performance resulted in the site being

removed from the Watch List in December 1988. Performance

subsequently declined and in January 1992, Dresden Station was

again placed on the NRC Watch List. For the past several years,

safety performance has been cyclic with identified weaknesses in

plant material condition, procedure quality and adherence,

engineering and licensing support, work performance,

communications, execution of management expectations, and

supervision and control of work activities.

Improvements have been made in all the areas that were inspected.

The rate of improvement has been incremental and has varied
significantly among Dresden Station organizations. Safety

performance has significantly improved in plant operations while

the level of improvement in engineering has not yet resulted in

fully effective problem identification and resolution as

evidenced by the failure to identify significant weaknesses in

design control and maintenance of design basis calculations, and

the failure to resolve a number of long-standing problems

affecting safety-systems. The results of improvement initiatives

in radiological protection, maintenance, testing, and selfassessment were mixed.

Notwithstanding these improvements, the ISI identified

significant weaknesses in the areas of radiation protection,

maintenance and testing, engineering, and in the implementation

of the corrective action program. A number of significant

deficiencies were identified during the inspection. Deficiencies

are apparent failures to comply with a regulatory requirement or

apparent failures to satisfy a written commitment that is not

legally binding. A summary of these deficiencies is provided in

Appendix F of the enclosed report, and many of them appear to be

related to two root causes: until recently, corporate and site

managers were not fully focused on correcting organizational,

programmatic, process and material condition problems that have

been evident for a number of years; and corporate oversight of

and involvement with contractor engineering services firms were

not sufficient to ensure the appropriate control and maintenance

of design basis calculations.

Corrective actions to resolve the lack of control and maintenance

of design basis calculations are only now being implemented after

the problem was brought to the attention of Dresden Station

senior managers by the ISI. Because of the significance of the

engineering and design basis issues, ComEd, in a letter dated

November 8, 1996, committed to a number of actions to provide

further confidence in the adequacy of the design basis and

engineering activities at Dresden Station. The short-term

actions were confirmed by an NRC Confirmatory Action Letter,

dated November 21, 1996.

The ISI also identified that significant challenges to continued

improvement exist. First, the level of emergent work continues

to hamper the ability to perform planned work consistently, which

is preventing the reduction of the corrective maintenance backlog

to the desired level and is unnecessarily challenging plant

safety systems and plant operators. Second, corrective actions

that have been implemented for programmatic and hardware problems

have not been effective in a number of areas, resulting in

repetitive problems. Finally, the full implications of the lack

of design control and maintenance of design basis calculations

have not yet been determined, pending ComEd's continuing reviews

in this area.

The results of the ISI were presented during an exit meeting,
open to public observation, on December 12, 1996, at Dresden

Station. I request that following the review of this report, you

determine the additional actions needed to ensure the long-term

resolution of the deficiencies identified. NRC Region III will

be responsible for followup of the issues identified during the

inspection, including the assessment of corrective actions and

the determination of any enforcement action that is deemed

appropriate.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the

enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. Should

you have any questions concerning this inspection, I would be

pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

original signed by

James M. Taylor

Executive Director for Operations

Dockets: 50-237; 50-249