United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Public Affairs, Region I

475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19401

Phone: 610/337-5330 Fax: 610/337-5241

Internet: dps@nrc.gov or nas@nrc.gov

I-97-34 April 1, 1997

Contact: Diane Screnci FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Neil A. Sheehan

NRC RATING OF INDIAN POINT 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

FINDS DECLINE IN OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF FACILITY

The Indian Point 2 nuclear power plant received performance

ratings of "good" in the areas of plant operations, maintenance

and plant support and "acceptable" in the area of engineering in

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's latest Systematic Assessment

of Licensee Performance, or SALP, of the facility.

The SALP report was sent yesterday to Consolidated Edison

Company of New York, which operates the plant in Buchanan, N.Y.

It evaluates the plant's performance from September 17, 1995,

through February 15, 1997.

NRC staff will meet with Consolidated Edison officials at

the facility at 1 p.m. on April 8 to discuss the report. The

session will be open for public observation.

SALP reports rate licensee performance in four functional

areas -- plant operations, maintenance, engineering and plant

support -- and assign ratings of Category 1 (superior), 2 (good)

or 3 (acceptable). The assessments are issued approximately once

every 18 months. Indian Point 2 had received ratings of

"superior" in the areas of maintenance and engineering and "good"

in the areas of plant operations and plant support in its

previous SALP.

In a letter to Consolidated Edison, NRC Region I

Administrator Hubert J. Miller said Indian Point 2's overall

performance declined during the latest SALP period.

"Many plant equipment problems were experienced due to the

poor condition of a number of systems," Mr. Miller wrote. "The

unit experienced nine trips and shutdowns, as well as several

power reductions as a result of equipment problems. Management

was involved in many plant activities and made conservative

operational decisions, but management oversight was at times

ineffective regarding overall efforts to identify, evaluate and

correct problems. Particular weaknesses were evident in

evaluation of the causes and extent of problems, and repeat

failures of plant equipment occurred. These weaknesses were

reflected in the handling of the Auxiliary Feedwater System flow

control and steam admission valve test failures and the turbine

casing grit intrusion event, which led to the failure of three of

the four Main Feedwater Regulating Valves. Problems with the AFW

equipment are of particular concern, because this system is the

most risk-significant system in the plant."

Mr. Miller continued, "Once resolutions to problems had

been developed, the implementation of corrective actions was slow
in a number of cases. Line organization self-assessments did

improve and became more self-critical late in the period,

particularly in the operations and maintenance areas. However,

the quality assurance organization had limited impact in

enhancing plant performance and the safety review committees were

not effectively involved in highlighting key problem areas of

facility performance."

Performance in the areas of operations and plant support

was generally effective, with some elements of those efforts very

good, the administrator wrote. "Operators performed well during

planned evolutions and unplanned transients. Decision-making

regarding plant operations was conservative," he said. "However,

there was some degree of informality in the conduct of operations

activities. Radiological controls and other plant support

programs continued to be implemented effectively."

In the area of maintenance, there was a decline in

performance, Mr. Miller said. "Routine maintenance activities

were usually conducted well, but in one case an error in routine

electrical breaker work caused a plant trip. Most emergent work

was handled well. However, thorough and aggressive actions were

not taken to analyze and address an adverse trend in overall

equipment performance and to correct deficient equipment

conditions, including those identified through surveillance test

anomalies and failures."

Mr. Miller noted that engineering performance declined

"substantially," elaborating that the quality of engineering

efforts was "good for modification work but often poor in day-today support to operations. Several instances demonstrated

failures of the engineering staff to aggressively address

existing problems and to provide in-depth evaluations of

identified problems. Also, surveillance test results were

sometimes inadequately evaluated; the AFW steam supply valve is a

notable example. This contributed to acceptance of less-thandesirable equipment conditions in the plant. Efforts to

understand and maintain the design and licensing bases were also

not fully effective."

At the April 8 meeting, Consolidated Edison officials will

be asked to discuss their plans to address weaknesses identified

in the evaluation.

#

SALP reports are available on the NRC's Internet web site

(http://www.nrc.gov/OPA) and by e-mail subscription. To receive

SALP reports by e-mail as they are issued, send an e-mail to

listproc@nrc.gov with the following message: subscribe salp

yourfirstname yourlastname.