In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 13-495

(Filed: October 25, 2013)

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Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss;

Renunciation of Citizenship; Civil 

Rights Violations; Lack of Subject 

Matter Jurisdiction; No MoneyMandating Statute Alleged.

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KIRELL TAYLOR, *

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 Plaintiff, *

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v. *

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THE UNITED STATES, *

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 Defendant. *

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Kirell Taylor, appearing pro se, Delano, California. 

Joshua E. Kurland, with whom were Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Deborah A. Bynum, Assistant Director, 

Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C., for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

WHEELER, Judge.

Plaintiff Kirell Taylor filed a pro se complaint in this Court on July 19, 2013. Mr. 

Taylor alleges that government officials have unlawfully denied him the right to renounce 

his citizenship. Compl. 5. Mr. Taylor seeks $25 million in damages for civil rights 

violations, racial discrimination, and constitutional violations. Compl. 9-11. Mr. Taylor 

also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief declaring him an expatriate and stateless 

person. 

On September 19, 2013, counsel for the United States filed a motion to dismiss 

Mr. Taylor’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of 

the Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 1. The Government 
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contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Taylor’s claims 

because: (1) the complaint fails to identify any source of substantive law creating the 

right to pursue money damages in this Court; (2) this Court does not have jurisdiction 

over claims brought under the civil rights statutes; and (3) the Court lacks jurisdiction 

over claims sounding in tort for civil wrongs committed by agents of the United States. 

Id. at 3-4. For the reasons stated below, the Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED.

Background

Mr. Taylor sought to voluntarily renounce his citizenship on religious grounds, but

the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied his request 

because such renunciation must take place outside of the United States. Compl. 5. Mr. 

Taylor is currently incarcerated in Kern Valley State Prison in Delano, California where 

he is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Mr. Taylor asks the Court 

to grant declaratory relief that he is a “stateless person or an alien in-custody without a 

criminal record.” Compl. 11. He also asks the Court to grant injunctive relief by 

ordering the Director of USCIS to remove Mr. Taylor from the California Department of 

Corrections. Id. 

Analysis

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the allegations in the 

complaint as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Ainslie v. 

United States, 355 F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Godwin v. United States, 338 

F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Though pro se litigants are held to “less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” failures to comply with the Court’s 

jurisdictional requirements are not excused. Hampel v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 235, 

237 (2011) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Where subject matter 

jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff must establish the Court’s jurisdiction by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 

746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

This Court’s jurisdiction is established by the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 

(2006). To invoke jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must point to a 

substantive right to money damages against the United States. Hamlet v. United States, 

63 F.3d 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Such a claim can be founded upon “the 

Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or 

upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or 

unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006).
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Here, Mr. Taylor’s claim appears to be based on a breach of contract. Mr. Taylor 

attached letters from the State Department as Exhibits B and C to his complaint. These 

letters explain the procedure and effects of renouncing citizenship, but Mr. Taylor alleges 

that the letters are contracts. Compl. 6. Mr. Taylor also refers to the Constitution as a 

contract. Pl. Opp'n. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 3. Neither the exhibits nor the 

Constitution is a valid contract between Mr. Taylor and the United States. Further, Mr. 

Taylor has not identified any “money-mandating” source of substantive law that will 

allow this Court to hear his claim. 

Furthermore, the Court cannot consider Mr. Taylor’s civil rights claims against the 

United States for failing to revoke his citizenship. It is well settled law that the Court of 

Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over civil rights claims brought under Title VII 

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or other civil rights statutes. Osborn v. United States, 47 

Fed. Cl. 224, 232 (2000). Mr. Taylor’s complaint also contains a Bivens claim—an

action for money damages under the Fourth Amendment. Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-397 (1971). However, 

this Court lacks jurisdiction over Bivens actions for civil wrongs committed by agents of 

the United States. Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Thus, the 

Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Taylor’s claims alleging racial 

discrimination and civil rights violations.

The remainder of Mr. Taylor’s demands, which are for declaratory or injunctive 

relief, are also outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. The Tucker Act 

does not provide independent jurisdiction over such claims for equitable relief. The 

Court cannot award injunctive relief that is not “an incident of and collateral to any such 

[money] judgment.” § 1491(a)(2); James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

The Court does not have authority to hear his claims for injunctive relief because this

Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Taylor’s claim to money damages.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

THOMAS C. WHEELER

Judge