NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 18a0025n.06 No. 17-1354 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. ANTHONY MARTELL SANDERS, Defendant-Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SI LER and COOK, Circuit Judges. SILER , Circuit Judge. Anthony Martell Sanders, a convicted felon, sold heroin to a confidential source on two occasions in August 2016. Each time, federal agents witnessed Sanders sell the drugs from hi s vehicle which he then parked in front of a Grand Rapids residence where he stayed several nights each week. Id . Agents executed a search warrant for Sanders’s vehicle and the residen ce. In the glove compartment a nd center console of the vehicle, agents recovered a loaded 9mm pistol along with 9mm ammunition, a key to the residence, and two bags containing marijuana. In the residence, they disc overed another 9mm handgun, several rounds of ammunition, heroin, and digital sc ales. Agents found the handgun in the back bedroom where Sanders slept, and they located the drugs in the kitchen. Sanders admitted to owning the weapons for protection but denied any involvement with the narcotics. Sanders was indicted on two counts: (1) felon in possession of a fir earm in violation of 18 USC § 922(g)(1), and (2) possession of heroin w ith the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and pled guilty to the first count. In exchange, the United States dismissedNo. 17-1354, United States v. Sanders

-2- the heroin charge. Id. The district court sentenced him to a term of 60 months’ imprisonment, which was below his Guidelines range of 70-87 months. Sanders now appeals this sentence, claiming that the district court improperly ap plied a four-level enhancement and based his Guidelines range on the wrong offe nse level. We reject these arguments and affirm Sanders’s

sentence. In determining the Guidelines range, the district court increased the offense level by four because Sanders possessed the firearms in connection with the heroin—another felony offense.
See USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Sanders argues that th e district court erred in finding a substantial nexus between his firearms and th e heroin. He denies any connec tion to the heroin discovered at the residence and claims that the government failed to meet its burden of proof that his firearms “facilitated or had the potential of facilitating” the alleged heroin trafficking. Sanders contends that mere proximity is not enough, and that he shared the residence w ith a roommate whose testimony was unreliable because she had a motive to lie. Lastly, Sanders argues that no heroin was found in his car and that the drugs in the hous e were of a small quantity consistent with personal use rather than distribution. Id. The district court found otherwise, and we review that finding for clear error. See United States v. Taylor , 648 F.3d 417, 431-32 (6th Cir. 2011). Federal agents twice observed Sanders sell heroin from his vehicle. They recovered heroin at Sanders’s residence, and they found handguns both in his ve hicle and in the residence. Although he denied selling heroin, Sanders admitted to owning both firearms prior to the dates when the drug sales were observed. “[A] suffici ent connection is estab lished if it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or ot herwise facilitate a drug transaction.” United States v. Ennenga , 263 F.3d 499, 503 (6th Cir. 2001). To convict SandersNo. 17-1354, United States v. Sanders

-3- on the heroin charge, the government would have needed to prove drug distribution beyond a reasonable doubt. By contrast, at sentencing, a district court only needs a preponderance of the evidence. “It makes no difference what crime [a] defendant was initially charged with, or whether he was convicted of that crime.” United States v. Suggs , 423 F. App’x 502, 505 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing USSG § 2K2.1 n.14(C)). As we ha ve held, “the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement applies whenever a firearm is found in close pr oximity to drugs, drug-manufacturing materials, or drug paraphernalia . . . such an expansive interpretation [] does not require that the gun be used by a dealer to sell drugs.” United States v. Sweet , 776 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2015). Therefore, the district court properly ap plied the four-level enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Sanders also argues that the district court miscalculated his base offense level when it classified his 2011 Michigan assaul t conviction as a crime of viol ence. Sanders was previously convicted of violating Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84, assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. At sentencing in this case, the di strict court held th at M.C.L. § 750.84 was a crime of violence. And, under USSG § 2K2.1(a)(3), the base offense level is 22 for a defendant who unlawfully possesses a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine—as Sanders did—“subsequent to sust aining one felony conviction of ... a crime of violence.” Since the time of se ntencing in this case, we have expressly held that M.C.L § 750.84 qualifies categorically as a crime of violence for sentencing purposes. See Raybon v. United
States , 867 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2017). Accordingl y, the district cour t properly calculated Sanders’s base offense level when it applied U SSG § 2K2.1(a)(3) in light of his 2011 Michigan conviction for assault. AFFIRMED

.