IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 15, 2017 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. SCARLET I. MARTIN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cheatham County

No. 17289 Larry J. Wallace, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2016-00615-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

Defendant, Scarlet I. Martin, was convicted of driving under the influence of an 

intoxicant (“DUI”) and driving under the influence of an intoxicant with a blood alcohol 

concentration (“BAC”) greater than .08 (“DUI per se”). She appeals, arguing that the 

evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred by 

denying her motion to suppress the results of a warrantless blood draw. After carefully 

reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient and that the blood 

draw was justified by exigent circumstances. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial 

court are affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.

Rob McKinney and Brittney Hollis, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Scarlet I.

Martin.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; M. Todd Ridley, Assistant 

Attorney General; Ray Crouch, District Attorney General; and Jack Arnold and Talmage 

M. Woodall, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Procedural History and Factual Summary

05/11/2017
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After a preliminary hearing, Defendant was indicted for DUI and DUI per se. 

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the test results of a warrantless blood draw. The 

trial court denied the motion. Defendant proceeded to a bench trial and was convicted as 

charged.

At trial, Trooper Bryant Campbell of the Tennessee Highway Patrol (“THP”) 

testified that on February 5, 2014, he was dispatched to the site of a single-car accident 

on Chapmansboro Road. The accident occurred around 10:30 p.m. THP was notified of 

the accident by the Cheatham County Sheriff’s Department. Deputies James Curran and 

William Zimmerlee were also dispatched to the scene. When Trooper Campbell arrived 

around 11:05 p.m., Defendant and a male passenger were receiving medical treatment 

and being loaded into the back of an ambulance. Trooper Campbell spoke briefly with 

the medical personnel, but he did not address Defendant or the passenger.

Pursuant to THP protocol, Trooper Campbell commenced a vehicle accident 

investigation. Trooper Campbell observed that the vehicle had departed from the road 

and gone “off down an embankment in a bunch of thicket-like area.” There were about 

50 feet of tire markings on the road, and it appeared that the vehicle travelled down the 

hill for about 150 feet. Trooper Campbell surmised that the vehicle was traveling north at 

the time of the accident. During the course of his on-site investigation, Trooper 

Campbell did not find any evidence of alcohol consumption and, therefore, did not have 

any suspicion of DUI at the time.

Because the vehicle appeared inoperable, Trooper Campbell called for a tow truck. 

The tow truck arrived around midnight. THP policy requires a patrolman to wait at the 

scene of an accident until a tow truck operator has completely secured the vehicle by 

loading the vehicle on the tow truck. The patrolman is also required to ensure that the 

tow truck operator retrieves all parts of the vehicle and does not leave anything behind.

After leaving the scene of the accident, Trooper Campbell went to the hospital to 

interview the Defendant and the passenger. He arrived at the hospital around 12:20 a.m. 

Defendant was being prepared for a CT scan, so Trooper Campbell spoke with the 

passenger, who appeared to have “scratches and marks all on him.” When Defendant 

returned from the scan, Trooper Campbell “could smell alcoholic beverage coming off of 

her.” The odor of alcohol was strong enough that the trooper recognized it “right away.” 

Trooper Campbell also noticed a “slight” slurring of Defendant’s speech.

Defendant admitted to Trooper Campbell that she was driving the vehicle and that 

she and the passenger were returning from Nashville. Defendant also admitted she had 

two alcoholic beverages before driving. At this point, Trooper Campbell suspected 

Defendant of committing DUI so he read the implied consent form to Defendant. She 
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refused to sign the form and refused to submit to a blood draw. Trooper Campbell 

directed one of the nurses to proceed with a blood draw without Defendant’s consent. 

After the blood was drawn, Trooper Campbell secured the blood. A forensic analysis of 

the blood conducted by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation determined that 

Defendant’s BAC was .17, which is more than twice the legal limit in Tennessee.

Trooper Campbell testified that there was nothing that he could have done to 

speed up the investigation. He later learned that the crashed vehicle was registered to 

Defendant’s father.

The trial court found Trooper Campbell’s testimony credible and found Defendant 

guilty as charged. The trial court merged both convictions and accepted the parties’ 

agreement to a minimum sentence. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. Analysis

Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support her convictions. 

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress 

because the warrantless search and seizure of her blood was unconstitutional. The State

maintains that the evidence was sufficient and that the warrantless blood draw was 

justified based on exigent circumstances. Defendant maintains that any exigency that 

existed was created by law enforcement.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is obliged 

to review that claim according to certain well-settled principles. A guilty verdict removes 

the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption of guilt. State v. Evans, 

838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992). The burden is then shifted to the defendant on appeal 

to demonstrate why the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. State v. 

Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). The relevant question the reviewing court 

must answer is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the accused guilty of 

every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); 

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). On appeal, “the State is entitled to the 

strongest legitimate view of the evidence and to all reasonable and legitimate inferences 

that may be drawn therefrom.” State v. Elkins, 102 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Tenn. 2003). As 

such, this Court is precluded from re-weighing or reconsidering the evidence when 

evaluating the convicting proof. State v. Morgan, 929 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1996); State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). 

Moreover, we may not substitute our own “inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact 

from circumstantial evidence.” Matthews, 805 S.W.2d at 779. Further, questions 
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concerning the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to 

evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by such evidence, are resolved by the trier of 

fact and not the appellate courts. State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990). 

“The standard of review ‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or 

circumstantial evidence.’” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) 

(quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)).

A person commits DUI by operating a motor vehicle on a public road while an 

intoxicant “impairs the driver’s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle by depriving the 

driver of the clearness of mind and control of oneself that the driver would otherwise 

possess.” T.C.A. § 55-10-401(1). A person also commits DUI by operating a motor 

vehicle on a public road if “[t]he alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath is 

eight-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more.” T.C.A. § 55-10-401(2).

At trial, the State presented evidence that Defendant was involved in an 

automobile accident, which resulted in Defendant and her passenger being hospitalized. 

When Trooper Campbell encountered Defendant at the hospital, he immediately smelled 

the odor of alcohol coming from Defendant. He also observed that Defendant’s speech 

was slightly slurred. Defendant admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages before 

driving home. The crashed vehicle belonged to Defendant’s father. Defendant refused to 

submit to a voluntary blood draw. The toxicology results of the forced blood draw 

showed that Defendant’s BAC was .17.

In the light most favorable to the State, the foregoing facts establish that 

Defendant was driving an automobile while unsafely impaired by an intoxicant and while 

possessing a BAC of .08 or more. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient for DUI and 

DUI per se. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Warrantless Blood Draw

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court will uphold 

the trial court’s findings of fact “unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” State v. 

Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tenn. 2014) (citing State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 556 

(Tenn. 2013)). Witness credibility, the weight and value of the proof, and the resolution 

of conflicts in the proof “are matters entrusted to the trial court as the trier of fact.” Id. at 

529. “The party prevailing in the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of 

the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate 

inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 217 

(Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). The trial court’s 

resolution of questions of law and application of the law to the facts are reviewed de novo 

with no presumption of correctness. State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 900 (Tenn. 2008).
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When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this Court “may 

consider the entire record, including not only the proof offered at the hearing, but also the 

evidence adduced at trial,” State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 473 (Tenn. 2012) (citing 

State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 297-99 (Tenn. 1998)), as well as at the preliminary 

hearing, State v. McCrary, 45 S.W.3d 36, 41 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Henning, 

975 S.W.2d at 299). Thus, we will set forth some of the additional evidence presented at 

the preliminary hearing and at the suppression hearing.

At the preliminary hearing, Deputy Curran testified that, when he arrived at the 

accident scene, Defendant appeared “highly upset” and was crying. He overheard 

Defendant saying that “she couldn’t afford a DUI because she was in nursing school.” 

Deputy Zimmerlee testified that he “detected a strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming 

from” Defendant while she was in the back of an ambulance. Deputy Curran was trained 

to do DUI investigations, but he did not participate in the investigation in this case in any 

capacity because Trooper Campbell was “working it.” Similarly, Deputy Zimmerlee did 

not conduct any type of investigation because the deputies “let THP deal with it.” The 

deputies were advised by the sheriff’s department “to have THP work” automobile 

accidents with injuries. When Trooper Campbell arrived, the deputies turned the scene 

over to him.

At the preliminary hearing, Trooper Campbell testified that he could “smell an 

alcoholic beverage coming from” Defendant when he first encountered her at the 

hospital, and she was acting “very uncooperative.” Defendant’s passenger “admitted that 

he had been out drinking.” He said that Defendant had a couple of drinks, but he did not 

know exactly how many. Defendant’s blood was drawn at 12:54 a.m. on February 6, 

2014. Trooper Campbell acknowledged that the jail was near the hospital and that he 

could have gotten a warrant from the magistrate. Trooper Campbell had previously 

applied for a search warrant and knew how to do so. However, nearly two and one-half 

hours had elapsed since the accident, and Trooper Campbell still would have had to call a 

magistrate down to the jail to approve the search warrant. Trooper Campbell did not 

have the capability to personally contact a judicial officer for a search warrant.

At the suppression hearing, Trooper Campbell testified consistently with his 

preliminary hearing testimony and his trial testimony. The automobile accident occurred 

at approximately 10:30 p.m. Trooper Campbell arrived at the scene around 11:05 p.m. 

and was there for about an hour. He estimated that the deputies left the scene after about 

fifteen minutes because “they had other calls to go to.”

While at the scene of the accident, Trooper Campbell did not have any reason to 

believe that he was investigating a potential DUI. He did not discuss any details of the 
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case with Deputies Curran and Zimmerlee aside from the basic facts that the car appeared 

to have gone off the road and rolled down an embankment and that the passengers were 

injured and about to go to the hospital. According to Trooper Campbell, most highway 

patrolmen prefer not to discuss facts or theories with other officers at an accident site 

when conducting an investigation. This is so that the investigator can develop his own 

theory of the case and obtain as much evidence as possible directly from the primary 

sources rather than through hearsay. Trooper Campbell added that, “in a lot of counties, 

the deputies aren’t trained to investigate crashes” beyond receiving “a short course.”

Trooper Campbell arrived at the hospital just before 12:30 a.m. on February 6, 

2014. After developing suspicion of DUI, Trooper Campbell read the implied consent 

form to Defendant. She refused to consent to a blood draw at approximately 12:45 a.m., 

which was approximately two hours and fifteen minutes after the accident occurred. 

Trooper Campbell then ordered an involuntary blood draw based on the time elapsed 

since the accident and the fact that the passenger was injured. Trooper Campbell was 

also concerned that Defendant might have been released from the hospital while he was 

obtaining a warrant. He did not make any attempt to obtain a warrant or inquire as to 

how long it would take to do so. Trooper Campbell explained that, based on previous 

experience, it probably would have taken him an additional thirty minutes to prepare a 

warrant application and it would have taken the magistrate another thirty minutes to get 

to the courthouse. On the one previous occasion that Trooper Campbell had obtained a 

search warrant for a blood draw in Cheatham County at night, it took about an hour and 

twenty minutes.

Trooper Campbell testified that he could have sought assistance from the local 

police or the sheriff’s department if he thought he needed assistance at any time. 

However, Trooper Campbell also testified that, even if he had suspected a DUI soon after 

arriving at the accident scene, it would not have altered the timeline of events because he 

would have had to complete his investigation at the accident scene before going to the 

hospital.

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 

7 of the Tennessee Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable searches 

and seizures. Tennessee’s constitutional protections regarding searches and seizures are 

identical in intent and purpose to those in the federal constitution. State v. Turner, 297 

S.W.3d 155, 165 (Tenn. 2009). “[A] warrantless search or seizure is presumed 

unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless 

the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the 

narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 

626, 629 (Tenn. 1997). One such exception is recognized for exigent circumstances. 

State v. Meeks, 262 S.W.3d 710, 723 (Tenn. 2008). However, the exigent circumstances 
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relied upon for a warrantless search cannot be created by the actions of law enforcement 

officers. State v. Carter, 160 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Tenn. 2005). The burden is on the State 

to prove that a warrantless seizure was constitutionally permissible. State v. Nicholson, 

188 S.W.3d 649, 656-57 (Tenn. 2006); Henning, 975 S.W.2d at 298.

A blood draw conducted at the behest of a law enforcement officer for law 

enforcement purposes is a search subject to constitutional protection. Birchfield v. North 

Dakota, -- U.S. --, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016); Missouri v. McNeely, -- U.S. --, 133 S.

Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013); State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283, 304 (Tenn. 2015). However, 

under the Fourth Amendment’s exception for exigent circumstances, in some situations a 

warrantless blood draw may be constitutionally permissible in order to prevent the 

destruction of evidence due to the metabolic dissipation of alcohol in blood stream. 

McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966). 

Whether a warrantless blood draw based upon exigent circumstances is constitutionally 

permissible depends on a “case-by-case assessment” in light of the totality of the 

circumstances. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561. In this context, the Supreme Court has 

explained:

In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably 

obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly 

undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates 

that they do so. We do not doubt that some circumstances will make 

obtaining a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the 

bloodstream will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted 

warrantless blood test.

Id. (citation omitted). The Court further explained:

[T]he fact that a particular drunk-driving stop is “routine” in the sense that 

it does not involve “ special facts,” such as the need for the police to attend 

to a car accident, does not mean a warrant is required. Other factors present 

in an ordinary traffic stop, such as the procedures in place for obtaining a 

warrant or the availability of a magistrate judge, may affect whether the 

police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious way and therefore may 

establish an exigency that permits a warrantless search. The relevant 

factors in determining whether a warrantless search is reasonable, including 

the practical problems of obtaining a warrant within a timeframe that still 

preserves the opportunity to obtain reliable evidence, will no doubt vary 

depending upon the circumstances in the case.

Id. at 1568.
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Since McNeely, this Court has had several occasions to consider whether a 

warrantless blood draw was justified based on exigent circumstances. For support, 

Defendant relies on the cases of State v. Charles A. Kennedy, No. M2013-02207-CCAR9-CD, 2014 WL 4953586 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2014), no perm. app. filed, and 

State v. James Dean Wells, No. M2013-01145-CCA-R9-CD, 2014 WL 4977356 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. Oct. 6, 2014), no perm. app. filed. In contrast, the State relies on State v. 

Darryl Alan Walker, No. E2013-01914-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 3888250 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. Aug. 8, 2014), no perm. app. filed, to support its argument that exigent 

circumstances were present in this case.

In Charles A Kennedy, two officers detained the defendant in a traffic stop at 

approximately 12:30 a.m. 2014 WL 4953586, at *8. The defendant appeared 

intoxicated, and he was arrested at approximately 12:50 a.m. Id. A third officer arrived 

and drove the defendant to the police station to conduct field sobriety tests “on more level 

ground.” Id. The first two officers followed the third officer to the station, where they 

arrived at approximately 1:00 a.m. Id. The defendant refused to perform field sobriety 

tests and also refused to consent to a blood draw after being read the implied consent 

form. Id. The refusal occurred at 1:17 a.m. Id. Two officers left the police station with 

the defendant at approximately 1:30 a.m., and they arrived at a hospital around 2:00 a.m. 

for an involuntary blood draw. Id. The defendant’s blood was finally drawn at 2:30 a.m. 

Id. A county magistrate testified that officers were required to appear in person to apply 

for a search warrant and that the process usually took between twenty minutes and one 

hour. Id. at *9. Usually, only one magistrate would have been on duty at that time of 

night. Id. This Court found that the State failed to prove that exigent circumstances 

justified the warrantless blood draw. Id. Noting that nothing prevented one of the 

officers from obtaining a search warrant while the other officers took the defendant to the 

hospital, we concluded that the record did “not support the State’s argument that 

obtaining a warrant in this case would have required significantly more time than the 

warrantless blood draw.” Id. at *10.

In James Dean Wells, we explained:

The trial court here examined the totality of the circumstances and 

concluded that exigent circumstances did not exist. In making this 

determination, the trial court found that five officers were simultaneously 

investigating the incident, that a magistrate was on duty in a building ten 

minutes from the place where the defendant was apprehended, and that it 

took a magistrate an average of ten minutes to review a warrant. The trial 

court further found that the defendant waited at the hospital, which was 

essentially across the street from the gas station where he was apprehended, 
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for approximately one hour until his blood was drawn . . . . Based on the 

time elapsed between the violation and the blood draw, the speed with 

which a warrant could have been obtained, and the availability of law 

enforcement personnel to obtain the warrant, we conclude that the 

circumstances were not exigent, as the record demonstrates that police 

could have “reasonably obtain[ed] a warrant . . . without significantly

undermining the efficacy of the search” and were, therefore, required to do 

so under the Fourth Amendment . . . .

2014 WL 4977356, at *5.

In Darryl Alan Walker, a state trooper was dispatched to the scene of a motorcycle 

crash. 2014 WL 3888250, at *1. When the trooper arrived, the driver was already en 

route to the hospital, but a passenger remained at the scene. Id. The trooper interviewed 

the passenger and noticed an odor of alcohol. Id. The trooper then surveyed the scene 

and observed a damaged motorcycle that “appeared to have driven off the road into a 

ditch.” Id. A tow truck took between twenty and thirty minutes to arrive, and the trooper 

had to assist the tow truck driver in loading the motorcycle. Id. After approximately an 

hour at the scene, the trooper made about a twenty-minute drive to the hospital. Id. Once 

at the hospital, the driver was being prepared to receive stitches. Id. The trooper 

questioned the motorcycle driver about the accident. Id. The driver smelled of alcohol,

had bloodshot eyes, and had difficulty following the conversation. Id. The trooper was 

required to wait while the driver received stitches. Id. After the medical procedure was 

complete, the trooper placed the driver under arrest and read the implied consent form. 

Id. At some point, the driver admitted to being at a bar prior to the accident and to 

having one beer. Id. at *2. The trooper testified that it would have taken additional time 

to obtain a search warrant application from his supervisor and then more time to locate a 

magistrate. Id. The defendant was arrested just over two hours after the trooper initially 

arrived at the scene of the accident, and the defendant’s blood was drawn after the arrest. 

Id. at *5. Given the totality of the circumstances, this Court concluded that the 

warrantless blood draw was justified based on exigent circumstances. Id. 

Although not cited by either party, we also reviewed several other cases in which 

this Court has considered whether a warrantless blood draw was justified under exigent 

circumstances. It appears that Darryl Alan Walker is our only case since McNeely to 

uphold a warrantless blood draw on the basis of exigent circumstances.1 Nonetheless, 

 

1

See, e.g., State v. Helkie Nathan Carter, No. M2015-00280-CCA-R9-CD, 2016 WL 3044216, at 

*7 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 20, 2016) (finding no exigent circumstances where the defendant’s blood was 

drawn about seventy minutes after traffic stop despite hospital being ten minutes from courthouse where 

warrant could have been obtained), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Mar. 8, 2017) (remanding for 

reconsideration); State v. Micah Alexander Cates, No. E2014-01322-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5679825, at 
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given the strong factual similarities between this case and Darryl Alan Walker, we are 

compelled to conclude that the search in this case was justified by exigent circumstances.

In Darryl Alan Walker, a lone trooper responded to the scene of a singlemotorcycle accident, and the driver was already on the way to the hospital when the 

trooper arrived. It took the trooper about an hour to wait for a tow truck and to assist the 

tow truck driver in securing the wrecked vehicle. The trooper then drove straight to the 

hospital where he had to wait for the motorcycle driver to receive stitches before the 

trooper could complete questioning about the accident. After developing probable cause 

of DUI, the trooper arrested the motorcycle driver approximately two hours after the 

accident occurred. The trooper testified that it would have taken additional time to 

prepare a search warrant application and even more time to contact and obtain approval 

from a local magistrate.

Similarly, in this case, Trooper Campbell responded alone to a single-vehicle 

accident. When he arrived, the driver and the passenger were already in an ambulance 

about to go to the hospital. Although there were two sheriff’s deputies already at the 

scene, those deputies left about fifteen minutes after Trooper Campbell arrived. The 

deputies did not assist with the accident or DUI investigation and did not relay any of 

their DUI suspicions to Trooper Campbell. Trooper Campbell followed THP protocol 

and remained at the scene for about an hour, during which he investigated the accident 

and waited for a tow truck driver to arrive and secure the wrecked vehicle. Trooper 

Campbell did not find any evidence of DUI at the scene. He then drove straight to the 

hospital, where the driver was about to receive a CT scan. Trooper Campbell spoke to

the passenger and waited for the driver. When the driver returned, Trooper Campbell 

questioned the driver. Upon developing probable cause of DUI, Trooper Campbell read 

 

*8-9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2015) (finding no exigent circumstances where the defendant was 

injured in a car accident and his blood was drawn about forty-five minutes later but the State failed to 

show why one of the eleven responding officers could not have sought a search warrant while the 

defendant was being transported to the hospital), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016) (remanding 

for reconsideration); State v. Melvin Brown, No. W2014-00162-CCA-R9-CD, 2015 WL 1951870, at *5

(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 2015) (finding no exigent circumstances where the State failed to prove that 

one of two law enforcement officers could not have obtained a search warrant during the nearly two and a 

half hours between the defendant’s car accident and the blood draw), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Nov. 22, 

2016) (remanded for reconsideration); State v. Boyce Turner, No. E2013-2304-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 

7427120, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2014) (finding no exigent circumstances where the State did 

not show why neither the supervisor responding to the arresting state trooper nor one of the five 

responding police officers could have helped obtain a warrant prior to the blood draw an hour after the 

traffic stop), no perm. app. filed; State v. James K. Gardner, No. E2014-00310-R3-CD, 2014 WL 

5840551, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 12, 2014) (finding no exigent circumstances where the State did 

not show why one of the three responding deputies could not have sought a warrant prior to the blood 

draw about forty-four minutes after the traffic stop), no perm. app. filed.
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the implied consent form to the driver, which was about two hours and fifteen minutes 

after the accident occurred. The driver’s blood was drawn about ten minutes later.

Trooper Campbell testified that he conducted the accident investigation and the 

subsequent DUI investigation as efficiently as he could. He was the only trooper on duty 

in the area at that time. Although two sheriff’s deputies also responded to the scene, they 

left on other calls shortly after Trooper Campbell arrived. Even if those deputies had 

been available to assist Trooper Campbell in a DUI investigation, Trooper Campbell 

would not have solicited their help or the help of anyone else because he was unaware 

that a DUI investigation was needed until he went to the hospital. By the time Trooper 

Campbell suspected DUI, over two hours had elapsed since the accident occurred. At 

that point, Trooper Campbell opted for an involuntary blood draw to preserve the driver’s 

blood because he figured that obtaining a search warrant at that time of night would have 

taken about another hour based on his previous experience doing so.

This case is distinguishable from Charles A. Kennedy and James Dean Wells. In 

those cases, multiple officers from the same law enforcement agency were involved in 

the DUI investigation, and the officers knew that they were performing a DUI 

investigation shortly after the outset of their interaction with the defendant. Under such 

circumstances, it was quite feasible for the officers in those cases to simultaneously 

proceed with both continuing the DUI investigation and seeking a search warrant. 

Furthermore, the length of the delay between the arrest and the blood draw in those cases 

was shorter than the delay in this case.

We are mindful of the Supreme Court’s concern about rulings on this subject that 

“might well diminish the incentive for jurisdictions ‘to pursue progressive approaches to 

warrant acquisition that preserve the protections afforded by the warrant while meeting 

the legitimate interests of law enforcement.’” McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1563 (quoting State 

v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771, 779 (Utah 2007)). Accordingly, nothing in this opinion is 

intended to promote law enforcement protocol that delays the efficient investigation of 

DUI cases or to dissuade officers from different law enforcement entities from 

collaborating in such cases. However, we conclude that Trooper Campbell acted 

reasonably under the facts of this case by authorizing a warrantless blood draw so as to 

prevent a delay of over three hours before Defendant’s blood could be preserved as 

evidence of DUI.2 This was not a situation where the exigent circumstances were created 

 

2

In McNeely, the supreme court acknowledged:

While experts can work backwards from the BAC at the time the sample was taken to 

determine the BAC at the time of the alleged offense, longer intervals may raise 

questions about the accuracy of the calculation. For that reason, exigent circumstances 
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by the state actors. Trooper Campbell performed his work as efficiently as he could 

under the circumstances. Seeking a search warrant for Defendant’s blood would have 

taken considerable additional time, thereby significantly undermining the efficacy of the 

criminal investigation. Therefore, the warrantless draw of Defendant’s blood was 

justified on the basis of exigent circumstances.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

__________________________

TIMOTHY L. EASTER, JUDGE

 

justifying a warrantless blood sample may arise in the regular course of law enforcement 

due to delays from the warrant application process.

133 S. Ct. at 1563.