SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1182-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

by the COMMISSIONER OF 

TRANSPORTATION, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

NICK WU, a/k/a SZU FU WU, 

and DAISY GARDEN CENTER, 

LLC, a New Jersey Limited 

Liability Company, 

 Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

DISCOVER PRODUCTS, INC., 

a Utah Corporation, STATE OF 

NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT 

OF TREASURY, and TOWNSHIP 

OF HILLSBOROUGH, in the 

COUNTY OF SOMERSET, a 

Municipal Corporation of New Jersey, 

 

Defendants, 

and 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1182-22

OUIDA VENIS, a/k/a QUIDA 

VENIS, 

 Defendant-Respondent. 

______________________________

Submitted February 26, 2024 – Decided May 2, 2024 

Before Judges Gilson and DeAlmeida. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-0187-21.

Steven P. Lombardi, attorney for appellants. 

McKirdy, Riskin, Olson & Della Pelle, PC, attorneys

for respondent Ouida Venis (Joseph W. Grather, of 

counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

 This appeal arises out of a condemnation action brought by the New Jersey 

Department of Transportation (the DOT) to take a portion of property currently 

owned by defendant Nick Wu and formerly owned by defendant Ouida Venis. 

The issue on appeal involves a dispute between Wu and Venis concerning the 

apportionment of the condemnation proceeds. 

 The DOT paid $95,000 for the condemned property and deposited that 

amount with the court. Wu and a limited liability company he owns, Daisy 

Garden Center, LLC (the Garden Center), appeal from an amended October 5, 

2022 order allocating $70,700, plus interest, to Venis and $24,300, plus interest, 
3 A-1182-22

to Wu. Wu and the Garden Center also appeal from orders dated June 25, 2021, 

and December 2, 2022.1 The December 2, 2022 order denied Wu's and the 

Garden Center's motion for reconsideration of the October 5, 2022 order. 

Because we discern no basis to reverse or modify any of the orders from which 

Wu and the Garden Center appeal, we affirm. 

I.

 On April 8, 2005, Wu and Venis entered into an agreement for sale of real 

estate (the Contract), under which Venis agreed to sell to Wu a property located 

at 181 Route 206 North, Hillsborough, New Jersey (the Property). At the time 

the Contract was executed, Venis and Wu were aware that the DOT was seeking 

to condemn a portion of the Property to construct a bypass and widen Route 206, 

a public highway. In that regard, prior to the execution of the Contract, the DOT 

had provided Venis with an estimate of the fair market value of the portion of 

1

 In their brief, Wu and the Garden Center list a May 25, 2021 order as another 

order they are appealing. We note, however, that the order was executed before 

the court granted an adjournment and then issued a June 25, 2021 order 

addressing both Venis' motion to withdraw the funds and Wu's and the Garden 

Center's cross-motion. Because Wu and the Garden Center do not present any 

arguments about the May 25, 2021 order in their appellate brief, we deem any 

challenge to that order abandoned and waived. See Green Knight Cap., LLC v. 

Calderon, 469 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Woodlands Cmty. 

Ass'n v. Mitchell, 450 N.J. Super. 310, 319 (App. Div. 2017)). 
4 A-1182-22

the Property to be condemned. That estimate valued the condemned portion of 

the Property at $24,300, based on assessments that the land was worth $18,100, 

the improvements were worth $4,850, and the lost value to the remainder of the 

Property was $1,350. 

 In the Contract, Wu and Venis included a condemnation clause. The 

condemnation clause included a section addressing how proceeds from the 

condemnation would be allocated. In that regard, section 10.2 of the Contract 

stated: 

Notwithstanding Sections 1.2 and 10.1, Purchaser 

acknowledges that the New Jersey Department of 

Transportation (the "DOT") has provided notice of a

taking of frontage on Route 206 and has offered 

compensation to Seller of $24,300.00. Purchaser 

agrees that Purchaser has no right to terminate this 

Agreement as a result of this taking. The Seller 

reserves the right to challenge the award and/or 

negotiate with the DOT for additional compensation. 

To the extent that such negotiations extend beyond the 

Closing Date, Purchaser agrees as necessary to appoint 

Seller as Purchaser's agent for this purpose. The sum 

of $24,300, as and when paid by the DOT, shall belong 

to Purchaser. All sums payable by the DOT in excess 

of $24,300 shall be the property of Seller; Purchaser 

agrees to promptly remit all such excess sums to Seller 

should the excess sums be remitted by the DOT to 

Purchaser. If the award is paid to Seller before the 

Closing date, the Purchase Price shall be reduced by 

$24,300. 
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 The State did not complete the condemnation and taking prior to the 

closing of the Contract and the sale of the Property. The record does not indicate 

what, if any, efforts plaintiff made to negotiate a higher condemnation 

compensation. Instead, it is undisputed that the DOT did not move forward with 

the condemnation of the portion of the Property until 2019. 

 In the interim, approximately five years after the sale of the Property, Wu's 

counsel wrote to Venis' counsel to inquire about the status of the condemnation 

and whether Venis had been paid compensation. In that correspondence, 

counsel for Wu stated: "Pursuant to Paragraph 10.2 of the Contract of Sale, once 

the Seller has settled with [the] DOT, the Purchaser was entitled to receive the 

sum of $24,300.00." Counsel for Venis responded by representing that the 

condemnation had not occurred and Venis had not received any compensation 

from the DOT as of that time. 

 In September 2019, the DOT sent Wu a letter offering to purchase a 

portion of the Property for $95,000. The letter included an updated appraisal, 

which valued the portion of the Property the DOT sought to acquire based on a 

valuation of the land at $47,000; a valuation of the improvements at $7,900; and 

a valuation of the loss to the remainder of the Property at $40,100. Shortly 

thereafter, Wu accepted the DOT's offer, and on January 17, 2020, after 
6 A-1182-22

receiving approval from the Commissioner of Transportation, the DOT signed 

an agreement to acquire the portion of the Property for $95,000. 

 The sale from Wu to the DOT did not immediately go forward. In 

February 2021, the DOT filed a verified complaint and order to show cause to 

enforce the January 2020 agreement of sale. In its complaint, the DOT stated 

that it was unable to acquire the portion of the Property through bona fide 

negotiations because Wu failed to close title. Accordingly, the DOT sought to 

estop Wu from seeking compensation greater than the agreed-upon amount of 

$95,000. 

 While that action was pending, the DOT learned of Venis' interest in the 

Property, and it amended its complaint to add Venis as a defendant. Thereafter, 

the court executed a supplemental order to show cause and directed that the 

$95,000 be deposited with the clerk of the court. 

 Wu did not object to the estoppel count of the DOT's complaint. 

Consequently, on May 4, 2021, the court entered a final judgment authorizing 

the taking of the portion of the Property and directing that the $95,000 be paid 

as compensation for the portion of the Property taken. 

 On May 10, 2021, Venis moved to withdraw $70,700, with interest, as her 

portion of the proceeds from the condemnation. In support of her motion, Venis 
7 A-1182-22

sought to enforce section 10.2 of the Contract. Wu and the Garden Center crossmoved to stay the withdrawal of funds, to allow for discovery, and for a plenary 

hearing on the distribution of the funds. 

 On June 25, 2021, after hearing oral argument on the motions, the trial 

court entered an order and statement of reasons denying Venis' motion to 

withdraw the funds and Wu's request for limited discovery and a plenary 

hearing. Instead, the court ordered that the matter would proceed to a summary 

hearing to determine the distribution of the deposited funds. 

 Thereafter, the judge who entered the June 25, 2021 order retired, and 

another judge took over management of the case. A "summary hearing" was 

then scheduled for October 5, 2022. The hearing took place telephonically, and 

counsel for Venis and Wu appeared. Both attorneys informed the court that they 

would rely on the papers already submitted. The judge then issued an oral 

decision, granting Venis' motion to withdraw $70,700, plus interest, from the 

deposited monies. In making that ruling, the trial court relied on and 

incorporated the statement of reasons issued by the court in support of its June 

25, 2021 order. That same day, the court entered an "Amended Order for 
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Withdrawal of Deposit Monies."2 That order directed the clerk of the court to 

pay $70,700, together with accrued interest, to Venis, and to pay $24,300, 

together with accrued interest, to Wu. 

 On October 24, 2022, Wu moved for reconsideration. After receiving 

papers in opposition, on December 2, 2022, the court denied Wu's motion for 

reconsideration and issued a statement of reasons. In the statement of reasons, 

the court explained that Wu had failed to satisfy the standard for reconsideration 

because he had not identified any legal or factual matters the court had 

overlooked and he had failed to demonstrate that the court's October 5, 2022 

decision was palpably incorrect or irrational. 

 Wu and the Garden Center now appeal from the orders entered on June 

25, 2021, October 5, 2022, and December 2, 2022. 

II. 

 On appeal, Wu makes three arguments. First, he contends that the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying his request for limited discovery, arguing 

that there are material factual disputes concerning the appraisal supporting the 

2

 The October 5, 2022 order apparently sought to amend the May 25, 2021 order. 

The October 5, 2022 order is identical to the May 25, 2021 order except the 

word "Amended" was written above "Order for Withdrawal of Deposit Monies" 

and "May 2021" was crossed out and substituted with "October 2022." 
9 A-1182-22

DOT's compensation offer in 2004 and the appraisal supporting the DOT's 

compensation offer in 2019. Second, Wu contends that the second judge failed 

to follow "the law of the case," which he argues required a summary judgment 

motion and not a summary proceeding. Finally, Wu asserts that the trial court 

erred in denying his motion for reconsideration because he presented new 

evidence concerning disputed facts and the court had failed to make adequate 

factual findings and legal conclusions. 

 The dispute on this appeal involves the interpretation of the Contract. 

When interpreting a contract, appellate courts conduct a de novo review. Serico 

v. Rothberg, 234 N.J. 168, 178 (2018); JPC Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enters., 

Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 145, 159-60 (App. Div. 2022). In interpreting a contract, 

courts start with the plain language. Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 

241 N.J. 595, 615-16 (2020). Courts enforce contracts based on the intent of the 

parties, the contract's express terms, the surrounding circumstances, and the 

contract's purpose. Ibid. "[W]hen the intent of the parties is plain and the 

language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as 

written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result." Id. at 616 (quoting 

Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016)). In other words, courts enforce 
10 A-1182-22

contracts as written and do not "make a better contract for either party." 

Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 342 (App. Div. 1999). 

 Section 10.2 of the Contract is clear and unambiguous. It states that if the 

condemnation takes place after the sale of the Property from Venis to Wu, Wu 

will receive $24,300 and Venis will receive any amount in excess of that amount. 

There is no time limitation in the Contract concerning the allocation of 

condemnation proceeds. To the contrary, the Contract stated that Venis will get 

any amount beyond $24,300 "as and when paid by the DOT." Nor is there any 

provision allowing for a modification based on any change in the DOT's 

appraisal of the portion of the Property to be condemned and taken. 

 Accordingly, we reject Wu's first argument that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying limited discovery. See Davis v. Disability Rts. N.J., 475 

N.J. Super. 122, 140-41 (App. Div. 2023) (explaining that an appellate court 

reviews a trial judge's discovery order for an abuse of discretion and will only 

reverse a discovery order "when a decision is made without a rational 

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an 

impermissible basis"). Wu argues that the different appraisals provided by the 

DOT in 2004 and in 2019 raise material issues of disputed fact. A change in the 

appraisal value does not raise any disputed issues of material fact. The Contract 
11 A-1182-22

does not allow for an adjustment of the agreed-upon allocation in favor of Wu 

based on a change in the appraisal provided by the DOT. To the contrary, the 

Contract stated that Venis could seek to increase the compensation to be paid by 

the DOT and that anything above $24,300 would be paid to her. There is no 

provision in the Contract allowing an adjustment in favor of Wu. In short, 

discovery would not provide anything to support Wu's contentions. To allow a 

revision to the Contract would be to effectively rewrite the Contract in Wu's 

favor, which is something a court will not do. See Lucier v. Williams, 366 N.J. 

Super. 485, 491 (App. Div. 2004). 

 We also reject Wu's argument concerning the law of the case. The June 

25, 2021 order did not mandate a summary judgment motion. Instead, it 

expressly stated that the matter would proceed as "a summary hearing." In the 

accompanying statement of reasons, the court described Venis' application as 

one seeking summary judgment, but that statement did not create a legally 

binding ruling that required a summary judgment motion. Instead, the trial court 

proceeded consistent with the governing Court Rules. 

 Rule 4:73-9 governs the procedures for disputes concerning the allocation 

of condemnation proceeds once the award has been paid into court. Subsection 

(c) of that rule authorizes any party to "apply for withdrawal of money paid into 
12 A-1182-22

court by motion on notice to all other parties." R. 4:73-9(c). If a party disputes 

the withdrawal, "the moving party shall proceed under paragraph (b)" of Rule 

4:73-9. Ibid. That paragraph states: 

If allocation of the proceeds of an award or judgment is 

in dispute, the same shall be tried only after the award 

has been paid into court or a judgment upon appeal 

from an award has been entered. The matter may be 

initiated by any party by a petition in the cause and shall 

proceed as a summary action under Rule 4:67.

[R. 4:73-9(b) (citation reformatted).]

Rule 4:67-1 states that "all actions in which the court is permitted by rule 

or by statute to proceed in a summary manner" can proceed in a summary 

fashion, provided it appears to the court "that it is likely that the matter may be 

completely disposed of in a summary manner." Under Rule 4:67-5, the trial 

court is authorized to determine actions on the pleadings and affidavits and 

render final judgment if the "affidavits show palpably that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact." Alternatively, if there is a showing of a material 

factual dispute, the court "shall hear the evidence as to those matters which may 

be genuinely in issue" before rendering final judgment. R. 4:67-5.

 Wu has not identified any material factual disputes. Instead, as already 

noted, he wants to argue that the changes in the appraisal value of the Property 

related to improvements he and the Garden Center made on the portion of the 
13 A-1182-22

Property to be condemned. Even if there is a connection between the 

improvements and the appraisal value, however, it is not material because the 

Contract does not allow for an adjustment of the allocation of the condemnation 

proceeds based on those changes. 

 Finally, we reject Wu's arguments concerning the denial of the motion for 

reconsideration. Wu presented no new evidence and failed to identify any 

palpable errors made by the trial court in the order entered on October 5, 2022. 

Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Wu's motion for reconsideration. 

See Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020) (quoting Guido v. Duane 

Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 87-88 (2010)); In re Belleville Educ. Ass'n, 455 N.J. 

Super. 387, 405 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 

374, 384 (App. Div. 1996)). 

 In summary, having considered the entire record, we discern no basis to 

reverse or modify any of the orders from which Wu and the Garden Center 

appeal. Instead, we affirm all the orders because they are consistent with the 

plain and governing language in the Contract. 

 Affirmed.