June 6, 2005

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman Diaz

Commissioner McGaffigan

Commissioner Merrifield

Commissioner Jaczko

Commissioner Lyons

FROM: Luis A. Reyes /RA/

Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: STATUS OF ALLEGATION PROGRAM - CALENDAR YEAR

2004 ANNUAL REPORT

In SECY-94-089, "Response to the Report of the Review Team for Reassessment of the NRC's

Program for Protecting Allegers Against Retaliation," the staff committed to have the Agency

Allegations Advisor provide an independent annual report to the Executive Director for

Operations that assesses the conduct of the Allegation Program in each office and region. A

copy the annual report for Calendar Year 2004 is attached for your information. The staff

intends to place the report in the ADAMS public library five days from the date it is forwarded to

the Commission unless you direct otherwise.

The report contains an assessment of the allegation program and a review of allegation data for

adverse trends for reactor and materials licensees. This annual report does not specifically

address activities concerning those allegations, because the Office of Investigations prepares

an annual report covering the follow-up of allegations involving wrongdoing.

Overall, the allegation program has maintained excellent performance in most areas. The

findings from audits completed in the last three years indicate excellent performance in

reviewing, documenting, tracking, and completing evaluations of allegations. The timeliness

goals were met in most cases. The quality rating goal was achieved each of the last three

years. One inappropriate release of an alleger’s identity was found in 2004 resulting from an

administrative error in placing documents into ADAMS in 2002. Immediate and comprehensive

actions were taken to prevent similar incidents. 

The attached report addresses the staff’s progress in carrying out the Commission’s direction

in several important areas including developing an Alternative Dispute Resolution process for

cases of alleged discrimination and providing the industry guidance on creating and maintaining

a Safety Conscious Work Environment. In addition, on August 30, 2004, the Commission, in a

Staff Requirements Memorandum, directed the staff to enhance the Reactor Oversight Process

to more fully address Safety Culture, while continuing to monitor industry and foreign efforts to

assess Safety Culture. This report also briefly discusses the staff’s efforts to address the

Commission’s direction in this area. Finally during 2004, the allegations staff has responded to

guidance from the Commission regarding the release of security-related information to the

public and that policy’s potential impact on the Allegation Program is addressed in this report.

Attachment: Annual Report
STATUS

OF

ALLEGATION PROGRAM

CALENDAR YEAR 2004

ANNUAL REPORT
CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

OVERVIEW OF THE ALLEGATION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Significant Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Alternative Dispute Resolution for Discrimination Allegations ..............3

Safety Conscious Work Environment and Safety Culture .................3

Implementation of Guidance from the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident

Response Regarding Release of Security-Related Information .......5

Allegation Program Performance .........................................5

Protecting the Identity of Allegers ...................................5

Timeliness Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Quality Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Staff Response to Communication After Closure .......................8

TRENDS IN ALLEGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

General Trends .......................................................9

Allegation Trends for Selected Reactor Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Indian Point 2 & 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Browns Ferry 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Salem/Hope Creek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Pilgrim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

San Onofre 2 & 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Susquehanna 1 & 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Perry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Oconee 1, 2, & 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Turkey Point 3 & 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Beaver Valley 1 & 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Allegation Trends for Selected Materials Licensees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Allegation Trends at Vendors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

APPENDIX 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In SECY-94-089, "Response to the Report of the Review Team for Reassessment of the NRC's

Program for Protecting Allegers Against Retaliation," the staff committed to have the Agency

Allegations Advisor prepare an annual report for the Executive Director for Operations that

assesses the conduct of the Allegation Program in each NRC office and region that routinely

handles allegations. This annual report fulfills that commitment. In this report, the staff

discusses allegation trends for reactor and materials licensees and vendors and reviews the

staff’s performance in the timely resolution of allegations. Because the Office of Investigations

prepares an annual report covering the follow-up of allegations involving wrongdoing, this report

does not specifically address activities concerning allegations of wrongdoing.

This report addresses the staff’s progress in carrying out the Commission’s direction in several

important areas including developing an Alternative Dispute Resolution process for cases of

alleged discrimination and providing the industry guidance on creating and maintaining a Safety

Conscious Work Environment. In addition, on August 30, 2004, the Commission, in a Staff

Requirements Memorandum (SRM), directed the staff to enhance the Reactor Oversight

Process to more fully address Safety Culture, while continuing to monitor industry and foreign

efforts to assess Safety Culture. This report also discusses the staff’s efforts to address the

Commission’s direction in this area. Finally during 2004, the allegations staff has responded to

guidance from the Commission regarding the release of security-related information to the

public and that policy’s potential impact on the Allegation Program is addressed in this report.

Overall, the Allegation Program has maintained excellent performance in most areas in the last

three years. The findings from audits completed during the last three years indicate excellent

performance in reviewing, documenting, tracking, and completing evaluations of allegations. 

The timeliness goals for holding initial Allegation Review Boards to discuss appropriate

disposition of issues and communications with allegers were met in most cases. The quality

rating goal was achieved in each of the last three years. However, one inappropriate release of

an alleger’s identity was found in 2004. The release was the result of an administrative error in

placing documents into ADAMS in 2002 and appropriate corrective actions have been taken.

The details of this occurrence are included under the section entitled “Overview of the

Allegation Program Performance.” 

As the figure to the right indicates, from

calendar year (CY) 2000 through 2004

the number of allegations received by

the NRC declined slightly. In 1996, the

NRC published the Policy Statement,

“Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear

Industry to Raise Safety Concerns

Without Fear of Retaliation,” to focus

the industry on the importance of

creating and maintaining a Safety

Conscious Work Environment. The

NRC began other actions as well to

communicate its expectations in this

area including, posting allegation

statistics on the NRC’s web page,

speaking at stakeholder forums, and
1

The total number of allegations received concerning reactor licensees from all sources,

as well as other information concerning the Allegation Program, can be found on the NRC’s

public website at http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/regulatory/allegations-resp.html.

2

participating in training academies hosted by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. By the

late 1990's the NRC’s and industry’s efforts began to have an impact, and in 1998 the rising

allegation trend reversed significantly. These actions continue to date.

For their part, many licensees have used what information the NRC has shared as an

opportunity to understand why licensee employees raise issues externally rather than using

internal reporting processes. In general, licensees have been increasingly responsive in

addressing employee concerns using internal processes and, as a consequence, more

employees are using internal mechanisms and fewer issues are coming to the NRC.

However, for some licensees the NRC continues to receive allegations in numbers that warrant

additional analysis. In preparing this report, a 5-year history of allegations was reviewed for

reactor and material licensees and vendors to identify adverse trends. Given the Commission’s

continuing emphasis on establishing and maintaining a SCWE, the analysis focused on

allegations that originated from onsite sources, either from licensee or contractor employees,

former employees and contractors, or anonymous sources.1

 The staff identified 10 reactor

sites for a more in-depth review: Indian Point 2 and 3, Browns Ferry 1, Salem/Hope Creek,

Pilgrim, San Onofre 2 and 3, Susquehanna 1 and 2, Perry, Oconee 1,2, and 3, Beaver Valley 1

and 2, and Turkey Point 3 and 4. Allegation trends at each of these sites are discussed in the

report. In summary, the trends either did not suggest a weakening SCWE or the licensee has

taken steps to address trends and the NRC is monitoring those activities. No materials

licensees or vendors were the subject of allegations at a level that warranted additional

analysis. 

The NRC staff has noted a significant increase in the number of generic security-related

allegations since the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Because of these increases, ongoing implementation of new and comprehensive security-related orders, rules and guidance,

and the availability of the physical facilities needed to properly handle these sensitive materials,

the Agency Allegations Advisor recommended in the 2003 Annual Report on the Status of the

Allegation Program that the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR) appoint

an Office Allegation Coordinator (OAC) to serve as the administrative point of contact for

processing and controlling allegations assigned to that office. NRC management reviewed this

proposal, as well as other alternatives to the organization of the Allegation Program, and

agreed that NSIR would assume responsibility for implementation of the Allegation Program for

generic NSIR-related allegations (security, emergency preparedness, etc.). Rather than

appoint anOAC however at this time, it was agreed that the NRR OAC would also act as NSIR’s

OAC and handle those administrative duties. The Agency Allegations Advisor and NSIR

management will monitor the effectiveness of this arrangement and may revisit the appointment

of an NSIR OAC in the future. 

In summary, the staff continues to emphasize addressing each allegation fully in a timely

manner and the program offices continue to demonstrate excellent performance in most areas

in meeting the agency’s goals for the program. The Office of Enforcement continues to

address the Commission’s direction in the areas of Alternative Dispute Resolution, Safety

Conscious Work Environment, Safety Culture, and the control of security-related information.
3

OVERVIEW OF THE ALLEGATION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Significant Activities

A number of significant agency activities took place in 2004 that affect the Allegation Program

and, therefore, warrant discussion in this report. The allegations staff continues to implement

the agency sponsored Alternative Dispute Resolution process for discrimination allegations and

prepare further Safety Conscious Work Environment guidance for the industry, as noted in the

2003 Annual Report. In addition, on August 30, 2004, the Commission, in SRM-SECY-04-

0111, directed the staff to enhance the Reactor Oversight Process to more fully address Safety

Culture, while continuing to monitor industry and foreign efforts in this area. The staff’s efforts

to address the Commission’s direction in these areas are discussed below. Finally, the

allegations staff has responded to guidance from the Commission regarding the release of

security-related information to the public.

Alternative Dispute Resolution for Discrimination Allegations

In late March 2003, the Commission directed the staff to implement many of the

recommendations of an agency task group chartered to improve the manner in which the NRC

investigated allegations of discrimination. One of the Commission’s recommendations was to

conduct a pilot Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) program to allow additional opportunities

for the parties to resolve their differences outside of the normal regulatory framework. The pilot

program includes the opportunity for using ADR early in the allegation process, before the NRC

conducts its investigation of the allegation. Early-ADR involves the use of a neutral third party

to facilitate discussion and timely settlement of the discrimination concern in an effort to prevent

negative impacts on the Safety Conscious Work Environment at the facility involved. On

October 15, 2004, Office of Enforcement staff issued an Allegation Guidance Memorandum

implementing the Early-ADR pilot program. Under the Early-ADR program, allegers are asked

if they are interested in entering into the pilot process. At any time, either party can exit the

ADR process and, if the alleger still wants to pursue the issue, they may request an

investigation by the NRC through the normal allegation process. The NRC staff’s policy under

the Early-ADR pilot program is not to pursue enforcement or an investigation of discrimination

complaints which have been settled through this process. Since implementation of the pilot

program, as of the end of May 2004, 15 allegers of the 35 that were offered have entered into

the Early-ADR process. Four of those completed resulted in settlement agreements between

the alleger and the licensee. The OE staff is continuing to monitor this program with regard to

the number of cases where ADR is accepted, the number of cases that settle, and indications

of the effect of Early-ADR on the Safety Conscious Work Environment at the involved facilities.

Safety Conscious Work Environment and Safety Culture

The Commission also directed the staff in March 2003 to prepare further guidance for licensees

on establishing a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE); that is, an environment where

employees in the nuclear industry are encouraged to raise safety concerns to their employers

or the NRC without fear of retaliation, and concerns are effectively addressed. The

Commission’s expectations with regard to licensees establishing and maintaining a SCWE are

outlined in a May 19, 1996, Policy Statement, “Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to

Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation.” However, the guidance provided by the

policy is very broad, and, with the staff continuing to see SCWE concerns at a variety of
4

facilities, the Commission directed the staff to provide further guidance to the industry in this

area. 

In the Fall of 2003 the staff formed a working group and drafted an outline of a SCWE guidance

document based on the content of the 1996 Policy Statement. This outline was published in the

Federal Register for comment and was the basis for discussion at a public meeting on February

19, 2004. While most of the stakeholders at the meeting, including representatives from the

industry and whistleblower advocates, agreed on the content of such a document, there were

many comments concerning the format, potential inappropriate use of the guidance, and the

appropriateness of the NRC issuing such guidance. 

Coincident with these comments, the Commission requested that the staff provide

recommended actions regarding agency guidance in the areas of SCWE and safety culture. In

the SECY which addressed the Commission’s request, the staff sought further guidance from

the Commission on whether the guidance document should be issued, in light of the comments

received. In SRM-SECY-04-0111, the Commission directed the staff to continue its efforts to

issue the guidance, following a brief comment period. In October 2004, the OE staff published

in the Federal Register for comment the full guidance document, which incorporated many of

the suggestions made as a result of the first public comment period. The staff has reviewed all

comments received and made significant revisions in response to comments that the guidance

was too prescriptive and that much of the guidance was applicable only to larger facilities. The

guidance document is currently in the final concurrence process.

Regarding the related area of Safety Culture, the Commission approved, in SRM-SECY-04-

0111, the following actions to address this important area: (1) continue to monitor industry

efforts to assess Safety Culture and ensure that the Commission remains informed of industry

efforts and progress; (2) enhance the Reactor Oversight Process treatment of cross-cutting

issues to more fully address Safety Culture; (3) include as part of enhanced inspection activities

for plants in the degraded cornerstone column of the reactor oversight action matrix, a

determination of the need for a specific evaluation of the licensees Safety Culture and a method

for conducting such an evaluation; and (4) continue to monitor developments by foreign

regulators in this area. The Commission emphasized the need for inspector training in this area

and stakeholder involvement in the process of enhancing the Reactor Oversight Process.

In order to address the Commission’s direction, the OE staff have formed a working group 

comprised of members representing NRR, RES, NMSS, and OE who have expertise in human

factors, SCWE, or inspection. The working group has been developing products including a

Safety Culture Response Plan and a Stakeholder Coordination Activities Plan. The Response

Plan describes the activities that will be conducted in response to the Commission’s direction in

the SRM. In addition, OE formed a Safety Culture Steering Committee which is comprised of

Senior Manager representatives from OE, NRR, RES, NMSS, and Region II to provide policy

direction to the Working Group and review Working Group draft products. Finally, a Safety

Culture Working Group Support Team has been formed comprised of members representing

NRR, RES, NMSS, NSIR, OE, and each of the regions. The Support Team assists by

reviewing working group products and supports the Working Group with additional subject

matter expert resources, particularly in the area of inspection.

The Working Group expects to make enhancements to the Reactor Oversight Process in this

area. While some changes may take upwards of eighteen months to effect, the staff expects to

incorporate a number of changes in the next 6-9 months and will keep the Commission

informed of their progress through interim updates. 
5

Implementation of Guidance from the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

Regarding Release of Security-Related Information

Because of recent concerns about the release of information related to potential safeguards

vulnerabilities at licensed facilities, the Commission directed the staff, in SRM-SECY-04-0002

dated March 29, 2004, to no longer make certain types of security-related information available

to the public. Although allegations correspondence is not normally made public, the potential

does exist for correspondence with allegers and licensees to unnecessarily release information

that could reveal potential security-related vulnerabilities. Therefore, the OE staff provided

interim guidance concerning the marking and control of security-related allegation

documentation and continues to finalize an Allegation Guidance Memorandum on the issue. 

The guidance reflects that allegers be informed that the amount of information which can be

provided related to security issues is limited. In addition, the details of the staff’s review of

security issues, as well as whether the issue was substantiated, are no longer communicated to

the alleger. The Agency Allegations Advisor is monitoring the impact of this policy change on

the willingness of individuals to bring security issues to the NRC and will make

recommendations, as appropriate, to NRC management if it is determined that this policy has a

negative effect on the viability of the Allegation Program with regard to security-related issues. 

To date, there have been a few complaints from allegers regarding this policy change on the

handling of security-related issues.

Allegation Program Performance

The Commission established the Allegation Program to provide a vehicle for individuals working

in NRC-regulated activities and members of the public to provide safety and regulatory

concerns directly to the NRC. The program includes a database that allows the staff to track

concerns submitted to the NRC to ensure that the concerns are evaluated and resolved in a

timely manner, consistent with their associated safety or risk significance, and that the results of

NRC’s evaluation are communicated to the individual who submitted the concerns, when

appropriate.

The performance of the Allegation Program is measured against goals for protecting the

identity of allegers and conducting an appropriate review of all concerns in a timely manner. It

is the goal of the agency that no alleger’s identity is inappropriately released. Timeliness goals

have been established for various stages of the process, including the convening of an initial

Allegation Review Board to evaluate the concerns, and correspondence with the alleger

concerning both acknowledgment and closure of the concerns. The quality of the staff’s review

and its correspondence with the alleger are assessed during program audits. 

Protecting the Identity of Allegers

One element of the Allegation Program that is essential to its credibility is protecting the identity

of allegers to the extent possible. The agency’s goal is to have no substantiated complaints of

the inappropriate release of an alleger’s identity as determined by either the Office of Inspector

General (OIG) or the staff. In May 2004, the staff identified one inappropriate release of the

identity of an alleger through ADAMS. The release occurred as the result of an administrative

error in placing documents into ADAMS. In this instance, a letter to an alleger with the

individual’s name and details of the concern accompanied a second letter to the licensee

detailing the NRC’s review into a complaint of discrimination for raising safety issues. Per

Management Directive 8.8, “Management of Allegations,” when the NRC staff concludes it’s

review of issues which were subject to an investigation by the Office of Investigation, a closure
6

letter is sent both to the alleger and the licensee. In finalizing the documents, an administrative

error occurred in which the letter to the alleger, rather than the letter to the licensee, was placed

in ADAMS for public viewing. 

In response to this finding, the program office immediately removed the document from ADAMS

and completed a search to determine the number of times that the document had been

accessed by members of the public. The ADAMS document properties indicated that last time

it had been accessed through the publicly available retrieval system was about a year after the

letter was issued to the alleger. The staff was not able to determine who accessed the letter or

how many times, if any, it was accessed prior to that instance, since our computer monitoring

system does not, by design, maintain a log of who reviewed an individual document. In

addition, the program office attempted to notify the alleger of the release in accordance with

Management Directive 8.8, but the alleger’s contact information was no longer valid. There are

several factors that helped to minimize the impact of this particular occurrence. The alleger had

filed a discrimination compliant with both the NRC and the Department of Labor (DOL), a public

process. As is their practice, the alleger’s name was already made publically available on

DOL’s website, prior to the NRC inadvertently placing the letter in ADAMS. Additionally, the

letter was addressed to a commercial facility, not the alleger’s home, and the alleger is no

longer receiving mail at that address. Nonetheless, the staff understands that public confidence

in the Allegation Program can be impacted by such an event and actions have been taken to

prevent its reoccurrence. The program office revised their office instructions for placing

documents in ADAMS to require that each document is opened when profiling it into ADAMS to

ensure that only the documents intended to be placed into ADAMS are made available. In

addition, all Allegation Program offices reviewed their procedures for entry into ADAMS to

ensure that adequate measures are implemented to verify that only authorized documents are

placed into ADAMS. The OE allegation staff also completed an audit to determine whether any

additional examples of inappropriate releases of the identities of allegers had occurred through

ADAMS. None were identified.

Timeliness Goals

The initial Allegation Review Board (ARB) is conducted for the purpose of reviewing the

allegation and assigning appropriate staff actions for follow-up. The program requires an initial

ARB to be held within 30 days of receiving an allegation in 100% of the cases. A total of 624 of

626, or 99%, of initial ARBs held in 2004 met this goal. In one case, a security issue was

initially received in NSIR on December 3, 2003, but was not recognized as an allegation and

forwarded to NRR until January 15, 2004, approximately 43 days after the allegation was

received. While the timeliness goal for having an ARB was not met, NSIR took appropriate

actions to follow-up on the issue before the ARB. NSIR has since appointed an individual to

serve as the point of contact for the NSIR staff on allegation issues and, more recently,

allegations have been forwarded to NRR from NSIR in a more timely manner. The other case

in which this goal was not met involved a question from an individual regarding the accuracy of

data provided by a licensee relative to occupational exposure which was initially considered to

be a question that could be readily answered rather than an allegation. Subsequently, it was

realized that an answer was not readily available and that additional follow-up was needed to

understand the validity of the concern. However, once the staff determined that further

information was needed to understand the validity of the concern, the issue still was not

recognized as an allegation. Consequently, it was not until 41 days after receipt that the matter

was brought to an ARB. In response to this issue, the region conducted a lessons learned

assessment and communicated to the entire regional staff the need to provide further

assurance that potential allegations are promptly identified and discussed at an ARB. 
7

Initial correspondence with the alleger acknowledges receipt of the allegation and documents

the specific concerns as understood by the NRC staff to ensure agreement prior to the staff

taking further action. The goals for issuing letters acknowledging receipt of allegations are 90%

within 30 days and 100% within 45 days. The 45-day goal provides an opportunity to contact

the alleger by telephone to solicit additional information prior to sending a letter acknowledging

receipt to ensure complete understanding of the alleger’s concerns. Ninety-seven percent of

the allegations received in 2004 were acknowledged within 30 days, and 100% within 45 days,

such that the agency goal for issuing these letters was met.

Regarding timeliness goals for closing technical, non-wrongdoing, allegations; the agency’s

goals are to close 70 percent of the allegations in 150 days or less; 90% of the allegations in

180 days or less; and 100% of the allegations in 360 days or less. As shown in the table below,

408 of the 409 allegations closed in CY 2004 were closed in 360 days or less. As such, the

goal for closing 100% of technical allegations within 360 days was not met. The one case

which did not meet this goal involved an issue which remained open pending a necessary reevaluation of an issue by the Federal Emergency Management Agency following the September

2001 terrorist attacks. As such, the timeliness of the agency’s resolution of this issue was

outside the control of the program office. As of January 2005, such issues are appropriately

excluded from the timeliness metric for the resolution of technical issues. 

Time to Close

Metric (Days) Total NMSS NRR RI RII RIII RIV

409 18 42 110 77 91 71

0 # 70% # 150 93%-382 100%-18 83%-35 94%-103 96%-74 95%-86 93%-66

151 # 90% # 180 98%-399 90%38 98%-108 99%-76 100%-91 95%-68

181 # 100% #

360

99%-408 99%-41 100%-110 100%-77 100%-71

Quality Goal

The staff instituted a quality goal for the Allegation Program in 1999. Although somewhat

subjective in nature, as part of the routine program assessments the reviewers evaluate, in

detail, a sample of closed allegation files to assess their quality. Specifically, the files are

reviewed to determine if staff follow-up of allegations appropriately captures and responds to

each issue raised in 90% of the allegations reviewed. A ten percent smart sample of the

allegations closed in 2004 was reviewed during the program audits conducted to date; two

additional audits are scheduled for the second calender quarter of 2005. In all, 31 files have

been reviewed, and although some observations were made to improve their overall quality, all

were determined to adequately capture and respond to the issues raised.

In addition to the routine program assessments discussed above, assessments of specific case

files are sometimes conducted at the request of the Inspector General or others. Such an

assessment of six specific allegation files related to a particular Region IV plant was conducted

in response to concerns raised by the allegers to the Office of the Inspector General and

forwarded to the Agency Allegations Advisor. Although this assessment found that the region

was properly implementing Management Directive 8.8, it also found that some responses

lacked rigor and attention to detail. The region initiated comprehensive corrective actions to
8

address these findings, including reopening some of the allegations for additional work and/or

documentation, improving management of the allegations process within the one branch

responsible for responses to the subject allegations, and providing additional guidance and

training for the regional staff. 

Staff Response to Communication After Closure

On September 5, 2002, the Executive Director for Operations issued a Commission Paper that

recommended the staff discontinue the Allegation Program survey of allegers. The

Commission approved the staff’s recommendation as noted in SRM-SECY-02-0163 on October

4, 2002. The Commission stated that the staff should continue to monitor feedback received

from allegers, and reconsider the need for a survey if the feedback indicates problems. As a

result, the Allegation Program assessments now include a review of feedback from allegers. In

all, 12 responses to the staff’s closure of an allegation have been reviewed during 2004

program audits to date. Although some observations were made to improve their overall

quality, all were determined to have adequately reviewed and responded to issues raised

following closure of an allegation.
9

TRENDS IN ALLEGATIONS

The NRC monitors both technical and discrimination allegations to discern trends or sudden

increases that might justify the NRC questioning the licensee as to the root causes of such

changes or trends. In preparing this report, a 5-year history of allegations was reviewed for

reactor and material licensees and vendors.

With the continuing emphasis on establishing and maintaining a SCWE, the staff focused on

those allegations that have the potential to provide insights into the SCWE, that is, those

allegations submitted by current or former licensee or contractor employees or by anonymous

sources. The staff performs an analysis of the allegations twice a year in support of the

Reactor Oversight Process mid-cycle and end-of-cycle assessments. In addition, an analysis

for a particular site or licensee may be performed whenever allegations or inspection findings

indicate it is warranted. 

The staff also conducts reviews to identify national trends for reactor and materials allegations,

shifts in users of the Allegation Program, and impact on the workload in the regions, NRR and

NMSS. These trends are discussed in the next section on general trends.

General Trends

National trends are of interest because they provide general information to the staff concerning

the impact of external factors, plant events, and the industry’s efforts to improve the SCWE at

NRC licensed facilities. In addition they are used in developing budget assumptions, labor

rates, and in preparing operating plans. Figure 2 below shows that the 5-year national trend

has declined slightly.

While the general trend in allegations has decreased in the last five years, the NRC staff did

note a slight increase in the number of reactor allegations from 2003 to 2004. As noted below

(see Figure 7), the most significant contributor to the number of allegations in 2004 was in the

security area, and many of these allegations were received shortly before the NRC’s new

Security Orders were required to be implemented in October 2004. Implementation of these

orders, combined with significant issues at a number of plants as discussed in the following

section, “Allegation Trends for Selected Reactor Sites,” likely contributed to this slight increase. 
10

While the 5-year trend in the number of allegations received declined slightly on the national

level, the figures below show that the impact of this decline is not evenly distributed across the

regions. Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the shift of allegation workload in the regions at the issue

level. Each allegation can include multiple issues or concerns. With the NRC’s budget

prepared two years in advance, budgeted resources may not reflect the actual workload in the

organization when shifts in workload occur as happens with allegations.

In the last five years, the volume of concerns in Regions II and IV remained fairly stable. 

However, the volume of concerns received in Region III and Region I declined and increased,

respectively. The decline in the number of concerns received in Region III can partly be

attributed to resolved union/strike issues at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and the end

of the extended shutdown of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in March 2004. A transfer

of licensees between regions also occurred in late 2003 which impacted the number of

allegations received in Region III; two large fuel cycle facilities were transferred from Region III

to Region II in late 2003. In addition, one state in Region III entered into an Agreement with the

NRC in 2003 whereby the licensed activities are regulated by the State with NRC oversight. As

a result, many of the individuals who may have filed an allegation with the NRC regarding a

licensee in this State now report such concerns to the State. Regarding Region I, the increase

from 2003 to 2004 can partially be attributed to an identified significant SCWE concern at a
11

Region I site. Finally, several of the plants in Region I underwent contract negotiations or

reorganizations in 2004.

To provide further insights into the areas in which the NRC is spending resources on reactorrelated allegation follow-up, Figure 7 depicts the twelve areas that represent approximately 80%

of the issues received nationwide in 2004. 

Security-related concerns continue to represent the greatest percentage of concerns received

in the NRC’s Allegation Program. This was expected following the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001. While security concerns represent the largest percentage of issues

received, the percentage of security concerns has decreased from 36% in 2002. However,

there was a slight increase in the percentage of security issues received from 2003 to 2004

(from 18% to almost 21%). A review of the timing of concerns received indicates that the slight

increase may have been due to preparation for the NRC’s requirement that implementation of

security orders be complete by October 2004. 

The significant increase in the number of allegations concerning a “chilling effect,” noted in

2003, indicating weaknesses in the licensees’ SCWE programs, was reversed in 2004. In fact,

the number of chilling effect concerns received in 2004 was approximately half of those

received in 2003. This may indicate positive accomplishments in the area of SCWE in the

industry. 

Another notable change in the issues received involved maintenance issues, which almost

doubled in number from 2003 to 2004. A review of the data regarding maintenance issues

indicates that this increase may be attributed to the continued maintenance issues at Salem/

Hope Creek and at Browns Ferry 1, a site under construction. 

Figures 8 through 12 depict the CY 2004 distribution in NRR and the four regions of the same

twelve areas illustrated in Figure 7. Notable changes from 2003 to 2004 include: (1) a shift in

the primary type of concern received in NRR from emergency preparedness to security; (2) a

substantial increase in the percentage of quality assurance issues received in NRR; (3)

increases in the percentage of security issues in Region III and Region IV; (4) an increase in
12

the percentage of operations, training, and health physics issues in Region IV; and (5) and a

decrease in the percentage of security and health physics issues in Region II. An analysis of

the specific cases received indicated no notable reason for the trends in the data. 
13

52.4%

47.6%

Medical Fuel Facility Radiography Gaseous Diffusion Plants

Nuclear Gauges Decommissioning Reactor Casks

FIGURE 16 - REGION

48.1%

14.8%

13.6%

23.5%

Medical Fuel Facility Radiography Gseous Diffusion Plants

Nuclear Gauges Decommissioning Reactor Casks

FIGURE 15 - REGION

Because activities performed by materials licensees are not as homogeneous as those

performed by reactor licensees, a comparison of the types of issues received doesn’t produce

meaningful results. To provide further insights into the areas in which the NRC is spending

resources on materials-related allegations, the following graphs depict the seven licensee

categories that represent approximately 80% of the issues received nationwide and the

distribution of those issues in NMSS and the four regions.
14

Notable changes in the distribution of the types of materials issues received in the regions and

program offices include a switch in the primary contributor to NMSS issues from medical in

2003 to casks in 2004 and an increase in the percentage of allegations regarding radiography

in Region IV. The changes in the types of issues received in Regions I, II, and III (an increase

in medical and radiography issues in Region I, gaseous diffusion and fuel facilities being the

only types of issues received in Region II, and a shift in Region III issues from the fuel facilities

to radiography and nuclear gauges), are likely a result of the transfer of responsibility for all

materials licenses from Region II to Region I and the transfer of the fuel facilities from Region

III to Region II. 

Figure 19 below and Figure 20 on the following page, provide a breakdown of allegations

received by categories of sources for which comprise about 99% of the concerns received

during the last three years for reactor and materials allegations. The data indicates that the

distribution of source categories has remained steady in the last 3 years. That is, the primary

sources of allegations continue to be licensee and contractor employees. Anonymous allegers

are, most likely, also from these on-site sources.

In comparing the sources for materials vs. reactor-related allegations, private citizens are a

more prevalent source for materials-related allegations and contractor employees are less

prevalent. This is logical because materials licensees’ activities are more visible to the public

and involve fewer contractors.
15

Two of the categories deserve some explanation. The source category “NRC” is used when the

NRC staff suspects a violation of requirements is deliberate or due to careless disregard and

the Office of Investigations opens an investigation. The category “Licensee” is used for the

same kinds of issues that are reported by a licensee to the NRC. An allegation number is used

to track the follow-up on the technical and wrongdoing aspects of the issue. 

Allegation Trends for Selected Reactor Sites 

As noted previously, the trending of allegations received concerning individual reactor sites is

one method the NRC staff uses to monitor the safety conscious work environment at reactor

sites. Statistics on allegations received concerning all operating reactor sites are given in the

table in Appendix 1. The allegations in the table cover the 5-year period January 2000 through

December 2004 and include allegations received from onsite sources only; that is, allegations

from current or former licensee employees, current or former contractor employees, or

anonymous allegers. For the purpose of this analysis, the NRC assumes anonymous

allegations are from onsite personnel.

In determining which reactor sites should receive a more in-depth review, the staff applied the

following criteria:

1) The number of onsite allegations received exceeds 2 times the median value for the

reactor industry, but does not exceed three times the median, and there is a 50%

increase in the number of allegations received over the previous year; or;

2) The number of onsite allegations received exceeds 3 times the median value.

For CY 2004, the median number of onsite allegations per reactor site was four. The ten

reactor sites that met one of these criteria are Indian Point (19), Browns Ferry (18),

Salem/Hope Creek (17), Pilgrim (14), San Onofre (13), Susquehanna (13), Perry (12), Oconee

(11), Turkey Point (9), and Beaver Valley (9). The first six sites listed exceeded 3 times the

industry median while the remaining sites exceeded 2 times the median and experienced more

than a 50% increase in the number of allegations concerning the site. A more detailed

discussion of each of these sites follows.
16

Indian Point 2 & 3

With the exception of CY 2002 when there was a notable increase, the number of allegations

received concerning the Indian Point site over the past five years has remained steady. Many

of the concerns received in 2004 were in the

security area. Similarly, the licensee, in

discussions with the NRC, confirmed that they

too had seen the same trend in the concerns

raised internally by their employees. 

With regard to the security concerns, as we

have indicated in the past, while the NRC is

fully committed to our goal of increasing public

confidence through communicating with the

public, we must balance that goal with the more

immediate need of ensuring the continued

safety and secure operation of nuclear facilities in our country. Normally, general information

concerning actions taken by the agency or licensee in the security area would be discussed in

this report. However, to ensure that we are not unnecessarily releasing information that would

reveal any potential security-related vulnerabilities, the Commission has instituted a new policy

regarding public release of security-related information and, in accordance with this policy, we

have not included such a discussion in this report. Nonetheless, in addition to enhancing the

security of reactor licensees through the implementation of new NRC orders in 2004, the NRC

has taken all necessary actions to address potential security-related concerns that may have

been identified during the course of the NRC’s review of allegations. 

Significant labor relation achievements were realized in 2004, when the licensee reached

agreement with both the utility workers union and security bargaining unit personnel. Site

integration also continued in 2004. Licensee management continues to focus on addressing

cultural differences within various departments.

With regard to allegations of discrimination, there were five raised in 2004. Investigations were

initiated in all five cases. In one case the agency did not find sufficient evidence to support a

finding that a violation of employee protection regulations had taken place, and closed the

investigation. The other four allegations of discrimination raised in 2004 were still under

investigation at the time of this report. In the previous four years a total of 24 discrimination

allegations were raised at the site, four in 2003, seven in 2002, four in 2001, and nine in 2000. 

Of the 24, only one remains open. Eleven claims were investigated, not substantiated, and

closed, one was withdrawn by the alleger, and eleven did not meet the requirements for

initiation of an investigation. In order for the NRC to pursue a matter of potential discrimination,

pursuant to 10 CFR 50.7, a certain pattern of facts, called a prima-facie showing, must be

articulated. Specifically, it must be initially established that an employee has engaged in a

protected activity, that an adverse personnel action was taken against the employee, that

management knew that the employee had engaged in the protected activity, and that the

protected activity was, in part, the reason for the adverse personnel action. The NRC has not

substantiated an allegation of discrimination at the Indian Point site during this five year review

period. 

Although Indian Point has a relatively high number of allegations, the volume is characteristic of

this site, and the results of investigations completed and inspection findings do not suggest a

weakening SCWE. The licensee continues to monitor their work environment using survey
17

20002001200220032004

0

5

10

15

20

Received Closed

Substantiated

FIGURE 23 - ALLEGATION

tools. The NRC staff will also continue to monitor the open allegations of discrimination, as well

as the general allegation trends at the Indian Point site.

Browns Ferry 1

Unit 1 of the Browns Ferry site is under construction, have a significant number of contractors

on site, and the allegations received at the NRC reflect that. The majority of concerns received

involve maintenance issues and the quality of

work being performed. The licensee verified

that the numerous major construction

activities on site in 2004 (including torus

repairs, painting/coating, cross over/under

piping, and general welding issues)

contributed to a substantial increase in

employee concerns being raised internally to

the licensee as well. To address these

increases, the licensee has taken a number

of steps, including SCWE training,

assessments, and program improvements. 

A major contractor on site also established a

program to address employee concerns in 2004. 

In the past two years, the NRC received five allegations of discrimination, four of those in 2004. 

Three of the five were investigated and based on the evidence developed during the

investigation, not substantiated, one was withdrawn by the alleger, and one had to be closed

when the NRC was unable, after several attempts, to reach the alleger for further needed

information. 

The nature of allegations received and the volume of concerns being raised internally do not

indicate a weakening SCWE. However, the NRC will continue to monitor the work environment

through normal inspection activities, including a review of the actions the licensee takes to

improve it, and the general allegation trend at the Browns Ferry Unit 1 site.

Salem/Hope Creek

A special NRC review of the SCWE was initiated in late 2003 at the Salem and Hope Creek site

to assess concerns raised in allegations and identified by the NRC through inspection. Interim

results of the special review were provided to

the licensee in a letter dated January 28, 2004

and the NRC met with the licensee in public

meetings in March and June to discuss their

assessments and planned actions in this

regard.

On July 30, 2004, the regional office issued a

letter to the licensee that provided the final

results of the NRC special review. This

in-depth review confirmed NRC interim results

previously provided and generally agreed with

the results of the licensee’s self-assessments. Specifically, while the special assessment did

not identify any serious safety violations, the NRC concluded that there were numerous
18

indications of weaknesses in corrective actions and management efforts to establish an

environment where employees are consistently willing to raise safety concerns. Examples

identified both by the licensee and the NRC indicated an underlying frustration by both staff and

management with poor equipment reliability. The equipment issues stemmed, in part, from

weaknesses in implementation of station processes such as work management and corrective

action. Consistent with this finding, clear trends in the areas of Maintenance and Corrective

Actions were identified in the volume of allegations received in 2004 from the site.

On August 23, 2004, the NRC’s Executive Director of Operations approved a deviation from the

NRC’s Reactor Oversight Program Action Matrix to provide a greater level of regulatory

oversight of the Salem and Hope Creek plants than would typically be called for by the

program. This deviation included augmented inspection of SCWE-related areas. The NRC has

established an internal NRC coordination team, involving regional and headquarters experts in

reactor oversight and SCWE to help coordinate NRC review efforts. Also, in the mid-cycle

assessment issued on August 30, 2004, the NRC identified a “substantive cross-cutting issue”

in SCWE at the Salem and Hope Creek site.

With regard to allegations of discrimination, there have been no substantiated cases during the

five year review period. Three cases were alleged in 2004 and all three are under investigation. 

Of the six discrimination concerns raised in the previous four years, four were investigated, not

substantiated and closed, and two did not make a prima-facie showing. 

The NRC is in the process of reviewing detailed SCWE improvement plans and performance

metrics developed by the licensee and additional SCWE inspections are planned for 2005. 

Increased oversight under the deviation memo will continue until the licensee demonstrates that

substantial and sustainable progress has been made to correct the weaknesses in the SCWE. 

Pilgrim

There was a significant increase in allegations concerning the Pilgrim plant in 2004, primarily in

the area of security. Again, to ensure that we are not unnecessarily releasing information that

would reveal any potential security-related

vulnerabilities, the NRC staff is not at liberty

to discuss specific information concerning

actions taken by the agency or licensee in

the security area. The NRC and licensee

have taken all necessary actions to address

potential security-related concerns that may

have been identified during the course of the

NRC’s review of these allegations. The

licensee, in discussions with the NRC,

confirmed that they too had seen a notable

increase in the volume of concerns raised

internally by their employees. 

There were four allegations of discrimination in 2004 concerning activities at the Pilgrim plant. 

One of the four was closed because a prima-facie showing of potential discrimination was not

articulated, and three allegations raised in 2004 are still under investigation. In 2004, after NRC

review of a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge finding of discrimination at another

utility, and a potential connection to the Pilgrim facility, the NRC sent a “Chilling Effect Letter” to

Pilgrim as well as the other utility and a contractor requesting information on any actions the
19

20002001200220032004

0

2

4

6

8

10121416

Received Closed

Substantiated

FIGURE 26 - ALLEGATION

licensee planned to take to mitigate potential impacts of this finding on their SCWE. The

licensee’s response indicated that they did not find this event had impacted their SCWE

negatively and they continue to provide ongoing SCWE training, reemphasize SCWE

expectations annually, and conduct annual SCWE surveys. Three allegations of discrimination

were raised between 2000 and 2003. Of those three, two were investigated, not substantiated

and closed, and one was raised anonymously and could not be investigated without further

specific information. 

An analysis of the trends in allegations does not suggest a SCWE problem. The licensee

continues to monitor their work environment using survey tools. The staff will continue to

monitor the general trend of allegations and trends in the licensee’s internal reporting programs,

as well as the open discrimination case files. 

San Onofre 2 & 3

The number of allegations received from onsite sources at the San Onofre site increased

slightly in 2004, but the 5-year period analyzed shows a steady trend as indicated by Figure 25. 

Trends in particular disciplines were identified

in the allegations. Similarly, the licensee, in

discussions with the NRC, confirmed that they

too had seen trends in the concerns raised

internally by their employees. The similarity of

the information indicates that licensee

employees were willing to raise issues

internally as well as to the NRC. 

The number of allegations of discrimination

declined in 2004 after doubling each of the

past two years. Of the two raised in 2004, one

was investigated but the agency did not find

sufficient evidence to support the complaint as alleged, and the other was not investigated

because a prima-facie showing of potential discrimination was not articulated. Ten allegations

of discrimination were raised in the prior four years evaluated. All ten were investigated, but

none substantiated.

The licensee confirmed that they continue to provide refresher SCWE training to supervisors

and monitor their work environment using survey tools. Although the number of allegations

received increased in 2004, because the increase was not substantial and the volume is

characteristic of this site, they do not suggest a weakening SCWE. 

Susquehanna 1 & 2

Although Susquehanna’s allegation trend over

the past five years is down, the number of

allegations from the site more than quadrupled in

2004 from the previous year. A review of the

individual issues found no pattern or trend in the

disciplines involved. Nor were there any

significant events that might explain the sudden

increase in the volume of concerns being raised

externally. 
20

In the Fall of 2004, the licensee conducted an independent review of the effectiveness of their

Employee Concerns Program. The contractor found that although the program effectively

addresses employee concerns, it does not always recognize the potential impact management

actions may have on the work environment and recommended a number of enhancements. 

The licensee is in the process of addressing those recommendations, including developing

better metrics and tools such as employee surveys to assess the SCWE. The NRC will

continue to monitor their progress with interest to assess the effectiveness of these and other

actions resulting from their internal assessments.

There were four allegations of discrimination filed in 2004; two were closed because a primafacie showing of potential discrimination was not articulated, and two were investigated and

closed as unsubstantiated. In the previous four years, seven allegations of discrimination were

raised; three did not make a prima-facie showing, one was withdrawn by the individual, and

although the remaining three were investigated, none were substantiated. 

Perry

As indicated in Figure 27, the volume of allegations received concerning the Perry plant has

been relatively steady over the past several years, and, until the past year, was even trending

down slightly. In 2004, however, the number of

allegations more than doubled and the trend

reversed itself. There are a number of issues

that may have contributed to this increase. The

licensee initiated organizational changes at

Perry in 2004. This reorganization resulted in

both new management expectations and some

staff reductions. The licensee indicated that

they also saw an increase in concerns brought

to the Employee Concerns Program, particularly

in the area of “management issues.” A licensee

initiated independent Safety Culture assessment

in the Fall of 2004, identified that a lack of

effective communications concerning the reorganization contributed to weaknesses in the

licensee’s SCWE. The licensee has developed an action plan to validate and address this and

other findings from that assessment. The NRC will continue to monitor these efforts as a part

of our routine inspection program.

The NRC conducted a special inspection in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95003 in

early 2005 that included an assessment of the licensee’s Employee Concerns Program and

SCWE. At the time of this report, the NRC’s observations were still pre-decisional, but are

expected to be documented in an inspection report in the near future. 

With regard to allegations of discrimination, two were raised in 2004, neither of which were

investigated by the NRC; one because a prima-facie showing of potential discrimination was not

articulated and the other because it involved a third party. The NRC does not pursue third-party

complaints of discrimination both because specific information is needed as well as permission

from the individual to release his name to the licensee. Of the six allegations of discrimination

raised between 2000 and 2003, three were withdrawn at the request of the individuals, one was

investigated, not substantiated and closed, one is still open, and one, raised in 2000, was

investigated, substantiated, and enforcement taken against the licensee. The NRC will

continue to monitor the open allegation of discrimination and general allegation trends at the
21

Perry plant, as well as the effectiveness of the actions taken in response to the licensee’s

assessment of their Safety Culture and SCWE as part of our routine inspection program.

Oconee 1, 2, & 3

The volume of allegations received at the NRC from the Oconee site continues to increase. A

review of the individual issues found no pattern or trend in the disciplines involved suggesting a

weakening SCWE in any one particular area. 

Similarly, the licensee indicated that no trends

were identified in the few concerns raised

internally to the Employee Concerns Program. 

Allegations of discrimination have also increased

in 2004. Of the four received, three are still

being investigated, and one did not articulate a

prima-facie showing of potential discrimination

and was closed. In the previous four years of

this review period only one discrimination

allegation was raised. That concern was

investigated, but the agency did not find

sufficient evidence to support a finding that a

violation of employee protection regulations had taken place.

The licensee informed the staff that SCWE training of all supervisors fleet-wide has been

conducted in recent years. The NRC will continue to monitor allegation trends, open

investigations of discrimination, and any impact the licensee’s training has on its SCWE.

Turkey Point 3 & 4

Although allegations concerning the Turkey Point plant are, over the five year period analyzed,

trending down, last year there was a notable increase. Many of the allegations received

involved training. The licensee confirmed that

they also received concerns internally

concerning the same discipline and by the end

of 2003 had intervened. Supervisory personnel

changes were made and the work environment

is being monitored. The licensee plans to

conduct a site-wide SCWE survey in the third

quarter of 2005.

With regard to allegations of discrimination, two

allegations were received in 2004, the first

since 2002. One was investigated but the NRC

did not find enough evidence to substantiate

the claim, while the other did not make a prima-facie showing of potential discrimination and

was closed. One allegation was raised in 2002, but did not make a prima-facie showing. And

one was raised in 2000, but was withdrawn by the alleger and closed.

Beside the one trend identified by the NRC which the licensee appears to have addressed,

there is no indication that the SCWE is weakening. The NRC will continue under the normal

inspection and oversight processes to monitor allegation trends and the work environment.
22

Beaver Valley 1 & 2

In 2004 the number of allegations at the Beaver Valley site increased significantly. As with

Perry, organizational changes were made at the Beaver Valley site in 2004. This reorganization

resulted in both new management expectations

and some staff reductions, which may have

contributed to the increase in allegations. The

licensee stated that they saw some

improvement in a SCWE survey conducted in

late 2004; however, an independent Safety

Culture assessment conducted in early 2005,

after the reorganization, identified some

weaknesses in the SCWE-related processes,

such as the Employee Concerns Program and

the willingness of some groups on site to use it. 

The licensee has developed an action plan to

validate and address this and other findings

from that assessment.

With regard to allegations of discrimination, there was also a sharp increase in 2004. Six

allegations were received in 2004, five of which are still under investigation, and one in which

the individual did not make a prima-facie showing of discrimination and therefore, was closed. 

In the previous four years, five discrimination allegations were received. In 2002 one was

received, investigated, and not substantiated. In 2001, three were received, two of which were

investigated, but not substantiated, and one in which the individual did not make a prima-facie

showing. And in 2000, one allegation of discrimination was investigated but the agency did not

find sufficient evidence to support the claim of employment discrimination as alleged. There

has been no finding of discrimination at the Beaver Valley site during this five year review

period. The NRC will continue to monitor the open allegations of discrimination and the

licensee’s efforts to improve the Employee Concerns Program and other tools used to maintain

their SCWE.

Allegation Trends for Selected Materials Licensees

Because of the small number of allegations received concerning individual materials licensees

and because of the potential for a licensee or contractor to identify an alleger, tables of

statistics on allegations concerning these two categories have not been included in this report. 

None of the material licensees received a sufficient number of allegations to discern a trend or

pattern, or provide insights into the work environment, therefore, more in-depth reviews were

not performed. 

Allegation Trends at Vendors

Because none of the vendors received a sufficient number of allegations to discern a trend or

pattern, or provide insights into the work environment, more in-depth reviews were not

performed. Statistics by contractor or vendor are not given in this report because publishing the

number of allegations received has the potential of identifying the alleger.
23

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the allegation program has maintained excellent performance in most areas. The

findings from audits completed in the last three years indicate excellent performance in

reviewing, documenting, tracking, and completing evaluations of allegations. The timeliness

goals for a) holding initial Allegation Review Boards to assign appropriate staff actions for

follow-up, b) communications with allegers, and c) closing allegations were met in most cases. 

The quality rating goal was achieved each of the last three years. One inappropriate release of

an alleger’s identity was found in 2004 resulting from an administrative error in placing

documents into ADAMS in 2002. Immediate and comprehensive actions were taken to prevent

similar incidents. 

As noted in the previous discussions of specific licensees, the analysis of allegations has

provided insights into the work environment at several facilities. The staff continues to take a

deliberately measured approach in addressing work environment issues with licensees,

including the preparation of additional guidance for the NRC staff in this area. As this report

indicates, the staff continues to monitor work environment issues at several facilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The staff has no recommendations for program changes at this time.
24

APPENDIX 1

ALLEGATIONS STATISTICS – OPERATING REACTORS
25

Allegations Received from Onsite Sources

Site 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

ARKANSAS 1 & 2 52346

BEAVER VALLEY 1 & 2 37119

BRAIDWOOD 1 & 2 14 5 5 1 3

BROWNS FERRY 2 & 3 4 2 2 6

BRUNSWICK 1 & 2 11132

BYRON 1 & 2 14 20 12 11 6

CALLAWAY 9 6 7 3 1

CALVERT CLIFFS 1 & 2 3 2 3 4 5

CATAWBA 1 & 2 7 2 2

CLINTON 10 1 3 2 4

COLUMBIA PLANT 13 5 4 6

COMANCHE PEAK 1 & 2 55212

COOK 1 & 2 22 12 14 9 12

COOPER 1 8 6 8 10

CRYSTAL RIVER 4 2 2 3 4

DAVIS-BESSE 2 27 14 12

DIABLO CANYON 1 & 2 6 6 3 2 2

DRESDEN 2 & 3 12 32 11 3 3

DUANE ARNOLD 2 3 2 2 8

FARLEY 1 & 2 8 3 1 3 1

FERMI 4 3 4 2 1

FITZPATRICK 6 1 1 7

FORT CALHOUN 1 2 2 3 1

GINNA 1 1 2

GRAND GULF 3 5 6 6

HARRIS 1 & 2 1 1 6 1

HATCH 1 & 2 12 2 3 2 1

INDIAN POINT 2 & 3 20 17 29 20 19

KEWAUNEE 4 3 4 3

LASALLE 1 & 2 4 2 1 2

LIMERICK 1 & 2 2 2 7 4 4

MCGUIRE 1 & 2 1 2 2

MILLSTONE 2 & 3 8 2 7 6 1
Allegations Received from Onsite Sources

Site 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

26

MONTICELLO 1 1

NINE MILE POINT 1 & 2 11 4 5 2 4

NORTH ANNA 1 & 2 4 1 10 1 4

OCONEE 1, 2, & 3 2 5 1 3 11

OYSTER CREEK 3 5 9 18 8

PALISADES 4 9 7 10

PALO VERDE 1, 2, & 3 3 3 2 19 8

PEACH BOTTOM 2 & 3 4 2 1 2 1

PERRY 7 7 5 5 12

PILGRIM 2 3 2 5 14

POINT BEACH 1 & 2 5 7 7 10 11

PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 & 2 5 2 4

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 6 1 3 1 1

RIVER BEND 2 1 1 4 3

ROBINSON 1

SALEM/HOPE CREEK 1 3 11 6 17

SAN ONOFRE 2 & 3 16 7 11 11 13

SEABROOK 33633

SEQUOYAH 1 & 2 7 2 5 7 4

SOUTH TEXAS 1 & 2 10 4 6 2 6

ST LUCIE 1 & 2 9 25 11 24 4

SUMMER 3 3 2 4 3

SURRY 1 & 2 42421

SUSQUEHANNA 1 & 2 13 15 9 3 13

THREE MILE ISLAND 1 5 5 1 6

TURKEY POINT 3 & 4 12 11 2 3 9

VERMONT YANKEE 2 4 3

VOGTLE 1 & 2 1 3 1 1

WATERFORD 2 2 7 1

WATTS BAR 4 4 8 2 4

WOLF CREEK 6 4 1