UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 20-cv-61386-BLOOM

CARLINE MAURICE, 

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent.

/

ORDER ON MOTION TO VACATE SENTENCE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Petitioner Carline Maurice’s (“Petitioner”) Motion 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody.

ECF No. [1] (“Motion”). The Government filed a Response to the Motion, ECF No. [6]

(“Response”), with supporting exhibits, ECF Nos. [6-1]-[6-12]. Petitioner filed a Reply. ECF No. 

[12] (“Reply”). The Court has carefully considered the Motion, all opposing and supporting 

submissions, the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the 

reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, who is presently incarcerated at the Coleman Federal Correctional Complex, 

asks the Court to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence. See generally ECF No. [1]. The Court 

construes Petitioner’s Motion liberally due to her pro se status. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 

519, 520-21 (1972).

On January 7, 2017, the Grand Jury returned an Indictment charging Petitioner and her two 

Co-Defendants, Maurice Exavier and Jimmy Alexandre, with 22 separate counts. CR-ECF No. 

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[3].1 Petitioner was charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

1343 and 1349 (Count 1), conspiracy to commit identity fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(f) 

and 1028(a)(7) (Count 2), 15 counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Counts 3-17), 

and 5 counts of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (Counts 18-22). Id. at 1-11.

The Offense Conduct and Trial. The Eleventh Circuit previously summarized the

background offense conduct and trial as follows: 

Exavier and Maurice were principals of Broward Financial Services, LLC 

(“BFS”), Advance Tax and Accounting Services, Inc. (“ATAS”), and Advance Tax

and Accounting Services 2 (“ATAS2”). All three companies provided tax 

preparation services. Alexandre worked as a tax preparer for a separate business 

called “Mr. Cash and Associates” (“Mr. Cash”). The government alleges that 

through these businesses, defendants arranged to file false tax returns on behalf of 

deceased individuals and have refund checks deposited into bank accounts that 

Exavier and Maurice controlled. 

To facilitate electronic filing, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) assigns 

individual tax preparers a Preparer Tax Identification Number (“PTIN”). Similarly, 

the IRS assigns tax preparation businesses an Electronic Filing Identification 

Number (“EFIN”). Both the EFIN and PTIN are specific to that business or 

individual, and cannot be transferred or reassigned. When a tax preparation 

business files an electronic return, it must include both the EFIN for the business 

and the PTIN for the individual tax preparer. 

In 2003, the IRS issued an EFIN to BFS. In March of 2008, the IRS issued 

a PTIN to Exavier so that he could file tax returns for BFS clients. In 2009, in 

addition to tax preparation services, BFS obtained a state license as a money 

services business to offer check cashing services for tax preparation clients. The 

EFIN for BFS became inactive in November of 2010, and the IRS suspended its 

authorization to file tax returns electronically. 

In July of 2010, Exavier and Maurice established ATAS, with Maurice as 

president and Exavier as vice president. The IRS issued an EFIN to ATAS. 

On September 10, 2010, a Florida corporation called The Tax Doctors of Broward 

County reorganized to become ATAS2, with the same business address as ATAS. 

On September 30, 2010, the IRS issued an EFIN to ATAS2. 

In early 2011, ATAS electronically filed 158 income tax returns seeking 

$536,430 in refunds for deceased individuals. In this same period, ATAS2 

electronically filed 312 returns for deceased individuals claiming $1,069,752 in 

1 References to docket entries in Petitioner’s criminal case, No. 16-cr-60007, are denoted as “CR-ECF No.”

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refunds. All of these refunds were filed under EFINs for ATAS and ATAS2 and 

Maurice’s PTIN. Each return included the correct name, birth date, and social 

security number of the decedent, but listed false information regarding 

employment, income, contact information, tax credits, deductions, and dependents. 

The IRS did not actually owe refunds on any of these returns. 

In transactions involving a paid tax preparer, a taxpayer can direct the IRS 

to deposit the refund in the bank account of a designated third party. The third party 

pays the tax preparer directly, then deducts a processing fee and pays the balance 

to the taxpayer. ATAS and ATAS2 used Santa Barbara Tax Products Group 

(“SBTPG”) to process refunds and pay tax preparation fees. SBTPG sent blank 

checks to ATAS and ATAS2 and when it received refunds from the IRS, authorized 

them to print cashier’s checks for the taxpayers. The government claimed that 

defendants used this arrangement so that Maurice and Exavier could deposit refund 

checks for deceased individuals into accounts which they controlled. 

On January 19, 2011, after reviewing nine tax returns that had been filed for 

deceased individuals under the ATAS EFIN, SBTPG terminated its relationship 

with ATAS. Other than a few refund checks that issued before it discovered the 

fraud, SBTPG did not actually issue refunds for the fraudulent returns that ATAS 

and ATAS2 had filed. SBTPG did deposit tax preparation fees into their bank

accounts, however, with ATAS receiving approximately $54,457 and ATAS2 

receiving $245,569. Of the $54,457 which ATAS received, $4,000 was traced to 

Maurice and $2,000 to Exavier, with the balance largely used to pay “1099 

commissions” to various unspecified individuals. Of the $245,569 which ATAS2 

received, $10,000 was transferred to Maurice through checks, $59,000 was 

transferred to Exavier through checks, $5,000 was transferred to a BFS bank 

account, and nine checks totaling $20,350 were made payable to cash. The balance 

apparently remained in the ATAS2 account or was not directly traceable to 

defendants. 

Alexandre worked as a tax preparer for Mr. Cash in early 2011. He received 

permission from the company’s owner, Yanel Laroche, to file electronic tax returns 

for his “friends,” i.e., tax preparers who had lost their EFINs but who nevertheless 

wished to service some 1,000 clients. Between January 28 and March 3, 2011, 

Alexandre filed 363 tax returns electronically under Mr. Cash’s EFIN and his own 

PTIN. Of those 363 tax returns, 345 sought refunds amounting to $1,708,910 in the 

names of deceased individuals. Like the fraudulent returns which ATAS and 

ATAS2 filed, Alexandre’s returns contained the correct names, birth dates, and 

social security numbers of the decedents, but listed false information regarding 

employment, income, contact information, tax credits, deductions, and dependents. 

For Alexandre’s returns, Mr. Cash used SBTPG to process refunds and pay tax 

preparation fees. In March of 2011, SBTPG contacted Laroche to alert him that tax 

returns had been filed for “dead people” under Mr. Cash’s EFIN. Laroche 

discovered that Alexandre had prepared all of those tax returns. When SBTPG 

detected the fraud, it had already authorized checks for many of the refunds claimed 

in those returns. Among them, SBTPG had authorized $555,939 in refunds on 161 

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checks that were printed in the Mr. Cash office and deposited into a BFS business 

checking account that listed Exavier and Maurice as authorized signatories. 

Alexandre, who did not have a physical office at Mr. Cash, was the only individual 

who had picked up refund checks that SBTPG issued for the fraudulent returns. 

SBTPG paid $965,585 in refunds that the IRS funded for the 345 fraudulent tax 

returns that Alexandre prepared in early 2011. 

Approximately 97 percent of the checks deposited into the BFS business 

checking account in the first quarter of 2011 were tax refund checks. At trial, IRS 

Special Agent Bradley Cohen testified that in addition to the 161 refund checks 

related to Alexandre’s returns, BFS deposits included 491 refund checks totaling 

$1,785,683 from returns filed by tax preparers other than defendants, ATAS, 

ATAS2, or Mr. Cash. Of this amount, $639,610 was transferred to another BFS 

account which listed Maurice and Exavier as signatories. From that account, checks 

totaling $57,250 were paid to Maurice, $40,500 to Exavier, $19,000 to Exavier’s 

wife, $4,000 to ATAS, and $360,298 to cash. Of the checks made payable to cash, 

$28,000 was traced to a joint account that belonged to Exavier and his wife. Agent 

Cohen did not opine on the legitimacy of all of the refund checks from other tax 

preparers, but he analyzed 100 of the 491 refunds. He found that more than 60 of 

the refund checks were for deceased individuals and that 18 of them were for 

incarcerated individuals, two of whom were serving life terms. 

Agent Cohen testified that documents from the Office of Financial 

Regulation had listed BFS as a check cashing and money transmitter business. 

Agent Cohen testified that in November of 2009, when Exavier applied for a 

Florida business license, he represented that his check cashing operation was 

limited to cashing checks for tax clients. Agent Cohen testified that in February of 

2012, when he went to visit the principal place of business which BFS listed on its 

annual report, he did not see any sign which represented that check cashing services 

were offered there. Agent Cohen testified that from 2010 through 2016, BFS moved 

several times to and from the most recent address on record with the State of Florida 

(2033 University Drive, Sunrise, Florida) and where ATAS and ATAS2 were 

located (930 and 938 N.E. 62 Street, Oakland Park, Florida). 

Agent Cohen further testified that some checks on the bank account of 

Exavier and his wife had been made payable to “Antonio Duval.” Other checks 

drawn on a BFS account were payable to the same individual. Agent Cohen never 

investigated Duval and did not know how much cash he received from Exavier. 

Exavier did not testify at trial. Through counsel, he maintained that he had a 

legitimate check cashing operation and that perhaps a teller, Duval, or someone else 

had cooperated with Alexandre in the fraudulent scheme. Exavier’s counsel argued 

that the government’s investigation was incomplete because it did not sufficiently 

investigate the signatures on various documents, the actual sender or recipient of 

various email communications, or the unidentified recipients of large amounts of 

money from refund checks and tax preparation fees. 

Maurice also did not testify. Through counsel, she suggested that someone 

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had forged her signature, established bank accounts in her name, and used her PTIN 

without her knowledge. A handwriting expert testified that “she didn’t write the 

signature on certain of the documents that were submitted” and that as to other 

documents, his findings were “inconclusive.” The expert eliminated Maurice as the 

signatory on three documents, including two checks, but he could not eliminate her 

as the person who signed the remaining documents. 

At trial, Alexandre testified that he had met a man named “Crazy C,” who 

told him that he and his partners had a tax return preparation business with more 

than 1,000 clients, but that the business had lost its EFIN. In return for part of the 

tax preparation fees, Crazy C gave Alexandre information on his clients so that 

Alexandre could prepare their tax returns for 2010. Alexandre testified that Laroche 

gave him permission to file the returns through Mr. Cash. Alexandre accepted tax 

return files from Crazy C and filed the returns electronically under Mr. Cash’s 

EFIN. Alexandre claimed that when he accepted tax returns from Crazy C, he did 

not know they were for deceased individuals. Alexandre testified that he had no 

intent to defraud anyone and that he had not conspired with Exavier or Maurice to 

file fraudulent tax returns. Alexandre testified that he had no idea how tax refund 

checks ended up in BFS bank accounts because he had simply picked up the checks 

at Mr. Cash’s offices and given them to Crazy C.

United States v. Exavier, 783 F. App’x 849, 852-55 (11th Cir. 2019). On July 26, 2016, at the 

conclusion of the 10-day trial, the jury found Petitioner and her Co-Defendant Exavier guilty as 

charged on all twenty-two counts. CR-ECF No. [167] at 55-57. Alexandre was acquitted on all 

counts. Id. at 57-58. Petitioner was sentenced to a total of 132 months imprisonment, 108 months 

as to each of Counts 1 through 17, to be served concurrently, and 24 months as to each of Counts

18 through 22, to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to Counts 1 through 

17. CR-ECF No. [136] at 2.

Appeal and Post-conviction Proceedings. Petitioner was represented by the same counsel 

for her direct appeal. Through counsel, Petitioner timely filed an appeal. Upon the Government’s 

unopposed motion, the Eleventh Circuit ordered Petitioner’s and Exavier’s appeals to be 

consolidated. See United States v. Exavier, 783 F. App’x 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2019). Petitioner

raised three arguments: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; (2) a new trial 

was warranted because the Government failed to disclose certain information and presented false 

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testimony; and (3) the district court erred when it refused to sever her trial from Exavier’s trial. Id.

The first two arguments were raised jointly, but Petitioner raised the third argument individually. 

Id. On July 30, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit issued a written opinion affirming the convictions. Id.

at 868.

The § 2255 Proceedings. On June 23, 2020,2 Petitioner filed her Motion Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. See ECF No. 

[1]. The Government filed a Response, ECF No. [6], and exhibits arguing that the Petitioner was 

not entitled to relief, ECF Nos. [6-1]-[6-12]. The Response did not dispute that the Motion was 

timely nor did it contend that procedural bars existed. ECF No. [6] at 7. 

Following review of the Response, Magistrate Judge Reid issued a Supplemental Order to 

Show Cause to both parties. ECF No. [9]. The Government filed a Supplemental Response, ECF 

No. [11] (“Supp. Response”), and supporting exhibits, ECF Nos. [11-1]-[11-2]. Petitioner filed 

responsive affidavits. ECF Nos. [13]-[14]. On December 15, 2020, based on the filings, the District 

Court ordered the Government to file a second supplemental response. ECF No. [15]. In 

compliance, the Government filed its Supplemental Response to December 15, 2020 Order, ECF 

No. [16], and attached exhibits, ECF Nos. [16-1]-[16-2]. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Section 2255 Motions. “A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by 

Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed 

in violation of the Constitution . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set 

aside, or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (alteration added). Because collateral review 

2

“Under the prison mailbox rule, a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is delivered 

to prison authorities for mailing.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted).

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is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments under 

§ 2255 are extremely limited. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982). A prisoner is 

entitled to relief under § 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or 

laws of the United States; (2) exceeded its jurisdiction; (3) exceeded the maximum sentence 

authorized by law; or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); see also 

McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “[R]elief 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow 

compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, 

result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Richards v. United States, 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988)).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate both (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) a 

reasonable probability that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984) (“Strickland”); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 104 (2011). To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner must establish that, but for 

counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993); Allen v. 

Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 611 F.3d 740, 754 (11th Cir. 2010). If a petitioner fails to establish one 

of the prongs under Strickland, the Court need not address the remaining prong. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 697.

A petitioner bears the burden of proof in habeas proceedings. See Blankenship v. Hall, 542 

F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2008). “‘There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was 

reasonable and adequate.’ To overcome that presumption, ‘a petitioner must establish that no 

competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.’” Gordon v. United 

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States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Michael v. Crosby, 430 F.3d 1310, 1320 

(11th Cir. 2005); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000)).

Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel. Strickland “governs a claim of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel.” Overstreet v. Warden, 811 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2016) 

(citation omitted). “Under Strickland, a petitioner must show (1) his attorney’s performance was 

deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner’s defense.” Id. (citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

“Appellate counsel has no duty to raise every non-frivolous issue and may reasonably weed 

out weaker (albeit meritorious) arguments.” Id. (citation omitted). “Generally, only when ignored 

issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of 

counsel be overcome.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000)); see also Davila 

v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2067 (2017) (“Declining to raise a claim on appeal . . . is not deficient 

performance unless that claim was plainly stronger than those actually presented to the appellate 

court.” (citation omitted)). “In most cases, an unpreserved trial error will not be a plainly stronger 

ground for appeal than preserved errors.” Davis, 137 S. Ct. at 2067. 

“A petitioner satisfies the prejudice prong upon showing that ‘there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the [appeal] would have been 

different.’” Overstreet, 811 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); see also Ferrell v. 

Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1236 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating that to prove prejudice, petitioner alleging 

appellate ineffectiveness must show that “the outcome of the appeal would have been different” 

(citations omitted)).

III. DISCUSSION

The Motion raises three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel. ECF No. [1]. In Claim One, Petitioner alleges that counsel was 

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ineffective for failing to communicate a plea offer. Id. at 14. In Claim Two, Petitioner raises three 

subclaims pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial. Id. at 14-15. In Claim 

Three, Petitioner raises two subclaims pertaining to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Id.

at 16-18. Petitioner was represented by the same counsel at trial and on appeal. The Court turns to 

each claim and subclaim in turn.

A. Claim One

In Claim One, Petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to communicate 

the Government’s plea offer. ECF No. [1] at 14. Petitioner contends that on August 29, 2019, 

during a legal telephone call with counsel following the denial of her direct appeal, he said to her, 

“Carline, you should have taken the deal.” Id. Petitioner replied, “What deal?” Id. Counsel then 

stated that he would send her documentation “to refresh her memory.” Id.; ECF No. [13] at 1. At 

all times relevant, Petitioner states that she never received any documentation regarding a plea 

offer nor did counsel ever inform her, prior to the August 29, 2019 telephone call, that the 

Government extended any plea offers. Id.

The Government filed two supplemental responses stating the following: (1) a “proffer 

session” was held with Petitioner, counsel, the prosecutor, and special agents from the IRS, ECF 

No. [16] at ¶ 1; (2) the “proffer session” was not productive, id.; and (3) no plea was ever extended 

to Petitioner, ECF No. [11] at ¶ 2. The Government submitted the signed “proffer letter,” ECF No. 

[11-1], and a July 7, 2016 email from the prosecutor to counsel regarding “informal discussions” 

regarding applicable sentencing guidelines, ECF No. [11-2]. The Government avers that counsel 

never emailed a reply to the July 7, 2016 message. ECF No. [16] at ¶ 2. 

Petitioner requested that the Bureau of Prison (“BOP”) provide her with a copy of the 

telephone conversation as well as copies of emails exchanged between her and counsel from 

January 2019 through January 2020. ECF No. [13] at 1; ECF No. [14] at 2. The BOP informed 

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Petitioner that the actual emails had been purged but provided her with a log of emails sent to and 

from counsel. ECF No. [14] at 2-3. The log showed a chain of emails with the subject matter 

“Docs” exchanged between Petitioner and counsel in September 2019; importantly, the log shows 

that counsel replied twice, including the last response in the email chain. Id. at 3. Petitioner did not 

receive a response to her inquiry about the telephone recording. Id. at 1-2.

The Government also requested records from the BOP pertaining to the August 29, 2019 

telephone call. ECF No. [16] at ¶ 3. The BOP responded that it “does not record properly placed 

legal calls, and that calls placed on an inmate line would be purged within six months.” Id. The 

BOP also produced a log of telephone calls to the facility from counsel’s phone number. Id. at ¶ 4. 

The Government submitted a redacted version except for calls between counsel and Petitioner. 

ECF No. [16-2]. In August 2019, there are only two calls between Petitioner and counsel: (1) a 

three-minute call on August 6, 2019; and (2) a four-minute call on August 20, 2019. Id. at 4.

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the plea bargaining context are governed by 

Strickland. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012) (citation omitted). “Under 

[Strickland’s] two-part test, a petitioner asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must 

demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice—that counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Gissendaner v. Seaboldt, 735 F.3d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir. 2013) (alteration added; citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). In Frye, the Court specifically held that counsel has a “duty to 

communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may 

be favorable to the accused,” and that, in general, where such an offer is not communicated to the 

defendant, counsel “[does] not render the effective assistance the Constitution requires.” Frye, 566 

U.S. at 145 (alteration added); In re Perez, 682 F.3d 930, 932 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 

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To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show that, but for the ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a reasonable probability existed that “[she] would have accepted the lapsed plea but also 

a reasonable probability that the prosecution would have adhered to the agreement and that it 

would have been accepted by the trial court.” Id. at 150 (alteration added).

Bare, conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance are insufficient to satisfy the 

Strickland test. Boyd v. Comm’n, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 697 F.3d 1320, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2012); 

Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). Where the petitioner 

does not provide credible supporting evidence and makes an unsupported factual allegation 

inconsistent with the record, she is not entitled to a hearing on her § 2255 petition. Ferguson v. 

United States, 699 F.2d 1071, 1072 (11th Cir. 1983), superseded on other grounds by Martin v. 

United States, 81 F.3d 1083, 1084 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); see Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 

587, 591 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (establishing need for an evidentiary hearing is petitioner’s 

burden). Furthermore, a hearing is not required on conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics. 

Peoples v. Campbell, 377 F.3d 1208, 1236-37 & n.57 (11th Cir. 2004); Tejada v. Dugger, 941 

F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991). Even in cases where a petitioner provides affidavits in support 

of her § 2255 petition, affidavits that amount to nothing more than conclusory allegations do not 

warrant a hearing. Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). 

Even construing Petitioner’s allegations in the most favorable light, she is not entitled to 

relief. Petitioner alleges that following her conviction and its affirmance on appeal, counsel 

informed her for the first time of the Government’s plea offer and advised she should have accepted 

it. ECF No. [1] at 14. The Government contends that no such plea offer was ever extended to 

Petitioner. ECF No. [11] at ¶ 2. The parties did confer on June 2, 2016 for a “proffer session” but 

it was “not productive and did not result in any offer of a plea bargain.” ECF No. [16] at ¶ 1. 

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Additionally, any “informal discussion” between the Government and counsel did not result in any 

plea offer. Id. at ¶ 2; see ECF No. [11] at ¶ 3.

Assuming Petitioner’s allegation that counsel told her in an August 2019 telephone call 

that she should have taken the plea offer is true, the record evidence forecloses any relief because 

it conclusively shows that the Government never extended a plea offer to Petitioner. In fact, 

counsel’s actions after-the-fact in failing to send Petitioner documents to “refresh her memory” 

lends further credence to the Government’s assertions—counsel could not send any plea 

documents because none existed. Petitioner’s allegations are inconsistent with the factual record. 

As such, she is not entitled to relief on Claim One. See Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1239.3

B. Claim Two

In Claim Two, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise certain 

objections during the trial. ECF No. [1] at 14-15. 

i. Counsel’s failure to object to Government statement regarding PTIN secrecy

First, Petitioner argues counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the Government’s 

statement that “the personal tax identification number (PTIN) is as secret as a debit (PIN).” Id. at 

14. Copies of 1040 tax returns were presented as exhibits at trial. Id. The name, address, and PTIN 

of the preparer were displayed on the front of the forms, undermining the Government’s statement 

that the PTIN was “as secret as a debit (PIN).” Id.

The record refutes Petitioner’s subclaim. In its opening statement, the Government argued 

that PTINs were “unique, individual, not shared and treated like a Social Security number.” CRECF No. [159] at 12. The IRS intended PTINs be used for identification purposes and instructed 

3 Assuming arguendo that Petitioner’s allegations regarding her counsel’s performance are true, where a

petitioner fails to establish that counsel’s performance prejudiced her, the Court need not conduct an 

evidentiary hearing. United States v. Laetividal-Gonzalez, 939 F.2d 1455, 1465 (11th Cir. 1991), overruling 

on other grounds recognized by United States v. Young, 975 F.3d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1992); Schultz, 701 

F.2d at 901.

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recipients to keep their PTIN confidential. Id. Counsel countered the Government’s claim in his 

opening statement. Id. at 29-32. He agreed that PTINs were used for identification purposes but 

stated that PTINs could not be confidential because they appear on tax returns and can be “made 

public.” Id. at 31. Counsel proposed that a PTIN could be “pull[ed] [] off of anywhere.” Id.

(alterations added).

Government witness Kristy Morgan, a criminal investigations witness coordinator and 

records custodian for the IRS, testified that “once [a PTIN is] issued, you are told to secure that 

PTIN just like you would a Social Security number using that only for your preparation of taxes.” 

Id. at 104-05 (alterations added). She also testified that she was not aware of any source of public 

information for an individual’s PTIN, that 1040 tax returns were not public records, and that there 

was no way to look up a PTIN online. Id. at 105-06. On cross examination, defense counsel elicited 

that a taxpayer could retrieve an individual’s PTIN if the taxpayer requested a copy of the 1040

tax return from the IRS. Id. at 140-42; CR-ECF No. [160] at 32. Alternatively, an individual could 

obtain their preparer’s PTIN if the preparer provided them with a copy of the completed 

electronically filed tax application. CR-ECF No. [160] at 32. Counsel pointed out that because

1,643 1040 tax returns were filed using Petitioner’s PTIN that meant that at least 1,643 individual 

taxpayers had the ability to obtain Petitioner’s PTIN. CR-ECF No. [159] at 151, 154. Finally, on 

cross examination, Co-Defendant Jimmy Alexandre confirmed that he never inputted his PTIN 

into the e-filing software, implying that the software preloaded the PTIN making the PTIN of a 

lesser order of confidentiality than a social security number or a PIN. CR-ECF No. [170] at 155. 

In his closing argument, counsel questioned the e-filing software, arguing that even if Petitioner’s

PTIN was used to obtain fraudulent tax returns, the Government failed to establish a direct 

connection to Petitioner personally attaching her PTIN. CR-ECF No. [166] at 127, 131.

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Accordingly, Petitioner’s subclaim that trial counsel failed to challenge the Government’s 

assertion of secrecy and confidentiality tied to Petitioner’s PTIN is contrary to the record and 

without merit. 

ii. Counsel’s failure to object to verification of Petitioner’s signature on filed tax 

returns

Second, Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

verification of her signature on filed 1040 tax returns. ECF No. [1] at 15. Petitioner’s signature 

was not on any of the filed tax returns in the space where the tax preparer would sign. Id. Had 

counsel objected, it would have proved that she was not involved in filing fraudulent tax returns 

and that she had no involvement in the scheme. Id.

Petitioner’s argument is misleading but is nonetheless refuted by the record. There were 

1,643 1040 tax returns in the record that were filed using Petitioner’s PTIN number. CR-ECF No. 

[159] at 144. Of those, testimony confirmed that 99% were electronically filed. Id. at 146. Counsel 

elicited testimony that in place of the tax preparer’s handwritten signature, the tax filing software 

for e-filing 1040 tax returns required the tax preparer’s typed-written name and PTIN. Id. at 152. 

Prior to the testimony of the first witness, the Government moved to admit exhibit number 

16, a 1040 tax return for a deceased individual. CR-ECF No. [159] at 42. Counsel objected to the 

admission of the bottom portion of the certified record on the basis that there was “no foundation 

for its admission under 803 business record . . . [or] to establish the nexus under 403, 404, 

prejudicial.” Id. at 43 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 403, 404, 801; alterations added). The objected to 

portion of the form contained Petitioner’s typed-written name and PTIN. Id. The objection was 

overruled. Id. On cross examination, counsel highlighted that Petitioner’s signature was missing 

from the fraudulent 1040 tax returns and that the exhibit merely showed that “someone typed 

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[Petitioner’s] name on a piece of paper.” Id. at 53 (alteration added). Speaking to a relative of one 

of the deceased victim’s, trial counsel clarified:

[Counsel]: We all share your loss, ma’am. We do. But you don’t 

know who typed that name on the piece of paper, do 

you?

[Witness]: No.

[Counsel]: And no one up until this moment of July 12 . . . has 

been able to indicate to you who created that 

document?

[Witness]: No.

Id. at 53-54 (alterations added). Trial counsel also elicited confirmation from Morgan, the IRS 

records custodian that reviewed the tax returns in question, that none of the returns contained 

Petitioner’s handwritten signature. Id. at 152.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s subclaim that trial counsel failed to challenge the verification of 

Petitioner’s signature on filed tax returns is contrary to the record and without merit. 

iii. Counsel’s failure to impeach testimony of Government witness Leonie Palmer 

Pascoe based on her romantic relationship with co-defendant Exavier

Petitioner’s third argument is less clear. Petitioner appears to argue that counsel was 

ineffective for not impeaching the testimony of Government witness Leonie Palmer Pascoe based 

upon her romantic relationship with Co-Defendant Maurice Exavier. ECF No. [1] at 15. In support, 

Petitioner incorrectly states that Pascoe testified at trial that she was dating Exavier. Id. In her 

Reply, Petitioner clarifies that the Government attempted to introduce testimony about Pascoe’s 

romantic relationship with Exavier, but the District Court sustained Exavier’s objection. ECF No. 

[12] at 4; see CR-ECF No. [162] at 157-59; CR-ECF No. [163] at 47-48. Petitioner states that the 

“jury was never made aware of [Pascoe’s] loyalty and conflict of interest to Mr. Exavier. Counsel 

was aware of this and did not argue this.” Id. (alteration added). Petitioner now argues that Pascoe 

fraudulently opened online bank accounts in Petitioner’s name without her consent. Id. Petitioner 

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states that the Government’s discovery showed that “the online accounts were managed by CoDefendant Exavier through his email account and not by Petitioner Maurice.” ECF No. [1] at 15.

Petitioner avers that she is “actually innocent” and counsel “should have questioned Ms. Pascoe 

more intently to reveal her reasoning for her loyalty and breaking the bank’s policy for Mr. 

Exavier.” ECF No. [12] at 4. Petitioner avers that Pascoe’s unimpeached testimony contributed to 

Petitioner’s conviction. Id.

Petitioner cannot meet her burden to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient. 

First, on direct, the Government elicited, and the jury heard, the following from Pascoe: that she 

was Exavier’s personal banker, CR-ECF No. [162] at 157; that she saw him “frequently,” id. at 

164; that she saw him at the bank and at the BFS office, id.; that after her home went into 

foreclosure, Exavier helped Pascoe with the short sale of her mortgage, id. at 164-65, see CR-ECF 

No. [163] at 24; that Exavier prepared Pascoe’s taxes at the BFS office, id. at 170; that when Pasco 

visited the BFS office to have her taxes prepared, she saw Petitioner sitting at a desk in the office, 

id. at 170, see CR-ECF No. [163] at 31; that Pascoe and Exavier exchanged email messages, id. at 

165; that Pascoe was familiar with Exavier’s handwriting and recognized his signature, id. at 168; 

that Bank of America’s policy for opening accounts and assigning signature authority required the 

customer to present identification and sign signature cards at the bank in the presence of the 

personal banker, CR-ECF No. [163] at 27-28; that for the opening of one of Petitioner’s and 

Exavier’s business accounts, both came into the bank to sign in her presence, id. at 29; and that 

based on her relationship with Exavier as a “well-known customer,” Pascoe “felt comfortable 

giving [Exavier] the signature cards to have [Petitioner] sign and return” them to her in violation 

of bank policy, id. at 29-31 (alterations added).

On cross examination, counsel again elicited testimony from Pascoe that she had not 

actually witnessed Petitioner sign the signature cards for the BFS business account:

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[Counsel]: When these signature cards were created by your 

own handwriting, was this young lad[y] standing or 

sitting in front of you, yes or no?

[Witness]: No.

[Counsel]: Did you ever call her up and confirm whether or not 

that was actually something she wanted to do, yes or 

no?

[Witness]: No.

. . .

[Counsel]: Under penalties of perjury, I certify that what’s 

contained in this document is true, isn’t that what the 

document says?

[Witness]: Yes. 

CR-ECF No. [163] at 41-42 (alterations added). Based on the testimony elicited from Pascoe at 

trial, Petitioner has not met her burden of proof that trial counsel performed deficiently. 

Moreover, the Government twice requested to ask Pascoe about her intimate relationship 

with Exavier in order to explain “why she was able to give [him] special treatment . . . [and] certain 

aspects of what she knows and why she knows it.” CR-ECF No. [162] at 158 (Direct Examination); 

see CR-ECF No. [163] at 47 (Re-direct Examination). In both instances, Exavier’s counsel

objected that introducing the intimate relationship constituted Rule 404(b) evidence and was more 

prejudicial than probative under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 159; CR-ECF 

No. [163] at 48. The District Court sustained both objections. Id.; CR-ECF No. [163] at 48. 

Counsel’s failure to raise a similar objection was not deficient performance because counsel could 

have reasonably concluded that any further argument in support of admission of the testimony had 

“dismal prospects for success.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 11, 127 (2009); see Pinkney v, 

Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 876 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[A]n attorney will not be held to 

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have performed deficiently for failing to perform a futile act, one that would not have gotten his 

client any relief.”). 

Furthermore, Petitioner did not suffer prejudice. Due to the Government’s attempts to 

introduce the testimony, the District Court had two opportunities to consider the substance of 

Petitioner’s instant claim and rejected it both times. Although the jury did not hear testimony 

regarding the intimate relationship between Pascoe and Exavier, they did hear testimony that 

Pascoe had an extensive business relationship with Exavier that extended to her own personal 

financial affairs. The jury also heard testimony that based upon her familiarity with Exavier, 

Pascoe violated bank policy requiring in-person signatures and did not personally witness 

Petitioner sign authorizing documents for business accounts she shared with Exavier. Accordingly, 

Petitioner cannot show that but for counsel’s failure to question Pascoe on her intimate relationship 

with Exavier, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 694. Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this subclaim.

C. Claim Three

In Claim Three, Petitioner argues she was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel. 

Petitioner raises several different arguments in support of Claim Three. She argues that, without 

consulting her, counsel agreed to the consolidation of Petitioner’s and Exavier’s direct appeals. 

ECF No. [1] at 16. Additionally, Petitioner argues counsel was ineffective for failing to file an 

addendum to her appellate brief. Id.

i. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for agreeing to the consolidation of 

Petitioner’s direct appeal with her co-defendant Exavier

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for agreeing to consolidate her direct appeal 

with Co-Defendant Exavier. ECF No. [1] at 17. In the October 26, 2017 letter, Petitioner states 

that she did not agree for the appeals to be consolidated. In her Reply, Petitioner asserts that “[t]he 

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Government had made the assumption that Ms. Maurice’s brief and Mr. Exavier’s brief would 

r[a]ise the same or similar issues.” ECF No. [12] at 4 (alterations added). Petitioner also states that 

on several occasions during the trial there was confusion when the Government referred to her full 

name due to the similarity with Co-Defendant Exavier’s full name. Id.

Petitioner’s subclaim is conclusory and refuted by the record. Although the appeals were 

consolidated, Petitioner was still able to raise additional claims independent of Exavier. See United 

States v. Exavier, 783 F. App’x 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2019) (“On appeal, Exavier and Maurice argue 

that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions and (2) a new trial is warranted 

because the government failed to disclose certain information and presented false testimony. . . . 

Maurice individually argues that the district court erred when it refused to sever her trial from 

Exavier’s trial.”). Additionally, Petitioner does not explain how instances of confusion between 

her name and Exavier’s name during the trial supports her contention that she was prejudiced when 

their appeals were consolidated. Petitioner’s subclaim is without merit. 

ii. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to file addendum to appellate 

brief

Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to file an addendum to her 

appellate brief. ECF No. [1] at 16-18. Counsel filed Petitioner’s appellant brief on April 17, 2017.

United States v. Maurice, No. 16-17009 (11th Cir. filed Nov. 7, 2016) (docket entry dated Apr. 

17, 2017), consolidated with United States v. Exavier, 783 F. App’x 849 (11th Cir. 2019).4

Petitioner’s letter to counsel is dated October 26, 2017, more than six months after the appellant 

brief was initially filed, and contains the following issues Petitioner wanted counsel to file in an 

addendum to the appellate brief: (1) the Government failed to disclose information to the Court 

4 On June 2, 2017, a corrected appellate brief was filed rectifying deficiencies but noting the service date 

as April 17, 2017. Maurice, No. 16-17009 (docket entry dated June 2, 2017).

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about subpoenas of Petitioner’s personal bank records from 2002-2012, which would have shown 

that no funds from the fraudulent scheme were ever deposited into her account; (2) unlike both 

Co-Defendants, Petitioner’s signature was not on any of the 8879 forms on the filed tax returns; 

(3) Co-Defendant Exavier opened and managed bank accounts in Petitioner’s name and only he 

had online access to the accounts through his email address; (4) no witnesses identified Petitioner 

as the person that filed their taxes or the taxes of “their loved ones.” ECF No. [1] at 16-17. The 

letter referenced a two-page motion that Petitioner was “considering sending to the court.” Id. at 

18. But, Petitioner conceded, she was sending the motion first to counsel to submit on her behalf. 

Id. Petitioner wrote that should counsel disagree with filing the motion, he should reply to her by 

November 14, 2017 with “legal reason(s)” not to submit the motion in order for Petitioner to “make 

other arrangemen[ts].” Id. at 18 (alterations added). The referenced motion was not included as an 

attachment to the Motion. 

Petitioner’s subclaim is without merit. First, Petitioner argues that counsel should have 

argued on appeal that the Government “withheld information from the Court and the jury about 

the subpoenas of [her] personal bank records from 2002-2012, which proved no funds of such 

scheme was ever deposited in [her] account.” Id. at 17 (alterations added). Petitioner’s arguments 

are merely conclusory. Petitioner does not provide the alleged withheld bank records, nor does she 

explain how simultaneously the Government withheld the records and counsel was aware of this 

and failed to raise the issue on appeal. Most importantly, Petitioner’s claim must fail because the 

facts allegedly withheld were within her personal knowledge. The Eleventh Circuit has “held 

numerous times that there is no suppression, and thus no Brady violation, if either the defendant 

or his attorney knows before trial of the allegedly exculpatory information.” Felker v. Thomas, 52 

F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1995). 

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Next, the record refutes Petitioner’s remaining arguments. Several of the issues raised in 

the letter involve the sufficiency of evidence to convict Petitioner. Id. at 17. In a renewed motion 

for judgment of acquittal at trial, counsel unsuccessfully argued that aside from her PTIN, 

Petitioner’s signature was not on any of the tax returns in question, nor did any witnesses testify 

that Petitioner prepared their tax returns or the tax returns of a loved one. CR-ECF No. [166] at 

62-64. On appeal, counsel again raised the issue of insufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the 

District Court abused its discretion when it denied counsel’s motion for judgment of acquittal. 

Maurice, No. 16-17009, 2017 WL 1406661 (Appellant Brief); see Exavier, 783 F. App’x at 852.

In the appellate brief, counsel argued that there was “no evidence that [Petitioner] knew the 

acquitted co-defendant, no evidence that [Petitioner] signed any fraudulent check, tax return or 

that she was involved in the setting up of the systems or entity used to commit the fraud.” Id. at 14

(alterations added). Thus, counsel was not required to raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal, 

particularly where those issues were not “clearly stronger” than those raised in the brief. See

Overstreet, 811 F.3d at 1287; see also Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2067. Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently.

Furthermore, it is clear from its opinion that the Eleventh Circuit was cognizant of the 

additional reasons Petitioner raised in her letter in support of the insufficiency claim. See Exavier, 

783 F. App’x at 855 (“Through counsel, she suggested that someone had forged her signature, 

established bank accounts in her name, and used her PTIN without her knowledge.”). The Eleventh 

Circuit found that “the district court did not err in overruling defendants’ motions for judgment of 

acquittal.” Exavier, 783 F. App’x at 857. Thus, Petitioner cannot show prejudice and is not entitled 

to relief. 

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IV. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need for an

evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 

2011). “[I]f the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas 

relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 

U.S. 465, 474 (2007); see also Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th 

Cir. 2016). Here, the issues presented can be resolved based on the record before the Court. Indeed, 

because the Court can “adequately assess [Petitioner’s] claim[s] without further factual 

development[,]” Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 

1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). 

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A prisoner seeking to appeal a district court’s final order denying his or her petition for 

writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal; rather, in order to do so, she must 

obtain a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); see also Harbison v. Bell, 556 

U.S. 180, 183 (2009). This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if Petitioner makes 

“a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where, 

as here, the district court has rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, the 

petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of 

the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

However, when the district court has rejected a claim on procedural grounds, the petitioner must 

show that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district 

court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. Petitioner has failed to make “a substantial showing 

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of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Upon consideration of the record, 

the Court concludes that no certificate of appealability shall issue.

VI. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 

1. Petitioner Carline Maurice’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, 

or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, ECF No. [1], is DENIED. 

2. No certificate of appealability shall issue. 

3. To the extent not otherwise disposed of, any pending motions are DENIED AS

MOOT and all deadlines are TERMINATED.

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on October 1, 2021.

_________________________________

BETH BLOOM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Carline Maurice

#12700-104

Coleman Federal Correctional Complex-Camp

Inmate Mail/Parcels

Post Office Box 1027

Coleman, FL 33521-1027

PRO SE

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