```

[House Report 106-1027]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                 Union Calendar No. 595

106th Congress, 2d Session -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - House Report 106-1027

                    JANET RENO'S STEWARDSHIP OF THE

                     JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: A FAILURE

                     TO SERVE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE

                               __________

                              TENTH REPORT

                                 by the

                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                             Volume 2 of 2

                                     

                                     

  Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                      http://www.house.gov/reform

 December 13, 2000.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on 
            the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
68-229                     WASHINGTON : 2000

                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                     DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS III, Virginia        CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana           ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana                  Columbia
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida             CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South     DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    Carolina                         ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia                    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida                  JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas             JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska                  THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois               HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon                  JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California                             ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin                 BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho              (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

                      Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                 Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
                     James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
           David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
                  Kristi L. Remington, Senior Counsel
                         Jim Schumann, Counsel
                       Kimberly A. Reed, Counsel
           Maria P. Tamburri, Assistant to the Chief Counsel
                     Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
                Philip Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
               Philip S. Barnett, Miniority Chief Counsel
            Kristin Amerling, Minority Deputy Chief Counsel
                   Paul Weinberger, Minority Counsel
?

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                                  House of Representatives,
                                 Washington, DC, December 13, 2000.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on 
Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's tenth 
report to the 106th Congress.
                                                Dan Burton,
                                                          Chairman.

                                     
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Findings of the Committee on Government Reform...................   VII
  I. The Attorney General's conflicted investigation..................1
        A. Background on the Independent Counsel Act.............     3
        B. A rocky start: early conflicts in the Justice 
            Department's campaign finance investigation..........     9
        C. Attorney General Reno changed her interpretation of 
            the Independent Counsel Act..........................    14
        D. Memoranda from FBI Louis J. Freeh and Task Force 
            Supervising Attorney Charles La Bella recommending 
            that an independent counsel be appointed.............    19
        E. Department of Justice rebuttal memoranda..............    44
        F. Department of Justice's bad faith in its application 
            of the Independent Counsel Act.......................    54
        G. The failure to appoint a special counsel for Vice 
            President Gore.......................................    59
 II. The failures of the Justice Department investigation............63
        A. The Justice Department failed to pursue the December 
            15, 1995, coffee tape................................    63
        B. The Justice Department has failed to question the 
            President and Vice President effectively.............    71
        C. The Justice Department failed to pursue relevant 
            documents............................................    74
        D. The Justice Department failed to pursue key 
            individuals and entities.............................    84
        E. The Justice Department failed to pursue the Kansas 
            conduit contribution scheme..........................   107
        F. The Justice Department failed to investigate leaks 
            harmful to the campaign fundraising investigation....   116
III. The Justice Department's political interference with congressional 
     oversight......................................................123
        A. Failure to comply with subpoenas for the Freeh and La 
            Bella memoranda......................................   123
        B. Failure to produce the Conrad memorandum..............   143
        C. The Justice Department's political gamesmanship.......   146
 IV. The favorable treatment of the Attorney General's friends......154
        A. The Justice Department's handling of the Soka Gakkai 
            matter...............................................   154
        B. Robert Bratt..........................................   181
Exhibits.........................................................   188

                               APPENDIXES

Appendix 1.--Correspondence between the committee and the Justice 
  Department.....................................................   638
Appendix 2.--Kansas Democratic party disclosure forms (receipts 
  and disbursements).............................................  1862

                                 VIEWS

Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. 
  Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, 
  Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon. Chaka 
  Fattah, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, Hon. 
  Rod R. Blagojevich, Hon. Danny K. Davis, Hon. John F. Tierney, 
  Hon. Jim Turner, Hon. Harold E. Ford, Jr., and Hon. Janice D. 
  Schakowsky.....................................................  2008
Exhibits.........................................................  2034

                                                 Union Calendar No. 595
106th Congress                                           Rept. 106-1027
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                 Vol. 2 of 2

======================================================================

 
JANET RENO'S STEWARDSHIP OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: A FAILURE TO SERVE 
                          THE ENDS OF JUSTICE

                                _______
                                

 December 13, 2000.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on 
            the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Burton, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the 
                               following

                              TENTH REPORT

    On October 19, 2000, the Committee on Government Reform 
approved and adopted a report entitled, ``Janet Reno's 
Stewardship of the Justice Department: A Failure to Serve the 
Ends of Justice.'' The chairman was directed to transmit a copy 
to the Speaker of the House.

MINORITY VIEWS OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, HON. TOM LANTOS, HON. MAJOR R. 
  OWENS, HON. EDOLPHUS TOWNS, HON. PAUL E. KANJORSKI, HON. CAROLYN B. 
  MALONEY, HON. ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, HON. CHAKA FATTAH, HON. ELIJAH E. 
  CUMMINGS, HON. DENNIS J. KUCINICH, HON. ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, HON. DANNY 
  K. DAVIS, HON. JOHN F. TIERNEY, HON. JIM TURNER, HON. HAROLD E. FORD, 
  Jr., AND HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY

    Over the past 4 years, Representative Dan Burton has waged 
a vendetta against the Attorney General of the United States. 
Mr. Burton has accused Attorney General Janet Reno of 
``deceit'' \1\ and ``corruption.'' \2\ He has called her the 
President's ``chief blocker.'' \3\ He has charged that the 
Attorney General ``eroded the people's respect for the 
Department of Justice'' \4\ and established a ``legacy'' of 
``incompetence and partisan zeal.'' \5\ He has said that the 
Attorney General has brought the Justice Department to ``shame 
and disrepute'' \6\ and has made a ``mockery of justice.'' \7\ 
He also has stated, ``When you ask me, do I trust her, I 
certainly do not.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Fox, ``Fox Special Report with Brit Hume'' (Mar. 14, 2000).
    \2\ Testimony of Representative Dan Burton, House Committee on 
Rules, Subcommittee on Rules and Organization of the House (July 15, 
1999) (available at www.house.gov/reform/oversight/99--07--15db-
rules.htm).
    \3\ Fox, ``The Edge with Paula Zahn'' (Mar. 14, 2000).
    \4\ Testimony of Representative Dan Burton, House Committee on 
Rules, Subcommittee on Rules and Organization of the House (July 15, 
1999) (available at www.house.gov/reform/oversight/99--07--15db-
rules.htm).
    \5\ Id.
    \6\ Id.
    \7\ NBC, ``Meet the Press'' (June 11, 2000).
    \8\ NBC, ``Meet the Press'' (Aug. 29, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In August 1998, Mr. Burton and the other Members of the 
majority even voted to hold the Attorney General in contempt of 
Congress.
    There is a fundamental problem with Mr. Burton's 
accusations against the Attorney General: they have no basis in 
fact. Over the course of the committee's investigation, the 
committee has heard testimony from a dozen Justice Department 
lawyers and FBI officials who have worked with Attorney General 
Reno. Several of these individuals, including FBI Director 
Louis J. Freeh and former Campaign Finance Task Force head 
Charles G. La Bella, have strongly disagreed with some of the 
Attorney General's judgments. But not one witness has said that 
the Attorney General is deceitful, corrupt, or partisan.
    Rather, witness after witness has testified--under oath--to 
the Attorney General's integrity. As Director Freeh testified, 
``I have stated many times my respect for Attorney General 
Reno. In the 4\1/4\ years we have worked together, I have seen 
her bring nothing but integrity and honesty to the table.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Testimony of FBI Director Louis Freeh, House Committee on 
Government Reform, hearings on ``The Current Implementation of the 
Independent Counsel Act,'' 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1128 (Dec. 9-10, 
1997) (H. Rept. 105-89).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority's main complaint about the Attorney General 
boils down to a dispute over conflicting interpretations of the 
independent counsel statute. The majority believes that the 
Attorney General was required to appoint an independent counsel 
to examine campaign finance matters. The Attorney General 
reached a different conclusion. This type of disagreement over 
interpreting the law is not unusual. Unfortunately, Mr. Burton 
seems to take the position that disagreeing with his opinion is 
evidence of ``bad faith'' and ``corruption.''
    It is the height of irony that the majority pronounces 
judgments on the handling of the campaign finance investigation 
by the Department of Justice given the widespread criticism 
this committee has received for misconduct in its own campaign 
finance investigation. The committee's campaign finance 
investigation has been referred to as a ``case study in how not 
to do a congressional investigation and as a prime example of 
investigation as farce,'' \10\ a ``parody of a reputable 
investigation,'' \11\ and ``its own cartoon, a joke, and a 
deserved embarrassment.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ ``House Probe of Campaign Fund-Raising Uncovers Little, Piles 
Up Partisan Ill Will,'' Los Angeles Times (May 2, 1998) (quoting Norman 
Ornstein, a congressional expert at the American Enterprise Institute). 
This article and other news stories are attached as exhibit 1.
    \11\ ``A House Investigation Travesty,'' New York Times (Apr. 12, 
1997). This editorial is attached with other editorials and 
commentaries as exhibit 2.
    \12\ ``Mr. Burton Should Step Aside,'' Washington Post (Mar. 20, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Three years ago, the chief counsel of the committee quit 
and told Mr. Burton that he had ``been unable to implement the 
standards of professional conduct I have been accustomed to at 
the U.S. Attorney's office.'' \13\ Two years ago, when Mr. 
Burton released doctored transcripts of former Associate 
Attorney General Webster Hubbell's phone conversations, one 
Republican investigator was quoted saying, ``I'm ashamed to be 
part of something that's so unprofessional.'' \14\ Over the 
course of the investigation, the majority has gone through four 
chief counsels and at least three different chief 
investigators. One former senior Republican investigator said, 
``Ninety percent of the staff doesn't have a clue as to how to 
conduct an investigation.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Letter from John P. Rowley III to Representative Dan Burton 
(July 1, 1997).
    \14\ ``Burton Tape Fiasco Pitted Panel's Pros Vs. Pols,'' the Hill 
(May 13, 1998).
    \15\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This committee is in no position to criticize the Attorney 
General--and the majority's report reflects this fact. As will 
be discussed below, the report is based on unfounded 
allegations and improperly injects the committee into 
prosecutorial decisions. The report is also highly partisan.

   I. Unfounded Allegations Regarding Attorney General Reno and the 
                           Justice Department

    Over the last 6 years, the majority has made a series of 
false allegations of wrongdoing by the Clinton administration. 
These allegations have included accusations that Deputy White 
House Counsel Vince Foster was murdered as part of a coverup of 
the Whitewater land deal; that the White House intentionally 
maintained an ``enemies list'' of sensitive FBI files; that the 
IRS targeted the President's enemies for tax audits; that the 
White House may have been involved in ``selling or giving 
information to the Chinese in exchange for political 
contributions''; that the White House ``altered'' videotapes of 
White House coffees to conceal wrongdoing; that the Clinton 
administration sold burial plots in Arlington National 
Cemetery; and that problems with the White House e-mail 
archiving system are ``the most significant obstruction of 
Congressional investigations in U.S. history'' and ``reach much 
further'' than Watergate.
    As documented in a staff report recently released by 
Representative Henry A. Waxman, these allegations have proven 
to be unsubstantiated.\16\ According to Al Hunt of the Wall 
Street Journal, ``the accusations have a common denominator: 
They are blatantly false.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Minority Staff Report, ``Unsubstantiated Allegations of 
Wrongdoing Involving the Clinton Administration'' (October 2000) 
(attached as exhibit 3).
    \17\ ``Congress Forfeits Its Role,'' Wall Street Journal (Sept. 21, 
2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Attorney General Janet Reno and the Department of Justice 
have been frequent targets of these false allegations. Further, 
in its efforts to suggest wrongdoing on the part of the Justice 
Department, the majority has unfairly smeared numerous 
individuals along the way. The major allegations that have been 
leveled against the Department and others over the last few 
years and in the majority's report--and the actual facts as 
established in the record before the committee--are described 
below.

 Allegation: Attorney General Reno has been 
``blatantly protecting the President, the Vice President and 
their party from the outset of this scandal'' \18\ and ``the 
record clearly shows that this Justice Department has bent over 
backwards to avoid investigating the President, the Vice 
President and other senior White House officials.'' \19\ It is 
``evident to anyone who's been closely involved in this that 
she's blocking for the president.'' \20\ It is ``hard to escape 
the conclusion that the Attorney General has acted politically 
to benefit the President, the Vice President, and her own 
political party.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Press release, House Committee on Government Reform (May 19, 
2000).
    \19\ Statement of Representative Dan Burton, House Committee on 
Government Reform, ``Has the Department of Justice Given Preferential 
Treatment to the President and Vice President?,'' 106th Cong., 6 (July 
20, 2000) (stenographic record) (hereinafter ``July 20 hearing'').
    \20\ Representative Dan Burton appearing on Fox, ``Hannity & 
Colmes'' (Aug. 3, 1999).
    \21\ House Committee on Government Reform, majority report 
entitled, ``Janet Reno's Stewardship of the Justice Department: A 
Failure to Serve the Ends of Justice,'' i (hereinafter ``majority 
report'').

    The Facts: Mr. Burton's allegations have been repeatedly 
refuted by sworn statements before this committee and other 
committees from, among others, FBI Director Louis Freeh and 
Charles La Bella, the former head of the Campaign Finance Task 
Force. Although Mr. Freeh and Mr. La Bella disagreed with 
Attorney General Reno's decision regarding appointing an 
independent counsel for campaign finance issues, they 
repeatedly affirmed their belief in the Attorney General's 
integrity and denied that she acted to protect the President or 
others or to impede their investigation.
    For example, Mr. La Bella stated, ``My perception is [the 
Attorney General] made no decisions to protect anyone.'' \22\ 
He also said:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Testimony of Charles La Bella, Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, 
``Hearing on 1996 Campaign Finance Irregularities'' (May 2, 2000).

        The Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General 
        have fully supported the Task Force, and I have every 
        confidence in the way they are handling the matter. 
        They are committed to a vigorous investigation and 
        prosecution of all campaign finance matters and have 
        told me to pursue the evidence wherever it leads. That 
        is what I have done and what I expect the Task Force to 
        continue to do.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Statement of Charles La Bella (May 3, 1998).

    According to Mr. La Bella, ``when you jump to the 
conclusion that this is corruption, I think you're making an 
incredible leap.'' \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Fox, ``Hannity & Colmes'' (Mar. 13, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, Mr. Freeh stated:

        I have tremendous respect for our Attorney General. . . 
        . I do not believe for one moment that any of her 
        decisions, but particularly her decisions in this 
        matter, have been motivated by anything other than the 
        facts and the law which she is obligated to follow. If 
        I thought anything differently, I would not be sitting 
        here today as the FBI Director. I think in all of the 
        matters that I have dealt with her, and this is over 5 
        years, you get to know a person pretty well. She has 
        always brought honesty and integrity to the table.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Testimony of Louis J. Freeh, House Committee on Government 
Reform, hearing on ``The Need for an Independent Counsel in the 
Campaign Finance Investigation,'' 105th Cong., 71 (Aug. 4, 1998) 
(hereinafter ``August 4 hearing'').

    Mr. Freeh's and Mr. La Bella's views about the Attorney 
General have been echoed by other senior FBI and Justice 
Department officials appearing before our committee. William J. 
Esposito, former Deputy FBI Director, testified, ``My dealings 
with the Attorney General [were] quite extensive, especially in 
my last year in the FBI. I found her to be a person of high 
integrity, a person who would do the right thing.'' \26\ He 
further stated that ``in all matters that I've dealt with her 
on, she acted very even-handedly.'' \27\ Neil Gallagher, 
Assistant FBI Director for Terrorism, stated, ``I have the 
highest respect for the Attorney General. I have dealt with her 
on many issues, and I have no reason to question her at all.'' 
\28\ And Robert Conrad, a career prosecutor who has been chief 
of the Campaign Finance Task Force since January 2000, told our 
committee that ``my experience has been that I have had a fair 
hearing from her on issues that I have brought before her and 
my expectation would be that I would have a fair hearing on any 
recommendations in the future.'' \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Testimony of William J. Esposito, House Committee on 
Government Reform, ``The Justice Department's Implementation of the 
Independent Counsel Act,'' 106th Cong., 73-74 (June 6, 2000) 
(stenographic record) (hereinafter ``June 6 hearing'').
    \27\ Testimony of William J. Esposito, June 6 hearing at 80.
    \28\ Testimony of Neil Gallagher, June 6 hearing at 129.
    \29\ Testimony of Robert J. Conrad, July 20 hearing at 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In total, the committee heard testimony from 12 senior 
Justice Department lawyers and FBI officials who worked with 
the Attorney General on the campaign finance investigation and 
other matters.\30\ Although several of these witnesses 
disagreed with the Attorney General's judgment, not one witness 
questioned her motives or integrity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ The witnesses were FBI Director Louis Freeh; Charles La Bella, 
former head of the Justice Department's Campaign Finance Task Force; 
James DeSarno, former lead FBI agent for the Campaign Finance Task 
Force; Lee Radek, chief of the Justice Department's Public Integrity 
Section; William Esposito, former FBI Deputy Director; Neil Gallagher, 
Assistant Director for Terrorism, FBI; James K. Robinson, Assistant 
Attorney General; Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General; Robert 
Conrad, head of the Justice Department's Campaign Finance Task Force; 
Alan Gershel, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; John R. Schmidt, 
former Associate Attorney General; and John Hogan, former chief of 
staff to Attorney General Reno.

 Allegation: The Attorney General misapplied the 
independent counsel statute to protect the White House. ``Janet 
Reno has defied the spirit and the letter of the independent 
counsel statute . . . Her investigation has become a sham,'' 
\31\ and ``the Attorney General placed politics over impartial 
enforcement of the laws.'' \32\ ``Reno engaged in a creative 
analysis of the law in what appeared to be an effort to avoid 
the implementation of the Independent Counsel Act.'' \33\ ``The 
Attorney General was able to avoid the appointment of an 
independent counsel through a disregard of the law and a narrow 
view of the evidence.'' \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Representative Dan Burton quoted in ``Reno Rejection of Ickes 
Probe Dims GOP Support for Counsel Law,'' Associated Press (Jan. 30, 
1999).
    \32\ Majority report at 62.
    \33\ Majority report at 1.
    \34\ Id.

    The Facts: Attorney General Reno has appointed more 
independent counsels than any of her predecessors. Since 
enactment of the independent counsel statute in 1978, 20 
independent counsels have been appointed. Seven of those 
appointments were made at the request of Attorney General 
Reno.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Those seven independent counsels were: Kenneth Starr 
(Whitewater, White House Travel Office, FBI files, and Monica 
Lewinsky); Donald Smaltz (Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy); David 
Barrett (Housing and Urban Development Secretary Henry Cisneros); 
Daniel Pearson (Commerce Secretary Ron Brown); Curtis von Kann 
(Americorps head Eli Segal); Carol Elder Bruce (Interior Secretary 
Bruce Babbitt); and Ralph Lancaster, Jr. (Labor Secretary Alexis 
Herman).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Representative Burton relies on memos written by Mr. Freeh 
and Mr. La Bella as evidence that the Attorney General 
misapplied the Independent Counsel Act. These memos recommended 
the appointment of an independent counsel. However, Mr. Burton 
dismisses and overlooks other memos provided to the committee 
which recommended against the appointment of an independent 
counsel or which took issue with recommendations in the Freeh 
and La Bella memos.\36\ The record shows that the Attorney 
General solicited and received conflicting advice from a number 
of advisors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ See, e.g., memorandum from Public Integrity Section Chief Lee 
Radek to Assistant Attorney General James K. Robinson (Aug. 5, 1998) 
(DOJ-FLB-00130 to 00150) (attached as exhibit 4); memorandum from 
Robert S. Litt to the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, 
and James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney General (July 20, 1998) (DOJ-
3149 to 3153) (attached as exhibit 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The record also shows that the conflicting advice was 
rendered in good faith. Mr. Freeh and a number of senior 
Justice Department officials testified that there was nothing 
unusual in the Attorney General receiving conflicting advice in 
the course of the campaign finance investigation. Mr. Freeh 
testified, ``I would hope and expect that Attorney Generals, 
past, present and future, always receive different, good 
advice. And I think the more divergent it is at times, the 
better it is for that Attorney General to make what he or she 
thinks is the best decision.'' \37\ James Robinson, head of the 
Justice Department's criminal division, stated that the 
internal documents released to Congress demonstrated ``honest 
good faith differences of opinion between prosecutors and 
investigators who are not shy about expressing their views.'' 
\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Testimony of Louis J. Freeh, August 4 hearing at 93.
    \38\ Testimony of James Robinson, July 20 hearing at 65. See also 
testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alan Gershel, July 20 
hearing at 66-67 (noting that ``it's certainly very common for 
prosecutors to engage in good faith discussions, disagreements, debates 
on the application of the law, the application of the facts, the 
appropriate way to charge or not charge a case. So it does not strike 
me as unusual at all''); testimony of Lee Radek, Public Integrity 
Section Chief of the Department of Justice, Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, 
``Hearing on Attorney General's Decisions Regarding Campaign Finance 
Investigations,'' 106th Cong. (May 24, 2000) (page numbers not 
available) (hereinafter ``May 24 hearing'') (stating that ``[i]nternal 
disagreements among Department of Justice officials about various 
aspects of the Independent Counsel Act date back to its passage over 20 
years ago. What is new is the determination of some to delve into those 
confidential discussions and disagreements that were intended as an 
honest and frank exchange of views between the attorney general and her 
various advisors''); testimony of Lee Radek, June 6 hearing at 31-32 
(noting that the style of the Attorney General ``has been to seek out 
the views of a variety of advisors, listen carefully to each of us, 
consider our arguments, ask her own questions, and then reach her own 
decisions'' and that ``[a]ny group of lawyers grappling with complex 
legal and factual issues are bound to have disagreements, and the 
issues we faced were both complex and difficult'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In these circumstances, it was the Attorney General's 
prerogative--and her responsibility--to choose which advice to 
follow. Not a single witness before the committee suggested 
that her decision was influenced by favoritism or politics. 
Rather, as Mr. Robinson testified, the record indicates that 
the Attorney General made a ``good faith effort to reach 
absolutely the correct view from her vantage point as the 
decision maker under the Independent Counsel Act.'' \39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Testimony of James Robinson, July 20 hearing at 65.

 Allegation: Attorney General Janet Reno ``changed 
her interpretation of the Independent Counsel Act'' to ``set 
the bar for appointing an independent counsel even higher for 
the campaign finance investigation than previous 
investigations.'' \40\ The Attorney General has stated that the 
discretionary clause of the independent counsel statute 
requires that she must conclude there is potential for an 
actual conflict of interest, rather than merely an appearance 
of a conflict of interest, when she invokes this clause. Yet in 
``at least four'' earlier investigations, she referred matters 
to an independent counsel under the discretionary clause and 
applied a standard of ``apparent conflict.'' \41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Majority report at 13-16.
    \41\ Majority report at 14-16.

    The Facts: The majority is engaging in pure speculation 
regarding whether the Attorney General based earlier 
independent counsel referrals on an ``apparent conflict'' 
standard in the discretionary clause of the Independent Counsel 
Act. The referral documents in which the Attorney General 
described her rationale for these earlier decisions do not 
support the majority's interpretation.
    For example, one of the four examples cited by the majority 
as an earlier ``discretionary clause'' referral is the matter 
involving former Assistant to the President for Management and 
Administration David Watkins. According to the majority report, 
this referral was made under the Act's ``discretionary 
provision,'' as ``David Watkins did not satisfy any of the 
requirements for the mandatory provision of the Act.'' \42\ In 
fact, the specific reason the Attorney General cited for 
recommending an independent counsel on this matter was that Mr. 
Watkins did fall under the Act's mandatory provision.\43\ The 
Act's discretionary clause was not invoked in the Watkins 
referral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Majority report at 15-16.
    \43\ Notification to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(a)(1) 
of the initiation of a preliminary investigation and application to the 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 593(c)(1) for expansion of the 
jurisdiction of an independent counsel, in re William David Watkins 
(D.C. Cir., Mar. 20, 1996). The Independent Counsel Act (which expired 
in 1999) specified a list of ``covered persons'' who automatically fall 
under the Act's mandatory provision. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591 (a) & (b). In 
her filing with the court regarding the Watkins investigation, the 
Attorney General stated, ``I have concluded that Watkins is a covered 
person under the Independent Counsel Act.'' in re William David 
Watkins, at 2 (emphasis added). In the filing, the Attorney General 
reasoned that the Act:

      includes as a covered person, for the entire duration of 
      the incumbency of the President: ``the chairman and 
      treasurer of the principal national campaign committee 
      seeking the election or reelection of the President, and 
      any officer of that committee exercising authority at the 
      national level.'' Watkins was the vice president and 
      secretary of the Clinton/Gore 1992 Campaign Committee, and 
      functioned as the deputy campaign manager for operations. 
      On the basis of an investigation into Watkins' role on the 
      campaign, I am satisfied that Watkins meets the criteria 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      set out by the statute.

Id.
    Another of the four examples cited by the majority was a 
referral involving former White House detailee Anthony 
Marceca.\44\ Mr. Marceca's referral concerned allegations that 
the White House had improperly obtained files from the FBI. 
According to the majority, the ``conflict'' at issue in the 
Marceca referral was based on Mr. Marceca's ``relationship with 
President Clinton or the White House generally.'' \45\ This 
characterization, however, is inconsistent with the rationale 
set forth in the Marceca referral. The referral states that an 
investigation by the Department of Justice would constitute a 
political conflict of interest ``because it necessarily will 
involve an inquiry into dealings between the White House and 
the FBI.'' \46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Majority report at 16.
    \45\ Id.
    \46\ Notification to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(a)(1) 
of the initiation of a preliminary investigation and application to the 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 593(c)(1) for the expansion of the 
jurisdiction of an independent counsel, in re Anthony Marceca, 3 (D.C. 
Cir. June 21, 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Further, with respect to the three referrals cited by the 
majority which did invoke the discretionary clause, there is 
simply no discussion of an ``apparent conflict'' standard 
anywhere in the referral documents. In these documents, the 
Attorney General cites ``political conflict of interest'' as 
the basis for the decision to refer, and does not discuss 
whether she perceived an ``apparent'' as opposed to an 
``actual'' conflict.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Notification to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(a)(1) 
of the initiation of a preliminary investigation and application to the 
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 593(c)(1) for the expansion of the 
jurisdiction of an independent counsel, in re Bernard Nussbaum, 3 (D.C. 
Cir. Oct. 24, 1996); application to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
Sec. 592(c)(1) for the appointment of an independent counsel in re 
Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 
1994); in re Anthony Marceca, supra note 46, at 3.

 Allegation: In explaining her view that the 
Independent Counsel Act's discretionary clause requires a 
finding of potential for an actual conflict of interest instead 
of merely an appearance of a conflict, the Attorney General 
``neglected to mention the report language supporting the idea 
of an apparent conflict of interest.'' \48\ ``[T]he Senate 
Report accompanying the 1982 Amendments to the Act stated 
`[t]he Committee recognizes that there may be instances when 
investigations by the Attorney General of persons not covered 
by the Act may create an actual or apparent conflict of 
interest.' '' \49\ The Attorney General ``ha[s] a problem with 
her interpretation of the Act's legislative history.'' \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Majority report at 14-15.
    \49\ Id. at 15.
    \50\ Id.

    The Facts: The majority's reference to the Senate report is 
misleading. The report language cited by the majority concerned 
the discretionary clause provision in the Senate-passed version 
of the 1982 Amendments to the Independent Counsel Act. The 
discretionary clause language in the Senate-passed bill 
authorized appointment of an independent counsel based on an 
``appearance'' of a conflict of interest. That language, 
however, was deleted before Congress enacted the 1982 
amendments into law. In fact, the floor manager of this bill, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Representative Sam Hall, specifically noted:

        The Senate-passed bill provides that the Attorney 
        General may apply for the appointment of a special 
        prosecutor to investigate persons other than the class 
        of individuals specifically covered whenever the 
        Attorney General determines a personal, financial, or 
        political conflict of interest or the appearance 
        thereof may result if an officer of the Department of 
        Justice conducts the investigation. The bill as amended 
        deletes the reference to appearances, and thereby 
        requires the Attorney General to determine that an 
        actual conflict may exist in order to utilize the 
        special prosecutor procedures.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Congressional Record, H9507 (Dec. 13, 1982) (emphasis added). 
The majority also faults the Attorney General for citing ``negative 
legislative history'' by drawing inferences regarding congressional 
intent from the fact that Congress rejected language. The majority is 
apparently concerned that in 1997 testimony, the Attorney General noted 
that Congress in 1994 decided to reject a proposal for a more flexible 
standard for invoking the discretionary clause. Majority report at 14-
15. This criticism ignores the fact that the Attorney General does not 
rely purely on ``negative legislative history'' in discussing her 
interpretation of the Act's discretionary clause. For example, as the 
majority report acknowledges in a footnote, the Attorney General also 
relies on the floor statement of Representative Hall that explicitly 
described why Congress deleted the ``appearance'' language from the 
discretionary clause. E.g., letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to 
Senator Orrin G. Hatch, 3 (Apr. 14, 1997) (DOJ-02046 to 02055) 
(attached as exhibit 6).

 Allegation: The Attorney General intentionally 
misled the committee about Waco by withholding evidence on the 
use of ``military rounds'' of tear gas during the siege of the 
Branch Davidian compound in Waco, TX. The basis of this 
allegation was that the Justice Department purportedly didn't 
produce the 49th page of a memo that was, according to Mr. 
Burton, ``the very definitive piece of paper that could have 
given us some information.'' \52\ Referring to allegations that 
the Justice Department had withheld Waco-related information 
from Congress, Representative Burton also stated that the 
Attorney General ``should be summarily removed, either because 
she's incompetent, number one, or, number two, she's blocking 
for the President and covering things up, which is what I 
believe.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Fox News, ``Fox News Sunday'' (Sept. 12, 1999).
    \53\ National Public Radio, ``Morning Edition'' (Aug. 31, 1999).

    The Facts: At the time Mr. Burton made these statements, 
evidence produced by the Justice Department regarding the use 
of ``military rounds'' of tear gas was in his own files--and 
had been since 1995. The Office of Special Counsel John 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Danforth investigated this issue, and concluded:

        [W]hile one copy of the report did not contain the 49th 
        page, the Committees [the House Government Reform and 
        Oversight Committee and the House Judiciary Committee] 
        were provided with at least two copies of the lab 
        report in 1995 which did contain the 49th page. The 
        Office of Special Counsel easily located these complete 
        copies of the lab report at the Committees' offices 
        when it reviewed the Committees' copy of the 1995 
        Department of Justice production. The Department of 
        Justice document production to the Committees also 
        included several other documents that referred to the 
        use of the military tear gas rounds, including the 
        criminal team's witness summary chart and interview 
        notes.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ John C. Danforth, Special Counsel, ``Interim Report to the 
Deputy Attorney General Concerning the 1993 Confrontation at the Mt. 
Carmel Complex, Waco, Texas,'' 54 (July 21, 2000).

 Allegation: The Attorney General has ``a double 
standard for Republicans and Democrats,'' and ``Republicans who 
break the law get the book thrown at them, Democrats who break 
the law get off with a slap on the wrist.'' \55\ ``[A]s far as 
the equal application of justice, it doesn't appear to me that 
there has been an equal application of justice by this Justice 
Department.'' \56\ ``When Democrats do get convicted, they get 
very light sentences. When Republicans get convicted of the 
same conduct, they're given massive fines.'' \57\ The Attorney 
General's conduct reflects ``uneven enforcement of the law.'' 
\58\
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    \55\ Press release, House Committee on Government Reform (Nov. 1, 
1999).
    \56\ Statement of Representative Dan Burton, House Committee on 
Government Reform, hearing on ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady 
Family in Political Fundraising,'' 106th Cong. (Dec. 15, 1999).
    \57\ Statement of Representative Dan Burton, House Committee on 
Government Reform, hearing on ``The Role Of Yah Lin `Charlie' Trie in 
Illegal Political Fundraising,'' 106th Cong. (Mar. 1, 2000).
    \58\ Majority report at 109.

    The Facts: The majority's statements ignore the fact that 
Democrats have received harsh fines for campaign finance 
offenses. For example, in December 1998, Future Tech 
International Inc. and its chief financial officer, Juan Ortiz, 
were fined $1 million for reimbursing employees for their 
campaign contributions to Democratic campaigns. The Federal 
Election Commission also imposed a $209,000 civil penalty--the 
fourth largest in FEC history--on Future Tech and several 
company officials.
    In addition to receiving fines, Democrats have also served 
actual jail time for their offenses, unlike their Republican 
counterparts:

         In December 1999, Yogesh Gandhi was 
        sentenced to 1 year in prison and ordered to pay more 
        than $237,000 in back taxes to the IRS for tax evasion, 
        mail fraud, and helping to make an illegal $325,000 
        campaign contribution to the Democratic National 
        Committee.

         In September 1997, Democratic party 
        fundraisers Gene and Nora Lum were sentenced to 10 
        months in custody, half in a community confinement 
        center, the other half in home detention. Each also 
        received $30,000 in fines and 2 years of probation for 
        arranging about $50,000 in illegal contributions in 
        1994 and 1995.

         In 1996, Jack Webb and Jeffress Wells, two 
        former officials of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
        were sentenced to 30 days in jail, 2 years of 
        supervised probation, and 120 hours of community 
        service and given a $2,500 fine for conspiring to raise 
        contributions for a PAC from coworkers and 
        subordinates. Mr. Wells and Mr. Webb were both active 
        Democrats, the persons solicited were Democrats, and 
        the PAC supported the Clinton campaign.

    Representative Burton's allegation of favoritism also 
conveniently overlooks the fact that Attorney General Reno has 
not initiated prosecutions against prominent Republicans 
involved in alleged campaign finance violations. For example, 
no action has been taken against former Republican National 
Committee Chairman Haley Barbour, who formed the National 
Policy Forum (NPF) and was alleged to have solicited and 
secured a $2.1 million loan from a foreign national for the NPF 
which he funneled into the RNC. According to Charles La Bella, 
the former head of the Campaign Finance Task Force:

        For its part the RNC, while apparently not on a par 
        with the DNC, had its fair share of abuses. The Barbour 
        matter is a good example of the type of disingenuous 
        fundraising and loan transactions that were the 
        hallmark of the 1996 election cycle. In fact, Barbour's 
        position as head of the RNC and NPF--and the liberties 
        he took in those positions--makes the one $2 million 
        transaction even more offensive than some concocted by 
        the DNC. Indeed, with one $2 million transaction, the 
        RNC accomplished what it took the DNC over 100 White 
        House coffees to accomplish.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ Interim report from Charles La Bella and James DeSarno for 
Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, 83 (July 
16, 1998) (DOJ-FLB-00030 to 00127).

    Similarly, no action has been taken against Republican 
Majority Whip Tom DeLay, despite specific and credible evidence 
that Mr. DeLay and a Republican congressional candidate, Brian 
Babin, knowingly participated in a scheme to funnel illegal 
contributions to Mr. Babin's campaign.\60\ The evidence 
relating to Mr. DeLay includes a sworn affidavit from Texan 
businessman and Republican donor Peter Cloeren stating that Mr. 
DeLay instructed him to funnel money illegally to Mr. Babin's 
campaign.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
``Investigation of Political Fundraising Improprieties and Possible 
Violations of Law,'' 105th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 4, at 4020-24 (Nov. 5, 
1998) (H. Rept. 105-829).
    \61\ Affidavit of Peter F. Cloeren, House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight (Aug. 6, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The validity of Mr. Burton's allegation can be tested by 
comparing the treatment received by two former Members of 
Congress who committed campaign finance violations, former 
Republican Representative Jay Kim and former Democratic 
Representative Mary Rose Oakar. Representative Kim knowingly 
accepted $230,000 in illegal contributions--over 14 times the 
amount of money that Representative Oakar conspired to 
contribute illegally ($16,000). But Representative Kim received 
a comparable sentence to Representative Oakar.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ In March 1998, Representative Kim was sentenced to 2 months 
home confinement under electronic monitoring, 1 year of probation, and 
200 hours of community service, and received a $5,000 fine. According 
to prosecutors, his case represented ``the largest amount of criminal 
campaign finance violations ever committed by a member of Congress.'' 
``Former Rep. Kim, Convicted in 1997, May Run Again,'' Los Angeles 
Times (Dec. 4, 1999). Representative Oakar received a sentence of 2 
years' probation and 200 hours of community service, and a $32,000 
fine.

 Allegation: The Attorney General delayed releasing 
the Freeh and La Bella memos in order to protect herself from 
public embarrassment. ``By withholding the memos from this 
Committee, you tried to keep the Committee from learning how 
you had mishandled the investigation.'' \63\ Furthermore, 
``when the Justice Department finally turned the documents over 
to the Committee, it was clear that the Justice Department's 
objections had been utterly false and baseless.'' \64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ Letter from Representative Dan Burton to Attorney General 
Janet Reno (Mar. 10, 2000).
    \64\ Majority report at 128.

    The Facts: The Attorney General's reluctance to produce the 
Freeh and La Bella memos was consistent with the longstanding 
departmental policy against releasing internal memoranda 
concerning ongoing investigations to Congress.\65\ Both Mr. 
Freeh and Mr. La Bella stated on numerous occasions that public 
release of their memoranda would jeopardize the Task Force's 
investigations and have a ``chilling effect'' on pending 
prosecutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ E.g., Charles J. Cooper, ``Response to Congressional Requests 
for Information Regarding Decisions Made Under the Independent Counsel 
Act,'' 10 Op. O.L.C. (Apr. 28, 1986); see also House Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, ``Contempt of Congress,'' 105th Cong., 
2d sess., minority views at 123-25 (Sept. 17, 1998) (H. Rept. 105-728).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, Attorney General Reno and Director Freeh 
warned in a December 8, 1997, letter to Representative Burton 
that release of the Freeh memo would provide a ``road map'' of 
their investigation.\66\ In his testimony before the committee 
on August 4, 1998, Director Freeh was asked whether he thought 
Congress should receive his memorandum. Director Freeh replied 
that ``I certainly believe it not prudent to receive it at this 
point.'' \67\ Mr. La Bella stated at the same hearing:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis 
J. Freeh to Representative Dan Burton (Dec. 8, 1997).
    \67\ Testimony of Louis J. Freeh, August 4 hearing at 110.

        The last thing in the world that I want to see as the 
        prosecutor heading this Task Force is that this memo 
        ever get disclosed. . . . I don't think it should ever 
        see the light of day, because this, in my judgment, 
        would be devastating to the investigations that the men 
        and women of the Task Force are working on right now 
        and that I have put my blood, sweat and tears into, and 
        I don't want to see that jeopardized.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Testimony of Charles La Bella, August 4 hearing at 110.

    Despite these well-founded reservations, the Attorney 
General made significant efforts to accommodate the committee. 
In early 1998, the Justice Department provided a briefing to 
the chairman, ranking member, and certain staff of the 
committee on redacted portions of the Freeh memorandum.\69\ In 
late 1998, the Justice Department provided a briefing to the 
chairman, ranking member, and certain staff of the committee on 
redacted versions of the Freeh and La Bella memoranda, and 
permitted review of these documents. And in May 2000, after the 
Department's successful prosecution of individuals mentioned in 
the memoranda, the Justice Department provided the documents in 
minimally redacted form to the committee.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ See letter from Representative Henry Waxman to Attorney 
General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis J. Freeh (Dec. 19, 1997).
    \70\ Mr. La Bella apparently concurred in the Attorney General's 
decision in May 2000 to release the minimally redacted memoranda to 
Congress. In December 1999, he stated, ``I would think now that the 
investigations are all concluded, there's a lot--a good portion of the 
memo that could be made public I think without risk to anybody or 
anything.'' Fox, ``Hannity and Colmes'' (Dec. 29, 1999).

 Allegation: ``[W]e have a piece of evidence from the 
Director of the FBI that makes it abundantly clear that we have 
been right all along. Janet Reno and Lee Radek have been 
blatantly protecting the President, the Vice President and 
their party from the outset of this scandal.'' \71\ ``Justice 
Department officials believed that a key supervisor of the 
campaign finance investigation thought that the Attorney 
General's political future hinged on her decisions regarding 
her political superiors.'' \72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ Press release, House Committee on Government Reform (May 19, 
2000).
    \72\ Majority report at v.

    The Facts: The majority's evidence is a December 9, 1996, 
memo from FBI Director Freeh to former Deputy FBI Director 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Esposito, which stated:

        I also advised the Attorney General of Lee Radek's 
        comment to you that there was a lot of ``pressure'' on 
        him and [the Public Integrity Section] regarding this 
        case because the ``Attorney General's job might hang in 
        the balance'' (or words to that effect). I stated that 
        those comments would be enough for me to take him and 
        the Criminal Division off the case completely.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ Memorandum from FBI Director Louis J. Freeh to Deputy FBI 
Director William J. Esposito (Dec. 9, 1996).

    The meaning of Mr. Radek's alleged comment is unclear. The 
testimony before this committee and a Senate Judiciary 
subcommittee suggests that the two people who heard Mr. Radek's 
alleged comment interpreted the comment differently. Mr. 
Esposito testified that he considered the remark to be 
``totally inappropriate,'' \74\ and he evidently communicated 
his belief to Mr. Freeh. But Neil Gallagher, Assistant FBI 
Director for Terrorism, testified that he ``did not put any 
great significance'' on the statement,\75\ and that ``the 
implication that I took was that Lee Radek was making a 
statement of how sensitive and tough this investigation was 
going to be that we were about ready to enter.'' \76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ Testimony of William J. Esposito, June 6 hearing at 119.
    \75\ Testimony of Neil Gallagher, June 6 hearing at 126.
    \76\ Testimony of Neil Gallagher, June 6 hearing at 125.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Radek is a 29-year career prosecutor who began working 
for the Justice Department in the Nixon administration and who 
has never been involved in Democratic party politics.\77\ He 
testified that while he has no recollection of the alleged 
conversation with Mr. Esposito, he ``would undoubtedly, in 
conversations with Mr. Esposito, talk about pressure on the 
Public Integrity Section at frequent occasions, whenever he and 
I would talk'' but that ``[i]t was pressure to do the job and 
do it right.'' \78\ Asked what pressure he got from the 
Attorney General, Mr. Radek responded that ``I got pressure to 
do a good job and to do it well.'' \79\ As for the Attorney 
General herself, Mr. Radek said that he was ``aware of no 
pressure being put on her.'' \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ Testimony of Lee Radek, May 24 hearing.
    \78\ Testimony of Lee Radek, May 24 hearing.
    \79\ Testimony of Lee Radek, May 24 hearing.
    \80\ Testimony of Lee Radek, May 24 hearing.

 Allegation: The Vice President ``apparently 
suggested that the DNC issue ads be shown to James Riady.'' 
\81\ The Justice Department failed to review an incriminating 
tape of a December 1995 White House coffee which is ``evidence 
that the Vice President knew that those [DNC issue] ads were 
being paid for by foreign money. That is evidence that the 
President knew that there was a connection between those ads 
and Mr. Riady.'' \82\ ``I don't think the Justice Department 
has even looked into this. In five interviews with the Vice 
President, they didn't ask him a single question about it. I 
don't think they have even asked to see the original tape.'' 
\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ Majority report at 65.
    \82\ Statement of Representative Bob Barr, July 20 hearing at 100.
    \83\ Statement of Representative Dan Burton, July 20 hearing at 10.

    The Facts: The videotape in question is of a December 15, 
1995, White House coffee attended by Arief Wiriadinata, the 
son-in-law of Hashim Ning, a business associate of Lippo 
founder Mochtar Riady. James Riady, Mochtar's son, is suspected 
of making conduit campaign contributions in the 1992 and 1994 
election cycles. According to Representative Burton's 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
description of the videotape:

        Mr. Wiriadinata moves away from the camera and you hear 
        a voice in the background. It sounds very much like the 
        Vice President. It sounds like he is saying, ``We 
        oughta, we oughta, we oughta show Mr. Riady the tapes, 
        some of the ad tapes.'' \84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ Statement of Representative Dan Burton, July 20 hearing at 9.

    According to neutral observers, however, the tape is 
virtually unintelligible. A Reuters reporter describing the 
playing of the videotape at the committee's hearing wrote, 
``Gore's muffled words were not clear.'' \85\ When the tape was 
played on a Fox TV show, the person in charge of transcribing 
the show was also unable to make it out. The transcript for the 
show reads: ``We ought to, we ought to show that to 
[unintelligible] here, let [unintelligible] tapes, some of the 
ad tapes [unintelligible].'' \86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ ``Justice Department Won't Discuss Gore Video,'' Reuters (July 
21, 2000).
    \86\ Fox, ``Hannity and Colmes'' (July 19, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, as the majority is aware, the tape in question 
was provided to the Justice Department in October 1997.\87\ 
Thus, it is entirely possible that the Department reviewed the 
tape 3 years ago and came to the same conclusion as other 
unbiased observers--namely, that the tape is 
unintelligible.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ Letter from Beth Nolan, counsel to the President, to James C. 
Wilson, chief counsel (Sept. 23, 2000) (noting that ``in a recent 
conversation with Lisa Klem of my office you indicated that you knew 
the Department of Justice had the videotape in October 1997'').
    \88\ The majority also asserts, ``The Vice President himself 
admitted that it was his voice, but deflected questions by saying it 
was a political attack using news that had been available for years.'' 
Majority report at 71 (citing ``Congressman Focuses on Gore Videotape 
Comment,'' Associated Press (July 19, 2000)). However, the news article 
the majority cites for this assertion says nothing about the Vice 
President's reaction to, or comments about, the videotape--nor do any 
of the other articles cited by the majority.

 Allegation: The Justice Department is ``more 
interested in defending the White House in the e-mail matter 
than investigating it'' \89\ and ``it has become known that the 
one part time lawyer handling the e-mail investigation for the 
Department has recently left government employment.'' \90\ The 
Department has given the White House ``preferential treatment'' 
by failing to investigate whether the e-mail matter involves 
``obstruction of Congressional investigations of the campaign 
finance scandal.'' \91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ Majority report at vii.
    \90\ Majority report at vii.
    \91\ Majority report at vii-viii.

    The Facts: The Department's e-mail investigation is being 
carried out in coordination with Independent Counsel Robert 
Ray.\92\ There is no reason to believe that Mr. Ray and the 
Justice Department are not pursuing an appropriate 
investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ Testimony of Alan Gershel, House Committee on Government 
Reform, hearing on ``Contacts Between Northrop Grumman Corporation and 
the White House Regarding Missing White House E-Mails,'' 35 (Sept. 26, 
2000) (stenographic record) (hereinafter ``September 26 hearing''). Mr. 
Gershel assured the committee that the Department had not impeded or 
limited the scope of Mr. Ray's investigation, and the committee has 
received no information to question this assurance. September 26 
hearing at 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The report offers no evidence to support its allegation 
that the Department has relied on one part-time lawyer to 
handle the e-mail investigation.\93\ Asked about this 
allegation, Attorney General Reno and Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General Alan Gershel each made clear that they were unable to 
respond, due to the Department's longstanding policy of not 
disclosing staffing levels for ongoing investigations.\94\ 
However, the Attorney General assured the committee that 
``there are sufficient resources committed to it based on the 
recommendations of the prosecutors involved.'' \95\ Similarly, 
Mr. Gershel observed:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \93\ The majority has repeated this accusation with increasing 
conviction, despite being unable to cite any evidence to support it. 
Mr. Burton said in a hearing on September 26 that ``We have heard 
from--heard the Task Force was using just one part-time lawyer.'' 
Statement of Representative Dan Burton, September 26 hearing at 41 
(emphasis added). In its e-mail report, released shortly thereafter, 
the majority asserted, ``It appears that for at least part of its e-
mail investigation, the Justice Department had only one part-time 
lawyer assigned to its e-mail investigation.'' House Committee on 
Government Reform, ``The Failure to Produce White House E-Mails: 
Threats, Obstruction and Unanswered Questions,'' 106th Cong., 141 
(2000) (stenographic record) (emphasis added). Now, the majority 
asserts simply that ``it has become known that the one part time lawyer 
handling the e-mail investigation for the Department has recently left 
government employment.'' Majority report at vii (emphasis added).
    \94\ Transcript of interview of Attorney General Janet Reno, House 
Committee on Government Reform, 4 (Oct. 5, 2000) (hereinafter 
``Attorney General Reno interview''); testimony of Alan Gershel, 
September 26 hearing at 34-35.
    \95\ Attorney General Reno interview at 9.

        the Attorney General regularly consults with Robert 
        Conrad, the chief of the Campaign Financing Task Force, 
        and me to ensure that the Task Force has the resources 
        it needs. Bob and I both believe that the Task Force 
        currently has sufficient staff to handle the White 
        House e-mail matter as well as its other 
        responsibilities.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ Testimony of Alan Gershel, September 26 hearing at 35.

Mr. Gershel also pointed out that ``with respect to the White 
House e-mail matter the [Department's] Task Force and the 
office of the independent counsel are working together in a 
coordinated investigation. So it is not just the Task Force's 
resources that are involved.'' \97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ Testimony of Alan Gershel, September 26 hearing at 35. The 
majority also asserts that the Department has given the White House 
``preferential treatment'' by failing to investigate whether the e-mail 
matter involves ``obstruction of Congressional investigations of the 
campaign finance scandal.'' Majority report at vii. In support of this 
assertion, the majority claims that ``[i]n an October 5, 2000, 
interview with the Committee, Attorney General Reno made it clear that 
she would not take proactive steps to determine whether the White House 
had obstructed Congressional investigations by failing to take steps to 
produce subpoenaed e-mail records.'' Majority report at viii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  This assertion is without merit. The interview with the Attorney 
General included the following exchange:

      Majority Counsel: . . . is the Department of Justice doing 
      an investigation of any sort of matters that go to 
      Congressional investigations?

      Attorney General Reno: I will be happy to check and see 
      what I can provide you based on what might be known or any 
      complaint that you have made of obstruction. But I don't 
      know the full range of your investigations, so I can't tell 
      you.

Attorney General Reno interview at 25.
  Moreover, in the course of the interview, majority counsel conceded 
that the Department had asked the majority months ago which 
congressional subpoenas may not have been complied with--and the 
majority declined to cooperate with this request:

      Majority Counsel: Mr. Gershel a number of months ago called 
      me directly and said he wanted to interview me specifically 
      to try and determine whether Congressional subpoenas had 
      not been complied with or whether there was obstruction of 
      a Congressional investigation. I said to him at the time I 
      would be happy to comply with his request for an interview 
      pending consultation with my superiors, but first we had 
      the outstanding question of whether there was a special 
      counsel to be appointed. And I indicated that it would 
      perhaps be counterproductive if I did an interview with him 
      when, as Mr. Raben had indicated--actually had not yet 
      indicated, but as indicated by you, there was an ongoing 
      determination as to whether a special counsel would be 
      appointed.

Attorney General Reno interview at 32.

 Allegation: In July 1999 testimony before the House 
Rules Committee, Representative Burton claimed that the 
Government Reform Committee had received information indicating 
that the Attorney General ``personally'' changed a policy 
related to release of information by the Justice Department so 
that an attorney she knew ``could help her client.'' \98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\ Testimony of Chairman Dan Burton, House Rules Committee (July 
15, 1999) (available at www.house.gov/reform/oversight/99--07--15db-
rules.htm).

    The Facts: Mr. Burton's allegations concerned a decision by 
the Justice Department to confirm the lack of existence of 
records in response to a FOIA request by a Miami attorney, 
Rebekah Poston. This decision to confirm the lack of records 
was legal,\99\ and it was damaging to Ms. Poston's client.\100\ 
The records produced to the committee and testimony by the 
relevant individuals showed that the Attorney General had 
recused herself from the decision.\101\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ Testimony of Richard Huff, House Government Reform Committee, 
``Felonies and Favors: A Friend of the Attorney General Gathers 
Information from the Justice Department,'' 150 (July 27, 2000) 
(stenographic record) (hereinafter ``July 27 hearing'').
    \100\ Ms. Poston was seeking information for a client, a member of 
an international religious organization known as Soka Gakkai. Ms. 
Poston's client had been sued in a Japanese court for libel by a 
Japanese citizen named Nobuo Abe. The alleged statements at the heart 
of this lawsuit related to whether Mr. Abe had been arrested or 
detained in Seattle in 1963. Mr. Abe maintained that he had never been 
detained and that statements to the contrary made by Ms. Poston's 
client were defamatory. Ms. Poston's FOIA requests sought records that 
would have established that her client's statements were true and that 
Mr. Abe had, in fact, been arrested or detained. E.g., letter from 
Russell J. Bruemmer and Patrick J. Carome of Wilmer, Cutler & 
Pickering, to Richard L. Huff (Mar. 31, 1995) (DOJ-02812 to 02817). The 
Justice Department's confirmation that no such records existed was 
adverse to the interests of Ms. Poston's client.
    \101\ Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to staff of the 
Attorney General (Apr. 28, 1995) (attached as exhibit 7); House 
Committee on Government Reform, ``Felonies and Favors: A Friend of the 
Attorney General Gathers Information from the Justice Department,'' 
July 27 hearing at 154. The majority also alleges that Ms. Poston took 
``illegal actions'' and that she ``Request[ed] Her Private 
Investigators to Break the Law.'' Majority report at 163, 168. The 
majority's allegation appears to be based on the premise that Ms. 
Poston inappropriately directed her private investigators to access a 
restricted FBI database. In testimony under oath before this committee, 
however, Ms. Poston denied asking private investigators to break the 
law. House Committee on Government Reform, ``Felonies and Favors: A 
Friend of the Attorney General Gathers Information from the Justice 
Department,'' July 27 hearing at 63. Richard Lucas, the investigator 
who received instructions from Ms. Poston on what she wanted 
investigated, also testified that she did not ask him to access 
restricted information. Id. at 50, 55-56, 66-67. In fact, contrary to 
the majority's allegation, no evidence received by the committee 
demonstrates that Ms. Poston instructed private investigators to break 
the law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  In its discussion of the Poston matter, the majority report also 
states that according to Mr. Lucas, Barry Langberg, an attorney for 
Soka Gakkai, hired Jack Palladino, a private investigator, to look into 
the issue of whether Mr. Abe was arrested in 1963. The majority report 
alleges that it is possible that through their actions on this matter, 
Mr. Palladino and Mr. Langberg ``broke the law.'' Majority report at 
162. The committee, however, never interviewed Mr. Palladino or Mr. 
Langberg. On Oct. 31, 2000, Mr. Langberg wrote the committee to address 
allegations in the majority report that relate to him. According to Mr. 
Langberg, the majority's account ``contains numerous demonstrable 
factual errors, and recklessly accuses private individuals of criminal 
wrongdoing without any pretense of due process or any substantive 
evidence.'' He also stated that he has ``no personal involvement with 
the activity criticized in the report.'' Letter from Barry B. Langberg 
to Representative Dan Burton and Representative Henry Waxman (Oct. 31, 
2000) (attached as exhibit 8).

 Allegation: There was an ``apparently illegal 
conduit contribution scheme by the Democratic National 
Committee to funnel more than a third of a million dollars to 
the Kansas Democratic party.'' \102\ ``The Justice Department 
failed to pursue the Kansas conduit contribution scheme.'' 
\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \102\ Majority report at 108.
    \103\ Id.

    The Facts: In 1996, Democratic party national committees 
contributed to Kansas State candidates and county committees, 
and to Democratic party committees in other States. Some of 
these candidates, county committees, and State party committees 
subsequently contributed to the Kansas Democratic party.\104\ 
Media accounts reported concerns that these actions may have 
constituted illegal circumvention of a Kansas law that caps 
contributions by national party committees to State party 
committees and prohibits making contributions in the name of 
another.\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ E.g., deposition of Jim Lawing, House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, 22-29 (Feb. 18, 1998).
    \105\ E.g. ``Local Demos Say They Felt Need to Repay State Party: 
Legality of Transfers Questioned,'' Winfield Daily Courier (Oct. 9, 
1997). The State law provisions at issue are Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 25-
4153 (1996) and Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 25-4154 (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1997, State representative Henry Helgerson wrote the 
bipartisan Kansas Commission on Governmental Standards and 
Conduct asking for clarification of the Kansas law.\106\ The 
Commission issued an opinion on this matter on September 11, 
1997.\107\ Under the Commission's opinion, national party 
committees could contribute to a Kansas State candidate, Kansas 
county committee, or other State party, and that candidate, 
county committee, or State party could subsequently contribute 
to a Kansas State party committee without violating the Kansas 
statute. A violation would occur only if the national party 
committees had an understanding with the entity to which they 
made the contribution that the money was to be contributed to 
the State party committee.\108\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ Letter from Henry Helgerson to Carol Williams (Sept. 3, 1997) 
(attached as exhibit 9). The Commission is charged with administering, 
interpreting and enforcing the Kansas Campaign Finance Act and laws 
relating to conflict of interests, financial disclosure and the 
regulation of lobbying. See the home page of the Commission at 
www.state.ks.us/public/gsc/.
    \107\ Kansas Commission on Governmental Standards and Conduct, 
Opinion No. 1997-45 (Sept. 11, 1997) (attached as exhibit 10).
    \108\ See id. (stating that there is no violation of the Kansas 
statute if ``A'' gives money to ``B'' and ``B'' then contributes the 
money to ``C,'' ``so long as there was not an understanding between `A' 
and `B' that the money was to be contributed to `C' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In February 1998, the committee deposed a total of five 
individuals on this matter, four of whom were Kansas Democratic 
State legislative candidates in 1996 and one of whom was a 
Kansas Democratic party official in 1996. All of these 
individuals received contributions from national Democratic 
party committees in 1996.\109\ All of these individuals also 
testified that they did not have any understanding with the 
national committees from which they received contributions that 
they would contribute that money to the State party.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ Deposition of Henry Helgerson, House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, 16 (Feb. 19, 1998); deposition of Jim Lawing, 
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 12-13, 22-23 (Feb. 
18, 1998) (testifying that he received a contribution is from the 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in his capacity as chairman 
of the Sedgwick County Democratic Central Committee); deposition of 
Marge Petty, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 14-18 
(Feb. 24, 1998); deposition of Jerald Karr, House Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight, 16-17 (Feb. 23, 1998); deposition of 
Douglas Walker, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 26-
29 (Feb. 23, 1998).
    \110\ Deposition of Henry Helgerson at 57-58; deposition of Jim 
Lawing at 41-42; deposition of Marge Petty at 14-15, 34-35; deposition 
of Jerald Karr at 30, 46; deposition of Douglas Walker at 26-27, 40. 
The majority report emphasizes a Sept. 3, 1996, memo from Tressie 
Hurley to Kansas State Senate candidate Donald Biggs which notes that 
the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee will contribute $1,000 to 
Senate campaigns and states, ``You may keep $200 but then must turn 
around and contribute $800 to the Senate Victory Fund.'' Majority 
report at 110. According to deposition testimony, however, at the time 
of this memo, Ms. Hurley was a junior staffer in the office of State 
Senate Minority Leader Jerald Karr. She was not an employee of any 
national Democratic party organization or otherwise in a position to 
act as an agent of such an organization. Deposition of Jerald Karr at 
36, 47. The Hurley memo does not therefore demonstrate an agreement 
between the national Democratic party and Mr. Biggs regarding the 
national party's contribution to him. Further, the committee never 
deposed either Ms. Hurley or Mr. Biggs to explore the significance of 
the memo.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to testimony of individuals in committee 
depositions, the Kansas Commission on Governmental Standards 
and Conduct also investigated the contributions at issue.\111\ 
While the Commission is prohibited by law from commenting on 
whether an investigation has been instigated or is 
ongoing,\112\ evidence indicates that the Commission has found 
no wrongdoing regarding this matter. Under Kansas law, the 
Commission must hold a hearing if, after investigating, the 
Commission finds that ``probable cause exists for believing the 
allegations of the complaint,'' and this hearing must be held 
no more than 30 days after the finding is made.\113\ No such 
hearing has ever been held on the allegations,\114\ which date 
back to close to 4 years ago. According to the Commission's 
executive director, the Commission deals with allegations in as 
timely a manner as possible, and 4 years from the time 
allegations were first made is outside of the realm of 
timeliness.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \111\ See, e.g., deposition of Jim Lawing at 47-48 (stating that he 
had given a statement and had provided documents to the Commission on 
the subject of the funds received from the national Democratic Party); 
deposition of Douglas Walker at 46 (stating that the Kansas Commission 
had spoken with him about a lot of the same subjects covered in the 
Committee's deposition of him).
    \112\ Kan. Stat. Ann. Sec. 25-4161 (1999).
    \113\ Id.
    \114\ Telephone conversation between minority staff and Carol 
Williams, executive director of the Kansas Commission on Governmental 
Standards and Conduct (Oct. 30, 2000).
    \115\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    II. The Majority Has Improperly Sought To Inject Politics into 
                        Prosecutorial Decisions

    Beyond making unsubstantiated allegations, Mr. Burton has 
repeatedly sought to interject the committee into prosecutorial 
decisions by the Justice Department. These efforts have 
conflicted with historical practices grounded in the principle 
of separation of powers. As former Attorney General Ramsey 
Clark stated:

        If Constitutional separation of powers, integrity and 
        effectiveness in the execution of the laws and the 
        individual rights of witnesses . . . are to be 
        protected, Congress must let the Attorney General 
        perform the duties of that office without demanding 
        investigative materials, or staff recommendations in an 
        ongoing investigation.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \116\ Letter from Ramsey Clark to Representative Henry Waxman (Aug. 
5, 1998) (attached as exhibit 11).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     A. The Majority's Subpoena of the Freeh and La Bella Memoranda

    One example of inappropriate overreaching into 
prosecutorial decisions was the majority's July 24, 1998, 
subpoena to the Attorney General for documents authored by FBI 
Director Louis J. Freeh and former Justice Department Campaign 
Finance Task Force head Charles G. La Bella. These documents 
contained prosecution recommendations and other sensitive and 
detailed information regarding the Justice Department's ongoing 
campaign finance investigation. Both Mr. Freeh and Mr. La Bella 
opposed release of the documents.\117\ As former Attorney 
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach stated, ``it is hard to 
imagine a less appropriate subject for a subpoena or one more 
calculated to politicize the Department.'' \118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ At the time of the dispute over the documents, Mr. La Bella 
testified that release of his memo would be ``devastating to the 
investigations that the men and women of the Task Force are working on 
right now,'' and Mr. Freeh testified that release of his memo would not 
be ``prudent.'' Testimony of Charles G. La Bella, August 4 hearing at 
110; testimony of Louis J. Freeh, August 4 hearing at 110.
    \118\ Letter from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Representative Henry 
Waxman (Aug. 5, 1998) (attached as exhibit 12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The majority's demands ignored a long history of Justice 
Department precedents.\119\ As the following examples 
demonstrate, Justice Departments under both Republican and 
Democratic administrations have recognized an important public 
policy interest in preserving the confidentiality of internal 
documents relating to open criminal investigations:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \119\ The majority report cites a number of precedents in an 
attempt to support the proposition that subpoenaing the Freeh and La 
Bella memoranda was appropriate. Majority report at 139-43. The 
precedents cited by the majority, however, do not resemble the 
circumstances relating to the Freeh and La Bella memoranda. In 
particular, none of the precedents involves a congressional attempt to 
obtain a prosecution memorandum during an open criminal investigation. 
For example, in the Palmer Raids investigation, the document produced 
was not a prosecution memorandum but a legal analysis of a trial court 
opinion, and the trial had ended. With respect to the Teapot Dome 
scandal, at the time the Justice Department produced documents to 
Congress, it had finished investigating the matter and had finished 
considering legal action, and the primary document produced was a 
report from an accountant, not a prosecution memorandum. For additional 
discussion of these and the other examples cited in the majority 
report, see House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
``Contempt of Congress,'' 105th Cong., 2d sess., minority views at 136-
38 (Sept. 17, 1998).

 Franklin Roosevelt administration: In 1941, a House 
committee requested all Justice Department investigative 
materials relating to labor strikes involving naval 
contractors. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson refused to 
provide the information, stating: ``all investigative reports 
are confidential documents of the executive department of the 
Government [and] congressional or public access to them would 
not be in the public interest.'' \120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \120\ Opinion of Attorney General Robert H. Jackson (1941).

 Nixon administration: In 1969, during a House 
committee investigation into the My Lai massacre, the Army was 
asked to provide all materials from its ongoing investigation 
into the incident. Thomas Kauper, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, rejected the request, stating: ``If a congressional 
committee is fully apprised of all details of an investigation 
as the investigation proceeds, there is a substantial danger 
that congressional pressures will influence the course of the 
investigation.'' \121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \121\ Thomas E. Kauper, ``Submission of Open CID Investigation 
Files'' (Dec. 19, 1969).

 Ford administration: In 1976, Representative Bella 
Abzug, who chaired a subcommittee of the Government Operations 
Committee, requested FBI investigative files concerning 
domestic intelligence matters. Deputy Attorney General Harold 
R. Tyler, Jr., refused to provide the information, stating: 
``if the Department changes its policy and discloses 
investigative information, we could do serious damage to the 
Department's ability to prosecute prospective defendants and to 
the FBI's ability to detect and investigate violations of 
criminal law.'' \122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \122\ Letter from Harold R. Tyler, Jr., to Representative Bella 
Abzug (Feb. 26, 1976).

 Reagan administration: In 1986, the Justice 
Department's Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the 
Attorney General should not disclose to Congress the contents 
of a report filed with a court pursuant to the Independent 
Counsel Act. Assistant Attorney General Charles J. Cooper wrote 
that ``the executive . . . has the exclusive authority to 
enforce the laws adopted by Congress, and neither the judicial 
nor legislative branches may directly interfere with the 
prosecutorial discretion of the Executive Branch by directing 
the executive to prosecute particular individuals.'' \123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \123\ Charles J. Cooper, ``Response to Congressional Requests for 
Information Regarding Decisions Made Under the Independent Counsel 
Act,'' 10 Op. O.L.C. 68 (Apr. 28, 1996).

 Bush administration: In 1989, the Justice 
Department's Office of Legal Counsel concluded that agency 
inspectors general were not required to provide information to 
Congress about open criminal investigations. Assistant Attorney 
General Douglas W. Kmiec concluded that there was no obligation 
to provide such information, stating: ``the executive branch 
has generally declined to make any accommodation for 
congressional committees with respect to open cases: that is, 
it has consistently refused to provide confidential 
information.'' \124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \124\ Douglas W. Kmiec, ``Congressional Requests for Information 
from Inspectors General Concerning Open Criminal Investigations,'' 13 
Op. O.L.C. 93 (Mar. 24, 1989).

    As summarized by Charles J. Cooper, Assistant Attorney 
General during the Reagan Administration in a 1986 legal 
opinion, the policy of not turning over investigative 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
documents:

        was first expressed by President Washington and has 
        been reaffirmed by or on by Presidents Jefferson, 
        Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin 
        Roosevelt, and Eisenhower. No President, to our 
        knowledge, has departed from this position affirming 
        the confidentiality and privileged nature of open law 
        enforcement files.\125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\ Charles J. Cooper, ``Response to Congressional Requests for 
Information Regarding Decisions Made Under the Independent Counsel 
Act,'' 10 Op. O.L.C. (Apr. 28, 1986). For additional discussion of 
precedent on this matter, see House Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, ``Contempt of Congress,'' 105th Cong., 2d sess., minority 
views at 123-25 (Sept. 17, 1998) (H. Rept. 105-728).

    Nevertheless, the majority persisted in its demands for the 
Freeh and La Bella memoranda. In fact, as discussed below, the 
majority even voted to hold the Attorney General in contempt of 
Congress in August 1998 after she refrained from appointing an 
independent counsel and refused to provide the Freeh and La 
Bella memoranda.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \126\ See House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, 
``Contempt of Congress,'' 105th Cong., 2d sess. (Sept. 17, 1998) (H. 
Rept. 105-728).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              B. The Majority's Use of the Contempt Power

    Article II of the Constitution vests the power to execute 
and enforce the laws of the United States in the executive 
branch. In particular, the courts have long recognized that 
criminal prosecution is exclusively the province of the 
executive branch.\127\ Nevertheless, Mr. Burton improperly used 
the Congress' contempt power to coerce the Attorney General to 
appoint an independent counsel to investigate the President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \127\ E.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In late July 1998, the conflict between Mr. Burton and the 
Attorney General over the production of the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda was reaching its climax. Mr. Burton told the media 
that he would hold the Attorney General in contempt of Congress 
if she did not comply with his subpoena to turn over the 
documents.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \128\ E.g., ``Justice Holds Subpoenaed Memos,'' Associated Press 
(July 27, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In an effort to reach an accommodation with Mr. Burton, the 
Attorney General and FBI Director Freeh requested a private 
meeting with Mr. Burton and Ranking Member Waxman.\129\ During 
this meeting on July 31, 1998, Mr. Burton told the Attorney 
General that he would drop his efforts to seek contempt if she 
would seek the appointment of an independent counsel. As Mr. 
Waxman wrote to the Attorney General after the meeting:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \129\ This request for a meeting was one of several efforts by the 
Attorney General to reach an accommodation with the committee. For 
example, on July 28, 1998, she and FBI Director Freeh wrote 
Representative Burton offering to provide a confidential briefing on 
appropriate portions of the La Bella memorandum after the Attorney 
General had completed her evaluation of Mr. La Bella's recommendation. 
Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI Director Louis Freeh to 
Representative Dan Burton (July 28, 1998) (attached as exhibit 13). On 
Aug. 4, 1998, the Attorney General reiterated her offer to provide a 
confidential briefing on appropriate portions of the La Bella 
memorandum after she had an opportunity to fully review the memorandum, 
noting that such review should take approximately 3 weeks. Letter from 
Attorney General Janet Reno to Representative Dan Burton (Aug. 4, 1998) 
(attached as exhibit 14). Further, on Aug. 6, 1998, the Attorney 
General contacted Mr. Burton by telephone and said that after she had 
reviewed the La Bella memorandum, she would be willing to appear before 
the full committee and, to the extent that it would not prejudice the 
ongoing criminal investigation, explain Mr. La Bella's legal rationale.

        The chairman's remarks were a blatant attempt to 
        influence your decision. You were told that you could 
        avoid being held in contempt of Congress if you acceded 
        to Mr. Burton's demands that you seek appointment of an 
        Independent Counsel. Conditioning a contempt citation 
        on your willingness to appoint an Independent Counsel 
        is clearly coercive.

           *         *         *         *         *

        Mr. Burton's tactics are not subtle. He knows that you 
        cannot turn over the La Bella memorandum. . . . Thus, 
        Mr. Burton is seeking to place you in an untenable 
        position. In effect, he has given you only two choices: 
        (1) become the first Attorney General in history to be 
        held in contempt of Congress because you cannot turn 
        over the La Bella memorandum or (2) appoint the 
        Independent Counsel that he demands.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \130\ Letter from Representative Henry Waxman to Attorney General 
Janet Reno (July 31, 1998) (attached as exhibit 15).

    The chairman's spokesman, Will Dwyer, confirmed Mr. 
Burton's intent. As reported in the Washington Post on the 
following day, Mr. Dwyer conceded that ``[t]he only one real 
objective here is getting an independent counsel, as these 
documents advise her to do. . . . If she follows that advice, 
there will be no need for the documents.'' \131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \131\ ``Democrats Say Burton Made Threat Against Reno,'' Washington 
Post (Aug. 1, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Attorney General Reno properly resisted these efforts at 
intimidation. As she explained on August 4: ``Chairman Burton 
told me Friday that if I triggered the appointment of an 
independent counsel, I would not have to produce the memos. If 
I give in to that suggestion, then I risk Congress turning all 
decisions to prosecute into a political football.'' \132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \132\ Press conference of Attorney General Reno, unofficial 
transcript (LEXIS, ``Scripts'') (Aug. 4, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By a party-line vote (24 to 19), the committee voted on 
August 6, 1998, to recommend to the House of Representatives 
that the Attorney General be cited for contempt of Congress. 
The majority's actions on this matter were the subject of 
widespread criticism.\133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ See ``Tell Him No, Ms. Reno,'' Miami Herald (Aug. 6, 1998) 
(``Mr. Burton's request is dangerous. It's more than laced with his 
palpable political motives. Worse, it's also bereft of any sign that he 
has weighed what these memos, if leaked, could do to the Justice 
Department's own investigation''); ``Give Reno Some Room,'' St. 
Petersburg Times (Aug. 6, 1998) (``What is clear is that Burton should 
wipe away the froth around his mouth and stop demanding information 
that he has no right to''); ``Buck Stops with Reno,'' Los Angeles Times 
(Aug. 6, 1998) (``This is a fishing expedition by Chairman Dan Burton . 
. . The precedent Rep. Burton seeks could make the executive branch a 
ground for all sorts of witch hunts by those who second-guess motives 
and judgments of decision-makers''); ``Mr. Burton and Ms. Reno,'' 
Washington Post (Aug. 7, 1998) (``The House Government Reform and 
Oversight Committee's vote yesterday to cite the attorney general in 
contempt of Congress is a dangerous political interference in a law 
enforcement decision that threatens to undermine the Justice 
Department's campaign finance investigation . . . Mr. Burton's approach 
to the matter has been nothing less than thuggish'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 C. Subpoenas for Grand Jury Materials

    Another example of Mr. Burton's inappropriate intrusion 
into prosecutorial matters is the majority's efforts to obtain 
grand jury subpoenas issued by the Justice Department during 
its campaign finance investigation. To obtain these grand jury 
materials, the majority issued a subpoena on March 22, 2000, to 
the Justice Department seeking the grand jury subpoenas issued 
by the Campaign Finance Task Force to the Executive Office of 
the President (EOP), the White House, the DNC, and the RNC. The 
majority also issued a subpoena on March 16, 2000, to the EOP 
asking for grand jury subpoenas provided or served by the 
Campaign Finance Task Force from September 1, 1996, to the 
present.
    The Justice Department responded to the majority's subpoena 
on April 24, stating that it was unable to provide copies of 
grand jury subpoenas because ``[d]isclosure of information as 
to any subpoena is prohibited by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure,'' which protects the secrecy of grand 
jury proceedings.\134\ Despite the Department's concerns, on 
August 3, 2000, the majority proceeded to issue subpoenas to 
the State Department, the Commerce Department, and the DNC 
asking for grand jury subpoenas issued by the Justice 
Department's Campaign Finance Task Force. The majority also did 
not withdraw the subpoena it had issued in March to the EOP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \134\ Letter from Assistant Attorney General Robert Raben to 
Representative Dan Burton (Apr. 24, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These attempts to subpoena grand jury subpoenas were 
improper. They did not recognize longstanding rules that 
protect the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. According to the 
U.S. Supreme Court:

        We consistently have recognized that the proper 
        functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the 
        secrecy of grand jury proceedings. In particular, we 
        have noted several distinct interests served by 
        safeguarding the confidentiality of grand jury 
        proceedings. First, if preindictment proceedings were 
        made public, many prospective witnesses would be 
        hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that 
        those against whom they testify would be aware of that 
        testimony. Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the 
        grand jury would be less likely to testify fully and 
        frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well 
        as to inducements. There also would be the risk that 
        those about to be indicted would flee, or would try to 
        influence individual grand jurors to vote against 
        indictment. Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the 
        proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but 
        exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to 
        public ridicule.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \135\ Douglas Oil Company of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 
441 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The 
court further noted that ``[o]ne of the several interests promoted by 
grand jury secrecy is the protection of the innocent accused from 
disclosure of the accusations made against him before the grand jury.'' 
441 U.S. at 218 (citation omitted).

    The Justice Department appropriately responded to these 
subpoenas by expressing its ``serious concern about the 
Committee's recent practice of subpoenaing public and private 
sector entities to produce copies of grand jury subpoenas.'' 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Department:

        the practice of ``subpoenaing subpoenas'' or otherwise 
        using the congressional subpoena power to shadow the 
        Department's ongoing investigations could undermine 
        effective law enforcement by creating a substantial 
        risk that sensitive and confidential investigative 
        information will be disclosed to targets of 
        investigations and to other persons who might use the 
        information to thwart our law enforcement efforts.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \136\ Letter from Assistant Attorney General Robert Raben to 
Representative Dan Burton (Sept. 25, 2000) (attached as exhibit 16).

    Unfortunately, the majority has failed to withdraw its 
subpoenas or otherwise respond to the Department's 
concerns.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\ The majority report also states, ``As of October 10, 2000, 
the DNC continues to refuse to comply'' with the committee's subpoena 
for grand jury subpoenas. Majority report at v. The majority report 
fails to recognize, however, the DNC's substantial efforts to 
accommodate the committee. On Oct. 10, 2000, attorneys for the DNC met 
with committee staff in an attempt to reach an agreement that balanced 
the committee's oversight interests and the DNC's interest in 
protecting the privacy of individuals who had either appeared before or 
had been investigated by the grand jury. The DNC first offered to make 
all grand jury subpoenas immediately available to committee staff for 
inspection, provided that the DNC could redact the names of those who 
had not been publicly identified with the Campaign Financing Task 
Force's criminal investigation. In a further attempt to satisfy the 
majority's concerns, the DNC's attorneys also made another preliminary 
offer, subject to approval by the DNC. The DNC's attorneys proposed 
that the majority prepare a list of individuals relevant to the 
committee's investigation. The DNC attorneys would then compare that 
list to the grand jury subpoenas and not redact any name that matched, 
regardless of whether that individual had been publicly identified with 
the Justice Department's criminal investigation. The majority rejected 
both offers of accommodation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          III. The Majority's Investigation Has Been Partisan

    During the course of the investigation, Mr. Burton has 
repeatedly alleged that Attorney General Reno's actions are 
marked by ``partisan zeal.'' The report makes the same 
findings, stating that ``it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that the Attorney General has acted politically to benefit the 
President, the Vice President, and her own political party.'' 
\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \138\ Majority report at i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As described above, these allegations are unfounded. They 
are also ironic. The partisanship in this investigation belongs 
to the committee not the Justice Department. For 4 years, Mr. 
Burton has conducted a blatantly partisan investigation. In his 
campaign finance investigation, Mr. Burton has issued over 900 
subpoenas, 99 percent of which involved allegations of 
Democratic abuses. He has also issued over 500 formal requests 
for documents or information relating to the investigation, 
over 98 percent of which also involved allegations of 
Democratic abuses. The committee has deposed or called to 
testify at hearings over 200 witnesses in connection with 
campaign fundraising allegations, 99 percent of whom were 
called to discuss alleged Democratic abuses.
    Editorial boards, columnists, and commentators across the 
country have recognized the partisan nature of the committee's 
investigation. They have called the investigation a ``soap 
opera,'' \139\ a ``House investigation travesty,'' \140\ a 
``sorry partisan spectacle,'' \141\ and a ``witch hunt in the 
House.'' \142\ In a May 1998 editorial entitled, ``The Dan 
Burton Problem,'' the New York Times stated: ``By now even 
Representative Dan Burton ought to recognize that he has become 
an impediment to a serious investigation of the 1996 campaign 
finance scandals. . . . If the House inquiry is to be 
responsible, someone else on Mr. Burton's committee should run 
it.'' \143\ Norman Ornstein, a congressional expert with the 
American Enterprise Institute, stated, ``[F]rom day one, Dan 
Burton did almost everything he could to destroy any chance 
that this would be seen as a bipartisan effort or an attempt to 
build a factual basis.'' \144\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \139\ ``Soap Opera,'' Roll Call (Apr. 27, 1998).
    \140\ ``A House Investigation Travesty,'' New York Times (Apr. 12, 
1997).
    \141\ ``Reno Roast Embarrasses Nobody but Congress,'' Los Angeles 
Times (Dec. 10, 1997).
    \142\ ``The Witch Hunt in the House,'' Albert R. Hunt, Wall Street 
Journal (Apr. 10, 1997).
    \143\ ``The Dan Burton Problem,'' New York Times (May 8, 1998). 
Other editorials include: ``Mr. Burton Should Step Aside,'' Washington 
Post (Mar. 20, 1997); ``Dan Burton Is a Loose Cannon,'' Hartford 
Courant (May 5, 1998); ``Burton Bumbles in Bad Faith,'' San Antonio 
Express-News (May 6, 1998); and ``Mistakes Were Made: Burton Inquiry 
Can't Reach a Credible Conclusion,'' Sacramento Bee (May 11, 1998).
    \144\ ``Another Bump In Burton Panel's Road,'' Washington Post (May 
13, 1998).
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    In particular, the majority's oversight of the Justice 
Department's campaign finance investigation has been marked by 
partisanship. While the Justice Department's investigation is 
examining allegations relating to both Republicans and 
Democrats, the majority has focused on obtaining information 
relating only to the Justice Department's investigation of 
Democratic abuses.
    On April 11, 2000, the majority wrote the Justice 
Department requesting dozens of interview summaries (known as 
FBI ``302s'') relating to Democratic allegations. At a public 
committee meeting on May 3, 2000, Mr. Waxman requested that Mr. 
Burton also ask the Justice Department to produce to the 
committee interview summaries relating to two of the most 
serious allegations of Republican fundraising improprieties: 
(1) potential violations involving former Republican National 
Committee chair Haley Barbour; and (2) potential violations 
involving Majority Whip Tom DeLay. The request reflected an 
attempt by Mr. Waxman to bring some balance to the committee's 
investigation.
    At the May 3 hearing, with the vast majority of committee 
members present, Mr. Burton agreed to subpoena the Justice 
Department for these materials.\145\ Mr. Burton stated, ``The 
subpoena in detail will be issued.'' \146\ Specifically, he 
said that the subpoena would be for the interview summaries 
that the minority requested as well as the documents and 
interview requests of the majority, noting, ``That way, 
everything will be in one subpoena.'' \147\ He further said 
that the subpoena would specify that ``all the documents be 
given jointly to both the majority and minority staff 
simultaneously.'' \148\ In response to a question as to whether 
all the materials subpoenaed had to be produced at once, he 
said: ``It was my understanding that there might be a rolling 
production of these things,'' but that the materials would be 
``given in a timely fashion and in a fair and equitable way.'' 
\149\
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    \145\ See House Committee on Government Reform, hearing on ``White 
House E-mails: Mismanagement of Subpoenaed Record,'' 221-28 (May 3, 
2000) (stenographic record).
    \146\ Id. at 228.
    \147\ Id. at 225.
    \148\ Id. at 226.
    \149\ Id. at 230.
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    However, one week later, Representative Burton wrote 
Representative Waxman and reneged on this commitment.\150\ He 
said that he would not issue a subpoena for interview summaries 
involving Mr. DeLay. He further stated that, with respect to 
interview summaries concerning Mr. Barbour, he would not issue 
a subpoena until ``the Attorney General has complied with all 
currently outstanding subpoenas from the Committee.'' \151\ Mr. 
Burton never issued the subpoena he promised on May 3, 2000.
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    \150\ Letter from Representative Dan Burton to Representative Henry 
Waxman (May 11, 2000) (attached as exhibit 17).
    \151\ Id. Mr. Burton stated several reasons for changing his 
commitment, none of which withstands scrutiny. For example, Mr. Burton 
claimed that Mr. Waxman's request for interview summaries relating to 
Mr. DeLay was not proper because at the time of the request Mr. Waxman 
``failed to disclose'' that the Democratic Congressional Campaign 
Committee (DCCC) was filing a lawsuit against Mr. DeLay. Mr. Burton 
suggested that Mr. Waxman's request had been ``part of a larger, 
coordinated effort driven by the DCCC to pursue politically motivated 
attacks against the Majority Whip.'' This charge was categorically 
untrue. Neither Mr. Waxman nor anyone on his staff involved with the 
subpoena request had knowledge of the DCCC lawsuit until after the May 
3 hearing in which Mr. Waxman made the request. Mr. Burton made this 
charge without asking either Mr. Waxman or his staff about the matter. 
See letter from Representative Henry Waxman to Representative Dan 
Burton (May 12, 2000) (attached as exhibit 18).
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  Mr. Burton's May 11 letter also stated that with respect to the 
interview summaries concerning Mr. Barbour, ``I agreed to issue a 
subpoena for the documents you requested, as long as other Justice 
Department materials already under subpoena are first provided.'' This 
statement mischaracterized Mr. Burton's May 3 commitment, in which he 
agreed to pursue both the majority and minority requests 
``simultaneously.''
  In his May 12 letter responding to Mr. Burton, Mr. Waxman noted that 
Mr. Burton had several options regarding how to proceed with his May 3 
commitment:

      First, you could--and should--have honored your commitment 
      and issued the appropriate subpoena.

      Second, if you were suspicious of whether there was a 
      connection between the DCCC lawsuit and my request for 
      302s, you could have asked me personally whether I had been 
      aware of the lawsuit when I made the request or was 
      coordinating with the DCCC on this matter . . . .

      Another alternative would have been for you to ask your 
      staff to contact my staff to investigate and discuss your 
      concerns relating to issuing the subpoena. . . .

      Alternatively, if you were intent on breaking your 
      commitment regardless of the facts, you could have at least 
      done so in a forthright manner, acknowledging that you had 
      made an agreement you would no longer honor.

      Instead, you chose the worst option possible. Without 
      bothering to consult with me, your May 11 letter reneges on 
      your commitment on the basis of untrue allegations that you 
      did not investigate.

Letter from Representative Henry Waxman to Representative Dan Burton 
(May 12, 2000).
    Unfortunately, this partisan conduct has continued. For 
example, the majority recently subpoenaed the DNC for document 
requests, subpoenas, and interview requests the DNC received 
from the Justice Department,\152\ but has failed to subpoena 
the RNC for similar Justice Department requests to the RNC.
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    \152\ Subpoena duces tecum from Committee on Government Reform to 
Democratic National Committee (Aug. 3, 2000).
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         IV. Accomplishments of the Campaign Finance Task Force

    The Campaign Finance Task Force of the Department of 
Justice was launched in December 1996. Contrary to the 
majority's assertions, the Task Force has been effective.
    At its height, the Task Force was staffed by 126 people, 
including 24 attorneys, 67 agents, and 35 support staff.\153\ 
The Justice Department and the FBI estimated that they spent 
over $31 million on the Task Force through fiscal year 1999 
alone.\154\ Mr. Freeh testified that he believed that he had 
all of the necessary resources to conduct the 
investigation.\155\ Mr. Freeh also testified that ``the FBI is 
not being impeded in any way in conducting our investigation'' 
and that the Task Force's ``marching orders are to go wherever 
the evidence leads them.'' \156\ Further, Mr. La Bella said 
that the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General 
``have told me to pursue the evidence wherever it leads. That 
is what I have done and what I expect the Task Force to 
continue to do.'' \157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \153\ U.S. General Accounting Office, ``Campaign Finance Task 
Force: Problems and Disagreements Initially Hampered Justice's 
Investigation'' (May 2000) (GAO/GGD-00-101BR).
    \154\ See id.
    \155\ Testimony of FBI Director Louis Freeh, House Committee on 
Government Reform, hearings on ``The Current Implementation of the 
Independent Counsel Act,'' 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1152 (Dec. 9-10, 
1997) (H. Rept. 105-89).
    \156\ Testimony of FBI Director Louis Freeh, House Committee on 
Government Reform, hearings on ``The Current Implementation of the 
Independent Counsel Act,'' 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1129 (Dec. 9-10, 
1997) (H. Rept. 105-89).
    \157\ Statement of Charles La Bella (May 3, 1998) (attached as 
exhibit 19).
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    The Task Force has achieved important successes. It has 
prosecuted 25 people.\158\ So far 19 individuals and 1 
corporation have been convicted.\159\
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    \158\ ``Thai Businesswomen Agree to Plead Guilty to Campaign 
Financing Charges,'' U.S. Department of Justice (June 21, 2000) 
(attached as exhibit 20).
    \159\ See id.
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    At bottom, the majority's complaints about Attorney General 
Janet Reno are based on her failure to initiate legal actions 
against the President and the Vice President. But her role is 
not to ``get'' the President or the Vice President. The 
Attorney General's responsibility is to follow the evidence 
where it leads and to apply the law evenhandedly. The record 
before the Committee indicates that she has fulfilled her 
responsibility creditably.

                                   Hon. Henry A. Waxman.
                                   Hon. Tom Lantos.
                                   Hon. Major R. Owens.
                                   Hon. Edolphus Towns.
                                   Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski.
                                   Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney.
                                   Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton.
                                   Hon. Chaka Fattah.
                                   Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.
                                   Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich.
                                   Hon. Rod R. Blagojevich.
                                   Hon. Danny K. Davis.
                                   Hon. John F. Tierney.
                                   Hon. Jim Turner.
                                   Hon. Harold E. Ford, Jr.
                                   Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky.

    [The exhibits referred to follow:]
    

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