a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2005 REBUILDING IRAQ

Actions Needed to 

Improve Use of 

Private Security 

Providers 

GAO-05-737

On August 5, 2005, the PDF file was revised to correct the 

graphic in Figure 7 of the report. The right-most bar was 

increased to represent 4 contracts instead of 3 contracts.
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-737.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-737, a report to 

congressional committees 

July 2005

REBUILDING IRAQ

Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private 

Security Providers 

The civilian U.S. government agencies and reconstruction contractors in Iraq 

that GAO evaluated have obtained security services, such as personal and 

convoy security, from private security providers because providing security 

to them is not the U.S. military’s stated mission. U.S. military forces provide 

security for those Department of Defense (DOD) civilians and contractors 

who directly support the combat mission. In Iraq, the Department of State 

and other federal agencies contract with several private security providers to 

protect their employees. Under their contracts, contractors rebuilding Iraq 

are responsible for providing their own security and have done so by 

awarding subcontracts to private security providers. As of December 2004, 

the agencies and contractors we reviewed had obligated more than $766 

million for private security providers. The contractors’ efforts to obtain 

suitable security providers met with mixed results, as they often found that 

their security provider could not meet their needs. Overall, GAO found that 

contractors replaced their initial security providers on more than half the 

2003 contracts it reviewed. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to 

various factors, including the absence of useful agency guidance. 

While the U.S. military and private security providers have developed a 

cooperative working relationship, actions should be taken to improve its 

effectiveness. The relationship between the military and private security 

providers is one of coordination, not control. Prior to October 2004 

coordination was informal, based on personal contacts, and was 

inconsistent. In October 2004 a Reconstruction Operations Center was 

opened to share intelligence and coordinate military-contractor interactions. 

While military and security providers agreed that coordination has improved, 

two problems remain. First, private security providers continue to report 

incidents between themselves and the military when approaching military 

convoys and checkpoints. Second, military units deploying to Iraq are not 

fully aware of the parties operating on the complex battle space in Iraq and 

what responsibility they have to those parties. 

Despite the significant role played by private security providers in enabling 

reconstruction efforts, neither the Department of State, nor DOD nor the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have complete data on 

the costs of using private security providers. Even at the contract level, the 

agencies generally had only limited information readily available, even 

though agency and contractor officials acknowledged that these costs had 

diverted a considerable amount of reconstruction resources and led to 

canceling or reducing the scope of some projects. For example, in March 

2005, two task orders for reconstruction worth nearly $15 million were 

cancelled to help pay for security at a power plant. GAO found that the cost 

to obtain private security providers and security-related equipment 

accounted for more than 15 percent of contract costs on 8 of the 15 

reconstruction contracts it reviewed. 

The United States is spending 

billions of dollars to reconstruct 

Iraq while combating an insurgency 

that has targeted military and 

contractor personnel and the Iraqi 

people. This environment created a 

need for those rebuilding Iraq to 

obtain security services. GAO 

evaluated the extent to which 

(1) U.S. agencies and contractors 

acquired security services from 

private providers, (2) the U.S. 

military and private security 

providers developed a working 

relationship, and (3) U.S. agencies 

assessed the costs of using private 

security providers on 

reconstruction contracts. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations 

to the Secretary of Defense to 

enhance military procedures to 

reduce incidences of the military 

firing on security providers and to 

provide training to U.S. military 

forces on the role of security 

providers. Also, GAO is making 

recommendations to the 

Secretaries of Defense and State 

and the Administrator, USAID, to 

assist contractors in obtaining 

security services, and to enable 

agencies to better plan for security 

costs in future efforts. The State 

Department disagreed with our 

recommendation to explore 

options to assist contractors in 

obtaining security, citing potential 

liability concerns, and did not take 

a position on our recommendation 

to account and plan for security 

costs. DOD agreed with our 

recommendations. USAID did not 

comment on them. 
Page i GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Security for Civilians and Contractors in Iraq Is Provided by a Mix of 

Military Forces, State Department Security Personnel, and Private 

Security Providers 10

While the Relationship between Security Providers and the Military 

Has Improved, Actions Should Be Taken to Further Improve 

Effectiveness 20

Agencies Have Limited Capabilities to Assess the Cost Impact of 

Using Private Security Providers 29

Expanded Use of Private Security Providers Does Not Appear to Be 

Increasing Attrition among Military Personnel 35

Conclusions 43

Recommendations for Executive Action 43

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 45

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 49

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 58

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State 61

Appendix IV: Comments from U.S. Agency for International 

Development 64

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements 65

Table Table 1: Occupational Stop Loss Dates for the Military Services 38

Figures Figure 1: The Complex Battle Space in Iraq 8

Figure 2: Incidence of Attacks against Civilians and Infrastructure 

Targets between June 2003 and April 2005 15

Figure 3: Number of Security Providers Employed on 

Reconstruction Contracts Awarded in 2003 and Reviewed 

by GAO 17

Figure 4: National Reconstruction Operations Center, Baghdad, 

Iraq 23

Figure 5: Locations of the Regional Reconstruction Operations 

Centers in Iraq 24
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Figure 6: Process for Requesting Assistance through the ROC 26

Figure 7: Percentage of Total Contract Billings Accounted for by 

Security Subcontractor Expenses as of December 31, 

2004 33

Figure 8: Average Attrition Rates for Military Occupational 

Specialties Preferred by Private Security Providers which 

Experienced Increased Attrition in Fiscal Year 2004 39

Figure 9: Army Special Forces Attrition Rates 41

Figure 10: Continuation Rates for Army Enlisted Special Operations 

Personnel with 14 through 19 Years of Service for Fiscal 

Years 2000 through 2004 42

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Abbreviations

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CPA Coalitional Provisional Authority

DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center

DOD Department of Defense

GAO Government Accountability Office

MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq

MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq

PCO Project and Contracting Office

ROC Reconstruction Operations Center

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
Page 1 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 28, 2005 Letr

Congressional Committees

The United States is spending billions of dollars to reconstruct Iraq while at 

the same time is engaged in combating an insurgency that has targeted 

military personnel, contractors, and the Iraqi people. According to the 

Department of Defense (DOD) and other sources, as of June 1, 2005, more 

than 1,600 U.S. and coalition military forces and 200 contractor personnel 

have been killed since major combat operations ended in May 2003. This 

uncertain security environment created a need for U.S. government 

agencies and contractors involved in rebuilding Iraq to obtain substantially 

more security services than is normally the case when operating in other 

countries. Creating a democratic Iraq and rebuilding its infrastructure is a 

U.S. national security and foreign policy priority, and, even without the 

need for enhanced security, is a challenging and complex effort. 

Prior to the conflict, DOD and the U.S. government agencies responsible 

for the reconstruction of Iraq believed that reconstruction would take place 

in an environment with little threat from insurgents or terrorists. By June 

2003 the security situation in Iraq began to worsen and it became clear in 

August 2003, with the bombing of the United Nations complex, that 

insurgents were targeting nonmilitary targets. The killings of four U.S. 

citizens working for a U.S. security provider in Iraq in March 2004 and the 

allegations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison1

 resulted in significant 

congressional concern2 over the use of private security providers in Iraq 

and raised a number of operational, legal, and contracting questions. 

1

 We recently discussed breakdowns in the procurement process when contracting for 

interrogators and other services in Iraq. See GAO, Interagency Contracting: Problems with 

DOD’s and Interior’s Orders to Support Military Operations, GAO-05-201 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005).

2

 These concerns have been expressed in requests from numerous members of Congress 

that the Comptroller General review the operational, legal, and contracting issues involving 

the use of private security providers in Iraq. Congress has subsequently included several 

provisions in legislation designed to improve the management of and support and protection 

provided to contractor personnel who support deployed forces or who are in a combatant 

commander’s area of responsibility. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, section 1205 and 1206 (Oct. 28, 2004) and H.R. 

1815, 109th Cong. title XVI (2005). 
Page 2 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Because of the broad level of interest by Congress in issues dealing with 

Iraq, the Comptroller General initiated this review under his statutory 

authority. Specifically, we evaluated the extent to which (1) U.S. 

government agencies and contractors working in Iraq have acquired 

security services from private providers; (2) the U.S. military and private 

security providers in Iraq have developed a cooperative working 

relationship; and (3) U.S. government agencies assessed the costs 

associated with using private security providers on reconstruction 

contracts. Additionally, we assessed the impact of the increased use of 

private security providers on attrition in key military skills.

To identify the rules and regulations governing and assigning responsibility 

for protecting government and contractor personnel working in Iraq, we 

reviewed policies, regulations, instructions, guidance, and orders issued by 

DOD, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),3

 and other DOD 

components relating to the use of contractors during wartime; orders and 

policies issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) regarding 

contractor operations in Iraq; and Department of State policies regarding 

the protection of U.S. government employees working abroad, including 

the Foreign Affairs Manual. We also interviewed military officials who had 

been stationed in Iraq as well as selected private security providers to 

understand their responsibilities and collaborative working relationship in 

Iraq. To understand the process by which contractors obtained private 

security providers, we selected 16 reconstruction contracts using a nonprobabilistic methodology that considered such factors as the awarding 

agency; the year awarded; the contract’s expected dollar value; and the 

type, nature and location of the reconstruction activity. These 16 contracts 

were awarded by various DOD components, including the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers; the Department of State; and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID). Nine of these contracts were 

awarded in 2003 and 7 were awarded in 2004. As of December 2004, the 

agencies had obligated about $8.6 billion on these contracts. We also 

obtained and reviewed six contracts that had been awarded the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, the Department of State, USAID, and by Army 

activities on behalf of the CPA for the protection of their personnel and 

facilities in Iraq. We then compared the type of security-related 

requirements incorporated within U.S. government contracts with those 

incorporated into contracts awarded to prime reconstruction contractors 

and, in turn, to subcontracts with security providers. We interviewed 

3

 CENTCOM is the U.S. military command responsible for prosecuting the war in Iraq. 
Page 3 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

agency and contractor officials, reviewed agency guidance provided to the 

contractors, reviewed the reconstruction contracts and security 

subcontracts, and analyzed the vouchers and other billing information 

submitted by the reconstruction contractors and security providers. To 

assess the impact on military attrition caused by the use of private security 

providers we obtained and analyzed DOD attrition data and spoke with 

private security providers and representatives of the U.S. Special 

Operations Command and the military services. We determined that the 

information and data discussed in this report were sufficiently reliable for 

the purposes of the report. Appendix I contains more detail on our scope 

and methodology. We conducted our review from May 2004 to June 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief All but one of the civilian U.S. government agencies and reconstruction 

contractors we evaluated that are operating in Iraq have obtained security 

services from private security providers. As of December 2004, the 

agencies and contractors we reviewed had obligated more than $766 

million for private security providers. The use of private security providers 

reflects the uncertain security environment that was, and is still being 

encountered in Iraq, as well as the fact that providing security for agencies 

and contractors is not part of the U.S. military’s stated mission. U.S. 

military forces in Iraq provide security only for those DOD civilians and 

contractors who directly support the military’s mission. In Iraq, as 

elsewhere, the U.S. Ambassador, as Chief of Mission, has overall 

responsibility for the security of U.S. government executive branch 

employees, except for those under the force protection of the combatant 

commander. However, individual U.S. government agencies have had to 

arrange for their own security services. As neither DOD nor the 

Department of State is responsible for providing security to reconstruction 

contractors, the terms of their contracts require reconstruction contractors 

to provide for their own security; and, they typically have done so by 

awarding subcontracts to private security providers. The contractors’ 

efforts to obtain suitable security providers met with mixed results, as 

many subsequently found that their initial security providers could not 

meet their needs. Overall, we found that contractors replaced their 

security providers on five of the eight reconstruction contracts awarded in 

2003 that we reviewed.4

 Contractor officials attributed this turnover to 

4

 On one additional 2003 contract, the contractor provided its own security.
Page 4 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

various factors, including their lack of knowledge of the security market 

and of the potential security providers, and the absence of useful agency 

guidance. 

Although the U.S. military and private security providers generally have 

developed a cooperative working relationship, actions can be taken to 

further improve its effectiveness. The relationship between the military in 

Iraq and employees of private security providers is one of coordination and 

cooperation, not control. Both U.S. Central Command officials and military 

personnel previously stationed in Iraq told us that there is no command and 

control relationship between the military and private security provider 

employees. At the same time, military and private security provider 

employees recognize the need to coordinate their actions. Prior to October 

2004, coordination was informal, based on personal contacts often initiated 

by the contractors, and it was inconsistent. In October 2004, the Project 

and Contracting Office opened the Reconstruction Operations Center to 

share intelligence and coordinate military contractor interactions. While 

providers and the military agree that coordination has improved since the 

advent of the operations center, some problems remain. First, private 

security providers continue to report incidents occurring between 

themselves and the military when they approach military convoys and 

checkpoints. Second, the military may not have a clear understanding of 

the role of contractors, including private security providers, in Iraq and of 

the implications of having private security providers on the battle space.

Despite the significant role played by private security providers in enabling 

reconstruction efforts to proceed, neither the Department of State, nor 

DOD, nor USAID—the principal agencies responsible for Iraq 

reconstruction efforts—have complete data on the costs associated with 

using private security providers. In turn, the Department of State’s 

quarterly report to Congress, which describes the status of projects, 

initiatives, and funding dedicated to Iraq reconstruction, does not provide 

information on the costs associated with using private security providers. 

Our discussions with agency officials found that the financial management 

and information systems used to prepare the reports are not set up to track 

security costs that are incurred under reconstruction contracts. Even at 

the contract level, the agencies generally had only limited information 

readily available on the costs associated with private security providers. 

While agencies do not specifically track such costs, both agency and 

contractor officials acknowledged that security costs had diverted a 

considerable amount of reconstruction resources and led to canceling or 

reducing the scope of certain reconstruction projects. For example, in 
Page 5 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

March 2005, USAID cancelled two electrical power generation-related task 

orders totaling nearly $15 million to help pay for increased security costs 

being incurred at another power generation project in southern Baghdad. 

Our review of 16 reconstruction contracts found that the cost to obtain 

private security providers and security-related equipment can be 

considerable. Overall, these costs accounted for more than 15 percent on 8 

of the 15 reconstruction contracts for which data were available. On only 4 

of those 8 contracts, however, did the agencies receive security cost 

information. Agency officials noted that increased costs or delays in 

reconstruction projects also reflect non-security-related factors, such as 

changes in planned funding levels or higher material costs. 

While both Special Forces and military police officials believe that attrition 

is increasing in their military specialties, partially because of increased 

employment opportunities with private security providers, our review of 

DOD data shows that the attrition levels in fiscal year 2004 increased 

compared to fiscal years 2002 and 2003, but are similar to the levels seen in 

fiscal years 2000 and 2001, prior to the establishment of stop loss.5

 This 

similarity indicates that former military members in the Special Forces and 

military police communities are leaving in the same proportions as before 

the attacks of September 11, 2001 but, according to Army officials, have a 

wider range of employment opportunities today. However, given that stop 

loss policies depress attrition rates, we are unable to determine whether 

the increase in attrition rates in fiscal year 2004 compared to fiscal years 

2002 and 2003 was due to the end of stop loss or to actual increases in 

attrition. Moreover, DOD data does not indicate why personnel are leaving 

the military—only the fact that they are doing so. 

We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to enhance 

military procedures to reduce incidences of the military firing on private 

security providers and provide training to U.S. military forces on the role of 

private security providers in Iraq. Additionally, we are making 

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and 

the Administrator, USAID, which would enable contractors to obtain 

adequate security services, as well as enable government agencies to more 

efficiently plan for security costs in future reconstruction efforts. 

5

 Stop loss prevents servicemembers from leaving the service even though they may have 

reached the end of their enlistment or service obligation. 
Page 6 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

DOD agreed with each of the recommendations, noting that it welcomed 

our assistance in improving how DOD and its contractors can plan for and 

effectively execute contracts in a complex and changeable security 

environment. DOD’s comments appear in appendix II. 

The Department of State disagreed with our recommendation to explore 

options to assist contractors in obtaining private security services, citing 

concerns that the government could be held liable for performance failures 

and noting it was unclear that a government-managed security contractor 

program would result in enhanced contractor security. While our work 

found that contractors had difficulty in obtaining security providers that 

met their needs and that they would have benefited from the agencies’ 

assistance, we did not recommend a particular course of action nor 

recommend a government-managed security program. Rather, we 

recommended that the Department, working jointly with DOD and USAID, 

explore options to assist contractors that are unfamiliar with obtaining the 

type of security services needed in Iraq. Such an effort would necessarily 

entail a thorough assessment of the advantages, disadvantages and risk 

mitigation strategies of the potential options. The Department did not 

indicate whether it agreed with our recommendation to establish a means 

to account and plan for security costs. The Department’s comments appear 

in appendix III. 

USAID found the report factually correct, but did not comment on the 

recommendations. USAID’s letter appears in appendix IV.

Background The United States, along with its coalition partners and various 

international organizations and donors, has continued to support efforts to 

rebuild Iraq in the aftermath of the war that replaced Iraq’s previous 

regime. From April 2003 to June 28, 2004, the CPA served as Iraq’s interim 

government and was responsible for overseeing, directing, coordinating, 

and approving rebuilding efforts. With the establishment of Iraq’s interim 

government, the CPA ceased to exist and its responsibilities were 

transferred to the Iraqi government or to other U.S. agencies. The 

Department of State is now responsible for overseeing U.S. efforts to 
Page 7 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

rebuild Iraq. DOD’s Project and Contracting Office (PCO)6 and the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers have played a significant role in awarding and 

managing reconstruction contracts. USAID has been responsible for 

various reconstruction and developmental assistance efforts, including 

those related to capital construction projects, local governance, economic 

development, education, and public health. 

As figure 1 demonstrates, the battle space in Iraq can best be described as 

complex. A complex battle space is one where military forces, civilian U.S. 

government agencies, international organizations, contractors, 

nongovernmental organizations, and the local population share the same 

geographical area.

6

 In May 2004, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive 36, which 

established the PCO as a temporary organization within DOD. The PCO provides 

acquisition and project management support for the reconstruction effort in Iraq. PCO 

personnel in Iraq are permanently or temporarily assigned under the Chief of Mission 

authority. 
Page 8 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Figure 1: The Complex Battle Space in Iraq

Included on the complex battle space are private security providers. While 

there is no mechanism in place to track the number of private security 

providers doing business in Iraq or the number of people working as 

private security employees, DOD estimates that there are at least 60 private 

security providers working in Iraq with perhaps as many as 25,000 

employees. The providers may be U.S. or foreign companies and their 

staffs are likely to be drawn from various countries, including the United 

States, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Nepal, Sri Lanka, or Fiji, and may 

Multinational

forces

U.S. military

forces

Reconstruction

contractors

Project and

Contracting

Office

Private security

providers

Contractors

accompanying

the force

SECURITY

USAID

State

Department

Source: GAO.

Iraq
Page 9 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

include Kurds and Arabs from Iraq. Generally, private security providers 

provide the following services:

• Static security – security for housing areas and work sites.

• Personal security details – security for high-ranking U.S. officials. 

• Security escorts – security for government employees, contractor 

employees, or others as they move through Iraq.

• Convoy security – security for vehicles and their occupants as they 

make their way into Iraq or within Iraq. 

• Security advice and planning.

The CPA issued a number of orders or memoranda to regulate private 

security providers and their employees working in Iraq. Among these are 

CPA Order number 3, (Revised)(Amended) which described the types of 

weapons that can be used by private security providers; CPA Order number 

17 (Revised), which stated that contractors (including private security 

providers) will generally be immune from the Iraqi legal process for acts 

performed in accordance with the terms and conditions of their contracts; 

and CPA memorandum number 17, which stated that private security 

providers and their employees must be registered and licensed by the 

government of Iraq. 

According to security industry representatives we contacted, there are no 

established U.S. or international standards that identify security provider 

qualifications in such areas as training and experience requirements, 

weapons qualifications, and similar skills that are applicable for the type of 

security needed in Iraq. Some security industry associations and 

companies have discussed the need for and desirability of establishing 

standards, but as of March 2005 such efforts are only in the preliminary 

stages of development.
Page 10 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Security for Civilians 

and Contractors in Iraq 

Is Provided by a Mix of 

Military Forces, State 

Department Security 

Personnel, and Private 

Security Providers

U.S. civilian government agencies and reconstruction contractors have had 

to contract with private security providers because it is not part of the U.S. 

military’s stated mission to provide security to these organizations. U.S. 

forces in Iraq provide security to contractors and DOD civilians who 

support military operations. The Ambassador is charged with generally 

ensuring the security of most executive branch employees in Iraq. 

Government agencies have contracted with a number of private security 

providers to provide personnel, escort, and site security. Reconstruction 

contractors are generally responsible for providing for their own security 

according to the terms of their contracts, and they have generally done so 

by contracting with private security providers. The contractors’ efforts to 

obtain suitable security providers have met with mixed results. More than 

half of the contractors awarded contracts in 2003 replaced their security 

providers. Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors, 

including the contractors’ need to acquire security services quickly, their 

lack of knowledge of the security market and potential security providers 

available to provide the type of security services required in Iraq, and the 

absence of useful agency guidance. Finally, while the U.S. military is not 

responsible for providing security for civilian agencies and reconstruction 

contractors, it does provide some services, such as emergency medical 

support, to U.S. government-funded contractors. 

The U.S. Military Provides 

Security for Civilians and 

Contractors Who Deploy 

with the Force

The stated mission of U.S. military forces in Iraq is to establish and 

maintain a secure environment, allow the continuance of relief and 

reconstruction efforts, and improve the training and capabilities of the Iraq 

Security Forces. As part of this mission, U.S. forces in Iraq provide security 

for DOD civilians who deploy with the force, non-DOD U.S. government 

employees who are embedded with the combat forces and contractors who 

deploy with the combat force. Among the contractors who deploy with the 

force are those that provide maintenance for weapon systems, those who 

provide linguistic and intelligence support to combat forces, and those who 

provide logistics support. Contractors who deploy with the force generally 

live with and directly support U.S. military forces and receive governmentfurnished support similar to that provided to DOD civilians. 

According to CENTCOM officials, the military uses soldiers rather than 

private security providers to provide security to contractors, civilians, 

facilities, or convoys which support combat operations because of 

concerns regarding the status of security personnel under the law of 

international armed conflict. This body of law considers contractors who 
Page 11 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

deploy with the force generally to be noncombatant civilians 

accompanying the force who may not take a direct part in hostilities. 

CENTCOM is concerned that using armed private security employees to 

protect clearly military activities would risk a change in status for these 

contractors from noncombatants to illegal combatants. Thus, the private 

security employees could lose the protections otherwise granted 

contractors accompanying the force under international law. 

At the time we published our report, DOD was in the process of 

establishing its first departmentwide policy on the military’s security 

responsibilities for contractor personnel. The draft directive and 

instruction specify that the military shall develop a security plan for 

protection of contractor personnel and the contracting officer shall include 

in the contract the level of protection to be provided to contractor 

personnel. In appropriate cases, the combatant commander shall provide 

security through military means, commensurate with security provided 

DOD civilians. In May 2005, DOD also issued a new standard contract 

clause in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 

(DFARS), to be included in all DOD contracts involving support to 

deployed forces stating that the Combatant Commander (for example, the 

CENTCOM Commander) will develop a security plan to provide protection, 

through military means, of contractor personnel engaged in the theater of 

operations unless the terms of the contract place the responsibility with 

another party.7

 Prior to the issuance of the new contract clause, the Army’s 

policy expressly required Army commanders to provide security for 

deployed contractors, while the Air Force’s policy gave the Air Force the 

option of whether or not to provide force protection to Air Force 

contractors. It is important to note, however, that the proposed DOD 

departmentwide policy, procedures and standard contract clause do not 

cover non-DOD government contractors who may be in a military theater 

of operations. As discussed in the following, these contractors are 

responsible for providing their own security.8

7

 DFARS Subpart 225.74.

8

 In response to public comments on the proposed new DFARS clause for contractor 

personnel supporting a force outside the United States, DOD stated that the new clause 

does not apply to nation building efforts such as the reconstruction of Iraq. See 70 Fed. Reg.

23791. 
Page 12 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Civilian U.S. Government 

Agencies Provide for Their 

Own Security in Iraq 

The State Department is responsible for the security of most of the 

executive-branch U.S. Government employees located in Iraq.9 According 

to the President’s Letter of Instruction, the U.S. Ambassador, as Chief of 

Mission, is tasked by the President with full responsibility for the safety of 

all United States government personnel on official duty abroad except 

those under the security protection of a combatant commander or on the 

staff of an international organization. The embassy’s Regional Security 

Officer is the Chief of Mission’s focal point for security issues and as such 

establishes specific security policies and procedures for all executive 

branch personnel who fall under the Chief of Mission’s security 

responsibility.

In June 2004, representatives10 from the Department of State and DOD 

signed two memoranda of agreement to clarify each department’s security 

responsibilities in Iraq. Among other things the agreements specify that

• In general, the Chief of Mission is responsible for the physical security, 

equipment, and personnel protective services for U.S. Mission Iraq;11

• The Commander, CENTCOM is responsible for providing for the 

security of the International Zone as well as regional embassy branch 

offices throughout Iraq;

• Military capabilities may be requested by the Chief of Mission to provide 

physical security, equipment, and personal protective services only 

when security requirements exceed available Marine Security Guard 

Detachment, Department of State Diplomatic Security Service, and 

Department of State contracted security support capabilities;

9

 We recently discussed the Department’s efforts to protect U.S. officials working abroad. 

See GAO, Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures 

to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies, GAO-05-642 

(Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005). 

10 One memorandum was signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy 

Secretary of State, the second was signed by the Ambassador to Iraq and the Combatant 

Commander, U.S. Central Command. The first memorandum deals with security assistance, 

the second with security responsibilities. 

11 All executive branch agencies in Iraq are part of U.S. Mission Iraq except those which fall 

under the command of the CENTCOM commander. 
Page 13 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

• U.S. forces will provide force protection and Quick Reaction Force 

support outside the International Zone, to the extent possible, for 

Embassy personnel and activities; and

• The Ambassador has security responsibility for DOD personnel under 

the authority of the Chief of Mission. This includes the Marine Security 

Detachment and personnel working for the PCO. 

In Iraq, the State Department, USAID, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

and the CPA12 contracted with commercial firms to provide security. Our 

review of six agency-awarded security contracts, awarded between August 

2003 and May 2004, showed that as of December 31, 2004, the agencies had 

obligated nearly $456 million on these contracts. In turn, the private 

security providers had billed the agencies about $315 million by that date 

for providing various services, including personal security details; security 

guards; communications; and security management. The companies 

providing security for U.S. government agencies may be U.S. or foreign. 

For example, while USAID contracted with a U.S. firm, the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers and the PCO are using British companies to meet their 

security requirements. Security for the Ambassador is provided by a U.S. 

company, and only U.S. citizens are used to provide protection. 

Security providers who provide security for executive branch employees 

follow the procedures and policies established by the Regional Security 

Officer. For example, one security provider told us that the Regional 

Security Officer recently increased the number of cars required for moving 

people within Iraq. The provider’s representative told us that they were 

obligated to comply with the Regional Security Officer’s instructions even 

though the contract was not awarded by the State Department and the 

company does not provide security for State Department personnel.

Contractors Rebuilding Iraq 

Obtained Their Own 

Security with Little 

Assistance from the 

Agencies 

Contractors engaged in reconstruction efforts were generally required to 

provide for their own security, and they have done so by awarding 

subcontracts to private security providers. Contractors did not anticipate 

the level of violence eventually encountered in Iraq and found themselves 

needing to quickly obtain security for their personnel, lodgings, and work 

sites. As of December 31, 2004, our review of 15 reconstruction contracts 

12 A U.S. Army contracting activity awarded several security contracts on behalf of the CPA.
Page 14 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

for which we had data found that the contractors had obligated more than 

$310 million on security subcontracts, and in turn, the security providers 

had billed the contractors more than $287 million. The contractors’ efforts 

to obtain suitable security providers met with mixed results, as many 

subsequently found that their security provider could not meet their needs. 

Overall, we found that contractors replaced their security providers on five 

of the eight reconstruction contracts awarded in 2003 that we reviewed.13 

This was attributable, in part, to the contractors’ need to acquire security 

services quickly, their lack of knowledge of the security market and 

potential security providers available for the type of security services 

required for Iraq, and the absence of useful agency guidance. Information 

reflected in the agencies’ own contracts for security, such as training and 

weapons qualifications requirements, could have assisted the contractors 

in identifying potential criteria for evaluating security providers and in 

structuring their subcontracts.

Agency officials expected that the post-conflict environment in Iraq would 

be relatively benign and would allow for the almost immediate beginning of 

reconstruction efforts. During a discussion with DOD we were told that 

this expectation was based on determinations made at the most senior 

levels of the executive branch and the contracting officials were bound to 

reflect that expectation in their requests for proposals. Consequently, they 

made few or no plans for any other condition. Reconstruction contractors 

shared this perspective, relying upon the language in the agency requests 

for proposals and the comments of agency representatives at pre-proposal 

and other meetings. Our discussions with contractor officials found that 

they anticipated providing for only a minimal level of security under their 

contracts, such as hiring guards to prevent theft and looting at residential 

and work sites. In one case, the contractor expected that the military would 

provide security for its personnel.

Our review of the agencies’ request for proposals and other documents 

found that they were consistent with this expectation. For example, our 

review of five contracts awarded by late July 2003, including four awarded 

by USAID and one awarded by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, found 

that 

• USAID’s requests for proposals instructed the contractors that work 

was to begin only when a permissive environment existed. Contractors 

13 On one additional 2003 contract, the contractor provided its own security.
Page 15 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

were given little guidance concerning security for their personnel and 

facilities and were not asked to estimate security costs as part of their 

proposals. 

• The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ request for proposal noted that the 

military was expected to provide security for the contractor and, thus, 

the contractor was not required to propose any security costs.

According to agency and contractor officials, the Iraqi security 

environment began to deteriorate by June 2003, although two contractors 

noted that the bombing of the United Nations compound in August 2003 

made it apparent that the insurgency was beginning to target nonmilitary 

targets (see figure 2). 

Figure 2: Incidence of Attacks against Civilians and Infrastructure Targets between June 2003 and April 2005

Number of reported incidences

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Year

Infrastructure

Civilians

Jun.

Jul. 

Aug.

Sep.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

MayJun.

Jul.

Aug.

Sep.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

2003 2004 2005

Source: GAO Analysis of data supplied by DOD.
Page 16 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Contractor officials told us that as the security environment worsened they 

unexpectedly found themselves in immediate need of enhanced security 

services. These officials told us that they received little guidance from the 

agencies relative to possible security providers. We found that the 

contractors’ efforts to obtain security providers often met with mixed 

results. For example:

• One contractor, awarded a contract by the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, expected that the U.S. military would provide security for its 

personnel. That contractor expressed concern, however, that the 

military protection being provided was insufficient to ensure its 

employees’ safety and to allow for the performance of its mission and 

subsequently stopped work at one of its locations. In June 2003, the 

Army finally told the contractor that it did not have adequate forces to 

continue to provide security as promised, and advised the contractor to 

acquire its own security. Following a limited competition,14 the 

contractor awarded a subcontract to a security provider in June 2003. In 

this case, the contractor has been satisfied with the services provided 

and retained the security provider when the contractor was 

subsequently awarded another reconstruction contract in June 2004. 

• One USAID reconstruction contractor told us it quickly awarded a noncompetitive subcontract to a security provider in July 2003. Within 

three months, the security company notified the reconstruction 

contractor that it was pulling its employees out of the country. As a 

former prisoner-transport service firm trying to expand into the 

protective services area, it discovered it lacked sufficient capacity to 

fulfill its contract requirements in Iraq. The reconstruction contractor 

subsequently conducted a competition among security providers 

already operating in Iraq to meet its needs. 

• Another reconstruction contractor initially hired a security service 

provider in October 2003. A contractor official stated that it soon 

became apparent that the security provider did not have the capacity to 

meet its security needs. As a result, the contractor awarded another 

subcontract, on a sole-source basis, to a security provider to augment 

the security services provided to its personnel. 

14 Pursuant to FAR Part 44, subcontracts are generally required to be awarded competitively, 

to the maximum practicable extent. The contractor prepared a justification, which was, in 

turn, approved by the contracting office.
Page 17 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

• Three of the reconstruction contractors we reviewed hired a newly 

established security provider company that was marketing itself in Iraq 

in mid- to late 2003. Officials representing one contractor told us that the 

provider was the only known provider capable of meeting their needs; 

officials for another contractor told us that they selected the provider 

based, in part, on its reputation. Each of the contractors, however, for 

various reasons, replaced the security provider. Subsequently, this 

security provider has been suspended from receiving further 

government contracts due to allegations of fraudulent billing practices. 

Overall, we found that five of the eight reconstruction contractors that 

were awarded contracts in 2003 that we reviewed replaced their initial or 

second security provider with another company, while in other cases, the 

contractors needed to augment the security services provided by their 

initial provider. As shown in figure 3, two contractors have awarded up to 

four contracts for security services. 

Figure 3: Number of Security Providers Employed on Reconstruction Contracts 

Awarded in 2003 and Reviewed by GAO

Providers

0

1

2

3

4

5

H

Contract

Security providers retained

Security providers not retained

A B C D E F G

Source: GAO analysis of security provider subcontracts provided by reconstruction contractors.
Page 18 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Contractor officials attributed this turnover to various factors, including 

the urgent need to obtain security, the increasing threat level, their lack of 

knowledge of potential sources and the security market, and the absence of 

useful agency guidance. In this latter regard, the detailed standards and 

requirements in their own agency security contracts may have provided 

useful assistance to reconstruction contractors in identifying potential 

criteria for evaluating security providers and in structuring their 

subcontracts. For example, the USAID security services contract, awarded 

in August 2003, contained

• a detailed and required organization structure to be used by the 

contractor, with titles, duties and responsibilities of various levels of 

security providers specified; 

• requirements for background checks on potential employees and 

provisions for agency approval and acceptance of those employees; 

• detailed standards of conduct for contractor employees; 

• language, health, and training requirements; 

• weapons capability requirements; and

• instructions regarding providing armored vehicles.15 

Our review of five other agency security contracts awarded directly to 

private security providers from December 2003 through May 2004 for the 

protection of agency personnel in Iraq found that, to varying degrees, most 

of the cited areas were addressed. Conversely, our review of the 

subcontracts awarded by the reconstruction contractors to their security 

providers generally contained far less information. 

According to most contractor officials with whom we spoke, information 

similar to that included in the agency’s contracts would have assisted them 

in defining their security needs and structuring their security subcontracts. 

15 USAID awarded its security contract on a sole-source basis citing an urgent and 

compelling need. In January 2005, the USAID Inspector General found, however, that in its 

efforts to award the contract quickly, USAID failed to adequately document the selection of 

the security provider and the purchase of armored vehicles that did not meet U.S. 

government standards. USAID generally agreed with the Inspector General’s findings and is 

taking corrective actions.
Page 19 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Some contractor officials also noted that agency assistance with identifying 

and vetting potential security provider companies would have been very 

useful or would be useful in future similar situations. They discussed the 

possibility of a qualified vendors list, or, if time permitted, the 

establishment of a multiple award schedule of qualified security providers, 

which contractors could use to quickly contract for their security needs 

through competitive task orders.16

Agency officials believed that information regarding personnel 

qualifications and competent providers could be made available to 

contractor personnel in future efforts, especially if the information was 

provided for the contractor’s consideration, rather than being a contract 

requirement. For example, one agency official noted that his agency’s 

requests for proposals for security services are publicly available. Some 

officials believed that making information a contractual requirement would 

infringe upon the contractor’s privity of contract with its subcontractors 

and might pose a potential government liability should such requirements 

later prove inadequate. Other officials believed that it should be the 

contractor’s responsibility to research and decide for itself its own needs 

and sources of security services without assistance from the government.

DOD Provides Emergency 

Quick Reaction Forces and 

Other Services to 

Contractors in Iraq 

According to U.S. officials and contractor personnel we interviewed, U.S. 

military forces in Iraq will provide, when assets are available, emergency 

quick reaction forces to assist contractors who are engaged in hostile fire 

situations. The military is also providing other support services to U.S. 

government-funded contractors, to include private security providers. For 

example, U.S. military forces will assist with the recovery and return of 

contractor personnel who have been kidnapped or held hostage. 

Additionally, the U.S. military also provides medical services above the 

primary care level to contractors. These services include hospitalization, 

as well as laboratory and pharmaceutical services, dental services, and 

evacuation services, should the patient require them. In addition, the 

military is providing medical support to private citizens, third country 

nationals, and foreign nationals when necessary to save life, limb, or eyesight. Finally, contractors are entitled to receive mortuary affairs services. 

DOD is providing these services pursuant to authorities under Title 10, 

16 For example, the General Services Administration currently maintains a multiple award 

schedule that federal agencies can use to obtain various types of security services within the 

United States.
Page 20 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

United States Code, as well as a variety of DOD Directives, a June 2004 

support agreement between DOD and the Department of State, National 

Security Presidential Directive 36 (which governs the operations of the U.S. 

government in Iraq) and specific contract provisions. 

While the Relationship 

between Security 

Providers and the 

Military Has Improved, 

Actions Should Be 

Taken to Further 

Improve Effectiveness

The military and the private security providers in Iraq have an evolving 

relationship based on cooperation and coordination of activities and the 

desire to work from a common operating picture. However, U.S. forces in 

Iraq do not have a command and control relationship with private security 

providers or their employees. Initially, coordination between the military 

and private security providers was informal. However, since the advent of 

the Reconstruction Operations Center in October 2004, coordination has 

evolved into a structured and formalized process. While contractors and 

the military agree that coordination has improved, some problems remain. 

First, private security providers continue to report incidents between 

themselves and the military when approaching military convoys and 

checkpoints. Second, military units may not have a clear understanding of 

the role of contractors, including private security providers, in Iraq or of 

the implications of having private security providers in the battle space. 

U.S. Forces Do Not Have 

Command and Control over 

Private Security Providers 

Working In Iraq

According to CENTCOM officials and military personnel who have been 

stationed in Iraq, U.S. military forces in Iraq do not have a command and 

control relationship with private security providers or their employees. 

According to a DOD report17 on private security providers working in Iraq, 

U.S. military forces in Iraq have no command and control over private 

security providers because neither the combatant commander nor his 

17 DOD report to Congressional Defense Committees as required by the Ronald W. Reagan 

National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, section 1206 

(Oct. 28, 2004).
Page 21 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

forces have a contractual relationship with the security providers.18

Instead, military and security provider personnel who served in Iraq 

described a relationship of informal coordination, where the military and 

private security providers meet periodically to share information and 

coordinate and resolve conflicts in operations.

Despite a lack of command and control over private security providers and 

their employees, commanders always have authority over contractor 

personnel, including private security provider personnel, when they enter a 

U.S. military installation. Commanders are considered to have inherent 

authority to protect the health and safety, welfare, and discipline of their 

troops and installation.19 This authority allows the commander to establish 

the rules and regulations in effect at each installation. For example, an 

installation commander may determine traffic regulations, weapons 

policies, force protection procedures, and visitor escort policies. 

Contractors, including private security providers, who fail to follow the 

military’s rules and regulations while they are on the installation can be 

prohibited from entering the installation and using its facilities. As an 

example, one Army official told us that his unit had barred some private 

security employees from using the unit’s dining facilities because the 

private security employees insisted on carrying loaded weapons into the 

dining facility. The unit did not allow loaded weapons in the dining facility 

for safety reasons. 

18 Although DOD does not have an explicit command and control relationship with private 

security providers, there are sanctions that can be imposed in response to acts of 

misconduct. DOD points out in its report to Congress that private security providers, in the 

absence of a formal declaration of war by Congress, are generally not subject to prosecution 

under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but they remain subject to prosecution by the 

Department of Justice under applicable U.S. federal laws, to include the Military 

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (18 U.S.C. 3261), the special maritime and territorial 

jurisdiction provisions of 18 U.S.C. 7(9), and the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. 2441). To date, 

DOD reports that there have been no disciplinary actions brought against private security 

providers for acts of criminal misconduct.

19 See Department of Defense Directive 5200.8, Security of DOD Installations and Resources 

(Apr. 25, 1991).
Page 22 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Coordination Between the 

Military and Private Security 

Providers in Iraq Has 

Evolved Since the Beginning 

of Reconstruction

Coordination between the military and the private security providers has 

evolved from an informal coordination based on personal relationships to a 

more structured, although voluntary, mechanism established by the Project 

and Contracting Office (PCO). According to military officials, contractors, 

and security providers coordination between the military and security 

providers was initially done informally. When a private security provider 

arrived in a unit’s area of operation, the security provider would try to meet 

with key officials of the unit and establish a relationship. A private security 

provider we spoke with told us that the results of this informal 

coordination varied based on the individual personalities of the military 

and provider personnel. According to some security providers, although 

many military commanders were very interested in establishing a 

relationship with the security providers, others were not. Additionally, 

coordination was inconsistent. For example, one officer who had served 

with the 4th Infantry Division in Iraq told us that coordination in his area 

was mixed. According to the officer, some security providers, such as the 

one providing security for the Iraqi currency exchange program, would 

always coordinate with the division before moving through the division’s 

area of operations but another contractor rarely coordinated with the 

division. This is similar to information we obtained from officials of the 

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment. One officer from one of the regiment’s 

squadrons told us that contractors that worked within the unit’s area of 

operation generally coordinated with the regiment while those who were 

traveling in or through his unit’s area of operation generally did not 

coordinate with the regiment. He also told us that on one occasion security 

providers escorted the CPA administrator into their area of operation 

without the squadron’s knowledge and while the squadron was conducting 

an operation in Najaf. According to the officer, a fire fight broke out at the 

CPA administrator’s location and the squadron had to send troops to rescue 

the CPA administrator and his party. This had a significant impact on its 

operation, according to the officer. Another officer, who served on the 

Combined Joint Task Force-720 staff, told of instances when contractors 

died and the division commander did not know that the contractors were 

operating in his area of operations until he was instructed to recover the 

bodies. Finally, according to a military officer serving with the PCO at the 

time of our review, the genesis of the Reconstruction Operations Center 

20 Combined Joint Task Force-7 was a subordinate command of CENTCOM and was 

responsible for the daily prosecution of the war. It was succeeded by Multi National ForceIraq (MNF-I) in May 2004.
Page 23 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

(ROC) (discussed next) was the need to improve coordination between 

contractors and the major subordinate commanders.

The ROC serves as the interface between the military and the contractors 

in Iraq and is located within the PCO. In May 2004, the Army awarded a 

contract to a private security provider to provide security for PCO 

personnel and to operate the ROC, shown in figure 4. The goal of the ROC, 

which became operational in October 2004, is to provide situational 

awareness, develop a common operating picture for contractors and the 

military, and facilitate coordination between the military and contractors. 

Figure 4: National Reconstruction Operations Center, Baghdad, Iraq 

The national ROC is located in Baghdad and six regional centers are colocated with the military’s major subordinate commands, to enhance 

coordination between the military and the private security providers. 

Figure 5 shows the locations of the regional centers. 

Source: Used with permission of the ROC contractor and the PCO.
Page 24 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Figure 5: Locations of the Regional Reconstruction Operations Centers in Iraq

Mosul

Tikrit

Baghdad

Fallujah (Camp Victory)

Basra

Diwaniya

Source: DOD.
Page 25 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Participation in the ROC is voluntary (although some DOD officials told us 

that participation should be mandatory) and is open (at no cost) to all U.S. 

government agencies, contractors, and nongovernmental organizations 

operating in Iraq. The ROC and the regional centers are staffed with a 

combination of military, U.S. government civilian, and contractor personnel 

who provide a number of services for private security providers and others. 

Among the services the ROC provides are:

• Intelligence information. The military provides unclassified intelligence 

information to the ROC for dissemination to contractors. Intelligence 

information is updated daily and information is available on a passwordprotected Web site and through daily intelligence briefings. In addition, 

contractors can request specific threat assessments on future building 

sites and planned vehicle routes. Contractors use the ROC to pass on 

information about incidents and threats to coalition forces as well. 

• Military assistance. The ROC serves as the 911 for contractors who 

need military assistance. Contractors who need assistance contact 

either the national ROC or the regional ROCs and ROC personnel 

contact the closest military unit and ask it to provide assistance. 

Assistance, such as a quick reaction force or medical assistance, is 

provided if military assets are available. Security providers we spoke 

with said that they rarely call for a quick reaction force because 

incidents with insurgents are usually over within a matter of minutes but 

on some occasions the quick reaction forces have proved to be very 

helpful. For example, one after action report described an incident in 

February 2005 in which a private security team was ambushed by 20 

insurgents and attacked by small arms fire and three rocket-propelled 

grenades. The contractors contacted both the regional ROC in Mosul 

and the national ROC in Baghdad. The military responded with fixed 

wing assets within 15 minutes and a rotary wing quick reaction force 

escorted the team safely back to Mosul. Contractors more frequently 

receive medical assistance from the military and described the 

assistance they received as excellent. Figure 6 depicts the process used 

to request assistance through the ROC or the regional ROCs. 
Page 26 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Figure 6: Process for Requesting Assistance through the ROC

• Improved communications. Communications with the military can be 

difficult in Iraq because of a lack of radio interoperability between the 

military and contractors. The ROC facilitates communications between 

the military and contractors. First, the ROC provides contact numbers 

for the military to private security providers to use when they are 

moving around in Iraq. Second, the ROC will ensure that the military is 

aware of contractor movements. Security providers who so choose can 

provide the ROC with information on convoy movements, which the 

ROC will forward to the appropriate military commands. Third, the 

ROC can contact the military to provide assistance to contractors, and 

finally, the ROC can track convoys through a real-time tracking system 

that uses the global positioning system and includes a communications 

link with the ROC if assistance is needed. 

Some Coordination 

Problems Remain between 

Private Security Providers 

and the U.S. Military

While security providers, reconstruction contractors, and military 

representatives of the PCO believe that the ROC has improved 

coordination on the complex battle space in Iraq, both the private security 

providers and the military believe that several coordination issues remain 

to be resolved. Security providers and military officials expressed 

continuing concern about incidents between security providers and the 

military when approaching military convoys and checkpoints and the need 

1

2

3

4

Contractor

in trouble

 Calls ROC or 

regional ROC 

for assistance

ROC calls U.S.

military unit

U.S. military provide

assistance if assets

are available

Source: GAO from data provided by ROC contractor.
Page 27 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

for a better understanding of the complex battle space by both private 

security providers and the military. 

Blue on White Incidents Are of 

Major Concern to the Military 

and Private Security Providers

One of the coordination issues that contractors and the military continued 

to be concerned about is blue on white violence. Blue on white violence is 

the term used by contractors and the military to describe situations when 

the military fires at friendly forces (such as contractors) or, as happens less 

frequently, when private security employees fire at military forces. An 

analysis of incident reports completed by the ROC indicates that these 

incidents happen most frequently when contractors encounter a military 

checkpoint or a military convoy. Private security providers have told us 

that they are fired upon by U.S. forces so frequently that incident reports 

are not always filed with the ROC. According to some incident reports filed 

with the ROC, some contractors believe that U.S. forces have fired on 

private security provider vehicles without provocation. For example, one 

security company official reported that his convoy was traveling on a route 

in Iraq when a U.S. military convoy approached. According to the report, 

the security convoy identified itself using generally recognized 

identification procedures and pulled off the road to allow the military 

convoy to pass. After about half of the 20-vehicle convoy had passed, a 

gunner in the military convoy began firing at the security convoy. 

According to the after incident report filed with the ROC, no injuries or 

damage resulted from this incident. A similar incident happened on the 

road from the International Zone to the Baghdad airport. As in the previous 

incident, part of a U.S. military convoy passed the private security convoy 

without incident when a gunner in the fourth vehicle of the convoy began 

to fire at the lead vehicle in the private security convoy. After this incident, 

the private security team leader received an apology from the 

servicemember who had fired on the security company vehicle. As a result 

of this incident, the company’s vehicle was rendered unserviceable. 

In another incident report, a private security provider documented an 

incident at a U.S. military checkpoint. According to the report, a security 

convoy had slowed to approach the checkpoint, and was then fired on by a 

U.S. soldier. The report went on to say that no verbal or hand warnings 

were given and no reason was given for the shooting. According to 

representatives of the security providers and the former director of 

security for the PCO, many of these incidents happen because of the 

military’s concerns over insurgents using vehicle-borne improvised 

explosive devices, as well as the inexperience of some U.S. troops. 
Page 28 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Reducing the number of blue on white incidents is a high priority for the 

U.S. military, the PCO, private security providers, and the Private Security 

Company Association of Iraq, a Baghdad--based association that works 

with both the U.S. government and the Iraqi government to resolve issues 

related to private security providers. In late December 2004, in an effort to 

reduce the number of blue on white incidents, the Multi National CorpsIraq (MNC-I) issued an order to major subordinate commands in Iraq 

establishing procedures for private security providers to use when 

approaching military convoys and military checkpoints. MNC-I directed 

the subordinate commanders to implement the procedures detailed in the 

order and to educate all private security providers and military on the 

procedures. Among the procedures were (1) a prohibition on nontactical 

vehicles (such as the vehicles used by private security providers) passing 

moving military convoys; (2) a requirement that warning shots, when fired, 

be aimed away from a vehicle and demonstrate a clear intention to do harm 

if directions are not obeyed; and (3) a requirement that vehicles should 

maintain a distance of a least 200 meters from a military convoy.

In early 2005, MNC-I completed an analysis of friendly-fire incidents that 

occurred between November 1, 2004 and January 25, 2005 to determine the 

top 10 lessons learned from such incidents. Among the top 10 lessons was 

the need for U.S. forces to comply with the rules of engagement, which 

require that U.S. troops determine that a person’s intent is hostile before 

the military uses deadly force. The other lessons learned were similar to 

the procedures included in the order. According to a PCO official, the top 

10 list was provided to the private security providers. 

Despite the MNC-I order, blue on white incidents continue to occur and 

security providers remain concerned about the frequency of the attacks. In 

the 5 months (January to May 2005) since the order was issued, the ROC 

has received reports on 20 blue on white incidents and the number of 

actual incidents is likely to be higher since, as we noted previously, some 

providers no longer report these types of incidents. Data on the number of 

incidents for the 5 months before the order was issued was not available 

because the ROC did not start collecting information on blue on white 

incidents until November 2004. A ROC official noted that blue on white 

incidents had decreased in April 2005. He believed that the reduction was 

due, in part, to the adoption of the procedures outlined in the order. 

However, he also noted that the number of incidents could increase again 

as troops rotate in and out of Iraq or if terrorist attacks increase. 
Page 29 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Units Do Not Receive Specific 

Training or Guidance about 

Working with Private Security 

Providers before Deploying

Military units that deployed to Iraq received no guidance or training 

regarding the relationship between private security providers and the 

military prior to deploying. Representatives from the 2nd Armored Cavalry 

Regiment, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary 

Force all told us that they received no guidance from either CENTCOM or 

Combined Joint Task Force-7 and that their units had not developed any 

written procedures for dealing with private security providers. 

Furthermore, a representative of a unit that is preparing to deploy, the 101st

Airborne Division, told us that it had not received any guidance on how to 

work with private security providers nor had it been directed to include 

information on private security providers, the PCO, or the ROC in its predeployment training, even though the 101st will be co-located with a 

regional ROC. To highlight the lack of training and guidance, 

representatives from one unit told us that they did not know there were 

private security providers in their battle space until the providers began 

calling for assistance. They also noted that any information about who 

would be in the battle space and the support the military should be 

providing would be useful. 

Several private security providers we spoke with told us that they believed 

it would be helpful if U.S. forces who deployed to Iraq received information 

on private security providers in Iraq. For example, the providers believed 

that U.S. troops needed more information on why private security 

providers are in Iraq, the impact of having private security providers there, 

and the operational styles of the private security providers. Army officials 

we spoke with believed that this type of information would be helpful and 

suggested that private security providers could use additional information 

about working with the U.S. military as well. 

Agencies Have Limited 

Capabilities to Assess 

the Cost Impact of 

Using Private Security 

Providers

Despite the significant role played by private security providers in enabling 

reconstruction efforts to proceed, neither the Department of State, DOD, 

nor USAID has complete data on the cost associated with using private 

security providers. For example, the quarterly report submitted by the 

Department of State to Congress on the status of reconstruction projects 

and funding does not provide information on security costs that are 

incurred under reconstruction contracts. Even at the contract level, the 

agencies generally had varying degrees of information on the costs 

associated with private security providers. On 15 reconstruction contracts 

we found that the cost to obtain private security providers and securityrelated equipment at the reconstruction contract level can be considerable, 

as it accounted for 15 percent or more on 8 of the 15 contracts we 
Page 30 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

reviewed; on only 4 of those 8 contracts, however, did the agencies 

formally track security costs under a separate task order or contract line 

item. Agency and contractor officials acknowledged that security costs 

had diverted planned reconstruction resources and led to canceling or 

reducing the scope of certain reconstruction projects, though they also 

noted that other factors have affected reconstruction projects. 

Agencies Do Not 

Comprehensively Track 

Costs Associated with 

Private Security Providers

The Secretary of State is responsible for submitting a quarterly report to 

Congress that outlines the current status of programs, initiatives, and funds 

dedicated to the Iraq reconstruction efforts.21 These quarterly reports 

provide information at the project and sector level—such as oil or 

electricity—and acknowledge the challenges and costs associated with the 

security environment in Iraq. For example, in its April 2005 report, the 

State Department noted that nearly $1.3 billion in funding has been, or will 

be, used in part to (1) cover unanticipated post-battle reconstruction costs, 

(2) cover indirect cost increases of contractors operating on cost-plus 

contracts that allow them to continue billing even during delays, and 

(3) account for increased security costs. The reports, however, do not 

identify the magnitude or impact of the costs associated with security 

providers on reconstruction efforts or available funding. Discussions with 

DOD and USAID personnel found that the financial and management 

information systems used to help prepare the report are not able to track 

costs incurred by reconstruction contractors for security services. Agency 

officials noted that to obtain such information would currently require the 

agencies to request such information from the contractors and manually 

prepare the information. Agency officials noted they have made inquiries 

on an ad hoc basis in the past, but cautioned that such requests can be 

burdensome for both the contractors and agency officials.

Contractor officials acknowledge that the cost of private security services 

and security-related equipment, such as armored vehicles, has exceeded 

what they originally envisioned. In some cases, increased security costs 

resulted in reducing or canceling the scope of some reconstruction 

projects. For example:

21 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of 

Iraq and Afghanistan for FY 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, section 2207 (Nov. 6, 2004) as 

amended by Pub. L. No. 108-309, section 135 (Sep. 30, 2004).
Page 31 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

• Contractor officials noted they were originally tasked to rehabilitate 23 

electrical substations and had conducted site surveys and procured 

equipment for all 23 substations. According to contractor officials, 

however, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers concluded that securing 14 

of the substations would not be cost effective, and therefore reduced the 

scope to 9 substations. Contractor officials indicated that the 

equipment and materials procured for the 14 substations have been or 

will be turned over to the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity.

• In February 2004, USAID obligated an additional $33 million on one of 

its contracts to pay for unanticipated increases in security costs that left 

it short of funds to pay for construction oversight and quality assurance, 

as well as fund administrative costs.

• In March 2005, USAID cancelled two electrical power generation-related 

task orders totaling nearly $15 million to help pay for increased security 

costs being incurred at another power generation project in southern 

Baghdad.

Contractor officials noted, however, that other factors also affected 

reconstruction progress, such as changes in priorities or higher material 

costs. For example, officials at one contractor noted that security had not 

been a significant factor delaying their work; rather, they pointed to delays 

in reviewing and approving projects and slower than anticipated release of 

funding. Similarly, USAID officials noted that, among other materials, the 

cost of concrete is significantly higher than anticipated, driving up the cost 

of many reconstruction projects. 

We found that at the contract level, agency personnel did not have 

consistent insight into security costs and their impact on reconstruction 

efforts. For example, agencies often did not require prospective bidders to 

propose meaningful security costs as part of their contract cost proposal 

nor require contractors to prepare a baseline security cost estimate at the 

time of contract award. Many of the contracts, including those awarded 

after the security environment began to deteriorate, were indefinite 

delivery contracts, in which the work to be accomplished was often 

described in general terms, with the specific work to be accomplished 

determined as task orders are issued. In several cases, agency personnel 

provided prospective contractors a sample task order to use in preparing 

their proposals. While the contractors’ cost and technical proposals 

described how they would approach security issues and provided an 

associated cost estimate, such estimates were only for evaluation purposes 
Page 32 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

and did not reflect meaningful security costs. Overall, in only 3 of the 16 

contracts we reviewed did contractors prepare an initial security cost 

estimate for the entire contract.

Further, we found that in only 7 of the 16 contracts did the contractors 

regularly provide security-related cost information in either monthly 

progress reports or in separate contract line items or task orders. The level 

of information and insight provided varied greatly depending on the 

approach taken. For example, on three contracts, the contractor provided 

security cost-related information for each of its projects, but did not 

provide information at the total contract level. In one contract, security 

costs were reported on both the task order and contract level. In one 

contract, the security cost information was reported under a separate 

contract line item with other expenses, and visibility was more limited. In 

the remaining two contracts, the agency established separate task orders 

specifically to track security-related expenses at the contract level. 

In 15 of the 16 reconstruction contracts that we reviewed, we were able to 

obtain data on the costs of acquiring private security services and related 

security equipment22 by reviewing invoices that private security providers 

and security equipment providers submitted to contractors. Our analysis of 

this data found that at the reconstruction contract level there was 

considerable variation in estimated security costs as a percentage of total 

contract billings (see figure 7).23 Eight of the 15 contracts had security 

costs that exceeded 15 percent of total contract billings as of December 31, 

2004; on 4 contracts, the percentage of contract billings accounted for by 

the cost of security subcontractors was more than 25 percent.24 On only 2 

of those 8 contracts in which security costs exceeded 15 percent did 

agency personnel require the contractors to formally track and report 

security costs under a separate task order or contract line item. Though 

22 One contractor did not specifically track or report the security costs it incurred under the 

contract.

23 Overall, the costs to obtain private security services and related security equipment for 

the 15 reconstruction contracts that we were able to obtain and review were about $334 

million, or about 7 percent of total contract billings as of December 31, 2004.

24 Several contractor officials noted the cost of security relative to total contract costs can 

vary over time. For example, they noted that initial security costs, such as for mobilizing 

and equipping security personnel and purchasing armored vehicles, can be considerable in 

relation to the amount of reconstruction work authorized. As additional work is authorized, 

the relative percentage accounted for by security costs could decrease considerably.
Page 33 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

not required, one contractor reported incurred security costs on two 

contracts on its own initiative. 

Figure 7: Percentage of Total Contract Billings Accounted for by Security 

Subcontractor Expenses as of December 31, 2004 

While our analysis indicates that at the reconstruction contract level the 

cost of obtaining private security services can account for a significant 

percentage of the contract’s total cost, it does not reflect total private 

security costs. For example, reconstruction contractors did not always 

specifically track security-related costs incurred by their subcontractors or 

lower tier suppliers. According to contractor officials, in seven of the 

sixteen reconstruction contracts that we reviewed, at least one of their 

subcontractors provided for their own private security; in five of those 

seven contracts, all of the subcontractors were required to provide for their 

own security.25 The cost for a subcontractor to obtain private security 

25 In three other contracts, the contractors indicated that they provided security for their 

subcontractors; one contractor did not hire subcontractors; and in the five remaining 

contracts, the contractor did not know about or did not provide information on 

subcontractor security needs.

Number of contracts

0

1

2

3

4

5

<5 5<10 10<15 15<20 20<25 >25

In percent

Source: GAO analysis of contractor supplied information.
Page 34 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

services can be considerable. For example, in one case, the costs incurred 

by a major subcontractor amounted to almost $10 million, or nearly onethird of what the reconstruction contractor was paying for security. In 

another case, the costs incurred by a major subcontractor exceeded $3.5 

million, or about 8 percent of what the reconstruction contractor was 

paying for security.

Our analysis and discussions with agency and contractor officials identified 

several factors that influenced security costs, including (1) the nature and 

location of the work; (2) the type of security required and the security 

approach taken; and (3) the degree to which the military provided the 

contractor security services. For example, projects that took place in a 

fixed, static location were generally less expensive to secure than a project 

that extended over a large geographic location, such as electrical 

transmission lines. In other cases, contractors relied on former military 

personnel or other highly-trained professionals to provide security to their 

employees. Conversely, some contractors made more extensive use of 

local Iraqi labor and employed less costly Iraqi security guards. Lastly, 

some contractors were able to make use of security provided by the U.S. 

military or coalition forces. For example, several contractors had facilities 

within or near U.S.-controlled locations, such as Baghdad’s International 

Zone or on military bases, which reduced their need to obtain private 

security services. In another case, the contractor was provided a limited 

degree of protection by the U.S. Army. 

Agency and contractor officials had mixed opinions on the value of 

establishing separate reporting or tracking mechanisms. For example, 

some agency officials believed that having visibility into security-related 

costs enabled them to provide more effective contract oversight, and 

identify security cost trends and their impact on the project. Other officials 

noted that many factors affect the cost and progress of reconstruction 

efforts, including changes in planned funding or projects, material costs, 

and the inability to find qualified workers willing to work in Iraq. 

Consequently, they indicated that they generally try to manage the projects 

at a total project level, rather than by individual elements, such as security. 

For example, they noted that when reviewing project status reports with 

the contractors, they will question the contractors on the factors causing 

delays or cost increases. They were not certain that having specific insight 

into security costs would help them better manage or oversee their 

projects. Agency program and financial management officials noted that 

from a budgeting perspective, tracking security cost information could 

enable staff to provide better estimates of future funding requirements. 
Page 35 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Contractor officials generally indicated that establishing a separate task 

order or contract line item for security enabled them to more efficiently 

account for and bill security costs and to more accurately report 

reconstruction progress. For example, officials at one contractor noted 

that they often had several projects under way which required security. 

Prior to establishing a separate task order, the security provider would be 

required to allocate costs to each of the projects even though the security 

was provided for a given location, often resulting in lengthy and complex 

vouchers, higher potential for error, and increased administrative 

expenses. Once a separate task order was established, its security provider 

charged the costs incurred for providing security to the location, rather 

than each project, simplifying the billing and review process. Other 

contractor officials noted that the need to obtain security providers and 

security-related equipment often occurred during the early stages of the 

contract when the agencies had issued only a few task orders for specific 

reconstruction projects. Consequently, contractor officials told us they 

found themselves incurring considerable security-related expenses during 

the mobilization phase that had to be allocated to subsequent task orders, 

thereby increasing costs. These officials noted that allocating security 

costs to existing task orders would have resulted in the task’s cost 

exceeding the government’s estimate. Contractor officials indicated that a 

separate task order for security would have enabled them to better explain 

to agency personnel the cost of the reconstruction effort and the impact of 

security costs and enable them to account for and bill security costs more 

efficiently.

Expanded Use of 

Private Security 

Providers Does Not 

Appear to Be 

Increasing Attrition 

among Military 

Personnel

Data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 26 show that in 

fiscal year 2004, the attrition rates for the occupational specialties 

preferred by private security providers returned to the same or slightly 

lower levels than those seen prior to the institution of occupational stop 

26 DMDC collects and maintains an archive of DOD’s automated manpower, training, and 

financial databases.
Page 36 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

losses27 in September 2001 despite the increased use of private security 

providers. Private security providers working in Iraq are hiring former 

servicemembers with a variety of skills, including servicemembers with 

military police or Special Operations experience. Military officials told us 

that they believe that servicemembers with these skills are separating from 

the military earlier than in prior years. We are unable to determine from 

this data whether servicemembers are leaving the military for positions 

with private security providers as the data can only demonstrate trends in 

attrition, not explain why people are leaving the military or what they 

intend to do after leaving the military. 

Private security providers prefer to hire former military members, 

particularly Special Operations forces, for their unique skills and 

experience. Servicemembers with Special Operations background are 

often hired to fill key positions, such as security advisors and project 

managers, and to provide personal security to high ranking government 

officials. These positions may pay as much as $33,000 a month. Other 

servicemembers may be hired to provide security to civilians in vehicle 

convoys with salaries between $12,000 and $13,000 per month, while some 

may be hired to provide site security for buildings and construction 

projects at somewhat lower salaries. For the most part, employees only 

receive these salaries when they are working in Iraq, typically 2 to 3 months 

at a time. All of the U.S.-based private security providers we spoke with 

told us that they do not actively recruit current servicemembers; however, 

they do recruit at military-sponsored transition job fairs, through the 

Internet, and with advertisements in military magazines and newspapers. 

Officials from the Special 

Operations Command and 

Army Military Police Believe 

Attrition Is Increasing Due, 

in Part, to Security-Related 

Job Opportunities 

Both Special Forces and military police personnel officials believe that 

attrition is increasing in their military specialties. For example, during a 

July 2004 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee, 

Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, 

representatives from the U.S. Special Operations Command and the 

military services’ Special Operations commands noted that the number of 

Special Forces enlisted personnel retiring at 20 years (the first time they 

are eligible) has been increasing due, in part, to the increased opportunities 

available in civilian government and with contractors. In addition, 

representatives of the Naval Special Operations Command and the Air 

27 Stop losses are short-term measures that increase force availability by retaining active or 

reserve component members on active duty beyond the end of their obligated service.
Page 37 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Force Special Operations Command also noted that they were seeing 

increased attrition rates among those servicemembers with 8 to 12 years of 

service. According to these representatives, servicemembers leaving at 

this point in their careers are also leaving for opportunities with 

contractors. 

Army officials have also expressed concerns about attrition in the military 

police force. For example, officials from the military police personnel 

office at the Army’s Human Resources Command told us that they have 

seen a significant number of senior noncommissioned officers leave the 

military police for positions with private security providers. These officials 

also told us they have seen the average length of service for colonels in the 

military police branch decrease from 28 to 25 years. Furthermore, in an email provided by the Army’s Human Resources Command, a senior 

noncommissioned officer at the 16th Military Police Brigade noted that the 

brigade did not meet its reenlistment targets in fiscal year 2004. Finally, the 

Army Central Command’s Provost Marshall in July 2004 told us that he had 

lost four of his eight senior noncommissioned officers to higher paying 

private security providers within the last year and was expecting to lose 

two more senior noncommissioned officers. He also noted that he had lost 

more than half of his company grade officers as well. 

Efforts are being taken by both the military police and Special Forces 

communities to address retention concerns. For example, the Army plans 

to double the size of its military police force from 15,500 to 30,000 by 2006 

and the Special Operations Command plans to increase its force size from 

13,200 to 15,900 over the next 5 to 6 years. Increasing the size of the Army 

military police and Special Operations will decrease the high operational 

tempo28 and relieve some of the stress on military personnel, which these 

communities believe contributed to higher attrition. In addition, DOD 

recently began to offer reenlistment bonuses to Special Operations 

personnel with 19 or more years of experience which range from $8,000 to 

those who reenlist for one year to as much as $150,000 for those who 

reenlist for an additional 6 years. 

28 In this report, operational tempo refers to the total days military personnel spend 

participating in normal drills, training, and exercises, as well as domestic and overseas 

operational missions.
Page 38 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Attrition Rates for 2004 

Returned to Level Seen 

Prior to Stop Loss Issuance

While data from several sources indicate increased attrition in fiscal year 

2004 compared to fiscal years 2002 and 2003 in the military skills sought by 

private security providers, these data also showed that attrition rates in 

fiscal year 2004 had returned to the levels seen in fiscal years 2000 and 

2001, prior to the majority of the stop loss policies that have been instituted 

by the services at various times since September 2001. Table 1 shows the 

dates of occupational stop losses for each of the services. 

Table 1: Occupational Stop Loss Dates for the Military Services

Source: GAO from DOD data.

a

Although the Army terminated its occupational stop loss program, at the time we issued this report the 

Army had a unit stop loss program in effect. The Army’s unit stop loss policy applies to soldiers in units 

preparing to deploy. It applies to all soldiers in a unit and prevents soldiers from leaving the Army 

within 90 days of their unit’s deployment, during the unit’s deployment, and 90 days after the unit has 

returned from its deployment. 

Each of the services added and released occupations from stop loss as the 

needs of the service dictated. For example, the Air Force placed all 

occupational specialties under a stop loss in September 2001 and then 

released a number of occupations from the stop loss in January and June 

2002. As we noted, the Air Force ended all stop loss activities in June 2003. 

In the Army, Special Operations forces were placed under stop loss in 

December 2001 and were released from the stop loss in June 2003, while 

enlisted servicemembers who served as military police were placed under 

stop loss in February 2002 and were released from the stop loss in July 

2003. Army officers serving as military police were placed under the stop 

loss in February 2002 and were released from the stop loss in June 2003. 

Data obtained from DMDC on the military occupational specialties 

preferred by private security providers revealed that several of these 

specialties show increased attrition in fiscal year 2004 over the attrition 

rates in fiscal year 2003. These specialties include: 

Service Stop Loss Began Stop Loss Ended

Army December 2001 November 2003a

Navy September 2001 August 2002

Air Force September 2001 June 2003

Marine Corps January 2002 May 2003
Page 39 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

• Air Force: Officer military police

• Army: Enlisted and Officer Infantry, military police, and Special Forces

• Marine Corps: Enlisted and Officer Infantry and military police

• Navy: Enlisted military police, Officer Special Forces, and Enlisted 

SEALs. 

For the specialties listed, the average attrition rates for each fiscal year are 

shown in figure 8. As seen in figure 8, the attrition rates for these 

specialties decreased in fiscal year 2002 and 2003 from their 2000 and 2001 

levels and showed an increase in attrition in fiscal year 2004. These data 

also show that the levels of attrition seen in fiscal year 2004 were actually 

lower than those seen in fiscal years 2000 and 2001.

Figure 8: Average Attrition Rates for Military Occupational Specialties Preferred by 

Private Security Providers which Experienced Increased Attrition in Fiscal Year 2004

0

5

10

15

20

25

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Fiscal year

Enlisted

Officer

Average attrition rate (by percent)

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Page 40 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

The decrease in attrition rates seen in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 as 

compared to the rates seen in fiscal years 2000 and 2001 reflect attrition 

patterns that are seen during stop losses. Service officials told us that stop 

loss policies affect attrition rates; they can temporarily delay separations 

and artificially decrease attrition rates for the year of the stop loss. 

Officials at the Army Human Resources Command also found that stop loss 

policies can also increase attrition rates for the year preceding the stop 

loss. For example, the Army saw increased separations in 2002 for military 

police colonels in anticipation of their occupation-specific stop loss. Given 

the impact of stop loss policies on attrition, data may not accurately convey 

the typical personnel losses that would have occurred had the stop loss not 

been in effect as people left the military both in anticipation of stop loss 

and after stop loss was lifted. Thus, we are unable to determine whether 

the increase in attrition rates in fiscal year 2004 was due to the lifting of the 

stop loss policy or true increases in military attrition.

Figure 9 shows a pattern of decline in attrition rates during the stop loss 

period followed by a rebound for Army Special Forces in fiscal year 2004. 

Attrition rates for enlisted Army Special Forces were almost identical in 

fiscal years 2000 and 2001, and declined through 2003 during the Army 

Special Forces specific stop loss, which was in effect from December 2001 

to June 2003. However, after the stop loss was lifted, attrition rates for the 

enlisted Army Special Forces almost doubled from 6.5 percent in fiscal year 

2003 to 12.9 percent in fiscal year 2004, a level which was about 25 percent 

higher than the fiscal year 2000 rate. Attrition rates for Army Special 

Forces officers also declined during the stop loss period and returned to 

just below the fiscal years 2000 and 2001 levels in fiscal year 2004.
Page 41 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Figure 9: Army Special Forces Attrition Rates 

The Special Operations Command also provided us with continuation rates 

calculated by DMDC for the Army, Navy, and Air Force Special Operations 

Commands. Continuation rates were calculated by determining which 

personnel remained on active duty from one year to the next and are an 

alternative method used to demonstrate retention and attrition. The 

continuation rates showed an increase in losses in 2004 for the Army 

Special Operations and Navy Special Warfare Commands senior 

noncommissioned officers, as well as Army Special Operations warrant 

officers. Similar to the DMDC data provided to us, these commands also 

saw a decrease in losses (or a decrease in attrition rates) in 2002 after a 

stop loss was issued and, with the exception of the Navy Special Warfare 

warrant officers, an increase in losses (or an increase in attrition rates) 

after the stop loss was lifted. 

Additionally, as shown in figure 10, the continuation data for Army Enlisted 

Special Operations personnel with 14 through 19 years of service separated 

at only a slightly higher rate in 2004 than in the pre-stop loss years — fiscal 

years 2000 and 2001. In the July 2004 hearing before the House Armed 

Percent attrition rate

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Fiscal year

Army Special Forces enlisted attrition

Army Special Forces officer attrition

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Page 42 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats 

and Capabilities, the Senior Enlisted Advisor for the United States Special 

Operations Command stated that the loss of these mature, operationally 

experienced personnel creates critical operational risk for the Special 

Forces. According to the Special Operations Command officials with 

whom we spoke, because the command is losing some of its most 

experienced personnel, younger less experienced servicemembers are 

being promoted to leadership positions more quickly than in the past. This 

need to rely on less experienced personnel has created some concerns for 

the command. 

Figure 10: Continuation Rates for Army Enlisted Special Operations Personnel with 14 through 19 Years of Service for Fiscal 

Years 2000 through 2004

Note: Con’t = continuation.

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

Total Personnel

0

20

40

60

80

100

Continuation rate in percent

Loss 116 104 43 31 116

Con't 1,225 1,229 1,257 1,245 1,121

Con't 91.4 92.2 96.7 97.6 90.6

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Source: Special Operations Command.
Page 43 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Many Factors Influence the 

Decision to Separate from 

the Military

While available data indicate that attrition, in almost all of the military 

specialties favored by private security providers, has returned to preSeptember 11, 2001 levels, the data do not indicate why personnel are 

leaving the military and what they are doing after they leave. Exit surveys 

conducted with servicemembers leaving the military do not include 

questions on the servicemembers’ future employment plans. Officials at 

the Army Human Resources Command told us that after September 11, 

2001, the opportunities for employment in the security field became more 

widespread as government agencies as well as private companies and 

organizations recognized the need to improve their security. These officials 

as well as officials from the Special Operations Command noted that they 

are losing personnel not only to private security firms operating in Iraq but 

also to security management companies operating in the United States, and 

security operations in other government agencies. Service officials at these 

commands also attributed the attrition rates to other factors, such as the 

attraction of a strong civilian economy, high operational tempo, and 

concerns about various quality of life conditions. 

Conclusions The reconstruction effort in Iraq is complex, costly, and challenging, in 

part, due to an urgent need to begin and execute reconstruction projects in 

an uncertain security environment. The extensive use of private security 

providers has raised a number of issues, particularly regarding how to 

facilitate methods contractors use to obtain capable providers. And, once 

security providers are actively working in an area, they must determine 

how best to establish effective coordination mechanisms with nearby 

military forces. While the experience in Iraq was certainly unique relative 

to historical reconstruction and assistance efforts, it is far less certain 

whether or not the future will find the United States engaged in 

reconstruction and assistance efforts in other hostile environments with 

costs that are likely to be significant. Much has been learned in Iraq over 

the past two years on this subject that can serve the United States and its 

contractors well in planning for and executing future reconstruction or 

assistance efforts. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

We are making four recommendations to address a number of immediate 

and long term issues: 

• To assist contractors operating in hostile environments in obtaining 

security services required to ensure successful contract execution, we 
Page 44 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

recommend that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and 

the Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, explore 

options that would enable contractors to obtain such services quickly 

and efficiently. Such options may include, for example, identifying 

minimum standards for private security personnel qualifications, 

training requirements and other key performance characteristics that 

private security personnel should possess; establishing qualified vendor 

lists; and/or establishing contracting vehicles which contractors could 

be authorized to use.

• To ensure that MNF-I has a clear understanding of the reasons for blue 

on white violence, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Combatant Commander, U.S. Central Command, to direct the 

Commander, MNF-I, to further assess all of the blue on white incidents 

to determine if the procedures outlined in the December 2004 order are 

sufficient. Furthermore, if the procedures have not proven to be 

effective, we recommend that the Commander, MNF-I, develop 

additional procedures to protect both U.S. military forces and private 

security providers. 

• To ensure that commanders deploying to Iraq have a clear 

understanding of the role of private security providers in Iraq and the 

support the military provides to them, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Defense develop a training package for units deploying to Iraq which 

provides information on the Reconstruction Operations Center, typical 

private security provider operating procedures, any guidance or 

procedures developed by MNF-I or MNC-I applicable to private security 

providers (such as procedures outlined in the December 2004 order to 

reduce blue on white incidents), and DOD support to private security 

provider employees. The training package should be re-evaluated 

periodically and updated as necessary to reflect the dynamic nature of 

the situation in Iraq.

• To improve agencies’ ability to assess the impact of and manage security 

costs in future reconstruction efforts, we recommend that the Secretary 

of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Administrator, U.S. Agency 

for International Development, establish a means to track and account 

for security costs to develop more accurate budget estimates.
Page 45 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

DOD, the Department of State and USAID provided written comments on a 

draft of this report. Their comments are discussed below and are reprinted 

in appendixes II, III, and IV, respectively.

DOD concurred with each of our recommendations, noting that it 

welcomed our assistance in improving how DOD and its contractors can 

plan for and effectively execute contracts in a complex and changeable 

security environment. Moreover, DOD described the steps it would take to 

implement some of our recommendations. 

The Department of State disagreed with our recommendation to explore 

options to assist contractors in obtaining private security services, citing 

concerns that the government could be held liable for performance 

failures. For example, while the Department noted that it could provide the 

criteria it utilizes to select its contractors on a non-mandatory basis, it 

expressed concern that contractors relying on government minimum 

standards could assert that performance failures were the result of the 

government establishing poor standards. The Department also noted it was 

unclear that a government-managed security contractor program would 

result in enhanced contractor security, compared to a contractor-managed 

security program. While our work found that contractors had difficulty in 

obtaining security providers that met their needs and that they would have 

benefited from the agencies’ assistance, we did not recommend a particular 

course of action nor recommend a government-managed security program. 

Rather, we recommended that the Department, working jointly with DOD 

and USAID, explore options to assist contractors that are unfamiliar with 

obtaining the type of security services needed in Iraq. Such an effort would 

necessarily entail a thorough assessment of the advantages, disadvantages 

and risk mitigation strategies of the potential options. Given the 

significance of contractors in accomplishing reconstruction objectives and 

the mixed results that they encountered when selecting their security 

providers, we continue to believe that thoroughly exploring potential 

options would be prudent. 

The Department of State did not indicate whether it agreed with our 

recommendation to establish a means to track and account for security 

costs in order to develop more accurate budget estimates. It noted that it 

can capture costs associated with direct security providers and work with 

prime reconstruction contractors to determine the feasibility of providing 

subcontract security costs. It is not clear to us from the Department’s 

comments how it intends to work with DOD and USAID to establish a 
Page 46 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

uniform means to track and account for private security costs, which is 

essential given that DOD and USAID are the principal agencies responsible 

for awarding and managing the majority of reconstruction contracts. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, USAID found the report 

factually correct, but did not comment on the recommendations.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority 

Member, House Committee on Government Reform; the Chairman and 

Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Energy and Commerce; 

the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on 

Governmental Affairs; and other interested congressional committees. We 

are also sending a copy to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of State; 

the Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development; and the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget, and will make copies available 

to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 47 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Bill Solis at 202-512-

8365 or by e-mail at solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs are found on the last page of 

this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

included in appendix V.

William Solis 

Director, 

Defense Capabilities and Management

David Cooper 

Director, 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Page 48 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar

Chairman

Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate

The Honorable Henry Hyde

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Lantos

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives
Page 49 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To determine the extent to which U.S. government agencies and 

contractors working in Iraq at the behest of the U.S. government have 

acquired security services from private security providers, we reviewed a 

wide array of documents to determine who was responsible for providing 

security to those types of organizations, including 

• warning orders and fragmentary orders issued by the U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM), Combined Joint Task Force-7, Multi National 

Forces–Iraq, and Multi National Corps-Iraq to determine if any orders 

had been issued regarding providing security to U.S. government 

employees or contractors rebuilding Iraq;

• contracting documents such as statements of work, requests for 

proposals and contracts and contact modifications;

• Department of Defense (DOD) regulations and instructions that relate 

to the management of contractors during contingency operations; 

• Departments of State and Defense memoranda of understanding 

regarding security and support;

• proposed guidance between the Department of State and the 

Department of Defense regarding contractor support;

• guidance to contractors prepared by the Coalition Provisional Authority 

(CPA) regarding contractor operations in Iraq; and

• Department of State rules and regulations, including the Foreign Affairs 

Manual.

We also met with officials from CENTCOM to obtain the command’s 

position on the extent of the military’s responsibility to provide security to 

civilian government employees and contractors, including both contractors 

supporting military forces and those engaged in rebuilding Iraq. In 

addition, we met with or obtained information from Army and Marine 

Corps units that served in Iraq to discuss their understanding of the 

military’s responsibility to provide security to contractors and civilian 

government employees and interviewed representatives of the State 

Department’s Office of Diplomatic Security to discuss the State 

Department’s use of private security providers in Iraq as well as 

representatives of other government agencies working in Iraq who have 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 50 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

contracted with private security providers to provide security to employees 

and facilities. 

To determine how agencies addressed security needs when planning for 

and awarding Iraq reconstruction contracts, we interviewed officials at the 

CPA; DOD, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Project and 

Contracting Office (PCO); the Department of State; and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID). We discussed the guidance and 

direction they received prior to awarding contracts and how such 

information was provided to the contractors. We reviewed various 

acquisition documents, including agency acquisition plans, requests for 

proposals, price negotiation memoranda, correspondence between 

contractors, and other relevant documents. We met with agency and 

contractor officials to discuss the nature and type of guidance provided 

relative to the expected security environment, the need for obtaining 

security services, and requirements and standards for security personnel or 

security-related equipment.

We identified how security-related requirements were reflected in 

reconstruction contracts by selecting 16 contracts that were awarded to 

10 reconstruction contractors. We selected these contracts using a 

nonprobabilistic methodology that considered such factors as the awarding 

agency; the year awarded; the contract’s expected dollar value; and the 

type, nature and location of the reconstruction activity. Nine of these 

contracts were awarded in 2003 and 7 were awarded in 2004. For each of 

these contracts, we obtained the contract and contract modifications 

issued as of December 31, 2004, totaling about $8.6 billion; relevant 

sections of the contractor's cost and technical proposal; security plans; 

security-related subcontracts; and other pertinent documents. We also 

obtained and reviewed 6 contracts that had been awarded by the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, the Department of State, USAID and by an Army 

contracting agency for the CPA, for the protection of their personnel and 

facilities in Iraq to compare the type of security-related requirements 

incorporated within U.S. government contracts with those incorporated 

into contracts awarded to reconstruction contractors and, in turn, to 

subcontracts with security providers. 

We identified whether there are existing government or international 

standards relative to security providers that were applicable to the Iraqi 

security environment. We also spoke with agency security personnel, 

including the Department of State’s Office of Diplomatic Security and the 

Overseas Security Advisory Council. We also contacted representatives 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 51 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

from relevant industry associations, including the International Peace 

Operations Association, International Security Management Association, 

and the American Society for Industrial Security. We also researched 

European security-provider standards and conducted a literature review of 

articles relating to the security provider industry.

To assess the military’s relationship with private security providers, we met 

with or spoke to representatives of CENTCOM, Army Central Command, 

and the PCO (at the Pentagon and in Baghdad) to discuss issues related to 

the military’s authority over private security providers and reviewed a 

Department of Defense report to Congress addresses the use of private 

security providers in Iraq. We also met with or contacted representatives 

of Army and Marine Corps units that had been stationed in Iraq to 

determine if they had been provided guidance on working with private 

security providers and discussed issues related to command and control of 

private security providers. 

To assess the level of cooperation and coordination between the military 

and private security providers both before and after the advent of the 

Reconstruction Operations Center (ROC), we spoke with 9 private security 

providers working in Iraq as well as representatives of military units which 

had served in Iraq to determine the state of coordination prior to and after 

the ROC became operational. We spoke with representatives of the PCO to 

discuss the ROC’s role in coordinating the interactions between the military 

and private security providers and any actions the PCO was taking to 

improve coordination between private security providers and U.S. military 

forces. We also discussed coordination issues with the executive director 

of the Private Security Company Association of Iraq and several 

reconstruction contractors. We also reviewed information posted on the 

ROC Web site related to security and reviewed documents developed by 

the ROC to explain its operations and functions. 

To determine the extent to which government agencies assessed the costs 

associated with using private security providers and security-related costs, 

we reviewed various contractual documents, including the 16 

reconstruction contracts and subsequent modifications, consent to 

subcontract requests, and monthly cost and progress reports submitted by 

the contractors we reviewed. We also met with agency and contractor 

officials to determine the means by which they maintained visibility over 

security providers and security-related expenses, as well as their general 

experiences in Iraq, the impact of security on reconstruction efforts, and 

the process by which they obtained security providers.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 52 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

We collected data on the costs associated with acquiring and using private 

security providers or in-house security teams; and the cost associated with 

acquiring security-related equipment, such as armored vehicles, body 

armor, communication equipment, and other security-related costs. We did 

not attempt to quantify the impact of the security environment on 

increased transportation or administrative expenses, on the pace of 

reconstruction efforts caused by security-related work stoppages or delays, 

or the cost associated with repairing the damage caused by the insurgency 

on work previously completed. We also excluded the cost associated with 

the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, or the costs borne by 

DOD in maintaining, equipping, and supporting U.S. troops in Iraq. 

For the 16 contracts we reviewed, we identified whether the agencies or 

the contractors had initially projected the cost of obtaining private security 

services. We reviewed various documents, including agency acquisition 

strategy plans and price negotiation memoranda; the contractor’s cost 

proposals and security plans; and interviewed agency and contractor 

officials. We identified the actual costs incurred for security services and 

equipment by reviewing various cost documentation, including invoices, 

vouchers, and billing logs submitted by the contractors and their security 

provider(s) through the period ending December 31, 2004. We analyzed 

this information to determine

• the total amount billed by the contractor to the government;

• the amount billed by security subcontractors to the contractor; and

• the amount billed for other security-related expenses, such as armored 

vehicles, body armor, communication, transportation costs, lodging, and 

other security-related equipment. 

We estimated the percentage of costs accounted for by private security 

providers and for security-related equipment by comparing the combined 

amount billed for these activities to the total amount billed by the 

reconstruction contractor to the government. We did not attempt to 

comprehensively identify costs that may have been incurred by 

subcontractors or lower tier contractors. We did, however, request 

information from the contractors as to whether their subcontractors 

required security above that which would typically be required, and if so, 

whether the subcontractor arranged for its own security or relied on 

security provided by the reconstruction contractor. We obtained examples 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 53 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

and cost information on selected cases in which subcontractors provided 

their own security. 

As part of our efforts, we reviewed pertinent sections of the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation, and in particular, the subcontractor competition 

and notification requirements provided for under Part 44; and relevant 

CPA, DOD, State Department, and USAID acquisition regulations, policy 

memoranda and guidance. We coordinated our work with and reviewed 

reports prepared by the Inspectors General for DOD, State, and USAID; the 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction; and the Defense 

Contract Audit Agency. 

To determine whether private security providers were hiring former 

military servicemembers, we interviewed three private security providers 

from the United States that are working in Iraq and discussed the skill sets 

they hire. Additionally, we spoke with officials at the Marine Corps and 

Navy human resources commands; the Air Force’s Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Personnel; the Army's Human Resources Command Military Police Branch 

and the Special Operations Command Personnel Division to ascertain 

whether certain military occupational specialties and ranks were seeing 

increased attrition and if private security providers were affecting military 

attrition. We also reviewed a transcript of a congressional hearing on 

Special Operations Forces personnel issues held in July 2004. 

To assess the extent to which military occupational specialties utilized by 

private security providers in Iraq are seeing increased attrition we obtained 

attrition information from the Defense Manpower Data Center’s Active 

Duty Military Officer and Enlisted Master Files, which is an inventory of all 

individuals on active duty in the services. Our analysis was limited to 

active duty personnel and did not include reservists. The Center provided 

information on personnel numbers and losses for fiscal years 2000, 2001, 

2002, 2003, and 2004. Attrition for the purposes of this report is an active 

duty member who is on active duty at the start of a given fiscal year and is 

no longer on active duty in the same service in the same pay category at the 

end of that fiscal year. An enlisted member who becomes a warrant or 

commissioned officer (or vice versa) or a member who changes services is 

considered to be a loss. The fiscal year lasts from October 1st of the 

previous year to September 30th of the named year. For example, fiscal 

year 2000 lasted from October 1, 1999 to September 30, 2000. Personnel 

numbers were calculated as the total number of members at the start of the 

fiscal year (for example, October 1, 1999 for fiscal year 2000). Losses are 

the endforce members who have attrited during the fiscal year (For 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 54 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

example, for fiscal year 2000, losses would be the number of personnel 

attrited from October 1, 1999 to September 30, 2000.). 

We received data from the Defense Manpower Data Center on active duty 

attrition rates for five military occupational specialties: special forces, 

military police, infantry, para-rescue, and combat controller. These military 

occupational groupings were selected because they represented military 

occupational skills most sought after by private security providers working 

in Iraq, as determined through interviews with officials at the human 

resources commands and private security companies. These data were 

then analyzed to determine whether attrition rates had increased in the 

past five years and whether servicemembers were separating from the 

military at increasing rates in certain ranks or number of years of service.

We assessed the reliability of the Defense Manpower Data Center’s Active 

Duty Military Personnel Master file by (1) reviewing existing information 

about the data and the system that produced them, and (2) interviewing 

agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the 

data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this report. 

We visited or interviewed officials from the following organizations during 

our review:

Department of State 

• Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Washington, D.C.; 

• U.S. Embassy, Amman, Jordan; 

• The U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., 

Baghdad, Iraq; and Amman, Jordan.

Department of Defense

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 

Military Personnel Policy, the Pentagon; 

• The Defense Contract Audit Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 55 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Department of the Air Force

• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Force Management 

Division.

Department of the Army

• United States Army Human Resources Command Military Police 

Branch, Alexandria, Virginia;

• United States Army Central Command (Rear), Fort McPherson, Georgia;

• Project and Contracting Office (Rear), the Pentagon;

• U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C.; 

• Southwestern Division, Dallas, Texas; 

• Transatlantic Program Center, Winchester, Virginia;

• Gulf Regional Division, Baghdad, Iraq;

• The Army Contracting Agency, Fort Eustis, Virginia; 

• 1st Armored Division, Wiesbaden, Germany;

• 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; 

• 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, Louisiana; 

• 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. 

Department of the Navy

• Naval Personnel Command, Millington, Tennessee;

• Marine Corps Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Washington, D.C.; 

• 1st Marine Corps Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, California.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 56 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Unified Combatant Commanders

• United States Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida;

• United States Special Operations Command Personnel Division, MacDill 

Air Force Base, Florida.

Contractors 

• Aegis Defence Services, Ltd., London, United Kingdom;

• ArmorGroup, London, United Kingdom;

• BearingPoint Inc., McLean, Virginia;

• Bechtel National, Inc., San Francisco, California;

• Blackwater USA, Moyock, North Carolina;

• CONTRACK International, Inc., Arlington, Virginia;

• Control Risk Group, London, United Kingdom;

• Creative Associates International, Inc., Washington, D.C.;

• DynCorp International, Irving, Texas;

• Fluor Intercontinental, Inc., Greenville, South Carolina;

• General Electric, Atlanta, Georgia;

• Global Risk Strategies, London, United Kingdom;

• Kellogg Brown and Root Services, Inc., Houston, Texas;

• Olive Security, London, United Kingdom;

• Parsons Corporation, Pasadena, California;

• Perini Corporation, Framingham, Massachusetts; 

• Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina;
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 57 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

• Triple Canopy, Lincolnshire, Illinois; 

• The Hart Group, London, United Kingdom; and

• Washington Group International, Inc., Boise, Idaho; and Princeton, New 

Jersey.

Industry Associations

• American Society for Industrial Security International, Alexandria, 

Virginia;

• International Peace Operations Association, Washington, D.C.;

• International Security Management Association, Buffalo, Iowa;

• Private Security Company Association of Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq;

• Professional Services Council, Arlington, Virginia.

We conducted our review from May 2004 through June 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 58 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 59 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 60 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq
Page 61 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 62 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 63 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq
Page 64 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Appendix IV

Comments from U.S. Agency for International 

Development ApendxiIV
Page 65 GAO-05-737 Rebuilding Iraq

Appendix V

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements ApendxiV

GAO Contacts William Solis (202) 512- 8365

David Cooper (617) 788-0555

Acknowledgments In addition to the contacts named above, Steve Sternlieb, Timothy 

DiNapoli, Carole Coffey, Gary Delaney, John Heere, William Petrick, 

Timothy Wilson, Moshe Schwartz, Kate Walker, Robert Ackley, David 

Mayfield, and Sylvia Schatz made key contributions to this report. 

(350544)
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