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[House Report 106-1027]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                 Union Calendar No. 595

106th Congress, 2d Session -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  House Report 106-1027

          JANET RENO'S STEWARDSHIP OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: 
                 A FAILURE TO SERVE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE

                               __________

                              TENTH REPORT

                                 by the

                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                             Volume 1 of 2

                                     

                                     

  Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                      http://www.house.gov/reform

 December 13, 2000.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on 
            the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
67-356                     WASHINGTON : 2000

                     COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                     DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN L. MICA, Florida                PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
THOMAS M. DAVIS III, Virginia        CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana           ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana                  Columbia
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida             CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South     DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    Carolina                         ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
BOB BARR, Georgia                    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida                  JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas             JIM TURNER, Texas
LEE TERRY, Nebraska                  THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois               HAROLD E. FORD, Jr., Tennessee
GREG WALDEN, Oregon                  JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California                             ------
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin                 BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 
HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho              (Independent)
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

                      Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                 Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
                     James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
           David A. Kass, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian
                  Kristi L. Remington, Senior Counsel
                         Jim Schumann, Counsel
                       Kimberly A. Reed, Counsel
           Maria P. Tamburri, Assistant to the Chief Counsel
                     Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
                Philip Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
               Philip S. Barnett, Miniority Chief Counsel
            Kristin Amerling, Minority Deputy Chief Counsel
                   Paul Weinberger, Minority Counsel

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                                  House of Representatives,
                                 Washington, DC, December 13, 2000.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on 
Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's tenth 
report to the 106th Congress.
                                                Dan Burton,
                                                          Chairman.

                                     
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Findings of the Committee on Government Reform...................   VII
  I. The Attorney General's conflicted investigation..................1
        A. Background on the Independent Counsel Act.............     3
        B. A rocky start: early conflicts in the Justice 
            Department's campaign finance investigation..........     9
        C. Attorney General Reno changed her interpretation of 
            the Independent Counsel Act..........................    14
        D. Memoranda from FBI Louis J. Freeh and Task Force 
            Supervising Attorney Charles La Bella recommending 
            that an independent counsel be appointed.............    19
        E. Department of Justice rebuttal memoranda..............    44
        F. Department of Justice's bad faith in its application 
            of the Independent Counsel Act.......................    54
        G. The failure to appoint a special counsel for Vice 
            President Gore.......................................    59
 II. The failures of the Justice Department investigation............63
        A. The Justice Department failed to pursue the December 
            15, 1995, coffee tape................................    63
        B. The Justice Department has failed to question the 
            President and Vice President effectively.............    71
        C. The Justice Department failed to pursue relevant 
            documents............................................    74
        D. The Justice Department failed to pursue key 
            individuals and entities.............................    84
        E. The Justice Department failed to pursue the Kansas 
            conduit contribution scheme..........................   107
        F. The Justice Department failed to investigate leaks 
            harmful to the campaign fundraising investigation....   116
III. The Justice Department's political interference with congressional 
     oversight......................................................123
        A. Failure to comply with subpoenas for the Freeh and La 
            Bella memoranda......................................   123
        B. Failure to produce the Conrad memorandum..............   143
        C. The Justice Department's political gamesmanship.......   146
 IV. The favorable treatment of the Attorney General's friends......154
        A. The Justice Department's handling of the Soka Gakkai 
            matter...............................................   154
        B. Robert Bratt..........................................   181
Exhibits.........................................................   188

                               APPENDIXES

Appendix 1.--Correspondence between the committee and the Justice 
  Department.....................................................   638
Appendix 2.--Kansas Democratic party disclosure forms (receipts 
  and disbursements).............................................  1862

                                 VIEWS

Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. 
  Major R. Owens, Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski, 
  Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon. Chaka 
  Fattah, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich, Hon. 
  Rod R. Blagojevich, Hon. Danny K. Davis, Hon. John F. Tierney, 
  Hon. Jim Turner, Hon. Harold E. Ford, Jr., and Hon. Janice D. 
  Schakowsky.....................................................  2008
Exhibits.........................................................  2034

             FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

    The Attorney General of the United States has exhibited a 
critical lack of judgment in her stewardship of the campaign 
fundraising investigation. Furthermore, the reputation of the 
Justice Department has suffered greatly during her tenure. 
Given the evidence compiled by the committee, it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that the Attorney General has acted 
politically to benefit the President, the Vice President, and 
her own political party. Specifically:

 The Attorney General had a conflict of interest in 
the Justice Department investigation of possible criminal 
wrongdoing involving the President and Vice President. Any 
investigation of the campaign fundraising scandal required a 
detailed examination of the actions of the President and Vice 
President. The Justice Department is wholly unsuited to conduct 
such an investigation, and the repeated failures of the 
Department during the last 4 years proves that the Attorney 
General cannot investigate her superiors.

 When investigative matters arose that touched upon 
the President, the Vice President, or the Democratic party, the 
Attorney General abandoned her expressed belief that an 
appearance of conflict was to be avoided by the Nation's chief 
law enforcement official. On May 14, 1993, Attorney General 
Reno testified before Congress. She stated: ``It is absolutely 
essential for the public to have confidence in the system and 
you cannot do that when there is a conflict or an appearance of 
conflict in the person who is, in effect, the chief 
prosecutor.'' This belief gave way to an inexplicable 
acceptance of the very appearance of conflict she sought to 
avoid when she retained supervision of the campaign finance 
investigation of the President, the Vice President and her own 
political party.

 The decision to retain control of the investigation 
of the President and the Vice President showed an unacceptable 
indifference to an appearance of impropriety. The principal 
beneficiaries of the campaign finance scandal of 1996 were 
President Clinton and Vice President Gore. In insisting that 
she retain control of the investigation of the President and 
Vice President, Attorney General Reno has failed to exercise a 
minimally acceptable standard of judgment required of the 
custodian of Federal law enforcement. If her investigation of 
campaign fundraising matters had indeed been thorough and 
vigorous, and if she had exhibited good faith cooperation with 
legitimate congressional oversight of her investigation, there 
would be less cause for concern. However, the decision to 
retain supervision of the investigation of the President, the 
Vice President, senior administration officials and her 
political party--juxtaposed with numerous missteps, failures, 
preferential treatment of political appointees, rejection of 
the advice of senior advisors, combined with the obvious bad 
faith exhibited toward congressional oversight--does not 
instill confidence in the Department of Justice.

 The decision to retain control of the investigation 
of her own political party showed an unacceptable indifference 
to an appearance of impropriety. For much of her adult life, 
the Attorney General has been an elected public official. She 
has, throughout that time, been elected on the Democratic party 
ticket. Although there has been an effort to describe the 1996 
campaign finance scandal as a matter of ``everybody does it,'' 
it is worth noting that Campaign Financing Task Force 
supervisor Charles La Bella devoted approximately 65 pages to 
possible Democratic misconduct and approximately 2 pages to 
possible Republican misconduct. The Attorney General's 
insistence on maintaining supervision of the investigation of 
her own political party again showed indifference to the 
appearance of evenhanded application of justice, and a critical 
lack of judgment. An example of this is the Justice Department 
failure to investigate an apparently illegal scheme by the DNC 
to use conduit contributors to funnel over a third of a million 
dollars to the Kansas Democratic party. The Department 
conducted a 3 year investigation of contributions to 
Republicans in Kansas but failed even to consider an illegal--
and successful--effort by her own party to use straw donors for 
political benefit.

 The failure to conduct a thorough investigation 
promoted an appearance of favoritism. This reflected poorly on 
the judgment of the Attorney General, particularly given 
recommendations made in 1997, 1998, and 2000, that someone else 
should supervise the investigation. Charles La Bella made the 
following point in his first recommendation for an independent 
counsel: ``[i]f these allegations involved anyone other than 
the President, Vice President, senior White House, or DNC and 
Clinton/Gore '96 officials, an appropriate investigation would 
have commenced months ago without hesitation.''

   LThe following failures bolster the conclusion that the 
Justice Department has not lived up to its obligation to 
conduct a thorough investigation of the campaign fundraising 
scandal, and that the country would have been better served if 
an independent counsel or special counsel had been appointed to 
handle the investigation:

         The President was not asked a single 
        question about foreign money until 2000.

         The President was not asked a single 
        question about James Riady until 2000.

         The President was not asked a single 
        question about John Huang, Charlie Trie, Mark 
        Middleton, and the Presidential Legal Expense Trust 
        until 2000.

         The President was not asked a single 
        question about his 5 minute meeting with Korean 
        national John K.H. Lee, which resulted in a $250,000 
        illegal political contribution, until 2000.

         The President and Vice President were not 
        asked a single question about White House coffee 
        fundraising events until 2000.

         The Vice President was not asked a single 
        question about the Hsi Lai Temple fundraiser until 
        2000.

         The Vice President was not asked a single 
        question about Maria Hsia until 2000, after she had 
        been convicted in Federal court. To make matters worse, 
        the Justice Department failed to subpoena the White 
        House for records regarding Hsia.

         The Vice President was not asked a single 
        question about John Huang or James Riady until the year 
        2000.

         The Justice Department should have been 
        aware of evidence that, on December 15, 1995, the Vice 
        President expressed an interest in showing political 
        advertisements to James Riady, who lived in Jakarta, 
        Indonesia. Not only did the Justice Department fail to 
        obtain the original evidence for over 6 months, at 
        least one unidentified source within the Department 
        sought to discredit the possible evidence before it was 
        even reviewed.

         The Vice President's former Director of 
        Political Affairs appears to have never been 
        interviewed by the Justice Department. This comes in 
        spite of the fact that she authored such communications 
        as the recently produced e-mail that discusses a 
        ``coffee list'' and states: ``these are FR coffees 
        right?'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ When the White House released this document on Sept. 22, 2000, 
White House staff anonymously suggested that ``FR'' could stand for 
``finance-related,'' not fundraiser. Other documents authored by the 
same individual, however, show that her use of the abbreviation ``FR'' 
refers to fundraisers.

         The Vice President was not asked about the 
        September 27, 1993, fundraiser with John Huang and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        China Resources Chairman Shen Jueren until 2000.

         At a very sensitive time in the Department's 
        investigation of Charlie Trie, it became clear that 
        Trie's former bookkeeper was destroying evidence. 
        Although the FBI wanted to move swiftly and execute a 
        search warrant, Justice Department lawyers refused to 
        approve such a warrant.

         The Justice Department failed to subpoena 
        the White House for records regarding Ernest Green and 
        Mark Middleton until 2000.

   To date, the Justice Department has failed to advance an 
investigative rationale for these significant failures. It 
appears that the President and Vice President received 
preferential treatment at the expense of the campaign finance 
investigation.

 The Attorney General has taken an active step to 
assist the Vice President during his election campaign. On 
August 23, 2000, the Attorney General announced that she would 
not appoint a special counsel to investigate Vice President 
Gore: ``I have concluded that there is no reasonable 
possibility that further investigation could develop evidence 
that would support the filing of charges for making a willful 
false statement [in the Hsi Lai Temple or White House coffee 
investigation].'' The Attorney General further explained her 
position in a committee interview on October 5, 2000: ``[t]he 
Vice President defined what he meant by a fund-raiser. . . . 
Based on his definition of what a fund-raiser was and what he 
said, I would not be able to prove, based on that, that he 
believed it to be a fund-raiser and testified falsely.'' 
Minutes later, the Attorney General reinforced this point: ``I 
think the whole statement clearly reflects what the Vice 
President understood a fund-raiser to be, and within his 
definition, I think he made it clear that his statement was not 
inaccurate.''

   There can be no more stark example of why the Attorney 
General should refrain from acting as investigator, judge and 
jury in a matter involving the Vice President. There are many 
suspects of criminal inquiry or criminal defendants around the 
country who would be eager to accept an offer from the 
government to be allowed to insert their definition of a 
factual matter in place of a jury's determination of a factual 
matter. The Attorney General has made an extraordinary 
accommodation to the Vice President--she effectively allowed 
him the opportunity to define a material element of the 
investigation and then said not only that she believed him, but 
that there was no possibility of developing evidence that would 
cast doubt on his definition.

 The Attorney General has gone to extraordinary 
lengths to cover up the failures of the Justice Department. 
Examples of bad faith negotiation by the Justice Department 
regarding document requests are legion. While the Department 
has argued that turning over documents would harm ongoing 
investigations or chill internal communications, these 
explanations have almost universally turned out to be pretexts 
to cover up embarrassment. For example:

         On December 10, 1999, the Department of 
        Justice announced that it would not comply with a 
        committee subpoena for FBI interview summaries of the 
        President and Harold Ickes. One month prior to this 
        notification, committee staff had been told that the 
        documents would be produced, without fail, on a 
        specific date. After relying on Department 
        representations, the committee was disappointed to 
        learn of the Department's new position. Not 
        surprisingly, the change of position came the week 
        before John Huang was scheduled to testify before the 
        committee. It must be noted that the hypocrisy of the 
        Department's position was underscored by the fact that 
        when Democrat Senate Committee Chairman Donald Riegle 
        requested FBI interview summaries in 1994, 84 such 
        documents were produced by the Attorney General. It 
        appears that a special standard was developed for the 
        campaign finance investigation--one made more 
        understandable when the interviews of the President 
        were finally produced and it became clear that the 
        Justice Department had neglected to ask a single 
        question about foreign money or James Riady.

           The hypocrisy of the Department's refusal was also 
        underscored by the assertion that ``[t]he Department 
        has observed what appears to be an increasing incidence 
        of public release of [FBI interviews].'' Chairman 
        Riegle released 84 FBI summaries in 1994. The Committee 
        on Government Reform, however, had released a grand 
        total of one FBI summary in the previous 3 years.

         The Freeh and La Bella memoranda, and the 
        transcripts of the Justice Department interviews with 
        the President and Vice President, show an investigation 
        derailed. Thus, the committee believed it was prudent 
        to come to an understanding of what documents had been 
        subpoenaed by the Justice Department. This too proved 
        informative. For example, by obtaining subpoenas issued 
        to the White House, the committee now knows that the 
        Justice Department did not even ask the White House for 
        information about former Presidential advisor Mark 
        Middleton (who invoked his fifth amendment rights 
        before this committee) or about Vice Presidential 
        friend and fundraiser Maria Hsia. Unfortunately, 
        however, the Justice Department and DNC have gone to 
        extraordinary lengths to keep this committee from 
        obtaining the subpoena issued to the DNC. The DNC and 
        the Justice Department have worked hand-in-glove to 
        keep the committee from learning whether the Department 
        was thorough in making its document requests to the 
        DNC. As of October 10, 2000, the DNC continues to 
        refuse to comply with a congressional subpoena for the 
        document requests issued to it by the Justice 
        Department.

 The Attorney General and her subordinates have made 
false statements to obtain tactical advantage in different 
negotiations. At various points in the committee's 
investigation, the Justice Department relied upon obfuscation. 
The Attorney General and her staff ignored truth when a 
falsehood made one of their arguments stronger.

         The Attorney General continued to rely on 
        Lee Radek's advice regarding campaign finance matters 
        even after he was rebuked within the Justice Department 
        for attempting to mislead his superiors about important 
        elements of the investigation.

         After a Federal court ruling made it 
        permissible for the Justice Department to share most of 
        the Freeh and La Bella memoranda with Congress, 
        committee staff requested the opportunity to review the 
        memoranda and were rebuffed. Nevertheless, the Attorney 
        General stated in a letter, ``[w]e advised the 
        Committee staff last fall that the memorandum with 
        reduced redactions was available for review.'' The 
        Attorney General's statement was patently false. This 
        statement is typical of the deceptive, self-serving 
        statements made by the Justice Department throughout 
        the debate on the Freeh and La Bella memoranda.

         After the committee subpoenaed the Freeh and 
        La Bella memoranda, the Attorney General and Director 
        Freeh signed a statement that the committee's subpoena 
        was ``unprecedented.'' This allowed the media and other 
        commentators to paint the committee in an unfavorable 
        light. The committee pointed out that this statement 
        was factually inaccurate, and the FBI Director withdrew 
        his statement. The Attorney General, however, persisted 
        in claiming that the subpoena was unprecedented until 
        the following year when one of her subordinates finally 
        admitted, in writing, that the subpoena was not 
        unprecedented. By then, of course, the Attorney General 
        had obtained the desired political benefit, and there 
        were no negative repercussions. While this admission 
        would have greatly harmed the Justice Department's 
        political position in August 1998 during the contempt 
        debate, by March 1999 few in the public cared.

 Justice Department officials believed that a key 
supervisor of the campaign finance investigation thought that 
the Attorney General's political future hinged on her decisions 
regarding her political superiors. The Attorney General's 
decision to retain control of this investigation while there 
was such a cloud over its stewardship shows a critical failure 
of judgment. William Esposito, the former Deputy Director of 
the FBI, testified before the committee that in November 1996, 
Lee Radek, the head of the Public Integrity Section, told him 
that he ``felt a lot of pressure,'' and that the Attorney 
General's job might ``hang in the balance'' depending on his 
decisions in the campaign finance investigation. This 
testimony, which was corroborated by another senior FBI 
official, Neil Gallagher, reinforced the committee's long-held 
view that the Attorney General had a political conflict of 
interest in trying to investigate the fundraising of the 
President, the Vice President and the Democratic party.

 The Justice Department's political support for the 
President and Vice President was evident when its officials 
publicly undermined prosecutors who recommended independent 
investigations of the President, Vice President and Democratic 
party. The Attorney General's failure to solve this problem by 
appointing an independent counsel to conduct the investigation 
was a significant failure of judgment. Justice Department 
officials showed that they were acting in a political manner 
when they publicly disparaged their colleagues on a number of 
occasions. The Attorney General tolerated this conduct by 
keeping the investigation under the purview of these same 
individuals.

         When Robert Conrad recommended that a 
        special counsel be appointed to investigate Vice 
        President Gore, the New York Times reported that 
        ``Justice Department officials disparaged his 
        conclusions.'' The newspaper reported: ``[o]ne Justice 
        Department official said that Mr. Conrad was alone in 
        his recommendation. `No other prosecutor in this matter 
        thought that there should be a need for a special 
        counsel,' said the official, who spoke on the condition 
        of anonymity.'' This was such an egregious lie that 
        even the Attorney General could not allow it to go 
        unremarked. The same day, she stated that Conrad's 
        recommendation was supported by other prosecutors.

         When Director Freeh recommended that an 
        independent counsel be appointed to look into 
        fundraising matters, he was savaged by both Justice 
        Department and White House officials. For example, the 
        New York Times reported the following in 1997: 
        ``[a]lthough Mr. Clinton had pointedly avoided 
        answering questions about Mr. Freeh's disagreement with 
        Ms. Reno's decision, White House aides were not so 
        circumspect. They privately ripped into Mr. Freeh--once 
        lauded by the President as one of his best appointees--
        and called him a disloyal subordinate.''

         When Charles La Bella's recommendation for 
        an independent counsel was being openly discussed in 
        the media by the Attorney General's advisors, not only 
        was La Bella's legal acumen attacked. One Justice 
        Department official commented that some people were 
        wondering whether La Bella had a ``deep-seated 
        psychiatric problem,'' or whether he was unstable. One 
        can hardly imagine a clearer message to refrain from 
        making honest recommendations than having a government 
        official question your sanity.

 The committee has been obstructed by the Justice 
Department's failure to provide guidance regarding subjects of 
investigation that would hamper ongoing criminal 
investigations. While investigating the illegal fundraising 
activities of John Huang, Charlie Trie and Johnny Chung, the 
committee respected requests by the Justice Department not to 
ask questions about certain individuals or subjects. For 
example, on November 9, 1999, Chairman Burton informed Attorney 
General Reno: ``I will respect the Department's wishes, and 
avoid questioning Mr. Trie about these two individuals, as long 
as they are under active investigation. I will also instruct 
other members of the Committee to avoid questioning Mr. Trie 
about those two individuals.'' Many months later, the committee 
sought guidance as to whether it is permissible to go back and 
revisit the unresolved subjects. The Justice Department has 
simply refused to cooperate and respond to numerous committee 
requests on these matters.

 The Justice Department's failure to be vigorous in 
pursuit of evidence indicates a lack of judgment and a 
proclivity to take the side of the White House.

         The Justice Department appears to be more 
        interested in defending the White House in the e-mail 
        matter than investigating it. The Justice Department 
        appears to be engaging in a vigorous defense of the 
        White House in the e-mail matter, rather than 
        investigating possible wrongdoing by the White House. 
        Although the Justice Department refuses to disclose 
        staffing levels of the e-mail investigation, it has 
        become known that the one part time lawyer handling the 
        e-mail investigation for the Department has recently 
        left government employment. This does not indicate an 
        aggressive allocation of resources. (For a detailed 
        discussion of this issue, please refer to the recently-
        released committee report ``The Failure to Produce 
        White House E-Mails: Threats, Obstruction, and 
        Unanswered Questions.'')

         Justice Department lawyers have taken 
        affirmative steps to mislead the public regarding key 
        matters that relate to document discovery in the 
        campaign finance investigation. This undermines 
        confidence in the Justice Department and shows an 
        extreme lack of judgment on the part of the Attorney 
        General. Department of Justice lawyers are taking 
        active steps to mislead a Federal court and the public 
        about essential elements of White House document 
        production. For example, Department lawyers stated that 
        the ``technical failure [to produce the e-mails] is a 
        long-standing matter of public record that has been 
        confirmed by the White House itself.'' This, of course 
        fails to disclose that the White House did not tell the 
        Justice Department investigators and Congress that it 
        had not fully complied with subpoenas. (For a detailed 
        discussion of this issue, please refer to the recently-
        released committee report ``The Failure to Produce 
        White House E-Mails: Threats, Obstruction, and 
        Unanswered Questions.'')

         The failure to investigate whether there has 
        been an obstruction of congressional investigations of 
        the campaign finance scandal indicates that the Justice 
        Department is giving the White House preferential 
        treatment. In an October 5, 2000, interview with the 
        committee, Attorney General Reno made it clear that she 
        would not take proactive steps to determine whether the 
        White House had obstructed congressional investigations 
        by failing to take steps to produce subpoenaed e-mail 
        records. (For a detailed discussion of this issue, 
        please refer to the recently-released committee report 
        ``The Failure to Produce White House E-Mails: Threats, 
        Obstruction, and Unanswered Questions.'')

 For reasons unexplained to date, the Attorney 
General has been lenient in her treatment of major foreign 
benefactors of the President, Vice President and DNC. There has 
been a very lengthy delay in Justice Department efforts to 
indict major DNC benefactors James Riady, Ji Shengde, Liu Chao-
ying and Tomy Winata. There is no acceptable explanation for 
the lack of vigor in the investigations of these individuals.

 Leaks from Justice Department personnel have harmed 
the campaign finance investigation. The Attorney General has 
exhibited poor judgment in leaving the investigation in the 
hands of people who have demonstrated their interest in harming 
the investigation. The Justice Department's campaign 
fundraising investigation has been plagued by leaks. These 
leaks, which were often made at strategic times, greatly harmed 
the Justice Department's investigation, and strongly suggested 
that certain officials in the Justice Department did not want 
the investigation to succeed. These leaks provide a clear 
example of why the Attorney General should have appointed an 
independent counsel--to remove the investigation from 
politically biased officials at the Justice Department.

 While acting as the primary Main Justice supervisor 
of the campaign finance investigation, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General Alan Gershel took time away from his 
responsibilities to be the lead attorney in the trial of 
Charles Bakaly. It is difficult to determine which is a greater 
failure of judgment--Gershel agreeing to take on this 
assignment, or the Attorney General and the head of the 
Criminal Division allowing him to take on the assignment. 
Charles Bakaly was the spokesman of Independent Counsel Kenneth 
Starr during the Lewinsky investigation. For Gershel or the 
Attorney General to have decided that he, and only he, out of 
hundreds of lawyers qualified to work on the case, was 
essential to the Bakaly prosecution, shows an astounding lack 
of judgment. At a time when it was becoming clear that the 
Justice Department had failed to ask the President and Vice 
President questions about significant campaign finance 
matters--and a whole new element of the investigation was 
opening up with the disclosure that the White House had failed 
to produce e-mail records to the Justice Department--Gershel 
decided to take on additional responsibility. Perhaps more 
important, he was oblivious to concerns that as the supervisor 
of an investigation of the President and his election tactics, 
he might look less than impartial if he prioritized his time so 
that he was a lead prosecutor in a case urged by the President, 
and designed to discredit Independent Counsel Starr.

                                                 Union Calendar No. 595
106th Congress                                           Rept. 106-1027
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                 Vol. 1 of 2

======================================================================

 
JANET RENO'S STEWARDSHIP OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT: A FAILURE TO SERVE 
                          THE ENDS OF JUSTICE

                                _______
                                

 December 13, 2000.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on 
            the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

   Mr. Burton, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the 
                               following

                              TENTH REPORT

    On October 19, 2000, the Committee on Government Reform 
approved and adopted a report entitled, ``Janet Reno's 
Stewardship of the Justice Department: A Failure to Serve the 
Ends of Justice.'' The chairman was directed to transmit a copy 
to the Speaker of the House.

           I. The Attorney General's Conflicted Investigation

    Since the inception of the Department of Justice's Campaign 
Financing Task Force, many people have believed that a conflict 
or perceived conflict of interest existed for the Department of 
Justice to investigate the fundraising issues surrounding the 
Democratic party and the reelection of President Clinton and 
Vice President Gore. This was because Attorney General Reno, 
ostensibly the final decisionmaker in any Justice Department 
investigation, was appointed by the President and answered only 
to him. The Independent Counsel Act\1\ (``the Act'') was 
enacted for just such situations. In order to avoid a conflict 
or an appearance of a conflict when the Attorney General would 
have to investigate the administration of which she is a part, 
she was able to request the appointment of an independent 
counsel. However, Attorney General Reno disregarded the Act and 
insisted that she was able to conduct the campaign finance 
investigation without conflict. This assertion was unfortunate 
considering she had an inherent conflict in any investigation 
involving the President, Vice President, and Democratic 
National Committee as central figures. Her actions troubled the 
committee and were the committee's impetus for conducting 
oversight of the Department of Justice in this matter. Although 
the Independent Counsel Act expired, and Reno would not have 
been able to request the appointment of an independent counsel 
in this matter after June 30, 1999, the committee believed it 
was important to investigate because the Attorney General's 
handling of the campaign finance investigation was tantamount 
to obstructing her own investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 591-599 (expired 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What the committee eventually came to discover was 
alarming. Through various memoranda eventually produced to the 
committee, it was learned that Reno engaged in a creative 
analysis of the law in what appeared to be an effort to avoid 
the implementation of the Independent Counsel Act. FBI Director 
Louis J. Freeh and later, Task Force Supervising Attorney 
Charles La Bella, took the position that under both the 
discretionary and mandatory provisions of the independent 
counsel statute, the Attorney General should request the 
appointment of an independent counsel for the campaign finance 
investigation. However, the Attorney General and her senior 
advisers disagreed with the conclusions reached by Freeh and La 
Bella. After each preliminary investigation of senior level 
White House officials, including the President and Vice 
President, opened by the Public Integrity Section (PIS), the 
Attorney General determined that no independent counsel was 
warranted. There are dozens of memoranda among senior level 
Justice Department officials discussing whether an independent 
counsel should be appointed to investigate campaign finance 
matters. The Justice officials, in their memoranda, spend 
hundreds of pages in an attempt to explain away the need for an 
independent counsel. The committee was shocked to find that the 
Chief of the Public Integrity Section, who was in charge of the 
application of the Independent Counsel Act, frequently 
misrepresented the facts and the law in memoranda for the 
Attorney General. In retrospect, had an independent counsel 
been appointed, thousands of hours could have been spent 
investigating criminal and possible criminal conduct, rather 
than fighting the recommendations of those that believed an 
independent counsel was necessary.
    The Attorney General was able to avoid the appointment of 
an independent counsel through a disregard of the law and a 
narrow view of the evidence. She did this by refusing to 
consider all of the evidence, taken as a whole, to determine 
whether there was sufficient information to appoint an 
independent counsel. Instead, she would examine individual 
pieces of information, as if in a vacuum, and disregard the 
fact that nearly all of the allegations relating to campaign 
finance violations led back to the overwhelming need for money 
created by the President and Vice President themselves.
    To make the appointment of an independent counsel more 
unlikely, the Task Force was not able to seek out information 
relating to covered persons under the Act. It seems that they 
had to hope that specific information from a credible source 
would simply appear. If this were to happen, the Department 
would then be able to initiate a preliminary investigation.\2\ 
Ultimately, Attorney General Janet Reno chose to ignore the 
facts, the political conflicts, and the trust placed in her by 
the American people, by refusing to appoint an independent 
counsel for the campaign finance matter.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ In nearly all of the preliminary investigations conducted by 
the Department of Justice, the allegations investigated came from an 
outside source. The press first reported on the President and Vice 
President's fundraising phone calls from the White House. The Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee brought the issue of Ickes' alleged 
perjury to the Task Force's attention. Common Cause first brought the 
media fund allegations to the Department.
    \3\ The Independent Counsel Act expired June 30, 1999. 28 U.S.C. 
Sec. 599. However, soon after the expiration of the Act, the Department 
of Justice enacted regulations allowing the Attorney General to appoint 
a special counsel, who would be authorized to investigate and prosecute 
matters when the Attorney General concludes that extraordinary 
circumstances exist such that the public interest would be served by 
removing a large degree of responsibility for a matter from the 
Department of Justice. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 600 et. seq. (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On June 30, 1999, the Attorney General and many senior 
level political appointees at the Justice Department could 
breathe a collective sigh of relief. On that day, the 
Independent Counsel Act expired.\4\ After holding hearings, 
Congress decided not to reauthorize the Act.\5\ Therefore, the 
Department of Justice could no longer be called upon to 
implement the Act in the campaign finance investigation. After 
the Act expired, the Attorney General assured Congress and the 
public that the Department had instituted regulations allowing 
for a ``special counsel.'' A special counsel was supposed to be 
similar to an independent counsel, but without the statutory 
authority or independence. It came as no surprise that when 
Reno's new Supervising Attorney, Robert Conrad, determined that 
a special counsel should be appointed to investigate Vice 
President Gore, Reno declined.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 599 (1994).
    \5\ See generally hearing on the ``Reauthorization of the 
Independent Counsel Statute,'' before the subcommittee on Commercial 
and Administrative Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th 
Cong. (1999); hearings on the ``Independent Counsel Act,'' before the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              A. Background on the Independent Counsel Act

    The Independent Counsel Act allowed the Attorney General, 
in certain situations, to remove an investigation from the 
Department of Justice, and place it in the hands of a neutral 
party who was empowered to investigate and prosecute Federal 
crimes.\6\ That neutral party was the independent counsel. The 
Office of Independent Counsel was entirely separate and 
independent from Main Justice.\7\ What made the independent 
counsel truly unique was that it had all of the power and 
authority of the Department of Justice, but did not report to 
the Attorney General or President.\8\ This was considered to be 
the best manner in which to assure the public that a truly non-
partisan investigation, free from undue influence, would be 
conducted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Because of the authority it conveyed upon an independent 
entity, appointed by a three judge panel, many people charged that the 
Independent Counsel Act was unconstitutional.
    \7\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 594(i).
    \8\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 594(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Legislative History of the Act

    The independent counsel statute was conceived in the 
aftermath of the Watergate investigation. As a result of the 
experiences of Watergate, Congress came to believe that the 
Attorney General and political appointees at the Department of 
Justice were not always able to conduct an impartial 
investigation when Presidential and party politics were 
involved. For instance, during the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities' (Watergate Committee) 
investigation, the committee uncovered evidence of impropriety 
on the part of the Department of Justice.\9\ In particular, the 
Watergate Committee concluded that the Chief of the 
Department's Criminal Division, Henry Peterson, acted as a 
conduit for information from the grand jury to the Counsel to 
the President and the President himself.\10\ In addition, 
Peterson gave the President tactical advice regarding the 
manner in which the White House should respond to the Watergate 
investigation.\11\ The committee also determined that Peterson 
``attempted to insure that the Department of Justice 
investigation of Watergate `was narrowed down' to avoid 
investigating the President.'' \12\ After uncovering this 
troubling conduct, at the completion of its investigation the 
Watergate Committee recommended the establishment of a 
permanent, independent prosecutor to handle ``criminal cases in 
which there is a real or apparent conflict of interest in the 
executive branch.'' \13\ In so doing, Congress wanted to ensure 
that nothing similar could happen in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ CRS Rept. No. 87-192A, ``Legislative History and Purposes of 
Enactment of the Independent Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978,'' Mar. 4, 1987, at 2.
    \10\ Id.
    \11\ Id.
    \12\ Id. (citing ``Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities,'' S. Rept. No. 93-981, at 80-81 
(1974)).
    \13\ Id. (citing ``Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities,'' S. Rept. No. 93-981, at 96 (1974)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Between 1974 and the Act's passage in 1978, both the Senate 
and House held numerous hearings on the various bills proposing 
an independent prosecutor. The first Senate hearings focused on 
the political and personal conflicts of interest in the 
Attorney General investigating the President or high-level 
administration officials. Whitney North Seymour, Jr., who was 
later appointed as an independent counsel,\14\ testified in 
1974, that, ``[l]oyalty to the political interests of the 
administration may often require disloyalty to the goal of 
impartial justice.'' \15\ Seymour illustrated the point that 
the Office of Attorney General is a political one, and that the 
Attorney General's loyalty often lies with the President who 
appointed him. Therefore it would be presumed that the Attorney 
General would want to shield the administration. Similarly, 
Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox testified regarding 
his belief in the need for independent counsel legislation. He 
stated, ``[t]he pressures, the tensions of divided loyalty are 
too much for any man, and as honorable and conscientious as any 
individual might be, the public could never feel entirely easy 
about the vigor and thoroughness with which the investigation 
was pursued. Some outside person is absolutely essential.'' 
\16\ Cox recognized the importance of the public's confidence 
in an investigation of a political figure. Likewise, the theory 
of those advocating the legislation was that if someone 
independent were to conduct the investigation, the public's 
concerns would be allayed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Whitney North Seymour, Jr. was appointed on May 29, 1986, to 
investigate former aide to President Reagan, Michael Deaver. The 
allegations involved post-employment conflict of interest laws relating 
to Deaver's representation of certain foreign clients before the White 
House after leaving government employment.
    \15\ ``Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice,'' 
hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2987 before the Subcommittee on Separation 
of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 216 
(1974).
    \16\ Id. at 200.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In its reports on the independent counsel legislation, 
Congress echoed the themes of conflicts of interest and public 
confidence in investigations. The following rationales for 
passage of the Act were highlighted:

         The Department of Justice has difficulty 
        investigating alleged criminal activity by high-level 
        government officials.

         It is too much to ask for any person that he 
        investigate his superior.

         It is a basic tenet of our legal system that 
        a lawyer cannot act in a situation where he has a 
        conflict of interest or the appearance thereof. . . . 
        The Attorney General and his principal assistants are 
        appointees of the President and members of an elected 
        administration. It is a conflict of interest for them 
        to investigate their own campaign or, thereafter, any 
        allegations of criminal wrongdoing by high-level 
        officials of the executive branch. The appearance of 
        conflict is as dangerous to public confidence in the 
        administration of justice as true conflict itself. 
        Having men of integrity operate in the face of a 
        conflict is an insufficient protection for a system of 
        justice.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ S. Rept. No. 95-170 at 5-6 (1977).

    Although there was a general consensus of why there was a 
need for some type of independent prosecutor, at first there 
was not agreement on how the entity should be structured. One 
of the first bills proposed the establishment of an 
``independent Department of Justice,'' or some other permanent 
mechanism for appointing special prosecutors, rather than 
relying on the Attorney General to make a request in each 
instance.\18\ The Senate's reasoning behind such a proposal was 
that ``[i]t is not sufficient to rely on the President or the 
Attorney General to appoint a temporary special prosecutor the 
next time the Attorney General or the President has a conflict 
of interest or the appearance thereof. It is not at all obvious 
that such an appointment will occur.'' \19\ Attorney General 
Janet Reno was met with that same criticism for her refusal to 
appoint an independent counsel in the campaign finance matter. 
However, under the language of the Act as passed, the Attorney 
General had the prerogative on whether or not to appoint an 
independent counsel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ ``Legislative History and Purposes of Enactment of the 
Independent Counsel (Special Prosecutor) Provisions of the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978,'' CRS Rept. No. 87-192A at 3, Mar. 4, 1987 
(citing ``Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice,'' 
hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 before the Subcommittee on Separation 
of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. (1974)).
    \19\ Id. at 9 (citing S. Rept. No. 94-823, at 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Language of the Act

    The Independent Counsel Act was not passed until 1978, 
approximately 4 years after the Congress first began looking 
into the concept.\20\ The proposed purpose of the Act was ``to 
provide a mechanism to avoid the inherent or structural 
conflicts of interest, or the appearances of conflicts or of 
'conflicting loyalties,' which could arise where the Attorney 
General or the President must supervise or conduct criminal 
prosecutions of themselves, or of high level officials or 
colleagues in the President's Administration.'' \21\ In order 
to do so, certain individuals were automatically covered by the 
Act:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ The Independent Counsel Act was passed as Title VI of the 
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-521, as amended and 
reauthorized by Public Law 97-409, Public Law 100-191, and Public Law 
103-270 (codified at 28 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 591-599 (1994)) (no longer in 
effect June 30, 1999). The Act as first passed referred to a ``special 
prosecutor.'' Id.
    \21\ ``Independent Counsel Provisions: An Overview of the Operation 
of the Law,'' CRS Rept. No. 98-283, at 3 (Mar. 20, 1998).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         the President and Vice President;

         Cabinet level officials;

         an individual working in the Executive 
        Office of the President and compensated at a rate 
        equivalent to SES II;

         any Assistant Attorney General, or DOJ 
        employee compensated at or above SES III;

         the Director and Deputy Director of the CIA, 
        and the Commissioner of the IRS;

         any person who held a position listed in 
        (1)-(5) for 1 year after the person leaves office;

         the chairman and the treasurer of the 
        campaign committee seeking the election or reelection 
        of the President, and any officer of that committee 
        exercising authority at the national level, during the 
        incumbency of the President.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591(b).

    Congress also realized that situations would arise where 
investigation by the Attorney General or Department of Justice 
officials of an individual not identified in the statute would 
create some type of conflict. Therefore, the Attorney General 
was permitted to appoint an independent counsel for any person 
if he determined that an investigation by him or other 
Department of Justice officials might have resulted in a 
``personal, financial, or political conflict of interest.'' 
\23\ This ``catch-all'' conflicts provision was not added to 
the Act until 1982, when the Act was reauthorized.\24\ A 
similar provision had been considered in 1977, but had been 
dropped prior to the enactment of the Independent Counsel Act. 
Although it did not remain in the final legislation, the House 
report noted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591(c)(1).
    \24\ Public Law No. 97-409.

        The mechanism recommended by the committee is triggered 
        by a conflict of interest. That conflict is defined to 
        occur in two situations. The first situation arises 
        when specified high-level executive branch officials 
        are accused of committing specified offenses. . . . The 
        second situation arises when an investigation or 
        prosecution directly and substantially affects the 
        political interests of the President or Attorney 
        General.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ ``Legislative History and Purposes of Enactment of the 
Independent Counsel (Special Prosecutor) Provisions of the Ethics in 
Government Act of 1978,'' CRS Rept. No. 87-192A, at 17 (Mar. 4, 1987) 
(citing H. Rept. No. 95-1307, at 4-5 (1978)) (emphasis added).

The original report language demonstrates that there surely 
would be a conflict were the Attorney General to investigate a 
matter relevant to the political interests of the President and 
their political party. During the 1982 reauthorization, 
Congress determined that the ``catch-all'' provision was needed 
in the Act because there were situations where serious 
conflicts of interest could arise that were not covered by the 
mandatory provision. The 1982 Senate report explained, ``[t]he 
Committee recognizes that there may be instances when 
investigations by the Attorney General of persons not covered 
by the Act may create an actual or apparent conflict of 
interest.'' \26\ At the time of consideration, Congress clearly 
understood that perceived conflicts could be just as harmful to 
the public's trust in a Department of Justice investigation as 
actual conflicts.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Id. at 17-18 (citing S. Rept. No. 97-469, at 9 (1981) 
(emphasis added).
    \27\ Attorney General Reno has recently interpreted the Act so as 
to exclude perceived conflicts. See letter from Janet Reno, Attorney 
General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Orrin G. Hatch, chairman, 
Senate Judiciary Committee, (Apr. 14, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a consequence of the amendments in 1982, the statute 
could be triggered in one of two ways. The mandatory triggering 
occurred when the Attorney General received information 
alleging a violation of Federal law by a covered official. 
Under the discretionary provision, the Attorney General could 
determine that some other individual posed a conflict for him 
or the Department. Thereafter, there were several steps the 
Attorney General would take to determine whether an independent 
counsel was necessary under the Act. The first step was the 
threshold inquiry, in which the Attorney General examined the 
sufficiency of the allegations presented to determine whether 
there were grounds to investigate. In determining the 
sufficiency of the allegations that a covered individual 
violated a Federal law the Attorney General could only consider 
the ``degree of specificity of the information'' and the 
``credibility of the source of the information.'' \28\ The 
Attorney General would have 30 days in which to make this 
determination.\29\ If, within the 30 days, he decided that the 
information received was specific and the source was credible, 
or, if he were unable to make any determination within that 
time, the investigation would move on to the ``preliminary 
investigation'' stage.\30\ The Act required that the 
preliminary investigation be completed within 90 days.\31\ In 
addition, the Attorney General was able to request that the 
Special Division grant a one time extension of 60 days in which 
to complete the preliminary investigation.\32\ During this 
phase, the Attorney General, after reviewing the matter, was to 
determine whether there were ``reasonable grounds to believe 
that further investigation is warranted.'' \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591(d)(1).
    \29\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591(d)(2).
    \30\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591 (a), (c).
    \31\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(a)(1).
    \32\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(a)(3).
    \33\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Act was drafted so that the Department of Justice would 
have limited authority to conduct an investigation during the 
threshold inquiry and preliminary investigation stages; 
therefore the parameters of those inquiries were purposely 
narrow. Similarly, there was no authority to ``convene grand 
juries, plea bargain, grant immunity, or issue subpoenas'' 
during the preliminary investigation.\34\ The statute 
intentionally limited the power of the Attorney General during 
this period in order to prevent his extensive participation in 
substantive decision making. Again, this is to avoid potential 
conflicts of interest. If, at the completion of the preliminary 
inquiry, the Attorney General determined that no further 
investigation were warranted, he was required to notify the 
Special Division of the Court of Appeals \35\ that handled 
independent counsel matters.\36\ As a check on his discretion, 
the Attorney General was not permitted to make a determination 
that ``no further investigation was warranted'' based on a 
finding that the official lacked the state of mind required for 
the violation, unless there was ``clear and convincing 
evidence.'' \37\ Congress believed that the Attorney General 
would rarely base a determination on state of mind, noting: 
``Congress believes that the Attorney General should rarely 
close a matter under the independent counsel law based upon 
finding a lack of criminal intent, due to the subjective 
judgments required and the limited role accorded the Attorney 
General in the independent counsel process.''\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(a)(2)(A).
    \35\ The Special Division is a division of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court consists of 
three circuit court judges or justices appointed by the Chief Justice 
of the United States. No two judges may be named to the Special 
Division from the same court at the same time, and one of the judges 
must be from the District of Columbia Circuit. The judges are appointed 
for 2 year terms, with any vacancy being filled only for the remainder 
of the 2-year period. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 49.
    \36\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(b).
    \37\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(a)(2)(B)(ii).
    \38\ ``Independent Counsel Provisions: An Overview of the Operation 
of the Law,'' CRS Rept. No. 98-283, at FN 22 (Mar. 20, 1998) (citing H. 
Rept. No. 103-511, at 11 (1994)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In considering whether further investigation was warranted, 
the Attorney General was required to take into account the 
written or other established policies of the Department of 
Justice relating to the conduct and prosecution of criminal 
investigations.\39\ Had the Attorney General found reasonable 
grounds to believe that further investigation was warranted, or 
after the specified period no determination was made, the 
Attorney General was required to apply to the Special Division 
for the appointment of an independent counsel.\40\ The Special 
Division then was responsible for appointing an independent 
counsel and defining his prosecutorial jurisdiction.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(c)(1)(B).
    \40\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(c).
    \41\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 593(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the campaign finance investigation Attorney General 
Reno initiated several preliminary investigations, including 
two related to President Clinton and three related to Vice 
President Gore.\42\ Independent of those investigations, FBI 
Director Louis Freeh and Task Force Supervising Attorney 
Charles La Bella recommended that the Attorney General request 
the appointment of an independent counsel based on their 
opinion that both the mandatory and discretionary provisions of 
the Act had been triggered. Miss Reno declined to request the 
appointment of an independent counsel in each instance.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Attorney General Reno initiated a preliminary investigation of 
President Clinton to examine whether he violated 18 U.S.C. section 607. 
The investigation related to alleged fundraising telephone calls made 
by President Clinton from the White House. The Attorney General also 
initiated a preliminary investigation of President Clinton to examine 
the Common Cause allegations of violations of election laws. Vice 
President Gore was subject to the same preliminary investigation. Two 
additional preliminary investigations were opened on Vice President 
Gore relating to fundraising telephone calls he made from his White 
House office. The first investigation was an inquiry into whether Gore 
violated section 607. The second investigation looked into whether Gore 
made false statements to investigators during the initial preliminary 
inquiry.
    \43\ In re William Jefferson Clinton, notification to the court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(b) of results of preliminary 
investigation (Special Div. DC Cir. 1997); in re William Jefferson 
Clinton, notification to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(b) of 
results of preliminary investigation (Special Div. DC Cir. 1998); in re 
Albert Gore, Jr., notification to the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
Sec. 592(b) of results of preliminary investigation (Special Div. DC 
Cir. 1997); in re Albert Gore, Jr., notification to the court pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(b) of results of preliminary investigation 
(Special Div. DC Cir. 1998); in re Albert Gore, Jr., notification to 
the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(b) of results of preliminary 
investigation (Special Div. DC Cir. 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. A Rocky Start: Early Conflicts in the Justice Department's Campaign 
                         Finance Investigation

1. Reno's Job ``Hangs in the Balance''

    After the November 1996 elections, Attorney General Reno 
was called on to decide whether to appoint an independent 
counsel to look into allegations of campaign finance abuses. As 
early as October 9, 1996, public interest group Common Cause 
requested that an independent counsel be appointed to 
investigate allegations of abuses on the part of both 
Republicans and Democrats.\44\ Common Cause also argued that 
Attorney General Reno and the Department of Justice had a 
conflict in conducting any criminal probe of campaign 
fundraising.\45\ Soon thereafter, Attorney General Reno 
received requests from the chairmen of four House committees 
and Senator John McCain for her to appoint an independent 
counsel.\46\ Pressure was building for a thorough investigation 
into the allegations of campaign finance abuses that were 
appearing daily in newspapers across the country. Many people 
believed that because the investigation would necessarily focus 
on political activities and the actions of President Clinton, 
Vice President Gore, and other high-ranking administration 
officials, the Attorney General would have a conflict were she 
to conduct the investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Common Cause (visited Sept. 9, 2000) /
www.commoncause.org/publications/1196jusstm.htm>. Common Cause alleged 
that both the Clinton and Dole campaigns violated Federal election laws 
by using their respective party committees to purchase TV 
advertisements, while circumventing the spending limits imposed on the 
candidates. Id.
    \45\ Id.
    \46\ Connie Cass, ``Democratic Committee Bows to Pressure and 
Releases Financial Data,'' AP, Oct. 29, 1996. Chairman Bill Clinger, 
Chairman Benjamin Gilman, Chairman Gerald Solomon, and Chairman Bill 
Thomas all requested that the Attorney General appoint an independent 
counsel to look into allegations of improprieties in Democrats' 
fundraising, including allegations of illegal contributions from 
foreign individuals and corporations. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While Reno weighed whether to appoint an independent 
counsel for campaign finance, President Clinton was determining 
which members of his Cabinet would remain for his second term. 
Attorney General Reno already had stated publicly that she 
would like to remain in her position. However, the President 
refused to comment on whether he would retain Reno as Attorney 
General.\47\ In fact, the press reported that ``White House 
aides, meanwhile, have privately said they wish Reno would 
leave in part because of her readiness to send allegations of 
official misconduct to independent counsels.''\48\ The White 
House was making it clear, through the press, that the 
President was contemplating appointing a new Attorney General, 
in part because Reno had requested too many independent 
counsels. The Attorney General serves at the pleasure of the 
President, and the President made it clear that he did not want 
an independent counsel appointed for the campaign finance 
investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ President William J. Clinton, White House press conference 
(Nov. 8, 1996).
    \48\ Carolyn Skorneck, ``Attorney General Rejects Call for Special 
Prosecutor,'' AP, Nov. 8, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Instead of appointing an independent counsel, in late 
November 1996, Attorney General Reno created a ``Task Force'' 
to investigate the allegations of campaign finance abuses in 
the 1996 election cycle. At the beginning of the investigation, 
the Task Force was nothing more than a few attorneys in the 
Public Integrity Section (PIS) of the Department of Justice. 
PIS was headed by Lee Radek, who Attorney General Reno placed 
in charge of the investigation.\49\ As Chief of PIS, Radek was 
responsible for conducting preliminary investigations under the 
Independent Counsel Act and making recommendations to the 
Attorney General on its application.\50\ Radek made his views 
on the Act very clear, stating in an interview that 
``[i]nstitutionally, the independent counsel statute is an 
insult.'' \51\ He added, ``[i]t's a clear enunciation by the 
legislative branch that we cannot be trusted on certain species 
of cases.'' \52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ GAO report at 20.
    \50\ GAO report at 27.
    \51\ Jeffrey Goldberg, ``What Is Janet Reno Thinking?,'' NY Times 
Magazine, July 6, 1997, at 30.
    \52\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FBI Director Louis Freeh expressed to Attorney General Reno 
his reservations about Radek and PIS' involvement in the 
campaign finance investigation. Director Freeh's concerns 
stemmed from a conversation between Lee Radek and FBI Deputy 
Director William J. Esposito prior to the integration of the 
Department of Justice and FBI agents into a formal Task Force. 
A meeting between Esposito and Radek took place on November 20, 
1996, the same time that the media was reporting on the 
precarious nature of Reno's position.\53\ They met to discuss, 
among other things, the campaign finance investigation.\54\ Mr. 
Esposito testified that at the end of his meeting with Radek 
that, ``[Radek] made the statement that there is a lot of 
pressure on him [Radek], and the Attorney General's job could 
hang in the balance.'' \55\ Esposito further testified that 
Radek linked the Attorney General's job status with the 
pressure on Radek and PIS.\56\ Concerned about the statement, 
Esposito reported the comment to Director Freeh.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ ``The Justice Department's Implementation of the Independent 
Counsel Act,'' hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 
106th Cong. 38 (2000) (testimony of William J. Esposito) (preliminary 
transcript).
    \54\ Id.
    \55\ Id. at 39.
    \56\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Radek's comment raised the question of whether he was able 
to be an impartial decisionmaker in the campaign finance 
investigation. Director Freeh also was troubled by the 
statement, and raised the issue with the Attorney General.\57\ 
In a memorandum outlining his conversation with Attorney 
General Reno, Director Freeh indicated that he told the 
Attorney General that, ``those comments would be enough for me 
to take [Radek] and the Criminal Division off the case 
completely.'' \58\ Furthermore, Radek himself later 
acknowledged that he was aware of rumors that the White House 
might not retain Reno as Attorney General during the second 
term. Radek stated, ``I recall press speculation that the 
possibility of her being the Attorney General into the second 
term might be being held up because the White House was 
concerned about the way she was doing her job[,] including this 
campaign finance investigation.'' \59\ Freeh's concerns 
regarding Radek were justified considering the timing of the 
comments and the position Radek assumed in the investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ Memorandum from Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, to William Esposito, Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (Dec. 9, 1996) (exhibit 1).
    \58\ Id.
    \59\ ``Oversight Hearing on 1996 Campaign Finance Investigation,'' 
hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and 
the Courts of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 18 
(2000) (Federal Document Clearing House transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to Director Freeh, the Attorney General said that 
she would look into the matter of Radek's comment.\60\ However, 
none of the individuals who were parties to the conversation 
were contacted about the statement.\61\ In fact, after her 
conversation with Director Freeh, the Attorney General formally 
established the Campaign Financing Task Force and placed it 
under the auspices of the PIS, making Radek the single most 
important attorney in the campaign finance investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ ``The Justice Department's Implementation of the Independent 
Counsel Act,'' hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 
106th Cong. 45 (2000) (testimony of William J. Esposito) (preliminary 
transcript).
    \61\ Id. at 46-48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The only follow-up Attorney General Reno ever conducted on 
Radek's comment occurred when the Freeh memo came to light, 
3\1/2\ years after it was written. Once Director Freeh's 
concerns were made public, in May 2000, Deputy Attorney General 
Eric Holder and even Attorney General Reno herself, contacted 
Esposito and Radek to determine what they recalled about the 
meeting.\62\ Such attention from the highest levels appears to 
indicate that the Attorney General realized that her disregard 
for Director Freeh's concerns created the perception that the 
Justice Department purposely ignored the conflict. As for the 
Attorney General, she stated that she did not recall the 
meeting to which Director Freeh referred in his memorandum, and 
did not recall any concerns raised regarding PIS or Lee 
Radek.\63\ Likewise, Radek did not recall his meeting with FBI 
Deputy Director Esposito.\64\ When called before House and 
Senate committees to testify about his alleged statement, Radek 
insisted that he could not recall the meeting with Esposito, 
but nevertheless said that he would not have made a statement 
linking pressure and the Attorney General's job ``hanging in 
the balance.'' \65\ It is difficult to understand how Radek was 
able to both state affirmatively that he had no recollection of 
the Esposito meeting and be certain that he did not make the 
statement attributed to him in Director Freeh's memo.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Id. at 46-48, 50.
    \63\ Attorney General Janet Reno, press conference (May 19, 2000).
    \64\ ``The Justice Department's Implementation of the Independent 
Counsel Act,'' hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 
106th Cong. 42 (2000) (testimony of Lee Radek) (preliminary 
transcript).
    \65\ Id.; ``Oversight Hearing on 1996 Campaign Finance 
Investigation,'' hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. 17 (2000) (Federal Document Clearing House 
transcript).
    \66\ ``Oversight Hearing on 1996 Campaign Finance Investigation,'' 
hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and 
the Courts of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 22 
(2000) (Federal Document Clearing House transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. PIS Control of the Task Force

    Relations between the FBI and Department of Justice were 
somewhat shaky in the beginning. Prior to any formalization of 
the Task Force, the Department of Justice asserted to the 
public and the media that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) was the lead agency on the campaign finance 
investigation.\67\ However, the FBI had yet to be contacted by 
the Justice Department. Despite the assertions about the FBI, 
PIS had been working with Commerce Department Inspector General 
investigators on the campaign finance matter.\68\ FBI Director 
Louis Freeh stated that he told the Attorney General, ``it 
didn't make sense for PIS to call the FBI the `lead agency' in 
this matter while operating a `Task Force' with DOC [Commerce] 
IGs who were conducting interviews of key witnesses without the 
knowledge or participation of the FBI.'' \69\ Freeh then 
recommended that the FBI and ``hand-picked DOJ attorneys from 
outside Main Justice'' conduct the investigation.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ Exhibit 1.
    \68\ Id.
    \69\ Id. See also Daniel Klaidman, ``Dodging A Bullet (Attorney 
General Janet Reno and the Investigation into Allegedly Illicit 
Fundraising by the Democratic Party),'' Newsweek, Dec. 9, 1996, at 24.
    \70\ Exhibit 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Director Freeh also expressed general concern over the 
prospect of PIS controlling the investigation. In his 
memorandum, Director Freeh indicated that he told the Attorney 
General that ``in [his] view, PIS was not capable of conducting 
the thorough, aggressive kind of investigation which was 
required.'' \71\ The Attorney General disregarded Director 
Freeh's recommendation and formally installed the investigation 
in PIS, headed by Radek. Although it was apparent that the 
campaign finance investigation would be followed very closely 
by the public, the media, and Congress, Radek appointed a 
junior PIS trial attorney, Laura Ingersoll, to lead the 
investigation. It appeared that the Justice Department was 
setting the investigation up to fail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A prime example of PIS' attitude toward the investigation 
and the Independent Counsel Act is the early investigation of 
Vice President Gore's fundraiser at the Hsi Lai Temple in Los 
Angeles. After the media reported allegations of the Vice 
President's involvement in the fundraiser at the Buddhist 
temple, the local U.S. Attorney's Office in California 
consulted with Main Justice and was given approval to 
investigate the matter on October 17, 1996.\72\ In the 
following 2 weeks Steve Mansfield, the Assistant U.S. Attorney 
assigned to the matter, actively investigated it. However, 
shortly before the election, Lee Radek informed the U.S. 
Attorney's Office that Main Justice, through PIS, was taking 
the case away from them.\73\ Radek indicated that PIS would 
handle the case because the independent counsel statute had 
been implicated.\74\ In an effort to continue his 
investigation, Mansfield vainly objected to PIS' effort to take 
the case away.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\ See letter from Lee J. Radek, Chief, Public Integrity Section, 
U.S. Department of Justice, to Steven E. Zipperstein, Chief Assistant 
U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Central District of California 
(Nov. 1, 1996).
    \73\ Memorandum from Craig C. Donsanto, Public Integrity Section, 
U.S. Department of Justice, to Lee J. Radek, Chief, Public Integrity 
Section, U.S. Department of Justice (Nov. 1, 1996).
    \74\ Id.
    \75\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What is even more troubling is that, after having taken the 
case away from the Central District, under the pretext of an 
investigation to determine whether the application of the 
Independent Counsel Act was appropriate, PIS never conducted 
the threshold inquiry. PIS' inaction gave the members of the 
Hsi Lai Temple the opportunity to destroy documents central to 
the investigation. Had they allowed the U.S. Attorney's Office 
to conduct the investigation, they surely would have been able 
to quickly subpoena documents and witnesses.
    In order to determine whether PIS made any attempt to 
investigate the matter, the committee subpoenaed the Justice 
Department's file on the Hsi Lai preliminary investigation. In 
response, the committee received a stack of news clippings.\76\ 
There was obviously no investigation. It appears that PIS took 
the case away from the U.S. Attorney's office on a pretext. 
Radek's misleading explanations were typical of his handling of 
the fundraising investigation. He admittedly disliked the 
Independent Counsel Act, and had already acknowledged that he 
was under a lot of pressure regarding the Independent Counsel 
Act provisions. His actions with regard to the Hsi Lai Temple 
were representative of the manner in which Radek conducted 
himself during the campaign finance investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ Subpoena from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice 
(June 26, 2000) (seeking all records relating to any possible 
consideration of the appointment of an independent counsel in the Hsi 
Lai Temple matter). All correspondence between and subpoenas to the 
Department of Justice are contained in appendix I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Radek's control over the campaign finance investigation 
caused some friction with the FBI as well. From the beginning, 
the working relationship between the Department of Justice and 
FBI was strained.\77\ DOJ attorneys and FBI investigators 
disagreed over the proper approach to the investigation, and an 
atmosphere of mistrust developed.\78\ One of the problems was 
that PIS did not have any plan for investigating the campaign 
finance matter.\79\ Radek assumed that PIS could conduct the 
campaign finance investigation as he would conduct any other 
PIS investigation.\80\ In so doing, he underestimated the 
nature and breadth of the investigation. Unfortunately for PIS, 
its normal caseload did not compare with the campaign finance 
investigation. It ultimately became clear that PIS and 
Ingersoll were unable to handle such a complicated 
investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ GAO report at 1.
    \78\ Id. at 1.
    \79\ Id. at 20.
    \80\ Id. at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Attorney General Reno eventually was forced to follow 
Director Freeh's original recommendation. The Task Force under 
PIS was failing and the structure had to be changed. The GAO 
investigation of the management and oversight, operations, and 
results of the Task Force reported:

        In the fall of 1997, displeased with the 
        investigation's slow pace, disclosures in the press 
        about critical leads not being pursued, and internal 
        frictions, the Attorney General and the FBI Director 
        changed the Task Force's leadership. Subsequently, the 
        Task Force's oversight structure was streamlined by the 
        removal of [the Public Integrity Section] from its 
        leadership role and the commitment of additional staff 
        and information management resources to get the 
        investigation on track.\81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ Id. at 5.

In September 1997, Charles La Bella, first Assistant U.S. 
Attorney in San Diego, and James DeSarno, a former Special 
Agent-in-Charge of the FBI's New Orleans Field Office were 
placed in charge of the Task Force. After La Bella's arrival, 
Lee Radek and PIS were taken out of the direct chain of 
command.\82\ However, Radek maintained primary responsibility 
for threshold inquiries and preliminary investigations under 
the Independent Counsel Act.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ Id. at 37.
    \83\ ``The Justice Department's Implementation of the Independent 
Counsel Act,'' hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 
106th Cong. 151-152 (2000) (testimony of Lee Radek) (preliminary 
transcript). The GAO report indicated that, ``Mr. Radek continued a 
direct role whenever Independent Counsel statute issues arose, as PI 
maintained primary responsibility for initial inquiries and preliminary 
investigations related to the statute.'' GAO report at 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It was the application of the independent counsel statute 
that remained one of the main areas of contention between the 
Department of Justice and FBI.\84\ Radek categorized the 
conflict as disagreements over the threshold of information 
required to trigger a recommendation for an independent 
counsel.\85\ The FBI agreed, indicating that senior FBI 
officials believed Radek's criteria for what information was 
needed to trigger the seeking of an independent counsel were 
too stringent.\86\ The FBI had been wary of its interaction 
with the Department of Justice on independent counsel issues, 
as it was excluded from the independent counsel decisionmaking 
process previously.\87\ Director Freeh wrote, ``[i]t was 
unfortunate that DOJ declined to allow the FBI to play any role 
in the Independent Counsel referral deliberations.'' \88\ By 
late-1997, Director Freeh made a formal recommendation that the 
Attorney General appoint an independent counsel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ GAO report at 4.
    \85\ Id. at 24.
    \86\ Id. at 25.
    \87\ Exhibit 1.
    \88\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Attorney General Reno Changed Her Interpretation of the Independent 
                              Counsel Act

    To understand how the Attorney General was able to 
consistently refuse to appoint an independent counsel in the 
campaign financing investigation, it is necessary to understand 
her interpretation of the Independent Counsel Act. In addition, 
it has to be pointed out that her interpretation has not been 
consistent. Attorney General Reno made numerous appointments 
under the discretionary provision of the statute that she never 
could have made under her present day interpretation. Her first 
articulation of her revised analysis was in response to a March 
1997, Senate Judiciary Committee request that she appoint an 
independent counsel in the campaign finance matter.\89\ Reno 
responded 1 month later, declining to request the appointment 
of an independent counsel.\90\ In the response, she laid out 
several points about the Independent Counsel Act itself, upon 
which her refusal was based.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin G. Hatch and nine 
other Republican Members made the request. See letter from Janet Reno, 
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Orrin G. Hatch, 
chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 14, 1997).
    \90\ Id.
    \91\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Appearance of a Conflict Versus Actual Conflict

    The key to Reno's arguments was her interpretation of the 
statute itself. If one were to follow the simple language of 
the statute, it would have been difficult for Reno to explain 
why she could not use the discretionary provision of the Act to 
request an independent counsel. Reno needed to interpret the 
statute in such a way that she could argue that the Act did not 
permit her to invoke the discretionary clause. Breaking with 
her own previous interpretations on the discretionary provision 
of the Act, Attorney General Reno stated in her letter to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee that ``[u]nder the Act, I must 
conclude that there is a potential for an actual conflict of 
interest, rather than merely an appearance of a conflict of 
interest.'' \92\ In the past, she had requested the appointment 
of independent counsels based on an appearance of a conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Department of 
Justice, to Orrin G. Hatch, chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 
14, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Reno repeated her new understanding of the discretionary 
provision in her May 1997 testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, where she was questioned about her 
interpretation.\93\ In her testimony, she repeated her 
conclusions regarding the discretionary provision, using the 
exact words of her letter.\94\ Reno expressly relied on the 
legislative history of a single proposed amendment to the 
Independent Counsel Act for her interpretation.\95\ She 
testified regarding her theory:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \93\ ``Oversight of the Department of Justice,'' hearing before the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 12 (1997).
    \94\ She stated that she ``must conclude that there is a potential 
for an actual conflict of interest rather than merely an appearance of 
a conflict of interest.'' ``Oversight of the Department of Justice,'' 
hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 12 
(1997) (testimony of Attorney General Janet Reno).
    \95\ Id.

        The Congress in 1994, under the reauthorization, 
        considered a proposal for a more flexible standard for 
        invoking the discretionary clause which would have 
        permitted its use to refer any matter to an independent 
        counsel when the purposes of the Act would be served. 
        Congress rejected this suggestion, explaining that such 
        a standard would substantially lower the threshold for 
        use of the general discretionary provision.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ Id.

However, as support for her argument, Reno was relying on 
negative legislative history.\97\ She attempted to define what 
Congress intended by describing what it did not do, rather than 
what it did. The Justice Department itself had rejected the 
practice, noting that it is not useful as an interpretive 
tool.\98\ In fact, a Justice Department report to the Attorney 
General states, ``[r]ejection is doubtful evidence of the 
legislative intent, let alone the meaning of the statute as 
enacted.'' \99\ Furthermore, the Attorney General neglected to 
mention the report language supporting the idea of an apparent 
conflict of interest. The legislative history is replete with 
statements of intent that completely contradict the Attorney 
General's interpretation.\100\ For example, the Senate report 
accompanying the 1982 amendments to the Act stated, ``[t]he 
Committee recognizes that there may be instances when 
investigations by the Attorney General of persons not covered 
by the Act may create an actual or apparent conflict of 
interest.'' \101\ Not only did Reno have a problem with her 
interpretation of the Act's legislative history, she had her 
own prior statements, as well as prior requests she had made 
for the appointment of independent counsels to explain away.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ Furthermore, Attorney General Reno was relying on the 
statement of only one Congressman, Representative Hall, for her 
argument.
    \98\ ``Using and Misusing Legislative History: A Re-Evaluation of 
the Status of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation,'' report 
to the Attorney General (Jan. 5, 1989). The report states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Rejection of proposed language does not necessarily imply 
      an intent to reject its substance. Language may be rejected 
      because it is perceived to be superfluous and potentially 
      damaging to the prospects for passage of the bill. If the 
      perception that it is superfluous is correct, the actual 
      meaning of the statute is the same without the language as 
      it is with it; rejection of that language cannot imply that 
      the enacted statute should be interpreted to mean something 
      different. Id. at 107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ Id. at 108.
    \100\ For examples of such statements, see section I.A. above.
    \101\ ``Using and Misusing Legislative History: A Re-Evaluation of 
the Status of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation,'' report 
to the Attorney General, at 17-18 (Jan. 5, 1989) (citing S. Rept. No. 
97-469, at 9 (1981)) (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When called upon to testify before the Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee on May 14, 1993, regarding the 
reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act, Janet Reno 
stated:

        It is absolutely essential for the public to have 
        confidence in the system and you cannot do that when 
        there is conflict or an appearance of conflict in the 
        person who is, in effect, the Chief prosecutor. There 
        is an inherent conflict here, and I think that that is 
        why this Act is so important.

           *         *         *         *         *

        The Independent Counsel Act was designed to avoid even 
        the appearance of impropriety in the consideration of 
        allegations of misconduct by high-level Executive 
        Branch officials and to prevent, as I have said, the 
        actual or perceived conflicts of interest. The Act thus 
        served as a vehicle to further the public's perception 
        of fairness and thoroughness in such matters, and to 
        avert even the most subtle influences that may appear 
        in an investigation of highly placed Executive 
        officials.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \102\ ``To Reauthorize the Independent Counsel Law for an 
Additional 5 Years, and for Other Purposes,'' hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 12 (1993) (statement of 
Attorney General Reno).

    After the reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act on 
June 30, 1994, the Attorney General, adhering to her original 
interpretation, referred at least four matters to an 
independent counsel that fell under the discretionary provision 
of the Act. She first referred what has become known as the 
Whitewater matter. In that case, she requested the independent 
counsel under the political conflict of interest provision 
because the individuals under investigation were friends and 
former business partners of the President and Mrs. Clinton. 
Similarly, under the discretionary provision, Attorney General 
Reno asked that the jurisdiction of the Whitewater Independent 
Counsel be expanded to include an investigation of former 
Assistant to the President for Management and Administration 
David Watkins for the Travel Office matter.\103\ David Watkins 
did not satisfy any of the requirements for the mandatory 
provision of the Act, and had left the White House's employ 
several years earlier. Several months after the Watkins 
referral, the Attorney General again requested that the 
Whitewater Independent Counsel's jurisdiction be expanded to 
include an investigation of Anthony Marceca, an investigator 
with the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division who had been 
detailed to the White House. The only political conflict of 
interest Mr. Marceca, or any of these individuals, posed to the 
Attorney General or the Justice Department were their 
connection to the White House. Finally, the Attorney General 
requested that the Whitewater Independent Counsel's 
jurisdiction be expanded to include an investigation of a 
perjury allegation against former Counsel to the President 
Bernard Nussbaum. Nussbaum left the White House nearly 3 years 
earlier. As with all of the prior investigations, Nussbaum did 
not fall under the mandatory provision of the Act. The Attorney 
General had to make the determination that there was a 
political conflict of interest for her to investigate the 
McDougals, David Watkins, Anthony Marceca, and Bernard 
Nussbaum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ Prior to joining the White House staff, Watkins had also 
worked on President Clinton's 1992 campaign.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is obvious that the Attorney General was applying the 
standard of an apparent conflict in these earlier independent 
counsel appointments. Had she been applying the actual conflict 
standard she surely would not have come to the conclusion that 
she had an actual conflict of interest with individuals such as 
the McDougals, David Watkins, Bernie Nussbaum, or Anthony 
Marceca, but not with any of the individuals involved in the 
campaign finance investigation. Her conflict, or perceived 
conflict, with those individuals for whom she did recommend an 
independent counsel was based on their relationship with 
President Clinton or the White House generally. The most 
glaring example is Anthony Marceca, a low-level detailee from 
the Department of Defense. It is laughable that Reno would 
determine that Marceca posed a conflict of interest for her 
while fundraisers for the DNC and friends of the President, 
such as John Huang and Charlie Trie, did not. By changing her 
interpretation, Reno set the bar for appointing an independent 
counsel even higher for the campaign finance investigation than 
previous investigations.

2. Standard for Initiating a Preliminary Investigation

    Reno also raised the bar by ignoring the statutory language 
of the discretionary provision, and instead applying a higher 
standard for initiating a preliminary investigation. In 
interpreting the discretionary provision of the Independent 
Counsel Act, the Attorney General stated, contrary to the 
statutory language, that:

        If, on the other hand, I receive specific and credible 
        evidence that a person not covered by the mandatory 
        provisions of the Act has committed a crime and I 
        determine that a conflict of interest exists with 
        respect to the investigation of that person, I may--but 
        need not--commence a preliminary investigation pursuant 
        to the provisions of the Act.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Department of 
Justice, to Orrin G. Hatch, chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
3 (Apr. 14, 1997) (emphasis added).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the statute reads:

        When the Attorney General determines that an 
        investigation or prosecution of a person by the 
        Department of Justice may result in a personal, 
        financial, or political conflict of interest, the 
        Attorney General may conduct a preliminary 
        investigation of such person in accordance with section 
        592 if the Attorney General receives information 
        sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether 
        that person may have violated federal criminal law. . . 
        .\105\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591(c)(1) (emphasis added).

Under Reno's standard, before initiating a preliminary 
investigation under the discretionary provision, she needed to 
have specific and credible evidence that a crime was actually 
committed. However, under the language of the statute, 
information that a crime may have been committed was 
sufficient.
    The original independent counsel provisions of the Ethics 
in Government Act of 1978, did require that in order to trigger 
a preliminary investigation, ``the Attorney General receive[] 
specific information that a person has committed a violation. . 
. .'' \106\ However, in 1982, the independent counsel 
provisions were reauthorized and amended.\107\ At that time, 
Congress changed the name from special prosecutor to 
independent counsel, and changed the requirement for triggering 
a preliminary investigation to ``grounds to investigate whether 
a person may have violated . . .'' \108\ The accompanying 
Senate report clarified:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591 (1978).
    \107\ Public Law 97-409.
    \108\ Id.

        It cannot be expected at this first step in the process 
        that the Attorney General could or should determine 
        that a criminal act has been committed. The purpose of 
        the change is to make it clear that the Attorney 
        General should proceed under the Act if the information 
        indicates that a violation of criminal law may have 
        taken place.\109\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ S. Rept. No. 97-469 (1981).

The legislative history of the provision clearly shows that 
Congress intended to create a lower threshold, and 
intentionally replaced the language ``has committed'' with 
``may have.''
    Throughout the campaign finance investigation Reno used her 
creative analysis of the statute to support her argument that 
she did not create a conflict by investigating. However, both 
FBI Director Freeh and Task Force Supervising Attorney Charles 
La Bella wrote detailed memoranda to the Attorney General 
explaining why they believed that she did have a conflict of 
interest, and therefore must appoint an independent 
counsel.\110\ They pointed out that the Task Force 
investigation was leading to the highest levels of the White 
House. Nevertheless, Attorney General Reno adopted a very 
narrow view of the language of the independent counsel statute, 
allowing her to claim that the campaign finance investigation 
had not yet reached the legal threshold for applying the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \110\ Memorandum from Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, to Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Department of 
Justice (Nov. 24, 1997); memorandum from Charles La Bella, Supervising 
Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice Campaign Financing Task Force, and 
James DeSarno, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to 
Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, and Louis J. 
Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, (July 16, 1998). Both 
memoranda also recommend that the Attorney General recommend the 
appointment of an independent counsel pursuant to the mandatory 
provisions of the Act. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     D. Memoranda from FBI Director Louis J. Freeh and Task Force 
Supervising Attorney Charles La Bella Recommending that an Independent 
                          Counsel Be Appointed

    Both FBI Director Freeh and Task Force Supervising Attorney 
Charles La Bella believed that the Attorney General was 
required, under the Independent Counsel Act, to request the 
appointment of an independent counsel in the campaign finance 
matter.\111\ In detailed memoranda, they applied the facts of 
the case to the independent counsel statute and came to the 
same conclusions. As the head of the FBI, Director Freeh was 
the chief investigator for the campaign finance investigation, 
and was familiar with both the facts and the law. Charles La 
Bella was Reno's handpicked choice for the Supervising Attorney 
position. La Bella coordinated the entire investigation, giving 
him the benefit of a comprehensive view of the matter. Freeh 
and La Bella were the two individuals with perhaps the best 
grasp of the investigation as a whole. Nevertheless, Attorney 
General Reno ignored their counsel. She insisted on 
compartmentalizing the investigation, viewing from a vacuum 
only one issue at a time and drawing no connections between the 
massive illegal fundraising and the push on the part of the 
administration to raise unprecedented amounts of money.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \111\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. The Freeh Memorandum

    In the fall of 1997, Attorney General Reno was confronted 
with her first decisions under the Independent Counsel Act in 
the campaign finance investigation. The initial question was 
whether to initiate preliminary investigations of Vice 
President Gore and President Clinton for fundraising telephone 
calls made from the White House.\112\ Reno agreed to the 
preliminary investigations, and was soon faced with making the 
final decision on whether to request the appointment of an 
independent counsel. Prior to her decision, FBI Director Freeh 
forwarded her a memorandum offering his recommendation that an 
independent counsel be appointed.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \112\ See memorandum from Mark M. Richard, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Janet Reno, Attorney 
General, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 29, 1997) (recommending that 
the Attorney General initiate a preliminary investigation into whether 
Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., violated Federal criminal law, 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 607, requiring that a preliminary investigation be 
commenced); memorandum from Mark M. Richard, Acting Assistant Attorney 
General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Janet Reno, Attorney General, 
U.S. Department of Justice (Oct. 14, 1997) (recommending that the 
Attorney General initiate a preliminary investigation into whether 
President William Jefferson Clinton violated Federal criminal law, 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 607, in soliciting contributions to the Democratic National 
Committee from his office in the White House).
    \113\ See memorandum from Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, to Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. Department of 
Justice (Nov. 24, 1997) (exhibit 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The November 24, 1997, memorandum from FBI Director Louis 
J. Freeh outlined his evaluation of the campaign finance 
investigation to date.\114\ He recounted the purpose and 
structure of the independent counsel statute, citing the 
legislative history. He reviewed Congress' intent in passing 
the legislation, outlining the justifications for the Act 
itself.\115\ Freeh, quoting from the original Senate report on 
the Act, repeated the reasons for the Act's enactment: the 
Department of Justice has difficulty investigating alleged 
criminal activity by high-level government officials; it is too 
much to ask for any person that he investigate his superior; 
and, the appearance of conflict is as dangerous to public 
confidence in the administration of justice as true conflict 
itself.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \114\ Id.
    \115\ Id.
    \116\ Id. at 1 (quoting the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 
report upon the enactment of the Independent Counsel Act. S. Rept. No. 
100-123, at 2 (1978)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. FBI's Investigative Plan
    In order to explain the context in which the memorandum was 
written, Freeh reviewed the Task Force's investigative plan, 
which investigators had been following since early 1997.\117\ 
The Task Force had developed three distinct areas of 
investigation, which they believed were interrelated.\118\ The 
three matters were:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ See id. at 7.
    \118\ See id.

         An aggressive campaign fundraising operation 
        developed and executed by a core group of individuals 
        from the DNC and the White House, including the 
        President, the Vice President, and a number of top 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        White House advisors.

         Allegations of illegal conduct by a myriad 
        of opportunists and other individuals who gained White 
        House access in order to further their personal, 
        business, and political interests.

         Efforts by the [People's Republic of China] 
        and other countries to gain foreign policy influence by 
        illegally contributing foreign money to U.S. political 
        campaigns and to the DNC through domestic 
        conduits.\119\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \119\ Id.

    Director Freeh explained that, ``[t]he core group 
investigative plan was based on a theory that most of the 
alleged campaign abuses flowed, directly or indirectly from the 
all-out effort by the White House and the DNC to raise money.'' 
One of the reasons for this was the President's decision to put 
in place an early and expensive media campaign. In order to pay 
for all of the television airtime and commercials they wanted 
to run, Clinton/Gore '96 and the DNC had to raise huge sums of 
money. Director Freeh pointed out that it was this need for 
money that led to things such as the White House coffees, 
overnights in the Lincoln bedroom, Presidential perks for large 
donors, as well as the telephone solicitations by the President 
and Vice President.\120\ Freeh asserted that nearly all of the 
FBI investigators' ``investigative avenues'' were linked to the 
initiatives of the core group.\121\ That was not to say that 
Freeh believed that the core group members were necessarily 
culpable for any criminal violations, but that they should not 
be immune from investigation.\122\ Director Freeh's explanation 
of the investigation, and acknowledgment that it led to the 
``highest reaches of the White House,'' including the President 
and Vice President, seemed exactly the type of situation for 
which the Independent Counsel Act was drafted.\123\ Because of 
where the campaign finance investigation was leading the Task 
Force, the attorneys and investigators necessarily had to 
consider whether the independent counsel statute should 
apply.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \120\ Id. at 8. See H. Rept. No. 105-829 (1998) (House Committee on 
Government Reform's interim report into the campaign financing 
investigation); S. Rept. No. 105-167 (1998) (Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee final report on its investigation of illegal or 
improper activities in connection with 1996 Federal election 
campaigns.)
    \121\ Exhibit 2 at 8.
    \122\ Id.
    \123\ Id. at 2.
    \124\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Department of Justice conducted the investigation in a 
manner that avoided looking into the actions of the core group 
of individuals referred to in Freeh's memorandum.\125\ Freeh 
explained that the FBI and Department of Justice had a 
fundamental disagreement over the manner in which the 
investigation should proceed.\126\ The FBI wanted to conduct a 
top-down strategy, and focus on the core group of 
individuals.\127\ The strategy followed from the working theory 
that the majority of the abuses occurred as a result of the 
core group's effort to raise vast sums of money.\128\ In 
contrast, the Department of Justice wanted to focus on what 
Freeh referred to as the ``opportunists.'' \129\ Freeh stated 
that with such a ``bottom up'' strategy, the investigation may 
or may not ever lead to the core group.\130\ In addition, by so 
doing, the Department of Justice was assured that it most 
likely would not need to address Independent Counsel Act 
issues. Finally, in July 1997, Freeh became frustrated with the 
Department of Justice's investigation and ordered FBI agents to 
interview ``all relevant core group and DNC officials.'' \131\ 
At that time there still was no prosecutor assigned to handle 
core group issues.\132\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\ See id. at 8.
    \126\ See id.
    \127\ Id.
    \128\ Id.
    \129\ Id.
    \130\ Id.
    \131\ Id.
    \132\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. The Department of Justice's Approach to Investigating 
                    Covered Persons
    Freeh indicated that the Department of Justice attorneys in 
charge of the Task Force adopted a ``cautious approach to 
investigating covered persons.'' \133\ The Department of 
Justice attorneys were extremely reluctant to proceed into 
areas of investigation where covered persons might be 
implicated, whereas in a normal investigation, agents and 
attorneys would follow all investigative leads.\134\ Freeh 
asserted that this process led to a flawed investigation in the 
following ways:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ Id. at 9.
    \134\ Id.

        First, the Task Force has partitioned its 
        investigation, focusing on individual persons and 
        events without effectively analyzing their relationship 
        to the broader fundraising scheme. Second, the Task 
        Force attorneys sometimes have made dispositive factual 
        assumptions without investigating to see if those 
        assumptions are accurate. . . . Third, important 
        investigative areas, such as the serious allegations 
        raised by Common Cause, have never been pursued because 
        they have been tied up in lengthy threshold legal 
        analyses within the Department.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \135\ Id.

Again, this manner of investigation appears to almost 
intentionally skirt around the independent counsel process. It 
was evident that Reno refused to invoke the discretionary 
clause of the Independent Counsel Act, and the Task Force's 
investigation made it very unlikely that she would have to 
confront an allegation against a covered person.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \136\ The Justice Department did have preliminary investigations 
open on President Clinton and Vice President Gore at the time Director 
Freeh wrote his memorandum, which Director Freeh readily acknowledges. 
However, those investigations were in response to media reports that 
both the President and Vice President had made telephone calls from 
their White House offices soliciting campaign contributions. 
Ultimately, Attorney General Reno declined to request the appointment 
of an independent counsel in both cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In those instances where allegations were reviewed for the 
application of the Independent Counsel Act, they were handled 
by the Public Integrity Section.\137\ The PIS attorneys had 
very limited involvement in the Task Force's work, and were 
therefore unfamiliar with the broader investigation.\138\ Freeh 
acknowledged that the issues should have been reviewed by PIS, 
but believed that the front line investigators and attorneys 
were being excluded unnecessarily.\139\ Freeh pointed out that 
separation between PIS and the Task Force in the independent 
counsel review process became even more apparent after Attorney 
General Reno changed the Task Force leadership and took PIS out 
of its leadership role.\140\ Accordingly, the new Task Force 
leadership, Supervising Attorney Charles La Bella and Lead 
Investigator James DeSarno, had ``no meaningful role'' in 
independent counsel matters.\141\ Freeh added that the tenor of 
the weekly meetings of the Task Force leadership changed 
``markedly,'' explaining that there was no longer any 
discussion of independent counsel related issues.\142\ Although 
Freeh noted that ``the FBI has very recently received several 
DOJ drafts on pending IC matters, FBI officials have not had 
any significant role in the deliberative process.'' \143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\ Exhibit 2 at 9.
    \138\ Id.
    \139\ Id.
    \140\ Id.
    \141\ Id.
    \142\ Id. at 10.
    \143\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. Information Sufficient to Trigger the Independent 
                    Counsel Statute in the Campaign Finance 
                    Investigation
    In his memorandum, Freeh laid out the argument for 
appointing an independent counsel using the facts of the 
campaign finance investigation. Freeh connected the various 
pieces of the Task Force's investigation to what he referred to 
as an ``overall funding scheme.'' \144\ The scheme was tied 
back to the core group's fundraising, which Freeh believed had 
never been investigated properly.\145\ Freeh stated: ``As a 
starting point, the Campcon Task Force has failed to address an 
overarching issue: whether the Clinton/Gore campaign (as well 
as the Dole campaign) engaged in an illegal scheme to 
circumvent the federal campaign financing laws.'' \146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \144\ Id. at 13.
    \145\ Id.
    \146\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The allegations Freeh was referring to were based on 
allegations set forth by the public interest group Common 
Cause.\147\ In Freeh's memorandum, he focused on the manner in 
which the Clinton/Gore campaign appeared to have violated 
several election laws.\148\ He explained that in early 1995, 
the Clinton/Gore campaign agreed to engage in an ``extremely 
ambitious series of TV ads,'' which would be very expensive. 
The problem for the campaign was that it was limited in the 
amount of money it was able to spend during both the primary 
and general elections.\149\ In exchange for receiving Federal 
matching funds, a candidate for President is required to limit 
his overall campaign spending, during both the primary and 
general elections.\150\ The Federal Election Campaign Act 
(FECA), Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, and 
the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act set forth criminal 
penalties for any knowing and willful violations of the 
spending limits.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \147\ Id. at 10.
    \148\ Id.
    \149\ Id. In 1996, there was a spending limit of approximately $62 
million for the general election. Id.
    \150\ Id.
    \151\ 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 431-455; 26 U.S.C. Sec. 9031 et. seq.; 26 
U.S.C. Sec. 9001 et. seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Clinton/Gore campaign worked out a plan to use the DNC 
to purchase the advertising, effectively working around the 
spending limits imposed by accepting matching funds.\152\ The 
campaign actually controlled the advertising, from creation to 
placement, while the President personally reviewed and approved 
all of the ads.\153\ Common Cause alleged that all of the facts 
put together led to a violation of the law.\154\ The Justice 
Department's preliminary conclusion was that, ``this scheme was 
simply an act of `coordination' between the Clinton/Gore 
campaign and the DNC.'' \155\ Director Freeh argued that the 
allegations presented unprecedented legal issues that led to 
differences of opinion of the election law experts on whom the 
Task Force relied.\156\ He added that because the law was 
unclear, and that there were no established enforcement 
policies to turn to at either the Department of Justice or the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC), the case should be turned 
over to an independent counsel to make the judgment of whether 
there was a prosecutable offense.\157\ Freeh stated that, 
``[a]ny case in which there is no clear policy against 
prosecution or any arguably exceptional circumstances are 
present should be sent to a special prosecutor.'' \158\ Freeh 
believed that the two most important points that the Attorney 
General should consider in deciding whether to seek the 
appointment of an independent counsel for the Common Cause 
allegations were: ``(1) the Department has had the allegations 
for more than a year; and (2) there is virtually no chance that 
the allegations could be resolved in the course of a limited 
preliminary inquiry.'' \159\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \152\ Exhibit 2 at 11.
    \153\ Id. at. 10.
    \154\ Id. at 11.
    \155\ Id. at 11-12.
    \156\ Id. at 12.
    \157\ Id.
    \158\ Id.
    \159\ Id. at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              i. Vice President Gore and President Clinton
    Freeh believed that many of the other allegations of 
criminal or potentially criminal activity were a result of the 
overarching need for money to pay for the media campaign. He 
explained, ``[i]n addition to allegations of a broad conspiracy 
to circumvent the campaign contribution and spending limits, 
many of the other allegations that have arisen in the course of 
the investigations have a direct connection to the core group's 
fundraising scheme.'' \160\ For instance, Freeh cited the 
preliminary investigations into President Clinton and Vice 
President Gore's fundraising telephone calls from the White 
House.\161\ In the case of the Vice President, who admitted 
that he made fundraising calls from his White House office, the 
Attorney General was faced with three legal questions in 
determining whether to request the appointment of an 
independent counsel:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \160\ Id.
    \161\ Id.

         Does section 607 [of the criminal code] 
        \162\ apply to the Vice President's telephone 
        solicitations?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \162\ 18 U.S.C. section 607 makes it unlawful ``for any person to 
solicit or receive any contribution within the meaning of section 
301(8) of the FECA in any room or building occupied in the discharge of 
official duties by any [officer or employee of the United States].

         Assuming section 607 does apply, is there an 
        established DOJ policy of non prosecution of such 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        offenses?

         Assuming section 607 applies and there is no 
        established policy of non-prosecution, is further 
        investigation warranted by an independent counsel? 
        \163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \163\ Exhibit 2 at 14.

Freeh concluded that section 607 would apply under the fact 
pattern presented by the Vice President's phone calls.\164\ He 
also found that there was neither a written nor other 
established policy of non-prosecution in section 607 cases, 
primarily because the facts of the individual cases are 
determinative.\165\ Finally, Freeh acknowledged that there was 
a consensus among Department of Justice prosecutors that it was 
likely that Justice would never prosecute a case such as 
Gore's, even if there were a technical violation.\166\ However, 
Freeh pointed out that the independent counsel statute did not 
permit the Attorney General ``to simply dispose of a case 
through an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.'' \167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \164\ Id. at 15.
    \165\ Id.
    \166\ Id.
    \167\ Id. at 16. Freeh also warned against closing the case based 
on lack of intent. Freeh stated that based on the facts, one could not 
come to the conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Vice 
President had no knowledge that the money he was raising would be used 
for both ``hard'' and ``soft'' money accounts. An important distinction 
to make the argument that a violation of 18 U.S.C. section 607 
occurred. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As to the Vice President, Freeh concluded:

        The Attorney General should seek the appointment of an 
        Independent Counsel with respect to the Vice 
        President's telephone solicitations. Such an 
        appointment is warranted on two levels. The preferable 
        course of action would be to refer this matter as 
        simply one piece of a comprehensive Independent Counsel 
        investigation which focuses on the alleged scheme to 
        circumvent the campaign financing laws. . . . Viewed in 
        that context, it is essentially immaterial whether the 
        telephone solicitations sought ``hard'' money or 
        ``soft'' money, or whether they were made from public 
        space or private space. Because they were a key 
        component of the overall fundraising scheme alleged by 
        Common Cause and others, these solicitations should be 
        referred for further investigation by an Independent 
        Counsel. Such a referral could be made under either the 
        mandatory clause or as a discretionary matter.\168\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \168\ Exhibit 2 a 17.

Director Freeh took a similar position in the investigation of 
President Clinton's telephone solicitations from the White 
House residence. He acknowledged that the calls most likely 
were not a violation of section 607, however, considered them 
to be part of a larger conspiracy to circumvent the campaign 
finance laws.\169\ For this reason, Freeh believed that an 
independent counsel should be appointed, and the President's 
phone calls should be part of the investigation.\170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \169\ Id. at 18.
    \170\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              ii. White House Coffees and Overnights
    The Clinton administration regularly held fundraising 
coffees with the President and Vice President in the White 
House, invited large donors to stay overnight in the Lincoln 
bedroom, or take trips on Air Force One.\171\ Again, there was 
a question of whether the actions of the Clinton administration 
violated section 607 for fundraising on Federal property.\172\ 
Freeh believed that the coffees, overnights in the Lincoln 
bedroom, and other perks for big donors were part of the 
overall scheme that he discussed, and that they should be part 
of an independent counsel investigation.\173\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \171\ See H. Rept. No. 105-829 (1998) (House Committee on 
Government Reform's interim report into the campaign financing 
investigation); S. Rept. No. 105-167 (1998) (Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee final report on its investigation of illegal or 
improper activities in connection with 1996 Federal election 
campaigns.)
    \172\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 607. An Office of Legal Counsel opinion 
concluded that certain rooms in the White House were not covered by 
section 607 if they were used for ``personal entertaining where there 
is a history of such use and where the cost of such use is not charged 
against an account appropriating funds for official functions.'' 
Exhibit 2 at 19. Originally, the Department of Justice assumed that all 
of the coffees took place in the White House residence, without ever 
investigating whether that was the case. However, after the belated 
production of White House videotapes, it became clear that the coffees 
took place in several different rooms, including the Oval Office.
    \173\ Exhibit 2 at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              iii. Solicitation of Foreign Nationals
    In the course of the campaign finance investigation, the 
Task Force ``developed substantial evidence that money from 
foreign nationals flowed into the DNC as a result of the 
massive fundraising effort coordinated by the DNC and the White 
House.'' \174\ Freeh asserted that the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA) should apply to those contributions.\175\ 
However, early in the campaign finance investigation, the 
Attorney General came to the opposite conclusion. She reasoned 
that the foreign gifts given to the DNC were soft money, and 
that soft money did not fall within the definition of 
``contribution'' under the FECA.\176\ Freeh argued that Reno's 
legal reasoning was intensely criticized by numerous election 
law experts, and that at the very least, the issue was one of 
unsettled law.\177\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \174\ Id.
    \175\ Id. at 20. Section 441e of FECA states that:

      It shall be unlawful for a foreign national directly or 
      through any other person to make any contribution of money 
      or other thing of value, or to promise expressly or 
      impliedly to make any such contribution, in connection with 
      an election to any political office or in connection with 
      any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select 
      candidates for any political office; or for any person to 
      solicit, accept, or receive any such contribution from a 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      foreign national. 2 U.S.C. Sec. 441e.

    \176\ Exhibit 2 at 20. Contribution is defined as including, ``any 
gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of 
value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election 
for Federal office . . .'' 2 U.S.C. section 431(8)(A)(i) (emphasis 
added).
    \177\ Exhibit 2 at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Soft money is neither defined nor specifically addressed in 
the FECA, and therefore Freeh questioned whether the Department 
of Justice should have engaged in ``elaborate legal analysis'' 
in the midst of determining whether an independent counsel 
should be appointed.\178\ He also pointed out that it was 
premature for Attorney General Reno to consider all foreign 
gifts soft money.\179\ Freeh stated, ``[i]n light of the 
evidence of nearly absolute control of DNC fundraising efforts 
by the White House, there is a very real issue about whether 
the `soft money' argument is largely a sham.'' \180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \178\ Id. at 20 (quoting 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2158).
    \179\ Id. at 21.
    \180\ Id. Freeh cited to a Jan. 6, 1997, statement of the FEC 
general counsel, indicating that if money is ``used for a candidate's 
election directly, then there is no question that 441e applies.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. Additional Reasons to Appoint an Independent Counsel
              i. The DNC Was ``Commandeered'' by the White House
    Freeh pointed out that the independent counsel statute was 
established because of the campaign related abuses of 
Watergate.\181\ Top campaign officials were the only non-
government officials to be included in the mandatory provision 
of the Act because those individuals are so important to the 
individual running for President.\182\ Freeh acknowledged that 
under the statute, only the chairman and treasurer of Clinton/
Gore would be covered. However, he argued that in the campaign 
finance case, the DNC itself should trigger the discretionary 
provision of the Act:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \181\ Id. at 23.
    \182\ Id.

        It does not by its terms cover senior officers of the 
        Democratic National Committee. However, in deciding 
        whether to exercise her discretionary authority, the 
        Attorney General should consider how the DNC was used 
        during the 1996 election cycle. By essentially 
        commandeering the DNC for the purpose of getting the 
        President re-elected, the White House appears to have 
        erased the traditional lines between the President's 
        own campaign committee and the national party 
        committee. In fact, the DNC was in large part the 
        President's central re-election machine, under the 
        tight control of senior White House advisors.\183\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \183\ Id. at 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              ii. The FBI Had a Conflict in Releasing National Security 
                    Matters to the White House
    The campaign finance investigation required the Task Force 
to look into allegations of Chinese Government efforts to 
influence the United States elections.\184\ This particular 
portion of the investigation caused a conflict for both the FBI 
and Department of Justice because they had ``conflicting duties 
to (1) keep the President informed about significant national 
security matters, and (2) simultaneously keep from the White 
House certain national security information that may relate to 
the ongoing criminal investigation.'' \185\ Freeh acknowledged 
that the appointment of an independent counsel would not 
entirely alleviate the problem, but would ease the perception 
of a conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \184\ Id. at 25.
    \185\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            e. Conclusions
    Director Freeh found there was sufficient evidence under 
both the mandatory and discretionary provisions of the Act for 
Attorney General Reno to request the appointment of an 
independent counsel. Freeh argued that the Attorney General's 
interpretation of the Act, requiring an actual conflict of 
interest, was not supported by the language or the legislative 
history of the statute.\186\ Finally, he concluded by stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \186\ Id. at 27.

        The Chief Campcon investigator, Director Freeh, has 
        concluded that the investigation presents the 
        Department with a political conflict of interest. This 
        by itself does not trigger the independent counsel 
        statute, since the ultimate resolution of the conflict 
        issue rests solely with the Attorney General. However, 
        the Director's view should be a significant factor in 
        the Attorney General's continued analysis of whether to 
        invoke the discretionary provision.\187\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \187\ Id.

Attorney General Reno ultimately disregarded the arguments set 
forth in Director Freeh's memorandum. She steadfastly 
maintained that she had no actual conflict of interest, despite 
what appearances might have been.

2. The La Bella Memorandum

    Shortly before Freeh submitted his memorandum to the 
Attorney General, there was a major reorganization of the Task 
Force. The Department of Justice realized that the established 
structure of the Task Force, with PIS as the leader, was not 
able to conduct the investigation in a productive manner.\188\ 
Therefore, in September 1997, Reno brought in Charles La Bella, 
a prosecutor from outside of Main Justice, to lead the Task 
Force.\189\ La Bella stayed with the Task Force for 
approximately 1 year, leaving between July and August 
1998.\190\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \188\ GAO report at 34.
    \189\ The GAO report on the Campaign Finance Task Force found that 
``[i]n the fall of 1997, displeased with the investigator's slow pace, 
disclosures in the press that critical leads were not being pursued, 
and internal frictions plaguing CFTF, the Attorney General and FBI 
Director Freeh decided to replace CFTF's leaderhip.'' GAO report at 34.
    \190\ GAO report at 41. La Bella returned to San Diego to become 
Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of California. However, 
he was not nominated to fill the position permanently. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prior to leaving the Task Force, La Bella drafted a 94-page 
memorandum outlining the facts surrounding several different 
investigations that La Bella believed warranted the appointment 
of an independent counsel.\191\ La Bella came to the same 
conclusion as Director Freeh had nearly 8 months earlier, that 
an independent counsel should have been appointed. He also 
echoed the concepts of a ``core group'' and ``opportunists'' 
outlined in the Freeh memo. However, La Bella focused his 
summary around individuals involved in the Task Force's 
investigation, including: Harold Ickes; President Clinton; Vice 
President Gore; Hillary Rodham Clinton; and, John Huang, Marvin 
Rosen, David Mercer and the DNC.\192\ With respect to the 
individual Task Force investigations, La Bella articulated 
common themes running through each and tying them together:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \191\ Memorandum from Charles G. La Bella, Supervising Attorney, 
Campaign Financing Task Force, and James DeSarno, Assistant Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. 
Department of Justice, and Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (July 16, 1998) (exhibit 3).
    \192\ Exhibit 3.

        the desperate need to raise enormous sums of money to 
        finance a media campaign designed to bring the 
        Democratic party back from the brink after the 
        devastating Congressional losses during the 1994 
        election cycle, and the calculated use of access to the 
        White House and high level officials--including the 
        President and First Lady--by the White House, DNC and 
        Clinton/Gore '96, as leverage to extract contributions 
        from individuals who were themselves using access as a 
        means to enhance their business opportunities.\193\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \193\ Id. at 1.

La Bella, like Freeh, focused on the idea that the exploitation 
of the campaign financing laws were a direct result of the 
conditions established by the White House.
    According to La Bella, as the pressure to raise money grew, 
there was a blurring of lines between the campaign and the 
DNC--there was an intermingling of funds, resources, and 
personnel--that eventually led to violations of the campaign 
contribution laws.\194\ La Bella explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \194\ Id. at 3.

        The intentional conduct and the ``willful ignorance'' 
        uncovered by our investigations, when combined with the 
        line blurring, resulted in a situation where abuse was 
        rampant, and indeed the norm. At some point the 
        campaign was so corrupted by bloated fundraising and 
        questionable ``contributions'' that the system became a 
        caricature of itself. It is hoped that this report will 
        place in context the abuses uncovered in our 
        investigation: a system designed to raise money by 
        whatever means, and from whomever would give it, 
        without meaningful attention to the lawfulness of the 
        contributions or the manner in which the money was 
        spent.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \195\ Id. at 6.

La Bella did not reserve his criticism for only the Clinton 
administration and the DNC; he was equally critical in his 
evaluation of the manner in which the Department of Justice had 
conducted the campaign finance investigation.
            a. The Department of Justice's Investigative Approach
    The Task Force as it was run by PIS operated under a method 
of investigation which La Bella described as a ``stovepipe'' 
approach, conducting 30 to 40 investigations of individual 
targets at any given time.\196\ Each investigation was assigned 
an investigative team of agents and prosecutors who were solely 
responsible for that particular investigation, and necessarily 
focused on its own issue.\197\ La Bella expressed concern that 
while each team might have been aware of other teams' 
overlapping activities, there had never been an overall 
review.\198\ Likewise, when the Attorney General and her 
advisers viewed the results of the investigation, they too 
focused on it one allegation at a time. Rather than viewing the 
entire ``landscape'' of allegations against covered persons, 
PIS, which had primary authority for the Act, viewed each 
allegation independently, making it difficult to trigger the 
application of the Act.\199\ La Bella recommended an approach 
that looked at all of the allegations in a broader 
context.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \196\ Id. at 6. La Bella indicated that there were several 
investigations where key players and themes were consistent, such as 
the investigations of Johnny Chung, Maria Hsia, Charlie Trie, Mark 
Jimenez, Howard Glicken, and John Huang. Id.
    \197\ Id.
    \198\ Id. at 7.
    \199\ Id.
    \200\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The memorandum was La Bella's attempt to bring all the 
pieces of the investigation together to form a whole picture. 
Upon doing so, he remarked that the information developed to 
that point presented ``the earmarks of a loose enterprise 
employing different actors at different levels who share a 
common goal: bring in the money.'' \201\ La Bella believed that 
such a situation should trigger the Independent Counsel Act. 
However, in practical terms, nobody at the Task Force had ever 
looked at the overall investigation to determine whether all 
the pieces of information put together might trigger the Act. 
That is, when viewed as a whole, whether there was specific 
information from a credible source that a covered person may 
have violated a Federal criminal law. La Bella asserted that 
each time such an investigation was suggested, it was rejected 
based on the claim that such an investigation could only be 
conducted as a preliminary investigation under the Act.\202\ 
The Department of Justice then insisted that a preliminary 
investigation could only be initiated if there were ``specific 
and credible evidence that a potential criminal violation has 
occurred.'' \203\ However, the Justice Department's argument 
was circular. The Task Force was unable to look for information 
on covered persons unless there was a preliminary 
investigation, but could not initiate a preliminary 
investigation without specific and credible evidence; and, in 
order to find evidence one had to investigate. Obviously, with 
those limitations placed on the Task Force, investigations 
relating to covered persons would go nowhere. The Task Force 
had to hope that information on covered individuals would just 
appear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \201\ Id.
    \202\ Id. at 7-8.
    \203\ Id. at 8. La Bella took issue with the Department of 
Justice's use of the term ``evidence,'' which was not in the statutory 
language. He believed it created a higher threshold for preliminary 
investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The information in the La Bella memo was information that 
the Task Force already had. However, La Bella attempted to put 
it in the context of the entire investigation.\204\ Having done 
that, La Bella was able to distinguish alarming patterns 
running through each investigation. Were he to have reviewed 
the individual actions in an investigative vacuum, they might 
have appeared innocuous.\205\ La Bella remarked:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \204\ Id.
    \205\ Id.

        This is especially true with respect to the conduct of 
        senior White House officials and key DNC and Clinton/
        Gore officials. These individuals make brief, albeit 
        key, appearances in the individual investigations. 
        While their participation in a single investigation 
        generally falls short of a knowing participation in 
        potential criminal conduct, the sum of their 
        appearances results in a pattern of conduct worthy of 
        investigation.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \206\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. The Department of Justice Did Not Apply Thresholds of 
                    Investigation Uniformly
              i. Initiating a Preliminary Investigation
    The Attorney General instructed the Task Force to ``leave 
no stone unturned.'' \207\ The Task Force was able to open an 
investigation on an uncovered person ``based upon a 
determination that there is an allegation which, if true, may 
present a violation of federal law.'' \208\ Although the 
threshold was admittedly low, the Department of Justice had 
articulated ``compelling'' reasons why it was the most 
appropriate policy for the campaign finance investigation:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \207\ Id. at 9.
    \208\ Id.

        the shortened statue of limitations for election 
        violations; the rash of potential illegal activities 
        presented during the 1996 election cycle and the 
        resulting political crisis; the apparent injection of 
        foreign money into our political system; the widespread 
        circumvention of existing election law restrictions; 
        the exposure of gaps in the law which permitted 
        wholesale circumvention of federal election laws; and 
        the possible participation--or willful blindness--of 
        public officials, and high level party officials in 
        connection with these activities.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \209\ Id. at 13.

The Justice Department had put forth strong justifications for 
its position, but seemed to ignore that reasoning when it came 
to certain individuals. La Bella contrasted the stated standard 
for opening a Task Force investigation with the one that had 
been imposed when dealing with covered persons under the 
Independent Counsel Act. Particularly, when dealing with the 
President, Vice President, and senior White House personnel, 
the Justice Department required specific and credible evidence 
that a crime had been committed in order for the Department, 
through PIS, to commence an investigation.\210\ According to La 
Bella, this structure made it nearly impossible to investigate 
covered persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \210\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    La Bella stated that ``the Department would not investigate 
covered White House personnel nor open a preliminary inquiry 
unless there was a critical mass of specific and credible 
evidence of a federal violation.'' \211\ Again, the standard 
the Attorney General mandated in cases of covered persons was 
``specific and credible evidence that a potential criminal 
violation has occurred.'' \212\ For La Bella, the use of the 
word ``evidence'' instead of ``information,'' as is used in the 
statute, also indicated a higher standard. He also explained 
that when an allegation against a covered person was made, PIS 
took over the investigation, taking it out of the Task Force's 
jurisdiction. Therefore PIS controlled the standards used to 
consider the allegations under the Act.\213\ In contrast, he 
noted that the Task Force initiated criminal investigations of 
individuals not covered by the Act on a ``wisp of 
information.'' \214\ Furthermore, he pointed out that even when 
the Department was conducting a preliminary investigation under 
the Act, the President, Vice President, and senior White House 
officials were treated more favorably than others were.\215\ 
For example, the matters involving Interior Secretary Bruce 
Babbitt and Labor Secretary Alexis Herman illustrated La 
Bella's contention.\216\ He observed that the amount of 
information needed to trigger the Independent Counsel Act, and 
subsequently warrant further investigation in those cases, was 
extremely low in comparison to the standards set for the 
President, Vice President, and senior White House 
personnel.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \211\ Id. at 11. La Bella also made the distinction between the 
terms ``evidence'' and ``information.'' The Justice Department 
consistently used the term evidence when referring to the standard in 
the Independent Counsel Act, whereas the statutory language refers to 
``specific information from a credible source.'' According to La Bella, 
the term evidence suggests a higher burden of proof. To him, the 
distinction, although subtle, was significant. Id. at 10-11.
    \212\ Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
    \213\ Id. at 10.
    \214\ Id. at 11.
    \215\ Id.
    \216\ Id. Independent counsels were appointed for both Babbitt and 
Herman. In re Bruce Edward Babbitt, application of the Attorney General 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(c)(1) for the appointment of an 
independent counsel (Special Div. D.C. Cir.) (Feb. 11, 1998); in re 
Alexis M. Herman, application of the Attorney General pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. Sec. 592(c)(1) for the appointment of an independent counsel 
(Special Div. D.C. Cir.) (May 11, 1998).
    \217\ Exhibit 3 at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    La Bella believed that the standard for initiating a 
preliminary investigation under the Act should be the same as 
the threshold applied when determining whether to open a Task 
Force investigation.\218\ The Attorney General, La Bella 
argued, was artificially raising the standard to determine 
whether there were grounds sufficient to investigate. Looking 
to the legislative history, La Bella stated that the reference 
to ``the specificity of the information and the credibility of 
the source for the information'' was intended to limit the 
factors the Attorney General could consider when deciding 
whether to proceed with a preliminary investigation. However, 
Reno turned the language around to create some type of higher 
threshold for even commencing an investigation that might 
implicate a covered person.\219\ La Bella observed that the 
Department of Justice engaged in ``unnecessary complication'' 
when applying the Independent Counsel Act standards, both in 
commencing and conducting an investigation.\220\ La Bella 
added:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \218\ Id.
    \219\ Id. at 12
    \220\ Id.

        This is especially so where the President and White 
        House personnel are involved. Indeed, the continuing 
        and often heated debate involving the so-called Common 
        Cause allegations is an apt example. If these 
        allegations involved anyone other than the President, 
        Vice President, senior White House, or DNC and Clinton/
        Gore '96 officials, an appropriate investigation would 
        have commenced months ago without hesitation. However, 
        simply because the subjects of the investigation are 
        covered persons, a heated debated [sic] has raged 
        within the Department as to whether to investigate at 
        all. The allegations remain unaddressed.\221\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \221\ Id. at 14.

Also with regard to the investigation of the Common Cause 
allegations, La Bella charged that, ``[t]he contortions that 
the Department has gone through to avoid investigating these 
allegations are apparent.'' \222\ The standards for initiating 
an investigation, La Bella argued, should be identical, and the 
better standard to use was the general Task Force standard: a 
determination that there is an allegation which, if true, may 
present a violation of federal law.'' \223\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \222\ Id.
    \223\ Id. at 9, 14. Of course, the requirement that the information 
be specific and from a credible source would still be taken into 
account. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              ii. Determining Whether Further Investigation Was 
                    Warranted
    Like the standard for commencing an investigation, La Bella 
urged that the standard for determining whether further 
investigation was warranted in a preliminary investigation be 
similar to the standard the Task Force used in both conducting 
and closing investigations.\224\ In the Task Force's 
investigations, they adhered to the ``leave no stone unturned'' 
policy demanded by the Attorney General.\225\ Conversely, in 
preliminary investigations, the Attorney General appeared to 
search for reasons not to continue to investigate. For example, 
during the campaign finance investigation, she often turned to 
examining the intent of the individual under investigation in 
order to close the investigation.\226\ The Independent Counsel 
Act instructed the Attorney General to comply with the 
``written or other established policies of the Department of 
Justice with respect to the conduct of criminal 
investigations.'' \227\ La Bella asserted that the ``leave no 
stone unturned'' theory was the established policy of the Task 
Force's investigation, as mandated by Reno.\228\ As such, the 
Department of Justice should adhere to the same standard when 
considering whether further investigation is warranted in a 
preliminary investigation. That is, the Attorney General should 
not have engaged in contortions to find a somewhat viable 
reason not to investigate. Anything that might even be 
considered prosecutorial discretion should have been left to an 
independent counsel to decide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \224\ Id. at 12.
    \225\ Id.
    \226\ The statute makes it clear that the Attorney General may not 
base her recommendation on a finding that an official lacked the state 
of mind required for the crime, unless there exists ``clear and 
convincing evidence.'' ``Independent Counsel Provisions: An Overview of 
the Operation of the Law,'' CRS Rept. No. 98-283, at 4 (Mar. 20, 1998) 
(citing H. Rept. No. 103-511, at 11 (1994)). Furthermore, Congress, in 
enacting the statute, believed that it would be a ``rare case'' in 
which the Attorney General could come to such a conclusion. Id. The 
House report notes: ``Congress believes that the Attorney General 
should rarely close a matter under the Independent Counsel law based 
upon finding a lack of criminal intent, due to the subjective judgments 
required and the limited role accorded the Attorney General in the 
independent counsel process.'' Id. However, that is precisely what Reno 
did in the case of Vice President Gore.
    \227\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(c)(1) (emphasis added).
    \228\ Exhibit 3 at 14. La Bella stated, ``[i]t has also been the 
policy of the Task Force to continue to investigate allegations and to 
decline prosecution and/or further investigation only after each and 
every allegation has been fully investigated. This is true despite the 
fact that some allegations approached what a reasonable investigator 
might characterize as frivolous.'' Id. at n.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              iii. La Bella's Interpretation of the Legislative History
    La Bella supported his theories with the legislative 
history of the Independent Counsel Act.\229\ He demonstrated 
that Congress often corrected the manner in which the 
Department of Justice was implementing the Act by amending the 
language of the Act. At the outset, he stated that Congress 
intended to create a system under which covered individuals 
were treated in the same manner as other individuals being 
investigated by the Justice Department, no more harshly or 
leniently.\230\ The amendments in 1987 and 1994 made clear that 
individuals covered by the Act should be treated the same as 
non-covered individuals in determining whether an investigation 
is initiated, and once initiated, whether further investigation 
was warranted.\231\ This was established, according to La 
Bella, by the language requiring the Department to follow 
``established policies'' in making its determinations.\232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \229\ Id. at 15.
    \230\ Id.
    \231\ Id.
    \232\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    La Bella cited numerous examples of the Congress 
criticizing the Department for interpreting the Independent 
Counsel Act in a manner that would serve Justice's own 
purposes. By doing so, the Justice Department substituted its 
own judgment for that of Congress.\233\ In order to demonstrate 
his point that the Department had raised the bar for 
investigating covered individuals, La Bella pointed to the 
following passage to demonstrate Congress' intent on the 
standards for investigation:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \233\ Id. at 18.

        The purpose of allowing the Justice Department to 
        conduct a preliminary investigation is to allow an 
        opportunity for frivolous or totally groundless 
        allegations to be weeded out. . . . On the other hand, 
        as soon as there is any indication whatsoever that the 
        allegations. . . . involving a high-level official may 
        be serious or have any potential chance of 
        substantiation, a Special Prosecutor should be 
        appointed to take over the investigation.\234\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \234\ Id. (citing to 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4270).

La Bella acknowledged that the Independent Counsel Act was not 
a ``model'' piece of legislation, but believed that people in 
the Department of Justice were trying to substitute what they 
thought to be the proper threshold for investigation.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \235\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. Information Sufficient to Warrant the Appointment of an 
                    Independent Counsel
    There were numerous fact patterns involving covered and 
other individuals that the Task Force had looked into and that 
La Bella believed were sufficient to warrant the appointment of 
an independent counsel. Among those individuals implicated in 
the investigation were: President Clinton; Vice President Gore; 
Harold Ickes; Hillary Rodham Clinton; and, John Huang, Marvin 
Rosen, David Mercer, and the DNC.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \236\ See exhibit 3 at 20-79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              i. Harold Ickes
    There were numerous allegations surrounding Harold Ickes, 
President Clinton's Deputy Chief of Staff, during the campaign 
finance investigation. Ickes was at the center of the Common 
Cause allegations because he ran the DNC and Clinton/Gore 
reelection efforts from the White House.\237\ Ickes was not a 
``covered person'' under the mandatory provision of the Act 
because his salary did not reach level II of the Executive 
Schedule, a requirement under the Act.\238\ However, La Bella 
believed that the mandatory provision should be applied to 
Ickes. His argument was based on the theory that Ickes was a de 
facto officer of Clinton/Gore '96, exercising authority at the 
national level.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \237\ Id. at 24.
    \238\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591(b)(3). La Bella pointed out that the 
President is authorized to pay 25 persons at level II, only 6 
individuals in the Executive Office of the President are paid at that 
level--none of whom are involved in the campaign finance investigation. 
In prior administrations, the Deputy Chief of Staff had been covered by 
the Act by virtue of his salary. Exhibit 3 at 20.
    \239\ Exhibit 3 at 20. As de facto chairman of the re-elect, Ickes 
would be subject to the Independent Counsel Act pursuant to section 
591(b)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In support of his argument, La Bella pointed to information 
such as the DNC and Clinton/Gore '96 reporting to Ickes before 
authorizing the disbursement of any funds or taking other 
actions.\240\ In addition, individuals involved in the re-
election effort confirmed Ickes leadership role.\241\ La Bella 
applied the facts of Ickes case to a two-part test developed by 
PIS for determining whether an individual was a covered person 
under section 591(b)(6) of the Act.\242\ The test relied upon 
an analysis of title and function in order to determine whether 
an individual was a covered person.\243\ La Bella argued that 
when he reviewed the reality or function of Ickes' position 
rather than just the title he was given, Ickes fell under the 
mandatory provision because of his re-elect activities.\244\ In 
the alternative, La Bella believed that Ickes fit within the 
discretionary provision of the Act as well.\245\ La Bella cited 
to the legislative history of the discretionary provision as 
intending ``to include members of the President's family, and 
lower level campaign and government officials who are perceived 
to be close to the President.'' \246\ Due to Ickes role in the 
campaign, the control he wielded, and his close relationship to 
the President, La Bella argued that the circumstances fit the 
type of political conflict that the Act envisioned.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \240\ Exhibit 3 at 22.
    \241\ Id. at 23. According to La Bella, Clinton campaign advisor 
Dick Morris ``confirmed that Ickes was the sole person charged with 
making financial decisions for the White House, DNC and the reelection 
effort.'' Id. Morris also added that Ickes controlled ``every aspect of 
DNC and Clinton/Gore fundraising and that Ickes was brought in by the 
President.'' Id. Finally, in an interview with former White House Chief 
of Staff Leon Panetta, Panetta told the Task Force that he personally 
did not have the experience needed to run a national Presidential 
campaign and he therefore ``relied heavily on Ickes to handle all 
issues relating to the President's re-election.'' Id. at 24.
    \242\ Id. at 21. The test was originally developed to determine 
whether Clinton fundraiser Terry McAuliffe was a covered person under 
the Act. Ultimately, PIS determined that he was not a covered person. 
Id.
    \243\ Id.
    \244\ Id.
    \245\ Id. at 25.
    \246\ Id. at 25 (citing 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2165).
    \247\ Id. Ultimately, the Attorney General decided to open a 
preliminary investigation of Harold Ickes under the Independent Counsel 
Act to investigate allegations of perjury before the Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee. No independent counsel was appointed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Once La Bella established that the Independent Counsel Act 
should cover Ickes, he turned to the fact patterns that 
warranted the appointment of an independent counsel. The first 
argument La Bella made was that Ickes ``knowingly permitted the 
DNC and Clinton/Gore '96 to accept conduit contributions 
collected by Charlie Trie \248\ and to file false and 
misleading reports with the FEC.'' \249\ Ickes had a unique 
knowledge of Trie's questionable contributions to another 
entity associated with the Clintons, the Presidential Legal 
Expense Trust (PLET).\250\ Ickes, along with several senior 
White House staff, was briefed on the questionable source for 
the funds.\251\ During the meeting, Deputy Counsel to the 
President, Bruce Lindsey mentioned that he knew Trie from 
Arkansas, and that Trie was involved with the Democratic 
party.\252\ Ickes, who La Bella considered the de facto head of 
Clinton/Gore '96 and the DNC, was the only individual at the 
meeting who had regular contacts with those organizations.\253\ 
He concluded that Ickes therefore had a duty to warn both 
organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \248\ Trie was a close friend of President Clinton's from Arkansas 
with wide-ranging access to the White House, Presidential advisors, and 
Clinton administration officials. See H. Rept. No. 105-829 at 1347 
(1998). Trie later plead guilty to knowingly causing the DNC to make a 
false report to the FEC and knowingly causing a conduit contribution to 
be made to the DNC.
    \249\ Exhibit 3 at 26.
    \250\ The PLET was established by and for the benefit of the 
President and the First Lady for the purpose of paying their personal 
legal bills. Contributions to the PLET were limited to $1,000 per 
person. See S. Rept. No. 105-167, at 2711 (1998).
    \251\ Exhibit 3 at 26. Michael Cardozo, the PLET Executive 
Director, hired a private investigator to examine the Trie donations. 
Cardozo briefed Ickes, the First Lady's Chief of Staff, and several of 
the White House counsels regarding the private investigators findings. 
In his prepared statement before the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee, Cardozo explained what the investigators found and why 
Trie's contributions were ultimately returned:

      One, the unique circumstances under which the funds were 
      delivered to the Trust; Two, the fact that it now appeared 
      that most if not all of these contributions were raised at 
      meetings of a religious organization, the Ching Hai--
      Buddhist sect which according to IGI had been described by 
      some as a ``cult'' and which raised concerns abut peer 
      pressure and coercion; and Three, concern over the ultimate 
      source of some of the contributions due to what appeared to 
      be the advancement of funds by the Ching Hai organization 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      to some contributors. Id. at 30.

    \252\ Exhibit 3 at 29.
    \253\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the campaign finance scandal was reported in the 
press, the Executive Director of the DNC, B.J. Thornberry, 
asked Ickes about DNC fundraiser John Huang.\254\ Ickes 
indicated that if the DNC were looking at John Huang, they 
should also take a look at Charlie Trie.\255\ The comment, La 
Bella believed, spoke volumes about Ickes knowledge of Trie and 
his fundraising.\256\ La Bella summarized, ``[a]t best, Ickes 
engineered an effort to consciously avoid learning the truth 
about Trie. At worst, Ickes' failure to act was intended to 
conceal the truth from those who would have protected the DNC 
and Clinton/Gore from Trie's illegal solicitations/
contributions.'' \257\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \254\ Id. at 32.
    \255\ Id.
    \256\ Id.
    \257\ Id. at 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    La Bella also believed that Ickes' role in the Common Cause 
allegations was troubling. He asserted that the information 
uncovered to date warranted the appointment of an independent 
counsel. He expressed frustration that the Department had not 
taken any action whatsoever, even independent of Ickes, on the 
Common Cause allegations.\258\ La Bella outlined the 
Department's refusal to initiate an investigation and stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \258\ Id. at 37.

        The alternative approach--a parochial and professorial 
        application of the [Independent Counsel Act]--is the 
        very approach that has gotten the Department into 
        trouble in the past. It is the same type of maneuvering 
        and practice that triggered the 1987 Amendments to the 
        ICA and the sharp criticism of the Department that 
        accompanied these amendments. Indeed, one could argue 
        that the Department's treatment of the Common Cause 
        allegations has been marked by gamesmanship rather than 
        an even-handed analysis of the issues.\259\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \259\ Id. at 38.

Ickes was intimately involved with the media efforts that were 
central to the Common Cause allegations. The President 
conferred the authority to run the re-election effort upon 
Ickes, who did so. Therefore, La Bella concluded that ``[t]o 
the extent that there was any effort to circumvent the 
regulations outlined above, Ickes was at the heart of the 
effort.''\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \260\ Id. at 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The final area of investigation relating to Ickes was the 
Diamond Walnut matter.\261\ The allegations centered on whether 
there was an effort to encourage teamster contributions and 
support of the Democratic party through the use of the 
administration's influence to attempt to settle an ongoing 
labor dispute.\262\ Ickes testified about the matter before the 
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, and there were some 
questions regarding the truthfulness of his testimony.\263\ La 
Bella outlined the facts and information that the Task Force 
had to date, and admitted that the investigation was in its 
``infancy.'' \264\ However, he concluded that there was 
sufficient specific information from a credible source to 
commence an investigation. The Task Force had done so, however, 
La Bella believed that, in light of the other information on 
Ickes, a preliminary investigation should have been 
initiated.\265\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \261\ Id. at 41.
    \262\ Id.
    \263\ Id. at 41-42.
    \264\ Id. at 45.
    \265\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              ii. President Clinton
    La Bella laid out his argument for appointing an 
independent counsel to investigate the President, who is a 
covered person under the Act. The main issues he addressed 
were: Charlie Trie's PLET contributions and subsequent 
appointment to a Presidential commission; the Common Cause 
allegations and conspiracy to violate soft money regulations; 
and, the President and senior White House officials' knowledge 
of foreign contributions.\266\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \266\ Id. at 46-56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As mentioned in the previous section, Charlie Trie, a close 
friend of the President and DNC fundraiser and contributor, 
delivered questionable contributions to the PLET totaling 
$789,000. According to its own guidelines, the PLET only 
accepted contributions from individual U.S. citizens using 
their own funds; and, the contributions had to be voluntary. 
Ultimately, it was discovered that the Trie contributions came 
from the Supreme Master Suma Ching Hai of the Ching Hai 
Buddhist sect, who offered to reimburse her followers if they 
contributed $1,000 to the PLET.\267\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \267\ See S. Rept. No. 105-167, at 2722 (1998). The money orders 
delivered to the PLET by Trie were sequentially numbered, meaning that 
they were purchased at one location. However, they were written from 
people living in different parts of the country. Many of the checks had 
the identical spelling error of ``presidencial.'' In addition, some of 
the checks were written by one person on behalf of another, in 
violation of trust guidelines. Finally, the Supreme Master Suma Ching 
Hai, who provided the reimbursement for the contributions, is based out 
of Taiwan--a violation of the foreign money guideline. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Not only were the contributions suspect, but the timing of 
the contributions was suspect as well. Around the time of the 
contributions, Trie was appointed to the Commission on U.S. 
Trade and Investment Policy (Commission).\268\ The President 
issued an Executive order expanding the size of the Commission 
on January 31, 1996, while Trie had visited the President 2 
days earlier.\269\ Trie delivered the first contributions on 
March 21, 1996.\270\ Approximately a month later, Trie received 
his formal appointment to the Commission.\271\ During the time 
period between the delivery of the contributions and Trie's 
appointment, the PLET Executive Director made the First Lady 
and senior White House staff aware of the problems with the 
contributions and Trie's delivery of them.\272\ Subsequently, 
the President himself was made aware of the problems, as he 
affirmed the decision to return the funds. La Bella concluded 
that based on the President's knowledge of the contributions 
and of the status of Charlie Trie as a fundraiser and 
contributor to the DNC and Clinton/Gore '96, his involvement 
should have been further investigated.\273\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \268\ The committee learned that the White House made the 
appointment process for the Commission very political. Because he had 
been instrumental in the creation of the commission, Senator Bingaman 
and his staff were supposed to have had a great deal of input into the 
creation of the Commission. Bingaman's staffer, Steve Clemons, found 
that he had a great deal of trouble getting Bingaman's candidates for 
the Commission approved. Charles Duncan, the Assistant Director of 
Presidential Personnel told Clemons that he checked all candidates 
names against a DNC donor list. When Trie's appointment was brought up, 
Clemons objected based on lack of experience and quality of candidate. 
However, the White House responded that Trie was a ``must appointment'' 
from the ``highest levels of the White House.'' See H. Rept. No. 105-
829, at 1374-1390 (1998).
    \269\ Exhibit 3 at 46.
    \270\ Id.
    \271\ Id. at 48.
    \272\ Id.
    \273\ Id. at 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    La Bella also believed that the President played a major 
role in the Common Cause allegations.\274\ He pointed out that 
the President was regularly briefed on the media fund and re-
election efforts.\275\ In addition, as Director Freeh pointed 
out in his memorandum, the President was highly involved in the 
creation and placement of the ads. It was the President who 
entrusted Harold Ickes with running the media campaign that is 
at the heart of the Common Cause allegations. Therefore, La 
Bella imputes to the President knowledge of Ickes' control over 
both the DNC and Clinton/Gore '96 in order to effect the media 
campaign.\276\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \274\ Id.
    \275\ Id.
    \276\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In conjunction with the media fund and general re-election 
efforts, there was an ongoing demand for more money to sustain 
the campaign.\277\ La Bella described events that he believed 
demonstrated a pattern of activity involving senior White House 
officials. He added, ``[t]his pattern suggests a level of 
knowledge within the White House--including the President's and 
First Lady's offices--concerning the injection of foreign funds 
into the reelection effort.'' \278\ The two examples La Bella 
used were the White House's handling of major donors Johnny 
Chung and Charlie Trie.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \277\Id. at 51.
    \278\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chung had a significant amount of contact with the First 
Lady's office in order to make arrangements for his Chinese 
associates to meet both the President and the First Lady. Chung 
first made attempts to get meetings and perks through the 
DNC.\279\ However, even the DNC was wary of Chung and his 
Chinese business associates. Therefore, Chung went to the First 
Lady's Chief of Staff, Maggie Williams. On two separate 
occasions when the DNC would not deliver, Williams was able to 
arrange a photo-op with the President or First Lady for Chung 
and groups of Chinese businessmen.\280\ In one instance, Chung 
offered the DNC $50,000 to arrange for him and a group of 
Chinese businessmen to meet with President Clinton.\281\ When 
the DNC would not do it, the First Lady's office did, using the 
$50,000 to retire a portion of its debt to the DNC.\282\ Chung 
explained in an interview with the Task Force that he informed 
White House and DNC staff that ``the more access he could get, 
the better his business would be and the more he could 
contribute.'' \283\ It should have been clear to anyone who 
dealt with Chung that he was using funds from the Chinese 
businessmen he brought to meet the President to contribute to 
the DNC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \279\ Id. at 52.
    \280\ Id.
    \281\ Id.
    \282\ Id.
    \283\ Id. at 60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At one point, the NSC stepped in to question whether photos 
of the President in the White House with the Chinese 
businessmen should be released.\284\ The NSC was told that the 
individuals were major DNC donors and that the President's 
office would like to release the photos.\285\ After reviewing 
the Johnny Chung scenarios, La Bella concluded that the 
connection between Chung's foreign business associates and his 
DNC contributions was quite clear. He added, ``[i]t is 
inconceivable that senior officials at the White House were 
oblivious to these connections.'' \286\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \284\ Id. at 53.
    \285\ Id.
    \286\ Id. at 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    White House officials should have drawn similar conclusions 
about Charlie Trie and his contributions. Both the President 
and First Lady, along with senior White House staff, were 
warned about the possibility of problems with Trie's 
fundraising through the PLET fiasco.\287\ Although they were 
aware that Trie was an active fundraiser for the DNC, nobody 
brought the problem to the attention of the DNC.\288\ La Bella 
stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \287\ Id. at 54-55.
    \288\ Id. at 55.

        These actions (and inactions) involving the President, 
        First Lady, Ickes, White House Counsel and Bruce 
        Lindsey, suggest a conscious decision not to learn the 
        truth about Trie's fundraising activities. By not 
        alerting the DNC and Clinton/Gore and by directing IGI 
        not to confront Trie about the PLET ``donations,'' the 
        White House chose not to impede a potent fundraiser at 
        a time when funds were needed.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \289\ Id.

    La Bella was able to tie all of the issues relating to the 
President together through the Common Cause allegations. For 
instance, the need to raise astronomical amounts of cash 
developed from the need to pay for the media campaign. Because 
the re-election efforts needed to raise so much cash, they 
turned a blind eye to problems such as foreign money coming 
into the campaign. Finally, under La Bella's analysis, the 
President was in the middle of it all. He approved the media 
campaign and followed it closely, assisted in raising the cash, 
and attending all of the fundraisers where he greeted the 
numerous foreign attendees, many of whom were unable to even 
speak English. La Bella argued that the President's role needed 
to be investigated and therefore, an independent counsel should 
have been appointed.
              iii. Vice President Gore
    The argument for an investigation of Vice President Gore 
was nearly identical to that of the President.\290\ Like the 
President, Vice President Gore participated in the 
decisionmaking on the media campaign and approved the 
efforts.\291\ Furthermore, La Bella believed that there should 
be a close review of the Vice President's fundraising calls 
from his White House office.\292\ The Department of Justice 
already had concluded that Gore did believe that he was 
soliciting ``hard'' money, a distinction that meant that there 
would have been no violation of law. However, La Bella did not 
want to rely solely on the Vice President's word, he believed 
further investigation was warranted.\293\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \290\ Id. at 57.
    \291\ Id.
    \292\ Id.
    \293\ Id. In fact, a subsequent preliminary investigation was 
opened on the Vice President when his aide's handwritten notes of a 
money meeting were discovered. The notes showed that hard and soft 
money splits for the media fund were discussed at a meeting the Vice 
President attended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              iv. Hillary Rodham Clinton
    The First Lady is not covered under the mandatory provision 
of the Independent Counsel Act. However, La Bella concluded 
that she should be considered under the discretionary 
provision.\294\ He believed that, like Ickes and the President, 
her role in the Charlie Trie contributions and failure to warn 
the DNC and Clinton/Gore about those contributions should be 
further investigated. In addition, the First Lady's office also 
had a close relationship with contributor Johnny Chung that La 
Bella believed also should be investigated further.\295\ Chung 
often made arrangements through the First Lady's office for his 
Chinese business associates to meet with the President and 
First Lady.\296\ La Bella summarized, ``[g]iven our threshold 
for opening investigations, determination of what the First 
Lady knew and what she did (or chose not to do) in connection 
with the information detailed above, is something which 
deserves further inquiry.'' \297\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \294\ Id. at 60.
    \295\ Id.
    \296\ Id.
    \297\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              v. Other Campaign Finance Figures
    Central to the campaign finance investigation was the role 
of the DNC, its officers, and fundraisers. Millions of dollars 
in illegal or otherwise questionable contributions flowed into 
the DNC's coffers during the 1996 Federal elections. It was the 
discovery of a foreign contribution to the DNC that led to the 
campaign finance investigation. John Huang, a DNC fundraiser, 
brought foreign money into the DNC and became a major figure in 
the investigation. La Bella focused on the events that brought 
John Huang to the DNC, the individuals involved, as well as the 
actions taken by the DNC that allowed them to cross the line of 
legality.\298\ He stated, ``[t]hese incidents suggest that at 
some level, certain DNC fundraisers were actively engaged in 
conduct which had the effect of concealing questionable 
fundraising conduct from the FEC and the public.'' \299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \298\ Id. at 61-73.
    \299\ Id. at 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Huang came to the DNC as a fundraiser through the 
intervention of President Clinton, who enlisted White House 
aides and personally spoke with the DNC to help Huang.\300\ 
Prior to that, Huang was a political appointee, subject to the 
Hatch Act, at the Department of Commerce.\301\ While at the 
Commerce Department, Huang had engaged in fundraising 
activities, in violation of the Hatch Act, with the full 
knowledge, and possibly at the prompting of the DNC.\302\ La 
Bella described how David Mercer, DNC Deputy Finance Director, 
credited Huang's wife Jane for funds raised in order to hide 
the fact that Huang was violating the Hatch Act.\303\ The 
committee later learned that while Huang was still working at 
the Commerce Department, White House Deputy Chief of Staff 
Harold Ickes actually asked Huang to raise money.\304\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \300\ Id. at 69. Several individuals were working on Huang's behalf 
to get him a fundraising position with the DNC, including James Riady, 
Mark Middleton, and Joe Giroir. Riady, Huang, and Giroir had a meeting 
with the President at which they discussed Huang working at the DNC as 
a fundraiser. The President enlisted the help of White House aides 
Bruce Lindsey and Harold Ickes to pave the way for Huang with the DNC. 
Ickes contacted the head of DNC fundraising Marvin Rosen and DNC 
Chairman Don Fowler to recommend Huang. Huang's application did not 
move forward until the President personally mentioned Huang to Rosen 
during a fundraiser. Shortly thereafter, Huang was hired at the DNC. 
See H. Rept. No. 105-829, at 1207-1208 (1998).
    \301\ Exhibit 3 at 70.
    \302\ Id. at 67.
    \303\ Id.
    \304\ Ickes asked Huang to raise funds for Jesse Jackson, Jr.'s 
congressional campaign during Huang's ``interview'' process for the 
DNC. Huang stated that Ickes said something like, ``can you help out 
from the Asian American community, round-up ten to fifteen thousand 
dollars for Jesse Jackson, Jr.?'' Ultimately, Huang did raise several 
thousand dollars for Jackson. FBI summary of Huang interview, DOJ-
H000127-131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although there are no criminal penalties for violating the 
Hatch Act, La Bella believed that the disclosure of the 
violation would have jeopardized both Huang's Commerce 
Department employment and his move to the DNC, resulting in a 
``public relations nightmare.'' \305\ Futhermore, La Bella 
indicated that the actions taken by Huang and Mercer possibly 
were in violation of section 371 of the criminal code. Such a 
violation would have involved a scheme to defraud the United 
States based on the Hatch Act violation.\306\ In light of the 
other evidence, and the potential section 371 violation, La 
Bella believed that a full investigation was warranted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \305\ Exhibit 3 at 67.
    \306\ Id. La Bella indicated that Justice Department Research 
showed that, ``a scheme to defraud in connection with false statements 
and active concealment relating to campaign funds solicited in 
violation of the Hatch Act, does present a viable prosecutable theory. 
Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    La Bella also cited to miscellaneous events that raised 
questions about whether DNC officials were aware of potential 
irregularities and illegalities in fundraising. For instance, 
by mid-1994, the DNC practically dismantled its procedures for 
vetting all contributions of $10,000 or more.\307\ Without 
vetting, the DNC would have no information on large 
contributions. As further evidence he cited to Johnny Chung's 
efforts to bring numerous Chinese businessmen to meet with the 
President. For example, Chung wrote to DNC Finance Director 
Richard Sullivan about a group of his Chinese associates who 
were to meet with the President, stating that one of the group 
would play ``an important role in our future party functions.'' 
\308\ Chung even wrote to Deputy Assistant to the President 
Doris Matsui, ``[i]n the next two years I will be coordinating 
a lot of visits from Asian business leaders to support DNC. I 
look forward to working closely with you. . . .'' \309\ La 
Bella believed that in light of these and other examples, a 
thorough investigation of the DNC's practices was in order. 
Such an investigation, he said, would be a political conflict 
of interest for the Department of Justice.\310\ He bolstered 
his assertion with the fact that the President and Harold Ickes 
were instrumental in running the affairs of the DNC and 
Clinton/Gore, meaning that any investigation would certainly 
include their activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \307\ Id. at 71.
    \308\ Id. Chung was referring to Chairman Chen of Haomen Beer, who 
later used his photograph with President Clinton as a marketing tool in 
China. Id.
    \309\ Id. at 72.
    \310\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              vi. The Loral Matter
    Illustrating his assertion that there was a higher 
threshold for initiating an investigation of the White House or 
its senior officials, La Bella cited to the investigation of 
the satellite communications company Loral.\311\ Shortly before 
La Bella wrote his memorandum, there were allegations reported 
in the media that the administration gave Loral an export 
waiver for satellite technology in return for the campaign 
contributions of its CEO Bernard Schwartz.\312\ According to La 
Bella, nobody at the Department of Justice was able to provide 
a sound premise upon which to base the initiation of a criminal 
investigation.\313\ Rather, because of the media and political 
pressure, Justice commenced an investigation.\314\ Therefore, 
the standard used by the Justice Department in this case was 
that ``allegations were made which, if true, suggested a 
potential violation of federal law.'' \315\ In light of the 
Loral investigation, La Bella believed that there was no 
justification for the refusal to initiate an investigation into 
the Common Cause allegations.\316\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \311\ Id. at 73.
    \312\ Id.
    \313\ Id.
    \314\ Id. at 74.
    \315\ Id. In comparison, the Justice Department imposed a higher 
standard when considering allegations related to senior White House 
officials: ``a determination that there is specific and credible 
evidence of a federal violation.'' Id. at 10.
    \316\ Id. at 74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the Justice Department already had decided to commence 
an investigation, La Bella argued that the actual and potential 
conflicts of interest were such that the appointment of an 
independent counsel ought to be sought.\317\ For instance, one 
of the areas of investigation was to determine whether 
Schwartz' campaign contributions ``corruptly influenced'' 
President Clinton's 1998 decision to grant Loral a waiver over 
the objections of the Department of Justice.\318\ At the time 
of the waiver, the Department of Justice had an open criminal 
investigation of Loral for the alleged transfer of technology 
to China.\319\ The Department of Justice informed the White 
House that a waiver would hinder its ongoing investigation of 
Loral.\320\ In addition to investigating the decision of the 
President, several high-level Justice Department officials were 
involved in discussions with the White House prior to the 
President's decision to grant the waiver.\321\ La Bella 
indicated that these officials' conversations with White House 
Counsel would be material to the investigation as well.\322\ In 
the end, La Bella determined that the most important factor in 
the investigation was that it would be an investigation of the 
President. He concluded that ``if the matter is sufficiently 
serious to commence a criminal investigation, it is 
sufficiently serious to commence a preliminary inquiry under 
the ICA since it is the president who is at the center of the 
investigation.'' \323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \317\ Id.
    \318\ Id.
    \319\ Id. at 75.
    \320\ Id.
    \321\ Id.
    \322\ Id. Robert Litt and Mark Richard were the individuals in 
contact with the White House regarding the Loral matter. Litt conveyed 
the Department's concerns over the possible waiver to Counsel to the 
President Charles Ruff. Id. at 75-76.
    \323\ Id. at 79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. La Bella's Conclusions
    La Bella argued that Justice Department officials were 
waiting for some type of smoking gun that implicated, beyond a 
doubt, a covered person in an act that violated Federal 
law.\324\ However, in the campaign finance matter, the 
information had to be gathered and reviewed as a whole, rather 
than looking at each individual piece. La Bella explained:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \324\ Id. at 93.

        [T]here are bits of information (and evidence) which 
        must be pieced together in order to put seemingly 
        innocent actions in perspective. While this may take 
        more work to accomplish, in our view it is no less 
        compelling than the proverbial smoking gun in the end. 
        . . . Indeed, were this quantum of information amassed 
        during a preliminary inquiry under the ICA, we would 
        have to conclude that there are reasonable grounds to 
        believe that further investigation is warranted.\325\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \325\ Id.

The report acknowledged that there were some areas of the 
campaign finance investigation that as an experienced 
prosecutor, La Bella would not pursue. Nevertheless, he made 
clear that in the situation at hand, the prosecutorial 
discretion belonged to an independent counsel.

3. Conclusion

    Both Director Freeh and Supervising Attorney La Bella 
believed that an independent counsel should be appointed to 
investigate the campaign finance investigation. Furthermore, 
they agreed that the Department of Justice was applying the 
Independent Counsel Act in a manner that almost assured that 
one would not be appointed. They both saw that the tunnel 
vision of Reno and her senior political advisors allowed them 
to ignore the big picture. Central to that big picture was what 
both Freeh and La Bella believed was some type of broad 
conspiracy centered around the need to raise vast sums of money 
and the willingness to bend or break the campaign financing 
laws to get it. The Common Cause allegations were a major part 
of their theory, and they asserted that the Department of 
Justice refused to investigate these allegations at any level.
    The Common Cause allegations laid out a common theme in 
both memoranda. The facts were that the President and Vice 
President needed to run ads early and frequently to be re-
elected. In order to run the ads the campaign needed to raise 
significant amounts of money. The White House, DNC, and 
Clinton/Gore '96 all participated in the effort to raise the 
money and pay for the ads. Once they began the operation, the 
three entities became blurred and began to spend money as if 
they were one. All of this happened under the watch and with 
the knowledge of the President, Vice President, and senior 
White House, DNC, and Clinton/Gore staff. As momentum started 
building, they needed more money, and that left the door open 
for people like John Huang, Charlie Trie, Johnny Chung, and 
Pauline Kanchanalak to bring in questionable funds. Neither 
Freeh nor La Bella definitively state that White House, DNC, or 
Clinton/Gore officials knew about the illegal contributions. 
However, in their memoranda they show that there was sufficient 
information to further investigate. Because the President and 
Vice President were so intimately involved in the areas being 
investigated, it was nearly impossible for the Task Force to 
conduct the investigation without looking into their conduct. 
As Freeh noted, the Justice Department attorneys were extremely 
reluctant to proceed into areas of investigation where covered 
persons might be implicated, necessitating the appointment of 
an independent counsel.
    The Department of Justice was setting a very high standard 
for appointing an independent counsel in the campaign finance 
investigation. Although Attorney General Reno constantly 
repeated that she would appoint an independent counsel when 
presented with specific information from a credible source that 
needed to be further investigated, she had not done so in 
practice. As both La Bella and Freeh argued, any one piece of 
information seen in a vacuum might not satisfy the standard, 
rather, the pieces together created a pattern that could not be 
ignored.

              E. Department of Justice Rebuttal Memoranda

    The Department of Justice circulated the La Bella 
memorandum to senior level personnel for review and discussion. 
In memoranda to the Attorney General, several senior level 
personnel responded to the facts and issues raised in the 
memorandum. The committee received the responses of Associate 
Deputy Attorney General Robert Litt and Chief of the Public 
Integrity Section Lee Radek, who both had negative reactions to 
the La Bella memo.

1. Litt's Response to the La Bella Memorandum

    In a July 20, 1998, memorandum to the Attorney General, 
Litt sets forth his observations about the La Bella memo.\326\ 
He first denied that the Department had applied an artificially 
high standard in applying the Independent Counsel Act. Litt 
then summarily stated that the Department of Justice never 
prohibited La Bella and the Task Force from conducting an 
investigation of the entire campaign finance landscape in order 
to determine whether specific information from a credible 
source sufficient to trigger the Act existed.\327\ Litt 
believed that the comprehensive nature of La Bella's memorandum 
proved that the Task Force had not been impeded in its 
investigation.\328\ In short, Litt concluded, ``it is not the 
Independent Counsel Act that is blocking investigation of the 
President and those around him; it is the lack of any specific 
and credible information that they may have committed a 
crime.'' \329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \326\ Memorandum from Robert S. Litt, Associate Deputy Attorney 
General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Janet Reno, Attorney General, 
U.S. Department of Justice, and Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney General, 
U.S. Department of Justice (July 20, 1998) (exhibit 4).
    \327\ Id. at 1.
    \328\ Id.
    \329\ Id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Litt's rebuttal of La Bella's allegations is unimpressive. 
He never addressed the argument that the Attorney General would 
look only at individual pieces of information in deciding 
whether the Independent Counsel Act was triggered rather than 
reviewing the investigation as a whole. Furthermore, he simply 
denied that La Bella's statements about the artificially high 
standard for the Independent Counsel Act were accurate. 
Obviously, La Bella had a difference of opinion which Litt 
never factually rebutted.
    Litt then turned to the individual cases discussed by La 
Bella, including the Common Cause allegations.\330\ Litt 
criticized La Bella for bringing up the Common Cause 
allegations, stating that the Department had already determined 
that they did not warrant criminal investigation under the FECA 
or Presidential Funding Acts.\331\ He also dismissed La Bella's 
legal argument that the Common Cause allegations could be 
prosecuted as a conspiracy to defraud the United States.\332\ 
Both Litt and PIS, headed by Radek, had rejected the Common 
Cause allegations earlier, and recommended that the charges be 
left to the FEC to investigate. Litt wrote:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \330\ Id. at 3.
    \331\ Id.
    \332\ Id.

        It is unfortunate that the FEC is so weak, but we 
        should not use that as an excuse to disregard well-
        established concepts of predication and well-
        established procedures, to conjure up novel legal 
        theories of which political candidates had no notice, 
        and to take on the responsibility of primary regulator 
        of the political process. That is not an appropriate 
        function of the Department of Justice.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \333\ Memorandum from Robert S. Litt, Associate Deputy Attorney 
General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Janet Reno, Attorney General, 
U.S. Department of Justice 4 (Feb. 6, 1998).

    There was a difference of opinion between the Task Force 
prosecutors and the FBI on the one side, and the Attorney 
General's advisors and PIS on the other about whether there was 
a violation of any laws in the scheme described by Common 
Cause. La Bella wanted at a minimum, to investigate. The 
Attorney General and her advisors decided that there was no 
predication to investigate, and refused to allow a Task Force 
investigation of the issue to go forward. Ultimately, La Bella 
and other Common Cause advocates received belated support in a 
FEC audit that found that the ``DNC media payments 
($46,546,476) to have been an in-kind contribution to either 
the primary or general campaign committee.'' \334\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \334\ Addendum to interim report from Charles G. La Bella, 
Supervising Attorney, Campaign Financing Task Force, and James DeSarno, 
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, for Janet Reno, 
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, and Louis J. Freeh, 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 5 (Aug. 12, 1998) 
(paraphrasing finding of FEC audit) (exhibit 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Addressing another section of the LaBella memorandum, Litt 
generally agreed that Harold Ickes and high-ranking DNC 
officials ought to be investigated, but not by an independent 
counsel.\335\ Although La Bella did advocate considering Ickes 
under the mandatory provision, he also urged the Attorney 
General to recognize the conflict of interest she and the 
Department had in investigating Ickes and the DNC. Litt 
neglected the argument that these matters ought to be 
considered under the discretionary provision of the Independent 
Counsel Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \335\ Exhibit 4 at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Radek Response to the La Bella Memorandum and La Bella's Reply

    Lee Radek, the Chief of the Public Integrity Section, 
attacked La Bella's memorandum to the Attorney General in his 
own August 5, 1998 response.\336\ Radek criticized La Bella's 
recommendations as ``flawed and based on numerous 
misinterpretations of the Independent Counsel Act.'' \337\ He 
also complained bitterly about what he perceived as personal 
digs:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \336\ Memorandum from Lee J. Radek, Chief, Public Integrity 
Section, U.S. Department of Justice, to James K. Robinson, Assistant 
Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice (Aug. 
5, 1998) (exhibit 6) this memorandum was forwarded to the Attorney 
General on Aug. 6, 1998.
    \337\  Id. at 2.

        I am, to put it directly, outraged by the personal 
        attacks and the suggestions contained in this Report, 
        some subtle, and some stunningly blunt, that the 
        motivations of those who have advised the attorney 
        General over the last two years concerning the 
        application of the Act with respect to campaign 
        financing matters have been colored by bad faith, a 
        deliberate twisting of the law, and an effort to 
        protect the White House.\338\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \338\ Id. at 1.

When La Bella's was confronted with Radek's charges, he 
replied, ``such an approach lessens legitimate debate and 
hampers the ability to reason to a result based on the 
merits.'' \339\ La Bella, on the other hand, insisted on 
replying to the substance of Radek's comments, rather than to 
his attacks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \339\ Exhibit 5 at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              i. Stovepipe Versus Landscape Analysis
    Radek addressed La Bella's criticism that the Department 
was conducting a ``stovepipe'' analysis rather than a 
``landscape'' analysis. Radek contended that there had been no 
previous investigation that was as carefully coordinated as the 
Task Force.\340\ He argued that efforts had been made and, 
``extensive steps have been taken to ensure that any 
overlapping evidence or potentially interlocking cases is [sic] 
not overlooked.'' \341\ Radek asserted that if the big picture 
had been ignored it was the fault of La Bella himself.\342\ He 
also denied, as ``simply untrue,'' La Bella's contention that 
the Task Force had not been allowed to do a ``broad survey of 
the entire campaign finance landscape.'' \343\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \340\ Exhibit 6 at 3.
    \341\ Id.
    \342\ Id.
    \343\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As evidence that La Bella was wrong, Radek pointed to the 
two examples that La Bella used in his memorandum. Radek first 
brought up the Common Cause allegations, and stated that they 
were ``thoroughly considered, analyzed at length, and closed on 
their merits.'' \344\ He also stated that the Task Force was 
told that they were free to investigate any of the facts 
underlying the investigation.\345\ Similarly, Radek asserted 
that the core group investigation was fully pursued by the FBI 
and dropped because it was not fruitful.\346\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \344\ Id.
    \345\ Id.
    \346\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to Radek's assertions regarding the stovepipe 
analysis, La Bella clarified that he had intended ``to 
reference the natural tendency of investigators and prosecutors 
to segment individual allegations and charges.'' \347\ La Bella 
indicated that he was not criticizing the investigators, 
rather, he had hoped that his memorandum would cause the 
Attorney General and her advisors to see the matter from the 
landscape view. He believed that the Common Cause allegations 
and core group analysis would have forced the Department of 
Justice to look at the investigation from the landscape view 
sooner.\348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \347\ Exhibit 5 at 1.
    \348\ Id. La Bella acknowledged that the core group investigation 
was closed before he arrived at the Task Force, and he had therefore 
relied upon the representations of others who were present.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    La Bella took issue with Radek's contention that the Common 
Cause allegations had been ``closed on the merits.'' \349\ On 
the contrary, he believed that the matter had been tabled, 
pending a decision by the Attorney General. La Bella stated 
that the Task Force had continually raised the Common Cause 
issue in order to come to some type of conclusion. Each time 
the issue was brought up, the Task Force was told that the 
matter remained under consideration.\350\ La Bella pointed to 
an August 4, 1998, memorandum from Criminal Appeals regarding 
Common Cause in support of his contention that the matter was 
very much open.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \349\ Id. at 2.
    \350\ Id.
    \351\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              ii. Independent Counsel Act Interpretation
    Radek next turned to the Department's application and 
interpretation of the Independent Counsel Act. He took issue 
with the ``evidence'' versus ``information'' distinction 
pointed out by La Bella. The Act itself refers to the 
specificity of the information and the credibility of the 
source.\352\ However, the PIS and Attorney General consistently 
referred to the ``specific and credible evidence'' needed to 
initiate a preliminary investigation. Radek insisted that he 
used the words evidence and information interchangeably, and 
did not mean for a higher threshold to apply.\353\ In response, 
La Bella argued that the wording of the Act itself was crucial 
as it could make a difference in whether the Act was 
triggered.\354\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \352\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591(d)(1).
    \353\ Exhibit 6 at 5.
    \354\ Exhibit 5 at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As described above, in his memorandum, La Bella criticized 
the Department for having two standards for investigation, a 
higher one for covered persons and a lower threshold for all 
others. Radek argued that the Act itself imposed this higher 
standard.\355\ He discussed how Congress, in contrast to La 
Bella's argument, was worried that the threshold for 
investigation might be too low, and therefore used the specific 
and credible language to normalize the threshold.\356\ Radek 
concluded that ``[t]he Report's conclusion that this minimal 
standard should be set aside in this case has no support in the 
Act, and indeed appears to us to be the very sort of strained, 
result-oriented analysis of which it accuses those who disagree 
with the authors.'' \357\ According to La Bella, the 1987 and 
1994 amendments to the Independent Counsel Act rebutted Radek's 
arguments which were based on the 1982 amendments.\358\ He 
argued that after the 1982 amendments, it became clear that the 
Justice Department was applying a higher threshold for the Act 
rather than applying it too loosely.\359\ Therefore, Congress 
changed the language to allow the Justice Department to take 
into account its own established policies in making decisions 
under the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \355\ Exhibit 6 at 5.
    \356\ Id.
    \357\ Id.
    \358\ Exhibit 5 at 9. See section C.2.b.iii. for La Bella's 
analysis of the legislative history.
    \359\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              iii. Harold Ickes
    Radek disagreed with La Bella's analysis of Ickes under the 
Independent Counsel Act. Radek insisted that the law did not 
permit the Attorney General to consider whether an individual 
was a ``de facto'' officer of a campaign committee, as La Bella 
argued that Harold Ickes was.\360\ However, he did acknowledge 
that the argument that the Attorney General should consider 
Ickes under the discretionary provision was persuasive.\361\ La 
Bella defended the ``de facto'' analysis, comparing it to 
liability in corporate law.\362\ For instance, Ickes would have 
been considered an ``agent'' of Clinton/Gore '96 based on that 
committee's own admissions. Therefore, Clinton/Gore '96 could 
have been held liable for Ickes' actions, making him a de facto 
officer in La Bella's view.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \360\ Exhibit 6 at 9.
    \361\ Id. at 10. Radek quibbled with the manner in which La Bella 
made his argument, stating that La Bella presumed to make the decision 
for the Attorney General, whereas, the decision is discretionary. Id. 
La Bella's response was that:

      While we gather that it is Public Integrity's policy not to 
      give advice as to invocation of the discretionary clause, 
      [] we believe that as supervisors of the Task Force, it is 
      our responsibility to address this important issue. To do 
      otherwise is to ignore the facts and fail to provide a 
      framework in which they should be considered. After hearing 
      the various viewpoints, the decision, of course, is 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      entirely the Attorney General's to make.'' Exhibit 5 at 9.

    \362\ Exhibit 6 at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The issue relating to Charlie Trie's PLET contributions 
encompassed Harold Ickes and the First Lady, as well as several 
other individuals in La Bella's memorandum. Radek stated that 
he could find no basis upon which to hold Ickes and the First 
Lady, criminally liable for failing to warn the DNC and 
Clinton/Gore about Trie's questionable fundraising.\363\ La 
Bella responded that in Ickes' case, there was support in basic 
agency law and statutes 18 U.S.C. sections 371 and 1341, among 
others.\364\ As for the First Lady, La Bella stated that, 
``[h]er potential criminal involvement tracks the conduct set 
forth relating to the PLET incident.'' \365\ Therefore, he 
concluded that her conduct warranted further inquiry. La Bella 
made a novel legal argument that the Justice Department would 
have to determine whether it could support. It should be noted 
that the Task Force prosecuted several DNC fundraisers under a 
similarly novel legal argument regarding causing false 
statements to be made to the DNC. Those arguments were upheld 
on appeal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \363\ Id.
    \364\ Exhibit 5 at 13. Section 317 deals with a conspiracy to 
defraud the United States, and was discussed at great length in the La 
Bella memorandum. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371. Section 1341 relates to frauds 
and swindles involving the mails. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341.
    \365\ Exhibit 5 at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              iv. President Clinton
    Radek also disagreed with the issues raised in the La Bella 
memorandum regarding the President. First, he stated that there 
was no evidence of a quid pro quo in which the President 
appointed Charlie Trie to the Presidential Commission in 
exchange for contributions to the PLET.\366\ Second, he states 
that there is no evidence that the President knew any 
contributions to the campaign were foreign.\367\ However, he 
does not take into account the fact that it was nearly 
impossible for the Task Force to develop any evidence on 
covered individuals under the standards set by the Department 
of Justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \366\ Exhibit 6 at 12.
    \367\ Id. at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although La Bella raised numerous questions about the 
President's actions, Radek asserted that ``there is absolutely 
no specific and credible information suggesting that the 
president committed a crime with respect to any of these 
matters; the Report identifies none, but rather lists a series 
of provocative and speculative hypothetical questions it 
asserts should be answered.'' \368\ Radek added that La Bella 
had fallen back on his argument that there should be one 
standard for initiating an investigation, which was not 
possible to do while still adhering to the standard of the 
Independent Counsel Act.\369\ Radek seems to prove La Bella's 
point through his argument. There are two standards for 
investigating, as Radek acknowledges, and the Task Force was 
prohibited from investigating the President or any other 
covered person unless they uncovered a specific piece of 
evidence that implicated a covered person in a violation of 
criminal law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \368\ Id. at 12.
    \369\ Id. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              v. The Vice President
    Radek also rebuffed the arguments regarding the 
investigation of Vice President Gore. However, by the time La 
Bella wrote his reply, the Task Force had received a memorandum 
of a White House ``money meeting'' with David Strauss' 
handwritten notes referencing what was discussed at the meeting 
and the comments of the Vice President.\370\ The notes showed 
that hard and soft money splits required to pay for the media 
fund were discussed, although the Vice President previously 
stated that he had no knowledge that hard money would be used 
for the media fund.\371\ Therefore, as noted by La Bella, the 
discovery of the Strauss memo yet again raised the question of 
the Vice President's knowledge.\372\ In fact, after the Strauss 
memo came to light, the Attorney General did initiate a 
preliminary investigation.\373\ However, she ultimately 
declined to appoint an independent counsel.\374\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \370\ Exhibit 5 at 15.
    \371\ Id.
    \372\ Id.
    \373\ See in re Albert Gore, Jr., notification to the court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(b) of results of preliminary 
investigation (Special Div. DC Cir. 1998).
    \374\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              vi. The DNC and Its Officials
    The La Bella memorandum also reintroduced the argument that 
the Attorney General had a political conflict of interest in 
investigating the DNC. The individuals involved were fundraiser 
John Huang, Finance Chairman Marvin Rosen, and Deputy Finance 
Director David Mercer, among others.\375\ Radek summarily 
dismissed La Bella's arguments as having been rejected by the 
Attorney General long ago.\376\ As long as no new information 
or developments had arisen relating to a covered person, Radek 
rejected the idea of an independent counsel.\377\ However, La 
Bella again pointed out that the DNC had been under the control 
of the White House and was used almost exclusively to re-elect 
the President.\378\ Therefore, he concluded that the matter, 
and the individuals being investigated, posed a political 
conflict of interest.\379\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \375\ Exhibit 6 at 16.
    \376\ Id.
    \377\ Id.
    \378\ Exhibit 5 at 16.
    \379\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              vii. The Common Cause Allegations
    The Common Cause allegations were central to both Freeh and 
La Bella's theories of the overall campaign finance 
investigation, yet the Department of Justice refused to 
investigate them. When La Bella was brought in to supervise the 
Task Force, he assigned one attorney, Steve Clark, to work 
solely on Common Cause. In late December 1997, Clark left the 
Task Force out of frustration over the Department's handling of 
Common Cause. Prior to his departure, Clark wrote in a December 
23, 1997, memorandum:

        That, to date, we have been unable to investigate the 
        Common Cause allegations in a straightforward way has 
        been a great personal and professional disappointment. 
        But, I believe the public has been most dis-served 
        [sic] by the way in which the ``whether to 
        investigate'' issue has been approached, debated, and 
        resolved. Never did I dream that the Task Force's 
        effort to air this issue would be met with so much 
        behind the scenes maneuvering, personal animosity, 
        distortions of fact, and contortions of law. (It also 
        is my impression that many involved have not read the 
        pertinent cases.) All this, not to forestall an ill-
        conceived indictment, not to foreclose a report making 
        an independent counsel referral, but to prevent any 
        investigation of a matter involving a potential loss of 
        over $180 million to the Federal treasury.\380\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \380\ Memorandum from (name redacted), Assistant U.S. Attorney, to 
Chuck La Bella, Supervising Attorney, Campaign Financing Task Force 
(Dec. 23, 1997). (Exhibit 7). It has been made public that the author 
of the memorandum was Steve Clark, AUSA.

It was not at all clear that Clark was referring to Radek in 
the passage, in fact, more than one individual would appear to 
be implicated. However, Radek's opinions match those that were 
disputed by Clark. Furthermore, Radek stooped to pure 
fabrication when he claimed that the Attorney General had 
decided that it did not warrant the appointment of an 
independent counsel. He was surely aware that there was never 
any closing memo on the Common Cause allegations that was 
approved by either the Attorney General or Director Freeh.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \381\ Exhibit 6 at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After insisting that the matter had been closed, Radek went 
on to address the merits of the allegations. He claimed that 
the FEC had primary responsibility for investigating and 
interpreting the election laws and, under longstanding 
agreements between the FEC and Department of Justice, it would 
be inappropriate for Justice to investigate. Long before Radek 
wrote his memo, Clark rebutted the arguments Radek put forward. 
In his December 1997 memorandum, Clark stated:

        While I recognize that there have been legitimate 
        disagreements, some positions urged in support of 
        avoiding any investigation have been so plainly wrong 
        as to be disheartening (e.g., the suggested referral to 
        the FEC, on the misapplication of the MOU with that 
        agency, with the claim that the FEC could refer the 
        case back after it checked out the ad content, but with 
        the unspoken reality that no criminal investigation 
        would ever happen--certainly not within the three year 
        statute of limitations; or the contention that an 
        independent counsel referral must be made immediately 
        if any investigation is even authorized).\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \382\ Exhibit 7.

La Bella agreed with Clark, stating that ``the MOU does not 
mandate that initial responsibility be placed with the FEC. It 
is clear that the Department can investigate independently.'' 
\383\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \383\ Exhibit 5 at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Radek rejected the theory that the Common Cause allegations 
could establish a section 371 conspiracy to defraud the United 
States. He stated, ``[t]o the contrary, the Attorney General 
has addressed the ultimate issue here squarely. She has decided 
that no amount of coordination between the candidates and the 
party can, by itself, constitute a violation. Only the content 
of the ads can establish a civil violation of the FECA.'' \384\ 
In his memorandum, Clark had a better perspective on the 
allegations generally. He pointed out that the Department could 
not possibly know, without investigating further, whether or 
not they could initiate criminal prosecutions.\385\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \384\ Exhibit 6 at 19.
    \385\ Exhibit 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response, La Bella directly addressed the criminal 
conspiracy argument, citing to the recent findings of a FEC 
audit report stating that the payments made by the DNC for the 
media campaign were in-kind contributions to either the primary 
or general campaign.\386\ The FEC audit also found that the ads 
contained an electioneering message.\387\ La Bella asserted 
that the audit report added ``considerable, credible, and new 
information supporting the Common Cause allegations.'' \388\ 
The finding specifically supported the allegations that the 
President directed and controlled ads that were paid for by the 
DNC pursuant to the President's request and that were intended 
to effect the President's election.\389\ In addition, because 
the auditors found ``electioneering content,'' meaning there 
was some type of violation of the campaign laws, the theory of 
a section 371 conspiracy was bolstered. Clinton/Gore's 
exclusion of the funds used to pay for the media campaign from 
its spending figures was therefore a potential criminal 
violation of the Federal campaign financing laws, according to 
La Bella.\390\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \386\ Exhibit 5 at 5.
    \387\ Id.
    \388\ Id. at 6.
    \389\ Id. at 7.
    \390\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the Task Force received the FEC Audit memorandum 
referred to by La Bella, the Attorney General could no longer 
ignore the matter, and was forced to open a preliminary 
investigation on the Common Cause allegations. Three months 
after his stinging memorandum ridiculing the Common Cause 
allegations, Radek, along with the new Task Force Supervising 
Attorney David Vicinanzo, finally acknowledged that those 
allegations were credible. Radek stated:

        To the extent that these advertising expenditures did 
        constitute contributions to and expenditures by the 
        campaign committees, they were unlawful, in that they 
        would have violated among other things, (1) the FECA's 
        limits on contributions to candidates by multicandidate 
        political parties like the DNC, and (2) the PPMPAA's 
        and PECFA's expenditure limits on publicly financed 
        elections. Any such violations made knowingly and 
        willfully would potentially be criminal.\391\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \391\ Memorandum from Lee J. Radek, Chief, Public Integrity 
Section, U.S. Department of Justice, and David A. Vicinanzo, 
Supervising Attorney, Campaign Financing Task Force, to James K. 
Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, at 2 
(Nov. 20, 1998).

    Radek stated that he would take the FEC's findings at face 
value for the purposes of the preliminary investigation. He 
determined that the main focus of the preliminary investigation 
was whether the President and Vice President had the requisite 
intent, knowing and willful, to be criminally liable.\392\ It 
is important to remember at this point that, as a check on the 
Attorney General's discretion under the Independent Counsel 
Act, she was not permitted to make a determination that ``no 
further investigation was warranted'' based on a finding that 
Clinton or Gore lacked the state of mind required for the 
violation, unless there was ``clear and convincing evidence.'' 
\393\ When drafting the Act, Congress believed that the 
Attorney General would rarely base a determination on state of 
mind, noting that ``due to the subjective judgments required 
and the limited role accorded the Attorney General in the 
independent counsel process.'' \394\ Nevertheless, Radek, 
accepting all of the other arguments that a criminal act 
transpired, focused in on intent as a way to avoid invoking the 
Independent Counsel Act. In fact, Radek concluded that the 
President and Vice President met this extremely high standard 
set by Congress, stating, ``in our view these facts establish 
that the President and Vice President lacked the requisite 
specific intent to violate the law.'' \395\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \392\ Memorandum from Lee J. Radek, Chief, Public Integrity 
Section, U.S. Department of Justice, and David A. Vicinanzo, 
Supervising Attorney, Campaign Financing Task Force, to James K. 
Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, at 2 
(Nov. 20, 1998).
    \393\ 28 U.S.C. Sec. 592(a)(2)(B)(ii).
    \394\ ``Independent Counsel Provisions: An Overview of the 
Operation of the Law,'' CRS Rept. No. 98-283, at FN 22 (Mar. 20, 1998) 
(citing H. Rept. No. 103-511, at 11 (1994)).
    \395\ Memorandum from Lee J. Radek, Chief, Public Integrity 
Section, U.S. Department of Justice, and David A. Vicinanzo, 
Supervising Attorney, Campaign Financing Task Force, to James K. 
Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, at 4 
(Nov. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Radek determined that the President and Vice President did 
not have the specific intent based upon their reliance on the 
advice of counsel.\396\ That is, they relied upon the advice of 
the DNC and Clinton/Gore attorneys who advised them. The 
attorneys, Joe Sandler and Lyn Utrecht, reviewed all of the ads 
before they were released and provided their opinion that the 
ads did not contain an electioneering message.\397\ Radek 
concludes that there was no evidence showing that the President 
and Vice President had independent knowledge of the 
electioneering standard or whether they might be violating 
it.\398\ However, he had to determine whether no further 
investigation was warranted. In this case, it is not at all 
clear that there was clear and convincing evidence of a lack of 
intent sufficient enough to overcome the need for further 
investigation, certainly without having conducted a grand jury 
investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \396\ Memorandum from Lee J. Radek, Chief, Public Integrity 
Section, U.S. Department of Justice, and David A. Vicinanzo, 
Supervising Attorney, Campaign Financing Task Force, to James K. 
Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, at 37 
(Nov. 20, 1998).
    \397\ Id.
    \398\ Id. at 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FBI found that the ``advice of counsel'' defense relied 
upon by Radek and Vicinanzo was ``not strong enough to satisfy 
the `clear and convincing' standard under the Independent 
Counsel Act.'' \399\ FBI General Counsel Larry Parkinson 
indicated in a memorandum to Director Freeh that there were 
several reasons why the standard had not been met. First, while 
relying on the advice of counsel defense, the President and 
Vice President had no direct contact with the attorneys 
providing the advice.\400\ Parkinson points out that all of the 
advice was filtered through intermediaries and raised serious 
questions as to whether the actual legal advice was provided to 
the President and Vice President.\401\ In addition, the 
attorneys in question, Sandler and Utrecht, were not 
disinterested parties, both had a vested interest in ensuring 
the re-election of Clinton and Gore. As Parkinson stated, had 
they wanted a truly disinterested opinion they could have gone 
to the FEC for advice.\402\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \399\ Memorandum from Larry Parkinson, general counsel, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, to Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, at 3 (Dec. 4, 1998) (exhibit 8).
    \400\ Id.
    \401\ Id.
    \402\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Perhaps most important to whether further investigation was 
warranted was that Sandler, one of the attorneys upon whom 
Clinton and Gore were relying, wrote a memorandum indicating he 
had doubts about whether the media campaign was violating 
election law.\403\ The memo stated, ``Under [the FEC's legal] 
test, the DNC is bumping up right against (and maybe a little 
bit over) the line in running our media campaign about the 
federal budget debate, praising the President's plan and 
criticizing Dole by name.'' \404\ The Sandler memo was somehow 
rewritten to soften the language by the time it was sent to the 
White House.\405\ Sandler was interviewed about the memoranda, 
and Parkinson stated that, ``Sandler gave a contorted 
explanation which led our agents to believe he was lying.'' 
\406\ In addition, the FBI believed that the White House had 
not produced all documents relevant to the preliminary 
investigation.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \403\ Id.
    \404\ Id. (quoting memorandum written by Joe Sandler, general 
counsel, DNC).
    \405\ Id.
    \406\ Id.
    \407\ Id. at 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Parkinson also took issue generally with Radek's 
application of the clear and convincing standard in the Vice 
President's case. He pointed out that Congress intended to set 
a very high threshold for the Attorney General to close a case 
based on lack of intent to commit the crime.\408\ He cited to 
the legislative history of the Act, wherein Congress stated 
that, ``[t]he Justice Department's demand for proof of intent 
to justify continuing independent counsel cases is disturbing, 
because criminal intent is extremely difficult to assess, 
especially in the early stages of an investigation. Further, it 
often requires subjective judgments, which should ideally be 
left to an independent decisionmaker.'' \409\ Parkinson framed 
the question as whether the Attorney General could reasonably 
conclude that the Vice President's case was one of those ``rare 
cases'' in which she could reach the threshold of the clear and 
convincing standard. Parkinson clearly concluded that it would 
not be reasonable for the Attorney General to make that 
determination.\410\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \408\ Memorandum from Larry Parkinson, general counsel, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, to James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney 
General, U.S. Department of Justice, at 7 (Nov. 20, 1998).
    \409\ Id. (citing to 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2159-60).
    \410\ Id. at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Parkinson memorandum should have been sufficient to 
convince the Attorney General that further investigation into 
the Common Cause allegations was warranted. Parkinson raised 
numerous issues that were not addressed by the preliminary 
investigation. In fact, Parkinson stated that the preliminary 
investigation, ``consisted primarily (but not exclusively) of 
an examination of an advice of counsel defense.'' \411\ That is 
hardly a ringing endorsement of the Public Integrity Section's 
preliminary investigation. Nevertheless, Attorney General Reno 
embraced the advice of counsel defense, disregarded the glaring 
problems with the investigation, and declined to appoint an 
independent counsel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \411\ Exhibit 8 at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    F. Department of Justice's Bad Faith in Its Application of the 
                        Independent Counsel Act

1. The Chief of the Public Integrity Section Was Predisposed Against 
        the Act

    The memoranda written by Freeh and La Bella made it clear 
that they believed that an independent counsel should have been 
appointed to investigate the campaign finance matter. However, 
the Justice Department's legal interpretation and application 
of the Act all but ensured that an independent counsel would 
not be appointed. Even the head of the Criminal Division, James 
Robinson, agreed that the Department had been applying too high 
of a threshold to trigger the appointment of an independent 
counsel in the case of the Common Cause allegations. He stated:

        It occurs to me that Public Integrity, in insisting 
        upon a ``may have violated the law'' standard which 
        includes a consideration of the ``state of the law'' at 
        the time of the conduct in question, and which also 
        addresses the issue of ``willfulness,'' is applying a 
        higher trigger standard than the one called for by the 
        ICA.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \412\ Memorandum from James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney 
General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Janet Reno, Attorney General, 
U.S. Department of Justice, at 4 (Aug. 25, 1998). Robinson disagreed 
with Lee Radek's analysis of the Common Cause allegations in Radek's 
response to the La Bella memo, and recommended that the Attorney 
General initiate a preliminary investigation. Id. at 11.

However, it should have come as no surprise to anyone that 
Public Integrity would avoid the application of the independent 
counsel statute. The Chief of the Public Integrity Section made 
his views of the Act very clear when he told the New York 
Times, ``[i]nstitutionally, the Independent Counsel statute is 
an insult. It's a clear enunciation by the legislative branch 
that we cannot be trusted on certain species of cases.'' \413\ 
Obviously, Radek, who was in charge of the application of the 
statute, had a bias against the Act. He also had an additional 
impetus for rejecting the Act early in the investigation, to 
protect Reno's position at the Department. He told the Deputy 
Director of the FBI that he was under pressure because of the 
campaign finance investigation and that the Attorney General's 
job might depend on the decisions he made in the 
investigation.\414\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \413\ Jeffrey Goldberg, ``What Is Janet Reno Thinking?,'' NY Times 
Magazine, July 6, 1997, at 30.
    \414\ ``The Justice Department's Implementation of the Independent 
Counsel Act,'' hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 
106th Cong. 38 (2000) (testimony of William J. Esposito) (preliminary 
transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Radek's subsequent recommendations regarding the initiation 
of preliminary investigations or appointments of an independent 
counsel demonstrate that he interpreted the Act as narrowly as 
possible, or even misinterpreted the Act, in order to avoid its 
invocation. In their memoranda, Director Freeh and Supervising 
Attorney La Bella exhaustively analyzed the Public Integrity 
Section's thresholds and standards of investigation. They both 
came to the conclusion that PIS was applying a higher standard 
of investigation for individuals covered by the Independent 
Counsel Act.

2. The Chief of the Public Integrity Section Misrepresented Facts

    There have been numerous other examples of problems with 
Radek's interpretation of the Independent Counsel Act, some 
already cited. One of the most egregious examples, according to 
both the Freeh and La Bella memoranda, was Radek's refusal to 
consider a preliminary investigation of the Common Cause 
allegations until forced to do so by the FEC audit report. 
However, Radek was also criticized for misleading statements he 
made regarding the various investigations and the contortions 
he sometimes went through to avoid invoking the Act. In one 
instance, the Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Office 
of Legal Counsel Dawn Johnsen rebuked Radek for misrepresenting 
the opinions of her office in a memorandum to the head of the 
Criminal Division. She stated:

        [T]o the extent that the [Radek] memorandum attempts to 
        report remarks made by OLC lawyers at the meeting, it 
        does so incorrectly and incompletely. Thus, not only 
        did the memorandum leave the mistaken impression that 
        ``OLC positions'' were expressed, it also 
        mischaracterized the comments that individual lawyers 
        offered in [sic] during the meeting.\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \415\ Memorandum from Dawn Johnsen, Acting Assistant Attorney 
General, U.S. Department of Justice, to Lee J. Radek, Chief, Public 
Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice, at 1 (Oct. 2, 1997).

    In another example, Radek wrote an August 24, 1998, 
memorandum recommending that the Attorney General not pursue a 
preliminary inquiry into whether the Vice President may have 
provided false statements regarding his fundraising telephone 
calls from the White House.\416\ A line attorney, Judy Feigin, 
took issue with many of the factual assertions made by Radek in 
his recommendation, and wrote a memorandum clarifying the 
facts.\417\ She stated that FBI agents' notes and recollections 
of witness interviews were significantly different from what 
Radek had written in his memorandum.\418\ In particular, Radek 
characterized White House Chief of Staff Leon Panetta as having 
an ``evolving memory,'' implying that he was not a credible 
witness.\419\ Feigin stated that the agents viewed Panetta as a 
very credible witness. Feigin cited numerous examples of 
Radek's factual inaccuracies and blatant misrepresentations, 
including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \416\ Memorandum from Lee J. Radek, Chief, Public Integrity 
Section, to James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. 
Department of Justice (Aug. 24, 1998) (transmitted to the Attorney 
General by Robinson).
    \417\ Memorandum from (name redacted), Assistant U.S. Attorney, 
U.S. Department of Justice, to James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney 
General, U.S. Department of Justice (Aug. 25, 1998). (Exhibit 9). The 
name of the Attorney, Judy Feigin, has been made public since the 
Justice Department's production of the memorandum.
    \418\ Id. at 2.
    \419\ Id.

         The memo (p. 11) says Panetta's 
        ``impression'' was that the Vice President was 
        following the hard money discussion. The agents' notes 
        reflect that Panetta said the Vice President was 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        listening attentively.

         Page 10, fn. 11 suggests that the media fund 
        was not an item in the DNC budget during the Spring and 
        Summer of 1995. However Watson recalled the agenda of 
        the June 8, 1995 meeting included the media fund.

         Page 11, fn. 12 says that Panetta may have 
        contradicted himself. The agents' notes do not support 
        this. Panetta recalled the general topic discussed 
        though not the specific details.

         Page 12: The memo suggests that Rosen 
        recalled the focus of the fundraising proposals 
        presented to the President and Vice President during 
        the November meeting was on raising soft money. The 
        agents' notes indicate that Rosen had no recall whether 
        the events were intended to raise soft or hard money.

         Page 14, n. 15: The footnote concludes that 
        Panetta, among others, did not understand the statement 
        made by Pastrick at the top of the footnote. In fact, 
        Panetta understood clearly the first part of the 
        statement, i.e., that every DNC expenditure during a 
        federal campaign is required to have a hard money 
        component. The only thing Panetta did not know was the 
        $20,000 limit.

         Page 15, n. 16: The memo quotes Ickes' 
        statement that Strauss was very sophisticated in 
        matters of soft money/hard money, and therefore may 
        have written notes of greater detail than actually 
        discussed. However, the memo does not mention Strauss' 
        own statement (reflected in agents' notes) that he was 
        not familiar with these issues as they pertained to the 
        White House and the DNC. Strauss was adamant that those 
        notations reflected comments made at the meeting.

         Page 16: The memo says that Gore stated he 
        and the President did not often attend DNC budget 
        meetings like that held on Nov. 21. In fact, the agents 
        report that most witnesses indicated that the President 
        and Vice President generally did attend the DNC budget 
        meetings.

         The memorandum at least twice refers to the 
        fact that the Vice President might well have left the 
        meeting at the point in which the hard money media fund 
        discussion took place. Not only is there no evidence 
        that this occurred (i.e., no witness recalls his 
        leaving) but the agents' notes reflect that Ickes told 
        them that when he conducted meetings (and he was 
        conducting the meeting on November 21), he would halt 
        the proceedings if the President or Vice President 
        stepped out of the room; the meeting would resume when 
        they returned. Therefore, rather than presume the Vice 
        President was not present, the presumption must be that 
        he was.\420\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \420\ Id.

    The information mischaracterized or left out by Radek was 
absolutely crucial to determining whether to initiate a 
preliminary investigation of Vice President Gore. At issue was 
whether the Vice President believed the media fund was financed 
exclusively with soft money, as Gore originally stated during 
the first investigation of his fundraising phone calls. What 
was discussed and recalled by other individuals present at the 
meeting would be a strong indication of the Vice President's 
knowledge. In Feigin's memorandum, she points out that there 
was specific evidence from a credible source suggesting that 
the Vice President did know that the DNC media fund had a hard 
money component, and that the only evidence to the contrary 
were self-serving statements by the Vice President and his 
counsel. Radek's flawed memorandum, on the other hand, 
intentionally or unintentionally had the effect of tipping the 
scales in Gore's favor and avoiding the initiation of a 
preliminary investigation under the Independent Counsel Act.
    A further example of Radek's tendency to discriminate 
against the Act occurred during the initial November 1997, 
investigation of the allegations that Gore made solicitations 
for campaign contributions from his White House office. La 
Bella raised a troubling issue regarding Radek's recommendation 
against the appointment of an independent counsel, stating, 
``[m]y overall concern is that at every point where two 
inferences could be drawn from a set of facts, the inference 
consistent with a lack of criminal intent/conduct was always 
chosen.'' \421\ He added:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \421\ Memorandum from Charles G. La Bella, Supervising Attorney, 
Campaign Financing Task Force, to Janet Reno, Attorney General, U.S. 
Department of Justice, at 2 (Nov. 30, 1997).

        By routinely embracing the most innocent inference at 
        every turn, even if the inferences are factually 
        defensible, the memorandum creates an appearance that 
        the Department is straining to avoid the appointment of 
        an Independent Counsel and foreclose what many would 
        characterize as an impartial review of the allegations. 
        When you look at the facts, the memos, the meetings, 
        and the DNC practice, it is hard to say, as the 
        memorandum does, that there is only one conclusion to 
        be reached.\422\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \422\ Id.at 7.

Perhaps if Radek had weighed the facts in favor of declining to 
initiate a preliminary investigation or appoint an independent 
counsel only on this one occasion, he would be more credible. 
However, it appears to have been his pattern and practice in 
nearly every Task Force investigation.\423\ This leads the 
committee to believe that Radek was intentionally avoiding the 
application of the Independent Counsel Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \423\ On one occasion, Radek recommended that the Attorney General 
initiate a preliminary investigation. In a Sept. 29, 1997, memorandum, 
Radek concluded that, with regard to the allegations that Vice 
President Gore may have solicited campaign contributions from his White 
House office in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 607, there was 
information sufficiently specific and credible to warrant further 
investigation. Radek had to come to this conclusion given the Vice 
President admitted he made the fundraising telephone calls from his 
office. Memorandum from Lee J. Radek, Chief, Public Integrity Section, 
U.S. Department of Justice, to Mark M. Richard, Acting Assistant 
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice (Sept. 29, 1997). After 
the preliminary investigation, Radek concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence that the Vice President may have violated section 
607 to warrant further investigation. Therefore, he recommended against 
the appointment of an independent counsel. Memorandum from Lee J. 
Radek, Chief, Public Integrity Section, U.S. Department of Justice, to 
Mark M. Richard, Acting Assitant Attorney General, U.S. Department of 
Justice, at 41 (Nov. 21, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The Attorney General Avoided the Invocation of the Independent 
        Counsel Act

    In the end, the decisions on independent counsels were left 
to the Attorney General alone. She consistently failed to apply 
the Act in the campaign finance investigation, and the blame 
falls squarely on her. Although Public Integrity Chief Lee 
Radek developed many of the theories upon which Reno relied, it 
was the Attorney General who chose not to apply the Act 
responsibly.
    In defense of herself, Attorney General Reno often invoked 
the numerous previous independent counsels she had appointed as 
proof that she was doing the right thing. However, none of the 
other independent counsels were a direct referral based on the 
President or First Lady except for Whitewater. In the 
Whitewater case, the Attorney General adamantly refused to 
appoint a special prosecutor \424\ until the President ordered 
her to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \424\ At the time, the Independent Counsel Act had expired, and had 
not yet been reauthorized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Task force attorneys and FBI officials wrote numerous 
memoranda to the Attorney General regarding her interpretation 
of the statute or practical application of it. They often 
explained why the standard she was applying was too high, or 
the analysis was flawed. By intentionally ignoring the advice 
given to her by people like Director Freeh and Supervising 
Attorney La Bella, who were familiar with both the facts and 
the law, Attorney General Reno crippled the campaign 
fundraising investigation. It appeared from her actions 
throughout the investigation, that that was her intent all 
along.

  G. The Failure To Appoint a Special Counsel for Vice President Gore

    The committee learned in December 1999 that the President 
and Vice President had never been interviewed about the vast 
majority of their activities relating to the 1996 campaign 
fundraising scandal. Shortly thereafter, in April 2000, the 
head of the Campaign Financing Task Force, Robert Conrad, 
requested interviews with President Clinton and Vice President 
Gore. In these interviews, Conrad covered many of the subjects 
that had been neglected by the Justice Department for the 
preceding 3 years.
    After his interview with Vice President Gore, Conrad made a 
recommendation to the Attorney General that a special counsel 
be appointed to investigate the Vice President for possible 
false statements made during the course of the April 18, 2000, 
interview. The details of Conrad's recommendation are not 
available to the committee, given the Justice Department's 
refusal to produce the Conrad memo to the committee.\425\ 
However, the facts that have been made public make it clear 
that Conrad's recommendation was based in part on his opinion 
that the Vice President may have made false statements about 
the Hsi Lai Temple fundraiser and the White House coffees.\426\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \425\ The Attorney General's refusal to produce the Conrad 
memorandum to the committee is discussed in detail later in this 
report.
    \426\ News conference with Attorney General Reno, Washington, DC. 
(Aug. 23, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The central dispute in the Vice President's interview about 
the Hsi Lai Temple event was whether or not the Vice President 
knew that the event was a fundraiser. During his testimony, the 
Vice President stated that:

        There was no solicitation of money. I did not see any 
        money or checks change hands. I never heard it 
        discussed. Nor do I believe it took place, 
        incidentally. Perhaps you know that some money changed 
        hands there. But to this day, I don't think any did.

           *         *         *         *         *

        And subsequent disclosures in the press and subsequent 
        production of memoranda that I never saw at the time 
        showed that--showed what they showed. And the very 
        fact, for me, the very fact that the members of a 
        finance-related event were present at the event was the 
        only connection that I had to the possibility that it 
        was finance-related.

        But I did not know that it was a fundraiser. And I do 
        not to this day know that it was a fundraiser.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \427\ Interview of Vice President Gore 68-69 (Apr. 18, 2000).

After the Vice President made this statement, Conrad presented 
him with a number of pieces of evidence suggesting that the Hsi 
Lai Temple event was considered to be a fundraiser by the Vice 
President's staff and the DNC staff. Nevertheless, the Vice 
President continued to assert that the event was not a 
fundraiser.
    Conrad also asked the Vice President his understanding of 
the nature of White House coffees. Again, the Vice President 
insisted that the coffees were not intended to raise funds:

        Mr. Conrad. What was the purpose of the coffees?

        Vice President Gore. Well, they were for the President 
        to meet with people who were interested in supporting 
        his policies and his politics. But that was more or 
        less on his side of the house and I'm not the best 
        source of information about that.

        Mr. Conrad. In terms of a fund-raising tool, what was 
        the purpose of the coffees?

        Vice President Gore. I don't know. They were on his 
        side of the house. And I will give you my understanding 
        of what I thought they were. I thought they were events 
        that allowed the President to spend time with 
        influential people who wanted to talk about policy, who 
        would at some later time possibly be asked to 
        financially support the DNC. It was certainly not my 
        understanding that they were fund-raising events.

        Mr. Conrad. Did you have any understanding, or do you 
        have any understanding that there was a price tag 
        associated with the coffees?

        Vice President Gore. No, I do not and did not.\428\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \428\ Id. at 52-53.

Conrad then presented to the Vice President the evidence that 
the coffees were used to raise funds for the DNC, but the Vice 
President did not change his belief that the coffees were not 
fundraisers.
    On August 23, 2000, after a lengthy period of deliberation, 
the Attorney General decided not to appoint a special counsel 
to investigate false statements made by the Vice President. The 
Attorney General explained her reasoning at a press conference:

        Because further investigation is not likely to result 
        in a prosecutable case under applicable criminal law 
        and principles of federal prosecution, I have concluded 
        that a special counsel is not warranted.

        The transcript reflects neither false statements nor 
        perjury, each of which requires proof of a willfully 
        false statement about a material matter. Rather, the 
        transcript reflects disagreements about labels. I have 
        concluded that there is no reasonable possibility that 
        further investigation could develop evidence that would 
        support the filing of charges for making a willful 
        false statement.

        The Task Force will, of course, continue its ongoing 
        investigation into illegal fundraising activity and 
        will be free to pursue all avenues of investigation, 
        wherever they may lead.\429\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \429\ News conference with Attorney General Reno, Washington, DC. 
(Aug. 23, 2000).

In her statement, the Attorney General said more than that she 
simply would not appoint a special counsel. She stated that 
there was no reasonable possibility of developing evidence 
which could lead to charges that the Vice President made a 
false statement during his interview. This definitive statement 
effectively closed the door to any further investigation of 
issues arising out of the Vice President's interview.
    During the period leading up to the Attorney General's 
announcement, a Justice Department source had leaked 
information making it appear that Conrad was alone in 
recommending a special counsel to the Attorney General, being 
quoted in the New York Times as saying that ``no other 
prosecutor in this matter thought that there should be a need 
for a special counsel.'' \430\ At her press conference, 
Attorney General Reno made it clear that the Justice Department 
leak was false: ``today Bob Conrad has been tagged with being 
the only person in the Justice Department who thought I should 
appoint a special counsel. Although I'm not going to get into 
who recommended what, I can tell you that that is not 
correct.'' \431\ Later, Reno confirmed that at least two other 
advisors of hers supported the appointment of a special counsel 
for Vice President Gore.\432\ A false leak from a Justice 
Department official about the level of support for Conrad's 
special counsel decision should have given the Attorney General 
pause. It appears that certain Justice Department officials are 
willing to both leak information about ongoing cases, and to 
lie about those cases, in order to create a public perception 
that is favorable to the Vice President. If these types of 
individuals are advising the Attorney General, how can she 
possibly receive unbiased advice?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \430\ Neil A. Lewis and Don Van Natta, Jr., ``Reno, Rejecting 
Aide's Recommendation, Declines to Name Counsel on Gore Fund-Raising,'' 
the New York Times at A19 (Aug. 23, 2000).
    \431\ News conference with Attorney General Reno, Washington, DC. 
(Aug. 23, 2000).
    \432\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unsurprisingly, the Attorney General's broad decision not 
to appoint a special counsel was not supported by the law, or 
the facts of the Task Force investigation. In those respects, 
it closely resembled the Attorney General's earlier decisions 
not to appoint independent counsels. The Attorney General's 
decision had a number of serious flaws.
    The Attorney General did not have all of the relevant 
evidence before her. In late August, when the Attorney General 
made her decision, the Justice Department and FBI were in the 
process of reconstructing the first batch of ``missing'' e-mail 
which had not been produced to investigators by the White 
House. When she made her decision on August 23, 2000, the 
Attorney General had reviewed ``some of the e-mails, not all of 
them.'' \433\ The e-mail reconstructed by the FBI had direct 
relevance to the decisionmaking process that the Attorney 
General was undertaking. One e-mail, from Gore's Political 
Director, stated ``[t]hese are FR coffees right?'' \434\ Given 
the fact that the e-mail reconstruction process was turning up 
evidence relevant to the special counsel decision, it is 
peculiar that the Attorney General would reach her decision 
before having all of the evidence. In addition, the author of 
the e-mail was Vice President Gore's former Political Director, 
and she has yet to be interviewed by the Justice Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \433\ Interview of Attorney General Janet Reno 34 (Oct. 5, 2000) 
(preliminary transcript).
    \434\ E-mail message from Karen Skelton to Ellen Ochs (Apr. 23, 
1996) (exhibit 10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In fact, it appears that the Attorney General did not 
believe that there could be any evidence which would undermine 
the Vice President's statements. In her interview with the 
committee on October 5, 2000, the Attorney General stated ``I 
don't think that there is a reasonable possibility of finding 
an e-mail or evidence that says, yes, I did it.'' \435\ Of 
course, it would not be necessary for the Justice Department to 
find an e-mail where the Vice President says ``yes, I did it'' 
in order to support the filing of false statements charges. 
Rather, it would only be necessary to find an e-mail message 
indicating that the Vice President contemporaneously believed 
that the White House coffees or the Hsi Lai Temple event were 
fundraisers. It is difficult to believe that the Attorney 
General concluded that there was not a reasonable possibility 
of uncovering such evidence through the e-mail reconstruction 
process. While it might be appropriate for the Vice President's 
lawyers or staff to have blind faith in his credibility, it is 
unseemly and disturbing when the Attorney General makes a leap 
of faith to clear the Vice President of wrongdoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \435\ Interview of Attorney General Janet Reno 39 (Oct. 5, 2000) 
(preliminary transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Attorney General also based her decision on her belief 
that ``the transcript reflects disagreements about labels.'' 
The Attorney General reiterated this belief in her October 5 
interview:

        The Vice President defined what he meant by fund-
        raiser, and there is no information at this time that 
        there were funds raised that he knew about at the 
        Temple. Based on his definition of what a fund-raiser 
        was and what he said, I would not be able to prove, 
        based on that, that he believed it to be a fund-raiser 
        and testified falsely.

           *         *         *         *         *

        And if a man says this is my definition of a fund-
        raiser and this is not my definition of a fund-raiser, 
        I've got to look at that and take it within the four 
        corners of this transcript and judge based on his 
        definition as to whether there is a false statement.

           *         *         *         *         *

        I think the whole statement clearly reflects what the 
        Vice President understood a fund-raiser to be, and 
        within his definition, I think he made it clear that 
        the statement was not inaccurate.\436\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \436\ Interview of Attorney General Janet Reno 42-43, 46-47 (Oct. 
5, 2000) (preliminary transcript).

It is remarkable that the Attorney General would base her 
decision not to appoint a special counsel on the fact that the 
Vice President defined ``fundraiser'' in such a way as to 
exclude all of the evidence suggesting that the Hsi Lai Temple 
event and the White House coffees were fundraisers. The Vice 
President's definition, which requires funds to actually change 
hands at the event, differs from the definition used by the 
DNC, under which the DNC assigned the Hsi Lai Temple event and 
the White House coffees to raise certain amounts of money for 
the DNC. The Vice President's definition also differs from that 
of his staff, who considered both events to be fundraisers. 
Given these facts, the Attorney General would be entitled, and 
in fact, obligated, to consider whether the Vice President's 
definition of ``fundraiser'' was reasonable and not simply a 
post hoc defense to avoid prosecution.
    The Attorney General's decision not to appoint a special 
counsel to investigate Vice President Gore is, unfortunately, 
consistent with her earlier decisions not to appoint 
independent counsels to investigate the fundraising scandal. 
The Attorney General ignored the facts and the law to reach a 
strained conclusion which was favorable to the Vice President. 
Unlike her other decisions, this one was made in the middle of 
the Presidential election campaign, and provided the Vice 
President with a valuable boost. Yet again, the Attorney 
General placed politics over impartial enforcement of the laws.

          II. Failures of the Justice Department Investigation

    The Attorney General's failure to appoint an independent 
counsel to head the campaign fundraising investigation had 
unfortunate practical consequences. The investigation was 
inadequate in many ways. Key documents were never subpoenaed. 
Key witnesses were never interviewed. Guilty parties have yet 
to be indicted. The Justice Department failed to pursue 
evidence aggressively. The Department's investigation has been 
extraordinarily passive, and appears designed more to provide 
political cover to the administration than to find out what 
happened in the 1996 elections.
    The Justice Department did prosecute important individuals 
whose actions were central to the scandal, namely John Huang 
and Charlie Trie. Even in those prosecutions, however, where 
the Justice Department gained the cooperation of Trie and 
Huang, the Justice Department failed to follow significant 
leads. Other individuals, particularly those at the White House 
and the DNC, received a free pass from the Justice Department 
regardless of the evidence against them. The end result was a 
good cover story for an investigation derailed. The Justice 
Department could point to 25 prosecutions as evidence of its 
commitment to get to the truth. The White House and the DNC 
could rest assured that they would not be next.

   A. The Justice Department Failed to Pursue the December 15, 1995, 
                            Coffee Videotape

1. The White House Production of Fundraising Videotapes

    On March 4, 1997, the committee served a subpoena on the 
White House for records, including any ``video or audio 
recording,'' on various named individuals central to the 
campaign finance investigation.\437\ In response, the White 
House produced documents, but not videotapes. The Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs specifically asked the White 
House about recordings of fundraising events in August 1997. 
However, the White House claimed that there were no video 
recordings.\438\ Nevertheless, the Senate continued to question 
whether the recordings existed. Finally, the White House 
revealed in October 1997 that videotapes showing President 
Clinton and Vice President Gore with many individuals then 
under criminal investigation did indeed exist.\439\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \437\ Committee on Government Reform and Oversight subpoena to the 
Executive Office of the President, Mar. 4, 1997, at 1, 3-4.
    \438\ S. Rept. No. 105-167, at 4284-4285 (1998).
    \439\ The White House's assertion that there were no responsive 
videotapes was based on the fact that the White House Communications 
Agency (WHCA) produced only six documents, and no videotapes, pursuant 
to the White House Counsel Office's request for records to be searched. 
However, the White House claimed that a proper search was not conducted 
by WHCA. Steven Smith, WHCA's chief of operations, said that his office 
was never asked for any videotapes or documents about the coffees until 
around October 1997. George Lardner, Jr., ``Aide Says Agency Didn't Get 
Request For Coffee Tapes,'' Washington Post, Oct. 13, 1997, at A1. The 
committee received the first White House videotapes on Oct. 5, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the White House discovered the videotapes on 
October 1, 1997, White House Counsel Charles Ruff did not 
immediately inform the Justice Department about their existence 
immediately. Despite the fact that he attended his weekly 
meeting with Attorney General Janet Reno on October 2, 1997, 
Ruff did not mention the videotapes. At the time of the 
meeting, Ruff was aware that Reno would be making a decision on 
whether or not to appoint an independent counsel within days. 
The videotapes were important pieces of evidence showing who 
attended and what occurred at numerous events. The next day, 
October 3, 1997, Special Counsel to the President Lanny Breuer 
informed the Senate of the existence of the videotapes, but 
neglected to inform the Justice Department. Reno announced her 
decision not to appoint an independent counsel on October 
3.\440\ When Breuer informed the Justice Department of the 
videotapes on October 4, 1997, it appeared as though the White 
House had purposefully withheld the tapes until after Reno made 
her decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \440\ Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno to Chairman Henry 
Hyde, Oct. 3, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Once the Attorney General learned what had occurred, she 
said: ``I was mad at the people responsible, but what I think 
what's important now is that we move on.'' \441\ Despite her 
anger, Reno quickly jumped to the defense of the White House. 
Based on what could only have been a cursory review of the 
tapes, Reno fully exonerated the White House of any wrongdoing 
when she said ``we do not have any indication of criminal 
activity by people covered under the Independent Counsel Act, 
including the President.'' \442\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \441\ Jim Abrams, ``Reno Says She Will Not Resign, Will Not Stop 
Investigation,'' Associated Press, quoting Meet the Press (NBC 
television broadcast, Oct. 12, 1997).
    \442\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The December 15, 1995, White House Coffee

    The videotapes showed a number of events where the 
President and Vice President were raising funds for the DNC. 
One of the events, a December 15, 1995, coffee, was especially 
relevant because the President and Vice President attended 
along with Arief Wiriadinata, an Indonesian citizen living in 
the United States. Wiriadinata and his wife, Soraya, 
contributed $455,000 to the DNC after they received a $500,000 
wire transfer from Indonesia from Soraya's father, Hashim Ning. 
Ning was a former business partner of the Riady family. The 
initial review of this tape showed that Arief Wiriadinata 
greeted President Clinton and said ``James Riady sent me.'' 
\443\ When the committee analyzed the tape further, it became 
apparent that the Vice President may have spoken with 
Wiriadinata as well. Vice President Gore appears to say:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \443\ White House Communications Agency videotape, Dec. 15, 1995. 
The committee subpoenaed the original WHCA Betacam tape of the event 
from the White House.

        We oughta, we oughta, we oughta show Mr. Riady the 
        tapes, some of the ad tapes.\444\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \444\ Id.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another voice then adds:

          I'll see if I can do that.\445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \445\ Two DNC officials, DNC Finance Chairman Marvin Rosen and DNC 
Finance Director Richard Sullivan, were in the vicinity of the Vice 
President when the comments were made. However, it is unclear who made 
the follow-up statement.

Vice President Gore was apparently referring to DNC issue 
advertisements that were televised across the country from the 
fall of 1995 until the election in 1996. President Clinton and 
Vice President Gore had agreed to help raise millions of 
dollars to finance the DNC's unprecedented advertisement blitz. 
According to the Vice President, the ads were shown to 
``individuals who would be willing to contribute to the DNC 
media fund.'' \446\ The Vice President traveled to San 
Francisco on October 13, 1995, to show a group of potential 
contributors the DNC issue ads. Then, on December 11, 1995, 4 
days prior to the coffee, Vice President Gore was in an airport 
hangar in Chicago again showing the DNC issue ads to potential 
donors in order to solicit contributions. Therefore, it was 
clear that in December 1995, the Vice President was using the 
presentation of the DNC issue ads as a fundraising tool. Four 
days after the Chicago fundraiser, Vice President Gore attended 
the December 15, 1995, White House coffee. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to believe that the Vice President was thinking 
about obtaining financial support from donors when he 
apparently suggested that the DNC issue ads be shown to James 
Riady.\447\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \446\ FBI interview of Vice President Gore, at 10 (Nov. 11, 1997).
    \447\ Vice President Gore was scheduled to hold his own coffee for 
DNC contributors in the Old Executive Office Building on Dec. 15, 1995. 
The Vice President was not included on the guest list for the coffee 
President Clinton held for DNC contributors in the Roosevelt Room of 
the White House on the same day. Guest list for Dec. 15, 1995, White 
House coffee (exhibit 11). It should also be noted that the Roosevelt 
Room is an official room in the White House and political solicitations 
there are illegal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The December 15, 1995, Videotape is Relevant to the Investigation of 
        Vice President Gore

    If Vice President Gore said that DNC advertisement tapes 
should be shown to James Riady in December 1995, his comment 
has far-reaching implications that could demonstrate the Vice 
President's direct knowledge of criminal activity in the 1996 
Presidential campaign. For the Vice President to have made the 
comment, he would have to be aware of two significant facts: 
(1) the Vice President understood that Arief Wiriadinata had a 
connection to James Riady; and (2) the Vice President had to 
know that James Riady was either raising or funneling 
contributions into the 1996 campaign, or that he was important 
enough to receive preferential treatment.
    The Vice President first would have to know who Arief 
Wiriadinata was and that Wiriadinata was connected to James 
Riady. Arief Wiriadinata and his wife, Soraya, were Indonesians 
who settled in Springfield, VA, where Arief was employed as a 
gardener. The Wiriadinatas were able to become prominent DNC 
donors enjoying the attention of the President and Vice 
President because of Soraya's father, Hashim Ning. Ning was a 
former business partner of the Riady family and a co-founder of 
the Lippo Group. When Ning became ill during a visit to the 
United States in June 1995, James Riady had his representative, 
John Huang, visit Ning in the hospital.\448\ During Ning's 
hospital stay, Riady and Huang arranged a ``get well'' card 
from President Clinton and a visit from Mark Middleton, who had 
worked in the White House chief of staff's office.\449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \448\ The visit at the hospital was the first time Huang met Arief 
and Soraya Wiriadinata. ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady Family 
in Political Fundraising,'' hearings before the House Committee on 
Government Reform, 106th Cong., 247 (Dec. 16, 1999) (preliminary 
transcript).
    \449\ Letter from President Clinton to Hasjim [sic] Ning, June 19, 
1995, F 0033816 (exhibit 12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By November 1995, while still employed by the Commerce 
Department, Huang began soliciting contributions from Arief and 
Soraya Wiriadinata on Riady's recommendation.\450\ Over the 
next 6 months, the Wiriadinatas would give $455,000 to the DNC. 
The Wiriadinatas' contributions all came from a $500,000 wire 
transfer sent to them on November 7, 1995, by Hashim Ning. By 
the time of the White House coffee on December 15, 1995, the 
Wiriadinatas had already contributed $130,000. John Huang's 
testimony before the committee in December 1999 revealed the 
close link between the contributions and the Lippo Group. 
First, Riady told Huang that he should ask the Wiriadinatas to 
give. Second, the money given by the Wiriadinatas came from one 
of the Riadys' long-time associates. Finally, and perhaps most 
striking, Huang testified that when Ning died in late 1995 or 
early 1996 and the Wiriadinatas had to return to Indonesia, 
they gave him a series of blank checks to fulfill their 
contribution commitment to him.\451\ Huang kept the blank 
checks in his desk and used them as needed to make 
contributions to the DNC on the Wiriadinatas' behalf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \450\ ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady Family in Political 
Fundraising,'' hearings before the House Committee on Government 
Reform, 106th Cong., 252 (Dec. 16, 1999) (preliminary transcript).
    \451\ ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady Family in Political 
Fundraising,'' hearings before the House Committee on Government 
Reform, 106th Cong., 13 (Dec. 17, 1999) (preliminary transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On November 2, 1995, Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata attended 
their first DNC fundraiser with Vice President Gore. At the 
event, John Huang introduced the couple to the Vice President. 
By this time, the Vice President had already begun the 
solicitation of contributors for the DNC issue ad campaign. The 
next known meeting between the Vice President and Arief 
Wiriadinata occurred at the White House coffee on December 15, 
1995.
    The Vice President's comment to Wiriadinata begs the 
question: why did the Vice President refer to James Riady? Was 
the Vice President aware that Riady was the source of the 
Wiriadinata contributions? Two possible explanations are 
apparent: either the Vice President heard Wiriadinata say 
``James Riady sent me'' to the President or the DNC officials 
near the Vice President prompted his remark about the ad tapes. 
The Vice President knew that Riady was an Indonesian 
businessman.\452\ Therefore, the Vice President's comment is 
troubling, as the showing of advertisement tapes to donors 
appears to have been a device to encourage further 
contributions and provide thanks for past contributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \452\ Testimony of Vice President Albert Gore Jr., at 111 (April 
18, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Clearly, it would have been illegal for Riady to contribute 
money to the 1996 Presidential campaign.\453\ Even John Huang, 
the DNC fundraiser responsible for many of the illegal 
contributions to the DNC in 1995 and 1996, acknowledged that it 
would have been illegal for Riady to contribute:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \453\ The DNC's last officially recorded contribution from James 
Riady occurred October 1992. The reason was because Riady had been 
permanently moved back to Indonesia in 1990 at the latest, and 
therefore, was ineligible even to make any political contributions in 
1992.

        Mr. Shays. Would it have been illegal for you to raise 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        money from the Riadys when you worked for the DNC?

        Mr. Huang. I'm sorry, sir?

        Mr. Shays. Would it have been illegal for you to have 
        raised money from the Riadys? You seem to want to make 
        clear to me that somehow during that time while you 
        worked at the DNC you did not raise money from the 
        Riadys but you raised money from people who had 
        business acquaintances and agreements with the Riadys.

        Mr. Huang. Because I had the knowledge at that time Mr. 
        Riady has relinquished his green card status back to 
        the United States and he was no longer holding the PR, 
        so-called permanent resident status in the United 
        States, he was not eligible to take care of any 
        further.\454\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \454\ ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady Family in Political 
Fundraising,'' hearings before the House Committee on Government 
Reform, 106th Cong., 111 (Dec. 15, 1999) (preliminary transcript).

    Vice President Gore's statement about Riady is troubling in 
light of his testimony concerning James Riady in his April 18, 
2000, interview with the Task Force. In that testimony, the 
Vice President created the impression he did not know Riady 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
well, and was not politically involved with Riady:

        Mr. Conrad. When is the first time you ever met James 
        Riady?

        Vice President Gore. To my knowledge, I have only seen 
        him twice in my life. I may be wrong about this. There 
        may be other times that I'm not thinking, that I'm not 
        remembering.

        But the only times--I think the only times I've met him 
        were once when he was in Betty Currie's office 
        preparing to go in to see the President with a couple 
        of other people.

        Mr. Conrad. Did you know who those people were?

        Vice President Gore. No, I did not. I was on the way 
        out. And either he introduced himself or somebody 
        introduced him to me. The only other time I--

        Mr. Conrad. Before you get to the other time, do you 
        recall the substance of any conversation with him at 
        that time?

        Vice President Gore. Hello, how are you. I said, you 
        know, I've heard your name. That was it. The door was 
        open. It was one of those deals.

        Mr. Conrad. What about the second time?

        Vice President Gore. The second time was in Malaysia. I 
        filled in for the President at the last minute for a 
        trip to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting for the Asian 
        Pacific--

        Mr. Conrad. Economic Council?

        Vice President Gore. Yes, APEC.

        Mr. Conrad. Right.

        Vice President Gore. And in conjunction with that 
        event, which was hosted by Mahathir, the leader of 
        Malaysia, there was a cultural event where all of the 
        heads of state and their stand-in--of which I think I 
        was the only stand-in--all went to this big dinner and 
        they had a dance, kind of a show. And he came up to me 
        during that and said, introduced himself again, and 
        said, hello, how are you. I said, fine, hello, how are 
        you. It was just--that was the substance of it[.]

        Mr. Conrad. Any substantive conversation with Mr. 
        Riady?

        Vice President Gore. No.

        Mr. Conrad. And no other meetings that you remember?

        Vice President Gore. No, not that I remember? \455\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \455\ Testimony of Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., at 109-111 
(Apr. 18, 2000).

In his testimony, the only personal information the Vice 
President knew about James Riady was that Riady was a 
businessman in Indonesia.\456\ The Vice President said he did 
not learn of Riady's relationship to President Clinton until 
after the scandal became public.\457\ The Vice President also 
indicated that he had no direct knowledge of Riady's 
involvement in politics or campaign contributions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \456\ Id. at 111.
    \457\ Id. at 114.

        Mr. Conrad. Mr. Riady has been fairly active, some 
        would say aggressive, in his courting of other 
        political people. But I take it from your testimony 
        that you've provided today that you weren't one of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        them?

        Vice President Gore. No. I think that--no. Unless you 
        count his role evidently in the background of 
        organizing that trip to Taiwan, but I never saw him or 
        talked to him there.

           *         *         *         *         *

        Mr. Conrad. At least based on your previous testimony, 
        you had no knowledge of any financial sponsorship by 
        Mr. Riady of a portion of the '89 trip to Asia?

        Vice President Gore. I don't think so . . .

           *         *         *         *         *

        Mr. Conrad. Also in August of 1992, Mr. Riady made 
        certain financial fund-raising commitments to the 
        President. Did you ever have any discussions with the 
        President about the fund-raising role of Mr. Riady in--

        Vice President Gore. No.

        Mr. Conrad. --The 1992 election cycle?

        Vice President Gore. No.\458\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \458\ Id. at 113-114.

    If the Vice President told Arief Wiriadinata that the DNC 
issue advertisements should be shown to James Riady, it would 
dramatically undermine the testimony given by Vice President 
Gore to the Justice Department. The Vice President testified 
that he was unaware of Riady's fundraising or contributions in 
the 1992 election, and Riady was clearly unable to participate 
in the 1996 election. Ostensibly, the only reason Vice 
President Gore was showing the ad tapes was to solicit a 
contribution, or to provide thanks for past contributions.

4. The Justice Department Failed to Obtain the Original Videotape After 
        the Apparent Remarks by Vice President Gore to Wiriadinata 
        Became Public

    The Justice Department has had a copy of the videotape for 
the December 15, 1995, White House coffee since October 5, 
1997. Yet in five interviews with the Vice President, the 
Justice Department did not ask any questions about Wiriadinata 
or that particular White House coffee. Either the Justice 
Department has not seriously examined the videotapes or they 
are unwilling to ask Vice President Gore what he said.
    The committee highlighted Vice President Gore's remarks at 
the coffee on previous occasions. The Justice Department has 
chosen not to take notice any of these times. On December 17, 
1999, at a committee hearing, Congressman Souder asked John 
Huang about the videotape:

        Mr. Souder. And then so at one point Mr. Wiriadinata 
        says James Riady sent me, and then if you keep 
        listening to the tape, as he speaks to the President, a 
        voice can be heard saying we should show tapes of the 
        advertisements to Mr. Riady. This sounds like Vice 
        President Gore.

           *         *         *         *         *

        Mr. Souder. Thanks. Why would the Vice President have 
        said we should show tapes of the advertisements to Mr. 
        Riady?

        Mr. Huang. I really don't know, Congressman, no.\459\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \459\ ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady Family in Political 
Fundraising,'' hearings before the House Committee on Government 
Reform, 106th Cong., 9-11 (Dec. 17, 1999) (preliminary transcript).

Representatives of the Justice Department were present 
throughout the 3 days of hearings with John Huang in December 
1999. Nevertheless, the Justice Department did not follow up on 
this issue after the committee's hearing.
    After the Vice President released his April 18, 2000, 
interview with the Task Force, the committee once again asked 
the Justice Department why the Vice President was not 
questioned about the Wiriadinata coffee.\460\ The Justice 
Department was also informed that the committee had possession 
of the original tape of the December 15, 1995, coffee, the best 
possible source of the information. The Justice Department did 
not respond.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \460\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (July 18, 2000) (correspondence 
between the committee and the Justice Department is contained in 
appendix 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At a hearing on July 20, 2000, the committee directly 
questioned four top-level Justice Department officials about 
the Vice President's comments at the December 15, 1995, 
coffee.\461\ The Justice Department officials refused to 
comment on any aspect of the tape:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \461\ The Justice Department witnesses were James Robinson, 
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division; Alan Gershel, Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division; Robert Raben, Assistant 
Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs; and Robert Conrad, 
Supervising Attorney, Campaign Financing Task Force.

        Mr. Barr. I ask again, is this tape, is this coffee, 
        are these individuals, is this language, of interest to 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        the Department of Justice?

        Mr. Robinson. I cannot comment on the investigative 
        matter but obviously we are here, we have heard it and 
        we receive lots of information from Congress and other 
        sources. Whenever we get information, we look at it 
        carefully as a general proposition, but I can't comment 
        on the specifics of our investigations. It would be 
        inappropriate.\462\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \462\ ``Has the Department of Justice Given Preferential Treatment 
to the President and Vice President,'' hearing before the House 
Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 41 (July 20, 2000) 
(preliminary transcript).

    In an attempt to assess how carefully the Justice 
Department has reviewed this evidence, if at all, the committee 
wrote to the Justice Department on August 1, 2000, and asked if 
Justice Department lawyers had ever listened to the original 
White House tape of the Wiriadinata coffee.\463\ The Justice 
Department refused to answer the question, stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \463\ Letter from James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on 
Government Reform, to Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General (Aug. 1, 
2000).

        [I]t would be inappropriate for this Department to 
        provide such information concerning an ongoing 
        investigation, both in terms of the ethical 
        responsibilities of federal prosecutors, and in terms 
        of our duty to avoid any appearance of undue external 
        influence on our investigations.\464\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \464\ Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to 
James C. Wilson, chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform (Aug. 4, 
2000).

Apparently, the high-minded ideal which prevented the Justice 
Department from discussing basic facts about the videotape with 
the Congress does not apply to its relationship with the media. 
On July 19, 2000, an unnamed Justice Department source leaked 
the Department's interpretation of the substance of the tape by 
telling the press that it was unclear what was said on the tape 
because of ``poor audio.'' \465\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \465\ ``Justice Says White House Coffee Tape Unclear; Hearings 
Scheduled Tuesday'' [sic] (viewed July 19, 2000) http://www.cnn.com/
2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/07/19/burton.gore/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Vice President Gore and his White House surrogates have 
been unwilling to explain the Vice President's remarks. The 
Vice President himself admitted it was his voice, but deflected 
questions by saying it was a political attack using news that 
had been available for years.\466\ The White House offered, 
off-the-record only, that the Vice President may have said 
``Godfrey,'' rather than ``Riady,'' a reference to H. Lee 
Godfrey, who also attended the December 15 coffee. Even the 
White House refused to go on the record with this defense, and 
the Vice President did not embrace it.\467\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \466\ ``Congressman Focuses on Gore Videotape Comment,'' Associated 
Press, July 19, 2000.
    \467\ Don Van Natta Jr., ``Questions Raised by House Panel About 
Gore Remark at a 1995 Fund-Raiser,'' New York Times, July 19, 2000, at 
A21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If the Vice President told Arief Wiriadinata that the DNC 
issue advertisements should be shown to James Riady, it would 
constitute a significant piece of evidence that top White House 
officials may have been aware of illegalities in the 1996 
Presidential campaign. The Justice Department's purposeful 
refusal to examine the evidence or to question the Vice 
President on this matter clearly demonstrates its unwillingness 
to pursue an honest and thorough investigation.
    On September 25, 2000, 9 months after the committee first 
highlighted the December 15, 1995, coffee tape, the Justice 
Department finally informed the committee it would ask for the 
videotape. As of October 10, 2000, though, it still had not 
made a written request for the videotape.\468\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \468\ Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, 
Department of Justice, to Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform (Sept. 25, 2000). Several days after the Sept. 25, 2000, letter, 
an FBI agent called the committee staff and requested the videotape. 
Committee staff informed the FBI agent that the committee would like to 
receive a written request before it turned over the original evidence 
to the FBI. The agent agreed to ask a Justice Department lawyer to send 
a written request to the committee. As of Oct. 10, 2000, the committee 
has not received the request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. The Justice Department Has Failed To Question the President and Vice 
                         President Effectively

1. Delay in Asking Relevant Questions

    From the beginning of the campaign finance scandal, it was 
clear that President Clinton and Vice President Gore were 
knowledgeable witnesses and possible participants in a scheme 
to bring illegal money into the DNC to finance their re-
election. Accordingly, it was important for the Justice 
Department to interview the President and Vice President--both 
thoroughly and expeditiously. However, the Justice Department 
waited over 3 years before asking the President or Vice 
President about most aspects of the fundraising scandal.
    The Justice Department interviewed President Clinton two 
times and Vice President Gore four times in 1997 and 1998.\469\ 
The Justice Department purposefully restricted the topics 
covered in the six interviews to the DNC issue advertisements 
and telephone solicitations from the White House. The 
justification for limiting the interviews to those two issues 
was because they were the subjects of preliminary 
investigations under the Independent Counsel Act. This 
rationale, however, fails to explain why they could not have 
been asked about other pertinent subjects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \469\ President Clinton was interviewed on Nov. 11, 1997, and Nov. 
9, 1998. Vice President Gore was interviewed on Nov. 11, 1997, June 10, 
1998, Aug. 8, 1998, and Nov. 11, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Under the Justice Department's self-imposed restriction, 
the President and Vice President would not be interviewed about 
their interaction with various criminals and questionable 
individuals because those investigations were not part of a 
preliminary investigation under the Independent Counsel Act. 
However, the Justice Department ignored evidence that the 
President and Vice President were possibly aware of illegal 
activity. In addition, the Justice Department ignored the fact 
that the President and Vice President were significant 
witnesses in the investigation. In some instances, President 
Clinton and Vice President Gore were the only available 
witnesses. Thus, there was no acceptable investigative reason 
for the failure to ask questions about important subjects. It 
appears, moreover, that the President and Vice President 
received preferential treatment at the expense of the campaign 
finance investigation.
    On April 25, 1999, due to concerns that the President and 
Vice President were receiving preferential treatment, the 
committee subpoenaed all Task Force interviews with President 
Clinton and Vice President Gore. In response to the committee's 
subpoena, the Justice Department, which previously supplied 
interview summaries to the Congress, announced a new policy of 
refusing to provide such summaries. The purported basis for the 
new Justice Department policy was that the public release of 
the interview summaries would have a chilling effect on future 
witnesses' cooperation, thereby harming law enforcement 
efforts.\470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \470\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (Dec. 14, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In December 1999, the Justice Department finally allowed 
the committee to review the interview summaries of the 
President and Vice President, but not to have copies.\471\ The 
committee's review in December 1999 found that the Justice 
Department had questioned the President and Vice President only 
about DNC issue advertisements and telephone solicitations at 
the White House. After 3 years of investigation, the Justice 
Department had not asked President Clinton one question on the 
following issues:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \471\ The Justice Department's attempt to withhold these interview 
summaries from the committee is discussed in detail later in this 
report.

         The President's relationship with James 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Riady.

         John Huang's placement at the DNC.

         White House coffees and other perks offered 
        in exchange for contributions.

         The President's interactions with Johnny 
        Chung and the reasons Chung was given access to the 
        White House.

         Charlie Trie's contributions to the 
        Presidential Legal Expense Trust.

         Charlie Trie's appointment to the Bingaman 
        Commission.

         The President's attendance at the July 30, 
        1996, fundraiser with James Riady and three of his 
        Asian business associates.

         The February 6, 1996, White House coffee 
        with Charlie Trie and Wang Jun.

         The June 18, 1996, White House coffee with 
        Huang, Pauline Kanchanalak and the CP Group from 
        Thailand.

         The President's attendance at the February 
        19, 1996, May 13, 1996, and July 22, 1996, fundraisers, 
        where numerous foreign nationals attended and 
        contributed.

         The President's 5-minute meeting with John 
        K.H. Lee, a Korean national, in exchange for $250,000.

Similarly, the Vice President was not questioned for 3 years 
about the following topics:

         The Hsi Lai Temple.

         The Vice President's relationship with Maria 
        Hsia.

         The Vice President's relationship with John 
        Huang.

         The Vice President's relationship with 
        Howard Glicken.

         White House coffees.

         Senator Gore's 1990 trip to Asia with Hsia 
        and Huang.

         The September 27, 1993, fundraiser with 
        Huang and China Resources Chairman Shen Jueren.

         The February 19, 1996, fundraiser at the Hay 
        Adams.

    On December 15, 1999, the Justice Department finally 
produced the interview summaries of President Clinton and Vice 
President Gore. The committee publicly announced the 
deficiencies of the interviews on December 16, 1999. The 
Justice Department's last interviews with the President and 
Vice President were in November 1998, and there was no evidence 
that the Justice Department intended to question them again. 
Since the Justice Department unreasonably withheld the 
interview summaries from the committee, the Justice Department 
would not have publicly revealed them voluntarily. However, 
once the committee announced the Justice Department's complete 
failure to ask a single question of the President or Vice 
President about foreign money or their knowledge of various 
criminals in the campaign finance investigation, the President 
and Vice President were re-interviewed in April 2000.

2. Favorable Circumstances of the April 2000 Interviews

    The April 2000 interviews were conducted differently than 
the previous six interviews with the President and Vice 
President. This time, the President and Vice President were 
both under oath and the interviews were transcribed. This 
provided the Justice Department with the benefit of having a 
clear record of what was discussed, but it also put the 
President and Vice President in a position where they could 
publicly release their interviews, theoretically compromising 
the Department's investigation. In addition, the Task Force 
afforded the President and Vice President an extraordinary 
courtesy by supplying the exhibits that were to be used in the 
interviews beforehand.\472\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \472\ The Department was also under a time limit in its interview 
of President Clinton. President Clinton and his attorneys agreed to an 
interview with Robert Conrad by Apr. 7, 2000. However, 2 days before 
the scheduled interview, and the day after the Vice President's 
contentious interview with the Task Force, the President rescheduled 
his weekly Saturday radio address to Friday, Apr. 21, 2000, the day of 
the Task Force interview. Mr. Conrad, who had previously been given as 
much time as necessary to complete the interview, then had to cover 43 
topics in less than 4 hours. Letter from Robert J. Conrad, Jr., to Beth 
Nolan, et al., Apr. 11, 2000; letter from Robert J. Conrad, Jr., to 
Beth Nolan, et al., Apr. 20, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By prior agreement with the Task Force, both President 
Clinton and Vice President Gore were given copies of their 
April 2000 interview transcripts. The committee is unaware of 
the President and Vice President or any other witness receiving 
copies of any of their previous interviews. Task Force Chief 
Robert Conrad explained that they were provided with a copy of 
the transcripts as a result of negotiations with the President 
and Vice President's counsels.\473\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \473\ ``Has the Department of Justice Given Preferential Treatment 
to the President and Vice President,'' hearing before the House 
Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 49 (July 20, 2000) 
(preliminary transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department had consistently told the committee 
that any release of interview summaries or transcripts would 
harm ongoing investigations. However, by allowing the President 
and Vice President to have copies of the transcripts, they 
contradicted their own argument. Again, it appears the 
President and Vice President were accorded preferential 
treatment. At the committee's July 20, 2000, hearing, all of 
the Justice Department officials present agreed with Attorney 
General Reno's statement to the committee that, ``significant 
harm to ongoing investigations would result from the disclosure 
of the records of the recent interviews.'' \474\ Disregarding 
any harm that might come to the Justice Department's 
investigation, Vice President Gore released his interview 
transcript to blunt media reports that the Task Force had once 
again recommended an outside prosecutor to investigate the Vice 
President.\475\ President Clinton followed suit and released 
his testimony on July 24, 2000.\476\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \474\ Id. at 112-113 (2000).
    \475\ Id. at 107-109.
    \476\ The committee subpoenaed the transcript of the President's 
Apr. 21, 2000, interview after the Vice President publicly released his 
transcript. When the President produced a copy of his transcript to the 
committee, he also gave a copy to the media.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     C. The Justice Department Failed to Pursue Relevant Documents

1. Failure to Subpoena Relevant Records

    The committee was concerned about the Justice Department's 
ability to conduct a fair and impartial investigation, 
particularly in light of its numerous missteps and failures. In 
order to carry out its oversight investigation of the Justice 
Department, the committee decided review document requests and 
subpoenas sent by the Justice Department to the White House, 
the Commerce Department, the State Department, and the DNC so 
that it could determine how thorough the Justice Department 
investigation had been.
    After the committee obtained records from the White House 
and Commerce Department which revealed how incomplete and 
incompetent the Justice Department investigation had been, the 
Justice Department began a concerted effort to keep the 
committee from obtaining the subpoenas served upon both public 
and private entities by the Justice Department. As a result of 
the Justice Department's efforts, which are described in detail 
below, the Justice Department has limited the committee's 
oversight of the Justice Department investigation, and covered 
up the Department's biased investigation from any further 
public scrutiny.
            a. The White House
    On March 16, 2000, the committee subpoenaed the White House 
to produce subpoenas and document requests it had received from 
the Task Force. These records were received nearly 5 months 
later on August 10, 2000. The White House obviously had 
thousands of documents relating to numerous individuals 
involved in the campaign finance investigation, and the Justice 
Department subpoenaed many documents from the White House. 
However, in certain crucial cases--Maria Hsia, Ernest Green, 
and Mark Middleton--the Justice Department either failed to ask 
the White House for documents or they requested the documents 
only very recently, years after the individual's involvement in 
the scandal became known.
    The Task Force never asked the White House for records 
concerning Maria Hsia. Hsia had a close relationship with Vice 
President Gore spanning 10 years. The Justice Department 
prosecuted Hsia for funneling illegal contributions to the DNC 
in support of Vice President Gore's visit to the Hsi Lai Temple 
in April 1996. Yet, the Justice Department never subpoenaed the 
White House for records relating to Hsia. This failure meant 
that the Justice Department brought a case against Hsia without 
a full understanding of Hsia's interactions with White House 
officials.\477\ The Justice Department did subpoena records on 
Maria Hsia from Ann Lewis, the White House Communications 
Director.\478\ However, that subpoena, sent to Lewis in her 
personal capacity, in no way obligated the White House to 
produce any records regarding Hsia.\479\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \477\ The Vice President also was not questioned about his 
relationship and interaction with Hsia until after her conviction.
    \478\ Justice Department subpoena for documents to Ann Frank Lewis, 
Aug. 13, 1997 (exhibit 13).
    \479\ The subpoena was sent to Lewis on Aug. 15, 1997, immediately 
after the Task Force interviewed Lewis, even though Lewis had no 
substantive knowledge of the individuals or the White House's 
involvement in campaign finance improprieties or illegalities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department did not subpoena the White House for 
records on Ernest Green or Mark Middleton until March 2000. 
Both Green and Middleton were key players in the campaign 
finance scandal in that each could provide substantial amounts 
of information about the fundraising activities of Charlie 
Trie, John Huang, and their interaction with the Clinton 
administration.
    Green and Charlie Trie were fundraising and business 
partners from 1994 to 1996. Green and Trie were frequent 
visitors to the White House and each were friends of President 
Clinton. Green used his influence in the DNC and Clinton 
administration to help Trie, and Trie in return tried to find 
business opportunities for Green in Asia. In 1998, Green became 
the focus of a Justice Department investigation for perjury 
relating to his testimony before Congress on Charlie Trie.
    Unlike Green, Middleton invoked the fifth amendment against 
self-incrimination and has refused to cooperate with the 
committee. Mark Middleton is a key figure in the campaign 
finance scandal. Middleton served as the principal White House 
contact for both John Huang and Charlie Trie. Once Middleton 
left the White House, he traveled to Asia with Trie and courted 
many foreign businessmen. Middleton frequently brought his 
foreign business clients to the White House. The White House 
had numerous records of Middleton bringing his foreign business 
clients to the White House, at times to meet the President, 
First Lady, or the White House staff. Middleton's extensive 
involvement in the campaign finance scandal all centers around 
the White House. There cannot be any investigation of 
Middleton, much less a serious one, without his White House 
records.
    In 1999, the committee obtained a document from the Justice 
Department that indicated that the Department's investigation 
of Middleton was ``reinvigorated'' in light of Charlie Trie's 
cooperation with the Justice Department.\480\ In fact, when 
Charlie Trie testified before the committee in March 2000, the 
Justice Department requested that the committee refrain from 
asking any questions about Middleton or Green because they were 
part of ongoing investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \480\ Listing of Task Force cases, June 4, 1999 (exhibit 14).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department's subpoenas to the White House 
reveal a great deal about the Department's investigation. While 
the Attorney General has frequently stated that the Task Force 
is free to follow any evidence, it is obvious that the Task 
Force is avoiding gathering critical evidence. It is difficult 
to believe that Justice Department prosecutors simply forgot to 
ask for this crucial evidence. Rather, it is possible that the 
Attorney General and her staff felt hesitant to pressure the 
White House which they serve to produce documents. Furthermore, 
as has become abundantly clear in the Justice Department 
investigation of the e-mails that have been withheld by the 
White House, it seems that the Justice Department is 
subordinate to the White House where document requests are 
concerned. An independent counsel would not experience this 
same conflict, and likely would have obtained the necessary 
documents.
            b. The State Department
    On August 4, 2000, the committee sent a subpoena to the 
State Department for any requests or subpoenas it received from 
the Justice Department in the course of the campaign finance 
investigation. The Justice Department's requests to the State 
Department were particularly critical due to the numerous 
foreign nationals involved in the investigation and allegations 
of foreign governments funneling illegal contributions into the 
DNC. If the Justice Department was serious about its 
investigation, it would ask the State Department to pressure 
foreign governments to provide access to the necessary 
documents and witnesses.
    Rather than comply with the committee's subpoena, the State 
Department turned to the Justice Department, to see whether it 
should comply. The Justice Department directed the State 
Department to redact from their submission to the committee any 
information that related to ongoing investigations. The Justice 
Department's position was more fully explained in a September 
25, 2000, letter from Assistant Attorney General Robert Raben, 
which claimed that the Justice Department had a right to redact 
information that related to ongoing investigations from State 
Department documents.\481\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \481\ Letter from Robert Raben to Chairman Dan Burton, Sept. 25, 
2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department's position is legally groundless, 
and moreover, has in practice, been abused by the Justice 
Department. When the committee did finally receive documents 
from the State Department, they were redacted so that almost 
every substantive piece of information was taken out. It is 
difficult to believe that the Justice Department still has so 
many ongoing investigations. If the Department's investigation 
is as far-flung as its redactions suggest, it is not equipped 
to handle such an investigation, having, as of December 31, 
1999, only 13 attorneys and 12 agents, down from 24 attorneys 
and 67 agents in 1997.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \482\ Briefing report by the U.S. General Accounting Office, 
``Campaign Finance Task Force: Problems and Disagreements Initially 
Hampered Justice's Investigation,'' May 2000, at 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, one specific redaction by the Justice Department 
suggests that the Department is acting in bad faith, and that 
it is redacting material that does not relate to ongoing 
investigations. The committee has been able to determine, by 
comparison with the same subpoena from the White House that was 
not redacted, at least two names redacted by the State 
Department at the Justice Department's insistence: Liu Chao-
Ying and her father, General Liu Huaqing.\483\ Liu Chao-Ying, a 
colonel in the Chinese military, gave $80,000 to the DNC 
through DNC fundraiser Johnny Chung. Liu Chao-Ying also 
introduced Chung to General Ji Shengde, the head of Chinese 
military intelligence, who gave Chung an additional $300,000 to 
funnel into the DNC. General Liu Huaqing, was the vice chairman 
of the Central Military Commission, and reportedly oversaw the 
Chinese army's modernization program. He was also a member of 
the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist party.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \483\ Subpoena to the Custodian of Records, Executive Office of the 
President, May 26, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As late as June 4, 1999, the Task Force had already listed 
Liu Chao-Ying as a ``Pending Inactive Investigation.'' \484\ 
The Task Force had not listed any investigation of General Liu 
Huaqing as of June 1999. Both Liu Chao-Ying and General Liu 
Huaqing are Chinese nationals living in China, and the 
committee is unaware of any Justice Department or State 
Department efforts to have Liu Chao-Ying or her father 
extradited. Furthermore, the Justice Department presented no 
objections to the committee's public hearings with Johnny Chung 
where he extensively discussed his interactions with Liu. It is 
troubling that they would allow their star witness against Liu 
to testify publicly about his dealings with her, and then claim 
that peripheral documents relating to her are part of an 
ongoing investigation. The facts suggest that it is highly 
unlikely Liu Chao-Ying or Liu Huaqing are the subjects of 
active Justice Department investigations. Rather, it appears 
that once again, the Justice Department is making a bad faith 
effort to shield itself from congressional oversight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \484\ Listing of Task Force cases, June 4, 1999 (exhibit 14).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. The DNC
    On August 3, 2000, the committee subpoenaed the DNC to 
produce the subpoenas and document requests it received from 
the Justice Department. For the next 6 weeks, the DNC failed to 
comply with the subpoena. During this period of time, counsel 
for the DNC informed the committee that they had concerns about 
complying with the subpoena, based on warnings accompanying a 
number of the subpoenas that they were not to be publicly 
disclosed. Counsel for the DNC attempted to contact the Justice 
Department during this 6 week period to determine whether the 
Justice Department objected to the DNC's compliance with the 
committee subpoena. DNC counsel claims that despite a number of 
contacts with the Justice Department, he was unable to obtain a 
definitive answer from the Department. Accordingly, as of 
September 26, 2000, the committee's subpoena had still not been 
satisfied. Therefore, when Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
Alan Gershel appeared before the committee, he was asked about 
the DNC subpoena:

        Committee Counsel. We also subpoenaed the DNC. We asked 
        the DNC for subpoenas served upon it by the Task Force. 
        Now, despite the fact that the subpoena was served over 
        6 weeks ago, the DNC has failed to comply because the 
        Department of Justice has prevented it from doing so. 
        This was communicated to us today. The DNC, however, is 
        either a witness or a target of the Department in this 
        investigation.

        Now I am going to read some words that your immediate 
        superior, Assistant Attorney General Robinson, spoke at 
        our last hearing. He testified under oath: ``although a 
        prosecutor may prefer that a witness not disclose 
        information about a pending case, the government does 
        not have any right to dictate who a witness can or 
        cannot talk to. Witnesses do not belong to either side 
        of a matter. As a matter of due process and 
        prosecutorial ethics, the government cannot threaten or 
        intimidate a witness for the purpose of preventing a 
        witness from talking to a subject or a target of 
        investigation or from exercising their First Amendment 
        rights.''

        Now, isn't that what the Department of Justice is doing 
        now in terms of preventing the DNC from complying with 
        the congressional subpoena?

        Mr. Gershel. Absolutely not. The DNC has never been 
        told not to comply with this committee's subpoena. To 
        the contrary, it's not my understanding. I have not had 
        contact with them. It's my understanding they were told 
        to fully comply with the subpoena.\485\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \485\ ``Contacts Between Northrop Grumman Corporation and the White 
House Regarding Missing White House E-Mails,'' hearing before the 
Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 111-12 (Sept. 26, 2000) 
(preliminary transcript).

Shortly after the hearing, Mr. Gershel attempted to clarify his 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
statement in a letter:

        Some members of the committee had the misimpression 
        that the Department was preventing the DNC from 
        complying with its subpoena. I also may have 
        contributed to the confusion by offering my mistaken 
        understanding that the DNC had been told by the 
        Department to fully comply with the subpoena.

        I want to clarify that the Department takes no position 
        on the issue of the DNC's rights and obligations 
        concerning compliance with a congressional subpoena. 
        That is an issue between the DNC and the congressional 
        committee. It certainly has never been the Department's 
        intent to prevent or discourage compliance with a 
        congressional subpoena.\486\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \486\ Letter from Alan Gershel, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
to Judah Best, Debevoise & Plimpton (Sept. 29, 2000) (exhibit 15).

Leaving aside the dramatic difference between Gershel's initial 
testimony that the DNC was told to ``fully comply'' with the 
subpoena, and his later statement that the Department ``took no 
position'' on the DNC's compliance, the effect of the 
Department's actions was clear.\487\ Two months have passed 
since the committee issued its subpoena, and the DNC has not 
complied with the subpoena.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \487\ The Justice Department's position with respect to the DNC's 
compliance with a lawful congressional subpoena--that it can take no 
position--gives an indication of the Department's lack of respect for 
Congress. Given this position, it is difficult to see how the 
Department could prosecute any party for obstructing or failing to 
comply with a congressional subpoena.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the September 26, 2000, hearing, DNC counsel called 
and then wrote to the committee to express their ``concern'' 
regarding committee's counsel's representations at the hearing. 
DNC counsel took the position that the DNC was never 
``prevented'' from complying with the committee's subpoena. 
Rather, in their mind, the Justice Department had protested the 
committee subpoena, and had raised ``admonitions'' with the DNC 
about disclosing the subpoena.\488\ The DNC tried to resolve 
these issues prior to the committee's hearing, and was 
unsuccessful. In the mind of DNC counsel, such conduct by the 
Justice Department did not ``prevent'' the DNC from complying 
the with the committee's subpoena.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \488\ These comments were made by Judah Best, counsel for the DNC, 
during a telephone conversation on Oct. 4, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, there is ample evidence that the Justice 
Department's actions have prevented timely compliance with the 
committee's subpoena:

         A number of Justice Department subpoenas to 
        the DNC warned the DNC that ``[b]ecause this subpoena 
        relates to an ongoing official criminal investigation 
        being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
        it is requested that you not disclose the existence of 
        the subpoena for an indefinite period of time. 
        Disclosure may impede the investigation and interfere 
        with the enforcement of the law.'' \489\ Such 
        directions are, however, contrary to the ethical 
        standards of prosecutors outlined by Assistant Attorney 
        General Robinson before the committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \489\ See, e.g., letter from Daniel O'Brien, Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, to Custodian of Records, Democratic National Committee (Jan. 
21, 2000) (exhibit 16).

         In a letter to the committee, which was 
        copied to the DNC, Assistant Attorney General Raben 
        expressed concern about the committee's subpoena to the 
        DNC. In that letter, Raben stated that ``I am writing 
        to express the Department's serious concern about the 
        committee's recent practice of subpoenaing public and 
        private sector entities to produce copies of grand jury 
        subpoenas and other documents relating to evidence 
        gathered by the Campaign Financing Task Force, 
        including subpoenas and documents relating to ongoing 
        criminal investigations.'' \490\ The only private 
        sector entity to which the committee directed such a 
        subpoena was the DNC. The Justice Department's 
        expression of ``serious concern'' about the DNC 
        subpoena was in conflict with the Department's official 
        position that it could take no position on whether the 
        DNC should comply with the subpoena.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \490\ Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to Dan 
Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Sept. 25, 2000) 
(emphasis added).

    Indeed, these protests had their intended effect, as on 
October 6, 2000, the DNC informed the committee that it would 
not comply with the committee's subpoena.\491\ In his letter to 
the committee, DNC counsel repeatedly cited the fact that the 
Justice Department had ``protested'' the committee's subpoena, 
and that the Department had concerns about the effect of 
compliance with the subpoena on ongoing investigations. 
Claiming that it wanted to protect these ongoing 
investigations, as well as the reputations of individuals named 
in the subpoenaed documents, the DNC refused to comply with the 
committee's subpoena.\492\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \491\ Letter from Judah Best, Debevoise & Plimpton, to Dan Burton, 
chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 6, 2000) (exhibit 17).
    \492\ The mere fact that the DNC shows such interest in protecting 
the integrity of the Justice Department investigation speaks volumes. 
The DNC is at the center of the campaign fundraising scandal. The fact 
that the DNC is working in tandem with the Justice Department to keep 
information about the investigation out of Congress' hands suggests 
that the DNC is trying to hide something about the investigation. If 
the subpoenas to the DNC are anything like the subpoenas to the White 
House, it is likely trying to hide the fact that the Justice Department 
has conducted a weak and politically biased investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the conclusion of this matter, it is clear that both the 
DNC and the Justice Department have worked together to keep the 
committee from obtaining information which might be extremely 
embarrassing to the Department of Justice and which might 
expose the DNC to additional investigation, as happened to the 
White House when it became clear the Justice Department had 
failed to ask the President and Vice President so many 
important questions. The Justice Department's admonitions and 
protests regarding the committee's subpoena sent the clear 
message to the DNC that it should not comply with the 
committee's subpoena. At the same time, in his letter of 
September 29, 2000, Mr. Gershel did state that the Department 
took no position on the committee's subpoena. Therefore, in the 
final analysis, it is the DNC that has decided to willfully 
disobey a lawful congressional subpoena.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \493\ The DNC and their counsel have a long history of 
misrepresentations to the committee. These are detailed in chapter II 
of the committee's interim report on the campaign fundraising 
investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The Justice Department Failed to Obtain a Timely Search Warrant for 
        Charlie Trie's Residence

    In 1997, a serious dispute arose between Justice Department 
attorneys and FBI agents regarding decisions made by the 
Justice Department in the investigation of Charlie Trie. The 
dispute concerned whether the Justice Department justifiably 
rejected a FBI request for a search warrant for Trie's 
residence after the FBI found documents discarded in the trash 
that were responsive to a subpoena.\494\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \494\ Around 1996, Trie began to use his residence in Little Rock 
as the office for his Arkansas companies, consequently most of his 
business records were at that location.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On March 7, 1997, Maria Mapili, Charlie Trie's bookkeeper, 
was served with a subpoena for documents by the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs.\495\ Mapili contacted Trie 
in Asia and informed him that she had been served with a 
subpoena from the Congress. According to Mapili, Trie told her 
to throw away certain documents called for in the 
subpoena.\496\ Mapili began to destroy documents specified by 
Trie, but at some point, Mapili became nervous and hid 
documents instead of destroying them. The FBI found in Trie and 
Mapili's garbage a number of documents relevant to the 
fundraising investigation, and which were responsive to the 
Senate subpoena.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \495\ The committee requested records from Trie in a letter to 
Trie's attorneys on Jan. 20, 1997. Trie's attorney said that because of 
the Justice Department's criminal investigation, they would not comply 
with the committee's document request. In February 1997, the committee 
attempted to serve a subpoena on Trie's attorneys in Washington, DC, 
but the attorneys refused to accept service.
    \496\ Testimony of Maria Mapili at 21, U.S. v. Yah Lin ``Charlie'' 
Trie, No. LR-CR-98-239 (D. AR, May 18, 1999). Mapili received immunity 
and testified against Trie during his trial in Little Rock, AR on 
obstruction of justice charges in April 1999. Before the trial was 
completed, Trie reached a plea agreement with the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    FBI Special Agent Roberta Parker and her partner, FBI 
Special Agent Kevin Sheridan requested search warrants for 
Trie's residence because they believed that Mapili was 
obstructing justice by destroying evidence. The agents were 
told by Task Force chief, Laura Ingersoll, that grand jury 
subpoenas had to be served before probable cause for search 
warrants would exist.\497\ A grand jury subpoena was served on 
Mapili on June 27, 1997.\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \497\ Id.
    \498\ The FBI charged that the timing of the grand jury subpoena 
cost them a valuable investigative lead. The Justice Department and the 
FBI had already agreed to place a pen register on Mapili's telephones 
to record the telephone numbers of incoming and outgoing calls made 
after Mapili was served with the grand jury subpoena. Before the pen 
register was in place, FBI Special Agent Daniel Wehr, in Little Rock, 
AR, was ordered to serve the grand jury subpoena on Mapili. Both Agent 
Wehr and FBI Special Agent in Charge in Arkansas Ivian Smith complained 
that the decision to prematurely serve the subpoena before the pen 
register was installed cost them a valuable lead. ``The Justice 
Department's Handling of the Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie Case,'' hearing 
before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong., 52-53 
(Sept. 22, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the search of the trash after the grand jury subpoena 
was served, the FBI found discarded financial statements and a 
check register for Daihatsu, along with a fax cover sheet to 
Antonio Pan. Agent Sheridan's understanding from Laura 
Ingersoll was that finding additional discarded documents after 
the grand jury subpoena was served would be sufficient evidence 
to allow the FBI to obtain the search warrant.\499\ Agents 
Parker and Sheridan began drafting an affidavit for search 
warrants for the residences of Trie and Mapili on July 1, 1997, 
and gave a copy to the Justice Department attorneys. Agents 
Parker and Sheridan had not heard of any opposition to the 
search warrants up to this point.\500\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \499\ Interview of Kevin Sheridan, Committee on Government Reform, 
at 2-3 (Sept. 13, 1999).
    \500\ Interview of Roberta Parker, Committee on Government Reform, 
4 (Aug. 27, 1999); interview of Kevin Sheridan, Committee on Government 
Reform, at 3 (Sept. 13, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 2, 1997, Justice Department Attorneys Jonathan 
Biran and William Corcoran had a telephone conference with Lee 
Radek, and during this discussion, the three Department lawyers 
decided that there was no probable cause for the warrants.\501\ 
This decision contradicted everything the FBI had been told up 
to this point. While Ingersoll conceded that the discarded 
documents were relevant, she said that before a warrant could 
be obtained, there also needed to be proof that Mapili was 
knowingly destroying the documents to avoid producing 
them.\502\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \501\ During the telephone conference, Lee Radek acknowledged the 
deteriorating relationship between the Task Force and the FBI when he 
advised William Corcoran that they were not to seek a search warrant in 
Little Rock without his personal approval. Radek's purpose behind this 
decision was to inject himself between the FBI and Ingersoll, who was a 
frequent target of FBI attacks and criticisms. Interview of Lee Radek, 
Committee on Government Reform, at 2 (Sept. 17, 1999). Radek's move 
added another bureaucratic layer to an already cumbersome process and 
required the approval of the Chief of the Public Integrity Section on 
routine matters.
    \502\ Interview of Laura Ingersoll, Committee on Government Reform, 
at 6 (Sept. 17, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ingersoll told FBI agents Kevin Sheridan and Laura Laughlin 
that the search warrants were rejected, but she could not give 
a good answer as to why there was no probable cause.\503\ 
Ingersoll sent an e-mail to her superiors on July 7, 1997, 
stating that the ``case agent'' and Laughlin conceded that 
there was no probable cause for the search warrants.\504\ In 
her testimony before the Senate, Ingersoll admitted she was 
referring to Agent Sheridan, but Agent Sheridan denied that he 
ever conceded that there was no probable cause for the 
warrants.\505\ Both Agents Parker and Sheridan found the 
refusal to pursue search warrants in this case to be abnormal 
compared to their other experiences.\506\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \503\ Interview of Kevin Sheridan, Committee on Government Reform, 
at 3 (Sept. 13, 1999). Ingersoll met with Agents Sheridan and Laughlin 
in the afternoon of July 2, 1997, after the telephone conference with 
Lee Radek. Ingersoll did not specifically recall meeting with Sheridan 
and Laughlin, while Laughlin recalled the meeting, but could not 
remember what was said. Interview of Laura Ingersoll, Committee on 
Government Reform, at 5 (Sept. 17, 1999); interview of Laura Laughlin, 
Committee on Government Reform, at 2 (Oct. 1, 1999).
    \504\ Ingersoll e-mail to Mark Richard, Bob Litt, and Lee Radek, 
July 7, 1997 (exhibit 18).
    \505\ ``The Justice Department's Handling of the Yah Lin 
``Charlie'' Trie Case,'' hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., 78 (Sept. 22, 1999); 
interview of Kevin Sheridan, Committee on Government Reform, at 3 
(Sept. 13, 1999).
    \506\ Sheridan said they had done searches before with a lot less 
probable cause than there was in the Trie case. Interview of Kevin 
Sheridan, Committee on Government Reform, at 5 (Sept. 13, 1999); Parker 
said she had never seen a warrant be rejected like this. Interview of 
Roberta Parker, Committee on Government Reform, at 8 (Aug. 27, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department imposed a higher standard than 
necessary for a search warrant. A search warrant needs to be 
supported by probable cause. Probable cause exists ``where the 
known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man 
of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found.'' \507\ The question was 
simply whether it was reasonable to believe, given the known 
facts and circumstances, that Mapili was obstructing the 
subpoenas, not whether it could be proven.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \507\ See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91(1964); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 176 
(1949); Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the search warrant request was denied, the FBI agents 
continued to investigate the matter. Agent Parker spoke with 
Agent Daniel Wehr in Little Rock and they listed documents 
found in the trash covers that were not produced pursuant to 
the grand jury subpoena.\508\ Task Force Attorney Jonathan 
Biran and Agent Parker then traveled to Little Rock to compare 
the documents recovered in the trash with the documents 
produced pursuant to the grand jury subpoena. After the review, 
Biran advised Ingersoll that there was no basis for an 
obstruction prosecution against Mapili.\509\ Agent Parker had a 
different assessment of the document review. It was clear to 
Agent Parker that folders marked ``President Clinton'' and 
``Vice President Gore'' that contained only one or two 
documents were not complete as was a fax cover sheet indicating 
five pages when only one was produced.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \508\ Roberta Parker memorandum to ``Criminal Investigative'', July 
25, 1997.
    \509\ Interview of Laura Ingersoll, Committee on Government Reform, 
at 7 (Sept. 17, 1999). Biran told Ingersoll that some of the documents 
were produced pursuant to the grand jury subpoena were incriminating 
and some other documents that were destroyed were copies of documents 
that had been produced.
    \510\ Interview of Roberta Parker, Committee on Government Reform, 
7-8 (Aug. 27, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FBI agents were proven correct. On October 21 and 22, 
1997, Mapili was interviewed by the Task Force and FBI agents 
in anticipation of her testimony before the grand jury. During 
the interviews, Mapili admitted that she had destroyed 
documents and stashed other documents that still remained 
hidden. Mapili had not informed her attorney or Trie's 
attorneys about the hidden documents. In addition, Mapili 
admitted that she did this at the direction of Charlie Trie, 
who told her to destroy certain documents after she received 
the Senate subpoena in March 1997. On October 23, 1997, the FBI 
conducted simultaneous searches of Trie's residence and office 
in Little Rock and his office at the Watergate in Washington, 
DC, uncovering many responsive documents that had never been 
produced to investigators. On November 9, 1998, Charlie Trie 
was indicted in Arkansas for obstructing the campaign finance 
investigation of the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs.\511\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \511\ Indictment of Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie, U.S. v. Trie, No. LR-
CR-98-239 (D. AR., Nov. 9, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Senate was not informed that Mapili was destroying 
records in response to their March 1997 subpoena. The FBI 
agents were told not to have contact with the Senate 
investigation.\512\ Although Agents Parker and Sheridan were 
under the impression that Ingersoll could contact the Senate 
should the need arise, Ingersoll denied it was her 
responsibility. Ingersoll's superior, Lee Radek, said Ingersoll 
was free to contact the Senate with any pertinent 
information.\513\ The explanation given by Ingersoll and 
Corcoran for not contacting the Senate was that since they had 
not seen the Senate subpoena, they did not know what it 
subpoenaed, and thus they were not in a position to determine 
if the documents found in the trash were responsive to it.\514\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \512\ Sheridan said they were told in writing not to contact the 
Senate. Interview of Kevin Sheridan, Committee on Government Reform, at 
4 (Sept. 13, 1999). Parker said Ingersoll told them she would handle 
all liaison with the Senate, and Parker took that to mean they should 
not contact the Senate. Interview of Roberta Parker, Committee on 
Government Reform, at 8 (Aug. 27, 1999).
    \513\ Radek said there were no special restrictions on Task Force 
attorneys, but the usual procedures were to be followed--informing 
superiors after the fact or going through the Congressional Affairs 
Office. Interview of Lee Radek, Committee on Government Reform, at 3 
(Sept. 17, 1999).
    \514\ Corcoran memos, attachment to memorandum of Sept. 29, 1997, 
at A-046; interview of Laura Ingersoll, Committee on Government Reform, 
at 3 (Sept. 17, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although Justice Department attorneys and FBI agents 
differed on their recollection of the facts and the application 
of the law, one area of general agreement was the degree of 
control top-level Justice Department officials exercised over 
the campaign finance investigation. Lee Radek, Chief of the 
Public Integrity Section and a 28-year veteran of the Justice 
Department, stated: ``we had the Attorney General regularly 
wanting to know how the investigation was progressing. We had 
supervision of the Acting Assistant Attorney General on a daily 
basis, something that usually does not happen.'' \515\ Laura 
Ingersoll, former chief of the Task Force and a 11-year veteran 
of the Justice Department, said the degree of control exercised 
by the Justice Department was ``unprecedented.'' \516\ For the 
FBI agents in the field, the Justice Department's control of 
the investigation caused, ``problems of aggressiveness and 
timeliness of investigative avenues [and] . . . investigative 
decisionmaking [that] was slow, if at all.'' \517\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \515\ ``The Justice Department's Handling of the Yah Lin 
``Charlie'' Trie Case,'' hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong., 99 (1999).
    \516\ Id. at 98. Ingersoll was the first chief of the Task Force. 
She was appointed to head the Task Force by Lee Radek on Nov. 1, 1996. 
When it became apparent that the Task Force was not doing its job 
properly, Attorney General Reno replaced Ingersoll with Charles LaBella 
in September 1997.
    \517\ Id. at 12 (statement of Special Agent-in-Charge Ivian Smith). 
Agent Smith is a 25-year veteran of the FBI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department's decisionmaking process caused a 
substantial delay in the Charlie Trie investigation. Even when 
it did finally issue a grand jury subpoena to Mapili, its 
purpose was to scare Mapili into preserving the documents and 
not to investigate Trie's criminal activity, even though many 
of Trie's illegal activities had been publicly documented. 
Without the FBI's insistence that something be done to preserve 
evidence, there was no indication that the Justice Department 
intended to subpoena documents that proved very useful in the 
investigation of Trie.\518\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \518\ The Justice Department collected 13 boxes worth of documents 
from Trie. The committee examined the documents and found a great deal 
of significant information that could not have been obtained from any 
other source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. The Justice Department Failed to Pursue Key Individuals and Entities

1. Failure to Pursue the DNC

    While the White House was the focal point for favors and 
access, the DNC served as the collection point for the illegal 
foreign and conduit contributions. In that capacity, officials 
at the DNC worked closely with the individuals bringing in 
foreign conduit contributions, John Huang and Charlie Trie. 
Huang and Trie both began their associations with the DNC as 
outsiders, giving illegal foreign and conduit contributions in 
exchange for favors and access. By 1996, the DNC had brought 
Huang and Trie inside the operation. Huang was a fundraiser 
working for the DNC and Trie spent a large amount of time 
soliciting contributions for Huang's events. No one voiced any 
concerns about allowing Huang or Trie to work on the DNC's 
behalf.
    There is evidence, however, that at least four officials at 
the DNC may have known of, encouraged or even participated in, 
illegal activities by Huang and Trie. Their knowledge of 
illegal acts by Huang and Trie began at the very early stages 
of Huang and Trie's association with the DNC. In interviews and 
depositions with the Justice Department and Congress, the DNC 
officials gave very misleading and potentially perjurious 
testimony to protect the DNC and to cover up their own 
involvement in the illegal activity.
    Despite the fact that the Justice Department has all of the 
information about the DNC officials' involvement in the 
fundraising scandal, the committee is not aware of any DNC 
official who has been under serious scrutiny by the Task Force. 
In several instances, DNC officials were questioned about their 
knowledge or participation in Huang and Trie's illegal acts, 
but there is no evidence that the Justice Department intended 
to investigate thoroughly or prosecute possible criminal acts 
by officials of the DNC. At other times, the Justice Department 
completely ignored evidence of wrongdoing by DNC officials.
            a. Melinda Yee, DNC Director of Constituencies
    Melinda Yee was a key figure in the campaign fundraising 
investigation, as she had contacts with John Huang and the 
Riadys in the 1992 election all the way through the 1996 
election. Yee met Huang in the late 1980s when she worked as 
the executive director of the Organization for Chinese 
Americans, and Huang was just beginning his political 
involvement. Melinda Yee joined the DNC in 1990 as the Director 
of Constituencies. When Yee worked for both the DNC and 
Clinton/Gore '92 during the 1992 campaign, she would 
occasionally see Huang in Los Angeles. After the election, Yee 
worked briefly for the Office of Presidential Personnel before 
joining the Commerce Department in May 1993.\519\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \519\ Deposition of Melinda Yee, Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, May 9, 1997, at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In deposition testimony before the Senate, Yee was asked to 
recite the times she saw Huang between their initial meeting 
and his employment with the Commerce Department in July 1994. 
Yee stated that she saw him whenever the 1992 campaign went to 
Los Angeles, but she could not recall any other specific 
meetings.\520\ Yee failed to mention her interaction with Huang 
in relation to the DNC's trip to Asia between December 4-13, 
1991, for DNC Chairman Ron Brown. To ensure that the 
fundraising portion of the trip was successful, Yee recruited 
John Huang to raise money in Hong Kong. Yee also explained 
Huang's role on the trip to Chairman Ron Brown:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \520\ Id. at 198.

        John Huang is our key to Hong Kong. He is also 
        interested in renewing his trusteeship to us on this 
        trip through his Asian banking connections. He has 
        agreed to host a high dollar event for us in Hong Kong 
        with wealthy Asian bankers who are either U.S. 
        permanent residents or with U.S. corporate ties. He 
        will make sure that all of the hotel accommodations, 
        meals, and transportation are paid for by his bank. He 
        should be invited to be part of our delegation.\521\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \521\ Memorandum from Melinda Yee to RHB [Ronald H. Brown], Oct. 
15, 1991, DNC 0828866-67 (exhibit 19).

Yee said John Huang agreed to host an event in Hong Kong with a 
goal of $50,000.\522\ The schedule for Chairman Brown shows 
dollar signs next to a lunch and a dinner on December 10, 1991, 
hosted by the Lippo Group.\523\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \522\ Memorandum from Melinda Yee to RHB [Ronald H. Brown], Oct. 
22, 1991, DNC 0828865 (exhibit 20).
    \523\ Memorandum from Melinda Yee to Alexis Herman, et al., Dec. 2, 
1991, DNC 0828853-58 (exhibit 21).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Huang testified that Yee invited him to go on the trip and 
that he did arrange for Lippo to pay the DNC's expenses. Huang 
gathered individuals together for a lunch and dinner hosted by 
Lippo, but he flatly denied that he ever promised to raise 
money or did raise any money in Hong Kong:

        Mr. Burton. Exhibit No. 109. That exhibit is a memo 
        from Melinda Yee to DNC Chairman Ron Brown. Ms. Yee 
        said you offered to host an event in Hong Kong with a 
        goal of $50,000; is that correct?

        Mr. Huang. The memo indicated that way. I did not 
        really offer that $50,000.

           *         *         *         *         *

        Mr. Burton. You never promised that. Did you say that 
        you would consider it? Did you say you would do it?

        Mr. Huang. She has proposed that I could do that.\524\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \524\ ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady Family in Political 
Fundraising,'' hearings before the Committee on Government Reform, 
106th Cong., 192-195 (Dec. 17, 1999) (preliminary transcript).

    Less than 1 year later, Huang and Yee were again discussing 
fundraising for the DNC. In August 1992, Huang asked Yee to 
arrange a private limousine ride between James Riady and then-
Governor Clinton.\525\ Yee made the arrangements and drafted a 
briefing memo to Clinton. Huang provided her with the 
information for the memo. Yee wrote that Riady gave $100,000 
for the August 14, 1992, fundraiser and that he had, ``the 
potential to give much more.'' \526\ Although Huang denied 
talking to Yee about future contributions, after Riady's 
limousine ride with Governor Clinton, Riady funneled over 
$640,000 to the 1992 campaign through his employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \525\ Id. at part I, 73.
    \526\ Memorandum from Melinda Yee to Governor Clinton, Aug. 14, 
1992, CG92B-00543 (exhibit 22).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yee invoked her fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination with the committee and refused to appear at a 
deposition.\527\ She had previously given deposition testimony 
to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in May 1997. In 
her testimony to the Senate, Yee directly contradicted her own 
DNC documents and Huang's testimony on the subject of 
fundraising with Huang:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \527\ Letter from Nancy Luque to Barbara Comstock, chief counsel, 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, July 17, 1998 (exhibit 
23).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Q. Did you ever talk to John Huang about fundraising?

        A. No.

        Q. When I say ever, I mean at any time. Did you talk to 
        John Huang about fund raising, political or campaign 
        fund raising?

        A. Well, I know he did fundraising, but I was, again, 
        in the political division and he worked with the 
        finance people on fundraising matters, specific 
        fundraising.

        Q. Did you discuss fund raising matters with him?

        A. Not--I was working--I talked to him about political 
        issues. I mean, if he had a fund raising, it could have 
        been mentioned, but if he ad [sic] to actually do fund 
        raising, he worked with finance. I mean, I just didn't, 
        I wasn't--that wasn't my job.

        Q. When are you talking about? You said, you talked to 
        John Huang when he worked with finance at DNC.

        A. No, no, I'm saying he worked with--I'm not staff 
        forwarding. I'm just saying, when I was at the DNC or 
        during the campaign, I would work with him on these 
        issues and campaign organizing. If he had finance 
        issues, he didn't work with me. He worked with whoever 
        he worked with and I don't know who in the finance 
        division. This was in 1992. I'm not talking about when 
        he actually worked there.\528\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \528\ Deposition of Melinda Yee, Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, May 9, 1997, at 198-99 (emphasis added).

Yee's testimony before the Senate cannot be reconciled with 
documents or the testimony of John Huang. Yee asked Huang to 
raise $50,000 for the DNC in Hong Kong and they discussed 
Riady's $100,000 and ``potential to give much more'' during the 
1992 campaign.
    The Justice Department should investigate Melinda Yee about 
her relationship with John Huang, her interaction with Huang 
for the DNC's 1991 trip to Asia, the 1992 limousine ride, and 
the contributions that resulted from the ride.\529\ There is 
evidence that Yee may have misled the Senate about the nature 
of her relationship with Huang. Despite this evidence, the 
committee has seen no indication that Yee is under active 
investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \529\ The Justice Department should also investigate Yee's 
statements about APAC-Vote, an Asian American organization set up for 
the 1992 campaign by Nora Lum. Yee denied that APAC-Vote was affiliated 
with the DNC, but Yee wrote to Lum stating that APAC-Vote was very 
important to the DNC and the DNC agreed to fund the organization. In 
addition, Yee wrote a letter authorizing Nora Lum of the ``DNC's APAC-
Vote Project to open an account under the name of `DNC/APAC'.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. David Mercer, DNC Deputy Finance Director
    There is substantial evidence that DNC fundraiser David 
Mercer conspired with John Huang to violate the Hatch Act, and 
then lied about his actions when questioned by this committee. 
While he worked as a Commerce Department employee, Huang was 
constrained in the political activities he could perform. 
Although Mercer was ``mindful of the Hatch Act,'' it did not 
stop him from asking Huang repeatedly to violate the 
statute.\530\ Mercer placed numerous calls to Huang at the 
Commerce Department and asked at least once to meet him across 
the street from the Commerce Department so Mercer could ask 
Huang to solicit contributions. At one point, Huang even asked 
Mercer not to get him involved in fundraising while he worked 
at the Commerce Department.\531\ Mercer did not stop.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \530\ FBI interview of David Lawrence Mercer, at 9 (Apr. 27, 1998).
    \531\ FBI interview of John Huang, at 57 (Jan. 19-Feb. 10, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In June 1995, Mi Ryu Ahn contributed $10,000 to the DNC. 
Ahn made the contribution after she received four or five 
telephone calls from John Huang, who was working at the 
Commerce Department.\532\ Although Huang stated that he did not 
solicit Ahn for her contribution, Huang clearly referred her to 
Mercer.\533\ Four days before receiving Ahn's $10,000, Mercer 
left a message for Huang at the Commerce Department that read: 
``Have talked to Mi. Thank you very much.'' \534\ On the check 
tracking form used by the DNC to record both internal and 
required information for the FEC, Mercer listed Jane Huang, 
John Huang's wife, as the solicitor of the contribution from 
Ahn.\535\ Mercer stated that he listed Jane Huang as the 
solicitor because she was an active trustee and there was a 
connection between the Huangs and Ahn.\536\ Statements from 
both John Huang and Mi Ryu Ahn contradict Mercer's contention. 
Huang stated that Jane Huang most likely did not know Ahn and 
that Jane did not solicit contributions while John worked at 
the Commerce Department.\537\ Ahn could not recall ever talking 
to Jane Huang, but she did remember that John Huang asked her 
to get involved with the DNC.\538\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \532\ S. Rept. No. 105-167, at 1189 (1998).
    \533\ FBI interview of John Huang, at 26 (Feb. 23-Mar. 26, 1999).
    \534\ S. Rept. No. 105-167, at 1189 (1998).
    \535\ Id. at 1189-1190.
    \536\ FBI interview of David Lawrence Mercer, at 7 (Apr. 27, 1998).
    \537\ FBI interview of John Huang, at 27 (Feb. 23-Mar. 26, 1999).
    \538\ S. Rept. No. 105-167, at 1190 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    John Huang also introduced Mercer to Arief and Soraya 
Wiriadinata. In November 1995, while Huang still worked at the 
Commerce Department, Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata each 
contributed $15,000 to the DNC. David Mercer was the DNC 
contact for those two contributions and he filled out their 
check tracking forms for the DNC. Mercer again recorded Jane 
Huang, John's wife, as the solicitor of the contributions.\539\ 
Mercer was asked why he listed Jane Huang, instead of John 
Huang, as the solicitor the contributions from the 
Wiriadinatas:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \539\ DNC check tracking forms for Arief Wiriadinata and Soraya 
Wiriadinata, DNC 1276337 and DNC 1276338.

        Q. How did you know to credit this to Jane Huang as 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        solicitor?

        A. Through an understanding prior of the Wiriadinatas 
        having association with the Huangs.

        Q. How did that understanding come about?

        A. I don't know.

        Q. But you understood that the Wiriadinatas and the 
        Huangs were associated. How did you understand they 
        were associated?

        A. I don't recall.

        Q. Why didn't you put John Huang down as solicitor?

        A. I don't recall why I--you know, I don't recall. I 
        didn't, you know--I don't . . . I don't recall. Jane 
        could have--I could have been told that Jane was the 
        one that brought these checks in. I don't know.\540\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \540\ Deposition of David L. Mercer, Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, May 27, 1997, at 33-34.

Mercer could not explain his own actions because to do so would 
uncover Mercer's role in encouraging Huang to violate the Hatch 
Act.
    John Huang and Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata all directly 
contradict Mercer's testimony. Not only did Arief say that John 
Huang solicited the November 1995 contributions, but both Arief 
and Soraya denied ever speaking to or meeting with Jane 
Huang.\541\ Huang also stated that Mercer testified falsely:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \541\ S. Rept. No. 105-167, at 1191 (1998).

        Mr. Wilson. But you do recall, and I may be wrong on 
        the complete number, but on some of the DNC check 
        tracking forms your wife was listed as the solicitor of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        contributions from the Wiriadinatas.

        Mr. Huang. I've learned that since I saw the documents.

        Mr. Wilson. Now, that was not correct you've testified, 
        is that right?

        Mr. Huang. That was not correct. My wife did not 
        solicit those contributions, no.\542\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \542\ ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady Family in Political 
Fundraising,'' hearings before the House Committee on Government 
Reform, 106th Cong., 280 (Dec. 17, 1999) (preliminary transcript).

    The Justice Department should investigate David Mercer for 
knowingly giving false testimony to the Congress by stating 
that Jane Huang solicited the contributions from Mi Ryu Ahn and 
the Wiriadinatas. Mercer's fundraising activities with Huang, 
while Huang was at the Commerce Department, points to a greater 
concern: Mercer knew that the DNC was hiring someone who was 
willing to break the law in return for contributions to the 
DNC.
            c. Richard Sullivan, DNC Finance Director
    In 1994, Charlie Trie and his foreign financier, Ng Lap 
Seng, contributed $15,000 to the DNC in illegal foreign money 
through the San Kin Yip International Trading Co. Documents 
show that DNC officials knew the money came from Ng Lap Seng 
and may have attempted to hide that fact. There is no evidence 
that the Justice Department has pursued these issues.
    On October 10, 1994, Charlie Trie received a fundraising 
letter from Richard Sullivan, Director of the BLF, and Tim 
Collins of the Business Leadership Forum (BLF), a DNC donor 
council for business leaders to interact with officials in the 
Clinton administration and the Democratic party.\543\ Trie was 
invited to recruit a guest to join the BLF and attend a small 
October 20, 1994, BLF event with Vice President Gore and senior 
administration officials in Washington, DC. Trie recruited his 
foreign benefactor Ng Lap Seng to join the BLF.\544\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \543\ Letter from Richard Sullivan, director, Business Leadership 
Forum, and Timothy C. Collins, chairman, Business Leadership Forum, to 
Charlie Trie, Oct. 10, 1994 (exhibit 24).
    \544\ Interview of Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie, Committee on 
Government Reform, at 2-3 (Feb. 29, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To pay for Ng's membership in the BLF, a company newly 
incorporated by Trie, San Kin Yip International Trading Co., 
gave a $15,000 check to the DNC. Sullivan filled out the DNC 
check tracking form for the $15,000 San Kin Yip contribution. 
The check was signed by Ng Lap Seng in Chinese.\545\ On the 
check tracking form, Sullivan listed Charlie Trie as the 
contact for the contribution. Following the event, though, 
Sullivan sent a letter to Ng Lap Seng, not Trie, thanking him 
for his contribution and for joining the BLF.\546\ There was no 
documentary evidence other than the Chinese signature that 
would have told Sullivan that the contribution came from Ng and 
not Trie, who Sullivan listed on the check tracking form.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \545\ Id. at 3.
    \546\ Letter from Richard Sullivan to Ng Lap Seng, Oct. 24, 1994 
(exhibit 25).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In deposition testimony, Sullivan distanced himself from 
Trie. In fact, Sullivan said that he specifically told David 
Mercer to instruct Trie that conduit contributions were 
unacceptable.\547\ Sullivan said he also gave a general warning 
to DNC fundraisers that if there was any chance of illegal 
contributions, Trie might be involved.\548\ Sullivan stated he 
did not solicit any contributions from Trie and that Deputy 
Finance Director David Mercer was Trie's primary contact.\549\ 
Sullivan did describe to the Justice Department a September 
1994 event Trie attended at Mercer's invitation where Trie 
agreed to serve as a chairman of the DNC Business Council.\550\ 
Sullivan said about 30 people attended and they went to hear 
the Vice President speak at the Old Executive Office Building. 
However, Sullivan neglected to tell the Justice Department 
about his involvement with Trie and Ng at the October 20, 1994, 
event and Ng's contribution to the DNC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \547\ FBI interview of Richard Lyles Sullivan, at 14 (Aug. 13, 
1997).
    \548\ FBI interview of Richard Lyles Sullivan, at 14 (Aug. 13, 
1997).
    \549\ Deposition of Richard Sullivan, Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, June 4, 1997, at 101-102.
    \550\ FBI interview of Richard Sullivan, at 2 (Nov. 21, 1997). The 
Business Council was the earlier name for the BLF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department did not confront Sullivan with the 
documents evidencing his own involvement with the illegal 
contribution from Ng. The Justice Department has had possession 
of Richard Sullivan's thank you letter to Ng Lap Seng since 
October 1997.\551\ The Justice Department interviewed Sullivan 
seven times after it seized the letter from Charlie Trie's 
residence in Little Rock and not once did the Justice 
Department ask Sullivan about it.\552\ The Justice Department 
did manage to ask Trie whether he sponsored Ng for membership 
in the BLF. When Trie could not recall, there were no further 
questions on the subject.\553\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \551\ The only known copy of Sullivan's letter was seized by the 
Justice Department and the FBI after a search warrant was executed on 
Charlie Trie's residence in Little Rock in October 1997.
    \552\ Sullivan was interviewed by the Justice Department two times 
prior to the search warrant in October 1997. After the letter was 
seized, the Justice Department interviewed Sullivan Nov. 21, 1997, Dec. 
1, 1997, May 14, 1998, Sept. 17, 1998, Sept. 18, 1998, Nov. 23, 1998, 
and Mar. 15, 1999.
    \553\ FBI interview of Charlie Trie, at 7 (June-October 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. Fran Wakem, Deputy Director, DNC Business Leadership 
                    Forum
    Fran Wakem was the Deputy Director of the Business 
Leadership Forum. In late 1994, Wakem arranged for an 
invitation to Lin Ruo Qing, a former colonel in the People's 
Liberation Army who was associated with Charlie Trie, to come 
to the United States and attend a DNC fundraiser.
    In 1994, Trie was introduced to Lin Ruo Qing when she 
served as the chairwoman of the San You Scientific and 
Technology Industry Group in Beijing, which was a Chinese 
Government-controlled entity. Trie started his own company 
called Sanyou Science & Technology Enterprises USA, Inc. in 
hopes of creating a joint venture with Lin's company in 
Beijing.
    As part of his efforts to enter a joint venture with Lin, 
Trie invited Lin to attend a DNC fundraiser in December 1994. 
Trie's employee, Jennifer Russell, contacted Richard Sullivan, 
Director of the DNC's Business Leadership Forum, and was told 
that a new member needs to pay $10,000 in order to attend a BLF 
event.\554\ Since Trie was already a member of the BLF, 
Sullivan's reference applied to Trie's efforts to get Lin into 
the BLF event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \554\ Note from Jennifer Russell to Charlie Trie (exhibit 26). 
Attached to the letter is the committee's translation of the letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In order to facilitate Lin's entry into the United States, 
Trie, through his employee Jennifer Russell, asked Fran Wakem, 
deputy director of the BLF, to invite Lin to a BLF event in the 
United States. In a letter dated November 9, 1994, Fran Wakem 
invited Lin to join the BLF and attend one of several upcoming 
BLF events.\555\ Wakem signed the letter and addressed it to 
Lin's business address in Beijing. Wakem's letter apparently 
was not specific enough to enable Lin to receive a United 
States entry visa. On November 16, 1994, Russell sent a copy of 
the letter back to Wakem with suggested revisions.\556\ Wakem 
quickly changed the letter, signed it, and sent the revised 
letter, still with the Beijing address, back to Russell.\557\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \555\ Letter from Francessa Wakem to Miss Lin Rou Qing, Nov. 9, 
1994 (exhibit 27).
    \556\ Facsimile from Jennifer Russell to Fran Wakem, Nov. 16, 1994 
(exhibit 28). The draft letter from Fran Wakem to Lin Ruo Qing is 
attached.
    \557\ Letter from Fran Wakem to Lin Ruo Qing, Nov. 16, 1994 
(exhibit 29).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FBI interviewed Wakem about her involvement in inviting 
a former military officer from Beijing to join the BLF and 
attend a BLF event. Although Wakem verified her signatures, 
Wakem had no recollection of her letters to Lin.\558\ Wakem 
knew that foreign nationals could not join the BLF because they 
could not contribute, and she could not think of any situation 
where a foreign national was invited to join the BLF.\559\ 
Richard Sullivan, director of the BLF, said that Wakem's 
letters to Lin were prepared at Charlie Trie's request.\560\ 
Sullivan, though, said he authorized Wakem to invite Lin to 
attend BLF events, but not to invite Lin to join the BLF.\561\ 
Sullivan surmised that Wakem sent letters inviting Lin to join 
the BLF because it was easier than drafting a new letter.\562\ 
Wakem's letter to Lin contained two references about traveling 
to the United States. Wakem admitted that such references were 
not contained in BLF form letters inviting someone to join the 
donor program.\563\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \558\ FBI interview of Francessa J. Wakem, at 2 (Oct. 6, 1998).
    \559\ Id.
    \560\ FBI interview of Richard Sullivan, at 2 (Sept. 18, 1998).
    \561\ Id.
    \562\ Id.
    \563\ Interview of Fran Wakem, Committee on Government Reform, at 3 
(Sept. 13, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In an interview with the committee, Wakem stated that she 
did not recall any of her dealings with Russell or the Lin 
letters. Wakem did admit, though, that the letters she signed 
to Lin were not ``form letters.'' \564\ As such, they were 
required to be approved by the DNC's general counsel's office 
before being sent out, but Wakem could not specifically recall 
whether the letter to Lin was approved by the general counsel's 
office.\565\ In addition, since the letters referencing visits 
to the United States were clearly not form letters, Sullivan's 
speculation that Wakem sent out a form letter inviting Lin to 
join cannot be correct. Wakem could not explain why it would 
not have occurred to her that the letters were inappropriate 
when she added two sentences inviting Lin to the United States. 
In her interview with the committee, Wakem characterized her 
letter as ``wacky'' and asked rhetorically, ``why in the hell 
was I doing that?'' \566\ Wakem's memory loss this year in no 
way effects the fact that in 1994, she knowingly invited a 
foreign national living in Beijing to join the BLF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \564\ Id. at 3.
    \565\ Id. at 3.
    \566\ Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Failure to Pursue Foreign Kingpins

    The campaign finance investigation revealed that three 
major participants in the scandal--John Huang, Charlie Trie, 
and Johnny Chung--each had wealthy and powerful foreign 
patrons. Documentary and testimonial evidence revealed that the 
foreign patrons had indeed funneled illegal foreign 
contributions into the DNC. Four foreign nationals in 
particular attracted investigative scrutiny: James Riady, Ng 
Lap Seng, General Ji Shengde, and Tomy Winata. These foreign 
nationals attracted attention not just because of the hundreds 
of thousands of dollars they provided in illegal political 
contributions, but also because they all had strong ties to the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) and other foreign governments. 
In March 1997, it was reported that United States intelligence 
had learned in 1996 that the PRC had discussed a plan to 
influence United States policy through lobbying and 
funding.\567\ Despite these alarming allegations, it appears 
that the Justice Department has done little to investigate or 
prosecute the foreign kingpins who were the source of much of 
the illegal money in the 1996 elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \567\ Brian Duffy and Bob Woodward, ``FBI Warned 6 on Hill About 
China Money; Officials Say Lawmakers, Others Targeted in $2 Million 
Plan to Buy Influence,'' Washington Post, Mar. 9, 1997, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. James Riady
    James Riady's family runs the Lippo Group, a $12 billion 
business empire based in Jakarta, Indonesia. Although the 
ethnic Chinese Riady family had close ties to the regime of 
President Soeharto in Indonesia, it also maintained very close 
business relationships with PRC Government interests and 
participated in major investments in China. One Lippo link in 
particular merits scrutiny--its multiple partnerships with 
China Resources. China Resources was owned entirely by the PRC 
Government and has been identified as an intelligence-gathering 
arm of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). According to John 
Huang, China Resources' parent company is the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC).\568\ MOFTEC is 
responsible for ensuring MFN status for China and reducing or 
eliminating United States-imposed restrictions on technical 
exports.\569\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \568\ FBI interview of John Huang, at 133 (Feb. 23-Mar. 26, 1999).
    \569\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department and the committee received extensive 
evidence and testimony documenting James Riady's involvement in 
funneling illegal contributions to the DNC and State Democratic 
parties. In August 1992, Huang arranged for Riady to have a 
private limousine ride with then-Governor Bill Clinton, so 
Riady could tell Governor Clinton that he would raise $1 
million for the Governor's Presidential campaign. Riady and 
Huang then identified Lippo employees and their spouses who 
could contribute to fulfill Riady's promise. At least $750,000 
in illegal contributions from Lippo Group employees and their 
spouses were sent to the DNC in the 1992 election.\570\ Huang 
gave Riady a detailed listing of Lippo employees' contributions 
and some of the employees bank accounts numbers so they could 
be reimbursed.\571\ Huang was personally told by some of the 
Lippo employees that they received reimbursements.\572\ The 
committee has bank records which show that the Lippo employees 
received reimbursements from various companies in amounts 
equaling their political contributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \570\ At the direction of the DNC, some of the Lippo contributions 
were sent to State Democratic parties.
    \571\ FBI interview of John Huang, at 20 (Oct. 25-26, 1999).
    \572\ FBI interview of John Huang, at 22-25 (Jan. 19-Feb. 10, 
1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the 1992 election, Riady continued to remain involved 
in U.S. politics. In 1995, he appealed directly to President 
Clinton to have his long-time aide John Huang hired at the DNC. 
During his year at the DNC, Huang would raise at least $1.6 
million in illegal contributions, a substantial amount of it 
from individuals with ties to the Lippo Group. For example, 
Huang raised over $450,000 from Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata, 
an Indonesian gardener and his wife, who received the entire 
sum that they gave to the DNC from Hashim Ning, a long-time 
Indonesian business partner of the Riadys.
    Despite the ample documentary and testimonial evidence 
implicating James Riady in illegal conduct, the Justice 
Department has failed to indict Riady. The department obtained 
John Huang's cooperation over a year ago, and gave Huang a 
reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony against Riady. 
Yet a year later, the Department still has not brought charges 
against Riady.
    The Justice Department's failure to bring charges against 
Riady certainly does not spring from any lack of evidence 
against Riady. It is possible that the Department has been 
dissuaded from pursuing Riady because of his close relationship 
with President Clinton. President Clinton has never denounced 
James Riady since his role in the fundraising scandal was 
uncovered, and he has never demanded that Riady return to the 
United States to face charges. Rather, he has continued to 
embrace a man who has been caught trying to illegally subvert 
U.S. elections.
    In September 1999, shortly after Huang finished providing 
evidence against Riady to the Justice Department, President 
Clinton saw Riady at an APEC conference in New Zealand. After 
he finished giving a speech, the President went down a 
ropeline, where Riady was prominently placed. When he saw 
Riady, the President stopped, and they exchanged extended 
pleasantries.\573\ The President apparently expressed little 
hesitation about meeting with Riady, who was a central target 
of one of the largest investigations in the history of the 
Justice Department.\574\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \573\ After learning of the Clinton-Riady encounter, the committee 
requested any WHCA videotapes of the New Zealand event. Two WHCA 
videotapes filmed the event, but remarkably, both missed the encounter 
between the President and Riady. One camera stopped filming as soon as 
the President reached Riady's place in line. The other WHCA cameraman 
was focused on his WHCA colleague rather than the President meeting 
Riady. The committee obtained a third tape of the event from a private 
source which captured the entire encounter between Riady and Clinton. 
This tape showed that the President greeted Riady warmly.
    \574\ Notwithstanding the President's warm embrace of Riady, the 
White House refuses to produce any documents related to recent contacts 
between Riady and the White House. The committee asked the White House 
to produce documents about this meeting on Oct. 5, 1999, but the White 
House has failed to produce any such records.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Recent news reports suggest that the relationship between 
James Riady and Bill Clinton is alive and well, and not limited 
to one friendly handshake in New Zealand. The Far Eastern 
Economic Review reported on October 5, 2000, that Riady has 
been telling associates that he has invited President Clinton 
to join the Lippo Board of Directors after he leaves office in 
2001, and expects the President to accept his offer. While this 
report has not been confirmed, it would be a shocking 
development if the President went to work for a man who is the 
target of a massive Federal investigation, who has close ties 
to the PRC, and who has been caught trying to funnel illegal 
foreign money to United States political campaigns. It would be 
a sad commentary on the Attorney General's judgment if she 
clung to her supervision of the investigation of the President 
and Riady while, at the same time, Riady was planning to 
involve the President in business ventures--as he had done with 
Webster Hubbell and Jim Guy Tucker after both came under 
investigation.\575\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \575\ It should be noted that Riady has a history of providing 
money and jobs to his allies and the allies of President Clinton when 
they are under investigation. He provided $100,000 to Webster Hubbell 
when he was under investigation by the Office of the Independent 
Counsel, he has hired former Arkansas Governor Jim Guy Tucker to work 
for him in Jakarta, and he provided John Huang with $20,000 in cash 
during the same period of time that Huang was ``cooperating'' with the 
Justice Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    President Clinton's continued warm relationship with James 
Riady sends the wrong message to the Justice Department. When 
one looks at the videotape of President Clinton and Riady 
exchanging warm greetings in September 1999, it is easy to see 
why the Justice Department has not indicted him. This problem 
provides a clear example of why the Justice Department is 
entirely unsuited to conduct this investigation, and why an 
independent counsel was necessary.\576\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \576\ Attorney General Reno appointed an independent counsel for 
Whitewater because Jim McDougal was involved. There is every indication 
that Riady is just as close to President Clinton as McDougal. Why did 
the Attorney General not employ the same rationale in this case?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. General Ji Shengde and Colonel Liu Chao-Ying
    For almost 2 years, the committee's critics claimed that 
there was no evidence of a Chinese plan to influence United 
States elections. For these critics, it was not enough to show 
that John Huang and Charlie Trie had funneled hundreds of 
thousands of dollars into the elections from foreign 
businessmen with close ties to China. However, in May 1999, 
when Johnny Chung testified before the committee, he provided 
clear evidence that Chinese military officers had funneled 
money into United States elections. Despite this clear 
evidence, the Justice Department has also failed to bring 
charges against either Chinese military officer involved.
    When he appeared before the committee, Chung testified that 
in August 1996, a business associate, Colonel Liu Chao-Ying, 
introduced him to General Ji Shengde, the head of Chinese 
military intelligence. Chung testified that General Ji told 
him:

        We like your President very much. We would like to see 
        him reelected. I will give you $300,000 U.S. dollars. 
        You can give it to the President and the Democrat 
        party.\577\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \577\ ``Johnny Chung: Foreign Connections, Foreign Contributions,'' 
hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 
283 (May 11, 1999).

Shortly after this meeting, General Ji provided Chung with 
$300,000 through his subordinate, Liu Chao-Ying. Chung funneled 
$35,000 of this money to the DNC.\578\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \578\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If the Justice Department was interested in determining the 
scope of the effort by the PRC to influence United States 
elections, the obvious first step would be to pursue General Ji 
Shengde and Colonel Liu Chao-Ying. However, there is little 
evidence that the Department has taken any firm steps to 
prosecute them. A list of Justice Department Task Force cases 
as of June 4, 1999, listed Liu Chao-Ying as a ``Pending 
Inactive Investigation.'' \579\ Consistent with the inactive 
state of the Department's investigation is that the 
administration has never called upon the Chinese Government to 
provide Liu or Ji to United States law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \579\ Listing of Task Force cases, June 4, 1999 (exhibit 14). It 
should be noted that the Justice Department recently attempted to 
withhold documents relating to Liu from the committee, claiming that 
she was part of an active investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Johnny Chung was one of the only witnesses to provide full 
and honest cooperation to the committee after he pled guilty. 
Chung provided clear evidence implicating high-level Chinese 
Government officials in illegal activity. It is inexplicable 
that the Department has not actively pursued this evidence. The 
failure, while one of many, is one of the most serious, and it 
sends a dangerous message China, and other governments that 
might seek to exercise improper influence in the United States 
electoral process.
            c. Ng Lap Seng
    Ng Lap Seng is an ethnic Chinese businessman who became 
wealthy through real estate ventures in Macau. According to one 
of Ng's business partners, Ng's success was due to the fact 
that he was chosen to be a ``front man'' in different 
investment projects for city and provincial governments in 
China.\580\ Ng was also a member of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a Communist 
political group populated by some of the most powerful people 
in Asia, including Stanley Ho, Li Ka Shing, Henry Fok, and Hong 
Kong's Chief Executive Tung Chee Hua.\581\ Ng also conducts 
business with Wang Jun, chairman of CITIC, and son of the 
former Vice President of China, Wang Zhen. Ng's largest project 
is the Nam Van Lakes development, a $600 million hotel and 
casino development co-owned by Edmund Ho Wah Hau, chosen by 
Beijing as the first chief executive of Macau, and Stanley Ho 
Hung Sun, who holds the monopoly on gambling rights in Macau. 
Barry Gold, senior vice president and head of the Asian project 
finance group in Hong Kong for Lehman Brothers, when told of 
details of the project by Trie, said it consisted of casinos 
and ``well-known Chinese interests.'' \582\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \580\ Interview of George Johnson, Committee on Government Reform, 
at 2 (Feb. 13, 1998).
    \581\ Li Ka Shing is one of the wealthiest individuals in Asia. 
Henry Fok, who is very wealthy, endeared himself to the Communist 
Chinese by running guns into China during the Korean War.
    \582\ Interview of Barry Gold, Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, at 1-2 (Mar. 26, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1994, Ng and Trie formed a partnership in which Ng would 
give Trie money, and Trie would find investors for the Nam Van 
Lakes development. Over the next 2 years, Ng wired over $1 
million to Trie. Trie used the money for all of his expenses, 
including making illegal contributions to the DNC and 
reimbursing the contributions of others. Ng obviously 
understood that Trie was using the wire transfers for political 
contributions because Ng attended a number of fundraising 
events with Trie. In October 1994, Ng was even credited by the 
DNC for giving a contribution, even though he was ineligible to 
give and he signed the check in Chinese. In October 1995, Ng 
had Charlie Trie and Ernie Green set up a dinner with Commerce 
Secretary Ron Brown and Ng's Asian business colleagues in Hong 
Kong. At the dinner, Secretary Brown told the crowd that they 
should do business with Trie in the United States and that Trie 
had a close relationship with President Clinton. Trie told the 
Asian businessmen to help the Democratic party with 
contributions.\583\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \583\ Interview of Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie, Committee on 
Government Reform, at 6 (Feb. 29, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There was not even a pretense of an investigation of Ng Lap 
Seng by the Justice Department. In January 1998, the Justice 
Department indicted Charlie Trie and Antonio Pan, while both 
were hiding in Asia, for funneling Ng's money into the DNC. If 
the Justice Department was truly following a ``bottom up'' 
approach to the campaign finance investigation, Ng would 
naturally be the next target after Trie and Pan. However, in 
June 1999, the Task Force identified all of its investigations 
and Ng Lap Seng was not even mentioned. However, there is no 
indication that the Justice Department is actively pursuing 
Ng.\584\ The fact that a foreign national could knowingly 
provide hundreds of thousands of dollars for illegal 
contributions in a U.S. Presidential campaign and completely 
escape scrutiny is unconscionable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \584\ When Trie testified before the committee, the Department 
identified three active investigations relating to Trie: Ernie Green, 
Mark Middleton, and Jude Kearney. The committee was prevented from 
questioning Trie about these matters. The committee questioned Trie 
extensively about his dealings with Ng.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is no excuse for the Justice Department's failure to 
investigate or indict Ng Lap Seng. Ng is in the same situation 
as James Riady. Both were wealthy overseas businessmen who used 
individuals in President Clinton's inner circle to funnel 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in illegal campaign 
contributions to the DNC. Press reports indicate that the 
Justice Department is at least working on an investigation of 
James Riady. There has been no indication that the Justice 
Department will ever investigate Ng Lap Seng for his illegal 
actions.
            d. Tomy Winata
    Tomy Winata is a fourth foreign national who illegally 
funneled money into U.S. elections, but there has not been any 
indication that the Justice Department intends to pursue his 
illegal conduct. Winata is an Indonesian billionaire with close 
ties to both the Chinese and Indonesian Governments. Winata 
served as the main business partner of the PLA and the largest 
shareholder in Satelindo, a major Indonesian telecommunications 
company. Winata was also a former business partner of the Riady 
family and Colonel Liu Chao-Ying. Winata gave Trie a total of 
$120,000 in wire transfers and between $10,000 and $20,000 in 
cash each time Winata visited the United States.
    In late 1995, Winata told Trie he wanted a private, one-on-
one meeting with President Clinton. Trie could not obtain a 
private meeting, but as an alternative, Trie invited Winata to 
sit next to President Clinton at the February 19, 1996, 
fundraiser at the Hay Adams Hotel in Washington, DC. Winata 
declined the invitation but sent two of his employees instead. 
Trie requested that Winata send money for the event, so Winata 
sent $200,000 in Bank Central Asia travelers checks with his 
employees.\585\ Trie used a portion of the $200,000 to 
reimburse contributors illegally for the February 19, 1996, 
event.\586\ Trie testified that Winata knew he was going to use 
the travelers checks to pay for tickets to the fundraiser.\587\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \585\ Hearing on ``The Role of Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie in Illegal 
Political Fundraising, Part I,'' hearing before the Committee on 
Government Reform, 106th Cong., 37-39 (Mar. 1, 2000) (preliminary 
transcript).
    \586\ Id. at 39-40.
    \587\ Id. at 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although Winata's true involvement in illegal political 
contributions was not known until Trie began cooperating, 
Winata's name had already surfaced through the wire transfers 
sent to Trie's bank accounts. Despite Trie's testimony, though, 
there is no indication that the Justice Department intends to 
indict Winata for knowingly funneling illegal contributions to 
the DNC.

3. Mark Middleton, Assistant to the White House Chief of Staff

    Mark Middleton is the highest-ranking Clinton 
administration official to invoke his fifth amendment right 
against self-incrimination in the fundraising scandal. The 
committee found that Middleton was heavily involved with 
several of the central figures under investigation. No other 
White House official had as much contact with John Huang, James 
Riady, and Charlie Trie as Mark Middleton. Their contacts 
continued after Middleton left the White House. While on his 
own, Middleton courted wealthy foreign businessmen and offered 
access to the White House and the DNC.
    During the time Middleton worked in the White House, he 
served as a key contact with Huang and Riady. White House 
records showed numerous visits and telephone calls between 
Huang, Riady, and Middleton. Middleton also served as a conduit 
of information between the White House and Huang and Riady. 
Middleton met with Huang and Riady three times in the week 
before Riady paid Hubbell $100,000. Middleton also hand-
delivered a ``get well'' note from President Clinton to Hashim 
Ning when he fell ill in the United States. In gratitude, 
Ning's daughter, Soraya Wiriadinata, and her husband Arief gave 
$455,000 to the DNC. After leaving the White House, Middleton 
was paid $12,500 a month by a Riady company.
    Middleton also served as Charlie Trie's main White House 
contact. Trie and Ng Lap Seng would regularly meet with 
Middleton in the White House when they came to Washington. When 
Middleton left the White House, he traveled to Asia twice with 
Trie. Middleton openly used his former position in the White 
House to impress potential Asian clients. During the second 
trip with Trie, Middleton discussed getting $15 million for 
President Clinton's re-election with the treasurer of Taiwan's 
ruling party.\588\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \588\ John Huang said Middleton told him about the $15 million 
offer and Huang told Middleton to be ``very careful.'' FBI interview of 
John Huang, at 30 (Feb. 23-Mar. 26, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After leaving the White House, Middleton amassed an 
impressive array of wealthy foreign clients. However, there is 
no evidence that Middleton provided any work for his clients 
beyond facilitating White House visits, meetings with Clinton 
administration officials, or meetings with the chairman of the 
DNC. On several occasions, Middleton made it blatantly clear to 
White House and DNC officials that his foreign clients were 
prepared to make substantial political contributions or trade 
access for cash.
    The Justice Department has been investigating Middleton for 
4 years. It has had Charlie Trie's cooperation with the 
investigation for over a year. Nevertheless, it has still 
failed to bring charges against Mark Middleton, one of the 
central figures in the scandal. Moreover, there is every 
indication that the Department is not even conducting a 
thorough or aggressive investigation of Middleton.\589\ Such 
failures indicate that the Department is not interested in 
learning what happened in the 1996 elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \589\ As explained above, the Department did not even obtain the 
records on Middleton from the White House, where he worked for 2 years, 
until March 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Ernie Green

    The committee's investigation of the activities of Charlie 
Trie involved a review of Trie's relationship with Ernest G. 
Green, who is also a close friend of President Clinton. Green 
and Trie had a close personal and business relationship, and 
they used their political contacts in order to further their 
business goals. They also made two trips to Asia, ostensibly 
for business reasons, to court prospective clients with 
invitations to events and fundraisers with top administration 
officials. In October 1995, in Hong Kong, Green, Trie, and Ng 
Lap Seng hosted a dinner of Asian businessmen with Commerce 
Secretary Ron Brown.\590\ In February 1996, Trie accompanied 
Wang Jun, one of the most prominent Chinese businessmen, to a 
White House coffee.\591\ On the same day, Green contributed 
$50,000 to the DNC, the precise amount Trie was instructed to 
pay to attend a coffee.\592\ Green and Trie accompanied Wang to 
meetings in Washington and New York. Green also used his White 
House contacts to help Trie land a Presidential appointment on 
an international trade commission.\593\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \590\ See H. Rept. No. 105-829, at 1370-1373.
    \591\ Guest list for Feb. 6, 1996, White House coffee.
    \592\ DNC check tracking form for Ernie Green, DNC 3064259; hearing 
on ``The Role of Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie in Illegal Political 
Fundraising, Part I,'' hearing before the House Committee on Government 
Reform, 106th Cong., 266 (2000) (preliminary transcript).
    \593\ Memorandum for the President from Bob J. Nash, Nov. 22, 1995, 
EOP 002216-002223. Ernie Green was listed as Trie's sponsor for 
appointment to the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Green was deposed by the House Government Reform Committee 
and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. When new 
evidence contradicting Green's testimony was discovered, Green 
was deposed a second time by this committee. On March 12, 1999, 
the committee referred Green's case to the Justice Department, 
asking the Department to determine whether Green perjured 
himself in his depositions.
    In his depositions, Green attempted to minimize his 
relationship with Trie. Green also denied that he made any 
conduit contributions or that his $50,000 contribution was 
connected in any way to Trie and Wang Jun's attendance at the 
White House coffee.\594\ Perhaps more significantly, Green 
claimed that he never received any money from Trie.\595\ The 
committee discovered irrefutable evidence that Green did 
receive at least $2,000 in travelers checks from Trie. In 
addition, Green's bank records showed numerous cash deposits 
into separate bank accounts at the time of Green's major 
contributions to the DNC.\596\ Green could not explain the 
source for the over $30,000 in cash he deposited.\597\ Green 
also denied that two cash deposits of $3,500 and $2,500 were 
connected to his $6,000 contribution to the DNC around the same 
time.\598\ The committee's referral clearly spelled out that, 
at a minimum, Green gave false statements about whether he 
received any money from Trie, and perhaps, misled the committee 
about his other contributions to the DNC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \594\ Deposition of Ernest G. Green, Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight, Dec. 17, 1997, at 210-214.
    \595\ Deposition of Ernest Green, Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, June 18, 1997, at 191-192.
    \596\ In fact, the $2,000 in travelers checks that Green received 
from Trie was right in the middle of the time that Green was making all 
of these cash deposits, February and March 1996.
    \597\ Deposition of Ernest G. Green, Committee on Government Reform 
and Oversight, Sept. 25, 1998, at 20-30.
    \598\ Id. at 12-14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Shortly after the committee's referral, around May 1999, 
Trie began cooperating with the Justice Department. The Justice 
Department attempted to shield from the committee or the public 
any information Trie gave about Green under the guise that 
Green was the subject or target of an ongoing criminal 
investigation. In November 1999, the committee immunized Trie, 
but was told by the Justice Department that questions relating 
to Green, along with Mark Middleton and Jude Kearney, were off 
limits. The basis for the Department's decision was that their 
investigation of Green was very serious and would be resolved 
in the near future. The committee was told that if Trie 
testified publicly about Green, it could jeopardize any case 
against Green.
    Through disclosures by the Justice Department and Trie, the 
committee subsequently learned that Trie did indeed provide 
incriminating information about Green. Not only did Trie's 
statements affirm the validity of the committee's referral 
against Green, but Trie also provided additional information 
that contradicted other sworn statements by Green regarding 
both his political contributions and his role in arranging 
high-level political meetings for Trie.
    The committee recently discovered that the Justice 
Department had not even requested Green's records from either 
the White House or the Commerce Department until March 24, 
2000, 1 full year after the committee's referral.\599\ 
Therefore, in February 2000, when the Justice Department told 
the committee that it was about to take action on Green, and 
prevented the committee from questioning Trie about Green, it 
had not even taken the basic first step of getting Green's 
documents from the White House or the Commerce Department. At a 
hearing on July 20, 2000, the Justice Department was asked to 
explain the anomaly between their words and their actions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \599\ Subpoena to the Custodian of Records, Executive Office of the 
President, Mar. 24, 2000 (exhibit 30); subpoena to the Custodian of 
Records, U.S. Department of Commerce, Mar. 24, 2000 (exhibit 31).

        Mr. LaTourette. Let me ask you this, and I think I 
        already know the answer, but you know what? I'm going 
        to ask it anyway. Are Mark Middleton and Ernie Green 
        under active investigation by the Department of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Justice?

        Mr. Conrad. I couldn't comment on that.

        Mr. LaTourette. Well, the reason I ask you that 
        question, we were specifically asked by the Department 
        of Justice to avoid talking about Ernie Green during 
        the Charlie Trie hearing, if I remember correctly. 
        Because we were advised that there was an ongoing 
        criminal investigation that the Justice Department was 
        very excited about.

        But I have to tell you that the level of excitement is 
        puzzling to me, and I assume to my colleagues, when we 
        find out that what you're so excited about you're not 
        even requesting records about from the White House. And 
        again, I don't like this backseat driving business. It 
        makes me very uncomfortable, because I'm sure as career 
        prosecutors, you do an excellent job . . . Mr. 
        Robinson, do you want to say something?

        Mr. Robinson. I would like to make one comment that I 
        hope will continue to be the case in our interaction on 
        parallel matters with the Congress. To the extent that 
        we have conversations with counsel for committees about 
        the appropriate scope of inquiry into witnesses, we 
        don't make those, we don't have those conversations 
        with the expectation that they will be publicly 
        disseminated. And the Code of Professional 
        Responsibility prohibits us from doing that.

        Mr. LaTourette. Yes, and I appreciate that 
        chastisement, but I will tell you that the committee 
        also has an oversight responsibility. And what you're 
        asking us to do is say, trust us. But then when we get 
        documents from the White House, we find out that stuff 
        we gave you a year and a half ago, you haven't acted 
        on[.] \600\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \600\ ``Has the Justice Department Given Preferential Treatment to 
the President and Vice President,'' hearing before the House Committee 
on Government Reform, 106th Cong., 121-123 (July 20, 2000) (preliminary 
transcript).

    The comments by Congressman LaTourette summarize the 
committee's conclusions about the Justice Department's handling 
of the Green case. The committee referred the matter to the 
Justice Department in March 1999, and it is clear that the 
Justice Department took little action on the referral, failing 
to subpoena records on Green from the White House or the 
Commerce Department until the following year. The Department's 
failure to act quickly on the referral is puzzling, given the 
clear evidence of perjury prepared by the committee. Even more 
puzzling though, is the fact that the Justice Department 
continued to delay action on Green, even after Charlie Trie 
presented them with substantial evidence of perjury and other 
crimes committed by Green. The Justice Department's failure to 
pursue the case against Green vigorously creates the appearance 
that the Justice Department is hesitant to pursue ever the 
clearest criminal case against individuals who are prominent 
Democrats and friends of President Clinton.

5. Keshi Zhan

    The Justice Department lost another investigative 
opportunity by failing to do a thorough investigation of Keshi 
Zhan, an associate of Charlie Trie. Zhan was initially thought 
to have been merely Trie's assistant and hostess in Washington, 
DC. She initially gained notoriety in the campaign fundraising 
investigation for having made a $12,500 contribution to the DNC 
on her annual salary of $22,408 as an Arlington County records 
clerk. However, as the investigation developed, it became clear 
that Zhan had a serious role in illegal activity.
    As the committee developed documentary and testimonial 
evidence, it became clear that Zhan was close to Ng Lap Seng, 
Charlie Trie's benefactor, who provided Trie with over $1 
million, much of which was directed into political campaigns. 
In addition, Zhan's father was a high-ranking professor of 
linguistics at a Chinese university, suggesting that her family 
had some political influence in China. Finally, Zhan was 
implicated in facilitating conduit contributions on behalf of 
Trie.\601\ This activity was significant, because the Justice 
Department has a policy of refusing to prosecute mere conduit 
contributors. However, it does prosecute individuals who 
facilitate conduit contributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \601\ In his interview with committee staff and his testimony 
before the committee, Trie cited a number of cases where Zhan arranged 
conduit contributions with individuals he did not even know.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department has failed to prosecute Zhan, 
despite a surfeit of evidence against her. The Senate Committee 
on Governmental Affairs immunized Zhan in 1997, and attempted 
to take her deposition. However, it soon became clear that Zhan 
was lying about even the simplest matters. Therefore, the 
committee closed her deposition. Zhan could be prosecuted for 
false statements made during the course of this deposition. 
However, the Department has declined to do so. Moreover, it 
appears that the Justice Department is failing to pursue Zhan 
for any of her illegal activities. A list of the status of 
Justice Department campaign fundraising investigations, which 
was inadvertently released by the Justice Department, listed 
the following information about Zhan: ``Keshi Zhan (subfile of 
Trie, not being actively pursued).'' \602\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \602\ Listing of Task Force cases, June 4, 1999 (exhibit 14).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By failing to pursue the Zhan investigation, the Justice 
Department has missed an opportunity to uncover valuable 
information about the campaign fundraising scandal. There is 
ample evidence to prosecute Zhan for a number of felonies, but 
the Department has simply decided, without explanation, not to 
investigate her.

6. The Justice Department Failed to Ask Key Questions of John Huang

    The Justice Department approved plea agreements with John 
Huang and Charlie Trie in 1999. The plea agreements allowed 
Huang and Trie to plead guilty to lesser offenses than their 
conduct warranted in return for full cooperation with the Task 
Force's investigation. The benefit to the Justice Department 
was to learn the details of Huang and Trie's activities and to 
gain information about the involvement of others, particularly 
those above Huang and Trie.
    By obtaining the summaries of the Justice Department 
interviews of Huang and Trie, and by questioning them 
extensively, the committee has learned that the Justice 
Department failed to question Huang and Trie about a number of 
significant matters. Most importantly, the Justice Department 
failed to question either Huang or Trie extensively about a 
number of connections between Trie, Huang, Riady, and Lippo 
Group employees. By failing to examine sufficiently the ties 
between them, the Justice Department allowed Huang and Trie to 
both claim that they were ignorant of each other's criminal 
activities.
            a. The Justice Department Did Not Investigate Ties Between 
                    Trie, Huang, and the Lippo Group
    Trie and Huang both state that they met around the summer 
of 1994.\603\ When Huang moved to the DNC in late 1995, Huang 
and Trie began working together to solicit contributions. Both 
claim that since they had met after both were established with 
the Democratic party, they did not discuss the rules of 
fundraising.\604\ Their claims are difficult to believe, in 
light of the evidence to the contrary. There is substantial 
evidence linking Trie to the Lippo Group and James Riady. This 
evidence may suggest that Trie was not acting on his own in 
funneling money to the DNC, but rather, like John Huang, was 
acting as an agent of the Lippo Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \603\ FBI interview of John Huang, at 41 (Jan. 19-Feb. 10, 1999); 
FBI interview of Charlie Trie, at 50 (June-October 1999).
    \604\ FBI interview of John Huang, at 4 (Feb. 5, 1999); FBI 
interview of Charlie Trie, at 51 (June-October 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The money for Trie's first illegal contributions to the DNC 
in May 1994 came from Lucky Port Investments Ltd.\605\ The 
owner of Lucky Port, Peter Chen, was a longtime Lippo employee 
and good friend of the Riady family patriarch, Mochtar 
Riady.\606\ While at Lucky Port, the Riadys accepted Chen's 
offer to invest in a shopping mall in China with a former 
member of the PLA.\607\ At the time of the wire transfer, Chen 
was still a Lippo employee as well. Antonio Pan, another 
longtime Lippo employee and future Trie assistant also worked 
at Lucky Port. Trie testified that this was the only money he 
received from either Lippo or anyone associated with the 
Riadys.\608\ The Justice Department did not question Trie about 
the $100,000 from Lucky Port. While he admitted that this money 
came from the Lippo Group, Trie could not explain why he 
received this money, and denied that he was acting on behalf of 
the Lippo Group when he funneled the $100,000 from Lucky Port 
into the U.S. elections. In failing to question Trie about the 
$100,000 from Lucky Port, the Justice Department missed a 
valuable piece of evidence linking Trie and the Lippo Group.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \605\ Wire transfer from Lucky Port Investments Ltd. to Yah Lin or 
Wang Mei Trie, May 6, 1994.
    \606\ Interview of Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie, Committee on 
Government Reform, at 13 (Feb. 29, 2000).
    \607\ Interview of Carol Pan, Committee on Government Reform, at 1 
(Dec. 1, 1998). Carol Pan, Antonio's ex-wife, worked at Lucky Port with 
Antonio and Chen.
    \608\ Hearing on ``The Role of Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie in Illegal 
Political Fundraising, Part I,'' hearing before the House Committee on 
Government Reform, 106th Cong., 236 (Mar. 1, 2000) (preliminary 
transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department missed other important leads linking 
Trie and Lippo. In documents seized from Trie's home by the 
FBI, one undated document, in Chinese, was entitled, 
``Cooperation Opportunities with James Riady.'' The document 
lists five separate business ventures involving Lippo and the 
Riadys. Trie strongly denied his own involvement in any of the 
projects listed in the document, which he said was authored by 
either Peter Chen or Antonio Pan.\609\ However, Trie admitted 
that one of the Lippo business projects in the documents did 
involve him:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \609\ Id. at 228-235.

        5. L.A. Bank Stocks: Maybe a part of the L.A. bank 
        stock can be sold to Wang Jun. Knowing you have good 
        relations with Wang Jun, hoping you can be the 
        intermediary. Proposing that Wang Jun buy the Lippo 
        bank stocks with money as reinforcement to enter the 
        U.S. market. You may also plan to get a part of the 
        stocks and a director position. James is a fair person. 
        He knows especially the long-term strategy and the 
        advantage of using business partners. He knows you have 
        good relations with China. Hope you may be able to help 
        realize the above suggestions. He agrees with my 
        proposal and is willing to work with you on the above 
        items.\610\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \610\ Undated document entitled, ``Cooperation Opportunities with 
James Riady'' (exhibit 32).

Trie admitted that Lippo was asking him to contact Wang Jun, 
CITIC chairman, to invest with Lippo.\611\ Although Trie denied 
any involvement with Lippo, he was clearly involved in 
negotiations of various business deals with James Riady. The 
Justice Department did not ask Trie about this document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \611\ Hearing on ``The Role of Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie in Illegal 
Political Fundraising, Part I,'' hearing before the Committee on 
Government Reform, 106th Cong., 231-235 (Mar. 1, 2000) (preliminary 
transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These pieces of evidence are important in determining the 
extent and nature of the relationship between John Huang and 
Charlie Trie. Considering Huang's claim that he was unaware of 
the fact that most of the contributions raised by Trie were 
illegal, it is important to obtain independent proof of the 
nature of the relationship between Huang and Trie. These pieces 
of evidence, which the Department did not question Trie about, 
suggest that the relationship between Trie and Huang was close, 
and raise the possibility that they were working together to 
raise illegal funds in 1996.
            b. The Justice Department Did Not Investigate the 1991 DNC 
                    Trip to Asia
    The Justice Department did not ask Huang any questions 
about a DNC trip to Asia in December 1991. This was an 
important area to explore because in 1996, the DNC claimed the 
two main fundraisers on the 1991 Asia trip, John Huang and 
Maria Hsia, duped them in 1996 by funneling illegal conduit and 
foreign contributions into the DNC. But in 1991, the DNC asked 
both Huang and Hsia to solicit political contributions in Asia.
    A review of the DNC documents for the trip show that the 
only purpose of the trip was fundraising. DNC documents about 
the trip focus almost exclusively on fundraising and whether 
enough money would be raised to justify the trip. Melinda Yee, 
who asserted her fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination before the committee, wrote, ``our goal is to 
bring $100,000 out of Taiwan and thus far, $50,000 is 
pledged.'' \612\ Chairman Ron Brown commented that the planning 
for the trip, ``looked good pending confirmation ($) from 
Waihee, Hsia, Huang.'' \613\ Linda Rotunno, from the Finance 
Division of the DNC, summed up the DNC's view by saying, ``as 
far as our goals are concerned, it would be a wasted trip if we 
could not finesse these new relationships into real money.'' 
\614\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \612\ Memo from Melinda Yee to Brian Foucart, Nov. 15, 1991, DNC 
0828876 (exhibit 33).
    \613\ Memo from Melinda Yee to RHB [Ronald H. Brown], Oct. 22, 
1991, DNC 0828865 (exhibit 20).
    \614\ Memo from Linda Rotunno to Cheri Carter, Oct. 25, 1991 
(exhibit 34).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The DNC recruited two fundraisers whose later tactics would 
haunt the DNC, John Huang and Maria Hsia, to bring in the money 
from Asia.\615\ Maria Hsia's job was to identify contributors 
who were going to give the money to the DNC while they were in 
Taiwan.\616\ John Huang agreed to host a high dollar event for 
the DNC where $50,000 would be collected from wealthy Asian 
bankers in Hong Kong who were either United States permanent 
residents or with United States corporate ties and even more 
money would be received when they returned to the United 
States.\617\ According to Huang's resume, however, his only 
contacts with wealthy Asian bankers were the Salim Group and 
the Riady family, both of which were ineligible to contribute 
to the DNC.\618\ The DNC noted Huang's commitment with dollar 
sign notations next to a lunch and dinner sponsored by the 
Lippo Group in Hong Kong.\619\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \615\ It should be noted that the DNC was very familiar with Huang, 
Hsia, and James Riady by this point because of their high-profile as 
fundraisers in California for the DSCC.
    \616\ Id.
    \617\ Id.; memo from Melinda Yee to RHB [Ronald H. Brown], Oct. 15, 
1991 (exhibit 19).
    \618\ The Riady family also paid all of the DNC's hotel, meal, and 
transportation expenses in Hong Kong.
    \619\ Schedule for Asia/Hawaii, DNC 0828853-58 (exhibit 21).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The DNC and its officials have not been forthcoming about 
what happened on the 1991 Asia trip. Although the DNC was able 
to produce many documents on planning the trip, it could not 
produce a single document detailing what actually occurred in 
Asia. The DNC officials involved in the trip refused to 
cooperate. Maria Hsia and Melinda Yee exercised their fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination and have refused 
to cooperate with the committee. Alexis Herman, who documents 
show was very involved in the trip, cannot even recall it 
happening.\620\ Linda Rotunno does not recall writing the 
memorandum which stated that the trip would be a waste unless 
the DNC got contributions from it.\621\ John Huang disavowed 
any involvement in the DNC's expectation that he would solicit 
contributions in Hong Kong. Huang testified before the 
committee that despite all of the DNC documents showing that he 
committed to raising money in Hong Kong, he did not ask for any 
money or contributions from anyone. Huang did admit that 
Melinda Yee proposed that Huang would raise $50,000 in Hong 
Kong, but Huang denied he did so.\622\ Huang claimed that he 
told the DNC that he could gather businessmen to greet Chairman 
Brown in Hong Kong, but Huang denied that the dollar signs next 
to the Lippo Group lunch and dinner signified a fundraising 
event.\623\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \620\ Interrogatories to Secretary Alexis Herman, May 7, 1998.
    \621\ Deposition of Linda Rotunno, Mar. 19, 1998, at 70.
    \622\ ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady Family in Political 
Fundraising,'' hearings before Committee on Government Reform, 106th 
Cong., 194 (Dec. 17, 1999) (preliminary transcript).
    \623\ Id. at 194-197.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 1991 DNC trip to Asia was the first chapter in the 
DNC's long and sordid relationship with foreign money. By 
investigating this trip, the Justice Department could have 
learned more about the relationship between Huang, Maria Hsia, 
and the DNC. However, it apparently failed to ask Huang any 
questions about this matter. This failure cannot be explained.
            c. The Justice Department Did Not Investigate Huang's 
                    Demands for Political Jobs in Exchange for 
                    Contributions
    The Justice Department did not question Huang about his 
role in a September 27, 1993, fundraiser in Los Angeles with 
Vice President Gore. By 1993, Huang had established himself as 
one of the dominant players in the California Asian American 
fundraising community. The DNC, cognizant of Huang's 
importance, arranged to meet with Huang, who was described as 
the Chair of the local fundraising committee.\624\ DNC staff 
went to Huang's office at the Lippobank, and Huang agreed to 
raise $200,000 for the September fundraiser with Vice President 
Gore.\625\ During the meeting, several others on Huang's 
fundraising committee stated that they felt hesitant about 
committing to contribute without a guarantee that there would 
be political appointments of Asian Americans by the time of the 
fundraiser.\626\ For example, the DNC was told that March Fong 
Eu, who was later appointed Ambassador to Micronesia, was 
concerned that she had not yet been contacted about her 
appointment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \624\ Undated memorandum from Vida Benavides to Laura Hartigan 
(exhibit 35).
    \625\ Id.; interview of Darius Anderson, Committee on Government 
Reform, Jan. 21, 2000, at 1.
    \626\ Undated memorandum from Vida Benavides to Laura Hartigan 
(exhibit 35).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After the meeting, Huang contacted the DNC with a 
compromise offer and the reasons for his concessions in 
exchange for his cooperation with the fundraiser:

        John Huang's Proposal

        (1) downpayment commitment of $100,000.

           *         *         *         *         *

        (3) commit 300-400,000 dollars at a later event once 
        significant appointments are named and if the 
        administration are useful of APA's during the APEC 
        Conference in Seattle.

           *         *         *         *         *

        Reasons:

           *         *         *         *         *

        (3) Since John Huang himself is up for an appointment, 
        his early commitment of 200,000 would be perceived as a 
        buy-off.

        (4) These fundraisers would like to help in the future 
        by going back to their fundraising base but would look 
        foolish if they themselves commit to give without a 
        guarantee of a possible appointment. Their own 
        credibility will be questioned . . . regardless if 
        their [sic] ``activist'' or not. WE should not assume 
        that APA fundraisers lack political integrity.

        SOLUTIONS

        (1) Accept John Huang's proposal, on the condition that 
        the next fundraiser will raise $900,000 to a total of 
        $1 million dollars when Clinton comes to LA in December

           *         *         *         *         *

        These must happen:

        (1) appointments by December.\627\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \627\ Undated memorandum from Vida Benavides to Martha Phipps, et 
al., (exhibit 36).

One month after Huang laid out his proposal, the White House 
signaled their acceptance of his terms. March Fong Eu wrote 
Huang to inform him that she learned the White House was set to 
announce her ambassadorship to Micronesia.\628\ On the top of 
the letter, it says, ``copy to JTR,'' meaning James Tjahaja 
Riady. Huang admitted that this was the sign he was waiting for 
from the administration.\629\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \628\ Letter from March Fong Eu to John Huang, Sept. 23, 1993, HHH 
3164 (exhibit 37).
    \629\ ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady Family in Political 
Fundraising,'' hearings before the House Committee on Government 
Reform, 106th Cong., 208-209 (Dec. 17, 1999) (preliminary transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Huang kept his promise and funneled over $120,000 in 
illegal foreign and conduit contributions through Lippo 
employees and Lippo companies to the September 27, 1993, 
fundraiser after receiving March Fong Eu's letter. In December 
1993, Huang funneled another $156,000 to the DNC for a 
fundraiser with President Clinton in furtherance of Huang's 
promise for additional money.
    The Justice Department never asked Huang about his 
negotiations with the DNC for the September 27, 1993, 
fundraiser. In his testimony before the committee, Huang 
admitted that he offered to exchange contributions for 
political appointments with the DNC, although Huang denied that 
he said his commitment of $200,000 could be perceived as a 
payoff for his own appointment.\630\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \630\ Id. at 207-208 (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     E. The Justice Department Failed To Pursue the Kansas Conduit 
                          Contribution Scheme

        I believe there was a very orchestrated campaign from a 
        high level to move money from Washington to 
        Topeka.\631\--Henry Helgerson, D-Wichita.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \631\ Dave Seaton, ``Local Demos say they felt need to repay state 
party: Legality of transfers questioned,'' Winfield Daily Courier, Oct. 
9, 1997 at 39 (exhibit 38).

    One of the more interesting episodes in the 1996 election 
cycle involved an apparently illegal conduit contribution 
scheme by the Democratic National Committee to funnel more than 
a third of a million dollars to the Kansas Democratic 
party.\632\ The motivating factor for this scheme appears to 
have been a Kansas statute that limited the amount of out-of-
state non-Federal (soft) money that could legally be 
contributed to Kansas political parties.\633\ In order for the 
national party to contribute large amounts of soft money to 
influence the two Senate and four House races in 1996, the 
Kansas statute had to be circumvented. This resulted in a 
particularly clever--but relatively transparent--effort to 
funnel money to the State Democratic party through a number of 
State political parties, Kansas County parties, and individual 
Kansas legislators. According to then-DNC General Counsel 
Joseph Sandler, ``[p]robably people from the White House would 
have been involved[.]'' \634\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \632\ The chart at the end of this section provides a one-page 
overview of the DNC's conduit contribution scheme.
    \633\ Kan Stat. Ann. Sec. 25-4153 (1999).
    \634\ Transcript of deposition of Joseph E. Sandler, former general 
counsel, Democratic National Committee, by Committee on Government 
Reform at 150 (May 14, 1998) (deposition on file with committee). 
Sandler also indicates that ``Harold Ickes, Doug Sosnik, Karen Hancox 
would have reviewed the budget.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although these apparent violations of law \635\ by the DNC 
were reported in the media, and although the committee brought 
these violations to the attention of the Department of Justice, 
the Attorney General made no effort to look into the 
allegations. It is troubling that while Attorney General Reno's 
Justice Department conducted a 3 year investigation of 
contributions to Republicans in Kansas that originated with the 
Triad organization,\636\ she took no steps to look at the 
obvious pattern of conduit contributions that originated with 
the DNC and that ended up in Topeka. This uneven enforcement of 
the law provides further indication that Attorney General Reno 
should not have retained supervision of the investigation of 
her own political party. Her failure to conduct even a cursory 
investigation pursuant to laws currently on the books also 
provides support to political efforts to make campaign finance 
reform more of an issue than it might otherwise be.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \635\ Under Federal law, the treasurer of a political committee is 
required to file reports that disclose ``the total amount of all 
disbursements, and all disbursements [including] . . . transfers to 
affiliated committees and, where the reporting committee is a political 
party committee, transfers to other political party committees, 
regardless of whether they are affiliated[.]'' See 2 U.S.C. 
Sec. 434(b)(4)(C). National party committees are further required under 
11 CFR 104.9(e) to ``report in a memo Schedule B each transfer from 
their non-federal account(s) to the non-federal account(s) of a state 
or local party committee.'' In other words, non-Federal or ``soft'' 
money is clearly covered by the Federal regulations governing 
disclosure. Also, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 prohibits false reports to the 
Federal Election Commission.
    \636\ The committee was provided a list of Justice Department 
campaign finance cases. As of the date of the list, June 4, 1999, the 
Triad investigation was listed as ``ongoing,'' even though there 
appears to be no serious suggestion that the Triad organization did 
anything illegal with respect to Kansas political contributions. The 
Justice Department list contains no reference to the DNC scheme to 
funnel soft money to Kansas, and the witnesses interviewed by this 
committee had not been contacted by the Justice Department at the time 
of their interview. See listing of Task Force cases (June 4, 1999) 
(exhibit 14).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The decision by the Justice Department not to investigate 
the Kansas matter is particularly troubling because a line 
appears to have been drawn by the Attorney General and her 
staff: conduit schemes involving the likes of Charlie Trie, 
John Huang and Johnny Chung were to be investigated, but a 
conduit scheme involving the Democratic party was to be 
ignored. In many respects, one would think that a scheme to 
circumvent campaign financing laws by one of the two major 
political parties would be accorded at least as much--if not 
more--importance than efforts by individuals who might be 
acting at their own behest. The Justice Department's decision 
is even more curious because the individual who appeared to be 
the DNC's liaison in Kansas came to Washington immediately 
after the 1996 election and was given a job on the staff of 
Democratic Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle.\637\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \637\ The Justice Department appears to have provided great 
deference to Senator Daschle. Not only did they avoid investigating the 
Kansas matter when it was clear that a member of his staff would need 
to be questioned, they also avoided referring to the conduit 
contributions made to him in the Charlie Trie indictment. There 
appeared to be no rationale for the omission of these particular 
contributions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. The Elements of the Conduit Contribution Scheme

In a 2 month period prior to the 1996 election, the Kansas 
Democratic party or its affiliates received over a third of a 
million dollars in contributions that appear to have originated 
in Washington, DC, with the DNC or affiliated organizations. 
The contributions were derived from the following sources:

 A total of $254,950 was received during the months 
of September and October from 17 State political parties. Each 
State gave either $14,990 or $15,000, the limit permitted 
according to Kansas statute. Prior to making these 
contributions, many of these States had an influx of funds from 
the national Democratic party in Washington, DC.

 A total of $56,900 was contributed to the State 
Democratic party or its affiliates by Kansas County Democratic 
parties. On September 30, 1998, 17 county parties were sent 
$5,000 by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 
Washington, DC. Within a matter of days, 13 of these counties 
had passed along most of this money to the State party.

 Kansas State Senate and House candidates also 
received money from the Democratic National Committee or its 
affiliates in Washington, DC and passed much of the money on to 
the State party. During the first week of August, for example, 
State Senate candidate Donald Biggs received a check for $1,000 
from the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee in 
Washington, DC.\638\ Biggs later received a memorandum dated 
September 3, 1996, from the Office of the Senate Democratic 
Leader in Kansas, Jerry Karr. It stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \638\ Letter from the Honorable J. Robert Kerrey, chairman, 
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, to Donald Biggs, Kansas State 
Senate candidate (Aug. 1, 1996) (exhibit 39).

        The DSCC, in an effort to support state senate 
        candidates, the Democratic Party, and their own 
        candidates, will contribute $1,000 to each state Senate 
        campaign our office designates. You may keep $200 but 
        then must turn around and contribute $800 to the Senate 
        Victory Fund, P.O. Box 1811, Topeka, KS 66601.

           *         *         *         *         *

        This money will help you (the $200) and it will help 
        the Kansas Coordinated Campaign and all Democratic 
        candidates as well.\639\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \639\ Memorandum from Tressie Hurley to Donald Biggs, Kansas State 
Senate candidate (Sept. 3, 1996) (exhibit 40) (emphasis added).

   LAs this instruction indicates, there was a very clear and 
specific intent to use Kansas citizens as conduits to funnel 
money from Washington, DC to the State party.
            a. Contributions from the DSCC Using States as Conduits
    Why did States--particularly traditionally campaign cash-
poor States like Maine, New Hampshire, Idaho, Wyoming and South 
Dakota--make large political contributions to Kansas? Tino 
Monaldo, who in 1996 was a lawyer for the Kansas Democratic 
party, would have the public believe Kansas ``attracted these 
contributions from other DSPs [Democratic State Parties] 
because of the excellence of its coordinated campaign efforts, 
and the quality of its candidates.'' \640\ The more honest 
answer, however, was provided by then-DNC General Counsel: 
``I'm aware that the DSCC requested State parties to make--
other State parties to make political contributions to the 
Kansas Democratic Party.'' \641\ Thus it was not the 
effectiveness of the Kansas Democratic party that drew 
unsolicited contributions; rather, it was on order from 
Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \640\ Letter from Tino Monaldo to Carol Williams, executive 
director, Kansas Commission on Governmental Standards and Conduct (Nov. 
13, 1997) (exhibit 41).
    \641\ Transcript of deposition of Joseph E. Sandler, former general 
counsel, Democratic National Committee, by Committee on Government 
Reform at 152 (May 14, 1998) (deposition on file with committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following chart provides an overview of which States 
contributed to Kansas, when they received funds from 
Washington, and when the money was sent on to Kansas: \642\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \642\ Appendix 2 provides supporting documentation for the charts 
that follow.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         Amount sent by the
                                             Date State received money     DSCC to States
States responsible for sending $15,000 or   from DSCC and date received    near in time to          Entity
            $14,990 to Kansas                        by Kansas            the contribution
                                                                              to Kansas
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Idaho....................................  9/10/96  9/17/96...             $64,464  DSCC
Florida..................................  9/29/96  9/27/96...              40,000  DSCC
Nebraska.................................  10/8/96  9/30/96...              50,000  DSCC
Arkansas.................................  \643\  10/3/96.....
Maine....................................  10/2/96  10/4/96...              15,000  DSCC
Colorado.................................  \644\  10/4/96.....
Georgia..................................  \645\  10/7/96.....
Louisiana................................  \646\  10/16/96....
Alabama..................................  10/15/96  10/16/96.              15,000  DSCC
Wyoming..................................  10/15/96  10/18/96.              15,000  DSCC
South Carolina...........................  \647\  10/18/96....
California...............................  10/18/96  10/18/96.              35,000  DSCC
South Dakota.............................  \648\  10/18/96....
New Hampshire............................  10/17/96  10/21/96.              18,750  DSCC
Minnesota................................  10/23/96  10/25/96.              17,500  DSCC
Michigan.................................  10/29/96  10/25/96.              16,500  DSCC
Montana..................................  10/25/96  10/30/96.              25,000  DSCC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As seems fairly clear from the above chart, it would be 
very surprising indeed if the contributions to Kansas were not 
coordinated. It takes a significant suspension of credulity to 
conclude that 17 States suddenly took it upon themselves to 
make large contributions to Kansas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \643\ Arkansas reporting requirements are such that this 
information was not recorded.
    \644\ The committee was unable to obtain information for Colorado 
filings after June 28, 1996.
    \645\ The committee was unable to obtain information for Georgia 
filings after May 9, 1996.
    \646\ There were numerous large donations from the DNC during the 
relevant time period.
    \647\ Records show that South Carolina received only $1,140 from 
the DNC in 1996.
    \648\ South Dakota's records provided no dates for contributions 
received from the DNC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, there are other indications that these 
contributions were unusual. For example, the Maine Democratic 
party amended an earlier financial disclosure report required 
by Maine and communicated the following to the State Commission 
on Government Ethics: ``The committee mistakenly did not report 
a contribution to the Kansas Democratic party. The disbursement 
was made from an account that is normally inactive. In fact, 
this was the only disbursement from the account this year.'' 
\649\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \649\ Letter from Kevin J. Mattson, executive director, the Maine 
Democratic party, to Marilyn Canavan, Commission on Governmental Ethics 
(Nov. 4, 1996) (exhibit 42).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Contributions from the DCCC Using Kansas Counties as 
                    Conduits
    Seventeen county parties were sent $5,000 by the Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) on September 31, 1996. 
Within days, 13 of the recipients made substantial 
contributions to the Kansas Democratic party. Most of these 
contributions were for the same amount. This is remarkable, 
given that the average total annual receipt for the 13 counties 
was $19,816. The following chart provides an overview of which 
Kansas counties received contributions from Washington, and 
what they did with the money:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                       Total county receipts for
                                                                                          1996 & percentage of
                                                             Amount sent   Date sent    income derived from the
                          County *                             to State     to State              DCCC
                                                                party        party    --------------------------
                                                                                         Receipts     Percentage
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cowley.....................................................       $4,750      10/8/96     $6,001              83
Douglas....................................................       $4,500      10/7/96    $28,081              17
Ellis......................................................       $4,500      10/4/96    $18,387.27           27
Harvey.....................................................       $4,500     10/13/96     $7,463              70
Leavenworth................................................       $4,500      10/9/96     $7,322              68
Marshall...................................................       $4,750      10/9/96     $5,590              89
Miami......................................................       $4,500     10/17/96     $5,500              91
Osage......................................................       $4,750      10/7/96     $5,200.98           96
Reno.......................................................       $4,500      10/3/96    $18,435              27
Riley......................................................       $4,500      10/2/96    $10,216              49
Sedgwick...................................................       $4,250      10/4/96    $98,208               5
Shawnee....................................................       $4,500      10/3/96    $34,182              14
Wyandotte..................................................       $2,400     10/30/96    $13,031             38
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Thirteen county parties were sent $5,000 by the DCCC on September 31, 1996, and passed money on.

    It is interesting to note that at least one of the counties 
appears not to have even asked for money from Washington. When 
asked why the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 
contributed $5,000 to Sedgwick county, former chairman of the 
Sedgwick County Democratic Central Committee Jim Lawing 
answered: ``No we never solicited that gift . . . it never 
occurred to me or anybody else with the Sedgwick County 
Democratic Central Committee to go look for that source of 
funding at the national level.\650\ In fact, prior to the 1996 
election, records indicate that county parties provided almost 
no money to the State party. In 1992, $1,924.88 was passed 
along to the State party by all county parties combined. In 
1994, $1,200 was passed along. In 1996, $60,650 was passed from 
county parties to the State party.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \650\ Transcript of deposition of Jim Lawing, former chairman, 
Sedgwick County Democratic Central Committee by Committee on Government 
Reform at 22-23 (Feb. 18, 1998) (deposition on file with committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An invoice prepared by the Reno County Democratic Committee 
is illustrative of the close coordination between Washington 
and Kansas:

        9-30-96 (Monday)--DCCC sends Reno County $5,000 \651\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \651\ Reno County Democratic Central Committee's disclosure forms 
of disbursements (schedule C) (Aug. 10, 1996-Oct. 8, 1996) (exhibit 
43).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Date Unknown--$5,000 arrives

        10-3-96 (Thursday)--KCCC bills Reno County for $4,500 
        \652\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \652\ ``KCCC'' is the Kansas Coordinated Campaign Committee. See 
Invoice from Reno County Democratic Committee to KCCC (exhibit 44).

        10-3-96 (Thursday)--Reno sends check to Kansas Dem. 
        party for $4,500 \653\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \653\ Check from Reno County Democratic Central Committee to Kansas 
Democratic party (exhibit 45).

    Other Kansas Counties had so few financial transactions in 
1996 that the DCCC contribution provided most of the county's 
annual revenue. For example, Osage County received a $5,000 
check on September 30, 1996, and 7 days later sent $4,750 to 
the State party. Interestingly enough, Osage County revenue for 
the entire year--excluding the $5,000 from Washington--was 
$200.98. Miami County revenue for the entire year, excluding 
the $5,000 from Washington, was $500, and it passed $4,500 to 
the State party. But for the out-of-State benevolence, Marshall 
County revenue was only $590 for 1996, and Marshall County 
passed almost all of its windfall on to the State party. 
Although the DNC's then-General Counsel was aware that States 
were being asked to give money to Kansas, he was unaware of the 
arrangements with the counties. Indeed, in 1998 he testified 
``that comes as a surprise to me even today.'' \654\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \654\ Transcript of deposition of Joseph E. Sandler, former general 
counsel, Democratic National Committee, by Committee on Government 
Reform at 155 (May 14, 1998) (deposition on file with committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. Contributions from Washington Using Kansas Citizens as 
                    Conduits
    In addition to the Memorandum from Tressie Hurley to Don 
Biggs that explains ``[y]ou may keep $200 but then must turn 
around and contribute $800 to the Senate Victory Fund,'' the 
committee obtained a document titled, ``Contribution Plan from 
DSCC in Washington.'' It states: ``The DSCC, in an effort to 
support state senate candidates, the Democratic Party, and 
their own candidates, will contribute $500 to each state Senate 
campaign we designate. The campaign may keep $100 but then must 
turn around and contribute $400 to either the Kansas 
Coordinated Campaign or the Senate Victory Fund. . . . It will 
help the candidate ($100) but it will help the Kansas 
Coordinated Campaign and all Democratic candidates as well.'' 
\655\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \655\ Document entitled, ``Contribution Plan from DSCC in 
Washington--July 22, 1996'' (exhibit 46).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following chart details contributions received from 
Washington by State candidates and the amount they in turn 
forwarded to the State party:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Amount passed
                                                   Received           on        Date received and date disbursed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senate Candidate:
    Don Biggs.................................          $1,000            $800  8/5/96  9/5/96
    Glenn Braun...............................          $1,000            $800  8/1/96  8/6/96
    Micheline Burger..........................          $1,000            $800  8/5/96  8/29/96
    Bill Campsey..............................          $1,000            $500  8/1/96  8/5/96
    Dana Crietz...............................          $1,000            $800  8/8/96  8/8/96
    Larry Daniels.............................          $1,000            $800  8/1/96  8/9/96
    Diana Dierks..............................          $1,000            $800  8/6/96  8/6/96
    Christine Downey..........................          $1,000            $800  8/5/96  8/20/96
    Paul Feliciano............................          $1,000            $800  8/3/96  8/12/96
    Wade Garrett..............................          $1,000            $800  8/6/96  8/9/96
    Rip Gooch.................................          $1,000            $800  7/30/96  9/11/96
    Greta Goodwin.............................          $1,000            $800  8/6/96  8/9/96
    Richard Hazell............................          $1,000            $800  8/1/96  8/22/96
    Anthony Hensley...........................          $1,000            $800  8/20/96  9/24/96
    Gerald Karr...............................          $1,000            $800  8/6/96  8/13/96
    Janis Lee.................................          $1,000            $800  8/1/96  8/13/96
    Janice McIntyre...........................          $1,000            $800  8/30/96  8/5/96
    Marge Petty...............................          $1,000            $800  8/1/96  8/6/96
    Pat Huggins Pettey........................          $1,000            $800  8/5/96  8/7/96
    John Sears................................          $1,000            $800  8/1/96  9/1/96
    Chris Steineger...........................          $1,000            $800  8/12/96  8/12/96
    Arthur Tannahill..........................          $1,000            $800  8/1/96  8/5/96
    Doug Walker...............................          $1,000            $800  8/1/96  8/9/96
    Allan White...............................          $1,000            $800  8/1/96  9/8/96
    Sherman Jones (In his Schedule C                    $1,000            $800  8/5/96  8/5/96
     Expenditures and Disbursements, it is
     clear that Jones gave the money on the
     day he received it. He also sent the
     money to the Kansas Senate Victory Fund,
     care of the ``DSCC.'' The address is
     Topeka, but it is strange that DSCC is
     mentioned.).
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
      Total Senate............................         $25,000         $19,700
                                               =================================================================
House Candidate:
    Judy Showalter............................            $500            $400  8/7/96  8/9/96
    Joe Shriver...............................            $500            $250  8/6/96  10/16/96
    Troy Findley..............................            $500            $400  8/5/96  8/14/96
    Chris Gallaway............................            $500            $400  8/5/96  8/8/96
    Jim Garner................................            $500            $250  8/6/96  8/8/96
    Bob Grant.................................            $500            $400  8/5/96  8/13/96
    Jerry Henry...............................            $500            $250  8/1/96  8/9/96
    Tom Platis................................            $500            $250  8/5/96  8/20/96
    Harry Stephens............................            $500            $375  8/6/96  8/20/96
    Vince Wetta...............................            $500            $500  8/1/96  8/14/96
                                               -----------------------------------------------------------------
      Total House.............................          $5,000          $3,475
                                               =================================================================
      Total Senate and House..................         $30,000         $23,175
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One recipient of a check from Washington provided a rather 
odd answer to a relatively straightforward question. When 
asked: ``[i]s it fair to say that no one told you that your 
receipt of this money was conditioned on your sending part or 
all of it to the Kansas Democratic Party or an affiliate,'' 
State senate candidate Doug Walker replied: ``I'm not sure if 
the answer is yes or no.'' \656\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \656\ Transcript of deposition of Douglas Walker, former Kansas 
State Senator, by the Committee on Government Reform at 40 (Feb. 23, 
1998) (deposition on file with committee).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When State Representative Henry Helgerson was deposed by 
this committee, he indicated that his initial concern arose 
because ``I was asked to accept money and then pass it on.'' 
\657\ He testified: ``I was asked to receive the check and to 
give $400 prior to receiving the check. That occurred before I 
received it. And then I received the check shortly after 
that.'' \658\ When it was first suggested that he would receive 
money, and that he should pass it on after it arrived, 
Helgerson told the committee that he said to staff at the State 
legislature: ``I think that's illegal, because I helped write 
the campaign finance law a few years ago. And I said that it 
sounded to me like it violated state law.'' \659\ The concern 
over the legality of the contribution scheme was also expressed 
in a local Kansas newspaper:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \657\ Transcript of deposition of Henry Helgerson, member, Kansas 
State House, by the Committee on Government Reform at 22 (Feb. 19, 
1998) (deposition on file with committee).
    \658\ Id. at 54-55.
    \659\ Id. at 22-23.

        Brad Russell, an Olathe attorney who also ran for a 
        Kansas Senate seat in 1996, confirmed that he was asked 
        to pass part of a DNC donation along for use by the 
        state party. Russell said he was contacted by a staffer 
        in the Kansas Senate Minority Leader's Office, who 
        indicated he would be receiving a check from the 
        Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. Russell said 
        the staffer encouraged him to send 20 percent of the 
        donation along to the state party. ``It sounded to me 
        like that would be running afoul of the spirit, if not 
        the out and out letter of the law,'' Russell said.\660\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \660\ Phil LaCerte, ``Democrat party chair doubts any role in fund-
raising scheme,'' Johnson County Sun, Sept. 26, 1997, at 69 (exhibit 
47).

As Helgerson and Russell's statements make clear, there were 
contemporaneous concerns about the instructions to act as a 
conduit for money that originated in Washington and was 
intended to go to the State party. When all the contributions 
are considered together, it is clear that the DNC and its 
affiliates were attempting to avoid Federal disclosure 
requirements.

2. By Funneling Money to the State Party, the DNC in Washington Was 
        Able to Benefit Statewide Candidates and Get More for Each 
        Dollar than if it had Simply Contributed to Candidates

    Conduit contribution schemes are generally designed to 
circumvent disclosure requirements. The ultimate goals are 
usually to enable contributions in excess of those legally 
permitted, or to hide the true identity of the contributor. 
Often, these two goals coexist. In Kansas, State statute 
prohibited contributions of out-of-state soft money above 
certain levels. Therefore, a conduit scheme was necessary to 
allow any one donor to make sizable soft money contributions.
    The purpose of the Kansas conduit scheme appeared to be 
twofold: (1) when re-directed to the State party, the money 
could be used for statewide candidates; and (2) by effecting an 
economy of scale at the State level, more could be obtained for 
a lesser expenditure.
            a. The Money from Washington Benefited Statewide Candidates
    Unfortunately, most Kansas Democratic party officials would 
not cooperate with the committee's investigation. Therefore, it 
was difficult to obtain straight answers to questions about how 
money that originated in Washington was used. However, it 
appears that once the money was funneled to the State party, it 
was not used exclusively for the benefit of the original 
recipient. For example, the State disclosure of the Reno County 
Democratic Central Committee stated that it was contributing 
$4,500 to the State party for ``electoral targeting data, Voter 
data base and software survey research--Voter contact services 
GOTV.'' \661\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \661\ Reno County Democratic Central Committee's disclosure forms 
of receipts and disbursements (schedules A and C) (Aug. 10, 1996-Oct. 
8, 1996) (exhibit 48).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another statewide Democratic party official provided an 
additional rationale for why it was important for the money 
from Washington to be redirected to the State party. He 
suggested:

        As you are aware, the Kansas Democratic Party through 
        the KCCC is providing generic voter contact/GOTV 
        activities on behalf of Democratic candidates all the 
        way down the ticket. In addition we have provided field 
        organizers and a state wide voter file.\662\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \662\ Memorandum from Tom Beal, Democratic Coordination Campaign, 
to Doug Johnston (Sept. 24, 1996) (exhibit 49).

As this communication makes clear, if money sent to the county 
by the DNC in Washington was re-directed to the State party, 
the State party would be able to undertake initiatives that 
would be of benefit to candidates outside of the particular 
county that had initially received the money.
    It is interesting to follow the paper trail that 
accompanied some of the individual contributions. For example, 
on September 30, 1996, DCCC Chairman Martin Frost sent $5,000 
to Sedgwick County and said that he was pleased to support 
``your 1996 nonfederal general election activities in the state 
of Kansas.'' \663\ Two days after the check is dated, the 
County Chair thanked Representative Frost, remarking ``please 
let the members of the DCCC know how helpful the $5,000 
contribution will be in getting our base of support to the 
polls.'' \664\ Four days after the DCCC check was dated in 
Washington, the Sedgwick County Democratic Central Committee 
sent a check for $4,250 to the Kansas Coordinated 
Campaign.\665\ The person who signed the letter is the same 
person who recognized that the money would go further if spent 
by the State party, as opposed to the county party. The only 
possible conclusion that follows from this tortured series of 
exchanges is that the conduit scheme had been set up to achieve 
something that would not have been legal if the money had been 
initially sent to its ultimate destination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \663\ Letter from the Honorable Martin Frost, chairman, Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee, to treasurer, Sedgwick County 
Democratic Committee (Sept. 30, 1996) (exhibit 50).
    \664\ Letter from Jim Lawing, county chair, Sedgwick County 
Democratic Central Committee, to the Honorable Martin Frost, chairman, 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (Oct. 2, 1996) (exhibit 
51).
    \665\ Letter from Jim Lawing, county chair, Sedgwick County 
Democratic Central Committee, to Tom Beal, Democratic Coordination 
Campaign (Oct. 4, 1996) (exhibit 52).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. The Kansas State Party Could Obtain a Greater Level of 
                    Services for the Same Expenditure than if 
                    Individual Counties or Candidates Spent the Money 
                    that They Received from Washington
    One Kansas county official provided an insight into why 
there was benefit attached to taking the money sent by 
Washington to counties and individuals and funneling it to the 
State party. He suggested that the State party would be able to 
take care of responsibilities for mailing campaign-related 
information, and ``do so on the state's mailing permit which 
apparently allowed for a little cheaper rate than we would get 
here.'' \666\ State party executives refused to cooperate with 
the committee, and therefore did not answer questions about the 
precise benefits derived from bundling smaller sums of money 
for use in larger spending campaigns. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to infer that the very type on conduct referenced by 
Mr. Lawing is in fact the type of conduct that did take place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \666\ Transcript of deposition of Jim Lawing, former chairman, 
Sedgwick County Democratic Central Committee by Committee on Government 
Reform at 30 (Feb. 18, 1998) (deposition on file with committee). There 
was also a suggestion that the ``State Committee would do all of the 
necessary printing . . . at its own expense'' Id. This, too, would 
permit an economy of scale unavailable without the subterfuge of the 
conduit contribution scheme.

    Kansas State Democratic Party--Contributions Originating with the
    Democratic National Committee or its Affiliates in Washington, DC
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Local candidates
                                                         (29 candidates
                            County parties (Seventeen    for the Kansas
 State parties (Democratic   county parties were sent   Senate received
 parties in 17 states gave   $5,000 on 9/30/98 by the   $1,000 each. 41
 to the Kansas Democratic    DCCC. Thirteen sent the     candidates for
          Party.)            following amounts to the   the Kansas House
                                  State party.)          received $500
                                                             each.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Idaho: $15,000              Cowley: $4,750             Senate
Florida: $15,000            Douglas: $4,500            24 Senate
                                                        candidates sent
                                                        $800 on.
Nebraska: $14,990           Ellis: $4,500              1 Senate
                                                        candidate sent
                                                        $500 on.
Arkansas: $15,000           Harvey: $4,500
Maine: $15,000              Leavenworth: $4,500        House
Colorado: $14,990           Marshall: $4,750           10 House
                                                        candidates sent
                                                        a total of
                                                        $3,475 to the
                                                        State Dem.
                                                        Party.
Georgia: $15,000            Miami: $4,500
Louisiana: $15,000          Osage: $4,750
Alabama: $14,990            Reno: $4,500
Wyoming: $14,990            Riley: $4,500
South Carolina: $15,000     Sedgwick: $4,250
California: $14,990         Shawnee: $4,500
South Dakota: $15,000       Wyandotte: $2,400
New Hampshire: $15,000
Minnesota: $15,000
Michigan: $15,000
Montana: $15,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total: $254,950             Total: $56,900             Total: $23,175
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Total = $335,025           .................
------------------------------------------------------------------------

 F. The Justice Department Failed To Investigate Leaks Harmful to the 
                   Campaign Fundraising Investigation

    The Justice Department's frequent and harmful leaks about 
the campaign fundraising investigation provided another clear 
sign of the investigation's failure. These leaks, which were 
often made at strategic times, greatly harmed the Justice 
Department's investigation, and strongly suggested that certain 
officials in the Justice Department did not want the 
investigation to succeed. The Attorney General has failed to 
investigate the vast majority of these leaks, and they have 
continued unabated, up to the present time. These leaks provide 
a clear example of why the Attorney General should have 
appointed an independent counsel--to remove the investigation 
from the politically biased officials at the Justice 
Department.

1. Leaks Regarding DNC Issue Ads

    The day after Justice Department lawyers interviewed 
President Clinton regarding his role in crafting DNC ``issue 
ads'' promoting his Presidency, a senior official in the 
Justice Department leaked information relating to that 
interview. Judging from the quote provided to the Washington 
Post, that senior official clearly gave the reporter the 
impression that it was unlikely that the Attorney General would 
appoint an independent counsel:

        ``Because this involves political speech, which clearly 
        falls under the protection of the First Amendment, 
        there is a relatively high threshold for determining 
        what constitutes criminal behavior,'' said a senior 
        Justice Department official. ``There are not a lot of 
        mysteries surrounding how the DNC ads were produced and 
        financed, but whether anything crossed that threshold 
        is another matter.'' \667\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \667\ John F. Harris and Roberto Suro, ``Clinton: 1996 `Issue Ads' 
Passed Legal Test,'' the Washington Post, Nov. 10, 1998, at A6.

The willingness of Justice Department staff to discuss ongoing 
investigations with the press should be contrasted to the 
Attorney General's repeated refusals to answer questions from 
this body--which is Constitutionally charged with overseeing 
the Justice Department. These types of leaks demonstrate that 
the Justice Department relies on the ``open case'' 
justification to keep damaging information from Congress, but 
casts that rationale aside when it wants to spread information 
favorable to the administration in the press.

2. Leaks Regarding the La Bella Memorandum

    In July 1998, shortly after Charles La Bella, the head of 
the Campaign Finance Task Force, gave the Attorney General his 
memorandum concluding that she was required by law to appoint 
an independent counsel, details of that memorandum were leaked 
to the press. Again, unnamed ``senior Justice Department 
officials'' released sensitive investigative materials to 
several newspapers:

        Government sources, even those speaking anonymously, 
        declined to provide specifics on La Bella's report, 
        which runs more than 100 pages. But one source who had 
        read the report said it represents ``a fresh approach 
        to everything he [La Bella] has seen'' and called for 
        legal conclusions and steps that had not been advanced 
        earlier.\668\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \668\ Ronald J. Ostrow, ``Report to Reno Urges Independent Counsel 
on Fund-Raising,'' Los Angeles Times, July 24, 1998, at A6.

        Officials familiar with Freeh's memo last winter and La 
        Bella's current report said that La Bella's includes a 
        much more extensive review of the evidence and makes a 
        firmer conclusion that there are sufficient indications 
        of wrongdoing by top officials to oblige Reno to seek 
        an outside prosecutor. As with the Freeh memo, the 
        basic argument is that top Democratic and White House 
        officials conducted a systematic and deliberate effort 
        to circumvent campaign finance laws setting limits on 
        fund-raising and defining what constitutes a legal 
        contribution.\669\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \669\ Roberto Suro and Michael Grunwald, ``Independent Probe of '96 
Funds Urged; Reno Noncommittal on Campaign Report,'' the Washington 
Post, July 24, 1998, at A21.

Another leak of the La Bella memorandum occurred in the pages 
of the Wall Street Journal. There, it was reported that the La 
Bella memorandum focused on potential wrongdoing by Harold 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ickes:

        Charles La Bella's findings, presented in a lengthy 
        memorandum to Ms. Reno, focus sharply on the fund-
        raising efforts of Harold Ickes, the former deputy 
        White House chief of staff. They form the basis of Mr. 
        La Bella's recommendation that Ms. Reno seek the 
        appointment of an independent counsel.\670\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \670\ Brian Duffy, ``Campaign Probe Looked at Ickes, Says La 
Bella,'' the Wall Street Journal, Aug. 3, 1998.

    While the Attorney General apparently tolerated public 
release of details from the La Bella memorandum by her senior 
staff, for almost 2 years she refused to provide the same 
memorandum to Members of Congress charged with oversight of the 
Justice Department.

3. Leaks Regarding the Gore Independent Counsel Decision

    The Attorney General was also steadfast in refusing to 
comment on her decisionmaking process in concluding that an 
independent counsel was not necessary to investigate the 
fundraising scandal. However, her aides did not show similar 
reticence. Before the Attorney General reached a decision on 
appointing an independent counsel to investigate Vice President 
Gore's fundraising telephone calls, her aides were discussing 
her decisionmaking process with reporters, saying ``they 
believe the Attorney General will reject accusations that there 
is specific and credible evidence of criminal wrongdoing[.]'' 
\671\ These types of leaks again show that Department officials 
did not hesitate to spread information favorable to the 
administration in the press.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \671\ Jerry Seper, ``No Outside Counsel Likely in Probe of Gore 
Campaign Calls,'' the Washington Times, Nov. 24, 1998, at A3. See also 
David Johnston, ``Reno's Aides Split on Merits of Need for Gore 
Prosecutor,'' the New York Times, Nov. 24, 1998, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Leaks Regarding the Huang Investigation

    Justice Department staff also leaked information regarding 
the investigation of former DNC Finance vice-chair and 
Presidential appointee John Huang. On October 2, 1998, the 
Washington Post reported that the Justice Department was no 
longer seeking to prosecute John Huang:

        Now, instead of pressuring Huang to say what he knows 
        about White House officials in exchange for immunity 
        from prosecution, federal prosecutors are bargaining to 
        get his testimony against Maria Hsia, a California 
        fundraiser already under indictment who played a minor 
        though controversial role in 1996, according to lawyers 
        close to the case.

           *         *         *         *         *

        And a senior Justice Department official said that some 
        investigators have concluded that Huang does not have 
        information that would support the prosecution of the 
        Democratic officials who received and spent the funds 
        he raised or the White House officials who promoted his 
        career in Washington.

        As a result, attention has turned to the possibility 
        that Huang might be able to bolster the endangered case 
        against Hsia.\672\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \672\ Roberto Suro, ``Prosecutors' Approach to Huang Signals Shift 
in Campaign Probe,'' the Washington Post, Oct. 2, 1998, at A17.

    This leak must be contrasted with the Attorney General's 
refusal to produce subpoenaed documents to this committee 
because she feared that the members of the committee would 
publicly disclose a ``roadmap'' to the investigation. Justice 
Department staff, however, felt free to disclose the 
Department's investigative roadmap regarding John Huang.

5. Leaks Regarding Johnny Chung

    One of the most disturbing leaks to come from the Justice 
Department concerned the testimony of DNC fundraiser Johnny 
Chung. After Mr. Chung pled guilty to criminal charges and 
began cooperating with the Justice Department, details of his 
testimony were on the pages of the New York Times:

        A Democratic fund-raiser has told Federal investigators 
        he funneled tens of thousands of dollars from a Chinese 
        military officer to the Democrats during President 
        Clinton's 1996 re-election campaign, according to 
        lawyers and officials with knowledge of the Justice 
        Department's campaign finance inquiry.

        The fund-raiser, Johnny Chung, told investigators that 
        a large part of the nearly $100,000 he gave to 
        Democratic causes in the summer of 1996--including 
        $80,000 to the Democratic National Committee--came from 
        China's People's Liberation Army through a Chinese 
        lieutenant colonel and aerospace executive whose father 
        was Gen. Liu Huaqing, the official and lawyers said.

           *         *         *         *         *

        A lawyer for Mr. Chung, Brian A. Sun, declined to 
        comment on his client's conversations with 
        investigators, citing his client's sealed plea 
        agreement with the Justice Department. ``I'm shocked 
        that sources at the Justice Department would attribute 
        anything like that to my client.'' \673\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \673\ Jeff Gerth, ``Democrat Fund-Raiser Said to Detail China 
Tie,'' the New York Times, May 15, 1998, at A1.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similar leaks appeared in the Washington Post:

        Democratic fund-raiser Johnny Chung has told Justice 
        Department investigators that a Chinese military 
        officer who is an executive with a state-owned 
        aerospace company gave him $300,000 to donate to the 
        Democrats' 1996 campaign, according to federal 
        officials[.] \674\ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \674\ Roberto Suro and Bob Woodward, ``Chung Ties China Money to 
DNC,'' the Washington Post, May 16, 1998, at A1.

    These leaks proved extraordinarily harmful to Johnny Chung. 
First, they were used by certain members of the Committee on 
Government Reform to attack Chung, and undermine his 
credibility at the very time that he was offering evidence 
tying senior Chinese officials to efforts to influence United 
States elections.
    Second, and more importantly, these leaks led to threats to 
Chung's life. In May 1998, when these articles appeared, Chung 
was cooperating with the Justice Department investigation, and 
had recently been contacted by Robert Luu. Luu claimed to be an 
associate of Liu Chao-Ying, and suggested to Chung that if he 
refused to cooperate with the Justice Department, he and Liu 
would compensate Chung. Luu also subtly suggested that if Chung 
did cooperate with the Justice Department, Chung and his family 
could be in danger. Chung cooperated with the FBI in an effort 
to get a tape of Luu offering money in exchange for Chung's 
silence. The investigation was at its most delicate phase at 
the time the leaks appeared in the New York Times. Chung 
described the events that followed in his testimony before the 
committee:

        In the first week of May, I learned that the New York 
        Times was doing a story that involved Liu Chao Ying and 
        the $300,000. The FBI and I were very concerned that 
        the news story would scare Mr. Luu off. My attorney and 
        I tried to get the New York Times to kill the story. 
        They refused. On the day before the story came out (May 
        15, 1998), I ended up going forward with a meeting with 
        Luu and his attorney. I consulted with the FBI before I 
        proceeded.\675\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \675\ ``Johnny Chung: Foreign Connections, Foreign Contributions,'' 
hearing Before the House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. 
266 (May 11, 1999) (statement of Johnny Chung).

After the article appeared, though, Chung and the FBI were not 
able to get Luu on tape threatening Chung, and it appeared that 
Luu had grown more cautious, and tried to distance himself from 
his earlier statements to Chung. However, Chung made it clear 
that the leaks from the Justice Department posed a serious 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
threat to him:

        Mr. Barr. Do you consider that your life was in danger 
        in 1998 because of the leaked story that appeared in 
        the New York Times?

        Mr. Chung. That is correct, and I am still looking out 
        my back every day.

        Mr. Barr. Did you leak that information in any way, 
        shape or form to the New York Times?

        Mr. Chung. No. I don't leak that information to the New 
        York Times.

        Mr. Barr. And would it also be accurate that your 
        attorneys didn't leak that information to the New York 
        Times?

        Mr. Chung. We tried to stop them.

           *         *         *         *         *

        Mr. Barr. Well, we would like the Department of Justice 
        to find that out. It would be very interesting to find 
        out, one, if they are concerned about it, because this 
        is a very damaging leak that endangered a very 
        important witness, yourself; and it may very well have 
        come from the Department of Justice. So we would be 
        very interested in that, as I am sure you would be.

        Mr. Chung. Mr. Congressman, that night, I had to go to 
        a meeting with those people. My attorney told me, don't 
        go. Maybe you are in trouble, in danger. I talked to my 
        wife, I talked to my attorney again, and I talked to 
        the FBI. I want to go forward because I want the truth 
        to come out.\676\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \676\ Id. at 319-20.

    The seriousness of this leak was apparent to the Justice 
Department as soon as it happened. However, it appears that the 
Justice Department has not undertaken any steps to determine 
where this information came from. Committee staff interviewed 
staff of the Justice Department Office of Professional 
Responsibility, who confirmed that as of October 27, 1999, this 
leak had not come under investigation by the Department.\677\ 
While most of the leaks from the Justice Department simply send 
the message that the Department is politically biased and not 
interested in a thorough investigation, this leak sent an even 
more dangerous message. This leak showed that someone involved 
in the Chung investigation thought that press coverage in the 
New York Times was more important than Chung's well-being, or 
the success of a significant sting operation. It is deeply 
disturbing that the Justice Department has not investigated 
this leak.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \677\ In December 1998, and again in August 1999, the committee 
drew the attention of the Justice Department to many of the leaks 
discussed in this section of the report. Committee staff met with 
Justice Department staff on Oct. 27, 1999, to discuss the Justice 
Department leak investigations. In that meeting, the Justice Department 
confirmed that of all of the leaks brought to their attention, they had 
only investigated the leaks of the Freeh memo and the decisionmaking 
relating to John Huang. In addition, the Department disclosed a leak of 
information relating to Charlie Trie.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Leaks Regarding the December 15, 1995, White House Coffee Videotape

    In July 2000, the committee brought the December 15, 1995, 
White House coffee videotape to the attention of the Justice 
Department. The committee had subpoenaed the original White 
House videotape of the event, and with the superior audio 
quality of that tape, was able to confirm that on the tape Vice 
President Gore said ``we oughta, we oughta, we oughta show Mr. 
Riady the tapes, some of the ad tapes.'' In a letter dated July 
18, 2000, the chairman asked the Attorney General to 
investigate these statements by the Vice President. A CNN 
article the following day captured the response of the Justice 
Department: ``a Justice Department source said it was unclear 
what was on the tape because of poor audio.'' \678\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \678\ ``Justice Says White House Coffee Tape Unclear; Hearings 
Scheduled Tuesday'' (published July 19, 2000) /www.cnn.com/2000/
ALLPOLITICS/stories/07/19/burton.gore/index.html>.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This particular leak was troubling for two reasons. First, 
it constituted a comment on an ongoing investigation by a 
Justice Department staffer. When the committee called a number 
of Justice Department officials before the committee, and asked 
them questions about the tape, they refused to comment in any 
way. It is troubling that Justice Department staff would 
observe Departmental policy when called before Congress and 
presented with serious evidence, and then disregard that same 
policy when denigrating the evidence in the press. But even 
more telling, is that the leak makes the very point the 
committee was trying to impress upon the Justice Department. 
The committee possessed the original White House tape of the 
event, and only using that original tape could the Justice 
Department reach a justifiable conclusion about the contents of 
the tape.

7. Leaks Regarding the Vice President Gore Special Counsel Decision

    The most recent leak in the Justice Department's campaign 
fundraising investigation came in August 2000, when the 
Attorney General was considering whether to appoint a special 
counsel to investigate Vice President Gore. The day of the 
Attorney General's announcement, the New York Times reported 
that ``[o]ne Justice Department official said that Mr. Conrad 
was alone in his recommendation. `No other prosecutor in this 
matter thought that there should be a special counsel,' said 
the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.'' \679\ 
However, just hours later, the Attorney General came forward to 
state that the ``Justice Department official'' cited in the 
Times had been lying: ``today Bob Conrad has been tagged with 
being the only person in the Justice Department who thought 
that I should appoint a special counsel. Although I'm not going 
to get into who recommended what, I can tell you that that is 
not correct.'' \680\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \679\ Neil A. Lewis and Don Van Natta, Jr., ``Reno, Rejecting 
Aide's Recommendation, Declines to Name Counsel on Gore Fund-Raising,'' 
the New York Times, Aug. 23, 2000, at A19.
    \680\ News conference with Attorney General Janet Reno, Washington, 
DC, (Aug. 23, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The false leak regarding Robert Conrad's recommendation 
follows the pattern of Justice Department leaks. Information 
was spread by Justice Department staff, in contravention of 
Department policy, to minimize the seriousness of the 
investigation and to benefit the Clinton-Gore administration. 
The Attorney General did take the unusual step of making it 
clear that the leak was untrue. However, there is no sign that 
the Justice Department has taken any steps to find the source 
of this leak.
    The leaks from the Justice Department's campaign 
fundraising investigation are harmful on many levels. First, 
they harm the Department's investigation. The leak of 
information about Johnny Chung endangered the investigation and 
Chung's life. The leak of information about John Huang provided 
him a signal that he was not a serious target of the 
Department's investigation. Second, the leaks have been made to 
minimize the investigation and support the Clinton 
administration. Recommendations for independent and special 
counsels have been trivialized, as has evidence of potential 
wrongdoing. Finally, these leaks have proven that the Justice 
Department cannot be trusted to carry out the campaign 
fundraising investigation. By keeping the investigation in the 
Department, where political appointees have had tight control 
over the investigation, the Attorney General has created an 
atmosphere where Department officials have the opportunity to 
undermine the case. By failing to investigate and punish the 
individuals responsible for the leaks, the Attorney General has 
sent the message that these kinds of leaks are permissible.

III. The Justice Department's Political Interference with Congressional 
                               Oversight

A. Failure To Comply With the Committee's Subpoena for the Freeh and La 
                            Bella Memoranda

    For 2\1/2\ years, the committee struggled to obtain copies 
of the Freeh and La Bella memoranda from the Justice 
Department. During that period of time, the committee issued 
four different subpoenas for the memos, in addition to a number 
of additional formal requests for the documents. Throughout the 
process, the Justice Department raised countless objections to 
complying with the committee's demands. The Justice 
Department's recalcitrance culminated in the committee's August 
6, 1998, vote to hold the Attorney General in contempt of 
Congress. In May 2000, the Justice Department finally relented, 
and provided copies of the Freeh and La Bella memos, and a 
number of other memoranda relating to the Attorney General's 
independent counsel decisionmaking process, to the committee. 
The committee released those documents to the public a short 
time later, on June 6, 2000.
    When the committee subpoenaed the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda, the Justice Department raised a number of different 
objections to complying with the subpoenas. First, the 
Department claimed that the committee's demand would harm the 
campaign fundraising investigation. Then it claimed that the 
committee's action would harm the effective functioning of the 
Justice Department. Finally, it claimed that there was no legal 
precedent for the committee's action. However, when the Justice 
Department finally turned the documents over to the committee, 
it was clear that the Justice Department's objections had been 
utterly false and baseless. Indeed, the fact that the Campaign 
Financing Task Force supervisor Robert Conrad later wrote a 
memorandum suggesting a special counsel to investigate whether 
the Vice President committed perjury, lays to rest the argument 
that honestly held opinion is ``chilled'' by congressional 
oversight.\681\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \681\ The Attorney General, in her opposition to disclosure of the 
Freeh and La Bella memoranda, fails to understand that the only 
recommendations chilled by oversight are dishonest or malicious 
recommendations. A review of honestly held opinions will never prevent 
anyone from acting in good faith in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The contents of the Freeh and La Bella memoranda were 
highly informative, and pointed out a number of shortcomings in 
the Task Force's investigation. However, almost as revealing as 
the memoranda was the way that the Justice Department handled 
the committee's demands for the memoranda. When the Justice 
Department was faced with a situation that was embarrassing and 
that pointed out the Attorney General's abysmal handling of the 
campaign fundraising investigation, it turned to mistruths, 
obfuscation, and outright obstruction of the committee's 
demands.

1. Why the Committee Needed the Freeh and La Bella Memoranda

    In December 1997, the committee learned from press reports 
that the Director of the FBI had drafted a memorandum to the 
Attorney General recommending the appointment of an independent 
counsel to investigate potential violations of law relating to 
the 1996 Democratic election campaign.\682\ Similarly, in July 
1998, the committee learned from press reports that Charles La 
Bella, the Supervising Attorney of the Justice Department 
Campaign Financing Task Force, had recommended that the 
Attorney General appoint an independent counsel to lead the 
investigation.\683\ In both cases, it appeared that the 
investigators with the greatest knowledge of the campaign 
fundraising scandal had decided that the Justice Department 
could not conduct the investigation without a conflict of 
interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \682\ See, e.g., David Johnston, ``F.B.I.'s Chief Tries to 
Influence Reno, Memo Argues for Appointment of Independent 
Prosecutor,'' N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1997, at A1.
    \683\ See, e.g., David Johnston, ``Report to Reno urges a Counsel 
Over Donations,'' N.Y. Times, July 23, 1998, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The failure of the Attorney General to follow the advice of 
her advisors to appoint an independent counsel was a strange 
departure for the Attorney General. Indeed, she had appointed 
independent counsels for a number of cabinet officials, and had 
strongly supported the reauthorization of the Independent 
Counsel Act in 1994. At a hearing in 1994, the Attorney General 
stated:

        The Independent Counsel Act was designed to avoid even 
        the appearance of impropriety in the consideration of 
        allegations of misconduct by high-level Executive 
        Branch officials and to prevent, as I have said, the 
        actual or perceived conflicts of interest. The Act thus 
        served as a vehicle to further the public's perception 
        of fairness and thoroughness in such matters, and to 
        avert even the most subtle influences that may appear 
        in an investigation of highly placed Executive 
        officials.\684\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \684\ ``S. 24, the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 
1993,'' hearing before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
103d Cong., 12 (1993).

As the Attorney General correctly observed in 1994, the proper 
application of the Independent Counsel Act was crucial in 
assuring American citizens that allegations of wrongdoing by 
senior government officials were being investigated thoroughly 
and free of political bias. Yet, when the time came that the 
Attorney General was faced with allegations of criminal 
wrongdoing by the President, Vice President, and senior 
officials of her political party that went to the heart of the 
Nation's political process, she steadfastly refused to appoint 
an independent investigator.
    Fueling the committee's concern that the Justice Department 
simply was not able to investigate the President, Vice 
President, and senior DNC officials were the Justice 
Department's numerous fumbles and failures in the investigation 
by that point. By December 1997, the time that word of Director 
Freeh's memorandum first leaked to the press, the Justice 
Department had already began to lose control of its 
investigation:

         The first lead prosecutor in charge of the 
        investigation, Laura Ingersoll, had to be removed by 
        Attorney General Reno, and replaced with Charles La 
        Bella.

         The White House delayed the production of a 
        number of records to the Justice Department, including 
        crucial videotapes of Presidential fundraising events. 
        In addition, the White House often preceded document 
        productions with Friday night ``document dumps'' to the 
        media.

         Specific and credible allegations of 
        criminal wrongdoing had already been made against 
        senior DNC and administration officials, and yet, no 
        independent counsel had been appointed, and few 
        indictments had been brought.

    In addition, a number of other problems had developed 
inside the investigation, and had not yet become known to the 
outside world. For example, at the beginning of the 
investigation, Lee Radek, who was then in charge of the 
investigation, told William Esposito, a senior FBI official, 
that he felt ``that there was a lot of pressure on him, and the 
Attorney General's job could hang in the balance based on the 
decision that he would make.'' \685\ Several months later, FBI 
agents discovered Charlie Trie's employees destroying documents 
responsive to congressional and Justice Department subpoenas. 
They asked for a search warrant to stop the destruction, and to 
determine what documents Trie had in his possession that he had 
not yet turned over. Laura Ingersoll, the head of the Task 
Force, refused to let the Task Force agents get the search 
warrant, claiming that they did not have adequate probable 
cause. Also, by December 1997, despite the fact that the 
fundraising investigation had been underway for over a year, 
the Justice Department had failed to subpoena critical 
documents from the White House, including documents relating to 
Maria Hsia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \685\ ``The Justice Department's Implementation of the Independent 
Counsel Act,'' hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 
106th Cong., 39 (2000) (preliminary transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By the time that word of Charles La Bella's recommendation 
leaked in July 1998, the committee's skepticism of the Justice 
Department investigation had grown. Despite 19 months of 
investigation, the Justice Department still had not taken any 
significant action against the foreign kingpins of the 
fundraising scandal, like James Riady or Ng Lap Seng. 
Similarly, the Task Force had failed to take any action against 
officials in the administration and DNC who had made the 
scandal possible, like Harold Ickes, Richard Sullivan, or David 
Mercer. Rather, the Task Force had brought charges only against 
the low-level fundraisers who had solicited much of the illegal 
money, like Charlie Trie, John Huang, and Maria Hsia.
    Accordingly, when the committee demanded the Freeh and La 
Bella memoranda, it was attempting to discover the reasons why 
the Attorney General was failing to trigger the Independent 
Counsel Act, and whether the inherent conflict of the Attorney 
General's investigation of the President, Vice President, and 
her own political party, had adversely impacted even-handed 
enforcement of the law. In each case, it appeared to the 
committee that there was significant cause to trigger the Act, 
and that the Attorney General had not explained her failure to 
do so. Moreover, it appeared at the time that the failure of 
the Attorney General to trigger the Act was causing 
significant, irreversible harm to the investigation.

2. The Committee's December 1997 Subpoena for the Freeh Memorandum

    On December 2, 1997, press reports emerged indicating that 
FBI Director Louis Freeh had drafted a memorandum to the 
Attorney General asking her to appoint an independent counsel 
to conduct the campaign fundraising investigation.\686\ The 
reports indicated that Director Freeh believed that the Justice 
Department had a political conflict of interest which 
prohibited it from conducting an investigation of the Clinton 
administration.\687\ That same day, the committee scheduled a 
hearing into the matter, and sent Director Freeh a letter 
requesting him to produce his memorandum to the committee by 
December 4, 1997.\688\ On December 4, 1997, Attorney General 
Reno wrote to the chairman, explaining why she would not comply 
with the chairman's request. In her letter, the Attorney 
General identified two reasons for her refusal to comply with 
the chairman's request: first, that longstanding Justice 
Department policy prohibited the Department from sharing with 
Congress deliberative material relating to open criminal cases; 
and second, that to provide this kind of deliberative material 
to Congress would chill Justice Department personnel from 
providing their frank advice to the Attorney General in future 
investigations.\689\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \686\ David Johnston, ``F.B.I.'s Chief Tries to Influence Reno, 
Memo Argues for Appointment of Independent Prosecutor,'' N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 2, 1997, at A1.
    \687\ Id.
    \688\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, to Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (Dec. 2, 1997) (all committee correspondence with and 
subpoenas to the Justice Department are printed in the appendix 
accompanying this report).
    \689\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Dan Burton, 
chairman, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 1-2 (Dec. 4, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As the Attorney General refused to produce the memorandum 
voluntarily, on December 5, 1997, Chairman Burton issued a 
subpoena to the Justice Department, requiring the production of 
the Freeh memorandum.\690\ In a letter accompanying the 
subpoena, Chairman Burton pointed out that it was critical to 
the committee's oversight responsibility to review the Freeh 
memorandum.\691\ He also pointed out that the committee's 
demand was consistent with a number of subpoenas and requests 
issued by congressional committees over the past decade.\692\ 
In those cases, the Justice Department complied with 
congressional requests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \690\ Subpoena duces tecum issued by the Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight (Dec. 5, 1997).
    \691\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, to Janet Reno, Attorney General 1 (Dec. 5, 1997).
    \692\ Id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 8, 1997, Attorney General Reno and Director 
Freeh responded to the subpoena, again refusing to comply. The 
Attorney General and Director Freeh reiterated the two reasons 
that Ms. Reno gave for refusing to comply in her December 4, 
1997, letter.\693\ In addition, they enunciated several new 
reasons for refusing to comply: first, that public and judicial 
confidence in the Department's investigation would be 
undermined by congressional intrusion into the investigative 
process; second, that disclosure of the memorandum would 
provide a ``road map'' of the Department's investigation; and 
third, that the reputations of individuals mentioned in the 
memorandum could be damaged by the disclosure of the 
memorandum.\694\ In addition, Attorney General Reno and 
Director Freeh claimed that the precedents for the committee's 
action, which had been cited in the chairman's letter of 
December 5, 1997, were inapplicable to this case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \693\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, and Louis Freeh, 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Dan Burton, chairman, 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (Dec. 8, 1997).
    \694\ Id. at 1-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee accepted at face value a number of the 
arguments that had been forwarded by the Justice Department. 
The committee hoped that the Attorney General was operating in 
good faith when she made these points, and that she was not 
using these arguments simply as pretext to avoid compliance 
with the committee's subpoena. Accordingly, the committee 
sought to reach an accommodation with the Justice Department to 
avoid enforcement of the committee's subpoena. Such an 
accommodation was reached in December 1997, when the Department 
agreed to allow Chairman Burton, Congressman Waxman, and three 
committee staff to review a heavily-redacted copy of the Freeh 
memorandum. The small portion of the memo that the chairman was 
allowed to review confirmed the committee's view that the law 
required the Attorney General to appoint an independent counsel 
to investigate the campaign fundraising scandal.

3. The Committee's July 1998 Subpoena for the La Bella Memorandum

    On July 23, 1998, a number of newspapers reported that the 
supervising attorney of the Campaign Financing Task Force, 
Charles La Bella, had drafted a report to the Attorney General 
recommending that she appoint an independent counsel to take 
over the investigation.\695\ According to these press reports, 
like Director Freeh, Mr. La Bella had concluded that the law 
required the appointment of an independent counsel, both 
because of the high-level administration officials who were 
being investigated, as well as the conflict of interest that 
the Attorney General had in conducting the investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \695\ David Johnston, ``Report to Reno urges a Counsel Over 
Donations,'' N.Y. Times, July 23, 1998, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    That same day, July 23, 1998, Chairman Burton sent a formal 
request to the Attorney General, asking her to produce to the 
committee both the Freeh and La Bella memoranda.\696\ The 
following day, committee staff were informed by telephone that 
the Justice Department would not comply with the chairman's 
request. Accordingly, on July 24, 1998, the chairman issued a 
subpoena to the Justice Department, requiring the production of 
the Freeh and La Bella memoranda.\697\ On July 28, 1998, 
Attorney General Reno and Director Freeh wrote to the chairman, 
informing him that they would not comply with the committee's 
subpoena.\698\ In the letter, the Attorney General and the 
Director repeated many of the arguments made when they refused 
to comply with the committee's subpoena for the Freeh 
memorandum in December 1997. The Attorney General and Director 
laid out five arguments against compliance with the committee's 
subpoena: (1) that longstanding Justice Department policy 
prohibited the Department from sharing open law enforcement 
files with Congress; (2) that disclosure of the memoranda could 
provide a ``road map'' of the Department's investigation; (3) 
the reputations of individuals mentioned in the memoranda could 
be harmed by public disclosure of the documents; (4) that 
disclosure of the memoranda would create the perception that 
Congress was putting political pressure on the Justice 
Department, and consequently, would undermine public confidence 
in the results of the investigation; and (5) the memoranda 
reflected the personal view of their authors, and the public 
disclosure of the memoranda could create a ``chilling effect'' 
on candid advice in the future.\699\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \696\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, to Janet Reno, Attorney General 1 (July 23, 
1998).
    \697\ Subpoena duces tecum issued by the Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight (July 24, 1998).
    \698\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, and Louis Freeh, 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Dan Burton, chairman, 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 1 (July 28, 1998).
    \699\ Id. at 1-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The chairman responded on August 3, 1998, to inform the 
Attorney General that he would not accept her explanation, and 
would move to enforce the committee's subpoena.\700\ In this 
letter, and throughout his correspondence with the Justice 
Department on this matter, the chairman explained why the 
objections raised by the Department had no merit:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \700\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (Aug. 3, 1998).

         First, the ``longstanding policy'' of 
        refusing to share open law enforcement files with 
        Congress, referred to by Attorney General Reno, was 
        never intended to be used as a way of refusing to 
        comply with a congressional subpoena. Rather, the only 
        valid basis for refusing to comply with the committee's 
        subpoena would be to cite executive privilege, or some 
        other constitutional privilege. The committee provided 
        the Attorney General with a number of precedents for 
        the committee's action, where Congress obtained records 
        relating to open Justice Department cases.\701\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \701\ Id. at 3-4.

         Second, the Attorney General's claim that 
        the memoranda provided a ``road map'' that would harm 
        the Task Force's investigation was misleading. Much of 
        the content of the memoranda had already been leaked to 
        the press. In addition, the facts discussed in the 
        memoranda were all publicly known through the 
        investigations conducted by the Government Reform 
        Committee and the Senate Committee on Governmental 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Affairs.

         Third, the complaint that the reputations of 
        innocent persons could be harmed by disclosure of the 
        memoranda was similarly hollow. The vast majority of 
        individuals discussed in the memoranda were individuals 
        who had been discussed extensively in the public 
        record, been deposed, or testified at public hearings.

         Fourth, the Attorney General's complaint 
        that the disclosure of the memoranda would create the 
        impression that Congress was placing political pressure 
        on the Justice Department to prosecute certain matters 
        was completely untenable. In the summer of 1998, there 
        was already a widespread perception that the Attorney 
        General was refusing to investigate certain matters 
        because of her political bias. This committee was 
        simply calling on the Attorney General to appoint an 
        independent counsel, not to indict certain individuals. 
        It is a testament to the doublespeak of this Attorney 
        General that she can claim to be acting in an 
        apolitical and principled fashion by conducting an 
        investigation of her boss and political party, and that 
        it would be ``politically motivated'' if she turned the 
        investigation over to an independent counsel.

         Finally, the Attorney General's claims that 
        the release of the memoranda would create a chilling 
        effect was similarly baseless. As previously noted, 
        many of the memoranda's conclusions had already been 
        shared with the press by Justice Department personnel.

    Despite the overwhelming weight of the committee's 
arguments, the Attorney General refused to comply with the 
committee's subpoena. Accordingly, the chairman scheduled a 
vote on a report citing the Attorney General for contempt of 
Congress. The members of the committee were subjected to an 
intensive lobbying campaign by the Justice Department to vote 
against the report. Two members of the committee were even 
invited by President Clinton to attend a ceremony at the White 
House at the time that the report was scheduled for a vote. 
Despite the lobbying campaign, the committee's Republican 
members voted unanimously in favor of the report. On August 6, 
1998, the Attorney General was cited for contempt of 
Congress.\702\ However, the contempt report was not taken up on 
the House floor prior to the end of the 105th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \702\ See H. Rept. No. 105-728 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. The Committee's October 1999 Request to Review the Freeh and La 
        Bella Memoranda

    Despite the committee's contempt vote, the Justice 
Department still made no effort to accommodate the committee's 
interests. Committee staff were allowed only several 
opportunities to review heavily-redacted copies of the lengthy 
memoranda. In the summer of 1999, a new ruling from the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit narrowed an 
earlier interpretation of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.\703\ This new ruling cleared the way for 
the Justice Department to share a great deal of information 
with the committee that was previously thought to be covered by 
Federal grand jury secrecy rules. Accordingly, on September 17, 
1999, committee staff asked Justice Department staff to make 
the Freeh and La Bella memoranda available for review by 
committee staff, in light of the new 6(e) ruling.\704\ By 
October 12, 1999, the Justice Department had still failed to 
reply to the committee's request. On October 12, Chairman 
Burton wrote to the Attorney General and formally requested 
that she make the memoranda available for review in their less-
redacted format.\705\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \703\ Rule 6(e) establishes the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.
    \704\ See letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General 3 (Oct. 12, 1999). The request 
to review the memoranda was made by the committee's chief counsel, 
James C. Wilson, to Craig Iscoe, Associate Deputy Attorney General, at 
the conclusion of a staff interview of Lee Radek.
    \705\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department never responded to the chairman's 
October 12, 1999, request to provide the memoranda for the 
committee's review in the less-redacted format. On March 21, 
2000, in a letter responding to a later subpoena for the 
memoranda, the Attorney General stated ``as a result of the 
Court decision, a large portion of the previously redacted 
information was no longer subject to redaction. We advised the 
Committee staff last fall that the memorandum with reduced 
redactions was available for review.'' \706\ The Attorney 
General's statement was patently false. At no time in 1999 did 
Justice Department personnel make the Freeh or La Bella 
memoranda available for the committee's review.\707\ The 
statement in the Attorney General's letter is typical of the 
deceptive, self-serving statements made by the Justice 
Department throughout the debate on the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \706\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Dan Burton, 
chairman, Committee on Government Reform 3 (Mar. 21, 2000).
    \707\ If such an offer had been made, the committee would have 
accepted the offer, as it accepted the offer when it was made in March 
2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. The Committee's March 2000 Subpoena for the Freeh and La Bella 
        Memoranda

    On March 10, 2000, the Los Angeles Times published an 
article on the La Bella memorandum which included extensive 
quotes from the memorandum.\708\ The Los Angeles Times 
apparently obtained a copy of the memoranda, despite the fact 
that it had never been provided to the committee, which had 
subpoenaed it almost 2 years earlier. Therefore, on March 10, 
2000, the committee subpoenaed the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda, as well as all other Justice Department memoranda 
responding to the Freeh and La Bella memoranda.\709\ In a 
letter accompanying the subpoena, the chairman noted that the 
leak of the La Bella memorandum undermined all of the arguments 
that the Attorney General had made to the committee in the 
preceding year and a half.\710\ The Attorney General had argued 
that the release of the memoranda would give the targets of the 
investigation a ``road map'' of the prosecutors' plans; she 
said that the release of the documents would create a 
``chilling effect'' on her senior advisors; and she stated that 
the memoranda were so sensitive that she could not even let all 
of the members of the committee look at them. However, while 
she was using these arguments to avoid complying with a lawful 
subpoena, she was careless enough to let her staff leak the La 
Bella memorandum to the Los Angeles Times. Given the fact that 
the entire memorandum was in the possession of the Los Angeles 
Times, and that large portions of it had been reported, the 
chairman again asked the Attorney General to now comply with 
the subpoena by March 14, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \708\ William C. Rempel and Alan C. Miller, ``Funds Probe Unfairly 
Spared White House, '98 Report Says; Donations: Revelations from Long-
Sealed Report Show Internal Dissension on Reno's Refusal to Appoint 
Counsel,'' L.A. Times, Mar. 10, 2000, A1.
    \709\ Subpoena duces tecum issued by the Committee on Government 
Reform (Mar. 10, 2000).
    \710\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (Mar. 10, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Amazingly, the Attorney General still refused to comply. In 
a letter dated March 21, 2000, she recited many of the 
arguments that she made in previous letters to the 
committee.\711\ She also acknowledged that the Justice 
Department had leaked the La Bella memorandum to the Los 
Angeles Times:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \711\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Dan Burton, 
chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 21, 2000).

        There have apparently been disclosures from one or more 
        memoranda to the media. It is not clear whether the 
        entire memoranda or only portions were disclosed to the 
        media, or whether additional materials were disclosed 
        as well. In any event, whatever disclosure was made was 
        wholly unauthorized.\712\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \712\ Id. at 2.

While it was comforting to know that the Attorney General did 
not authorize the release of the La Bella memorandum to the 
press, the endless parade of leaks of information relating to 
the campaign fundraising investigation was disturbing. By March 
2000, the chairman had repeatedly brought the Attorney 
General's attention to the fact that her subordinates were 
leaking highly sensitive information relating to the 
investigation. Yet, she apparently took no action to identify 
and discipline these individuals. Nor did she understand the 
appearance problems derived from her refusal to endorse an 
independent investigation while her subordinates were 
undermining the Department's own efforts.
    Despite the leak of the memorandum to the press, the 
Attorney General still refused to provide the memorandum to the 
committee. She did offer to allow committee staff to review the 
Freeh and La Bella memoranda, in their less-redacted form.\713\ 
However, as a condition of that review, staff were not allowed 
to take any notes. The Attorney General's conditions were 
somewhat troubling, given that she had allowed the staff of 
another committee to review the memoranda while taking 
notes.\714\ In addition, the Attorney General's condition 
rendered a review of the memoranda difficult, given the fact 
that the major memoranda (including the reply memorandum of Lee 
Radek, the response of Charles La Bella, and the summary 
memorandum of James Robinson) totaled over 180 pages.\715\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \713\ Id. at 3-4.
    \714\ Committee staff learned that staff of the House Judiciary 
Committee were allowed to take extensive notes while reviewing the La 
Bella memorandum.
    \715\ On May 3, 2000, the committee issued a new subpoena to the 
Justice Department for all ``formal memoranda that were sent to the 
Attorney General or senior Justice Department officials in connection 
with decisions involving the application of the Independent Counsel Act 
to campaign finance-related matters, including memos that address the 
Independent Counsel Act-related aspects of the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda.'' Subpoena duces tecum issued by the Committee on Government 
Reform (May 3, 2000). The Justice Department's production of the 
various campaign fundraising memoranda was formally made in response to 
this subpoena.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. The Committee's Attempts to Reach Agreement with the 
                    Justice Department
    Despite the Attorney General's unsatisfactory response to 
the committee's March 10 subpoena, committee staff began to 
review the responsive memoranda on March 31, 2000. Over the 
next 2 months, committee staff reviewed the memoranda a number 
of times. During this period, the committee also negotiated 
with the Justice Department regarding the Department's refusal 
to comply with the committee's subpoena. The Department 
repeatedly asked the committee to agree to a ``protocol'' under 
which the committee would receive and handle the subpoenaed 
memoranda. While the Department was never specific about how it 
wanted the committee to handle the memoranda, it identified two 
major concerns: (1) protecting the identity of line attorneys 
mentioned in the memoranda; and (2) ``keeping internal, 
deliberative documents out of the campaign season.'' \716\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \716\ This statement was made initially by John Tanner of the 
Justice Department's Office of Legislative Affairs at a meeting on May 
16, 2000, between Mr. Tanner, Alan Gershel, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, James C. Wilson, majority chief counsel, Committee on 
Government Reform, David A. Kass, majority deputy counsel, Committee on 
Government Reform, Phil Schiliro, minority staff director, Committee on 
Government Reform, and Phil Barnett, minority chief counsel, Committee 
on Government Reform.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department's candor on this point was 
refreshing, but it revealed the central motive in the Justice 
Department's actions throughout the debate over the Freeh and 
La Bella memoranda--protecting the Clinton administration from 
political embarrassment. It is illustrative that at the end of 
the day, after all of the posturing, the Justice Department 
identified only these two concerns when turning the documents 
over to the committee. No longer did the Department raise 
arguments about ``chilling effects'' or ``prosecutorial 
roadmaps.'' Rather, now it was focused on the negative 
political impact that the release of the documents would have 
on the Democratic party. Indeed, the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda overwhelming discuss potentially illegal conduct by 
Democratic officials and donors.\717\ Therefore, when the 
Justice Department stated that it wanted to keep these 
documents out of the campaign season, it was saying that it did 
not want documents embarrassing to Democrats to come out during 
the campaign.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \717\ Indeed, approximately 65 pages of the La Bella memorandum are 
devoted to discussions of Democrat wrongdoing, while approximately 2 
pages are devoted to Republican wrongdoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. The Justice Department's Production of the Memoranda to 
                    the Committee
    Other developments quickly superseded the committee's 
negotiations with the Justice Department. On May 18, 2000, the 
Associated Press reported that in December 1996, Lee Radek, the 
head of the Public Integrity Section, which was then conducting 
the campaign fundraising investigation, told William Esposito, 
the Deputy FBI Director, that Radek felt ``a lot of pressure'' 
and that the Attorney General's job might ``hang in the 
balance'' with respect to the campaign fundraising 
investigation.\718\ This report reinforced the committee's 
long-held view that the Attorney General had a political 
conflict of interest in trying to investigate the fundraising 
of the President, Vice President and Democratic party. 
Therefore, on May 19, the chairman wrote to the Attorney 
General informing her that the committee had scheduled a 
hearing on this matter, and requesting the production of the 
Freeh, La Bella, and related memoranda before that 
hearing.\719\ On May 23, the chairman wrote again, demanding 
production of the memoranda, and informing the Attorney General 
that the memoranda would be treated as any other committee 
record, subject to release by a vote of the committee.\720\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \718\ John Solomon, ``Freeh: Justice Felt Pressure Not to Proceed 
with Probe to Save Reno,'' Associated Press, (May 18, 2000).
    \719\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (May 19, 2000).
    \720\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (May 23, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On May 24, 2000, Robert Raben, the Assistant Attorney 
General for Legislative Affairs responded to the chairman, 
stating that the Justice Department was ``pleased to agree to 
your Committee's proposal as set forth in your May 23 letter 
and as elaborated in subsequent discussions with your staff.'' 
\721\ Under the agreement reached with the Justice Department, 
all of the memoranda responsive to the committee's May 3 
subpoena were to be produced to the committee. The documents 
were to be kept in a secured facility, and access was to be 
restricted to six staff from each side of the committee. In 
addition, the committee was to provide the Department with 
notice of any plan to release the documents, and also gave the 
Justice Department the opportunity to explain why the release 
should not take place.\722\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \721\ Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to Dan 
Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (May 24, 2000).
    \722\ Id. at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On May 31, 2000, the chairman wrote to the Attorney General 
and informed her of the plan to release the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda, as well as other related memoranda, at the 
committee's June 6, 2000, hearing.\723\ On June 2, 2000, the 
Justice Department wrote to object to the committee's release 
of the documents.\724\ In this, the final objection prior to 
the release of the documents, the Justice Department only 
identified two concerns: first, the chilling effect that the 
release of the memoranda might have on the ability of Justice 
Department lawyers to render full and frank advice; and second, 
the way that the memos infringed upon the ``privacy interests'' 
of individuals mentioned in the memoranda.\725\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \723\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (May 31, 2000).
    \724\ Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to Dan 
Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform (June 2, 2000).
    \725\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On June 6, 2000, at a hearing of the committee on the 
Department's implementation of the Independent Counsel Act, the 
chairman asked unanimous consent to release the Freeh, La 
Bella, and a number of related memoranda.\726\ Representative 
Lantos then amended the unanimous consent request to release 
all of the documents received from the Justice Department in 
response to the May 3, 2000, subpoena.\727\ All of the records 
were then released by unanimous consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \726\ ``The Justice Department's Implementation of the Independent 
Counsel Act,'' hearing before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th 
Cong. 5, (June 6, 2000) (preliminary transcript).
    \727\ Id. at 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. The Justice Department's Misleading Arguments

    It is understandable that the Justice Department resisted 
giving the committee the Freeh and La Bella memoranda. The 
Justice Department did have legitimate institutional interests 
at stake that it was entitled to protect. However, once the 
committee served its subpoena upon the Justice Department, it 
was legally obligated to produce the memoranda to the 
committee. Rather than follow the legally obligated course of 
action, the Justice Department used misleading arguments for 
over 2 years to avoid complying with its legal duty. Few of the 
arguments were true, and none constituted a valid basis for a 
subpoena. Now that the Justice Department has complied with the 
committee's subpoenas, it appears that the Justice Department 
did not even believe the arguments that it was making.
            a. The Justice Department's Shifting Arguments
    When the committee first subpoenaed the Freeh memorandum in 
December 1997, the Justice Department presented four main 
arguments: (1) the Justice Department had a policy against 
discussing investigative strategies of open cases (and that it 
was unprecedented for a congressional committee to demand such 
records); (2) the release of the memoranda could create a 
``chilling effect'' on Justice Department employees; (3) the 
memorandum could provide a ``road map'' of the investigation; 
and (4) the reputations of individuals mentioned in the 
memoranda could be harmed by the release of the documents.\728\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \728\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Dan Burton, 
chairman, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (Dec. 4, 1997); 
letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, and Louis Freeh, Director, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on 
Government Reform and Oversight (Dec. 8, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When the committee subpoenaed the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda in July 1998, the Department reiterated its earlier 
concerns, and made an additional argument, that compliance with 
the committee's demand would create the perception of political 
influence in the prosecutorial process, undermining public 
confidence in the investigation.\729\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \729\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, and Louis Freeh, 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Dan Burton, chairman, 
Committee on Government Reform (July 28, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When the committee subpoenaed the memoranda in March 2000, 
the Attorney General made only three arguments: (1) the 
campaign fundraising investigation remained open, and 
therefore, the release of the memoranda could have an impact on 
the investigation; (2) the release of the memoranda could 
create a chilling effect inside the Justice Department; and (3) 
the memoranda were available for review by committee staff, and 
therefore, it was unnecessary to provide the memoranda to the 
committee.\730\ As explained above, the Attorney General's 
statement in the March 21, 2000, letter that committee staff 
were offered the opportunity to review the memoranda in the 
fall of 1999 was false.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \730\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Dan Burton, 
chairman, Committee on Government Reform (Mar. 21, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, when the committee actually received the memoranda 
in May 2000, the Justice Department made four arguments, two of 
which were made in the three earlier rounds of discussion: (1) 
the release of the memoranda would create a chilling effect; 
(2) the memoranda would infringe privacy interests of 
individuals mentioned in the documents, and (3) the memoranda 
contained the identity of line attorneys; and (4) the memoranda 
should not be released during the campaign season.
            b. The Justice Department's False Arguments
              i. The Justice Department's Nonexistent ``Policy'' 
                    Against Providing Deliberative Documents
    The argument repeated most often by the Justice Department 
throughout the debate on the Freeh and La Bella memoranda was 
that the Justice Department had a longstanding policy against 
providing deliberative documents about ongoing investigations 
to Congress. In fact, in a December 8, 1997, letter to Chairman 
Burton, Attorney General Reno and FBI Director Freeh stated 
that ``[i]t is unprecedented for a congressional committee to 
demand internal decisionmaking memoranda generated during an 
ongoing criminal investigation.'' \731\ As was pointed out by 
the committee in its correspondence with the Justice 
Department, this claim was not true: congressional committees 
had demanded and received internal decisionmaking memoranda and 
other investigative materials during ongoing investigations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \731\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, and Louis Freeh, 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Dan Burton, chairman, 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 2 (Dec. 8, 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Palmer Raids Investigation: In the early 1920s, the Senate 
and the House held hearings into the raids and arrests of 
suspected communists conducted by the Department of Justice 
under Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. During the course of 
their investigation, the committees received a number of 
Department records relating to the raids. Included in the 
documents provided to the committees was a ``memorandum of 
comments and analysis'' prepared by a Department lawyer, 
responding to a District Court opinion, which was under appeal, 
and which criticized the Department's actions.\732\ This 
document was provided to the committee even though it contained 
facts and the Department's legal reasoning regarding an open 
case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \732\ ``Charges of Illegal Practices of the Department of 
Justice,'' hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary, 66th Cong. 484-538 (1921).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Teapot Dome Scandal: Later in the 1920s, the Senate 
conducted an investigation into the Department of Justice's 
handling of the Teapot Dome scandal, specifically, charges of 
``misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of Justice.'' 
\733\ The Senate committee heard from Justice Department 
attorneys and agents who offered extensive testimony about the 
Department's failure to pursue cases. Likewise, the Senate 
committee also received documentary evidence from the 
Department about its nonfeasance. Testimony and documents were 
received from a number of cases, some of which were still 
open.\734\ In one notable example, the Attorney General 
permitted an accountant with the Department to testify and 
produce documents relating to an investigation that he 
conducted. The accountant produced his confidential reports in 
which he had described his factual findings and made 
recommendations for further action. The Department had failed 
to act upon his recommendations, although the case was still 
open.\735\ In a letter to the committee on March 12, 1999, 
Acting Assistant Attorney General Dennis Burke acknowledged 
that this case did provide a precedent for the committee's 
request, but attempted to distinguish the case because the 
Senate committee was not asking for a prosecutorial 
decisionmaking document like the Freeh or La Bella memoranda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \733\ McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 151 (1927).
    \734\ See, e.g., hearings before the Senate Select Committee on 
``Investigation of the Attorney General,'' vols. 1-3, 68th Cong. 1495-
1503, 1529-30, 2295-96 (1924).
    \735\ Id. at 1495-1547.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    White Collar Crime in the Oil Industry: In 1979, the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the House 
Committee on the Judiciary held joint hearings on allegations 
of fraudulent pricing in the oil industry. As part of that 
inquiry, the committees examined the failure of the Justice 
Department to investigate properly and prosecute related cases. 
As part of their hearings, the committees held closed sessions 
where they received evidence regarding open cases in which 
indictments were pending.\736\ In open session, the committees 
called a Justice Department staff attorney who testified as to 
the reasons for not proceeding with a certain criminal case, 
despite the fact that a civil prosecution of the same case was 
pending. The Department similarly provided the committees with 
documentary evidence relating to this case.\737\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \736\ See ``White Collar Crime in the Oil Industry,'' joint 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and the Subcommittee on 
Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1979).
    \737\ Id. at 156-57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Gorsuch/EPA Investigation: In the early 1980's the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House 
Committee on Public Works and Transportation investigated the 
enforcement policy of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
with regard to the Superfund program. The subcommittee 
investigated the EPA's enforcement policy with respect to both 
criminal and civil matters.\738\ In response to the committee's 
document requests, the EPA, with the advice and assistance of 
the Justice Department, objected to the request on the basis 
that ``[i]nternal enforcement documents which form the basis 
for ongoing or anticipated civil or criminal prosecutions are 
extremely sensitive. These documents include, for example, 
memoranda by Agency or Department of Justice attorneys 
containing litigation and negotiation strategy, settlement 
positions, names of informants in criminal cases, and other 
similar material.'' \739\ After the committee's issuance of a 
subpoena for the documents, President Reagan asserted executive 
privilege over the documents, stating that ``a controversy has 
arisen . . . over the EPA's unwillingness to permit copying of 
a number of documents generated by attorneys and other 
enforcement personnel within the EPA in the development of 
potential civil or criminal enforcement actions against private 
parties.'' \740\ The Department of Justice took the position in 
the case that the policy against providing Congress with access 
to open law enforcement files applied to both civil and 
criminal matters.\741\ Despite the President's invocation of 
executive privilege in the Gorsuch matter, the committee and 
the House of Representatives voted to hold Administrator 
Gorsuch in contempt of Congress for refusing to produce the 
subpoenaed documents. Ultimately the documents were produced, 
and the contempt citation was withdrawn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \738\ ``Contempt of Congress,'' report of the Committee on Public 
Works and Transportation, H. Rept. No. 97-968 at 10 (1982).
    \739\ Id. at 28 (letter from Robert M. Perry, associate 
administrator and general counsel to Chairman Elliott H. Levitas, Oct. 
7, 1982).
    \740\ Id. at 42 (memorandum from President Ronald Reagan to the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency).
    \741\ Id. at 87-88 (memorandum from Assistant Attorney General 
Theodore B. Olson to Attorney General William French Smith).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Iran-Contra: The most well-known example of congressional 
oversight of the Justice Department involving the demand and 
receipt of information from open case files in the 
investigation of the Iran-Contra affair. As part of their work, 
the Iran-Contra committees investigated the nature of the 
Department of Justice's initial inquiry into the affair. The 
investigating committees demanded the production of the 
Department's files regarding their initial inquiry. The House 
committee requested, inter alia:

        (b) All records relating to Justice Department 
        consideration of, or action in response to, the request 
        of October 17, 1986, by members of the House Committee 
        on the Judiciary for an application for appointment of 
        an independent counsel.

        (c) All records relating to the consideration of, and 
        ultimate preparation and submission of, an application 
        for appointment of an Independent Counsel on the Iran 
        matter.

        (d) All records from January 1, 1984, to December 15, 
        1986, relating to requests to, by, or through the 
        Department of Justice to stop or delay ongoing 
        investigations relating to the anti-government forces 
        in Nicaragua and assistance being provided to them[.] 
        \742\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \742\ Letter from Chairman Lee Hamilton to Attorney General Edwin 
Meese III, Jan. 14, 1987.

    The Department resisted, making claims similar to those 
Attorney General Reno is making now. The Department claimed 
that the production of documents to the committees would 
prejudice the upcoming prosecutions by the independent counsel. 
The committees overruled this objection, and received all 
requested documents, despite the fact that the independent 
counsel was pursuing the prosecution of a number of open cases. 
The committees obtained both documentary evidence and the 
testimonial evidence of a number of high-level Department 
officials, including Attorney General Meese.\743\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \743\ See ``Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating 
the Iran-Contra Affair,'' H. Rept. No. 433 and S. Rept. No. 216, 100th 
Cong. 310, 317, 314, 647 (1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other Cases: In other cases where congressional oversight 
committees sought access to Department of Justice records 
relating to prosecution of cases, the cases at issue were 
closed. However, those committees were investigating the fact 
that the cases were closed, because they were closed through 
alleged malfeasance on the part of the Department. For example, 
in the Rocky Flats case, and in the case of Congressman 
Dingell's investigation of the Department's environmental 
crimes prosecutions, there were allegations that the Department 
was allowing guilty parties out of criminal prosecutions with 
only minimal punishment. In the Rocky Flats matter, Congressman 
Dingell described the Department's objections to disclosure, 
which are similar to those asserted here, as ``misguided and 
legally unjustifiable.'' Ultimately, over the objection of the 
Department, investigating committees obtained a number of 
sensitive internal documents. In the Rocky Flats case, the 
committee even obtained testimony from line attorneys at the 
Department. It also obtained documents, witness interviews, and 
other records submitted to the grand jury, but not subject to 
Rule 6(e).\744\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \744\ Another notable example of the scope and need for 
congressional oversight of the Justice Department can be found in 
Watergate. In his testimony in the House Judiciary Committee's INSLAW 
hearings, House Counsel Steven R. Ross addressed the nature of 
congressional oversight in the Watergate scandal:

      The Impeachment Report concluded, ``Unknown to Congress, 
      the efforts of the President, through Dean, his counsel''--
      specifically, having the Assistant Attorney General tell 
      Congress to hold off its investigation because of pending 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      proceedings--``had effectively cut off the investigation.''

      Of course, the excuse of pending proceedings did not keep 
      Congress out of investigating Watergate forever; it only 
      delayed that Congressional investigation. By Spring of 
      1973, Congressional committees were no longer accepting the 
      claim of parallel proceedings as an excuse for withholding 
      evidence. Ultimately, Watergate and its cover-up, including 
      the role of Attorney General Mitchell, the role of Attorney 
      General Kleindienst in related matters, and the 
      manipulation of the Justice Department and the FBI, were 
      thoroughly probed by the Senate Watergate Committee and the 
      House Judiciary Committee. This probing occurred at the 
      same time as the pending investigations and proceedings of 
      Special Prosecutors Cox and Jaworski.
          * * * * * * *
      Watergate was a dramatic instance where the House and 
      Senate investigations had to overcome, not mere claims of 
      pendency of civil proceedings--let alone, as here, mere 
      pendency of the appeal from such proceedings--but claims of 
      impact on soon-to-be-tried criminal cases. It was up to the 
      committees to determine what evidence they needed, not to 
      the Justice Department to measure whether to block those 
      committees. History reflects that it was only because this 
      Committee insisted on obtaining all the documents and other 
      evidence from the Justice Department, despite any claims 
      about pending proceedings, that the depths of the scandal 
      were ultimately plumbed.

      It is an appropriate note to this period that two Attorneys 
      General--Kleindienst and Mitchell--were eventually 
      convicted of perjury before Congressional investigations.

``The Attorney General's Refusal to Provide Congressional Access to 
``Privileged'' INSLAW Documents,'' hearing before the House Committee 
on the Judiciary, 101st Congress 88-90 (Dec. 5, 1990) (statement of 
Steven R. Ross) (emphasis added). Based on his review of this and the 
other precedents discussed above, Ross concluded that the Justice 
Department's policy of refusing access to open civil or criminal law 
enforcement files has been consistently rejected by the courts and by 
Congress. Id. at 84, 94.
    Shortly after he signed a letter claiming that the 
committee's subpoena was ``unprecedented,'' \745\ FBI director 
Louis Freeh reversed course, and admitted that ``your subpoena 
is not an unprecedented one, but it is an extraordinary one.'' 
\746\ However, the Attorney General persisted in claiming that 
the committee's subpoena was unprecedented until the following 
year. In March 1999, after the threat of contempt had subsided, 
Acting Assistant Attorney General Dennis Burke admitted that 
the committee's subpoena was not unprecedented.\747\ While this 
admission would have greatly harmed the Justice Department's 
political position in August 1998, during the contempt debate, 
by March 1999, few in the public cared.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \745\ Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, and Louis Freeh, 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to Dan Burton, chairman, 
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (Dec. 8, 1997).
    \746\ ``The Need for an Independent Counsel in the Campaign Finance 
Investigation,'' hearing before the Committee on Government Reform and 
Oversight, 105th Cong. 70 (Aug. 4, 1998).
    \747\ Letter from Dennis K. Burke, Acting Assistant Attorney 
General, to Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 2-3 
(Mar. 12, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              ii. The Chilling Effect of the Release of the Memoranda
    The Attorney General claimed that if the Justice Department 
complied with the committee's subpoena, it would create a 
``chilling effect'' that would discourage Justice Department 
personnel from providing the Attorney General with candid and 
thorough advice. By its very nature, the Attorney General's 
argument was highly speculative, and difficult to prove. There 
is no evidence that the public release of the Freeh and La 
Bella memoranda has had any such chilling effect. Indeed, the 
evidence shows that the Attorney General's advisors continue to 
offer their candid, written advice, despite the intense public 
scrutiny given to the Freeh and La Bella memoranda. Charles La 
Bella drafted his memorandum after all of the attention given 
to the Freeh memorandum in December 1997. In the middle of the 
debate over whether to hold the Attorney General in contempt 
for her failure to turn over the Freeh and La Bella memoranda, 
her advisors continued to draft lengthy reports reviewing the 
evidence in the campaign fundraising investigation. This 
practice continued even after the Justice Department turned the 
memoranda over to the committee in May 2000. In the spring of 
2000, the new head of the Task Force, Robert Conrad, prepared a 
report recommending the appointment of a special counsel to 
investigate Vice President Gore. Indeed, the only practical 
consequence of the committee's release of the Freeh and La 
Bella memoranda is probably the message that one should not 
commit dishonest views to paper. The committee does not feel 
the need to protect dishonest or malign advice.
    Also undermining the Attorney General's claim of a chilling 
effect was the fact that some of her advisors contemplated the 
publication of their memoranda. In addition, once the memoranda 
were turned over to the committee, it became clear that at 
least one Charles La Bella's critics, Lee Radek, contemplated 
that the memos would be made public: ``[i]t is inexcusable, and 
I believe clearly calculated, that they [La Bella and De Sarno] 
have chosen to communicate their views about others within the 
Department in a memorandum that is the subject of such intense 
public interest, and is therefore likely to be leaked or become 
public through some other route.'' \748\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \748\ Memorandum from Lee J. Radek, Chief, Public Integrity 
Section, to James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney General 2 (Aug. 6, 
1998) (exhibit 6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It appears that this committee's interest in the Freeh and 
La Bella memoranda has not had any chilling effect on Justice 
Department personnel. The more serious chilling effect on those 
personnel may come from the Attorney General's apparent 
disinterest in the advice of her advisors. She disregarded 
calls from seven different career law enforcement professionals 
to appoint an independent or special counsel to investigate 
Democratic fundraising in 1996. At the same time she appeared 
to be oblivious to failures to ask important questions and 
interview significant witnesses, and the reality that 
subordinates were leaking material in a way that undermined the 
Justice Department investigations. It is surprising that 
advisors like Robert Conrad still make recommendations to 
appoint a special counsel when the Attorney General routinely 
disregards such recommendations.
    Another more likely source of a chilling effect upon the 
Attorney General's advisors is the fact that their 
recommendations are selectively leaked to the media after they 
are made. The recommendations of Director Freeh, Charles La 
Bella, and Robert Conrad were all leaked to the press shortly 
after they were made. Often, these leaks were made in such a 
way to disparage the authors of the documents. For example, as 
one ABC reporter noted:

        I vividly recall talking to officials back then who 
        were amazed at the language employed in the report. 
        This week, they remembered their shock. One senior aide 
        who is no fan of Public Integrity and had generally 
        supported La Bella's efforts, said in his report La 
        Bella had gone ``over the top'' and ``out of bounds.''

        He said La Bella had become ``too emotionally involved 
        to be able to present a cogent legal argument;'' it was 
        more a rant, a tirade, than an argument. The so-called 
        evidence was really just new wine in old bottles. And 
        this official noted that in ensuing days the vitriol 
        became remarkable on both sides. He recalled that some 
        people were actually wondering whether La Bella had a 
        ``deep-seated psychiatric problem,'' or whether he was 
        unstable.

           *         *         *         *         *

        I asked, well, did his argument make sense? ``It made 
        sense, it was just wrong.'' He said parts of it 
        contained ``horrendous inferences'' and were ``not 
        persuasive.'' \749\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \749\ Beverly Lumpkin, ``Waco, Yet Again,'' (published Mar. 17, 
2000) /www.abcnews.go.com/sections/us/hallsofjustice/
hallsofjustice28.html>.

    Similarly, when Robert Conrad recommended that a special 
counsel be appointed to investigate Vice President Gore, senior 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Justice Department officials'' disparaged his conclusions:

        One Justice Department official said that Mr. Conrad 
        was alone in his recommendation. ``No other prosecutor 
        in this matter thought that there should be a need for 
        a special counsel,'' said the official, who spoke on 
        the condition of anonymity.\750\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \750\ Neil A. Lewis and Don Van Natta, Jr., ``Reno, Rejecting 
Aide's Recommendation, Declines to Name Counsel on Gore Fund-Raising,'' 
N.Y. Times (Aug. 23, 2000) at A19.

The following day, the Attorney General was forced to admit 
that this statement, given by one of her own Justice Department 
staff, was false, and that Mr. Conrad had been supported in his 
recommendation by two other Task Force prosecutors.\751\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \751\ Attorney General Reno, remarks at press conference, 
Washington, DC (Aug. 23, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even worse than the criticism in the press aimed at Justice 
Department officials who dared speak their mind was the 
treatment that Director Freeh received at the hands of the 
White House after his recommendation that an independent 
counsel be appointed. The New York Times reported the White 
House's reaction to his recommendation in December 1997:

        Although Mr. Clinton had pointedly avoided answering 
        questions about Mr. Freeh's disagreement with Ms. 
        Reno's decision, White House aides were not so 
        circumspect. They privately ripped into Mr. Freeh--once 
        lauded by the President as one of his best appointees--
        and called him a disloyal subordinate.\752\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \752\ David Johnston, ``Reno Decision Bares Rifts on Clinton 
Team,'' N.Y. Times (Dec. 4, 1997) at A28.

It is difficult to believe that the committee's subpoena for 
the Freeh memorandum could have had a greater chilling effect 
upon Director Freeh's actions than criticism leveled at him by 
staff of the President of the United States. Yet, while 
Attorney General Reno defended Director Freeh against the 
committee's advances, she did not afford him the same 
protection from the White House.
              iii. The Memoranda Did Not Contain a ``Road Map'' of the 
                    Investigation
    The Attorney General claimed that the subpoenaed memoranda 
contained a ``road map'' of her investigation, and that the 
information in the documents, if it came into the possession of 
the targets of the investigation, could seriously prejudice the 
investigation. Now that the committee has received the 
documents, we can see that the Attorney General's claim was not 
true. None of the matters discussed in these memoranda was ever 
prosecuted. As Chairman Burton observed when the committee 
released the memoranda, ``if this is a road map, it's a road 
map of a car going around in circles.'' \753\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \753\ ``The Justice Department's Implementation of the Independent 
Counsel Act,'' hearing before the Committee on Government Reform, 106th 
Cong. 15 (June 6, 2000) (preliminary transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Freeh memorandum discusses only seven substantive 
investigative matters: (1) the ``Common Cause Allegations;'' 
(2) Vice President Gore's fundraising phone calls; (3) 
President Clinton's fundraising phone calls; (4) allegations 
made against Secretary O'Leary by Johnny Chung; (5) White House 
coffees and overnights; (6) solicitation of money from foreign 
nationals; (7) the White House Database. Of these investigative 
areas, the Justice Department brought charges in only one 
area--solicitation of funds from foreign nationals. This 
section of Director Freeh's memorandum is four paragraphs long, 
and discusses only general legal issues, and does not even name 
any of the individuals under investigation. Given these facts, 
it is difficult to understand the Attorney General's reference 
to a ``road map.'' There is no information in the Freeh 
memorandum that related to any criminal charges ever brought in 
the campaign fundraising investigation.
    The La Bella memorandum discussed a wide range of subject 
areas, six in all: (1) Harold Ickes; (2) President Clinton; (3) 
Vice President Gore; (4) First Lady Hillary Clinton; (5) John 
Huang, Marvin Rosen, David Mercer and the DNC; and (6) Loral. 
Of all of these individuals and entities, charges were brought 
only against one individual, John Huang, and for conduct not 
discussed in the La Bella memorandum.
              iv. The Memoranda Did Not Infringe on Privacy Interests
    On several occasions, the Attorney General asserted that 
the release of the memoranda would infringe upon the privacy 
interests of individuals who were named in the documents, but 
who were never charged with any crimes. This argument, like the 
others, was specious. Once the committee received the 
memoranda, it was able to see that there were very few facts 
discussed in the documents that had not already been 
extensively discussed in public.\754\ Indeed, when the 
committee was releasing the memoranda, the Justice Department 
was given an opportunity to protect privacy interests by 
suggesting redactions. It failed to identify one substantive 
area, or the name of any suspect or witness that should be 
redacted from the documents prepared for release by the 
majority staff.\755\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \754\ One example of an issue in the La Bella memorandum that was 
not public prior to the release of the La Bella memorandum was the role 
of Robert Litt, a senior Department staffer, in the Loral 
investigation. In his memorandum, Charles La Bella took issue with what 
he saw as Mr. Litt assisting the White House with its ``damage 
control'' at the same time that the Department was investigating the 
White House's handling of the Loral matter. As Mr. Litt was a senior 
Justice Department official, it is difficult to believe he has a strong 
privacy interest in keeping this matter out of the public record.
    \755\ At one point, Justice Department staff recommended that the 
committee redact from the La Bella memorandum the discussion of the 
``Gina Ratliff'' incident, wherein Johnny Chung alleged that he was 
threatened by the First Lady's Chief of Staff, Margaret Williams, to 
repay debts he owed to a former employee, Gina Ratliff.
    In addition, when the chairman proposed releasing the binders of 
selected memoranda, Representative Lantos amended the unanimous consent 
request to release all of the documents received by the committee in 
response to its May 3 subpoena. Among these documents was a memorandum 
referring to an investigation of CIA Director Tenet which contained 
various personal information about the Director. This information was 
redacted from the memorandum, and in addition, that memorandum was 
never released or disseminated by the committee majority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              v. The Release of the Memoranda Does Not Create the 
                    Perception of Political Influence in the Task Force 
                    Investigation
    The Attorney General's claim that the release of the 
memorandum would create the perception that her investigation 
was politically influenced is, like many other of her claims, 
speculative. However, the committee's interest in this matter, 
from the beginning, has not been to dictate any certain outcome 
in the campaign fundraising investigation, but rather, to 
ensure that a thorough and unbiased investigation is conducted. 
It has been the Attorney General's continued refusal to appoint 
an outside investigator to conduct the investigation, not the 
efforts of this committee, that have undermined public trust in 
the Attorney General's investigation. The editorial board of 
the New York Times observed that:

        [The memoranda] are further evidence of Ms. Reno's 
        politicized handling of the campaign fund-raising issue 
        and of her dedication to protecting Democratic Party 
        interests from start to finish. . . . These latest 
        documents, however, cast further doubt on her wisdom 
        and add to the evidence that she has run a Justice 
        Department that often puts politics ahead of impartial 
        law enforcement.\756\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \756\ ``The Justice Department Memos,'' N.Y. Times (Mar. 11, 2000) 
at A14.

Given observations like that, and from a number of other 
editorial boards, it may be that the release of the memoranda 
did undermine confidence in the Justice Department's 
investigation--not because it raised some specter of political 
influence--but because it showed how political the Department's 
investigation had been.
              vi. The Justice Department's Request to Keep the 
                    Memoranda Out of the Campaign Season
    Shortly before the Justice Department produced the 
subpoenaed memoranda to the committee, Justice Department staff 
and committee staff negotiated terms for the handling of the 
documents. During those negotiations, Justice Department staff 
identified one of their central concerns as ``keeping the 
memoranda out of the campaign season.'' This request had never 
been raised in the earlier debates over the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda. Indeed, one can only imagine the reaction if the 
Attorney General had stated in a letter that she was refusing 
to comply with the committee's subpoena because she feared that 
the memoranda would be used to attack Vice President Gore. 
However, that is precisely what her subordinates suggested in 
their negotiations with committee staff. Again, it is 
understandable that the Attorney General wanted these memoranda 
out of the public's hands. The documents do not portray the 
subjects of the Justice Department's investigation in a 
positive light. However, the Attorney General is not entitled 
to use political fallout as a reason to avoid complying with a 
congressional subpoena. That her staff even recommended such a 
thing speaks volumes about the Justice Department's motives 
throughout this matter.

  B. The Justice Department's Failure To Produce the Conrad Memorandum

    The committee had hoped that the Justice Department's 
damaging, and ultimately unsuccessful experience in trying to 
keep the Freeh and La Bella memoranda from the committee would 
keep it from repeating such efforts in the future. The Justice 
Department's misleading arguments and bad faith in trying keep 
the Freeh and La Bella memoranda from the committee were fully 
exposed when the committee obtained the documents in May 2000. 
However, the committee's recent efforts in trying to obtain the 
Conrad memorandum has shown that the Justice Department has 
learned nothing from its experiences. It has continued to deal 
with the committee in bad faith, trying to keep information 
embarrassing to the administration from becoming public.
    After the Attorney General announced her decision not to 
seek a special counsel for Vice President Gore on August 23, 
2000, the committee subpoenaed the Conrad memorandum and all 
related memoranda, from the Justice Department. The committee 
believed that Attorney General Reno's announcement on August 
23, 2000, gave every indication that the investigation of false 
statements by Vice President Gore had been closed, and 
accordingly, that the Conrad memorandum could be produced to 
the committee:

        The transcript reflects neither false statements nor 
        perjury, each of which requires proof of a willfully 
        false statement about a material matter. Rather, the 
        transcript reflects disagreements about labels. I have 
        concluded that there is no reasonable possibility that 
        further investigation could develop evidence that would 
        support the filing of charges for making a willful 
        false statement.

        The Task Force will, of course, continue its ongoing 
        investigation into illegal fundraising activity and 
        will be free to pursue all avenues of investigation, 
        wherever they may lead.\757\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \757\ News conference with Attorney General Reno, Washington, DC 
(Aug. 23, 2000).

In this statement, the Attorney General clearly indicated that 
there was no reasonable possibility that the Justice Department 
would ever turn up evidence supporting the filing of charges 
against Vice President Gore for making a false statement. Given 
the basis of the Attorney General's efforts to frustrate 
congressional oversight of the Justice Department--that she did 
not want to interfere with ongoing investigations--she would 
hardly have made such a pronouncement unless she believed this 
matter to be closed. Therefore, she should not flout a valid 
congressional subpoena. Her willingness to do so, given her 
strong conclusion, is indicative of the extreme bad faith 
currently being exercised by the Justice Department.
    The deadline for compliance with the subpoena, August 31, 
2000, passed without any action by the Justice Department. On 
September 6, 2000, committee staff discussed the subpoena with 
Justice Department staff.\758\ During that discussion, Justice 
Department staff could not provide a cogent explanation for the 
failure to produce the Conrad memorandum. The Department did 
suggest that it was possible that the Conrad memorandum did 
still pertain to an open case. However, the discussion gave 
every indication that the Justice Department had decided that 
it was not going to produce the Conrad memorandum to the 
committee, but was still groping for the rationale for its 
refusal. As the experience with the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda had shown, it was not unusual for the Reno Justice 
Department to reach its conclusion first, and attempt to 
develop a rationale later.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \758\ See letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (Sept. 7, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department refused to provide any further 
information regarding its refusal to comply with the 
committee's subpoena for the Conrad memorandum until the 
committee's October 5, 2000, interview with the Attorney 
General. During that interview, the Attorney General was 
questioned about her failure to comply with the committee's 
subpoena:

        Committee Counsel. Moving on to the Conrad--Mr. 
        Conrad's recommendation to appoint a special counsel. 
        Is it fair to say that you have absolutely refused to 
        comply with the Committee's subpoena for us to receive 
        Mr. Conrad's recommendation to you to appoint a special 
        counsel?

        Attorney General Reno. I don't think Mr. Conrad's memo 
        should be produced. I think it is part of a pending 
        investigation.

        Chairman Burton. Is that--that is pretty much the same 
        reason you gave for not giving us the La Bella memo?

        Attorney General Reno. What I indicated for the La 
        Bella memo was that it was--been a part of the 
        investigation. Much of it has been made public now, and 
        the matter is behind. The issues in the Conrad memo, as 
        I told them, could still be pursued, any lead could be 
        followed; and I want to make sure that we don't do 
        anything that interferes with that.

           *         *         *         *         *

        Chairman Burton. It is not a matter of whether the 
        issues in the Conrad memo can be pursued. It is whether 
        they are being pursued. Are the issues raised in the 
        Conrad memo still under active investigation?

        Attorney General Reno. I cannot comment.

        Chairman Burton: You can't tell us whether or not they 
        are under active investigation? The reason we can't see 
        the memo, according to you, is because there is an 
        ongoing criminal investigation. If there is no 
        investigation going on, then there should be no reason 
        why we can't see the memo. And so all we are asking is, 
        simply, are the issues raised in his memo still under 
        investigation?

        Attorney General Reno. I can't tell you that.

        Chairman Burton. You are not telling us about any 
        specific investigation; you are not talking about 
        anything like that. All we are asking generically is, 
        are the issues raised in his memo--and you don't have 
        to go into the specifics--are those being pursued in an 
        investigation, criminal investigation?

        Attorney General Reno. Mr. Chairman, I respectfully 
        suggest to you that if I start answering questions like 
        that, I am going to continue to run into the situation 
        that I am faced with now where people are beginning to 
        question whether we are being pushed around by Congress 
        inappropriately in pending criminal matters.\759\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \759\ Interview of Attorney General Reno 47-50 (Oct. 5, 2000) 
(preliminary transcript).

    The Attorney General's responses to Chairman Burton are 
facially absurd. In her announcement on August 23, 2000, she 
stated that she was not appointing a special counsel to 
investigate the Vice President because there was no reasonable 
possibility that further investigation would produce evidence 
that would support the filing of charges. This statement sent 
the clear message that Vice President Gore had been cleared, 
and that he was no longer under investigation for making false 
statements. This message was warmly welcomed by the Gore 
campaign. However, when the committee subpoenaed the Conrad 
memorandum, the Attorney General tried to manufacture a reason 
why the committee could not receive the document. When she was 
squarely asked whether Conrad was still investigating false 
statement charges against Vice President Gore, Attorney General 
Reno refused to answer the question. In the past, the Justice 
Department has rarely hesitated to tell the committee that it 
could not receive certain documents because they pertained to 
an open case. The fact that the Attorney General refused to 
state whether the Conrad investigation of Vice President Gore 
is still open suggests one of two possibilities: (1) that the 
case is in fact closed, or (2) that the Attorney General's 
statement that there was ``no reasonable possibility that 
further investigation could develop evidence'' was made to 
benefit the Vice President. If the former is true, the Attorney 
General is withholding the Conrad memo from the committee with 
no proper justification. If the latter is true, the Attorney 
General has misled the public about the nature of the Task 
Force's investigation to benefit the Presidential nominee of 
her political party.
    The Justice Department has also refused to provide the 
committee with any opportunity to review the Conrad memorandum. 
When asked why the Justice Department had not provided the 
committee the opportunity to review the memorandum, Reno 
provided the following answer:

        I think it is important, based on the experience that 
        we are having now and the questions that have been 
        raised, that we do everything we can to ensure that 
        there is not an inappropriate outside influence on a 
        pending matter.\760\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \760\ Interview of Attorney General Reno 53 (Oct. 5, 2000) 
(preliminary transcript).

However, the refusal to provide any review of the Conrad 
memorandum stands in contrast to the Department's willingness 
to allow the committee to review the Freeh and La Bella 
memoranda. The Department allowed the committee to review those 
memos in 1998, despite the fact that information in those 
documents still conceivably was linked to open cases.
    The Justice Department's refusal to provide the Conrad 
memorandum to the committee provides further evidence of the 
politicization of the Justice Department. Without any legal or 
factual basis, the Justice Department has refused to comply 
with a lawful congressional subpoena. It appears that the 
Justice Department's motive for keeping the Conrad memo out of 
Congress' hands is the same motive that has guided it for the 
past 4 years--protecting the Clinton-Gore administration from 
criminal jeopardy and public embarrassment.

           C. The Justice Department's Political Gamesmanship

    The Justice Department's refusal to cooperate with the 
committee was also manifested in its willingness to engage in 
political gamesmanship to try to embarrass the administration's 
critics. There were two notable instances of this behavior 
during the campaign fundraising investigation: first, the 
release of the FBI interview summary of former Congressman 
Gerald Solomon; and second, the attempted release of 
investigative material relating to Chairman Burton.

1. The Release of the Solomon Interview Summary

            a. The Justice Department Refuses to Provide the Clinton 
                    and Gore Interview Summaries
    On November 9, 1999, the committee subpoenaed the FBI 
interview summaries of President Clinton and Harold Ickes.\761\ 
The committee was seeking the records as part of its oversight 
of the Justice Department's campaign fundraising investigation, 
to ensure that the Justice Department conducted thorough 
interviews of Mr. Ickes and Mr. Clinton before declining to 
appoint an independent counsel to investigate their fundraising 
activities. The committee did not expect to receive any 
resistance to this subpoena, as it had already received FBI 
interview summaries for John Huang. Before the committee 
received a response to the subpoena from the Justice 
Department, the chairman sent another request to the Department 
on November 17, 1999, requesting 25 additional FBI interview 
summaries relating to the campaign fundraising investigation, 
including the interview summaries for Vice President Gore.\762\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \761\ Subpoena duces tecum issued by the Committee on Government 
Reform (Nov. 9, 1999) (all committee correspondence with and subpoenas 
to the Justice Department are printed in the appendix accompanying this 
report).
    \762\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (Nov. 17, 1999). This request 
was made pursuant to the committee's subpoena of July 29, 1999, which 
required the Justice Department to produce all records relating to the 
investigations of John Huang and Yah Lin ``Charlie'' Trie. On several 
occasions, the chairman sent specific narrow requests to the Department 
for records covered by this subpoena.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Committee staff asked Justice Department staff about the 
production of these interview summaries on a number of 
occasions during the following weeks. As Chairman Burton noted 
in a November 30, 1999, letter to the Attorney General, the 
Justice Department failed to produce the records, and provided 
no explanation for the failure to produce them.\763\ At the 
time, the committee was planning to hold a major hearing on 
John Huang from December 15-17, 1999. On December 10, 1999, the 
committee finally received an answer to its requests. In a 
letter to Chairman Burton, Assistant Attorney General Robert 
Raben explained that the Justice Department was formulating a 
new policy against the release of FBI interview summaries to 
Congress:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \763\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (Nov. 30, 1999).

        The decision by the Department and its FBI component to 
        permit the Committee to review the 302s, but not to 
        provide copies, is based upon the chilling effect that 
        public disclosure of the 302s can have on law 
        enforcement. Historically, witnesses who have been 
        interviewed by the FBI have understood that their 
        interviews, and the information that they provided, 
        would not be made public unless the witness were to 
        testify at a public trial or the prosecutor were to use 
        the information as the factual basis for a guilty plea. 
        . . . A witness who believes that it is likely that his 
        or her interview will become public may become less 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        willing to cooperate fully with the FBI.

        The Department has observed what appears to be an 
        increasing incidence of public release of 302s. The 
        widespread public disclosure of 302s is likely to make 
        it more difficult for the FBI to conduct its 
        investigations in the future, especially in cases in 
        which witnesses may become reluctant to cooperate out 
        of a desire to avoid becoming publicly involved in a 
        high-profile matter.\764\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \764\ Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to Dan 
Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 1-2 (Dec. 10, 1999).

    The Justice Department's position was further elaborated by 
Craig Iscoe, Associate Deputy Attorney General, and Larry 
Parkinson, General Counsel of the FBI, in a meeting on December 
13, 1999. In that meeting, Mr. Iscoe and Mr. Parkinson 
expounded on the Justice Department's concern that the release 
of FBI interview summaries to the committee would harm the 
Department's ability to conduct investigations in the future. 
Committee staff pointed out to Mr. Iscoe and Mr. Parkinson that 
the Department had produced interview summaries on a number of 
other occasions, and had never expressed this concern until the 
committee sought the interview summaries of President Clinton, 
Vice President Gore, and Harold Ickes.
    The chairman protested the Department's decision not to 
provide the interview summaries in a letter on December 14, 
1999.\765\ First, the chairman pointed out the suspicious 
timing of the Department's decision. The Department was 
subpoenaed to produce the interview summaries of President 
Clinton and Harold Ickes over a month earlier, and was 
requested to produce Vice President Gore summaries almost a 
month earlier.\766\ Despite numerous requests during that 
period of time, the Department announced its decision not to 
provide the documents to the committee only several days before 
the John Huang hearing. The subpoenaed documents were needed 
for the hearing, and indeed, ended up being discussed 
extensively at the hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \765\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (Dec. 14, 1999).
    \766\ Id. at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The chairman also pointed out the Justice Department's 
apparent double standard. In the 103rd Congress, Chairman Don 
Riegle requested a number of FBI interview summaries, which he 
received, and subsequently published in a Senate report.\767\ 
In the 104th Congress, the Department provided Chairman Bill 
Clinger with 183 FBI interview summaries pertaining to the 
White House Travel Office investigation.\768\ In addition, 
throughout the fall and winter of 1999, the Justice Department 
was producing scores of interview summaries pertaining to the 
Waco investigation, even as it was trying to prevent the 
committee from obtaining interview summaries from the 
fundraising investigation. Moreover, by December 10, the 
committee had received three FBI 302s relating to the campaign 
fundraising investigation--John Huang, Charlie Trie, and Johnny 
Chung--without the committee even requesting the 302 for Johnny 
Chung. Therefore, the Justice Department's newly-found 
hesitance seemed to be linked to the fact that the committee 
was now requesting the 302s for the President, Vice President 
and Harold Ickes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \767\ Id.
    \768\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the chairman took issue with the statement by 
Assistant Attorney General Raben in his December 10, 1999, 
letter in which he stated that ``[t]he Department has observed 
what appears to be an increasing incidence of public release of 
302s.'' \769\ The chairman then pointed out that Chairman 
Riegle released 84 FBI interview summaries in a Democrat-
controlled Congress in 1994, and that the Government Reform 
Committee had released just 1 such interview summary in the 
preceding 3 years.\770\ The chairman also noted the fact that 
the Department's concerns about the release of 302s harming 
ongoing investigations seemed to be misplaced. When the 
committee received the 302s for Charlie Trie, they had 
supposedly redacted all information from the summary that could 
harm ongoing investigations. However, the Department failed to 
redact from the Trie 302 information relating to Ernest Green, 
information which strongly indicated that Green had perjured 
himself in a committee deposition.\771\ At the time, Green was 
under active investigation by the Justice Department for 
perjury, and the release of this information could have 
theoretically harmed the Department's investigation. The 
committee identified the Justice Department's error, and on its 
own initiative, redacted the information relating to 
Green.\772\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \769\ Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to Dan 
Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform 1-2 (Dec. 10, 1999).
    \770\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (Dec. 14, 1999).
    \771\ Id. at 2.
    \772\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After receiving the chairman's letter, the Department 
finally relented, and provided the requested 302s for President 
Clinton, Vice President Gore, and Harold Ickes on December 15, 
1999. When the committee was able to review these 302s, it 
learned that the Justice Department had failed to ask the 
President and Vice President about central matters involved in 
the campaign fundraising scandal: the President had not been 
asked about James Riady or Charlie Trie; and the Vice President 
had not been asked about the Hsi Lai Temple fundraiser or Maria 
Hsia. Once the committee received these 302s, it became evident 
why the Justice Department had gone through such contortions to 
keep them out of the public domain. However, if the content of 
the 302s was not enough to confirm that the Justice 
Department's posturing of the past month had been purely 
political, the Department's actions in the following 2 days 
would confirm that fact.
            b. The Justice Department Releases the Interview Summary of 
                    Representative Gerald Solomon
    When John Huang appeared before the committee on December 
15, 1999, he made the following statement:

        People seeking publicity have lied about me repeatedly 
        in the press and even before this committee without 
        consequence. For example, a former Member of this body, 
        Mr. Solomon, in attacking the administration, accused 
        me of economic espionage on the basis of what I am 
        advised was an anonymous source at a cocktail party, 
        with whom, it turned out, did not even mention my name 
        or do anything other than perpetuate a rumor against an 
        unidentified Asian-American, a rumor which Mr. Solomon 
        was only too eager to embrace and capitalize upon.\773\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \773\ ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady Family in Political 
Fundraising,'' hearings before the House Committee on Government 
Reform, 106th Cong., 55 (1999) (preliminary transcript).

At the time that Mr. Huang made his statement, it was unclear 
where he had obtained this information. Therefore, Chairman 
Burton asked John Huang to identify the source of his knowledge 
about Representative Solomon's comments.\774\ Huang told the 
chairman that he had been told this by his attorneys.\775\ 
Chairman Burton then asked Ty Cobb, Huang's counsel, where he 
had obtained this information, and Mr. Cobb stated that he had 
learned this information from one of the prosecutors on the 
Campaign Financing Task Force.\776\ As Chairman Burton noted in 
a letter to the Justice Department after the Huang hearing, it 
was highly irregular that the Department would share this kind 
of information with the target of a criminal 
investigation.\777\ As the chairman noted, the disclosure to 
Huang's attorneys ``could have no legitimate investigative 
purpose, and seemed to be designed only to give Mr. Huang a 
sympathetic anecdote for his opening statement.'' \778\ 
Moreover, the Department's willingness to provide details from 
FBI interview summaries certainly undermined the arguments it 
had so forcefully made just days earlier, when it claimed that 
releasing 302s would chill witnesses from giving interviews to 
law enforcement, or that it would jeopardize investigations. 
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of a situation that would chill 
a witness from giving an interview more than turning the 
details of the interview over to an admitted felon who then 
used that information to attack the witness in the press and on 
national television.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \774\ Id. at 166.
    \775\ Id.
    \776\ Id. at 167.
    \777\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General 2 (Apr. 18, 2000).
    \778\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, the Justice Department's hypocrisy was only 
beginning to emerge. During the first day of the Huang hearing, 
in response to Huang's opening statement, Congressman Waxman 
asked Chairman Burton to request the FBI interview summary of 
Congressman Solomon from the Justice Department.\779\ Chairman 
Burton agreed that he would do so.\780\ The following day, 
Associate Deputy Attorney General Craig Iscoe appeared at the 
committee offices with a copy of the Solomon 302. The chairman 
had not even formally requested the Solomon 302, but the 
Justice Department had produced it nonetheless in under 24 
hours. There were several facts about this chronology that were 
especially troubling:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \779\ ``The Role of John Huang and the Riady Family in Political 
Fundraising,'' hearings before the House Committee on Government 
Reform, 106th Cong., 97 (1999) (preliminary transcript).
    \780\ Id. at 97-98.

         The Justice Department produced the 302 
        without a formal request of any type, much less a 
        subpoena. Justice Department staff explained that it 
        views an oral request made by a chairman during a 
        committee hearing the same way that it would view a 
        written request or a subpoena.\781\ This was the first 
        time that this policy was ever enunciated for this 
        committee, and it seemed to be a post hoc justification 
        for the Department's actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \781\ This information was related by Craig Iscoe, Associate Deputy 
Attorney General, to committee staff when he brought the Solomon 302 to 
committee offices on Dec. 16, 1999.

         The Justice Department produced the Solomon 
        302 in under 24 hours. Craig Iscoe, the Associate 
        Deputy Attorney General who brought the 302 to the 
        committee, explained that the 302 was relatively short, 
        and was easy to prepare for production.\782\ However, 
        when the Reno Justice Department's track record of 
        document productions is closely scrutinized, the rapid 
        production of the Solomon 302 appears suspicious. 
        During the committee's investigation, there were 
        occasions where the Justice Department: lost committee 
        document requests; failed to produce documents for days 
        because they could not find a messenger to bring the 
        documents to committee offices; failed to produce 
        documents for days because they had to be personally 
        Bates-stamped by the Associate Deputy Attorney General; 
        or simply took months to produce documents because of 
        vacations, illness, or difficulty in locating 
        responsive documents.\783\ Yet, when the Department had 
        a 302 that was potentially embarrassing to 
        Representative Solomon, a critic of the Justice 
        Department, they produced it in less than 24 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \782\ This information was related by Craig Iscoe, Associate Deputy 
Attorney General, to committee staff when he brought the Solomon 302 to 
committee offices on Dec. 16, 1999.
    \783\ See, e.g., letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on 
Government Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (Feb. 11, 1999) 
(regarding failure of Justice Department to respond in timely fashion 
to requests for documents relating to Orlando Castro); letter from Dan 
Burton, chairman, Committee on Government Reform, to Janet Reno, 
Attorney General (June 14, 1999) (regarding failure of Justice 
Department to respond in timely fashion to requests for documents 
relating to search warrant of Trie residence).

         The Solomon 302 was produced rapidly, and 
        without a formal request, despite the Justice 
        Department's impassioned arguments of several days 
        earlier. The Department had been arguing that the 
        committee was receiving and releasing too many 302s. 
        The Department was even willing to argue that it should 
        not obey a congressional subpoena because of the harm 
        that the committee was doing by requesting and 
        releasing 302s. Yet, scarcely days after those 
        arguments had been made, the Department provided a 302 
        to the committee without a formal request. Moreover, 
        Department staff had made the information in that 302 
        available to a convicted felon so that he could paint 
        himself in a more favorable light in his congressional 
        testimony. The speed with which this document was 
        produced made a mockery of the apparently earnest 
        entreaties made just days earlier by Associate Deputy 
        Attorney General Iscoe and FBI General Counsel 
        Parkinson.\784\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \784\ It is only fair to point out that Mr. Parkinson did not 
appear to be involved in the Justice Department's efforts to get the 
Solomon 302 out to the committee and the media.

    The Department's release of the Solomon 302 served as a 
stark example of the politicization of the Justice Department. 
The Department was willing to disobey lawful subpoenas when the 
committee was seeking information pertaining to the President 
and Vice President that was embarrassing to the Justice 
Department because it indicated a serious failure in the 
campaign fundraising investigation. Yet, when the Justice 
Department had the opportunity to spread information that 
harmed a widely respected Republican Member of Congress, it 
abandoned all of its principled arguments and seized the 
opportunity. Faced with an example like this, it is difficult 
to believe that the actions of the Reno Justice Department were 
motivated by anything other than crass political self-interest.

2. Attempted Release of Information Relating to Chairman Burton

    Six months later, the Justice Department again tried to 
release information that was harmful to one of its critics. 
This time, on the eve of the committee's release of the Freeh 
and La Bella memoranda, the Justice Department attempted to 
force the committee to release information relating to the 
Justice Department's investigation of Chairman Burton.\785\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \785\ Shortly after Chairman Burton announced his plans to conduct 
an investigation of the 1996 campaign fundraising scandal, Mark Siegel, 
a former DNC officer and active DNC fundraiser, alleged that he had 
been ``shaken down'' to make political contributions by Chairman 
Burton. Given Mr. Siegel's political affiliation, and the timing of his 
charges, his allegations could scarcely be taken seriously. 
Nevertheless, the Justice Department launched a grand jury 
investigation of the allegations, issuing subpoenas to the Burton 
campaign shortly after the Government Reform Committee issued its first 
subpoena to the Justice Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Throughout the month of May 2000, the Justice Department 
located and made available to the committee various memoranda 
responsive to the committee's May 3, 2000, subpoena for the 
Freeh and La Bella memoranda, as well as other memoranda 
written in response to those two reports. After the responsive 
documents were produced to the committee on May 24, 2000, the 
committee continued to receive additional documents. In most 
cases, these were memoranda that were missed in earlier 
searches. In most of these cases, these documents pertained to 
the Attorney General's decision not to appoint an independent 
counsel to investigate the 1996 campaign fundraising scandal.
    In late May, the committee scheduled a hearing to take 
place on June 6, 2000. At this hearing, the committee was 
scheduled to release the Freeh and La Bella memoranda and 
related documents, and it was also scheduled to question Public 
Integrity Section Chief Lee Radek about those documents. 
However, on the evening of June 5, 2000, a staff attorney in 
the Department's Office of Legislative Affairs contacted 
committee staff to tell them that the Department would be 
producing to the committee that evening a document relating to 
the investigation of Chairman Burton. Chairman Burton responded 
almost immediately with a letter refusing to accept production 
of the records, and questioning the Department's attempt to 
send the documents to the committee.\786\ The Department's 
attempted production of records relating to Chairman Burton 
raised several troubling questions: (1) how were the Burton 
records related to the committee's subpoena; (2) why did the 
Justice Department attempt to produce records relating to what 
purported to be an open investigation; and (3) why did the 
Justice Department attempt to provide these records to the 
committee at 5:10 p.m., on the evening before a hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \786\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (June 6, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, the committee's May 3, 2000, subpoena called for 
``[a]ll formal memoranda that were sent to the Attorney General 
or senior Justice Department officials in connection with 
decisions involving the application of the Independent Counsel 
Act to campaign finance-related matters, including memos that 
address the Independent Counsel Act-related aspects of the 
Freeh and La Bella memoranda.'' \787\ When they told committee 
staff that they intended to produce the documents relating to 
the Burton investigation, Justice Department staff were unable 
to provide any explanation of how the records related to the 
committee's subpoena. While there was a provision of the 
Independent Counsel Act that allowed the Attorney General to 
request an independent counsel for Members of Congress, there 
had been no indication that such a request had been made for 
Chairman Burton. Indeed, the Justice Department has 
investigated many Members of Congress in the past several 
years, and of all of those investigations, the Department 
proposed producing documents only from the Burton 
investigation.\788\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \787\ Subpoena duces tecum issued by the Committee on Government 
Reform (May 3, 2000).
    \788\ After the committee refused to accept records relating to the 
investigation of Chairman Burton, the Justice Department did attempt to 
explain the production of records relating to Chairman Burton. In a 
letter dated June 9, 2000, Robert Raben, the Assistant Attorney 
General, stated that ``[w]e have confirmed that the allegations that 
are discussed in the memorandum were the subject of a decision under 
the Independent Counsel Act and therefore that the memorandum is 
responsive to your subpoena. We have further confirmed that production 
of the memorandum would not harm any pending investigation--which is 
the standard we have applied to all other documents responsive to the 
Committee's subpoena for Independent Counsel-related memoranda.'' 
Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Attorney General, to Dan Burton, 
chairman, Committee on Government Reform (June 9, 2000). Taking the 
significant step of accepting all of these representations as true, the 
timing of the Department's decision still raises serious questions 
about the Department's motivations. The Department attempted to produce 
the memorandum to the committee on the eve of the release of the Freeh 
and La Bella memoranda (and the wholesale release of all independent 
counsel memoranda, which was proposed by the committee minority).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, the Justice Department had frequently refused to 
produce records to the committee on the basis that the 
subpoenaed records related to an open investigation. A 
memorandum improperly released by a senior Justice Department 
staffer in 1999 listed the allegation against Chairman Burton 
as ``not yet closed, but likely to be shortly.'' \789\ Despite 
this designation in June 1999, neither Chairman Burton nor his 
private counsel have ever been informed that the investigation 
against him was closed. Therefore, it appears that as of the 
Department's attempted release of the information regarding 
Chairman Burton in June 2000, the investigation of Chairman 
Burton was still technically open. Leaving aside the 
significant issue of why the Burton investigation was left open 
for so long after all investigative work had ceased,\790\ the 
Justice Department appeared to be deviating from its policy of 
refusing to release records relating to open cases, so that it 
could release records relating to Chairman Burton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \789\ Memorandum titled Task Force cases (June 4, 1999) (exhibit 
14).
    \790\ Chairman Burton has often questioned the apparent Justice 
Department practice of leaving cases open long after investigative 
activity in that case has ceased. The Justice Department has often 
refused to produce records about a matter to the committee, claiming 
that the matter is open. However, in many of these cases, it is 
apparent that all activity in the case has stopped. The June 4, 1999, 
list of Task Force cases seems to confirm the chairman's criticisms. 
For example, there are 27 cases listed under the heading 
``Investigations Which FBI and the Task Force have closed (awaiting AG 
determination).'' Id. There are another 14 cases listed under the 
heading ``Investigations Not yet Closed but Likely to be Shortly.'' Id. 
Chairman Burton's case is listed under this heading, with the 
additional notation ``closing memo sent to Public Integrity.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, the timing of the Department's decision was 
especially suspicious. The Department had had over 2 months to 
locate records responsive to the committee's subpoena. Yet, it 
waited until the evening before the committee's release of the 
Freeh and La Bella memoranda to attempt to produce these 
records to the committee. When committee staff asked Justice 
Department staff to describe the process that led to this 
document being discovered, Justice Department staff described 
it as ``people rooting through boxes and pulling out 
documents.'' \791\ As part of an effort to better understand 
this process, and identify the staffer who was ``rooting 
through'' boxes relating to the Burton investigation, the 
chairman asked the Justice Department to identify the staffers 
responsible for proposing the production of the Burton 
records.\792\ The Department never responded to this request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \791\ Letter from Dan Burton, chairman, Committee on Government 
Reform, to Janet Reno, Attorney General (June 6, 2000).
    \792\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Justice Department's attempt to produce records 
relating to the investigation of Chairman Burton appeared to be 
a maneuver, much like the release of the Solomon 302, designed 
to draw attention away from committee hearings which were 
embarrassing to the Clinton administration. It also appeared to 
be designed to intimidate Chairman Burton, and to discourage 
him from subpoenaing documents from the Justice Department. 
Like the Department's release of the Solomon 302, the 
Department's attempted release of information about Chairman 
Burton was done in contravention of Department policy, and 
under highly irregular circumstances.

       IV. Favorable Treatment of the Attorney General's Friends

     A. The Justice Department's Handling of the Soka Gakkai Matter

    The committee investigated the efforts of Rebekah Poston, a 
prominent Miami lawyer and a friend of the Attorney General, to 
obtain confidential law enforcement information from the 
Justice Department. The committee has learned the following:

         Rebekah Poston was hired by Soka Gakkai, a 
        large Japanese Buddhist sect, to obtain criminal 
        justice records on a man named Nobuo Abe, the head of a 
        rival Buddhist sect. Soka Gakkai hoped to use these 
        records in a defamation lawsuit against Abe.

         Poston hired private investigators who 
        illegally obtained confidential National Crime 
        Information Center (NCIC) records on Nobuo Abe.

         Poston then filed a Freedom of Information 
        Act (FOIA) request to legally obtain this same 
        information on Abe. Long-standing Justice Department 
        policy prohibited the Department from releasing this 
        type of information pursuant to a FOIA request. 
        Moreover, long-standing Department policy prohibited 
        even confirming or denying the existence of a criminal 
        record. Accordingly, Poston's FOIA request was 
        rejected, as was her appeal.

         Poston used her influence with the Attorney 
        General's Chief of Staff to obtain a reversal of the 
        Justice Department's position. Poston had at least 22 
        contacts with senior Justice Department staff regarding 
        her FOIA request. Her contacts resulted in a meeting 
        between her and Associate Attorney General John 
        Schmidt, the third-ranking official in the Justice 
        Department. Schmidt reversed the earlier decision of 
        Richard Huff, the head of the Office of Information and 
        Privacy, who had rejected Poston's FOIA appeal. Huff 
        could recall no other meetings like this in his 25 year 
        career.

         When the Department of Justice responded to 
        Poston's FOIA request, it stated that it had no records 
        on Nobuo Abe. Poston's investigators believed that the 
        record they had earlier obtained had been deleted by 
        government officials. This deletion, as well as other 
        evidence regarding the record, led a number of 
        individuals involved in the case to speculate that the 
        Abe record had been planted in the NCIC system by 
        individuals associated with Soka Gakkai.

         The evidence that Abe's NCIC record was 
        illegally accessed was provided to lawyers at the FBI's 
        Office of Professional Responsibility on at least four 
        different occasions. Yet, the FBI and the Justice 
        Department failed to conduct a thorough investigation 
        of these allegations.

    There are two deeply troubling aspects to the facts 
uncovered by the committee. First, a prominent Florida 
attorney, a close friend of the Attorney General, was involved 
in criminal activity. This criminal activity has gone without 
any investigation or punishment for nearly 6 years. Now that 
the committee has brought these facts to light, Rebekah Poston 
has refused to answer any questions regarding her activities. 
Poston refused to answer a number of questions in a private 
interview, citing both attorney-client privilege, and concerns 
regarding possible criminal exposure. Then, when called to a 
public hearing, Poston repeatedly cited attorney-client 
privilege.\793\ Second, this same friend of the Attorney 
General used her influence within the Justice Department to 
obtain a one-time reversal of long-standing Department policy. 
The implications of the Justice Department's failures in this 
case are severe: (1) it appears that the Department does not 
want to investigate allegations of improper access to its law 
enforcement databases; (2) it appears that the Department does 
not want to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by a friend 
of the Attorney General; (3) it appears that the Department 
applies a more lenient legal standard to FOIA requests made by 
a friend of the Attorney General than other FOIA requesters; 
and (4) the long-standing Justice Department policy of neither 
confirming nor denying the existence of criminal records 
relating to non-citizens is in doubt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \793\ Both during and after the committee's July 27, 2000, hearing, 
Ms. Poston and her counsel denied that she ever intended to invoke her 
fifth amendment rights. However, during the committee's interview of 
Ms. Poston on June 29, 2000, Ms. Poston's counsel, Eduardo Palmer, 
informed committee staff that Ms. Poston would not answer any questions 
about her efforts to obtain information through private investigators 
because of attorney-client privilege issues and because of her possible 
criminal exposure. These issues were raised in a letter to Chairman 
Burton after the committee's hearing. See letter from C. Boyden Gray, 
Wilmer Cutler & Pickering, to Chairman Dan Burton (Sept. 21, 2000) 
(exhibit 53). Ms. Poston's--and her counsel's--expressions that she 
would be unable to answer questions because of ``possible criminal 
exposure,'' and her baseless invocation of attorney-client privilege 
are discussed in detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Background

            a. Background on Soka Gakkai
    Soka Gakkai was formed in 1930 as an organization espousing 
the reform of Japanese schools. After World War II, Soka Gakkai 
became affiliated with the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist sect. 
Between 1951 and 1991, Soka Gakkai operated as a lay 
organization affiliated with the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist sect. 
During that period of time, Soka Gakkai grew to have 
approximately 10 million members and assets over $100 
billion.\794\ Soka Gakkai also controls Komeito, which is the 
fourth-largest political party in Japan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \794\ Bob Whitby, ``The Buddha Brotherhood,'' Miami New Times (Nov. 
11, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1991, after years of tension between Nobuo Abe (also 
known as Nikken Abe), leader of Nichiren Shoshu, and Daisaku 
Ikeda, leader of Soka Gakkai, the leaders of Nichiren Shoshu 
expelled Soka Gakkai members from their sect, and severed all 
ties between the groups. This action sparked extended 
litigation between the groups that continues to this day. This 
litigation reached American shores, as Nichiren Shoshu and Soka 
Gakkai both had extensive United States assets and membership.
    In June 1992, two Soka Gakkai publications published a 
controversial allegation by Hiroe Clow, a Soka Gakkai member. 
Clow stated that in 1963, she traveled to the United States 
with Nobuo Abe, and was called by Mr. Abe late at night after 
he was detained by the Seattle police for being involved in an 
altercation with prostitutes. Ms. Clow stated that she picked 
Mr. Abe up at the police station, and that no charges were 
filed against Abe. Clow's charges against Abe were a major 
embarrassment for Abe and Nichiren Shoshu, and they responded 
by filing a lawsuit for libel against Clow and Soka Gakkai in 
Japan. This lawsuit, as well as counterclaims, and related 
litigation in the United States, was pursued by both sides with 
little regard for expense, and both sides employed large teams 
of lawyers and investigators in the United States and Japan.
    Soka Gakkai International-USA had extensive real estate 
holdings in the United States, including a 120-acre compound 
outside of Miami, FL. Steel Hector & Davis, a leading Miami law 
firm, represented Soka Gakkai in connection with its Florida 
real estate projects, and considered Soka Gakkai a major 
client.\795\ In late 1994, Soka Gakkai apparently asked Steel 
Hector if it could assist in connection with the Abe lawsuit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \795\ Memorandum from Rich [Lucas] to Phil [Manuel] (Nov. 4, 1994) 
(exhibit 58).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Background on Steel Hector & Davis
    Steel Hector & Davis was formed in 1925, and is now one of 
Florida's largest and best known law firms. The current 
Attorney General of the United States, Janet Reno, served as a 
partner at the firm prior to her service as Florida State 
Attorney. When Soka Gakkai was seeking help in getting 
information from the Justice Department, Steel Hector was a 
good choice for other reasons as well. John Edward Smith, a 
senior partner in the firm, was a long-time friend of the 
Attorney General, and was one of only two lawyers to help her 
prepare for her confirmation hearings.\796\ Rebekah Poston also 
made Steel Hector a good choice for Soka Gakkai. Poston had 
just joined Steel Hector as counsel, but she was an experienced 
white collar defense lawyer, and more importantly, was also a 
friend of the Attorney General. Poston's sister, Roberta 
Forrest, served as the campaign manager for Reno when she ran 
for State Attorney. Poston's sister also worked as a secretary 
in the State Attorney's office where both Reno and her future 
Chief of Staff at the Justice Department, John Hogan, 
worked.\797\ Poston describes herself as a friend of the 
Attorney General, and describes her sister as a close personal 
friend of the Attorney General.\798\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \796\ Interview of John Hogan at 2 (June 23, 2000) (Hogan 
interview).
    \797\ Interview of Rebekah Poston at 1 (June 29, 2000) (Poston 
interview); Hogan interview at 1.
    \798\ Poston interview at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Rebekah Poston Illegally Obtains Information from the Department of 
        Justice

    In 1992, Soka Gakkai printed the account of Hiroe Clow, a 
member of Soka Gakkai. Clow stated that in 1963, she witnessed 
the arrest of Nobuo Abe, the leader of Nichiren Shoshu, for 
soliciting prostitutes. Litigation in the United States and 
Japan commenced soon thereafter. Nichiren Shoshu argued that 
Nobuo Abe, its High Priest, had been defamed by the charges 
printed by Soka Gakkai. In response, Soka Gakkai argued that 
Mrs. Clow had been defamed by Abe's repeated statements that 
Clow's accusations were false. Central to these lawsuits was 
whether there was any proof that Abe had actually been arrested 
for soliciting prostitutes in Seattle in 1963. Soka Gakkai's 
lawyers faced two major problems. First, the incident occurred 
30 years earlier, and few records remained, especially since 
charges were never brought against Mr. Abe. Second, if records 
did exist, they may have resided in non-public files or 
databases.
            a. Soka Gakkai Illegally Obtains Information on Nobuo Abe 
                    Through Jack Palladino
    According to one cooperating witness, Soka Gakkai's main 
lawyer in the United States, Barry Langberg, hired Jack 
Palladino, a well-known private investigator, to determine 
whether Abe was arrested in Seattle in 1963.\799\ Palladino 
then apparently contacted a source in the Bureau of Prisons who 
had access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 
database. This source accessed the database, and noted the 
following information:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \799\ Interview of Richard Lucas at 1 (July 11, 2000) (Lucas 
interview).

        3/63, NCIC-NATF, Complaint by four females of possible 
        pandering and solicitation by a bald Oriental, male, no 
        english at 12:40 AM, taken in for questioning, at 1:30 
        AM, no english. detained [sic] and released at 3:30 AM, 
        forwarded by teletype.\800\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \800\ Memorandum from Rich Lucas to Phil Manuel (Dec. 28, 1994) 
(exhibit 72).

This information was then apparently provided to other 
attorneys working on the case. If this information on Abe was 
taken from the NCIC database and provided to private parties 
like Langberg or Palladino, the source at the Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP) broke the law, as did possibly Langberg and 
Palladino.\801\ Federal law prohibits the theft, conversion, or 
unauthorized conveyance of government records, and individuals 
have been prosecuted for the theft of NCIC records 
specifically.\802\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \801\ After the committee's July 27, 2000, hearing regarding this 
subject, committee staff was contacted by counsel for Mr. Langberg, who 
denied that Mr. Langberg had hired Palladino to obtain any information 
on Abe. He also denied that Mr. Langberg was involved in any illegal 
activity. The committee intends to subpoena information from Mr. 
Langberg and Mr. Palladino to confirm the extent of their involvement 
in this matter.
    \802\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641; see also facsimile from John Sebastian to 
Phillip Manual (sic) (Feb. 15, 1995) (attaching two newspaper articles 
about prosecutions for theft of NCIC records) (exhibit 80).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Soka Gakkai would later attempt to confirm this record 
through other sources, and would have great difficulty in doing 
so. First, it received confirmation through Rebekah Poston and 
her investigators that there was a record on Abe in the NCIC 
system, but that it was different from the record viewed by the 
source at the Bureau of Prisons. Then, subsequently, when 
Poston tried to access the record through the FOIA process, she 
was told that no record existed. These later problems, which 
are discussed in detail below, have led individuals involved in 
the case to speculate that the NCIC information on Abe was 
planted there by the initial source at the Bureau of Prisons. 
This speculation is supported by several factors:

         It is unlikely that a computer record would 
        have existed for Abe if he was detained and released in 
        1963 on a minor charge.

         Indeed, in his interview with committee 
        staff, Phil Manuel, the main investigator who worked 
        for Poston, noted that he believed that the BOP source 
        was a member of Soka Gakkai, and a friend or associate 
        of Hiroe Clow.\803\ If that information is true, she 
        would have had the motive to fabricate evidence against 
        Abe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \803\ Interview of Philip Manuel at 3 (July 18, 2000) (Manuel 
interview).

         Other private investigators were unable to 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        verify the information provided by the BOP source.

         When conducting a search for records in 
        response to Poston's FOIA request, the Justice 
        Department was unable to find any records on Abe.

    If indeed this information on Abe was planted in the NCIC 
system, it raises serious questions about the stewardship of 
the NCIC database, and makes the subsequent failure by the 
Justice Department to investigate this matter even more 
troublesome.
            b. Poston Requests Her Private Investigators to Break the 
                    Law
    While Soka Gakkai already had gained access to what 
purported to be Abe's arrest record, they chose to confirm its 
existence through another source. It is unclear why Soka Gakkai 
chose to hire another set of lawyers and investigators to 
access Abe's record a second time. Perhaps they were concerned 
with the reliability of Mr. Palladino's work, or perhaps they 
simply wanted a high degree of confidence in their information 
before they used it in court in Japan.
    Billing records subpoenaed by the committee indicate that 
Poston's work for Soka Gakkai began in early November 
1994.\804\ Poston was one of a number of lawyers hired by Soka 
Gakkai through their main California-based lawyer, Barry 
Langberg. While the circumstances of Poston's hiring are not 
entirely clear, at least one document prepared by individuals 
working with Poston states that ``Steel Hector was hired due to 
the relationship with the Attorney General.'' \805\ Indeed, 
Poston confirmed to investigators working for her that she 
believed that the only reason Steel Hector & Davis was working 
on this matter was because of the firm's influence in 
Washington.\806\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \804\ See Steel Hector & Davis billing records at 0000143, 0000154 
(exhibit 100).
    \805\ Memorandum from Mike Wilson to John Gibbons at 1 (Nov. 27, 
1996) (exhibit 98).
    \806\ Lucas interview at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Poston had her initial client meeting on the Abe matter on 
November 2, 1994.\807\ Due to an invocation of privilege by 
Soka Gakkai, the committee has not learned who met with Poston, 
or what was discussed. However, immediately after her client 
meeting, Poston apparently contacted Richard Lucas, a private 
investigator in Florida who worked with the Philip Manuel 
Resource Group (PMRG), an investigative firm based in 
Washington, DC. Poston retained PMRG to work on the case, and 
specifically, to determine whether Abe had a record in the NCIC 
system. Lucas explained Poston's request in a memo to Phil 
Manuel, the principal in PRMG:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \807\ Steel Hector & Davis billing records at 0000154 (exhibit 
100).

        [Poston] called this afternoon asking for assistance on 
        a government inquiry. Her request is unusual and came 
        with the usual promises that it will lead to bigger and 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        better things.

        She is attempting to obtain a March 1963 document that 
        substantiates an individual was arrested 30 years ago 
        in Seattle for prostitution. It was confirmed, 
        according to her, through the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
        that they have in there [sic] files a reference of this 
        arrest.\808\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \808\ Memorandum from Rich Lucas to Phil Manual (Nov. 2, 1994) 
(exhibit 54).

    This task, though, proved difficult for Lucas and Manuel to 
accomplish. Poston's billing records indicate that she had four 
telephone calls with ``investigators'' over the next 2 
days.\809\ On November 4, 1994, Lucas sent another memo to 
Manuel:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \809\ Steel Hector & Davis billing records at 0000154.

        As you know we received an assignment from Poston and 
        now I am in a precarious position.

           *         *         *         *         *

        It appears the two alternatives are to use a 
        confidential source or tell Poston that we do not want 
        the case. The latter will cause ill feelings since we 
        should have informed her on Wednesday but it is better 
        to be up front now than to incur expenses, not get the 
        information, and burn bridges with the our [sic] only 
        inroad at Steel Hector Davis.\810\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \810\ Memorandum from Rich Lucas to Phil Manuel (Nov. 4, 1994) 
(exhibit 55).

Manuel responded by saying ``Poston must realize that SUPERMAN 
does not exist. There is no confidential source who will give 
documentary evidence which is not released through proper 
channels. . . . If the document exists we can get it but it 
will take time--that's it. She'll have to take it or leave 
it.'' \811\ After an additional memo from Lucas asking him to 
reconsider, Manuel wrote ``I do not know a confidential source 
in Seattle which has the authority to hand search criminal 
files that are not on a computer--remember we have no 
identifiers like DOB or SSN only a name therefore NCIC sources 
are useless. Computer files do not go back to 1963. The files 
must be hand searched by someone with access.'' \812\ Later on 
November 4, Poston obtained Abe's date of birth, and provided 
it to Manuel and Lucas to assist them in their search.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \811\ Memorandum from Rich Lucas to Phil Manuel (Nov. 4, 1994), 
(with handwritten notations of Phil Manuel) (exhibit 56).
    \812\ Memorandum from Rich [Lucas] to Phil [Manuel] (with 
handwritten notations by Phil Manuel) (exhibit 57).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. Poston Obtains the Information
    Using the information provided by Poston, Manuel and Lucas 
each contacted confidential sources to determine whether Abe 
had an arrest record. Manuel contacted Ben Brewer, the manager 
of the Program Support Section within the Administration 
Division at the FBI.\813\ According to Richard Lucas, Brewer 
accessed the NCIC database, and told Manuel the information on 
Abe contained in the database.\814\ Lucas contacted a friend, 
Tony Gonzalez, a retired IRS investigator, to ask for help in 
obtaining criminal history information on Abe. Gonzalez in turn 
contacted a confidential source who provided him with 
information regarding Abe's purported 1963 arrest in 
Seattle.\815\ Several days later, on November 11, 1994, Lucas 
sent a memo to Poston containing the information that Manuel 
and Lucas had been able to obtain from their confidential law 
enforcement sources:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \813\ Lucas interview at 1. In an interview with committee staff, 
Philip Manuel denied that he ever obtained NCIC information, or any 
other proprietary government information on Abe. Manuel interview at 2-
3. However, Manuel's interview statement is contradicted not only by 
Lucas, but also by Manuel's own sworn affidavit, in which he states ``I 
contacted a confidential and highly reliable source'' and ``my source 
told me that there was a federal government record for Nobuo Abe which 
referred to `Suspicion of Solicitation of Prostitution, Seattle Police 
Department, March 1963.' ''
    \814\ Lucas interview at 1.
    \815\ Id.

        A source was contacted and provided the following 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        information:

        1. The source was provided with the identifiers of 
        Nobuo Abe and Noburo Abbe, and the date of birth of 
        December 19, 1922. The source was also told there was 
        no social security number due to the subject not being 
        a U.S. citizen.

        2. The source relayed that under the data provided 
        there was a reference to ``Solicitation of 
        Prostitution, Seattle Police Department, March 1963''. 
        The charge was abbreviated and not spelled out.\816\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \816\ Memorandum from Richard Lucas to Rebekah Poston (Nov. 11, 
1994) (exhibit 61).

The memo then contained a detailed explanation of the NCIC 
database, as well as an explanation of why information like 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
this would be in the NCIC:

        6. The source theorized that if Abe was a Japanese 
        citizen with no U.S. residence or forms of 
        identification, other than a passport, an inquiry might 
        have been made with NCIC to determine if he was wanted 
        on other charges or had previous encounters with law 
        enforcement.\817\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \817\ Id.

    After receiving this information, Poston and Soka Gakkai 
came back with a number of questions. George Odano, the Soka 
Gakkai representative dealing with Poston, posed a number of 
questions to Poston, seeking more detail on the information 
that the investigators had obtained, as well as confirmation 
that the information obtained by Manuel and Lucas was 
accurate.\818\ Apparently, one concern was that the information 
that Soka Gakkai had previously obtained from the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons was more detailed than the information 
obtained by Manuel and Lucas. Poston forwarded these questions 
to Lucas, ordering him to ``please get answers to as many of 
these as you can and be specific. This is a matter of serious 
importance.'' \819\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \818\ Facsimile from Rebekah Poston to Richard Lucas (Nov. 11, 
1994) (attaching Nov. 10, 1994 letter from George Odano to Rebekah 
Poston) (exhibit 62).
    \819\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Lucas provided these follow-up questions to Phil Manuel, 
and Manuel worked to obtain the requested information. Six days 
later, on November 17, 1994, Lucas wrote another memo to Poston 
to address Odano's follow-up questions:

        A source within the U.S. government in Washington D.C. 
        was contacted and provided the following information:

        1. There is no record or information on Hiroe Clow.

        2. There is a record for Nobuo Abe. The record refers 
        to ``Suspicion of Solicitation of Prostitution, Seattle 
        Police Department, March 1963''. There is no reference 
        to Abe's date of birth nor the exact date of the 
        incident. There was no other significant date as to the 
        facts and circumstances surrounding the incident.

        3. The confidential source stated that the information 
        on Mr. Abe was an inquiry for information by the 
        Seattle Police Dept. not a recording of an arrest or 
        conviction.

        4. The source in Washington D.C. has access to any 
        inquiries made by third parties on Mr. Abe. According 
        to the computer tracking system there have been more 
        than six inquiries on Mr. Abe from various U.S. cities 
        over the last two weeks.

        5. The various inquiries by the different government 
        entities has caused concern in the Washington D.C. 
        central office. The source stated the recorded 
        information should never have been entered on Mr. Abe. 
        The source also stated that if Mr. Abe made an official 
        request, the entry under his name would be removed from 
        the record. In addition, it is under consideration that 
        the entire record be removed due to the obvious recent 
        interest by numerous third parties, the date of the 
        alleged incident and the fact it is a ``questionable 
        entry''.

        6. It is our opinion that any effort to obtain the 
        information on Nobuo Abe through an official request be 
        done expeditiously.\820\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \820\ Memorandum from Richard Lucas to Rebekah Poston (Nov. 17, 
1994) (exhibit 63).

Lucas informed committee staff that Manuel obtained this 
information from Ben Brewer, his confidential source in the 
FBI.\821\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \821\ Lucas interview at 2. Again, Manuel denied in his committee 
interview that he obtained NCIC information on Abe. However, Manuel's 
denials are contradicted by his own sworn affidavit, and are not 
credible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At this point, both Lucas and Manuel were becoming quite 
concerned with their involvement in the Soka Gakkai matter. 
Both were under the impression that this would be a small 
project when they accepted it.\822\ In fact, the only reason 
they accepted it was because Poston was a senior lawyer with a 
prominent firm with close connections to the Justice 
Department. Otherwise, PMRG never would have accepted a case so 
small.\823\ However, shortly after they started working on the 
project, Lucas and Manuel realized that the project was more 
complicated, and exposed them to significant risks. Lucas told 
the committee that it was clear that ``essentially you were 
breaking the law'' by doing what Poston had asked.\824\ In sum, 
Lucas and Manuel became convinced that Poston had asked them to 
expose themselves to a major risk for very little financial 
reward.\825\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \822\ Lucas interview at 2.
    \823\ Id.
    \824\ Id. When questioned by minority staff at the committee's July 
27, 2000, hearing, Lucas qualified the statement he had given to 
majority staff on an earlier occasion. When asked if he felt that his 
actions broke the law, Mr. Lucas first stated that he could not reach a 
legal conclusion determining whether or not he broke the law. 
``Felonies and Favors: A Friend of the Attorney General Gathers 
Information from the Justice Department,'' 106th Cong. 52 (July 27, 
2000) (preliminary transcript). Then, he stated that ``I do not believe 
my contact with Mr. Gonzalez was breaking the law.'' Id. at 53. Mr. 
Lucas' conclusion that he was not breaking the law was based upon the 
fact that he claims that he did not have specific knowledge that 
Gonzalez would be accessing the NCIC database, and that he did not 
specifically request Gonzalez to access to NCIC database. The fact that 
Lucas, and for that matter, Manuel, did not specifically ask their 
sources to access NCIC is legally irrelevant. Rather, the fact is that 
they were asked to confirm the existence of information in NCIC, and 
asked their sources to confirm the existence of the information. Their 
sources then did so, by accessing NCIC. Such activity is illegal.
    \825\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. The Information on Abe is Deleted
    By December 1994, Manuel and Lucas became concerned that 
the NCIC record on Abe was going to be deleted. Apparently, Ben 
Brewer, Manuel's source within the FBI, told Manuel that there 
was concern in the FBI about the origin of the Abe record, and 
that it might be deleted.\826\ By early December 1994, Lucas 
was discussing with Poston actions that Soka Gakkai could take 
to secure the Abe NCIC record before it was deleted. They 
discussed seeking a court injunction preserving the Abe record, 
but apparently decided not to.\827\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \826\ Id.
    \827\ Memorandum from Richard Lucas to Rebekah Poston (Dec. 9, 
1994) (exhibit 67).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By late December 1994, Abe's NCIC record had been deleted. 
On December 22, 1994, Manuel wrote a memo to Poston in which he 
described his contacts with a confidential source who accessed 
NCIC on his behalf (Richard Lucas informed the committee that 
this source was again Ben Brewer of the FBI):

        This is to report that a highly confidential and 
        reliable source has advised as follows regarding the 
        subject of your inquiry:

        (1) Whatever files of references, either in data base 
        [sic] form or hard copy form, which were available 
        previously have apparently been purged. There are 
        currently no derogatory references to the subject of 
        your inquiry in any files maintained by or under the 
        control of the Department of Justice or any of its 
        investigative agencies. Specifically, there is no 
        information in NCIC.\828\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \828\ Memorandum from Philip R. Manuel to Rebekah Poston (Dec. 22, 
1994) (exhibit 71).

    Because of the confusion surrounding Abe's NCIC record at 
this point, Poston apparently went back to the original source 
of the information on Abe--Jack Palladino's source at the 
Bureau of Prisons. Poston apparently learned exactly what 
information the BOP source extracted from the NCIC, and passed 
this information on to PMRG.\829\ Poston asked Lucas and Manuel 
to determine whether the BOP source's notes were legitimate, 
and whether that kind of information could have come from 
databases accessible at the BOP.\830\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \829\ Memorandum from Rich Lucas to Phil Manuel (exhibit 71).
    \830\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is unclear what, if any, answers Manuel and Lucas were 
able to provide to Poston. A number of records show that Poston 
was hiring still more private investigators as late as 1996 to 
determine what happened to the NCIC records on Abe.\831\ It 
appears that Poston decided that it was crucial to her case to 
determine where the original BOP source got the information on 
Abe. It also appears that Poston's desire to get information 
from the BOP source may have even led her to offer a bribe to 
the BOP employee. As one memo from 1996 notes:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \831\ Memorandum from Michael Wilson to John Gibbons (Nov. 19, 
1996) (exhibit 97).

        Poston stated she was told the Bureau of Prison [sic] 
        employee would not come forward due to her pension may 
        be at risk if she was exposed. She added an offer may 
        have been made as to severance pay by the client if 
        that resulted.\832\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \832\ Memorandum from Michael Wilson to John Gibbons (Nov. 27, 
1996) (exhibit 98).

Due to barriers raised by Poston and her attorneys, namely the 
invocation of the fifth amendment and attorney-client 
privileges, the committee has not been able to learn whether 
Poston or Soka Gakkai ever made good on this payment to their 
confidential source.
            e. The Actions Taken Were Illegal
    There is no question that the actions taken by Rebekah 
Poston, Philip Manuel, Richard Lucas, and their confidential 
sources, were illegal. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641 provides for felony 
or misdemeanor penalties for anyone who ``embezzles, steals, 
purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of 
another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of 
any record . . . or whoever receives, conceals, or retains the 
same with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it 
to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted[.]'' 
\833\ This statute has been used to prosecute individuals who 
sell or give away government information.\834\ It appears that 
both Poston and the private investigators at PMRG were aware of 
their legal exposure. Richard Lucas stated that ``in direct 
conversations with Ms. Poston, she commented about her concern 
that the activities of the unknown Bureau of Prisons employee 
and the actions taken by PMRG on her behalf could be 
illegal[.]'' \835\ There is also a document indicating that 
Phil Manuel was aware of the risks involved in improperly 
obtaining NCIC information. On February 15, 1995, an individual 
named John Sebastian sent Manuel a fax of two newspaper 
articles with the handwritten note ``TITLE: OUT ON THE LIMB.'' 
Sebastian then wrote on top of each article a caption stating 
``THEFT OF NCIC RECORDS.'' \836\ The articles describe police 
officers prosecuted for selling NCIC printouts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \833\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641.
    \834\ See, e.g., United States v. Elefant, 999 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 
1993).
    \835\ Letter from John C. Gibbons to David V. Ries, Deputy Chief, 
Office of Professional Responsibility, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
May 28, 1997 (exhibit 103).
    \836\ Facsimile from John Sebastian to Philip Manuel (Feb. 15, 
1995) (attaching articles regarding the theft of NCIC records) (exhibit 
80).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, the 1996 memo describing Poston's efforts to 
obtain information from Jack Palladino's source at the BOP 
raises additional questions about illegal conduct by the Soka 
Gakkai lawyers and investigators. The memo indicates that 
Poston may have made an offer that Soka Gakkai would reimburse 
the BOP source if she lost her pension as a result of coming 
forward with her confidential information.\837\ If these 
allegations are true, they could constitute a bribe or 
solicitation for bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \837\ Memorandum from Michael Wilson to John Gibbons (Nov. 27, 
1996) (exhibit 98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Poston Requests Information on Nobuo Abe Through FOIA

            a. Poston Places FOIA Requests for Information on Abe
    On November 21, 1994, Poston submitted FOIA requests to the 
Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and a number of other 
agencies, requesting information on Abe's alleged detention in 
Seattle. Given the claims of attorney-client privilege made by 
parties involved in the investigation, all of Poston's reasons 
for pursuing the information through FOIA are unknown. However, 
it appears that information obtained through legal means would 
be easier to use in the ongoing litigation in Japan. In 
addition, it appears that Poston had a concern that the Abe 
record might be deleted from the NCIC database, given the 
concern within the FBI that it was not a legitimate record.
            b. Poston Publicly Confirms that She Already Has the 
                    Information
    While her FOIA requests were still pending, in December 
1994 and January 1995, Poston took steps that publicly 
acknowledged the receipt of confidential NCIC records from 
Manuel and Lucas. First, on December 9, 1994, Poston wrote a 
letter to Soka Gakkai confirming that she had obtained the NCIC 
information on Abe:

        Your organization has requested us to investigate 
        whether the United States government has maintained any 
        records of an investigation concerning an individual 
        known as Nobuo Abe, a foreign national, born December 
        19, 1922.

        Subsequent to this request, we engaged the Philip 
        Manuel Resource Group, Ltd. (PMRG), a highly 
        prestigious private investigations firm based in 
        Washington, D.C[.]

        PMRG reported to us on November 17, 1994, that a source 
        within the U.S. government in Washington, D.C. was 
        contacted and the source confirmed to PMRG that there 
        is a record for Nobuo Abe. According to PMRG's report 
        to us, the record refers to:

          Suspicion of Solicitation of Prostitution

          Seattle Police Department

          March, 1963

           *         *         *         *         *

        I am able to testify as to the truthfulness and 
        accuracy of my statements in this letter.\838\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \838\ Letter from Rebekah Poston to Soka Gakkai (Dec. 9, 1994) 
(exhibit 68).

    Poston repeated the same information in a letter sent to 
Hiroe Clow on January 4, 1995.\839\ Shortly thereafter, in a 
SGI-USA newsletter dated January 9, 1995, Barry Langberg, Hiroe 
Clow's lawyer, publicly disclosed Poston's letter to Clow.\840\ 
Langberg included the letter in an interview in which he was 
explaining the progress of Clow's lawsuit against Abe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \839\ Letter from Rebekah Poston to Hiroe Clow (Jan. 4, 1995) 
(exhibit 73).
    \840\ The SGI-USA Newsletter (Jan. 9, 1995) (exhibit 74).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Poston's disclosure of the information that PMRG had 
obtained for her is surprising, given that her activities had 
been cloaked in secrecy to that point. Moreover, the disclosure 
by Poston constitutes a public admission that she had hired 
individuals who broke the law to obtain Abe's NCIC information, 
with Poston's apparent knowledge and consent. In addition, 
Poston's disclosure of the information obtained by PMRG 
constitutes a waiver of any attorney-client privilege or work 
product protection that she could invoke over those subjects.
            c. Negative Responses to Poston's FOIA Requests
    When Poston made her FOIA requests for NCIC information on 
Nobuo Abe, she was taking on a long-standing Justice Department 
policy against the release of that kind of information. 
According to Richard Huff, the Co-Director of the Office of 
Information and Privacy, the Department has a policy against 
releasing any criminal justice information to a third party 
without permission of the party involved.\841\ Moreover, in 
cases where they cannot release records, the Department has a 
policy against even confirming or denying the existence of 
criminal justice records within the Department.\842\ According 
to Huff, this policy ensures that individuals who have arrest 
records, and other records, have those records kept private. As 
Huff explained to committee staff, if the Department confirmed 
when individuals did not have arrest records, and simply said 
``no comment'' when they did have records, any person would be 
able to determine who had arrest records in the Justice 
Department.\843\ Therefore, according to Huff, the Justice 
Department's policy of refusing to confirm or deny whether 
criminal justice records exist is integral to a system that 
attempts to protect the privacy of individuals involved.\844\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \841\ Interview of Richard L. Huff at 1 (June 16, 2000) (Huff 
interview).
    \842\ Id.
    \843\ Id. at 1-2.
    \844\ Id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Poston apparently recognized the fact that she was 
attempting to obtain information in the face of long-standing 
Justice Department policy. She informed the committee that she 
viewed her FOIA request as a long-shot, because she was 
requesting information on a person that she did not 
represent.\845\ Poston's client, Hiroe Clow, also seemed to 
recognize that the FOIA request would not be granted, stating 
in a letter to Janet Reno: ``[m]y lawyers tell me that things 
don't look so good on the F.O.I.A. request if decided in 
accordance with previous practices.'' \846\ And, as expected, 
Poston's FOIA requests were rejected. The FBI informed Poston 
that she could not receive any information on Abe unless she 
provided either proof of death, or a notarized waiver from 
Abe.\847\ Similarly, the Executive Office of United States 
Attorneys told Poston that she must provide a notarized waiver 
by Abe.\848\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \845\ Poston interview at 3.
    \846\ Letter from Hiroe Clow to Janet Reno, Attorney General, 
Department of Justice (Mar. 21, 1995) (exhibit 110).
    \847\ Letter from J. Kevin O'Brien, Chief, Freedom of Information--
Privacy Acts Section, Information Resources Division, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, to Rebekah Poston (Dec. 8, 1994) (exhibit 66).
    \848\ Letter from Bonnie L. Gay, Attorney-in-Charge, FOIA/PA Unit, 
Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, to Rebekah Poston (Jan. 12, 1995) 
(exhibit 75).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Poston met with the FBI to discuss their handling of the 
FOIA request, and according to Poston, the FBI was receptive to 
her arguments, but informed her that their general policy was 
not to release, or even confirm or deny the existence of 
records about third parties in NCIC without the permission of 
the third party.\849\ According to Poston, the FBI told her 
that they would like to help her, but that any decision on the 
release of Abe's NCIC information would have to be made by the 
Attorney General, not the FBI.\850\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \849\ Poston interview at 2.
    \850\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After she received negative responses to her FOIA requests, 
on February 3, 1995, Poston submitted an appeal to the Justice 
Department. In her appeal, she argued that the Justice 
Department should release NCIC records on Abe, based on the 
fact that there was a significant public interest in whether 
Abe was arrested in Seattle in 1963; and that as a non-citizen, 
Abe was not protected by the Privacy Act.\851\ However, Poston 
was aware that her arguments would not likely be accepted by 
the Justice Department.\852\ The Justice Department had an 
established policy that it would not confirm or deny the 
existence of the records that Poston was seeking. This policy 
had been in place for a significant period of time, and 
Poston's arguments did not change that fact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \851\ Letter from Rebekah Poston to Attorney General Janet Reno 
(Feb. 3, 1995) (exhibit 77).
    \852\ Poston interview at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Rebekah Poston's Lobbying Campaign

    After her unsuccessful meeting with the FBI, Poston began a 
remarkable series of contacts with the Justice Department, in 
an effort to reverse the existing Justice Department policy, 
and obtain whatever information existed on Nobuo Abe in the 
NCIC system. Between January and June 1995, Poston contacted 
high-level Justice Department officials at least 22 times 
regarding her FOIA request.\853\ These contacts were made with 
senior staff in the Office of the Attorney General, the Office 
of the Associate Attorney General, and the Office of 
Information and Privacy. Poston began this lobbying campaign 
even before her FOIA appeal had been rejected by the Justice 
Department. As she explained in her interview with committee 
staff, she understood that her legal arguments were a long-
shot, and she believed that she needed to raise this matter at 
the highest levels of the Justice Department.\854\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \853\ See Steel Hector & Davis billing records (exhibit 100).
    \854\ Poston interview at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. Poston's Contacts with John Hogan
    Over the next several months, Poston would be in frequent 
contact with John Hogan, the Chief of Staff to the Attorney 
General. According to Poston, Hogan is a good friend of hers, 
and a great friend of her sister.\855\ As an example of her 
family's friendship with Hogan, Poston informed the committee 
that at the time of Hurricane Andrew, Hogan invited Poston's 
sister and Poston to stay with him in his house.\856\ Poston 
initially told Hogan that she was in a ``FOIA situation,'' and 
wanted to meet with the decisionmakers face-to-face to make her 
case.\857\ Poston explained to Hogan that she wanted him to 
make an introduction to the relevant individuals who could help 
her.\858\ According to Poston, Hogan told her that ``he didn't 
do FOIA, but would be happy to help her,'' and he told her that 
he would check into the matter.\859\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \855\ Id.
    \856\ Id.
    \857\ Id.
    \858\ Id.
    \859\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hogan's account differs in some significant respects from 
Poston's. First, he downplayed his relationship with Poston. He 
acknowledged that he knows Poston, but did not describe her as 
a friend.\860\ He similarly downplayed Poston's relationship 
with the Attorney General, merely acknowledging that Roberta 
Forrest was a secretary for the State Attorney's Office, 
failing to mention that she managed Ms. Reno's campaigns for 
office.\861\ Hogan acknowledged that he was contacted by 
Poston, and that Poston asked him for help with her FOIA 
appeal. However, he stated that he ``did not pay much attention 
to what she was saying after he heard that it was a FOIA 
case,'' and that he generally suggested that she needed to talk 
to people in the DOJ FOIA office.\862\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \860\ See Hogan interview.
    \861\ Id. at 1.
    \862\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hogan informed the committee that he believed that he spoke 
with Poston on less than five occasions.\863\ Similarly, Poston 
estimated that she spoke with Hogan on two to four 
occasions.\864\ However, records subpoenaed by the committee 
reveal a remarkable volume of contacts between Poston and 
Hogan. Between January 26, 1995, and June 2, 1995, Poston 
contacted John Hogan at least 18 times on the Soka Gakkai 
matter.\865\ While it is possible that some of these contacts 
were occasions when Poston merely left a message with Hogan, 
they clearly indicate that Hogan did more than suggest that 
Poston speak with officials in the Justice Department FOIA 
office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \863\ Id.
    \864\ Poston interview at 3.
    \865\ See Steel Hector & Davis billing records. A number of the 
cited pages refer to contact between Poston and the Attorney General's 
Office. However, in her interview, Poston acknowledged that her sole 
contact in the Attorney General's Office was Hogan. Similarly, in his 
interview, Hogan stated that he believed that other than the Attorney 
General, he was the only person in the Attorney General's Office who 
knew Poston.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Poston's FOIA Appeal is Rejected
    During the time that Poston was making these contacts with 
Hogan, her appeal was rejected by the Justice Department's FOIA 
office. In a letter dated April 25, 1995, Richard Huff, the Co-
Director of the Office of Information and Privacy, rejected 
Poston's arguments. Huff informed the committee that he did not 
spend much time deliberating Poston's appeal, and viewed it as 
a clear-cut decision.\866\ In Huff's mind, the Supreme Court 
directly addressed this issue:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \866\ Huff interview at 2.

        I find the Supreme Court's holding in United States 
        Department of Justice v. Reporter's Committee for 
        Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) to be 
        controlling in this case. Thus, in the absence of such 
        authorization [from Mr. Abe], and after careful 
        consideration of your appeals from the actions of the 
        EOUSA and the FBI, I have decided to affirm the initial 
        actions of these components in refusing to confirm or 
        deny the existence of records responsive to your 
        request. Lacking an individual's consent, proof of 
        death, official acknowledgment of an investigation, or 
        an overriding public interest, even to acknowledge the 
        existence of law enforcement records pertaining to an 
        individual could reasonably be expected to constitute 
        an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.\867\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \867\ Letter from Richard L. Huff to Rebekah J. Poston (Apr. 25, 
1995) (exhibit 83).

At this point, the Office of Information and Privacy, which 
served as the highest office deciding FOIA appeals within the 
Justice Department, had spoken. To obtain a reversal would 
require the intervention of a high-level appointee at the 
Justice Department.
            c. Attorney General Reno Recuses Herself
    On April 28, 1995, only 3 days after Huff rejected Poston's 
FOIA appeal, the Attorney General recused herself from the Soka 
Gakkai matter. In a memorandum to her staff, copied to the 
Associate Attorney General, Ms. Reno stated:

        This is to inform you that I have recused myself from 
        participation in the FOIA appeal made to the Department 
        concerning requests for information relating to Nobuo 
        Abe, a prominent religious leader, on behalf of Mrs. 
        Hiroe Clow.

        Apparently, an attorney, who is a close personal friend 
        of mine and participated in my confirmation hearing 
        preparation has requested my intervention in the matter 
        and I want to make it very clear that I have chosen to 
        disqualify myself from any participation and request 
        that no information regarding this matter be brought to 
        my attention.\868\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \868\ Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to staff of the 
Attorney General (Apr. 28, 1995) (exhibit 84).

    Poston was asked about the recusal memo, and stated that 
the memo clearly refers to a contact from John Edward Smith, a 
close friend of the Attorney General, and a senior partner at 
Steel Hector who worked on the Abe matter.\869\ However, Poston 
denied having any knowledge that Smith contacted Reno on the 
Abe matter.\870\ In addition, the Steel Hector billing records 
do not show that Smith billed any time on the Abe matter.\871\ 
John Hogan, the Attorney General's Chief of Staff, similarly 
believed that the memo referred to Smith.\872\ In his interview 
with committee staff, Hogan claimed that he was unaware that 
Reno had recused herself from this matter.\873\ However, at the 
committee's July 27, 2000, hearing, Hogan offered a new 
explanation of Reno's recusal:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \869\ Poston interview at 4.
    \870\ Id.
    \871\ See Steel Hector & Davis billing records (exhibit 100).
    \872\ Hogan interview at 2.
    \873\ Id.

        I had a conversation with her [Poston] at one point, 
        and she clearly was frustrated with the fact that her 
        position was not gaining momentum within the 
        Department, and she mentioned to me that she was 
        handling the matter with a man by the name of John 
        Edward Smith. I knew him to be a friend of the Attorney 
        General. Again, I have worked with the Attorney General 
        since 1979 and knew her before that. He had been at 
        Steel Hector & Davis when the Attorney General was 
        there, as opposed to Ms. Poston, who joined the firm 
        after Ms. Reno left. He was someone--when she was 
        nominated to be Attorney General, he took a leave of 
        absence from the firm and actually came up here to 
        Washington to help her prepare for her confirmation 
        hearings. He came up here and helped her prepare for 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        those hearings.

        So when Ms. Poston mentioned John Edward Smith's name 
        to me, I became concerned. I went to the Attorney 
        General and said, there is this FOIA matter that 
        Rebekah Poston had called me on, and I sent it off to 
        the career people. And the Attorney General just said, 
        I am recusing myself from the matter. Make sure nothing 
        else comes to me.

        Although Ms. Poston I would not characterize as a 
        friend or social acquaintance of the Attorney General, 
        Mr. Smith was, and that was my notice that he was more 
        involved, and so I brought it to her attention.\874\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \874\ ``Felonies and Favors: A Friend of the Attorney General 
Gathers Information from the Justice Department,'' 106th Cong. 147-48 
(July 27, 2000) (preliminary transcript).

    However, Hogan's hearing testimony is in some tension with 
the text of Reno's recusal memo, which states that 
``[a]pparently, an attorney, who is a close personal friend of 
mine and participated in my confirmation hearing preparation 
has requested my intervention in the matter[.]'' This statement 
is considerably different from what Hogan supposedly relayed to 
the Attorney General. Given the fact that Poston is unaware of 
Smith's contacts with Reno, the two versions of Hogan's 
recollection, and the text of Reno's own recusal memo, the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
committee is left with a number of questions:

         Did anyone representing Soka Gakkai contact 
        Attorney General Reno? If it was John Smith, why didn't 
        he either inform Poston, who was overseeing the case, 
        or bill his time?

         If Smith contacted Reno, why does Rebekah 
        Poston claim to be unaware of the contact? Smith was 
        not the main attorney on the case, and it is difficult 
        to believe that he would contact the Attorney General 
        about the case without informing Poston.

         Why did Reno recuse herself from the case? 
        Richard Huff, who has directed the Office of 
        Information and Privacy for almost 20 years, stated 
        that he has never heard of the Attorney General, Deputy 
        Attorney General, or Associate Attorney General ever 
        recusing themselves from a FOIA appeal.

         The manner of Reno's recusal raises 
        significant questions about the contacts that led to 
        the recusal. What did Smith ask Reno to do? Hogan 
        stated that in his experience, Reno would ``not receive 
        it well if [someone like Smith] asked her for special 
        treatment on behalf of a client.'' \875\ that is the 
        case, why did Smith, a long time friend of the Attorney 
        General, contact her?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \875\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. John Hogan Arranges a Meeting with the Associate 
                    Attorney General
    After the rejection of her FOIA appeal, Rebekah Poston 
continued her contacts with John Hogan, requesting a meeting 
with the Associate Attorney General. On May 12, 1995, she wrote 
to Hogan, and specifically requested a meeting. In a letter 
marked ``PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL,'' Poston stated that she 
was ``rather disappointed'' with the Justice Department's 
rejection of her FOIA appeal.\876\ She then requested the 
meeting with Schmidt:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \876\ Letter from Rebekah Poston to John Hogan (May 12, 1995) 
(exhibit 85).

        Consequently, John Smith, Russell Bruemmer and I 
        believe we must take one last step before deciding 
        whether to initiate litigation on these issues. Believe 
        me, we do not want to bring unnecessary or senseless 
        litigation. Unfortunately, however, we are lacking an 
        understanding, given our arguments and the failure of 
        anyone in the Office of Information and Privacy to 
        address them head on, as to why our appeal has been 
        denied. If you could assist the three of us in 
        scheduling a meeting with Mr. Schmidt, we would like to 
        address our concerns with him. We have not yet 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        attempted to contact Mr. Schmidt.

        We trust that Mr. Schmidt will agree to one final 
        conference on this matter; we will of course work with 
        his schedule on a convenient date and time.

        I harken [sic] back to the beginning of this matter 
        when you and I first spoke. You commented that you 
        didn't understand why they could not tell whether they 
        have a record or not. Frankly, we would be satisfied 
        with such a response.\877\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \877\ Id.

    Steel Hector & Davis billing records also indicate that 
Poston called Hogan at least four times in late May and early 
June, apparently the time when the meeting with Schmidt was 
scheduled.\878\ In her interview with committee staff, Poston 
stated that she was asking Hogan to help set up the meeting 
with Schmidt.\879\ Poston stated that Hogan was responsive, and 
said he would contact Schmidt, and help set up the 
meeting.\880\ When he was interviewed by committee staff 
though, Hogan had a different recollection. He stated that he 
did not even recall Poston asking for help in setting up a 
meeting with Schmidt.\881\ Hogan stated that ``I cannot imagine 
that I would be so presumptuous as to ask Schmidt to meet with 
anyone.'' \882\ Hogan did allow that it was possible that he 
forwarded Poston's May 12 letter to Schmidt's office, but does 
not believe that he ever spoke with Schmidt about this 
matter.\883\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \878\ Steel Hector & Davis billing records at 0000146 (exhibit 
100).
    \879\ Poston interview at 3.
    \880\ Id.
    \881\ Hogan interview at 1.
    \882\ Id. at 2.
    \883\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hogan's account of how the Schmidt meeting was arranged is 
troubling. Poston clearly stated that Hogan helped arrange the 
meeting. The timing and volume of the telephone calls between 
Poston and Hogan supports the conclusion that Hogan was 
involved in scheduling the meeting with Schmidt. Under Hogan's 
account, the 18 contacts from Rebekah Poston go unexplained. 
Poston continued to contact him, despite the fact that in their 
initial conversation, Hogan told her that he did not ``do 
FOIA,'' and directed her to the Office of Information and 
Privacy. The fact that there were so many more contacts, 
including contacts shortly before the meeting with Schmidt, 
supports the conclusion that Hogan was involved in scheduling 
the meeting. Finally, common sense supports the conclusion that 
Poston received some assistance in arranging a meeting with the 
Associate Attorney General on a matter so small as a FOIA 
appeal. It would be unlikely that the Associate Attorney 
General would meet with a party on this kind of matter unless 
there was some special request.
            e. The Justice Department ``Reverses its Policy''
    Rebekah Poston, John Smith, and Russell Bruemmer met with 
John Schmidt on June 15, 1995, at 3:30 p.m.\884\ Before their 
meeting with Schmidt, John Smith arranged for the group to 
visit Attorney General Reno in her office. In her interview, 
Poston confirmed that John Smith had made this appointment with 
the Attorney General.\885\ Poston stated that this was a social 
call, and that the group exchanged pleasantries with the 
Attorney General.\886\ For example, Poston stated that the 
Attorney General asked her how her sister and her children were 
doing.\887\ Poston denied that she, Smith, or Bruemmer 
discussed the Soka Gakkai matter with the Attorney 
General.\888\ When the Attorney General asked them what brought 
them to the Justice Department, Smith stated that ``we have 
other business in the Department.'' \889\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \884\ Calendar of Rebekah Poston for June 15, 1995, Steel Hector & 
Davis document 000028 (exhibit 99).
    \885\ Poston interview at 5.
    \886\ Id.
    \887\ Id.
    \888\ Id.
    \889\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After their meeting with the Attorney General, Poston, 
Smith and Bruemmer met with Schmidt. According to Poston, 
Schmidt started the meeting by informing them that he had not 
yet discussed the matter with Richard Huff.\890\ Poston took 
this as a positive sign, because it meant that Schmidt had an 
open mind on the subject.\891\ On the other hand, it is 
slightly troubling that Schmidt would not take any steps to 
educate himself on the Department's FOIA policy before he met 
with a party who was seeking the reversal of long-standing 
Department policy. Poston commented on another troubling aspect 
of the meeting with Schmidt--Schmidt had no staff present at 
the meeting with Poston.\892\ It is strange enough that 
Schmidt, the third-highest official in the Department of 
Justice, would even attend a meeting on a FOIA request. It is 
even more odd that he would attend this meeting by himself, and 
not seek to delegate this matter to a staffer. Due to Schmidt's 
failure to recall even the most basic facts about this matter, 
we cannot determine whether Schmidt recognized that Poston's 
request was irregular, or whether he simply wanted to work on 
this matter himself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \890\ Id.
    \891\ Id.
    \892\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Poston informed the committee that she, Smith and Bruemmer 
made their points with Schmidt, and he stated that he would 
take their arguments under advisement.\893\ When he was 
interviewed by committee staff, Schmidt could recall almost 
nothing about the entire Soka Gakkai matter. Schmidt did recall 
that he asked Huff to find out what information the Department 
had on Abe, and that when he discovered that there were no 
records, that he decided they could tell that to Poston.\894\ 
According to Schmidt, ``it was hard to see the adverse 
consequences'' of confirming that there were no NCIC records on 
Abe.\895\ Schmidt told committee staff that ``Dick [Huff] said 
he would be comfortable with that.'' \896\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \893\ Id.
    \894\ Interview of John R. Schmidt (June 16, 2000).
    \895\ Id.
    \896\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Richard Huff, though, tells a dramatically different story. 
Huff stated that Schmidt called him in mid-June to ask about 
the Poston FOIA appeal.\897\ They arranged a meeting for June 
22, 1995. At the meeting, Schmidt asked Huff what the 
Department policy was on releasing this kind of 
information.\898\ Huff told Schmidt that Abe, as a foreign 
national, was not covered by the Privacy Act.\899\ Huff also 
explained, however, that there was a Department policy against 
even confirming or denying the existence of criminal justice 
information on third parties, whether they were U.S. citizens 
or not.\900\ Schmidt asked Huff if they could make a disclosure 
in this case.\901\ Huff responded by saying that they should 
not vary Justice Department policy in this case.\902\ Huff 
believes that Schmidt also mentioned the fact that Poston was 
threatening to litigate if she did not receive the information 
that she had requested. Huff responded by telling Schmidt that 
the odds were ``spectacular'' that the Justice Department would 
prevail in such litigation, given that the Supreme Court had 
already addressed this precise issue.\903\ Schmidt resolved the 
meeting by asking Huff to find out whether the Department had 
any NCIC records on Abe.\904\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \897\ Huff interview at 2-3.
    \898\ Id. at 3.
    \899\ Id.
    \900\ Id.
    \901\ Id.
    \902\ Id.
    \903\ Id.
    \904\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After his meeting with Schmidt, Huff requested the FBI and 
the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys to search for the 
requested information on Abe, and they confirmed that they had 
no information on Abe.\905\ Huff communicated this fact to 
Schmidt.\906\ Schmidt asked Huff if the Department could tell 
Poston that they had no NCIC records on Abe.\907\ Huff told 
Schmidt that they legally could do so.\908\ Schmidt then 
directed Huff to reverse his earlier decision, and confirm in a 
letter to Poston that they did not have any NCIC records on 
Abe.\909\ Accordingly, on July 11, 1995, Huff wrote to Poston 
to tell her that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \905\ Id.
    \906\ Id.
    \907\ Id.
    \908\ Id. Huff informed Schmidt that the Privacy Act did not apply 
to Nobuo Abe, since he was not a U.S. citizen or permanent resident. 
Therefore, the Justice Department's confirmation that Abe had no 
records at DOJ was not a violation of the Privacy Act. Despite the fact 
that the Privacy Act was inapplicable in this case, Huff still believed 
that Justice Department policy not to confirm or deny the existence of 
any criminal justice records should apply.
    \909\ Id.

        After considering your Freedom of Information Act 
        request under Attorney General Reno's policy of 
        undertaking discretionary disclosure of information 
        whenever no foreseeable harm would result, Associate 
        Attorney General John R. Schmidt has determined that it 
        is appropriate to disclose the fact that neither the 
        Federal Bureau of Investigation nor the Executive 
        Office for United States Attorneys maintains, or has 
        any evidence of ever maintaining, any record within the 
        scope of your request.\910\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \910\ Letter from Richard L. Huff to Rebekah J. Poston (July 11, 
1995) (exhibit 90).

    While Schmidt told committee staff that Huff was 
``comfortable'' with this decision, Huff told a different 
story, and pointed out a series of remarkable facts about this 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
matter.

         First, Huff made it clear to Schmidt that he 
        disagreed with the decision.\911\ He told Schmidt that 
        it wouldn't be illegal to release this information, but 
        that he disagreed with the discretionary disclosure. In 
        addition, Huff characterized Schmidt's decision as 
        ``unusual.'' \912\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \911\ Huff interview at 3.
    \912\ Id.

         In his 25 years at the Justice Department, 
        Huff had never had any one-on-one meetings with 
        Schmidt, or any other Associate Attorney General.\913\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \913\ Id.

         When asked how much senior political 
        appointees were involved in FOIA appeals, Huff stated 
        that ``typically, there is none.'' \914\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \914\ Id. at 1.

         Huff is aware of involvement of senior 
        political appointees in FOIA appeals in only two other 
        cases. The first case involved a request for notes 
        taken by a Justice Department lawyer relating to an 
        interview of Sandra Day O'Connor before she was 
        appointed to the Supreme Court. The Office of 
        Information and Privacy initially made a decision to 
        grant the request, and this decision was then 
        overturned by a political appointee.\915\ The second 
        case involved a request by Terry Anderson, who had been 
        held captive in Lebanon, for criminal justice 
        information possessed by the government on the 
        individuals who had held him captive. The Office of 
        Information and Privacy had denied his request, 
        consistent with Justice Department policy, and then, 
        after significant media attention, political appointees 
        at the Department directed Huff to reverse the 
        decision.\916\ Both cases stand in obvious contrast to 
        this case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \915\ Id.
    \916\ Id.

         It is unclear what effect the Schmidt 
        decision had on Justice Department policy. Huff was 
        asked whether this decision was a change of DOJ policy, 
        or whether it was a one-time departure from existing 
        policy. Huff stated that he believed that it was a one-
        time departure.\917\ When asked if Schmidt offered Huff 
        any reason why this case would be treated differently 
        from any other FOIA case coming to the Department, Huff 
        stated that Schmidt offered no such rationale.\918\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \917\ Id. at 3.
    \918\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Aftermath

            a. Poston ``Wins the Battle, but Loses the War''
    When Poston received the July 11, 1995, letter from Huff 
informing her that Schmidt had decided to disclose the fact DOJ 
had no NCIC records on Nobuo Abe, she felt like she had ``won 
the battle, but lost the war.'' \919\ When asked to explain why 
she felt that way, she declined, based on her lawyers' concerns 
that such an explanation would cause her to disclose the 
illegal activities conducted on her behalf by PMRG.\920\ 
However, documents obtained by the committee show how disturbed 
Poston was to find out that the Justice Department did not have 
any records on Abe. Huff's letter conflicted with the 
information that Phil Manuel, Richard Lucas, and Jack Palladino 
had extracted from confidential sources within the Justice 
Department. On July 19, 1995, shortly after she got the Huff 
letter, Poston wrote to Manuel and Lucas to ask them to follow 
up with their confidential sources:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \919\ Poston interview at 5.
    \920\ Id.

        I need your assistance in helping me explain to my 
        clients the apparent inconsistencies between the letter 
        we received from Richard L. Huff, dated July 11, 1995 
        and your investigative reports of November 11 and 17, 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        1994.

        Our personal meeting with Deputy [sic] Associate 
        Attorney General John Schmidt resulted in a policy 
        decision by the Attorney General to reverse the 
        original position of the Department of Justice by 
        authorizing the release of the requested record or a 
        statement as to whether it existed in the past. That is 
        a major accomplishment and victory. The result, 
        however, is quite perplexing.

        I can only conclude that since a record existed, which 
        your two independent sources verified, the places 
        searched enumerated in Huff's letter must not have been 
        the proper locations. Any other conclusion means that 
        the sources are either not telling the truth or that 
        the record was deleted (a real possibility according to 
        the source in the November 17, 1994 report) without a 
        trace, an impossibility according to former, FBI, S/A 
        Lawler, if the record was ever in NCIC. That is part of 
        the problem.

        Our client views this letter as an absolute defeat for 
        them in Japan.

           *         *         *         *         *

        Our client is requesting that each of you ask your 
        sources for an explanation or [sic] where they found 
        the record. The Attorney General's position is clear--
        its existence and/or its deletion is authorized to be 
        disclosed.

        I have the utmost confidence in your reports. We must 
        try our best to resolve this critical issue for our 
        client. Please give this matter your immediate 
        attention. Leave no stone unturned.\921\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \921\ Letter from Rebekah Poston to Philip Manuel and Richard Lucas 
at 2 (July 19, 1995) (exhibit 92).

    Poston and Schmidt were questioned about this letter at the 
committee's hearing. When questioned about the statement that 
the Attorney General had decided to reverse the Justice 
Department's position, Schmidt stated that it was ``obviously 
wrong'' and ``lawyer's puffery.'' \922\ However, Poston stood 
by the statement in her letter, saying ``it could have been 
more artfully written to say the `office of,' but I don't 
believe it's puffery.'' \923\ Poston's insistence that the 
Office of the Attorney General was responsible for her success 
in obtaining the information on Abe continues to raise 
questions about the involvement of John Hogan in this matter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \922\ ``Felonies and Favors: A Friend of the Attorney General 
Gathers Information from the Justice Department,'' 106th Cong. 155 
(July 27, 2000) (preliminary transcript).
    \923\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Lucas informed the committee that he took no action in 
response to Poston's requests.\924\ He believes that Phil 
Manuel's confidential source, Ben Brewer, told Manuel that he 
believed that Abe's NCIC record was erased, and that there was 
no evidence of its erasure.\925\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \924\ Lucas interview at 3.
    \925\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After Lucas and Manuel failed to produce any further 
information, Poston threatened to make both of them testify at 
trial in Japan, where apparently, Poston's earlier 
representations about the existence of an NCIC record on Abe 
were coming under considerable scrutiny.\926\ Lucas refused to 
go to Japan and instead, Poston drafted an affidavit for Lucas 
to sign.\927\ Lucas refused to sign the affidavit unless Manuel 
signed one as well.\928\ The surprising result was that in 
September 1995, Manuel and Lucas both executed sworn affidavits 
regarding their activities in the Abe case, including their 
illegal conduct in obtaining the information on Abe. Manuel 
admitted:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \926\ Id.
    \927\ Id.
    \928\ Id.

        11. As part of PMRG's investigation, I contacted a 
        confidential and highly reliable source who I believed 
        would be able to determine whether the federal 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        government had documentary evidence.

        12. My source told me that there was a federal 
        government record for Nobuo Abe which referred to 
        ``Suspicion of Solicitation of Prostitution, Seattle 
        Police Department, March 1963.''

        13. My source further told me that the record 
        concerning Mr. Abe reflected that the Seattle Police 
        Department had made an inquiry for information.

        14. My source also told me that if Mr. Abe made an 
        official request for the information under his name to 
        be removed from the record, it could be removed.

        15. Sometime later, my source informed me that the 
        record concerning Mr. Abe apparently had been purged.

        16. I am confident that the information provided to me 
        by the source is accurate and reliable.\929\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \929\ Affidavit of Philip R. Manuel at 2-3 (Sept. 20, 1975) 
(exhibit 95).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lucas made similar admissions in his affidavit:

        9. As part of my investigation for PMRG, I contacted a 
        highly reliable source and advised the source that I 
        was attempting to confirm the existence and the 
        whereabouts of documents in the possession of the 
        federal government related to Mr. Abe. I told this 
        source that Mr. Abe's name is ``Nobuo Abe'' and that 
        his date of birth is December 19, 1922. I also told the 
        source that Mr. Abe had no social security number 
        because he was not a U.S. citizen.

        10. The source later reported to me that he had 
        determined that the federal government did have a 
        record regarding a Nobuo Abe which referred to 
        solicitation of prostitution, Seattle Police 
        Department, March 1963.

        11. I am confident that the information provided to me 
        by the source is accurate and reliable.\930\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \930\ Affidavit of Richard Lucas at 2 (Sept. 22, 1995) (exhibit 
96).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. Justice Department Fails to Prosecute Poston or Manuel
    One of the committee's greatest concerns is that the 
Justice Department has shown no interest in prosecuting the 
clearly illegal conduct evident in this case. The actions by 
Poston, Manuel, and Lucas clearly implicate 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641. 
Any case brought against Poston or Manuel would be exceedingly 
strong, as it would be bolstered by extensive documentary 
evidence, as well as the testimony of Richard Lucas. Indeed, 
Poston and Manuel admit to their illegal actions, in writing, 
and in Manuel's case, even under oath.
    The Justice Department has been provided with this 
information on a number of occasions. In February 1997, counsel 
for Nichiren Shoshu, John Gibbons, sent a set of documents to 
the FBI Washington Field Office.\931\ Those documents detailed 
the fact that NCIC information on Abe had been illegally 
obtained by Poston, Manuel, and Lucas. Those records were 
forwarded to the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility 
(OPR). On February 19, 1997, David Ries, the Deputy Chief of 
OPR, wrote to Gibbons, stating that the charges ``have no 
merit.'' \932\ However, Ries did state that the FBI OPR would 
consider revisiting the issue if it obtained a detailed 
statement from Richard Lucas. Gibbons provided a detailed 
accounting of Lucas's testimony in May 1997.\933\ In September 
1997, Ries responded, stating that ``the allegations presented 
by you and others have been repeatedly brought to the attention 
of the FBI by numerous individuals in various communications 
and in various meetings, for a number of years. . . . This 
review indicates the allegations remain without merit.'' \934\ 
Gibbons wrote back on September 26, 1997, to ask Ries to at 
least interview Lucas before he reached any conclusions that 
the Abe matter was without merit.\935\ Ries wrote back one 
final time on October 16, 1997, to tell Gibbons that OPR would 
not conduct any further investigation into the Abe matter, and 
that his ``allegations remain without merit.'' \936\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \931\ See letter from David V. Ries, Deputy Assistant Director, 
Office of Professional Responsibility, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
to the OSO Group, Ltd. (Feb. 19, 1997) (exhibit 102).
    \932\ Id.
    \933\ Letter from John C. Gibbons to David V. Ries, Deputy 
Assistant Director, Office of Professional Responsibility, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (May 28, 1997) (exhibit 103).
    \934\ Letter from David V. Ries, Deputy Assistant Director, Office 
of Professional Responsibility, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the 
OSO Group, Ltd. (Sept. 4, 1997) (exhibit 105).
    \935\ Letter from John C. Gibbons to David V. Ries, Deputy 
Assistant Director, Office of Professional Responsibility, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 26, 1977) (exhibit 106).
    \936\ Letter from David V. Ries, Deputy Assistant Director, Office 
of Professional Responsibility, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the 
OSO Group, Ltd. (Oct. 16, 1997) (exhibit 107).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to numerous attempts made by counsel for 
Nichiren Shoshu, the committee has referred this matter to the 
Justice Department. In 1998, committee staff met with FBI 
personnel to explain this matter, and request the FBI to 
investigate the potentially illegal actions taken by Poston and 
PMRG.
    It is astounding that the Justice Department has refused to 
take action on this matter. The Department has been provided on 
repeated occasions with clear-cut evidence of illegal activity. 
There is both documentary and testimonial evidence that Rebekah 
Poston, Philip Manuel, and Richard Lucas penetrated 
confidential law enforcement databases to obtain information on 
Nobuo Abe. However, the Department has concluded on three 
separate occasions, without explanation, that these charges are 
``without merit.'' Apparently, though, they have not attempted 
to interview any of the witnesses in this case, including 
Richard Lucas, who offered repeatedly to be interviewed, 
against his own legal interests.\937\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \937\ Although there is no doubt that Richard Lucas' conduct was 
unlawful, it must be pointed out that he was the only witness involved 
in the illegal efforts to obtain information on Abe to cooperate fully 
with the committee. As important, his offer of cooperation to the 
Justice Department indicates a willingness to atone for his part in 
improper conduct. By comparison, Poston and Manuel have taken no steps 
to cooperate with law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Poston's Appearance Before the Committee on July 27, 2000

    On July 27, 2000, the committee held a hearing at which 
Rebekah Poston, Philip Manuel, Richard Lucas, John Schmidt, 
Richard Huff, and John Hogan testified.
            a. Poston Refused to Invoke the Fifth Amendment
    When Poston was interviewed by committee staff on June 29, 
2000, her counsel informed committee staff that she would not 
answer questions about her efforts to obtain information about 
Nobuo Abe through private investigators. Her counsel, Eduardo 
Palmer, stated that Poston would not answer these questions 
because of the attorney-client privilege and Poston's possible 
criminal exposure. Therefore, committee staff asked few 
questions about those subjects.
    When Poston was informed in early July that she would be 
called to a hearing of the committee, her counsel strenuously 
objected. In a conference call on July 12, 2000, her counsel, 
Eduardo Palmer, C. Boyden Gray, and Jane Sherburne, explained 
the reasons why they believed Poston should not be called to 
the committee's hearing. During this telephone call, Palmer and 
Gray repeatedly stated that they believed that Poston would be 
forced to take the fifth if called to a hearing. Palmer 
repeatedly stated that he did not want Poston to be forced to 
take the fifth publicly, and argued that in light of this fact, 
it would be more appropriate to hold a closed hearing, to spare 
Poston the embarrassment of taking the fifth publicly.
    Once at the hearing, Poston and her counsel did not invoke 
the fifth amendment, and even attempted to deny that they ever 
stated that they would if called to a hearing. When asked about 
her contacts with private investigators, and her requests that 
they illegally obtain NCIC information, Poston claimed 
attorney-client privilege. Chairman Burton then questioned her 
about her counsel's representations:

        Chairman Burton. Let me just inform Ms. Poston, first 
        of all, that you are directed by the committee to 
        answer the question and you do run the risk of being 
        held in contempt of Congress if you do not.

        The second thing is, I'd like to ask the question, when 
        you appeared before Mr. Wilson and his colleague and 
        were discussing these issues, did you indicate that you 
        would take the fifth amendment before this committee?

        Ms. Poston. I did not, nor do I intend to do so.

           *         *         *         *         *

        Chairman Burton. Did your legal counsel, your lawyers, 
        indicate that you might take the fifth amendment?

           *         *         *         *         *

        Mr. Palmer. I had discussions with a member of your 
        committee who spoke with me about these matters over 
        the course of the last year and a half.

        Chairman Burton. I'm talking about when you were here, 
        what, a few weeks ago.

        Mr. Palmer. Three weeks ago.

        Chairman Burton. Yes.

        Mr. Palmer. No, sir.

        Chairman Burton. When you discussed with them on the 
        phone the issues in the last week did you indicate that 
        she might take the fifth amendment?

        Mr. Palmer. Members of your committee indicated to me 
        that, in their view, the conduct at issue here could 
        constitute a criminal violation; and we discussed all 
        the privileges that would be applicable in that 
        situation. I advised them that if that were the 
        situation that, first and foremost, the information the 
        committee sought would be protected by the attorney-
        client privilege and the work product doctrine.

        I also told them that if they believed that a witness 
        had committed a criminal offense and they knew that 
        from the outset, that it would be improper for--to 
        force the witness to come before this committee merely 
        to assert a fifth amendment privilege.

        Chairman Burton. So you did indicate that Ms. Poston 
        might under these circumstances assert her fifth 
        amendment privilege.

        Mr. Palmer. I indicated exactly what I just expressed 
        to you.\938\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \938\ ``Felonies and Favors: A Friend of the Attorney General 
Gathers Information from the Justice Department,'' 106th Cong. 39-40 
(July 27, 2000) (preliminary transcript).

    Palmer's characterization of his discussions with committee 
staff varied substantially from reality. Palmer's discussions 
with staff were not an abstract discussion of the propriety of 
forcing a witness to invoke the fifth amendment. Rather, he 
made an extended plea to have Poston appear in a closed 
session, based upon the fact that it would be improper and 
embarrassing to force her to take the fifth in public. Indeed, 
if Palmer never intended to have Poston take the fifth, as he 
claimed at the hearing, the plea made in his July 12 conference 
call was highly misleading. In retrospect, it appears as though 
the positions taken by Poston and her counsel evolved. 
Initially they believed that they would be compelled by the 
facts of this particular case to invoke the fifth amendment. 
Later, they decided--improperly, from the perspective of the 
committee--to use the attorney-client privilege as an all-
purpose prophylactic against appearing to admit guilt to any 
possible crime.
            b. Poston Refused to Answer Questions Which She Was Legally 
                    Obligated to Answer
    A number of times during the committee's hearing, Poston 
was asked about her contacts with Philip Manuel Resource Group, 
and her efforts to obtain criminal history information about 
Nobuo Abe. Any time that Poston was asked substantive 
information about those efforts, she invoked attorney-client 
privilege. Poston invoked the privilege despite the fact that 
she was informed that the privilege did not apply. As explained 
to her during the hearing, many of the subjects being discussed 
in the committee's hearing were not privileged in any way, for 
the following reasons:

         A number of details about Poston's contacts 
        with PMRG were published by her client in the Soka 
        Gakkai newsletter. The publication of these matters 
        would waive the privilege.

         Many of the contacts between Poston and her 
        investigators took place prior to the establishment of 
        a formal agency relationship between Steel Hector & 
        Davis and PMRG.

         Many of the activities undertaken by PMRG 
        were illegal, and cannot be the subject of a claim of 
        privilege, because of the crime/fraud exception to the 
        privilege.

         Finally, Congress need not recognize the 
        attorney-client privilege, and the committee does not 
        in the Poston case, given the clear indicia that Poston 
        and her investigators were engaged in illegal activity.

Despite a clear instruction from the chairman that she answer 
questions put to her, Poston refused to answer questions about 
her attempts to gather criminal history information on Nobuo 
Abe.\939\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \939\ Poston's refusal to comply with the chairman's order should 
be contrasted with Richard Lucas's compliance with the chairman's 
order. Lucas answered all questions put to him, understanding that the 
committee had considered and rejected all claims of privilege. 
``Felonies and Favors: A Friend of the Attorney General Gathers 
Information from the Justice Department,'' 106th Cong. 45-46 (July 27, 
2000) (preliminary transcript).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Improper access to law enforcement databases is a serious 
and pervasive problem. While it is not uncommon for 
investigators to access databases like NCIC without permission, 
such activity is illegal. The Department of Justice and FBI 
should take seriously their responsibility to guard the privacy 
and integrity of the information in law enforcement databases. 
When confronted with clear evidence that a team of lawyers, 
private investigators, and law enforcement personnel were 
improperly accessing the NCIC record of Nobuo Abe, the Justice 
Department should have taken action, and prosecuted the 
responsible parties. By failing to investigate this case, the 
Justice Department and FBI have sent the clear message that 
they do not value the sanctity of law enforcement databases.
    Similarly, Justice Department's handling of Rebekah 
Poston's FOIA request raises serious questions. Justice 
Department policy called for Poston's FOIA request to be 
rejected, without confirming or denying the existence of any 
record. However, through her contacts in the Office of the 
Attorney General, Poston was able to obtain special treatment. 
While the disclosure made by the Justice Department in response 
to Poston's FOIA request was not criminal, it was an unseemly 
favor for a friend of the Attorney General. This disclosure 
makes it appear that the Justice Department places the Attorney 
General's personal friendships above the judgment of career 
Justice Department staff and long-standing Justice Department 
policy.

                            B. Robert Bratt

    Robert K. Bratt, who had a 21 year career with the 
Department of Justice, retired on August 1, 2000. From August 
1995 to July 2000, he was the Criminal Division Executive 
Officer for the Office of Administration (OA).\940\ From March 
1995 until his retirement, Bratt also held the following posts:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \940\ ``An Investigation of Misconduct and Mismanagement at ICITAP, 
OPDAT, and the Criminal Division's Office of Administration,'' U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, at xiii (Sept. 
2000).

         March 1995-August 1996: Acting Director of 
        the International Criminal Investigative Training 
        Assistance Program (ICITAP)\941\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \941\ Created in 1986, ICITAP's mission includes ``two principal 
types of projects: (1) developing police forces in the context of 
international peacekeeping operations, and (2) enhancing the 
capabilities of existing policing forces in emerging democracies based 
on internationally recognized principles of human rights, the rule of 
law, and modern police practices.'' Id. at 23.

         September 1996-April 1997: Coordinator of 
        ICITAP and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
        Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT)\942\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \942\ Created in 1991, OPDAT ``works with United States embassies 
and other United States government agencies to coordinate training for 
judges and prosecutors in South and Central America, the Caribbean, 
Russia, other Newly Independent States, and Central and Eastern Europe. 
The office also serves as the Department of Justice's liaison between 
private and public agencies that sponsor visits to the United States 
for foreign officials interested in learning about his country's legal 
system.'' Id. at 24-25. In 1997, ``OPDAT's mission shifted exclusively 
to international training issues.'' Id. at 23 n.1.

         April 1997-March 1998: Detailed as Executive 
        Director for Naturalization Operation of the 
        Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)\943\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \943\ ``Hearing on the Immigration and Naturalization Service,'' 
hearing before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, 105th 
Cong. (testimony of Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service) (May 1, 1997).

         March 1998-July 2000: Detailed as Acting 
        Director of Information Management Narrowband 
        Communications Wireless Offices of Justice Management 
        Division (JMD) \944\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \944\ Id. at xiii.

Bratt, a onetime Reno favorite, served as one of the Attorney 
General's top troubleshooters.\945\ In a committee interview, 
Attorney General Reno stated that ``Mr. Bratt was first 
introduced to me as somebody in the [C]riminal [D]ivision who 
was a very good administrator, and I saw him in that context.'' 
\946\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \945\ See, e.g., ``Hearing on the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service,'' hearing before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Immigration, 105th Cong. (testimony of Doris Meissner, Commissioner, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service) (May 1, 1997); Michael Isikoff, 
``The Perils of Romance,'' Newsweek Online (Sept. 12, 2000) 
news/459043.asp>; Jerry Seper, ``Top Justice Officials 
Being Probed About Security Violations,'' the Washington Times, Sept. 
22, 2000, at A10; and Jamie Dettmer, ``Internal Probe to Embarrass 
Justice Department,'' Insight on the News, Jan. 3, 2000, at 6.
    \946\ Transcript of interview of Attorney General Janet Reno, 
Department of Justice, in Washington, DC, at 62 (Oct. 5, 2000) 
(preliminary transcript). Because of Reno's confidence in Bratt, she 
personally asked him to be detailed to INS. Id. and ``Hearing on the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service,'' hearing before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, 105th Cong. (testimony of Doris 
Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service) (May 1, 
1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In March 1997, the Department of Justice Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) initiated an investigation into 
``allegations of misconduct, security violations, financial 
mismanagement, travel violations, and favoritism in ICITAP, 
OPDAT, and [OA].'' \947\ Bratt was one of the main subjects of 
this investigation. As a safeguard measure, in March 1998, 
after OIG briefed Attorney General Reno on the ongoing 
investigation, the Department of Justice suspended Bratt's 
security clearance.\948\ In September 2000, OIG released its 
findings in the report: An Investigation of Misconduct and 
Mismanagement at ICITAP, OPDAT, and the Criminal Division's 
Office of Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \947\ ``An Investigation of Misconduct and Mismanagement at ICITAP, 
OPDAT, and the Criminal Division's Office of Administration,'' U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, at 27 
(September 2000).
    \948\ Id. at 27 n.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In its report, the OIG determined that ``Bratt repeatedly 
engaged in substantial misconduct while serving as the 
Executive Officer of the Criminal Division and while he was 
responsible for overseeing ICITAP and OPDAT.'' \949\ In 
particular, the OIG concluded the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \949\ Id. at 401.

         Bratt committed egregious misconduct by 
        using his government position to improperly procure 
        visas for two Russian citizens[.] \950\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \950\ Id. at 402.

         Bratt attempted to provide his former 
        assistant ``with a false scenario that she would then 
        provide to the OIG'' in its investigation.\951\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \951\ Id. at 205.

         Bratt ``was engaged in an effort to alert 
        and probe witnesses, to dissemble to them that he had 
        never knowingly done anything wrong, and to seek 
        reassurance from them that they would not say 
        otherwise'' to the OIG.\952\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \952\ Id.

         ICITAP employees under Bratt's supervision 
        failed ``to observe fundamental security practices,'' 
        \953\ failed to ``enforce the government's security 
        regulations,'' \954\ resisted continual ``advice and 
        warnings of ICITAP's security officers,'' \955\ and 
        ``violated security regulations by disclosing 
        classified information to uncleared parties and by 
        removing documents.'' \956\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \953\ Id. at 21 (regarding Associate Deputy ICITAP Director Joseph 
Trincellito's conduct).
    \954\ Id. at 405 (regarding ICITAP Director Janice Stromsem's 
conduct).
    \955\ Id. at 21 (regarding Associate Deputy ICITAP Director Joseph 
Trincellito's conduct).
    \956\ Id. (regarding Special Assistant to the ICITAP Director Cary 
Hoover's conduct).

         Bratt committed serious misconduct in 
        connection with his government travel.\957\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \957\ Id. at 402.

         Bratt ``put his staff in a position where 
        following his instructions left them with no other 
        option [but to violate Department of Justice rules.]'' 
        \958\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \958\ Id. at 180.

         Bratt had a pattern of ``blaming his staff 
        for his own misconduct and failures to abide by the 
        rules'' during the OIG investigation.\959\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \959\ Id. at 403.

         Bratt was not forthcoming and honest during 
        his interviews with [the OIG].\960\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \960\ Id. at 402.

         Bratt's [romantic] involvement with [a 
        female Russian citizen] also raised significant 
        security concerns.\961\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \961\ Id. at 403.

In the end, Attorney General Reno's ``successful, effective 
troubleshooter and adviser'' was found to be ``a supervisor who 
willfully violated government regulations, who was recklessly 
indifferent to the security interests of the government, who 
induced subordinates to aid and abet his misconduct, and who 
made false statements to the OIG.'' \962\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \962\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Building upon the OIG's alarming evidence, this committee 
is concerned about several instances of possible Department of 
Justice favoritism toward Bratt and its effects. Despite 
Bratt's egregious conduct, the Department offered and Bratt 
accepted early retirement, which included employment benefits 
and an annuity. The OIG determined that, in effect, this option 
allowed Bratt to be ``no longer subject to discipline by the 
Department'' because he is no longer a Federal employee.\963\ 
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder testified that ``Bratt was 
not awarded any special arrangements'' regarding early 
retirement.\964\ However, the committee believes that Bratt 
took advantage of this offer to escape discipline. The timing 
of the OIG's release of a draft copy of its report to Bratt and 
Bratt's application for early retirement, which comes within a 
few days of each other, is suspect.\965\ Bratt's early 
retirement took effect 1 month before the OIG released its 
report.\966\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \963\ Id. at 402.
     \964\ Hearing on the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector 
General's September 2000 report titled: ``An Investigation of 
Misconduct and Mismanagement at ICITAP, OPDAT, and the Criminal 
Division's Office of Administration,'' hearing before the House 
Judiciary Committee, 106th Cong. (testimony of Eric Holder, Deputy 
Attorney General, Department of Justice) (Sept. 21, 2000).
    \965\ On July 10, 2000, Bratt was provided a copy of the draft IG 
report and asked to respond. On July 19, 2000, Bratt submitted an 
application for early retirement.
    \966\ On August 1, 2000, Bratt's early retirement took effect. In 
mid-September, the OIG report was released to Congress. The Judiciary 
Committee made the report available to the public on its Web site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The committee also believes that Bratt's senior position 
within the Department of Justice had a chilling effect on 
whistleblowers. Denise Turcotte, Bratt's former assistant, was 
co-opted to make improper travel arrangements for Bratt.\967\ 
In her initial interview with OIG, Turcotte denied doing 
anything improper. Several months after that interview, she 
voluntarily asked the OIG to reinterview her. During the 
interview, Turcotte explained that Bratt had tried to influence 
her testimony, and get her to lie about her activities:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \967\ The OIG found that Turcotte's conduct did not warrant 
discipline. ``An Investigation of Misconduct and Mismanagement at 
ICITAP, OPDAT, and the Criminal Division's Office of Administration,'' 
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, at 407 
(September 2000).

        Ms. Turcotte. He said that he had had like a full day 
        of talking with you folks about travel and that he 
        wanted to talk to me about it, and could we go for a 
        walk, so we went for a walk. We went, he got a bagel 
        and I was very uncomfortable. He started talking about, 
        you know, basically, I turned all the travel over to 
        you and, you know, I--I expressed, you know, you made 
        the final decisions, basically. If I made any 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        preference, you had the final decision.

        OIG: Is this Mr. Bratt saying this to you?

        Ms. Turcotte. This is Mr. Bratt saying this. And I am 
        going--I am in shock, first of all, and I just 
        continued to listen to him because I couldn't quite 
        tell where he was going with it. But he also said that, 
        first of all, he didn't want anyone to know about this 
        conversation. He made that very clear, we never had 
        this conversation. And, again, I didn't say yes or no 
        about keeping any, you know.

        He--he said that--something to the effect, and I can't 
        recall the exact words, but I never asked you to juggle 
        my travel hours so that I could qualify for business 
        class, did I? \968\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \968\ Transcript of Office of the Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of Justice, investigative interview of Denise Turcotte (Feb. 
24, 1999) at 20.

Also in this interview, Turcotte was asked why she had been 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
afraid of coming forward.

        Ms. Turcotte. [Bratt] is a powerful guy, yeah. He knows 
        a lot of high level people. And I was hoping that, gee, 
        if I get bored with this position in the Criminal 
        Division, you know,--am I thinking the OIG had better 
        hire me? I mean I am--you know, I am--there's that part 
        of it, too. You know, please, you know, I can be 
        trusted. I don't know where I--you know, I just don't 
        know.

        Mr. Nassikas.\969\ And he is a powerful, as I 
        understand, personality. I mean there's a----
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \969\ John Nassikas represented Denise Turcotte as counsel.

        Ms. Turcotte. Yeah, he is very charismatic. He has done 
        a lot of pet projects for Reno. He has been tasked to 
        do the INS thing, for instance. Now it is the wireless 
        thing. Of course, the circumstances are different, 
        but---- \970\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \970\ Transcript of Office of the Inspector General, U.S. 
Department of Justice, investigative interview of Denise Turcotte (Feb. 
24, 1999) at 47-48.

It is clear that Turcotte believed she could not come forward 
because of Bratt's relationship with Attorney General Reno and 
other high-level Department of Justice officials. Turcotte also 
indicated that whistleblower protections were not enough to 
protect her against retaliation.\971\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \971\ Id. at 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The actions of another senior Justice Department official 
may also have had a chilling effect upon whistleblowers. 
Shortly after the allegations against Bratt surfaced, Stephen 
Colgate, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, Justice 
Management Division, who was a close friend of Bratt, told the 
Legal Times: ``Believe me, when the dust settles, Bratt will be 
vindicated . . . [the allegations are] an outrage, an absolute 
outrage.'' \972\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \972\ Sam Skolnik, ``Charges of Fraud, Waste Prompt Probe of 
Justice Department Training Programs,'' Legal Times, Sept. 21, 1998, at 
2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Colgate's comments are troubling because he is commenting 
about an open case. More important, such comments by a senior 
Justice Department official like Colgate condemning 
whistleblowers' allegations sends a clear message that 
whistleblowers are not welcome at the Department. Much to the 
dismay of this committee, when the Attorney General was asked 
about the effects of Colgate's comment, she only defended his 
actions and refused to admit the potential negative 
implications.

        Committee Counsel. And it would not be mysterious, I 
        think, but our concern would be that if senior 
        Department of Justice officials are commenting about 
        what is a pending case, something that we have so much 
        communication back and forth with with [sic] the 
        Department, that that communicates to employees in the 
        Department of Justice something very negative. Do you 
        think Mr. Colgate should have made a statement like 
        that back in 1998?

        Attorney General Reno. My understanding is that he was 
        recused from this matter and that he feels that the 
        questions and the answer--and that the answer was taken 
        out of context. So I would have to check on that.

        Committee Counsel. But is it just he feels it was taken 
        out of context or do you think it was appropriate or 
        inappropriate for him to go on the record and make a 
        comment about what was at that point a pending matter 
        that was just starting to be investigated by the 
        Inspector General's office?

        Attorney General Reno. I would have to understand the 
        context.

        Committee Counsel. But even without the context, just 
        the comment on the pending investigation, is that 
        something you would condone or not condone?

        Attorney General Reno. I would look at it in terms of 
        the context and how it was said and what was asked and 
        where the occasion took place.

        Committee Counsel. Do you personally have any reaction 
        to the effect that a statement like that would have on 
        a low level employee like Ms. Turcotte?

        Attorney General Reno. Counsel, I may not have--be as 
        far along in my review of the matter to understand all 
        the details I need to properly respond to your 
        question, but I just think it is important before I do 
        that, I understand all the issues and that I don't 
        spout off without being fully informed.\973\
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    \973\ Transcript of interview with Attorney General Janet Reno, 
Department of Justice, in Washington, DC at 71-73 (Oct. 5, 2000) 
(preliminary transcript).

    During the October 5, 2000, committee interview, there were 
many more examples of Attorney General Reno's unwillingness to 
answer questions about Mr. Bratt. As the transcript shows, 
Attorney General Reno was either unwilling or unable to answer 
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many of the questions directed to her:

        Committee Counsel. Have you read the Office of 
        Inspector General report about Mr. Bratt?

        Attorney General Reno. I have read it but not in 
        detail.\974\
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    \974\ Id. at 63

           *         *         *         *         *

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        Committee Counsel. [W]ere you aware the Inspector 
        General concluded Mr. Bratt had asked his former 
        assistant to lie for him?

        Attorney General Reno. Because the disciplinary and 
        remedial matters are pending, we are limited, as I am 
        sure the committee understands, in what we can say 
        about them[.]\975\
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    \975\ Id. at 64-65.

           *         *         *         *         *

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        Committee Counsel. But my question is, if [Bratt] 
        doesn't work for the Department of Justice, short of a 
        prosecution, is there any avenue of discipline that the 
        Department of Justice can effect at this point?

        Attorney General Reno. There are matters relating to a 
        number of issues within the report, and I think it 
        would be inappropriate to comment until all those 
        matters are resolved.\976\
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    \976\ Id. at 65-66.

           *         *         *         *         *

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        Committee Counsel. [D]o you at this point think that 
        Mr. Bratt did receive any preferential treatment by the 
        Department of Justice thus far?

        Attorney General Reno. I think the important thing for 
        me, before I answer specific questions, would be to 
        review the whole record. And I think that is something 
        Dr. Hawk Sawyer should do.\977\
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    \977\ Id. at 70-71.

These exchanges did nothing to resolve the committee's serious 
questions about this case.\978\
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    \978\ The OIG also concluded that senior level Department of 
Justice employees were failing to doing their jobs:

      Even if Bratt had been an exemplary manager, ICITAP and 
      OPDAT would have benefited from attention and guidance by 
      senior Criminal Division managers[.] [T]he failure to 
      adequately supervise [Bratt's] conduct added fuel to 
      ICITAP's preexisting problems. We do not believe that all 
      of ICITAP's difficulties and Bratt's and other managers' 
      improprieties could only have been ferreted out by an OIG 
      investigation. Some of them, particularly security and 
      travel issues, should have been apparent to anyone taking 
      the time to look. The fact that the Criminal Division did 
      not follow up to ensure that recommendations from other OIG 
      or internal investigations had been implemented is an 
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      example of the lack of adequate oversight.

``An Investigation of Misconduct and Mismanagement at ICITAP, OPDAT, 
and the Criminal Division's Office of Administration,'' U.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, at 413 (September 2000).
    Representative Howard Coble recently expressed concern at a 
Judiciary Committee hearing about the OIG report that, when it 
came to security issues, the ``fox may be guarding the henhouse 
down at Justice.'' \979\ Noting the Department of Justice's 
favorable treatment toward Bratt and inaction toward Colgate's 
intimidating statements to the press, this committee also must 
conclude that the Department's embarrassing instances of 
security breaches by top officials are being contained--not 
discouraged--with a ``fox guarding the henhouse'' approach. The 
Bratt case provides just one more example of an Attorney 
General more interested in providing unfair advantages to her 
friends and political allies than in doing her job.
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    \979\ Hearing on the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector 
General's September 2000 report titled: ``An Investigation of 
Misconduct and Mismanagement at ICITAP, OPDAT, and the Criminal 
Division's Office of Administration,'' hearing before the House 
Judiciary Committee, 106th Cong. (statement of Representative Howard 
Coble) (Sept. 21, 2000).
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    [The exhibits referred to follow:]
    
    

```