GAO-05-962R Military Transformation 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

August 4, 2005 

The Honorable Terry Everett 

Chairman 

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify 

New Triad Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach

In response to your request, we issued a report in June 2005 on the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) progress in determining and allocating resources needed to 

implement the New Triad today and in the future.1 In that report, we made 

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to provide greater visibility of the 

projected spending and future investments for DOD’s efforts to create the New Triad 

and acquire future capabilities. On April 28, 2005, we provided DOD with a draft of 

that report for review and comment. DOD did not provide comments in time to 

incorporate them in that report, which went to printing on June 24, 2005. DOD 

provided its comments to us on June 30, 2005. To present DOD’s comments and 

provide our perspective on them, this report briefly summarizes our June 2005 

report’s objectives, results, and recommendations, along with DOD’s comments and 

our evaluation of the comments. DOD’s comments, which were provided by the 

acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, are included 

as enclosure I to this report. 

Summary of Objectives, Results, and Recommendations 

In our June 2005 report, we determined the extent to which DOD has (1) identified 

the projected spending for the New Triad in its Future Year Defense Program (FYDP) 

and (2) developed a long-term investment approach to identify and manage future 

investments needed to achieve the synergistic capabilities envisioned for the New 

Triad. 

In its December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, DOD significantly expanded the range 

of strategic capabilities to include not only the old Triad, which consisted of nuclear-

 

1

 See GAO, Military Transformation: Actions Needed by DOD to More Clearly Identify New Triad 

Spending and Develop a Long-term Investment Approach, GAO-05-540 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 

2005). 
Page 2 GAO-05-962R Military Transformation

armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 

strategic bombers, but also conventional and nonkinetic offensive strike and 

defensive capabilities. The review also called for revitalizing the U.S. research and 

development and industrial infrastructure that would develop, build, and maintain 

offensive forces and defensive systems and be capable of responding in a timely 

manner to augment U.S. military capabilities when necessary. According to DOD, the 

three legs of the New Triad–offensive strike, active and passive defenses, and 

responsive infrastructure–are intended to be supported by timely and accurate 

intelligence, adaptive planning, and enhanced command and control capabilities. The 

review stated that the synergism achieved through the integration of nuclear and 

conventional offensive strike and defensive capabilities would provide the President 

and Secretary of Defense with a broad array of military options to better address the 

spectrum of potential opponents and contingencies that may arise in the coming 

decades. Figure 1 shows the three legs of the New Triad and its supporting elements. 

Figure 1: The New Triad 

Note: ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles; SLBMs = submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 

We found that although DOD established its New Triad in 2001, it has not developed a 

way to fully identify projected spending for New Triad programs in its FYDP. In light 

of the challenges DOD faces in transforming strategic capabilities in the current fiscal 

environment, decision makers need to have the best and most complete data 

available about the resources being allocated to the New Triad. Although DOD has 

identified some New Triad-related spending in the FYDP, our notional analysis of 

such spending included in the FYDP through 2009 indicates that overall spending for 

the New Triad could be much greater than DOD’s limited analyses have identified. 

DOD has not fully identified New Triad spending because the diversity and scope of 

the New Triad and ambiguity of the concept make it difficult for DOD officials to 

reach agreement on a complete list of programs, according to DOD officials. 

Additionally, the current FYDP structure does not readily identify and aggregate New 

Triad spending. A mechanism to aggregate FYDP spending, known as a “virtual 

major force program,” has been used by DOD to identify space funding and could be 
Page 3 GAO-05-962R Military Transformation

beneficial in tracking New Triad funding, according to some DOD officials including 

the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. Without some mechanism to 

aggregate funding associated with the New Triad, DOD will be limited in its ability to 

guide and integrate New Triad spending. 

We also found that despite the long lead time generally needed to develop and 

acquire new systems and the need to consider long-term affordability issues, DOD 

has not developed an overarching and integrated long-term investment approach for 

acquiring new capabilities and replacing some or all of its aging systems that provide 

New Triad capabilities. Best practices show that long-term capital planning is needed 

to help organizations define direction, establish priorities, and plan future budgets. 

While DOD has identified some near-term investments, its investment plans are 

incomplete because some key capabilities for the New Triad have not been fully 

assessed in context of the New Triad and long-term replacement of key platforms 

have not been assessed in the context of the new security environment and DODwide affordability challenges. Although DOD recognizes the need for a long-term 

investment approach, it has not begun to develop one because its concepts for 

nonnuclear strike and missile defense are not fully mature. However, delaying the 

preparation of a long-term investment approach puts DOD at risk of not developing 

an affordable strategy. Additionally, DOD and Congress will not have sufficient 

information to effectively determine future investment costs, the priorities, and tradeoffs needed to sustain New Triad implementation. While we agree that some 

concepts are continuing to evolve, and that new systems are still under development, 

we do not believe that these circumstances preclude DOD from beginning to plan for 

the future of the New Triad. As new information becomes available, we would 

expect to see adjustments in DOD’s plans–that is the nature of long-term planning. 

To strengthen DOD’s implementation of the New Triad and provide greater 

transparency of resources that are being applied to developing, acquiring, and 

sustaining the needed capabilities, we recommended in our June 2005 report that the 

Secretary of Defense take the following four actions: 

• Direct the Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, in consultation 

with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), to (1) develop and obtain 

approval of a comprehensive list of program elements in the FYDP, which 

support activities for developing, acquiring, and sustaining New Triad 

capabilities; (2) modify the FYDP to establish a virtual major force program for 

the New Triad by creating new data fields that would clearly identify and allow 

aggregation of New Triad-related program elements to provide increased 

visibility of the resources allocated for New Triad activities; and (3) report 

each year the funding levels for New Triad activities and capabilities in the 

department’s summary FYDP report to Congress. The Secretary of Defense 

should direct that these three actions be completed at or about the time when 

the President’s budget for fiscal year 2007 is submitted to Congress. 

• Direct the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy and Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics to develop an overarching and integrated long-term 

investment approach for the New Triad that provides decision makers with 

information about future joint requirements, projected resources, spending 
Page 4 GAO-05-962R Military Transformation

priorities and trade-offs, milestones, and funding time lines. As part of 

developing and implementing this approach, DOD should leverage the 

analyses, assessments, and other information prepared under the Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System process. The Secretary of 

Defense should direct that development of a long-term investment approach 

be completed in time for it to be considered in the department’s preparation of 

its submission for the President’s budget for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 and be 

updated, as needed, to adapt to changing circumstances. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

DOD’s comments on a draft of our June 2005 report are summarized below and 

reproduced in enclosure I. DOD concurred with one of that report’s four 

recommendations. 

DOD did not concur with our three recommendations to develop and obtain approval 

of a comprehensive list of New Triad-related program elements in the FYDP; modify 

the FYDP to establish a virtual major force program; and report funding levels for the 

New Triad in the department’s summary report to Congress, which DOD addressed as 

one recommendation in its comments. DOD believed that developing an official New 

Triad virtual major force program would be difficult and would not contribute 

substantially to developing coherent long-range investment plans. It believed that a 

New Triad virtual major force program would be more difficult to develop than the 

one that was created for space because the New Triad is presently much more 

complex and difficult to separate from other DOD-wide programs than the programs 

for space. DOD stated that while it is fairly straightforward to identify some program 

elements that contribute substantially to a particular New Triad capability, it would 

be highly subjective and difficult to attribute other elements to the New Triad. For 

example, DOD believed that it would be very hard to determine which conventional 

strike program elements to include in the New Triad. It further stated that 

categorizing science and technology efforts as relevant to the New Triad would also 

be very subjective. DOD believed that placing a program element in the New Triad 

virtual major force program would not automatically make a program a high priority 

or that the department would set aside funding for New Triad programs. 

Furthermore, DOD believed that a list of New Triad program elements should be 

more narrowly defined than the notional list prepared by GAO and that a New Triad 

major force program should include only those program elements that are most 

central to or contribute most directly to New Triad capabilities. 

We continue to believe that each of these three recommendations have merit and, if 

implemented collectively, would provide DOD and congressional decision makers 

with the most complete accounting of the projected spending planned for the New 

Triad over the next several years as they deliberate the budget and make decisions on 

the affordability, sustainability, and trade-offs among efforts to develop and acquire 

capabilities. As our June 2005 report states, DOD needs to move beyond a broad 

conceptual framework for the New Triad it articulated in December 2001 and begin to 

identify the program elements currently in its FYDP that are intended to provide 

capabilities for the New Triad, whether they are fully or not fully dedicated to its 

missions. Establishing a virtual major force program for the New Triad in the FYDP 

would provide an important mechanism for DOD and Congress to continuously 
Page 5 GAO-05-962R Military Transformation

identify and track projected spending, trends, and priorities and enhance an 

understanding of the progress made by DOD in developing and shaping New Triad 

capabilities. Our notional list of New Triad-related program elements was intended 

to provide an illustrative example of how a comprehensive list could be developed 

and we agree that it could be more narrowly defined if necessary. We believe that 

knowledgeable DOD officials should be able to agree on the most relevant program 

elements that make up the New Triad. DOD predicated the New Triad concept on 

creating a synergy between the capabilities provided by nuclear and conventional 

strike; active and passive defense; responsive infrastructure; and enhanced command 

and control, planning, and intelligence. But without some coherent and systematic 

attempt to identify program elements in the FYDP and aggregate and report on those 

elements, DOD stakeholders and congressional decision makers do not have the 

information they need to understand how this synergy is being achieved and to make 

decisions on programs that affect the creation and success of the New Triad concept. 

We also believe that a comprehensive and approved list of New Triad program 

elements could provide a foundation for developing long-range investment plans by 

helping to better define the New Triad and the capabilities currently being developed 

and acquired, their availability, and the scope of those efforts. Additionally, we 

believe that Congress could benefit in its deliberations on funding levels for New 

Triad-related programs in the President’s budget for fiscal year 2007 if DOD were to 

fully implement our recommendations at or about the time that budget is submitted 

to Congress. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop an overarching and integrated 

long-term investment approach for the New Triad. In its comments, DOD stated that 

its recently completed Nuclear Posture Review Strategic Capability Assessment 

provides an initial effort toward that goal by identifying shortfalls in capabilities that 

would be used to develop individual investment strategies. The department stated 

that these individual plans and strategies are required as well as an overarching 

integration of these efforts. DOD also agreed that it should leverage the analysis, 

assessments, and other information prepared under the Joint Capabilities Integration 

and Development System process as part of developing and implementing this 

approach. We support DOD’s efforts in this direction and look forward to additional 

actions by the department to bring this approach about, particularly to support 

preparation of its submission for the President’s budget for fiscal years 2008 and 

2009. Such a long-term investment approach will not only be of great value to the 

department for identifying and prioritizing its resources for acquiring future New 

Triad capabilities, but it will assist Congress in its deliberations on New Triad-related 

initiatives and programs. 

Matters for Congressional Consideration 

On the basis of DOD’s comments on our recommendations regarding actions for DOD 

to take to provide greater visibility of projected New Triad spending in the FYDP, as 

discussed above, Congress should consider requiring the Secretary of Defense to 

• develop and obtain approval of a comprehensive list of program elements in the 

FYDP, which support activities for developing, acquiring, and sustaining New 

Triad capabilities; 
Page 6 GAO-05-962R Military Transformation

• modify the FYDP to establish a virtual major force program for the New Triad by 

creating new data fields that would clearly identify and allow aggregation of New 

Triad-related program elements to provide increased visibility of the resources 

allocated for New Triad activities; and 

• report each year the funding levels for New Triad activities and capabilities in the 

department’s summary FYDP report to Congress. 

Congress should also consider requiring DOD to complete these actions at or about 

the time when the President’s budget for fiscal year 2007 is submitted to Congress. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the 

Secretary of Defense; the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and the Director, 

Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-4402 (stlaurentj@gao.gov). Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff 

who made major contributions to this report are listed in enclosure II. 

Sincerely yours, 

Janet A. St. Laurent 

Director, Defense Capabilities 

 and Management 

Enclosures – 2 
Page 7 GAO-05-962R Military Transformation

Enclosure I 

Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 8 GAO-05-962R Military Transformation

Enclosure I 

Now on page 27 

of GAO-05-540.
Page 9 GAO-05-962R Military Transformation

Enclosure I 
Page 10 GAO-05-962R Military Transformation

Enclosure I 

Now on page 27 

of GAO-05-540.
Page 11 GAO-05-962R Military Transformation

Enclosure II 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact Janet A. St. Laurent (202) 512-4402 

Acknowledgments In addition to the individual named above, Gwendolyn R. 

Jaffe, Mark J. Wielgoszynski, David G. Hubbell, Kevin L. 

O’Neill, Julie M. Tremper, and Renee S. McElveen made 

key contributions to this report. 

(350736) 
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