Number 153, January 1999

U.S.-Central Asian Security*Balancing Opportunities andChallenges
by Sylvia Babus and Judith Yaphe

Conclusions- The newly independent states of Central    Asia exhibit relative stability although economic progress is slow. While their greatest    security threats are internal—political repression, inequitable distribution of    income, ethnic and tribal unrest—their leaders focus instead on external threats such    as hostile neighbors and the spill-over of Islamic extremism (especially in Afghanistan). 
- The potential wealth anticipated from    the region’s as yet untapped energy resources may be greater than the actual return    from oil and gas deposits. The resources will help diversify world energy supply, but will    not replace Persian Gulf oil or gas.  
- Neighbors—Russia, Iran, and    China—worry about U.S. military intrusion in the region and encirclement by hostile    European, Western, or NATO forces. They are also competing for access to and control over    pipelines exporting the region’s gas and oil. 
- The Central Asian states are comfortable    with the current U.S. level of engagement in the region, but the growing momentum of    economic interests, diplomatic ties, and military relationships risks unintended    consequences. Leaders of the Central Asian states may interpret U.S. military and    diplomatic initiatives as a commitment to regime survival and preservation of the regional    status quo, policy decisions the United States has not yet made. 
**Central Asia as a Work in Progress

In the seven years since the collapse ofthe Soviet Empire, the five states that comprise the predominantly Muslim states ofCentral Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, andUzbekistan—have made significant progress in their search for political independenceand economic stability. Their independence is established and their northern neighbor isunlikely to be able to reestablish domination. Their regimes are relatively stable if notdemocratic. Most practice a repressive, autocratic-style of political rule with symbolicelections, few true political parties, and no succession mechanisms. With some variations,these are leader-dominated systems with few opportunities for citizen voices to be heardand little tolerance for opposition or political critics. Most credit their stability tostrong control from the top; many of the governing elite cite the civil war that convulsedTajikistan until last summer as proof that democratic changes and Islamist politicalactivism can destabilize society. They are restructuring their economies, movinghesistantly toward market systems. They export commodities or natural resources, and twoof them—Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan—could become very wealthy from oil and gasexports. Their societies have ethnic and religious fault lines but no open conflict atpresent. 
**The Five Republics

Each of the five Central Asian states hasdifferent political leadership styles, resources, and needs.

**Kazakhstan** has huge oil reserves.Western oil companies are major investors in the area, but China has small oil fieldinvestments and talks about financing an 1,800-mile pipeline to Xinjiang. Americancompanies are the largest commercial actors in the Tengiz fields in western Kazakhstan, aswell as in the consortia that are developing undersea Caspian oil (primarily inAzerbaijani territory). A large Russian population lives along the northern border.

**Kyrgyzstan** is a poor, mountainouscountry with few resources. It depends on foreign assistance, and is politically moreprogressive than its neighbors.

**Tajikistan,** also poor, saw ethnicand political unrest between Islamists and old-line secularists from 1992 through 1996. ARussian military force of 18,000 monitors the 1997 peace agreement.

**Turkmenistan** hopes to gain wealthfrom its huge natural gas deposits; but it has no outlets and needs pipelines to exploitits natural gas fields.

**Uzbekistan** is self-sufficient ingas and oil, and an exporter of cotton and gold. It sees itself as the Islamic center ofCentral Asia, although the current regime has repressed religious activities. 
**Ties that Bind

The Central Asian states face dauntingeconomic problems. Rich in energy and other resources, they are land-locked—dependenton the goodwill of neighbors for export routes. Energy exploitation is expensive, accessto markets difficult, and demand, at least in the near term, uncertain. Their fragileeconomies have not recovered from the collapse of the Soviet Union with its highlycentralized, bureaucratic business practices. Since the collapse, the GDP of these stateshas dropped 15-20 percent, resulting in lower standards of living and fewer jobs. Thesestates are seeking foreign investment, new markets, and multiple distribution routes toexport their gas, oil, and other commodities. Among the alternatives, they prefer multiplepolitical allies and trade routes rather than depending on new forms of Russian politicaland economic domination. They see the United States as a lever against Russian dominance,and a source of investment capital and technology. Moreover, they are aware that thegreatest risk to regime well-being could arise from the economic uncertainties which fuelethnic violence, religious-secular clashes, and the failed-state syndrome.
**Whose Great Game Is It?

The Central Asian states are the focus ofattention from neighbors and other interested parties because of the potential for greatwealth and because of the risks that arise from dangerous circumstances. Neighbors havevisions of playing "Big Brother" to the region, hoping that shared histories,ethnicity, language, or greed will help shape these states in the neighbor’s image.

*Turkey’s*regional visionstresses Turkish-style secularism and democracy. Ankara depends on the region for energyimports and hopes to make the East-West pipeline project from Baku to Ceyhan become areality. It fears Russian expansionism but needs Russian trade (approximately $4 billionyearly), tourism, and expatriate earnings. To strengthen its links to the republics,Turkey sends educational and training missions, and sponsors an estimated 3,000 CentralAsian military officers annually in its military academies. 

*Russia* sees opportunity and troublein its Near Abroad. Moscow views the Central Asian region as a natural part of its sphereof influence because of its contiguous borders, centuries of domination, and the largenumber of ethnic Russians living there. Russian nationalists fret over the loss of Russiancontrol and prestige (posing a potential political problem for the Kremlin), but mostRussians realize they have only a limited ability to compete economically or militarilywith the West. Moscow participates in NATO Partnership for Peace exercises in Central Asiabut it is uneasy about the expanding U.S. military presence in the region. AlthoughRussia’s primary security risk at present is its economy, it fears Islamistinstability on its borders and views Central Asian states as a buffer zone.

*Iran* assumes it is the naturalprotector of Central Asia because of long historical, ethnic, linguistic, and religiousties. Tehran also worries that U.S. military links to Central Asian states are part of aglobal effort to encircle and isolate it. Tehran casts a covetous look at theregion’s energy resources with an eye both to the day when its own oil reserves aredepleted and to the profit to be made from export pipelines passing through Iran to theGulf. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan would benefit from the development of oil and gaspipelines through Iran. Although Iran has meddled in the Tajik civil war, whateverambitions it might have had to support Islamist extremists in Central Asia have probablybeen tempered by changes in Tehran’s leadership, a lack of resources, and a fear ofpromoting ethnic backlash among Iran’s Tajik and other ethnic minorities. 

*China* may become a more importantplayer in Central Asian energy politics. Once Asia’s top oil exporter, China nowimports half of its energy needs from the Persian Gulf and estimates suggest that coulddouble within the next two years. Its rising energy needs are fueling investment inKazakhstan’s oil fields and pipeline projects. Beijing also keeps an eye on ethnicunrest among its Uighur minority on the borders with Kazakhstan. 

Central Asian states view the turmoil inAfghanistan as a potential security threat and assume the Taliban, if successful, willeventually be in conflict with them. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistanhave agreed to coordinate efforts, including military assistance, to defend theircountries against the Taliban. 
**The Islamist Threat

Some Central Asian states, like Russia,emphasize the "external meddler" as a source of Islamic politicalactivism—a viewpoint that minimizes the strength and appeal of indigenous Islamwithin the national population and tends to demonize it. Uzbekistan, for example, recentlyforged an alliance against "Wahhabi extremism" with Russia, Tajikistan, andKyrgyzstan. However, Central Asia lived under Islamic rule for a thousand years, but underSoviet rule for only 70 years. Most people in the region are nominal Muslims, and clericswith a Turkish background, or Iranian, or Saudi support are vying for influence. Theregion is undergoing a surge in personal piety and interest in its Islamic history and culture. Political leaders (most of whom came of age underSoviet tutelage) manipulate Islamic symbols to rally popular support, but they also usethe specter of a menacing, externally supported religious extremism coming across theirborders to bolster domestic power. Russia also uses this specter to justify its strategicinterest in the region. Few observers of Central Asia expect Iranian-style Islamistrevolutions in the region, but all agree that Islamic institutions offer a potentialoutlet for people frustrated by current social and economic ills.
**U.S. Opportunities and Challenges

U.S. policy in Central Asia is based onthe principles of engagement, mutual self-reliance, and self-respect. Publicly, the policypromotes the independence, sovereignty, and security of the states; encourages democraticgovernment; develops free market economies; ensures world access to regional energyresources; prevents the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and combatsnarcotics traffic. The more accurate drivers of U.S. foreign policy include securingaccess to the region’s energy resources and pipeline investments for U.S. companiesand reducing dependence on Persian Gulf energy supplies. Depending on the status ofrelations with Moscow, Ankara, and/or Tehran, U.S. policy interests in the region couldalso be shaped by a desire to contain one and reward another.

Bilateral and multilateral programs formilitary contacts, training, and assistance have grown rapidly. The Central Asian stateswelcomed the U.S. commercial and diplomatic presence, and—after some initialhesitation—they have also welcomed contacts with our military and various forms ofsecurity assistance. Denuclearization, arms control, and help with defense conversion wereimportant aspects of the early U.S. relationship with Kazakhstan. Military-to-militarycontacts began to expand after all but Tajikistan (because of its ongoing civil conflict)joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Through this mechanism, the CentralAsian states’ contacts with Western military officials multiplied, and they begantaking advantage of opportunities to gain technical assistance, training, and equipmentfrom the NATO states.

There are risks in pursuing U.S. policyobjectives in Central Asia. Not all the states are alike. Each has a different set ofproblems and threat perceptions, and each needs to be addressed individually. Persistentpolitical repression, especially if it targets Islamists, could radicalize large segmentsof the population and lead to political and social turmoil. 

Moreover, rapid economic growthconcentrated in the hands of the few, coupled with corruption and economic discontent,could provoke domestic unrest and a backlash against U.S. interests popularly perceived assupporting repressive and corrupt regimes. While the United States may be able to dolittle to affect internal rule or custom, our close ties to these regimes will implygreater influence than we have. 

Finally, if the oil fields and pipelineprojects do not prove profitable, what happens to U.S. interests? The regimes have beenencouraged to aspire to new levels of expectations and rewards in allowing foreigneconomic and commercial development. Disappointment and lowered expectations could providenew problems for the United States in the region.
**Recommendations
To support growing U.S. regionalinterests, military and civilian officials have made a number of high-level visits,institutionalized political, economic, and commercial relationships, and participated inhigh-visibility joint military training exercises. Trade ties lag behind those withEastern Europe, however, and the Central Asian regimes have yet to initiate the kinds oflegal reforms and security protection that promote business confidence. Several issuesneed to be examined as the U.S. presence and interests expand in the region:
- Define the region. The United States has    divided the region between CENTCOM (the five Central Asian republics) and EUCOM (the three    Caspian states), leaving Russia unassigned. The division of responsibility should not be a    problem for force posture and planning, but in a crisis resources would be thinly spread.    The states view themselves in different alignments, depending on whether economic,    strategic, trade, or pipeline issues are relevant. National self-interest will determine    where they look for support; the ties that bind them together might affect U.S.    operational activity. 
- Assign priorities and determine levels    of engagement. The United States needs to identify and prioritize its interests in the    region and decide which policy instruments are best suited to pursue them. The    interests—not in order—include energy diversity, commercial advantage, promoting    security cooperation among the Central Asian states, internal and regional stability,    political and economic reform, and nation building. The instruments are civilian diplomats    and military and intelligence officers—all are developing contacts, and some have    ill-defined missions. U.S. policymakers need to define what the United States would    defend: oil? external invasion? internal unrest? Uighurs? Or none of the above? And    against whom would the United States engage—Russia? China? Are there any internal    circumstances that would trigger a U.S. reaction? Most observers of Central Asia see    little risk of outside aggression but assume Russia would be the state most likely to    intervene militarily in the region. 
- Avoid false expectations. U.S.-Central    Asian military-to-military ties have been our greatest success. Local enthusiasm is high    for the annual joint military exercises with the regional peacekeeping force, known as    CENTRASBAT. Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Latvia, and Azerbaijan participated in the 1998    exercise "in the spirit of the Partnership for Peace." China and Pakistan sent    observers. Central Asian leaders, however, may interpret U.S. military participation and    diplomatic initiatives as a commitment to regime survival and preservation of the regional    status quo. 
- Manage the neighbors. To pursue our    strategic objectives effectively in Central Asia, the United States needs to convince    Russia, Iran, and China that our presence does not threaten their security. Rather, there    are mutual benefits in energy development, economic investment, trade, military training    exercises, and positive diplomacy.  
- Review measures for force protection.    While this is already a high priority for U.S. forces and embassies, the pattern of    terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities in Africa—where security is generally lax    and buildings hard to isolate and protect—could repeat itself in Central Asia. 

Dr. Sylvia Babus and Dr. Judith Yaphe are Senior Fellowsin the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the National Defense University. For moreinformation contact Dr. Babus at (202) 685-4683 or by e-mail to [email protected]; or Dr.Yaphe at (202) 685-2224, e-mail to [email protected]. 

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

Editor in Chief - Hans Binnendijk

Editor - Jonathan W. PierceNOTE

**| Return   to Top | Return to Strategic Forum Index |  Return to Publications |
*Return to NDU Homepage**INSS Homepage******************