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28–987 2007

[H.A.S.C. No. 109–54]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY AND

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

HEARING HELD

MARCH 9, 2006
(II)

STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama, Chairman

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

JOE SCHWARZ, Michigan

CATHY MCMORRIS, Washington

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

BILL OSTENDORFF, Professional Staff Member

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member

KATHERINE CROFT, Staff Assistant
(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2006

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, March 9, 2006, Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization

Act—Budget Request for Missile Defense Agency and Ballistic Missile Defense Programs ..................................................................................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, March 9, 2006 ........................................................................................ 37

THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 2006

FISCAL YEAR 2007 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Everett, Hon. Terry, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Strategic

Forces Subcommittee ........................................................................................... 1

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Strategic Forces Subcommittee ..................................................................................... 2

WITNESSES

Dodgen, Lt. Gen. Larry J., Commanding General, U.S. Army Space and

Missile Defense Command, and U.S. Army Forces Strategic Command,

U.S. Army ............................................................................................................. 9

Duma, David W., Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 11

Flory, Hon. Peter C.W., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy .............................................................................................................. 15

Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III, Director, Missile Defense Agency, U.S. Air

Force ...................................................................................................................... 4

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Dodgen, Lt. Gen. Larry J. ................................................................................ 71

Duma, David W. ............................................................................................... 90

Flory, Hon. Peter C.W. ..................................................................................... 96

Obering, Lt. Gen. Henry A., III ....................................................................... 46

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre ....................................................................................... 41

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Everett ........................................................................................................ 111

Mr. Reyes .......................................................................................................... 113

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 113

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2006, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR MISSILE DEFENSE

AGENCY AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 9, 2006.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1 p.m., in room 2212,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Terry Everett (chairman of

the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, STRATEGIC

FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. EVERETT. The meeting will come to order.

Thank you all for being here.

Somewhere I have an opening statement. I will get to it.

The subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the Department of Defense fiscal year 2007 budget request for missile defense programs. Again, I thank you all for coming.

I welcome Lieutenant General Obering, Director of the Missile

Defense Agency (MDA); Lieutenant General Dodgen, Commanding

General, U.S. Army Space and Missile Command; Mr. Duma, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in the Department of Defense; and Mr. Flory, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

Thank you again for being here. We have a lot of ground to cover

today, so I would ask each of you to limit your opening statement

to about five minutes, and your entire statement will be made a

part of the permanent record.

I will briefly comment that world events continue to highlight

the security threats posed by the proliferation of missile technology

and nuclear materials. The news concerning potential threats from

Iran and North Korea is no better this year than it was last year.

As a Member of both the House Armed Services Committee and

Intelligence Committee, along with my colleague Mr. Reyes, I firmly believe that we have a responsibility to press forward with fielding those missile defense elements for our nation’s defense.

General Obering, I would like to highlight a few specific areas

that I am interested in hearing about today: The impact of funding

reductions for the fiscal year 2007 through 2011 Missile Defense

Agency programs that were made late last year.

I was very pleased with your response to the independent review

team’s finding last year following several Ground-based Midcourse

Defense (GMD) past failures. I specifically commend you for stand-
2

ing up a missions readiness task force, and I am looking forward

to hearing your assessment on how the MDA test program is proceeding.

General Dodgen, I am specifically interested in hearing about the

following: your crucial role as joint functional component commander for Strategic Command (STRATCOM), including progress

in developing contingency operations for GMD, and your assessment of the operational readiness.

Mr. Duma, I know that your organization has been working very

closely with MDA in developing criteria for operational realistic

testing. I look forward to hearing more about your assessment of

MDA’s test program.

Mr. Flory, I look forward to hearing about your perspective on

the ballistic missile threat to our country. I am interested in your

views on how we are doing and engaging our international partners

in cooperative missile defense.

Now, let me recognize my good friend and colleague Mr. Reyes,

the ranking member of the subcommittee.

And a while ago when I mentioned that both of us were on the

House Armed Services and the Intel Committees—comments following that—I do not speak for Mr. Reyes. He speaks for himself

on those kind of things. But he has always been a strong advocate

for the defense of this country.

STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to thank Lieutenant General Obering and Lieutenant

General Dodgen, Mr. Duma and Assistant Secretary Flory for joining us here today.

Welcome, gentlemen.

Mr. Chairman, although we have several contentious issues in

our subcommittee’s jurisdiction, our Members who follow your example are able to express differences of opinion without letting the

debate turn ugly.

We may need to call upon your leadership again this afternoon,

Mr. Chairman, as we will be discussing some contentious issues related to the development, the testing and the deployment of ballistic missile defense.

Before we get into that discussion, however, I want to explain,

Mr. Chairman, how I frame this particular issue. This context is

not for the sake of the Members of this subcommittee, because even

when we may disagree about a defense issue, we never question

each other’s commitment to defending our nation.

Rather, I do this for the sake of the general public, because too

often we Democrats are painted as reflexively and unalterably opposed to missile defense.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, after these many years that we

have known each other, I am a strong supporter of missile defense,

including the GMD system that already is being deployed in Alaska

and California. And I think we will eventually prove that this system is an effective insurance policy against a limited ICBM threat.
3

Moreover, ballistic missile defense systems that protect or will

protect our troops on the front lines such as Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC–3), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THADD)

and Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) enjoy broad and strong

bipartisan support.

In 1999 H.R. 4, a bill co-authored by two of our committee colleagues, Congressman Curt Weldon and Congressman John Spratt,

came to the House floor for a vote. H.R. 4 simply stated that, ‘‘It

is the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defense system.’’

This was the simple language of H.R. 4, period, end of story, no

caveat. And I am proud to tell you that a majority of House Democrats—again, a majority of House Democrats—voted for that measure, supporting that policy.

I also know that on my side of the aisle we do not have as much

consensus on national missile defense and deployment of that system as our colleagues on the other side. But somehow, in spite of

all the evidence to the contrary, there is widespread perception

that all Democrats oppose missile defense, especially a national

missile defense system. That is flat wrong.

I provide this context because today many Members will ask

tough questions. And even though I strongly support missile defense, and even though I believe it is important and imperative for

our nation to have a ballistic missile defense system in place, I too

want to ask some tough questions because even though I support

missile defense, I do not think we should give it a blank check or

allow it to avoid a thorough testing process. I think that is part of

our obligation as Members of Congress.

On the contrary, the very fact that someday a missile defense

system might be the last line of defense to protect our citizens

against nuclear-tipped missiles, this is exactly why it should undergo some strenuous testing before deployment.

Last year, when we held our subcommittee oversight hearing

after three missile defense test failures, I stated that we should not

be discouraged by those tests, and I compared our task to that of

a baseball player who, after striking out, needs to go back to the

dugout, regroup before his next turn at bat.

Well, General Obering, MDA has regrouped. Your decisions to

charter an independent review team and then implement its recommendations have helped to set the program back on the path to

success. Since resuming testing last summer, MDA has achieved

test objectives in all aspects of the program, including interceptors,

radar, battle management, and targeting.

Just yesterday, MDA successfully completed a joint test with the

Japanese demonstrating the performance of SM–3 Aegis missile

that had been modified with a Japanese-designed advanced nose

cone, all very welcome news to all of us on the committee.

Yet the most challenging tests, I think, are still to come. This

spring and summer MDA will attempt to verify the entire field

chain of the GMD system, including an actual intercept using deployed hardware under what I think are going to be more realistic

conditions with our nation’s warfighters at the controls.

Today we will have an opportunity to ask both the developer and

the operational tester about the value of these upcoming tests. Spe-
4

cifically, if these tests are successful, will we have achieved Block

04 operational capability?

In the broader context, I also have questions about the pace and

the scope of the missile defense program. As an example, the fiscal

year 2007 budget includes long-lead funding for GMD boosters

numbers 41 through 50. This buy would complete procurement of

all GMD boosters prior to the conclusion of operational testing.

In addition, funding for the two boost phase missile defense options, Airborne Laser (ABL) and Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI),

is collectively slated to grow by over 50 percent between fiscal year

2006 and 2007. This growth is proposed even after Congress requested a report comparing the capabilities and the cost of these

two systems.

My question is do we really need to accelerate the development

of both boost phase systems. As I see it, we are not debating the

question of are you for missile defense or not. Instead, today we are

discussing the relative value and the priority of different missile

defense systems given the threats that we are facing worldwide.

We are also seeking assurance that deployed systems undergo

the rigorous testing required to assure warfighters of their operational capability.

So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to state the

context as I personally see it and for calling this very important

hearing. I value your leadership, and I value your friendship, and

I know that you always have given us an opportunity to fully look

at all these different issues.

So today I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses, and with that, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

Mr. EVERETT. I thank my colleague. And as my colleague knows,

I have no objection to anything that he says. I am in full agreement.

I am supposed to have a—General Obering, I will tell you what.

We will just start with you while I find out where I am at here.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING III, DIRECTOR,

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY, U.S. AIR FORCE

General OBERING. Yes, sir. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Reyes and distinguished Members of the committee. It is

an honor to be here today. I ask that my prepared statement be

entered for the record.

Mr. EVERETT. Without objection. And by the way, we can make

that 10 minutes if you guys need it. I will take 5, but we can make

it 10 minutes each, and the rest of your statements will be made

a part of the record.

General OBERING. Thank you. Since I last addressed this committee, we have made good progress developing and fielding an integrated layered system to defend the United States, our deployed

forces, allies and friends against ballistic missiles of all ranges in

all phases of flight.

We have implemented improved mission assurance processes, established an increasingly robust and operationally focused test pro-
5

gram, and continued the fielding of system components and integrated capabilities.

For the 2007 budget request, we plan to expand the development,

fielding and verification of this critically needed defense. Proliferating and evolving ballistic missile systems increasingly pose a danger to our national security.

There are hundreds of these missiles in more than 20 countries

around the world, including those hostile to the United States. Last

year, there were nearly 80 foreign ballistic missile launches.

Our program is structured to meet this evolving threat. We balance the early fielding of system elements with steady improvements for a spiral development and test approach. 2007 will be a

very intense and demanding period for our development and fielding efforts. As such, we are requesting $9.3 billion to support our

program of work. About $2.4 billion covers the continued fielding and sustainment

of system components, including the long-range ground-based midcourse defenses, short to intermediate range defenses involving our

sea-based interceptors, and all supporting radars, command, control, battle management, and communications (C2BMC) capabilities. About $6.9 billion will be invested in development for evolution and testing of the system.

As I detail our request for 2007, I think that it is appropriate for

me to review where we are with the budget that you previously approved.

In our long-range midcourse defense element, I delayed the interceptor deployment in 2005 to make the program changes recommended by an independent team that reviewed our two flight

test reports last year.

I also established a mission readiness task force to follow

through on the corrections to ensure our return to a successful program.

We are now undertaking the additional recommended qualification tests and have implemented much stronger systems engineering and quality control processes. These comprehensive reviews

and our recent successes indicate that we should continue interceptor deployment. But I will pause again if necessary.

We recently emplaced 3 more ground-based interceptors in Alaska and plan to have a total of 16 deployed by December of this

year. This progress is critical, since we expect the ground-based

midcourse defense element to be the backbone of our long-range defense capabilities for years to come.

Missile defense testing, based on event-driven results, continues

to evolve to where we test as we fight and we fight as we test. We

cooperate fully with the operational test community and the combatant commanders and their efforts to characterize system effectiveness and readiness.

Last year, I told you that we planned to conduct two long-range

interceptor tests in 2005. That did not happen, because we wanted

to ensure that we fully implemented the recommendations of the

mission readiness task force.

With the successful December flight of our operationally configured long-range interceptor, we have resumed an aggressive test

program that includes three more flight tests this year. These will
6

include realistic targets, operational sensors, operational crews and

operational interceptors from operational silos, with two of them as

planned intercepts beginning this summer.

Last year the committee voiced concern about the ability of the

Cobra Dane radar to support the fire control mission. This past

September, we flew a threat representative air launch target, generating tracks that the operational fire control system then used to

produce an intercept solution. We are confident in the capability of

this radar.

We also reached another major milestone last month when we

successfully tested the upgraded Beale early warning radar in California against a realistic ICBS target launched from Alaska. Again,

the operation configured fire control system generated an intercept

solution from the track data provided by the Beale radar.

Later this year, we will deploy the first transportable forwardbased X-band radar to our very important ally, Japan, where it will

provide both support for regional and homeland defense.

And in the United Kingdom, we expect the upgraded Fylingdales

radar to achieve initial capability later this year.

In our sea-based sensor program, we added six more Aegis longrange surveillance and track destroyers for a total of 11. We successfully tested this capability against targets launched from Hawaii and California.

Last year this committee expressed interest in our long-range

and our large sea-based X-band radar. I am pleased to report that

we completed its instruction and made good progress in integrating

that radar into the system.

This winter, after extensive sea trials and high-power radiation

testing, the radar completed its long journey from Texas to Hawaii.

Later this year, it will be placed on station in Alaska where it will

complete its integration and checkout. Of our total 2007 budget request, $2.7 billion would go toward

the long-range midcourse defense. These funds would allow us to

continue to improve and build additional interceptors, their silos,

support equipment and facilities, as well as order long-lead items

for the next fielding increment.

We plan to field and support up to a total of 22 interceptors and

conduct two more flight tests by the end of 2007. To continue to

expand our sensor coverage in 2007, we would deliver the second

forward-based X-band radar and begin a major portion of the upgrade to the Thule radar in Greenland. We are requesting $475

million between these efforts.

As we prepare for an uncertain future, being able to meet emerging threats worldwide becomes important. This means moving to

space with precision tracking sensors. Therefore, we have budgeted

$380 million to continue the development of our space tracking and

surveillance system. This includes the launch of two demonstration

satellites in 2007 to begin experimentation.

I would now like to turn to our most important area, command,

control, battle management and communications. This infrastructure is the heart, soul and brain of our defensive capabilities. Without it, we simply cannot execute the mission.

The global foundation that we have established for our nation’s

leadership, Strategic Command, Northern Command and Pacific
7

Command, is unmatched in the world, but we have only just begun.

We need to expand this network to other combatant commands and

to develop the integrated fire control that will allow us to mix and

match sensors and weapons to expand our detection and engagement capabilities.

We also continue to work closely with strategic command and the

combatant commanders to train and certify missile defense crews

by exercising the system with launch-ready demonstrations. The

$264 million we are requesting for these efforts is essential to ensuring an effective missile defense system.

Committee Members raised a concern last year that with our

focus on long-range defenses, we might not be adequately funding

defenses against the short to intermediate range ballistic missiles.

I can assure you that we are aggressively addressing these threats

from several angles. Nearly $2 billion of our 2007 budget request

is allocated evenly between our Aegis ballistic missile defense and

terminal high altitude area defense, or THAAD, program to enable

us to field capabilities to counter these threats.

In addition to providing long-range surveillance and tracking

support, Aegis is providing a flexible sea-mobile intercept capability

against the shorter range ballistic missile. This past year, we

added a second Aegis engagement cruiser trial involving architecture. In November, we successfully used an Aegis cruiser to engage

a separating target carried on a medium-range ballistic missile. We

plan to conduct two more intercept tests this year and two more

in 2007 using upgraded versions of this interceptor.

By the end of 2007, we expect to have three engagement cruisers

and seven engagement destroyers available with up to 33 Standard

Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors delivered.

In our THAAD program, we are coming off a very encouraging

flight test last November when we put the redesigned interceptor

through its paces. We will continue to characterize this performance and integrate this element into the overall system.

We plan to conduct four more flight tests in 2006, including the

first high endo-atmospheric intercept. And in 2007, we plan to conduct four intercept tests in both the exo- and endo-atmospheric regions. We will continue our development efforts and plan to field

a first unit in Block 2008 with a second unit available in Block

2010.

To keep ahead of future threats, there are several other important development efforts funded in this budget. We continue to follow a strategy of retaining alternative paths until the capability is

proven, what we call a knowledge-based approach.

The airborne laser reached all of its knowledge points for last

year when it reached and achieved a full duration lase at operational power and completed initial beam control and fire control

flight tests.

Currently, we are installing the tracking and atmospheric compensation lasers and preparing the aircraft to accept the highpower laser modules in 2007. We have planned a campaign of flight

tests leading to a lethal shootdown of a ballistic missile in 2008.

Nearly $600 million of our budget request is for this revolutionary

work.
8

In our other boost phase development activity, the kinetic energy

interceptor (KEI), we focused our efforts on demonstrating a mobile

land-based very high acceleration booster. Last year, we demonstrated the command, control, battle management and communications functions required for the boost intercept mission.

This past January, we completed the successful static firing of a

second-stage prototype and will continue static firing tests of the

booster’s first and second stages in 2007 leading to the first flight

in 2008. We have requested nearly $400 million in our budget for

this moderate-risk effort.

As threats grow in complexity, we will need a volume kill capability. The multiple kill vehicle (MKV) program is a generational

upgrade to our long-range midcourse interceptor.

In 2005, we made progress in the development of the seeker and

made the decision to move to a lower-risk propulsion system which

we plan to hover test in 2009. We have allocated $162 million to

continue this very important development effort.

Committee Members expressed strong interest last year in our

international efforts. We have been working closely with a number

of allies and friends and have concluded formal agreements with

four countries, with several more pending.

Japan continues to make significant investments in multilayered

missile defenses. We have worked closely with Japan since 1999 to

develop advanced Standard Missile-3 components, and I am proud

to say that yesterday we successfully flight tested a product of this

cooperation, an advanced nose-cone, off the coast of Hawaii.

This success is a good start for our most ambitious international

effort with our partner, Japan, the co-development of a 21-inch

Standard Missile-3 which will have greatly expanded performance

and dependent area capability.

In April we concluded an agreement with Australia to expand

our cooperative work on sensors. An agreement with Denmark allows us to upgrade the Thule radar and integrate it into the system

by 2009.

In addition to the Fylingdales radar integration activities, we are

undertaking a series of technical development efforts with the

United Kingdom. In our ongoing work with Israel on the Arrow Interceptor will continue to enhance its missile defenses against

emerging threats.

Mr. Chairman, last year I asked this committee to have tactical

patience as we worked through our quality control issues. I explained that we certainly have our challenges, but for the most

part the program is on track.

The successes that we have had over the past year bear this out.

I greatly appreciate this committee’s continued support and patience, and I want to thank the thousands of Americans and allies,

both in government and industry, working hard to make missile

defense a success.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Obering can be found in the

Appendix on page 46.]

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, General Obering.

General Dodgen.
9

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LARRY J. DODGEN, COMMANDING

GENERAL, U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND, AND U.S. ARMY FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND, U.S.

ARMY

General DODGEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Reyes and Members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear

before this distinguished panel and for your ongoing support to our

military.

This committee’s support of the Army and the missile defense

community has been instrumental to our efforts in fielding missile

forces for our nation and our allies.

I appear before this panel in two roles. The first role is as an

Army commander for missile defense and proponent for the

ground-based midcourse defense, or GMD, system. My second

role——

Mr. EVERETT. General Dodgen, do you mind pulling that mike a

little bit closer?

General DODGEN. Not at all.

Mr. EVERETT. I am getting old and it is hard to hear. Let me say

older, not old.

General DODGEN. In my second role, I am a member of the joint

missile defense team as commander of the joint functional component command for integrated missile defense, or JFCC–IMD, as

part of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and

the joint user representative working closely with MDA, other services, combatant commanders to ensure that our national goal of developing, testing and deploying an integrated missile defense (IMD)

system is met.

Before addressing the fiscal year 2007 President’s budget submission for the Army’s missile defense systems, I would like to provide

a very brief update on the JFCC–IMD. The JFCC–IMD was established in January 2005 as one of the JFCC supporting U.S.

STRATCOM’s new triad concept. We reached full operational capability on 28 February of this year.

The JFCC is truly joint, manned by Army, Navy, Air Force and

Marine Corps personnel. It is headquarters at the Joint National

Integration Center at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado. This

arrangement allows us to leverage the existing robust infrastructure and our strong partnership with our co-located MDA team to

execute the IMD mission.

In the past year, the JFCC–IMD has aggressively executed

STRATCOM’s global mission to plan, coordinate and integrate missile defense—in short, to operationalize capabilities. In collaboration with geographical combatant commanders, we are developing

IMD plans that integrate theater and national assets to provide the

best protection.

Through our partnership with MDA, our sister services and

warfighters at the GCCs, U.S. STRATCOM is setting the stage to

evolve the BMDS beyond its current capability to a global capability to provide more robust missile defense for the homeland, deployed forces, friend and allies.

I would now like to highlight the Army’s fiscal year 2007 budget

submission for air and missile defense (AMD) systems. The Presi-
10

dent’s budget presented to Congress on February 6 includes approximately $1.57 billion with which the Army proposes to perform

current Army AMD responsibilities and focus on future development and enhancement of both terminal phase and short-range

AMD systems.

Mr. Chairman, with the past support of this committee, the

Army continues to improve its ability to acquire, track, intercept

and destroy theater air and missile threats. The Patriot system remains the Army’s mainstay theater air and missile defense system,

and our nation’s only deployed land-based short to medium-range

ballistic missile defense capability.

Today’s Patriot force is a mixture of configured units. To maximize our capabilities and better support the force, the Army is

moving toward updating the entire Patriot force to PAC–3 configuration. The current and updated Patriot force should be maintained

through sustainment and recapitalization efforts until the medium

extended air defense system, or MEADS, is fielded, which is projected to begin in 2015.

As many of you are aware, the MEADS is a cooperative development program with Germany and Italy to collectively field an enhanced ground-based air and missile defense capability. The

MEADS program will enable the joint integrated air and missile

defense community to move beyond the critical asset defense designs we see today.

MEADS will provide theater-level defense of critical assets and

continuous protection of a rapidly advancing maneuver force as

part of a joint integrated AMD architecture.

As I reported last year, the Patriot MEADS combined aggregate

program, or CAP, has been established. The objective of CAP is to

achieve the objective MEADS capability through incremental fielding of MEADS’ major in-items into Patriot.

Patriot MEADS CAP is an important capability that will operate

within MDA’s BMDS. The Patriot and PAC–3 MEADS CAP research, development and acquisition budget request for fiscal year

2007 is approximately $916 million. This request procures 108

PAC–3 missiles and reflects the necessary Patriot development to

keep the system viable as we pursue development of PAC–3

MEADS CAP capabilities.

The threat from land attack cruise missiles exists today and will

grow in the future. As you know, cruise missiles are inherently

very difficult targets to detect, engage and destroy because of their

small, low-detection signature and low-altitude flight characteristics.

It is clear that the required systems and capabilities necessary

to counter this emerging threat need to be accelerated to the field,

to field a cruise missile defense (CMD) capability as soon as possible.

Critical Army components of the joint CMD architecture are provided by the joint land attack cruise missile defense elevated netted sensor, or JLENS; the surface launched advance medium-range

air-to-air missile, or SLAMRAAM; and an integrated fire control

capability.
11

We are also working closely with the joint community to assure

development of doctrine that synchronizes our military’s full capabilities against the cruise missile threat.

The JLENS program is developing unique lightweight fire control

and surveillance radars to detect, track and identify cruise missile

threats. JLENS uses advanced sensors and networking technologies to provide precision tracking and 360-degree wide-area,

over-the-horizon surveillance of land attack cruise missiles.

The fiscal year 2007 JLENS funding request is $264 million, supports development of full JLENS capability with first unit equipped

occurring by 2011.

SLAMRAAM will provide a CMD system to maneuver forces with

an extended battle space and a beyond line-of-sight engagement capability critical to countering the cruise missile and unmanned

area vehicle threats. The fiscal year 2007 funding request of $49

million supports the scheduled initial operational capability target

of 2011.

Sentinel radar is a critical component in the Army’s ability to

conduct air surveillance for the maneuver force. Sentinel is a small,

mobile battlefield radar that supports the joint air defense sensor

network in detecting cruise missiles, UAVs and helicopter threats.

The fiscal year 2007 request of $17.6 million provides for continued development and integration of improvements to support joint

interoperability.

The forward deployment today of joint tactical ground stations,

or JTAGS, in EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM, provides assured

missile warning to combatant commanders and assigned forces

through a direct downlink to space-based infrared assets into the

joint theater communications architecture.

Fiscal year 2007 funding request of $24.9 million sustains the

forward deployed JTAGS units supporting joint warfighters and

postures the Army to participate with the Air Force in future

ground mobile system compatible with the space-based infrared

system and follow-on sensors.

Mr. Chairman, the Army is a full contributing member of the

joint team to develop and field ballistic missile defense for our nation, deployed forces, friends and allies. With the continued support

of this committee, the Army will continue the transformation to

support the Army’s future force, the joint integrated air and missile

defense system and our global BMDS, building on the ongoing success of our theater air and missile defense forces.

I appreciate having the opportunity to speak on these important

matters and look forward to addressing your questions to you and

other Members of this committee. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Dodgen can be found in the

Appendix on page 71.]

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, General Dodgen.

Mr. Duma.

STATEMENT OF DAVID W. DUMA, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL

TEST AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. DUMA. Chairman Everett, Ranking Member Reyes, distinguished Members of the committee, I am pleased to have this op-
12

portunity to speak to you about the ballistic missile defense system

test program. I will cover four areas.

First, I will recap the Missile Defense Agency, or MDA, test accomplishments during the past year. Second, I will discuss organization and philosophy changes within MDA. Third, I will give you

a status of compliance with the test requirements prescribed in recent national defense authorization acts. Fourth, I will highlight future challenges facing the test program of the ballistic missile defense system, or BMDS.

First, the results. The MDA testing program during 2005 was

adequate and appropriate to the developmental maturity of the

BMDS. The results of ground tests demonstrated that integration,

interoperability, tactics, doctrine and procedures were adequate to

increase confidence in these aspects of the system.

For the first time, MDA flew a Raytheon exo-atmospheric kill vehicle integrated onto an orbital sciences booster. While the flight

was successful, it did not evaluate the fixes to the ground support

system that caused the previous flight test launch failures. Plans

are to demonstrate the ground system fixes in subsequent flighttesting.

The flight of threat representative targets across the search and

track volumes of the Cobra Dane and Beale early warning radars

demonstrated their capability to provide target acquisition, tracking and queuing data.

MDA executed an operationally realistic test scenario that provided significant information regarding the Cobra Dane capabilities

and limitations. MDA also demonstrated they could successfully

launch a long-range threat representative target from an air platform.

The Aegis ballistic missile defense system completed two intercept missions with the new SM–3 missile. One of these flights included an intercept of a separating target. This was a first for that

missile.

The airborne laser completed the passive phase of flight test of

the beam control/fire control system, and completed the integration

and operational demonstration of six integrated chemical oxygen iodine laser modules.

The terminal high-altitude area defense system, or THAAD, executed its first flight test in five years. It flew its redesigned missile

on a non-intercept test to demonstrate performance and measure

interceptor kinematics.

Last year, two new sensors completed integration and some combined developmental and operational testing. The forward-based Xband radar-transportable, or FBX–T, demonstrated its ability to

track long-range ballistic missile launches.

The sea-based X-band radar completed integration testing in the

Gulf of Mexico and has arrived in Hawaii to begin its checkout and

integration into the BMDS test bed. The results of the integrated

ground tests, coupled with the success of other element-level

ground and flight test events, indicate the BMDS is maturing.

Second, the approach. General Obering implemented several

changes in organization and test philosophy during the past year.

These changes more tightly integrate the developers, warfighters

and operational testers. They should also better integrate the sys-
13

tem engineering functions and the test and evaluation functions

within MDA.

These changes, coupled with improvements in test planning, execution and analyses should result in better definition of data requirements and better, more efficient test execution.

As part of his re-engineering his agency, General Obering established the responsible test organization and combined test force

under the leadership and direction of his deputy for test and assessment.

The combined test force will plan and execute tests and collect

and analyze data that will populate a database to support the technical and operational evaluations of BMDS performance. The combined test force will include test personnel from each of the BMDS

elements and the operational test agencies.

With the support of General Obering, I have commissioned the

Institute of Defense Analyses to examine and recommend a construct that integrates the operational testers into the combined test

force. The goal is to maintain the operational testers’ independence

and credibility while economizing resources, eliminating duplication of effort and supporting the combined test force mission and

objectives.

General Obering and I have also asked the institute to investigate and recommend how to best integrate each stakeholder’s assessment needs into the test planning, execution, data collection,

analysis and evaluation processes. This should further streamline

the test and evaluation planning and execution process, while ensuring all stakeholders efficiently and effectively meet their objectives.

Along with these organizational changes, MDA and the operational test community have agreed on an integrated test planning

approach for future BMDS blocks. Beginning with Block 2006,

MDA, the joint operational test agency and my office will develop

an integrated, evaluation-driven test plan.

This test planning philosophy brings discipline and structure to

planning block testing based upon overall system evaluation needs.

It does this while concurrently addressing individual element test

requirements.

This approach should increase the quantity and the quality of

data while fostering the efficient use of test resources. It will also

enhance efforts to address priority issues, such as verification, validation, and accreditation of models and simulations.

Third, congressional interest. Over the last few years, Congress

has asked MDA and my office to accomplish several specific initiatives with regard to operational testing of the BMDS. Fiscal year

2004 National Defense Authorization Act required operationally realistic testing of the BMDS.

This past year, MDA conducted numerous ground tests, war

games and capability demonstrations using trained warfighters to

operate the systems. These exercises included fully integrated

ground and simulated missions designed by the operational testers

and the warfighters.

This year’s update to the integrated master test plan incorporates greater operational realism in the areas of increased

warfighter involvement in flight tests; more end-to-end system test-
14

ing; use of operationally representative missiles; employment of

operational tactics, techniques and procedures; and inclusion of

more complex countermeasures.

Incorporating trained warfighters into the testing program has

added to the operational understanding of the capabilities, limitations and maturity of the BMDS.

In fiscal year 2005, Congress required the MDA to conduct a realistic operational test of the BMDS. Following two launch failures

in the ground-based midcourse defense system and recommendations from two independent review teams, General Obering restructured the flight test program.

Flight testing to date has not yet reduced the risk to the point

where General Obering is ready to execute an operationally realistic flight test. Under the restructured program, MDA plans three

operationally realistic flight tests later this year.

In fiscal year 2006, Congress required the operational test community to plan and conduct an operational test of the capability

provided by each block of the BMDS beginning with Block 2006. I

have taken action to begin this effort involving not only the operational test community but also the warfighters and MDA.

When the evaluation plan is finished, MDA will include these

tests in the next revision to the integrated master test plan.

Fourth, the challenges. The complexity of the BMDS is increasing. Elements are maturing and being integrated into the system.

Consequently, testing of the BMDS is becoming more challenging

as the agency adds elements and capability.

Testers must assess performance and reliability during concurrent test and operations of a layered BMDS system. Integration of

the BMDS elements and sensors that are still maturing with operational legacy systems is a difficult task.

Fusing the data that each element provides into a single, unambiguous operational picture is a significant software development,

integration, and testing challenge. Range safety and environmental

restrictions limit intercept geometries to only a few scenarios.

Meeting each of these challenges is a big task, one that requires

a series of well-planned ground and flight tests.

Over the long term, MDA should incrementally develop a capability to support concurrent testing and operations, including simulation over live testing, to speed up the process. This is similar

to how DOD upgraded and tested Cheyenne Mountain without

interfering with operations.

When developed, this capability will provide an alternative

means for system test and evaluation to characterize operational

effectiveness and suitability using actual hardware and warfighters

in the loop.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, the MDA experienced a difficult

year with its ground-based midcourse defense system but ended the

year on several high notes. Element successes indicate they are

progressing toward maturity.

Last year, warfighters demonstrated they could operate the integrated ground system. The fact remains, however, that we ground

test for discovery, and we must flight test to verify operational performance and validate the simulations.
15

Successful flight tests are the cornerstone for building confidence

in the BMDS. War fighters must have confidence that the system

will defend on demand.

This concludes my opening remarks. I ask that my statement be

entered into the record. And I welcome your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Duma can be found in the Appendix on page 90.]

Mr. EVERETT. Without objection, and thank you, Mr. Duma.

Mr. Flory.

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER C.W. FLORY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Secretary FLORY. Chairman Everett, Ranking Member Reyes and

Members of the subcommittee, thank you. It is a pleasure to be

here with you today to provide the subcommittee with a policy perspective on our ballistic missile program. You just heard laid out

for you very capably and exhaustively the details of that program

and where we are going with it.

I would like to express our support for the subcommittee’s support and assistance over the years for our strategic programs and

for the Department of Defense.

Ballistic missile defense has been a top defense priority of this

Administration from day one, and it remains a priority today. I

take you back briefly to the beginning of the Administration and

look at the threat in the world we faced at that point.

As members are aware, the security environment at 2001, at the

beginning of 2001, was very different from the one we faced in the

Cold War and it is about to change again significantly.

Former Director of Central Intelligence Jim Woolsey has pointed

out that with the demise of the Soviet Union, we found that while

we had slain a great dragon, the dragon had been replaced by

many dangerous snakes. So the end of the Cold War did not mean

that the we no longer faced a threat, but it meant that the United

States would faced a different kind of threat and a greater number

of threats.

One such threat was the spread of weapons of mass destruction

and the means of delivering them, particularly ballistic missiles.

Regimes in countries such as North Korea and Iran and, at the

time, Iraq understood that while they could not hope to match the

United States in conventional forces, they could gain strategic leverage by investing in ballistic missiles.

Without a defense against ballistic missiles, the American people

are vulnerable to the threat of missile attack. And without defenses, an American President, faced with a threat to vital U.S. interests from a rogue state armed with long-range missiles, could

find that our options are constrained by the fact that these countries can now, for the first time, hold at risk the U.S. population

and the American homeland.

To deal with this threat, President Bush in 2001 and 2002, took

several bold steps. First, he announced that the United States

would exercise its right to withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile,

or ABM, Treaty.
16

Second, in 2002 he directed the Department of Defense to end

what had been for decades a research-and-development-only approach to ballistic missile defense and to begin actually fielding an

initial set of capabilities for the United States by the end of 2004.

I am pleased to say that today the United States has all of the

pieces in place that it needed to intercept an incoming long-range

ballistic missile. As you have heard described, we have groundbased interceptors in Alaska and California; a network of ground,

sea and space-based sensors; a command and control network; and,

most importantly, trained servicemen and women ready to operate

the system.

Our system today is primarily oriented toward continued development and testing, but we are confident that it could intercept a

long-range ballistic missile if called upon to do so.

Because of the importance of this mission, one of the first things

I did on assuming my current position in the Department of Defense was to take a trip up to Fort Greely. I want to tell you how

impressed I was, not just by the equipment and the hardware and

the facilities there, but the dedication and the professionalism and

the sense of mission of the men and women who are there guarding

our country day and night.

And I would encourage you all to visit Fort Greely. I know it is

a long way away. But I know the men and women who are stationed there would appreciate the visit, and I am confident you will

be as impressed as I was by both the facilities and the quality of

the people we have there.

I would like to take a few minutes to put this program in its

strategic context, in terms of the evolving threat, and in terms of

our overall defense strategy. First and foremost, as I mentioned

briefly earlier, the threat posed by ballistic missiles is growing.

And the missiles we are talking about are growing in range, complexity and in the threat they pose.

In 1990, around the end of the Cold War, there were 16 countries

that possessed ballistic missiles of varying ranges. Today, about 25

countries have them.

The number of countries that possess medium, intermediate, or

intercontinental ballistic missiles—in other words, missiles with

ranges over 600 kilometers that may reach our friends and allies

and, in some cases, the U.S. homeland itself—has increased from

five to nine, so it has almost doubled.

Not only is the number of nations possessing ballistic missiles increasing, but the group includes some of the world’s most threatening and least responsible regimes, such as North Korea and Iran.

General Maples, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,

testified recently in an unclassified session that North Korea continues to invest in ballistic missiles, not only for its own use but

for foreign sales as well.

As General Maples—I should be clear, Lieutenant General

Maples, pointed out, Pyongyang is likely developing intermediate

and intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.

As then—Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz testified before

the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2001, North Korea

launched a multi-stage Taepo-Dong-1 missile in 1998, which the in-
17

telligence community tells us demonstrated a North Korean capability to deliver a small payload to the United States.

Now today, North Korea continues to work on the Taepo-Dong II.

In fact, it may be preparing to test the Taepo-Dong II, which is a

longer range missile capable of reaching more of the United States

with a nuclear weapon-size payload.

Mr. Chairman, for over 50 years, U.S. service members have

stood on the border of North and South Korea. And we have always

known that these men and women were in harm’s way. The prospect of long-range ballistic missiles in the hands of the North

means that, for the first time, the American people, too, are in

harm’s way.

Turning to Iran, Iran represents a dangerous nexus, combining

a vigorous ballistic missile program, a desire and a program to develop nuclear weapons, and a history of support for international

terrorism.

Terrorism has been part of Tehran’s strategy for decades. And in

fact, before the 9/11 attacks, more Americans had been killed by

Iranian-backed terrorists like Hezbollah and others than by any

other terrorist group.

Iran has now made ballistic missiles an important part of its defense strategy. The intelligence community judges that Iran now

has the Shahab–3 missile operationally deployed and could flighttest an IBM by the year 2015, so that is 9 years away.

Now, the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, recently testified before Congress that Iran has engaged in a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly two decades and that,

although it is the judgment of the intelligence community that Iran

does not yet possess a nuclear weapon or have the necessary fissile

material to do so, the danger that it will acquire a nuclear weapon

and the ability to integrate such a weapon with ballistic missiles

that Iran already possesses is a reason for immediate concern.

In this environment, the recent statements by Iranian president

Ahmadinejad threatening the United States and its friends are of

even greater concern. In an October 2005 speech, president

Ahmadinejad declared that ‘‘Israel must be wiped off the map and,

God willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world without the United States and Zionism.’’

I note that in the papers today we see an Iranian spokesman

promising that harm and pain will come to the United States if the

U.N. sanctions Iran over its nuclear weapons program.

Iran’s ballistic missiles already cast a shadow over U.S. friends

and allies and over our deployed forces in the Middle East. And as

DNI Negroponte testified recently, this is part of Iran’s strategy to

be able to threaten our allies, to be able to threaten our forces in

the region.

The addition of nuclear warheads and an ICBM that could reach

the United States would further extend Iran’s ability to coerce others and to threaten the United States.

As we face these threats, ballistic missile defenses are an important part of our overall defense strategy. Last month, the department released the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR. The

QDR identifies a number of priorities to guide the department as
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it makes choices about how to best defend the Nation and how best

to win the long war against terrorism and extremism.

These priorities include defending the homeland in depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing

hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using weapons

of mass destruction.

Ballistic missile defenses make a contribution to each of these

important priorities. They can be used to defend the homeland and

to defeat the actual use of a ballistic missile against the population

and territory of the United States, or its deployed forces or its

friends and allies.

And by making an adversary uncertain that a ballistic missile attack would succeed, missile defenses can dissuade countries from

investing in missiles or deter their use by those who have already

acquired them.

Some have questioned the amount of attention and the amount

of money that has been invested in ballistic missile defense in the

years following the September 11th attacks, on the theory that the

main threat to the United States is terrorism, and that a ballistic

missile attack against the United States is unlikely.

I would turn that argument around. One of the lessons of September 11th is that nothing is unthinkable, and that the United

States must and can prepare to defend itself against the widest

range of threats possible.

The U.S. Government was criticized in the wake of 9/11 for not

connecting the dots on the terrorist threat and for failing to act to

prevent the attacks. With respect to the ballistic missile threat, the

dots are out there for all to see.

And I certainly would not care to have to come before this committee in the wake of a ballistic missile attack to explain why,

given all that we know of ballistic missiles in the hands of dangerous regimes, we had not acted to defend the American people.

A theme throughout the Quadrennial Defense Review is the presence of uncertainty and surprise. And I mention this because this

has been particularly part of our history of dealing with the ballistic missile threat.

Despite the best efforts of our intelligence community, the fact is

that countries that develop ballistic missiles for the kind of purposes that they are developing them for, to threaten the United

States, to intimidate us and our allies—first, they tend to do it in

unorthodox ways that do not look like the way that we and the Soviets prepared them.

They do not have long, extensive test programs. They are not

seeking high degrees of reliability or safety. But as a result of that

and the way that they proceed, they are able to achieve what for

them is a useful capability with relatively little time and, because

they are going to great lengths to hide these, often with very little

or no warning for the United States.

We have been surprised many more times than we would like to.

One example is North Korea’s deployment of the No Dong missile

after only one test, something that we, based on our own practices,

would have judged unlikely.

Another example was when North Korea launched the TaepoDong-I missile in 1998 and when, to our surprise, it turned out to
19

have a third stage that we had had no idea that they were working

on.

I mention this to emphasize that the—while I have tried to give

you an idea of the threats that we know about, we always need to

be very modest and we need to be very cautious in our confidence

in the information that we have and the assumptions that we are

making based on that information, because as the Rumsfeld Commission on Ballistic Missile Defense pointed out in 1998, we need

to be very cautious, and we cannot be sure that we know all the

things that we need to know to make these decisions, and that

therefore decisions that require—that are premised on having a

certain level of certainty can be very risky.

I spoke earlier about the ballistic missile defense goals the President laid out in 2002. In addition to directing us to field defenses

for the United States, the President directed us at that time to cooperate with friends and allies to extend the benefits of missile defenses to them as well.

Since then, we have embarked upon a number of important missile defense initiatives with our international friends and partners.

We have worked with the United Kingdom to upgrade the early

warning at Fylingdales so that it can perform a ballistic missile defense mission.

We have worked with Denmark to achieve agreement to allow us

to upgrade the early warning radar at Thule, Greenland. We continue to work with Israel on the Arrow program. Our own Patriot

system is widely deployed and is available for export to a number

of countries.

Germany and Italy are our partners in the medium extended

range air defense system, or MEADS. We signed a framework

memorandum of understanding on missile defense cooperation with

Australia in 2004.

And we are negotiating a defense technical cooperation agreement with Russia to facilitate both government-to-government as

well as industry-to-industry missile defense cooperation. At the

same time, we continue to seek practical areas of cooperation with

Russia on a bilateral basis as well as in the NATO-Russia context.

One particularly good news story in our international ballistic

missile defense is our cooperation with Japan. The successful test

that we just had has already been noted. Japan has committed to

spending the equivalent of roughly $1 billion on ballistic missile defense, making it our largest international partner.

If you look at the map of Japan’s neighborhood, and if you consider that Japan was the country that North Korea launched a ballistic missile over in 1998, you can understand the level and the

intensity of their interest in this program.

We have agreed with the Japanese to work together to develop

a more capable sea-based interceptor that will improve the defense

of both the U.S. and Japan. That is the larger standard missile.

I am particularly pleased that the government of Japan has

agreed to evaluate the optimum deployment site for an X-band

radar on its territory that will help defend both the United States

and Japan. In addition, the U.S. and Japan are taking the steps

necessary to share ballistic missile defense information with one

another.
20

We also are considering fielding long-range missile defense inter- ceptors and radars in Europe. There is roughly $120 million in the

President’s fiscal year 2007 budget request to begin work on this

project.

Such a site would house interceptors very similar to those that

we have currently have fielded at Fort Greely and at Vandenberg

Air Force Base in California. Fielding such a capability would improve the defense of the United States against long-range missiles,

especially those launched from the Middle East, and it would also

begin to extend missile defense to our European allies, protecting

their populations from attack and reducing the risk of coercion or

blackmail.

The U.S. Government has held consultations with a number of

allies, beginning in 2002, about their willingness to host missile defense interceptors. We intend to continue those consultations in the

near future with allies who have expressed interest.

We are currently in the process of notifying those countries, and

I do not want to get ahead of that process today. But that said, I

would be happy to follow up with the subcommittee in the near future with more details of what we are doing in this regard.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Reyes, thank you very much for the time and

the committee’s time today. I look forward to answering your questions and those of other subcommittee Members. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Flory can be found in the

Appendix on page 96.]

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Mr. Flory.

Mr. Reyes.

By the way, we will limit our Members to 5 minutes. I will ask

them to be respectful of that time so that all Members can have

a shot at getting a question in. And then we will go as many

rounds as we have to.

Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to cover

this briefly.

General Dodgen, based on current tests and procurement plans,

when do you anticipate or expect that THAAD, the THAAD system,

will be ready to be transferred to the Army for operational deployment?

And does the Army have a position on how many successful

flight tests need to be completed before they consider THAAD

ready for operational transition?

And then the last question is what will be the process to determine when that transition to the Army by THAAD will be accomplished?

General DODGEN. Thank you, Congressman Reyes. Let me start

from the back of the question and go forward. We are in the middle

of negotiations now with the Army and the Missile Defense Agency

on exactly what those procedures—and we have come to a lot of

agreement.

And I think the agreement we have right now and the understanding we have right now—there is no doubt that on 9/11 when

the THAAD batteries are ready for operation, there will be United

States Army soldiers that are manning those units wherever they

may be deployed around the world.
21

The Army test agency has been intimately involved in the test

program with MDA, as described by Mr. Duma in his statement.

And while I am not sure exactly how many test we ultimately

see required, because we will continually test the program throughout the life of a particular weapons system, I will tell you that the

Army’s very comfortable with the test program and that it is meeting what we think are appropriate testing to operationalize the system.

I think the system is coming along very well. The successful test

was a step in the right direction. There are four additional tests

later this year. We look forward to doing those tests.

And inherent in the mechanism that MDA does, soldiers and operators are involved in every one of those tests, so there is a growing exercise from test to test. But the Army is very much looking

forward to gaining that capability, putting it into our inventory.

And at the same time this year we will be determining what the

ultimate number of batteries and missiles we will need for the defense of our nation.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EVERETT. Oh, thank you.

Dr. Schwarz.

Dr. SCHWARZ. For anyone who cares to answer—and I am on the

learning curve on this topic, gentlemen, so—but can you tell me

what are the advantages or disadvantages in airborne laser intercept as opposed to a kinetic energy interceptor, A?

And B, could a laser interceptor, which I believe has got to be

on an airborne platform—can that be scrambled quickly enough to

intercept a missile in the boost phase?

General OBERING. Congressman, I will take that, if you do not

mind. First of all, the advantages and the disadvantages of each.

With a directed energy weapon like airborne laser, one of the significant advantages, of course, is you cannot outrun it—instantaneous speed of light transmission.

Also, a tremendous advantage in terms of its applicability to all

ranges of missiles, so it can attack the short-range as well as all

the way up to the intercontinental range missiles.

It can operate in a concept of operations not unlike what we do

today with our Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System

(STARS) aircraft, our Airborne Early Warning Control System

(AWACS) aircraft, in establishing orbits. And then they are supported, obviously, by protective layers and tankers to be able to do

that. That work we have done. We have worked that with the Air

Force. And we thought through some of those concepts of operation.

Some of the disadvantages, on the other hand—it is not 24-hours,

7-day persistent like you could get with a terrestrial-based capability. But that is why we instituted a KEI, or kinetic energy interceptor, program, so that we would not only have a risk reduction alternative to the airborne laser, but also offers a complementary capability to that.

The disadvantage with a KEI is it cannot reach out and touch

the very short range in the short range ballistic threats. It is more

effective against the intermediate range and the longer range

threats. But it does give us an alternative for that.
22

But again, it provides us persistence to the fight, and when we

can either land-base them or sea-base them, it also gives you the

flexibility to move as the emerging threats move.

Dr. SCHWARZ. In the end, we will have both.

General OBERING. Our intention is that we will——

Dr. SCHWARZ. Best-case scenario, in the end, you will have both.

General OBERING. In the end, we will have both options to choose

from, if we have the resources, and the funding, and the affordability of both of those systems, we will pursue both of those.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EVERETT. General, I applaud your optimism.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank all of you for being here. You know we appreciate

what you do to protect this country and to especially prepare us for

whatever kinds of challenges we may face in the future. I know

that each one of you are very affirmed by that beyond any words

of gratitude that I could have, but I certainly want you to know

that it exists.

And having said that, Mr. Flory, if you can express it in an unclassified manner, what do you see as our greatest missile vulnerability? I mean, would it come from North Korea or China as far

as our primary concerns?

And if not, let me know. If so, what would be our default systems

to try to interdict some type of either singular missile or salvo?

What would be the things that we would default to?

And then last, what would be our chances of successfully intercepting such an attack?

And perhaps, General Obering, you might want to follow up as

well.

Secretary FLORY. Congressman Franks, thank you, first of all, for

your kind words.

The threats we are most focused on are the what is sometimes

called the rogue state threats. And Iran and North Korea are the

main competitors for that title right now.

I would say that the—and we would be happy to get you greater

detail in classified form. The tests I mentioned of the Taepo-Dong

(T.D.) I—what we know about the Taepo-Dong II and the development of it suggests that North Korea may be closer than Iran today

to actually having an ICBM that could reach out and hit the

United States. The intelligence community assesses that Iran could

flight-test an ICBM in the year 2015.

As I mentioned earlier, there is a lot of uncertainty involved, but

given that the North Korean test of the T.D.–1 was in 1998, and

they have been working on the T.D.–1 but also the T.D.–2 for that

whole time, I think we have to assume that they are closer.

They also are more advanced in their nuclear weapons capability.

The U.S. intelligence community assumes that they have nuclear

weapons. They claim that they have nuclear weapons and we believe them.

We have not actually put our hands on them, not surprisingly.

We do not have that level of certainty as to their numbers. But it

is something that we have to assume that they have.
23

Now, Iran is right now the subject of a great deal of high-level

diplomacy. As you know, there was a meeting of the IAEA, and the

Iran dossier is going to the Security Council. And I hope that some

vigorous and tough diplomacy can maybe achieve what we have not

been able to achieve so far, which is to get Iran to back off of its

efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program.

On the other hand, we have to be prudent, and we have to plan

for the possibility that Iran may—either the diplomatic efforts may

fail or, for whatever reason, Iran may end up with a nuclear weapons capability which, in time, when that ICBM—if that ICBM is

tested and becomes operational, that could be then mated to that.

Now, in the meantime, there are a lot of other things that Iran’s

current missiles, the Shahabs, which have a range of about 1,300

kilometers, can already do to make our life more difficult. With

1,300 kilometer missiles they threaten a lot of our friends and allies in the Middle East.

By doing that, they also—not only is there the risk that they

could actually hit these countries, but they have the ability to constrain our freedom of action, and we——

Dr. SCHWARZ. In the interest of time, Mr. Flory, may I——

Secretary FLORY. Sure.

Dr. SCHWARZ [continuing]. Try to just pull that question down to

an attack on the continental United States? What would be our

greatest danger there and what would be our chances of interdicting?

Secretary FLORY. I will defer to General Obering on the operational question, other than to say that we are confident that we

have pieces in place that could intercept a missile. I would say that

North Korea is probably going to be in a position to do that sooner

than Iran.

General OBERING. Sir, with respect to North Korea, I cannot get

into specifics on the effectiveness, but I will let you draw some of

your own conclusions. We have actively flight-tested, as I mentioned in my oral statement, against the Cobra Dane sensor,

against the Beale radar. We generated fire control solutions based

on that testing that in the analysis shows that they would have

been successful. Once we get this kill vehicle into its end game,

into the terminal basket—it has done a very good job, and the testing we have shown to date shows that we would have done that

on that series of tests.

With respect to the Iranian threat, until we get sensor coverage

from that approach, we do not have protection against the homeland. That is one of the reasons that we are upgrading the

Fylingdales radar in the United Kingdom and continuing with our

work in Thule.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you.

General DODGEN. Mr. Chairman, could I add on to that from the

operator standpoint?

Mr. EVERETT. Yes, and also let me make a brief remark that

General Obering or General Dodgen, either one of you, could comment on.

The stage we are in now—doesn’t that pretty much compare to

the way we were when the Israelis were when they deployed the

Arrow missile?
24

General OBERING. Sir, we are following the very same approach,

which is we test to where we get a sufficient level of confidence

that we have a capability. We put it out there, because we know

we do not have protection, therefore we want to get some modicum

of protection. And we continue to improve it over time. And so we

are following very similar approaches.

General DODGEN. I would like to add to Congressman Franks’

questions and then answer a question you gave me in your opening

statement, which is—and I speak for the operators on the system

that have been manning the system 24/7 since October of 2004.

They have been involved in all the testings. They have seen the

individual pieces of this system tested. The operational capability

demonstrations—they have gained a great deal of confidence in this

particular system for the threat that we might be facing at this

time in this—and they are very ready and very able to put that

system into effect if called.

They are looking forward to the testing which is coming on this

year because the end-to-end tests will allow us to optimize the use

of our inventory and maybe change our techniques and procedures

to get the most out of the missiles we have.

But as far as operating the system they have right now, I share

their optimism. I share their confidence that they are ready to do

the job.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Obering, with regards to proposed budget and spacebased test bed, although this year’s proposal does not include any

dollars, starting next year through 2011 there is $569.7 for a spacebased test bed. Can you help us understand what you mean by a

space test bed, first off?

And then can you discuss whether or not this test bed will include deploying some prototype space-based kinetic energy interceptors?

General OBERING. Yes, Congressman. First of all, there is a lot

that we would like to learn about space and space basing when it

comes to our sensors, to start with. So the first step in that, as I

mentioned in my oral testimony, is that we want to launch two of

our space tracking and surveillance system satellites in 2007, and

that program is on track to do that.

Those two satellites along with their cross links allow us to begin

experimentation to see can we solve the technical challenges that

are facing us there, what effectiveness is it, and how reliable may

this system be.

We intend to follow, as you said, in 2008 and beyond with some

experimentation that starts us down the path to understand some

of the technical challenges we face if we eventually decide to pursue a space-based interceptor layer.

Now, we currently do not have any interceptors programmed in

our budget. All we have are experimentation to understand some

of the technical challenges, things like netted sensors and how you

would relate that to a fire control solution from space.

We have the Near-Field Infrared Experiment (N–FIRE), of

course, which we are launching in 2007 that is part of this overall

concept as well, in which we can do some of the boost phase meas-
25

urements between what we call the plume-to-hardbody handover—

otherwise, can you track an object in that arena.

Mr. LARSEN. So you will use N–FIRE for that?

General OBERING. N–FIRE is part of our experimentation, exactly. So we think it is prudent that while we encourage the debate

about whether or not we should have a space-based interceptor

layer that we base that on some concrete results. And so we want

to make sure we provide that debate with the information that we

think we will gain from our experimentation.

Mr. LARSEN. I would hope as well that we are part of that

debate——

General OBERING. Yes, sir.

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. And that information comes back to us so we can participate in that. So with the $569 million you are requesting, would that then pay for developmental satellites—be deployed as part of this test bed with limited defense capabilities?

Are you going to be looking at that as well? Should we expect to

see that as well?

General OBERING. That is something we will come back to you

and define in more detail what that looks like.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. With regards to ABL and KEI, last year the

NDAA included in section 231 a requirement for a comparative assessment of capabilities and costs, a report for that. When do you

expect to complete this report? When do we expect to see it?

General OBERING. It should be forthcoming here in the next couple of weeks. We have done the majority of that and we will provide that to you.

Mr. LARSEN. Can you give us an preliminary thoughts on that

assessment?

General OBERING. Well, as I say, we are trying to set this up to

where we have the first flight in 2008 that we can understand

whether or not we have reached the knowledge point for the KEI

program as well as the airborne laser.

There are advantages and disadvantages to both, as I briefly

mentioned earlier.

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

General OBERING. And so a lot of that will basically say that we

are going to try to retain our options as long as we can and understand more. Airborne laser has achieved some great success last

year.

However, we have a long way to go there. We have got to integrate that laser on the aircraft. We still have to go through the active flight tests and the high-power lasing. And so we believe that

we have a lot more to learn before we can make a final decision.

Mr. LARSEN. That sort of gets up to a follow-up point, then, that

I had about just kind of being aware of the potential cost of these

systems before we—well, we have to make some decisions about

the budget here this year for 2007, including the $631 million for

ABL and $405 million for KEI, so that report—to the extent that

we can certainly get that before we delve into markup would be a

great help.

I will end the questions right there. I have got another set of

questions on different topics for another witness, so I will just end

there.
26

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thanks for your testimony, and I am sorry I was late. I appreciate your forthcoming presentations. I want to see if we can

link together the testimony.

Mr. Duma, I understand you from past statements to say that

the ballistic missile defense testing regimen was not realistic

enough. You seem to testify today that we have made strides in

that direction over the last year.

But you also state in your testimony flight testing to date has

not yet reduced the risk to the point where General Obering is

ready to execute an operationally realistic flight test.

What is missing in the testing regimen now that needs to be

added to it to make it realistic?

Mr. DUMA. Well, the fundamental technical unknown at this

point is to demonstrate the intercept capability on the groundbased interceptor. We have modeled that. We have done a tremendous amount of work down in Huntsville and actually across the

nation, linking models and simulations together for integrated

ground tests.

The big benefit of that has been the inclusion of the warfighters,

as General Dodgen has stated. That has gone a long way to look

at the tactics, techniques, procedures, the integration problems

that we are facing to get the communications flow.

But the technical unknown right now—and while we have demonstrated technology for hit-to-kill, we have not done it on the operational booster and operational kill vehicle. We did fly those for the

first time successfully, but that was without a target. The booster

operated as expected. The kill vehicle operated as expected and maneuvered as expected. But that was not against a target.

So we need to get a target up there. And you may recall from

approximately a year ago we expended two targets but no groundbased interceptors, because of other problems, so we need to close

that loop.

Mr. SPRATT. Until that is done, that loop is closed, can we state

with confidence that a long-range missile can be intercepted by our

system if called upon to do so?

Mr. DUMA. We have all the pieces in place to be able to try that.

I cannot tell you with certainty that we can do it yet. We have not

done that end-to-end demonstration.

Should a launch occur today, I would certainly hope the operators would put it on alert and try the best they can with what they

have, but the testing to date has not confirmed that you could

count on that.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, sir.

General Obering, as I look at your budget, it is $10.4 billion all

together, including PAC–3 and MEADS. In addition, the Air Force

is paying for SBIRS-high, but it is a component of your system.

That is about $670 billion. The two together are $11 billion.

And we do not know where SBIRS-low is. I do not believe there

is a breakout for Space Tracking Surveillance System (STSS), is

there, or whatever that——

General OBERING. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT [continuing]. In the line?
27

General OBERING. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. I beg your pardon. So that is included. If you include

SBIRS-high, then we are talking about $11 billion this year, but almost all of that, as Mr. Larsen was saying, is already T&E.

What is the procurement? What is the likely acquisition cost of

these systems if they are brought to fruition, proven to work? What

is the far end of the effort that we are doing now when it comes

to fielding all of this stuff that we are developing and proving?

General OBERING. Well, Congressman, I cannot give you a single

number. And the reason I cannot is because we are trying to pace

this program based on what we see as the threat development and

what we see as the technology development and the maturation of

the system.

So what we are doing is trying to manage the program within

the budget that we have been given and the top line authority that

we have been given. I have responsibility of that amount that you

mentioned. I have responsibility for $9.3 billion of that.

And if you look across, it looks about that level, about $1.5 billion

to $2 billion of that per year goes to fielding, and the rest of it goes

to development of continuing improvement of the system.

And what we will do is we will field as maturity and as the

knowledge-based testing presents itself to justify that and continue

that, and we will produce the rates that we think we need to keep

apace and ahead of what we see as the threat inventories.

Mr. SPRATT. You have got a full plate, I think you would agree.

General OBERING. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPRATT. Lots of things to bring together—GBI, KEI, ABL.

There might be a tradeoff between the two of those. You are looking at an MKV to replace the EKV, and as you go along with the

spiral development the technology gets more and more sophisticated.

I am a little dismayed at the notion that we would start by fiscal

year 2008 adding to this plate—multiple systems—another system

that could be hugely expensive, and that is a space-based system.

General Abrahamson came to the conclusion years ago that to

field a space-based system you would have to have a dramatic reduction in the cost of lift. Now, he was supportive of the idea, but

he also included in his SDI program a lift cost production program

seeking a reduction by a factor of three or four in the cost of lifting

a pound of payload into space.

Would you anticipate having to do the same thing to make 50 to

100 space-based interceptors a feasible undertaking?

General OBERING. Well, yes, sir. That is part of what I mentioned in the experimentation program that we would try to—as

part of that experimentation program is miniaturization and how

much weight can you get out of some of these payloads that you

would have to do.

But General Abrahamson, as you reflected—the constellations

that were envisioned at one time were much, much larger than

what we are talking about now, when you add a layer to an already-existing terrestrial-based system. But we have a lot of work

to do there.
28

About the $10,000-per-pound-to-orbit cost—that has to be driven

down. A lot of those are the challenges that we would be facing in

any type of an approach or movement to space.

But if I can address your point about the affordability, that is another advantage as to why we are proceeding the way we are. We

will not embark on a program if we do not think it is affordable.

We may have tremendous success with airborne laser all the way

through to lethal shoot down. But if we do not think it is an affordable capability, we will not pursue that.

That is part of the criteria that we apply to these programs when

they get to their knowledge points. It is not just knowledge points

about technical performance. It is also about cost affordability. And

we will reserve the right to make those decisions.

As we get to that point, there will be ebbs and flows throughout

the program, so there will be programs that will be coming off of

their fielding requirements and others that will be expanding.

That is why we think that this is a prudent investment, because

even with all of those programs thrown in that you just mentioned,

they are still less than 3 percent overall of our defense budget.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question for you, General Obering. Both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, in an unclassified assessment of the threat that we face, have stated that

it is their belief that North Korea is capable of using rudimentary

countermeasures in an ICBM attack against the United States.

When will MDA test the GMD system against these kinds of

countermeasures?

General OBERING. We already have, which is a little-known fact.

But we have demonstrated—the successful intercepts that occurred

in 1999 to 2002—there were countermeasures involved in those

intercept tests. Having said that, we plan three more flight tests

this year, as I said.

If we are successful in that test series, we will—we have already

actually given the direction to look at how we could add countermeasures to part of that test regime.

Mr. REYES. And in those tests, do we mimic or mirror the basic

or the rudimentary types of countermeasures that both North

Korea, Iran and possibly others might use?

General OBERING. Well, Congressman, the intelligence community may have much better insight into that than I do, but I do not

know of anybody that can say with any certainty what kind of

countermeasures those countries are capable of.

However, based on the physics, based on what you would try to

conjecture in terms of vulnerabilities, those are the kind of things

that we would use as part of our test program.

Mr. REYES. All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EVERETT. All right.

Dr. Schwarz.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Secretary Flory, I think this is probably best directed at you. And the way to ask this so that, you know, my ques-
29

tion does not make you answer that that information is classified—

so let me give it a shot.

In unclassified terms, what is the near-term ballistic missile

threat to the United States? What additional capabilities might we

need to face that threat? And how likely is it that a non-nation

state will ultimately possess or could conceivably possess ballistic

missiles and the pertinent launch capability?

Secretary FLORY. I would say in terms of the near-term threat,

I would probably go back to some of my response to Mr. Franks’

question. In terms of a long-range missile, an ICBM threat, we

know what North Korea has done—its 1998 test of the Taepo-Dong

I. We know that it is working on the Taepo-Dong II.

As I mentioned, the intelligence community thinks that Iran may

have an ICBM, might be able to flight-test an ICBM by 2015. So

in this setting, and bearing in mind the classification issue, that is

about all I think I can say on that, although we would be happy

to get you a briefing on the details.

In terms of additional capabilities, I would ask my colleagues to

jump in on that, but I think—what we are working on now is designed to deal with the kind of missile, the kind of trajectory, the

kind of threat we are talking about here, so I think we are on a

path to that.

Now, I would put one caveat. A couple of countries have tested

shorter-range missiles launched from ships, so that is something—

the shorter-range missiles exist. That is something that hypothetically could happen in a much shorter time frame, because all

the elements of it exist. And that would be something very challenging.

In terms of non-nation states getting a hold of ballistic missiles—

excuse me, I think non-state—maybe I garbled that—non-state actors getting a hold of ballistic missiles, we have to be concerned

about that.

North Korea has shown a willingness to sell weapons to all and

sundry. Iran’s ties with terrorism, which go back for a long time,

and represent a consistent element of Iran’s national strategy, are

other concerns.

On the other hand, I think that with respect to non-nation

states, this would be challenging. I mean, they would have to use

a nation state somewhere to launch it from, so I think they are—

we know that there are terrorist groups, Al Qaida in particular,

that are working on trying to get together materials for radiological

and nuclear weapons. We know that they have pursued chemical

and biological.

But I would think, at least in the shorter term, those would be

more likely options for them to pursue.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General Obering, I would direct the question to you, with

the understanding if anyone else has a different perspective or a

better one—I am wondering, we were briefed by the high-altitude

electromagnetic pulse, the EMP, commission here last year.
30

And that really reassessed in my own mind some of the potential

priorities that we may face, and with the potential that even

maybe a Scud missile or something of a more rudimentary level

might be used to elevate some type of enhanced nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapon.

Having said that, do we have any focus in the direction of being

able to interdict something that would come from our own homeland, you know, to be elevated high enough to be detonated over

our homeland, or something that would, say, come off the near

term coastline that would probably be more, like you mentioned, a

rogue state attack?

So we have any sensing capability or any response capability for

something like that? Are we even thinking in that direction?

General OBERING. Mr. Franks, actually, the big problem there is

sensors and sensing. And we have taken steps to cover that—what

we call an asymmetric threat that would be off the coast, and upgrading the sensors that we have existing today to be able to meet

that threat.

We could also choose to deploy assets that are available to protect some of our higher population areas—that type of thing—that

is a decision that could be made in the future. But in terms of the

ability, the technical ability, we have that inherent as part of our

program.

I will not comment on internal launches. That is something that

we have nothing in our program today that would address that.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I guess, you know, it occurs to me that maybe

the greatest danger that we would face would be something along

those lines, because even in Iran, as insane as that government is,

it occurs to me that if they did have a missile capable of reaching

the United States, even though they have to know what our response would be, they have to, it seems to me like they would try

to pass some type of technology off to someone that could launch

it closer, that they could ostensibly have no fingerprints on it.

But you are saying to me that at least that equation is being considered carefully, and I guess my add-on to that would be how do

you assess that threat in terms of potential—put it in priority for

me as far as, you know, some ICBM coming from North Korea.

It occurs to me that we are almost more likely to face some sort

of close-in threat like that from some terrorist than we are from

some nation.

General OBERING. Congressman, I would let the intel community

comment on the likelihood, but I will comment on the technical feasibility. And I believe it is not that difficult to do.

And in fact, in August of 2004 we actually launched that type of

a missile off the coast as part of a target series that we are using

in a test program with the Arrow missile. And so we do not assess

the difficulty technically of being that hard to do.

But the likelihood, the motivations and that type of thing, I

would leave that to the intel community.

Mr. FRANKS. Sure. But you are saying to me that we have the

technical capability to sense and acquire and respond to something

like that if it were necessary.

General OBERING. We have that as part of our program, planned

program.
31

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Spratt, we are going to reserve a place for Mr.

Larsen, if you are ready to go with a second round.

Mr. SPRATT. You have all touched upon this in your testimony,

but it would be useful if particularly you, General Obering, or General Dodgen, you could kind of lay out for us—the Ground-based

Initiative (GBI), for example. How many more tests do you have to

go before you think you will be able to say with proven confidence

that this is an operationally effective system? And what are these

tests?

General OBERING. The tests that we have planned for the remainder of the year, I will walk through those very quickly. We

have a target launched out of Kodiak, Alaska, that will fly across

the Beale radar, and we will launch an interceptor out of the Vandenberg Air Force Base, and we will do what we call a target characterization for this flight. That will occur in the late May, early

June time frame.

We will repeat that same type of profile in the latter part of the

summer and then again in the latter part of the fall. And so those

are what we would consider to be very operationally realistic tests

because they are threat representative targets. That is an operational radar, the Beale radar.

They are operational crews manning the consoles. There will be

an operational fire control system that will be used, operational

hardware and software. And of course, we have an operational configured interceptor.

And so we believe that that begins to fit the bill of a—the closest

that we can come to an end-to-end test other than trying to take

a missile off the coast of North Korea and launch it back this way,

which is very improbable and not practical.

General DODGEN. If I may deal with it from an operational question, in a way the crews are dealing with it, the uncertainty that

we have in the performance of a system is dealt with at an operational level right now by the potential of doing multiple engagements on the same incoming missile.

As we see this test that is unfolding this year, we will get a better understanding of just exactly the effectiveness of the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) in the end game and the interceptor,

and we will go and modify our firing doctrine in very short order

so that we are gaining the effects we want.

At the same time, because this is the year when our inventory

is going to be going up significantly—so I think they marry up

pretty well that as our uncertainty goes down, and our confidence

goes up, we will be modifying our firing doctrine to achieve the effect.

But we deal with the uncertainty with the ability to shoot multiple times at the same target today.

Mr. SPRATT. Going back to the electromagnetic question, once

again I think your predecessors determined some time ago that if

the attack were truly a massive attack in the days when we were

still conceiving the Soviet Union or the former Soviet Union as our

principal nuclear adversary, there was a general rule of thought

that if the attack was more than 100 RVs or greater magnitude

than that, that the electromagnetic effects of intercepting a number
32

of these RVs coming at us would be such that the system soon

would be—its operation would be extremely problematic.

Do you still feel that way, that if we had a large attack against

the system, and if we were successful and particularly if they were

fused so that they would detonate upon collision, salvage-fused,

would that thwart the effectiveness of this system if the—if so,

what would be your estimate of the limit at which this problem—

this became a problem?

General OBERING. Well, first of all, sir, the system that we are

fielding today clearly is not designed for massive attack. It is not

designed for that mission. It is designed to handle the degrees of

nuclear detonation that you talked about with respect to the numbers that we would potentially be facing, and the inventories that

we have fielded, and the capabilities that we have in the system,

and we have further steps that are identified to even make that

more effective against that type of a detonation that could occur.

But it is not designed for a massive attack, and it is designed

right now for the rogue nation threat, as we mentioned.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you.

Mr. EVERETT. Well, let me give it a shot while—I know Mr.

Larsen wants to have some questions.

General Obering, as long as you are still up at bat, let me ask

you about a—last year, this committee and the House Armed Services Committee, with the help of my colleagues here, authorized an

additional $100 million for further testing. And I think the appropriators added another $50 million. I think you ended up getting $150 million. Talk to me a little bit, or talk

to the committee a little bit, if you will, on how that money was

used and what good you think came from it.

General OBERING. Sir, it was tremendously advantageous for us to get that. What we used that money for specifically is over $100

million went directly into our test program.

One of the things I did last year upon the recommendation of the

independent review team and the mission readiness task force was

to divert more of our interceptors into our test program, so we actually diverted four interceptors from what would have been silo emplacement into our test program.

And they also recommended that we do additional ground test

and additional qualification test with components. For example, we

stack fired an interceptor this last November as part of our ongoing

qualification and risk reduction testing. And so what that money

did was allow us to offset some of those impacts of having to divert

those boosters into the test program.

It also allowed us to integrate the sensors that are coming online

this year, the sea-based X-band, the forward-based X-band that we

are deploying, and that—especially the sea-based X-band—greatly

enhances our test bed as well, so we were able to use that money

for that, as well as provide $25 million for mooring for that seabased X-band off of Adak, Alaska.

So that money went directly into our testing and helped us to offset some of the impacts from our diversion of interceptors into that

test program.

Mr. EVERETT. General Dodgen, can you update us, please, on the

Army’s progress in directing the Patriot friendly fire that we noted
33

in Operation Iraqi Freedom? And also, do you have adequate funding to complete upgrading all the batteries out there?

General DODGEN. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. With congres- sional help, we were able to reprogram $43.1 million to take care

of the immediate needs in the aftermath of Iraqi Freedom. We did

a very good scrub of what are the combat-related improvements we

needed to do. And they were in three categories.

The first one was better connectivity on the battlefield. The second one was retraining our crews in Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and reinventing the way we did friendly protect.

And the third one was fixing the software classification things in

our software build and the Patriot system, the latter being the

thing that took the longest.

We used that money to accelerate the fielding of the battery command posts that are out there now which gave every one of the Patriot batteries Link 16 connectivity and datalink connectivity assured.

We have retrained our crews over the last two years. We have

redesigned the next software build which is post-deployment build

six. It will be ready to put into the system at the beginning of next

year, and that will be the extent of those improvements.

And we are very confident the TTPs will take care of us until the

software gets into the system, and when the software gets into the

system, we will be very robust and have those things corrected.

Mr. EVERETT. Well, thank you. I will just simply say this has

been of long interest of this subcommittee. Some years back, when

we first noticed this, we put about $20 million in there for you to

take a look at it. And unfortunately, we lost it in the appropriation

process. But that is good news.

Mr. Larsen, we have been carrying the weight here until you got

back.

Mr. LARSEN. I did not know I had that much pull on the——

Mr. EVERETT. Absolutely.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, sure. Yes.

A quick follow up for General Obering and the space-based test

bed. The GMD system evolved from experimental assets deployed

in Alaska into an operational system, and I think perhaps the coda

of my question in the last round might be something like this.

As you move forward through 2011 with the $500 million or so,

are we kind of moving from experimental to something that we assume will be operational, or can you commit to this committee

right now that if this is—you are just experimenting, we are looking at this, and this is not the beginning of something that gets so

far down the road that we cannot say hold on a second, what are

the costs on this, why isn’t this working, how does it work?

General OBERING. No, it is not. I would not characterize it like

that at all, Congressman Larsen. Again, it is a space test bed for

just experimentation purposes. We do not have any configuration,

anything like that, that is laid into our program for that intercept.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. Yes. Thanks.

Mr. Duma, the 2006 act included a section 234 requiring appropriate joint service operational test and violation components. As

the director, you have to approve the block test plan and submit

a report when the test is complete.
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And the operational test requirement begins with Block 2006.

Can you describe to the committee your plans for implementing

that particular statutory requirement and discuss your progress to

date?

Mr. DUMA. Yes, I can, Congressman. As I said in my opening

statement, we have worked with the Missile Defense Agency to implement a bit of a new test philosophy, and that is any valuationbased philosophy to drive, then, the test events required to get the

information to satisfy the knowledge points for the development

and the operational capabilities of the systems.

We have begun that effort. And as I said, the approach being

taken will be incorporated into the next update to the integrated

master test plan. We did update the integrated master test plan

based upon the findings and recommendations of the independent

review team and the mission readiness task force.

Both of those bodies took inputs from the operational test community and incorporated them into their recommendations. We updated the master test plan based on that. That plan is virtually

complete, and I believe it is in the final signature chain right now.

And General Obering just told me he had signed it now, so that

will be out shortly. The next version of that will incorporate the

evaluation-based test planning.

Mr. LARSEN. So this particular test plan design does not reflect

evaluation-based——

Mr. DUMA. No, it does not. It reflects the recommendations of the

IRT and the mission readiness task force.

Now, that statute also requires reporting, as you know, and I

have three reports that I am read to provide to Congress. I do an

annual report which is through my Title X in which I report an unclassified summary of the testing that has occurred. I have an annual report that I have submitted so far in a classified nature on

the missile defense test program and progress made. That is due

February 15th of every year. And now this section 234 requires another report on the completion of each block. So it starts with Block

2006. That technically ends on the 31st of December in 2007, so the

report—or to satisfy that Article 234 requirement will be in January of 2008.

Mr. LARSEN. All right. I apologize for asking this, but you said

the classified report that you have is due February 15th. Have we

received——

Mr. DUMA. You have. I sent that, I think, around the 13th of

February.

Mr. LARSEN. Just under the wire. All right.

General Obering, the Navy and MDA is scheduled to select a seabased program for KEI in fiscal year 2007, and do you have any

concerns about moving forward with that, given that we have not

actually decided on the KEI or ABL?

General OBERING. We have a study involved in terms of what

that recommended approach will be, looking at the various configurations, ship configurations, and recommendations. That is what

that entails.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay.

General OBERING. But we will base any type of—even a development program on the testing that will occur between now and the
35

end of 2008. That is what we mean by a knowledge-based approach.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay.

General OBERING. We still do the systems engineering, and if you

go with a land-based and sea-based version, you have to do that

allocation of performance and allocation of requirements. That is a

prudent thing to go do. And in fact, that is how you derive your

knowledge points. But we fully intend to achieve——

Mr. LARSEN. But the dollars are not there to put something on

a ship——

General OBERING. No.

Mr. LARSEN [continuing]. With the 2007——

General OBERING. No. No.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.

Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. I just have one last quick question.

Mr. EVERETT. Sure, absolutely.

Mr. REYES. And this one is for you, General Dodgen. What is the

Army doing to develop or pursue technology to counter the rocket,

artillery and mortar attacks? And what is SMDC’s role in these efforts? And in your opinion, is there sufficient research funding for

these efforts in the 2007 budget?

General DODGEN. Well, as you know, we have deployed certain

guns with the help of this committee, certain guns into Iraq. And

as a part of that, there has been a joint sense-and-warn ability

which has been very effective also, which quickly senses and warns

soldiers so they can take cover. And that, in and of itself, has saved

a lot of lives.

So we have something that we have tested as an interim fix, and

we have deployed, and we are going to deploy more of those, and

we are going to continue to test those.

At this time, I think we recognize in the Army that this is going

to be a threat that is going to stay with us for some time, and we

are going to have to develop some capabilities for the future force.

And we are looking at alternatives now, and the Army is actually

looking at the requirements in building something for the future.

SMDC has always been involved in what I am optimistic about,

and that is directed energy, a high-energy laser. We have recently

gone away from chemicals because of its ability and its immobility

on the battlefield, and now we are actively pursuing solid-state lasers that could be packaged in a mobile system to do that particular job.

And that is one alternative that is already funded. It is not ready

to be accelerated. We have awarded some contracts. We want to get

up to a certain level of power and make a determination then. So

we are looking at the future with that alternative, directed energy,

and we are looking at other things.

So from solid-state standpoint, I think the 2007 is properly funded for us to move forward.

Mr. REYES. Very good. Thank you very much.

Thank you.

Mr. EVERETT. Thank you.

And I thank the panel for being here today.
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And I thank my Members for the questions. Obviously, there

were some in-depth questions that I thought were well put and

well answered.

I am personally pleased with the progress that we have made,

General Obering and General Dodgen, and from where we were

this time last year. I think that is a step forward. And I look forward to the rest of this year.

I think I actually smell some success out there, big-time success.

So we are looking forward to that. There will probably be some

questions for the record, and I would ask you to respond to those

in real time rather than Washington time, which is about 30 days,

please. [Laughter.]

So thank you again. I thank the panel. I thank the Members for

participating.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X

MARCH 9, 2006

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 9, 2006

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

MARCH 9, 2006

(111)

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. EVERETT

Mr. EVERETT. I understand that the Missile Defense Agency has invested over

$250 million in the development of radiation hardened electronics. Additionally,

DTRA has invested approximately $150 million and the Defense Production Act has

invested over $100 million. Recognizing the importance of this technology and the

large amount of funding that has been invested, how do you plan to utilize the results of these efforts? Will there be a centralized data base to prevent the unnecessary duplication of effort and the optimum utilization of the results by the prime

contractors?

General OBERING. The Ballistic Missile Defense System began improving its nuclear survivability this Fiscal Year. Two Ballistic Missile Defense System elements,

Ground-based Midcourse Defense and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, received funds

to address electromagnetic pulse protection, radiation hardening against persistent

radiation from high altitude nuclear blast, and to conduct the assessment study of

nuclear survivability capability for the potential upgrades using radiation hardened

electronics to enhance BMDS capability in accordance with our High Altitude Exoatmospheric Nuclear Survivability standard. Our Future Years Defense Plan requests nuclear survivability funding to address High Altitude Exo-atmospheric Nuclear Survivability requirements next Fiscal Year for the Multiple Kill Vehicles, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, and the Forward Based X-band Transportable

radar. I have a table to submit for the record that identifies our current and future

funding plan.

PB07 MDA Nuclear Survivability

[Dollars in Millions]

BMDS Element FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 Total

Aegis BMD 3 4 4 6 7 5 29

GMD 5 7 24 66 55 34 191

MKV 12 26 50 72 91 251

FBX–T 1 2 2 5

THAAD 3 25 25 3 56

Total 8 23 57 148 161 135 532

The Missile Defense Agency will include hardened electronics, co-funded by the

Missile Defense Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Defense

Production Act, in future Ballistic Missile Defense System equipment deployments.

The Missile Defense Agency has a Small Business Innovation Research contract

to build a radiation hardened catalog that will aid in access, recognition, and utilization of DoD radiation hardened electronics data. Next year, to prevent unnecessary

duplication of effort, Ballistic Missile Defense System contractors will be able to use

this catalog to search for hardened technology via a database warehouse using a secure Internet-based protocol.

In addition to the Small Business Innovation Research contract I just discussed,

the Agency also participates in the Director of the Defense Research and

Engineering’s Radiation Hardened Oversight Council to mitigate unnecessary duplication of effort and optimize utilization of radiation hard technology.

Mr. EVERETT. As the Army’s Patriot System remains the cornerstone for theater

air and missile defense, I understand the Army Chief of Staff recently decided the

need to upgrade 12 Patriot batteries from the older Configuration-2 to the upgraded

Configuration-3 which permits the battery to fire all missile versions to include the

PAC–3. Given that decision was only recently arrived at, would additional funding
112

in FY07 permit the Army to begin moving to that end-state more quickly and get

that enhanced capability to our troops sooner in the face of the growing threats

world-wide?

General DODGEN. Yes. The Army Chief of Staff directed the pure fleeting of all

Patriot battalions to configuration-3 to occur no later than the end of FY09. Due

to the long lead time necessary for industry to produce, test, and install the upgrade

kits, funding is required in FY07 to meet the 2009 timeline. If funded in the FY07

appropriation, a contract would be awarded upon receipt of funds. This requirement

is currently on the Army’s unfunded 1–N list.

Mr. EVERETT. Would acceleration of moving the Patriot force to a ‘‘pure fleet’’ configuration-3, in other words PAC–3 capable force, starting in FY07 improve the

Army’s operational flexibility to meet global threats to our friends forward deployed

troops?

General DODGEN. Yes.

• A Patriot configuration-3 system provides substantially increased capability

against cruise and ballistic missiles in terms of Probability of Kill (Pk), defended area footprint, lethality [‘‘hit-to-kill’’ missile technology], Weapons of

Mass Destruction (WMD), and saturation attack.

• Additional funding in FY07 to pure-fleet the Patriot force to configuration-3 improves the Army’s missile defense operational flexibility by:

Æ Enabling the requisite number of ‘‘like Patriot battalions’’ (config-3) to implement the Army’s Force Generation model (ARFORGEN) to ensure a continuous, rotational, and trained presence for Combatant Commanders and

Allies in forward deployed locations.

Æ Negating capability deltas and interoperability challenges between Patriot

Configuration-2 and Configuration-3 systems enables attainment of Army’s

goal of modularity, which provides flexibility to deploy tailorable and modular Patriot task organizations.

Æ Streamlining the Army’s institutional training and logistics processes to

maintain and sustain an operational Patriot force structure.

Mr. EVERETT. The Army has taken steps to address the unfortunate fratricide incidents experienced early in Operation Iraqi Freedom involving Patriot. There have

been improvements to communications resources and software along with training

and other measures. Along with these and other improvements to the Patriot system, if an upgrade to the radar were available to achieve a measure of organic combat Identification not now present; would you support additional funding to develop

that onboard capability?

General DODGEN. Yes, upgrades to the radar are available which would provide

a significant organic combat identification capability. This capability has been demonstrated in an engineering test environment, and if implemented into the tactical

system, would greatly improve the protection of friendly aircraft. We fully support

additional funding to develop the onboard capability.

Mr. EVERETT. Are there efforts currently underway to improve Patriot and other

air defense systems with technologies and improvements that will reduce or eliminate the likelihood of firing upon friendly US or coalition aircraft?

General DODGEN. Yes, there are several efforts underway to incorporate new technologies to greatly reduce the likelihood of firing on a friendly aircraft.

- New Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) Mode 5/Mode S. These capabilities are

currently being developed for the Patriot system. However, with the present radar/

IFF interface, the utility of these new capabilities is greatly limited. The full benefits of the new IFF modes cannot be realized with the current interface. An upgrade

to the radar processor and IFF interface (unfunded) are required to realize the benefits of the new IFF capabilities.

- New radar processing techniques. These techniques are currently in use by other

services, and have shown significant capability to improve combat identification.

The techniques have been demonstrated with the Patriot radar in an engineering

demonstration environment; however no funding is available to incorporate them

into the tactical system.

Mr. EVERETT. The Army recently concluded a need to standup an Integrated Air

& Missile Defense program office for the purpose of working to facilitate engineering

and open architecture design activities in support of the Army System of Systems

initiative in both the ongoing SLAMRAAM and Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Programs. The FY07 President’s Budget request arrived at the Hill before the

results of this decision could be taken into account. Would additional funding in

FY07 assist the Army in accelerating its efforts to field a System of Systems Integrated Air & Missile Defense capability by 2011?
113

General DODGEN. While adequate funds exists to meet the fielding of an Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture by FY11, additional funding, if available, could be used to develop those unique and common components associated

with attaining a more robust capability. Additional funding could be used to upgrade software of Patriot configuration-3 radars to ensure integration with a common Battle Manager, accelerate the Launch Station component to achieve the objective 2011 architecture and lastly, assist in the refinement and development of the

common Battle Management architecture.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES

Mr. REYES. In response to my question during the hearing concerning your plans

for testing the Ground Based Interceptor against countermeasures that might accompany a threat-representative ICBM warhead, you stated that MDA has already

successfully tested the system against a target accompanied by countermeasures.

Please provide me with information about each GBI test that has included countermeasures. General OBERING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. REYES. Please describe the types of countermeasures that were included in

these tests.

General OBERING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. REYES. Were these test countermeasures developed based on intelligence community estimates of the most challenging types of countermeasures that could be

developed to stress a missile defense system by threat nations?

General OBERING. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

Mr. ROGERS. The Army has taken steps to address the unfortunate fratricide incidents experienced early in Operation Iraqi Freedom involving Patriot. There have

been improvements to communications resources and software along with training

and other measures. Along with these and other improvements to the Patriot system, if an upgrade to the radar were available to achieve a measure of organic combat Identification not now present; would you support additional funding to develop

that onboard capability?

General DODGEN. Yes, upgrades to the radar are available which would provide

a significant organic combat identification capability. This capability has been demonstrated in an engineering test environment, and if implemented into the tactical

system, would greatly improve the protection of friendly aircraft. We fully support

additional funding to develop the onboard capability.

Mr. ROGERS. Are there efforts currently underway to improve Patriot and other

air defense systems with technologies and improvements that will reduce or eliminate the likelihood of firing upon friendly US or coalition aircraft?

General DODGEN. Yes, there are several efforts underway to incorporate new technologies to greatly reduce the likelihood of firing on a friendly aircraft.

- New Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) Mode 5/Mode S. These capabilities are

currently being developed for the Patriot system. However, with the present radar/

IFF interface, the utility of these new capabilities is greatly limited. The full benefits of the new IFF modes cannot be realized with the current interface. An upgrade

to the radar processor and IFF interface (unfunded) are required to realize the benefits of the new IFF capabilities.

- New radar processing techniques. These techniques are currently in use by other

services, and have shown significant capability to improve combat identification.

The techniques have been demonstrated with the Patriot radar in an engineering

demonstration environment; however no funding is available to incorporate them

into the tactical system.

Mr. ROGERS. The Army recently concluded a need to standup an Integrated Air

& Missile Defense program office for the purpose of working to facilitate engineering

and open architecture design activities in support of the Army System of Systems

initiative in both the ongoing SLAMRAAM and Patriot/MEADS Combined Aggregate Programs. The FY07 President’s Budget request arrived at the Hill before the

results of this decision could be taken into account. Would additional funding in

FY07 assist the Army in accelerating its efforts to field a System of Systems Integrated Air & Missile Defense capability by 2011?
114

General DODGEN. While adequate funds exists to meet the fielding of an Integrated Air and Missile Defense architecture by FY11, additional funding, if available, could be used to develop those unique and common components associated

with attaining a more robust capability. Additional funding could be used to upgrade software of Patriot configuration-3 radars to ensure integration with a common Battle Manager, accelerate the Launch Station component to achieve the objective 2011 architecture and lastly, assist in the refinement and development of the

common Battle Management architecture.

Æ