UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4930

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RONALD BROOKS CAMPBELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior

District Judge. (7:07-cr-00131-F-1)

Submitted: August 21, 2014 Decided: September 5, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Andrea T. Barnes, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer 

P. May-Parker, Shailika K. Shah, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Ronald Brooks Campbell pleaded guilty to the first 

count of a two-count indictment charging him with possession of 

a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 

(2012), and possessing stolen firearms, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 922(i) (2012); the district court sentenced him to 180 

months of imprisonment in November 2008. The court subsequently 

granted Campbell’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion filed pursuant 

to this court’s decision in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 

237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated the prior judgment as to 

Count 1 of the indictment, and reinstated Count 2. Campbell 

pleaded guilty to the charge in Count 2 of the indictment and 

the court sentenced him to time served followed by five years of 

supervised release. 

Six months after his release into supervision, 

Campbell’s probation officer filed a motion seeking revocation 

of Campbell’s supervised release for various alleged violations. 

After a hearing, the district court determined that Campbell had 

violated the terms of his supervised release, revoked his 

supervised release, and sentenced Campbell to twenty-four months 

of incarceration with no period of supervised release to follow. 

Campbell now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

Campbell first argues that the district court violated 

his due process rights by failing to determine that there was a 
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factual basis for the revocation. As Campbell failed to raise 

this issue in the district court, we review this challenge for 

plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 

(1993). Campbell must demonstrate, therefore, that (1) the 

district court erred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error 

affected his substantial rights. Id.

“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

imposes procedural . . . limitations on the revocation of the 

conditional liberty created by . . . supervised release.” 

United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “In considering whether a 

district court's findings in support of a supervised release 

revocation are sufficient, this court must consider the district 

court's written findings, together with the hearing transcript 

and the rest of the record, and determine whether these 

materials permit the court to determine the factual basis of the 

district court's decision.” United States v. Driggers, 27 F. 

App’x 152, 153 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (citing United 

States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 832 (4th Cir. 1992)). The 

district court need only find a violation of a term of 

supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012); see United States v. Armstrong, 187 

F.3d 392, 394 (4th Cir. 1999). Moreover, “[a] defendant's 

supervised release cannot be revoked without a full hearing 
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unless the defendant knowingly and voluntarily admits to the 

allegations against [him] and waives [his] rights under Rule 

32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” United 

States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We have reviewed the record and the 

relevant legal authorities and conclude that the district court 

did not commit plain error in revoking Campbell’s supervised 

release.

Campbell next challenges the sentence imposed by the 

district court. We review a sentence imposed as a result of a 

supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence 

is plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 

433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). Although a district court must 

consider the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the 

Sentencing Guidelines along with the statutory requirements of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583 (2012), “the court ultimately has 

broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a 

term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 

F.3d at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted). And although 

“[a] court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a 

revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a [original] 

sentence . . . it still must provide a statement of reasons for 

the sentence imposed.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 

547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our 
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review of the record leads us to conclude that the sentence is 

not plainly unreasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED