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37–792 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–33]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST ON ADEQUACY TO

MEET READINESS NEEDS

HEARING HELD

MARCH 13, 2007
(II)

READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas, Chairman

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

PAUL ARCANGELI, Professional Staff Member

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member

CHRISTINE ROUSHDY, Staff Assistant
(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Tuesday, March 13, 2007, Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization

Act—Budget Request on Adequacy to Meet Readiness Needs ......................... 1

APPENDIX:

Tuesday, March 13, 2007 ........................................................................................ 31

TUESDAY, MARCH 13, 2007

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—

BUDGET REQUEST ON ADEQUACY TO MEET READINESS NEEDS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Readiness

Subcommittee ....................................................................................................... 1

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Readiness Subcommittee 3

WITNESSES

Cody, Gen. Richard A., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ........................................ 4

Corley, Gen. John D.W., Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force ................................ 9

Magnus, Gen. Robert, Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps ................... 7

Willard Adm. Robert F., Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy ................. 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Cody, Gen. Richard A. ...................................................................................... 35

Corley, Gen. John D.W. .................................................................................... 71

Magnus, Gen. Robert ........................................................................................ 80

Willard, Adm. Robert F. ................................................................................... 41

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 103

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2008 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST ON ADEQUACY TO

MEET READINESS NEEDS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 13, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Solomon Ortiz (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. ORTIZ. I think that we have a sufficient number of members,

and I think that more will come in as we progress with this hearing.

I thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before

this subcommittee today. We honor and appreciate the sacrifices

made by our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, who serve

throughout the world in support of our nation and in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Today, the Readiness Subcommittee will consider the readiness

posture of our armed forces and whether the fiscal year 2008 budget, if this request is adequate to meet the readiness needs.

After 5–1/2 years of sustained operations in two theaters of war,

I am greatly concerned about the declining readiness condition of

the services in terms of personnel, equipment and training. This

growing readiness problem is most evident in the ground forces of

the Army and Marines, but we also see it in the effects on the Air

Force and the Navy.

The Congress has provided significant funding beyond what has

been requested by the Department of Defense to try to mitigate the

decline, but the high tempo of operations and the constraints of the

defense industrial base are making it difficult for the service to

turn the decline around.

By far, the Army has been the service most affected by the global

war on terror and the war in Iraq. The Army’s planned commitment of 21 of its 42 brigade combat teams to combat operations is

stressing both soldiers and equipment and reducing the readiness

posture of units not deployed to combat.

To meet wartime needs, the Army has pulled equipment from

across the forces to equip soldiers deploying into harm’s way. This

practice, as General Cody notes in his written testimony, increases
2

risk for the next-to-deploy units and limits the Army’s ability to respond to emerging strategic threats.

I have seen the classified Army readiness reports. And based on

those reports, I believe that we as a nation are at risk of mission

failure, should our Army be called to deploy to an emerging threat.

Because of time and equipment and strength, commanders are

being forced to seek efficiencies in completing required pre-deployment training. Rotations at the National Training Center for the

last two brigade combat teams headed to Iraq were eliminated,

with the units conducting home-stationed training in Washington

and Georgia, instead of in the desert at Fort Irwin, California.

The Marine Corps, like the Army, has seen significant ground

combat since the year 2001. This is reflected in lower readiness

rates for non-deployed units. The problems in the Marine Corps are

not as severe as the Army, but they are affecting training and overall readiness posture of the service.

The Navy’s fiscal year 2008 budget supports 45 underway or

steaming days per quarter for deployment forces, but reduces

steaming days for non-deployment forces from 24 in fiscal year

2007 to 22 in fiscal year 2008.

We will be interested in hearing how confident the Navy is that

an increased reliance upon the use of simulation exercises and improvements in training methods can ensure the readiness of the

Navy’s non-deployment forces.

Likewise, we will want to hear how much non-deployed aircrew

readiness the Navy has sacrificed to fund an average of T–2.5 aircrew readiness levels, as reported in fiscal year 2008 budget request.

The Air force is flying over 200 sorties per day in the central

command theaters of operation, and has more than 350 aircraft

committed to supporting combat operations. This commitment has

resulted in high utilization rates on aging Air Force assets. These

increased use on a smaller, older fleet has resulted in readiness

rates that are 17 percent below unit operation readiness rates prior

to 9/11, and below last year’s all-around low levels.

I have noted in General Cody’s written testimony his comment

that addressing readiness will require a national commitment to

sustained, predictable resourcing.

I agree with this comment, but will go on to say that we need

a national commitment to our military and to providing for our national defense.

Our armed forces have done what has been asked of them over

the last 5–1/2 years, and it has taken a heavy toll. Readiness has

fallen now, and the American people must look forward to the future and the future work to restore our military, so that armed

forces are ready when we need them.

Gentlemen, I look forward to hearing your testimony.

The chair recognizes the distinguished gentleman from Alabama,

my good friend, Mr. Rogers, who is filling in for my good friend,

Ms. Davis, who has been a little ill.

Mr. Rogers.
3

STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM ALABAMA, READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to welcome all the witness. And thank you each for taking

the time to be with us to talk about this important issue today.

As we all know, the readiness of our troops is critical to our national security and success in the war on terror. The Department

of Defense continues to face budgetary pressures against the backdrop of the ongoing war on terror, a continued high operations

tempo, and the need to recapitalize much of its aging equipment.

The fiscal year 2008 budget reflects these challenges and requires the services to continue to do more with less.

The total request of $235.3 billion for operations and maintenance is up only 1.1 percent than the fiscal year 2007 request. According to the estimates provided to this subcommittee, this increase is only half of what is needed to cover inflation, rising energy costs, and provides no room for program growth.

In effect, the services’ Operation & Maintenance (O&M) budgets

are $2.7 billion short if you simply take inflation into account.

The readiness challenges facing the Department of Defense are

significant. Years of underfunded procurement amounts are manifesting in its aging fleets, aircraft, ships and vehicles. This aging

equipment is costly to maintain, it offers reduced reliability, and

requires increased manpower to keep it serviceable.

Yet, the high mission capable rates and mission effectiveness ratings are a direct result of the hardworking dedicated men and

women serving this nation.

In my home state of Alabama, for example, we see this dedication and the talented workforce at critical installations like the Anniston Army depot. Their motivation and pride is to provide our

military personnel the best-maintained, most reliable equipment

they can.

Of course, each of the services are tackling these challenges in

different ways, from the Air Force’s Smart Op 21 to the Navy’s

Fleet Response Plan, our military personnel are looking for ways

to do things smarter, cheaper and better.

I look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses today on the

readiness challenges and hope to hear more about the tools they

need to get the job done for our nation.

And, again, I want to thank you for being with us.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.

Mr. ORTIZ. We are going to start our testimony. We have outstanding witnesses with us today.

And, my friends, thank you for joining us.

Now, we have three votes. We have one 15-minute vote and two

5-minute votes. So it will take us about 25, 30 minutes to come

back.

But we will start with General Cody, with your testimony.

And I can assure you that all your entire testimony will be submitted for the record.

General Cody.
4

STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD A. CODY, VICE CHIEF OF

STAFF, U.S. ARMY

General CODY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished

members of the committee. On behalf of the nearly 1 million soldiers that comprise this all-volunteer Army, 248,000 of whom are

forward deployed throughout the world, thanks for the opportunity

to discuss Army readiness and the need to improve the strategic

depth of our force.

Today’s deployed soldiers are the best-trained, best-equipped and

best-led we have ever sent into combat. However, after five years

of combat, we have done this at the expense of our non-deployed

forces. And we are stretched thin.

To sustain the readiness of our deployed forces and to begin restoring the strategic depth of our Army, we require congressional

support in five key areas.

First, recent decisions to expand the Army reflect the clear recognition of the dangers facing America and the strain that five

years of sustained combat have placed on this all-volunteer force.

Providing the sustained, predictable resourcing required to grow

our force in a balanced, coordinated fashion while providing adequately for the needs of the all-volunteer soldiers and their families

requires a national commitment.

Second, last year, Congress provided the resources needed to secure battle losses and repair our worn-out equipment, and we are

ahead of schedule in executing these funds.

To sustain this effort, we will require $13.5 billion in fiscal year

2008 and corresponding levels of funding for at least 2 to 3 years

beyond the duration of this current conflict; and the ability to begin

executing these executed funds upon enactment, so that we don’t

break down the momentum we have right now in our five depots.

Third, we require a significant sustained investment to both

overcome the $56 billion of equipment shortfalls which we entered

this war in and to modernize.

We must aggressively buy back the equipment shortages to restore the strategic depth of the Army: active, guard and reserve.

We must also remain committed to investing in technologies and

equipment that enable our most important asset, the American soldier, to remain ahead of all our adversaries.

Fourth, our ability to grow the force and to meet rotational requirements is jeopardized by the $2 billion reduction in BRAC due

in fiscal year 2007.

We urge the Congress to restore the BRAC funding for fiscal year

2007 and to fully fund BRAC and the military construction request

for fiscal year 2008.

My fear is, if we don’t get this, we will have soldiers show up at

post camps and stations without the proper military construction,

without the proper barracks and without the proper quality of life

that they deserve.

Fifth, we require receipt of additional fiscal year 2007 supplemental funding by April. If delayed beyond April, the Army will be

forced to reprogram in order to sustain operation and maintenance

accounts that fund key warfighting requirements in the operational

area. We cannot afford to repeat last year’s late-to-need cash flow
5

experience and meet the increased operational demands we now

face.

With Congress’s support in these five areas, we will be able to

sustain the readiness of our deployed forces and begin to build and

restore the strategic depth of America’s Army. We are be able to

ensure that our soldiers have the resources necessary to prevail

against the enemy today and tomorrow. We will be able to provide

a quality of life for our soldiers and families that is equal to their

quality of service of this all-volunteer force. The young men and

women who have raised their right hands to defend this great nation deserve nothing less.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Cody can be found in the

Appendix on page 35.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much, General.

I would like to inquire to see how much time we have before the

first vote. I understand that we have about 5 minutes. We are

going to recess for about 20, 25 minutes because we do have three

votes. And then as soon as we come back we will resume the testimony.

So take a little break. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. ORTIZ. We are going to continue with our hearing. And I

thank you for your patience. We had three votes there.

But, Admiral, if you are ready, we can go ahead and hear your

testimony, sir.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ROBERT F. WILLARD, VICE CHIEF OF

NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Chairman Ortiz, Congressman

Rogers and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Good

afternoon. And thank you for this opportunity to testify on the

readiness of our Navy.

Your Navy is combat-ready and engaged around the clock in defense of our nation. This committee’s dedicated support of our men

and women in uniform remains critical to their success.

Today, more than 60,000 sailors, as well as nearly 100 of our

ships and submarines in your fleet are deployed, providing the

reach, precision and persistence to fight and win our nation’s wars.

While many of our sailors are actively fighting the war on terror,

others are contributing through enduring maritime missions as an

element of what has become our nation’s strategic reserve.

The recently deployed John C. Stennis Strike Group is an example of the fleet response plan, providing flexible and sustained

forces supporting maritime security and deterrence operations in

the Persian Gulf.

While Navy doctors, nurses and corpsmen risk their lives daily

to save others, our explosive ordnance disposal teams and electronic warfare personnel are doing the same to locate and disarm

improvised explosive devices.

Navy security personnel guard detention facilities while Navy

special force special warfare personnel disrupt terrorist leadership

worldwide.
6

One half of your deployed sailors are in the Central Command

area of responsibility, and almost one half of them are employed in

ground combat or combat support roles; most under the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command.

This support is anticipated to grow.

We are rebuilding in Afghanistan, chasing pirates off of the Horn

of Africa, flying ground support missions and conducting landbased air and submarine surveillance and reconnaissance patrols.

The care and welfare of our returning wounded sailors, Marines,

soldiers and airmen are of utmost importance to the Navy and

Navy medicine. We continually strive to provide the highest-quality

medical care in safe, clean and nurturing environments for all our

patients.

The Navy has begun a focused review of the living and operating

conditions in our medical facilities to ensure that we are meeting

all of the health care needs of our sailors and of their families.

Our equipment, platforms and people are showing the effects of

these sustained operations in the war on terror, and I am concerned about several communities’ ability to maintain this degree

of operational tempo.

I am proud of the Navy’s efforts in this long war, and so are our

sailors. The fiscal year 2008 budget fully supports our near- and

long-term warfighting requirements and reflects our top priorities:

sustaining combat readiness, building the future fleet, and developing our future leaders.

Operations and maintenance funding supports our increased flying and steaming hours, as well as medical support and reserve

force activation. Depot maintenance and procurement funds will

help impede the wear and tear of our older expeditionary aircraft,

particularly the F–18 Hornet, Charlie and Delta models. These aircraft are experiencing flight hours 30 percent greater than originally planned.

Our P–3, EP–3 and EA–6B Prowlers are all at or well beyond

their expected service life. Your funding will help support completion of critical maintenance to keep them safely flying until the

EA–18 Growler enters the fight.

The Navy’s ship maintenance budget ensures all four public shipyards are mission funded and supports the fleet response plan by

allowing fleet commanders to control maintenance priorities. Procurement funds will support our Seabees, whose equipment has not

proved to be as durable as they are. Our request will purchase the

heavy construction gear and mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles needed to support these forces.

Basic allowance for housing is one of the primary issues for our

sailors, specifically the existing gap between funding levels and

local housing costs. Continued support from Congress is needed to

provide some relief for this gap and improve family readiness.

I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee for

your continued support of our sailors and their families during this

critical and dangerous time in our history. I look forward to your

questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard can be found in the

Appendix on page 41.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir.
7

General Magnus.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT MAGNUS, ASSISTANT

COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General MAGNUS. Chairman Ortiz, Congressman McKeon, and

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to report to you today.

I would like to express my appreciation for the steadfast and continuing support that you provide to your Marine Corps.

I request that my written statement be accepted for the record,

and I would like to highlight three points from that statement for

you.

First, I will report to you on the readiness of our most precious

resource: your Marines and sailors. I assure you, our units are receiving the most comprehensive mission-focused training available.

Every Marine and sailor deploying to OIF or OEF, regardless if

they are active or reserve, an individual augmentee or in a unit,

or part of a training team, complete the tailored five-phase training

program culminating for units with the Mojave Viper exercise at

Twentynine Palms in California, or the Desert Talon exercise at

Yuma, Arizona.

Your Marine Corps supports Marines, sailors and families

throughout the deployment cycle. Our combat and operational

stress control program trains and educates Marines and sailors and

their family members to prevent, identify and treat stress injuries.

We are also implementing the occupational stress control and

readiness program, which embeds medical health providers with

ground forces to provide early identification and treatment to defeat the stigma of combat stress and to overcome barriers to care.

Your Marine Corps continues to strengthen communications between the unit and the families in order to improve the flow and

comprehension of information throughout a deployment cycle. We

find time and again that our key volunteer network is the crucial

link to unit flexibility and information dissemination to families.

These selfless volunteers provide the glue among families awaiting

the return of their loved ones.

We pride ourselves that Marines take care of Marines. In addition to supporting and protecting our deployed troops, care for our

wounded and fallen warriors has our highest priority. We have liaisons called patient administration teams, assigned to the major

medical treatment centers at Landstuhl, Germany, and throughout

this country.

These Marines assist our wounded warriors and their families

through their inpatient and outpatient care. They assist care managers in scheduling appointments and provide transportation support. These teams also interface with the local Veterans Affairs

medical facilities to assist in the transition of wounded

servicemembers to the Veterans Affairs system.

To further improve the care of Marine, the commandant directed

the redesigning of the Marine for Life injured support program to

form a wounded warrior regiment, with a battalion on each coast.

The primary focus of this regiment is the centralized oversight and

care of our wounded warriors and sailors. This regiment will

proactively facilitate the integration of care and support by military
8

treatment facilities, Department of Veterans Affairs medical centers, civilian facilities, and assistance from charitable organizations.

The battalions will give wounded Marines a place at home among

their fellow warriors under the watchful eye of hands-on leaders,

knowing that they remain valued members of our force while they

receive the medical treatment they deserve.

Second, I would like to comment on our equipment readiness. Extended combat operations have severely tested our material. While

a vast majority of our equipment has passed the test of combat operations, it has been subjected to a sustained usage rate far exceeding planning factors. This results from increased vehicle mileage

and flight hours and the harsh environmental conditions.

Your Marine Corps continues to evolve equipment and tactics,

techniques and procedures for our troops to respond to and defeat

an extremely adaptive enemy.

We are continuing to field new generations of personal protective

equipment, such as the modular tactical vest, occipital pads for

light-weight helmets and flame-retardant operational gear to protect the individual Marine and soldier.

We are at the forefront of procuring mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles which have proven on the roadways of Iraq to be up

to 400 percent more effective than the uparmored Humvees in reducing injuries or deaths.

We believe that our requirement for 3,700 of these vehicles can

be fielded by the end of fiscal 2008 with sufficient resources.

We are combating the threats to our rotary-wing aircraft through

a combination of tactics, techniques and procedures, and upgrading

aircraft survivability.

While these immediate steps should improve aircraft survivability, funding to accelerate development of next-generation helicopter survivability equipment is essential to counter emerging

threats.

Third, I would like to comment on Marine Corps future readiness. With your assistance, we are increasing our end-strength to

202,000 Marines. This increase will go a long ways toward reducing

the strain on the individual Marine, their families, their units.

Our plan will gradually decrease the deployment to dwell ratio

of our high operational tempo units, and it will also, more importantly for the long term, give them the time at home to train for

the uncertain operational environments of the future, including full

spectrum warfighting.

The Congress has responded rapidly and generously to our requests for equipment and increased protection for our troops. We

also need the Congress’s support to reset the force and continue

modernization.

You have always been ready to serve us, and your Marines have

always been ready to serve in any clime and place. Your continued

support remains appreciated. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Magnus can be found in the

Appendix on page 80.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. We certainly appreciate your testimony.
9

I think that all of you have been very candid with your testimony, and I know that the committee has lots of questions.

And we have my good friend. Go ahead, General. I was going to

leave you out. I couldn’t see too well with your blue uniform there.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN D.W. CORLEY, VICE CHIEF OF

STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General CORLEY. Thanks very much, Chairman Ortiz. It is always great to see you, sir. And to you, as well as the distinguished

committee members, thank you for the opportunity to speak about

the readiness of your Air Force.

We continue to appreciate all that you have done for our Air

Force. And on behalf of Secretary of the Air Force Mike Wynne and

the Chief of Staff T. Michael Moseley, but more importantly the

men and women of the Air Force that are helping to fight this nation’s wars and defending its freedoms overseas, thank you.

And let me express the gratitude continued to you and your guidance of this committee.

Look, we are a nation at war. And your Air Force is fully engaged in the war on terror. We are providing global vigilance, global reach, global power not just for the Air Force, but for the entire

joint team. And we have been doing that for 16 years since Operation Desert Storm.

In those 16 years, they have not passed without a price, a price

that has been paid in high operations tempo of our airmen and excessive wear and tear on our equipment.

We can expect to be engaged in this conflict and others for the

foreseeable future, perhaps another decade or more. And we see no

end to either the high operations tempo for our airmen or the aging

and the deteriorating of our air and space inventories.

We are currently meeting our wartime requirements, but our future dominance is at risk.

In meeting our nation’s tasking, we have flown nearly half a million sorties in the Central Command region alone since this nation

was attacked on 9/11.

But let me explain what that means and what your airmen are

doing every day with those half-million sorties. Today, those nearly

26,000 airmen just in the Central Command region alone are deployed at over 16 major bases. They are flying over 300 aircraft out

of 10 major bases.

Every day they are flying, if you will, the fuel for that fight, in

terms of food and ammunition to locations across that expanse, and

they are flying out our nation’s most precious resource, our wounded sons and daughters. They are medevac’ing them back to the

United States often in less than 72 hours.

Your airmen fly and maintain the aircraft that are delivering

iron and steel against the terrorists. They are conducting combat

search and rescue missions. They are conducting command and

control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic

warfare, strategic and tactical airlift and the refueling missions for

our joint and coalition team.

And they are operating and maintaining a satellite constellation

that we all often take for granted.
10

That is just the tip of the iceberg, Chairman. It is what your Air

Force is doing around the world every day. Your airmen are providing strategic deterrence with Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

(ICBM) fields that cover a combined landmass the size of Pennsylvania. They are guarding the homeland today with over 100 fighters and tanker and Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS)

aircraft on alert. And your airmen are filling over 5,000 in lieu of

taskings, trying to help relieve some of the stress on our Army and

Marine Corps. And we are doing that in uncharted territory today.

Our aircraft and our spacecraft inventories have never been this

old. Our C–130’s are just one example of the aircraft that are

stressed. These assets are doing great work on intra-theater airlift,

both in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are getting hundreds of convoys off the roads, and, better, they are getting thousands of our

other forces off the roads and not exposed to improved explosive devices.

But that comes at a cost: Last year, alone, our C–130 fleets

overflew their programmed hours by nearly 24,000 hours. Some of

our C–130Es can no longer deploy to combat because we have literally flown the wings off of them. Center wing boxes are cracked.

In fact, we have five C–130’s at Ramstein Air Base alone with

major structural issues. One is so hard-broken that it hasn’t flown

in four years. The other four have cracked center wing boxes, so

they can only carry the crew—no cargo, just the crew. That kind

of negates the idea of having airlift aircraft in the first place.

I could tell similar stories of our tanker fleets. Tankers remain

the single point of failure for the air bridge, the single point of failure for global intelligence surveillance and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), the single point of failure for global strike.

This is not just an Air Force issue. It is a joint and coalition force

issue.

Tankers are crucial to the deployment and the employment of

the joint and coalition combat power, and are crucial to rapid response to combat and humanitarian operations around the globe.

Yet, our tanker aircraft are the oldest aircraft in our inventory and

continue to show severe signs of fatigue and stress.

They are venerable airplanes, the KC–135. But some have

turned 50 years old, with an average for the fleet over 45 years of

age, often older than the crews that are flying them. And the cost

to operate and maintain these older airframes is growing rapidly.

But it is not just the dollar figure we are concerned about; it is

the lives of the airmen who are doing the mission every day, dayin and day-out.

Your Air Force is engaged in this fight not just in Iraq and Afghanistan, but globally engaged in the fight. But we are strained,

and readiness is at risk.

Your airmen are the nation’s strategic edge. They are expeditionary. They are highly trained warriors. And with your continued

help, sir, as the Congress has helped, we will provide them with

the necessary training, the necessary equipment, and the quality of

life to keep our great nation’s asymmetric advantage in global vigilance, reach and power.
11

We request your continued help on recapitalization and modernization of this aging airspace and equipment inventories. We

want them ready not just for today’s fight, but the future one.

I look forward to your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Corley can be found in the

Appendix on page 71.]

Mr. ORTIZ. General, thank you so much.

As I stated before, that you all have been very candid. And the

only way we, as Members of the Congress, can alleviate and help

you with the conditions that we are in now is for you to tell us how

we can help you.

I am going to ask a question for each one of you, and maybe you

can respond. And this is, what is the readiness of our deployed and

nondeployed forces to support ongoing operations? And what are

some of the key challenges you face in giving them the equipment

that they need, training and otherwise preparing forces in the light

of the demands of ongoing operations, as well as the need to maintain readiness to perform other missions?

And I know that we are talking about a surge. The first brigade

left and there is another one going. And now the President has

called for at least 8,000 more troops now.

Where are we at, as far as the readiness, those that are there,

those that will be deploying, equipment-wise? And maybe you can,

you know, tell us a little more as to what we need to do to help

you.

General Cody.

General CODY. Thank you, sir.

As I said in my opening statement, in my statement for the

record, the readiness of the brigade combat teams and the battalions and other teams that we have in Iraq and Afghanistan, to include the two brigades that just moved in for the plus-up, is the

highest that we have seen, in terms of in the last four years,

amount of uparmored Humvees with FRAG Kit 5s, the density of

night-vision devices, the density of crew-jamming systems, the density of all the force protection for our soldiers in Afghanistan and

Iraq is the highest.

And thanks to the Congress here for giving us that money.

That being said, the readiness continues to decline of our nextto-deploy forces. We have a large amount of equipment that is in

Iraq and Afghanistan. We briefed this committee and others a few

days ago as to the status of our Army prepositioned stock.

And that is bothersome. And we can discuss more, I guess, when

you have the other classified briefings.

We do have shortages with the non-deployed forces. And those

forces, by the way, are the next to deploy. And they are also your

strategic reserve. And there are shortages in the light tactical vehicles, medium tactical vehicles, heavy tactical vehicles; some sport

shortages in weapons, shortages in radios, and shortages in night

vision devices that we have had to flow to the force forward.

That is on the active side; the 16 to 18 brigades we have back

right now that are getting ready to deploy.

For the national guard, those shortages are even more. And, as

you know, in the next five years we have about $30 billion to buy

back the equipment shortages for the Army National Guard, and
12

about $10 billion to buy back readiness for the United States Army

Reserves.

The last thing I will say is, when you talk about readiness and

training—we are training our forces right now because of the dwell

time and because of the demand for 21-plus brigades in combat

right now on your Army—the dwell time for them to reset, retrain,

get new equipment, and then turn around and go into a collective

training event, and then deploy, is 12 months.

And in that 12 months, we are only able to train them to collective events for counterinsurgency operations.

And right now we have the best counterinsurgency Army on the

planet. But they are not trained to full-spectrum operations.

And I think in this setting, that is about as much as I want to

say. But that is right now the state of readiness of your Army.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

And let me ask this question before we go to the admiral and the

other generals.

But we have a surge of 21,000 troops, and then there is the possibility of 8,000 more support troops or more. And we know we are

lacking in equipment. How is that going to impact on those that

will be gone, if we know that it takes anywhere from 12 months

to maybe 2 years to get this equipment?

Can you elaborate a little bit on that?

General CODY. Right now you are talking about the additional

combat support and combat service support to provide the

sustainment for the five brigade combat team plus-ups, as well as

the plus-ups of Marines that are going into the Al Anbar. Because

we do provide a certain amount of combat service support for our

Marine brothers.

We have the equipment right now to be able to do that, but we

did it by taking it out of our Army prepositioned stocks, so that the

additional forces we put over there will have that.

The stress on the force for that is that the next-up units will be

shorted some equipment and just-in-time flow of equipment before

they go to their major training exercise before they get ready to deploy.

Last year alone we moved over 9,600 rolling stock all over the

continental United States to get it to the right training venue for

the units just in time for their deployment. And then of course once

they deploy they are falling in on full-up equipment over in either

Iraq or Afghanistan.

So it is a major problem for us. We need to continue to get the

right procurement dollars and get it timely, in a fashion so that we

can continue to buy equipment to buy ourselves back that strategic

readiness we need.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

Admiral Willard, would you like to add anything to what has

been said?

Admiral WILLARD. I would. Thank you, Chairman.

The deployed readiness of the Navy is well served by the budget

that is currently being discussed. Our forces deployed, and as I

mentioned, about 100 ships, about 60,000 or so sailors across our

Navy, is executing a fleet response plan at 6-plus-1.
13

This means that of our carrier strike groups, six are capable of

deploying in about 30 days and one additional in about 90 days,

which we use as a frame of reference for the current readiness of

the force, our ability to surge in support of major combat operations

or major contingencies. And we are funded to that extent.

Our ships typically sail at a readiness level of C–2 or better. Our

air wings, of which we have 10, are also captured in the fleet response plan figure. So when a carrier strike group deploys, obviously its striking arm, the carrier air wing, deploys as well. And

we are funded currently to a readiness level of 2.5. Again, reflective

of that C–2 goal that Navy has set.

The 2008 budget currently reflects improved readiness across

both our deployed forces as well as our forces left behind, including

the fleet replacement squadrons, where they are slightly plussed

up in their readiness accounts as well.

So I think in terms of deployed readiness we are in great shape.

We have concerns about some of the communities that are deployed

and have very stressed dwell times in support of the operations

currently ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Specifically, those are our Seabees, our explosive ordnance disposal units, as well as our corpsmen.

So we have, again, those select communities that we micromanage now.

Now, our concern is their dwell time. Both the 2007 emergency

supplemental request and the 2008 and the global war on terror

(GWOT) request contain within them the equipment that these

more highly stressed communities require to maintain that pace of

operations.

In addition to a plus-up in force size, specifically in our Navy

construction battalions within the Seabees.

So we watch these closely. We will continue to watch them closely. And we appreciate your support, in this budget and in these

supplementals, to keep them well-equipped.

One point that I would like to make is that our health care, Navy

health care budget reduction, has stressed our ability to provide

health care generally here in CONUS.

In order to meet those budgetary constraints, we will have to

scale back some services that are provided across Navy to both our

active and reserve sailors and their families.

And I think the end result of that will be additional health care

will be pushed into the private sector.

So we are dealing with that issue now, studying the best ways

and means to adjust the current health care provisions in order to

meet those budgetary constraints.

But in terms of deployed readiness and the readiness of your

forces, across the board, Navy is in good shape.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

General Magnus, would you like to add?

General MAGNUS. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Along with my fellow warriors, the vice chief of staff of the Army

and the vice chief of naval operations, I agree that the Marines

that are forward deployed or those preparing to forward deploy,

they are in the highest state of readiness.
14

And, in fact, even with the plus-up of forces, we will not deploy

Marines forward unless they have the training to the mission and

the equipment for the mission. And, in many cases, the equipment

for that mission is specific to Iraq and Afghanistan and is moved

forward there.

Having said that, you are correct, Mr. Chairman; there are several challenges. The Congress has provided us tremendous support

over the last several years with nearly $10.2 billion between the

2006 budget, the 2007 Title IX and the 2007 request that is before

you.

But, as you know, there is lead time away to procure new equipment, military construction and the other assets that are going to

be needed. Those will not deliver for months, if not years. And we

are in the middle of a war.

That said, the Marines are deploying ready, and the plus-up

forces, of which the Marines are part, and the additional forces

that are being outlined for Afghanistan, they will go to war ready.

And they will be well taken care of while they are there and they

will be well taken care of when they are back.

The supply readiness is actually increasing. Of course, our equipment densities are increasing and we are growing the force, particularly the Army and the Marine Corps.

In the near term, those are presenting added challenges, as we

have to add more troops, more units while we are also trying to

grow more troops and units back here.

We see that the funding that has been provided will be delivering

within the next two or three years. But, of course, we will continue

to fight the war that we have and we are fighting them with the

finest troops that the mothers and fathers of America could have

possibly given us.

The challenges about growing the force, to me, my principal concern is not in the request and the supplementals that the Congress

has responded to so favorably over the last several years, it is to

ensure that the baseline budgets now and in the future are going

to be adequate not only to support the manpower costs, including

health care, as the Vice Chief Naval Officer (VCNO) mentioned, for

our troops, but also to support adequate military construction for

barracks, for armories, for aircraft hangars; and to buy the ground

combat vehicles and the aircraft that are going to have to not only

replace the ones that we are losing, but to modernize this force because, make no mistake, we are all coldly aware that we are in a

long war.

That said, the Marines are ready today and we will be ready in

the future.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, sir.

General Corley.

General CORLEY. Thanks, sir.

We have got to be able to fight tonight, and we still have to be

prepared for the future fight.

Your airmen are all about the mission. To be able to do the mission, your airmen need the tools to accomplish that mission.

As I look at one metric of measuring the readiness of those tools,

there is a disturbing trend. Since 2001, the readiness, by that metric, is down about 20 percent.
15

Let me give you a further peel back on that onion.

We have got about 1,300 fewer airplanes, but we are flying them

at the same rate we were 13 years ago; 1,300 fewer airplanes and

flying them at the same rate we were 13 years ago. An aging fleet,

13 years older, 1,300 fewer of them.

So if we think about what is the impact in terms of our airmen

and do they have the tools to be able to accomplish the mission,

you ask a question: How do we help?

My plea to you and to the rest of the members would be your

continued help on recapitalization of this old, this very old fleet of

airplanes, so those airmen would have the tools to do this. It would

be able to modernize this old, very old, aging fleet of aircraft. It

would be able for the Air Force to manage that fleet of aircraft.

That would give our airmen the tools to do their mission, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

Now I will yield to Mr. Jones for any questions that he might

have.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

And, gentlemen, I want to personally thank you. I represent the

3rd district of North Carolina, the home of Camp Lejeune, and do

claim assets at Cherry Point, even though my colleague Mr.

Butterfield claims that asset, but in Seymour Johnson Air Force

Base.

I want to thank you for your honesty and integrity, of which I

am not surprised. Let me make that clear. I just hope that the

American people—I know this is a public hearing and so therefore

they have access—I hope they are listening very carefully to what

you are saying, because, as I have heard many of you say, with all

the stresses and the challenges and the problems, we are in good

shape.

And that is what I would expect you to say. But you have also

articulated the problems. And the problems today are the war in

Iraq and Afghanistan. But we know that, five and ten years down

the road, no matter what happens in Afghanistan and Iraq, we

have a nation known as China that has been taking our jobs, that

you have nothing to do with.

We lost 3 million manufacturing jobs in the last 6 years. We

have a trade deficit with China that is astronomical. So the communistic government of China is building their military.

We are the greatest and the best right now. But if this nation

does not understand soon that this nation has got to replenish and

fix what is soon going to be broken because of being worn out.

And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this hearing because

I will tell you, I would like to take this testimony from these four

military heroes who represent the heroes and submit it for the

record on the floor of the House. Because, too many times, the people back home that are, you know, drinking the Kool-Aid, they are

not listening to the facts of what is happening.

And I think I have listened today. I will be at the classified hearing tomorrow. I have heard it before.

Just a couple of other points, and then I will—I don’t really have

the questions, because you have answered my questions in a very

articulate way. You have said to me as a Member of Congress:

Wake up and listen to what I am saying.
16

And I am listening to you. And that is why I will continue to do

what little bit I can to make sure that our military is not forgotten,

not just today, in this war in Iraq and war on terrorism in Afghanistan, but ten years from now, if I am still here or someone else who

replaces me.

You mentioned family, quality of life, housing, stress. And I want

to share, Mr. Chairman, with you, two weeks ago I was invited to

Johnson Primary School to read a book, ‘‘Dr. Seuss.’’ The words in

there I am not sure I pronounced correctly, but their teacher said,

‘‘Don’t worry about it. The six-year-old children won’t know it.’’

But the point I want to make is, when I finished, I let the little

children ask me questions—ten of them in the library. One or two

said, ‘‘My mom is in Iraq,’’ ‘‘My dad is in Iraq,’’ and you fumble to

give them some words of hope or, you know, just to try to make

a child feel better about the possibility of what might happen.

But a little kid at the end said to me—and if I don’t make another point, I want to make this, because I want people to fully understand what you have said and where we are, because our military are the real heroes of this nation. This little kid said to me,

‘‘Congressman′′—no, excuse me, he did not. He said, ‘‘My daddy is

not dead yet.’’ That is as profound as anything I could say—a sixyear-old child.

Too many times, not you, sirs, but too many times the people of

this country do not understand the impact of war on families and

children. But a six-year-old child says to me, ‘‘Daddy is not dead

yet.’’ And I looked at the teacher, and I just hoped God gave me

the right words to give that child some encouragement.

But I close because my time is up. I want, Mr. Chairman, if I

can get it, I really would like to submit for the record—a lot of people read that record—what these men have said to us today. And

I hope America is watching and listening, because this is a critical

situation for our men and women in uniform.

And I thank you. I am sorry I preached, but I thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. And I agree with the gentleman. I think, as I stated

before, this has been very candid testimony, and we need to share

this with the American people and with the rest of the Members

of Congress.

Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just wanted to reiterate what I just heard. And I was at the

secret hearing talking about the troop readiness. And I tried to

speak to my state about it in general, about troop readiness and

the pressure on them. And I won a headline that said something

along the lines of, ‘‘Shea-Porter: Gloom and Doom.’’

Now I am not getting political here. What I am talking about is

that this country needs to know exactly the state of the military

and what you all have gone through.

But we also need to acknowledge that for several years, we were

told that things were going well. And so for me to come to Congress—I am a freshman—and start looking at these numbers and

hearing this testimony has been astounding for me.

I was a military spouse during the 1970’s. My husband was in

the Army, so I have a special affection for the Army.
17

And I just got back from Iraq last week. And I looked and I saw

with my own eyes. And I have to tell you, the gap between what

Americans think is going on, and what I saw and what I have

heard through—I think we had 63, 65 hearings, and I have sat in

every one of them except for one—is astounding.

And so my question to you, even though it is open-ended, is: How

can we help to get this message out? Because all of us need to understand what you are telling us, and it has to get beyond the political realm. So what can we do to carry the message, and how

could we best serve this country and serve all of you that are struggling mightily and deserve the equipment, the personnel deserve to

be ready, and the families need to be supported.

And I will start with you, General Cody.

General CODY. Well, thank you, ma’am, for the question.

First off, I think we need to have a national dialogue about, not

just focused on Iraq and focused on the plus-up and how well

things are going or not going, I think we have to have a dialogue

about what type of military does this country need and want. And

the needs and wants need to be the same in this type of environment, the strategic environment that we are in.

When the wall came down in 1989 and then we had Desert

Shield-Desert Storm, the military was reduced by almost 40 percent. We spent 10 years not investing in the military, and then 9/

11 happened. And it has taken us this long to build the equipment

and the types of soldier protection that you seen when you just recently had your visit.

And it has taken us almost 4 years in the Army to grow the

Army by 20,000 during this war on the active side.

It is not a issue of affordability. This is the richest country in the

world, with a $13 trillion economy. It is really an issue of national

priority. And I think that is where the dialogue needs to start,

across all services, not just the Army.

I believe we are in the most dangerous times. We are five years

into this war. I think that we should not let the dialogue just focus

on what is tactically happening in Iraq. We need to take a look at

this whole global war on terror and explain to the American people

what global means, what the nature of this war means, and what

type of terrorists we are talking about, and what type of threats

they really bring to this nation.

Our soldiers understand it. That is why they have stayed with

us, our Marines and our sailors and our airmen. This all-volunteer

force that has fought for five years is stretched, but they have

stayed with us, because they believe the American people are behind them.

But they also believe that this is something that we have to do.

As one soldier told me, every fight since 9/11 needs to be an

away game. We don’t need any more home games.

So our soldiers understand this.

But I think that is where the national dialogue needs to be. And

it needs to be bipartisan.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I absolutely agree. I may have a different

opinion from somebody else who has another opinion about, you

know, the mission and should we be there, and whatever. But I do
18

know one thing: that if we put soldiers there, we need to be there

for them. So I think we have to have that dialogue.

Would anybody else like to add another comment?

I plan to go back to my papers and send as much as I am allowed

to, as many statements as I am allowed to, to try to get people to

see what is actually happening inside the forces.

Admiral WILLARD. Ma’am, if I may, I think we as

servicemembers bear a responsibility in getting the message out.

And forums like this offer us that opportunity to get as open and

frank in the questions and answers as we can be and in our statements, both formal and informal.

But at the same time, there are public forums that we have an

equal responsibility to be spokesmen at and to answer to the general public and to the journalists as frankly as needs be.

I think in general we are doing that. I am not sure that the message is as ubiquitous across our nation as we would like it to be.

But whether it is a formal, open dialogue with the Nation discussing its military and educating the general public or whether it is

an effort on the part of the services to reveal to the public their

mission set and their current state of play and condition, and their

stewardship of the taxpayers’ money, I think the dialogue must

occur.

And, once again, I think we understand and bear a responsibility

in ensuring that that message gets out as accurately as possible.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

I have one last question, please: If a soldier has a story to tell

that you need to hear at your level, are they able to do that without any form of retribution?

For example, if they know that the numbers are very low for

readiness in their particular area and they don’t think it is being

reflected properly by one of their commanders, do they have a way

to deliver that message to the top without retribution?

General CODY. Yes, ma’am, they do. And I am sure there is probably one soldier out there in our million-man Army, our millionman and woman Army that probably feels that the readiness of

their outfit, especially if they are getting ready to deploy, shouldn’t

be where it is.

And what we have to do is make sure the leadership explains to

them: You don’t have 100 percent of this right now; you will have

it for the training; and then you will for sure have it when you

move to the combat zone.

And that is a challenge that we have to make sure.

But we expect our commanders at all levels to report accurately

the readiness. And you saw the readiness reports they gave you the

other day. I mean, those were stark numbers that you were briefed

on. And they were not generated by the Department of the Army,

they were generated by commanders in the field, captains, majors,

lieutenant colonels and colonels reporting very accurately the status, because they know they have to report it that way because it

is their men and women that they are going to lead in combat.

And so I believe that the reporting is very accurate, honest. And

I think our commanders know to tell it like it is. And we need to

know it.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you very much.
19

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Hayes.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, let me add my thanks particularly for not only your

service, but the men and women that you represent.

I would correct all of you on one point. Protocol says you come

and you thank us for being here and you thank us for all the things

that you have done for us. Well, we haven’t done enough. So when

you come, preface it: We need more—whatever the case may be. I

think that would be helpful. Again, as we carry on the dialogue

with the American people, they need to hear that regularly.

General Cody, I particularly appreciate your reminding folks of

the tremendous gap in an eight- or ten-year period where the military was defunded. And that potential always exists in this atmosphere of competition for hard-earned tax dollars.

There is nothing any more important than the security of this

nation. Wars must be fought and won. There is a war against terrorists that is being fought as we speak by brave, careful, competent, and victorious men and women. And we need to continue

to talk about that.

So let’s talk specifically on readiness, Admiral, about choices. Is

it a better choice to have new F–18s flying onto the boat, or more

concrete at the outlying landing field (OLF), places to train, where

these old airplanes like F–15s are speed-restricted and C–130’s are

cargo-restrict. That might not be a question you want to answer

here. But, again, we have got to use the money wisely.

Is that something that you could care to comment?

Admiral WILLARD. Unquestionably, we need the OLF, I mean, for

the realism associated with carrier training. And Navy is committed to the necessary fiscal support to see that reality.

We strike a very fine balance between our procurement accounts

and our current readiness accounts. Navy engages in this in an enterprise format where we look at our current commitment to production of readiness for our fleet—to your point about OLF—and

we look at our future capability; that is, our attempt to pace the

threats around the world and also improve on the quality and capabilities that currently exist.

There is always a tension there, and it is challenging to strike

and find that correct balance. But we work very hard at it. And we

haven’t for many years now sacrificed that current readiness merely for the sake of that future capability, but rather we have tried

to find the correct balance between the two.

Mr. HAYES. You ought to be sitting up here. That was a good political answer. Give me more airplanes in the meantime. And the

Navy has got a bunch of hurdles that they have got to overcome

before that landing field is sited. So we will talk about that more.

General Magnus.

General MAGNUS. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYES. I have recently received some very positive anecdotal

evidence of significant progress in the Marine sector in Anbar Province. I would ask you if you have anything to add to that today,

because it is important people back home know that that progress

is being made. This report consisted of Shia and Sunni cooperation

between police and security forces, military. These things are happening again because the men and women are getting the job done.
20

Would anyone on the panel like to add to that? Because I think

people are anxious to know that reinforcing the troops is the right

thing to do and it is resulting in ultimate victory.

General MAGNUS. Congressman, thank you for the question.

Clearly, detailed discussion of what is going on in Iraq or Afghanistan, in particular what most people think of as the Marine

sector, but Multinational Force West is a joint sector, is probably

most properly addressed by the combatant commander and his

chain of command.

But what I can tell you is that—and we have to be very careful

about declaring optimism too soon. And I have been over there,

came back as recently as November the 3rd. General Cody, my

warrior mate here at the end of the table, has come back more recently. But there is palpable progress, and the progress is in what

we have been able to do over the past three years with the Iraqi

army and the Iraqi police.

There are no mistaking fundamentally huge challenges in the political and economic domains. And make no mistake, there is a very

dangerous insurgency which is in various different casts.

But I would agree that much of what I have seen recently in the

various print media, regardless of underlying opinions about the direction of the war, yes, we are seeing progress and the very initial

phases of the plus-up appear to be adding to the security environment.

Make no mistake, though, this is a long war.

Mr. HAYES. No question.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

You all giving us information that is accurate and timely about

that progress is very important as we report back to our folks at

home.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Ms. Bordallo.

Mr. Taylor said that he didn’t——

Ms. BORDALLO. I wish to thank Mr. Taylor publicly, for allotting

me his time, his slot.

Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony today.

General Magnus, thank you for sending all the Marines to

Guam. We are waiting for them.

General Cody, I have a question for you. I represent Guam. And

the soldiers from the Guam National Guard have for a number of

years now been assigned to operate on the Horn of Africa. Soon the

third deployment of Guam soldiers are scheduled to return to the

United States and complete their demobilization activities on Hawaii before returning to Guam. And this, I understand, may take

anywhere from one to three months.

These soldiers’ family members would like to see their loved ones

as soon as possible. They have requested that the Army fly them

to Hawaii to be with their loved ones when they arrive there. But

the Army has told the family members that it cannot support these

requests. I have been contacted by a number of wives of these soldiers regarding why the military will not support their request to

travel on space-available basis to Hawaii to be there when their

husbands return from deployment.
21

I respectfully request that you describe for the subcommittee the

Army’s policy on transporting dependents on space-available basis

on military aircraft to demobilization sites to greet returning loved

ones. And I also request that you describe for the subcommittee the

nature of these activities that soldiers who return from deployment

to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, or elsewhere around the

world must undergo.

I am interested in learning of the nature of counseling, training,

or assistance that soldiers receive on how to manage the challenges

associated with reentering family life upon returning from deployments to hostile environments, and whether such counseling is provided during demobilization activities.

Am I correct to believe that the effective demobilization of a soldier and his or her reintegration into the family and civilian life

in the case of the guard and reserve soldiers is an important part

of the total force readiness?

General CODY. Thank you, ma’am, for the question.

First, I don’t think we have a policy or not. I will take it for the

record and get back to you to answer on national guard family

members who are on active duty and why they should not be able

to go space-available from Guam to Hawaii.

But I will look into that, get with the National Guard Bureau,

and get back to you.

The one to three months sounds a little high to me. And I am

very familiar with the Guam soldiers. I have met two of the companies that were training to go over in Hawaii.

We bring them to Hawaii because that is where the best training

is and that is where we equip them.

And then we bring them back to the mobilization site in Hawaii

at Schofield Barracks and go through about a two- to three-week

demobilization.

And, during that time frame, we do the military health assessment, we do the counseling, as well as get their finances and everything all straightened out and then we ship them forward again

back to Guam for the reintegration with their family members.

And then there is another follow-on 90-day assessment, military

health assessment.

And so I will have to go back and take a look at the Guam situation, because it is a little different, because it is a company, and

we are rotating in and out.

And I will have to come back and tell you.

I do know that the joint travel regulations—because we have

looked at this before for Alaska and other places, about getting

family members to and from places where we have had to extend

soldiers—we have been restricted by the joint travel regs to fly people commercially, and then we have had to go out with our foundations and get frequent flyer miles and stuff like that to help the

family members.

But I don’t have a good answer for you on who in the Army said

we have a policy. I don’t think we have one. And I need to get you

a better answer.

Ms. BORDALLO. General, I think, on the time period there, if

there should be some health problems that they find then perhaps
22

the time is more. But I have heard everything from three weeks

to three months.

So I don’t know——

General CODY. That wouldn’t surprise me, especially if a soldier

had a medical issue, he is right there with Tripler Army Medical

Center. And it may be a soldier choice to stay there and get it fixed

before he goes back to Guam and before he demobilizes.

So I bet you, as we run each one of these down, you will find that

the soldier has kind of requested it because he can get the medical

care right there. And we owe that to him.

But I will go back and take a good look at it.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.

Just one quick follow-up. Could you give me any good reason, if

there is such a policy, why the Army has told these families that

they cannot support this request?

General CODY. Again, I believe it is an interpretation of the joint

travel regulation. And I have got to go back and have my staff look

at it.

There are ways we can do this and take care of the family members. There is also, though—you know, we have this in other places

where we have soldiers deployed off of Samoa and other of the island chain, Alaska, and we have looked into it. And what we have

done is gone to foundations for frequent flyer miles donations to be

able to do it.

What we would like to do is get the soldiers back to Guam as

fast as we can and get them back to the family unit and start that

reintegration.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I would appreciate a written response to

this, General, if you could provide my office with that.

Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. My friend from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to thank all of you gentlemen for your service to our

nation, for being here.

I have got to admit that I find it ironic that for years people have

come before this committee, starting with Secretary Rumsfeld, telling us that all our defense needs were being met, and then, suddenly, we walk into the 2008 budget cycle and everyone says, ‘‘We

are broke.’’

So as a personal comment, I do believe the previous secretary intentionally misled this Congress as to the true costs of the war. I

very much appreciate you gentlemen bringing to our attention the

cost of what we need to do to fix things. And I will leave it at that.

If you wish to comment on it, you are welcome to.

What I would like, General Cody, your thoughts on is—I am

going to start with praise, in that I think the Marines are taking

an extremely ambitious and rightful approach toward the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) program, with a goal of replacing all of their vehicles in Iraq hopefully by next January.

My concern is that the Army is not nearly as ambitious, that we

are making the same mistake that we have made first with body

armor, uparmored Humvees, jammers, and that is, setting a number lower than 100 percent of every vehicle as the requirement.
23

And since I felt like our nation, in particular the troops, were

burned on those three decisions of setting a requirement lower

than 100 percent, why are we apparently making the same mistake

when it comes to MRAPs?

General CODY. First off, Mr. Congressman, as you know, the

Army has about 18,000 uparmored Humvees. So we have a size

and scope as well as a mission differential.

Second, we have about a thousand tanks and Bradleys, as well

as 700 Stryker vehicles that we have in-country. And there are

about 600-some-odd armored security vehicles, and we are buying

48 a month from the vendor on the armored security vehicle.

When we got our operational needs statement from theater, it

was for 2,500. They did not ask us to replace all 18,000 uparmored

Humvees with MRAP level 1, level 2 or level 3.

And I would also like to state that we have been buying the

MRAP vehicle for quite some time: the Buffalo, the RG–31 and the

Cougar, for our route clearance. And so, when we looked at this

thing, the requirement came in for 2,500. We put the requirement

into the 2007 budget, the main supplemental, and it did not stick,

and some of it got pushed to the 2008.

And right now, I believe, as we did the amendment, we have got

$700-some-odd million in there for 700-some-odd vehicles. These

vehicles cost about a million dollars.

And then we put in a UFR, unfinanced requirement, for the

other 2,000, of about $2.2 billion, that we sent to this committee.

We are going to buy them as fast as we can, but right now what

we are focused on is the FRAG Kit 5, which we are putting on.

These are the doors and everything that our commanders have

asked for.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, I hate to interrupt, but I have a very short

attention span, I am sorry to say. When you said ‘‘did not stick,’’

who did that not stick with? Office of Management and Budget

(OMB)? The White House? The Secretary of Defense?

Because I don’t think I have heard this committee say that is a

nonstarter, and we are the ones who fund those things under the

constitutional provisions of the law.

General CODY. We did not have a valid requirement except for

335 MRAP vehicles when the 2008 Title IV supplemental was

being built. I don’t have all the particulars, but we——

Mr. TAYLOR. But, General, if I could. And believe me, I have

enormous respect for you. I have enormous respect to everyone at

that table. I have enormous respect for your sons who also served

over there.

But we are getting back to that word requirement. And I have

pointed out three instances where somebody tried to fight this war

on the cheap. And I guarantee you kids died needlessly and kids

are lying up in Walter Reed needlessly because of body armor, because of Humvees and because of jammers.

So the question is: Why do we go through this again? I mean,

as you mentioned, this nation has a $13 trillion economy. We are

finally admitting things that we should have been asking for last

year and the year before that and the year before that.

If this vehicle is going to save lives, if Humvees, as we now

know, are vulnerable to mines and a hugely disproportionate num-
24

ber of casualties are occurring in Humvees because of mines and

we have a way to address that, why don’t we address it now?

Because if the Marines are telling me every vehicle needs to be

changed out, I have trouble visualizing that riding down the road

that the Army’s traveling looks a whole lot different than the road

the Marines are traveling, or that the injuries sustained by a Marine are that much different from an injury sustained by a soldier.

General CODY. We will buy the MRAP vehicles, and we have already bought many, as you know, in our route clearance. We will

buy 2,500. We are with the Marines on this. They are the lead in

terms of the procurement.

We have asked for in the supplemental almost $1 billion for the

initial buy of 700 to meet the 2,500. We have asked for more money

in an unfinanced requirement in 2008 to buy out the 2,500.

These are costs off the shelf, the production line is set. The Marines will be getting the first tranche. We are finishing up the

FRAG Kit 5. And then the Marines and the Army just finished

having a captains of industry meeting with everybody to take a

look at how many of these MRAPs can we buy, how fast can we

buy them. But in stride with that, how quickly can we get to replacing the up-armored Humvee with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.

And we just finished that, General Magnus and I had that meeting with the captains of industry. So I don’t think we are being as

slow and lethargic as your frustration shows.

I want to get any vehicle out there as fast as I can to any soldier

or any Marine so that they can safely move through and do the

types of missions that they have.

Right now, I think we are buying these things as fast as we can.

We do have an unfinanced requirement for the total number. But

I think if you gave us the money today, I still wouldn’t get them

any faster than what we have.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, you touched on it. You did everything short

of saying this nation is not taking this war seriously. So I will paraphrase it for you.

I think this committee is taking this war seriously, and I think

if you came to us and said, ‘‘I need the legal authority to talk to

our nation’s automakers, particularly those who are shutting down

plants anyway, to turn their production over to this type of vehicle

so that kids don’t die needlessly, so that kids don’t get maimed

needlessly,’’ I think we would respond.

But I think you also know that if it comes from this committee

without the request of one of the services, then The Washington

Post and the New York Times labels it pork. I don’t think it is

pork.

I don’t want to go to the last funeral of a kid who died in a

Humvee for hitting a land mine or visit him repeatedly in the veterans’ home if we can avoid that.

And it troubles me that, again, one branch of the service is admitting that they need to replace every vehicle as quickly as possible, but the Army seems to be dragging their feet.

And I really want to encourage you to take a second look at this.

We are going to have the supplemental in the next couple of weeks,

but we are also going to follow up in October. And if it means giv-
25

ing you the legal authority to walk into an automotive plant and

say, ‘‘Guess what, we are going to do something different than

make Ford Rangers for the next couple weeks,’’ then our nation

needs to do that.

We need your help on this. And I certainly have noticed a change

in attitude with our new secretary of defense. I think he is a good

enough man to say, ‘‘Mistakes have been made,’’ including himself,

which I didn’t see a lot with his predecessor.

But this is something that absolutely has to be addressed.

General CODY. Again, we are not dragging our feet. And the Marines have a different density; we have certainly a different problem set. What we have been focused on is getting this FRAG Kit

5 to the 15,000 vehicles, which are saving soldiers’ lives.

We do have a mine problem. That is why the Marines and the

Army have looked at the MRAP. And, again, we have a $2.2 billion

UFR in our funding stream right now because our commanders

asked for FRAG Kit 5. And that is what we focused on. That is the

monies we had to get our FRAG Kit 5 out to 15,000 vehicles that

we will have done by April. And then we are buying these mineresistant vehicles.

And I know you are getting frustrated with me, but I am telling

you that 2,500 of these vehicles will be hard to be able to get in

the next 2 or 3 months. So we will buy as many as we can. At the

same time, the Marines will buy as many as they want.

But replacing 18,000 of them, we have to ask the question: Do

we buy up to the 2,500 that our commanders have asked for in

combat, coupled with their other tanks and Bradleys that they

have over there, or do we buy 18,000 of them, which we probably

wouldn’t get for another 2 or 3 years?

So it is something we are going to have to balance. I don’t disagree with how good an MRAP is.

Mr. TAYLOR. What does a FRAG Kit 5 do for you as far as a mine

detonated below that vehicle?

General CODY. Frag Kit 5 does not assist you with a deeply buried mine. It gives you a little bit more protection based upon that,

but it is not as effective—what it does, too, is take care of the explosively formed penetrators and side blasts and gives the crew

compartment much more survivability.

Mr. TAYLOR. It is my understanding—you have been there; I just

go from what I read—but it is my understanding that the enemy

is well aware of the vulnerability of a blast from below; has now

targeted our vehicles from below; and they talk to each other.

I have got to believe, if it is happening in Iraq, it is going to be

happening in Afghanistan pretty quickly. And again, General, I

know you take this seriously. I know you take your efforts, the efforts of your sons and every one of the people that serve seriously.

But I think the Army is making a tragic—and I can’t emphasize

the word ‘‘tragic’’ enough—mistake in not asking for more of these

vehicles.

General Magnus, please.

General MAGNUS. Congressman Taylor, I would like to join with

my fellow warrior, General Cody.

And I want to point out a fundamental problem that both of us

have. General Cody talked about unfinanced requirements. We
26

have stated a larger number because of the curious nature of our

battlefield in Al Anbar. But the truth is the 3,700 MRAP vehicles

that the Marine Corps currently requires and the 2,500 vehicles

that the Army currently requires, the total number is over 6,700,

and that is aside from any numbers that Special Operations Command may want.

We are $3.8-plus billion underfunded for that. And that number

of 6,700 may grow in the future, but I don’t want to see a production line shut down for the lack of money, because the country certainly has the money to send its sons and daughters to war.

Because you and I both know, and I know the Congress knows,

we really don’t want to see them in the military treatment facility;

we really don’t want to see them in the veterans’ homes. And war

is what it is, but we can cut their casualties by perhaps as much

as two-thirds with these vehicles.

So as to whether or not there should be more than 6,700, I think

the Army and the Marine Corps are united about the fact that we

would like to have the unfinanced part of that, which is over $3.8

billion, financed.

Mr. TAYLOR. To what extent, General, has that been expressed

to the appropriators? And to what extent is that being addressed

in the supplemental that we are going to be voting on in the next

couple weeks?

General MAGNUS. As General Cody had said earlier, we, as this

rapidly evolving requirement over the past three months, we had

notified the appropriate officials in our Departments of the Army

and Department of the Navy. I know our friends in the Air Force

and the Navy itself had separate requirements.

Those were provided both up the requirements chain, as well as

up the budgeting chain.

Because of the timing of the 2007 supplemental, the 2008 GWOT

request, it turns out that only a small amount of money was placed

in there. The 2007 supplemental request for the Marine Corps gave

us $428 million. The 2008 GWOT request gave us another $91 million.

Bottom line is, we are still $2.8 billion short, and, therefore,

when we were requested if there were any unfinanced or unfunded

programs, we sent the response back to Congressman Hunter, indicating that we were $2.8 billion, the Army $1 billion short.

So this has been known. It is a matter of timing, as to when the

budgets were prepared and submitted to the Congress. But it is

well-known throughout the Department, and I believe it has not

been a secret as far as what our requirements are, and I believe

the Army and the Marine Corps are united in that.

Mr. TAYLOR. All right, General, just one last request.

I hope you know that we had a hearing on this in the Seapower

Committee about a month ago. I thought that the two generals who

were representing the Marine Corps said that that program was

fully funded. I am now hearing something different.

So by way of clarification, since our markup is about a month

away, I would very much appreciate a definitive statement on behalf of the Marine Corps as to what you need to fully fund this program.

General MAGNUS. Sir, we will provide that for the record, sir.
27

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

I know that we have a position where some of these programs

might not be funded. But if we are certain that this type of vehicle

can save lives, we are willing to look at it and to see if we can, you

know, put some more money, because they are our children and our

daughters who are out there in harm’s way.

General Cody, and all of you now, when you consider your budget, do they consult with you as to what the needs are and what you

need to include in your budget? I know that sometimes they place

limitations, but does DOD consult with you as to what you need

to put in there?

Or sometimes I know, in many instances, not only in the Armed

Services Committee, certain people tried to micromanage, you

know, the funding because funding is very scarce.

And I was just wondering whether you are consulted when you

tried to put your budget together.

General CODY. Chairman, we are. And we submit our budget line

by line. I review it. I have a capable staff of three-stars and twostars and actually some colonels. And we go down line by line and

we submit it.

Then it goes through a review. If it is a supplemental like the

2007 supplemental, we have to go up and defend.

I will tell you, in 2005, 2006 and 2007, we submitted a certain

number. What was sent over here to Congress was less. And Congress always approved what came over.

But what we sent through the system was more.

Mr. ORTIZ. Anybody else would like to make any comments?

Go ahead.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, to follow up on that, I would very much

like to see the difference between what you, as a general in the

Army, ask for and what the DOD actually sent over here by way

of the previous request, as a follow-up to your previous statement.

General CODY. Sure. I can do that for you, Congressman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Either now or for the record, whatever is easier for

you.

General CODY. I will take it for the record because I want to

make sure that, in the process, there is always a give and take.

Well, that is too much, take it back. I want to make sure that we

said, ‘‘We need this much’’ and then it was cut at a certain level

based upon either OSD or OMB guidance. And then each year the

chiefs are asked and the Secretary is asked, ‘‘Can you live with

that?’’ And everybody said, ‘‘Based upon all the constraints, yes, we

can live with that.’’

The problem is, and let me be clear, in 2005, 2006 and 2007, everybody thought that the level of commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan was going to be moving downward.

And so, as constraints were put in based upon projections of

maybe not being at 15 brigades but coming down 5 brigades to 10

brigades in 2006, 2007, some constraints were put in there saying,

‘‘Well, you won’t be there.’’

I think everybody has realized that that has not been true. And

I think we are now at a situation where everybody is going to have

to look at this thing and not forecast and budget for best case, but
28

we need to be budgeting right now for worst case, because we have

been executing worst case scenarios for the last three years.

Mr. TAYLOR. And if I could, General, I would like to make the

same request of all of you gentlemen, what you asked for and what

you got in the previous four-year budgets.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Do you have a question?

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I just have one quick question. Thank you.

My question has to do with the helmets. I was told that we didn’t

have the proper helmets for the soldiers and there was a Web site

dedicated to raising money from families for these helmets.

Then I was told by a general recently, who was quite upset that

I suggested we might not have the proper helmets, that all of the

soldiers’ helmets are the top grade, the best we can do to protect

them from brain injuries.

Do we or don’t we have the best possible helmets for our troops?

And for all the troops or some of the troops?

General CODY. The helmet that we have now, the ACH, the Advanced Combat Helmet, we have tested several different ways. I directed a year and a half ago that our infantry center, as well as

our surgeon general, look at the helmet, the new Advanced Combat

Helmet, and the other helmet that we had, the Kevlar helmet.

Both of them provided the maximum protection, as well as what

the soldier needed for wearing of the night vision devices, as well

as the hearing protection, as well as the ensemble of the kit that

he wears to protect his neck and everything else.

And so we have gone through and looked at the different types

of battle injuries, and right now I can tell you that our people, the

experts tell me that the helmet is the best that we have and we

have enough of them for every soldier that is down range.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. So you can say with certainty that 100 percent of the troops are using the most advanced helmet?

General CODY. We may have soldiers that don’t have the ACH,

the Advanced Combat Helmet, but the protection of the regular

Kevlar helmet is the same, it is just a different sizing.

So we may have some combat support troops that are not going

out on patrol—the ACH, the newer helmet, was designed for patrolling, and it gives you other access, in terms of wearing your kit,

in terms of night-vision devices and stuff.

So I can’t accurately say that 100 percent have the Advanced

Combat Helmet, but both the helmets they have have the same

type of protection.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. I have one question. And I had a chance to go visit

national guard units and reserve units. And I was wondering

whether the $50 billion for the national guard in the budget, do

you think this is sufficient money to get them up its required readiness, or do you think that we need to add more money to the budget?

General CODY. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure of that number that

you just put out there. Is that for the procurement?

Mr. ORTIZ. That is $30 billion.
29

General CODY. Okay, the $30 billion. We have looked at this in

concert with the modularity. As you know, the national guard, in

five years, footprint and types of unit is going to be different.

And so, when we looked at the move-shoot-and-communicate

equipping of the national guard and what they are going to look

like in terms of the number of heavy brigades, light brigade combat

teams, maneuver enhancement engineers and other types of artillery units and transportation units, we priced that out.

And this gets them up to their equipment levels and fills all the

holes, but also gets rid of the in-lieu-ofs, the M35 deuce and a

halves that are too old, that we need to get rid of, that we get rid

of those in 2008, and get the new equipment. So the $30.2-something billion out through fiscal year 2013 fills all those holes with

a modular Army National Guard.

Mr. ORTIZ. Because when I went to visit those units, it is very

important, some of the equipment, as you well know, has been left

behind.

Then, when they come back to their units, they don’t have the

equipment to train. The governors were concerned in case of a disaster, if they don’t have the equipment to respond, of course, they

cannot respond; they don’t have the equipment.

So this is very, very important, that we equip the national guard

as well.

Does anybody else have any more questions?

If not, this has been a very, very candid dialogue between us

members and you, and this is what we needed to know so that we

can try to help you.

And again, thank you so much.

And this meeting stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 13, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 13, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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MARCH 13, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Mr. TAYLOR. I would very much appreciate a definitive statement on behalf of the

Marine Corps as to what you need to fully fund the MRAP program.

General MAGNUS. To fully fund the USMC MRAP Program requirement, a total

of 2.784B is required in FY08 broken out as follows:

2.372B Procurement

89M O&M

10M RDT&E

The FY08 requirement includes completing the procurement of the USMC 3700

vehicles, Initial support for vehicles procured in FY08 and FY07, GFE for vehicles

procured in FY08, Upgrade kits for all 3700 vehicles, Shipment to theater for vehicles procured in FY08 and a majority of the FY07 procured vehicles, Sustainment

for vehicles delivered in FY07/prior, and a small amount of RDT&E for Spiral development of vehicle upgrades. The FY09 requirement is currently 482M broken out

as follows:

10M RDT&E

472M OMMC Sustainment

Mr. TAYLOR. When you consider your budget, do they consult with you as to what

the needs are and what you need to include in your budget? I know that sometimes

they place limitations, but does DOD consult with you as to what you need to put

in there? I would very much like to see the difference between what you, as a general in the Army, ask for and what the DOD actually sent over here by way of the

previous request.

General CODY. The table below displays the Army’s combined base program request and supplemental request since FY03 in three columns: as submitted to the

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), as approved by OSD, and the Office

of Management and Budget and as appropriated by the Congress.

Army’s Budget Request as Submitted to OSD from FY03—FY08

($billion)

Total Budget

Army Request

to OSD

OMB/OSD

Position

Congressional

Position (APPN)

FY 2003 135.6 115.6 115.2

FY 2004 145.6 131.2 134.2

FY 2005 168.3 155.4 159.5

FY 2006 187.7 165.9 165.7

FY 2007

(Base and Title

IX Only) 160.4 160.7 159.0

This table shows the amounts requested by the Army and subsequently approved

by OSD/OMB for the FY07 Emergency Supplemental, FY08 Base budget and FY08

GWOT Request.

($billion)

Budget Request

Army Request

to OSD

OMB/OSD

Position

FY 2007 Main

Supplemental * 66.0 58.9

FY 2008 Base ** 130.7 130.0

FY 2008 GWOT

Allowance *** 105.1 92.1
104

* - Adds $12.2 billion for Afghanistan Security Force Fund (ASFF), Iraqi Security

Forces Fund (ISFF), and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) not included in the Army’s request to OSD but submitted to Congress by OMB/OSD.

** - Includes $7.7 billion for Grow the Army.

*** - Adds $8.7 billion for ASFF, ISFF, and JIEDDO not included in the Army’s request to OSD but submitted to Congress by OMB/OSD.

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