Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Projection 

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 3:30 p.m. EDT 

Tuesday, July 19, 2005 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS

Progress and Challenges 

Facing the DD(X) Surface 

Combatant Program 

Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

GAO-05-924T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-924T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Paul L. Francis 

at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-924T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Projection 

Forces, House of Representatives 

Committee on Armed Services 

July 19, 2005

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Progress and Challenges Facing the 

DD(X) Surface Combatant Program 

Demanding requirements and time frames present substantial challenges for 

the DD(X) program. DD(X)’s revolutionary design and automated operations 

require multiple technological advances. For example, to carry out its 

primary mission of land attacks, DD(X) must be able to strike land targets 

from distances of up to 83 nautical miles (about 96 miles)—a capability 

requiring a level of accuracy and range not yet achieved in naval gunfire. To 

meet DD(X)’s stealth requirements, new materials, designs, and construction 

processes are being developed, including a radical hull design that reduces 

the ship’s signature by sloping out—not in—from the ship’s deck to the 

waterline. In addition, many traditionally manned functions will be 

automated to appreciably cut crew size and reduce operational costs. At the 

same time, the DD(X) program has imposed a tight schedule—one that calls 

for concurrent development, design, and construction. 

To reduce risk in the DD(X) program, the Navy is building 10 engineering 

development models that represent the ship’s most critical subsystems and 

technologies. While use of these models is a sound approach, planned testing

of the models continues through system design and, in some cases, into 

detailed design and construction, creating risk. Any problems identified 

through testing could require design changes and result in delays and cost 

increases. Past GAO work shows that demonstrating technological 

maturity—that is, the technology has been shown to perform in its intended 

environment—at the start of system design and development is key to 

reducing risk and meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives. In 

addition, the models are not identical in design to the subsystems that will 

actually be installed on the first ships and thus will require additional work 

to reach the final design. 

The consequences of not meeting the challenges facing the DD(X) program 

are significant. If the program fails to demonstrate capabilities, develop 

software, or integrate subsystems as planned, these activities will be pushed 

into the later stages of design and construction. In these stages, the cost of 

work and delays is much higher and the schedule much less forgiving than in 

earlier stages. At the same time, the Navy must compete for funding with 

other programs, while supporting existing platforms and deployments, in a 

time when the discretionary budget is constrained. In light of the risks 

framed by the DD(X)'s challenges, decision makers should consider 

potential trade-offs in advance, including accepting reduced mission 

performance, increased costs, delayed shipyard work, and/or additional 

manning. It would be prudent to consider the palatability of such trade-offs 

now before authorizing the construction of the first ship—a commitment the 

Navy plans to make by the end of this fiscal year. 

In April 2002, the Department of 

the Navy launched the DD(X) 

Destroyer program to develop a 

stealthy, multi-mission ship that 

would provide advanced land 

attack capability to support forces 

ashore and contribute to military 

dominance in shallow coastal 

waters. Numbers and costs for the 

DD(X) have changed since the 

inception of the program. 

According to the program’s official 

cost estimate, the first ship is 

expected to cost $3.3 billion, with 

per unit costs decreasing as 

production progresses.

DD(X) is approaching Milestone B 

and critical design review—two 

key decision points that will shape 

the future of both the program and 

the Navy itself. This testimony 

focuses on (1) the challenges the 

DD(X) program is expected to 

encounter, (2) the program’s 

approach and progress in managing 

attendant risks, and (3) potential 

consequences if program progress 

falls short of expectations. 
Page 1 GAO-05-924T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of the Navy’s 

DD(X) Destroyer program, part of the family of future surface combatants. 

The DD(X) is being developed as a next-generation multi-mission 

destroyer. It is intended to provide advanced land attack capability to 

support forces ashore and contribute to military dominance in the shallow 

coastal water environment known as the littorals. The DD(X) program 

began in April 2002 with the award of a design and development contract 

to Northrop Grumman Ship Systems. Since that time, the program has 

been developing key technologies and a system design to meet the 

requirements established by the Navy. Currently DD(X) is approaching key 

decisions on design and acquisition strategy that will shape the future of 

both the program and the Navy itself. 

We have published two previous reports on technology development in the 

DD(X) program.1

 Today I would like to discuss (1) the challenges the 

DD(X) is expected to meet, (2) the program’s approach and progress in 

managing attendant risks, and (3) potential consequences if program 

progress falls short of expectations. 

The DD(X) program faces a steep challenge that is framed by demanding 

requirements and a tight schedule imposed by industrial base concerns. 

Several demands have been made of the DD(X) program, including 

multiple missions, with a focus on land attack; stealth; manning levels of 

less than half of the predecessor Arleigh Burke destroyer; and a 

construction schedule that must address industrial base priorities. To meet 

these demands, the DD(X) will employ revolutionary designs and 

automated operations, requiring multiple technological advances, to be 

accomplished on a schedule that calls for concurrent development, design, 

and construction. 

Key to the management of risk is the building of 10 engineering 

development models that represent the ship’s most critical subsystems 

and technologies. Progress is being made on each, and the delay in the 

decision to authorize the first ship has allowed additional work to be 

 1

 GAO, Progress of the DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-05-752R (Washington, D.C.: June

14, 2005); GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer Program, 

GAO-04-973 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 3, 2004).

Summary 
Page 2 GAO-05-924T 

completed. Tests of several engineering development models resulted in 

successful demonstration of key components and progress toward final 

testing. In other models, tests identified technical problems that will need 

to be overcome before ship installation or that have led to changes in the 

ship design. Although the use of engineering development models is a 

good approach, the timing for their completion entails risk. Our work on 

successful commercial and defense product developments shows that 

demonstrating mature technology at the start of system development is 

key to reducing risk and meeting cost, schedule, and performance 

objectives. In the case of DD(X), testing of the engineering development 

models continues into system design and some extend into detailed design 

and construction. In addition, the models are not identical in design to the 

subsystems that will actually be installed on the first ships and thus will 

require additional work to reach the final design. 

The Navy has developed a structured approach for meeting the 

challenging demands of the DD(X). At the same time, it must be 

recognized that these challenges are, to some extent, conflicting and do 

not have much give in them. They may not be simultaneously achievable 

regardless of the acquisition strategy. To the extent that the large scope of 

activities remaining for the DD(X) do not go as planned, work—in the 

form of demonstrating capabilities, developing software, integrating 

subsystems, and actual fabrication—will travel to the later stages of design 

and construction. In these stages, the cost of work and delays is much 

higher and the schedule much less forgiving than in earlier stages. In light 

of the risks framed by the DD(X)’s challenges, decision makers will have 

to be prepared to make difficult trade-offs. These could include accepting 

reduced mission performance, increased costs, delayed shipyard work, 

and/or additional manning. It is advisable that the palatability of such 

trade-offs be discussed now before the upcoming commitment to 

authorize construction of the first ship is made. 

The DD(X) program is currently in the system design phase, approaching 

two key decision points. One is Milestone B, when the Navy will decide on 

whether to authorize the award of a detail design and construction 

contract for production of the lead ship(s). Milestone B was planned for 

March 2005 but has been delayed several times and is now expected to 

take place before the end of the fiscal year. The other key decision point is 

the critical design review, scheduled for September 2005. This review is 

intended to demonstrate the design maturity of the ship and its readiness 

to proceed to production. Following these decisions, a contract will be 

awarded for detailed design and construction. Fabrication is planned to 

Background 
Page 3 GAO-05-924T 

start in 2008. The Navy’s most recent cost estimate places the cost of the 

first ship at $3.3 billion, with per unit costs decreasing as production 

progresses.2

The DD(X) program faces a steep challenge that is framed by demanding 

requirements and a tight schedule imposed by industrial base concerns. 

Several demands have been made of the DD(X) program. First, the DD(X) 

is required to perform not only its primary mission of land attack, but also 

anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, and mine warfare tasks. For the land attack 

mission alone, the ship must be able to precisely strike land targets from 

distances of up to 83 nautical miles, a capability requiring a level of 

accuracy and range not yet seen in naval gunfire. Second, the DD(X) must 

meet stealth requirements, which affects the destroyer’s signature across 

all spectrums (infrared, radar cross section, and acoustic). Third, to 

reduce operational costs, crew size must be at least half of historical 

levels, requiring the automation and computerization of many traditionally 

manned functions. Finally, to manage shipyard workloads, the Navy 

believes construction of the DD(X) must begin in 2008. 

To meet these demands, performance and schedule objectives, the DD(X) 

will employ revolutionary designs and automated operations, requiring 

multiple technological advances, to be accomplished on a schedule that 

calls for concurrent development, design, and construction. To meet 

stealth requirements, completely new materials, designs, and construction 

processes are being developed, including a revolutionary hull design—the 

tumblehome hull form—which widens as it approaches the waterline. 

Another departure from traditional shipbuilding design is the peripheral 

vertical launch system, which situates missile enclosures peripherally 

instead of centrally. Several new technologies are being developed to 

provide the needed weaponry, radars, signature reduction, fire 

suppression, and propulsion. Advances in automation are necessary to 

replace many manpower-intensive tasks. For example, the advanced gun 

system will be completely automated, requiring crew only for the 

command to fire and replenishment of its magazines. Fire suppression will 

also be highly automated. This level of sophistication necessitates a large 

software development effort—14 to 16 million lines of code. 

 2

The quoted estimate assumes alternating production at two shipyards beginning in fiscal 

year 2007. 

The DD(X) Challenge: 

Deliver 

Unprecedented 

Performance on a 

Tight Schedule 
Page 4 GAO-05-924T 

To reduce risk in the DD(X) program and demonstrate the ship’s 12 

technologies, the Navy is building 10 engineering development models that 

represent the ship’s most critical subsystems. The development models are 

described in table 1. 

Table 1: Description of Engineering Development Models 

Engineering 

development models Description 

Advanced gun system Will provide long-range fire support for forces ashore 

through the use of unmanned operations and the longrange land attack projectile. 

Integrated deckhouse and 

apertures 

A composite structure that integrates apertures of radar 

and communications systems. 

Dual band radar Horizon and volume search improved for performance in 

adverse environments. 

Integrated power system Power system that integrates power generation, 

propulsion, and power distribution and management. 

Total ship computing 

environment 

Provides single computing environment for all ship 

systems to speed command while reducing manning. 

Peripheral vertical launch 

system 

Multipurpose missile launch system located on the 

periphery of the ship to reduce damage to ship systems. 

Integrated undersea warfare 

system 

System for mine avoidance and submarine warfare with 

automated software to reduce workload. 

Infrared mockup Seeks to reduce ship’s heat signature in multiple areas. 

Hull form Designed to significantly reduce radar cross section. 

Autonomic fire suppression 

system 

Intended to reduce crew size by providing a fully 

automated response to fires. 

Source: DD(X) program office and contractors. 

The engineering development models are the most significant aspect of the 

program’s risk reduction strategy. They represent a disciplined process for 

generating the information needed for development. In using engineering 

development models, the Navy seeks to achieve increasing levels of 

technology maturity by first defining the requirements and risks of a 

developmental technology and then executing a series of tests to reduce 

these risks and prove the utility of a technology. It is these tests that 

provide confidence in a technology’s ability to operate as intended. Once 

the technology is demonstrated, the subsystem can be integrated into the 

ship’s system design. The progress of technology maturity is recorded and 

DD(X) Acquisition 

Strategy Requires 

Completing 

Technology Maturity 

During Detail Design 

and Construction 
Page 5 GAO-05-924T 

communicated clearly through the use of established metrics,3 affording 

the program manager and others readily available information for use in 

decision making. While engineering development models provide the Navy 

with vital information on the progress of technologies, the models are 

being completed later than they should, putting more pressure on the 

remainder of the program. 

Our reviews of commercial and Department of Defense acquisition 

programs have identified a number of specific practices that ensure that 

high levels of knowledge are achieved at key junctures in development and 

used to make investment decisions. The most important practice is 

achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system 

development. A technology reaches full maturity when its performance is 

successfully demonstrated in its intended environment. Maturing a 

technology to this level before including it into system design can reduce 

risk by creating confidence that a technology will work as expected and 

allows the developer to focus on integrating mature technologies into the 

ship design. This improves the ability to establish realistic cost, schedule, 

and performance objectives as well as the ability to meet them. Including 

the technologies in the system design before reaching maturity raises the 

risk of discovering problems late and can increase the cost and time 

needed to complete design and fabrication. 

The DD(X) program is based on a concurrent schedule that calls for 

developing and testing key subsystems during system design and into 

detailed design. The schedule for DD(X) and its attendant development 

models is shown in figure 1. Most of the testing of the development models 

takes place during the program’s system design, which culminates in 

critical design review. In some cases, the testing of development models 

continues through the start of DD(X) construction. If problems are found 

in testing, as has been the case with other programs, they could result in 

changes in the design, delays in product delivery, and increases in product 

cost. 

 3

One metric utilized by the DD(X) program office is technology readiness levels. This 

metric incorporates many of the factors that determine technology maturity, including 

form, fit, and function, into a single digit numerical score. 
Page 6 GAO-05-924T 

Figure 1: DD(X) First Ship and Engineering Development Models Schedule 

As you can see, testing of some engineering development models 

continues through the detailed design and construction phase. Not shown 

here are the events that will follow tests of the development models. The 

development models demonstrate the technologies but are not identical in 

design to the subsystems that will actually be installed on the first ships. 

Tests performed with development models may also not demonstrate the 

full functionality of the systems needed for DD(X). In some cases, such as 

the dual band radar, substantial changes will be needed. Results of testing 

need to be analyzed and integrated into the final design, and production 

plans will need to be finalized and approved before the subsystems are 

manufactured. Testing of the final subsystems will take place before and 

after installation into the ship. 

FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 FY 09 FY 10 FY 11

Final development model test not yet scheduled 

 Approximate end of testing

?

?

?

Detailed Design & Construction 

Advanced

gun system

Preliminary

Design

System

Design

Integrated

deckhouse

Dual band

radar

Power

system

Computing

environment

Peripheral

vertical launch

Undersea

warfare system

Infrared

mockup

Hull form

Autonomic fire

suppression

Sources: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

07/05

12/04

06/05

09/05

09/05

09/05

08/07

04/05

Engineering development models

DD(X)
Page 7 GAO-05-924T 

In responding to our September 2004 report,4 the Department of Defense 

stated that it is appropriate to take a reasonable amount of risk in 

developing technologies for the lead ship of DD(X) given the long 

production time associated with shipbuilding. Yet DD(X) will proceed 

from the start of system development to initial capability in the same or 

less time as other major acquisition programs for which DOD does call for 

demonstration of technology maturity before development start. Table 2 

gives time periods for DD(X) and DDG-51, as well as other 

nonshipbuilding systems. 

Table 2: Comparison of Time from System Development to Initial Capability 

System Start of system development Initial capability Time elapsed 

DD(X) March 2004 January 2013 8 years, 10 months 

DDG-51 March 1983 February 1993 9 years, 11 months 

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet May 1992 September 2001 9 years, 4 months 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle December 2000 September 2010 9 years, 9 months 

Joint Strike Fighter October 2001 March 2012 10 years, 5 months 

F/A-22 Raptor June 1991 December 2005 14 years, 6 months 

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Other shipbuilding programs have developed acquisition strategies that 

sought to mature key technologies before their inclusion into system 

design, especially if they are vital to the performance or design. The 

CVN-21 program had a risk-reduction strategy that defined a timeline for 

making decisions about a technology in line with the start of system 

design. One example of a technology that followed this strategy was the 

electromagnetic aircraft launching system, an advanced technology key to 

meeting system requirements. While there were other technologies not 

matured to levels as high as the launch system, the majority followed the 

risk-reduction strategy and had options to switch to an existing technology 

should development fail. The Navy tested the Virginia class submarine’s 

nonpenetrating periscope at sea before including it into requirements, 

assuring that the submarine’s design could benefit from that technology 

while reducing the risk it would delay design. 

 4

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Facing the DD(X) Destroyer Program, GAO-04-

973 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 3, 2004).
Page 8 GAO-05-924T 

Much of the testing to this date has been for components of subsystems, 

for example tests on the turbine engines that supply electricity to the 

integrated power system. Tests of several engineering development 

models resulted in successful demonstration of key components and 

progress toward final testing. One example is the advanced gun system, 

which has been able to rapidly change design or correct deficiencies to 

meet requirements and demonstrate capability. In other cases, tests 

identified technical problems that will need to be overcome before ship 

installation or that have led to changes in the ship design. Examples 

include the integrated power system or the dual band radar. While these 

problems could be considered normal for any developmental program, 

especially when this many new technologies are being developed 

simultaneously, they are occurring as the program approaches a decision 

on starting detail design and construction. 

The advanced gun system is a large caliber, unmanned gun system 

designed to fire long-range projectiles in support of land attack missions, 

such as strikes at specific targets or suppressing fire in support of ground 

troops. The DD(X) design calls for two gun systems with approximately 

300 rounds in each magazine, as well as an additional 320 rounds in an 

auxiliary magazine. Because the gun system provides supporting fire for 

land attack, a fundamental mission objective of the DD(X), it needs to be 

able to quickly and accurately hit a substantial number of land-based 

targets from a significant distance. The system consists of the mount (the 

gun together with its housing and movement mechanisms), a fully 

automated magazine, and a munition known as the long-range land attack 

projectile. A schedule of key events for the advanced gun system can be 

seen in table 3. 

Progress on 

Engineering 

Development Models 

Advanced Gun System 
Page 9 GAO-05-924T 

Table 3: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Advanced Gun System 

2004 2005 2006 and beyond 

October: Virtual testing of gun system 

Second quarter: Component testing 

begins 

December: First munition guided flight test 

First quarter: Component testing ends 

April: Factory acceptance testing of the 

magazine 

January–February: Munition guided flight 

tests 

May: Factory acceptance testing of the 

mount 

May: Long-range land attack projectile 

preliminary design review 

July: Land-based testing of the mount and 

magazine 

April–September: Further guided flight 

tests of munition 

To be determined: Munition firing from gun 

system 

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

 

In October 2004 the advanced gun system was tested using a physicsbased software model that included the software functionality for all 

major components of the advanced gun system and incorporated the 

results of physical testing. Results met or exceeded expectations for 

response time, rate of fire, sustained rate of fire, range, and pallet 

unloading rate. The contractor has begun verifying the results through 

testing of physical components. In April, the magazine component of the 

advanced gun system successfully completed factory acceptance testing 

by demonstrating its ability to meet requirements and has been shipped to 

Dugway, Utah, for integration into further land-based tests. In May, the 

mount component completed similar testing. Land-based tests scheduled 

to begin in mid-July will demonstrate the entire firing sequence of the 

advanced gun system. However, these tests will not demonstrate the 

ability of the gun system to communicate target information to the 

munition or the ability to move the gun side to side. The munition will not 

be tested with the gun until after ship installation. 

The munition for advanced gun system, known as long-range land attack 

projectile, has completed four flight tests at Point Mugu, California; and 

has successfully demonstrated launch, tail fin deployment, canard 

deployment, rocket motor ignition, global positioning system acquisition, 

and some flight maneuvers. The first guided flight test failed when the 

canards deployed improperly and controlled flight was lost. The issue was 

identified, corrected, and successfully resolved in later flight tests. The 

current schedule calls for completion of an additional three flight tests by 
Page 10 GAO-05-924T 

the end of September 2005. Flight testing of the munition will continue 

after critical design review. 

Recently, the design of the advanced gun system was changed to support 

ease of production for DD(X). The advanced gun system will now be 

constructed as a single modular unit, transported to the shipyard, and 

installed as a block. This redesign has added some weight, which has been 

accounted for in the current design. 

Integrated deckhouse and apertures refers to the superstructure on the 

deck of the ship and the openings in which radar, sensor, and 

communication equipment are placed. The deckhouse is dependant on the 

use of recently developed composite materials to meet requirements for 

weight. A major focus of deckhouse design is to reduce the ship’s radar 

cross section signature. A separate technical challenge, referred to as cosite interference, involves placing apertures in precise locations to ensure 

the signals from the multitude of antennas do not interfere with one 

another. The contractor, Northrop Grumman, is building two test articles 

to fulfill requirements for the testing of the deckhouse. One is a fire and 

shock test article that will be subjected to underwater explosions; the 

other is an integrated deckhouse article that will be tested for radar cross 

section and antenna placement. A schedule for key events for the 

integrated deckhouse can be seen in table 4. 

Table 4: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Integrated Deckhouse 

2004 2005 2006 and beyond 

August: Begin antenna predelivery tests 

November: Begin fire and shock testing 

(postponed) 

February: End antenna predelivery tests 

March: Shielding effectiveness tests 

April: Lightning-protection tests 

June: Co-site interference tests 

July: End fire and shock testing 

(postponed) 

September: Radar cross section tests 

To be determined: Fire and shock testing 

(postponed) 

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Construction on the fire and shock test article continues to be delayed due 

to questions about the material properties of the composites involved, and 

lack of adequate test facilities. Further time is needed to conduct analysis 

of composite properties regarding issues such as structural strength, 

corrosion, toxicity of fumes when composites catch fire, and ability to 

Integrated Deckhouse and 

Apertures 
Page 11 GAO-05-924T 

bind composites with the steel hull. The program office states that the 

ability of the deckhouse design to meet requirements will continue to be 

analyzed in support of the critical design review. In addition, facilities for 

shock testing of large-scale articles, such as those needed for testing of the 

deckhouse, are not available until 2006. Testing of the fire and shock 

article has been delayed until the next contract period, after DD(X) critical 

design review. 

Since May 2004, a series of changes involving equipment, antenna size, and 

positioning have been made to the deckhouse, which has caused changes 

in the placement of apertures. The integrated deckhouse test article was 

scheduled to begin testing for radar cross section in May, including all 

deckhouse antennas and the multifunction radar (half of the dual band 

radar system), and for co-site interference in June. 

The deckhouse has experienced some problems remaining within its 

margins for weight. To reduce weight, the program has made a number of 

changes to the design including modifications to fragmentation protection, 

and redesigned power and cooling systems for the radars and other 

components. The program office states that the deckhouse is now in 

compliance with its weight budget. 

The dual band radar monitors airborne and surface activities, guides 

weaponry to targets, and conducts environmental mapping. The dual band 

radar is made up of two major radar systems, the multifunction radar and 

the volume search radar, unique technologies that are brought to bear 

jointly on a range of critical tasks to improve overall depth and quality of 

battlespace vision. The volume search radar specializes in providing 

information on aircraft, missiles, and other activities in the vast, open sky 

environment. In contrast, the multifunction radar is designed to monitor 

airspace at horizon or near the surface levels for threats such as low-flying 

antiship cruise missiles. Key events for the dual band radar can be seen in 

table 5. 

Dual Band Radar 
Page 12 GAO-05-924T 

Table 5 - Schedule of Key Events Relating to Dual Band Radar 

2004 2005 2006 2007 and beyond 

September–October: 

Multifunction radar tests for 

clutter rejection and sensitivity 

September: Multifunction radar 

cross section tests 

February: Integration and test 

of volume search radar array 

February-May: Multifunction 

radar at sea tests 

May: Engineering development 

model “string” test for the 

volume search radar 

June: Volume search radar 

Array delivery 

August: Dual band radar landbased tests 

To be determined: Continued 

development of volume search 

radar to meet requirements 

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Testing and development of the multifunction radar is proceeding well. 

There have been a number of design changes, including a power/cooling 

system redesign that reduced weight. These changes will be validated in 

land based tests with the volume search radar in August 2007. Tests of the 

multifunction radar’s clutter rejection capabilities and firm track range, 

two key functions required for demonstration, have been proven in 

demonstrations with realistic targets. In a simulated scenario, the 

multifunction radar has demonstrated the ability to guide an Evolved Sea 

Sparrow Missile against an inbound cruise missile. Testing of the radar’s 

ability to communicate with one of its own outbound missiles will take 

place in 2007, when the fully assembled dual band radar undergoes landbased tests. A significant risk remaining is ensuring that the shape and 

placement of the multifunction radar meets radar cross section 

requirements. 

The transmit/receive units, the individual radiating elements that are the 

essence of the volume search radar, encountered difficulties when a key 

component failed in testing. Officials believe they have identified a 

solution to the problem, but a further design iteration is needed to fully 

satisfy performance requirements for the engineering development model. 

Additional iterations of design will be necessary before ship installation. 

The schedule for construction of the dual band radar is already 

challenging, with the radar for the first DD(X) scheduled for placement 

after the ship is already afloat. Additional delay in development of the 

volume search radar could affect the schedule for ship construction. 
Page 13 GAO-05-924T 

The integrated power system centrally generates and distributes power to 

the ship for all functions, including propulsion. This design allows greater 

flexibility in power use and will allow the integration of high-energy 

weapons in the future. The integrated power system consists of three 

primary components: turbine generator sets, a power distribution system, 

and propulsion motors. A significant technical challenge is development of 

the propulsion motors, which are used to turn the shaft and propeller. To 

reduce risk the program carried two designs of propulsion motor, the 

permanent magnet motor and the advanced induction motor. A schedule 

of events for the integrated power system can be seen in table 6. 

Table 6: Schedule of Key Events Relating to Integrated Power System 

2004 2005 2006 and beyond 

October: Main turbine generator set factory 

acceptance test 

October: Advanced induction motor factory 

acceptance test 

November: Auxiliary turbine generator 

factory acceptance test 

January: Auxiliary turbine generator factory 

acceptance test 

January: Permanent magnet motor test 

failure 

July-September: Land-based testing of 

integrated power system 

To be determined: Full power load test 

To be determined: Integration and testing 

with ship control system 

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

The program has completed initial testing on propulsion motors for 

DD(X). The program carried two designs of propulsion motor, the 

permanent magnet motor and the advanced induction motor. The program 

preferred to use the permanent magnet motor due to its ability to meet 

requirements with less weight and noise, but carried the advanced 

induction motor as a backup. Recently, the permanent magnet motor 

failed to demonstrate the speed needed to produce the required power. 

The advanced induction motor tested successfully in October 2004 and has 

now been selected as the propulsion motor for DD(X). Carrying a backup 

to a critical new technology is a smart strategy and paid off on the 

propulsion motor. This change does have has implications for design as 

the advanced induction motor is heavier and less efficient than the 

permanent magnet motor, will require more space, and operates at a 

different voltage. It will take two advanced induction motors linked 

together to replace one permanent magnet motor. 

Navy officials stated that the advanced induction motor will be tested this 

summer to 18.25 megawatts, half of what the ship requires per propeller 

and half of what the permanent magnet motor was to demonstrate. The 

advanced induction motor will also demonstrate half of the torque needed 

per propeller. While two advanced induction motors will be needed to turn 

Integrated Power System 
Page 14 GAO-05-924T 

one shaft in the final design, program officials state that there is little risk 

in simply adding a second motor to reach full power. During 

demonstrations this summer, the advanced induction motor will also be 

tested for integration with the power distribution system. 

Factory acceptance tests on turbine generators were performed to 

demonstrate their ability to produce the power needed for DD(X). The 

design for DD(X) requires two main turbine generators and two auxiliary 

turbine generators that are tested to similar requirements. The main 

turbine generator set, a Rolls-Royce MT-30 turbine and a generator 

produced by Curtiss-Wright, was tested in October 2004. Due to limitations 

of contractor facilities, the turbine engine and the generator were tested 

separately. Some problems with heat were experienced in testing of the 

turbine engine, but program officials have stated these issues have been 

resolved. The program tested two different turbine engines for the 

auxiliary generator sets, a Rolls-Royce MT-5 and a General Electric LM500. Both turbine generator sets demonstrated they were able to produce 

the power necessary and actually produced more power than predicted. 

Design of the power distribution system was also changed to reduce 

weight and improve performance. According to officials, the Navy will use 

a system it has been developing called “integrated fight through power,” 

which includes the use of solid state components and rapid switching 

technologies. 

Program officials estimate that DD(X) will require 14 to 16 million lines of 

new and reused software code. The total ship computing environment, 

which accounts for a large portion of the software, will provide a common 

architecture for major ship systems to facilitate integration and to speed 

command and control while reducing manning. A schedule of events for 

the total ship computing environment can be seen in table 7. 

Table 7: Schedule of Events Relating to Total Ship Computing Environment 

2003 2004 2005 2006 - 2009 

September: Preliminary design 

review 

May: Critical design review 

June: Software release 1 

certification 

March: Software release 2 

certification 

May-September: Land-based 

tests 

September: Software release 3 

certification 

Completion of remaining 3 

software releases 

Source: U.S. Navy (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Total Ship Computing 

Environment 
Page 15 GAO-05-924T 

While not a physical technology, the magnitude of software development 

for DD(X) still needs time for development, design, testing, and correction 

like the other engineering development models. An engineering 

development model for the computing environment is being developed for 

testing and includes three of six software releases. These three releases 

include the critical infrastructure functionality needed, as well as some 

functionality for anti-air, undersea, and land attack missions. To prove the 

functionality of the computing environment, it will be tested in a software 

integration center and connected with data from other engineering 

development models. 

Computing environment development plans include many of the software 

best practices identified in our past work, including developing software in 

an evolutionary environment, following disciplined development process, 

and using meaningful metrics to measure progress. While robust 

development plans are in place, the computing environment is on a tight 

schedule that continues beyond the start of construction and has limited 

margin for correction of defects found in testing. While the total ship 

computing environment has not experienced significant challenges thus 

far, a demanding effort lies ahead. About three-quarters of the software 

development effort occurs during the detail design and construction 

phase. 

Our review of the remaining engineering development models has been 

less extensive. Nonetheless, I would like to highlight a few aspects of these 

systems. 

The peripheral vertical launch system consists of the missile launcher, 

referred to as the advanced vertical launch system, and the enclosure for 

the launcher, referred to as the peripheral vertical launch system. The 

system is located on the sides of the ship to improve survivability, rather 

than the more traditional central positioning. A demonstration in May 2004 

to test the peripheral vertical launch system against expected threats 

resulted in destruction of the test article that necessitated redesign and 

further testing. A second test replicating the same conditions with the new 

design and representative materials was held in June 2005. 

The integrated undersea warfare system is used to detect mines and 

submarines in the littorals and consists of medium and high-frequency 

arrays, towed arrays, and decision-making software to reduce workload. 

Tests for the demonstration of mine warfare systems were scheduled for 

May, and were to take place on a vessel modified to carry DD(X) sonar 

Additional engineering 

development models 
Page 16 GAO-05-924T 

and processing equipment. Submarine warfare tests were scheduled for 

June. According to program officials, at-sea tests of algorithms for 

antisubmarine warfare, a key component in reducing manning, have been 

changed to laboratory testing due to a lack of test ships. Significant 

advances in the automation of submarine detection and tracking may be 

required to meet manpower goals. 

As a part of requirements for signature management, the DD(X) program 

seeks to reduce the heat signature of the ship using material treatments on 

the deckhouse and passive air cooling for engine exhaust. The use of 

subsystems or materials to reduce heat signature has changed due to 

design trade-offs for performance, weight, and cost. A sheeting water 

system for the hull has been deleted from the ship design and replaced 

with an alternate system. Program officials have determined that further 

testing of exhaust suppressors for the main turbine generator is no longer 

necessary. Program officials stated that the operational requirements are 

still achievable using the new design. 

DD(X) uses a radically new hull design to reduce the radar cross section of 

the ship. Development also includes design of a new propeller. Scale 

models of the hull form are currently being tested for factors like 

resistance, efficiency of the propeller, and capsize probability. 

Development of the software model used to predict hull form behavior is 

continuing. 

The autonomic fire suppression system utilizes new technologies, such as 

smart valves, flexible hosing, nozzles, sensors, and autonomic operations 

to reduce the crew and time needed for damage control. This system is 

vital for meeting requirements for ship survivability and manning. Testing 

for the system was performed on two Navy test ships and has been 

successful. An initial test aboard the ex-Peterson, a former destroyer used 

as a test ship, successfully demonstrated the system’s ability to detect 

damage and control fires. Tests aboard the ex-Shadwell, another larger 

test ship, demonstrated the same abilities for specific ship environments. 

Because the exact components used in testing aboard the ex-Shadwell 

may not be the ones used in ship construction, Navy officials state that it is 

unclear how the engineering development model will translate into final 

ship design. 
Page 17 GAO-05-924T 

The Navy developed a structured approach for meeting the challenging 

demands of the DD(X) — multiple mission requirements, stealth, reduced 

manning, and industrial base timeframes. This strategy builds in some 

margins for risk, such as for additional weight and manning, should they 

become necessary. At the same time, it must be recognized that these 

challenges are, to some extent, conflicting and do not have much give in 

them. They may not be simultaneously achievable, regardless of the 

acquisition strategy. 

The DD(X) strategy relies on multiple activities occurring concurrently to 

meet its schedule. To the extent things do not go as planned, work—in the 

form of demonstrating capabilities, developing software, integrating 

subsystems, and actual fabrication—will travel to the later stages of design 

and construction. In these stages, the cost of work and delays is much 

higher and the schedule much less forgiving than in earlier stages. In light 

of the risks framed by the DD(X)’s challenges, decision makers will have 

to be prepared to make difficult trade-offs. For example, 

• If technologies do not perform as expected or have unintended 

consequences, such as additional weight, will the user accept lower 

performance or will more time and money be allocated to delivering 

required performance? 

• If costs increase, will more money be provided or will performance tradeoffs be considered to reduce cost? 

• If the schedule will not allow the ship, as currently scoped, to be ready for 

in-yard fabrication, will scope be reduced to maintain schedule or will 

industrial base consequences attendant to a schedule delay be accepted? 

• If the ship actually demands a larger crew than planned, can the manning 

be afforded and accommodated aboard ship or will workload be reduced 

to meet planned crew size? 

In planning for such contingencies, there are a number of factors that 

should be considered. Earlier this year, we issued a report on cost growth 

experienced by previous shipbuilding programs.5

 One of the key factors in 

cost growth was the extent to which the maturity of design affects costs. 

In the course of doing this work, shipbuilders emphasized the importance 

 5

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Improved Management Practices Could Help Minimize Cost 

Growth in Navy Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-05-183 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005) 

Consequences of Not 

Meeting DD(X) 

Challenges Must Be 

Discussed Early 
Page 18 GAO-05-924T 

of properly sequencing work to achieve cost efficiency. They pointed out 

that the cost of performing a task increases if it is delayed further into the 

construction process. For example, one shipbuilder estimated that the 

same task performed early in the construction process at a steel, electrical 

or other shop is 3 times more expensive when delayed until assembling 

units or sections of the ship at the dock, and 8 times more expensive if the 

ship is afloat. According to another shipbuilder, before construction 

begins on a particular section of the ship, firm information is needed on 

equipment and components including such information as the dimensions, 

weight, and power and cooling requirements. When technologies are still 

being developed and tested, the Navy’s ability to gather this information 

and finalize design is constrained. When firm information is not available 

and construction proceeds, the potential exists that work will not be done 

in the most efficient sequence and that changes will lead to redoing work 

already completed, increasing cost and delaying delivery. 

Another factor is the DD(X) does not have fallback technologies that could 

mitigate changes to design and performance. The program has passed the 

decision point for inclusion of the two viable fallback technologies the 

program began with, a different hull form and the advanced induction 

motor. If the other technologies embodied in the engineering development 

models run into difficulties, they cannot be substituted. Thus, their 

consequences, whether in performance, weight, or manning, would have 

to be ameliorated through trade-offs. 

When considering the possibility of cost growth, it must be taken into 

account that spending on the program comes at a time when the Navy is 

also procuring Virginia class submarines, Littoral Combat Ships, 

amphibious vessels, support vessels, and the last of the Arleigh Burke

class destroyers. In addition to DD(X) the Navy is also developing new 

aircraft carriers and aircraft, and may soon start development of new 

cruisers and submarines. The Navy must compete for funding for these 

programs with other services, while simultaneously supporting existing 

platforms and deployments, at a time when the discretionary budget is 

constrained. 

Finally, delays in the schedule for DD(X) construction would reduce the 

flow of work to the shipyards at the time that DDG-51 construction is 

drawing to a close. This could result in declining workloads, revenues, and 

employment levels. 

As the cost, schedule, and capabilities of a program change, the business 

case for that program changes as well. The business case for DD(X), or a 
Page 19 GAO-05-924T 

similar capability, has already changed multiple times since the Navy 

launched the future destroyer development effort in 1995. Originally, 

under the DD-21 program, the Navy planned to build 32 ships at an average 

cost of approximately $1 billion when the cost of development is also 

included. After the program transitioned to DD(X) the number of ships 

required changed repeatedly with numbers ranging from 24 ships to 16 to 

8. The latest program baseline, released in April 2004, outlines a purchase 

of 8 ships at an average cost of around $2.9 billion with the inclusion of 

development costs.6

 A new life cycle cost estimate, released in March of 

2005, presents different figures on number of ships and costs. Even this 

estimate does not reflect the current acquisition strategy proposed by the 

Navy. The Navy will have to decide what constitutes an acceptable 

business case for the DD(X) and at what point the business case becomes 

unacceptable. 

It is important that these contingencies be confronted now and discussed 

because once the detail design and construction phase begins, it will be 

very difficult to change course on the program. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to answer any questions. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Paul L. Francis 

at (202) 512-4841. 

Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Karen 

Zuckerstein, J. Kristopher Keener, and Marc Castellano.

 6

Amounts are in fiscal year 2005 constant dollars. 

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