Central Asians 

Take Stock

Reform, Corruption, and Identity

Nancy Lubin

United States 

Institute of Peace
Peaceworks no. 2. First published February 1995.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors or conference participants alone. They do not 

necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

1550 M Street NW

Washington, DC 20005-1708

Phone: 202-457-1700

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Internet: gopher.usip.igc.org 7001
CONTENTS

 Summary v

1 Introduction 1

2 Democratization 4

3 Economic Reform 6

4 Corruption and Organized Crime 8

5 Environmental Issues 13

6 Identity: Islam, Ethnicity, and Nationality 15

7 Foreign Policy Orientations 20

8 Conclusion 22

 Notes 24

 About the Author 25

 About the Institute 26
The new Central Asian states—once obscure 

outposts of the former Soviet Union—are 

becoming a significant focus of U.S. foreign 

policy. Central Asia’s enormous resource base—

including the largest gold mine in the world, 

enormous reserves of other nonferrous metals and 

cotton, and some of the world’s largest resources 

of oil and gas—has, since the collapse of the Soviet 

empire, made the region increasingly attractive to 

foreign investors. Uzbekistan alone is the eighth 

largest gold producer and the fourth largest cotton 

producer in the world. Turkmenistan is the world’s 

third largest producer of natural gas. Some believe 

the rich oil and gas resources of Kazakh-stan will 

make it “another Kuwait.”

Central Asia has also become more important to 

our political, strategic, and humanitarian interests 

because of a range of features and factors. These 

include a population of over fifty million, mostly 

Muslim; a huge territory the size of eastern and 

western Europe combined (Kazakhstan alone is the 

ninth largest country in the world) and 

bordering on the volatile Middle East; extreme 

poverty and devastating environmental problems; 

several authoritarian governments, frequent 

human rights abuses, and a great deal of regional 

strife; and a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons on its 

territory. It is likely that events in Central Asia will 

reverberate far beyond the republics’ borders.

For all these reasons, it is in the West’s interest to 

encourage the development of stable, democratic 

systems and market economies in these new countries and to minimize the social, ethnic, 

religious, and other sources of conflict that could destabilize the region further. But increasingly, 

effectiveness in these efforts will depend as much on 

the views of the Central Asian populace as on policies promulgated by their leaders.

As a small step toward understanding some of 

these popular views, this author, under the 

auspices of the United States Institute of Peace and 

working with the Expert Center in Uzbekistan, 

conducted a public opinion survey in June and July 

1993 among 2,067 respondents in Uzbekistan and 

Kazakhstan—countries that together comprise almost three-quarters of Central Asia’s population and 

about 80 percent of its landmass.

Democracy 

While “democracy” has become a catchword used by 

leaders and the general population alike throughout 

Central Asia, our survey suggests that strong leadership, stability, law and order, and 

economic improvement are far higher priorities than 

the construction of any particular government system. Since there is no history of democratic rule in 

these countries, democracy is 

perceived there as, at best, an ideal for some 

distant future, not as the best system to resolve Uzbekistan’s or Kazakhstan’s problems today.

Respondents who said they supported democracy, moreover, often demonstrated vague or 

contradictory perceptions of what democracy 

entails as a political system. In general, while traditional values in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan tend 

to emphasize fairness and certain other democratic 

values, survey results also highlight competing currents of less-than-democratic priorities and 

support for relatively authoritarian systems and 

leaders.

Economic Reform

Respondents’ contradictory perceptions were 

mirrored in their views on economic reform. While 

v

SUMMARY
vi

“market reform” and “privatization” have become 

catchwords throughout Central Asia, most of our respondents simultaneously demonstrated a 

good deal of skepticism about, and displayed little 

understanding of, what constitutes economic 

reform. Although in an earlier survey most had said 

they favored the “creation of a free market” and “an 

economy free from direct government 

administration,” for example, most also said it is “very 

important” to institute or retain state control over 

prices.

Economic problems such as high inflation, 

dramatic declines in production, and growing 

economic hardship among the population as a whole 

are the most immediate areas of concern among 

Uzbekistan’s and Kazakhstan’s populations. Most respondents were skeptical that 

economic reforms will improve the situation.

Corruption and Organized Crime

A large part of the reason for respondents’ ambivalence toward economic and democratic reforms stems 

from their perceptions of widespread 

government corruption and organized crime. 

Corruption has become an integral and accepted part 

of the political and economic life of Uzbekistan and 

Kazakhstan. More than two-thirds of our respondents 

in Uzbekistan and about 70 percent in Kazakhstan, for 

example, believe that “without bribes, it is impossible 

to resolve anything [emphasis added] in a timely manner.”

Corruption and ties to organized crime, moreover, 

are viewed as particularly rampant among highly 

placed government officials and law 

enforcement personnel. As such, widespread 

corruption and organized crime are viewed as 

perhaps the greatest constraints on implementing 

economic reform. One cannot establish a market 

economy based on the rule of law while a significant 

portion of that economy continues to operate outside 

the law and has spawned deep-seated vested interests 

opposed to reform. And as widespread corruption and 

organized crime increase, the population has become 

more skeptical of the reform process itself. As many as 

60 percent of Kazakhstani respondents, for example, 

believe that economic reform is only promoting the 

growth of organized crime.

Islam

Western observers, as well as Central Asian leaders, 

have often portrayed Islam as one of the strongest 

sources of identity in this region, gaining in importance 

rapidly and likely to present political challenges for 

both Central Asia and the rest of the world. However, 

although Islam is deeply 

ingrained in Central Asian history and culture, and 

popular interest in Islam is growing, the survey suggests that at least for now its influence may be more 

limited.

Instead, the survey suggests that, largely 

because of a history where religious teaching and practice were either forbidden or co-opted by 

successive political regimes, personal understanding 

of Islamic doctrine in Uzbekistan and Kazakh-stan remains limited or distorted. With the 

possible exception of parts of the Fergana valley of 

eastern Uzbekistan, Islam tends to be viewed much 

more in traditional and cultural terms than in religious 

ones. Politically, the survey suggests that Islamic leaders are seen as relatively weak, and few respondents 

hope for an Islamic state. Were an “Islamic” conflict to 

explode in the near future, the results suggest, Islam is 

less likely to be the root cause of the conflict than to be 

a vehicle for 

expressing other grievances that are far more 

immediate causes of dissension and despair.

Ethnic Identity

Survey results suggest that while divisions in 

Central Asia run deep between Russians and 

other ethnic groups, they are strong among the different Central Asian ethnic groups as well. In addition to 

ethnic affiliation, responses suggest the importance of 

other identities—for example, family, 

relatives, community, and region—in shaping 

individuals’ thoughts and actions. This point was particularly glaring when respondents were asked whom 

they would like and not like to have as a son- or daughter-in-law, as a neighbor, and as a 

colleague at work.

The lines between Central Asians and Russians, or 

Muslims and non-Muslims, are not always clear-cut. 

Instead, discord may be expressed in terms of region, 

smaller ethnic group, neighborhood, 

family, or clan as much as in broad ethnic or 

religious terms. The survey also suggests that the 

younger generation—regardless of nationality or educational level—may be just as intolerant of other national 

groups as older respondents are.
vii

Foreign Policy Views

Facing a litany of political, economic, and social 

challenges at home, Central Asian citizens are 

often expected to favor turning to other countries 

for aid and technical assistance. Religious and 

ethnic identity are viewed as playing an important 

role in their determinations of partners abroad, 

with foreign competition largely a contest between Turkey and Iran, or between the Muslim 

and non-Muslim worlds.

Despite economic hardship at home, the survey suggests that support for foreign investment 

in, or assistance to, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 

may be far weaker than many observers have 

assumed. And among those who do welcome 

foreign investment, most are seeking it not from 

Turkey or Iran, but overwhelmingly from the 

West or Japan.

Implications

Survey results suggest that western foreign policy 

toward Central Asia must be structured to take 

account of a population whose support for reform 

may be more complex and ambivalent than 

perhaps previously thought; whose support for 

sometimes authoritarian leaders may be quite 

high; whose leaders may have magnified less 

significant threats, such as Islamic fundamentalism, to obscure more pressing problems; and in 

whose countries organized crime and corruption 

have become major obstacles to reform. Western 

assistance efforts must be sensitive not only to the 

hardships, lack of social safety nets, and cultural 

values and traditions, but also to the uniquely 

contorted mixture of Soviet and Middle Eastern 

political and economic systems in these new 

countries, which may be quite different from 

other parts of the world.

Finally, democratization and reform cannot be 

viewed primarily as policies to be implemented 

from the top down. Instead, reforms will emerge 

not only as a result of new laws or regulations, but 

from the oversight and accountability that come 

only with a greater sense of empowerment from 

below. A shift to a healthy market can occur only 

when there is a sense that it will contribute to the 

greater well-being of the population, and not just 

to the corrupt government and the organized 

criminal world. How the population of Central 

Asia thinks and feels about these issues will 

become an increasingly important factor as we 

refine our policies for the region.
1

The new Central Asian states—once obscure 

outposts of the former Soviet Union—are 

becoming a significant focus of U.S. foreign 

policy. Central Asia’s enormous resource base, for 

example—including the largest gold mine in the 

world; enormous reserves of other nonferrous 

metals and cotton; and some of the world’s largest 

resources of oil and gas—has made the region 

increasingly attractive to foreign investors, including the U.S. business community. Uzbekistan 

alone is the eighth largest gold producer and the 

fourth largest cotton producer in the world. Turkmenistan is the world’s third largest producer of 

natural gas. The $20-billion Chevron oil venture 

with Kazakhstan and the western consortium to 

exploit the oil fields in the Caspian Sea are among 

the world’s largest and potentially most lucrative 

oil and gas ventures, and the number of other U.S. 

companies seeking opportunity there has grown 

exponentially in the past few years.

Central Asia has also become more important to 

our political, strategic, and humanitarian interests 

because of a range of features and factors. These 

include a population of over fifty million, mostly 

Muslim; a huge territory the size of eastern and 

western Europe combined (Kazakhstan alone is 

the ninth largest country in the world) and bordering on the volatile Middle East; extreme poverty 

and devastating environmental problems; several 

authoritarian governments, frequent human rights 

abuses, and a great deal of regional strife; and a 

vast arsenal of nuclear weapons on its territory. It 

is likely that events in Central Asia will reverberate 

far beyond the republics’ borders.

These challenges in Central Asia are not hypothetical. The civil war in Tajikistan has already 

claimed an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 lives, more 

than all previous conflicts combined on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Increased instability in Central Asia is already affecting and will 

continue to affect the precarious reform process 

in Russia and Russia’s relations with the United 

States; will continue to complicate shifting alliances in Iran, Afghanistan, and the rest of the 

Middle East; and threatens to increase the flow of 

nuclear materials and narcotics that reportedly has 

already begun from this region to other parts of the 

world.

For all these reasons, it is increasingly in the 

U.S. interest to encourage the development of 

stable, democratic systems and market economies 

in these new countries and to minimize the social, 

ethnic, religious, and other sources of conflict that 

could destabilize the region further.

Traditionally, questions of democratic and 

economic reform and social and religious tension 

in Central Asia have been examined from the top 

down, or from the outside in. But today these 

challenges are being driven increasingly from 

The Survey

These themes, therefore, formed the basis of our 

survey: attitudes toward democracy and market 

reform; corruption and organized crime; environmental and other social challenges; Islamic, ethnic, 

and national identity; ethnic or national intolerance; and foreign policy orientations. The survey 

results could be broken down by most major 

indicators of age, sex, nationality, urban versus 

rural residence, place of residence (oblast), level 

of education, and profession. The sample was ran1INTRODUCTION
dom, and it closely followed the 1989 census data 

in most of these indicators. The survey was 

conducted in face-to-face interviews in one of four 

languages: Uzbek, Kazakh, Russian, and Karakalpak. And it included a separate, additional survey 

of 100 experts from law enforcement, 

commerce, the courts, and the procuracy in Uzbekistan for comparison with responses of 

the population as a whole.

By themselves, the responses to our survey by 

no means paint a definitive picture of the views of 

Uzbekistan’s or Kazakhstan’s citizens. Responses 

were undoubtedly influenced, for example, by the 

prevailing “party” line, by fear, or by the likely 

desire of many respondents to give the answers 

they believed the interviewer wanted to hear 

rather than their actual opinions. These 

influences may have been felt particularly in Uzbekistan, where the regime of President 

Karimov has tended, sometimes brutally, to 

suppress views contrary to those of the 

government. Like other types of research, the 

survey was also undoubtedly influenced by 

outside events and local media coverage at the 

time it was conducted. At that time, for example, 

relations between Uzbekistan and the United 

States were depicted in Uzbekistan’s media as 

somewhat more strained than they had been just a 

few months earlier; and several opposition figures 

had recently been arrested or had fled. And survey 

research generally, like any other type of research, 

is plagued by a host of other uncertainties and 

inexactitudes.

These problems may have affected our survey 

less than anticipated, however. For numerous 

questions, the “proper” answer or party line was 

unclear at the time the survey was taken. Official 

government pronouncements at this time were 

quite contradictory on the question of Islam, for 

example, simultaneously supporting and 

condemning the renewed interest in Islam 

throughout Central Asia. The survey questionnaire, moreover, was designed to minimize these 

problems further by, for example, asking the same 

type of question several times in different contexts 

and in different ways. And personal observation 

on my part (in rural and urban areas of the 

Fergana valley and Tashkent oblast) and on the 

part of the scores of survey takers who had been 

trained to conduct this survey throughout 

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan suggests that 

respondents may have been surprisingly forthcoming in their answers.1

Thus, despite the limitations, the results of the 

survey are intended to provide a broad sense of 

some of the attitudes and values among Uzbekistan’s and Kazakhstan’s populations, so that readers may gain some additional appreciation for the 

challenges that may lie ahead in this region, both 

for the Central Asians themselves and for the West. 

At a time when U.S. policy is oriented so heavily 

toward introducing concepts of democratization, 

market reform, tolerance, pluralism, civil society, 

and rule of law in Central Asia, it is hoped that the 

survey results may also provide insights to better 

shape our policies so that they may have more 

resonance in a region rife with confusion and 

contradiction.

2
Popular attitudes toward democracy and 

market reform demonstrate perhaps the 

greatest contradictions and challenges. 

Previous surveys in Uzbekistan have revealed relatively widespread support for “democratic reform.” 

“Democracy” has become a catchword repeated by 

leaders and constituents alike throughout Central 

Asia, but democratic views have not been reflected 

widely in policy.

This situation has led some to conclude that we 

share the same vocabulary and concepts regarding 

democratic reform and that one has only to get on 

with the particulars. It has led others to conclude 

that the Central Asians have no real democratic 

instincts and that one must start by trying to 

inculcate basic notions of trust, honesty, and 

fairness.

Our survey results suggest something more 

complex and in-between. While the Central Asian 

publics have expressed support for democracy, 

and while the governments of Central Asia have 

been quick to espouse democratic and free market 

ideals, our results suggest that support for these 

abstract notions of reform is tenuous and contradictory. Since there is no history of democratic rule 

in these countries, democracy is perceived there as, 

at best, an ideal for some distant future, but not the 

best system to help solve Uzbekistan’s or 

Kazakhstan’s problems today. In general, while 

traditional values in these two countries tend to 

emphasize fairness and perhaps other democratic 

values, survey results also highlight competing 

currents of less-than-democratic priorities and 

support for relatively authoritarian systems and 

leaders.

When asked, for example, which political system would best promote the resolution of their 

country’s problems, half of all respondents in Uzbekistan and almost two-thirds of Kazakhstani respondents supported “any system, as long as there 

is order” (figure 1). The proportion of Central 

Asians and Slavs, males and females, and different 

age groups did not differ greatly on this 

answer.

The small group of respondents who selected 

a “western-style democracy,” moreover, also 

displayed contradictory sentiments.2 As a rule, 

for example, the “democrats” in Uzbekistan also 

strongly supported President Islam Karimov; such 

support for an incumbent leader is typical of their 

culture but, in this case, the president is widely 

viewed as heading one of the least democratic governments to have emerged since the disintegration 

of the USSR. The “democrats” were mixed in their 

views regarding opposition parties: about 40 percent of the respondents who supported democracy 

in Uzbekistan, and about 30 percent in 

Kazakhstan, also believed opposition groups 

should be limited or banned. And when asked 

what kind of person a politician should be in order 

to get the respondent’s vote, only one-quarter of 

the “democrats” in both countries said the politician should indeed be democratic. More important 

were that the politician bring law and order, be 

honest and decent, and understand economics 

(each selected by 50 percent to 60-percent of 

respondents).

The heavy focus on order over democratic freedom emerged from other questions as well. When 

asked to rate a series of challenges facing their 

countries, roughly 90 percent of respondents in 

both countries identified as most important the 

need to “strengthen social order and discipline.”3 

More than 70 percent of respondents in both 

countries also considered the following problems 

to be among the most important: establishing 

government control over prices (89 percent in 

Uzbekistan, 76 percent in Kazakhstan); securing 

the independence of Uzbekistan (84 percent) or 

Kazakhstan (74 percent); fighting speculation (83 

percent in Uzbekistan, 72 percent in Kazakhstan); 

D2EMOCRATIZATION

3
4

and environmental protection (about 80 percent 

in each country).

By contrast, our respondents indicated less 

support for elements fundamental to a democracy—free speech, freedom of the press, pluralism, and tolerance of other political views. Fewer 

than 40 percent of all respondents in Kazakhstan 

and fewer than half in Uzbekistan (47 percent) 

believed that securing free press and free speech 

are important.4 Ironically, support for these notions was weaker among the younger age groups 

(18 to 29 and 30 to 39 years old) than among the 

older age groups, although responses did not differ 

greatly by nationality.

Certainly these answers are ambiguous. In the 

relatively oppressive, authoritarian context of Uzbekistan, for example, where opposition groups 

are brutally repressed and are consistently discredited in the media, the fact that almost one-quarter 

of respondents challenged government policy by 

declaring that these groups should be given full 

freedom is significant. But the large proportion of 

respondents supporting a ban on the activities of 

opposition groups—and the relatively narrow differences between respondents in Uzbekistan and 

the relatively more open Kazakhstan—suggest that 

when we speak of supporting democratic principles, we are not necessarily speaking the same 

language as most Central Asians.

Overall, the data suggest that the notion of democracy, and perhaps notions of other systems of 

government, are highly idealized in Central Asia. 

In the minds of our respondents, the sense of fairness and the need for “decency” appear to be high, 

but other basic democratic values are still poorly 

understood. Most important to our respondents 

are questions of maintaining order and stability 

in the wake of the chaos of political and economic 

disruption throughout the former Soviet Union. 

This attitude should not be surprising in countries 

that have a long history and tradition of authoritarianism, colonial rule, and economic hardship. But 

this attitude may be one reason why President 

Karimov’s casting himself in the role of defender of 

stability and security has so far proved effective in 

his country, and why public support runs high for 

both presidents.

Figure 1. Respondents’ views on which political system could best solve their country’s problems.
Similar contradictions are reflected in survey 

responses regarding economic reform. 

Economic problems—such as high inflation, 

sometimes dramatic declines in production, and 

growing economic hardship among the population as a whole—clearly are the single greatest concern among Uzbekistan’s and Kazakhstan’s populations. When asked to select the most important 

problems in their countries today, most 

respondents named high prices and unemployment.5 And since the survey was taken, the 

economic situations in both Uzbekistan and 

Kazakhstan have only deteriorated. As but one 

example, in June and July 1993, when this survey 

was taken, one dollar in each of these countries 

was worth roughly 1,000 rubles; by November 

1993, on the eve of the introduction of their own 

currencies, the exchange rate had risen tenfold, to 

10,000 rubles. In the first half of 1994, Kazakh1stan’s gross domestic product (GDP) fell 27 

percent compared with the same period in 1993. 

Inflation continued to climb in 1994. In June, 

prices rose by 20 percent in Uzbekistan and by 

more than 40-percent in Kazakhstan, while GDP 

continued to decline.

Several surveys suggest that most people in 

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan support some type of 

“economic reform.” In a survey conducted by our 

partner, the Expert Center in Uzbekistan, in February 1993 among roughly the same sample, most 

respondents were in favor of “the creation of a free 

market economy, i.e., an economy free from direct 

government administration.” This preference has 

been mirrored in other surveys as well. 

While “market reform” and “privatization” have 

become catchwords throughout Central Asia, 

however, most of our respondents simultaneously 

demonstrated a good deal of skepticism toward 

reform and displayed little understanding of what 

constitutes a market economy. Most respondents 

have seen their quality of life decline since economic reform became a government slogan, and 

severe economic problems loom large today: only 

about 7 percent of respondents in Kazakhstan 

believed they had gained from economic reforms, 

while six times as many, or nearly half (45 percent) 

said they had lost. In Uzbekistan, one-tenth of all 

respondents said they had gained, while nearly 

four times as many, or almost two-fifths of all respondents, said they had lost (table 1).

Although respondents favored the “creation of 

a free market” and “an economy free from direct 

government administration,” most respondents 

in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (76 percent 

and 89 percent, respectively) also believed that it is 

“very important” to institute or retain state control 

over prices. Our survey also showed that the 

public was split over the importance of introducing private ownership of land with the right to buy 

and sell it (although support was somewhat stronger in Kazakhstan, especially among the younger 

generation). Overall, roughly 40 percent of Uzbekistani respondents believed that privatization 

of land is important; just under half of Uzbekistani 

respondents believed it is either not very 

important or even undesirable. In Kazakhstan the 

figures were roughly reversed.

In other words, despite strong vocal support for 

reform, respondents tended to view the specifics 

of economic reform with apprehension and skepticism. Since this survey was taken, there have been 

some steps toward privatizing in both countries. 

But in the midst of much economic hardship, there 

was little support for enduring any more shortterm hardship for the sake of longer term 

economic gains. And many were skeptical about 

the prospects for fair economic reform because of 

the main constraints inhibiting or perverting it: 

widespread political corruption and organized 

crime.

E3CONOMIC REFORM

5
6
C4ORRUPTION AND

ORGANIZED CRIME

7

I

ndeed, much of the respondents’ ambivalence

toward economic and democratic reform 

stems from their perceptions of widespread 

corruption and organized crime. This is the area of 

our survey where responses were least ambiguous. 

Corruption has become an integral and accepted 

part of Uzbekistan’s and Kazakhstan’s economies. 

It is no longer considered a “second” economy; 

our survey suggests that it is enormously widespread, and many believe it is the economy.

More than two-thirds of our respondents in 

Uzbekistan, for example—and about 70 percent in 

Kazakhstan—believe that “without bribes, it is 

virtually impossible to resolve anything [emphasis 

added] in a timely manner.” The composition of 

those who agreed with this statement was roughly 

similar along nationality lines. Although a higher 

proportion of Russians in Uzbekistan felt bribes 

were critical to resolve anything quickly, a higher 

proportion of Central Asians felt this way in 

Kazakhstan.

These bribes, moreover, may represent enormous sums, especially in relation to the average 

wage. Admission to a prestigious institution of 

higher learning in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, 

while technically free, commonly ran close to one 

million rubles, more than twice the average annual 

salary in these countries at the time this survey 

was taken. Bribes to avoid a traffic ticket (especially if one had prior convictions) commonly 

reached as high as 50,000 rubles, and surgery in 

a good clinic, while technically free, likewise cost 

50,000 rubles or more (figure 2).

Corruption was viewed as particularly rampant 

in government and law enforcement, as well as 

among the business community (figures 3 and 4). 

When asked, for example, to indicate how closely 

a list of individuals and organizations may or may 

not be tied to the mafia, nearly half of all respondents (45 percent) in Uzbekistan and more than 

60 percent of respondents in Kazakhstan said 

that as a rule, highly placed government officials 

are either themselves members of the mafia or are 

closely tied to the mafia.6 A higher proportion of 

Russians than Central Asians felt this way, but the 

belief was widespread across the board; there was 

little variation by gender or age.

The perception of corruption at lower levels 

and in different branches of government varied 

and was sometimes ambiguous. Least ambiguous, 

however, were perceptions of bribe taking in the 

legal and law enforcement communities, where 

corruption is seen as especially pervasive. More 

than half of all respondents in Kazakhstan, and 

almost half in Uzbekistan, said that bribery occurs 

sometimes or often in the procuracy and in the 

courts.7 (Almost one-third of Kazakhstani 

respondents said that it occurs often in these two 

institutions.) And roughly three-quarters of all 

respondents said that bribery is common in the 

police department.

In our survey of 100 Uzbekistani experts, law 

enforcement officials themselves corroborated the 

high level of bribe taking and corruption in the law 

enforcement community. More than two-thirds of 

the 100 experts stated that, as a rule, the following 

groups are either members of the mafia or closely 

tied to the mafia: local government officials 

(61 percent); businesspeople and merchants (61 

percent); highly placed government officials (63 

percent); store owners (69 percent); millionaires 

(73 percent); owners of bars and restaurants (77 

percent); and racketeers themselves (85 percent). 

Only in two areas were experts’ estimates of ties to 

the mafia lower than those of the general population: the procuracy (44 percent) and the courts (36 

percent). But lest one believe that law enforcement 

personnel automatically protect their own, the 

police in our survey provided a dose of honesty: 

more than one-quarter of the police surveyed, or 

11 of 39 respondents, said that as a rule their fel-
8

Figure 2. Respondents’ reports of bribes required for various services.

a. Kazakhstan

b. Uzbekistan
9

low police are themselves either members of or tied 

to the mafia.

The extensive nature of corruption and organ-ized 

crime is affecting psychological attitudes 

toward economic reform. Certainly there is nothing 

new about corruption and what is now being called 

“organized crime” in these countries. Earlier research 

by this author suggests these activities have always 

been an integral part of Central Asian, if not Soviet, society.8 Press coverage of “organized criminal activity” 

was likewise high during the 

Soviet period, both in all-Union newspapers and in 
10

the local press.

The more widespread that corruption and criminal economic activity have become with the breakdown of the Soviet system, however, the more 

skeptical the population has become of the reform 

process itself and of legitimate private economic 

activity. Indeed, many respondents associate economic reform directly with the growth of 

corruption and disorder. More than 80 percent of 

respondents in Kazakhstan, and about 70 percent 

in Uzbekistan, believe that organized crime has 

grown in the past few years.9 Among Kazakhstani 
11

respondents, 60 percent believe that economic 

reform is only promoting this growth of organized 

crime.10

These beliefs have made our respondents 

particularly wary of new entrepreneurs and 

businesspeople—precisely the people who would 

likely spearhead reform. Almost two-thirds of 

respondents in Kazakhstan, and more than half of 

all respondents in Uzbekistan, said that owners of 

commercial stores are either members of or tied 

to the mafia. Roughly the same proportions of all 

respondents said that workers in trade, businesspeople, and owners of bars and restaurants are in 

this category.

Corruption, while extremely widespread, is not 

always regarded as a negative phenomenon in the 

former Soviet Union. In the words of a Kazakh 

sociologist, “It is like rain or snow. Some people 

like it, some people don’t. But it is a natural part of 

life.” Nevertheless, corruption is viewed as perhaps 

the greatest constraint to implementing economic 

reform. A market economy based on the rule of 

law cannot be established if a huge chunk of that 

economy continues to operate outside the law. 

And as life becomes harder, the additional burden 

of bribes and payoffs has, at least in some cases, 

become a destabilizing influence.
Dissatisfaction with the quality of life in 

Central Asia is increasingly affected by 

environmental concerns. The new countries of what formerly was Soviet Central Asia have 

emerged as some of the world’s most serious 

environmental cases. For many, this situation is 

symbolized by the Aral Sea catastrophe. The 

dramatic drying up of the Aral Sea, located in both 

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, has wreaked havoc 

with the region’s agriculture and ecosystem and 

the population’s health. Industrial waste and 

exceedingly heavy use of agrochemicals and other 

field poisons have contaminated the water supply. 

In the words of Turkmenistan’s former minister 

of health, much of the population of Central Asia 

drinks from “little more than a sewage ditch.” The 

cumulative health effects of these problems have 

been devastating, with infant mortality rising 

dramatically over the past two decades to levels 

that are among the highest in the world. In the 

western regions of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, 

more than 10 percent of newborn infants do not 

live to their first birthday. This infant mortality rate 

is compounded by increasing incidences of 

typhoid, cholera, hepatitis, intestinal diseases, 

cancers, dysentery, and a host of other illnesses, 

making life expectancy in some villages near the 

Aral Sea as low as 39 years.

In light of these problems, one might expect 

environmental issues to be uppermost in the 

minds of the local populations, a potential catalyst 

for public pressure if not enormous unrest, and 

perhaps therefore the most important area to be 

targeted by western assistance.

To be sure, concern about deteriorating 

environmental and health conditions is reflected 

vividly in our survey. Roughly half of all respondents in Kazakhstan and almost one-third in Uzbekistan believe the environment where they live 

is dangerous for human habitation. About 80 percent of respondents in both the Uzbekistan 

survey and the Kazakhstan survey said that 

environmental protection measures are very 

important to achieving normal living conditions.

Despite the extent of environmental concern, 

however, environmental problems are still overridden by economic and political concerns, not only 

among government officials but among the 

general public as well. When asked, for example, 

which problems on a list of challenges should be 

addressed in first, second, and third place, respondents in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan ranked 

high prices, unemployment, housing, crime, and 

ethnic relations as more important than environmental problems. In Uzbekistan, only 4.5 percent 

of respondents put environmental problems in 

first place versus 29 percent who put high prices in 

first place and 23 percent who put unemployment 

there. This outlook held even in such environmentally devastated regions as Karakalpakstan, which 

borders the Aral Sea, even though about threequarters of respondents in Karakalpakstan believe 

their local environment is dangerous for human 

habitation.

These responses, ironically, also contrast greatly 

with responses in other parts of the former USSR. 

Despite the magnitude of environmental problems 

in Central Asia, Central Asians themselves demonstrate a lower level of awareness and concern 

about these problems than people elsewhere in 

the USSR. In a survey conducted by this author in 

1990 throughout the entire USSR, roughly onethird of the entire pool of respondents named 

environmental protection as a top priority, along 

with provision of food products; all remaining categories were viewed as lesser priorities.11 The survey showed quite a different set of priorities among 

Central Asians: roughly 40 percent of Central 

Asian respondents ranked interethnic conflicts in 

first place, and the next most important problem, 

12

5

ENVIRONMENTAL

ISSUES
named by 25 percent, was crime. In last place were 

environmental problems, named by only 3.6 percent of Uzbek respondents as the first priority.

Likewise, Central Asians were less willing to 

make environmental and economic trade-offs than 

their counterparts in other parts of the former 

Soviet Union. For example, when asked in the 

1990 survey which of the following scenarios 

would be preferable for the future—(1) that 

consumer goods availability get better but the 

situation of the environment stay the same; (2) 

that consumer goods availability stay the same but 

the environmental situation improve slightly; or 

(3) that consumer goods availability get worse but 

the environmental situation improve significantly 

—the largest group of respondents in the whole 

USSR, about 38 percent, selected the second 

option, namely, that consumer goods availability stay the same but the environment improve 

slightly; about 23 percent selected the first option; 

and 20 percent selected the third. By contrast, the 

largest group, 42 percent of all Uzbek respondents, 

selected the first option, and less than 6 percent 

selected the third—that the economy worsen but 

the environmental situation improve significantly. 

This outlook seemed to be reflected in the 1993 

survey as well. More than one-third of all respondents said they would not agree to some worsening of their own material position even if it would 

help to protect the environment. While not dramatic, these numbers may be particularly telling, 

given the relative “political incorrectness” of these 

answers; most people at least want to appear 

environmentally conscious.

This is not to diminish the importance or 

severity of environmental problems in Central 

Asia. Instead, our survey and others suggest that 

Central Asians view environmental problems as 

but one component of the rapidly deteriorating 

quality of life. Thus, although it is critically important to address environmental problems in the 

new Central Asian states, our survey stands as a

 reminder that those problems cannot be viewed 

in isolation. Efforts to address environmental 

problems will have more resonance if such problems are placed in the context of equally catastrophic economic, demographic, political, and 

social challenges plaguing the populations of 

these new states.

13
14

As elsewhere in the world, questions of 

identity have become powerful sources of 

conflict in Central Asia. With the severe 

social dislocations that resulted from the collapse 

of the USSR, the question of how individuals 

define themselves has caused new schisms and 

tensions.

Islam

In the past, Islam has been viewed as one of the 

strongest sources of identity and a sense of belonging in this region, likely to grow rapidly and present important political challenges for both Central 

Asia and the rest of the world. Local leaders have 

certainly played up this view. As Central Asian 

leaders consolidated their power in the wake of the 

disintegration of the USSR, they often portrayed 

the specter of growing Islamic political movements 

as the biggest challenge to their own power and 

authority and to the stability of their new countries. Tajikistan’s government believed it had only 

to label its opposition as “Islamic fundamentalists” 

to garner Russian and western support for its side. 

President Karimov of Uzbekistan has used the 

threat of an allegedly growing Islamic opposition 

in Central Asia to justify a crackdown on his own 

population.

While interest in Islam is growing rapidly 

throughout Central Asia, however, our survey 

highlights more ambiguous conclusions and 

suggests that, at least for now, fears of Islamic 

opposition may be exaggerated. Largely because of 

a long history of religious teaching and practice 

being either forbidden or co-opted by successive 

political regimes, personal understanding of Islam 

in Central Asia remains limited or distorted. 

Although this situation could certainly change, 

Islam is viewed more in traditional and cultural 

terms than in religious ones, weakening the claims 

of some Central Asian leaders that an already widespread Islamic fundamentalism poses a threat to 

their survival.

Forty-three percent of Kazakh respondents 

and 52 percent of Uzbek respondents said yes 

when asked, “Do you consider yourself a believer?” (table 2). Of these believers, 24 percent of 

respondents in Kazakhstan and 46 percent of respondents in Uzbekistan professed belief in Islam 

(table 3). However, knowledge or practice of the 

main pillars of Islam among these Muslim believers appeared weak. Almost one-third of respondents in the Uzbekistani survey who identified 

themselves as practicing Muslims—and about twothirds of the self-proclaimed practicing Muslims 

in the Kazakhstani survey—could not translate the 

sentence “There is no God other than Allah, and 

Mohammed is his prophet” from the Arabic, or 

they gave a wrong translation. (Indeed, nearly 20 

percent of the Kazakhstani respondents who said 

they are practicing Muslims also said they disagree 

with this statement, which is a fundamental tenet 

of Islam.) In terms of rituals, more than three-quarters of those who said they are Islamic believers 

do not pray at all, and three-quarters say they never 

fast. In Uzbekistan, responses suggest slightly 

more adherence to rituals, but adherence is still 

low.12

Age and regional differences were striking, 

especially in Uzbekistan, where expressed 

adherence to Islam was higher. Despite a reported 

spread of Islam among Uzbekistan’s younger 

population, our survey suggests that Islamic belief 

is still weaker among the younger generations. 

Roughly 39 percent of the 18-to-29-year-olds in our 

survey, for example, consider themselves 

Muslim believers, versus 47-percent of the 50-to59-year-olds and two-thirds of the respondents 

over 60.

I

6

DENTITY: ISLAM, 

ETHNICITY, AND

NATIONALITY
15

Regionally, adherence to Islam was stronger 

in the Fergana valley than elsewhere in Uzbekistan, especially in Andizhan oblast, where about 

three-quarters of respondents see themselves as 

practicing Muslims—versus, say, 25 percent of respondents from Tashkent, or between 13 and 20 

percent in the western regions of the country. The 

proportion of Islamic believers was lower in the 

other two oblasts in the Fergana valley included in 

our survey: 47 percent of respondents in 

Namangan consider themselves practicing 

Muslims, as do 41 percent in Fergana oblast—

roughly the same proportion as in Syrdar’ya 

oblast and only slightly higher than Samarkand 

and Bukhara oblasts.

As far as the political threat of Islam is concerned, our survey also suggests that, so far, respondents view the political role of Islam as weak. Our 

survey indicates that Islamic leaders are generally 

viewed as exerting little power and influence today, 

and few respondents supported the establishment 

of an Islamic state in either country. For example, 

when asked what kind of state would best promote 

the resolution of Uzbekistan’s and Kazakhstan’s 

problems, fewer than one-eighth of Uzbekistani respondents selected an Islamic state (slightly fewer 

than the number that picked western-style democracy.) In Kazakhstan only 18 respondents, or less 

than 2 percent, chose an Islamic state.

Moreover, it was unclear what those who 

selected an Islamic state meant by that term, and 

their responses were contradictory. For example, 

when asked what traits are most important in politicians they vote for, only 17 percent of those who 

supported the creation of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan said they believed it is important for the 

politician they vote for to be a Muslim. Instead, the 

most important traits were honesty and 

decency (68 percent) and experience in leading 

(49 percent). Also more important than religious 

affiliation were that a leader defend the poor (24 

percent), understand people well (23 percent), 

and bring law and order (19 percent). For the 

survey as a whole, religious affiliation was viewed 

as one of the least important traits for a prospective 

leader of Uzbekistan.

Likewise, when asked which government 

leaders they most respect, more than 70 percent 

of those who selected an Islamic state named 

President Karimov. While it was typical among all 

groups to support the incumbent, this percentage 

of support was higher than that expressed by any 

other group despite the fact that Karimov has been 

quite vocal in his opposition to an expanded role 

of Islam in politics.13

Certainly, responses about personal belief may 

be underestimated in our survey, for respondents 

likely sought to provide the politically “correct” 
answers to our questions. At the time the survey 

was taken, however, the correct answers to these 

questions were not clear. At that time, most 

Central Asian leaders presented a dual approach 

to ethnic identity and Islam. They tended to support the growth of traditional values and Islam as 

a faith while steadfastly denouncing the growth of 

any potential fundamentalist or political Islam that 

could challenge their political power. Although 

this duality could possibly account for the low 

proportion of those who supported an Islamic 

state, it does not explain the low level of personal 

belief in Islam. On the contrary, it would probably 

have seemed more embarrassing to assert that one 

is a practicing Muslim but to then display little 

knowledge of, or interest in, the content of Islam.

If this logic holds, then our survey responses 

suggest that, with the possible exception of the 

Fergana valley, adherence to Islam may be seen 

today more in cultural or traditional terms than in 

purely religious ones. While Islam may be growing, public opinion suggests that the threat of the 

growth of a political Islam as an alternative power 

source to President Karimov or President Nazarbayev is, at least so far, a relatively weak one.

This is not to minimize the importance of Islam 

in Central Asian society or politics. The practice 

of Islam is certainly growing throughout Central 

Asia, and Islamic politicization may become a reality in the future. As we have seen elsewhere in the 

world, it can be a powerful political tool in fomenting conflict and unrest. What our data do suggest, 

however, is that were an “Islamic” conflict to 

explode in the near future, Islam itself would probably not be the root cause of the conflict; more 

likely, it would be an umbrella or a vehicle for 

expressing other grievances that are far more 

immediate causes of dissension and despair.

Ethnic and National Identity

It is difficult in any analysis to separate ethnic, 

religious, cultural, and other identities, and our 

survey again presented mixed results. When 

respondents were asked, for example, to which 

groups it was most important for them to belong, 

most selected family and community over 

religious or specifically national identity. Only 13 

percent of respondents in Uzbekistan and only 4 

percent in Kazakhstan selected “people of my 

nationality.” This finding likely reflects the fact 

that the groups that respondents selected—family, 

relatives, neighbors, community, and region—are 

often of the same ethnic identity to begin with. But 

it also suggests how important these other identities are in individuals’ thoughts and actions.

Responses to other questions, on the other 

16
17

hand, suggested schisms at a personal level as 

much within Central Asian and Muslim communities as between Central Asians and others. Indeed, 

aside from the most pronounced dislike they 

seemed to display toward Jews and Armenians, 

Central Asians displayed almost as much wariness 

of each other as they did of Russians.

For example, when respondents were asked 

whom they would like to see as a son- or daughterin-law, a neighbor, and a colleague at work, most 

respondents—especially ethnically Central Asian 

respondents—tended to have strong preferences 

and biases. More than 90 percent of our Uzbek 

and Kazakh respondents said they would like their 

son or daughter to marry someone of their nationality; only 4 to 5 percent said the individual’s 

nationality did not matter. But the second highest 

remaining percentage of respondents, roughly 10 

percent of both groups, said they would like their 

son or daughter to marry a Russian. Between half 

and two-thirds of all Russian respondents (with a 

higher percentage in Uzbekistan) said they would 

like to have a Russian as a son- or daughter-in-law; 

about 13 percent said an Uzbek, and 10 percent, a 

Kazakh; about one-quarter of the Russians in both 

countries said the nationality did not matter.

When asked whom they would not want as a 

son- or daughter-in-law, Central Asians likewise 

had strong feelings. In both countries, the nationalities named most often were Jews and Armenians. But about the same proportion of Kazakhs 

who named a Russian as an undesirable son- or 

daughter-in-law (37 percent) also named Uighurs 

(36 percent) and Uzbeks (35 percent); and about 

the same proportion of Uzbeks who named a 

Russian as undesirable (23 percent) also named 

a Kyrgyz (21 percent) and a Kazakh (20 percent). 

Only 4 percent of the Kazakhs in our Kazakhstani 

survey, and only 6 percent of the Uzbeks in the Uzbekistani survey, said they had no strong feelings 

on the subject.

Respondents naturally were more tolerant 

about the desired nationality of their neighbors, 

who are more distant from one’s immediate 

personal life; but prejudice and intolerance 

remained. Again, Jews and Armenians were at the 

top of the list, with almost one-third of all Uzbek 

respondents stating that they would not want 

to have a Jew as a neighbor; 26 percent said they 

would not want to have an Armenian neighbor. 

But here again, more Uzbek respondents named 

Tatars (19.4 percent), Koreans (15 percent), 

Kazakhs (12 percent), Kyrgyz (11 percent), and Tajiks (8-percent) than named Russians (7 percent); 

and more Kazakh respondents named Uzbeks 

(14 percent), Tatars (20 percent), Koreans (19 

percent), and Uighurs (17-percent) than named 

Russians (10 percent). Only 9 percent of the Uzbek respondents and about 20 percent of Kazakh 

respondents said it made no difference who their 

neighbor is.

A significant proportion of respondents 

preferred not to have Jews and Armenians even as 

professional colleagues. Almost one-quarter of all 

Uzbek respondents said they would prefer not to 

have a Jewish colleague at work, and one-fifth said 

they would prefer not to have an Armenian one. 

But again, more people said they would prefer not 

to work with other Central Asian nationalities and 

non-Russians than Russians. More Kazakhs would 

prefer not to have an Uzbek (11 percent), Tatar 

(13-percent), Korean (11 percent), or Uighur (11 

percent) colleague at work than would prefer not 

to have a Russian colleague (6 percent); and more 

Uzbeks would prefer not to have a Kyrgyz, Tajik, 

Tatar, Kazakh, or Korean co-worker than a Russian 

one. Only 10 percent of the Uzbeks, versus 26 

percent of the Russians, said that nationality 

makes no difference.

These patterns were similar among the younger 

generation and the more highly educated portions 

of our sample, who proved to be no more tolerant 

than their older or less-educated counterparts. Indeed, in general they were less 

tolerant.

Nonetheless, in view of increasing economic 

hardship and increased emphasis on “indigenization” in these countries after such a long period of 

colonial rule, it is also not surprising that Russians 

and Central Asians displayed a different sense of 

stake in these countries. When asked whether, 

given the opportunity, they would like to leave Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan and live in another place, 

well over 90 percent of the Uzbeks and Kazakhs 

replied no; by contrast, about 43 percent of the 

Russians in Kazakhstan and more than one-third 

of the Russians in Uzbekistan replied yes, 

despite the fact that many likely had roots in 

Central Asia going back two or three generations 

and had established their own communities there. 

Most of these Russians wanted to go to Russia, 

Ukraine, or Belarus, or else to Europe, the United 
States, or Canada. Most wanted to leave because 

they feared for the future of their children or were 

seeking better economic conditions. They tended 

to be concentrated in the younger age groups and 

were among the more highly educated.

What the survey results suggest, then, is that 

while divisions among nationality groups in 

Central Asia run deep in interpersonal relationships, they may exist as much among Central 

Asians as between Central Asians and Russians. 

Discord, moreover, may be expressed in terms of 

ethnic group, family, neighborhood, and region as 

much as in broad ethnic or religious terms. And 

our survey suggests that the younger generation of 

all nationalities and educational levels may be just 

as intolerant of other national groups as the older 

respondents. Divisions run deep and will likely 

have an enormous influence on Uzbekistan’s and 

Kazakhstan’s paths to reform, but the splits and 

schisms will not always be clear-cut.

18
Facing this litany of political, economic, and 

social challenges at home, Central Asian 

citizens are often expected to be in favor of 

turning to other countries for aid and assistance. 

Because Central Asian societies are imbued with a 

strong sense of separate ethnic and cultural 

identity, questions of religious and ethnic identity 

are often viewed as playing an important role in 

determining partners abroad. For example, many 

western observers have tended to view foreign 

assistance in Central Asia as largely a contest between Turkey and Iran, given their proximity to 

Central Asia and their shared cultural, if not religious, values. But the contradictory contextual 

nature of identity in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 

seems to be reflected in foreign policy orientations 

as well.

First, despite the economic hardship at home, 

our survey suggests that Central Asians’ attitudes 

toward foreign investment in or assistance to their 

countries may be ambivalent. When respondents 

were asked to rate the importance of a number of 

possible measures to address Uzbekistan’s 

problems, only about one-third in both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan said that the widespread attraction of foreign capital is important; in 

Uzbekistan, more Russians than Uzbeks said 

it is unimportant.

Likewise, when asked whether their country 

should turn to other countries to help solve its 

economic and environmental problems, respondents in both countries were split: almost half the 

respondents in Uzbekistan said no, while 40 

percent said yes; in Kazakhstan these proportions 

were reversed. The overwhelming reasons for this 

wariness about turning to other countries for 

assistance were the sense that the Central Asian 

new states can “do it themselves,” the perceived 

humiliation that would come with receiving outside assistance, and the fear of becoming 

dependent on western countries.

Among those who do welcome foreign investment, however, most favor seeking it not from Turkey or Iran but from the West or Japan. Of the 519 

respondents in Uzbekistan and the 423 in Kazakhstan who said their countries should turn to other 

countries for assistance, most did not name Turkey 

or other Islamic countries as the most desirable 

source of that assistance. Instead, the largest proportions of respondents named 

European countries (one-third of Uzbekistani 

respondents and more than half of Kazakhstani 

respondents) and Japan (34 percent of Uzbekistani respondents and 29 percent of Kazakhstani 

respondents). One-third of respondents in 

Uzbekistan also named the United States, but 

only 15 percent of Kazakhstani respondents did 

so—about the same proportion who advocated 

turning to Russia (figure 5).

By contrast, about one-quarter (26 percent) of 

Uzbekistani respondents and about 6 percent of 

Kazakhstani respondents said their governments 

should turn to Turkey. For Uzbekistan, this 

number was slightly less than the 29 percent 

who said Uzbekistan should turn to Russia for 

assistance, and about the same proportion (25-

percent) who said it should turn to governments 

of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 

and also to other Muslim countries. Only nine 

Uzbekistani respondents, or less than 2 percent of 

Uzbeks who responded to this question—and only 

about one-half of 1 percent of respondents in Kazakhstan—said their countries should turn to Iran.

Nor were these answers divided strictly along 

nationality lines. Central Asians predominated 

both among those selecting Muslim countries and 

among those who advocated seeking assistance 

from the West.14 When asked from which 

countries Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan should keep 

the greatest distance, respondents most frequently 

7FOREIGN POLICY

ORIENTATIONS

19
named Afghanistan (more than one-third of 

respondents in both countries), followed by Israel, 

Iran, and Pakistan. One-third of Kazakhstani 

respondents also named China.

Figure 5. Respondents’ views on which 

countries should be turned to for assistance 

in solving economic and environmental 

problems.

20
United States policies in Central Asia have 

focused on promoting respect for human 

rights and democratic reform and 

encouraging the formation of market economies. 

Since independence, the leaders of Uzbekistan and 

Kazakhstan have echoed these goals. There has 

been more movement in this direction in 

Kazakhstan than in Uzbekistan, yet these concepts 

have remained vague in both countries, and any 

commitment to fundamental reform has been 

superseded by a perceived need to maintain 

stability and order.

Our survey suggests that this approach may 

find broad resonance among a population in 

which, despite the rhetoric, the concepts of “democracy” and “market reform” remain vague and 

ill-defined; economic reform is viewed with skepticism and apprehension; and maintaining 

order and stability is a priority, perhaps the chief 

priority. Widespread corruption and organized 

crime have strengthened resistance to fundamental reform among many highly placed officials and 

leaders who have so much to lose, and at the same 

time have increased the general population’s 

skepticism about reform.

The support these leaders enjoy today, however, 

may also be tenuous. As our survey and others 

like it illustrate, deteriorating economic conditions in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are a major 

and increasing concern to their populations. Our 

survey suggests that ideological concerns such as 

widespread support for Islamic fundamentalism 

are not as likely to spark instability as much as 

further deterioration in the economy and general 

quality of life, and increased political corruption 

and chaos. While Islam may be the vehicle through 

which these grievances are expressed, our survey 

suggests it is currently unlikely to be the root 

cause. Although ethnic and national divisions run 

deep, the survey suggests that they are not always 

clear-cut and cannot be viewed solely in terms of 

Russians versus Central Asians.

With the multitude of challenges facing them, 

Uzbekistan’s and Kazakhstan’s leaders and population alike recognize, however ambivalently the 

need for foreign investment in their countries to 

help address their economic and social crises. 

Contrary to a common belief, they are looking far 

beyond Iran and Turkey to Japan and the West, 

including the United States.

As U.S. assistance efforts are expanded then, 

they must be structured to take account of a population whose support for reform may be more 

complex and ambivalent than observers may have 

thought previously; whose sense of fairness and 

trust may be strong, but whose support for authoritarian leaders is also high; whose leaders may 

have magnified less significant threats, such as 

Islamic fundamentalism, to obscure more imminent ones; and among whom organized crime and 

corruption have become major obstacles to 

reform. U.S. efforts must be sensitive not only 

to the hardships, social safety nets, cultural values, and traditions of Central Asia but also to the 

uniquely convoluted mixture of Soviet and Middle 

Eastern political and economic systems in these 

new countries, which may be quite different from 

other parts of the world.

The U.S. record to date has been mixed. While 

numerous U.S. programs have had a beneficial 

impact, other initiatives have been criticized by 

locals as empowering the very government structures we may be trying to reform, or as patronizing. Some of our efforts at economic reform have 

been criticized for ignoring the pervasiveness of 

corruption and organized crime and thus benefiting the most corrupt elements rather than the 

population as a whole. And the fear of Islamic 

fundamentalism that seemed to drive so many 

of our initial efforts in Central Asia has also been 

8CONCLUSION

21
viewed as leaving a destructive legacy that may 

have only encouraged the growth of this very 

fundamentalism.

Perhaps most of all, U.S. efforts have been 

criticized for viewing democratic and market 

reform as something to be imposed and implemented largely from the top down. Despite our 

stated commitment to expand the role of grassroots efforts, U.S.–Central Asian partnerships of 

small nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 

have played a relatively minor role in our overall 

assistance programs. Likewise, few of our 

programs have required any prior on-the-ground 

expertise to help avoid obstacles from the 

beginning.

For example, the recent U.S. Agency for 

International Development (AID) Request for 

Applications for a $5-million project to support the 

development of Central Asian NGOs is one of the 

newest programs to “help citizens of Central Asia 

more actively and effectively participate in the 

political and economic life of their countries.” It 

states explicitly that “prior experience in the 

Central Asian republics” is “not required.”15

Democratic reforms ultimately will emerge not 

only as a result of new laws or regulations but from 

the oversight and accountability that come with a 

greater sense of empowerment from below. A shift 

to a healthy market can occur only when there is a 

sense that it will contribute to the greater wellbeing of the population, and not just to the corrupt 

government and the organized criminal world. 

How the population of Central Asia thinks and 

feels must become an increasingly important 

calculation as we shape and reshape our policies 

in the months and years ahead.

22
23

Notes

1. The author deliberately did not conduct any of 

the interviews, for an American interviewer probably 

would have received different responses. She did sit in 

on 

several interviews during both the pretest and the 

actual survey to assess the kinds of responses the survey was generating. All interviews were conducted 

by trained and experienced local survey takers from 

throughout Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

2. The small group comprised roughly one-eighth of 

respondents in Uzbekistan and about 17 percent in 

Kazakhstan.

3. Respondents were asked to rate whether each 

challenge listed was very important, not very important, unimportant, or undesirable.

4. More than one-third of all respondents in both 

countries said that a free press and free speech are not 

very important; more than one-tenth of respondents in 

Uzbekistan, and 15 percent in Kazakhstan, said they are 

unimportant; and about 2 to 3 percent of respondents 

in both countries stated that a free press and free speech 

are undesirable.

5. Twenty-nine percent of respondents in Uzbekistan 

and 24 percent in Kazakhstan named high prices as the 

greatest problem that must be resolved in their countries; 23 percent and 16 percent, respectively, named 

unemployment.

6. Respondents could choose one of the following 

responses: the individuals or organizations named, as 

a rule, are themselves members of the mafia, are tied to 

the mafia, are not tied to the mafia, have no relations 

whatsoever with the mafia, don’t know, or no answer. 

Fewer than one-quarter of respondents (24 percent in 

Uzbekistan and only 19 percent in Kazakhstan) said 

that as a rule highly placed officials are not tied to the 

mafia or have no relations with the mafia, and one-fifth 

to one-quarter (26 percent in Uzbekistan and 21 percent 

in Kazakhstan) did not know or found it difficult to answer.

7. Only about 14 percent of Kazakhstani respondents 

said that one finds bribery there rarely or never.

8. See Nancy Lubin, Labour and Nationality in Soviet 

Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise, Macmillan 

(England) and Princeton University Press, 1984, 

especially chapter 6.

9. Less than 8 percent of respondents in Kazakhstan 

and only 17 percent of respondents in Uzbekistan said 

they did not believe that organized crime has grown in 

the past few years; the remaining 13 percent in Uzbekistan and 10 percent in Kazakhstan did not answer or did 

not know.

10. In both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Russians felt 

somewhat more strongly about the growth of organized 

crime than Central Asians did, but overall, differences 

were minimal.

11. The survey was conducted among 2,500 people in 

fifteen regions of the former Soviet Union, including several hundred respondents in Uzbekistan, Kazakh-stan, 

and Turkmenistan, and was supported by grants from 

the MacArthur Foundation and the National Council for 

Soviet and East European Research.

12. For example, only about one-third pray one to five 

times per day, about one-fifth do so occasionally, and 44 

percent not at all. Likewise, roughly one-third of those 

who said they are religious Muslims fast regularly, onethird do so sometimes, and one-third do not fast at all.

13. Next in line were eleven people (9 percent) who 

named Rashidov and eight people who named Lenin. 

Only one person named the Ayatollah Khomeini.

14. While 88 percent of the 135 people who selected 

Muslim countries and 85 percent of the 137 people who 

selected Turkey were Central Asians, 70 percent of the 

150 people who selected Russia and 70 percent of the 

159 people who chose European countries were Central 

Asians. Eighty-one percent of the 153 people who selected the United States were also Central Asian.

15. See U.S. AID Request for Applications, Solicitation 

No. NIS/RCO 94-05, cover letter, Central Asian 

Republics Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) 

Support Activity, issued July 6, 1994, and awarded 

Fall 1994, p. 2.
Nancy Lubin has spent more than two decades following ethnic and 

domestic policy issues in the former Soviet Union, and especially Central 

Asia. A Jennings Randolph Peace Fellow at the Institute in 1992–93, she is 

currently president of JNA Associates, a consulting firm that works with 

private foundations, businesses, the media, and government agencies on 

projects concerning Central Asia and the newly independent states (NIS), 

and directs the privately funded Project on Reform of Aid to the NIS. She is 

also an adjunct professor at Carnegie-Mellon University.

Before holding these positions, Lubin was an associate professor at Carnegie-Mellon University and, previously, a project director and the Sovietologist for the congressional Office of Technology Assessment where she directed studies on U.S.-Soviet 

cooperation and military affairs. She is the author of Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An 

Uneasy Compromise, as well as congressional reports, congressional testimony, and scholarly and popular articles on Soviet, post-Soviet, and Central Asian affairs. She has lived and traveled in Central Asia, 

as well as Russia, for extended periods, including one year as a researcher at Tashkent State University, 

Uzbekistan.

The author gratefully acknowledges the support and assistance of the United States Institute of Peace 

in carrying out the research and survey for this publication. She also greatly appreciates the research 

assistance of John Loncle, and earlier assistance from Claire Palmgren and Laurie Boke. Additional 

thanks are due Steven Grant, Richard Dobson, and Michael Swafford for their help and advice, and the 

MacArthur Foundation and the National Council for Soviet and East European Research for support of 

previous background research.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created 

and funded by Congress to strengthen the nation’s capacity to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict. Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including grants, fellowships, conferences and workshops, library services, publications, and other 

educational activities. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States 

and confirmed by the Senate.

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Distinguished Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame

William R. Kintner, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei

Elspeth Davies Rostow, Stiles Professor of American Studies Emerita, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public 

Affairs, University of Texas

Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts 

University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

Ervin J. Rokke, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University

Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

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