Airspace Control In 

The Combat Zone 

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.7

13 July 2005 

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 

3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations and Joint Publication 

3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-1.7 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 13 JULY 2005 

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS 

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. 

This revision updates key airspace control doctrine concepts to include a discussion of 

airspace control during varying levels of conflict/contingency; discusses other possible 

nongovernmental users of the airspace during conflict and en route air traffic 

control/airspace/airfield management during contingencies and conflict (Chapter One); 

adds a discussion of conventional air launched cruise missiles and Army tactical missile 

systems and their requirements for airspace coordinating measures (Chapter Four); 

updates the discussion of the theater air control system, including deletions of the terms 

airborne battlefield command and control center and control and reporting element; 

adds a discussion on the airborne command element, the air mobility liaison officer, the 

expeditionary operations center and the regional air movement control center (RAMCC); 

updates the discussion of the airborne warning and control system and data links used 

for airspace control (Chapter Five). Adds a discussion of en route airspace 

management (Chapter Six); adds a new appendix that discusses RAMCC operations 

and employment (Appendix C); updates definitions, terminology, historical references, 

and readings throughout.

Supersedes: AFDD 2-1.7, 9 May 2001 

OPR: HQ AFDC/DR (Lt Col Judson K. Hill) 

Certified by: HQ AFDC/DR (Lt Col Eric Schnitzer) 

Pages: 91 

Distribution: F 

Approved by: Bentley B. Rayburn, Major General, USAF 

 Commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center 

 
FOREWORD 

 Military operations in the 21st century are highly complex and require close 

coordination to be effective and safe. As Airmen we are delegated control of the most 

fluid portion of the battlespace: the airspace, where aircraft and missiles fly. Recent 

conflicts have demonstrated the need for airspace control in varying levels of conflict, 

from major combat operations to stability operations. We share the airspace during 

military operations with civil users, nongovernmental organizations, coalition military 

forces, and host nation users. We must ensure the safety of all users, even if military 

operations are ongoing while civil aviation continues. The doctrine outlined in this 

document allows combat effectiveness, while promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible 

use of airspace with a minimum of restraint placed upon airspace users. 

 

 Our doctrine for airspace control rests upon the Air Force tenets of centralized 

control and decentralized execution. A commander of Air Force forces will be 

designated whenever Air Force forces are presented to a joint force commander. This 

designation provides unity of command. To a joint force commander, a commander of 

Air Force forces provides a single face—one “go-to guy”—for all US Air Force issues. 

 The joint force commander normally designates the commander of Air Force 

forces as the joint force air and space component commander, resulting in clear lines of 

authority for both joint and Air Force component operations. The joint force air and 

space component commander normally is assigned the duties of the airspace control 

authority and area air defense commander, due to the integrated relationship between 

these functions. We organize, train, and equip Airmen to execute the myriad tasks of 

airspace control in the combat zone through the theater air control system and other Air 

Force systems. 

 

 Our doctrine is broadly stated to fit varying levels of contingencies and diverse 

geographical areas, while encompassing joint and multinational operations. Study it, 

discuss it, and be ready to recommend improvements to it based upon your unique 

experiences. We must be able to articulate the unique contributions Airmen make to 

provide a safe, reliable, and flexible environment for all airspace users, while 

guaranteeing freedom from attack for our forces. 

BENTLEY B. RAYBURN 

 Major General, USAF 

 Commander, Headquarters 

 Air Force Doctrine Center 
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... v 

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS ..................................................................... vii 

CHAPTER ONE—Considerations for Airspace Control......................................................... 1 

General ...................................................................................................................................... 1 

Objective.................................................................................................................................... 1 

Airspace Control System Fundamentals.............................................................................. 2 

Interoperability and Adaptability............................................................................................. 4 

Training...................................................................................................................................... 5 

Information Assurance ............................................................................................................ 5 

Summary ................................................................................................................................... 6 

CHAPTER TWO—Role and Responsibilities .......................................................................... 7 

General ...................................................................................................................................... 7 

Commanders’ Roles ................................................................................................................ 7 

Coordination with the Host Nation and Integration with Civil and Military Air 

Operations............................................................................................................................... 11 

CHAPTER THREE—Developing the Airspace Control System ......................................... 13 

General .................................................................................................................................... 13 

Operational Requirements.................................................................................................... 13 

Planning Considerations ....................................................................................................... 13 

Transition from Peacetime to Combat Operations ........................................................... 14 

Integration of Airspace Control and Air Defense Operations.......................................... 15 

Types of Identification............................................................................................................ 17 

Levels of Control in Air Defense Operations...................................................................... 19 

Engagement of Enemy Air Threats ..................................................................................... 19 

Transition from Combat to Peacetime Operations ........................................................... 22 

CHAPTER FOUR—Airspace Control for Specified Missions ............................................. 23 

General .................................................................................................................................... 23 

Airspace Control Within an Amphibious Objective Area.................................................. 23 

Airspace Control for Maritime Missions.............................................................................. 24 

Airspace Control During Stability Operations .................................................................... 24 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ................................................................................................... 26 

Cruise/Long Range Missile Operations .............................................................................. 28 

CHAPTER FIVE—Airspace Control Execution: The Theater Air Control System (TACS)

....................................................................................................................................................... 29 

General .................................................................................................................................... 29 

Organization, Facilities, and Personnel.............................................................................. 29 

Air and Space Operations Center........................................................................................ 30 

The Theater Air Ground System (TAGS)........................................................................... 32 

Ground TACS Elements........................................................................................................ 35 

Airborne Elements of the Theater Air Control System..................................................... 36 

C2 Elements That Interface with the TACS....................................................................... 38 
iv

Airspace Control Procedures ............................................................................................... 38 

Integration and Synchronization with Surface Operations .............................................. 40 

Communications and Information........................................................................................ 42 

CHAPTER SIX—Integration of Air Traffic Services into the Airspace Control System .. 45 

Air Traffic Control’s Function in the Airspace System...................................................... 45 

Planning................................................................................................................................... 45 

Capabilities.............................................................................................................................. 48 

Safety and Standardization .................................................................................................. 49 

SUGGESTED READINGS ....................................................................................................... 51 

APPENDIX A Airspace Control Plan....................................................................................... 54 

APPENDIX B Procedural Airspace Coordinating Measures ............................................... 56 

APPENDIX C Regional Air Movement Control Center......................................................... 67 

GLOSSARY................................................................................................................................. 69 
v

INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

 Air Force commanders and personnel will normally lead the effort to control 

airspace for joint force commanders. US Air Force training, equipment, and procedures 

must be formulated and implemented with joint operations in mind. Airmen must 

understand how to organize Air Force forces and how to present them to the joint force 

commander to ensure safety and survivability for all users of the airsp ace, while 

ensuring mission accomplishment. This Air Force doctrine document details principles 

for conducting airspace control in the combat zone. 

APPLICATION 

 This Air Force doctrine document (AFDD) applies to all active duty, Air Force 

Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel. 

 The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, 

commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation 

when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it. 

SCOPE 

 This airspace control doctrine is broad in nature and is adaptable to diverse 

geographic and force deployment situations and differing levels of conflict. Although 

space-based assets will play an important role in the joint campaign or operation, 

airspace control in this publication does not include controlling space-based assets. 

Future airspace control may also involve the deconfliction of space operations over an 

existing joint force area of responsibility in support of a single joint force commander. 
vi

COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC 

A note on terminology

One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is “the US

Air Force prefers—and in fact, plans and trains—to employ

through a COMAFFOR who is also dual-hatted as a JFACC.”

(AFDD 1) 

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine

documents will assume the above case unless specifically stated

otherwise. The term “commander, Air Force forces”

(COMAFFOR) refers to the Title 10 Service responsibilities while

the term “joint force air and space component commander”

(JFACC) refers to the joint operational responsibilities. 

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one

individual will normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and

JFACC, the two responsibilities are different, and are typically

executed through different staffs. 

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational

control/administrative control of AF forces through a Service AStaff while the JFACC function executes tactical control of all

joint air and space component forces through an air and space

operations center. 

When multinational operations are involved the JFACC

becomes a combined forces air and space component

commander. Likewise, though commonly referred to as an AOC,

in joint or combined operations the correct title is JAOC or

CAOC. 
vii

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

 Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which 

AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these 

statements. 

 Airspace control is essential to combat effectiveness in accomplishing the joint force 

commander’s objectives at all levels of conflict. (Page 1) 

 Unity of effort is essential for effective airspace control. (Page 2) 

 The airspace control structure and procedures need to be simple to execute for both 

ground operations personnel and aircrews. (Page 3) 

 Information assurance is a key enabler to airspace control capabilities. (Page 5) 

 As the nation’s only full-service air and space force, the Air Force is the primary user 

of airspace in most areas of responsibility or joint operational areas. (Page 6) 

 Airspace control structures and procedures require extensive planning before 

operations commence. The airspace environment may transition through varying 

stages from peacetime to combat and back to peacetime operations during a 

contingency. (Page 12) 

 The airspace control authority may assign a portion of airspace to another 

commander to accomplish a specified mission. (Page 22) 

 The Air Force airspace command and control system is a reflection of the air and 

space power tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution. The Air Force 

theater air control system provides the Air Force component commander with the 

means to achieve this tenet. (Page 28) 

 Close coordination among airspace control, air defense, and air traffic control 

elements is required to maximize combat effectiveness while preventing fratricide 

and mutual interference. (Page 43) 
1

 Air control can be established by superiority in 

numbers, by better employment, by better 

equipment, or by a combination of these factors. 

 —General Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz 

CHAPTER ONE 

 CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRSPACE CONTROL 

GENERAL 

 Before World War II, there were few airspace users. Planes, airships, and 

balloons were slow and easy to recognize and identify. World War II introduced large 

joint operations with far more airspace users, creating the need for an airspace control 

system. The advent of integrated air defense systems, cruise missiles and unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAV) further complicated theater airspace control requirements. In 

today’s complex political and strategic environment, civilian use of airspace in a combat 

zone can occur alongside ongoing military operations. Civilian airliners, 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and relief agencies may demand to use the 

airspace in a combat zone, even though the host-nation air traffic control system has 

broken down or is nonexistent. These increased demands require a more complex 

airspace control system to promote flight safety and prevent fratricide. 

OBJECTIVE 

Airspace control is essential to combat operations effectiveness in 

accomplishing the joint force commander's (JFC's) objectives at all levels of 

conflict. Airspace in the combat zone is a crucial dimension of the battlespace and is 

used by all components of the joint and multinational force. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, 

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines airspace control in the 

combat zone as “[a] process used to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the 

safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace.” Airspace control is provided in order to 

prevent fratricide, enhance air defense operations, and permit greater flexibility and 

safety of operations. Airspace control does not infringe on the authority vested in 

commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations. The concept is also 

referred to as “airspace control” and “combat airspace control.” This publication will use 

the terms “airspace control,” “combat airspace control,” and “airspace control in the 

combat zone” interchangeably. The terms “air defense” and “defensive counterair” will 
2

similarly be used synonymously when referring to defensive measures to destroy or 

negate air or missile threats. 

AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM FUNDAMENTALS 

In order to enhance combat operations effectiveness, the airspace control 

system must be developed using the following fundamentals: unity of effort, common 

procedures, and simplicity. These precepts are discussed below: 

Unity of Effort

Unity of effort is essential for effective airspace control. Commanders, 

whether representing a Service, component, or coalition, view the battlespace through 

their own “lens.” The objectives of the corps commander are not the same as those for 

the commander of the amphibious task force. To ensure the airspace requirements of 

these commanders are addressed within the context of a theater airspace structure, an 

airspace control authority (ACA) is normally designated by the joint force commander 

(JFC). The ACA is the commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the 

operation of the airspace control system. The ACA achieves unity of effort primarily 

through centralized planning and control. The ACA should, to the maximum extent 

possible, coordinate with joint force component liaisons throughout the campaign 

planning process, but especially prior to hostilities. The ACA must integrate information 

flow throughout the system to provide necessary information for airspace control 

throughout the area of responsibility (AOR). 

Closely allied with the ACA is the area air defense commander (AADC). The 

AADC will be given overall responsibility for air defense from the unified, subordinate 

unified, or joint task force (JTF) commander. Normally, this will be the component 

commander with the preponderance of air defense capability to plan and execute 

integrated air defense operations. For most operations, assigning the roles of ACA and 

AADC to a single commander, the joint force air and space component commander 

(JFACC) further unifies efforts across the spectrum of airspace use. Vesting appropriate 

authority and responsibility in a single air component commander provides for the 

effective exercise of leadership and power of decision over assigned forces to achieve a 

common objective. The air component commander develops strategies and plans, 

determines priorities, allocates resources, and controls air and space forces made 

available to achieve that objective. Having one commander with the responsibility and 

authority to coordinate and integrate air defense and airspace control greatly enhances 

the effort to gain and maintain control of the airspace environment. The planned and 

coordinated use of airspace gives flexibility to the self-defense of surface forces, helps 

prevent inadvertent attacks on friendly forces, and enables the execution of offensive 

attacks against an enemy's warfighting potential. 

Centralized control and decentralized execution of air forces help make those 

forces responsive, serve to ensure that forces are properly used and integrated, and 

foster initiative at the action level. While centralized control guides actions to support a 
3

broad plan of action, decentralized execution provides the flexibility for subordinate 

commanders to use ingenuity and initiative in attacking targets.

 Constraints on the airspace in the combat zone, special missions, or the sheer 

demand for airspace may result in overlapping areas of airspace control. Close liaison 

and coordination among all airspace users is necessary to promote timely and accurate 

information flow to airspace managers in the joint operations area (JOA). The primary 

reason for close coordination among airspace control, air traffic control, and area air 

defense elements is to maximize combat effectiveness while reducing the risk of 

fratricide and balance those risks with the requirements for an effective air defense 

system. Identification requirements for airspace control must be compatible with those 

for air defense. Airspace control, air defense, military air traffic control, and supporting 

command and control (C2) procedures, equipment, and terminology need to be 

compatible, mutually supporting, and interoperable. 

Common Procedures 

Common airspace control procedures throughout the JOA enhance the 

effectiveness of air operations. These procedures need to allow maximum flexibility 

through an effective mix of identification and control measures. The control structure 

needs to permit close coordination of air operations with all components, and allow 

rapid concentration of combat power in a specific portion of airspace in minimum time. 

Objectives of airspace control procedures are to: 

 Safely accommodate and expedite the flow of all air traffic in the AOR. 

 Prevent fratricide. 

 Facilitate air defense identification. 

 Enhance effectiveness in accomplishing the joint force commander’s objectives. 

Simplicity 

The airspace control structure and procedures need to be simple to 

execute for both ground operations personnel and aircrews. Procedures should 

include visual, electronic, geographic, and/or maneuver means for sorting friendly and 

enemy aircraft. 

Reliable and Interoperable Command and Control Systems 

The airspace control system should have a reliable, jam-resistant, and, where 

appropriate, secure C2 network. Coordinated and detailed planning is required to 

ensure that communication systems and procedures are interoperable and compatible 

among all airspace managers and users. 
4

Survivable, Sustainable, and Redundant Systems 

Airspace control systems need to be survivable, sustainable, and redundant 

because they are likely to be targeted by an adversary. Positive airspace control must 

be backed up by procedural coordinating measures. The airspace control system in the 

combat zone needs to be responsive to evolving enemy threat conditions and to the 

ongoing operation, as well as capable of supporting day, night, and all-weather 

operations. 

Positive Control and Procedural Control 

 The ACA is delegated the authority from the JFC to ensure effective airspace 

control. This control capability is achieved through both positive and procedural control 

measures. Positive control relies on positive tracking, direction, and identifying aircraft 

to exercise airspace control. It is conducted electronically by agencies equipped with 

radar; identification, friend, or foe (IFF) interrogators and receivers; beacons; 

computers; digital data links; and communications equipment. Generally, two conditions 

must exist for a commander to exercise positive control: the means to identify and 

locate airspace users and the ability to maintain continuous communications with them. 

Procedural control relies on previously agreed upon and promulgated orders 

and procedures. Included in these orders and procedures are airspace control 

measures, fire support coordinating measures, and air defense control measures. 

Procedural control divides the airspace by volume and time and uses airspace control 

measures, real time communications capabilities, and weapons control statuses to 

manage aviation operations. Procedural control can be executed by following a planned 

route, with timing established for passing each waypoint along a course. This serves to 

deconflict the route or airspace with other aircraft. It can also be used in real time, with a 

control agency maintaining communications with airspace users and directing entry/exit 

to maintain safety and effective use. Procedural control can serve as a backup system if 

positive control is the primary system of control, but becomes unavailable. 

INTEROPERABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY 

 Using current US national military objectives and assigned missions as a 

baseline, the air component develops AOR-specific concepts for airspace control. 

Procedures to implement these concepts must take into consideration the likelihood of 

multinational operations. As such, the need for developing procedures to ensure 

compatibility and interoperability of support systems and methods to handle potential 

alliances and coalitions must be met. US forces participating in multinational operations 

may also be subject to international agreements that address issues related to coalition 

command structure, interoperability, and other relevant matters. 
5

TRAINING 

Effective and safe operations in today’s complex airspace environment require all 

users to be effectively trained. Training is a Service component responsibility. Theaterspecific training should augment Service component training. Airspace control 

procedures and personnel must be trained and exercised in peacetime to be effective in 

combat. To provide a realistic assessment, it is crucial that the airspace control system 

be exercised as an overall system rather than a series of individual components. 

Exercises and simulations involving multiple agencies and users across the range of 

military operations provide needed complexity to train operators. Both joint and coalition 

elements should be incorporated whenever feasible. 

 

INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) 

Information assurance is a key enabler to airspace control capabilities. IA 

comprises those measures taken to protect and defend information and information 

systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation (ability to prove sender’s identity and prove delivery to recipient). IA 

depends on the continuous integration of trained personnel, operational and technical 

capabilities, and necessary policies and procedures to guarantee continuous and 

dependable information, while providing the means to efficiently reconstitute these vital

services following disruptions of any kind, whether from an attack, natural disaster, 

equipment failure, or operator error. In an assured information environment, warfighters 

can leverage the power of the information age. 

 Developing and implementing security and protection in the 21st century requires 

recognition of the globalization of information and information systems. The Air Force 

employs a defense-in-depth philosophy by providing layered and integrated protection 

of information, information systems, and networks. The defense-in-depth approach 

employs and integrates the abilities of people, operations, and technology to establish 

multilayer, multidimensional protection. Security and protection include the policies and 

programs to help counter internal and external threats—whether foreign or domestic—to 

include protection against trusted insider misconduct or error. Security, like 

interoperability, must be incorporated into information systems designs from the 

beginning to be effective and affordable. Levels of protection must be commensurate to 

the importance and vulnerability of the specific information and information systems. 

 Traditional programs such as communications security (COMSEC), physical 

security, emissions security, and network defense are methods to protect our 

information and information systems. In addition, other information assurance programs 

help assess the interoperability, compatibility, and supportability of our information 

systems and aim specifically to reduce vulnerabilities and to improve the overall security 

of shared networks and systems. Due to the US dependency on and the general 

vulnerability of information and its supporting systems, IA is essential to airspace 

control.
6

SUMMARY 

Awareness of the airspace environment within the AOR and the ability to affect it 

at will are the aims of airspace control operations. Each of the joint force components 

has legitimate airspace requirements that must be melded into a comprehensive 

airspace control system. Airspace control procedures should facilitate combat 

operations, expedite air defense identification, safely accommodate and expedite the 

flow of all air traffic in the theater of operations, prevent mutual interference from all 

users of the airspace, prevent fratricide, and lead to an early return to peacetime 

procedures. 
7

 CHAPTER TWO 

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

GENERAL 

As the nation’s only full-service air and space force, the Air Force is the 

primary user of airspace in most AORs or JOAs. Air Force commanders will likely 

be responsible for planning and integrating airspace control for joint forces in 

accordance with JFC guidance. In order to establish an airspace system that maximizes 

combat effectiveness of all forces while reducing risks of fratricide, Air Force 

commanders must train their personnel to soundly employ operational risk management 

principles and be knowledgeable of all component systems and procedures. 

International agreements, forces, operational concepts, and operating environments will 

necessitate specific arrangements for joint airspace control; however, the basic 

doctrine, ideas, and concepts relating to airspace control remain constant. These 

“constants” are the subject of this chapter. 

Consistent with existing provisions of JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces 

(UNAAF), JFCs organize assigned and attached forces to best accomplish their 

assigned mission. The organization of forces will depend on the mission assigned, the 

manner in which the mission is to be fulfilled, and the capabilities and strength of the 

component elements of the forces assigned. Consequently, the organizational form of 

the airspace control system may vary. 

COMMANDERS’ ROLES 

 The primary emphasis of command relationships is to keep the chain of 

command simple so all involved understand who is in charge. In terms of airspace 

control, unity of command is a guiding principle. Understanding the roles of the JFC, 

Service component commanders, functional component commanders, the ACA, the 

AADC, and airspace management agencies involved in executing the JFC’s campaign 

or operations plan is essential. 

Joint Force Commander 

 “A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander or a 

joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command 

authority) or operational control over a joint force.” (JP 1-02) The JFC for a particular 

 Nothing is so important in war as an 

undivided command. 

 —Napoleon: Maxims of War 
8

operation is responsible for employment of forces assigned, attached, or otherwise 

made available to accomplish the assigned mission or objective in accordance with 

guidance provided by the establishing commander. In accomplishing the mission or 

objective, the JFC will normally employ forces through Service component commands, 

functional component commands, or a combination of functional and Service 

component commands. 

Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) 

 The COMAFFOR is the Air Force officer designated as commander of the Air 

Force component command assigned or attached to a JFC at the unified, subunified, 

and JTF level. Command and control of Air Force forces assigned or attached to the Air 

Force component is exercised through the COMAFFOR. Air Force forces should be 

organized as an air and space expeditionary task force (AETF). The AETF commander 

is the COMAFFOR. The COMAFFOR will have complete administrative control 

(ADCON) of all assigned US Air Force forces and specified ADCON of all attached Air 

Force forces. Through the JFC’s command authority, the JFC normally will conduct 

operations through the COMAFFOR by delegating operational control (OPCON) of the 

Air Force component forces to the COMAFFOR. When designated as the JFACC, the 

COMAFFOR normally maintains OPCON of assigned and attached Air Force forces 

and normally receives tactical control (TACON) of forces from other components as 

directed by the JFC. If the JFACC is designated from another component of the joint 

force, the COMAFFOR will ensure Air Force forces are employed in accordance with 

the JFACC’s guidance and tasking. 

Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander 

The JFACC derives authority from the JFC who has the authority to exercise or 

delegate operational and/or tactical control, assign missions, direct coordination among 

subordinate commanders, and redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in 

the accomplishment of the overall mission. If JFCs elect to organize functionally, they 

will normally designate a JFACC. The JFACC typically exercises TACON over air 

capabilities/forces made available for tasking. The JFACC’s responsibilities are 

assigned by the JFC, but will normally include developing a theater air and space 

campaign plan, assigning missions, tasking forces, and ensuring unity of effort in 

accomplishing the overall theater air mission. To ensure unity of effort in airspace 

control and air defense, the JFC will also normally designate the JFACC as the ACA, 

AADC, and the space coordinating authority (SCA). To accomplish these missions, the 

JFACC will use established interfaces with the JFC and other components to establish a 

theater wide command and control system that will meet the JFC’s objectives. In most 

large scale operations the Air Force will provide the preponderance of air assets and 

possess the necessary C2 capabilities to exercise command and control over all theater 

air operations. Accordingly, the Air Force component commander will normally be 

designated the JFACC. 
9

Airspace Control Authority 

 The JFC designates the ACA. “The ACA is the commander designated to 

assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the 

airspace control area.” (JP 1-02) The broad responsibilities of the ACA include 

coordinating and integrating the use of the airspace control area. Subject to the 

authority and approval of the JFC, the ACA develops broad policies and procedures for 

airspace control and for the coordination required among units within the AOR. The 

ACA establishes an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of the JFC, 

provides for integration of the airspace control system with that of the host nation, and 

coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. If the host nation air traffic control (ATC) 

infrastructure does not exist or is significantly degraded, such as occurred when the 

Taliban was removed from power in Afghanistan in 2002, the ACA may be requested to 

provide advisories to civil and commercial users of the ATC and airspace system of the 

host nation, until the nation’s ATC system can be reactivated. The ACA provides this 

service through the airspace management specialty team, the terminal airfield 

operations element and the regional air movement control center, (RAMCC), if 

activated. This service provides a safe and efficient operating environment by managing 

the complex interaction of military and civil aircraft attempting to access or transit the 

airspace control area. 

The ACA publishes an airspace control plan (ACP) that provides the basic 

information on all aspects of airspace control. The ACP establishes procedures for the 

airspace control system (ACS) in the operational area. See Appendix A for an example 

of the topics that should be considered when developing an ACP. The JFC approves 

the ACP. To provide effective operational procedures the ACP and air defense plan 

(ADP) must be integrated with the JFC’s operation plan (OPLAN) and orders. Both 

plans should articulate available C2 systems and capabilities. The ACP must consider 

procedures and interfaces with the international or regional air traffic systems necessary 

to effectively support air operations, augmenting forces, and JFC objectives. As a 

consequence, the ACP should be preplanned as much as possible and be put in a 

simplified, understandable format. Because the airspace control area normally coincides 

with air defense boundaries, coordination between combat zone airspace control and 

area air defense operations is essential. 

Implementation of the ACP is through the airspace control order (ACO). The 

ACO is an order that provides the details of the approved requests for airspace 

coordination measures (ACM). While the ACP provides general guidance for the 

control of the airspace, the ACO implements specific control procedures for established 

time periods. It is published either as part of the ATO or as a separate document. It 

defines and establishes airspace for military operations as deemed necessary by the 

appropriate military authority. It notifies all agencies of the effective time of activation 

and the composite structure of the airspace to be used. The ACO may include ACMs 

and fire support coordinating measures (FSCMs) such as air routes, base defense 

zones (BDZs), and restricted operations areas (ROAs). A change to the ACO should be 

distributed whenever a new area is established or an existing area deleted. 
10

 A key responsibility of the ACA is to provide the flexibility needed within the 

airspace control system to meet contingency situations that necessitate rapid 

employment of forces. Matters on which the ACA is unable to obtain agreement will be 

referred to the JFC for resolution. A summary of the ACA responsibilities is provided 

below: 

 Coordinate and integrate the use of the airspace. 

 Develop policies and procedures of airspace control and for the coordination 

required among units within the operational area. 

 Establish an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of the JFC, 

provide for effective and timely integration of the airspace control system with that of 

the host nation, and coordinate and deconflict user requirements. 

 Develop the airspace control plan and, after JFC approval, distribute it throughout 

the JOA. Implement the airspace control plan through the airspace control order. 

 Provide necessary facilities and personnel for airspace control functions in assigned 

areas and identify these facilities and personnel for inclusion in the airspace control 

plan. 

The ACA develops the ACP and, after JFC approval, promulgates it throughout the 

AOR. The ACP must be integrated with the area air defense plan (AADP) and 

coordinated with the other joint operation plans. The ACP must consider procedures 

and interfaces with the international or regional air traffic systems necessary to 

effectively support JFC objectives, air operations (including en route overflight of neutral 

nations), and augmenting forces. An example of the topics that should be considered 

when developing an ACP is provided in Appendix A. These documents must be 

coordinated to facilitate continued operations in the event of degraded command and 

control systems. The ACP needs to support an orderly transition from peacetime 

operations to combat operations and back to peacetime. Such a transition could occur 

during a period of increasing tensions or suddenly without warning.

Area Air Defense Commander 

 The JFC will normally designate an AADC as the single commander responsible 

for air defense (protection of friendly forces and other vital assets from attack by enemy 

air and missile threats). This includes, but is not limited to, defensive measures 

designed to destroy attacking enemy air and missiles or to nullify or reduce the 

effectiveness of such attacks should they escape destruction. The AADC should be the 

commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and possessing the 

capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. The successful 

conduct of air defense operations requires the integrated operation of all available air 

defense systems. Air defense operations must be coordinated with other operations, 

both on and over land and sea. The AADC develops the AADP and, after JFC 

approval, promulgates it throughout the AOR. The responsibilities of the AADC are 

interrelated with those of the ACA. 
11

Other Component Commanders 

 Each component commander advises the JFC on the employment of forces. The 

JFACC, in coordination with other components, plans and executes AOR-wide air and 

space operations. Subject to the authority of the JFC, each component commander 

within a joint force: 

 Provides airspace control in areas designated by the ACA in accordance with 

directives and/or procedures in the ACP, and is prepared to provide airspace control 

in other areas designated by the ACA when combat or other factors degrade the 

airspace control system. 

 Forwards requests for ACMs to the ACA in accordance with the ACP. 

 Develops detailed airspace control instructions, plans, and procedures in 

accordance with guidance in the ACP. These detailed instructions, plans, and 

procedures need to be coordinated by the ACA to ensure consistency with JFCapproved airspace control guidance and approved in accordance with directives 

and/or procedures in the ACP. 

 Provides necessary facilities and personnel for airspace control functions in 

assigned areas of operations and identifies these facilities and personnel to the ACA 

for inclusion in the ACP. 

COORDINATION WITH THE HOST NATION AND INTEGRATION 

WITH CIVIL AND MILITARY AIR OPERATIONS 

 Airspace management personnel should coordinate the ACP with representatives 

of the host nation(s) in whose airspace the operations will take place and with civil air 

activities that may occur in or near the airspace. There should also be close planning 

and coordination between representatives employing both offensive and defensive 

weapon systems of US and multinational armed services. Broad areas of concern for 

developing the ACP include familiarity with the basic operation plan, knowledge of host 

and multinational capabilities, procedures of military and civil airspace control and air 

traffic control systems, and general locations of friendly and enemy forces. Additionally, 

planners must be familiar with any host nation agreements that could impact air 

operations. They should be prepared to identify any new requirements that should be 

negotiated and formalized with the host nation. Host nation agreements may only be 

negotiated by authorized personnel in accordance with Air Force instructions on 

negotiating airspace control activities. They must integrate surface-to-air defense 

weapons and air defense aircraft for maximum effectiveness. 

 Proper coordination with civil air operations is especially important during 

transitions into or out of wartime status or during non-wartime periods of heightened 

tensions. Adequate protections must exist to prevent misidentification of civil air traffic 

as a hostile threat. Operation NOBLE EAGLE, the defense of America’s skies after the 

attacks of September 11, 2001, has demonstrated the need for close civil-military 

coordination during homeland security operations. Additional information on defense of 
12

America’s skies is detailed in JP 3-01.1, Aerospace Defense of North America and 

AFDD 2-10, Homeland Security Operations. 

Airspace Coordinating Measures 

 ACMs are the means to define controlled sub-areas within a given airspace. 

They are referred to as zone, area, corridor, etc., in their description, and define 

airspace restrictions, access, and control and coordination procedures (a list of ACMs is 

at Appendix B). The ACP should specify ACMs to be used in the AOR and how these 

measures will be promulgated. The ACP also should include FSCMs and all Service 

and component-unique ACMs and terms. FSCMs are employed by land or amphibious 

commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide 

safeguards for friendly forces. FSCMs are usually activated for a limited time and refer 

to areas where fires may be active. ACMs should also identify areas that are protected 

from overflight such as religious sites or those that are environmentally protected. 

Air Traffic Control Integration with Airspace Control 

 The ACP should provide procedures to fully integrate the resources of military air 

traffic control facilities with terminal-area airspace control responsibilities. ATC facilities 

should be interfaced and linked with airspace control system communications to form a 

system that ensures the safe and efficient flow of air traffic supporting the combat effort 

while permitting maximum combat flexibility. 

Integration with Air Defense 

 The integration of air defense in the ACP is critical. The location of specific types 

of air defense operations and specific procedures for the identification of aircraft are 

critical to a viable ACP. The area air defense plan needs to be written with detailed 

engagement procedures that are consistent with the airspace control plan and 

operations in the combat zone. Drafters of the AADP must be cognizant of fielded 

equipment (and its possible limitations) employed by the joint/combined forces involved. 

Airspace control and area air defense operations need to be capable of functioning in a 

degraded C2 environment. Detailed engagement procedures and the roles of 

subordinate commanders in decentralized execution of air defense operations are keys 

to success in a degraded environment. 

Providing an Air Picture for the Joint Force 

 The JFACC is also responsible for incorporating data from various air, ground, 

and space sensors into a recognized air picture (RAP), that enables planning and 

decision making for air operations in the theater. Feeds from data links are managed by 

the interface control officer (ICO) at the air and space operations center (AOC) and 

combined with other sources into a common operational picture (COP). A COP utilizes 

the common operating environment (COE), to help joint force commanders synchronize 

the actions of air, land, sea, special operations, and space forces. This fused picture is 

shared for mission planning and execution at all levels of command. 
13

The primary goal of combat zone airspace 

control is to enhance air, land, maritime, and 

special operations force effectiveness in 

accomplishing the JFC’s objectives. 

—JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace 

Control in the Combat Zone 

 CHAPTER THREE 

DEVELOPING THE AIRSPACE CONTROL 

SYSTEM 

 

GENERAL

Airspace control structures and procedures require extensive planning 

before operations commence. The airspace environment may transition through 

varying stages from peacetime to combat and back to peacetime operations 

during a contingency. Contingencies may be of short duration, or they may last for 

years. As such, air defense, methods of controlling and identifying aircraft within the 

airspace, and rules of engagement (ROE) must be addressed. 

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS 

 Every joint force is different, depending on the mission to be accomplished, 

forces assigned, and the command structure established by the JFC. In most cases, 

these forces will have specific operational requirements for airspace that must be taken 

into account when developing the ACP. These requirements must be determined as 

early as possible to be incorporated in the overall joint force planning effort. Political 

constraints, national and military airspace control and air traffic control systems and 

procedures, and the capabilities and limitations of these systems are important 

considerations. ROE, disposition of air defense weapons, fire support plans, and 

procedures for identification of US and multinational aircraft are also important items 

that should be considered. 

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 

Planning Process 

For situations that require significant involvement of Air Force forces, the Air 

Force component should identify a COMAFFOR, as soon as feasible, to the joint force 

commander. Normally the COMAFFOR is designated as the JFACC, and should 

rapidly assemble a joint staff representing all airspace control, airspace management 

and air defense forces anticipated for the operation. This staff should proceed with 
14

completion of all phases of crisis action planning including the formulation of an ACP 

and AADP for the JFC’s approval. These plans must be developed in coordination and 

in parallel with the JFC and other component staffs’ planning efforts. The airspace 

control system that will execute the AADP must be designed to meet and complement 

the JFC’s campaign plan. 

Integrated Planning Cycles 

 The airspace planning cycle should be integrated with the planning cycle for the 

joint campaign plan and the overall joint air operations plan. Inputs from all 

organizations involved in the conflict must be consolidated, and the final ACP devised 

and disseminated to users. The ACP can be added as an appendix to the operations 

annex to the joint force operation plan or the overall joint air operations plan. 

Volume of Air Traffic and Degraded Operations 

 Planning for airspace control in the combat zone must consider the aircraft traffic 

volume throughout the operation. It is highly likely that offensive operations will 

significantly increase the complexity of airspace control planning and execution. 

Planners must anticipate this and develop a straightforward, easily understood, and 

executable plan. This plan must fully integrate all airspace and air traffic control 

functions across the AOR, to include the possible integration and deconfliction of 

civil/humanitarian operations and the activation of a RAMCC, if required. Plans should 

anticipate the effects of information operations and communications degradation. An 

effective airspace control system needs to plan for the full spectrum of communications 

from no degradation to full degradation. Plans also should consider the effects of the full 

range of applicable weather conditions and day/night operations.

TRANSITION FROM PEACETIME TO COMBAT OPERATIONS 

 JFCs should have an ACP that is continually updated both in peacetime and 

throughout the evolution of a campaign, and a standing ACO to provide airspace control 

during degraded operations. The Air Force component will likely develop and 

coordinate such plans in most theaters. Peacetime airspace rules and organizations 

change during actual conflict, and the nature of these changes is different from theater 

to theater. During stability operations, normal airspace control and air defense 

operations may be in place. The ACP needs to provide instructions to transition from 

peacetime to combat and back again in simple, clear steps. For example, existing air 

defense and/or air traffic control structures may be overwhelmed by massed enemy 

attacks over small geographic areas. These massed attacks may be heavily supported 

by electronic and communications jamming, or by asymmetric covert methods. Once 

the scope and nature of enemy massed operations are determined, friendly forces can 

be focused within the AOR to counter the enemy threat and to re-establish an air 

defense and air traffic control system. 
15

 

Surface-to-air weapons such as 

Patriot are used against the 

theater ballistic missile threat.

INTEGRATION OF AIRSPACE CONTROL AND AIR DEFENSE 

OPERATIONS 

 Because these two functional areas would conflict and interfere with each other if 

operating independently, prioritization and integration are essential. Ultimately, the 

airspace control function must be integrated with air defense operations. Airspace 

control procedures will be used to assist in aircraft and missile identification, facilitate 

engagement of enemy aircraft and missiles, and provide safe passage of friendly air 

vehicles. Normally the JFACC unifies these functions in the AOC. 

Area Air Defense Commander—The Prime Integrator 

 The AADC utilizes all joint theater air defense forces made available into an 

integrated air defense system (IADS) that can respond to the array of enemy threats by 

optimizing employment of all friendly air defense forces. The JFC, through the AADC, 

ensures detailed coordination and control of defensive measures with the affected air, 

land, and maritime commanders. The exchange of liaison personnel at the joint force 

level is essential for the coordination necessary to ensure unity of effort. For most 

operations, assigning the roles of ACA and AADC to a single commander, the JFACC, 

further unifies efforts across the spectrum of airspace use.

 

Surface-to-Air Weapons

Air defense units must be free to 

engage hostile aircraft within prescribed air 

defense procedures promulgated by the 

AADC. Airspace coordinating measures 

should not unduly restrain surface-to-air or airto-air weapons systems so as to significantly 

increase the enemy’s chance of success.

Procedures will need to be established within 

the airspace control system to allow 

identification of friendly aircraft, avoid delays 

in air operations, and prevent fratricide. These 

procedures must be simple to execute for both 

aircrews and ground operations personnel 

and may include visual, electronic, separation 

by altitude and timing, and other procedural 

means for sorting friend from foe. Air defense 

operations should not cause delays in air 

operations by creating an unnecessarily 

complicated or lengthy air route structure. Full 

integration of surface-to-air weapons into the 

overall IADS will help minimize the fratricide 

potential, and will also expedite targeting of hostile aircraft and missiles. 
16

Integration of the Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) 

 The AAMDC is the Army’s operational lead for Army theater air and missile 

defense (TAMD). The commanding general of the AAMDC has two roles common to 

every air defense artillery (ADA) commander—commander of all assigned ADA forces 

and theater Army air and missile defense coordinator (TAAMDCOORD) for the 

commander, Army forces (COMARFOR). The AAMDC’s forces may be employed in 

either the ADA or the theater missile defense (TMD) role, depending upon the mission 

tasking. The AAMDC commander may be appointed as deputy area air defense 

commander (DAADC). The three roles discussed above reflect the total theater 

involvement of the AAMDC. The JFC and AADC will determine whether a DAADC 

should be designated. This designation formalizes the relationship between the landbased TAMD assets dedicated to theater level missions and the AADC and helps to 

ensure fully integrated and synchronized counterair operations. The DAADC performs 

integration and parallel planning to ensure efficient coordination and rapid response to 

the AADC’s counterair requirements. The DAADC ensures the Army land forces’ 

contribution to the counterair fight is properly planned, synchronized, and executed. The 

AAMDC, as the senior Army air defense element in support of the AADC/DAADC 

requirements, is the primary interface at the joint AOC (JAOC) for all land-based active 

air defense operations. Although the AAMDC commander may serve as a “deputy” 

AADC, the DAADC would not assume the role of the AADC if the AADC were 

incapacitated. Not a true deputy commander, the DAADC’s primary responsibilities are 

to assist the AADC in planning, coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing land-based 

TAMD operations. Neither the AAMDC commander nor his staff has the tactical, 

technical, or procedural expertise and capability to perform all of the functions of an 

AADC in a joint environment. The DAADC and the AAMDC support the AADC/DAADC 

relationship by providing the following support to the AADC: 

 Integrate land-based TAMD into theater defensive counterair (DCA) operations. 

 Advise the AADC regarding ROE, weapons control status, weapons control 

procedures, states of readiness/alert, fire control orders, airspace coordinating 

measures, and air defense warnings. 

 Assist the AADC with AADP development. 

 Advise the AADC regarding land-based TAMD operations and capabilities. 

Flexibility of Procedures 

 Highly flexible airspace control procedures are necessary to respond to potential 

threats or coordinated attacks. The procedures should allow coordinated and, if 

appropriate, integrated employment of air, land, and maritime air defense systems 

against the threat, and use the inherent flexibility of airborne air defense platforms to 

mass forces to meet the threat. All elements of the air defense system must understand 

their roles and responsibilities at each level of attack. The process of identifying and 
17

AWACS electronically identifies 

friendlies through the use of 

IFF/SIF interrogators. 

classifying friendly, neutral, and hostile aircraft during the heat of battle and employing 

air defense forces against these enemy elements is a highly complex task. 

TYPES OF IDENTIFICATION 

 The types of identification (ID) vary throughout the range of military operations 

that include both combat and non-combat activities. The methods employed within an 

AOR are positive, procedural, and a combination of both. The airspace control structure 

needs to be responsive to evolving enemy threat conditions and changing tactical 

situations. Based on the concept of operations, the JFC, through the ACA, decides the 

appropriate identification method. 

 Positive identification: Identification is 

determined by visual recognition, 

electronic support systems, noncooperative target recognition (NCTR) 

systems, identification friend or 

foe/selective identification feature 

(IFF/SIF) systems, or other physicsbased identification techniques. 

Positive identification does not assume 

identity solely based on location or 

adherence to airspace procedures

 Procedural identification: Identification 

assumptions are made based on 

adherence to agreed upon ACMs and 

rules. Identification is assumed to be friendly as long as rules are followed, but 

identification is assumed unknown if rules are not followed and the suspect vehicle is 

not otherwise positively identified. Examples of procedural identification are 

minimum risk routes (MRR) and safe passage corridors. 

Most airspace control methods employ a combination of positive and procedural 

means or measures to effect identification. When employing a combination of 

identification means, procedural measures may be used to identify friendlies but are not 

used to identify suspects or hostiles. Visual and electronic systems may be used to 

identify friendlies and hostiles. Stated another way, procedural measures may be used 

to identify friendlies but positive techniques must be used to identify hostiles. Hostiles 

are not normally engaged based only on lack of friendly (LOF) identification. Exceptions 

are when self-defense criteria are met or when the AADC specifically promulgates 

weapons control status that allows it. Positive hostile identification (PHID) is required in 

most cases, as specified by theater-specific ROE. Positive ID is a high-confidence ID 

derived from visual observation and/or electronic ID systems. When available, positive 

ID is used because it provides the most rapid, reliable, and transferable means of 

identification. Most enemy PHIDs are derived from technology-based ID systems that 

exploit the physical or electronic characteristics of a target (e.g., NCTR, signals 

intelligence, and electronic support measures). For more information on identification 
18

techniques and classification of tracks as discussed below, see Air Force Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (Interservice) (AFTTP [I]) 3-2.31, Multi-Service Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for an Integrated Air Defense System, and AFTTP 3-1.1, 

General Planning and Employment Considerations (Classified). Whatever ID method is 

used, theater-specific ROE must be followed in all cases. ROE are normally classified. 

Classification of Tracks 

 Once tracks are identified, they must be classified by the air defense structure, 

prior to engagement or interception—if engagement or interception is required. This 

description of track classification is notional. Theater-specific ROE and operations order 

(OPORD) guidance must be followed in all cases. Identified tracks are assigned a 

category. An element in the air defense system then defines and assigns a more 

specific classification. Classification may be automatically performed by the system or 

determined by system operators. Track classifications are grouped into four main 

categories: 

 Pending. When an aircraft is initially detected by the system it is classified as 

pending, waiting for the operator or the system's database to further classify the 

track. 

 Unknown. A track in this category can be classified as: 

  Assumed Friend. Meets one or more of the identification criteria detailed in 

the OPORD. 

  Assumed Enemy. Meets only some, not all, of the Friendly identification 

criteria detailed in the OPORD. 

  Evaluated Unknown. Track data is screened by the operator and the system 

database—classification is still unknown. 

 Friendly. The track meets all friendly criteria detailed in the OPORD. 

 Hostile. A track in this category is classified as: 

  Assumed Enemy. Meets the hostile identification criteria detailed in the 

OPORD or meets the threat criteria loaded in the databases of the systems’ nodes. 

The system will automatically identify and classify a track only up to this hostile level. 

  Enemy. Meets all of the enemy identification and classification criteria 

detailed in the OPORD. The authority for declaring a track enemy is tightly 

controlled. A designated air defense commander is required to make the final 

approving determination of this classification. 
19

LEVELS OF CONTROL IN AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS 

 The degree of control held at higher echelons of command is situation dependent 

and reliant on the ability to maintain situational awareness and communicate orders. 

Levels of control in air defense operations are slightly different than the air and space 

tenets of centralized control and decentralized execution and need to be explained. 

Examples of centralized and decentralized control follow: 

 Centralized Control. In air and space employment, centralized control is the 

vesting of authority in one commander for planning and directing operations of all air 

forces throughout the AOR. This centralized planning and direction enables timely 

allocation and tasking of assets to exploit the speed, range, and flexibility of air 

capabilities across the entire area. Centralized tasking and allocation of resources is 

accompanied by progressive decentralization of task execution to the lowest 

command echelon capable. In centralized control, authority may be progressively 

delegated to subordinate echelons (as opposed to command by negation, which 

progressively pulls authority back from subordinate echelons). 

 Centralized Control in Air Defense. This is the control mode whereby a higher 

echelon makes direct target assignments to subordinate units. Identification and 

engagement authority may be delegated from the AADC to the regional air defense 

commander or sector air defense commander during joint engagement zone (JEZ) 

centralized control operations. 

 Decentralized Control. In air defense, decentralized control is the normal control 

mode. A higher echelon monitors unit actions, making direct target assignments to 

units only when necessary to ensure proper fire distribution or to prevent 

engagement of friendly aircraft. 

 Autonomous Operation. In air defense, autonomous operation is the mode of 

operation assumed by a unit after it has lost all communications with higher 

echelons. The unit commander assumes full responsibility for control of weapons 

and engagement of targets. While not the normal mode of operation, autonomous 

operations procedures must be in place as they may be required with little or no 

warning. Autonomous operations will be in accordance with the ROE and weapons 

control status established by the AADC in the AADP. 

ENGAGEMENT OF ENEMY AIR THREATS 

 Engagement of enemy air threats by friendly air, land, and maritime assets must 

be fully coordinated and, if possible, integrated to reduce uncoordinated simultaneous 

engagements, unengaged penetrators, and fratricide. Airspace control in a combat 

zone and area air defense operations are inextricably linked in enemy engagement 

operations. The airspace control system plays a key role in identifying friendly and 

enemy air vehicles and ensuring safe passage of friendly aircraft throughout the AOR. It 

also coordinates and disseminates information throughout the area air defense network. 
20

In the space between the outer barrier of guns and London itself, there were 

at the time a considerable number of guns. At night, when our patrols were up, it 

was plain that, as it was not possible to distinguish friend from enemy, these guns 

must remain silent. I therefore began to clear this patrol zone of guns, and I filled 

it with searchlights. With a little more training, and with some improved projectors 

now becoming available, the searchlights would be able to help the pilots by 

pointing the beams toward the target, even if they could not illuminate it. In this 

zone, our pilots could fly on their patrol lines, without risk from gun-fire.

—Major-General E. B. Ashmore, 

Discussing initiatives for the air defense of 

London, September 1917, in his book, Air Defence

Reliable voice and data communications, use of proper joint procedures, effective joint 

training and exercises, and exchange of liaison personnel are necessary for effective 

information flow to ensure effective and safe operations. Also, joint planning and 

coordination are extremely important and necessary to optimally deploy air defense 

assets prior to and after the start of hostilities. 

Joint Engagement Zone Operations 

 The JEZ is that airspace within which multiple air defense systems (surface-to-air 

missiles and aircraft) are simultaneously employed to engage air threats. These 

operations involve air defense weapon systems of one or more Service components. 

Combined fighter and missile engagement zone operations present the enemy with the 

dilemma of defending against two entirely different weapon systems, which decreases 

their survivability and impacts their mission effectiveness. Successful JEZ operations 

depend on correctly identifying friendly, neutral, and hostile aircraft and the proper 

allocation and coordination of air defense systems to avoid duplication of effort. Positive 

identification can ensure that real-time engagement taskings are based on 

comprehensive situational awareness. Under procedural identification, all air defense 

systems and aircraft must be capable of accurately discerning between enemy, neutral, 

and friendly air vehicles in a highly complex environment before full joint engagement 

operations occur. If these conditions cannot be met, separate zones for missile and 

fighter engagement should be established. A JEZ, without effective command and 

control, is extremely difficult to safely implement. 

Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ) Operations 

 In FEZ operations, the responsibility for engagement lies with the fighter. These 

operations may take place in airspace above and beyond the engagement ranges of 

surface-based (land and sea) air defense systems and are an alternative engagement 

operation if the detailed control aspects of joint engagement operations cannot be met. 
21

F-15s engaging targets within a FEZ. 

Situations requiring massed combat airpower to counter enemy threats are highly 

dependent on coordination and flexibility within the airspace control system. In a FEZ, 

surface-to-air missile systems will not be allowed to fire weapons unless targets are 

positively identified as hostile 

and assigned by higher 

authority, or unless they are 

firing in self defense. FEZ 

operations offer great ability 

for the JFC to respond 

immediately with fighter assets 

to an enemy air offensive 

regardless of its location. FEZ 

operations within the airspace 

control area should not result 

in undue restraints on the 

ability of surface-based air 

defense systems to engage 

the threat. 

Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ) Operations 

 In MEZ operations, responsibility for engagement lies with surface-to-air missiles. 

These operations are ideal for point defense of critical assets, protection of maneuver 

units in the forward area, and area coverage of rear operations. MEZ operations offer 

the JFC the ability to meet the enemy with a high- and low-altitude, all-weather 

capability. Advanced surface-to-air missile systems have long-range, high-firepower 

capability that can engage enemy aircraft and missiles beyond the forward line of own 

troops (FLOT) or disrupt massed enemy air attacks prior to committing fighter assets. 

MEZ operations need to be designed to maximize the full range and capabilities of 

various systems. Finally, MEZ operations within the airspace control area should not 

unduly restrain flexibility and responsiveness of air assets or result in attacks on friendly 

assets. 

Coordination of Enemy Engagement Operations 

 The ACA and the AADC are normally the same person. This is extremely 

important in order to maintain the unity of effort and flexibility needed for effectively 

meeting the enemy air threat. With this in mind, the following general guidelines apply: 

 When urgent or emergency combat situations arise, the airspace control authority 

can authorize deviations from established policies and procedures. In these 

exceptional situations, the airspace control authority should notify all affected air 

defense assets and airspace users prior to authorizing deviations. The JFC also 

should be informed as soon as possible, as well as The International Civil Aviation 

Organization (ICAO), who can aid in disseminating notices to Airmen and other 

advisories. 
22

 When the circumstances of a contingency situation necessitate the rapid deployment 

and employment of forces for which there are no approved operations plans or 

previously established ACP, the ACA, as directed by the JFC, will establish a 

temporary airspace control system responsive to immediate tactical or operational 

requirements. The ACA will implement the planning and coordination requirements 

to modify or adjust the system as the nature of participating forces changes. 

Integration of Friendly Electronic Warfare and Suppression of Enemy 

Air Defense 

 The JFC will integrate electronic warfare and suppression of enemy defense 

measures into the overall campaign plan. This integration could degrade the 

effectiveness of some airspace control assets in the combat zone, degrade some of the 

positive identification aspects of the system, and reduce the capability to identify 

aircraft. Proper coordination by the ACA will allow procedural identification measures to 

be developed to compensate for this degradation. Thorough planning is required to 

preclude electronic warfare efforts from unduly degrading air defense and airspace 

control efforts. 

TRANSITION FROM COMBAT TO PEACETIME OPERATIONS 

 The ACP must be continually updated and evaluated throughout the evolution of 

a campaign. When combat operations cease, or the host nation/coalition again 

becomes able to provide airspace control capabilities, the ACP must reflect the new 

situation. The ACP should accommodate the redeployment of TACS and air traffic 

control assets from the AOR and provide for the orderly assumption of their duties by 

other agencies. Effective planning will ensure adequate airspace control for all levels of 

conflict encountered during a conflict and support the JFC’s overall campaign plan 

throughout the campaign. 

 The transition from combat back to peacetime operations may take time and may 

proceed through many phases. The ultimate goal of transition is to return the air traffic 

control system back to its pre-conflict state, usually within requirements as an ICAO 

signatory. This transition may depend upon many factors, such as the level of 

destruction of the occupied nation’s C2 and air traffic control infrastructure and the level 

of training and proficiency of their airspace control personnel. Facilities such as the 

RAMCC may aid in this transition. The RAMCC aids in the management and flow of 

military and civil airlift that flows into a region during a conflict. It can also aid in 

returning the nation’s air traffic control infrastructure back to normal after a conflict has 

ceased. For more on the mission of the RAMCC see Appendix C. 
23

USS Essex conducting amphibious 

operations. 

CHAPTER FOUR 

AIRSPACE CONTROL FOR SPECIFIED MISSIONS 

GENERAL 

 This chapter discusses missions that may be sub-elements of a larger operation, 

or may not exactly fit into the category of full-scale combat operations. The ACA may 

assign a portion of airspace to another commander to accomplish a specified 

mission. This may be done to accomplish a specified mission, or at the direction of the 

JFC. In this situation, the ACA may temporarily designate a subordinate commander as 

the control authority for the specified airspace area. This designated commander must 

coordinate with the ACA to ensure: 

 Unity of effort and minimize interference along adjacent boundaries. 

 Agreement on procedures for coordination of flight information, clearance of aircraft 

to enter and depart the airspace and coordination of airspace control services. 

AIRSPACE CONTROL WITHIN AN AMPHIBIOUS OBJECTIVE AREA 

(AOA) 

For airspace control in 

amphibious operations, the JFC or 

higher authority who orders the 

amphibious operations will assign to 

the commander, amphibious task 

force (CATF) an AOA, which will 

include an airspace of defined 

proportions. 

Control by the Commander, 

Amphibious Task Force 

 All air operations and airspace 

control procedures in the AOA will be 

under the control of the CATF, or 

designated CATF representative, until the amphibious operation is terminated. Unity of 

effort in overall air operations must be ensured. The CATF will coordinate air 

operations within the defined airspace with the commander responsible for airspace 

control in the surrounding area when adjacent airspace control areas exist.

Transfer of Authority to the Commander, Landing Force (CLF). As conditions 

warrant and as control and coordination agencies are established ashore, the CATF 

delegates the authority to control and coordinate supporting arms to the CLF. As part of 

this authority airspace control and the control of air operations in the AOA are passed to 
24

the CLF or to a commander of forces ashore who has the capability to control and 

coordinate such operations. 

Transfer of Authority Back to the ACA. At the termination of the amphibious 

operation, the AOA will be disestablished. Airspace control will be passed to the ACA 

designated for that area in accordance with the JFC’s initiating directive. 

JFC’s Guidance on Coordination. Guidance on the coordination procedures 

required for aircraft providing support into the AOA and amphibious task force aircraft 

providing support outside the AOA must be established in the initiating directive. 

Approved missions will be reflected in the standard air tasking order (ATO) as described 

in JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 

For specific details on airspace control in amphibious operations, refer to JP 3-

02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, and JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for Landing 

Force Operations. 

AIRSPACE CONTROL FOR MARITIME MISSIONS 

 The variety of organic weapons within the carrier strike group (CSG) allows for 

defense options other than airborne defense alone. Control and defense procedures 

and measures may differ from those in land-based operations. To achieve unity of 

effort for the defense of the CSG, or for a specific mission in support of the JFC, the 

ACA may designate an airspace control sector or area to the maritime commander. The 

Maritime Airspace Sector Commander should coordinate with the ACA on the areas 

listed below: 

 Procedures for coordination of flight information. 

 Clearance of aircraft to enter and depart the maritime airspace sector. 

 Procedures for assisting and coordinating with airspace control elements that 

respond to adjacent or supporting component commanders. 

 Procedures for deconfliction of operations during transitional operations and during 

operations in overlapping airspace areas (including FEZ, JEZ, and MEZ operations). 

 Procedures for coordination of minimum-risk routes and fleet air defense 

identification zones to assist in eliminating fratricide 

AIRSPACE CONTROL DURING STABILITY OPERATIONS 

Air Force forces must be ready to undertake a variety of missions. Stability 

operations are generally confined to a specific geographic area and are often 

characterized by constraints on the forces, weapons, and tactics employed and the level 

of hostility. Depending on the environment, mission, and location throughout the range 
25

Counternarcotics operations involve numerous US and host 

nation agencies and require extensive coordination and 

positive identification to ensure success and safety. 

of military operations, the degree of control may need to be increasingly rigorous and 

the ROE more restrictive. This is especially true in an environment that can transition 

quickly from combat to noncombat and back again and often has constraints on the 

forces, weapons, and conduct of ATC activities. Any required changes or waivers to 

national regulations, as well as problems that result from restrictions to military 

operations, should be forwarded to the JFC and may be referred through diplomatic 

channels for resolution. 

Joint forces may be called on to participate in operations that involve US security 

for intelligence missions, raids, rescue missions, or other limited uses of military forces. 

In these operations it may not be possible to implement some of the airspace control 

procedures described in this publication. When conducting these missions, joint forces 

may encounter opposing military forces whose capabilities and potential for hostilities 

vary widely, so the airspace control function will have to vary accordingly. Planning for 

these operations, however informal or brief, should include: 

 Deconfliction between units and aircraft performing the military mission and other 

types of air traffic. 

 Timely and effective implementation of appropriate airspace control procedures if 

hostilities ensue. 

Peacekeeping Operations 

 Peacekeeping operations can involve all air missions, including both fixed and 

rotary-wing aircraft of all components. These are the missions most likely to fluctuate 

from combat to noncombat and back again. To reduce the risk of mutual interference 

and/or fratricide all missions must appear on the ATO. However, in cases of highdensity aircraft operations, such as an AOA, published in the ACO, aircraft may operate 

without an ATO mission number. All aircraft involved in the operation must monitor a 

common frequency and operate on designated IFF/SIF modes and codes, which must 

be appropriately checked prior to mission start. This type of rigorous control is 

necessary during such operations because the mix of friendly, enemy, and neutral 
26

Global Hawk UAV in flight.

aircraft and mission constraints require the JFC to strictly control flights in the AOR. 

The airspace control methods the ACA recommends to the JFC should be continually 

evaluated for effectiveness and efficiency as the environment and mission change. 

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) or Low Air Threat Situations 

 When supporting FID or low air threat situations, activities are focused so the 

host nation is the primary agent in most actions. Extensive coordination with the host 

nation(s) or multinational force airspace control or ATC system will be required. 

 Airspace control in a FID situation is based on air traffic regulations and control of 

civil and military airspace users. In FID, the ATC system of the host nation frequently 

provides the framework around which most of the airspace control takes place. A 

theater air control system may or may not be established. The existing airspace 

control system may require some modification as the specific situation requires. 

 Airspace control activities in this environment are largely related to air traffic 

regulation and control. Special identification procedures and air traffic regulation may 

require that all flight operations be planned and coordinated with the appropriate 

ATC systems of the nations involved. Adherence to ICAO regulatory procedures 

must be considered. 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVs) 

 The established principles of airspace 

management used in manned flight 

operations will normally apply to UAVs. 

Pilots and operators of USAF UAVs are 

trained and certified to fly and operate their 

aircraft. They maintain currency just as 

aircrew on manned aircraft. They require 

theater certification before piloting and 

operating their aircraft in an AOR. 

 UAVs are generally difficult to acquire 

due to their small radar cross-section, and 

therefore present a potential hazard to high 

performance aircraft. There has also been a proliferation of UAVs in recent years. The 

mission of UAVs has expanded from that of ISR missions to include capabilities of 

weapons delivery as well. As adversaries improve upon UAV technology, counter UAV 

operations are becoming an important consideration. Therefore, it is imperative to be 

able to distinguish friendly UAV operations and enemy UAVs. Small UAVs are more 

difficult to visually acquire and pose greater challenges to air defense and airspace 

management personnel. The use of procedural control measures or tracking devices 

will soon be required to identify friendly unmanned systems, as is already the case with 

manned aircraft. 
27

Airspace Integration and Management of UAVs in the Combat Zone 

 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles vary in size and weight, ranging from the 25,000 

pound Global Hawk to the half-pound Black Widow. As technology improves, the 

numbers of UAVs in the battlespace are growing dynamically each year. Regardless of 

size, UAV operations require special considerations in terms of airspace control and 

usage. Specific volumes of planned airspace for UAVs need to be included in the ACO, 

and operational UAV information must be part of the theater airspace control plan (ACP) 

and special instructions (SPINS). Each service will have significant numbers of UAVs 

that may operate over or near friendly forces, airfields, and ports providing force 

protection or conducting reconnaissance, surveillance, or targeting missions. All UAV 

missions need to be coordinated with the appropriate command and control agency 

prior to launch, ensuring effective integration/deconfliction with other airspace users. 

Although coordinated, small UAVs may not be included in the ATO/SPINS. These UAVs 

must be deconflicted on a real-time basis with the appropriate airspace control agency. 

If UAV operations are not deconflicted properly, unsafe flying conditions may result, 

which may result in some airspace users being unable to accomplish their mission. 

Thorough coordination will ensure the safe separation of UAVs and manned aircraft as 

well as preventing engagement by friendly forces. 

Airspace Integration and Management of UAVs in the National and 

International Airspace 

Unmanned systems must be integrated into national and international airspace. 

Operation of UAVs and remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) inside restricted and warning 

areas in the United States are conducted at the discretion of the Air Force. Operations 

in the National Airspace System require a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

certificate of authorization (COA) negotiated with the appropriate FAA region. The Air 

Force currently has several COAs on file with the FAA, and all have enabled UAVs and 

RPAs to operate outside of restricted/warning areas when required in order to complete 

mission requirements. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense UAV Roadmap instructed the Air Force to 

“coordinate revising FAA Order 7610.4, Special Military Operations, to replace the 

requirement for using the certificate of authorization process for all UAVs with one for 

using the DD175 (flight plan) form for qualifying UAVs.” Also, the Air Force is working 

with other Services and US Government agencies to develop technologies, such as 

sense-and-avoid systems, that will increase flight safety. The near-term goal is for RPA 

and UAV operators to be able to file a flight plan and fly above or below commercial air 

traffic, with some restrictions on climbing and descending through airspace that is also 

used by commercial aircraft. By 2025, RPA and UAV operators may be able to file an 

instrument flight plan and fly anywhere in national or international airspace.
28

CRUISE/LONG RANGE MISSILE OPERATIONS 

 Much like UAVs, in the employment of cruise and long range missile systems 

such as conventional air launched cruise missiles (CALCM), joint air to surface standoff 

missiles (JASSM), and Army tactical missile systems (ATACM) operations, the 

established principles of airspace management used in manned flight operations will 

normally apply. The CALCM is designed to be a standoff weapon fired from a launch 

point on a pre-programmed flight profile to a designated target. The flight profile is 

based on the en route threat to the weapon from launch point to target. Due to its small 

radar cross-section, positive control is not an effective means to deconflict CALCM 

operations with other airspace users. Procedural ACMs must be used and are identified 

primarily in the ACO and also discussed in the ACP during the planning phase of air 

operations. Deconfliction must be done on a real-time basis once operations 

commence. 

 The JASSM is an autonomous, long-range, conventional, air-to-ground, precision 

standoff missile. It is designed to destroy high-value, well-defended, fixed and 

relocatable targets at ranges beyond enemy air defenses. It is fired from a preplanned 

launch point or area. Its route of flight is designed to minimize exposure to known 

threats and is normally known prior to missile launch. Similar to CALCM, procedural 

ACMs must be used and identified in the ACP, ATO, and SPINS during the planning 

phase of air operations, or deconfliction must be done on a real-time basis once 

operations commence. Once hostilities start, deconfliction procedures will be included 

in the ACO and may be included in the ATO and SPINS. 

 The ATACMS provide long-range, surface-to-surface fire support for Army corps 

and division operations. ATACMS are guided missile systems with an 

antipersonnel/antimateriel (APAM) warhead. Targets include surface-to-surface missile 

and multiple rocket launcher units; air defense systems; logistics elements; and 

command, control, and communications complexes. ATACMS operations are usually 

planned or requested by corps, echelon above corps, Service, and/or functional 

components, or the JFC. Procedural means are used to deconflict ATACMS operations 

via the ACO, ATO, SPINS, or real-time notification measures are used for immediate 

fires. The AOC airspace cell, upon notification of an imminent ATACMS launch, 

establishes a restricted operations zone (ROZ) around the launch area and impact area, 

and, a corridor to protect the missile en route. Working in concert with the Army 

airspace command and control system (A2C2) element, the air support operations 

center (ASOC) (or direct air support center, if applicable) is able to deconflict close air 

support (CAS) aircraft in the projected impact area. Deconfliction is also required 

beyond the range of CAS operations/assets and will be coordinated through the 

airborne warning and control system (AWACS) or the control and reporting center 

(CRC) or the tactical air operations center (TAOC) as the applicable controlling agency. 
29

 Combat inspires the need to invent things on the spot 

when you have to handle difficult circumstances you’ve never 

come across before. 

 —General John P. Jumper, CSAF 

CHAPTER FIVE 

AIRSPACE CONTROL EXECUTION: THE THEATER AIR CONTROL 

SYSTEM (TACS) 

GENERAL 

The Air Force airspace C2 system reflects the air and space power tenet of 

centralized control and decentralized execution. The Air Force TACS is the C2 

mechanism that provides the COMAFFOR with the means to achieve this tenet. 

TACS elements may be employed in garrison, deployed for contingencies or deployed 

to augment theater-specific systems. Advances in communications and data link 

capabilities enable tailoring the configuration of the TACS to meet the dynamics of an 

operation. While sometimes configured differently in the various theaters of operations, 

the basic functions performed by the TACS are the same. The TACS is the 

COMAFFOR’s executor for the AADP, ACP, and ACO. When combined with other 

component’s C2 elements the TACS becomes the theater air-ground system (TAGS), to 

execute operations for the JFACC. 

ORGANIZATION, FACILITIES, AND PERSONNEL 

The Air Force organization for controlling air forces is derived from the basic 

qualities of airpower: flexibility, range, and speed. Because airpower can quickly apply 

force to a wide range of targets, centralized planning and control are essential to 

efficient employment. On the other hand, the details of directing the actions of many 

widely separated units require delegation; thus the necessity for decentralized 

execution. The TACS is a hierarchy of organizations and C2 systems to plan, direct, 
30

Component liaisons

Area Air Defense

Weather

Legal

Airspace Management

Logistics/Sustainment

Space

Information Warfare

Rescue Coordination

System Administration

Air-to-Air Refueling

Communication Operations

(Others as needed)

Strategy 

Division

Strategy Plans 

Team

 Strategy

 Guidance

 Team

Combat

Plans

Division

 TE Team

MAAP Team

ATO

Production

Team

C2 Planning

Team

Combat 

Ops 

Division

Offensive

Operations

Team

Defensive 

Operations

Team

Air Mobility

Division

Airlift Control

Team

Air Refueling

Control Team

Air Mobility

Control Team

Aeromedical

Evacuation

Control Team

ISR 

Division

Analysis,

Correlation,

and Fusion

Team

Targets / CA

 Team

ISR

Operations

Team

 (ISR 

Management. 

 And

 RFI

 Management)

PED

Management

Team

 Senior

 Officer

 ISR Duty

 Team

Team

 Operational 

 Assessment

and control theater air operations and coordinate air operations with other Services and 

allied forces. The TACS airspace control role is to be the executor of the ACP and 

ACO. The elements of the TACS coordinate, integrate, and regulate airspace activities 

within the Air Force. For a more detailed examination of each element of the TACS, 

see AFTTP 3-1, Vol. 26, Theater Air Control System and AFOTTP 2-3.2, Air and Space 

Operations Center. 

AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER (AOC) 

Figure 5.1. Basic Structure of a Notional AOC 

 The AOC is the senior element of the TACS. It is an Air Force weapon system, 

known as the Falconer. It is the air and space operations planning and execution focal 

point for the JFACC, exercising OPCON and TACON. It is where centralized planning, 

direction, control, and coordination of air and space operations occur. AOC personnel 

are responsible for planning, executing and assessing air and space operations and 

directing changes, as the situation dictates. The AOC provides the air and space 

component commander the capability to plan, execute, and assess air and space 

operations. The AOC is nominally designed and organized to conduct intense air 

operations consistent with a major theater war. The JFACC retains the flexibility to 

organize and man the AOC as necessary to meet the operational requirements of the 

contingency for which air operations are being conducted. Each AOC is uniquely 
31

tailored to the local environment, resource availability, operational demands, and 

command relationships of the military and civilian hierarchy. As such, AOC operations 

can be defined more by functions than by manning. In addition, although the Air Force 

provides the core manpower for the AOC, other components contributing air and space 

forces also provide personnel as necessary. 

 The AOC is organized under a director, with five divisions (strategy; combat 

plans; combat operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and air 

mobility), and multiple support/specialty teams. Each integrates numerous disciplines in 

a cross-functional team approach to planning and execution. Figure 5.1 depicts a 

notional AOC organization. 

Component Liaisons 

 Each Service or functional component commander involved in the operation 

normally provides a liaison element to the AOC to articulate component requirements 

for airspace and to provide expertise in the development and execution of the AADP, 

ACP, and ACO. The special operations component commander is represented by the 

special operations liaison element (SOLE) to coordinate, deconflict, and integrate 

special operations forces (SOF) operations, strategy, and plans with conventional air. 

The other Services have a liaison presence in the AOC. The battlefield coordination 

detachment (BCD) represents the Army, while the naval and amphibious liaison 

element (NALE) articulates Navy and Marine interests, unless a separate Marine liaison 

officer (MARLO) is designated. For related discussion, see AFDD 2, Operations and 

Organization. 

Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) 

 For large operations, the JFACC may establish an ACCE with the JFC’s or the 

surface component commander’s headquarters to better integrate air and space 

operations with surface operations, and with the JTF headquarters to better integrate air 

and space operations within the overall joint force. When established, these elements 

act as the JFACC’s primary representatives to the respective commanders and facilitate 

interaction between the respective staffs. This element facilitates integration by 

exchanging current intelligence, operational data, and support requirements and 

coordinating the integration of JFACC requirements for airspace coordinating measures, 

joint fire support coordinating measures, and close air support. Element expertise 

includes plans, operations, intelligence, airspace management, and air mobility. The 

ACCE also communicates the surface commander’s decisions and interests to the 

JFACC. However, the ACCE should not replace, replicate, or circumvent normal 

request mechanisms already in place in the component/JTF staffs. The ACCE director’s 

rank should be commensurate with the rank of the component or JTF commander to 

which he/she is attached. 
32

Airspace Coordination Within the AOC 

 The airspace management specialty team leader coordinates and integrates the 

use of airspace within the AOR, assisted by the airspace managers within each division. 

Integrated into the combat plans, combat operations, and air mobility divisions within the 

AOC, the airspace managers accomplish combat airspace planning and execution. 

Within the combat plans and air mobility divisions, team members, in coordination with 

the airspace management specialty team leader, write the ACP and the ACO for the 

ACA. The combat operations division monitors the ACO and makes immediate 

changes to it as the situation dictates. Depending on the degree of integration of effort 

with other Services, host nations, and allied forces, component liaison officers may be 

assigned to assist in the development of airspace control documents. 

Regional Air Movement Control Center (RAMCC) 

 The RAMCC provides the ACA and AADC with a centralized function to help 

deconflict both military and civilian air traffic in a particular airspace control area. The 

RAMCC is a specialty team, not necessarily co-located with the AOC, reporting directly 

to the AOC Director. The goal of the RAMCC is to provide a safe and efficient operating 

environment through managing the complex interaction of military and civil aircraft 

attempting to access or transit the airspace control area. This includes combat, combat 

support, humanitarian, and commercial air operations. It also provides a way for the 

AADC to have visibility over non-AOC directed users operating in the airspace control 

area. The RAMCC is responsible for coordinating operational requirements with ICAO, 

and disseminating airspace and airfield information to operators. The RAMCC may 

include liaison officers from the coalition and neutral nations and will have interface with 

NGOs and civil or commercial users of the airspace. For more information on RAMCC, 

see Appendix C. 

THE THEATER AIR-GROUND SYSTEM (TAGS) 

 The JFC has a theater-wide system to control air operations, during the different 

maneuver phases of the conflict. The Army air-ground system, the Naval tactical air 

control system, and the Marine air command and control system combine with the 

TACS to support the JFC’s air objectives in planning and execution. To fully understand 

the relationship of the TACS to the TAGS, planners must understand each Service's 

system and its composition and structure. The TAGS combines each Service's C2 and 

airspace management system that supports the JFC. It provides the framework that 

allows each service system to exist in a joint and coalition force environment and 

support the JFC. The TAGS is discussed in the paragraphs below. 

Army Air-Ground System (AAGS) 

 The AAGS provides the control system for synchronizing, coordinating, and 

integrating air operations with the land component commander's (LCC) scheme of 

maneuver. The AAGS provides the means to initiate, receive, process, and execute 

requests for air support and to disseminate information and intelligence produced by 
33

aerial assets. Some elements attached to the AAGS are liaisons provided by the Air 

Force. These elements are the air mobility liaison officer (AMLO), the Tactical Air 

Control Party (TACP), and the ASOC. They function as a single entity in planning, 

coordinating, deconflicting, and integrating the air support operations with ground 

elements. The principal Army agencies are command posts (CPs), fire support 

elements, air defense elements, A2C2 elements, and coordination and liaison elements, 

such as the BCD, theater Army air and missile defense coordinator, and ground liaison 

officers (GLOs). 

Navy Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) 

 The senior Navy amphibious air control agency is the Navy TACC. The functions 

of the TACC may be spread across several ships. The Navy TACC possesses the 

functionality of future plans and current operations. During amphibious operations, the 

Navy TACC coordinates the types of airspace coordinating measures and controls all 

air operations within the operational area until a land-based air control agency is 

established ashore. Once a land-based air control agency receives control of all 

landing force air operations, the Navy TACC becomes a tactical air direction center 

(TADC), supporting the land-based air control agency. Ideally, the Navy TACC is 

collocated with the supporting arms coordination center (SACC). 

 

Marine Corps Tactical Air Command Center 

 The Marine TACC is the senior agency of the Marine air command and control 

system (MACCS). When established ashore, it provides the facilities for the aviation 

combat element (ACE) commander and staff to conduct amphibious air operations. If 

the ACE is afloat, the Marine TACC may be incrementally phased ashore. Initially, a 

Marine TADC is established ashore subordinate to the Navy TACC and is responsible 

for air operations in the landward sector of the operational area. Upon completion of its 

build-up and when airspace management functions are passed from afloat to ashore the 

Marine TADC assumes the title and responsibilities of the Marine TACC. The Navy 

TACC then becomes a TADC, in support of the Marine TADC. 
34

 General Moseley explained how it would all work. There “will be

a 24-hour presence of forward air controllers both on the ground

and in the air, plus a 24-hour presence of a mix of aircraft and

ordnance,” he said. Munitions options—from guns to Mavericks to

five hundred-pound LGBs—would let operators “truly select the

right weapon for the right situation.”...It was a carefully

diagrammed plan. The bull’s-eye center was the Baghdad

Restricted Operations Zone or B-ROZ. V Corps had already done

detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield for Baghdad. In

addition, standard killbox and keypad control measures applied.

Forty miles out, aircraft approaching the zone checked in with

ground controllers. Inbound aircraft were kept separate from

egressing aircraft by altitude as well as heading separations. They

then joined one of four CAS stacks on different radials over the

city. Ten strike aircraft and four airborne Forward Air Controllers

filled each stack. Bombers were available, too. Specific guidance

to aircrews included instructions on compensating for smoke and

debris, and how to fly the safest attack angles. They carried a

variety of ordnance ranging from laser-guided bombs to inert bomb

shapes and ammunition for their guns. The idea was to minimize

“rubbling” and ensure that weapons could be delivered very close

to friendly forces.... 

—General T. Michael Moseley, discussing 

Urban CAS operations during Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM, in The First 600 Days of 

Combat by Rebecca Grant 
35

GROUND TACS (GTACS) ELEMENTS 

Control and Reporting Center (CRC) 

 The CRC is a deployable battlespace management platform employed at the 

tactical level to support air operations planning and execution across the entire 

spectrum of operations, from stability operations to a major combat operation. The 

CRC is directly subordinate to the AOC. As a tactical C2 element, it can operate 

independently or in combination with other tactical C2 elements (e.g., AWACS, joint 

surveillance targeting and attack radar system [JSTARS]) The AOC assigns the CRC a 

geographic area, within which it manages all air defense, offensive air and airspace 

management activities, and assists in the execution of offensive operations. Execution 

of both airspace control and air defense operations can be delegated to the CRC, if the 

situation requires it, by the AOC. The CRC is also responsible for recommending 

changes in air defense warning conditions based on the air situation. The CRC 

provides battle management, weapons control, surveillance, identification, and link 

management within unit manning and equipment constraints. In terms of airspace 

control/management, it accomplishes these tasks by providing management and 

deconfliction of airspace use in support of theater air operations. Operating 

continuously, the CRC is uniquely capable of delegated airspace control plan/order 

execution including the control of FEZ/MEZ, MRR, air refueling tracks, restricted 

operating zones (ROZ), DCA, combat air patrol (CAP), kill boxes, and high value 

airborne assets (HVAA) orbits by: 

 Receiving and fusing surveillance data from organic and external sources, and 

providing a recognized air picture (RAP) to the AOC via data link(s). 

 Identifying all air tracks. 

 Assigning weapons to engage targets and scrambling or diverting counterair aircraft. 

 Providing positive control to aerial refueling and search and rescue missions. 

 Compliance with ACP / ACO. 

CRC Remote Radars

 The CRC may deploy mobile radars and associated communications equipment 

to expand radar coverage and communications range within its assigned operating 

area. These remote radars are capable of providing early warning, surveillance, 

weapons control, and identification functions. 

Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) 

 The ASOC is an element of the TACS directly subordinate to the AOC, but 

normally located with the senior army tactical level of command. The ASOC 

coordinates with the corps (or the senior army tactical level of command, as applicable) 

for the integration of air operations within the corps area of operations (AO). The ASOC 
36

provides fast reaction to requests for air support and is also capable of conducting time 

sensitive targeting within its area. The ASOC and subordinate TACPs are provided in 

direct support to their associated Army unit(s). Operational control of the supporting 

effort will be exercised through the ASOC director to the subordinate TACPs. The 

ASOC has communications links to the TACPs and disseminates ATO mission data to 

them. The ASOC plays a major role in airspace control in their area of operations 

through the execution of joint airspace coordinating measures, such as high density 

airspace control zones (HIDACZ) and MRR. It deconflicts airspace usage with the 

Army’s fire and effects coordination cell (FECC), G-3 air, and Army A2C2 element. 

Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs) 

TACPs are the principal Air Force liaison elements, aligned with Army maneuver 

units from battalion through corps, and consist of air liaison officers (ALOs) and terminal 

attack controllers (TACs). TACPs advise ground commanders on the capabilities and 

limitations of air power and provide the primary Air Force terminal attack control of CAS 

in support of ground forces. They coordinate directly with Army airspace and fire 

support agencies to deconflict air operations in the ground sector. They may employ 

both formal and informal fire support coordinating measures to prevent fratricide or 

synchronize air operations with surface fire support. TACP members are recognized as 

joint terminal attack controllers (JTAC). They are qualified and current joint terminal 

attack controllers who are recognized across the DOD as capable and authorized to 

provide terminal attack control. They are qualified to direct the action of combat aircraft 

engaged in close air support and other offensive operations. 

 

AIRBORNE ELEMENTS OF THE THEATER AIR CONTROL SYSTEM 

(AETACS) 

Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The AWACS is an airborne radar 

control element of the TACS and is normally one of the first battle management assets 

to arrive in theater. As such, it is tasked with tactical C2 by providing early warning, 

surveillance, battle management, combat ID, and weapons control functions. It has the 

ability to detect and control aircraft below and beyond the coverage of ground-based 

radars and enables a more accurate air picture through various tactical data links 

(TDLs), also referred to as tactical digital information links (TADILs) in joint 

publications. The AWACS’ range, flexibility, and C2 system capabilities enable it to 

operate directly subordinate to the AOC. The AWACS is capable of performing many of 

the capabilities of the CRC, depending upon mission configuration and the needs of the 

theater. 

Joint Surveillance Targeting and Attack Radar System (JSTARS). JSTARS is a 

command and control battle management system often subordinate to the AOC. It is 

designed to provide ground surveillance, target detection, and target-tracking capability 

to develop the enemy ground picture. Joint STARS provides the supported 

commander(s) a means for battle management and support to offensive air operations 

by providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support; support to 

offensive air operations; and command and control that contribute to an understanding 
37

When working in tandem, JSTARS and AWACS provide the 

JFACC both the air and ground picture, enabling near real 

time airspace control decisions.

of the enemy situation and assist commanders to delay, disrupt, and destroy enemy 

forces in accordance with the JFC’s overall objectives. It is used for identifying 

opportunities for rapid interdiction and retargeting of enemy ground forces. It can also 

function in a limited role as a backup ASOC to assign or divert sorties to more lucrative 

targets, coordinating with TACP, Army command and control centers, and the AOC. 

Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC[A]). The FAC(A) is an airborne extension of 

the TACP and has the authority to direct aircraft delivering ordnance to a specific target 

cleared by the ground commander. The FAC(A) provides additional flexibility in the 

battlespace by enabling rapid coordination and execution of air operations. It also 

enhances the TACS’ situational awareness by disseminating information on the flow of 

aircraft on target. 

Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR) Operations. SCAR operations, 

also called killer scout operations, are similar to those performed by a FAC (A). SCARqualified aircrew can control the flow of fighters in and out of working areas and provide 

targeting guidance and BDA reports. They are not, however, formally trained or 

qualified for release authority for CAS operations (i.e., when friendly troops are in close 

proximity to the target). Not all air-to-ground aircrews are SCAR-trained or certified. 

A-10 and F-16 aircraft 

functioning as FAC(A) add 

great flexibility to time critical 

air operations in support of 

ground forces.
38

C2 ELEMENTS THAT INTERFACE WITH THE TACS 

Air Mobility Liaison Officer (AMLO). AMLOs are rated air mobility officers supporting 

the Army through corps, division, and separate brigade, or regiment levels. AMLOs 

advise ground commanders, commanders’ staffs, and the ALO on the capabilities, 

limitations, and use of air mobility resources. They also assist in planning, requesting, 

and using airlift resources.

Airborne Command Element (ACE). The ACE is an optional element composed of a 

single officer or team of mission experts who fly on board airborne C2 platforms and 

function as the JFACC’s representative. When required, the ACE conducts the air battle 

in accordance with the latest command guidance. 

Expeditionary Operations Center (EOC). EOC is the key command and control 

center that bridges the C2 gap between operational planning and tactical execution. 

This center provides the AEW commander with a rapidly deployable, tailorable, single 

source C2 center that contains all the C2, information, and expeditionary combat 

support elements necessary to effectively establish an airbase, bed down the force, 

generate the mission, sustain the force, and redeploy the force. The EOC provides 

functional experts to receive, schedule, plan, and direct execution of the ATO. As 

required, the EOC is capable of connecting with the AOC, CRC, and the ASOC through 

voice and data communications. From the EOC the AEW commander can respond to 

airbase attack or emergency incidents while maximizing mission execution. The EOC 

provides a clear C2 entity for the entire expeditionary base. This is especially effective 

when working with host nation representatives, tenant organizations, joint, and coalition 

forces 

Special Tactics Teams (STTs). Although not part of the TACS, special tactics teams 

are a part of the theater special operations forces and normally under OPCON of the 

joint force special operations component commander. TACON of STTs to support 

theater mobility operations may be delegated to the JFACC. STTs establish visual and 

procedural terminal area airspace control (attack, command and control, and air traffic 

services at remote drop/landing zones and austere or expeditionary airfields. They 

sustain these operations until relieved by other elements (TACP, tanker airlift control 

element, or general purpose air traffic service forces). 

AIRSPACE CONTROL PROCEDURES 

Responsibilities 

 The C2 system can be tailored to support the Air Force tenets of centralized 

control-decentralized execution of forces from the smallest stability operation to fullscale combat operations. The Air Force will provide the COMAFFOR with the resources 

necessary to meet responsibilities as the ACA and AADC during small scale operations 

that do not require a JFACC, and as the JFACC during large scale operations that 

include air and space power from the other Services. Under either circumstance, the 
39

Aircraft with different missions have differing airspace 

 requirements, which must be deconflicted. 

Air Force will support the JFACC to ensure unity of effort in all aspects of theater air 

operations. 

Implementation 

 The ACP provides specific planning guidance and procedures for the airspace 

control system for the JOA, including airspace control procedures. The ACP will be 

distributed as a separate document or as an annex to the operations plan. The ACO, 

implementation directive of the ACP, is normally disseminated as a separate document. 

The ACO provides the details of ACMs for the next ATO/ACO cycle and includes fire 

support coordinating measures and other information that airspace users need. 

 The elements of the TACS along with other components’ forces use the ACO to 

execute the airspace control function. Changes to the ACO are published on an asneeded basis. 

Airspace Deconfliction Procedures 

 The airspace management team in the AOC deconflicts airspace. The combat 

plans division usually resolves conflicts during the planning cycle. The combat 

operations division handles real-time conflicts. Deconfliction is executed by elements of 

the TACS capable of providing airspace control functions and achieved by time, altitude, 

space, and other procedural means. 

Integration with Air Defense 

 To minimize the risk of friendly air defense weapons engaging friendly aircraft, 

the Air Force C2 organization is structured to accommodate air defense operations 

coincident with airspace control. Air defense functions of weapons control, surveillance, 

and ID are inherent in the TACS, from the oversight and direction provided by the AOC, 

down through the execution capability of the AWACS and the CRC. 
40

The CRC passes identification information to AWACS and other 

agencies involved in air defense operations and airspace 

deconfliction.

Integration of Air Defense and Airspace Control in the Air and Space 

Operations Center 

 Airspace control and air defense functions are integrated in both the combat 

plans and combat operations divisions. In the combat plans division, the ground and 

airborne C2 planning staff officers and other Service liaison officers (LNOs) integrate air 

defense considerations such as MRR; IFF/SIF modes and codes; fighter altitudes; and 

MEZ, FEZ, and JEZ areas for airspace control in publishing the ATO, ACO, and ACP. 

In the combat operations division, the chief of combat operations (CCO), through the 

airspace manager, is responsible for the execution of airspace control while the senior 

air defense duty officer (SADO) is responsible for the air defense portion of air 

operations. This organizational arrangement and further description of the specific 

duties of the positions in the AOC are found in AFI 13-1AOC, Vol 3, Operational 

Procedures-Air and Space Operations Center and AFOTTP 2-3.2, Air and Space 

Operations Center. 

INTEGRATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION WITH SURFACE 

OPERATIONS 

 Airspace control procedures increase in complexity and detail when air 

forces operate in proximity with, or in conjunction with, surface forces. To prevent both 

air-to-surface and surface-to-air fratricide, joint operations must be synchronized and 

integrated within this portion of the battlespace. The Army’s BCD in the AOC enables 

exchange of information and integration of Army air defense forces in direct support of 

the LCC into the JFACC’s plan for an integrated air defense. The BCD also provides 

visibility of Army air defense assets in direct support of the LCC engaged in maneuver 

and aids in preventing fratricide. 

Each AO may be defined with specific boundaries. Within each AO you may 

have a fire support coordination line (FSCL), forward line of own troops (FLOT), 

FSCMs, ACMs, or multiples of these during nonlinear operations. Another boundary 
41

Common Geographic Reference System 

During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Air Force aircrews and forward

air controllers improved upon a system to deconflict aircraft and other weapon

systems in the congested airspace over Afghanistan. Reference systems to help

manage and ID the battlespace are not new. During the siege of Khe Sanh in Viet

Nam, pre-established restricted and free fire zones were used. During Operation

DESERT STORM, a grid overlay system known as a "kill box” was developed. The

kill box concept was also adopted in Operation DELIBERATE FORCE in Kosovo,

then further defined in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.

The Air Force is developing a standardized grid reference system for adoption in

all theaters, known as the common geographic reference system (CGRS). The

CGRS is a two-dimensional construct to improve joint weapons integration over the

battlespace. Some applications of the CGRS can be made three-dimensional by

adding altitude restrictions. The development of battlespace control measures is an

evolutionary process. 

For further detail see AFTTP(I) 3-2.59 MTTP for Kill Box Employment

definition is to use a coordination altitude to vertically separate rotary wing and UAV 

traffic from faster moving aircraft. One method to define AOs is a kill box grid that 

covers the entire theater. 

Kill Box Operations 

 Kill boxes are normally used when a support relationship already exists between 

two or more functional or service components. The goal is to reduce the coordination 

required to fulfill support requirements with maximum flexibility, while preventing 

fratricide. A kill box is a three-dimensional area reference that enables timely, effective 

coordination and control and facilitates rapid attacks. US Central Command, US 

European Command, and US Forces Korea typically define kill boxes by 30x30 minute 

squares, further divided into nine 10x10 minute sections. Each section is commonly 

referred to as a “keypad,” in comparison to a telephone keypad. 
42

Communications for

the TACS include 

line-of sight and 

satellite systems. 

The authority over kill box status, whether short or beyond the FSCL, rests with 

the supported commander. Concurrence of the LCC is mandatory for opening any kill 

box short of the FSCL to ensure that all land forces are clear of the designated area. 

Since the ASOC is deployed with the land force and is normally the TACS element 

responsible for airspace short of the FSCL, it is the ideal agency to coordinate the 

opening and closing of kill boxes in that zone. For operations beyond the FSCL, 

AWACS, the CRC, or the AOC will likely be the agencies to contact to determine kill box 

status. Integration of air-to-surface and surface-to-surface fires requires application of 

appropriate restrictions: altitude, time separation, or lateral separation. The supported 

commander will determine which of these is appropriate for the mission and ensure 

dissemination through the appropriate C2 nodes. 

Kill boxes are complementary to, and do not preclude or conflict with, other fire 

support coordinating measures, and may be employed on either side of the FSCL. To 

use kill boxes in this manner, it is critical that the same common geographic reference 

system is used throughout the JOA. The Air Land Sea Application Center is 

responsible for the multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting kill 

box operations. 

 

 When integrating, TACS liaison elements consider the employment of long-range 

surface weapons systems, fratricide risks, operational requirements, the battlefield 

framework, as well as fire support coordinating measures that are in use. Airspace 

control and operational considerations while operating in 

proximity with or in conjunction with surface forces are 

further discussed in AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland. 

COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION 

 The TACS has undergone evolutionary changes 

in order to maintain the flexibility and responsiveness 

necessary to support highly mobile forces using more 

lethal weapons on a larger, nonlinear battlefield. 

Although the C2 infrastructure has remained fairly 

stable, the communications network has improved 

significantly, enhancing the reliability, security, and 

timeliness of information flow in the theater of 

operations. These enhancements (voice and data) have 

enabled AETACS to operate directly under the AOC, 

with JSTARS assuming some functions of the ASOC. 

This provides the JFACC with a variety of employment 

options. Secure voice (UHF, VHF, and HF) is a highly 

reliable means of communication. It was used as the 

primary means to communicate among airborne 

elements during Operations ENDURING FREEDOM 

and IRAQI FREEDOM. 
43

Communications Planning 

 Planning is an essential element of effective airspace command and control. The 

need to communicate effectively demands that planners analyze the warfighter’s 

requirements and translate those needs into workable solutions. These needs are 

normally met by installing a combination of organic and commercial communications 

systems prioritized to meet the commander’s mission. The goal is to maximize the use 

of organic military capabilities and expand with commercial systems to increase 

capacity and reliability and to generate greater freedom of action. 

Airspace Communications Systems 

 

 The primary means of communications between airspace command and control 

elements and airspace users is voice. Principal transmission should be through secure 

and anti-jam radio equipment. The TACS includes line of sight and satellite systems, but 

planners should also ensure that radio relays are considered to enhance over-thehorizon radio communications. 

Data 

 TDLs (also referred to as TADILs) are standardized communication links, 

approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suitable for transmission of digital information. All 

Services, including the Air Force, use these links primarily for C2 of the air defense 

network. Since the nodes for air defense are also the nodes for airspace control, these 

rapid data transmission means can support airspace control as an ancillary function. 

Link 16 has been designated as the primary data link for use in the combat air forces 

(CAF). Examples of links that may be used to facilitate executing the airspace function 

are: 

 Army Tactical Data Link 1. 

 Link-11/11B (TADIL A/TADIL B). 

 Link 14 (Maritime, UHF or HF). 

 Link 16 (TADIL J). 

CJCSM 6120.01C, Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link Operating Procedures provides a 

detailed description of each link shown above. 

 Other tools exist for extending the TDL network. The situation awareness data 

link (SADL) integrates Air Force close air support aircraft with the digitized battlefield via 

the Army’s enhanced position location reporting system. It provides fighter-to-fighter 

and air-to-ground/ground-to-air secure communications. The data link gateway is a 

Navy system that provides TDL connectivity to a wide variety of users. Ships, aircraft, 

ADA units and fixed C2 sites use either a host emulator or a terminal emulator to pass 

data via TADIL J links, if not TADIL J-equipped. Some AETACS and GTACS elements 
44

have this capability. The data link gateway can also be used for exercises and for 

operational training. 
45

CHAPTER SIX 

INTEGRATION OF AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES 

INTO THE AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM 

 Body Text styl 

 Body Text styl 

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL’S FUNCTION IN THE AIRSPACE SYSTEM 

Close coordination among airspace control, air defense, and air traffic 

control elements is required to maximize combat effectiveness while preventing 

fratricide and mutual interference. At the core of this concept is a full-spectrum 

safety and risk management focus, including the implementation of a sound risk 

management plan. Commanders must ensure risks are balanced against mission 

requirements and mitigate the risks or stop operations when those risks become too 

great. Air traffic control operations are required during every stage of a conflict to 

ensure a safe flying environment. Military-managed airspace control and air defense 

operations are only employed when the need arises. The air traffic control system must 

be able to accommodate an increased operations tempo and to support air defense and 

airspace control requirements as they are levied by the JFC and dictated by the 

operational situation. The ATC system must also deconflict air base defense/force 

protection operations that may extend into the terminal traffic area.

PLANNING 

 In a deteriorating situation, commanders determine the forces required, the 

arrival sequence, and to what level of risk they are willing to expose the airfield 

operations forces. Additionally, deployed airfield operations forces must be prepared to 

be self-sufficient during the early stages of an operation since the logistics system may 

not be in place. Initial airfield operations should plan to deploy with adequate capability 

and supplies to maintain operations until the theater is capable of supporting operations, 

and the resupply pipeline is established. 

 Though missions vary widely across the range of military

operations, the framework and process for C2 of joint air

operations are consistent. Control of joint air operations... is

complicated by the possible use of airspace by civilian

airlines, national and international agencies, governmental

and NGOs, allied and coalition forces, and other participating

entities. Joint air operations may be integrated within an

existing air structure, or one may have to be established by

the joint force. 

 —JP 3-30, Command and Control

 for Joint Air Operations
46

 Airfield operations officers and/or air traffic controllers who are qualified airspace 

planners are assigned to numbered Air Forces as combat airspace managers in the 

AOC. Oversight of all AOC airspace managers is provided by the airspace 

management specialty team leader. Combat plans’ airspace manager’s duties include 

ACP and ACO development and production. The airspace management specialty team 

is responsible for representing the JFC’s interests in international and host nation 

agreements, such as those required to establish the JFACC as the ACA and to ensure 

integration of all flight operations. They also coordinate with the terminal airfield 

operations element to support deliberate and crisis action planning, deployment, 

employment, sustainment, and redeployment of airfield operations forces. 

 Airspace management specialty team members and liaison positions will be filled 

by airfield operations-qualified personnel. The liaison personnel provide support to 

various worldwide cells or theater staffs to ensure the US and its allies can quickly apply 

global power to crisis situations anywhere in the world. 

Terminal Area Air Traffic Services/Airfield Management 

 

 Terminal area air traffic services and airfield management must be capable of 

supporting operations as required by the JFC. Normally aligned under the 

COMAFFOR’s A3, the role of the airfield operations element is to support combat flight 

operations. Air Force deployable air traffic control and landing systems (DATCALS) 

provide equipment and personnel to support terminal area flight operations. DATCALS 

are designed to ensure a safe, flexible, and efficient use of terminal airspace. 

DATCALS also provide continuity of control with the TACS and air base defense forces. 

Air traffic control and airfield management personnel will deploy, operate, and sustain 

DATCALS to support operations at bare base or host nation locations. While the focus 

of the capabilities is on deploying large-scale forces into a bare base scenario, airfield 

operations packages can also be adapted to small unit and/or single mission 

deployments. 

 Airfield operations packages must also be adaptable to steady state operations in 

an ongoing combat zone after major hostilities have ceased. Terminal area air traffic 

controllers must be knowledgeable in arrival and departure procedures designed for 

threat mitigation, communications brevity codes and code words, and capabilities 

limitations of aircraft using the airfield that may affect arrival procedures. 

En Route Airspace Management. The airspace management specialty team 

coordinates airspace requirements with US and coalition force military users to provide 

for integration of the airspace control system with that of the host nation. The airspace 

management specialty team ensures airspace and air traffic control issues are handled 

effectively. It also provides oversight of airspace management personnel working within 

the AOC divisions. 
47

The terminal airfield operations element, or ATC cell, ensures integration of the 

host nation civil ATC system with the military ATC systems to include host nation 

agreements for international and national air traffic, and coordination with the ICAO, 

NGOs, and aid organizations for integration of humanitarian air missions. Internal to the 

AOC, the team plans for the full range of ATC operations to support deliberate and 

crisis action planning, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of ATC 

forces, and collaborates with combat plans to integrate airspace design in development 

of the airspace control plan. 

Flight Following Mechanisms. The air traffic control system normally uses an 

automated flight planning system to assist air traffic controllers in maintaining positive 

control of the terminal area. The ATO can be used in lieu of a flight planning system to 

provide separation. 

Procedural Control versus Radar Control. Environmental and equipment factors 

may preclude radar control of all air traffic in the combat zone. Because of this potential 

constraint, appropriate procedural methods must be available. 

Collision and Avoidance Systems. Technological advances have improved aircraft 

safety and separation and can aid in airspace control in the combat zone. The traffic 

alert/collision avoidance system (TCAS) is an airborne system developed by the Federal 

Aviation Administration that operates independently from the ground-based ATC 

system. TCAS was designed to increase cockpit awareness of proximate aircraft and to 

serve as a "last line of defense" for the prevention of mid-air collisions. There are two 

levels of TCAS systems. TCAS I was developed to accommodate the general aviation 

community and the regional airlines. This system issues traffic advisories to assist 

pilots in visual acquisition of intruder aircraft. TCAS II is a more sophisticated system 

which provides the information of TCAS I, and also analyzes the projected flight path of 

approaching aircraft and issues resolution advisories to the pilot to resolve potential 

mid-air collisions. The international community adopted these standards for the airborne 

collision avoidance system and it is now mandated throughout most of Europe and 

other countries such as Japan and Australia. 

Airfield Management. Airfield management provides notices to airmen and flight 

planning services. In coordination with deployed civil engineering and aircraft logistics, 

airfield management provides airfield criteria for inspections, markings, safety/security, 

parking plans, and munitions and hot fuel areas. 

Airfield Operations. The ATC cell will coordinate, integrate, and regulate the air traffic 

services and airfield management assets provided by each of the Services to increase 

operational effectiveness. The air component commander will coordinate and plan 

appropriate relief of the Air Force STTs by follow-on, general-purpose air traffic control 

forces. 
48

STTs secure an area to 

establish airfield 

CAPABILITIES 

 Airfield operations personnel and DATCALS provide the full range of support 

from initial visual flight rules (VFR) and limited instrument flight rules (IFR) capability to 

host nation liaison/augmentation. General purpose DATCALS and airfield operations 

personnel provide terminal area and airfield support from austere to fully supported host 

nation airfields with mobile control tower, surveillance radar, precision landing system, 

terminal navigational aids, and space/ground based capabilities or any combination of 

the above. Austere airfield operations can be provided by STT. General purpose air 

traffic controllers are capable of providing an initial bare base ATC capability, but 

generally these forces are not capable of autonomous operations and require additional 

base support. 

Austere Airfield Operations 

 Austere airfield operations have been 

identified as an STT core competency. STTs are Air 

Force special operations forces organized, trained, 

and equipped to integrate, synchronize, and control 

the elements of air and space power. Specifically, 

as an advance tactical enabling force, STTs conduct 

austere airfield control, assault zone assessment 

and establishment, combat weather observations, 

and combat weather forecasting. Capabilities 

include a visual control tower, navigational aids, and 

a precision landing system. While other forces have 

the ability to provide ATC support in a bare base 

environment, only STTs provide the entire range of 

austere airfield operations to include aircraft 

marshaling, load/off-load, and forward area rearming 

and refueling point operations. STTs are tasked 

through United States Special Operations Command 

and execute SOF missions, airlift missions, and 

other missions with SOF and non-SOF forces. 

Bare Base Support 

 Air Force general purpose (reserve and active duty) initial air traffic services 

capabilities include limited visual control tower and tactical air navigational aids. Initial 

air traffic controllers can provide separation and sequencing of arriving and departing 

aircraft, positive or procedural control measures as required by environmental factors, 

density, complexity of air traffic, and airspace. 

 

 Due to the typical requirement of maintaining 24-hour operations at an airfield at 

home station when a major Air Force unit deploys, it is normally not possible to deploy 

airfield operations and air traffic control personnel from the same base as a flying unit, 

but will consist of qualified personnel from across the Air Force. 
49

Mature Capabilities 

 General purpose ATC equipment such as the control tower and radars are not 

considered to be a "first-in" capability due to size, limited movement, and airlift 

constraints. However, as the location matures, this equipment may be deployed to 

enhance air traffic control capabilities. Close coordination with the ATC cell is required 

to ensure the appropriate systems are requested and deployed in a timely manner. 

SAFETY AND STANDARDIZATION 

 The airspace control environment should enable all Airmen to balance combat 

opportunity, necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and the impact on accomplishing 

assigned objectives against the associated risk to friendly air and space forces. To 

enhance safety and standardization, ICAO air traffic phraseology should be used to the 

maximum extent possible. Terminal airspace control for uncontrolled airfields follows 

procedures published in the ACP, and can be amplified by the ACO and SPINS as 

required. However, if such criteria are not sufficiently responsive to mission 

requirements, the ACA may direct alternative standards. Reduced criteria and 

procedures must be authorized by the ACA in consideration of the degree of risk 

deemed acceptable by the JFC. 

 Host nation regulations and procedures apply to Air Force controllers who 

augment a civil or foreign ATC facility. The Aeronautical Information Publication is a 

source for host nation ATC and airspace information such as terminal instrument 

procedures and other critical data for effective operations. In addition, Air Force 

controllers who augment a host Service facility will comply with the procedures of the 

host Service branch. 

US Air Force Hazardous Air Traffic Reports (HATR) 

 The Air Force HATR program provides a means for personnel to report all near 

midair collisions (NMAC) and alleged hazardous air traffic conditions. The HATR 

program is applicable during contingencies as well as during peacetime and should be 

used to enhance airspace and ATC safety in the combat zone. Reports cover events 

that occur during aircraft operations. Reportable events include those which, in the 

observer's opinion, create a potential for injury to personnel or damage to aircraft 

resulting from ATC services or procedures, landing systems, rules of the air (IFR and 

VFR operations), and airspace management (i.e., hazards associated with the use of 

military operations areas, military training routes, or local terminal airspace). 
50

To employ airborne close air support as the primary supporting

fires for...[Operation ANACONDA], CJTF Mountain needed two

items: a supply of fighters and bombers over the battle area; and

a way to prioritize and deconflict requests...while staying in line

with the USCENTCOM-imposed rules of engagement. The first

was never a major concern... the CFLCC-Fwd staff realized they

could count on about 60 sorties per day. But the second item, an

efficient way to work with the air component to control airstrikes,

was left far more to chance and the efforts of a few individuals.

CJTF Mountain’s OPORD set up a very small battle area ringed

with ground troops that were operating independently but

supported with conventional and other assets. While all but one

set of these teams were technically under CJTF Mountain’s

control, the design for Operation ANACONDA made for the most

complex airspace control arrangements yet seen in Afghanistan.

The battle space was “extremely constrained,” [CAOC Director]

[Major] General [John D.W.] Corley said later. The CAOC would

have “B-52s at higher altitudes dropping Joint Direct Attack

Munitions; B-1s at lower altitudes; unmanned vehicles such as

Predator flying through there; P-3s, aircraft contributing to the ISR

assets; helicopters down at the ground; fast-moving aircraft, F14s, F/A-18s, F-16s, F-15Es; tanker aircraft that are flying

through there. So you begin to see and sense the degree of

difficulty of deconfliction,” General Corley explained. 

On top of all this “we had three civil air routes opened up,” added

[CFACC/COMAFFOR] [Lieutenant] General Moseley.

Passengers generated up to three million dollars’ worth of

revenue a month for Afghan civil carriers. As the CFACC, [I] put

“bombers above the civil routes, bombers below the civil routes.”

NGO relief flights used the airspace as did Army helicopters, of

which General Moseley said “if they were going to be on the ATO

to do strike stuff, we knew what they were doing, but if they

weren’t, we didn’t.” Omitted from Generals’ Corley and Moseley

lists were AC-130 gunships, operating at night under the tactical

control of SOF units, providing CAS. 

—Operation ANACONDA, An Airpower Perspective; 

The Office of Air Force Lessons Learned 

Task Force Enduring Look 
51

Suggested Readings 

Air Force Publications (Note: All Air Force doctrine documents (AFDDs) are 

available at https://www.doctrine.af.mil and Air Land Sea Application documents 

(AFTTP(I)s) are available at https://wwwmil.alsa.mil/index.html) 

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine

AFDD 2, Operations and Organization

AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare

AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland

AFDD 2-8, Command and Control

AFI 13-1AOC, Vol. 3, Operational Procedures-Air and Space Operations Center

AFPD 13-201, Air Force Airspace Management 

AFPD 13-203, Air Traffic Control 

AFOTTP 2-3.2, Air and Space Operations Center 

AFTTP 3-1, Vol. 26, Theater Air Control System

AFTTP 3-1.1, General Planning and Employment Considerations (Classified) 

AFTTP(I) 3-2.17, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for the 

Theater Air-Ground System

AFTTP (I) 3-2.31, MTTP for an Integrated Air Defense System

AFTTP (I) 3-2.59, MTTP for Kill Box Employment 

Joint Publications 

 

CJCSI 6241.04, Policy and Procedures for Using United States Message Text 

Formatting 

CJCSM 6120.01C, Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link Operating Procedures

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) 

JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

JP 3-01.1, Aerospace Defense of North America 

JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations 

JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations 

JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone

Department of Defense Publications 

DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap, 2002-2027,

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics), Air Warfare, 

2002 

NATO Publications 

Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 3805, Doctrine for Airspace Control in Time of 

Crisis and War, ATP-40 (B) 
52

Other Publications 

Federal Aviation Administration Handbook 7610.4, Special Military Operations

Articles 

Burgess, Mark. Killing Your Own: The Problem of Friendly Fire During the Afghan 

Campaign. Center for Defense Information. 2002. 

Eflein, Dawn R. A. Case Study of Rules of Engagement in Joint Operations: The Air 

Force Shootdown of Army Helicopters in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. Air Force 

Law Review, Vol. 44. 1998. 

Books

Ashmore, E.B., Major-General, R.A.F., Air Defence (Longmans, Green and Co.). 1929. 

Futrell, Robert F., The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953 (Revised Edition). 

(Office of Air Force History). 1983. 

Grant, Rebecca., The First 600 Days of Combat; The US Air Force in the Global War on 

Terrorism (IRIS Press). 2004. 

Hallion, Richard P., Storm Over Iraq, Air Power and the Gulf War (Smithsonian 

Institution Press). 1992. 

Harmer, Todd P., Lieutenant Colonel, USAF and Colonel C.R. Anderegg, USAF (Ret.). 

The Shootdown of Trigger 4; Report of the Project Trigger Study Team. (Headquarters 

United States Air Force). 2001. 

 

Nalty, Bernard C. Air Power Over South Vietnam, 1968-1975. (Air Force History and 

Museums Program). 2000. 

Owen, Robert C., Colonel, USAF. Deliberate Force, A Case Study in Effective Air 

Campaigning. (Air University Press). 2000. 

Tillotson, David. Restructuring the Air Operations Center: A Defense of Orthodoxy. (Air 

University Press). 1993. 

Werrell, Kenneth P. Archie, Flak, AAA, and SAM: A Short Operational History of 

Ground-Based Air Defense. (Air University Press). 1988. 

Westenhoff, Charles M., Lt Col, USAF. Military Air Power, The CADRE Digest of Air 

Power, Opinions and Thoughts. (Air University Press). 1990. 

Research Reports 

Djuric, Teresa A. H., Lt Col, USAF. Future Command and Control of Aerospace 

Operations. Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2001. (US Army War College). US Army War 

College Strategy Research Project. 
53

Dorward, Alan C. Federal Aviation Administration Impact on Military Air Traffic Control 

Force Projection. Fort Leavenworth, KS, (U S Army Command and General Staff 

College), 1996. 

Drumm, Michael W. Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) and the 

Contingency Tactical Air Control System Automated Planning System (CTAPS): Is 

There a Joint Method to this Parochial Madness? Fort Leavenworth, KS, (U S Army 

Command and General Staff College), 1995. (School of Advanced Military Studies. 

Monograph) 

Hallion, Richard P., Ph.D., SES, USAF. Control of the Air: The Enduring Requirement. 

Bolling AFB, Washington DC. Air Force History and Museums Program. September, 

1999. 

Headquarters United States Air Force, Office of Air Force Lessons Learned, AF/XOL. 

Operation ANACONDA: An Air Power Perspective. February 7, 2005. 

Kauffman, Larry R., Col, IDANG. Guarding America’s Sky: Effective Use of 

Interagency. Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2002. (US Army War College). US Army War 

College Strategy Research Project. 

Sink, J. Taylor. Rethinking the Air Operations Center: Air Force Command and Control 

in Conventional War. Maxwell AFB, AL, 1994. (Air University. Air Command and 

Staff College, School of Advanced Airpower Studies student thesis.) 

United States Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Board Task 

Force on Combat Identification. Washington, DC, 1996. Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. 

Wessner, David, et al. Joint Air Operations Center: C4I Structure Study. Maxwell AFB, 

AL, 1995 (Air University. Air Command and Staff College research paper.) 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Reading List 

CSAF’s professional reading list, with links to book reviews, is available on the Air Force 

web site at: http://www.af.mil/lib/csafbook/readinglist.shtml. The list is subject to 

revision. Readers are encouraged to check the website for the most current 

information.
54

APPENDIX A 

NOTIONAL AIRSPACE CONTROL PLAN1

1. Purpose 

Provide considerations for development of an Airspace Control Plan (ACP). 

2. Airspace Control Plan Considerations 

Every ACP must be based on the objectives of the military operations, the capabilities 

and shortcomings of both friendly and enemy forces, and the contributions and 

complexities introduced by host-nation and multinational forces, as well as the access 

required to the airspace by non-belligerent aircraft. ACP considerations include: 

a. Description of the conditions under which the guidance and procedures in the ACP 

are applicable (e.g., the exercise, operation plan, operation order, military operation). 

b. Description of the AOR within which the ACP applies. 

c. Appointment of the ACA; location of ACA headquarters. 

d. List of the capabilities that exist within the joint force and in the AOR to provide 

airspace control (ground sites, airborne capability) and means of communicating with 

those elements. 

e. Description of the duties and responsibilities of: 

• The airspace control authority. 

• Each airspace user within the joint force (to include requirements for liaison to 

and coordination with the ACA). 

• Each element used in the airspace control system (site, facility, or airborne 

platform). 

f. Description of the interface between the JFACC, ACA, the AADC, and fire support 

coordination elements and the procedures adopted to coordinate and deconflict air 

defense and operational requirements. 

g. Description of interface with the Federal Aviation Administration, host-nation air traffic 

control system, and/or ICAO. 

h. Description of the interface between the theater air control system and the elements 

within the system for air traffic control. 

 

1

 JP 3-52 
55

i. Description of the interfaces between US and multinational forces to coordinate and 

deconflict airspace requirements, as required. 

j. Plans to provide for airspace control operations under degraded conditions (alternate 

headquarters, alternatives for key radar or command and control nodes, and other 

required capabilities). 

k. Description of positive airspace coordinating measures and procedures for the joint 

force. 

l. Description of the procedures to propose, approve, modify, and promulgate 

procedural airspace coordinating measures available for use within the AOR 

(HIDACZ, JEZ, FEZ, MEZ, MRR, low level transit routes (LLTRs), coordinating 

altitudes, air routes, corridors, restricted operations zones, and other appropriate 

procedures). 

m. Description of IFF/SIF procedures. 

n. Description of orbit procedures. 

o. Description of procedures and systems to compile and promulgate the airspace 

control order. Description of the ACO. Provides airspace control procedures and/or 

guidance in effect for the specified time period. The airspace control order would 

normally contain: 

• Modifications to guidance and/or procedures contained in the ACP. 

• Active or current IFF/SIF procedures. 

• Location and procedures associated with active procedural airspace coordinating 

measures such as those in item “l” above. 

• Procedures for entering and transiting active restricted operations zones (e.g., 

amphibious objective area, amphibious defense zone, firepower umbrella). 

• Location of active orbit areas. 

• Active UAV launch and recovery areas and mission areas. 

p. Description of procedures for air refueling areas (to include emergency, on-call air 

refueling area, and/or tracks as required for the combat zone airspace. 

q. Description of alternate routes of entry into the combat zone (to be prepared for the 

case where neutral nations do not allow overflight of their nation which is en route to 

the combat zone). 

r. Consider IFF outages and improper (sour) IFF code procedures, to be included in the 

SPINS. 

s. Consider AWACS (or equivalent C2 node) off-station procedures. 
56

 APPENDIX B 

PROCEDURAL AIRSPACE COORDINATING MEASURES2

This appendix provides a description, considerations, uses and a few graphic 

representations of Service measures for controlling airspace. The following airspace 

coordinating measures are provided to aid in defining airspace control requests, orders, 

and plans. A sample airspace control request is provided as Annex A to this appendix. 

a. Air Corridor

• Description. A restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft 

and established to prevent engagement by friendly forces. 

• Uses. Air corridors are used to route air traffic, to include airlift and civilian traffic, 

within the AOR. Altitudes of air corridor(s) are established in the ACO. 

• Point of Contact (POC): ACA. 

b. Air Defense Action Area 

• Description. An air defense action area and the airspace above it is an area 

within which friendly aircraft or surface-to-air weapons are normally given 

preference to conduct air defense operations except under specific conditions. 

• Uses. An air defense action area is an engagement area used for preference of a 

specific weapon system over another without excluding the other from use under 

certain operational conditions. From an airspace control perspective, an air 

defense action area provides airspace users with location of air defense areas for 

mission planning purposes. 

• POC: AADC. 

c. Air Defense Area

• Description. An air defense area is a specifically defined airspace for which air 

defense must be planned and provided. 

• Uses. An air defense area defines, in an area of operations, the area to be 

defended. 

• Considerations. An air defense area is a planning or division-of-responsibility aid; 

it is not used as an airspace coordinating measure. 

• POC: AADC. 

d. Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 

• Description. An ADIZ is airspace of defined dimensions within which the ready 

identification, location, and control of airborne vehicles are required. 

• Uses. Associated with nations or areas of operation, the ADIZ is normally the 

transition between procedural control areas (outside) and positive control areas 

(inside). Typically, ADIZ is used for sovereign national boundaries, or in the case 

of areas of operation, for identification into the rear areas. 

 

2

 JP 3-52 
57

• Considerations. See flight information publications/ICAO for theater-specific ADIZ 

and associated procedures and limitations. 

• POC: AADC. 

e. Air Refueling Area

• Description. An air refueling area is airspace defined by lateral and altitude limits 

for the purpose of conducting aerial refueling operations. Also known as 

refueling track, refueling orbit or refueling anchor. Block altitudes are normally 

required for multiple cell refueling operations. 

• Uses. Establishes a separate block of airspace dedicated to aerial refueling 

operations 

• POC: ACA. 

f. Airspace Control Area

• Description. Airspace that is laterally defined by the boundaries of the operational 

area. The airspace control area may be divided into airspace control sectors. 

• Uses. Airspace control areas are a means of planning or dividing responsibility. 

• Considerations. Geographically defined, an airspace control area may include 

political boundaries. 

• POC: ACA. 

g. Airspace Control Sector

• Description. An airspace control sector is a sub-element of the airspace control 

area established to facilitate the control of the overall area. Airspace control 

sector boundaries normally coincide with air defense organization subdivision 

boundaries. 

• Uses. An airspace control sector provides airspace control of an area by a 

component or other airspace control-capable entity best able to provide control in 

that geographic area. 

• Considerations. An airspace control sector interface with the airspace control 

system needs to be developed. 

• POC: Airspace control sectors are designated by the ACA in consideration of 

joint force component, host nation, and multinational airspace control capabilities 

and requirements. 

h. Airspace Coordination Area

• Description. An airspace coordination area is a three-dimensional block of 

airspace of defined dimensions and used as a restrictive fire support coordinating 

measure. 

• Uses. An airspace coordination area is used primarily in close air support 

situations for high-volume fire. Friendly aircraft are reasonably free from friendly 

surface fires, with artillery, helicopters, and fixed-winged aircraft given specific 

timing, lateral or altitude restrictions within which to operate. 

• Considerations. Timely implementation of the area is dependent on the ground 

situation. Burden of deconfliction rests with the ground commander. 
58

• POC: An airspace coordination area is established by the ACA at the request of 

the appropriate ground commander. 

i. Amphibious Defense Zone

• Description. An amphibious defense zone is the area encompassing the AOA 

and additional adjoining airspace as needed for the accompanying naval force for 

the purpose of air defense. 

• Uses. An amphibious defense zone provides an antiair warfare area for 

protection of the amphibious task force. 

• Considerations. If an amphibious defense zone overlaps other land-based air 

defense areas, appropriate coordination for division of responsibilities and 

boundaries must be conducted. 

• POC: CATF. 

j. Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) 

• Description. An AOA is a geographic area delineated in the initiating directive for 

purposes of command and control, within which is located the objective(s) to be 

secured by the amphibious task force. This area must be of sufficient size to 

ensure accomplishment of the amphibious task force’s mission and provide 

sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. The 

airspace associated with this area is included in the AOA. When dissolved, 

airspace control passes to the ACA. 

• Uses. With respect to airspace control, AOA allows the commander, amphibious 

task force, freedom of air operations within the AOA. 

• Considerations. Coordination with non-organic aircraft for entry, exit, and 

deconfliction operations within the AOA with operations just outside the AOA 

normally requires continuous, active involvement of the affected commanders 

and staffs. 

• POC: JFC. 

k. Base Defense Zone (BDZ)

• Description. BDZ is an air defense zone established around an air base and 

limited to the engagement envelope of short-range air defense weapon systems 

defending that base. BDZs have specific entry, exit, and IFF procedures 

established. 

• Uses. From an airspace control perspective, a BDZ provides airspace users with 

location of the engagement zone for the air defense systems defending a base 

for mission planning purposes. 

• Considerations. See short-range air defense engagement zone (SHORADEZ) in 

this section. 

• POC: AADC. 

l. Coordinating Altitude

• Description. A coordinating altitude is a procedural method to separate fixed- and 

rotary-wing aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft 

normally will not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly. It 
59

may include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations and extend from the 

forward edge of the communications zone to the FLOT. The coordinating altitude 

does not restrict either fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft when operating against or in 

the immediate vicinity of enemy ground forces. Fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft 

planning extended penetration of this altitude will notify the appropriate airspace 

control facility. However, approval acknowledgment is not required prior to fixedwing aircraft operating below the coordinating altitude or rotary-wing aircraft 

operating above the coordinating altitude. See Figure B-3 for a graphic 

representation of a coordinating altitude. 

• Uses. Coordinating altitude allows procedural separation of aircraft types. 

• Considerations. See-and-avoid procedures are used during visual meteorological 

conditions. 

• POC: The coordinating altitude is normally specified in the ACP, which is 

approved by the JFC. 

m. Falcon Radials

• Description. Falcon radials are the planned magnetic bearings along which 

aircraft depart or return to aircraft-capable ships. 

• Uses. Falcon radials provide tracking, control, and assistance to friendly aircraft 

within the antiair warfare surveillance area of the battle group. 

• POC: Antiair warfare commander (AAWC). 

n. Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ)

• Description: FEZs normally will be established in those areas where no effective 

surface-to-air capability is deployed. These operations usually take place in 

airspace above and beyond the engagement ranges of surface-based (land and 

sea), short-range air defense systems, and are an alternative type of 

engagement operation if the detailed control aspects of joint engagement 

operations cannot be met. FEZ is an air defense control measure. 

• Uses. From an air defense perspective, FEZ normally is used when fighter 

aircraft have the clear operational advantage over surface-based systems. These 

advantages could include range, density of fire, rules of engagement, or 

coordination requirements. From an airspace control perspective, it provides 

airspace users with location of the engagement zone for fighter aircraft for 

mission planning purposes. 

• Considerations. Coordination and flexibility within the combat airspace control 

system may be a limiting factor with FEZ. Under fighter engagement zone 

operations, surface-to-air missile systems will not be allowed to fire weapons 

unless targets are positively identified as hostile and assigned by higher 

authority, or unless they are firing in self defense. 

• POC: AADC. 

o. Firepower Umbrella 

• Description. Firepower umbrella is an area of specified dimensions defining the 

boundaries of the airspace over a naval force at sea within which the fire of a 

ship’s antiaircraft weapons can endanger aircraft, and within which special 
60

procedures have been established for the identification and operation of friendly 

aircraft. 

• POC: AAWC. 

p. High-Altitude Missile Engagement Zone (HIMEZ)

• Description. Normally applied to long-range surface-to-air missiles, a HIMEZ will 

limit the volume of airspace within which these weapons may conduct 

engagements without specific direction of the AADC. HIMEZ is an air defense 

control measure. See Figure B-3 for a graphic representation of a HIMEZ. 

• Uses. From an air defense perspective, HIMEZ normally is used when a highaltitude missile system has a clear operational advantage over using aircraft. 

These advantages could include range, command and control, rules of 

engagement, or response time. From an airspace control perspective, it provides 

airspace users with location of the engagement zone of a high-altitude missile 

system for mission planning purposes. 

• Considerations. Design of the HIMEZ is contingent on specific weapon system 

capabilities. 

• POC: AADC. 

q. High-Density Airspace Control Zone (HIDACZ) 

• Description. HIDACZ is an area in which there is a concentrated employment of 

numerous and varied weapons or airspace users. A high-density airspace control 

zone has defined dimensions that usually coincide with geographical features or 

navigational aids. Access to a HIDACZ and air defense weapons status within 

the HIDACZ is normally approved by the appropriate commander. See Figure B1 for a graphic representation of a HIDACZ. 

• Uses. HIDACZ allows ground/Marine air-ground task force commanders to 

restrict a volume of airspace from users not involved with ongoing operations. It 

restricts use of the airspace because of the large volume and density of fires 

supporting the ground operations within the described geographic area. 

• Considerations. The volume of air traffic demands careful coordination to limit the 

potential conflict among aircraft needed for mission essential operations within 

the HIDACZ and other airspace users. When establishing a HIDACZ, consider 

the following: 

--MRRs into and out of the HIDACZ and to the target area. 

 --Air traffic advisory as required. Consider also procedures and systems for air 

traffic control service during instrument meteorological conditions. 

 --Procedures for expeditious movement of aircraft into and out of the HIDACZ. 

 --Coordination of fire support, as well as air defense weapons control orders or 

status within and in the vicinity of the HIDACZ. 

 --Location of enemy forces inside of and within close proximity to the HIDACZ. 

• POC: HIDACZ is nominated by the ground commander and approved by the 

ACA. 
61

Figure B-1. HIDACZ and SAAFR 

r. Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ) 

• Description. JEZ is airspace of specified dimensions within which multiple air 

defense weapon systems (surface-to-air missiles and fighters) of one or more 

Service components are simultaneously employed and operated. 

• Uses. From an airspace control perspective, JEZ provides airspace users with 

location of the joint engagement zone for mission-planning purposes. 

• Considerations. JEZs are highly dependent on correct differentiation between 

friendly, neutral, and enemy aircraft. 

• POC: AADC. 

s. Kill Box 

• Description. A kill box is a generic term for a three-dimensional block of the 

battlespace defined by theater-determined parameters. 

• Uses. A kill box is a preplanned or immediate fire support coordinating measure 

used by the joint force to integrate and synchronize air and surface operations 

and deconflict joint fires in an expedient manner or on an asymmetric battlefield. 

• Considerations. The theater/joint force determines the parameters and 

procedures for kill box use considering terrain, component operations, command 

relationships, and operational necessity. 

• POC: As determined by theater procedures. 

t. Low-Altitude Missile Engagement Zone (LOMEZ) 
62

• Description. LOMEZ is a volume of airspace established to control engagements 

of low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missiles. Subject to weapon system 

capabilities, the LOMEZ normally will extend beyond the forward edge of the 

battle area. 

• Uses. From an airspace control perspective, LOMEZ provides airspace users 

with location of the engagement zone of low-altitude missile systems for mission 

planning purposes. 

• Considerations. The design of the LOMEZ is contingent on specific weapon 

system capabilities. 

• POC: AADC. 

u. Low-Level Transit Route (LLTR)

• Description. LLTR is a temporary bidirectional corridor of defined dimensions that 

facilitates the low-level passage of friendly aircraft through friendly air defenses 

and controlled or restricted airspace. LLTR currently is used only within the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 

• Uses. LLTR normally is used by high performance aircraft. LLTR is an airspace 

coordinating measure in NATO. 

• Considerations. LLTR is a procedural method. See NATO regional airspace 

control plans (MIKE-Plans). 

• POC: ACA. 

v. Minimum Risk Route (MRR) 

• Description. An MRR is a temporary corridor of defined dimensions 

recommended for use by high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft that presents the 

minimum known hazards to low-flying aircraft transiting the combat zone. MRRs 

are established considering the threat, friendly operations, known restrictions, 

known fire support locations, and terrain. See Figure B-2 for a graphic 

representation of a MRR. 

• Uses. MRR is an airspace coordinating measure used primarily by cross-FLOT 

operations. Close air support aircraft do not usually use MRRs in the vicinity of 

the target area. 

• Considerations. MRRs are established based on known threats. 

• POC: ACA. 
63

Figure B-2. Minimum Risk Routes

w. Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone (PIRAZ) 

• Description. PIRAZ is a designated area within which Navy ships (usually naval 

tactical data systems equipped) separate friendly from hostile aircraft. 

• Uses. PIRAZ provides tracking, control, and assistance to friendly aircraft within 

the antiair warfare surveillance area of the battle group. 

• POC: AAWC. 

x. Restricted Operations Area (ROA)

• Description. ROA is airspace of defined dimensions created in response to 

specific operational situations or requirements within which the operation of one 

or more airspace users is restricted. Also known as a restricted operations zone. 

Also known as a Restricted Operations Zone (ROZ). See Figure B-3 for a graphic 

representation of a ROA (ROZ). 

• Uses. An ROA is an airspace coordinating measure used to separate and identify 

areas. For example, artillery, mortar, naval gunfire support, UAV operating areas, 

aerial refueling, concentrated interdiction areas, areas of search and rescue 

(SAR), SOF operating areas, and areas in which the AADC has declared 

“weapons free.” It is commonly used for drop zones, landing zones, SAR areas, 

UAV launch and recovery sites, UAV mission areas, and special electronics 

mission aircraft. 
64

• Considerations. ROA can adversely affect air defense operation; therefore, air 

defense missions generally have priority over ROAs. 

• POC: ACA. 

Figure B-3. Coordinating Altitude, HIMEZ, ROA, and ROZ (also known as a ROA)

y. Return To Force (RTF) 

• Description. RTFs are planned route profiles for use by friendly aircraft returning 

to an aircraft-capable ship. 

• Uses. RTF provides a means for easily identifying friendly aircraft. 

• POC: AAWC. 

z. Short Range Air Defense Engagement Zone (SHORADEZ)

• Description. Areas of short-range air defense (SHORAD) deployment may fall 

within a LOMEZ or HIMEZ. It is possible that SHORAD assets may solely defend 

some areas. A SHORADEZ can be established to define the airspace within 

which these assets will operate. 

• Uses. SHORADEZ is normally established for the local air defense of high-value 

assets. From an airspace control perspective, SHORADEZ provides airspace 

users with the location of the engagement zone of short-range air defense 

systems for mission planning purposes. 
65

• Considerations. Because centralized control over the SHORAD weapons may 

not be possible, these areas must be clearly defined and disseminated so 

friendly aircraft can avoid them. 

• POC: AADC. 

aa. Special Use Airspace

• Description. Special use airspace is a term used to define airspace for a specific 

purpose. It may also designate airspace in which no flight activity is authorized. 

General subdivisions (regions, sectors, and AOA) are not special use airspace. 

• Uses. Special use airspace is typically applied to BDZs and cap/orbit areas. 

• Considerations. Special use airspace typically is a peacetime term contained in 

Federal Aviation Administration Handbook 7610.4 (Special Military Operations) to 

include military operating areas, Air Traffic Control Assigned Airspace, and other 

airspace. 

• POC: ACA. 

bb. Standard Use Army Aircraft Flight Route (SAAFR) 

• Description. SAAFR are routes established below the coordinating altitude to 

facilitate the movement of Army aviation assets and normally located in the corps 

through brigade rear areas of operation. See Figure B-1 for a graphic 

representation of a SAAFR. 

• Uses. SAAFR is an airspace coordinating measure used by Army assets for 

administrative and logistic purposes. 

• POC: If altitudes are at or below the coordinating altitude, the using authority 

implements SAAFR. If a coordinating altitude has not been established, an air 

corridor is established by the ACA at the request of the appropriate ground 

commander. See AFTTP(I) 3-2.17, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and 

Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System for additional information. 

cc. Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ)

• Description. In air defense, WEZ is airspace of defined dimensions within which 

the responsibility for engagement normally rests with a particular weapon 

system. These include FEZ, HIMEZ, LOMEZ, SHORADEZ, and JEZ. 

• Uses. WEZ defines air defense areas by weapon system. From an airspace 

control perspective, WEZ provides airspace users with the locations of the air 

defense engagement systems for mission planning purposes. 

• Considerations. Design of the WEZ is dependent on specific weapon system 

capabilities. 

• POC: AADC. 

dd. Weapons Free Zone

• Description. A weapons free zone is an air defense zone established for the 

protection of key assets or facilities, other than air bases, where weapons 

systems may be fired at any target not positively recognized as friendly. 

• Uses. A weapons free zone is an air defense control measure normally used for 

high-value assets defense and in areas with limited command and control 
66

authority. From an airspace control perspective, this zone provides airspace 

users with the location of a weapons free area for mission planning purposes. 

• POC: AADC declares weapons free with the ACA establishing the zone. 

Airspace Control Request Representative Format 

TO: 

FROM: 

SUBJECT: Request for Airspace 

(A) Airspace Coordinating Measure Requested 

(B) Location (Lat/Long) 

(C) Altitude(s) 

(D) Valid/Void Times (normally ZULU) 

(E) Type Aircraft/Mission 

(F) Controlling Agency 

(G) Comments 

NOTE: This format is representative of the appropriate US Message

Text Format. Refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Instruction (CJCSI)

6241.04, Policy and Procedures for Using United States Message Text

Formatting for detailed instructions. 
67

APPENDIX C 

REGIONAL AIR MOVEMENT CONTROL CENTER 

 Used in Operations ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI 

FREEDOM, the RAMCC is typically established when significant military forces operate 

in an area with an inadequate air traffic control infrastructure. Under these 

circumstances, the ACA must deconflict aircraft directed by the AOC with other aircraft 

participating in the contingency (e.g., United Nations, Red Cross, NGO, and commercial 

operators). This becomes even more critical when the ACA must operate in an ICAO 

flight information region in a sovereign nation with limited airspace control capabilities. 

 Safe operations in the airspace control area may require coordination among a 

multitude of users and air traffic facilities, beyond those the AOC normally directs or 

considers in an air tasking order, airspace control order, and/or airspace control plan. 

Non-AOC directed users may include some military airlift, special operations and other 

services, along with United Nations or other peacekeepers, humanitarian relief 

organizations, host nation or coalition aircraft and scheduled commercial air services. 

Many of these operations are beyond the purview of ATO/ACO/ACP deconfliction, yet 

frequently transit airfields in the airspace control area where conflicts are most 

prevalent. 

 Air traffic volume increases dramatically after initial military strikes. Combat, 

combat sustainment, and non-AOC directed airlift missions might transit airspace or 

arrive at airfields simultaneously. Civil entities conducting humanitarian or commercial 

air operations may further congest airspace and airfields. This can lead to increased 

hazardous air traffic reports and maximum-on-ground problems, and undermine the 

operation unless integrated air traffic management measures are implemented. 

 The ACA may elect to establish airfield and airspace scheduling, granting 

authority to the RAMCC to issue or deny slot times at airfields and control points in 

order to deconflict aircraft in the airspace control area/ICAO flight information region. 

Slot times are normally based on an assessment of an airfield’s limitations 

(onload/offload rate, parking capacity, etc.) and, as applicable, air traffic control 

separation capability. With RAMCC scheduling in effect, all US military aircraft 

operating in the control area must participate and adhere to slot times to ensure 

adequate margins of safety. The RAMCC issues Mode 3 IFF codes to non-AOC 

military and civilian aircraft desiring to transit the airspace control area, and includes 

them in the daily ATO/SPINS if necessary. Thus RAMCC is the centralized information 

source providing the AADC with the identity of civil and other military aircraft operating 

in the control area. Despite gaining a certain level of procedural control through these 

advanced scheduling schemes, most aircraft movements are still conducted under 

Visual Flight Rules (i.e., "see and avoid"), unless air traffic control separation is 

instituted. By managing ramp capacity at theater airfields, the RAMCC ensures the 

maximum capacity for parking aircraft at an airfield or that the maximum on ground 

capability for aircraft is not exceeded. 
68

Organization 

 The RAMCC is a separate specialty team, not necessarily collocated with the 

AOC, reporting directly to the AOC Director. It deals with a variety of civil organizations 

and matters of great political sensitivity, such as determining the priority of various 

military airlift missions in relation to civil relief or other high-visibility missions. The 

RAMCC director is normally a senior officer (O-6) because of the scope of responsibility 

and seasoned leadership expertise required. The RAMCC serves a function distinct 

from the combat plans division or the air mobility division by dealing with a wider-range 

of users, deconflicting terminal operations and sometimes being involved in current 

operations (e.g., en route deconfliction). Its members work closely with divisions within 

the AOC but its members are not spread across them. 

 Ideally, the RAMCC should have a wide variety of specialties, services and allied 

nation (coalition operation) representation to reflect the user-base of the organization. 

Specialties include, but are not limited to, rated crewmembers, air traffic controllers, 

transportation and aerial port specialists, command and control specialists, 

communication/computer technicians, and administrative support. Diverse manning 

during coalition operations allows the RAMCC to execute its mission as an honest 

broker, given the broad range of RAMCC customers. 

 

 The RAMCC organization is typically subdivided into long-range plans, current 

operations, airfield operations, and a mission support section. The long-range planning 

cell manages activities beyond 24 hours of execution including military and civilian 

users’ arrivals and departures at airfields as well as aircraft transiting through the 

airspace controlled by the ACA. The current operations cell takes the long-range plan 

and makes short-notice changes, including adjusting the plan during execution in near 

real time. The RAMCCs in Afghanistan and Iraq created a combined website for both 

military and civil users to contact them before transiting the country. Sites such as this 

have detailed procedures for filing airspace/slot requests and restrictions for flying incountry. 
69

GLOSSARY 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

A2C2 Army airspace command and control 

AADC area air defense commander 

AADP area air defense plan 

AAGS Army air-ground system 

AAMDC Army Air and Missile Defense Command 

AAWC antiair warfare commander 

ACA airspace control authority 

ACCE air component coordination element 

ACE airborne command element (USAF), aviation combat 

element (Marines) 

ACM airspace coordinating measure 

ACO airspace control order 

ACP airspace control plan 

ACS airspace control system 

ADA air defense artillery 

ADCON administrative control 

ADIZ air defense identification zone 

AETACS airborne elements of the theater air control system 

AETF air and space expeditionary task force 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AFTTP(I) Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures 

(interservice) 

ALO air liaison officer 

AMD air mobility division 

AMLO air mobility liaison 

ANG Air National Guard 

AO area of operations 

AOA amphibious objective area 

AOC air and space operations center 

AOR area of responsibility 

APAM antipersonnel/antimaterial 

APOD aerial port of debarkation 

ASOC air support operations center 

ATACMS Army tactical missile system 

ATC air traffic control 

ATO air tasking order 

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 

BCD battlefield coordination detachment 

BDZ base defense zone 
70

C2 command and control 

CALCM conventional air launched cruise missile 

CAP combat air patrol 

CAS close air support 

CATF commander, amphibious task force 

CCO chief of combat operations 

CGRS Common Geographic Reference System 

CLF commander, landing force 

COE common operating environment 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

COMARFOR commander, Army forces 

COMSEC communications security 

COP common operational picture 

CP command post 

CRC control and reporting center 

CSG carrier strike group 

DAADC deputy area air defense commander 

DATCALS deployable air traffic control and landing system 

DCA defensive counterair 

DOD Department of Defense 

EOC expeditionary operations center 

FAC forward air controller 

FAC(A) forward air controller (airborne) 

FECC fire and effects coordination cell 

FEZ fighter engagement zone 

FID foreign internal defense 

FIR flight information region 

FLOT forward line of own troops 

FSCL fire support coordination line 

FSCM fire support coordinating measures 

GLO ground liaison officer 

GTACS ground theater air control system 

HATR hazardous air traffic report 

HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone 

HIMEZ high-altitude missile engagement zone 

HVAA high value airborne asset 

IA information assurance 

IADS integrated air defense system 

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
71

ICO interface control officer 

ID identification 

IFF identification, friend or foe 

IFF/SIF identification, friend or foe/selective identification 

feature 

IFR instrument flight rules 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JAOC joint air operations center (JP 1-02); joint air and 

space operations center (USAF) 

JASSM joint air-to-surface standoff missile 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JEZ joint engagement zone 

JFACC joint force air component commander (JP 1-02); joint 

force air and space component commander (USAF) 

JFC joint force commander 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 

JTAC joint terminal attack controller 

JTF joint task force 

LCC land component commander 

LOF lack of friendly 

LLTR low-level transit route 

LNO liaison officer 

LOMEZ low-altitude missile engagement zone 

MACCS Marine Air Command And Control System 

MARLO Marine liaison officer 

MCC maritime component commander 

MEZ missile engagement zone 

MRR minimum-risk route 

MTTP multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures 

NALE naval and amphibious liaison element 

NCTR non-cooperative target recognition 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NMAC near mid-air collision 

NOTAM notice to Airmen 

NTACS Navy Tactical Air Control System 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 
72

PHID positive hostile identification 

PIRAZ positive identification and radar advisory zone 

POC point of contact 

RAMCC regional air movement control center 

RAP recognized air picture 

ROA restricted operations area 

ROZ restricted operations zone (Also see ROA) 

ROE rules of engagement 

RTF return to force 

SAAFR standard use Army aircraft flight zone 

SACC supporting arms coordination center 

SADL situation awareness data link 

SADO senior air defense officer 

SAR search and rescue 

SCA space coordinating authority 

SCAR strike coordination and reconnaissance 

SHORAD short-range air defense 

SHORADEZ short-range air defense engagement zone 

SIF selective identification feature 

SOF special operations forces 

SOLE special operations liaison element 

SPINS special instructions 

STT special tactics team 

TAAMDCOORD theater Army air and missile defense coordinator 

TAC terminal attack controller 

TACC tanker airlift control center (USAF); tactical air control 

center (USN); tactical air command center (USMC) 

TACP tactical air control party 

TACON tactical control 

TACS theater air control system 

TADC tactical air direction center 

TADIL tactical digital information link 

TAGS theater air-ground system 

TAMD theater air and missile defense 

TAOC tactical air operations center (USMC) 

TCAS traffic alert/collision avoidance system 

TDL tactical data links 

TMD theater missile defense 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces 
73

VFR visual flight rules 

WEZ weapon engagement zone 

Definitions 

active air defense. Direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the 

effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It 

includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, electronic warfare, and other available 

weapons. See also air defense. (JP 1-02) 

airborne early warning. The detection of enemy air or surface units by radar or other 

equipment carried in an airborne vehicle, and the transmitting of a warning to friendly 

units. Also called AEW. (JP 1-02)

air component coordination element. An Air Force component element that 

interfaces and provides liaison with the joint force land component commander, or 

commander, Army forces. The air component coordination element is the senior Air 

Force element assisting the joint force land component commander, or commander 

Army forces in planning air component supporting and supported requirements. The air 

component coordination element is responsible to the joint force air component 

commander and coordinates with the joint force land component commander's staff, 

representing the joint force air component commander's needs in either a supporting or 

supported role. Also called ACCE. (JP 1-02)

air corridor. A restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft and 

established for the purpose of preventing friendly aircraft from being fired on by friendly 

forces. (JP 1-02)

air defense. All defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or 

missiles in the Earth’s envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness 

of such attack. Also called AD. (JP 1-02)

air defense action area. An area and the airspace above it within which friendly 

aircraft or surface-to-air weapons are normally given precedence in operations except 

under specified conditions. (JP 1-02)

air defense area. 1. overseas —A specifically defined airspace for which air defense 

must be planned and provided. 2. United States — Airspace of defined dimensions 

designated by the appropriate agency within which the ready control of airborne 

vehicles is required in the interest of national security during an air defense emergency. 

(JP 1-02)

air defense identification zone. Airspace of defined dimensions within which the 
74

ready identification, location, and control of airborne vehicles are required. Also called 

ADIZ. 

air refueling area. Airspace defined by lateral and altitude limits for the purpose of 

conducting aerial refueling operations. Also known as a refueling track, refueling orbit, 

or refueling anchor. (AFDD 2-1.7)

airspace control. See airspace control in the combat zone. (JP 1-02)

airspace control area. Airspace that is laterally defined by the boundaries of the 

operational area. The airspace control area may be subdivided into airspace control 

sectors. (JP 1-02)

airspace control authority. The commander designated to assume overall 

responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control 

area. Also called ACA. See also airspace control; airspace control area, airspace 

control system. (JP 1-02)

airspace control boundary. The lateral limits of an airspace control area, airspace 

control sector, high density airspace control zone, or airspace restricted area. (JP 1-02) 

airspace control center. The airspace control authority’s primary airspace control 

facility, including assigned Service component, host nation, and/or multinational 

personnel and equipment. (JP 1-02) 

airspace control facility. Any of the several Service component, host nation, or allied 

facilities that provides airspace control in the combat zone. (JP 1-02)

airspace control in the combat zone. A process used to increase combat 

effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Airspace 

control is provided in order to reduce the risk of friendly fire, enhance air defense 

operations, and permit greater flexibility of operations. Airspace control does not infringe 

on the authority vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat 

operations. Also called airspace control; combat airspace control. (JP 1-02)

airspace control order. An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides 

the details of the approved requests for airspace coordinating measures. It is published 

either as part of the air tasking order or as a separate document. Also called ACO. (JP 

1-02)

airspace control plan. The document approved by the joint force commander that 

provides specific planning guidance and procedures for the airspace control system for 

the joint force operational area. Also called ACP. See also airspace control system; 

joint operations area. (JP 1-02)

airspace control procedures. Rules, mechanisms, and directions that facilitate the 
75

control and use of airspace of specified dimensions. See also airspace control authority; 

airspace control in a combat zone; airspace control order; airspace control plan. (JP 1-

02) 

airspace control sector. A sub-element of the airspace control area, established to 

facilitate the control of the overall area. Airspace control sector boundaries normally 

coincide with air defense organization subdivision boundaries. Airspace control sectors 

are designated in accordance with procedures and guidance contained in the airspace 

control plan in consideration of Service component, host-nation, and multinational 

airspace control capabilities and requirements. See also airspace control area. (JP 1-

02)

airspace control system. An arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, 

procedures, and facilities required to perform airspace control functions. Also called 

ACS. (JP 1-02) 

airspace coordinating measures. Measures employed to facilitate the efficient use of 

airspace to accomplish missions and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly 

forces. Also called ACMs. See also airspace control area; airspace control boundary; 

airspace control sector; airspace coordination area; high-density airspace control zone; 

weapons engagement zone. (JP 1-02)

airspace coordination area. A three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, 

established by the appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft are 

reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The airspace coordination area may be 

formal or informal. Also called ACA. (JP 1-02)

airspace management. The coordination, integration, and regulation of the use of 

airspace of defined dimensions. (JP 1-02)

airspace restrictions. Special restrictive measures applied to segments of airspace of 

defined dimensions. (JP 1-02)

air tasking order. A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate 

units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to 

targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call 

signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also called 

ATO. (JP 1-02)

air traffic control facility. Any of the component airspace control facilities primarily 

responsible for providing air traffic control services and, as required, limited tactical 

control services. (JP 1-02)

amphibious objective area. A geographical area (delineated for command and control 

purposes in the order initiating the amphibious operation) within which is located the 

objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size 
76

to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission and must provide sufficient 

area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. Also called AOA. (JP 1-02)

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified 

command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air 

defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with 

the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and 

communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. 

Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to 

the area air defense commander’s headquarters. Also called AADC. (JP 1-02)

Army air-ground system. The Army system which provides for interface between 

Army and tactical air support agencies of other Services in the planning, evaluating, 

processing, and coordinating of air support requirements and operations. It is composed 

of appropriate staff members, including G-2 air and G-3 air personnel, and necessary 

communication equipment. Also called AAGS. (JP 1-02)

autonomous operation. In air defense, the mode of operation assumed by a unit after 

it has lost all communications with higher echelons. The unit commander assumes full 

responsibility for control of weapons and engagement of hostile targets. (JP 1-02)

base defense zone. An air defense zone established around an air base and limited to 

the engagement envelope of short-range air defense weapons systems defending that 

base. Base defense zones have specific entry, exit, and identification, friend or foe 

procedures established. Also called BDZ. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at 

accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-

02)

centralized control. 1. In air defense, the control mode whereby a higher echelon 

makes direct target assignments to fire units. 2. In joint air operations, placing within 

one commander the responsibility and authority for planning, directing, and coordinating 

a military operation or group/category of operations. See also decentralized control. 

(JP 1-02) [In air and space employment, the vesting of authority in one commander for 

planning and directing operations of all air forces throughout the area of operations. 

This centralized planning and direction enables timely allocation and tasking of assets to 

exploit the speed, range, and flexibility of air capabilities across the entire area. 

Centralized tasking and allocation of resources is accompanied by progressive 

decentralization of tasks’ execution to the lowest command echelons capable of 

accomplishment. In centralized control, authority may be progressively delegated to 

subordinate echelons (as opposed to command by negation which progressively pulls 

authority back from subordinate echelons, as required). In air defense, centralized 

control is the control mode whereby a higher echelon makes direct target assignments 

to fire units. Identification and engagement authority may be delegated to the regional 

air defense commander (RADC) or sector air defense commander (SADC) during joint 
77

engagement zone (JEZ) centralized control operations.] {Italicized words in brackets 

apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

combat airspace control. See airspace control in the combat zone. (JP 1-02)

combat zone. 1. That area required by combat forces for the conduct of operations. 2. 

The territory forward of the Army rear area boundary. (JP 1-02)

combined operation. An operation conducted by forces of two or more Allied nations 

acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. (JP 1-02)

common operating environment. Automation services that support the development 

of the common reusable software modules that enable interoperability across multiple 

combat support applications. This includes segmentation of common software modules 

from existing applications, integration of commercial products, development of a 

common architecture, and development of common tools for application developers. 

Also called COE. (JP 1-02)

common operational picture. A single identical display of relevant information shared 

by more than one command. A common operational picture facilitates collaborative 

planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP. 

(JP 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a 

commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. 

The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation 

plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected 

operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed 

to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of 

purpose. Also called commander’s concept or CONOPS. (JP 1-02)

coordinating altitude. A procedural airspace control method to separate fixed- and 

rotary-wing aircraft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft will 

normally not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft normally will not fly. The 

coordinating altitude is normally specified in the airspace control plan and may include a 

buffer zone for small altitude deviations. (JP 1-02)

counterair. A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and 

maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to 

destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. (JP 1-02) 

decentralized control. In air defense, the normal mode whereby a higher echelon 

monitors unit actions, making direct target assignments to units only when necessary to 

ensure proper fire distribution or to prevent engagement of friendly aircraft. See also 

centralized control. (JP 1-02)
78

defensive counterair. All defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, 

and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air 

environment. Also called DCA. (JP 1-02) 

drone. A land, sea, or air vehicle that is remotely or automatically controlled. See also 

remotely piloted vehicle; unmanned aerial vehicle. (JP 1-02)

fighter engagement zone. See weapon engagement zone. (JP 1-02)

fire support coordination. The planning and executing of fire so that targets are 

adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (JP 1-02)

fire support coordination line. A fire support coordinating measure that is established 

and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their 

boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected 

commanders. Fire support coordination lines (FSCLs) facilitate the expeditious attack of 

surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An FSCL does not 

divide an area of operations by defining a boundary between close and deep operations 

or a zone for close air support. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based 

weapons systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond an 

FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary 

reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets beyond the FSCL 

must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse attacks on, or to the rear of, the 

line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are 

controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. The FSCL should 

follow well-defined terrain features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is 

especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In 

exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the 

attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of 

fratricide and could waste limited resources. Also called FSCL. (JP 1-02)

fire support coordinating measure. A measure employed by land or amphibious 

commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide 

safeguards for friendly forces. Also called FSCM. See also fire support coordination. (JP 

1-02) 

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a 

government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 

designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 

and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

forward line of own troops. A line that indicates the most forward positions of friendly 

forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The forward line of own troops 

(FLOT) normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces. The 

FLOT may be at, beyond, or short of the forward edge of the battle area. An enemy 

FLOT indicates the forward-most position of hostile forces. Also called FLOT. (JP 1-02)
79

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, 

composed of forces of two or more Military Departments, which may be established 

across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that 

may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. See also Service 

component command. (JP 1-02)

high-altitude missile engagement zone. See weapon engagement zone. (JP 1-02)

high-density airspace control zone. Airspace designated in an airspace control plan 

or airspace control order, in which there is a concentrated employment of numerous and 

varied weapons and airspace users. A high-density airspace control zone has defined 

dimensions, which usually coincide with geographical features or navigational aids. 

Access to a high-density airspace control zone is normally controlled by the maneuver 

commander. The maneuver commander can also direct a more restrictive weapons 

status within the high-density airspace control zone. Also called HIDACZ. (JP 1-02)

identification, friend or foe. A device that emits a signal positively identifying it as a 

friendly. Also called IFF. See also air defense. (JP 1-02)

identification, friend or foe/selective identification feature procedures. The 

directives that govern the use of identification, friend or foe selective identification 

feature equipment. See also identification, friend or foe. (JP 1-02)

joint engagement zone. See weapon engagement zone. (JP 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, 

assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint 

force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air 

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint 

force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish 

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 

1-02) [The joint force air and space component commander (JFACC) uses the joint air 

and space operations center to command and control the integrated air and space effort 

to meet the joint force commander’s objectives. This title emphasizes the Air Force 

position that air power and space power together create effects that cannot be achieved 

through air or space power alone.] (AFDD 2) {Words in brackets apply only to the Air 

Force and are offered for clarity.}

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified 

commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command 
80

(command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02) 

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic 

combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force 

commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to 

accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when 

operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be 

conducted on the boundaries between theaters. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02)

joint terminal attack controller. A qualified (certified) Service member who, from a 

forward position, directs the action of combat aircraft engaged in close air support and 

other offensive air operations. A qualified and current joint terminal attack controller will 

be recognized across the Department of Defense as capable and authorized to perform 

terminal attack control. Also called JTAC. (JP 1-02)

kill box. A three-dimensional area reference that enables timely, effective coordination 

and control and facilitates rapid attacks. (JP 1-02) [A kill box is a three-dimensional fire 

support coordinating measure used to facilitate the expeditious air-to-surface lethal 

attack of targets, which may be augmented by or integrated with surface-to-surface 

fires.] (AFDD 2-1.3) {The definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is 

offered for clarity.}

low-altitude missile engagement zone. See weapon engagement zone. (JP 1-02)

low level transit route. A temporary corridor of defined dimensions established in the 

forward area to minimize the risk to friendly aircraft from friendly air defenses or surface 

forces. Also called LLTR. (JP 1-02)

marine air command and control system. A system that provides the aviation combat 

element commander with the means to command, coordinate, and control all air 

operations within an assigned sector and to coordinate air operations with other 

Services. It is composed of command and control agencies with communicationselectronics equipment that incorporates a capability from manual through semiautomatic 

control. Also called MACCS. (JP 1-02)

minimum-risk route. A temporary corridor of defined dimensions recommended for 

use by high-speed, fixed-wing aircraft that presents the minimum known hazards to lowflying aircraft transiting the combat zone. Also called MRR. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by 

forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or 

alliance. (JP 1-02) 

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for 

geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, 

but are not limited to, such descriptors as area of responsibility, theater of war, theater 
81

of operations, joint operations area, amphibious objective area, joint special operations 

area, and area of operations. (JP 1-02) 

operational risk management (ORM). The systematic process of identifying hazards, 

assessing risk, analyzing risk control options and measures, making control decisions, 

accepting residual risks, and supervising/reviewing the activity for effectiveness. (AFI 

90-901)

point defense. The defense or protection of special vital elements and installations; 

e.g., command and control facilities or air bases. (JP 1-02)

positive control. A method of airspace control that relies on positive identification, 

tracking, and direction of aircraft within an airspace, conducted with electronic means by 

an agency having the authority and responsibility therein. (JP 1-02)

positive identification. Identification is determined by visual recognition, electronic 

support systems, non-cooperative target recognition systems, identification friend or foe 

systems or other physics-based identification techniques. Positive identification does 

not assume identity solely based on location or adherence to airspace procedures. 

(AFDD 2-1.7) 

procedural control. A method of airspace control which relies on a combination of 

previously agreed and promulgated orders and procedures. (JP 1-02)

procedural identification. Identification is based on adherence to airspace control 

measures and rules. Identification is assumed to be friendly as long as rules are 

followed, but identification is assumed unknown if rules are not followed and the suspect 

vehicle is not otherwise positively identified. (AFDD 2-1.7) 

restricted operations area. Airspace of defined dimensions, designated by the 

airspace control authority, in response to specific operational situations/requirements 

within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted. Also called ROA.

(JP 1-02)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate 

the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or 

continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-

02)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component 

commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, 

organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that 

have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate 

unified command or joint task force. See also functional component command. (JP 1-

02)
82

short-range air defense engagement zone. See weapon engagement zone. (JP 1-

02)

space coordinating authority. The single authority designated, by the supported 

combatant commander or JFC, to coordinate joint theater space operations and to 

integrate space capabilities thereby facilitating unity of the theater/JOA space effort. 

Also called SCA. (AFDD 2-2.1)

standard use Army aircraft flight route. Routes established below the coordinating 

altitude to facilitate the movement of Army aviation assets. Routes are normally located 

in the corps through brigade rear areas of operation and do not require approval by the 

airspace control authority. Also called SAAFR. (JP 1-02)

tactical air control center. The principal air operations installation (ship-based) from 

which all aircraft and air warning functions of tactical air operations are controlled. Also 

called Navy CC. (JP 1-02)

unmanned aerial vehicle. A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human 

operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be 

piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal 

payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are 

not considered unmanned aerial vehicles. Also called UAV. (JP 1-02)

weapon engagement zone. In air defense, airspace of defined dimensions within 

which the responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with a particular 

weapon system. Also called WEZ. a. fighter engagement zone. In air defense, that 

airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for engagement of air 

threats normally rests with fighter aircraft. Also called FEZ. b. high-altitude missile 

engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the 

responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with high-altitude surface-toair missiles. Also called HIMEZ. c. low-altitude missile engagement zone. In air 

defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for 

engagement of air threats normally rests with low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air 

missiles. Also called LOMEZ. d. short-range air defense engagement zone. In air 

defense, that airspace of defined dimensions within which the responsibility for 

engagement of air threats normally rests with short-range air defense weapons. It may 

be established within a low- or high-altitude missile engagement zone. Also called 

SHORADEZ. e. joint engagement zone. In air defense, that airspace of defined 

dimensions within which multiple air defense systems (surface-to-air missiles and 

aircraft) are simultaneously employed to engage air threats. Also called JEZ. (JP 1-02)

weapons free zone. An air defense zone established for the protection of key assets 

or facilities, other than air bases, where weapon systems may be fired at any target not 

positively recognized as friendly. (JP 1-02)
83