UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case File No. 9:20-cv-81063-RS 

 

STEVE HARTEL, individually and on behalf 

of all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

 

THE GEO GROUP, INC., et al., 

Defendants. 

 

 

 

 

 

/ 

PLAINTIFFS’ UNOPPOSED MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT 

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ....................................................................................... 1 

II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION ................................................................................ 2 

III. THE PROPOSED TERMS OF SETTLEMENT ............................................................... 3 

A. The Settlement Class Definition ............................................................................ 3 

B. Monetary Consideration and Plan of Allocation ................................................... 3 

C. Release Provisions ................................................................................................. 4 

IV. THE SETTLEMENT WARRANTS PRELIMINARY APPROVAL ............................... 4 

A. The Standard for Judicial Approval of Class Action Settlements. ........................ 4 

B. The Settlement Meets the Approval Requirements Under Rule 23(e)(2). ............. 6 

1. Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel Adequately Represented the Settlement 

Class. ..........................................................................................................6 

2. The Proposed Settlement was Negotiated at Arm’s Length. .......................7 

3. The Relief Provided for the Settlement Class Is Adequate. .........................8 

(a) The benefits of Settlement outweigh the costs of litigation. ........... 8 

(b) The proposed method of relief distribution is effective. ............... 10 

(c) The proposed award of attorneys’ fees is reasonable. .................. 12 

(d) Considering all identified agreements, relief is adequate. ............ 13 

4. The Settlement Treats Settlement Class Members Equitably. ...................13 

V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT IS SUFFICIENT................................ 14 

VI. THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED FOR SETTLEMENT 

PURPOSES ...................................................................................................................... 16 

A. The Requirements of Rule 23(a) have been met. ................................................. 16 

B. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) have been met. ............................................ 18 

VII. PROPOSED SCHEDULE ............................................................................................... 20 

VIII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 20 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases

Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 

521 U.S. 591 (1997) ......................................................................................................... 16, 19 

Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 

568 U.S. 455 (2013) ............................................................................................................... 19 

Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., 

302 F.R.D. 657 (S.D. Fla. 2014) ............................................................................................ 17 

Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 

692 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................................. 17 

Bennett v. Behring Corp., 

96 F.R.D. 343 (S.D. Fla. 1982) ............................................................................................ 5, 6 

Blum v. Stenson, 

465 U.S. 886 (1984) ............................................................................................................... 12 

Burrows v. Purchasing Power, LLC, 

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189397 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2013) ......................................................... 9 

Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Coca-Cola Co., 

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121093 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 20, 2008) ............................................ 8, 9, 14 

Cifuentes v. Regions Bank, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37458 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2014) ........................................................ 5 

City of L.A. v. Bankrate, Inc., 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115071 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2016) ................................................. 5, 8 

Dukes v. Air Can., 

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221914 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2019) ........................................ 10, 18, 19 

Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 

544 U.S. 336 (2005) ................................................................................................................. 9 

Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 

668 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2011) ............................................................................................... 6 

Fla. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229456 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2019) ....................................................... 5 

Fresco v. Auto Data Direct, Inc., 

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37863 (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2007) ...................................................... 10 

Grant v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14673 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2019) ........................................................ 8 

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Gunthert v. Bankers Std. Ins. Co., 

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37161 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2019) ......................................................... 7 

Hanley v. Tampa Bay Sports & Entm’t. LLC, 

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89175 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2020) ..................................................... 12 

Holman v. Student Loan Xpress, Inc., 

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113491 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2009) ............................................ 16, 18 

Holmes v. Cont'l Can Co., 

706 F.2d 1144 (11th Cir. 1983) ............................................................................................. 14 

In re Clarus Corp. Sec. Litig., 

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50147 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2005) ......................................................... 13 

In re Flowers Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., 

No. 7:16-cv-000222-WLS, 2019 WL 6771749 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2019) ........................... 13 

In re Health Insurance Innovations Sec. Litig., 

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61051 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2021) .................................................... 13 

In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 

334 F. App’x 248 (11th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................ 16 

In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 

572 F.3d 854 (11th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................. 5 

In re Netbank, Inc. Sec. Litig., 

No. 1:07-cv-2298-TCB, 2011 WL 13353222 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 2011) ................................ 13 

In re NetBank, Inc., 

259 F.R.D. 656 (N.D. Ga. 2009) ........................................................................................... 17 

In re Profit Recovery Grp. Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 

No. 1:00-cv-1416-CC, 2005 WL 8172262 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 2005) ................................... 13 

In re Rayonier Sec. Litig., 

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167510 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2017) ..................................................... 16 

In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 

176 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (S.D. Fla. 2001) .................................................................................... 9 

In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43082 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2005) ...................................................... 14 

In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32850 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2004) ..................................................... 13 

In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 

967 F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1992) ................................................................................................. 5 

Kennedy v. Tallant, 

710 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1983) ............................................................................................... 19 

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Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 

827 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1987) ............................................................................................... 18 

Lee v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121998 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2015) ................................................... 15 

Lunsford v. Woodforest Nat’l Bank, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200716 (N.D. Ga. May 19, 2014) ...................................................... 7 

Mashburn v. Nat’l Healthcare, Inc., 

684 F. Supp. 660 (M.D. Ala. 1988) ......................................................................................... 5 

Missouri v. Jenkins, 

491 U.S. 274 (1989) ............................................................................................................... 12 

Monroe Cty. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Southern Co., 

332 F.R.D. 370 (N.D. Ga. 2019) ........................................................................................... 19 

Morgan v. Pub. Storage, 

301 F. Supp. 3d 1237 (S.D. Fla. 2016) .................................................................................... 8 

Nelson v. Mead Johnson & Johnson Co., 

484 F. App'x 429 (11th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................... 5 

Pierre-Val v. Buccaneers, L.P., 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81518 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2015) ....................................................... 6 

Poertner v. Gillette Co., 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116616 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014) .................................................... 4 

Pritchard v. Apyx Med. Corp., 

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222174 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2020) .................................................. 13 

Thorpe v. Walter Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144133 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2016) ......................................... 10, 12, 17 

Waters v. Int'l Precious Metals Corp., 

190 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) ............................................................................................. 12 

Statutes

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(7) ................................................................................................................ 15 

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)................................................................................................................. 16 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1) ................................................................................................................... 6 

Other Authorities

Newberg on Class Actions § 22:59 (5th ed.) ................................................................................ 13 

Manual for Complex Litigation, § 21.312 (4th Ed.) ..................................................................... 14 

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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

Lead Plaintiffs James Michael Deloach and Edward Oketola (together, “Plaintiffs”), by 

and through their counsel, hereby respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23, for entry of the proposed Preliminary Approval Order: (1) granting preliminary 

approval of the proposed Settlement in the above-captioned action; (2) certifying the Settlement 

Class for settlement purposes; (3) approving the form and manner of providing notice of 

Settlement to members of the Settlement Class; and (4) setting a date and time for the fairness 

hearing to consider final approval of the Settlement, the Plan of Allocation, and Lead Counsel’s 

forthcoming motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses and for Plaintiffs’ PSLRA 

Award.1 In accordance with the terms of the Stipulation, Defendants do not oppose this Motion. 

Pursuant to the proposed Settlement, Defendants have agreed to cause to be paid 

$3,000,000 in cash in exchange for the release of all claims asserted in the Action.2 The Settlement 

will bring a close to this hard-fought litigation, which included extensive motion practice, 

engagement of fact discovery, and mediation with a nationally recognized mediator. This is a 

strong result for the Settlement Class and, if approved, would guarantee a near-term distribution 

to shareholders, eliminate additional costs to the Parties, and circumvent future risks of litigation. 

Indeed, Plaintiffs believe the Settlement represents a favorable recovery for the Settlement Class. 

Preliminary approval is warranted because the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and 

certification of the Settlement Class is appropriate for purposes of settlement and final judgment. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). 

1

 Unless otherwise noted, capitalized terms used herein have the same meanings ascribed to them 

in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement dated May 1, 2023 (the “Stipulation” or “Stip.”), 

filed herewith; all emphasis is added; and internal citations are omitted. 

2

 Defendants are The GEO Group (“GEO” or the “Company”) and George C. Zoley (“Zoley”). 

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II. SUMMARY OF THE LITIGATION 

The initial complaint in this Action was filed on July 7, 2020. ECF No. 1. The operative 

complaint (the “Second Amended Complaint”) was filed on October 4, 2021, alleging violations 

of Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and 

Securities and Exchange Act Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, on behalf 

of all persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired GEO common stock between 

November 9, 2018 and August 5, 2020, inclusive (the “Class Period”). ECF No. 46. Among other 

things, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants made material misstatements and/or omissions regarding 

the financial impact of the Company’s pending lawsuits, which caused its common stock to trade 

at artificially inflated prices until the market learned the truth, resulting in a decline in the price of 

GEO stock. Defendants deny each and all of Plaintiffs’ allegations of wrongdoing. Defendants 

further maintain that any alleged misstatements did not have a material impact on the Company’s 

stock price. 

Prior to filing an amended complaint, Plaintiffs initiated a thorough investigation into 

GEO’s business, operational and compliance policies, including the review of GEO’s SEC filings, 

as well as securities analysts’ reports and advisories about the Company, press releases and other 

public statements issued by GEO, and media reports about the Company. See Joint Declaration of 

Adam M. Apton and Ivy T. Ngo (“Joint Decl.”)), ¶¶8, 12. Additionally, through third-party 

investigators, Lead Counsel contacted and interviewed former GEO employees and other persons 

with relevant knowledge of the claims asserted, consulted with counsel representing plaintiffs in 

the relevant pending lawsuits, and corresponded with industry professionals investigating and 

monitoring GEO’s business and ongoing liabilities. See id. ¶15. Lead Counsel also consulted with 

an expert on damages and loss causation issues regarding potential recovery in the Action. Id.

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On June 21, 2022, the Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in part 

Defendants’ third motion to dismiss. The Order reaffirmed its previous findings that Plaintiffs 

adequately alleged that Defendants made materially false and misleading statements relating to the 

effects of the Company’s pending lawsuits, and when the truth was revealed, Plaintiffs and the 

other members of the proposed class suffered a loss. ECF No. 63. Defendants filed their respective 

Answers on July 1, 2022. ECF Nos. 64 & 65. 

Discovery commenced shortly thereafter. While counsel for the Parties made significant 

efforts to work collaboratively to conduct discovery, disputes arose early in the process, resulting 

in numerous lengthy meet and conferrals. See Joint Decl. ¶¶27, 33. 

On December 4, 2022, the Parties attended a full-day mediation session with mediator 

Robert A. Meyer. Id. at ¶28. Mediation was initially unsuccessful, but the Parties ultimately agreed 

to resolve the case in response to a “mediator’s recommendation” to settle for $3,000,000. Id. 

III. THE PROPOSED TERMS OF SETTLEMENT 

A. The Settlement Class Definition 

The Settlement Class is defined as all Persons or entities who purchased or otherwise 

acquired GEO common stock during the Class Period, and who were damaged thereby. Stip. at 

¶1.37. Excluded from the Settlement Class are Defendants, current and former Officers and 

directors of GEO during the Class Period, their Immediate Family Members, their legal 

representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, any entity in which any excluded party has or had 

during the Class Period a controlling interest, and any Persons or entities who or which exclude 

themselves by timely filing a request for exclusion that is accepted by the Court. Id.

B. Monetary Consideration and Plan of Allocation 

Plaintiffs secured a total benefit of $3,000,000 for the Settlement Class, to be paid on behalf 

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of Defendants. Id. at ¶2.1. The Plan of Allocation, described in full in the Notice of Pendency and 

Proposed Settlement of Class Action (the “Notice”), is based on the Second Amended Complaint, 

providing compensation to Settlement Class Members that sustained losses as a result of the 

decline in the price of GEO’s common stock on July 17, 2019 and August 6, 2020. See O’Brien 

Decl. Ex. A-1 (“Notice”) at 8-10. As described in detail below, the Plan of Allocation will be 

applied uniformly to all Settlement Class Members who submit valid and timely claims. 

C. Release Provisions 

In exchange for monetary consideration, Plaintiffs agreed to release Defendants (and 

Defendants’ Releasees) from all claims arising from their purchase of GEO common stock during 

the Class Period. Specifically, the Stipulation defines “Released Plaintiffs’ Claims” as follows: 

[A]ny and all claims and causes of action of every nature and description 

whatsoever, including both known claims and Unknown Claims, whether arising 

under federal, state, local, statutory, common, or foreign law, or any other law, rule 

or regulation, including without limitation, claims for negligence, gross negligence, 

breach of contract, breach of duty of care, breach of duty of loyalty, breach of duty 

of candor, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or breach of fiduciary duty, that relate 

to the purchase or otherwise acquisition of GEO common stock during the Class 

Period, and that the Plaintiffs or the Settlement Class Members, or any of them, or 

the successors or assigns of any of them, whether directly, indirectly, 

representatively or in any other capacity, against any of the Released Persons (i) 

asserted in the Complaint or (ii) could have asserted in any forum that arise out of, 

are based upon, or relate in any way, directly or indirectly, to (a) the allegations, 

transactions, facts, events, matters, occurrences, acts, representations, or omissions 

involved, set forth, or referred to in the Complaint; (b) Defendants’ statements, 

including public filings, and (c) the purchase, sale, holding, or acquisition of GEO 

stock by any Settlement Class Member during the Class Period. 

Stip. at ¶1.31. 

IV. THE SETTLEMENT WARRANTS PRELIMINARY APPROVAL 

A. The Standard for Judicial Approval of Class Action Settlements. 

Rule 23(e) requires judicial approval of any class action settlement. See Poertner v. Gillette

Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116616, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2014), aff’d, 618 F. App’x 624 

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(11th Cir. 2015). The Court’s decision to approve a settlement is “informed by the strong judicial 

policy favoring settlement as well as by the realization that compromise is the essence of 

settlement.” Nelson v. Mead Johnson & Johnson Co., 484 F. App'x 429, 434 (11th Cir. 2012). This 

is especially true of securities class actions. See In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 572 F.3d 854, 

862 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Public policy strongly favors pretrial settlement of class action lawsuits.”).3

Rule 23(e) provides a two-step process for approving class action settlements. First, “the 

court conducts a preliminary review to determine whether the proposed settlement is within the 

range of possible approval, or, in other words, whether there is probable cause to notify the class 

of the proposed settlement.” Fla. Educ. Ass’n v. State (“FEA”), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229456, 

at *8-9 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2019). Second, “the court conducts a fairness hearing at which all 

interested parties are afforded an opportunity to be heard” in order “to determine if the proposed 

settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate to those who are affected.” Id. at *9. “Preliminary 

approval is appropriate where the proposed settlement is the result of the parties’ good faith 

negotiations, there are no obvious deficiencies, and the settlement falls within the range of reason.” 

City of L.A. v. Bankrate, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115071, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2016).4 

3 See, e.g., Mashburn v. Nat’l Healthcare, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 660, 667 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (“Due to 

the notable unpredictability of result in complex securities litigation and the distinct possibility of 

litigation spanning up to a decade or more, securities fraud class actions readily lend themselves 

to settlement.”); see also In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 493 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Complex 

litigation can occupy a court’s docket for years on end, depleting the resources of the parties and 

the taxpayers while rendering meaningful relief increasingly elusive. Accordingly, the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure authorize district courts to facilitate settlements...”); Bennett v. Behring 

Corp., 96 F.R.D. 343, 348 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff’d, 737 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[S]ettlements 

[of class actions] are highly favored in the law and will be upheld whenever possible.”); Cifuentes 

v. Regions Bank, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37458, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2014) (same). 

4

 Courts typically “rely upon the judgment of experienced counsel for the parties,” and “absent 

fraud, collusion, or the like,” are “hesitant to substitute its own judgment for that of counsel.” 

Canupp v. Liberty Behavioral Health Corp., 417 F. App'x 843, 845 (11th Cir. 2011); see also 

Smith v. Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67832, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 2010) 

(“Preliminary approval is not binding, and it is granted unless a proposed settlement is obviously 

deficient.”). 

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Pursuant to Rule 23(e)(1), notice should be provided to the class if, based upon the parties’ 

showing, the court “will likely be able to: (i) approve the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2); and (ii) 

certify the class for purposes of judgment on the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1). The court 

should consider the factors enumerated in Rule 23(e)(2) when assessing settlement approval. 

Further, when assessing whether the settlement “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” courts in the 

Eleventh Circuit generally consider the Bennett factors: 

(1) the likelihood of success at trial; (2) the range of possible recovery; (3) the range 

of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable; (4) the 

anticipated complexity, expense and duration of litigation; (5) the amount of 

opposition to the settlement; and (6) the stage of proceedings at which the 

settlement was achieved. 

Bennett, 737 F.2d at 986; see e.g., Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 668 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th 

Cir. 2011). Full analysis of Rule 23(e)(2) or the Bennett factors is unnecessary at the preliminary 

approval stage. See Pierre-Val v. Buccaneers, L.P., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81518, at *3 (M.D. 

Fla. June 17, 2015) (“Preliminary approval of a settlement agreement requires only an initial 

evaluation of the fairness of the proposed settlement”). 

B. The Settlement Meets the Approval Requirements Under Rule 23(e)(2). 

1. Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel Adequately Represented the Settlement 

Class. 

Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel diligently prosecuted this Action for more than two years. 

Among other things, Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel investigated relevant factual events, analyzed 

GEO’s SEC filings and other public statements, and reviewed analyst reports concerning the 

Company. See Joint Decl. at ¶¶8, 11-12. Lead Counsel also researched the legal issues underlying 

Plaintiffs’ claims; drafted a detailed amended and second amended complaint; prevailed in part 

against Defendants’ second and third motions to dismiss; conducted fact discovery; retained 

experts and consultants; and participated in lengthy, mediator-assisted settlement negotiations. See 

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id. at ¶¶12-28. Likewise, Plaintiffs have been active and informed participants in the litigation. See 

generally Declarations of James Michael DeLoach and Edward Oketola. Among other things, 

Plaintiffs oversaw the drafting of both the amended and second amended complaint, and reviewed 

briefing on Defendants’ second and third motions to dismiss. See id. at ¶3. Plaintiffs also 

participated in discovery, providing responses to written requests and documents in their 

possession relating to transactions in GEO common stock. Id. 

Indeed, Lead Counsel, who is experienced in prosecuting complex class actions, had a clear 

view of the strengths and risks of the Action and were equipped to make an informed decision 

regarding the reasonableness of a potential settlement. See Joint Decl. at ¶¶32-37; see also 

Lunsford v. Woodforest Nat’l Bank, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200716, at *26 (N.D. Ga. May 19, 

2014) (“The Court should give great weight to the recommendation of counsel for the parties, 

given their considerable experience in this type of litigation.”). The result of these efforts is an 

impressive settlement of $3,000,000 in cash for the benefit of the Settlement Class. As such, 

Plaintiffs and Lead Counsel have adequately represented the Settlement Class. 

2. The Proposed Settlement was Negotiated at Arm’s Length. 

Courts presume that a proposed settlement is fair and reasonable when, as here, it is the 

result of arm’s-length negotiations. See Gunthert v. Bankers Std. Ins. Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

37161, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 8, 2019) (“There is a presumption of good faith in the negotiation 

process... [and] [w]here the parties have negotiated at arm’s length, the Court should find that the 

settlement is not the product of collusion.”). As previously discussed, the Parties engaged Robert 

A. Meyer, a nationally recognized mediator, and attended a full-day mediation session, which was 

initially unsuccessful. See Joint Decl., ¶28. Following weeks of post-mediation negotiations, the 

Parties ultimately agreed to resolve the Action based on a “mediator’s recommendation” to settle 

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for $3,000,000. Id. Mr. Meyer’s involvement strongly supports a finding that negotiations were 

conducted at arm’s length and without collusion. See Morgan v. Pub. Storage, 301 F. Supp. 3d 

1237, 1247 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (“[T]he assistance of an experienced mediator in the settlement 

process confirms that the settlement is non-collusive.”). 

3. The Relief Provided for the Settlement Class Is Adequate. 

(a) The benefits of Settlement outweigh the costs of litigation. 

Under Rule 23(e)(2)(C) or the Bennett factors, courts assess the adequacy of the relief 

provided by settlement in contrast to the continuing risks of litigation. See Grant v. Ocwen Loan 

Servicing, LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14673, at *18 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2019) (“[I]t is not the 

value or nature of the settlement relief alone that is decisive, but whether that relief is reasonable 

when compared with the relief plaintiffs would likely recover if successful, appropriately 

discounted for the risk of not prevailing.”). When determining the range of reasonableness with 

respect to settlement of securities cases, “[c]ourts have repeatedly noted that stockholder litigation 

is notably difficult and notoriously uncertain.” Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Coca-Cola 

Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121093, at *37 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 20, 2008) (collecting cases). 

Here, the proposed Settlement provides a certain near-term recovery of $3,000,000, which 

represents 8.9% of the estimated class-wide damages. See Joint Decl. at ¶¶31-32. According to 

Cornerstone Research, the median settlement as a percentage of total class-wide damages in 

securities fraud cases with damages ranging from $25 million to $74 million is 7.4%. See id. at 

¶31 & Ex. A. Thus, the proposed Settlement represents a meaningful portion of the Settlement 

Class’s possible recovery and comports with historical settlement data in similarly sized cases. See 

Bankrate, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115071, at *15 (preliminarily approving settlement “recognizing 

that securities class actions are difficult to measure” and finding the amount “appears to be within 

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range of reasonableness”). Moreover, the Parties were well positioned to assess the strengths and 

weaknesses of the Action and the benefits of the proposed Settlement as this case has been 

zealously litigated since its filing in 2020. See Joint Decl. at ¶¶6, 8, 11-27; In re Sunbeam Sec. 

Litig., 176 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (holding “[t]his factor weighs in favor of the 

Court finding the proposed settlement to be fair, adequate, and reasonable” because the “case had 

progressed to a point where each side was well aware of the other side’s position and the merits 

thereof.”). 

While Plaintiffs stand by their claims, further litigation – including contentious fact 

discovery, defeating Defendants’ opposition to class certification, summary judgment, and 

winning at trial – presents clear risks. See Joint Decl. at ¶¶34-37. For example, while the Court 

partially denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss, it also significantly limited Plaintiffs’ theories of 

liability and actionable statements, thus substantially reducing the Settlement Class’s possible 

recovery. See ECF Nos. 45, 47. Further, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs have failed to 

demonstrate the alleged corrective disclosures were the proximate cause of any alleged loss.5 See 

Joint Decl. at ¶¶34-35. Acceptance of any such arguments by the Court or a jury, in whole or part, 

would dramatically limit potential recovery, or eliminate it altogether. Thus, Plaintiffs’ likelihood 

of success at trial is not certain. See Burrows v. Purchasing Power, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

189397, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2013) (“[B]ecause success at trial is not certain for Plaintiff, this 

factor weighs in favor of accepting the settlement.”); see also Coca-Cola Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 121093, at *36 (“[T]he range of possible recovery must be weighed against the risk of no 

recovery.”). 

Further, even assuming Plaintiffs were successful at each junction, continuing litigation 

5

 Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving “that the defendant’s misrepresentations caused the loss for 

which the plaintiff seeks to recover” Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345-46 (2005). 

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would pose considerable costs to the Parties and the Court, and would inevitably delay recovery 

for the Settlement Class. See Joint Decl. at ¶¶33, 36; see also Thorpe v. Walter Inv. Mgmt. Corp.,

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144133, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2016) (granting final approval and noting 

that “ongoing discovery and trial preparation would have substantially increased costs to the 

Class”). As such, the early stage of this litigation supports preliminary approval. See Dukes v. Air 

Can., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221914, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2019) (recommending preliminary 

approval of settlement of class action “pending for more than a year” finding that “[t]he proposed 

settlement is occurring early enough in the litigation that significant litigation fees and costs will 

be avoided, but not so early that counsel lacked sufficient information to make an informed 

decision.”) aff’d and adopted by, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221913 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2019).

Thus, considerations of the complexity, expense, and duration of continuing litigation in 

conjunction with the certain near-term recovery of the proposed Settlement and the current stage 

of litigation support preliminary approval. See Fresco v. Auto Data Direct, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 37863, *17 (S.D. Fla. May 11, 2007) (preliminarily approving settlement concluding that 

“[w]ere this matter to continue, numerous, complex issues of law would have to be resolved at the 

cost of considerable time and expense to the parties and the Court.”). 

(b) The proposed method of relief distribution is effective. 

The proposed Settlement, like most securities class action settlements, will be effectuated 

with the assistance of an established and experienced claims administrator. See Joint Decl. at ¶38.6

The Claims Administrator will employ a well-tested protocol for processing claims in connection 

with the settlement of a securities class action. Specifically, notice will be provided to potential 

6

 Plaintiffs selected and retained Epiq Class Action and Claims Solutions, Inc. (“Epiq”) to serve 

as the Claims Administrator for the Class, upon Court approval. Epiq is one of the leading claims 

administrators within the securities industry. See Declaration of Joseph Martino of behalf of Epiq 

Class Action and Claims Solutions, Inc. (“Martino Decl.”). 

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Settlement Class Members by mailing the Court approved Notice of Pendency and Proposed 

Settlement of Class Action (the “Notice”) to the Company’s shareholders of record, including 

recipients consisting of brokers and various investment advisors as a standard operating procedure. 

Martino Decl., ¶¶4-6. These recipients manage accounts on behalf of thousands of retail investors 

who then forward the Notice to potential Settlement Class Members. Id. at ¶5. The Claims 

Administrator will also publish a Summary of Proposed Settlement of Class Action (the “Summary 

Notice”) through a national business newswire. Id. at ¶2. In addition, toll-free telephone and email 

support will be provided, and a Settlement-specific website will be created where key documents 

will be posted, including the Stipulation, Notice, Proof of Claim and Release form (the “Proof of 

Claim”) and [Proposed] Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement and Providing for Notice to the 

Class (the “Notice Order”). Id. at ¶8. 

Settlement Class Members then respond to the Notice by timely submitting a Proof of 

Claim. Once Settlement Class Members’ Proof of Claim is received, either by mail or 

electronically, and the deadline for submitting Proof of Claim passes, the Claims Administrator 

will begin the process of reviewing each Proof of Claim for completeness and assessing the validity 

of the claim. Id. at ¶10. During the review process, the Claims Administrator verifies each Proof 

of Claim is authorized, i.e., has been completed correctly, is properly signed, details qualifying 

transactions in GEO stock, in accordance with the Settlement Class definition, and includes all 

necessary supporting documentation. Id. at ¶10. Claimants who submit a deficient Proof of Claim 

will be notified and given an opportunity to cure the deficiency. Id. at ¶11. Once the claims are 

fully vetted, the Claims Administrator will calculate the distribution of the Settlement Funds to be 

sent via check to all eligible Settlement Class Members who submit a valid Proof of Claim 

(“Authorized Claimants”) equal to his, her or its pro rata share of the total recoverable losses, 

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upon the Court’s approval. Id. at ¶12. Payees are typically given 90 to 180 days to negotiate the 

checks. Id. at ¶13. 

(c) The proposed award of attorneys’ fees is reasonable. 

Lead Counsel intends to seek an award of attorneys’ fees of up to 32% of the Settlement 

Fund.7 See Joint Decl., ¶43. The Supreme Court has recognized that an appropriate court-awarded 

fee is intended to approximate what counsel would receive if they were bargaining for the services 

in the marketplace. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1989). If this were a nonrepresentative action, the customary fee arrangement would be a percentage-based contingency 

fee, and in the range of 30% to 33% of the recovery. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 903-04 

(1984) (“In tort suits, an attorney might receive one-third of whatever amount the plaintiff 

recovers. In those cases, therefore, the fee is directly proportional to the recovery.”) (Brennan, J., 

concurring). Moreover, in considering the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees under the percentage 

method, “district courts in the Eleventh Circuit routinely approve fee awards of one-third of the 

common settlement fund.” Hanley v. Tampa Bay Sports & Entm’t. LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

89175, at *16 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2020) (citing Wolff v. Cash 4 Titles, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

153786, at *16-*17 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2012) (collecting cases and concluding that 33% is 

consistent with the market rate in class actions); Waters v. Int'l Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 

1291, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 1999) (affirming attorneys’ fee award of 33.3% to class counsel)). 

Indeed, this is especially true for comparable securities class actions in the Eleventh Circuit.8 

7

 Lead Counsel also intends to request reimbursement for its out-of-pocket expenses, the majority 

of which are attributable to retaining and consulting with third-party consultants and experts, and 

engaging Mr. Meyer to oversee the Parties’ mediation. See Joint Decl., ¶43. Lead Counsel will 

also request a PSLRA award to reimburse Plaintiffs for their time and expenses serving as class 

representatives during this litigation. Id. at ¶44. When Lead Counsel formally moves for an award 

of fees and expenses, it will submit additional evidence in support thereof. See id. at ¶45. 

8 See, e.g., Thorpe, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144133, at *35 (awarding Co-Class Counsel 33.3% of 

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(d) Considering all identified agreements, relief is adequate. 

Rule 23(e)(2)(C)(iv) requires the disclosure of any agreement between the Parties in 

connection with the Settlement. In addition to the Stipulation, the Parties have entered into a 

supplemental agreement dated May 1, 2023 (the “Supplemental Agreement”) regarding requests 

for exclusion. See Stip., ¶7.4. The Supplemental Agreement provides Defendants with the option 

to terminate the Settlement in the event requests for exclusion from the Settlement Class exceed a 

certain agreed-upon threshold. See id. As is standard in securities class actions, the Supplemental 

Agreement is being kept confidential in order to avoid incentivizing the formation of a group of 

opt outs for the sole purpose of leveraging a larger individual settlement, to the detriment of the 

Settlement Class. See 7 Newberg on Class Actions § 22:59 (5th ed.) (“[P]arties write a so-called 

‘blow up’ agreement into a settlement, whereby the defendants are authorized to walk away from 

the settlement if too many class members opt out; parties attempt to keep the precise level at which 

the exit is authorized private so as not to encourage opt outs.”)). Pursuant to the Supplemental 

Agreement, it may be submitted to the Court in camera or under seal. 

4. The Settlement Treats Settlement Class Members Equitably. 

Rule 23(e)(2)(D) requires courts to evaluate whether the settlement treats class members 

equitably relative to one another. “A plan of distribution is [ ] sufficient where ... there is a rough 

correlation between the settlement distribution and the relative amounts of damages recoverable 

settlement fund); In re Health Insurance Innovations Sec. Litig., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61051, at 

*36 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2021) (awarding 33% of settlement fund as reasonable); Pritchard v. Apyx 

Med. Corp., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222174, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2020) (awarding 33.3% of 

settlement fund as “fair and reasonable”); In re Flowers Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 7:16-cv000222-WLS, 2019 WL 6771749, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2019) (awarding 33.3%); In re 

Netbank, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:07-cv-2298-TCB, 2011 WL 13353222, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 9, 

2011) (awarding 34%); In re Profit Recovery Grp. Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:00-cv-1416-CC, 

2005 WL 8172262, at *3 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 2005) (awarding 33.3%); In re Clarus Corp. Sec. 

Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50147, at *24 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2005) (same); In re Theragenics 

Corp. Sec. Litig., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32850, at *19 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2004) (same). 

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by Class Members.” In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43082, 

at *16 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2005); see also Holmes v. Cont'l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1148 (11th 

Cir. 1983) (“[T]here is no rule that settlements benefit all class members equally.”). 

As reflected in the Plan of Allocation, the proposed Settlement treats all Settlement Class 

Members, including Plaintiffs, equitably relative to each other by providing that each Settlement 

Class Member shall receive his, her, or its pro rata share of the Settlement Fund less taxes, 

approved costs, fees, and expenses (the “Net Settlement Fund”) based on their “Recognized Loss.” 

See Notice at 8-10. As described in the Notice, the Plan of Allocation has a rational basis and was 

formulated by Lead Counsel, with the assistance of Plaintiffs’ damages expert, ensuring its fairness 

and reliability. See id. The Plan of Allocation also clearly identifies the circumstances by which 

Settlement Class Members may participate in the distribution of the Net Settlement Fund. See id. 

As such, the Plan of Allocation is consistent with the alleged theories of damages under the 

Exchange Act and is substantially similar to other plans approved and successfully implemented 

in securities class actions in this Circuit. See Coca-Cola Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121093, at 

*21 (finding securities class action plan of allocation “treats all Settlement Class Members in a 

similar manner—ensuring that everyone entitled to a distribution...gets a pro rata share of the Net 

Settlement Fund in the proportion that his, her, or its Recognized Claim bears to the total of all 

Recognized Claims.”). 

V. THE PROPOSED NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT IS SUFFICIENT 

“Rule 23(e)(1)(B) requires the court to direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class 

members who would be bound by a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise.” 

Manual for Complex Litigation, § 21.312 (4th Ed.). In order to satisfy the due process 

requirements, notice “need only be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 

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interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 

objections.” Lee v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121998, at *12 (S.D. Fla. 

Sept. 14, 2015). Notice must also satisfy the requirements of the Private Securities Litigation 

Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”). See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(7). Here, the Parties propose that 

notice be provided to the Class by mail via the U.S. Postal Service, as well as by the one-time 

publication of the Summary Notice over a national business newswire. See Stip. at ¶3.1. 

The proposed Notice provides the following, in simple language: (i) basic information 

about the Action; (ii) an explanation of the Settlement and the considerations that caused Plaintiffs 

and Lead Counsel to conclude the Settlement is fair and adequate; (iii) a description of the 

Settlement benefits and how Settlement Class Members can submit a claim; (iv) an explanation 

that if the Settlement is approved, any claims against Defendants that could have been litigated in 

the Action will be released; (v) the contact information for the Claims Administrator and Lead 

Counsel; (vi) an explanation of how Settlement Class Members can timely exercise their right to 

opt out of the Settlement Class or object to the Settlement; (vii) information regarding Lead 

Counsel’s intent to seek an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses; and (viii) an explanation of the 

final approval hearing and how to submit a notice of appearance. See generally, Notice. The 

proposed Summary Notice also provides essential information about the Action and the Settlement 

and directs Settlement Class Members to alternative sources for additional information. See Stip., 

Ex. A-3. Likewise, the proposed Postcard Notice provides necessary information about the 

Settlement and how to participate. See Stip., Ex. A-4. In addition to the mailed and published 

notice, the Stipulation provides for the establishment of a website devoted to posting Settlementrelated information, and a toll-free telephone number to answer Settlement-related inquires. See 

Stip. at ¶5.2. 

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Thus, the proposed nature and methods of notice constitute valid and sufficient notice to 

the Class, and comply fully with the requirements of the PSLRA, Rule 23 and due process. See In 

re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 334 F. App’x 248, 250 (11th Cir. 2009) (individual notice to all 

reasonably locatable class members, publication in newspapers); In re Rayonier Sec. Litig., 2017 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167510, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2017) (individual notice to all reasonably 

locatable class members, publication in Investor’s Business Daily and over PR Newswire). 

VI. THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SHOULD BE CERTIFIED FOR SETTLEMENT 

PURPOSES 

“A class may be certified solely for purposes of settlement if a settlement is reached before 

a litigated determination of the class certification issue.” Holman v. Student Loan Xpress, Inc.,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113491, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2009). Plaintiffs submit that Defendants 

stipulated to the certification of a Settlement Class for settlement purposes only. Stip. at ¶8.1. 

Settlement Class certification is appropriate because the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 

(numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy of representation) are met. See Amchem Prods. v. 

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997). Also, common issues of law or fact predominate over 

individual issues, making the class action a superior vehicle to fairly and efficiently adjudicate the 

Class’s claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In certifying a Settlement Class, the Court “need not 

inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, for the proposal 

is that there be no trial.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D). Plaintiffs, 

therefore, respectfully request that the Court certify the Settlement Class using the definition 

agreed to in the Stipulation. Stip. at ¶1.37. 

A. The Requirements of Rule 23(a) have been met. 

First, Rule 23(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to show “the class is so numerous that joinder of all 

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members is impracticable.” Here, GEO stock traded on the NYSE, and Plaintiffs believe there are 

“hundreds or thousands of members in the proposed [Settlement] Class.” ECF No. 46 at ¶¶33, 157. 

Accordingly, the class is sufficiently numerous, and the difficulty or inconvenience of joining all 

Settlement Class Members makes certification appropriate. Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners 

Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657, 664 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (“Securities fraud actions predicated on public 

misrepresentations typically satisfy Rule 23(a)(1) where the securities were traded on a national 

public exchange, as the putative class members are likely to be numerous, geographically dispersed 

and difficult to identify.”). 

Second, the proposed Settlement Class also meets the commonality requirement of Rule 

23(a), which the Eleventh Circuit has characterized as a “low hurdle” and “can even be satisfied 

by a single common question.” Thorpe, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33637, at *17. Here, Plaintiffs 

allege that Defendants engaged in conduct involving a common nucleus of operative facts by 

mispresenting or omitting material information relating to the Company’s pending lawsuits. See 

In re NetBank, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 656, 664 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (“Generally, where plaintiffs allege that 

the action is a result of a unified scheme to defraud investors, the element of commonality is met.”). 

Third, Rule 23(a)(3) requires that Plaintiffs show their claims or defenses “...are typical of 

the claims or defenses of the class.” “Class members’ claims need not be identical...rather, there 

need only exist a sufficient nexus...between the legal claims of the named class representatives 

and those of individual class members to warrant class certification.” Ault v. Walt Disney World 

Co., 692 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs’ claims (like those of the Settlement Class) 

concern publicly traded GEO stock, are based on the same facts and legal theories, and will be 

proven with the same evidence, thus certification is warranted. 

Lastly, pursuant to Rule 23(a)(4), “class counsel and the class representatives are adequate 

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representatives of the class if (1) ‘plaintiffs’ counsel are qualified, experienced, and generally able 

to conduct the proposed litigation’ and (2) the plaintiffs lack ‘interests antagonistic to those of the 

rest of the class.’” Holman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113491, at *9 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. J.C. 

Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 726 (11th Cir. 1987)). First, having purchased or acquired GEO 

common stock during the Class Period and having sustained damages as a result of the same 

alleged material misstatements, Plaintiffs interests are aligned with those of the other Settlement 

Class members. In addition, as discussed above, Plaintiffs have taken an active role in the litigation 

on behalf of the absent Settlement Class members. See O’Brien Decl., Ex. 3-4. Likewise, Lead 

Counsel have years of experience prosecuting securities class actions, as numerous courts around 

the country have recognized. See id. at Ex. 8-9. And the proposed Settlement was reached only 

after a thorough investigation of the facts and merits of the legal claims and defenses. See Joint 

Decl., ¶¶8, 11-28; see also Air Can., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221914, *11 (preliminary approval 

recommended where “Plaintiff and the Settlement Class seek redress of the same alleged wrong” 

and “Plaintiff’s counsel understands the claims in this case and possesses class action 

experience.”). 

B. The Requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) have been met. 

The proposed Class satisfies Rule 23(b)(3), because: (1) “the questions of law or fact 

common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”; 

and (2) “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 

the controversy.” Predominance inquiries are based “on the legal or factual questions that qualify 

each class member’s case as a genuine controversy, questions that preexist any settlement.” 

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Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623.9 As in Amgen, common questions of law and fact exist as to all 

Settlement Class Members and predominate any questions affecting individual members. See 

Amgen, 568 U.S. at 459-60. 

Finally, Courts have long recognized that the class action is not only a superior method, 

but possibly the only feasible method to fairly and efficiently adjudicate a controversy involving 

a significant number of purchasers of securities injured by securities law violations. See Kennedy 

v. Tallant, 710 F.2d 711, 718 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Separate actions by each of the class members 

would be repetitive, wasteful, and an extraordinary burden on the courts.”). Settlement Class 

Members are not likely to have an interest in or the means to prosecute an individual case against 

GEO, a large, sophisticated company accustomed to litigation. Further, a class action benefits GEO 

which could not otherwise obtain a Class-wide release, and therefore, would have little incentive 

to agree to the current Settlement on an individual basis. Additionally, concerns of efficiency and 

economy further tip the scales in favor of collectively litigating the alleged claims. Therefore, 

resolution of the Action on behalf of the proposed Settlement Class is superior to any other 

available method of resolution.10 

9

 The “[p]redominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud 

[claims].” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625; see also Monroe Cty. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Southern Co.,

332 F.R.D. 370, 380 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (same). The Supreme Court provided clarity offering, “Rule 

23(b)(3) requires a showing that questions common to the class predominate, not that those 

questions will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class.” Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans 

& Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 459 (2013). 

10 See Air Can., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221914, *12-13 (“The members of the Settlement Class 

suffered the same alleged injury and seek relief under the same legal theory; thus, as a practical 

matter, requiring multiple actions by each Settlement Class member would be financially 

burdensome and judicially inefficient.”). 

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VII. PROPOSED SCHEDULE 

In conjunction with the Notice Order, the Parties propose the following schedule: 

EVENT PROPOSED TIMING 

Deadline to mail Postcard Notice (“Notice 

Date”) 

No later than 21 calendar days after entry of 

Notice Order 

Deadline to publish the Summary Notice No later than 14 calendar days after Notice Date 

Deadline to file initial papers in support of 

final approval and seek fees and expenses

No later than 42 calendar days prior to Settlement 

Hearing 

Deadline to object or request exclusion No later than 28 calendar days prior to Settlement 

Hearing

Deadline to file proof of mailing and 

publication

No later than 7 calendar days prior to Settlement 

Hearing

Deadline to file reply papers No later than 14 calendar days prior to Settlement 

Hearing

Settlement Hearing Approx. 100 calendar days from entry Notice 

Order

Deadline to submit Proof of Claim No later than 120 calendar days after Notice Date 

VIII. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant their Motion in its entirety. 

Dated: May 8, 2023 Respectfully submitted, 

CULLIN O’BRIEN LAW, P.A.

 /s/ Cullin O’Brien .

Cullin O’Brien (FL# 0597341) 

6541 NE 21st Way 

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 

(T): (561) 676-6370 

(F): (561) 320-0285 

cullin@cullinobrienlaw.com 

Additional Counsel for Lead Plaintiff James 

Michael DeLoach

LEVI & KORSINSKY, LLP 

Adam M. Apton 

55 Broadway, 4th Floor 

New York, New York 10006 

(T): (212) 363-7500 

(F): (212) 363-7171 

aapton@zlk.com 

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FREEDMAN NORMAND FRIEDLAND LLP 

Velvel (Devin) Freedman (FL# 99762) 

Ivy T. Ngo 

Constantine P. Economides (FL# 118177) 

1 SE 3rd Avenue, Suite 1240 

Miami, FL 33131 

(T): (786) 924-2900 

vel@fnf.law 

ingo@fnf.law 

ceconomides@fnf.law 

Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Class 

THE SCHALL LAW FIRM 

Brian Schall (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

1880 Century Park East, Suite 404 

Los Angeles, CA 90067 

(T): (424) 303-1964 

brian@schallfirm.com 

Additional Counsel for Lead Plaintiff Edward 

Oketola 

 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on May 8, 2023, I authorized the electronic filing of the foregoing 

document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of 

such filing to the e-mail address denoted on the attached Electronic Mail Notice List. 

/s/ Cullin O’Brien 

Cullin O’Brien 

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