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38–340PS 2008

RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE: ASSESSING

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLINICAL

LABORATORY CAPABILITIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND

OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND

TECHNOLOGY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 25, 2007

Serial No. 110–67

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.science.house.gov

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

JERRY MCNERNEY, California

LAURA RICHARDSON, California

PAUL KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM MATHESON, Utah

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri

CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona

CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,

Wisconsin

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

BOB INGLIS, South Carolina

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

HON. BRAD MILLER, North Carolina, Chairman

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

BART GORDON, Tennessee

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,

Wisconsin

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

DAN PEARSON Subcommittee Staff Director

EDITH HOLLEMAN Subcommittee Counsel

JAMES PAUL Democratic Professional Staff Member

DOUGLAS S. PASTERNAK Democratic Professional Staff Member

KEN JACOBSON Democratic Professional Staff Member

BART FORSYTH Republican Counsel

TOM HAMMOND Republican Professional Staff Member

STACEY STEEP Research Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

October 25, 2007

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Brad Miller, Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 5

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7

Statement by Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Ranking Minority

Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on

Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................. 8

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10

Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Science and

Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ....................................................... 11

Witnesses:

Ms. Dana Tulis, Deputy Office Director, Office of Emergency Management,

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; accompanied by Dr. John Griggs,

Chief, Monitoring and Analytical Services Branch, Office of Radiation and

Indoor Air, National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory

(NAREL), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 12

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14

Dr. Robert T. Hadley, Chair of Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center’s Laboratory, Analysis Working Group, Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 18

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 19

Biography .......................................................................................................... 22

Dr. Robert L. Jones, Acting Chief, Inorganic and Radiation Analytical Toxicology Branch, Division of Laboratory Sciences, National Center for Environmental Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 22

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 24

Dr. John Vitko, Director of Chemical and Biological Division, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; representing Dr. S. Randolph Long, Chief

Technical Advisor, Chemical and Biological Division, Science & Technology

Directorate, Department of Homeland Security

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 27

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 29

Discussion

National Environmental Radiological Laboratory Capacity Gap Assessment 33

How the Gap Effects Response to a Dirty Bomb ............................................... 34

Ability to Evaluate the Damage Done By an Attack ........................................ 34

QAP Programs ...................................................................................................... 35

The Decision to Close QAP .................................................................................. 35

EPA Preparedness to Deal With a Dirty Bomb ................................................. 36

Page

IV

Assessing a Radiological Event ........................................................................... 36

More on the Capacity Gap ................................................................................... 36

Why Is There a Lack of Capacity? ...................................................................... 36

Why Isn’t the DOE Prepared for a Radiological Emergency? .......................... 37

The TOPOFF Simulation .................................................................................... 37

DOE Executives ................................................................................................... 38

Environmental Samples ...................................................................................... 38

What Did the Polonium–210 Poisoning Tell Us About Our Capacity? ............ 39

CDC Using DOE Laboratories ............................................................................ 39

Environmental Radioanalytical Laboratory Response Network ...................... 40

Timeline and Plans for Expanding the Current Capacity ................................ 40

What Are the Next Steps to Being Better Prepared? ....................................... 41

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RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE: ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLINICAL LABORATORY

CAPABILITIES

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2007

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Miller

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Radiological Response: Assessing

Environmental and Clinical

Laboratory Capabilities

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2007

9:30 A.M.–12:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose

Every two years the government conducts the TOPOFF series of national counterterrorism exercises, mandated by Congress. This year, TOPOFF IV (T4) is taking

place from October 14–24, 2007, and will focus on National Planning Scenario #11,

which envisions the detonation of a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or ‘‘dirty

bomb.’’ In this exercise, involving thousands of federal, state and local officials and

sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), terrorists detonate an

RDD in Guam, Portland, Oregon and Phoenix, Arizona. The exercise will test the

handling and flow of operational and time-critical intelligence between agencies and

the existing procedures and policies for domestic incident management of a major

radiological event.

One of the key assumptions in the National Planning Scenario developed by the

White House’s Homeland Security Council and being exercised in TOPOFF IV is

that all potentially exposed individuals (an estimated 100,000 people at each site)

will be tested for radiological exposure and/or contamination and that a valid method exists for testing these clinical specimens. Yet, validated methods to test clinical

specimens in a radiological emergency exist for only six of the 13 highest priority

radioisotopes most likely to be used in a terrorist scenario. For those isotopes for

which ‘‘validated’’ methods do exist screening 100,000 individual clinical specimens

in the wake of a radiological attack could take more than four years to complete due

to the current shortfall in radiochemistry laboratories, personnel and equipment.

Environmental sampling could take as long as six years to complete given the current capacity and capabilities of the U.S. radiochemistry laboratory infrastructure.

Although not a focus of the TOPOFF IV exercise, in any real world event the critical lack of a sufficient environmental and clinical radiochemistry laboratory capacity will delay appropriate public health care actions and plans, increase public

panic, degrade public trust in government officials and increase the economic losses

due to delays in assessment and cleanup. The Subcommittee hearing on radiological

response will review what steps are underway to address this critical need, what

technologies or resources would help tackle this capacity gap and what federal agencies responsible for addressing this need have learned from actual radiological emergencies, such as the recent Polonium–210 poisoning in London that killed former

Russian KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko last November and the 1987 (accidental)

radiological release in Goiania, Brazil, that killed four people and injured hundreds.

It will also examine why this crucial public health ability has received limited attention and what more needs to be done to improve the U.S. radiochemistry laboratory

infrastructure.

Witnesses

Dr. Randolph Long, Chair of the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks

(ICLN) Network Coordinating Group and Chief Technical Adviser, Chemical and Biological Division, Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security.

Dr. Robert L. Jones, Chief, Inorganic Toxicology and Radionuclide Labs, Centers

for Disease Control and Prevention. He is also the Co-Chair of the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) Network Coordinating Group’s Radiological

4

Laboratory Response Workgroup and headed up the CDC’s Polonium–210 response

efforts last year.

Dr. Robert T. ‘‘Robb’’ Hadley, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Department of Energy. Dr. Hadley is the current Chair of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center’s (FRMAC) Laboratory Analysis Working Group and

was formerly the Chair of the FRMAC Health & Safety Working Group.

Dr. John Griggs, Chief, Monitoring and Analytical Services Branch, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory (NAREL) and Co-Chair of the ICLN Network Coordinating Group’s Radiological Laboratory Response Workgroup.

Ms. Dana Tulis, Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Management (OEM), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

5

Chairman MILLER. Good morning. This hearing will come to

order. Today’s hearing is on Radiological Response: Assessing Environmental and Clinical Laboratory Capabilities.

If there is one punch that terrorists have clearly telegraphed, it

is the detonation of a dirty bomb in an American city. A dirty bomb

is a conventional bomb that broadcasts, spreads radioactive material, contaminating perhaps several city blocks. We heard years ago

that Osama bin Laden had tried to obtain radioactive materials to

use in a dirty bomb.

But the Federal Government was better prepared for Katrina

than we are now for the detonation of a dirty bomb in an American

city.

Yesterday concluded a ten-day national counterterrorism exercise

called TOPOFF that included the participation of thousands of

State, local, and federal officials. The exercise was based on the

White House’s National Planning Scenario #11 that envisions the

simultaneous detonation of a ‘‘dirty bomb’’ or Radiological Dispersal

Device in three major urban areas. The simulated attacks in this

exercise took place in Guam, Phoenix, Arizona, and Portland, Oregon. Perhaps one of you could explain why Guam was included as

what I had not thought of as a major American city.

In a real radiological terrorist attack, the Environmental Protection Agency estimates that they would need to collect, process, and

analyze more than 350,000 environmental samples in the 12

months after the incident. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention, the CDC, is charged with monitoring and assessing the

public’s health in response to a radiological emergency, and the

CDC estimates that they would need to screen 100,000 individuals

for potential radiological exposure for internal contamination in the

first days after a radiological attack.

Yet, depending on the type of radioactive materials used in a

real-world event, the EPA predicts that given the Nation’s current

radiochemistry laboratory infrastructure, it might take them six

years to analyze the 350,000 samples necessary to conduct a thorough environmental analysis, and that is just in one city. One of

the key assumptions outlined in the national planning documents

upon which the most recent TOPOFF exercise was based is that all

potentially exposed individuals, an estimated 100,000 people in

each city, will be tested for radiological contamination and that a

valid method exists for testing those clinical specimens.

For those isotopes for which validated methods do exist, screening 100,000 clinical specimens in the wake of a radiological attack

could take more than four years to complete because of the current

shortfall in radiochemistry laboratories, personnel, and equipment.

That is the good news. The CDC currently has no valid method to

test clinical specimens in a radiological emergency for seven of the

13 most-likely radioisotopes, radioactive materials, used in a terrorist attack, in a dirty bomb attack.

Those drastic shortfalls may have far-reaching implications for

government officials responsible for responding to and recovering

from a national radiological emergency.

Today, we will hear from representatives from the CDC, EPA,

Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security,

about the gaps that exists in their ability to respond to a radioVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Jun 07, 2008 Jkt 038340 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\102507\38340 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
6

logical emergency effectively and efficiently by conducing rigorous

and rapid analysis of radiological environmental and clinical samples. Radiochemistry laboratories provide a vital role in determining who has been contaminated and the nature and dangers of

their exposures providing a roadmap for appropriate medical care.

These labs also provide assessments of environmental contamination that affect evacuation, remediation, and restoration decisions

that have serious social, public health, political, and economic implications for potentially millions of people. The ability to provide

policy-makers with analytical data regarding the scale, scope, and

public health implications of potential radiological contamination

quickly and accurately is critical to making informed decisions regarding evacuation, re-occupation, medical treatment, and environmental clean-up. But given the Nation’s current lab capacity, they

can’t possibly get that information when we need it.

Last November, former Russian KGB agent Alexander

Litvinenko was murdered in London using radioactive isotope Polonium–210. It took a long time for the British to figure out what

had happened to him, and what was wrong. Fearful that others

may have been exposed to the radiation, our CDC identified 160

American citizens who had been in the same hotels, the same restaurants that Litvinenko had been in at about the same time. And

in the end, none of them had anything to fear. They did not suffer

from any radiological contamination. But in attempting to locate a

laboratory to do the clinical analysis for exposure to Polonium–210,

the CDC found that only one single U.S. private lab was qualified

and capable of doing the analysis, which really shows the massive

shortfall in our radiochemistry laboratories.

There have been some efforts to close the gap, but the results

have been slow and at times the bureaucratic response in some

agencies has been infuriating. In 2005 the Department of Homeland Security established an Integrated Consortium of Laboratory

Networks to help establish the capacity and capability to address

this radiochemistry gap. But at the very same time, elsewhere in

DHS, DHS was terminating a major, world-renowned

radiochemistry quality assurance program at the Environmental

Measurements Laboratory in New York.

That decision has had significant effect on many State and federal radiochemistry labs undermining their ability to certify that

the sample results they provide are accurate and reliable.

Today, there are renewed calls for federal agencies to establish

a proficiency testing program as part of radiological networks proposed by the CDC and the EPA to ensure that the data radiological

emergency response officials and the public receive is dependable

and trustworthy. We’re going to have to spend some money and it

is going to be to establish a program that is pretty much identical

to the one that we just closed.

It is true that a radiological attack, a dirty bomb, would probably

result in relatively few deaths initially, but there would be largescale, low levels of exposure to a lot of people and a lot of critically

important territory perhaps in city centers. Imagine the economic

effect if we could not tell for days whether the downtown, the bottom of Manhattan, the financial district could be occupied again,

whether we could use those buildings, whether we could go there,

7

whether we needed to demolish those buildings or clean them up

before we could safely occupy those buildings again. And there

would just be tens of thousands of people who would want to know

whether they were contaminated, whether they suffered from internal contamination, whether their health was at risk, whether their

children were affected by exposure.

Closing the capacity gap that we have as soon as possible would

be an insurance policy against much worse effects of a dirty bomb

attack.

The public expects that we do better than what we are prepared

to do now, and the government’s planning documents identify the

estimated scale of the response, and it is clear that we do not have

the capacity to do what is required of us. It seems we are likely

headed for a radiological Katrina if terrorists do succeed in detonating a dirty bomb in an American city.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Miller follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BRAD MILLER

If there’s one punch that terrorists have clearly telegraphed, it’s the detonation

of a ‘‘dirty bomb’’ in an American city. A dirty bomb is a conventional explosion that

spreads radioactive material, contaminating perhaps several city blocks. We heard

years ago that Osama bin Laden had tried to obtain radioactive materials to use

in a dirty bomb.

But the Federal Government was better prepared for Katrina than we are for the

detonation of a dirty bomb in an American city.

Yesterday concluded a ten-day national counterterrorism exercise called TOPOFF

that included the participation of thousands of local, State and federal officials. The

exercise was based on the White House’s National Planning Scenario #11 that envisions the simultaneous detonation of a ‘‘dirty bomb’’ or Radiological Dispersal Device

(RDD) in three major urban areas. The simulated attacks in this exercise took place

in Guam, Phoenix, Arizona and Portland, Oregon.

In a real radiological terrorist attack, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

estimates that they would need to collect, process and analyze more than 350,000

environmental samples in the 12 months following the incident. The Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), charged with monitoring and assessing the

public’s health in response to a radiological emergency, estimates that they will

need to screen 100,000 individuals for potential radiological exposure in the first few

days after a radiological attack.

Yet, depending on the types of radioactive material used in a real world event,

the EPA predicts that given the Nation’s current radiochemistry laboratory infrastructure it could take them as long as six years to analyze the 350,000 samples

necessary to conduct a thorough environmental analysis—in just one city. One of

the key assumptions outlined in the national planning documents upon which the

most recent TOPOFF exercise was based is that all potentially exposed individuals

(an estimated 100,000 people) will be tested for radiological contamination and that

a valid method exists for testing these clinical specimens.

For those isotopes for which validated methods do exist screening 100,000 clinical

specimens in the wake of a radiological attack could take more than four years to

complete due to the current shortfall in radiochemistry laboratories, personnel and

equipment. And that’s the good news. The CDC currently has no valid method to

test clinical specimens in a radiological emergency for seven of the 13 highest priority radioisotopes most likely to be used in a terrorist scenario.

These drastic shortfalls may have far-reaching implications for government officials responsible for responding to and recovering from a national radiological emergency. Today, we will hear from representatives at the CDC, EPA, Department of

Energy (DOE) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), about the massive gap

that exists in their ability to respond to a radiological emergency effectively and efficiently by conducing rigorous and rapid analysis of radiological environmental and

clinical samples. Radiochemistry laboratories provide a vital role in determining

who’s been contaminated and the nature and dangers of their exposures providing

a roadmap for appropriate medical treatment. These labs also provide assessments

of environmental contamination that affect evacuation, remediation and restoration

decisions and have serious social, public health, political and economic implications

8

for potentially millions of people. The ability to provide policy-makers with analytical data regarding the scale, scope and public health implications of potential radiological contamination quickly and accurately is critical to making informed decisions

regarding evacuation, re-occupation, medical treatment and environmental clean-up.

But given the Nation’s current lab capacity gap they can’t possibly get that information when they need it.

Last November, former Russian KGB agent Vladimir Litvinenko was murdered

in London with the radioactive isotope Polonium–210. Fearful that others may have

been exposed to the radiation, the CDC identified 160 U.S. citizens that were in the

same hotels and restaurants as Litvinenko around the same time. In the end, none

of them had anything to fear. They did not suffer from any radiological contamination. But in attempting to locate a laboratory to do the clinical analysis for exposure

to Polonium–210, the CDC found only one single U.S. private lab that was qualified

and capable of doing the analysis, highlighting the massive shortfall in U.S.

radiochemistry laboratories.

There have been some efforts to close this gap, but the results have been slow

and at times the bureaucratic response in some agencies has been infuriating. In

2005 the Department of Homeland Security helped establish an Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) to help establish the capacity and capability

to address this radiochemistry gap. Inexplicably at the very same time, the very

same agency was terminating a major, world renowned radiochemistry quality assurance program at the Environmental Measurements Laboratory in New York.

That decision has had a significant effect on many state and federal radiochemistry

labs undermining their ability to certify that the sample results they provide are

accurate and reliable. Today, there are renewed calls from federal agencies to establish a ‘‘proficiency testing’’ program as part of radiological networks proposed by the

CDC and EPA to ensure that the data radiological emergency response officials and

the public receive is dependable and trustworthy. We’re going to have to spend

money to establish an identical program to the one that DHS just ended a couple

of years ago if we’re going to have the radiological testing capacity needed to respond to a dirty bomb.

A radiological attack is likely to result in few immediate deaths but large scale

low-levels of radioactive exposure to the vast majority of victims. Regardless of the

actual public health impact, however, a ‘‘worried well’’ of tens of thousands of individuals are likely to demand clinical tests that can confirm they have not been contaminated with radiation. Providing that reassurance will help maintain the public’s

confidence in the government and will help stem a potential tide of growing fear

that large segments of the public may have suffered from radiological contamination, however unfounded. Most important, this analysis will help identify those truly

contaminated so that they can receive appropriate medical treatment as soon as possible. Closing this capacity gap as soon as possible would be a small insurance policy

against a far larger disaster in the future. The public expects the Federal Government to be able to respond appropriately; the government’s own planning documents

identify the estimated scale of that response; yet the government has not moved actually to put into place the mechanisms we need to carry that response forward.

Without the ability to conduct both environmental and clinical radiological assessments reliably and quickly it seems we may be headed for a radiological Katrina

if terrorists succeed in detonating a dirty bomb in an American city.

Chairman MILLER. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Sensenbrenner

for his opening statement.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much. For once I am

happy to endorse everything that the Chairman has said in his

opening statement, and let me begin by saying that the potential

for radiological accidents or attacks is a reality that we need to prepare for. This is something that has to be a high priority.

Several years ago I took one of those infamous Congressional

oversight trips, and when I was in northern Norway, I was advised

by an environmental NGO that there were over 100 beacons that

the former Soviet Union put on their Arctic coast powered by cesium–137 batteries and that there were also a number of these

beacons in the mountains of the Caucasus with similar powering.

They are all in very remote areas. It would be very easy for someone to take the cesium–137 battery and to turn it into a dirty bomb

9

without anybody knowing that the batteries were missing. The day

following this discovery, a scientist who was on this trip and who

was temporarily on Senator Biden’s staff asked the Norwegian scientists that were studying Arctic issues how many dirty bombs

each of these batteries could make. The answer was 10 a piece.

And as a result of this, Senator Biden and I successfully co-sponsored legislation which was signed into law amending the NunnLugar Act to allow us to buy this nuclear material from the Russian government, like we did with other types of nuclear material,

not only from Russia but the other independent republics of the

former Soviet Union. It is my understanding that a battery was left

by somebody in Gorky Park in Moscow to let the Russian government know that somebody had their hands on these types of nuclear materials that shouldn’t have them. And this is truly scary

because if the Chechen rebels have these batteries, I think we can

assume that there has been a move by other terrorist organizations

which target the United States and having these batteries.

If there is a dirty bomb explosion, not only will there be potentially tens or hundreds of thousands of people exposed to contamination, but the panic that will set in if large parts of major cities

have to be evacuated. And I think that is one of the reasons why

the exercise that just concluded yesterday was something that was

real time and something that we have to prepare for.

Now, in June of 2005 the Homeland Security Department released the Technology Assessment Roadmap known as ERDAP,

and that assessment found, quote, ‘‘tools to rapidly triage individuals needing medical attention and to intelligently direct medical

treatment to those needing immediate care will optimize the use of

scarce resources, improve survival, and enhance public confidence

in government.’’ These tools don’t exist today.

Following a radiological incident, there is a critical need to determine who has been exposed and to what degree. Rapid radiological

dose assessment is critical for determining who needs treatment

and what treatment is needed. And as ERDAP found, quote, ‘‘lives

may be saved if we can develop rapid dose assessment and can implement earlier treatment.’’

Despite this critical need, we are still suffering from a clear technology gap. Validated methods of testing in a radiological emergency exist for only six of the CDC’s 13 highest priority

radioisotopes most likely to be used in a terrorist scenario. And for

those isotopes where screening methods do exist, screening the

number of individuals likely to be exposed in a terrorist attack

could take years.

Real-world radiological incidents should be instructive. The most

recent example was the Polonium–210 poisoning in London that

killed former KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko. The CDC estimated that 160 Americans were potentially exposed to radiation as

the Chairman indicated. When it attempted to test these individuals, it found that there was only one laboratory in the country capable of carrying out the test and it only had the capacity to test

a handful of people per day. Fortunately, all of these tests proved

negative on the Americans who were exposed.

A radiological incident in an urban area could result in much

greater exposure. In 1987, in Goiania, Brazil, a small source of ceVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Jun 07, 2008 Jkt 038340 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\102507\38340 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
10

sium–137, which is the same isotope that I referred to in these beacons in the former Soviet Union, was stolen from an abandoned radiotherapy institute. By the time the material was recognized as

dangerous 15 days later, four people were dead and hundreds were

injured by internal contamination. Over 100,000 people had to be

examined for radiological contamination, topsoil had to be removed

from several sites, and several houses were demolished. Neither of

these incidents originated from an intentional effort to spread contamination. The scale of an actual radiological attack would be

likely much greater.

In a report titled Creation of a National Radioanalytical Laboratory Response Network, the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory

Networks workgroup found that in the case of a radiological dispersion device, better known as a dirty bomb, in an urban district,

350,000 environmental samples would need to be collected over 12

months; and more than 100,000 clinical samples would need to be

collected, analyzed, and processed within the first few days. Not

only did the workgroup identify a lack of capacity to deal with this

volume, it also highlighted a lack of competency due to a lack of

laboratory analytical methods specific for emergency response

needs, reduction in radiochemistry expertise due to retirements,

lack of formal training programs for radioanalytical labs, and reduction in federal radiological proficiency testing programs.

We no longer have the luxury not to maintain this capacity, and

I look forward to the testimony today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sensenbrenner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.

The potential for radiological accidents or attacks is a reality we need to prepare

for. In a June 2005, The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a Technology Assessment and Roadmap for the Emergency Radiation Dose Assessment Program (known as ERDAP). Two years ago, the assessment found that:

Tools to rapidly triage individuals needing medical attention and to intelligently

direct medical treatment to those needing immediate care will optimize the use

of scarce resources, improve survival, and enhance public confidence in government.

Today, these tools still do not exist. Following a radiological incident, there is a

critical need to determine who has been affected and to what degree. Rapid radiological dose assessment is critical for determining who needs treatment and what

treatment is needed. As ERDAP found, ‘‘lives may be saved if we can develop rapid

dose assessment and can implement earlier treatment.’’ Despite this critical need, we are still suffering from a clear technology gap. Validated methods for testing in a radiological emergency exist for only six of the CDC’s 13 highest priority radioisotopes most likely to be used in a terrorist scenario. And

for those isotopes where screening methods do exist, screening the number of individuals likely to be exposed in a terrorist attack could take years.

Real world radiological incidents should be instructive. The most recent example

was the Polonium–210 poisoning in London that killed KGB agent Vladimir

Litvinenko. The CDC estimated that 160 Americans were potential exposed to radiation. When it attempted to test these individuals it found that there was only one

laboratory in the country capable of carrying out the test and it only had the capacity to test a handful of people per day.

A radiological incident in an urban area could result in much greater exposure.

In 1987, in Goiania, Brazil, a small source of cesium–137 was stolen from an abandoned radiotherapy institute. By the time the material was recognized as dangerous

15 days later, four people were dead and hundreds were injured by internal contamination. Over 100,000 people had to be examined for radiological contamination,

topsoil had to be removed from several sites, and several houses were demolished.

Neither of these incidents originated with an intentional effort to spread contamination. The scale of an actual radiological attack would likely be greater still.

11

In its report titled, Creation of a National Radioanalytical Laboratory Response

Network, the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) work group

found that, in the case of a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb, in an urban

district, 350,000 environmental samples would need to be collected over 12 months

and more than 100,000 clinical samples would need to be collected, analyzed, and

processed within the first few days. Not only did the work group identify a lack of

capacity to deal with this volume, it also highlighted a lack of competency due to:

a lack of laboratory analytical methods specific for emergency response needs, reduction in radiochemistry expertise due to retirements, lack of formal training programs for radioanalytical labs, and reduction in federal radiological proficiency testing programs.

We no longer have the luxury to not maintain this capacity. I look forward to

hearing from today’s witnesses about how these capacity and competency gaps can

be addressed.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. There will be a recession following the hearing to celebrate Mr. Sensenbrenner’s and my agreement.

If there are any Members who wish to submit additional opening

statements which seems unlikely since no one else is here, their

statements will be added to the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the Subcommittee looking into this issue today, as our

nation’s preparedness in the event of a radiological emergency is of the utmost importance. In a post-9–11 era, constant examination of many of our emergency response procedures is critical, given what is at stake if a radiological attack were to

take place.

A central question that must be addressed is how to better prepare for an emergency given our current limited capacity to test for internal radioactive exposure?

The technology already exists to test victims in the event of a radiological attack,

but not enough laboratories are equipped to handle a large volume of samples. In

the most common general scenario given, if Chicago were to be attacked and

100,000 samples were sent for testing, it would take more than four years to see

the results.

I look forward to learning more about the possibilities for increasing laboratory

capacity, working in conjunction with the CDC, EPA and DOE.

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to commend you for calling this hearing so we can better

examine our nation’s preparedness level in the case of a radiological attack. Staying

prepared in the event of all types of emergencies is an enormous task, and this

hearing is a step in the right direction.

Chairman MILLER. I will now introduce the witnesses. Dr. John

Griggs is the Chief of the Monitoring and Analytical Services

Branch of the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s

National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory, NAREL,

Office of Radiation and Indoor Air. I hope you don’t have to say

your whole title very often. He is the Co-Chair of the Integrated

Consortium of Laboratory Networks, ICLN, Radiological Laboratory Response Group. With Dr. Griggs is Ms. Dana Tulis, Deputy

Director of the Office of Emergency Management at the Environmental Protection Agency. Ms. Tulis will read a joint statement for

herself and Dr. Griggs. Dr. Robert Hadley is from the Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory at the Department of Energy. Dr.

Hadley is the current Chair of the Federal Radiological Monitoring

and Assessment Center’s, FRMAC, Laboratory Analysis Working

Group and was formerly the Chair FRMAC Health and Safety

Working Group. Dr. Robert L. Jones is the Chief of Inorganic Toxicology and Radionuclide Labs at the Center for Disease Control

and Prevention. He is the Co-Chair of the Integrated Consortium

of Laboratory Networks, ICLN, Radiological Laboratory Response

12

Group, and head of the CDC’s Polonium–210 response efforts last

year. And unfortunately, Dr. Randy Long who chairs the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks for the Department of

Homeland Security was supposed to testify today, had a severe

medical problem yesterday with a knee which presumably is not

life-threatening, although perhaps painful and annoying, and is not

able to be with us today. We hope he is up and about soon, but Dr.

John Vitko, Director of the Chemistry and Biological Security Division at DHS has graciously agreed to read Dr. Long’s prepared testimony into the record.

As all of your know, your full written statement will be placed

in the record and your oral testimony is limited to five minutes

each. We aren’t real strict with that, but try to pay some attention

when you see the red light go on. It is also the practice of the Subcommittee to take testimony under oath. I did not really anticipate

there would be any perjured testimony today, but it is under oath.

Do any of you have any objection to being sworn in? You also have

a right to be represented by counsel. We just ask you these questions to put you ease. Are any of you represented by counsel today?

If you would then please stand and raise your right hand. Do you

swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth?

Ms. Tulis, you may begin.

STATEMENT OF MS. DANA TULIS, DEPUTY OFFICE DIRECTOR,

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Ms. TULIS. Good morning. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Dana Tulis, the Deputy Office Director for the Office of Emergency Management. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the status of EPA’s efforts to assess environmental

radioanalytical laboratory capability and capacity for radiological

response. I would also like to share with you some of the other activities EPA has underway to protect the Nation in the event of an

accidental or intentional release of radiological material.

I am accompanied today by John Griggs, Chief of the Monitoring

and Analytical Services Branch for EPA’s National Air and Radiation Environmental Lab, NAREL. I will summarize my remarks,

but I do ask that my entire written testimony, as you stated, be

submitted for the record.

EPA, working with the Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, Health and Human Services, and others, has identified a considerable gap in national environmental radiological laboratory capacity for responding to terrorist incidents involving radiological

contamination. In the event of such an event fixed laboratories will

serve as a critical source of high-quality data to support incident

response. Data from fixed environmental radiological laboratories

will be particularly critical during consequence management activities such as decontamination and clearance efforts, and restore any

critical infrastructure, such as ensuring the safety of our drinking

water.

Under the National Response Plan’s, NRP, Nuclear/Radiological

Incident Annex, the Department of Energy coordinates radiological

monitoring and assessment activities for the initial phases of a reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Jun 07, 2008 Jkt 038340 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\102507\38340 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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sponse to a radiological incident via the FRMAC, as you know, the

Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center. After the

immediate emergency condition of an incident is stabilized as well

as other criteria, the FRMAC leadership is transferred to the Environmental Protection Agency.

Throughout the response effort, however, EPA provides resources

for defining and delineating the environmental impact of the radiological incident. EPA brings to bear both personnel and equipment

to this mission, including 250 on-scene coordinators and our special

teams under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances National

Contingency Plan.

EPA’s NRP responsibilities include maintaining and enhancing

the Nation’s most comprehensive ambient radiation monitoring

network called RadNet, which consists in part of 50 stationary and

40 portable near-real time air monitors. The stationary real-time

monitors collect a beta and gamma spectrum of particulates on an

air filter hourly, and transmit data to the NAREL for further analysis. The portable monitors collect ambient gamma radiation readings as well as air filters which can also be sent to a laboratory

for further specific analyses.

Under the NRP, EPA has responsibility to lead the cleanup and

recovery phase of a radiological incident for which no other department or agency has that responsibility, and that does include terrorist incidents such as a dirty bomb. EPA will use the Protected

Action Guides for dealing with long-term site restoration following

a major radiological release to help State and local authorities

make protective action decisions. Through training, research, development and technical support activities, EPA continues to increase

the agency’s preparedness, and its response and recovery capabilities for chemical, biological as well as radiological incidents.

In April 2004, the White House released Homeland Security

Presidential Directive Number 10. To fulfill our responsibilities

under HSPD–10, EPA is establishing an all-media, such as soil,

water, and air, environmental Laboratory Response Network

(eLRN) to address environmental laboratory analytical gaps for

chemical warfare, biological and radiological agents. The eLRN is

leverage existing networks and capabilities, and will upgrade and

expand additional capabilities to ensure EPA has sufficient capability and capacity to meet its responsibilities for an incident. EPA

has also begun a demonstration study aimed at improving environmental radiological laboratory capacity through enhancing State

laboratories and is developing tools to enhance the capacity of commercial laboratories as well.

However, EPA’s analysis of the Nation’s existing environmental

radiological laboratory capacity relative to demand from only a single dirty bomb or radiological dispersal device (RDD) in a major

urban business district does reveal significant laboratory gaps. As

you know, the gap is based upon the Homeland Security’s Planning

Scenario #11 which we evaluated which actually was for three

major urban business districts. However, our peak shortfall for just

one RDD is approximately 7,000 to 9,000 samples per week with

an average shortfall of 3,000 samples per week. This gap will result

in a lack of timely, reliable, and interpretable data which will delay

14

national and local response as well as consequent management activities. We estimate about two years for those type of analyses.

In closing, I want to assure the Committee that EPA will continue to work closely with our other federal agencies via the DHSsponsored radiological laboratory working group, and with states to

enhance national radioanalytical capability and capacity to start to

fill this environmental laboratory gap and to maintain readiness to

meet our responsibilities in the event of an accidental or intentional release of radiological or nuclear material.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks. Myself and

Dr. Griggs would be very pleased to answer any of your questions

that you or the Subcommittee Members may have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tulis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANA TULIS

Good morning. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am Dana Tulis,

Deputy Office Director for the Office of Emergency Management at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the status of EPA’s efforts to assess environmental radioanalytical capability and capacity

in radiological response. I would also like to share with you broader activities EPA

has underway to protect the Nation in the event of an accidental or intentional release of radiological material.

ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOANALYTICAL LABORATORIES IN RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE

In the event of a radiological or nuclear Incident of National Significance (INS),

fixed environmental radiological laboratories will serve as a critical source of high

quality and interpretable data to support incident response and consequence management activities. When EPA responds to radiological incidents, it is essential that

the environmental radiological laboratories, whether federal, State, or commercial,

that conduct analyses on environmental samples meet EPA’s standards for stringent

accuracy and quality control. The fixed laboratories must have the capability of analyzing for the broadest possible range of radiological contaminants while achieving

the most sensitive measurements in terms of detection capabilities. Data from fixed

environmental radiological laboratories will be particularly critical during consequence management activities such as decontamination and clearance efforts, and

will be used to make long-term decisions to protect the public from radiological contamination, and to restore any affected critical infrastructure and key resources,

such as ensuring the safety of our drinking water.

NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN: EPA’S RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE RESPONSIBILITY

Under the National Response Plan’s (NRP’s) Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex,

the Department of Energy (DOE) coordinates radiological monitoring and assessment activities for the initial phases of a response to a radiological incident. DOE

coordinates federal radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities

as the lead technical organization in what is known as the Federal Radiological

Monitoring and Assessment Center or the ‘‘FRMAC.’’ The FRMAC is an interagency

organization with representatives from various federal, State, and local radiological

response organizations. The FRMAC provides an operational framework for coordinating all federal radiological monitoring and assessment activities during a response to support the Federal Coordinating Agency, State(s), local, and/or tribal governments. In the event of a Presidentially-declared major disaster or emergency, the

FRMAC also provides its information to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) Federal Coordinating Officer to assure appropriate and adequate additional resources are available for the State and local authorities to draw upon. The

FRMAC works with the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center,

or IMAAC, to produce predictive plots of plume dispersion and dose rates and collects radiological monitoring data. It develops radiation contours showing where

contamination is located and the associated radiation levels, which are used to recommend appropriate protective actions.

FRMAC leadership responsibility, and leadership of federal radiological environmental monitoring and assessment activities, is transferred to EPA per the Nuclear/

Radiological Incident Annex to the NRP, at a mutually agreeable time, and after

15

consultation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its coordination

entities, as well as State, local, and tribal governments. The following conditions are

intended to be met prior to transfer:

Æ The immediate emergency condition is stabilized;

Æ Off-site releases of radioactive material have ceased, and there is little or no

potential for further unintentional off-site releases;

Æ The off-site radiological conditions are characterized and the immediate consequences are assessed;

Æ An initial long-range monitoring plan has been developed in conjunction with

the affected State, local, and tribal governments and appropriate federal

agencies; and

Æ EPA has received adequate assurances from the other federal agencies that

the required resources, personnel, and funds are available for the duration

of the federal response.

When the FRMAC is transferred to EPA, EPA assumes responsibility for coordination of radiological monitoring and assessment activities.

EPA’S PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT RESOURCES

Throughout the response effort, however, EPA provides resources for defining and

delineating the environmental impact of the radiological incident, whether under

DOE leadership or EPA leadership, and uses these resources to carry out its mission

and NRP responsibilities. These responsibilities encompass maintaining personnel

and asset readiness for radiological emergency responses, which include participating in emergency response situations and providing technical expertise and support. EPA brings to bear both personnel and equipment to this mission, including

250 On-Scene Coordinators and its Special Teams under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances National Contingency Plan such as the National Decontamination Team (NDT), the Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT), the Environmental Response Team (ERT), and the National Counter Terrorism Evidence Response Team (NCERT) which each bring specialized personnel and equipment, and

the expertise gained every day in protecting human health and the environment.

More specifically, the RERT has up to 50 people who can be deployed to the field

or a support role and the NDT has 15 people who are available for deployment. Altogether EPA has approximately 350 personnel for emergency responses and is also

building a Response Support Corps to expand our response capability. The Agency’s

radiation health and safety and detection equipment assets run the gamut from approximately 300 personnel dosimeters to measure dose to protect response personnel

to more than 200 pieces of emergency response/assessment equipment to detect

alpha, beta, or gamma radiation, depending on the equipment, in different environmental matrices. Equipment also includes mobile laboratories, a scanner van, and

field based equipment that can identify specific gamma sources.

In addition to personnel and assets, EPA’s NRP responsibilities include maintaining and enhancing the Nation’s most comprehensive ambient radiation monitoring

network named RadNet, which currently consists of 50 stationary and 40 portable

near-real time air monitors, 40 additional non-real time air monitors, milk collection

at 37 locations, drinking water collection at 77 locations and precipitation collection

at 44 locations. The stationary near real-time monitors collect a beta and gamma

spectrum of the particulates on an air filter hourly, and transmit data to the National Air and Radiation Environmental Laboratory (NAREL), where radionuclide

specific determinations can be quickly made. The portable monitors collect ambient

gamma radiation readings through the use of air filters which can be sent to a laboratory for radionuclide specific analyses.

GUIDANCE FOR RADIATION RESPONSES

EPA has worked closely with DHS and our other federal partners to ensure that

the Protective Action Guidelines, or PAGs that can be applied to almost any radiological or nuclear incident, including radiation dispersal devices (dirty bombs). EPA

has developed PAGs, which suggest precautions that can be taken to keep people

from receiving an amount of radiation that might be dangerous to their health. The

PAGs are decision levels to help State and local authorities make protective action

decisions during emergencies, and should be applied using incident-specific information. Users of PAGs may include hazardous materials teams, emergency managers,

anyone working on terrorism preparedness, and nuclear power plant communities.

The PAGs Manual, which EPA issued in 1992, presented guidance for the early

or emergency phase e.g., first four days, and intermediate phase, e.g., source is controlled and field data become available, of a response to primarily nuclear power

16

plant accidents. A revision is underway that addresses all radiological incidents

such as a terrorist use of a dirty bomb, and incorporates DHS’ guidance for dealing

with long-term site restoration following a major radiological release. The DHS

guidance does not recommend pre-established numerical guidelines for cleanup levels because of the broad range of potential impacts that may occur.

Instead, it proposes an optimization process in which potential actions to reduce

radiation dose are evaluated, and the benefits of each are then compared to the detriments of the action. We have also developed guidance for Agency personnel on radiation turn-back levels. Turn-back levels help incident responders know how far

they can go into a radiation area; they are exposure rates and dose limits which

when met require responders to turn back and seek further guidance. The levels we

developed are specific to EPA’s mission and capabilities, and we recommend that

other organizations develop their own.

Under the NRP, EPA has responsibility to lead the cleanup and recovery phase

of a radiological incident for which no other department or agency has responsibility, including terrorist incidents such as a dirty bomb. Through training, research, development and technical support activities, EPA continues to increase its

preparedness, and its response and recovery capabilities for chemical, biological or

radiological incidents that threaten homeland security. The Agency continues to assemble and evaluate private sector tools and capabilities to ensure effective response

approaches can be identified and evaluated for future first responders, decisionmakers, and the public to use. EPA continues to work with federal institutions and

other organizations through collaborative research efforts to strengthen decontamination capabilities. EPA promotes improved response capabilities across government and industry in areas where EPA has unique knowledge and expertise. In the

area of environmental laboratory capabilities and capacity, EPA has begun a demonstration study aimed at improving national radiological laboratory capacity

through enhancing State laboratories and is developing tools to enhance capacity of

commercial laboratories throughout the United States.

HIGHLIGHTS OF ‘‘ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY CAPACITY GAP’’

In April 2004, the White House released Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 10 (HSPD–10). This directive requires EPA to determine the nationwide laboratory capacity required to support environmental decontamination of

chemical, biological, and radiochemical-nuclear agents by reviewing federal, State,

local, and private laboratory capabilities specifically related to environmental sampling and testing and to ensure evidentiary considerations. To respond to HSPD–

10 requirements, EPA is establishing an all media, e.g., soil, air, and water, environmental Laboratory Response Network (eLRN) to address environmental laboratory

analytical gaps for chemical warfare, biological and radiological agents. The eLRN

will leverage existing laboratory networks and capabilities, and upgrade and expand

additional capabilities to ensure that EPA has sufficient capacity and capability to

meet its responsibilities for an INS, such as a terrorist attack involving radiological

or nuclear materials. In order to determine the national environmental radiological

laboratory capacity needs associated with an INS involving radiochemical or nuclear

agents, EPA conducted an assessment of the environmental sample demand for the

White House Homeland Security Council’s Planning Scenario #11 which involves

the detonation of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) in three major urban business districts.

The results of the assessment of the sample demand and estimates of the existing

nationwide environmental radiological laboratory capacity are summarized in EPA’s

draft document entitled Assessment of National Environmental Radiological Laboratory Capacity Gap. The estimated sample demand resulting from a single RDD

event is approximately 360,000 samples over a one-year period. This estimate

equates to an average sample demand of approximately 7,000 to 8,000 samples per

week over 52 weeks and a peak sample demand of 13,000 to 15,000 samples per

week. These numbers do not include the quality control analyses the laboratories

will perform in conjunction with the samples which contribute to the overall analysis demands on the laboratories’ personnel. EPA’s analysis of the Nation’s existing

radiological laboratory capacity relative to the estimated sample demand from the

RDD scenario reveals a significant laboratory capacity gap with an estimated peak

capacity shortfall of approximately 7,000 to 9,000 samples per week and an estimated average capacity shortfall of approximately 3,000 samples per week. This gap

will result in a lack of timely, reliable, and interpretable data which will delay national and local response and consequence management activities.

It should be noted that this gap is based on a single RDD event in which the

source is a single radionuclide which is among the most straightforward to measure

17

from a laboratory perspective. An RDD event with a more complex source—multiple,

more difficult to analyze radionuclides, multiple RDD events as described in Planning Scenario 11, or multiple RDD events with different radiation sources would result in an even larger capacity gap. Although EPA has not conducted a detailed assessment, a limited analysis of an improvised nuclear device (IND) scenario indicates a contamination area of approximately 3,000 square miles, and a laboratory

capacity gap with potentially millions of laboratory analyses required.

In addition to the capacity gap, EPA’s national environmental radiological gap assessment also revealed capability and competency gaps. The capability gap relative

to laboratory incident response is largely due to a lack of ‘‘tools’’ like rapid

radiochemical methods and laboratory protocols specifically designed for response to

radiological or nuclear incident.

The competency gap is due to an overall national declining infrastructure for radiological laboratories due to a number of factors including: reduction of personnel

with radiochemistry expertise without adequate replacements; lack of formal training programs for radiological laboratory personnel; and a reduction in federal radiological proficiency testing (PT) programs.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION INCIDENTS

EPA works continuously with federal, State, and private sector emergency preparedness and response communities to ensure that lessons learned from incidents

such as the 1987 Goiania incident in Brazil and the more recent Polonium–210 murder in the United Kingdom are integrated into the Nation’s preparedness efforts.

While the Goiania and London incidents provided numerous lessons of potential relevance to a dirty bomb response, it should be remembered that neither actually

originated as an intentional effort to spread contamination throughout a densely

populated area. In fact, environmental contamination was an unintended consequence. Thus, the scale of these two incidents, in particular, needs to be assessed

carefully with respect to intentional efforts to harm the Nation’s people and economy by spreading radiological contamination.

However, these and other incidents have taught us that there are a number of

critical aspects in responding to radiological contamination. The Protective Action

Guides must be accepted and understood prior to an incident. Adequate field personnel and instruments are needed to detect, identify and quantify the radioactive

material. Extensive field and fixed laboratory capacity and capability will be needed

to analyze the many air, water, soil and food samples that will be used to determine

public protective measures.

ROLE IN TOPOFF IV

EPA participation in the DHS-led TOPOFF IV was extensive. EPA deployed over

250 participants to the three exercise venues—Portland, Oregon; Mesa, Arizona; and

Guam. Participants included EPA’s On-Scene Coordinators, members of our four

special teams, the Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT), Environmental

Response Team (ERT), National Decontamination Team (NDT), and the National

Counterterrorism Evidence Response Tem (NCERT), as well as personnel from

headquarters and EPA’s regional offices. We also deployed monitoring and analytical equipment such as our mobile radiation laboratory. Additionally, the EPA

Emergency Operations Center was staffed and EPA participated in various interagency coordination and support entities, such as the Domestic Emergency Support

Team (DEST), the Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT), and the National

Response Coordination Center (NRCC). EPA personnel filled critical positions within FRMAC, working in support of DOE, DHS, and the affected State and local governments to assess potential contamination. EPA staff also served as controllers and

evaluators at the various exercise venues.

At the time this testimony was submitted to the Committee on Science and Technology, the TOPOFF IV counterterrorism exercise had just concluded, and the federal community is still working to analyze the exercise and develop conclusions. In

addition to the functional exercise, TOPOFF IV includes a Long-Term Recovery

table top exercise, which will occur in December 2007. During this exercise, we expect to discuss the role of environmental laboratories in supporting the recovery

phase. DHS will publish a final report that will provide a summary of conclusions,

and we will be happy to provide you with additional information in the future.

However, it should be noted that the primary exercise venue, in Portland, Oregon,

emphasized the initial emergency response activities rather than the extended recovery phase during which the majority of fixed laboratory samples will be analyzed.

As noted earlier in my testimony, the spread of radiological contamination from

multiple events such as in Portland, Phoenix and Guam would require more laboraVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Jun 07, 2008 Jkt 038340 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\102507\38340 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tory analyses than the assessment of capacity and capability done to date, which

assumed a single RDD event.

CONCLUSION

We appreciate the Committee’s interest in examining national radioanalytical laboratory capability and capacity to support radiological response and the opportunity

to update you on the status of EPA’s other efforts in the area of radiological response. We understand that radioanalytical capacity is a key component of a multifaceted radiological response in an environment of declining radiochemistry infrastructure. EPA is working closely with other federal agencies via the DHS-sponsored

Radiological Laboratory Working Group and with states to enhance national environmental radioanalytical capacity to maintain readiness to meet our responsibilities in the event of an accidental or intentional release of radiological or nuclear

material.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. Dr. Hadley.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT T. HADLEY, CHAIR OF FEDERAL

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT CENTER’S

LABORATORY, ANALYSIS WORKING GROUP, LAWRENCE

LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

ENERGY

Dr. HADLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am honored to have the opportunity to testify here

today as a subject matter expert about radioanalytical laboratory

issues. I am a certified industrial hygienist and health physicist

from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory with over 25 years

in nuclear emergency response management, and I currently serve

as the Chair of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, or FRMAC, Laboratory Analysis Working Group.

We all recognize that a response to a radiological event will require many highly skilled professionals ranging from surveillance

to response organizations and forensics. My remarks today are confined to my role as part of the FRMAC.

The FRMAC is part of the Nuclear Incident Response Team

maintained by DOE can be activated by the Department of Homeland security in response to a nuclear or radiological incident. The

purpose of the FRMAC is to provide a clear operating picture of radiological conditions in the field to responders for decision-making

and incident action planning. FRMAC data is critical for characterizing the exact nature and extent of contamination which supports

public health and safety efforts. FRMAC provides verified radiation

measurements and characterization of overall radiological conditions. FRMAC measurements are utilized by the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center located at Lawrence Livermore to

provide an accurate and complete picture of the radioactive footprint. This information can help guide crop and food field sampling

teams to areas where contamination might result in an ingestion

pathway dose that exceeds health and safety limits.

FRMAC provides procedures for sample collection and analysis to

all participating agencies. We work closely with CDC, EPA, and

State and local responders. FRMAC also provides live and webbased instructions and participate in national and regional level exercises.

I participated as part of the FRMAC team in the recent the

TOPOFF-4 exercise, at the Portland, Oregon venue. I was the senior radiological data controller at the event scene, and my responsibilities included providing radiological exposure and contaminaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Jun 07, 2008 Jkt 038340 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\102507\38340 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tion measurements to federal, State, and local responders and

other government officials including the FBI. During the first day,

most of the radiological data involved direct reading instruments

that provide immediate results.

FRMAC capabilities arrived and began operation on Day 2 and

stayed through the end of the exercise period. FRMAC air sampling

instruments were deployed within and around the contaminated

area and collection of soil, plant, water, and air samples began.

This data was used to determine the size of the contaminated area

and provide health and safety information to local residence.

FRMAC established a liaison at the Joint Field Office, and the

FRMAC Web Portal was utilized to disseminate information to approved users at all levels of government. The interagency FRMAC

team was well-integrated and worked together to gather requirements and provided hazard information in a timely manner. Unfortunately, due to the short duration and field play, the full

radioanalytical laboratory infrastructure was not exercised. It is

my understanding that remediation and recovery requirements

were in notional play during this the final week of TOPOFF.

In June 2007, FRMAC released a draft analysis for the emergency phase of a response, typically the first 4 to 7 days. This is

a critical period for addressing the health and safety of the public

and responders. This document focuses on the federal resources activated to provide rapid support to the nuclear/radiological monitoring and dose assessment activities at the incident scene in accordance with the national response plan and nuclear and radiological incidence. It did not attempt to complete a comprehensive

assessment of environmental and clinical laboratory resources that

would be needed for the long-term environment remediation activities, medical response, and human health monitoring.

All scenarios were addressed as a single event and included a nuclear explosion, radiological dispersal devices, and accidental or unintentional non-explosive release of radioactive materials. For the

limited scope of the study, the document suggested that current

fixed radioanalytical laboratory infrastructure could handle short

duration environmental monitoring and dose assessment missions.

These laboratories have not been integrated into an enduring national capability focused on the long-term analytical needs.

Although the primary mission of the FRMAC is to evaluate environmental radiological data, FRMAC assets may also be called on

to assist the Department of Health and Human Services with

human clinical data. DOE has developed a cytogenetic dosimetry

capability at Radiation Emergency Assistance Center Training Site

in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to evaluate radiation dose received based

on blood samples collected from victims or responders. This capability was demonstrated during TOPOFF.

This concludes my remarks, and thank you for the opportunity

to address the Committee.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hadley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT T. HADLEY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to

testify here today as a subject matter expert about radioanalytical laboratory issues.

I am a Certified Industrial Hygienist and Health Physicist from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) with over 25 years in nuclear emergency response

20

management and currently serve as the Chair of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) Laboratory Analysis Working Group. The

FRMAC was formally established in 1979 following Three Mile Island. The FRMAC

is an interagency effort and normally includes representation from the Department

of Energy (DOE), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Commerce, the National Communications System, Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers and other federal agencies as needed. Response to a radiological event will require many highly skilled professionals ranging from surveillance to response operations and forensics. Although LLNL’s extensive scientific and

technical expertise in nuclear materials behavior is routinely called upon to support

many phases of the response activity, my remarks today are confined to my role as

part of the FRMAC.

Under the Homeland Security Act, DHS has the authority to activate the Nuclear

Incident Response Team (NIRT), which consists of: (1) DOE entities that perform

nuclear and/or radiological emergency support, and (2) EPA entities that perform

such support functions (including radiological response functions) and related functions. The FRMAC is a NIRT asset maintained by DOE that is available on request

to respond to nuclear/radiological incidents. The purpose of the FRMAC is to provide

a clear operating picture of radiological conditions in the field to responders for decision-making and incident action planning; it provides radiation measurements, interpretations of radiation contamination distribution and overall characterization of

the radiological conditions. DOE maintains the Aerial Measuring System as well as

a land-based mobile laboratory that can be established at or near the incident site

to enable close coordination with DHS and other federal, State and local response

agencies.

Upon activation, the FRMAC provides an operational framework for coordinating

Federal, State, local and tribal government radiological monitoring and assessment

activities during a response to a radiological emergency. The support the FRMAC

provides includes:

• Coordinating federal radiological monitoring and assessment activities

• Maintaining technical liaison with State and local agencies with monitoring

and assessment responsibilities

• Maintaining a common set of all radiological monitoring data, in an accountable, secure, and retrievable form, and ensuring the integrity of the FRMAC

data

• Providing monitoring data and interpretations including exposure rate contours, dose projections and any other requested radiological assessments to

DHS and other federal, State and local response agencies

• Providing personnel and equipment needed to perform radiological monitoring

and assessment activities.

FRMAC assist the states, local and tribal governments in their mission to protect

the health and well-being of their citizens with verified radiation measurements, interpretations of radiation distributions based on federal and local guidelines, and

characterization of overall radiological conditions. FRMAC data is critical for characterizing the exact nature of the contaminant and the extent of contamination,

which, in turn, supports public health and safety efforts. Integration of measurements of radioactive contamination, airborne or on the ground, is particularly valuable in the early and intermediate phases of an event.

FRMAC measurements are utilized by the National Atmospheric Release Advisory

Center (NARAC) to provide a complete picture of the radioactive footprint. This

technique can aid in helping guide crop and food field sampling teams to areas in

which contamination might result in an ingestion pathway dose that exceeds regulatory limits.

Plans and procedures for sample collection and analysis have been developed and

made available to all participating federal, State, and local agencies. FRMAC works

closely with Center for Disease Control (CDC), EPA, and the Radiation Emergency

Assistance Center/Training Site (REACS/TS) to assist in the dissemination of information pertaining to public health emergencies, training, and exercise opportunities.

FRMAC also provides live classroom instruction and web-based training venues. National level and regional exercises have been used to evaluate the FRMAC response.

As an example of a National Level Exercise, I would like to explain how sample

collection and laboratory analysis was exercised during the recent the TOPOFF–4

exercise, which was recently conducted. During this exercise, FRMAC participated

in the full field exercise at the Portland, Oregon venue. I participated as the lead

day-shift radiological data controller at the event scene. My responsibilities included

providing radiological exposure and contamination measurements to Fire, HazVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Jun 07, 2008 Jkt 038340 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\102507\38340 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ardous Materials (Hazmat), Radiological Assistance Program (RAP), Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI), and all other responding teams.

During the first day, most radiological data involved direct reading instruments

that provide immediate results. Air samples were collected for laboratory analysis

to evaluate airborne radioactivity that responders and the public may be breathing

into their bodies, and to determine (using spectral data) the particular radioisotopes

that were present. The spectral data received initial evaluation from locally deployed DOE Radiological Assistance Teams and/or local HAZMAT responders. Spectral data was also sent to DOE laboratories (usually LLNL, LANL or SNL) for confirmatory analysis. Air samples were sent to local environmental analysis laboratories (e.g., University of Oregon) for evaluation. Victims and casualties were evaluated for external contamination with direct reading instruments and then sent to

hospitals for treatment and further clinical evaluation.

FRMAC capability arrived and became operational at TOPOFF–4 on Day 2 and

stayed operational through the end of the exercise period. Additional air sampling

instrumentation was deployed within and around the contaminated area and the

collection of soil, water, and vegetation samples began. This data was used to determine the size of the contaminated area, whether occupants could return to their

homes, and began addressing issues such as the safety of drinking water and local

produce. FRMAC established a liaison at the Joint Field Office and products were

provided to Oregon Emergency Managers and Incident Commanders, as well as

Mayor of Portland and the city’s incident commander. The FRMAC Web Portal was

utilized to disseminate information to approved users at all levels of government,

including DHS and DOE headquarters. The interagency FRMAC team was well-integrated and worked together to gather requirements and provide hazard information in a timely manner. Due to the short duration and field play for TOPOFF–4,

only the mobile EPA laboratory from Las Vegas responded and the national

radioanalytical laboratory infrastructure was not exercised. It is my understanding

that remediation and recovery requirements were in notional play during the final

week, including the hand-off of FRMAC leadership from DOE to EPA.

In June 2007, the FRMAC released a draft document titled ‘‘Mission Analysis—

Emergency Phase, An Interagency Document for Implementing the National Response

Plan Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex.’’ The purpose of this document was to

define the overall federal radiological monitoring and dose assessment response to

a nuclear or radiological incident as defined in the Nuclear Incident Annex to the

National Response Plan in the ‘‘Emergency Phase,’’ typically the first three to seven

days after the event. This is a critical period for addressing the health and safety

of the public and responders.

This document focused on the federal resources activated to provide rapid support

to the nuclear/radiological monitoring and dose assessment activities at an incident

site. While the report provided an initial compilation of personnel and equipment

requirements for the environmental and dose assessment component of the emergency response, it did not attempt to complete a comprehensive assessment of environmental and clinical laboratory capabilities required for medical response and

long-term environmental restoration activities.

All scenarios were addressed as a single event. The following scenarios were considered:

• Domestic Nuclear Explosion (DNE)—A low technology, low yield nuclear device detonated near ground level in a major U.S. metropolitan area.

• Nuclear Power Plant Incident or Event Involving a Significant Release

• Alpha Radiological Dispersal Device/Failed Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)

• Beta Gamma Radiological Dispersal Device

Scenarios not included in this document, but identified for future consideration include multiple simultaneous events, combined radiation/chemical events, and combined radiation/biological events.

The key findings included:

• Improved processes for electronic data processing

• Standardized internal communications (voice & data)

• Established guidelines for public monitoring support and medical registry

• Additional personnel and equipment resources to address the DNE scenario

For the limited scope of this study, the document implies that current fixed

radioanalytical laboratory infrastructure could handle short duration environmental

monitoring and dose assessment missions, but these laboratories have not been inteVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Jun 07, 2008 Jkt 038340 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\102507\38340 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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grated into an enduring national capability focused on the radiological contaminants.

In addition, mobile radioanalytical laboratories belonging to DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the States

also respond as part of the FRMAC to evaluate priority samples in support of decision-making. These laboratories must be driven or flown to the incident site and

often arrive a couple of days into the response. Plans and procedures have been developed for mobile response coordination. This planning and coordination was evaluated during the FRMAC Southern Crossing Exercise conducted in August 2006 in

Dothan, Alabama.

Although the primary mission of the FRMAC is to evaluate environmental radiological data, FRMAC assets may be called on to assist the Department of Health

and Human Services with human clinical data. Specifically, DOE has developed a

cytogenetic dosimetry capability at REAC/TS in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to evaluate

the radiation dose received based on blood samples collected from victims or responders. This capability was demonstrated at the TOPOFF–4 Exercise. Similar capability exists in only a few other locations such as the Armed Force Radiobiology

Research Institute (AFRRI) and sites in Canada and in France. The number of evaluations that can be simultaneously processed is limited. DOE maintains at its various sites the capability to evaluate internal ingestion or inhalation of radioisotopes

using whole body counting, lung counting, and body fluid analyses. This capability

is designed to handle situations involving DOE site activities and only a few individuals—not large public emergencies.

Thank you, again, for the opportunity to address this committee.

BIOGRAPHY FOR ROBERT T. HADLEY

M.S., Biophysics and Computing, University of Utah, 1980

B.S., Life Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1975

Mr. Robb Hadley is a Certified Industrial Hygienist (CIH) and Health Physicist

at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California with over

25 years experience as a Nuclear Emergency Response Manager. Mr. Hadley currently serves as the Chair of the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment

Center (FRMAC) Laboratory Analysis Working Group.

Before joining the Nuclear Incident Response Program in 1999, Mr. Hadley managed the LLNL Industrial Hygiene Group where he was responsible for a staff of

25 health and safety professionals.

Mr. Hadley has participated in numerous national level exercises. He was the

Lead Planner and control for the Diablo Bravo and Comanche Warrior exercises involving radiological incidents. He recently completed the TOPOFF–4 exercise as the

Radiological Data Controller at the event scene. In this capacity his responsibilities

included providing radiological exposure and contamination measurements to local

responders, the Radiological Assistance Program, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other responding teams.

Mr. Hadley has authored several DOE Site emergency and responder handbooks,

guides and procedures. He is a regular participant in several emergency response

technical working groups, including DOD/DOE Nuclear Weapons Accident Response

Technical Working Group, the multi-agency Population Monitoring Working Group,

the Accident Response (ARG) Capability Coordinating Committee, the consequence

Management Operations Working Group and the ARG Health and Safety Working

Group.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. Dr. Jones.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT L. JONES, ACTING CHIEF, INORGANIC AND RADIATION ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY BRANCH,

DIVISION OF LABORATORY SCIENCES, NATIONAL CENTER

FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, CENTERS FOR DISEASE

CONTROL AND PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

AND HUMAN SERVICES

Dr. JONES. Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the

Subcommittee. My name is Dr. Robert Jones, Acting Chief of the

Inorganic Radiation and Analytical Toxicology Branch in the Division of Laboratory at CDC.

23

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the role of clinical laboratories, and in particular, the role of CDC’s radiation lab, in protecting the health of the American people in response to a radiological event.

My testimony will address three issues. First, the essential laboratory information needed to respond to an event; second, the national laboratory capability for such a response; and third the potential methods to improve our ability to respond

Following an event with uncontrolled radioactive material, such

as a dirty bomb or terrorist nuclear attack, public health officials

will need to answer four questions to guide their response: what

were people exposed to or contaminated with, who was exposed,

how much exposure or contamination did each person have, and

did it enter the body? Contamination with radionuclides can be primarily internal, that is inside the body, primarily external, outside

the body such as on clothing or hair, or contamination of both. The

decision to medically treat people will depend on our ability to rapidly and accurately identify and quantify internal contamination.

To direct appropriate medical treatment to the truly affected, we

need new methods to rapidly and accurately assess internal contamination for a broad array of radionuclides.

Nationwide the current laboratory capacity for measuring radionuclides in people in response to emergency is limited. Methods to

measure radionuclides in urine must have four characteristics.

First, they must be fast, with results available in a day or so; second, they must be able to process large numbers of samples per day

to handle urine samples from many people involved; third, they

will need to use a small amount of urine available from collecting

a sample at a point in time; fourth, they must be able to identify

and quantify different radionuclides likely to be used by terrorists.

A few years ago, CDC recognized the gaps in current lab capacity

for measuring radionuclides in an emergency event and took steps

to begin developing a state-of-the-art urine radionuclide screen. To

date, CDC has developed the scientific approach for the urine

radionuclide screen using a combination of alpha, beta, and gamma

radiation detection instruments and a specialized technique in

mass spectrometry. Currently CDC has some limited capacity to

measure six radionuclides in urine. Although our scientific approach is working well, considerable applied method development

remains to be done.

CDC’s efforts to improve lab capacity to respond to a radiological

event include a validated urine radionuclide screen, which is currently in development, which would provide results within 24 hours

of receiving the sample. The CDC urine radionuclide screen would

require only a point-in-time, small-volume urine sample, no need

for 24-hour collections, and the screen would identify and quantify

13 different priority radionuclides. When the urine radionuclide

screen is ready for distribution, the CDC will consider how to build

on the existing Laboratory Response Network, the LRN, a national

network of local, State and federal public laboratories that provide

the infrastructure and capacity to respond to public health emergencies, to establish surge capacity in public health laboratories for

measuring people’s exposure to a variety of radionuclides.

24

The recent incident in London involving the death of a former

Russian KGB agent from exposure to Polonium–210 underscores

the importance of having laboratory capability that can provide

human exposure information.

We found that only one laboratory, a commercial laboratory, that

could analyze Polonium–210 in urine. This laboratory needed a 24-

hour sample and typically required 30 days for analysis. For this

emergency, the laboratory did the analyses in seven days. In summary, the Nation has a limited laboratory capability necessary to

identify people who may be exposed to an event involving radioactive materials. This leads to a limited capability to provide patients, their doctors, and health departments with exposure information. Completing the radionuclide screen, developing the LRNR,

and transferring the urine radionuclide screen to the LRNR laboratories are options to close these gaps.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be

happy to respond to any questions that you or the Members of the

Subcommittee may have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. JONES

Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee.

My name is Dr. Robert Jones, and I am Acting Chief of the Inorganic Radiation

and Analytical Toxicology Branch in the Division of Laboratory Sciences of the National Center for Environmental Health at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the role of clinical laboratories, and in particular, the role of CDC’s radiation laboratory, in protecting the

health of the American people in response to an event involving radioactive materials.

I will first discuss the essential laboratory information that is needed to respond

to these events, focusing on the assessment of internal contamination with radioactive materials. Then I will describe the current estimate of the national laboratory

capability for such a response and potential methods to improve our ability across

the Nation to respond to an event. I also will address CDC’s efforts to monitor and

assess the potential exposure of U.S. citizens during an incident in the United Kingdom that resulted in the death of a former Russian KGB agent from Polonium–210.

I also will describe briefly CDC’s capabilities and readiness to meet emergency response needs under the Nuclear/Radiological Annex of the National Response Plan;

and finally, I will touch briefly on our laboratory’s role in the just-completed

TOPOFF–4 counterterrorism exercise.

Laboratory Public Health Response

Information Needed Following a Radiation Event: Following an event with uncontrolled radioactive material, such as a dirty bomb or terrorist nuclear attack, public

health officials need to answer three questions to guide their response: what were

people exposed to or contaminated with, who was exposed or contaminated, how

much exposure or contamination did each person have, and did it enter the body?

Contamination can be primarily internal (that is, inside the body), primarily external (outside the body), or a combination of both. Hand-held radiation detectors, like

Geiger counters, generally are used for assessing externally deposited contamination

by certain radioactive materials and are useful for prioritizing people for external

decontamination. These detectors can be used to assess internal contamination in

some specific cases.

Internal contamination cannot be reliably quantified by clinical assessment of

early symptoms. The decision to medically treat people will depend on our ability

to rapidly and accurately identify and quantify internal contamination. To direct appropriate medical treatment to the truly affected, we need a method to rapidly and

accurately assess internal contamination for a broad array of radionuclides. The new

methods for measurement of radionuclides in urine are being developed to meet this

need for internal contamination and dose assessment.

Current Laboratory Capabilities for Internal Contamination: In the event of a radiological incident, our ability to effectively respond to the health needs of our citiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Jun 07, 2008 Jkt 038340 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\102507\38340 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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zens will depend on the methods we have in place to measure radionuclides in

urine. These methods must have four essential characteristics: first, they must be

fast, with results available in a day or so; second, they must be able to process large

numbers of samples per day to handle urine samples from the many people involved; third, they need to use a small amount of urine available from collecting a

sample at one point in time; and fourth, they must be able to identify and quantify

the various radionuclides likely to be used by terrorists.

Nationwide, the current laboratory capability for measuring radionuclides in people in response to an emergency is limited. Currently available methods for measuring radionuclides in urine, and our national capacity to do so, are limited. Right

now, the methods are slow; it typically takes five to 30 days to obtain a urine radionuclide measurement. The number of samples that can be processed per day is

low—the few labs that can measure urinary radionuclides typically process fewer

than 20 samples per day. Urine volume requirements are high—about half a gallon

of urine, usually comprising a patient’s entire urine output for a 24-hour period. Finally, we currently have validated analytic methods to measure only a few of the

radionuclides of concern.

CDC recognized this gap a few years ago and took steps to begin developing a

state-of-the-art Urine Radionuclide Screen. To date, CDC has developed the scientific approach for the Urine Radionuclide Screen using a combination of radiationdetection instruments that detect the three types of radiation, alpha, beta, and

gamma, and a specialized technique in mass spectrometry. CDC currently has some

limited capacity to measure five radionuclides in urine. Although our scientific approach is working well, considerable applied method development remains to be

done.

A radiological event is one of many threats for which the Nation must prepare.

At CDC, our all hazards approach to preparedness also includes preparation for

chemical and biological events, as well as natural disasters. The challenges I have

cited in our current lab capacity to respond to a radiological event must be balanced

with the need to prepare for other public health emergencies.

Efforts to Improve Capabilities for Internal Dose Assessment: CDC efforts to improve lab capacity to respond to a radiological event include:

1) The development of a validated Urine Radionuclide Screen, which would provide results within 24 hours of receiving the sample. The CDC Urine Radionuclide Screen, which is currently under development, would require only a

point-in-time, small-volume urine sample—no need for 24-hour collections—

and the Screen would identify and quantify 13 different priority radionuclides.

2) When the Urine Radionuclide Screen is ready for distribution, the CDC will

consider how to build on the existing Laboratory Response Network (LRN),

a national network of local, State and federal public health laboratories that

provide the infrastructure and capacity to respond to public health emergencies, to establish surge capacity in public health laboratories for measuring people’s exposure to a variety of radionuclides.

Lessons Learned from UK Polonium–210 Event

The recent incident in London involving the death of a former Russian KGB agent

from exposure to Polonium–210 underscores the importance of having laboratory capability that can provide human exposure information.

Shortly after the incident, CDC became the U.S. Public Health Point of Contact

for the U.K. Health Protection Agency. The CDC radiation laboratory was asked to

identify laboratories in the United States that could analyze Polonium–210 in urine

because it was thought that some U.S. citizens had been exposed to the radionuclide

during the incident. We contacted more than 12 federal or commercial laboratories

in the United States to determine which could do the analysis. We found that only

one laboratory—a commercial laboratory—could analyze Polonium–210 and had certification under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA-certified).

This laboratory needed 24-hour urine samples, and its usual time for sample analysis is 30 days. For this emergency, the laboratory completed the analyses in seven

days.

In an effort to identify U.S. citizens who may have been exposed to Polonium–

210, CDC began contacting these citizens directly by telephone, e-mail, or letter. In

a few cases, CDC contacted the State or local health department and provided lists

of citizens within their jurisdiction to contact. CDC provided State and local health

departments with telephone interview scripts for this process. If the individuals or

their physicians who were contacted wished to have urine testing performed, CDC

referred them to a private laboratory capable of performing this analysis.

26

Thirty-one individuals who were tested requested that their laboratory urine results be interpreted by CDC. CDC’s Health Physics staff calculated individual dose

assessments based on internationally recognized and accepted methods similar to

dose assessments that were used by the UK Health Protection Agency and communicated these results to the individuals or their physicians.

Communication played a key role in CDC’s efforts to monitor U.S. citizens potentially exposed to Polonium–210. CDC provided citizens, their private physicians, and

the State and local health department with communication and educational materials about the incident and laboratory testing. Direct communication via telephone

and mail were the primary channels for communicating with the citizens and physicians involved; however, CDC also used its public web site and secure network notification systems to communicate information and updates.

During the response, contact with citizens initially was delayed in large part by

a lack of complete contact information for U.S. citizens. At the outset, CDC had to

rely on contact information provided by the UK Health Protection Agency, which obtained telephone and address information obtained from hotel registers or credit

card receipts in places of interest. Therefore, neither CDC nor the UK Health Protection Agency can be certain that all potentially exposed people were contacted or

whether other people who may have been exposed (e.g., those paying bills in cash)

will ever be identified.

Communications with State and local health agencies were hampered because of

limited awareness or understanding about the State and local health department responsibilities in an event involving radioactive materials. In some cases, State and

local health departments did not know their Radiation Control Program contact

even when this contact resided in their own organizational structure. CDC did provide this information to the requesting health departments but cannot be certain

that other health departments made the correct connections to their local Radiation

Control Program.

Finally, the private laboratory conducting the testing did not provide results of

analyses directly to CDC, citing privacy issues. In all cases, the private laboratory

would not provide results directly to CDC without the express permission of their

clients. Therefore, CDC cannot be sure that it has received the results of all of the

analyses conducted for U.S. citizens.

The Nation has a limited laboratory capability necessary to identify people who

were exposed occurring during an event involving radioactive materials. This leads

to a limited capability to provide patients, their doctors, and health departments

with exposure information.

The Nuclear/Radiological Annex of the National Response Plan tasks the Department of Health and Human Services with coordinating federal assistance for performing population-monitoring activities. Population monitoring is a process that begins soon after a radiation incident is reported and continues until all potentially

affected people have been monitored and evaluated for the following:

• Needed medical treatment

• The presence of radioactive contamination on the body or clothing

• The intake of radioactive materials into the body

• The removal of external or internal contamination (decontamination)

• The radiation dose received and the resulting health risk from the internal

and external exposure

• Long-term health effects

Assessment of the first five items listed above, and the whole body external dose,

should be accomplished as soon as possible following an incident. Long-term health

effects are usually determined through a population registry and an epidemiologic

investigation that will likely span several decades.

Under the Nuclear/Radiological Annex of the National Response Plan, population

monitoring is the responsibility of State, local, and tribal authorities, assisted and

supported by HHS. However, it is likely that in a mass casualty event involving radioactive materials State, local, and tribal authorities will very quickly request assistance from the Federal Government.

In the United States, 31 states have operating nuclear power plants. These states

already have local plans for responding to an incident at the nuclear power plant

in their own state or at one in a neighboring state. These plans include requirements related to population monitoring. However, effective response to a radiological

or nuclear terrorism incident requires a broader scope of planning and most likely

a different mode of response than those described in these current plans.

Plans need to account for several factors: first, the suddenness of an incident (as

opposed to a nuclear power plant failure that would likely unfold over a 24- to 72-

27

hour period); second, the likelihood that the incident would be large in scale, involving a much larger urban population; and third, the unknown aspect of the radionuclide(s) involved. However, the plans and expertise already developed can be assets in preparing for a radiological or nuclear terrorism incident with mass casualties in these states.

CDC, working with technical staff from a number of other federal agencies, has

developed a planning guide on population monitoring in radiation emergencies for

public health officials and emergency preparedness planners at the State, local, and

tribal levels. CDC is also developing materials to assist these officials in training

personnel to initiate the population- monitoring process before any federal assets

can arrive to assist. However, although most State, local, and tribal authorities have

some limited ability to perform external population monitoring and decontamination, their ability to perform internal monitoring and decontamination is much more

limited.

For the lab results to be used effectively in managing a radiation event, personnel

who are radiation experts in converting radionuclide analyses into dose and risk are

required. They can then communicate health risk information to health care providers and decision-makers. In every level of government, the Nation has a limited

supply of the radiation health experts who provide these interpretations. CDC plans

to leverage the expertise of the radiation protection experts within the Department

of Energy and other federal partners. During a national emergency, these experts

could be used to help CDC with the surge in needs.

TOPOFF Update

The recent TOPOFF–4 exercise represented the first mass-casualty exercise that

included population monitoring as a significant exercise objective. In preparation for

TOPOFF–4, I oversaw plans that would exercise CDC’s clinical laboratory capabilities. These included sample acquisition, packaging and shipping, sample logistics,

analysis, risk assessment, and reporting of final results to State officials. Before the

exercise, CDC collaborated with the State public health laboratory in Oregon to preposition 100 urine samples in Portland.

As the Nation’s premier terrorism preparedness exercise, TOPOFF–4 highlighted

the essential functions and challenges involved in responding to a national incident

involving radioactive materials. It is clear that we have challenges in our laboratory

capacity to respond to a radiological event. We are working to complete the Urine

Radionuclide Screen and consider plans to transfer the Urine Radionuclide Screen

to public health laboratories in the future. At the same time, we are supporting improvements in preparedness for biological and chemical events as well, at both the

federal and State levels. We continue to strive to maintain a balanced effort across

all high priority threats and improve overall public health preparedness.

Closing Remarks

CDC is addressing existing gaps by systematically identifying priorities and working to alleviate these concerns. We have developed a series of goals to guide capacity

improvements in preparedness and other areas. CDC wants to make sure the investments the American people make in public health are having impact.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. And now Dr. John Vitko will read

the prepared testimony of Dr. Randy Long who cannot be with us.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN VITKO, DIRECTOR OF CHEMICAL

AND BIOLOGICAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; REPRESENTING DR. S. RANDOLPH LONG,

CHIEF TECHNICAL ADVISOR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL

DIVISION, SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Dr. VITKO. Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member

Sensenbrenner, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.

As noted, I am John Vitko. I am the head of the Chemical and Biological Division in the Department of Homeland Security Science

and Technology Directorate. And Randy Long is one of my senior

advisors and also the Chair of the Network Coordinating Group for

the ICLN. He expresses his regrets for not being here. He develVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Jun 07, 2008 Jkt 038340 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\102507\38340 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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oped extreme pain in his knee last night, could barely hobble out

of the office, and is seeking some emergency care probably as we

speak, so please accept his regrets.

With that I will read his statements and it is that I am pleased

to appear before you today with this panel to discuss the Nation’s

radiological laboratory capabilities and capacities to respond to an

accidental or intentional release of radiological material. Insofar as

the panel assembled here has the technical depth and responsibility for addressing the functional needs, I will restrict my comments to the ICLN and the role it plays in highlighting and supporting laboratory analytical requirements across the all-hazards

landscape.

Assessment of contamination due to any hazard in the chemical,

biological, or radiological realm requires highly technical laboratory

services. Expeditious decisions that may affect large numbers of

people and key assets of commerce or government critically depend

on a system of quality laboratory service that is both sufficiently

robust and provides the data needs for such decisions. The need to

develop such a system of quality laboratory service across all hazards provided the impetus for the establishment of the ICLN.

Upon establishment, one major charge to the ICLN relevant to

the subject of this hearing was the assignment of responsible federal agencies across the chem-bioradiological laboratory response

spectrum.

The principal analytical matrices that would be encountered include clinical, environmental, food, drinking water, animal, and

plant samples. Phases of response common to each hazard include

monitoring and surveillance, incident response, remediation, and

forensics. The assignment of responsible federal agencies for each

matrix and phase gave consideration to existing department obligations and authorities, a history of already working toward or having established capability, and applicable executive branch directives.

In the areas of response and remediation to radiological contamination, HHS, DOE, and EPA are considered the major players.

When the ICLN Network Coordinated Group considered in 2006

the establishment of a radiological working group to consider laboratory needs and gaps, it charged HHS and EPA with co-chairmanship with DOE being a key member of the group.

Another major objective of the ICLN has accomplished is a first

assessment of the Nation’s laboratory capabilities across the chembio-radiological spectrum. This study initiated in early 2006 and

was finalized as a For Official Use Only report in April of 2007.

The study is considered a first-order analysis of the ICLN laboratory networks in response to nine selected homeland security scenarios. These scenarios explored chemical, biological, and radiological hazards across a variety of targets, human, animal, and

plants. It is functionally a self-assessment and provides a reasonable estimate of gaps that may exist between estimated analytical

requirements and estimated existing capabilities.

An exceedingly important caveat is that the assessment is based

on agent-specific scenarios. Changes in agent or other key scenario

parameters could substantially alter conclusions found in the report. Specifically for the scenario involving radiological agent disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Jun 07, 2008 Jkt 038340 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\I&O07\102507\38340 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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persal, the study results indicate ‘‘major shortfalls’’ in environmental and clinical laboratory capability in the response to and remediation of such an event. We can infer from the assessment that

without the benefit of an organized framework and some expansion

of quantitative analytical capabilities, decisions based on analysis

of both clinical and environmental samples for a radiological dispersal event may be compromised.

The ICLN Coordinating Network Group discharged the Radiological Lab Response Working Group to consider the logical steps

to be taken to close the analytical gap in this area. This group has

outlined the measured approach based on building prototype capabilities consistent with best practices recommended by the ICLN

which can be expanded as adjustments in funding priorities become

favorable. It is our expectation that the recently concluded

TOPOFF–4 exercise and the follow-on, long-term recovery tabletop

exercise will substantially inform this need. The interagency laboratory response community is constituted in the ICLN Network

Coordinating Group, supports forward movement in the establishment of effective radiological laboratory response capability, and

very much appreciates the Subcommittee’s interest in this need.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to address this committee.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Long follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF S. RANDOLPH LONG

INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Chairman Miller and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Nation’s critical need for improved radiological laboratory capabilities and capacities to respond to an accidental

or intentional release of radiological material. Insofar as the panel assembled here

has the technical depth and responsibility for addressing the functional needs, I will

restrict my comments to the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks and the

role it plays in highlighting and supporting laboratory analytical requirement across

the all-hazards landscape.

THE ROLE OF LABORATORIES IN RESPONSE TO A RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT

Assessment of contamination due to any hazard in the chemical, biological, or radiological realm requires the services of highly technical laboratory services. These

services support both the determination of exposures to population, to determine

who has been exposed to how much of the hazard, and the determination of the environment or physical space that remains a hazard until remediation and restoration has occurred. In both cases, decisions affecting application of medical countermeasures and evacuation from potentially contaminated spaces are effectively determined through risk assessments that rely upon quality information from laboratory

systems. Expeditious decisions that may affect large numbers of people and key assets of commerce or government critically depend on a system of quality laboratory

service that is sufficiently robust to provide the data needs for such decisions.

The need to develop such a system of quality laboratory service across all hazards

provided the impetus for the establishment of the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks.

INTEGRATED CONSORTIUM OF LABORATORY NETWORKS (ICLN)

In response to the threat posed by terrorist use of WMD threat agents, a number

of laboratory networks have been established over the past several years to provide

the Nation the capability to characterize, contain, and recover from such attacks on

our people and our essential commodities. During the fall of 2004, the Homeland

Security Council and multiple Agency stakeholders worked together to develop an

organizational framework that links existing and future laboratory networks under

a single interagency umbrella. The goal of the effort is to create the basis for a system of laboratory networks capable of integrated and coordinated response and consequence management of acts of terrorism and other major incidents requiring laboratory response. Establishing a laboratory network system to strengthen early deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:02 Jun 07, 2008 Jkt 038340 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\I&O07\102507\38340 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
30

tection and consequence management is consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directives 9 and 10.

The Memorandum of Agreement establishing the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) was signed in June of 2005. Senior officials of agencies

with primary responsibility for current and emerging networks as well as those with

a strong supporting role joined together to endorse the laboratory organizational

framework. Signatory agencies to this agreement include the Department of Agriculture (Food Safety Inspection Service [FSIS], Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service [CSREES], and Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service [APHIS]), Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Department of

Health and Human Services (Food and Drug Administration [FDA], and Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention [CDC]), Department of Defense, Department of

Homeland Security, Department of Interior, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau

Investigation), Department of State, and the Environmental Protection Agency.

As outlined by the MOA, the primary functions and motivations of the ICLN include:

• Agreement by signatories to work cooperatively to optimize national laboratory preparedness by improving coordination of laboratory response to incidents;

• Recognizing Responsible Federal Agencies’ role in assuring capability of networks;

• Promoting common standards of performance across all lab response assets

to ensure data supporting homeland security decisions is best quality and defensible;

• Assessing and filling gaps in coverage across multiple sample types, potential

victim groups (human, animal, plant), all WMD weapons, and all response

phases;

• Rationalizing and enhancing relevant interagency budgets.

Established networks included in the ICLN are the Laboratory Response Network

(LRN), Food Emergency Response Network (FERN), National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), and National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN). A network under development in the consortium is EPA’s Environmental Laboratory Response Network (eLRN).

The managers of the networks mentioned above, along with designated representatives of other signatory agencies, comprise the Network Coordinating Group (NCG)

of the ICLN, which meets on a monthly basis. A senior-level oversight group, the

Joint Leadership Council, oversees their work. DHS serves to coordinate activities

through chairmanship of the JLC and the NCG.

To support the efforts of the primary representatives of the NCG, the NCG established a number of technical sub-groups, addressing issues of Scenarios and Threat

Prioritization, Methods Development, Quality Assurance, Training, and Information

Technology and Communications. In addition, three technical working groups address specific areas of concern. These include the Environmental Anthrax Sampling

Validation Working Group, the Environmental Chemical Laboratory Response

Working Group, and the Radiological Laboratory Response Working Group.

In its short history, the ICLN has accomplished two major objectives relevant to

the subject of this hearing: the assignment of Responsible Federal Agencies across

the CBR response spectrum, and a first assessment of the Nation’s laboratory capability across this same spectrum.

Assignment of Responsible Federal Agencies

In order to ensure a basis for organization and maintenance of the Nation’s laboratory response infrastructure against chemical, biological, and radiological, the

ICLN first considered the types of samples which might require analysis and the

phase of response during which such analysis would be required. The principal analytical matrices that would be encountered include human clinical, environmental,

food, drinking water, animal, and plant samples. Phases of response common to

each hazard area include monitoring and surveillance, incident response, remediation, and forensics. The assignment of Responsible Federal Agencies gave consideration to existing Department obligations and authorities, a history of already working toward or having established capability, and applicable Executive Branch directives or logical extensions thereof.

These assignments are not ratified among the signatory agencies by a separate

formal Memorandum of Agreement, but rather serve as a basis for development and

sustainment of an effective all-hazards laboratory response capability. Accordingly,

if prevailing guidance or organizational environment shifts, the assignments could,

31

in principle, change. Separate MOAs do need to be developed to outline the shift

in operational responsibility from one agency to another during response to a crisis

to enhance overall orderly process. Finally, the level of attention given to a specific

analytical area is expected to be guided by consideration of risk relative to other

requirements.

It will be noted that, in the areas of response and remediation to radiological contamination, EPA, DOE, and HHS are the major players. When the ICLN NCG considered in 2006 the establishment of a radiological working group to consider laboratory needs and gaps, it charged EPA and HHS with co-chairmanship.

ICLN Capability Assessment Key Findings

The assessment and addressing of gaps in the Nation’s laboratory response infrastructure is a key charge to the ICLN under its MOA. The ICLN addressed this

charge through a study initiated in early 2006 and finalized as an FOUO report in

April 2007. The study considered nine scenarios, generally inspired by the National

Planning Scenarios, which explored chemical, biological, and radiological hazards

across a variety of targets (i.e., humans, animals, and plants). The Homeland Security Institute mediated the study and assimilated the report, relying heavily on

modeling support and sample throughput data from technicians within the National

laboratory response system.

The study is considered a first-order analysis of capabilities, capacities, protocols,

and policies of the ICLN laboratory networks in response to the selected homeland

security scenarios. It is functionally a self-assessment of the ‘‘as-is’’ operational context of the member networks and provides an ‘‘order of magnitude’’ estimate of gaps

that may exist between analytical requirements and existing capability.

In order to assure parity across the range of scenarios and networks examined,

certain bounding conditions were set: Funding, reagents, and consumable materials

were not considered to be limiting factors. Normal rates of laboratory staffing were

assumed. Industry and private laboratories outside Federal oversight were excluded,

but laboratories within other Federal agencies were included as analytical assets to

the extent they could be accessed. In addition to projected actual sick or injured,

‘‘worried well’’ were included. No assumptions related to policies that might mitigate

analytical requirements were made, but prevailing policy was certainly considered.

All qualified laboratories within established networks were considered to be accessible analytical resources, regardless of state and local boundaries. An additional exceedingly important reminder is that the assessment is based on agent-specific scenarios. Changes in agent or other key scenario parameters could substantially alter

conclusions found in the report.

Specifically for the scenario involving radiological agent dispersal, the study results demonstrate ‘‘major shortfalls’’ in environmental and clinical laboratory capability in the response to and remediation of such an event.

For the specific agent used in the RDD scenario, various sources of data were

used to identify laboratories with adequate characteristics to contribute materially

to the environmental sampling needs that would support on-the-ground hazard

mapping and decontamination. Against the scenario estimate of a large number of

environmental samples required during the remediation process, a backlog of samples awaiting analysis would extend some 50 to 100 weeks beyond the event and

substantially affect decisions regarding the remediation activity. Similarly, the scenario estimate of clinical samples requiring analysis significantly exceeds the modeled capability for such samples.

The study did not take into consideration the positive benefits of streamlined sampling and analysis, for example, the pooling of samples from multiple sites or individuals that may decrease the overall analytical burden. As such methods are developed and validated, an improvement in our analytical posture may be expected.

However, without the benefit of an organized framework and adequate quantitative

analytical capability, it seems clear that decisions based on the analysis of both clinical and environmental samples for a substantial RDD event would be compromised.

The testimonies of CDC and EPA will address the clinical and environmental analytical gaps and their implications on response and recovery.

STEPS TAKEN TO BUILD AN EFFECTIVE RADIOLOGICAL ANALYTICAL

CAPABILITY

As noted earlier, the ICLN established a Radiological Lab Response Working

Group in 2006 to begin to consider the radiological testing gap and what needs to

be accomplished to close this gap. EPA and CDC were charged with co-chairing the

group, which includes participation also from DOE, DHS, FDA, USDA, National Institute for Standards and Technology, U.S. Geological Survey, and Association of

Public Health Laboratories.

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An effective radiological lab response network would address capability gaps by

establishing acceptance criteria for membership; identifying and enhancing select

federal and State laboratories that have attributes closest to those required to meet

acceptance criteria; providing those laboratories with the appropriate tools, resources, and analytical methods; establishing and exercising proficiency testing to

ensure readiness and quality; and establishing data management and communication protocols.

The NCG advised the group that, given prevailing funding priorities, a measured

approach designed to explore the relationship between analytical power and cost

would be the most logical means to establish initial capability while describing the

total cost associated with establishing a capability that might be considered ‘‘adequate’’ to meet the needs of an incident of substantial scope.

The initial vision of the Radiological Lab Response Working Group incorporates

three ‘‘sub-networks,’’ each covering environmental, clinical, and food samples,

under the sponsorship of EPA, CDC, and FDA, respectively. Pilot programs have

been formulated or proposed within each agency to serve as the genesis of a national radiological capability.

The effort has just begun, with the bulk of the work required to establish an effective radiological analytical capability still ahead.

TOP OFFICIALS 4 EXERCISE

This hearing occurs shortly after the end of the TOPOFF–4 exercise. Our information indicates varying levels of play by analytical resources of several government

agencies (e.g., DOE, EPA, FBI) in the exercise. The exercise will explore, in various

venues, gaps and deficiencies related to short-term medical monitoring, long-term

health issues, effects on consumables such as food and water, decontamination, and

waste disposal. Laboratory analytical information is a key component to addressing

these issues. The actual exercise and associated table-top exercises, to include the

Long-Term Recovery Table-top Exercise scheduled for early December, offer valuable fora for the consideration of gaps related to radiological laboratory infrastructure.

CONCLUSION

The ICLN exists to design, develop, and promote the use of best practices across

the Nation’s laboratory response infrastructure to inform critical decisions in the response and recovery from incidents involving chemical, biological, and radiological

hazards. We have assessed a significant gap in our radiological laboratory response

capability which may compromise important decisions regarding health and environment in key scenarios. We will continue to promote the need to fill this gap among

the agencies identified as Responsible Federal Agencies and their partners, and appreciate very much the interest of this Subcommittee in radiological laboratory matters.

DISCUSSION

Chairman MILLER. Thank you. The bell that you heard was our

being called to a vote. It appears that there is some grievance that

the Minority has, and we will have a series of protest votes, temper

tantrum votes. Someone has moved to adjourn, and I will need to

go over and Mr. Baird will need to go over to vote against adjourning and probably pretty much as soon as we get back, someone will

move again to adjourn. So we will do the best we can in trying to

proceed with questions, but we will be doing kind of a middle-aged

equivalent of wind sprints between here and the Capitol. Why don’t

we adjourn now, all go vote. We will ask over there whether another vote is coming immediately or not and try to come back and

try to make some sense of today’s hearing.

Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman MILLER. Yes.

Mr. BAIRD. Is the middle age in reference to our age or the

epoch?

Chairman MILLER. I suppose it could be either. I hope that this

is a middle. Thank you. We will be back. Sometime. Thank you.

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[Recess]

Chairman MILLER. There is no telling what the day will look

like. Probably the third or fourth time I have to run back and forth

like that I am probably going to be pretty cranky, so you may not

want to take questions from me after that point. And this is not

the kind of hearing in any case when we think witnesses are being

less than forthcoming. Those kinds of hearings are a great deal

more fun to conduct, but there will not be any high, hard, inside

pitches here. We do fundamentally think that what you’re telling

us is true. And our questions will simply be to call upon you to reiterate or elaborate upon some portions of your testimony. So if we

can’t really complete any kind of coherent period of questioning, I

am not sure that the loss will be that great. I think we have already accomplished what we needed to accomplish by your testimony already, your oral testimony and that which you have submitted in writing.

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY

CAPACITY GAP ASSESSMENT

With that said, I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. Dr. Griggs, you had a report prepared or a report was prepared for you earlier this year that assessed the national environmental radiological laboratory capacity gap. Tell us what the report

found and what the findings tell us about our ability to respond to

a dirty bomb if it were detonated in an American city. I think that

is probably not dissimilar to what you have already testified about,

but go on.

Dr. GRIGGS. Mr. Chairman, we looked at really one RDD event

in a single city, and we estimated the environmental sample demand from that event. We then compared that to our assessment

of the national lab capacity, and we looked at laboratories from two

major aspects, one would be their capacity, their infrastructure in

terms of personnel, equipment, and the ability to process samples.

But we did also look at their competency, and to do that we had

reviewed historically how well they had done on proficiency test

samples from like the Quality Assessment Program (QAP) and

other programs that send samples to laboratories and have them

report back results. And what we found is that when you look at

the national environmental lab capacity versus the sample demand, 360,000 samples over a year, there was a significant gap in

the ability to analyze samples promptly and report the results.

And the numbers that we talked about averaging about 3,000

samples per week was the average capacity gap with peak capacity

gap 7,000 to 9,000 samples per week. These numbers indicate a

pretty serious gap in terms of environmental analysis capability in

the country. When we look at absent in an increase in that national capacity that it would take a little over 100 weeks, or two

years, to analyze the samples that would have been collected in a

single RDD event, and I think as you have noted and Ms. Tulis

noted the scenario 11 is actually three RDD event. So if we compare it back to that scenario, you can take that gap and multiply

it times three and the timeframes times three as well. So it is indicative of a very significant gap, and that is going to be a delay

in data to decision-makers, action to protect home health and

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cleanup and contamination. Our major focus is on the critical recovery phase as Dr. Hadley talked about in the kind of early phase.

But we are looking at the clean-up phase, recovery phase, and that

is where the bulk of the laboratory samples are going to be generated, and that is where our numbers actually came from.

HOW THE GAP EFFECTS RESPONSE TO A DIRTY BOMB

Chairman MILLER. What would be the real-world consequences of

that gap? How would it affect our ability to respond to the detonation of a dirty bomb in American cities?

Dr. GRIGGS. I will let Dana elaborate more, but essentially laboratory data provides decision-makers the information that they

need to make decisions about is it safe to reoccupy buildings. Have

the decontamination efforts been successful? Because there will be

a tendency to decontaminate what can be contaminated, potential

public health impacts because of the data we fed into CDC and

they would likely use our data for their kind of estimates for example. So basically all the conscious management decisions that go

into the recovery effort are predicated on accurate, timely data; and

with this gap there is going to be deficiency of accurate and timely

data. So the decision-makers will be faced with issues of either

having to make decisions without the adequate data or having to

delay their decisions, and that could result as you noted in your

testimony in increased economic losses because of the lack of ability to go back to reoccupy the city, potential additional health impacts if the data were insufficient and incorrect decisions were

made based on that data. So it creates a whole host of problems

as you can imagine when you simply don’t have information you

need to evaluate the status of the extent of the contamination, the

degree of the contamination, and likely impacts to the public

health.

Chairman MILLER. Ms. Tulis, would you like——

Ms. TULIS. There is just one thing I wanted to note just to be

clear. We do have field tools to be able to detect radiation very

early on, and so for those critical decisions, sheltering and place,

evacuation, we would be able to still make those decisions. This is

more for the long-term remediation and consequence management

stage.

ABILITY TO EVALUATE THE DAMAGE DONE BY AN ATTACK

Chairman MILLER. The whole premise of terrorism is to create

terror among a civilian population by attacking not combatants but

non-combatants, attacking a civilian population, innocents, and not

having the violence appear random, unrelated to anything that

non-combatants had done to create terror among the population.

What will be the effect on the population of an inability to know

exactly what damage had resulted, what the level of contamination

was, and what health effects there might be, Dr. Griggs?

Dr. GRIGGS. Well, certainly as you indicated there is going to be

great panic and concern because one of the issues in addition to the

impacted urban environment of the city is that as people leave the

city from that area, potentially they could be taking material home

with them, and their homes could be contaminated. You get kind

35

of transport, people moving about in that city; and I think radiation in general for a lot of people is a very fearful type of a threat.

So the lack of data I think is just going to result in heightened public concern and panic and frankly a demand for answers for what

risks are they at, what can be done to protect them and their families and those kinds of things. I think the longer it goes without

sufficient data, the greater those concerns are going to be.

QAP PROGRAMS

Chairman MILLER. Anyone else wish to respond to that question

or both questions? Dr. Griggs, you mentioned QAP which is not

Elmer Fudd using a mild profanity, it is an acronym for Quality

Assurance Program, a program the Environmental Measurement

Lab, a government-owned and managed lab in New York which

dates back to the Manhattan Project. And the Department of

Homeland Security closed that lab a couple of years ago. How do

the programs of QAP compare to the kind of proficiency testing

that you had said is needed?

Dr. GRIGGS. Mr. Chairman, one of the things that we did when

we did our evaluations of laboratories for our assessment of the national capacity is that we actually went back and looked at historical data from the QAP program and also for another acronym, the

MAPEP program which is a Dewey Laboratory out of Idaho. And

the data from both of those assessment programs was really critical

in our evaluation of laboratories for their capability and their competency. It allowed us to look at select radionuclides that are likely

to be very important in an RDD event and to see how well those

labs have performed over the years in key environmental matrices

like air filters, water, and vegetation. So it’s a critical data set as

we evaluate those laboratories and they help us to select which laboratories we could turn to.

Now, from the laboratory perspective, in addition to those that

assess the laboratories, from the laboratory perspective these samples are invaluable in that they allow the laboratory to analyze externally prepared samples of known concentration that are traceable back to a national standard, general NIST, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and it allows them to adjust,

augment their measurement systems to make sure that they have

the necessary accuracy and precision that they need. So these programs are invaluable to both those that assess laboratories and to

the laboratories themselves.

THE DECISION TO CLOSE QAP

Chairman MILLER. On a stupidity scale of one to 10, one being

Einsteinesque and 10 being stupider than dirt, dumber than dirt,

how would you assess the decision to close QAP?

Dr. GRIGGS. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know that I am in a position

to answer that because I don’t know the factors or considerations

that DHS faced when they made that decision. All I can say is the

data from those programs is a valuable data set.

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EPA PREPAREDNESS TO DEAL WITH A DIRTY BOMB

Chairman MILLER. Ms. Tulis, EPA’s role at the World Trade

Center has been severely criticized, being unable to tell exactly

what the environmental risks were coming out of that. Is EPA better prepared now in dealing with a radiological emergency, a dirty

bomb detonation, than it was to deal with the World Trade Center?

Ms. TULIS. The EPA is certainly better prepared to respond to

any sort of national incident such as we had for the World Trade

Center. We spent the last six years becoming more prepared, hiring

more people, reorganizing, getting the right resources, having 50

additional people added to our environmental response team, creating the Office of Emergency Management, and establishing our

Office of Homeland Security as well as working on various preparedness and response procedures. So we have been taking great

strides to overcome some of the issues we had during that large response, although we do feel as though we did handle the response

well, but we always have lessons learned and we continue to apply

those to the way that we operate.

ASSESSING A RADIOLOGICAL EVENT

Chairman MILLER. How would the difficulty of assessing a radiological event compare to the difficulty of assessing the environmental consequences of the collapse of the World Trade Center, the

towers?

Ms. TULIS. I mean, they are very different incidents, and we basically approach incidents from a site-specific basis. The World

Trade Center large collapse, the impact, and the analyses would be

quite different than an RDD event where it is very specific type of

analyses that we would be looking at.

MORE ON THE CAPACITY GAP

Chairman MILLER. Is the gap that we have heard about, the capability gap, is it simply a funding issue or is there something beyond that other than that?

Ms. TULIS. I think for radiological laboratories, because the community is actually doing a good job of cleaning up the existing

problems we have had, we just have an economic issue going on

when we had the actual radiation laboratories from a commercial

perspective. The businesses are just not being able to support,

there is just not enough work out there to support this type of work

anymore. It is very hard to expect a commercial laboratory to build

up capacity for something that may or may not happen, and so we

have almost an irony going on here where because we have been

efficient to cleaning up some of our past problems, we are losing

that very lab community that we would need in the event of a future large-scale incident.

WHY IS THERE A LACK OF CAPACITY?

Chairman MILLER. Anyone else on that issue? What is the reason

for the lack of capacity? Is it simply funding? Dr. Hadley?

Dr. HADLEY. I agree with Ms. Tulis that there is not as much of

demand for the radiological community for that type of sampling as

37

we have had in the past. We are using less materials, we have had

nuclear reactors shut down, we have cleaned up places, within the

weapons complex we have less weapons, less production. So there

is not as much radioactive environmental or clinical analytical activity needed. And so these places have been shutting down and

closing up, and only those that really need to be there, they are

viable economically, are the ones that are staying open.

WHY ISN’T THE DOE PREPARED FOR A RADIOLOGICAL

EMERGENCY?

Chairman MILLER. You would agree that preparedness is more

effective if it is done in advance?

Dr. HADLEY. It would be very nice. That is why we are here

today to work on this. I agree completely, but I think that is what

is contributing to it.

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Hadley, DOE does have a significant

radiochemistry infrastructure but it apparently is not certified in

the way the Congress I think has specified. What prevents the

DOE from being prepared to do more to analyze environmental

clinical samples in the kind of emergency we are talking about?

Dr. HADLEY. Yes, I understand. DOE has developed their own

clinical capability to handle its own people, its workers and its contractors that are busy working on tasks and operations for the Department of Energy. They have been sized to handle that situation.

Many of the procedures that were developed were developed years

ago. We have many special procedures where we will handle different isotopes than anyone else will because of the types of work

that we do. Because of some of that—and the other thing is we are

not available for outside—we are not a commercial lab, we do not

do outside business. We keep it within-house, and we do have QA

programs. We have always had QA programs. They are just not always the same one as they use for outside laboratories. So we have

capabilities that are capabilities really to handle our own upsets

and tasks, and so the level of capacity meets that but it is not very

much more.

THE TOPOFF SIMULATION

Chairman MILLER. In your testimony you said that the national

radioanalytical laboratory infrastructure was not exercised in the

TOPOFF simulation. What did you mean by that?

Dr. HADLEY. I participated and I was in the area where I was

watching samples being collected and what was being done with

them, and really there was nothing being sent to very much of a

laboratory. There was one EPA mobile laboratory who had prepared 50 samples, and so they were there and they were processing

samples, but that was it. That is all that I saw from my standpoint.

There were a few clinical samples. I mentioned that REAC/TS

DOE, a medical-type group who advise on radiation issues, they

collected three blood samples, sent them off to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and were processed through their cytogenetic laboratory to

see what type of radiation dose we would expect. But other than

that, that was all of the laboratory capability I saw utilized.

38

One of the issues I should mention to you so that you might understand this is in the first few days of an event, the environmental laboratory needs are not as big. The first few days of an

event you are most worried about evacuation, sheltering in place,

where is the radiation or contamination on the ground, and much

of the information can be given by direct reading instruments and

by models. Also it takes time for laboratories to arrive and people

to arrive to handle laboratory samples and collect those samples.

So normally laboratories get involved a little bit later from an environmental standpoint. From a clinical standpoint, they will get involved early and that will come through local hospitals and others.

But the FRMAC and DOE have been most concerned with the environmental ones, and even during TOPOFF we saw that because of

the short duration of the TOPOFF exercise, by the time that you

would start to see a significant number of laboratory samples, it

was indexed and the exercise was over.

DOE EXECUTIVES

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Hadley, how much attention are these

issues receiving from those further up the ladder of the DOE at the

top levels, Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or Assistant Secretary?

Dr. HADLEY. We had had mobile laboratory resources mainly for

our weapons program for many years. So we had had that, they

know it is important. There have been emergency resources but

they have been limiting in scope, not real large, not handle a large

population. And beyond that I really don’t know. We would like to

do more in this area. We would like to exercise more and work with

the other agencies in developing these networks because we see

there is a need.

ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES

Chairman MILLER. For any of you who want to answer it, in the

materials I read in preparation for this hearing, some apparently

believe that the estimate of 350,000 environmental samples in a

year is far too modest of what will actually be needed. In what I

read, and apparently some of the other scenarios besides scenario

#11 but the exercise that was built around assumes a million. Is

that your understanding as well? Dr. Griggs?

Dr. GRIGGS. Mr. Chairman, I think the million could be a result

of that the 350,000 is based on a single RDD event in one city, and

the scenario 11 is based on three identical cities; and I think the

million is probably the result of the that times three effectively. So

if you look at the full scenario 11, you’re looking at a little over a

million samples.

Chairman MILLER. But there are some who think the 350 for an

event is conservative?

Dr. GRIGGS. There is a reason to think conservative is true.

Chairman MILLER. Anyone else? Dr. Hadley? Dr. Jones?

Dr. HADLEY. Coming up with those numbers is extremely difficult because we have not had the event, we have looked at the

Guyana event and I think that the one thing that we have learned

from the Guyana, Brazil event, is they very much underestimated

what they were going to have to deal with. So we have come up

39

with our best guess, what those numbers are. They may be much

higher depending on what happens.

Dr. JONES. The CDC has not been involved with the estimation

of environmental sample analysis, so we are not able to comment

on those numbers.

WHAT DID THE POLONIUM–210 POISONING TELL US ABOUT

OUR CAPACITY?

Chairman MILLER. You were involved with—and yes, I understand that CDC has a different piece of the puzzle. The testing for

internal contamination on the people who are exposed to radiation,

what did the response to the Polonium–210 poisoning in London

tell you about our capacity?

Dr. JONES. It told us that we have a gap in our national capacity

to respond to a radiological event. Because of the fact that we could

only identify one later, a second laboratory much further down the

road that could assist us in identifying the people that were potentially exposed and evaluating their internal exposure from the Polonium–210.

CDC USING DOE LABORATORIES

Chairman MILLER. I am not trying to start a fight between you

and Dr. Hadley, but why did CDC turn down DOE’s offer to conduct assessment with their labs?

Dr. JONES. In my initial evaluation discussions with the Department of Energy, it was actually the Department of Energy who

pointed me toward the laboratory that we finally utilized. Their

contract with one of the contract labs was the second laboratory

that was utilized, or was potentially utilized, and we looked at

some of the Department of Energy’s bioassay laboratories, and as

Dr. Hadley alluded to, the DOE laboratories are more for occupational exposure assessment. If you remember from the testimony

that we gave earlier, our needs for an emergency response, the

data needs and the sample size needs, are much different than the

traditional DOE bioassay laboratories. And because those bioassay

laboratories were not routinely measuring Polonium–210 in people

at the time, we felt that it would be a much more prudent fact to

look at and utilize a laboratory that was currently measuring Polonium–210 in occupational exposed individuals.

Chairman MILLER. Of course, if there were more than 31 people

to test, you would have a bigger problem. What can be done for

CDC to make use of the Department of Energy’s capacity or can

you find a way to make use of the capacity if you have more than

31 people to test?

Dr. JONES. We have already been in discussion with the Department of Energy, and we are looking at evaluating how we can utilize their laboratories, utilize their instrumentation and personnel,

to apply the methods that we are trying to develop at CDC to be

a surge capacity in the future, utilizing the parameters of the data

needs that we have. So we have hopes that we can in the future

work together to utilize their infrastructure.

Chairman MILLER. As tedious as it is for me and for you, I need

to leave and go vote; and I will come back. I think we have just

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a few more questions I really do want to get in. So I am not apologizing for something I did not do. I am not going and having a temper tantrum, but I will be back in just a few minutes.

[Recess.]

Chairman MILLER. I have to run back and forth from the Capitol,

but you don’t have to sit and wait for him to come back anymore.

ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOANALYTICAL LABORATORY RESPONSE

NETWORK

Dr. Griggs, I understand that you have proposed creating an environmental radioanalytical laboratory response network to close

the capacity gap. That you have described in your testimony. What

is the status of that network, has it received funding, is it established already, what needs to be done to make it happen?

Dr. GRIGGS. Mr. Chairman, let me first say kind of what is underway. We have what we call a pilot initiative for this network,

and it is in the form of two agreements that are going to be provided to two State and local laboratories. We are receiving applications now from those laboratories and expect to award these two

agreements in possibly three months. The recipient laboratories

will receive equipment for counting environmental samples, they

will receive training, they will receive funding to buy supplies and

standards and even personnel costs. It is called a demonstration

project, but the laboratories will take this equipment and training

and enhance their capacity and capability of analyzing environmental samples. So it is really in our view the pilot of this larger

network that you referred to.

To give this a better sense of, you know, is this approach the

right approach, are some of our budget numbers correct, are the estimates good and to kind of see the kind of results that we are

going to get from providing this equipment, training, and funding

to these two State and local laboratories. We are in kind of the

pilot phase of this particular network. I would like to add that this

radiological environment laboratory network would be a component

of the ERN that Mrs. Tulis has previously addressed. And I defer

to Dana, Ms. Tulis, for any comments on that?

Ms. TULIS. Yes, I mean, that is an estimate as Dr. Griggs indicated, and until we get further along, we are not going to have a

better idea of exact cost. We also, as part of the overall eLRN, we

are working collaboratively on funding this process as well as on

working at looking at the future years as well. But it is part of our

overall budget thinking and processing we are working on right

now.

TIMELINE AND PLANS FOR EXPANDING THE CURRENT

CAPACITY

Chairman MILLER. That answer didn’t quite suggest the urgency

that I feel. We have known for at least six years that Osama bin

Laden tried to buy, has tried to acquire radioactive materials for

a dirty bomb. How long is this pilot going to go on before you try

to take it to the scale necessary to be prepared to respond to the

kind of scenarios that the TOPOFF exercise just dealt with?

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Dr. GRIGGS. I think the plan is we start with the two and we

would add more, so it would be a phased approach as we add additional labs and—— Chairman MILLER. How long are these phases?

Dr. GRIGGS. They had projected in the proposal five years.

Chairman MILLER. And at the end of the five years, will there

be the capacity to deal with the scenario #11?

Dr. GRIGGS. Well, this particular proposal really is addressed at

the capacity of one RDD event, and 11 involves three, but we felt

like this was initially to get positioned so that we could respond to

a single RDD event. So that was the basis of this particular proposal.

Chairman MILLER. Maybe in five years we will have the capacity

to respond to one-third of the need that we just conducted an exercise to try to assess our preparedness for?

Dr. GRIGGS. In addition to this particular proposal, which is primarily geared for State and local type laboratories, we are developing tools for the commercial sector. We are developing varying

rapid methods, for example. We are developing guidance documents

for the commercial laboratories that are really aimed at increasing

their efficiency and their utilization of their existing infrastructure.

We have initiated training, for example. We developed a training

course we presented last month at our laboratory, the NAREL laboratory. So there are other activities in addition to this that are ongoing where the focus is trying to enhance the existent commercial

capacity. That will put us in a better position to respond to such

an event as well.

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Jones? I hope you feel great urgency. I

know that you have proposed a radiochemistry laboratory network

similar to what the EPA has proposed. That seems to be a critical

need to prepare for a dirty bomb attack which could happen at any

time because as Mr. Sensenbrenner has pointed out in his opening

statement, the material is out there. It is not secure. It could happen tomorrow, it could happen this afternoon; and being ready

maybe in five years, depending on how the pilot projects go, does

not give me the reassuring sense that you feel the sense of urgency

about this that feel and that Mr. Sensenbrenner feels. Where does

your proposal stand? Is it a pilot or are you going to ask for funding for it? Have you received funding for it? What needs to be done

to make it happen?

Dr. JONES. We have started the CDC process of requesting funding for proposals like this, and at CDC there is obviously the Polonium–210 event as well as the TOPOFF–4 exercise, awareness that

this is a very important issue. It is in the process right now at this

year’s budgetary allocations, and I am not in a position at this time

to know where we stand in that process.

WHAT ARE THE NEXT STEPS TO BEING BETTER PREPARED?

Chairman MILLER. Well, to all of you, what are the steps that

you think need to happen? What can we do as Congress? We are

now finding out for an oversight hearing that we are not as prepared as I had assumed we were. We are woefully short of the level

of preparation that I assumed we would have given how clearly

this threat has been communicated. I mean, if there is one threat,

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if there is one possible terrorist tactic we know Al Qaida is considering is the detonation of a dirty bomb on an American city or several American cities. They like to do things in a big way, so if they

do one in Washington, they might very well try to do one in Chicago, and I’m not really sure they are thinking about Guam but

they might do them in several places. What do we need to do to

be ready, to strengthen our radiological emergency response capacities to be able to know whether we can use the buildings that have

been contaminated; whether they need to be demolished; whether

they need to be remediated, cleaned up, before anyone can go back

in; whether we can conduct economic activity in what might be critical areas; whether hundreds of thousands of people are going to

be told that we will test your children for whether they have internal contamination, in a couple more years we will be able to test

them but let us know if their hair starts falling out, maybe we can

move them up in line. What do we need to do to be better prepared

than we are? I am not really happy with pilot programs at this

point. Dr. Griggs.

Dr. GRIGGS. I am going to refer this question to Ms. Tulis.

Ms. TULIS. When you say pilot, it may give a misimpression as

to what we are actually doing. I mean, the concept is to be building

capacity, getting additional equipment in there, and making sure

that we have the performance testing that we need to incur. So it

made it sound not as proactive as it is. The concept is to start to

build capacity and provide the funds to do that, to learn as we are

doing it, and then to continue to expand the program. So I do have

a concern that it may sound like the pilot isn’t a proactive enough

approach. It is a way of getting out there and starting to build capacity at this point, but we don’t want to just give everything out

without having a good idea of how to approach this process, and

so we are starting with the two and we do intend to expand.

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Hadley?

Dr. HADLEY. I think this hearing has been very useful. We appreciate being part of it and being able to bring this to the attention

of the country and particularly our bosses. I think now that this

has been held, this will get their attention a little bit more and

funding may become a little easier. That is always an issue. But

there are a lot of issues in this. There are a lot of things that need

to be done.

Chairman MILLER. One of the images of Congressional Oversight

hearings is that top administration officials get to hear about what

is going on within their administration. Dr. Jones?

Dr. JONES. Again, CDC feels and has realized for some time now

that this is a gap, and we have worked very hard at developing the

science behind how would we prepare to respond to a radiological

event. I believe the current issues have raised the awareness within CDC, and we are trying to act on it as best we can.

Chairman MILLER. Dr. Vitko, I know that you were here to read

prepared testimony, but this is something you probably can respond to.

Dr. VITKO. I hope I can. First of all, I agree this has highlighted

the urgency. I think that the ICLN as a group has an action item

from this hearing to figure out how they can meet that capacity

need within five years and come up with a concrete plan. I also

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think the question you raised earlier about the significance of the

gaps and what do we do if the gaps are not filled is one that we

could put more attention on. Again, there is a question of the number of measurements versus the confidence level you place in those,

and there may be other strategies to look at; and I think we owe

answers on both of those in a timely way.

Chairman MILLER. Well, I have the important work to do of trotting back and forth to the Floor to vote not to adjourn, and I am

sure that you all have things to do as well. So I think without further business, the hearing is adjourned. Thank you for being here.

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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