United States

Department of 

Agriculture

Forest Service

Pacific Northwest

Research Station

General 

Technical Report

PNW-GTR-550

July 2002

Economics Research

Supporting Water

Resource Stewardship 

in the Pacific Northwest

Laurie L. Houston, Jeffrey D. Kline, Ralph J. Alig
Laurie L. Houston is a program associate, Department of Agricultural and Resource

Economics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR 97331; Jeffrey D. Kline and

Ralph J. Alig are research foresters, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service,

Pacific Northwest Research Station, Forestry Sciences Laboratory, 3200 SW Jefferson

Way, Corvallis, OR 97331.

Authors
Houston, Laurie L.; Kline, Jeffrey D.; Alig, Ralph J. 2002. Economics research 

supporting water resource stewardship in the Pacific Northwest. Gen. Tech.Rep. 

PNW-GTR-550. Portland, OR: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, 

Pacific Northwest Research Station. 72 p. 

The use of water increasingly involves complex tradeoffs among biophysical,

economic, ecological, and societal values. Knowledge about the value of water 

to different users and methods with which to evaluate biophysical, economic,

ecological, and social tradeoffs associated with allocating limited water resources

among competing uses is vital to devising appropriate and effective water resource

policies. A review and synthesis of water resource economics research can contribute to a foundation on which to plan and conduct interdisciplinary research evaluating tradeoffs regarding water. It also can assist in setting research priorities for

developing analytical processes and tools with which to evaluate tradeoffs, as well

as develop water resource management strategies that are ecologically sound,

economically efficient, and socially acceptable. Intended primarily for noneconomists,

this report reviews existing water resource economics literature concerning the

economic value of water in different uses in the Pacific Northwest, the evaluation 

of tradeoffs among uses, and the use of economic incentives for water conservation

and protection or enhancement of water quality. The synthesis of water economics

literature culminates in the identification of priority research topics relevant to the

Pacific Northwest. An annotated bibliography of a sampling of water resource 

economics research is provided in an appendix.

Keywords: Economic values and tradeoffs, water quality and quantity, 

riparian species.

Abstract Houston, Laurie L.; Kline, Jeffrey D.; Alig, Ralph J. 2002. Economics research 

supporting water resource stewardship in the Pacific Northwest. Gen. Tech. Rep.

PNW-GTR-550. Portland, OR: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service,

Pacific Northwest Research Station. 72 p.
1 Introduction

2 Conceptual Overview of Water Uses

8 Determining the Value of Water

9 Valuing Water Rights

10 Valuing Water in Various Uses

14 Evaluating Tradeoffs and Allocation Scenarios

14 Tradeoffs Among Agriculture, Water Quality, and Other Uses

16 Tradeoffs Among Recreation Uses

16 Conjoint Analysis and Contingent Choice Models

17 Other Social Choice Models

17 Policies and Programs for Managing Water Resources

18 Taxes and Subsidies

19 Water Markets, Marketable Use Permits, and Transferable Quotas

23 Pollution Markets

24 Combining Several Economic Incentives 

24 Changing Socioeconomic Context of Water Management

25 Macro Socioeconomic Trends

26 Regional Socioeconomic and Land Use Trends

28 Trends in Public Attitudes and Preferences

28 Research Needs

29 Acknowledgments

29 Metric Equivalents

30 Literature Cited

42 Appendix 1: Glossary of Selected Economics Terms

44 Appendix 2: A Partial Annotated Bibliography of Water Resource 

Economics and Related Literature

44 Water Valuation Methods

46 Empirical Examples of Water Valuation

46 General and Multiuse Values

48 Irrigation

49 Recreation

56 Environmental Amenities and Ecosystem Services

60 Water Quality 

64 Examining Tradeoffs Among Uses

67 Water Policies

67 General

68 Water Pricing

69 Water Markets

Contents
1

The use of water increasingly involves complex tradeoffs among biophysical, 

economic, ecological, and societal values. Demands for water in different uses are

projected to increase at a moderate rate in the future (Brown 1999). Increased demand

will be driven largely by steady population growth, tempered by accompanying

increases in various conservation efforts. In the Pacific Northwest, water is subject

to various competing uses that have different values and tradeoffs associated with

them. These uses include navigation, power generation, industrial uses, irrigation,

boating, fishing, swimming, drinking, household uses, lawn and landscape maintenance, and habitat for salmon and other fish and wildlife species. Knowledge about

the value of water to different users and methods with which to evaluate the biophysical, economic, ecological, and social tradeoffs associated with allocating limited

water resources among competing uses is vital to devising appropriate and effective

water resource policies. 

Water resource economics can help in this process. Principles of water resource

economics are based on the laws of supply and demand for water. A significant

amount of research pertaining to water resource economics provides analytical

techniques for addressing distortions or impediments to the efficient workings of 

the marketplace for water. Water resource economists have developed methods for

estimating the value of water in different uses and for evaluating economic tradeoffs

among different uses. A review and synthesis of the water resource economics

research can contribute to a foundation on which research institutions can plan and

conduct interdisciplinary research evaluating biophysical, economic, ecological, and

social tradeoffs regarding water. A review and synthesis also can assist in setting

research priorities for developing analytical processes and tools with which to evaluate tradeoffs, as well as assist in developing water resource management strategies

that are ecologically sound, economically efficient, and socially acceptable. 

Intended primarily for noneconomists (with a glossary of selected economics terms

provided in app. 1), this report reviews existing water resource economics literature

as it relates to the economic value of water in different uses in the Pacific Northwest,

the evaluation of tradeoffs among uses, and use of economic incentives for promoting water conservation and protection or enhancement of water quality. Specific

objectives include providing (1) a conceptual overview of water uses, (2) a review of

methods and research regarding the valuation of water in different uses, (3) a review

of methods and research evaluating tradeoffs among water uses, (4) a conceptual

overview of economic incentives to manage water resources, with examples, and 

(5) an overview of the changing socioeconomic context of water resource management at national and regional levels. The synthesis of water economics literature

culminates in the identification of priority research topics relevant to the Pacific

Northwest. An annotated bibliography of a sampling of water resource economics

research is provided in appendix 2.

Introduction
The value of water differs greatly by time, location, quantity, quality, and use. Water

is often grouped into four categories of use: residential (or municipal), commercial

(or industrial), agricultural, and recreational. These categories also generally can 

be separated into consumptive uses and nonconsumptive uses. Agricultural and

residential uses generally are consumptive uses because they remove ground or

surface water that is consumed for irrigation or household uses. However, a small

percentage of the water withdrawn for these uses will not be consumed because it

will be returned to the water system as return flows from irrigation or wastewater

from domestic use. The quality of these return flows can be impaired and not suitable for all types of uses. 

Industrial uses can be either consumptive or nonconsumptive depending on the

specific use. For example, hydroelectric power generation generally is a nonconsumptive use because water is removed from rivers temporarily to power generators, then returned. Other industrial uses, such as manufacturing, might consume a

significant portion of withdrawn water in production processes. As with agricultural

and municipal uses, even if the use is considered consumptive, a portion may be

returned to the water system and considered nonconsumptive, but quality may be

impaired. Recreational uses, such as boating and swimming, are typically nonconsumptive (or instream) uses, because water is not consumed by these uses. Other

less tangible though valued uses of water include its role in providing wildlife habitat,

ecosystem services, flood control, and pollution assimilation.

The quantity of water used (or consumed) and its value depend on the factors of

supply and demand. The supply of water represents how much water a seller (or

supplier) is willing to supply at various prices at a given point in time (fig. 1). In a

competitive market, the supply of water a seller would be willing to provide in the

2

Conceptual

Overview of 

Water Uses

Figure 1—Supply and demand for water in a competitive market.
market would be determined by the marginal costs borne by the seller to produce

water. The marginal cost of water is the cost associated with producing one additional unit of water. For example, the supply of water in a particular geographic area

might be determined by the marginal costs associated with pumping and transporting ground or surface water to specific locations where water is desired. The supply

curve for water generally will be upward sloping, because the marginal cost of producing water generally increases as the quantity supplied increases. For example, 

if additional water were desired in the short term, bigger and more costly pumps

might be needed or deeper wells might have to be dug, both of which would likely

increase the cost of supplying additional water. The steepness and curvature of the

supply curve is dependent on the mobility and marginal costs of resources and

infrastructure needed to supply water at a given point in time. With respect to prospective supplies, water scarcity has been called the top global issue of concern 

in the 21st century in developed and developing countries alike (see, for example,

Kundzewicz 1997, Rosegrant and Meinzen-Dick 1996), and costs of providing water

are likely to receive more attention in the future. 

The demand for water is represented by the price people are willing to pay for each

unit of water. People’s willingness to pay for each additional unit of water is a function of the marginal utility they derive from the additional unit. Marginal utility is the

additional utility held by a user for an additional unit of water at a given point in time.

The marginal utility of water tends to diminish as more water is consumed, because

users tend to become satiated. For example, to a single household the marginal

utility of the first glass of residential water per day might be quite high, whereas the

marginal utility of the 100th glass may be much lower. If given the choice, a household would not pay the same amount for the 100th glass of water as the first glass.

For this reason, the demand curve for water is downward sloping because the marginal utility to users of additional units of water decreases, and the amount people

are willing to pay for each additional unit of water also decreases (fig. 1). 

Conceptually, the optimal price (or market value) of water is determined by the intersection of the supply and demand curves at price P* and quantity Q* (fig. 1). At this

price and quantity, both producer and consumer benefits are maximized. Consumer

surplus is a monetary measure of consumer well-being. It is measured as the area

under the demand curve and above the market-determined price, and represents

the amount above the current price that consumers are willing to pay for water at a

given quantity supplied. Consumer surplus is the difference between consumers’

total willingness to pay for water and the amount they actually paid. Thus, there is 

a gap between total utility and total market value, which the consumer gets because

the consumer receives more than they pay or a “consumer surplus.” 

The concept of consumer surplus reflects that market price is determined by marginal rather than total utility, and represents the benefit consumers gain from being

able to buy at lower prices than what the total is worth to them. Although use of

consumer surplus as a measure of the economic efficiency benefits to the consumer

3
4

seems relatively straightforward, actual expenditures are readily observable in the

marketplace, and consumer surplus can be inferred only after the product’s demand

curve is statistically estimated (Swanson and Loomis 1996). For goods and services

that are consumed in small units (a can of soda, for example), it is only the last unit

purchased that is worth exactly just what the consumer paid. Because the last unit

has value to the consumer exactly equal to what he or she paid, there is usually no

consumer surplus on the last unit bought. The basic idea of consumer surplus is to

attach a monetary value to the change in welfare resulting either from a change in

consumption or from a change in prices and the budget. Changes in the supply of

marketed outputs can sometimes generate no or little change in consumer surplus

because the change in marketed outputs is usually small relative to the market, so

that there is no change in the price of the output to consumer. 

Similarly, producer surplus is a monetary measure of producer well-being associated with changes in production or prices. Producer surplus is measured as the

area above the supply curve and below the market-determined price, and represents the amount below the current price that producers are willing to accept as

payment for a given quantity of water. Producer surplus is the difference between

producers’ total willingness to accept for water and the amount actually paid to

them, and can be viewed as one measure of “profit.”

Economic theory states that under competitive market conditions, supply and

demand will determine the optimal value of a good. In some cases of water, however, this is untrue for several reasons. First, water generally is not allocated among

users under competitive market conditions. Often in a given region there may be

only one supplier of water, such as a municipality or irrigation water district. Such

suppliers may set a constant price for water based on the average costs associated

with providing water to all users or some other criteria. The effect of a constant

water price, from the perspective of the water consumer, is similar in effect to a 

horizontal supply curve for water. From the perspective of the consumer, the water

supplier is willing to supply any amount of water at a specified price no matter how

much water is demanded by the consumer. Because such consumers do not experience higher water prices associated with their increasing quantity demanded, they

lack a strong incentive to use less water or to not increase their water usage.

Constant water prices, set below a socially optimal level, generally result in too

much water being consumed. 

Another factor disrupting the optimal allocation of water is that water is often treated

as a public good. A public good is a pure public good if, once produced, no one can

be excluded from benefiting from its availability (Nicholson 1989, p. 729). In some

cases, public goods also are nonrival in consumption—additional consumers are

able to use or consume the good at zero marginal cost. In the United States, there

are two distinct water rights that affect the allocation of water. Riparian water rights

are predominant in the Eastern United States where water is plentiful. Riparian

water rights accrue to landowners whose lands are adjacent to water bodies such
5

as rivers and lakes. Generally, landowners adjacent to such water are allowed to

consume or distribute as much water as they like, as long as they do not impair the

quantity or quality of water for other downstream users. Prior appropriation water

rights are predominant in the Western United States where water is scarce. Prior

appropriation water rights accrue to the first person in time (senior rights holders),

meaning the individual who first files a claim for use. Each user down the line in

time (junior rights holders) has less right to water than users earlier in time. In times

of increased scarcity, such as during a drought, the first user in time or senior water

rights holders have the right to use as much water as they are legally allowed, and

whatever is left goes to the next user in time, and so on down the line. It is possible

for there to be no water left for the user last in line. In the absence of water-pricing

policies or more clearly defined rights with respect to water use, users generally are

free to consume as much water as they like subject to riparian or prior appropriation

rules. As a result, the costs to users of obtaining water often do not accurately

reflect the true scarcity of water to society, leading to overuse of water generally. 

A final factor that disrupts the optimal allocation of water is the presence of externalities. Externalities are side effects of an action that influence the well-being of nonconsenting parties (Gwartney and Stroup 1980). Externalities can be positive, such

as the pleasant smell outside a bakery, or negative, such as the unpleasant smell

surrounding a sewerage treatment plant. Externalities generally are not reflected in

the market prices of goods, so the external costs associated with producing goods

are not borne by consumers or producers. 

For example, an important use of water in the Pacific Northwest is irrigation. With

water often a limiting factor in agricultural production in many parts of the West, irrigated acreage in 17 Western States increased from 17.2 million acres in 1939 to

30.8 million acres in 1959 and reached a peak of 43.6 million acres in 1978 (Van

Kooten 1993). Irrigation now constitutes more than 80 percent of all freshwater withdrawals in the Western States (Solley and others 1998). Most of the increase in irrigated acreage was due to federally subsidized water projects, which have distorted

the true cost of water for irrigation. Wahl (1989) describes the nature of the subsidies,

within their historical context, which was mainly to help settle the arid West. In general, irrigation water was subsidized through repayment schemes that do not include

interest charges on the costs of construction of dams, irrigation canals, and other

facilities. Wahl (1989) also describes how these subsidies had a detrimental impact

on the efficient use of water. 

Irrigation prices in the West are gradually increasing to reflect costs closer to the

true costs associated with the subsidized water projects. However, prices for irrigation water generally still only reflect the marginal costs associated with pumping and

transporting water to agricultural fields, and generally do not represent potential

external costs associated with, for example, negative impacts to salmon resulting
from too little water left instream, or negative impacts that agricultural drainage

water and runoff might have on water quality. If the marginal costs of producing agricultural irrigation water resulted in the supply curve S* (fig. 2), the optimal price and

quantity demanded of irrigation water would appear to be P* and Q*. Suppose, however, that supplying irrigation water imposes external costs in the form of reduced

streamflow, loss of salmon habitat, and decreased water quality owing to agricultural

drainage water and runoff. If water producers were made to acknowledge the true

marginal costs of producing irrigation water, their supply curve would be SE (fig. 2),

resulting in a higher irrigation water price PE and a lower quantity demanded QE.

Under these supply and demand conditions, when external costs are not internalized, irrigators pay less for water and consume more water than they would if the

price of water did reflect external costs associated with salmon. Failure to internalize

costs associated with negative externalities generally results in overuse of water. 

An important goal of water resource economists is to remedy the misallocation of

water through the use of economic incentives, such as pricing mechanisms and

taxes, to correct imperfections in water markets. For example, tiered water pricing 

is used to increase the marginal price of water as the quantity of water demanded

by a consumer increases, making each additional unit of water consumed cost

more. Tiered pricing generally is implemented by a sole supplier of water in place 

of a constant price to simulate, from the perspective of the water consumers, an

upward sloping supply curve for water to motivate conservation. The rate at which

prices are made to increase depends typically on the steepness of the demand

curve for water and the desired equilibrium quantity of use. The price elasticity of

demand gives an indication of the percentage of change in the amount of quantity

demanded in response to a given percentage of decrease in price. The steeper

(typically more inelastic) the demand curve, the more the price must increase to

have the same impact on quantity demanded.

Figure 2—Supply of water when producers acknowledge external costs associated with producing water.

6
Another way economic incentives can be used to reduce the quantity of water to

mitigate negative externalities associated with water overuse is to impose taxes on

the quantity of water withdrawn for various uses. Returning to the example depicted

in figure 2, a tax could be imposed on water producers, effectively increasing their

marginal costs associated with supplying water, resulting in the supply curve SE.

The new tax-induced supply curve SE would result in a higher equilibrium price of

water at PE and a lower quantity demanded at QE. 

Conceptually, one way to determine an appropriate tax to mitigate negative externalities is to evaluate the marginal benefits to individuals of causing an externality 

relative to the marginal damages associated with the externality. Generally, individuals pursue actions that result in negative externalities, water pollution for example,

because it is in some way beneficial privately or individually for them to do so. It is

reasonable to expect individuals to generate increasing levels of an externality until

the marginal benefit of generating the externality equals zero at Z’, for example, in

figure 3. Increasing levels of the negative externalities, however, also might be associated with increasing marginal damages borne by society, such as, for example,

increasing degradation of riparian habitat and the resulting impacts to aquatic species

caused by irrigation water withdrawal. Suppose society was willing to accept some

level of habitat degradation to achieve a balance between the needs of irrigators

and protecting riparian habitat. One solution would be to allow irrigators to withdraw

water only until the marginal benefit they gain from additional withdrawals equals

the marginal damages to riparian habitat associated with those additional withdrawals Z*. Such an outcome would be possible by charging irrigators a tax T* per

unit of withdrawal, which would result in the socially efficient level of riparian habitat

degradation. Actually implementing taxes in this way necessitates that policymakers

have good information about the marginal benefits and damages of externalities,

which may not always be available. 

7

Figure 3—Determining the optional tax to mitigate an externality.
An economic remedy addressing specifically the public goods nature of water is to

introduce a water market that enables holders of water rights to buy and sell their

rights to use a specific quantity of water at market-determined prices. Because

water markets enable users to sell their rights to unused water, water markets provide an incentive to users to conserve. Water users would consume water only to

the point where the marginal net benefit of an additional unit of water equaled the

price at which they would be able to sell that unit (if unused) in the market. For

water markets to work properly, rights to water must be clearly defined, must be

enforceable, and must be fully transferable from one user to another. 

The institutional setting for water supply and use is an important consideration in

relation to the types of water policies that could be implemented in different settings.

Markets are valuable institutions for allocating resources, but historically there have

been some important facets of water supply and institutional settings that have prevented water markets in the first place, and some of these still remain. For example,

historically, prior appropriation laws generally were effective for protecting water

users in the specific situations they faced during settlement in the Western United

States. Relatively large-scale water development projects that facilitated water

resource use and economic development in many regions of the West generally

were costly and beyond the reach of private users. Without government intervention

to finance such projects, many would not have occurred. 

Another institutional consideration is land ownership and its impact on land as the

source of water for downstream uses. Although nationally most watersheds comprise of a mixture of public and private land ownerships, public lands play a significantly larger role as sources of water in the Western United States. National forests,

in particular, under the management of the USDA Forest Service, are the Nation’s

largest single source of fresh water (Everest and others, in press). In the Western

United States, national forests produce about one-third of the region’s annual runoff,

and the ratio is even higher in the Pacific Northwest. The significant role played by

public-owned lands as sources of water in the Western United States greatly affects

the potential mix of programs and policies that could be implemented to deal with

water allocation problems when and where they exist. In some cases, regions composed of significant proportions of public land ownership may be able to address

some water resource allocation issues through changes in land management and

policy without the need for more market-based economic remedies. 

Ideally, water would be allocated among all users and uses over time and space 

so that the marginal benefit of an additional unit of water for any one use would be

equal to the marginal benefit of an additional unit of water for any other use. To do

this, it is necessary to know the value of water in different uses over time and

space, and the costs imposed by externalities associated with those uses. Some

values can be observed from market transactions, whereas others must be estimated

based on various survey and analytical techniques. The values of water in different

uses then can be used to evaluate tradeoffs associated with various policy alternatives intended to improve water management or mitigate negative externalities

associated with different water uses.

8

Determining the

Value of Water
When estimating and comparing water values, it is important to distinguish between

the value of a water right and the value of a water use. A water right is legal access

to a specific water source or quantity of water, and can be defined in a variety of

ways (an allowable pumping or diversion rate per year, for example). A water right

also could be defined in terms of priority of access to a water source relative to

other users. The value of a water right generally is larger than the value of a particular water use because the value of a water right can reflect values associated with

several alternative uses. Also, water right value analyses tend to report values that

are capitalized over the life of the water right, whereas analyses of specific water

use values tend to be estimated as value in a specific year of use.

Colby (1989) describes four methods commonly used to value water rights: sales

comparison, income capitalization, land value differentials, and least-cost alternatives. The sales comparison method is similar to the approach real estate appraisers

use to value real estate and involves examining similar and recent sales of water

rights. Location and other characteristics, such as water quantity and quality, are

compared among individual sales to estimate a range within which the water right

value could fall. The value of water rights also can be inferred from actual transactions of water in short-term water markets. However, such market transactions tend

to inadequately account for values of maintenance of instream flows and water

quality (Saliba 1987), a trait that can characterize all the methods discussed. 

The income capitalization method calculates the present value of future annual net

benefits that a water right will generate in various uses. As such, this method generally is only useful if annual net returns can be attributed solely to specific uses for

which the contribution of water can be clearly distinguished from other inputs. Water

often is one of many inputs that generate net returns to a water right holder, however, so its value cannot easily be separated from those of other inputs (Colby 1989).

More recently, inferential methods such as hedonic pricing and contingent valuation

have been used to separate the value of water from other factors that contribute to

net benefits. 

Examining land value differentials between land parcels with and without water

rights is another way to estimate the economic value of water rights (Faux and

Perry 1999) and is most often used to value water for irrigation. Lastly, the least-cost

method estimates the cost of creating a water supply similar to the one being valued

(Colby 1989). This method often is used as a last resort when other methods are

not feasible. This is because it does not necessarily represent a willingness to pay

for water rights, but rather the potential costs of replacement. It is valid only if there

is evidence that water users in the area actually would be willing to pay the costs

associated with obtaining new water supplies. In some cases, however, it might

be prohibitively expensive to obtain new water supplies, so users may choose to

do without or find more innovative ways to conserve or develop alternative water

supplies.

9

Valuing Water Rights
The value placed on water is often determined by the manner in which it is used

(Marcouiller 1999). Water can have a variety of economic and ecological uses.

Water use can be valued in terms of marketed outputs, such as agricultural products, industrial products, and power generation, or as unpriced benefits such as

instream uses including recreation, transportation, aesthetics, and wildlife habitat

and other ecological functions. In rare instances where clearly defined water markets exist, economists can observe water values from actual market transactions.

More commonly, markets for water do not exist. For these situations, economists

have developed various nonmarket valuation methods to value unpriced benefits

that water provides, including travel cost and contingent valuation methods, conjoint

analysis and choice experiments, hedonic pricing, avoidance cost or cleanup cost

analysis, and value added analysis, among others (Colby 1989, Gibbons 1986).

Gibbons (1986) in particular provides an extensive reference to the valuation of

water in a broad set of alternative uses. Detailed description of water valuation

methods for specific uses also can be found in Adelsman and Bloomgren (1987),

Colby (1989), Gibbons (1986), Knaff (1991), and Young and Gray (1972) among

other sources. The appropriate method for valuing water in a given situation often

depends on the specific use.

For example, travel cost and contingent valuation methods often are used to value

water in recreational uses (Bergstrom and others 1990, Cordell and Bergstrom 1993,

Creel and Loomis 1992, Johnson and others 1990, Shelby and others 1990). The

travel cost method is an indirect valuation method based on the observed behavior

of water users. It can be used to value water in a recreational setting by estimating

the demand for access to a given recreational site (for example, Caulkins and others

1986, Layman and others 1996, Sorg and Loomis 1984). The theoretical basis of

the travel cost method is that the distance visitors travel and the expenditures

incurred en route represent visitors’ willingness to pay to recreate at the site and

can be used to construct a demand function for the recreational experience

(Bockstael 1995, Young 1996). 

The travel cost method is based on a set of assumptions that involve the cost per

mile of a trip, opportunity cost of travel time, whether the trip is a single or multipurpose trip, the availability of substitute sites, and the amount of time spent at the site.

Travel cost models commonly group visitors to a particular site by their zone of

origin. The number of visitors from each origin is multiplied by an estimate of the

travel costs associated with that origin. Travel costs are broken into two components: the cost of operating a vehicle and the cost of time spent traveling. The cost

of operating a vehicle for one visitor’s trip is the cost per mile times the number of

miles, divided by the number of people per vehicle. The cost of time spent traveling

is the opportunity cost of taking the trip rather than doing some other activity. This is

generally estimated as a proportion of the traveler’s wage rate. Visitation, cost, and

income information generally is gathered from in-person, onsite interviews or from

mail surveys. Many researchers now use an estimated vehicle operation cost per

mile reported by the U.S. Department of Transportation. Many studies also calculate

opportunity costs of travel time for a particular region as one-third of the per capita

income for that region (see, for example, Sorg and others 1985). 

10

Valuing Water in

Various Uses
The contingent valuation method is a survey-based technique that attempts to simulate a market for nonmarket goods, such as recreational services or water quality,

by using hypothetical situations to elicit peoples’ perceived willingness to pay for 

a good (see, for example, Bishop and Heberlein 1986, Mitchell and Carson 1989).

By asking water consumers their willingness to pay for water or a service that

water provides, contingent valuation attempts to measure the consumer surplus

associated with the good or service at hand. Contingent valuation is a direct method

of determining water values; rather than obtaining willingness-to-pay information

indirectly through observed behavior, people are directly asked about their willingness to pay for access to a site or an activity. The contingent valuation method has

been used to value many aspects of water such as water levels (Eiswerth and others

2000), instream flows (Brown and others 1991, Duffield and others 1994), and riverside wetlands (Kosz 1994). For the purposes of this general discussion, we also

include conjoint analysis and choice experiments along with contingent valuation.

Conjoint analysis and choice experiments also are survey-based methods in which

survey respondents are asked to state their preference for an outcome or good

described by its particular attributes. In the case of water valuation, attributes might

pertain to water quantity and quality as well as cost, enabling dollar amounts to be

placed on different levels of attributes by using empirical analysis. 

Contingent valuation studies can be conducted either in person, by mail, or by telephone. Many researchers choose mail surveys because it is less time consuming

and fewer people are needed to administer the survey. However, mail surveys pose

a greater chance of nonresponse bias, although it is often possible to do followup

telephone interviews of nonrespondents to determine if nonresponse should be

interpreted as zero bids or as protest of the survey altogether (Mitchell and Carson

1989). The key to a successful contingent valuation study is creating an unbiased

questionnaire. Ensuring this often requires conducting adequate focus groups and

pretesting of potential survey instruments. A thorough pretest of the questionnaire

can minimize problems such as embedded effects, starting-point bias, and misinterpretation of the questions being asked. A well-designed hypothetical scenario is

straightforward enough that a variety of respondents will understand the situation

and interpret it in the same manner. 

An important element of contingent valuation surveys is the method used to obtain

willingness-to-pay values. Some researchers use an iterative bidding process

whereby a respondent is asked their willingness to pay $x for a good. If the respondent says “yes,” they are asked their willingness to pay iteratively higher amounts

until the respondent says “no.” A commonly used alternative to the open-ended

question format is the closed-ended question format in which respondents are

asked if they would be willing to pay a specified amount for the good being valued.

Payment amounts are varied across survey respondents, but each respondent has

only one yes or no response. This method often is combined with an iterative

process, whereby the initial question is followed by a single higher dollar value if the

respondent answers “yes” to the first. The close-ended format has evolved in recent

years into the referendum format, in which the question is posed to simulate an

actual referendum on which respondents have the opportunity to vote. Often, the

11
referendum format is implemented by varying different levels of the goods or attributes being valued across respondents, in addition to varying specified dollar amounts.

Advocates of the referendum format argue that by mimicking the voting process, the

method presents the otherwise difficult task of valuing natural resources and environmental goods in a survey process that is both more realistic and acceptable to

survey respondents. 

An advantage of the contingent valuation method over the travel cost method is that

it can be used to determine the value of something that may not yet exist, such as

increased water available at a site, or estimate the value of various changes at a

site (Cameron and others 1996, Cordell and Bergstrom 1993, Creel and Loomis

1992, Fadali and Shaw 1998, Ward and others 1996). The travel cost method generally can only be used to measure the value of what does (or did) exist, because

values are based on costs incurred while traveling to a site in its current, rather than

hypothetical, condition. Contingent valuation also is the only method that can be

used to determine nonuse values for water associated with water-related existence,

bequest, and option values (Brookshire and Smith 1987, Kosz 1994, Walsh and

others 1990). Many aspects of survey design and administration, however, can bias

contingent valuation estimates, particularly in relation to nonuse values. In 1993, a

blue-ribbon panel of economists was assembled that addressed survey design

methods and provided guidelines to minimize bias of valuation estimates from such

surveys (NOAA 1993). Many contingent valuation studies now follow these guidelines in survey development and administration.

Both the travel cost and contingent valuation methods can be appropriate for valuing

recreation activities. The most appropriate method often is determined by the

specific study context. For example, since derivation of a demand curve using the

travel cost method requires sufficient variability in travel costs, it is not an appropriate

method if most respondents travel equal distances (Forster 1989). Because contingent valuation is based on posing hypothetical situations, it is the most appropriate

method when trying to value a hypothetical change to a site that may affect recreational opportunities, such as a change in water quantity or quality. 

Hedonic pricing is an empirical technique based on the assumption that an individual’s utility for a good is based on the attributes that characterize the good. Hedonic

pricing most commonly is used to examine the attributes of land that contribute to 

its value. In the case of water, the marginal value of a water-related land attribute,

such as water quality, would be measured by using an empirical model that describes

land prices as a function of variables describing land attributes, such as location and

access, and variables describing water quality. Land price and other data might be

obtained from property tax assessors or from reported actual market transactions.

This information could be used to estimate a regression equation that describes

land values as a function of the land attributes, including water quality. Estimated

model coefficients can then be interpreted as marginal prices for each attribute.

Hedonic pricing has been used to estimate use values for water, such as for irrigation (Faux and Perry 1999), and nonuse values, such as the value of water quality

along lakeshores (Steinnes 1992). 

12
A limitation to hedonic pricing is that it potentially captures willingness to pay for 

perceived rather than actual differences in attributes (Freeman 1995) and may overor under-estimate the true benefits derived from actual differences in attributes. For

example, Malone and Barrows (1990) attempted to use this method to value groundwater quality in Portage County, Wisconsin. They determined that costs associated

with nitrate pollution in the study area did not appear to be reflected in land prices.

Rather, they concluded that costs of nitrate pollution likely are absorbed by landowners in other ways, such as the length of time that land may exist on the market

before eventual sale, or through averting expenditures by landowners, such as the

cost of purchasing filters or the cost of obtaining a new source of quality water by

drilling new wells. 

Several other methods are used to estimate the value of water, and these tend 

to differ by water use. For example, irrigation water values often are estimated by

using analysis of the value that irrigation water adds to agricultural crops based on

comparison of crop production functions for dry and irrigated land (Colorado Arts

and Mechanics College 1950, Gibbons 1986, Kulshreshtha and Brown 1990,

Kulshreshtha and Gillies 1994, Thomas and others 1962). As a result, value-added

analysis is closely tied to the specific crops produced and the productivity of land 

on which crops are grown. For this reason, water value estimated based on valueadded analysis can differ greatly from one situation to the next. For example, valueadded analysis likely will result in relatively high water value estimates in situations

where irrigation water is used to grow high-value vegetable crops, compared to

situations where irrigation water is used to grow lower value forage and grain

crops. Water value estimates also tend to be higher in regions where soil quality

is very high and above-average crop production is obtained, compared to regions

where soil quality is low.

The value of water for industrial uses also is often estimated by using a valueadded approach based on input-output models that estimate the value-added impact

of water on an industry’s output (Gibbons 1986). The value of water or water quality

to industrial users also often is determined by estimating the costs associated with

obtaining alternative sources of water. For example, a particular level of water

quality in a particular source might be valued by estimating the costs associated

with obtaining an alternative water source of equal quality or by estimating the

costs associated with avoiding or preventing further degradation of water quality

in the source (Gibbons 1986). These types of averted cost methods, however,

can fail to provide an accurate measure of the true value of water for different

uses, because they are not directly linked to users’ willingness to pay for water

(Courant and Porter 1981). 

Municipalities generally determine residential water prices based on the average

cost of supplying water, including the costs of utility infrastructure, operation, and

management, plus profit (Gibbons 1986). Consumers’ surplus for residential water

must be determined by subtracting these costs of bringing water to the faucet from

consumers’ overall willingness to pay. Demand functions can be estimated to produce such consumer surplus estimates representing the value of water in various

municipal uses (Gibbons 1986). In the absence of estimated demand functions,

13
comparing price elasticities of demand—how responsive a percentage of change 

in quantity of use is to a percentage of change for price—for different uses can be

used to determine relative values of each use. 

Evaluating tradeoffs among various water users can contribute to determining the

best allocation of water among different uses. From an economic perspective, the

optimal allocation of water is that which equates marginal values of water across all

users or uses. Some uses, such as diversions for irrigation and instream uses for

recreation or maintenance of salmon habitat, are competitive with one another in 

the sense that one use generally can only be increased at the expense of the other.

Other uses, such as hydropower dam releases and white-water rafting or kayaking,

can be complementary, because both can be increased or decreased together.

Identifying potential complementarities among different uses often can minimize the

need to make difficult tradeoffs between different uses. When complementarities do

not exist, comparisons of the value of water in different competing uses can help to

identify socially and economically beneficial allocations of water among competing

off-stream and instream uses (Colby 1989). 

Determining the most economically or socially advantageous way to allocate water

among users in time and space depends on an accurate representation of the value

of water to different users and the impact that each water user has on other water

users. Meaningful comparisons among different users require that the quantity of

water used both instream and off-stream is clearly defined, and that its timing,

location, and quality are comparable across uses (Young and Gray 1972). Once

economic values have been determined for different uses, tradeoffs can be evaluated to examine socioeconomic implications of different water allocation scenarios.

In situations where particular water uses also have implications for the maintenance of ecological processes, information is needed about the relation between

water uses and ecological processes and society’s preferences or tradeoffs for

water uses relative to the maintenance or enhancement of ecological processes.

Allocating water among competing uses does not always have to result in specific

users being made worse off to benefit others. Policy options do not necessarily

always come in the form of win-lose situations (Schaible 2000). Sometimes multiple

users can all be made better off simply by changing such factors as the timing or

duration of water withdrawals in ways that avoid the necessity for more difficult

tradeoffs among competing users. Several examples of tradeoff analyses involving

water exist in published literature, and we will discuss some of these next. 

Agriculture often is at the center of policy debates about water allocations, because

the agriculture sector generally uses the most water. Agriculture also is viewed as a

major source of nonpoint source water pollution and so can be an important factor

affecting the quality of water for other uses including aquatic habitat. Several studies

have examined tradeoffs associated with the value of agricultural production and the

public benefits derived from other factors, including water conservation (Schaible

2000), water quality improvements (Contant and others 1993, Randhir and Lee 1997),

and habitat enhancement for specific species (Aillery and others 1999, 2001). Other

14

Evaluating

Tradeoffs and

Allocation

Scenarios

Tradeoffs Among

Agriculture, Water

Quality, and Other 

Uses
studies have examined tradeoffs between benefits derived from irrigation and 

benefits derived from instream water uses such as recreational fishing (Hansen and

Hallam 1990) and hydropower (Oven-Thompson and others 1982). These studies

generally identify specific factors that are associated with individual water policies

and how management of those factors will impact farm operations and revenue.

Each situation requires a unique modeling approach depending on the policy context

and purpose, as well as soil conditions, agricultural practices, and crop production

objectives currently in use. 

For example, Contant and others (1993) constructed a set of models simulating

nitrogen and pesticide loading in groundwater and surface water runoff, and the

sediment loading in surface water, to examine several policy alternatives intended

to improve water quality in Iowa, including pesticide regulations, taxes, technical

assistance, cost-sharing, and research and education. Aillery and others (2001) constructed a dynamic model of agricultural production, soil loss, and water retention in

the Florida Everglades to examine alternative water-retention policies designed to

restore the Everglades ecosystem, and evaluate their impacts on agricultural water

use, production, and net returns. Aillery and others (1999) examined alternative

recovery efforts for Columbia salmon, focusing on costs incurred by the agricultural

sector resulting from different combinations of recovery strategies, including reservoir draw-downs, dam release timing, and flow augmentation. 

Economic and environmental risks associated with different environmental policies

also can be incorporated into tradeoff evaluations (Qui and others 1988, Randhir

and Lee 1997). Generally, examples of such studies use empirical models to evaluate the maximum farm profit obtainable while holding adverse environmental risks

below some specified target. For example, Qui and others (1988) examined the

farm profit implications of alternative policies designed to reduce adverse impacts 

of nonpoint source nitrogen and sediment loading in water resulting from potential

storm events. Randhir and Lee (1997) evaluated alternative policies related to

restrictions of nitrogen and pesticide use in agriculture. Randhir and Lee caution

that although policies targeting a specific pollutant may reduce that particular pollutant, they also can result in simultaneous increases in the use of other harmful 

substances not targeted by such policies. In this way, policies designed to reduce

environmental risks associated with one pollutant can actually increase environmental risks associated with unforeseen increases in other pollutants. For this reason,

analysis of tradeoffs is most effective if conducted at a scope appropriate to the

issue under study. 

When evaluating tradeoffs, it is important not only to look at total costs or benefits 

to a region but also to look at how costs are distributed within a region (Aillery and

others 1999, Contant and others 1993). For example, Contant and others (1993)

compared the costs of implementing water quality policies with the effectiveness of

each policy within various regions and identified regions where particular policies

were more effective than others. They suggest that targeting policies to particular

areas may be an effective way to improve overall water quality and minimize impacts

to farm profitability. Some regions may have a particular comparative advantage

over others in meeting certain water policy goals. Identifying comparative advantages when they exist can be an important factor in improving overall efficiency

and success of water policies and management strategies. 

15
16

Tradeoffs Among

Recreation Uses

Conjoint Analysis and

Contingent Choice

Models

Many studies focus on the marginal costs of alternative policies or management

scenarios, because the costs of implementing policies are relatively easy to quantify.

Some studies do include quantitative estimates of the benefits of alternative policies

or management scenarios; however, estimating benefits, particularly benefits to

society, can be more complex owing to the nonmarket aspect of societal benefits.

Consequently, many studies that compare values across different water uses do not

attempt to evaluate tradeoffs as much as they focus on identifying costs associated

with implementing policy options. 

Although many studies involving water recreation focus on evaluating tradeoffs

between a particular water recreational use and some nonrecreational water use,

often two or more different water recreational uses can be in conflict with one another.

Johnson (1975) is one of the few studies that examines tradeoffs between two

different water recreation uses—upstream, reservoir-based recreation, and downstream, reservoir release-based instream recreation. Benefit functions representing

both types of recreation are combined in an objective function and optimized by

using a nonlinear programming model. Johnson’s conclusion is based on a basic

tenet in resource economics theory, that the optimal allocation between upstream

and downstream recreation occurs where the marginal benefits associated with

water allocated to the reservoir are just equal to the marginal benefits associated

with water allocated to the stream. This is the allocation that maximizes social

benefits (Johnson 1975). 

Conjoint analysis and contingent choice models provide a direct method for evaluating tradeoffs among different uses by using surveys of select individuals or the public.

These methods combine economic theory of the utility individuals gain from goods

or services with economic theory of the value derived from goods and services as

characterized by their specific attributes or characteristics. Conjoint analysis and

contingent choice surveys are similar in design to surveys using dichotomous choice

contingent valuation. Survey respondents are asked to choose among two or more

bundles of environmental goods or services described in terms of different levels of

their various attributes. Empirical modeling of respondents’ choices generally results

in a set of estimated coefficients that represent the influence that each attribute has

on the choices of (or utility to) respondents. Typically, one of the attributes included

in the attribute set is money, enabling relative marginal values of all attributes to be

compared along a common monetary scale. Consumer surplus estimates associated

with changes in specific attribute levels can be derived for each attribute and compared to consumer surplus estimates for other attributes or from other studies.

An advantage of conjoint analysis and contingent choice models is that they can 

be used to examine tradeoffs among hypothetical policy scenarios characterized by

different levels of environmental attributes for which values are otherwise difficult to

measure. In the case of water, relevant attributes might include water quality, riparian

habitat quality, instream flow, allowable recreational uses, and the quality of specific

recreational uses. If implemented appropriately, such studies also can be appealing

from a political perspective, because they enable a subsample of the public or other

relevant target sample to choose (or vote) among predetermined sets of policy outcomes. 
17

Other Social 

Choice Models

Conjoint analysis and contingent choice models have been used to evaluate public

preferences for alternative forest landscapes (Hanley and others 1998b), examine

perceived environmental tradeoffs associated with water supply alternatives (Blamey

and others 1999), and evaluate public preferences for watershed management policy alternatives and outcomes (Farber and Griner 2000, Johnston and others 1999).

Blomquist and others (2000) used a budget survey technique to determine the benefits of water quality programs in Kentucky. Individuals were asked to allocate surplus government funds across existing water quality programs. Individuals were

assumed to allocate the budget such that marginal benefits were equal across

programs. The approach enabled the social benefits associated with each program to be derived from individuals’ marginal willingness to trade among water

quality programs. Although the approach used by Blomquist and others (2000)

does not provide measures of willingness to pay for programs, it does provide

information about the relative values of programs.

D’Angelo and others (1998) provide a description of other types of social choice 

procedures that have been applied to water-resource management issues in northern Arizona. The methods include plurality voting, the Borda count, the Hare system, and pairwise voting. These procedures can be used to enumerate preferences

among policy or management alternatives when multiple decisionmakers or decisionmaking groups disagree on the criteria used to make decisions. Because no

quantification of the criteria is needed, these methods also are useful if decisionmaking criteria cannot be easily quantified, or data with which to describe and

model economic behavior and decisionmaking are absent or difficult to obtain, or 

if values are uncertain. Plurality voting selects the alternative that has the largest

number of first-place rankings. With Borda count, all choices are given a ranking,

the rankings are added, and the choice with the highest rank is selected. 

The Hare system is based on the successive deletion of less desirable alternatives.

If any alternative is ranked the best for at least half of the criteria, then it is selected

as the social choice. If two alternatives can be found, both are selected. Otherwise,

the alternative that has the best ranking for the fewest criteria is deleted from the

preference list. This process is repeated until either an alternative is the best for at

least half of the criteria, or all the remaining alternatives are the best for the same

number of criteria. In pairwise voting, pairs of alternatives are compared and voted

on. The selected alternative then is compared to the next available alternative and

so on until only one alternative remains, which is the social choice. 

Accurate price signals that reflect the true value of natural resources and their use

can be essential to sound management. When markets fail to provide correct price

signals, economic incentives can be used to adjust the effective prices of natural

resources to attain environmental goals and targets in a cost-effective manner

(Baumol and Oates 1988, Tietenberg 2000). Over the past two decades, there have

been several examples of economic incentive programs implemented in the United

States and abroad for the purpose of managing water resources. Economic incentives have been used to reallocate scarce water resources to improve fish and

wildlife habitat, improve water quality, and increase municipal water supplies. 

Policies and

Programs for

Managing Water

Resources
18

Taxes and Subsidies

The goal of any incentive program is to modify existing market conditions to reflect

the true scarcity or value of a good or to reflect the damages caused by excessive

use of a good. In the case of water, economic incentives might include price adjustments, such as taxes and subsidies, and quantity controls that establish clear property rights to water by using marketable permits or transferable quotas that can be

traded in water markets. Both approaches can be used as management tools to

encourage both conservation and water quality improvements (Crase and others

2000, Lovell and others 2000, Weinberg and others 1993, Yoscowitz 1999). Welldesigned economic incentive programs targeted toward specific individuals or firms

often can preclude more expensive prescribed command and control actions mandated by water management agencies. 

Taxes and subsidies are used to adjust the price of a good to either encourage or

discourage its use to obtain a desired level of use. A well-designed tax essentially

raises the price of a good by an amount equal to the external costs associated with

use of the good not accounted for in the marketplace. For example, in the case of

nonpoint sources of pollution, such as agricultural runoff from irrigation, where individuals or firms responsible for the resulting water pollution cannot be identified,

water managers might impose a tax on water use that reflects the marginal damage

associated with negative externalities such as water pollution or diminishment of

fish habitat. Because such a tax essentially would increase the price of water,

users would be encouraged to conserve water, and there would be less pollution

from agricultural runoff. Subsidies work in the opposite way, by reducing the price

of a good to encourage its use. For example, policymakers might subsidize investments in water-saving technologies, such as more efficient appliances, to encourage

their use. Subsidies might take the form of direct transfers of money, tax rebates, or

low-interest loans and effectively decrease the cost of water-saving technologies to

individuals. 

In many cases, taxes and subsidies can result in the same target outcome in terms

of obtaining optimal resource use; however, the distributional and equity impacts

on welfare—who gains, who loses, and by how much—will differ. Some economists

also recommend caution as to the use of subsidies, especially for achieving pollution control goals. Although subsidies can be effective at reducing emissions of individual firms, they have the potential to make an industry more profitable, enticing

the entrance of additional firms to the industry, thus increasing total industry-wide

emissions (Baumol and Oates 1988). 

Tietenberg (1990) and Ekins (1999) provide several examples of the use of taxes

and subsidies in water resource management, most of which are from Europe. For

example, emission charges for effluent are being used to control water pollution in

France, Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands. The design of such programs can be

altered to achieve equity goals as well as use or discharge goals. By equity goals,

Tietenberg is referring to equating marginal costs and marginal benefits among

firms as opposed to efficiency goals that just aim to reduce pollution at the least

cost, no matter how much each individual’s costs may differ. In Germany, for example, dischargers are required to pay a fee on every unit of emissions. If dischargers

meet or exceed effluent standards, they pay only half the normal discharge fee.
19

Water Markets,

Marketable Use

Permits, and

Transferable Quotas

The fee forces dischargers to recognize that their polluting actions carry a cost and

provides an incentive to reduce emissions. The fee reduction offered to dischargers

meeting or exceeding effluent standards provides an added incentive to improve.

Many countries use the revenue generated from such fees to fund improvements in

water quality, subsidize installation of pollution-reduction equipment, and compensate victims harmed by pollution. 

It is also possible to implement taxes and subsidies in combination to simultaneously provide disincentives for one action and incentives for another. In a nonwater-related example of this “carrot and stick” approach, the Swedish government

charged citizens a tax for cars purchased without catalytic converters and issued

subsidies for cars purchased with catalytic converters, to increase the rate of 

purchase of cars with catalytic converters in Sweden (Tietenberg 1990). 

The lack of clearly defined property rights in natural resource use often is one

source of externalities (Baumol and Oates 1988). In the case of water, externalities

often are associated with declines in water quality or excessive use of water that

can limit water available to other potential users or can adversely impact riparian

species if too little water is left for the maintenance of instream habitat. The absence

of clearly defined property rights for water via ownership or rental agreement has

meant that historical priority and allotments, rather than prices, have determined

water use (Dales 1968, Weinberg and others 1993). As a result, water typically has

not been allocated to those uses of highest value nor has it been used conservatively. For example, water in a river may be perceived or treated as a common

good because no single person owns the river. In such cases, individual water

users may have little incentive to expend time and money on management practices

or technologies that will minimize degradation of water quality or conserve water,

because only downstream users will reap these benefits. If individual users were

able to gain from investments in conservation or improving water quality, they would

be more willing to make those investments. 

One way to encourage more efficient use of water is to establish clearly defined,

enforceable property rights that can be freely traded among water users in competitive open markets. This would create more competitive market conditions.

Marketable permits and individual transferable quotas have been used to protect 

air and water quality, and fish stocks since the mid-1970s (Tietenberg 1990). Water

markets can be used to improve water quality (Howitt 1994, Lovell and others 2000,

Weinberg and others 1993) and to maximize the economic value of scarce water

through conservation and trading (Crase and others 2000, Yoskowitz 1999). Water

markets enable the price of water to be determined in the marketplace and results

in an allocation of water to its highest and best use. Assigning property rights for

common property and open access goods such as water (or air and some fisheries)

can reduce negative externalities associated with the overuse or misuse of community goods. 

Assigning property rights to water that was previously treated as a common property

resource, or enabling free trading of existing property rights, enables individuals who

own those rights to gain from water quality improvements or conservation, thus providing incentives for innovation (McLean 1997). Firms are given the freedom to find
the least costly manner in which to comply with their permit or quota. Such systems

can reduce the societal costs of obtaining water quality or conservation goals and

can be more efficient than prescribing one management strategy for all users. Water

markets also can result in lower administrative costs and do not have the direct

income-reducing consequences of taxes and regulations. For water markets to be

successful, however, water rights initially must be assigned to water users and must

be freely transferable or tradable among users, and transaction costs associated

with trading must be minimal. 

Related economic tools include marketable use permits and individual transferable

quotas that have been used to protect air and water quality and fish stocks since 

the 1970s (Tietenberg 1990). These programs assign “property rights” to what was

previously a common property good with the intent of providing owners of the right

the potential to gain from either conservation of the good or reductions in externalities associated with use of the good. Marketable use permits and transferable quotas

provide incentives for innovation that reduce the costs associated with achieving

emission standards or meeting conservation goals (McLean 1997). 

A significant obstacle to the establishment of water markets has been the nature 

of water rights established during the settlement of the Western United States (Van

Kooten 1993). Western water law generally required that water rights holders use

their water toward certain well-defined “beneficial uses,” which tended to include

out-of-stream uses, such as irrigation, but not include instream uses, such as maintaining habitat for fish. Some observers suggest that such early definitions of beneficial uses of water under the Prior Appropriation doctrine, in combination with

subsidized water projects designed to induce development in Western States, have

contributed to wasteful water practices, environmental degradation, overcapitalization of marginal agricultural lands, and have exacerbated water shortages (Graff 

and Yardas 1998). Owing to the “use it or lose it” nature of water rights, many users

overconsume the resource simply to maintain their legal rights to its use (Graff and

Yardas 1998). Western water law developed and evolved in response to specific

factors faced by Western settlers. In recent years, Western water law has been

slowly changing and adapting to provide incentives for wiser use of water in arid

regions. Many Western States have redefined beneficial uses of water to include

instream uses. 

For example, until recently, Oregon law stipulated that a water rights holder had to

use their water at least once out of every 5 years or it would be considered forfeited

or subject to cancellation (Oregon Water Resources Department 1997). In the past,

leaving the water in the stream would result in the holder losing the water right.

However, Oregon has recently changed its water law to include instream flow uses

of water as a “beneficial use.” This allows irrigators to sell or lease their water rights

for use in augmenting instream flows. This is beneficial for improvements in water

quality, fish and wildlife habitat, and instream recreation uses of water. Such changes

have enabled markets for water rights to emerge whereby water rights can be purchased or sold specifically for maintaining instream flows. Both long-term and shortterm water rights markets have emerged. This change in policy has encouraged

20
21

greater conservation of agricultural water for instream uses and allowed opportunities for water markets to emerge. These water markets have in turn allowed for

the reallocation of scarce water resources via voluntary, compensated transfers in

the marketplace rather than by regulatory or judicial intervention (Graff and Yardas

1998). Gillian and Brown (1997) provide a more complete discussion of instream

flows and water law and management.

One of the major purchasers of water rights for instream uses has been the U.S.

government. Congress has budgeted money to purchase water in several states for

the purpose of increasing instream flows for fish and wildlife habitat, recreation, and

water quality, and a few states are taking advantage of this money. For example, in

1990 Congress authorized $11.7 million for the procurement of agricultural water

rights for wetland restoration in the Lahotan Valley of Nevada, which is home to the

Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge, Stillwater Wildlife Management Area, Carson

Lake, and Fallon Tribal Wetlands. These wetlands are important stopovers on the

Pacific Flyway (Lovell and others 2000). As of September 1997, 40 water rights had

been purchased that totaled 18,960 acre-feet. The current price offered for these

rights is approximately $500 per acre-foot or $1,750 per acre. Most of these water

rights are purchased from agriculture, which in most Western States account for 

80 percent of the water consumed (Graff and Yardas 1998). 

More recently, in 1996 the U.S. Department of the Interior and three counties in

Nevada allocated $24 million to purchase water rights primarily from agriculture

(Lovell and others 2000). These water rights are being used to increase instream

flows in the Truckee River, which will improve water quality by increasing the assimilative capacity of the river. The goal is to acquire 24,000 acre-feet from agricultural

water rights holders, for an average of $1,000 per acre-foot. Purchasing water rights

from agricultural landowners is expected to have the added advantage of reducing

nonpoint source pollution from these lands. Compared to a simple reduction in water

supply to agriculture, an environmental water market can mitigate the economic

losses borne by rural communities as a result of water reallocations because farmers

will receive compensation for using less water. The results of a survey of waterrights sellers indicate that the lowest value water rights are being transferred to the

public sector, a result consistent with economic efficiency (Lovell and others 2000,

p. 26).

Prior to the significant water shortages during 2001, farmers in the Klamath Lakes

region of south-central Oregon and northern California were interested in entering

into a similar agreement to help reduce the demand for scarce water in the Klamath

Project (Quinn 2000). The Klamath Project is an irrigation system developed by the

federal Bureau of Reclamation in 1906. The project drained marshes for agriculture

and constructed canals and delivery systems from three lakes and two rivers in the

area to deliver water to 240,000 acres of dried lakebeds. Recently, it was determined

that more water was needed in the Upper Klamath Lake to protect endangered Lost

River and shortnose suckers and in the Klamath River to protect threatened coho

salmon. Prior to 2001, farmers in the Klamath Basin had offered to sell 30,300 acres

that include water rights to the federal government for $5,000 per acre (Quinn

2000). 
In another example, Congress allocated $500,000 to the Little Applegate Streamflow

and Fish Habitat Improvement Project to transfer senior water rights, some dating

back to 1854, from the Little Applegate River in Oregon to the Applegate Lake. This

enables water to be left in the Little Applegate River for instream use to improve streamflow and aquatic habitat. Landowners along the Little Applegate River annually

divert about 14.5 cubic feet per second to irrigate about 580 acres. During summer

irrigation seasons, virtually all flow is diverted. The Applegate River Watershed

Council has coordinated the project with farmers on the Little Applegate River and

other interested parties, including the USDA Forest Service, USDI Bureau of Land

Management, and the Oregon Water Trust. The river provides habitat for a variety 

of fish species including steelhead, Chinook salmon, coho salmon, cutthroat and

rainbow trout, and Pacific lamprey. Restoring streamflow to this river is expected to

greatly improve aquatic habitat, especially in summer when the absence of precipitation combined with withdrawals for irrigation reduce streamflow dramatically. 

The Oregon Water Trust itself also is involved in various projects offering incentives

to water rights holders to convert consumptive water rights to instream water rights.

The trust acquires water rights by purchase, lease, and donation. The trust also

provides cost-share assistance to water rights holders to fund irrigation efficiency

projects. In some cases, landowners willing to give up certain water rights are compensated for livestock feed that they can no longer produce. In taking advantage of

such incentives, water rights holders are able to gain income from the sale of water

rights for marginally productive areas or can be eligible for tax breaks associated

with permanent donations of water rights to the Trust.

Metropolitan water districts also procure water rights. For example, in 1998 the

Metropolitan Water District of Southern California negotiated with the Imperial

Irrigation District for the purchase of a long-term right to divert 100,000 acre-feet 

of water annually in exchange for $100 million in water conservation projects in the

Imperial Valley. As metropolitan water demands grow, such transactions are likely 

to become more common in the future. 

Markets for short-term water rights also are becoming common in the West. In

California, the Central Valley Improvement Act allows farmers to sell up to 20 percent of their contract water without approval of their local water district. Thus, for the

first time, the property right to the first 20 percent of contract water has been vested

directly to individual users. This change substantially increases the potential supply

of marketable water (Howitt 1994) and provides an added incentive for irrigators to

conserve water for possible sale.

An active spot market for water also exists along the Rio Grande River in Texas,

which has many of the characteristics of a perfectly competitive market (Yoskowitz

1999). Prices for water are negotiated between buyers and sellers depending on

demand and supply conditions. Between 1993 and 1998, an average of 251 transactions took place each year among the more than 800 individuals holding water

rights. Water rights transactions are facilitated free of charge by a “water master”

who brings together potential buyers and sellers, resulting in relatively low transaction costs. A key component to the success of the spot market for water along the

Rio Grande is that water rights are well defined, enforceable, and transferable

(Yoskowitz 1999).

22
The idea of using property rights for pollution control is attributed to Dales (1968).

Dales suggested that the least costly means of pollution control would be to set a

desired level of pollution (below the current conditions) and issue pollution rights to

individual dischargers. Each individual discharging pollution must hold a right to do

so. Dischargers who possess unneeded rights, owing to technical innovation (e.g.,

installation of new, cleaner technologies) or changes in management, can sell those

rights to other dischargers who require additional rights. In this way the market

establishes a price for pollution that individuals respond to by finding the least costly

way to reduce discharges. Because pollution rights have a value, polluters have an

incentive to find the least costly way to reduce pollution. 

In Dales’ (1968) vision, anyone would be able to buy pollution rights even if individuals had no pollution to discharge. This facet of the pollution rights system would

enable environmental groups to purchase rights to pollute, thus reducing the total

amount of pollution that could occur. However, many environmentalists have

opposed the idea of creating markets for pollution, because they see the programs

as authorizing or endorsing the right to pollute. Others, such as the Environmental

Defense Fund, have argued that implementation of pollution markets are an

improvement over traditional command-and-control regulations that essentially 

give away the right to pollute for free (McLean 1997). 

Pollution markets have been most commonly implemented to manage air quality.

For example, Clean Air Act amendments in 1990 created the sulfur dioxide allowance program to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions. Sulfur dioxide emissions by

primarily coal-fired electrical plants have been implicated in the acidification of

lakes and rivers in North America and in Europe. The program represents the first

statutorily mandated, national, market-based approach to environmental management (McLean 1997). The program was implemented in 1995 by the Environmental

Protection Agency. 

The program was set up so that a maximum of 8.95 million tons of sulfur dioxide

could be emitted annually in total. Each polluter was allocated a specified amount 

of sulfur dioxide they could emit. New potential polluters were not allocated any

emission allowances and must purchase allowances from existing allowance holders. Firms able to reduce their emissions are given credit for those reductions and

can sell or bank emission rights for another year. Firms not in compliance are penalized $2,000 per ton exceeded. Few trades occurred during the first years of the

program, but the market-based program provided incentives for technical innovation.

For example, some firms began blending coals of varying sulfur content or switched

entirely to low-sulfur coal, whose price had fallen substantially over the previous 5

years. Such innovation was thought to be impractical just a few years ago (Burstraw

1996). Initial cost estimates of full compliance by 2010 were $5 billion per year if no

trading of pollution permits were permitted, and $4 billion per year with unrestricted

trading. However, technological innovation has enabled firms to adapt to tighter

emission standards, and helped reduce compliance costs to about $2 billion per

year (McLean 1997). 

23

Pollution Markets
Often a combination of economic incentives can be used. For example, the Broadview

Water District in the San Joaquin Valley of California used a combination of three

economic incentives to motivate improvements in irrigation practices among farmers

to reduce agricultural drainage water (Wichlens 1991, Wichelns and others 1996).

The first incentive involved issuing water allotments (or rights) to farmers based on

their acreage within the district. These rights could be traded among users so that

farmers not using all of their water allotment are able to sell unused allotments to

others, thus creating an incentive to conserve. Farmers needing more water than

their initial allotment are able to buy water from other farmers in the district, other

water districts in the region, and the California Drought Water Bank, a statewide

water rights exchange. 

The second incentive involved implementing a crop-specific tiered water-pricing 

program. The price of water was based on historical water deliveries that reflected

the evapotranspiration, leaching requirements, and cultural treatments associated

with different crops. The first tier allowed farmers to purchase water at the usual

price. If farmers exceeded 90 percent of historical water applications for a particular

crop, however, all water above that level would be charged roughly 2.5 times the

usual price. The increased price charged for the last units of water consumed 

provided an incentive to conserve. 

The third economic incentive involved implementing a subsidy for investing in

improved irrigation technologies. Funds provided by the California State Water

Resources Control Board and money collected from the tiered pricing program

allowed the water district to offer low-interest loans to farmers willing to invest in

water-saving irrigation systems. The subsidy enabled farmers who were not growing

high-value crops to overcome the financial constraints associated with converting to

more expensive water-saving irrigation systems. 

Irrigation and drainage data collected in the Broadview Water District during implementation of the three economic incentive programs suggest that the district was

successful in motivating farm-level improvements in water management and in

reducing drain water volume (Wichelns and others 1996). By the fourth year of the

program, many of the farmers were able to adapt their irrigation regimes to grow

their crops without purchasing water at the higher tier.

The Western United States is characterized by relatively intense competition for 

limited water resources. Increasing human populations coupled with growing concerns for maintaining ecological processes contribute to increased demand and

increased competition for limited water resources. In the Pacific Northwest, water

affects and is affected by socioeconomic as well as biophysical and ecological

processes. These processes function at local, regional, national, and global scales

and are affected by local, regional, national, and global demographic trends, changes

in land use and land cover, changing economic conditions, and changing human

values. An appreciation of these trends is essential for resolving existing and future

water-related issues and conflicts. 

24

Combining Several

Economic Incentives 

Changing

Socioeconomic

Context of Water

Management
25

Macro Socioeconomic

Trends

Demands on water likely will continue to grow in the future and will be driven in

large part by global population growth. The world’s population is projected to grow

from 6 billion in 2000 to about 9 billion by 2050 (United Nations 1999). Growing

human populations and their use and consumption of the Earth’s natural resources

are placing more pressure on the ecological systems of the planet. The United

States population also continues to grow, particularly in the South and West, and

is projected to increase by more than 120 million people by 2050 (USDC Bureau of

the Census 1996). Socioeconomic trends already are affecting options for maintaining and restoring ecosystems, and will continue to affect the supply and demand of

ecosystem-based goods and services. 

For example, the U.S. population is aging. Early in the 20th century, 1 in 25 Americans

was over age 65. By 1990, 1 in 8 was over 65, and this ratio will decline further (USDC

Bureau of the Census 1996). The aging of the population is a key factor leading to

increased mobility of the population as a whole as older residents relocate during

retirement. Such relocations are an important source of in-migration in many regions

of the country and can result in significant regional land use and socioeconomic

change. Americans’ personal incomes also have grown substantially during the

second half of the 20th century, and personal incomes in the Pacific Northwest have

increased even more relative to the national average. Projected increases in new

retirees and discretionary income will increase demands for renewable resources

and could lead to further conversion of forests and other parts of coastal ecosystems

to residential, commercial, and industrial uses. 

The United States has experienced significant economic growth in recent years,

with the stock markets experiencing relatively large gains in the 1990s. Wealthier

nations are more likely to have a greater ability to accommodate restoration and

maintenance of ecosystems than those under serious economic stress. Some

development patterns resulting from economic growth, however, may increase 

vulnerability of land-based systems in spite of greater wealth. Growing and increasingly wealthy populations could increase both development pressure and recreational use stresses on forests, wetlands, and riparian areas. 

Many economic sectors of the United States also are in the midst of rapid changes

and advancements in technology. New information technologies have affected

industrial and residential use of water, as well as agricultural production, and the 

forest sector to a lesser degree. Socioeconomic conditions will influence how technology is disseminated, and this will affect how well the Pacific Northwest and the

Nation can effect improvements in water resource stewardship. The rapidly changing technological environment is part of a broader changing environment that can

provide opportunities as well as challenges to resource managers and policymakers.

The U.S. population increasingly is located near coastal areas, and this trend likely

will intensify pressure on associated coastal ecosystems that are a crucial link in

water cycles. Fifty-three percent of the U.S. population lives on the 17 percent of

land located in the coastal zone, and the largest projected population increases

over the next several decades are in coastal areas. The majority of the 20 fastest

growing counties and cities in the United States are in coastal areas. Such trends

need to be factored into research planning, given implications for fish habitat, other

riparian areas, wetlands, and recreational opportunities. For example, more than
half of the threatened and endangered species in the Southeast United States

depend on wetlands, as do 75 percent of forest bird species. Half of the region’s wetlands, however, have been converted to other uses. The relocation of assets to

coastal areas could complicate the rehabilitation of ecosystems for threatened

and endangered species, such as Pacific coast salmon, as well as increase vulnerability of coastal areas to extreme events that some suggest may be associated with

climate change (U.S. Department of State 1997).

The potential for climate change and associated disturbance patterns are additional

factors confounding socioeconomic changes. Although it is difficult to predict the

magnitude and timing of these environmental changes, climate change has important socioeconomic implications arising from its causes, possible impacts, and any

adaptation or mitigation strategies or policies (see, for example, Frederick and

Gleick 1999; Hurd and others 1999a, 1999b). An integrated research program dealing with water resource stewardship should address human dimensions of global 

climate change, so that society would then be better able to project the influence of

humans on these events and the likely impacts that these climatic events will have

on humans and water systems.

In a global context, the United States is a relatively large consumer of natural

resources and is the world’s leading producer and exporter of wood and wood 

products. The multiple production possibilities from forests and grasslands involve

compatibility issues, as the U.S. domestic forest-based contributions include

waterflows, wildlife, recreation, and other ecosystem services, in the face of competing and complementary demands and uses. 

At a regional level, the Pacific Northwest has experienced gradual but steady

socioeconomic change in recent years. For example, Oregon’s population increased

from 2.0 million in 1970, to 2.6 million in 1980, and to a projected 3.4 million in 2000

(McGinnis and others 1996). Washington’s population increased from 3.4 million in

1970, to 4.1 million in 1980, and to a projected 5.6 million in 2000 (McGinnis and

others 1997). Oregon’s population is projected to be 4.0 million by 2015 and 4.3 million by 2025. Washington’s population is projected to be 7.0 million by 2015 and 7.8

million by 2025 (USDC Bureau of the Census 1996). Increasing populations can result

in increasing demands for water in all uses. Although much of this growth is projected to occur in the western regions of both states, at least some predominantly

rural eastern counties will experience significant growth as well. For example, in

Oregon, Deschutes County, located on the eastern slope of the Cascade Range,

currently is one of the fastest growing counties in the state. 

As population has grown, it has gradually become more urban. For example,

between 1980 and 1990, the number of Oregonians living in metropolitan areas of

the state increased 14 percent, while the number living in nonmetropolitan areas

decreased by 3 percent (McGinnis and others 1996). In Washington, from 1980 to

1990, the number of people living in metropolitan areas increased 20 percent, while

the number living in nonmetropolitan areas increased by 8 percent (McGinnis and

26

Regional

Socioeconomic and

Land Use Trends
27

others 1997). By 1990, metropolitan residents accounted for 69 percent of Oregon’s

population and 83 percent of Washington’s population. Increasing numbers of urban

residents relative to rural residents can lead to increased demands for municipal

water supplies. Increasing urbanization also may be accompanied by increasing

demands for outdoor recreation and the protection of forest amenities and wildlife.

Population growth will increase demands for water, and this increases the likelihood

that water markets in the Northwest will be further developed in the future. Markets

for water are generally not as well developed in the Northwest as in some other

parts of the country, especially for areas near large cities in arid settings such as

Denver. Markets for water may become more developed in the Northwest as

demands and concerns grow involving both water quantity and quality. The different

scales at which markets interact with biophysical and ecological processes is an

important part of understanding those processes and should be considered in

research planning and large-scale conservation efforts. Examination of impacts on

consumers and producers should be integrated in the research program, drawing

upon principles of welfare economics. The example of proposals to remove Snake

River dams illustrates that urban and rural residents may be affected quite differently

by water resource management alternatives. Identifying those who gain or lose

should be factored into research planning, so that better information is available 

to resource managers and policymakers when alternatives are considered.

Population growth also will affect the future water resource policy environment in 

the Pacific Northwest by inducing land use change resulting from the conversion of

forest and farmland to urban uses (Alig and Healy 1987; Kline and Alig 1999, 2001).

Urban expansion and associated issues are receiving increased attention around

the Nation. In the Pacific Northwest, about 250,000 acres of forest were converted 

to urban and developed uses between 1982 and 1992 (USDA NRCS 1996). Oregon

and Washington’s populations have increased faster than the national average over

the last decade, and both states have experienced relatively strong economic growth

in the 1990s. Most of the population increase was in the western part of the region,

especially along the Interstate 5 corridor (Zheng and Alig 1999). In Oregon alone,

70 percent of the state’s 3.4 million people live in the Willamette Valley, with the

valley population expected to grow by 1.3 million new residents in the next 40

years (McGinnis and others 1996, 1997). 

Projected population growth will motivate increasing interest in examining where

land use changes are most likely to affect forests and the goods and services that

forests provide throughout the region. Urbanization may cause the forest land base

to become more fragmented, impacting ecosystem conditions and economic outputs

(Alig and others 2000). Conversion of forest land to developed uses essentially is a

permanent change leading to permanent fragmentation of the landscape, in contrast

to forest cutting where regrowth and succession may replace temporary fragmentation. Ecological impacts from conversion to urban and developed uses could

include altered waterflows from more impervious surface area. As a population

becomes more urban and wealthier, the area of paved and residential areas will

increase, with the latter having implications for water runoff that may include lawn

fertilizers and other chemicals. 
Population growth is accompanied by potentially changing attitudes and demands

toward forests and forest management. A growing number of social scientists

believe the Nation is experiencing rapid and significant change in forest values

(Bengston 1994) and attitudes concerning forest management (Davis and others

1991, Schindler and others 1993). Egan and Luloff (2000) observe that in many

places of the United States, urbanites are migrating to rural areas seeking to

improve their quality of life. These exurbanites are bringing with them different attitudes, needs, and values than those of long-term residents. Egan and Luloff call it

the “exurbanization” of America’s forests. The process is manifested in changing

attitudes regarding the use and management of forests, and a push for forestry

policies and practices that reflect changing forest values (Egan and Luloff 2000).

Changing attitudes can result in changing demands for water in various uses as

well as alter the political environment in which forest and water management and

policy are framed. 

There is a need to evaluate what current regional socioeconomic and land use

trends imply about potential future water demands in the Pacific Northwest. This

includes assessing potential future demands for water in various uses and identifying potential conflicts between specific uses. For example, society has spent billions

of dollars on salmon restoration in spite of substantial information gaps, including

information about the public’s willingness to trade salmon protection for other water

uses such as irrigation and power generation. Opportunities exist for improved integration of socioeconomic and ecological information to analyze the implications of

alternative water resource management scenarios. 

More than a century ago through the Organic Act of 1897, Congress directed that

“No national forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest

within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of waterflows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of 

citizens of the United States (USDA Forest Service 1998).” Although in recent

decades, focus has been on the Organic Act’s provision for timber production, less

understood has been the act’s focus on watershed protection. In fact, the need to

protect water supplies and control floods was the driving force behind the Organic

Act and other early forest legislation. The emphasis on watershed protection is consistent with the fact that today the national forests contain several municipal watersheds, and 80 percent of the Nation’s freshwater sources originate on national forest

land (USDA Forest Service 1998). A potential research interest in water resource

issues, management, and policy within the USDA Forest Service is not without

reason. 

Information about the interactions among streamflow regimes, forest and agricultural

conditions, industrial and residential conditions, aquatic and riparian ecological conditions, and waterflow modifications by humans tends to be fragmented. Basic data,

such as water cycle data, are needed to facilitate the development of water management alternatives that are biophysically possible, economically efficient, and socially

acceptable. Information characterizing relations between waterflows and ecological

processes are needed to evaluate the implications of alternative management scenarios on habitat for terrestrial and aquatic species. Socioeconomic research needs

28

Trends in Public

Attitudes and

Preferences

Research Needs
to be incorporated early in the conceptual design and planning of watershed research

programs, and should be augmented with participatory monitoring and evaluation

methods throughout a program or project cycle (Brooks and Eckman 2000). New

databases are needed to evaluate tradeoffs among the multiple allocations and

uses of water, and to inform resource managers regarding the joint socioeconomic

and ecological implications of alternative water resource management strategies.

Tradeoffs among alternative uses need to be analyzed in the face of competing

uses, including broader consideration of substitutes and complements in the use of

water while recognizing the dynamics of the land base, demographics, and society. 

Specific needed research includes:

• Examine and describe relations between the timing and location of water and 

specific water uses, such as irrigation, power generation, and recreation, and

maintenance of ecological processes and habitat for nonhuman terrestrial and

aquatic species.

• Examine human dimensions of sustainable development in watershed management, with consideration of trends of change, spatial scale of impacts (extent and

intensity, for example), and temporal dimensions (duration and frequency, for

example). 

• Identify existing and potential conflicts associated with different water uses and

maintenance of ecological processes involving federal forest management, and

identify and evaluate potential policies and management strategies for alleviating

or mitigating such conflicts.

• Identify and evaluate policies and management strategies that will most 

efficiently and effectively meet societal demands for water, including investment

components. 

Future water research and policy will face new challenges in attempting to balance

management of social, economic, and ecological components. Socioeconomic

trends suggest that improvements in decision support are warranted to help managers and policymakers identify options, implications, and policies for allocating

water in an increasingly competitive environment. This includes improved analytical

processes, tools, and possibly institutions to develop innovative methods for analyzing the benefits, costs, tradeoffs, and risks associated with water resource management alternatives. This effort must be built on a strong foundation of how biophysical,

ecological, and socioeconomic systems work and their key interrelations. 

This research was funded by the Water Sustainability Initiative, USDA Forest

Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station, Portland, Oregon. We thank Rich

Adams, Gwen Aldrich, Tom Brown, Kelly Burnett, Fred Everest, Brian Hurd, and

Deanna Stouder for helpful comments.

When you know: Multiply by: To find:

Acres 0.405 Hectares

Acre-feet 0.123 Hectare-meters

Tons .907 Megagrams (tonnes)

29

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Definitions are taken from Gwartney and Stroup (1980), unless otherwise noted. 

Competition—A term that denotes rivalry or competitiveness between parties 

(for example, producers or input suppliers), each of which seeks to deliver 

a better deal to buyers when quality, price, and product information are all 

considered. Competing implies a lack of collusion among sellers.

Consumers’ surplus—The difference between consumers’ aggregate willingness 

to pay for a good and their aggregate actual payments for the good (Hirshleifer

1984).

Demand, the law of—A principle that states that there will be a negative relation 

between the price of a good and the amount of it buyers are willing to purchase.

Diminishing marginal utility, law of—A basic economic principle that states that 

as the consumption of a commodity increases, eventually the marginal utility

derived from consuming more of the commodity (per unit of time) will decline.

Marginal utility may decline even though total utility continues to increase, albeit

at a reduced rate.

Efficiency, economic—Economizing behavior. When applied to a community, it 

implies that (a) an activity should be undertaken if the sum of the benefits 

to the individuals exceeds the sum of their cost and (b) no activity should 

be undertaken if the costs borne by the individuals exceed their benefits. 

Equilibrium—A state of balance between conflicting forces, such as supply and 

demand.

Equity—A term describing the fairness of a given resource allocation or distribution of welfare across individuals in terms of who gains and who loses.

Although general agreement is lacking on what an equitable allocation entails,

four views include (1) Egalitarian—all members of society receive equal amounts

of goods, (2) Rawlsian—the utility of the least-well-off person is maximized,

(3) Utilitarian—the total utility of all members of society is maximized and 

(4) Market-oriented—the market outcome is the most equitable (Pindyck and

Rubinfeld 1992). 

Externality—The side effects of an action that influence the well-being of nonconsenting parties. The secondary parties may be either helped (external 

benefits) or harmed (external costs).

Marginal cost—The change in total cost associated with a unit change in output.

Marginal utility—The additional utility received by a person from the consumption 

of an additional unit of a good within a given time period.

42

Appendix 1:

Glossary of

Selected

Economics 

Terms
43

Market—An abstract concept that encompasses the trading arrangements of buyers

and sellers that underlie the forces of supply and demand.

Opportunity cost—The highest valued benefit that must be sacrificed (forgone) 

as the result of choosing an alternative.

Price elasticity of demand—The percentage change in the quantity of a product 

demanded divided by the percentage change in its price.

Producers’ surplus—The difference between producers’ aggregate actual receipts 

for a good and their aggregate willingness to accept for the good (Hirshleifer

1984).

Public goods—Jointly consumed goods. When consumed by one, they are also 

made available to others. National defense, poetry, and scientific theories are 

all public goods.

Quantity demanded—The amount of a good demanded by consumers at a given 

price.

Quantity supplied— The amount of a good supplied by producers at a given price.

Supply, the law of— A principle that states that there will be a positive relation 

between the price of a good and the amount of it offered for sale by sellers.

Utility—The benefit or satisfaction expected from a choice or course of action.

Welfare—In the broadest sense, the satisfaction levels of all consumers 

(Henderson and Quandt 1980).
This annotated bibliography includes citations and abstracts from a sampling of

published environmental and natural resource economics literature. Although in

most cases we have limited the bibliography to literature specifically addressing

water, we also have included a few more general reviews of valuation methods of

relevance to water resource issues. In most cases, we have provided the published

abstracts for each entry. In cases where published abstracts were unavailable or

overly brief, we have provided our own synopsis of the paper’s content. Although

we have categorized each paper into a general topical category to provide some

order, many papers justifiably could be included in several categories.

Beare, S.D.; Bell, R.; Fisher, B.S. 1998. Determining the value of water: the role 

of risk, infrastructure constraints, and ownership. American Journal of Agricultural

Economics. 80: 916-940.

The authors examine the optimal value of irrigation water under supply and demand

uncertainty by developing an integrated economic and hydrological model of farmlevel water demand with exogenous prices. The authors use the model to evaluate

farm-level and regional values of irrigation water under several infrastructure constraints on water supply, such as dams with fixed capacity and channel flow requirements. 

Colby, B.G. 1989. Estimating the value of water in alternative uses. Natural 

Resources Journal. 29: 511-527.

A good general source describing water valuation methods.

Abstract from journal: Many public and private decisions regarding water use allocation, and management require estimation of water’s value in alternative uses. This

paper discusses economic concepts essential in valuing water, outlines and compares market and non-market based approaches used to estimate water

values, and reviews the application of these methodologies for valuing water in

instream, irrigation, municipal and industrial uses in the Western United States. 

Garrod, G.; Willis, K.G. 1999. Economic valuation of the environment. 

Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 384 p.

This book covers several environmental valuation techniques for revealed preferences and expressed preferences, including chapters addressing market price and

cost measures of valuation, travel-cost methods, hedonic price models, contingent

valuation, and discrete choice. The authors also present several examples of how

valuation methods have been applied to recreation, landscape attributes, biodiversity, water quality, and amenity values.

44

Appendix 2:

A Partial 

Annotated

Bibliography of

Water Resource 

Economics and 

Related Literature

Water Valuation

Methods
Gibbons, D.C. 1986. The economic value of water. Washington, DC: Resources for

the Future. 101 p.

A good general source describing water valuation methods. This book addresses

the value of water in various uses including municipal, irrigation, industry, waste

assimilation, recreation, navigation, and hydropower. The author discusses estimation methods and summarizes a substantial body of published and unpublished

literature on the value of and demand for water in various sectors. The author suggests that “The study offers strong evidence of the shortcomings of a tradition

which assumes that offstream water uses are insensitive to price and warrant 

priority over all instream uses” (p. viii). 

Knaff, E. 1991. The economic value of water. Working Paper No. 7. St. Paul, MN: 

Metropolitan Council. 20 p.

The author discusses interdependency among water uses and the importance of

scarcity in determining the value of water. 

Marcouiller, D.W. 1999. The economic value of water: an introduction. Madison, 

WI: University of Wisconsin, Cooperative Extension. 6 p.

The author describes and categorizes several use and nonuse values of water in

layperson language. The author suggests that the best way to determine how people

value water is to determine how people use water. Use values are separated into

direct use and ecological function values. The ecological function values include

flood control, carbon storage, water storage, waste assimilation and ecological

diversity. Direct use values are categorized as either marketed outputs or unpriced

benefits. Marketed outputs include crops, meat and fish, timber, renewable energy,

and industrial uses. Unpriced benefits include recreation, landscape attributes, and

aesthetics. The author categorizes nonuse values as future option values, existence

values and bequest values. Benefits from future drugs, potential gene pools, and

recreational options are examples of future option values. Existence values derive

simply from the satisfaction one receives from knowing that a resource exists.

Bequest value is the benefit one receives from passing on benefits to future 

generations.

Oates, W.E. 1992. The economics of the environment. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar

Publishing Company. 605 p.

The book is a collection of articles written from 1968 to 1991 addressing a variety 

of environmental economics issues. Included in one section are several articles

addressing the measurement of benefits and costs associated with various environmental amenities, outdoor recreation, pollution control, and water quality using a

variety of valuation methods. 

45
Adelsman, H.R.; Bloomgren, P.A. 1987. The economic value of water. St. Paul, 

MN: Department of Natural Resources, Division of Waters. 22 p.

The authors determine the value of water in Minnesota. The authors suggest that

the value of water changes as a function of “to whom” the value accrues and scarcity.

The authors suggest that determining the value of water in Minnesota is complicated

because water has so many uses and therefore many values depending on use. To

simplify valuation, the authors group uses into economic production and recreation

categories. Economic production values are determined by using input-output and

linear programming models to evaluate the economic impacts of water supply constraints and production technologies. Recreation values are separated into market

and nonmarket values and were estimated by using surveys addressing willingness

to pay for recreational trips and annual expenditures of respondents on water

recreation. 

Brown, T.C.; Harding, B.L.; Payton, E. 1990. Marginal economic value of streamflow: a case study for the Colorado River basin. Water Resources Research.

26: 2845-2859.

Abstract from journal: The marginal economic value of streamflow leaving forested

areas in the Colorado River Basin was estimated by determining the impact on

water use of a small change in streamflow and then applying economic value estimates to the water use changes. The effect on water use of a change in streamflow

was estimated with a network flow model that simulated salinity levels and the routing of flow to consumptive uses and hydroelectric dams throughout the Basin. The

results show that, under current water management institutions, the marginal value

of streamflow in the Colorado River Basin is largely determined by nonconsumptive

water uses, principally energy production, rather than by consumptive agricultural or

municipal uses. The analysis demonstrates the importance of a systems framework

in estimating the marginal value of streamflow.

Griffin, R.C.; Tanyeri-Abur, A. 1989. Case studies on the value of water in Texas. 

DIR 89-1 SP-5. College Station, TX: Texas Agricultural Experiment Station, Texas

A&M University. 40 p.

The authors review several studies examining water values, with a focus on those

estimating marginal and average water prices by using water demand models. 

Romm, J.M.; Ewing, A.; Yen, S.J.; Haberman, R. 1987. The economic value of 

water in national forest management. In: Proceedings of the California watershed

management conference. Davis, CA: University of California, Wildland

Resources Center: 89-102. 

Abstract from proceedings: This paper identifies the economic values of water in 

the National Forest System of California and institutional factors that influence their

effect on Forest Management. The estimated values of forest water range from 0 to

$320 per acre-foot among broad areas of the National Forest System and are highest in the southern and central Sierras and in Southern California. Although relatively

46

Empirical 

Examples of 

Water Valuation

General and 

Multiuse Values
47

uniform water values have been used in Forest plans, growing interdependence

among State and Federal resource interests and capacities is raising and diversifying these values. Water supply will consequently emerge as an explicit objective of

National Forest Management and a dominant objective in some areas.

Rosenberger, R.S.; Loomis, J.B. 2000. Using meta-analysis for benefit transfer: 

in-sample convergent validity tests of an outdoor recreation database. Water

Resources Research. 36: 1097-1107.

Abstract from journal: The application of metaregression analysis models for the

purpose of benefit transfer is investigated using in-sample convergent validity tests

on average value transfers. The database on which the metaregression analysis

models are developed is composed of empirical outdoor recreation use value studies

conducted from 1967 through 1998. Results of the convergent validity tests suggest

that the national model is slightly more robust to changes in application than the

Census Region models. The results suggest that the application of meta-analysis

for benefit transfers is promising considering limitations imposed by inconsistent

data reporting of original studies.

Thomas, J.W.; Huffman, R.E.; Grace, C.T. [and others]. 1962. The value of water 

in alternative uses: with special application to water use in the San Juan and Rio

Grande basins of New Mexico. Albuquerque, NM: The University of New Mexico

Press. 426 p.

The authors determine the economic effects of different patterns of water use in the

state. Impacts on gross state product are estimated for agriculture, municipal and

industrial, and recreational uses. 

Young, R.A.; Gray, S.L. 1972. Economic value of water: concepts and empirical 

estimates. Fort Collins, CO: Department of Economics, Colorado State

University. 347 p.

Abstract from report: Conceptually valid and empirically sound estimates of water

values are essential for rational allocation of water among uses and users over time.

The study was divided into two parts. In the first part, a number of issues are examined that must be taken into account in deriving conceptually valid estimates of the

values of water. These issues include (1) defining the quantity of water used in both

instream and withdrawal uses, (2) assuring comparability of use in terms of time,

location and quality, (3) maintaining a distinction between long run and short run

values where water is used for production of consumer goods. The second part of

the study involves analysis of water values for various uses with attention to regional

differences. This analysis employs the conceptual approach developed initially and

considers numerous previous studies from an exhaustive literature review. The

water uses considered are municipal, industrial, irrigation, waste assimilation, 

recreation, fish and wildlife, navigation and hydroelectric production.
Faux, J.; Perry, G.M. 1999. Estimating irrigation water value using hedonic price 

analysis: a case study in Malheur County, Oregon. Land Economics. 75: 440-452.

Abstract from journal: Hedonic price analysis is applied to agricultural land sales to

reveal the implicit market price of water in irrigation. This provides price information,

where otherwise absent, which can facilitate reallocation of water supplies to meet

growing demands. The failure to include available information on soil quality, an

important determinant of agricultural land value, results in erroneous conclusions.

Joint testing of heteroskedasticity and functional form is demonstrated. The value 

of irrigation water in this location is estimated at $9 for an acre-foot on the least 

productive land irrigated, and up to $44 per acre-foot on the most productive land.

Kulshreshtha, S.N.; Brown, W.J. 1990. The economic value of water for irrigation: 

a historical perspective. Canadian Water Resources Journal. 15: 201-215.

Abstract from journal: The value of water in alternate uses is required in all situations where water allocation mechanisms have to be activated, or where conflicts in

its use develop. Irrigation being a major water user in the Prairie Provinces, as well

as in Saskatchewan, has come under some public scrutiny. In this study an historical

value of water in irrigation has been estimated using the concept of producer surplus. The value of irrigation water was estimated both from private (farmer) as well

as society’s accounting stance. The results suggest that the long-run value of water

in irrigation is positive only from the farmers’ standpoint. Under present crop mix

and cultural practices, society has not realized a positive value for irrigation water.

Kulshreshtha, S.N.; Gillies, J.A. 1994. The economic value of the South 

Saskatchewan River to the City of Saskatoon: (III) value of alternative minimum

river waterflow. Canadian Water Resources Journal. 19: 39-55.

Abstract from journal: This is the last of a three-part report on economic valuation 

of the South Saskatchewan River for the city of Saskatoon. This paper examines

the value of the river in terms of its marginal waterflow. River flow has an economic

value particularly if changes in the flow result in changes in economic benefits (or

costs). Several benefit components, such as instream recreation, power generation,

waste transport, aesthetics, water supply, and the aquatic ecosystems are associated

with instream flow. These benefits were examined in this study for the South

Saskatchewan River from a City of Saskatoon accounting perspective. Three levels

of minimum flows were examined: present flow (42.5 m3/S), reduced flows (25 m3/S)

and increased flow (100 m3/S). Three conclusions are warranted on the basis of this

study: One, that benefits from increased flow are very small, less than one percent

of the annual value of the river to the city. Two, benefits from increasing vs. decreasing the river flow are not symmetrical. In fact, those associated with increased flow

were even lower than those associated with decreased flow. Three, value of river

flow should be examined in an integrated manner, such as both benefits of using

the water within the city boundaries are considered together with those elsewhere.

These two values suggest a situation of trade-off exists. Thus, policy makers should

make explicit recognition of these values.

48

Irrigation 
49

Recreation Bergstrom, J.C.; Stoll, J.R.; Titre, J.P.; Wright, V.L. 1990. Economic value of 

wetlands-based recreation. Ecological Economics. 2: 129-147.

Abstract from journal: The loss of wetlands is an issue of growing concern. Previous

studies have focused primarily on quantifying the commercial, storm protection, and

energy-output value of wetlands. Relatively little research has been devoted to

quantifying the outdoor recreational value of wetlands. In this paper, the recreational

value of wetlands is discussed conceptually within a total economic value framework.

Total economic value contains many value components which are broadly divided

into non-use, current use, and future use values. Each of these value categories

can be further subdivided into expenditures and consumer’s surplus.

An empirical study was conducted to measure expenditures and consumer’s 

surplus associated with on-site, current recreational uses of a coastal wetlands

area. Aggregate expenditures were estimated at approximately $118 million and

aggregate consumer’s surplus was estimated at approximately $27 million. These

results suggest that the economic impacts and net economic benefits associated

with wetlands-based recreation may be considerations for wetlands policy and 

management.

Brookshire, D.S.; Smith, V.K. 1987. Measuring recreation benefits: conceptual and

empirical issues. Water Resources Research. 23: 931-935.

Abstract from journal: The focus of this special section is the conceptual and 

empirical issues associated with the development of water-based recreation benefit

estimation methodologies. The papers address two themes in the ongoing development of modeling the demand for outdoor recreation: the issues of characterizing

and estimating nonuse (existence) values and the problem of developing consistent

methodologies for modeling the household’s recreation decisions. This paper

attempts to identify and highlight the issues and interrelationships of these themes

and attempts to identify remaining research issues.

Brown, T.C.; Taylor, J.G.; Shelby, B. 1991. Assessing the direct effects of streamflow on recreation: a literature review. Water Resources Bulletin. 27: 979-988.

The authors review 25 studies that have estimated the relation between streamflow

and recreation quality. Studies are organized by the method used, including expert

judgment, systematic assessment of flows by a small sample, user surveys, and

empirical models. A discussion of pros and cons of each method is provided. 

Abstract from journal: A variety of methods have been used to learn about the 

relation between streamflow and recreation quality. Regardless of method, nearly all

studies found a similar nonlinear relation of recreation to flow, with quality increasing

with flow to a point, and then decreasing for further increases in flow. Points of minimum, optimum, and maximum flow differ across rivers and activities. Knowledge of

the effects of streamflow on recreation, for the variety of relevant activities and skill

levels, is an important ingredient in the determination of wise streamflow policies.
Cordell, H.K.; Bergstrom, J.C. 1993. Comparison of recreation use values among 

alternative reservoir water level management scenarios. Water Resources

Research. 29: 247-258.

Abstract from journal: Throughout the United States, reservoirs are managed for

multiple uses, including hydropower, streamflow regulation, flood control, and recreation. Water level drawdowns for hydropower, streamflow regulation, and flood control often reduce the suitability of reservoirs for water-based recreation. The gain in

aggregate economic use value of outdoor recreation under three alternative water

level management scenarios was measured for four reservoirs in western North

Carolina as part of an interagency policy analysis. Use values were estimated using

a contingent valuation survey and expert panel data. The basic question addressed

by this study was whether the value recreational users place on higher water levels

held longer into the summer and fall is significantly greater than the value of using

these reservoirs as they were managed at the time of this study. Maintaining high

water levels for longer periods during the summer and fall was found to result in

considerable gains in estimated recreational benefits. While not a primary objective

of this study, having these estimates provided us an opportunity to compare increased

recreational benefits with the value the Tennessee Valley Authority estimated for the

reduced production of electricity that would result if the lakes were managed to hold

reservoir levels higher, longer into the year.

Cordell, H.K.; Bergstrom, J.C.; Ashley, G.A.; Karish, J. 1990. Economic effects 

of river recreation on local economies. Water Resources Bulletin. 26: 53-60.

Abstract from journal: Outdoor recreation is a major, growing use of water resources

in the United States. The economic effects of expenditures by visitors to three recreational river sites on local economies surrounding the sites were estimated using an

input-output model (IMPLAN). Expenditure data were from the Public Area Recreation

Visitors Study (PARVS). Results indicate that visitor spending stimulates a considerable amount of economic activity and growth in local economies. Economic effects

include increases in total gross output ranging from $2.6 million to $13.4 million,

increases in total income ranging from $1.2 million to $5.6 million, and increases 

in employment ranging from 60 to 292.2 jobs.

Creel, M.; Loomis, J. 1992. Recreation value of water to wetlands in the San 

Joaquin Valley: linked multinomial logit and count data trip frequency models.

Water Resources Research. 28: 2597-2606.

Abstract from journal: The recreational benefits from providing increased quantities

of water to wildlife and fisheries habitats is estimated using linked multinomial logit

site selection models and count data trip frequency models. The study encompasses

waterfowl hunting, fishing and wildlife viewing at 14 recreational resources in the

San Joaquin Valley, including the National Wildlife Refuges, the State Wildlife

Management Areas, and six river destinations. The economic benefits of increasing

water supplies to wildlife refuges were also examined by using the estimated models

to predict changing patterns of site selection and overall participation due to

50
increases in water allocation. Estimate of the dollar value per acre foot of water are

calculated for increases in water to refuges. The resulting model is a flexible and

useful tool for estimating the economic benefits of alternative water allocation policies

for wildlife habitat and rivers.

Duffield, J.W.; Brown, T.C.; Allen, S.D. 1994. Economic value of instream flow in 

Montana’s Big Hole and Bitterroot Rivers. Res. Pap. RM-317. Fort Collins, CO:

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Forest and

Range Experiment Station. 64 p.

Abstract from report: Instream flow is valuable to recreationists who rely on flows for

fishing, boating, and other forms of river recreation. Instream flow is also valuable to

many members of society, whether they visit the rivers or not, because flows maintain ecosystem stability and associated fish and wildlife habitat. This study estimates

the economic value of these recreation and preservation benefits along the Big Hole

and the Bitterroot Rivers in Montana. Valuation and participation information was

obtained from recreationists who were interviewed along the rivers, and from households that were sampled using mail and phone surveys. Both dichotomous-choice

and open-ended contingent valuation questions were used in these surveys to

estimate the value of instream flow. In addition, methodological issues of additivity

of preservation values and apportionment of total value into use and nonuse categories were investigated. Results indicate substantial economic value for maintaining

instream flows above minimum levels, with most of the value attributable to preservation motives.

Eiswerth, M.E.; Englin, J.; Fadali, E.; Shaw, W.D. 2000. The value of water levels 

in water-based recreation: a pooled revealed preference/contingent behavior

model. Water Resources Research. 36: 1079-1086.

Abstract from journal: In this paper we present estimated recreation values for 

preventing a decline in water levels at, and even the total loss of, a large Western

lake that is drying up. We use a Poisson version of the count data travel cost model;

however, in addition to and in combination with revealed preference (RP) data, we

employ contingent behavior (CB) responses to hypothetical questions on alternative

water levels and number of trips. The pooled model used allows for tests of differences between results using RP and CB data. This particular pooled RP/CB

approach has not to our knowledge previously been applied to examine the values

of alternative water quantities in water-based recreation. 

English, D.B.K.; Bowker, J.M. 1996. Economic impacts of guided whitewater 

rafting: a study of five rivers. Water Resources Bulletin. 32: 1319-1328.

Abstract from journal: This paper presents estimates of the statewide economic

impacts of guided whitewater rafting on five rivers in six states: the Nantahala

(North Carolina), Gauley (West Virginia), Kennebec (Maine), Middle Fork of the

Salmon (Idaho), and the Chattooga (Georgia-South Carolina). Except for the

Chattooga and the Middle Fork, rafting is dependent on upstream dam releases.

Guide fees range from about $15 per trip on the Nantahala to over $1,000 on the

51
Middle Fork. Economic impacts per nonresident 1000 visitors increase along with

the length of the rafting trip and remoteness of the river. Total industrial output per

1000 non-resident visitors ranged from $95,000 on the Nantahala to over $2.5 million on the Middle Fork. However, because of differences in annual visitation levels,

total impacts were greatest at the Nantahala, at over $14 million in 1993. Multipliers

for all economic measures were relatively consistent over the rivers. Employment

multipliers (Type III) ranged from 1.67 to 1.90, income multipliers from 2.0 to 2.4,

and industrial output multipliers from 2.1 to 2.5.

Forster, B.A. 1989. Valuing outdoor recreational activity: a methodological survey. 

Journal of Leisure Research. 21: 181-201.

Abstract from journal: This paper surveys the economic literature relevant to the

monetary valuation of outdoor recreational activity. The paper examines issues that

arise in the design and application of the Travel Cost Method, the Contingent

Valuation Method, and the Hedonic Methods to valuing outdoor recreational activity

and the response of researchers to these issues.

Johnson, R.L.; Bregenzer, N.S; Shelby, B. 1990. Contingent valuation question 

formats: dichotomous choice versus open-ended responses. In: Johnson, R.L.;

Johnson, G.V., eds. Economic valuation of natural resources: issues, theory, and

applications. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 193-203.

The authors use a mail survey including both open-ended and dichotomous choice

questions to examine peoples’ willingness to pay for a trip on the Rogue River in

Oregon. The dichotomous choice question yielded a mean response of $52.93 per

trip and a median response of $48.32 per trip. The open-ended question yielded a

mean response of $32.66 per trip with a 95 percent confidence interval between

$28.30 and $34.87 per trip. The survey was conducted in 1985.

Johnson, R.; Moore, E. 1993. Tourism impact estimation. Annals of Tourism 

Research. 20: 279-288.

Abstract from journal: Economic impacts associated with whitewater recreation on

the Klamath River in Oregon (USA) are estimated using a combination of primary

expenditure data and the IMPLAN input-output system. Impact estimates are generated for a range of use levels. A “naïve” model, which assumes that all expenditures

in the destination area are related to the river, is distinguished from an “adjusted”

model, which includes only expenditures that would be lost without the river. Primary

data regarding substitution behavior indicate that estimates of total impact may be

overstated if an adjusted model is not employed. Overall, results show that whitewater recreation, even on a small scale, can help to diversify a region’s economy.

52
Laughland, A.; Caudill, J. 1997. Banking on nature: the economic benefits to local 

communities of National Wildlife Refuge visitation. Washington, DC: U.S. Fish

and Wildlife Service. 118 p.

The authors estimate income and employment effects recreational visitors to wildlife

refuges have on local communities by using expenditure data from the national survey of fishing, hunting, and wildlife-associated recreation; visitation data obtained

through the refuge management information system; and IMPLAN. 

Leones, J.; Colby, B.; Cory, D.; Ryan, L. 1997. Measuring regional economic 

impacts of streamflow depletions. Water Resources Research. 33: 831-838.

Abstract from journal: Because of large upstream diversions for agriculture and an

absence of policies to protect in-streamflows, flows in the Rio Grande near Taos,

New Mexico, routinely are low by midsummer. The reach is a popular whitewater

run in the southwestern United States when flows are adequate for river running.

This article estimates the regional economic impacts attributable to summer streamflow depletions. Economic analysis indicates that while lower water levels affect the

number of people coming to the region to raft on the river reach, low water levels

had no effect on another nearby rafting area. Total expenditures and economic

impacts were simulated for streamflows maintained at levels adequate for whitewater recreation throughout the summer season. These simulations indicate a 24

percent ($0.74 million) increase in rafting-linked expenditures and a 25 percent

($0.94 million) increase in value added from rafting, compared to actual 1992

expenditures and value added.

Loomis, J.B. 1989. Estimating the economic activity and value from public parks 

and outdoor recreation areas in California. Journal of Park and Recreation

Administration. 7: 56-65.

Abstract from journal: This study compares traditional measures of the economic

importance of parks and recreation, such as visitor expenditures, with direct economic benefits received by the participants. Visitor spending at parks and recreation

areas in California supports 238,500 jobs and contributes $4.5 billion in personal

income to Californians. Participant benefits are quantified in the form of net willingness to pay. Direct benefits to participants from camping and water sports are

shown to be two to three times their actual expenditures. These direct benefits

provide a more correct picture of the overall contribution of recreation to society.

The average rate of return on investments in recreation facilities and programs 

is also estimated. 

Loomis, J.B.; Gonzalez-Caban, A. 1997. How certain are visitors of their economic

values of river recreation: an evaluation using repeated questioning and revealed

preference. Water Resources Research. 33: 1187-1193.

Abstract from journal: We test the robustness of visitor dichotomous choice willingness to pay (WTP) for maintaining instream flow by challenging respondent’s affirmative answers. This is followed by rephrasing the per trip WTP question into an

53
annual dichotomous choice WTP question and re-asking the question. About 5 

percent of visitors revised their “yes” answer to “no.” Estimated WTP changed from

$12.81 per trip to $11.96 per trip. Using the method of convolutions, this is an

insignificant difference. To further evaluate the robustness of contingent valuation

method estimated WTP, these values are compared to WTP derived from the

revealed preference travel cost model of the same visitors. No statistical difference

was found.

Loomis, J.B.; Roach, B.; Ward, F.; Ready, R. 1995. Testing transferability of 

recreation demand models across regions: a study of Corps of Engineer reservoirs. Water Resources Research. 31: 721-730. 

Abstract from journal: This research tests the interchangeability of two specifications

of travel cost demand models for recreation at U.S. Army Corps of Engineer reservoirs in Arkansas, California, and Tennessee/Kentucky. Statistical tests of coefficient

equality for both nonlinear least squares and Heckman sample selection models

suggest rejecting a transferable model among all three regions. However, the nonlinear least squares models in Arkansas and Tennessee were similar enough to fail

to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients at the 0.01 significance level. Even so,

interchanging the Arkansas and Tennessee nonlinear least squares coefficients produces visitor use and total benefit estimate that are more than 100 percent too high.

However, interchanging coefficients does provide reasonably close estimates of the

average consumer surplus per trip for both states using the nonlinear least square

model (5 to 10 percent). This is due to similarity of the price coefficients in the two

models. Thus a more limited form of transferability which focuses on average benefit

per day, rather than on predicting total use and total benefits, appears promising.

McCollum, D.W.; Peterson, G.L.; Arnold, J.R. [and others]. 1990. The net 

economic value of recreation on the national forests: twelve types of primary

activity trips across nine forest service regions. Res. Pap. RM-289. Fort Collins,

CO: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Forest and

Range Experiment Station. 36 p.

Abstract from report: The Public Area Recreation Visitors Survey (PARVS) was used

to estimate demand models, from the point of view of a site operator, for recreation

on Forest Service lands for twelve types of primary activity trips in all nine Forest

Service regions. The models were estimated using the travel cost method with a

“reverse multinomial logit gravity model.” At the first stage, they are share models

estimating the probability that a trip observed at a given recreation site originated in

a particular county. This probability is equivalent to the expected proportion of total

trips to a site coming from a particular origin. A second staging process, identical to

that used in traditional travel cost models, was used to derive site demand functions

from the point of view of a site operator. These functions were used to estimate

average consumer surplus. The relative values for different primary activity trips

across different regions of the country are examined, as are relative values for 

different primary activity trips within the regions.

54
Shelby, B.; Johnson, R.L.; Brunson, M. 1990. Comparative analysis of whitewater

boating resources in Oregon: toward a regional model of river recreation.

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey; final Tech.

Rep. G1609-07. 144 p.

The authors examine boaters’ willingness to pay for boating trips on the Clackamas,

Deschutes, Klamath, and Rogue Rivers in Oregon by using travel cost and contingent valuation methods. 

Sorg, C.; Loomis, J.B. 1984. Empirical estimates of amenity forest values: a 

comparative review. Gen. Tech. Rep. RM-107. Fort Collins, CO: U.S. Department

of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment

Station. 23 p.

The authors surveyed published and unpublished recreation economics literature

that used primarily travel cost and contingent valuation methods. The authors

attempted to adjust value estimates from each study to make them consistent with

one another in terms of the proportions of in-state versus out-of-state visitors, travel

time, and real dollars. Willingness-to-pay values are reported for anadromous fishing,

coldwater fishing, warmwater fishing, big game hunting, camping, hiking, nonmotorized boating (rafting and kayaking), small game hunting, picnicking, waterfowl hunting, water sports, wilderness recreation, downhill skiing, motorized boating, and

saltwater fishing. 

Abstract from report: Comparisons of empirical estimates of the values of wildlife,

wilderness, and general recreation require that the values be based on comparable

methods and comparable units of measurements. Adjustments necessary to allow

such comparisons are outlined and are applied to an extensive database of valuation studies. 

Ward, F.A. 1987. Economics of water allocation to instream uses in a fully appropriated river basin: evidence from a New Mexico wild river. Water Resources

Research. 23: 381-392. 

Abstract from journal: In fully appropriated multiple-use river basins, a major

potential competitor for a share of water may be publicly sponsored appropriation

to supplement low streamflows for fish, wildlife and recreation, which generates

economic values not revealed in the marketplace. Based on a survey of instream

recreationists on New Mexico’s Rio Chama a travel cost model is developed to

identify the potential recreation demand for instream flows. A discrete optimal control

model is formulated that solves for the intraseasonal allocation of reservoir releases

which maximizes the yearly value of instream recreation benefits, net of values of

competing uses in the basin. Results indicate that the New Mexico, reservoir releases

which augment the low streamflows can return gross recreation benefits in the

range of $900 to $1100 per acre-foot (ac ft) of water consumed (1 ac ft = 1.233 

× 103 m3). This compares to a $40/ac ft cost of using the water. Consequently,

results strongly support the hypothesis of potential economic payoff from public

investments in and management of instream flow reservations.

55
Ward, F.A.; Roach, B.A.; Henderson, J.E. 1996. The economic value of water in 

recreation: evidence from the California drought. Water Resources Research. 

32: 1075-1082.

Abstract from journal: A significant barrier to economically efficient management of

most reservoir systems is lack of reliable information about how recreational values

change with reservoir levels. This paper presents evidence on marginal values of

water for recreation at Corps of Engineer reservoirs in the Sacramento, California

District. Data on visitors were collected by origin and destination before and during

the early part of the 1985-1991 California drought. Because lake levels varied widely

during the sample period, water’s effect on visits was isolated from price and other

effects. An estimated regional travel cost model containing water level as a visit

predictor provided information to compute marginal values per acre-foot (1234 m3)

of water vary from $6 at Pine Flat Reservoir to more than $600 at Success Lake.

These findings are limited to use values of visitors who travel to the reservoirs and

do not reflect passive use values to people who value the reservoirs but never visit

them. Analysis could apply similar methods to other river basins in which a public

agency controls the management of multiple water uses. 

Blamey, R.; Gordon, J.; Chapman, R. 1999. Choice modeling: assessing the 

environmental values of water supply options. Australian Journal of Agricultural

and Resource Economics. 43: 337-357.

Abstract from journal: Three criticisms of the contingent valuation method are considered in this article. One technique that would appear to answer such criticisms is

choice modeling. Choice Modeling permits value estimates for different goods sharing a common set of attributes to be pieced together using the results of a single

multinomial (conditional) logit model. The choice modeling approach to environmental value assessment is illustrated in the context of a consumer-based assessment

of future water supply options in the Australian Capital Territory. Choice modeling is

found to provide a flexible and cost effective method for estimating use and passive

use values, particularly when several alternative proposals need to be considered.

Daily, G.C., ed. 1997. Nature’s services: societal dependence on natural ecosystems. Washington, DC: Island Press. 392 p.

Abstract from publisher: Nature’s Services brings together world-renowned scientists

from a variety of disciplines to examine the character and value of ecosystem services, the damage that has been done to them, and the consequent implications for

human society. Contributors present a detailed synthesis of our current understanding of a suite of ecosystem services and a preliminary assessment of their economic

value. Nature’s Services represents one of the first efforts by scientists to provide an

overview of the many benefits and services that nature offers to people and the

extent to which we are all vitally dependent on those services. The book enhances

our understanding of the value of the natural systems that surround us and can play

an essential role in encouraging greater efforts to protect the earth’s basic lifesupport systems before it is too late.

56

Environmental

Amenities and

Ecosystem Services
57

Englin, J.; Netusil, N.; Hilger, J. [and others]. 1999. Non-market values associated

with Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge. Prepared for U.S. Department of the

Interior, Truckee-Carson Coordination Office, Carson City, Nevada. Reno, NV:

Department of Applied Economics and Statistics, University of Nevada. 75 p.

The authors examine the nonmarket benefits of increasing and stabilizing wetland

habitat in the Lahontan Valley, including the Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge,

Fallon Indian Reservation, and Carson Lake by using expenditure data obtained

from on-site surveys of waterfowl hunters and general recreationists. 

Goulder, L.H.; Kennedy, D. 1997. Valuing ecosystem services: philosophical bases

and empirical methods. In: Daily, G.C., ed. Nature’s services: societal dependence on natural ecosystems. Washington, DC: Island Press: 23-48.

The authors discuss different types of ecosystem services and methods for valuing

them. Four types of ecosystem services are outlined: (1) provision of production

inputs such as pest control, flood control, soil fertilization, and water filtration, (2)

sustenance of plant and animal life, including consumptive and nonconsumptive

uses of plants and animals, with direct and indirect use values, (3) provision of

existence values, and (4) provision of option values. Valuation methods discussed

include avoided cost, direct valuation based on market prices, indirect valuation

using travel cost and contingent valuation methods, and empirical assessments of

individual risk aversion. The authors discuss several applications.

Hamilton, C. 1995. The economics of logging high conservation value native 

forests. Economic and Labour Relations Review. 6: 159-79.

Abstract from journal: This paper analyses various aspects of the economics of logging high conservation value native forests. After outlining the multiple uses of these

forests, evidence is reviewed that suggests that subsidization of logging is extensive.

Next the paper reviews work that indicates that when account is taken of the environmental values lost due to logging (including the value of water with alternative

uses) there are net social costs from logging high conservation native forests.

Hanley, N.; Wright, R.E.; Adamowicz, V. 1998b. Using choice experiments to 

value the environment. Environmental and Resource Economics. 11: 413-428.

Abstract from journal: This paper outlines the choice experiment approach to 

environmental valuation. This approach has its roots in Lancaster’s characteristics

theory of value, in random utility theory and in experimental design. We show how

marginal values for the attributes of environmental assets, such as forests and

rivers, can be estimated from pair-wise choices, as well as the value of the environmental asset as a whole. These choice pairs are designed so as to allow efficient

statistical estimation of the underlying utility function, and to minimize required

sample size. Choice experiments have important advantages over other environmental valuation methods, such as contingent valuation and travel cost type models,

although many design issues remain unresolved. Applications to environmental
issues have so far been relatively limited. We illustrate the use of choice experiments with reference to a recent UK study on public preferences for alternative 

forest landscapes. This study allows us to perform a convergent validity test on 

the choice experiment estimates of willingness to pay.

Johnston, R.J.; Swallow, S.K.; Weaver, T.F. 1999. Estimating willingness to 

pay and resource tradeoffs with different payment mechanisms: an evaluation 

of a funding guarantee for watershed management. Journal of Environmental

Economics and Management. 38: 97-120.

Abstract from journal: This study reports on a contingent choice survey in which

respondents expressed their preferences for packages of watershed management

outcomes, where these packages assessed alternative institutional characteristics 

of the funding mechanism. Specifically, this study addresses the issue of respondents’ faith in the payment mechanism as an efficient and guaranteed funding

source. Analyses of marginal willingness to pay for single variable changes, marginal

rates of substitution among variable pairs, and willingness to pay for watershed

management packages indicate the potential for significant impacts of payment

mechanism attributes. Implications address ranking of policy packages and validity

in estimating money-scaled welfare impacts.

Kline, J.D.; Alig, R.J.; Johnson, R.L. 2000. Forest owner incentives to protect 

riparian habitat. Ecological Economics. 33: 29-43.

Abstract from journal: Private landowners increasingly are asked to cooperate with

landscape-level management to protect or enhance ecological resources. We examine the willingness of nonindustrial private forest owners in the Pacific Northwest to

forego harvesting within riparian areas to improve riparian habitat. An empirical

model is developed describing owners’ willingness to accept an economic incentive

to adopt a 200-foot harvest buffer along streams, as a function of their forest ownership objectives and socioeconomic characteristics. Results suggest that owners’

willingness to forego harvest varies by their forest ownership objectives. Mean

incentive payments necessary to induce owners to forego harvest in riparian areas

are higher for owners possessing primarily timber objectives than for owners possessing both timber and nontimber objectives or primarily recreation objectives.

Kosz, M. 1994. Valuing riverside wetlands: the case of the “Donau-Auen” National 

Park. Ecological Economics. 16: 109-127.

Abstract from journal: For two decades, the establishment of the “Donau-Auen”

national park east of Vienna has been on the political agenda in Austria. Since

1991, concrete proposals have been worked out for several variants of a national

park including hydraulic engineering concepts and hydroelectric power stations.

Within this planning process a cost-benefit analysis was carried out to estimate the

economic impacts of the proposed projects. One crucial question was how to value

the ecological quality of wetlands. These environmental goods were valued by

means of a willingness-to-pay (WTP) survey. Two different kinds of variables were

defined: (1) Costs and benefits depending on direct “anthropocentric” use including

58
59

energy production with hydroelectric power stations, shipping, groundwater protections, stabilization of the river bed to stop channel erosion, visitors’ benefits, forestry,

farming, fishing, hunting and the costs of establishing a national park. Based on

these variables the net present value for variants with hydroelectric power stations

is higher than for variants without electricity production. On the contrary, the internal

interest rate and the benefit-cost ratio is higher for a “pure” national park without

electricity production. (2) Taking also the Austrians’ WTP for the “Donau-Auen”

national park as a substitute measure for ecological values into account, only 20

percent of the WTP which was measured by means of contingent valuation is

needed to make the net present value of the “best” national park variant equal to

that of the “best” hydroelectric power variant. This shows that the protection of

national goods, like wetlands, in a natural state might be more efficient from an

economic viewpoint than development projects. 

Kramer, R.A.; Richter, D.D.; Pattanayak, S.; Sharma, N.P. 1997. Ecological and 

economic analysis of watershed protection in eastern Madagascar. Journal of

Environmental Management. 49: 277-295.

Abstract from journal: Watershed protection is one of the many goods and services

provided by the world’s fast disappearing tropical forests. Among the variety of

watershed protection benefits, flood damage alleviation is crucial, particularly in

upland watersheds. This study is a rare attempt to estimate flooding alleviation

benefits, resulting from the protection of upland forests in Eastern Madagascar.

A three-stage model is used to examine the relationship between the economic

concept of value and the bio-physical dimensions of the protected area. This

approach combines techniques from remote sensing, soil and hydrologic sciences

and economics. In stage one, the relationship between changes in land use practices and the extent of flooding in immediate downstream is established by using

remotely sensed and hydrologic-runoff data. Stage two relates the impact of

increased flooding to crop production by comparing the hydrologic data with agronomic flood damage reports for the same time period. In stage three, a productivity

analysis approach is adopted to evaluate flood damage in terms of lost producer

surplus. The presence of the Mantadia National Park, in Eastern Madagascar, is

designed to prevent land conversions and changes in hydrologic patterns, thereby

alleviating flood damage. This averted flood damage is a measure of the watershed

protection benefits to society. Given that natural systems are subject to considerable

stochastic shocks, sensitivity analysis is used to examine the uncertainty associated

with the key random variables. The results of this analysis should help policymakers

assess trade-offs between the costs and benefits of protecting tropical rainforest. 

Loomis, J.B. 1996. Measuring the economic benefits of removing dams and 

restoring the Elwha River: results of a contingent valuation survey. Water

Resources Research. 32: 441-447.

Abstract from journal: The contingent valuation method was used to obtain estimates of willingness to pay for removing the two dams on the Elwha River on 

the Olympic Peninsula in Washington State and restoring the ecosystem and the

anadromous fishery. Using the dichotomous choice voter referendum format, the

mean annual value per household is $59 in Challam County, $73 for the rest of

Washington, and $68 for households in the rest of the United States. The aggregate
benefits to residents of the State of Washington is $138 million annually for 10 years

and between $3 and $6 billion to all U.S. households. These estimates suggest that

the general public would be willing to pay to remove old dams that block salmon

migration.

Sanders, L.D.; Walsh, R.G.; Loomis, J.B. 1990. Toward empirical estimation of the

total value of protecting rivers. Water Resources Research. 26: 1345-1357.

Abstract from journal: The purpose of this paper is to develop and apply a procedure

to estimate a statistical demand function for the protection of rivers in the Rocky

Mountains of Colorado. Other states and nations around the world face a similar

problem of estimating how much they can afford to pay for the protection of rivers.

The results suggest that in addition to the direct consumption benefits of onsite

recreation, total value includes offsite consumption of the flow of information about

these activities and resources consumed as preservation benefits. A sample of the

general population of the state reports a willingness to pay rather than forego both

types of utility. We recommended that offsite values be added to the value of onsite

recreation use to determine the total value of rivers to society. 

Bocksteal, N.E.; Hanemann, W.M.; Kling, C.L. 1987. Estimating the value of water

quality improvements in a recreational demand framework. Water Resources

Research. 23: 951-960.

Abstract from journal: With the advent of Executive Order 12291, policymakers

involved in water quality regulations are increasingly interested in assessing the

benefits of their programs. Several methods for valuing water quality improvements

using recreational demand models have been developed by economists, most of

which depend on observing recreationists visiting an array of sites with varying

water quality and costs of access. In this paper, three general types of models are

described: systems of demands, discrete choice models, and hedonic travel cost

approach; the latter two models are demonstrated using a common data set on

water quality and swimming behavior in the Boston area. The models are contrasted

and their relative usefulness in answering policy questions explored. 

Caulkins, P.P.; Bishop, R.C.; Bouwes, N.W., Sr. 1986. The travel cost model for 

lake recreation: a comparison of two methods for incorporating site quality and

substitution effects. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 68: 291-297.

Abstract from journal: This paper empirically illustrates how different assumptions

regarding recreationists’ decision-making behavior affect the predicted changes in

recreational activity given a water quality improvement. A multinomial logit model,

which reallocates visits away from other sites to the improved site, predicts a smaller

outward shift of the recreationist’s demand curve than the more traditional travel

cost model, which does not assume any reallocation of visits among sites.

60

Water Quality
61

Contant, C.K.; Duffy, M.D.; Holub, M.A. 1993. Tradeoffs between water quality 

and profitability in Iowa agriculture. Iowa City, IA: Public Policy Center, the

University of Iowa. 67 p.

The authors define four types of policies with which to control ground and surface

water contamination, including regulation, taxation, technological assistance and

cost sharing, and research and education, and estimate potential changes in water

quality and farming profitability if each policy were adopted. 

Courant, P.N.; Porter, R.C. 1981. Averting expenditure and the cost of pollution. 

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 8: 321-329.

Abstract from journal: The paper considers the relationship between the willingness

to pay for environmental quality and averting expenditures—that is, the costs of

measures undertaken in efforts to counteract the consequences of pollution. The

models used assume perfect mobility among locations with different levels of environmental quality. The major results are (1) averting expenditures are not in general

a good measure of willingness to pay; (2) averting expenditures are not always even

a lower bound on willingness to pay; (3) even when averting expenditures are a

lower bound, the difference between the level of such expenditures and willingness

to pay cannot be attributed to the unavertable aesthetic consequences of pollution.

Crutchfield, S.R.; Cooper, J.C.; Hellerstein, D. 1997. Benefits of safer drinking 

water: the value of nitrate reduction. Agric. Econ. Rep. 752. Washington, DC:

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 158 p.

Abstract from report: Nitrates in drinking water, which may come from nitrogen fertilizers applied to crops, are a potential health risk. This report evaluates the potential

benefits of reducing human exposure to nitrates in the drinking water supply. In a

survey, respondents were asked a series of questions about their willingness to pay

for a hypothetical water filter, which would reduce their risk of nitrate exposure. If

nitrates in the respondent’s drinking water were to exceed the EPA minimum safety

standard, they would be willing to pay $45 to $69 per household per month, to

reduce nitrates in their drinking water to the minimum safety standard. There are 

2.9 million households in the four regions studied (White River area of Indiana,

central Nebraska, lower Susquehanna, and Mid-Columbia Basin in Washington). If

all households potentially at risk were protected from excessive nitrates in drinking

water the estimated benefits would be $350 million.

Edwards, S.F. 1988. Option prices for groundwater protection. Journal of 

Environmental Economics and Management. 15: 475-487.

This paper reports results from a contingent valuation study of households’ willingness-to-pay to prevent uncertain, future nitrate contamination of a potable supply of

groundwater. The functional form of the corresponding logit model is derived from

utility maximization theory. Probability of future demand, change in the probability of

future supply, and an attitudinal score for interests in the well-being of future generations are significant, positive determinants of option prices. Several implications of

these results for aquifer management policy are highlighted.
Malone, P.; Barrows, R. 1990. Groundwater pollution’s effects on residential property values, Portage County, Wisconsin. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation.

45: 346-348.

Abstract from journal: Nitrate pollution of groundwater had no statistically significant

effect on the price of residential property in a study in Portage County, Wisconsin.

These results however, do not mean that groundwater pollution has no cost. Sellers

may be forced to wait longer to sell to a buyer who is uninformed or simply does

not care abut nitrate pollution, so the cost of pollution may be denominated in time

rather than sale price. A closer examination of market process suggests that sellers

may also absorb pollution costs by drilling new wells or purchasing filters in response

to demands from realtors, lenders, or buyers. Groundwater pollution costs do not

appear in property prices but are likely absorbed in other ways.

McCarthy, P.S.; Tay, R.; Fletcher, J.J. 1991. Estimating the value of water quality 

improvements from a fully discrete model of recreational fishing. Paper No. 1001.

West Lafayette, IN: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and

Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue

University. 19 p.

The authors estimate travel demand for recreational fishing trips and compute

potential welfare gains from improved water quality. 

Phaneuf, D.; Kling, C.; Herriges, J. 1998. Valuing water quality improvements 

using revealed preference methods when corner solutions are present. American

Journal of Agricultural Economics. 80: 1025-1031.

Abstract from journal: A general utility model of recreation choice is set up for use 

as a benchmark. This theoretical model, which can also be described as a quality

differentiated goods model, is matched against three alternative empirical demand

models using data on water-based recreation taken from the Great Lakes region.

The data used in empirical analysis was obtained from two mail surveys on angling

behavior conducted at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1990.

Shultz, S.D.; Lindsay, B.E. 1990. The willingness to pay for groundwater protection. Water Resources Research. 26: 1869-1875.

Abstract from journal: To determine the willingness to pay (WTP) for a hypothetical

groundwater protection plan in Dover, New Hampshire, a mail contingent valuation

survey was conducted. The median WTP value among Dover residents was estimated to be $40 per household, and the community WTP value is estimated to be

at least $100,000 annually for a groundwater protection plan. The assessed land

values of respondents as well as their incomes were shown to positively influence

their WTP values, while their ages had a negative influence on WTP. A variety of

other socioeconomic variables were shown to have no influence on individuals’

WTP for groundwater protection. This research illustrates a methodology that other

researchers, and water resource managers can use to estimate the value which

people place on various water resources and can help to predict whether the public

will accept water policies and projects.

62
63

Steinnes, D.N. 1992. Measuring the economic value of water quality: the case of 

lakeshore land. Annals of Regional Science. 26: 271-276.

Abstract from journal: The valuation of water quality has proved difficult for economists using hedonic methods. This study, by employing a sample of lakes and

considering only land values, is able to overcome many methodological and empirical

problems inherent in previous studies. One objective measure of water quality,

secchi disc reading, is found to be significant for various alternative specifications 

of the hedonic model. However, the results suggest that economic value may be

attached to a perceived, rather than actual, measure of water quality. This raises

fundamental questions as to how economists and natural scientists can work

together to formulate public policy regarding water quality.

Sun Henglun, J.C.B.; Dorfman, J.H. 1992. Estimating the benefits of groundwater 

contamination control. Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics. 24: 63-71.

Abstract from journal: In this paper, a conceptual model of estimating option price

for groundwater quality protection is developed and the effects of subjective demand

and supply uncertainty and other variables on option price are examined. A contingent valuation study to measure option price for groundwater quality protection was

conducted in southwestern Georgia. Evaluation results suggest that the monetary

benefits to citizens of protecting groundwater supplies from agricultural chemical

contamination are quite large.

Sutherland, R.J. 1982. A regional approach to estimating recreation benefits of 

improved water quality. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

9: 222-247.

Abstract from journal: Recreation demand and value are estimated with the travelcost method for fishing, camping, boating, and swimming on a site-specific regional

basis. The model is regional in that 179 sites are defined for the Pacific Northwest.

A gravity model is employed to estimate the number of trips from each origin to

each destination in the region, and these data are the basic input in the travel-cost

demand curves. The model is illustrated by estimating the recreation benefits that

would result from meeting the national environmental goal of “fishable and swimmable” rivers. The main finding is that potential recreation benefits are concentrated

in a few select areas, which are accessible to large population centers. 

William, P.G.; Rabinowitz, H. 1993. Groundwater contamination: its effects 

on property values and cities. Journal of the American Planning Association. 

59: 473-484.

Abstract from journal: This paper discusses the impact of groundwater contamination with toxic chemicals on the value of contaminated and surrounding property.

The case studies indicate that groundwater contamination negatively affects the

value of commercial and industrial properties, but not residential properties. This

finding suggests that real estate markets may not be functioning properly. The risk

of liability for contamination may differ by type of property. The paper explores the

policy implications, especially for cities, where fear of liability may inhibit action to

protect public health.
Aillery, M.; Moore, M.R.; Weinberg, M. [and others]. 1999. Salmon recovery in 

the Columbia River basin: analysis of measures affecting agriculture. Marine

Resource Economics. 14: 15-40.

Abstract from journal: The effects of salmon recovery measures on the Northwest

agricultural sector are evaluated. Relevant recovery measures, such as modified

timing for dam releases, reservoir drawdown, and flow augmentation in the Columbia

River basin, on the regional agricultural sector are evaluated. Combined, these

measures would increase power rates, grain transportation costs, and irrigated

water costs and reduce the supply of water to irrigators. We quantify these input

cost and quantity changes and combine them into seven recovery scenarios for

analysis. Results suggest that drawdown and/or minor reductions in irrigation

water diversions would reduce producers’ profits by less than 1 percent of baseline

levels. However, the most extreme scenario—a long drawdown period combined

with a large reduction in irrigation diversions would reduce producers’ profits by $35

million (2.5 percent) annually. That effect is magnified at the local level; of the $35

million decline in annual profits, more than $27 million occur in southern Idaho and

eastern Oregon. The federal government would bear these costs if it acquires water

via voluntary transactions.

Aillery, M.; Shoemaker, R.; Caswell, M. 2001. Agriculture and ecosystem restoration in south Florida: assessing tradeoffs from water-retention development in the

Everglades agricultural area. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 

83: 183-195.

Abstract from journal: Agricultural production decisions can affect ecosystem function and environmental quality. Environmental restoration policies can, in turn, affect

profitability of the agricultural sector. A dynamic model of agricultural production, soil

loss, and water retention in the Everglades Agricultural Area is developed to assess

agricultural impacts under alternative water policy and land acquisition scenarios. 

Bischoff, J.H.; Dobbs, T.L.; Pflueger, B.W.; Henning, L.D. 1995. Environmental 

and farm profitability objectives in water quality sensitive areas: evaluating the

tradeoffs. In: Clean water, clean environment, 21st century: team agriculture

working to protect water resources—conference proceedings. St. Joseph, MI:

American Society of Agricultural Engineers: 25-28. Vol. 3. 

Abstract from proceedings: This research project was designed to determine

whether the economic incentives offered by recent environmental provisions of 

the federal farm program are sufficient to induce western Corn Belt/Northern Great

Plains farmers in environmentally sensitive areas to adopt sustainable farming practices and systems. Particular attention is being focused on the Integrated Crop

Management program and the Water Quality Incentive Program. Results of the 

participation of farmers in a three-county water quality demonstration project area of

eastern South Dakota—The Big Sioux Aquifer Demonstration Project—indicate that

45 out of 400 farmers had enrolled in the Integrated Crop Management program or

the Water Quality Incentive Program, or both by the end of 1993. The most popular

practices under these programs were nutrient management, pest management,

conservation cropping sequence, and crop residue use. There was very little change

64

Examining

Tradeoffs Among

Uses
in either crop type or crop rotation. Preliminary economic results for three case study

farms in the project area indicated no change in “typical-year” net profits “after”

participation compared to “before” participation on one farm, modest increase on

another, and substantial increase on the other. Simulation of possible additional

practice changes thought to improve groundwater quality showed further possible

modest increases in profits on all three case farms. Simulated system changes,

involving changes to more diverse crop rotations, also appear to add to profitability;

however, sensitivity analyses are yet to be carried out for the system changes to

test the range of assumptions under which this conclusion is valid.

Gold, A.; Weaver, T.; Porter, E.; Opaluch, J. 1988. Potential water use conflicts 

generated by irrigated agriculture in Rhode Island. Northeastern Journal of

Agricultural and Resource Economics. 17: 8-14.

Abstract from journal: This study constructs a simulation model to evaluate the

potential for conflict among residential and agricultural users of water in southern

Rhode Island. The model estimates the profitability of irrigation of turf farms and

projects the total use and the economic value of irrigation water. The results indicate

that the economic value of irrigation water compares favorably with current residential water prices in the area. In addition, substantial demand for irrigation water is

projected. Given current rates of growth in turf acreage and residential water use,

there appears to be a significant potential for conflict, particularly given the absence

of well-developed institutions for allocating water among users.

Hansen, L.T.; Hallam, A. 1990. Water allocation tradeoffs. Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 21 p.

Abstract from report: Diverting water from streams for irrigation competes with its

use as a recreational fishing resource. This report develops a procedure for estimating the marginal value of water used for fishing that includes effects of upstream

diversions on all points downstream. The downstream effects are dispersed across

a wide geographic area and, until now, have not been estimated. The procedure is

applied to all 99 major river basins of the contiguous states. The tradeoffs in water

allocation are detailed in the 67 river basins where irrigation competes for the water

with recreational fishing. The results substantiate the role of water for recreational

fishing and highlight the implications for a national perspective in water allocation

decisions.

Hutchinson, W.G.; Chilton, S.M. 1999. Combining preference ordering and contingent valuation methods to assess nonmarket benefit of alternative afforestation

projects. Journal of Rural Studies. 15: 103-109.

Abstract from journal: The application of the contingent valuation method in 

this paper incorporates a prior preference ordering of several alternative future

afforestation programs which could be implemented in Ireland over the next decade.

This particular experimental design is thereby shown to reveal the potentially conflicting preferences of different groups within society. These findings are used to

devise appropriate contingent valuation method scenarios to take account, not only

65
of the efficiency gains of choosing a single policy alternative over others, but also

the effects on the distribution of non market benefit between different groups within

society, arising from choice between alternatives.

Johnson, S.H., III. 1975. Optimal tradeoffs between reservoir and downstream 

recreation benefits. In: Proceedings: annual meeting of the Western Agricultural

Economics Association. Fort Collins, CO: Department of Agricultural and

Resource Economics, Colorado State University: 140-143.

The author develops benefit functions for reservoir recreation and open stream

(downstream) recreation based on the amount of water allocated to each type of

recreation, and suggests that complementary, competitive, and supplementary 

relations exist between the two activities depending on water levels. The benefit

functions are combined in an optimization program to examine tradeoffs between

reservoir and downstream recreational uses. The optimal tradeoff between the two

occurs when the marginal benefits associated with water allocated to the reservoir

are equal to the marginal benefits associated with water allocated to the stream.

Furthermore, the optimal size of the reservoir can be determined where the marginal

cost of construction of an increased acre-foot of capacity is just equal to the

expected marginal benefits associated with the flow.

Oven-Thompson, K.; Alercon, L.; Marks, D.H. 1982. Agricultural vs. hydropower 

tradeoffs in the operation of the High Aswan Dam. Water Resources Research.

18: 1605-1613.

Abstract from journal: This paper defines a tradeoff relationship between hydropower

and agriculture for the monthly operations of the High Aswan Dam under current

water availability conditions. A stochastic dynamic programming model is employed

which incorporates the physical constraints of the High Aswan Dam system. Variations

of monthly reservoir releases for agricultural purposes are imposed on the system

through this model, and consequent impacts on hydropower production at the high

dam are studied. The results show that once operating rules are optimized for current agricultural demands an 11-20 percent increase in firm monthly hydropower

production can be gained when summer irrigation allocations are reduced by 25

percent. A simple benefit/cost analysis concludes that potential benefits obtained by

gains in firm monthly hydropower are nearly equal to potential losses in the agricultural sector when summer allocations are reduced by 5-10 percent. Operation questions raised by the introduction of a new emergency flood control spillway at Toska

are addressed. Recommendations are made for the operating guidelines of the high

dam releases in light of these results.

Qui, Z.; Prato, T.; Kaylen, M. 1988. Watershed-scale economic and environmental 

tradeoffs incorporating risks: a target MOTAD approach. Agricultural and

Resource Economics Review. 27: 231-241.

Abstract from journal: This paper evaluates the economic and environmental tradeoffs at watershed scale by incorporating both economic and environmental risks in

agricultural production. The target MOTAD model is modified by imposing a probability-constrained objective function to capture the yield uncertainty caused by random allocation of farming systems to soil types and by introducing environmental

66
67

Water Policies

General

targets to incorporate environmental risk due to random storm events. This framework is used to determine the tradeoff frontier between watershed net return and

sediment yield and nitrogen concentration in runoff in Goodwater Creek watershed. 

Schaible, G.D. 2000. Economic and conservation tradeoffs of regulatory vs. incentive-based water policy in the Pacific Northwest. Water Resources Development.

16: 221-238.

Abstract from journal: In this paper, on-farm water conservation and agricultural 

economic tradeoffs between selected regulatory and conservation-incentive waterpolicy choices are evaluated for the Pacific Northwest. Five broad water-policy 

perspectives are analyzed using a total of 37 alternative policy scenarios. Policy

analyses use a primal/dual-based, multi-product, normalized restricted-equilibrium

model of Pacific Northwest field-crop agriculture. Results demonstrate that conservation-incentive water policy, when integrated within balanced policy reform, can

produce upwards of 1.7 million acre-feet of on-farm conserved water for the region,

while also significantly increasing economic returns to farmers. Producer willingness

to accept water-policy change is lowest for regulatory policy, but highest for conservation-incentive policy that increases both irrigation efficiency and crop productivity.

Conservation-incentive water policy also enhances decision-maker flexibility in

meeting multiple regional policy goals (i.e., water for endangered aquatic species,

water quality, Native American treaty obligations, and sustainable rural agricultural

economies).

Willis, D.B.; Whittlesey, N.K. 1998. Water management policies for streamflow 

augmentation in irrigated river basins. Journal of Agricultural and Resource

Economics. 23: 170-190.

Abstract from journal: The value of maintaining a minimum streamflow objective on

average is lessened when there is considerable dispersion around the average. An

integrated economic and hydrology model is presented which provides water policy

planners with a way to accurately measure both the economic cost and hydrologic

consequences of maintaining a minimum streamflow level in an irrigated river basin

at alternative probabilities of maintaining the target flow level. Water markets for

streamflow augmentation are shown to be the most cost-effective policy in the 

study area.

Clyde, S.E. 1989. Adapting to the changing demand of water use through continued

refinement of the prior appropriation doctrine: an alternative approach to the

wholesale reallocation. Natural Resources Journal. 29: 435-455.

Abstract from journal: The prior appropriation doctrine facilitated Western expansion

and economic growth in the arid West. The doctrine rewarded those who were first

by providing them with a relatively stable water supply by protecting them from

unreasonable interference by junior appropriators. Beneficial use generally required

both the diversion and consumption of water in some economic activity. Today, society recognizes other values in water. Some people fear that the prior appropriation

doctrine may prevent the use of water for these non-consumptive purposes and are

searching for novel legal theories to circumvent it. This effort is unnecessary. The

doctrine is inherently flexible. Given time, it will be adapted to meet the competing
needs and interests of society. The prior appropriation doctrine is not an obstacle to

change. We do need, however, sufficient time to discern the true direction of our

rapidly changing societal values.

Fleming, W.M.; Hall, G.E. 2000. Water conservation incentives for New Mexico: 

policy and legislative alternatives. Natural Resources Journal. 40: 69-91.

Excerpt from abstract: A broad range of options for encouraging municipal, industrial

and agricultural water conservation are proposed for water-short New Mexico. Of

particular interest are feasible options within the existing institutional and legal

framework, focusing on measures that could be implemented without statutory

changes by the Office of the State Engineer and the Interstate Stream Commission. 

Lamb, B.L.; Lord, E. 1992. Legal mechanisms for protecting riparian resource 

values. Water Resources Research. 28: 965-977.

Abstract from journal: Riparian resources include the borders of rivers, lakes, ponds,

and potholes. These border areas are very important for a number of reasons,

including stream channel maintenance, flood control, aesthetics, erosion control, fish

and wildlife habitat, recreation, and water quality maintenance. These diverse functions are not well protected by law or policy. We reviewed law and policies regarding

endangered species habitat designation, land use planning, grazing management,

water allocation, takings, and federal permits and licenses, along with the roles of

federal, state, and local governments. We discuss the politics of implementing

these policies, focusing on the difficulties in changing entrenched water and land

use practices. Our review indicates a lack of direct attention to riparian ecosystem

issues in almost all environmental and land use programs at every level of government. Protection of riparian resource values requires a means to integrate existing

programs to focus on riparian zones.

Haddad, B.M. 2000. Economic incentives for water conservation on the Monterey 

Peninsula: the market proposal. Journal of the American Water Resources

Association. 36: 1-15.

Abstract from journal: Literature on price-based urban water conservation and 

on market-based mechanisms to manage natural resources suggests that marketbased management of urban/suburban water use may be feasible. A market-based

proposal that emerged from a water shortage on California’s Monterey Peninsula is

presented. In the proposal, conservation incentives arise both from an ability among

end-users of water to reduce consumption and sell use-rights to water, and from a

penalty price for consumption in excess of one’s use rights. The amount of water

associated with use rights is capped and varies according to hydrological, meteorological, ecological, and other criteria. Requirements for further study of the proposal

are listed, and the role that similar market-based mechanisms could play in urban

water management is discussed. 

68

Water Pricing
69

Water Markets

Hewitt, J.A.; Hanemann, W.M. 1995. A discrete/continuous choice approach to 

residential water demand under block rate pricing. Land Economics. 71: 173-192.

Abstract from journal: A discrete/continuous choice model of the residential demand

for water under block rate pricing is presented, estimated, and compared to results

of regression models. The empirical analysis uses a dataset from a previously

published study, Nieswiadomy and Molina (1989) a household level panel data for

Denton, Texas, for summer months from 1981 to 1985 with an increasing block rate

in effect. The striking result is that the discrete/continuous choice model produces

price elasticity estimates near -1.6, which are much more elastic than previously

published results based on regression models where discrete choice is not explicitly

modeled.

Huffaker, R.; Whittlesey, N.; Michelsen, A. [and others] 1998. Evaluating the 

effectiveness of conservation water-pricing programs. Journal of Agricultural and

Resource Economics. 23: 12-19.

Abstract from journal: Charging farmers increasing block prices for irrigation deliveries is advocated as a means of encouraging agricultural water conservation in the

West. We formulate a model of a hypothetical irrigated river basin to investigate the

hydro-economic circumstances in which such pricing leads to water conservation.

Our results indicate that increasing delivery prices may encourage irrigators to make

adjustments with countervailing impacts on consumptive water use and conservation. Whether these countervailing impacts combine to conserve water or increase

its consumptive use must be resolved empirically. An alternative resolution of this

ambiguity is to assess water prices in terms of consumptive use.

Wichelns, D.; Cone, D. 1992. Tiered pricing motivates Californians to conserve 

water. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation. 47: 139-144.

Excerpt from Journal: California’s Broadview Water District implemented an

increasing block-rate pricing plan in October 1988 to motivate the use of water

conservation practices. The goal of these practices: to reduce the volume of drain

water collected beneath farm fields. The program’s success was to be measured

by observed changes in irrigation practices and reductions in water deliveries and

collected drain water. The positive results obtained in subsequent years prompted

the district’s board of directors in 1990 to adopt tiered pricing as a permanent 

district policy.

Brennan, D.; Scoccimarro, M. 1999. Issues in defining property rights to improve 

Australian water markets. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource

Economics. 43: 69-89.

Abstract from journal: This article discusses the key practical issues associated with

defining property rights to water use, in the context of broadening the scope of the

market for transferable water entitlements. In particular, the third party impacts of

water trade and the need for improved water trading rules are discussed. Some of

the issues associated with defining the reliability of water rights, including the design

of appropriate dam management policies, are also discussed. The article concludes

with some positive suggestions for the policy debate.
Crase, L.; O’Reilly, L.; Dollery, B. 2000. Water markets as a vehicle for water 

reform: the case of New South Wales. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and

Resource Economics. 44: 299-321.

Abstract from journal: Water reform in NSW is being undertaken using an adaptive

approach in recognition of the uncertainty and imperfect knowledge embodied in the

riverine environment. However, the reform process also relies, in part, on the ability

of markets for tradable water entitlements to develop and thereby assist in allocating

scarce water resources to their highest value use. This article explores impediments

to the formation of efficient markets in permanent tradable water entitlements in

NSW. The article concludes that more attention should be paid to market failures

and related problems, which manifest themselves in thin markets for permanent

water entitlements.

Duffield, J.W.; Neher, C. 1991. Market value of agricultural water leased for instream

flows. Missoula, MT: Bioeconomic Associates; final report submitted to Montana

Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks. 138 p.

Abstract from report: The purpose of this report is to provide market values for leasing agricultural water for instream flow purposes and to develop a structure for lease

agreements. This information is to assist Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and

Parks in implementing a pilot instream flow water-leasing program.

Fadali, E.; Shaw, W.D. 1998. Can recreation values for a lake constitute a market 

for banked agricultural water? Contemporary Economic Policy. 16: 433-441.

Abstract from journal: This paper presents estimates of the recreational use value 

to prevent the loss of a Western lake threatened by diversions of upstream waters

that supply it. The recreation demand model used to estimate recreation-related 

values is the popular repeated nested multinomial logit model. The model is specified

to allow an individual to choose when to visit various sites during the season,

because site choice is likely to be influenced by water levels that change over the

course of the season. The values are compared to agriculture values in order to

assess whether the potential recreation demand side of a market for a water bank

exists.

Gardner, B.D.; Warner, J.E. 1994. The Central Valley Water Project Improvement 

Act and water markets: two steps forward—one step back. Choices. 9: 4-9.

The authors discuss the Central Valley Water Project Improvement Act, which

changed the rules for allocating federal water in California. The act aims to promote

market transfers of federal water to promote efficiency. The act also introduced a

tiered pricing scheme that depends on the contracted price of water, quantity of

water used, and the full cost of water. The act includes certain safeguards for fish

and wildlife habitat, including a mandate of 13 percent of project water to be dedicated annually for fish and wildlife habitat restoration. The authors argue that this

favored position for fish and wildlife distorts market values for water and hinders the

process of water markets. They suggest that such restrictions on market exchanges

will cost far more in efficiency losses than any benefits they might provide.

70
Graff, T.J.; Yardas, D. 1998. Reforming Western water policy: markets and 

regulation. Natural Resources and Environment. 12: 165-169.

The authors discuss inefficiencies and environmental externalities caused by the

prior appropriation doctrine. They suggest that water must be reallocated and this

can best be accomplished through the development of water markets.

Hanley, N.; Fairchney, R.; Munro, A.; Shortle, J.S. 1998a. Economic and 

environmental modeling for pollution control in an estuary. Journal of

Environmental Management. 52: 211-225.

Abstract from journal: This paper reports on results from an environmental-economic

modeling exercise aimed at quantifying the potential cost savings from a Tradable

Pollution Permits (TTPs) scheme in the Fourth Estuary, Scotland. Such a scheme

might be introduced to control inputs of biological oxygen demand more cheaply

than the current regulatory system. A MIKE 11 water-quality model is combined

with step-wise integer and linear programming models representing firms’ abatement costs. Cost savings under a deterministic scenario are compared with savings

under a stochastic scenario, where transfer coefficients, relating discharges to

ambient water quality, are allowed to vary. Potential cost savings appear to exist in

both cases, although these cost savings are less in the stochastic case. The paper

concludes by considering potential barriers to any real-life TPP market actually

achieving these potential cost savings.

Howitt, R. 1994. Water markets, individual incentives and environmental goals. 

Choices. 9: 10-13.

This article is a response to Gardner and Warner (1994) who argue that environmental constraints imposed by the Central Valley Project Improvement Act will deter

free trading of water in California. Howitt (1994), on the other hand, argues that other

aspects of the act will stimulate water market sales. The underlying debate is whether

or not environmental restrictions imposed by the act will restrict water sales more than

new incentives will encourage them. Howitt (1994) argues that the restoration of water

for fish and wildlife simply corrects the negative externalities that environmentalists

believe stemmed from misallocation of water to agriculture by the Central Valley

Project several decades ago. The act also attempts to control for third-party impacts

of water trades by placing some restrictions on water trades, such as the restriction

that fish and wildlife shall not be negatively impacted by water transfers. Howitt

states that the provision in the act that allows farmers to sell up to 20 percent of

their water without approval of their local water district, creates an incentive that will

improve water markets. This provision basically (for the first time) gives a portion of

the water property right directly to individual users. This prevents other users from

interfering with or stopping individuals from selling water and making gains from

trade. Howitt believes that the net effect of all the provisions in the Central Valley

Project Improvement Act should be an increase in water traded despite the stronger

environmental regulations. 

71
Lovell, S.; Millock, K.; Sunding, D.L. 2000. Using water markets to improve 

environmental quality: two innovative programs in Nevada. Journal of Soil and

Water Conservation. 55: 19-26.

Abstract from journal: Economists have long advocated the use of market mechanisms as a means to improve environmental quality at minimum cost. Voluntary

water purchase programs are an example of such a policy. This paper examines 

the structure and performance of two water right purchase programs operating in

Nevada: the Truckee River Water Quality Agreement and the Lahontan Valley purchase program administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the State of

Nevada and The Nature Conservancy. Statistical analysis of the latter program indicates that it is performing efficiently. Notably, personal factors prompt water right

sales, and the least productive rights (e.g., those appurtenant to poor soils) are sold

to the government. Concluding comments offer suggestions about ways to improve

program performance, including allowing the sale of fractional water rights.

Weinberg, M.; Kling, C.L.; Wilen, J.E. 1993. Water markets and water quality. 

American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 75: 278-291.

Abstract from journal: In addition to improving the allocative efficiency of water use,

water markets may reduce irrigation-related water quality problems. This potential

benefit is examined with a nonlinear programming model developed to simulate

agricultural decision-making in a drainage problem area in California’s San Joaquin

Valley. Results indicate that a 30 percent drainage goal is achievable through

improvements in irrigation practices and changes in cropping patterns induced by 

a water market. Although water markets will not generally achieve a least-cost solution, they may be a practical alternative to economically efficient, but informational

intensive, environmental policies such as Pigouvian taxes. 

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