Number 157, January 1999

U.K. Defense Policy
Modern Forces for the Modern World
by Michael O’Neill

Conclusions- The United Kingdom’s recent    Strategic Defence Review (SDR) builds on a process of military transformation underway    since the end of the Cold War. In contrast to earlier reforms, the SDR is firmly rooted in    foreign policy and a clear intellectual framework for assessing the future size and shape    of U.K. armed forces. 
- The United Kingdom is a major European    state, with a fundamental interest in Europe’s security, but with interests that are    not confined to Europe. Elsewhere, U.K. interests are most likely to be affected by events    in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. 
- An increasingly unstable international    environment requires smaller but frequent military operations, often simultaneous and    sometimes prolonged, including peace support and humanitarian operations which may be    militarily very demanding. 
- Future U.K. armed forces must be able to    conduct either an operation similar in size and duration to the Gulf War, or two    concurrent medium-scale operations. 
- U.K. armed forces will be restructured    and modernized to be more deployable, sustainable, mobile, and flexible, including: 
- a properly manned, well-trained, and    better equipped front line**;** 
- greater emphasis on joint forces with    enhanced capabilities; 
- improved power projection, logistics,    and other support. 
- Army personnel levels will rise by    3,300, mainly in signals, engineer, and logistics areas, the Royal Navy will reduce by    1,400, and the Royal Air Force will remain unchanged. 
- Savings made from support and    procurement reforms and program reductions will fund substantial new investment and    modernization. 
**Strategic Defence Review

The U.K. Government launched a StrategicDefence Review immediately after its election in May 1997. The parameters came from theGovernment’s manifesto: strong defense, security based on NATO, and retention ofTrident missile submarines combined with multinational arms control. The results appearedin July 1998 in a white paper, *Strategic Defence Review:**Modern Forces for theModern World*. Defence Secretary George Robertson called the review radical,"modernising and reshaping our armed forces to meet the needs of the 21st century,reflecting a changing world in which the confrontation of the Cold War has been replacedby a complex mixture of uncertainty and instability."

Since the end of the Cold War, like otherAllies, the United Kingdom had progressively reduced defense spending and force levels.During 1990-98 the armed forces decreased from 315,000 to 210,000 personnel.Conventionally armed submarine numbers decreased from 28 to 12, destroyers and frigatesfrom 48 to 35, infantry battalions from 55 to 40. Tank numbers had fallen by 45 percent,RAF aircraft numbers by 30 percent.

But there had been no comprehensive reviewof military roles and structures. Cuts were made roughly proportionately rather than byshifting resources strategically to reflect new requirements. The increasing frequency ofextended overseas deployments, notably in the Balkans, revealed weaknesses in logisticsupport and an increasing over-stretching of military forces.

The SDR was the first fundamentalre-appraisal of the U.K.’s post-Cold War defense posture. The starting point was apolicy framework devised by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Foreign and CommonwealthOffice. That was converted into eight Missions for the armed forces that were furtherdeveloped into 28 Military Tasks. The forces, capabilities, equipment, and support neededwere then assessed.

A further innovation was the open andinclusive process. Extensive consultation took place with parliament, the public, outsidespecialists, and defense personnel through open seminars led by Ministers. The MOD alsoreceived hundreds of written submissions, as well as advice from an expert panel,academics, industrialists, trade unionists, scientists, and others. There was closeliaison with Allies, for example, talks with the U.S. Department of Defense ProgramAnalysis and Evaluation staff and other participants in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
**U.K. Security Priorities and the StrategicEnvironment

The setting of the SDR is that Britain isa major European state, whose economic and political future is as part of Europe. Britainhas a fundamental interest in Europe’s security and stability and in NATOeffectiveness as a collective political and military instrument to underpin them. Europeansecurity is also reinforced by other means, including conflict-prevention by theOrganization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and European Union (EU) success inextending prosperity and stability, especially through its Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy (CFSP).

But Britain’s interests are notconfined to Europe. Its economy is founded on international trade—U.K. exports form ahigher proportion of GDP than for the United States, Japan, Germany, or France. OutsideEurope, British interests are most likely to be affected by events in the Persian Gulf andthe Mediterranean. So, U.K. national security and prosperity also depend on promotingwider international stability, freedom, and economic development, and on the work ofmultinational organizations, above all the United Nations.

There is today no direct military threatto the United Kingdom or Western Europe, nor is one likely to re-emerge. But this cannotbe taken for granted. NATO enlargement and defense cooperation programs will helpstrengthen the trend. Nonetheless, instability in Europe, as in the Balkans, or beyond, asin Africa, can threaten U.K. security directly or indirectly. With weapons of massdestruction (WMD) and missile technology proliferating, dangerous regimes elsewherethreaten vital economic interests and international stability. It is noteworthy that since1990 more British troops have been on active operations at any one time than during theCold War. 
**Future Roles and Shape of U.K. ArmedForces

Hitherto U.K. defense planning was basedon three Defence Roles: protecting the United Kingdom and Dependent Territories, insuringagainst major external threats to the United Kingdom and Allies, and contributing to widerinternational peace and stability. Over time, this framework has become inadequate, forexample, giving insufficient prominence to the range of operations under Role Three. TheSDR rectifies this with eight new Defence Missions, giving a more accurate and balancedstatement of the roles of the armed forces and a clearer basis for planning. Inclusion ofDefence Diplomacy reflects the importance to U.K. security of building and maintainingtrust and preventing conflict. The Missions also anticipate growing calls forcontributions to international peace support and humanitarian operations, some of whichcould be militarily very demanding. 

These missions include:

1. Peacetime Security2. Security of the Overseas Territories3. Defence Diplomacy 4. Support to Wider British Interests5. Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations6. Regional Conflict outside the NATO Area7. Regional Conflict inside the NATO Area8. Strategic Attack on NATO.

A crucial innovation of the SDR was therigorous intellectual framework used to assess future force structures. First, changes inthe nature of future operations were considered. In place of an intense conflict ofrelatively short duration, future operations might be smaller in scale but longer lastingand farther afield, with little local infrastructure. There would be more need forexpeditionary forces requiring increased lift, logistic support, and extendedcommunications. At sea the emphasis would move from large-scale, open-ocean operationstoward littoral operations and force projection. The increasing tempo of land operationswould demand greater deployability and mobility, precision and range of firepower, andforce protection. Air superiority and air defense would be vital for many deployedoperations, requiring a continued balanced mix of aircraft but more emphasis on precisionmissiles and transport aircraft.

Second, a specific benchmark was adoptedto plan the size and shape of the force, based on planning assumptions about requiredscales of effort, readiness levels, and endurance and concurrency of operations. Theyardstick was that the United Kingdom should be able to meet continuing commitments suchas in Northern Ireland and *either* conduct operations similar in scale and durationto the Gulf War (when the United Kingdom deployed an armored division, 26 major warships,and over 80 combat aircraft) *or*undertake a more extended deployment on a lesserscale, as in Bosnia, and retain the capacity for a second major deployment, for example, acombat brigade and appropriate naval and air forces.

The SDR conclusions reflect aninternational environment that is in many ways more demanding. Undertaking smaller butfrequent, often simultaneous and sometimes prolonged operations can be harder thanpreparing for a single, worst-case conflict. There will be more use of armed forces todeter or manage crises. They must have the military capabilities and flexibility torespond rapidly and effectively to a wider range of tasks.

The restructured armed forces will have anew generation of equipment, including attack helicopters, long-range precision munitions,digitized command and control, new aircraft carriers, submarines, escorts, the Eurofighteraircraft, and a successor to the Tornado. Other capabilities planned or entering serviceinclude ASTOR airborne ground surveillance radar, Phoenix unmanned target acquisitionvehicles, Cobra artillery-locating radar, and Tracer battlefield reconnaissance vehicles.New information and communication systems will integrate sensors, weapons, platforms, andlogistics (e.g., a secure intranet for deployed operations), the Bowman combat radio, andupgraded satellite communications. Force structure and the balance of investment betweenweapons, platforms, and other systems will be adjusted as new capabilities come available.
**Procurement and Support

The SDR will also bring major changes inequipment procurement and defense support to secure greater economy, efficiency, andeffectiveness.

In procurement, separate approaches willbe introduced for major and minor projects and commodity and other low-risk items, and athrough-life approach to projects will be adopted, covering both acquisition andin-service support. Single project teams will combine requirements, technology andevaluation, procurement, and logistics functions. Approval procedures will be simplified,with two not three key decision points, to allow greater responsiveness to technologicalchange. These changes should mean faster, cheaper, and better procurement and in-servicesupport.

Substantial savings have already been madeby reforming support, including new Defence Agencies and more private sector involvement.These efforts will continue. Further emphasis will be placed on a joint approach, as inoperations. Merging all Service logistics into one organization under a Chief of DefenceLogistics will facilitate further rationalization. New Agencies will be responsible forstorage and distribution of all non-explosive stores and repair and overhaul of allmilitary aircraft. A new Defence Transport and Movements Organization will controllarge-scale movements of personnel and materiel. Major savings will be made by reducingstockholdings and defense real estate.
**DEVELOPING THE EUROPEAN    SECURITY     AND DEFENSE IDENTITY (ESDI)**
The United Kingdom is committed to    fairer burdensharing between Europe and North America, by ensuring Europe can speak with a    single, authoritative voice on key international issues and intervene effectively, where    necessary. Europe’s CFSP is being improved with new instruments like a planning staff    and a High Representative to ensure policy is more coherent and better implemented. Europe    must also develop the ability to act independently when the United States is unable or    unwilling to participate. 

One element of this is implementing the    ESDI within NATO, for example, by developing the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept    to allow Europe to make better use of Alliance assets. A further requirement is proper    European decisionmaking structures. Since October 1998, Britain has led a new effort on    this, looking at measures such as streamlined institutions and for the first time    including defense ministers, with the expertise they bring, in EU discussion of security    issues.

The United Kingdom has long recognized,    however, that more efficient institutions are far from a sufficient condition for a    stronger European contribution. As Tony Blair said in November 1998, "Europe needs    genuine military operational capability and political will. Without these, we will always    be talking about an empty shell." The modernization of U.K. armed forces set out in    the SDR offers improved military capability and a model for others. The United Kingdom is    also strengthening military ties with other Europeans (e.g., by new links between European    air forces and between U.K. and French national headquarters) that build on recent    bilateral operational cooperation in Bosnia.

The central principles of the U.K.    approach are that this work should not undermine or duplicate NATO and should be conducted    in partnership with NATO members not in the EU. In this way a stronger Europe, more able    and committed to action, will be a stronger partner for the United States while also    strengthening NATO.
 
**PRINCIPAL SDR    CONCLUSIONS
**Joint capabilities

New Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF),    able to mount simultaneously two brigade-sized operations to high-intensity combat

New Royal Navy/RAF fixed wing force –    Joint Force 2000 – to operate from land and aircraft carriers

New Joint Battlefield Helicopter Command,    encompassing all battlefield helicopters and providing force packages to operational    commanders

New Deployable Joint Force Headquarters,    greater powers for the Chief of Joint Operations, and new Joint Defence Centre to develop    doctrine
**Strategic capabilities

Retaining four Trident submarines, but    with a reduced stockpile of 200 operationally available warheads and 58 missile bodies

Improved strategic lift, including four    additional Ro-Ro ships and four new C-17s or equivalent

Enhanced logistic support, including 2,000    new combat support posts and two new Joint Force Logistic Component headquarters

New nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC)    reconnaissance organization and enhanced biological and chemical detection and    decontamination equipment
**Single Service capabilities

Introducing two larger, more versatile    aircraft carriers, able to operate up to 50 fixed wing aircraft and helicopters;

Fitting all attack submarines to fire    Tomahawk missiles

Updating escort and attack submarine    fleets, leading toward introduction of the Horizon air defense frigate early in the new    century

Maintaining specialized brigade-sized    landing force and amphibious shipping, including a new landing platform helicopter and two    replacement landing platform docks

Maintaining two deployable Army divisions,    with size of regular infantry unchanged, and eight existing tank regiments reconfigured    into six larger regiments

Converting the airborne brigade into a    mechanized role, making a total of six armored and mechanized brigades to allow a more    balanced operational cycle

Converting the air-mobile brigade into a    highly mobile, powerful, air maneuver brigade with parachute capability and Apache attack    helicopters

Restructuring the Territorial Army    (Reserves) from a force of formed units at low readiness to a smaller but more deployable    force closely integrated with Regular forces

Confirming Eurofighter order and    conducting further Future Offensive Air System studies

New missiles for Eurofighter and Tornado,    including Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missile, Brimstone anti-armor missile, and Storm    Shadow long-range cruise missile** 
 
**JOINT RAPID REACTION    FORCES**

A key theme of the SDR is greater emphasis    on joint activity. The United Kingdom already has a Permanent Joint headquarters and Joint    Rapid Deployment Forces. The SDR marks a significant further step in this direction. 

The JRRF will spearhead Britain’s    modernized, rapidly deployable, and better-supported front line. Force packages will be    assembled from a pool of powerful, versatile units from all three Services for all    short-notice military tasks. The JRRF will have more punch and protection than the    existing Joint Rapid Deployment Force, as well as improved strategic transport,    operational logistics, and medical services, and deployable command and control. 

The JRRF should be operational by 2001.    Its first echelon, held at very high readiness, would allow early entry operations and an    initial military capability. It could provide a maritime task group, air power, lead    battle groups of land and amphibious forces, and special forces, under a fully equipped,    rapidly deployable headquarters. A second echelon would provide further naval and air    forces to allow substantial combat operations, and a land force which could comprise a    commando, air-mobile, armored, or mechanized brigade.
 
 
**FORCE LEVELS**
**Force Element**
**Previous        Plans**
**Post-SDR Plans**Aircraft Carriers 33Amphibious        Ships 88Attack Submarines  1210Destroyers and Frigates  3532Minewarfare Vessels  2522Royal Marine Commando 3.53.5Armored and      Reconnaissance        Regiments 1110Artillery Regiments 1515Engineer Regiments 1113Equipment Support Battalions 67Armored Infantry Battalions 89Mechanized Infantry Battalions 46Light Infantry Battalions 2522NBC Regiment 
-
1Royal Logistics Corps      Regiments 87Airborne Early Warning Aircraft 
                          66Maritime and Reconnaissance      Aircraft 2323Air Defense Aircraft10087Offensive Air Support Aircraft 177154Support Helicopters(Chinook equivalents) 63 636363Transport and Tanker Aircraft 7882
Michael O’Neill is a British foreignservice officer currently assigned to the British Embassy in Washington, D.C. He wrotethis article during a three-month attachment as a Visiting Fellow at INSS. Furtherinformation, including the full white paper and essays on specific issues, are availableon the U.K. Ministry of Defence website at www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/index.htm. 

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

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Editor - Jonathan W. PierceNOTE

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