Fox filed suit, asking the district court to compel Clark County 

to abide by the memorandum of understanding. Clark County moved to 

dismiss, arguing that it was not Fox's employer. The EJDC intervened 

and agreed with Clark County that it, not the county, employed the 

deputy marshals. The district court decided in favor of Fox, finding that 

Clark County and the EJDC were de facto co-employers, that Clark 

County gave the EJDC apparent authority to bind Clark County to the 

memorandum of understanding, and that due process requires that Fox 

receive a Step 2 hearing. Both EJDC and Clark County filed separate 

appeals. 

The district court reasoned that Clark County could be bound 

to the memorandum of understanding signed by the EJDC because Clark 

County's letter of agreement relinquished authority to the EJDC. The 

district court thus concluded that due process requires Clark County to 

provide Fox with a Step 2 hearing or its functional equivalent. 

We fail to see how Clark County is bound by the memorandum 

of understanding. Clark County was not a party to the memorandum. It 

therefore cannot be held liable for not complying with the memorandum's 

provisions. See Cnty. of Clark v. Bonanza No. 1, 96 Nev. 643, 648-49, 615 

P.2d 939, 943 (1980) ("As a general rule, none is liable upon a contract 

except those who are parties to it."). 

The district court's conclusions of law briefly mention a theory 

of liability based on apparent authority. Apparent authority prevents a 

party from denying agency when its conduct has cloaked the agent with 

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apparent authority to act on the party's behalf. Tsouras v. Sw. Plumbing 

& Heating, 94 Nev. 748, 751, 587 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1978). 

Here, the EJDC is not an agent, real or apparent, of Clark 

County. Even assuming that Clark County is a co-employer, which we 

decline to decide today, Clark County's letter of understanding did not 

give the EJDC authority to bind Clark County into another agreement. In 

the letter of understanding, "the court" adopted the Clark County Merit 

Personnel System, but Clark County did not give any authority to the 

court. 

The record does not show that Clark County gave real or 

apparent authority to the EJDC to bind Clark County to the memorandum 

of understanding. The district court's order does not explain how, without 

this apparent authority, Clark County could be bound by the 

memorandum of understanding to which it did not agree. 

Fox should have asked the EJDC to proceed with his posttermination hearings under the memorandum of understanding. If the 

EJDC was not receptive to such a request, he could have sued the EJDC to 

enforce any right to a Step 2 hearing that he might have under the 

memorandum. As it is, Fox sued Clark County to enforce an agreement to 

which Clark County was not a party. But the record does not show how 

Clark County could be liable under this agreement. The district court 

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Saitta 

Pickering 

J. 

Gibbons 

therefore erred by granting Fox's motion for summary judgment and we 

reverse its order denying Clark County's motion. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 

121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (stating that this court 

reviews summary judgments de novo). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED. 

sect....ac , C.J. 

Hardesty 

I _II 

cL 

Parraguirre 0 

1 

Douglas 

cc: Chief Judge, The Eighth Judicial District Court 

Hon. Charles M. McGee, Senior Judge 

Kamer Zucker Abbott 

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas 

Law Office of Daniel Marks 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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