UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 

FLORIDA MIAMI DIVISION

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INS. CO.; et al Case No.: 20-CV-22044-JEM

Plaintiffs,

v.

MANUEL V. FEIJOO, MANUEL V. FEIJOO, M.D., 

P.A., WE CARE MEDICAL SERVICES, INC, 

MANUEL MARTINEZ VARELA, TONY NGUYEN, 

D.O.; NEW LIFE CLINICAL SERVICES, INC, 

ALEAN MACHADO,

JOSE ESTEVEZ, YOANDRA RODRIGUEZ, 

ACCIDENT REHAB ASSC. INC, d/b/a AMERICAN 

MEDICAL & REHAB CENTER, ALEJANDRO 

VAZQUEZ, MARIA VAZQUEZ, ERICK SALADO, 

M.D., MIAMI MEDICAL GROUP, INC, JUAN 

JIMENEZ, GRACIELA JIMENEZ, JOSE MARQUEZ, 

M.D., MARIA NODARSE, D.C., YARA VAZQUEZ and 

HAI UZAN

Defendants.

/

DEFENDANTS’ REPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

Defendants, WE CARE MEDICAL SERVICES, INC, and MANUEL MARTINEZ 

VARELA, by and through its undersigned counsel (Defendants), submit this Reply to Plaintiff’s 

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, [DE 26], and state:

I. Plaintiffs Have No Standing to Bring These Claims In the Case at Bar

Despite Plaintiff’s arguments in its Response, the issue in this action remains the same: 

whether GEICO should be permitted to create a private right of action by alleging violations of 

a number of regulatory statutes without civil enforcement provisions together, to create 

common law causes of actions, thereby asking this Court to judicially create a private right of 

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action, where the legislature did not intend to create one.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, none of GEICOs claims can survive without this Court 

making a determination that there were statutory violations. GEICO in its Response, states that 

Defendants are incorrect in their assertion that it lacks standing to bring this suit because there

is no private right of action. However the cases it cites appear to be distinguishable under the 

pertinent fact pattern, and that the Florida Supreme Court cases of Murthy v. N. Sinha Corp.,

644 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1994) and QBE Ins. Corp. v. Chalfonte Condo. Apt. Assn., 94 So. 3d 

541 (Fla. 2012), which were not cited to those courts, are still applicable.

In addition, the District Court cases cited, are factually distinguishable from the case at 

bar. Most of the cases dealt with a factual pattern in which the illegality of the defendants 

activities was evident on the face of the complaint. Contrary to this type of facially fraudulent

illegality, which made any alleged statutory violations incidental, and which the court’s accepted 

as the basis for finding standing in those cases to bring its claims, in the case at bar, the 

substantive factual allegations in the Complaint are so sparse, that all that GEICO can do to 

attempt to establish its standing to bring its claims, is to allege supposed violations of the 

statutes. As such, the private enforcement of these statutes becomes the sole basis of its legal 

standing to bring the claims in GEICO’s Complaint, once again, in contravention of the Supreme 

Court cases cited. 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “But where the well-pleaded 

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facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the 

complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at

679.

As such, in the case at bar, unlike the cases cited, GEICO has not shown any conduct by 

the defendant’s independent of the alleged statutory violations, which would give it the standing 

to pursue its claims for damages. Thus, the statutory violations claims, as pled in the case at bar, 

become in effect, a private cause of action under that statute, contrary to the Florida Supreme 

Court cases cited above. 

Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted, that in this particular case, GEICO has not 

shown the necessary standing to bring these actions, as alleged. 

II. Plaintiffs’ Fail to Allege It’s Fraud Claims with the Requisite Particularity under Rule 

9(b)

Despite Plaintiffs’ arguments in its Response to the contrary, Plaintiff’s claims for fraud 

should be dismissed because they fail to comply with the heightened pleading standard under 

Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A plaintiff “must provide particular facts so 

the Court is not left wondering whether a plaintiff has offered mere conjecture or a specifically 

pleaded allegation on an essential element of the lawsuit.” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Beverly 

Enters., 248 F. App’x 73, 75 (11th Cir. 2007)). Failure to meet Rule 9(b)'s standards results in 

dismissal of the complaint. Id.

GEICO, once again, throughout its voluminous Complaint, generalizes the alleged 

fraudulent conduct without specifying particular incidents sufficient to meet its pleading burden. 

The particularity requirement applies not only to Plaintiffs’ common law fraud, but also to its 

claims for violations of FDUTPA. See Meitis v. Park Square Enters., No. 608CV1080-

ORL22GJK, 2009 WL 703273, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2009)(determining that rule 9(b)’s 

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requirements apply to claims under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act 

reasoning “[m]ost courts construing claims alleging violations of the Federal Deceptive Trade 

Practices Act or its state counterparts have required the heightened pleading standard

requirements of Rule 9(b).”) (citing cases). In sum, Plaintiff must plead the violations of each 

of the predicate statutes and the violations of FDUTPA and the fraud claim with particularity as 

to each defendant.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons fully set forth above, Defendants respectfully requests 

that this Honorable Court enter an Order dismissing Plaintiff=s Complaint and granting any other 

such relief this Court deems just and proper.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 7

th day of August 2020, I electronically filed the

foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the 

foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record via

transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF.

By: /S/Carlos Cruanes

Carlos Cruanes

FBN: 0121940

LAW OFFICES OF CARLOS CRUANES, P.A.

815 N.W. 57

th Avenue, Suite 401

Miami, Florida 33126

Telephone: (786) 378-8189

Facsimile: (305) 631-1816

E-Mail: ccruanes@cruaneslaw.com

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