# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 2 2

- 72 1 C (Filed: July 2 1 , 202 2 )

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MARC EL JAMES LAMAR WOOD

,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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* Pro Se Plaintiff; Sua Sponte Dismissal for

Lack of Jurisdiction ; Sovereign Citizen Allegation s

Marc el J a m es Lamar Wood

, Chester

, PA

, pro se

.

OPINION AND ORDER

SWEENEY

, Senior Judge

Pro se plaintiff Marc el James Lamar Wood seeks declaratory and unspecified monetary relief arising from the United States’ purported misappropriation of h is “Estate.” For the reasons discussed below, the legal fiction underlying plaintiff’s claim is insufficien t to establish jurisdiction in this court ; therefore, the court dismisses plaintiff’s complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 28, 2022, plaintiff filed a form complaint accompanied by an appendix of documents. In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that the “United States was and is acting as” the

“custodian” of h is “Estate” because, pursuant to the “Cestui Que Vie Act [of] 1666,” it presumed

that he was dead or had abandoned h is “Estate.” Compl. 1. 1 H e further alleges that neither presumption is accurate

–– he is alive and has not abandoned h is “Estate.” Id. H e represents that to support h is allegations, he attached to h is complaint evidence of “the United States[’] involvement over the said Estate” and the name and registration number of the “Estate.” I d. at 2. Finally, without any further explanation of the nature of h is claim or the jurisdictional basis for asserting h is claim in this court, he requests a declaration that he is “the entitlement holder of the said Estate,” a declaration that he is aliv e, and to “be compensated the interest of the Estate from

the ‘United States.’” Id. at 3.

1 The page references to plaintiff’s filings are those assigned by the court’s electronic filing system.- 2

- Turning to the complaint’s appendix

, s ome of the documents appear to set forth a philosophical foundation for plaintiff’s claim, while others are in the form of est ate planning

documents apparently intended to support h is claim. The court will not examine each of these

documents in detail here , but instead presents a brief overview of their contents.

The first document is titled “Notice and Warning to Utility Companies.” Compl. App. 1. The key allegation in this document is a reference to the “bankruptcy” of the United States that purportedly occurred in 1933. See id. (“ Sin ce H ous e Joint Resolution 192 (HJR 192) (Public law 7310) was passed in 1933 we have only had debt, because all property a nd gold w [ere]

seized by the government a s collateral in the bank rupt cy of t he United S t ates .”). The document

also includes the following passage , presented wi thout alteration :

Every judge and every attorney in America, especially those who hold positions wi t h several dir ect connections into t he u t ilities companies ban k

accoun t s and acting as a ttorneys for the b an ks, most pr e s u m a bly in all o t her countries as well, since t hey a ll g et their instr u c t ions from England t he same place

that all t h e b a nks ge t their ins t r u ctions through t he Comp t roller of The Cu rre ncy h e adq uarters in London England, each knowing t h e above and inco rpo rated to b e true, since they ar e well ver sed on t he US Bank ruptcy of 1933 and that America

s t ill remains t o da te in a sta t e of Emergency and op e rates under English Law, though that also is supposed t o b e a w el l

- k e pt s ecret.

Th is means t here “ IS NO M ONEY. ” It further means that since there is no money Ame rican’s signatures are used as the cr edit to run this coun try. That in turn means that it is the American people whom are the Creditor s not the Debtors, as the

banks and utilities companies would like every one to believe.

Id. at 2.

The second document is a “Schedule of Fees,” through which plaintiff purports to
establish specific monetary penalt ies for various infractions related to the “Trust” which owns the “Copyright, trademark, [and] trade name . . . Marc el James Lamar Wood ,© TM.” Id. at 3

. For example, the unsolicited “Interrogation” of the trustee of the “ Trust ” as to that person’s name

or driver’s license number is a $10,000 infraction

. Id. at 3

- 4. Requiring a signature under “threat, duress, or coercion” is a $1,000,000 infraction. Id. at 4.

The third document is a “First Will and Testament of the Grantor,” in which plaintiff

purports to provide identifying information for the e state that is the basis for his claim:

I, Sheila Vandoria Mack , being of sound mind and over the age of 5 0, as

Grant o r of the private trust security

- Estate MARC EL JAMES LAMAR WOOD

, Registration Number 1989

- 00 51968 , Date of Registration

– July 13 , 1989, do Bless and do Grant Irrevocable Power of Attorney over said trust security to my

son Marc el J.L. Wood , h is agents and/or assigns this twentieth day of May

20 22 [.]- 3

- Id. at 5. In t he next document , an “Affidavit of Correction, ” plaintiff asserts that he is correcting

an error on h is birth certificate beca use the name on the birth certificate is in all capital letters

, which must be “considered a fictitious name,” whereas the “proper form” should be written

“Marc el James Lamar Wood .” Id. at 6.

The next t wo documents are affidavits, one “ of K nowledge of F acts” and another “of

L ife

, ” which appear to have the purpose of establishing , respectively, the truth of the assertions in the documents attached to the complaint, and that plaintiff is indeed alive. Id. at 7

- 9. In the

document that follow s , plaintiff reference s the Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666 and includes a

passage attributed to th is authorit y related to the circumstance of a person being alive after having been presumed dead. Id. at 10

- 1 2

. Plaintiff then presents a Declaration of Trust, id. at

1 3

- 2 5

, in which he identifies “ MARC EL JAMES LAMAR WOOD REG# 1989

- 00 51958 ” as a component of the trust corpus, id. at 24. The final document is a “Last Will and Testament of

Marc el James Lamar Wood .” I d. at 26

- 33.

Having considered all of plaintiff’s submissions, and finding a response from defendant unnecessary, the court i s prepared to adjudicate plaintiff’s claim.

II. DISCUSSION

Although the legal theory presented in support of plaintiff’s claim is cryptic , th e complaint has all of the hallmarks of a sovereign citizen suit. As is common in these suits

, plaintiff rel ies on a legal fiction to support a monetary claim that has no basis in the laws of the

United States. Before explaining further, t he court addresses the governing standards of review.

A. S tandards of Review

1

. Pro Se Plaintiffs

Pro se pleadings are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and are “to be liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) ( quoting Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) ). However, the “leniency afforded

to a pro se litigant with respect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meet jurisdictional requirements.” Minehan v. United States , 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007); accord

Henke v. United States , 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The fact that [the plaintiff] acted pro

se in the drafting of his complaint may explain its ambiguities, but it does not excuse its failures, if such there be.”). In other words, a pro se plaintiff is not excused from h is burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the court possesses jurisdiction. See Banks v. United

States , 741 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv.

, 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).

2

. Jurisdiction

Whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case is a- 4

- threshold matter. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t , 523 U.S. 83, 94

- 95 (1998). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdic tion is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle , 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). The question of subject

- matter jurisdi ction “ may be raised

. . . by a court on its own

initiative [] at any stage in the litigation .” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) ; accord Folden v. United States , 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

The ability of the United States Court of Federal Claims to entertain suits against the United States is limited. “The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it

consents to be sued.” United States v. Sherwood , 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). The waiver of immunity “cannot be implie d but must be unequivocally expressed.” United States v. King , 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).

The Tucker Act, the principal statute governing the jurisdiction of this court, waives sovereign immunity for claims against the United States that are founded upon the United States Constitution, a federal statute or regulation, or an express or implied contract with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). However, the Tucker Act is merely a jurisdictional statute and “does not create any substantive right enforceab le against the United States for money damages.”

United States v. Testan , 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Instead, the substantive right must appear in another source of law, such as a “money

- mandating constitutional provision, statute or regulation

that has been violated, or an express or implied contract with the United States.” Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States , 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).

To determine whether it has jurisdiction, the court discerns the true nature of the claim i n the complaint and is not constrained by the plaintiff’s characterization of th e claim. Katz v.

Cisneros , 16 F.3d 1204, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 1994)

. If the court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over a claim, R ule 1 2(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims requires that the

court dismiss th e claim.

B. Analysis

Plaintiff’s claim, as best the court can discern, is premised on h is interpretation of h is status as a person who is alive and who may h ave been presumed dead , h is contention that h is birth certificate does not accurately reflect h is existence, and h is assertion that h is estate,

“ MARC EL JAMES LAMAR WOOD REG# 1989

- 00 51958 ,” requires h im to be compensated by

the United States. These are sovereign citizen

- type arguments , where such plaintiff s attempt to
convince court s that their status as sovereign citizen s differs from the status of the fictional

individual s identified by their birth ce rtificate s or their social security number s

. E.g.

, Davis v.

United States , No. 09

- 862C, 2010 WL 1685907, at * 1

- 3 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 22, 2010)

.

O ften, a sovereign citizen plaintiff will argue that his or her birth certificate (and/or other documents) eviden ces a trust and that he or she ha s the right to collect the funds in that trust from

the United States

. See, e.g.

, Davenport v. United States , No. 17

- 1122C, 2017 WL 5988354, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 4, 2017) (stating that “[p] roponents of the sovereign citizen theory allege that- 5

- th [eir] security interest results in the creation of an individual trust account ” and attempt to claim

the funds in th at account by suing the United States); Rivera v. United States , 105 Fed. Cl. 644, 646 (2012) (noting that a sovereign citizen may assert that he or she “ is a sovereign, not a United States citizen, and therefore is entitled to obtain certain funds under a theory known as

‘ redemption ’ ” ). As in this suit, see Compl. App. 1, a sovereign citizen may reference the “ House

Joint Resolution 192” of 1933 as a legal basis for his or her redemption claim

, Rivera , 105 Fed.

Cl. at 646. The sovereign citizen redemption theory typically includes the following elements:

Many Sovereign Citizens believe that whe n the government began issuing legal tender in 1933, “all Citizens were ‘pledged’ as collateral for the national debt” resulting from the loss of value from the gold standard. All Sovereign Citizens

therefore have two identities: a real “private” individ ual and a fictional “public”

person. Refusing to be used as collateral can hypothetically result in access to a trust fund held in the fictional person ’ s name at the U.S. Treasury.

Jessica K. Phillips

, Not All Pro Se Litigants Are Created Equally: Exami ning the Need for New Pro Se Litigant Classifications Through the Lens of the Sovereign Citizen Movement , 29 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1221, 1226 (2016) (footnotes omitted).

Sovereign citizens also sometimes reference the Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666 , or a “cestui que vie” trust, 2 as support for their arguments in court

. See United States v. Nissen , 555 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1182 (D.N.M. 2021) (discussing a pro se criminal defenda nt’s sovereign citizen arguments that relied on the “ Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666 ” to assert that the court had no power

over him ) ; Ammon v. United States , 142 Fed. Cl. 210, 216 (discussing a sovereign citizen’s redemption claim based on an alleged “cestui que vie” trust account at the United States Treasury)

, appeal dismissed , No. 19

- 1759 (Fed. Cir. June 21, 2019)

. Here, s imilarly, plaintiff

relies on the Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666 in both the form complaint and its appendix to assert

that because h e has been presumed dead

, the United States became the custodian of h is estate
and now owes h im the “ interest o f th e E state. ” 3 Compl. 1

- 3; Compl. App. 1 0

- 1 2

.

Finally, the court notes that sovereign citizen plaintiffs often make a distinction between their names written in all capital letters and the same names written with just the initial letters capitalized. See Bryant v. Wash

. Mut. Bank , 524 F. Supp. 2d 753, 75 8 n.8 (W.D. Va. 2007) (noting that the sovereign citizen theory typically asserts that “ the name of the fictitious entity is the real person ’ s name in all

- capital letters, which apparently explains why names are commonly

2 A “cestui que vie” is “ [t] he person whose life measures the duration of a trust, gift, estate, or insurance contract

. ” Cestui que vie

, Black’s Law Dictionary (1 1 th ed. 201 9 )

.

3 Fo reign law is not among the money

- mandating sources of law that fall within the

ambit of the Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. See, e .g. , De Archibold v. United

States , 57 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (2003) (“The law of Panama, a foreign country, cannot act as the waiver of sovereign immunity that is required for Tucker Act jurisdiction in this court.”). Similarly , the Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666

, an English law, cannot support Tucker Act jurisdiction for a claim in this court.-6- written in all

- capital letters on birth certificates, dr iver ’s licenses, and other government

documents ”)

, aff’d , 282 F. App’x 260 (4th Cir. 2008). S overeign citizen s typically believe that when they use the proper capitalization of their names, they can redeem the funds held by the United States in “secret, i ndividual trust accounts, one for each citizen.” Id. at 759. Here, too, plaintiff states that his proper name is not to be written in all capital letters, as it was written on

h is birth certificate, Compl. App. 6, and that he is entitled to the “ interest o f the E state” held by

the United States , Compl. 3.

In short, the legal fiction presented by plaintiff in the complaint is not based in law but in the fantasies of the sovereig n citizen movement. There is no jurisdiction in this court for

fictitious claims. See Boeing Co. v. United States, 968 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ( stating

that “[a] llegations of subject matter jurisdiction, to suffice, must satisfy a relatively low

standard ,” but also noting that “essentially fictitious” claims do not meet the standard (quoting Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45-46 (2015) )). Like other monetary claims of sovereign

citizens this court has considered , plaintiff’s claim must be dismis sed for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g.

, Ammon , 142 Fed. Cl. at 220 (dismissing sovereign citizen redemp tion claim sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction ) ; Gravatt v. United States , 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 285, 288 (2011) ( dismissing

, sua sponte, sovereign citizen claim founded on fictitious trust fund account with the United States Department of the Treasury for lack of jurisdiction).

I II

. CONCLUSION

The clerk’s office is directed to DISMISS the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice . F urther, t he court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith because, as alleged, plaintiff’ s claim is clearly beyond the jurisdiction of this court.

No costs are awarded. The clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

MARGARET M. SWEENEY Senior Judge