U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

66–712 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

DOD’S REDUCED DRUG CONTROL EFFORT: TO

WHAT EXTENT AND WHY?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JANUARY 27, 2000

Serial No. 106–150

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

LISA SMITH ARAFUNE, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman

BOB BARR, Georgia

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

DOUG OSE, California

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

SHARON PINKERTON, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

GIL MACKLIN, Professional Staff Member

LISA WANDLER, Clerk

CHERRI BRANSON, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on January 27, 2000 ......................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Ford, Jess T., Associate Director, International Relations and Trade

Issues, National Security and International Affairs, Government Accounting Office; Ana Maria Salazar, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, Department of Defense; Rear Admiral Ernest R. Riutta, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard; and Charles Stallworth, Executive Director,

Air and Marine Interdiction Division, U.S. Customs Service ................... 13

Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:

Ford, Jess T., Associate Director, International Relations and Trade

Issues, National Security and International Affairs, Government Accounting Office, prepared statement of ....................................................... 16

Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Florida:

Chart concerning aircraft support ........................................................... 4

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 7

Riutta, Rear Admiral Ernest R., Assistant Commandant for Operations,

U.S. Coast Guard, prepared statement of ................................................... 46

Salazar, Ana Maria, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug

Enforcement Policy and Support, Department of Defense, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 38

Stallworth, Charles, Executive Director, Air and Marine Interdiction Division, U.S. Customs Service, prepared statement of ................................... 53

(1)

DOD’S REDUCED DRUG CONTROL EFFORT: TO

WHAT EXTENT AND WHY?

THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Mica, Gilman, Hutchinson, Ose, and

Kucinich.

Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director and chief counsel;

Charley Diaz, congressional fellow; Gil Macklin, professional staff

member; Lisa Wandler, clerk; Cherri Branson, minority counsel;

and Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk.

Mr. MICA. Good morning. I would like to call this hearing of the

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources to order. We may be joined by additional Members as they

come in from the snow and ice in beautiful Washington as it is recovering from the great snowstorm of this week. But I would like

to go ahead and get started.

I will start with an opening statement, and then we will have a

panel of witnesses that we will hear from and again hopefully we

will be joined by some of the other Members, but we do want to

proceed. And we do have a vote I believe scheduled for 12 noon,

and so we would like to conclude the hearing by then if possible.

This morning’s hearing is being held to examine a General Accounting Office report. Do we have copies available? And let us

make sure that we have copies for all of the Members.

This is a report which I requested last year to assess DOD’s drug

interdiction efforts.

This report which was recently released documents a dramatic

reduction in the DOD assets committed to reducing the supply of

illegal drugs in America.

In fact, while some columnists have pronounced the war on drugs

a failure, this report confirms that the war on drugs did not fail,

but rather was dismantled piece by piece by the Clinton administration beginning in 1993.

Imagine, if you can, waging a war by slashing the command

structure, cutting combat resources in half, dismantling intelligence and surveillance capabilities, ignoring strategic targets and

treating only the wounded in battle. Imagine fighting a war where

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intelligence information sharing was purposely diminished and denied to both our troops and our allies.

Today, we will hear that this strategy was purposefully implemented by this administration. As this GAO report concludes: ‘‘The

decline in assets DOD uses to carry out its counterdrug responsibilities is due, one, to lower priority assigned to the counterdrug mission; and, two, overall reductions in defense budgets and force levels.’’

Both of those commentaries appear on page 4.

This low priority strategy has taken a terrible toll on our country. Indeed, shutting down America’s war on drugs has had very

grave consequences. Few wars in the history of the United States

have taken a greater toll in lives or imposed greater destruction in

casualties on our society. Teen use has doubled in the United

States since 1992. I think we have a chart on teen use. This is an

interesting chart. First, put up the 12th grade drug use and without objection I would like this made part of the record, and it does

show the dramatic increase since 1992 in 12th grade drug use.

Teen use as I said has doubled in the United States since 1992;

and specifically for teens aged 12 to 17, drug use rose by 70 percent

during this time period. As pointed out in the report, the White

House Office of National Drug Control Policy estimates that almost

14 million Americans now use illegal drugs, and illicit drugs and

drug related crimes costs our Nation at least $110 billion annually.

More tragic, however, is the fact that since 1993 more than 100,000

Americans have died from drug-related deaths, including 15,973 in

1998.

Now, everyone who will listen to the President tonight is well

aware of the rosy picture he will paint for our Nation in his attempt to define a favorable legacy during his final year in office.

But the issue before us today and in this hearing is the incredible

volume of illegal drugs that are pouring into our Nation and its

horrible legacy of death and destruction.

This GAO report confirms our worst suspicions that this administration has neglected our vital national interest in halting the

flow of deadly drugs into this country. In fact, it even failed to implement its own national strategy. Two of the five critical goals of

the Office of National Drug Control Policy strategy, which were

presented to this subcommittee by the head of the ONDCP state—

and let me state them for the record. Goal No. 4: shield America’s

air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat. Goal No. 5, again

from ONDCP as our supposed national policy in our national drug

control strategy is to break foreign and domestic drug sources of

supply.

We will hear today that beginning in 1993, the administration’s

policy and its action failed to stop drugs before they entered the

United States. The GAO findings are most disturbing and demonstrate a failure to protect our borders from an onslaught of death

and destruction. The findings of this GAO report are just another

indicator of the Clinton administration’s lack of commitment to effectively combat the scourge of illegal drugs. Even the drug czar,

General McCaffrey, has attacked the administration for doing too

little too late in Colombia. According to a recent news article of December 2, 1999, General McCaffrey stated the situation matter of

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factly about Colombia, ‘‘Colombia is out of control. It is a flipping

nightmare.’’ That is his quote, not mine.

Among GAO’s findings in this report are the following data

which cover the period from 1992 to 1999: the number of flight

hours dedicated to detecting and monitoring illicit drug shipments

declined from approximately 46,000 to 15,000, or 68 percent; and

we have a chart up there that shows some of the decline in various

activities.

In addition, this report also details the number of ship days declined from 4,800 to 1,800, or a 62 percent decline in ship days

dedicated to going after illegal narcotics.

Closing down interdiction and surveillance has had serious consequences. One can see how Colombia has spiraled out of control.

Recent statistics show that heroin use and deaths are skyrocketing

in our cities. In this morning’s paper is this article, ‘‘Drug use explodes in rural America.’’ This is not from a week ago or a month

ago or a year ago; this is in this morning’s paper. Let me quote the

article from Joseph Califano, president of the National Center on

Addiction and Substance Abuse and a former health secretary, I

believe. He says, ‘‘drugs are now as available on Main Street as

they are in Manhattan.’’ That is his quote, and again some startling statistics even today in what is taking place.

We now know that our air and maritime support for reducing the

supply of drugs was purposely and foolishly abandoned. And again

that is detailed in this GAO report. Even worse, this occurs at a

time when we have lost our air base in Panama, our forward operating locations for surveillance in the war on drugs, and ceded control of this strategic area without first obtaining replacement bases

for continued effective air surveillance.

I went down and had a briefing by Southcom during the break,

and it appears that we are still in a state of disarray in getting

back to even a fraction of the former surveillance flights that we

had when we had Panama in operation.

I have another chart up here. This is from this report, and this

appears on page 12, and I think on the chart in blue is the request

by the Southern Command for assistance in the war on drugs and

which was actually provided by DOD. It shows fiscal year 1997,

1998, and 1999. The 1999 figures are most startling; it shows us

actually back sliding in a tremendous fashion. Only a small percentage of those assets are being provided to Southcom, again from

this report. Without objection, I would also like to make that chart

part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Events in Colombia, the source of most domestic heroin and cocaine, indicate that the domestic situation is deteriorating rapidly. Narcoguerillas are killing citizens and police daily.

Businesses and foreigners continue to flee, while acts of terrorism

increase and their dangers magnified, as evidenced by the recent

terrorist disruption of power to nearly one-third of the country. Our

subcommittee was briefed last week that coca production in Colombia is double or triple what was earlier estimated. This means that

over 400 metric tons of coca are being produced and more cocaine

than ever is moving into the United States. And in 1993, Colombian heroin production—and you have to understand this—was basically nonexistent. Now Colombia produces 74 percent of the heroin found in the United States.

Finally, let me state that I continue to monitor military assistance that has been promised to source countries by this Congress.

I am increasingly disturbed to learn of the continued delays that

prevent assistance from reaching those who desperately need it.

I am particularly concerned about the capability of the State Department to deliver military aid expeditiously. It is almost like the

gang that couldn’t shoot straight. I think we had one report during

the recess, members of the panel, that ammunition that we have

been requesting for some 3, 4 years was delivered to the docks at

the Department of State rather than delivered to Colombia. It is

incredible that volumes of ammunition could end up on the docks

of the State Department and not to Colombia.

Our subcommittee staff also informed me that last week we were

told that the armor is finally on the way for the helicopters to Colombia, that it was shipped last week. So we have less than onethird of the $300 million actually in Colombia according to our latest staff reports and briefings that we had at the end of last year,

and the bulk of that is in three Black Hawk helicopters, which I

believe still sit idle because they are not armored and the ammunition and resources have not reached Colombia.

Again, this issue needs to be very closely examined. State Department officials have long been obstacles in committing essential

military assistance to countries in combating drug suppliers. I am

now afraid the Department is responsible for delays that prevent

assistance from reaching countries in immediate need, like Colombia. Colombia has sought basic military wares for years, including

fully operational helicopters. The State Department advises me

that their delivery of promised combat-ready helicopters may not

be completed until year’s end. Why the delays?

I don’t recall such delays in getting military assistance to Kosovo

or to support our troops in Operation Desert Storm. This predicament illustrates why the military has reduced rather than enhanced its counterdrug efforts. GAO is correct in its assessment

that reducing drug supply has not been a high priority of this administration. Now I understand why General McCaffrey does not

like to describe the current efforts of the administration as a drug

war. As a general, he knows very well what war is, and I may say

to my colleagues, this is no war. I, however, do refer to our efforts

in this campaign as a drug war because our Nation’s vital interests

are at stake and our citizens continue to die. This report documents a 7-year retreat.

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Whether we call this a war or not is less important than the recognition that we must fight it as if we expect to be successful. Congress has made substantial commitments to restart an all-out war

and all-out effort against illegal narcotics. We must now ensure

that we support cost-effective and proven anti-narcotics programs.

At the same time we cannot shortchange our allies who need support and assistance.

Making this effort a priority and fulfilling commitments to rid

this hemisphere of drug cartels, narcoterrorism, and illegal drug

suppliers will pay huge dividends to protect countless lives. Waiting to stop drugs after they reach our borders and only treating the

wounded in battle has proven to be an ineffective combat technique.

Somewhere DOD has either lost the will and the commitment to

be engaged in this battle or has simply diverted resources. Today

we need to find out what went wrong. Last year this subcommittee

held 28 hearings, 16 on drug-related topics. This year I intend to

ensure that our oversight in this area, whether through hearings

or by other means, continues. Despite certain differences in approach, I know that the members of this subcommittee, majority

and minority, feel that our Nation’s drug control strategy and its

successful implementation is and must remain a priority.

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today, and I

hope that we can, through this hearing, fulfill our responsibilities

and see that all of our agencies, including our military and others

that are responsible for protecting our citizens, help in this national threat.

[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica follows:]

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Mr. MICA. I am pleased that we have been joined by other members. If I may yield to Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. I want to thank the chairman for this hearing. As

usual, the chairman is focusing on the right issues and is asking

the right questions about what needs to be done in order to effectively reduce the illegal supply of drugs in this country.

I think one of the things that is very instructive in the GAO report is where they define the background and begin by outlining

that almost 14 million Americans use illegal drugs regularly and

that drug-related illness, crime and death cost the Nation $110 billion annually. Between 1990 and 1997 there was more than

100,000 drug-induced deaths in the United States. The United

States consumes over 300 metric tons of cocaine per year.

Certainly, the chairman’s dedication on this issue is important to

people of the United States, and I want to thank you for your holding this hearing.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. I recognize now the chairman

of the International Relations Committee and thank him for his

continued support and cooperation. He is also a member of our

panel. And also for his leadership. He just recently led a congressional delegation to the European Union Interparliamentary meetings; and one of the most lengthy discussions—and I was pleased

to participate with him in that presentation with our European allies—was on the question of curtailing narcotics trafficking and

stemming illegal narcotics, a very successful effort, and I compliment you on that and recognize you at this time.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We thank you for this

issue of keeping illicit drugs on the front burner of our national

agenda, and I thank you for your recent participation in our meetings with our European allies and European parliamentarians and

stressing to them how important it is to have an effective drug war;

it is not a unilateral matter, but it needs international cooperation.

Mr. Chairman, today’s hearing is particularly important since it

goes to the very heart of keeping illicit drugs out of our own Nation. The effective capacity and the key role of our U.S. military as

a lead agency for monitoring and detection of drug trafficking is

vital and is an important subject matter, and for that reason I commend you for taking the time of our committee to focus our attention on this very important area.

The appalling reduction in military assets for the war on drugs

under the current administration is difficult for most of us to understand. And in reading the GAO report that you’ve recited—the

report that is dated December 1999 entitled drug control assets

DOD contributes to reducing the illegal drug supply have declined—there is a statement there that says DOD has not yet developed a set of performance measures to assess its effectiveness in

contributing to this goal, but has taken some initial steps to develop some measures but DOD’s level of support to international

drug control efforts has declined significantly since 1992.

I think that is a warning bell to all of us, and I hope that our

panelists can give us some important information as to why this

has occurred and what we should do to correct it.

It goes on to say that the lower priority assigned to the

counterdrug mission compared to that assigned to other military

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missions that might involve contact with hostile forces such as

peacekeeping is one of the problems involved in the effectiveness

of our military attention to this problem.

There is no clearer role for the Federal Government than protecting our skies and shores from illicit drugs coming from abroad.

Many of our Presidents, present and past, have said that these illicit drugs pose a clear threat to our national security as well as

our national interest in keeping the well-being of our citizens and

communities in the forefront.

One of our key foreign policy goals of the American people has

always been keeping illicit drugs out of our Nation, and that certainly entails providing the necessary civilian law enforcement and

military assets and the resources to do this very important and

vital job. Regrettably, we have not seen that done in recent years.

Today, we are facing an unprecedented onslaught of cocaine and

heroin from Latin America onto our shores and intended for our

communities and for, regrettably, our youngsters. According to the

GAO report of December 1999, the DOD level of support and efforts

in the international drug control arena has declined markedly. The

GAO reports that the number of military flight hours dedicated to

detecting and to monitoring illicit drugs have declined from 46,000

flight hours to 15,000 hours from 1992 to 1999. That is a 68 percent reduction in their monitoring efforts. And it will only get

worse with the loss of Howard Air Force that our chairman referred to, the base in Panama near the heart of the drug production area, nearby Peru and Colombia.

The GAO reports that on ship days dedicated to the fight against

illicit drugs over the same period of 1992 through 1999 has declined from about 4,800 to 1,800 ship days, or a decline of 62 percent. And while the administration may say some of these cutbacks

have been made up by the Coast Guard and Customs Service, the

obvious fact is that there has been no effective war on drugs by the

administration at this date nor commitment to using our military

to help our law enforcement community effectively fight this

scourge.

Peru is the classic case of such neglect. In the last few years, we

witnessed nearly a 60 percent reduction in coca production based

on an aggressive Peruvian shoot-down policy that depended on

United States aerial surveillance and data. In 1998 the administration took its eye off the ball and reduced aerial surveillance in that

area, resulting in coca leaf prices soaring above the profitability

break-even point. We can anticipate increased production in that

area unless we turn that neglect around.

Our Southcom commander summed it up when he told GAO that

his command can only detect and monitor 15 percent of the key

drug trafficking routes in the overall drug trafficking area, only

some 15 percent of the time.

Accordingly, is it any wonder that we are in trouble with the

supply of drugs and increased use among our people? The administration is now scrambling with an emergency supplemental request

to restore some regional resources for Colombia, for Peru and for

Bolivia after that appalling neglect. As Supreme Court Justice

Felix Frankfurter once said, ‘‘Wisdom too often never comes, and

one ought not reject it merely because it comes late.’’

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Mr. Chairman, we look forward to the testimony of the witnesses

you have assembled today, and we thank you again for providing

us with this opportunity.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I thank Mr. Gilman and recognize now the

gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Hutchinson.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman: I appreciate your

leadership throughout the congressional break in holding hearings

across the country and following up in this Congress on the concern

about our interdiction efforts and the Department of Defense assets.

I traveled to Mexico and Panama during the break and toured

that region and received briefings from our officials there. Let me

tell just one simple story. When I was in Mexico, in the Guadalajara area, our agents told me about intelligence information that

they have received in which there was a ship on the West Coast

which was allegedly transporting large quantities of narcotics and

they simply did not have the assets in order to go and try to find

that ship. This was good intelligence information, and it is one

small example of the problem that we are discussing in this hearing. I have read the Department of Defense report and the testimony that will be presented. I want you to know that I have read

this testimony even though I have to leave.

Do we have a copy of the testimony of Ms. Salazar? I would like

to make sure that I have that even though I might not be here to

hear that. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I recognize the gentleman from California,

Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As always, it is a pleasure

to be here with you. You are indeed one of our leaders on this

issue. I am looking forward to this testimony today. I find it interesting that if we were engaged in a military conflict that was in

effect arguably costing as many lives overseas as this problem costs

domestically, this would be getting no shortage—this issue would

have more resources than shown on this board.

So I am here today interested in an explanation as to why it is

on an issue arguably where we have over 10,000 Americans dying

every year, we have a situation where we have declining resources

committed to trying to solve it.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. Before some of the members

depart—and I know that they will be in and out today—we did conduct during the recess a hearing in New York City at the request

of Mr. Towns.

We had scheduled one for yesterday in Baltimore for Mr.

Cummings and that was canceled because of the snow. We are

working with our colleagues on the other side to reschedule that

possibly for the 28th, the afternoon of the 28th. You might circle

your calendar.

We have a horrible problem in Baltimore, which experienced 7 or

8 years of liberalization, now has 60,000 heroin addicts, a decline

in population and the other effects. We are going to try to reschedule that very important hearing.

And then March 6, Monday, we will be in Sacramento. Mr. Ose

has requested a hearing in his district on the narcotics use issue,

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and then we will go to San Diego at the request of Mr. Bilbray for

a Southwest border hearing.

And Mrs. Mink has requested a hearing and we have put that

off for a year. She is our ranking member. That is scheduled now

for the Monday after St. Patrick’s Day in Honolulu, and that is a

long way out and a long way back which I found in scheduling. So

I just advise the members of those requested member field hearings and thank you.

There being no further opening statements at this time, I would

like to introduce our panel and witnesses today. First is Mr. Jess

T. Ford, who is the Associate Director of International Relations

and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs of

the General Accounting Office. Second is Ms. Ana Maria Salazar,

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy

and Support for the Department of Defense.

The third is Rear Admiral Ernest Riutta, and he is Assistant

Commandant for operations with the U.S. Coast Guard.

The fourth witness and panelist is Mr. Charles Stallworth. He is

the Executive Director for Air and Maritime Interdiction Division

of the U.S. Customs Service.

Some of you have been here before, and some of you have not.

Our panel is an investigation and oversight. Specifically, we are

part of the Government Reform Committee. In that light, we do

swear in all of our panelists and witnesses under oath, and so if

you would stand at this time and be sworn.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. MICA. The witnesses all answered in the affirmative. Again

for those appearing for the first time, we do try to limit your statements to 5 minutes, your oral statements. You can summarize a

lengthy statement. Upon request, we will enter into the record any

lengthy documentation or other materials requested.

With that, I will first welcome—and we have the GAO report,

which I requested along with Charles Grassley, chairman of the

Caucus on International Narcotics Control, and the response by the

GAO; and I am going to recognize Jess T. Ford with GAO to review

this report for the subcommittee. You are recognized.

STATEMENTS OF JESS T. FORD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TRADE ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE; ANA MARIA SALAZAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT

POLICY AND SUPPORT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; REAR

ADMIRAL ERNEST R. RIUTTA, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND CHARLES

STALLWORTH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AIR AND MARINE

INTERDICTION DIVISION, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE

Mr. FORD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of

the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss our

work on DOD’s contribution to reducing the supply of illegal drugs

entering the United States. My statement is based on our December 1999 report, which was requested by your subcommittee and

the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics and Control.

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This report concentrates primarily on DOD support for international drug control efforts. Today, I plan to cover three main

points. First, I will discuss the decline in DOD’s aerial and maritime support allocated to counterdrug activities from fiscal years

1992 through 1999. I will also discuss some of the consequences

and reasons for those declines.

Second, I will discuss the obstacles that DOD faces in helping

foreign governments counter illegal drug activities.

Third, I will also briefly discuss DOD’s counterdrug strategy and

the need for performance measures to judge its counterdrug program effectiveness.

The Department of Defense has lead responsibility for aerial and

maritime detection and monitoring of illegal drug shipments to the

United States. It also provides assistance and training to foreign

governments to combat drug trafficking activities. DOD supplies

ships, aircraft, and radar to detect drug shipments and train equipment and other assistance to foreign governments. DOD’s

counterdrug activities support the efforts of the U.S. law enforcement agencies such as the Customs Service and Coast Guard, and

also foreign governments to stem the flow of illegal drugs. In fiscal

year 1998, DOD spent about $635 million to support these supply

reduction efforts.

Since 1992, DOD’s level of support to counterdrug trafficking in

Central and South America and the Caribbean has significantly declined. For example, the number of flight hours devoted to

counterdrug missions declined 68 percent and the number of ship

days fell 62 percent from 1992 to 1999. In fiscal year 1999 U.S.

Southern Command reported that DOD was unable to meet 57 percent of the command’s request for intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance flights to support its detection and monitoring responsibilities.

According to the Southern Command, the lack of assets hurt

their ability to quickly respond to changing drug trafficking patterns. As a result, coverage in some key drug trafficking routes to

the United States is lower, leaving gaps in detection areas. For example, United States officials in Peru told us that since late 1997,

there has been little or no aerial support to air interdiction operations between Peru and Colombia. In the eastern Pacific, a key

threat area, DOD was unable to sustain its support in 1997 and

1998 to successful interdiction operations due to a lack of available

assets.

DOD acknowledges that its coverage in key drug trafficking

areas in South America has gaps. DOD ascribes the decline in its

support to the lower priority of counterdrug missions as compared

to other missions such as war peacekeeping and training as well

as decreases in its overall budget and force structure during the

1990’s. DOD believes that while the level of assets has declined, its

overall operations are more efficient than in the past.

However, DOD faces obstacles in providing support to foreign

governments in counterdrug efforts. Over the years we have raised

concerns about the limit capabilities of the foreign military and law

enforcement organizations to operate and repair equipment and effectively use the training provided by DOD. For example, one concern we raised in our December 1999 report involved the capacity

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of the Peruvian police to operate and maintain boats to be used for

counterdrug river operations.

Other concerns include human rights and intelligence sharing.

DOD cannot give training support to some foreign military units,

nor can it share intelligence information with certain foreign

counterdrug organizations because of their record on human rights

abuses and evidence of corruption in these organizations. Finally,

Mr. Chairman, DOD has set plans and strategies that directly supports the goals of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. For

example, DOD has developed a 5-year counterdrug plan that broadly describes the military personnel and assets that it will provide

to further these goals.

At the regional level, the U.S. Southern Command has a

counterdrug campaign plan designed to execute its counterdrug activities. However, DOD does not have a set of performance measures to evaluate its counterdrug activities. In our 1999 report, we

recommended that DOD develop such measures, and they have

begun to do so.

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, that concludes my

summary. I would be happy to answer any questions you may

have.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. We will hold questions until we have

heard from all of panelists.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

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Mr. MICA. I would now like to recognize Ms. Ana Maria Salazar,

who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, Department of Defense.

Ms. SALAZAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you pointed out, we

have also had some problems with the weather in trying to—although many of us did go to work in the last few days, we are unable to provide a written statement. We will provide in the next 2

days a written statement for the record.

Mr. MICA. If you will, submit that to the committee. We will

leave the record open for at least 10 days, and hopefully your written testimony will be provided to the subcommittee before then.

Ms. SALAZAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the opportunity to come again and testify before this

subcommittee and to share DOD’s perspective on the recently released GAO report titled, ‘‘Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the

Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined.’’

The Department is finalizing our formal response. However, I

would like to take this opportunity to summarize our thoughts to

date, regarding this report. I would like to say that we agree with

a number of the aspects presented in the report and we appreciate

GAO’s year-long efforts and work. Although there are a number of

issues the GAO report raise regarding DOD, I must note that the

GAO did not find that the Department was not continuing to effectively carry out its congressional mandate for counterdrug missions.

In the report, the GAO makes a single and very important recommendation. DOD needs to develop more fully its measures of effectiveness in order to adequately assess its contributions to the

counterdrug detection and monitoring efforts. We agree that this is

a legitimate concern, and the Department is working with Joint

Interagency Task Force East and Joint Interagency Task Force

West to develop these measures.

However, the difficulty of developing measures of effectiveness

cannot be understated. This is evidenced in a 1993 GAO report

which identifies the difficulty of developing quantitative measures

for the detection of the monitoring missions. Nonetheless, the Department of Defense has not neglected this area, and we are currently funding a consolidated counterdrug data base which involves

efforts by all of the agencies involved in the counterdrug efforts.

This data base has served us as a statistical foundation for a number of interagency products to analyze the illegal flow of cocaine

from South America, and you may have seen some of those products. We use this data base to produce the cocaine movement, the

semiannual report that comes out on an annual basis and is used

to make strategy decisions as to how to proceed with certain missions.

We also use this data to evaluate the performance of our systems

in executing the counterdrug detection and monitoring missions.

The data shows that the interagency success in detecting and monitoring airborne cocaine trafficking events in the transit zone increased from 68 percent of known smuggling events in fiscal year

1995 when we started collecting this data to 91 percent in fiscal

year 1999.

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Other major issues addressed in the report with regards to the

counterdrug efforts since 1992; and they focus, as my GAO colleague stated, in two particular areas, the OPTEMPO and the dollars. The analysis of the report focuses on these two issues in looking at the number of flying hours or ship days devoted to the monitoring and detection of illicit drug shipments and the size of the

DOD budget. And as he stated, there has been a reduction on both

of these issues.

However, I would like to suggest that these areas must be considered in the context of what has happened since 1992. There has

been an ongoing debate over two administrations regarding the

level of support DOD should provide to the counterdrug mission. I

am just going to give you an example. In 1993 at the height of our

dedicated OPTEMPO and sizable DOD budget for counterdrugs,

GAO recommended in its report, ‘‘DOD’s counterdrug flying hours

and steaming days should be significantly reduced to bring DOD’s

effort more in line with law enforcement in host nation end game

capabilities.’’ this is a 1993 report.

I would also like to point out in 1994 we received the largest

budgetary cut to our counterdrug budget which was—it was mandated by Congress and this reduction was approximately $200 million. So when you look at the statistics and you see that our budget

suddenly goes down, it is in part because of this budgetary reduction that we received in 1994.

In addition to this debate, there are three other considerations

that I believe it is important to outline. There have been three

major changes which have occurred since 1992 to 1999. Among

them is, one, the overall decline in defense resources. Two, the increased competing demands from other—from other missions for

these limited assets that are used currently for detection and monitoring mission. And three, there is an evolving U.S. Government

counterdrug strategy in light of changing trafficking threats.

I would like to briefly touch each one of these. The decline in resources. Although we saw the dip as pointed out in the GAO report

in our resource level, over the last 6 years we have maintained a

stable funding level between $800 and $900 million. Our ability to

maintain this funding has been in part a result of Congress’ interest in this mission, and we thank you for this support.

Also I would like to point out that after the fall of the Berlin

Wall, it was quite clear that the Department of Defense could expect a reduction in its force structure and funding. Counterdrug

programs would not be exempted. We have competing demands, as

stated by the GAO report. We also are aware that we would have,

as we were feeling the problem of a reduction in force, we knew

this would be compounded by the fact that the assets used for detection and monitoring were also important assets for these other

missions that may involve the protection of United States personnel, and I think some examples were presented—were mentioned

by another member, Bosnia, the Balkans, northern watch, southern

watch.

However, the Department has never neglected its counterdrug

congressional mandate responsibilities. Instead, we have looked for

different ways to meet these responsibilities in an era of reduced

resources, and this is what we have done. And many of these issues

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have already been—and programs have been indicated by the GAO

report.

Since 1992, we have fielded a number of highly sophisticated air,

ground, and monitoring detection systems. These include two

ROTHRs and ground-based radars. We have upgraded various systems for this new role of counterdrugs. We have used patrol coastal

vessels and TAGO ships to support transit zone interdiction activities. We have also modified the P–3 aircraft for its counterdrug

mission. We have also increased our direct support to host nations

to assist them in increasing their end-game capabilities, and you

may have seen a report in the newspaper today where we currently

have a team of SEALS that are training with Colombians in order

to prove their capability of interdicting drugs.

Also, our Riverine program, which I believe you are very aware

of, is another example of the type of programs that we are currently—that are going the way that we are assisting the Colombians. We have increased our information sharing with law enforcement, and we also are looking for ways to be able to replace the

loss of Howard Base by the installation of new forward-operating

locations in different parts of the source zone and the transit zone.

In closing, I would like to conclude my remarks highlighting the

constant balancing act we perform at DOD. On the one hand, we

recognize the importance of DOD’s support to the law enforcement

community so they can adequately execute their role in the

counterdrug efforts. However, in an age of reduction in force, in an

age where we see law enforcement participating more and more

with assets in the detection monitoring, we also have the responsibility of making sure that the armed forces’ primary role is not

affected. Once again, I want to assure you and this subcommittee

that DOD has not lost its will to its commitment to the

counterdrug mission in fulfilling our responsibility to the American

people.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering any of

your questions.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, and we will have questions when we have

heard from all of our witnesses.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Salazar follows:]

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Mr. MICA. The next witness is Rear Admiral Ernest Riutta, Assistant Commandant for Operations of the U.S. Coast Guard. Welcome, and you are recognized, sir.

Admiral RIUTTA. Good morning, sir. Mr. Chairman, distinguished

members of the subcommittee, I am Rear Admiral Riutta, Coast

Guard Assistant Commandant for Operations. I would like to

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss

the resource issues raised in the recent General Accounting Office

report. Like the Department of Defense, our written statement has

been snowbound, and with your permission, sir, we would like to

submit that.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, it will be made a part of the record.

Admiral RIUTTA. Sir, in general, the Coast Guard concurs with

the GAO report. It is true that there has been a decline in DOD

aircraft hours and ship days over the past year. While at the same

time there has been a Coast Guard increase in drug interdiction

operations. However, these have not been directly targeted at detection and monitoring. It is true that we have assisted to some degree in detection and monitoring, but our effort in the past several

years in the increase has been targeted at our end-game capabilities, trying to take down the targets that the Department of Defense has so ably brought our way.

I would also like to point out that there has been, over the last

5 or 6 years, a significant increase in maritime drug smuggling.

Various resource assessments have consistently reported shortfalls

in air and service assets, and these gaps continue to grow. The success of an end-game effort is absolutely dependent on the assets

that the Department of Defense provides. Interdiction requires a

robust detection and monitoring capability and a credible interdiction and apprehension capability. We expect in the Coast Guard to

be very challenged to try to meet the national drug control performance goals whose targets are to reduce the flow of drugs 10

percent by 2002 and 20 percent by 2007. The Coast Guard’s target

is an 18.7 percent seizure rate by 2002 and a 28 percent seizure

rate by 2007. Currently we are about 11 percent.

The Department of Defense plays a vital role in the air and maritime drug interdiction. Department of Defense provides very capable patrol assets for detection and monitoring. By comparison,

Coast Guard assets are old, slow, and I would define them as halfblind compared to what the DOD provides in this particular role.

Navy assets also involve Coast Guard law enforcement potential,

which greatly add to the end-game capability for us. The Department of Defense supports drug interdiction efforts through intelligence collection and cueing, command and control capability,

training infrastructure, and international engagement activities.

Clearly, these contributions cannot be replicated from within the

law enforcement community itself.

Coast Guard resource hours have increased over the last few

years, but they are still less than they were 10 years ago and have

not offset the decline in DOD assets. Some of this increase has

been from a reallocation of effort from other missions, such as fisheries in New England, Alaska, and Hawaii. Recent readiness

trends indicate that we may be very challenged to maintain this

pace.

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Increases in our efforts are focused on end-game, and have been

directly associated with Campaign STEEL WEB, which is a sequential pulse operation in the Caribbean. Although we have contributed some of our assets to increased detection and monitoring,

we have not focused on that, as our focus has been on end-game.

Our ability to continue to respond is of increased concern as we address some other readiness problems. Our operational tempo has

been extremely high over the last few years, and our ability to

maintain this is significantly in question. We must be able to maintain our equipment and the facilities and begin to recapitalize our

resources for future mission requirements. We are addressing these

modernization concerns through the innovative Deepwater Capability Replacement Project.

In conclusion, sir, I would like to say that the declining resources

available from DOD have impacted our ability to meet our national

supply reduction objectives. Transit zone interdiction is one of the

essential elements of our national strategy and complements other

supply reduction efforts as part of a balanced national strategy. Finally, neither the Coast Guard nor other law enforcement agencies

can fill the shortfalls created by declining numbers of the DOD assets.

I thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important issue

and I would be happy to answer any questions you have.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Again, we will hear from all of our witnesses after we have heard from our last panelist as far as questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Riutta follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Mr. Charles Stallworth is the Executive Director of

the Air and Maritime Interdiction Division of the U.S. Customs

Service. Welcome, sir, and you are recognized.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Chairman

Mica, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. I will

submit a formal statement that I may ask be made a part of the

record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, that will be made a part of the

record. Thank you.

Mr. STALLWORTH. I will now make a few brief opening remarks.

With a fleet of 114 aircraft and 88 vessels, the mission of the

U.S. Customs Air and Marine Interdiction Division is to guard our

Nation’s borders and protect its people from the smuggling of narcotics and other contraband. Unlike other Federal programs involved in drug interdiction efforts, the primary mission of the Air

and Marine Interdiction Division is drug interdiction. We carry out

this commission from our continental boundaries, in the skies over

the coca fields in Colombia and Peru.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense has a

lead role for the detection and monitoring for all counternarcotics

operations in the transit and source zones. Southcom has designated the Joint Interagency Task Force East, JIATF-East, as the

controlling facility for U.S. agencies involved in the air and marine

interdiction in its area of responsibilities. JIATF-East determines

which assets are best suited to meet the program objectives. They

also coordinate on the integration and execution of passing those

assets on interdiction missions.

Over the past 2 years, Customs has provided approximately 90

percent of our P–3 operational flight hours to JIATF-East task missions. JIATF-East allocated 33 percent of those hours to source

zone missions in 1998 and 35 percent in 1999. As additional P–3

aircraft come on-line, we are committed to providing more operational P–3 flight hours in support of JIATF-East missions. U.S.

Customs also provides Citation tracker aircraft in the transit and

source zones. Two Citations are based in Mexico in support of the

Government of Mexico’s drug interdiction program. Significant seizures have resulted from that cooperative effort, particularly in

Hermosillo, a city in the area south of Arizona.

Another critical component of our drug interdiction effort is our

marine program. Smugglers are increasingly using both air drops

and high-speed boats to move illegal drugs from South America

through the Caribbean and on to the United States. In response,

Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly has consolidated the marine assets with aviation operations to provide an integrated strategic and

tactical response to this threat. As a primary force provider of detection and monitoring assets in the source zones, U.S. Customs is

working closely with DOD to provide long-term solutions to the loss

of Howard Air Force Base in Panama. Since the closure of Howard

in April 1999, U.S. Customs has been conducting P–3 and Citation

operations from Aruba. DOD recently negotiated a long-term agreement to use Aruba for forward operations. Southcom has also completed negotiations to provide an FOL in Manta, Ecuador. We support DOD and are confident that Manta will provide a viable forVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:05 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66712.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ward operating location to meet our current and future requirements.

Mr. Chairman, we thank you and other Members of Congress for

your leadership and support. With your support, U.S. Customs has

been able to maintain our aging aviation and marine fleet and

begin planning the addition of assets critical to improve counternarcotics detection and monitoring throughout the Western Hemisphere. I thank the committee for the opportunity to appear before

you today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stallworth follows:]

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Mr. MICA. I thank all of our witnesses for their testimony. Particularly, I want to thank the Customs Service and Coast Guard.

I call your attention to page 14, and also to page 16, the charts

there that show both Customs and Coast Guard. The Coast Guard

has done an incredible job in counterdrug ship activities. But as I

said, their mission is the end game, and I do notice some slight

downturn from 1998 to 1999. That’s another reason that we wanted this hearing. But at least since 1995, we have seen some very

good activity in the part of both of those agencies and I appreciate

it. I think you have been handicapped by the information that we

find here about DOD’s lack of attention and emphasis on going

after the mission that Congress has assigned, and this report details that they have ignored it.

First of all, if you could put up General Wilhelm’s quote. General

Wilhelm, who I met with during the recess, is quoted in this report

and confirmed this commentary to me when I met with him a few

weeks ago in Miami. He said that ‘‘command can only detect and

monitor 15 percent of key routes in the overall drug trafficking

area about 15 percent of the time.’’ These are his quotes.

Is this correct, Ms. Salazar?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes, it is correct. We are very aware of General

Wilhelm’s concerns about being able to provide the sufficient intelligence platforms in order for him to do his job, and we are responding to that concern. If you would allow me—and I think it is

briefly mentioned in the GAO report—this year we are going to be

providing Southcom with a number of assets that will be the exclusive use of General Wilhelm and upcoming CINCs in order to be

able to support the intelligence collection that he requires.

Mr. MICA. Put the other chart up there on page 12 that I referred to in my opening comments. We have—I can’t think of any

sessions of Congress other than the last few that have put more

and more assets into DOD, including supplementals. We have requests by Southern Command and reported in this report—we have

requests that actually seem to be ignored or diminished. Is this information correct on page 12, the number of requests and what

DOD has provided, Ms. Salazar?

Ms. SALAZAR. I believe it is, sir. I would have to go back and talk

to Southcom on what was the basis of some of the assumptions

they made.

Mr. MICA. One of the things that you told me is you tried to

move your assets around, according to threats. On page 17 it says,

‘‘However, in late 1997, U.S. aerial support for the program declined. U.S. officials in Peru’’—and this was brought out by GAO—

‘‘told us that there had been little or no U.S. airborne intelligence

or surveillance of air traffic routes between Peru and Colombia

since 1997, even though recent changes in smugglings tactics and

communications have made sophisticated airborne surveillance increasingly important.’’

In addition, it says the United States Ambassador to Peru

warned in an October 1998 letter to the State Department that reduction in air support could have a serious impact on the price of

coca. Were you all aware of this change in pattern?

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Ms. SALAZAR. Absolutely. We have been in discussions with the

Peruvian Government and the United States Embassy trying to understand what is that change in pattern.

Mr. MICA. What is startling to me is I met with Southern Command. They haven’t announced this publicly, but this details what

was going to happen. We were told—our agencies were told what

was going to happen. They told me that now production for the

first time—we have been diminishing that through small amounts

of money that we have provided since 1995 to Peru and Bolivia, 50

percent reduction in Bolivia, 60 percent reduction in Peru—now for

the first time we are seeing an increase. They are going to report

an increase in production of coca which is predicted here in this

trafficking pattern. And it appears that we have not paid attention

or moved our assets or had the flights and capability of surveillance to even assist them in combatting this. So now this prediction

has come true.

Ms. SALAZAR. There are a couple of issues here. On the one hand,

we have raised concerns with the Peruvian Government in regards

to the potential raise of coca leaf price. In our conversations with

them, there is a number of things that may be happening. It may

be because there has been increased flights leaving Peru. It may

be because the transit of drugs has changed. That is, instead of

using flights to bring the coca leaf out of Peru, they may be using

both roads and maritime. What we are trying to understand, sir,

is: why is it rising; how much it will rise; and what we can do for

the Peruvians.

Mr. MICA. The question is, the production is up that is predicted

here. You said one of the things that you tried to do, again, from

your testimony, is move these assets as you learned about it, about

activities. This was clearly something that was pointed out to us,

and it doesn’t appear that we responded. And now we are seeing

an increase in production and trafficking.

Ms. SALAZAR. What I am trying to say, sir, is that even if we

were able to provide the dome requirement that has been suggested by the Embassy, we are not too sure it would have a big impact on the effect on the rising price of cocaine leaf. We are—as I

said before, we are talking to the Peruvians. They may need more

assistance, for example, in the Riverine program because this coca

leaf may be leaving through the rivers. It may be because there are

trucks that are taking it out. It may not be necessarily through

flights. So we are concerned. We are talking to the Peruvians, and

we are also talking to our law enforcement colleagues; and they

have been very supportive. I believe that Customs has provided, at

least this last year, some support in dome support in trying to establish what is the flight patterns, if any, through Peru.

Mr. MICA. We have had these predictions. We have had requests

for Riverine equipment. I went with Speaker Hastert into the Peruvian jungles with some of my other colleagues, and they requested

assistance there. We found, even as late as December, Riverine

equipment had—the contracts had not been let. I think they finally

had been let on some of them from 1997; is that correct? They have

been let now?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes, I believe they have.

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Mr. MICA. But they were pending from 1997. We cannot get the

equipment or resources there, which is highlighted by this report;

and you bring up Riverine, which is even a bigger disaster in my

opinion. We have met with you behind closed doors and some of the

other agencies trying to figure out why we were not getting our assets that Congress has appropriated or we have requested or even

the administration has offered as far as surplus to Colombia. We

have also discussed the problem of the gap now by Howard Air

Force Base, my colleagues referred to that, and I did. What level

are we up to of flights from Manta and Aruba? What percentage

of flights are we up to right now this month as opposed to what

we had when Howard was open prior to May 1999?

Ms. SALAZAR. I believe we are up to about 85 percent. Now, I will

agree with some of the statements made not only by you but by the

GAO that many of these flights have been within the transit zone

and that we need to increase the number of flights in the source

zone.

Mr. MICA. You are testifying today 85 percent?

Ms. SALAZAR. Eighty-five—I am looking for the exact number because the last time I testified before you I was off.

Mr. MICA. I don’t think it is anywhere close to that according to

the reports that we have had. In your testimony before our subcommittee last May, you stated that the over-the-horizon radar site

in Puerto Rico would be operational by January 2000. I believe we

are in January 2000, well into it. What is the current status of that

radar site?

Ms. SALAZAR. We believe it will be March 2000 this year. We did

not anticipate some of the hurricanes that took place, and it did

put us back about 3 or 4 months.

Mr. MICA. Also, during the holidays I was informed that the Air

Force is taking down or plans to take down the aerostats, some in

Florida. I believe Customs has one and DOD has nine, something

like that, plus the ones in the Southwest border. There is great

concern that the over-the-horizon radar, even if it is in place, I am

told by technical folks, will not fill the gap that would be created

by taking down these aerostats. What is the status of the

aerostats?

Ms. SALAZAR. We are now in discussions with the Air Force, sir,

in trying to establish how we are going to continue funding the

aerostats, in particular the aerostats that basically protect and

identify the illegal threat of drugs into the United States. We believe that most of the aerostats are going to stay up. It is just an

issue of funding, who is going to fund it, whether it be the

counterdrug budget or the Air Force. As of recent conversations,

the Air Force has been guided—has been instructed by the Department of Defense to fund the three aerostats in the Gulf Zone.

Mr. MICA. So they will stay up? The recommendation is they are

going to stay up?

I think there will be other members you will be hearing from. I

have already heard from some that are very concerned about this

potential action, but you are telling us today they will stay up?

Ms. SALAZAR. That is my belief, yes.

Mr. MICA. Final question. One of the things that concerns me in

talking with our folks out in the field or during the break is it apVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:05 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66712.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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pears that this drug mission—and DOD, does not interdict drugs.

They provide intelligence and information surveillance which

seems to be absolutely critical in the war on drugs. It can tell us

where narcotics are being grown. It can tell us where planes take

off that are carrying narcotics. It can allow our allies to do most

of the combat and hands-on work in stopping drugs closest to their

source, most cost effectively.

But the thing that I picked up during the break is there doesn’t

seem to be any will, either from the Secretary of Defense office, or,

as a policy, the U.S. Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. It appears there is just a lack of any effort to participate in

this program. This report is devastating. It shows that we have put

more money into DOD, and we have a fraction of activity to provide

the vital information to combat any kind of a real war on drugs.

Instead of getting better, it is getting worse. I have also heard reports of diversion of assets, which I won’t get into at this hearing.

What is the Secretary of Defense and what is the Department of

Defense’s policy? Are you on board with us or are you retreating

from this battle?

Ms. SALAZAR. Sir, as I stated in my remarks, the Department of

Defense is committed to not only to the counterdrug strategy but

being able to support our drug enforcement colleagues so they can

perform their primary mission.

Mr. MICA. It would be hard pressed for me to believe that you

could come before Congress and say that when you see again from

this report detailed by GAO that in fact there has been less effort

on every front. I can’t imagine fighting a battle in Kosovo or someplace where we are sending fewer surveillance flights out, where

we are getting less information, where there is less participation,

less cooperation with allies and we are not even getting assets into

the arena of battle. This—I see why our streets and our communities are flooded with drugs because one of the major ingredients,

which is DOD providing this vital information and cooperation, is

not there.

Ms. SALAZAR. As you stated, sir, we are one of the ingredients.

DOD’s participation in the counterdrug strategy is one part of the

equation in order to have an effective counterdrug war. I like using

the word ‘‘war’’ in this sense. But when you look at budgetary numbers and the fact that we were cut in 1994 and there has been a

number of intents to bring up the budget to at least stabilize the

budget at a number where we can appropriately provide the support required, not only by law enforcement but also for our domestic programs, I believe we have done very well, sir.

I understand your concern in the sense that some of these assets

have been diverted, particularly in AWACs, to other missions. But

when we have the Secretary of Defense and the chairman telling

us that they need these assets because they have U.S. personnel

who may be in imminent danger—and these are the type of discussions that take place in the Department of Defense, and they make

these decisions based on this type of information. So once again,

sir, I want to reassure you that the Department of Defense, the

Secretary of Defense, the chairman are committed to the

counterdrug strategy and to their responsibilities.

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Mr. MICA. Well, I thank you. I find this hard to believe. I have

concerns that the war on drugs has been sabotaged, and this report

confirms my worse suspicions about that. Mr. Gilman, you are recognized.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Salazar, the joint

chiefs stated that the level of DOD assets committed to

counterdrug activities is unlikely to change. In light of that, how

does your office intend to deal with the problems that we are seeing come out of Latin America?

Ms. SALAZAR. We have done a number of things, sir, in anticipating that it would be unlikely to change. I guess we should explain

why it is unlikely to change. As you are aware, there are not very

many AWACs. The Cadillac premier asset for the detection and

monitoring is the AWACs. There is not that many of them flying

around the world. So every time we have missions like in the Balkans, Somalia, Iraq, these types of assets become premier assets.

Mr. GILMAN. Let me interrupt you. How long has it been since

AWACs aircraft operated in and around the source countries in

Southcom’s area of responsibility?

Ms. SALAZAR. Can I talk to you off-line about the specific numbers, sir? We will come and brief you on that.

Mr. GILMAN. Yes, but it has been a long time as I understand

since they have operated in that area.

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes. That’s why in conversations with our colleagues from Customs we have talked about this deficiency, and we

are trying to coordinate efforts with Customs in order to assure

that we get the necessary coverage that the strategy requires.

Mr. GILMAN. I interrupted you, and you were telling us why the

joint chiefs have said there will be no change in their commitment.

Ms. SALAZAR. These assets, most of these assets are purchased

or acquired based on the premier mission of the Department of Defense, which is defending our Nation.

Mr. GILMAN. If there is a need for more AWACs, why isn’t there

a request made for more AWACs?

Ms. SALAZAR. I would talk to other persons in the Department

of Defense, mainly the services. We depend on the services to tell

us what their requirements are.

Mr. GILMAN. Don’t you have requirements that you set forth?

Ms. SALAZAR. We do, absolutely. And we set forth every year—— Mr. GILMAN. Have you made a request for more AWACs?

Ms. SALAZAR. Absolutely, yes. And the response from the services

has been with the numbers of assets we have right now, there are

other requirements of higher priority.

Mr. GILMAN. So then the drug issue gets down the totem pole on

the priority list. Is that right?

Ms. SALAZAR. It has a lower priority in consideration of other

types of missions where eminent——

Mr. GILMAN. That’s what our chairman is saying, we don’t have

a high enough priority for our drug war. We look to you to assert

yourself and insist that it be given a higher priority.

Ms. SALAZAR. Sir, I have added my voice to these discussions. My

predecessor has added his voice to these discussions. The main

problem as I see it, as a person who has done counterdrug programs for a number of years now, is that the Department of DeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:05 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66712.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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fense has other missions which is very different than, for example,

our law enforcement colleagues. Our premier mission is not

counterdrugs.

Mr. GILMAN. We gather that. Mr. Ford, you stated it is clear that

setting of priorities is the key to getting DOD assets committed to

the war on drugs. Whose responsibility is it to set the higher priority for the use of these DOD assets?

Mr. FORD. As far as I know, that is an internal decision made

by the Department of Defense. We didn’t challenge their reasoning.

Mr. GILMAN. Who in the Department of Defense has that responsibility?

Mr. FORD. Again, I would attribute that to the joint chiefs of

staff, the office of the Secretary of Defense. In determining what

their overall priorities are, they apparently have decided that other

missions are of a higher priority than this one.

Mr. GILMAN. So I guess the ball that—the responsibility would

stop at the President’s desk on this of setting a higher priority in

DOD. Would you agree with that?

Mr. FORD. Well, to the extent that the White House is involved

in this, I would guess at least that at General McCaffrey’s level he

would weigh in on this decision.

Mr. GILMAN. I would hope that someone would be weighing in on

it. Let me ask you, Admiral Riutta, on Peru when are we going to

restore aerial surveillance so we can make the shoot-down policy

more effective and drive home those coca leaf prices below profitability? I had a chart here that showed how the Peruvian leaf

prices climbed dramatically after we stopped the surveillance from

$1.50 for a kilo to $3.50. Can you tell us when you are going to

be doing some of that?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sir, is that question for Admiral Riutta or for

Customs——

Mr. GILMAN. Or Customs.

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sir, Customs, after having meetings with the

Peruvian delegations and having discussions with JIATF-East, actually went on two deployments which had not been scheduled last

year to Peru to investigate the possibility or try and figure out

what was going on with air assets in Peru as far as the——

Mr. GILMAN. What is going on with those air assets?

Mr. STALLWORTH. As a result of our first deployment, we really

didn’t get anything other than we did conduct training with the Peruvian air force and do our coordination for intercept. In the second

deployment, which was in November, late November, we did look

at the Bolivia-Peru border and we did see activity there, sir. We

are still going through the analysis with JIATF-East on what information we did get on that, but there is activity.

Mr. GILMAN. Whose responsibility is it to restore the aerial surveillance in Peru?

Mr. STALLWORTH. The responsibility is with whoever has the assets. We are a force provider because of the role that DOD has.

And in fact in these deployments we had to take the initiative, sir,

to go there. We had to go and convince DOD that we did want to

put these aircraft there because——

Mr. GILMAN. Have we put the aircraft there?

64

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sir, we deployed the aircraft on from 8- to 10-

day deployments there. We could not leave them there. That’s not

something that we can do at this time.

Mr. GILMAN. When did we do the 8 to 10 days?

Mr. STALLWORTH. We did one in August. I don’t have the dates

right now, sir. We had another in late November 1999.

Mr. GILMAN. So between August and November there was no deployment; is that right?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Not in Peru itself, not from Lima.

Mr. GILMAN. Since November have we had any deployment?

Mr. STALLWORTH. No, sir, we are supposed to go a little bit later

this month.

Mr. GILMAN. Haven’t the Peruvian people been asking for more

aerial coverage and what are we telling them?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, sir, they have. They have been cooperating with us as we have tried to conduct site surveys for different

landing sites in Peru.

Mr. GILMAN. I am talking about aerial surveillance now. They

asked for more aerial surveillance, did they not?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, they did.

Mr. GILMAN. We haven’t done anything since November?

Mr. STALLWORTH. No, sir. We have plans to go there again this

month.

Mr. GILMAN. Plans to go in February?

Mr. STALLWORTH. No, sir, this month, sir, in January.

Mr. GILMAN. Is that sufficient, to only go 3 or 4 months without

surveillance and then go down for just a few days? Does that accomplish very much?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Sir, again, we are force providers. We have

limited assets, but we are doing what we can—— Mr. GILMAN. I realize you are doing what you can, but I am asking now, is that effective to leave that big gap of time without aerial surveillance?

Mr. STALLWORTH. No, sir, it isn’t.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Mr. Stallworth, with a deteriorating situation or the problems of flying missions with civilian fields in the

region have been an increasing problem, when do you envision, if

ever, that we are going to be back to aerial coverage levels before

we gave up the Howard Air Force Base?

Mr. STALLWORTH. As to the first part of your question, regarding

the civilian situation in Ecuador, sir, I am not at liberty or don’t

have the basic knowledge to tell you when that would be better. As

to Manta, my understanding is that as soon as funding is provided

that DOD will move forward as far as preparing that area for——

Mr. GILMAN. Has funding been requested, Mr. Stallworth, for

Manta?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Yes, sir, it has.

Mr. GILMAN. What is the status?

Mr. STALLWORTH. Part of it is in the emergency supplemental

that has been provided. I would rather DOD answer that question

because they have more of the specifics on that, sir.

Ms. SALAZAR. If you would allow me, we have included funding

for Manta in the Colombian supplement. We have also included

funding for Aruba and Curacao in our request. As you may rememVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:05 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66712.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ber, sir, we have requested MILCON construction in our fiscal year

2000 budget and we didn’t get it, basically.

Mr. GILMAN. So how much funding has been requested now for

Manta and the other forward bases?

Ms. SALAZAR. In fiscal year 2000, we are requesting approxi- mately $39 million. In fiscal year 2001, we are requesting, I believe—I will give you the exact number—— Mr. GILMAN. Just give us a ball park figure.

Ms. SALAZAR. $100 million.

Mr. GILMAN. How long would it take you to get these forward

bases in operation?

Ms. SALAZAR. Depending on which ones and at what level, as was

mentioned before, our priority is trying to get Manta fully functioning, and we have been doing that at different steps. We believe we

are going to be flying more P–3s out of Manta in the next month;

and then it would be fully functional, be able to do night flights,

I believe, in about March. So we are going to be able to do much

more than we are now. At one point we are going to have to do

major repairs on one of the runways.

Mr. GILMAN. When do you envision that you will be back to aerial coverage levels prior to our giving up Howard Air Force Base?

Ms. SALAZAR. We will probably be at that level, if not higher,

since we are going to be doing more flights out of the source zone,

I would say in about a year, year and a half.

Mr. GILMAN. So a year and a half to get back to the Howard Air

Force Base level of aerial coverages; is that correct?

Ms. SALAZAR. We would have an increased level, in fact. We

would have a better coverage level—— Mr. GILMAN. How long would it take you to get back to where

we were at the Howard Air Force level.

Ms. SALAZAR. I would say a year and a half. The reason that I

say that is we have to finish—once we are done with all of the infrastructure construction that we are going to be doing in these

FOLs, once they are completely done, we will have much better

coverage, improved coverage.

Mr. GILMAN. Have we given up our negotiation to try to retain

our Howard Air Force Base?

Ms. SALAZAR. I believe so, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. That is a dead issue?

Ms. SALAZAR. We have not had conversations with the Panamanians on this issue.

Mr. GILMAN. I had spoken with the Panamanian President not

too long ago, and it seemed that the door was open for further negotiation, but you are saying that we are not doing anything?

Ms. SALAZAR. I am not aware of any conversations that are taking place right now, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Gilman. It is good to be on some of

these panels for a number of terms because you hear different figures counted by different folks at different hearings. Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One of the questions that

I have—and I imagine this goes to Mr. Ford—is you have a comment on page 15 of your report that the trafficking methods have

primarily gone toward maritime. I look at the charts between the

66

air hours and the ship days, and I am trying to reconcile whether

or not there is an interchangeability or ratio of ship days that

equals to so many air hours, if you will. Do you have any such information?

Mr. FORD. If I understand your question, in terms of dealing with

the maritime threat?

Mr. OSE. Yes.

Mr. FORD. Actually, I am going to defer to the Admiral on this,

but basically obviously you need ships on the water to interdict

maritime vessels, like go-fast boats, which is one of the major

means of travel by the drug traffickers. But you also need some air

assets. You need helicopters to be able to track them and you also

need tracking aircraft so you can hand them off to someone on the

ocean. I don’t know what the appropriate ratio is. I don’t want to

put the Admiral on the spot, but I think he might know better, as

this is a main Coast Guard responsibility.

Clearly, the data that we show in the report indicates that the

threat in the 1990’s has generally shifted more toward maritime,

there are more maritime-type incidents, you would expect to see

perhaps an increase in the amount of ship days. But we don’t see

that in our data with the exception of the plus-up in the Coast

Guard. So it seem as little anomalous to me as to why that situation exists.

Mr. OSE. In that we have the information, that the trafficking

methods have gone, if you will, to a maritime route, but we haven’t

responded with additional assets to deal with it? Is that your

point?

Mr. FORD. Well, the data clearly shows that the number of ship

days that you might expect to see, to jive with the threat, doesn’t

seem to be there or at least it is not there at the same level of what

you would expect, given the fact that maritime is now about threequarters of the threat.

Mr. OSE. Is the evidence as to the threat from the maritime

sources unequivocal, clear?

Mr. FORD. I think it is based on the known intelligences that our

people have. Obviously, there could be things going on out there

that we are not aware of. That’s always the situation. But based

on the data that the interagency community uses, clearly they have

a rough idea of what the trends are. And the trend clearly has gone

toward maritime.

Mr. OSE. Admiral, would you agree with that?

Admiral RIUTTA. Yes, sir, I would certainly agree with that. It

has clearly gone maritime.

Mr. OSE. So in response—with the exception of the Coast Guard

that peaked in 1997, in response to evidence that our agencies have

collected, we in effect have reduced, if I understand correctly, air

hours in favor of ship days; but in fact according to the chart on

page 14 of the GAO report, the number of ship days has also been

reduced?

Admiral RIUTTA. You are correct. We have reduced both. I would

like to point out that to find go-fast you need aircraft. You can’t

offset aircraft with ships and hope to efficiently find these go-fasts,

particularly in the eastern Pacific coming off the west coast of Colombia, off the west coast of Central America, which is a very wide

67

open space. Just putting a few extra ships down there doesn’t solve

the problem. You need good aircraft coverage in order to find the

targets and then you go after them.

Mr. OSE. Let me go on, if I might. I appreciate you guys trying

to quantify how to balance those assets and their use. One question, Ms. Salazar. One thing you kept referring to was a reduction

in 1994 in terms of the resources committed to this effort. I just

wanted to make sure I understood. That would have been a budget

passed in 1993 pursuant to the President’s request submitted in

January 1993? The resources for fiscal year 1994 followed appropriations bills, bills passed in late 1993?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes. This is a fiscal year 1993 appropriations, conference report, November 9, 1993.

Mr. OSE. I do want to point out just the interesting dynamic is

that since the majority of the House and Senate changed there has

been no intention or policy on the part of the majority now existent

in the House to reduce assets. So I find it interesting, and I take

considerable exception to a constant reference to a reduction in

1994 that flowed from one side of the aisle as opposed to the effort

on this side of the aisle to give more assets to this effort.

Ms. SALAZAR. That was not my intention. What I was trying to

highlight to the subcommittee is that throughout the years there

has been a bipartisan—through two administrations—ongoing debate as to what is the level of support that the Department of Defense should provide to the counterdrug strategy. As I mentioned

earlier, there was a 1993 report that strongly suggested that we

were providing way too many flying hours, way too many steaming

days for the detection and monitoring efforts. That was the recommendation in the sense of that report at that time.

There have been different hearings throughout the years in

many ways going back and forth. I sit in some of the other committees, the defense committees; they would suggest or they would— some of them would suggest that perhaps that we are providing too

much of DOD’s efforts to the counterdrug strategies. So the reason

I did this, sir, is not to point a finger to one of the others, but to

suggest this is an ongoing debate. But despite the debate and despite there has been some fluctuation in our budget and in the

amount of resources we receive, we have sought different ways of

trying to support General Wilhelm’s Southcom and to support our

law enforcement community and to support host nations in their

capability to interdict drugs.

Mr. OSE. If I might just make one observation. I can’t help but

go to the empirical data that indicates very clearly from the early

1990’s to today, an increase in drug usage, increased mortality rate

in terms of Americans using drugs, and a battle here about making

sure sufficient resources get committed to that effort to combat this

problem. I find it intellectually very challenging to balance the

lives of American citizens with somebody’s disconcernment, if you

will—that’s not even a word—but it is just very interesting to me.

I get calls at home about this. I go home every weekend. I get calls

on this regularly. I wanted to express that to you. I think this Congress is ready to give you the resources that you need to take this

effort to the Nth degree, if I have any sense of the chairman and

the others here.

68

Ms. SALAZAR. We are very appreciative of that. In many ways,

some of the pluses we have received throughout the years have

been, thanks to the chairman, and to a number of people who believe that the Department of Defense should have an important

role in the counterdrug strategy, not only in the international or

early detection and monitoring, but also in our domestic programs.

We are very grateful for that, sir.

Mr. OSE. Let me ask a question. You mentioned the interaction

to some of our host nations. We have been providing up until July

1999 the aircraft for Peru to monitor flights originating there. Unfortunately, we had a plane go down. We lost a number of people

there. Is that aircraft or is that asset still being provided to the

country of Peru?

Ms. SALAZAR. The asset that you are talking about is an ARL

which crashed in Colombia. Is that the asset that you are talking

about, sir? It is an Intelligence asset. We coordinate the flights

with host nations, and we do provide that type of support. However, it is also one of those premier assets that if there is other

missions that have higher priority, the Department of Defense

could very easily be taken away and used for some other mission

or in different parts of the world. In general, we fight very hard

to obtain an ARL for ARL coverage for the source zone.

Mr. OSE. I guess that was a no?

Ms. SALAZAR. I am going to ask someone to look at my data right

now, but we continue to provide ARL support. What I don’t know

is if after the crash that there has been another deployment down

there.

Mr. OSE. Assuming there hasn’t been, have there been ARL deployments elsewhere in the world?

Ms. SALAZAR. I believe so, sir.

Mr. OSE. I would be interested in that information. I want to nail

down, A, have we or have we not continued to provide this assistance to the Colombians and Peruvians; and, B, if we haven’t, where

have those resources gone?

Ms. SALAZAR. I think we would be delighted to brief you, not only

on this particular asset but on the different assets and the types

of capabilities they have and what other parts of the world they

have been used. I have just been advised that yes, we have had an

ARL deployment to the source zone since the crash.

Mr. OSE. Are they flying?

Ms. SALAZAR. They don’t fly, sir, constantly. These are for all of

the assets. I think my colleague from Customs was trying to explain. The way that we program the use of these assets is that decision is made that they are going to fly for 10 days, 15 days, they

go down there, they do the coverage and then they return. This is

the way that we have been performing these types of deployments,

as far as I know.

Sometimes they will work out of the Nation or they will land

there, but it is not permanent. They will basically land there, be

there for a number of days and then return.

Mr. OSE. Let me do a little housekeeping, if I may. The chairman

asked for a report in late July or early August regarding the unfortunate crash in Colombia. And now it is January 27. Where is that

report?

69

Ms. SALAZAR. I will have to come back and give you further information. I don’t know right now, sir.

Mr. OSE. It is my recollection from our hearing in that time period that’s just about what you told us then. I have got to tell you,

we were in Miami and we were told the same thing. That is January 3. At what point is the report going to be here?

Ms. SALAZAR. I apologize, sir. I don’t have that information. My

office is not the office that would be drafting that report.

Mr. OSE. Who does?

Ms. SALAZAR. I think it is probably the Secretary of the Army.

This would be an Army report. I will come back to you, sir, with

that information.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time. Excuse me, I’m

sorry.

Mr. MICA. Go ahead.

Mr. OSE. The GAO report cites, again, the shift from airborne to

maritime using the go-fast boats. For the Admiral, in 1998 the

Coast Guard was authorized to acquire some new armed helicopters to counter this new maritime activity. What is the current

status of that effort?

Admiral RIUTTA. Sir, we have deployed those armed helicopters

on two occasions in a daylight operation. As you can see, this is a

fairly complicated mission to put together a package like this. We

are currently undergoing nighttime training, and expect to deploy

them in the fairly near future to do a complete 7 by 24 operation

down in the Caribbean.

Mr. OSE. Are we providing any assistance to Colombia of a similar nature with these assets?

Admiral RIUTTA. With these particular assets, not in-country. Off

the coast of Colombia they will certainly operate. We have a limited fielding this summer when we will get the assets back in theater. They will work off the coast of Colombia.

Mr. OSE. One of the concerns I have is we were recently briefed

by State OMBCP people that the administration’s latest package of

assistance to Colombia cut this out. Is that true?

Admiral RIUTTA. As far as I know, it is, yes.

Mr. OSE. It is true that it was cut out?

Admiral RIUTTA. I have not seen the package; but as far as I

know, it was reduced, yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. As it relates to this particular program as we go forward, it will be ending in terms of assistance to Colombia of this

nature?

Admiral RIUTTA. This program is funded in 2000. Depending on

the budget notions in 2001, it will continue forward.

Mr. OSE. But the administration’s proposal has been to remove

this funding?

Admiral RIUTTA. I believe the administration proposal has been

just not to support it in the Colombian supplemental.

Mr. OSE. That sounds like they are removing this funding. Now,

I want to go back to the over-the-horizon radar with Mr. Ford. We

have gaps in our coverage. We have covered 15 percent. That’s like

2.8 percent, or something like that, of the time. Do the over-thehorizon radars in Puerto Rico take care of the gaps on the aviation

routes that we are attempting to cover?

70

Mr. FORD. What I know about—they are supposed to extend coverage down to the southern part of Colombia. I don’t know how far

it goes in terms of whether it covers the entire area down there,

so I can’t say that there will be 100 percent coverage in that area.

The other area, I believe—ROTHR does not always touch, is in the

eastern Pacific. I am not sure whether the Puerto Rico radar would

cover that or not. I guess I have to defer that to my colleagues

here. But it would definitely expand coverage down into the Colombia area, which is going to be part of our new program down there.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Stallworth, do you have any observations on that,

whether or not the over-the-horizon radar fills the gaps that we

otherwise might have?

Mr. STALLWORTH. I think the best answer for me at this point,

since I don’t have specific data and it hasn’t—no one, engineers or

anyone else, can assure us that it will and so I can’t answer that

question; and I would have to defer to DOD. But no one has assured us that it will cover the gaps. We just don’t know.

The design—let me say it like this. The design of the ROTHR is

optimized for over water to bounce off the ionosphere and do the

things it does. It is optimized for—other than the modifications

that they might have made for it, to B–52 sized targets. It does not

give correlated data as to identification friend or foe or altitude. So

it is better than nothing, but it is not necessarily the best for the

conditions. And then when you shoot that over the jungle or over

land, we just don’t know what it is going to bring us in results.

Mr. OSE. That begs the question. Given the inadequacies that

you’ve described, are we using something less than the best in

terms of providing coverage? And if that is the case, do we have

something that is better that we are not using?

Mr. STALLWORTH. I would have to defer that to DOD.

Mr. OSE. Admiral, do you have any input on this?

Admiral RIUTTA. Actually, I am not an expert in ROTHR. I don’t

work in that area.

Mr. OSE. Ms. Salazar.

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes, I am also not an expert in ROTHR, but I do

have some comments. The Puerto Rico ROTHR will actually provide extensive coverage—it actually covers Ecuador, goes down into

Peru and parts of Brazil. So we will have coverage of an area that

we did not have before.

I think what Mr. Stallworth was trying to explain is that as any

system, they have certain capabilities and can do certain things,

and there are other things that they cannot do. There is not one

single radar or asset that can basically satisfy all of the needs that

law enforcement and DOD has in regards to detection and monitoring. The secret is being able to coordinate the existing systems,

provide more systems that can support what we are trying to do,

but at the same time improve our coordination not only with the

end-game capability of law enforcement but also what the host nations have in the way of end games and the assets that they have.

What I am trying to say, sir, is that the Puerto Rico ROTHR is

going to provide us an enormously increased capability. But does

it resolve all of our problems? No, it doesn’t.

Mr. OSE. You have been very kind, Mr. Chairman; and I yield

back the balance of my time.

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Mr. MICA. Just in a final couple of questions, the GAO report

highlights—and that concerns me is that there doesn’t seem to be

a coordination between the Secretary of Defense’s DOD Office of

National Drug Control Policy to coordinate with the JIATFS, the

Joint Interagency Task Force and ONDCP. Also, having been involved in this since about 1981, I have found after years and years

of trying to get everybody trying to work together, DOD, Customs,

Coast Guard, all of the different agencies that are involved—there

are 19 or 20 agencies I think involved—and all of that seems to be

falling apart. That is one of the criticisms that I see here. DOD

does not have measures of performance, and also the problems with

working with these other agencies. And then the other thing is that

nobody seems to be in charge of coordinating. Ms. Salazar, did you

want to respond?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes. I was looking for that comment because I did

not read that from the report.

I believe that there has been more coordination than ever, and

I haven’t been working in counterdrug programs as long as you

have, but I have seen an increased coordination in the programs

in part because of the role ONDCP plays, and in part from the detection and monitoring aspect—I am not going to call it an organization, but we have created a committee, the U.S. Interdiction

Committee headed by Admiral Loy, that basically brings in all the

law enforcement community, DOD, the JIATFs, SOUTHCOM, anyone who has any role in the detection and monitoring. We all sit

in a room quarterly and we basically have—our job is to not only

set priorities but we also have something that is called the ‘‘neighbors.’’ We have an outline each one of these agencies must take to

support the counterdrug strategy.

Mr. MICA. I am telling you what I am hearing out there as far

as overall coordination. Within DOD, GAO has stated here today—

and I think they have a recommendation—and one of their recommendations in their report was that DOD adopt performance

measures. And you said—someone said that they had started.

Wasn’t that one of your criticisms or recommendations, Mr.

Ford?

Mr. FORD. Yes, it was. In fact, I am going to refer back to our

1993 report, which has been mentioned a couple of times.

Mr. MICA. Yes, I finally found out who is responsible for the dismantling of the war on drugs. It is GAO.

Mr. FORD. We apologize, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter].

Mr. MICA. That is my next question.

Mr. FORD. I just want to comment, in 1993 we did in fact question DOD’s involvement; but that was because back then they were

spending a lot of money and there wasn’t anywhere near the

amount of data available to show what we were getting for the

amount that they were spending. Some of their operational concepts back then are much different than they are today. Today we

use a lot of queued intelligence, and back in those days they didn’t.

As far back as then we indicated that DOD needed to do a better

job of articulating what we are getting for the investment we are

making. We are basically making the same point today. We want

DOD to do a better job of articulating what types of outputs and

72

what type of efficiencies, what types of effectiveness we are getting

for the investment that we are making for the DOD dollar.

I will say that DOD now has made some efforts to try to do that.

In the past, I would say that they resisted trying to measure their

effectiveness, but I think now they have some efforts underway

which might get us there. We recognize that it is hard to do, particularly when you are a support organization. But the Government

as a whole has a mandate to report on results, and we think that

this is something that DOD ought to be able to do. We hope to see

down the road some more tangible outputs on their part.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Let me try to fill in a couple of missing links here.

There was some talk about status of material to Colombia and

also to the source countries.

Ms. Salazar, the 506 which would be surplus materials that had

been promised in 1996, I am told were finally delivered in November; is that correct?

Ms. SALAZAR. I can’t give you the specific details, mainly because

these types of programs are led by the State Department although

we provide the assets.

Mr. MICA. Can you tell me whether those assets have been provided? The information I have is 1996, it was finally provided, and

60 percent of the 1997 promised assets have been provided to date

to Colombia. Is that correct?

Ms. SALAZAR. Sir, I will have to come back with the information.

Mr. MICA. And can you also give us 1998 and 1999?

Ms. SALAZAR. We will talk to our State Department colleagues.

Mr. MICA. I am not interested in State Department. I am interest

in what DOD has done. We can get information from them. I would

like to know the status of all of these 506 equipment promises to

Colombia in particular. The others, if you can provide that, fine,

but Colombia.

The cost of Mantas seems to have jumped from $43 million. Did

you tell me $39 in 2000 to 2001 and then to $100 million the next

year?

Ms. SALAZAR. These are for all three of them. Let me give you

the exact numbers.

We have received as of this year—for all of the facilities, all

three, Aruba, Curacao, Manta, we are requesting $128.4 in total.

Mr. MICA. This year?

Ms. SALAZAR. In total. For this year we would be requesting approximately $38 for FOL Manta in the supplemental. In our fiscal

year 2001 budget, we would be requesting the rest. I have to make

a calculation of the difference. For Aruba, Curacao—and I believe

it comes to $122. I have that number in my mind. If you give me

10 minutes, I can provide you the exact numbers.

Mr. MICA. Can you provide that information?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes.

Mr. MICA. Also there were discussions in addition to Antilles and

Ecuador, Costa Rica. Is that anticipated in the expenditures if an

agreement is reached with Costa Rica?

Ms. SALAZAR. If we do reach an agreement with Central America,

we would anticipate that there would be some costs. It depends on

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which one of the FOLs we would be using. So that is not included

in that figure. Only Antilles and Manta. Correct?

Ms. SALAZAR. Correct, sir. For fiscal year 2000 and 2001. I believe we may be including that in our fiscal year 2002.

Mr. MICA. And we have one 10-year agreement now with Ecuador, and we still have not reached a conclusion on the agreement

with Antilles?

Ms. SALAZAR. They have concluded the negotiations and initialed

the agreement, and now it is following the process by which they

take it to their minister who signs it, and then, it is presented to

their legislators. We have an initialed agreement with the Kingdom

of the Netherlands.

Mr. MICA. Right. Because we met with them in September and

encouraged them to sign.

Ms. SALAZAR. We appreciate that because the negotiations went

very well.

Mr. MICA. One of the problems with the Antilles is I am told that

our planes there are delayed now in the tourist season for takeoff,

that we don’t have runway access when we need it. Can you respond to that?

Ms. SALAZAR. Sir, can I come back to you. I have not heard that

statement. I would defer to my Customs colleagues since they are

flying out of Aruba whether they are having any problems of that

sort. Part of the infrastructure construction is to avoid some of

these problems because we acknowledge that they are international

airports and that they have their flights that they need to do.

Mr. MICA. Finally, despite the White House press release of Jan- uary 11, the $1.6 billion aid package for Colombia still has not been

presented to us. Do you have any idea when we are going to get

the details of the package? General Wilhelm did give me the

DOD—at least his request. I don’t know if that was all included in

the final package. When will we see the final package?

Ms. SALAZAR. I believe the formal rollout—and I may be wrong— is February 7th or 8th. And of course once the rollout takes place,

we would come in and do the necessary briefings.

Mr. MICA. Sort of a slow emergency package, but we will get

there.

We appreciate your assistance. There is a vote on the floor of the

House. We will leave the record open, as I said, for 10 days. We

ask also that further questions be submitted to the witnesses.

There being no further business before the subcommittee on

Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, this meeting

is adjourned.

[NOTE.—The GAO report entitled, ‘‘Drug Control, Assets DOD

Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined,’’

may be found in subcommittee files.]

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

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