RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1667-22 

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

CIVIL COMMITMENT OF 

A.E. 

________________________

Argued February 12, 2024 – Decided February 21, 2024 

Before Judges Mawla and Vinci. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Docket No. 

MNCC-000047-23. 

Brian P. Hughes, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant A.E. (Jennifer Nicole 

Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Brian P. Hughes, on

the briefs). 

Matthew White, Assistant County Counsel, argued the

cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Emeshe 

Arzón, Camden County Counsel, attorney; Krista Ayn 

Schmid, Assistant County Counsel, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1667-22

 A.E. appeals from the January 26, 2023 order that continued his 

involuntary commitment. Based on our review of the record and applicable 

principles of law, we affirm. 

 On January 9, 2023, A.E., who was sixty years old at the time, was 

admitted to Northbrook Behavioral Health Hospital ("Northbrook") in Camden 

suffering from acute unspecified psychotic disorder. A.E. was experiencing 

delusions that he was paralyzed. His delusions began after he saw a player 

sustain an injury while watching a professional football game. On January 10, 

2023, a judge entered a temporary order for involuntary commitment. On 

January 26, 2023, the court conducted a commitment hearing. A.E. applied for 

immediate discharge. He did not seek Conditional Extension Pending 

Placement ("CEPP"). 

 Dr. Thomas Campo, A.E.'s treating psychiatrist at Northbrook, testified

for the State, and recommended continuing involuntary commitment. Dr. 

Campo testified A.E. was suffering from a mental illness, unspecified psychotic 

disorder. At the time of the hearing, A.E. was still experiencing delusions that 

he had previously been paralyzed but was "somewhat recovered" and suffering 

"vestigial weaknesses." According to Dr. Campo, A.E. believed "if he [was] on 

the floor, his limitations [would not] allow him to get up by himself, [and] he 
3 A-1667-22

[would have] to remain on the floor." During his stay at Northbrook, hospital 

staff did, in fact, need to help him up from the floor. 

 A.E. was not suffering from any medical or neurocognitive issues that 

would cause paralysis or weakness. Dr. Campo was treating A.E. with Risperdal 

and Gabapentin. Dr. Campo testified A.E. was medication compliant, but A.E. 

believed he did not need medication. A.E. also believed he needed a defibrillator 

implanted to help with his medical issues. 

 Dr. Campo testified A.E. could not attend to his necessary activities of 

daily living, including general hygiene, without assistance in the hospital due, 

in part, to his delusions. Dr. Campo testified A.E. had poor insight into his 

mental illness and believed he was being treated for a medical condition causing 

his paralysis and weakness. 

Although A.E. desired to return to his elderly parents' home where he lived 

since 1973, his parents advised Northbrook they would not allow him to return 

until he was stable. Dr. Campo testified that returning A.E. to his parents' home 

when he was ready was a better option than alternative housing. He explained 

no less restrictive environment was appropriate at the time, and A.E. was an 

imminent danger to himself due to his inability to care for himself because of 

his mental illness. Specifically, Dr. Campo opined that if A.E. was released 
4 A-1667-22

immediately, he would need to go to an emergency shelter and would end up in 

the emergency room by the end of the day because of his delusions. Dr. Campo 

believed A.E. was "getting better" and expected A.E. would be released in 

"another week or so." 

 A.E. testified he had "a condition in [his] spine. It hits [his] peroneal 

nerve, so [he] can't get down on the floor and get back up. [He has] to be by a 

chair. [He] didn't fall down getting up. Nobody helps [him], in [Northbrook], 

[to] get back up." A.E. also testified, contrary to Dr. Campo's testimony, he 

showered regularly and cared for himself at Northbrook and never needed 

assistance to get up from the floor. 

 Based on Dr. Campo's testimony and written report, the court found the 

State proved by clear and convincing evidence A.E. suffered from a mental 

illness, unspecified psychotic disorder. The court also found A.E. suffered "a 

delusional incident where he believed himself to become paralyzed. He ha[d] 

since regained some mobility, but he still believe[ed] that if he [was] on the 

ground, he [could] not stand up." The court noted there was no evidence A.E. 

had a source of income and found A.E. had no place to live other than his parents' 

home, which was not available to him until his condition improved. It found 

A.E. would not be able to survive outside the hospital because he would not have 
5 A-1667-22

a place to live, be able to obtain food, or care for himself. The court concluded 

A.E. "in his present situation" was not "able to negotiate the basic requirements 

of life and be able to care for himself." It ordered continued involuntary 

commitment and scheduled a review hearing for February 16, 2023. On 

February 7, 2023, A.E. was released. 

 On appeal, A.E. argues the court erred in not ordering CEPP. In his reply 

brief, A.E. also argues the State failed to meet its burden to establish involuntary 

commitment was appropriate. More particularly, A.E. argues the State failed to 

establish by clear and convincing evidence it was probable he would suffer 

substantial bodily injury within the foreseeable future. 

We review the decision to continue an individual's civil commitment 

utilizing an abuse of discretion standard. See In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58-59 

(1996). When reviewing civil commitment decisions, "we afford deference to 

the trial court's supportable findings." In re Commitment of T.J., 401 N.J. Super. 

111, 119 (App. Div. 2008). We "reverse[] only when there is clear error or 

mistake." In re Commitment of M.M., 384 N.J. Super. 313, 334 (App. Div. 

2006). However, we "must consider the adequacy of the evidence." Ibid. 

To continue an individual's involuntary commitment after a temporary 

commitment order, a court must find "by clear and convincing evidence 
6 A-1667-22

presented at [a] hearing that the patient is in need of continued involuntary 

commitment . . . ." R. 4:74-7(f)(1). The Legislature has defined this to mean: 

that an adult with mental illness, whose mental illness 

causes the person to be dangerous to self or dangerous 

to others or property and who is unwilling to accept 

appropriate treatment voluntarily after it has been

offered, needs outpatient treatment or inpatient care at 

a short-term care or psychiatric facility or special 

psychiatric hospital because other services are not

appropriate or available to meet the person's mental 

health care needs. 

[N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(m).] 

A person is "dangerous to self" if: 

by reason of mental illness the person has threatened or 

attempted suicide or serious bodily harm, or has 

behaved in such a manner as to indicate that the person 

is unable to satisfy [their] need for nourishment, 

essential medical care or shelter, so that it is probable 

that substantial bodily injury, serious physical harm, or

death will result within the reasonably foreseeable

future; however, no person shall be deemed to be 

unable to satisfy [their] need for nourishment, essential 

medical care, or shelter if [they are] able to satisfy such 

needs with the supervision and assistance of others who 

are willing and available. This determination shall take 

into account a person's history, recent behavior, and any 

recent act, threat, or serious psychiatric deterioration. 

[N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(h).] 

A patient who no longer needs involuntary commitment generally must be 

released within forty-eight hours in accordance with a plan developed by the 
7 A-1667-22

patient's treatment team. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.15(b); see also N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.18 

(stating the treatment team's obligation with respect to preparation of the plan). 

CEPP is an exception to the general rule requiring release within forty-eight 

hours. A CEPP order is proper only when the patient no longer requires 

involuntary commitment but "is not able to survive in the community 

independently or with the help of family or friends." In re S.L., 94 N.J. 128, 

140 (1983). A judge must make the finding, and the evidence must be adequate 

to satisfy the judge that CEPP is appropriate. Id. at 140-41.

We are not persuaded by A.E.'s argument that the court erred by 

continuing his involuntary commitment. A.E. does not dispute his diagnosis of 

unspecified psychotic disorder, or that his diagnosis qualifies as a mental illness 

under the statutory scheme. Based on Dr. Campo's testimony, the court found, 

at the time of the hearing, A.E. would not have been able to survive outside of

the hospital because he did not have a place to live and, because of his mental 

illness, he would not have been able to obtain food or care for himself. 

The court also found A.E.'s parents were unwilling to allow him back into 

their home until he stabilized and there were no other individuals to whom he 

could turn for assistance. It found A.E. "in his present situation" was not "able 

to negotiate the basic requirements of life and be able to care for himself." These 
8 A-1667-22

findings readily established that A.E. was "unable to satisfy his need for 

nourishment, essential medical care or shelter, so that it [was] probable that 

substantial bodily injury, serious physical harm, or death [would] result within 

the reasonably foreseeable future . . ." as required by N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(h). We 

are satisfied the court's findings were supported by substantial, credible 

evidence in the record and it did not abuse its discretion by continuing the 

involuntary commitment.

A.E.'s argument, which was not raised below, that the court was required 

to order CEPP is misplaced. CEPP is appropriate only if the patient no longer 

requires involuntary commitment. Because we have determined the court 

correctly continued the involuntary commitment, the court did not err by failing 

to consider CEPP. 

Affirmed.