### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT S eptember 8, 20 04 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ _ N o. 03- 1534 0

____ ____ ____ _ D.C. Dock etNo. 0 1- 00 74 9- CV-ORL-2 2- JGG DAVID L. MORRISON, P la int if f- Appe llant, ve rs us MA G IC CA RP E T A V IA T IO N , aD el aw ar e co rp or at ion , RD V S PO RT S, I N C. , aMi ch igan c or por at ion , HARRY MITC HEL, ind iv id ua ll y , ALTICOR, INC., a Mi ch igan c or

por at ion , f

. n. a. A m w ay Co rp or at ion , D ef

en dants -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ (S ep te m be r 8, 200 4) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, and T JO FL A T and C O X , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e:B e c a us e Ma g ic Carp e t w a s a

wh oll y owne d s ub sid iary

of Amwa y , M or ri so n w a s a lso 1 an e mpl oye e of

Amwa y . Si nc e Amwa

y did no t ha ve any e mpl oye e s w ith in 7 5 mi le s o f h is M a g ic Carpet wor

ksite, howeve r, that fa ct does not help Morr ison’s case . 2 App el la nt Davi d M orris on was a pi lo t fo r Mag ic Carp etAvi at io n, In c. He 1 cl ai m s th at

his sup er vis or a t M ag ic Carp et , H ar

ry Mi tc he l, vio la te d th e Fam ily Me dic al L eave A ct

of 199 3 ( FM L A ), 107 S ta t. 6, 29 U . S. C. §§ 2 601- 2654 , by le tti ng h im

take onl y tw o, r athe r than f

our , w ee ks o ff

f ro m w ork to de al w ith de pr es si on . Whe n M orris on req ue st edad di ti on al ti m e o ff, Mi tc he l fi redhi m . Mor ri son fi le d su it unde r the F ML A a ga ins t M itc he l and thr ee e nti tie s: ( 1) Ma gic C a r p e t , ( 2 ) Amw a y C o r

p . , o f wh i c h M a g i c C a r

p e twa s awh o l l y o w n e ds ub s i d i a ry, and (3) RD V S ports, Inc. , which owned Or lando Magic, L td., a com pany that had a contract w ith Magic Carpet to fly play ers and staff

for the O rlando Magic NB A ba sk etba ll tea m

aro un d t he co un try. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d su m m ar y j udgm en t t o th e de fe ndants on Mor ri son’ s F ML A c la im s be ca use , in or de r fo r the statut e to a ppl y , the em plo y er (s ) at

iss ue m ust have a t l ea st 5 0 e m

plo y ee s w ith in a

75 m ile r ad ius of

the w orksi te . S ee 29 U . S. C. § 26 11( 2) (B )( ii) . T he c ourt he ld tha t a lth oughMa gic Carp et and A m w ay ( as Ma gic Carp et ’ s c om

ple te ow ne r) w er e Mor

ri son’ s j oin t em ploy ers, they

did no t have enough em

ploy ees to m ake the FML A a pplicable. It also held that, as a m atter of law, RD V S ports, Inc. , w as not Morrison’s em ploy er,3

int eg rate d e m

plo y er , or j oin t e m plo y er f or pur pose s of the A ct . C onse que ntl y , it s em plo y ee s c oul d no t be c ount ed tow ar d satis fy ing thi s r equir em en t. I n th is a ppe al , Mor ri son ch al le nge s th is l atte r ru lin g, c ont en din g th at RD V S ports w as his em pl oyer or, a t t he ve ry

lea st , hi s i nt eg rat edor jo in t em pl oyer.

“ When exam ining summ ary j udgm ents, our re view is plenary .” G a. -Pac . Corp. v. Lie beram , 959 F. 2d 90 1, 904 (11th Cir. 1992). W e re view the district co urt’ s le ga l c onc lus ion s un de r a de nov o st an dard . S ee S m ithv. Be llS outh T el ec om m s. , I nc . , 273 F . 3d 1 303, 130 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) ( hol din g, in the c ont ex t of anappe al f

ro m adis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t, that “ que sti on[ s] of law. . . are r ev ie w [e d] de nov o” ). T he f ac ts m ust be vie w ed

in the li ght

m ost favor ab le to the non m ovant. T he c ourt’ s ul tim at e co nc lus iona s to w he the r the se facts ar e sufficient to m ake RD V Mor rison’s e m

ploy er under the FM LAis a m ixed que sti on o f fa ct

and l aw( inv olv ing the appl ic at ionof the lawto part ic ular fa ct s) that i s r ev ie w ed

de nov o. S ee Q uik

Ca sh P awn & Je w el ry , I nc . v. S he ri ff of Brow ard County , 279 F. 3d 13 16, 1319 (11t h Cir. 2001 ) (“ W e re view the tria l co urt' s gr an t of

sum m ar y j udgm en t de nov o, vie w ing the r ec or d and draw ing a ll reas on ab le in fere nc es in th e li gh t m os t fa vo rab le to th e n on -m ov in g p art y . . . .”). I. RDVwa s clearly

not Morrison’s em

ploy er. In considering whether an4

en tity is anind ivi dua l’ s e m

plo y er , w e co nsi de r: ( 1) w he the r or not the e m plo ym en t too k pl ac e on the pr em ise s of the a lle ge d e m

plo y er ; ( 2) howm

uc h c ontro l the alleged em

ploy er e xerted on the em

ploy ees; and (3) whether or not the alleged em plo y er ha d th e pow er

to fi re , hir e, or

m odi fy the e m plo ym en t c ondi tio n of

the em plo y ee s. W el chv. L an ey , 57 F . 3d 1 004, 101 1 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) ( quot ing W irtz v. Lo ne Sta r St eel Co ., 40 5 F .2d66 8, 6 69 -7 0 (5 th Cir . 19 68 )). T he thi rd f ac tor in thi s te st c uts a ga ins t M or ri son. Whil e RD V S ports, a s a m aj or client of Magic Carpet, could un doub tedly exert significant influence over its e m plo ym en t de ci sio ns, it

did not a ct ua lly have the pow er

to hir e or f ir e him dir ec tly . T he sim

ple f ac t tha t a m aj or c lie nt c anpr es sur e ane m plo y er int o f ir ing a pa rti cu la r in di vi du al do es no t t ran sm ut e th atcli en t i nt o t ha t i nd iv id ua l’s em pl oyer. O ur ana ly sis of

the f ir st p ro ng i s so m ewha t c om pli cate d. W el cha sks w he the r the w orksi te be lon ge d to the e m plo y er , w hic h r ai se s th e que sti on o f w he the r the e m

plo y er m ust be the outri ght

ow ne r of the pr em ise s or

if ale as eh old int er es t w oul d su ff

ic e. W e do n ot r ea d W el cha s r equir ing f ee sim ple ow ne rs hip of the worksite; m any

com panies, particular ly

in large cities, rent or lea se office spa ce in sky sc ra

pe rs f ro m the bui ldi ng’ s owne rs or apr ope rty

m an ag em en t or ganiz at ion . S uc h ale sse e undo ubt ed ly “ ow ns” the w orksi te of

it s e m plo y ee s f or pu rp os es of Welc h, ev en th ou gh it s cl ai m to th e p ro pe rty is o nl y

a le as eh ol d.5

Mor ri son’ s w orksi te w as , e sse nti al ly , the Bo ei ng a ir plane he f

le w . Ma gic Carp et le as ed the plane f

ro m it s a ct ua l owne r, w hose ide nti ty is not pe rt ine nt t o this su it. O rlando Magic, L td., which w as wholly owned by

RD V, had a tim eshare ag re em en t i n w hic h it

le as ed the plane f

ro m Ma gic Carp et

f or the ti m es w he n it ne ed ed to fl y it s pl ay er s to vari ous ga m es . T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ld tha t this

“ agreem ent was e ssentiallya lease betwee n the parties.” As the ow ner of a le as eh old int er es t i n th e ai rp lane w he n it w as be ing use d to f

ly O rl an do M ag ic play er s, O rl an do M ag ic , L td. , and h en ce RD V , c oul d be tho ught of a s th e ow ne r of Mo rri so n’s wo rk si te at t he rel ev an t t im es . Th i s p ar t i cu l arl ea s e a g re emen t , h o we v er , g re at l y ci rc u m s cr i b ed RD V’s co ntr ol o ve r both th e plane and i ts c re w . I t st at ed : A ll fl igh ts c ondu ct ed

und er thi s A gr ee m en t sh al l be und er the ope ratio na l c ontro l of

Ma gic Carp et . F or

the pur pose of thi s A gr ee m en t, ope ratio na l c ontro l sh al l i nc lud e, w ith out li m itatio n, ex cl usi ve c ontro l ov er : ( i) a ll cr ewm em be rs ; ( ii) de te rm inatio n w he the r an y

part ic ular fl igh t m ay

be sa fe ly ope rate d; ( iii ) as sig nm en t of c re wm em

be rs to part ic ular fl igh ts; ( iv) ini tiatio n and t er m inatio n of a ll fl igh ts; ( v) dir ec tio ns t o c re wm em be rs to co nduc t f

lig hts ; and (v i) d is pa tc h o r rel eas e o f fl ig ht s. Whil e thi s a gr ee m en t purp orts t o le as e the plane to RD V , it a ct ua lly gave RD V no ri ght s e xc ep t t o have it s pl ay er s si t ba ck and b e fl ow n aro und. I t di d no t gi ve R D V an y m e a n i n g f

u l d i r e c tc o n t r o l o v e r

o r i n th e wo rk s i t e i t s e l f

. C o n s e qu e n t l y,6

w e ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lus ionthat the f ir st p ro ng i s of

no ava il to Mo rri so n— th ou gh no t wi th ou t s ig ni fic an t h es it at io n. The sec ond factor of the W elch test—the extent of control the alleged em plo y er ha d ov er it s pu tativ e em

plo y ee —gi ve s us e ve n m or e pause , e ve n th ough m uc h of the e vid en ce Mo rr iso n in tr oduc es to de m onstrate that RD V ha d c ontro l ove r him is pa te ntl y

ir re le vant. F or

e xa m ple , the f ac t tha t i t gave him

vari ous gif

ts an d pe rquis ite s—i nc lud ing ahol iday bonus, adis co unt

a t the Ma gic ’ s F an A tti c sto re , se as on t ic ke ts t o M ag ic G am es , inv itatio ns t o RD V ’ s sum m er pic nic and Christm as party , and an inv itation to volun teer at an Or lando Magic event—do es not m ean th at

it ha d c ontro l ov er

him in an y w ay . Whil e, in the abstra ct , the se fa ct s are c onsi ste nt w iththe e xis te nc e of an e m plo ym en t r el at ion shi p, and c oul d be co nstru ed a s e ve n su gge sti ng o ne in our e ve ry day c onc ep tio n of

the w or d, the y

do no t s ho w th atRDV ha d c on tro l o ve r hi m forpu rp os es of t he W el ch tes t. Be ca use the part ie s a gr ee d th at W el chgov er

ns this a ct ion , w e cannot consider any

way s in which these fac ts m ight tend to prove that RDVwa s Morrison’ s em

ploy er outside of the standards articulated in W elch. Moreover, ev enif w e w er e to c onc lud e that W el chw as ba se d onan anti qua te d or und uly narr owc onc ep tio n of

e m plo ym en t— a poi nt whic h w e do n ot r ea ch —w e w oul d sti ll be bound t o up hol d it und er the pr ior pane l r ule . S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. S m ith ,7

122 F.3d 135 5, 1359 (11th Cir. 1997 ) (“ [U ] nder the prior prece dent rule, w e ar e bo un d b y ou r ear li er p an el ho ld in gs . . . .”). Perhaps the best evidence of control Morrison offer s is the fact that he w as req ui redto wear an RDV id en ti fic at io n b ad ge , Mag ic ne ck ti es , and a Mag ic pa rk a. The di st ric t co ur t fo un d t ha t M orris on ha d fa il edto in tro du ce ev id en ce t ha t RDV spe ci fi ca lly , r athe r than M ag ic Carp et , ha d r equir ed thi s. C onse que ntl y , the re is no evidence that RDVhad direct control over Morrison, r ather than the indirect co ntr ol o ve r a se rv ic e pr ovi de r’ s e m plo y ee s th at

ac ust om er

m ay obt ai n by co ntr ac tin g w iththat se rv ic e pr ovi de r. S uc h in dir ec t c ontro l do es not a m ount to ane m plo ym en t r el at ion shi p be ca use the c ust om er

is in p ri vity

of c ontra ct w iththe se rv ic e pr ovi de r (whic h is it se lf an in de pe nde nt c ontra ct or of the c ust om er ), and not the se rv ic e pr ovi de r’ s e m plo y ee s. S ee , e . g. , Mo re auv. A ir F r. , 343 F . 3d 1 179, 1190 -9 1 ( 9thCi r. 200 3) ( co nc lud ing that “ A ir F ranc e shou ld n ot b e tr eate d a s a j oin t e m plo y er of the gr ound

handl ing se rv ic e co m

pany e m plo y ee s, ” ev entho ugh Air France contracted w ith that com pany to provid e services f

or its flights ); Z hao v. Be be S tor es , I nc . , 247 F . S upp. 2d 1 154, 115 9- 60 ( C. D . Ca l. 200 3) ( de cl ini ng t o find that Bebe Stores w as the em ploy er of Apex’ s em

ploy ees, despite the fact that Bebe hired Apex to prod uce som e clothes that it sold , bec ause “ Apex had an ongo ing bus ine ss whic h hi re s, f ir es and s upe rv ise s a

sig nif ic an t num be r of8

em plo y ee s w ho p er fo rm

se rv ic es f

or c om panie s othe r than B eb e St or es ”) ; se e al so G ranse v. Br ow n P hot o C o. , N o. 3- 80- 338, 198 5 U . S. D ist . L E X IS 183 18, a t *3 8- 39 (D. Minn. July

1, 1985) (holdin g that a service provider—a profe ssion al phot ogr ap he r— “ w as not

an e m plo y ee of his c ust om er ’ s. . . . T he c ust om er s ha d no ac tua l c ontro l ov er

him oth er than th e ind ir ec t c ontro l of the pur se str ing s and whe th er t o o rd er an d p ay forad di ti on al pri nt s b as edon th e p ro of s.”) . If RDV co ntr ac te d w ithMa gic Carp et to ha ve Ma gic Carp et ’ s e m plo y ee s w ear RD P or O rl an do M ag ic ins ign ia , it is Ma gic Carp et , r athe r than RD V , w ho i s c om pe lli ng it s emplo y ees to wear s uc h app arel to sat is fy it s co nt ract ua l o bl ig at io ns . Perh ap s m os t p ers ua si ve ly, th e ag reem en t b et ween Orla nd o M ag ic , Ltd ., and Magic Car

pet specified that “ all cre w m em bers,” the “ assignm ent of cre w m em bers to particular flights,” and “ directions to crew m em bers to conduct fl igh ts, ” w oul d be und er the “ ex cl usi ve c ontro l” of Ma gic Carp et . Mo rr iso n is hard pr es se d to ove rc om e the pla in l an gua ge of thi s a gr ee m en t, w hic h e xpr es sly places exclusive control ov er him in Magic Car

pet, r ather than O rlando Magic, Ltd ., andby ext en si on RDV. Putting asid e the issue of control, the three factors that trouble us m ost are that he w as r equir ed

to w ear anRD V ide nti fi catio n ba dge , that he w as r equir ed to attend an em

ploy ee orientation at RD V, and that he was listed in RD V’ s staff9

dir ec tor y a s an e m plo y ee . T he se c onsi de ratio ns d o no t e as ily f al l w ith in the W elch fram ew ork. B ecause Morr ison failed to offer an em ploym ent-by -estoppel arg um en t ei th er b el ow o r on ap pe al , we nee d n ot co ns id er t hi s i ss ue . See, e.g ., G re enbr iar, L td. v. Ci ty

of A la ba ste r, 881 F . 2d 1 570, 157 3 n. 6 ( 11th C ir . 198 7) (“ [I]ss ue s n ot arg ue d o n app eal are d eem edwaiv ed. . . .”). Fo r th es e rea so ns , we affi rm th e d is tri ctco ur t’s co nc lu si on th atRDV is no t M orris on ’s em pl oyer. II. Inthe a lte rn at ive , Mo rr iso n c ont en ds tha t RD V , a lon g w ithA m w ay and Magic Car

pet, w as his “ integrated em ploy er. ” T he De partm ent of L abor states that various com

panies m ay

be an individ ual’ s “ integrated em ploy er” wher e they ha ve “ (i ) Co m

m on m an ag em en t; (i i) I nte rr el at ionbe tw ee n op er at ion s; ( iii ) Ce ntr al iz ed

c ontro l of

la bor r el at ion s; and ( iv) [ A ] [ d] eg re e of c om m on own ers hi p/ fin an ci al co nt ro l.” 2 9 C .F.R. § 8 25 .10 4( c)(2 ). Mo rri so n fa il s t o i nt ro du ce an y ev id en ce co nc ern in g t he fir st fact or . Re gard ing the se co nd f

ac tor , Mo rr iso n’ s on ly

arg um en t i s th at

RD V loo ke d to Am way for advice in r estructuring its in ternal operations. T he fac t that RDVm ay ha ve a tte m

pte d to e m

ulate A m w ay doe s no t m ean th ey

w er e int er

re la te d inany w ay . Mo re ove r, Mo rr iso n f ai ls t o m en tio n th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c or re ct obs er va tio n that RDVlooked to a varie ty of other m aj or com

panies for advice in its internal10

res tru ctur in g a s wel l. Re gard ing the thi rd

pr ong, c en tr al iz ed

c ontro l of

la bor r el at ion s, the m ost Morrison can point to is the fact that he w as requested to attend an em ploy ee or ie ntatio n a t RD V w he n he w as f ir st h ir ed . T his is hard ly

e noug h to sho w centralize d control ov er labor r elations, m uch less that RDVand Magic Car pet were s o i nt eg rat edth atth ey were, i n e ffec t, o ne en ti ty. T he f ina l pr ong of

thi s te st i s th e onl y

one Mo rr iso n ha s satis fi ed ; the w ea lth y D eV os f am ily ow ns b othA m

w ay and RD V . A s am atte r of law , w e do not be lie ve that c om

m on o w ne rs hip of

tw o c or por at ion s is e noug h f

or aj ur y to co nc lu de th atth ey

were i nt eg rat edin to on e o pe rat io n fo r FMLA p ur po se s. Co nse que ntl y , the dis tr ic t c ourt w as c or re ct in co nc lud ing that RD V w as not Mo rri so n’s i nt eg rat edem pl oyer. III. Mor ri son fi na lly

c ont en ds tha t RD V , A m

w ay , and M ag ic Carp et

w er e his

“ j oin t e m plo y er s. ” T he D ep ar

tm en t of L ab or state s th at

vari ous co m

panie s m ay

be an indiv idual’s “

j oint em ploy ers”: Where there is an arr angem ent betwee n em ploy ers to share an em ploy ee’ s services or to interchange em ploy ees; (2) W

here one em ploy er a cts directly

or indirectly

in the interests of the oth er e m plo y er in re la tio n to the e m

plo y ee ; or , ( 3) Whe re the em ploy ers . . . m ay

be deem ed to share control of the em ploy ee,11 dir ec tly or ind ir ec tly , be ca

use one e m

plo y er c ontro ls, is controlled by , or is und er c omm on control with the oth er em pl oyer. 29 C.F.R. § 82 5.1 06 (a). Notw ithstand ing th e existence of the tim eshare a greem ent, Ma gic Carpet an d RD V did

not “ share ” Mor

ri son’ s se rv ic e. Mo rr iso n w as apil ot f or Ma gic Carp etwho se job was t o fl y Mag ic Carp et ’s cli en ts to th ei r de st in at io ns . Mor eo ve r, a s di sc uss ed

above , RD V la ck ed

dir ec t c ontro l ov er

e ith er Mo rr iso n or Mag ic Carp et . Con se qu en tl y , th e joi nt em pl oyer tes t d oe s n ot ap pl y . T he r em ai nde r of

Mo rr iso n’ s c ont en tio ns are m er el y r es ta te m en ts o f his foregoing argum ents and are w hollywithout m erit. T he j udgm ent of the district co ur t i s, i n i ts en ti ret y , AFFIR MED.