Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1411-CT-515 | May 8, 2015 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Rebecca L. Loeffler

H. Joseph Certain

Kiley, Harker & Certain

Marion, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Tara K. Tauber

Rhett L. Tauber

Tauber Law Offices

Schererville, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Bill J. Bowers,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Jack Weichman,

Appellee-Plaintiff

May 8, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A04-1411-CT-515

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Calvin D. Hawkins, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 45D02-1301-

CT-11

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] On September 27, 2010, Appellant-Defendant Bill J. Bowers and AppelleePlaintiff Jack Weichman attended a Chicago Bears/Green Bay Packers football 

game at Soldier Field in Chicago. Both Bowers and Weichman watched the 
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game from the suite that belonged to Appellee-Defendant Horseshoe 

Hammond, LLC (“Horseshoe”). At some point during the game, Bowers and 

Weichman were involved in a physical altercation. As a result of the physical 

altercation, Weichman claims that he suffered serious and permanent injuries to 

his face.

[2] On August 2, 2012, Weichman filed suit against Bowers, Horseshoe, AppelleeDefendant Monterrey Security Consultants, Inc., and Appellee-Defendant 

Delaware North Companies Sportservices, Inc. (collectively, the 

“Defendants”).1 Weichman subsequently amended his complaint to assert that 

he suffered personal injuries as a result of the physical altercation with Bowers. 

Bowers filed a motion to dismiss on April 4, 2013, claiming that the trial court 

lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The trial court denied Bowers’s motion 

to dismiss and certified the matter for interlocutory appeal.

[3] Bowers contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

dismiss. Upon review, we conclude that because the incident in question took 

place in Illinois and Bowers did not have significant contacts with the State of 

Indiana, we conclude that Indiana Courts do not have personal jurisdiction 

over Bowers. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and 

 

1

 Monterrey Security Consultants, Inc. provided security services in the Horseshoe suite and 

Delaware North Companies Sportservices, Inc. provided food and beverage services in the 

Horseshoe suite.
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remand to the trial court with an instruction to enter an order dismissing 

Weichman’s claims against Bowers.

Facts and Procedural History

[4] In the fall of 2008 Christina Herrera, the then-National Casino Marketing 

Manager for Horseshoe, spoke to Jennifer Rivers from the Harrah’s Casino in 

Las Vegas. Rivers indicated to Herrera that she had “a group of folks that 

wanted to come and enjoy [Horseshoe’s] suite for the Packers/Bears’ game.” 

Appellant’s App. p. 53. This group included Bowers, a resident of Wisconsin 

who does not conduct business or own any real property in Indiana. Because 

Bowers had never been to Horseshoe prior to Rivers’s request, Herrera looked 

Bowers up in Horseshoe’s casino marketing system to verify that Bowers 

qualified for the tickets. Herrera determined that Bowers, who had attained 

“diamond player” status, qualified for the tickets. Appellant’s App. p. 60. 

[5] After determining that the group, again including Bowers, qualified for the 

tickets, Herrera reserved rooms at a hotel in Chicago for the group. In 

exchange for the complimentary hotel room and tickets, “the understanding is 

that [the group would] come to [Horseshoe] and play, and then [ ] pick up their 

tickets on [Horseshoe] property.” Appellant’s App. p. 58. Upon picking up the 

tickets in December of 2008, Bowers and his friends stayed at Horseshoe for 

approximately six hours.
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[6] Rivers again contacted Herrera about tickets to the Bears/Packers football game 

in the fall of 2010. Bowers and his friends were again given complimentary 

hotel rooms in Chicago and tickets to watch the football game from 

Horseshoe’s suite. Similar to 2008, Bowers and his friends came to Horseshoe 

to pick up the tickets. On this visit, the group stayed for approximately eight 

hours. During their visit to Horseshoe, Bowers and his friends also received a 

complimentary dinner at the restaurant located within Horseshoe. 

[7] On September 27, 2010, Bowers attended a Chicago Bears game at Soldier 

Field in Chicago as a guest of Harrah’s Las Vegas, sitting in Horseshoe’s suite. 

Weichman and his girlfriend also attended the Chicago Bears game at Soldier 

Field on September 27, 2010, and sat in Horseshoe’s suite. Throughout the 

course of the game, the occupants of the suite were provided with alcoholic 

beverages. Weichman claims that he and his girlfriend were harassed and 

ridiculed by Bowers throughout the game. Weichman further claims that as the 

game ended, Bowers physically battered him. As a result of this alleged 

physical altercation, Weichman claims that he sustained serious and permanent 

injuries to his face.

[8] On August 2, 2012, Weichman filed suit against the Defendants. Weichman 

subsequently amended his complaint to assert that he suffered personal injuries 

after being physically battered by Bowers in the Horseshoe suite at Soldier Field 

in Chicago. Bowers filed a motion to dismiss on April 4, 2013, claiming that 

the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. On October 10, 2014, the 
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trial court denied Bowers’s motion to dismiss and certified the matter for 

interlocutory appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Bowers contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 

because Indiana courts do not have personal jurisdiction over him. 

“Personal jurisdiction is a question of law....” Anthem Ins. Co. v. Tenet 

Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227, 1237 (Ind. 2000). As with other 

questions of law, a determination of the existence of personal 

jurisdiction is entitled to de novo review by appellate courts. Id. We 

do not defer to the trial court’s legal conclusion as to whether personal 

jurisdiction exists. Id. However, personal jurisdiction turns on facts, 

typically the contacts of the defendant with the forum, and findings of 

fact by the trial court are reviewed for clear error. Id. at 1238.

LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind. 2006).

[10] “When a person attacks the court’s jurisdiction over him, he bears the burden of 

proof upon that issue by a preponderance of the evidence, unless the lack of 

jurisdiction is apparent upon the face of the complaint.” Attaway v. Omega, 903 

N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Lee v. Goshen Rubber Co., 635 N.E.2d 

214, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied). “When reviewing a motion to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, we apply a de novo standard of 

review.” Id. (citing Dexter Axle Co. v. Baan USA, Inc., 833 N.E.2d 43, 48 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2005)). “However, personal jurisdiction turns on facts, typically 

related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, and findings of fact by the 
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trial court are reviewed for clear error.” Id. (citing LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 

965).

[11] In Attaway, we explained that 

[u]ntil fairly recently, determining personal jurisdiction in Indiana 

required an analysis under both Indiana Trial Rule 4.4 (Indiana’s long 

arm provision) and the federal due process clause. In 2006, however, 

our supreme court clarified that a 2003 amendment to Indiana Trial 

Rule 4.4(A) “was intended to, and does, reduce analysis of personal 

jurisdiction to the issue of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction 

is consistent with the Federal Due Process Clause.” Id. at 967. 

This federal due process analysis is well-settled. In International Shoe 

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), the 

U.S. Supreme Court established that a nonresident defendant must 

have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play 

and substantial justice.” Id. at 316, 66 S. Ct. 154 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). The Court later clarified this test to mean 

that the nonresident defendant must engage in “some act by which 

[he] purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting 

activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.

Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

Id. 

[12] It is well-established that there are two types of personal jurisdiction, general 

and specific. Id. “If the defendant’s contacts with the state are so ‘continuous 

and systematic’ that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled 

into the courts of that state for any matter, then he is subject to general 

jurisdiction, even in causes unrelated to his contacts with the forum state.” Id. 

(citing LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 967; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. 
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v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n.9 (1984)). The parties agree, as do we, that Bowers 

is not subject to general jurisdiction in Indiana.

[13] Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, “requires that the defendant has 

purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 

forum state and that his conduct and connection with that state are such that he 

should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Id. (citing Burger 

King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985)). “A single contact with 

the forum state may be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over a 

defendant if it creates a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum state and the 

suit is related to that connection.” Id. at 77 (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 

355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)). However, “[a] defendant cannot be haled into a 

jurisdiction ‘solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or of 

the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.’” Id. (quoting Burger 

King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475). 

[14] “If the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient to support a 

finding of general or specific jurisdiction, due process requires that the assertion 

of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” 

Id. (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476). 

To make this determination, the court may consider five factors: (1) 

the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state’s interest in 

adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 

convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s 

interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and 

(5) the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 

substantive shared policies. [Burger King Corp., at 476-77].
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Id.

[15] In claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, Bowers 

argues that the facts of the instant matter are similar to those presented in 

Rosowsky v. University of Colorado, 653 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. 

denied. Rosowsky, who at the time was a professor at Purdue University, 

applied for a faculty position at the University of Colorado. 653 N.E.2d at 147. 

Rosowsky interviewed for the position over the course of three days in April of 

1993. Id. at 148. In May of 1993, the chair of the relevant department was 

vacationing in Michigan. Id. The chair of the department set up a dinner 

meeting with Rosowsky at a yacht club in Michigan City, Indiana. Id. During 

this meeting, the chair of the department notified Rosowsky that he anticipated 

that the department would be making an offer of employment. Id. In June of 

1993, the University of Colorado sent Rosowsky an offer of employment. Id. 

The terms of the offer made it clear that the offer was contingent upon approval 

by the Board of Regents. Id. Rosowsky accepted the offer. Id. The Board of 

Regents, however, did not approve of Rosowsky’s employment, and the offer of 

employment was withdrawn. Id.

[16] Rosowsky subsequently filed a breach of contract suit against the University of 

Colorado in Tippecanoe County, Indiana. Id. Upon review, we noted that the 

University of Colorado is not generally engaged in business in Indiana, has no 

registered agent, telephone facilities, bank accounts, or property in Indiana. Id. 

at 149. Further, the majority of the contact between the University of Colorado 
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and Rosowsky consisted of letters and phone calls, which do not subject a nonresident to jurisdiction in the state of the recipient. Id. The only contact that 

took place in Indiana was a two-hour dinner meeting that was occasioned by 

the fact that the department chair was vacationing in Michigan and was 

available to meet Rosowsky at a mutually convenient location. Id. This 

meeting fortuitously occurred in Indiana and could “just as easily have 

occurred in a restaurant in Michigan instead of in an Indiana border city.” Id. 

Based on these circumstances, we concluded that “[a] single visit by an agent to 

the forum state for social and business discussions does not subject the 

nonresident to jurisdiction in that state when the visit is incidental to an agent’s 

trip to another state.” Id.

[17] Weichman, for his part, argues that the facts of the instant matter are more 

similar to those presented in Attaway. In Attaway, we considered whether 

Indiana courts had personal jurisdiction over two residents of Idaho, the 

Attaways, who had entered into an agreement over eBay to purchase a vehicle 

from two residents of Indiana. Id. at 75. After receiving the vehicle, the 

Attaways filed a claim with PayPal (the online payment service owned by eBay 

which was used to submit payment for the vehicle), asking for a refund. Id. In 

requesting a refund, the Attaways claimed that the vehicle was “significantly 

not-as-described in its eBay listing.” Id. (internal record quotation omitted). 

After the Attaways took possession of the vehicle and rescinded payment, the 

Indiana residents filed suit against the Attaways in an Indiana trial court 

seeking $5,900.00 in damages. Id. at 76. 
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[18] The Attaways subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, in which they claimed 

that the Indiana trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. Id. The trial 

court denied the Attaways’ motion to dismiss. Id. Upon review, we affirmed 

the judgment of the trial court, concluding that with respect to the purchase of 

the vehicle over eBay, “the Attaways purposefully availed themselves of the 

privilege of conducting activities within the State of Indiana such that they 

could reasonably anticipate defending a lawsuit in Indiana related to this eBay 

purchase.” Id. at 79.

[19] While the facts of the instant matter do not directly mirror the facts presented in 

either Rosowsky or Attaway, we believe that the type of contacts Bowers had 

with the State of Indiana are more similar to those had by the agent for the 

University of Colorado than the internet purchasers of a vehicle from sellers 

who were residents of Indiana. Again, through his “diamond player” status 

with Harrah’s Casino in Las Vegas, Bowers qualified to receive tickets to a 

Chicago Bears/Green Bay Packers football game. This game took place at 

Soldier Field in Chicago. The tickets were obtained by representatives from 

Harrah’s from representatives of Horseshoe. 

[20] Bowers’s only contacts with the State of Indiana were occasioned on the 

requirement that he pick up the tickets from Horseshoe and spend some time 

gambling in the casino. The first contact took place in 2008 and has no relation 

to the instant matter. The second contact took place in the fall of 2010, prior to 

the alleged incident between Bowers and Weichman. Bowers could have easily 

been required to pick up the tickets from a location in Illinois or Michigan, 
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rather than Indiana. Bowers’s minimal contacts with Indiana were fortuitously 

due to Horseshoe’s location within a few miles of the Indiana/Illinois state line 

on Indiana’s Lake Michigan shorefront. Further, nothing in the record even 

suggests that Bowers encountered Weichman while at Horseshoe or in the State 

of Indiana. Weichman does not allege that he ever had any contact with 

Bowers within the State of Indiana. The only alleged contact between 

Weichman and Bowers occurred at Soldier Field in Chicago. 

[21] Again, it is undisputed the alleged altercation between Bowers and Weichman 

took place in Illinois, not in Indiana. As such, Indiana has no real interest in 

adjudicating the dispute. In addition, there would be a great burden upon 

Bowers if we were to allow personal jurisdiction over Bowers in Indiana. 

Bowers is a Wisconsin resident who is not regularly engaged in business in 

Indiana. He does not own any property in Indiana and seemingly has no 

connection to Indiana other than his two short visits to Horseshoe, one of 

which occurred in 2008 and the other of which occurred in 2010. Further, to 

the extent that Weichman may be entitled to relief, nothing in the record 

suggest that he could not obtain said relief from another jurisdiction, i.e., 

Illinois. 

[22] Upon review, we conclude that under the facts of the instant case, due process 

considerations preclude Indiana courts from asserting jurisdiction over Bowers. 

As such, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Bowers’s motion to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the judgment of 
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the trial court and remand to the trial court with an instruction to enter an order 

dismissing Weichman’s claims against Bowers.

[23] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter remanded to the trial 

court with instructions.

Vaidik, C.J., and Kirsch, J., concur.