FOREIGN INTERNAL 

DEFENSE

Air Force Doctrine Document 3-22

15 September 2007

Interim Change 2 (Last Review), 1 November 2011

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-22,

Foreign Internal Defense.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 3-22

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 15 SEPTEMBER 2007

INCORPORATING INTERIM CHANGE 2, 1 NOVEMBER 2011

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

The Air Force Doctrine Working Group has reviewed this document and 

recommended that it remains valid and will again be reviewed no later than September 

2012. AFDD numbering has also been changed to correspond with the joint doctrine 

publication numbering architecture. AFDD titles and content remain unchanged until 

updated in the next full revision. A margin bar indicates newly revised material.

Supersedes: AFDD 2-3.1, 10 May 2004

OPR: LeMay Center/DD

Certified by: LeMay Center/DD

Pages: 106

Accessibility: Available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for

 downloading

Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication

Approved by: LeMay Center/CC, Maj Gen Thomas K. Andersen, USAF

 Commander, LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education

Old Number New Number Title

AFDD 2-1 changed to AFDD 3-1 Air Warfare

AFDD 2-1.1 changed to AFDD 3-01 Counterair Operations

AFDD 2-1.2 changed to AFDD 3-70 Strategic Attack

AFDD 2-1.3 changed to AFDD 3-03 Counterland Operations

AFDD 2-1.4 changed to AFDD 3-04 Countersea Operations

AFDD 2-1.6 changed to AFDD 3-50 Personnel Recovery Operations

AFDD 2-1.7 changed to AFDD 3-52 Airspace Control

AFDD 2-1.8 changed to AFDD 3-40 Counter-CBRN

AFDD 2-1.9 changed to AFDD 3-60 Targeting

AFDD 2-10 changed to AFDD 3-27 Homeland Operations

AFDD 2-12 changed to AFDD 3-72 Nuclear Operations

AFDD 2-2 changed to AFDD 3-14 Space Operations

AFDD 2-2.1 changed to AFDD 3-14.1 Counterspace Operations

AFDD 2-3 changed to AFDD 3-24 Irregular Warfare

AFDD 2-3.1 changed to AFDD 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense

AFDD 2-4 changed to AFDD 4-0 Combat Support

AFDD 2-4.1 changed to AFDD 3-10 Force Protection

AFDD 2-4.2 changed to AFDD 4-02 Health Services

AFDD 2-4.4 changed to AFDD 4-11 Bases, Infrastructure... [Rescinded]

AFDD 2-4.5 changed to AFDD 1-04 Legal Support

AFDD 2-5 changed to AFDD 3-13 Information Operations

AFDD 2-5.1 changed to AFDD 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare

AFDD 2-5.3 changed to AFDD 3-61 Public Affairs Operations

AFDD 2-6 changed to AFDD 3-17 Air Mobility Operations

AFDD 2-7 changed to AFDD 3-05 Special Operations

AFDD 2-8 changed to AFDD 6-0 Command and Control

AFDD 2-9 changed to AFDD 2-0 ISR Operations

AFDD 2-9.1 changed to AFDD 3-59 Weather Operations
FOREWORD 

 Today, the United States finds itself embroiled in counterinsurgency operations with 

multiple manifestations and broad implications. 

 The resurgence of radical Islam and its use of terrorism to subvert and overthrow 

established governments to reshape society in its own image is but one of these 

manifestations. Other manifestations include ultra-nationalist militants seeking political 

autonomy within existing states and the use of violence and illicit narcotics trafficking to 

subvert or overthrow legitimate governments. 

 Since the 9/11 tragedy, our efforts to prosecute terrorism and insurgency have 

produced the realization that a successful conclusion lies many years in the future and 

that success will be impossible without the active participation of global partners. A 

strategy of enabling partner nations to defend themselves against these internal threats 

is clearly emerging from that realization. US initiatives to support this strategy fall within 

an operating area termed foreign internal defense (FID). In fact, the Global War on 

Terrorism is taking place largely in the FID arena. The strategic end game is a partner 

nation capable of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of 

national power to eradicate lawlessness, terrorism, subversion, and insurgency. 

 Although Air Force forces can perform FID across the range of military operations, 

the main form of FID support consists of assessing, training, advising, and assisting 

foreign aviation forces. Doctrine stresses this indirect approach to capture those 

aspects of FID that apply worldwide and that extend beyond the present conflicts in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. Increased emphasis in this area can multiply US influence globally 

without requiring a standing-force presence in a multitude of locations. 

 We know that military forces in many lesser-developed nations cannot engage in 

joint and coalition operations without US Air Force FID assistance. While Air Force 

forces can apply airpower at virtually any level of intensity, our ability to prosecute an 

indirect approach is crucial to Air Force FID. Virtually all nations have laws prohibiting 

foreign combat operations within their sovereign territory. Accordingly, partner nation 

forces will, in most instances, have to take the tactical offensive supported by US Air 

Force training and advisory assistance. That form of assistance will most often be the 

instrument of both choice and necessity. 

 Where US forces must fight as a coalition partner with foreign forces, the full weight 

of airpower can be brought to bear in appropriate ways, and will play a crucial role. This 

doctrine document is designed to help Air Force commanders select appropriate options 

and tailor their efforts to fit the conditions at hand. 

ALLEN G. PECK 

Major General, USAF 

Commander, Air Force Doctrine 

Development and Education Center
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................vi

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS...............................................................vii

CHAPTER ONE— Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Fundamentals.................................. 1

Strategic Realities .................................................................................................................... 4 

Principal Air Force FID Intiatives ........................................................................................... 5 

CHAPTER TWO—Operational Environment................................................................... 9

General Characteristics........................................................................................................... 9 

Understanding the Environment .......................................................................................... 10 

Social and Political Conditions ......................................................................................... 11 

Threat Forms .......................................................................................................................... 12 

Subversion........................................................................................................................... 12 

Insurgency........................................................................................................................... 13 

Lawlessness........................................................................................................................ 13 

Terrorism ............................................................................................................................. 14 

Airpower in Developing Nations........................................................................................... 15 

Aircraft.................................................................................................................................. 16 

Agile Combat Support Capabilities.................................................................................. 16 

Aircraft Maintenance...................................................................................................... 16 

Personnel......................................................................................................................... 17 

Training ............................................................................................................................ 17 

Communications............................................................................................................. 17 

Air Facilities......................................................................................................................... 18 

Intelligence .......................................................................................................................... 18 

CHAPTER THREE—The Role of Airpower in FID ....................................................... 20

Flexibility and Versatility........................................................................................................ 21 

Internal Defense and Development Strategy..................................................................... 21 

Development and Mobilization......................................................................................... 22 

Security and Neutralization............................................................................................... 22 

Airpower Functions ................................................................................................................ 23 

Air Mobility........................................................................................................................... 23 

Agile Combat Support ....................................................................................................... 24 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance........................................................... 25 

Command and Control ...................................................................................................... 26 

Counterland Operations .................................................................................................... 26 

Personnel Recovery Operations...................................................................................... 27 

Information Operations...................................................................................................... 27 

Air Force Special Operations Forces .............................................................................. 28 

CHAPTER FOUR—FID Operations .............................................................................. 30

Characteristics of Air Force FID Operations...................................................................... 30 

Integrated Interagency Objectives....................................................................................... 31 

iii
The FID Continuum................................................................................................................ 32 

Indirect Support .................................................................................................................. 33 

Foreign Military Financing............................................................................................. 34 

International Military Education and Training............................................................. 35 

Building the FID Trainer Advisor Team........................................................................... 35 

Direct Support (not involving combat)................................................................................. 36 

Direct Support (involving combat) ....................................................................................... 39 

CHAPTER FIVE—Command and Control..................................................................... 40

Indirect Support ...................................................................................................................... 40 

Direct Support......................................................................................................................... 41 

Combat Operations................................................................................................................ 41 

Coordination............................................................................................................................ 42 

Joint Interagency Operations ............................................................................................... 42 

Multinational Operations ....................................................................................................... 43 

CHAPTER SIX—Planning............................................................................................. 44

Indirect Support ...................................................................................................................... 44 

Direct Support......................................................................................................................... 45 

Planning Requirements......................................................................................................... 45 

Airpower Analyses and the Operational Design................................................................ 46 

Strategy-to-Task FID Planning............................................................................................. 47 

Critical Sequencing................................................................................................................ 48 

Intelligence Support of FID................................................................................................... 49 

Space Support to FID............................................................................................................ 49 

Agile Combat Support Capabilities...................................................................................... 50 

Security Assistance Surge Operations ............................................................................... 51 

Psychological Operations ..................................................................................................... 53 

Civil Affairs .............................................................................................................................. 53 

Simulation and Gaming......................................................................................................... 53 

CHAPTER SEVEN—Employment................................................................................. 54

Air Force FID........................................................................................................................... 55 

Train-Advise-Assist Employment Concept..................................................................... 57 

Training Versus Advising .................................................................................................. 59 

FID Assistance.................................................................................................................... 60 

Combat Aviation Advisors (CAA)..................................................................................... 60 

Specialized Characteristics of CAA Forces ................................................................... 61 

CAA Employment............................................................................................................... 62 

FID Training......................................................................................................................... 64 

Security Assistance Teams .............................................................................................. 66 

Joint and Combined Actions............................................................................................. 67 

Direct Support......................................................................................................................... 68 

Force Protection ..................................................................................................................... 69 

Personnel Recovery .............................................................................................................. 70 

Foreign Aircraft and Systems Requirements..................................................................... 70 

Optimal Solutions ............................................................................................................... 70 

iv
Suggested Readings ..................................................................................................... 72

Appendices

A. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency .............................................................................. 74 

B. Joint and Multinational Exercises .................................................................................. 81 

C. Air Force Security Assistance Teams........................................................................... 85 

Glossary ........................................................................................................................ 89

v
INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE

 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense, provides 

Air Force doctrine for foreign internal defense (FID) operations and supports basic Air 

Force doctrine. AFDD 2-3.1 provides the Air Force perspective on FID operations and 

discusses the broad, enduring beliefs about the best way to employ airpower in FID 

operations. 

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel, 

including regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units and members. 

Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of 

operations. 

 The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, 

commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation 

when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it. 

SCOPE

 This document articulates fundamental Air Force roles for FID and advises 

commanders how to employ and integrate Air Force resources to achieve US objectives 

through FID operations. It includes a discussion of the operational environment, 

command and control, and planning considerations. 

vi
FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which 

AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these 

statements. 

 Foreign internal defense (FID) efforts are most successful when they preclude the 

need to deploy large numbers of US military personnel and equipment. (Page 1) 

 Most Air Force FID actions entail working by, with, and through foreign aviation 

forces to achieve US strategic and operational objectives. (Page 2) 

 Joint training and advisory support offers long-term, strategic relevance far beyond 

US direct tactical actions. (Page 4) 

 The greatest FID challenge is understanding the nature of irregular conflicts that can 

impact US national security interests and the security interests of important friends 

and allies. (Page 10) 

 Airpower plays a critical role in supporting counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 

and entails supporting civil law-enforcement agencies and government 

administrative mechanisms, as well as military surface forces. (Page 20) 

 Air Force commanders and their assigned or attached forces should be prepared to 

function as part of a joint-interagency team with mutually supporting programs and 

objectives. (Page 31) 

 Air Force FID operations do not automatically transition from indirect to direct forms 

of assistance based on any precondition or sequence of events. The transition, if 

required, is based on policy decisions made by the appropriate, legally empowered, 

authorities. (Page 32) 

 Deployed Air Force FID training and advisory teams, including mobile training teams 

and combat aviation advisor forces, should work closely with security assistance 

organization authorities to formulate appropriate FID goals, devise in-country 

operating procedures, and coordinate FID operations and training with host nation 

(HN) counterpart forces. (Page 34) 

 Air Force FID primarily entails airpower enablement, i.e., helping foreign aviation 

forces employ, sustain, and defend their own resources at required levels of 

capability. (Page 54) 

 Commanders should seek opportunities to elevate Air Force training and advisory 

efforts to higher levels of HN military leadership and address such issues as basic 

air force infrastructure, organization, training, command and control, logistics, and 

procurement processes. (Page 58) 

vii
CHAPTER ONE 

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) FUNDAMENTALS 

“Often treated by Americans as an exceptional form of warfare, insurgency is 

anything but. Spanning the globe, centuries, and societies, insurgency is quite 

common. Given the threat insurgency presents to U.S. interests and allies around 

the world, the importance of counterinsurgency is no surprise. However, history has 

shown that insurgencies are rarely defeated by outside powers. Rather, the best role 

for outsiders is an indirect one: training, advising, and equipping the local nation, 

which must win the war politically and militarily. And while counterinsurgency might 

seem to be a task most suited to ground forces, air power has much to contribute. 

These facts combine to suggest that advising, training, and equipping partner air 

forces will be a key component of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts worldwide. The 

authors note that, if the Air Force is to participate in these tasks, it will need to make 

counterinsurgency an institutional priority, developing the capabilities of its personnel 

both as advisors and trainers and as combatants, as well as developing the 

necessary institutional support structures.” 

—Abstract of "Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic 

Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions," RAND, 2006 

Foreign internal defense (FID) is defined as participation by civilian and military 

agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government 

to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (Joint 

Publication [JP] 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms). The term FID was devised by the US Army in 1976 as a euphemism for 

“support for counterinsurgency.” In reality, FID is a very large domain encompassing 

the total political, economic, informational, and military support the US provides to 

enable other governments to field viable internal defense and development (IDAD) 

programs for counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and counter-narcotics. FID is a 

component of irregular warfare (IW), defined as a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. For more 

information on IW, see AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare. 

The National Security Council provides planning guidance for FID at the strategic 

level. The Department of State (DOS) is normally designated the lead agency for 

execution, while the Department of Defense (DOD) provides personnel and equipment 

to help achieve military FID objectives. The strategic end state is a host nation capable 

of successfully integrating military force with other instruments of national power to 

eradicate terrorism, lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. FID efforts are most 

successful when they preclude the need to deploy large numbers of US military 

personnel and equipment. 

1
FID is not limited to low intensity conflict or non-combat operations, and it entails far 

more than training foreign military forces. Incorporating all elements of national power, 

FID can be applied across the range of military operations. US military FID assistance 

can be applied as indirect support (primarily training and equipment transfers), direct 

support not including combat (e.g., advisory programs, intelligence sharing, logistic 

airlift, and certain equipment loans), and, at the highest end of the scale, direct support 

with US forces functioning in tactical combat roles, including advising, assisting, and 

direct execution. Moving across the thresholds that separate one level of engagement 

from the next carries serious legal and policy implications for the United States. 

Generally, the preferred methods of helping another country are through education 

and developmental assistance programs. Most Air Force FID actions entail working 

by, with, and through foreign aviation forces to achieve US strategic and 

operational objectives. With Presidential direction, however, FID can entail the use of 

US combat units and advisors in coercive roles aimed at stabilizing the security and 

survival of a foreign regime and vital institutions under siege by insurgent or terrorist 

forces. FID includes military training and equipping, technical assistance, advisory 

support, and infrastructure development as well as tactical operations. When feasible, 

military assistance should be closely coordinated with diplomatic, economic, and 

informational initiatives. 

Foreign Internal Defense – The Past to the Present 

The US has a long history of assisting the governments of friendly nations 

facing internal threats. The post-World War II policy of assisting friendly nations to 

develop stable governments to counter the threat of communism led to our 

involvement in the Greek civil war. The Greek Communist Party mounted a rural 

insurgency in 1946 against a war-weakened Greek government that threatened to 

absorb Greece into the communist Iron Curtain. The US provided economic, 

equipment, training, and advisory support pivotal to the Greek government’s victory 

against the insurgency in 1949. 

As in other cases from 1945 through 1989 (Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam, 

and El Salvador), insurgency had its origins in communism. Communist-based 

insurgency following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union 

no longer presents the same type of threat. The security challenges, as well as the 

relative stability, of a bipolar world have been replaced by increased uncertainty 

and often more dangerous problems. Insurgency based on political, socioeconomic, or religious ideology is a serious threat. The fundamental concept of 

the IDAD program, supported by US training and materiel assistance in aiding 

friendly nations to develop stable governments and resist internal threats, is the 

foundation of FID and is an integral component in today’s security environment. 

—Various Sources

2
Air Force FID actions should be designed to support and reinforce the host-nation’s 

IDAD strategy, its overarching strategy that focuses all instruments of national power on 

countering the internal problems of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (including 

terrorism and illicit narcotics production and trafficking). The Air Force provides FID 

assistance to the supported country’s air forces, but it may provide assistance to other 

military Services and civil aviation agencies, depending on how air support 

responsibilities are assigned within the host country and on the types of airpower assets 

employed. 

Air Force FID incorporates a broad range of airpower missions, resources, and 

capabilities. Specific operations rely on both special operations and conventional forces 

to achieve FID objectives. In most instances, Air Force FID operations are conducted 

jointly with other US Service components and government agencies and are combined 

with the activities of foreign military forces in the host country. With proper 

authorization, the Air Force may conduct operations in support of nation-assistance 

programs or specific FID activities of other US Government departments and agencies. 

The Air Force uses agile combat support (ACS) capabilities to create, prepare, 

deploy, employ, sustain, protect, and redeploy Air Forces to conduct FID operations as 

required by the joint force commander (JFC) to train advise and assist host nation 

forces. Failure to incorporate ACS early in any operation may result in the inability of 

the Air Force capabilities to bring the desired effects to bear in a given conflict. For more 

information, see AFDD 2-4, Combat Support. 

Air Force FID operations fall under the broad category of nation assistance. Nation 

assistance is comprised of three separate but complementary programs: humanitarian 

and civic assistance (HCA), security assistance (SA), and FID. Security assistance—

though having much broader application than FID—can be integrated with FID 

strategies and operations. Security assistance is designed to help select countries 

meet their internal defense needs and to promote sustainable development and growth 

of responsive institutions. There is a clear distinction between personnel performing 

mission activities under the command and control of a combatant commander and 

personnel performing those activities under the laws, regulations, and funding 

applicable to Title 22, United States Code (U.S.C.), Security Assistance-funded 

Programs. 

The overall Air Force FID orientation is global, although some Air Force elements 

may be organized and trained for FID operations in specific geographic areas. FID 

operations may be conducted in the host country, in other friendly foreign countries, or 

in the US. Air Force regional area specialists proficient in foreign languages and 

cultures help geographic combatant commanders sustain coalitions, achieve regional 

stability, and contribute to multinational operations and FID efforts. Language 

capabilities and international skills are a force multiplier and essential to the Air Force’s 

ability to operate globally. Currently, Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) 

is tasked with maintaining forces that are specifically organized, trained, and equipped 

to conduct FID missions. 

3
STRATEGIC REALITIES 

Today’s conflict environment requires international cooperation and commitment. 

The US cannot unilaterally neutralize every significant terrorist threat or eliminate every 

guerrilla insurgency threatening the stability of friendly and allied nations. There are 

also serious legal and policy restrictions on what the US can do to directly counter or 

neutralize such non-state threats. Most countries’ laws and constitutions do not allow 

for direct military intervention on their own territory by another country. 

At the same time, the resources and tactical skills needed to locate, identify, and 

destroy guerrilla and terrorist targets do not exist or are not well developed in most 

countries of the non-industrialized world. This is particularly true in the case of 

airpower. In addition to foreign constitutional frameworks restricting US combat 

operations abroad, a wide range of strategic, political, and logistical factors affecting our 

own strategic path places serious reliance on the ability of other nations to defend 

themselves and to function as viable coalition partners. The ability of those nations to 

maintain their own internal security is critical to everyone's success. 

Each host nation must eventually find its own winning combination of political, 

economic, informational, and military instruments to neutralize or eliminate internal 

threats. It is in direct US interest, however, to help these nations with various strategic, 

operational, and tactical initiatives. America’s desired course of action will often require 

partnering with select countries assisting their efforts to deal with internal threats. For 

the Air Force, this primarily involves providing balanced combinations of US equipment, 

training, advisory assistance, and assisted execution aimed at helping foreign aviation 

forces defend home populations, economic resources and foundations, cultural 

traditions, and vital national institutions against belligerent militants and criminal threats. 

The greatest long-term return on US airpower investments in combating terrorism and 

support for counterinsurgency (COIN) is realized when helping host nations build and 

maintain viable aviation capabilities to support their own IDAD. 

Joint training and advisory support generally offers long-term strategic 

relevance far beyond US direct tactical actions. Complementing an enablement 

strategy, tactical combat initiatives by US forces continue to have important and 

immediate applications in certain conflict scenarios. Given the scope and complexity of 

the challenge, commanders should be prepared to pursue a broad range of direct and 

indirect military actions to help the US and supported host nations avoid or alleviate 

crisis situations and to achieve desired levels of security and stability. 

The most realistic FID model is another nation that must deal with insurgent and 

terrorist threats within its own sovereign boundaries and legal framework, and which 

may require external assistance to do so effectively. US military assistance in the form 

of assessing, training, and advising, coupled with assisted execution, continue to be 

vital to US as well as foreign security interests. These initiatives involve application of 

US military power that, when blended with other security efforts, can help foreign 

nations stabilize their regimes and connected interests. 

4
A principal reason many of our supported host nations cannot deal with terrorism 

and guerrilla insurgency is because they only possess surface militaries and have little 

or nothing to offer in the way of airpower to find, fix, and finish critical terrorist and 

guerrilla targets. In many cases, these host nations cannot adequately prepare a 

hostile target set or position their surface forces into attack position when and where 

they wish, and they cannot sustain, protect, and evacuate these forces in the field. 

These air forces often consist of small air units flying a few token sorties per month in 

decrepit, marginally airworthy aircraft. Accordingly, surface forces are the primary 

national defense force. Moreover, they are likely to remain ground-based unless 

Airmen step in with initiatives to promote the development and use of indigenous 

airpower for this type of conflict. 

Viable airpower capabilities structured for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 

(CT) operations are needed in those developing nations for the same reason any 

defending force needs them—to apply flexible airpower initiatives through such 

functions as reconnaissance, surveillance, close air support, interdiction, mobility for 

surface forces, and medical evacuation. Airpower adds an entire dimension to friendly 

force capability, setting the conditions that can allow friendly forces to seize and 

maintain the initiative and prevent terrorists and insurgents from shaping and pacing 

operations. If countries possessed 

airpower capabilities providing presence 

and persistence, then political visibility, 

surface-force mobility, situational 

awareness, and options for coercive 

actions, large and broad-based extremist 

elements might not exist today. 

 Airpower, and all its aspects of 

employment and sustainment, cannot carry 

the day, but properly tailored aviation 

capabilities can help lesser-developed 

countries govern and administer more 

effectively. Foreign airpower leaders, in 

many cases, may not fully understand this 

perspective. 

Day helo assault training in Pakistan

PRINCIPAL AIR FORCE FID INITIATIVES 

Air Force FID operations are primarily aimed at developing and improving hostnation airpower capabilities. FID initiatives can take a variety of forms and should 

address the overall needs and capabilities of foreign airpower employment and 

sustainment. 

A principal US instrument for conducting FID is the transfer of major items (weapon 

systems and related support items) to selected host nations, primarily through the 

security assistance program. The Air Force often facilitates such transfers through 

operational and strategic assessments, airpower studies, security assistance-funded 

aircraft refurbishment, airlift of security assistance-funded defense articles, training on 

5
specific weapon systems and support items through security assistance-funded mobile 

training teams, and security assistance case management and oversight. Delivery of 

foreign military sales items can be performed in conjunction with combined operations 

and contingencies and with other training programs conducted by the geographic 

combatant commands (GCC) and by various departments and agencies of the US 

government. 

Air Force training and advisory assistance may be employed to facilitate the 

availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of foreign aviation forces engaged in 

IDAD operations and in joint or multinational contingencies and actions. Training and 

advisory operations are a cost-effective means of helping host nations deal with internal 

problems before they assume regional or global dimensions requiring large-scale 

introduction of US combat forces. This assistance also builds enduring relationships 

with foreign officials who may provide or facilitate access to important resources and 

real estate during crises or emerging contingencies. Critical access problems have 

often been overcome through bonds of trust forged between advisors and foreign 

military leaders during FID initiatives. 

Air Force FID operations can establish a US presence, build rapport, achieve 

combined integration of forces, and build a foundation for future regional cooperation. If 

necessary, commanders can employ an even greater range of capabilities and 

resources in more direct forms of FID support when host-nation aviation units are 

inadequately sized or structured to make necessary and timely contributions to their 

own defense effort. Figure 1.1 summarizes the principal initiatives to accomplish FID 

objectives. 

Facilitate Transfer of US Defense Articles and Services 

Assess Foreign Military Aviation Capabilities 

Train Foreign Military Forces 

Advise Foreign Military Forces and Government Agencies

Assist Foreign Aviation Forces in Mission Execution 

Facilitate Force Integration for Multinational Operations

Provide Direct Support to Host Countries 

Figure 1.1. FID Activities 

6
 Facilitate the transfer of US defense articles and services under the 

Security Assistance Program to eligible foreign government aviation units 

engaged in IDAD operations. 

 Assess foreign military aviation capabilities and provide direction or 

recommendations towards improving host-nation airpower employment and 

sustainment methods. Aviation assessments are carried out primarily in support 

of GCC requirements and for other key agencies and departments of the US 

government. Assessments focus on foreign aviation capabilities and limitations, 

specifically aircrew capability and safety, aircraft airworthiness, critical resource 

availability, resource sustainability, and operational potential. 

 Train foreign military forces to operate and sustain indigenous airpower 

resources and capabilities. Training includes tactics, techniques, and procedures 

in such areas as command and control (C2); combat search and rescue (CSAR); 

communications systems support; air-ground interface; aerial insertion, 

extraction, and resupply; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); 

close air support (CAS); and airdrop operations. Training is neither time- nor 

situation-specific. Appropriately funded training can be used to close specific 

gaps in foreign aviation skills and raise the level of competency where they can 

be advised on the proper employment of acquired capabilities. Training 

assistance in the aviation support and sustainment areas includes aircraft 

maintenance, logistics, life support, medical, air base defense, personal survival, 

personnel recovery, munitions, ground safety, and other functions supporting 

combat air operations. 

 Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on how to employ 

airpower in specific operational situations. Advisory assistance may also be 

provided to GCCs on such issues as foreign airpower capabilities, limitations, 

and potential roles supporting joint and combined operations. Advising is 

conducted within the context of specific times, places, and situations. Advisory 

assistance addresses such areas as airpower doctrine (i.e., how to employ 

airpower as opposed to how to operate airplanes), mission planning, basing 

concepts, operational sustainment methods, tactical employment, 

communications capabilities, and C2 development/employment for real-world 

operations and contingency actions. Along with training, Air Force advisory 

assistance helps foreign military forces and government agencies generate and 

sustain airpower supporting IDAD programs. 

 Assist foreign aviation forces in executing specific missions or 

contingency operations. Assistance can take on many forms, but generally 

includes hands-on assistance in ACS capabilities such as aircraft maintenance, 

fuels, health services support, and aviation medicine. Assistance may also 

include operational capabilities like C2, intelligence exploitation, aircrew mission 

planning, and direct on-board advisory assistance in tactical operations. In the 

tactical realm, assistance can be applied to such functions as CSAR; fixed and 

7
rotary-wing airlift, including personnel insertion and extraction; casualty 

evacuation; ISR; and air attack. 

 Facilitate force integration for multinational operations. Air Force personnel 

bring all other key tasks (assessing, training, advising, and assisting) together in 

a coordinated effort to draw foreign aviation forces into joint or combined 

operations. 

 Provide direct support to host countries by using Air Force resources to 

provide intelligence, communications capability, logistics support, and airpower 

effects. 

8
CHAPTER TWO 

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

Air Force AN-26 instructors 

with Uzbek counterparts 

...it is clearer now than ever before that we 

must foster and maintain sufficient overseas 

presence and international relationships in order 

to conduct future training as well as contingency 

or combat operations. In essence, this is 

"geopresence"—a multifaceted presence that 

allows the US military to operate in any region of 

the world, promoted by conscious diplomatic, 

economic, military, and political involvement in 

the necessary regions and with the necessary 

countries. 

—General Gregory S. Martin, “US National 

Security Strategy and the Imperative of 

Geopresence”, 

Air and Space Power Journal, 

Summer 2003 

Until recently, only a few regional experts and conflict theorists possessed a genuine 

understanding of the irregular warfare environment comprised of insurgency, 

counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and narco-trafficking. Given the current and 

projected path of irregular warfare, this understanding must expand and become part of 

the Air Force’s professional knowledge base. These forms of conflict represent the 

most pervasive and persistent forms of modern warfare, and Air Force commanders 

should anticipate operating in this arena, probably indefinitely. The political, economic, 

and physical terrains of host nations present significant challenges to both US and hostnation air forces. The physical condition and operational posture of typical host-nation 

air forces are only discussed in general terms; commanders should assess each 

situation on its own and take into account the total operational environment before 

employing a specific “operational strategy” or concept of operations. The desired 

objective is to first achieve an understanding of the local situation and then apply Air 

Force FID efforts tailored to that situation. 

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 

A review of global geopolitical conditions reveals a world of failed states and 

ungoverned territories dominated by non-state actors, syndicated narco-violence, and 

emerging warrior cultures. The scene is characterized by lawlessness, ethnic violence, 

and devastating weapons in the hands of hostile, irregular forces. Typically, threat 

locations shift geographically, often into remote wilderness sanctuaries. A nonuniformed enemy, often difficult to identify within surrounding society, operates on the 

9
basis of commitment to ideologies and principles totally alien to Western culture. Even 

where the motivation is purely monetary, the enemy employs tactics and rules of 

engagement not subject to the same risk factors and limitations that democratic states 

impose on themselves. 

This global dynamic is the genesis of an increasingly complex form of modern 

warfare—insurgency, terrorism, drug wars, separatist insurrections, radical nationalist 

movements, and spiritual revolutions, all taking place now with unprecedented intensity 

on various political, economic, informational, and military battlefields around the world. 

This broad range of politically destabilizing violence is growing more lethal and broader 

in scope with the expansion of heavily armed, drug-funded professional organizations 

that can cripple or dominate lesser-developed countries. These organizations are 

moving into the midst of modern, industrialized society, including the US. 

Influenced to some extent by the fall of the Soviet Union, the principal conflict 

environment has altered from a state-versus-state confrontation into a far more 

sophisticated domain of radical militant organizations and ideologically-based 

movements, mostly of non-state origin, that target governments and institutions vastly 

superior in terms of organization, size, wealth, and technology. 

Being able to hide and maneuver within an often sympathetic host population or 

tribal group, the non-state militant actor is far less visible and presents much less of a 

target than state institutions. Having no need to mass his forces, the radical militant 

possesses far more tactical agility and can take the tactical initiative virtually at will, 

using rules of engagement of his own design. Asymmetric threats posed by militant and 

criminal organizations have the potential to significantly alter global economic and 

political orders and relationships. 

The nature of threats has shifted from governments fighting field-worn guerrillas and 

communist political cadres roaming the countryside “winning hearts and minds” to 

international networks of financiers, investors, promoters, recruiters, weapons trainers, 

forgery experts, communications specialists, electronics technicians, spies, bombers, 

and shooters deeply imbedded in many countries of the developed and developing 

worlds. At heart, the scene is little changed from classic models, though now the tools 

of revolution and insurgency include global reach and potentially weapons of mass 

destruction. This is a key change that mandates a re-evaluation of the US approach to 

traditionally-viewed “low-intensity” threats. The events of September 11, 2001, 

demonstrated that a single tactical event can have a devastating and lasting strategic 

impact. 

UNDERSTANDING THE ENVIRONMENT 

 

The greatest FID challenge is understanding the nature of irregular conflicts 

that can impact US national security interests and the security interests of 

important friends and allies. The first step should be to identify those threats for what 

they really are, the kinds of administrative and financial mechanisms that power them, 

10
and the kinds of beliefs and ideologies that underpin their persistence and vitality 

among millions of the world’s population. Even the way insurgency is fought has an 

enormous influence on the types of forces and weapon systems that can be 

successfully employed. 

The global information environment contributes to the efficacy of these concepts. 

Commanders should apply as much vigor to information campaigns as other FID 

initiatives since these activities, as part of a broader strategic communication plan, can 

be a force multiplier. Strategic communication shapes perceptions at the global, 

regional and national levels. Air Force operations can play a significant supporting role 

in the US government to communicate policy and demonstrate US commitment. 

The lessons derived from the classic models, or paradigms, of insurgency, small 

wars, and terrorism are crucial for building theoretical backgrounds for recognizing and 

analyzing both current and possible future manifestations of these types of conflict. 

Subjects should include political, economic, and military imperatives governing IDAD 

strategies as well as the basic concepts of insurgency, e.g., political mobilization, 

struggles for legitimacy, minimum violence, alternate centers of gravity, and the use of 

terrorism as a tactic of guerrilla warfare. 

 Accordingly, commanders who enter this arena should examine the individual 

characteristics of the conflict environment. Current studies and analyses should 

address the specific characteristics of current and emerging insurgency threats. Of 

specific importance are the insurgencies that are growing and expanding in Southwest 

Asia. Past insurgency models are not entirely sufficient to describe the impact when a 

local or regional insurgency is exported on a global scale against established or 

emerging governments that foster, sponsor, or accommodate forces of change and 

modernization. 

Social and Physical Conditions 

The only peace we will ever know will be low intensity conflict (irregular, 

asymmetric warfare), and maintaining the peace means managing low-intensity 

conflict. 

—Ada Boseman, War and the Clash of Ideas

Major environmental factors affecting FID planning and execution include physical 

and psychological pressures from hostile elements, social fragmentation, political 

instability, and economic impoverishment. Difficult terrain, physical isolation of 

population groups, and poorly developed infrastructures often impede 

counterinsurgency and FID operations. Airpower, because of its inherent flexibility, can 

overcome many of these obstacles. 

Nations most susceptible to lawlessness, terrorism, and insurgency are 

characterized by various forms of social, economic, and political fragmentation and by a 

11
lack of national identity within population groups who resist, or are denied, integration 

into the national community. Some actions that contribute to this fragmentation include 

political and ethnic alienation, separatism, and lack of accessibility to government 

resources by certain groups, poor income distribution among social classes, and 

disenfranchisement or lack of other political rights. Situations most likely to involve Air 

Force FID activities are prevalent in developing nations where public services, industrial 

infrastructures, and air support facilities are relatively primitive by Western standards.

Difficult terrain, seasonal weather patterns, physical isolation of population groups, 

and poorly developed physical infrastructures often impede military operations. 

However, such obstacles also provide opportunities to use airpower in a variety of 

combat and non-combat roles. In many cases, air transportation affords the only 

reliable form of physical contact with civil-military elements in rural areas.

Terrain varies widely and can impact FID operations. Typically, rugged or austere 

terrain, adverse climate, and the scarcity of improved airfields affect not only the tempo, 

scale, and character of air operations but also the types of aircraft that can be 

employed. 

In some regions, seasonal weather patterns dictate the timing and form of military 

campaigning. Major offensives supported exclusively by ground logistics may be 

restricted to prolonged periods of dry weather. During extended periods of heavy rain 

and high water, airpower offers significant advantages in rural administration, logistics, 

and tactical mobility. 

THREAT FORMS 

Subversion, insurgency, lawlessness, and terrorism manifest themselves in a variety 

of forms capable of seriously challenging the authority and survival of host nations. 

Below are examples of internal threats that may require Air Force FID assistance. 

Strategic and operational level planning should address the degree to which each one 

of these forms manifests itself in the overall threat to host nation (HN) internal security. 

Subversion 

Subversion comprises an extremely broad range of actions aimed at eroding, 

undermining, or destroying the political, economic, psychological, and military strength 

of a government or political party. At one end of the scale, subversion may take the 

form of a major drug cartel weakening government authority through extortion, bribery, 

and physical threats. In other cases, opponents of the government can foment 

widespread civil disorder eventually leading to political and economic crises, ethnic and 

religious confrontations, and armed disputes among rival political factions external to 

the government. Local dissident groups may use propaganda and terrorism against 

citizens and property, which are symbols of government authority, to dramatize political 

causes or to extort concessions from host governments. At the other end of the scale, 

certain forms of civil disorder and anarchy can produce widespread violence and social 

12
upheaval precipitating a host government’s collapse. These situations can require 

military intervention and reinforcement of civil law enforcement agencies.

Insurgency 

Insurgency is a complex, protracted form of subversion employing psychological 

pressure, armed force, and terror to force or prevent social, economic, and political 

changes within the host nation. Insurgencies often develop as a result of internal 

perceptions that a host government is unable or unwilling to solve important domestic, 

economic, or political problems. An insurgent’s aim is attaining legitimacy derived from 

popular support. Popular support fuels the political mobilization required to generate 

workers, fighters, money, and weapons while denying the same to the government. 

Preemptively addressing critical economic and political issues by host governments is 

central to countering insurgencies and should generally take precedence over military 

force. Insurgency often assumes an ideological foundation with social, economic, 

political, or religious components. The relationship of force application to the central 

issues underlying an insurgency warrants special consideration in planning. Insurgency 

dominates the direction of violent political change occurring in the world today. 

Appendix A discusses the principles of classic insurgency and counterinsurgency. 

Insurgencies have individual characteristics that commanders should take into 

consideration when initiating FID operations. It is imperative that commanders 

understand as precisely as possible the nature of the conflict in which they are going to 

engage. The essential elements of information typically shift from empirical estimates 

(enemy strength, position, tactical posture, and direction of movement) to cultural and 

political identity and motivation. Standard insurgency-counterinsurgency paradigms 

may not work. A failure to apply critical analyses and recognize the insurgent conflict 

for its exact nature at the beginning of an internal confrontation can waste FID dollars 

and actually contribute to fueling rather than reducing the insurgency. 

Lawlessness 

In the FID context, lawlessness includes both subversion and insurgency, including 

terrorism and illicit narcotics production and trafficking. The term does not simply mean 

lack of public support or obedience to authority, which some governments label 

“lawlessness.” The term, as it applies to FID, carries the connotation of anarchy and 

revolt, indiscriminate killing of innocents by insurgents, narco-terrorists, gangs, and 

warlords, as well as rampant theft and destruction of property. 

Lawlessness often occurs when a government has marginal or ineffective oversight 

and control over its population or territories. Lawlessness may also exist when the 

government lacks the mechanisms required to monitor and control the formation and 

activities of subversive organizations. Local dissident groups may use terrorism against 

government agencies, or against other ethnic or religious groups, to demonstrate and 

reinforce their claims to autonomy. The inability of a government to extend its 

administration and influence into outlying regions results typically in the emergence of 

13
“ungoverned territories.” This is often the result of not having the technological means 

to provide physical presence and persistence in forward areas. Airpower can help 

alleviate this deficiency. 

Subversion, insurgency, illegal drug production, and narco-terrorism are all forms of 

lawlessness. Illicit drug production and trafficking can function subversively when 

international drug cartels seek permissive environments and resort to intimidation and 

violence to suppress government interference. “Partnerships” involving exchanges of 

drugs, weapons, and money between insurgents and drug cartels may also support 

subversive activities, terrorist organizations, and revolutionary movements. Terrorist 

organizations, insurgents, and drug cartels often share common infrastructures. In such 

cases, revolutionary or separatist claims may be fraudulently used to justify the cartel’s 

existence, as in the case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC). 

Lawlessness is destabilizing to a legitimate regime and may also serve to promote 

insurgent goals. 

A potential shift in focus and required capabilities in irregular warfare stands at every 

corner of the FID landscape. Trained regional area specialists should be available to 

commanders and planners from the outset of any FID initiative to maximize the chances 

of proceeding effectively in foreign environments. 

Terrorism 

At the opening of the 21st Century, the most dangerous form of lawless violence 

threatening the internal security of free nations is terrorism of regional origin expanded 

into insurgency of global scope and impact. This type of terrorism now extends the 

threat of internal violence to virtually every country in the world. 

Classically, terrorism is employed as a tactic of insurgency and guerrilla warfare. 

Terrorism uses intimidation and violence to achieve its aims, which are usually linked to 

a goal or cause. Terrorism carried out in pursuit of religious as well as political and 

ideological goals may be aimed at replacing governments and regimes that give in to, or 

encourage, forces of change and modernization that threaten to sweep away traditional 

religious orders and ways of life. In other cases, terrorism may be used to simply gain 

political or economic concessions from a host government. 

Where political mobilization and legitimacy form the critical centers of gravity, 

terrorism often demonstrates the inability of incumbent regimes to defend themselves 

and their population. Terrorism is generally considered a major component or tactical 

instrument of the whole threat array, not necessarily a separate, stand-alone 

phenomenon without ideological or political content and motivation. Even the suicide 

bombers who blow themselves up generally serve the political ends of a larger 

revolutionary movement dominated by an ideological religious elite who do not blow 

themselves up. 

14
US security interests can be adversely affected when HN governments are 

threatened by terrorist violence. In some cases, the internal security efforts of foreign 

friends and allies may require US assistance through FID. In addition to helping other 

countries manage internal conflicts through training and advisory assistance, the Air 

Force can help with ISR, C2, and certain forms of direct assistance. 

Selection of Air Force FID capabilities offered to the HN depends on the strength 

and capability of the host nations being assisted. The socio-economic and political 

stability of the host nation, prevailing local conditions, and the efficacy of the host 

nation’s airpower capabilities are major determinants in planning Air Force FID 

operations. 

AIRPOWER IN DEVELOPING NATIONS 

In general, Air Force FID operations focus on support to HN aviation forces. By Air 

Force standards, the scale of military airpower operations in lesser-developed nations is 

relatively small in terms of force size, total sortie potential, resource consumption and 

availability, and overall support costs. For example, the entire fixed-wing tactical air 

mobility capability of these nations may consist of only a limited number of small or 

medium transports. The contributions of these HN aircraft, however, can be vital to the 

success of counterinsurgency or drug suppression operations. Because host 

governments possess so few aircraft, airframe availability, maintenance turnaround 

times, and sortie generation rates are critical. Additionally, sustainment and 

supportability are difficult problems with small inventories. Because of funding 

constraints and supply shortages in host countries, small logistics problems can assume 

major proportions. The grounding or combat loss of one or two aircraft can seriously 

impair or neutralize an air effort. 

Air Force commanders commencing FID operations should anticipate stark 

differences between US and foreign organizational structures and personnel policies. 

These differences must be taken into account in planning and executing FID training 

and advisory assistance. High degrees of centralization and division of labor are 

prevalent in the military cultures of lesser-developed nations where workers are viewed 

discretely as factors of production rather than thoughtful contributors of organizational 

output. Giving noncommissioned officers and company grade commissioned officers 

any significant degree of authority and responsibility is not a priority issue with most air 

force units in the lesser-developed nations, particularly in cases where decision making 

has traditionally been in the hands of a few senior leaders who maintain almost total 

control of political and administrative structures. 

There is growing recognition among some countries that they must build new 

administrative structures, distribute authority and decision-making tasks, and institute 

new policies, or become militarily irrelevant. This is an important realization, as 

combating terrorism and insurgency requires organizational effectiveness and flexibility 

not traditionally found in the cultures of lesser-develop nations. Senior foreign air force 

commanders and staff members are now approaching US Air Force authorities with 

15
questions concerning processes, systems, and operating procedures for running a 

modern air force. Questions range from how to manage aircraft maintenance to how to 

build complete air logistics systems. There are important opportunities at many 

overseas locations for senior Air Force officers and enlisted personnel to train and 

advise foreign counterparts on how to organize, direct, and supervise airpower forces. 

Host nations threatened by insurgency and other forms of internal conflict usually 

require some form of outside financial or materiel assistance to acquire, operate, and 

maintain their air forces. In some cases, their military aviation programs are entirely 

dependent upon foreign assistance for major weapon systems, aviation support 

equipment, aircraft spares, training, advice, technical services, survival equipment, 

specialized clothing, munitions, and even consumables. 

Aircraft 

Host-nation military aircraft available for counterinsurgency operations (air mobility; 

ISR; air battle management; and air attack) are typically well-used, older-generation 

aircraft acquired from the US and other foreign sources. In most cases, these aircraft 

are non-standard to US Air Force inventories and are difficult to maintain because of 

dwindling sources of spare parts and supplies. FID initiatives in those countries are 

complicated by lack of commonality with existing US Air Force platforms and parts 

inventories. At the same time, the cost and complexity of modern aircraft systems 

usually rule out new procurement and always magnify life-cycle support problems. 

Lacking modern counterinsurgency aircraft, older-generation, non-standard aircraft may 

be the only viable option for host nations. 

Friendly and allied nations in the lesser-developed nations possess few, if any, 

precision-guided munitions. In fact, most air forces in the developing world lack the 

basic capacity to place lethal fire close to friendly troops in contact at night. Many air 

forces are presently capable of “area engagement” but not “precision engagement.” 

An effective air attack capability is conspicuously lacking in most developing nations. 

Many nations in the developing world possess some kind of weapons delivery platforms 

(mostly fighter aircraft) but cannot field these resources because of restricted funding for 

operations and maintenance. Most of these aircraft remain grounded in their respective 

countries because of lack of spare parts and fuel. 

Agile Combat Support Capabilities 

Aircraft Maintenance 

Most military aviation support facilities are able to conduct routine maintenance on 

piston-driven aircraft. A few have a limited capability for airframe overhaul and rebuild 

of non-pressurized aircraft; jet engine repair facilities are extremely limited. In most 

developing nations, there are no facilities for major overhaul of aircraft engines. 

Subsequently, in regions where major aircraft repair facilities do exist; they are often 

16
located only in the civilian sector. Local shop facilities may have limited capabilities for 

test and calibration. Depot-level repair and overhaul facilities for support items are not 

generally available. In many cases, aircraft support items and services are not available 

from local sources. Often insufficient technical skills, scarcity of tools and equipment, 

and lack of adequate plant facilities in the host nation limit aircraft and support system 

maintenance capabilities. Local refining capability and supply routes influence the type 

of fuel available and the ability to operate jet, piston, or reciprocal engines. 

Personnel 

Generally, military aviation programs in developing nations rely on an extremely 

narrow base of trained personnel to accomplish even routine operational tasks and 

support functions. Routine flightline servicing and maintenance often suffer because 

technical manuals are not always published in the local language. Maintenance 

technicians may lack the foreign language skills needed to receive technical instruction 

and advice from outside sources. Although basic flying skills are often well developed, 

most individuals are not tactically qualified and are insufficiently trained in joint tactics, 

techniques, and procedures. The most serious training deficiencies are generally in 

aircraft and support systems maintenance. Most host aviation units lack technical 

proficiency and mid-level supervision in these functional areas. 

Training 

Technical training for qualified students is often severely limited because formal 

courses of instruction and on-the-job training programs have not been sufficiently 

developed or resources are not available to fund instruction. In some cases, a large 

portion of the enlisted force, often composed primarily of conscripts and short-term 

enlistees, do not receive technical training during their period of service because they 

lack the required education (principally math and reading skills), mechanical 

background, and service retention. Internal instruction programs are difficult to 

establish due to insufficient numbers of qualified technicians to instruct others and 

maintain the assigned force. In most cases, outside training assistance is needed to 

generate host-nation training programs capable of self-sustaining operations.

Communications 

Air communications capabilities in developing nations may be antiquated. To offset 

the lack of modern communications, lesser-developed nations often exercise 

considerable resourcefulness in designing communications for military air operations. 

This resourcefulness, however, often entails the use of obsolete, low-performance 

radios that provide poor connectivity between air and surface elements. The makeshift 

nature of communications often found within the typical host country renders it 

extremely vulnerable to enemy intercept and jamming. Air request networks may not 

extend into remote areas of a nation’s interior. A general lack of communications 

security training and procedures further degrades command and control effectiveness. 

17
Air Facilities 

Aerial port facilities vary. Most capital cities in developing nations are served by 

airports capable of accepting medium to heavy multi-engine jet aircraft. However, 

conducting military air operations from major civilian airports is often impractical, due to 

traffic congestion, space restrictions, and political sensitivity. Outside capital cities, civil 

and military aviation support facilities are relatively primitive. In many cases, military 

aviation units have access to only one or two main operating locations with hard-surface 

runways. 

Forward operating locations usually consist of short, unimproved airstrips with 

limited approach or runway lighting, central electric power, and no passive defense 

capabilities. Modern, ground-based navigational aids may be extremely limited. Nondirectional beacons are prevalent, though often unreliable. Except for navigation aids 

found at air installations occupied by US military forces, there are generally no terminal 

approach aids outside international airports. As a consequence, military flying 

operations rely extensively on visual flight rules procedures or global positioning system 

navigation. 

Intelligence 

Intelligence collection capabilities are limited in scope. Human intelligence 

(HUMINT) is limited by the lack of all-source analysis or fusion and uncertain source 

credibility. Nevertheless, HUMINT is often the best source for intelligence many host 

nations possess. Often, HN reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft lack the means of 

collecting intelligence through thermal imaging and most are incapable of exploiting the 

electromagnetic medium beyond a very limited capacity for communications intercept. 

Generally, collection is limited to visual and photographic means. That said, usually 

only a limited number of air platforms are configured for photoreconnaissance. Even 

where intelligence resources and programs and a viable cadre of intelligence 

professionals exist, the lack of efficient procedures for timely dissemination of tactical 

intelligence often degrades overall mission effectiveness. Aviation units in the lesserdeveloped nations rarely understand how to incorporate intelligence products into the 

mission planning process. 

18
Insurgency in El Salvador 

The US Air Force’s Role in Training the Salvadoran Air Force

El Salvador was the scene of escalating violence from a mix of factions through 

the 1970s. These groups eventually culminated in 1980 into a common organization, 

the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) and carried the marks of communist 

influence. The FMLN depended heavily on the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua 

for support. 

The US response to the communist insurgency in El Salvador was vastly different 

from the US military build-up and involvement in South Vietnam. The US specifically 

limited involvement to a small number of troops stationed in the country and limited 

their involvement to training. 

The Salvadoran Air Force consisted largely of US-supplied aircraft. The USAF 

trained the Salvadoran pilots and maintenance personnel and provided limited advice 

on flying operations and tactics. Restrictions prohibited USAF personnel from flying 

with Salvadorans on combat or combat support missions and from performing 

operations on Salvadoran equipment or aircraft. By 1987, the Salvadoran Air Force 

owned 135 aircraft, but still only half as many pilots. The Salvadoran Air Force also 

did not have training facilities or instructor pilots. Pilots and maintenance personnel 

had to maintain proficiency in more than one aircraft type hindering their ability to 

attain mission readiness. The US responded by improving their training program, 

sending the Salvadorans to the Inter-American Air Force Academy. 

The FMLN launched a final and unsuccessful offensive against El Salvador in 

1989. Peace accords were finally signed between the FMLN and El Salvador in 

1992. While the US strengthened the ability of El Salvador to defend itself, the 

peace in El Salvador was fought for and won by Salvadorans 

—Annual History of USAF Southern Air Division, 

Howard AFB, Panama, 1987, 1989, and 1992

19
CHAPTER THREE 

THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN FID 

Enhanced organic, regional 

airpower capabilities will add 

stability and thereby shape the 

environment and promote stability 

without the need to project a large 

US force presence abroad. 

—US Air Force Transformation 

Flight Plan, November 2003 Mil-to-Mil contact between Air Force 

advisors and Algerian aircrew 

Air Force FID operations are founded on the basic tenets of airpower. These tenets, 

which apply equally to US and HN forces, include centralized control and decentralized 

execution, flexibility and versatility, synergistic effects, persistence, concentration, 

balance, and priority. Specific methods, applications, and expectations, however, may 

vary according to the nature, political imperatives, and location of the conflict. In 

counterinsurgency and combating terrorism, for instance, the number of air attacks 

against defended positions often indicates deterioration in security and stability. 

Airpower plays a critical role in supporting counterinsurgency and 

counterterrorism and entails supporting civil law-enforcement agencies and 

government administrative mechanisms, as well as military surface forces. For 

additional discussions on support to counterinsurgency and counterrorism see AFDD 2-

3, Irregular Warfare. The most commonly employed airpower functions in this arena 

include air mobility, ISR, and C2. 

In counterinsurgency, civilian security and stability are of utmost importance. Air 

strikes are significantly restricted in order to limit collateral damage—a factor that can 

alienate a population and increase sympathies for the insurgents, as well as weaken 

domestic and international political support. The lesser requirement for kinetic effects 

does not obviate the importance of armed aircraft. CAS, for example, may prove critical 

in emergency situations with friendly troops in close contact with hostile forces. Air 

attacks may be required prior to launching operations against armed terrorist and 

insurgent targets. Armed aircraft can also accomplish route reconnaissance, defend 

convoys, and conduct searches for missing friendly forces. A major challenge for 

commanders is achieving a proper balance between lethal and non-lethal effects and 

assigning realistic priorities to the use of military force. 

20
The host-nation’s IDAD strategy (its overarching counterinsurgency strategy) 

provides the basis for determining appropriate airpower objectives. Accordingly, Air 

Force FID assistance should be designed to support and reinforce the host-nation’s 

IDAD strategy. A typical IDAD strategy, illustrated in Figure 3.1, incorporates four basic 

tasks designed to help prevent or counter internal threats. Airpower operations are 

most successful when their resources and methods support the total range of IDAD 

strategies. 

Flexibility and Versatility 

Flexibility and versatility should be aggressively exploited in countering subversion, 

lawlessness, and insurgency. To achieve its strategic aims, a host government should 

establish and maintain effective administration and control on the ground, often in 

contested areas. The inherent flexibility and versatility of airpower can enable the 

government to accomplish this. Airpower’s flexibility can help government forces 

achieve rapid concentration of effort from great distances and overcome terrain features 

with increased margins of safety. This flexibility can be exploited with varying degrees 

of success, depending on the types of airpower resources possessed and the relative 

strengths of friendly surface forces. 

The principal weight of airpower should be applied where the government seeks 

critical points of leverage against the insurgent/terrorist movement. These points of 

leverage, located at a conflict’s common center of gravity, generally involve political 

mobilization and legitimacy. Airpower can often be employed to establish government 

presence and persistence in contested areas of a country to exercise political and 

economic influence over the population. Where IDAD actions are focused on 

socioeconomic development and mobilization, airpower resources are employed 

“administratively” in support of infrastructure development and mobilization. 

IDAD STRATEGY 

IDAD Strategy: Basic Tasks 

 Develop balanced social, economic, 

and political institutions 

 Mobilize manpower and materiel 

 Secure the population and natural 

resources 

 Neutralize hostile elements

Figure 3.1. IDAD Strategy 

As the government brings all four 

tasks of the IDAD strategy into play, 

airpower resources should help the 

HN government administer and create 

synergies among various defense and 

development initiatives. These roles 

are principally ACS capabilities such 

as aircraft maintenance, parts supply, 

fuels, and communications efforts to 

establish government influence and 

control in contested areas of the 

country. Mobile, space-based C2, for 

example, allows HN forces to operate with a non-intrusive footprint in contested areas. 

Using airpower in these roles enhances the host government’s ability to focus on 

political and economic solutions to a crisis. At the same time, airpower’s flexibility can 

21
help government forces achieve rapid concentration of effort from great distances and 

overcome terrain features. Appendix A provides additional details. 

US and foreign commanders, as well as Air Force advisors, planners, and analysts, 

should carefully weigh the likely consequences of applying airpower in an environment 

where the critical center of gravity is not the defeat and destruction of opposing forces 

but rather political mobilization and credibility. Where a negative impact on the civilian 

population provides further legitimacy to the insurgent movement, assigning correct 

airpower priorities may mean the difference between success and failure. Where 

friendly lives and property are at risk from insurgent attack, for instance, air combat 

power should function as a component of coordinated joint security and neutralization 

actions aimed at creating a safe environment for developmental programs that in turn 

promote and sustain political mobilization and credibility. 

Development and Mobilization 

The US role in development and mobilization should focus on helping the 

government administer and govern. Where ground lines of communication (LOC) 

cannot be maintained because of terrain or enemy presence, aerial logistics and 

communications networks carrying information, supplies, and services to civilian 

elements establish critical links between the government and the population. Such 

“direct contact” initiatives as government health care services and disease control 

measures demonstrate the regime’s willingness and ability to govern and, at the same 

time, provide access to important HUMINT. 

Security and Neutralization 

A government defending itself and the population against insurgent attack must be 

able to exercise two additional critical functions—security and neutralization. Security 

entails specific government actions to protect vital human and institutional resources 

and, at the same time, create a safe, permissive environment for balanced development 

and mobilization. Neutralization employs civil law enforcement and military forces in 

lawful actions to physically and psychologically separate insurgents from the population. 

Appropriate tools for neutralization range all the way from information operations to 

combat engagement. 

Airpower can contribute most effectively to security and neutralization when it 

functions as an integrated, joint component of the overall internal defense effort. It is 

least effective when employed unilaterally merely as a substitute for ground maneuver 

or long-range artillery. In many instances, airpower can be exploited to greatest 

advantage by emphasizing ISR, C2, and logistics mobility. 

Insurgents generally possess no airpower capabilities, although that may change 

with the advent of small, easy-to-acquire unmanned aircraft (UA). They have no 

heartland and no fixed industrial facilities. Insurgents’ lack of extensive strength and 

22
weaponry is offset by tactical mobility, surprise, and deception. Their irregular forces 

are deployed in small units that find easy concealment in rural terrain and civilian 

society. Typically, insurgents are unwilling to concentrate their forces and are 

integrated within the civilian population, presenting difficult and contentious targets for 

air attack. The application of ground firepower, an errant bomb, loss of civilian life, or 

damage to civilian property can be used against the government and provide increased 

support for the insurgents. In some cases, it may be more appropriate to use airpower 

primarily to deploy, sustain, and reinforce military surface forces and civil law 

enforcement agencies. Employed in correct roles, airpower capabilities can 

demonstrate to the population that a legitimate government is in control. 

AIRPOWER FUNCTIONS 

Depending on the objectives and the general situation, airpower assets can work 

synergistically to support counterinsurgency operations and cyberspace capabilities. In 

all cases where airpower may be applied (combat or non-combat roles), commanders 

should consider the political, economic, informational, and military implications of using 

the functions of airpower. 

Air Mobility 

Air mobility increases the government’s capacity to govern and administer through 

presence and persistence in otherwise inaccessible regions of the country, and by 

physically extending the reach of public policy and information programs. Air mobility 

also provides a means of rapidly transporting security forces and supplies to forward 

areas. 

To promote balanced development and mobilization through nation assistance, air 

transportation can be used to access remote regions and bring in resources and 

personnel to address a wide variety of problems and issues. Airlift, by fixed or rotarywinged aircraft, for example, can carry specialists and trainers to remote regions to 

provide on-site technical training and assistance in specific areas like public services 

management, sanitation and hygiene, agronomy, agribusiness management and 

technology (marketing, supply, and distribution), veterinary medicine, ecology, 

environmental protection, and public schools administration. 

Air mobility can also support developmental initiatives by delivering construction 

equipment, supplies, and personnel for building rural housing projects, power 

generation plants and hydroelectric facilities, bridge building, and other public works 

programs. To support security and neutralization, air mobility can be used to deploy, 

sustain, and reinforce civil law enforcement agencies as well as military and paramilitary 

surface elements. Air mobility has even been used successfully to support political 

goals by extending the electoral process to rural groups. 

Logistics tasks are carried out through air landing, airdrop, and aerial extraction of 

equipment, supplies, and personnel. Air mobility operations can include any 

23
combination of combat operations, casualty evacuation, emergency extraction of 

military forces, noncombatant evacuation, troop movement, and resupply. Air mobility 

can also be used for infiltration and recovery of ground reconnaissance teams, 

surveillance personnel, and special intelligence resources 

Tactical battlefield mobility, including casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and logistics 

support for surface combat units, is a vital airpower function for maintaining security and 

neutralizing hostile forces during COIN and combating terrorism operations. Both fixedand rotary-wing airlift play crucial roles. In the military realm, fixed-wing transports are 

best suited for carrying ground assault forces into forward staging areas for tactical 

insertion by rotary-winged vehicles. Fixed-winged and vertical lift vehicles are ideal 

platforms to carry ground assault teams into the immediate target area or employment 

site. CASEVAC should be integral to any operation involving the employment of 

personnel in hostile-fire situations. Rotary-winged and vertical lift vehicles are best 

suited for this task because of their vertical retrieval capability and their ability to land 

and take off in the immediate vicinity of the target area. 

Agile Combat Support 

ACS operations in FID may be designed to support US-only or multinational operations, 

enable host nation airpower capabilities against irregular threats, or a combination 

thereof. ACS may transition from a purely Air Force support role to one of more direct 

involvement as when training host nation aviation forces in such areas as maintenance, 

air base defense, medical, etc. FID operations and activities present challenges to 

commanders who should consider the different capabilities associated with employing 

ACS in FID: 

 Operating in austere environments with limited infrastructure. 

 Increased combat readiness for surviving and operating in increased threat 

environments to include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

environments. 

 Increased security and force protection requirements. 

 Extended logistical lines. 

 Communications limitations. 

 Multiple distributed operations 

 Host nation forces combat support capabilities should be assessed and training and 

education developed to ensure full mission capability. 

24
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

Airpower can help commanders maintain situational awareness through robust ISR 

capabilities. Airpower platforms, in some cases, provide intelligence collection 

capabilities for security and neutralization. These capabilities may provide intelligence 

to civilian law enforcement agencies engaged in insurgent, terrorist, or drug cartel 

undercover operations, or to military and paramilitary units engaged in combating 

terrorist and insurgent forces. In some cases, platforms equipped with signals 

intelligence (SIGINT) or geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) capabilities may be used to 

identify and assess insurgent, terrorist, or drug enterprise infrastructures. Further, 

SIGINT and GEOINT capabilities can provide real-time battlefield awareness and battle 

damage assessments, and identify and pinpoint high value targets in real- or near-real 

time. 

For all the capabilities offered by technical collection means, in many cases, the 

most useful intelligence in counterinsurgency and combating terrorism operations has 

proven to be human intelligence. HUMINT can tell a commander far more than what is 

happening during a given conflict or battle. HUMINT-derived information can yield 

insights into sources and potential vectors of destabilization and revolt before the 

situation spirals out of control. It can be used to build strategic assessments and plans 

for IDAD, and for planning US strategic paths. HUMINT can provide information on how 

well US FID programs are working in other countries and how HN authorities intend to 

employ FID-provided weapons and training. This information can be used to improve or 

modify the FID effort. 

Air- or space-based reconnaissance and surveillance can be used to monitor the 

condition of isolated friendly enclaves, surface LOCs, and civilian population groups, or 

to collect intelligence on enemy strength, location, and movement in denied areas. 

Information on hostile activities is also accessible through other intelligence disciplines, 

including HUMINT. Airpower assets can expand and accelerate the HUMINT process 

by opening up collection sites not accessible by surface transportation, and by speeding 

up collection and recovery of time-sensitive data. 

ISR is a critical airpower function in counterinsurgency. Air or space-based 

reconnaissance and surveillance are rarely a suitable replacement for HUMINT, but ISR 

is the principal technology underlying the government’s ability to maintain situational 

awareness of ground events and the physical disposition of insurgent forces within the 

country’s borders. ISR is also employed at the beginning of the find, fix, target, track, 

engage, and assess target cycle. Those platforms best suited for this mission are 

equipment fitted with forward-looking infrared and deployed throughout the country’s 

interior and along its borders to detect, identify, and report maneuvering terrorist groups 

and cross-border traffic. The principal task of ISR supporting offensive security and 

neutralization is finding and identifying targets, in both rural and urban settings, for 

exploitation by HN forces. 

25
Many ISR requirements can be satisfied through unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). 

Until these assets are made available to lesser-developed nations, however, there will 

continue to be a need for manned ISR platforms in counterinsurgency and combating 

terrorism operations. 

Command and Control 

Positive control of air strikes by airborne elements of the theater air control system 

(AETACS) platforms as well as tactical air control parties increases the accuracy of air 

strikes and decreases the likelihood of fratricide and collateral damage. Fixed or rotarywing aircraft may also be able to provide line-of-sight relay between ground combat 

units and between tactical operations centers and deployed ground forces for critical 

updates. For more information on the AETACS, see AFDD 2-1.7, Airspace Control in 

the Combat Zone. 

The primary role for the AETACS is to control air assets beyond the coverage of 

ground based C2, while providing an accurate and reliable real-time battlespace picture. 

The ideal platform for this task is one that can operate for extended periods of time from 

unimproved sites and remain in close proximity to surface attack forces. With such an 

aircraft, ground assault teams can ensure they maintain a safe stand-off distance until 

after the aerial attack is complete before closing in. The aircraft can function as an 

airborne command and control platform affording connectivity between ground attack 

forces and air support elements. 

Counterland Operations 

In a counterinsurgency operation, the counterland operations mission is essentially 

an air attack role with emphasis on precision engagement operations, both preplanned 

and immediate, via interdiction, CAS, and strike coordination and reconnaissance. 

Offensive air attack provides the ability to neutralize or seriously degrade enemy 

resistance before inserting ground assault teams. The COIN air attack normally flows in 

sequence from aerial ISR into interdiction for target preparation before insertion of 

ground assault forces, and from there into CAS and CASEVAC and, finally, to air cover 

for extraction. 

The applications of air attack for security and neutralization are in instances when 

hostile elements openly commit their forces during assembly and attack against friendly 

positions or when their command and control centers and logistics elements are 

exposed and identified. 

 

Air attack operations should be planned and executed on a scale commensurate 

with the required effects. In countering certain forms of lawlessness (e.g., illicit 

narcotics production and civil disorders), surface operations are generally aimed at 

controlling territory, arresting people, and seizing contraband rather than inflicting 

casualties. CAS, if required, should be limited to protecting the surface forces by using 

tactics and munitions designed for suppression, shock, and intimidation, rather than 

26
maximum lethality. For information on conventional counterland operations, see AFDD 

2-1.3, Counterland Operations. 

Personnel Recovery Operations 

Personnel recovery (PR) operations can be employed in virtually every aspect of 

counterinsurgency air operations. The part of PR that plays the largest role in 

counterinsurgency and combating terrorism is CSAR. For additional information, see 

AFDD 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations. 

The availability of dependable CSAR and CASEVAC, especially at night, has 

dramatically improved the willingness and ability of host nation ground combatant forces 

to engage in operations they may otherwise be less motivated to perform. This was 

particularly noticeable in the Philippines during the years immediately following the 

September 11, 2001, tragedy. Philippine ground forces would not engage terrorists at 

night knowing there was no night CASEVAC capability available. Ground combat teams 

began night operations immediately after the Philippine Air Force acquired this 

capability provided by Air Force combat aviation advisor (CAA) trainers. 

Information Operations 

Information operations should be integrated into all aspects of development, 

mobilization, security, and neutralization to disrupt the unity and motivation of hostile 

forces and to politically isolate them from friendly civilian elements. Information 

Operations (electronic warfare operations, netware warfare operations, and influence 

operations) provide force flexibility for both combat and non-combat operations (direct 

and indirect support). Specific information operations such as psychological operations 

(PSYOP), for example, can help defeat insurgencies and help support host 

governments. Other information operations may also support counterinsurgency 

operations. 

Airpower provides critical PSYOP capabilities such as delivering information by 

radio, television, loudspeakers, and print. Using air mobility to establish the physical 

presence of government officials at isolated locations increases and improves 

information dissemination and collection efforts with the added benefit of building 

psychological support among target audiences. PSYOP can be used to help turn 

hostile elements into neutral elements and neutral elements into friendly. While not part 

of PSYOP, public affairs operations can help support the overall PSYOP effort. See 

AFDD 2-5.3, Public Affairs Operations.

In addition to technical means of information delivery, airpower forces possess 

inherent capabilities to produce psychological effects by demonstrating superior 

mobility, responsiveness, and firepower. The psychological effect of air activities on the 

behavior of target groups may be pursued as a principal goal to weaken enemy 

resistance, capture public support, or both. Psychological effects may produce a 

27
secondary benefit resulting from such initiatives as humanitarian assistance and civic 

assistance action. 

Development and mobilization programs involving military security forces should 

include informational initiatives that clarify and promote government intentions. Air 

transportation of public information officials can provide a means of disseminating vital 

information when development and mobilization actions are undertaken in isolated 

areas. Public affairs operations can be an effective tool to bolster a HN’s public support 

for counterinsurgency operations. 

Electronic protection (EP) support to foreign air forces will provide increased 

survivability and effectiveness through increased situational awareness to foreign 

aircrews. Electronic attack (EA) or communications jamming can further increase the 

effectiveness of air, land, or sea operations by HN, coalition, or US forces. 

Network attack capabilities provide an indirect or direct combat role to support or 

extend kinetic and non-kinetic effects while network defense can provide defense indepth options in the face of increased probing and attempted intrusion or attack of 

coalition networks. 

Air Force Special Operations Forces 

Air Force special operations forces (AFSOF) offer extended military capabilities and 

tailored options providing great flexibility, stealth, surgical execution, speed, and 

surprise. AFSOF aviation is inherently offensive in nature and is especially useful in 

situations where insurgent and terrorist threats are not amenable to large-scale 

conventional solutions. The development and maintenance of AFSOF aviation is 

particularly important to countries that must deal with such internal asymmetric threats 

as guerrilla insurgency, terrorism, criminal subversion, and illicit drug production and 

trafficking. 

AFSOF aviation should be primarily organized, trained, and equipped to support 

special operations surface forces in hostile or denied territory with air mobility and 

resupply, insertion and extraction, personnel recovery, ISR, and CAS. AFSOF aviation 

should enable surface forces to conduct small-unit tactical operations in territory that 

cannot be accessed or occupied by conventional forces. Whereas many foreign nations 

possess surface special operations units, few possess special operations aviation 

assets. Where needed, indigenous aviation forces may find it expedient to organize, 

train, and equip to support ground special operations surface forces in hostile or denied 

territory with air mobility and resupply, insertion and extraction, CASEVAC, PR, ISR, 

and CAS. As with US forces, indigenous capabilities should be adaptive, fluid, and 

responsive to asymmetric threats and circumstances. For additional information, see 

AFDD 2-7, Special Operations. 

28
Internal Conflict: The Philippine Experience 1946-1954 

The Philippines were the scene of a rural-based communist insurgency during 

the years 1946-1954. The Philippines were granted independence from American 

colonialization in 1946 and were threatened by the Communist Party of the 

Philippines which mobilized guerilla forces originally formed during World War II to 

struggle against the Japanese. The insurgent group was known as the Hukbalahap. 

The Philippine government was newly established, struggling with the after-effects 

of the war, and ill-equipped to deal with the threat as the military was in the process 

of being rebuilt. 

Wealth was concentrated in the hands of the few, with most of the rural 

population at a low standard of living. The strongest appeal of the insurgents was 

to the land-hunger of the people, which the Hukbalahaps sloganized as “land for the 

landless.” 

The Philippine government recognized the need to influence, by means other 

than force, the actions and attitudes of all those who played a role in the insurgency 

and in the effort to counter it. A civic action office was established in “Huklandia” 

(the areas under insurgent control). 

Government programs involving building roads, repairing bridges, digging wells, 

rebuilding houses and building schools developed good relations with the 

population and undercut the appeal of the insurgents. Loyalty to the government 

was necessary. A combination of governmental programs and information 

operations was aimed directly against the demand of “land for the landless.” The 

Philippine government offered to resettle and provide land to any surrendered 

Hukbalahap. 

The coordinated efforts of the internal development programs and information 

operations successfully countered the communist insurgency in the Philippines. 

—Various Sources

29
CHAPTER FOUR 

FID OPERATIONS 

Even with the myriad of combat-oriented 

operations that occurred over the past 

decade, US airpower extends our nation’s 

reach in more subtle ways. From 

Mozambique to the Philippines to Europe to 

South America, airpower supports diplomatic 

and humanitarian efforts to ease suffering 

and improve human dignity for thousands 

each year. This stance sends a dramatic, 

asymmetric double message to both 

people and governments: (1) “Airpower 

can deliver justice to your borders as easily 

as it delivers food, medicine, and other 

supplies,” and (2) “America prefers to help 

rather than to destroy.” 

—Lt Col Anthony C. Cain, Editor, 

Air and Space Power Journal, Spring 2003 

Humanitarian operations in 

Mozambique helped ease 

suffering for thousands 

FID operations are divided into three major categories--indirect support, direct 

support (not involving combat), and combat operations. Although various capabilities, 

programs, and activities within these categories may occur simultaneously, the 

categories themselves represent significantly different levels of Air Force involvement. 

They also indicate the broad range of Air Force FID options that can be exercised 

depending upon the level of US military commitment. 

Airpower functions as a force multiplier in countering subversion, lawlessness, and 

insurgency (including terrorism) by increasing the survivability and effectiveness of 

internal security activities. As a force multiplier, airpower is most useful during the early 

stages of conflict when the host government’s chances of success are highest. Early 

Air Force initiatives to develop or improve HN capabilities also reduce the need for 

higher forms of direct support or intervention. 

CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR FORCE FID OPERATIONS 

Air Force FID operations support US response measures that, according to the 

principles of international and domestic law, affirm the inherent right of states to assist 

one another in maintaining internal order against insurgency and other forms of internal 

violence. This is based on the host government’s inherent right of self-defense, 

recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) charter and international law. The 

30
UN charter also recognizes, through the right of collective self-defense, that targets of 

aggression may request assistance, to include armed assistance, from other states. 

Such requests, under international law, should be evaluated according to the principles 

of necessity and proportionality. 

FID operations take place within the larger context of US strategies for shaping, 

influencing, and dominating the operational environment. Normally, the Air Force will 

conduct FID operations when the President or Secretary of State honors a HN request 

for military assistance and Air Force forces have been directed to do so by appropriate 

legal authorities. The decision to conduct FID operations is based on US and 

international laws, however, the culture and norms of the affected nation influence how 

the operation is conducted. The US may assist host nations and, in some cases, may 

directly intervene. Commanders should understand that operations must be tied to 

specific objectives and may be conducted over extended periods. All stability 

operations, regardless of context, require an exit strategy. 

INTEGRATED INTERAGENCY OBJECTIVES 

The first requirement for Air Force FID operations is to ensure that commanders 

clearly articulate military objectives based on HN and US objectives. Air Force FID 

activities should be sensitive to HN needs while directly relating plans and operations of 

other participating departments, executive agencies, and US government organizations. 

Commanders should structure the FID effort to fit the precise requirements of the 

conflict at hand. The various FID efforts need to function together coherently within the 

FID continuum, as shown in Figure 4.1. 

Commanders should ensure that Air Force FID-related security assistance efforts 

and direct support operations function as integrated elements of the overall US FID 

effort. Air Force commanders and their assigned or attached forces should be 

prepared to function as part of a joint-interagency team with mutually supporting 

programs and objectives. Clearly defined relationships among various command 

agencies are of paramount concern. Air Force FID activities will often fall under the 

purview of non-DOD agencies. 

Implementing FID involves a wide range of responses by various agencies, 

departments, and independent establishments of the US Government plus many nongovernment organizations (NGOs). These multi-agency operations involve all 

instruments of national power as well as participation with the international humanitarian 

and reconstruction community, to support major combat actions if necessary; establish 

internal security; facilitate reconciliation among local adversaries; help establish political, 

social, and economic infrastructures; and facilitate HN defense initiatives. 

31
THE FID CONTINUUM 

The principal thrust of Air Force FID operations is to encourage and support hostnation solutions to their problems of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency to reduce 

the possibility of direct US military involvement. Accordingly, Air Force support is 

usually applied indirectly through security assistance training, advisory help, and 

logistics support. 

Additionally, the Air Force can provide certain forms of direct support that do not 

commit US forces to combat. If all other options have been exhausted and the US 

decides to use force, the Air Force has the capability to engage in combat to meet US 

and HN objectives. Air Force FID operations do not automatically transition from 

indirect to direct forms of assistance based on any precondition or sequence of 

events. The transition, if required, is based on policy decisions made by the 

appropriate, legally empowered, authorities. 

 PEACE WAR

Indirect Support Direct Support 

 (Not Involving Combat) 

Direct Support 

(Combat Operations)

 

 Combat Support 

Combat 

Operations 

Includes activities in 

other boxes 

ISR 

Civil-Military Operations 

Air Mobility and ACS Capabilities 

Aerial Photography and Cartography

Weather Support Operations 

Counter-drug Activities 

Information Operations 

Security 

Assistance 

Joint/Multinational 

Exercises 

Exchange 

Programs 

Trainer Advisor 

Figure 4.1. The Continuum of Air Force FID 

If direct support is required, the level and type of assistance should be appropriate to 

the situation and should preserve or increase HN strength and responsibility for self 

defense. Direct support should be withdrawn as soon as possible, consistent with HN 

needs and capabilities. Tailored Air Force teams can assess, train, advise, assist, and 

integrate (into multinational or joint operations) HN aviation forces in employment and 

sustainment at all three levels of US support. 

32
The Air Force FID capabilities described in the following paragraphs help 

commanders develop appropriate options to support US objectives and are specifically 

tailored to HN airpower needs and capabilities. The air component may be 

simultaneously operating in all phases of FID. These capabilities fall under the three 

main FID categories—indirect support, direct support (not involving combat), and 

combat operations—as illustrated in Figure 4.1. 

FID operations in the Philippines between 2002 and 2006 offer a welldocumented case of using security assistance defense articles and services to build 

solid self-defense capabilities in a foreign aviation force. In 2002, the US delivered a 

squadron of UH-1H helicopters to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) to help them 

conduct defensive operations against insurgent-terrorist forces in the southern region 

of the country. During the four years following aircraft delivery, Air Force FID trainers 

and advisors increased PAF helicopter capabilities from day-only, point-to-point 

navigation to a full, day-night tactical insertion-extraction posture, including raids, 

rescues, and casualty evacuation. 

—Various Sources 

Indirect Support 

Indirect support emphasizes Air Force efforts to develop and sustain HN selfsufficiency and is often associated with Phase 0 shaping. Security assistance, 

appropriately supplemented by joint and multinational exercises and other joint 

initiatives, constitutes the primary Air Force contribution to indirect support FID 

operations.

H-60 CSAR training in 

Colombia 

Air Force security cooperation efforts are defined by 

the Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy (AFSCS), 

and security assistance is one of the tools available for 

FID operations. The intent of this assistance is to help 

nations acquire, maintain, and, if necessary, employ a 

self-defense capability. The principal objective of security 

assistance in FID is to establish secure environments in 

which foreign governments can pursue social, economic, 

and political initiatives to relieve tensions in their nations 

and to prevent insurgent or terrorist organizations from 

establishing a safe haven. Although security assistance 

encompasses far more than FID, it is an important component inherent in other FID 

operations such as logistics, training, and advisory support. 

Air Force security assistance efforts should focus on defense equipment and 

services that reduce host-nation dependency on continuous in-country supervision and 

support by the US. Recipient nations’ personnel should be trained to operate and 

33
maintain the systems provided. In some cases, they should also be shown how to 

employ these systems for specific operations. As HN proficiency in air operations 

improves, developing internal training capabilities within host-aviation units can reduce 

dependence on in-country Air Force assistance. To overcome sustainability problems 

inherent in maintaining older generation aircraft and systems, Air Force security 

assistance operations may also include administration and logistics support of 

nonstandard items. 

The DOS has the overall responsibility for military and economic security assistance. 

The DOD administers the military assistance portion, under the direction of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The Air Force is 

responsible, as an implementing agency, for those security assistance programs 

assigned by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Of the several security 

assistance programs, involving the Air Force, the main programs typically include 

mobile training teams (MTT), foreign military financing, and international military 

education and training (IMET). See AFSCS for types of security assistance. 

Foreign Military Financing 

Security assistance organizations (SAOs) are those armed forces organizations 

permanently assigned to US diplomatic missions to carry out security assistance 

responsibilities. Air Force elements assigned to SAOs administer and manage Air 

Force programs and serve under the direction and supervision of the chief of the US 

diplomatic mission (usually the ambassador), as provided by law. 

Primary tasks traditionally assigned to SAOs include security assistance case 

management and oversight, including monitoring the program; managing equipment, 

services and training; evaluating and planning host-government capabilities and 

requirements; and providing administrative support and liaison functions exclusive of 

advisory and training functions. Commanders should refer to the appropriate directives 

and publications for additional details on SAO duties. 

The transfer of all US defense equipment and services must be accomplished under 

proper statutory authority. When authorized by statute, defense articles or services may 

at times be provided in accordance with bilateral agreements negotiated to cover a 

particular program. Negotiation of such assistance agreements is subject to specific 

requirements for delegation of authority and reporting and requires knowledge of 

international law, procurement law, and security assistance law. 

Deployed Air Force FID training and advisory teams, including MTTs and CAA 

forces, should work closely with SAO authorities to formulate appropriate FID 

goals, devise in-country operating procedures, and coordinate FID operations 

and training with HN counterpart forces. Where an SAO is not established, the 

defense attaché office (DAO) will assume SAO duties, functions, and responsibilities. 

SAO/DAO offices generally exercise policy supervision and oversight of deployed FID 

training and advisory teams operating with foreign military forces. 

34
International Military Education and Training 

 Multinational exercises are conducted to test and evaluate mutual capabilities of 

US and foreign coalition partners. These exercises complement security assistance 

goals by testing and evaluating capabilities that security assistance recipients want to 

improve. These exercises may include specific types of training and construction, as 

well as HCA projects, within the host country. Appendix B provides further information 

on exercise objectives, constraints, and funding. 

Exchange programs are also a form of a multinational activity having potential FID 

applications. While some exchanges are authorized under security assistance (e.g., 

unit exchanges and professional military education exchanges), individual permanent 

change of station (PCS) and temporary duty (TDY) exchanges are designated as DOD 

mission functions separate from security assistance. These exchanges provide 

commanders a means to further FID objectives by fostering mutual understanding 

among multinational forces, and by familiarizing each force with the organization, 

administration, and operations of the other. The office of the Secretary of Air Force, 

International Affairs, in concert with the geographic combatant commanders develops 

and executes exchange programs in accordance with the AFSCS. 

Mutual understanding between Air Force personnel and HN forces is strengthened 

through orientation visits, doctrine outreach programs, conferences, and joint security 

consultations. Other initiatives include counter-narcotics-funded training of HN forces, 

subject matter expert exchanges, and various military-to-military contact events. The 

guidance, conditions, and limitations pertaining to these kinds of initiatives vary 

considerably. Accordingly, commanders should seek proper legal and administrative 

guidance before execution. 

Building the FID Trainer-Advisor Team 

Air Force experience supporting counterinsurgency over the past 40 years indicates 

that dedicated FID trainers and advisors should be organized as regionally-oriented 

units comprised of individuals encompassing a broad range of aviation specialties, who 

train and deploy as cohesive coordinated teams. Most important, and most difficult to 

acquire, is the ability to connect tactical and operational-level advisory efforts to the 

much larger objectives of theater commanders and host governments. An advisor's 

success involves knowing what is at stake all the way up to the strategic level and being 

able to estimate how military force applied at specific times and places will affect, or 

interact with, HN political, economic, and informational initiatives. This FID task entails 

a team member advising foreign aviation counterparts on how to employ their aviation 

resources (an operational-level task), as opposed to how to operate an airplane (a 

tactical-level issue).

Such a task entails creating a range of professional skills that can only be acquired 

through extensive training, self-study, and experience. An aviation advisor’s personal 

skill sets encompass a broad range of hard-won personal attributes and skills that are 

unique within the Air Force. These peculiar attributes and skills constitute what may be 

35
referred to as the advisor’s tradecraft. It is one’s mastery of the tradecraft that usually 

determines whether or not one succeeds in training or advising the aviation forces of a 

foreign power. It may even determine whether or not one survives the political and 

environmental hazards of the advisory business. It is the multi-dimensional nature of 

this tradecraft that qualifies the aviation advisor for the mission and provides a basis for 

maintaining dedicated FID organizations within the Air Force. 

DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT) 

When it is impractical for the host air force to 

develop self-sufficiency in time to counter a threat, 

the Air Force may be tasked to provide direct support 

that does not commit US personnel to combat. Such 

support encompasses Service-funded activities that 

improve host air force effectiveness without 

duplicating or replacing security assistance efforts to 

create or maintain host-nation capabilities. Air Force 

activities at this level normally focus on civil-military 

operations (CMO), intelligence collection and analysis, 

logistics support, and other “stand-off” support 

functions. Air Force activities should emphasize the 

host military’s combat role. 

Air Force mil-to-mil 

contact in Niger 

Air Force intelligence resources, in conjunction with country team and theater 

programs and initiatives, can support host-nation IDAD planning through long-range 

strategic collection and analysis. At the tactical level, Air Force technical capabilities 

can complement and augment host-nation collection programs. Intelligence sharing 

involves providing intelligence products. It does not mean transferring collection 

methods, sources, or technology to the host nation. 

Air Force ground, airborne, and space-based communications resources can 

support HN security forces by providing critical C2 capabilities. The Air Force can also 

provide positioning, navigation, and timing aids where HN resources are lacking. Such 

support may include HN use of US communication assets, but it does not involve the 

transfer of communications systems or technology to the host nation. The Air Force 

maintains control of systems employed in the direct support role and ensures protection 

of classified communications and computer technology. 

Air Force forces and capabilities can support CMO. Civil-military operations are a 

broad area embracing the relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and 

the population and are employed to develop favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior 

in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. The five major areas of CMO, each with important 

applications in FID, are civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, humanitarian assistance (HA), HCA, 

and military civic action (MCA). Although the Air Force does not possess CA units, Air 

Force resources can provide support to joint US civil affairs operations through air 

36
mobility and contingency response element support, communications backup, 

information broadcasting, and technical advice on airpower operations. 

The inherent psychological effects of airpower can be employed to further FID 

objectives through shows of strength and overt demonstrations of support to friends and 

allies. Specific, stand-alone PSYOP capabilities can be used to support the 

dissemination of host-government informational programs. Aircraft can dispense leaflets 

or conduct PSYOP broadcasting over standard radio, television, short wave, and 

military communications bands. 

With appropriate authorization and direction, the Air Force can undertake HA 

independent of joint/multinational exercises or other military operations. Air Force 

capabilities for HA include personnel evacuation, air mobility, and medical support for 

disaster victims. Aerial platforms can also support relief activities by broadcasting 

evacuation instructions and other public information and by temporarily replacing or 

expanding coverage of existing ground transmitters. 

Whereas HA focuses on emergency transportation support and other support to 

alleviate urgent host-nation needs caused by natural disasters and catastrophes, HCA 

activities are planned in advance and carried out in conjunction with military operations 

and exercises. Appendix B contains more detailed information on HCA. MCA can be 

undertaken along with security assistance training or as part of traditional theater 

activities. MCA is essentially a US military-to-HN military program involving projects 

undertaken by primarily indigenous forces. Examples include construction, health care, 

and agriculture projects. Air Force support of MCA is generally limited to training and 

advisory assistance. 

The Air Force provides critical ISR 

capabilities. Maps of developing nations 

often lack sufficient scale and definition for 

planning and executing exercises and 

tactical operations. Air Force capability in 

this area can also be used for testing and 

evaluating mutual intelligence analysis 

techniques and procedures. A steady supply 

of photographs and maps for HN personnel 

in quantities larger than that consumed in 

exercises usually requires security 

assistance funding. Tactical helicopter training in 

Uzbekistan 

37
Air Force meteorological reporting, analysis, forecasting, and interpretation can be 

employed as part of the direct support effort to enhance HN IDAD initiatives. 

Interpretation of weather data for local effects (rainfall, flooding, wind, visibility, etc.) can 

be used in an MCA role or applied to host-military planning activities. 

Exercise Nuevos Horizontes, 2000 

Over 2,000 Service members from throughout the US deployed to El Salvador 

in February 2000 to participate in Nuevos Horizontes. This exercise was a training 

mission to exchange experience and knowledge for construction engineers, 

military police, medical units, and other combat service support units. Four 

schools and a medical clinic were built and six potable water wells were drilled in 

the four-month exercise. Physicians, dentists, pharmacists, veterinarians, and 

preventative medicine instructors conducted training and medical assistance to 

improve the health and quality of life for El Salvadorans. 

The Air Force’s 823rd RED HORSE Squadron, out of Hurlburt Field, 

established the base camp and poured the foundations for the schools and clinic. 

The Air Force’s 7th Medical Group served as a medical readiness team and 

treated up to 600 Salvadoran patients each day during the exercise. 

The US Ambassador to El Salvador stated the exercise would be remembered 

as evidence of US efforts. 

—Headquarters 12th Air Force Annual History for 2000 

Air mobility is another capability crucial to FID direct support operations. Air mobility 

can be used for delivery, recovery, and resupply of US defense equipment and 

services, returning items to the US for repair, transporting HN personnel to out-ofcountry training locations, and providing aeromedical evacuation from main operating 

bases in the host nation. 

Air Force resources may be used in concert with counter-drug activities in countries 

receiving FID assistance. Such activities may include intercept of aircraft, vessels, or 

vehicles for communications purposes, gathering and processing tactical intelligence 

from a variety of sources (including fixed and mobile surveillance assets), and 

intelligence sharing. 

Subject to DOD policy and legislative guidance, the Air Force may offer certain types 

of direct support to host-nation counter-drug personnel. Air Force resources may also 

provide capabilities to US civilian law enforcement agencies that may be operating in 

the region and to the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. 

Combatant commanders direct their components’ execution of counter-drug activities 

within their geographic areas of responsibility (AORs). 

38
Counter-drug activities, subject to legislative constraints, may involve Air Force 

capabilities like intelligence sharing; meteorological services; aerial reconnaissance and 

mapping; air mobility of personnel, supplies and equipment; communications support; 

counter-drug training; upgrading and maintenance of equipment; and establishing and 

operating bases or training sites that facilitate counter-drug activities. However, US 

forces are prohibited from engaging in direct law enforcement activities unless directed 

by the President or Secretary of Defense. 

DIRECT SUPPORT (INVOLVING COMBAT) 

Air Force personnel can conduct joint/multinational combat operations in the host 

country. Air Force assets can provide air mobility for both US and host-nation forces. 

ISR, attack, and forward air control assets provide capabilities in support of US and host 

ground and naval forces. Air Force electronic warfare platforms can also provide 

support including communications jamming. Additionally, USAF can provide all 

capabilities listed in Figure 4.1. 

39
CHAPTER FIVE 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

Specific C2 systems and processes for indirect 

and direct support vary according to the conflict 

situation, HN requirements, US objectives, and the 

level of US involvement. C2 systems and processes 

for security assistance and most forms of direct 

support (not involving combat) contain civilian as well 

as military elements. NGOs and commercial 

consortia can provide much of the C2 infrastructure 

that enables FID operations. Air Force security 

assistance activities overseas are organized under a 

military command structure within security assistance 

offices, but both civilian and military elements control 

and supervise aspects of these activities. Military 

authorities command, control, and supervise tactical 

operations in the field.

Pre-mission FID briefing 

with joint/combined forces 

in Paraguay 

Overseas SAOs respond to two channels: One through the US diplomatic mission 

and the other through the GCC. All US government personnel performing security 

assistance duties in a foreign country are under the policy direction and supervision of 

the US chief of mission. Commanders and senior officers assigned to SAO positions in 

foreign countries should be given special training that defines the limits of “policy 

direction and supervision” and appropriate reporting instructions in military channels 

when guidance may not be consistent with DOD policy. 

INDIRECT SUPPORT 

The Air Force conducts indirect support in accordance with the guidance contained 

in statutory authorities and executive orders, as well as directives, regulations, and 

manuals issued by the DOS and the DOD. Military personnel temporarily assigned 

within a foreign nation serve under the policy direction, coordination, and supervision of 

the chief of mission, unless deployed to perform duties directed by the geographic 

combatant commander. Forces temporarily deployed overseas to accomplish security 

assistance functions within a combatant commander’s AOR should normally be 

attached to that commander. The supported geographic combatant commander 

normally exercises operational control (OPCON) of these forces. 

Security assistance-funded MTTs accomplish tasks and objectives established in 

security assistance case letters of offer and acceptance by the State Department, 

Secretary of the Air Force, and the security assistance community, rather than a GCC 

or Special Operations Command (SOC). MTTs fall under security assistance case 

management and oversight of the SAO, or US Military Group, in the American 

40
Embassy. The MTT carries out contractual functions with a training "product" at the 

end. AFSOC MTT deployments, however, should be coordinated with the theater SOC 

personnel to advise them of the team's presence in the AOR. 

Air Force teams deployed temporarily for training events and exercises with HN 

forces normally fall under the policy supervision and oversight of the American 

Embassy, generally through the SAO. Where practical, temporarily deployed teams 

should be attached to the SAO for in-country administrative support (including 

appropriate technical, legal, and administrative status in the host nation) and for 

procedural guidance established by the combatant commander and the US chief of 

mission. 

DIRECT SUPPORT (NOT INVOLVING COMBAT) 

Direct FID support (not involving combat) is authorized and directed on a case-bycase basis by the President or Secretary of Defense. Direct support of this nature is 

classified as a military mission with respect to command and control responsibilities of 

the combatant commander in whose AOR the operation is conducted. 

Deployed Air Force special operations trainers and advisors are routinely assigned 

for purposes of C2 to the theater special operations component commander; however, 

the joint force air component commander (JFACC), through the GCC and the US 

Special Operations Command, can request and employ this capability. Title 10, U.S. 

Code, Section 2011, allows such units as AFSOC’s CAA to expend unit operation and 

maintenance funds (O&M) to train (and train with) foreign forces. This legal provision 

gives Air Force special operations forces greater flexibility than other FID and military 

coalition support activities. Their inherent flexibility makes CAA forces a very attractive 

and cost-effective way for the US to establish important foreign relationships. 

The US chief of mission can request certain forms of indirect and direct support, and 

it is generally subject to his or her approval. Coordination of mission requirements, 

operational constraints, and tasking should take place with the JFC or other designated 

agencies of the joint command. The ambassador normally exercises in-country policy 

supervision and oversight of these activities. 

DIRECT SUPPORT (COMBAT OPERATIONS) 

As a general rule, Air Force forces employed in combat FID operations should be 

organized, commanded, and controlled on the basis of guidance established in joint and 

Air Force doctrine and directives; however, C2 structures may require tailoring to fit 

specific operational environments, force allocations, and US-HN agreements on 

command of multinational forces. 

When deployed, AFSOF are normally attached to a joint task force (JTF) as part of a 

subordinate joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commanded by a joint force 

special operations component commander. However, AFSOC personnel performing 

41
FID missions may be attached directly to a non-special operations forces (SOF) air and 

space expeditionary task force (AETF) under a commander, Air Force forces 

(COMAFFOR). If FID operations expand into larger combat operations, these AFSOC 

forces may either remain part of the AETF or be reorganized as part of the JSOTF. 

COMAFFORs and participants should be prepared for either command relationship. 

COORDINATION 

Security Assistance aircraft 

delivery in Tunisia 

 Where military and civilian responsibilities 

overlap, planning and execution of FID initiatives 

require emphasis on close, continuous 

coordination rather than on command and control 

as defined in purely military terms. In many 

cases, the relationship between agencies is one 

of interdependence. Combatant commanders, for 

instance, have functions and responsibilities that 

go beyond security assistance. SAOs and 

country teams, with their knowledge of security 

assistance activities and other foreign aid 

efforts, serve the combatant commander as 

important sources of information on HN IDAD 

planning and military preparedness. In addition, combatant commanders have war 

plans and intelligence at their disposal that may be relevant to security assistance 

planning and crisis response. These commanders also have assigned forces, TDY 

personnel, strategic expertise, and materiel resources that can be used in host-nation 

relations, security assistance, joint-multinational exercises, and certain forms of direct 

support. They can also promote interoperability and standardization for multinational 

operations involving US and host-nation forces. 

Coordination tailored to specific locations and missions benefits not only US 

diplomatic mission objectives but also the combatant commander’s security assistance 

mission. For example, Air Force elements assigned to combatant commands and 

SAOs (or other country team components) support joint-interagency coordination of 

airpower requirements and capabilities for security assistance planning, administration, 

logistics support, and direct support operations. To accomplish such coordination, Air 

Force representatives may choose to use an appropriate channel of communication that 

may extend outside formal coordination procedures. These channels can be used to 

support combatant commander efforts to help SAOs develop realistic air defense 

requirements in host countries. They can also be used to keep US diplomatic missions 

informed about airpower resources and capabilities available for direct support and 

crisis response. 

JOINT-INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS 

FID operations frequently involve joint actions. Additionally, Air Force FID 

operations often support the goals and objectives of other US departments and 

42
agencies. Success of these operations depends on secure and nonsecure 

communications for tasking, coordinating, monitoring, and reporting among the various 

US civilian and military agencies. Air Force C2 structures should be tailored to specific 

environments, missions, and joint force compositions and should be adaptable to 

varying scenarios. These structures should connect in-country, joint, and interagency 

elements and should establish links between in-country elements, the combatant 

commander, and US command and supervisory elements. Deployed Air Force teams 

may function as elements attached to other Service units or attached, under special 

arrangements, to interagency organizations. 

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS 

Air Force elements play a key FID role by helping to develop and support 

multinational C2 capabilities for airpower operations. Multinational (combined) activity is 

inherent in all forms of military FID assistance, and all these forms require links between 

US and HN C2 elements. Command relationships and responsibilities for multinational 

exercises and contingency operations are established in accordance with US-HN 

agreements. Connectivity is essential, particularly when US and HN forces function in 

mutual support during combat operations. Interoperability issues should also be 

considered in light of the Air Force’s need for information assurance. 

Significant C2 interoperability challenges in multinational operations typically involve 

incompatible equipment and standards, language barriers, differing C2 procedures, lack 

of HN experience, and inadequate HN logistics infrastructures to maintain modern 

communications equipment. Equipment modernization provided under security 

assistance can alleviate some of these deficiencies, but commanders should also 

consider the use of Air Force trainers and advisors to improve HN C2 doctrine, 

coordinate combined C2 procedures, and facilitate interoperability. 

43
CHAPTER SIX 

PLANNING 

 By defining the extremist movement 

as a global insurgency, we can better 

determine what capabilities and actions 

are needed to effectively defeat the threat 

posed by such an enemy. 

—House Armed Services Committee 

Professional Staff memorandum to 

members of the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and 

Capabilities Maintenance FID training 

in Niger 

Where appropriate, FID planning should be incorporated into theater security 

cooperation plans, strategies, theater campaign plans, and FID contingency actions. 

Moreover, FID planning should account for the AFSCS. The FID plan defines 

objectives to be accomplished in pursuit of national strategy and provides subordinate 

commanders with general force employment guidance. A combatant commander bases 

this guidance on an assessment of employment opportunities and an analysis of the 

relative strengths and weaknesses of friendly and hostile forces. 

FID plans provide joint forces a concept of operations and establish resource 

requirements, priorities, channels of communication, and basing modes. Plans for 

indirect and direct support are extensions of theater strategy, and contribute to theater 

goals and objectives, but vary in purpose and execution. FID operations can be 

planned and carried out independent of US military actions, performed in conjunction 

with major joint and combined actions, or carried out following major campaigns aimed 

at securing specific military objectives. 

INDIRECT SUPPORT 

The principal function of US military operations is to secure US and allied strategic 

interests through indirect FID assistance, therefore planning should be directed at 

specific ACS capabilities like aircraft maintenance, fuels, and training; as well as 

advisory help to create and sustain HN military capabilities. HN military commanders 

carry out force deployment, employment, and the orchestration of tactical events to 

accomplish objectives established in the HN IDAD plan. Accordingly, joint planning for 

indirect FID assistance should guide US military commanders and executive agents 

charged with security assistance and joint-multinational exercise responsibilities. These 

plans for indirect FID assistance serve US strategic interests by supporting HN IDAD 

44
programs where such assistance is politically feasible, strategically sound, and 

logistically supportable. 

DIRECT SUPPORT 

Direct-support planning for FID, whether it involves combat or not, primarily involves 

the employment and logistical support of US forces. Direct support planning guides US 

military activities and, at the same time, complements and supports host-nation IDAD 

programs. Direct support planning does not normally include training and equipment 

transfers to the host nation, though it may include combat advisors to help HN forces 

execute tactical operations and keep them connected to multinational joint forces at the 

tactical level. Airpower priorities and tasks established in the plan involve the allocation 

and apportionment of Air Force aircraft, aircrews, and support resources. Planning may 

include mobility and employment considerations for allied foreign forces when 

multinational operations are involved. 

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS 

 Air Force FID planning requires a clear statement of airpower objectives in the host 

nation, specifically, what major role (or roles) airpower should play and what that role 

should accomplish in furthering the host-nation’s IDAD strategy. These objectives, 

derived from priorities contained in the IDAD plan, should function as the basis for 

planning various forms of airpower support to the host government. Air Force 

planners need to be involved in the FID planning process in order to account for Air 

Force capabilities to create desired effects. 

 Operational-level airpower planning for FID generally requires extensive cooperation 

and coordination among a variety of agencies within the joint, multinational, and 

interagency arenas. In most cases, combatant commanders and their staffs function 

as focal points for coordinating indirect as well as direct forms of assistance. In 

many cases, the planning process requires the direct participation of the supported 

government and its military forces. 

 Plans establishing guidance and objectives for all types of direct and indirect support 

should be compatible with host-government IDAD initiatives. 

 Planning should determine airpower tools appropriate to the operational environment 

and local conditions, for example, transferring available air platforms to the HN that 

fit within the technological and financial resources of that nation. 

 Air Force FID planning should be flexible. Periodic revisions may be necessary to 

accommodate alterations in HN planning, unanticipated restrictions on US 

assistance, and significant shifts in conflict intensity and levels of US support.

 Air Force FID planning should be conducted jointly, or, where appropriate, 

coordinated with joint US military components and with US civilian agencies 

exercising control, supervision, and oversight of FID activities in the recipient nation. 

45
 All forms of indirect and direct FID support is coordinated with, and approved by, the 

supported nation. In most cases, the planning process requires direct participation 

by the supported government and its military forces. Joint-combined planning gives 

participants a means to negotiate and agree on such issues as mission objectives, 

force levels, composition of forces, support arrangements, C2 relationships, and 

rules of engagement. 

 Air Force FID planning should be carried out according to US procurement and 

security assistance law. Allowable FID activities vary within the US government, the 

DOD, and the Air Force. To ensure compliance with legislative constraints and 

funding procedures, FID planners should involve knowledgeable judge advocates 

early and often in the planning process. It is a mistake to fully develop a FID plan 

then submit it for legal review, only then to find a substantial legal obstacle exists. 

Sound legal advice throughout the planning and execution of FID operations is 

essential to mission success. 

AIRPOWER ANALYSES AND THE OPERATIONAL DESIGN 

Planning for FID operations, as with all contingency actions, starts with an analysis 

of critical capabilities and vulnerabilities of both friendly and adversary forces. This 

allows planners to determine appropriate courses of action for employing airpower. 

Much of the ACS and deployment planning for FID operations can be undertaken using 

standard planning techniques and procedures. The failure to incorporate ACS in 

planning future operations may result in the inability to adequately support and sustain 

selected courses of action. Employment planning for asymmetric engagement and 

certain types of foreign training and advisory actions, however, may require a different 

approach or operational design. 

The analysis may indicate that the most direct approach to meeting desired end 

states requires leveraging HN civil and military capabilities. That determination may, in 

turn, lead to the conclusion that the desired end state, and major thrust of US actions, 

should be through enabling HN forces to defend their own sovereign territory from 

internal threats. The air planner’s operational design is then structured around achieving 

strategic aims by working with a HN’s aviation forces. 

The air planner should address certain key questions that ultimately lead to an 

understanding (or estimate) of appropriate airpower roles and missions as well as 

required organizational structures, command and control capabilities, training programs, 

tactical resources, etc. The primary focus of planning should be centered on the 

internal threats to HN national security and how those threats can be met within that 

nation’s financial and technological resources, specifically, what priorities are assigned 

to countering these threats. 

46
STRATEGY-TO-TASK FID PLANNING 

Having identified and assigned priorities to the threats, the next issue is how the HN 

government should employ and integrate its political, economic, informational, and 

military instruments of national power to counter these threats. The goal here is to 

specify the ends (desired results), the ways (methods), and the means (actual 

resources) to achieve national security objectives, thus creating a national security 

strategy. The following illustrates this focused, integrated scheme. 

The ends (desired result) may be to: 

 Prevent insurgent/terrorist incursions throughout the country’s interior and across 

its borders from a neighboring country. 

The ways (method) may be to: 

 Launch an information campaign designed to turn international opinion against 

the insurgents. 

 Invest money in training, education, and medical programs to improve living 

conditions and psychological resistance in affected areas of the country. 

 Implement political reforms throughout the country to mobilize public support of 

the government. 

 Mount a military response to the insurgent threat and enforce, underscore, and 

protect HN economic and political initiatives. 

The means (actual resources) may include: 

 All facets of the local and national media to broadcast the government’s message 

to the world. 

 The country’s financial cash reserves derived from product exports, taxes, etc. 

 Legal actions carried out in the courts to implement political reforms. 

 Personnel and material resources of the nation’s armed forces. 

Next, planners should determine what the roles (purpose and function) of military 

force are: What tasks the military performs to meet HN national strategic needs and 

goals, and how airpower fits into this equation, i.e., what specific airpower missions are 

appropriate to support surface force operations; carry the fight to the insurgent or 

terrorist forces; and ultimately support the national strategy. They should determine 

what priorities should be assigned to these airpower missions. Finally, they should 

determine what the host nation possesses in the way of appropriate airpower to 

accomplish these missions and what additional airpower resources are required through 

47
FID assistance efforts to bring HN aviation forces up to required operational status. 

These issues require an airpower assessment conducted by a qualified Air Force 

assessment team. 

Having determined what airpower should be doing to support the national 

security/military strategy; it is now possible to establish requirements, priorities, goals, 

and physical parameters for recruiting, organizing, training, equipping, and employing 

HN military aviation forces. This includes a determination of major end items and 

training the US might furnish the HN government under an enablement strategy. These 

requirements, priorities, and goals also establish the basis for formulating what higher 

echelons of HN military command should do, or be capable of doing, to enable their 

own commanders at the tactical level to exploit battlefield events to ultimately meet 

national security and military objectives. 

Having proceeded this far with the operational design, the planner can now build a 

FID plan with a concept of operations that includes estimated timelines with phased 

initiatives, goals, and objectives for US actions. The FID plan can then be reconciled 

with the HN’s IDAD strategy, and adjustments made accordingly. The FID plan gives 

the Air Force commander a starting point for initiating appropriate actions. 

CRITICAL SEQUENCING 

Although the most desirable FID course of action is often through indirect support, 

minimizing US presence and participation, analysis may show that HN aviation forces 

alone cannot prevail under the estimated timelines and conditions required to bring their 

units up to operational status. The operational design and resulting plan may require 

that Air Force airpower be introduced in combination with enabling FID initiatives aimed 

at helping the HN counter, survive, and prevail against a serious threat to internal 

stability. However, even when FID actions involve the direct use of Air Force forces, 

there is a critical sequence of initiatives to incorporate into the planning process: 

 Air Force direct support operations are carried out in accordance with the JFC’s 

guidance and performed in concert with other joint and combined military forces and 

civilian agencies. 

 HN airpower is brought into play through training, advising, assisting, and providing 

material support. HN airpower should become functional as soon as practical and, 

where possible, be applied simultaneously with the Air Force direct support effort. 

 Air Force advisors facilitate combined operations with HN forces followed by a 

transition to a HN-only, joint battlefield. 

 Air Force direct-support forces and operations are phased out of the campaign or 

contingency. 

48
 The Air Force supports HN air operations with ongoing sustainment initiatives, 

including specific ACS capabilities and advisory assistance, until the host nation 

attains a successful conclusion to the conflict. 

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF FID 

The key to effective employment of US intelligence is early development of essential 

elements of information (EEIs) by combatant commanders, air component 

commanders, and intelligence analysts. In all cases, it is essential that commanders 

understand the operational environment well enough to accurately determine the EEIs 

for intelligence planning and execution. Commanders should have access to regional 

area specialists to help develop these EEIs. These EEIs should be translated into 

collection requirements for intelligence collection processes, resources, and 

methodologies. 

Because the internal dynamics of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and other forms of 

internal conflict vary with each situation, FID planning should begin with an analysis of 

the operational environment. Intelligence requirements are based on the commander’s 

information needs and can include risk assessments, analyses of friendly and enemy 

forces and infrastructures, endemic health threats to deployed personnel, situation 

reporting, and targeting data. HUMINT is a major source of information for FID planning 

and execution. 

Critical intelligence in this field is constructed from conflict and crisis backgrounds 

such as historical analysis and cultural factors; social, economic, and political 

components of the conflict; and the personalities and ambitions of the key players. 

Early intelligence estimates provide a foundation for establishing proper correlation and 

priorities among military and nonmilitary airpower roles for both the host nation and Air 

Force FID forces. Early assessments derived from basic and estimative intelligence 

also increase the HN’s chances to counter the insurgent or terrorist threat with the least 

amount of force. 

If an insurgency progresses to the point where intelligence activities are reduced to 

crisis reporting, non-military options are severely limited. At the crisis stage, the EEIs 

focus primarily on how large the enemy force is, what its capabilities and intent are, 

where it is located, and how it can be destroyed. During the early, incipient phase, the 

questions shift from what and where to who and why. Knowing the answers to this last 

set of questions allows defenders to address the insurgency, not just the insurgent. 

SPACE SUPPORT TO FID 

Space support should be integrated into FID at all stages of engagement. Space 

systems and personnel, for example, provide commanders with ISR; C2 support; and 

position, navigation, and timing (PNT) services. Proper command relationships, 

normally direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH), should be established between incountry teams and national agencies, such as the National Reconnaissance Office 

49
(NRO) and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA). Those relationships 

allow in-country teams access to timely intelligence data and analysis. 

Long-haul and over-the-horizon communication systems are vitally important for FID 

teams operating in austere locations. These teams should have access to the regional 

satellite communications (SATCOM) support centers (RSSC) for the areas in which they 

operate to provide them SATCOM capabilities. Similarly, DIRLAUTH, with the mission 

management center for blue-force tracking (BFT), allows proper management and use 

of BFT capabilities. 

Many space capabilities and services can be shared with HN forces. Air Force FID 

planners should take appropriate measures to ensure that security and classification 

guidelines are in place and followed. 

DIRLAUTH with the space air and space operations center (AOC)/joint space 

operations center (JSpOC) allows in-country FID teams access to DOD space support. 

The space AOC/JSpOC can also request and coordinate reachback to many non-DOD 

space service providers that offer non-DOD, foreign, and commercial space support. 

The space AOC/JSpOC provides reachback to many space-service providers that offer 

ISR, C2, and PNT capabilities. Depending on where the FID effort is taking place, the 

HN will often have better relations with foreign-service providers than the US does. In 

those cases, the FID team should provide the host nation with information that will 

enable them to request services directly from sources that may not want to support US 

efforts. 

ACS CAPABILITIES 

ACS elements play a dominant role in security assistance and form the backbone of 

indirect Air Force FID assistance. Air Force ACS elements also support US force 

deployment and specific joint-multinational operations in more direct forms of support. 

Information developed by Air Force ACS elements through site surveys, jointmultinational exercises, ACS studies, and other assessments supporting security 

assistance activities may contain significant information for planners. A key step in ACS 

planning is to understand the HN’s IDAD strategy and define its aviation requirements 

and capabilities. 

The HN’s IDAD strategy should be understood and its aviation requirements and 

capabilities defined before detailed ACS planning commences. Accordingly, ACS 

planning for significant force structure improvements should focus initially on what the 

host nation intends to do, or can do, for itself. Specifically: 

 How the host government intends to employ its national resources to reach its 

IDAD goals. 

 What immediate and long-range priorities are assigned to the IDAD strategy. 

50
 How the host nation intends to employ airpower to support both military and 

nonmilitary objectives contained in the overall strategy. 

 What the host-nation’s capacity is to receive, store, operate, and maintain both 

present and projected air, space, and information resources. 

Resource priorities should be aligned with objectives identified in the IDAD plan. 

ACS planning should take into account the limited logistics infrastructures often 

prevalent in developing nations and should consider social, economic, and political 

factors that could enhance or impede Air Force ACS operations. 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGE OPERATIONS 

Foreign air forces receiving security assistance often possess the nucleus of a 

counterinsurgency or counter-drug capability but are not able to generate the air support 

required to meet national emergencies. Significant improvements can be made in 

emergency situations through security assistance surge operations. These surge 

operations often involve new or increased support in equipment transfers, training, 

advice, and other forms of technical assistance. Where possible, surge operations 

support should focus on low-cost options to upgrade current host aviation capabilities. 

Where the HN faces imminent threat and US interests are at risk, the surge support 

may include more extensive efforts at increasing levels of funding. Security assistance 

actions are conducted by the appropriate DOD component. Planners normally 

coordinate their proposed actions with the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force 

(International Affairs). 

Surge requirements for airpower resources and services should be based on 

assessments and recommendations from country team members (including SAO 

representatives), Air Force survey teams, and combatant commanders. Because of the 

extraordinary logistics effort generally required during surges, planning conducted within 

the security assistance community should be closely coordinated with joint military and 

civilian defense agencies supporting the transportation and execution phases of the 

operation. In developing transportation schedules and modes of delivery, including Air 

Force air mobility, planners should consider such factors as the size of the logistics 

effort, overall budget constraints, the time limits imposed, and political restrictions on the 

presence of US military aircraft in the host country. 

Surge requirements should be anticipated as early as possible. Some foreign air 

force organizations may have difficulty absorbing large, rapid infusions of additional 

security assistance. Surge activities involving additional aircraft, support items, and 

facilities should be geared to the availability of qualified aircrews and ground support 

specialists. For this reason, additional aircrew and ground training requirements are 

often a major planning factor in surge operations. A surge effort, therefore, begins by 

determining the near-term “build-up” potential of the host air force. 

51
Tactical Air Improvement Plan, Cambodia, 1974: 

A Surge Operation 

In mid-1973, while pulling American combat forces out of Vietnam, US authorities 

launched their final strategy in Southeast Asia—hold the line in Laos and Cambodia until 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces, using massive amounts of US-provided military 

hardware, could defeat the North Vietnamese Army in the South. This strategy 

depended on the Khmer Republic not losing to communist forces, an outcome requiring 

timely US assistance. 

The Khmer Republic’s army fought hard, but lacked weapons and supplies. They 

also lacked air support and it became clear to anyone with experience in Southeast Asia 

that holding off the Khmer Rouge would take more than artillery-backed infantry 

employing conventional fire-and-maneuver tactics. The Khmer Republic’s army needed 

aggressive air support: air interdiction to degrade enemy logistics, close air support to 

help defeat Khmer Rouge in contact, and air mobility to give Khmer Republic surface 

forces an edge in logistics and battlefield maneuver. At the time, the Khmer Air Force 

(KAF) consisted of personnel only. There were no operational aircraft or functioning 

maintenance facilities. 

Realizing this, the Pentagon’s Defense Security Assistance Agency proposed 

rebuilding the KAF. An Air Force assessment team entered Cambodia in October 1973 

to determine the KAF’s ability to absorb greatly accelerated deliveries of US defense 

articles and services. Their findings and recommendations, titled the Tactical Air 

Improvement Plan (TAIP): Cambodia, were favorably reviewed by President Nixon and 

National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. They decided to initiate a security assistance 

surge operation. 

The KAF received one squadron of AT-28 attack aircraft, one squadron of C-123 

transports, one squadron of AC-47 gunships, one squadron of O-1D forward air control 

aircraft, and one squadron of AU-24 Helio Stallion light armed utility short takeoff and 

land aircraft. The surge included all support items and services including training, fuel, 

munitions, aircraft spare parts, and the complete refurbishment of a squadron of UH-1H 

helicopters. KAF combat aircrews successfully employed their newly acquired aircraft 

with great effect throughout the range of assigned airpower tasks and missions. 

In the face of a highly motivated and determined foe, Cambodia fell to communist 

forces in the spring of 1975. While overall US strategy in the region did not succeed, the 

TAIP helped stave off defeat and preserved the Khmer Republic for a number of 

months—months it would not have had without a security assistance surge operation. 

Although it only partially achieved its objectives, the TAIP helped prove the future 

viability of surge operations. 

—Jerome W. Klingaman, Director of Strategy and Plans, 

Sixth Special Operations Squadron 

52
The long-term implications of major force structure changes in the host air force 

should be considered during surge planning activities. A near-term payoff in operational 

capability should be weighed against anticipated post-surge funding levels and longterm requirements within the host nation. The potential for the perception of a lack of 

support following surge operations should be considered. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP) 

PSYOP and FID operations can be complementary and produce synergistic effects. 

PSYOP considerations and planning should be included in all FID activities, even when 

those activities are not primarily designed to achieve psychological effects. Operations 

and logistics planners at all levels of command should carefully consider the 

psychological implications of any Air Force action involving direct or indirect support to a 

foreign government. Accordingly, PSYOP planning should be closely tied to all-source 

intelligence on friendly and hostile elements. FID planners should also anticipate 

enemy psychological operations directed at Air Force operations in the host nation. 

Operations likely to generate counterpropaganda operations requirements should be 

coordinated with appropriate US and HN public affairs and information agencies. 

CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA) 

In some circumstances, US Army or Marine Corps CA augmentation teams may be 

needed to support Air Force elements deployed overseas on FID operations. FID 

planners should identify requirements for CA support early in the planning process. CA 

teams can assist in preparing overseas bases and facilities by securing local 

acceptance and support of Air Force operations. CA teams can also assist deployed Air 

Force forces by providing information on local civilian attitudes, culture, religions, ethics, 

infrastructure, and conflict dynamics in the area of operations. CA teams can also 

coordinate Air Force humanitarian and civic assistance and civic action programs and 

help HN authorities secure the cooperation and support of their own citizens. 

SIMULATION AND GAMING 

Simulation and gaming may be used to facilitate planning for FID. Success of 

military operations in FID often depends on the planner’s ability to assess a broad range 

of complex, mutually related problems involving human and technological factors. 

Simulation and gaming based on country-specific models are useful tools for identifying 

these factors and for developing and testing appropriate airpower roles and operations, 

security assistance initiatives, and direct-support options. 

53
CHAPTER SEVEN 

EMPLOYMENT 

The Air Force needs to look hard at expanding CAA into 

something bigger in scope than it is today. CAA is an important 

facet of foreign internal defense, but our new coalition partners 

require training beyond specialized airpower. There is a growing 

need to conduct air centric, post conflict stability operations—for 

example, rebuilding air force and civil air infrastructure. We see 

an increasing demand for conventional Air Force expertise in 

command and control, fighters, training and simulation, base 

setup and support, and information operations. 

—Lieutenant General Michael W. Wooley 

Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command

 Air Force FID primarily entails airpower enablement, i.e., helping foreign 

aviation forces employ, sustain, and defend their resources at required levels of 

capability. US and supported allied commanders practice unity of command, create 

economy of force, and use maneuver to achieve desired objectives. 

As with their US counterparts, allied commanders should employ airpower forces as 

mutually supporting, integrated systems capable of functioning synergistically with 

surface operations. Air Force commanders should tailor their own FID efforts to specific 

conflict situations, objectives, and priorities. Direct and indirect efforts should be 

mutually supporting and integrated with defense and employment efforts on the ground. 

Air Force units routinely conduct FID operations as an integral part of the overall 

military assistance effort the US extends to selected foreign governments. The delivery 

of US defense articles and services, in the form of major weapon systems, spare parts, 

maintenance support items, and training provided under security assistance are 

examples. Although the US aviation role can be extensive, the term “aviation FID” 

generally refers to DOD programs for assessing, training, advising, and assisting HN 

aviation forces in the sustained use of airpower to help their governments deal with 

internal threats. 

FID operations are not a SOF-only arena. It may be necessary to expand and tailor 

the FID capabilities of general-purpose forces to accomplish national security 

objectives. This stems from dramatic shortfalls in the infrastructures and administrative 

mechanisms of important partner nations in the lesser-developed world. Protracted FID 

efforts may require forces to know how to operate by, with, and through indigenous 

forces to reach end goals. Operating by, with, and through the personnel and aviation 

resources of another air force is a crucial skill to be developed to meet the demands of 

the modern asymmetric battlefield. 

54
During extended counterinsurgency operations, Air Force commanders should be 

prepared to play an important role in identifying and introducing to foreign aviation 

forces aircraft types and capabilities, as well as airpower operational functions, ACS 

resources, information, and technology specifically suited to the needs and capabilities 

of lesser-developed partner nations. Commanders may be required to help foreign 

aviation forces fly and maintain aircraft that are non-standard to the US Air Force 

inventory. 

FID-provided training includes development of basic skills in flight operations, 

logistics, force protection, ISR, weather, health services, and other support functions. 

More advanced specialized training should be used to provide foreign personnel a 

means of applying these basic skills to specific problems affecting internal security in 

their countries. Such training directly supports internal, host-nation solutions to the 

conflict, thus decreasing the likelihood of a larger US military role. Where practical, 

tactical and operational-level training should be conducted jointly. Joint training offers 

major advantages in developing common understandings among host-military Services 

of requirements, capabilities, limitations, and procedures. Multinational participation 

lays the groundwork for future contacts between US and host-country personnel by 

establishing mutual understanding of FID-IDAD requirements and objectives. 

AIR FORCE FID 

The geopolitical environment and US force structure reductions have increased US 

reliance on the ability of foreign friends and allies to defend themselves and to function 

as viable coalition partners. There is 

increased emphasis by planners and joint 

force commanders on creating combined as 

well as joint battlefields. That task, which 

involves facilitating the availability, reliability, 

safety, and interoperability of foreign forces, 

will fall to US military trainers and advisors. 

The advisor is the JFC’s most immediate 

point of contact with foreign counterparts and 

coalition forces. Air Force training and 

advisory personnel represent the airpower 

component of this overall advisory effort. Night helicopter assault training 

in Pakistan The size and composition of US military 

training and advisory teams should be sufficient to address the major deficiencies that 

affect the host air force. Trainers and advisors should also be able to recognize 

potential airpower applications in a given internal conflict. Trainers and advisors should 

understand the various elements of ACS as well as their application and 

interdependence when conducting FID. They should understand the means and 

55
possible limitations of integrating airpower operations into the HN’s social, economic, 

psychological, political, and joint military initiatives. 

Trainers and advisors exert a major influence on foreign counterpart forces. They 

help the JFC bring foreign forces into contingency planning as force multipliers and help 

keep the coalition connected at the tactical level by engaging foreign forces in tactical 

environments. This task includes advising foreign aviation units in both airpower 

applications and airpower sustainment methods supporting joint and combined 

objectives. 

The assess-train-advise-assist mission set can be performed at any level of FID: 

Indirect support, direct support (not including combat), and direct support (including 

combat). Air Force FID assistance to foreign governments conducting 

counterinsurgency is referred to as “support for counterinsurgency.” 

Aviation FID operations primarily involve support to HN counterinsurgency, 

combating terrorism, and counter-narcotics programs. Aviation FID is intended to 

function as a complement to other SOF component operations involving ground, 

maritime, and riverine advisory assistance and training conducted with HN forces in 

various theaters of operation. In the case of FID, training and advisory operations can 

be employed to encourage and support HN solutions to the problems of internal 

subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, and should be conducted prior to the onset of 

crisis or war, thus supporting the strategic goals of conflict prevention and deterrence as 

well as regime and regional stability. 

Commanders should anticipate the precise types and levels of training needed by 

HNs to succeed in military operations to counter terrorist groups or insurgents. As an 

example, foreign forces engaged in CT operations should train in specific tactical 

actions needed to accomplish the task, e.g., small-unit tactics, helicopter alternate 

insertion and extraction, rappelling, and night operations. This training may require 

foreign air force units to shift their basic tactics for both rotary-winged vehicles and 

fixed-wing aircraft from point-to-point airlift to precision insertion, extraction, and 

resupply. It is not simply a matter of what platform to use, but how to use that platform. 

Air support elements also have to work closely with their surface force counterparts to 

develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures required for combat operations against 

terrorist forces. 

Major improvements in the air support capabilities of candidate foreign aviation 

forces may be required to achieve “mission-ready” COIN or CT status. Foreign forces 

need to be able to generate and apply detailed intelligence in the air support mission 

planning and execution processes. It also means transitioning from day or night, pointto-point visual flight rules navigation in relatively benign environments to night, low-level 

navigation into remote, hostile locations using night vision goggles. These capabilities 

have been successfully introduced in some lesser-developed nations, but the skill sets 

are not universal. 

56
Assess-Train-Advise-Assist 

A variety of personnel throughout the Air Force can accomplish the assess, train, 

advise, and assist mission set. Although the Air Force possesses forces specifically 

organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the assess, train, advise, and assist 

mission, the need for these skills worldwide exceeds the number of specialized forces 

available. This is especially true in cases when training and advisory forces must 

maintain presence and persistence at overseas locations for extended periods of time. 

Commanders should consider all available options for enabling foreign aviation forces 

through FID training and advisory initiatives.

When tasked, Air Force training and advisory personnel deploy to a designated 

country, collocate with HN aviation elements at squadron, wing, or headquarters levels, 

and assess, train, advise, and assist counterpart personnel in the employment and 

sustainment of airpower operations. Training and advisory assistance is conducted at 

both the operational and tactical levels. 

In appropriate instances, US instructor aircrews fly with foreign counterparts at the 

deployment location, generally using HN aircraft, to assess capabilities and determine 

current levels of proficiency and safety. The instructors may then train HN aviation 

personnel in required tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint and combined 

warfare. 

The mission set of assessing, training, advising, and assisting is founded on critical 

sequencing. All training and advisory efforts involving flying should be preceded by an 

assessment of the airworthiness and safety of the HN unit’s aircraft and crews. The 

assessment is required for familiarization with HN aviation capabilities and procedures 

before commencement of combined operations. It is also required as a basis for 

conducting risk management and for estimating possible levels of combined 

interoperability. 

Tactical flying training may be required to bring HN aviation forces to the point where 

they can be advised in airpower applications supporting campaign or air operations 

objectives. The basic steps in this process are sequential—assess, train, advise, assist. 

Commanders should issue directives or operating instructions clearly defining which 

steps are authorized and tasked. 

Upon appropriate direction, tactically qualified aircrews may be required to fly with 

HN counterparts on certain critical missions to provide the needed margin of safety and 

reliability, especially when supporting other US or US-advised forces. To facilitate 

combined air planning, aircrews also advise appropriate US command elements (based 

on first-hand experience) of foreign-aviation capabilities and limitations. 

General-purpose Air Force forces can be brought into such programs as security 

assistance-funded MTTs, advisory support teams, and military transition teams (MiTT) 

that train, advise, or simply mentor foreign aviation forces. These teams provide a 

57
means of reaching outside the special operations-oriented arena to train and advise in a 

broader range of airpower functions and supporting tasks for FID and 

counterinsurgency. 

While such teams can be created for specific purposes, commanders should take 

appropriate steps to ensure that members deploying to overseas locations are properly 

trained and equipped for the task. As an example, during the late summer of 2006, 105 

Air Force MiTT members were trained by AFSOC CAA forces and deployed for 

extended duty as embedded advisors with the Iraqi Air Force. 

FID training and advising have traditionally focused on tactical flying skills and 

associated sustainment capabilities at the squadron and wing levels of foreign aviation 

units. Historically, however, the most significant problems encountered during Air Force 

overseas training and contingency operations involve senior HN air force leaders having 

no idea how to effectively organize and train their forces and not knowing how to even 

approach the task of creating regulations and operating instructions to establish 

operational boundaries. The problem affects operational-level sustainment in such 

areas as administration, resource programming, training, aircraft maintenance, logistics, 

force protection, standardization and evaluation, and certification of skills. 

Commanders should seek opportunities to elevate Air Force training and 

advisory efforts to higher levels of HN military leadership and address such 

issues as basic air force infrastructure, organization, training, C2, logistics, and 

procurement processes. The effort should be focused on building effective 

foundations for a lasting and competent self defense, rather than a temporary capability 

that swiftly erodes with the exodus of external support. In most cases, this larger 

perspective is needed before evaluating, recommending, and funding specific tactical 

weapon systems, technical capabilities, and training. 

The task of training and advising foreign aviation forces in these large-scale 

infrastructure changes and initiatives is a significant challenge for Air Force training and 

advisory personnel. Air Force CAA resources and skill sets do not usually include 

mechanisms for assisting foreign aviation forces with broad, fundamental changes to 

basic administrative processes and logistics infrastructures. The skills and level of 

experience needed to accomplish this task generally reside within the more experienced 

levels of the Air Force community. 

The Air Force approach to foreign assistance and advisory efforts should be 

integrated at the joint and interagency levels. Commanders should consider ways and 

means to identify qualified senior-level officers and noncommissioned officers to either 

augment CAA operations or carry out well-defined FID airpower infrastructure-building 

initiatives on their own. 

The level of success achievable in Air Force FID operations is contingent on the 

training and performance of the people performing this specialized mission. Foreign 

58
area and geopolitical expertise, language ability, cultural intelligence, and advanced 

force protection capability are indispensable tools in the FID toolkit. 

Training Versus Advising 

There is an important difference between training and advising. Training, a form of 

indirect support, can provide a doctrinal or procedural foundation for military operations 

and activities. Advising is a form of direct support that may or may not include combat, 

and involves the practical application of operational doctrine and tactics, techniques, 

and procedures in the host country. Advising is real-world, situation-specific, and can 

directly implicate the US in a given HN contingency or operation. Generally, the step 

from training to advising crosses a critical political threshold requiring Presidential 

approval. Commanders should ensure that clearly-defined rules of engagement 

containing operational guidelines and parameters are drawn up and made available to 

tasked Air Force training and advisory personnel. 

Training enables foreign aviation forces to accomplish a variety of airpower 

functional tasks, roles, and missions. Instructional programs impart employable 

capabilities ranging from technical skills, sustainment functions, and tactical flying skills 

to knowledge of airpower doctrine. Training includes operational planning and 

employment methods; combat tactics, techniques, and procedures; sustainment 

methods; and operational support activities including design and employment of 

communication structures. FID training initiatives should be tailored to fit a realistic 

analysis of human factors as well as the technological and financial limitations in 

recipient nations. 

Advice on airpower application is often most effective when applied at top decisionmaking levels within the host government. Advice on strategic matters, operationallevel planning, joint operations, and the integration of multiple governmental agencies is 

appropriately directed at higher levels of the military command structure. In addition, 

advisory efforts may have a more lasting effect and can carry considerably more weight 

when acted upon by senior members of the host military. 

Advisors should help HN commanders apply an operational-level perspective to 

such issues as air base planning and construction, air base defense, logistics, 

intelligence, C2, and training. Field advisors should help local subordinate commanders 

ensure that tactical air support planning follows joint operational-level guidance and that 

tactical operations are properly coordinated and integrated with other military and civil 

activities. Besides providing technical assistance on operating and maintaining US 

defense articles, field advice should focus on such issues as air base security and 

operability, resource conservation, munitions safety, and ground-handling procedures. 

Advisors also should help HN air force commanders focus on the political and 

psychological implications of combat operations. 

Air Force advisors are often in the best position to identify requirements for 

additional security assistance efforts or more direct forms of support because of their 

59
close contact with in-country IDAD operations. When tasked by proper authorities, they 

should coordinate US direct support activities with host authorities and help analyze and 

interpret US-provided intelligence. 

FID Assistance 

FID assistance extends the duties of an Air Force trainer or advisor to the level of 

helping a foreign counterpart accomplish his/her technical specialty. This may entail an 

Air Force maintenance technician helping a foreign counterpart fix or maintain an 

aircraft or item of equipment or engage an Air Force Security Forces trainer or advisor 

in directly assisting a foreign counterpart establish and maintain base security. 

Generally, the step from advising to assisting crosses another political threshold, 

requiring Presidential authority when the tasks are performed in conjunction with realworld HN tactical operations. Assisting in the capacity of aircrew member under hostilefire conditions is an example of direct support (including combat). Commanders should 

ensure that clearly-defined rules of engagement are drawn up and made available to Air 

Force training and advisory teams. 

Combat Aviation Advisors 

While most Air Force units could conduct FID operations, a small number of Air 

Force personnel are specifically focused on training and maintaining readiness for this 

mission. Leveraging their capabilities increases the probability of success when 

conducting FID training and advisory operations. Air Force personnel structured and 

tasked to accomplish the assess, train, advise, and assist mission on a routine basis are 

referred to as combat aviation advisors. Currently, only AFSOC maintains CAA teams 

who possess specialized FID skills and capabilities. 

Commanders should employ CAA teams when FID operations take place in remote, 

forward operating locations and there are no other US military forces present. CAA 

teams should also be employed when the training, advising, and assisting involve 

special operations-oriented tactics, techniques, and procedures or operations are 

conducted jointly with or support other US special operations forces. 

CAA teams, organized into operational aviation detachments (OAD), assess, train, 

advise, and assist foreign aviation forces in tactical and operational-level airpower 

employment and sustainment. Tactical OAD teams facilitate the availability, reliability, 

safety, and interoperability of air combat and combat support forces, and help integrate 

those forces into joint and multinational operations throughout the range of military 

operations. 

A CAA team represents a highly specialized collection of capabilities. Taskings for 

this capability can materialize quickly, and it cannot be put together ad hoc. The team’s 

training is directed towards enabling the individual to operate successfully on the ground 

in the fluid conditions and sometimes autonomous structures inherent in FID operations. 

60
CAA team members can mission plan, execute, and recover in a variety of FID 

scenarios with little assistance, accomplishing this within legislative and military 

guidance. CAA teams generally deploy and operate alone. In most cases, they provide 

their own tactical communications and force protection when deployed. 

Air Force CAA team 1000 miles into the Sahara 

Specialized Characteristics of CAA Forces 

Although CAA personnel are not the only forces capable of training, advising, and 

assisting foreign aviation forces, the peculiar demands of this mission have led to the 

development of unique and specialized skills. These forces train, plan, and conduct 

operations to maximize several specialized characteristics of the organization: Foreign 

language skills, tailored force packaging, and competency in nonstandard aircraft and 

aviation support programs. Combat aviation advisors are distinguished by such 

attributes as cultural and political astuteness, adaptability to field conditions, and an indepth knowledge of US and foreign C2 structures. Teams receive extensive training in 

CAA-peculiar field-craft, advanced weapons and survival, tactical communications, 

security assistance law, academic-instructor methods, and area/theater orientation.

Most CAA personnel are volunteers who are qualified instructors in a particular Air 

Force specialty code. Approximately six months of advisor-related, individual- and teamoriented training equip them with area orientation, field-craft, and “move, shoot, and 

61
communicate” ground-combat operating skills that prepare them to function successfully 

in the joint, SOF, multinational, and interagency arenas. CAA teams generally deploy 

and operate alone with what they have. In most instances, they provide their own force 

protection when deployed. 

CAA employment characteristics include minimal strategic airlift requirements and 

limited go-it-alone capability for operating from austere operating locations. Minimum 

bulk plus simplicity and ease of operation equal tactical agility for CAA team members. 

CAA characteristics include a small logistics footprint, fast in-theater pick-up-and-go 

mobility, and communications equipment capable of maintaining critical connectivity 

among OAD teams, and between the teams and higher C2 elements, e.g., the JFACC 

or a joint special operations air component. 

CAA Employment 

CAA personnel do not train foreign personnel in basic military skills, although they do 

provide weapon systems upgrade training under special funding arrangements. 

Accordingly, the term adaptive training is used to distinguish between instruction in 

applied tactics, techniques, and procedures tailored to specific tactical needs and types 

of aircraft and more basic types of instruction provided through such agencies as 

undergraduate pilot training and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy. The adaptive 

training approach advances these basic skills through advice or instruction in the host 

language and is provided in the host country using the equipment at hand. This 

approach helps foreign air units adapt their basic skills to specific environmental and 

tactical conflict situations. 

Assistance to foreign aviation units can be provided through MTTs programmed and 

funded under security assistance or performed in conjunction with other programs 

conducted by the GCCs and by various agencies of the US government. CAA forces 

conduct MTT activities in fulfillment of US Government and GCC security assistance 

objectives, but must operate in accordance with security assistance law, which restricts 

MTT members from taking part in combat operations. Combat restrictions, or 

constraints, governing CAA activities in such programs are provided under security 

assistance law and the established rules of engagement. 

As part of their overall mission capability, CAA teams provide direct assistance to 

DOD and non-DOD agencies on foreign aviation issues. This is an inherent capability 

of any Air Force CAA unit. Commanders should employ CAA teams for assessments of 

foreign aviation capabilities, liaison with foreign aviation forces, and assistance in air 

campaign planning. CAA personnel can also be employed to perform surveys aimed at 

identifying opportunities and requirements for joint and combined operations, 

contingencies, exercises, and training. 

CAA teams can perform their missions with various types of foreign air force units. 

Given the small size and principal combat orientation of the typical CAA team, however, 

its priority mission focus is developing and improving foreign aviation special operations 

capabilities to complement all other joint and combined operations. Developing and 

62
maintaining indigenous special air operations capabilities is important to countries that 

must deal with internal, asymmetric threats that do not qualify as traditional military 

targets, e.g., guerrilla insurgency, criminal subversion, terrorism, illicit drug production 

and trafficking, environmental pillage, and poaching. 

Although there are currently very few dedicated AFSOF aviation units in lesserdeveloped countries, the need for this capability is steadily increasing, primarily for 

counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counter-narcotics operations. Where such 

units do exist, or where special operations-oriented skills can be created from existing 

conventional resources, the CAA objective is to help indigenous aviation forces provide 

their governments tailored options and greater flexibility, stealth, surgical execution, 

speed, and surprise. 

Combat Aviation Advisory Operations—From Past to Present 

More than 30 years ago, air commandos of the Air Force Special Operations 

Force trained and advised foreign aviation forces around the world in the use of 

airpower to counter communist-sponsored “wars of national liberation.” That 

advisory capability was lost at the end of the war in Southeast Asia, and global 

conflicts eventually transformed themselves into other forms—radical nationalist 

movements and separatist insurrections, state-sponsored terrorism, syndicated 

narco violence, and regional warfare. 

In October, 1994, the Air Force reactivated one of its original air commando 

units, the Sixth Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS), to join forces with Army 

Special Forces and Navy SEALS [sea, air, land forces] to work with foreign 

counterparts in countering these evolving threats. Today, the combat mission of 

the 6 SOS is to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower 

employment, sustainment, and force integration in three interrelated mission areas: 

Foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and coalition support. When 

conducting tactical training and advisory operations, 6 SOS personnel focus on 

facilitating the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of host-nation 

aviation resources supporting joint and multinational operations. 

This mission carries over into training and advising foreign aviation combat and 

combat support units in logistics sustainment, air base defense, command and 

control, survival, and other functions supporting air operations. The 6 SOS also 

helps combatant commanders and civilian agencies plan and integrate foreign air 

operations into theater campaign plans, contingencies, and other joint and multinational activities. 

—Jerome W. Klingaman, 

 Director of Strategy and Plans, 

Sixth Special Operations Squadron 

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An experienced CAA team member with advanced skills should be armed with the 

relevant strategic issues surrounding the FID task. Such issues include: 

 How a threatened nation applies its instruments of national power to counter an 

internal threat and how strategic ends, ways, and means differ from previous 

strategic models. 

 The joint and interagency opportunities, tasks, and players. 

 Given the current threat posed by radical Islam and its global aims, consideration 

of a new model. 

 The political, economic, informational, and military tools. 

 In the military realm, how HN land, maritime, and airpower function, and how 

military forces gain and maintain currency and relevancy in the CT/COIN fight. 

 How coalition operations for CT/COIN affect the way CAAs train as a joint, interagency team. 

For the CAA team member, understanding these strategic issues is vital for finding 

answers and solutions, including at the operational and tactical levels. 

CAA mission capabilities are built around the need to provide foreign forces 

specialized tactical training and advisory assistance in such skills as helicopter alternate 

insertion and extraction, remote operations, aerial gunnery, night vision device usage, 

fixed-wing aerial delivery, air-land insertion and extraction, personnel air-drop 

techniques, air-ground interface, PSYOP, and close air support. These skill sets, which 

represent critical capabilities in combating terrorism and counterinsurgency, happen to 

fall mostly within special operations mission boundaries. 

FID Training 

Individuals who command, plan, and administer FID operations should understand 

the operational environment and how deployed forces function under existing C2 

relationships between combatant organizations and US diplomatic missions. FID 

trainers and advisors should understand the correct relationship of military force to other 

instruments of national power in counterinsurgency and combating terrorism, and 

recognize appropriate uses of airpower. Courses of instruction should be tailored to fit 

user and operator requirements and should be administered to personnel before they 

assume FID duties. Air Force FID training should enable deploying FID trainers and 

advisors to operate and survive as small teams in forward, remote areas outside the C2 

mechanisms and force protection of other US military forces. 

Commanders preparing FID forces for overseas deployment should coordinate with 

supported agencies to determine the types and depth of training required for specific 

activities and locations. General familiarization in such areas as operational 

environments, uses of military force, and airpower functions and operations provides Air 

64
Force personnel a broad conceptual framework for planning and executing FID 

operations. This training has extensive application for all FID participants and serves as 

the introduction to more specialized forms of instruction. 

The value of foreign language training cannot be overemphasized. Language 

requirements vary. Experience indicates that training and advising in Central and South 

America is virtually impossible without being able to speak reasonably fluent Spanish. 

FID operations in Central Asia will be conducted in Russian, a local native language, or 

carried out through an interpreter. French is required in many African countries. In 

other countries, some of the officers speak English while almost none of the enlisted 

personnel can. 

If training or exercises do not reflect 

realism, the stress and challenges of actual 

conditions, then our Airmen will not be 

prepared when they are called upon to 

execute their mission. Training programs 

must be aligned with expected outcomes 

and provide realistic experience to greatly 

improve skill competency. Stress, 

unpredictability, fatigue, night operations, 

adverse weather, simulated equipment 

breakdowns, and chemical and biological 

contamination are examples of the 

challenges our men and women will face in 

the field and should be trained to overcome. 

—Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1, 

Leadership and Force Development 

Joint air assault training in 

Pakistan 

Although CAA teams are unique in the Air Force, the way in which they achieve 

mission-ready status can provide a template for training other Air Force forces in this 

arena. A variety of FID-related instructional programs are available to Air Force 

personnel. Additional FID training is available through other US military departments 

and civilian agencies via inter-Service or interagency support agreements. Service 

academies and developmental education programs should be employed as sources of 

general education in FID matters. Civilian universities and colleges also have area 

studies and other instructional programs. Further, the Air Force and joint special 

operations establishments provide both general education and specialized training in 

insurgency-counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and function as the principal 

source of specialized FID instruction on airpower matters for deploying Air Force 

training and advisory teams and for direct support elements. 

Various civilian departments, agencies, and independent establishments of the US 

government are potential sources of specialized and technical instruction in such areas 

65
as intelligence, PSYOP, counter-drug, civil and military law enforcement, civic action, 

nation assistance, nation building, country team operations, and public information 

programs. 

CAA teams undergo extensive preparation before being certified as “mission ready.” 

This includes training and education in a variety of individual skills including crosscultural communications, regional area orientation, battlespace C2, and conflict 

analysis. Integrated skills training (IST) consists of ground school and intense field 

training exercises that enable candidate aviation advisors to move, shoot, and 

communicate and to bring a broad range of individual skills together in a focused team 

effort.

IST training, which includes advanced weapons, combat casualty care, tactical 

communications, deployment planning, and personnel survival, enables CAA personnel 

to perform the FID mission and survive in remote regions of the world outside the forceprotection capabilities and immediate C2 and logistics support structures of larger US 

expeditionary forces. IST includes the legal dimensions of FID planning and execution, 

as well as the development of specialized skills in training and advising foreign military 

personnel. Advanced field-craft training allows CAA teams to exercise a high degree of 

self-sufficiency while deployed. 

Security Assistance Teams 

Air Force security assistance teams supplement SAO capabilities by providing 

training, advice, and technical assistance to recipient nations. The teams, funded under 

security assistance, vary in size and composition. Air Force personnel may deploy as 

an Air Force team or function as the air component of a larger joint effort. When the 

operation involves training or advisory efforts aimed at developing tactics, techniques, 

and procedures, teams should include Air Force members and members from the other 

US Services when appropriate. Appendix C has additional details on security 

assistance efforts. 

Combatant commanders may employ Air Force security assistance teams for limited 

support on technical training in the operation and maintenance of specific airpower 

systems. The principal criteria for team selection are competence in the specialty 

requested, teaching skills, and language compatibility with host-nation recipients. When 

training and advisory assistance teams are required to provide guidance on planning, 

developing, and employing airpower, teaching skills in one technical specialty are rarely 

sufficient. 

Country teams or combatant commanders normally initiate in-country support 

requirements, which should be based on recommendations derived from surveys and 

assessments. This approach anticipates the problem of a team deploying overseas to 

develop or improve operational capabilities of a particular weapon system when the 

host air force lacks the infrastructure or resources to employ the system effectively. 

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Surveys on security assistance support of FID should include three basic tasks. The 

first task is to determine appropriate airpower roles and operations for the given conflict 

or pre-conflict situation. Second, the team then conducts an assessment of the HN’s 

ability to fulfill these roles with existing airpower resources. Finally, the team develops 

requirements and recommendations for improvements that can be carried out through 

HN initiatives or through additional US assistance. Besides helping to provide US 

defense equipment and services to the host nation, Air Force logistics personnel should 

advise host-nation authorities on the use of 

airpower to establish and sustain IDAD 

programs through aerial lines of supply and 

personnel movement 

Training and equipment provided to the 

host nation may not be sufficient to ensure the 

success of aviation programs in some conflict 

situations. When authorized and directed by 

appropriate legal authority, Air Force advisory 

personnel may also be employed to advise 

host air force units on how to employ airsupport resources in a manner that serves the 

combined interests of the US and the host 

nation. 

Helicopter insertion-extraction 

training in Yemen 

Joint and Combined Actions 

In certain training scenarios, or during wartime or contingency deployments, training 

and advisory Air Force personnel may collocate with both US and HN land or naval 

forces to accomplish required liaison functions and to advise on certain aspects of joint 

air-ground operations. Specially qualified advisors can accompany US Army or Navy 

teams into an objective area to provide an Airman’s perspective. Support to Army or 

Navy counterparts can entail aviation assessments of HN capabilities and limitations as 

well as operational- or tactical-level advice on the employment of HN airpower in varying 

political and military environments. Support may also include familiarization with the 

characteristics of HN tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

Personnel of other Services may accompany and train with CAA teams in an 

objective area to provide the necessary ground or maritime perspective in a combined 

arms scenario. An Army Special Forces (SF) or Navy SEAL team member, for example, 

can help a 6 SOS team provide HN air force personnel a surface warfare perspective on 

joint air-ground operations. At the same time, CAA team members can help the SF or 

SEAL personnel provide HN army or navy counterparts the corresponding air warfare 

perspective. This concept is designed to promote effectiveness, safety, and 

interoperability, not only between HN service components, but also between US SOF 

and participating HN units. The team’s efforts in this example are aimed at helping the 

HN aviation unit provide air support to its own ground and maritime forces. In a classic 

joint initiative, US surface forces, possibly Army SF and Navy SEALS, may be training 

and advising HN surface-force counterparts. 

67
Commanders should employ CAAs to help plan and integrate foreign aviation forces 

into combined theater campaigns, contingency actions, and other joint or multinational 

activities, and to assist foreign aviation forces in operational and tactical planning. To 

assist in shaping the battlefield prior to the onset of crisis or war, commanders can 

employ CAAs to promote and test combined effectiveness, safety, and interoperability 

among joint-coalition players. CAAs have specific capabilities that can be employed by 

the JFC and JFACC, depending on the characteristics of the operating environment. 

JFACCs should employ CAAs to maintain vital coordination links between US and 

combined air tasking authorities and foreign aviation units. Support includes liaison and 

advisory assistance to the JFACC for air tasking order (ATO) planning and execution 

involving foreign aviation forces. Assistance includes facilitating airspace deconfliction 

and area air defense coordination among coalition partners, evaluating safety and 

interoperability between US and foreign forces, and increasing the tactical effectiveness 

of foreign airpower in combined operations. CAA teams may be used when foreign 

aviation forces are employed as theater-assigned assets and operations involving 

dissimilar types of aircraft are envisioned. For additional information, see JP 3-07.1, 

Joint Doctrine on Foreign Internal Defense. 

DIRECT SUPPORT 

The Air Force can provide direct support at varying levels of conflict intensity to 

enhance or supplement security assistance initiatives and host aviation programs. To 

preserve HN self-sufficiency and legitimacy, the Air Force should maintain a proper 

balance between direct and indirect forms of assistance. Balanced assistance 

preserves host self-sufficiency and legitimacy. Such direct support initiatives as combat 

advising and assisting may be used concurrently with security assistance to prevent the 

transition to more destructive forms of warfare and higher levels of US involvement. At 

the same time, direct support initiatives should not undermine the HN’s will or capacity 

to achieve an internal solution to the crisis. 

HN airpower requirements may exceed the objectives and limitations of security 

assistance and joint-multinational exercises. At the same time, a US combat role may 

also be tactically inappropriate or politically infeasible as a FID instrument. To satisfy 

some of these requirements at acceptable levels of commitment and risk, the Air Force 

can employ its resources in a variety of direct support roles that bridge the gap between 

indirect assistance and combat operations. Examples include intelligence sharing, 

logistics airlift, equipment loans, communications support, and other “stand-off” options. 

Direct support (not including combat) does not eliminate all risks, but it does offer a 

means of providing specialized assistance to a host country without intentionally 

exposing US personnel to hostile fire. Direct Air Force involvement in such activities as 

HCA and MCA requires the physical presence of Air Force personnel working in close 

contact with friendly elements. For some operations like intelligence collection and 

PSYOP, it may be possible to conduct operations from outside the recipient country 

68
when there are political or operational constraints on the presence of Air Force assets 

on foreign installations. Clandestine or low-visibility techniques and procedures in 

politically sensitive or denied areas may also be required for combat operations. 

Commanders should consider the use of Air Force special operations forces to conduct 

these kinds of operations if required. 

During combined operations, commanders should anticipate differences in tactics, 

techniques, and procedures between US and HN forces. Commanders should consider 

using Air Force advisory personnel to resolve these differences and make adjustments 

to fit the strengths and weaknesses of the combined force. Commanders may also 

have to tailor their operating procedures to suit specific objectives, operational 

constraints, and policies pertaining to the use of Air Force forces in the host country. 

A central objective of combat operations is to protect vital resources and to buy time 

for the host government to stabilize its social, economic, and political institutions. The 

Air Force role here is supportive only. It is not designed to capture the strategic 

initiative or to transfer strategic responsibilities from the host government to the US. To 

preserve its legitimacy and achieve a lasting, internal solution to the conflict, the host 

government must carry full responsibility for the strategic offensive. The Air Force FID 

effort should be designed to transfer air support tasks and responsibilities to the host 

nation as soon as practical. 

FORCE PROTECTION 

Force protection for FID applies to deployed operational units supporting host-nation 

IDAD programs. Commanders exercise force protection to ensure the defense and 

survival of US personnel, facilities, C2 structures, and weapon systems. Specific force 

protection guidance is contained in AFDD 2-4.1, Force Protection.

FID training and advisory teams often deploy to locations where there is no other US 

military presence. Commanders should, commensurate with the estimated threat level, 

ensure that force protection personnel deploy as an integral part of the team. Teams 

are typically small. Accordingly, force protection personnel should be prepared to 

conduct threat, criticality, vulnerability, and risk assessments and make 

recommendations to the commander for risk management. They should also provide 

some measure of force protection for the deployed team. This allows indigenous 

security force personnel to augment the US team’s force protection effort and provide 

security for their own forces and resources. The early integration of HN security forces 

into the FID operating environment should be afforded priority consideration. In-country 

training and advisory FID teams should possess a robust BFT capability, or similar 

capability. 

69
PERSONNEL RECOVERY 

PR for FID applies to all deployed operational units supporting HN IDAD programs. 

Specific personnel recovery guidance is outlined in AFDD 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery 

Operations.

Training and advisory teams often deploy to locations where there is no other US 

presence, and are typically outside the normal PR architecture. In those cases, support 

from national space agencies becomes vitally important. Commanders responsible for 

this type of FID activity should ensure plans are in place to support self-recovery 

operations, and that PR plans are integrated with the team’s force protection plan. If 

lack of HN PR infrastructure dictates, Air Force CSAR forces can assess, train, advise, 

and assist as needed to maintain team integrity and establish HN mechanisms for PR 

operations, thereby enhancing safety of US and HN forces. 

Effective integration of PR advisory operations serves two primary purposes. First, 

training and advising in PR assists the HN with its overall employment of airpower 

during combat operations and search and recovery (SAR) activities. Second, effective 

PR training enhances the HN’s capability to execute PR operations in support of US 

activities during potential contingency operations. 

FOREIGN AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS 

As long as enhancing foreign airpower capabilities remains essential to US overseas 

defense posture or exit strategies, Air Force commanders will be increasingly called 

upon to provide ideas and recommendations to establish or increase foreign capabilities 

to perform successfully in this vital conflict arena. Commanders may have to define 

aircraft and systems options for counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and counter-drug 

programs in terms of various types of equipment that could be employed on certain 

types of aircraft and indicate possible courses of action, including off-the-shelf air 

platforms, modifications, and systems match-ups that would fit with foreign aviation 

needs and capabilities. 

The ability of Air Force personnel to conduct FID in the assess-train-advise-assist 

mode depends on the airpower capabilities of assisted nations. Commanders should 

be aware that the ability of lesser-developed nations to perform airpower roles varies 

enormously, based mostly on levels of indigenous funding, technology, and training. 

Optimal Solutions 

Optimum solutions involving the enablement of foreign aviation forces are those that 

are the most realistic for a given set of conditions in the host nation. Exploiting the full 

potential of airpower in foreign aviation units will depend on a host of factors including 

cost, availability, complexity, ease of maintenance, durability, survivability, performance 

trade-offs, etc. Regardless of how obvious or desirable a particular capability or air 

platform may be, the recommended assets must fit within the technological and financial 

70
resources, as well as the mission needs, of assisted nations. As an example, a daynight capability with real-time tactical awareness promoting maximum threat avoidance 

and minimum threat exposure to defeat a threat in non-permissive environments is a 

desired goal, but it may be unsupportable given the prevailing financial and 

technological restrictions in the typical host nation. 

Achieving US foreign policy objectives in the FID arena may, in some instances, 

require that selected host nations actually possess aircraft capable of performing the 

critical operational functions discussed in Chapter Three—air mobility, ISR, counterland, 

and CSAR/CASEVAC. In addition to cost and complexity considerations, aircraft 

optimized for internal defense of countries with lesser developed militaries should be 

able to operate from relatively unimproved forward operating locations and be 

sustainable in the field for extended periods of time using small aviation maintenance 

teams. 

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine.... 

71
SUGGESTED READINGS 

Air Force Publications 

(Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the Air Force Doctrine 

Center web page at https://www.doctrine.af.mil) 

 AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine 

 AFDD 2, Operations and Organization 

 AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland Operations 

 AFDD 2-1.6, Personnel Recovery Operations 

 AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare 

 AFDD 2-4, Combat Support 

 AFDD 2-4.1, Force Protection

 AFDD 2-4.2, Health Services

 AFDD 2-5, Information Operations 

 AFDD 2-7, Special Operations

Joint Publications 

 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States 

 JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal 

Defense 

 JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian 

Assistance

 JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations 

 JP 3-57, Doctrine for Joint Civil-Military Operations 

 DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations 

Other Publications 

Abstract, “Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of 

USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions,” (RAND). 2006. 

72
Boseman, Ada, War and the Clash of Ideas (Orbis, Spring). 1976. 

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 2.0, August 2005. 

Corum, James S., and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents 

and Terrorists (University Press of Kansas). 2003. 

Dean, David J., The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict (Air University Press). 

1986. 

Graham, James R., ed., Non-Combat Roles for the US Military in the Post-Cold War Era 

(National Defense University Press). 1993. 

Hamilton, Donald W., The Art of Insurgency (Praeger Publishers). 1998. 

Johnson, Lt Col Wray R., Whither Aviation Foreign Internal Defense, Air Power Journal, 

Spring 1997. 

Koster, Maj Michael, Foreign Internal Defense: Does Air Force Special Operations 

Have What It Takes? (Air University Press). 1993. 

Metz, Steven, Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability, US 

Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 28 

February 1995. 

Sloan, Stephen, Beating International Terrorism (Air University Press). 2000. 

Smith, Jeffrey A., Counterinsurgency in Uzbekistan: An Adapted FID Strategy for Policy 

Consideration (Naval Post Graduate School). 2002. 

Tucker, Shelby, Among Insurgents: Walking Through Burma (St Martin’s Press). 2000. 

Vick, Alan, David T. Orletsky, Abram N. Shulsky, and John Stillion, Preparing the US Air 

 Force for Military Operations Other Than War (RAND). 1997. 

73
APPENDICES 

APPENDIX A 

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 

To establish a realistic context for COIN air operations, this appendix describes 

the dynamics of classical insurgency and counterinsurgency. A detailed treatment of 

the many variants and paradigms of counterinsurgency is beyond the scope of this 

document. Accordingly, the following text attempts to establish a generic profile for the 

conflict arena, knowing full well that insurgencies vary considerably in scope and detail. 

There are situations, for example, where insurgent forces may want something less 

than total control of the government. Insurgents seeking greater autonomy for the 

province of Kosovo as an integrated part of Serbia are an example, as are Kurdish 

rebels trying to win basic rights in Turkey. There are also examples of insurgents being 

totally impervious to government reforms or concessions; e.g., Khmer Rouge fighters 

bent on destroying the government and all its supporters through combat actions. 

The appendix describes ways to apply various instruments of power to achieve 

balanced development, neutralize enemy combatant forces, and promote political 

mobilization and legitimacy through reforming economic and legal sectors of society, 

alleviating grievances, recognizing causes, etc. This appendix provides Air Force 

commanders, trainers, advisors, and other personnel involved in FID a basic framework 

for understanding and evaluating the major components of the conflict arena. This 

framework is the basis for Air Force FID planning and execution, and especially for 

recognizing appropriate and inappropriate uses of airpower resources. 

The discussion focuses on the nature and characteristics of insurgency and 

counterinsurgency and on the major functions and objectives of a HN’s IDAD strategy. 

Insurgencies have individual characteristics that should be taken into consideration. 

The classic concept of social, economic, and political fragmentation engenders a 

"winning hearts and minds" approach to successfully countering insurgent movements, 

an idea that gained relevancy during the Vietnam War era. This idea does not have 

universal application. 

ANALYZING INSURGENCY 

Because insurgencies vary greatly in form, scope, and intensity, it is impossible to 

construct a universal model for this type of conflict. However, there are many elements 

that can be analyzed to determine the composition and likely direction of an insurgent 

movement. The way an insurgency is inspired, organized, and employed should be of 

principal interest to FID planners. Typically, insurgency incorporates an ideological 

content that furnishes a revolutionary theory and cause; a revolutionary infrastructure 

providing leadership, organization, logistics, communications, and intelligence; and a 

militant arm to defend the revolutionary movement and help achieve its political 

74
objectives. Understanding these elements allows those defending against an insurgency 

to direct their campaign against root causes and supporting infrastructure as well as the 

insurgent's military forces. To devise appropriate countermeasures, including the use of 

airpower, defense planners should also analyze the insurgent's strategy—the goals and 

likely methods of attack. 

Ideological Content 

Poverty, class oppression, political disenfranchisement, and ethnic or religious strife 

often furnish the necessary conditions for revolution, but are rarely sufficient to generate 

armed conflict. Given economic and political grievances, another condition must be 

met. A catalyst must be furnished to draw attention to these grievances and focus them 

on the failure of the state to act in the best interests of the people. The catalyst 

originates in the ideological content of the revolution (Marxism or religion, for example). 

Together, the grievances and the ideological content function as necessary conditions 

to set the revolution in motion. Ideology is the mechanism for connecting the population 

with the central ideas and goals of the revolutionary movement. It defines the economic 

and political future of the revolutionary state and provides the inspirational basis for 

revolt. The ideological underpinnings of a revolution may extend beyond the legitimate 

needs and aspirations of the people. Insurgents bent on achieving power at any cost 

often view government reforms as a threat to their political ambitions. 

Revolutionary Infrastructure 

Revolutionary infrastructure furnishes the organizational devices to administer and 

control all social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives. Leaders, 

located at the infrastructure's center, formulate strategic plans, policies, and goals. 

They are the source of political-ideological order and discipline. In many revolutions, 

political cadres located throughout the organizational structure represent party 

leadership. Overall, the infrastructure functions as the heart of the insurgent 

organization’s C2 system. 

The infrastructure is often organized into interconnected, clandestine cells 

responsible for recruitment, training, intelligence, deception, propaganda, and logistics. 

C2 lines extend to insurgent military elements and, where possible, to agents located in 

various segments of local and national government, host military organizations, and 

society at large. Insurgents may conduct political action and psychological operations 

through legal front organizations such as labor unions, organized student groups, and 

registered political parties. 

The infrastructure is often a coalition of factions with differing grievances, ideological 

patterns, and political agendas. When faction leaders differ significantly over 

revolutionary ends, ways, or means, internal alliances are often dynamic and extremely 

fragile. The nature of these alliances—their dominant political direction and degree of 

cohesion—is an important indicator of the nature of the revolution, its strategic goals, 

strengths, and weaknesses. 

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Insurgent Strategy 

Usually, insurgent strategy is carried out on multiple fronts (through social, 

economic, informational, political, and military initiatives) to separate the government 

from the population and to neutralize the government's self-defense mechanisms. The 

contest is for legitimacy and, where possible, political mobilization of the people. 

Mobilization furnishes the revolution with workers, fighters, money, weapons, and 

intelligence, while at the same time denying these assets to the government. By 

neutralizing the government's authority through the use of propaganda and force, the 

insurgent creates opportunities to implant forms of political and economic control of the 

population. In certain types of insurgency, the strategy is ultimately aimed at "outadministering" the host government. Although the insurgent does not necessarily 

require the active participation of the majority of the population, the insurgent can 

secure neutrality or passive support. 

Military Operations 

The insurgent movement usually enters armed conflict with a small insurgent force 

that increases in strength as personnel and weapons become available. The insurgents 

fight as guerrillas because they lack the means to apply force quickly and decisively in 

open battle with defending conventional forces. The insurgents usually begin with little 

of the materiel and manpower resources available to the government. They avoid allout confrontations, relying instead on accumulating smaller successes to achieve social, 

economic, psychological, and political objectives. 

Guerrilla tactics extend the revolution with the means available, wearing down the 

host-nation financial and materiel resources and also the political and moral resolve of 

foreign friends and allies supporting the counterinsurgency effort. By interdicting vital 

lines of communication, halting or slowing agricultural production, and inhibiting 

domestic and foreign trade, the insurgency reduces the government's financial ability to 

resist. Successful interdiction of economic targets also undermines the legitimacy of the 

government by creating inflation, higher taxes, and critical shortages of goods and 

services. Insurgents may also employ terrorism or terrorist techniques (e.g., 

assassination, bombings, kidnapping, extortion, and blackmail) as tactical instruments 

to suppress or inhibit government actions. Selective attacks against industrial facilities, 

transportation systems, government officials, and civil law enforcement agencies may 

have significant psychological effect, primarily in discrediting the host government's 

ability to manage and administer the affairs of state. 

Guerrilla tactics may also function as a crucial lead-in phase to conventional 

operations aimed at defeating the government's main forces. In many instances, 

national security forces are driven into their most defensible positions during the 

protracted guerrilla phase. This withdrawal provides insurgents time and secures 

maneuvering space to consolidate their political and economic control in rural areas. It 

also gives them time to establish their legitimacy and to assemble a larger, more 

76
conventionally structured force capable of making decisive, final assaults on 

government garrisons. When the defending forces become isolated in static positions, 

the government's chances of success are poor. 

Phased Actions 

A Maoist-type insurgency is usually a progressive, evolutionary process marked by a 

series of phases corresponding to major transitions in the revolutionary movement. 

Although insurgencies can take many forms, three phases are common to many: a prehostility or incipient phase, a guerrilla warfare phase, and a conventional confrontation 

phase. 

 Phase I corresponds to infrastructure development plus initial recruiting, 

organizing, training, and equipping of combat elements. During this phase, 

insurgents may engage the government in open political confrontations like public 

demonstrations, labor strikes, and boycotts. Insurgents often establish secure 

base areas for military command elements and guerrilla operations during this 

phase. Political-ideological cadres focus on indoctrination of civilians and armed 

revolutionaries. 

 Phase II is the first level of armed violence. Irregular forces engage in sabotage, 

interdiction of communication and logistics links, assassination, and selective 

attacks against government forces. Insurgents expand their secure base areas 

and, where possible, link them to form strategic enclaves of political autonomy. 

 Phase III marks the transition from guerrilla actions to operations incorporating 

the tactics, techniques, and procedures of conventional fire and maneuver. 

The reference to conflict phases in a Maoist insurgency is only a means of 

identifying critical shifts in the scope and intensity of insurgent activity. Phases may not 

signify a clean break between one kind of activity and another and not every Maoist 

insurgency will pass through all three phases. Furthermore, non-Maoist insurgencies 

generally do not follow the three-phase model at all. For example, in Afghanistan’s war 

against Soviet occupation, insurgent operations essentially consisted of armed violence 

by irregular forces for the duration of the conflict, with no initial phase of infrastructure 

development and no transition from guerrilla actions to conventional confrontation 

required to force the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the collapse of the Sovietsupported government in Afghanistan. For example, infrastructure development is a 

continuous process of expanding administration, C2, training, and employing mobilized 

resources. Mobilization of insurgent combat forces must continuously expand to carry 

the insurgency from one phase to the next. Similarly, guerrilla operations may carry 

over into the conventional confrontation phase as a force multiplier. Also, an insurgency 

does not have to progress through all three phases to succeed. A critical combination 

of political, economic, psychological, and military pressures may be sufficient to 

precipitate a government's collapse or persuade a government’s foreign backers to 

withdraw at any stage of a conflict. 

77
A revolutionary movement is most vulnerable to government countermeasures 

during the initial build-up phase, before the insurgent develops military forces. Once the 

insurgency takes up armed combat, government countermeasures become far more 

complicated and difficult to apply. Insurgent warfare is, however, reversible. 

Reversibility can work to the advantage of either side in the conflict. If an insurgency 

fails militarily in one phase, it can revert to a lower phase, thus securing its survival 

while generating or reinforcing combat capabilities. The government, on the other hand, 

may be able to capitalize on reduced levels of military activity to focus on solutions 

aimed at rooting out the infrastructure and eliminating economic and political grievances 

that may fuel the revolution. 

COUNTERINSURGENCY 

Countering a revolutionary strategy focused on political or ideological mobilization 

and protracted violence requires a wide range of social, economic, informational, 

political, and military initiatives. No single government initiative is sufficient, particularly 

when the insurgents are able to bind political-ideological goals with genuine grievances. 

The government's initiatives should be taken simultaneously and should reinforce each 

other. These initiatives require all instruments of national power be combined into a 

single, integrated IDAD program using both military and civilian resources. An effective 

IDAD strategy emphasizes unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of 

violence, and responsive government leadership and administration. Ideally, the IDAD 

strategy should be used early enough to prevent an insurgency, but it can also be 

employed to counter an insurgency that has already started. The strategy incorporates 

four major tasks—balanced development, mobilization, security, and neutralization. 

Balanced Development 

Balanced development attempts to create a social, economic, and political 

environment resistant to insurgent attack. It does this through reforms aimed at 

removing or alleviating sources of legitimate grievance that can be exploited by 

insurgent elements. Although the scope and detail of the reforms vary from country to 

country, their principal functions are to establish the defending regime's legitimacy, 

capture the political initiative from the insurgent movement, and mobilize public support 

of IDAD efforts. In some cases, balanced development may require major investments 

in the industrial and agricultural sectors. Economic development, however, should be 

balanced with equally important nation-building initiatives in such areas as human 

rights, legal process, public education, communications, health care, transportation, 

utilities, water, and other public service programs. The host military often possesses 

unique capabilities in transportation, communications, and manpower that can be 

employed in nation-building programs. 

Balanced development should be driven by the nature of the conflict. In conflicts 

where the insurgency is inspired by economic grievances or class oppression, economic 

development may be very effective, whereas insurgencies based primarily on 

78
longstanding cultural, ethnic, or religious discord may respond better to other forms of 

nation building, like human rights and other political reforms. 

Mobilization 

The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Mobilization 

maximizes manpower, materiel resources, political support, and intelligence available to 

the government while denying these resources to the insurgent. The net effect of 

mobilization is a social-political environment in which the government can "outadminister" the leadership and control mechanisms of the insurgent movement. 

Mobilization relies heavily on informational instruments to instill public confidence in the 

government and to reduce anxiety over military initiatives. 

Security 

Security includes all activities to protect the population, the government, and vital 

economic resources from insurgent violence. Security provides a safe environment for 

balanced development and denies the enemy access to popular support. The ability of 

internal security forces to maintain law and order is a key factor in demonstrating the 

government's legitimacy. During the early stages of insurgency, civil law enforcement 

agencies should function as a major line of defense for internal security. Revolution's 

major dynamic—political mobilization—occurs at the grass-roots level, and the 

government agency closest to that level is the local police. Police are generally the first 

to detect critical signs of unrest, particularly in rural areas, and they are often closest to 

important sources of HUMINT on infrastructure organization and methods. They also 

provide a nucleus for establishing local auxiliaries and paramilitary forces. In some 

instances, civilian security forces are more acceptable to the local populace than the 

military. Military participation may begin with lateral support or augmentation of the 

police during low levels of violence and increase to a direct combat posture if the 

insurgency escalates. 

Neutralization 

Neutralization is physically and psychologically separating the insurgents from the 

population. It includes all lawful activities to disrupt, disorganize, and defeat insurgent 

organizations. Neutralization thus enlarges the objectives of security to include 

eliminating sources of insurgent violence. Neutralization relies on civil law enforcement 

agencies as well as military forces to accomplish these objectives. 

The principal target of neutralization is the active or tacit support that the insurgents 

receive from the populace. Neutralization requires internal defense forces that are 

organized, trained, and equipped for joint combat operations. However, military force 

rarely is decisive in determining long-term strategic outcomes. Insurgent leaders and 

forces often are deeply embedded in the civilian sector. They operate in a clandestine 

manner, many times under the protective cover of legitimate institutions. In most cases, 

penetrating and rooting out leadership and other insurgent elements is done more 

79
effectively with legal, informational, and civil law enforcement and investigative 

instruments than with military forces. Defeating the insurgency militarily may drive the 

conflict to a lower level of violence or drive it underground, but it does not eliminate the 

social, economic, political, or cultural tensions fueling the insurgency. Military force 

should be aimed at holding the conflict at the lowest possible level of violence while the 

government eliminates the insurgents’ infrastructure and engages in balanced 

development and reform. Force is not an end in itself. It is only a way to buy time until 

the processes of reform and nation building take effect. 

The reversible, multiphase nature of insurgency requires great flexibility in planning 

and executing military operations. Tactics, techniques, and procedures appropriate for 

conventional confrontations may be ineffective, even counterproductive, when executing 

military operations during counter-guerrilla operations. Because of varying situations 

and force requirements, decision makers and planners require accurate, timely 

intelligence to facilitate the process of selecting proper options. 

The social, psychological, and political implications of military actions, particularly 

those employing deadly force, should be clearly understood and correctly exploited by 

the HN government. Excessive or ineffective use of force erodes government 

legitimacy and promotes political mobilization in favor of the insurgents. Even when the 

government assumes special emergency powers through legislation or decree, security 

forces must provide for the safety of law-abiding citizens. 

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APPENDIX B 

JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES 

Coincidental with testing and evaluating mutual capabilities, joint and multinational 

exercises may include certain types of training and construction, as well as HCA 

projects, within a host country. Although the exercises may be conducted between Air 

Force and the host air force units only, maximum utility is realized when they involve 

joint as well as multinational operations. 

INTEROPERABILITY AND SAFETY TRAINING 

Interoperability Training 

The purpose of interoperability training is to ensure that US and HN forces can 

function as mutually supporting entities during combat operations. Training to achieve 

interoperability should include doctrine; tactics, individual skills, weapons familiarization 

(particularly if US and host forces use different weapon systems), maintenance, and C2 

procedures. 

Interoperability training assumes that comparably proficient units are involved. The 

training experience allows US commanders to learn how other forces conduct IDAD 

operations and to develop the most compatible methodology, consistent with US FID 

policies and objectives, for operating together. 

If the foreign force is not proficient enough to conduct multinational operations with 

US forces, foreign military sales provided under security assistance should be 

conducted to equalize the foreign force before multinational exercises are undertaken. 

Joint-multinational exercises are not to be used to provide training to foreign military 

personnel if that training is normally provided under security assistance. 

Safety Training 

Safety training reduces the risks inherent in conducting military operations by two or 

more forces differing widely in language, culture, geographic origin, technology, and 

practical experience. Mutual safety is improved not only through training in the use of 

specific weapons but also through standardization of tactics, techniques, and 

procedures. 

CONSTRUCTION 

Construction related to multinational exercises is permitted under two sets of rules, 

one for Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercises and another for non-JCS exercises. 

81
JCS Exercises 

Set-aside funds contained in the unspecified minor construction account of each US 

military Service pays for all exercise-related construction during JCS exercises. Setaside funds cover only material, supplies, nonmilitary labor costs, overhead (except 

planning and design costs), and DOD-funded costs applicable to O&M of equipment. 

O&M funds may not be used for construction related to JCS exercises. 

Non-JCS Exercises 

During non-JCS exercises, O&M funds may be used to construct or improve facilities 

under US control, if each construction project results in a complete, usable facility 

necessary for US units to take part in the multinational exercise. Strict project rules and 

precise funding limits are established for such construction. 

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE 

HCA projects conducted predominantly by US personnel may be performed in 

conjunction with exercises or military operations. HCA is rendered to the local 

populace. US governing authority prohibits HCA, directly or indirectly, to any military or 

paramilitary activity. 

Authority 

HCA is provided under separate authorities established in Comptroller General 

opinions and legislation that: 

 Recognize the DOD's inherent ability to undertake HCA activities while fulfilling 

the training needs of the unit involved, which incidentally create humanitarian 

benefit to the local populace. 

 Permit authorized DOD personnel to conduct HCA activities that are unrelated to 

training requirements by using minimal expenditures of Service funds in 

conjunction with JCS-directed or JCS-coordinated exercises overseas. 

 Recognize the DOD's ability to carry out HCA on a reimbursable basis for 

another US government agency with authority and appropriations to conduct 

such activities. This is referred to as an interagency transaction or economy act 

transaction. During FID operations, such a transaction usually occurs when the 

US Agency for International Development funds economic-assistance type 

activities under Part I, Developmental Assistance, of the Foreign Assistance Act. 

 Authorize certain types of HCA activities in conjunction with military operations 

(not necessarily exercises). This is a statutory authority referred to as the 

Combatant Commander’s Cooperative Program or Title 10 U.S.C., section 401, 

Humanitarian Assistance and Other Assistance Authority. 

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FORMS OF HCA 

There are three distinct forms of HCA with important applications in FID-related jointmultinational exercises: Statutory HCA, De Minimus (or Minimal) HCA, and Stevens 

HCA. Commanders contemplating the use of HCA should seek legal advice on the 

form of HCA most appropriate for the operation or exercise being conducted, especially 

with respect to rules governing HCA limitations and funding. 

Statutory HCA. This is carried out in conjunction with authorized military 

operations, such as JCS-directed or coordinated exercises and single-Service 

deployments for training, and is funded from specifically appropriated (host-nation 

support) O&M funds. The Secretary of State must provide prior approval for DOD to 

conduct this form of HCA, and the activities should be closely coordinated with State 

Department personnel in-country. 

 The activities should complement, not duplicate, other assistance provided by the 

US and enhance the security interests of both the US and the host nation. The 

activities should also enhance the operational skills of US military personnel. 

 Although the authority prohibits funding to construct airstrips, Air Force airlift 

resources may be employed to support joint US HCA elements engaged in 

construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems, drilling wells and 

constructing basic sanitation facilities, and rudimentary construction and repair of 

public facilities. Further, Air Force personnel and resources may also provide or 

support medical, dental, and veterinary care in rural areas of a country. 

De Minimus HCA. This is also carried out along with authorized military operations, 

but consists of activities for which only minimal expenditures may be incurred. Such 

HCA is funded from O&M funds and is not subject to the requirements of Statutory 

HCA. An example of De Minimus HCA activities described by Congress includes a unit 

doctor's examination of villagers for a few hours, with the administration of a few shots 

and the issuance of some medicine, but not the deployment of a medical team for the 

purpose of providing mass inoculations to the local populace. Another example is the 

opening of an access road for several hundred yards but not the asphalting of any 

roadway. 

Stevens HCA. This provides that O&M funds may be used to pay costs incurred in 

providing HCA incidental to authorized military operations. Stevens HCA is limited to 

JCS-directed or coordinated exercises. 

 Stevens HCA must complement, not duplicate, other assistance provided by the 

US and enhance the security interests of both the US and the host nation. It 

must enhance the operational skills of US military personnel and must be 

"incidental" in nature. Incidental HCA are those activities that are "minor" when 

viewed in the context of the overall exercise scenario in which they occur. 

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 Stevens HCA activities must be provided as an incidental benefit to a 

comprehensive training program. They cannot be designed as stand-alone civic 

action programs or as major exercise activities in their own right. Accordingly, 

commanders must determine what amount of incremental O&M cost associated 

with HCA would be reasonable in view of the overall amount of O&M funds to be 

expended in the JCS-directed or coordinated exercise. 

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APPENDIX C 

AIR FORCE SECURITY ASSISTANCE TEAMS 

This appendix assists commanders in identifying and selecting appropriate options 

for foreign internal defense by providing a brief survey of teams who perform functions 

under security assistance. One of the key operational-level objectives of Air Force 

advisory operations is to help integrate host-nation airpower into the multinational and 

joint arenas. Commanders should refer to current directives and publications for 

guidelines and specific policy on assistance provided under the Air Force security 

assistance program. It also discusses functions, goals, and special constraints 

associated with Air Force advisory support to host nations. 

BASIS OF REQUIREMENT 

Legislative guidance limits training and advising by permanently assigned SAO 

personnel. Also, SAOs are not sufficiently sized or configured to advise and train or 

perform technical assistance duties that extend beyond primary (and essentially 

logistical) SAO functions. Outside assistance may be required in specific instances. 

Types of Teams 

Besides SAOs, several teams and organizations may perform limited security 

assistance functions for specified periods of time on a TDY or PCS basis. These teams 

include technical assistance teams (TAT), technical assistance field teams (TAFT), 

MTTs, extended training service specialists (ETSS), quality assurance teams, language 

training detachments, site survey teams, and defense requirement survey teams. 

Commanders for FID activities can employ these teams and others assembled for 

specific purposes, such as health service support teams. In certain instances, 

temporarily deployed Air Force teams may be called on to advise foreign personnel on 

operational matters directly related to the use of host-nation resources in specific 

conflict situations. 

Non-training Support of Host-Nation Forces 

A variety of non-training assistance functions can be accomplished under the 

security assistance program. The principal vehicles for non-training support are TATs 

and TAFTs. 

Technical Assistance Teams 

In cases where the operational readiness of host aircraft and support equipment is 

seriously degraded because of battle damage, unexpected materiel failures, or longterm deficiencies in local maintenance and funding, a requirement for one-time repair 

and refurbishment may exist. Introducing new equipment provided under security 

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assistance may also require specialized Air Force assistance to place the systems in 

operation. 

TATs and civilian engineering technical surveys can be deployed to provide these 

services. In some cases, US or foreign civilian contract personnel may be used. Such 

non-training support may be conducted in the host country or, when prohibited or 

deemed impractical because of inadequate local facilities, conducted out of country. 

TATs should not be used to provide technical training or instruction except for 

incidental over-the-shoulder technical assistance in conjunction with their primary 

duties. 

Technical Assistance Field Teams 

Where ongoing aviation support requirements cannot be met through the combined 

efforts of the host air force, the SAO, and temporarily deployed Air Force teams, TAFTs 

can be sent to the host nation, normally for one year or longer, from DOD resources. 

TAFTs help install, operate, maintain, and support foreign military sales, purchased 

weapon systems, and equipment. 

Specialized Non-training Support 

Besides TATs and TAFTs, other forms of non-training support allow commanders to 

tailor team capabilities to meet specialized field requirements. 

Air Force assistance teams (funded through security assistance) can use periodic 

visits to offset host-nation aircraft materiel management deficiencies by performing 

inventories, refining procedures, clearing up back orders, and resolving accounting 

discrepancies. 

The Air Force can provide other specialized forms of non-training support. An 

example is theater technical training of US logisticians through the logistics team 

training (LTT) program. Small teams (10 to 15 individuals) train in such ACS skills as 

aircraft battle damage repair, corrosion control, materiel management, specialized 

maintenance, transportation operations, or other ACS functions. Service O&M funds 

support the training of US personnel. Host-nation security assistance funds pay for 

repair parts and other expendables used by an LTT during training activities. 

 The LTT concept is designed to ensure, and the Service must certify, that 

deployments offer opportunities for critical training that would not occur, or would 

occur at significantly higher costs or reduced efficiency, in another, similar 

geographic area. The concept is based on the precept that certain US forces 

training is so critical and reasonably unavailable that incidental, spin-off services 

provided to a foreign country in exchange for the training opportunities are 

insignificant in the balance of benefits, thereby making the training in the best 

interests of the US Government. 

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 As with TATs, training or instruction of host personnel is limited to incidental, 

"over-the-shoulder" technical assistance. 

Training Support to HN Forces 

In many cases, incidental "over-the-shoulder" instruction occurring as a byproduct of 

certain non-training functions may not be sufficient to produce significant improvements 

in long-term self-sufficiency. Training teams, funded under security assistance, should 

be used where more extensive, formally structured courses of instruction are required. 

The teams can be deployed to reinforce SAO capabilities. 

Mobile Training Teams 

MTTs deployed to the recipient nation add to SAO capabilities by training HN 

personnel in the operation, maintenance, and employment of airpower weapon systems 

and support equipment. MTTs are authorized for specific in-country training 

requirements beyond the capability of SAOs, primarily to develop the recipient's selftraining capabilities in particular skills. MTTs may be funded from either foreign military 

sales or international military education and training programs. 

MTTs are also authorized to provide training associated with equipment transfers or 

to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. MTTs may be requested 

to carry out specific training tasks for limited periods of time. MTTs will not be used to 

assemble, maintain, operate, or renovate a system. 

Extended Training 

Sustained Air Force training capabilities are available through ETSS who are 

technically qualified to provide advice, instruction, and training in the engineering, 

installation, operation, and maintenance of weapons, equipment, and systems. 

Advisory Support to Host-nation Forces 

When specifically authorized and directed, deployed Air Force security assistance 

teams advise host military personnel on using airpower systems and related support 

capabilities. Advisory functions are subject to legislative restrictions and DOD directives 

on levels and types of assistance provided. Commanders and SAO personnel 

requesting this type of assistance must ensure that advisory activities fall within current 

policy guidelines and legal parameters. 

Command Advisory Functions 

Air Force advisory assistance may be required to facilitate host air force support of 

IDAD objectives and to encourage a satisfactory correlation between US security 

assistance goals and the recipient's use of security assistance assets. Advisory 

assistance teams accomplish these tasks by advising central command elements of the 

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host military on the capabilities, limitations, and correct use of airpower in a given 

conflict. Command advisory functions focus on operational-level planning that can 

bridge the gap between IDAD strategy and tactical employment. 

Field Advisory Functions 

Air Force advisory assistance conducted at the field level (operational flying units, 

aviation support elements, and army maneuver units) focuses primarily on improving 

host military tactics, techniques, and procedures for airpower operations. 

Air Force advisory functions include mission-related advice on intelligence collection 

and analysis, maintenance, logistics, communications, and administration as well as 

tactical operations. Field advisory support also has important applications in medical 

and military civic action programs, military construction, and psychological operations. 

Its principal objective is to provide guidance fostering self-sufficiency in the use of 

airpower resources for the conflict at hand, not to supplant host-nation capabilities. 

Field advisory functions should be closely linked to operational-level objectives 

supporting overall US/HN strategic goals. This entails such field advisory functions as 

testing and verifying HN airpower employment and sustainment capabilities, focusing 

HN aviation resources on appropriate roles and missions, and facilitating the availability 

of safe, reliable, and interoperable aviation support as a force multiplier for the joint 

force commander. 

Field advisory functions are not automatically linked to direct participation in host 

military operations. Advisory functions that expose US personnel to hostile fire 

represent a significant increase in US commitment with profound legal and political 

implications. Under current law, personnel performing defense services may not 

perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and 

advising, that may engage US personnel in combat activities outside the US. 

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GLOSSARY 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

ACS agile combat support 

AETACS airborne elements of theater air control systems 

AETF airpower expeditionary task force 

AFSCS USAF Security Cooperation Strategy 

AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command 

AFSOF Air Force special operations forces 

AOC air and space operations center 

AOR area of responsibility 

ATO air tasking order 

BFT blue-force tracking 

C2 command and control 

CA civil affairs 

CAA combat aviation advisors 

CAS close air support 

CASEVAC casualty evacuation 

CMO civil-military operations 

COIN counter-insurgency 

COMAFFOR commander of Air Force forces 

CSAR combat search and rescue 

CT counterterrorism 

DAO defense attaché office 

DIRLAUTH 

DOD 

direct liaison authorized 

Department of Defense 

DOS Department of State 

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

EEI essential elements of information 

ETSS extended training service specialists 

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia 

FID foreign internal defense 

FMLN Farabundo MartiLiberation Front 

GCC geographic combatant commands 

HA humanitarian assistance 

HCA humanitarian and civil assistance 

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HN host nation 

HUMINT human intelligence 

IDAD internal defense and development 

IMET international military education and training 

ISR Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

IST integrated skills training 

IW irregular warfare 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JFACC 

JFC 

joint force air component commander (JP 1-02); 

joint force air and space component commander 

(Air Force) 

joint force commander 

JP joint publication 

JSOTF joint special operations task force 

JspOC Joint Space Operations Center 

JTF joint task force 

KAF Khmer Air Force 

LOC line of communications 

LTT logistics team training 

MCA military civil action 

MiTT military transition team 

MTT mobile training team 

NGA National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 

NGO 

NRO 

non-government organization 

National Reconnaissance Office 

O&M operations and maintenance 

OAD operational aviation detachment 

OPCON operational control 

PAF Philippine Air Force 

PCS 

PNT 

PR 

permanent change of station 

positional navigation timing 

personnel recovery 

PSYOP psychological operation 

RSSC regional satellite communications support center 

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SA security assistance 

SAR search and rescue 

SATCOM satellite communications 

SAO 

SF 

security assistance organization 

special forces 

SIGINT 

SOC 

signals intelligence 

Special Operations Command 

SOF special operations forces 

TAT technical assistance teams 

TAFT technical assessment field team 

TAIP tactical air force improvement plan 

TDY temporary duty 

UA unmanned aircraft 

UAS unmanned aircraft systems 

U.S.C. United States Code 

Definitions 

air and space expeditionary task force. The organizational manifestation of 

Air Force forces afield. The AETF provides a joint force commander with a taskorganized, integrated package with the appropriate balance of force, 

sustainment, control, and force protection. Also called AETF. (AFDD 1) 

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a 

strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See also 

campaign plan. (JP 1-02)

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at 

accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. 

See also campaign. (JP 1-02) 

centralized control. 1. In air defense, the control mode whereby a higher 

echelon makes direct target assignments to fire units. 2. In joint air operations, 

placing within one commander the responsibility and authority for planning, 

directing, and coordinating a military operation or group/category of operations. 

(JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units 

organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and 

to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See also civil-military 

operations. (JP 1-02) 

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, 

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maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental 

and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian 

populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate 

military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civilmilitary operations may include performance by military forces of activities and 

functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national 

government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other 

military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military 

operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, 

by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also 

called CMO. See also civil affairs. (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 

accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed 

through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and 

procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 

controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also 

called C2. (JP 0-2) 

coordination. The necessary action to ensure adequate exchange of 

information to integrate, synchronize, and deconflict operations between 

separate organizations. Coordination is not necessarily a process of gaining 

approval but is most often used for mutual exchange of information. Normally 

used between functions of a supporting staff. Direct authority to liaison 

(DIRLAUTH) is used to coordinate with an organization outside of the immediate 

staff or organization. (AFDD 1) 

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, 

psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. 

Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

decentralized execution. Delegation of execution authority to subordinate 

commanders. (JP 1-02) [Decentralized execution of airpower power is the 

delegation of execution authority to responsible and capable lower-level 

commanders to achieve effective span of control and to foster disciplined 

initiative, situational responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.] (AFDD 1) {Italicized 

words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

direction. Guidance to or management of support staff functions. Inherent 

within command but not a command authority in its own right. In some cases, 

can be considered an explicit instruction or order. Used by commanders and 

their designated subordinates to facilitate, channel, or motivate support staff to 

achieve appropriate action, tempo, or intensity. Used by directors of staff 

agencies on behalf of the commander to provide guidance to their staffs on how 

best to accomplish stated objectives IAW the commander’s intent. (AFDD 1) 

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direct support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and 

authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. 

Also called DS. (JP 1-02) 

effects. A full range of outcomes, events, or consequences of a particular action 

or set of actions. The action can derive from any element of power—economic, 

political, military, diplomatic, or informational—and may occur at any point across 

the continuum from peace to global conflict. (AFDD 2-1.2) 

essential elements of information. The critical items of information regarding 

the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time 

to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in 

reaching a logical decision. Also called EEI. (JP 1-02) 

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against 

Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, 

facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting 

potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the 

coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the 

effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the 

enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect 

against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02) [An integrated 

application of offensive and defensive actions that deter, detect, preempt, 

mitigate, or negate threats against Air Force airpower operations and assets, 

based on an acceptable level of risk.] {Italicized words in brackets apply only to 

the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a 

government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 

designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, 

lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02) 

foreign military sales. That portion of US security assistance authorized by the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 

1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program 

and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient 

provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. Also 

called FMS. (JP 1-02) 

guerrilla warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held 

or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called GW.

See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02) 

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, 

coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or 

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to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02) 

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided 

by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. 

This is specifically authorized by Title 10, U.S. Code, section 401, and funded 

under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited 

to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) 

construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and 

construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and 

repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that 

incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called HCA.

(JP 1-02)

human intelligence. A category of intelligence derived from information 

collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02) 

 

indirect support. Security assistance and other efforts to develop and sustain 

host nation capabilities. This definition establishes a distinction between security 

assistance and forms of support involving direct operational employment of US 

forces which supports the guidance in the National Security Strategy of the US. 

(AFDD 2-3.1) 

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted 

government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)

internal defense and development. The full range of measures taken by a 

nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, 

and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, 

social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. See 

also foreign internal defense. (JP 1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of 

two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 0-2)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, 

assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a 

single joint force commander. (JP 1-02) 

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, 

sub-unified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise 

combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint 

force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02) 

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the 

Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an 

existing joint force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02) 

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military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on 

projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, 

training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, 

sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which 

would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the 

population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in 

overseas areas.) Also called MCA. (JP 1-02) 

mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action 

to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when 

applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. 

The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 1-

02) 

narco-terrorism. Terrorism conducted to further the aims of drug traffickers. It 

may include assassinations, extortion, hijackings, bombings and kidnappings 

directed against judges, prosecutors, elected officials, or law enforcement 

agents, and general disruption of a legitimate government to divert attention from 

drug operations. (JP 1-02) 

nation assistance. Civic and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by 

foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or 

emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. 

Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, 

foreign internal defense, other Title 10 U.S.C. (DOD) programs, and activities 

performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international 

organizations. (JP 1-02) 

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by 

commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. 

Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and 

may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between 

combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will 

exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be 

specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to 

perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving 

organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating 

objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the 

mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of 

military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned 

to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the 

commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised 

through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional 

component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to 

organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in 

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operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does 

not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of 

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called 

OPCON. (JP 1-02) 

policy. Guidance that is directive or instructive, stating what is to be 

accomplished. It reflects a conscious choice to pursue certain avenues, and not 

others. Policies may change due to changes in national leadership, political 

considerations, or for fiscal reasons. At the national level, policy may be 

expressed in such broad vehicles such as the National Security Strategy. Within 

military operations, policy may be expressed not only in terms of objectives, but 

also in rules of engagement—what we may or may not strike, or under what 

circumstances we may strike particular targets. (AFDD 1) 

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information 

and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective 

reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, 

groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or 

reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. 

Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02) 

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community 

relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with 

interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02) 

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance 

Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, 

or other related statutes by which the US provides defense articles, military 

training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales 

in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02) 

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located 

in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security 

assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory 

groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, 

liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security 

assistance functions. (JP 1-02) 

special operations. Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically 

sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or 

economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad 

conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, 

clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across 

the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in 

conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies 

and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. 

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Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and 

political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from 

friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and 

indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP 1-02)

strategic intelligence. Intelligence that is required for the formation of strategy, 

policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. (JP 1-02)

strategy. The art and science of developing and employing instruments of 

national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, 

national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02) 

subversion. Action designed to undermine the military, economic, 

psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. (JP 1-02) 

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains 

another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that 

helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, 

or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02) 

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or 

commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is 

limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within 

the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. 

Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be 

delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant 

command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the 

command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing 

commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary 

of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and 

directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within 

the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02) 

tactical intelligence. Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting 

tactical operations. (JP 1-02) 

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are 

planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units 

or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and 

maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to 

achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02) 

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence 

to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in 

the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. See also 

force protection. (JP 1-02) 

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unconventional warfare. A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary 

operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or 

by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, 

supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, 

but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence 

activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02) 

war. Open and often prolonged conflict between nations (or organized groups 

within nations) to achieve national objectives. (AFDD 1) 

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