July 2004 Defense Horizons 1

Defense

Overview

For 150 years, military laboratories have made vital contributions to national defense. In recent years, they have been 

significantly reduced in number by several rounds of base realignment and closure (BRAC). Even so, they remain the primary 

source of internal technical competence within the Department 

of Defense (DOD). Their capability in that role will depend 

on how DOD answers two questions. Is there excess laboratory 

capacity—too many laboratories relative to forecasts of future 

force structure? What is their military value—their likely contribution to the future operational needs of warfighters. 

As required by law, DOD has publicly announced the criteria it will use in making BRAC 2005 decisions. None directly 

acknowledge the military value of research and development 

(R&D). Consequently, excess capacity and military value judgments about the labs will depend on metrics now being formulated and the subjective weights they are assigned in computations. This calculus will place greater weight on options that 

allow DOD to combine separate but similar functions, such as 

R&D, on single bases. This emphasis on jointness could lead to 

such recommendations as a single defense research laboratory or 

to approaches that would parse the current technical work of the 

labs into a number of bins and then assign responsibility for each 

to a single service. Experience suggests that reliance on overlysimplified “closure-by-arithmetic” decisions could lead to serious 

mistakes in deciding which laboratories to close and which to 

keep. America’s ability to wage high-tech warfare depends on 

avoiding such mistakes.

An Illustrious History

There is a great deal in the news today about the impending 

round of base closures by the Department of Defense (DOD). Most 

of the coverage focuses on large military bases and major industrial 

facilities, such as shipyards and aircraft repair depots, and the 

Defense Laboratories and 

Military Capability: Headed

for a BRACdown?

Michael L. Marshall

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

Number 44

HorizonsJ U L Y 2 0 0 4

economic impact of their closure on local and state economies. Lost 

in the debate is any meaningful discussion of what may become of 

military labs and test centers. These are the places that help develop 

and field weapons and other systems needed to ensure the continued 

superiority of our military forces. These labs and centers have a long 

and distinguished record of achievement. For example, their pioneering work in radar gave us that invaluable tool in time for widespread use in World War II. More recently, they invented and helped 

develop the Global Positioning System that enables the precision 

bombing so heavily relied on in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even today, 

their contributions are helping us win the global war on terrorism.

The utility of science and technology as a multiplier of military force was popularized by Thomas Edison as early as 1917, and 

demonstrated time and again during the Second World War, when 

academic and industrial laboratories across the country joined with 

those operated by the military to support what became the first 

truly technological conflict. The success of this partnership led to 

increasing reliance on federally-funded research and development 

(R&D) in the post-War period, and the strategy of technologicallybased deterrence continued to gain importance as the Soviet Union 

exploded its first fission device (1949) and hydrogen bomb (1953) 

and launched SPUTNIK (1957). Indeed, maintaining a technological 

edge over the Soviet Union became a Cold War imperative for the 

United States.

Historically, the Navy was the first service to understand the 

importance of science and technology in the conduct of war, a point 

made in a recent article by Jim Colvard, a prominent former Navy 

lab director.1

 More importantly, Colvard points out that the Navy was 

the first Service to recognize “...that the nature of scientists and ‘big 

science’ requires institutional environments to foster creativity and 

support formulation of ideas and discovery.” Accordingly, early on it 

began to create these environments by establishing a community of 

engineering centers, test stations, proving grounds, weapons labs, 

and similar facilities. In the ensuing years, the other services followed the Navy’s lead. 
2 Defense Horizons July 2004

Michael L. Marshall is an assistant to the Director of the Applied Research 

Laboratory at Pennsylvania State University. He is currently supporting the Office 

of Naval Research and the Naval Research Laboratory on an Intergovernmental 

Personnel Act assignment. He may be reached at (202) 767-2880.

How Much R & D is Enough?

There have been four previous BRAC rounds: 1988, 1991, 1993, 

and 1995. Collectively, they resulted in the elimination of nearly 100 

major bases, including numerous labs and test centers. Many other 

bases were realigned.2 Even so, the Department continues to argue 

that many more bases should be closed to eliminate what it calls 

“excess capacity” and free up billions of dollars for other uses, from 

new weapons systems to higher pay for the military. 

In an April 1998 report to Congress, the Department claimed 

that, despite the four previous rounds of BRAC, it still has nearly 25 

percent excess base capacity overall.3 The Department has relied 

heavily on this report to argue to Congress that it needs closure 

authority to eliminate this excess capacity and achieve other strategic and financial goals. Some Pentagon insiders have indicated this 

could mean the closure of at least 100 and perhaps as many as 150 

of the nation’s 425 bases.

The April 1998 BRAC report to Congress also contained 

detailed estimates of excess lab and test center capacity by service 

as follows: Army (39-62 percent), Navy (18 percent), and Air Force 

(24-38 percent). These estimates were recently updated in a second 

report required by Congress as part of the 2005 BRAC process.4

Utilizing the same methodology for computing excess capacity, this 

report contained the following estimates: Army (62 percent), Navy 

(18 percent), and Air Force (18 percent).

The April 1998 report has been reviewed by others, including 

the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).5

 Both pointed out shortcomings 

in the analysis underpinning DOD estimates of savings from prior 

BRAC rounds and remaining excess capacity. The GAO noted that 

the analysis provided only a “rough measure of excess capacity,” and 

did not report capacity “as a percentage of the total capacity by types 

of installations, such as the total capacity in all depots.” The CBO 

found the DOD approach to estimating excess capacity was reasonable and would, at least in the aggregate, yield a credible estimate 

but worried that “it may not provide good estimates for particular 

categories of installations.” 

The concept of excess capacity is easy to understand. Fewer 

aircraft need fewer runways and hangars. Fewer ships need fewer 

piers. The difficulty comes in quantifying just how many runways or 

piers may be needed in 20 years, the time frame of BRAC 2005.

For the estimates in the April 1998 report, DOD defined a metric or family of metrics for each base category. Each metric was a 

ratio that expressed an indicator of capacity (maneuver base acres, 

facility square feet, etc.) with a relevant measure of force structure 

(maneuver brigades, personnel spaces assigned, etc.) in 1989, the 

year selected as a baseline. For some installation categories, the 

use of multiple metrics led to differing estimates of excess capacity, 

hence the use of a range, as in the case of labs and test centers.

Next, the department estimated future capacity needs by 

multiplying the 1989 metric value by an estimate of force structure 

needed in 2003. In essence, the product is the amount of capacity 

required for the future force structure, keeping constant the ratio 

of capacity to force structure that existed in 1989. Subtracting this 

estimate of capacity requirements from the amount of capacity following the completion of all BRAC 1995 realignments and closures 

yielded an estimate of excess capacity. 

This approach seems reasonable if there is a linear relationship 

between force size and the infrastructure, such as piers and runways, needed to support it, and as long as estimates of future force 

structure needs are sound.

Estimating how many labs or test centers will be needed to support some level of future force structure is much more problematical. 

The DOD, in its report to Congress, used square feet as the metric by 

which to quantify the excess capacity of Army and Air Force labs and 

test centers, while the Navy used workload measured in work-years 

(one scientist or engineer working full-time on a project for one year 

equals one work-year).

A recent National Defense University publication discusses the 

dangers of using simple calculations in making decisions about the 

closure or realignment of military labs and test centers.6

 After pointing out that there is no direct relationship between force size and 

lab and test center infrastructure (buildings, roads, utilities, etc.), 

the author, who was a member of the Navy’s BRAC 1995 analytical 

team, goes on to discuss three further difficulties with “closure by 

arithmetic.”

First, it unrealistically treated scientists and engineers as 

interchangeable, conveyable, replicable items—such as hospital 

beds and hangar space—regardless of their position, education, 

and professional accomplishment. Literally unable to distinguish 

between a technician and a Nobel laureate, the computer model 

moved scientists and engineers from one laboratory to another, 

much the way guests are assigned to hotel rooms.

Second, the surrogate metric counted only in-house workyears, which means contractor work-years were excluded. This 

was not an oversight. Contractor numbers are notoriously hard to 

verify. With the high stakes of a BRAC, this raises the risk of fraud 

or, almost as bad, of rumors of fraud. Nevertheless, contractors 

perform about half of Navy research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), and a great many of them work at the laboratories 

and use their infrastructure. Therefore, the metric provided an 

incomplete picture and yielded inaccurate conclusions. Using the 

above hotel analogy, this is like counting only guests who occupy 

even-numbered rooms.

Third, laboratories considered for closure were chosen by 

coupling the surrogate metric with military value, a metric heavily 

weighted in favor of sites with test ranges. Test ranges are critical 

assets, some irreplaceable—but so are laboratories performing 

high levels of basic and applied research, the work that creates 

tomorrow’s warfighting capabilities, and the weights militated 

against them.

The author argued that these difficulties combined to yield 

what would have been a grave mistake: “The process led to considering closure of the Indian Head Laboratory, an East coast site, to move 

its workload to a West coast site with a test range. Since most scien-
July 2004 Defense Horizons 3

tists and engineers do not relocate with the work, closing it would 

have devastated a center of critical expertise. That would have cost 

lives. Only Indian Head had the ability to develop the thermobaric 

warhead, sparing U.S. troops the bloody prospect of tunnel-to-tunnel 

combat in Afghanistan.

What is the Future Worth of R&D Capability?

The concept of military value is critical in deciding which bases 

to close or realign. As in past rounds, BRAC 2005 will give priority 

consideration to keeping those bases considered to have the highest military value to the force of the future. Indeed, the legislation 

drawn up by Congress to authorize the next round mandates that 

military value will have primary consideration among the selection 

criteria.

As is the case with excess capacity, the concept of military 

value seems simple enough. In essence, it “represents the ability of 

the installation to contribute to DOD future mission capabilities and 

operational readiness,” according to Philip Grone, principal assistant 

deputy undersecretary of defense for installations and environment.7

The real question is how do you measure the future worth of labs and 

test centers? How many and what kinds will we need in 20 years? In 

this regard, it should be noted that our record of predicting technologies and their impact is dismal.

As required by law, the department has tried to define military value by drawing up a set of criteria for closing and realigning 

military bases within the continental United States. They contain a 

number of considerations that must be weighed. In December 2003, 

the department published these criteria in the Federal Register.

8 

Despite receiving more than 200 letters from Congress and community leaders during the public comment period, the department’s 

final criteria published in February were identical to the original.9

They are as follows:

■ current and future mission capabilities and the impact on 

operational readiness of the total military force, including joint 

warfighting, training, and readiness.

■ availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated 

airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, 

naval, or air forces throughout diverse climate, terrain, and staging 

areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) 

at existing and potential receiving locations.

■ ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future 

total force requirements at existing and potential receiving locations 

to support operations and training.

■ The cost of operations and the manpower implications

Many of those who offered comments on the criteria argued 

that such considerations are so broad they could justify any DOD 

decision on which bases to close. Senators Mike DeWine and George 

Voinovich of Ohio voiced concern that the criteria did not acknowledge the military value of such functions as R&D.10

 The DOD addressed these public comments in a February 12, 

2003, Federal Register announcement of the final criteria, including 

those directed at concerns about how labs and test center would 

be treated in military value rankings. Here, the department noted 

simply: 

DOD highly values its research, development, test and 

evaluation, engineering, procurement, and technical facilities. 

Research, development, engineering, procurement and other 

technical capabilities are elements of military value captured 

within criteria one through four. The Department will consider 

military value in a way that incorporates these elements.

In fact, the details of how DOD will rank labs and test centers in 

terms of military value are up to one of seven DOD joint cross-service 

groups or JCSGs composed of representatives from each service and 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Each group is assigned 

to study a functional area in which the services might jointly share 

work. These groups are intelligence, industrial, technical, medical, 

education, headquarters and support activities, and supply and storage.11 The technical JCSG is charged with developing a detailed 

set of metrics for ranking the military value of the labs and test 

centers.

In carrying out its work, the technical JCSG receives top-level 

guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the two groups he has 

established to oversee the BRAC process.12 The Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) will provide policy and oversight. Chaired by the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense, its membership includes the service 

secretaries and chiefs of staffs of each service, the chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, (USD (AT&L)). The Infrastructure 

Steering Group (ISG) will manage the efforts of the seven JCSGs. It 

is headed by the USD (AT&L), and includes the vice chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs, the assistant service secretaries for installations and 

environment, and others.

From various comments in the press, it is clear that Secretary 

Rumsfeld plans to run BRAC 2005 as a top-down process, unlike 

his predecessors who mostly accepted closure recommendations 

developed by the services and forwarded them to the BRAC Commission. Indeed, the Secretary plans to use this BRAC to accomplish 

one of his top goals: transforming the way the DOD fights wars, buys 

weapons, and manages its personnel. Simply put, his plan is to use 

this round of BRAC to totally overhaul how the department bases 

and houses military forces. The idea is to create joint bases that will 

allow the services to combine separate but similar functions—precisely the kinds being studied by the seven JCSGs. The emphasis on 

this approach was recently underscored by Philip Grone, who noted 

that “enormously significant emphasis” will be placed on jointness in 

developing closure and realignment recommendations. Interestingly, 

Grone downplayed the importance of excess capacity as a driver 

for BRAC 2005 recommendations, commenting, “We are not talking 

about a capacity-reduction exercise—that’s how we implemented 

BRAC in the past.” 13
4 Defense Horizons July 2004

Effect on Labs and Test Centers

From the foregoing, several points emerge. First, excess capacity within the laboratory and test center infrastructure will be a consideration, but not the significant driver of closure decisions it was in 

the previous four BRAC rounds. To the contrary, in this round a base 

with large excess capacity may be at an advantage inasmuch as it 

could facilitate consolidation of joint functions at that site. Second, 

the definition of military value, focused as it is on mission capability and operational readiness of the forces, is hard to apply to labs 

and centers. Moreover, the recently published criteria seem of little 

help in assigning an objectively-based military value to labs and test 

centers. The real decision on military value will flow from the metrics being devised by the technical JCSG and the weights they will 

be accorded in the BRAC analysis process. Third, the real emphasis 

in BRAC 2005 will be on achieving closures and realignments that 

will support the Secretary’s goal of military transformation through 

creation of joint bases and functions, including such technical functions as RDT&E.

The notion of jointness as applied to military RDT&E is not 

new. For example, as a result of the Defense Management Review 

undertaken in February 1989 at the direction of the President, the 

DOD comptroller issued several budget decisions aimed at savings in 

the 1990 and later budgets. In October 1989, Defense Management 

Review Decision 922 proposed a significant savings in the budget 

over the years 1991-1995 by consolidating the service labs and test 

centers to reduce overhead, streamline operations, and centralize 

professional staff associated with specific technology areas.14

Because of the enormity of the issues implicated in the comptroller recommendation of a consolidated RDT&E infrastructure, 

then Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald J. Atwood held off implementing the comptroller-recommended actions until they could be 

studied in detail. Teams were established to carry out the studies 

and report back with an implementation plan by May 1, 1990. They 

were directed to focus on inter-service consolidations rather than 

the intra-service consolidation already underway. 

Although the recommendation eventually was withdrawn, it 

served to generate significant discussion on ways to strengthen 

inter-service cooperation in the DOD science and technology planning process. One of the approaches considered, called Project Reliance, examined opportunities to consolidate and collocate service 

efforts at single-site locations in selected technology areas. It also 

led to the joint planning process in use today in DOD science and 

technology programs.

Another effort to foster jointness in the RDT&E infrastructure 

was based on presidential direction and a provision in the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996. The goal was the 

development of a plan for DOD laboratories and test centers for the 

21st century. This plan, called Vision 21, was developed but never 

implemented, as it was subsumed into the Department’s failed effort 

to win congressional approval for a much broader BRAC round. 15

The only serious BRAC effort to develop joint, cross-service 

plans for the labs and test centers occurred as part of the 1995 

round. This effort was chaired by Dr. Anita Jones, then Director, 

Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). It produced a number 

of so-called laboratory alternatives for the services to consider for 

inclusion in their individual BRAC 1995 efforts.16 In the end, the 

services resisted incorporation of these joint, cross-service plans in 

their recommendations, with the result that only intra-service consolidations of the labs and test centers emerged from BRAC 95.

Given the overwhelming emphasis on jointness in BRAC 2005, 

and the fact that the crucial metrics that will determine the ranking 

of military value for the labs and test centers are being devised by 

a JCSG focused on RDT&E as a common support function, crossservice consolidation options are all but certain to predominate. But 

what might they be?

Some idea of the range of options that could be considered may 

be found in study recommendations and other pronouncements by 

past and current BRAC players. Consider, for example, the recommendations of a 2001 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study 

on Defense science and technology.17 The DSB is a federal advisory 

panel whose members, drawn from the private sector, are selected 

by the USD(AT&L). Their job is to provide high-level scientific and 

technical advice to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior members of the Department. 

The 2001 DSB study was co-chaired by Dr. Anita Jones, who 

oversaw the BRAC 1995 laboratory JCSG effort. It makes several 

recommendations with regard to the DOD labs and test centers 

including the following:

■ Administratively transfer personnel not involved in science 

and technology to acquisition organizations

■ Move to university management those [labs] doing significant in-house research or technology development

■ Privatize, consolidate, or close the others.

These recommendations could be carried out in any number 

of ways, such as by privatizing the services’ corporate research labs 

or putting major universities in charge of their management. The 

Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories, for 

example, are managed for the Department of Energy by the University of California.

Another idea has been advanced by Michael Wynne, who has 

been nominated to the position of USD (AT&L).18 While his Senate confirmation is pending, Mr. Wynne is acting in that position, 

which makes him a member of the Secretary’s BRAC IEC as well as 

the chairman of the ISG. In an October 29, 2002, memorandum, Mr. 

Wynne recommended a commission to:

■ Identify those labs that are imperative for defense to retain

■ Propose the organization of a defense research lab (DRL) 

combining the remnants of the service laboratories

■ Recommend, for those lab functions not deemed critical, 

appropriate academic or commercial outsourcing candidates.

The notion of depending on the private sector to perform more 

DOD RDT&E has gained acceptance in recent years. For example, 

Raymond DuBois, who as Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for 

Installations and Environment is the DOD point man for BRAC, says 

that the technical experts have not reviewed how the services manage their various research efforts and how that work could be com-
July 2004 Defense Horizons 5

bined across the services or with non-military research organizations 

and industry efforts. “We have arguably the greatest research institutions in the world in this country—the universities, the corporations 

and think tanks,” DuBois says. “To what extent does the military truly 

take advantage of that?” 19

While it is true that much of the nation’s R&D is performed 

in the private sector, a substantial portion is federally funded, 

especially in basic research. The President’s Council of Advisors on 

Science and Technology made this point in a recent report: “While 

strong support of R&D by private industry is to be commended, this 

source of funding cycles with business patterns and focuses on short 

term results by emphasizing development of existing technology 

rather than establishing new frontiers.”20 That patterns of R&D 

spending do indeed cycle with economic conditions is confirmed 

by a January 2004 study of R&D funding by Battelle, which found 

that industrial R&D spending (in constant 1996 U.S. dollars) has 

declined for three years (2001-2003).21

Each service has a corporate research laboratory that focuses 

primarily on science and technology. These include the Army 

Research Laboratory, headquartered in Adelphi, Maryland; the 

Naval Research Laboratory, headquartered in Washington, D.C.; and 

the Air Force Research Laboratory, headquartered in Dayton, Ohio. 

The Wynne suggestion would seem to encourage the idea of a single 

research lab, belonging to OSD. Presumably, the DRL could be operated within the current government-owned-government-operated 

framework or be converted to some alternative form of governance, 

such as a government-owned-contractor-operated entity, a federallyfunded R&D center, or some form of government-owned corporation. 

A number of these alternative governance models are discussed in 

detail in a recent paper by the National Defense University’s Center 

for Technology and National Security Policy, which recommends a 

government-owned corporation model based on a public university 

analogy.22 Creation of such a model would, however, require congressional action.

A more recent study also recommends, as one option, the creation of a DRL.23 Chartered by the Secretary of Defense in March 

2003, this effort—formally named the Joint Defense Capabilities 

Study—examined how the DOD could be reorganized to enable 

it to field a more effective, joint force. The study, chaired by Pete 

Aldridge, former USD(AT&L), offers a range of alternative management structures for more effective and efficient end-to-end planning 

and execution of the Department’s RDT&E investment. Alternatives 

discussed include a coordinated investment approach, centralized 

funding and centers of excellence, and a central DOD lab system 

(DRL).

The BRAC 2005 technical JCSG could also opt for a Project 

Reliance approach in its lab and test center closure and consolidation recommendations. Simply put, it could recommend parsing the 

technical work currently done by the service labs and centers into a 

number of bins and then assigning responsibility for each execution 

to a service. For purposes of illustration, the group could recommend 

collocating all DOD in-house nanoscience work at the Army Research 

Lab, materials research at the Air Force Research Lab, and so on. 

Such an approach overlooks numerous difficulties, including the fact 

that not all technical work fits neatly into such bins. Moreover, many 

of the scientific breakthroughs today come from interdisciplinary 

and multidisciplinary research—nanoscience being a good example. 

Research benefits from the collocation of multiple disciplines at the 

same geographic location. A Project Reliance approach could undercut work in frontier areas of cross-disciplinary research. 

A further problem with the Project Reliance approach is that 

it assumes you can move highly educated scientists and engineers 

around like so many pieces on a chess board. As noted in the discussion of “closure by arithmetic,” it is unrealistic to treat them this way, 

regardless of their position, education, and professional accomplishment. Indeed, although the data vary from place to place, it appears 

that only about 25 percent of scientists and engineers relocated 

after the last BRAC round, and many of those who did relocate subsequently left the government.24 This roughly parallels experience 

in the private sector, where more than 35 percent of employees who 

were relocated left the company within three years. These losses 

could be further exacerbated by the fact that a significant portion 

of the DOD scientific and engineering workforce is at or nearing 

retirement age. An even higher percentage of them may retire rather 

than relocate as part of a BRAC 2005 realignment action. Given 

current national trends, there may not be enough new graduates to 

replace them, because few young Americans are pursuing science 

and engineering degrees today, and United States citizenship is a 

prerequisite for employment for nearly all technical positions in the 

military labs and test centers. Unlike the case with industry, the 

extent to which DOD can turn to an off-shore solution to satisfy its 

future technical needs is unclear.

Conclusion

Since the end of World War II, the military labs and test centers have been important to the internal technical competence of 

the DOD. Historically, they provided this competence by performing three roles: performer of long-term, high-risk projects, quick 

responder in times of crisis, and yardstick for external work.

As DOD moves to further outsource its technical work, this 

need for a yardstick to assess whether that work is technically competent will be even more important. Ironically, increased outsourcing will make it more difficult for the military labs and test centers 

to perform their yardstick role, because to do so they must first be 

knowledgeable performers of hands-on technical work themselves. 

Therefore, the question of how to retain internal technical competence should be of serious concern to BRAC decisionmakers.

Since the end of the Cold War, the military labs and test centers 

have undergone nearly 15 years of personnel and infrastructure cuts 

as DOD management focus shifted from strengthening them to making them less expensive to operate. In the years since BRAC 1995, 

most management cost-cutting at the labs and centers have focused 

on actions that could be implemented without congressional authority, mostly personnel reductions. Some of these labs and centers have 

seen overall civilian staff reductions of 40 percent or more since the 

end of the Cold War, and further reductions are budgeted.

In examining the April 1998 BRAC report to Congress, the GAO 

found that personnel reductions accounted for more than 80 percent 

of BRAC savings. With the Pentagon claiming it will achieve savings 

from BRAC 2005 as great as in all four previous rounds combined, the 
6 Defense Horizons July 2004

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. CTNSP 

publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other 

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

 Hans Binnendijk

Director

burden of cuts will fall heavily on civilian personnel at the labs and 

test centers once again.

With industry cutting back on R&D investment, especially in 

basic research and areas with little or no commercial payoff, can the 

private sector be depended upon to fund and perform the technical 

work needed to transform warfighting capability away from Cold 

War legacy systems and toward the high-tech solutions needed to 

combat terrorism? This is a debate that deserves a long and thoughtful discussion, but time is running out . In a matter of months, the 

Department will begin to refine its plans for the remaining military 

labs, and the die will be cast.

Notes1James E. Colvard, “Closing the Sailor,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 

2002.

 2 These actions are detailed in Appendix G of the report: “Vision 21: The Plan 

for 21st Century Laboratories and Test and Evaluation Centers of the Department of 

Defense: Report to the President and Congress.” Accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/labman/vision21/appg.html.

 3 “The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure,” 

April 1998. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/docs/98dodbrac.pdf.

4 “Report Required by Section 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2003,” March 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/brac/docs/04_

0_body032403.pdf.

5 “Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and Closure,” GAO/NSIAD-00-17, November 1998; “Review of The Report of the Department of 

Defense on Base Realignment and Closure,” Congressional Budget Office, July 1998.

6 Don J. DeYoung, “The Silence of the Labs,” Defense Horizons 21,(Washington, 

DC: National Defense University Press, January 2003). Accessed at http://www.ndu.

edu/inss/press/nduphp.html 

7 “BRAC Criteria Focus on “Military Value,” American Forces Information Service News Articles, February 28, 2004. Accessed at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/

Feb2004/n02282004_200402281.html.

 8 Federal Register, Vol. 68, No. 246, December 23, 2003.

 9 Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 29, February 12, 2004.

10 “Senators ask Pentagon to use criteria in deciding bases’ fate,” Associated 

Press, Wednesday, January 28, 2004.

11 George Cahlink, “Pentagon sees base closings as critical to larger strategy,” 

GovExec.com, January 30, 2004. Accessed at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0104/

013004g1.htm.

 12 Statement of H.T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations 

and Environment before the Subcommittee on Military Construction of the House 

Appropriations Committee on BRAC 2005 Selection Process, February 12, 2004. 

Accessed at http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/testimony/facilities/johnson040212.

txt.

13 George Cahlink, “Pentagon sees base closings as critical to larger strategy,” 

GovExec.com, January 30, 2004. Accessed at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0104/

013004g1.htm.

 14 Rodney P. Carlisle, “Navy RDT&E Planning in an Age of Transition: A Survey 

Guide to Contemporary Literature,” Navy Laboratory/Center Coordinating Group, 

Naval Historical Center, 1997.

15 “Vision 21, The Plan for 21st Century Laboratories and Test and Evaluation Centers of the Department of Defense: Report to the President and Congress.” 

Accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/labman/vision21/index.html.

 16 See, for example, Director, Defense Research and Engineering Memorandum 

of November 29, 1994. Subject: Additional BRAC 95 Laboratory Alternatives for Military Department Consideration (#4). Accessed at http://www.dtic.mil/labman/projects/brac/appendixg.html.

17 The Defense Science Board 2001 Summer Study on Defense Science and 

Technology (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 2002). Accessed at http://

www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/sandt.pdf.

18 Rowan Scarborough, “Lab-closings defense memo seen as breaking Bush 

pact,” The Washington Times, November 15, 2002, A3.

 19 George Cahlink, “Erasing Bases,” GovExec.com, October 17, 2003. Accessed 

at http://www.govexec.com/features/1003/1003s2.htm.

 20 Letter of October 16, 2002 from G. Wayne Clough, Chair, PCAST Panel on Federal Investment in Science and Technology and Its National Benefits to the Honorable 

John M. Marburger III and Mr. E. Floyd Kvamme, transmitting the panel’s final report: 

“Assessing the U.S. R&D Investment: Findings and Proposed Actions.” Accessed at 

http://www.ostp.gov/PCAST/FINAL%20R&D%20REPORT%20WITH%20LETTERS.pdf.

21 “R&D Funding Forecast: Upturns and Defense Drive R&D in 2004,” editorial, 

R&D Magazine, January 2004. 

22 Timothy Coffey, Kenneth W. Lackie, and Michael L. Marshall, “Alternative 

Governance: A Tool for Military Laboratory Reform,” Defense Horizons 34 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, November 2003). Accessed at http://www.

ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html

23 “Joint Defense Capabilities Study, Final Report,” December 2003. Accessed at 

http://www.paxriver.org/files/JointDefCapabilitiesStudy.pdf.

24 Michael L. Marshall and J. Eric Hazell, “Private Sector Downsizing: Implications for DOD,” Acquisition Review Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 2, spring 2000.

25 “A Study in Employee Turnover Rates,” Mobility magazine, March 1998, cited 

in Relocation Trends 2001. Accessed at http://www.rriworld.com/myrriworld/whitepapers/pdfs/Trends2001.pdf.