J-A20013-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: W.U., JR., A 

MINOR 

APPEAL OF: S.U., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 934 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Order Entered March 8, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000186-2022 

IN THE INTEREST OF: W.U.,JR., A 

MINOR 

APPEAL OF: S.U., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 935 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 8, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000381-2023 

IN THE INTEREST OF: V.U., A 

MINOR 

APPEAL OF: S.U., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 936 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Order Entered March 8, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000187-2022 

IN THE INTEREST OF: V.U., A 

MINOR 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 
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APPEAL OF: S.U., MOTHER :

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: No. 937 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 8, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000382-2023 

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.U., A 

MINOR 

APPEAL OF: S.U., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 938 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Order Entered March 8, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000188-2022 

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.U. A 

MINOR, 

APPEAL OF: S.U., MOTHER 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 939 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 8, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000383-2023 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and LANE, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 27, 2024

S.U. (Mother) appeals from the orders and decrees, entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, changing the permanency goal from 
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reunification to adoption and involuntarily terminating her rights to her three 

minor children, W.U., Jr. (born 4/11), V.U. (born 7/13), and B.U. (born 10/16) 

(collectively, Children).1 After careful consideration, we affirm. 

 In February 2022, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

(DHS) received a general protective services (GPS) report that Mother had 

been abusing illegal substances and was homeless. The report was deemed 

valid. DHS learned that Children were residing with Mother in Maternal 

Grandmother’s home. Mother admitted that she had recently been evicted 

from her home and that she was actively using methamphetamines. Maternal 

Grandfather2 agreed to sign a safety plan and have Children and Mother move 

into his home. DHS provided in-home services for the family that were 

implemented through the Community Umbrella Agency (CUA). In lateFebruary, Mother informed DHS that she had admitted herself into an inpatient 

drug and alcohol treatment program. However, only two weeks into 

treatment, Mother signed herself out of the inpatient facility, threatening to 

violate CUA’s safety plan and remove Children from Grandfather’s home. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 On April 10, 2024, our Court sua sponte consolidated Children’s separate 

appeals at Nos. 934-939 EDA 2024, as they involve related parties and issues. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 513. 

2

 Maternal Grandmother told a DHS social worker that she was sick with Stage 

4 cancer and could not care for Children. See N.T. Goal Change/Termination 

Hearing, 3/8/24, at 22. At that point, the social worker called Maternal 

Grandfather, who agreed to have Mother and Children move in with him. Id.

at 22-23. 
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On March 1, 2022, DHS obtained an order of protective custody (OPC) for 

Children; Children remained in Grandfather’s care.3 On March 4, 2022, a 

shelter care hearing was held, after which the court lifted the OPC order and 

prohibited Mother from contacting and visiting Children. The court held a 

permanency hearing on March 23, 2022, and ordered supervised, weekly 

visitation between Mother and W.U., Jr., at DHS. 

On April 11, 2022, the following single case plan was developed for 

Mother: (1) comply with CUA case management4 and court-ordered services; 

(2) sign all consent and release forms; (3) obtain suitable housing; (4) 

address her substance abuse issues; (5) participate in a Clinical Evaluation 

Unit (CEU) assessment and submit to court-ordered urine drug screens; (6) 

submit to three court-ordered random urine drug screens; (7) attend a 

Behavioral Health Forensic Evaluation Center consultation and evaluation; (8) 

address visitation; and (9) attend supervised visits at DHS within line of sight 

and line of hearing. 

 Children were adjudicated dependent on April 18, 2022. Legal custody 

of Children was transferred to the DHS. Children were placed in kinship care 

with Grandfather. In June of 2022, Children were moved to the kinship care 

home of Paternal Aunt (Aunt) and Paternal Uncle. Children were referred for 

____________________________________________ 

3

 W.U., Jr., and V.U. were also found to have severe truancy issues at the 

time of DHS’ investigation. 

4

 CUA’s case plan objectives for Mother included obtaining household 

management skills, getting suitable housing, addressing mental health issues, 

and managing substance abuse issues. See N.T. Goal Change/Termination 

Hearing, 3/8/24, at 29-30. 
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trauma-focused therapy, provided by clinicians at Children’s Crisis Treatment 

Center (CCTC), to address their exposure to Mother’s mental health issues, 

which included hallucinations, delusions, mania, and depression. See N.T. 

Goal Change/Termination Hearing, 1/18/24, at 64; CCTC Treatment Letter, 

10/2/23, at 1-2. In particular, V.U.’s therapist noted that V.U. suffered from 

inconsolable crying, had sleep issues, worried, had fears and intrusive 

thoughts, and was generally sad. Id. at 88. Since receiving therapy, V.U.’s 

therapist said that her sleep issues have improved, but that she still exhibits 

“a lot of sadness.” Id. at 89. 

B.U.’s therapist, Amatullah Abu Bakr, testified she had only been 

working with B.U. for a little less than one month at the time of the termination 

hearing; B.U.’s prior therapist, Emma Lewi, left the agency in November 2023. 

Id. at 105. Abu Bakr testified that B.U. suffered from PTSD, that he currently 

seems to be “in a safe and secure placement,” and was not currently exhibiting 

any symptoms. Id. at 106-08. 

Children’s therapists collectively recommended that Children continue 

to participate in weekly, in-person trauma-focused therapy, id. at 68, live with 

a caregiver who can provide them a stable and safe environment, id. at 69, 

and pause visitation with Mother due to Mother having missed visitation for 

an extended period of time. Id. at 71. W.U.’s therapist testified that pausing 

visitation would “support the [C]hildren with their treatment by reducing 

opportunities for being triggered, or trauma reminders, as well as allowing 

[Mother] more time to focus on her treatment needs and stability before 
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engaging in caregiving work” in order to achieve reunification. Id. In fact, 

CUA case manager Spencer Vaye testified that at visits Mother had told 

Children that she was “going to take them home . . . and [they would] come 

live with [her].” Id., 3/8/24, at 35. Mother missed nine visits with Children, 

id. at 37, and was late for seven visits. Id. 

 At a September 2023 inter-agency remote meeting, the CCTC therapists 

did not deem caregiver sessions for Mother clinically appropriate, even though 

Mother had reached out to begin caregiver sessions, because it had been 

reported that Mother had missed 11 to 12 supervised visits between June and 

August of 2023 for an at-the-time unknown reason. Id., 1/18/24, at 79-80. 

However, CCTC clinician Cheyenne DuFall testified that during the Zoom 

meeting in September, she learned that Mother had missed the visits because 

she was in an inpatient treatment program. Id. at 80-81. Despite Mother 

having reached out to commence the sessions, DuFall testified that without 

proof that Mother had successfully completed a drug and alcohol program, 

CCTC would not have recommended she begin caregiver sessions. Id. at 82-

83. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother’s supervised visits with 

Children had resumed and were occurring once a week for two hours at the 

agency. Id. at 112. See also id. at 113 (DHS attorney stating agency not 

asking to change Mother’s scheduled visitation). 

 In April and October of 2022, Mother’s urine sample, collected and 

tested thought the Substance Analysis Unit/CEU, came back positive for 

amphetamines. See N.T. Goal Change/Termination Hearing, 1/18/24, at 34, 
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37. In April 2023, Mother gave birth to a child; both Mother and the infant 

tested positive for benzodiazepines and amphetamines. Id. at 44. Mother 

admitted to a DHS intake social worker that she had been taking 

amphetamines and benzodiazepines throughout that pregnancy. Id. at 45. 

 On January 18, 2024, the court held a goal change and contested 

termination hearing where CEU/Substance Analysis Unit Clerk Scott Signell, 

DHS Social Worker Nadine Fulton, CCTC Trauma Clinicians Diamond Harper 

(for V.U.), DuFall (for W.U.) and Amatullah Abu Bakr (for B.U.), and CUA case 

manager Vaye testified. Vaye testified that Children are doing very well and 

thriving in their placement with their kinship caregiver, paternal aunt and 

uncle. Id. at 56. Moreover, V.U.’s therapist testified that Aunt participates in 

V.U.’s therapy, providing V.U. support and acting as the “anchor for [V.U.] in 

those moments” where V.U. has a “lot of confusion and sadness around 

inconsistency in the past with [Mother’s] visits as well as [her] worries for the 

future.” Id. at 92. See also id. at 100 (V.U.’s therapist testifying V.U. 

exhibited “deregulation” around Mother’s missed visits resulting in trauma 

symptoms increasing). V.U.’s therapist testified that over the past year of 

therapy, V.U. “is a completely different kid” socially, now participating in 

school plays, going on sleepovers, making friends, expressing feelings, and 

becoming involved in sports. Id. at 96. 

On March 8, 2024, W.U. testified that he would like to be adopted by 

Aunt, who has provided him stability and nurtured him, and that while he 

would feel sad if he did not see Mother anymore, he “would be fine with it.” 
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N.T. Goal Change/Termination Hearing,5 3/8/24, at 8-13.6 An October 2023 

CCTC letter, prepared by CCTC trauma therapists, noted that after 23 trauma 

therapy sessions, “[a]s visitation with [Mother] has been reintroduced, 

[W.U.’s] trauma-related symptoms have increased, . . . including [W.U.] 

engaging in physical aggression with peers and having increased difficulty 

concentrating.” CCTC Treatment Letter, 10/2/23, at 3. 

At that same proceeding, V.U. testified that her visits with Mother are 

“good,” that he likes visiting with Mother, and that if he could be reunified 

with Mother, he would like to live with Mother over Aunt. N.T. Goal 

Change/Termination Hearing, 3/8/24, at 20. V.U. also testified that she 

understands what adoption means and that while Aunt provides for her 

security and she is happy living with Aunt, she would be “sad” if she were not 

able to see Mother. Id. at 23. Finally, V.U. testified that she gets worried 

and upset when Mother does not show up to visits, id. at 25, that she would 

be happy to stay with Aunt if she could not be reunited with Mother, but that 

even if W.U. and B.U. continued to live with Aunt, she would still want to live 

____________________________________________ 

5

 Children were represented by both a guardian ad litem and separate counsel 

at the goal change/termination hearings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a); see 

also In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) (where court finds 

guardian ad litem cannot adequately represent legal interests of child, counsel 

must be appointed).

6

 W.U. also testified that if he had the option of living with his aunt and uncle, 

but continue to see Mother, that would be preferred over adoption. See id.

at 13-14. However, later, when the court further explained to W.U. what 

adoption meant, he testified that he would still want to be adopted. Id. at 

15-16. 
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with Mother if possible. Id. at 27. See also CCTC Treatment Letter, 10/2/23, 

at 4 (V.U. began experiencing sadness and sleep issues when visits with 

Mother resumed). 

Finally, B.U. testified that she likes living with Aunt, that her visits with 

Mother are “good,” that she would like to spend more time with Mother, and 

that she would like to go back with Mother rather than be adopted. N.T. Goal 

Change/Termination Hearing, 3/8/24, at 28-30. However, B.U. also testified 

that if it were not possible to be reunited with Mother, she would feel “good” 

about living with Aunt. Id. at 30. CCTC therapists noted that even after 24 

trauma-therapy sessions, B.U. experiences an increase in bedwetting 

incidents and nightmares before and after his expected visits with Mother. 

See CCTC Treatment Letter, 10/2/23, at 5-6. 

At the conclusion of the termination proceedings, counsel for Children 

asked the court to deny the petitions as to B.U. and V.U., but grant the petition 

as it related to W.U. See N.T. Goal Change/Termination Hearing, 3/8/24, at 

130. Counsel stated that the two younger children “clearly stated that they 

would like the opportunity to go back with [M]other if the circumstances did, 

in fact, change [and] that that is a clear sign that these [two] children . . . do 

not want to be adopted.” Id. at 132. DHS’s attorney, on the other hand, 

argued that it would be in Children’s best interest to have the goal changed 

to adoption and Mother’s rights terminated where CUA case manager Vaye 

testified that Children would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were 

terminated and where Children are thriving in their current kinship placement, 
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a pre-adoptive home that has provided Children stability and fulfilled their 

emotional, developmental, and behavioral needs. Id. at 127-28. 

On March 8, 2024, the court changed the permanency goal to adoption 

and involuntarily terminated Mother’s rights to Children pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act.7 Mother filed 

a timely notice of appeal and contemporaneous Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). 

On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our consideration: 

Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion 

by involuntarily terminating [Children’s] parental rights under 23 

Pa.[]C.S.[A.] § 2511(b), where [DHS] failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that involuntarily terminating [Children’s] 

parental rights would best serve the emotional needs and welfare 

of the Children? 

Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion 

by changing the Children’s permanency goal from reunification to 

adoption where [DHS] failed to provide sufficient evidence that 

such a goal change would be best suited for the [C]hildren’s needs 

and welfare[?] 

Mother’s Brief, at 4. 

In a proceeding to terminate parental rights involuntarily, the 

burden of proof is on the party seeking termination to establish 

by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for 

doing so. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined 

as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty[,] and convincing as 

to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” It is well 

established that a court must examine the individual 

circumstances of each and every case and consider all 

explanations offered by the parent to determine if the evidence in 

light of the totality of the circumstances clearly warrants 

termination. 

____________________________________________ 

7

 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. 
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In re Adoption of S.M., 816 A.2d 1117, 1122 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). We review a trial court’s decision to 

involuntarily terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion or error of 

law. In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 563 (Pa. Super. 2003). Our scope of review 

is limited to determining whether the trial court’s order is supported by 

competent evidence. Id. 

Mother contends that the trial court improperly terminated her parental 

rights to Children, under subsection 2511(b), where DHS did not present clear 

and convincing evidence that termination would best serve Children’s needs 

and welfare. Specifically, Mother asserts that termination was improper where 

she and Children shared a healthy bond that served as a “protective factor in 

their emotional wellbeing[,]” Mother’s Brief at 18, severing that bond would 

be detrimental to Children, V.U. and B.U. clearly expressed their desire to 

return to Mother, and W.U. expressed a desire to maintain ongoing contact 

with Mother. 

 Recently, in In the Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023), our 

Supreme Court clarified the standard that courts should employ when 

examining the parent-child bond under subsection 2511(b), stating: 

Notably, courts should consider the matter from the child’s 

perspective, placing her developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare above concerns for the parent. See [In re 

Adoption of] C.M., 255 A.3d [343,] 358 [(Pa. 2021)] (“A parent’s 

right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control 

of his or her children is among the oldest of fundamental rights. 

[However, t]he time-tested law of the Commonwealth requires 

that we balance this intrinsic parental interest within the context 

of a child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and 

support.”); In re H.S.W.C.-B, [] 836 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa. 2003) 
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(In termination proceedings and appeals, “the best interest of the 

children is always paramount[.]”). Cf. In re R.I.S., [] 36 A.3d 

567, 579 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion) (Baer, J., concurring) (“It 

is incumbent upon the judicial system to be child-focused. 

Regardless of the heartbreak to a parent, children are entitled to 

every opportunity for a successful life, and a permanent, loving 

parental relationship greatly fosters that opportunity.”). 

Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must 

be made on a case-by-case basis. See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 

265 A.3d 580, 593 (Pa. 2021). We have observed “the law 

regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied 

mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests 

and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.” In 

re T.S.M., 71 A.3d [251,] 268-69 [(Pa. 2013)]. Thus, the court 

must determine each child’s specific needs. See, e.g., In re 

Adoption of S.P., [] 47 A.3d 817, 831 (Pa. 2012) (affirming trial 

court’s conclusion termination “best serve[d]” child’s needs and 

welfare where father would likely not be able to provide for her, 

especially considering her special needs and developmental 

delays, child did not have a relationship with father, and child had 

strong bond with half-sister placed in same foster family). 

Moreover, the child’s “emotional needs” and “welfare” include 

“intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. As further guidance, we have identified 

factors, i.e., specific needs and aspects of the child’s welfare, that 

trial courts must always consider. The court must consider 

“whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether 

they have a bond with their foster parents.” Id. at 268; see e.g., 

In re D.C.D., [] 105 A.3d 662, 677 (Pa. 2014) (trial court properly 

considered child’s “strong bond with her foster family with whom 

she has lived nearly all her life and who has indicated a desire to 

adopt her” pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b)). And, if the child has 

any bond with the biological parent, the court must conduct an 

analysis of that bond, which “is not always an easy task.” T.S.M., 

71 A.3d at 267. 

* * * 

Accordingly, notwithstanding T.S.M.’s language directing “utmost 

attention” to the parental bond, a fuller review of relevant case 

law indicates that bond, plus permanency, stability[,] and all 

“intangible” factors may contribute equally to the 

determination of a child’s specific developmental, physical, 
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and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of 

“primary” importance in the [s]ection 2511(b) analysis. 

Judge Bowes, writing for the panel in [In re] N.A.M., observed 

that, although the parental bond is a “major aspect” of the 

[s]ection 2511(b) analysis, “it is nonetheless only one of many 

factors to be considered by the court,” in addition to the 

intangibles “such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” 33 

A.3d [95,] 103 [(Pa. Super. 2011)]. Moreover, the court must 

consider whether, in the context of all these factors, the parental 

bond is “necessary and beneficial” to the child. See id. (courts 

“must examine the status of the bond to determine whether its 

termination would destroy existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship”) (quotation marks omitted). See also Int. of M.E., 

[] 283 A.3d 820, 836-37 (Pa. Super. 2022) ([t]o [] extent [] bond 

[exists], [] trial court must examine whether termination of 

parental rights will destroy [] “necessary and beneficial 

relationship[.]”); J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944 (“When examining the 

effect upon a child of severing a bond, courts must examine 

whether termination of parental rights will destroy a ‘necessary 

and beneficial relationship’”); P.A.B., 570 A.2d at 525-26 (courts 

must consider [] parental bond and determine “whether 

terminating the natural parents’ rights would destroy something 

in existence that is necessary and beneficial”). It is only a 

necessary and beneficial bond, after all, that should be maintained 

when [s]ection 2511(b) mandates the child’s needs and welfare 

are of “primary” importance. As the statute directs, courts must 

evaluate whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. This 

evaluation involves considering the effect of severing a child’s 

bond with her parent. T.S.M., 71 A.3d 267, 269. Severance of a 

“necessary and beneficial” bond would predictably cause more 

than the “adverse” impact that, unfortunately, may occur 

whenever a bond is present. By contrast, severance of a 

necessary and beneficial relationship is the kind of loss that would 

predictably cause "extreme emotional consequences" or 

significant, irreparable harm. See E.M., 620 A.2d at 484 (“a 

beneficial bonding could exist between a parent and child, such 

that, if the bond were broken, the child could suffer extreme 

emotional consequences”); see also, e.g., M.E., 283 A.3d at 837 

(“To the extent there is a bond, the trial court must examine 

whether termination of parental rights will destroy a ‘necessary 

and beneficial relationship,’ thereby causing a child to suffer 

‘extreme emotional consequences.’”); J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944 

(“When examining the effect upon a child of severing a bond, 

courts must examine whether termination of parental rights will 
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destroy a necessary and beneficial relationship, thereby causing a 

child to suffer extreme emotional consequences[.]”). Moreover, 

by evaluating the impact of severance to determine if it will 

impose more than an adverse or detrimental impact, courts 

correctly refine their focus on the child’s development and mental 

and emotional health rather than considering only the child’s 

“feelings” or “affection” for the parent, which even badly abused 

and neglected children will retain. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267, 

quoting K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 535 (“[e]ven the most abused of 

children will often harbor some positive emotion towards the 

abusive parent”) (alteration in original); see also K.T., 2022 Pa. 

Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1272, 2022 WL 1793083, at *7 (Murray, J., 

dissenting), quoting K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 535. 

We are painfully aware of the heavy and irrevocable consequences 

of termination; we have described it as a “death penalty” in the 

dependency context. C.M., 255 A.3d at 362. Although it is always 

a difficult and fraught process, we have nevertheless concluded 

that, under certain circumstances, termination of parental rights 

is intended “to prevent children from growing up in an indefinite 

state of limbo, without parents capable of caring for them, and at 

the same time unavailable for adoption by loving and willing foster 

families[.]” In re H.S.W.C.-B, [] 836 A.2d 908, 910-11 (Pa. 

2003). It is for this reason courts must not only consider the 

child’s bond with the biological parent, but also “examine the 

intangibles such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the 

child might have with the foster parent.” In re K.Z.S., [] 946 

A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (emphasis added); see also 

N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103 (same); A.S., 11 A.3d at 483 (same). It 

is why federal law sets a twenty-two-month permanency timeline 

and requires concurrent planning so that agencies can prepare to 

quickly place the child in an alternative, permanent home if 

reunification efforts fail. See supra [at] n[.]19-20; 42 U.S.C. 

§671(a)(15)(F) (concurrent planning provision); id.

§675(5)(E)(ii) (permanency timeline); see also id. §675(5)(C) 

[(Adoption and Safe Families Act] requires participating states 

adopt “procedural safeguards” by holding a permanency hearing 

and determining a permanency plan at least every twelve months 

the child is in foster care). 

Id. at 1105-12 (emphasis added; footnotes, some citations, and headnotes 

omitted). 
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 While there is an undeniable parent-child bond between Mother and 

Children, the trial court was careful to employ a totality of the circumstances 

approach when performing its needs and welfare analysis under subsection 

2511(b). In addition to recognizing the parental bond, the court properly 

focused on “intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability,” took 

into account the bond that Children have with their kinship family, a preadoptive home, and prioritized “the safety and security of Children” over the 

damage that the parental bond may cause if it is left intact. In re K.Z.S., 

supra; In re Adoption of L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d 41, 52 (Pa. Super. 2024) 

(citation omitted); T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (courts correctly refine their focus 

on child’s development and mental and emotional health rather than 

considering only child’s “feelings” or “affection” for parent, which even badly 

abused and neglected children will retain). 

 Here, the trial judge emphasized the fact that Children are “all struggling 

with uncertainty about the future, fear, [and] anxiety.” N.T. Goal 

Change/Termination Hearing, 1/18/24, at 117. Even though Children may 

have had positive interactions with Mother during their inconsistent visits, the 

Children’s trauma therapists, as well as Aunt, acknowledged that Children 

exhibited behavioral and emotional setbacks when Mother failed to attend a 

visit. Moreover, Children’s trauma therapists clearly testified that they would 

not recommend Mother participate in caregiver sessions, a prerequisite to 

reunification, until she had completed a drug and alcohol program and 

successfully been discharged from mental health treatment. At the time of 
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the termination hearings, Mother was found to have been minimally compliant 

with her permanency plan and minimally progressed toward alleviating the 

circumstances that led to Children’s original placement—having not obtained 

suitable housing, completed a CEU drug and alcohol evaluation/assessment, 

successfully completed a substance abuse program, or completed an 

evaluation and assessment for the Behavioral Health Services Unit. 

Vaye testified that Children wanted to live with Aunt if they could not be 

returned to Mother. Id., 3/8/24, at 44-45. Vaye also testified that while the 

parties had discussed the possibility of permanent legal custodianship (PLC) 

as a permanency goal, because Aunt “said she does not want to do PLC,” id.

at 45, DHS pursued adoption as the better permanency goal. Id. at 69.8 Vaye 

testified that while Children have a bond with Mother, that bond is not 

beneficial to their emotional or physical needs and welfare, that they need 

stability and security, and that Aunt meets their physical and emotional needs. 

Id. at 49-50. Finally, Vaye finally testified that Children would not suffer 

irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Id. at 50-53. 

____________________________________________ 

8

 However, Vaye also testified that if Aunt did agree to do PLC, he would “be 

fine with that [because] that was [his] recommendation.” Id. But see 

Pennsylvania Dependency Benchbook, 3rd Edition (2019), at Ch.12.4 

Permanent Legal Custodianship (“In the hierarchical scheme of permanency 

options, permanent legal custodianship is less desirable than reunification or 

adoption, but preferable to permanent relative placement and another 

planned permanent living arrangement (42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6351(f.1)(3).”). 

Notably, in a PLC arrangement, the court no longer has an oversight role 

following the permanent transfer of legal custody. Id.
J-A20013-24 

- 17 - 

Because the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, we 

conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the subsection 

2511(b) bond considerations. T.S.M., supra. In coming to this decision 

today, we are not numb to the fact that termination carries with it “heavy and 

irrevocable consequences.” K.T., supra at 111. However, we must also keep 

in mind “the ticking clock of childhood,” T.S.M., supra at 269, and the fact 

that Mother’s bond with Children is not in their best interests. Id. at 1106. 

Thus, we are constrained to affirm. Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 839 (Pa. 

Super. 2022). 

 Decrees affirmed.9

Date: 9/27/2024 

____________________________________________ 

9

 Because we affirm the termination decrees, the appeals from the goalchange orders are moot. See Int. of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1272-73 (Pa. 

Super. 2021) (finding issues regarding goal change moot in light of 

termination of parental rights); see also In re D.K.W., 415 A.2d 69, 73 (Pa. 

1980) (stating once parental rights are terminated, issues of custody and 

dependency under Juvenile Act are moot).