AFDD Template Guide 

20 September 2002

.

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1 

2 August 2004 

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-14, 

Joint Doctrine for Space Operations.

Counterspace Operations
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-2.1 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 2 AUGUST 2004 

 

NOTICE: This publication is available on the AFDPO WWW site at 

 http://www.e-publishing.af.mil 

OPR: HQ AFDC/DR, Major Daniel D. Wright III, USAF 

Certified by: AFDC/DR, Col Scott Walker, USAF 

Pages: 66 

Distribution: F 

Approved by: Bentley B. Rayburn, Major General, USAF 

 Commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center
FOREWORD

Counterspace operations are critical to success in modern warfare. The rapid maturation 

of space capabilities and the evolution of contingency operations have greatly enhanced the 

effectiveness of air and space power. Combatant commanders leverage space capabilities such as 

communication; position, navigation, and timing; missile warning; environmental sensing; and 

reconnaissance to maintain a combat advantage over our adversaries. As demonstrated by the 

Iraqi deployment of global positioning system (GPS) jammers during Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM, adversaries will target space capabilities in an attempt to deny that combat 

advantage. We must also be prepared to deprive an adversary of the benefits of space capabilities 

when American interests and lives are at stake. Space superiority ensures the freedom to operate 

in the space medium while denying the same to an adversary and, like air superiority, cannot be 

taken for granted. The development of offensive counterspace capabilities provides combatant 

commanders with new tools for counterspace operations. Air Force doctrine, likewise, is 

evolving to reflect technical and operational innovations. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 

2-2.1, the Air Force’s first doctrine publication on counterspace operations, provides operational 

guidance in the use of air and space power to ensure space superiority. 

Space superiority is gained and maintained through counterspace operations which is one 

of the Air Force’s air and space power functions. Counterspace operations have defensive 

and offensive elements, both of which depend on robust space situation awareness. These 

operations may be utilized throughout the spectrum of conflict and may achieve a variety of 

effects from temporary denial to complete destruction of the adversary's space capability. 

This publication codifies United States Air Force (USAF) beliefs and practices on the use 

of counterspace operations in planning and executing military operations. It is useful to the 

tactician, operational-level planner, and strategist in formulating and carrying out an effective 

plan for defending United States (US) access to space and denying hostile exploitation of that 

medium. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... v 

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS....................................................................... vii 

CHAPTER ONE—Counterspace Operations................................................................................. 1 

General........................................................................................................................................ 1 

Counterspace Operations............................................................................................................ 2 

Space Situation Awareness (SSA).......................................................................................... 2 

Defensive Counterspace (DCS) Operations ........................................................................... 3 

Offensive Counterspace (OCS) Operations............................................................................ 3 

Air Force Counterspace Operations............................................................................................ 3 

Threats ........................................................................................................................................ 4 

Policy .......................................................................................................................................... 5 

CHAPTER TWO—Command and Control of Counterspace Operations...................................... 7 

General........................................................................................................................................ 7 

Command Relationships............................................................................................................. 7 

Unity of Command in Global Counterspace Operations........................................................ 9 

Unity of Command in Theater Counterspace Operations....................................................... 9 

Unity of Effort in Global Counterspace Operations............................................................... 9 

Unity of Effort in Theater Counterspace Operations.............................................................. 9 

Unity of Effort Between Global and Theater Counterspace Operations.............................. 10 

Roles and Responsibilities........................................................................................................ 10 

Secretary of Defense (SecDef).............................................................................................. 11 

Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM)............................................ 11 

Commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC/CC)....................................................... 11 

Commander, Fourteenth Air Force (14 AF/CC)................................................................... 11 

Commander, Geographic Combatant Command.................................................................. 12 

Joint Force Commander (JFC).............................................................................................. 12 

Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR).................................................................... 12 

Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander (JFACC)............................................. 12 

Space Coordinating Authority (SCA)................................................................................... 12 

Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR)........................................................................ 14 

14AF Air and Space Operations Center [Space AOC]......................................................... 15 

Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) ............................................................................. 15 

Command and Control of Space Forces................................................................................... 15 

Categories of Space Forces................................................................................................... 15 

Control of Global Space Forces in Theater Counterspace Operations................................. 16 

Control of Deployable Space Forces in Theater Counterspace Operations.......................... 17 

Control of Theater Organic Forces in Theater Counterspace Operations ............................ 17 

CHAPTER THREE—Space Situation Awareness....................................................................... 19 

General...................................................................................................................................... 19 

Components of Space Situation Awareness ............................................................................. 20 

Intelligence............................................................................................................................ 20 

Surveillance .......................................................................................................................... 20 

Reconnaisance ...................................................................................................................... 21 

iii
Environmental Monitoring ................................................................................................... 21 

Command and Control.......................................................................................................... 21 

SSA Requirements and Tasks................................................................................................... 21 

Find, Fix, and Track.............................................................................................................. 22 

Target and Engage ................................................................................................................ 22 

Assess.................................................................................................................................... 23 

Battlespace Awareness ............................................................................................................. 23 

Space Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (SIPB).................................................... 23 

Predictive Battlespace Awareness (PBA)............................................................................. 24 

CHAPTER FOUR—Defensive Counterspace Operations........................................................... 25 

General...................................................................................................................................... 25 

Deterrence................................................................................................................................. 25 

Defense ..................................................................................................................................... 25 

Passive Measures.................................................................................................................. 26 

Attack Detection and Characterization................................................................................. 26 

Active Measures ................................................................................................................... 27 

Recovery ................................................................................................................................... 27 

Redundancy........................................................................................................................... 28 

Reconstitution ....................................................................................................................... 28 

DCS Resources and Forces....................................................................................................... 28 

CHAPTER FIVE—Offensive Counterspace Operations ............................................................. 31 

General...................................................................................................................................... 31 

OCS Targets.............................................................................................................................. 32 

OCS Resources and Forces....................................................................................................... 33 

CHAPTER SIX—Planning and Executing Counterspace Operations......................................... 35 

General...................................................................................................................................... 35 

Planning and Execution of Space Forces.................................................................................. 35 

Distributed Operations/Reachback ....................................................................................... 35 

Air Tasking Cycle................................................................................................................. 36 

Space Tasking Cycle............................................................................................................. 36 

Synchronization of Theater and Global Operations ............................................................. 37 

Planning and Executing Counterspace Operations................................................................... 38 

Effects-based Approach........................................................................................................ 38 

Legal Considerations ............................................................................................................ 39 

Course of Action (COA) Development ................................................................................ 39 

Targeting............................................................................................................................... 40 

Deconfliction ........................................................................................................................ 41 

Approval Authority............................................................................................................... 42 

Rules of Engagement (ROE) ................................................................................................ 42 

Assessment............................................................................................................................ 42 

Suggested Readings...................................................................................................................... 45 

Glossary ........................................................................................................................................ 47 

iv
INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

This document is prepared by the United States Air Force to guide the application of 

counterspace operations, the ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains 

space superiority. It provides greater depth to warfighting doctrine as articulated in AFDD 1, Air 

Force Basic Doctrine, AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Forces, and AFDD 

2-2, Space Operations. 

APPLICATION 

This AFDD applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and 

civilian Air Force personnel. 

The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, commanders 

need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation when accomplishing their 

missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it. 

SCOPE 

This doctrine expands upon Air Force basic beliefs and concepts on space operations 

doctrine, codifying beliefs, principles, and practices for the application of the counterspace 

function. It provides commanders, planners, and operators with considerations and advice on 

conducting counterspace operations with a variety of capabilities as part of a joint or coalition 

action. This doctrine establishes unclassified operational-level guidance for tactics, techniques, 

and procedures described in Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) and Air 

Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFOTTP). 

v
vi
FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which AFDDs 

are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these statements. 

 US Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air Force 

achieves and maintains space superiority. 

 The Air Force executes the counterspace function to protect US military and friendly space 

capability while denying space capability to the adversary, as situations require. 

 Space superiority is a distinctive capability of the Air Force. 

 The Air Force brings space expertise across the spectrum of military operations, whether as a 

single Service or in conjunction with other Services in joint operations. 

 Counterspace operations have defensive and offensive elements, both of which depend on 

robust space situation awareness (SSA). 

 SSA is the result of sufficient knowledge about space-related conditions, constraints, 

capabilities, and activities—both current and planned—in, from, toward, or through space. 

 Achieving SSA supports all levels of planners, decision makers, and operators across the 

spectrum of terrestrial and space operations. 

 Defensive counterspace (DCS) operations preserve US/friendly ability to exploit space to its 

advantage via active and passive actions to protect friendly space-related capabilities from

enemy attack or interference. 

 Offensive counterspace (OCS) operations preclude an adversary from exploiting space to 

their advantage. 

 Counterspace operations are conducted across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of 

war by the entire joint force (air, space, land, sea, information, or special operations forces). 

 Within the counterspace construct, any action taken to achieve space superiority is a 

counterspace operation. 

 Air Force counterspace operations, underpinned by space situation awareness, support both 

the space control mission of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and theater military 

operations. 

 The theater commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR), assisted by the director of space 

forces (DIRSPACEFOR), ensures unity of effort within theater and with global space 

operations. 

vii
viii

The first principle that should guide air and space professionals is the imperative 

to control the high ground. This has been a rule of warfare ever since the dawn of time. 

But as war fighting moved from Earth surfaces into the air, the military advantages of 

control of the high ground became even more pronounced. We’ve traditionally kept air 

supremacy because we have a very rigorous and aggressive doctrine of control of the 

air. The first thing we do in any military campaign or combat operations is to gain 

mastery of the skies and deny the skies to the adversary.... 

How must we apply this principle to space? Look at what we’ve been able to 

accomplish using space: collection of all kinds of intelligence, precision navigation and 

using it for weapons delivery, communication and transmission of information to users 

worldwide. How long before an adversary realizing the tremendous benefit that we gain 

from our space capabilities, across the spectrum of warfighting, will seize an 

opportunity to deprive us the use of them? How long will we continue to assume zero 

percent losses to our space systems during hostilities? The need to continue our thinking 

about space control is not just doctrinal rhetoric, but military reality. 

Controlling the high ground of space is not limited simply to protection of our own 

capabilities. It will also require us to think about denying the high ground to our 

adversaries. We are paving the road of 21st century warfare now. And others will soon 

follow. What will we do five years from now when American lives are put at risk because 

an adversary uses space-borne imagery collectors, commercial or homegrown, to 

identify and target American forces? What will we do ten years from now when 

American lives are put at risk because an adversary chooses to leverage the global 

positioning system or perhaps the Galileo constellation to attack American forces with 

precision? 

The mission of space control has not been at the forefront of military thinking 

because our people haven’t yet been put at risk by an adversary using space capabilities. 

That will change. It is these sorts of events that the Space Commission members had in 

mind when they warned about the possibilities of a space Pearl Harbor. I believe we not 

only need to think about the mission and implications of space control—it is 

fundamentally irresponsible for us not to do so. Space is the ultimate high ground. Our 

military advantage there must remain ahead of our adversaries’ capabilities. And our 

own doctrine and capabilities must keep pace to meet that challenge. 

 

 —The Honorable Peter B. Teets 

 Undersecretary of the Air Force 

 AFA symposium 

 15 November 2002 
 

CHAPTER ONE 

COUNTERSPACE OPERATIONS 

The United States relies on space operations for its security,

and this reliance may make us vulnerable in some areas.

Identifying vulnerabilities will allow us to apply our full range of

capabilities to ensure space superiority and continued support to

joint military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Space

superiority is as much about protecting our space assets as it is

about preparing to counter an enemy's space or anti-space

assets. Counterspace operations, both defensive and offensive,

supported by situation awareness, will ensure we maintain our

superiority in space. We must protect our space assets. 

—General John P. Jumper

Chief of Staff

GENERAL 

US Air Force counterspace operations are the ways and means by which the Air 

Force achieves and maintains space superiority. Space superiority provides freedom to attack 

as well as freedom from attack [AFDD 1]. The Air Force executes the counterspace function 

to protect US military and friendly space capability while denying space capability to the 

adversary, as situations require. 

 

The US military is dependent on the use of space capabilities in all types of warfare

to maintain a combat advantage over our adversaries. With rare exception, today's space 

infrastructure is largely unprotected. Space capabilities, as a center of gravity, could be prime 

targets for hostile exploitation and attack. 

Adversaries, likewise, are using space to their advantage. Space capabilities, at one 

time limited to a few space-faring nations, are now commercially available to any adversary. 

Today, we must assume that an adversary has access to the benefits of space and plan 

accordingly. 

Space and air superiority are crucial first steps in any military operation. Space 

superiority is a distinctive capability of the Air Force. The Air Force brings space expertise 

across the spectrum of military operations, whether as a single Service or in conjunction 

with other Services in joint operations. Air Force counterspace operations are evolving rapidly 

given our reliance on space and indications that potential adversaries are beginning to exploit 

space both for their benefit and for purposes harmful to our national interests. This AFDD 

1
addresses how the Air Force organizes and employs counterspace operations to achieve space 

superiority. 

COUNTERSPACE OPERATIONS 

Counterspace has offensive and defensive operations, which are dependent on 

robust space situation awareness (SSA). Counterspace operations are conducted across the 

tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war by the entire joint force (air, space, land, 

sea, information, or special operations forces). Within the counterspace construct, any 

action taken to achieve space superiority is a counterspace operation. 

Examples of counterspace operations include: 

 Improving the commander’s situational awareness and view of the battlespace. Find, fix, 

track, target, engage, and assess space capabilities. 

 Instituting appropriate protective and defensive measures to ensure friendly forces can 

continuously conduct space operations across the entire spectrum of conflict. 

 Operations to deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary space capabilities. 

Space Situation Awareness (SSA) 

SSA is the result of sufficient knowledge 

about space-related conditions, constraints, 

capabilities, and activities—both current and 

planned—in, from, toward, or through space. 

Achieving SSA supports all levels of planners, 

decision makers, and operators across the 

spectrum of terrestrial and space operations. SSA 

involves characterizing, as completely as possible, 

the space capabilities operating within the terrestrial 

and space environments. SSA information enables 

defensive and offensive counterspace operations and 

forms the foundation for all space activities. It 

includes space surveillance, detailed reconnaissance 

of specific space assets, collection and processing of 

intelligence data on space systems, and monitoring 

the space environment. It also involves the use of 

traditional intelligence sources to provide insight 

into adversary space and counterspace operations. 

There are over 8,000 cataloged 

man-made objects in space

2
Defensive Counterspace (DCS) Operations 

DCS operations preserve US/friendly ability to exploit space to its advantage via 

active and passive actions to protect friendly space-related capabilities from enemy attack 

or interference. Friendly space-related capabilities include space systems such as satellites, 

terrestrial systems such as ground stations, and communication links. DCS operations are key to 

enabling continued exploitation of space by the US and its allies by protecting, preserving, 

recovering, and reconstituting friendly space-related capabilities before, during, and after an 

adversary attack. DCS operations may target an adversary’s counterspace capability to ensure 

access to space capabilities (e.g., an air strike against an active GPS jammer) and freedom of 

operations in space. 

Counterspace operations can provide a deterrent against attacks on US space assets. 

Robust counterspace capabilities send the message that potential adversaries cannot act upon 

space assets with impunity. SSA capabilities can convince an adversary it is impossible to hide 

use of space systems or attacks against friendly space systems. Demonstrated DCS capabilities 

may convince adversaries that an attack against a space system will be ineffective and will not 

significantly impair warfighting capabilities. 

Offensive Counterspace (OCS) Operations 

 

OCS operations preclude an adversary from exploiting space to their advantage. 

OCS operations may target an adversary’s space capability (space systems, terrestrial systems, 

links, or third party space capability), using a variety of permanent and/or reversible means. The 

“Five Ds” —deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction—describe the range of 

desired effects when targeting an adversary’s space systems. 

As adversaries become more dependent on space capabilities, counterspace operations 

have the ability to produce effects that directly impact their ability and will to wage war at the 

strategic, operational and tactical levels. Denying adversary space capabilities may hinder their 

ability to effectively organize, coordinate, and orchestrate a military campaign. For example, if 

adversaries reconstitute their command and control (C2) capabilities via satellite 

communications (SATCOM) after their ground-based communications network has been 

destroyed by precision bombing, offensive counterspace operations may be employed in 

conjunction to reduce or eliminate their ability to communicate with their forces. 

AIR FORCE COUNTERSPACE OPERATIONS 

Air Force counterspace operations, underpinned by space situation awareness, 

support both the space control mission of USSTRATCOM and theater military operations. 

USSTRATCOM’s space control mission includes: surveillance of space; protection of 

US and friendly space systems; prevention of an adversary's ability to use space systems for 

hostile purposes; negation of adversarial capability, if necessary. Within the negation mission, 

3
one may deceive, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy adversary space capability [JP 3-14, Joint 

Doctrine for Space Operations]

Theater military operations require space superiority to ensure US and friendly forces 

have the freedom to operate in the space medium while denying the same to the adversary. 

THREATS 

The US’s space advantage is threatened by the growth in adversary counterspace 

capability and the adversary’s increased use of space. In the past, the US has enjoyed space 

superiority through our technology development and exploitation, advanced information 

systems, and robust space infrastructure. The ability to sustain this advantage is challenging and 

may be eroding as our adversaries close the gap through technology sharing, materiel 

acquisition, and purchase of space services. 

Adversaries can conduct attacks against our space capabilities using various 

methods both symmetric and asymmetric. Adversaries may have the capacity to develop 

counterspace capabilities but, in many cases, may simply acquire them from a third party. Near 

and far-term threats may include the following: 

 Ground system attack and sabotage using conventional and unconventional means against 

terrestrial nodes and supporting infrastructure. 

 Radio frequency (RF) jamming equipment capable of interfering with space system links. 

 Laser systems capable of temporarily or permanently degrading or destroying satellite 

subsystems, thus interfering with satellite mission performance. 

 Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons capable of degrading or destroying satellite and/or 

ground system electronics. 

 Kinetic antisatellite (ASAT) weapons capable of destroying spacecraft or degrading their 

ability to perform their missions. 

 Information operations (IO) capabilities capable of corrupting space-based and terrestrialbased computer systems utilized to control satellite functions and to collect, process, and 

disseminate mission data. 

Adversaries do not need to be space-faring nations to exploit the benefits of space.

Adversaries can purchase space products and services, such as imagery and communications, 

which often rival those available to US military forces. Adversaries may leverage US or friendly 

systems to their advantage as well. For example, an adversary may use the NAVSTAR GPS 

constellation for navigation. In conflict, adversary access to space decreases US advantage and 

increases the threat to friendly military forces. 

4
POLICY 

National space policy governs our conduct with regard to military operations in, through, 

or toward space. The 1996 National Space Policy charges the Department of Defense to maintain 

the capability to execute the mission area of space control. It further specifies: “Consistent with 

treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate, and maintain space control 

capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to 

adversaries.” 

 DODD 3100.10, Department of Defense Space Policy, states: 

 “Space is a medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be 

conducted to achieve US national security objectives. 

 Ensuring the freedom of space and protecting US national security interests in the medium

are priorities for space and space-related activities. 

 Purposeful interference with US space systems will be viewed as an infringement on our 

sovereign rights. The US may take all appropriate self-defense measures, including, if 

directed by the [President and/or SecDef], the use of force, to respond to such an 

infringement on US rights. 

 Space activities shall contribute to the achievement of US national security objectives by 

countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes.” 

 

5

CHAPTER TWO 

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF COUNTERSPACE OPERATIONS 

Whereas those who have the capability to control the air, control the 

land and sea beneath it, so in the future it is likely that those who have 

the capability to control space will likewise control the earth's surface.

 

 —General Thomas D White 

Chief of Staff 

United States Air Force, 1957 

GENERAL 

The need for space superiority can exist simultaneously for both global (supporting 

multiple theater and/or national level objectives) operations and theater joint task force (JTF) 

operations. Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM), charged with the 

mission of space control, ensures space superiority for global operations. The joint force 

commander (JFC) ensures space superiority in the theater area of responsibility (AOR). 

Depending on the number of joint operations, multiple commanders may have the responsibility 

to establish space superiority. While some theater counterspace operations are independent (an 

air strike to destroy a GPS jammer that is impacting local operations only), many are 

interdependent with other theater or global counterspace operations (jamming a signal in one 

AOR may impact operations in another AOR). Unity of command and unity of effort within 

global and theater operations and unity of effort between global and theater operations are 

crucial to ensure space superiority for all US military forces. Command relationships for 

counterspace operations continue to evolve and each situation can dictate a unique arrangement. 

Therefore, flexibility is paramount at all levels of command, whether supporting global or 

theater operations. 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 

Command relationships for counterspace are in accordance with JP 0-2, Unified Action 

Armed Forces (UNAAF); JP 3-14; and AFDD 2-2. 

There are four basic forms of command relationships: combatant command (command 

authority) (COCOM), operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), and support. 

These “warfighting” authorities flow from the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to the combatant 

commanders. The SecDef assigns forces under the COCOM of the appropriate combatant 

commander via the Forces For Memorandum. Forces that are assigned to one combatant 

commander may be transferred and temporarily attached to a different combatant commander 

when deployed via a SecDef approved Deployment Order. The SecDef will specify the 

command relationship that the gaining combatant commander will exercise over the forces 

attached (usually OPCON). The combatant commander(s) will provide assigned and attached 

7
forces to subordinate JFCs with specification of OPCON, TACON, or in support. The JFC in 

turn delegates appropriate authorities to the various component commanders, who in turn 

delegate appropriate authority to their subordinate commanders.

Other authorities, outside the command relationships delineated above, include 

coordinating authority and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH). According to JP 0-2, 

coordinating authority is the “authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating 

specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or 

more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service....” The commander or 

individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not 

have the authority to compel agreement. [JP 0-2] Coordinating authority, according to JP 0-2, is 

“not an authority by which command may be exercised” and is “more applicable to planning and 

similar activities than to operations.” DIRLAUTH, according to JP 0-2, is “that authority granted 

by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a 

command or agency within or outside of the granting command.” DIRLAUTH is a “coordinating 

relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised” and is “more 

applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the 

commander granting DIRLAUTH informed.” [JP 0-2] 

Unity of command “ensures the concentration of effort for every objective under one 

responsible commander.” [AFDD 1] The principle of unity of command emphasizes that all 

efforts should be directed and coordinated toward a common objective. While coordination may 

be achieved by cooperation, it is best achieved by vesting a single commander with the authority 

to direct all force employment in pursuit of a common objective. Unity of command ensures 

unity of effort. The command relationships, OPCON, TACON, or support, ensure unity of 

command. 

Unity of effort ensures a coordinated and cooperative effort toward a commonly 

understood objective. Unity of effort becomes crucial when unity of command is not feasible. 

Military operations are often supported by non-DOD space capabilities (civil, national, and 

commercial). Given these space capabilities are not assigned to the DOD, a command 

relationship is not possible. Many of these non-DOD space capabilities are managed via an 

interagency coordination process. The combatant commander staff or JTF staff normally 

interfaces with these interagency processes. Per JP 3-14, requests for intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) support derived from on-orbit satellites, whether national or 

commercial systems, normally goes through the combatant commander or JTF J-2 and the 

collection manager. Similarly, all SATCOM requirements (military and commercial) are 

managed by the Joint Staff. 

Given the nature of space support, provided by both DOD and non-DOD assets, there 

should normally be a unity of command of DOD space assets and a unity of effort with nonDOD space assets. Unity of command can be provided via OPCON, TACON, or support. Unity 

of effort can be facilitated by the designation of a coordinating authority. The unity of command 

and unity of effort for both global and theater counterspace operations, and the unity of effort 

between global and theater counterspace operations, are discussed below. 

8
Unity of Command in Global Counterspace Operations 

 

CDRUSSTRATCOM is assigned COCOM of DOD space forces and normally exercises 

command through component commanders. Commander, Air Force Space Command 

(AFSPC/CC) has OPCON of assigned and attached Air Force space forces. Commander, 

Fourteenth Air Force (14 AF/CC) plans and executes Air Force space operations on behalf of 

AFSPC/CC. In accordance with JP 3-14, CDRUSSTRATCOM “may designate a subordinate to 

manage space operations.” Clear command relationships must be established to ensure unity of 

command should a subordinate, such as AFSPC/CC, be assigned the mission of global 

counterspace operations. 

Unity of Command in Theater Counterspace Operations 

Unity of command is ensured when space forces are presented to a theater via OPCON, 

TACON, or support. At SecDef direction, CDRUSSTRATCOM will transfer space forces or 

capabilities to another combatant commander. For example, a joint tactical ground station 

(JTAGS) detachment could be deployed and attached, normally with OPCON, to another 

combatant commander. If needed by a JFC, OPCON of those forces is normally delegated to the 

JFC, who then delegates that authority to the appropriate Service component commander. The 

JFC normally delegates OPCON of assigned and attached Air Force space forces to the 

COMAFFOR. To ensure unity of command of theater DOD space forces, a JFC may designate a 

supported commander for joint theater space operations. The appropriate Service or functional 

component commander should exercise TACON of theater space forces made available by the 

Services. The Service with the preponderance of space capability and the capability to command 

and control should normally be designated supported commander for joint theater space 

operations. This normally is the COMAFFOR, or COMAFFOR/ joint force air and space 

component commander (JFACC) (COMAFFOR dual-hatted as the JFACC), if established. 

Unity of command should be given to the theater to perform offensive counterspace operations 

in support of theater objectives. 

 

Unity of Effort in Global Counterspace Operations 

Military space capabilities are often augmented by civil, commercial, and national space 

systems. As unity of command over these space systems is problematic, unity of effort is crucial. 

USSTRATCOM has established agreements and working relationships with several of the nonDOD support providers to help ensure unity of effort. 

Unity of Effort in Theater Counterspace Operations 

To facilitate unity of effort within theater space operations, a JFC may designate a space 

coordinating authority (SCA) [JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations, uses “space 

authority”]. The commander with SCA is the single authority to coordinate joint theater space 

operations and integrate space capabilities. The JFC can either retain authority or designate a 

component commander as the SCA. The JFC should designate the COMAFFOR or 

COMAFFOR/JFACC as the SCA, given they normally provide the JFC with the preponderance 

of military space capabilities, space expertise, and C2 capabilities. 

9
Unity of Effort Between Global and Theater Counterspace Operations 

Global and theater counterspace operations must be coordinated, deconflicted, integrated, 

and synchronized to ensure space superiority for all US military forces. Unity of effort is vital 

given multiple commanders may have the responsibility to carry out counterspace operations. 

Unity of effort between global and theater counterspace operations is facilitated by the SCA. The 

SCA, normally authorized DIRLAUTH with Service components of USSTRATCOM, can assist 

the JFC in coordinating, deconflicting, integrating, and synchronizing theater counterspace 

operations with USSTRATCOM global counterspace operations. If CDRUSSTRATCOM 

assigns the mission of global counterspace operations to a Service component, such as 

AFSPC/CC, the theater SCA should be authorized DIRLAUTH with that component. 

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 

Space superiority for all US military forces requires unity of command and unity of effort 

within global and theater counterspace operations and unity of effort between global and theater 

counterspace operations (Figure 2.1). 

 Figure 2.1. Notional Overview of Counterspace Roles and Responsibilities 

10
Secretary of Defense (SecDef) 

The SecDef assigns military forces to combatant commanders by the “Forces for Unified 

Commands” memorandum. The SecDef is the approval authority for transfer of military space 

forces from CDRUSSTRATCOM to a geographic combatant commander and will specify the 

command relationships the gaining commander will exercise. Upon receipt of attached or 

reassigned forces, the geographic combatant commander may further delegate command 

relationships to a subordinate commander or JFC as appropriate. As the establishing authority for 

a support relationship between CDRUSSTRATCOM and other combatant commanders, the 

SecDef decides on the solution for the supported commander’s needs that cannot be fulfilled by 

the supporting commander. The SecDef may retain approval authority of individual counterspace 

operations. 

Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) 

CDRUSSTRATCOM has COCOM of all DOD space forces assigned by the SecDef’s 

“Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum. CDRUSSTRATCOM deconflicts, prioritizes, 

and synchronizes space capabilities in support of other combatant commanders and the SecDef. 

CDRUSSTRATCOM, with the combatant commanders, determines the command relationships 

necessary to meet respective theater space requirements. Global counterspace operations, both 

defensive and offensive, are part of CDRUSSTRATCOM’s assigned space control mission area. 

Commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC/CC) 

AFSPC/CC serves as the COMAFFOR for USSTRATCOM for assigned Air Force space 

forces. AFSPC/CC exercises OPCON over all assigned Air Force space forces and, with 

guidance from CDRUSSTRATCOM, directs Air Force space forces. AFSPC/CC is responsible 

for Air Force global counterspace operations supporting USSTRATCOM’s space control 

mission. If designated by CDRUSSTRATCOM, AFSPC/CC may serve as the supported 

commander for joint global counterspace operations. AFSPC plans for and develops tactics, 

techniques, and procedures for offensive and defensive counterspace operations. 

Commander, Fourteenth Air Force (14 AF/CC) 

Commander, Fourteenth Air Force (14 AF/CC) plans and executes Air Force space 

operations on behalf of AFSPC/CC. 14 AF/CC exercises command through the 14 AF air and 

space operations center (AOC), referred to as the “space AOC.” 14 AF/CC is responsible to 

AFSPC/CC for planning and execution of Air Force global counterspace operations in support of 

CDRUSSTRATCOM. 14 AF/CC is responsible to the COMAFFOR/JFACC, when in direct 

support, for integration of Air Force global space forces into theater counterspace operations. 14 

AF/CC is normally authorized DIRLAUTH with the supported theater commander, normally the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC. 

11
Commander, Geographic Combatant Command 

The geographic combatant commander provides prioritized theater space requirements to 

CDRUSSTRATCOM. The combatant commander coordinates requirements within the theater if

there are multiple JTFs or other theater priorities. The combatant commander, with 

CDRUSSTRATCOM, determines the command relationships necessary to meet those 

requirements. At the SecDef’s direction, CDRUSSTRATCOM transfers space forces or 

capabilities to a geographic combatant commander. 

Joint Force Commander (JFC) 

The JFC is responsible for space superiority in the specified AOR/joint operations area 

(JOA). OPCON of theater space forces is normally delegated to the JFC, who then delegates that 

authority to the appropriate Service component commander. The JFC normally exercises 

command of assigned and attached Air Force space forces through the COMAFFOR. 

Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR) 

The COMAFFOR commands all assigned or attached Air Force space forces on behalf of 

the JFC. The COMAFFOR normally exercises command through the air and space operations 

center. The COMAFFOR is responsible to the JFC, or the designated supported commander for 

counterspace operations, for planning and execution of Air Force theater counterspace 

operations. The COMAFFOR is responsible to the JFC, or the designated supported commander 

for counterspace operations, for integration of Air Force theater space forces into global 

counterspace operations. The COMAFFOR, assisted by the DIRSPACEFOR, ensures unity 

of effort within theater and with global space operations. The JFC may designate the 

COMAFFOR as the SCA. The COMAFFOR normally serves as the joint force air and space 

component commander (JFACC). 

Joint Force Air and Space Component Commander (JFACC) 

The JFACC, when designated by the JFC, plans, coordinates, allocates, tasks, executes, 

and assesses air and space operations to accomplish assigned operational missions. [AFDD 2] 

The JFACC should be assigned the responsibility for space superiority in the theater AOR. To 

ensure unity of command in theater space operations, the JFC may designate the JFACC as the 

supported commander for theater space operations. If designated as the supported commander, 

the JFACC should exercise TACON of theater space forces made available by the Services. To 

facilitate unity of effort within theater space operations and with global DOD forces and nonDOD space capabilities, the JFC should designate the JFACC as SCA. 

 

Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) 

The SCA is the single authority to coordinate joint theater space operations and integrate 

space capabilities. The JFC may retain SCA or designate a component commander to carry 

out the responsibilities of the SCA. The JFC should designate a component commander as SCA, 

12
given coordination and integration is focused on operational-level operations. According to JP 

3-14, the JFC “considers the mission, nature and duration of the operation, preponderance of 

space force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities (including reachback) in selecting the 

appropriate option.” 

The JFC should designate the COMAFFOR or COMAFFOR/JFACC as the SCA, given 

they normally provide the JFC with the preponderance of military space capabilities, space 

expertise, and C2 capabilities. 

 

Responsibilities of the SCA include: 

 Deconflict/prioritize military space requirements for the JTF 

 Recommend appropriate command relationships for space to the JFC 

 Facilitate space target nomination 

 Maintain space situation awareness 

 Request space inputs from JTF J-staff and components during planning 

 Ensure optimum interoperability of space assets with coalition forces 

 Recommend JTF military space requirement priorities to JFC 

 The SCA facilitates unity of effort within theater by coordinating joint theater space 

operations to support integration of space capabilities and having primary responsibility for intheater joint space operations planning. The SCA can require consultation between agencies 

involved but does not have the authority to compel 

agreement. The SCA coordinates with theater components 

(Army and Navy space support teams, space support 

teams assigned to special operations forces [SOF]) and the 

Air Force’s DIRSPACEFOR. The SCA also coordinates 

with other deployed DOD and national agency theater 

support teams, to include the national intelligence support 

team (NIST). The NIST may include teams from the 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security 

Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National 

Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and other intelligence 

community agencies as required. If the JFC does not 

designate a supported commander for theater counterspace 

operations, unity of effort between theater forces 

executing counterspace operations will be crucial to 

ensure space superiority in the theater AOR. 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

The combined forces air and 

space component commander 

(CFACC) was designated 

for the first time 

space coordinating authority

13
 The SCA facilitates unity of effort between global and theater space operations. The 

SCA gathers military space requirements throughout the joint force and provides the JFC a 

prioritized list of recommended military space requirements. Upon JFC approval, the list is 

provided to CDRUSSTRATCOM. The SCA is normally authorized DIRLAUTH with Service 

components of USSTRATCOM and can assist the JFC, or designated supported commander for 

theater counterspace operations, in coordinating, deconflicting, integrating, and synchronizing 

theater counterspace operations with USSTRATCOM counterspace operations. If 

CDRUSSTRATCOM assigns the mission of global counterspace operations to a Service 

component, such as AFSPC/CC, the SCA should be authorized direct liaison with that 

component. 

Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR) 

The DIRSPACEFOR serves as the senior space advisor to the COMAFFOR or 

COMAFFOR/JFACC. The DIRSPACEFOR conducts coordination, integration, and staffing 

activities to tailor space support for the COMAFFOR/JFACC. The DIRSPACEFOR is a senior 

Air Force officer with space expertise and theater familiarity, nominated by AFSPC/CC and 

appointed by the theater COMAFFOR. The DIRSPACEFOR is attached to the COMAFFOR, 

and should be part of the COMAFFOR’s or COMAFFOR/JFACC’s special staff. 

Responsibilities of the DIRSPACEFOR include: 

 Recommend appropriate command relationships for space to the COMAFFOR/JFACC 

 Provide assistance to COMAFFOR/JFACC in establishing and prioritizing military space 

requirements required by the JFC and the policies for employing those space capabilities 

 Provide senior space perspective for strategy and daily COMAFFOR/JFACC guidance 

development, target selection, and force enhancement to terrestrial operations 

 Direct and monitor, on behalf of the COMAFFOR/JFACC, space forces and capabilities 

assigned or attached to the COMAFFOR/JFACC, including space-related special technical 

operations; includes space forces made available for tasking with specification of TACON to 

the COMAFFOR/JFACC 

 Facilitate and coordinate AFSPC, USSTRATCOM, Service, and agency support to the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC—coordinate vertical, horizontal, and reachback activities with the 

space AOC and other component space support teams and liaisons as necessary; 

assist/recommend DIRLAUTH relationships to execute time-sensitive requests for space 

support 

 Execute day-to-day SCA responsibilities, on behalf of the COMAFFOR/JFACC, as directed 

 Act as COMAFFOR/JFACC’s representative to the SCA if the authority resides with the JFC 

or another component 

 Accomplish other duties as assigned by the COMAFFOR/JFACC 

14
14 AF Air and Space Operations Center [Space AOC] 

The 14 AF/CC exercises C2 of assigned and attached space forces through the 14 AF’s 

space AOC. The space AOC uses the space tasking cycle to translate both CDRUSSTRATCOM 

and JFC objectives, priorities, and intent into a coherent, synchronized plan. The space tasking 

order (STO), a key product of the space tasking cycle, is used to task and execute AFSPC 

assigned and attached space forces. Synchronization of the STO with theater operations is 

discussed in Chapter Six, “Planning and Executing Counterspace Operations.” 

Air and Space Operations Center (AOC) 

The COMAFFOR exercises command through the AOC. The AOC uses the air tasking 

cycle to plan, coordinate, allocate, task, execute and assess air and space operations to 

accomplish assigned operational missions. The air tasking order (ATO), a key product of the air 

tasking cycle, is used to task and execute theater air and space operations. Details on the AOC 

can be found in AFDD 2. 

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPACE FORCES 

The C2 structure established for Air Force space forces depends on the effect to be 

produced by that force (global or theater) and the ability of a theater combatant commander to 

command and control that force (Figure 2.2). If a space asset produces global effects (supporting 

multiple theater and/or national level objectives) then a centralized structure commanded by 

CDRUSSTRATCOM is usually best. If a space asset produces theater-only effects (effects 

focused primarily on an individual theater), and that asset can be commanded and controlled by 

the theater, then it is the responsibility of that theater combatant commander to 

command/employ that space asset. 

Categories of Space Forces 

AFDD 2 describes three categories of space forces that can provide space support to a 

campaign: global space forces, deployable space forces, and theater organic space forces. Global 

space forces are military space assets, normally assigned to USSTRATCOM, that support 

national objectives and multiple theaters. For example, GPS is a space-based radionavigation 

system nominally consisting of a constellation of 24 orbiting satellites that provide position, 

navigation, and timing information to military and civilian users worldwide. Deployable space 

assets are space forces that can or must move forward to a theater to support operations. For 

example, JTAGS is a deployable system providing combatant commanders with direct 

downlinked, in-theater early warning of ballistic missile launches. Organic space forces, 

normally OPCON to the JFC, are those that are embedded in theater in anticipation of their use 

in theater operations. For example, EAGLE VISION provides in-theater, real-time acquisition 

and processing of commercial satellite imagery. Space assets supporting counterspace operations 

may come from any of the three categories. 

 

15
Deployed

to theater?

Produces

theater-only

effects?

In-theater ability

to C2 asset?

Asset in

DIRECT SUPPORT

Asset in

DIRECT SUPPORT

Asset 

TACON to Theater

Produces

theater-only

effects?

Asset in

DIRECT SUPPORT

In-theater ability

To C2 asset?

Asset in

DIRECT SUPPORT

Asset 

OPCON to Theater

YES

YES

YES

NO

YES

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

 Figure 2.2. C2 Decision Tree for Control of Space 

Assets in Theater Operations 

Control of Global Space Forces in Theater Counterspace Operations 

 When global space forces are requested to produce effects within a theater, the 

SecDef will normally establish a command relationship between CDRUSSTRATCOM and the 

requesting combatant commander. As with other functional forces, such as mobility, “the 

functional combatant commander will normally retain OPCON of assigned forces and provide 

either TACON or a direct support relationship with the supported combatant commander/JTF.” 

[AFDD 2] Per AFDD 2-2, the litmus test for providing theater TACON of global space 

assets is 1) asset produces theater-only effects and 2) in-theater capability to command and 

control the asset. 

AFSPC/CC normally retains OPCON of global Air Force space forces and provides 

them via a support relationship. Unity of command in theater counterspace operations is 

ensured as the commander responsible for theater counterspace operations, normally the 

COMAFFOR or COMAFFOR/JFACC, can direct “designation and prioritization of targets or 

objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for 

coordination and efficiency” [JP 0-2]. Direct support, specifying the COMAFFOR or 

COMAFFOR/JFACC as the supported commander, allows AFSPC/CC to directly answer the 

supported commander’s requests for assistance. This command relationship is parallel to the 

close air support (CAS) mission, where the COMAFFOR or JFACC retain OPCON/TACON of 

air assets, centrally control them, and provide CAS via a support relationship. 

 

16
The JFC may be given TACON of a global space force given it produces theater-only 

effects and the theater can command and control the asset. Such a space force, regardless of 

physical location, is a de facto theater space force and should be integrated into theater 

counterspace operations like other theater space forces. While current global space systems 

including on-orbit assets, do not meet the litmus test for transfer of TACON, future global space 

forces may offer theater-only effects that can be commanded and controlled in-theater. 

Control of Deployable Space Forces in Theater Counterspace Operations 

CDRUSSTRATCOM has COCOM of deployable space forces. The SecDef may transfer 

OPCON of deployable spaces force to a geographic combatant commander. The litmus test for 

providing theater OPCON of deployable space assets is 1) asset produces theater-only 

effects and 2) there is an in-theater capability to command and control the asset. 

If the space force’s operation only impacts that individual theater, the SecDef may direct 

USSTRATCOM to transfer the space forces to the geographic combatant commander. The 

command relationship the gaining commander will exercise is specified by the SecDef. The 

normal relationship will be OPCON, however, a TACON or support relationship may be 

appropriate depending on the ability of the theater commander to conduct space operations 

planning. 

Control of Theater Organic Forces in Theater Counterspace Operations 

Geographic combatant commanders may have COCOM of theater organic space forces. 

COMAFFOR normally exercises OPCON of Air Force theater organic space forces. A JFC may 

designate a supported commander for joint theater space operations. The appropriate Service or 

functional component commander should exercise TACON of theater space forces made 

available by the Services. The Service with the preponderance of capability and the capability to 

command and control should normally be designated supported commander for joint theater 

space operations. This normally is the COMAFFOR, or COMAFFOR/JFACC, if established. 

17
18
CHAPTER THREE 

SPACE SITUATION AWARENESS 

Space superiority is our imperative – it

requires the same sense of urgency that we place

on gaining and maintaining air superiority over

enemy air space in times of conflict. This

imperative requires a full understanding of the

medium of space, and we will pursue robust space

situation awareness leading to space superiority. 

—General Lance Lord

Commander, Air Force Space Command

GENERAL 

The foundation for counterspace operations is an understanding of friendly space 

capabilities, adversaries’ space capabilities, threats to space systems, the terrestrial and space 

environment, and how these factors affect friendly and adversary operations. The forces and 

assets that provide space capabilities operate as links and nodes in a variety of mediums, 

including space, air, land, sea, and IO. 

Space situation awareness provides the battlespace awareness required for planning, 

executing, and assessing DCS and OCS operations. SSA is the result of sufficient knowledge 

about space-related conditions, constraints, capabilities, and activities—both current and 

planned—in, from, toward or through space. Achieving SSA supports all levels of planners, 

decision makers, and operators across the spectrum of terrestrial and space operations. SSA 

involves characterizing, as completely as possible, the space capabilities operating within the 

terrestrial and space environments. SSA forms the foundation for all space activities, but has its 

most stringent requirements derived from counterspace operations. 

SSA provides knowledge of the space medium, intelligence on space systems, and the 

ability to correlate effects, all crucial for protection of Air Force space systems and effective 

operations against adversary space capabilities. For example, the space medium is a hostile one. 

Prediction of space environmental activity allows protective action, such as turning solar arrays 

parallel to an oncoming meteor shower, to minimize damage to a satellite. Analysis of SSA 

information on space systems, such as a satellite’s orbit, helps prevent inadvertent collisions 

between man-made objects. Space system information, combined with the ability to correlate 

effects, allows operators to predict and avoid radio frequency interference and unintentional 

fratricide against friendly space systems. Likewise, SSA is necessary to predict and defend Air 

Force space systems from adversary attack. SSA is crucial to accurate determination of the space 

system failure, whether from environmental effects, unintentional interference, or an adversary 

19
attack, allowing decision makers to determine the appropriate response. Finally, SSA provides 

detailed intelligence on adversary space capabilities and on-going space operations, enabling Air 

Force counterspace planning, execution, and assessment. 

COMPONENTS OF SPACE SITUATION AWARENESS 

Intelligence 

Intelligence is “the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, 

analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or 

areas.” [AFDD 1] For SSA, intelligence provides the characterization and assessment of 

foreign (adversary and third party) space capabilities. Characterization includes, but is not 

limited to, how forces and assets operate, their impact to friendly and adversary military 

operations, and their vulnerabilities and strengths. Intelligence analysis of all elements of space 

systems is required to determine threats and vulnerabilities of foreign space capabilities. 

Intelligence must be timely to support OCS and DCS operations. It primarily supports the 

characterization and assessment of space capabilities in preparation for targeting or defending 

against them. Reliable, timely, and accurate intelligence also supports battle damage assessment 

(BDA). 

Surveillance 

Surveillance is “the function of

systematically observing air, space, surface, or 

subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by 

visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other 

means.” [AFDD 1] Space surveillance is the 

systematic and continuous observation and 

information collection on space systems 

operating in the space environment. 

Surveillance contributes to orbital safety, 

indications and warning of space events, initial 

indications where threats may be located, and 

battle damage assessment. Space events include 

satellite maneuvers, anticipated and unanticipated 

launches, reentries into the atmosphere, laser 

emanations, solar events, and electromagnetic 

conflicts such as radio frequency interference 

(RFI). 

20th Space Control Squadron tracks 

objects through phased array radar 

technology. 

Surveillance data, for example, is used to produce the satellite catalog—the fused product 

that provides the location of on-orbit satellites. Information from the satellite catalog is used by 

predictive orbital analysis tools to anticipate satellite threats and collection opportunities for 

friendly, adversary, and third party assets. 

20
Reconnaissance 

Reconnaissance is “obtaining, by visual observation or other detection methods, specific 

information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or in securing 

data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular 

area. Reconnaissance generally has a time constraint associated with the tasking.” [AFDD 1] 

Assets that perform reconnaissance may also conduct surveillance. Reconnaissance provides the 

detailed characterization needed to assess the battlespace. Space reconnaissance supports 

satellite anomaly (i.e., on-board problem) resolution, targeting, and post-strike assessment. 

Reconnaissance data, for example, may come from a remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) 

providing visual images of a mobile satellite ground station to aid in the planning of a strike 

against that ground station. 

Environmental Monitoring 

Environmental monitoring includes the characterization and assessment of space weather 

(i.e., solar conditions) on satellites and links, terrestrial weather near important ground nodes, 

and natural and man-made phenomena in outer space (i.e. orbital debris). This environmental 

information must be accurate, timely, and predictive to protect space systems and to support 

counterspace planning and execution. Predictions of natural environmental effects should be 

synchronized with military commanders’ courses of action to enhance military effects. 

Environmental monitoring can be critical in counterspace operations. Natural 

phenomena, such as solar flares and lightning, can interfere with space systems. Operators must 

be able to differentiate between natural phenomena interference and an intentional attack 

on a space system in order to formulate an appropriate response. 

Command and Control 

Command and control is “the battlespace management process of planning, directing, 

coordinating, and controlling forces and operations.” [AFDD 1] SSA provides the knowledge 

and intelligence needed in the planning, execution, and assessment cycles. Combining multiple 

sources of information into a single integrated space picture (SISP) is essential for SSA. 

Likewise, C2 processes enhance SSA by providing feedback on the status/readiness of forces 

and insight on how integrated space capabilities are contributing to military operations. Fusion 

of SSA information occurs at several levels, but is crucial at the C2 nodes. Multiple C2 nodes 

will often require SSA information, making unity of effort for SSA activities essential. 

SSA REQUIREMENTS AND TASKS 

Space situation awareness is more than surveillance of space. SSA is the command and 

control, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) and environmental 

data required for all space operations. Recent studies (Space Control Broad Area Review, 2000, 

and the Space Situation Awareness Task Force, 2001) have highlighted the need for synergy 

21
between the intelligence and the surveillance of space activities, improved force structure for 

‘situational awareness,’ and other improvements to advance the understanding of the battlespace 

with respect to space operations. SSA requires: 

 Use of intelligence sources to provide insight into adversary space doctrine, strategy, tactics, 

and operations 

 Surveillance of all space objects, activities, and terrestrial support systems 

 Detailed reconnaissance of specific space objects 

 Monitoring and analysis of the space environment

 Monitoring and status of friendly, neutral, and adversary space assets, capabilities, and 

operations

 Command, control and communications (C3), processing, analysis, dissemination, and 

archival capabilities used to accomplish these activities 

 The tasks of SSA include find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess. Accomplishing 

these tasks ensures coherent battlespace awareness for planners, operators, and commanders. 

Find, Fix, and Track 

The ability to find, fix, and track space objects, signals, and terrestrial nodes is 

fundamental to either attack the adversary, defend/preserve friendly space capabilities, assess 

collateral effects on third party space assets, or understand the operational environment. Similar 

to an air operation, such as airborne warning and control system (AWACS), which tries to find, 

fix, and track all airborne objects within their area of interest, radar and optical sensors 

worldwide focus to find, fix, and track objects in space. An important aspect of find, fix, and 

track includes the ability to characterize space systems, signals, environment, and threats. 

Characterization builds knowledge of how systems operate, the signals they use, how they react 

to changes in conditions, the threats they pose to friendly/adversary operations, and many other 

important factors. Understanding our own space systems and the threats to them enhances our 

ability to preserve, withstand, or respond to an attack. 

Target and Engage 

Characterization data enhances our ability to target a space capability, often providing 

greater flexibility to achieve the desired effect. If we understand how the space system works, 

the decision and the trade-offs on how to affect the target will be easier. Deconfliction is just as 

important in counterspace operations as it is in other military operations. Electromagnetic 

spectrum and physical deconfliction must be accomplished to avoid “blue-on-blue” impacts and 

unintentional interference with other parties. 

22
Assess 

Assessment of the results of OCS or DCS operations is critical. The ability to assess 

whether the environment or a threat is producing an effect, like interference, is key to ensuring 

proper response. Effective ISR planning and execution are essential for accurate assessment. 

Today, our ability to characterize and assess a potential threat or target may be limited. Close 

cooperation with appropriate DOD and non-DOD agencies is critical to improve the ability to 

access the intelligence required to characterize and assess space systems, signals, environment, 

and threats. 

BATTLESPACE AWARENESS 

Space situation awareness provides the battlespace awareness needed by all levels of 

planners, decision makers, and operators across the spectrum of terrestrial and space operations. 

SSA contributes to the development of the space intelligence preparation of the battlespace 

(SIPB) and predictive battlespace awareness (PBA). 

Space Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (SIPB) 

SIPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment to 

support military decision making across the spectrum of space operations. It is a framework for 

analyzing the full spectrum of adversary space capabilities and potential courses of action, as 

affected by the environment, both natural and man-made. SIPB’s primary purpose is to support 

the commander’s planning and decision-making process by identifying, assessing, and 

estimating the adversary’s space-related centers of gravity (COG), vulnerabilities, capabilities, 

limitations, and intentions. Characterizing and assessing space systems, signals, environment, 

and threats can be difficult and time consuming but critical to counterspace operations. SIPB for 

counterspace operations should be accomplished early, often in the planning process, to ensure 

availability of intelligence needed for planning and execution of operations. Space orders of 

battle are an important part of SIPB. 

Blue, red, and gray space orders of battle are based 

on operational reporting and intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance data. Each provides insight into the 

space systems of friendly forces (blue), adversary forces 

(red), and third party (gray) space forces, respectively. 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

Commercial satellites 

provided over 80% of all 

satellite communications used 

by the US military.

 The blue space order of battle, regarding military and government space systems, may 

be maintained through a combination of up-channel reporting of military space forces, formal 

arrangements, and frequent coordination with other government agencies. 

 The red space order of battle, regarding a potential adversary’s military and 

government space systems, may be developed through a comprehensive network of intelligence 

resources. However, insight into adversary use of third party space systems is difficult due to the 

need to track contractual and other arrangements between these vendors and potential 

adversaries. 

23
 The gray space order of battle, regarding US commercial and neutral foreign 

(commercial and government) space systems, can be difficult to develop and maintain. Status on 

US commercial providers requires their voluntary participation, as US law and policy strictly 

limit the ability of US intelligence agencies to collect, retain, or disseminate information 

concerning US persons and corporations. The importance of third party providers must not be 

understated as they provide space capabilities to numerous clients, including friendly and 

adversary military operations. 

SIPB will generally require dedicated support from multiple agencies as well as sufficient 

infrastructure and processes. For example, developing and maintaining space orders of battle can 

be challenging. While provisions exist to require the registration of new launches and objects 

placed in orbit, along with communication frequencies used, they are difficult to enforce and do 

not always account for subsequent satellite movements or frequency changes. Furthermore, 

provisions do not exist for commercial vendors to report service arrangements/contracts made 

with customers. Intelligence officers with a space background, both in the AOC and space AOC, 

can help provide the space situation awareness essential for successful counterspace operations. 

Predictive Battlespace Awareness (PBA) 

PBA is multidimensional understanding of the operational and natural battlespace in 

time, space, and effect, regardless of the adversary, location, weather, or time of day. It is 

continuous and achieved by the commanders through possession of relevant, comprehensive 

knowledge, including an accurate forecast of pertinent influences that affect the battlespace. This 

knowledge of the operational and natural environment, in concert with C2, permits commanders 

to anticipate future conditions, establish priorities, exploit emerging opportunities, and act with a 

degree of speed and certainty not matched by our adversaries. 

SSA contributes to PBA by providing enabling information on space, a key portion of the 

battlespace. A predictive awareness of space allows commanders and their staffs to accurately 

anticipate changing conditions, establish priorities, and exploit emerging opportunities while 

minimizing the impact of unexpected consequences. 

24
CHAPTER FOUR 

DEFENSIVE COUNTERSPACE OPERATIONS 

 

The proverbial first shot of space warfare has

already been fired with the advent of jammers designed

to defeat the capabilities our airmen derive from space.

—The Honorable James G. Roche

Secretary of the Air Force

GENERAL 

 

Potential adversaries have access to capabilities, some commercially available, that can 

deceive, deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy US space capability. DCS operations preserve US and 

friendly ability to exploit space to its advantage via active and passive actions to protect friendly 

space-related capabilities from enemy attack or interference. 

DCS operations provide the means to deter and defend against attacks and to continue 

operations by limiting the effectiveness of hostile action against US space assets and forces. 

DCS operations include deterrence of attacks against our space system, defense of our space 

systems as they come under attack, and where necessary, recovery of our space forces and assets. 

Given the distributed nature of space systems, a variety of forces and assets are employed to 

deter, defend, and recover our space capabilities from attack. 

DETERRENCE 

Deterrence, with an emphasis on a demonstrated national policy of appropriate response 

to threats or attacks and the national will to respond to such threats or attacks, remains at the 

forefront in protection of our space system assets and forces. 

DEFENSE 

If deterrence fails, defense of US and friendly space capabilities from deception, denial, 

disruption, degradation, or destruction by an adversary is crucial to maintain space superiority. 

While many defensive measures are passive in nature, the ability to detect and characterize an 

attack on friendly space capabilities is critical for the initiation of most active measures. 

25
Passive Measures 

Passive measures limit the effectiveness of hostile action against US and friendly space 

systems and are employed to counter adversary attacks. Passive techniques for DCS operations 

include the use of camouflage, concealment, and deception, hardening of systems, and the use of 

dispersal. The objective of passive survivability is to provide a layered defense and to withstand 

attack without warning. 

 Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (CC&D). CC&D is most effective with 

terrestrial-based nodes. Certain types of ground-based components of space systems may 

operate under camouflage or be concealed within larger structures. These measures 

complicate adversary identification and targeting. 

 System Hardening. Hardening of space system links and nodes allow them to operate 

through attacks. Techniques such as filtering, shielding, and spread spectrum help to protect 

capabilities from radiation and electromagnetic pulse. Physical hardening of structures 

mitigates the impact of kinetic effects, but is generally more applicable to ground-based 

facilities than to space-based systems due to launch-weight considerations. Robust networks, 

hardened by equipment redundancy and the ability to reroute, ensure operation during and 

after information operations attack. 

 Dispersal of Space Systems. For space nodes, dispersal could involve deploying satellites 

into various orbital altitudes and planes. For terrestrial nodes, dispersal could involve 

deploying mobile ground stations to new locations. 

Attack Detection and Characterization 

Effective attack detection and characterization rely on robust space situation awareness. 

Detecting and characterizing an attack on space systems and assessing the impact of these 

attacks enable active defense measures and provide post-attack indications and warning for other 

space forces. 

 Detection. The process of attack detection confirms that a space system is under attack. The 

ability to quickly and accurately distinguish between hostile, unintentional, and natural 

events is critical to the ability to detect attacks on space systems. Without such confirmation, 

operations in retaliation should not be undertaken. Given today's capabilities, attack 

detection involves the support of multiple organizations. 

 Characterization. Identifying the nature of the attack and the type of attacking system

enables locating the attacker and initiating one or more courses of action in response. 

Ideally, analysis should take place as close to the tactical level as possible, thus decreasing 

the amount of time between detection and identification. Analysis may often take time due to 

the number of organizations involved, the need for certainty, and technological limitations. 

Detailed analysis may require the support of both DOD and non-DOD agencies. 

 Impact assessment. Impact assessment begins when an attack is detected. It provides an 

understanding of the impact an adversary attack is having on the targeted asset and any 

26
associated systems. Accurate assessment is important, as it provides a basis for determining 

the appropriate response to the attack. 

 Location. The location of an attacker must be known to suppress an attack. Various 

capabilities must be brought into support in a synergistic fashion to provide geographic 

location and confirmation of the location. 

Active Measures 

Active measures for DCS may involve actions to avoid or remove hostile effects.

Physical adjustments to the nodes and links of space systems, such as a maneuver or frequency 

change, may avoid hostile effects. Use of conventional or special operations forces may stop an 

adversary’s counterspace attack. The key to these active measures is early detection and 

characterization of the threat in order to determine the most effective countermeasure. 

 Maneuver/Mobility. Satellites may be capable of maneuvering in orbit to deny the 

adversary the opportunity to track and target them. They may be repositioned to avoid 

directed energy attacks, electromagnetic jamming, or kinetic attacks from antisatellite 

weapons (ASATs). Today, maneuver capability is limited by on-board fuel constraints, 

orbital mechanics, and advanced warning of an impending attack. Furthermore, 

repositioning satellites generally degrades or interrupts their mission. The use of mobile 

terrestrial nodes complicates adversarial attempts to locate and target command and mission 

data processing centers. However, movement of these nodes may also impact the system’s 

capability, as they must still retain line of sight with their associated space-based systems. 

Though the use of mobile technology is expanding, many of today's ground-based systems 

are not mobile, making physical security measures essential. 

 System Configuration Changes. Space-based and terrestrial nodes may use different modes 

of operation to enhance survivability against attacks. Examples include changing RF 

amplitude and employing frequency-hopping techniques to complicate jamming and 

encrypting data to prevent exploitation by unauthorized users. 

 Suppression of Adversary Counterspace Capabilities (SACC). SACC neutralizes or 

negates an adversary offensive counterspace system through deception, denial, disruption, 

degradation, and/or destruction. SACC operations can target air, land, sea, space, special 

operations, or information operations in response to an attack or threat of attack. Examples 

of SACC operations include (but are not limited to) attacks against adversary antisatellite 

weapons (before, during, or after employment), intercept of antisatellite systems, and 

destruction of RF jammers or laser blinders. 

RECOVERY 

Recovery operations focus on restoring a disrupted space capability. Two techniques 

that apply to recovery operations are redundancy and reconstitution. 

27
Redundancy 

Redundancy may be incorporated into space-based or terrestrial capabilities, or within a 

link itself. Redundancy in equipment components allows continued operations of specific 

platforms in the event of onboard hardware or software malfunction. Full systems may have 

redundancy through the use of on-orbit satellite spares, or use of alternate commanding, tracking, 

and relay stations. Link redundancy can be achieved through the use of alternate frequencies for 

command or mission information along with data multiplexing techniques. 

Reconstitution 

Reconstitution involves actions to restore operations after an attack. Reconstitution may 

involve repairing equipment that has been degraded or it may entail deploying new space and 

terrestrial platforms to replace combat losses. Reconstitution of satellite constellations requires 

responsive spacelift, availability of replacement spacecraft, and properly trained personnel to 

launch and operate the systems. 

DCS RESOURCES AND FORCES 

The following are some of the forces and weapon systems that could be used, if and when 

available, to support DCS operations: 

 Single integrated space picture would provide an accessible picture of global and theater 

space capabilities, threats and operations to commanders, planners, and combat forces, 

covering the full spectrum of friendly, adversary, and third party space systems. This would 

provide a comprehensive peacetime and wartime situation awareness capability, fusing 

information collected on all space systems, their ground, air, and space links and nodes to 

include their capabilities, status, vulnerability, and users. 

 Physical security systems provide security and force protection for critical ground facilities 

and equipment. A complementary mix of technology and security forces can effectively and 

efficiently mitigate specific threats in an ever-changing environment. When properly 

deployed and utilized, physical security systems can represent an effective deterrent and 

provide aggressive defense against terrestrial node attack and sabotage. 

 Air defense assets are capable of protecting launch and terrestrial nodes from air or missile 

attack. If threatened, commanders should consider deploying air defense assets such as 

fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and/or antiaircraft artillery to protect critical space 

assets (e.g., facilities and infrastructure). A sound air defense may deter an adversary and 

most certainly will be instrumental in defending our forces and assets if an attack is 

attempted. 

 Attack detection and characterization systems detect space system attacks and provide 

information on the characteristics of the attack, especially if the source and/or capability of

the attack is unknown or unexpected. These systems will support locating the source of the 

attack and the type of weapon used in the attack. They may be ground-, air- or space-based 

28
and either integrated with systems they protect or used in a stand-alone capacity. Having our 

adversaries aware of these capabilities may influence their decision and act as an effective 

deterrent. 

 Survivability countermeasures ensure critical space systems continue to operate both during 

and after attack. Examples include (but are not limited to): spacecraft system hardening, 

redundant systems (both on spacecraft and in ground stations), spacecraft maneuverability, 

ground station mobility, and jam-resistant communication links. Known survivability 

measures may deter an adversary from attacking our space capabilities. 

 Operations security (OPSEC) and information assurance (IA) protect our space systems 

by limiting the availability of information on their operations, capabilities, and limitations to 

our adversaries. IA protects critical computer systems from intrusion and exploitation. 

Guiding adversaries’ actions can successfully deter effects on our space services, but OPSEC 

and IA operations are primarily focused on defending our assets from attack. 

 Conventional and special operations forces conduct defensive counterspace operations 

through their ability to attack adversary counterspace capabilities. A demonstrated capability 

and willingness to counter their counterspace capabilities may deter an adversary from

attacking US/friendly space capabilities

29
30
CHAPTER FIVE 

OFFENSIVE COUNTERSPACE OPERATIONS 

Our dependence on operations in space, however, 

makes us somewhat vulnerable to new challenges. It's 

only logical to conclude that we must be attentive to 

these vulnerabilities and pay careful attention to 

protecting and promoting our interest in space. 

—The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld 

Secretary of Defense

GENERAL 

Potential adversaries have access to a range of space systems and services that could 

threaten our forces and national interests. Even an adversary without indigenous space assets 

may use space through US, allied, commercial, or consortium space services. These services 

include precision navigation, high-resolution imagery, environmental monitoring, and satellite 

communications. Denying adversary access to space capability and protecting US and friendly 

space capability may require taking the initiative to preempt or otherwise impede an adversary. 

Offensive counterspace operations preclude an adversary from exploiting space to 

their advantage. OCS operations may target an adversary’s space capability (space system, 

forces, information links, or third party space capability), using a variety of permanent and/or 

reversible means. The “Five D’s”—deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction—

are the possible desired effects when targeting an adversary’s space capability. 

 Deception employs manipulation, distortion, or falsification of information to induce 

adversaries to react in a manner contrary to their interests. 

 Disruption is the temporary impairment of some or all of a space system’s capability to 

produce effects, usually without physical damage. 

 Denial is the temporary elimination of some or all of a space system’s capability to produce 

effects, usually without physical damage. 

 Degradation is the permanent impairment of some or all of a space system’s capability to 

produce results, usually with physical damage. 

 Destruction is the permanent elimination of all of a space system’s capabilities to produce 

effects, usually with physical damage. 

31
OCS TARGETS 

OCS operations seek and attack targets in three general categories: space nodes, 

terrestrial nodes, and links. Space nodes may include satellites, space stations, or other 

spacecraft. Terrestrial nodes include land, sea, or airborne equipment and resources used to 

deploy, enable, interact with, or otherwise affect the space node. Communication links tie nodes 

together, and pass information between them. Understanding space capability as a system of 

nodes and links enables one to determine the best ways and means for affecting adversarial 

capability. The following are examples of OCS target sets: 

 On-orbit Satellites. Satellites are on-orbit assets consisting of a mission sensor and a 

satellite bus. The mission sensor provides raw data, which is usually sent to a ground station 

for processing. The satellite bus carries the mission sensor and provides it power, thermal 

control, and communications. OCS operations may target the mission sensor or the satellite 

bus. For example, a laser may deny, disrupt, degrade, or destroy certain types of sensors. 

Kinetic antisatellite weapons, on the other hand, usually target the satellite bus for physical 

destruction. 

 Communication Links. Space systems are dependent on RF and/or laser links to provide 

communication between space and terrestrial nodes (satellite to ground station or satellite to 

user), between terrestrial nodes (ground station to users), and between satellites (satellite to 

satellite). On-orbit satellites and ground-based satellite control stations/users send data up 

and down the link. In the up-link, command and control data tasks satellite mission payloads 

and subsystems. In the downlink, mission payload and satellite state-of-health data are sent 

to a ground station for processing. The ground station, after processing, often sends the 

mission data to the users via SATCOM for exploitation. In the case of SATCOM systems, 

data may be directly up-linked and then down-linked between users. Most space systems are 

ineffective without communication links. 

 Ground Stations. Ground-based systems perform

satellite command and control and mission data 

processing. Ground stations are normally permanent 

structures that may represent a single point of failure 

in a space system. Mobile ground stations can also 

be used to command and control a satellite, but may 

have no ability, or a limited capacity, for processing 

satellite mission data. 

 Launch Facilities. The ability to place satellites into 

orbit is the first step to space access; fundamental to 

the ability to operate and maintain space-based 

capability. Whether this capability is indigenous, or 

provided by a third party, it is the only means to deploy satellites to space and represents a 

primary choke-point for interdicting an adversary’s efforts to augment or reconstitute space 

forces. 

Defense Support Program 

(DSP) Ground Station 

32
 Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Systems. C4ISR systems are critical to the effective employment 

of forces and assets. Destruction of such systems would substantially reduce the enemy’s 

capability to detect, react, and bring forces to bear against friendly forces. Attacking C4ISR 

systems may contribute to OCS operations but may also contribute to strategic attack or 

counterair operations, depending on the intended effects.

 Third Party Providers. An adversary may gain significant space capabilities by using third 

party space systems. Using diplomatic or economic means to deny an adversary access to 

these third party (commercial or foreign) space capabilities will generally require the 

assistance of other US governmental agencies. 

OCS RESOURCES AND FORCES 

The effectiveness of OCS operations to affect the array of targets previously listed 

depends on the availability and capabilities of certain resources and systems. The choice of

system depends upon the situation, threats, weather, and available intelligence. Whenever 

possible, use systems and methods which minimize risk to friendly forces. For example, an 

aircraft employing standoff weapons may provide the same effect as an inserted SOF team on a 

direct mission, with less risk to friendly forces. The following are some of the forces and weapon 

systems that could be used, if and when available, to conduct OCS: 

 Aircraft. Friendly aircraft provide nonkinetic and kinetic capabilities against surface targets 

associated with an adversary’s space capabilities. For example, electronic attack platforms 

(manned and remotely piloted aircraft) could affect the links of an adversary’s space system

employing stand-off and stand-in techniques. By attacking terrestrial nodes, aircraft may 

disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy an adversary’s ability to control their satellites or deliver 

space effects. 

 Missiles. Missiles may be employed against a variety of an adversary’s space capabilities 

including launch facilities, ground stations, and space nodes. 

 Special Operations Forces (SOF). SOF can conduct direct attacks against terrestrial nodes 

or provide terminal guidance for attacks against those nodes. Additionally, SOF may be used 

to provide localized jamming of an adversary’s links. 

 Offensive Counterspace Systems. These systems are designed specifically for OCS 

operations, such as a counter satellite communications capability, designed to disrupt 

satellite-based communications used by an adversary or a counter surveillance 

reconnaissance capability, designed to impair an adversary’s ability to obtain targeting, battle 

damage assessment, and information by denying their use of satellite imagery with 

reversible, nondamaging effects. 

 Antisatellite Weapons (ASATs). ASATs include direct ascent and co-orbital systems that 

employ various mechanisms to affect or destroy an on-orbit spacecraft. 

33
 Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). DEWs, such as lasers, may be land, sea, air, or space 

based. Depending on the power level used, DEWs are capable of a wide range of effects 

against on-orbit spacecraft, including: heating, blinding optics, degradation, and destruction. 

Under certain circumstances, lasers may also be effective against space launch vehicles while 

in-flight. 

 Network Warfare Operations. Many OCS targets, particularly elements of the terrestrial 

node, may be affected by various IO techniques such as malicious codes, electronic warfare, 

or EMP generators. Some IO techniques afford access to targets that may be inaccessible by 

other means. 

 Electronic Warfare Weapons. RF jammers may be used to disrupt links. 

 C4ISR Systems. These systems include early warning and surveillance systems, satellites, 

radar, identification systems, communications systems, and surface-, air-, and space-based 

sensors. These systems enhance OCS operations by providing early warning, intelligence, 

targeting, and assessment data, as well as C2 of friendly forces.

 Surface Forces. The ability to occupy and secure key areas, as well as the lethality of 

supporting surface fires, can achieve significant counterspace effects. For example, surface 

forces can attack a satellite control station in order to disrupt, degrade, or destroy an 

adversary’s space capability.

34
CHAPTER SIX 

PLANNING AND EXECUTING COUNTERSPACE OPERATIONS 

... we've got in excess of 50 satellites that we're working as part 

of my quiver in the air and space applications; the satellites have 

been just unbelievably capable, not just the global positioning 

system, but all of the others in being able to support both 

conventional surface forces, the naval forces, special ops forces, 

and the air forces themselves. 

 —Lt Gen Michael Moseley 

 CFACC / SCA 

 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

GENERAL 

Counterspace operations entail the planning and executing of various forces that can 

contribute to space superiority (air, land, sea, space, special operations, or information 

operations). Strengths and limitations exist within each of the mediums that often make one type 

of force better suited to accomplish an objective than another. More often than not, the 

combination of capabilities creates the greatest effect on the adversary. The key is picking the 

right forces and combining them to create synergy, exerting the greatest pressure on the 

adversary. Air Force counterspace operations, given the potential for interdependence between 

theater and global space operations, requires a planning and execution process that synchronizes 

theater and global space operations to ensure space superiority for all US military forces. This 

chapter provides guidance pertaining to planning and execution of counterspace operations. 

PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF SPACE FORCES 

Distributed Operations/Reachback

 

Air Force space operations are integrated through the 14 AF’s space AOC and the theater 

air and space operations center. Depending on the situation and forces involved, counterspace 

operations planning and execution may be accomplished via distributed operations, reachback, 

or a combination of the two. 

Distributed operations occur when independent or interdependent nodes or locations 

participate in the operational planning and/or operational decision-making process to accomplish 

goals/missions for engaged commanders [AFDD 2-8, Command and Control]. Although 

distributed operations are similar to reachback, there is one major difference. Reachback 

provides ongoing combat support to the operation from the rear while a distributed operation 

35
indicates actual involvement in the operational planning and/or operational decision making. The 

goal of effective distributed operations is to support the operational commander in the field; it is 

not a method of command from the rear. 

Reachback is a generic term for obtaining forces, material, or information support from

Air Force organizations not forward-deployed [AFDD 2-8]. Communications and information 

systems should provide a seamless information flow of prioritized data to and from forward and 

rear locations. Reachback command and control is normally provided from a 

supporting/supported relationship. This relationship gives the forward-deployed COMAFFOR 

the support necessary to conduct operations while maintaining a smaller deployed footprint. 

Air Tasking Cycle 

The air tasking cycle is the process the theater AOC uses to translate theater joint force 

commander’s objectives, priorities, and intent into a coherent, executable plan for assigned and 

attached Air Force air and space forces. The air tasking order, a key product of the space tasking 

cycle, is used to task and execute assigned and attached air and space forces. 

The air tasking cycle is an iterative process for planning, coordinating, apportioning, 

allocating, executing, and assessing the effectiveness of air and space operations. The cycle is 

typically a 72-hour development process followed by 24 hours of execution, but can be 

lengthened or shortened to meet the theater battle rhythm. The 72-hour horizon accommodates 

longer-range planning, allowing planners to anticipate the enemy and assess friendly actions, 

which enables them to get inside the enemy’s decision cycle. It includes continuous collection, 

correlation, and prioritization of many inputs to meet theater JFC’s intent and objectives. 

The joint air and space operations plan (JAOP) reflects the integrated air, space, and 

information operations plan to support the JFC’s campaign. It should include the tasking of all 

assigned or attached space forces and all requests for theater support from global space forces. 

Air Force space forces that are OPCON or TACON to a theater COMAFFOR or 

COMAFFOR/JFACC will be integrated into operations via the air tasking cycle and tasked via 

the ATO. Further details on planning and execution of theater space forces can be found in 

AFDD 2-2. 

Space Tasking Cycle 

The space tasking cycle is the process the space AOC uses to translate 

CDRUSSTRATCOM and theater joint force commander’s objectives, priorities, and intent into a 

coherent, executable plan for Air Force space forces. The STO, a key product of the space 

tasking cycle, is used to task and execute AFSPC assigned and attached space forces. 

The space tasking cycle, based on the air tasking cycle, is an iterative process for 

planning, coordinating, apportioning, allocating, executing, and assessing the effectiveness of 

space operations. The cycle is typically a 72-hour development process followed by 24 hours of 

execution, but can be lengthened or shortened to meet the theater battle rhythm. The 72-hour 

36
horizon accommodates longer-range planning, allowing planners to anticipate the enemy and 

assess friendly actions, which enables them to get inside the enemy’s decision cycle. It includes 

continuous collection, correlation, and prioritization of many inputs to meet both 

CDRUSSTRATCOM and theater JFC’s intent and objectives. 

The STO is derived from CDRUSSTRATCOM orders and, when supported, JFC’s 

orders. It tasks and executes AFSPC assigned and attached space forces, provides guidance for 

synchronization of global and theater joint air and space operations, and provides special 

instructions (SPINS) for the 24-hour period it covers. Every space operation during that period 

should be on the STO for situation awareness and deconfliction purposes. Further details on 

planning and execution of global space forces can be found in AFDD 2-2. 

Synchronization of Theater and Global Operations 

When the space AOC is supporting a theater operation, the STO is synchronized with the 

theater ATO throughout the tasking cycle (Figure 6.1), with theater operators working closely 

with those at the space AOC. The space tasking cycle is synchronized with the air tasking cycle 

to optimize space support to the theater. The theater AOC and space AOC run parallel 

processes, such as guidance, apportionment, and targeting (GAT) and master air and space attack 

plan (MAAP) teams, on the same battle rhythm. The space AOC, using guidance from the 

COMAFFOR/JFACC, helps develop space courses of action in support of theater operations. 

During the planning phase, the space AOC uses JFACC guidance, rules of engagement (ROE), 

the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL), the target nomination list (TNL), and the 

approved MAAP, to finalize the STO. After the ATO is finalized, the theater AOC forwards it to 

all required users to include the space AOC. The 14 AF/CC approves the STO, ensuring it 

reflects theater taskings, and disseminates it to all required users to include the theater AOC. The 

STO, normally disseminated 6 hours prior to implementation, tasks AFSPC assigned and 

attached space forces to meet theater and global requirements for the next 24-hour period. 

Furthermore, within the 24-hour period of execution, space tasking can occur dynamically to 

meet the supported commander's requests. 

37
Day -2

Planning

Day -1

Production

Day 0

Execution

ATO

Production GAT MAAP

H

Deconfliction

STO

Execution GAT

STRAT

Dev

Day -3

Planning

STRAT

Dev

STO

(H-6hrs)

ATO

(H-12hrs) AOD JIPTL

TNL

MAAP

ATO

Execution Assessment

Assessment

CTL

Dev

AOD: Air and Space Operations Directive

ATO: Air Tasking Order

CA: Combat Assessment

CTL: Combined Target List

GAT: Guidance, Apportionment, Targeting

JIPTL: Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List

MAAP: Master Air & Space Attack Plan

OA: Operations Assessment

STO: S pace Tasking Order

TNL: Target Nomination List

C

A

O

A

MAAP

ThTheeaatteerr A AOOCC

SpSpaaccee A AOOCC

Unit

MAAP Reports

Input

ATO

Changes

Combined

Assessment

Report

ATO

STO STO Production

Figure 6.1. Notional Process for ATO/STO Synchronization 

PLANNING AND EXECUTING COUNTERSPACE OPERATIONS 

Air Force counterspace operations planning and execution should be in accordance with 

AFDD 2; AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare; and AFDD 2-2. Refer to these documents for in-depth 

explanation of the planning and execution processes utilized by the Air Force to accomplish 

counterspace operations. The material below highlights some of the unique factors that should be 

taken into account when planning and executing counterspace operations. 

Effects-based Approach 

Fundamental to the Air Force’s success in warfare, is its ability to focus on the effects 

necessary to achieve campaign objectives, whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical level. 

Effects are outcomes, events, or consequences resulting from specific actions. As such, they 

should contribute directly to desired military and political objectives. This emphasis on effects 

is as crucial for successful counterspace operations as for any other air and space power function. 

Counterspace operations entail a strategy to task planning methodology whereby tasks are 

defined, planned, and carried out that most effectively and efficiently achieve space 

superiority.

 

An effects-based methodology of planning places the highest priority on achieving a 

given desired outcome, in order to attain or directly contribute to the attainment of military and 

political objectives. An effects-based analysis is critical to ensure congruence between tactical, 

operational, and strategic objectives. An effects-based methodology requires thorough 

38
examination of the conditions or circumstances surrounding the military action and causal 

linkages between actions and objectives in order to determine which tactics might be most 

successful and which tactics might prove detrimental to the campaign. 

Counterspace operations can create effects at the tactical, operational, and strategic level 

of war. Denying an adversary's access to space can carry many intended and unintended 

consequences transcending military operations, potentially impacting a nation's economy and 

diplomatic position. Due to the potential for wide-ranging effects, when planning 

counterspace actions, Airmen ensure the tactical action supports the operational and 

strategic level objectives and strategies.

Legal Considerations 

To the extent allowed under international and domestic laws, national space policy 

allows defense- and intelligence-related activities in pursuit of national security and other goals. 

In general, counterspace operations are legally permitted to the extent they are conducted for 

national or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter or when the 

United Nations Security Council authorizes the use of force. In all cases, a judge advocate 

should be involved when considering specific counterspace operations to ensure compliance 

with domestic and international law and applicable rules of engagement.

Course of Action (COA) Development 

COA development focuses on how counterspace operations will ensure friendly space 

superiority. A strategy to task methodology, accounting for the complexity of counterspace 

operations, ensures support to both CDRUSSTATCOM and theater JFC objectives. Airmen 

should consider the following when developing COAs for defensive and offensive counterspace 

operations: 

 Space Situation Awareness. The success of counterspace operations, both defensive and 

offensive, is critically dependent on the intelligence support provided during COA 

development. Intelligence support of counterspace operations can be a complex task, 

requiring multiple resources and focused attention. Due to the depth of intelligence analysis 

required, there may be long lead times to obtain the necessary intelligence on adversary 

space capabilities. 

 Friendly COG. A planner must understand friendly space capabilities, provided by organic 

and/or third party assets. Identification of a friendly space COG is not always clear-cut, 

particularly when a third party provides space support. Extensive use of military, civil, and 

commercial space systems, and the resulting dependency on these systems, makes friendly 

COG identification an important step in defensive counterspace operations. 

 Adversary COG. A planner must understand the adversary’s space capabilities, provided 

by organic and/or third party assets. Identification of an adversary’s space COG is not 

always clear-cut, particularly when a third party provides space support. A thorough analysis 

of adversary space capabilities, including insight into the owners, operators, and users of 

39
both organic and third party assets, should minimize unintended effects of counterspace 

operations. 

 Adversary’s Counterspace Strategy. Adversaries may have capabilities that can deny 

friendly forces access to space capability. Planners must consider friendly space 

vulnerabilities as well as the adversary's ability and will to carry out their own counterspace 

operations. 

Targeting 

Counterspace target sets are those that directly or indirectly impact US and friendly space 

superiority. CDRUSSTRATCOM and/or JFC’s guidance and objectives, coupled with 

intelligence assessments of enemy threats, locations, and capabilities help determine target 

selection, target priority, and sequencing. Airmen may plan targets prior to hostilities and keep 

them current based on the latest intelligence. Planners evaluate target defenses, to include active 

and passive measures, and determine the vulnerability of each target. They consider means and 

resources available to reduce collateral effects. 

Planners must decide on the desired effect—deception, disruption, denial, degradation, 

and destruction—when targeting an adversary’s space capability. There may be times when 

temporary, reversible counterspace operations prove more appropriate than operations that 

permanently degrade or destroy space capabilities. 

Airmen should consider the following when planning defensive and offensive 

counterspace operations: 

 Ground Stations. Ground-based C2 and data processing facilities are often located deep 

within an enemy’s territory or may be located in neutral countries. While most are 

vulnerable, some may be deeply buried or hardened. Ground facilities may be located among 

the civilian population, within the scientific community, or operated by civilian personnel. 

 Satellite Communications. The orbital altitude, number 

of spacecraft, communications scheme, and number and 

mobility of ground stations complicate attempts to 

counter this capability. Many communications satellites 

are owned and controlled by third party providers, to 

include governments, commercial interests, and 

multinational consortia. Multiple transponders allow 

providers to service the communications requirements of 

many users, including some who may be adversarial and 

others who may be friendly or neutral. Therefore, 

planned action against space communication assets must 

be carefully deconflicted to avoid unintended 

consequences.

Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM 

AFSPC optimized GPS 

performance for precision 

strikes. 

40
 Space-based Navigation. The large number of satellites in a typical navigation satellite 

constellation may make antisatellite attacks inefficient. Electronic warfare can have a 

significant effect on navigation satellite signal availability within a theater of operations or 

localized area. Due to the dependency of friendly forces on satellite navigation systems and 

the large number of civilian users, careful consideration must be given to potential 

unintended collateral effects.

 ISR. ISR spacecraft operate in a variety of orbital altitudes, depending on their specific 

function. Optical reconnaissance satellites normally operate in low orbits and may be few in 

number. These factors increase their vulnerability. As with most space systems, the ground 

stations are potentially vulnerable to attack and the links are usually vulnerable to jamming. 

 Weather Satellites. Some weather spacecraft operate in low earth orbit (LEO) and are 

vulnerable to physical attack from a variety of systems, while others operate in the relative 

safety of geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO). Whether in LEO or GEO, the links and 

terrestrial nodes may be vulnerable to attack or disruption. When planning operations 

against an adversary’s space-based weather capabilities, consider potential collateral impacts 

on friendly or neutral nations’ assets or information. 

 Space Launch Facilities. Space launch facilities are normally few in number and are at 

known locations, with large facilities for production and launch operations. These 

characteristics make space launch infrastructure potentially vulnerable to attack by a wide 

variety of possible methods. However, few nations possess indigenous spacelift capability. 

As a result, infrastructure supporting adversarial interests may be in third party countries. 

 Adversary Use of Space. An adversary’s space strategy and pattern of satellite usage must 

be considered in order to effectively plan counterspace operations. For example, does the 

adversary have terrestrial back-up systems to the targeted space capability? If so, those backup systems may also have to be targeted in order to produce the desired effect against the 

adversary. What types of strategies will the adversary employ to deter attacks, and if

attacked, how will they respond? For example, are adversary command and control ground 

stations collocated with the civilian population or do they have mobile command and control 

capabilities? Do they leverage commercial space services or other arrangements? Targeting 

for counterspace operations can be a significant challenge given the technical complexity of 

space systems and an adversary’s strategy to exploit those capabilities. 

Deconfliction 

Counterspace operations must be deconflicted with other friendly operations to 

minimize unintended effects. Counterspace operations could have unintended consequences 

against other space systems. Therefore, space situation awareness of DOD and non-DOD space 

systems is vital for deconfliction of counterspace operations. Likewise, counterspace operations 

are closely related to information operations. Today’s space systems derive their utility as 

collectors, fusers, and disseminators of information. Counterspace operations, by ensuring space 

superiority, protect friendly use of space-derived information and can deny the adversary the 

same. Deconfliction of counterspace and information operations may be required given 

41
counterspace operations can result in substantial losses in exploitable intelligence. Information 

operations should often be considered when planning and executing counterspace operations, 

and vice versa. 

Approval Authority 

Counterspace operations will likely require different levels of approval authority

depending on the type of operation, potential collateral effects on civilian and third party 

populations, ownership of the target, location of the target (space node, terrestrial node, or link), 

permanency of effects, and the policy regarding that type of operation. Certain counterspace 

operations carry greater consequence than others. For example, operations against on-orbit 

systems may have greater consequences than those against satellite ground stations. Likewise, 

counterspace operations against adversaries using third party space capabilities may have 

economic, diplomatic, and political implications. 

 

Approval authority should be delegated to the lowest level, commensurate with the 

responsibility, to facilitate accomplishment of counterspace operations. However, depending on 

the potential effect of the operation, approval authority may be held at the most senior levels. 

Planners must be familiar with different approval levels established by law, policy, and ROE. 

Processes should be in place to rapidly coordinate and gain approval for counterspace operations. 

Rules of Engagement (ROE) 

Establishing detailed ROE prior to military employment can enhance 

responsiveness of counterspace operations. Clear and concise ROE and leadership intent are 

critical to the effective conduct and timeliness of counterspace operations. While these rules 

provide top-down directives on the authorized use of force in military operations, they are not a 

substitute for planning. It is imperative that ROE be established during the planning phase, 

prior to military employment, in order to assure responsiveness of counterspace 

operations. Planners should refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces, as well as theater-specific or 

supplemental ROE for a particular operation. 

Assessment 

Assessment provides feedback on the impact of counterspace operations. Timely 

assessment allows the commander to evaluate and adjust counterspace operations in response to 

ineffective operations or adversary actions, or to determine when/if a reattack is necessary. 

Assessment merges the picture of what was done with how it was done and compares the 

results with predetermined metrics. These metrics are developed to assess tactical-, operational-, 

and strategic-level success, explaining how the operations will work (planned actions, causal 

linkages, desired effects). 

42
Space situation awareness is crucial for assessment of counterspace operations. SSA 

is an important source of BDA, particularly for counterspace operations against space nodes and 

links. Certain counterspace operations, particularly those with nonkinetic effects, may require 

focused, real-time BDA to effectively assess an adversary’s defensive counterspace response. 

At the very heart of warfare lies 

doctrine...

43
44
SUGGESTED READINGS 

Air Force Publications 

(Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the Air Force Doctrine Center web 

page at https://www.doctrine.af.mil) 

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine

AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power 

AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare

AFDD 2-2, Space Operations

AFDD 2-5, Information Operations 

AFDD 2-5.1, Electronic Warfare 

AFDD 2-8, Command and Control

Joint Publications 

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

JP 3-13, Information Operations

JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions 

CJCSI 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces

Department of Defense Directives 

DODD 3100.10, Department of Defense Space Policy

Other Publications 

Chun, Clayton K.S., Lt Colonel, USAF, Shooting Down a "Star": Program 437, the US Nuclear 

ASAT System and Present-Day Copycat Killers (Air University Press). 2000. 

“The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and 

Organization – Final Report.” 2001. 

Lupton, David E., Lieutenant Colonel, USAF (Retired), On Space Warfare: A Space Power 

Doctrine (Air University Press). 1988. 

45
Mantz, Michael R, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, The New Sword: A Theory of Space Combat 

Power (Air University Press). 1995. 

National Space Policy, National Science and Technology Council (The White House). 1996. 

Oberg, James E., Space Power Theory (Government Printing Office). 1999. 

US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-18, Space Support to Army Operations

46
GLOSSARY 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document 

AFOTTP Air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 

AFSPC Air Force Space Command 

AFSPC/CC Commander, Air Force Space Command 

AFTTP Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 

AOC air operations center (JP 1-02); 

air and space operations center {USAF} 

AOD air and space operations directive 

AOR area of responsibility 

ASAT antisatellite weapon 

ATO air tasking order 

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System 

BDA battle damage assessment 

C2 command and control 

C3 command, control, and communications 

C3ISR command, control, communications, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance 

C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance

CAS close air support 

CC&D camouflage, concealment, and deception 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

CFACC combined force air component commander [JP 1-02]; 

combined forces air and space component commander 

{USAF} 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

CJCSI Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 

COA course of action 

COCOM combatant command (command authority)

COG center of gravity 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

CSAF Chief of Staff, United States Air Force 

CTL combined target list 

DCS defensive counterspace 

DEW directed energy weapon 

DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 

DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized

DIRSPACEFOR director of space forces 

DOD Department of Defense 

47
DODD Department of Defense Directive 

DSP Defense Support Program

EMP electromagnetic pulse

Five Ds deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction 

GAT guidance, apportionment, and targeting

GEO geosynchronous earth orbit

GPS global positioning system

IA information assurance 

IO information operations 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

JAOP joint air operations plan [JP 1-02]; joint air and space operations plan {USAF} 

JFACC joint force air component commander [JP 1-02]; 

joint force air and space component commander {USAF} 

JFC joint force commander 

JIPTL joint integrated prioritized target list 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

JSST joint space support team

JTF joint task force 

JTAGS joint tactical ground station 

LEO low earth orbit 

MAAP master air attack plan (JP 1-02); 

master air and space attack plan {USAF} 

NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NIST national intelligence support team

NRO National Reconnaissance Office 

NSA National Security Agency 

OCS offensive counterspace 

OPCON operational control 

OPSEC operations security

PBA predictive battlespace awareness 

RF radio frequency 

RFI radio frequency interference 

48
ROE rules of engagement 

RPA remotely piloted aircraft

SACC suppression of adversary counterspace capabilities 

SATCOM satellite communications 

SCA space coordinating authority 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SIPB space intelligence preparation of the battlespace 

SISP single integrated space picture 

SOF special operations force 

SPINS special instructions

SSA space situation awareness 

STO space tasking order 

TACON tactical control 

TNL target nomination list 

UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces

US United States 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

49
Definitions 

air and space power. The synergistic application of air, space, and information systems to 

project global strategic military power. (AFDD 1) 

battlespace. The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully 

apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, 

space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the 

electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and 

areas of interest. (JP 1-02). 

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or 

operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02) 

center of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which a military 

force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight Also called COGs. (JP 1-

02) [In Air Force terms, a COG is a primary source of moral (i.e., political leadership, social 

dynamics, cultural values, or religion) or physical (i.e., military, industrial, or economic)

strength from which a nation, alliance, or military force in a given strategic, operational, or 

tactical context derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight]. {Italicized 

words in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.} 

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established 

by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of 

unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the 

Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the 

authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned 

forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating 

objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint 

training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. 

Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force 

commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command 

(command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the 

combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control 

is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02) 

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under 

a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of 

Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02) 

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 

commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command 

and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 

50
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, 

coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also 

called C2. (JP 1-02) 

counterinformation. Counterinformation seeks to establish a desired degree of control in 

information functions that permits friendly forces to operate at a given time or place without 

prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (AFDD 2-5) 

counterspace. Those offensive and defensive operations conducted by air, land, sea, space, 

special operations, and information forces with the objective of gaining and maintaining control 

of activities conducted in or through the space environment. (AFDD 2-2) 

defensive counterspace. Operations to preserve US/friendly ability to exploit space to its 

advantage via active and passive actions to protect friendly space-related capabilities from

adversary attack or interference. Also called DCS. 

DIRSPACEFOR. The Air Force officer serving as the senior space advisor to the commander, 

Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) or the COMAFFOR/joint force air and space component 

commander (JFACC). The DIRSPACEFOR conducts coordination, integration, and staffing 

activities to tailor space support for the COMAFFOR or COMAFFOR / JFACC. (AFDD 2-2.1) 

distributed operations. The process of conducting operations from independent or 

interdependent nodes in a teaming manner. Some operational planning or decision-making may 

occur from outside the joint area of operations. The goal of a distributed operation is to support 

the operational commander in the field; it is not a method of command from the rear. (AFDD 2-

8) 

effects. A full range of outcomes, events, or consequences of a particular action or set of 

actions. The action can derive from any element of power—economic, political, military, 

diplomatic, or informational—and may occur at any point across the continuum from peace to 

global conflict. (AFDD 2-1.2) 

effects-based. Actions, such as operations, targeting, or strategy, that are designed to produce 

distinctive and desired effects while avoiding unintended or undesired effects. (AFDD 2-1.2) 

effects-based approach. Actions taken against adversary systems designed to achieve specific 

effects that contribute directly to desired military and political outcomes. 

global positioning system. A satellite constellation that provides highly accurate position, 

velocity, and time navigation information to users. Also called GPS (JP 1-02) 

information operations. Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems 

while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO. (JP 1-02) 

[Information operations are the integrated employment of the core capabilities of Influence 

Operations, Electronic Warfare Operations, Network Warfare Operations, in concert with 

specified Integrated Control Enablers, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human 

51
and automated decision making while protecting our own.] (AFDD 2-2.1) {Italicized words in 

brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.} 

information warfare. Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary 

information, information-based processes, information systems and computer-based networks 

while leveraging and defending one’s own information, information-based processes, 

information systems and computer-based networks. Also called IW. (JP 1-02) [The theory of 

warfare in the information environment that guides the employment of information operations 

capabilities. Parallels and complements the theory of air warfare.] (AFDD 2-2.1) {Italicized 

words in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.} 

intelligence preparation of the battlespace. An analytical methodology employed to reduce 

uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. 

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential area in 

which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the 

impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. 

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (JP 1-02)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more 

Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02) 

joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander derives 

authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, 

assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize 

forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force 

commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air 

component commander’s responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander 

(normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and 

tasking based on the joint force commander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint force 

commander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component 

commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component 

commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various 

missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02) [The JFACC uses the joint air and 

space operations center to command and control the integrated air and space effort to meet joint 

force commander’s objectives. The Air Force position is that air power and space power 

together create effects that cannot be achieved through air or space power alone.] (AFDD 2)

{Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified 

commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command 

(command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02) 

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a position of advantage over the enemy. 

2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 

3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. 

Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire 

52
potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the 

mission. (JP 1-02) 

offensive counterspace. Operations to preclude an adversary from exploiting space to their 

advantage. Also called OCS. (AFDD 2-2.1) 

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon 

at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant 

command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are 

transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander 

will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by 

the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of 

command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, 

assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to 

accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of 

military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the 

command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate 

organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders 

and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides 

full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in 

operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of 

itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal 

organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02) 

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are 

planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of 

operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives 

needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational 

objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. 

These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the 

logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical 

successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (JP 1-02) 

operations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing 

friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions 

that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile 

intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical 

information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate 

or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. 

Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02) 

order of battle. The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the 

personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. Also called OB; OOB. (JP 1-02) 

predictive battlespace awareness. An effort to allow commanders to better anticipate where 

contingencies will arise and to permit development of courses of actions to deal with the new 

53
situations. Also called PBA. (AFDD 2-2.1) 

reachback. The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or 

equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 1-02) 

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the 

circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue 

combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

space. A medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be conducted 

to achieve US national security objectives. (JP 1-02)

space capability. 1. The ability of a space asset to accomplish a mission. 2. The ability of a 

terrestrial-based asset to accomplish a mission in space (e.g., a ground-based or airborne laser 

capable of negating a satellite). (JP 1-02) [The ability of a space asset or system to accomplish a 

mission.] { Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

space coordinating authority. The single authority designated, by the supported combatant 

commander or JFC, to coordinate joint theater space operations and to integrate space 

capabilities thereby facilitating unity of the theater/JOA space effort. Also called SCA. (AFDD 

2-2.1) 

space control. Combat, combat support, and combat service support operations to ensure 

freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, deny an 

adversary freedom of action in space. The space control mission area includes: surveillance of 

space; protection of US and friendly space systems; prevention of an adversary’s ability to use 

space systems and services for purposes hostile to US national security interests; negation of 

space systems and services used for purposes hostile to US national security interests; and 

directly supporting battle management, command, control, communications, and intelligence. (JP 

1-02) [Operations to assure the friendly use of the space environment while denying its use to the 

enemy. Achieved through offensive and defensive counterspace carried out to gain and maintain 

control of activities conducted in or through the space environment.] (AFDD 2-2). {Italicized 

words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

space environment. The region beginning at the lower boundary of the Earth’s ionosphere 

(approximately 50 km) and extending outward that contains solid particles (asteroids and 

meteoroids), energetic charged particles (ions, protons, electrons, etc.), and electromagnetic and 

ionizing radiation (x-rays, extreme ultraviolet, gamma rays, etc.). (JP 1-02)

space forces. The space and terrestrial systems, equipment, facilities, organizations, and 

personnel necessary to access, use and, if directed, control space for national security. (JP 1-02)

space situation awareness. The knowledge and intelligence that provides the planner, 

commander, and executor with sufficient awareness of objects, activities, and the environment to 

enable course of action development. This involves characterizing, as completely as possible, 

the space capabilities operating within the terrestrial and space environments. Space situation 

54
awareness forms the foundation for all space activities, and is the enabler for counterspace 

operations. Also called SSA. (AFDD 2-2.1) 

space superiority. The degree of dominance in space of one force over another that permits the 

conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, air, space, and special operations 

forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (JP 1-02) 

[The degree of control necessary to employ, maneuver, and engage space forces while denying 

the same capability to an adversary.] {Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force 

and are offered for clarity.} 

space support. Combat service support operations to deploy and sustain military and 

intelligence systems in space. The space support mission area includes launching and deploying 

space vehicles, maintaining and sustaining spacecraft on-orbit, and deorbiting and recovering 

space vehicles, if required. (JP 1-02) [Those operations conducted with the objective of 

deploying, sustaining, and augmenting elements or capabilities of military space systems. Space 

support consists of spacelift and on-orbit support.] [AFDD 2-2] { Italicized words in brackets 

apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity. 

space support team. A team of space operations experts provided by the Commander, US 

Space Command (or one of the space component commands and augmented by national 

agencies, as required) upon request of a geographic combatant commander to assist the 

supported commander in integrating space power into the terrestrial campaign. Also called SST. 

(JP 1-02)

space systems. All of the devices and organizations forming the space network. These consist 

of: spacecraft; mission packages(s); ground stations; data links among spacecraft, mission or 

user terminals, which may include initial reception, processing, and exploitation; launch systems; 

and directly related supporting infrastructure, including space surveillance and battle 

management and/or command, control, communications and computers. (JP 1-02)

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of 

nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and 

guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at 

this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define 

limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop 

global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and 

other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02) 

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a 

task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. 

In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares 

operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who 

receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for 

ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02) 

55
supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support 

to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated 

combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support 

command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another 

commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the 

supported commander. (JP 1-02) 

suppression of adversary counterspace capabilities. Suppression that neutralizes or negates 

an adversary offensive counterspace system through deception, denial, disruption, degradation, 

and/or destruction. These operations can target ground, air, missile, or space threats in response 

to an attack or threat of attack. Also called SACC. (AFDD 2-2.1) 

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military 

capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and 

control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish 

missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control 

may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. 

When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the 

gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces 

must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for 

controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within 

the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02) 

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and 

executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at 

this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each 

other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 1-02) 

56