AFDD Template Guide 

20 September 2002

.

SPACE OPERATIONS 

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2 

27 November 2006 

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-14, 

Joint Doctrine for Space Operations.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-2 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 27 NOVEMBER 2006 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

This version updates Air Force space doctrine based on recent operational 

experience. The chapter on command and control defines space coordinating authority 

(page 13), discusses the joint force air and space component commander’s role as the 

supported commander for counterspace operations (page 15), and includes the position 

of director of space forces (page 16). The planning chapter describes space integration 

considerations for planners based on observations during recent military operations 

(page 21). The execution chapter expands discussion of the space air and space 

operations center, which now operates as the joint space operations center (page 29). 

Finally, the development of the space professionals chapter updates the discussion of 

exercises, wargames, red teaming and experiments (pages 38). 

Supersedes: AFDD 2-2, 27 November 2001 

OPR: HQ AFDC/DD 

Certified by: HQ AFDC/CC (Maj Gen Allen G. Peck) 

Pages: 64

Accessibility: Available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading 

Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication 

Approved by: T. MICHAEL MOSELEY, General, USAF 

 Chief of Staff 
FOREWORD 

The mission of the United States Air Force is to deliver sovereign options for the 

defense of the United States of America and its global interests – to fly and fight in Air, 

Space, and Cyberspace. 

Our space forces perform functions that are critical for the joint force—

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; command and control; positioning, 

navigation, and timing; weather services; counterspace; communications; and spacelift. 

As our reliance on space increases, so too, must our ability to integrate space 

capabilities throughout joint operations. To retain the US military’s asymmetric 

advantage based on space superiority, our Air Force must fully exploit and defend the 

space domain. 

To that end, our space warfighters are Airmen trained in the operation and 

employment of space operational concepts and forces. These Airmen integrate air and 

space power with joint forces on a daily basis, proving their worth in military operations. 

This space operations doctrine describes our shared beliefs about the integration 

of space power across the range of military operations. Specifically, it recommends a 

command and control construct for space operations we found extremely effective in 

recent operations. As a keystone doctrine document, it emphasizes the forcemultiplying and enabling nature of space operations. It is our job as Airmen to operate 

and organize space forces based on the premises articulated in this doctrine. 

T. MICHAEL MOSELEY 

General, USAF 

Chief of Staff 
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... v 

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS ..................................................................... vii 

CHAPTER ONE—Space Operations Fundamentals ............................................................. 1 

An Airman’s Perspective on Space Power .......................................................................... 2 

Key Space Operations Principles .......................................................................................... 4 

CHAPTER TWO—Command and Control (C2) of Space Operations ................................ 8 

Global And Theater Considerations...................................................................................... 9 

C2 of Global Space Forces .................................................................................................. 10 

C2 of Theater Space Forces ................................................................................................ 10 

Integrating Global Space Forces ..................................................................................... 11 

Theater Space Forces....................................................................................................... 12 

Theater-organic Space Forces......................................................................................... 13 

Presentation of Forces ...................................................................................................... 13 

The Combined Force Air and Space Component Commander’s Authority and 

 Role in Theater Space Operations.................................................................................. 13 

Space Coordinating Authority........................................................................................... 13 

Supported Commander for Counterspace Operations and Strategic Attack............ 15 

Director of Space Forces .................................................................................................. 16 

CHAPTER THREE—Planning for Space Operations .......................................................... 18 

Campaign Planning................................................................................................................ 18 

Contingency Planning........................................................................................................ 18 

Crisis Action Planning........................................................................................................ 19 

Range of Military Operations............................................................................................ 19 

Air and Space Operations Planning ................................................................................ 20 

Joint Space Operations Plan Development ................................................................... 20 

Planning Factors .................................................................................................................... 21 

Phasing ................................................................................................................................ 21 

Space Integration Considerations ................................................................................... 21 

Space Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.................................... 24 

Spacelift ................................................................................................................................... 25 

Legal Issues............................................................................................................................ 26 

CHAPTER FOUR—Executing Space Operations ................................................................ 29 

Execution of Global Forces .................................................................................................. 29 

Space Air and Space Operations Center (AOC)/Joint Space Operations Center 

(JSpOC)............................................................................................................................... 29 

Space AOC/JSpOC Organization.................................................................................... 30 

Integrating Global With Theater Space Operations...................................................... 32 

Execution of Space Forces in Theater................................................................................ 34 

Integrating Civil, Commercial, Foreign Space Assets...................................................... 35 

Responding to an Asymmetric Attack Against US Space Capabilities.......................... 36 
iv

CHAPTER FIVE—Development of Space Professionals.................................................... 38 

Space Training and Evaluation............................................................................................ 38 

Exercises ................................................................................................................................. 39 

Integrated Air, Space, and Information Test Range ..................................................... 39 

Education................................................................................................................................. 39 

Developmental Education................................................................................................. 39 

Wargames ............................................................................................................................... 40 

Red Teaming .......................................................................................................................... 40 

Experiments ............................................................................................................................ 40 

Suggested Readings ................................................................................................................. 41 

Appendix...................................................................................................................................... 43 

Glossary....................................................................................................................................... 51 
v

INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

This document refines general doctrinal guidance from Air Force Doctrine 

Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, and AFDD 2, Operations and 

Organization. It establishes specific doctrinal guidance for space operations integrated 

across the range of military operations that extends from military engagement, security 

cooperation, and deterrence, to crisis response, contingencies and, if necessary, major 

operations and campaigns. This doctrine forms the foundation upon which Air Force 

commanders plan, execute and assess space operations, as well as integrate space 

capabilities throughout joint operations. 

APPLICATION 

This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel, 

including regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units and members. 

Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of 

military operations. 

 The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, 

commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation 

when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it. 

SCOPE 

This doctrine expands upon basic Air Force beliefs and operating principles 

found in AFDD 1 and AFDD 2, providing further detail on employing space forces and 

capabilities in the joint environment. Air Force forces, to include people, weapons, and 

support systems, can be used at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of military 

operations. This document discusses the fundamental beliefs that underpin the 

application of space power to accomplish missions assigned by the President and the 

Secretary of Defense. 
vi

COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC 

A note on terminology 

One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that “the US Air Force 

prefers - and in fact, plans and trains - to employ through a commander, Air 

Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and 

space component commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1) 

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine documents will 

assume the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated 

otherwise. The term “COMAFFOR” refers to the Air Force Service component 

commander while the term ”JFACC” refers to the joint component-level 

operational commander. 

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will 

normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are 

different, and should be executed through different staffs. 

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational control/ 

administrative control of assigned and attached Air Force forces through a 

Service A-staff while the JFACC function executes tactical control of joint air and 

space component forces through an air and space operations center (AOC).

When multinational operations are involved, the JFACC becomes a 

combined force air and space component commander (CFACC). Likewise, the 

air and space operations center, though commonly referred to as an AOC, in 

joint or combined operations is correctly known as a JAOC or CAOC. Since 

nearly every operation the US conducts will involve international partners, this 

publication uses the terms CFACC and CAOC throughout to emphasize the 

doctrine’s applicability to multi-national operations. 
vii

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

 Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which 

AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these 

statements. 

 Space power should be integrated throughout joint operations as both an enabler 

and a force multiplier. (Page 1) 

 Space capabilities contribute to situational awareness; highly accurate, all-weather 

weapon system employment; rapid operational tempo; information superiority; 

increased survivability; and more efficient military operations. (Page 2) 

 Space power operates differently from other forms of military power due to its global 

perspective, responsiveness, and persistence. (Page 2) 

 Global and theater space capabilities may be best employed when placed under the 

command of a single Airman through appropriate command relationships, focused 

expeditionary organization and equipment, reachback and specialized talent. (Page 

3) 

 Space is a domain—like the air, land, sea, and cyberspace—within which military 

operations take place. (Page 3) 

 Space coordinating authority (SCA) is an authority within a joint force aiding in the 

coordination of joint space operations and integration of space capabilities and 

effects. SCA is an authority, not a person. (Page 13) 

 The combined force air and space component commander (CFACC) should be 

designated as the supported commander for counterspace operations. (Page 15) 

 To plan, execute, and assess space operations, the commander of Air Force forces 

typically designates a director of space forces, an Air Force senior space advisor 

who facilitates coordination, integration, and staffing activities. (Page 16) 

 Space operations should be integrated into the joint force commander’s contingency 

and crisis action planning to magnify joint force effectiveness. (Page 18) 

 Integration of theater space requirements must consider both a global and a theater 

perspective. (Page 21) 

 An established relationship between the CFACC and the commander, joint functional 

component command for space is essential to ensure flexibility and responsiveness 

when integrating space operations. (Page 32) 
1

CHAPTER ONE 

SPACE OPERATIONS FUNDAMENTALS

Military forces have always viewed the "high ground" as one of dominance and 

advantage in warfare. With rare exceptions, whoever owned the high ground owned the 

fight. Space assets offer an expansive view of the Earth operating high above the 

planet’s surface; satellites can see deep into an adversary’s territory, with little risk to 

humans or machines. Today, control of the ultimate high ground is critical for space 

superiority and assures the force-multiplying capabilities of space power. Tomorrow, 

space superiority may enable instant engagement anywhere in the world. 

Space assets have not only enhanced our national security but have also 

fundamentally changed military operations. Because of this, the Air Force views space 

power as a key ingredient for achieving battlespace superiority. Space power is defined 

as the total strength of a nation’s capabilities to conduct and influence activities to, in, 

through, and from space to achieve its objectives (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02, 

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). Space power 

should be integrated throughout joint operations as both an enabler and a force 

multiplier. This chapter focuses on space operations fundamentals, including an 

Airman’s perspective on space power, effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), 

and key space operations principles. 

 Space operators are essential to space power, providing a uniquely persistent 

presence over key areas of the world through the effective employment of space 

capabilities. Space power arms Airmen with permanently “forward-deployed” satellites 

and adds another dimension to the joint force’s ability to posture quickly and achieve 

battlespace superiority. Space power bolsters US global presence because it is not 

limited by terrestrial anti-access concerns. Airmen exploit this global presence and 

produce force-multiplying capabilities like instant global communications, timely missile 

warning, near-persistent surveillance and reconnaissance, and precise positioning, 

navigation and timing (PNT). 

 

There is something more important than any ultimate 

weapon. That is the ultimate position—the position of total 

control over Earth that lies somewhere out in space. That 

is...the distant future, though not so distant as we may have 

thought. Whoever gains that ultimate position gains control, 

total control, over the Earth, for the purposes of tyranny or for 

the service of freedom. 

— Lyndon B. Johnson, United States Senator, 1958
2

The Milstar Satellite 

Communications System is a 

joint communications satellite 

system that provides secure, 

jam-resistant communications 

 The ability to create accurate effects is crucial in military operations. Space 

capabilities contribute to situational awareness; highly accurate, all-weather 

weapon system employment; rapid operational tempo; information superiority; 

increased survivability; and more efficient military operations. For example, the 

integration of space–based PNT capabilities with airborne platforms has expanded 

military precision strike capabilities. Today Airmen destroy multiple targets per sortie 

with global positioning system (GPS)-aided munitions in all weather conditions, when 

similar targets in previous conflicts frequently required multiple attacks per target. 

 Precision based on space capabilities 

benefits not only weapons delivery, but is also 

useful to many other applications. For instance, 

space capabilities allow for precision in mapping 

terrain and environmental conditions. Airmen 

may collect detailed imagery and other technical 

characteristics of adversary assets. They can 

also detect and characterize an inbound missile, 

pinpoint its launch location, and predict its 

impact. 

 When applied with other forces, space 

capabilities increase the flexibility of military 

operations. Where communication lines cannot 

be laid, or when terrain and other line-of-sight 

radio frequency limitations hamper terrestrialbased communications, space communications keep forward and rear echelons in 

contact. In denied areas of the world, intelligence derived from space capabilities often 

fills critical gaps in situational awareness and operational environment knowledge. 

Therefore, space operations today offer flexibility through exploitation of the "ultimate 

high ground." 

AN AIRMAN’S PERSPECTIVE ON SPACE POWER 

Space power operates differently from other forms of military power due to 

its global perspective, responsiveness, and persistence. Through the integration of 

space capabilities, Airmen conduct simultaneous operations affecting multiple theaters, 

unlike surface forces that typically divide up the battlefield into individual, 

geographically-based operating areas. Because space-related effects and targeting 

can be global in nature, Airmen involved in the application of space power are inherently 

poised to accomplish an effects-based approach to space operations based on 

functional capabilities rather than geographic limitations. 

 The Air Force leverages the strengths of space platforms to produce effects 

based on this global perspective and responsiveness. Moreover, the space domain 

provides a unique degree of persistence with regard to military operations. Space 
3

assets hold the ultimate high ground; they offer the potential for persistent presence 

over any part of the Earth. This is a different kind of persistence than other forces 

provide, but it is relevant because this persistence can allow military forces to bring 

modern combat power to bear with a small in-theater footprint. The challenge for 

campaign planners is to ensure space operations are integrated throughout the joint 

force commander’s (JFC’s) scheme of maneuver across all levels of war—strategic, 

operational, and tactical. While this is no different than any other form of military 

capability, space operations usually occur over great distances and are conducted by 

units far from the battlefield, so the challenge is significant. 

 Also, the Air Force is focused on operationalizing space, which requires 

integration and normalization. Historically, space operations had a strategic focus. 

Now Airmen lead the charge to integrate space capabilities at the operational and 

tactical levels of military operations. Integration of space capabilities occurs within Air 

Force operations, with joint operations, and across the range of military operations. 

Moreover, the space capabilities Airmen bring to the fight are not necessarily unique; 

navigation aids; airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); long-haul 

communication lines; and ground-based radars provide similar capabilities. Space 

assets like GPS, Milstar satellite communication, and the Defense Support Program 

(DSP) complement existing capabilities. That is why it is important to integrate space 

capabilities and normalize space operations with traditional processes. The synergistic 

effect of combining space capabilities with traditional surface, subsurface, and airborne 

systems delivers persistence over the joint operations area (JOA). 

 However, space operations and the space domain are unique. Like mobility 

forces, space power defies a single model for organization and operations because it 

requires both a theater and a global perspective. Some capabilities create theater 

effects and generally are more easily deployable, and thus organize and operate within 

a regional model. Other capabilities have global responsibilities; such forces are best 

organized and controlled through a functional model. However, global and theater 

space capabilities may be best employed when placed under the command of a 

single Airman through appropriate command relationships, focused 

expeditionary organization and equipment, reachback, and specialized talent.

 There are two different, but mutually inclusive, perspectives as to the doctrinal 

view of space. First, space is viewed as a physical domain where space-centric 

activities are conducted to achieve objectives. Space is a domain – like the air, land, 

sea, and cyberspace – within which military operations take place. This view is 

relevant at the tactical (e.g., operation of specific platforms), operational (e.g., 

synchronization of military operations to achieve the commander’s objectives), and 

strategic (e.g., space as a domain that must be protected and controlled) levels of war. 

The tactical level focuses on execution of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). 

Space is relevant at the operational level because it enables improved horizontal and 

vertical integration. The strategic level, consistent with national policy, is where the 

President of the United States (POTUS), Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and unified 

combatant commanders focus. 
4

 The second doctrinal view of space is an effects-centric view, and is particularly 

relevant at the operational level of war—that level at which campaigns and major 

operations are planned, executed, and assessed to accomplish strategic objectives 

within theaters. In terms of planning, execution, and assessment, commanders are 

concerned with achieving effects, not whether those effects come from space 

capabilities. The focus of EBAO is on the end result, not the differences in how 

individual platforms operate to achieve that result. 

 EBAO enables integrated space planning to achieve operational effects beyond 

the traditional platform-centric, attrition-based view of warfare. The tactical and 

operational effects obtained from space forces complement other military forces to set 

conditions for space-enabled warfare. The ability to produce effects through the 

integration of space power is key to Air Force doctrinal thought on space operations. 

 Also, EBAO allows for JFC direction on operational objectives while enabling 

warfighting components to determine the best means of achieving those objectives. If 

the JFC desires the effect of removing enemy air defense’s command and control (C2) 

communications infrastructure, it could be accomplished via kinetic strike on an uplink 

terminal or via uplink jamming of the C2 signal. As a result, Airmen should focus on 

commanding air and space forces to achieve strategic and operational effects, not just 

on managing target lists. Recognizing the overarching role of the political sector in 

determining objectives, the end state, and rules of engagement, commanders must be 

prepared to correlate military objectives to political objectives and to advise civilian 

leaders on courses of action. In doing so, they should always consider the integration 

of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, information, military, and economic. 

For an in-depth discussion of EBAO, see AFDD 2, Operations and Organization. 

Historically, the United States has enjoyed an asymmetric advantage in employing 

space capabilities. In the recent past, no other power or entity possessed space 

capabilities to match our abilities. Over the years, adversaries have changed shape 

and form. In the Cold War, the US prepared to fight nation states. Today, non-state 

actors have emerged as adversaries. Airmen have adapted to this new adversary and 

are employing air and space power in new ways to win the Global War on Terrorism 

(GWOT). 

KEY SPACE OPERATIONS PRINCIPLES 

This section discusses key principles and concepts to describe space operations, 

giving Airmen a common perspective. It includes discussion on the space mission 

areas, categories of space capabilities, and space-related terminology. 

 Space mission areas describe the capabilities space brings to the fight. Space 

force enhancement (SFE) capabilities contribute to maximizing the effectiveness of 

military air, land, sea, and space operations (e.g. ISR, warning, communication, 

PNT, blue force tracking, space environment monitoring, and weather services). 
5

Space control (SC) capabilities attain and maintain a desired degree of space 

superiority by allowing friendly forces to exploit space capabilities while denying an 

adversary’s ability to do the same (e.g., surveillance, protection, prevention, and 

negation). The Air Force uses counterspace as an equivalent definition of the space 

control mission. Counterspace aligns more appropriately to other Air Force air and 

space power functions (i.e., counterair, counterland, and countersea), provides less 

ambiguity, and provides common Air Force language. Space force application

(SFA) capabilities execute missions with weapons systems operating in, through or 

from space which hold terrestrial-based targets at risk (e.g., intercontinental ballistic 

missiles [ICBM], ballistic missile defense, and force projection). Space support (SS) 

capabilities provide critical launch and satellite control infrastructure, capabilities and 

technologies that enable the other mission areas to effectively perform their 

missions. 

There are three terms used to describe different categories of space capabilities—

space systems, space assets, and space forces. 

 Space systems. All the devices and organizations forming the space network. 

These consist of: spacecraft; ground and airborne stations; and data links among 

spacecraft, mission, and user terminals. Space systems refer to the equipment 

required for space operations, and these systems are comprised of nodes and links. 

There are three types of nodes: space, airborne, and terrestrial. Space nodes 

include satellites, space stations, or reusable space transportation systems like the 

space shuttle. Airborne nodes are primarily aircraft weapon systems that leverage 

space capabilities. Terrestrial nodes include any land or sea equipment that 

receives, processes, or uses data derived from space capabilities. Information 

conduits called links tie these nodes together. These links also are classified into two 

types: control and mission. Space operators use control links to operate space 

systems. Space systems disseminate data on mission links, which enable force 

multiplication (see Figure 1.1). For example, Airmen in the 4th Space Operations 

Squadron (4 SOPS) are part of the terrestrial node, and they operate and employ 

the Milstar constellation via the control link. The data stream between the 

receiver/user and the Milstar satellites in orbit is the mission link. 

 Space assets. Space assets include military and civil space systems, commercial 

and foreign entities (CFE), ground control elements, operators, and spacelift 

vehicles. These assets are unique in that they provide global persistence, 

perspective, and access unhindered by geographical or political boundaries. Military 

space assets are aligned under established military C2 processes, different from civil 

and CFE C2 processes. It is essential to integrate these separate processes for 

synergistic space effects. 
6

CONTROL LINK MISSION LINK 

SPACE NODE 

AIRBORNE NODE 

TERRESTRIAL NODE

Figure 1.1. Elements of Space Systems 

 Space forces. Space forces are military space assets and personnel utilized by the 

joint force, are normally organized as units, and are categorized by their impact on 

global or theater requirements. As such, there are global space forces and theater 

space forces. Global space forces support multiple theater and/or national 

objectives and are controlled by the commander, United States Strategic Command 

(CDRUSSTRATCOM). Theater space forces support individual theater 

requirements and generally fall under the control of the geographic combatant 

commander (GCC). Theater space forces are primarily focused on a single theater, 

with little or no direct impact outside the designated area of responsibility (AOR). 

Space also enables network centric warfare by providing a global infrastructure that 

can be exploited at all levels of operations—strategic, operational, and tactical. For 

example, a Predator unmanned aircraft (UA) depends on space for distributed 

operations. Space enables networking across vast distances, providing real-time 

horizontal and vertical integration for the warfighter. Across the operational 

environment, warfighters leverage space to an unprecedented degree, serving as the 

foundation for 21st century warfare—space-enabled warfare. 

The Air Force categorizes relative advantage in the space domain by space parity, 

space superiority, and space supremacy. Space parity describes a roughly equal 

degree of power between friendly and adversary use of space capabilities. Next, space 
7

superiority is that degree of space advantage of one force over another that permits the 

conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the 

opposing force. Space superiority does not mean the enemy is prevented from 

interfering with friendly operations, but rather that friendly losses or disruption will not 

prevent friendly forces from achieving objectives. Finally, space supremacy is that 

degree of space advantage of one force over another that permits the conduct of 

operations at a given time and place without effective interference by the opposing 

force. Supremacy may sometimes be an unrealistic objective because sources of 

space power include commercial and third party space capabilities, and it is difficult to 

completely deny an adversary’s access to these capabilities. These categories 

describe the relative advantage over an adversary in the space domain. 

 Space forces integrate and employ at the operational level through the following 

organizational constructs: 

 The air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) is the organizational structure 

for deployed Air Force air and space forces. 

 The commander of Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) is the senior US Air Force 

officer designated as commander of the US Air Force component assigned to a joint 

force commander at the unified, subunified, and joint task force level. The 

COMAFFOR is the senior Air Force warfighter who exercises C2 over all assigned 

and attached air and space forces. The COMAFFOR commands Air Force air and 

space forces engaged at the operational and tactical level of war. 

 The combined force air and space component commander (CFACC) plans, 

coordinates, allocates, tasks, executes, and assesses air and space operations to 

accomplish assigned operational missions, when designated by the JFC. 

 The space coordinating authority (SCA) is an authority within a joint force aiding 

in the coordination of joint space operations and integration of space capabilities and 

effects. SCA is an authority, not a person. 

 The director of space forces (DIRSPACEFOR) is the senior Air Force space 

officer who advises the COMAFFOR/CFACC. The DIRSPACEFOR facilitates 

coordination, integration, and staffing activities to tailor space integration support for 

the CFACC. 

For operations and organization of Air Force forces, see AFDD 2. 

These terms and concepts describe space power and provide Airmen a common 

vernacular on space operations. It is important for Airmen to understand this 

information and articulate the impact of Air Force space operations in a joint 

environment. The objective is better integration of the force-multiplying capabilities of 

space operations. 
8

CHAPTER TWO 

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPACE OPERATIONS 

C2 of space operations is challenging due to the fragmented sources of space 

capabilities and the interdependence between global and theater space forces. Space 

capabilities come from a variety of organizations, sometimes outside the Department of 

Defense (DOD) with nontraditional chains of command. Also, interagency 

responsibilities with authority split between organizations further complicate C2 of space 

operations. An example involves the C2 of space-based missile warning and defense 

capabilities. Theater missile warning and defense during Operation DESERT STORM 

was performed through the cooperative use of the Air Force DSP satellites and ground 

radars for surface-to-surface missile launch notification to cue Army Patriot missile 

defense batteries. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, these assets were combined 

with the Army-Navy joint tactical ground station (JTAGS) and the Air Force’s 2nd Space 

Warning Squadron (2 SWS) to provide missile defense warning data to the CFACC in 

his role as area air defense commander (AADC). 

 

Other challenges occur when one organization owns 

an asset while another has responsibility for the actual 

operation, or when one organization operates the platform 

while another has responsibility over the on-board payload. 

For example, Defense Meteorological Support Program 

(DMSP) weather satellites, which provide weather data 

for DOD and national operations, currently fall under 

the combatant command of US Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM), but are operated on a daily basis by the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

under the Department of Commerce, and requirements for 

on-board sensor tasking are provided by the Air Force 

Weather Agency, an Air Force field operating agency. 

This chapter provides a construct for C2 of space operations. Global and theater 

considerations are discussed followed by C2 of global and theater space forces. The 

chapter concludes with the CFACC’s authority and role in theater space operations. 

This construct has proven to be effective in recent operations and exercises, and it will 

normally be the construct for C2 of space forces. 

Defense Support 

 Program (DSP) 

provides 

uninterrupted spacebased early warning 

and detection 

Nothing is more important in war than unity of 

command. 

— Napoleon Bonaparte 
9

GLOBAL AND THEATER CONSIDERATIONS 

Many space assets support joint operations in more than one geographic area. 

Space assets may be used to fulfill single theater, multiple theater, or global objectives. 

Thus, the C2 structure established for integrating space assets and forces must be 

robust enough to account for these various operating areas. When the effect of 

employing space assets meets global or multiple theater requirements, a structure that 

bridges more than one theater, and is capable of dealing with the non-DOD agencies, is 

normally necessary. In this case, USSTRATCOM usually provides such a structure. 

When the effects are focused primarily on a single theater, that geographic 

combatant commander may control those space forces that produce strategic, 

operational, or tactical effects within that theater. If needed by a joint force, the 

combatant commander normally delegates operational control (OPCON) of theater 

space forces to the appropriate Service component commander and tactical control 

(TACON) to the appropriate functional component commander, as required. For Air 

Force space forces, this Service component commander is the COMAFFOR. The 

CFACC is normally best suited to integrate space operations within a combined/joint 

force. Within that force, the COMAFFOR is best suited to integrate Air Force space 

operations because of his ability to exercise C2 of space capabilities and the 

COMAFFOR’s theater-wide warfighting perspective. 

When the situation arises that there are no Air Force forces attached to a joint 

task force (JTF), the COMAFFOR to the joint force commander may be tasked in a 

supporting relationship to the JTF to integrate and provide space capabilities and 

effects. For example, multiple JTFs in US Central Command’s AOR require space 

effects for the on-going GWOT. The CFACC provides/coordinates these effects for 

JTFs in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. 

Although not operated or controlled by USSTRATCOM, non-military US space 

assets also provide critical space capabilities for warfighters. Some assets belong to

national agencies such as National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 

National Reconnaissance Office, and NOAA. International consortia such as the 

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) and the 

International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) Organization own other space assets. 

USSTRATCOM has established coordination channels with some US non-military 

organizations. 

 If not already established, a JFC may request USSTRATCOM assistance in 

coordinating with these non-military organizations for integration of their capabilities. 

The SecDef and the combatant commanders develop processes to streamline 

discussions, policies, procedures, and rules of engagement for space forces. These 

assets are important in establishing space superiority for global and theater operations. 
10

USSTRATCOM Joint Functional Component Commands (JFCC) 

USSTRATCOM executes assigned missions through a number of subordinate 

elements called JFCCs in lieu of JTFs. These commands are responsible for the 

day-to-day planning and execution of primary USSTRATCOM mission areas: space, 

global strike and integration, ISR, network warfare, integrated missile defense, and 

combating weapons of mass destruction. 

The commander, JFCC Space (CDR JFCC Space), serves as USSTRATCOM’s 

single point of contact for military space operational matters to plan, task, direct, and 

execute space operations. CDR JFCC Space will conduct space operational-level 

planning, integration, and coordination with other JFCCs, combatant commanders, 

other DOD, and non-DOD partners to ensure unity of effort in support of military 

operations, and national security operations. CDR JFCC Space will be the primary 

USSTRATCOM interface for operational space effects. 

The JFCC Space CDR’s mission includes employing joint space forces for missile 

warning, PNT, communications, spacelift, and counterspace operations. 

Refer to AFDD 2 for an overview of command relationship arrangements between 

regional and functional air and space components. 

C2 OF GLOBAL SPACE FORCES 

The Unified Command Plan establishes USSTRATCOM as the functional unified 

command with overall responsibility for military space operations. CDRUSSTRATCOM, 

has combatant command (command authority) or COCOM of all space forces as 

assigned by the SecDef in the Forces For Unified Commands memorandum. 

CDRUSSTRATCOM employs these forces to support worldwide operations. 

 

C2 OF THEATER SPACE FORCES 

Theater commanders integrate space effects throughout joint military operations. 

Space effects are created by a mix of global and theater space forces. Global space 

forces normally support national objectives and multiple theaters and produce effects for 

theater operations. Theater space forces move forward to conduct operations in a 

specific theater or consist of organic space forces assigned in theater. Global space 

forces and theater space forces require different command relationships and levels of 

coordination to achieve effects within the theater. 

Space experts on theater staffs facilitate space integration. The Air Force 

embeds space expertise within its component and air and space operations center 
11

(AOC) staff. Also, the Air Force augments theater staffs with additional space expertise, 

when requested, to assist with integration of global space effects and control of theater 

space forces. 

Integrating Global Space Forces 

When a theater requests global space forces to produce effects, the SecDef will 

specify a command relationship between CDRUSSTRATCOM and the combatant 

commander—normally a supporting/supported relationship. This will be employed at 

appropriate levels within both the supporting and supported commands. These support 

relationships fall into four categories: general, mutual, direct, and close support. 

General support is used when the support is given to the supported force as a whole. 

Mutual support is that support which units render each other against an enemy because 

of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their 

inherent capabilities. Direct support is used when a mission requires a force to directly 

support another specific force. Close support is used to describe actions by a 

supporting force in close proximity against objectives near the supported force which 

require detailed integration of the supporting actions of the supporting force. For a more 

detailed discussion on command relationships, see AFDD 2 and JP 0-2, Unified Action 

Armed Forces. 

For space forces providing effects via a support relationship, it is important for 

both supported and supporting commanders to document their requirements in an 

establishing directive. The establishing directive should specify the purpose of the 

support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. 

Additional information includes: 

 The space forces and resources allocated to the supporting commander's effort. 

 The time, place, level, and duration of the supporting commander's effort. 

 The relative priority of the supported commander's effort. 

 The degree of authorities exercised by the supported and supporting commanders 

over the effort, to include processes for reconciling competing requirements and 

emergency events expeditiously, as required. 

To facilitate a support relationship, an appropriate level of coordination should 

occur between the involved commanders. This facilitates planning the detailed 

integration of space capabilities and effects with theater operations, and enables theater 

warfighters to coordinate directly at either the same or differing organizational levels. 

Normally, CDRUSSTRATCOM retains control of global space forces. However, 

a theater commander may require a greater degree of command authority than 

specified by a support relationship. This assumes the requisite expertise and ability to 

C2 exist in theater. In those instances, SecDef may transfer control over specified 

global space forces conducting operations affecting an individual theater. 
12

Theater Space Forces 

If space forces are only tasked to impact a single theater, the SecDef may direct 

CDRUSSTRATCOM to attach the forces with specification of OPCON or TACON to the 

GCC with the mission requirement. As the common superior commander between the 

combatant commanders, the SecDef will specify the command relationship the gaining 

commander will exercise. The normal relationship for attached forces is OPCON, but a 

TACON or support relationship may be appropriate depending on the ability of the 

theater commander to C2 space operations, as well as other factors like the nature and 

duration of the operation. The GCC usually delegates OPCON of attached forces to the 

Service component commander who requires those forces and has the capability to C2 

them. For attached Air Force space forces, this is the COMAFFOR, who also is 

normally dual-hatted as the CFACC, and designated supported commander for 

counterspace operations in the JOA. For more information on the attachment of 

functional space forces, see AFDD 2. 

Examples of Space Support 

GENERAL SUPPORT: 

During the major combat operations phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), 

USSTRATCOM provided general support from space operations to the Iraqi theater 

of operations. This support relationship helped the joint force integrate space 

capabilities, such as positioning, navigation, and timing from GPS, and counterspace 

effects. 

MUTUAL SUPPORT: 

During the counterinsurgency phase of OIF, the combatant commander assigned the 

CFACC the task of space superiority. For this objective, the JFC designated the 

CFACC as the supported commander with other component commanders in a 

mutual support relationship for space operations. 

DIRECT SUPPORT: 

During Operation ALLIED FORCE (OAF), a direct support relationship was 

established between the CFACC and the 11 SWS. This relationship allowed the 

AOC to directly task 11 SWS personnel and exchange real-time information from the 

DSP satellite for time critical actions like personnel recovery after aircraft shoot 

downs. 

CLOSE SUPPORT: 

Future space capabilities will be responsive to the warfighter. These space forces 

may operate in close proximity with theater forces and will require detailed integration 

to provide close support to theater operations. These types of forces could emerge 

as technologies based on the Air Force’s operationally responsive space and joint 

warfighting space operating concepts. 
13

Theater-organic Space Forces

GCCs exercise COCOM of assigned theater space forces. Service component 

commanders are normally then delegated OPCON of those forces. During contingencies, these forces may be incorporated into a joint force. Within the joint force, the 

appropriate functional component commander normally exercises TACON of forces 

made available by Service component commanders. For space forces, this component 

commander should normally be the CFACC if one is designated. 

Presentation of Forces 

If a contingency operation requires a joint force, Air Force forces will be 

presented as an AETF. The commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC/CC) is 

responsible for providing Air Force space forces to an AETF, when required. Within the 

AETF, space forces may be attached to an air expeditionary wing, group, or squadron. 

Attached space forces are commanded by the COMAFFOR who commands the AETF 

through an A-staff and controls forces through an AOC. The AOC coordinates 

integration of space effects with the Space AOC/JSpOC for and execution of assigned, 

attached, and supporting space forces (direct liaison authority [DIRLAUTH] should be 

authorized for coordinated planning between AOC and Space AOC/JSpOC.) 

THE CFACC’S AUTHORITY AND ROLE IN THEATER SPACE 

OPERATIONS 

The CFACC is normally delegated SCA and designated the supported 

commander for counterspace operations by the JFC. In cases where the CFACC is 

other than an Air Force officer, the COMAFFOR will fill designated billets within the 

CFACC staff to ensure proper employment of space assets. If a CFACC is not 

appointed, the JFC may delegate SCA to the COMAFFOR, designate another 

component/Service commander SCA, or opt to retain SCA. 

Space Coordinating Authority 

Space coordinating authority is an authority within a joint force aiding in 

the coordination of joint space operations and integration of space capabilities 

and effects. SCA is an authority, not a person. As such, the commander with SCA 

serves as the focal point for gathering space requirements from the JFC’s staff and 

each component commander. This provides unity of effort for space operations in 

support of the JFC’s campaign. These requirements include requests for space forces 

(e.g., deployed space forces), requests for space capabilities (e.g., support to personnel 

recovery operations), and requests for implementation of specific command 

relationships (e.g., a support relationship between the CFACC and CDR JFCC Space). 

The commander with SCA develops a recommended prioritized list of space 

requirements for the joint force based on JFC objectives. The sphere of influence and 

focus of SCA in theater is the JOA. While a commander with SCA can facilitate non-
14

traditional uses of space assets, planning staffs should use the established processes 

for fulfilling intelligence and communications requirements. 

Because component commanders normally execute forces, the JFC may 

delegate SCA to the component commander level. Coordination should be done at the 

operational level because that is where requirements are prioritized to support the 

operations of the component commanders, which in turn support the overall campaign. 

Moreover, the commander delegated SCA should have a theater-wide perspective and 

a thorough understanding of integrating space operations with all other military 

activities. 

SCA is a specific type of coordinating authority where authority is delegated to a 

commander or individual for coordinating specific space functions and activities 

involving forces of two or more military departments, functional components, or two or 

more forces of the same Service. The commander with SCA has the authority to 

require consultation among the agencies involved but does not have the authority to 

compel agreement. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the 

establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other 

matters. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not 

an authority by which command may be exercised (JP 1-02). 

Delegation of SCA is tied to force assignment, and it is normally delegated to the 

functional component commander with the preponderance of space forces, expertise in 

space operations, and the ability to C2 space assets, including reachback. 

Preponderance of space forces is based on a component’s space capabilities affecting 

the theater, through the C2 of space forces assigned, attached, and in support. Users 

of space capabilities are not a factor in the determination of preponderance; it is based 

solely on the ability to operate space capabilities and produce effects with space forces. 

Responsibilities Accompanying Space Coordinating Authority 

 Recommend appropriate command relationships for space forces to the JFC or 

JFACC. 

 Establish, deconflict, prioritize and recommend military space requirements. 

 Recommend guidelines for employing space capabilities, such as ROE, for the 

joint force. 

 Guide strategy development, operational planning, and space integration. 

 Provide status of space assets that affect the JOA to key theater staffs. 

 Maintain space situational awareness. 

 Ensure optimum interoperability of space assets with coalition forces. 
15

During times of conflict or large-scale contingencies it is important to have a 

coordinating authority for space within the joint force structure to appropriately represent 

the space requirements of the joint force. With each component and many allies having 

their own organic space capability, there is a requirement to integrate, synchronize, and 

deconflict among the space operations, redundant efforts, and conflicting support 

requests. By designating SCA for the joint force to a single commander, the JFC can 

optimize space operations in the JOA. To facilitate unity of effort within theater space 

operations and with global space assets, the JFC normally delegates SCA to the 

CFACC. 

There are several reasons why the JFC normally delegates SCA to the CFACC. 

First, the CFACC has space expertise embedded in their staff. Second, the CFACC 

has the ability to command and control space forces via the AOC, including reachback 

to the Space AOC/JSpOC. Lastly, unlike the land or maritime component commanders 

who are assigned specific area of operations (AOs) within a theater, the CFACC 

maintains a JOA and theater-wide perspective. This perspective is essential for 

coordinating space operations that also support the JFC throughout the theater. 

Supported Commander for Counterspace Operations and Strategic 

Attack 

To ensure unity of command, the JFC should designate the CFACC as the 

supported commander for counterspace operations. These operations are designed to 

maintain space superiority. With US dependence on space capabilities for our 

asymmetric advantages in the operational environment and the proliferation of various 

threats to space systems, it is critical to have a single component commander focused 

on maintaining space superiority using all available capabilities as part of the overall 

joint campaign. 

The CFACC is well suited to execute counterspace operations for the JFC as 

part of the overall campaign for several reasons: First, the Air Force has the 

overwhelming majority of satellite operations, maintenance, and C2 experience, making 

it especially qualified to plan, execute and assess offensive and defensive space 

activities. This expertise is integrated into the CFACC's staff. Second, the CFACC 

has a complete AOR perspective due to range, speed and flexibility and is able to 

employ various methods to attack the user/user equipment through kinetic and nonkinetic means, both directly and indirectly. Also, the CFACC, as the COMAFFOR, can 

recommend theater defensive measures to ensure TTPs and infrastructure reduce or 

mitigate potential threats. For example, the CFACC could provide guidance in the 

special instructions (SPINs) that units should be prepared to employ weapons in a GPShostile environment. Third, the CFACC, through its organic C2 centers (to include 

reachback) has the ability to integrate assets to deliver effects when and where 

needed. Fourth, the Air Force understands the treaty, legal, and policy considerations 

associated with space operations. For these reasons, the CFACC should be 

designated as the supported commander for counterspace operations. In this 

role, the CFACC has the authority to designate target priority, effects and timing of 
16

these operations and attack targets across the entire JOA (to include targets within the 

land and maritime AOs, although operations within a surface AO must be coordinated 

with the AO commander). 

 

To coordinate with the JFC and other component commands, the CFACC may 

colocate an air component coordination element (ACCE) within their respective staffs. 

The purpose of the ACCE is to act as the CFACC’s liaison to other commanders. The 

CFACC will normally integrate space expertise (and counterspace expertise, if 

designated the supported commander for counterspace) in the ACCE (or other liaison 

elements) to coordinate space-related issues with the JFC and component 

commanders, on their behalf. 

In future operations and consistent with treaty obligations, assigning theater 

activities for force application from or through space to the CFACC would enhance unity 

of command. The CFACC, as the supported commander for strategic attack, 

would integrate these capabilities into the overall joint campaign. The CFACC has the 

ability within the AOC to integrate and deconflict all strategic attack capabilities to meet 

the JFC's objectives. All Air Force strategic attack capabilities should be integrated 

throughout joint operations to achieve the commander’s desired effects. 

Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR) 

To plan, execute, and assess space operations, the COMAFFOR typically 

designates a DIRSPACEFOR, an Air Force senior space advisor who facilitates 

coordination, integration, and staffing activities. In the preferred construct of a dualhatted COMAFFOR/CFACC, the DIRSPACEFOR serves as the senior space advisor to 

the CFACC in an appropriate capacity, such as special staff, to tailor space operations 

as part of the JFC’s campaign plan. Also, this position normally requires a small 

support staff to work requirements specific to the JOA and ongoing military operations. 

Because the intended scope includes coordination with both Air Force and other Service 

space forces, the DIRSPACEFOR accomplishes joint responsibilities, especially given 

the normal situation where the CFACC is delegated SCA and designated supported 

commander for counterspace operations. The DIRSPACEFOR is a senior Air Force 

officer with broad space expertise and theater familiarity, normally nominated by 

AFSPC/CC and approved by the theater CFACC. AFSPC ensures DIRSPACEFORs 

are trained and certified to perform their responsibilities, and the CFACC provides 

theater-specific information and orientation. 

When the situation arises that there are no Air Force forces attached to a JTF, 

the COMAFFOR to the joint force commander may be tasked in a supporting 

relationship to the JTF to integrate and provide space capabilities and effects. In the 

situation of multiple JTFs, the DIRSPACEFOR should work for the theater 

COMAFFOR/CFACC, who normally is delegated SCA, to provide space effects to the 

JTF based on JFC priorities. 
17

The Air Force oganizes, trains and equips space forces for employment during 

military operations based on the construct of a COMAFFOR/CFACC. However, there 

may be exceptional circumstances which fall outside the bounds of this construct. First, 

for the rare instances when the CFACC is not delegated SCA (e.g., a JFC retains SCA 

or delegates SCA to another component commander), the DIRSPACEFOR will continue 

to work space-related issues on behalf of the COMAFFOR/CFACC. Second, for the 

special case when the JFC chooses to organize and employ military forces through 

service components and does not designate a CFACC, the DIRSPACEFOR works for 

the COMAFFOR, who is expected to be delegated SCA. In all these special 

circumstances, theater-wide coordination will be the responsibility of the component 

commander delegated SCA, who will normally be aided by a senior space advisor. The 

Air Force recommends a senior space advisor handle day-to-day SCA responsibilities 

on behalf of the component commander delegated SCA. 

Tasks of the DIRSPACEFOR 

 Recommend appropriate command relationships for space forces. 

 Establish, deconflict, prioritize and recommend operational military space 

requirements. 

 Recommend policies for employing space capabilities, such as rules of 

engagement. 

 Provide senior space perspective for strategy and daily guidance development, 

effects and target selection, and space integration throughout joint force 

operations. 

 Monitor status of space forces that affect the JOA, and provide status to JFC staff 

and components. 

 Maintain space situational awareness. 

 Request space inputs from JFC staff during planning and operations. 

 Ensure optimum interoperability of space assets with coalition forces. 

 Execute day-to-day SCA responsibilities on behalf of the CFACC, or act as the 

CFACC’s representative to the SCA if the authority is retained by the CFC or 

delegated to another component; assist the COMAFFOR with command and 

control of Air Force space forces if another component is designated CFACC. 
18

When blows are planned, whoever contrives them 

with the greatest appreciation of their consequences will 

have a great advantage. 

— Frederick the Great 

CHAPTER THREE 

PLANNING FOR SPACE OPERATIONS 

 Space capabilities provide the US military the asymmetric advantages needed 

when projecting power worldwide throughout the range of military operations. 

Consequently, space assets must be considered during all phases of planning. Space 

operations should be integrated into the JFC's contingency and crisis action 

planning (CAP) to magnify joint force effectiveness. USSTRATCOM planning 

should be consistent with space-specific operations plans (OPLAN) and operations 

orders (OPORD) developed by the JFC. Moreover, space assets must be integrated 

throughout the plans developed and executed by all unified combatant commanders, 

including both geographic and functional combatant commanders (CCDRs). 

 Annexes C, N, and S of supported commander OPLANs and campaign plans 

contain space contributions to the overall effort. Development of these annexes is the 

supported commander's responsibility but requires coordinated effort between the JFC 

and component staffs and USSTRATCOM staffs at joint and Service component levels. 

CAMPAIGN PLANNING 

 Combatant commanders use campaign planning to ensure orderly transition from 

peace to crisis and to facilitate deployment and employment of military forces. 

Campaign planning culminates during a crisis, but the basis and framework of a 

successful campaign is laid by peacetime analysis and planning. Campaign planning 

may begin with contingency planning and continue through crisis action planning. 

Military campaigns integrate air, information, space, land, sea, and special operations 

effects to attain national and coalition objectives. The campaign plan embodies the 

combatant commander’s strategic vision of integrated operations required to achieve 

theater strategic objectives. As such, space assets should be integrated into campaign 

planning to ensure their optimal use. 

Contingency Planning

 The OPLAN serves as the foundational employment concept for a theater of 

operations. It provides the combatant commander’s vision and intent by articulating 

broad operational and sustainment concepts for the duration of conflict. The resulting 

plan provides strategic military objectives and operational direction, organizes and tasks 

subordinate forces, identifies external support requirements, and designates command 

relationships, additional responsibilities, and objectives. 
19

The COMAFFOR supports the combatant commander’s contingency planning 

process through integrated theater air and space planning. This effort should be 

conducted as a single process rather than separate air and space processes. Theater 

planners normally incorporate space planning into theater OPLAN annexes. However, 

space requirements should be considered as part of the overall campaign, not simply 

limited to an OPLAN space annex. Space planning must be embedded into the 

contingency planning process so that space assets and capabilities are appropriately 

integrated into each phase of the combatant commander’s campaign. 

 Because much of theater space integration involves forces controlled by 

USSTRATCOM, they need to be consulted when building plans. Reachback support 

may be requested to provide space-specific expertise or information to augment theater 

planning. Through this cooperation, theater-developed OPLANs should designate, 

organize, and task theater space forces and also provide realistic external support 

requirements for global space assets. In addition, space requirements and considerations should be included in other functional combatant commander’s plans 

supporting theater operations. 

 

Crisis Action Planning 

 Unlike contingency planning, CAP is based on emerging events and is conducted 

in time-sensitive situations. Planners base their plans on the actual circumstances that 

exist at the time planning occurs. Contingency planning supports CAP by anticipating 

potential crises and facilitating development of joint operation plans to facilitate the rapid 

development and selection of a course of action (COA). This is especially crucial for 

certain space operations that may need substantial coordination in advance due to their 

political sensitivity or because they are controlled by USSTRATCOM, civil, national, or 

commercial agencies. Also, one result of CAP are orders (e.g., OPORDs, fragmentary 

orders [FRAGOs]) that can be executed to satisfy SecDef execution direction.

Space operations should be fully integrated into the development of all COAs. A 

COA is a broad statement of possible ways to accomplish a mission. During COA 

development, as with contingency planning, planners should identify tasks for space 

assets in support of theater objectives. In addition, planners need to examine the role 

and contributions of space assets in the various phases of the campaign. During COA 

selection, the combatant commander should review space forces, along with air, 

information, land, sea, and special forces, to make an informed decision on COA 

selection. Additionally, global and theater space capabilities may enable the 

commander’s situational awareness to facilitate this decision. 

Range of Military Operations 

Space power capabilities are adaptable across the range of military operations 

due to the continued presence and accessibility of space assets. Certain space assets 

may be applied to attain strategic-, operational-, or tactical-level effects against limited 

objectives as effectively as those mounted against more “traditional” wartime targets. 

Whether conducting space operations that shape and influence the situation or 
20

providing the eyes and ears of a sophisticated command and control system; the 

flexibility of space forces is integral to any operation. 

Space forces provide an asymmetric advantage to military forces and operations 

whether responding to engagement, cooperation, and deterrence operations, 

contingencies and crisis response operations, or major operations and campaigns. The 

specific tasks involved in any given air and space operation will vary greatly, depending 

on the detailed context of the larger conflict or contingency, national policies and 

objectives, forces available to do the job, and a host of other considerations. Space 

capabilities may also be provided by other organizations (national, civil, commercial) 

throughout the range of military operations, though integration may be difficult due to 

command relationships.

Air and Space Operations Planning 

 Theater planning for space operations is also a crucial aspect to planning in 

order to integrate space capabilities and effects throughout the JFC’s campaign. It is 

normally accomplished by the CFACC through an air and space estimate process that 

combines the mission activities and desired effects of air and space platforms into a 

coherent plan to support the JFC's campaign. The result is the joint air and space 

operations plan (JAOP). The JAOP should include the tasking of all allocated and 

assigned space forces and all requests for theater support from global space assets. 

Planned space operations that enable theater operations and produce effects in theater 

are captured in the JAOP. Theater space capabilities and effects derived from 

deployed and organic space forces under the CFACC’s OPCON/TACON should be 

integrated through the air tasking order (ATO). The majority of JAOP development 

occurs within the AOC; consequently space expertise should be embedded throughout 

the AOC, to include strategy, ISR, combat plans, and combat operations divisions. 

Joint Space Operations Plan (JSOP) Development 

In concert with theater planning efforts, CDR JFCC Space plans internally for 

space support to the theater and to meet global space requirements. Joint space 

planning in support of the geographic or functional supported JFC's requirements 

occurs through the Space AOC/JSpOC. 

The JSOP is the space equivalent to the CFACC’s JAOP. The JSOP details how 

joint space operations will support both global missions and theater requirements. The 

JSOP prioritizes space operations across all AORs and functions based on geographic 

and functional combatant commander’s requests and CDRUSSTRATCOM priorities. 

Theater strategists should include theater space requirements in the JAOP. Each plan 

should contain a sustainability assessment and delineate specific procedures for 

allocating and exercising C2 of global space assets. In doing so, the JSOP allows for 

optimum integration of global assets supporting theater operations. The Space 

AOC/JSpOC will use the JSOP to guide the development of the space tasking order 

(STO). The JSOP developed during this process should: 
21

 Integrate joint space capabilities to achieve theater and global objectives. 

 Identify and prioritize space objectives and desired effects, and the weight of effort 

required to achieve results in support of the theater’s objectives. 

 Indicate the phasing of space forces in relation to the theater’s campaign plan. 

 Identify and nominate adversary targets that degrade US space superiority. 

PLANNING FACTORS 

The following are some critical factors to consider in planning military space 

operations. This list is not exhaustive but serves as a starting point for air and space 

planners. 

Phasing 

Phasing provides an orderly schedule of military decisions and indicates preplanned shifts in priorities and intent. Phasing may be used to modify the prioritization 

of limited space capabilities to theater operations. Space operations often occur 

simultaneously and can be continuous throughout the campaign, sometimes leading to 

a sense that phasing is less relevant to space operations. Phasing remains a useful 

tool to communicate the JFC’s concept of operations and the shifting of emphasis 

between ongoing space operations. For instance, counterspace operations may be 

emphasized early in an operation and be de-emphasized once space superiority is 

firmly established. Some level of regional or temporal space superiority is likely to be a 

prerequisite to effective pursuit of other objectives. 

Space Integration Considerations 

Integration of theater space requirements must consider both a global and 

a theater perspective. Global integration is the responsibility of CDRUSSTRATCOM. 

Theater integration is the responsibility of the geographic combatant commander and 

the CFACC. The geographic combatant commander and CDRUSSTRATCOM normally 

authorize DIRLAUTH between component commanders and formalize a support 

relationship as the situation dictates. The CFACC and CDR JFCC Space ensure space 

integration occurs throughout the process. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning 

than operations and carries with it the requirement to keep the commander granting 

DIRLAUTH informed. For discussion on support and DIRLAUTH, see JP 0-2, UNAAF. 

During recent warfare, including Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, 

ALLIED FORCE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM, several space-related 

considerations have surfaced that directly impact US military success. Planners should 

consider the following when developing courses of action: 

 Theater commanders should state their requirements in terms of desired effects. 

Deciding which space forces are required and which tactics are needed is usually 

best left to the supporting commander. Using support from the space-based infra-
22

red system (SBIRS) as an example, the theater may request constant vigilance 

(CV), a tactic used by the 2 SWS for focused warning support to a very specific 

geographic region. However, CV is very manpower- and operator-intensive. Very 

often 2 SWS can support the supported commander’s request for warning with other 

tactics and procedures that are less demanding than CV. Theaters should not 

request specific tactics. Rather, theater commanders must state their desired 

effects. 

 Theater missile warning requirements should also be considered. Many factors will 

determine the support requirements for missile warning capabilities. Decisions on 

timeliness, tolerance of false reports, coverage, and data distribution may drive 

configuration changes in missile warning constellation alignment and possibly in the 

communications allocation for transmitting the reports to the theater. 

 Since GPS accuracy varies due to the number of visible satellites, orientation, and 

other factors, planners should identify AOR accuracy requirements so GPS assets 

can be better deployed/commanded. Specific geographical accuracy enhancements 

may be temporarily achieved which could possibly result in changing operational 

time lines. 

 Satellite bandwidth is another consideration, including the potential for increasing 

bandwidth through arrangements with commercial providers for voice, data, imagery, 

and video communications. Bandwidth usage is directly dependent on the amount 

of US access to satellite. The theater has normal processes that address these and 

other communication-related issues, like frequency deconfliction and restricted 

frequency list management. 

 Protected satellite communications is another consideration. Protected communications is a valuable capability that ensures secure, survivable, jam-resistant 

global communications to meet essential wartime requirements for high priority 

users. 

 Space-based ISR capabilities provide large amounts of data. Assessment of this 

data requires significant analysis by the intelligence community. Planners should 

account for intelligence assessments throughout the COA development process. 

 Combat weather assets provide the capability to forecast environmental conditions. 

Planners should consider the DMSP combined with meteorological information from 

US civil geostationary and polar-orbiting satellites. This forecast information affects 

military operations from timing of maneuvers to selection of targets and weapons 

systems. Planners should also consider potential system performance degradation 

due to the effect of space weather on space capabilities, like ionosphere scintillation, 

solar events, and meteor showers. 

 Planners must characterize the operational environment to include full understanding of the threats to friendly space operations. As with any campaign, 

appropriate knowledge of the operational environment is essential to conducting 
23

military operations. The theater intelligence directorate of a joint staff accomplishes 

operational environment characterization, in coordination with continental US 

(CONUS)-based organizations. 

 Planners should consider integrating non-kinetic counterspace capabilities into the 

campaign plan. For example, some counterspace weapon systems, like the counter 

communications system operated by the 76th Space Control Squadron, produce 

temporary reversible effects such as disruption and denial of adversary satellite 

communications, which minimize post-conflict reconstruction of the adversary 

infrastructure. These systems may require frequency deconfliction, as well as 

deconfliction with other air, surface, information, and space operations. 

 Theater planners must also consider friendly space vulnerabilities as well as threats. 

Theater planners are responsible for planning strikes on adversary counterspace 

capabilities or preparing alternatives for the possible loss of friendly space 

capabilities if strikes are neither appropriate nor feasible. Strikes may not be 

appropriate or feasible if the intelligence value of the adversary space capability is 

deemed more important. They also should consider available countermeasures. An 

essential part of this effort will be attack detection, assessment, and reporting. 

Operators and planners must know as quickly as possible the origin of any anomaly 

and be able to identify and geolocate the threat in a timely manner. Determining 

whether an event is the result of intentional attack, unintentional interference, or 

space weather is crucial in determining a course of action. 

 Potential adversaries have access to a range of space systems and services. This 

includes fielding of potential counterspace assets (some commercially available) 

against US space assets. Even an adversary with no indigenous space assets may 

use space through US, allied, commercial, or consortium space services. These 

services could potentially include precision navigation, high-resolution imagery, 

environmental monitoring, and satellite communications. For example, during 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Iraqi government used a leased transponder on 

Arab Satellite Communication Organization (ARABSAT), a Middle Eastern 

consortium-owned communications satellite, to broadcast propaganda on news 

networks. 

 Planners should consider targeting adversary space assets using all instruments of 

national power. Adversary space targets may include data links; launch sites; 

booster storage facilities; satellite storage and assembly facilities; mission data 

processing facilities; communications links; telemetry, tracking, and commanding 

nodes; satellites; research and development facilities; and launch vehicles. Planners 

should consider the potential impact of allowing an adversary unrestricted or 

unlimited use of a space asset. If the potential impact is sufficient enough to require 

action, then the desired effect (deception, disruption, denial, degradation, or 

destruction) should be considered. For example, if the objective is to prevent an 

adversary from using space imagery to observe preparations for a counteroffensive 

in a specific area, then any instrument of power could be employed: Diplomatic—

persuade a consortia-owned satellite company to deny service to the adversary; 
24

Informational—provide US intelligence to a friendly nation in exchange for their 

denial of information to adversaries; Military—denial, disruption, degradation, 

deception, or destruction of an adversary space system; or Economic—buy imagery 

to prevent the adversary from acquiring it. Additionally, if the objective is to 

permanently disrupt adversary C2 of fielded forces, any of the instruments of power 

could be effective to include permanent destruction of assets, if necessary. 

Planners must continuously mesh appropriate actions with respect to a target’s 

intelligence value, JFC objective, the action’s impact on conflict escalation, and 

collateral damage mitigation. 

SPACE INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 

 

CDR JFCC Space is responsible for monitoring status and capabilities of foreign 

space assets. The Space AOC that forms the core of the JSpOC provides the 

capability to operationally plan and execute operations for military space forces. Within 

the Space AOC/JSpOC, the ISR division conducts intelligence preparation of the 

operational environment (IPOE) to support operational employment of space forces. 

IPOE is a process involving detailed research, analysis, and knowledge of the 

adversary regarding topics such as force disposition, force sustainment, deployment of 

forces, weapon system capabilities and employment doctrine, environmental conditions, 

and most likely the most dangerous courses of action. IPOE consists of four phases 

and can readily be applied to the space mission area: 

 Defining the Operational Environment: This involves determining the orbital and 

terrestrial regimes in which space forces will be employed and space effects will be 

generated or realized. Space intelligence planners will bound the intelligence 

preparation needs by using satellite assessed maneuver capabilities and ranges to 

determine the potential area of interest and potential natural hazards, for example, 

predicting upcoming meteor showers, solar flares or other significant environmental 

threats or obstacles to space vehicles or communications signals. This also 

includes determination of which nation-states are supporting or affected by a 

potential conflict and possible avenues of approach for friendly forces. It also 

includes mapping the background electromagnetic environment and characterizing 

or mapping the coherent signals in that environment. 

 Describing Operational Environment Effects: Generally, space operations focus on 

surface, exoatmospheric, and electromagnetic dimensions of the operational 

environment. On the surface, the IPOE process is concerned with the effects of the 

environment on the ground nodes that support space operations which may include 

terrestrial weather conditions which inhibit or enhance space operations. In the 

exoatmospheric environment, predicting the effects of the space environment on 

adversary and third-country space capabilities might include predicting the 

probability of being struck by debris or meteoroids, potential space environment 

effects on a spacecraft, possible avenues of attack for enemy forces, and evaluating 

environment-based limitations on the maneuver capabilities of space vehicles. 
25

Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle – 

First Atlas V launch 

from Cape Canaveral 

AFS, FL in August 

2002 

Describing electromagnetic effects includes determining the effect of an energized 

atmosphere or scintillated ionosphere on space communications, determining the 

susceptibility of a given signal, satellite, line of communication, or ground asset to 

the effects of the electromagnetic environment (such as interference). 

 Evaluating the Adversary: This includes evaluating the adversary force composition 

and order of battle; satellite capabilities; offensive or defensive counterspace 

capabilities, tactics, and doctrine; ability to sustain or reconstitute space capabilities; 

the friendly assets the adversary is likely to target; and the adversary’s willingness to 

engage in various combat operations. Additional analysis is performed on enemy 

space centers of gravity and critical nodes and assets that are critical to the success 

of the enemy’s operations. Furthermore, US forces must evaluate adversary access 

to commercial space products and services by analyzing their impact on the battle 

space. US forces must also attempt to understand enemy space crew force training 

status, use of space communications and ISR capabilities, and C2 capabilities. 

 Determining Adversary COA: Intelligence analysts fuse knowledge of adversary 

capabilities and the environment, as well as assessments of enemy objectives and 

desired end state to determine potential enemy courses of action. This includes 

determination of most likely and most dangerous COAs. It also includes evaluation 

of the branches and sequels of these COAs. 

Thorough and detailed IPOE is a necessary prerequisite to effective conduct of 

space operations. Well-accomplished IPOE provides commanders at all levels with 

intelligence decision aids necessary to accomplish operational objectives. 

Space intelligence preparation of the operational environment is a key component of 

predictive operational environment awareness, thus supporting the commander’s 

multidimensional understanding of the operational environment in time, space, and effect, regardless of the 

adversary, location, weather, or time of day. PBA is 

continuous and achieved by the commander through 

possession of relevant, comprehensive, knowledge, 

including an accurate forecast of pertinent influences in 

the operational environment. This knowledge of the 

operational environment, in concert with C2, permits 

commanders to anticipate future conditions, assess 

changing conditions, establish priorities, exploit emerging 

opportunities, and act with a degree of speed and 

certainty not matched by our adversaries. 

SPACELIFT 

Planners should be aware of the limitations of the 

current US spacelift infrastructure. Today, launching a 

satellite requires extensive pre-launch preparation and 

checkout followed by extensive on-orbit checkout prior to 
26

operations. In addition, the US does not have the capability to perform multiple 

launches in rapid succession, or make rapid changes to a planned launch’s payload. 

Today, spacelift requirements need to be identified years ahead of operational need. 

Furthermore, military planners are limited to on-orbit assets when responding to 

contingencies. 

In the future, the Air Force may field a robust “launch-on-demand” spacelift 

infrastructure, the ability to place a satellite on orbit within days or even hours of being 

requested. Combined with operationally responsive satellites, military planners will 

have more flexibility to meet joint warfighter requirements. 

LEGAL ISSUES 

The laws applicable to space operations flow mainly from four treaties. Additionally, 

general principles of international law, including those embodied in the United Nations 

Charter and law of armed conflict, apply to the conduct of space operations. There are 

also several arms control agreements impacting military space activities. Domestically, 

we must consider the impact of US laws and policies on our space activities. While the 

space legal regime imposes a few significant constraints, the bulk of this regime 

provides a great deal of flexibility for military operations in space. 

 The Outer Space Treaty. The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 

States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 

Celestial Bodies, more familiarly known as the Outer Space Treaty (OST), 

establishes the fundamental precepts governing outer space operations. The OST 

establishes several important principles: 

  The Freedom Principle. Article I of the OST establishes that outer space 

“shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of 

any kind....” An important aspect of this principle is that satellites may freely 

operate in space, including over other nations, without the same sovereignty 

concerns applicable to territorial airspace relating to the overflight of aircraft. 

  The Non-Appropriation Principle. Article II of the OST provides that outer 

space is “not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by 

means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” 

  The Applicability of International Law. Article III clarifies that international 

law applies to activities in outer space. The right of self-defense, as 

recognized in the United Nations Charter and more fundamentally in 

customary international law, applies in outer space. Also, law of war precepts 

such as necessity, distinction and proportionality will apply to any military 

activity in outer space. 

  Weapons in Space. Article IV prohibits placing nuclear weapons or other 

weapons of mass destruction in orbit around the earth, installing them on the 

Moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise stationing them in outer space. 
27

Article IV also prohibits a limited range of military activities to include 

establishing bases, weapons testing, and the conduct of military maneuvers 

on celestial bodies. Thus, the placement of weapons other than weapons of 

mass destruction in outer space is permissible (except for testing of a weapon 

on celestial bodies), as is the transit of nuclear weapons, such as ICBMs, 

through space. 

  Peaceful Purposes. The OST recognizes “the exploration and use of outer 

space for peaceful purposes.” The majority of nations have traditionally held 

that the “peaceful purposes” language does not prohibit military activities in 

outer space; such activities have taken place throughout the space age 

without significant international protest. The phrase, rather, has been 

interpreted to require that activities in space be non-aggressive, or in other 

words, in compliance with the requirements under the United Nations Charter 

and international law to refrain from the threat or use of force except in 

accordance with the law, such as in self-defense or pursuant to United 

Nations Security Council authorization. 

  Non-interference. Article IX calls on states to enter into international 

consultations before engaging in activities likely to cause harmful interference 

with another nation’s peaceful uses of outer space. 

 Other Space Treaties. Other major treaties pertaining to space are the 1968 

Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 

Objects Launched into Outer Space (The Rescue and Return Agreement), the 1972 

Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 

(Liability Convention) and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into 

Outer Space (Registration Convention) of 1974. The Rescue and Return Agreement 

obligates nations to cooperate in the rescue and return of distressed astronauts and 

to take those measures it deems practicable to return space objects of other nations 

that come to Earth within its territory. The Liability Convention provides a system for 

assessing liability for damage caused by space objects. Generally, a nation is 

responsible for damage caused by a space object to objects on the ground or to 

aircraft in flight. Damage caused to other space objects, on the other hand, will only 

lead to liability if one party can establish fault on the part of the other party. Finally, 

the Registration Convention requires nations to notify the UN “as soon as 

practicable” after an object has been launched into outer space, providing certain 

descriptive information, to include orbital parameters and a general statement of the 

purpose of the space object. 

 Arms Control Treaties. A few arms control treaties have provisions with some 

impact on space operations. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, for example, prohibits 

nuclear explosions in space. Many arms limitations treaties also prohibit 

interference with “national technical means” of treaty verification. These national 

technical means include certain surveillance satellites. During times of hostilities, 

however, arms control treaty obligations may be suspended as between belligerents 

to the extent those terms are inconsistent with a state of armed conflict. 
28

 Space Policy. National and DOD policy have long asserted that the US is 

committed to exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes 

and for the benefit of all humanity. US policy has consistently been that peaceful 

purposes include defense and intelligence purposes. The US further recognizes the 

right of all nations to engage in the exploration and use of outer space free from 

harmful interference. In fact, national and DOD space policy state that “[p]urposeful 

interference with US space systems will be viewed as an infringement on sovereign 

rights.” Finally, both US and DOD policy specifically assign DOD the four space 

mission areas of space support, space force enhancement, space control, and 

space force application. 
29

CHAPTER FOUR 

EXECUTING SPACE OPERATIONS 

During force employment, execution of space operations is a dynamic task that 

requires timely integration throughout the joint campaign. The employment of space 

forces at the operational level is accomplished through tasking orders that deconflict, 

synchronize, and integrate space operations with theater operations. Although no 

authority exists for control over non-military space assets, the joint force must integrate 

with enabling space operations conducted by non-military space assets. Also, during 

operations, the adversary will seek to disrupt friendly space capabilities. This 

asymmetric attack against our space capabilities could threaten our ability to maintain 

space superiority. Airmen must prepare for an attack of this nature and execute space 

operations in an integrated manner. 

EXECUTION OF GLOBAL FORCES 

USSTRATCOM executes a strategy based on requests from multiple theaters, 

global requirements for national defense, and maintenance of on-orbit space assets. 

When forces are employed, execution of the space tasking order is a dynamic task 

requiring timely deconfliction, integration, and synchronization with other elements of 

the theater campaign. Integrating various space-related or space-based capabilities is 

accomplished through deliberate coordination processes between the theater AOC and 

the Space AOC/JSpOC. 

Space AOC/JSpOC 

The Air Force provides a Space AOC that forms the core of the JSpOC. The 

Space AOC/JSpOC is located at Vandenberg AFB CA. It includes personnel, facilities 

and equipment necessary to plan, execute and assess space operations and integrate 

space power. 

The Space AOC/JSpOC tracks assigned and attached space forces/assets and 

provide reachback support to organic theater space personnel. The Space 

AOC/JSpOC translates CDRUSSTRATCOM’s OPORDs and CDR JFCC Space 

guidance into the STO. STOs task and direct assigned and attached space forces to 

...[As] we showed and proved during DESERT STORM, and 

proved again during the air campaign over the Balkans, space 

is an integral part of everything we do to accomplish our 

mission. Today, the ultimate high ground is space. 

—General Lester P. Lyles 

Commander, Air Force Materiel Command 
30

Space AOC/JSpOC is located at 

Vandenberg AFB CA 

fulfill theater and global mission requirements in support of national objectives. The 

STO cycle is flexible to synchronize with the theater’s battle rhythm. 

Space AOC/JSpOC Organization 

The Space AOC/JSpOC is a functional 

AOC composed of four divisions: Strategy, 

combat plans, combat operations, and ISR. 

There are also specialty teams, liaisons from 

other agencies and sister Service personnel 

to enable the Space AOC to fulfill its 

responsibilities as the JSpOC. Collectively, 

they accomplish the main processes of 

strategy development, planning, tasking, 

collection management and intelligence 

analysis/production. The Space AOC/JSpOC 

serves as the focal point for coordination and 

reachback support for regional space operations requirements. Organized along the 

structure of an AOC, the Space AOC/JSpOC consists of four divisions that focus on 

global and theater space operations: 

 Strategy Division. The strategy division recommends both long- and short-term 

strategies to achieve USSTRATCOM and theater objectives by developing, refining, 

disseminating, and assessing strategy. This is normally presented through the JSOP 

and space operations directive (SOD), which will be used to guide tasking order 

development, and during crisis action planning will be expanded or modified to meet 

the crisis situation. The strategy division is organized into three teams: Strategy 

development team, strategy guidance team, and operational assessment team. 

  Strategy Development Team produces the JSOP based on strategic and 

theater plans, established doctrine, and global space requirements. 

  Strategy Guidance Team produces the SOD and ensures theater air 

operations directive and USSTRATCOM OPORDs and FRAGOs are linked to 

the overall objectives. 

  Operational Assessment Team collects information provided by combat 

operations and other sources and performs an operational assessment of the 

space effects being generated. The operational assessment team analyzes 

the effectiveness of previous STO executions which may guide future strategy 

development. 

Each of these teams has individuals who are matrixed from other Space 

AOC/JSpOC divisions to provide subject area expertise for development of strategy 

division products. 
31

 Combat Plans Division. The combat plans division performs operational planning 

to develop execution orders for joint space operations. The combat plans division 

publishes and disseminates the STO. This document applies specific space 

capabilities and assets to accomplish tasks in fulfillment of global USSTRATCOM 

and/or theater missions. The combat plans division is divided into two teams, the 

master space plan team and STO production team. 

  Master Space Plan Team defines space effects and builds the master space 

plan (MSP). The MSP is similar to the master air attack plan. 

  STO Production Team uses the MSP to produce an executable STO. 

Accompanying SPINs are also included in the STO. 

 The STO production cycle is based on the six-step targeting cycle described in 

joint doctrine. The cycle is typically designed around the joint standard of 72 hours 

(48 hours for planning and 24 hours for execution). However, the cycle is flexible to 

synchronize with the warfighter’s battle rhythm requirements. 

 Combat Operations Division (COD). The COD monitors execution of the current 

tasking order and publishes any required changes. The COD maintains space 

situational awareness and provides a 24/7 reachback interface for theater AOCs. 

Timely coordination between the COD and each tasked wing operations center 

(WOC) is essential for effective tasking order execution. Wing commanders and 

their squadrons receive orders, directives, and other guidance from the Space 

AOC/JSpOC through the WOC.

 The Space AOC/JSpOC has aligned itself according to functions based on 

effects based approach to operations. These concepts describe the capabilities and 

effects space forces contribute to the joint fight. They include space superiority; 

global information services; global surveillance, tracking and targeting; assured 

access; space force application; and space C2. 

  Space Superiority is that level of control in the space domain that one force 

enjoys over another that permits the conduct of operations at a given time 

and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Space 

superiority may be localized in time and space, or it may be broad and 

persistent. Achieving space superiority is of primary concern since it allows 

control and exploitation of the space domain in order to provide space effects 

in and through space. The Air Force achieves space superiority through 

counterspace operations, including offensive and defensive operations, both 

of which are based on robust space situational awareness. 

For more detailed discussion of space superiority, refer to AFDD 2-2.1, 

Counterspace Operations.

  Global Information Services. One of the primary effects space assets 

provide is the transmission and distribution of information. Global information 
32

services describes space assets ability to contribute to information superiority 

and includes such capabilities as positioning, navigation, and timing; satellite 

communications; and blue force tracking. 

  Global Surveillance, Tracking and Targeting describes abilities of space 

assets to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, enabling other functions 

like weather and missile warning. 

  Assured Access. Our capabilities to gain access and operate in the space 

domain describe assured access to space. This includes launch and range 

operations, satellite control networks, as well as terrestrial communication 

networks that link ground nodes of our C2 systems. 

  Space Force Applications are those forces that deliver kinetic effects to, 

from, or through space. While only ICBM systems currently fall into this 

category, future space systems, such as the common aerospace vehicle, 

land-based strategic deterrent, and conventional ICBM, could deliver combat 

effects to terrestrial and space targets. 

  C2 of Space Forces. C2 provides the ability to monitor, assess, plan, and 

execute space forces in an integrated and comprehensive manner. 

 ISR Division. The ISR Division (ISRD) is focused on providing the strategic, 

operational, tactical, and technical knowledge about adversary capabilities 

necessary to effectively plan US operations. Since knowledge of adversary 

capabilities, tactics, strengths, and weaknesses is necessary to optimally plan and 

execute both offensive and defensive operations, ISRD personnel support all Space 

AOC/JSpOC divisions. ISRD activities include IPOE, maintaining adversary orders 

of battle, enemy COA prediction, identifying and tracking critical indicators of 

pending foreign activity, recognizing and predicting foreign patterns and behavior, 

and providing target system analysis and target nomination lists. 

Integrating Global with Theater Space Operations 

To ensure theater military space requirements are met, appropriate command 

relationships should be established. Control of military space forces is normally 

retained by USSTRATCOM due to the global nature of space assets. Support is the 

normal command relationship used to integrate USSTRATCOM space operations and 

theater operations. These command relationships allow theaters to coordinate with the 

supporting commander to integrate space capabilities. An established relationship 

between the CFACC and the CDR JFCC Space is essential to ensure flexibility 

and responsiveness when integrating space operations. Additionally, DIRLAUTH 

should be authorized for coordinated planning. 
33

The Space AOC/JSpOC normally synchronizes its supporting operations with the 

theaters because the supported commander drives tasking requirements. By adjusting 

its operational schedule, the Space AOC/JSpOC optimizes support to the theater and 

space integration. If more than one theater is being supported, an operational schedule 

will be adjusted to balance support to all theaters. 

Examples of Global Space Forces In Support Of Theater Operations 

Operation DESERT STORM, Missile Warning – Prior to DESERT STORM, the 

DSP had been used to support missile warning for ICBM launches against North 

America. During DESERT STORM, command relationships were established 

between US Space Command (the predecessor to USSTRATCOM) and US Central 

Command so that US Space Command provided missile warning to the theater via 

military satellite communications. During the operation, DSP detected 87 SCUD 

launches. A warning sent to the theater allowed time for the Saudis, US forces, and 

the allied forces to seek shelter from incoming SCUDs. The data was also used for 

attack operations (SCUD hunting) and Patriot operations (SCUD in-flight destruction). 

Based on the lessons learned from DESERT STORM, new space units were created 

to improve warning operations to the theater, such as the 11 SWS. 

Operation ALLIED FORCE, Munitions Guidance – Munitions using GPS for 

guidance became a requirement for what Admiral James Ellis (Commander of Allied 

Forces Southern Europe; and former Commander, JTF Noble Anvil) called 'A War of 

Weather.' Precision-guided munitions were no longer "good enough." In this 

operation, pilots experienced a greater than 50 percent cloud cover more than 70 

percent of the time. Laser and electro-optical-guided munitions simply could not hit 

what the pilots could not see. GPS-aided munitions allowed allied forces to operate 

at night and in poor weather conditions eliminating enemy sanctuaries and 

operational lulls. 

Operation ALLIED FORCE, Battle Damage Indications (BDI) – Through a direct 

support relationship between the 11 SWS (CONUS) and the CFACC (Italy), real-time 

information from DSP was fed to the CAOC. This information, coupled with data 

from unmanned aircraft (UA) and imaging satellites provided BDI to tailor follow-on 

strike packages. This increased situational awareness for analysts and operators. 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, All-weather employment and Defensive 

Counterspace Operations – GPS guidance and navigation continued to be critical 

to joint operations. During a sandstorm, the Air Force was able to continue to strike 

enemy ground forces in close contact with friendly forces, effectively denying the 

adversary an operational sanctuary. OIF also provided the first operational 

experience showing the vulnerability of the GPS signal to electronic attack when Iraqi 

forces attempted to jam GPS. Ironically, some of the GPS jammers were destroyed 

with GPS-aided munitions, the first real-world example of the counterspace mission 

called suppression of adversary counterspace capabilities. 
34

EXECUTION OF SPACE FORCES IN THEATER 

Today, there are multi-Service space forces that can deploy to support operations. 

Some of these forces are designed to integrate into various levels of command within 

the joint force. Other deployable space forces possess capabilities that must be 

integrated into the overall military campaign. Depending on theater requirements and 

the global situation, the SecDef may attach these forces to geographic combatant 

commanders conducting combat operations. 

When deployed, Air Force space forces are normally attached to an AETF under 

the OPCON of the COMAFFOR. When the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the CFACC, 

the CFACC is normally given TACON of other Service space forces in excess of their 

organic requirements. The CFACC should integrate and task assigned, attached, and 

other Service forces into operations via the AOC and the ATO process. Air Force space 

experts are matrixed across the AOC, ensuring space capabilities and effects are 

integrated into theater operations via the ATO, for deployed space forces, and STO, for 

global space forces. 

Examples of Theater Space Forces in Operations 

Vietnam War – Even though USSTRATCOM and AFSPC were decades from 

formation, a significant example of deployed space forces occurred during the 

Vietnam War. Two DMSP ground stations were deployed to theater. One 

went to Vietnam and the other went to Thailand to support military operations 

with weather data. Weather was a major concern during Vietnam. The DMSP 

satellites became the primary short-term forecasting tool for tactical military 

operations. The impact was profound. The commander of Air Force operations 

in Southeast Asia stated: “As far as I am concerned, this [satellite] weather 

picture is probably the greatest innovation of the war.”

Air Force Space Support Teams (AFSSTs) (1993-2000) – The AFSSTs 

deployed to several operations, supporting the JFACC in the AOC by providing 

space education and expertise. Due to the success of the AFSST, the Air 

Force recognized the need to integrate space expertise into theater staffs. By 

the end of 2000, the Air Force had deactivated the AFSSTs and begun the 

integration of space forces across the combat air forces. 

 

Korea – Currently, the air component commander uses a deployable data 

downlink station operated by the Army and Navy to integrate an in-theater 

capability to support theater missile warning operations. The JTAGS provides 

data for warning and attack operations against ballistic missile attack. The Air 

Force provides mission data to JTAGS via the DSP satellite. 
35

INTEGRATING CIVIL, COMMERCIAL, FOREIGN SPACE ASSETS 

Today, many civil, commercial, and foreign organizations contribute space 

capabilities to military operations. Some organizations, such as those within the 

communications and intelligence communities, have established processes for military 

forces to request services. Non-military space assets provide alternatives to meet the 

military’s operational needs. 

Military resources will be stressed during large-scale contingencies and combat 

operations. In these situations, the military normally will use civil, commercial, and/or 

foreign space assets to support military objectives. The integration of non-military 

space assets may become vital to mission accomplishment. Military capabilities may be 

augmented with these assets or the assets may, by themselves, meet the military’s 

needs. In most cases, the geographic combatant commander’s staff will determine the 

appropriate avenue for meeting warfighter needs using these assets. 

Civil, commercial, and foreign space assets can be leveraged through preestablished agreements, but often must be requested on an unplanned basis. For 

example, the military may request NASA to redirect focus from a scientific mission to 

support a military operation. DOD organizations like the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency and Defense Information Systems Agency are designated to 

contract with commercial entities for services. In any case, because of unique C2 

processes, pre-established agreements enhance effectiveness. 

National and civil organizations are responsive to warfighter requirements in most 

instances. There may be instances, however, where competing requirements must be 

balanced, such as strategic reconnaissance for treaty verification that compete with 

operational collection requirements. Also, when dealing with commercial entities, 

military commanders may not expect the same level of support as with DOD or civil 

agencies. Corporations are market driven and concerned with their long-term success. 

There may be situations where commercial entities conclude it is not in their best 

interest to support certain military operations. 

Similarly, foreign space assets, even those provided by our allies, may not be 

easily integrated into military operations. Civil, commercial, and/or foreign space assets 

may be specialized and not have sufficient flexibility for dynamic re-tasking, may require 

unique procedures and equipment, and may not meet critical requirements for military 

operations. 
36

RESPONDING TO AN ASYMMETRIC ATTACK AGAINST US SPACE 

CAPABILITIES 

 

The US is the most advanced space power in world. The US is also the most 

space-dependent country in the world. Today, most adversaries will not be able to 

directly overcome the US or its allies’ dominance in space, which makes an asymmetric 

Examples Of Civil/Commercial Space Assets In The Fight

Vietnam War – During the Vietnam War, the military used a NASA 

communications satellite, the synchronous communications satellite, to provide 

communications between Saigon and Hawaii. Also, the military leased 

commercial satellite communications circuits to connect Saigon and Hawaii to 

meet administrative and logistical needs. Satellite usage during the Vietnam 

conflict established the military practice of relying on civil and commercial space 

systems. 

Operation DESERT STORM – Civil remote sensing satellites played a key role 

in providing wide-area information in the theater. The Pentagon spent up to 

$6M on data from the US-owned Land Remote Sensing Satellite and Frenchowned SPOT imaging satellites. These satellites were used to provide widearea surveillance to augment and complement US intelligence satellites. 

Operation ALLIED FORCE – During the later stages of the campaign, 60 

percent of satellite communications was provided by commercial entities. This 

is a significant change from DESERT STORM where only 15 percent of 

communications was provided by commercial satellites. 

Operation ATLAS RESPONSE – An Air Force-led JTF was deployed in March 

2000 to Mozambique and South Africa to conduct humanitarian 

assistance/disaster relief for flooding in the region. During initial deployment 

and setup, the JTF staff found overhead imagery from a NASA experimental 

satellite posted on the NASA web site. The images showed the difference in 

saturation of the land following the flooding. The JTF had no formal relationship 

with NASA, but used the images to build situational awareness on the region. 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – During OIF, military satellite communications 

did not meet the significant bandwidth requirements of the joint force during 

major combat operations. Consequently, the military contracted commercial 

satellite communications to supply nearly 80% of communications during the 

operation. As requirements for increased communications bandwidth continue 

to rise, the US military will continue to seek commercial satellite alternatives to 

augment our capabilities. 
37

attack against friendly space capabilities attractive. For example, some adversaries 

have a limited ability to attack links or nodes of our space systems. During Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM, the adversary employed GPS jammers to interfere with coalition 

weapons employment. Military planners and operators must be prepared for electronic 

as well as other types of attacks. 

Decision makers in the AOC must understand that time-sensitive requirements 

necessitate a responsive relationship with reachback agencies who can anticipate 

possible situations and to react quickly. Normally, when establishing the command 

relationship, the supported/supporting commanders discuss how to handle timesensitive situations. Command relationships need to be flexible enough to support timesensitive operations. Because of the impacts of asymmetric attacks against space 

capabilities, theater and Space AOCs need to discuss time-sensitive processes early in 

planning process. 

Asymmetric attacks may be in violation of various international laws and 

agreements. Depending on the nature of the attack, interagency and international 

cooperation may play a significant role in responding to such attacks. In a given 

circumstance, the sequenced or simultaneous employment of the diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of national power may complement or even obviate 

the need for a military response. 
38

... the US must, over the next few years, develop a cadre 

of experienced, intensely knowledgeable people skilled in 

applying space to combat. We are talking about an entirely 

new breed of war fighters, who will ultimately transform the 

power and scope of warfighting in the same way airpower 

professionals have done in the last century. 

—The Honorable Peter B. Teets 

Former Acting Secretary of the Air Force, 

Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, 

 and DOD Executive Agent for Space

CHAPTER FIVE 

 DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE PROFESSIONALS 

Developing Airmen is an Air Force core competency, and the development of a 

space professional cadre is recognized as an enabling capability for employing 

integrated space capabilities that support the full spectrum of military operations. Space 

professional training and education instill space-mindedness, make space capabilities 

universally understood, accepted, and exploitable by joint forces, and create military 

and civilian space leaders with a stronger foundation in space employment and a 

greater understanding of space capabilities. 

SPACE TRAINING AND EVALUATION 

Space operators should be trained throughout their careers to integrate space 

across the range of military operations and during all phases of an operation. Continual 

training is crucial to maintain proficiency because space assets and their TTPs 

continually evolve. In concert with training, evaluation is key to identifying shortfalls and 

is a critical measure of training program effectiveness. Stringent standards of 

performance should be established to ensure space operators attain and maintain the 

high degree of proficiency required for mission success. Commanders at all levels 

should be involved with the training and evaluation of their personnel and should be 

confident they meet minimum standards before being certified mission ready. 

Following training common to all space professionals, space operators initially 

become specialists in a specific area or system. However, the diverse nature of space 

operations dictates that, over time, they should gain knowledge and understanding of 

the broad spectrum of space operations. As their careers progress, space operators 

should move beyond technical knowledge of their core specialty areas and gain a more 

operational-level focus of air and space power. Ultimately, the Air Force needs Airmen 

who are space professionals and can articulate how space operations integrate into, 

contribute to, and improve military operations. 
39

EXERCISES 

Exercises are conducted to achieve training objectives. For training to best 

prepare participants for actual requirements, exercises should be planned and 

conducted to resemble real operations as closely as possible. Space forces are no 

exception and should be realistically exercised to the full extent possible, consistent with 

operational requirements. To improve readiness, space forces should participate as a 

full partner with air and information assets in large-scale exercises overseas and in the 

US. Joint exercises in overseas locations provide realistic training for in-theater and 

deployable Air Force forces, and also allow other Services and allied military forces to 

gain valuable experience in integrating space capabilities. When it is impossible to 

meet mission requirements and take part in an exercise, high fidelity simulators should 

be used to present the correct “space picture” to participants. 

Integrated Air, Space, and Information Test Range 

There are several ranges and exercises that prepare Air Force forces for joint 

operations. As new space capabilities are developed, test ranges such as the space 

test and training range evaluate new capabilities prior to operational fielding. The 

development of an integrated test range for air, space, and information assets enables 

the Air Force to conduct enhanced testing, training, and exercises against potential 

adversary space force capabilities. It also integrates Air Force forces in an operational 

environment prior to real-world contingency operations. This training enhances the Air 

Force’s ability to effectively integrate capabilities and produce the commander’s desired 

effects. 

EDUCATION 

Education broadens understanding of space’s overall contribution to military 

operations and gives operators an appreciation of how their specific area of expertise 

impacts global and theater operations. Education is necessary to move space 

professionals beyond the tactical and technical focus of their day-to-day jobs and to 

assure the requisite level of technological skills necessary to sustain the space mission. 

Space education goes beyond individual service requirements and encompasses all 

organizations within the national security space environment. 

Developmental Education (DE) 

DE provides broad education appropriate for different points in an Airman’s career 

as a space professional. These programs provide a perspective on the role of space 

power in military operations through study of such subjects as Air Force and joint 

doctrine. An understanding of these areas is critical for Airmen to effectively employ 

space power within a joint and coalition environment. DE also provides the opportunity 

for all Airmen to learn about the application of space in military operations. 
40

WARGAMES 

 Wargames are used for educating personnel and testing of new concepts of 

employment and organization. Because the United States has yet to meet a “space 

peer” in conflict, wargames continue to be a primary means of assessing the potential 

doctrinal implications of the use of space systems. Wargames generate insights into 

the current and future uses of space in warfighting. This venue allows the US to test 

potential actions used by adversaries to attack our space capabilities. An important 

element in wargames is to demonstrate unanticipated consequences involved with 

future space capabilities including vulnerabilities, policy, and force structure concerns. 

Space forces should be modeled in a realistic fashion consistent with other military 

forces. 

RED TEAMING 

 Red Teaming provides a capability to conduct vulnerability assessments used to 

prepare combat air forces, joint and allied forces for combat by providing challenging, 

realistic space threat replication, training, and feedback. Experiencing the tactics and 

capabilities adversaries may use against us will help ensure we maintain the space 

superiority we need to prevail in real world scenarios. 

EXPERIMENTS 

Experiments are used for evaluating operational concepts and new technologies. 

Through experiments, the Air Force gains knowledge about future systems technology 

and processes, spiral development of developing technology and processes, and rapid 

transition of proven technology and processes to the warfighter. Experimentation is 

fundamentally different from exercises. Exercises involve training all personnel in 

established processes on fielded systems. Combatant commanders are encouraged to 

conduct experiments to test new operating concepts. However, because experiments 

are designed to be repeated, desired system and process knowledge is gained. 

However, lessons learned should not be overstated given the carefully orchestrated 

nature of experiments. 
41

SUGGESTED READINGS 

Air Force Publications (Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the 

Air Force Doctrine Center web page at https://www.doctrine.af.mil)

Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine

Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization 

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations

Air Force Operational Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 2-3.4, Joint Space Operations Center

Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-1.28, Space

Joint Publications 

Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations

Joint Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations

Joint Publication 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

Other Publications 

Arnold, David C., Spying from Space: Constructing America's Satellite Command and 

Control Networks (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005). 

Air University Space Primer, (Air University Press), Aug 2003 

Cleary, Mark C., The Cape: Military Space Operations, 1971–1992 (45th Space Wing, 

History Office), 1994. 

Gorn, Michael H., Harnessing the Genie, Science and Technology Forecasting for the 

Air Force 1944-1986 (Office of Air Force History), 1988. 

Goure, Daniel, and Christopher M. Szara, Air and Space Power in the New Millennium

(Center for Strategic and International Studies), 1997. 

Hayes, Peter, Space Power for the Next Millenium (Air University Press), 2000. 

Jelonek, Mark P., Toward an Air and Space Force: Naval Aviation and the Implications 

for Space Power (Air University Press), 1999. 

Johnson-Freese, Joan, and Roger Handberg, Space, the Dormant Frontier: Changing 

the Paradigm for the 21st Century (Praeger), 1997. 

Lupton, David, On Space Warfare (Air University Press), 1988. 
42

MacDougall, Walter A., ...the Heavens and the Earth (Johns Hopkins University Press), 

1985. 

Mantz, Michael R., The New Sword: A Theory of Space Combat Power (Air University 

Press), 1995. 

Oberg, James, Space Power Theory, GPO, 1999. 

Peebles, Curtis, High Frontier: The U.S. Air Force and the Military Space Program (Air 

Force History and Museums Program), 1997. 

Preston, Bob, Plowshares and Power: The Military Use of Civil Space (National Defense 

University Press), 1994. 

Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space 

Management and Organization, 2001. 

Spires, David N., Beyond Horizons: A Half Century of Air Force Space Leadership (Air 

Force Space Command), 1997. 

United Nations, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space: text and status 

of treaties and principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of 

outer space, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (Office for Outer Space 

Affairs, United Nations), 1994. 

US Army Field Manual 3-14, Space Support to Army Operations. 
43

APPENDIX 

ORBITAL FUNDAMENTALS 

1. Strengths and Limitations of Space Operations 

Because the constellation design and orbital characteristics of a space system 

can vary greatly, space operations’ strengths and limitations must be considered. In 

general, space systems provide the ultimate high ground without overflight restrictions. 

The absence of significant drag and other natural opposing forces also allows space 

systems to have increased longevity, sometimes limited only by the reliability of the 

systems themselves (see Figure A.1). However, there are several forces at work that 

slowly degrade the accuracy of a satellite’s location: atmospheric drag (air particles and 

atoms exist even at very high altitudes); gravitational attractions of the sun, moon, and 

other planets; the fact that the Earth is not a perfect sphere and the force of gravity 

varies; gentle pressure from solar radiation; and the interaction of solar radiation and 

the Earth’s geomagnetic environment. 

Figure A.1. Operational Advantages of Space 
44

2. A Satellite Orbital Period 

The size of a satellite’s orbit determines its period, or the time it takes to 

complete one revolution. The lower the orbital altitude, the shorter the period. Common 

orbits have periods ranging from about 90 minutes (low orbits just above the 

atmosphere) to 24 hours (“geosynchronous” orbits approximately 22,300 statute miles 

above the Earth’s surface) (see Figure A.2). 

Figure A.2. A Satellite Orbital Period 

3. Eccentricity 

 

Eccentricity is used to describe how much an orbit’s shape deviates from a circle. 

The figure ranges from 0 to 1 with a value of 0 for a circular orbit. 

4. Inclination 

A satellite’s inclination is the angle between the Earth’s equatorial plane and the 

satellite’s orbital plane (measured counterclockwise from the equatorial to the orbital 

plane at the point where the satellite’s path crosses the equator headed northward) (see 

Figure A.3). This angle determines what part of the Earth’s surface passes directly 

beneath the satellite—a critical consideration in accomplishing its mission (see Figure 

A.4). Depending on the inclination, a single satellite may not be able to provide 

coverage of a specific point on or region of the Earth. However, a constellation may 

have that capability. Other space assets—civil, commercial, international, and military— 

may be used to supplement the satellite’s capability and provide continuous, nonintrusive coverage. 
45

Figure A.3. Inclination 

Figure A.4. Comparison of Inclination 

5. Types of Orbits (See Figure A.5)

Figure A.5. Types of Orbits 
46

a. Low Earth Orbit (LEO). LEO is the easiest type of orbit to reach, and the satellite’s 

proximity to the Earth’s surface provides the best potential for high-resolution imagery 

(see Figure A.6). However, satellites in these orbits can view a smaller portion of the 

surface of the Earth at any one time than those at higher altitudes, and atmospheric 

drag can shorten mission duration. LEO applications include manned flight, 

environmental monitoring and other ISR, and communication missions. 

Figure A.6. Low Earth Orbit 

b. Polar Orbits. A polar orbit is one with an inclination near 90 degrees. A satellite in a 

polar orbit will travel pole to pole, covering all or almost all of the surface of the earth in 

12 to 24 hours, making this type of orbit very useful for environmental monitoring and 

other ISR missions. A particular type of near polar orbit is a sun synchronous orbit. It 

has an inclination of 90 to 120 degrees and maintains a constant orientation towards the 

sun throughout the year, resulting in similar lighting conditions every orbit and making it 

very useful to detect changes in environmental conditions or surface features of the 

Earth over time. 
47

Figure A.7. Polar Orbit 

c. Medium Earth Orbit (MEO). MEO provides a satellite a view of a larger portion of 

the Earth at any one time than LEO. While atmospheric drag is negligible, a lot more 

energy is required to place a satellite in these orbits (see Figure A.8). Current 

applications include navigation systems (e.g., GPS). 

Figure A.8. Medium Earth Orbit 

d. Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO). HEO is an orbit with a large eccentricity, and an orbit 

shape of an ellipse vs. a circle. A useful feature of a satellite in a HEO is that the 

satellite travels relatively slowly when near apogee, giving a long dwell time combined 

with visibility of a large portion of the Earth. The former Soviet Union made extensive 

use of a HEO called a Molniya orbit that has a period of 12 hours, an inclination of 63.4 

degrees, an eccentricity of 0.7, and an apogee over the Northern Hemisphere (See 
48

Figure A.9). This particular HEO is very useful for providing communications or 

coverage in the high northern latitudes, a region less well covered by satellites in 

geostationary orbits. HEO orbits are useful for communications and some ISR 

missions. 

Figure A.9. Highly Elliptical Orbit 

e. Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO). Geostationary satellites are in a near-circular, 

near-zero inclination orbit with periods exactly equal to the Earth’s rotation of 24 hours 

(see Figure A.10). Hence, geostationary satellites remain roughly over one spot on the 

Earth at all times. Orbits that have a 24-hour period, but do not have a near-zero 

inclination or eccentricity, are called geosynchronous. All geostationary satellites are 

geosynchronous, but not all geosynchronous satellites are geostationary. The ground 

trace of a GEO satellite looks like a figure “8” pattern when traced onto a Mercator map 

of the Earth, which reflects the natural oscillations of the orbit as well as the degree to 

which the orbit is inclined to the Earth’s equatorial plane. GEO orbits have an altitude of 

approximately 22,300 statute miles, are difficult to reach, and require launch vehicles 

with significant lift capability. Satellites in GEO orbit provide coverage of large areas of 

the surface of the globe with continuous visibility of these areas. Therefore they are very 

useful for persistent communications, weather monitoring, and certain ISR functions.
49

Figure A.10. Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 

6. Constellations 

a. When a single satellite cannot provide the coverage necessary to accomplish a given 

mission, multiple satellites performing a single mission (a constellation) are used to 

provide global coverage or increase timeliness of coverage (see Figure A.11 and Figure 

A.12). Navigation constellations (such as GPS) are designed to ensure that signals from 

multiple satellites can be simultaneously received at a location on the ground, improving 

the accuracy of the information coming from those satellites. Communications 

constellations, on the other hand, are designed to ensure that at least one satellite is 

within line of sight of both ends of the communications link, and may include both 

equatorial and polar components. ISR constellations have satellites in both high and 

low altitude orbits, providing both wide-area coverage and high-resolution data. 

Figure A.11. Typical Constellations 

Variations
50

Figure A.12. Intelligence and Weather, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance 

Constellations 

b. Weather and reconnaissance systems may require constellations that combine high 

and low altitude systems. This provides on-board sensors with the capability to acquire 

wide-area, low-resolution coverage and limited field of view, high-resolution coverage, 

respectively. Some ISR systems, on the other hand, need continuous access to the 

areas surveyed and usually rely on high altitude, long dwell time orbits. 

This appendix is based on information in JP 3-14, Space Operations. 
51

GLOSSARY 

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

AADC area air defense commander 

ACCE air component coordination element 

AETF air and space expeditionary task force 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AFSPC Air Force Space Command 

AFSST Air Force space support team 

AFSPC/CC Commander, Air Force Space Command 

AO area of operations

AOC air and space operations center 

AOR area of responsibility 

ARABSAT Arabian Satellite Communications Organization 

ATO air tasking order 

BDI battle damage indications 

C2 command and control 

CAOC combined air and space operations center 

CAP crisis action planning 

CCDR combatant commander 

CDR commander 

CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic Command 

CFACC combined forces air component commander 

CFE commercial and foreign entities 

COA course of action 

COD combat operations division 

COCOM combatant command (command authority) 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

CONUS continental United States 

DE developmental education 

DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized 

DIRSPACEFOR director of space forces 

DMSP Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

DOD Department of Defense

DSP Defense Support Program

EBAO effects-based approach to operations

FRAGO fragmentary order 

GCC geographic combatant commander
52

GEO geosynchronous earth orbit 

GPS Global Positioning System

GWOT global war on terrorism 

HEO highly elliptical orbit

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile

INMARSAT international maritime satellite 

INTELSAT International Telecommunications Satellite Organization 

IPOE intelligence preparation of the operational environment 

ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

ISRD Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance division 

JAOC joint air and space operations center 

JAOP joint air operations plan 

JFACC joint force air and space component commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JFCC joint functional component command 

JOA joint operations area 

JP joint publication 

JSOP joint space operations plan 

JSpOC Joint Space Operations Center 

JTAGS joint tactical ground station 

JTF joint task force 

LEO low Earth orbit 

MEO medium earth orbit 

MSP master space plan 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

OAF Operation ALLIED FORCE 

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

OPCON operational control 

OPLAN operation plan 

OPORD operation order 

OST Outer Space Treaty 

PNT Positioning, navigation, and timing 

POTUS President of the United States 

ROE rules of engagement 

SBIRS Space-based Infrared System 
53

SC space control 

SCA space coordinating authority 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SFA space force application 

SFE space force enhancement 

SOD space operations directive 

SOPS space operations squadron 

SPINS special instructions 

SS space support 

STO space tasking order 

SWS space warning squadron 

TACON tactical control 

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures 

UA unmanned aircraft 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

WOC wing operations center 

Definitions 

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for 

coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military 

Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual 

has the authority to require consultation between agencies involved, but does not have 

the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be 

obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority 

is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be 

exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities 

than to operations. (JP 1-02) 

direction. Guidance to or management of support staff functions. Inherent within 

command but not a command authority in its own right. In some cases, can be 

considered an explicit instruction or order. Used by commanders and their designated 

subordinates to facilitate, channel, or motivate support staff to achieve appropriate 

action, tempo, or intensity. Used by directors of staff agencies on behalf of the 

commander to provide guidance to their staffs on how best to accomplish stated 

objectives IAW the commander’s intent. (AFDD 1) 

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air 

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint 

force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish 
54

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. See 

also joint force commander. (JP 1-02) [The joint force air and space component 

commander (JFACC) uses the joint air and space operations center to command and 

control the integrated air and space effort to meet the joint force commander’s 

objectives. This title emphasizes the US Air Force position that air power and space 

power together create effects that cannot be achieved through air or space power 

alone.] [AFDD 2] {Words in brackets apply only to the US Air Force and are offered for 

clarity.} 

space assets. A generic term which may refer to any of the following individually or in 

combination: space systems, individual parts of a space system, space personnel, or 

supporting infrastructure. (AFDD 2-2) 

space capability. 1. The ability of a space asset to accomplish a mission. 2. The ability 

of a terrestrial-based asset to accomplish a mission in space (e.g., a ground-based or 

airborne laser capable of negating a satellite). See also space; space asset. [JP 1-02] 

[The ability of a space asset or system to accomplish a mission.] [AFDD 2-2] {Words in 

brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

space control. Combat, combat support, and combat service support operations to 

ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when 

directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space. The space control mission area 

includes: surveillance of space; protection of US and friendly space systems; prevention 

of an adversary's ability to use space systems and services for purposes hostile to US 

national security interests; negation of space systems and services used for purposes 

hostile to US national security interests; and directly supporting battle management, 

command, control, communications, and intelligence. (JP 1-02) [Operations to attain 

and maintain a desired degree of space superiority by allowing friendly forces to exploit 

space capabilities while denying an adversaries ability to do the same (e.g. protection, 

prevention and negation). SC is achieved through offensive counterspace and 

defensive counterspace operations. Note: The Air Force uses counterspace as an 

equivalent definition of the space control mission.] Also called SC (AFDD 2-2) {Words 

in brackets apply only to the US Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

space coordinating authority. An authority in theater to coordinate joint space 

operations and integrate space capabilities. SCA can be retained by the JFC but is 

generally delegated down to the functional component commander with the preponderance of space forces, expertise in space operations, and ability to command and 

control. (AFDD 2-2) 

space forces. The space and terrestrial systems, equipment, facilities, organizations, 

and personnel necessary to access, use and, if directed, control space for national 

security. (JP 1-02) [Operational military units which consist of some combination of 

space assets such as space-based and terrestrial equipment, facilities, organizations, 

and personnel used to exploit space for national security.] [AFDD 2-2] {Words in 

brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 
55

space force application. Combat operations in, through, and from space to influence 

the course and outcome of conflict. The space force application mission area includes 

ballistic missile defense and force projection. Also called SFA (JP 1-02) 

 

space force enhancement. Combat support operations to improve the effectiveness 

of military forces as well as support other intelligence, civil, and commercial users. The 

space force enhancement mission area includes: ISR; integrated tactical warning and 

attack assessment; command, control, and communications; position, velocity, time, 

and navigation; and environmental monitoring. (JP 1-02) [Space-based capabilities that 

contribute to maximizing the effectiveness of military air, land, sea and space operations 

as well as support other intelligence, civil, and commercial users. The SFE mission 

area includes: ISR; integrated warning and attack assessment; communications; 

positioning, navigation and timing; blue force tracking; space environment monitoring 

and weather services.] Also called SFE (AFDD 2-2) {Words in brackets apply only to the 

US Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

space parity. That condition wherein neither opposing force enjoys an appreciable 

advantage over the other in controlling the space domain. (AFDD 2-2) 

space situation awareness. The requisite current and predictive knowledge of space 

events, threats, activities, conditions, and space system (space, ground, link) status, 

capabilities, constraints and employment—current and future, friendly and hostile—to 

enable commanders, decision makers, planners, and operators to gain and maintain 

space superiority across the spectrum of conflict. Space situation awareness is the 

cornerstone of space operations, all-inclusive of space force enhancement, space 

support, and space control. Also called SSA (AFDD 2-2) 

space superiority. The degree of dominance in space of one force over another that 

permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, air, space, and 

special operations forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by 

the opposing force. (JP 1-02) [That level of control in the space domain that one force 

enjoys over another that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place 

without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Space superiority may be 

localized in time and space, or it may be broad and enduring.] (AFDD 2-2) {Words in 

brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} 

space support. Combat service support operations to deploy and sustain military and 

intelligence systems in space. The space support mission area includes launching and 

deploying space vehicles, maintaining and sustaining spacecraft on-orbit, and deorbiting 

and recovering space vehicles, if required. (JP 1-02) [Those operations conducted with 

the objective of deploying, sustaining, and augmenting elements or capabilities of 

military space systems. Space support consists of spacelift, on-orbit support, deorbiting 

and recovering space vehicles, and reconstitution of space forces. Also called SS

(AFDD 2-2) {Words in brackets apply only to the US Air Force and are offered for 

clarity.} 
56

space supremacy. That level of control in the space domain that one force enjoys over 

another that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without 

effective interference by the opposing force. Space supremacy may be localized in time 

and space, or it may be broad and enduring. (AFDD 2-2) 

space system. A system with a major functional component that operates in the space 

environment or affects a space-based capability. Space systems consist of nodes and 

links. There are three nodes: space, terrestrial, and airborne. A space system also 

consists of links: control and mission. (AFDD 2-2)