2024 IL 128731

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 128731) 

SHAWNEE COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 84 et al., 

v. ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD et al., Appellees 

(Shawnee Community Unit School District No. 84, Appellant). 

Opinion filed May 23, 2024.

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet, Rochford, and O’Brien concurred 

in the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice Neville dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Holder White. 

OPINION

¶ 1 The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether a taxpayer must pay 

disputed property taxes as a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the 

Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) under section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code 
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(Code) (35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 2016)). The appellate court concluded that 

payment of the disputed taxes was not required in order to pursue an appeal. 2022 

IL App (5th) 190266. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the 

appellate court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Grand Tower Energy Center, LLC (Grand Tower), is the owner of a power plant 

located along the Mississippi River in Jackson County, Illinois. For the 2014 tax 

year, the Jackson County assessor imposed an assessed value of $33,445,837 on 

Grand Tower’s property. Grand Tower appealed the assessment to the Jackson 

County Board of Review, which reduced the assessed value of the property to 

$31,538,245. 

¶ 4 On May 28, 2015, Grand Tower timely filed an appeal to the PTAB under 

section 16-160 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 2014)), seeking a reduction 

of the final assessment imposed by the board of review. Shawnee Community Unit 

School District No. 84 (School District), which serves portions of Jackson County 

and receives funding from property taxes generated in that county, was granted 

leave to intervene in the appeal.1

¶ 5 While its appeal was pending before the PTAB, Grand Tower’s 2014 property 

taxes came due. Grand Tower did not pay the taxes. In December 2015, the Jackson 

County collector prepared the annual list of properties with delinquent taxes. See 

id. § 21-15. The list included Grand Tower’s property and showed that Grand 

Tower owed $2,557,423.91 in unpaid taxes for 2014. 

¶ 6 Thereafter, on January 14, 2016, the collector applied to the circuit court of 

Jackson County for a judgment and order of sale for taxes on the 2014 delinquent 

properties, including Grand Tower’s. See 35 ILCS 200/21-150 (West 2016). That 

same day, the court entered a judgment and order of sale pursuant to section 21-

180 of the Code (id. § 21-180). The court’s order stated, in part: 

1The Jackson County Board of Review was a party in the PTAB proceedings and the appellate 

court but is not participating in this appeal.
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“[W]hereas issue notice has been given of the intended application for 

Judgment against said land and lots in said application described, and no 

sufficient defense having been made or cause shown why Judgment should not 

be entered against said lands and lots for taxes, *** Judgment *** is hereby 

entered against the aforesaid tract o[r] tracts of lots or lands *** in favor of the 

people of the State of Illinois for the sum annexed to each *** and it is Ordered 

by the Court that the several tracts of lots or lands *** to be sold or forfeited as 

the law directs.”

¶ 7 At a tax sale held on January 19, 2016, an unrelated third party purchased Grand 

Tower’s 2014 taxes. 

¶ 8 On August 17, 2016, the School District filed a motion before the PTAB 

seeking dismissal of Grand Tower’s appeal. Citing section 23-5 of the Code (id.

§ 23-5), the School District maintained that Grand Tower was required to pay the 

2014 property taxes under protest in order to pursue an appeal before the PTAB. 

The School District asserted that Grand Tower “could have preserved its right to 

appeal to the PTAB had it pursued its legal remedies and paid the real estate taxes 

associated with the Grand Tower Station under protest” but it had not done so. 

Thus, according to the School District, the appeal should be dismissed. 

¶ 9 The School District also raised an additional argument in support of its motion 

to dismiss. Citing Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Construction, 96 Ill. 2d 159 (1983), 

the School District maintained that, once the Jackson County collector made the 

application for judgment and order of sale, the circuit court acquired “jurisdiction 

over the taxes and all supplemental matters,” including the determination of the 

assessment. The School District argued, therefore, that the PTAB was divested of 

jurisdiction to review the 2014 assessment and the appeal should be dismissed. 

¶ 10 Finally, the School District maintained that the circuit court’s entry of the 

judgment and order of sale stood as a conclusive determination not only of the fact 

that the taxes were delinquent but also of the correctness of the assessment. The 

School District argued that Grand Tower “could have presented its defenses or 

made its objections” to the assessment before the circuit court but failed to do so. 

As a consequence, according to the School District, Grand Tower “was collaterally 

estopped from disputing the assessment,” and the appeal should be dismissed for 

this reason as well. 
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¶ 11 In a written order dated September 19, 2016, the PTAB denied the School 

District’s motion to dismiss. A motion to reconsider was denied on November 4, 

2016. 

¶ 12 For the 2015 tax year, the Jackson County Board of Review again imposed a 

final assessed valuation of $31,538,245 on Grand Tower’s property, and in 

February 2016, Grand Tower again filed an appeal to the PTAB challenging the 

assessment. The PTAB consolidated Grand Tower’s 2015 appeal with the 2014 

appeal. Like the 2014 taxes, Grand Tower’s 2015 taxes also went unpaid and were 

sold to the same party that had purchased the 2014 taxes. 

¶ 13 In August 2017, Grand Tower redeemed the 2014 and 2015 taxes. Grand Tower 

paid the full amount of the taxes due, plus penalties and interest, as required by 

section 21-355 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/21-355 (West 2016)). 

¶ 14 On June 18, 2019, following an evidentiary hearing, the PTAB issued a lengthy 

written decision on Grand Tower’s consolidated appeals. In its decision, the PTAB 

was highly critical of the methodology employed by the School District’s valuation 

expert and found that Grand Tower had proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

that its property had been overvalued for tax years 2014 and 2015. As a result of 

the PTAB’s decision, the assessed value of Grand Tower’s property for each of the 

2014 and 2015 tax years was reduced from $31,538,245 to $3,333,000. The School 

District subsequently appealed the PTAB’s decision directly to the appellate court 

pursuant to section 16-195 of the Code (id. § 16-195). 

¶ 15 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the PTAB. 2022 IL App 

(5th) 190266. The appellate court rejected the School District’s contention that the 

PTAB had erred in reducing the assessed valuation of Grand Tower’s property, 

finding that the PTAB’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Id. ¶¶ 70-102. The court also rejected the School Board’s contention that 

the PTAB had erred in denying its motion to dismiss. Id. ¶¶ 45-69. The appellate 

court held that payment of the contested taxes was not a condition precedent to 

pursuing an appeal before the PTAB and that the tax sale proceedings in the circuit 

court did not divest the PTAB of jurisdiction to review the 2014 and 2015 property 

assessments. Id. ¶ 69. 
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¶ 16 We allowed the School District’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 

315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). We also allowed the Illinois Association of School 

Administrators and the Illinois Association of School Boards to file a brief amicus 

curiae in support of the School District’s position and the Civic Federation to file 

a brief amicus curiae in support of Grand Tower and the PTAB’s position. See Ill. 

S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 In this court, the School District does not challenge the appellate court’s 

judgment affirming the PTAB’s reduction of the assessments for the 2014 and 2015 

tax years. Instead, the School District contends only that the appellate court erred 

in affirming the PTAB’s denial of the School District’s motion to dismiss. 

¶ 19 I. Timely Payment of Taxes Before Seeking PTAB Relief

¶ 20 The School District first argues that the PTAB should have granted the motion 

to dismiss because Grand Tower did not timely pay its property taxes before 

seeking assessment relief. According to the School District, timely payment of the 

taxes is a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB. 2 We 

disagree.

2The dissent repeatedly asserts that we have “misstate[d] the central issue in this case” and that 

“[t]he School District does not argue that payment of property taxes constitutes a condition 

precedent to filing an appeal with the [PTAB].” Infra ¶ 74. This is incorrect. As in the trial court 

and the appellate court (see 2022 IL App (5th) 190266, ¶¶ 45-58), the School District first argues in 

this court that the PTAB erred in denying its motion to dismiss because Illinois taxpayers are 

required “to make timely payments before seeking assessment relief” and, specifically, that the 

payment under protest requirement of section 23-5 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/23-5 (West 2016)) 

“set[s] forth a condition precedent for objecting to property taxes generally before any forum.” This 

argument has been the School District’s primary contention throughout this litigation. Indeed, fully 

two-thirds of the analysis portion of the School District’s opening brief in this court is devoted to 

this issue. Grand Tower recognizes this point, stating that the first issue in this appeal is whether 

“the Property Tax Appeal Board err[ed] when it concluded that the Property Tax Code does not 

require a taxpayer to pay the disputed property tax, under protest or otherwise, as a condition of 

maintaining an appeal to PTAB under Section 16-160 of the Code.” The dissent’s repeated 

assertions that we have “misstated” the School District’s arguments are inaccurate and unwarranted.
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¶ 21 The PTAB is a state agency created in 1967 to review taxpayer challenges to 

property tax assessments imposed by local boards of review. Cook County Board 

of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 339 Ill. App. 3d 529, 535 (2002). The 

statutory provisions governing the administration of the PTAB are set forth in 

article 16 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160 to 16-195 (West 2016)). 

¶ 22 Section 16-160 of the Code (id. § 16-160), defines the procedure taxpayers must 

follow to appeal property tax assessments to the PTAB. Section 16-160 provides, 

in relevant part:

“any taxpayer dissatisfied with the decision of a board of review or board of 

appeals as such decision pertains to the assessment of his or her property for 

taxation purposes, or any taxing body that has an interest in the decision of the 

board of review or board of appeals on an assessment made by any local 

assessment officer, may, (i) in counties with less than 3,000,000 inhabitants 

within 30 days after the date of written notice of the decision of the board of 

review *** appeal the decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board for review. 

*** Such taxpayer or taxing body, hereinafter called the appellant, shall file a 

petition with the clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board, setting forth the facts 

upon which he or she bases the objection, together with a statement of the 

contentions of law which he or she desires to raise, and the relief requested.” 

Id.

¶ 23 Nothing in section 16-160 states that a taxpayer is required to pay the disputed 

property taxes in order to pursue an appeal of an assessment before the PTAB. 

Rather, section 16-160 requires only that the taxpayer file a petition with the clerk 

of the PTAB within 30 days of the local review board’s decision on an assessment, 

regardless of whether any property tax payment is due. 

¶ 24 The 30-day deadline for filing the petition is significant. Because the property 

tax imposed on a taxpayer is determined by multiplying the assessed value of the 

property by the tax rate (id. § 18-45), the assessment decision is made well in 

advance of the extension of the tax. The 30-day deadline therefore means that, in 

almost every instance, the taxpayer must initiate an appeal with the PTAB before

the actual tax payments are due for the tax year in question. Cf. Millennium Park 

Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill. 2d 281, 308 (2010) (noting that a taxpayer 

can immediately challenge an assessment before a local board of review “before 
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any taxes are due and payable”). It would be unreasonable to conclude that the 

legislature made paying disputed property taxes a condition precedent to pursuing 

an appeal of an assessment before the PTAB when, at the time of initiating the 

appeal, the taxpayer has not yet even received a property tax bill. 

¶ 25 Further support for the conclusion that payment of the disputed taxes is not a 

condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB can be found in section 

16-185 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/16-185 (West 2016)). That provision states, in 

part: 

“The extension of taxes on any assessment so appealed shall not be delayed by 

any proceeding before the [PTAB], and, in case the assessment is altered by the 

[PTAB], any taxes extended upon the unauthorized assessment or part thereof 

shall be abated, or, if already paid, shall be refunded with interest as provided 

in Section 23-20.” (Emphasis added.) Id. 

¶ 26 The inclusion of the phrase “if already paid” in section 16-160 shows 

conclusively that payment of the disputed property taxes is not required to pursue 

an appeal before the PTAB. If payment were required, there would be no need to 

include that language. Accordingly, by their plain terms, sections 16-160 and 16-

185 do not require payment of the disputed property taxes as a condition precedent 

to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB. 

¶ 27 Despite the foregoing, the School District nevertheless maintains that payment 

of the disputed property taxes is required to pursue an appeal. In support, the School 

District points to section 23-5 of the Code (id. § 23-5), a provision that governs the 

filing of tax objection complaints in the circuit court. 

¶ 28 A tax objection complaint (see id. § 23-10) provides an alternative means of 

challenging a property tax assessment imposed by a local board of review. Madison 

Two Associates v. Pappas, 227 Ill. 2d 474, 477-78 (2008). The two options for 

challenging an assessment—an appeal to the PTAB and the filing of a tax objection 

complaint—are mutually exclusive. Id. at 477. A taxpayer seeking review of an 

assessment before the PTAB may not file a tax objection complaint challenging the 

assessment in circuit court, and a taxpayer who files a tax objection complaint 

challenging as assessment in circuit court may not file an appeal before the PTAB. 

Id. at 477-78. 
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¶ 29 Section 23-5 requires that a taxpayer who files a tax objection complaint pay 

the disputed taxes “under protest” as a condition precedent to filing the complaint. 

Section 23-5 states:

“Payment under protest. *** [I]f any person desires to object to all or any part 

of a property tax for any year, for any reason other than that the property is 

exempt from taxation, he or she shall pay all of the tax due within 60 days from 

the first penalty date of the final installment of taxes for that year. Whenever 

taxes are paid in compliance with this Section and a tax objection complaint is 

filed in compliance with Section 23-10, 100% of the taxes shall be deemed paid 

under protest without the filing of a separate letter of protest with the county 

collector.” 35 ILCS 200/23-5 (West 2016). 

¶ 30 Stressing that section 23-5 states that the “payment under protest” requirement 

applies to “any person” objecting to “any part” of a property tax for “any reason,” 

the School District argues that the requirement applies to taxpayers who bring 

appeals before the PTAB. We reject this contention. 

¶ 31 Section 23-5 appears in article 23 of the Code, which is titled “Procedures and 

Adjudication for Tax Objections.” Id. art. 23. Section 16-160, the provision setting 

forth the procedure for initiating an appeal before the PTAB, appears in an entirely 

different part of the Code, article 16 (id. art. 16), titled “Review of Assessment 

Decisions.” The two means of challenging an assessment, the tax objection 

complaint and the appeal to the PTAB, are different procedures. In the absence of 

language indicating otherwise, there is no reason to presume the legislature 

intended that a statutory provision governing one should also apply to the other. 

¶ 32 Further, the second sentence of section 23-5 expressly references section 23-10 

of the Code (the provision that authorizes the filing of tax objection complaints), 

indicating that the payment of taxes in accordance with section 23-5 satisfies the 

“payment under protest” requirement for filing the complaint. However, section 23-

5 contains no reference to section 16-160 or, indeed, to any statutory provision 

related to proceedings before the PTAB. Requiring a taxpayer to pay disputed taxes 

as a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal is a significant matter. Had the 

legislature intended the “payment under protest” requirement of section 23-5 to 

apply to PTAB appeals, there would be some reference to section 16-160 in that 
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provision. There is none. By its express terms, section 23-5 applies to tax objection 

complaints, not appeals filed in the PTAB. 

¶ 33 In addition, a fundamental contradiction arises when attempting to apply 

section 23-5 to PTAB appeals. If the “payment under protest” requirement of 

section 23-5 were also a condition precedent to pursuing an appeal before the 

PTAB, the taxpayer appealing to the PTAB would have to file a tax objection 

complaint, since it is this complaint, and only this complaint, that constitutes the 

statutorily required “protest.” However, section 16-160 expressly prohibits a 

taxpayer who appeals to the PTAB from filing a tax objection complaint. That 

section states: “If a petition is filed by a taxpayer, the taxpayer is precluded from 

filing objections based upon valuation, as may otherwise be permitted by Sections 

21-175 and 23-5.” Id. § 16-160. Such an internally contradictory approach is 

unworkable and could not have been intended by the legislature. See, e.g., Dynak 

v. Board of Education of Wood Dale School District 7, 2020 IL 125062, ¶ 16 (we 

presume the legislature does not intend absurd results). 

¶ 34 Citing Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 106 (1973), Central 

Illinois Public Service Co. v. Thompson, 1 Ill. 2d 468, 471 (1953), and other cases, 

the School District also argues that the “payment under protest” requirement of 

section 23-5 must apply to taxpayers pursuing an appeal before the PTAB because, 

otherwise, a “loophole” would be created that “resurrect[s] an antiquated process 

that allows taxpayers to ‘harass’ units of local government by refusing to pay their 

taxes while awaiting relief from the assessments or as a means to negotiate a more 

favorable property tax settlement.” This argument is unpersuasive. 

¶ 35 As this court has explained, prior to 1933, there was no statutory mechanism in 

place that allowed taxpayers to pay taxes under protest and, at the same time, file 

an objection to a property assessment. Clarendon, 56 Ill. 2d at 106. Instead, a 

taxpayer wishing to challenge an assessment would withhold paying the property 

taxes, and then, once the county collector made the annual application for judgment 

and order of sale, the taxpayer would submit the objection to the assessment in that 

proceeding. Id. When a large number of taxpayers followed this procedure (as 

happened during the Great Depression), adjudication of the objections was often 

delayed. Id. This, in turn, led to a delay in determining the final amount of taxes 

due, the entry of any findings of delinquency, and the ordering of judicial tax sales, 
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all of which “severely impaired the collection of taxes and thus the functions of 

governmental units.” Id. 

¶ 36 The concerns regarding delays described in cases such as Clarendon are not 

present with appeals before the PTAB. Section 16-185 of the Code expressly states 

that “[t]he extension of taxes on any assessment so appealed [to the PTAB] shall 

not be delayed by any proceeding before the Board.” 35 ILCS 200/16-185 (West 

2016). This means that the existence of an appeal before the PTAB does not prevent 

or delay the county clerk from sending the taxpayer a property tax bill, which the 

taxpayer is required to pay. And, unlike the situation in cases such as Clarendon, if 

the taxes go unpaid, the existence of a PTAB appeal does not prevent or delay a 

county collector’s application for judgment and order of sale, a finding of 

delinquency, or the subsequent judicial sale of the taxes. The type of delay and 

“harassment” described in cases like Clarendon simply is not present, even if the 

“payment under protest” requirement of section 23-5 is not applied to the PTAB 

appeal. 

¶ 37 Finally, the School District cites a footnote from this court’s decision in 

Madison Two Associates, 227 Ill. 2d at 477 n.2 (citing 35 ILCS 200/16-185 (West 

2002)), which states: 

“Unlike the tax objection alternative, paying the property tax is not a 

prerequisite for seeking relief from the [PTAB]. Pursuing the appeal through 

the [PTAB] does not, however, stay the obligation to pay the contested tax. If 

the tax falls due before the [PTAB] issues its decision, the tax must still be paid. 

If the [PTAB] subsequently lowers the assessment, any taxes paid on the portion 

of the assessment determined to have been unauthorized must be refunded with 

interest.”

¶ 38 According to the School District, this court’s statement that “paying the 

property tax is not a prerequisite for seeking relief from the [PTAB]” means only 

that the taxpayer need not pay the property taxes to initiate an appeal. The 

subsequent statement that, “[i]f the tax falls due before the [PTAB] issues its 

decision, the tax must still be paid” means that the “payment under protest” 

requirement is a condition of maintaining the appeal. Because that did not happen 

here, the School District contends the 2014 and 2015 appeals should have been 

dismissed. Again, we disagree.
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¶ 39 The statement that, “[i]f the tax falls due before the [PTAB] issues its decision, 

the tax must still be paid,” means only that the pendency of a PTAB appeal does 

not stay enforcement of the Code’s provisions regarding tax collection and 

enforcement. See 35 ILCS 200/16-185 (West 2016). The statement does not mean 

that payment of the tax is a condition precedent to maintaining an appeal before the 

PTAB. “[T]his court has long held that ‘[t]axing statutes are to be strictly construed. 

Their language is not to be extended or enlarged by implication, beyond its clear 

import. In cases of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government 

and in favor of the taxpayer.’ ” Van’s Material Co. v. Department of Revenue, 131 

Ill. 2d 196, 202 (1989) (quoting Mahon v. Nudelman, 377 Ill. 331, 335 (1941)). 

¶ 40 Here, the “clear import” of section 23-5 is that the “payment under protest” 

requirement applies only to tax objection complaints filed in the circuit court. 

Accordingly, we hold that the payment of disputed property taxes is not a condition 

precedent to pursuing an appeal before the PTAB under section 16-160 of the Code.

¶ 41 II. Jurisdiction Over Grand Tower’s Tax Liability 

¶ 42 The School District also contends, however, that the PTAB erred in denying its 

motion to dismiss for an additional reason. The School District notes that, in Vulcan 

Materials, this court stated that “a tax-sale proceeding is in rem and the court 

acquires jurisdiction over the land when the county collector makes his application 

for judgment and order for sale.” Vulcan Materials, 96 Ill. 2d at 165. Relying on 

this statement, the School District maintains that the circuit court acquired 

jurisdiction to determine Grand Tower’s property tax assessment when the Jackson 

County collector made the applications for judgment and order of sales regarding 

the 2014 and 2015 taxes. At that time, according to the School District, the PTAB 

was divested of its jurisdiction to review the correctness of the assessments, and the 

motion to dismiss should therefore have been granted. We disagree. 

¶ 43 The PTAB acquired jurisdiction to review Grand Tower’s property tax 

assessments when Grand Tower timely filed its petitions pursuant to section 16-

160 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 2016)). No other jurisdictional step 

was required. While the appeals were pending, the property taxes went unpaid, and 

the Jackson County collector applied for judgments and orders of sale pursuant to 

procedures set forth in article 21 of the Code. See, e.g., id. § 21-110 (requiring the 
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collector to publish a list of the delinquent properties, giving notice of the intent to 

seek a judgment and order of sale); id. §§ 21-150, 21-160 (setting out the 

procedures for the collector to follow in applying for a judgment and order of sale); 

id. § 21-180 (establishing the form for a judgment and order of sale). 

¶ 44 Importantly, however, none of the statutory provisions in article 21 state that 

the PTAB is divested of its jurisdiction to consider a properly filed, pending appeal 

once the county collector files a subsequent application for judgment and order of 

sale. The statutes are entirely silent on this point. And Vulcan Materials is not to 

the contrary. That decision does not concern or discuss the effect a collector’s 

application for judgment and order of sale has on a pending PTAB appeal, and it 

does not hold that the application for judgment and order of sale divests the PTAB 

of its jurisdiction.

¶ 45 The legislature knows how to divest the PTAB of jurisdiction. Section 16-160 

states, for example, that if an appeal before a local board of review is dismissed 

because the taxpayer failed to appear, the PTAB “shall have no jurisdiction to hear 

any subsequent appeal on that taxpayer’s complaint.” Id. § 16-160. If the legislature 

had intended to divest the PTAB of its jurisdiction when a county collector makes 

an application for judgment and order of sale, there would be a provision in the 

Code stating so. Yet there is no such provision. The School District is asking this 

court to read language into the Code that is not there. This, of course, we may not 

do. See, e.g., Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 24. 

¶ 46 Further, the School District’s contention that the PTAB loses jurisdiction of an 

appeal once a county collector makes an application for judgment and order of sale 

leads to questionable results. Appeals before the PTAB are not limited to taxpayers. 

A taxing body, such as a county, may appeal a property tax assessment to the PTAB 

if it believes the assessment is too low. See 35 ILCS 200/16-160 (West 2016). 

Accepting the School District’s argument would mean that, when a county files an 

appeal with the PTAB, a taxpayer could simply withhold payment of the property 

taxes and wait until the county collector applies for the annual judgment and order 

of sale, thereby divesting the PTAB of its jurisdiction to hear the county’s appeal. 

The taxpayer could then pay the taxes before a judicial sale (see id. § 21-165) and, 

in so doing, retain the property with no risk of an increase in the assessment. No 

matter how incorrect the assessment might be, the county would no longer have 
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any appeal before the PTAB, and any potential increase in property tax revenue 

would be lost. We do not think the legislature intended this result. 

¶ 47 The governing rule is well settled. “The obligation of citizens to pay taxes is 

purely a statutory creation, and taxes can be levied, assessed and collected only in 

the manner expressly spelled out by statute.” (Emphasis added.) Millennium Park 

Joint Venture, 241 Ill. 2d at 295. Nothing in the Code expressly states that the 

PTAB is divested of jurisdiction when a county collector makes an application for 

judgment and order of sale, and such a provision cannot be read into the Code by 

this court. This is particularly true given that the School District is asking this court 

to deny a taxpayer its right to an appeal—one expressly provided for by the 

legislature—and negate the proceedings before the PTAB in their entirety. This is 

not a step this court may take. Accordingly, we conclude that the county collector’s 

application for judgment and order of sale did not divest the PTAB of its 

jurisdiction to review Grand Tower’s properly filed appeals. 

¶ 48 III. Review of the Assessments

¶ 49 In addition to arguing that the PTAB was divested of jurisdiction when the 

application for judgment and order of sale was filed, the School District also argues 

that the circuit court’s entry of the judgment order itself “precluded further relief 

from the PTAB.” The School District notes that the amount of property taxes a 

taxpayer must pay is determined by multiplying the assessed value of the property 

times the tax rate. The School District further notes that, when a circuit court enters 

a judgment and order of sale, as it did in this case, it must state the amount of the 

property taxes to be sold. See 35 ILCS 200/21-180 (West 2016) (setting out the 

requirements for the order). That number, according to the School District, must 

necessarily include a determination of the assessment, since “a property tax 

assessment has only one function – to determine the amount that goes into the tax 

bill.” The School District argues that the assessment and the taxes are “inextricably 

intertwined” and that the circuit court’s judgment and order of sale stands as a 

conclusive determination of the assessment. Thus, the School District maintains 

that, once the circuit court entered the judgment and order of sale, Grand Tower 

was precluded or estopped from seeking any further review of the assessments. We 

disagree. 
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¶ 50 Prior to 1995, a tax objection brought in the circuit court to challenge an 

assessment was not filed as a separate complaint but, instead, was filed as a 

response or defense “within the annual county collector’s application for judgment 

and order of sale of delinquent properties.” Report of the Civic Federation Task 

Force on Reform of the Cook County Property Tax Appeals Process at 7 (Mar. 2, 

1995), https://www.civicfed.org/sites/default/files/report_of_the_task_force_on_

reform_of_cook_county_property_tax_appeals_process_march_1995.pdf [https://

perma.cc/XZ3D-J6LN].3 The governing statutes at that time reflected this reality 

and expressly authorized the circuit court to determine the correct amount of the 

taxes due within the application for judgment and order sale proceedings. Section 

21-150, for example, stated: 

“Time of applying for judgment. Except as otherwise provided in this Section 

or by ordinance or resolution enacted under subsection (c) of Section 21-40, all 

applications for judgment and order of sale for taxes and special assessments 

on delinquent properties and for judgment fixing the correct amount of any tax 

paid under protest shall be made during the month of October. In those counties 

which have adopted an ordinance under Section 21-40, the application for 

judgment and order of sale for delinquent taxes or for judgment fixing the 

correct amount of any tax paid under protest shall be made in December. In the 

10 years next following the completion of a general reassessment of property 

in any county with 3,000,000 or more inhabitants, made under an order of the 

Department, applications for judgment and order of sale and for judgment fixing 

the correct amount of any tax paid under protest shall be made as soon as may 

be and on the day specified in the advertisement required by Section 21-110 

and 21-115. If for any cause the court is not held on the day specified, the cause 

shall stand continued, and it shall be unnecessary to re-advertise the list or 

notice.” (Emphases added.) 35 ILCS 21-150 (West 1994). 

Cases decided prior to 1995 would thus speak of the circuit court having 

“jurisdiction to determine the validity of the assessment” in the application for 

judgment and order of sale proceedings (First Lien Co. v. Markle, 31 Ill. 2d 431, 

3The Civic Federation is “ ‘an independent, non-partisan taxpayer watchdog and government 

research organization.’ ” People ex rel. Devine v. Murphy, 181 Ill. 2d 522, 534 n.1 (1998). Its report 

was incorporated as part of the legislative history of the 1995 amendments to the Code enacted by 

Public Act 89-126 (eff. July 11, 1995). Devine, 181 Ill. 2d at 534 n.1. 
- 15 - 

436 (1964)), because that is where the correctness of a contested assessment was 

determined.

¶ 51 However, this is no longer the case. Amendments to the Code adopted by the 

legislature in 1995 expressly removed the language (italicized in the statutory quote 

above) that authorized the circuit court to determine the correctness of the tax when 

a county collector makes an application for judgment and order of sale. See Pub. 

Act 89-126 (eff. July 11, 1995) (amending 35 ILCS 200/21-110, 21-115, 21-150, 

21-160, 21-170). Thus, under current law, a circuit court does not have the authority 

to review the correctness of a contested assessment when a collector makes an 

application for judgment and order of sale. That occurs in an entirely separate 

proceeding, either in a tax objection complaint or in an appeal before the PTAB. 

¶ 52 Section 22-75(b) of the Code states: 

“Any order for the sale of property for delinquent taxes, except as otherwise 

provided in this Section, shall estop all parties from raising any objections to 

the order ***, which existed at or before the rendition of the order, and which 

could have been presented as a defense to the application for the order. The 

order itself is conclusive evidence of its regularity and validity in all collateral 

proceedings ***. 35 ILCS 200/22-75(b) (West 2014). 

The circuit court’s judgment and order of sale in this case could not preclude or 

estop Grand Tower from seeking review of its 2014 and 2015 assessments before 

the PTAB because Grand Tower was prohibited, as a matter of law, from 

challenging those assessments in the circuit court proceeding. Simply put, Grand 

Tower’s challenges to its assessments were not “objections *** which existed at or 

before the rendition of the order, and which could have been presented as a defense 

to the application for the order.” Id. 

¶ 53 This court has long applied this understanding of estoppel within the context of 

tax judgment proceedings and section 22-75(b). In Markle for example, this court 

held that a taxpayer was estopped from challenging an assessment after the 

judgment and order of sale had been entered because the objections to the 

assessment “clearly existed prior to the rendition of the judgment and could have 

been presented to the court as a defense to the collector’s application for judgment.” 

Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 437; see, e.g., United Legal Foundation v. Department of 
- 16 - 

Revenue, 272 Ill. App. 3d 666 (1995) (a taxpayer was foreclosed from challenging 

a tax judgment and order of sale where it had a statutory defense to the county 

collector’s application that could have been raised in the circuit court). That is not 

the case here.4

¶ 54 A judgment and order of sale conclusively establishes that the property taxes 

are delinquent and are to be sold at a tax sale. However, the entry of that judgment 

does not estop a taxpayer under section 22-75(b) from pursuing a properly filed 

appeal challenging an assessment before the PTAB. Accordingly, the appellate 

court correctly affirmed the PTAB’s denial of the School District’s motion to 

dismiss.

¶ 55 CONCLUSION

¶ 56 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed 

the decision of the PTAB, is affirmed.

¶ 57 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 58 Board decision affirmed. 

4The School District does not contend that the common-law doctrine of res judicata precluded 

Grand Tower from proceeding with its appeal before the PTAB. Nevertheless, the dissent discusses 

this principle extensively in its analysis. That analysis is clearly misplaced in the context of this 

case. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court 

of competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on 

the same cause of action. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 2016 IL 118781, ¶ 42. Although the circuit court 

rendered a final judgment in the application for judgment and order of sale proceeding, the School 

District was not a party in that proceeding. Further, the circuit court proceeding and the 

administrative proceeding did not concern the same cause of action: the former was an in rem action 

brought by the Jackson County collector to establish whether Grand Tower’s taxes were delinquent 

and should be sold at a tax sale, while the latter was a review of assessment complaints brought by 

Grand Tower and was limited solely to determining the correctness of those assessments. See, e.g., 

Wand v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2023 IL App (2d) 210150-U (noting that the PTAB’s 

jurisdiction is limited to determining the correctness of a contested assessment).
- 17 - 

¶ 59 JUSTICE NEVILLE, dissenting:

¶ 60 This case turns on a simple and previously unquestioned principle: when a 

defendant, served with process, fails to file a response to a complaint, the court has 

authority to enter a default judgment finally determining the rights of the parties 

concerning the matters raised in the complaint. See Saichek v. Lupa, 204 Ill. 2d 127 

(2003). The Jackson County circuit court’s final default judgment of January 14, 

2016, entered after Grand Tower failed to respond to the Jackson County collector’s 

complaint, adopted the Jackson County board of review’s finding that Grand Tower 

owed $2,557,423.91 in property taxes for 2014. The default judgment became 

res judicata—a matter decided—after 30 days and barred a second assessment of 

the 2014 taxes by the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB). According to section 

22-75(b) of the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/22-75(b) (West 2014)), 

the Jackson County circuit court’s final default delinquency judgment also estopped 

Grand Tower from challenging the amount of the assessment. By misconstruing the 

res judicata effect of the Jackson County circuit court’s default judgment, entered 

on January 14, 2016, and by ignoring section 22-75(b)’s estoppel of Grand Tower’s 

appeal to PTAB, the majority’s decision permits an administrative agency to 

contradict the circuit court’s order on the amount of Grand Tower’s liability for its 

2014 property taxes. Accordingly, because the majority (1) disregards the 

res judicata effect of the Jackson County circuit court’s January 14, 2016, judgment 

as a bar to a second proceeding by PTAB to determine Grand Tower’s tax liability 

for 2014; (2) misinterprets section 22-75(b) of the Code which, upon the entry of 

the Jackson County circuit court’s January 14, 2016, default judgment, explicitly 

estops Grand Tower from challenging the finding that it owed $2,557,423.91 in 

unpaid taxes for 2014; and (3) ignores or misinterprets consistent well-reasoned 

precedent construing the Code, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 61 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 62 A. The Board of Review’s Assessment

¶ 63 Grand Tower owns a large tract of land and a power generation facility in 

Jackson County. The county assessor assessed the property for 2014 taxes, and 

Grand Tower asked the board of review to reduce the assessment. On May 7, 2015, 
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the board of review notified Grand Tower that it reduced the assessment of the 

property to $31,538,245 for 2014. 

¶ 64 On May 28, 2015, Grand Tower filed an appeal with PTAB, challenging the 

2014 assessment. PTAB permitted Shawnee Community Unit School District No. 

84 (School District) to intervene in the appeal. 

¶ 65 While the appeal remained pending before PTAB, the county collector sent 

Grand Tower a tax bill for 2014, with payment due in November 2015. Grand 

Tower did not pay the taxes. Jackson County’s collector included Grand Tower’s 

property on the delinquency list it prepared in December 2015. The list specified 

the amount of unpaid taxes assessed against each property on the list. According to 

the delinquency list, based on the board of review’s assessment, Grand Tower owed 

$2,557,423.91 in unpaid taxes for 2014. The county collector applied to the Jackson 

County circuit court for an order for sale of all the delinquent properties for the 

unpaid taxes. Grand Tower filed no defense to the application for an order for sale. 

¶ 66 The Jackson County circuit court, in accord with section 21-180 of the Code 

(id. § 21-180), entered a judgment against Grand Tower’s property finding Grand 

Tower liable for 2014 taxes in the amount of $2,557,423.91 and ordering the sale 

of the property for the unpaid taxes. Grand Tower filed no appeal from the 

delinquency judgment and the order for sale.

¶ 67 On January 19, 2016, a bidder at the tax sale purchased Grand Tower’s property 

and paid the taxes of $2,557,423.91, as assessed by the board of review, in accord 

with the delinquency judgment. 

¶ 68 The taxes for 2015 followed a similar course: Grand Tower refused to pay the 

taxes, the collector applied for a delinquency judgment, Grand Tower filed no 

defense, the circuit court entered a default delinquency judgment against Grand 

Tower’s property for the amount assessed by the board of review, and the bidder at 

the sale for 2014 taxes also paid the 2015 taxes. 

¶ 69 B. PTAB and the Appellate Court 

¶ 70 In August 2016, the School District filed with PTAB a motion to dismiss Grand 

Tower’s appeal because of Grand Tower’s failure to pay the 2014 taxes and the 
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circuit court’s entry of a default judgment and an order for sale. PTAB denied the 

motion. 

¶ 71 Grand Tower redeemed the property in August 2017, 19 months after the 

Jackson County circuit court entered its January 14, 2016, default delinquency 

judgment and order for sale. 

¶ 72 PTAB held a hearing and concluded that the property had a value of about onetenth of the value assessed by the board of review. PTAB’s order concluded with 

only one form of relief: interested parties could apply to Jackson County’s treasurer 

for a refund of taxes paid in excess of the amount due under PTAB’s assessment of 

the property. The appellate court affirmed PTAB’s order. 2022 IL App (5th) 

190266. 

¶ 73 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 74 The majority misstates the central issue in this case. The School District does 

not argue that payment of property taxes constitutes a condition precedent to filing 

an appeal with PTAB. Supra ¶¶ 1, 20. The School District states at the outset of its 

argument: 

“With respect to PTAB appeals, the 30-day deadline in almost every 

conceivable instance necessitates that taxpayers file PTAB appeals before their 

tax bills are even calculated for the tax year in question. *** Therefore, in most 

instances PTAB appeals must be filed months before taxpayers pay their taxes.” 

The School District does not contend that property owners who choose to file 

appeals with PTAB must pay the taxes before they come due. 

¶ 75 Instead, the School District argues that Grand Tower could not continue its 

appeal because the Jackson County circuit court’s default judgment of January 14, 

2016, deprived PTAB of jurisdiction over Grand Tower’s appeal. 

¶ 76 To address the issues argued by the School District, I will rely on cases 

concerning the res judicata and estoppel effects of default judgments under the 

Property Tax Code. Next, I will use the Code to analyze the School District’s 

argument that Grand Tower’s refusal to pay taxes estops Grand Tower from 
- 20 - 

challenging the judgment and seeking a second assessment with an appeal to PTAB. 

Finally, I will conclude my analysis by questioning some of the assertions the 

majority makes in support of its holding. 

¶ 77 A. The Property Tax Code 

¶ 78 The legislature set out the basic procedures for tax assessment in articles 9, 12, 

and 18 of the Code. First, the county assessor determines the fair cash value for 

each property. 35 ILCS 200/9-155 (West 2014). The county clerk later determines 

the tax rate applicable to all properties’ assessed valuations. Id. § 18-45. The 

assessed value times the tax rate equals the amount of property taxes the owner 

must pay. Id. The county collector sends tax bills to all property owners in the 

county and keeps a record of all payments. Id. §§ 20-5, 20-40. 

¶ 79 Article 21 concerns collection when the owner has not timely paid the assessed 

tax. See id. art. 21. After the due date for the payment of taxes, the collector must 

publish a list of the delinquent properties, giving notice of the collector’s intent to 

apply for a judgment of delinquency and an order for sale of the properties. Id. § 21-

110. The collector then applies to the circuit court for a delinquency judgment and 

an order for tax sales of all properties remaining on the delinquency list. Id. §§ 21-

150, 21-160. The possible particular grounds for objecting to an application for 

judgment and order for sale include the defense that “the tax or special assessments 

were paid prior to the sale.” Id. § 22-75(b). 

¶ 80 For all properties on the delinquency list for which the owner offers no defense 

to the application for a judgment and an order for sale, the circuit court enters a 

judgment “in favor of the People of the State of Illinois, for the amount of taxes 

*** due thereon.” Id. § 21-180. The form of the court’s default delinquency order 

has remained largely unchanged for more than 60 years. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, 

ch. 120, ¶ 716. The judgment establishes “the amount of taxes *** due” for each 

property for which the owner, like Grand Tower, presented no defense to the 

application for a judgment and an order for sale. See 35 ILCS 200/21-180 (West 

2014). 
- 21 - 

¶ 81 B. The Res Judicata Effect of the Default Judgment 

 Entered Against Grand Tower’s Property 

¶ 82 In accord with sections 21-150 and 21-160 (id. §§ 21-150, 21-160), in 

December 2015, the collector for Jackson County applied to the court for an order 

for sale of all delinquent properties, including Grand Tower’s property because 

Grand Tower refused to pay the taxes due for 2014. Grand Tower did not assert any 

defense to the application. Accordingly, on January 14, 2016, without any 

objection, the circuit court entered a default judgment against Grand Tower’s 

property in accord with section 21-180 (id. § 21-180). Based on the board of 

review’s finding that the property had an assessed value of $31,538,245, the circuit 

court ordered a sale of the property for unpaid taxes in the amount of $2,557,423.91, 

as set out on the delinquency list. See id.; see McChesney v. People ex rel. 

Kochersperger, 178 Ill. 542, 548 (1899) (court may enter default judgment against 

delinquent lands for unpaid property taxes where owner asserts no defense). 

¶ 83 Illinois courts have repeatedly held that a default judgment entered when a 

property owner files no defense to an application for a delinquency judgment for 

unpaid taxes conclusively determines the amount of the property owner’s tax 

liability. Judgments by default have “the same preclusive effect under the doctrine 

of res judicata as any other judgment.” Housing Authority for La Salle County v. 

Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Ottawa, 101 Ill. 2d 246, 251 (1984). 

¶ 84 In People v. Hagerty, 104 Ill. App. 3d 240, 242 (1982), Hagerty failed to pay 

the taxes due on her property, and the court, on the collector’s application, entered 

an order for sale of the property. No bidder offered to pay the delinquent taxes, so 

the State took ownership of the forfeited property. The State then sued Hagerty to 

recover the unpaid taxes. Id. Hagerty argued that the county had imposed an 

excessive assessed valuation on her property, leading to an overstatement of her tax 

liability. Id. at 244. The Hagerty court held that the default judgment the court 

entered because Hagerty filed no defense to the application for a delinquency 

judgment conclusively determined the assessed value of the property and the 

amount of Hagerty’s tax liability. Id. at 245. 

¶ 85 In People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 50 Ill. App. 3d 387, 389 (1977), the 

court similarly held, “After judgment for taxes is entered against realty, the 

judgment is conclusive evidence of the regularity and validity of the judgment 
- 22 - 

unless the property is exempt from general taxes or where the tax is paid.” Again, 

“the judgment entered on the collector’s application therefore must be deemed to 

act as a bar to further litigation.” Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Tully, 76 Ill. App. 3d 

336, 341 (1979); see also Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Construction, 96 Ill. 2d 159, 

165 (1983). 

¶ 86 The majority holds that the Jackson County circuit court’s judgment does not 

conclusively establish the amount of taxes due, as it only “conclusively establishes 

that the property taxes are delinquent and are to be sold at a tax sale.” Supra ¶ 54. 

¶ 87 The collector alleged in its application that Grand Tower owed $2,557,423.91 

in unpaid property taxes for 2014. “[D]efault judgments are always res judicata on 

the ultimate claim or demand presented in the complaint.” Young Men’s Christian 

Ass’n, 101 Ill. 2d at 251. Thus, the Jackson County circuit court’s default judgment 

stands as res judicata on the collector’s ultimate claim that Grand Tower owed 

$2,557,423.91 in unpaid property taxes for 2014. 

¶ 88 The default judgment “constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action 

involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.” People v. Kidd, 398 Ill. 405, 

408 (1947). The proceeding on the collector’s application and the proceeding 

before PTAB both addressed the collector’s ultimate claim that Grand Tower owed 

$2,557,423.91 in unpaid property taxes for 2014. The only relief PTAB purported 

to grant was a reduction of liability for property taxes, thereby clarifying that it 

addressed the same claim or demand (that Grand Tower owed $2,557,423.91 in 

unpaid property taxes owed for 2014) determined by the Jackson County circuit 

court’s January 14, 2016, default judgment and order for sale. The circuit court’s 

default judgment against Grand Tower “is conclusive not only as to every matter 

which was offered to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other 

matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” Barry v. Commonwealth 

Edison Co., 374 Ill. 473, 478 (1940). 

¶ 89 The proceedings before PTAB make this case very similar to First Lien Co. v. 

Markle, 31 Ill. 2d 431 (1964), and United Legal Foundation v. Department of 

Revenue, 272 Ill. App. 3d 666 (1995). In Markle, Markle objected to an error in the 

assessor’s records that led to an overstatement of property taxes for 1956 and 1957.

Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 433-44. The assessor acknowledged the error and reduced the 

amount owed for 1956 and 1957. Id. at 434. The Cook County treasurer filed an 
- 23 - 

application for a judgment and order of sale for the 1958 taxes on Markle’s 

property. Id. at 432-33. Markle, relying on the objections he presented to the 

assessor, filed no response to the application. Id. at 436. The circuit court entered 

an unopposed judgment and order for sale of Markle’s property for the unpaid taxes 

as alleged in the treasurer’s application. Id.

¶ 90 On appeal, this court noted that Markle had good cause for objecting to the tax 

assessment, but the court held that the default delinquency judgment, entered 

because Markle filed no response to the application, conclusively established the 

amount of Markle’s liability for 1958 taxes. Id. at 437. The circuit court that entered 

the default judgment had passed no judgment on the validity of Markle’s objections, 

as Markle had not presented any defense to the application for judgment and order 

for sale. 

¶ 91 In United Legal Foundation, the United Legal Foundation and the Elijah 

Muhammad Foundation (collectively, the Foundations) filed an application for an 

exemption from property taxes for 1990. United Legal Foundation, 272 Ill. App. 

3d at 668. When the Department of Revenue (Department) denied the application, 

the Foundations filed a complaint for administrative review of the Department’s 

decision. Id. In 1992, while the complaint for administrative review remained 

pending, the Cook County treasurer filed an application for a judgment and order 

for sale of the property for 1990 taxes. Id. at 673. The Foundations, relying on the 

administrative review proceedings, filed no response to the application. Id. at 673-

74. The circuit court entered the unopposed judgment and order for sale in January 

1993. Id. at 673 n.4. The United Legal Foundation court said, “If a taxpayer fails 

to object to the [collector’s] application, the judgment and order of sale acts as a 

default judgment against the property for the year in question.” Id. at 674. The 

United Legal Foundation court held that the default judgment entered on the 

treasurer’s application conclusively established the amount of the Foundations’ 

liability for 1990 taxes. Id. at 675-76. The circuit court had not passed judgment on 

the Foundations’ claim for an exemption, as the Foundations had not presented any 

defense to the application for judgment and order for sale. 

¶ 92 Here, similarly, Grand Tower initiated proceedings to contest property taxes for 

2014 before the taxes came due. Like Markle and the Foundations, Grand Tower 

relied on the separate proceedings on its objections and filed no response to the 
- 24 - 

application for judgment and order for sale. Like the circuit courts in Markle and 

United Legal Foundation, the Jackson County circuit court here did not consider 

any of the arguments raised in the separate proceedings on objections to the taxes, 

as the parties did not present the arguments to the court. In all three cases, the 

property owner’s failure to respond to the application led to the entry of a judgment 

and order for sale for the amount of unpaid taxes. The results in Markle and United 

Legal Foundation should control the result here: the default judgment entered when 

Grand Tower failed to respond to the application for judgment established 

conclusively the amount of Grand Tower’s liability for 2014 property taxes. 

¶ 93 C. The Code Estops Grand Tower From 

 Contesting Its Property Taxes 

¶ 94 Section 22-75 additionally clarifies the consequences of a default delinquency 

judgment and an order for sale. In Markle, the court explained the circuit court’s 

jurisdiction in a tax proceeding and the effect of the circuit court’s ruling in 

delinquency proceedings: 

“The trial court acquired in rem jurisdiction of the property and of the 

subject matter upon the collector’s application for judgment and order of sale, 

and therefore had the power to enter the judgment order against defendants’ 

lands. [Citations.] Whether the assessment was erroneous or illegal, the trial 

court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the assessment, and that 

determination, no matter how erroneous, is conclusive upon the parties after 30 

days ***. 

 *** 

The finality of the tax judgment and order of sale was clearly established by 

the legislature in section 270 of the Revenue Act when it provided as follows: 

‘And any judgment for the sale of real estate for delinquent taxes, except as 

otherwise provided in this section, shall estop all parties from raising any 

objections thereto, or to a tax title based thereon, which existed at or before the 

rendition of such judgment or decree, and could have been presented as a 

defense to the application for such judgment in the court wherein the same was 

rendered, and as to all such questions, the judgment itself shall be conclusive 
- 25 - 

evidence of its regularity and validity in all collateral proceedings, except in 

cases where the tax or special assessments have been paid or the real estate was 

exempt from general taxes under this Act or was not subject to special 

assessment.’ Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 120, par. 751 [(now codified at 35 ILCS 

200/22-75)].

 *** 

*** [T]he judgment and order of sale was conclusive as to defendants’ 

objections to the assessment which clearly existed prior to the rendition of the 

judgment and could have been presented to the court as a defense to the 

collector’s application for judgment.” Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 436-37. 

See Hagerty, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 245 (predecessor of section 22-75(b) estopped 

Hagerty from contesting taxes established conclusively by the default delinquency 

judgment). 

¶ 95 Thus, under section 22-75, the Jackson County circuit court’s January 14, 2016, 

default judgment and order for sale estops Grand Tower from objecting to the 

assessment made part of the judgment for sale. See 35 ILCS 200/22-75(b) (West 

2014). 

¶ 96 D. The Majority’s Arguments 

¶ 97 1. The Majority Misstates the Res Judicata Effect 

 of the Default Delinquency Judgment 

¶ 98 The majority admits that article 22 of the Code (id. art. 22) applies to Grand 

Tower’s property and permits enforcement of the default delinquency judgment 

(supra ¶¶ 52, 54, but the majority holds that the judgment does not establish the 

amount of taxes owed. Prior to today’s decision, Illinois courts consistently held 

that default delinquency judgments stood as res judicata conclusively determining 

the amount of taxes the property owner owed. See Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 436-37; 

Vulcan Materials, 96 Ill. 2d 159; United Legal Foundation, 272 Ill. App. 3d 666; 

Hagerty, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 245; Tully, 76 Ill. App. 3d 336; Chicago Title & Trust, 

50 Ill. App. 3d 387. The majority does not explain what constitutes a final judgment 

establishing the amount of taxes owed for the properties on the delinquency list if 
- 26 - 

the delinquency judgment, entered in accord with section 21-180, does not finally 

determine the amount of taxes owed. See 35 ILCS 200/21-180 (West 2014). 

¶ 99 The majority contends my analysis of res judicata is “misplaced.” Supra ¶ 53 

n.4. “[A] reviewing court has a duty to consider its jurisdiction and to dismiss the 

appeal if it determines that jurisdiction is wanting.” Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. 

Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 539 (1984). An adjudicative body has jurisdiction when it 

has “the power to decide the matter involved.” Herb v. Pitcairn, 392 Ill. 151, 152 

(1945). 

¶ 100 Here, the judgment of the circuit court, finally establishing the amount of Grand 

Tower’s property tax liability for 2014, left PTAB with nothing to decide. 

Therefore, PTAB lacked jurisdiction over Grand Tower’s appeal, and the appellate 

court had a duty to vacate PTAB’s order and dismiss the appeal. 

“We have power to review judgments of the Appellate Court when they are 

properly before us, but we cannot review a judgment which the Appellate Court 

had no jurisdiction to render. *** [Where PTAB and the Appellate Court lack 

jurisdiction], this court cannot entertain an appeal from that court for the 

purpose of passing upon the merits of the case, but for the purpose, only, of 

vacating or reversing the judgment of the Appellate Court, with directions to 

dismiss the appeal.” Kowalczyk v. Swift & Co., 317 Ill. 312, 324 (1925). 

¶ 101 The majority also suggests that res judicata does not apply because the School 

District intervened only in the PTAB appeal and not also in the proceedings on the 

delinquency petition. Supra ¶ 53 n.4. For res judicata to apply, the court must find 

“an identity of parties or their privies.” People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land 

Developers, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 285, 294 (1992). “Privity is said to exist between 

parties who adequately represent the same legal interests. [Citation.] It is the 

identity of interest that controls in determining privity, not the nominal identity of 

the parties [citation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 296. 

¶ 102 Jackson County collects tax revenues and distributes those revenues to fund 

services throughout the county, including the services provided by the School 

District. Thus, Jackson County and the School District, as cobeneficiaries of the 

$2,557,423.91 collected from the purchaser in the tax sale of Grand Tower’s 

property, share the same legal interest in the determination of Grand Tower’s tax 
- 27 - 

liability in this case. Res judicata applies to the Jackson County circuit court’s final 

determination of Grand Tower’s tax liability for 2014 property taxes and bars 

PTAB from redetermining Grand Tower’s tax liability.

¶ 103 2. The Majority Misconstrues Section 16-185 

¶ 104 According to the majority, the legislature in a single sentence both requires 

payment of taxes when due and then establishes that the property owner has no 

obligation to pay the taxes when due. Supra ¶ 26. 

¶ 105 Section 16-185 provides, 

“The extension of taxes on any assessment so appealed shall not be delayed by 

any proceeding before the Board, and, in case the assessment is altered by the 

Board, any taxes extended upon the unauthorized assessment or part thereof 

shall be abated, or, if already paid, shall be refunded with interest as provided 

in Section 23-20.” 35 ILCS 200/16-185 (West 2014). 

In this context, the sentence means that, if PTAB completes its review before the 

tax falls due, the property owner needs to pay only the tax found due by PTAB—

the decision “abate[s]” the tax. But, as in this case, if PTAB does not complete its 

review before the tax comes due, the statute provides that “[t]he extension of taxes 

on any assessment so appealed shall not be delayed by any proceeding before the 

Board” and, therefore, the owner must pay the tax and PTAB may order a refund 

of any overpayment. 

¶ 106 3. The Majority Misconstrues Section 22-75 

¶ 107 The majority asserts, 

“The circuit court’s judgment and order of sale in this case could not preclude 

or estop Grand Tower from seeking review of its 2014 and 2015 assessments 

before the PTAB because Grand Tower was prohibited, as a matter of law, from 

challenging those assessments in the circuit court proceeding. Simply put, 

Grand Tower’s challenges to its assessments were not ‘objections *** which 

existed at or before the rendition of the order, and which could have been 
- 28 - 

presented as a defense to the application for the order.’ ” Supra ¶ 52 (quoting 

35 ILCS 200/22-75(b) (West 2014)). 

¶ 108 Grand Tower had the option of raising all its objections in court, rather than 

filing an appeal to PTAB. See 35 ILCS 200/23-10 (West 2014). Even after it filed 

the initial appeal to PTAB, it had the option of withdrawing the appeal to pursue 

instead the court proceeding. And Grand Tower always had the option of keeping 

its property off the delinquency list in the first place, and pursuing the appeal to 

PTAB, by paying the taxes when due. See id. § 16-185. Because the facts that form 

the basis for Grand Tower’s objection to the tax assessment were already available 

to Grand Tower before entry of the default delinquency judgment, the objections 

existed at or before the rendition of the order, and section 22-75(b) estops Grand 

Tower from arguing against the amount of taxes found owing in the default 

delinquency judgment. See Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 436-37; 35 ILCS 200/22-75(b) 

(West 2014). 

¶ 109 4. The Majority Incorrectly Holds the 

 Legislature Relies on Tax Sales as 

 Complete Protection for the Collection of Taxes

¶ 110 The majority relies on the tax sale as adequate protection for the collection of 

taxes. Supra ¶ 36. Illinois courts have observed that tax sales do not always meet 

the county’s tax collection needs, as no law requires anyone to bid at the tax sale 

and some properties go unsold. Hagerty, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 243; Tully, 76 Ill. App. 

3d at 341; see 35 ILCS 200/21-260 (West 2014) (concerning sales when no bidder 

offers to pay the full amount of the unpaid taxes). 

¶ 111 5. The Majority Misconstrues the 1994 

 and 1995 Amendments to the Code 

¶ 112 The majority relies on amendments to section 21 regarding the change in 

procedures when the property owner pays the taxes under protest and files an 

objection in circuit court challenging the tax. Supra ¶¶ 51-52. The 1994 

amendments to the Code separated proceedings on tax objections in the circuit court 

from proceedings on the collector’s application for default judgments by taking the 
- 29 - 

properties for which the owner filed an objection under section 23-10 off the 

delinquency list. Compare 35 ILCS 200/21-150 (West 1996) (“all applications for 

judgment and order of sale for taxes and special assessments on delinquent 

properties shall be made during the month of October”), with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, 

ch. 120, ¶ 710 (“all applications for judgment and order of sale for taxes and special 

assessments on delinquent lands and lots and for judgment fixing the correct 

amount of any tax paid under protest shall be made during the month of October”). 

The 1994 amendments to the Code did not alter the finality or effect of default 

judgment in proceedings on the collector’s application for judgment and order for 

sale of properties that remained on the delinquency list. 

¶ 113 The majority asserts, “a circuit court does not have the authority to review the 

correctness of a contested assessment when a collector makes an application for 

judgment and order of sale. That occurs in an entirely separate proceeding, either 

in a tax objection complaint or in an appeal before the PTAB.” Supra ¶ 51. 

¶ 114 The court that addresses the application for judgment and orders for sale does 

not pass judgment concerning objections filed under section 23-10 because 

properties for which the owners paid the taxes under protest do not appear on the 

delinquency list and therefore they do not appear on the application for judgment 

and orders for sale. See 35 ILCS 200/21-150, 23-10 (West 2014). The court only 

passes judgment on properties, like Grand Tower’s, on the delinquency list. The 

Jackson County circuit court’s judgment and order for sale, according to section 

21-180, establishes “the amount of taxes *** due” for each property on the 

delinquency list. Id. § 21-180. The amendment to section 21-150 has no effect on 

owners whose properties, like Grand Tower’s, appear on the delinquency list and 

who fail to file a defense to the collector’s application for a judgment and an order 

for sale.

¶ 115 6. The Legislature Did Not Include a Provision 

 for PTAB to Retain Jurisdiction Over Properties That 

 Appear on the Delinquency List

¶ 116 The majority asserts, “The legislature knows how to divest the PTAB of 

jurisdiction.” Supra ¶ 45. The majority stresses that the Code does not explicitly 

state that PTAB loses jurisdiction. See supra ¶¶ 44-45. 
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¶ 117 Code provisions also show the legislature knew how to provide for continuing 

jurisdiction of administrative agencies over properties that appear on the 

delinquency list. 

¶ 118 Section 21-175 of the Code provides that “if a defense is made that the property 

*** is exempt from taxation and *** a proceeding to determine the exempt status 

*** is pending ***, the court shall not enter a judgment relating to that property 

until the proceedings *** have terminated.” 35 ILCS 200/21-175 (West 2014). 

¶ 119 The Code includes no similar provision for continuing PTAB’s jurisdiction over 

a pending claim that the board of review imposed an excessive tax. The absence of 

a similar provision for cases in which an owner filed an appeal with PTAB shows 

that the legislature intended the proceedings on the collector’s application to finally 

determine the amount of the property owner’s tax liability, despite a pending appeal 

before PTAB, if the property appeared on the delinquency list. 

¶ 120 The Code did not need an explicit provision providing that PTAB loses 

jurisdiction when the circuit court enters a default judgment because the 

res judicata effect of the default judgment, entered because the property owner 

failed to answer the application, established the amount of property taxes owed. 

The Jackson County circuit court’s January 14, 2016, default judgment for 

$2,557,423.91 in unpaid 2014 property taxes, after 30 days, became res judicata—

a matter decided—and left PTAB with nothing to decide, regardless of whether a 

statute specifically states it loses jurisdiction.

¶ 121 7. The Majority’s Other Arguments Do 

 Not Support the Majority’s Decision

¶ 122 Next, the majority acknowledges the Civic Federation’s 1995 report as part of 

the Code’s legislative history. Supra ¶ 50 n.3. The Civic Federation’s report did not 

suggest any change to section 22-75(b) or to the res judicata effect of default 

delinquency judgments. 

¶ 123 Finally, the majority claims that a finding that a default delinquency judgment 

finally determines a property owner’s tax liability would lead to the unfair result 

that an owner could nullify a taxing body’s appeal to PTAB for an increase in the 
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tax on the owner’s property. Supra ¶ 46. The majority says, “when a county files 

an appeal with PTAB, a taxpayer could simply withhold payment of the property 

taxes and wait until the county collector applies for the annual judgment and order 

of sale, thereby divesting the PTAB of its jurisdiction to hear the county’s appeal.” 

Supra ¶ 46. No provision of the Code prevents the county or another interested 

taxing body from objecting to the entry of a default delinquency judgment on 

grounds that the collector has not required a sufficient amount for the property tax 

payment. The taxing body’s objection, like a timely defense from a property owner, 

removes the property from the list of properties subject to the default delinquency 

judgment, allowing PTAB to complete its review of the board of review’s 

assessment of the property. 

¶ 124 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 125 In 2016, the Jackson County circuit court, ruling on an application for a 

judgment of tax liability and an order for sale, entered a final judgment holding that 

Grand Tower owed $2,557,423.91 in unpaid taxes for 2014, based on the board of 

review’s finding that the property had an assessed value of $31,538,245. No party 

appealed from the Jackson County circuit court’s judgment. More than three years 

later, PTAB entered an order with a conflicting finding that Grand Tower’s property 

had a market value for 2014 that would support an assessed value of $3,333,000. 

¶ 126 The majority’s decision affirming PTAB’s order leaves standing two 

incompatible judgments for Grand Tower’s liability for 2014 property taxes and 

ignores the res judicata effect of the Jackson County circuit court’s default 

delinquency judgment. Prior to today’s decision, Illinois courts have consistently 

held that a circuit court’s default judgment entered on an application for judgment 

and order for sale for unpaid property taxes conclusively determines the amount of 

taxes the property owner owes. Markle, 31 Ill. 2d at 436-37; United Legal 

Foundation, 272 Ill. App. 3d 666; Hagerty, 104 Ill. App. 3d at 243; Vulcan 

Materials, 96 Ill. 2d at 165; Tully, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 341; Chicago Title & Trust, 50 

Ill. App. 3d at 389. Therefore, because the majority (1) ignores the res judicata

effect of the Jackson County circuit court’s judgment as a bar to a second 

proceeding by PTAB to determine Grand Tower’s tax liability for 2014,

(2) misconstrues section 22-75(b) of the Code, which explicitly estops Grand 
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Tower from challenging the finding that it owed $2,557,423.91 in unpaid taxes for 

2014, (3) ignores or misinterprets consistent well-reasoned precedent, and 

(4) destabilizes funding for Illinois counties by misconstruing the Code (35 ILCS 

200/1-1 et seq. (West 2014)), I respectfully dissent. 

¶ 127 JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE joins in this dissent.