Coalition Command and Control

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STRATEGIC FORUM

INSTITUTE FOB NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Number 10, October 1994

Coalition Command and Control: Peace

Operations

Dr. David S. Alberts

Summary

Peace operations differ in significant ways from traditional combat missions. As a result ofthese unique

characteristics, command arrange-ments become far more complex. The stress on command and control

arrangements and systems is further exacerbated by the mission's increased political sensitivity. Current

JTF headquarters need to be augmented in a number of different ways to make them more effective in a

coalition peace operations environment.

Background

Peace operations encompass a range of disparate missions, including humanitarian assistance, traditional

peacekeeping (UN Chapter VI), and peace enforcement (UN Chapter VII). By far the most difficult and

complex situations for command and control are so-called "Chapter VI.V" missionspthat is, unstable

Chapter VI missions that threaten to be transformed into Chapter VII situations. These operations differ

significantly from "traditional" military missions in a number offundamental ways, including- 1) the

compression ofstrategic, operational, and tactical decisions and processes; 2) the ad hoc nature of

command, force, and sustainment arrangements; 3) the lack of unity of command or even purpose; and

4) the addition of a civil-military dimension.

The United States has operated successfully in both Chapter VI (Multinational Force and Observers in

the Sinai, and1 Able Sentry in Macedonia) and Chapter VII (Desert Storm) situa-tions. In the Sinai and

Macedonia, the United States serves as a member of a coalition under the operational control (OPCON)

of a non-U.S. commander, and in Desert Storm the United States led a coalition with foreign forces

under our operational control.

Yet these two situations are less complex and difficult than a Chapter VI.V operation, albeit for different

reasons In the above Chapter VII situation our vital interests were at stake, and hence easier to explain

to the electorate. With respect to C2, the relative simplicity was a result ofthe clarity ofmission, and the

willingness of coalition partners to accept United States leadership. In the Chapter VI circumstances

above, the political dimension is simplified by the clarity ofmission and the low risk to U S forces

while the stress on C2 arrangements and systems is greatly reduced. However, Chapter VII opera-tions

that are not delegated to a lead country are likely to have very complex and stressed C2 arrangements

(e.g., UNOSOMII in Somalia).

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Able Sentry has shown that the Presidential Decision Directive-25 distinction between OPCON and

command can work in practice. First, Able Sentry demonstrated that, on a day-to-day basis, U.S. forces

can be transformed into pblue helmetsb and integrated effectively into a multinational force commanded

by a non-American general. Second, by selectively referring, to a higher authority, orders felt to be

inconsistent with the scope ofthe OPCON, U.S. commanders at Able Sentry have shown that national

command is not relinquished.

The classic militaryprinciple ofunity ofcommand is difficult to achieve in multilateral

peace operations.

The degree of "Americanization" that is appropriate for an operation depends upon geopolitical and

domestic considerations. Operations tend to become Americanized as a result of either U.S. leadership

or a perceived or actual predominance of U.S. forces. Thus, ifthe United States wants to maintain a

low-profile role in a particular operation, then we must be willing to accept the more complex C2

arrangements that may be associated with a lower profile role.

The critical challenge will be to design command and control arrangements and develop doctrine and

systems that will successfully function in the more politically sensitive and complex Chapter VI.V

environment. This environ-ment implies not only additional C2 requirements but involves a new way of

doing business.

CJTF headquarters need to be tailored specifically to support peace operations in general and Chapter

VI.V operations in particular, in order to improve their ability to effectively deal with these complex

situations and to be able to collaborate with other participants.

Appropriate training and exercise are important prerequisites for readiness to command, control, and

conduct peace operations. However, difficult tradeoffs are involved because forces properly trained for

peace operations may lose their warfighting edge and may need to undergo additional training to return

to fighting form.

Unique Aspects of Peace Operations

Although Chapter VII or even VI.V operations may look very much like war, they have unique

characteristics, some ofwhich may be found only in a very small subset of classical warfare situations. It

is these unique characteristics that make command and control of peace operations different from

wartime command and control, and so challenging to accomplish well. Nine ofthese unique

characteristics follow:

• The need to deal with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary

organizations (PVOs) on a continuous basis will be central to many peace operations. In some

contexts, the NGOs have long histories and valuable insights and information about the country

involved. In others, they play an important role in creating or maintaining a situation where peace

operations stand a chance to succeed. However, NGOs also have their own agendas and are often

reluctant to cooperate closely with peace operators.

• The classic military principle ofunity of command is difficult to achieve in multilateral peace

operations. National interests and prerogatives of coalition partners, while providing room for

common interests and action, can differ significantly, thus requiring the need to operate in a

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consensus mode.

• The presence of a UN special representative may serve to increase the complexity of command

arrangements and impact the ability to make timely decisions when NATO is also involved at the

strategic level. On the other hand, in a pure UN operation, a UN special representative can

expedite matters by provid-ing strategic direction in a timely fashion.

• The CJTF commander's span of control is often stretched beyond traditional limits. In Somalia, the

senior military member of each national group reported directly to the UN commander, giving him

several dozen immedi-ate subordinates, ranging from junior company grade officers to

experienced general officers.

• Recent coalition peace operations have been greatly complicated by the variety of partici-pants,

which created language, cultural, and doctrinal discrepancies. The sheer size ofheadquarters

operations resulting from the need for translators, liaison officers, communications personnel, and

other reflections of diversity represents a management challenge. The absence of norms and

standards contributes to these problems.

• The amount ofwork to be performed at the CJTF headquarters level is dramatically increased, not

only as a result ofthe increased complexity of command arrangements, but also because ofthe

compression ofthe strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command. In Somalia, all three

were located in the same headquarters. In any UN operation there is a tendency to expect the

theater commander to translate the political guidance (UN resolutions) into military missionsba

role usually played by a national level joint or general staff.

• Command and control, communications, and intelligence systems have not yet achieved a suitable

level of either technical or functional interoperability to support coalition peace operations. The

result: the continued dependence on U.S. technical and systems support, with a host of associated

political, security, and financial problems.

The ability to obtain and disseminate both information and commands will

become central to the success ofcombined and coalition peace operations.

• Given the uneven quality and great variety of equipment and the lack of established logistics and

sustainment capacity, these technical problems extend well beyond the purview of command and

control, making coalition operations heavily dependent on the United States, particularly in

Chapter VII situations.

• The ability to obtain and disseminate both information and commands will become central to the

success of combined and coalition peace operations. For example, barriers to the sharing of

intelligence will adversely affect the ability of a commander to formulate and execute options.

Information about national political agendas and positions for coalition members is also crucial,

particularly at the strategic or theater command level, and must be sought actively both from

foreign military personnel and from political officials in the coalition.

CJTF Headquarters for Peace Operations

Current JTF headquarters should be aug-mented or enhanced in a number of different dimensions to

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make them more effective in a coalition peace operations environment. These include:

• An augmented intelligence capability staffed to filter national "eyes only" information facilitating

the sharing ofintelligence with other nations involved in the operations;

• A senior political advisor and supporting staffto facilitate communications with U.S. ambassadors

and ensure that the political implications ofmilitary efforts are properly considered and incountry actions properly coordinated;

• A legal advisor to ensure that international and United States laws and procedures are factored into

planning and operations;

• Logistics planning and implementation capability to deal effectively with the range of demands

likely to be made by USG agencies, the UN, other countries, NGOs, and PVOs;

• An information and visitors center to handle media relations, VIPs, and celebrity visitors, who

tend to appear during humanitarian operations;

• A Crisis Management Operations Center (CMOC) to provide a venue for communicating with

both public and private organizations in the area that can be of help in completing the mission.

This includes other USG agencies, the host government, various UN organizations, local leaders,

NGOs, and PVOs. This model was successful during Provide Comfort in Iraq and the Somalia

operations;

• U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) forces should be under CJTF OPCON.

Workshop Recommendations

While Chapter VI missions can often operate with simple C2 systems, these systems will not provide

adequate support to a Chapter VII situation should the need arise. Therefore, in the case of operations

that have the potential to transform into Chapter VII situations, C2 systems capable of being rapidly

augmented should be deployed from the onset.

The capabilities of a JTF headquarters should be augmented to support peace operations and interactions

with the myriad of organizations involved.

CJTF force commanders should be selected early and have appropriately experienced staffs that can

work together to achieve a level ofreadiness that will support deployments.

To the extent possible, rules of engagement (ROEs) should be known a priori to avoid incidents on the

ground setting precedents for ROEs on an ad hoc basis.

Technology applications (e.g., distributed colla-borative planning tools and automated language and data

base translators) need to be explored to facilitate the bcollegialb decision- making process inherent in

coalition peace operations and improve the interoperability of disparate systems.

Individuals interested in workshop participation or workshop reports may contact Dr. David S. Alberts.

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