United States Government Accountability Office 

GAO	 Testimony Before the Subcommittee on 

Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, 

Committee on the Judiciary, House of 

Representatives 

For Release on Delivery 

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. EDT IMMIGRATION

ENFORCEMENT 

Preliminary Observations 

on Employment Verification 

and Worksite Enforcement 

Efforts 

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice 

GAO-05-822T

Why GAO Did This Study 

Highlights 

Accountability Integrity Reliability 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-822T. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Richard M. 

Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-822T, testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Immigration, 

Border Security, and Claims, Committee 

on the Judiciary, House of 

Representatives 

The opportunity for employment is 

one of the most important magnets 

attracting illegal aliens to the 

United States. The Immigration 

Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 

1986 established an employment 

eligibility verification process and a 

sanctions program for fining 

employers for noncompliance. Few 

modifications have been made to 

the verification process and 

sanctions program since 1986, and 

immigration experts state that a 

more reliable verification process 

and a strengthened worksite 

enforcement capacity are needed 

to help deter illegal immigration. In 

this testimony, GAO provides 

preliminary observations from its 

ongoing assessment of (1) the 

current employment verification 

process and (2) U.S. Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) 

priorities and resources for the 

worksite enforcement program and 

the challenges it faces in 

implementing that program. 

June 21, 2005 

IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 

Preliminary Observations on Employment 

Verification and Worksite Enforcement 

Efforts 

What GAO Found 

The current employment verification (Form I-9) process is based on 

employers’ review of documents presented by new employees to prove their 

identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they 

have reviewed documents presented by their employees and that the 

documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting the 

documents. However, document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and 

identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging 

to others) have undermined the employment verification process by making 

it difficult for employers who want to comply with the process to ensure 

they hire only authorized workers and easier for unscrupulous employers to 

knowingly hire unauthorized workers. In addition, the number and variety of 

documents acceptable for proving work eligibility has hindered employer 

verifications efforts. In 1998, the former Immigration and Naturalization 

Service (INS), now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

proposed revising the Form I-9 process, particularly to reduce the number of 

acceptable work eligibility documents, but DHS has not yet finalized the 

proposal. The Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which 

participating employers electronically verify employees’ work eligibility, 

shows promise to enhance the current employment verification process, 

help reduce document fraud, and assist ICE in better targeting its worksite 

enforcement efforts. Yet, several current weaknesses in the pilot program’s 

implementation, such as its inability to detect identity fraud and DHS delays 

in entering data into its databases, could adversely affect increased use of 

the pilot program, if not addressed. 

The worksite enforcement program has been a low priority under both INS 

and ICE. For example, in fiscal year 1999 INS devoted about 9 percent of its 

total investigative agents’ time to worksite enforcement, while in fiscal year 

2003 it allocated about 4 percent. ICE officials told us that the agency has 

experienced difficulties in proving employer violations and setting and 

collecting fine amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly 

hiring unauthorized workers. In addition, INS and then ICE shifted its 

worksite enforcement focus to critical infrastructure protection after 

September 11, 2001. 

United States Government Accountability Office 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to participate in this hearing 

on worksite enforcement and employer sanctions efforts. As we and 

others have reported in the past, the opportunity for employment is one of 

the most important magnets attracting illegal aliens to the United States. 

To help address this magnet, in 1986 Congress passed the Immigration 

Reform and Control Act (IRCA),

1

 which made it illegal for individuals and 

entities to knowingly hire, continue to employ, or recruit or refer for a fee 

unauthorized workers. The act established a two-pronged approach for 

helping to limit the employment of unauthorized workers: (1) an 

employment verification process through which employers verify all newly 

hired employees’ work eligibility and (2) a sanctions program for fining 

employers who do not comply with the act. Efforts to enforce these 

sanctions are referred to as worksite enforcement and are conducted by 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 

As the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform reported, immigration 

contributes to the U.S. national economy by providing workers for certain 

labor-intensive industries and contributing to the economic revitalization 

of some communities.2

 Yet, the commission also noted that immigration, 

particularly illegal immigration, can have adverse consequences by helping 

to depress wages for low-skilled workers and creating net fiscal costs for 

state and local governments. Following the passage of IRCA, the U.S. 

Commission on Immigration Reform and various immigration experts have 

concluded that deterring illegal immigration requires, among other things, 

strategies that focus on disrupting the ability of illegal immigrants to gain 

employment through a more reliable employment eligibility verification 

process and a more robust worksite enforcement capacity. In particular, 

the commission report and other studies have found that the single most 

important step that could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the 

development of a more effective system for verifying work authorization. 

In the nearly 20 years since passage of IRCA, the employment eligibility 

verification process and worksite enforcement program have remained 

largely unchanged. Moreover, in previous work, we reported that 

employers of unauthorized aliens faced little likelihood that the 

1

P.L. 99-603, 8 U.S.C. 1324a et seq. 

2

U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: Immigration and 

Immigrant Policy (Washington, D.C: September 1997). 

Page 1 GAO-05-822T 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

3

 would investigate, fine, or 

criminally prosecute them, a circumstance that provides little disincentive 

for employers who want to circumvent the law.

4 

My testimony today is drawn from our ongoing work for this 

subcommittee to assess the employment verification process and ICE’s 

worksite enforcement program. Specifically, I will discuss our preliminary 

observations on (1) the current employment verification process and 

(2) ICE’s priorities and resources for the worksite enforcement program 

and the challenges it faces in implementing that program. 

We developed these preliminary observations by reviewing federal laws 

and information obtained from ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

Services (CIS), and Social Security Administration (SSA) officials in 

headquarters and selected field locations. We examined regulations, 

guidance, past GAO reports, and other studies on the employment 

verification process and the worksite enforcement program. We also 

analyzed the results and examined the methodology of an independent 

evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an automated system through which 

employers electronically check employees’ work eligibility information 

against information in Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and SSA 

databases, conducted by the Institute for Survey Research at Temple 

University and Westat in June 2004.5

 Furthermore, we analyzed data on 

employer use of the Basic Pilot Program and on worksite enforcement and 

assessed the data reliability by reviewing them for accuracy and 

completeness, interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data, 

and examining documentation on how the data are entered, categorized, 

and verified in the databases. We determined that the independent 

evaluation and these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our 

review. We conducted the work reflected in this statement from 

September 2004 through June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted 

3

In March 2003, INS was merged into the Department of Homeland Security, and its 

immigration functions were divided between U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement is responsible for managing and implementing the 

worksite enforcement program. 

4

GAO, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment 

Exist, GAO/GGD-99-33 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999). 

5

Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Basic Pilot Program 

Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: June 2004). 

Page 2 GAO-05-822T 
government auditing standards. We plan to complete our analysis and 

prepare a report for issuance later this summer. 

Summary 
 The employment verification process is primarily based on employers’ 

review of work eligibility documents presented by new employees, but 

various weaknesses, such as the process’ vulnerability to fraud, have 

undermined this process. Employers certify that they have reviewed 

documents presented by their employees and that the documents appear 

genuine and relate to the individual presenting the documents. However, 

document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity fraud 

(fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to others) 

have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with the 

employment verification process to ensure that they hire only authorized 

workers and have made it easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly 

hire unauthorized workers. In addition, the large number and variety of 

documents acceptable for proving work eligibility have hindered 

employers’ verification efforts. In 1998, the former INS proposed revising 

the verification process and reducing the number of acceptable work 

eligibility documents; that proposal was never acted upon. DHS, however, 

at the direction of Congress, introduced the Basic Pilot Program, an 

automated system for employers to electronically check employees’ work 

eligibility information with information in DHS and SSA databases, that 

may enhance this process. This program shows promise to help reduce 

document fraud and assist ICE in better targeting its worksite enforcement 

efforts. Yet, a number of current weaknesses in the pilot program’s 

implementation, including its inability to detect identity fraud and DHS 

delays in entering data into its databases, could adversely affect increased 

use of the pilot program, if not addressed. In addition, CIS officials told us 

the current Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete timely 

verifications if the number of employers using the program significantly 

increased. In fiscal year 2004, about 2,300 employers actively used the 

Basic Pilot Program. 

Under both INS and ICE, worksite enforcement has been a low priority. In 

fiscal year 1999, INS devoted about 240 full-time equivalents6

 (or about 

9 percent of its total investigative agent workyears) to worksite 

enforcement, while in fiscal year 2003 it devoted about 90 full-time 

equivalents (or about 4 percent of total agent workyears). Furthermore, 

6

One full-time equivalent is equal to one workyear or 2,080 non-overtime hours. 

Page 3 GAO-05-822T 
Background 

the number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers for knowingly 

hiring unauthorized workers or improperly completing employment 

verification forms decreased from 417 in fiscal year 1999 to 3 in fiscal year 

2004. According to ICE officials, the agency has experienced difficulties in 

proving employer violations and in setting and collecting fine amounts that 

meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized 

workers. In addition, after September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE almost 

exclusively focused worksite enforcement resources on identifying and 

removing unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites, such as 

airports and nuclear power plants. 

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 

(IIRIRA)

7

 of 1996 required INS and SSA to operate three voluntary pilot 

programs to test electronic means for employers to verify an employee’s 

eligibility to work, one of which was the Basic Pilot Program.8

 The Basic 

Pilot Program was designed to test whether pilot verification procedures 

could improve the existing employment verification process by reducing 

(1) false claims of U.S. citizenship and document fraud; (2) discrimination 

against employees; (3) violations of civil liberties and privacy; and (4) the 

burden on employers to verify employees’ work eligibility. 

The Basic Pilot Program provides participating employers with an 

electronic method to verify their employees’ work eligibility. Employers 

may participate voluntarily in the Basic Pilot Program, but are still 

required to complete Forms I-99

 for all newly hired employees in 

accordance with IRCA. After completing the forms, these employers query 

the pilot program’s automated system by entering employee information 

provided on the forms, such as name and social security number, into the 

pilot Web site within 3 days of the employees’ hire date. The pilot program 

7

IIRIRA of 1996 was enacted within a larger piece of legislation, the Omnibus Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 1997, P. L. 104-208. 

8

The other two pilot programs mandated by IIRIRA—the Citizen Attestation Verification 

Pilot Program and the Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program—were discontinued in 

2003 due to technical difficulties and unintended consequences identified in evaluations of 

the programs. See Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Citizen 

Attestation Verification Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2003) and 

Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Machine-Readable Document 

Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: May 2003). 

9

The Form I-9 is completed by employers in verifying the work eligibility of all newly hired 

employees. 

Page 4 GAO-05-822T 
then electronically matches that information against information in SSA 

and, if necessary, DHS databases to determine whether the employee is 

eligible to work, as shown in figure 1. The Basic Pilot Program 

electronically notifies employers whether their employees’ work 

authorization was confirmed. Those queries that the DHS automated 

check cannot confirm are referred to DHS immigration status verifiers 

who check employee information against information in other DHS 

databases. 

Page 5 GAO-05-822T 
Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process 

Employer enters 

new employee 

Form I-9 data 

Work authorization 

not confirmed (by 

SSA’s database) 

Immigration 

Status Verifier reviews 

Form I-9 information 

and checks other 

DHS databases 

Information 

is compared 

with DHS 

database 

SSA tentative nonconfirmation issued 

Employee 

contests 

finding; Must visit 

SSA local 

office 

Employee 

contests 

finding; Must 

call or visit 

DHS 

Employee does not 

contest finding or does 

not resolve issue with 

SSA local office within 

8 days 

Employee does not 

contest finding or does 

not resolve issue with 

DHS within 

8 days 

Employer informs employee of the finding 

Authorized 

Authorized 

Authorized 

Authorized 

Authorized 

Unauthorized 

Unauthorized 

DHS tentative non-confirmation issued 

Employer informs employee of the finding 

Information 

is compared 

with SSA 

database 

Noncitizens 

Citizens 

Social Security Administration 

Department of Homeland Security 

Source: GAO analysis based CIS information. 

In cases when the pilot system cannot confirm an employee’s work 

authorization status either through the automatic check or the check by an 

immigration status verifier, the system issues the employer a tentative 

Page 6 GAO-05-822T 
nonconfirmation of the employee’s work authorization status. In this case, 

the employers must notify the affected employees of the finding, and the 

employees have the right to contest their tentative nonconfirmations by 

contacting SSA or CIS to resolve any inaccuracies in their records within 

8 days. During this time, employers may not take any adverse actions 

against those employees, such as limiting their work assignments or pay. 

Employers are required to either immediately terminate the employment, 

or notify DHS of the continued employment, of workers who do not 

successfully contest the tentative nonconfirmation and those who the pilot 

program finds are not work-authorized. 

Various Weaknesses 

Have Undermined the 

Employment 

Verification Process, 

but Opportunities 

Exist to Enhance It 

Current Employment 

Verification Process Is 

Based on Employers’ 

Review of Documents 

In 1986, IRCA established the employment verification process based on 

employers’ review of documents presented by employees to prove identity 

and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employees must attest that they are 

U.S. citizens, lawfully admitted permanent residents, or aliens authorized 

to work in the United States. Employers must then certify that they have 

reviewed the documents presented by their employees to establish identity 

and work eligibility and that the documents appear genuine and relate to 

the individual presenting them. In making their certifications, employers 

are expected to judge whether the documents presented are obviously 

counterfeit or fraudulent. Employers are deemed in compliance with IRCA 

if they have followed the Form I-9 process, including when an 

unauthorized alien presents fraudulent documents that appear genuine. 

Form I-9 Process Is Since passage of IRCA in 1986, document and identity fraud have made it 

Vulnerable to Document difficult for employers who want to comply with the employment 

and Identity Fraud verification process to ensure they hire only authorized workers. In its 

1997 report to Congress, the Commission on Immigration Reform noted 

that the widespread availability of false documents made it easy for 

unauthorized aliens to obtain jobs in the United States. In past work, we 

Page 7 GAO-05-822T 
reported that large numbers of unauthorized aliens have used false 

documents or fraudulently used valid documents belonging to others to 

acquire employment, including at critical infrastructure sites like airports 

and nuclear power plants.

10 In addition, although studies have shown that 

the majority of employers comply with IRCA and try to hire only 

authorized workers, some employers knowingly hire unauthorized 

workers, often to exploit the workers’ low cost labor. For example, the 

Commission on Immigration Reform reported that employers who 

knowingly hired illegal aliens often avoided sanctions by going through the 

motions of compliance while accepting false documents. 

The Number and Variety of 

Acceptable Documents 

Hinders Employer 

Verification Efforts 

The number and variety of documents that are acceptable for proving 

work eligibility have complicated employer verification efforts under 

IRCA. Following the passage of IRCA in 1986, employees could present 29 

different documents to establish their identity and/or work eligibility. In a 

1997 interim rule, INS reduced the number of acceptable work eligibility 

documents from 29 to 27.11 The interim rule implemented changes to the 

list of acceptable work eligibility documents mandated by IIRIRA and was 

intended to serve as a temporary measure until INS issued final rules on 

modifications to the Form I-9. Since the passage of IRCA, we and others 

have reported on the need to reduce the number of acceptable work 

eligibility documents to make the employment verification process simpler 

and more secure.12 In 1998, INS proposed a further reduction in the 

number of acceptable work eligibility documents to 14, but the proposed 

rule has not been finalized. According to DHS officials, the department is 

currently assessing possible revisions to the Form I-9 process, including 

reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, but has not 

established a target time frame for completing this assessment and issuing 

regulations on Form I-9 changes. 

10

GAO/GGD-99-33, and GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security 

and a Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004). 

11Eight of these documents establish both identity and employment eligibility (e.g., U.S. 

passport or permanent resident card); 12 documents establish identity only (e.g., driver’s 

license); and 7 documents establish employment eligibility only (e.g., social security card). 

12See GAO/GGD-99-33, and U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 

Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Options for an Improved Employment Verification 

System (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1992). 

Page 8 GAO-05-822T 
The Basic Pilot Program 

Shows Promise to 

Enhance Employment 

Verification, but 

Challenges Exist to 

Increased Use 

Various immigration experts have noted that the most important step that 

could be taken to reduce illegal immigration is the development of a more 

effective system for verifying work authorization. In particular, the 

Commission on Immigration Reform concluded that the most promising 

option for verifying work authorization was a computerized registry based 

on employers’ electronic verification of an employee’s social security 

number with records on work authorization for aliens. The Basic Pilot 

Program, which is currently available on a voluntary basis to all employers 

in the United States, operates in a similar way to the computerized registry 

recommended by the commission, and shows promise to enhance 

employment verification and worksite enforcement efforts. Only a small 

portion—about 2,300 in fiscal year 2004—of the approximately 5.6 million 

employer firms nationwide actively used the pilot program.13 

The Basic Pilot Program enhances the ability of participating employers to 

reliably verify their employees’ work eligibility and assists participating 

employers with identification of false documents used to obtain 

employment by comparing employees’ Form I-9 information with 

information in SSA and DHS databases. If newly hired employees present 

counterfeit documents, the pilot program would not confirm the 

employees’ work eligibility because their employees’ Form I-9 information, 

such as the false name or social security number, would not match SSA 

and DHS database information when queried through the Basic Pilot 

Program. 

Although ICE has no direct role in monitoring employer use of the Basic 

Pilot Program and does not have direct access to program information, 

which is maintained by CIS, ICE officials told us that program data could 

indicate cases in which employers do not follow program requirements 

and therefore would help the agency better target its worksite 

13The number of employers who actively used the program in fiscal year 2004 includes a 

small number of employers who switched between two versions of the program and, as a 

result, were counted twice as active users. CIS is not able to easily determine which 

employers were counted twice. In addition, the approximately 2,300 employers who 

actively used the pilot program in fiscal year 2004 do not reflect the number of worksites or 

individual business establishments using the program. The about 5.6 million firms in the 

United States were the number of firms in 2002, which is the most current data available. 

Under the Basic Pilot Program, one employer may have multiple worksites that use the 

pilot program. For example, a hotel chain could have multiple individual hotels using the 

Basic Pilot Program, but the hotel chain would represent one employer using the pilot 

program. A firm is a business organization consisting of one or more domestic 

establishments in the same state and industry that were specified under common 

ownership or control. 

Page 9 GAO-05-822T 
enforcement efforts toward those employers. For example, the Basic Pilot 

Program’s confirmation of numerous queries of the same social security 

number could indicate that a social security number is being used 

fraudulently or that an unscrupulous employer is knowingly hiring 

unauthorized workers by accepting the same social security number for 

multiple employees. ICE officials noted that, in a few cases, they have 

requested and received pilot program data from CIS on specific employers 

who participate in the program and are under ICE investigation. However, 

CIS officials told us that they have concerns about providing ICE broader 

access to Basic Pilot Program information because it could create a 

disincentive for employers to participate in the program, as employers 

may believe that they are more likely to be targeted for a worksite 

enforcement investigation as a result of program participation. According 

to ICE officials, mandatory employer participation in the Basic Pilot 

Program would eliminate the concern about sharing data and could help 

ICE better target its worksite enforcement efforts on employers who try to 

circumvent program requirements. Moreover, these officials told us that 

mandatory use of an automated system like the pilot program could limit 

the ability of employers who knowingly hired unauthorized workers to 

claim that the workers presented false documents to obtain employment, 

which could assist ICE agents in proving employer violations of IRCA. 

The Basic Pilot Program may enhance the employment verification 

process and a mandatory program could assist ICE in targeting its 

worksite enforcement efforts. However, weaknesses exist in the current 

program. For example, the current Basic Pilot Program cannot help 

employers detect identity fraud. If an unauthorized worker presents valid 

documentation that belongs to another person authorized to work, the 

Basic Pilot Program would likely find the worker to be work-authorized. 

Similarly, if an employee presents counterfeit documentation that contains 

valid information and appears authentic, the pilot program may verify the 

employee as work-authorized. DHS officials told us that the department is 

currently considering possible ways to enhance the Basic Pilot Program to 

help it detect cases of identity fraud, for example, by providing a digitized 

photograph associated with employment authorization information 

presented by an employee. 

Delays in the entry of information on arrivals and employment 

authorization into CIS databases can lengthen the pilot program 

verification process for some secondary verifications. Although the 

majority of pilot program queries entered by employers are confirmed via 

the automated SSA and DHS verification checks, about 15 percent of 

queries authorized by DHS required secondary verifications in fiscal year 

Page 10 GAO-05-822T 
2004.14 According to CIS, cases referred for secondary verification are 

typically resolved within 24 hours, but a small number of cases take 

longer, sometimes up to 2 weeks, due to, among other things, delays in 

entry of employment authorization information into CIS databases. 

Secondary verifications lengthen the time needed to complete the 

employment verification process and could harm employees because 

employers might reduce those employees’ pay or restrict training or work 

assignments, which are prohibited under pilot program requirements, 

while waiting for verification of their work eligibility.15 DHS has taken 

steps to increase the timeliness and accuracy of information entered into 

databases used as part of the Basic Pilot Program and reports, for 

example, that data on new immigrants are now typically available for 

verification within 10 to 12 days of an immigrant’s arrival in the United 

States while, previously, the information was not available for up to 6 to 9 

months 16 after arrival. 

According to CIS officials, current CIS staff may not be able to complete 

timely secondary verifications if the number of employers using the 

program significantly increased. In particular, these officials said that if a 

significant number of new employers registered for the program or if the 

program were mandatory for all employers, additional staff would be 

needed to maintain timely secondary verifications. Currently, CIS has 

approximately 38 Immigration Status Verifiers allocated for completing 

Basic Pilot Program secondary verifications, and these verifiers reported 

that they are able to complete the majority of manual verification checks 

within their target time frame of 24 hours. However, CIS estimated that 

even a relatively small increase in the number of employers using the 

program would significantly slow the secondary verification process and 

strain existing resources allocated for the program. 

14In fiscal year 2004, only about 10 percent of total Basic Pilot Program queries were 

referred to DHS for verification. Of these queries referred to DHS for verification, about 85 

percent were confirmed via the DHS automated verification check. 

15Institute for Survey Research and Westat. 

16DHS, Report to Congress on the Basic Pilot Program (Washington, D.C.: June 2004). 

Page 11 GAO-05-822T 
Low Priority and 

Implementation 

Challenges Have 

Hindered Worksite 

Enforcement Efforts 

Worksite Enforcement 


Remains a Low Priority


Worksite enforcement was a low priority for INS and continues to be a low 

priority for ICE. In the 1999 INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, the 

strategy to block and remove employers’ access to undocumented workers 

was the fifth of five interior enforcement priorities.

17 We have reported 

that, relative to other enforcement programs in INS, worksite enforcement 

received a small portion of INS’s staffing and enforcement budget and that 

the number of employer investigations INS conducted each year covered 

only a fraction of the number of employers who may have employed 

unauthorized aliens.18 Furthermore, INS investigative resources were 

redirected from worksite enforcement activities to criminal alien cases, 

which consumed more investigative hours by the late 1990s than any other 

enforcement activity. After September 11, 2001, INS and ICE focused 

investigative resources on national security-related investigations. 

According to ICE, the redirection of resources from other enforcement 

programs to perform national security-related investigations resulted in 

fewer resources for traditional program areas, like worksite enforcement 

and fraud. 

The resources INS and ICE devoted to worksite enforcement have 

continued to decline. As shown in figure 2, between fiscal years 1999 and 

2003, the most recent fiscal year for which comparable data are available, 

the percentage of agent workyears spent on worksite enforcement efforts 

generally decreased from about 9 percent, or 240 full-time equivalents, to 

about 4 percent, or 90 full-time equivalents. 

17INS, Interior Enforcement Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1999). 

18

GAO/GGD-99-33. 

Page 12 GAO-05-822T 
Figure 2: Investigative Agent Workyears Spent on Worksite Enforcement Efforts 

and Agent Workyears Spent on Other Investigative Areas for Each Fiscal Year from 

1999 through 2003 

Work years 

3,000 

2,499 2,472 2,500 

2,000 

1,500 

1,000 

500 

0 

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 

Fiscal year 

240 176 117 

2,341 

132 

2,290 

90 

2,430 

Work years for worksite enforcement 

Work years for all other investigative areas 

Source: GAO analysis of INS case management data. 

Workyear data for fiscal year 2004 cannot be directly compared with 

workyear data for previous fiscal years because of changes in the way INS 

and ICE agents entered and categorized data in their respective case 

management systems. However, ICE data indicate that the agency 

Page 13 GAO-05-822T 
allocated about 65 full-time equivalents to worksite enforcement in fiscal 

year 2004.19 

In addition, the number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers as 

well as the number of unauthorized workers arrested at worksites have 

also declined. Between fiscal years 1999 and 2004, the number of notices 

of intent to fine issued to employers for improperly completing Forms I-9 

or knowingly hiring unauthorized workers generally decreased from 417 to 

3. (See figure 3.) 

19Fiscal year 2004 and 2005 data cannot be compared with data for previous fiscal years 

because the way INS agents entered data on investigative workyears into the INS case 

management system differs from the way ICE agents enter such data into the ICE system. 

Following the creation of ICE in March 2003, the case management system used to enter 

and maintain information on immigration investigations changed. With the establishment of 

ICE, agents began using the legacy U.S. Customs Service’s case management system, called 

the Treasury Enforcement Communications System, for entering and maintaining 

information on investigations, including worksite enforcement operations. Prior to the 

creation of ICE, the former INS entered and maintained information on investigative 

activities in the Performance Analysis System, which captured information on immigration 

investigations differently than the Treasury Enforcement Communications System. 

Page 14 GAO-05-822T 
Figure 3: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers for Each Fiscal 

Year from 1999 through 2004 

Notices of intent to fine 

450 

417 

400 

350 

300 

250 

200 

150 

100 

50 

0 

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 

Fiscal year 

178 

100 

53 

162 

3 

Source: GAO analysis of INS and ICE case management data. 

The number of worksite arrests declined by about 84 percent from 2,849 in 

fiscal year 1999 to 445 in fiscal year 2003. (See figure 4.) 

Page 15 GAO-05-822T 
Figure 4: Number of Worksite Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal Year from 1999 

through 2003 

Number of arrests 

3,000 2,849 

953 

735 

485 445 

The difficulties that INS and ICE have experienced in proving that 

employers knowingly hired unauthorized workers and in setting and 

collecting fine amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly 

hiring unauthorized workers have limited the effectiveness of worksite 

enforcement efforts. In particular, the availability and use of fraudulent 

documents has not only undermined the employment verification process, 

but has also made it difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers 

knowingly hired unauthorized workers. In 1996, the Department of Justice 

Office of the Inspector General reported that the proliferation of cheap 

fraudulent documents made it possible for the unscrupulous employer to 

avoid being held accountable for hiring illegal aliens.20 In 1999, we reported 

that the prevalence of document fraud made it difficult for INS to prove 

that an employer knowingly hired an unauthorized alien.

21 ICE officials 

20Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Immigration and Naturalization 

Service Efforts to Combat Harboring and Employing Illegal Aliens in Sweatshops, I-96-08 

(Washington, D.C.: May 1996). 

21GAO/GGD-99-33. 

2,500 

2,000 

1,500 

1,000 

500 

0 

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 

Fiscal year 

Source: GAO analysis of INS case management data. 

Difficulties Proving 

Employer Violations, 

Collecting Fines, and 

Detaining Aliens Have 

Weakened the Worksite 

Enforcement Program 

Page 16 GAO-05-822T 
told us that employers who they suspect knowingly hire unauthorized 

workers can claim that they were unaware that their workers presented 

false documents at the time of hire, making it difficult for agents to prove 

that the employer violated IRCA. 

According to ICE officials, when agents can prove that an employer 

knowingly hired an unauthorized worker, difficulties in setting and 

collecting meaningful fine amounts have undermined the effectiveness of 

worksite enforcement efforts and the deterrent effect of employer fines. 

Under IRCA, employers who fail to properly complete, retain, or present 

for inspection a Form I-9 may be administratively fined from $110 to 

$1,100 for each employee. Employers who knowingly hire or continue to 

employ unauthorized aliens may be administratively fined from $275 to 

$11,000 for each employee, depending on whether the violation is a first or 

subsequent offense. ICE officials told us fine amounts recommended by 

both INS and ICE agents were often negotiated down in value during 

discussions between agency attorneys and employers. These officials said 

that the agency mitigates employer fines because doing so may be a more 

efficient use of government resources than pursuing employers who 

contest or ignore fines, which could be more costly to the government 

than the fine amount sought. Furthermore, the amount of mitigated fines 

may be, in the opinion of some ICE officials, so low they believe that 

employers view it as a cost of doing business, and they believe the fines do 

not provide an effective deterrent for employers who attempt to 

circumvent IRCA. In addition, the Debt Management Center, which is 

responsible for collecting fines issued against employers for violations of 

IRCA, has faced difficulties in collecting the full amount of fines from 

employers. According to ICE, the agency has faced difficulties in 

collecting fines from employers for a number of reasons, for example, 

because employers went out of business or declared bankruptcy. In such 

instances, the agency determines whether to pursue collection of 

employer fines based on the level of resources needed to pursue the 

employer and the likelihood of collecting the fine amount. 

Finally, the Office of Detention and Removal

22 has limited detention space, 

and unauthorized workers detained during worksite enforcement 

investigations are a low priority for that space. In 2004, the Under 

22The Office of Detention and Removal is primarily responsible for identifying and 

removing criminal aliens from the United States. The office is also responsible for 

managing ICE’s space for detaining aliens. 

Page 17 GAO-05-822T 
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security sent a memo to the 

Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Assistant 

Secretary for ICE outlining the priorities for the detention of aliens. 

According to the memo, aliens who are subjects of national security 

investigations were among those groups of aliens given the highest priority 

for detention, while those arrested as a result of worksite enforcement 

investigations were to be given the lowest priority. According to ICE 

officials, the lack of sufficient detention space has limited the 

effectiveness of worksite enforcement efforts. For example, they said that 

if investigative agents arrest unauthorized aliens at worksites, the aliens 

would likely be released because the Office of Detention and Removal 

detention centers do not have sufficient space to house the aliens and they 

may re-enter the workforce, in some cases returning to the worksites from 

where they were originally arrested. 

Worksite Enforcement 

Focus Shifted to Critical 

Infrastructure Protection 

after September 11, 2001 

In keeping with the primary mission of DHS to combat terrorism, after 

September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE has focused its resources for 

worksite enforcement on identifying and removing unauthorized workers 

from critical infrastructure sites, such as airports and nuclear power 

plants, to help reduce vulnerabilities at those sites. According to ICE 

officials, the agency shifted its worksite enforcement focus to critical 

infrastructure protection because unauthorized workers employed at 

critical infrastructure sites indicate security vulnerabilities at those sites. 

In conducting critical infrastructure operations, the agency has worked 

with employers to identify and remove unauthorized workers and, as a 

result, has not focused on sanctioning employers at critical infrastructure 

sites. In 2003, ICE headquarters issued a memo requiring field offices to 

request approval from ICE headquarters prior to opening any worksite 

enforcement investigation not related to the protection of critical 

infrastructure sites, such as investigations of farms and restaurants. ICE 

officials told us that the purpose of this memo was to help ensure that field 

offices focused worksite enforcement efforts on critical infrastructure 

protection operations. Field office representatives reported that noncritical infrastructure worksite enforcement is one of the few investigative 

areas for which offices must request approval from ICE headquarters to 

open an investigation and also reported that worksite enforcement is not a 

priority unless it is related to critical infrastructure. In addition, some of 

these representatives, as well as immigration experts we interviewed, 

noted that the focus on critical infrastructure protection does not address 

the majority of worksites in industries that have traditionally provided the 

magnet of jobs attracting illegal aliens to the United States. 

Page 18 GAO-05-822T 
Concluding 

Observations 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Efforts to reduce the employment of unauthorized workers in the United 

States require a strong employment eligibility verification process and a 

credible worksite enforcement program to ensure that employers meet 

verification requirements. The current employment verification process 

has not fundamentally changed since its establishment in 1986, and 

ongoing weaknesses have undermined its effectiveness. The Basic Pilot 

Program shows promise for enhancing the employment verification 

process and reducing document fraud if implemented on a much larger 

scale. However, the weaknesses identified in the current implementation 

of the Basic Pilot Program, as well as the costs of an expanded program, 

are considerations that will need to be addressed in deciding whether this 

program, or a similar automated employment verification process, should 

be significantly expanded or made mandatory. Even with a strengthened 

employment verification process, a credible worksite enforcement 

program would be needed because no verification system is foolproof and 

not all employers may want to comply with IRCA. 

We are continuing our work and expect to have several recommendations 

aimed at improving employment verification and worksite enforcement 

efforts. 

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions you and the Subcommittee members may have. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Richard Stana 

at 202-512-8777. 

Other key contributors to this statement were Orlando Copeland, 

Michele Fejfar, Ann H. Finley, Rebecca Gambler, Kathryn Godfrey, 

Eden C. Savino, and Robert E. White. 

Page 19 GAO-05-822T 
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(440433) Page 20 GAO-05-822T 
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