U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

1

32–986 2007

[H.A.S.C. No. 109–102]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S.

PACIFIC COMMAND AND

U.S. FORCES KOREA

HEARING HELD

MARCH 9, 2006
(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

JIM RYUN, Kansas

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

KEN CALVERT, California

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

JOE SCHWARZ, Michigan

CATHY MCMORRIS, Washington

MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

IKE SKELTON, Missouri

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

LANE EVANS, Illinois

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island

STEVE ISRAEL, New York

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

TIM RYAN, Ohio

MARK UDALL, Colorado

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, Georgia

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

ROBERT L. SIMMONS, Staff Director

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member

HEATHER MESSERA, Staff Assistant
(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2006

Page

HEARING:

Thursday, March 9, 2006, Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization

Act—Budget Request from the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces

Korea ..................................................................................................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Thursday, March 9, 2006 ........................................................................................ 47

THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 2006

FISCAL YEAR 2007 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES

KOREA

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services ......................................................................................... 1

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................................... 3

WITNESSES

Bell, Gen. B.B., III, Commander, United Nations Command; Commander,

Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea, U.S. Army .............................................. 6

Fallon, Adm. William J., Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Navy ........ 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Bell, Gen. B.B., III ............................................................................................ 85

Fallon, Adm. William J. ................................................................................... 60

Hunter, Hon. Duncan ....................................................................................... 51

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 53

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Andrews ..................................................................................................... 131

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 131

Mrs. Drake ........................................................................................................ 130

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 129

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 130

Mr. Marshall ..................................................................................................... 131

Dr. Snyder ......................................................................................................... 130

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 130

(1)

FISCAL YEAR 2007 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC

COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 9, 2006.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:41 a.m., in room 2118,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of

the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE

ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

This is the committee’s hearing to review the posture of our unified commands for fiscal year 2007, and our guests this morning

are Admiral William J. Fallon, United States Navy commander,

U.S. Pacific Command; General Burwell B. Bell, III, United States

Air Force, commander, United States Forces Korea, commander,

United Nations Command, commander, Republic of Korea, United

States Combined Force Command.

Admiral Fallon, welcome back.

Let me also welcome General Bell in his first appearance before

the committee as a commander of U.S. Forces Korea. We all look

forward to your testimony and appreciate your appearance this

morning.

For the last few years, the public’s attention has been focused on

the Middle East. That is understandable, but it should not distract

us from national security issues in the rest of the world.

Developments in the Pacific are as crucial to our future security

as the operations in Southwest Asia. The Global War on Terror is

just that, and many of our ongoing efforts to combat extremists are

taking place in Asia and the Pacific. Indonesia, the Philippines and

the waters of the South China Sea continue to be home to terror

groups that seek to do harm and further extremist ideologies.

Natural disasters such as the December 2005 tsunami and the

recent mudslides in the Philippines highlight the need for ready,

responsive forces to come to the aid of our friends and allies in the

region.

Fortunately, our combatant commanders recognize the challenges

in their respective areas of responsibility and are working to get

ahead of threats and prepared for unexpected challenges.

And, you know, I think the world was amazed at the time when

we are engaged as heavily as we are in warfighting theaters, in

Iraq and Afghanistan, and carrying on the war against terror
2

around the world, that when the tsunami occurred and the

mudslides occurred and the other things occur, you do not see people wearing the uniform of our European allies in great numbers.

You see a few, a few, teams here and there.

But you see Americans. You see the American uniforms at the

time when we have got these multiple burdens around the world,

being able to respond to humanitarian requirements. It is quite an

extraordinary reflection on what I would call the flexibility and the

creativity and the broad base of the armed forces.

In addition to combating terrorism and providing humanitarian

relief, our forces in the Pacific must also keep a watchful eye on

developments in China. China’s economic expansion and focus on

military modernization continues, and recent comments made by

the National People’s Congress indicate that China plans to boost

military spending this year by about 15 percent. This spending

trend and the lack of transparency in Chinese intent fuels increased tensions across the Taiwan Straits.

Just this week, the Taiwanese president scrapped the symbolic

unification council and drew angry warnings from Beijing. It is

clear that situations such as this can escalate quickly and it threatens American lives and interests in the region.

Of course, the threats to our security do not stop there. North

Korea now admits publicly what the intelligence community has

concluded openly for years, that its possesses nuclear weapons in

violation of all of its Nonproliferation Treaty obligations. Continued

economic strain and Kim Jong-Il’s ‘‘military first’’ policy keep South

Korea and its neighbors at risk.

General Bell, I look forward to your assessment of the situation

on the peninsula and your thoughts about the challenges the world

faces in coping with nuclear North Korea.

No examination of the Pacific would be complete without touching on the recent discussions between the administration and India

over nuclear technology assistant. Despite having a nuclear weapons program and not signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

(NPT), the President recently stated that India should receive the

benefits and accept all the responsibility of the world’s leading

states with advanced nuclear technology.

Some feel that U.S.-India cooperation could help to assure India

reliable access to nuclear technology for its energy needs and increase India’s involvement in nonproliferation efforts. However,

many argue that by cooperating with a known nuclear weapons

state, which has refused to sign the NPT, the United States undermines the foundations of ongoing international discussions with

other nuclear states, such as North Korea and Iran.

I think to the President’s credit, we have to acknowledge that

none of these problems and challenges come wrapped in neat packages. Nonetheless, this is an issue that is going to require, I think,

a deep involvement by Congress and a fairly thorough scrutiny, understanding the President is undertaking this challenge in a very,

very difficult set of circumstances as we watch nations emerge as

weapons powers, nuclear weapons powers.

The recently released Quadrennial Defense Review and the fiscal

year 2007 budget request reflect a global posture realignment to

cope these many challenges. I am concerned, however, that these
3

adjustments add one more challenge to the equation, and it is unclear how this transition will be implemented. Military readiness

must be maintained in this critical region, even during the Navy’s

realignment of forces, the Air Force’s downsizing and the Army’s

transition to modularity.

And, pardon me, General Bell, I think I recognized you as the

United States Air Force General and right after you were telling

me about the extraordinary adventures of the 173rd airborne.

General BELL. Sir, we are all joint, and I am honored.

The CHAIRMAN. I knew you would say that.

Gentlemen, you are all on the front lines of dealing with those

threats and reversing those trends before the result in full-fledged

threats to the security of the United States. So we look forward to

hearing how your commands are fairing in the face of these challenges. So, thanks for being with us and being with us at a time

when we are attempting to readjust, realign and transform our

services but facing probably a set of challenges that has never been

more complex. Before we recognize our guests for their statements,

let me go to the ranking Democrat on the committee, my partner,

the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he

would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON

ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I join you, Mr.

Chairman, in welcoming Admiral Fallon, General Bell. It has certainly good to see you today. We are especially proud of young men

and young women that you lead, and we thank them for their service.

Today, the Pacific region is a critically important part of the

world. We face an enormous number of serious security challenges,

and yet I am concerned that our involvement in Iraq and in the

Middle East has preoccupied us away from the Pacific region’s rapidly changing strategic landscape. Our role in Iraq and the Middle

East is very vital, as we all agree, but we must have a broader

focus. It seems we should be doing much more in the Pacific region

to ease tensions at flashpoints, cultivate strategic partnerships,

build local capacity, prevent terrorism, proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction, of course, violence and instability.

We need a sophisticated, long-term strategy in the region that is

well coordinated, and unfortunately, I do not see it from the administration. So hopefully you can tell us what we can do here in Congress to help in that arena. I continue to think, Mr. Chairman, that

the Taiwan Strait is one of the most dangerous places in the world,

given the potential for miscommunication or miscalculation.

Just days ago, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, Taiwan’s president announced the National Unification Council ceased to function, inviting a sharp response from Beijing. At the same time,

China recently revealed the biggest increase in its defense budget

in four years.
4

Economic ties between China and Taiwan, between China and

America continue to grow, and this could lead to cooperation in a

number of other areas, but we cannot rely on economic relations

alone. We must actively pursue other opportunities for cooperation

that will lead China to increase its transparency, engagement in

regional confidence-building measures and contributions to other

security goals.

Combating terror and the proliferation of mass destruction weapons should be central to the American-China strategic partnership,

and addressing the avian flu and other health environment concerns should be a priority, given the serious security implications.

I also believe we cannot afford to take our eye off the South

China Sea. Many experts warn the potential for conflict there is

greater than in the Taiwan Strait. I am also very concerned about

the Six-Party talks with the North Koreans over the nuclear weapons program. These talks have been stalled now for several

months, and yet North Korea may have at least eight nuclear

bombs. What should America be doing to move along these talks,

and what is the Pacific Command and the U.S. Forces Korea doing

to prepare for all possible scenarios on the Korean peninsula.

In addition, our relations with Japan and South Korea, two longstanding allies, cannot be more important than they are right now.

They are involved in the North Korean talks, we share a number

of key security goals. And so what are we doing to ensure those relations with those two allies to make sure they remain strong?

India, the president, as you know, just came back from India and

gave a few of us a recent briefing in the White House, and it continues to be an important U.S. partner in the region. Since 2001,

American-India relations have flourished, including in the area of

defense. Yet India has the nuclear weapons that it has tested in

the past. It has never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Despite that, the administration is pushing an agreement that

would give India nuclear power.

Many experts warn the deal could enhance India’s ability to

make nuclear weapons, ignite a regional arms race and strain

American relations with other regional partners. It could also create undesirable precedence and make it more difficult to curb proliferation of weapons. I hope you will share your thoughts on the

regional security risk you think the nuclear deal with India might

create.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we face serious challenges in Southeast

Asia, particularly the Philippines and Indonesia with the threat of

terrorism, violence, instability. We were reminded of this last October following the Bali bombings, but we must have more efforts in

Southeast Asia and make that a higher priority.

The Pacific Command did a tremendous job responding to the

2004 tsunami in Indonesia and recent landslides in the Philippines,

and we compliment you for that. These types of efforts are important to bolstering strategic relationships and improving security cooperation. Again, I hope you will offer your thoughts on what we

need to be done in the future. Admiral Fallon, General Bell, we are

very, very pleased to have you with us today. Mr. Chairman, thank

you.
5

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 53.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

And just on a notice note, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.

Skelton, and I are going to host an informal breakfast for all the

committee members with Secretary Rice and her staff who worked

the India deal to come down and talk to us candidly and let us ask

candid questions about that issue. So we will try to do that in the

next week or two at a breakfast, and we will make sure everybody

gets a notice on that.

Well, thank you very much, gentlemen, for being with us.

And, Admiral Fallon, the floor is yours, sir.

STATEMENT OF ADM. WILLIAM J. FALLON, COMMANDER, U.S.

PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. NAVY

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, distinguished members of the committee. It is a great honor for me to

be here this morning representing the men and women of Pacific

Command to testify regarding the posture of U.S. forces in the Pacific and the security situation throughout the Asia-Pacific area.

I would characterize the Pacific region as one of exceptional dynamic activity, very vibrant economic growth and overall an optimistic outlook is shared by the majority of people in this region.

Nonetheless, there are some long-standing frictions and challenges

that remain and some newly emerging concerns that I would be

happy to discuss with you.

First thing I would tell you is that in the year that I have been

on the job I now recognize the vast size of this area, immense indeed. More than 50 percent of the surface of the Earth and 60 percent of the world’s population live in the Asia-Pacific area. And I

have traveled extensively to try and see firsthand just what is

going on and to personally better understand the security situation

out there.

It seems to me that there are several priority tasks. The first one

being to maintain long-standing alliances with some of our critical

allies in the region and partners in many endeavors throughout the

region and the world and to help to try to build capacity in particularly the developing countries of this region so that they can better

deal with the security situations in their own countries. Of course,

we are also trying to, at the same time, transform our U.S. force

structure and work with our allies as they, in fact, undertake

transformation of their militaries as well.

There are certainly some long-range concerns—the situation on

the Korean peninsula, the emergence of China, the continuing friction in the Taiwan Strait—but balancing that against some very

optimistic developments—the new relationship with India and I

particularly cite the changes in Indonesia as areas of particular

hope and expectation.

We are currently supporting the efforts in the Central Command

area and Iraq and Afghanistan with many thousands of troops,

forces from all the services that are based in the Pacific region that

are currently serving with distinction in the war zones.

I would tell you that the number one priority for our region as

well as CENTCOM is the Global War on Terror. I would also tell
6

you that the focused areas that I have our people working are continuing to address the readiness of our joint and combined

warfighting capabilities to ensure that our operations plans, contingency plans are actually credible, to look into these things and

make sure that if we are on the hook to do things, that we can in

fact feel confident that we can execute these responsibilities.

We are also working very hard throughout the region to advance

our regional security cooperation with partners, large and small,

because I think that at the end of the day it is really essential that

we help people throughout the region to be secure in their daily

lives. Because it is pretty obvious to me that without fundamental

security and confidence in their ability to exist day to day we are

unlikely to see the growth and development, either individually or

collectively, in these nations. And so we have an awful lot of effort

going on in countries throughout the region.

Finally, and certainly not least important, is that we are working

every day to try to posture our forces as we look to the future so

that they will be able to respond quickly and as required to meet

any emerging security challenges.

I think I will knock it off here, and just with a sincere thank you

for your support to our men and women. I know that all the soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, civilians from the Department

of Defense and our good friends in the other agencies that we work

with hand-in-glove every day, thank you for your staunch support

of their efforts day in and day out, and I want to thank you again

for the opportunity to be here testifying in front of you today.

I would be pleased to respond to whatever questions you may

have.

And, Mr. Chairman, if I could ask that my written testimony be

entered into documentation here.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Fallon can be found in the

Appendix on page 60.]

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, all written statements will be

taken into the record.

Thank you, Admiral Fallon.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you very much, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Admiral Fallon.

General Bell, you wear a lot of hats. Good morning.

STATEMENT OF GEN. B.B. BELL, III, COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND; COMMANDER, REPUBLIC OF KOREAUNITED STATES COMBINED FORCES COMMAND; AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA, U.S. ARMY

General BELL. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I need to work on

that airborne badge, though, and I promise you I am going to

relook at my deficiencies and see if I can make an improvement.

That is the one hat I am not wearing for you today, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You only need five, count them, five.

General BELL. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman, Representative Skelton, distinguished members of

the committee, it is truly my pleasure to before you today representing the service members, Department of Defense civilians

who serve in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf of these out-
7

standing men and women, I really do thank you for your continuing support.

And for the record, sir, I, too, would like to submit my posture

statement. I appreciate that.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be taken in.

General BELL. Since I assumed command in Korea last month,

I have assessed the Republic of Korea military capability and that

of North Korea, and it is my belief that our alliance with the Republic of Korea remains strong as a key strategic partnership for

the United States as well as for the Republic of Korea (ROK).

The ROK-U.S. alliance provides a true pillar of stability in

Northeast Asia while it continues to deter North Korea. The ROKU.S. Mutual Defense Treaty relationship has progressed from what

was a single-purpose military alliance into a much broader alliance

based on shared democratic values and common interests. And although the United States, indeed, has many ongoing global commitments, I am convinced that we must continue to stand with our

South Korean partner to deter aggression on the Korean peninsula.

And in doing this, we are also going to continue to substantially

contribute to regional stability.

The success and prosperity of the Republic of Korea reflects the

result of a half century of American commitment. Since the Korean

war, the alliance has maintained a security environment favorable

to the development of what is a remarkable free-market economy,

as well as a free and democratic society. Today, South Korea is a

world economic leader. They are our close friend and our partner.

One-quarter of the world’s economic output is generated in

Northeast Asia, and the Republic of Korea ranks as a seventh largest trading partner. United States trade alone in that region exceeds $500 billion a year.

Now, as you know, our nation is currently entering into negotiations for a free trade agreement with the Republic of Korea, and

I think all of this is good for us here at home as we continue to

trade in a global economy.

Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea military is on a solid path to

modernization and transformation; there is no doubt about that.

And it continues to assume very tough missions from the United

States, which heretofore we could only accomplish, in my view. It

has my assessment that today, and with our help, the Republic of

Korea is fully capable of defending itself against North Korean aggression.

In contrast, North Korea is a significant threat that must still be

deterred. North Korea’s Kim regime continues to build and sustain

a military arsenal far beyond its requirements for self-defense at

the dire expense of its own people’s well-being.

The North’s military is located forward along the demilitarized

zone, and it is positioned to strike well within range of Seoul where

about half of South Korea’s 48 million population resides. North

Korea’s missile inventory and its self-declared possession of nuclear

weapons threaten the Northeast Asia region and beyond. North

Korea proliferates a range of weapons and technology, and it appears willing to sell to anyone.
8

As North Korea continues to proliferate and pursue WMD capability, they may eventually threaten the continental United States

and indeed the entire world.

As you know, the United States and our allies have attempted

significant engagement efforts with the North, and we will continue

to do this in the future. But North Korea delays discussion, breaks

commitments and disregards international standards of behavior.

The Kim regime prefers to pursue its own ends regardless of the

good-faith efforts of the United States and other regional actors.

With the reality of North Korea ever present, there is a desire

by the Republic of Korea to see our half-century alliance mature

and adapt to its contemporary and foreseeable security requirements. I think this approach is reasonable and healthy. As we support the ROK’s desire for a greater role in its own defense, we also

compliment our efforts to meet out our transformation objectives.

In the past few years, we have begun of reposition our forces

south of Seoul, redeploy selected units to our home shores and return valuable land to the Korean people in the south. This process

will continue over the next few years.

Recently, the ROK government has asked us to revise the command structure which characterizes our current military relationship should war break out on the peninsula. Today, the alliance

calls for a combined or equally shared operational command arrangement between our two nations, under my leadership, as the

Commander of Combined Forces Command.

In the future, South Korea would like to move to a command arrangement where they would independently direct combat operations of their forces. United States forces would therefore transition from our current equally shared command relationship to more

of a supporting role.

The ROK military is modern and capable, and my assessment is

that this arrangement will make sense for both of our nations,

while continuing to effectively deter and ensure victory should deterrence fail.

In the future, to support the Republic of Korea’s desire to exercise independent combat command, I envision U.S. military support

to the alliance to be air and naval-centric. And as I see it, our past

commitment to the Republic of Korea and the region has significantly benefited our nation as well as the Republic of Korea.

Throughout our history, the United States has prided itself on the

promotion of democracy, free-market economies as a celebration of

individual freedoms and rights and the propagation of peace and

stability.

The ROK-U.S. alliance demonstrates our continued pursuit of

those ideals and we have been successful.

Sir, that is my current assessment. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee, and I do look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Bell can be found in the Appendix on page 85.]

The CHAIRMAN. General Bell, thank you.

And, Admiral Fallon, thank you for your opening statements.

And I am going to pass on my questions and I will have some ques-
9

tions at the end to try to make sure all of our members get a

chance to have a discussion with you.

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will ask only one

question, as we speak, and I will have a number of them at the

end of the hearing. And I suppose it could be addressed to both of

you, but how much should we be concerned with the recently reported increase in China’s defense spending and what does that

mean for us? Admiral Fallon, and then General Bell.

Admiral FALLON. Mr. Skelton, it is a concern, because it is following a pattern of increasing amounts of money, and it is about

15 percent that has been announced. It exceeds their gross domestic product (GDP) growth, which is impressive, nonetheless, for the

past decade. It almost doubles the GDP growth.

So the challenge that I see is not so much in the aggregate

amount of that because they are still a fraction of our defense expenditures, a small fraction. But the challenge that I have is the

lack of transparency and dialogue with the Chinese and what their

intentions are.

Very clear to me that a lot of the acquisition of hardware of late

appears to be directed to affect military activity, vis-a-vis Taiwan.

And also, a lot of this appears to be aimed at countering our ability

to respond to that challenge.

So in the absence of much dialogue, we are left to ponder just

what is going on.

Again, the numbers and the amount of this equipment is relatively small compared to ours, but it is a pretty steady growth,

and I would sure like to have a better understanding of what their

intentions are.

General BELL. Sir, I could add that I have looked in some detail

at the relationship, militarily, between the PRC and the North Koreans, and I can report to you that the level and engagement from

a military perspective is quite low and, as such, a positive situation, in my view. They rarely exercise together, there is no known,

to my knowledge at this point, major weapons sales, contracts, et

cetera, the exchange of military personnel, which you might see between allies, is very, very low.

And so although they do share in a friendship treaty, the amount

of military support that the PRC provides to the North is minimal,

and I think at this point represent a good-faith effort to keep a lid

on North Korean expansionism, proliferation, et cetera. And I

would encourage us to continue to work with the Chinese through

all the methodologies to make certain that it stays that way.

Mr. HEFLEY [presiding]. Well, excuse me, I guess it is my turn

now, since Mr. Hunter left.

Admiral Fallon, you mentioned readiness. You are going around

the Pacific trying to see for yourself about the readiness and so

forth. How are we from a readiness standpoint? Of course, that is

a committee that I Chair and have the deepest interest in.

Such things as our preposition equipment, which we have taken

a lot of it, I think, to fight the war and the O&M budget, which

we are always running behind. Do you have the resources you need

to properly train, maneuver, prepare for whatever contingency is

out there?
10

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. The short answer, Mr. Hefley, is that

I feel we do have the resources to do what needs to be done to keep

our forces ready. We have been concerned about the drawdown of

prepositioned (PREPO) stocks, and we have been extensively discussing this with the services, particularly the Army and the Marine Corps. And we are confident that the plan that is in place to

replenish those stocks is sufficient for our needs.

I will tell you that my detailed look at this has me convinced

that the smart thing to do for the Nation is not to demand an immediate fill up of all these things with the material that has been

removed. Because I know that a substantial amount of this material, weapons and other stocks, are going to be replaced with more

modern equipment.

And so I have not put a huge demand signal on the services to

immediately refill the stocks, because I know that some of these

things are in the initial stages of procure, but I am satisfied that

we have got enough should we need to respond right now. And the

forces have been adequately resourced.

We do have a significant number of our forces that are deployed,

and have been deployed, and are rotating through the active combat areas in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the result of this is that

while we do have forces out of area they are contributing to the

war effort in the near term and the training, on-the-job training

they get, their real readiness has certainly increased based on their

experience in the war.

So the units we get back in the theater and probably more responsive to our needs should they be called upon. So the bottom

line is I think we are in good shape on readiness.

Mr. HEFLEY. Okay. Well, you know, you guys have the tendency,

and it is a good tendency, to make due and go do the job with

whatever they give you. But, please, let us know where any deficits

are so that we can work with you to make sure that we are ready.

General Bell, sometimes we get the impression that there is a

question about how badly the South Koreans want us there, and

I know that street demonstrations do not tell the full story. But,

now, you have been there a short time but long enough to get a

feel for it. What is your evaluation of this, what is your sense of

this?

General BELL. Thanks, Mr. Hefley. I will give you my assessment. I am very optimistic, by the way.

First, just to give you a sense of where the general polls are, and

I guess polls can tell you whatever they want them to tell you, and

you all perhaps know more about polls than I do.

But I am going to tell you about a poll that was recently conducted by a credible source in the Republic of Korea, which demonstrated that 77 percent of the population of the Republic of

Korea favors U.S. continued presence, favors a strong alliance with

the United States. And I think that is indicative of what I have

seen in the month that I have been there.

So at the baseline, and there are other polls out there that show

the same thing—this is not an anomaly at all. I will tell you that

the Republic of Korea is a thriving democracy. It has all the apparatus of democracy that you would expect, not unlike what we have

here in the United States. They have got a range of political par-
11

ties, they have got different perspectives in those parties, and they

debate the issues in public. When it serves the needs of one of the

parties to attempt to gain favor with the population, if they can

raise issues about the alliance and if they believe that that will

produce some favoritism, they have perhaps in the past raised

issues about the alliance and U.S. presence.

But in the end, the government that has been elected there and

the officials that I meet with, including the highest levels of their

government, have the same principles that we have seen over the

years: One, deter North Korea and ensure that there is no conflict

on the peninsula. Peace is in everybody’s interest, and you just cannot buy peace; you have to have peace through strength, and the

Republic of Korea understands that clearly.

They invest significantly in their military force for that purpose.

Their GDP commitment to their military is higher than almost all

of our European allies, and so there is a real monetary commitment to defense. Their purpose is the same as ours, to denuclearize

North Korea, and they state that publicly and they help us toward

that end.

So my assessment would be while nothing is an easy day today,

necessarily, I do celebrate, in many respects, in fact in all respects,

the operation of a democracy, free people, freedom of press, freedom

of speech, all working in that area of the world wherein democracies over the years have not always flourished.

And so I am optimistic. We have some issues; we are working

through them. They get debated in the public arena. But they are

the kinds of the issues we would expect when dealing with a good

friend and a good partner.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you for that, but one last question. You are

going to move a lot of our footprint out of Seoul, I understand. In

recent years, we have struggled to put money into the command

there so that it is better living conditions and so forth. And it has

been a struggle. I mean, there are not any South Koreans that vote

in any of these districts, and it is hard to get the military construction (MILCON) necessary.

But as you move, are the improvements that we have put in in

the last few years, are they going to the South Korean military or

were many of those put in to where you are going to go?

General BELL. Sir, that is a great question. Let me attack it from

a couple of angles. Since 2003, we have very judiciously, in my

view—I have looked at it very carefully and I have walked the

ground—attempted to ensure that any military construction that

comes out of U.S. funds is located on enduring installations that we

intend to occupy and be in into the foreseeable future.

I can tell you I just last week walked the halls of a new family

housing unit at Camp Humphreys, exactly center of mass of one of

our enduring installations in a project that was approved several

years ago.

So, first and foremost, I want to assure you that for at least the

last three years and now into a fourth year, we are very careful before we ask for military construction to ensure they will be at our

enduring installations.

Now, second, our training areas that we will retain we are still

asking for MILCON in some cases to upgrade our training areas.
12

Sir, I will not tell you that in the past we have not built things

at, say, Camp Casey, a place that we do intend to leave and go

south of Seoul. I will tell you, however, that the South Korean government is helping us measurably in this effort. They are paying

for the vast majority of our move south. Over $4 billion of investment by the South in infrastructure and move costs to move the

U.S. military south is being borne by them.

They have already spent $1.8 billion of that $4 billion commitment, and I think, sir, that is a magnificent demonstration of burden-sharing. Their annual burden-sharing outside the move but

just burden-sharing is in excess of $500 million a year cash on a

barrelhead to United States operations in that area of the world.

So our ally is putting their money on the table to assist us, and

I want to assure that as I ask you for some money in the future,

that I will only put it where I know we are going to be enduring,

where it makes sense for the American taxpayer and where it is

justifiable.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Fallon and General Bell, welcome to our hearing today.

I know, Admiral, that they touched on the status of the preposition stocks. I know that has been a problem, and we know that we

are beginning to see some hotspots in Pakistan and Indonesia. Are

you satisfied with the preposition stock that we have now?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. We found a problem a little over a

year ago in the maintenance of some of the PREPO stocks, particularly the stocks that were in Korea and earmarked for Korean contingencies. And it had to do with relatively small amounts of

money and attention to detail. I feel confident that that has been

addressed.

I have gotten a detailed rundown of each of the issues in that

regard, and from that perspective, I have got a new chief of logistics, an Army one-star, a great big guy, a very sharp guy, and he

has been bird-dogging this stuff, and we feel very comfortable.

I will ask General Bell for his comments too.

Mr. ORTIZ. General.

General BELL. Sir, I think this is a story I ought to share with

you because it is a good news story and we appreciate it.

Some of our PREPO equipment in the Republic of South Korea,

which is there for an immediate warfight, is centered around what

we call a heavy brigade combat team, armor and mechanized infantry combat team, or PREPO. There are other pieces of PREPO, precision munitions, bombs and these kind of things, but the core element is this Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), we call it,

heavy brigade combat team.

On inspection a little over a year ago, some of that equipment

was found to be wanting. I can give you lots of reasons. Part of it

was that we were deploying an organization to Iraq out of Korea,

from the 2nd Infantry Division, a brigade. Some of the equipment

that was in PREPO was used to get this brigade in exactly the

right configuration, so there were some issues. But let there be no

doubt that there is a reasonable perspective that we did not pay
13

the degree of attention to that equipment over the years that we

should have.

What we did last year, just a bit over a year ago, was triple the

amount of maintenance money that we are using to keep that brigade combat team ready, from about $14 million to about $42 million a year in direct funding to do the maintenance on this equipment as it sits in these sheds, et cetera, et cetera.

We hired 160 additional civilian employees, mechanics, to work

on the equipment to make sure it is in a high state of readiness.

We have instituted a pretty aggressive effort to not only read our

readiness reports but also to exercise the equipment.

The heavy brigade combat team right now readiness rates that

I am receiving from our Army Materiel Command are in excess of

90 percent; in fact, higher than that. I will not give you an exact

number here, but they are very impressive numbers. Our exercises

that we are doing will test some of these in a more tough field environment.

But the facts are that we have put a lot of money into ensuring

that this equipment is maintained, and we have a checks and balances program to make sure that we are not kidding ourselves. I

am very comfortable right now that we have put the attention into

this equipment that we should have and that in the last year we

have made enormous progress.

And I will keep this committee posted if there are issues with additional funding, but right now this tripling of funding that we

have put into that set has made a big difference, by all measures.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. Another question that I would like to ask, I know that

you do have the pre-stock, what you think is adequate. How about

your sustainability? How long can you sustain in case something

breaks up? We have got North Korea and we have got all those

hotspots. For how long can you sustain yourself?

General BELL. Let me go just a bit afield on you, and then I will

come back and answer your question. If a war were to break out

in Korea today, if our deterrent regimen with our ally were to fail

and they were to attack, this war—and, obviously, I will not get

into the specifics of a war plan—but this war would be first and

foremost fought our Republic of Korea ally principally. Their army

on the ground is in excess of 500,000 active duty, and they are on

the line, and they are ready. They have got three field armies fielded. They have got a large air force with over 600 aircraft with very

modern fighter aircraft—F–16s, F–15s, et cetera—ready to fight.

They have got a good navy and an excellent marine corps.

So on the ground, sir, they will accept the brunt of the fight initially. It is not going to be like 1950 when the military was not

ready. This is a ready outfit. They have taken many missions from

us, and they are very good.

Meanwhile, the United States is prepared to respond, first and

foremost, with an aggressive air campaign that, in my view, like

one of our core competencies would be extremely effective in

blunting any kind of invasion of the South. Likewise, our naval

forces, et cetera, et cetera.

So I am not telling you that we do not need a lot of supplies to

sustain operations, but, sir, what I am telling you is that we envi-
14

sion a war in Korea—first, we do not want a war in Korea. We

want to deter and we want North Korea to join the peaceful community of nations. That is our objectives. We want them to

denuclearize.

But should they miscalculate, I do not think you are going to see

a war like 1950, sir. I think you will see it concluded on the alliance’s terms fairly quickly.

Having said that, we have sufficient stocks to sustain U.S. forces

for the length of time that we need to. I believe the Republic of

Korea needs to continue to invest in stocks to sustain their military. I would not tell you that in my assessment that they have finished procuring the kinds of materials that they need to sustain a

war over a longer period of time.

But, again, I have got a lot of confidence in our capability, and

I look at it every day, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. I just have one short question, and I

think that you are having problems with training ranges. They are

small. How can we help you there, because we need for your troops

to be adequately trained, and if you do not have enough land to

train, is that causing a problem?

General BELL. Sir, we have issues with training ranges. I do not

want to get laborious here. I will talk all day about great military

and pretty proud of it.

I like our ground training capability. It is good and getting better. I would love a place the size of my home state of Tennessee

to train in, but we have lots of ways to train where we do not need

a place the size of the state of Tennessee. We have got good ground

combat ranges. We are investing in them. This year, I have got in

the budget request about $4 million requesting upgrades of three

ground ranges that are for our exclusive use that will continue to

help us in our training environment.

Our issue in the Republic of Korea today is air training, the

training of our air ground capability, our fighter aircraft to delivery

bombs on target. We do not have the ranges that I believe are required to ensure our competency day to day.

Now, we are negotiating, working with and trying to resolve this

with our Republic of Korea ally. We had the ranges that we needed

until several months back. We are transitioning to a new range

complex, and we were under the belief that that transition would

go very quickly and that we would begin to use a new range complex with scoring targets, et cetera, et cetera, so the pilots could

grade their performance, et cetera.

We have not gained access to that range yet. It is an issue, and

I am working on it. In the interim, we have other training opportunities off the peninsula for our aircraft that we are using to ensure

that our readiness is maintained at the highest levels.

But, sir, we do need access to these air ground training areas,

and I anticipate getting that access in the near term.

Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much.

General Bell, I would just like to follow up on Mr. Ortiz’s last

question and just allow you to expand on your needs. As we spoke
15

before the hearing, you indicated to me that there were some

things that were issues that you wanted to explain to us, and if you

would just take this opportunity to go ahead and do that.

General BELL. Sir, I think the issues that I have deal more with

North Korea. If I could get off into that area just a bit——

Mr. SAXTON. Yes, sir.

General BELL [continuing]. I would appreciate it.

You know, we have worked, as I said in my opening statement,

pretty hard, the international community has, since the North became one of the great proliferators of technology, of missiles and

self-declared nukes, at least the development of nuclear weapons.

And we have tried in good faith to find resolution of that. The

North Koreans have, on some occasions, come forth and appeared

to have negotiated and work with the six parties—the other five

parties in good faith, only then to retrench and put another demand on the table. And so it is a matter of concern.

And in this world in which we live today, proliferation of technologies to countries around the world has got to be a great concern for all of us, and North Korea continues the development program. Only in the last couple of days they have again tested shortrange ballistic missiles that are in fact a quantum leap forward

from the kinds of missiles that they produced in the past, solid fuel

missiles that have great reliability, are easy to move around a battlefield, have higher accuracy potential, et cetera, et cetera. They

are routinely testing these.

So one could expect that if they chose to proliferate these, that

they have got a system that is working pretty well and that they

would have a buyer out there.

So this kind of behavior is unnecessary in the world today. It is

time for North Korea to enter the peaceful group of nations that

seeks to empower their own people to be free and to raise their

kids in a safe and secure environment. And I think that the United

States, with our leadership and with the other members of the six

parties and with the rest of the international community, has to remain strong in this regard.

It has worked effectively since the end of the Korean War, and

we need to continue to be very cautious as we deal with the North.

I do not think that they deal in good faith in these meetings. There

is no major indication of good faith here. They still have the capability to produce plutonium from enriched uranium that has been

run through a reactor. They have a reactor. The began construction

on a large reactor some years ago, which is now not being worked

on but there it is.

So my biggest concern remains a continued effective deterrence

with respect to North Korea. We need to continue to engage North

Korea. I think the Six-Party talks is a good forum to do that. We

need to gain international consensus on this issue. We need to confront those who are buyers and make certain that we make it hard

for them to buy. We need financial penalties, we need economic

penalties, et cetera, et cetera.

So my biggest issue is that after all these years it is time for

North Korea to become a peaceful nation and to join the community of nations instead of continuing to be, if you will, a rogue na-
16

tion that proliferates in a world that does not need that kind of

proliferation at this time, sir. I apologize for ranting and raving.

Mr. SAXTON. No, sir. We need to hear that. Thank you.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen.

I am going to throw a scenario at you. I guess everyone has got

a different view of what they think the assassin’s mace is. If Chinese make their move against Taiwan, simultaneously, the Koreans decide to invade the South, and just for good measure, since

we have realized how vulnerable the city of New Orleans is, they

send someone over with a gasoline-powered auger, a few sticks of

dynamite and they blow the levee again. So we simultaneously

have a situation in the Far East, 500,000 people sitting on rooftops.

And what really struck me last fall was, apparently, how we are

running a just-in-time military on things like generators, tents,

meals ready to eat (MREs). And just-in-time works find in peacetime in ideal situations, but you start changing the equation with

an unanticipated disaster and just-in-time does not work.

So under that scenario, General—and let’s just say the Chinese

have now fielded a few pretty good diesel subs that have done a

pretty good job of disrupting the sea lanes. So on just basic things

like MREs, water, generators, tents, how are your troops able to

take care of themselves for the first month?

General BELL. Sir, we have——

Mr. TAYLOR. Given this scenario: You have got 500,000 screaming civilians in the city of New Orleans, you have got a situation

off of China, you have got, what 36,000 combat troops that you

have got to take care of.

General BELL. Sir, we did have 36,000, you are correct. We are

at about 30,000 right now because we are redeploying some of

these troops. We are going to go to about 25,000. And I do not want

to restate what I stated because I do not want to waste your time,

but I do want you to know that we have the preposition materiel

supplies that we need to sustain our force, in my view, adequately

on the ground.

Mr. TAYLOR. May I interrupt?

General BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. And, please, with all due respect, whether you are

for the war in Iraq or against the war in Iraq, I really do think

it is fair to say that a hidden cost of the war in Iraq has been materiel. And I am not so sure those things are being replaced for whatever reason.

So, please continue. And I want you to convince me that I am

wrong on that one.

General BELL. Sir, I would not endeavor to convince you that you

are wrong, because we are fighting a Global War on Terror. It is

expensive. We are consuming a lot of products, to say the least, and

this is not an easy endeavor for the United States or the world

community.

But what I want to share with you is that if the North miscalculated, I am absolutely convinced in a very strong way that we have

what we need on the peninsula to defeat an attack by North Korea

resoundly and quickly.
17

And a lot of this extends from the good work done by all of our

predecessors over the last 50-plus years in assisting the Republic

of Korea in building a military that is arguably one of the best in

the world. What we wanted to do in this alliance is, one, produce

a democracy, get the Nation back up on its feet and allow it to defend itself. It is now, you name it, the 10th, the 14th largest economic power in the world. It has got a magnificent modern military, and we are transitioning quickly to ensure that they take on

the totality of the burden of deterring and defending.

So my sense is that we are postured well on that peninsula to

deal with any contingency.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, if I may.

General BELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. And, again, I heard you say that. I am not doubting

your word. I guess just to allay my fears, how long could your

troops be self-sufficient? If for whatever reason the sea lanes were

blocked and other contingencies around the world were gobbling up

supplies at an unanticipated rate, how long could your troops be

self-sufficient? Nothing shows up to help.

General BELL. Sir, I would—and I know you think I am equivocating. I promise you I am not. The number of days of supply that

I feel confident in that we can be self-sufficient, I would ask to inform you of that in a closed session or privately.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. I would welcome that.

Okay. So let’s just an analogy that maybe you could answer in

public session. Is that number the same as, more than or less than

four years ago today?

General BELL. I would say that it is the same as four years ago

today because our force is smaller and the Republic of Korea is

much more capable today than it was four years ago when I was

exercising with them as an army corps. They have taken over, for

example, the counterfire missions, arguably the hardest mission for

a land force to do in modern warfare is to understand what guns

are shooting at you and return precision fire to destroy those guns.

They have now taken that mission from us. And I went through

their counterfire facilities just the other day. It is world class. They

know what they are doing; they are very good.

The United States forces in Korea I do not believe are at risk in

terms of lack of supplies, lack of materiel. Certainly, they are not

at risk in terms of the training or readiness of the young men and

women who make up our force over there. And I confident that the

plans that we have in place could be executed and that we would

be successful.

Having said that, I would not tell you for a second, sir, that life

is perfect out there with wars going on in Afghanistan and Iraq.

And things like this horrible tragedy in Louisiana and Mississippi

and along the Gulf coast and for that matter in Florida where

these hurricanes crisscrossed before they made landfall over in

other parts of the Gulf coast.

And we do need to reinvest as a nation in many of the supplies

and commodities that make certain that our military can sustain
18

itself. But irrespective of that, I have a lot of confidence about our

ability on the ground, in the Republic of Korea.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. For the record, I would like that number in

whatever manner you choose to present it.

General BELL. Sir, I will submit that to you.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral FALLON. Mr. Taylor, could I offer a couple of comments?

Mr. TAYLOR. If the chairman permits it.

Mr. HEFLEY. Surely. Go ahead.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, sir.

When I went into this job about a year ago, one of the first

things that I decided to go take a real hard look at was exactly this

issue of what kind of shape are we in to be able to execute our contingency plans, because my intuitive feeling for probably the same

reasons that motivated your comments were that we had a pretty

significant draw on equipment worldwide to support the effort in

Iraq and Afghanistan.

And what I discovered was in fact this was true, that particularly for our rolling stock and related equipment there had been a

significant pull. And the thing we discussed earlier, some of this

was due to lack of availability. The equipment was actually there

but not in the right maintenance condition. It needed to get fixed,

and that has been done.

The other significant factor is regarding rolling stock. A lot of

this equipment is planned to be replaced with upgraded equipment.

This has to be funded. This is in the Army budget, the Marine

Corps budget. I have seen the documents for this year, next year

and the year after. It is going to be the ability to actually fill out

those stocks is going to be contingent upon continued funding to do

that.

I would like to address specifically one other area and that is ammunition. My command, the Pacific Command, put a significant demand signal on the ammunition folks to provide precision strike

munitions in the last couple of years with the advent of Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and (JSAT) weapons, which came

into the inventory a few years ago.

And so our requirements, if you would, change to larger numbers

of these equipment. We do not have all of those weapons in hand.

We have other weapons that could be used for the purposes that

would be required. But the build programs, they are already funded, I believe will provide adequate supplies of those precision weapons over the next couple of years. The stocks are building quite

rapidly, and I feel pretty comfortable there.

It is my responsibility as Pacific Commander to provide the support to sustain General Bell should he be in a warfight. I think the

points that he mentioned about the preponderance of the ground

effort being in the hands of the South Koreans, the ROK, is very

significant.

The other point I would make is that the Pacific area is primarily an air and maritime theater, and, as such, our air and

naval forces have not been nearly as heavily engaged certainly in

Iraq and Afghanistan as the Army and Marine Corps. We would
19

expect to bring those capabilities to bear; that is the plan should

there be a contingency in Korea.

I guess the other point would be that as we look to the future,

as the potential for plans might be changed, we will still make sure

that we can adequately support and sustain our forces.

You made the comment about the common things, things that

people use everyday—MREs, water and generators. I am going to

tell you that those specific items were exactly what was requested

several weeks ago by our JTF Commander in the Philippines to try

to respond to the humanitarian disaster.

And I will tell you that we had those supplies on hand. In fact,

as I reviewed the bidding here last week, I went through the Philippines to see how and to congratulate our folks for a great job. In

fact, they were back flowing exactly those commodities. So the fact

that we were able to respond on very, very short notice, within 36

hours, to get that exact material on the ground from existing stocks

in the western Pacific, I think, is a pretty good indicator that we

are in reasonable shape.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, Chairman Hunter, in his opening remarks, commented

about China has announced intentions to increase military spending, and we know that that is just kind of the tip of the iceberg,

that what they are actually spending is several times greater than

that.

What do you believe is the ultimate goal of their apparent attempt to build up a blue water navy? They do not need that for

Taiwan. What is your assessment of their attempts to increase and

build up their navy.

Admiral FALLON. Congressman Forbes, I do not know what their

intentions are. That is the big question that we wish our intelligence system would provide for us, and that is clearly the most

difficult thing to determine. It seems to me that the buildup of capabilities by the Chinese is, first and foremost, aimed at trying to

facilitate their capability to move should they feel the need to do

that. Against Taiwan.

And that presents Pacific Command particularly with a significant challenge, because at the same time that we want to encourage China to engage in a meaningful dialogue and to act in a manner that other nations in the Pacific region act on a daily basis. We

also are very mindful of the fact that we are committed to defend

Taiwan should they be attacked.

And so what I do with this is I look at the specific hardware acquisitions that are visible to us, that the PRC is investing in things

that would be helpful to have them achieve this objective should

they feel inclined of do it.

Hand in glove with that is the knowledge, I am sure, that we are

committed to help Taiwan. And so the ability for them to counter

our capabilities to attempt to neutralize our advantage in these

areas in which we would respond also seems to be an objective of

these purchases.
20

My sense is that this is generally aimed at the immediately vicinity of China and trying to build up their numbers and ability to

deal with the Taiwan challenge and with our potential response to

that.

Mr. FORBES. And I know that you mentioned that their capabilities were small compared to our capabilities still there, but have

you made any assessment of the lethality that they would be able

to bring to bear on the civilian population of the United States if,

heaven forbid, we were to have a conflict of some sort with China?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. You are certainly aware that the Chinese possess nuclear weapons, and they have the means to deliver

those weapons by long range. That said, I do not see any indications whatsoever that their intent is to use those against the

United States. My sense is that the overwhelming indicators are

that their acquisitions are intended to enable them to respond regionally to their perception of need in that area and not aimed at

the U.S.

Mr. FORBES. Last question I have is, as we did the recent Committee Defense Review (CDR), we heard all of our commanders say

that both today and tomorrow there will be an increasing need to

marshal the resources under the control of all of our agencies and

not just traditional platforms and weapons systems. What do you

see as the shortcomings that we currently have and being able to

marshal all those resources? And do you have any suggestions for

us to how we can do a better job in doing that in the future?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. It is certainly a key item and I believe

essential to success. If I could focus on the development of the

emerging nations in the Asia Pacific region.

It is very clear that military can play a substantial role in providing the security backdrop to enable countries to deal with their

challenges. But many of the skill sets that are necessary for these

countries to be able to take care of the needs and their own within

their own borders and to be able to provide for their own security

rests with other agencies. And so we try to work very carefully.

I will tell you that in the Asia-Pacific area, the relationship we

have with our ambassadors and the embassy staffs, and Department of State is superb. Hardly a day goes by that I am not in a

dialogue with one or more of our ambassadors on some number of

issues. We cooperate very closely.

And our ambassadors, of course, are the folks who coordinate the

activities of other agencies of our government into activities within

those countries. So of course there are going to be challenges because people are used to doing things within their own particular

organizations. We have challenge among ourselves. But I will tell

you that we actively engage in outreach. This past fall, the Department of State sponsored a chief submission conference in Hawaii

in which we participated very actively, discussed a wide range of

issues exactly related to these kinds of challenges.

I will tell you that in our tsunami response a year ago, a lot of

the levers of capability that were brought to bear were not military.

We facilitated the presence and sustainability of many of these resources, but many of the things that were brought to bear were

from other agencies, and I think this went very well. We did a hot

wash up and then a detailed lessons learned. We have blueprints
21

should we need to do this things in the future. And I think these

kinds of activities have been very useful for us in getting a better

understanding and actually having real solutions in hand to be

able to make these things work.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, to continue the discussion about China, in your written

statement you talk about the—I believe you describe it as the advisability of having increases military-to-military relations with

China. Would you talk about that a little bit more, both from your

perspective about what it is that you need to do but also from

Congress’s perspective? Do you have everything that you need from

us in terms of furthering military-to-military contacts?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir, be happy to talk to that. A little historical review here. Following the collision between the Navy EP–

3 and the Chinese F–8 fighter in 2001, for all practical purposes,

mil-to-mil engagement ceased with the PRC. Over the past year,

we have been working to reestablish more engagements and closer

ties through a whole range of endeavors.

Why? Because in the absence of some dialogue, I think we are

likely to pursue parallel paths that are not going to be in the best

interests of this nation. We need to understand what the Chinese

are thinking. We need to understand and have an appreciation of

their military leaders and the role that they envision playing in

their own policies and in the engagement with the rest of the

world.

As I travel through the region, there is not a stop that I make

that I do not run into or have just come behind or coming after me

Chinese representatives. They are engaged at every one of these

countries in a major way, and it is in our interest to make sure

that we stay engaged too.

The idea that I have seen demonstrated in other parts of the

world, for instance, I spent a fair amount of time working with the

NATO alliance in Europe. One of the major benefits of that engagement with our allies in that alliance is the fact that people share

information with one another. Other people get a chance to sit and

look and see what their neighbors or fellow alliance members are

actually doing.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, where is the obstacle in the development of

mil-to-mil relations with China? Well, part of our policy decision by

our government that has now been changed. ‘‘The secretary of defense has supported my request to expand this engagement,’’ and

that is under way. There is one legislative restriction right now

that is tied up in the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act that

specifically prohibits certain activities that are more operationally

oriented with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). I have asked

by members of the Senate my opinion of what we ought to do with

that, and I am frankly considering just how to respond to that.

Would you provide that information to us in written form——

Admiral FALLON. Sure. Yes, sir.
22

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. When you reach those conclusions, if

you could get that to my office and the other offices here.

Admiral FALLON. Will do, sir. Be happy to take it for the record.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Dr. SNYDER. In terms of your broader view of a look at China,

it has seemed like over the last decade, of course they have had

tremendous economic expansion, that has contributed, it appears,

to stability in the area. But then they also benefit, they still have

hundreds of millions of people they are trying to lift out of poverty

and get more stability in their economic development. But they still

would benefit from the stability that comes from their economic development, from the U.S. presence.

How strong do you see the partnership is between our country

and the People’s Republic of China when it comes to contributing

to the stability in the region?

Admiral FALLON. It is really an interesting situation. We have

increasing economic, commercial ties in just about every sector of

our national engagement, except the military. And this is disconcerting to me because I do not know how you can do all these

other things and then have nothing going on in the mil-to-mil business.

But it is a challenge, because, fundamentally, this is a communist country. At the end of the day, people in that nation do not

have the freedom to do anything they care to. It is an interesting

evolution of communism that they have allowed people to have

quite a bit of initiative in the economic area. But as you mentioned,

there is a huge difference in that country between what goes on in

the eastern one-third and the rest of the nation.

One point three billion people is a lot of folks, and from every

indication that I see, they are very, very concerned about their ability to sustain economic growth in that country with these large

numbers of people to feed and jobs to find. And there is not a day

that goes by now that we do not see activity going on throughout

that country that indicates that people are pretty restless.

And so as I look at the potential possibilities of activities there,

it seems to me that their focus on internal security has probably

got to be a paramount concern. It give us some opportunities, because the rest of the nations in the Asia Pacific area, in every engagement that I have with them, reaffirm the enduring presence

of the U.S. military as the primary instrument, historically and

continuing today for stability.

The other side of the coin is that China has afforded every nation

in Asia phenomenal economic growth in the last several years. If

you look at the data, the amount of goods that are traded to China

for China’s domestic market are very substantial. Raw materials

coming from most of the nations around the periphery are fueling

their economic recoveries from the last nineties crash.

So the countries in the area really value our presence and certainly want us to continue. They also highly value the economic

benefits of an emerging China, and they want to have it both ways,

understandably.

So the role that China plays is immense, but I think it is fragile

in some ways because it is dependent upon their abilities to sustain
23

security internally. All the more reason, it seems to me, that they

ought to be very interested in engaging with us so that we have

a better understanding of what both of us are about in this region.

It is very complex, and the more that we can understand the situation, the better off I think we are going to be.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. And assuming that we can get your recommendations or even a menu of potential options on dealing with

that legislative language, the better off we will be as we head into

this expedited year under the defense bill.

Thank you, both.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral, General, thank you very much for being here.

I have had the great privilege and opportunity to visit with your

personnel in Hawaii and Korea. I have also had the opportunity to

visit Guam. Again, it is just so impressive to see the young people

serving our country; so proud as a veteran myself, a member of this

committee, a parent with three sons serving the military.

And, General, I am very pleased, the fourth son has applied for

an Army ROTC scholarship.

But the leadership we have, I have never seen it better, and so

I want to thank you for what you are doing. In Guam, I was very

pleased, what a team they have with Congresswoman Madeleine

Bordallo, Governor Felix Camacho. They are very effective in pointing out the strategic location of Guam, the warm hospitality, the

extraordinary infrastructure in place which could accommodate additional troops, ships. And then the long service and loyalty of the

people of Guam. They are pride of being Americans where America’s day begins. So where you serve is extraordinary.

Additionally, I appreciate so much what you have done for our

new allies. Who would ever think that Mongolia now is a strong

ally of the United States, an active participant with the United

States in war on terrorism with troops serving in Iraq, in Afghanistan?

And as the former co-chair of the India caucus, and how far we

have come, and I would like for you to point this out or give an

example about the new relationship we have with the Republic of

India, the world’s largest democracy? But this is all new, just within the last two years. There have been joint military exercises.

Could you tell us about these joint military exercises?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir; I would be happy to. The emerging relationship with India is certainly a bright spot for a host of reasons. It is a huge country as well, over one billion people. And it

is a country that has advanced technology, that has tremendous

impact in the economic and commercial world in this country and

the rest of the region, certainly.

It also present some challenges, because there are a lot of folks

that have needs in that country as well. And because of their growing economy, they are also putting huge demands on energy resources throughout the region and the world.

But the potential for good relations with that country and for

continued growth and interaction are very high. In this past year,

we have seen substantial progress in our military engagement. We
24

see high interest from the Indians in doing things with us at just

about every level. Naval and air have been the majority of the exercises, but we actually had some Army troops in that country, in

the foothills of the Himalayas just a month ago doing an exercise

at company level, and we are going to expand that to higher next

year.

So the potential is really good, and it is really important, because

India is not only a huge number of people, a large country but crucial role. And if you look around the periphery of India, as I do,

I see significant instability that they can be helpful in quelling.

The trends in Kashmir, a long-standing major area of friction,

the trends in that area have been very good in the last several

months, and I think that that is, in no small measure, due to the

increased confidence that the leaders of India, as well as Pakistan,

feel in having the U.S. significantly engage with both countries.

They know that we care about them and we are there to stay, and

we are really going to continue to push a good relationship.

And I have a strong feeling that that confidence is starting to

spread and that they feel more comfortable in their direct engagement with one other, and we have seen a whole host of issues. But

not without challenge. There are extremists that are, unfortunately, alive and still perpetrating their horrible acts in both nations. But in other areas around India there is instability in Nepal,

in Sri Lanka, in Bangladesh, and we would certainly like to partner with India to help in aiding and abetting the return to stability

and security in each of these areas.

So I think it is critically important for us. We are going to continue to work our engagement with India. I have been there. I had

a chance to meet with the leadership, and we are pursing a number of specific tasks to facilitate our further engagement with that

country.

Thank you, sir.

General BELL. Sir, I could just give you an anecdotal perspective

of the amount of effort that our Korean ally has made over the

years and specifically today with respect to helping the United

States in these missions that we are pursuing around the world.

I know you know that they were staunch allies with us during

Vietnam, Desert Storm and that they are out there in Operation

Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) right

now and certainly tsunami relief, et cetera.

When the earthquake happened in Pakistan, I was sitting in

Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan visiting my soldiers from Europe—

I was commanding our Army in Europe at the time—and a NATO

headquarters. But with me I had invited the allied and partnering

nations to have breakfast with me, and so sitting next to me was

a Republic of Korea lieutenant colonel. And as the floor began to

shake and the place was waving around, I looked at this and I said,

‘‘What is that?’’ He said, ‘‘I do not know but we are in this together.’’ I said, ‘‘Wow, I hope that the roof does not fall in.’’ I mean,

we were a long, way away from Pakistan, about 500 miles from

where this things happened.

I mean, so there they are, serving in the midst of our staff integrated on the staff with U.S. officers, both there at Bagram and another place in Afghanistan.
25

When I was given responsibility for training the next what we

call Multinational Iraq Headquarters, which was going to be surrounding the Fifth U.S. Corps stationed in Heidelberg, Germany

just now. I put out a call for all the allies to join us at the seat

of a tank training from the Cold War, Grafenwoehr, where we have

a modern simulation training facility where we could simulate a

wreck very effectively.

And who showed up en mass, the Koreans. They brought their

people, they brought their equipment, because they have a major

effort in northern Iraq. And they exercised with us for a month and

were a significant part of the operation there in this Cold War

place called Grafenwoehr, Germany.

The world is not perfect, but our allies that we have made over

the years are hanging in there with us, they are contributing. They

are on a team, and I think that sometimes that gets lost in the

shuffle, and I wanted to share that with you, sir.

Thank you.

Mr. WILSON. And thank you very much.

And as I conclude, indeed, I appreciate the contributions of

Japan, and I have been in Afghanistan where I saw the joint U.S.-

Korean provincial reconstruction teams and the progress that they

are making improving the lives of the people of Afghanistan, tiny

little projects that are enhancing the safety and health and security of the people of Afghanistan, which, ultimately, helps the families of Korea and the United States.

Thank you.

Mr. HEFLEY. We have one vote. Yes, I think we just have one

vote, and we are going to try to work through this for the convenience of our witnesses. So if any of you that are down the line a

little bit want to run and vote and come back, Mr. Hunter is doing

that, that would be good.

And we will go now to Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

Admiral Fallon and General Bell, thank you for your service and

for being here today.

I appreciate your discussion about the relationship with China

and the military leadership there, because I think that if there is

something in the way of that that we can try and work with, I

would certainly appreciate that. You made a clear point of the fact

that that is one area in which there should be and there can be

improvement.

I wanted to just look at the area as a whole, and you mentioned

how dynamic it is, how challenging it is, and a number of the positive changes that have occurred in some of them as recently as last

week. But I also wanted you to talk about how that can have an

effect on increasing tension in the region, and just citing a few

issues, the agreement with India, the relationship that that might

have to the balance of power, the perception of balance in power

between China and India.

You mentioned the ballistic missile defense exercises with Japan.

Does that have an impact on final Japanese relationships that affect China even in the Five-Party Talks there? How do we assess

the extent to which we are increasing at times tensions or reducing

them, and what is your general feeling, particularly on those two?
26

Admiral FALLON. Yes, ma’am. I think regarding India, the feeling

would be generally one of relief from the nations in the region that

we are actually soliciting a very good relationship with that country. Because India casts a very significant influence on other countries in South Asia, and I think that there is little doubt that people feel when others are in regular dialogue that it is a lot better

than nothing happening and lack of engagement.

Of course, there are going to be some concerns, because, at the

end of the day, we are never certain of what all the intentions are.

But I believe that a good indicator would be the reaction from Pakistan to this, which would probably be the most obvious historic

challenge in that region.

And I believe that Pakistan recognizes that we have made a significant attempt to change an historic tilt to one that is more reasonably balanced. And the leadership of Pakistan has high confidence that we are committed to their continued security and development and are going to work with them in a multitude of efforts. At the same time, we are going to undertake this kind of an

effort with India. So I think the overall perception is very positive.

Regarding Japan, there, of course, is an interesting dynamic. In

Northeast Asia, there are historic entities that go back for many

years, certainly to World War II and even beyond that. And there

is enduring mistrust, I am not going to beat around the bush, between every one of these countries. Japan feeling the need, in the

wake, particularly of North Korea’s saber-rattling in the last couple

of years, their missile activity, I think felt a strong need to take

what steps it felt prudent in securing its own defense.

They recognized the fact that we have an emerging ballistic missile defense capability, and they have reached out very strongly to

us to try to partner with us to acquire and to share information,

knowledge and systems that might be useful to them.

This is also beneficial to us, because the potential to have, for example, high resolution radar that we are currently negotiating the

installation of in western Japan not only serves to provide for defensive awareness for the Japanese, but it provides a significant

link in our system to alert us to the potential that missiles might

be coming from somewhere to the west of that area and headed

maybe beyond Japan. So there is mutual benefit there.

Clearly, the U.S. is the one country that maintains relationship

with virtually every—with, no doubt, every country in the region.

And our ability to maintain good communication with each of these

countries I think contributes to the overall stability.

I will tell you right upfront that one of my challenges that I recognize in the are is that most of the countries are very interested

in having bilateral relationships with us. We are even more interested in expanding those relationships to multilateral so that countries feel comfortable working not only with us but with some of

their neighbors. And that is one of our enduring challenges that we

continue to work.

Thank you.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. I appreciate that. Appreciate your adjusting the Six-Party Talks to five. Thank you.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mrs. Drake.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
27

Admiral Fallon, General Bell, thank you for being here with us

today.

Admiral Fallon, I would just like to ask you quickly, it is my understanding that Pacific Command is testing a new targeting system called Web-Enabled Execution Management Capability

(WEMIC). Previously, this system was called Joint Defense Operations Center (JDOC), and my information was very much as a

warfighter. Like JDOC, I have been told by the Air Force it needed

to be converted over to this Web-enabled version called, WEMIC.

So I wonder if you have been using it long enough, do you have

information, do you know how it is being accepted by the

warfighter? And, most importantly, do we feel it has been worth

the cost and the effort to make the changeover?

Admiral FALLON. Ms. Drake, I would like to take that one for the

record. I am aware of the system, and I do not want to wing the

detailed response to you. So if I could, I will get back to you with

it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 130.]

Mrs. DRAKE. Okay. I would appreciate that.

Thank you.

Mr. HEFLEY. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And good morning, Admiral Fallon, a good friend of Guam’s, we

deal with you quite often, and of course General Bell.

I would like to personally thank you, Admiral, for all of the great

investments that PACOM is making to Guam. It is very clear that

you and your command recognize the tremendous value that Guam

has for U.S. national security and that Guam is a great place for

American service members and their families to live.

And, also, please accept my thanks to the work that is being undertaken by your deputy commander, Lieutenant General Dan

Leaf, and the Joint Guam Development Group. We are really working very hard to make Guam an even better duty station by improving our local infrastructure.

And before I go into my questions, Admiral, I do have three

guests, Mr. Chairman, from the Guam National Guard that I

would like to introduce: Colonel Santo Tomas, Chief Frank Pablo

and Master Sergeant Jeff Holden.

[Applause.]

Thank you very much. We are indeed very proud of our national

guardsmen and reservists. I think we have more per capita than

any other state in the Nation serving, and they are serving in all

parts of the world today.

I am particularly interested—Admiral, this question is for you—

in the recent decisions that have been made as to moving Atlantic

fleet submarines to the Pacific. Guam is the home port to two and

soon three submarines and has the capacity to host as many as

nine.

The submarines on Guam, because of their strategic location, are

taking a large share of the operational mission days in the Pacific,

and can you explain to me how the home port decisions for these

transfers were made and the reasoning behind them.
28

And, also, Admiral, you know better than I about the pace of

Chinese submarines procurement and operations, and I am concerned that we are not building enough Virginia class submarines,

that are neglecting anti-submarine warfare assets and that we are

quickly being outpaced by our Chinese counterparts.

The Virginia class submarines are especially valuable in the Pacific where we have multiple, irregular warfare threats along with

large-scale conventional military threats, and the Virginia class

submarines have the flexibility to handle these type of missions.

Guam is vulnerable to stealth attacks from submarines, so I would

like you to, if you can, address your concerns with submarine and

anti-submarine warfare in the Pacific.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, ma’am. Thank you.

First, the rationale for home porting submarines in Guam, the

priority issue in that decision was the ability to be on station in

the western Pacific more quickly, more responsibly than if they

were based further back in Pearl Harbor or on the west coast of

the U.S. And so the advantage of the potential for more operationally available days is the significant driver.

The Navy is gathering lessons from the forward deployment of

these subs, three, now two and, as you indicated, another one to

fill back in. We are assessing the performance of these ships. The

feedback that I have gotten directly is that we are very happy with

the operational responsiveness and what we have been able to get.

We need to further understand the other implications of having

these boats forward deployed regarding maintenance and the distance from maintenance facilities, the business of having our families moved out there and the capability of Guam to sustain that additional number of people and to provide the necessary facilities for

those folks.

So I think we have got a positive body of feedback from our experience to date. The Navy, I know, is going to look at this and then

that will be a factor in deciding what to do with the additional

boats that we would expect to move into the Pacific from the Atlantic.

I think, in general, that is reflective of the reality that the Pacific

region is much larger and, frankly, we have had an historic split

that was based pretty much just on numbers of we will split them

in half and put one in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. And I

think this more accurately reflects the challenges of today.

Regarding the Virginia class subs, I think the Navy is doing their

darndest to try to balance a lot of priorities. Little doubt we would

love to be able to up the build rate of those boats to be more efficient in that particular line, but I am also aware that the Navy has

got other challenges they are trying to meet as well. And I am confident that Admiral Mullen and his team will be working that one

hard to come up with the best solution.

Thank you, ma’am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral.

And, General, if you want to add to any of this, please feel free

to do so.

General BELL. I would only offer that, one, I agree, obviously,

with everything that Admiral Fallon said. Where I serve in Korea

the North Koreans have a very significant special operating force
29

capability, upwards of 100,000. Their plan is to insert those by air

and/or sea, and, principally, that sea methodology is small submarines. So there is an anti-submarine coastal submarine issue

there that the Republic of Korea is addressing effectively.

It is interesting, just recently they assumed from the United

States that countersoft infiltration missions, again, one of these indicators of a mission that the Republic of Korea has taken aboard.

But, nonetheless, our ability to control the seas and to prevent infiltration is a function of a combined naval effort led by the United

States, in my view, and our capabilities in the Pacific are very important to me in that regard.

Thank you.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.

Another question, Admiral, and this is one of my favorite questions, I know that the discussions are ongoing currently as to when

and where an additional carrier will come to the Pacific. And

Guam, as you know, is watching closely. I would like to mention

here that the military is very welcome on Guam. Traditionally, we

are a military island, but I continue to hear of increased numbers

and durations of port calls by U.S. carriers on Guam.

So can you explain how Guam may be used to increase the availability of carrier assets in the Pacific by having longer duration

port calls on the island?

Admiral FALLON. Let me, if I could, ma’am, go back to Admiral

Mullen recently publicly committed to making every attempt to

maintain a six-carrier presence in the Pacific, and I applaud that.

These are very valuable assets and used in a multitude of tasks.

My priority for the western Pacific regarding Guam would be to

try to develop more of a capacity to sustain operations in the western Pacific area. So when I recently visited Guam and went down

to look at the facilities in the port area, there is certainly an ability

to take a ship and bring into the harbor and to anchor it there.

And I am sure the crew would enjoy some time down now, some

liberty time in Tumon Bay and other parts of the island. But it

seems to me that there is not a very extensive capability right now

to sustain a forward presence in the area.

So we are looking at that as part of the task I have given General Leaf to examine the infrastructure on Guam so that we fully

understand what is there. And as we contemplate a range of potential options to make more use of this U.S. territory here, that is

certainly going to be one of the things that is high on the priority

list. So we will keep you posted and if there is an opportunity for

the Fleet Commander to cycle more ships in there for port visits,

I am sure he will take advantage of it.

Thank you, ma’am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.

I have one last question, Mr. Chairman. I guess it is fortunate

I am one member of this committee that cannot vote on the floor,

so I can sustain this time period here.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. You know, it is very instructive to listen to the gentlelady and her expertise in that great area of the

Pacific, so you go right ahead.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very

much.
30

I am working currently with this committee to increase the vehicle authorization to two for service members assigned to, well, any

of the European locations, I guess, Guam, Hawaii. I know this is

very important to our serving families, especially working spouses.

And I would be pleased if either yourself or the General, the both

of you, could comment on how service members in PACOM’s area

of responsibility would feel about such an increased authorization.

I know that many of my constituents, service families, have

asked me about it, and I do know that I think it was explained earlier that you do have the used cars that go from one family to another, but there is also when they are assigned overseas sometimes

families have to sell a second car and many times they are losing

on a deal such as that when the time for deployment is quick.

So do you have any comments on a two-vehicle authorization?

Admiral FALLON. General Bell, you want to try that for Korea

and then I will back you up here?

General BELL. I will talk about Korea and then I will talk about

in general, because I have lived this issue for some years.

First, in Korea, I do not think it is a requirement. We are very

close in there. There are not large numbers of accompanied family

members. We do have some and we are trying to increase it. Right

now, in Korea, and, again, I have been there a short while, I do

not see the requirement as being as interesting as I saw in Europe

where I raised this issue frequently.

The spouses were a fully accompanied force over there. There

were jobs for spouses to have. They needed transportation. This is

2006; it is not 1885. They needed a conveyance. They would almost

always have to buy their own and sell one in the states on the way

over, so there was a money loss here, it is quite clear.

And, you know, I understand the services and the Office of the

Secretary of Defense (OSD) have lots of priorities and we respect

that, and I would not get into service matters here right now, but

the issue of authorizing two vehicles per family is a legitimate

issue for our services, it should be prioritized against our other requirements, it ought to be reviewed carefully, and I think it has

merit.

Thank you.

Admiral FALLON. I will confess that I had not paid any attention

to this, was not even aware of the issue until I moved to Hawaii

last year, whereupon my wife informed me that, ‘‘Oh, by the way,

I would be paying for that second car that we felt we were going

to move out there.’’

So now I have some awareness. I will tell you, though, that it

is really a mixed bag because on Oahu, for example, Mayor

Hannemann probably would be very happy if I helped to not introduce too many more vehicles on that island because it is, frankly,

choking in traffic. You cannot move on the H1 trying to get east

to west on the island. And in fact they are trying hard to develop

a mass transit system to try and alleviate the problem.

So I recognize that it is an issue with some families, and I guess

that it would be nice to scratch every itch and to have every one

of these things resolved so that nobody had anything out of pocket,

but it also, I think, serves another purpose right now, certainly in

Hawaii, and that is to have people think really a little longer and
31

harder about the actual necessity. And I will tell you, in my own

case, if I had to do this again, I would not have brought the second

car, but we may not be representative of all the families there.

I got the point. In fact, I do not know that we have actually done

any significant survey work to find out what the situation is.

Guam, because of the low density, might be an area that would be

worth looking at it.

I will take a look at it and give you some feedback, ma’am.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 131.]

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Admiral and General.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

I thank the gentlelady.

And Admiral Fallon and General Bell, I really apologize because

I have had to break away here, and I, unfortunately, have got to

break away again, and the very able Mr. Schwarz is going to take

over the Chair here.

But let me, since I did not ask a question upfront, let me just

ask a couple of questions before I go.

General Bell, we have got substantial MILCON costs that will

emanate from the relocation, which I think is a wise thing, this redeployment, getting out from underneath that North Korean artillery fan is not a bad idea, especially with the drawdown in forces.

But we are going to have a MILCON price tag attached to that.

And my request is to do a real heavy duty scrub on that price

tag, on that MILCON price tag. We used to be in the business of

building houses, and you can build a house for 300 square feet or

you can build one for 80, and they both pass code. And I know that

the host country eagerly awaits those construction contracts, but

we have got lots of money being spent on ammo right now and

readiness and other things that are necessary for the warfighter.

So I would hope that you could scrub that heavily.

Second, the Korean military up to some 21 divisions, I understand. Is it your take that they have a fairly strong readiness number on their divisions? And is 21 roughly accurate?

General BELL. Thank you, sir. Let me first address the MILCON.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

General BELL. I have got your message, and agree with it totally.

I want to make sure that I am comfortable. I can tell you, I reviewed the 2007 request down to the last dollar. It is appropriate,

it makes sense, it is in the right place, and it is something that we

ought to fund, in my view.

The Republic of Korea is spending about $4 billion moving us

south. They have spent already cash in the ground, $1.8 billion. I

mean, this is phenomenal, in my view. Burden sharing, however

you measure it every year in consumables, is $500 million to $1.2

billion.

There are lots of ways to slice this thing, but most of our construction, the vast majority of construction, for the move, Mr.

Chairman, is being funded by the Republic of Korea (ROK) at their

expense, because they are the ones that fundamentally asked us to

move out of downtown Seoul to the south.
32

Now, where they did not ask us to move but we want to move,

and we have agreed to share a portion of that burden, so I think

we are doing well by the American taxpayer. I accept, nonetheless,

the need to continue to scrub hard and to make sure that I do not

let anything get in here that is not absolutely necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. You know, just in terms of configuration, things

that are not necessarily security dominated but are things that

with respect to the location of personnel and the amenities, you

might look at finding American building corporation that has got—

and you might ask them for advice to take a look at the footprint

and the efficiency of the construction operation and see if they have

got any ideas in terms of giving you the most bang for the buck,

not cheap stuff but a configuration that best lends itself to efficient

and inexpensive construction. Because we are going to be stretching dollars this year, you understand? I know you know that better

than anybody.

Last question is that we face, and we will face—now, if you give

us this take on the South Korean military, 21 divisions; is that

roughly accurate?

General BELL. Mr. Chairman, I need to get back to you on the

number of divisions.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 129.]

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

General BELL. Because they have, like we in the active component and reserve component, they have got a large reserve force.

Their army is 580,000 active, larger than our Army active, and

very large reserve component. They have got three field armies.

And I have gone and looked at all these, but I will tell you, sir,

I cannot give you a division count at this moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. But is your take on the South Korean

army that it is ready to stop a move from the North?

General BELL. Absolutely. They are spending the money they

need. Two point eight percent of a very healthy GDP goes to their

military. That is higher than any of our European allies, for example, substantially higher.

The CHAIRMAN. How much is the GDP?

General BELL. Two point eight percent. They are spending their

military budget. It sounds small but——

The CHAIRMAN. It does.

General BELL. But, sir, it is larger than Great Britain, for example, who spends about, I think, 2.6 of their GDP.

The CHAIRMAN. Except Great Britain does not have a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

General BELL. No, sir, they do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

General BELL. But I will tell you that I have looked at this force.

They increase spending every year, real dollars this past year.

They had a 6.7 percent increase. Their goal is about 9 percent a

year increase through 2020. They are putting real increases. As we

transform our mission and they are required to spend more money

on defense, to date, for the last 3 years they have been doing that

in real terms.
33

So I think it is a positive story, and I will keep the committee

posted on where they stand, but I am satisfied right now that they

are committing and they are spending more money every year in

real terms.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Okay. Thank you.

And, gentlemen, I will make an extra point to follow up personally, because I really apologize for not being able to be here during

this full hearing. But we will do that. And Mr. Schwarz will take

over the chair, and it is his turn to ask some questions.

Thank you for your service to America and all the great people

who serve with you. They are carrying out the most important mission possible and that is our security, and we appreciate it.

Thank you, and I will make a point to get with you as soon as

we get these other things taken care of.

Dr. SCHWARZ [presiding]. We will go to the gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am glad that Ms. Bordallo kind of opened the way for me to

bring up the question, Admiral, with regard to Pearl Harbor and

this carrier. The question really is not about the carrier. I think

you are well aware of my position that this is a strategic decision

and that I regret very much and disassociate myself from a lot of

commentary about this carrier decision in terms of economic benefits, real or imagined, and all those kinds of things. You are aware

of my views on that.

But the difficulty here, because the Quadrennial Review and this

decision-making process has been so lengthy, the difficulty is, is

that it has thrown completely off—it has thrown off completely,

rather, our ability to make a decision on, among other things, transit, which, as you know, we have to make over the next nine

months. In fact, the final decision has to be made as to whether

to go ahead with rail transit, particularly the routing. The council

has to vote on a preferred alternative. I have had to do this myself

in the past, so I know what pressure is on that and the necessity

of it.

This has to do with the base closing procedure at Kalaeloa, Barber’s Point area. You are probably also aware I have always voted

against this Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) thing because

I never believed it was going to be done or that it would not be

reneged on or reviewed or reconsidered and all the rest of it. And,

of course, that is exactly what seems to be happening here.

Now, I was very pleased last week to speak with the Secretary

of the Navy, Secretary Winter, and Admiral Mullen, who indicated

they would work with me on this. We have to have a decision

there. That land around the top of the base is for housing, and

where the route is going to go for mass transit we have to make

that decision and it is bordered on either side by Hawaiian homelands, parcels and this golf course and a couple of beaches. Now,

there is no way on earth that there is a strategic interest in keeping a golf course. It may add to the recreational inventory, if you

will, on Oahu, but it is an outrage to have that happen in the context of being serious about national security.

We have to have that housing, and that land has to come, regardless of what you do with the carrier. That land is not going to
34

be suitable for housing. You can maybe keep the air base for the

helicopters, I do not know, but that is what we have Fort Island

for.

So my question is, is regardless of what you are doing with a decision on the carrier, can’t we resolve this issue or when are we

going to be able to resolve this issue of getting this land turned

over so that we can get on with our decision-making on transit and

building housing?

Admiral FALLON. Congressman, that is really the Navy as opposed to PACOM, but I will be happy to get with them to see if

there is anything we can do.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay, fine. I will take it from there. But I

would very much appreciate it if you would put this on agenda, get

with the Navy and say, ‘‘Look, this has to be done.’’ And I think

you are well aware that when it comes to Fort Island, that is the

place to go for housing, and it also is imperative that we put more

housing in than is presently planned at Fort Island if you make

that decision, because the transit stations are also going to go

there. We have to make that decision.

We really, really, really need to have the housing side of this

taken off the board regardless of what you do with the carrier. And

if the carrier decision is made, I assure you there is plenty of opportunity and ample provision can be made for the necessary housing and logistics absent the Kalaeloa circumstances.

Admiral FALLON. Sir, I will do what I can. Thanks.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

The last question I have has to do with Guam and Okinawa. You

may be aware of my long-standing interest in this area, and I am

pleased to see that this administration has caught up with where

I think we needed to be ten years ago, but I have in front of me

the U.S.-Japan alliance transformation and realignment for the future agreement. The doc is called a security consultative committee

document from October of last year.

And without going into all the details of the acceleration of the

Futenma relocation and the rest of it, what bothered me here is the

consultation with local community leaders and officials in Okinawa

seems to me, at best, at bear minimum or non-existent, in putting

this together. And the information I have is there is still a lot of

consternation over the extension of the extended runway out into

the bay and all the rest of it.

So I would like to know how far have we moved, in practical

terms, toward implementing the Futenma relocation, in practical

terms, and then how far are we moving in the budget terms and

that to actually transferring the Marines to Guam, and how far

have we moved, in practical terms, and what are the budget implications for the joint use at Camp Hansen and the other promises

that were made with regard to relocation of forces on the island,

from the southern portion to the northern portion?

Admiral FALLON. Congressman, there are a lot of issues that are

tied up in this framework——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I know you cannot answer the whole thing in

three minutes.

Admiral FALLON. Well, I will tell you what is going on. As we sit

here this morning, a couple of hours out in Hawaii we will be re-
35

convening a large group of folks who are in their now third

iteration of trying to work through the details of these implementation plans. There are a host of issues that we needed to resolve just

on the U.S. side regarding detail of each phase of these moves.

There is a self-imposed deadline of the end of March the Secretary has put on this to try to tee up the way ahead in each of

these implementation plans.

So I know that there are lots of issues buzzing, there are a million pieces on the table, but we are working very hard to try and

get these things——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The decision made at the end of March, will

it manifest itself in——

Dr. SCHWARZ. The gentleman’s time has expired. We could do another round, but Mr. Simmons, Mr. Larsen, Mr. Marshall——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will follow up in writing, if you would.

Dr. SCHWARZ [continuing]. Need to ask their questions, as do I.

And I just happen to be up next.

Let’s talk about Indonesia for a second, if we may. Let’s talk

about the Malacca Strait, the Sundra Strait, the Bali Strait, the

Flores Strait, how open the channels of navigation are, what the

cooperation is with the Indonesian government, the Indonesian

navy, the Malaysian navy as well and what is going on in the

Spratlys and the Paracel Islands.

And I am just going to allow you to free associate on all those,

Admiral Fallon, if you do not mind, and tell me what is going on.

Are we getting port calls in places like Surabaya or Tanjung

Perak? What is the relationship with the most populous Muslim

country in the world right now that sits afoot all of these vital maritime channels?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir, Congressman Schwarz. I will tell you

that this is a pretty bright spot of optimism in the Pacific region.

I just came back from Indonesia last week and Malaysia. One of

the primary purposes of that visit down there was to, in addition

to meeting with the leadership of both countries, was to actually

get out and get eyes on several of these regions that have been historically challenging for us in terms of security.

First, regarding the Malacca Strait, a critically important waterway, half the world’s oil, more than a third of our U.S. trade comes

through that strait every month. It is critical not only to us but to

every country in the region, if not the world. But a lot of interest

in recent years on this particular body of water.

Last summer, I attended a meeting in Singapore with all of the

chiefs of defense from the region, including Secretary Rumsfeld

going out and one of the principal topics of this weekend’s meeting

was security in that strait. So I have been very interested in following up on it to see where we are.

I will tell you today that I feel much more confident that not only

is there renewed interest throughout the world in this area but

there is action being taken particularly by Indonesia, Malaysia and

Singapore, the principal neighboring states, Thailand also included,

to address the security concerns.

I actually went and looked at specific facilities that each in these

countries. I met with leadership in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur and
36

in Singapore. And then I went downrange to the actual strait itself

to look at what is really going on.

And I will tell that while Indonesia certainly would like to have

more capacity and one of the things I would certainly like the Congress to doing is to somehow increase the amount of funding that

is available for foreign military engagement with these countries.

If I could give you just one data point. This country spends about

two billion and some dollars on foreign military engagement

throughout the world. The entire Pacific region, 43 countries, half

the world’s area, gets less than one percent of that money. This

year, we have a grand total of $1 million that we have earmarked

to try to help Indonesia. The country is emerging from some challenging times. It has a vibrant new democracy. It is a country

where 76 percent of the population actually voted in their last national election, so a lot of trends are moving in the right direction.

They need some help. We have a lot of capacity to do that. I would

sure like to do what we can from this country.

But back to the specifics. They are committed to improving security in the strait. They are committed and have already started the

construction on a series of coastal radar sites, to give them better

visibility into their part of it. Singapore has already established

that capability and has it. Singapore has undertaken an initiative

to build a regional command and control center on the island to

which they have invited the U.S. to participate and other regional

countries.

Malaysia has substantially increased security there. They have

coastal radar sites already in operation. Malaysians have proposed

a joint surveillance program, they call Eyes in the Sky, just getting

under way now to figure out a way to provide materiel. We can

also, from the U.S. side, help them in this area that would increase

the security in the larger areas.

So there are a host of issues that are proceeding.

One of the things that I would be particularly encouraging is better cooperation between those countries. They are the people that

need to do it. They are not interested, by the way, in having us

come and do it; they want to do it themselves. I applaud that initiative. But they need to continue to be encouraged.

In other areas I also went over to the area that I am most concerned about for security in the form of terrorism, and that is the

area, the so-called Sulawesi, or Celebes Sea, southern Philippines,

northeastern Indonesia and eastern Malaysia, Kalimantan; as it is

known in those parts.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Borneo.

Admiral FALLON. I actually went to visit several sites in the area

to see what is going on. I was encouraged, particularly Indonesia

and Malaysia, a renewed sense of attention to the area. They know

that this is a transit route for bad guys, for the terrorists and their

supporters. They know that they are moving around and as the

heat gets on in one place, they try to scurry to another place. In

fact, they and we both call that string of islands that connect these

areas, ‘‘the rat lines,’’ for the local population, the two-legged variety. And so they have renewed emphasis on working this, and I feel

that we are making progress in the area.
37

So my overall assessment is positive. There is a lot of work to

be done. There are still a lot of bad actors that need to be taken

off the street in this area. And I think that as the rest of the countries in the world recognize the steps that have been taken by

these countries, it ought to encourage them—by the way, the issue

of piracy that has come up again and again in the area, particularly the Bangka Strait, far and away the majority of this stuff is

criminal activity by local characters that are out for their own benefit, as opposed to international terrorist operations.

I would also point out that the instances of piracy in this last

year of 2005 dramatically lower than the previous several years,

which had been an upward trend. So the data indicates, and my

observations indicate we are making progress in this area.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you very much for giving us that update on

what I think are, if not the most important, certainly some of the

top five or six most important sea lanes in the world. And as a

former assistant naval attache in Indonesia and Jakarta many

years ago, I thank you for your interest in that part of the world.

The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And that was in fact one

of my questions I had, but I do want to follow up quickly. This

might be an easy answer for you.

It seems to be this is in fact one of the most important places

in the world for us to consider, and yet I do not know that members of this committee as an organized group have visited that

area. We go to China and Korea, and Korea is obviously a place

we ought to go, but it seems to me that this is an area that we

ought to go as well.

So my question, again, the softball to start, is if we are able to

put something together to identify specific countries to put our own

eyes on the ground, is this something that Pacific Command

(PACOM) would help with, would welcome and would help with?

Admiral FALLON. We would welcome you to come and see, and

I think the Indonesian government would also welcome visitors.

When I was out there last week, Senator Feingold from Wisconsin

came by and we were able to join up and spend a day looking at

specific things in the country.

He remarked to me, shaking his head, that the Indonesians told

him he was only the second U.S. senator to visit in recent times

to that country. So I think there would be benefit in actually getting eyes on. It is a huge country.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

Admiral FALLON. Indonesia is broader across than the mainland

U.S., 230 million people, the majority of Muslims, far and away a

very moderate country. They are interested in negating the kind of

radical ideas that are so prevalent in other parts of the world. We

need to be, I think, taking advantage of this.

Mr. LARSEN. And you mentioned both in your written testimony

and your response to Mr. Schwarz’s question that perhaps one

thing we will get to focus on is the foreign military financing and

trying to direct dollars to this region a little more closely; is that

right?

Admiral FALLON. Absolutely right. I will give you a couple of examples. Last year when the tsunami hit in this region, the most
38

affected country was Indonesia. Their ability to respond to help

themselves was severely crippled by the inability to put their mobility assets into the sky, and those are American-made instruments, mostly C–130’s and helicopters. Did not have the spare

parts now. Part of this as a result of an embargo that we had

placed on those materials that have now been waived by the secretary of state.

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

Admiral FALLON. But there are a lot of things that could be done.

The Congress last year in direct language in the legislation that

applies here told me to direct those funds to maritime security, and

I am happy to do that. That is their first priority as well, and so

I think this will be some money very well spent.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. With regard to China, you have been quoted

in various U.S. papers as well as the regional papers over there

about military-to-military relations. Could you describe for the

committee an ideal military-to-military exchange program with

China?

Admiral FALLON. Well, what I would really like to see——

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

Admiral FALLON [continuing]. Is the kind of relationship we

enjoy with most every other country in the region, and that is one

where we can regularly interface, where if I have a need or desire,

feel the need to go visit that country, we can pretty readily make

arrangements to do that and it does not take months of negotiation

to come to a satisfactory arrangement, which is, unfortunately,

where we are with China today.

Part of that problem is bureaucratic and systemic with them.

They funnel every activity through one office in their Ministry of

Defense.

Mr. LARSEN. Right.

Admiral FALLON. But my idea of goodness would be where we exchange at multiple levels. And so we have pretty good insight into

what they are doing, what they are feeling. We understand their

people, we know who their leaders are. They know who we are.

There is confidence in an ability to engage.

I can pick up a telephone and call my counterparts in virtually

every other country, except Myanmar and North Korea, at the snap

of my fingers, and we can have some meaningful dialogue on whatever the issue. That is not possible today with China. And part of

this, a good piece of this is getting them to be less suspicious and

more open, and it is not going to happen overnight. We have just

got to keep working on them.

Very important. In the absence of knowledge, we are going to be

making assumptions, and most of those will probably end up being

wrong.

Mr. LARSEN. So I guess to rephrase what you just said, with regards to your ability to pick up the phone and make a call, China

is in the same category with Myanmar and North Korea.

Admiral FALLON. No. Technically, I can get through but to get

a meaningful engagement——

Mr. LARSEN. To get a meaningful engagement, yes.

Admiral FALLON [continuing]. It is a non-starter.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. It is a long slog to make that happen.
39

Admiral FALLON. The openness is not there. The willingness to

actually engage has yet to be seen.

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Quickly, my last few seconds, I will ask

the question for General Bell. Later this afternoon we have a hearing in the subcommittee on missile defense, and so I would like to

get your thoughts on the role that Patriot, THAAD, and Aegis

plays in your responsibility and why it is important and what, if

anything, needs to change or get fixed.

General BELL. Thank you. There are philosophically three kinds

of missiles we have to be able to defense against. One are the tactical short-range missiles that we have seen just in the last couple

of days more developmental activity. There are lots of fielded missiles in North Korea, the old scuds but they are effective. They

have got a bunch of them, we think about 600. They have got the

Nodong missiles which are longer range. These are fielded, we

think several hundred. They have a range of out to 1,300 miles.

They will go past Japan, et cetera, et cetera.

So the first thing you have got to do is defend against these tactical missiles. They affect you on the battlefield, and, as you know,

we have got a pretty darn good system to do that. We could always

use more but the Patriot and Aegis both provide the kind of coverage that is effective against these kind of tactical missiles.

The longer range, medium range, developmental programs that

North Korea has ongoing, while we have not seen a lot of activity

in that in recent days, we have seen a lot of activity in these shortrange missiles. We certainly have seen it in the past. We know

they have the technological wherewithal to continue to develop

these kinds of medium and even long-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).

The Taepo Dong II and III, as we call it, which were in development and presumably still are, could reach far beyond any requirement they have for defense, all the way to Alaska and even estimates are the Taepo Dong III could reach throughout the continental United States.

So as long as the North Koreans continue to pursue missile technology, have an active testing program, have a nuclear weapons

program that sits beside that, it is in our best interest that the

total layered array of air defense capability, a multiservice land

and sea and for that matter air across the full spectrum out to include intercontinental, in my view, is prudent. It makes sense for

America and our allies, and we ought to continue to develop and

invest.

Dr. SCHWARZ. The gentleman’s time is expired.

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Simmons.

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both, gentlemen, for your distinguished service

and for your appearance here today.

I will direct my questions to Admiral Fallon and start by saying

when you were at Villanova doing your Navy ROTC, I was down

the road at Haverford with the Quakers. We did not have ROTC

there. But we really enjoyed having the Villanova track team use

our field house. It gave me as a track guy the opportunity to run

with some of the national leaders when it came to track and cross

country. So it is good to have you here.
40

Admiral FALLON. Thanks. I used to be on that team too and followed them around. I was the anchor man there. I lived right

across the street from Haverford.

Mr. SIMMONS. I was lucky to keep up with David Patrick when

he was just doing an easy job.

You and I have exchanged letters regarding the President’s proposed package to sell submarines to Taiwan, and I appreciate your

comments last November that you are fully committed to obligation

to provide Taiwan with the necessary capabilities for its self-defense.

I recently returned back from Taiwan, and what I was hearing

from many of the officials that I met was confusion over the apparent U.S. insistence that they commit to a $12 billion package before

there would be any forward motion. And they felt that the Navy

was dragging its feet on that project. In fact, the Taipei Times of

just a day or so ago says, ‘‘The U.S. Navy has refused to negotiate

on the budget before the submarine is approved by the legislature.’’

A lot of foreign military sales involve the sale of a package that

has been designed and built and is understood, even though the

equipment packages may be tailored for the sale. But we are dealing with a unique situation here. We are dealing with the design

and construction of a diesel submarine that does not exist. It is not

in existence. And it is my understanding that the conceptual design

work and the detailed design work probably would cost around

$200 million.

And the question that I pose to you and that they posed to me is, why do we have to commit to $12 billion not knowing what it

is? Why don’t we commit to the design work, the detailed design

work for a couple of hundred million and that gives us a benchmark to know how and whether we should proceed? In other words,

if you are going to build a house, show me the plans. I will pay

for the plans, and once I see the plans, I will decide whether I go

forward with the house, whether it will be three stories or two stories, have bedrooms, et cetera.

Would you comment on that proposal, please?

Admiral FALLON. Congressman, I am not familiar at all with the

details of the construction business or the things that U.S. Navy—

the role the U.S. Navy might play in any of that. But I will tell

you I am a little bit surprised that the business of the $12 billion,

as you characterize it, it seems it is either an all or nothing thing.

I am all for making progress in this area, and I do not know that

there is any requirement or restriction, legislative or otherwise,

that would preclude the Taiwanese from taking a chunk out of that

elephant. And I have been trying since I have been in this job to

encourage them to do something to make some moves rather than

nothing, which is what has happened so far.

The way I see this, you have got me in bit of a box here, because

I am committed to defend this country in the event of any military

aggression should that occur from PRC, and yet the history is that

they have not been forthcoming in investing in their own defense.

And I do not understand the reluctance to move forward. If they

feel they cannot, and this is their business, obviously, it is their

legislature that has to decide this, but I do not quite understand

why they could not consider a decision that would say, ‘‘Let’s take
41

a chunk of this material that has been proposed by our country and

get on with it.’’

Mr. SIMMONS. And so you would support the concept of breaking

out the design work as a portion of the project.

Admiral FALLON. I do not know enough to tell you that that is

a good idea or not. What I would like to see is some steps being

made, some investment by Taiwan to actually acquire some of

these capabilities and to boost their own readiness and ability to

provide for their own defense.

Mr. SIMMONS. I certainly agree with that, and I certainly would

not want to commit U.S. forces in an area where local forces are

not willing to fight. I spent almost four years in Vietnam. I was

drafted into the U.S. Army before there was mandatory draft in

Vietnam. That came after the Tet offensive. And so I am a great

believer in partners and partnerships.

One of the problems we have, of course, is with Taiwan highranking military officers are restricted from visiting there. Capstone officers do not visit there. I do not know whether you have

been there.

Admiral FALLON. No. I am not permitted.

Mr. SIMMONS. You are not permitted to, and so we are dealing

with a ridiculous situation, in a way.

Admiral FALLON. But I will tell you that we have had extensive

engagement. In fact, just last week we had a delegation from Taiwan who was in our headquarters, and there is some reason to be

optimistic here. I think that we are making progress in convincing

the leadership, certainly the military leadership of the necessity of

taking steps that would be fundamentally helpful in increasing defends. And we have had pretty extensive negotiations with them.

So I just wish somebody could decide to make some progress on

the budget side of the House.

Mr. SIMMONS. Well, I think you know that I am working on that.

Would my colleagues yield me one additional minute?

Dr. SCHWARZ. Without objection.

Mr. SIMMONS. We are moving submarines from a 50–50 to a 60–

40; 60 percent in the Pacific, 40 percent in the Atlantic. We are

doing that because, in my opinion, we do not have enough submarines. We have not yet committed to two a year for the Virginia

class, and it does seem to me that if we have allies in the Far East

and elsewhere who wish to purchase from us diesels, that we

should be stepping up to the plate.

It also occurs to me that we should increase the build rate of our

own strategic subs, the Virginia class. What are your thoughts on

that subject?

Dr. SCHWARZ. Admiral, I am going to ask you to be pretty brief

on this one. We have Mr. Marshall left here, and I know all of us

have places to go and I am certain that you do.

Mr. SIMMONS. Well, let me just say I believe we should be building two a year. You do not have to respond, and thank you very

much for your testimony here, sir.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, sir.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Marshall, gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
42

We certainly appreciate your service and the service of everybody

that you command.

Admiral Fallon, enjoyed having dinner with you over at Secretary Rumsfeld’s. We wound up having quite an interesting conversation. I do not know how we wandered into that area, but it

was quite interesting.

I managed to get back to Vietnam early last year, along with Mr.

McHugh and Mr. Calvert. We went to visit with the Vietnamese

government and the Laosian government concerning POW–MIA

issues. And it happens that this morning I received the minutes

from, I guess, a very recent meeting of the National League of

Families. Read through those minutes and thought that I should

bring a few things to your attention.

And I am getting this information from those minutes. These

folks pretty much stay right on top of this business, and so I suspect it is accurate, but I do not know that is the case. I have not

had an opportunity to check it out.

They are initially quite concerned that Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) funding, which goes to PACOM is not fenced

and is going to be diminished. They believe that $60 million is

needed, it is in the budget, should be spent. They are worried that

about $12 million is going to be taken from that amount, and they

specifically say, and I will read this sentence, ‘‘Providing JPAC has

sufficient funds from the U.S. Pacific Command, field operations

will resume in Vietnam in late February. If funding does not come

through, these operations will be drastically reduced, and the next

joint operations in Laos will be as well.’’

They observe that the President is planning a visit to Southeast

Asia in the fall and they think this is—there is never a good time

to be reducing the funding for this kind of mission, and this is a

terrible time to reduce funding for this mission. And I would like

some assurance, if you can give it to me, that that will not occur,

that these alarms—in addition, I understand as of 2010 on

MILCON is new quarters, particularly for their forensic operation.

And I am told that the quarters that they currently occupy are

pretty dismal and that it would be—but I have not been there and

I do not know for myself.

Final thing, and I do not know that you have got any influence

on this, in these minutes, they make reference to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) possibly moving Stoney Beach to Japan from

where Stoney Beach is currently headquartered; again, too remote

from where the action is and something that sends the wrong signal with the President coming into Southeast Asia. And so they are

concerned that that is not a good move to make.

And if you could comment on those things, it would be very helpful.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. I think, first of all, there have been

some issues with the JPAC budget over this year. We in the Pacific

Command act as the agent for that money. We are not the people

that determine how much money is going to be allocated to whatever purpose. This is done by Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO). Because we are on scene and I have oversight over JPAC, we exercise that administrative authority over

that budget. But, of course, we are very interested in it, because
43

I think the role the JPAC plays in our overall Pacific strategy, Asia

Pacific strategy is significant.

Without getting into the detail of all the dollar amounts, we have

just been informed in the past week that an agreement has been

reached back here in which some money is going to be made available, both by DPMO and the Navy, to, I think, square the accounts

here this year.

But if you would recognize, too, that there are a lot of competing

priorities here in the region, and JPAC is one of them. But we are

going to work with them as best we can and try to square the

thing.

I cannot address the DIA issue at all. That is news to me. I will

do some research and get back to you on that one, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 131.]

Mr. MARSHALL. I appreciate it. Thank you for your service.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Larsen has asked for an extra couple of minutes. Without objection, Mr. Larsen for an extra couple of minutes.

And then we need to adjourn.

Mr. LARSEN. It will just be an extra couple of minutes, Mr.

Chairman.

Admiral Fallon, I want to go back to something I asked in my

last round, and I want to make perfectly clear that I was not asking to put you on the spot about preparing that response from the

Chinese military leadership to Myanmar and North Korea. So I

will take responsibility for it. I think it is important for the Chinese military leadership to understand that if that is the kind of

response that we get when we make a phone call, they should not

wonder why we have concerns about their transparency. And that

has to be a message that we will continually communicate very

clearly to them.

There was an attempt at transparency recently. Representative

Mark Kirk and Tom Feeney and I visited China in January. We

were allowed to go to Jiuquan Space Launch Center in the middle

of the Gobi Desert, a little cooler in January than perhaps most of

PACOM’s service area. But we were allowed to go out there and

ask questions, go in the vehicle assembly building, all at the permission of Defense Minister Xao. So there is an attempt, but we

wanted to make clear to them as well that as important as this is,

there is a long way to go on transparency.

I was wondering as well on the military-to-military, if you could

be more specific, perhaps on paper and get back to us if there are

specific steps that you think that we can stand behind on the committee and push. We just met with Ambassador Zhou this morning

from the Chinese embassy, and we can talk to him directly and

push with the Division of Foreign Affairs within the Ministry of

Defense as well if there are some specific things that we can do.

And then, General Bell, you mentioned earlier the ROK, in your

opinion, is fully capable of defending itself against a Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) invasion and it wants an independent combat command, which would result in perhaps relatively

more U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force compared to Army and Marine

presence on the peninsula.
44

Can you talk about the timing of that?

Why don’t we start there and then go back to Admiral Fallon?

General BELL. Thank you. It is premature to talk timing beyond

the current negotiations that we have gone through with our ally

and the programs that we have laid out. We do have a very vigorous consultative process. We meet, essentially, monthly at the ministry of defense level between Washington and the Republic of

Korea. Whether that is done in Hawaii or Guam or Seoul or even

here in Washington, very active, and we talk frequently about

these issues.

What we have asked, quite frankly, last October, so about six

months ago, both ministers of defense, Minister Ying from the Republic of Korea and Secretary Rumsfeld, agreed to look at this

independent combat command issue. And so this has been on the

table for several months.

We have a committee that is looking at that and saying, ‘‘Okay,

if and when this transfer is made from shared command to independent command, what are the functions of the U.S. military that

the ROK military would still need so that as allies we can guarantee deterrence and victory should deterrence fail?’’ And we are in

the process of doing that. We are aggressively working with our

ROK ally to lay out those mission sets.

So our hope is the next time the two ministers of defense get together in October, that we will have this sorted out largely in

terms of timelines and that they will agree to timelines at that

point. That is our goal. I am certain we will meet that.

So if I could defer until October and tell you then, because I

think we will publish where we see these timelines going, that is

our goal and our intention. Thank you.

Admiral FALLON. Mr. Larsen, just to come back, first of all, let

the record show that on my visit to China last year I was very

warmly received at every level, from foreign minister to General

Xao, General Leong, at every level welcomed and made to feel quite

at home. The challenge is in getting substantive engagement on

issues.

I had strong concurrence from their side that we ought to have

more mil-to-mil. Got it. An offer to travel more extensively in the

country, for me to come back on subsequent visits and see the

western part of the country and a number of other places.

But what remains is to actually get into substantive dialogue at

levels below four-star level, and that is a challenge. Even yesterday, I received a note back from General Leong who is the chairman-equivalent, closest we can get, regretting his inability to attend our Asia Pacific Chiefs of Defense conference that is teed up

for eight months from now, citing scheduling problems.

The other nations in the Asia Pacific area come to me and they

say, ‘‘What is the problem? Why is it that we cannot get their reps

to come and engage? ‘‘ They will go to other countries but it seems

that when we are involved, we still have some challenges. I think

some of this is the system, the communist system. They do not delegate a whole lot down to the local level; they want central control

of everything. And certainly not the way we run things. And does

this mean we give up and stand back and say, ‘‘Ah, the heck with
45

you’’? No. I think we have just got to redouble our efforts to crack

the ice here and get moving.

Mr. LARSEN. Yes.

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Admiral Fallon, thank you so very much for being

with us this morning, the holder of the most historic command in

the U.S. Navy. I want to call you CINCPAC.

And, General Bell, awfully good to see you again, sir. Chattanooga moccasin.

General BELL. Absolutely.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thanks very much, gentlemen, for being here.

The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 9, 2006

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 9, 2006

(51)
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

MARCH 9, 2006

(129)

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER

The CHAIRMAN. If you give us this take on the South Korean military, 21 divisions; is that roughly accurate?

General BELL. Total number of ROK Divisions is 47 (22 Active and 25 Reserve).

Breakdown is as follows:

• Active: 17 Infantry Divisions and 5 Mechanized Divisions (Total 22)

• Reserves: 13 Homeland Reserve Divisions (HRD) and 12 Mobilized Reserve Divisions (MRD) (Total 25)

The CHAIRMAN. Given the vastness of the theater and range of possible threats,

is the Fleet Response Plan sufficient?

Admiral FALLON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files].

The CHAIRMAN. What is the status of planning efforts for the build up of Defense

forces and infrastructure on Guam and U.S. Pacific Territories? To what extent has

this been linked with other planning efforts in the PACOM area of responsibility?

What are the cost estimates associated with funding this build up?

Admiral FALLON. USPACOM has taken the lead role in coordinating various Service planning and infrastructure expansion initiatives on Guam. This joint planning

process has been underway since March 2005 and received additional emphasis

since the recently announced plan to transfer significant USMC personnel and capabilities from Japan to Guam. This joint effort has been examining infrastructure,

facilities, support requirements and environmental considerations and will provide

DOD leadership detailed data to make informed decisions regarding Guam and

Commonwealth of Northern Marianas. A final report is expected by July 2006.

Planning activities in Guam are closely linked with each of the Service initiatives

as well as regional planning efforts.

At the recently concluded U.S.-Japan negotiations, the Government of Japan

agreed to provide $6.09 billion of the currently estimated $10.27 billion required for

the Marine Corps relocation from Okinawa to Guam. The U.S. will fund the remainder of the required infrastructure improvements. USPACOM is working closely with

the Services and DOD to ensure resources are programmed for the MILCON needed

to support these force posture changes.

The CHAIRMAN. What impact will the buildup in the Pacific have on the training

and mobility requirements and capabilities for Guam and U.S. Pacific territories?

Admiral FALLON. As U.S. force capabilities are adjusted, training facilities and capabilities on Guam and the Northern Marianas will need to be expanded and improved. The same is true for mobility requirements and capabilities.

Currently available training airspace and target ranges on Guam will not adequately support the robust aircraft/aircrew training or the next generation of aircraft being envisioned for Guam. Farallon De Medinilla (FDM), the only live ordnance range in the area, is not compatible with current or future advanced weapons

capabilities. The small land footprint, lack of scoring instrumentation, and encroachment issues at FDM severely restrict the types and quantities of training munitions

that can be used. FDM lacks RADAR coverage and air controllers as well as telemetry devices for scoring accuracy and feedback to aircrews. The Joint Guam Military

Master Plan Working Group is studying these challenges and will recommend appropriate solutions/mitigations.

Navy training facilities available on Guam are not at desired levels. Simulators

available to CONUS units, for example, do not exist on Guam. The Guam Distance

Learning Center is being upgraded to provide training to Guam homeported submarines (SSN). The Center can currently provide 23 of the required 101 courses for

SSN training and upgrading the number of courses available. Forward Deployed

Naval Forces units have historically relied on actual operations and U.S./Coalition

field exercises to provide training and experience.

The mobility requirements and capabilities necessary to operate from Guam and

the Northern Marianas will increase with the repositioning of U.S. Forces. More

intra-theater lift sorties will likely be required to deploy our forces for potential contingencies.
130

Newly acquired C–17s in Hawaii and Alaska plus C–5 enhancements, and the development/acquisition of High Speed Vessels will facilitate the ability to deploy

forces and respond to crises.

The CHAIRMAN. To what extent will the build up of defense forces and infrastructure on Guam and U.S. Pacific territories have on the need to provide additional

family housing and barracks quarters, operational and administrative facilities, base

operation and support services, joint basing opportunities, medical, and education

resources?

Admiral FALLON. The USPACOM directed Joint Guam Development Group and

the Joint Guam Military Master Plan (JGMMP) are identifying the infrastructure

required to base additional capabilities and forces on Guam. This effort incorporates

both operational and quality of life issues and is well under way with the JGMMP

expected to be completed by July 2006. The JGMMP will include each function and

outline infrastructure, facilities, and support needs, including medical and education

facilities, for all active duty personnel. The planners are emphasizing opportunities

for joint-use and joint basing and seek to avoid redundancy.

We envision a Joint Base framework on Guam, which would include all military

forces on-island, regardless of Service. The Deputy Undersecretary for Installations

and Environment has been spearheading processes and procedures to implement

joint basing. USPACOM and Service Components are linked to this effort.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Mr. TAYLOR. How long could your troops be self-sufficient? If for whatever reason

the sea lanes were blocked and other contingencies around the world were gobbling

up supplies at an unanticipated rate, how long could your troops be self-sufficient?

General BELL. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Is that number the same as, more than or less than four years ago

today? For the record, I would like that number in whatever manner you choose to

present it.

General BELL. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Mr. LARSEN. General Bell, you mentioned the ROK, in your opinion, is fully capable of defending itself against a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea invasion and

it wants an independent combat command, which would result in perhaps relatively

more U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force compared to Army and Marine presence on the

peninsula.

Can you talk about the timing of that?

General BELL. A roadmap for the Republic of Korea achieving independent wartime operational command is an agenda item for discussion at the 38th Security

Consultative Meeting in October 2006. The United States Secretary of Defense and

the Minister of National Defense for the Republic of Korea will discuss and determine the manner and the timing in which these issues will be resolved. A combined

ROK/US study effort is on-going and will make appropriate recommendations to

both nations in time for the October meeting. Following that session, we should

have more clarity on future timing.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. SNYDER

Dr. SNYDER. Where is the obstacle in the development of military-to-military relations with China?

Admiral FALLON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DRAKE

Mrs. DRAKE. Admiral Fallon, it is my understanding that Pacific Command has

begun testing a new targeting system known as WEEMC (Web-Enabled Execution

Management Capability), which is a net-centric version of an existing system known

as JADOCS (Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination Systems) already in

use by many of our combatant commands, including Central Command.
131

I have requested from the Air Force testimony directly from the warfighter commenting on the capability of a web-enabled JADOCS. In an effort to justify the

funds used to web-enable an existing system, can you provide me with feedback on

the capability afforded your command by the use of WEEMC.

Admiral FALLON. Web-Enabled Execution Management Capability (WEEMC) is

currently under development and is yet to be tested in the field. Joint Force Commanders, Component Commanders, and tactical level forces are still using the Joint

Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS) to manage operational

and tactical level fires. The planned follow-on capability—the net-centric web-Enabled Execution Management Capability—is intended to make collaboration faster,

easier, and more accurate.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. I am working currently with this committee to increase the vehicle authorization to two for service members assigned to, well, any of the European

locations, I guess, Guam, Hawaii. I know this is very important to our serving families, especially working spouses. And I would be pleased if either yourself or the

General, the both of you, could comment on how service members in PACOM’s area

of responsibility would feel about such an increased authorization.

I know that many of my constituents, service families, have asked me about it,

and I do know that I think it was explained earlier that you do have the used cars

that go from one family to another, but there is also when they are assigned overseas sometimes families have to sell a second car and many times they are losing

on a deal such as that when the time for deployment is quick.

So do you have any comments on a two-vehicle authorization?

Admiral FALLON. According to a 2003 Hawaii survey, most military families have

a second POV. Thesurvey of 4000 married military members yielded the following

results: 83% owned at least two vehicles; 79% used the second vehicle for spousal

employment and education. The second POV was also commonly used for shuttling

children to and from school and extracurricular activities. A 2005 survey of approximately 3200 military members yielded similar results. Of note, the 2005 survey included 851 respondents assigned to Guam.

To meet the need for a second vehicle, military members either (1) sell a POV

stateside, usually at a loss, and purchase another vehicle upon reassignment or (2)

pay to ship a second vehicle at a cost ranging from $1000–$3000.

Although most members own two POVs, it is not clear authorizing a two-POV

shipment at government expense is affordable. I will ensure the Services are aware

of your concern.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MARSHALL

Mr. MARSHALL. Reference was made to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) possible moving Stoney Beach to Japan from where Stoney Beach is currently

headquartered; again, too remove from where the action is and something that

sends the wrong signal with the president coming into Southeast Asia. And so they

are concerned that that is not a good move to make.

If you could comment on this, it would be very helpful.

Admiral FALLON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. I continue to be concerned about the issue of relations across the

Taiwan Strait and our preparedness for potential escalation in the region. I believe

we must look to the past to correct any deficiencies in our ability to act in the region, and to the future to do as much as we can to promote a peaceful resolution

to Taiwan-China relations.

First, I would like to ask about communications between the US military and that

of the Republic of China. In 1996, President Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to

the region in response to China’s belligerent firing of missiles in the waters off Taiwan’s coast. When they got there, I am told that our military realized that there

was no established communications channel from us to the Taiwanese military. I

understand that there has been improvement in the communication channels between the two militaries, but I wanted to find out your opinion of our current ability

to communicate with the Taiwanese military. Without divulging any confidential in-
132

formation, can you tell us whether there are any established high-level, direct and

regular communications between the two militaries now? What could be done to improve our ability to coordinate with the Taiwanese if necessary in the future?

Admiral FALLON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files].

Mr. ANDREWS. Second, I believe that actions by China with respect to Taiwan give

observers reason to be concerned about their intentions. According to the latest

Quadrennial Defense Review, China is significantly developing its military in a way

that may seriously destabilize cross-Strait relations with Taiwan. The QDR states:

Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete

militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that

could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter

strategies. Further, ‘‘China continues to invest heavily in its military, particularly

in its strategic arsenal and capabilities designed to improve its ability to project

power beyond its borders.’’

Additionally, the QDR reveals that most of Beijing’s military modernization plans

are carried out in secret, and suggests that ‘‘China is likely to continue making

large investments in high-end asymmetric military capabilities, emphasizing electronic and cyber-warfare; counter-space operation; ballistic and cruise missiles; advanced integrated air defense systems; next-generation torpedoes; advanced submarines; strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated land- and sea-based

systems; and theater unmanned aerial vehicles for employment by the Chinese military and for global export.’’

Mr. Chairman, Admiral Fallon, I am deeply concerned about these developments.

I fear that they suggest that China may be preparing for military superiority in any

potential conflict with Taiwan, and that these weapons systems may be specifically

designed to prevent the United States from coming to Taiwan’s assistance.

I feel that US policy with regard to Taiwan must be made clear to the Chinese;

that they should dismantle their 784 missiles aimed at the island, that they must

settle their differences with the Taiwan peacefully (as is US policy), and that they

should normalize their relations with the democratically-elected leaders on the island.

In your view, how do US capabilities in the region match the expected growth in

capabilities of the Chinese, and would you have any advice for the Taiwanese military to prepare to confront the growing Chinese threat?

Admiral FALLON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files].

Mr. ANDREWS. Finally, it is my belief that in the face of any hostility from the

Chinese towards Taiwan, the US should be prepared to act decisively. Are you at

liberty to share with me any plans that Pacific Command has in place if the Chinese

were to act on threats of violence against Taiwan?

Admiral FALLON. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files].

Æ