### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Ma y 11, 200 5 S es sio n
KEL LI WHI TESI DE v. MI CHAEL A. HE DGE, ET AL 

### . Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Knox County No. 1-15-02 D ale C. Workm an, Jud ge

No. E2004-02598-COA- R3-CV - F ILED MAY 26, 2005

Th e so le iss ue in thi s ca se is w he the r e xtra ne ou s p re jud ic ia l in fo rm a tio n w a s impr op e rl y br ou g ht t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f

t h e j u r y. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

W I L L I AM H. INMAN , S R

. J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, i n which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY and S HAR ON G A I L LEE , J .J ., joined.

Clifford Wils on, Nashville, Tenne ssee, attorney for a ppellant, Kelli Whiteside.

J ames S. MacD onald, Knoxvil le, Tenne ssee, attorney for ap p el l ee s, Michael A. H edg e and Paul Hedg e.
OP IN ION

This is an action for

damag es for

persona l injuries resulti n g from a r ear -end c ollisi on on J anuary 15, 2001. L iabilitywas a dmitted, and the p ro o f foc used on the nature a nd extent of the pla int if f’ s in jurie s. The plaintiff w as a nine teen- y ear -old student who was am b ulatory immediately

afte r the
acc ident. She missed two day s of s chool t hroug hout the wint er/spring of 2001, worke d for a bank du ri ng the su mme r of 20 01 , a nd re turne d to sc ho ol i n 2 00 2 ta kin g a n e xtra or din ary

a mou nt o f p a in medication.

At the time of t he trial of this ca se, which w as conc luded on May 3, 2004, the plaintiff had be e n s e e n b y

a ve ri ta ble ho st o f p hy sic ia ns fo r h e r c omp lain ts o f p a in. He r m e dic a l pr ob le ms pe rh aps be g a n in he r e arl y te e ns wh e n s he su ff e re d f ro m de pr e ssi on wh ic h c on tin ue d in te rm itt e ntl y to the time of the ac cident. The prec ise cause of he r pain wa s elusive; al t h o u g h in her brie f she
asserts that two of her phy sicians testified that they diag nosed her

condition as syring omy elia, the only phy sician who used this term, D r. Fr ed Killeffe r, a neurosur g eon, testified that the pla intiff was-2-

not suffering f

rom sy ring omy elia, but had a

benign co n genit al anomaly known as pe rsistent ‘e mbr y o n i c c e n tr a l c a n a l

. ’ S e v e r a l p h y s i c i a n s b e l i e v e d t h a tp ar to f t h e p a i n t h e p l a i n t i f

f s u f f e r s is
cause d by syrinx s in her spine, a

condition which involves pocke ts of cer ebra l s p i n al fl u id which forms on the spinal cor d.

Th e plaint if

f h a s in c ur

re d me dic a l e xpe ns e s a mou nti ng to $60 ,0 00 .0 0 s inc e the a c c ide nt. Tw o p hy sic ia ns te sti fi e d th a t th e se e xpe ns e s we re re la te d to the a c c ide nt, on e of the se ph y sic ia ns sa id that the plaintiff would re quire up to $5,000.00 per y ear of pre scription medication for the re mainder of her life. Dr. K elleff

er te stified that only

the first fe w wee ks of the plaintiff’ s medical tre atment
was re lated to the ac cident and that in his opi nion she did not suffer from sy ri n go m y elia. The plaintiff testified that she w as following t he advice of Dr. Kill eff er and a differe nt pain manag ement ph y sic ia n a ndha d n ot t ake n a ny pa in m e dic a tio n f

or se ve ra l w e e ks prior

to t ri a l.

The jury returne d a verdic t f or $25,000.00 and the plaintiff appe als the disallowanc e of he r motion for a new trial which alleg ed no g rounds. The a ffidavit of juror Batchellor wa s submitt ed, toge ther with a me morandum of law in support of the motion, which, ta ken tog ether , alleg e that the fo re ma n o f the jury c on du c te d his ow n re se arc h on the I nte rn e t a bo ut s yri ng omy e lia

a ndsh are d th is inf or ma tio n w ith the oth e r j ur or s.
Discussion

We r e pr od uc e the a ff

ida vit :
A F F ID A V IT

_________________________________________________________________ Comes now Aar on Batchellor, who a fter f irst being duly

sworn, say s as fo llo ws :
1. I was a member of the jury in the above c aptioned matter which wa s tried on April 30, 2004 and c oncluded on Ma y 3, 2004.

2. Th e fo re ma n of our jury , Clif fo rd Wat so n, du ri ng ou r d e lib e ratio n, tol d
me a nd the oth e r jur or s tha t he ha d don e so me re se arc h on the I nte rn e t a bo ut s yri nx’s

. He sh are d w ith us wh a t he ha d le arn e d o n th e I nte rn e t.

3. I am not sure what effe ct the information Mr. Watson shared with us had on the ultimate outcome of this ca se.

F urthe r A ff

ia nt S a ith No t. ( S i g n a t u r e o f A a ro n B a t ch el l o r

) 5/13/04 Aar on Batchellor-3-

The dispositi on of this c ase is g overne d by Rule 606(b) of the Te nnessee Rules of Evidence

. I t pr ov ide s: (B ) Inq uiry I nto Va lid ity

of Ve rd ic t or

I nd ic tme nt. Upo n an inquiry

into the validityof a ve rdict or indictment, a jur or may not testify as t o any

matter or statement occ urring during the
course of t he jury ’s deliberations or t o the ef fec t of anything upon a ny juror’s mind or e motions as influencing that juror to as s en t to or dissent from the ver dict or indictment or conc erning the juror’ s me n ta l p r o c e s s e s , e xc e p t th a t a ju r o r may te s ti f y o n th e q u e s ti o n of whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly broug ht to the jury ’s a tte nti on , whe the r an y ou tsi de inf lue nc e wa s impr op e rl y br ou g ht t o b e ar u pon any jur or , o r w he the r the jur or s a g re e d in advanc e to be bound by a quotient or g ambling ve rdict without further discussion; nor may

a juror’ s aff

idavit or evidenc e of a ny

statement by the juror c oncerning a

matter a bout which the juror w ou l d be pr e c lud e d f

ro m te sti fying be re c e ive d f or the se pu rp os e s.
Th e re are on ly thr e e ins ta nc e s in whic h a jur or ma y of fe r t e sti mon y , o r, a s h e re , a n a ff ida vit , c on c e rn ing the va lid ity

of a ve rd ic t:

1. I f “ . . . e x trane ous prejudicial i n fo rm ation was improperly broug ht to the jury ’s attention.”

2. I f “any outside influence was im proper ly broug ht to bear upon a ny juror.” O r
3. I f “ . . . a

juror ag ree d in advanc e to be bound by a quotient or g ambling verdic t.”

Th e on ly e xce pti on re le va nt t o th is c a se, is w he the r e xtra ne ou s prejudicialinformation was improperly

broug ht to the jury ’s attention.

I n Sta te v . Bl

ac kwe ll , 664 S.W .2d 686 (Tenn. 1984) the Supreme Court specifica lly adopted Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 606(b) (identica l to curr ent Tenn. R. of Evid. 606(b) with the e x ception that the fe dera l rule does not include a spec ific re fer ence to quotient verdicts) a s the rule g overning the exclusion and admissibil ity of e v i d en ce to impea ch a jury verdic t in Tennessee

. Bla c kwe ll is clea r on the point that the “outside influenc e” e lement of 606(b) rela tes to third pa rty c on tac t wit h the jur y . The Bla c kwe ll court acknow ledg ed that differ ent rules might apply to se questere d and nonsequester ed juries. The jury in this civil case was not seque stered. E ven thoug h the “outside influe n c e ” te s t d o e s n o t c o n ta in th e s a me “ p r e ju d ic ia l” q u a li f

ie r a s in th e “ e xtr a n e o u s p r e ju dicial information” test, the “ outside influence ” test provides “ whethe r an youtside influence was-4-

im prop e rly broug ht to bear upon a n y j u ro r. ” I n prac tical ef fec t, the Bla c kwe ll

court de fined the “outside influenc e improper ly broug ht to bear upon any juror” test in te rms of the pre judicial eff

ect
o f s u ch o u t s i d e i n fl u en ce , s t at i n g:

We agre e with the Court of Criminal Appea ls that something more than a bare showing of a ming ling with the g ener al public is require d wher e the jury

is not sequestere d to shift the bur d en o f p ro o f to the State of showing no prejudice

. The additional require ment is tha t as
a re sult of a juror’ s contac t with a third p er son some extraneous prejudicia l information, fac t or opinion, was imported to one or more jurors or some outside imprope r influenc e broug ht to bear on one or more juror s, Bla c kwe ll , p. 689.

The a ppellees a rg ue that ther e is no “outside influence ” claim involving third parties being
ma de by the pla int if

f but rathe r that she on ly

a dv a nc e s “ e xtrane ou s p re jud ic ia l in fo rm a tio n” c la im. But unde r either

test the burden of proof is on the appellant to pr ove prejudice

. The aff idavit of Mr. Batchellor re veals that he was one of the juror s selecte d in this case who selec ted Clifford Watson
a s f or e ma n a ndwh o to ld M r. B a tc he llo r andthe oth e r j ur or s:

. . . that he had done some rese arc h on the I nterne t about syrinx ’s [si c]. He shar ed with us what he had lea rned on the I nterne t. I

am not sure what eff

ect the information Mr. Watson share d with us had on the ultimate outcome of this ca se. We ag ree with the appellee s that the prec edential c ases r evea l that clear and co n v i ncing evidenc e of pr ejudice is re quired to me et the standards of Tenne ssee Rules of Evidence 606(b). The aff idavit does not reve al the extent of the re sear ch, or w hat, if anything, Mr. Watson lea rned.

One of the ca ses re lied on by

the appe llant, Cal

ad ar o v . V and e rb ilt Uni v e rsi ty , 794 S.W .2d 738 (Tenn. Ct, App, 1990), involved a nursing malprac tice cla im. The two basic holding s of the Cal ad ar o court a re: (1) the af

fidavits of two jurors stating that one juror r epeatedly rea d his notes to the other juror s during their deliber ations despite the instructions of the trial court to the contra ry wer e inadmissible, based on the fac t that this information was de emed to be “ intrinsic” ra ther than “extrinsic” information, and a s such, inadmissible for consideration by a re viewing court pursua nt to Tennesse e R ules of Evidence 606(b) , and (2) the fa ct that the same juror re peate dly told his fellow jur or s th a t he wa s marrie d to a nu rs e , a ndthe re fo re ha d s pe c ia lize d kno wl e dg e of wh a t nu rs e s w ou ld do , w a s h e ld to be pa

rt of the “ no rm a l ju ry

de lib e ratio ns that in c lud e dis c us sio ns ba se d o n th e jur or s’ g ener alized knowledg e and e x perie nce [that] do not consti tute g rounds for ove rturning a ver dict.” The c ourt pointed out that the juror in question was not sa id to have had any prior or e x trane ous knowledg e of the parties or events that g ave rise t o the s uit, and applying that principle to this case, neither ha s it been sug g ested that the j u ry fo re m an in this case had any prior or e x trane ous knowledg e whatever

of the pa rties or the e vents g iving rise to the lawsuit.-5-

T h e case of Cav ali e r Me tal Cor po ra tio n v . J

ohns on M

e tal Cont ro ls , 1 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d 122 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) is instructi v e. I n Cavalierthe plaintiff cor poration obtained a

$2,029,294.00 jury verdic t a g ainst the defe ndant corpor ation for br eac h of contra ct. A juror w ho had bee n challeng ed for c ause by

the def endant c orporation who had fire d her f or abse nteeism share d her opinions that while she wa s working for the de fenda nt, it breac hed the c ontrac t first and that the q u al i t y o f the pa rt s p ro vid e d b y

the pl ain ti ff

c or po ratio n w e reno wo rs e than th os e fu rn ish e d b y oth e r s up pli e rs

. This was held to be “ extraneous, pre judicial information.” The Ca v a li er d ecision i s further instructive in setting out the a naly sis to be followed in case s such as this : (1) the thre shold inquiry is w he the r o r n ot the inf or ma tio n is “ e xtra ne ou s” a nd , ( 2) if “ e xtra ne ou s, wheth er or no t sa id inf or ma tio n w a s p re

jud ic ia l, a nd(3 ) f

ina lly , if bo th e xtra ne ou s a ndpr e jud ic ia l, w he the r s a id
ex tra n eo u s p re

j u d i ci al i n fo rm at i o n h ad an i n fl u en ce o n t h e j u ry , ci t i n g Pa tto n v . Ro se , 892 S.W .2d 410, 414 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). In Patton the court found that a ne wspape r shar ed with the jury was clea rly extraneous i nformation but that the i nformation was not prejudicial to the plaintiff a nd that there was no e vidence that this newspaper article aff

ecte d the j urors in their deliber ations. Where t h e r e h a s b e e n n o s h o w i n g w h a t e v e r c o n c e r n i n g t h e s p e c i f i c s o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n s h ar e d w i t h t h e j u r y, w e c a n n o tc o n c l u d e t h a tt h i s i n f o r m a t i o n w a s “ p r e

j u d i c i a l ” o r

t h a ti th a d a n i n f

l u e n c e o n t h e j u r y. Th is de te rm inatio n is re inf or c e d by re fe re nc e to the a ff ida vit of Mr

. B a tc he llor wh o s pecif ic a lly state s th a t “ I

a m no t su re wh a t e ff

e c t the inf orma tio n Mr

. Wat so n sh are d wi th us ha d on the ult imate outcome of the case .”

The rec ord does not r evea l the rea son(s) why juror Batchellor and fore man Watson were not
su bp oe na e d to te sti fy . I n h e r b ri e f the app e lla nt m e re ly state s:
Plainti f f d o e s n o t k n o w w h a t in te r n e t ar ti c le s th e ju r y f o r e man , Mr. Watson, reviewe d during his internet re sea rch. Pl aintiff does not kn ow wh a t f

a c ts o r i nf orma tio n wa s share d by Mr . Wats on wi th h is fellow jurors re g arding the information he f ound during his outside
rese arc h.
We ag ree with the ap p ellee that more than a ppellant’s admitted inability to provide any sp e c if ic s c on c e rn ing the inf

or ma tio n sh are d wi th the jury is n e c e ssa ry to s e t a sid e the ve rd ic t in thi s case . We a lso note that it wa s the appellant who initiallyreje cted “ article s off the Interne t” into the trial of the c ase by

cross e x amining D r. Fred Killeffer about an a

rticl e h e had see n on the I nterne t from the National I nstitut e of N eurolog ic Disea s es an d Stroke, and made this I nterne t article a nd Ex hibit to t he De position of Dr. Killeffe r. All conc erne d appar ently ag ree d that this article fr om the I nterne t was authoritative. T he re cord doe s not re v ea l an y specific information obtained by the fore man, but if it may

be infe rre d that the I nterne t information was similar to the informa tion elicited by the cr oss-examination of Dr. Killeff er, the re c an be no possible pr ejudice to the a ppellant. I n any event, we cannot a gre e with t he appe llant’s arg ument that the awa rd of $25,000.00 “ display s that something ha

ppened in the jur or room to sway the jury in f avor of the defe ndant.” We can neither infer nor presume pr ejudice r esulted to the plaintiff, or for that matter, to the defendants, on ac count of the for eman’ s statements. As in Pa tto n v . Ro se , su pr a :-6- I t is clear f

rom this recor d, howeve r, th at t h er e is absolutely no evidenc e that the jury considere d this a rticle in their deliberations, nor is the re any

evidenc e that the a

rticle itself influenc ed deliber ations of the jury . . . and ther e is nothing in the r ecor d to indicate that the jury
us e d th e e xtra ne ou s inf

orma tio n in any ma nn e r i n r e a c hin g its ve rd ic t. The judg ment is affirme d at the costs of the appellant, Ke lli W hiteside.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM H. INMAN, SENI OR J UDGE