UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-7206

RAHSAN DRAKEFORD,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

DR. MULLINS; NURSE SCOTT,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior

District Judge. (7:15-cv-00253-JLK-RSB)

Submitted: February 22, 2017 Decided: March 9, 2017

Before KEENAN, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Rahsan Drakeford, Appellant Pro Se. Rosalie Fessier, 

TIMBERLAKE, SMITH, THOMAS & MOSES, PC, Staunton, Virginia, for 

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Rahsan Drakeford commenced a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action 

against Dr. Benny Mullins and Nurse S. Scott, claiming 

deliberate indifference to his medical needs following a wrist 

fracture suffered while Drakeford was incarcerated. Drakeford 

appeals from the district court’s order granting summary 

judgment to Mullins and Scott and dismissing the complaint, and 

we affirm.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo, “viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Smith v. 

Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

“A prison official’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s 

serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 

under the Eighth Amendment.” Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 

178 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976)). An inmate alleging a deliberate indifference claim 

must establish that his medical condition was objectively 

serious—that is, “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as 

mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay 
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person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s 

attention.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).* The inmate must also show 

that the official subjectively knew of and disregarded an 

excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety. Jackson, 775 

F.3d at 178 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 

(1994)).

Drakeford alleged that Mullins, who treated him during the 

thirteen days between his injury and surgery, did not timely 

attend to his medical needs and was responsible for a delay in 

scheduling the operation necessary to repair the fracture. 

However, Mullins’ affidavit, which was supported by Drakeford’s 

medical records, demonstrated that Mullins diligently monitored 

Drakeford and prescribed him various pain medications while he 

was awaiting surgery. When Mullins perceived that an orthopedic 

consultation might delay the operation, he referred Drakeford to 

another doctor, who performed the surgery two days later. 

Drakeford also claimed that Scott refused him pain 

medication. Scott explained in his affidavit that he twice 

delayed administering pain medication to Drakeford in order to 

 * Mullins and Scott do not dispute the district court’s 

finding that Drakeford’s injury constituted a serious medical 

need.
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comply with the prescription. This claim is borne out by 

Drakeford’s medical records.

Drakeford did not offer any documentary evidence to refute 

these accounts, nor was there any evidence that Mullins or Scott 

consciously disregarded any risk to Drakeford’s well-being. To 

the extent that Drakeford complains that additional, stronger, 

or more frequent pain medication was required, this, without 

more, is insufficient to prevail on a deliberate indifference

claim. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 

1985). Because Drakeford failed to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact as to whether Mullins and Scott acted with a 

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834

(internal quotation marks omitted), the district court properly 

granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED