Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats and International Relations, 

Committee on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Tuesday, July 26, 2005 NUCLEAR SECURITY

Actions Needed by DOE to 

Improve Security of 

Weapons-Grade Nuclear 

Material at its Energy, 

Science and Environment 

Sites 

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

GAO-05-934T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-934T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or AloiseE@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-934T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

July 26, 2005

NUCLEAR SECURITY

Actions Needed by DOE to Improve 

Security of Weapons-Grade Nuclear 

Material at its Energy, Science and 

Environment Sites 

Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade nuclear 

material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements. 

Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces generally comply 

with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and 

equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required 

training programs, facilities, and equipment. However, GAO did find some 

weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of protective 

forces to defend these sites. For example, despite the importance of training 

exercises in which protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of

mock terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE neither sets standards for 

individual protective force officers to participate in these exercises, nor does 

it require sites to track individual participation. GAO also found that 

protective force officers at all five of the ESE sites reported problems with 

their radio communications systems. Specifically, according to 66 of the 105

protective force officers GAO interviewed, they did not always have 

dependable radio communications as required by the DOE Manual 473.2-2, 

Protective Force Program Manual. Security officials stated that related 

improvements were under way. 

To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 

2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they will 

need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include 

transforming its current protective force into an elite, possibly federalized, 

force, developing and deploying new security technologies to reduce the risk 

to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating and eliminating 

nuclear weapons material between and among ESE sites, and creating a 

sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to ensure 

coordination across all ESE offices that have weapons-grade nuclear 

material. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are 

in early stages of development and will require significant commitment of 

resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the 

October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is uncertain. 

DOE Protective Force Member 

Source: DOE.

A successful terrorist attack on a 

Department of Energy (DOE) site 

containing nuclear weapons 

material could have devastating 

effects for the site and nearby 

communities. DOE’s Office of the 

Under Secretary for Energy, 

Science and Environment (ESE), 

which is responsible for DOE 

operations in areas such as energy 

research, manages five sites that 

contain weapons-grade nuclear 

material. A heavily armed security 

force equipped with such items as 

automatic weapons protects ESE 

sites. GAO was asked to examine 

(1) the extent to which ESE 

protective forces are meeting 

DOE’s existing readiness 

requirements and (2) the actions 

DOE and ESE will need to take to 

successfully defend against the 

larger, revised terrorist threat 

identified in the October 2004 

design basis threat (DBT) by DOE’s 

implementation deadline of 

October 2008. 

What GAO Recommends

To ensure that DOE and ESE 

protective forces can meet the 

terrorist threat contained in the 

2004 DBT, GAO made five 

recommendations to the Secretary 

of Energy to, among other things, 

address weaknesses with 

protective officers’ equipment and 

coordinate ESE efforts to address 

the 2004 DBT. DOE concurred 

with and accepted GAO’s 

recommendations and provided an 

update on actions it anticipated 

taking to address GAO’s 

recommendations. 
Page 1 GAO-05-934T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the work you requested on 

nuclear security at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Office of the Under 

Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE). My testimony is 

based on the report being released today, entitled Nuclear Security: 

DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and 

Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New 

Design Basis Threat (GAO-05-611). 

DOE has long recognized that a successful terrorist attack on a site 

containing the material used in nuclear weapons, such as plutonium or 

highly enriched uranium, could have devastating consequences for the site 

and its surrounding communities. The risks associated with these 

materials, which in specified forms and quantities are referred to as 

Category I special nuclear material, vary but include theft for use in an 

illegal nuclear weapon; the creation of improvised nuclear devices capable 

of producing a nuclear yield; and the creation of so-called “dirty bombs,” 

in which conventional explosives are used to disperse radioactive 

material. 

Because terrorist attacks could have such devastating consequences, an 

effective safeguards and security program is essential. For many years, a 

key component for DOE security programs has been the development of 

the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the 

potential size and capabilities of adversary forces. In response to the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE issued an updated DBT in May 

2003 and gave its sites until October 2006 to comply with its requirements. 

In response to recommendations in our April 2004 report to this 

Subcommittee,1

 congressional criticism, and a new review of intelligence 

data, DOE issued a revised DBT in October 2004. The 2004 DBT identified 

a larger terrorist threat for DOE sites than the 2003 DBT. Consequently, 

DOE is not requiring full compliance with the 2004 DBT until October 2008 

in order to allow its sites adequate time to implement measures to defeat 

this larger terrorist threat. By July 29, 2005, DOE sites will have to forward 

2004 DBT implementation plans to the Deputy Secretary of Energy and, 

within 3 months, begin submitting quarterly DBT implementation reports. 

At the time of our review, cost estimates were still preliminary, but 

 1

See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully 

Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004). 
Page 2 GAO-05-934T 

security officials at ESE sites said that, collectively, they may require an 

additional $384 million-$584 million over the next several years in order 

for all ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material to meet the 2004 

DBT. 

The private contractors who operate DOE’s facilities counter the terrorist 

threat contained in the DBT with a multifaceted protective system. While 

specific measures vary from site to site, a key universal component of 

DOE’s protective system is a heavily armed protective force equipped with 

such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, 

and chemical protective gear. 

On June 22, 2004, we testified before this Subcommittee, identifying 

several issues that could impede ESE’s ability to fully meet the threat 

contained in the May 2003 DBT by DOE’s October 2006 deadline.2

 Not the 

least of theses issues was the lack of a departmentwide, multiyear, fully 

resourced implementation plan for meeting DBT requirements; the plan 

would have to include important programmatic activities, such as the 

closure of facilities and the transportation of special nuclear material. 

Subsequently, you asked us to examine ESE in more detail and to 

determine, for the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material, 

(1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE’s existing 

readiness requirements and (2) what actions DOE and ESE will need to 

take to successfully defend against the larger, revised terrorist threat 

identified in the October 2004 DBT by DOE’s implementation deadline of 

October 2008. 

To determine the extent to which protective forces at ESE sites are 

meeting existing DOE readiness requirements, we reviewed pertinent 

literature about the factors that affect the readiness of forces, such as 

military forces, that are like those defending ESE sites. We conducted 

structured interviews with 105 randomly selected ESE protective force 

officers at the five ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear 

material. While the responses from these interviews are not projectable to 

the entire universe of ESE protective force officers, we did speak to about 

10 percent of the total protective forces at the five sites. We asked the 

 2

See GAO, Nuclear Security: Several Issues Could Impede the Ability of DOE’s Office of 

Energy, Science and Environment to Meet the May 2003 Design Basis Threat, 

GAO-04-894T (Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2004). 
Page 3 GAO-05-934T 

officers questions designed to determine their readiness to defend the 

sites, including questions about their morale, training, and equipment. We 

also reviewed the training records of the 105 officers for selected firearms 

and physical fitness qualifications to determine if these officers complied 

with existing DOE requirements and regulations. Finally, we reviewed the 

equipment used by ESE protective forces to determine if it met current 

DOE requirements. 

To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully 

defend against the new threat identified in the October 2004 DBT by DOE’s 

implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the October 2004 

DBT and associated guidance documents. We discussed the October 2004 

DBT with officials in DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance 

Assurance and with officials in ESE’s Offices of Environmental 

Management; Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and Science, 

which oversee the five ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear 

material. Finally, where available, we reviewed documents prepared by 

ESE officials on how they plan to comply with the October 2004 DBT. We 

performed our work between March 2004 and July 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In summary, we found the following: 

• Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing Category I special 

nuclear material generally meet existing DOE readiness requirements. 

However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely 

affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. With 

respect to current readiness, 102 of the 105 officers we interviewed stated 

that they believed that they and their fellow officers understood what was 

expected of them if the site were attacked by a terrorist group. Moreover, 

65 of the 105 officers rated themselves as highly ready to defend their site 

while 20 officers rated themselves as somewhat or moderately ready. 

Supporting their views, we found that the five ESE sites we visited had the 

required training programs, facilities, and equipment, and that the 105 

protective force members whose records we reviewed generally complied 

with existing DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness 

levels, and equipment standardization. However, we did find some 

weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of 

protective forces to defend these sites. For example, despite the 

importance of training exercises in which protective forces undergo 

simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force exercises), 

DOE neither sets standards for individual protective force officers to 

participate in these exercises, nor requires sites to track individual 
Page 4 GAO-05-934T 

participation. While 84 of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed 

stated they had participated in a force-on-force exercise, only 46 of the 84 

protective force officers believed that the force-on-force exercises they 

had participated in were either realistic or somewhat realistic. We also 

found that protective force officers at all five of the ESE sites reported 

problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, 

according to 66 of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed, they 

did not always have dependable radio communications, as required by 

DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual. Site security 

officials stated that improvements were underway and would be 

completed this year. 

• To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 

2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they will 

need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include 

transforming its current protective force into an “elite force”—modeled on 

U.S. Special Forces, developing and deploying new security technologies 

to reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating 

and eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among sites, and 

creating a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority 

to ensure coordination across all ESE offices that have Category I special 

nuclear material. However, these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are 

in the early stages of development and will require a significant 

commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE. 

Consequently, their completion by the 2008 October DBT implementation 

deadline is uncertain. 

In our report to you we made five recommendations to the Secretary of 

Energy to track and increase protective force officers’ participation in 

force-on-force training exercises, correct weaknesses with protective 

force officers’ equipment, coordinate implementation of DOE’s various 

efforts designed to meet the 2004 DBT through the development of a 

departmentwide, multiyear implementation plan, and create a more 

effective ESE security organization. 

DOE concurred with our report, accepted our recommendations and 

provided an update on actions it anticipated taking to address our 

recommendations. While we believe that most of DOE’s anticipated 

actions will be responsive to our recommendations, we are concerned 

about DOE’s response to our recommendation that it develop a 

departmentwide, multiyear implementation plan for meeting the 2004 DBT 

requirements. Specifically, in responding to this recommendation, DOE 

cited only individual efforts to address the development of an elite force, 

the deployment of enhanced security technologies, and the consolidation 
Page 5 GAO-05-934T 

of special nuclear material, not the development of a departmentwide, 

multiyear implementation plan. While each of these efforts is important, 

we continue to believe that DOE cannot be successful in meeting the 

requirements of the 2004 DBT by its deadline of October 2008 without an 

integrated effort that is built around a comprehensive plan. 

Five ESE sites collectively contain substantial quantities of Category I 

special nuclear material. These include the following: 

• the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, and the Hanford Site 

in Richland, Washington, which are managed by the Office of 

Environmental Management; 

• the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and the 

Argonne National Laboratory-West, which are located in Idaho Falls, 

Idaho, and are managed by the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and 

Technology3

; and 

• the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which is 

managed by the Office of Science. 

Contractors operate each site for ESE. DOE has requested over $300 

million in fiscal year 2006 for security at these five sites. 

Within DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, DOE’s 

Office of Security develops and promulgates orders and policies to guide 

the department’s safeguards and security programs. DOE’s overall security 

policy is contained in DOE Order 470.1, Safeguards and Security 

Program, which was originally approved in 1995. The key component of 

DOE’s approach to security is the DBT, a classified document that 

identifies the characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. A 

classified companion document, the Adversary Capabilities List, 

provides additional information on terrorist capabilities and equipment. 

The DBT traditionally has been based on a classified, multiagency 

intelligence community assessment of potential terrorist threats, known as 

the Postulated Threat. The threat from terrorist groups is generally the 

most demanding threat contained in the DBT. 

 3

The two Idaho sites were consolidated as a single site, now known as the Idaho National 

Laboratory, in February 2005. 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-05-934T 

DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a multifaceted 

protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, all 

protective systems at DOE’s most sensitive sites employ a defense-indepth concept that includes the following: 

• a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting intruders; 

• physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles; 

• numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers, vehicle 

inspection stations, radiation detectors, and metal detectors; 

• operational security procedures, such as a “two person” rule that prevents 

only one person from having access to special nuclear material; and 

• hardened facilities and vaults. 

Each site also has a heavily armed protective force that is often equipped 

with such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body 

armor, and chemical protective gear. These protective forces are 

comprised of Security Police Officers who are classified into three groups: 

Security Police Officer-I, Security Police Officer-II, and Security Police 

Officer-III. Security Police Officer-Is are only assigned to fixed, armed 

posts. Generally, very few of these officers are used at ESE sites because 

of the limited roles they can fill. Security Police Officer-IIs generally are 

assigned to posts such as access control booths, or to foot or vehicle 

patrols. Finally, Security Police Officer-IIIs are responsible for operations 

such as hostage rescue and the recapture and recovery of special nuclear 

material. According to federal regulations, Security Police Officer-IIIs have 

more demanding physical fitness and training standards than Security 

Police Officer-Is or Security Police Officer-IIs. The ESE sites we visited 

employ about 1,000 Security Police Officer-IIs and Security Police 

Officer-IIIs. ESE protective forces work for private contractors and are 

unionized. 

Protective force duties and requirements, such as physical fitness 

standards, are explained in detail in DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force 

Program Manual, as well as in DOE regulations (10 C.F.R. pt. 1046, 

Physical Protection of Security Interests). DOE issued the current 

Protective Force Program Manual in June 2000. Although protective 

forces are expected to comply with the duties and requirements 

established in DOE policies, deviations from these policies are allowed as 

long as certain approval and notification criteria are met. 
Page 7 GAO-05-934T 

In addition to complying with these security requirements, DOE protective 

systems, including protective forces, also must meet performance 

standards. For example, DOE sites are required to demonstrate that their 

protective systems are capable of defending special nuclear material 

against terrorist forces identified in the DBT. The performance of 

protective systems is formally and regularly examined through 

vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment is a systematic 

evaluation process in which qualitative and quantitative techniques are 

applied to detect vulnerabilities and arrive at effective protection of 

specific assets, such as special nuclear material. To conduct such 

assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts, such 

as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and forceon-force exercises, in which the site’s protective forces undergo simulated 

attacks by a group of mock terrorists. In addition to their use in evaluating 

the effectiveness of physical protection strategies, DOE believes force-onforce exercises are the most realistic representation of adversary attacks 

that can be used to train protective forces. 

Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing Category I special 

nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements. 

Specifically, we determined that ESE protective forces generally comply 

with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and 

equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required 

training programs, facilities, and equipment. In addition, we found that the 

majority of the 105 protective force members we interviewed at ESE sites 

generally believe that they currently are ready to perform their mission of 

protecting the site’s special nuclear material. However, we did find some 

weaknesses at ESE sites that could impair the ability of ESE protective 

forces to defend their sites. 

A ready force should possess a sufficient number of experienced, trained, 

and properly equipped personnel. Through realistic and comprehensive 

training, these personnel are forged into a cohesive unit that can perform 

its tasks even under extreme conditions. DOE orders and federal 

regulations establish the framework for ensuring that DOE protective 

forces are ready to perform their mission. We found that ESE protective 

force officers generally believe that they are ready to perform their 

mission. Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers we interviewed stated that 

they believed that they, and their fellow officers, understood what was 

expected of them should the site be attacked by a terrorist group. 

Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated the readiness of their site’s 

Protective Forces at 

ESE Sites Generally 

Meet Established 

DOE Readiness 

Requirements, but 

Some Weaknesses in 

Protective Force 

Practices Exist 

Protective Force Officers 

Are Confident in Their 

Current Overall Readiness 

and Generally Meet the 

DOE Training and 

Equipment Requirements 

We Reviewed 
Page 8 GAO-05-934T 

protective force as high, while 20 officers rated their protective force as 

somewhat or moderately ready to defend the site. Only a minority of the 

officers (16 of 105) we interviewed rated the readiness of their force to 

defend their sites as low. In addition, the majority of officers we 

interviewed believed they and the protective force officers with whom 

they worked on a regular basis have formed a cohesive unit that would be 

able to perform their most essential mission—that of protecting special 

nuclear material. For example, of the 105 officers we interviewed, 84 

officers responded that they had a high degree of confidence in their 

fellow officers in the event of a terrorist attack, and 88 reported that their 

fellow officers would be willing to risk their lives in defense of their site. 

As called for in DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual, readiness is 

achieved through appropriate training and equipment. Each of the five 

sites we visited had formally approved annual training plans. Each site 

generally had the training facilities, such as firearms ranges, classrooms, 

computer terminals, and exercise equipment, which enabled them to meet 

their current DOE and federal training requirements. Furthermore, each 

site maintained computerized databases for tracking individual protective 

force officers’ compliance with training requirements. To determine if 

these programs and facilities were being used to implement the DOE 

requirements and federal regulations, we focused on three key areas—

firearms proficiency, physical fitness, and protective force officer 

equipment. 

• Firearms Proficiency. DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual states 

that protective force officers must demonstrate their proficiency with the 

weapons that are assigned to them every 6 months. According to the 

training records of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed, 79 had 

met this proficiency requirement with their primary weapon, the M-4 or M16 semiautomatic rifle. Of the 26 officers who had not met this 

requirement within the 6 month time frame, 11 officers were all located at 

one site and 8 of these 11 officers did not meet the requirement until 2 to 5 

months after the required time. According to an official at this site, seven 

of the eight officers could not complete the requirement in a timely fashion 

because the site’s firing range was closed for the investigation of an 

accidental weapon discharge that had resulted in an injury to a protective 

force officer. We determined that 2 of the 26 officers did not complete the 

requirement for medical reasons. We were not given reasons why the 

remaining officers did not meet the requirement. 
Page 9 GAO-05-934T 

• Physical Fitness. Under DOE regulations,4 DOE’s contractors’ protective 

force personnel who are authorized to carry firearms must meet a 

minimum standard for physical fitness every 12 months. There are two 

standards for such personnel—Offensive Combative and Defensive 

Combative. All Security Police Officer-IIIs, which include DOE special 

response team members, must meet the Offensive Combative standard, 

which requires a 1-mile run in no more than 8 minutes 30 seconds and a 

40-yard prone-to-running dash in no more than 8 seconds. All other 

protective officers authorized to carry firearms must meet the Defensive 

Combative standard, which requires a one-half mile run in no more than 4 

minutes 40 seconds and a 40-yard prone-to-running dash in no more than 

8.5 seconds. According to the training records of the 105 protective force 

officers we reviewed, 103 of the 105 protective force officers had met the 

standard required by federal regulation for their position. Two officers 

who did not meet the requirement were on medical restriction. The 

records for another officer showed him as having met the requirement, but 

additional records provided by the site showed the officer had completed 

the run in a time that exceeded the standard. Site officials could not 

provide an explanation for this discrepancy. 

• Protective Officer Equipment. DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual

sets a number of requirements for protective force equipment. For 

example, all Security Police Officers are required to carry a minimum set 

of equipment, including a portable radio, a handgun, and an intermediate 

force weapon such as a baton. In addition, a mask to protect against a 

chemical attack must be carried or available to them. All Security Police 

Officer-IIs and Security Police Officer-IIIs must also have access to 

personal protective body armor. In addition, firearms must be kept 

serviceable at all times and must be inspected by a DOE-certified armorer 

at least twice a year to ensure serviceability. Issued firearms must be 

inventoried at the beginning of each shift, an inventory of all firearms in 

storage must be conducted weekly, and a complete inventory of all 

firearms must be conducted on a monthly basis. Finally, DOE protective 

forces equipment must be tailored to counter adversaries identified in the 

DBT. To this end, sites employ a variety of equipment, including automatic 

weapons, night vision equipment, and body armor. In most cases, each 

site’s protective forces carried or had access to the required minimum 

standard duty equipment. Most sites demonstrated that they had access to 

certified armorers, and each site maintained the required firearms 

maintenance, inspection, and inventory records, often kept in a detailed 

 4

10 C.F.R. pt. 1046, subpt. B, app. A. 
Page 10 GAO-05-934T 

computerized database. The appropriate policies and procedures were 

also in place for the inventory of firearms. In addition, some sites have 

substantially increased their protective forces weaponry since September 

11, 2001, or have plans to further enhance these capabilities to meet the 

2004 DBT. 

While protective forces at ESE sites are generally meeting current DOE 

requirements, we identified some weaknesses in ESE protective force 

practices that could adversely affect the current readiness of ESE 

protective forces to defend their sites. These include protective force 

officers’ lack of participation in realistic force-on-force exercises; the 

frequency and quality of training opportunities; the lack of dependable 

communications systems; insufficient protective gear, including protective 

body armor and chemical protective gear; and the lack of armored 

vehicles. 

• Performance Testing and Training. According to DOE’s Protective Force 

Program Manual, performance tests are used to evaluate and verify the 

effectiveness of protective force programs and to provide needed training. 

A force-on-force exercise is one type of performance test during which the 

protective force engages in a simulated battle against a mock adversary 

force, employing the weapons, equipment, and methodologies postulated 

in the DBT. DOE believes that force-on-force exercises are a valuable 

training tool for protective force officers. Consequently, DOE policy 

requires that force-on-force exercises be held at least once a year at sites 

that possess Category I quantities of special nuclear material or Category 

II quantities that can be rolled up to Category I quantities. However, DOE 

neither sets standards for individual protective force officers’ participation 

in these exercises, nor requires sites to track individual participation. 

While 84 of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed stated they 

had participated in a force-on-force exercise, only 46 of the 84 protective 

force officers believed that the force-on-force exercises they had 

participated in were either realistic or somewhat realistic. Additionally, 

protective force officers often told us that they did not have frequent and 

realistic tactical training. In this regard, 33 of the 84 protective force 

officers reported that safety considerations interfered with the realism of 

the force-on-force exercises, with some protective force officers stating 

that they were limited in the tactics they could employ. For example, some 

protective force officers stated that they were not allowed to run up 

stairwells, climb fences, or exceed the speed limit in patrol vehicles. 

Contractors’ protective force managers agreed that safety requirements 

limited the kind of realistic force-on-force training that are needed to 

ensure effective protective force performance. 

Some Weaknesses in ESE 

Site Protective Force 

Practices Exist 
Page 11 GAO-05-934T 

• Communications Equipment. According to DOE’s Protective Force 

Program Manual, the radios protective force officers use must be capable 

of two-way communications, provide intelligible voice communications, 

and be readily available in sufficient numbers to equip protective force 

personnel. In addition, a sufficient number of batteries must be available 

and maintained in a charged condition. Protective force officers at all five 

of the sites we visited reported problems with their radio communications 

systems. Specifically, 66 of the 105 protective force officers reported that 

they did not always have dependable radio communications, with 23 

officers identifying sporadic battery life, and 29 officers reporting poor 

reception at some locations on site as the two most significant problems. 

In addition, some of the protective force officers believed that radio 

communications were not sufficient to support their operations and could 

not be relied on if a terrorist attack occurred. Site security officials at two 

sites acknowledged that efforts were under way to improve radio 

communications equipment. In addition, security officials said other forms 

of communications, such as telephones, cellular telephones, and pagers, 

were provided for protective forces to ensure that they could 

communicate effectively. 

• Protective Body Armor. DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual requires 

that Security Police Officer-IIs and -IIIs wear body armor or that body 

armor be stationed in a way that allows them to quickly put it on to 

respond to an attack without negatively impacting response times. At one 

site, we found that most Security Police Officer-IIs had not been issued 

protective body armor because the site had requested and received in July 

2003 a waiver to deviate from the requirement to equip all Security Police 

Officer-IIs with body armor. The waiver was sought for a number of 

reasons, including the (1) increased potential for heat-related injuries 

while wearing body armor during warm weather, (2) increased equipment 

load that armor would place on protective force members, (3) costs of 

acquiring the necessary quantity of body armor and the subsequent 

replacement costs, and (4) associated risks of not providing all Security 

Police Officer-IIs with body armor could be mitigated by using cover 

provided at the site by natural and man-made barriers. According to a site 

security official, this waiver is currently being reviewed because of the 

increased threat contained in the 2004 DBT. 

• Special Response Team Capabilities. Security Police Officers-IIIs serve on 

special response teams responsible for offensive operations, such as 

hostage rescue and the recapture and recovery of special nuclear material. 

Special response teams are often assigned unique equipment, including 

specially encrypted radios; body armor that provides increased levels of 

protection; special suits that enable officers to operate and fight in 
Page 12 GAO-05-934T 

chemically contaminated environments; special vehicles, including 

armored vehicles; submachine guns; light machine guns; grenade 

launchers; and precision rifles, such as Remington 700 rifles and Barrett 

.50 caliber rifles. These response teams are also issued breaching tools to 

allow them to reenter facilities to which terrorists may have gained access. 

Each site with Category I special nuclear material must have a special 

response team capability available on a continuous basis. However, one 

ESE site does not have this capability and, instead, relies on another 

organization, through a formal memorandum of understanding, to provide 

a special response team. This arrangement, however, has not been 

comprehensively performance-tested, as called for in the memorandum of 

understanding. Site officials state that they will soon conduct the first 

comprehensive performance test of this memorandum of understanding. 

• Chemical Protective Gear. DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual

specifies that all Security Police Officer-IIs and -IIIs be provided, at a 

minimum, with protective masks that provide for nuclear, chemical, and 

biological protection. Other additional chemical protective gear and 

procedures are delegated to the sites. At the four sites with special 

response teams, we found that the teams all had special suits that allowed 

them to operate and fight in environments that might be chemically 

contaminated. For Security Police Officers-IIs, chemical protective 

equipment and expectations for fighting in chemically contaminated 

environments varied. For example, two sites provided additional 

protective equipment for their Security Police Officer-IIs and expected 

them to fight in such environments. Another site did not provide additional 

equipment but expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to evacuate along 

with other site workers. Finally, the one site that did not have a special 

response team expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to fight in 

chemically contaminated environments. However, the site provided no 

additional protective gear for its officers other than standard-duty issue 

long-sleeved shirts and the required protective masks. 

• Protective Force Vehicles. We found that ESE sites currently do not have 

the same level of vehicle protection as National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA) sites that also have Category I special nuclear 

material. Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA sites with 

Category I special nuclear material currently operate armored vehicles. 

However, only one of the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear 

material operated armored vehicles at the time of our review. One other 

ESE site was planning to deploy armored vehicles. 
Page 13 GAO-05-934T 

To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 

2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they 

need to take several actions. These include transforming its current 

protective force into an elite force, developing and deploying new security 

technologies, consolidating and eliminating special nuclear material, and 

making organizational improvements within ESE’s security program. 

However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early 

stages of development and will require a significant commitment of 

resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the 

October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is uncertain. The status of 

these initiatives is as follows: 

• Elite Forces. DOE officials believe that the way its sites, including those 

sites managed by ESE, currently train their contractor-operated protective 

forces will not be adequate to defeat the terrorist threat contained in the 

2004 DBT. This view is shared by most protective force officers (74 out of 

105) and their contractor protective force managers who report that they 

are not at all confident in their current ability to defeat the new threats 

contained in the 2004 DBT. In response, the department has proposed the 

development of an elite force that would be patterned after U. S. Special 

Forces and might eventually be converted from a contractor-operated 

force into a federal force. Nevertheless, despite broad support, DOE’s 

proposal for an elite force remains largely in the conceptual phase. DOE 

has developed a preliminary draft implementation plan that lays out highlevel milestones and key activities, but this plan has not been formally 

approved by the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. The 

draft implementation plan recognizes that DOE will have to undertake and 

complete a number of complex tasks in order to develop the elite force 

envisioned. For example, DOE will have to revise its existing protective 

forces policies to incorporate, among other things, the increased training 

standards that are needed to create an elite force. Since this proposal is 

only in the conceptual phase, completing this effort by the October 2008 

DBT implementation deadline is unlikely. 

• New Security Technologies. DOE is seeking to improve the effectiveness 

and survivability of its protective forces by developing and deploying new 

security technologies. It believes technologies can reduce the risk to 

protective forces in case of an attack and can provide additional response 

time to meet and defeat an attack. Sixteen of the 105 protective force 

officers we interviewed generally supported this view and said they 

needed enhanced detection technologies that would allow them to detect 

adversaries at much greater ranges than is currently possible at most sites. 

However, a senior DOE official recently conceded that the department has 

not yet taken the formal steps necessary to coordinate investment in 

DOE and ESE 

Officials Need to Take 

Several Prompt and 

Coordinated Actions 

to Address the New 

DBT Requirements by 

2008 
Page 14 GAO-05-934T 

emerging security technologies and that the role of technology in helping 

sites meet the new threats contained in the 2004 DBT by the department’s 

deadline of October 2008 is uncertain. 

• Consolidation and Elimination of Materials. ESE’s current strategy to 

meet the October 2008 deadline relies heavily on consolidating and 

eliminating special nuclear material between and among ESE sites. For 

example, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology plans to 

down-blend special nuclear material and extract medically useful isotopes 

at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory—an Office of Science site. This 

action would eliminate most of the security concerns surrounding the 

material. Neither program office, however, has been able to formally agree 

on its share of additional security costs, which have increased significantly 

because of the new DBT. In addition, neither ESE nor DOE has developed 

a comprehensive, departmentwide plan to achieve the needed cooperation 

and agreement among the sites and program offices to consolidate special 

nuclear material, as we recommended in our April 2004 report. In the 

absence of a comprehensive plan, completing most of these consolidation 

activities by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is unlikely. 

• Organizational Improvements. The ESE headquarters security 

organization is not well suited to meeting the challenges associated with 

implementing the 2004 DBT. Specifically, there is no centralized security 

organization within the Office of the Under Secretary, ESE. The individual 

who serves as the Acting ESE Security Director has been detailed to the 

Office by DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and 

has no programmatic authority or staff. This lack of authority limits the 

Director’s ability to facilitate ESE and DOE-wide cooperation on such 

issues as material down-blending at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and 

material consolidation at other ESE sites. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may 

have. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841. James Noel, Jonathan Gill, Don Cowan, and Preston Heard 

made key contributions to this testimony. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(360616) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER