1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 94-10667

Summary Calendar.

T.H. INC. and Edwin T. McBirney, III, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

6218 INVESTORS, et al., Defendants,

RTC as Receiver for Sunbelt Federal Savings, Defendant-Appellee.

Jan. 5, 1995.

Appeal f rom the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, DAVIS and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs T.H., Inc. and Edwin T. McBirney, III appea l the

district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant

Resolution Trust Corporation (the "RTC"), as receiver for Sunbelt

Federal Savings, FSB ("Sunbelt"). We reverse the grant of summary

judgment and remand to the district court for remand to the state

courts of Texas.

BACKGROUND

This suit involves real property known as 6218 Raintree Court,

Dallas, Texas (the "Property"). On April 2, 1985, the Property was

conveyed to 6218 Investors, Ltd. ("Investors"). Investors executed

a deed of trust in favor of Wes tern Savings & Loan Association

("Western"). On August 30, 1988, Investors granted plaintiffs an

option to purchase the Property. Western subsequently transferred

the deed of trust to Sunbelt, and the RTC acquired the deed of2

trust as receiver for Sunbelt.

On October 2, 1992, plain tiffs filed a suit for declaratory

judgment against the RTC and other parties in Texas state district

court, seeking to clarify that their option to purchase was valid

and superior to the lien which Sunbelt held on the Property.

Plaintiffs provided the RTC and the other defendants with a copy of

the pleadings they had filed on or about that same day. Citation

was subsequently served on the RTC on January 28, 1993.

The RTC filed a notice of removal on March 26, 1993. The

federal district court denied a motion by plaintiffs to remand to

state court. The district court then granted the RTC's motion for

summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs' causes of action against

the remaining defendants.

DISCUSSION

We hold that the RTC's notice of removal to federal court was

untimely, and that the district court therefore should have

remanded the case to Texas state district court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1447(c).

In its notice of removal, the RTC cited the general removal

provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1446, as the basis for removal in this case.

However, the RTC did not file its notice of removal within the time

period specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1446. That provision allows

removal within thirty days "after the receipt by the defendant,

through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading

..." The RTC filed its notice of removal on March 26, 1993, almost

six months after plaintiffs provided the RTC w ith a copy of the3

pleadings and more than 30 days after the citation was served on

the RTC.

Assuming that the RTC may also rely on the removal provision

of 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) (Supp.1994), which it did not cite in

its notice of removal, the RTC still failed to comply with the time

period requirements for removal. The Financial Institutions Reform

and Recovery Act of 1989 provides, in 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B),

for an ext ended time period for removal in a suit involving the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation operating in its capacity as

the RTC. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B), the RTC may remove to

federal court "before the end of the 90-day period beginning on the

date the action, suit, or proceeding is filed against the [RTC] or

the [RTC] is substituted as a party." The RTC filed its notice of

removal in this case on March 26, 1993, after the 90-day period for

removal, running from the filing of the suit on O ctober 2, 1993,

had expired.

The RTC argues that it filed its notice within the applicable

time period, because the time period did not begin to run until the

RTC appeared in the suit by filing an answer in state court on

February 19, 1993. The RTC bases its argument on the latter part

of 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B), which provides that the 90-day period

for removal may begin on the date the RTC is substituted as a

party. The RTC points to caselaw which indicates that the RTC will

not be considered to be a party until it has made an appearance in

the state court suit. S ee FDIC v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316, 327 (5th

Cir.1992).4

In this case, however, the RTC was named as a defendant in the

original petition. The RTC already served as receiver for Sunbelt

when the suit was filed. There was no need to substitute the RTC

as a party, and so the language provi ding for the running of the

90-day period after substitution does not apply. In F DIC v. Loyd,

the court held that the FDIC (acting in its capacity as the RTC in

this case) could not be considered a party under § 1446(b) "until

it ... made an appearance, voluntary or involuntary, in the state

court case." 955 F.2d at 327. But, in that case, the FDIC had not

been a party to the suit when it was filed. It did not become

receiver for a party involved in the suit until after the suit had

been brought. The court was forced to look at the language of 12

U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) providing that the 90-day period may begin

to run when the FDIC is substituted as a party and determine when

the FDIC became a party. Such a determination is not required in

this case, because the RTC was always a party to the suit.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH ORDERS TO REMAND TO STATE COURT.