*This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicataand collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 8/2/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

_____________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EDDIE LEE WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-7162 (D.C. No. CR-91-6-S) (E.D. Okla.)

_____________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

_____________________ Before BRORBY, EBEL and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

_____________________ After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Mr. Williams, a federal inmate and a pro se litigan t, was stopped in-2-

Stapleton Airport in Denver at which time drug enfo rcement agents seized $10,000 cash from him. The money was administrativ ely forfeited. Mr. Williams was then convicted of sixteen felony drug counts. After his conviction, Mr. Williams, as part of the criminal proceeding, asked for the return of all properties seized. This motion was denied. Mr. Williams now appeals the denial of that motion. Mr. Williams raises two issues: first, “The multip le proceedings and multiple punishments that were in violation of the double jeopardy clause,” and second, “The DEA agent testified at the defendant’s trial about the seized $10,000.00. All of the other seized property was c onfiscated using an IRS search warrant, except for the $512.00 seized at the defen dant’s arrest. All the property was used as evidence at the trial of the defendant. " We first examine our jurisdiction to hear this appe al. The question we must address is whether an appeal from the denial of a m otion for the return of property filed in a criminal case is governed by th e civil rule, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) allowing sixty days to appeal, or the criminal rule , Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) allowing ten days to appeal. In United States v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1996), we held "'[w]here criminal proceedings against the movant have already been-3-

completed, a district court should treat a rule 41( e) motion as a civil complaint.'" (quoting Onwubiko v. United States , 969 F.2d 1392, 1397 (2d Cir. 1992)). Although Mr. Williams failed to cite to Fed. R. Cri m. P. 41(e) in his motion, this was the proper basis under which he could move for the return of the seized property. Because Mr. Williams is proceeding pro s e we will treat his motion as coming under 41(e) and find his motion was therefor e filed in within Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)'s sixty-day limit and we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Turning to the merits of this appeal, we are not pe rsuaded the trial court erred. A fair reading of Mr. Williams’ brief shows he is arguing the administrative forfeiture constituted double jeopar dy. This argument has no merit. See United States v. Ursery, ___ S. Ct. ____, 1996 WL 340815 (June 24 1996) and United States v. German , 76 F.3d 315 (10th Cir. 1996). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED . Entered for the Court WADE BRORBY United States Circuit Judge