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22–739 PDF 2005

S. HRG. 109–86

FIREFIGHTING PREPAREDNESS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND FORESTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

FIREFIGHTING PREPAREDNESS

APRIL 26, 2005

(

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico, Chairman 

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho 

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

RICHARD M. BURR, North Carolina, 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

JIM BUNNING, Kentucky 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey 

KEN SALAZAR, Colorado

ALEX FLINT, Staff Director 

JUDITH K. PENSABENE, Chief Counsel 

ROBERT M. SIMON, Democratic Staff Director 

SAM E. FOWLER, Democratic Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND FORESTS

LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho, Chairman 

CONRAD R. BURNS, Montana, Vice Chairman

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming 

JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington

PETE V. DOMENICI and JEFF BINGAMAN are Ex Officio Members of the Subcommittee

FRANK GLADICS, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT MILLER, Democratic Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS 

Page

Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator From New Mexico ........................................ 2

Burns, Hon. Conrad, U.S. Senator From Montana ............................................... 5

Caswell, James, Office of Species Conservation, State of Idaho, accompanied 

by Kirk Rowdabaugh, State Forester of Idaho .................................................. 32

Craig, Hon. Larry E., U.S. Senator From Idaho ................................................... 1

Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator From Alaska ............................................... 3

Nazarro, Robin M., Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 17

Rey, Mark, Under Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment, Department of Agriculture, accompanied by Lynn Scarlett, Assistant Secretary, 

Policy, Management and Budget, Department of the Interior ......................... 7

APPENDIX 

APPENDIX I 

Responses to additional questions .......................................................................... 59

APPENDIX II 

Additional material submitted for the record ........................................................ 69

(1)

FIREFIGHTING PREPAREDNESS 

APRIL 26, 2005

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND FORESTS, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in room 

SD–366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Larry E. Craig presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LARRY E. CRAIG,

U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO 

Senator CRAIG. Good afternoon, everyone. the Subcommittee on 

Public Lands and Forests will convene. 

I want to welcome all of our witnesses. Assistant Secretary of 

Policy, Management and Budget for the Department of the Interior, Lynn Scarlett. Lynn, welcome. 

Under Secretary of Natural Resources and the Environment for 

the Department of Agriculture, Mark Rey. Mark, welcome. 

Robin M. Nazzaro, Director of Natural Resources and Environment at the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Robin, welcome. 

Jim Caswell—I have had the privilege of working with Jim over 

the years out in the State of Idaho, Office of Species Conservation 

for the State of Idaho—who is here today to testify on the Western 

Fire Leadership Council blue ribbon report on large fire suppression costs. Jim was a co-chair, along with Kirk Rowdabaugh, State 

Forester of Arizona, who is the other co-chair of that council. 

So we welcome all of you for being with us today. 

I am going to ask that all of you come to the witness table as 

you have. Together we will take testimony from all of the agencies 

and then from the Government Accountability Office and finally 

from the blue ribbon panel. I am doing this so that we can gain 

the benefit of give and take between our witnesses during the question and answer period. I am interested in some give and take between you as it relates to the question of fire costs and what can 

be done to control these costs. 

As we have done in past years, we are very interested in your 

projection of the upcoming fire season. I have to say the outlook for 

my State of Idaho and the Pacific Northwest is not very good at 

this moment. 

In 6 out of the last 8 years, we have expended more funding on 

fire suppression than was appropriated. While over eight million 

2

acres burned last year, over 80 percent of those acres were in the 

State of Alaska. 

I am concerned what the costs might be. If those six-to-seven 

million acres burned were in the Intermountain West or in the 

Cascades, I think those projections would have been dramatically 

different, or the realities would have been. 

We are also going to hear from Robin Nazzaro on two reports 

that the Government Accountability Office has recently completed: 

one on progress on cohesive strategy, and one on assessing technology to better protect structures and improve communications 

during these wildfires. Both have implications on the long-term 

costs of firefighting. 

We all understand that the decision to ground the heavy fixed 

wing retardant aircraft had both monetary and operational impacts. It also forced the agencies to re-examine the contracts they 

use to ensure needed aerial assets are available. 

I am afraid, given the number of calls, letters, and visits that I 

have received, that this transition is not going smoothly, and I will 

be asking questions on these issues. 

I know that Senators Wyden and, of course, the ranking member 

of the full committee, Senator Bingaman, and others have issues 

that they want to hear about and are most interested in the projections you all see for the upcoming fire season. 

We will follow a 5-minute testimony rule today to allow maximum time for questions from all of you. Before I ask for you to 

start, Lynn, I will turn to Senator Bingaman for any opening comments he would like to make. 

Senator. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR

FROM NEW MEXICO 

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much. Thanks to all the witnesses for being here. Chief Domback, in a recent article, observed 

we spend half the year talking about the need to reintroduce fire 

into fire-adaptive ecosystems, and the other half of the year suppressing wildfire at substantial economic costs. I thought that was 

an insightful comment. 

We have several reports that I gather—a couple of reports that 

we are going to hear something about today, and let me just highlight a couple of issues that I think are covered in those reports. 

There is a cost management report, as I understand it. The 

Western Governors have endorsed the report as highly persuasive. 

Agencies have agreed to implement the recommendations of that 

report. 

I guess my question would be what are we waiting on? Is there 

some reason we are not going ahead? There have been several 

months that have passed since the report was issued, and I have 

not seen indications that we are going ahead and implementing the 

recommendations. 

One other issue, Mr. Chairman, I wanted to flag for the panel 

is that we had this tragic air crash in California last week, and I 

am very unclear in my own mind about what the plan is with regard to the airtanker situation, both short term and long term. 

3

I hope the witnesses can address that. That is a subject that we 

have heard about now for several years, and I had sort of thought 

we were on the way to getting that fixed, but I guess my information was erroneous in that regard. But I would be interested in 

hearing anything I could on that subject. Thank you very much. 

Senator CRAIG. Senator, thank you. 

Senator Murkowski, do you have any opening comments? 

STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR

FROM ALASKA 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will put 

the full comments of my statement in the record, but I do want to 

follow up on Senator Bingaman’s comment about the loss of the 

three fire aviators last Wednesday. We join with their families and 

their co-workers in grieving their loss. 

For those of us in Alaska, we recognize that wildfires are part 

of our summer, part of the landscape out there, but last year was 

tough for us. 2004 was our worst fire season in our State’s history. 

We had 148,000 lightning strikes. On one afternoon that I was 

there, they had had 11 just minutes before. We had 737 wildfires, 

6.72 million acres burned. That is one of the estimates, incredible 

in terms of our numbers. 

Hundreds were evacuated from their homes. Some were evacuated, returned to their homes, and then had to be evacuated again. 

On the positive side for us in Alaska, there was no loss of life 

and very little loss to private property. But it bears noting that 

that 2004 fire season did not end because the firefighters were successful in extinguishing the fires; it ended basically because winter 

came. The fires continued literally all summer. And it wasn’t just 

the fire itself, but the smoke, and the effect on the quality of life. 

We had 40 days, a full month plus, of extreme smoke conditions 

in Fairbanks. Forty days of toil on economic and recreational opportunities. Forty days of really very difficult breathing in interior 

Alaska. 

I was up there on several occasions, and your eyes burned, your 

lungs burned. And I was inside, in the buildings. 

We saw the smoke migrating all across the State, so thick actually, down in Anchorage, that we had air-quality warnings. So, 

again, Mr. Chairman, we hope that in Alaska we are not faced with 

another fire season like we had in 2004. 

I am going to be listening with great interest as we discuss how 

we deal with the assets that are available to us and assets available in a timely manner. 

We were very concerned about whether or not we would be able 

to get the aircraft that we needed. There were issues that crossed 

jurisdictional bounds, let us say, that complicated the scene for us, 

and my constituents were very concerned. 

They did not care whether it was Federal property or State property. They wanted to know that somebody was going to be coming 

to aid and assist. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that we are having this hearing 

today and look forward to the comments from all those that have 

joined us here this afternoon. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Murkowski follows:]

4

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Last Wednesday, the lives of three fire aviators 

were lost when the P-3 Orion aircraft they were training on went down in the 

Lassen National Forest in California. We join with their families and their co-workers in grieving their loss. 

Wildland firefighting is dangerous work and when one of our brave wildland firefighters is lost, the people in my State of Alaska grieve. The nation grieves. Our 

wildland firefighters and wildland aviators are the people who protect our homes, 

our property and our lives. 

In 2004, nobody knew this better than Alaskans. During the summer of 2004, 

Alaska experienced the worst fire season in our State’s young history. 

The statistics are staggering:

• 148,000 lightning strikes • 737 wildfires • 6.72 million acres burned—that’s one of the estimates • Hundreds were evacuated from their homes—some evacuated, returned to their 

homes and evacuated again. • On the positive side, no loss of life and little loss of private property.

Yet it bears noting that the 2004 fire season did not end because firefighters extinguished the fires—it ended because winter extinguished the fires. 

The 2004 fires caused Alaskans to fully appreciate the impact that smoke can 

have on the quality of life. 40 days of extreme smoke conditions in Fairbanks. 40 

days of toll on economic and recreational opportunities. 40 days of hard breathing 

for the residents of Interior Alaska. 

Worse yet, the smoke migrated. The people who live in South Central Alaska will 

not soon forget the week of August 16th. Smoke poured into the Anchorage Bowl 

and the Mat-Su Valley without warning. Smoke so thick you could cut it with a 

knife. The smoke was so thick that people in downtown Anchorage began to fear 

that the fire was burning in their own backyards. 

It is important that we dwell on the words ‘‘without warning.’’ But it is also significant to ask why the management agencies could not tell the people of Anchorage 

where it was coming from. 

There were initial reports that the smoke was coming from a prescribed fire set 

by the Bureau of Land Management in the Glennallen area, 185 miles to the east 

of Anchorage. Anchorage officials expressed outrage that a prescribed fire would be 

set during the extreme fire season and without any warning to our State’s most populous community. 

The Bureau of Land Management insists and has presented evidence to support 

that the smoke did not come from Glennallen but from Interior Alaska, having traveled more than 250 miles. 

Whatever the cause, the people of South Central Alaska were rudely awakened 

by the persistent smoke conditions that had been plaguing the people of Interior 

Alaska on a daily basis since late June. 

It is customary after each fire season to focus on the lessons learned. Ordinarily 

this after-action review is conducted within the Fire Service. However, 2004 was no 

ordinary year for Alaska. 

Following the 2004 season, Mayor Jim Whittaker and the Fairbanks North Star 

Borough Assembly appointed a commission of three outstanding citizens to conduct 

their own independent review of the wildfire response. 

In Alaska, wildfires are fought on an interagency basis with the State and the 

federal government sharing responsibility and resources. So many of the recommendations contained in the report are directed to the federal government as 

well as the State. 

There are 22 recommendations in the report and I will not go into each of them. 

I would ask that the Department of the Interior and the Forest Service respond to 

each of the recommendations for the record. 

I would like to highlight a few recommendations of national significance:

• The wildfire commissioners were gravely concerned that fire managers did not 

consider the effects of smoke on populated areas in determining the intensity 

of their initial attack. Their attention was focused solely on the risk that the 

fire posed to structures, particularly inhabited structures. They did not consider 

the public health effects of smoke. As a result, Fairbanks experienced 40 days 

of extreme smoke conditions that seriously violated air quality standards. 

• The availability of heavy fixed wing retardant tankers is diminishing and is insufficient. The commissioners recommended that the nation should immediately 

address the need for a modern and technologically advanced tanker fleet and 

5

agencies should insure that sufficient aircraft are available at the start of the 

2005 season. • More helicopters need to be available for fire suppression. • The transition between Type III, Type II and Type I Incident Management 

Teams and back again occurred suddenly. Moreover, concern was expressed 

that the national teams could not access local expertise. • And, of course, there is a continued need to educate the public about Firewise 

behavior. • The quality of public information and the need for early implementation of joint 

information centers to control rumors and resolve differences of interpretation 

between agencies was also noted by the Commissioners. I should point out that 

even though a joint information center was up and running in Fairbanks on August 16, the people of Anchorage, 260 air miles to the south, felt that they were 

‘‘in the dark’’ where the smoke was coming from. Municipal leaders were receiving conflicting information from the agencies. This should not be happening.

I commend the members of the Wildland Fire Commission for a very thoughtful 

analysis and I will look forward to hearing how the fire management agencies will 

implement the recommendations. 

The federal government responded to the 2004 fire season in Alaska with a vast 

array of resources. Wildland firefighters were dispatched from across the country to 

supplement our own very able Alaska crews. 

We were blessed to benefit from the expertise of experienced Incident Commanders and their interagency wildland fire teams. Much of the Nation’s top fire 

talent was in Alaska last summer. 

I was privileged to watch these dedicated people in action on July 5th when I visited the Type I team managing the Boundary Fire, north of Fairbanks. 

My State Forester, Jeff Jahnke, has asked me to express two words to the dedicated fire managers, wildland firefighters and fire aviators who came to Alaska last 

summer. Those two words are ‘‘Thank you.’’ You are our heroes and we thank you. 

And let me add my personal thanks to Interior Secretary Gale Norton and to 

Mark Rey, the Undersecretary of Agriculture, who were always there when I needed 

them. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for convening this hearing. You have assembled a distinguished panel and I look forward to their testimony.

Senator CRAIG. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Burns. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS, U.S. SENATOR

FROM MONTANA 

Senator BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I give 

up. I just give up. Up in Montana, we got a snow pack. It is about 

60, 65 percent of normal. We are getting rain now, and maybe that 

will not be so darn wet up there. Who knows. We got lucky last 

year, and I would hope that we could probably be fortunate enough, 

because I have given up. 

I believe in prevention, and we are not getting it done. We are 

not cutting it. I lost another mill, got logs laying on the ground, 

cannot get to them, and I just give up. 

So I have this to put on the record, and I will hear what they 

have got to say, but it has got to be pretty darn good. Thank you 

very much. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Burns follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD R. BURNS, U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA

In 2004, nearly 7 million acres of forest and rangeland were burned including 6 

million acres in Alaska, which experienced its largest wildfire season on record. 

Wildfire suppression costs were $900 million which I understand includes the additional $60 million of replacing the large airtanker fleet with helicopters and single 

engine airtankers. 

In Montana, we’ve been fortunate to have some spring moisture, but with the 

snow pack at 60 percent of average in Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington, 

combined with the continuing drought, we could experience another severe fire seaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
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son in these states. The good news is we do have a decent snow pack for the southwest, California, Colorado, and Utah. 

In 2004 an independent panel of federal, state, and county experts completed a 

fire-suppression cost-management report. Another cost management report issued 

by the National Academy of Public Administration stated the Forest Service and the 

Department of the Interior could substantially reduce wildfire suppression costs by 

changing its purchasing activities. 

I would be interested in the Department of Agriculture and the Department of 

the Interior progress in implementing the reports’ recommendations. I would specifically like to hear the progress made to ensure initial responses are guided by the 

closest appropriate forces, especially those of local and Tribal governments. 

I have some concerns with the National Fire Plan funding. The continued funding 

for wildland fire preparedness and hazardous fuel reduction is important and I 

strongly support increasing the funding for both of them. 

What I am concerned about is the reduced funding for community assistance and restoration. I find it difficult to accept that the FY 2006 Budget proposes an $88 

million reduction in State and Private Forestry, which includes $32 million in cooperative fire assistance, $32 million in forest health management, and $23 million 

in cooperative forestry, and the elimination of the economic action program. Other 

reductions include State Fire Assistance $23 million and cooperative land management $31 million. 

This strikes me as a poor way to meet the recommendations of both the Wildlands 

Fire Leadership Council and the National Fire Plan which emphasize the federal 

agency need to work closely with Tribal, State, and local governments on fire suppression. 

I am also concerned with the reduction in restoration funding. This funding is 

critical to controlling erosion and reducing fish and wildlife habitat losses. This includes noxious weed treatment. If we don’t keep up with the weed treatments, we 

will continue to lose more and more habitat to non-native vegetation which in turn 

affects the watershed and wildlife. 

In 2004, the Forest Service limited its use of large fixed wing airtankers due to 

concerns raised by the FAA and NTSB. The agency did clear 7 P-3’s for use in 2004 

and is completing a review of aircraft service life for P-2V aircraft owned by Neptune Aviation and Minden Aircraft. I realize a P-3 aircraft crashed during a training 

flight last Wednesday, April 20th. I believe we should withhold judgment on whether large airtankers are safe until we see the P-3 investigation report and the aircraft service life contracts are completed. 

I would like to hear from our witnesses what the 2005 fire season plans are for 

retardant aircraft, and the long-term strategy for replacing the existing large 

airtanker fleet. 

Finally, I consider the Healthy Forests Restoration Act an important part of reducing the catastrophic wildfire risk. The act authorized increased funding to the 

Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management to reduce hazardous fuels and I 

hope you can take a few minutes to discuss the successes of how the act is reducing 

hazardous fuels. 

I want to welcome our witnesses, Mark Rey, the Department of Agriculture’s Undersecretary for Natural Resources and the Environment, Lynn Scarlet, Assistant 

Secretary for Policy, Management, and Budget, Robin Nazarro, GAO’s Director for 

Natural Resources and Environment, and Jim Caswell, Co-chair of the Strategic 

Issues Panel on Fire Suppression Costs. I appreciate hearing from all of you and 

look forward to your testimony.

Senator CRAIG. Senator, thank you. I think you can all judge by 

the opening comments, there is a growing high level of frustration 

here in the Congress about a variety of issues, in part centered 

around the core issue of today’s hearing. 

With that, Lynn, would you please begin. Assistant Secretary, 

Policy Management and Budget, Department of the Interior, Lynn 

Scarlett. 

Ms. SCARLETT. Senator Craig, if I might, I would like to ask 

Mark Rey to begin. We have a joint statement, and we have divided up the duties with his going first, if that is all right with you. 

Will that work okay? 

Senator CRAIG. We would certainly allow the Under Secretary for 

Natural Resources and the Environment of the Department of AgVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
7

riculture to proceed. I was kind of looking at the total landscapes 

involved here, trying to determine who was on first and who was 

on second. You have done that by process. 

Ms. SCARLETT. Thank you very much. I apologize. 

Senator CRAIG. Mark, please proceed. 

Mr. REY. We cooperated to write a joint statement as an indication that we can cooperate to fight fires effectively as well. 

Senator CRAIG. All right. 

STATEMENT OF MARK REY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF 

AGRICULTURE, ACCOMPANIED BY LYNN SCARLETT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

Mr. REY. Thank you for the opportunity to meet with the subcommittee today. The three themes that characterize our efforts for 

wildland fire management and hazardous fuels reduction are better 

management to assure efficient use of resources, the application of 

science to inform our decisions, and collaboration with other levels 

of government and non-government entities to leverage resources 

and ensure coordinated action. 

I want to start at the outset by assuring you that the Forest 

Service and the Department of the Interior continue to have available the resources, including firefighters, equipment, and aircraft 

necessary to continue to achieve a high rate of success in suppressing fires on initial attack. Our plans, as discussed below, ensure successful initial attack capability, with public and firefighter 

health and safety continuing to be our highest priority. 

Now with respect to the 2005 fire season outlook, the Predictive 

Services office at our National Interagency Fire Center in Boise 

provides an ongoing outlook for the fire season by monitoring 

weather conditions and other factors and reporting changing conditions. These reports increase in frequency as the fire season progresses. The preliminary outlook for the 2005 fire season shows 

normal fire potential in the Southern and Eastern States. Significant fire activity in the Southwest is expected to occur mostly in 

the southern parts of Arizona and New Mexico and at lower elevations over a relatively narrow band of time. That is a sharp contrast to the previous fire seasons in the Southwest, where we had 

extended high risk areas at higher elevations and heavier fuels. 

The potential for an above-average fire activity exists in the 

Northwest and in the northern Rocky Mountain States later this 

summer. Alaska is not expected to have another severe fire season 

like that of last year. 

We expect to have firefighting resources, comparable to those 

that were available to us last year. The number of firefighters usually peaks in late June, as students become available following firefighter training. More than 18,000 Federal firefighters will be 

available, including permanent and seasonal employees, crews from 

tribal and local governments, contract crews, and emergency and 

temporary hires. 

Training and qualification systems for personnel are standardized nationally. There will be 16 Type 1 national interagency incident management teams available for complex fires or incidents. 

8

Thirty-eight Type 2 incident management teams will be available 

for regional or national incidents. 

If local areas experience severe fire risk, we will increase firefighting ability by staging or deploying firefighters, equipment, and 

teams as needed. 

During 2005, the Department of Defense has indicated that they 

will make available two battalions of 500 personnel each to serve 

as firefighting crews if needed in extreme conditions as was the 

case in 2000, when our needs exceed the available regularly mustered firefighters. 

Additionally, if needed, additional firefighting resources are also 

available from other countries, using established agreements and 

protocols, particularly with southern hemisphere countries like 

Australia and New Zealand, where we have cooperative agreements to trade experienced management and oversight personnel, 

as our seasons are reverse from one another. 

Going to aviation, as mentioned earlier, in May 2004, the Forest 

Service and the Bureau of Land Management terminated contracts 

for the 33 heavy airtankers, due to the National Transportation 

Safety Board recommendations about the airworthiness of the aircraft. An ongoing effort was commenced at that time to assure the 

airworthiness of the large tankers in July 2004. The airworthiness 

of eight P-3 Orions was determined and these planes were returned 

to service. When we stood down the airtankers in 2004, we reconfigured the fleet of firefighting aircraft and increased the use of 

single-engine tankers, large helitankers, and medium helicopters. 

We also pre-positioned eight military C-130 aircraft, equipped 

with modular airborne firefighting systems, to areas of high fire 

danger, thereby reducing initial attack response times. 

In calendar year 2004, the results of that reconfigured fleet were 

actually quite good and in fact superior to the results that we 

achieved in 2003 with all of the heavy airtankers available to us. 

In 2003 we extinguished 98.3 percent of fires on initial attack, 

which is where the tankers are the most valuable. In 2004 we extinguished 99.1 percent of the fires on initial attack. That meant 

70 fewer fires escaped initial attack, thereby decreasing firefighting 

costs significantly. 

As the fire season in 2005 develops, we will continue to monitor 

the needs and reconfigure the fleet of firefighting aircraft as needed, with the goal of continuing to successfully suppress fires on initial attack. 

To date, our 2005 aviation plan includes six heavy airtankers, six 

large helitankers and helicopters and more than 70 small and medium helicopters. 

Through cooperative agreements with State and interagency 

partners, there are two exclusive use CL-215 airtankers, 28 exclusive use single-engine tankers, and approximately seven call-whenneeded single-engine tankers. We expect that two to three callwhen-needed CL-215s will also be available, and eight military C130s will be available as well. 

During the course of the year, we will continue to assess the 

safety of the airtankers that are currently grounded, the P-2Vs and 

the Douglas three, four, sixes and sevens. We have assessments 

underway which will be completed with the P-2Vs by the beginning 

9

of June and with the Douglas products at some time later in the 

summer. 

If those aircraft are deemed safe to fly, we will add them to the 

fleet and decommission some of the helicopters or alternative aircraft, since they are more expensive to operate. 

If they are not deemed safe to fly, we will continue with the fleet 

as reconfigured in 2004, with the expectation that we will continue 

to achieve the level of success that we achieved in 2004, relative 

to previous years. 

We did suffer a crash of a P-3 Orion, one of the ones that we 

deemed to be safe to fly, this past week. The NTSB Team is onsite now investigating the crash along with Forest Service personnel. It is far too early to indicate what the cause of the crash 

was. There is no indication at this time that the plane suffered 

structural failure in flight. But that does not mean that it did not 

happen, it just means we have not found evidence of that initially. 

Here again, if we find no reason to ground the P-3s, we will continue to use them. If we have to ground the P-3s, then we will add 

on additional assets among helicopters and single-engine, fixedwing airtankers. 

The Forest Service and the Department of the Interior, together 

with our interagency partners, have initiated a long-term plan for 

reconfiguring our aviation resources, and I will be happy to talk 

with you during the question-and-answer period on that. 

Last, situational awareness is the centerpiece of firefighter safety 

and for managing the unexpected on wildfires. Both Departments 

have significantly increased training programs, and we are continually evaluating the results. After the investigations of fatal fires 

in the last decade, we have implemented a number of changes. 

Classroom training, review of qualifications, on-the-job training, 

drills and after-action reports and reviews are part of the expanded 

safety program. Firefighters today must complete more comprehensive coursework that includes multiple training assignments and 

simulations before they are certified for critical fireline positions. 

I will now turn to Assistant Secretary Scarlett to continue the 

balance of our statement. 

Senator CRAIG. Lynn, please proceed. 

Ms. SCARLETT. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Chairman, and members 

of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to meet with 

you today. 

I first want to join Mark in expressing my deep sense of sadness 

and our condolences at Interior for the loss of life that occurred as 

a result of last week’s tragic airtanker crash. 

As Mark noted, as we look ahead to the 2005 fire season, three 

themes characterize our efforts in wildland fire management. I am 

going to turn to those themes briefly and begin with management. 

Our first effort under our management improvements pertains to 

planning. The Forest Service has completed fire management plans 

for all of the national forests and national grasslands. Interior has 

completed plans for the vast majority of lands it manages and 

plans to complete all of them in the remainder of this year. These 

new plans will enable us to increase the use of wildland fire to accomplish land management objectives in pre-defined geographic 

10

areas. These plans will also ensure the appropriate response in 

each area. 

A second management focus is firefighter safety. Both Departments have significantly increased training programs. We have improved classroom training, review of qualifications, on-the-job 

training, drills and situational awareness. 

But perhaps the centerpiece of our management efforts has been 

a focus on the high costs of fire suppression, the third management 

focus. In 2003 we began interagency large fire cost reviews. In 2004 

the Wildland Fire Leadership Council convened a strategic cost 

panel comprising senior State, local, tribal, and Federal representatives and incident team members, co-chaired by Mr. Caswell and 

Mr. Rowdabaugh. We very much appreciate their work on that effort. 

The panel examined cost containment, including methods to better integrate suppression activities and considerations and vegetation management in a broader landscape context. 

The panel issued a report in July 2004, with seven sets of recommendations. The Wildland Fire Leadership Council approved 

implementation of the majority of these recommendations, and we 

would be happy to discuss, in the question period, the status of 

those efforts. In 2005, for those incidents that meet certain size, 

cost and duration criteria, we will continue interagency large fire 

cost containment oversight. 

Beyond management, another key to improving fire program 

management is access to relevant scientific information. I am 

pleased to say that our LANDFIRE project is proceeding on schedule. It is a multi-partner ecosystem and fuel assessment mapping 

project. It is designed to map and model vegetation, fire and fuels 

characteristics for the entire United States. It will provide us with 

consistent nationwide spatial data and predictive models needed by 

land and fire managers to better evaluate, prioritize, plan, complete and monitor fuels treatment and restoration projects. Two 

prototypes, one in Montana and one in Utah, are complete. We expect national delivery of LANDFIRE products to occur over the 

next 5 years, with the Western United States scheduled for completion in 2006. These data will help agencies focus their effort where 

the risk is greatest. 

Let me conclude by focusing for a moment on the importance of 

collaboration in our fire program efforts. Collaboration lies at the 

heart of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act and the President’s 

Healthy Forests Initiative. 

To enhance collaboration, the National Association of State Foresters, National Association of Counties, Society of American Foresters, and the Western Governors’ Association prepared a handbook to assist communities in identifying values, risks, mitigation 

measures and priorities for wildland fire projects. 

The Forest Service is utilizing its State fire assistance program 

to work with States, local and tribal governments, and non-governmental organizations to enhance wildland fire prevention, hazard 

mitigation and fire suppression response. The Forest Service provides funding to State foresters for many of these activities. In 

2005 the Forest Service will provide $73 million of this funding for 

those purposes. State and Federal land management agencies and 

11

local communities are also using Community Wildland Fire Protection Plans to generate local solutions to hazardous fuels problems 

in the Wildland Urban Interface areas. Interior agencies have completed over 7,000 fuel reduction projects associated with risk assessments and mitigation plans or Community Wildland Fire Protection Plans in Wildland Urban Interface areas. These collaborative efforts are helping us achieve our fuels reduction goals. The 

Forest Service and the Department of the Interior agencies accomplished 4.2 million acres of hazardous fuel reduction in 2004, exceeding our targets by 13 percent. Thus far in 2005, about 1.6 million acres have been treated with hazardous fuels dollars. We are 

on target to meet all of our agency goals or exceed them. The 

Wildland Fire Leadership Council is working with the Western 

Governors’ Association and others to develop monitoring protocols 

for fuels projects. Citizens will play a key role in helping us in 

these efforts. 

I want to end by underscoring the importance of the Firewise 

program in which homeowners can protect their homes by creating 

cleared space and building their houses and landscaping their yard 

with fire resistant materials. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, 

we are prepared for the 2005 fire season. We are happy to answer 

any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rey and Ms. Scarlett follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK REY, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES

AND ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, AND LYNN SCARLETT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to meet with you today. Since the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Department of Agriculture work closely together in fire management, the two agencies are 

providing a joint statement. We are pleased to be here today to review the Forest 

Service’s and the Department of the Interior’s (DOI) preparedness for the upcoming 

fire season. Three themes characterize our efforts in wildland fire management and 

hazardous fuels reduction—better management to ensure efficient use of resources; 

application of science to inform our decisions; and collaboration to leverage resources and ensure coordinated action. 

The Forest Service and DOI continue to have available the resources, including 

firefighters, equipment, and aircraft, necessary to achieve a high rate of success in 

suppressing fires on initial attack. Our plans, as discussed below, ensure successful 

initial attack capability, with public and firefighter health and safety continuing to 

be our highest priority. 

Though many areas across the United States have fire-adapted ecosystems, decades of vegetation build-up have resulted in overly dense tree stands and hazardous 

levels of underbrush. As a result, we face the challenging tasks of reducing fuels, 

restoring the health of our forests and rangelands, and reducing the vulnerability 

of our communities. These challenges are national and long term in scope. Meeting 

these challenges requires unprecedented levels of interagency cooperation among 

federal agencies and with state, tribal and local governments. To strengthen this cooperation, we continue to work through the Wildland Fire Leadership Council as a 

policy and implementation forum. 

Of the three factors that most influence wildland fire behavior—weather, topography, and fuel—land managers can effectively influence only fuel. For much of the 

twentieth century, wildland fires were generally thought to be bad for the environment. As a consequence, fires were suppressed as soon as possible. Over time and 

across large areas, fire-adapted ecosystems changed as the amount and structure of 

shrubs and trees increased. The build up of vegetation, coupled with other factors 

such as long-term drought and the development of homes and communities next to 

12

public lands, has led to increasing concerns about the both the health of our forests 

and rangelands and the risks to communities near these lands. Both the President’s 

Healthy Forests Initiative and the bipartisan Healthy Forests Restoration Act recognize and help us address these challenges. 

2005 SEASONAL WILDLAND FIRE OUTLOOK

The Predictive Services office at the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) provides an ongoing outlook for the fire season by monitoring weather conditions and 

other factors and reporting changing conditions. The reports increase in frequency 

as the fire season progresses. The preliminary outlook for the 2005 fire season 

shows normal fire potential in the southern and eastern states. Significant fire activity in the southwest is expected to occur mostly in the southern parts of Arizona 

and New Mexico at lower elevations. The potential for above-average fire activity 

exists in the northwest and northern Rocky Mountain States later this summer. 

Alaska is not expected to have another severe fire season like that of last year. Currently, the main threat for high fire potential is in the western Kenai Peninsula due 

to large areas of bug-killed spruce. 

PREPAREDNESS

Predictive Services units located in each geographic area and at the national level 

provide integrated analysis and assessment of weather, climate and fuel conditions. 

This information supports local, geographic and national decisions about resource 

allocation based on anticipated fire starts, fire spread and severity. Local units identify required personnel, equipment, and supplies based on computer models that include local fire frequency and the resources at risk, such as homes or unique areas. 

The closest local responders provide the initial fire attack. The closest available 

resource responds regardless of agency. Usually this is the agency with management 

jurisdiction and protection responsibility for the location of the fire, such as a national forest or national park. However, interagency agreements allow for response 

by the closest fire fighting entity. 

In initial fire attacks, agencies use a variety of firefighting resources, including 

firefighters, engines, or a mixture of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. In recent 

years, agencies have succeeded in controlling 98 percent of fires through initial attack. If the fire continues to grow and locally available resources are inadequate, 

fire managers request additional resources. 

Critical firefighting needs are coordinated through the National Interagency Coordination Center, located at the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Boise, 

Idaho. If fire-fighting resources are strained as a result of multiple simultaneous 

fires, resources are prioritized and allocated by the National Multi-Agency Coordinating group at NIFC. The National Multi-Agency Coordinating group consists of 

the national fire directors of all the Federal firefighting agencies and state representatives. These efforts ensure assets are appropriately positioned based on the 

most up to date information. 

Firefighting resources include:

• Fulltime professional fire program leaders; 

• Firefighters hired based on geographic area fire seasons; 

• Federal agency personnel qualified and mobilized to perform incident management duties in addition to their normal responsibilities, often called the ‘‘militia’’; 

• State and local personnel (including volunteer fire departments) through mutual aid agreements; 

• Agency-owned equipment; 

• Contract equipment, aircraft, and crews; and 

• Firefighting personnel from other countries.

We expect to have firefighting resources comparable to those available last year. 

The number of firefighters usually peaks in late June as students become available 

following firefighter training. 

More than 18,000 firefighters will be available, including permanent and seasonal 

Federal and State employees, crews from Tribal and local governments, contract 

crews, and emergency/temporary hires. Training and qualification systems for personnel are standardized nationally. There are 16 Type 1 (500 individuals or greater) 

national interagency incident management teams available for complex fires or incidents. Thirty-eight Type 2 (200 individuals or less) incident management teams are 

available for regional or national incidents. If local areas experience severe fire risk, 

we will increase firefighting ability by staging or deploying firefighters, equipment, 

and teams as needed. 

13

In 2005, the Department of Defense will make available two battalions (500 personnel each) to serve as firefighting crews if needed in extreme conditions (where 

requests exceed the available firefighters). If needed, additional firefighting resources are also available through other countries using established agreements and 

protocols. 

Personnel, equipment, aircraft, vehicles, and supplies are dispatched and tracked 

through a nationally integrated system. Supplemental personnel, equipment, and 

aircraft will be pre-positioned in specific locations when increased threats for fire 

starts are determined. 

FIRE AVIATION

In May 2004, the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management terminated the 

contracts for 33 heavy airtankers due to the National Transportation Safety Board 

recommendations about the airworthiness of the aircraft. In July 2004, airworthiness of eight P-3s was determined and these planes were returned to service. Tragically, one of these aircraft, a P-3 Orion, crashed on April 20 during a training 

flight, killing three crew members. The incident is under investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board. While this aircraft was not operating at that 

time under contract to the government, we are deeply saddened by this loss and 

wish to underscore the imperative of maintaining safety for all firefighting activities. 

Heavy airtankers are one of the many tools that we use to suppress wildland 

fires. The primary role of heavy airtankers is to deliver a large amount of retardant 

rapidly, in the initial attack of a wildfire. We have increased our fleet of other firefighting aircraft to assist ground firefighters, particularly during extended attack. 

We also note that during any year, thousands of wildland fires are suppressed without the benefit of air support. 

In 2004, we reconfigured the fleet of firefighting aircraft. We increased the use 

of Single Engine Airtankers (SEATs), large helitankers, and medium helicopters, 

and we pre-positioned the military C-130 aircraft equipped with Modular Airborne 

Firefighting Systems (MAFFS) to areas of high fire danger, thereby reducing initial 

attack response times. As fire season 2005 develops, we will continue to monitor 

needs and reconfigure the fleet of firefighting aircraft as needed with the goal of 

successfully suppressing fires upon initial attack. 

To date, our 2005 aviation plan includes 6 heavy airtankers, 6 large helitankers 

and helicopters, and more than 70 small and medium helicopters. Through cooperative agreements with State and interagency partners, there are 2 exclusive use CL215 airtankers, 28 Exclusive Use SEATS, and approximately 70 Call-When-Needed 

SEATS. We expect that two to three Call-When-Needed CL-215s will be available. 

Eight military C-130 aircraft equipped with the Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS) are also available. 

The heavy airtankers will continue to be downloaded by 15% by weight of retardant as an extra precaution. All of the airtankers have been configured with traffic 

collision avoidance systems. In addition, three heavy airtankers will be returned to 

limited service to collect operational loads data to be used in determining the mechanical stresses of aerial firefighting. Operational loads monitoring equipment will 

be installed in all activated airtankers as additional safety and data gathering tools. 

The Forest Service and DOI, together with interagency partners, have initiated 

a long-term plan for aviation resources. 

MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS

Recognizing that the fire program is both complex and uses significant resources, 

the agencies and Wildland Fire Leadership Council have taken and continue to take 

steps to implement recommendations of the Administration’s Program Assessment 

Rating Tool (PART) evaluation to improve the effectiveness and efficiency with 

which we use resources. 

Fire Management Plans 

Consistent with the 2001 National Fire Policy, Fire Management Plans have been 

completed for all of the National Forests and National Grasslands and the vast majority of lands managed by DOI, with the exception of BLM-managed lands in Alaska which will be completed by the end of September 2005. These new plans will 

enable us to increase substantially the use of wildland fire to accomplish land management objectives in pre-defined geographic areas. 

Post-fire activities are determined by an assessment of damage caused by the fire 

and suppression activities as soon as safely possible. Plans are created and implemented for immediate repair of damage caused by firefighting activities. Erosion 

14

control and replanting activities are also conducted based on the assessment of the 

risk for erosion and invasive species. 

Fire Safety 

Situational awareness is the centerpiece of firefighter safety and for managing the 

unexpected on wildfires. Both Departments have significantly increased training 

programs, and we are continually evaluating the results. After the investigations of 

fatal fires in the last decade, we have implemented a number of changes. Classroom 

training, review of qualifications, on-the-job training, drills, discussions, and afteraction reports and reviews are part of the expanded safety program. Firefighters 

today must complete more comprehensive coursework that includes multiple training assignments and simulations before they are certified for critical fireline positions. 

Type 3 Incident Commanders (ICs) manage fires that have escaped initial attack 

using multiple resources. In reviewing the similarities among the incidents that led 

to fatalities over the last ten years, the Forest Service realized Type 3 ICs required 

a higher level of competency to oversee and manage more complex transitional fire 

operations. The Forest Service now requires Type 3 ICs to undergo real-time simulations to test their decision making skills under changing wildfire conditions. In 

2004, every Forest Service Type 3 IC was required to be tested for proficiency in 

leadership and decision making skills. Every new Forest Service Type 3 IC must 

pass this proficiency test. In areas where Interior personnel work in close proximity 

to the Forest Service, many Interior Type 3 ICs took advantage of the Forest Service 

training and testing as well. 

In fall 2004, the USDA Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed a review of 

the Forest Service Firefighting Safety Program. The report noted the Forest Service 

has made significant improvements in the safety of firefighting operations and had 

excellent written firefighting safety policies and procedures. The report identified 

four areas in which the agency can strengthen efforts to promote firefighter safety. 

The four areas that the OIG identified were: (1) monitoring the agency’s response 

to fire safety recommendations, (2) maintaining centralized records to support firefighting qualifications, (3) conducting administrative investigations on serious fire 

accidents, and (4) incorporating firefighting safety standards as critical elements in 

firefighter performance evaluations. 

Reviews such as the OIG report help us in our evaluations of firefighter safety. 

In cooperation with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and other 

interagency partners through the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, we agree 

on areas of safety that need focus. For example, we improved our fire complexity 

analysis; enhanced training of agency administrators involved in fire suppression; 

emphasized fatigue awareness; and improved work/rest guidelines. We also clarified 

driving guidelines for both our employees and our contractors. We recently began 

the use of the Incident Qualifications Certification System which enhances our ability to track the formal training and on-the-job training of each federal firefighter 

and fire manager. With this system, fire managers and supervisors can better measure previous training and experience to help determine future training needs. 

In addition, both Departments are concentrating on human factors such as experience, leadership, and performance. One major initiatives is our interagency 

Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program. The program comprises three 

major components that affect both firefighters and fire managers. The first is a set 

of leadership values and principles that define good leadership and provide a framework for evaluating the performance of firefighters in leadership roles. The second 

component is a curriculum of formal leadership development courses that are designed to span the career of wildland firefighters from entry levels to management. 

The third component is an on-line resource (www.fireleadership.gov) that assists individual firefighters seeking to improve their leadership skills through self-directed 

continuing education efforts. We emphasize preparing leaders to be capable decision-makers in the complex and intense situations found in firefighting. 

On an interagency basis, the Fireline Safety Refresher Training is updated annually and is a required course for all fire personnel. The annual updates focus on key 

safety principles and key issues that surfaced in the preceding fire season. These 

updates are distributed nationwide to all agencies for use in required pre-season 

safety refresher courses. 

Also, a Safety Summit and Human Factors Workshop is being held this week in 

Missoula, Montana. This summit, which has drawn hundreds of fire personnel from 

across the Nation, is focusing on leadership and human factors issues and training 

that we, as a group, believe contribute significantly to improved fire line safety and 

operational performance. 

15

Contracted firefighting resources are additional assets for the agencies. We recognize our responsibilities for these resources and are working with the National Wildfire Coordinating Group to improve our interagency oversight to ensure safe, reliable performance. 

Cost Containment 

Interagency large-fire cost reviews, which began in 2003, continued in 2004. In 

2004, the Wildland Fire Leadership Council convened a strategic cost panel comprising senior State, local, Tribal and Federal representatives and incident team 

members. The panel examined cost containment, including methods to better integrate suppression activities and vegetation management in a broader landscape context. The report, ‘‘Large Fire Suppression Costs, Strategies for Cost Management’’, 

was issued in July 2004. The report contains a variety of recommendations, many 

of which have the support of the Wildland Fire Leadership Council. A team assigned 

to design implementation actions will be reporting to the Wildland Fire Leadership 

Council in May. 

Every year, the agencies prepare a Fire and Aviation Management Operations Action Plan. The Plan provides direction for suppression and includes direction for efficient coordination and cost containment. 

In 2005, for those incidents that meet certain size, cost, and duration criteria, we 

will continue interagency large fire cost-containment oversight. In addition, the Forest Service asked the USDA Office of the Inspector General to conduct a large fire 

cost review in 2005. This review will look at decision making and cost containment 

practices. The Forest Service is assembling the internal and external review recommendations made over the past two years and will prioritize them based on their 

potential to improve efficiency and reduce costs. The Service will develop an implementation plan and track these recommendations. 

Program Effectiveness 

Finally, the Departments are continually working to improve program efficiency 

through a variety of means, including developing cost containment strategies, using 

data from established performance measures, integrating systems that implement 

cost reporting, prioritizing hazardous fuels projects, standardizing cost-sharing 

agreements, and reviewing recommendations made by an independent cost control 

review panel. 

USE OF SCIENCE

Land managers are increasingly challenged by the need to justify decisions and 

apply scientifically sound solutions to firefighting as well as to on-the-ground land 

management. This need for science-informed decision making has always existed, 

but the demand is increasing as management agencies strive actively to address 

fuels problems and restore fire-adapted ecosystems. The need for new information 

and tools also is increasing as firefighting and treatments are applied in visible 

wildland urban interface areas and across larger areas of the landscape. As researchers develop information and tools to address these and other emerging issues, 

we are working to transfer rapidly and effectively these advances to managers so 

that work can be based on the best available information. 

For example, the LANDFIRE project is a multi-partner ecosystem and fuel assessment mapping project. It is designed to map and model vegetation, fire, and fuels 

characteristics for the United States. The objective is to provide consistent, nationwide spatial data and predictive models needed by land and fire managers to evaluate, prioritize, plan, complete, and monitor fuel treatment and restoration projects. 

Two prototypes, in Montana and Utah, are complete. We expect to complete this 

year a rapid assessment of fire regime condition class at the mid-scale. We expect 

national delivery of LANDFIRE products to occur over the next five years, with the 

western United States scheduled in 2006. These data will help agencies focus their 

effort where the risk is the greatest. 

COLLABORATION: WHAT OUR PARTNERS ARE DOING

Collaboration lies at the heart of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act and President’s Healthy Forests Initiative. A centerpiece of collaboration is in project selection and design. To enhance collaboration, the National Association of State Foresters, National Association of Counties (NACO), Society of American Foresters, and 

the Western Governors’ Association (WGA) prepared a handbook—‘‘Preparing a 

Community Wildfire Protection Plan’’—in March 2004 to assist communities in identifying values, risks, mitigation measures, and priorities for wildland fire projects. 

State and Federal land management agencies and local communities can use 

Community Wildfire Protection Plans (CWPPs) to bring about comprehensive and 

16

locally-supported solutions to the hazardous fuels problem in the wildland urban 

interface (WUI). As described in the Healthy Forests Restoration Act, these community plans provide local communities the opportunity to become involved in planning 

for hazardous fuels treatment on Federal lands. 

Interior agencies have completed over 7,000 fuel reduction projects associated 

with risk assessments and mitigation plans or Community Wildfire Protection Plans 

in WUI areas. The Bureau of Land Management places a high priority on assisting 

communities to complete Community Wildfire Protection Plans. Each state has a 

different approach. Some undertake their plans at the county level; others—like 

California—use a Fire Safe Council approach on a smaller geographic scale. Enough 

communities in Utah now have plans such that BLM is requiring all BLM wildlandurban interface projects to be identified in a completed Community Wildfire Protection Plan. 

The Forest Service utilizes the State Fire Assistance (SFA) program to work with 

states, local and tribal governments and non-governmental organizations to enhance 

wildland fire prevention, hazard mitigation, and wildland fire suppression response. 

The Forest Service provides SFA funding to State Foresters to allocate for such 

tasks as coordinating wildland fire response, developing Community Wildfire Protection Plans, conducting hazardous fuel treatments in the wildland urban interface, 

and coordinating cross-boundary fuel treatment efforts. The Forest Service will provide $73,099,000 of SFA funding in 2005. 

Collaboration goes beyond priority-setting to include project implementation. The 

Wildland Fire Leadership Council is working with the WGA and others on developing a monitoring protocol, including ways to monitor the extent of collaboration 

and cooperation. 

Citizens can take action through the FIREWISE program, which helps people who 

live or vacation in fire-prone areas educate themselves about wildland fire protection. Homeowners can learn how to protect their homes with a survivable, cleared 

space and how to build their houses and landscape their yard with fire resistant 

materials. A consortium of wildland fire agencies sponsors the program; the consortium includes the Forest Service, the Department of the Interior, the National Fire 

Protection Association, and the National Association of State Foresters. 

We also continue working to enhance collaboration in firefighting with rural and 

volunteer firefighters. In 2004, Interior bureaus invested over $9 million with nearly 

1,500 rural fire departments. We invested another $10 million with local communities doing risk assessments, mitigation planning, and implementation actions like 

fuels treatments. So far in 2005, Interior has issued 40 awards totaling $332,000 

in the rural fire assistance program, while dispensing another $1.3 million in community assistance. We again expect to help about 1,500 rural fire departments with 

equipment purchases and training using some $10 million in appropriated funds. 

The Forest Service assists volunteer rural fire departments with funding for training, equipment and organization through the Volunteer Fire Assistance (VFA) program. In 2004, the Forest Service provided $13,445,000 in VFA funding to over 

2,600 volunteer fire departments to assist in the establishment of new fire departments, train firefighters, and fund the purchase, repair and maintenance of equipment. In 2005, another $13,917,000 in funding is available to support volunteer fire 

departments through VFA, and the Forest Service expects to support a similar number of fire departments. 

Some have expressed concerns about capacity for rural fire assistance going forward. We want to underscore that our commitment remains strong. Interior and the 

Forest Service expect to work closely with FEMA and its local fire assistance program to ensure that we are able to assist rural firefighting communities who contribute significantly to the wildland fire effort. 

THE HEALTHY FORESTS INITIATIVE

We would also like to discuss briefly our progress in implementing the Healthy 

Forests Initiative. The President’s Healthy Forests Initiative (HFI) includes both the 

Healthy Forest Restoration Act (HFRA) and administrative reforms that give federal agencies tools to reduce the risk of severe wildland fires and restore forest and 

rangeland health. 

The HFRA complements administrative reforms put into place previously. These 

reforms help expedite hazardous fuel treatments and ecological restoration projects 

on federal land and are being successfully implemented. For example, hundreds of 

projects have proceeded using Categorical Exclusions, Guidance for Environmental 

Assessment of Healthy Forest Projects and Forest Stewardship Contracting. 

The Forest Service and the Department of the Interior (DOI) agencies accomplished 4.2 million acres of hazardous fuel reduction in 2004. This includes 3.1 milVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
17

lion acres treated under the hazardous fuels program and another 1.1 million acres 

from other DOI and USDA vegetative management activities that also result in 

fuels reduction. Overall, we exceeded our acreage targets by 13%. Thus far in FY 

2005, about 1.6 million acres have been treated with hazardous fuels dollars. About 

1.0 million of those acres located in the Wildland-Urban Interface (WUI). 

At the Interior Department, WUI acres now account for over 60 percent of dollars 

spent and, we expect, nearly half of all acres in 2006. This contrasts to 20 percent 

of fuels reduction efforts in 2001. In total, DOI and Forest Service will have completed nearly 9 million acres of fuels treatments in WUI areas between 2001 and 

2006. 

A more complete list of our accomplishments in 2005 can be found in the Healthy 

Forests Report located on the internet at www.HealthyForests.gov. The FY 2006 

President’s Budget proposes more than $867 million to continue our efforts. 

The FY 2006 President’s Budget proposes more than $867 million to continue our 

efforts. 

SUMMARY

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, we are prepared 

for the 2005 fire season. We are happy to answer any questions you might have.

Senator CRAIG. Lynn, thank you very much. I was sitting here 

thinking as you were talking about the fire mitigation. You do one 

million in a year and Mother Nature does six or eight million a 

year. She is ahead of you by a substantial factor. 

Let us now turn to Robin Nazzaro, Director, Natural Resources 

and Environment, Government Accountability Office. Robin, you 

have two reports you wish to report on, so we will give you a little 

more time to do so. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF ROBIN M. NAZZARO, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. NAZZARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the 

subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss two recent 

GAO reports that address wildland fire issues. 

The first report, issued in January of this year, discusses the 

progress the Federal Government has made over the past 5 years 

and key challenges it faces in developing and implementing a longterm response to wildland fire problems. 

The second report, being released today, discusses ways to help 

protect homes and improve communications during such fires. 

As has been noted, wildland fires are increasingly threatening 

communities and ecosystems. When a large, high intensity fire 

burns near inhabited areas, it can threaten hundreds of homes at 

the same time and overwhelm firefighting resources. Also, communications among Federal, State and local firefighters during 

wildland fires can be hampered by incompatible equipment. 

First, let me summarize the findings of the January 2005 report. 

In the past 5 years, the Forest Service and the land management 

agencies in the Department of the Interior, working with the Congress, have made important progress in putting into place the basic 

components for a framework for managing and responding to the 

Nation’s wildland fire problems. 

Specifically, we noted that they have established a priority to 

protect communities near wildlands. They have increased the 

amount of effort and funds available for addressing wildland fire 

problems, improved data and research on wildland fire, local fire 

management plans, interagency coordination, and collaboration 

18

with non-Federal partners, and refined performance measures and 

results monitoring for wildland fire management. 

While this progress has been important, many challenges remain 

for addressing wildland fire problems in a timely and effective 

manner. Most notably, GAO believes that the land management 

agencies need to complete a cohesive strategy that identifies the 

long-term options and related funding needed for reducing fuels 

and responding to wildland fires. As the Government Accountability Office noted in 1999, the agencies and the Congress need 

such a strategy to make decisions about an effective and affordable 

long-term approach for addressing problems that have been decades in the making and will take decades more to resolve. Completing and implementing such a strategy will require that the 

agencies complete several challenging tasks, including finishing 

their data systems needed to identify the extent, severity and location of wildland fire threats to the Nation’s communities and ecosystems; updating local fire management plans to better specify actions needed to effectively address these threats; and assessing the 

cost-effectiveness and affordability of options for reducing fuels. 

In our January report, we recommended that the Secretaries of 

Agriculture and the Interior provide the Congress, in time for its 

consideration of the agencies’ fiscal year 2006 wildland fire management budgets, with a joint tactical plan outlining the critical 

steps the agencies will take, together with related timeframes, to 

complete a cohesive strategy that identifies long-term options and 

needed funding for reducing and maintaining fuels at acceptable 

levels and responding to the Nation’s wildland fire problems. The 

Departments of Agriculture and the Interior have said that they 

will produce such a joint tactical plan by August of this year. 

Next, I will summarize the findings of our report being released 

today that discusses measures to help protect homes and the role 

that technology plays in improving firefighting agencies’ abilities to 

communicate during wildland fires. Our findings are based on the 

views of a panel of experts that we convened with the help of the 

National Academies of Science and in discussions with Federal, 

State and local fire officials. 

In summary, we found that the two most effective measures for 

protecting structures from wildland fires are: One, creating and 

maintaining a buffer around a structure by eliminating or reducing 

trees, shrubs and other flammable objects within an area from 30 

to 100 feet around the structure, and, two, using fire resistant roofs 

and vents. Experts we spoke with said that if these measures were 

correctly and consistently used by homeowners, the risk posed by 

wildland fires would be significantly reduced. Other technologies 

can help to protect structures, but to a lesser degree. These include 

fire resistant windows and building materials, sprinkler systems, 

and chemical agents in the form of gels and foams that coat structures with a temporary protective layer. Although protective measures are effective and available, many homeowners do not use 

them because of the time or expense involved, competing values or 

concerns, misperceptions about wildland fires, and lack of awareness of homeowners shared responsibility for home protection. 

Federal, State, and local government agencies and non-governmental organizations are attempting to increase the use of protecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
19

tive measures through education, financial or direct assistance, and 

adoption and enforcement of laws requiring defensible space 

around structures and the use of fire resistant building materials. 

Regarding the role that technology plays in improving firefighting agencies’ ability to communicate during wildland fires, we 

found that a variety of technologies exist and others are being developed. But technology alone will not solve this problem. In the 

short term, patchwork interoperability technologies, such as audio 

switches, can be used to link communications using different radio 

frequencies or equipment. In the long term, technologies are available or under development to upgrade communication systems to 

provide increased interoperability. Effective adoption of any of 

these technologies, however, requires planning and coordination 

among Federal, State and local agencies. The Department of Homeland Security, as well as several State and local jurisdictions, are 

pursuing initiatives to improve communications. 

Catastrophic damages from wildland fires will probably continue 

to increase until an adequate long-term Federal response, coordinated with other levels of government, is implemented, and individuals living in at-risk areas take preventive measures to protect 

their homes from wildland fires. 

Effective communication among the many agencies that assist in 

the management or suppression of wildland fires is also essential 

to fighting these fires successfully and ensuring both firefighter 

and public safety. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you or members of the subcommittee 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Nazzaro follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBIN M. NAZZARO, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND

ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY

Wildland fires are increasingly threatening communities and ecosystems. In recent years, they have become more intense due to excess vegetation that has accumulated, partly as a result of past suppression efforts. The cost to suppress these 

fires is increasing and, as more people move into fire-prone areas near wildlands, 

the number of homes at risk is growing. During these wildland fires, effective communications among the public safety agencies responding from various areas is critical, but can be hampered by incompatible radio equipment. 

This testimony discusses (1) progress made and future challenges to managing 

wildland fire, (2) measures to help protect structures, and (3) the role of technology 

in improving responder communications during fires. It is based on two GAO reports: Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy (GAO-05-147, Jan. 14, 2005) and 

Technology Assessment: Protecting Structures and Improving Communications during Wildland Fires (GAO-05-380, Apr. 26, 2005). 

WHAT GAO RECOMMENDS

In its report, GAO recommended that the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior develop a plan for completing a cohesive strategy that identifies options and 

funding needed to address wildland fire problems. The departments agreed. 

WHAT GAO FOUND

Over the last 5 years, the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and 

land management agencies in the Department of the Interior, working with the 

Congress, have made important progress in responding to wildland fires. Most notably, the agencies have adopted various national strategy documents addressing the 

20

1GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy, GAO-05-147 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005). 

need to reduce wildland fire risks, established a priority to protect communities in 

the wildland-urban interface, and increased efforts and amounts of funding committed to addressing wildland fire problems. However, despite producing numerous 

planning and strategy documents, the agencies have yet to develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the long-term options and related funding needed to reduce excess vegetation that fuels fires in national forests and rangelands. Reducing these 

fuels lowers risks to communities and ecosystems and helps contain suppression 

costs. As GAO noted in 1999, such a strategy would help the agencies and the Congress to determine the most effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing wildland fire problems. Completing this strategy will require finishing several 

efforts now under way to improve a key wildland fire data and modeling system, 

local fire management planning, and a new system designed to identify the most 

cost-effective means for allocating fire management budget resources, each of which 

has its own challenges. Without completing these tasks, the agencies will have difficulty determining the extent and location of wildland fire threats, targeting and 

coordinating their efforts and resources, and resolving wildland fire problems in the 

most timely and cost-effective manner over the long term. 

The two most effective measures for protecting structures from wildland fires are 

(1) creating and maintaining a buffer around a structure by eliminating or reducing 

trees, shrubs, and other flammable objects within an area from 30 to 100 feet 

around the structure and (2) using fire-resistant roofs and vents. Other technologies—such as fire-resistant building materials, chemical agents, and geographic 

information system mapping tools—can help in protecting structures and communities, but they play a secondary role. Many homeowners, however, are not using 

the protective measures because of the time or expense involved, competing values 

or concerns, misperceptions about wildland fires, or lack of awareness of their 

shared responsibility for home protection. Federal, state, and local governments and 

others are attempting to address this problem through a variety of educational, financial assistance, and regulatory efforts. 

Technologies exist and others are being developed to address communications 

problems among emergency responders using different radio frequencies or equipment. However, technology alone cannot solve this problem. Effective adoption of 

these technologies requires planning and coordination among federal, state, and 

local agencies involved. The Department of Homeland Security, as well as several 

states and local jurisdictions, are pursuing initiatives to improve communications. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss two GAO reports that reviewed several 

wildland fire issues—one issued in January 2005 that reviews the status of the federal government’s efforts to address our nation’s wildland fire problems and another, 

being released today, that discusses ways to help protect homes and improve communications during such fires. Each report is presented separately below. 

Wildland fire is a natural process that plays an important role in the health of 

many fire-adapted ecosystems, but it also can cause catastrophic damages to communities and ecosystems. The trend of increasing wildland fire threats to communities and ecosystems that we reported on 5 years ago has been continuing. The average acreage of lands burned by wildland fires annually from 2000 through 2003 

was 56 percent greater than the average amount burned annually during the 1990s. 

Also, since 2000, wildland fires have burned an average of 1,100 homes each year 

in the United States, according to the National Fire Protection Association. In 2003 

alone, more than 3,600 homes were destroyed by wildland fires in Southern California and resulted in more than $2 billion in insured losses. Experts believe that 

catastrophic damages from wildland fires probably will continue to increase until an 

adequate long-term federal response, coordinated with other levels of government, 

is implemented and individuals living in at-risk areas take preventive measures to 

protect their homes from wildland fires. 

WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT: FOREST SERVICE AND INTERIOR NEED TO SPECIFY STEPS

AND A SCHEDULE FOR IDENTIFYING LONG-TERM OPTIONS AND THEIR COSTS

First, let me summarize the findings of GAO’s January 2005 report that discusses 

the progress the federal government has made over the last 5 years and key challenges it faces in developing and implementing a long-term response to wildland fire 

problems.1 This report is based primarily on over 25 reviews we conducted in recent 

years of federal wildland fire management that focused largely on the activities of 

the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and the land management 

21

agencies in the Department of the Interior, which together manage about 95 percent 

of all federal lands. 

In the past 5 years, the federal government has made important progress in putting into place the basic components of a framework for managing and responding 

to the nation’s wildland fire problems, including:

• establishing a priority to protect communities near wildlands—called the 

wildland-urban interface; • increasing the amount of effort and funds available for addressing fire-related 

concerns, such as fuel reduction on federal lands; • improving data and research on wildland fire, local fire management plans, 

interagency coordination, and collaboration with nonfederal partners; and • refining performance measures and results monitoring for wildland fire management.

While this progress has been important, many challenges remain for addressing 

wildland fire problems in a timely and effective manner. Most notably, the land 

management agencies need to complete a cohesive strategy that identifies the longterm options and related funding needed for reducing fuels and responding to 

wildland fires when they occur. A recent Western Governors’ Association report also 

called for completing such a cohesive federal strategy. The agencies and the Congress need such a strategy to make decisions about an effective and affordable longterm approach for addressing problems that have been decades in the making and 

will take decades more to resolve. However, completing and implementing such a 

strategy will require that the agencies complete several challenging tasks, including:

• developing data systems needed to identify the extent, severity, and location of 

wildland fire threats to the nation’s communities and ecosystems; • updating local fire management plans to better specify the actions needed to effectively address these threats; and • assessing the cost-effectiveness and affordability of options for reducing fuels.

In our January 2005 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Agriculture 

and the Interior provide the Congress, in time for its consideration of the agencies’ 

fiscal year 2006 wildland fire management budgets, with a joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps the agencies will take, together with related time frames, 

to complete a cohesive strategy that identifies long-term options and needed funding 

for reducing and maintaining fuels at acceptable levels and responding to the nation’s wildland fire problems. The Departments of Agriculture and the Interior have 

said that they will produce such a joint tactical plan by August 2005. 

BACKGROUND

Wildland fire triggered by lightning is a normal, inevitable, and necessary ecological process that nature uses to periodically remove excess undergrowth, small trees, 

and vegetation to renew ecosystem productivity. However, various human land use 

and management practices, including several decades of fire suppression activities, 

have reduced the normal frequency of wildland fires in many forest and rangeland 

ecosystems and have resulted in abnormally dense and continuous accumulations of 

vegetation that can fuel uncharacteristically large and intense wildland fires. Such 

large intense fires increasingly threaten catastrophic ecosystem damage and also increasingly threaten human lives, health, property, and infrastructure in the 

wildland-urban interface. Federal researchers estimate that vegetative conditions 

that can fuel such fires exist on approximately 190 million acres—or more than 40 

percent—of federal lands in the contiguous United States but could vary from 90 

million to 200 million acres, and that these conditions also exist on many nonfederal 

lands. 

Our reviews over the last 5 years identified several weaknesses in the federal government’s management response to wildland fire issues. These weaknesses included 

the lack of a national strategy that addressed the likely high costs of needed fuel 

reduction efforts and the need to prioritize these efforts. Our reviews also found 

shortcomings in federal implementation at the local level, where over half of all federal land management units’ fire management plans did not meet agency requirements designed to restore fire’s natural role in ecosystems consistent with human 

health and safety. These plans are intended to identify needed local fuel reduction, 

preparedness, suppression, and rehabilitation actions. The agencies also lacked 

basic data, such as the amount and location of lands needing fuel reduction, and 

research on the effectiveness of different fuel reduction methods on which to base 

their fire management plans and specific project decisions. Furthermore, coordination among federal agencies and collaboration between these agencies and nonfederal entities were ineffective. This kind of cooperation is needed because wildland 

22

2GAO, Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to Address Catastrophic Wildfire Threats. GAO/RCED-99-65. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999. 

fire is a shared problem that transcends land ownership and administrative boundaries. Finally, we found that better accountability for federal expenditures and performance in wildland fire management was needed. Agencies were unable to assess 

the extent to which they were reducing wildland fire risks or to establish meaningful fuel reduction performance measures, as well as to determine the cost-effectiveness of these efforts, because they lacked both monitoring data and sufficient data 

on the location of lands at high risk of catastrophic fires to know the effects of their 

actions. As a result, their performance measures created incentives to reduce fuels 

on all acres, as opposed to focusing on high-risk acres. 

Because of these weaknesses, and because experts said that wildland fire problems could take decades to resolve, we said that a cohesive, long-term, federal 

wildland fire management strategy was needed.2 We said that this cohesive strategy 

needed to focus on identifying options for reducing fuels over the long term in order 

to decrease future wildland fire risks and related costs. We also said that the strategy should identify the costs associated with those different fuel reduction options 

over time, so that the Congress could make cost-effective, strategic funding decisions. 

IMPORTANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ADDRESSING FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE

MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS OVER THE LAST 5 YEARS

The federal government has made important progress over the last 5 years in improving its management of wildland fire. Nationally it has established strategic priorities and increased resources for implementing these priorities. Locally, it has enhanced data and research, planning, coordination, and collaboration with other parties. With regard to accountability, it has improved performance measures and established a monitoring framework. 

Progress in National Strategy: Priorities Have Been Clarified and Funding Has Been 

Increased for Identified Needs 

Over the last 5 years, the federal government has been formulating a national 

strategy known as the National Fire Plan, composed of several strategic documents 

that set forth a priority to reduce wildland fire risks to communities. Similarly, the 

recently enacted Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 directs that at least 50 

percent of funding for fuel reduction projects authorized under the act be allocated 

to wildland-urban interface areas. While we have raised concerns about the way the 

agencies have defined these areas and the specificity of their prioritization guidance, 

we believe that the act’s clarification of the community protection priority provides 

a good starting point for identifying and prioritizing funding needs. Similarly, in 

contrast to fiscal year 1999, when we reported that the Forest Service had not requested increased funding to meet the growing fuel reduction needs it had identified, fuel reduction funding for both the Forest Service and Interior quadrupled by 

fiscal year 2004. The Congress, in the Healthy Forests Restoration Act, also authorized $760 million per year to be appropriated for hazardous fuels reduction activities, including projects for reducing fuels on up to 20 million acres of land. Moreover, appropriations for both agencies’ overall wildland fire management activities, 

including preparedness, suppression, and rehabilitation, have nearly tripled, from 

about $1 billion in fiscal year 1999 to over $2.7 billion in fiscal year 2004. 

Progress in Local Implementation: Data and Research, Fire Management Planning, 

and Coordination and Collaboration Have Been Strengthened 

The agencies have strengthened local wildland fire management Implementation: 

Data and implementation by making significant improvements in federal data and 

research on wildland fire over the past 5 years, including an initial Management 

Planning, and mapping of fuel hazards nationwide. Additionally, in 2003, the agencies approved funding for development of a geospatial data and modeling system, 

called LANDFIRE, to map wildland fire hazards with greater precision and uniformity. LANDFIRE—estimated to cost $40 million and scheduled for nationwide 

implementation in 2009—will enable comparisons of conditions between different 

field locations nationwide, thus permitting better identification of the nature and 

magnitude of wildland fire risks confronting different community and ecosystem resources, such as residential and commercial structures, species habitat, air and 

water quality, and soils. 

The agencies also have improved local fire management planning by adopting and 

executing an expedited schedule to complete plans for all land units that had not 

been in compliance with agency requirements. The agencies also adopted a common 

23

interagency template for preparing plans to ensure greater consistency in their contents. 

Coordination among federal agencies and their collaboration with nonfederal partners, critical to effective implementation at the local level, also has been improved. 

In 2001, as a result of congressional direction, the agencies jointly formulated a 10-

Year Comprehensive Strategy with the Western Governors’ Association to involve 

the states as full partners in their efforts. An implementation plan adopted by the 

agencies in 2002 details goals, time lines, and responsibilities of the different parties 

for a wide range of activities, including collaboration at the local level to identify 

fuel reduction priorities in different areas. Also in 2002, the agencies established an 

interagency body, the Wildland Fire Leadership Council, composed of senior Agriculture and Interior officials and nonfederal representatives, to improve coordination of their activities with each other and nonfederal parties. 

Progress in Accountability: Better Performance Measures and a Results Monitoring 

Framework Have Been Developed 

Accountability for the results the federal government achieves from its investments in wildland fire management activities also has been strengthened. The agencies have adopted a performance measure that identifies the amount of acres moved 

from high-hazard to low-hazard fuel conditions, replacing a performance measure 

for fuel reductions that measured only the total acres of fuel reductions and created 

an incentive to treat less costly acres rather than the acres that presented the greatest hazards. Additionally, in 2004, to have a better baseline for measuring progress, 

the Wildland Fire Leadership Council approved a nationwide framework for monitoring the effects of wildland fire. While an implementation plan is still needed for 

this framework, it nonetheless represents a critical step toward enhancing wildland 

fire management accountability. 

AGENCIES FACE SEVERAL CHALLENGES TO COMPLETING A LONG-NEEDED COHESIVE

STRATEGY FOR REDUCING FUELS AND RESPONDING TO WILDLAND FIRE PROBLEMS

While the federal government has made important progress over the past 5 years 

in addressing wildland fire, a number of challenges still must be met to complete 

development of a cohesive strategy that explicitly identifies available long-term options and funding needed to reduce fuels on the nation’s forests and rangelands. 

Without such a strategy, the Congress will not have an informed understanding of 

when, how, and at what cost wildland fire problems can be brought under control. 

None of the strategic documents adopted by the agencies to date have identified 

these options and related funding needs, and the agencies have yet to delineate a 

plan or schedule for doing so. To identify these options and funding needs, the agencies will have to address several challenging tasks related to their data systems, fire 

management plans, and assessing the cost-effectiveness and affordability of different 

options for reducing fuels. 

Completing and Implementing the LANDFIRE System Is Essential to Identifying 

and Addressing Wildland Fire Threats 

The agencies face several challenges to completing and implementing LANDFIRE, 

so that they can more precisely identify the extent and location of wildland fire 

threats and better target fuel reduction efforts. These challenges include using 

LANDFIRE to better reconcile the effects of fuel reduction activities with the agencies’ other stewardship responsibilities for protecting ecosystem resources, such as 

air, water, soils, and species habitat, which fuel reduction efforts can adversely affect. The agencies also need LANDFIRE to help them better measure and assess 

their performance. For example, the data produced by LANDFIRE will help them 

devise a separate performance measure for maintaining conditions on low-hazard 

lands to ensure that their conditions do not deteriorate to more hazardous conditions while funding is being focused on lands with high-hazard conditions. 

In implementing LANDFIRE, however, the agencies will have to overcome the 

challenges presented by the current lack of a consistent approach to assessing the 

risks of wildland fires to ecosystem resources as well as the lack of an integrated, 

strategic, and unified approach to managing and using information systems and 

data, including those such as LANDFIRE, in wildland fire decision making. Currently, software, data standards, equipment, and training vary among the agencies 

and field units in ways that hamper needed sharing and consistent application of 

the data. Also, LANDFIRE data and models may need to be revised to take into 

account recent research findings that suggest part of the increase in wildland fire 

in recent years has been caused by a shift in climate patterns. This research also 

suggests that these new climate patterns may continue for decades, resulting in further increases in the amount of wildland fire. Thus, the nature, extent, and geoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
24

graphical distribution of hazards initially identified in LANDFIRE, as well as the 

costs for addressing them, may have to be reassessed. 

Fire Management Plans Will Need to Be Updated with Latest Data and Will Need 

to Be Updated with Latest Data and Research on Wildland Fires 

The agencies will need to update their local fire management plans when more 

detailed, nationally consistent LANDFIRE data become available. The plans also 

will have to be updated to incorporate recent agency fire Research on Wildland Fire 

research on approaches to more effectively address wildland fire threats. For example, a 2002 interagency analysis found that protecting wildland-urban interface communities more effectively—as well as more costeffectively—might require locating a 

higher proportion of fuel reduction projects outside of the wildland-urban interface 

than currently envisioned, so that fires originating in the wildlands do not become 

too large to suppress by the time they arrive at the interface. Moreover, other agency research suggests that placing fuel reduction treatments in specific geometric 

patterns may, for the same cost, provide protection for up to three times as many 

community and ecosystem resources as do other approaches, such as placing fuel 

breaks around communities and ecosystems resources. Timely updating of fire management plans with the latest research findings on optimal design and location of 

treatments also will be critical to the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of these 

plans. The Forest Service indicated that this updating could occur during annual 

reviews of fire management plans to determine whether any changes to them may 

be needed. 

Ongoing Efforts to Assess the Cost-Effectiveness and Affordability of Fuel Reduction 

Options Need to Be Completed 

Completing the LANDFIRE data and modeling system and updating fire management plans should enable the agencies to formulate a range of options for reducing 

fuels. However, to identify optimal and affordable choices among these options, the 

agencies will have to complete certain cost-effectiveness analysis efforts they currently have under way. These efforts include an initial 2002 interagency analysis 

of options and costs for reducing fuels, congressionally-directed improvements to 

their budget allocation systems, and a new strategic analysis framework that considers affordability. 

The Interagency Analysis of Options and Costs: In 2002, a team of Forest Service 

and Interior experts produced an estimate of the funds needed to implement eight 

different fuel reduction options for protecting communities and ecosystems across 

the nation over the next century. Their analysis also considered the impacts of fuels 

reduction activities on future costs for other principal wildland fire management activities, such as preparedness, suppression, and rehabilitation, if fuels were not reduced. The team concluded that the option that would result in reducing the risks 

to communities and ecosystems across the nation could require an approximate tripling of current fuel reduction funding to about $1.4 billion for an initial period of 

a few years. These initially higher costs would decline after fuels had been reduced 

enough to use less expensive controlled burning methods in many areas and more 

fires could be suppressed at lower cost, with total wildland fire management costs, 

as well as risks, being reduced after 15 years. Alternatively, the team said that not 

making a substantial short-term investment using a landscape focus could increase 

both costs and risks to communities and ecosystems in the long term. More recently, 

however, Interior has said that the costs and time required to reverse current increasing risks may be less when other vegetation management activities—such as 

timber harvesting and habitat improvements—are considered that were not included in the interagency team’s original assessment but also can influence wildland 

fire. 

The cost of the 2002 interagency team’s option that reduced risks to communities 

and ecosystems over the long term is consistent with a June 2002 National Association of State Foresters’ projection of the funding needed to implement the 10-Year 

Comprehensive Strategy developed by the agencies and the Western Governors’ Association the previous year. The state foresters projected a need for steady increases 

in fuel reduction funding up to a level of about $1.1 billion by fiscal year 2011. This 

is somewhat less than that of the interagency team’s estimate, but still about 21⁄2

times current levels. 

The interagency team of experts who prepared the 2002 analysis of options and 

associated costs said their estimates of long-term costs could only be considered an 

approximation because the data used for their national-level analysis were not sufficiently detailed. They said a more accurate estimate of the long-term federal costs 

and consequences of different options nationwide would require applying this national analysis framework in smaller geographic areas using more detailed data, 

25

3 Report to the Western Governors on the Implementation of the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy, Western Governors’ Association Forest Health Advisory Committee (Denver, Colo.: 2004). 

such as that produced by LANDFIRE, and then aggregating these smaller-scale results. 

The New Budget Allocation System: Agency officials told us that a tool for applying this interagency analysis at a smaller geographic scale for aggregation nationally may be another management system under development—the Fire Program 

Analysis system. This system, being developed in response to congressional committee direction to improve budget allocation tools, is designed to identify the most 

cost-effective allocations of annual preparedness funding for implementing agency 

field units’ local fire management plans. Eventually, the Fire Program Analysis system, being initially implemented in 2005, will use LANDFIRE data and provide a 

smaller geographical scale for analyses of fuel reduction options and thus, like 

LANDFIRE, will be critical for updating fire management plans. Officials said that 

this preparedness budget allocation system—when integrated with an additional 

component now being considered for allocating annual fuel reduction funding—could 

be instrumental in identifying the most cost-effective long-term levels, mixes, and 

scheduling of these two wildland fire management activities. Completely developing 

the Fire Program Analysis system, including the fuel reduction funding component, 

is expected to cost about $40 million and take until at least 2007 and perhaps until 

2009. 

The New Strategic Analysis Effort: In May 2004, Agriculture and Interior began 

the initial phase of a wildland fire strategic planning effort that also might contribute to identifying long-term options and needed funding for reducing fuels and 

responding to the nation’s wildland fire problems. This effort—the Quadrennial Fire 

and Fuels Review—is intended to result in an overall federal interagency strategic 

planning document for wildland fire management and risk reduction and to provide 

a blueprint for developing affordable and integrated fire preparedness, fuels reduction, and fire suppression programs. Because of this effort’s consideration of affordability, it may provide a useful framework for developing a cohesive strategy that 

includes identifying long-term options and related funding needs. The preliminary 

planning, analysis, and internal review phases of this effort are currently being 

completed and an initial report is expected in 2005. 

The improvements in data, modeling, and fire behavior research that the agencies 

have under way, together with the new cost-effectiveness focus of the Fire Program 

Analysis system to support local fire management plans, represent important tools 

that the agencies can begin to use now to provide the Congress with initial and successively more accurate assessments of long-term fuel reduction options and related 

funding needs. Moreover, a more transparent process of interagency analysis in 

framing these options and their costs will permit better identification and resolution 

of differing assumptions, approaches, and values. This transparency provides the 

best assurance of accuracy and consensus among differing estimates, such as those 

of the interagency team and the National Association of State Foresters. 

A RECENT WESTERN GOVERNORS’ ASSOCIATION REPORT IS CONSISTENT WITH GAO’S

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

In November 2004, the Western Governors’ Association issued a report prepared 

by its Forest Health Advisory Committee that assessed implementation of the 10-

Year Comprehensive Strategy, which the association had jointly devised with the 

agencies in 2001.3 Although the association’s report had a different scope than our 

review, its findings and recommendations are, nonetheless, generally consistent 

with ours about the progress made by the federal government and the challenges 

it faces over the next 5 years. In particular, it recommends, as we do, completion 

of a long-term federal cohesive strategy for reducing fuels. It also cites the need for 

continued efforts to improve, among other things, data on hazardous fuels, fire management plans, the Fire Program Analysis system, and cost-effectiveness in fuel reductions—all challenges we have emphasized today. 

CONCLUSIONS

The progress made by the federal government over the last 5 years has provided 

a sound foundation for addressing the problems that wildland fire will increasingly 

present to communities, ecosystems, and federal budgetary resources over the next 

few years and decades. But, as yet, there is no clear single answer about how best 

to address these problems in either the short or long term. Instead, there are different options, each needing further development to understand the trade-offs 

among the risks and funding involved. The Congress needs to understand these opVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
26

4 California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, The Changing California: Forest and 

Range 2003 Assessment (Sacramento, Calif.: 2003). 5GAO, Technology Assessment: Protecting Structures and Improving Communications during 

Wildland Fires, GAO-05-380 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005). 

tions and trade-offs in order to make informed policy and appropriations decisions 

on this 21st century challenge. 

This is the same message we provided in 1999 when we first called for development of a cohesive strategy identifying options and funding needs. But it still has 

not been completed. While the agencies are now in a better position to do so, they 

must build on the progress made to date by completing data and modeling efforts 

underway, updating their fire management plans with the results of these data efforts and ongoing research, and following through on recent cost-effectiveness and 

affordability initiatives. However, time is running out. Further delay in completing 

a strategy that cohesively integrates these activities to identify options and related 

funding needs will only result in increased long-term risks to communities, ecosystems, and federal budgetary resources. 

Because there is an increasingly urgent need for a cohesive federal strategy that 

identifies long-term options and related funding needs for reducing fuels, we have 

recommended that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior provide the Congress, in time for its consideration of the agencies’ fiscal year 2006 wildland fire 

management budgets, with a joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps the agencies will take, together with related time frames, to complete such a cohesive strategy. 

In an April 2005 letter, Agriculture and Interior said that they will produce by 

August 2005, for the Wildland Fire Leadership Council’s review and approval, a 

.joint tactical plan that will identify the steps and time frames for developing a cohesive strategy. 

WILDLAND FIRE: PROTECTING STRUCTURES AND IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS

Next, I would like to summarize the findings of our second report, being released 

today, that discusses ways to help protect homes and improve communications during wildland fires. Although wildland fire is a natural process that plays an important role in the health of many fire-adapted ecosystems, it has the potential to damage or destroy homes located in or near these wildlands, in the area commonly 

called the wildland-urban interface. Since 1984, wildland fires have burned an average of 850 homes each year in the United States, according to the National Fire 

Protection Association. However, losses since 2000 have risen to an average of 1,100 

homes annually. In 2003, more than 3,600 homes were destroyed by wildland fires 

in Southern California and resulted in more than $2 billion in insured losses. 

Many homes are located in the wildland-urban interface nationwide, and the 

number is growing, although the risk to these homes from wildland fire varies widely. In California, for example, an estimated 4.9 million of the state’s 12 million housing units are located in or near the wildlands, and 3.2 million of these are at significant risk from wildland fire.4 As people continue to move to areas in or near fireprone wildlands, the number of homes at risk from wildland fire is likely to grow. 

When a large high-intensity wildland fire occurs near inhabited areas, it can threaten hundreds of homes at the same time and overwhelm available firefighting resources. Homeowners can play an important role in protecting their homes from a 

wildland fire, however, by taking preventive steps to reduce their home’s ignition 

potential. These preventive measures can significantly improve a home’s chance of 

surviving a wildland fire, even without intervention by firefighting agencies. 

Once a wildland fire starts, many different agencies may assist in the efforts to 

manage or suppress it, including the Forest Service (within the Department of Agriculture); land management agencies in the Department of the Interior; state forestry agencies; local fire departments; private contract firefighting crews; and, in 

some cases, the military. Effective communications among responders commonly 

called communications interoperability—is essential to fighting wildland fires successfully and ensuring both firefighter and public safety. Communications interoperability can be hampered because the various agencies responding to a fire may communicate over different radio frequency bands or with incompatible communications 

equipment. 

My testimony today summarizes key findings from our report released today5 and 

addresses: (1) measures that can help protect structures from wildland fires, (2) factors affecting the use of these protective measures, and (3) the role that technology 

27

6Our report also includes information on the use of military resources for wildland firefighting. 

plays in improving firefighting agencies’ ability to communicate during wildland 

fires.6

SUMMARY

In summary, we found the following:

• The two most effective measures for protecting structures from wildland fires 

are: (1) creating and maintaining a buffer around a structure—often called defensible space—by eliminating or reducing trees, shrubs, and other flammable 

objects within an area from 30 to 100 feet around the structure and (2) using 

fire-resistant roofs and vents. Other technologies, such as fire-resistant windows 

and building materials, sprinkler systems, and chemical agents (gels and foams) 

that coat structures with a temporary protective layer can also help protect 

structures, but they play a secondary role. In addition, technologies, such as geographic information systems (GIS) are available or under development to assist 

in fire protection at the community level. • Although protective measures are effective and available, many homeowners do 

not use them for four main reasons: time or expense involved, competing values 

or concerns, misperceptions about wildland fires, and lack of awareness of 

homeowners’ shared responsibility for home protection. Federal, state, and local 

government agencies and nongovernmental organizations are taking steps to increase the use of protective measures through education, financial or direct assistance, and adoption and enforcement of laws requiring defensible space 

around structures and the use of fire-resistant building materials. • A variety of technologies exist, and others are being developed, to aid communications interoperability between emergency responders, including firefighters, 

but technology alone cannot solve this problem. In the short-term, patchwork 

interoperability technologies, such as audio switches, can be used to link communication systems using different radio frequencies or equipment. In the longterm, technologies are available or under development to upgrade communications systems to provide increased interoperability. Effective adoption of any of 

these technologies, however, requires planning and coordination among federal, 

state, and local agencies that work together to respond to wildland fires and 

other emergencies. 

BACKGROUND

To understand how preventive steps can help protect homes from wildland fire requires an understanding of what wildland fire is, how it spreads, and how it can 

threaten homes. Fire requires three elements—oxygen, heat, and fuel—to ignite and 

continue burning. Once a fire has begun, a number of factors—including weather 

conditions and the type of nearby vegetation or other fuels—influence how fast and 

how intensely the fire spreads. Any combustible object in a fire’s path, including 

homes, can fuel a wildland fire. In fact, homes can sometimes be more flammable 

than the trees, shrubs, or other vegetation surrounding them. If any one of the three 

required elements are removed, however, such as when firefighters remove vegetation and other fuels from a strip of land near a fire—called a fire break—a fire will 

normally become less intense and eventually die out. 

Wildland fire can threaten homes or other structures in the following ways:

• Surface fires burn vegetation or other fuels near the surface of the ground, such 

as shrubs, fallen leaves, small branches, and roots. These fires can ignite a 

home by burning nearby vegetation and eventually igniting flammable portions 

of the home, including exterior walls or siding; attached structures, such as a 

fence or deck; or other flammable materials, such as firewood or patio furniture. 

• Crown fires burn the tops, or crowns, of trees. Crown fires normally begin as 

surface fires and move up the trees by burning ‘‘ladder fuel,’’ such as nearby 

shrubs or low tree branches. Crown fires create intense heat and if close 

enough—within approximately 100 feet—can ignite portions of structures even 

without direct contact from flames. 

• Spot fires are started by embers, or ‘‘firebrands,’’ that can be carried a mile or 

more away from the main fire, depending on wind conditions. Firebrands can 

ignite a structure by landing on the roof or by entering a vent or other opening 

and may accumulate on or near homes. Firebrands can start many new spot 

fires or ignite many homes simultaneously, increasing the complexity of firefighting efforts.

28

7 Radio frequencies are measured in Hertz (Hz); the term kilohertz (kHz) refers to thousands 

of Hertz, megahertz (MHz) to millions of Hertz, and gigahertz (GHz) to billions of Hertz. 

Recognizing that during severe wildland fires, suppression efforts alone cannot 

protect all homes threatened by wildland fire, firefighting and community officials 

are increasing their emphasis on preventive approaches that help reduce the chance 

that wildland fires will ignite homes and other structures. Because the vast majority 

of structures damaged or destroyed by wildland fires are located on private property, the primary responsibility for taking adequate steps to minimize or prevent 

damage from a wildland fire rests with the property owner and with state and local 

governments that can establish building requirements and land-use restrictions. 

When a wildland fire occurs, personnel from firefighting and other emergency 

agencies responding to it primarily use land mobile radio systems for communications. These systems include mobile radios in vehicles and hand-held portable radios 

and operate using radio signals, which travel through space in the form of waves. 

These waves vary in length, and each wavelength is associated with a particular 

radio frequency.7 Radio frequencies are grouped into bands. Of the more than 450 

frequency bands in the radio spectrum, 10, scattered across the spectrum, are allocated to public safety agencies. A firefighting or public safety agency typically uses 

a radio frequency band appropriate for its locale, either rural or urban. Bands at 

the lower end of the radio spectrum, such as VHF (very high frequency), work well 

in rural areas where radio signals can travel long distances without obstruction 

from buildings or other structures. Federal firefighting agencies, such as the Forest 

Service, and many state firefighting agencies operate radios in the VHF band. In 

urban areas, firefighting and other public safety agencies may operate radios on 

higher frequencies, such as those in the UHF (ultrahigh frequency) or 800 MHz 

bands, because these frequencies can provide better communications capabilities for 

an urban setting. When federal, state, and local emergency response agencies work 

together, for example to fight a fire in the wildland-urban interface, they may not 

be able to communicate with one another because they operate in different bands 

along the radio frequency spectrum. 

DEFENSIBLE SPACE AND FIRE-RESISTANT ROOFS AND VENTS ARE KEY TO PROTECTING

STRUCTURES; OTHER TECHNOLOGIES CAN ALSO HELP

Managing vegetation and reducing or eliminating flammable objects—often called 

defensible space—within 30 to 100 feet of a structure is a key protective measure. 

Creating such defensible space offers protection by breaking up continuous fuels 

that could otherwise allow a surface fire to contact and ignite a structure. Defensible space also offers protection against crown fires. Reducing the density of large 

trees around structures decreases the intensity of heat from a fire, thus preventing 

or reducing the chance of ignition and damage to structures. Analysis of homes 

burned during wildland fires has shown defensible space to be a key determinant 

of whether a home survives. For instance, the 1981 Atlas Peak Fire in California 

damaged or destroyed 91 out of 111 structures that lacked adequate defensible 

space but only 5 structures out of 111 that had it. 

The use of fire-resistant roofs and vents is also important in protecting structures 

from wildland fires. Many structures are damaged or destroyed by firebrands that 

can travel a mile or more from the main fire. Firebrands can land on a roof or enter 

a home through an opening, such as an attic vent and ignite a home hours after 

the fire has passed. Fire-resistant roofing materials can reduce the risk that these 

firebrands will ignite a roof, and vents can be screened with mesh to prevent firebrands from entering and igniting attics. Combining fire-resistant roofs and vents 

with the creation of defensible space is particularly effective, because together these 

measures reduce the risk from surface fires, crown fires, and firebrands. 

Other technologies can also help protect individual structures from wildland fires.

• Fire-resistant windows constructed of double-paned glass, tempered glass, or 

glass block help protect a structure from wildland fire by reducing the risk of 

the window breaking and allowing fire to enter the structure. 

• Fire-resistant building materials—such as fiber-cement, brick, stone, metal, and 

stucco—can be used for walls, siding, decks, and doors to help prevent ignition 

and subsequent damage from wildland fire. 

• Chemical agents, such as foams and gels, are temporary protective measures 

that can be applied as an exterior coating shortly before a wildland fire reaches 

a structure. Although these agents have successfully been used to protect 

homes, such as during the Southern California fires in 2003, they require that 

someone be available to apply them and, possibly, reapply or rewet them to ensure they remain effective. They can also be difficult to clean up. 

29

8For additional information on how GIS can assist wildland fire management, see: GAO, 

Geospatial Information: Technologies Hold Promise for Wildland Fire Management, but Challenges Remain, GAO-03-1047 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2003). 9 lnfrared and ultraviolet technologies sense the electromagnetic radiation from a fire outside 

the visible band that humans can see. Temperature sensitive devices, such as heat sensitive resistant wires, do not sense radiation but react to temperature differentials. 

• Sprinkler systems, which can be installed inside or outside a structure, lower 

the risk of ignition or damage from wildland fires. Sprinklers, however, require 

reliable sources of water and, in some cases, electricity to be effective. According 

to firefighting officials, adequate water and electricity may not be available during a wildland fire.

In addition to technologies aimed at protecting individual structures, technologies 

also exist or are being developed which can help reduce the risk of wildland fire 

damage to an entire community.

• GIS is a computer-based information system that can be used to efficiently 

store, analyze, and display multiple forms of information on a single map.8 GIS 

technologies allow fire officials and local and regional land managers to combine 

vegetation, fuel, and topography data into separate layers of a single GIS map 

to identify and prioritize areas needing vegetation management. State and 

county officials we met with emphasized the value of GIS in community-planning efforts to protect structures and communities from wildland fire damage 

within their jurisdictions. • Fire behavior modeling has been used to predict wildland fire behavior, but 

these models do not accurately predict fire behavior in the wildland-urban interface. Existing models can help identify areas likely to experience intense 

wildland fires, identify suitable locations for vegetation management, predict 

the effect of vegetation treatments on fire behavior, and aid suppression by predicting the overall behavior of a given fire. These models do not, however, consider the effect that structures and landscaping have on wildland fire behavior. • Automated detection systems use infrared, ultraviolet, or temperature-sensitive sensors9 placed around a community, or an individual home, to detect the presence of a wildland fire. On detecting a fire, a sensor could set off an audible 

alarm or could be connected via radio or satellite to a device that would notify 

homeowners or emergency personnel. Several such sensors could be networked 

together to provide broad coverage of the area surrounding a community. According to fire officials, sensor systems may prove particularly helpful in protecting communities in areas of rugged terrain or poor access where wildland 

fires might be difficult to locate. These systems are still in development, however, and false alarms are a concern. 

TIME, EXPENSE, AND OTHER COMPETING CONCERNS LIMIT THE USE OF PROTECTIVE

MEASURES FOR STRUCTURES, BUT EFFORTS TO INCREASE THEIR USE ARE UNDER WAY

Many homeowners have not used protective measures—such as creating and 

maintaining defensible space—for four primary reasons:

• Time or expense. State and local fire officials estimate that the price of creating 

defensible space can range from negligible, in cases where homeowners perform 

the work themselves, to $2,000 or more. Moreover, defensible space needs to be 

maintained, resulting in additional effort or expense in the future. Further, 

while fire-resistant roofing materials are available that are comparable in cost 

to more flammable options and, for a home under construction may result in 

no additional expense, replacing a roof on an existing home can cost thousands 

of dollars. • Competing concerns. Although modifying landscaping to create defensible space 

has proven to be a key element in protecting structures from wildland fire, officials and researchers have reported that some homeowners are more concerned 

about the effect landscaping has on the appearance and privacy of their property, as well as on habitat for wildlife. • Misconceptions about wildland fire behavior. Fire officials and researchers told 

us that some homeowners do not recognize that a structure and its surroundings constitute fuel that contributes to the spread of wildland fire or understand exactly how a wildland fire ignites structures. Further, they may not 

know that they can take effective steps to reduce their risk. • Lack of awareness of homeowners’ responsibility. Fire officials told us that some 

homeowners in the wildland urban interface may expect the same level of service they received in more urban areas and do not understand that rural areas 

may have less firefighting personnel and equipment and longer response times. 

30

10 In addition, some insurance companies also direct homeowners in high-risk areas to create 

defensible space. Historically, the insurance industry has not placed a high priority on wildland 

fire issues because of relatively low losses compared with other hazards, such as hurricanes or 

earthquakes. 11Firewise Communities is jointly sponsored by the International Association of Fire Chiefs, 

National Emergency Management Association, National Association of State Fire Marshals, National Association of State Foresters, National Fire Protection Association, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, U.S. Fire Administration, Forest Service, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service. Numerous 

state and local fire and forestry officials also participate in Firewise program activities. 12The National Fire Plan was developed by the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior after severe wildland fires in 2000. In fiscal year 2001, Congress almost 

doubled funding for federal firefighting agencies to help meet the plan’s objectives to (1) increase 

fire suppression preparedness; (2) rehabilitate and restore lands and communities damaged by 

wildland fire; (3) reduce hazardous fuels; and (4) assist communities through education, hazard 

mitigation, and training and equipment for rural and volunteer fire departments. 

Also, when a wildland fire burns near communities, so many houses may be 

threatened simultaneously that firefighters may be unable to protect all of 

them.

Federal, state, and local agencies and other organizations are taking steps in 

three main areas to help increase the use of protective measures.10 First, government agencies and other organizations are educating people about the effectiveness 

of simple steps they can take to reduce the risk to homes and communities. The primary national education effort is the Firewise Communities program,11 which both 

educates homeowners about available protective measures and also promotes additional steps that state and local officials can take to educate homeowners. Education 

efforts help demonstrate that defensible space can be attractive, provide privacy, 

and improve wildlife habitat. 

Second, some federal, state, and local agencies are directly assisting homeowners 

in creating defensible space by providing equipment or financial assistance to reduce 

fuels near structures. Under the National Fire Plan,12 for instance, federal firefighting agencies provide grants or otherwise assist in reducing fuels on private 

land. State and local governments have provided similar assistance. 

Third, some state and local governments have adopted laws that require maintaining defensible space around structures or the use of fire-resistant building materials. For example, California requires the creation and maintenance of defensible 

space around homes and the use of fire-resistant roofing materials in certain at-risk 

areas. Officials of one county we visited attributed the relatively few houses damaged by the 2003 Southern California fires in the county, in part, to its adoption 

and enforcement of laws requiring defensible space and the use of fire-resistant 

building materials. Not all states or localities at risk of wildland fire, however, have 

required such steps. Some state and local officials told us that laws had not been 

adopted because homeowners and developers resisted them. Furthermore, to be effective, laws that have been adopted must be enforced, and this does not always 

happen. 

EFFECTIVE ADOPTION OF TECHNOLOGIES TO ACHIEVE COMMUNICATIONS

INTEROPERABILITY REQUIRES BETTER PLANNING AND COORDINATION

Technologies are available or under development to help improve communications 

interoperability so that personnel from different public safety agencies responding 

to an emergency, such as a wildland fire, can communicate effectively with one another. Short-term, or patchwork, interoperability solutions use technology to interconnect two or more disparate radio systems so that voice or data from one system 

can be made available to all systems. The principal advantage of this solution is 

that agencies can continue to use existing communications systems, an important 

consideration when funds to buy new equipment are limited. Patchwork solutions 

include the following:

• Audio switches that provide interoperability by connecting radio and other communications systems to a device that sends the audio signal from one agency’s 

radio to all other connected radio systems. Audio switches can interconnect several different radio systems, regardless of the frequency bands or type of equipment used. 

• Crossband repeaters that provide interoperability between systems operating on 

different radio frequency bands by changing frequencies between the two radio 

systems. 

• Console-to-console patches that are not ‘‘on-the-scene’’ devices but instead connect consoles located at the dispatch centers where calls for assistance are reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
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13 In some cases, this is the Internet; and in others, it is a private data network. 14See GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges in Achieving Interoperable Communications for 

First Responders, GAO-04-231T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2003). 15The Wireless Public Safety Interoperable Communications Program, otherwise known as 

SAFECOM, was first established as an Office of Management and Budget e-initiative in 2001. 

ceived. The device links the dispatch consoles of two radio systems so that the 

radios connected to each system can communicate with one another.

Other interoperability solutions involve developing and adopting more sophisticated radio or communications systems that follow common standards or can be programmed to work on any frequency and to use any desired modulation type, such 

as AM or FM. These include:

• Project 25 radios, which must meet a set of standards for digital two-way radio 

systems that allow for interoperability between all jurisdictions using these systems. These radios are beginning to be adopted by a variety of federal, state, 

and local agencies. 

• Software-defined radios that will allow interoperability among agencies using 

different frequency bands, proprietary systems from different manufacturers, or 

different modulation types (such as AM or FM). Software-defined radios, however, are still being developed and are not yet available for use by public safety 

agencies. 

• Voice over Internet Protocol that treats both voice and data as digital information and enables their movement over any existing Internet Protocol data network.13 No standards exist for radio communications using Voice over Internet 

Protocol, and, as a result, manufacturers have produced proprietary systems 

that may not be interoperable. 

Whether the solution is a short-term patchwork approach or a long-term communications upgrade, officials we spoke with explained that planning and coordination 

among agencies are critical for successfully determining which technology to adopt 

and for agreeing on funding sources, timing, training, maintenance, and other key 

operational and management issues. State and local governments play an important 

role in developing and implementing plans for interoperable communications because they own most of the physical infrastructure for public safety systems, such 

as radios, base stations, repeaters, and other equipment. In the past, public safety 

agencies have depended on their own stand-alone communications systems, without 

considering interoperability with other agencies. Yet as firefighting and other public 

safety agencies increasingly work together to respond to emergencies, including 

wildland fires, personnel from different agencies need to be able to communicate 

with one another. Reports by GAO,14 the National Task Force on Interoperability, 

and others have identified lack of planning and coordination as key reasons hampering communications interoperability among responding agencies. According to 

these reports, federal, state, and local government agencies have not worked together to identify their communications needs and develop a coordinated plan to 

meet them. Without such planning and coordination, new investments in communications equipment or infrastructure may not improve the effectiveness of communications among agencies. 

In recent years, the federal government, as well as several states and local jurisdictions, have focused increased attention on improving planning and coordination 

to achieve communications interoperability. The Wireless Public Safety Interoperable Communications Program (SAFECOM), within the Department of Homeland 

Security’s Office of Interoperability and Compatibility,15 was established to address 

public safety communications issues within the federal government and to help 

state, local, and tribal public safety agencies improve their responses through more 

effective and efficient interoperable wireless communications. SAFECOM has undertaken a number of initiatives to enhance communications interoperability. For example, in a joint project with the commonwealth of Virginia, SAFECOM developed 

a methodology that could be used by states to assist them in developing a locally 

driven statewide strategic plan for enhancing communications interoperability. Several states have established statewide groups to address communications interoperability. For example, in Washington, the communications committee has developed 

a statewide public safety communication plan and an inventory of state governmentoperated public safety communications systems. Finally, some local jurisdictions are 

working together to identify and address communications interoperability issues. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at 

this time.

32

Senator CRAIG. Robin, thank you very much. Now let me turn to 

Jim Caswell, co-chair of the Western Fire Leadership Council’s 

blue ribbon report on large fire suppression costs. 

Jim. 

Mr. CASWELL. Can I thank——

Senator CRAIG. I was going to say, Jim, and also Kirk 

Rowdabaugh. Why don’t you proceed, both of you, as co-chairs, the 

order for your determination. Thank you. 

Mr. CASWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

STATEMENT OF JAMES CASWELL, OFFICE OF SPECIES CONSERVATION, STATE OF IDAHO, ACCOMPANIED BY KIRK 

ROWDABAUGH, STATE FORESTER OF ARIZONA 

Mr. CASWELL. Both Kirk and I thank you and Senator Wyden 

and the distinguished members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to appear and present testimony on the findings of the strategic issues panel on fire suppression costs. 

This testimony is presented on behalf of the Western Governors’ 

Association, and the lead Governors for fire-enforced health issues 

at the Western Governors’ Association are Governor Napolitano of 

Arizona, and my Governor, and your former colleague, Governor 

Kempthorne of Idaho. 

Kirk and I will share the testimony this afternoon, and the full 

text of our testimony has been provided to the subcommittee for 

the record. So, Kirk—I will let Kirk talk a little bit about the beginnings of our collaboration and how we developed the report. 

Kirk. 

Mr. ROWDABAUGH. Thank you, Chairman Craig, Senator Wyden, 

members of the subcommittee. The Western Governors’ Association’s interest in cost containment is to prevent escalating fire suppression costs from overwhelming the goals of the 10-year comprehensive strategy for reducing wildland fire risks to communities 

and the environment. The goals of that congressionally-requested 

report and the 10-year comprehensive strategy are to improve fire 

prevention and suppression, reduce hazardous fuels, restore fireadapted ecosystems, and to promote community assistance. 

High suppression costs drain funding from other proactive forest 

health and community protection efforts. The need to focus on large 

fire costs is clear. However, wildland fire suppression costs do not 

appear to be spiraling out of control, but instead seem to be increasing at roughly the same rate as overall government spending 

for the last two decades. Total suppression expenditures are strongly correlated with total acres burned and are overwhelmingly centered in large fire costs. Since 1980, large fires—those fires that 

are greater than 300 acres in size—represent less than 2 percent 

of all wildland fires reported, yet account for a whopping 94 percent of the total suppression expenditures. 

The suite of indicators for future fire occurrence, that is the 35 

million acres of unhealthy forests and hazardous fuels on Federal 

lands, the climate predictions for decades of continuing drought, 

the growth of rural communities in Western States and the expansion of the wildland urban interface and the societal expectations 

for those of us in emergency response agencies to protect our natVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
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ural resources and our communities at risk, all of these point to 

more and large fires and expensive fires for the foreseeable future. 

In short, there is no relief in sight for the primary drivers of 

large fire costs. Thus, cost management and the full implementation of the recommendations contained in this cost-containment report are imperative for meeting future land management goals. 

The recommendations that Jim will review with you in just a 

second are strategic in nature. They are not designed to be tactical 

or operational, but they are designed to be complementary of each 

other and to reduce expected suppression expenditures in the future. 

Mr. CASWELL. We had seven recommendations. Recommendation 

1 deals with increasing the level of accountability and the interest 

for large fire costs and their impacts by allocation of suppression 

funds at a regional or equivalent level, depending on the agency. 

Recommendation 2 dealt with land management planning, resource management planning, and directed that policy and direction incorporate cost management on large fires as these plans are 

developed. 

No. 3 really talks about draw-down and how we pre-position 

forces around the country to deal with our upcoming fire season. 

No. 4 was about training and using local resources in both initial 

response and development of Type 3 teams to have more resources 

available, both from local and tribal resources. 

No. 5 dealt with the fuels management issue, future fire management cost considerations when planning all resource management 

projects. It is about the notion of points of control as opposed to perimeter control. It is about using fires that burn today and capitalize on that and create additional areas where we ought to do 

work so we can build on what nature has given us to deal with. 

It is about maintaining acres once they are in a proper state. 

No. 6 deals with cost, data infrastructure and the fact that we 

have very poor cost accounting and the ability to determine what 

really are the principal drivers for large fires. 

And the last one deals with losses averted and how we count or 

do a cost-effective measure for how suppression funds are spent, a 

benefit/cost sort of an approach, losses averted sort of an approach, 

as opposed to acres burned. 

As far as where the status is right now, Assistant Secretary 

Lynn Scarlett addressed this a little bit. The report has been submitted to the two Secretaries by the Governors, and Western Governors’ Association has adopted, with some caveats, the bulk of the 

recommendations. 

Implementation plans are being developed, and next month when 

the Wildland Fire Leadership Council meets in the spring meeting, 

there will be a report on our progress since those decisions were 

made in December. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Caswell and Mr. Rowdabaugh 

follows:]

34

1WGA Policy Resolution 03-18 ‘‘Improving Forest and Rangeland Ecosystem Health in the 

West,’’ section B2. ‘‘The active management and restoration treatments called for in the 10-Year 

Strategy will require substantial investment by all levels of government and private citizens if 

the agreed-to goals are to be achieved. While the Western Governors fully support the cost containment efforts the federal agencies have undertaken to control wildfire suppression costs, the 

Administration should request and the Congress should provide funding to fully implement the 

10-Year Strategy while ensuring that proactive fuels reduction funds are not sacrificed in years 

of high suppression costs. By using proactive approaches called for in the 10-Year Strategy to 

reduce hazardous fuel, to restore ecosystems and to increase the capacity of our communities 

to assist, this nation can eventually reduce loss of life and property from wildfire catastrophes 

while lowering the tremendous suppression costs that are incurred.’’ http://www.westgov.org/

wga/policy/O3/foresthealth3-18.pdf 2See ‘‘A Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities and the 

Environment, 10 Year Comprehensive Strategy Implementation Plan,’’ May 2002 at http://

www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/fire/implemlplan.pdf and ‘‘A Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities and the Environment, 10-Year Comprehensive 

Strategy,’’ August 2001 at http://www.westcov.org/wga/initiatives/fire/finallfirelrpt.pdf. 3See ‘‘WGA Forest Health Advisory Committee Report to the Western Governors on the Implementation of the 10-Year Strategy,’’ November 2004 at http://www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/fire/tempe-report04.pdf.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES CASWELL, OFFICE OF SPECIES CONSERVATION, STATE OF IDAHO, AND KIRK ROWDABAUGH, STATE FORESTER OF ARIZONA, CO- CHAIRMEN, STRATEGIC ISSUES PANEL ON FIRE SUPPRESSION COSTS, ON BEHALF OF

THE WESTERN GOVERNORS’ ASSOCIATION

Thank you, Chairman Craig, Senator Wyden and other distinguished members of 

this Subcommittee for the opportunity to appear and present testimony for today’s 

hearing on wildfire and forest health issues. This testimony is presented on behalf 

of the Western Governors’ Association. Lead governors for forest health issues at 

WGA are Governor Janet Napolitano of Arizona, and Governor Dirk Kempthorne of 

Idaho. WGA is an independent, non-partisan organization of Governors from 18 

Western states and three U.S.-Flag Islands in the Pacific. We appreciate this opportunity to present the views of the WGA on the topic of large-fire suppression costs 

management. 

THE NEED FOR COST CONTAINMENT

WGA has long-standing policy that it has pursed with the Administration and the 

Congress to prevent fire suppression costs from overwhelming the other proactive 

goals of the Congressionally requested ‘‘A Collaborative Approach for Reducing 

Wildland Fire Risks to Communities and the Environment, 10-Year Comprehensive 

Strategy.’’ 1 The goals of the Strategy, adopted by the Secretaries of the Interior and 

Agriculture along with many others in 2001 and 2002, is to: 

• Improve Fire Prevention and Suppression • Reduce Hazardous Fuels • Restore Fire-Adapted Ecosystems • Promote Community Assistance2

For the nation to truly address the risk of catastrophic wildfires, all four of these 

goals must be pursued simultaneously and with equal fervor. This approach is, however, at particular risk of failure because of rising fire suppression costs that overwhelm the other goals of the Strategy. 

Progress has been made since the 10-Year Strategy was approved, particularly in 

the areas of suppression and hazardous fuels. These successful efforts were recently 

reported to the governors by WGA’s Forest Health Advisory Committee.3 Despite 

this important progress, after five years of concerted effort, there are still hurdles 

facing our pursuit of the 10-Year Strategy goals. 

In particular, wildland fire suppression expenditures have been increasing over 

the past two decades and have exceeded the $1 billion mark in three of the last five 

years. The states’ share of spending on suppression has increased commensurately. 

These increasing costs for wildland fire suppression threaten to topple all the efforts 

of the National Fire Plan, 10-Year Strategy, Healthy Forests Initiative and Healthy 

Forests Restoration Act. Pervasive droughts, over-stocked forests, and an expanding 

wildland-urban interface will only exacerbate the societal, economic and natural impacts and costs of wildfire will continue to worsen. 

High suppression costs drain funding for other proactive forest health management efforts called for by the forest health policies and programs mentioned above. 

Austere federal budget estimates make it more important than ever to pursue strategic containment of suppression costs. With forests, as with people, preventive medicine is the most cost efficient approach. For example, a recent Colorado State UniVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
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4See, Journal of Forestry, September 2004, vol. 102, no. 6, pp. 42-49. 5Large Fire Suppression Costs: Strategies for Cost Management, A Report to the Wildland 

Fire Leadership Council From the Strategic Issues Panel on Fire Suppression Costs at 2 (August 

2004). http://www.fireplan.gov/reports/2004/costmanagement.pdf. 6 Id. at 6. 

7 Id. 

8Western Governors’ Association letter of November 8, 2004 to Secretary of the Interior Gale 

Norton and Secretary of Agriculture Ann M. Veneman. http:/www.westgov.org/wga/initiatives/

fire/cost-ltr11-8-04.pdf.

versity study put direct and indirect loses to people and the environment from Colorado’s 2003 Hayman Fire at $230 million, or alternatively nearly $1,700/acre. In 

contrast, fuel reduction costs range from $200-$1500/acre, depending on proximity 

to homes in the wildland-urban interface.4

By using the proactive approaches called for in the 10-Year Strategy to reduce 

hazardous fuel, to restore ecosystems and to increase the capacity of our communities to assist, this nation can eventually reduce loss of life and property from wildfire catastrophes while lowering the tremendous suppression costs that are incurred. 

THE STRATEGIC ISSUES PANEL ON FIRE SUPPRESSION COSTS

The Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC), led by the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture, chartered the ‘‘Strategic Issues Panel on Fire Suppression 

Costs’’ (the ‘‘Panel’’) in early 2004 to ‘‘explore specific strategic issues associated 

with large fire costs, including the relationship of fire to vegetation management 

and land and resource management plans.’’ 5 The need for focus on large fire costs 

is clear. Fire suppression expenditures are overwhelmingly centered in larger fires. 

‘‘From 1980 through 2002 small fires (less than 300 acres) managed by the Forest 

Service totaled 98.6 % of the fires reported but represented only 6.2% of the total 

suppression expenditures. Larger fires (greater than 300 acres) represented 1.4% of 

the fires reported and a whopping 93.8% of the suppression expenditures.’’ 6

‘‘Unwillingness to take greater risks [in operational fire suppression decision-making], unwillingness to recognize that suppression techniques are sometimes futile, 

the ‘free’ nature of wildland fire suppression funding, and public and political expectations are all potential contributors to the underlying causes for the high cost of 

large fires.’’ 7

The WFLC charter for the Panel explicitly identified five areas for examination:

1. Barriers and obstacles to cost containment; 

2. Strategies for cost containment success; 

3. Impediments to equitable sharing of suppression and cost apportionment 

among jurisdictions; 

4. Criteria to measure cost containment success; and, 

5. Relationships of fire management plans and resource management plans to 

suppression costs.

Governor Kempthorne of Idaho serves on the WFLC on behalf of WGA. WFLC 

asked WGA to chair the Panel upon its chartering, and Governors Kempthorne and 

Napolitano agreed. James Caswell, retired Forest Service and Director of the Idaho 

Governor’s Office of Species Conservation, along with Kirk Rowdabaugh, State Forester for the State of Arizona, were asked by their respective Governors to serve as 

the co-chairmen of the Panel. 

Fourteen individuals representing a wide variety of fire fighting interests, including the federal government, worked collaboratively over a four-month period and 

met multiple times face-to-face to construct the final Panel report. The Panel examined the last five years’ reports related to suppression costs; interviewed a wide variety of people and groups, including researchers, special interests, fire managers, 

and other government officials; and analyzed more than 300 past recommendations 

to better understand the issues and to develop strategic actions that meet the intent 

of the Panel’s charter. The Panel’s report was first presented to the WFLC in July 

2004. 

While there have been many past reports on this topic that have led to efficiencies 

in managing the costs of large fires, those efforts have, at best, provided marginal 

cost reductions. The Panel’s report, however, seeks to substantively address the underlying causes of large fire suppression costs. It is this important distinction that 

WGA believes makes the Panel’s report with extremely valuable. As a result, the 

Governors have commended the report to the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture8 and do so today to this Subcommittee and the Congress. 

The strategic and interdependent recommendations set forth in the Panel’s report 

are as follows:

36

A. Increase the level of accountability and interest for large fire costs and their 

impacts by allocating suppression funds on a regional or equivalent basis. 

B. Set policy and direction on agency land/resource management planning to incorporate cost management on large wildfires. 

C. Plan, budget, and manage resources effectively for large fire suppression, such 

that resources for effective initial response and extended attack are not compromised. 

D. Ensure initial responses are always aggressive and driven by the principle of 

utilizing the closest appropriate resources, including those of local and tribal governments. 

E. Incorporate fuels management and future fire management cost considerations 

when planning all resource management projects for public and private lands. 

F. Commit to improving the fire cost data infrastructure as a prerequisite step 

toward improving accountability and strengthening fire management performance. 

G. Develop and use a benefit cost measure as the core measure of suppression cost 

effectiveness.

The following are the recommendations as taken from the Panel’s report including 

the necessary components of each recommendation as well as the goals each recommendation seeks to achieve. 

A. Leadership, Commitment and Accountability 

Increase the level of accountability and interest for large fire costs and their impacts by allocating suppression funds on a regional or equivalent basis. Create a 

dedicated group of agency administrators representing local and regional levels, and 

at least one member of the Panel, to develop operational rules and oversight procedures. Components of this recommendation include:

• Allocate suppression funds to regions or logical geographical divisions. 

• Use predictive-based budgeting, as opposed to the current system of 10-year 

moving averages, as the basis for allocation. The 10-year average will not provide sufficient funds to implement this recommendation. 

• Establish special relief provisions for ‘‘mega’’ or ‘‘extreme’’ large wildfires, i.e., 

establish reasoned estimates for reasonably anticipated levels of funding. 

• Create and manage a national suppression reserve from allocated suppression 

funds. Eliminate ‘‘severity funding,’’ as it is known today. 

• Provide incentives for staying within allocated amounts by allowing up to 51% 

of ‘‘savings’’ to be used for other fire-related projects. Set provisions for the remaining 49% of savings to be returned to the national suppression reserve. 

• Require each region or logical geographic division to contribute a co-payment to 

the wildland fire suppression expenditure before granting access to the national 

suppression reserve. 

• Improve adjacent agency partnerships to co-manage the funds. Combine allocations where practical and feasible. 

• Increase regional tracking and reporting of suppression expenditures. Establish 

a headquarters comptroller, who reports directly to the agency administrator 

(not the fire organization) explicitly for suppression cost allocations, monitoring, 

and suppression reserve management.

Generally, cost considerations take a back seat to firefighter and public safety and 

environmental concerns. While this hierarchy of concern is appropriate, cost considerations are never brought to the forefront. Costs and cost effectiveness have rarely 

been regarded as a priority for the federal wildland fire suppression organizations, 

and most agency administrators have operated under the current system of essentially having a blank check. The lack of accountability for costs allows for increasing 

costs of wildland fire suppression. The goal of this recommendation, therefore, is to 

create the accountability that is missing and the incentives for land managers to 

consider costs. 

WGA believes that Recommendation A will provide the greatest amount of cost 

saving if fully implemented. 

B. Resource/Land Management Planning (R/LMPs) and their Relationships to Fire 

Management Planning (FMPs) 

Set policy and direction on agency land/resource management planning to incorporate cost management on large wildfires. Components of this recommendation include:

a. Display the anticipated wildland fire suppression costs in R/LMPs for each alternative proposed, including the no-action alternative. 

37

9Title II of the National Drought Preparedness Act of 2005 (S.802) seeks to address an inherent flaw in wildfire suppression funding administered by the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) regarding pre-positioning. Currently, FEMA has authority to reimburse states 

for pre-positioning equipment to combat wildfires. This reimbursement is available only for a 

two-week period following a FEMA declaration. However, this current authority actually acts 

as a disincentive to states to provide pre-positioned resources. When states proactively and effectively extinguish a fire before it becomes an emergency, they do not qualify for reimbursement 

as FEMA has no need to make an emergency declaration because there is no emergency. Conversely, when state efforts fail at initial containment and a large fire ensues, they are reimbursed by FEMA. Title II of the National Drought Preparedness Act contains language that 

would ameliorate this disincentive by amending existing FEMA authority under the Robert T. 

Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5131 et seq.). 

b. Establish the expectations in R/LMPs and FMPs for costs of implementing the 

plans by recognizing the probability of large fire occurrence and specifying acceptable losses, given the land management direction established. 

c. Where state, local, and tribal governments have established effective cost management guidance, consider it in the agency planning process.

Without the consideration of cost in the planning process, costs are simply a result of the incident and nothing else should be expected since nothing else was 

planned. The goal is the establishment of a ‘‘line of sight’’ from land management 

planning through Fire Management Plan preparation and on into the Wildland Fire 

Situation Analyses that incorporates cost management as a priority. Land management planning must recognize the wildland fire behavior conditions its decisions 

create. 

C. Sustaining Initial and Extended Attack Capability 

Plan, budget and manage resources effectively for large fire suppression such that 

resources for effective initial response and extended attack are not compromised. 

Components of this recommendation include:

a. Develop standard procedures to determine minimum resource levels that need 

to be maintained for effective initial and extended attack in each geographic area 

using predictive services capabilities based on Energy Release Component, or other 

applicable fire danger index. 

b. For those resources not needed to meet the requirements noted above, develop 

and establish protocols for national control and positioning of those resources.

Creating a sustained program means emphasizing both a strong initial attack and 

extended attack capability. It must also provide for increasing state and local capability for efficient support of federal programs. This entails optimizing funds provided to field units by ensuring support costs are appropriate for services received. 

With maximum financial flexibility to pre-position resources, it is possible to increase initial attack success with the benefit of containing or possibly lowering 

costs.9 It is also critical to sustain initial and extended attack resource capability 

at the local level by ensuring consistent budgeting for preparedness resources. This 

element would involve a cohesive, long-term budget strategy that includes preparedness, emergency suppression, fuels management, and state and local fire assistance 

in order to implement an effective, cost-efficient fire management program. 

D. Initial Attack and Extended Attack Response 

Ensure initial responses are always aggressive and driven by the principle of utilizing the closest appropriate resources, including those of local and tribal governments. Components of this recommendation include:

a. Use all available local resources in wildfire suppression strategy to create an 

integrated and coordinated response to wildland fire. 

b. Form local Type 3 Incident Management Teams (IMTs) to manage initial and 

extended attack operations locally rather than rely on mobilization of Type 1 and 

Type 2 teams. Develop agreements with local, state and federal agencies that establish local Type 3 IMTs. 

c. Focus meaningful federal and state agencies’ financial support and provide appropriate technical assistance to strengthen local resources and assure their availability on a wildfire incident.

Enhanced firefighting preparedness and increased interagency coordination at the 

local level will improve the cost effectiveness of federal and local wildland firefighting efforts. An effective local department that is prepared to act immediately 

or in cooperation with other agencies to suppress wildfires can attack and contain 

wildfires on adjacent state and federal land, often before state and federal forces arrive. They can also provide much-needed assistance to large state and federal 

38

10See, The Changing Role and Needs of Local, Rural, and Volunteer Fire Departments in the 

Wildland-Urban Interface: Recommended Actions for Implementing the 10-Year Comprehensive 

Strategy, An Assessment and Report to Congress (June 2003). http://www.stateforesters.org/

pubs/Final%20Rural%20Fire%20Report.pdf.

wildfires, reducing national mobilization costs for federal agencies and lowering 

overall suppression expenditures. 

Increasing the skills and availability of locally based Type 3 teams will lead to 

effective extended attack. When successful, the need for mobilization of higher cost 

Type 1 or 2 teams is negated. Additionally, the development of Type 3 teams that 

use local firefighters and support (regardless of agency) extensively will reduce costs 

in a variety of ways: the teams could take command, coordinate an effective extended attack, order necessary resources, and provide for safety through increased 

supervision, command and control. Most importantly, these teams will have knowledge of the local conditions and landscapes that will help them make good informed 

decisions. Within the first few hours of a fire-start, they can be very effective in controlling the fire quickly by establishing a competent management organization.10

E. Landscape Fuels Management for Public, Tribal and Private Lands 

Incorporate fuels management and future fire management cost considerations 

when planning all resource management projects for public and private lands. Components of this recommendation include: 

For Public and Tribal Lands 

a. Develop interagency protocols that identify and report acres of hazardous fuels 

reduction from wildland fire. 

b. Require analysis of burned-over areas and adopt active management strategies 

to ensure that excessive fuels do not accumulate again. 

c. After large wildfires, re-evaluate the impacts and feasibility of adopting strategies that use the recently burned areas as boundaries for less costly wildland fire 

use. Incorporate the opportunity presented by the wildfire into the unit fuels strategy. 

For Private Lands 

a. Engage communities and property owners in creating defensible space around 

structures, and appropriate land use, zoning and construction methods/standards for 

structures situated in fire hazard areas. 

b. Strive to make R/LMPs and FMPs into national, comprehensive interagency 

and intergovernmental wildland vegetation defensive management plans.

We want to put particular emphasis on the fact that the Panel also found that 

a paradigm shift in thinking about hazardous fuels reduction effectiveness is required and can be started by ceasing to use acres treated as a ‘‘results’’ measurement for program accomplishments. 

Despite recent increases in funding and fuels treatments, it is apparent that current fuels reduction strategies are not able to address the full magnitude and scope 

of the fuels problem. Collectively, the integration of wildland fire risk mitigation 

measures into all resource management activities, a shift in suppression tactics and 

greater emphasis on post-fire fuel characteristics may reduce the overall costs of 

suppression, while ensuring the protection of high values-at-risk. 

Solutions must address how to create a politically viable, collaborative effort to 

manage the landscape and mitigate fire risks within and around the wildland/urban 

interface. 

F. Fire Cost Management Data Needs 

Commit to improving the fire cost data infrastructure as a prerequisite step toward improving accountability and strengthening fire management performance. 

Necessary components of this recommendation include:

a. Wildland fire management agencies should begin the development of a more 

complete fire database and management information system. 

b. Forest Service Research and Development, in partnership with the fire agencies, should be charged with developing and maintaining this database and with developing a regular series of peer-reviewed reports and analyses that track cost patterns and influences over time. 

c. Establish an effective national fire-related information technology/information 

management framework under the guidance of the WFLC. 

d. Develop an integrated database for all federal, state, and local agencies involved in the collection of wildland fire data that allows for sharing information 

across agencies and provides for a consolidation report on wildland fire response.

39

11See Wildland Fire Leadership Council, Summary Decisions and Action Items, Emmitsburg, 

Maryland, December 2004 at http://www.fireplan.gov/leadership/120704.html.

The absence of information inhibits the ability to improve program management 

and to contain costs. Not knowing fully what wildfires cost—and why—retards 

credibility and accountability at all levels throughout the organization and with external stakeholders. Before cost management can become an integral part of the fire 

culture, similar to safety and stewardship, data and meaningful information on 

costs and cost management performance will have to be made readily available. 

Data problems are not confined to suppression expenditures. Data on actual fuels 

treatment expenditures and treatment characteristics are also absent. Information 

maintained in the National Fire Plan Operations and Reporting System (NFPORS) 

contains planned—not actual—costs, and data are collected to report progress rather 

than evaluate and analyze actual results. Without better data on actual costs and 

their drivers, the agencies cannot assess their firefighting effectiveness or the efficiency with which they are managing costs. 

G. Cost Management Metrics 

Develop and use a benefit cost measure as the core measure of suppression cost 

effectiveness. Necessary components of this recommendation include:

a. Measure should be supported by a comprehensive analysis of wildland fire suppression expenditures and losses averted. 

b. Analysis should be supported with a comprehensive knowledge base of fire 

management costs, suppression cost drivers, and values-at-risk. 

c. Losses averted and suppression costs should be estimated and compared on 

every fire greater than 300 acres, using defensible methodology for estimation of 

values-at-risk and scientific fire behavior predictions for estimating the extent of fire 

involvement in the absence of control. 

d. Benefit/cost ratios should be tracked over time and across regions and forests 

to assess trends.

Performance measures need to encourage managers to balance costs and protection objectives and to inform the public and government officials with a more complete picture for public debate. Without reliable and clear performance measures 

and cost information, land and fire managers may be compelled to select suppression alternatives to reduce potential negative impacts regardless of the cost. 

Needed is a measure that helps evaluate the benefits and costs of suppression alternatives. Cost management involves not only minimizing the cost of suppression 

inputs and assuring their productive deployment, but also making sure that the 

total value of the cost and losses averted is in line with the direct and indirect costs 

of protecting those values. To bring the costs and benefits of an activity into an acceptable balance, managers of the activity can either increase the benefits or decrease the costs. 

NEXT STEPS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS

AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS

The WFLC discussed implementation of the Panel’s recommendations at their December 2004 meeting in Emmitsburg, Maryland. An overall review of the recommendations by WFLC staff concluded that most of the report would be feasible 

to implement, if agency leadership is committed to making implementation of the 

Panel’s recommendations a priority for accomplishment. However, resources at the 

agencies are stretched thin. Staff noted that most of the people who should be assigned to an implementation are also involved in other high priority interagency assignments. 

In Maryland, WFLC went forward, and with some caveats and amendments, 

adopted the bulk of the recommendations of the Panel, and we commend them for 

doing so.11 However, on Recommendation A: ‘‘Leadership, Commitment and Accountability,’’ where we believe there is the greatest opportunity for suppression cost 

savings, WFLC was not able to move forward in full. In part, WFLC had concern 

that certain components of the recommendations would require Congressional action 

to implement. It was noted that to create a national suppression reserve and thereby eliminate severity funds, Congressional approval might be required to allow reprogramming from suppression to preparedness and to create the national-level 

fund. To provide incentives to regional managers to stay within allocated suppression costs by allowing them to use part of any savings on other fire-related projects, 

Congressional approval was also noted as necessary, given the prohibition against 

moving appropriated funds from one budget line-item to another (e.g., from suppression to forest restoration) without prior approval. Finally, Congressional approval 

40

* The letter can be found in the appendix. 

was also noted as necessary to allow a co-payment from a federal land manager to 

the wildland fire suppression expenditure before granting access to the national 

suppression reserve. Appropriations law prohibits augmentation of one account with 

funds appropriated for a different purpose. 

We urge appropriate Congressional leadership to sit down with the Administration and determine how the impediments to full implementation of Recommendation 

A may be overcome. If Congress and the Administration want to make a serious and 

concerted effort to contain large-fire costs, we urge you to strongly consider making 

the legal changes necessary for suppression cost savings to become a reality. Moreover, given the interrelated nature of all the recommendations, we urge the Congress to closely track and review progress made by the Administration in implementing each and all of the Panel’s recommendations. 

CONCLUSION

Real savings in the suppression budget will not happen overnight. Only with 

strong and sustained leadership from the Congress and the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior can significant reductions in the costs of suppression of 

large fires be achieved. The Panel believes those savings can be achieved if the recommendations they have put forward are fully implemented. As the Panel states, 

true suppression expenditure savings will only be achieved by focusing on strategic 

cost considerations as set forth in their recommendations, not on tactical cost considerations, such as the apportionment of suppression costs between all involved jurisdictions. The recommendations may require certain legal changes, and they most 

definitely require a change in the status quo of the agencies fire-fighting operations 

and mind set. The Panel and the WGA believe the time for these changes has come, 

and we hope the Congress and the Administration agree.

Senator CRAIG. Jim, Kirk, thank you both very much. It is tremendously helpful to get someone in your position and with the 

Governors of the Western States, who are really kind of in the core 

of that drought zone at the moment, looking at the realities of our 

forests and firefighting. We appreciate your thoughts at the moment, and we will take a very close look at the study in its completion. 

Mark, let me start with you. It has been almost 2 years since the 

blue ribbon report on aviation safety was released and a year since 

the cancellation of 33 contracts for the heavy retardant multi-engine aircraft. 

We have heard from people pushing everything from A-10 Warthogs to S-3 Vikings to Boeing 747s fitted with slip-in retardant 

tanks. We understand the process for certification of the B-200 amphibious aircraft, and the British Aerospace BA-146 is progressing. 

What is the Department’s long-term strategy for replacing these 

fire assets, and when will you be making your proposal on this and 

how much are the alternatives that you are considering likely to 

cost? 

Mr. REY. First, I will submit for the record a summary of our 

progress in implementing the recommendations of the blue ribbon 

commission 2 years ago. Many of those recommendations which 

went beyond just the integrity of the airtanker fleet have been implemented. 

I will also submit for the record an April 5 letter, this year, April 

5, 2005, from Secretary Johanns and Secretary Norton, responding 

to the National Transportation Safety Board’s recommendations.* 

It is our judgment that we either have or are implementing all 

of the National Transportation Safety Board’s recommendations. 

Both of those go to the integrity of the existing aviation assets and 

the existing airtanker fleet. 

41

Now all of that having been given, we know that the existing 

fleet is not infinite, that there needs to be a going-forward strategy 

to bring online the next fleet, the next generation of tankers, and 

we are working on that, both between the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture and the White House. 

In broad terms, I think we can summarize what we are leaning 

toward is a fleet that is newer, but with fewer large fixed-wing 

airtankers, in favor of a larger number of more mobile assets, particularly helicopters, because our experience over the last couple of 

years has shown pretty good results with helicopters. There still is 

a need to maintain some number of large fixed-wing airtankers in 

the mix, because they are a particularly cost-effective asset. 

Over the last year, as we have had the opportunity to look at the 

existing fleet, as well as look at the options for a future fleet, as 

well as talk to virtually everybody who has one of those planes you 

mentioned, I have met with all of them, and you have probably met 

with all of the ones who have operations in Idaho, and there are 

at least 14 of them that are out there with what they think is the 

next best thing. Unfortunately, none of those aircraft are ready to 

put online at the present time, and some of them probably never 

will be ready to put online. They are interesting experiments, but 

they probably will not get beyond that. 

So as we looked at where to go, going forward, we were leaning—

and may still yet lean—toward acquiring additional P-3s, because 

the military has a number of low-hour P-3s that can be retrofitted 

at a reasonable cost and used as the backbone of a large airtanker 

fleet in conjunction with all of the aviation assets. We would still 

maintain room if one or another of those 14 entrepreneurs is able 

to bring an alternative aircraft online at a comparable cost of operation to fly those as well. 

Now in light of the crash this past week, we are going to have 

to take some time to evaluate why that occurred and what implications it has, if any, for where we were headed. So it is going to be 

a couple more, probably a couple more months, before we close on 

a going-forward strategy. 

We are confident that our existing fleet, augmented by the assets 

that we can make available, either if the P-2Vs or the McDonnell 

Douglas products can come back online, or additional helicopters or 

helitankers or fixed-wing, single-engine tankers is going to be adequate to meet our needs for the foreseeable future. At the same 

time, we would like to get on with reconfiguring this fleet with 

more modern aircraft to take us not to next year or the year after, 

but to 10 years and 15 years down the road. 

Senator CRAIG. Mark, thank you. 

Senator Bingaman. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for 

having the hearing. 

Mr. Caswell, let me ask you about one of the conclusions that 

your report reached as I understand it. This is on the whole issue 

of predictive-based budgeting. We have had this discussion here in 

the committee before. I believe we had a discussion about it with 

Under Secretary Rey here last year. 

42

You say in your report you use predictive-based budgeting as opposed to the current system of 10-year floating averages. This is for 

purposes of allocating suppression funds to different regions. 

I essentially made that same suggestion, and the answer that I 

understood I got was that it was impossible to predict the relative 

severity of a fire season a year or more in advance when the agency budgets are being developed, so predictive-based budgeting was 

not possible, at least for those purposes when those budgets are put 

together. 

I guess I would be interested in any response you have as to 

what you were intending to convey with this recommendation. 

Mr. CASWELL. Mr. Chairman, Senator Bingaman, our view of 

this—this is one of the more critical recommendations in the 

seven—of the seven recommendations, and it is the one we felt 

really gives us the most opportunity to make a difference. And it 

was based on the notion that we need to have both incentives and 

disincentives, and we need to change behavior throughout the levels of the organization if we are going to turn the corner on how 

important it is to really seriously consider the costs in the future 

and to try to at least control those and not allow sort of just exponential growth to continue. So the idea here is really quite simple, 

and we think it is quite feasible to do this. 

Now it is not without risks and there are complications. There 

are some legal complications and there is a bunch of stuff that 

would have to be worked through. However, having said that, it is 

quite simple. We know pretty much where, from history, these fires 

occur—the mega-fires is one of the ones I am talking about, this 

2 percent—and in what areas. 

So if we were to allocate our suppression funding, which in the 

2006 budget I think right now stands at a recommendation level 

of about $700 million, to the areas of the country where we expect 

the most activity to occur, and then hold those, in the case of the 

Forest Service, regional foresters, and in the case of the Bureau of 

Land Management, State directors, responsible to manage their 

suppression budget. When they get to the point where it is exceeding the money they were allocated, they then have to dip into their 

regular resource funds—it is just like a deductible in insurance—

until they have exceeded that level. We suggested 20 percent. Then 

they can come back to the national level to tap into the national 

level fund that is available. 

There are a whole lot of things in terms of spreading risk, leadership, accountability, coordination, communications, decision-making, throughout the year about how I manage my region. And, yes, 

we may get it wrong some years in terms of our ability to predict, 

but built into that ought to be the ability to move some money 

around, too. We think this is a doable thing. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Let me ask one other question here. Thank 

you very much for that answer. I am concerned about priority setting for fuels reduction treatments where the emphasis is on the 

number of acres treated. I hear complaints in my State that this, 

as a performance measure, is almost the exclusive driver behind 

the priority setting. The result is, instead of treating the highest 

priority areas, rangers are pushing to treat those acres that can be 

treated most cheaply and thereby get more acres treated. So the 

43

cost containment report, as I read it, is very critical of using acres 

treated as a performance measure. Am I reading this right, and 

would someone like to comment on that? 

Mr. ROWDABAUGH. Mr. Chairman, Senator Bingaman. 

Senator BINGAMAN. Yes. 

Mr. ROWDABAUGH. You got that exactly right. This report and 

the panel’s recommendation is that we de-emphasize acres treated 

as the measure of program efficiency and emphasize resources protected: natural resources protected, human development, structures 

protected, lives protected. 

The emphasis needs to change and to put our scarce resource 

dollars, our fuel-treatment dollars, on the ground in those areas 

where we can make the greatest difference to protecting our highest priorities. 

Senator BINGAMAN. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 

very much. 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you very much, Senator. The last question 

I think was very probative and relevant to our current circumstance. It is a concern of mine also. 

Let me turn to Senator Murkowski. Lisa. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Chairman, this is the third hearing I 

have attended where we have talked about the upcoming fire season, and with each hearing, we talk about those assets that are 

available to get out and combat these fires, and continuing problems with the retardant tanker fleet. 

After our big fires last summer, the Fairbanks North Star Borough kind of did their own analysis of what went right, what went 

wrong. It was their own independent commission, looking at the 

Federal, State, local cooperation and some of the jurisdictional 

issues. One of the things that, of course, they pointed to, which is 

no surprise to anybody, is again we do not care whether it is Federal property or State property, but give us something that can assist us with the fires. 

And, Mr. Rey, you mentioned the possibility of bringing more 

helicopters online as, again, an additional asset or an asset that 

can be more responsive than perhaps the retardant tankers. But it 

seems that there has been this issue of not having enough of the 

tankers. We had the concern last year with the ambiguity as it related to these three—the Canadian retardant tankers that we had 

contracted with—the State of Alaska had contracted with—and 

there was ambiguity as to whether or not these tankers could fight 

the fires in Federal protection areas. 

And what we were faced with, as I mentioned in my opening 

statement, was not so much the threat of the fire to property and 

person, but what the smoke was doing to our urban centers, literally shutting down the interior to traffic, whether it be road or 

air traffic for tourism. 

What can we expect this year in terms of what will be available 

to us? Will we have the ambiguity cleared up in terms of whether 

or not we can use these Canadian tankers? What will we have 

there? 

And I notice on the map we are not in the above-normal potential range except down on the Kenai Peninsula in south central, 

44

which is, of course, where our population center is. So I need to 

know that we will have the assets that are available. 

I am also concerned about the possibility for getting additional 

helicopters as well as local fire trucks down in the Kenai Peninsula 

area, so if you can speak to that, please. 

Mr. REY. I had this discussion with Senator Stevens at the Appropriations Committee, and so I went back and checked to make 

sure that what I told Senator Stevens was correct. 

The allocation of resources in an incident is controlled by the incident commander. We do not tell him how many planes he needs. 

We do not tell him you need to hire this kind of equipment or that 

kind of equipment. That is what we train them for and what we 

rely on them for. None of the incident commanders in Alaska had 

unmet resource requests. 

So whether people, looking from the outside in to the firefighting 

effort, thought it was adequate or not is another question. But in 

the judgment of the incident commanders who were fighting those 

fires, they asked for and got what they thought they needed, and 

we thereafter do a review to see if that was the right firefighting 

strategy. 

There was some initial confusion, which was later remedied, 

about the use of non-federally certified tankers and the liability associated with that, having stood down the fleet of heavy tankers. 

That has been remedied and that will not be a problem this year, 

State of Alaska tankers. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. You say it has been remedied and it will 

not be a problem. It is remedied in what way? Have we cleared up 

the jurisdictional issue or do we have more tankers? 

Mr. REY. We have cleared up the safety issue. We are not concerned with the safety of the assets that are going to be used, either by the Federal Government or by the State. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. So they will be available if needed. 

Mr. REY. They were available if needed anyway under State control. The question is whether we wanted to put an asset, a plane 

that we could not verify could fly safely, into a federally-controlled 

firefighting effort. And that issue has now been remedied, because 

we believe the plane is safe to fly. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. What about the Canadian tankers? 

Mr. REY. Those are the ones we are referring to. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. So if we need them, they will be available 

to us without any concern about either the safety component or the 

accessibility? 

Mr. REY. That is correct. But to the point, last year we had extra 

tankers standing by at the time those incident commanders were 

fighting those fires. So if the incident commander had said I need 

a tanker here, the fact that——

Senator MURKOWSKI. Were not those tankers standing by down 

in California? 

Mr. REY. Correct. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. And the problem that we were facing was 

that the smoke was so thick we could not get anything into the air, 

whether it be a tanker or a helicopter or——

Mr. REY. That is a different problem. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Okay. 

45

Mr. REY. There are times when aviation assets, even though they 

are available, are ineffective. We had that problem for a considerable period of time in Alaska last year. We had it for different reasons in California in 2003, where extreme winds made tanker, or 

any aviation flight, too hazardous and ineffective. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. I have more questions, Mr. Chair, but I will 

wait until the next round. 

Senator CRAIG. We will have another round. 

Senator Cantwell. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

hearing on wildfire preparedness and certainly to you and Senator 

Wyden for your continued focus on this issue. I think it is very important. 

Obviously, the charts and the map here show almost all three of 

our States. 

Senator CRAIG. Your State and Ron’s State and my State are in 

the bull’s-eye this year. 

Senator CANTWELL. Yes. And I think it is not lost on our panel 

who are testifying today, the conditions of the Northwest with 

drought conditions. And I do not know yet that our Governor has 

declared an emergency related to drought, but may do so in the 

near future, which brings up one particular question that I have. 

Mr. Rey, I think you and I have talked about this before, which is 

the issue of preparedness and how we spend our money and particularly the training of firefighting individuals. 

Now I notice that Mr. Caswell, representing the Western Governors’ Association, actually included in his testimony a statement 

about, ‘‘Not knowing fully what wildfires cost—and why—retards 

credibility and accountability at all levels throughout the organization with the external stakeholders. And before cost management 

can come an integral of firefighting culture, similar to safety and 

stewardship... .’’ He goes on to say that we have to have that 

information. 

So I guess, Mr. Rey, I am asking, when will this subcommittee 

get information on what costs are in the budget, specifically related 

to training of firefighter personnel and the safety in firefighter 

training budget, in particular, beyond just training? But what safety measures and what dollars are being spent on that? Now that 

is a request I have made previously, and I do not know if you have 

information you can provide us today about the actual costs associated with training and safety for preparedness as it relates to the 

workforce that is actually out there on the front line. 

Mr. REY. One of the complications is that many of the training 

programs that we undertake are not specific to firefighters. We 

train other field personnel in some of the same techniques. 

So what we are trying to do, in response to your request, is to 

break out those training expenses to just those that are associated 

with training firefighters as opposed to other field workers. We 

should be able to get that to you within the next couple of weeks. 

Senator CANTWELL. So I will—because we made a request——

Mr. REY. I think you made it at the budget hearing, earlier this 

spring, if I recall. 

46

Senator CANTWELL. And I just want to point out that in 2002, 

you also said that you would get us specific requests, which we did 

not see. So we are very anxious about this, and I will tell you why. 

You know, obviously everybody remembers Storm King, the fire 

where many individuals lost their lives. And then in Washington 

State, we had the Thirtymile Fire. But what was surprising about 

the Thirtymile Fire, in the investigation that was done by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, is that in this 

Thirtymile case, all 10 of the agencies’ standing fire orders—I 

mean the provisions about what the workforce should be doing—

and 18 watch-out situations, which are again the basic rules, were 

violated or disregarded. 

Then along comes the Cramer Fire. Two more individuals lose 

their lives, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

study found that there were, in the Cramer Fire, additional serious, willful and repeat violations. 

So we are hearing the same information over and over again, and 

it seems to be related to a workforce that is out there in a very 

dangerous situation. Everybody knows that and understands that, 

but may not be fully trained, fully aware or getting the right level 

of training as it relates to the dangerous level of the situation. And 

the fact that we keep seeing the same issues from the Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration being brought up, the same 

rules—and I do not want to get into a situation where we are blaming the individuals who may not have gotten enough training. In 

the situation with our own State and what happened at Thirtymile, 

they were a very young group of people. I mean there were 18-yearolds out there being trained a short period of time. 

So I want to get to the bottom of what we are spending and actually agree, Mr. Caswell, with you making that statement—in a 

much broader fashion— of the information. But to me, getting the 

culture corrected on following these rules is also about finding the 

money and how much we are spending on it and being detailed 

about it. 

Mr. REY. We can get that to you. There is a common theme between all three of those fires, and that is that the catastrophe occurred when the fires were in transition. So it is not just a question 

of changing the agency’s culture. It is not just a question of investing more in training. It is, in this case, a question of figuring out 

what happens at that moment when a fire transitions from a relatively benign incident to one that is one much more difficult. We 

need to identify that in order to train people to anticipate and 

avoid it. 

So there are, in these particular instances, some things we are 

focused on in trying to focus on that specific circumstance, because 

that is where the casualties seem to be occurring more commonly 

than, for example, when crews are combating a fire that has already become a large incident fire. So there is some complexity 

there as well. 

Senator CANTWELL. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman, but I 

think that there is something beyond just that these were very 

tricky situations in the sense that in the Thirtymile Fire situation, 

there was a lot of testimony, a lot of dispute, about whether that 

47

particular crew should have been at that particular point at that 

time. 

Now you are talking about communication and command, and as 

I mentioned them, the watch-out—the 18 watch-out situation commands that are supposedly passed on to these individuals, but are 

they following? 

And so we do end up getting people in very dangerous situations. 

But somehow these standing orders, and specifically the watch-out 

situations—hey, these are the things you should watch out for—are 

not being followed. 

Mr. Chairman, I will submit more questions, but we certainly 

will be looking for this information. 

Mr. REY. One of the things about Thirtymile that has changed 

since then is that one of the causal factors was fatigue on the part 

of the crew leader, so we have changed our rest-rotation requirements. It was not an issue of training so much as it was that they 

were on shift too long and good decision-making was not made as 

quickly as it should have in the face of a rapidly changing fire environment. 

Senator CRAIG. Now let me turn to Senator Smith. 

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mark Rey and all of you, thank you for your testimony and your 

contribution to this hearing. Mark, last week Senator Craig and I 

sent a letter to the Forest Service chief requesting that the Service 

provide real-time estimates of smoke and gas emissions from this 

year’s wildfires. Do you believe the Forest Service will be able to 

provide this information to the public this year? 

Mr. REY. Probably not this year, likely next year. We have been 

working on and have invested a considerable amount of time on a 

model that will use fuel conditions and weather data to tell us 

what will happen when a particular area burns, where the smoke 

will go, and what it will contain. The model is called Blue Sky 

Rains. 

What we will do this year is, as we get fires, locate monitors so 

that we are monitoring the smoke emissions and then compare 

what we get on a real-time basis to what the model has predicted 

in order to calibrate the model properly. If we are able to do that—

and, frankly, there is part of me that hopes we will not be able to 

do that, because that means there will not be many fires. But I 

think probably we will get the fires. So if we are able to do that, 

then by next year, with the model properly calibrated, we should 

be able to tell you if this amount of southwestern Oregon burns, 

this is where the smoke will go and these will be what kinds of 

emissions you will get. 

The model is hinged on particulate emissions, which we think 

are a pretty fair indicator for the greenhouse gases and the toxins 

that we know are also emitted in an uncontrolled wildfire situation. 

Senator SMITH. You mentioned in your testimony the total acreage treated on Forest Service lands. There are concerns that the 

bulk of this acreage was accomplished through prescribed fire rather than mechanical treatment. Could you provide me and the subcommittee with a breakdown of burn versus mechanical acreage 

treated, and also how many acres where condition class was actually changed? 

48

Mr. REY. We have that information in our data bases and we can 

spit it out for you. 

One of the things that is important to remember is that, as we 

had a pretty benign fire season, a relatively benign fire season, in 

2004, we had very large burn windows for prescribed fire, and that 

made the acres for prescribed burning able to be increased. And I 

do not begrudge our people the opportunity to do that, because it 

meant that fuels treatment work was getting done. 

Again, there was a discussion earlier about acres treated not 

being the best performance measure, and we agree with that, and 

that is why we are developing more refined performance measures, 

but it is one that everybody can understand. 

And last year was the first year, excluding Alaska, although I am 

reluctant to do that—but excluding Alaska, last year was the first 

year that we actually treated more acres than were burned in 

wildfires. 

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I will submit some further questions and ask for written responses. They relate to the number of 

helicopter companies in Oregon that have expressed concerns over 

contract negotiations with the Forest Service for their facilities to 

be used in treating wildfires. Thank you. 

Senator CRAIG. Senator, thank you, and thank you for attending. 

Now let me turn to Senator Ron Wyden. Ron. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my friend 

and colleague, Senator Smith, has been, as usual, diplomatic with 

respect to the frustrations at home about contracting, and I am not 

going to be——

Senator SMITH. I was going to have a follow-up question, but you 

proceed, because you will be less diplomatic. 

Senator WYDEN. I am not going to be as diplomatic as my friend 

is, because I think there is tremendous frustration, Mr. Rey, on 

this point. And this goes to the question that we have been at summer after summer with respect to the readiness of aircraft, and 

these helicopters that Senator Smith and I are concerned about are 

more needed now than they were before. 

And what we have to do is get clarified how these contracts are 

going to proceed. And as far as I can tell, there is a lot of confusion 

with respect to the two kinds of potential contracts out there for 

the aircraft that we need. There is one kind of contract called an 

exclusive contract where, in effect, I gather, the aircraft is just sitting there and is available. And then there is another aircraft contract called call-when-needed, and essentially these kinds of aircraft could be used for other sorts of matters. And what folks at 

home are concerned about—and I think this is really going to affect 

our readiness—is that the two kinds of contracts are sort of being 

used interchangeably by folks at home, so people cannot prepare 

and get a sense of what they are going to actually need out on the 

ground. 

And in particular there was a meeting on March 7 of this year 

that was held at Forest Service Headquarters with Larry Brosnan, 

the Assistant Director of Fire and Aviation, to discuss the contracting malpractice. A lot of the folks that Senator Smith and I 

represent were there. And I think they went home vastly more confused than they were when they got there. 

49

And what I would like to ask, Mr. Rey, is if you could get us a 

statement within the next 10 days that specifically clarifies how 

these contract practices will work, what kind of implementation is 

going to be needed. Because we need to provide our constituents 

with the basic contracting 101 information with respect to these 

types of contracts if we are going to have the kind of readiness that 

I know you want to see and I want to see. So can we get that 

worked out so that within the next 10 days you will get us a clear 

statement with respect to how this contracting authority is to proceed and what the folks in Oregon are supposed to do to get it implemented? 

Mr. REY. That will be easy to do. This has been a matter of ongoing negotiation between the Forest Service and the vendors from 

among the helicopter companies, and it has been a very good and 

vibrant negotiation. 

Now, last year at this time, when it was clear that we were going 

to depend on a larger amount of helicopters, some of the helicopter 

operators—certainly none of your constituents or Senator Craig’s, 

but some of them from somewhere—thought they had us over the 

barrel, quite frankly, and the rates they quoted us were outrageous. We took a pretty firm line that we were not going to 

spend the taxpayers’ money that way, and lo and behold, as it 

turned out, we were able to work something out with them. 

So we have, you know, some pretty aggressive contract people. 

They view themselves as the guardian of the public trust and 

sometimes that results in unhappiness, sometimes it results in confusion. There are two different kinds of contracts, and we can clarify for you how we use each. 

Senator WYDEN. Good. Well, that strikes me as fair and if I could 

say, Mr. Chairman, I would like to work with you on this, because 

I think we want a win/win. We want to make sure that the region 

has the aircraft that we need, and we want to make sure that the 

taxpayers’ interests are protected. 

What I am concerned about is we are on our way to a lose/lose. 

We are going to have confusion with respect to the aircraft and we 

are not going to protect the taxpayer concerns. And I am sure that 

people other than those in Idaho, Oregon and Washington would 

probably try to exploit that. But I am glad you want to work with 

us, and we will expect that within 10 days. 

The other point that I wanted to ask about goes to something 

that I have been interested in over the years and ask more in 

terms of a long-term kind of discussion. My question is, is there 

any way to track the costs of a fire while it is actually ongoing? 

The reason that I ask about this is that obviously our folks are in 

harm’s way and people who are out in the field cannot do that. But 

I wonder what the process is in terms of folks away from the fire 

trying to figure out how to best allocate the costs. 

The reason I ask this is that there seems to still be wide variations in cost per acre of fires that even to an inexpert eye like my 

own look fairly similar. So how is that done? And, if so, are there 

any ways in which that might be improved? And I see one of your 

colleagues, Ms. Scarlett, nodding as well. 

I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman, but if both Mr. Rey and 

Ms. Scarlett could respond to that, that would be great. 

50

Mr. REY. We actually have the capability to track costs on a daily 

basis, on a real-time basis. Not the cost of the burn in resource values, but our costs of suppression. So we can provide that information for any incident in a fairly short time period. 

There is a very wide variation of cost per acre, and you are right. 

Sometimes the reasons for that variation are obvious, given where 

and what kind of fire it is. Sometimes they are less obvious, and 

that is looking at the costs of large incidents. Fires that we do not 

extinguish on initial attack is where we know, as Mr. Caswell said, 

most of the savings can be achieved. So understanding those differences is a good part of our cost recovery effort. 

Ms. SCARLETT. Senator, the only thing I would add to that is that 

it is precisely those variations that caused us to, in 2003, do five 

analyses of some large fires and take a very close look at them to 

see if we could better understand what was driving the differences 

in costs from one to the other. 

In turn, that is also what led the Wildland Fire Leadership 

Council to convene the strategic issues panel that these two gentlemen co-chaired, again, to give us a better understanding. We think 

that that strategic issues panel has illuminated some issues and we 

are in the process of trying to implement some of those recommendations. It is not going to do away with the variation that 

is driven by terrain and other factors, but hopefully we can get 

more uniformly efficient by utilizing some of their recommendations. 

Senator WYDEN. Can you provide Senator Craig and me that information? Because, on their face, these variations are simply too 

wide to gloss over, and the fires look relatively similar. The variations—the gap is very substantial, and I would like to have you 

supply us the information you gathered with respect to how you 

might go about addressing those differences. 

Ms. SCARLETT. We would be happy to do that. 

Mr. REY. One difference I would just point out at the outset is 

it depends on what the prevailing rate, if we use State or local 

help, is. It is more expensive to fight fires in southern California 

than it is eastern Oregon, if we are using State assets. 

Senator WYDEN. I think that is a fair point. That is not the kind 

of concern I have. Obviously, there could be wage differentials and 

things that are apparent on the face. But what has been, I think, 

unusual to me, and certainly inexplicable on its face, is it looks like 

fairly similar kinds of fires in fairly similar parts of the rural West, 

and the variations are dramatic. So I would like that information 

then. I thank you for your thoughts on that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you, Ron. 

Now let me turn to Senator Salazar, noting that on the Rocky 

Mountain front, from top to bottom, you are at 100 to 150 percent 

of normal moisture. So we would assume that both agencies would 

transfer a dominant amount of the resources that would otherwise 

play out in Colorado to the inland West this year. Other than that, 

let me recognize Senator Salazar. 

Senator SALAZAR. Thank you very much, Chairman Craig. You 

know that in any part of the West, the arid West, there never is 

enough rainfall anyway. We are still in a drought situation in ColoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
51

rado, notwithstanding the statistics, but thank you for the moisture, whoever has been creating it. We are doing much better in 

Colorado than we had for a very long time and conditions have, in 

fact, improved. 

Let me say to the chairman, Senator Craig, I really appreciate 

the fact that you have convened this hearing, because it is a very 

important subject for all of us across the West, certainly very important for us in Colorado. And I think when you have lived 

through the wildfires that we have seen across the West and you 

have seen, firsthand, the tragedies that sometimes occur because of 

wildfires, that this is exactly the kind of thing that we ought to be 

doing. So my commendation again to our chairman. I think I am 

doing that two or three times a day on different things these days, 

but he is doing a great job. 

In Colorado, in 1994, we lost 14 men and women near Glenwood 

Springs in the Storm King Fire. Back, I think it was 2 years ago, 

I was involved in prosecuting the person who started the Hayman 

Fire, near the Denver area, where there were over 138,000 acres 

of forest lands that were burned there, as well as a lot of private 

property that was burned in that particular burn. And then in 

2002, up near Estes Park, we also saw a slurry bomber go down 

with three crew members that were also killed. So we know from 

the great drought of the last several years in our State how important this issue is for all of us and the importance of addressing it 

in a preventive way. 

My question to you, Mr. Rey and Ms. Scarlett, is relative to coordination with State and local governments. At the end of the day, 

you know, the national effort cannot do it alone, and there has to 

be a tremendous coordinated effort with State and local fire prevention and firefighting efforts. And I would like just an overview 

of how it is that the Department is coordinating with the State and 

local governments on this issue. 

Ms. SCARLETT. I will tackle that first, if I might. There are a 

number of things that we have underway. Let me first thank you 

for the observation. We fully agree that it is critically important 

that we work better and better with the State and local entities. 

The Department of the Interior, recognizing that, has actually incorporated into its preparedness plan this year special training for 

local firefighting folks, so that we can both enhance their ability to 

fight wildland fires alongside of us and have the same kind of 

training that our Federal people have. So that is a priority for us. 

Second, we had reference to the interoperability issues and the 

technical issues. We have underway, working with State and local 

governments, efforts to have a common incident reporting system 

and then, secondly, working on better communications interoperability, which has been a very significant impediment identified by 

local governments in the past. 

So both on the training front and on the interoperability front, 

we have efforts underway to make that a more seamless collaborative effort. 

Senator SALAZAR. And are you comfortable then, Ms. Scarlett, 

with respect to that level of coordination that currently exists, as 

we look at the season ahead, that if I were to ask local governments how you are coordinating with them, that I would get back 

52

* The articles can be found in the appendix. 

the response that they would say the Feds are doing everything 

right in the way that we like to see it done? 

Ms. SCARLETT. I would always like to say that improvement is 

a journey, not a destination. I am sure there are more things that 

we can still do better. 

We have significantly enhanced training, and we did, for the first 

time 2 years ago, sign, with the International Association of Fire 

Chiefs, a memorandum of understanding. That was a first-timeever agreement that we signed with them, again, with the idea of 

getting some common agreement on what kinds of training would 

be needed and to work with them. So I think if you were to ask 

them, what you would hear back is that progress has been made, 

but there certainly is more to do, and I would say especially on the 

technical interoperability side. 

Senator SALAZAR. Is the technical interoperability effort, which 

is, I think, a necessity for us to be able to have the right kind of 

communication—are there technical challenges there with respect 

to the funding of equipment to achieve interoperability, or is it 

more a question of training? 

Ms. SCARLETT. The issue is not so much a funding issue as it is 

a matter of local governments and Federal agencies using different 

communications equipment, in some instances, different kinds of 

telecommunications. 

So we are working on a wildfire enterprise architecture. That is 

a fancy terminology meaning that we are trying to identify certain 

equipment standards and then try to achieve better alignment so 

that our communications technology can speak with their communications technology. 

So it is not so much a funding issue as it is getting common 

standards and common understanding of how our systems can 

work together. 

Senator SALAZAR. I know my time is up, but just a comment. I 

think that is a very important challenge for you to make sure that 

you prioritize, because I know from my experience in law enforcement, including the response that we had at the Columbine killings 

back on April 20, 1999 in Colorado, that the most significant problem we had in the response was that we could not have—the jurisdictions simply were not able to communicate with each other. And 

I am sure that was the challenge that we faced there. It is also a 

challenge that you face on the firefighting front. Thank you very 

much. 

Senator CRAIG. Ken, thank you. 

Mr. REY. If I could just add something for the record. 

Senator CRAIG. Please. 

Mr. REY. We do have agreements with all Western States and 

most Eastern States for integrated command systems and cooperative firefighting efforts. Within the last week, there has been an article from a fire in South Dakota, and one from California, where 

local firefighters are commenting on the increased level of cooperation between Federal, State and local firefighting organizations. So 

I will submit those for the record.* 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you. 

53

Ms. Nazzaro, let me ask you a question, if I might, in relation 

to reading through the Government Accountability Offices report 

05-147 on wildland fire management. It is my sense that the Government Accountability Office believes the agencies need to tell 

Congress how much money it will take to implement a cohesive 

strategy. I also believe they need to tell us how long it will realistically take to implement that plan, given various funding levels. Did 

your staff find any information during its investigation to suggest 

what those costs might be—that would be one question—or how 

long it will take to truly reduce the condition of class 3 fire risk 

areas to a lower condition class level? 

Ms. NAZZARO. Yes. And we agree with you. What we are advocating is that they develop a cohesive long-term strategy that 

would give you various options with the associated funding. 

But in the short term, we identified two different studies. One 

was an interagency study that the agencies did, where they made 

an estimate that for fuel reduction, they would have to triple their 

budget to $1.4 billion. They came up with eight different options 

and associated costs and that was their estimate. That report was 

done in 2002 and has not been officially released or adopted. It is 

our understanding it is with the Office of Management and Budget 

for review. You may want to ask the agencies for any more current 

update on that. 

The study said that basically they needed that increase for a period of a few years to start reducing the fuels through the fuel reduction program. Long term, they were estimating it would take, 

though, about 15 years to really see the risks reduced as far as fire 

management. 

The second study that we came across was one done by the National Association of State Foresters. That was done in June 2002. 

Basically it was very similar. Their cost estimate was 21⁄2 times the 

current budget or a little over $1 billion. 

Senator CRAIG. Okay. Any response to Ms. Nazzaro’s observation? 

Mr. REY. Only to respond that those numbers are now fairly dated. Our budget this year was $867 million for this activity. So 

obviously we are substantially higher than we were when these 

numbers were developed. 

Ms. SCARLETT. I would add that as we have done more and more 

of these fuel reduction projects, we are trying to move toward not 

simply counting acres, but looking at actual risks reduced. And our 

LANDFIRE program that I mentioned in my testimony, which is 

getting us vegetation information, is enabling us to better place our 

fuels reduction projects in a more strategic fashion. That obviously 

allows us, therefore, to have each dollar have a greater bang for 

the buck. So, again, I think that time and experience has perhaps 

transcended those numbers of several years ago. 

Senator CRAIG. Thank you. 

Jim, maybe you and Kirk, together, can respond to this. First of 

all, let me thank you for your continued public service and for lending your expertise and wisdom to the findings of the large fire cost 

containment report. 

The first recommendations were to allocate suppression funding 

on a regional basis. You have talked about that some, to allow reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
54

gions to hold on to the savings to be used for other fire-related 

projects and to establish a special relief for a region for mega or 

extreme fires. Fascinating concept. You caught my attention with 

that one. How has it been received here in Washington by the planners at the Department of Agriculture and at the Department of 

the Interior? 

Mr. CASWELL. Mr. Chairman, not with great glee, I have to say. 

I mean this is kind of a radical idea, and then there are a lot of 

complications. 

I mean we recognize, the panel recognizes, this would take some 

pretty heavy lifting, and it would probably take some legislation. 

And we did not look into all of those issues and how that might 

work. That really was not our charge. 

There have been some folks from both Ag and Interior who have, 

in fact, looked at this. They have thought through the complications, and we at Wildfire Leadership Council have adopted it with 

some caveats. 

The Forest Service is—and we will hear about this next month, 

as I indicated, but the Forest Service is going to do a paper test 

to see this year, if this had been in place, with some assumptions 

included, what would have been the result. Maybe that will give us 

some insight into the pros and cons of moving forward. 

Interior has been, at least at the agency level, more reluctant to 

take it on. They think that—I think they believe, quite frankly, 

they are already there in a lot of cases, particularly the Bureau of 

Land Management. Now that is my feeling about this in talking to 

some of the Bureau of Land Management people. I don’t know if 

Kirk wants to add anything. 

Mr. ROWDABAUGH. Certainly it was clear during the investigation 

of the panel that the field of incentives and disincentives for the 

line officers who make the cost decisions for any particular fire is 

certainly skewed right now for them to minimize the risks of them 

personally and to the local conditions on the ground at the expense 

of the overall suppression. For the line officer on the ground that 

makes the day-to-day decisions about how much money any particular fire is going to be allocated, there are no opportunity costs 

to that line officer. 

It costs them nothing, personally, to expend these funds, and yet 

if they do not, they run great risks, personally, if they fail. And we 

had hoped through this recommendation to begin to change that 

dynamic so that the individual Federal line officer who makes 

these important decisions actually has a stake in the outcome. 

Senator CRAIG. Well, thank you for thinking outside the box. It 

rarely happens in this community, and, Jim, you are to be a credit. 

You used to be one of us and now you are outside, thinking outside 

the box, and we greatly appreciate it. 

I do not know that any of us have considered incentivizing firefighting costs or firefighting. Incentivizing in almost every other 

area has a result. Usually it tends to achieve what it is directed 

toward. 

Mark and Lynn, have you given this any thought, and were you 

part of that not so well received group? 

Mr. REY. No, I do not think so, but Jim correctly identified this 

as the showstopper among their recommendations. 

55

One of the things Senator Bingaman mentioned is that he was 

dissatisfied that he had not heard more about the disposition of 

these recommendations. And what I want to do is to submit for the 

record a one-page summary of where they all stand, because I 

think, as Jim indicated, we are moving forward on many of them, 

and this is one that we do think prudence suggests that we ought 

to model retrospectively to see how it would have worked. 

But consider the conversation you just had with Kirk, and reel 

back the conversation I had with Senator Cantwell and put the two 

together, because the concern over safety is one of the things that 

affects fire attack strategies. 

Sure we could be more aggressive. We could put firefighters out 

on the line in more hazardous circumstances and cut costs dramatically if we succeed. But at the same time, if we lost a crew, I am 

quite certain the conversation we would have afterward would be 

much different. 

So, yes, the system does not incentivize risk-taking, nor should 

it. And that is one of the places we are probably not going to see 

significant costs reduction progress being made. 

But it is one of the cost drivers, because if we were willing to 

take a significant amount of risk, a substantial amount of risk, almost a fool-hardy risk, we probably had one chance in three of 

stopping the Hayman Fire at about 50 acres. But the other two 

chances in three would have probably meant losing two fire crews 

that we put in an untenable situation. But if we had succeeded, we 

would have been heroes. We would have saved tens of millions of 

dollars. 

Senator CRAIG. Well, I can appreciate all of those concerns. If you 

had succeeded, no one would have been able to observe the savings 

made, because it would have been incalculable. Those are some of 

the realities of what we face. There is a reality, and the reality was 

discovered by the blue ribbon panel. 

Firefighting costs go up at or near or slightly above the rate of 

the growth of government. If that level continues, and we look out 

there 10 or 12 years longer at these kinds of increased fire scenarios, I am not quite sure we can sustain that and do so in a realistic way. 

I do not believe that action or aggressiveness necessarily jeopardizes individuals if the training is done effectively and appropriately 

in advance. And you just mentioned, as it related to the one fire, 

the situation of timing or someone too long on the line and, therefore, substantially fatigued. Those are not cost factors. Those are 

personnel factors that are realities that I think we all have to look 

at. 

But, anyway, I appreciate the thought and/or all of the thoughts 

that have come forward. And if you would for us, track these recommendations and the results of them. I think that would be tremendously valuable. 

I am going to have to run. I am going to turn the balance of the 

questioning over to Senator Murkowski. I would conclude, though, 

in an observation made by both the Senators from Oregon, that I 

understand all of these contractual problems that we are into. I 

would suggest that while we appreciate tough contract negotiators, 

my guess is that you probably ought to send a few of them to 

56

charm school. They have done little more than infuriate some of 

the private contractors who feel that they are professionals and not 

somebody to be browbeaten by a tough negotiator. I think those are 

circumstances that we all have to deal with. And, of course, the reality is there are two Senators from Washington and I know there 

are two from Idaho who hear about it on a regular basis. 

Mr. REY. It is the contractors that have come to talk to me as 

well. So we are working our way through that. 

Senator CRAIG. I am sure they have. 

Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do 

not intend to keep the panel much longer. I do want to thank you, 

ladies and gentlemen, for the information you have give us all 

today. It has been very interesting as we have gone through some 

of these. 

I want to just go back to the question that we left, and I think 

we started going down one track and I got sidetracked with my initial point which was if the State of Alaska contracts with the Canadian tankers, do we have jurisdictional problems when we are 

fighting fires over Federal protection areas? It is at State and Federal and you are up in the air and whose land are we over? Has 

that ambiguity been cleared up? 

Mr. REY. It has been, and I have a few more details that I did 

not have when we were trying to close on it the first time. 

Last year the State contracted with some DC-4s that we were not 

satisfied could be flown safely and are still not satisfied could be 

flown safely. And when a State has assets that we do not believe 

are safe, if we are going to be responsive to the National Transportation Safety Board, the typical approach is fly them on State fires, 

fly them in any circumstance where they are not under our control, 

such that we accept liability for their operation. 

This year, the Canadian tankers are tankers that meet the 

standards that the National Transportation Safety Board indicated 

we should have, so that issue will never emerge. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Okay. Good. And then very quickly, I alluded to the heightened fire threat on the Kenai Peninsula that 

you have outlined on the map there. As I understand, there is concern about what is available to fight any fires down in that region 

this summer, whether or not there would be availability of additional helicopters. I understand if they need additional fire trucks, 

we have to bring them up from outside from the lower 48. 

My question is, what are we doing to prepare for this year’s fire 

season down on the Kenai Peninsula, recognizing that this is the 

area where we have the greatest spruce bark beetle damage anywhere in the State? It is that tinder lying to be lit. So what are 

we doing in anticipation of the fire season down in that area? 

Mr. REY. What I would like to do is get the pre-positioning assets 

identified so I can show you what we are going to put in the Kenai 

when we hit fire season there. That is a combination of both Forest 

Service and Fish and Wildlife Service, as well as Kenai Borough 

land. So whatever is there will probably be integrated assets from 

the three entities. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Ms. Scarlett. 

57

Ms. SCARLETT. Senator, I would like to add another dimension 

that we have not discussed and it relates also to your questions 

about the smoke challenges last year. 

The Alaska Wildland Fire Coordinating Group has actually been 

very actively reevaluating operations and procedures in light of 

some of the concerns that were raised last year, and held some 13 

public sessions with the local communities to hear those concerns. 

As a consequence of that, we will be coming out with new guidance 

as it pertains to when we can go in with additional assets to mitigate smoke, for example, even if it was not in the original fire plan. 

As part of that Wildland Fire Coordinating Group look, we are 

also reexamining asset deployment, and when the details are finalized for the pre-positioning, we will get back to you on that. But 

I wanted to mention——

Senator MURKOWSKI. When do you expect that guidance is going 

to be ready? 

Ms. SCARLETT. It should be soon. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. You mean before the fire season? 

Ms. SCARLETT. Yes. 

Mr. REY. It will. 

Ms. SCARLETT. Yes. 

Mr. REY. Yes, by necessity. 

Ms. SCARLETT. Before the fire season. 

Mr. REY. Before the fire season. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. 

Ms. SCARLETT. And the new guidance, and the new guidance on 

smoke management also, should be available before the new fire 

season. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Good. That is of critical importance and 

being very keenly followed up north. 

One last question then, and this relates to a prescribed burn that 

was set in the Glennallen area in mid-August. We had been dealing with all this smoke up north all summer long and then you 

wake up one morning in Anchorage, and you can’t see across the 

street. We learned that a prescribed burn had been set. There is 

still some discussion about whether or not what we were experiencing in Anchorage was smoke from the Glennallen prescribed 

burn or whether it was smoke that had traveled down from the interior. 

My question to you is what kind of communication goes out from 

your agencies to the local communities that might be in the path 

of any smoke that is coming their way so that folks know that this 

is going to happen, because it took the entire south central region 

by surprise? 

Ms. SCARLETT. I am not familiar with the particular incidence of 

the prescribed burn that you mentioned. However, it is normal procedure when we are doing a prescribed burn that our agencies 

work very closely with the local communities and the local authorities to alert them both to the fact that a prescribed burn would be 

occurring. 

Also, as Mark Rey mentioned earlier, typically before we do a 

prescribed burn, we would be looking at wind conditions and so 

forth. But I can look into the particular——

58

Senator MURKOWSKI. And as soon as we are smarter than the 

wind and Mother Nature, you let me know. 

Ms. SCARLETT. But I will look into this particular instance and 

see whether proper communications did not occur. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. I know that that was an issue that was 

presented to us, and as they were going through the after review 

of the fires, that was something that certainly my constituents had 

hoped would be contained as part of that review. 

If you are going to do a prescribed burn while we have all of 

these wildfires going on, let people know, A, and B, make sure that 

if the winds do shift, which is what happened in this case, you do 

not get that cumulative effect to the communities that really is 

pretty devastating. 

With that I thank all of the panelists for joining us this afternoon, and thank you for your good work. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(59)

APPENDIXES 

APPENDIX I 

Responses to Additional Questions 

Responses to the following questions were not received at the 

time the hearing went to press.

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND FORESTS, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, April 29, 2005. 

Hon. MIKE JOHANNS, 

Secretary, Department of Agriculture. 

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for sending Mr. Mark Rey to appear before the Subcommittee on Public Lands & Forests 

of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on April 26, 2005, to 

give testimony regarding the upcoming fire season. 

Enclosed herewith please find a list of questions which have been submitted for 

the record. If possible, I would like to have your response to these questions by May 

18, 2005. 

Thank you in advance for your prompt consideration. 

Sincerely, 

LARRY E. CRAIG, 

Subcommittee Chairman. 

[Enclosure.] 

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CRAIG

AIRCRAFT RELATED QUESTIONS

We spent an additional $60 million last year to settle the multi-engine heavy retardant aircraft contracts that were terminated by the government and to pay for 

the additional helicopters and SEATs aircraft needed to cover for the loss of those 

aircraft. 

Question 1. Compared to 2003, how much additional funding is it likely to be 

needed this year to maintain the coverage that will be needed to make up for the 

loss of the 34 heavy bombers that agencies refused to contract with? 

FIRE COSTS

According to the end of year statistics on acres burned and costs of the suppression efforts, most of the acres are burned on private land yet the Forest Service was 

responsible for 72% of the total cost of fire suppression.

2004 FIRE STATISTICS 

Agency Acres Burned Percent Suppression Costs Percent 

BIA ..................................... 71,292 1% $63,452,000 7%

BLM ................................... 1,305,707 16% $147,165,000 17%

FWS .................................... 2,099,403 26% $7,979,000 1%

NPS .................................... 42,352 1% $34,052,000 4%

State/Other ........................ 4,026,811 49%

FS ....................................... 551,966 7% $637,585,000 72%

60

Question 2. In terms of federal land fire fighters that are red-card certified, what 

percent come from each agency? Are 72% of the federal fire fighters Forest Service 

employees? 

Question 3. Could you provide us with the following data: what percent of the 

total employees in each agency are red-card certified for this year? 

Question 4. How does that compare with the state agencies that provide land 

management and fire fighting services? 

Question 5. We are seeing changes in Forest Service contracting for aerial and 

ground equipment. At times it appears from afar that the contracting officers may 

be driving policy, rather than the policy makers driving policy. 

I have been told that the national contract for fire engines has been eliminated 

and that regions are using either the national contract template or the Emergency 

Equipment Rental Agreement. What steps are being taken to ensure that contract 

engines are properly equipped, their crews are adequately trained, and the agency 

is getting the best value? 

Question 6. Can you assure us that from region to region we will get a uniform 

application of the contracts? 

Question 7. Does the agency plan on ordering called-when-needed aircraft through 

exclusive-use contracts? I see a statement in your Fire and Aviation Management 

Bridge Plan talking points (dated April 7 2003) that said: ‘‘Six Type I helicopters 

have been contracted. Converting to Call When Needed (CWN) contracts to exclusive use is an option and will result in significant cost savings if these ships are 

needed. ‘‘(emphasis added). What is agency policy regarding call-when-needed aircraft? 

Question 8. It is becoming more common to see private fire suppression crews on 

federal land fires. 

How do you see contract fire suppression forces fitting into overall agency fire preparedness? What are your plans for utilization of contract crews and engines? 

Question 9. There has been considerable speculation about the availability of 

qualified incident commanders following investigations of the Cramer and 

Thirtymile fires and the passage of Public Law 107-203, requiring Agriculture Inspector General’s investigations of Forest Service firefighter fatalities. In your opinion, have these events had any impact on the willingness of firefighters to achieve 

and maintain their Type III Incident Commander qualifications? 

Question 10. Can you have your staffs provide our Committee with a year to year 

analysis from 1990 until 2004 of the number of people from the federal agencies and 

state agencies that were red card qualified as Type I, Type II or Type III incident 

commanders? 

Please help us understand how many people on average retire or drop their red 

card in each year. Has the rate of attrition increased since 2000? 

Question 11. I need you to help us better understand where we are on aerial assets and contracts of both helicopters and fixed-winged aircraft. 

Last year in response to the decision to cancel the fixed-winged heavy retardant 

contracts you asked a number of companies to add helicopters to their exclusive use 

contracts. In the past these extra helicopters would have been obtained through 

called-as-needed contracts. 

How many and what types of heavy retardant aircraft do you have under contract 

for this season? 

Question 12. Do you have all the available and certified heavy aircraft under contract? 

Question 13. The rumor is that the folks that are doing the service life analysis 

on the P-2V Neptunes need 700 more hours of flight data from the two P-2V’s, that 

flew last year and are under restricted contracts this year, before they can complete 

their work. Is there any truth to that rumor? When will the service life analysis 

on the P-2V aircraft be completed? 

Question 13a. How about the Douglas DC-6 and 7 aircraft, when will that service 

life contract be completed? 

Question 14. How many and what types of helicopters do you have under contract? How many are under exclusive use contracts and how many are under calledas-needed contracts? 

Question 15. How many Single Engine SEATs aircraft do you have under contract? What percent are under exclusive use contracts and how many are under 

called-as-needed contracts? 

Question 16. How do the numbers of called-as-needed contracts this year compare 

to the numbers you had for the Heavy Retardant multi-engine planes, helicopters 

(heavy-lift, medium and light), and single-engine SEATs aircraft contracted in 2000? 

Question 17. What is the annual cost of staffing and maintaining USFS Air Tanker Bases? 

61

Question 18. What is the annual cost of staffing and operating heliports and spotters for Helicopter bucket drops on the federal land fires? 

Question 19. What is the cost of training, maintaining, and operating the Lead 

Plane program for large Air Tankers? 

Question 20. If lead planes are required for fixed wing retardant aircraft, are they 

also required for Type I helicopters that are dropping retardant, if not why not? 

Question 21. When combined (operational cost of USFS Air Tanker Bases and the 

Lead Plane program) what is the cost of the Air Tanker program per Gallon of product delivered? 

Question 22. When combined (operational cost of heliports and spotters and lead 

planes if used with helicopters) what is the cost of the helicopter program per gallon 

of product delivered? 

Question 23. Where are the hidden cost of the Air Tanker program, Air Tanker 

Base maintenance, Lead Plane program cost, Retardant Cost, and aircraft flight 

time, accounted for and reported? 

Question 24. Where are the hidden cost of the helicopter program, heliports, helicopter inspection, contract costs, administration of contract costs, heliport construction and operation, spotters or other federal employees needed to ensure the safe 

operation of helicopters on federal fires, accounted for and reported? 

Please provide these costs and answers to these questions for Type I, Type II and 

Type III helicopters and the SEATs and heavy retardant aircraft. 

QUESTION FROM SENATOR MURKOWSKI

Question 1. Following the 2004 season, Mayor Jim Whittaker and the Fairbanks 

North Star Borough Assembly appointed a commission of three outstanding citizens 

to conduct their own independent review of the wildfire response. Many of the recommendations contained in the report are directed to the federal government as 

well as the State. There are 22 recommendations in the report of the Fairbanks 

North Star Borough Wildfire Commission. I would ask the Department of the Interior and the Forest Service to respond to each of the recommendations for the 

record. 

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BURNS

Question 1. How far along is the Department of Agriculture in implementing the 

cost management reports, especially those related to local and tribal governments 

for initial attack closest forces? 

Question 2. National Fire Plan Funding. What is the expected Maximum Efficient 

Level (MEL) funding we can expect for the 2005 fire season? 

Question 3. I realize prescribed fire may be cheaper to do and you can treat more 

acres. I believe we still need to treat some acres mechanically due to the fuel location in the wildland-urban interface and to provide some wood to our small mill operators. What efforts are being made to balance prescribed burning and mechanical 

treatment of hazardous fuels? 

Question 4. What are the alternatives to meeting our federal partner commitments to Tribal, state, and local agencies for fire suppression assistance with the 

proposed funding reductions? 

Question 5. Not only are you reducing funding for noxious weeds in the restoration funding, but also in your resource budgets? How do you expect to maintain the 

gains we’ve made in noxious weed control if we stop funding it? 

Question 6. Are we still on track for a June completion date for the P-2V aircraft? 

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SMITH

Question 1. I understand that the USFS has indicated its desire to test the 747 

Supertanker. I also understand that the agency has been presented with a proposal 

requesting their contracting department to commence discussions with the contractor so the testing process can move forward as soon as possible. Please comment 

on the current state of testing for the 747 Supertanker. 

Question 2. Given that the USFS has formulated both an Exclusive Use contract 

and a Call-When-Needed contract, what, precisely, is the USFS position regarding 

the appropriate use of each type of contract? 

What does the USFS consider ‘‘sufficient notice’’ to industry of Exclusive Use contracts for Type 1 helicopters for the coming fire season? 

Question 3. In 2003 and 2004, how many acres in Region 6 were mechanically 

treated for hazardous fuels, versus through controlled burn. On how many acres 

was the Condition Class of the stand actually changed? 

62

Question 4. Will Type I helicopters again be contracted by ‘‘Emergency Authority’’ 

and not by standard federal acquisition procurement processes? 

Question 5. The USFS currently has six Type I helicopters on Exclusive Use Contract. Are these aircraft enough to support the agency’s needs without relying on 

‘‘Call When Needed’’ aircraft? 

Question 6. Why does the USFS not contract and manage Type I helicopters in 

the same manner as large airtankers? 

Question 7. Taxpayer funds are being used to install Traffic Collision Avoidance 

Systems on exclusive use airtankers. Why are Type I helicopters being required to 

install Automated Flight Following equipment, with no financial assistance and 

with no guarantee that the aircraft will actually be used? 

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BINGAMAN

Question 1. For each unit of the National Forest System and each Department of 

the Interior management unit where fire is a major component of the natural forested ecosystem, please provide the number of burnable acres within the unit, 

whether Wildland Fire Use currently is permitted on that unit, and the maximum 

number of acres for which Wildland Fire Use currently is permitted. 

Question 2. Please provide the committee with a detailed status report on and 

plan for the implementation of each of the seven key recommendations made in the 

Large Fire Suppression Cost Report. 

Question 3. In which months will the agencies provide to Congress (1) a joint tactical plan and (2) a cohesive strategy that identifies long-term options and needed 

funding for reducing and maintaining fuels, as described in the GAO’s recent 

Wildland Fire Management report? 

Question 4. Please provide a description of the agencies’ long-term strategy for the 

aerial fire suppression fleet. 

Question 5. What was the average cost per acre of mechanical fuel treatments, 

prescribed burns, emergency wildfire suppression, and Wildland Fire Use on National Forests in FY 2004. 

Question 6. The Large Fire Suppression Cost report refers to the important role 

of sample ordinances and examples of wildland fire policies and planning documents 

in minimum levels of WUI protection (see p. 28). Is there a clearinghouse that provides local governments, homeowner associations and the like with examples of or 

models for guidance or requirements for protecting structures from wildfire? 

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR FEINSTEIN

According to Mr. Caswell, the Strategic Panel on Fire Suppression Costs found 

that, and I quote, ‘‘a paradigm shift in thinking about hazardous fuel reduction effectiveness is required and can be started by ceasing to use acres treated as a ‘results’ measurement for program accomplishments.’’

I share his concern that fixating on ‘‘acres treated’’ can lead the agencies to focus 

simply on the cheapest acres, regardless of how effective the treatments are. 

Question 1. Can you respond to and address these concerns? 

I would like to emphasize the importance to California of the absolute need to 

have a large and diverse fleet of firefighting aircraft. We know we’re going to have 

a bad fire year sooner or later, and we need a fleet that can respond quickly on the 

initial attack when that year comes. 

Question 2. You say in your testimony that the Forest Service and Interior, and 

I quote, ‘‘have initiated a long-term plan for aviation resources.’’ What steps have 

you taken? When will the plan be submitted for Congressional review? Does Congress need to start budgeting additional money for this need now? 

You relied extensively on helitankers and other helicopters for fighting fires last 

year. 

Question 3. Do you agree with me that it would be better to have a more diverse 

fleet of aircraft? In particular, aren’t the large airtankers better at responding to 

numerous and distant fires on the initial attack? 

It’s now been one and a half years since the disastrous Southern California fires 

of October 2003. The Forest Service has made a lot of progress, but I understand 

that we still have work to do to remove hazardous fuels and protect communities, 

particularly in the bark-beetle killed areas. 

Question 4. Can you give me a status report, and tell me where we need more 

funding to get needed work done? 

I understand that the Western Governors’ strategic panel recommended that the 

federal agencies, and I quote, ‘‘Engage communities and property owners in creating 

defensible space around structures.’’

63

Question 5. Do you believe that California’s Fire Safe program is an effective way 

to engage communities in hazardous fuels reduction? Is this a cost-effective strategy 

for the federal government, given the significant local matching grants? 

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CANTWELL

Question 1. Mr. Rey, the Northwest Forest Pass, created under the Fee Demo program, currently brings in more than one million dollars each year to trails in Washington state. Local forests, which have seen their recreation budgets decline dramatically over the past decade, have come to depend upon these funds to take care 

of basic maintenance and operations needs. 

How will the new fee regime, created under the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act, ensure that this important source of trail funding is preserved? 

Or, if the Northwest Forest Plan does not continue in its current form, how will 

the agency cover the cost of maintaining its trail system? 

Question 2. Mr. Rey, as you know, funds shifted within the Forest Service at the 

national level magnify exponentially as they filter down through the regions to local 

forests, especially as the agency covers its various overhead and management expenses. 

Given the President’s proposed flat budget for Forest Service recreation funding, 

what do you anticipate to be the actual impact to recreation budgets at the forest 

level? 

Likewise, the President has proposed a 16 percent cut to the agency’s Capital Improvement and Maintenance/Trails (CIMT) account. After adjusting for agency and 

overhead costs, for every dollar delivered to a Washington forest in 2005, how many 

cents will they see in 2006? 

Question 3. Mr. Rey, I understand that the individual regional Forest Service requests for LWCF funding to acquire in-fill parcels for the Pacific Crest National Scenic Trail total $5 million. All of these acquisitions are from willing sellers and will 

allow trail relocation off the roadway for safety reasons and to protect the trail from 

intense development pressures. 

Please explain why the President’s budget request does not follow the recommendations of the regional Forest Service offices. 

Question 4. Mr. Rey, as you know the Forest Service is currently considering comments to its proposed changes to the landmark 2001 Roadless Area Conservation 

Rule. 

Please provide me with an update on this process and when you think it will be 

completed. 

What is the total number of comments received on this draft rulemaking? How 

many of those comments were from Washington state? Can you provide a preliminary analysis of those comments? 

Question 5. Mr. Rey, the proposed changes to the Roadless Rule would provide 

governors with an unprecedented roll in determining the use of federally owned 

lands. 

Is there any historic or regulatory precedence for state officials deciding how federal lands should be managed? 

Is the Department of Interior concerned about how this dynamic could alter the 

use of other federally owned public lands? 

Do you envision providing state agencies with federal resources to take on these 

tasks? 

Mr. Rey, I understand that under the draft rule the Forest Service still retains 

all the final decision-making authority. Is it true that the Forest Service can still 

turn down any or all Governors’ requests for roadless area protections? 

Question 6. Mr. Rey, I am concerned about the fiscal implications of the proposed 

changes to the Roadless Rule. 

What does the Forest Service estimate it will cost to begin a new state-by-state 

rulemaking process? 

How will the proposed rule change affect the existing multi-billion-dollar road 

maintenance backlog? 

Please update me on the state of the road maintenance backlog, including an estimation of its overall cost and an explanation of how these figures were derived. 

How does the President’s FY 2006 budget request propose to deal with this vital 

issue? 

Question 7. Mr. Rey, as you know, the issue of USFS firefighter safety has been 

an issue that I have paid very close attention because of a horrible tragedy. On July 

10, 2001, near Winthrop in Okanogan County, in the midst of the second worst 

drought in the history of our state, the Thirtymile fire burned out of control. 

Four courageous young firefighters were killed. Their names:

64

1. Tom Craven, 30 years old; 

2. Karen FitzPatrick, 18; 

3. Jessica Johnson, 19; 

4. and Devin Weaver, 21.

Sadly, as subsequent investigations revealed, these young men and women did not 

have to die. In the words of the Forest Service’s own report on the Thirtymile fire, 

the tragedy ‘‘could have been prevented.’’ At that time, I said that I believe we in 

Congress and management within the firefighting agencies have a responsibility to 

ensure that no preventable tragedy like Thirtymile fire ever happened again. 

Yet, I’m deeply saddened by the fact that it’s clear we haven’t done enough. 

In July 2003—two years after Thirtymile—two more firefighters perished, this 

time at the Cramer Fire within Idaho’s Salmon-Challis National Forest. Jeff Allen 

and Shane Heath were killed when the fire burned over an area where they were 

attempting to construct a landing spot for firefighting helicopters. 

After the Thirtymile Fire, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 

(OSHA) conducted an investigation and levied against the Forest Service five citations for Serious and Willful violations of safety rules. It was eerie, when OSHA 

concluded its investigation of Cramer. The result: another five OSHA citations, for 

Serious, Willful and Repeat violations. Reading through the list of causal and contributing factors for Cramer and putting them next to those associated with the 

Thirtymile fire, I was struck by the many disturbing similarities. Even more haunting are the parallels between these lists and the factors cited in the investigation 

of 1994’s South Canyon Fire on Storm King Mountain in Colorado. It’s been ten 

years since those 14 firefighters lost their lives on Storm King Mountain—and yet, 

the same mistakes are being made over and over again. 

These facts have also been documented by an audit and memorandum issued by 

the Department of Agriculture’s Inspector General. The IG found that ‘‘while there 

were many factors common to all three fires, the most important was a failure by 

[Forest Service] fire suppression personnel to establish fire safety rules and guidelines and to exercise acceptable supervision and judgment.’’ The audit also stated 

‘‘accidents on the South Canyon, Thirtymile, and Cramer Fires, all of which involved 

fatalities, could have been avoided if certain individuals had followed standard safety practices and procedures in place at the time.’’ Lastly, the IG noted that the Forest Service ‘‘has not timely implemented actions to improve its safety programs.’’

Despite these critical issues, how do you explain reductions in the USFS-preparedness budget? 

What specific steps are you taking to ensure that our wildland firefighters and 

those that manage them during firefighting, are getting the training and equipment 

they need as we head to another challenging fire season in my state and throughout 

the West? 

Can you clearly identify how much many will be spent on preparedness within 

each region of the Forest Service—including within my State of Washington? 

Question 8. Mr. Rey, the USFS conducted an internal investigation following the 

Thirtymile fire. Unfortunately, much of that information was redacted when the report was released in May 2002. I believed then, and continue to believe, that the 

Forest Service over-reached—claiming ‘‘deliberative process privilege’’ as the reason 

it won’t release any more. Deliberative process privilege is what agencies claim 

when they want to reject FOIA requests. It is clear that it is within the agency’s 

discretion to release a less redacted version of the report itself. 

Can you please explain your reasoning that this material, so important to the 

families of the four victims, has been redacted and is considered ‘‘deliberative process privilege’’? 

Question 9. In the context of homeland security, communications interoperability 

is defined as the ability of public safety agencies to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio communications systems, exchanging voice and/or data with one 

another on demand, in real time, when needed and as authorized. Local, state, and 

federal employees as well as contractors fighting forest fires face many of the same 

communications challenges confronting first responders. Additionally, many forest 

fires occur in remote locations where there is limited or no communications infrastructure in place to connect to. 

How does the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior ensure that those 

fighting forest fires can communicate with each other in all locales and under all 

conditions? 

Is lack of interoperability between government owned and contractor owned communications equipment a concern? If so, how is this being addressed? 

A percentage of contractors fighting any given fire may not be native English 

speakers and have an extremely limited understanding of English. How does the 

65

Forest Service and the Department of the Interior ensure that these individuals can 

receive vital communications? 

Question 10. A number of my constituents have voiced a concern about the lack 

of fairness in the spending of funds authorized by the Healthy Forests Restoration 

Act in the State of Washington. 

Please provide me with a detailed list of projects that have started in my State 

since the passage of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act. Within that inventory, 

please note which projects are taking place within the Wildland Urban Interface 

and what communities are being protected. 

Has your Forest Service recreation site maintenance back log grown over new 

funding needs mandated by the Healthy Forests Restoration Act? 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND FORESTS, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, April 29, 2005. 

Hon. GALE NORTON, 

Secretary, Department of the Interior. 

DEAR MADAM SECRETARY: I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for 

sending Ms. Lynn Scarlett to appear before the Subcommittee on Public Lands & 

Forests of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on April 26, 

2005, to give testimony regarding the upcoming fire season. 

Enclosed herewith please find a list of questions which have been submitted for 

the record. If possible, I would like to have your response to these questions by May 

18, 2005. 

Thank you in advance for your prompt consideration. 

Sincerely, 

LARRY E. CRAIG, 

Subcommittee Chairman. 

[Enclosure.]

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CRAIG

It is becoming increasingly clear that the fires that we are experiencing are getting more costly; and fire preparedness, suppression, and emergency rehabilitation 

is going to consume more and more of the land management agencies’ budgets. I 

believe we will be impacting all land management agencies’ ability to carry out the 

other land management they are tasked with. 

We hear from some states that half of their employees are called away on federal 

fires each summer, while they perceive that only 15 to 20% of the federal land management agencies’ employees are participating in fire fighting. Further, they believe 

that the federal land fire fighters do not spend as much time on state and private 

land fires as their employees spend on federal fires. I have a couple of questions. 

Question 1. Looking at last year’s data it looks to me like the Department of the 

Interior spent about $70 per acre on fires on lands they are expected to manage, 

while the Forest Service expended about $1,155 per acre. Can you help me understand what your agencies are doing differently from the Forest Service? 

Question 2. If we are asking the states to send as many people as they do to federal land fires, and spend as much time as they do, what kind of assistance should 

the federal land management agencies provide the states to ensure the state agencies do not fall behind on their normal work? 

Question 3. I want you to understand how important the state timber sale programs have become in states like Oregon, Washington, Idaho and Montana. They 

have taken up the slack for the complete breakdown of the federal timber sale programs. Do you think it is fair for the federal government to walk away from its timber sale program and demand the states to send more people, to spend more time 

on federal fires, at the expense of other important programs on those state lands? 

Question 4. What are you going to do to ensure a larger percent of federal land 

management agencies’ employees help fight these fires? 

Question 5. Over time you are going to be asking the contractors to improve the 

technology in their aircraft. Better seatbelts, digital radios, and instrumentation to 

measure stress and metal fatigue have all come up in the recent past. Can you assure us that the people in fire and aviation will be developing the policy, not your 

contracting officers? 

Question 6. Also I am concerned that the agencies have paid for some upgrade 

for the fixed winged aircraft, but not always for the helicopter companies. Can you 

help us understand how those decisions are made? 

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AIRCRAFT RELATED QUESTIONS

We spent an additional $60 million last year to settle the multi-engine heavy retardant aircraft contracts that were terminated by the government and to pay for 

the additional helicopters and SEATs aircraft needed to cover for the loss of those 

aircraft. 

Question 7. Compared to 2003, how much additional funding is it likely to be 

needed this year to maintain the coverage that will be needed to make up for the 

loss of the 34 heavy bombers that agencies refused to contract with? 

FIRE COSTS

According to the end of year statistics on acres burned and costs of the suppression efforts, most of the acres are burned on private land yet the Forest Service was 

responsible for 72% of the total cost of fire suppression.

2004 FIRE STATISTICS 

Agency Acres Burned Percent Suppression Costs Percent 

BIA ..................................... 71,292 1% $63,452,000 7%

BLM ................................... 1,305,707 16% $147,165,000 17%

FWS .................................... 2,099,403 26% $7,979,000 1%

NPS .................................... 42,352 1% $34,052,000 4%

State/Other ........................ 4,026,811 49%

FS ....................................... 551,966 7% $637,585,000 72%

Question 8. In terms of federal land fire fighters that are red-card certified, what 

percent come from each agency? Are 72% of the federal fire fighters Forest Service 

employees? 

Question 9. Could you provide us with the following data: what percent of the 

total employees in each agency are red-card certified for this year? 

Question 10. How does that compare with the state agencies that provide land 

management and fire fighting services? 

QUESTION FROM SENATOR MURKOWSKI

Question 1. Following the 2004 season, Mayor Jim Whittaker and the Fairbanks 

North Star Borough Assembly appointed a commission of three outstanding citizens 

to conduct their own independent review of the wildfire response. Many of the recommendations contained in the report are directed to the federal government as 

well as the State. There are 22 recommendations in the report of the Fairbanks 

North Star Borough Wildfire Commission. I would ask the Department of the Interior and the Forest Service to respond to each of the recommendations for the 

record. 

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BURNS

Question 1. How far along is the Department of the Interior in implementing the 

cost management reports, especially those related to local and tribal governments 

for initial attack closest forces? 

Question 2. National Fire Plan Funding. What is the expected Maximum Efficient 

Level (MEL) funding we can expect for the 2005 fire season? 

Question 3. I realize prescribed fire may be cheaper to do and you can treat more 

acres. I believe we still need to treat some acres mechanically due to the fuel location in the wildland-urban interface and to provide some wood to our small mill operators. What efforts are being made to balance prescribed burning and mechanical 

treatment of hazardous fuels? 

Question 4. What are the alternatives to meeting our federal partner commitments to Tribal, state, and local agencies for fire suppression assistance with the 

proposed funding reductions? 

Question 5. Not only are you reducing funding for noxious weeds in the restoration funding, but also in your resource budgets? How do you expect to maintain the 

gains we’ve made in noxious weed control if we stop funding it? 

Question 6. Are we still on track for a June completion date for the P-2V aircraft? 

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR BINGAMAN

Question 1. For each unit of the National Forest System and each Department of 

the Interior management unit where fire is a major component of the natural forVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:01 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 022739 PO 10986 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\22739.TXT SENERGY2 PsN: PAULM
67

ested ecosystem, please provide the number of burnable acres within the unit, 

whether Wildland Fire Use currently is permitted on that unit, and the maximum 

number of acres for which Wildland Fire Use currently is permitted. 

Question 2. Please provide the committee with a detailed status report on and 

plan for the implementation of each of the seven key recommendations made in the 

Large Fire Suppression Cost Report. 

Question 3. In which months will the agencies provide to Congress (1) a joint tactical plan and (2) a cohesive strategy that identifies long-term options and needed 

funding for reducing and maintaining fuels, as described in the GAO’s recent 

Wildland Fire Management report? 

Question 4. Please provide a description of the agencies’ long-term strategy for the 

aerial fire suppression fleet. 

Question 5. The Large Fire Suppression Cost report refers to the important role 

of sample ordinances and examples of wildland fire policies and planning documents 

in minimum levels of WIJI protection (see p. 28). Is there a clearinghouse that provides local governments, homeowner associations and the like with examples of or 

models for guidance or requirements for protecting structures from wildfire? 

QUESTION FROM SENATOR FEINSTEIN

Question 1. Both Mr. Caswell’s Strategic Costs Panel and the GAO have emphasized we need better focus on treating the most cost-effective acres. The GAO and 

the federal agencies also seem to agree that completing the LANDFIRE mapping 

system is an excellent way to guide our fuel reduction efforts. 

I understand from your testimony that LANDFIRE is scheduled for implementation in the West by 2006. Can you assure me that the West will be fully mapped 

by the end of next year? 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS AND FORESTS, 

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC, April 29, 2005. 

Mr. JIM CASWELL, 

Office of Species Conservation, Boise, ID. 

DEAR MR. CASWELL: I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for appearing before the Subcommittee on Public Lands & Forests of the Senate Committee 

on Energy and Natural Resources on April 26, 2005, to give testimony regarding the 

findings of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Fire Cost Management. 

Enclosed herewith please find a list of questions which have been submitted for 

the record. If possible, I would like to have your response to these questions by May 

18, 2005. 

Thank you in advance for your prompt consideration. 

Sincerely, 

LARRY E. CRAIG, 

Subcommittee Chairman. 

[Enclosure.] 

QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR FEINSTEIN

Mr. Caswell, in your testimony you say that your Strategic Panel on Fire Suppression Costs found that, and I quote, 

‘‘a paradigm shift in thinking about hazardous fuel reduction effectiveness is required and can be started by ceasing to use acres treated as a ‘‘results’’ measurement for program accomplishments.’’

I share your concern that fixating on ‘‘acres treated’’ can lead the agencies to focus 

simply on the cheapest acres, regardless of how effective the treatments are. 

Question 1. Can you elaborate further on the Panel’s thinking here? 

I understand that the Western Governors’ strategic panel recommended that the 

federal agencies, and I quote, ‘‘Engage communities and property owners in creating 

defensible space around structures.’’

Question 2. Do you believe that California’s Fire Safe program is an effective way 

to engage communities in hazardous fuels reduction? Is this a cost-effective strategy 

for the federal government, given the significant local matching grants? 

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APPENDIX II 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

FIREFIGHTERS ARE ‘IN SYNC’

‘READY’: A WET WINTER MEANS MORE FUEL,

BUT AGENCIES SAY THEY’RE NOW WORKING TOGETHER. 

[By Ben Goad, the Press-Enterprise, Riverside, CA, April 25, 2005] 

California’s top fire chiefs anticipate a busy season characterized by fast-moving 

and dangerous grassfires. 

But they, along with elected leaders and local fire bosses, are encouraged by the 

state’s progress in tackling problems encountered during the recommendations devastating 2003 firestorms. 

Twenty-two of 48 recommended changes laid out a year ago by the Governor’s 

Blue Ribbon Fire Commission are in place or are being addressed, according to a 

draft of a report being prepared for Gov. Schwarzenegger. 

An additional 18 of the panel’s recommended actions are expected to be complete 

by July. The remaining eight are to be implemented by various dates ranging from 

next January to the year 2010, according to the report. 

‘‘Are we ready for fire season? Yes, we’re ready,’’ California Department of Forestry Director Dale Geldert said Monday. ‘‘This is the first time I know of when all 

the fire agencies have worked together for a common set of goals for the entire state 

of California. We’re in sync.’’

Training, Resources Cited 

More training and resources are cited by the report as areas where progress has 

been made. 

New regulations extend the daily operating time for firefighting aircraft, and 

agencies from local, state and federal levels have begun holding regular teleconferences to compare notes and share information on days when conditions are ripe 

for a large wildfire, Geldert said. 

Other recommendations, including calls for new laws and training standards, 

have been addressed but will take years to implement, according to the report. 

Report Being Compiled 

Geldert, one of 13 commission members on a working group that is compiling the 

report, said he expects to brief state Resources Secretary Michael Chrisman on the 

progress in the coming weeks, and Schwarzenegger soon after. 

The report comes just months after several elected officials, firefighters and commission members expressed frustration that agencies had not implemented more 

recommendations. As of mid-October, only nine had been addressed. 

Agriculture Undersecretary Mark Rey, who oversees the U.S. Forest Service, said 

late last week that the region could get a respite from major forest fires this year. 

Winter rains lessened the effects of enduring drought, and fires that move 

through treetops, in Southern California’s four national forests, Rey said. 

‘‘Generally speaking, we think fire season will be more benign in Southern California and more difficult in the Northern Rockies,’’ he said. 

Rain a Mixed Blessing 

But state and local officials, while agreeing that moisture levels deep in area forests are far higher than in previous seasons, fear that the heavy precipitation is a 

mixed blessing. 

The bumper crop of grass and new brush brought by the past winter’s near-record 

rainfall already has begun its annual transition from lush green to brittle amber. 

The drying vegetation will become fuel for fires. 

70

‘‘There is a tremendous grass crop that has left me extremely worried,’’ said Jim 

Wright, CDF’s chief of fire protection. 

Several significant wildfires, some as large as 30 to 40 acres, have already occurred in the region, particularly in the Lake Matthews area, Corona Fire Chief 

Mike Warren said. 

But Warren said he already sees a difference in the way fire agencies respond to 

fires in the post-blue ribbon commission era. Improved communication, which was 

among the chief priorities set out by the panel, is evident, he said. 

‘‘What I’m seeing is a rapid move toward mutual aid,’’ Warren said. ‘‘There isn’t 

the kind of hesitation that there has been in the past to call on a neighbor for help.’’

Governor Credited 

Warren, who is also a commission member, attributed much of the commission’s 

progress to support from the Schwarzenegger administration. 

Schwarzenegger came under fire in October after vetoing four fire-related bills 

amid the height of fire season. Several officials questioned the state’s resolve to implement the commission’s recommendations. Even retired Sen. William Campbell, 

who served as chairman of the panel, expressed frustration. 

In a December meeting, Schwarzenegger vowed ‘‘100 percent support’’ of the commission’s plans, Warren said. In subsequent meetings in January, February and 

March, commission members spent hundreds of hours further prioritizing the recommendations and setting them into motion, he said. 

Schwarzenegger and then-outgoing Gov. Gray Davis created the commission in 

the aftermath of the 2003 fires, which torched three quarters of a million acres 

across Southern California, destroying thousands of homes and killing 22 people. 

AN END TO TURF BATTLES: NEW FIRE-FIGHTING STYLE TESTED AT CAMP 5 BLAZE

[By Bill Harlan, Rapid City Journal, Rapid City, SD, April 25, 2005] 

U.S. Forest Service District Ranger Pam Brown and Joe Lowe, the state of South 

Dakota’s top fighter of wildfires, were almost giddy Wednesday over what happened 

last Sunday during the Camp 5 forest fire near Deadwood. 

‘‘We came together as firefighters rather than as agencies,’’ Lowe, who directs the 

state Division of Wildland Fire Suppression, said. 

‘‘From my perspective, this was huge,’’ Brown, who runs the Northern Hills District of the Black Hills National Forest, said. 

The fire ignited late Sunday afternoon about a mile south of U.S. Highway 14A, 

which runs through Boulder Canyon. It ran hot and fast into the night, burning 775 

acres before firefighters had it 60 percent contained Monday and fully contained by 

Tuesday night. 

Cool, wet weather Monday night helped administer the coup de grace, but Lowe 

and Brown were both emphatic that a crucial ‘‘burn-out’’ and fire lines built on the 

east side of the fire helped save homes in the Boulder Park subdivision. 

What they were excited about was a fire management structure called a ‘‘unified 

command’’—a concept that only a policy wonk could get giddy about. 

Brown and Lowe, however, insisted that the ‘‘unified command’’ system could 

have profound results in the fire-prone Black Hills. 

‘‘They’ve used it for years in California,’’ Lowe said. He spent most of his firefighting career there. 

Unified command is a management structure that allows various firefighting 

agencies to come together quickly to coordinate firefighting efforts. 

Sunday night, for example, Lowe and Forest Service firefighter Terry Tompkins 

were among the first on the scene. The fire was on Forest Service land, so, under 

the traditional system, Tompkins would have been in charge. However, Lowe had 

already discussed trying the unified command system with Dean Berger, fire management officer for the Black Hills National Forest. 

Lowe and Tompkins, talking on cell phones on their way to the fire, decided to 

give unified command a try. 

Brown, who manages the ranger district where the fire started, also approved. 

‘‘We had to get after it fast,’’ she said. 

Lowe and Tompkins met in person at the fire to discuss a strategy. Among their 

objectives:

• Fight the fire aggressively all night. 

• Focus on the east flank of the fire. 

• Set an east flank burn-out that, though risky, could help save homes.

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They also agreed on a system for ordering people, equipment and supplies. They 

even roughed out a cost-sharing agreement. 

Lowe said the most important objective, aside from safety, was to ‘‘build a box’’ 

on a map. ‘‘Once the box is defined, you look for ways to keep the fire in it,’’ he 

said. 

While Lowe and Tompkins were building the box, the initial responders, including 

volunteer departments, continued to work the fire, which was already crowning—

moving fast through tree tops. 

The fire plan, however, was in place, in writing, within minutes. Then Lowe and 

Tompkins picked an ‘‘operations officer’’ to run the effort. For the night-shift Sunday, that turned out to be Randy Skelton, a battalion chief with the Rapid City Fire 

Department. 

Brown said that from Sunday night on, firefighters from about a dozen organizations worked as though they had trained together all year. They came from the Forest Service, the state of South Dakota, the National Park Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, volunteer fire departments and county agencies. They also included 

specially trained state prisoners from the Rapid City Trusty Unit. 

‘‘It’s great when it’s so effortless,’’ Brown said, because multi jurisdictional firefighting can be difficult. 

Elements of the unified command system have been used here before, but Lowe 

said this was the first time the formal structure had been used on a big wildfire 

in the Black Hills. 

Lowe is eager to use the system again. The Black Hills National Forest is 

honeycombed with private land holdings, he pointed out, which makes it ripe for 

turf battles—or at least jurisdictional confusion. 

‘‘When would unified command not make sense in the Black Hills?’’ Brown asked. 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 

Washington, DC, April 5, 2005. 

Hon. ELLEN ENGLEMAN CONNERS, 

Chairwoman, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MADAM CHAIRMAN: On April 23, 2004, the National Transportation Safety 

Board (NTSB) issued a letter to the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture 

(USDA), the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) containing safety recommendations based on the NTSB’s review of three large airtanker crashes caused by inflight structural failures. This joint response from USDA and DOI addresses NTSB 

Safety Recommendations A-04-29 through A-04-31. 

A-04-29. Develop maintenance and inspection programs for aircraft that are used 

in firefighting operations that take into account and are based on:

1. The airplane’s original design requirements and its intended mission and operational life; 

2. The amount of operational life that has been used before entering firefighting 

service; 

3. The magnitude of maneuver loading and the level of turbulence in the firefighting environment and the effect of these factors on remaining operational life; 

4. The impact of all previous flight hours (both public and civil) on the airplane’s 

remaining operational life; and 

5. A detailed engineering evaluation and analysis to predict and prevent fatigue 

separations.

On behalf of their respective Departments, USDA’s Forest Service and DOI’s Bureau of Land Management have engaged in a process to immediately mitigate the 

safety risk and provide for continuing safe operation of public firefighting aircraft 

to comply with Recommendation A-04-29. This process is outlined as follows:

1. On May 10, 2004, the agencies terminated 33 large airtanker contracts. 

2. With FAA participation, an enhanced inspection process was established and 

a request was issued to airtanker companies for documentation that could be used 

to evaluate historical data and the maintenance and inspection programs and practices of the airtanker industry. 

3. On June 10, 2004, the Forest Service contracted with DynCorp Technical Services to provide evaluations of aircraft and vendors for compliance with A-04-29. 

4. With regard to items 1, 2, and 4 of the above recommendation, the issue of determining the ‘‘remaining operational life’’ of some existing airtaker models was 

problematic, but the Departments agree with the NTSB that determination of an 

72

operational life was critical to preventing separations that might result from widespread fatigue damage. 

5. To this end, vendors and the Departments are working together to determine 

an operational service life while simultaneously collecting load spectrum data to refine it for the firefighting environment. DynCorp was tasked to determine if an 

operational service life existed or could be determined for each aircraft type—and 

if individual aircraft remain within this service life. To determine operational service life and ‘‘fatigue life expended’’ for each airframe, DynCorp is actively seeking 

fatigue life histories and applicable information from airtanker companies, Sandia 

National Laboratories, original aircraft manufacturers, and the military. 

6. Data recorders have been installed on several airframe models to collect load 

data on the low-level fire environment in order to more accurately define the load 

spectrum and to determine fatigue life limits and maintenance and inspection procedures and intervals. This information will be critical in the evaluation of current 

and future firefighting aircraft.

A-04-30. Require that aircraft used in firefighting operations be maintained in accordance with the maintenance and inspection programs developed in response to 

Safety Recommendation A-04-29. 

The Forest Service has contracted with the former Executive Director of the 

Transportation Safety Board of Canada to develop a Special Purpose Operations and 

Airworthiness Manual. This manual will clearly articulate roles, responsibilities, 

processes, and procedures for operational, maintenance, and inspection standards 

for public-use firefighting aircraft. 

In the interim, the Forest Service has established conservative maintenance and 

inspection requirements for airtankers that have been returned to operational service and has included these expanded requirements in all airtanker contracts. The 

requirements will continue to be refined as additional load data are collected and 

appropriate engineering analyses are conducted. 

The Bureau of Land Management has established a Continuing Airworthiness 

Program (CAP) Manager position with responsibility.for implementing a CAP for all 

of the types of firefighting aircraft it uses. This CAP is based on assessments of aircraft mission profiles, make/model safety information, aircraft inspections, aircraft 

records research, and maintenance and inspection program evaluation. The end result of these assessments will be the development of a Structural Health Monitoring 

plan for each make/model of aircraft used in firefighting operations. All steps in the 

process are to be coordinated with the Original Equipment Manufacturer. 

STATEMENT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE

FIRE AND AVIATION MANAGEMENT BRIEFING PAPER

Topic: Fiscal Year 2005 Forest Service Firefighter Training Cost Estimates 

Issue: Projected training costs for 2005 based on anticipated personnel employed 

in Fire Positions 

Background: The cost of training fluctuates from year to year and from region to 

region. In addition, the Forest Service does not consider training cost an effective 

means of determining a firefighter’s ability to perform safely and does not specifically track these costs. However, any estimate of training cost must be based on the 

number of firefighters and required courses. Firefighter is qualified for a variety of 

positions that require successful completion of training, observed performance, and 

approval from a board of experts. Firefighters carry a position qualifications document (Red Card) that show they have met all training, experience and physical fitness requirements to perform specific jobs. No firefighter is assigned to the fireline 

until they have met all standards and this has been certified. 

Key Points:

• The Forest Service maintains training standards for most fire positions that are 

above the minimum training requirements set by the National Wildfire Coordination Group. The increased qualifications are outlined in the Forest Service’s 

Fire and Aviation Management Qualifications Handbook FSH 5109.17. 

• Standard government-wide accounting uses Budget Object codes to classify 

costs, such as salary, travel, and training. However, travel expenses in budget 

object codes are typically limited to training tuition costs, which is a small portion of total training costs. The majority of the costs are associated with the 

time and expense of employees attending training. 

• Each region is required to use money included in their preparedness funding 

to pay for training related expenses. The cost for regional and local fire training 

in FY05 was $22.4 Million. 

73

• The Forest Service also provides funds for National or advanced levels of training which are hosted by the National Wildfire Apprentice Training Academy, 

National Advanced Fire and Resource Institute, Fire Use Training Academy, 

and National Prescribed Fire Training Center. The amount provided in FY 2005 

for these training programs was $7.1 Million. 

• On October 1, 2004 Interagency Fire Program Management (IFPM) was initiated in response to recommendations from the Interagency Management Review 

Team. IFPM is intended to professionalize the fire and aviation organization 

with standard position competencies and higher education standards. This program will increase the training requirements for a significant portion of the 

workforce. The first significant signs of an increase in training needs will occur 

in FY 2006.

Conclusion: The cost of training fluctuates from year to year and from region to 

region. These fluctuations are due to the variation of individuals hired and the 

amount of specialized or advanced training determined to be necessary to meet current individual, unit, regional and National needs. The combined estimate cost of 

local, regional and National fire training for FY05 is $29.5 Million.

Æ