```

[House Report 109-224]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

109th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 1st Session                                                    109-224

======================================================================

 
  REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTING THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO 
 TRANSMIT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NOT LATER THAN 14 DAYS AFTER 
   THE DATE OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION ALL DOCUMENTS IN THE 
   POSSESSION OF THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RELATING TO 
  COMMUNICATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM RELATING TO THE 
            POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO IRAQ

                                _______
                                

 September 16, 2005.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed

                                _______
                                

Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                             ADVERSE REPORT

                       [To accompany H. Res. 408]

    The Committee on International Relations, to whom was 
referred the resolution (H. Res. 408) requesting the President 
and directing the Secretary of Defense to transmit to the House 
of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the 
adoption of this resolution all documents in the possession of 
the President and Secretary of Defense relating to 
communications with officials of the United Kingdom relating to 
the policy of the United States with respect to Iraq, having 
considered the same, reports unfavorably thereon without 
amendment and recommends that the resolution not be agreed to.

                           TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
Purpose and Summary..............................................     2
Background and Need for the Legislation..........................     2
Hearings.........................................................     4
Committee Consideration..........................................     4
Vote of the Committee............................................     5
Committee Oversight Findings.....................................     5
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................     5
Performance Goals and Objectives.................................     5
Constitutional Authority Statement...............................     5
New Advisory Committees..........................................     5
Congressional Accountability Act.................................     5
Federal Mandates.................................................     5

                          Purpose and Summary

    House Resolution 408 requests the President and directs the 
Secretary of Defense to transmit to the House of 
Representatives all information in the possession of the 
President and the Secretary of Defense relating to 
communication with officials of the United Kingdom between 
January 1, 2001, and March 19, 2003, relating to the policy of 
the United States with respect to Iraq.

                Background and Need for the Legislation

    House Resolution 408 is a resolution of inquiry, which 
pursuant to Rule XIII, clause 7 of the Rules of the House, 
directs the Committee to act on the resolution within 14 
legislative days, or a privileged motion to discharge the 
Committee is in order. H. Res. 408 was introduced and referred 
to the Committee on International Relations on July 28, 2005, 
and was ordered reported adversely by the Committee on 
September 14, 2005.
    Under the rules and precedents of the House, a resolution 
of inquiry is one of the methods used by the House to obtain 
information from the executive branch. According to Deschler's 
Procedure it is a ``simple resolution making a direct request 
or demand of the President or the head of an executive 
department to furnish the House of Representatives with 
specific factual information in the possession of the executive 
branch.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\Deschler's Precedents, H. Doc. No. 94-661, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 
vol. 7, ch. 24, section 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On July 28, 2005, Rep. Maurice Hinchey of New York 
introduced H. Res. 408. Mr. Hinchey's resolution requests the 
President to turn over to the House of Representatives all 
documents, including telephone and electronic mail records, 
logs, calendars, minutes, and memos, in the possession of the 
President relating to communications with officials of the 
United Kingdom from January 1, 2001, to March 19, 2003, 
relating to the policy of the United States with respect to 
Iraq, including any discussions or communications between the 
President, then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, or 
other Administration officials and officials of the United 
Kingdom. The resolution also directs the Secretary of Defense 
to turn over to the House of Representatives all documents, 
including telephone and electronic mail records, logs, 
calendars, minutes, and memos, in the possession of the 
Secretary of Defense relating to communications with officials 
of the United Kingdom from January 1, 2001, to March 19, 2003, 
relating to the policy of the United States with respect to 
Iraq, including any discussions or communications between any 
Defense Department official, including Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith, and Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, and officials 
of the United Kingdom.
    H. Res. 408 apparently was introduced in response to 
publication of a British document known as the ``Downing Street 
Memo.'' The Downing Street Memo, as leaked to and published by 
the press, was apparently written in connection with a meeting 
between Tony Blair and British officials held on Downing Street 
on July 23, 2002. The Memo was leaked to a member of the 
British press and published in London's The Sunday Times on May 
1, 2005. The heart of the Downing Street Memo is the 
description of U.S. pre-war intelligence that included the view 
that intelligence was being ``fixed'' around the policy.
    Prior to introduction of H. Res. 408, thorough 
investigations and lengthy reports were issued by the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, the Commission on the 
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (known as the Silberman-Robb 
Commission), the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 
and the British Hutton inquiry. None of these reports found any 
evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce, 
influence or pressure members of the intelligence community to 
``fix'' intelligence.
    The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reviewed the 
record of intelligence on Iraq over the span of a decade 
stretching back to the first Gulf War. The Senate's report ran 
over 500 pages and was the product of over twelve months of 
Committee review of over 45,000 pages of intelligence 
documents, interviews of over 200 individuals including 
National Security Council staff members, and four committee 
hearings. Conclusion number 83 in the Senate Intelligence 
Committee report entitled ``U.S. Intelligence Community's 
Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq'' states: ``The 
Committee did not find any evidence that Administration 
officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts 
to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction capabilities.''\2\ This conclusion, as is true of 
the entire report, was approved by a unanimous, bipartisan vote 
by the Senate Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Conclusions of U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence 
Assessments on Iraq, Conclusion 83, p. 25 (July 7, 2004), available at 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/conclusions.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
reviewed U.S. intelligence regarding the amount or existence of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, including the issues of 
bias, dissenting views and how intelligence was disseminated, 
and the linkages between Iraq and terrorist organizations. The 
Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Intelligence Committee 
informed the House International Relations Committee that 
Members of the International Relations Committee had been 
granted access to the documentation provided by the Central 
Intelligence Agency that the Intelligence Committee was 
studying in its review. Again, no evidence of ``fixing'' 
intelligence surfaced in the course of this congressional 
review.
    The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the 
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the 
Silberman-Robb Commission) produced what is viewed as the 
definitive report on pre-war intelligence. This was a blue-
ribbon, bipartisan commission headed by former Senator Charles 
S. Robb and Judge Laurence H. Silberman, which included a 
talented and experienced group of commissioners such as Senator 
John McCain, Walter Slocombe, Judge Patricia Wald, and Lloyd 
Cutler, and was supported by a bipartisan, experienced staff of 
88 professionals and consultants. The following conclusions are 
particularly relevant to H. Res. 408:

          We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead 
        wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about 
        Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. . . . Its principal 
        causes were the Intelligence Community's inability to 
        collect good information about Iraq's WMD programs, 
        serious errors in analyzing what information it could 
        gather, and a failure to make clear just how much of 
        its analysis was based on assumptions, rather than good 
        evidence.
          . . .

          After a thorough review, the Commission found no 
        indication that the Intelligence Community distorted 
        the evidence regarding Iraq's weapons of mass 
        destruction. What the intelligence professionals told 
        you about Saddam Hussein's programs was what they 
        believed. They were simply wrong.
          . . .

          Finally, we closely examined the possibility that 
        intelligence analysts were pressured by policymakers to 
        change their judgments about Iraq's nuclear, 
        biological, and chemical weapons programs. The analysts 
        who worked Iraqi's weapons issues universally agreed 
        that in no instance did political pressure cause them 
        to skew or alter any of their analytical judgments.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Silberman-Robb Commission), 
Report to the President of the United States, 2, 11 (March 31, 2005).

    In light of the number and thoroughness of these previous 
inquiries made by congressional committees and special 
commissions especially well-qualified in matters of 
intelligence, it is unnecessary for the International Relations 
Committee through this resolution agree to demand this wide-
range of documents and to repeat such inquiries. The House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees, after thorough review of large 
volumes of documents, found no evidence that the Administration 
improperly used, coerced, manipulated, or ``fixed'' pre-war 
intelligence. The Silberman-Robb Commission confirmed this 
conclusion. Senator Pat Roberts, the Chairman of the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, referring to the numerous 
reports on pre-war intelligence, aptly stated, ``I don't think 
there should be any doubt that we have now heard it all 
regarding prewar intelligence. I think that it would be a 
monumental waste of time to replow this ground any further. We 
should now turn our full attention to the future . . .''\4\ 
Given the extensive, multiple investigations of this issue, the 
Committee deemed the document requests made in H. Res. 408 to 
be unnecessary and voted to report it adversely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\Press Release, Senator Roberts' Remarks on the WMD Commission 
Report (March 31, 2005), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/
050331.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                Hearings

    The Committee did not hold hearings on H. Res. 408.

                        Committee Consideration

    On September 14, 2005, the Full Committee marked up the 
resolution, H. Res. 408, pursuant to notice, in open session. 
The Committee agreed to a motion to report the resolution 
adversely to the House by a record vote of 23 ayes to 22 nays, 
with one voting ``Present.''

                         Vote of the Committee

    Clause (3)(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives requires that the results of each record vote 
on an amendment or motion to report, together with the names of 
those voting for or against, be printed in the Committee 
report. The following record vote occurred during consideration 
of H. Res. 408:
    Vote to report to the House adversely:
    Voting yes: Hyde, Smith (NJ), Burton, Gallegly, Ros-
Lehtinen, Rohrabacher, King, Chabot, Tancredo, Issa, Flake, 
Davis, Green, Weller, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, Boozman, 
Barrett, Mack, Fortenberry, McCaul, and Poe.
    Voting no: Leach, Lantos, Berman, Ackerman, Menendez, 
Brown, Sherman, Wexler, Engel, Delahunt, Meeks, Lee, Crowley, 
Blumenauer, Berkley, Napolitano, Schiff, Watson, Smith (WA), 
McCollum, Chandler and Cardoza.
    Voting ``Present'': Paul
    H. Res. 408 was ordered reported adversely to the House by 
a vote of 23 ayes to 22 noes, with one voting ``Present.''

                      Committee Oversight Findings

    The Committee held no oversight activities under clause 
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.

               New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures

    Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because 
H. Res. 408 does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

                    Performance Goals and Objectives

    The rule requiring a statement of performance goals and 
objectives is inapplicable.

                   Constitutional Authority Statement

    Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for 
this resolution in article I, section 1 of the Constitution.

                        New Advisory Committees

    H. Res. 408 does not establish or authorize any new 
advisory committees.

                    Congressional Accountability Act

    H. Res. 408 does not apply to the legislative branch.

                            Federal Mandates

    H. Res. 408 provides no Federal mandates.

                                  

```