Number 147, September 1998

Hemispheric SecurityRelations*Remodeling the U.S. Framework for theAmericas
by John A. Cope

Conclusions

Changes in the U.S. approach to securityaffairs in the Americas are being influenced by: 
- The April 1998 Presidential Summit in    Santiago, Chile, which provided a catalyst for replacing the demeaning, assistance-focused    mind-set of U.S. hemispheric security policy. 
- Hemispheric and sub-regional trade and    investment partnerships that provide a model on which to base cooperation in security    affairs. 
- The need for the United States to be    committed to multilateral partnerships on a voluntary, ad hoc basis, and, to the    acceptance of a gradual move toward military interoperability.  
**Challenge at the End of an Era

The standard U.S. approach to securityrelations in the Western Hemisphere is at the end of an era. Deep and widespread changesin the hemisphere’s political and economic environment over the last 20 years haveintroduced anomalies that the existing U.S. paradigm did not anticipate. Transformationsin Latin America and the Caribbean since the Cold War have produced a growing sense thatWashington’s past experience is no longer adequate to meet problems shaped by anenvironment that it in part created. Outlines of the coming era seem visible in the trendtoward regional cooperation found in recurring meetings of the region’s defenseministers, the close diplomatic and military collaboration among six countries in theMilitary Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru, and the measures being adopted by neighbors tobuild mutual confidence. The United States is moving in this security milieu without aclear view of the horizon or a plan of action to get there.

The existing U.S. paradigm is no longer areliable guide for relations with inter-American states or for defining thehemisphere’s place in the broader context of U.S. global interests. Grounded incontinental defense, Soviet containment, and now U.S. "engagement," threeorganizing principles and a mind-set constitute the core of the current paradigm. Theprinciples stress:
- ensuring the primacy of U.S. interests    and autonomy of action in the Americas 
- excluding extra-hemispheric influences    hostile to U.S. interests, particularly in the Caribbean Basin 
- protecting U.S. interests with limited    resources. 

Underlying the principles is anassistance-focused mind-set—a deep belief that the United States must tutor, supply,and in many ways aid, or manipulate, the region’s "developing" states. 

Washington has to decide whether theseprinciples remain valid in 1998, and, if not, what might replace them. Is its mind-setstill appropriate or is it detrimental? What approach is best suited to pursuing U.S.regional and global interests in a hemisphere undergoing dramatic changes? 

Until the April 1998 Presidential Summitof the Americas in Chile, no external catalyst urged U.S. policymakers to confront thesignificance of regional trends and reconstruct the existing security framework. In 1994,the Miami Summit launched several cooperative programs based on common economic andpolitical visions, but the will to work together did not extend to security matters. Thischanged in Chile when presidents and prime ministers agreed to "promote regionaldialogue [on building confidence and security] with a view to revitalizing andstrengthening the institutions of the Inter-American System, taking into account the newpolitical, economic, social and strategic-military factors in the Hemisphere and in itssub-regions." Before responding, the United States needs to rethink its ownconceptual approach to regional security and decide how the Americas fit in its globalvision. The options include:
- continuing to assert U.S. security    interests in the region, but work to broaden the scope and improve the quality of    collaborative efforts and past assistance-related programs. The region does not play a    role in global security strategy. 
- remodeling the security framework,    leaving an era dominated by unilateral interests, to encourage genuine partnership,    military interoperability, reciprocity, and the promotion of shared regional and global    interests—in other words, to pursue the potential of this neighborhood in security    affairs in the same positive way the United States has pursued cooperation in trade and    investment.  

This paper develops the second option witha review of the traditional model, presenting examples of how anomalies confront theparadigm, and suggesting a conceptual structure better suited to contemporarycircumstances. It concludes with a short list of preliminary steps to start the securityframework rebuilding process.
**The Traditional Security Framework

With its autonomy assured by economic andmilitary dominance, the United States has long been able to protect or promote itsregional interests. Three traditional organizing principles governed by a"fatherly," assistance-focused mind-set have defined Washington’s standardreactive approach to engaging American neighbors. The United States has sought: (1) toensure its primacy in the hemisphere, (2) to exclude from the region extra-hemisphericinfluences hostile to North America, and (3) to protect its interests using limitedresources. The three principles are interconnected. The first may hold only if the secondis accomplished. Applying the second may not assure the first (e.g., powerful non-stateactors and chronic internal instability can threaten U.S. interests). The third may besustained only if the preceding two are accomplished. U.S. political concerns, economicaid, intelligence collection, and military activity have been disproportionately greaterin the Caribbean Basin than in the rest of Latin America. Today, issues associated withthe Caribbean—international crime, migration, drug trafficking, and the restorationof democracy in Panama and Haiti—continue to command U.S. public attention. 

The mind-set that permeates the currentsecurity framework combines three factors: (1) a historic conviction that the UnitedStates must guide neighboring states through democratization and development; (2) a beliefin U.S. pre-eminence as the region’s military tutor and the supplier of tradingopportunities, foreign investment and aid; and (3) the region’s actual need, early inthe Cold War, for developmental and military assistance. Latin American and Caribbeanneighbors are seen as developing, "subordinate" states. Many U.S. officialsassume that Washington can control arms sales and defense spending in general,institutionalize democratic civil-military relations, and overcome domestic politicalinstability. The mind-set is found in today’s engagement activities to shape theregion: counterdrug operations, foreign assistance, military humanitarian and civicassistance exercises, conferences on human rights, and opportunities formilitary-to-military contact. As seen by American neighbors, however, the three principlesand the dominant mind-set reflect the U.S. tendency to see the region only through NorthAmerican eyes and to impose its solutions without consultation or understanding ofinherent complexities. Most regional governments do not share the current U.S. conceptionof security priorities which emphasize combatting drug trafficking, promoting democracy,and strengthening regional stability. They define security in terms of defendingsovereignty, trade integration and development, redefining the military’s role insociety, fighting poverty, and curbing domestic crime and violence. One official framedthe problem well: "It is hard to work together when there is only one security issue[terrorism] on which we agree." 
**Contemporary Anomalies

The unprecedented return of democracy, theemergence of open economies, the globalization of trade and finance, the internationalinfluence of non-state actors, and other trends have produced anomalies that confound thetraditional paradigm’s expectations. 

**Integration and Independence**. LatinAmerican and Caribbean countries have stopped automatically looking northward or deferringto the United States in security matters. The ability of Washington to influence regionalevents is weakening. The existing paradigm does not envision a region in which trade andinvestment are integrating states and the presence of many extra-hemispheric interests hasgrown dramatically. Nations have stronger economies today. The flow of goods, capital,manpower and information in response to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers has increasedwithin sub-regional pacts, such as the Southern Cones trading bloc (MERCOSUR) and theCentral American Common Market. The region as a whole is becoming a relatively stablemarket in the global economy, and the United States faces strong and growing economiccompetition for the first time since 1945. Latin American governments are cultivatinginvestment, as well as political and security relationships, with the European Union,Japan, China and others. External actors present a new counterbalance to the weight ofU.S. influence in the hemisphere. 

**Multilateral and Bilateral Focus.**Transnationalsecurity issues, from narcotics and arms trafficking to environmental awareness and thedefense of democracy, defy the paradigm emphasis on "hub and spoke" solutions.While bilateral arrangements are important, multinational plans, procedures andinstitutions are a necessity. The commonality of most major issues, transnational threats,limited national response capabilities, and even many domestic problems challengegovernments, including the United States, to overcome their traditional hesitation tocooperate with neighbors. Anti-drug programs provide an example of prolonged bilateralefforts that have not achieved U.S. security interests. A multinational anti-druginitiative, sponsored by the United States, and adopted at the Santiago Summit suggests acommitment finally to move in a more effective direction.

**Leadership.** U.S. regionalleadership is assumed in the traditional paradigm. Washington’s recent policysignals, however, have left international observers unsure of U.S. commitment. On the onehand, at the 1994 Miami Summit the United States praised the convergence of democraticvalues and economic interests and argued persuasively for the creation a Free Trade Areaof the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. President Clinton’s visits to Mexico, CentralAmerica, the Caribbean, and South America in 1997, and his return in April 1998 for asecond summit, suggest strong interest within the executive branch. On the other hand,U.S. Congressional decisions belie this view. Critics point to the Helms-Burton Act, theprocess of "certifying" countries receiving U.S. assistance in the drug war, thenon-expansion of NAFTA to Chile, and, above all, the congressional rejection of "fasttrack" authority. From a Latin American and Caribbean perspective, a sincere sense ofpartnership is far more important today than leadership, a fact recognized by the EuropeanUnion in its dealings with regional states.

**Military Anomalies**

The security framework’s militarydimension has taken many forms of bilateral assistance over time, from military sales andprofessional education to intelligence sharing and military-political conferences. TheUnited States has nurtured military relationships, helped countries face internalinstability, and provided institutional development. However, Washington has also been anunreliable source of support, imposing restrictions on bilateral assistance to sendpolitical messages. 

Democratization, peace, the conflictingchallenges of today’s security environment, and changing professional military needsplace a strain on the traditional paradigm. The standard U.S. approach no longer satisfiesregional security expectations. Most armed forces want operational contact to improveprofessional capabilities and modernize doctrine. In past practice, the United States hasapproached cooperation by pressing a country to accept the U.S. agenda, which might nothave been in its interest, and by compensating with attractive assistance programs to helpthe government respond as desired. Reciprocity, common standards for technical andtactical interoperability, and interest in a genuine partnership have long been absent.Consequently, when Washington needed to assemble a large multinational force in thePersian Gulf in February 1998, regional governments refused to contribute, in part becausetheir forces lacked cooperative experience with the United States. 

Many states would like to develop moreprofessional, operational contacts. With the exception of naval forces, the United Stateshas shown tepid interest in promoting close working relations or in developing theinteroperability found with its European and East Asian allies. It is still difficult, forexample, to communicate by radio. Foreign liaison officers have only recently been allowedon U.S. surveillance aircraft or at military command posts employed in anti-drugoperations. Washington sponsors exercises focused on peacekeeping. The training offersU.S. technical advice and nurtures collaboration among neighboring Latin and Caribbeancountries. The United States has not encouraged cooperation with its Armed Forces outsidethe region. Opportunities to agree on common American interoperability standards forfuture peace operations are being lost. And exercises do not prepare neighbors to workwith European counterparts using NATO standards. 

From a regional perspective, militaryrelations with the United States are losing importance. In the Southern Cone, for example,the advent of MERCOSUR and mutual acceptance of several confidence- and security-buildingmeasures have led to a significant improvement in cooperation among the defenseinstitutions of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Overcoming severe mutual distrust, an annualseries of academic conferences begun early in the 1990s has given way to unprecedentedbilateral military and naval exercises between these neighbors. South American governmentsalso look outside the hemisphere. The Rio Group regularly engages in a security dialoguewith the European Union. Several countries have joined extra-regional training exercisessponsored, for example, by NATO or South Africa. 

**Remodeling the Security Framework**

A pragmatic U.S. security frameworkrecognizing Latin American and Caribbean states’ determination to define their rolein world affairs is needed. The 1998 Summit provides Washington a catalyst for shiftingits security paradigm, and the 1994 Summit suggests how. In Miami, the Summit participantsagreed to build a partnership for development and prosperity. The experience of MERCOSUR,and regional progress toward collaborating on a structure for multilateral trade, can beapplied to security affairs. The model suggests that the U.S. ability to act as a greatpower in a financially and technologically integrated world is enhanced by identifyingshared interests with Inter-American neighbors, developing mutual confidence, and creatingcapabilities for multinational cooperation on international issues. 

At the core of the new paradigm are twoorganizing principles and a mind-set that are sensitive to regional perspectives andcommitted to developing partnerships whenever possible. The principles stress: (1)respecting state sovereignty yet working closely with regional partners to achieve commoninterests, and (2) pursuing U.S. interests with limited resources. The underlying mind-setfocuses on the importance of cooperation. Genuine cooperation among partners meansreciprocity, transparency and institutional accountability. There is a give and take amongparties pursuing common objectives. It will require time, innovation, understanding, andperseverance in the United States and across the Americas to bridge the asymmetries ofpower as well as the cultural differences to produce mutually beneficial cooperation. 

Commitment and reciprocity in militarypartnerships encourage close working relations and ultimately interoperability. A formalhemispheric alliance structure is unnecessary. Building confidence in the idea of ad hocpartnerships within sub-regions for a few common missions is a start. In time, as comfortlevels increase, the nature of the cooperation can be expanded.

**Recommendations**
Changing the U.S. security paradigm beginswith an awareness of existing inconsistencies and a willingness to develop a moreappropriate approach. Several shifts in design and execution are necessary.

**Support Concept.** The paradigmtransition requires a commitment to pursue multilateral partnerships of a voluntary, adhoc and informal nature to address common security issues. The United States needs toexpress its desire to operate militarily with Latin American, Caribbean, and NorthAmerican counterparts on search and rescue, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions.Standards of interoperability for these missions need to be pursued and established. Arealistic timetable should be set for accomplishing this goal. Other military missionsmight be added in the future. 

**Gradually Develop MilitaryPartnerships.** Washington must show that "engagement" today also meanscommitment to ad hoc military partnerships to pursue common objectives. Interoperabilityof equipment and operational doctrine is essential. Common (NATO) standards simplify thetask and de-link from exclusively U.S. requirements. Movement toward interoperabilityshould begin in the functional area of command, control, and communication. As the NATOPartnership for Peace experience suggests, however, this step is complex and requirestime, creativity, funding, and patience.

**Avoid Competition.**There is no needto challenge existing or emerging security arrangements such as the Rio Pact, or theongoing security dialogue on security matters taking place between South American statesand non-regional, primarily European, counterparts.

**Review New Conceptual Approach withMinisters of Defense.** A Defense Ministerial meeting would provide a venue and anopportunity to explain a changing perspective within the U.S. security framework, itsemphasis on regional partnerships, and the new U.S. commitment to voluntary, ad hocworking relationships and to achieving interoperability for search and rescue,peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions.
Colonel John Cope, USA (Ret.), is a SeniorFellow and the Americas Team Leader at the Institute for National Strategic Studies. Hecan be contacted at (202) 685-2373 or via e-mail at: [email protected].

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

Editor in Chief - Hans Binnendijk

Editor - Jonathan W. PierceNOTE

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