F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

A R T H U R J O H N P A T T E R S O N , Petitioner-Appellant
,

v.

B A R B A R A W A G N E R , W arden, R espondent-Appellee

. No. 13-56080

D.C. No. 2:12-cv-09960-ODW

OPI NI ON

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Otis D. W rig ht I I , District J u dg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted N ovember 21, 2014—Pasadena, California

F iled May

4, 2015

B efore: W illiam A. F letcher and J ay S. B y bee, Circuit J udg es, and David A. Ez ra, District J udg e. *

Opinion by

J udg e W

. F letcher

* T h e Ho n o rab l e D a v i d A

. Ezra, District J u d g e f o r th e U.S. District Co urt f o r th e W estern

District o f

T ex as, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.P A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 2

SUMMARY * *

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Arthur Patterson’s habeas corpus p et ition challeng ing a mag istrate judg e’s order certify

in g h im for ex tradition to South Korea for prosecution for murder.

Patterson a r g ued that his ex tradition would violate the 1998 ex tradition treaty

between the United States and South Korea b ecause his prosecution would be barred b y the statute of limitations in the United States, and thus w ould violate the treaty ’s lapse-of-time provision. T he panel held t hat the treaty ’s lapse-of-time provision, w hich states that e x tradition “may b e d enied” when the prosecution would h ave been barred by the statute of limitations in the United States, does not impose a mandatory

bar to ex tradition.

Patterson also arg ued that his ex tradition would violate the double-jeopardy p rovision of th e Status of F orces Ag reement (SOF A) g overning American military personnel, and their dependents, in South Korea. Th e p a n e l disag reed

w i t h the premise that rig hts conferred by the SOF A m a y b e enforced by the judiciary

to block ex tradition.

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p ar t o f t h e o p in io n o f th e co urt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co urt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.P A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 3

COUNSEL

Craig Anthony Harbaug h (arg ued), I saacs/F r iedberg
, L L P, L os Ang eles, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Nancy Spieg e l (arg

ued), Assistant United States Attorney
, L os Ang eles, California, for Respondent-Appellee.

OP INION

W

. F L ETCHER, Circuit J udg e:

As a teenag er, Arthur Patterson was c onvicted in a South Korean court of destroy ing evidenc e i n connection with a murder. After serving his prison term, Patterson left Korea for the United States. The South Korea n go v e r nment n ow seeks to p rosecute him for the murder itself and requests that the U nited States ex tradite him. O ver Patterson’s objections,

a mag istrate judg e certified him for e x tradition. P a tterson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to c h alleng e the certification o rder. The district court d e n i ed Patterson’s petition.

Patterson arg ues that h is ex tradition would violate ( 1) the

ex tradition treaty between the United States and South Korea and (2) the Status o f F orces Ag reement g overning American military personnel and their dependents in South Korea. W e conclude that neither the treaty nor the ag reement bars

ex tradition. W e therefore affirm.P A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 4

I . B ackg round

I n 1997, Arthur Patterson, a seventeen-y ear-old son of an American serviceman stationed in South Korea, was involved in some manner in the mu r d er o f a Korean colleg e student, Cho J oong -pil, in a B urg e r K ing restroom in Seoul. Patterson and his f riend Edward L ee followed Cho into the restroom and came out covered in blood. Afterwards, each accused the other of h aving stabbed Cho. Almost twenty y ears later, South Korea seeks to prosecut e P a t terson for murder. I ts

ex tradition request alleg es that Ch o w a s stabbed with Patterson’s k

nife, tha t P a t t e r son threw the knife in a sewer after the stabbing
, and that two of Patterson’s friends have stated that Patterson told them that he killed Cho.

I n the immediate aftermath of the murder, South Korean authorities accepted Patterson’s claim that L ee, not Patterson,

was the murderer. They prosecuted L ee f or mu r d er a n d P at terson for destruction of e v idence. Patterson was convicted of destruction of evidence a n d served slig htly more than a y ear in prison. I n 1999, after his release from prison, Patterson left South Korea for the U n ited States. L ee was convicted o f murder, but his c onviction wa s o v e r turned on appeal. The South Korean g overnment prosecuted L e e ag ain, and he was acquitted.

I n 2009, South Korean p rosecutors obtained a warrant for Patterson’s arrest and sent a n ex tradition request to the United States g overnment. I n 2011, the U.S. g overnment soug ht a nd obtained an arrest warrant and arrested Pa t terson. The g overnment then filed a complaint in f ederal district court seeking Patterson’s ex tradition to South Korea. Patterson op p o sed e x tradition. He arg ued that because the murder occurred in 1997, and because he had already been tried andP A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 5

convicted of a crime related to the murder, two international ag reements b ar ex tradition for the prosecution South Kor e a now seeks to bring

.

A mag istrate judg e r ejected Patter s on’s arg uments a nd certified him for ex traditio n

. P a t terson then filed a petition for a writ of habea s corpus. The district court denied the petition, and Patterson timely appealed.

I I . Discussion

A . Ex tradition

A state part y to an e x tradition treaty ordinarily must comply with a request o f another state part y to arrest a nd deliver a person soug ht by that state for c riminal prosecution. See Restatement (Third) of the F oreig n Relations L aw of the United States § 478 ( 1987 & 2014 Supp.). Ex tradition rests

on the premise that “[ a] ll nations have a common interest in the repression of crime.” 1 J ohn B asse tt Moore, A Treatise on Extradition and Interstate Rendition § 3 (1891).

“[ E] x tradition is a d iplomatic process carried out throug h the powers o f t h e ex ecutive, not the judicial, branch.” Blaxland v. Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions
, 323 F .3d 1 198, 1207 (9 t h C i r. 2 003). Under the federal

ex tradition statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184, the c ountry seeking

ex tradition must first file a request w ith the State D epartment. Vo v. Benov
, 447 F .3d 1235, 1237 (9th Cir. 2006). “After the request has been evaluated by the State Departm ent to determine whether i t is w ithin the scope of the relevant

ex tradition treaty , a United States Attorney
, if so instructed, files a complaint i n federal district court seeking an arrestP A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 6

warrant for the person soug h t to be ex tradited.” Blaxland
, 323 F .3d at 1207.

After the United States has soug ht an arrest warra n t for the p erson to be ex tradited (known as the “relator”), a federal

o r state judicial officer must hold a hearing to det e rm i n e whether to certify the relator for ex tradition. 1 8 U

. S.C. § 3184. The role of the judg e is “very limited.” Vo
, 447 F .3d

a t 1237. The judg e must determine whether the r e i s “‘evidence sufficient to s u s t a in the charg e u n der the provisions of the p roper tr e a ty or c onvention,’ or, in other

w ords, whether there is probable cause.” Id. (quoti n g 18 U.S.C. § 3 184) (citation o mitted). I f the judg e determines tha t t here is probable c ause, he o r she “is required to c ertify the individual as e x traditable to the Secretary of State.” Blaxland
, 3 23 F .3d at 1208. The Secretary then dec i d e s , in the ex ercise of his or her discretion, whether to ex tradite the relator to the requesting

country

. Vo , 447 F .3d at 1237.

“The authority of a

. . . judg e serving a s an e x tradition j u d i cial officer is

. . . limited to determining an individua l ’s elig ibility to be ex tradited

. . . . ” I d. As part of the determination of elig ibilit y for ex tradition, “the district o r mag istrate judg e must

. . . assess whether any o f the applicable t reaty provisions bar e x tradition of the alien for any of the charg ed offenses.” B arapind v. Re n o , 225 F .3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). B ecause an e x tradition certification is not a final order sub j e c t t o appellate review, judicial r eview of the decision of t h e ex tradition judg e is b y habeas corpus. Prasoprat v. Benov
, 4 21 F .3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). Our review of the district court’s interpretation o f the relevant international ag r eements is d e n ovo. Kamrin v

. United States , 725 F .2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 1984).P A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 7

B . Potential B ars to Ex tradition

Patterson arg ues that two ag reements between the United States and South Korea bar his ex trad i t i o n

. F irst, he arg ues that his e x tradition wou l d v iolate the ex tradition treaty between the two c ountries b ecause h is prosecution f o r murder would be barred by t h e s t a tute of limitations in the United States, and thus would viol at e the treaty ’s lapse-of-time provision

. S e cond, he arg ues that his ex tradition would violate the double-jeopardy p rovision of the Status o f F orces Ag reement g overning American military personnel, a nd their dependents, in Sou t h Korea. W e address each arg ument in
turn.

1. Ex tradition Treaty

Patterson first arg u es that the 1 9 9 8 ex tradition treaty between the United States a n d South K o r e a prohibits his

ex tradition because his prosecution w ould be untimely

. The question is whether the treaty ’s lapse- o f-time provision, which s t a tes that ex tradition “may be denied” w hen the prosecution would have been barred b y the relevant statute o f limitations in the United States, imposes a mandatory bar to

ex tradition. W e conclude that it d oes not impose a mandatory bar.

A r ticle 6 of the ex tradition treaty between the U n i t e d States and South Korea provides, in part:

Lapse of Tim e

Ex traditi o n may b e d

enied u nder this T r eaty when the prosecution or the ex ecution o f punishment of the o ffense for whichP A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 8

ex tradition is requested would have b een barred because of the statute of limitations of the Requested State had the s a me offense been committed in the Requested State.

E x t radition Treaty
, U.S.-S. Kor., art. VI
, J une 9, 1998, T.I .A.S. No. 12,962 (“Treaty ”) (emphasis added). That is, if

a person cannot be prosecuted for a crime in the United States because t h e relevant statute of limitations has ex pired,

ex tradition to South Korea f or that crime “may b e d e n ied.” Id.

The p a

rties agr ee that Patterson has been certified for

ex tradition f

o r a c rime for which he cannot now be prosecuted in the U nited States. The mag istrate judg e certified Patterson for ex tradition only f o r s econd-deg

r ee murder, concluding that the evide n ce did not support a finding o f probable cause for premeditat e d murder. The mag istrate judg e then applied the five-y ear federal statute of limitation s for second-degr ee murder, see 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a), for the purpose of addressing the la p s e- o f-time provision of Article 6. The g overnm en t challeng es neither the f inding of probable c ause nor the application o f the federal statute of limitations. However, the g overnme n t contends tha t t h e lapse-of-time provision of Article 6 is not judicially enforceable.

W e beg in w ith the tex t of the treaty

. Medellin v

. T exas , 552 U.S. 491, 506 ( 2008) (“The interpretation of a treaty , like the interpretation of a statute, beg ins with its tex t.”). Article 6 provides, “Ex tradition may be denied .” Treaty
, a r t

. V I (emphasis added). T h e normal r e ading of “may ” is
pe rm i s sive, not mandatory

. The most natural reading o f Article 6, therefore, is that untimeliness is a discretionaryP A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 9

factor for the Secre t ar y of State to consider in deciding whether to g r ant ex tradition. Tha t i s , the Secretary “ may ” decline to ex trad i t e someone whose prosecution would be time-barred in the U nited States, but he or she is not r equired
to d o so. Under this reading
, there is n o mandatory duty that

a court may enforce. Cf. Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas
, 683 F .3d 952, 960 ( 9 th Cir. 2012) (en banc) ( Thomas, J
., concurring ) (“[ I ] t is the Secretary ’ s role, not the courts’, to determine whether ex tradition s h ould b e denied on humanitarian g rounds

. . . . ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

This reading of Article 6 is c o n sistent with o u r decision in Vo

. I n that case, Vo was a rrested in the U n ited States for bombing the Vietnamese emba s s y i n Thailand. 447 F .3d at 1238–39. W hen Thailand soug ht to ex tradite him, Vo a rg u ed
t h at the relevant treaty b arred h is ex tradition. The tre at y stated that ex tradition “ may b e denied w hen the person soug ht is being or has been proceeded ag ainst” ( i.e. , prosecu t ed ) i n the e x traditing country for a r e lated c rime. Id. at 1238 (emphasis added). We rejected Vo’s arg ument that the “may

be-denied” lang u ag e barred the judg e from certif y i n g his

ex tradition, holding that the lang u ag e meant that a proceeding for a related crime was a discretionary factor to be considered by the Secretary o f State in deciding whether to ex tradite. Id. at 1246. W e wrote that, as a g eneral matter,

[ t ] he two ty

pes of ex ception [ i.e. , mandatory and discretionary ] a re characteriz ed b y different lang uag e in ex tradition treaties. The

use of “shall” languag e in a treaty indicates a p r o v i s i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a m a n d a t o r y
ex c eption.

. . . The u s e of “ may ” lang uag e inP A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 10

a treaty indicates a provision constitutes a discretionary

ex ception.

Id. at 1246 n.13.

Patterson contends that our reading of “may b e d enied” in V o d o e s n ot apply to that same lang uag e in Article 6

. Patterson arg u es that evidence from the treaty ’s drafting a nd neg otiating history demonstrate that, d es p i te the use of the “may -be-deni e d ” lang u ag e, Article 6 was intended to be a mandatory bar to untimely ex tradition requests. Patterson further a rg ues that the mag istrate judg e erred by ig noring this evidence. W e ag r ee with Patterson that ex tra-tex tual evidence is relevant to treaty interpretation, but we disag r ee with him on the sig nificance of that evidence in this case.

W h ile “[ t] he interpretation of a treaty . . . beg ins w ith its
tex t,” Medellin
, 552 U.S. at 506, it does not end there. B ecause the purpose of treaty interpretation is t o “ give the specific words of the treaty a meaning c o n s istent w ith the shared ex pectations o f the contracting parties,” Air France v

. Saks
, 4 70 U.S. 3 9 2
, 399 (1985), courts — including our Supreme Court — look t o the ex ecutive branch’s interpretation of the issue
, t h e views of other c ontracting states, and the t r eaty ’s neg otiation a nd drafting history in order to ensure that their interpretation of the tex t is not contradicted by other evidence of intent. See Abbott v

. Abbott
, 560 U.S. 1, 15–20 (2010) (ex amining the s e f actors following its tex tual analy sis); Medellin
, 552 U.S. at 508–13 (same); see also Vo
, 447 F .3d at 1 246 n.13 (consulting a letter of submittal from the Secretary of State).

I n this c ase, the ex tra-tex tual evidence, considered as a whole, reinforces the interpretation o f Article 6 for which theP A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 11

g overnment arg ues. Patterson points to e v i dence that he contends shows that b oth the Senate and the ex ecutive b ranch understood Article 6 t o impose a mandatory bar. B ut this evidence fal l s s hort of establishing that either the Senate o r the ex ecutive branch understood the treaty in this way

.

F irst, Patterson arg u e s that the Senate Report accomp a n y i n g the treaty shows that the Senate u nderstood Article 6 to be m a n d a t o ry

. He points to the Report’s summary , which states, “The T reaty with the Republic o f Korea precludes ex tradition o f o ffenses barred by an applicable statute o f limitations.” S. Ex ec. Rep. No. 1 06-13, at 5 ( 1999) (“Rep o r t ” )

. Patterson arg ues that this lang uag e shows that t h e lapse-of-time provision of Article 6 is mandatory
, not permissive. B ut the body of the Report calls that reading into q

uestion. T h e more detailed technical analy sis of the treaty , contained in the body of the Report, describes Article 6 in permissive terms, stat i n g that

ex tradition “may be denied” and ex plain i ng that the Korean and U.S. statutes of limitations operate s o d ifferently that “this provision could be very difficult to im p l e m e nt.” Id. at 14. The technical a

naly sis points to three ex tradition treaties that h ave what it characte r i z e s as “similar p rovisions.” Id. Telling ly
, two of those treaties use the word “shall,” and o ne

uses the word “may .” Compare E x tradition Treaty
, U.S.-F r ., art. 9(1), Apr. 23, 1 9 96, S. T r eaty D oc. N o. 105-13 (“shall”), and Ex tradition Treaty
, U.S.-J apan, art. I V(3), Mar. 3, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 8 9 2 (“shall”), with Ex tradition Treaty
, U .S.-L ux ., art. 2(6), O ct

. 1, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-10 (“may”). W h en parties to a treaty intend to make an e x ception to

ex tradition mandatory
, in other words, they kno w h ow to state that it “shall” apply

.P A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 12

Second, Patterson a

rg u es that the hearings o n the treaty

s h o w that the Senate understood Article 6 to be mandator y

. He points to a

n e x chang e between Senator Ro d Gr a m s a nd J ohn Harris, the A cting Director o f the Office of I nternational Affairs at the Department of J ustice, during the Senate hearing

. B ut to the ex tent the ex chang e supports either reading of Article 6, it only w eakly supports Patterson’s contention that the Senate u n d erstood the provision to be mandatory
, and it shows fair l y c learly that the e x ecutive branch understood it to be permissive. The ex ch a n ge i s a s follows:

SENATOR GRAMS:

Article 6 of th e p roposed treaty bars extradition in cases where the l aw of the requested State would have barred the

c rime due to a statute of limitat i o n s having run out.

. . .

So t h e question is are y ou confident that this article of the tre a ty adequately insures that fug itives cann o t simply run out the clock by

fleeingto Korea?

MR. HARRI S:

Senator, this article o

f the treaty w as the subject of considerable negotiation. As
you may recall, of the tr eaties that were before the Senate l a st fall, m ost of them had slightly different language. Many o fP A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 13

our most modern ex tradition treaties f latly
state that the statute o f limitations of the requesting State will apply

.

W e have a few in which it w a s n o t possib l e to reach that r esolution. I n this
case, because of the specific provisions o f Korean law, w e did a g ree that the statute of limitations of the requested State would apply

. But

, as you have indicated, the specific language in the article is c rafted

so that those factors which toll the statute of l i m itations under the law of the requesting State would be given weight.

Report at 37 (emphasis added).

The import of the italiciz ed portion of Senator Grams’s question is not clear. Senator Grams may h a v e thoug ht that Article 6 was a mandatory b a r , as indicated in t he italiciz ed words, but he may have been speaking imprecisely

. B ut even if Senator Grams was speaking precisely
, he m a y have considered himself to have been informed to the contrary , a nd persuaded and corrected, by Mr. Harris’s answer. And even if he was speaking precisely
, a n d even if he did not chang e his view after hearing Mr. Harris’s answer, S e n at o r Grams

was not speaking for the full Senate. B y contrast, the import of Mr. Harris’s words, g iven o n b e h a l f of the e x ecutive branch, is fairly clear. He stated that Article 6 was the subject of “ considerable neg o tiation,” a nd that the “specific lang uag e in the a r t i cle is crafted” to g ive “weig ht” to a statute o f limitations determination. Id.P A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 14

Ad d itional evidence of the ex ecutive branch’s interpretation of A rticle 6 shows that the ex ecutive branch has interpreted Article 6 to g rant discretion to the g overnment to which the ex tradition request is made. The State Department’s official submitta l l e tt e r , w h i c h a c companied the treaty when President Cli n ton submitted it to the Senate, described the treaty provisions. See S. Treaty Doc. No. 106- 2, a t v (1999). I n that letter, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott ex p la i n e d t hat “Article 6 permits ex tradition to be denied” wh e n t h e prosecution would be untimely

. Id. at vii (emphasis added). The submittal letter’s use of the word “permits” rather than “requires” indicates that the e x ecutive branch believed that Article 6 w a s permissive r a ther than mandatory

.

Taken as a whole, the ex tra

- tex tual evidence reinforces the natural reading of Article 6. U nder t h a t reading
, the Secretary of State may choose, in hi s o r h e r discretion, whether to g rant or deny ex tradition in a case where the
statute of limitations in the United State s has ex pired. F ederal courts thus have no authority under A r t i c l e 6 to dictate to the Secretary o f State w h a t h e or she must do in such a case.

2. Status of F orces Ag reement

Patterson nex t arg ues that the Status o f F orces Ag reement (“SOF A”) go v e rning American military personnel and their dependents in Sou t h Korea prohibits his ex tradition. Specifica l l y , he arg ues that his ex tradition to Korea would

ex p ose him to double jeopardy in contravention o f the SOF A
, and that the SOF A confers a judicially enf o r ceable rig ht not to be ex tradited. The premise o f Patterson’s arg ument is thatP A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 15

rig hts conferred by the SOF A may be enforced by the judiciary to block ex tradition. We disag ree with this premise.

The U nited States and South K orea entered into the SOF A in 1 966 pursuant to the mutual defense treaty between the two countries. Under the ag reement, U.S. military personnel a nd their dependents in Korea a r e entitled to enume r a t e d rig hts, including
, as relevant here, the r ig ht “not [ to] be prosecuted

or punished more than once f or the same offense.” F acilities and Areas and the Status o f U n i t e d S t ates Armed F orces in Ko r e a, U.S.-S. Kor., J uly 9, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1677, 1780 (“SOF A”). The parties a g ree that the SOF A a p plies to Patterson, as he was the dependent of an American serviceman s t a tioned in South Korea at the time of the murder.

Patterson arg ues that his prosecu t i o n i n South Korea for murder would violate the SOF A provision protecting ag ainst double jeopardy

. He ar g ues that his conviction for destruction of evidence required a finding by t h e South Korean court in that proceeding that h e did not commit the murder for which ex tradition is n o w s oug ht. This is so, he

a rg ues, because the statute under which he was conv i c t e d prohibits the destruction o f evidence in connection w ith “a criminal

. . . case against another

. ” Criminal A c t, Act No. 293, Sept. 18, 1953, a

r t. 155(1)
, amended by Act No. 5057, Dec. 29, 1995 (S. Kor.) (emphas i s added). Thus, Patterson arg ues, the South Korean court was required to find in his earlier criminal trial that h e was not the person who murdered Cho.

W e need not reach the question whet h e r the SOF A forbids Patterson’s prose c u t i o n for murder in South Korea. A threshold question is whether, even if the double jeopardyP A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 16

provision o f SOF A fo r

b i ds the prosecution, we can e nforce that provision by blocking his e x tradition. W e c onclude that the answer to this question is “no.”

F or purposes of our decision, we assume that there is no categ orical prohibition ag ainst a federal statute, or a treaty o r other international ag reement to which the United States is a party , p roviding a basis f or a judicial order blocking

ex tradition. Cf. Trinidad y Garcia
, 683 F .3d at 956–57. B ut it is clear that the SOF A is not such an international ag reement. W e ag r ee with the Seventh and D.C. Circuits that

a r elat o r seeking to block ex tradition by rely ing on an international ag reement must sho w, a t a minimum, that the ag reement upon wh i ch he relies e stablishes a judicially enforceable r ig ht. See In re Burt
, 737 F .2 d 1477, 1487–88 (7th Cir. 1984); Holmes v

. Laird
, 459 F

. 2d 1211, 1 222 (D.C. Cir. 1972); cf. Edye v. Robertson ( H e ad Money Cases ), 112 U.S. 5 8 0, 598 (1884) (a treaty , t h o u gh primarily “a comp a ct between independent nations,” may c ontain “provisions which confer c e rtain r ig hts upon the citiz ens o r subjects o f one of the nations

. . . whi c h are capable o f enforcement as between private pa r t i e s in the courts o f the country ”).

Thoug h the SOF A appears to establish individual rig hts,

we conclude that they are not judicially enforceable. Confronted with a si m i l a r question reg arding the NATO status of forces ag reement, the Seventh and D.C

. Circuits looked to w hether the ag reement estab l ished judicial o r diplomatic mechanisms for a djudicating dis putes. Burt
, 737 F .2d a t 1487–88; Holmes
, 4 59 F .2d at 1222. I n B urt , the Seventh Circuit held that reco u r s e for a v iolation was “diplomatic, not judicial
, ” a n d on that basis rejected the relator’s p etition for a writ of h a b e a s corpus. 737 F .2d atP A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 17

1488. S imilarly
, in Holmes
, the D.C. Circuit h eld that because the ag reement required the parties to neg otiate d i s p u tes “relating to the interpretation o r application of th i s Ag reement,” the “enforcement mechanism” for the assertion of individual rig hts under the ag reement was “diplomatic recourse only .” 459 F .2d at 1222.

Here, a s in Burt a

nd Holmes
, the U.S.-Korea SOF A establishes d i p l o matic procedures for resolution o f matters arising under its provisions. I t provides that “[ a] J oint Committee shall be established as the means for consultation between [ the United States and South Korea] on all matters requiring mutual consultation reg a rding the i m p lementation of this Ag reement ex cept where otherwise provided.” SOF A at 1704. Amendments adopte d i n 2001 specify a procedure by which the J oint Committee’s jurisdiction is invoked: the
state parties have ten d ay s to resolve a ny complaint at the l o c a l level; the matter is then referred the J oint Committee, which has 21 day s to resolve it; if the Co m mittee cannot do
so, the matter is referred to the two g overnments. F a c ilities and Areas a

nd the Status of United States A rmed F orc es, U.S.-S. Kor., art. XXI I
, ¶¶ 5 (c), 9, J an. 18, 2001, T.I

. A .S. No. 13,138. L ike the NATO ag reement, the SOF A establishes an enforcement mechanism that is “diplomatic, n ot judicial.” Burt , 737 F .2d at 1488.

The SOF A’s provisions thus establish a dip l omatic conflict resolution scheme w it h n o r ole for the judiciary

. Even if prosecution of Patterson for murder violates the SOF A’s p rovision protecting ag ainst double jeopardy (a questi o n we do not decide), that provision does not provide a basis for a court to bar his ex tradition.P A T T E R S O N V

. W A G N E R 18

Conclusion

B e cause neither the treaty nor the SOF A p rovides a basis for a court to bar Patterson’s e x tradition, the mag istrate judg e did not err in certify

ing him f o r e x tradition to South Korea, and the district court did not err in deny ing h is petition for a writ of h abeas corpus. Our decision d o e s n ot foreclose Patterson from seeking relief from the Secretary of State. W e hold only that neither the t r e a t y nor the SOF A provides a basis for judicial relief.

AF F IRMED.