A NATION AT WAR IN AN ERA OF STRATEGIC CHANGE

Williamson Murray

Editor

September 2004
ii

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ISBN 1-58487-171-7
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword................................................................................................... v

1. Introduction

Dr. Williamson Murray..........................................................................1

2. “Knowledge Must Become Capability”: Institutional

Intellectualism as an Agent for Military Transformation

Commander Steven W. Knott, USN.....................................................21

3. Swiftly Defeat the Efforts, Then What? The “New American 

Way of War” and the Transition from Decisive Combat 

Operations to Post Confl ict Security Operations

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Nelson ......................................................43

4. Nuclear High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse--Implications 

for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Riddle..................................................69

5. Iraq, 2003-04; and Mesopotamia, 1914-18: A Comparative 

Analysis in Ends and Means

Lieutenant Colonel James D. Scudieri ..................................................95

6. Waging Peace: ECLIPSE in Postwar Germany and Iraq

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth O. McCreedy.........................................125

7.The Abrams Doctrine: Has It Been Abused in the Global 

War on Terror?

Colonel George A. Brinegar................................................................173

8. The Abrams Doctrine: Total Force Foundation or Enduring 

Fallacy?

Colonel Brian D. Jones........................................................................201

9. Secure the Victory: Is It Time for a Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Command?

Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Ashworth ................................................ 227
iv

10. Nation Building: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come?

Lieutenant Colonel Burt K. Thompson...............................................255

11. Seabasing and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver and Their 

Implications for the Joint Force Commander

Colonel Stuart L. Dickey, USMC.......................................................277

12. Is the Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) 

Embedded in the Coalition Forces Land Component Command 

(CFLCC) HQ A Model for Future Confl ict?

Lieutenant Colonel Byron H. Risner, USAF .....................................303

13. The National Security Strategy of the United States: 

Development of Grand Strategy

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Reilly ................................................321

14. The Human Dimension of Transformation

Colonel Robert E. Scurlock, Jr. ...........................................................343

About the Authors ................................................................................367
v

FOREWORD

The President, Secretary of Defense, and the Army’s Chief of 

Staff have all stated that the United States is a “Nation at War.” This 

fundamental fact is key to what we do at the U.S. Army War College. 

Because of our continued emphasis on the Global War on Terrorism, 

we face signifi cant strategic challenges as we continue to transform 

the force, improve interagency integration into joint operations, and, 

all the while, engage in active combat operations. 

This collection of outstanding essays―three of which won 

prestigious writing awards―by the students enrolled in the Army 

War College Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) highlights 

some of these strategic challenges and offers thoughtful solutions. 

The authors provide insights that undoubtedly will prove useful 

to decisionmakers at the highest levels of our national security 

establishment. Our ASAP graduates continue to make their mark 

as outstanding theater strategists in the Offi ce of the Secretary 

of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Army Staff, and in the Combatant 

Commands.

DAVID H. HUNTOON, JR.

Major General, U.S. Army

Commandant

1

CHAPTER 1

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM:

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

Dr. Williamson Murray

INTRODUCTION

It is a pleasure to once again have the opportunity to write 

an introductory essay for the collection of essays written by the 

students of the U.S. Army War College’s Advanced Strategic Arts 

Program (ASAP). This year’s students, as their essays suggest, more 

than lived up to the standards of their predecessors in the program. 

Last year, two of the essays won prizes at the U.S. Army War 

College’s Graduation. This year, three students received writing and 

research awards at the college’s graduation ceremonies. Commander 

Steven W. Knott’s essay on the importance of intellectual effort in 

transformation received the second place award in the Chairman’s 

essay contest, while Lieutenant Colonel John D. Nelson’s essay on 

the problems in transitioning from combat operations to stabilization 

operations won the AUSA’s Land Warfare Award. Finally, Lieutenant 

Colonel Thomas C. Riddle’s examination of the implications of the 

Electromagnetic Pulse Threat to Homeland Security won the Armed 

Forces Communications-Electronics Association award.

Not surprisingly, a number of this year’s essays address the 

problems of transition operations after conventional military 

victory. This is a problem that will confront the American military 

for the remainder of the 21st century. The concerns of the students 

in the Advanced Strategic Arts Program thus refl ect the realities that 

they and their fellow offi cers in Iraq already confront. There is, and 

will be, no easy route to political and strategic success in the confl icts 

that America will confront over coming decades. 

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE IRAQ WAR

There have been a number of observers within and outside 

the Services who have suggested that the American military has 
2

little to learn from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, since the Iraqi 

military, as in the Gulf War, for the most part put up such a poor 

showing. Nothing could be more dangerous in the years ahead. 

Whatever the weaknesses of the Iraqi Army, military operations 

in this war suggested a number of issues that the services and the 

joint world need to address. If these weaknesses showed up during 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, there is every reason to believe that 

more effective and adaptive enemies will be in a position to take 

advantage of American mistakes in a fashion that will have a direct 

and painful impact on the lives and well being of young soldiers, 

marines, sailors, and airmen―the life blood of this nation. 

What has been particularly encouraging about the reaction of 

the American military to this confl ict has been willingness not only 

of the Services, but the Joint world as well, to address the whole 

business of lessons learned in an honest and forthright fashion.1

The diffi culty now confronting the American military is the reality 

that no conceivable power is going to challenge its power directly. 

Instead, throughout the world military organizations and others are 

thinking about asymmetric challenges that could address American 

military power indirectly. U.S. forces are already seeing the results of 

such thinking and adaptation in the streets and along the highways 

of Iraq. Technology alone will not address the challenges of the 21st 

century, because man is an inventive and adaptive animal to the 

ever changing conditions and context of his environment.

Above all, the victory over Saddam Hussein’s forces underlined 

that the fundamental nature of war is not going to change, whatever 

the technological superiority that American forces bring to the 

battlefi eld. The technological monism that has molded so much of the 

debate about transformation and military technological revolutions 

has quite simply foundered on the realities of the battlefi elds in Iraq. 

Unfortunately, there is little evidence that those realities have had 

an impact on the technophiles, since they have so little interest in 

history, including even the history of the recent past.

In fact, the head of the Offi ce of Force Transformation has recently 

argued that the American military can discard the traditional 

approach of the inductive method of learning from experience (i.e., 

history and experience) in favor of the deductive method, where 

one can derive the future from assumptions. In other words, the 
3

Department of Defense (DoD) has supposedly reached a position 

where it can posit what the future is going to look like without 

reference to the past and thus determine what capabilities are 

transformational and which are not.2 Interestingly, such an approach 

fl ies in the face of everything that historians have uncovered about 

successful and unsuccessful transformations in the past, where 

careful analysis of military experience and past history by armies, 

navies, and air forces was crucial to keeping innovations relevant 

and effective on future battlefi elds.3

The confl ict also suggests that the American military needs to 

think in a more holistic fashion about the conduct of war at the 

operational level. Since war is a political act, the defeating of enemy 

military forces in combat operations only represents a portion 

of the far larger mosaic that must include not only the planning 

stages, but the transition stages from war to peace as well. In fact, as 

Americans are discovering in Iraq and Afghanistan, the latter may 

represent as important a component of operational art as the direct 

battlefi eld confrontations in securing the political ends for which the 

United States has waged war. And those political aims are the only 

conceivable reason that the U.S. military will engage in war.

Americans should not believe that all their opponents in future 

wars will prove as militarily inept and ineffective as did the 

Iraqis.4 And here lies perhaps the most dangerous lesson of the 

war. American intelligence provided a clear picture of numbers 

of tanks, artillery pieces, and divisions that the Iraqis possessed. 

But in the largest sense, it failed to provide what matters most: 

an understanding of the enemy as a human, dynamic polity. That 

failure, of course, was not confi ned alone to America’s intelligence 

agencies. The general framework of planning and preparation for 

the war refl ected a general ahistoricism and lack of knowledge of 

the cultural and historical framework within which Iraqi society and 

Saddam’s tyranny were coexisting. Not surprisingly, that failure 

had a devastating impact on the implementation of the transition 

from war to stabilization in an explosive and dynamic situation that 

came with the collapse of the Ba’ath regime. 

This introductory chapter then aims to suggest some of the wider 

and more complex lessons of recent military operations. And those 

lessons form the only reasonable framework for thinking about what 
4

kinds of military forces the United States will need for both the short 

term and the long term. There is no easy road for America’s military 

to the future. Yet the signposts are there from the conduct and the 

fallout of the Iraq War. Americans can delineate those lessons now 

and adapt their thinking to what the past suggests. Or, they can wait 

and relearn those lessons in the future, but then only at the cost of 

the lives of young Americans.

LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFRONT: 

THE ANCIENT VERITIES MATTERS

Much of what the military operations against Iraq suggest, one 

can argue, simply boils down to a reaffi rmation of the old verities. 

The “western way of war” fi rst began to emerge with the Greeks, 

came to full fl ower under the Romans, and then was rediscovered 

by the Europeans at the beginning of the 17th century.5 Through 

the centuries it has relied on three basic pillars: discipline, training, 

and cohesion.6 The fi rst has provided the glue that makes tough, 

realistic preparation possible, while discipline and training have 

provided the glue that has not only kept soldiers and marines under 

the trauma of battle, but enabled them to fi ght as a part of a coherent 

and effective killing machine. 

The historian of the Roman-Jewish War of the fi rst century AD, 

Flavius Josephus, depicted the interplay of those factors with an 

economy of words that would do justice to the military forces of 21st 

century America:7

And, indeed, if anyone does but attend to the other parts of their military 

discipline, he will be forced to confess, that their obtaining so large a 

dominion hath been the acquisition of their valour, and not the bare gift 

of fortune: for they do not begin to use their weapons fi rst in time of war, 

nor do they put their hands in motion, having been idle in times of peace; 

but as if their weapons were part of themselves, they never have any 

truce with warlike exercises; nor do they stay [their hands] till times of 

war admonish them to use them; for their military exercises by no means 

fall short of the tension of real warfare, but every soldier is every day 

exercised, and that with real diligence, as if it were in time of war, which 

is the reason they bear the fatigue of battles so easily; . . . nor would he be 

mistaken that would call those their exercises unbloody battles, and their 

battles bloody exercises.8
5

For all the enabling advantages that modern technology 

provided U.S. forces, the real superiority that U.S. soldiers and 

marines brought to combat in the Mesopotamian Valley in March 

and April 2003 had to do with their discipline and training regimen. 

One can see that discipline etched in the thousands of photographs 

of soldiers and marines engaged in combat, and yet unless fi ring 

their weapons, every one with his index fi nger on the trigger guard, 

not on the trigger.9 Indeed one might not be going too far in claiming 

that had the equipment of the two forces been reversed, and the 

Iraqis possessed the technologically superior equipment, the results 

would still have been the same: an Iraqi defeat―although admittedly 

at considerably higher cost to American forces. 

The fi rst steps in the recovery of American military forces after 

the catastrophe of the Vietnam war came not with new technology, 

but with the restoration of military discipline in the barracks in the 

1970s.10 Only when America’s military forces again refl ected the 

norms of discipline could the revolution in training begin. Here the 

technologies that supported the creation of realistic training ranges 

at the National Training Center and on the ranges of Nevada and 

southern California allowed for the creation of training regimens 

that slowly but surely turned the U.S. military into the deadly 

tactical forces that have devastated America’s opponents in the wars 

since the ending of the Cold War. 

LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: 

CLAUSEWITZ IS ALIVE AND WELL

One of the sadder aspects of recent military literature has been the 

minimization of Clausewitz’s understanding to the understanding 

of war in the modern world not only by military pundits, but by 

military historians as well.11 The anti-Clausewitzian tide in the 

American military reached fever pitch in the 1990s, with claims 

about the supposed ability of future technologies that would soon be 

available to the American military to see everything and understand 

everything in the battlespace. The foremost exponent of such views 

was and remains Admiral Bill Owens, former Vice-chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).12
6

Unfortunately for such views the Iraq War suggests that the 

removal of Clausewitzian concepts such as friction and the fog of 

war―in other words that uncertainty and ambiguity will always 

dominate the battlespace―is simply never going to happen in the 

real world. In fact, everything that modern science is telling us about 

the nature of the universe has suggested that such views are simply 

incompatible with reality.13 Virtually everything in the planning and 

preparation, the conduct, and the results of the Iraq War underline 

that Clausewitz’s understanding of the fundamental nature of war is 

much closer to reality than the technological dreams produced in the 

last decade, a century and three-quarters after his death.14

The American military brought the 21st century’s technology to 

the battlefi eld. But they were never able to escape the reality not only 

that their enemies were attempting to kill them, but that the physical 

debilities that accompany intense experiences affected everything 

that they attempted to do. Danger, fear, and anger all molded the 

views of those involved in combat―factors that the realities of 

extreme physical exertion and fatigue only served to exacerbate. As 

Clausewitz suggests:

In the dreadful presence of suffering and danger, emotion can often 

overwhelm intellectual conviction, and in this psychological fog it is . . . 

hard to form clear and complete insights . . . It is the exceptional man who 

keeps his power of quick decision intact.15

Extreme physical exertion and fatigue accompanied the dangers 

of war. There is a recurring theme in the accounts of soldiers and 

marines: the bone-deep weariness of day-after-day tension during 

the movement to contact. Fatigue and fear, along with sleep 

deprivation, hunger, fi lth, the brutal climate, an alien landscape, 

and the terrifying sight of the dead and wounded led to mistakes, 

miscalculations, and accidents. Technology could alleviate some of 

the suffering of the wounded, but it could do little to mitigate the 

dismal conditions under which those living on the sharp end must 

inevitably live.

For those at the higher levels of decisionmaking, the technology 

of the information age brought in its wake a fi re hose that spewed 

forth data in almost infi nitive amounts. However, those technologies 
7

brought in their wake precious little knowledge. In some case 

technology helped to remove old frictions, such as the diffi culties 

commanders often have in communicating with their subordinates, 

their superiors, or their colleagues. But at the same time, by 

providing so much information, technology may have introduced 

even more uncertainty into the equation. Information did not, as was 

the case in previous wars, translate into useable knowledge either 

easily or smoothly. Those in command of coalition forces had to 

make decisions of life and death under this unprecedented barrage 

of information that was often ambiguous, uncertain, contradictory, 

or even wrong.16

Moreover, senior commanders found themselves bombarded 

by demands from Washington at hours that were entirely outside 

their own body rhythms. At best, information technologies allowed 

commanders to make decisions more quickly, but still in an uncertain 

and ambiguous universe. There was a real reason why Lieutenant 

Commander of V Corps General William Wallace and Major 

General Jim Mattis spent most of their time in forward headquarters 

where they could gain a direct sense of what was happening on the 

battlefi eld. Ikons simply do not represent reality―especially in terms 

of a human endeavor like combat, where psychological factors are, 

in many cases, the most important. 

Like the best generals in World War II, Wallace and Mattis felt that 

intuition, gained by being immediately in touch with the battlefi eld, 

was crucial. The worst contribution that technology could make to 

the U.S. military would be to recreate the chateau generalship of the 

First World War, where military leadership remained out of touch 

with the realities of the battlefi eld, happily ensconced in the belief 

that technology could provide both safety and knowledge to those 

in command. 

LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: 

THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM

The Iraq War underlined some signifi cant weaknesses in the 

whole framework of American intelligence. This is not to say that 

the United States does not possess some extraordinary intelligence 

capabilities, or that in some areas intelligence did not contribute 
8

signifi cantly to the triumph of American arms. Situational awareness 

of where Iraqi units were and what there strength was remained at 

a high level throughout most of the campaign. As one battalion 

commander commented after the war, he could not have been 

better informed about the disposition and capabilities of the units 

immediately to his front.17

However, knowledge of physical realities such as the number of 

tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces that the enemy 

possesses does not equate to perfect knowledge, because it does not 

tell combat commanders much about the human dimensions of 

the units that their opponents have put in the fi eld. How will they 

fi ght? What is their morale? What is their tactical effectiveness and 

what is the competence of their leaders? How does the enemy view 

the coming war? How well does he know and understand how 

U.S. forces will fi ght? The battalion commander, quoted above, 

also commented that, while his understanding of the placement 

of enemy equipment was outstanding, he possessed virtually no 

understanding of the cultural and ideological framework within 

which his Iraqi opponents would fi ght. Thus, when he reached 

Baghdad, his unit still possessed nearly all the anti-tank rounds 

that he had begun the campaign with, but that he was in condition 

“black” with regards to anti-personnel ammunition―a condition 

which no one in the division had expected at the beginning of the 

campaign.18

In the end, it is not the number of tanks, or armored personnel 

carriers, or soldiers that matter; it is the soul of a military 

organizations―the morale, training, and cohesion that they bring to 

the fi ght―that matter in determining the outcome of war.19 And little 

of that is calculable before and often during war. In Tolstoy’s great 

novel about the French invasion of Russia in 1812, War and Peace, the 

nobleman Pierre comments to Prince Andrei that war is like a game 

of chess. To which the Prince answers in the affi rmative:

[B]ut with the slight difference that in chess you can think over each 

move as long as you please, unrestricted by conditions of time and 

with the further difference that the knight is always stronger than 

a pawn, and two pawns always stronger than one, while in war a 

battalion is sometimes stronger than a division, and sometimes weaker 

than a company. No one can ever be certain of the relative strength of 
9

armies. . . . Success [in war] never has and never will depend on position 

or equipment, or even on numbers . . .20

It is in the area of cultural understanding that considerable 

failures in intelligence occurred.21 The intelligence agencies of the 

United States did not understand the culture and framework within 

which not only the Iraqi opponent, but the Iraqi people would 

operate. This was true at the strategic and political levels as well as 

at the operational and tactical levels. And that fl awed understanding 

played a major role in the huge problems―many of them self 

infl icted―that the Coalition confronted in the transition phase after 

major combat operations had ended. 

History, culture, and language still matter in intelligence. 

The United States confronts a wholly new strategic and political 

environment since the ending of the Cold War. That said, neither 

its intelligence agencies nor its military organizations have adapted 

to that reality. In the end, intelligence is not just about counting 

things, but understanding living, adaptive opponents. And in the 

future, the United States will inevitably confront opponents who are 

smarter and more adaptive than Saddam’s thuggery proved to be. 

LESSONS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD: OPERATIONAL ART

In addition to the traditional human capabilities that played such 

a key role in the American victory, there was an additional factor: 

a system of professional military education that produced senior 

offi cers deeply knowledgeable in their profession at the operational 

level of war. The second war against Iraq was by far and away more 

successful than the fi rst in terms of the operational performance of 

American military forces. The fi rst war saw an enormous buildup 

of air, ground, and naval forces. It began with a stunning blow 

that entirely deconstructed Iraq’s air defense system in a matter of 

hours.22

But that success was followed by an interminable air campaign 

that lasted for over a month before the ground campaign began on 

February 24. While the advance of V Corps and XVIII Airborne 

Corps in the west were supposed to be coordinated with the Marine 

advance toward Kuwait City, there was, in fact, no ground component 
10

commander. Thus, there was no coordination between soldiers and 

marines. Thus, one can hardly speak of a truly joint effort outside 

of the air campaign under Air Component Commander Lieutenant 

General Chuck Horner and his planners in the “Black Hole.”

The ground campaign took few risks; III Corps’ advance against 

a badly beaten and retreating foe proceeded at a snail’s pace, 

stopping on the initial night after advancing for a few hours. The 

result was that the great left hook, which was supposed to slam 

shut on Saddam’s Republican Guard divisions, failed to close fast 

enough. The Republican Guard divisions escaped through Basra 

and then played a crucial role in putting down the rebellions that 

broke out through Iraq, particularly in the Shi’ite and Kurdish areas, 

and in 1994 almost re-invaded Kuwait at Saddam’s instigation. 

On the tactical level, American soldiers and marines performed in 

exemplary fashion, which the action at 73 Easting exemplifi ed.23

Nevertheless, the campaign at the operational level was less than a 

singular success, while relations among the generals appear to have 

been less than impressive.24 As for air-ground jointness, that factor 

never really received a fair test because the ground campaign was 

so short, while severe weather conditions prevented air attacks for 

much of the period.

The performance of soldiers and marines during Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM was as impressive on the tactical level as it had 

been during the fi rst confl ict against Iraq. What was signifi cantly 

more impressive about this war was the performance of U.S. forces, 

both in the joint arena and in the conduct of the operational level of 

war. It is impossible to separate out the direct contribution made 

by air and ground forces to the destruction of Iraq’s Army and 

Republican Guard formations from the overall wreckage of defeat 

which underlines the full triumph of jointness. Commander of the 

101st Airborne Division Major General David Petraeus commented 

that throughout the war he never knew what service, including his 

own, was providing the fi re power that decimated the Iraqi enemy.25

Equally signifi cant in terms of jointness and combined operations 

was that there was an overall ground component commander in the 

second war against the Iraqis. Lieutenant General David McKiernan 

was the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander, with Major 

General “Rusty” Blackman, USMC, as his chief of staff. Directly 
11

under McKiernan was V Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General 

William Wallace, and I MEF, commanded by Lieutenant General 

James Conway. In addition to its marines, I MEF had under its 

command the British 1st Armoured Division, which itself was 

formed from units of the British Army and Royal Marines. 

Moreover, during the initial days of the campaign, the British 

division had under its control the U.S. Marine Corps’ 15th Marine 

Expeditionary Unit.26 What is so impressive about the conduct of 

operations by the Coalition Land Forces Component Commander 

was the smoothness with which the individual pieces cooperated in 

a rapid and devastating articulation of force to achieve the overall 

effects, which led to the fall of Saddam’s tyranny in less than 3 

weeks. That performance refl ected the educational and intellectual 

framework that has taken hold in the American military over the 

past 2 1/2 decades. 

Thus, it was the conduct of the campaign that suggests a true 

masterpiece in joint, combined operational art. Tactical profi ciency, 

technology, and jointness were clearly all signifi cant enablers to the 

victory, but the articulation of the main drives of the 3rd Infantry 

Division and the 1st Marine Division represented a far more daring 

and effective utilization of operational art than was the case in the 

fi rst war against Iraq. One British offi cer in the Coalition Forces Land 

Component Commander headquarters commented that watching 

the 1st Marine Division’s use of its three regimental combat teams 

to slice through the Mesopotomian Valley, entrap signifi cant Iraqi 

forces, and then drive up to the east of Baghdad was “a thing of 

beauty.”27 The performance of the 3rd Infantry Division was equally 

impressive in its dash up the western bank of the Euphrates and then 

through the Karbala Gap, with its drive straight at Baghdad’s airport 

and then the city itself. The result was the complete destruction of 

Iraq’s military forces in less than 3 weeks, all accomplished with 

minimal U.S. casualties. 

In retrospect, the performance of American military forces lived 

up to the expectations of the military thinkers of the 1980s, who fi rst 

argued for the study of operational art as the fundamental heart 

of the military profession. That thinking led to the two greatest 

doctrinal manuals that the American military has ever produced: 

the U.S. Army’s 1986 edition of Field Manual 100-5 and the Marine 
12

Corps Fleet Marine Field Manual 1, Warfi ghting.28 The extent of 

that intellectual contribution is suggested by a comparison of their 

intellectual content and vigor with what passes for doctrine today. 

In fact, the diminution of intellectual vigor in the doctrinal manuals 

refl ects an unfortunate decline within the services of serious debate 

and study of the military profession. Undoubtedly, part of the 

problem has been the increasing operations tempo that has made 

the services increasingly unwilling to devote their human capital 

to the intellectual preparation of future warfi ghters. That decline 

has also been refl ected in professional military education, where 

the senior leaders of the American military, themselves the product 

of professional military education, are exhibiting less interest in 

the education of the next generation than was the case of their 

predecessors over the past 2 decades. 

Thus, for all the impressive nature of the campaign’s conduct at 

the operational level, there were problems with how the American 

military is, at present, thinking about and preparing for operational 

art in future campaigns. As one perceptive commentator noted in 

the late 1990s: “That too little of this debate and discussion still goes 

on is, perhaps, indicative of the need to continue pressing for further 

development of the operational art concept in an armed forces 

once more caught up in a perceived technology-based revolution 

in military affairs.”29 Serious intellectual debate within and outside 

DoD has almost entirely dried up, to be replaced by power point 

briefi ngs that are remarkable for their lack of content.

The success at the operational level in the Iraq War rested to a 

great extent on the intellectual preparation and education of today’s 

senior leaders that took place throughout the 1980s. In other words, 

the intellectual climate of that time formed the thought processes of 

those who led the Coalition to victory in the Iraq War of 2003. The 

question, then, remains: What intellectual framework is forming the 

mental horizons of the majors who will be leading America’s military 

forces in 15 years? One senior retired four-star Army general has 

suggested to this author that the state of professional education is as 

bad as it was in the mid-1970s, when he and a number of other senior 

army generals attempted to improve the position of education in the 

Army. 
13

What capital the American military is willing to devote to 

preparing the horizons of its offi cers to deal with an increasingly 

complex world will exercise an enormous infl uence on the nation’s 

military effectiveness in the coming decades of the 21st century. It is 

a situation analogous to the television commercials for frequent oil 

changes in which the car dealer comments: “You can pay me now, 

or you can pay me later.” And the great diffi culty is that the results 

of penny-wise, pound-foolish educational policies will not be clear 

until well after those who are responsible for such an approach have 

passed from the scene.

TRANSITION OPERATIONS: TOWARD 

A WIDER UNDERSTANDING OF OPERATIONAL ART

The interest in operational art in the late 1970s and early 1980s lay 

in a growing realization among military thinkers and analysts that 

there was an area of war that the study of war at the tactical level 

or at the strategic level simply failed to address. Both the German 

and Soviet military had been addressing that gap by studying what 

they called “the operational level of war,” which helped to push 

the American military toward a new paradigm for understanding 

war.30 Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, the understanding of 

operational art as it evolved in the American military over the course 

of the last 2 decades of the 20th century has remained almost entirely 

focused on combat operations. 

Admittedly, the American understanding as it has evolved is far 

broader in scope than was the case with Germans. The Wehrmacht’s 

generals, for cultural reasons, left logistics as well as intelligence 

out of their understanding of operational art.31 The Americans, on 

the other hand, have had to address logistics and intelligence as the 

fi rst step in projecting military power abroad.32 And the services 

have confronted over the past decade―especially in the run up to 

Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM―the fact 

that the United States increasingly depends on projecting its military 

power from North America as its military forces return from bases 

abroad.

Nevertheless, for all the skill U.S. military forces have displayed 

in conducting tactical and military operations over the course of the 
14

period since the ending of the Cold War―including Operation JUST 

CAUSE―the period that has followed the ending of major hostilities 

has been less than satisfactory. Yet, the only reason that states are 

supposed to fi ght wars―at least according to Clausewitz―is to 

achieve a satisfactory political outcome. 

No one starts a war―or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so―

without fi rst being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that 

war, and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; 

the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which 

will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is 

required, and make its infl uence felt throughout down to the smallest 

operational detail.33

Looking at the experiences of the past 2 centuries, Clausewitz would 

certainly include the period after major military operations have 

concluded as being essential to the achievement of the political 

objective. This was certainly the case in the period after April 15. 

Others are already apportioning the blame, but that is not the issue 

here. What is crucial is what the American military services learn 

from the post-confl ict diffi culties of the past decade.34 Operational 

planning and execution must include serious attention to the postconfl ict phase, as well as the political goals for which the United 

States is engaging in military operations. There is considerable 

interest at present in the conduct of “effects-based operations.” If 

such an approach is to mean anything, effects-based operations 

must take into account the political ends above all. Within such a 

framework, the bombing of the Iraqi ministries during the initial 

“shock and awe” portion of the war against Saddam’s regime made 

no sense at all. In fact, in terms of the fi nal political goal of bringing a 

more equitable government to Iraq, the destruction of the ministries 

and their records inevitably damaged the future running of the 

country as well as the potential to bring Saddam’s thugs to justice. 

Thus, the American military must never think of operational 

art as the purely military portion of a campaign. Operational art 

must involve a holistic approach in which planning, major military 

operations, and the inevitable clean up and restoration of government 

all are considered together. In the world of the 21st century, transition 

or post-confl ict operations may be more important than the conduct 
15

of major military operations in the achievement of the political goals 

for which the United States will fi ght its wars.

CONCLUSION

The Iraq War may well represent a milestone in the projection 

of American military power to achieve national goals. It is unlikely, 

given the results, that any nation will directly take on the American 

military in the fashion that Saddam’s Iraq was willing to do. But 

already the enemies of the United States are looking for other 

alternatives: low intensity confl ict, weapons of mass destruction, 

cruise missiles and mines, new technologies, dispersed operations 

with highly disciplined forces, and extensive use of special forces 

and/or terrorists. Nor is it likely that future opponents of the U.S. 

military will be as badly trained, prepared, and led as were the Iraqis. 

Above all, the American military must think in terms of fi ghting the 

next war as an enterprise where the political goals receive the fullest 

of attention. No deus ex machina of the United Nations or reformed 

interagency processes will save military organizations which have 

failed to plan for the reconstitution of politics after the noise of battle 

has ceased. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. That was certainly not the case in the aftermath of the Gulf War. The Joint 

world managed to produce a superfi cial report to Congress that the Services 

largely provided. The Army and Marine Corps largely produced lessons-learned 

reports that focused on tactics, techniques, and procedures or hagiographical 

accounts. The only service to produce a careful examination of the Gulf War was 

the Air Force with its Gulf War Air Power Survey, Eliot Cohen, ed., Washington, 

DC, 1993. However, that report existed only because of the support and interest of 

Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice and with considerable opposition from the 

institutional Air Force. And with the change over to the Clinton administration, 

the institutional Air Force entirely buried the survey.

2. Statement of Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director, Offi ce of Force Transformation, 

Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, before the subcommittee on Terrorism, 

Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, House Armed Services Committee, 

February 26, 2004. 

3. For military transformations, see, among others, MacGregor Knox 

and Williamson Murray, eds., The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, 
16

Cambridge, 2000; Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, Military Innovation in 

the Interwar Period, Cambridge, 1996; James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Hans 

von Seeckt and German Military Reform, Lawrence, KS, 1992; Robert Doughty, Seeds 

of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939, Hamden, CT, 1985; 

David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, Innovation and the U.S. Army, 

1917-1945, Ithaca, 1998; Harold R. Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John 

Stuart-Burnett and British Armor Doctrine, 1927-1938, Lawrence, KS, 1988; and J. P. 

Harris, Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-

1939, Manchester, 1995. 

4. For the reasons lying behind the extraordinary ineptitude of Iraq’s military 

institutions, see Williamson Murray and Robert Scales, Jr., The Iraq War, A Military 

History, Cambridge, MA, 2003, chpt. 1.

5. For a discussion of the importance of the Greek model of war, see Victor 

Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War, Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, Oxford, 

1989. One of the more important points inherent in Hanson’s book is the inherent 

superiority of the cultural discipline of Greek hoplites over their barbarian 

opponents, where each soldier fought as an individual. This was even more the 

case of the Romans where consistent, ruthless discipline produced legionaires 

who fought as a part of the legion, not as individuals.

6. For the role that these factors played in the fi rst military revolution in 

the West and the creation of military forces that were simply unbeatable by any 

other civilization, see MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, The Dynamics of 

Military Revolution, 1300-2050, Cambridge, 2000, chpt. 1.

7. And Josephus would have reason to understand the strength and ferocious 

effectiveness of the Roman military system, since he commanded the Jewish forces 

in Galilee against them.

8. Flavius Josephus, The Great Roman-Jewish War: A.D. 66-70, William Whiston, 

trans., and William R. Farmer, ed., New York, 1960, p. 121. What makes the Roman 

example so intriguing is that only 30 legions, each of approximately 5,000 men, 

were suffi cient to defend the entire Mediterranean basin from the barbarian forces 

which ranged across the empires frontiers.

9. The same goes for British soldiers and marines. I am indebted to Colonel 

Richard Hart Sinnreich, U.S. Army retired, for this point.

10. A number of offi cers in both the Army and the Marine Corps have 

emphasized to me that they and their NCOs had to go armed into the barracks, so 

bad was the discipline and the culture of disobedience. It took much of the 1970s 

to restore order.

11. For a particularly egregious example by one of the world’s foremost 

historian, see John Keegan, A History of Warfare, New York, 1993.

12. For Owens’ views, see Admiral Bill Owens with Ed Offl ey, Lifting the Fog 

of War, New York, 2000.
17

13. For the scientifi c reasons that make such claims of future technological 

capabilities wrong-headed and dangerous, see Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian 

Friction and Future War Friction and Future War, Washington, DC, 1996. For a study that connects , Washington, DC, 1996. For a study that connects 

Clausewitz’s theory of friction with modern concepts of nonlinearity which are 

increasingly infl uencing how scientists view the world, see Alan Beyerchen, 

“Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security, 

Winter 1992/1993.

14. Similarly, the greatest historian of war, Athenian general Thucydides, 

commented in his history of the Peloponnesian War: “These . . . events which 

happened in the past . . . (human nature being what it is) will at sometime or other 

and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future.” Thucydides, History of the 

Peloponnesian War, Rex Warner, trans., London, 1954.

15. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and , Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and 

trans., Princeton, NY, 1996, pp. 108, 113.

16. The CNN special, fi lmed over several hours at Lieutenant General 

McKiernan’s headquarters while the war was on going and shown this last 

summer, underlined for this observer, at least, that, while the senior offi cers in the 

headquarters of the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander had immense 

amounts of reports, data, and other bits of information at their disposal, actually 

deciding what it all meant was still as diffi cult as in the past.

17. Conversation between Major General Robert Scales, Jr., U.S. Army Retired, 

and one of the battalion commanders from the 3rd Infantry Division.

18. Ibid. 

19. In the summer of 1940, the Italian fl eet outnumbered and possessed 

considerably newer ships than its opponent in the Royal Navy. Yet from the 

fi rst battles off Sicily and Calabria in July, the Royal Navy fl eet in the Eastern 

Mediterranean under Admiral Andrew Cunningham established a tactical and 

operational dominance over the Italians that lasted for the rest of the war. For a 

discussion of why this was so, see MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-

1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War, Cambridge, 1982.

20. Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, Anne Dunnigan, trans., New York, 1969, pp. 

929-930.

21. One senior army general told this author in mid-April 2003 that the most 

surprising aspect of the campaign against Iraq had been the degree of control that 

the Ba’ath party had been able to exercise over the Iraqi population right up until 

the regime’s fi nal collapse.

22. For a discussion of how this was done, see Williamson Murray, Operations, 

Report 1, Vol. 2, The Gulf War Air Power Survey, Eliot Cohen, ed., Washington, DC, 

1993.

23. In this action, a troop of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment under the command of 

Captain H. R. McMaster destroyed a brigade plus of Iraqi armor in less than half 
18

an hour with no casualties to itself. For a description of this action, see Murray and 

Scales, The Iraq War, preface.

24. For a critical look at the campaign, see Michael Gordon and Bernard 

Trainor, The Generals’ War, New York, 1996.

25. Comment by Major General David Petraeus made to Major General Robert 

Scales, Jr., immediately after the end of the war.

26. For a delineation of the Coalition military forces and their organization for 

the campaign, see Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, chpt 1.

27. Interview conducted by the author with a British offi cer at Upavon, 

Director General of Doctrine and Development, June 2003.

28. The increasing interest in rethinking the understanding of the American 

military about the nature of war was undoubtedly sparked by the appearance of a 

more sophisticated and clear translation of Clausewitz’s classic study of the nature 

of war in the mid 1970s. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Howard and Paret.

29. B. J. C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, The Operational Art, 

Developments in Theories of War, Westport, CT, 1996, p. 166.

30. To a certain extent, this gap in American understanding was crossed by 

referring to the operational level of war as the realm of grand tactics. But that 

terminology was confusing itself as to what the separation might be between 

tactics and grand tactics. 

31. The reason for this had to do with Germany’s placement in the center of 

Europe, where the Germans did not have to get to the war. Thus, logistics were 

much less important than has been the case with the American military, which 

has always had to get to the war as the fi rst step. Moreover, Germany obviously 

has had a direct interchange with its neighbors, making intelligence at least at the 

beginning of a confl ict far less important. In World war II, that almost exclusive 

focus on the combat portion of operational art worked very well until the Germans 

discovered themselves engaged in a world war that ran from the depths of the 

North Atlantic to the depths of European Russia, and from the North Cape to the 

shores of North Africa. Then logistics and intelligence did matter, and the Germans 

failed miserably at both. 

32. And this was true even in the Civil War, when the Federal military forces 

were not in a position to bring about the defeat of the Confederacy until they were 

able to project military power into the South’s heartland in 1863, 1864, and 1865. 

Only then were they able to break the will of the Southern people to continue the 

struggle―a factor that Union commanders consistently underestimated until well 

into 1862.

33. Clausewitz, p. 579.

34. And one should not believe that this is a new issue. The post-confl ict 

phases in dealing with Germany and Japan after the Second World War succeeded 

because those operations had received extensive attention and planning effort 
19

while military operations were going on. Moreover, planners dealing with the 

postwar period also drew extensively from the failures of post-confl ict operations 

after World War I, as well as the extensive lessons-learned analyses they were able 

to do with the occupation of Italy which began with the seizure of Sicily in July 

1943.

21

CHAPTER 2

“KNOWLEDGE MUST BECOME CAPABILITY”:

INSTITUTIONAL INTELLECTUALISM AS AN AGENT

FOR MILITARY TRANSFORMATION

Commander Steven W. Knott

While academics and military professionals have debated the 

value of intellectual pursuits to the profession of arms in recent 

years, that dialogue to date has failed to address the salient issue: 

the concept of institutional intellectualism and its catalytic role as 

an agent for transformation. Leading advocates of the military as 

an intellectual profession have attempted―with varying success―to 

convince their community that there exists an historic bias against 

intellectuals (thinkers) in favor of individuals of action (doers). The 

commonly held opinion that intellectuals provide little of practical 

value and fail to function effectively as combat leaders serves as 

the origin of that bias.1 These proponents further argue that despite 

examples to the contrary―including Joshua L. Chamberlain and 

George S. Patton―such individuals succeed “in spite of and not 

because of offi cial encouragement,” their intellectual talent largely 

ignored and veiled in the shadow of their battlefi eld achievements.2

The opinion of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who disdainfully 

characterized an intellectual as one “who takes more words than are 

necessary to tell more than he knows,” best represents the traditional 

military view of intellectualism.3 This typical and pervasive bias has 

compelled current advocates of military intellectualism to caution 

the uniformed services against rejecting or marginalizing individual 

thinkers, thereby depriving themselves of “precious intellectual 

capital” and the innovative capacity required to adapt successfully 

to the evolutionary character of war.4 One cannot dispute the merit of 

this conclusion; the warning is germane. Nevertheless, the prevailing 

debate over whether intellectual bias exists or not remains largely 

superfi cial and serves only to obscure the far more important issue 

of institutional intellectualism.

It is irrelevant that Joshua Chamberlain and George Patton were 

gifted intellectuals; as military professionals, their intellect had 
22

no infl uence on doctrine or in catalyzing change, transformation, 

or a revolution in military affairs (RMA). While it is possible for 

exceptional combat leaders like Chamberlain and Patton to employ 

their intellect in solving battlefi eld challenges, this is far different 

from the individual who uses his intellect to drive institutional 

change that results in transformation throughout the organization as 

a whole. And herein resides the salient point: only institutionalized 

military intellectualism can achieve successful transformation or, 

on rare occasion, revolutionize warfare; conversely, individual 

intellectualism that remains outside of an institutional context is 

largely impotent. 

One can best defi ne institutional intellectualism as systemsponsored critical thinking that focuses intellectual capital to 

effect transformational change and continual renewal within an 

organization. First, and of paramount signifi cance, it operates within 

and as a function of the military system; this means that institutional 

intellectualism resides (formally or informally) within the 

organization’s offi cial structure, and that it is capable of infl uencing 

mainstream thought and processes. Yet thinkers working within the 

system will always encounter opposition to change from entrenched 

traditional elements. This phenomenon offers an interesting paradox: 

the nature of the military system ideally produces and empowers 

the traditionalists, while simultaneously affording legitimacy and 

sanctuary to the intellectual progressives―in turn preventing their 

marginalization. Second, institutional intellectualism can only 

exist―and succeed―in an organizational climate that promotes 

free-thinking and a critical exchange of ideas. Not only is such an 

environment a prerequisite for creating institutional intellectualism, 

but it is indispensable for catalyzing change within a system and 

for overcoming inevitable resistance from ensconced traditionalists. 

Third, institutional intellectualism achieves a synergistic effect that 

focuses intellectual energy in a highly disciplined, organized, and 

coordinated fashion. As a result, collective ideas are transformed 

more effectively into reality―and resulting military capability. 

Moreover, individual efforts working within an institutional 

context contribute to this intellectual synergy rather than remaining 

disconnected from the process. Lastly, institutional intellectualism 

is not military orthodoxy. In order for focused intellectual energy 
23

to push the envelope of convention, it must remain dynamic and 

be infused periodically with fresh perspective. This is best achieved 

by ensuring the system embraces new intellectual capital, while 

simultaneously replacing those veteran thinkers whose former 

ideas or theories now constitute established operating doctrine―or 

orthodoxy. 

Man is a problem-solver. By nature, he applies intellectual energy 

to overcome current―and anticipated―challenges. The complex, 

fl uid environment of war demands the institutionalization of this 

intellectual energy to affect the necessary organizational and doctrinal 

changes required to infl uence the nature and alter the character of 

armed combat. Simply illustrated, institutional intellectualism gives 

birth to theory and corresponding organizational-doctrinal change. 

New systems and doctrine in turn act as the primary determinates 

for successful transformation, and transformation historically will 

constitute one of two forms: it will be in response to an RMA, or it will 

prove the catalyst for such a revolution itself. Moreover, in contrast 

to prevailing military beliefs, transformation remains primarily the 

product of intellectual energy, and is rarely borne of technology.5

Technology is a powerful military tool, but it traditionally remains 

ineffective until wedded to a doctrinal system on the battlefi eld. 

The English longbow6 and the tank, for example, failed to catalyze 

transformational change in the military art simply as a result of 

their invention; rather it required the innovative and systematic 

application of these weapons to realize their full potential.7

Two historic case studies will serve to illuminate more clearly 

the role of institutional intellectualism in producing successful 

transformation. The fi rst provides an example of a specially 

constituted team of intellectuals responsible for transforming an 

entire military organization in response to an adversary’s military 

revolution: the Prussian reforms following catastrophic defeat 

by Napoleon at Jena-Auerstädt in 1806. The second example 

demonstrates how individual intellectuals collectively can propel 

transformation within an institutional context―and in this case 

also initiate an RMA: the creation of the German armor force 

(Panzerwaffe) during the inter-war period. Prusso-German examples 

especially are relevant, given the traditional success that nation’s 
24

military has enjoyed in fostering a culture embracing intellectualism 

(thinkers) and tactical-operational excellence (doers) within the same 

institutional framework.8 Moreover, as military transformation can 

infl uence only tactical-operational events and remains divorced from 

the realm of strategy,9 the Germans again provide a valid example as 

their land forces historically (in the wake of Prussian reforms) have 

maintained an exceptional level of professional skill, ingenuity, and 

combat effectiveness at the tactical and operational levels of war.

THE PRUSSIAN MILITARY REORGANIZATION 

COMMISSION

Following the destruction of the Prussian Army at Jena-Auerstädt 

in 1806, Carl von Clausewitz sardonically observed that “it was not 

just a case of a style [of warfare] that had outlived its usefulness, but 

the most extreme poverty of imagination to which routine has ever 

led.”10 Indeed, the Prussian Army had arrived on the fi eld woefully 

ill-prepared for battle against Napoleon. Yet few in the ranks or 

among the senior leaders realized that the character of war had 

changed fundamentally until they were overwhelmed so swiftly and 

decisively by Napoleon’s Grand Army. Despite a self-confi dence 

securely rooted in the military achievements of Frederick the Great, 

the Prussian Army of 1806 was fl awed institutionally. The offi cers, 

more concerned with status and social affairs than professional 

matters, were of inconsistent talent and inadequately schooled. A 

considerable percentage of soldiers were poorly trained, and many 

were well over 40 as the Prussian state required up to 30 years of 

service before granting military exemption. More signifi cantly, the 

soldiers lacked patriotic and military spirit because their interests 

were not one with the king; simply put, the fate of the nation in 

war had little infl uence on their day-to-day lives as disenfranchised 

subjects of the crown. Compounding these moral defi ciencies, 

the Prussian Army also suffered from poor administration and 

equipment; specifi cally, the troops lacked proper uniforms and the 

weapons, fi eld gear, and rations were the worst in Europe. Moreover, 

the military organization and tactical doctrine employed by the 

Prussians were obsolete as well.11 In retrospect, given the atrophied 
25

state of Prussian arms and the transformational nature of the French 

military revolution, the decision at Jena-Auerstädt was inevitable.

The French Revolution had bequeathed Napoleon the 

unprecedented military potential of the world’s fi rst modern nationstate; once harnessed, molded, and exploited in the hands of genius, 

such power-in-being gave birth to the fi rst truly modern army and 

ushered in a new age of warfare across Europe:

. . . In 1793 a force appeared that beggared all imagination. Suddenly 

war became the business of the people―a people of thirty millions, all 

of whom considered themselves to be citizens . . . The people became 

a participant in war; instead of governments and armies as heretofore, 

the full weight of the nation was thrown into the balance. The resources 

and efforts now available for use surpassed all conventional limits; 

nothing now impeded the vigor with which war could be waged, and 

consequently the opponents of France faced the utmost peril.12

Acknowledging the need for change (if not the socio-political 

implications of the French transformation), Prussian King Frederick 

William III convened a military commission in 1807 to investigate 

the debacle at Jena-Auerstädt and propose reforms to the existing 

military structure. While the king failed to recognize that Prussia’s 

defeat lay beyond the sole realm of military concerns, the individuals 

he appointed to the commission fortunately possessed far greater 

intellectual vision.13 The principal members were Prime Minister 

Baron Carl vom und zum Stein, General Gerhard von Scharnhorst, 

Colonel August von Gneisenau, Major Carl von Grolman, and 

Major Hermann von Boyen; Clausewitz, as a young captain and 

administrative assistant to Scharnhorst, also became a de facto 

participant of some infl uence.14 Stein and Scharnhorst were selected 

to lead the commission because the prime minister was one of the 

king’s most trusted political advisors and the general proved one 

of the few senior military leaders who had performed well on the 

fi eld against Napoleon. Moreover, Scharnhorst had gained universal 

respect as a military scholar and thinker while serving as director 

of the highly regarded Militärische Gesellschaft (Military Society), the (Military Society), the 

fi rst institution of its kind devoted exclusively to the academic study 

of war. Signifi cantly, Scharnhorst chose the remaining members 

of the commission based on their intellectual contributions to the 
26

Militärische Gesellschaft Militärische Gesellschaft and their recent performance in combat―in and their recent performance in combat―in 

short, they were the “best and brightest” the Prussian Army had to 

offer.15 Despite a diverse range of experience and political infl uence 

among the reformers, they shared a common belief that the nature 

of the problem transcended military organizational defi ciencies. 

Each possessed a keen intellect and a progressive worldview 

that enabled the commission to discern the need for institutional 

transformation across a broad societal, political, and military 

spectrum.16 Consequently, the reformers recognized the signifi cance 

of the fundamental shift in the relationship between government, 

the people, and military power that had occurred in France. Similar 

reforms―short of revolution―would have to occur in Prussia to 

reverse the results of 1806. 

The Military Reorganization Commission began by correcting 

straightforward organizational discrepancies. The army received 

improved uniforms and equipment, state-of-the-art weapons, and 

new tactical procedures (authored in part by Clausewitz).17 Once the 

means were in place to correct these defi ciencies, the commission 

turned its attention to more diffi cult challenges. In addressing the 

pervasive socio-political faults within the army, the commission 

embarked on a more radical path that led to the creation of a new 

offi cer corps, the citizen-soldier, and a revolutionary general staff 

system. The reformers’ guiding objective in pursuing these initiatives 

was to imbue the Prussian army with “institutionalized military 

excellence”; specifi cally, “organizational genius . . . led in battle 

by operational genius.”18 Scharnhorst and his associates believed 

fervently that to achieve this ambitious transformational goal was 

to provide the nation with its best insurance against revisiting JenaAuerstädt. 

Prior to overhaul by the reorganization commission, the state had 

reserved admission to the Prussian offi cer corps almost exclusively 

to members of the aristocratic landed gentry, or Junker class. 

Commissions rested on the basis of political infl uence and patronage 

rather than an offi cer candidate’s actual merit or military potential. As 

a result, inconsistent talent, insularism, and professional stagnation 

had characterized the Prussian offi cer corps before 1807. Moreover, 

the Junkers discounted the value of formal education (believing that 
27

it made one “soft”―a thinker rather than a doer); as a result, the 

intellectual capacity of the offi cer corps remained limited as well. 

The reformers transformed the offi cer corps fi rst by persuading the 

king to grant eligibility to all elements of society. New offi cers―

whether Junker or commoner―would receive appointment through 

a universal examination process blind to station or infl uence. This 

measure alone served to expand signifi cantly the talent pool from 

which candidates came, and it proved to be the principal foundation 

upon which the new Prussian offi cer corps would rest. Secondly, 

Scharnhorst, recognizing the value of education, supervised the 

creation of three military schools to provide basic instruction to all 

newly commissioned offi cers prior to assignment with the active 

force. Compulsory military education was also unprecedented in 

Prussian military tradition; yet it proved equally successful and 

ensured standardization of quality while promoting intellectual 

growth among the new offi cer corps.19

In tandem with reforms to the offi cer corps, the commission 

also pursued signifi cant transformational objectives in recasting the 

Prussian soldier. At Jena-Auerstädt the men in the ranks did not 

constitute a peoples’ army whose common interests were coupled with 

those of the state; in fact, most viewed the war as solely the concern of 

King Frederick William (and the Junker class), thereby resulting in an 

alarming popular indifference to the French invasion. Consequently, 

the average soldier was bereft of esprit de corps or patriotic spirit, 

and, equating service in the king’s army with unjust coercion, he 

was likely to desert at the fi rst opportunity.20 The reformers pursued 

a twofold scheme to transform the Prussian commoner-in-arms 

into a citizen-soldier. The fi rst was through a system of egalitarian 

universal conscription which denied exemption to any element of 

society and mandated a shorter period of obligation. The goal of 

universal conscription was to ensure that the military “burden . . . 

was carried on all shoulders” and that service in the Prussian Army 

became “a proud civic duty . . . that turned the cause of the state 

into the cause of every man.” An additional advantage would be 

in promoting a new nationalistic spirit in which fealty to the king 

also encompassed a growing loyalty to the state―or Fatherland.21

Secondly, primarily through the work of Stein, the reformers wished 
28

to expand markedly the powers of the constitutional element of the 

government vis-à-vis the king. They hoped this would encourage a 

feeling of general enfranchisement among the people to combat the 

pervasive sense of alienation from government resident throughout 

Prussia. Moreover, included in this initiative was an attempt to 

transfer control of the army from the king to constitutional civilian 

authorities.22 While the reorganization commission was extremely 

successful in implementing universal conscription in 1808, the king 

rejected initiatives to expand constitutional powers or surrender 

control of his army.23 Nevertheless, suffi cient measures were in place 

to transform the existing system and produce Prussia’s fi rst citizensoldiers as the reformers envisioned.

Having addressed successfully basic organizational defi ciencies 

as well as implemented initiatives to transform the offi cer corps 

and the Prussian soldier, the commission members likewise created 

the means to administer, train, and lead this new army with 

“institutionalized genius”―the general staff system. This measure 

proved the most unprecedented and intellectually revolutionary of 

all the reforms in the commission’s efforts to counterbalance France’s 

military revolution (as well as Napoleon’s genius). Best described as 

“the intellectual center of the army,”24 this new general staff concept 

far transcended traditional European staff organizations responsible 

primarily for executive clerical and courier functions. The Prussian 

Army meticulously selected, organized, and empowered the best 

offi cers―intellectually and professionally―to function collectively:

. . . as a single, coordinated brain, but always be fully responsive to 

the commands and desires of the Commander-in-Chief . . . This was 

to be done in both systematic and dynamic ways. New General Staff 

offi cers . . . would be educated carefully and intensively to replace older 

offi cers as they lost their sharpness and faded into retirement. The chief 

of this elite group would be the individual who combined the best in 

experience, education, imagination, vigor, and intellect. He would not be 

the Commander-in-Chief, since that post would still be reserved for the 

monarch . . . But the advice and information that the Chief of the General 

Staff could give the king, and the assistance that he and the Staff could 

also provide in the exercise of command, were expected to assure that 

wise decisions could and would be made by the least able of monarchs, 

and that even if a headstrong ruler were to make a blunder, the Staff 

would be able to retrieve it.25
29

Moreover, the general staff’s organization encompassed 

operational, mobilization, and logistical planning functions, as 

well as responsibility for the coordination of operations once 

hostilities commenced. General staff offi cers routinely transferred 

between assignments with fi eld units (where they assisted the unit 

commander and facilitated coordination with higher echelons) 

and the Great General Staff (at the War Ministry) to broaden their 

experience and perspective. Of signifi cance, selection to the general 

staff was competitive and entailed exceptionally high standards. 

A system of examination selected only 150 candidates per year to 

attend the Kriegsakademie (war academy―founded by Scharnhorst in 

1810). On graduation, each offi cer served with the general staff for a 

2-year trial period; at the conclusion of this probationary assessment, 

only three or four offi cers received permanent assignment to the officers received permanent assignment to the 

general staff.26 In its unprecedented ability to create and promote 

institutionalized military excellence, this unique general staff system 

remains the most signifi cant initiative born of the reorganization 

commission―and its success underlies the fact that every major 

European army would eventually attempt to emulate it in one form 

or another.

The achievements of the reorganization commission provide a 

persuasive example of institutional intellectualism as an agent for 

military transformation. Working under a mandate from the army 

commander-in-chief (King Frederick William III), the reformers 

operated within and as a function of the military system. Moreover, 

they enjoyed a degree of intellectual freedom and engaged in a 

critical exchange of ideas that were remarkable for the time. This 

climate in turn allowed for the synergistic union of Prussia’s leading 

military thinkers―and their focused intellectual energy achieved 

a level of societal, political, and military reform that truly was 

transformational. 

Admittedly, concerted elements of the Junker Class―both civil 

and military―remained convinced that organizational military 

reforms were suffi cient alone to cure the ills of Jena-Auerstädt 

and opposed the commission’s initiatives.27 These traditionalists 

attempted at every turn to counter the reformers’ efforts at 

socio-political change. Signifi cantly, only within the system can 
30

intellectual energy achieve the necessary cohesion and infl uence to 

overcome this traditional opposition. One easily can imagine that 

even the extraordinary intellect and vigor of Scharnhorst would 

have failed had he waged a crusade alone, disconnected from the 

political and military institutional framework. Furthermore, the 

commission’s work did not constitute military orthodoxy; indeed, 

one of the functions it envisioned for the general staff system was to 

prevent organizational stagnation and promote fresh perspectives 

that would challenge convention well into the future. 

One fi nal observation is germane: the immutable factor of time. 

Even institutional intellectualism takes years―possibly decades―to 

reap the fruit of its transformational seeds. The Prussian reformers 

put sweeping socio-political-military changes in place between 1807 

and 1812. As a result, the Prussian Army performed signifi cantly 

better in the campaigns of 1814 and 1815 against Napoleon; yet the 

full return on their intellectual labor was not realized fully until the 

wars of 1866 and 1870, in which the Prussian Army defeated Austria 

and France, respectively, and established the Prusso-German nation 

as the greatest power in Europe.

THE CREATION OF THE PANZERWAFFE

In 1933 Adolf Hitler witnessed a rather modest military 

demonstration which proved to be the harbinger of profound 

transformation within the German Army and, in time, was to usher in 

an RMA. This exhibition introduced the militarily ambitious German 

Chancellor to the basic components of the newly created mechanized 

army and included coordinated maneuvers by motorcycle, anti-tank, 

and armored reconnaissance units in cooperation with a platoon of 

light tanks. Hitler was so impressed by the demonstration that he 

announced enthusiastically to the assembled offi cers and political 

leaders: “That is what I need! That is what I want to have!” While it 

is doubtful that Hitler recognized the true military potential of this 

infant force, he did provide an important institutional impetus to its 

further development and incorporation in the operational doctrine 

of the German Army;28 signifi cantly, it is this doctrinal change that 

transformed the character of war in 1939.
31

Unlike the Prussian Military Reorganization Commission, the 

thinkers most responsible for the creation of the German armor force 

(Panzerwaffe)―and its revolutionary application to Blitzkrieg―had no 

formal organization. Instead, they achieved transformation through 

their collective individual actions, albeit working in an institutional 

context and within a system that encouraged innovation. The fi rst of 

these individuals whose achievements warrant discussion is General 

Hans von Seeckt. Seeckt, in his position as chief of the Army Command 

Troop Offi ce, served as a clandestine chief of the general staff and 

led the German Army between 1919 and 1926. A progressive thinker 

who recognized the need for military reform, Seeckt’s fi rst initiatives 

involved purging many traditionalist elements from the offi cer corps 

and undertaking a comprehensive analysis of lessons-learned from 

the First World War. Not only was he successful in creating “a very 

different offi cer corps from that which had existed before World 

War I, one whose cultural ethos emphasized intellectual as well as 

tactical and operational excellence,” but his investigation into the 

causes of Germany’s defeat (conducted by over 500 offi cers working 

in specialized committees) yielded tangible results and provided the 

genesis for a revolutionary new doctrine.29 Army Regulation 487, 

entitled Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen30 (Leadership and 

Battle with Combined Arms) and published in 1921-23, fi rst articulated 

this doctrine. Written under Seeckt’s supervision, this regulation 

described in great detail combined arms operations emphasizing 

offensive action, speed of maneuver, penetration and exploitation, 

and decentralized command and control.31 Signifi cantly, Army 

Regulation 487 devoted an entire section to the use of tanks and 

other armored vehicles and recognized their potential for massed 

operations and deep penetration; likewise, “using tanks in small 

numbers or on a narrow front was emphatically discouraged.”32

Seeckt initiated several other measures during his tenure as 

army chief aimed specifi cally at cultivating the fl edgling panzer 

force. He created the Inspectorate of Motor Troops in 1924 and 

assigned an armor offi cer to all units and garrisons. This offi cer 

was to indoctrinate and train offi cers and noncommissioned 

offi cers throughout the army in armor technology and procedures; 

additionally, he advised unit commanders in matters pertaining 
32

to mechanized warfare and assumed command of mock tank 

units during fi eld exercises. The importance Seeckt placed on this 

program is evident in the fact that assignment and transfer of these 

armor offi cers had to be approved by the Inspector of Motor Troops. 

Seeckt also personally directed every year between 1920 and 1925 

that more training and emphasis be devoted to armored warfare. 

Moreover, the army commander further insisted that tanks and 

motorized elements take part in all fi eld exercises to the maximum 

extend possible.33 While these initiatives certainly were benefi cial 

to the early development of the Panzerwaffe and subsequent armor 

doctrine, Seeckt’s primary contribution was in creating an intellectual 

environment that encouraged free-thinking and the critical exchange 

of ideas. Signifi cantly, he enabled key armor theorists and advocates 

to work within a system that provided institutional legitimacy to 

their continuing efforts at doctrinal reform.

The leading German armor theorist during the formative years 

of the Panzerwaffe was Lieutenant Ernst Volckheim. A tanker during 

the First World War, Volckheim had the opportunity to observe 

fi rst-hand the success of Allied armor in reversing 4 years of 

stalemate on the Western Front in 1918. Consequently, following the 

war he began a concerted study of mechanized warfare, becoming 

Germany’s leading authority during the 1920s. Volckheim was a 

prolifi c professional writer, authoring over two dozen articles on 

armored warfare between 1923 and 1927, as well as publishing 

two comprehensive books on the subject during the same period: 

one an autobiographical account of the German tank corps during 

the First World War; the second a theoretical work on armor 

technology, tactics, and doctrine that became a standard army text. 

Convinced that future operations would entail armored spearheads 

to effect penetration (with the requirement to destroy enemy armor), 

Volckheim was the fi rst theorist to discount the value of light tanks in 

favor of more heavily armored and gunned medium battle tanks. He 

also stressed the need to maintain a mobile armor reserve, believing 

this to be the best doctrinal solution for defeating a successful 

enemy tank penetration through friendly defenses. Additionally, 

Volckheim was the fi rst German to advocate equipping all armored 

vehicles and supporting arms with radio gear, recognizing that 
33

wireless communications would enhance command and control 

functions and greatly increase the tempo of operations.34 The young 

theorist devoted his considerable intellectual energies to the pursuit 

of these concepts―all of which were included in subsequent German 

armored doctrine. 

Following the First World War, two schools of thought emerged 

governing the employment of armor in battle. The majority view, 

advocated by the traditional offi cer corps of every major military 

power, recognized the tank as simply another supporting arm for 

the infantry; the minority school, championed by a small number of 

independent thinkers, envisioned the tank as the principal combat 

arm to be supported instead by the infantry (as well as the other 

traditional supporting arms).35 In Germany, the leading intellectual 

champions for independent armored units were Colonel Werner 

von Fritsch, Colonel Werner von Blomberg, and Colonel Ludwig 

Beck (all destined to be senior leaders in the German Army). During 

the mid-1920s these offi cers advocated the creation of independent 

mechanized units which possessed the inherent capability to breach 

or envelope an enemy position and then achieve rapid penetration 

in depth. In this manner, with powerful armored forces ranging 

throughout the enemy’s vulnerable rear areas, victory would prove 

inevitable, providing the mechanized formations maintained a 

rapid tempo of operations and retained the initiative. Moreover, 

they envisioned a totally mechanized force in which the supporting 

infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, engineer, and staff units also 

would be motorized and capable of maintaining pace with the 

tank formations. Fritsch wrote in 1927 as Army Command Troop 

Offi ce operations chief that “armored, quickly moving tanks most 

probably will become the operationally decisive offensive weapon. 

From an operational perspective this weapon will be most effective 

if concentrated in independent units like tank brigades.”36 While 

the Germans possessed no tanks during the 1920s, these offi cers 

validated their views concerning the potential for combined arms 

armor operations by closely observing British maneuvers during 

this period and extrapolating their own conclusions: 

. . . one can now clarify what will happen with tanks behind the enemy’s 

main line of resistance after a successful breakthrough. Tanks can be used: 

for attacks on the enemy’s rear positions, against advancing reserves, as 
34

well as against command posts and artillery emplacements. For such 

tasks, present- day tanks are far more capable than older models.37

Fritsch, Blomberg, and Beck’s vision began to be realized in 1928 

with the creation of the fi rst independent mechanized battalion with 

permanently assigned armored car, motorcycle, and mock tank units 

(actual tanks would be added in 1933). This was accomplished under 

the able direction of two infl uential armor pioneers in the Inspectorate 

of Motor Troops: Colonel Oswald Lutz and Colonel Alfred von 

Vollard-Bockelberg. These two offi cers were also responsible for the 

design of Germany’s fi rst generation of light and medium tanks, as 

well as for expanding the technical curriculum at the Panzer Troops 

School to include formalizing training in mechanized warfare 

doctrine and combined arms tactics.38 Given the conviction and 

vigor of all these offi cers in pursuing transformation, it will come 

as no surprise that Fritsch and Lutz later supervised the creation of 

the fi rst three panzer divisions in 1935 as the army’s Commander-inChief and Commander of Panzer Troops, respectively.39

An observation concerning the contributions of General Heinz 

Guderian is necessary at this point. While active in the development 

and expansion of the mature Panzerwaffe in the late 1930s as 

Commander of Panzer Troops, Guderian played little intellectual 

role in the creation of the armored force and associated doctrine 

despite subsequent assertions to the contrary. In fact, Guderian 

later claimed authorship for virtually all of the innovations and 

achievements described in the preceding paragraphs!40 Nevertheless, 

in 1937 Guderian published a credible overview of German armored 

warfare doctrine in a widely circulated work, Achtung-Panzer!41

This book reiterated the conviction that “. . . tanks would only 

be able to play their full part within the framework of a modern 

army when they were treated as that army’s principal weapon and 

were supplied with fully motorized supporting arms.”42 Moreover, 

Guderian emphasized the need to concentrate the panzer divisions 

at the “decisive point of action” in order to maximize their advantage 

in mobility, fi repower, and shock value; conversely, operational 

dispersion of the Panzerwaffe would undermine its inherent 

strengths and negate its decisiveness.43 Consequently, as Guderian 

concluded: “In an attack that is based on a successful tank action the 
35

‘architect of victory’ is not the infantry but the tanks themselves; for 

if the tank attack fails, then the whole operation is a failure, whereas 

if the tanks succeed, then victory follows.”44 The concept of the 

independent panzer division as described by Guderian in AchtungPanzer!, with its potential for massed action against the enemy’s 

front or fl ank―followed by relentless exploitation in the rear―made 

the transformation of German operational doctrine possible.

In the wake of the creation of the fi rst three panzer divisions 

in 1935, Beck (now a general and Fritsch’s Chief of Staff) initiated 

a study to determine the feasibility of panzer corps and panzer 

armies. Subsequent fi eld exercises and operational experience in 

the occupation of Austria in 1938 prompted the general staff to 

make ongoing improvements to the organization, training, and 

tactical procedures of the panzer divisions: “The result was a 

process of steady incremental improvement and innovation that 

amounted over the long term to systematic change, but without the 

risk of following false paths due to the misplaced enthusiasms of 

reformers or the troglodytic opposition of conservatives.”45 During 

the operation in Austria, the panzer divisions were employed 

piecemeal with subordinate units attached to infantry corps; the 

seizure of Czechoslovakia in 1939, however, witnessed the panzer 

divisions operating independently, though still under the control 

of an infantry corps commander. In short order, with procedures 

and doctrine further refi ned, the panzer divisions were organized 

in dedicated armor corps and teamed exclusively with motorized 

infantry divisions for combat operations against Poland.46 As such, by 

the outbreak of war in September 1939, the intellectual vision begun 

by Seeckt and Volckheim had been institutionalized successfully 

within the organizational and operational framework of the army―

transformation was a reality. And in a devastating endorsement of 

the validity of German armored doctrine, the Panzerwaffe proved a 

revolution in military affairs and made possible in 4 weeks in MayJune 1940 what had eluded German arms for 4 long years during 

World War I―the total defeat of France.

The creation of the Panzerwaffe offers another persuasive 

example of institutional intellectualism as an agent for military 

transformation. The collective efforts of several individuals―Seeckt, 

Volckheim, Fritsch, Blomberg, Beck, Lutz, and Vollard-Bockelberg―
36

achieved organizational and doctrinal change within the system 

solely as a result of synergistic, focused intellectual energy. Seeckt 

set the conditions for transformation and sponsored progressive 

intellectual activity within an environment that encouraged a 

critical exchange of ideas; moreover, his endorsement assured that 

contemporary and follow-on reformers remained shielded within 

the system and never forfeited their institutional legitimacy. Of 

course, they faced inevitable opposition from old school advocates; 

General Gerd von Rundstedt clearly expressed the opinion of the 

traditionalists when, at an exercise involving the new tank units, he 

declared: “All nonsense, all nonsense, my dear Guderian.”47 Yet―

signifi cantly―the conservative element never seriously impeded 

the development of the Panzerwaffe or associated organizational/

doctrinal reform because debate remained protected within the 

system where it could infl uence mainstream thought and processes. 

Additionally, it is important to note that the march of intellectual 

progress never stagnated into premature orthodoxy; the vision 

was continually renewed by succeeding generations of progressive 

thinkers who refused to stop short of real transformational success. 

Consequently, orthodoxy emerged only over time―when Blitzkrieg

became relegated to the realm of convention. 

Two fi nal observations are worth reemphasizing: While the 

German achievements in France certainly included a signifi cant 

technological dimension, the RMA was not born simply of new tank 

designs and ubiquitous radios; instead, it resulted from the correct 

(and decisive) application of technology through a transformational 

doctrine. The doctrine was revolutionary, not the tank.48 Secondly, 

the factor of time again is apparent; it took nearly 2 decades for the 

collective intellectual vision of Seeckt, Volckheim, and the other 

progressive thinkers to mature into actual operational capability―

illustrating well that military transformation, by its nature, is never 

a timely or effi cient process.

“KNOWLEDGE MUST BECOME CAPABILITY”

The catalytic role of the Prussian Reorganization Commission 

and the architects of German armored doctrine in promoting 

transformation within their respective military organizations should 
37

be apparent; as such, one can garner several instructive themes from 

these case studies that are relevant and applicable to current―and 

future―efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to embrace 

transformation.

Intellectualism must work within an institutional context to succeed.

Transformation is born of intellectual energy, but as demonstrated in 

the preceding case studies, it can only thrive within an institutional 

framework which is wedded to the system. Organizational 

endorsement―as witnessed by King Frederick William III and 

Seeckt―provides indispensable legitimacy and intellectual freedom. 

The recent creation of the Offi ce of Force Transformation under 

the direct purview of the Secretary of Defense offers a potential 

institutional framework for intellectualism to fl ourish and exercise 

infl uence within DoD. Similarly, the Army’s Doctrine Command, 

coupled with Joint Forces Command’s responsibility for the creation 

of Joint doctrine, afford additional opportunities for institutional 

intellectualism to work within and for the system. Unfortunately, 

these organizations to date largely have been incapable of catalyzing 

signifi cant and enduring institutional change because they remain 

culturally divorced from the mainstream of events within the 

armed forces. Simply, while the structure is in place, the intellectual 

capital it houses is not integrated within the system in the manner 

achieved by Scharnhorst or Seeckt. Moreover, this structure fails to 

promote effective innovation, free-thought, or a critical exchange of 

ideas within and throughout the organization as a whole; instead, 

these endeavors are confi ned to “think tanks” and reside within the 

walls of academia―well outside the organizational and professional 

mainstream. Perhaps in time the Offi ce of Force Transformation will 

correct these defi ciencies; if not, substantive transformation will 

prove impossible until intellectual endeavor is institutionalized in a 

way Scharnhorst and Seeckt would recognize.

The absolute best intellectual capital must be assigned to transformation 

duties. The Offi ce of Force Transformation, Doctrine Command, 

and Joint Forces Command must be staffed with the “best and 

brightest” to ensure the highest caliber of intellectual power, energy, 

and vigor is applied to transformation activities. Furthermore, 

these individuals primarily should be military professionals with 
38

operational experience. Successful transformation requires critical 

thinkers demonstrating exceptional “agility of the mind.”49 At 

present, it remains highly questionable whether those organizations 

responsible for transformation are staffed with the proper 

intellectual capital. Are the contemporary intellectual peers of 

Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, and Seeckt in residence at the Offi ce of 

Force Transformation or Doctrine Command? They are not, because 

the system resists assigning them to duties presently considered 

“non career-enhancing.” Additionally, a concerted effort is required 

to identify and employ young offi cers of exceptional intellectual 

talent as demonstrated by the personnel selections of Scharnhorst 

and Seeckt; intellectual renewal and avoidance of orthodoxy are 

possible only when the system empowers young critical thinkers 

such as Clausewitz, Grolman, Boyen, and Volckheim to temper the 

experience of senior offi cers and press the envelope of convention. 

Again, in the absence of our best intellectual capital (of all ranks), 

transformation will prove chimerical. 

Technological achievement does not constitute transformation. 

As illustrated in both case studies, transformation is born 

almost exclusively of organizational, systemic, and/or doctrinal 

innovation; therefore, while there is frequently a technological 

component to transformation, technology is incapable of catalyzing 

transformational change or an RMA until it is subordinated to effective 

ideas. Consequently, there is an intellectual danger in staffi ng the 

Offi ce of Force Transformation, Joint Forces Command, or Doctrine 

Command with technocrats rather than critical thinkers. Given the 

current euphoria surrounding modern military technology, it is 

logical to assume that technocrats hold great infl uence within these 

organizations―and transformation efforts dominated by technocrats 

will not succeed regardless of how revolutionary their technological 

achievements may be.

Transformation takes time to achieve. Presently, there exists a 

pervasive misconception throughout all levels of the American 

military establishment that transformation can be accomplished 

in short order. As described previously, the Prussian Military 

Reorganization Commission required decades for its sweeping 

transformational goals to be realized, while the creation of the 
39

Panzerwaffe and associated doctrine consumed nearly 20 years in 

catalyzing less ambitious transformation. Of course, the complexity 

and scope of the transformation process will dictate the time required 

to achieve the desired end state―but the duration likely always will 

be measured in years. Therefore, since historical experience dictates 

that military reform is a laborious, time-consuming process, it would 

be logical to conclude that current transformation efforts within DoD 

will likely not reach maturation in less than several years. 

Transformation will always face concerted opposition from 

traditionalists. “Transformation requires changing culture and 

attitude.”50 It is human nature to resist change; as such, intellectual 

efforts to drive transformation will always have to contend with 

traditional conservative elements supporting the status quo and 

resisting change. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the preceding 

case studies, this opposition can be overwhelmed by ensuring the 

intellectual impetus for transformation remains institutionalized 

and resides within the system. Therefore, conservative opposition 

to present American efforts at military transformation, while extant, 

does not pose any real challenge as long as the transformation 

effort is driven by institutional intellectualism, continues to work 

within the organization, and retains administration and Secretary of 

Defense patronage. 

The purpose of transformation is to turn intellectual vision into 

military capability. Whether this transformation is in response to 

an RMA or constitutes a revolution itself, the driving force will―

and must―remain institutional intellectualism; and this is why 

professional debate on intellectualism in the military must confi ne 

itself to this salient issue. To do otherwise is to lose sight of the most 

important aspect of intellectualism and its exclusive role as an agent 

for military transformation. Clausewitz emphatically reminds us in 

On War that “knowledge must become capability.” that “knowledge must become capability.”51 We must never 

forget that, without institutional intellectualism, this is not possible, 

and professional stagnation and atrophy must eventually result.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Uniformed Intellectual and His Place in American 

Arms, Part I,” Army Magazine, July 2002, pp. 18-20.
40

2. Ibid., pp. 20-23.

3. Richard Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life, New York, 1963, p. 10.

4. Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Uniformed Intellectual and His Place in American 

Arms, Part II,” Army Magazine, August 2002, p. 40.

5. Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, “The Future Behind Us,” The 

Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, eds. MacGregor Knox and Williamson 

Murray, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 175-180.

6 Clifford J. Rogers, “As If a New Sun Had Risen’: England’s FourteenthCentury RMA,” The Dynamics of Military Revolution, pp. 18-22.

7. Williamson Murray, “May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German 

RMA,” The Dynamics of Military Revolution, pp. 172-174.

8. David. E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, Ithaca, NY, 1998, pp. 8-15.

9. Murray and Knox, “The Future Behind Us,” p. 193.

10. Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation, Westport, CT, 

1986, p. 5.

11. Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings, ed. and trans. by 

Peter Paret and Daniel Moran, Princeton, NJ, 1992, pp. 39-42.

12. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter , ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret, Princeton, NJ, 1989, pp. 591-592.

13. Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, New York, 

1956, pp. 38-39.

14. Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 

1807-1945, Toronto, 1977, pp. 20-24.

15. Charles E. White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharnhorst and the Militärische 

Gesellschaft in Berlin, 1801-1805, New York, 1989, pp. xiii, 128-131.

16. Peter Paret, Understanding War, Princeton, NJ, 1992, pp. 78-80.

17. Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton, NJ: 1986, 

pp. 192-193.

18. Dupuy, A Genius for War, p. 24.

19. Ibid., pp. 27-29.

20. Ibid., p. 26.

21. Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, Oxford, 1976, p. 138.

22. Dupuy, A Genius for War, pp. 27, 29.

23. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 138-139.

24. Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff 1657-1945, New York, 

1995, p. 35.
41

25. Dupuy, A Genius for War, p. 28.

26. Ibid., pp. 30, 46-48.

27. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, p. 39.

28. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany 

Between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY, 1984, pp. 210-211.

29. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, pp. 8-9.

30. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military 

Reform, Lawrence, KS, 1992, p. 254.

31. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, p. 9.

32. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, p. 125.

33. Ibid., pp. 132-133.

34. Ibid., pp. 126-130.

35. Charles Messenger, The Blitzkrieg Story, New York, 1976, pp. 64-65.

36. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, pp. 130-131.

37. Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare: the British, French, and German 

Experiences,” Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, eds. Williamson Murray 

and Allan R. Millett, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 39-40.

38. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, pp. 134-136.

39. Larry A. Addington, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865-

1941, New Brunswick, NJ, 1971, pp. 34-35.

40. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, pp. 136-143.

41. Kenneth Macksey, “Guderian,” Hitler’s Generals, ed. Correlli Barnett, New 

York, 1989, p. 445.

42. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader Panzer Leader, trans. by Constantine Fitzgibbon, New , trans. by Constantine Fitzgibbon, New 

York, 1952, p. 31.

43. Kenneth Macksey, Guderian: Panzer General, London, 1992, p. 59.

44. Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 43.

45. Murray, “May 1940: Contingency and Fragility of the German RMA,” pp. 

161-162.

46. Ibid., p. 162.

47. Ibid., p. 161.

48. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 218-219.

49. Arthur K. Cebrowski, dialogue with Advanced Strategic Art Program 

students, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, October 29, 2003.

50. Ibid.

51. Clausewitz, On War, p. 147.

43

CHAPTER 3

SWIFTLY DEFEAT THE EFFORTS, THEN WHAT?

THE “NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR” AND THE 

TRANSITION FROM DECISIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS

TO POST-CONFLICT SECURITY OPERATIONS

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Nelson

Since the fi rst Gulf War, the United States has fought three 

major campaigns: Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, Operation 

ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM in Iraq. The principles of rapid decisive operations 

have infl uenced the pattern and conduct of operations in all three 

confl icts. These principles evolved from early work by Harlan 

Ulman and James Wade, Jr., in Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid 

Dominance, published in 1996.1 The principles of rapid decisive 

operations created such success in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM that 

Max Boot called the approach a “New American Way of War.”2

It was the promise of rapid decisive operations that served as the 

lynchpin for the revision of the two Major Theater of War (MTW) 

force sizing constructs during the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.

3

This revision resulted in a new force sizing, one that mandated 

. . . forces be shaped to defend the United States; deter aggression and 

coercion forward in four critical regions; swiftly defeat aggression 

in overlapping major confl icts while preserving for the President the 

option to call for a decisive victory in one of those confl icts―including 

the possibility of regime change or occupation; and conduct a limited 

number of smaller scale contingency operations.4 

The Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense embraced the new concept of 

“swiftly defeat the efforts” of an adversary, in large part, on the hope 

that this would yield force savings with no discernable risk.5

The last three combat operations undertaken by the United States 

in the period since the fi rst Gulf War suggest that the assumptions 

postulated in the concept of Rapid Decisive Operations to justify 

the force sizing choices made in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review

were justifi ed. However, the authors of the concept, those who 
44

operationalized the concept in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, and 

most especially the policymakers in the Offi ce of the Secretary of 

Defense, have failed to include post-confl ict operations as part of 

their calculus. The notion of rapid decisive operations was one of “hit 

and run” rather than “fi ght and stay.” Yet fi ght and stay is precisely 

what happened in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Paradoxically, it 

now takes more ground forces to secure the peace in periods after 

war than to carry out decisive operations.6

This condition would not be much of a problem were it not for 

the rules associated with the Quadrennial Defense Review’s forcesizing construct, which allows the sizing of forces only for the 

conduct of the decisive operations. It considers other force structure 

“lesser included” and, for analytical purposes, to be extracted from 

a stability operation to conduct decisive operations.7 However, 

during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the United States did not 

extract forces from on going stability operations in the Sinai, Bosnia, 

Kosovo, or Afghanistan. The post-confl ict operations that the nation 

has committed the U.S. Army to exceed the forces sized to meet the 

decisive operations needs envisioned under the two major theater 

war concept. A force improperly sized, if not corrected, can lead to 

symptoms of increased force stress and result in decreased readiness, 

increased retention problems, and larger institutional problems.

This chapter will examine the paradox created by the “New 

American Way of War,” as represented by the concept of rapid 

decisive operations and the increased need for ground forces to 

secure the peace compared to the conduct of decisive operations. 

To examine this paradox, this chapter will compare the concepts 

associated with rapid decisive operations and the “New American 

Way of War.” The primary focus will be on the period of time 

in a campaign when decisive operations transition from confl ict 

termination to post-confl ict stability operations. It will compare the 

concepts in the previous sections to the cases of Kosovo, Afghanistan, 

and Iraq to provide conclusions and recommendations for use in 

force-sizing discussions in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.

A NEW AMERICAN WAY OF WAR

The “New American Way of War,” as described by Max Boot in 

Foreign Affairs, is a method of war characterized by rapid maneuver 
45

and precision fi repower to achieve quick victory with minimum 

casualties. This new style of warfare puts a premium on fl exibility 

and surprise. It relies on special operations forces to a much greater 

extent than in the past. The “New American Way of War” depends 

on the heavy use of psychological and information operations to 

force opponents to capitulate without fi ghting. The main pillar of this 

“New American Way of War” is the use of information technology to 

integrate air, land, and seapower to accomplish assigned missions.8

Boot points to U.S. operations in Iraq during Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM and in Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM as evidence that this transformation in the American Way 

of War has occurred right before the eyes of Americans. Admittedly, 

Iraq was a far better example of the “New American Way of War” 

than U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

involved greater combined arms operations, for there were far more 

conventional land forces than used in Afghanistan.9 Boot’s analysis 

of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM demonstrated the diffi culties 

of not employing suffi cent land forces in an operation, since 

some of the most signifi cant Taliban and al Qaeda forces eluded 

destruction.10

Boot’s vision of the “New American Way of War” couples the 

increased precision of airpower with the networking of the total 

joint force to increase the effi cacy of airpower. However, this does 

not obviate the need for ground forces during decisive operations. 

He argues effectively that the United States will require ground 

forces in lesser numbers during decisive operations to defeat forces 

that airpower cannot destroy due to dispersion and concealment.11

However, one cannot conclude that the United States can gain 

savings from the “New American Way of War” by reducing the size 

of ground forces. He argues, paradoxically, that the United States 

will require more ground forces to secure the peace.12

Similar views about the changing nature of the American Way of 

War have appeared. Their authors, the current director of the Offi ce 

of Force Transformation along with a professor from the Naval War 

College, argue that Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan 

showcased the “Emerging American Way of War.” In the January 

2003 issue of Proceedings, Vice Admiral (Retired) Cebrowski co-
46

authored, with his Assistant for Strategic Futures, a vision of the 

“Emerging American Way of War.”13 He has expanded this vision 

in further detail in a subsequent article titled “The Top 100 Rules 

of the New American Way of War.”14 Together, for all intents and 

purposes, these two documents outline the Department of Defense’s 

(DoD) vision for the future of warfare. The Offi ce of the Secretary of 

Defense will view and implement future transformational concepts 

and white papers through the lens of the “Emerging American Way 

of War.”15

The “Emerging American Way of War” showcases special 

operations forces operating with local knowledge from remote 

locations and applying information-age technology to leverage 

networked precision capabilities. These forces will receive the 

support of units capable of nation-building and constabulary 

operations at the end of strike operations to free elite forces for 

subsequent missions. Ultimately, super-empowered individual 

warfi ghters (meaning special operation forces) will perform as 

super global cops, neutralizing enemies of the United States such 

as Osama bin Laden. The “Emerging American Way of War” will 

push jointness down to the tactical level. This vision exhibits speed 

in execution of operations and increasing precision of operational 

effects to limit an adversary’s strategic choices.16 

The “Emerging American Way of War” is possible through the 

networking of military capabilities to allow more discreet use of 

those capabilities in surgical strikes rather than the imprecise battles 

of old fashioned war.17 This networking of capabilities will mean 

that: “. . . as information moves down echelon, so does combat 

power, meaning smaller joint force packages wield greater combat 

power. Network-centric warfare generates new and extraordinary 

levels of operational effi ciency.”18

Or put another way, the “Emerging American Way of War,” 

through the use of Network Centric operations, supposedly will 

provide the promise of less land forces in contact with the enemy 

during decisive operations. The “Top 100 Rules of the New 

American Way of War” goes so far as to argue that the United States 

“endeavors to keep the ground forces’ ‘footprint’ as economical as 

possible.”19 How does this concept enable the limited use of ground 
47

forces? The joint force “aims for rapid dominance of any battlefi eld 

it may enter so the initial blows come from the air.”20 This is the 

connection the authors of the “Emerging American Way of War” 

make with the concepts of rapid dominance and rapid decisive 

operations. In these concepts, ground forces will “roll up enemy 

ground forces that have been softened by air attacks and . . . occupy 

terrain.”21 Thus, the authors of these concepts envisage limited 

ground forces only to impose a decision already facilitated by the 

network-centric, rapid decisive operations.

The authors of the “New American Way of War” remain 

largely mute about the issue of securing the peace. They envision 

constabulary and nation-building forces that will allow elite forces 

to exit upon completion of decisive operations. Their notion is 

that there will be a clear delineation between decisive-combat and 

post-confl ict operations. The concept of securing and occupying 

terrain and controlling the adversary’s populace receives virtually 

no attention other than the assumption that limited land forces 

will have to secure the peace due to the decisive nature of the 

network-centric, rapid decisive operations. In fact, the authors of 

the rules for “The New American Way of War” envision a short 

stabilization period due to passing of security of the countryside 

to the local constabulary or to other national peacekeeping forces.22

The authors further elaborate on this concept as part of their ideas 

for the employment of ground forces in which the Army maintains 

the peace as a “premier long-term occupation force.” The Army will 

maintain the peace only until the United States can transition the 

post-confl ict stability duties to international or local civilian rule.23

What emerges from the Offi ce of Force Transformation’s view of 

the “New American Way of War” is somewhat different from that 

of Max Boot. The Offi ce of Force Transformation’s view rests on the 

belief that because of the changing nature of war, there will be only a 

limited need for ground forces during decisive operations. One may 

assume the same ground forces needed for success during decisive 

operations could handle the post-confl ict, since their argument 

makes no mention of increasing the number of ground forces in the 

transition to post-confl ict operations. Perhaps a more detailed look 

at the concept for rapid decisive operations or the emerging joint 
48

operations concept for major combat operations, largely based on 

ideas drawn from rapid decisive operations, might provide insights 

into the transition from conducting decisive operations to securing 

the peace and whether this transition requires more land force than 

decisive operations does.

FROM RAPID DOMINANCE TO RAPID DECISIVE 

OPERATIONS

The seeds for the “New American Way of War” originated in 

1996 by a group of military theorists from the National Defense 

University and outlined in Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid 

Dominance. The concept of rapid dominance emerged in response 

to the changing strategic environment of the post-cold war period. 

This environment was one of increasing technological change and 

diversifi cation of strategic threats. One of the main drivers behind 

the concept of rapid dominance was the need to change the two 

major regional contingency (MRC) force structure and replace it 

with one that was less costly.24 Through the use of perfect, or near 

perfect, situational awareness on the battlefi eld, more effi cient forces 

supposedly could defeat or destroy an adversary.

Thus came the idea of rapid dominance aimed at harnessing 

these technological innovations to produce desired strategic results. 

The goal of rapid dominance would render an adversary incapable 

of further resistance through the use of physical and psychological 

means. The end result, achieved with minimal U.S. forces, would be 

complete submission of the enemy through “shock and awe.”25 The 

idea of rapid dominance is predicated on four characteristics; perfect 

knowledge of the operational environment; rapidity of application 

of capabilities; total control of the information and intelligence; and 

brilliance in empowering individuals at the lowest levels to apply 

such capabilities against an adversary.26

Virtually no description about what occurs after decisive 

operations occurs in writings about rapid dominance. The concept 

envisioned by the authors is such that “Rapid Dominance seeks to 

impose (in extreme cases) the non-nuclear equivalent of the impact 

that the atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
49

had on the Japanese.”27 Therefore, with the implementation of 

rapid dominance, decisive victory will entail small forces on the 

ground with near perfect information and intelligence directing 

and applying lethal and nonlethal weaponry against an adversary. 

They will so overwhelm the enemy physically and psychologically 

that he will capitulate. The transition to post-confl ict is therefore 

just a matter of moving a relatively benign constabulatory force to 

occupy an adversary’s territory for a short period of time, at least 

until a handover to local or international authority occurs. While 

the authors of rapid dominance never really address the transition 

to post-confl ict, the metaphor that Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide 

suggests that there will be a relatively rapid transition requiring few 

ground forces to secure the peace.

The Joint Forces Command took the ideas of rapid dominance 

and developed the concept of rapid decisive operations. The 

concept of rapid decisive operations will serve as the blueprint for 

future concept development and experimentation.28 In addition, 

the Joint Forces Command released the recommendations for rapid 

decisive operations to coincide with the release of the results of the 

Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001.29 Not surprisingly, none of the 

recommendations really addressed the issue of transitioning to postconfl ict from decisive operations or for the security forces required 

for ensuring the success of the transition to the post-confl ict. Rapid 

decisive operations, as described in the White Paper, integrates 

knowledge, command and control, and operations, while leveraging 

other elements of national power, to enable the United States and its 

allies to attack an adversary asymmetrically from different directions 

and in different dimensions. These operations supposedly will so 

overpower an adversary that he will lose coherence, will realize 

he cannot achieve his objectives, and thus will capitulate or will 

ultimately be defeated.30

A rapid decisive operation, as outlined in the White Paper, 

envisions decisiveness by imposing U.S. will on an adversary 

through breaking his coherence and defeating his will and ability 

to fi ght. Friendly forces will use the concepts of rapid decisive 

operations through knowledge of the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities; 

effects-based planning and execution; use of information superiority; 
50

dominant maneuver; and precision engagement to synchronize 

precision effects to generate relentless overwhelming shock on 

the adversary.31 As envisioned in the White Paper, rapid decisive 

operations will focus on rapid resolution. Rapid decisive operations 

thus are: 

not designed for long-term commitment or to resolve long-standing 

problems. A rapid decisive operation creates the desired outcome 

itself or it establishes the conditions to transition to a higher (e.g., major 

regional contingency) or lower (e.g., security and stability operation) 

level of commitment.32

Therefore, the concept for rapid decisive operations, while 

described as simultaneous and parallel in its characteristics, 

envisions a sequential and serial post-confl ict transition. The forces 

required for the transition may or may not be available to the Joint 

Force Commander since the White Paper concept does not address 

the transition to post-confl ict and confl ict termination. Moreover, 

the White Paper never really addresses the need for the Joint Force 

Commander to fi ght decisive operations, while simultaneously 

securing the peace. There really is no mention of a transition from 

decisive operations to post-confl ict operations. Yet the ideas of rapid 

decisive operations refl ect the hallmarks of the “New American 

Way of War” as outlined by the Offi ce of Defense Transformation 

with its emphasis on speed, networked command and control, 

and the enabling of effects-based operations at the lowest level to 

achieve decisive results.33 The ideas of rapid decisive operations 

also permeate the new “Joint Operating Concept for Major Combat 

Operations.”34

The central theme for the “Joint Operating Concept for Major 

Combat Operations” is that the joint force will bring confl ict with 

a regional nation-state to decisive conclusion through the use of 

swiftly executed, simultaneous, and sequentially applied power 

in a contiguous or noncontiguous manner.35 The characteristics 

of how Joint Forces Command views the future conduct of major 

combat operations are to employ a knowledge-enhanced, effectsbased approach, applying relentless pressure, and engaging the 

adversary comprehensively. The joint force will accomplish this by 
51

using collaborative processes, aligning deployment, employment, 

and sustainment actions, and protecting itself throughout the 

battlespace. The joint force will start a major combat operation with 

a strategic purpose in mind to achieve decisive conclusions.36

The description of how a joint force fi ghts in a major combat 

operation in the joint operating concept is similar to the characteristics 

of rapid decisive operations. Rapid decisive operations highlight 

a knowledge-enabled, effects-based force that uses precision 

weaponry to generate relentless overwhelming shock to the enemy’s 

system. As with rapid decisive operations, the “Joint Operating 

Concept for Major Combat Operations” provides few details on 

how a joint force would transition from decisive operations to postconfl ict operations. It envisions that the joint force, if it implements 

the concept fully, will “use decisive defeat of enemy combat forces 

as a means to achieve decisive conclusion to war.”37 But, of course, 

it is the enemy who determines that the war is over.

The concept thus assumes that a coherent enemy force remains at 

the end of combat operations to capitulate and terminate the confl ict. 

There is no mention of simultaneous conduct of decisive combat 

along with stability operations or security operations to impose U.S. 

will on an adversary who no longer represents a coherent fi ghting 

formation but has decomposed into guerrilla bands or terrorist cells. 

The concept makes mention of ideas for post-confl ict: “Successfully 

imposing our will on an adversary whose behavior brought us to 

engage him in combat operations may very well rest upon what we 

do after we have forcefully and successfully engaged an adversary’s 

ability to resist.”38 The unstated assumption is that decisive 

operations have brought relative stability to the region. There is no 

mention of the chaos created in the wake of decisive operations due 

to a power vacuum created by the swift disintegration of an enemy 

force. In short, there is no meaningful treatment of transition of 

decisive operations to post-confl ict stability operations.

TRANSITIONING FROM DECISIVE OPERATIONS 

TO POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

Joint Forces Command, in lieu of integrating a concept for 

transition to post-confl ict operations in the “Major Combat 
52

Operations Joint Operating Concept,” has chosen to stovepipe 

the concept into a separate “Joint Operating Concept for Stability 

Operations.” The entire focus of the stability operations joint 

operating concept is to describe the stability operations following a 

major combat operation.39

The joint operating concept for stability operations envisions 

a stability force separate and distinct from a combat force. The 

joint operating concept envisions that a separate and distinct 

commander will command the “Stability Force.” The purpose of 

this force will be two-fold during combat: to ensure continued 

momentum of decisive combat operations, and to create conditions 

that would ensure the long-term success of post-confl ict operations. 

The stability force then will transition to post-confl ict actions, 

following decisive combat operations that will focus on assisting 

the interagency, international community, and local government 

by conducting security operations and civil-military operations in 

“restorative” stability operations.40 Much of this concept calls for an 

organization and force structure that is separate and distinct from 

the force structure and organizations that execute the major combat 

operations.41 Therefore, the Joint Force Command concept is looking 

to a constabulary force, a force structure and organizations separate 

and distinct from conventional operational forces to conduct the 

post-confl ict operations. This concept compliments a proposal 

published by the Center for Technology and National Security 

Policy at the National Defense University.

In Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,

Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson recognize that the advent of 

the “New American Way of War,” characterized by rapid decisive 

operations with the use of network-enabled, precision effects 

based operations, brings the need to secure the peace in a rapid 

simultaneous fashion. The authors conclude that the force needed 

to conduct decisive operations was inadequate to secure the peace in 

Afghanistan and Iraq.42 Establishing a safe and secure environment 

will be the primary mission of military forces in post-confl ict 

operations. “Embedding” civilians with the expertise required for 

essential post-confl ict activities would facilitate the rapid return 

of governance and civil services, essential to long-term success of 
53

the post-confl ict operations.43 The authors propose establishing 

separate and distinct joint organizations to conduct post-confl ict 

operations rather than providing a single warfi ghting commander 

the resources needed to execute simultaneously decisive combat 

operations and post-confl ict operations. The idea would be that 

the joint stabilization force would plan the post-confl ict operations 

and then roll in behind major combat operations forces to conduct 

post-confl ict operations in a concurrent manner.44 Military police, 

with a Tactical Combat Force provided as back-up, would constitute 

the bulk of the security forces envisaged in this concept, depending 

on the enemy situation.45 The command and control relationships 

are somewhat vague for the joint stability force. Would the force 

report directly to the regional combatant commander like other joint 

task forces, work for the Coalition Joint Force Land Component 

Commander (CFLCC), or, because of the large involvement with 

the Interagency, report back to the Secretary of Defense, or some 

combination of these that evolve over time?

These are all questions dealing with the transition to post-confl ict 

operations that a variety of researchers have asked. However, the 

answer to the most important question about what the military 

provides best during the transition to the post-confl ict will determine 

the right force structure solution for the problem. Consensus 

amongst these researchers is that the main task that military forces 

must accomplish rather quickly in transitioning from decisive 

operations to post-confl ict operations is to provide security to enable 

the inter-agency, international community, and local authorities to 

reestablish services and governance.46

In A Wiser Peace, researchers from the Center for International 

Studies recommend that the United States should not underestimate 

the needs for security in post-confl ict situations to ensure a successful 

transition from decisive combat operations to peace. Defi ciencies in 

security forces were endemic in post-confl ict Afghanistan and to a 

lesser extent post-confl ict Kosovo.47 They argue that a post-confl ict 

security force should be part of any combined coalition force that 

leads combat operations. Unity of effort for the security forces as they 

transition from decisive operations should ensure swift deployment 

of adequate security forces to eliminate the possibility of a power 
54

vacuum in the wake of swift decisive operations.48 The authors 

envisioned that a “constabulary” force would complete these tasks. 

They assume that this force would focus on civil security, primarily 

policing common crime, but not conducting operations against 

guerrillas or terrorists in an asymmetric confl ict. They recommend 

that coalition combat forces disarm the adversary’s army, purge 

undesirables, and retrain it to meet internal and external instability 

needs. The coalition combat forces would have to meet those 

missions until such time as the new force was prepared to assume 

post-confl ict security needs.49 Thus, if instability exists and local 

indigenous capability was not available, coalition combat forces 

would be required. These combat forces would be an integral part 

of the coalition forces for unity of effort and assume these missions 

as soon as decisive operations transition to post-confl ict operations 

or maybe simultaneous with decisive operations.

In America’s Role in Nation Building: from Germany to Iraq, 

researchers from the RAND Corporation examined post-confl ict 

operations that the United States conducted from Germany and 

Japan to Iraq. The researchers conclude that in the transition from 

decisive operations to post-confl ict, one of the most important 

considerations will be security. Their research concludes that there is 

an inverse correlation between the size of the stabilization force and 

risk. The higher proportion of stabilization force appears to reduce 

the number of casualties taken in the post-confl ict.50 They argue 

that there will be no quick solution to post-confl ict since the average 

post-confl ict operation that the United States has participated in 

lasted approximately 5 years.51 Indeed, the researchers from Rand 

discovered that: “It seems that the more swift and bloodless the 

military victory, the more diffi cult post-confl ict stabilization can 

be.”52 Thus the “New American Way of War” may have created the 

conditions that require more forces to succeed in post-confl ict than is 

required for success in decisive operations.

The actual practice of transition from decisive combat operations 

to post-confl ict operations informed the researchers from the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and from RAND and 

shaped their conclusions and recommendations. The “Stability Joint 

Operating Concept” from Joint Forces Command and the “Concept 
55

for Transforming Stability and Reconstruction Operations” out of the 

National Defense University seem less grounded in actual practice. 

All recognize the need for security in the transition from decisive 

combat to post-confl ict operations. The concepts from the Joint Forces 

Command and the National Defense University take a different path 

to achieve that transition. Two differences between the concepts 

and the actual practice, as represented by the RAND and the CSIS 

study stand out: First is the use of specialized fi xed organization 

constabulary forces, rather than conventional combat forces, with 

the proper capabilities in the right numbers to meet the mission sets 

as determined by the coalition commander on the ground. Second is 

the idea of a separate joint command for stabilization in post-confl ict, 

rather than the integrating stabilization forces under the overall joint 

force commander, to enable a simultaneous transition from decisive 

operations to post-confl ict operations. Finally, there is one other 

difference between the two concepts and the review of the modern 

historical record. The modern historical record suggests that a larger 

ground force is required to provide security during the transition 

from decisive combat to post-confl ict than the force required to be 

successful during decisive combat operations. The two concepts 

to establish stability forces, on the other hand, envision no need 

for additional combat forces for success. In fact, the two concepts 

assume that lighter forces may be successful in modern post-confl ict 

operations.

TRANSITIONING FROM DECISIVE COMBAT 

TO POST-CONFLICT STABILIZATION: THREE CASE STUDIES

Three modern operations demonstrate the differences between 

the actual practice in transition from decisive operations to postconfl ict stabilization and the proposed concepts to accomplish 

stabilization under the “New American Way of War.” The 

operations are ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo, ENDURING FREEDOM 

in Afghanistan, and IRAQI FREEDOM. These operations exhibit 

the characteristics of the “New American Way of War.” All three 

operations showcased the use of networked, precision, air and 

seapower, enabled by special operations forces concluding in rapid 
56

decisive victory of adversary military forces. All three also required 

a transition to post-confl ict operations. This will be the focus of 

the evaluation of the case studies highlighting the size of the force 

during the transition to post-confl ict operations, the command 

relationships associated with that force, and, fi nally, the effi cacy of 

the post-confl ict security arrangements.

Operation ALLIED FORCE-Kosovo.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted 

ALLIED FORCE to enforce compliance with United Nations (UN) 

Security Council Resolution 1199, which called on the government of 

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cease hostilities and redeploy 

mobilized forces from the province of Kosovo. ALLIED FORCE was 

primarily an air operation, which NATO commenced on March 23, 

1999. The confl ict ended on June 10, 1999, with the Yugoslav security 

forces complying with a Military Technical Agreement, which called 

for the full withdrawal of Yugoslavian forces from Kosovo. The 

operation lasted 78 days and returned Kosovo to status quo ante 

bellum.

53

The commander of the Allied Forces Southern Europe 

(AFSOUTH) implemented ALLIED FORCE under direction of the 

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The Commander 

Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH) commanded 

the air operations with the Commander of the Fifth Allied Tactical 

Air Force executing air operations.54 However, in practice, SACEUR 

retained much of the command of Operation ALLIED FORCE.55

In addition to the command of NATO air forces, the Commander 

of AFSOUTH also had NATO operational control of the Allied 

Rapid Reaction Corps that fulfi lled the role of the land component 

command. The commander of AFSOUTH was dual-hatted as the 

U.S. Commander of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil. In this capacity, 

he had tactical control of the Joint Special Operations Task Force as 

well as operational control of all U.S. forces within the operating 

area.56

ALLIED FORCE demonstrated a pattern of war that is similar to 

the “New American Way of War.” The use of air delivered precision 

weapon systems by network centric forces achieved a relatively swift 
57

victory with minimal casualties.57 Indeed one of the major lessons 

learned during Kosovo was a validation of American investment in 

precision weapons, command and control information technology, 

and extensive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems 

to enable the U.S. dominated NATO forces to conduct this “New 

American Way of War.”58 That is not to say this was exclusively 

an air operation. Notwithstanding the potential contributions of 

Task Force Hawk, ground forces played a role in ALLIED FORCE. 

The Kosovo Liberation Army acted as a force on the ground that 

facilitated the targeting of the Yugoslav forces in order to increase 

the effectiveness of the air operations, thus enabling the “New 

American Way of War.”59 At the time of ALLIED FORCE, the 

Kosovo Liberation Army numbered from 5,000 to 15,000 soldiers.60

Ground forces were absolutely essential in securing the peace. 

General Clark gave the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps the mission to 

move into Kosovo immediately upon cessation of hostilities in order 

to secure the agreement reached with the Yugoslavian military and 

NATO forces. This was no small task and included the mission to 

establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, to include 

public safety and order. The initial size of the force under the 

name Operation JOINT GUARDIAN was 42,500 troops deployed 

in Kosovo directly. This force was under the command of the 

commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe who acted as the joint 

force commander for the fi rst 3 months of the operation.61 The size 

of this force correlated to one soldier per 100 residents.62

Thus in one of the fi rst operations that could claim the defi nition 

of the “New American Way of War,” a land force that was larger 

than the land force used during the decisive operations had the 

task to conduct post-confl ict security operations. This post-confl ict 

security force was under the command and control of the joint force 

commander who had the responsibility for decisive operations, 

thereby achieving unity of command and synchronizing the 

near-simultaneous post-confl ict security with the end of decisive 

operations. The overall effect of the post-confl ict security was 

relatively successful and has returned the province to status quo 

ante bellum in the last 5 years, with a relatively modest NATO and 

international presence remaining.63
58

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-Afghanistan.

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan commenced 

on October 7, 2001, in response to the Al Qaeda attacks on the World 

Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. ENDURING 

FREEDOM was a U.S.-led operation with coalition forces. The United 

States contributed the bulk of the air forces and special operations 

forces, while the coalition partners from 30 nations provided some 

airpower, special operations forces, and niche specialty forces. The 

bulk of the ground forces during decisive operations, numbering 

some 15,000, came from the Northern Alliance, a rebel army that had 

been in confl ict with the ruling Taliban forces for several years prior 

to ENDURING FREEDOM.64 Although, the operation is on-going, 

decisive combat operations subsided in December 6, 2001, after only 

59 days, with the capture of Kandahar and the removing from power 

of the ruling Taliban leadership.65

The commander of coalition forces in ENDURING FREEDOM 

continues to be the commander of the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM). The Commander of CENTCOM assumed the 

command of all land forces on November 11, 2001, as the Coalition 

Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC). The Special 

Operations Command Central Command held the command of 

special operations forces. The commander CFLCC synchronized 

special operations activities with his own operations; including 

the transition to post-confl ict security, which occurred near 

simultaneously as combat operations progressed with the 10th 

Mountain Division and a Marine task force providing some postconfl ict security.66 Eventually post-confl ict security operations 

transitioned to the International Security Assistance Force in 

accordance with the Bonn Agreement on December 6, 2001. That 

force has post-confl ict security responsibility only for Kabul and 

its environs.67 The post-confl ict security responsibilities for the 

remainder of Afghanistan are somewhat vague.

Initially, decisive combat operations in ENDURING FREEDOM 

displayed the use of networked precision fi repower directed by teams 

of special forces on the ground, operating with local indigenous 

Northern Alliance Forces, which closed with and defeated opposing 
59

Taliban and Al Qaeda forces.68 Eventually, U.S. conventional forces 

deployed and joined with the special forces-assisted indigenous 

forces to conduct Operation ANACONDA. The forces required 

to conduct decisive combat were approximately 15,000 Northern 

Alliance soldiers69 assisted by a handful of special operations A 

teams, joined later by approximately a division sized element to 

conduct follow-on operations to include Operation ANACONDA.70

Therefore, the operations in Afghanistan during ENDURING 

FREEDOM resembled the pattern of the “New American Way of 

War” for decisive combat operations.

The transition to post-confl ict security from decisive operations 

was less successful, and its second and third order effects continue 

to plague Afghanistan to this day. There was never a general 

recognition that post-confl ict security should be an integral part of 

the transition from decisive operations, and that these actions should 

occur simultaneously or near-simultaneously. Instead, a separate 

organization was established in the form of the International Security 

Assistance Force and employed about a month after decisive combat 

in Kabul ended, creating a gap in security. The gap has never 

closed, to the point of placing post-confl ict reconstruction efforts and 

political actions, such as elections, in jeopardy.71 The United States 

limited the military forces committed to the post-confl ict security 

effort by design. The Secretary of Defense’s answer to a reporter’s 

question regarding the deployment of peacekeeping forces 10 days 

after the completion of decisive combat in Kabul is informative to 

the issue of the design of the post-confl ict security effort:

My feeling is that you don’t get peacekeeping until you get peace. I 

like to refer to it as a security force. I don’t think that it will have to be 

a terribly big one. The only place they are talking about having it is in 

Kabul, the capital. Most of the other places are relatively calm. There is 

still fi ghting and lawlessness, but this is true in some American cities as 

well.72

The post-confl ict security force represented a ratio of one military 

member for every 1,730 residents.73 The deliberate under-resourcing 

of post-confl ict security and placing the effort under a separate 

command that arrived late may be one of the factors that still are 

hampering U.S. efforts to secure the peace in Afghanistan.
60

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM-Iraq.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a U.S.-led coalition operation 

conducted to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Iraqi 

support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people from the tyranny 

of the Baath party.74 IRAQI FREEDOM was a joint and combined 

operation directed at the removal of the regime of President Saddam 

Hussein. Decisive combat operations began on March 19, 2003, 

and the President of the United States declared decisive combat 

operations, lasting just 44 days, over on May 1, 2003.75 The Coalition 

removed President Saddam Hussein from power, and operations to 

secure the peace continue to this day.

Commander of CENTCOM General Tommy Franks was the 

coalition and joint force commander. CENTCOM organized air, sea, 

and land operations under the command of functional component 

commanders who may have commanded similar “functions” from 

two or more services. General Franks delegated command of all 

land forces to the CFLCC Commander, Lieutenant General David 

McKiernan.76 The Commander of Special Operations Command, 

Central Command (SOCCENT) led the Coalition Forces Special 

Operations Command (CFSOCC). Command and control of the 

post-confl ict security force was somewhat ambiguous. The Director 

of the Offi ce of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was 

to lead the effort of post-confl ict civil assistance actions and report 

directly to the Secretary of Defense with a loose coordination 

relationship with the CFLCC. General McKiernan did not view 

post-confl ict security as his mission, but rather that of the Offi ce of 

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.77 Since there was a 

clear delineation of responsibility between confl ict and post-confl ict 

security operations, neither organization planned for the transition. 

The need for the transition to post-confl ict security to occur 

simultaneously with decisive operations compounded the problem 

of transition for both organizations.

Clearly the decisive combat operations in IRAQI FREEDOM 

demonstrated the “New American Way of War”: networked 

precision munitions, synchronized with the maneuver of modest 

ground forces, rapidly achieved decisive victory.78 Joint Forces 
61

Command is already integrating lessons from IRAQI FREEDOM 

into the joint operating concepts for the conduct of major combat 

operations into the future.79 Yet, despite the stunning decisive 

victory, the United States has not secured the peace in Iraq.

The limited number of ground forces required to achieve 

decisive victory actually proved an impediment to the rapid 

implementation of post-confl ict security. The force that CENTCOM 

and CFLCC originally planned to achieve the operational endstate 

of a safe and secure Iraq was fi ve divisions organized under the V 

Corps and I Marine Expeditionary Force. The size of the force that 

actually conducted the operation was a little over three divisions.80

This translated to approximately 151,000 coalition soldiers and 

marines in the land forces during the transition to post-confl ict 

stability, which represented one solider or marine for every 164 Iraqi 

residents. Therefore, rapid transitioning to post-confl ict security 

simultaneously, or near simultaneously, was diffi cult, since the forces 

required to follow and support, or follow and assume, the mission 

to secure bypassed territory, or bypassed forces, were not available 

in suffi cient quantities to conduct those operations. Indeed, when 

it came time to secure key civilian institutions in Baghdad, General 

McKiernan, upon completion of decisive combat operations, was not 

able to meet all the post-confl ict security missions. 81

Therefore, the pattern of the “New American Way of War” 

continued in IRAQI FREEDOM. A new pattern emerged as well 

that germinated from ENDURING FREEDOM, which was to use 

limited ground forces during decisive combat with the assumption 

that these same forces would be adequate to conduct post-confl ict 

security missions. Indeed, when presented with the testimony of 

Chief of Staff of the Army General Eric Shinseki’s estimate of several 

hundred thousand soldiers to secure the peace in a post-confl ict Iraq, 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that “It’s hard to conceive 

that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam 

Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the 

surrender of Saddam’s security forces. Hard to imagine.”82 Indeed, 

hard to imagine. Yet later in the year, the number of coalition 

ground forces working to secure post-confl ict Iraq numbered 185,000 

soldiers just for the U.S. Army, let alone coalition partners.83 Thus, 
62

the latest war in the pattern of the “New American Way of War” 

demonstrated that the rapid nature of decisive combat operations 

requires more ground forces to secure the post-confl ict peace than it 

does to achieve decisive victory.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The “New American Way of War” cannot deliver on the 

promise of reduced ground forces for which the authors of the 2001 

Quadrennial Defense Review hoped. In the drive to swiftly defeat the 

efforts of an adversary and return conditions to status quo ante bellum,

American forces will require more ground forces to secure the peace 

than to complete decisive combat operations. Indeed, to conduct 

and win a decisive campaign in a major combat operation, the 

United States will require more ground forces to remove a regime. 

Two lessons regarding the transition to post-confl ict security emerge 

from the recent past.

To secure the post-confl ict peace effectively, an overwhelming 

combat force is necessary. In Kosovo this meant deploying 40,000 

NATO soldiers to provide presence and impose the Alliance’s will 

upon the Serbs and Kosovars. This translated to one combat soldier 

for every 100 residents. The joint force commander may reduce the 

overwhelming forces required in the initial transition later once 

peace and stability return, as occurred after ALLIED FORCE. NATO 

reduced forces in Kosovo to half of what they were at the start of 

the operation. The United States chose to employ modest forces to 

secure the peace in Afghanistan and Iraq. Today the United States 

still is unable to provide a stable and secure environment in both 

nations. In Kosovo the United States and NATO provided a safe and 

secure environment within months of the end of decisive combat.

To secure the post-confl ict peace effectively as a result of “The 

New American Way of War,” the Joint Force Commander needs 

to provide simultaneously, or near simultaneously, post-confl ict 

security, while engaged in decisive combat operations. In Kosovo, 

this meant deploying land combat forces as soon as NATO signed the 

technical agreement with the Yugoslavs. In Afghanistan, coalition 

forces waited for a month to provide post-confl ict security to Kabul, 
63

while waiting for the arrival of the International Security Assistance 

Force. In Iraq, the coalition forces secured terrain as they progressed, 

but the arrangements for transition to post-confl ict security with 

the Offi ce of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance were 

ambiguous. This led to a power vacuum resulting in the massive 

chaos that coalition ground forces still are not able to control almost 

a year after the war. Unity of effort is essential for a simultaneous or 

near simultaneous transition to post-confl ict security from decisive 

combat operations. The idea that a separate organization should be 

responsible for post-confl ict security fl ies in the face of this lesson.

In order to provide the joint force commander the right 

capabilities needed to transition to post-confl ict security in future 

decisive operations, the United States should consider the following 

recommendations:

• Properly resource the land component commander responsible 

to conduct decisive operations with combat formations that 

can follow and assume security missions for bypassed enemy 

and provide presence on occupied terrain. The amount of 

force sized to secure the peace in ALLIED FORCE could serve 

as a good rule of thumb, which was 1 ground combatant for 

every 100 residents.

• Place post-confl ict security forces under the command of the 

land component commander for unity of command. Task 

organize additional specialized forces such as civil affairs, 

military police, and engineers to the combat formations to 

assume some post-confl ict civil reconstruction, police, and 

infrastructure repair missions until the security situation 

allows a transition to international, local, or nongovernmental 

solutions. Such a step would eliminate the need for a separate 

joint stability force organization, since the land component 

commander would possess the right capabilities to secure the 

peace in parallel with decisive combat operations.

• Adjust the rules for force sizing in the next Quadrennial Defense 

Review to allow for the sizing of a potentially larger postconfl ict ground security force in comparison to the ground 

force required for success in decisive combat operations. 
64

This should be additive force structure rather than a lesser 

included force structure.

Implementing these recommendations may provide the future 

joint force commander the right capabilities to ensure that winning 

the decisive victory includes securing the peace. A full understanding 

how “The New American Way of War” has transformed the nature 

of war may help in visualizing the reality that more ground force is 

now required to secure the peace than to conduct decisive combat.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Harlan Ulman, et al., Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance, Washington 

DC, 1996, p. 16.

2. Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 

4, July/August 2003, p. 42.

3. Michele A. Flournoy, ed., QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s 

Security, Washington DC, 2001, p. 225.

4. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington 

DC, 2001, p. 17.

5. Flournoy, p. 225.

6. Edward B. Atkesson, “Adapting to the New American Way of War: 

Postmaneuver Security Operations,” Army 53, No. 9, September 2003, pp. 8-11.

7. Flournoy, pp. 186-187.

8. Boot, p. 42.

9. Ibid., p. 45.

10. Ibid., p. 43.

11. Ibid., p. 55.

12. Ibid., p. 57.

13. Arthur K. Cebrowski and Thomas P. M. Barnett, “The American Way of 

War,” Proceedings, January 2003, pp. 42-43.

14. Thomas P. M. Barnett and Henry H. Gaffney Jr., “The Top 100 Rules of 

the New American Way of War,” available from http://informationclearinghouse.info

/articles3193.htm; internet; accessed December 31, 2003.

15. Speech given by the Director of the Offi ce of Force Transformation to 

the Network Centric Warfare Conference, January 22, 2003, available from http:

//www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_fi les/speech_143_CEBROWSKI%20SPEECH%20T

O%20NETWORK%20CENTRIC%20WARFARE%20CONFERENCE.doc; Internet, 
65

accessed January 3, 2004. See also Offi ce of Force Transformation, Offi ce of the 

Secretary of Defense, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Washington, DC: 

Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, pp. 28-36; available from http://www.oft.osd.mil/

library/library_fi les/document_297_MT_StrategyDoc1.pdf; Internet: accessed January ; Internet: accessed January 

3, 2003.

16. Cebrowski and Barnett, p. 4.

17. Ibid., p. 2.

18. Ibid.

19. Barnett and Gaffney, Rule 43.

20. Ibid., Rule 48.

21. Ibid., Rule 49.

22. Ibid., Rule 65.

23. Ibid., Rule 89.

24. Ulman, p. 4.

25. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

26. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

27. Ibid., pp. 12.

28. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations,” 

RDO Whitepaper Version 2.0, Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, October 

25, 2001, Preface.

29. Ibid., p. vi.

30. Ibid., p. v.

31. Ibid., p. 12.

32. Ibid., p. 16.

33. Offi ce of Force Transformation, “Military Transformation a Strategic 

Approach,” Washington, DC: Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, Fall 2003, p. 28.

34. “Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept,” Version 0.88, 

Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, November 21, 2003, p. iii. The CJCS, 

with the commander of the Joint Forces Command as the executive agent, is 

promulgating a series of Joint Operating Concepts to serve as a framework to 

guide the combatant commands and the services in their development and 

implementation of the future force. The pillar of these concepts is the “Joint 

Operating Concept for Major Combat Operations.” The purpose of the Joint 

Operating Concept is to address “. . . the challenges of conducting large-scale 

military actions in a distributed, collaborative environment against a militarily 

capable regional nation state into the second decade of the 21st century.”

35. Ibid., p. 8.
66

36. Ibid., p. 17.

37. Ibid., p. 32.

38. Ibid.

39. U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Stability Operations Joint Operating 

Concept,” Version 0.79, Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, November 21, 

2003, p. 2.

40. Ibid., pp. 5-7.

41. Ibid., pp. 33-35.

42. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization 

and Reconstruction Operations, Washington DC, 2003, p. 55.

43. Ibid., pp. 11-19.

44. Ibid., pp. 57.

45. Ibid., p. 67.

46. A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a Post-confl ict Iraq, Washington, 

DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003, p. 12 (hereafter A Wiser 

Peace); James Dobbins, et al, pp. 165-166; Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, 

Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Postconfl ict Scenario, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, p. 43.

47. A Wiser Peace, p. 12.

48. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

49. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

50. Dobbins, et al., p. 165.

51. Ibid., p. 166.

52. Ibid., p. 162.

53. “AFSOUTH Factsheet: Operation Allied Force, Former ‘Determined 

Force’,” Naples, Italy: Headquarters AFSOUTH, December 17, 2002; Available 

from http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/detforce/force.htm, Internet, accessed 

January 26, 2004.

54. Ibid.

55. Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War, New York, 2001, p. 424.

56. “Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action 

Report,” Washington, DC: Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, January 31, 2000, p. 

20.

57. Clark, p. 432.

58. “Kosovo After-Action Report,” pp. 1-4.

59. Clark, p. 329.
67

60. Federation of Atomic Scientists, “Intelligence Resource Program Kosovo 

Liberation Army (KLA),” Available from http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/kla.htm, 

Internet, accessed January 26, 2004.

61. “AFSOUTH Factsheet: Operation Joint Guardian,” Naples, 

Italy: Headquarters AFSOUTH, January 18, 2001, Available from http:

www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/kfor/kfor2.htm, Internet, accessed January 26, 2004.

62. “Force Ratios in 7 Recent Stability Operations,” Washington, DC: 

Department of the Army, Unpublished Staff Study, February 2003.

63. Dobbins, et al., pp. 117-120.

64. William R. Hawkins, “What Not to Learn from Afghanistan,” Parameters,

Summer 2002, pp. 24-32.

65. Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for the 

Army and Future Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, p. 11. 

See also Peter Beaumont, et al., “The Rout of the Taliban,” The Observer Guardian, 

London, November 18, 2001, available from http://observer.guardian.co.uk/

afghanistan/story/0,1501,596923,00.html, Internet, accessed January 27, 2004.

66. John A. Bonin, U.S. Army Forces Central Command in Afghanistan and the 

Arabian Gulf During Operation Enduring Freedom: 11 September 2001-11 March 2003, 

Carlisle, PA, 2003, pp. 8-16.

67. “History of the International Security Assistance Force,” Kabul, 

Afghanistan: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), August 11, 2003, 

available from http://afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/about/about_history.htm, Internet, 

accessed Janaury 27, 2004.

68. Biddle, p. vii.

69. Beaumont, et al.

70. Bonin, pp. 17-20.

71. David R. Sands, “Afghans Still Lacking Security,” Washington Times, 

January 28, 2004, p. 13A.

72. “Go After Them and Destroy Them,” Washington Post, December 16, 2001, 

p. B1, available from ProQuest, accessed January 28, 2004.

73. “Force Ratios in 7 Recent Stability Operations.”

74. George W. Bush, Presidential Address, March 19, 2003, available From 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/iraq/20030319-17.html, Internet, 

accessed February 1, 2004.

75. George W. Bush, Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln, 

May 1, 2003, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/

20030501-15.html, Internet, accessed February 1, 2004.

76. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military 

Lessons, Washington, DC, 2003, p. 349.
68

77. Ibid., pp. 493-515.

78. Boot, p. 44.

79. “Military Transformation a Strategic Approach,” p. 36.

80. James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” The Atlantic Monthly, January/

February 2004, pp. 52-74.

81. Cordesman, pp. 494-496.

82. Fallows, pp. 52-74.

83. Cordesman, p. 211.
69

CHAPTER 4

NUCLEAR HIGH ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE:

IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

HOMELAND DEFENSE

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Riddle

The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism 

and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear 

weapons, along with ballistic missile technology―when that occurs, even 

weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike 

great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have 

been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to 

blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends―and we will oppose 

them with all our power.

President Bush

West Point, New York 

June 1, 2002

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States 

recognizes that over the past decade, “advances in technology and an 

increasingly globalized international environment have contributed 

to the proliferation of the means for new adversaries to organize and 

threaten great nations in ways that previously required the creation 

and maintenance of large armed forces and supporting industrial 

capabilities to achieve.”1 The strategy emphasizes chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and the means of 

delivering them because these threats are “coveted by rogue nations 

as tools of intimidation, military aggression, blackmail, and the 

means to overcome the conventional superiority of the United 

States.”2 The use of a single nuclear-armed ballistic missile could 

offer an adversary the means to accomplish this objective.

Open hearings in the House of Representatives in 1997 and 1999 

indicated that the detonation of a nuclear weapon at an altitude of 

approximately 500 kilometers (km) over the United States would 

generate a high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) which 
70

instantaneously could disrupt or destroy electrical and electronic 

systems that operate the critical infrastructure of the United States, 

as well as portions of Canada and Mexico.3 Largely as a result of 

the testimony presented during these hearings, Congress directed 

the Department of Defense (DoD) to establish a “Commission to 

Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse 

Attack.”4 Although the interim efforts of the commission are not 

publicly available, consideration of the previous testimony, coupled 

with a review of on-going efforts to manage the current strategic 

environment, provides a suitable vantage point to consider what 

additional efforts are required.5 Those interested in the efforts to 

ensure an effective homeland defense and homeland security effort 

should understand the implications of a successful HEMP attack on 

the United States, and the factors that infl uence the probability of an 

attack, as well as continuously seek innovative ways to prevent such 

an attack from ever occurring, and simultaneously, to prepare for it, 

if preventative efforts should fail.6

This chapter will explore how a nuclear weapon would create 

a HEMP. It will then address the effects that such an attack would 

have on electrical and electronic systems and the implications for the 

nation’s critical infrastructure. It then will turn to a discussion of the 

risks of such an attack and the contributions of the existing national 

strategies to prevent and prepare for a HEMP attack. After identifying 

areas of concern, the chapter concludes with recommendations 

to strengthen the nation’s capability to prevent or mitigate and 

recover from the effects of this ultimate form of asymmetric attack. 

To appreciate properly the implications for homeland defense and 

homeland security, however, it fi rst is necessary to begin by defi ning 

what an electromagnetic pulse is. 

HIGH ALTITUDE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE

The Technology Division of the National Communications 

System defi nes an electromagnetic pulse as a wide frequency 

range, high-intensity, extremely rapid, and short duration burst of 

electromagnetic energy. Such a burst produces electric and magnetic 

fi elds which can couple to metallic conductors associated with 
71

electrical and electronic systems to produce damaging current and 

voltage surges.7 One noted expert in the fi eld of nuclear weapons 

and electromagnetic pulse effects characterized such a pulse as being 

similar to “. . . very intense static electricity that is carried on radiofrequency electromagnetic waves.”8

 Although electromagnetic pulse 

can result from both nuclear and non-nuclear means, this chapter 

will concentrate on a pulse created by a high altitude nuclear 

detonation.9

In general, a nuclear explosion creates an electromagnetic pulse 

through the interaction of high energy nuclear emanations with 

atoms in the atmosphere.10 At altitudes above approximately 40 

kilometers (km), this effect becomes particularly signifi cant due to 

the large volume of the atmosphere underneath the explosion that 

interacts with the high energy nuclear radiation. According to one 

expert, the nuclear weapon’s high energy radiation interacts with 

air molecules and essentially transforms the atmosphere underneath 

the explosion into a gigantic, radio-transmitter antenna.11

The Director of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics 

Lab testifi ed that there are two overriding characteristics that make 

a HEMP attack unique.12 These characteristics are of particular 

interest to those concerned with an effective homeland defense and 

homeland security. First, the area affected by the electromagnetic 

pulse could be continental in scope. As the altitude of the detonation 

increases the area in line of sight to the radiation and, therefore 

subjected to direct electromagnetic pulse effects, also increases.13

A detonation at an altitude of approximately 500 km could impact 

the entire continental United States as well as portions of Canada 

and Mexico, although at the edges, the fi eld intensity would be 

approximately half of the peak levels, while the fi eld strength would 

not be uniform over the entire area. 14

The second HEMP characteristic is that peak electromagnetic 

fi eld amplitude and the speed at which it increases are extremely 

high.15 Although electromagnetic pulse has often been compared to 

a lightning strike, such an analogy is only useful as an illustrative 

comparison to understand the scale of some effects. There are 

signifi cant differences. For example, a HEMP is comprised of 

several components, each generated by different effects of the nuclear 
72

weapon.16 Each has unique characteristics and pose different 

protection challenges. Moreover, electromagnetic pulse generated 

by an exoatmospheric nuclear explosion develops its peak electrical 

fi eld much faster than lightning, making it harder to protect against.17

Finally, lightning remains a localized event, while the implications of 

a continental-sized electromagnetic fi eld create unique propagation 

effects.

Since an electromagnetic fi eld interacts with metallic conductors 

to induce currents to fl ow through them, any metallic object (such 

as power lines, local area network cables, or even plumbing) could 

act as antennae which would gather in the electromagnetic signal 

and convert it to current fl ow.18 Long-line conductors such as power 

lines and metallic communication cables could extend further these 

currents throughout and beyond the area illuminated by the line-ofsight effects. The direct and indirect electromagnetic coupling effects 

are the means by which such a pulse generated by a high altitude 

nuclear detonation could cause near-instantaneous, potentially 

damaging voltages and currents in unprotected electronic circuits 

and components throughout an entire continental-sized area.19

Modern electronics and computer systems depend extensively 

on semiconductor technology. Due to the exceptional sensitivity 

of modern semiconductors to relatively small amounts of energy, 

the extreme voltages and/or current spikes produced by an 

electromagnetic pulse event could create irreversible damage to 

unshielded or specially designed electronic and computer devices. 

Such a result underlines why a high altitude electromagnetic attack 

would be so potentially catastrophic to the United States―this nation 

is the most electronically dependent country in the world. 

CONSEQUENCES OF A HEMP ATTACK ON THE UNITED 

STATES HOMELAND

A detailed prediction of all of the potential effects of a HEMP 

attack is diffi cult due to the complexity of interdependent systems, 

the diverse environments throughout the effected areas, and 

the uncertainties associated with the manner of nuclear weapon 

employment. While an electromagnetic pulse and its effects on 
73

various devices and equipment has received intense scrutiny over 

the past 40 years, much of this analysis was conducted by DoD and 

focused on nuclear command and control systems. As a result, much 

of the material produced about electromagnetic pulse remained 

highly classifi ed. A great deal of the publicly available information 

regarding the effect of electromagnetic pulse on military and civilian 

infrastructure has resulted from several open hearings held by the 

House of Representatives in 1997 and 1999. Those hearings form a 

foundation to understand the effects that a successful HEMP attack 

on the United States could have.

 One expert described the results of a successful HEMP attack in 

a hearing before the 1997 Military and Research Sub-committee of 

the House Armed Services Committee:

. . . [a successful HEMP attack] . . . is a continental scale time machine. 

We essentially . . . move it back in time by about one century and you live 

like our grandfathers and great grandfathers did in the 1890s until you 

rebuild. You do without telephones. You do without television, and you 

do without electric power . . . and if it happens that there is not enough 

fuel to heat with in the winter time and there is not enough food to go 

around because agriculture has become so ineffi cient and so on, the 

population simply shrinks to meet the carrying capacity of the system.20

Taking into account the increasing interdependence of the 

critical infrastructure in the United States, the picture is particularly 

grim.21 The critical infrastructure of the nation utterly depends on 

information age technologies.22 Indeed, all of the 13 interdependent 

critical infrastructure sectors (agriculture, food, water, public 

health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base, 

information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, 

banking and fi nance, chemical industry and hazardous materials, 

postal and shipping23) inextricably are reliant on the proper 

functioning of electrical power, electronic devices, and computer 

systems. Virtually all of the technology that operates each of these 

critical infrastructures may be highly vulnerable to the effects of 

electromagnetic pulse.24

In addition to the immediate disruptions caused by the loss 

of extensive portions of the information age infrastructure, 

the cumulative effects of such an attack would have long-term 
74

consequences on restoration efforts. Unlike the localized effects of 

a hurricane or even a “traditional” low altitude nuclear weapon 

detonation, the instantaneous, continental scope and infrastructurewide effects of a HEMP attack would make recovery attempts 

exceptionally diffi cult and a lengthy process. Essentially post-attack 

America would remain stuck in the 19th century until replacement 

electrical equipment and components became available (most likely 

having to be brought in from abroad) and installed.25 Of course, this 

assumes those in charge could locate and effi ciently employ the 

variety of skills required to conduct such a recovery in a population 

attempting merely to survive the anarchy that would inevitably 

result. 

Additionally, America’s military forces have increasingly 

returned to the continental United States. A HEMP attack would 

also affect them directly. Although the strategic nuclear forces (and 

portions of their supporting infrastructure) possess the means to 

resist the effects of electromagnetic pulse, the general purpose forces 

have not received the same capabilities. After a successful HEMP 

attack, the posts, camps, bases, and stations throughout the country 

likely would be unable to provide the services necessary to function 

as power projection platforms. Although some military programs 

have incorporated electromagnetic pulse survivability within their 

design and acquisition process, increasingly, the military forces have 

turned to commercial-off-the-shelf equipment that has little or no 

such protection.

To jump start national recovery efforts likely would require 

signifi cant portions of the remaining overseas military resources of 

the United States to focus their efforts on domestic recovery. The 

resulting lack of a viable forward military presence, coupled with 

an American government intently focused on internal recovery, 

undoubtedly would result in numerous regional confl icts as nations 

attempted to gain advantage or to redress old grievances. Several of 

these regional confl icts (India-Pakistan, Israel-Syria, China-Russia, 

China-India) certainly have the potential to involve further use of 

nuclear weapons with their attendant effects. 

Moreover, the worldwide economy increasingly has grown 

interdependent. The economic disruptions that occurred in the 
75

wake of the 2001 attacks suggest a clear demonstration of this 

interdependence. The disruption of the interdependent critical 

infrastructure of the United States would likely produce worldwide 

economic turmoil. The extended loss of the American consumer 

markets, disruption of domestic manufacturing capability, and 

chaotic fi nancial institutions would contribute to an extended 

period of worldwide economic chaos. Clearly, the United States is 

vulnerable, and the consequences of such an attack, both within the 

United States and across the globe, are unacceptable. However, the 

existence of exceptional vulnerability does not equate necessarily to 

risk. One needs to make an assessment of the probability of a HEMP 

attack on the homeland of the United States to determine the relative 

degree of risk that is acceptable. 

ASSESSING THE RISK 

When considering potential threats, one must conduct a risk 

assessment to gain an appreciation for an event’s occurrence. This 

is necessary to provide a basis to ensure the proper provision of 

national resources to reduce the likelihood of the event occurring 

or the severity of its impact. This risk assessment will fi rst evaluate 

the current nuclear proliferation environment and provide a broad 

assessment of the availability of suitable delivery capabilities. This 

will provide a basis to judge the likelihood of a HEMP attack. 

Nuclear Proliferation. 

Although it is a gross generalization, the reader can assume 

that essentially every nuclear weapon will produce infrastructuresignifi cant electromagnetic pulse effects when detonated at high 

altitude. The Institute for Science and International Security estimates 

that approximately 30 countries have either sought to develop 

nuclear weapons or indicated their intentions to do so. Other than the 

United States, the following countries have successfully developed 

nuclear weapons: Great Britain, France, Russia, China, Pakistan, 

and India. Israel is suspected of possessing nuclear weapons, as is 

North Korea. 26 In a June 2003 report to Congress, the Director of 
76

Central Intelligence stated that, although Syria is a signatory to the 

nonproliferation treaty, broader access to foreign expertise warrants 

concern about that nation’s nuclear intentions.27 Of the remaining 

nations that either had established programs or had advocated the 

development of nuclear weapons, only three were considered to be 

actively seeking nuclear weapons: Iraq, Libya, and Iran.28

Nevertheless, there have obviously been substantial 

developments over the last year in the arena of nuclear proliferation. 

Two of these nations reportedly seeking nuclear weapons, Iraq and 

Libya, have terminated their programs. Analysis of the intentions 

and methodologies of their programs is on-going and likely will 

provide valuable knowledge about other nation’s weapons efforts 

and nuclear technology proliferation in general. However, other 

recent proliferation developments warrant particularly careful 

attention. First, Iran has confi rmed the existence of a substantial 

weapons-grade material processing capability.29 Although the 

International Atomic Energy Agency trumpeted the announcement 

that the Iranians have signed the additional protocol on nuclear 

safeguards in December 2003, doubts remain as to the extent of 

that nation’s future cooperation with full verifi cation measures (as 

well as the effi cacy of those inspections).30 Thus, the full extent and 

maturity of Iran’s nuclear weapons program remain unknown. 

The second proliferation development that warrants careful 

attention is the exposure of a highly effi cient and organized 

international “proliferation for profi t” effort. The acknowledged 

extent and activities of the Pakistani “Kahn Network” is particularly 

troubling.31 President Musharraf has publicly disavowed the 

involvement of the Pakistani government or military (supported 

by the prepared statement of Dr. Kahn) with this international 

proliferation effort. Nevertheless, there are troubling indicators that 

the government of Pakistan has been actively supporting the spread 

of nuclear weapons technology throughout the Islamic world.32 The 

interception while enroute from Malaysia to Libya of equipment (of 

Pakistani specifi cation) destined for use in uranium refi nement is 

just one example.33

The fi nal area of concern about proliferation remains the access 

to existing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-grade material 
77

by nations and others interested in possessing nuclear weapons. 

A recent article in the New York Times reiterates that the refi nement 

of weapons-grade material is not a simple matter, and that the 

production of atomic weapons still remains a complex undertaking.34

This creates an extensive demand for states and others with nuclear 

ambitions to obtain either complete nuclear weapons or weaponsgrade materiel. Although any nation with fi ssile materials or nuclear 

weapons is potentially a source, Russia, the newly independent 

states of the former Soviet Union, and the former satellite nations 

remain a particularly signifi cant proliferation concern due to the 

economic turmoil, massive stockpiles of fi ssile materials, inadequate 

nuclear storage security, and continuing susceptibility to demandside diversion.35

The inadequate security arrangements surrounding Russian 

fi ssile stockpiles and nuclear weapons storage facilities, the 

proliferation of nuclear technologies by organized networks (such 

as created by Dr. Kahn), and the nuclear programs of states such as 

Iran, North Korea, and, potentially, Syria are clearly of signifi cant 

concern to U.S. policymakers and strategists. However, to conduct 

a HEMP attack successfully, a nation or terrorist organization must 

match the weapon to a suitable delivery means. 

Nuclear Weapon Delivery.

To conduct a successful HEMP attack on the United States, the 

perpetrator confronts the signifi cant challenge of getting the weapon 

to the required altitude. Due to the area affected by such an attack, 

exact geographic accuracy is not a primary requirement. Obviously, 

an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with suffi cient payload 

capacity to carry the weapon would suffi ce. Similarly, weapons 

traditionally considered as either short, medium, or intermediate 

range ballistic missiles would also be suitable, if of suffi cient payload 

capacity and positioned at a launch point close enough to the United 

States. 

The 1998 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to 

the United States (the Rumsfeld Commission) observed that the use 

of Soviet-era patterns of ballistic missile development as guides to 
78

evaluating current threats are misleading.36 Those seeking the means 

to threaten or attack the United States may use ballistic missile 

development and deployment approaches that were not used by the 

major Cold War powers for reasons of effi ciency, safety, or quality 

control.37 The report cited transfer of operational missile systems as 

a specifi c concern. Similarly, the commission specifi cally identifi ed 

several countries that were pursuing sea launch capabilities (a 

troubling aspect of this development is the increased diffi culty 

of correctly assigning responsibility for such an attack).38 This 

development obviously expands the potential threat envelope to 

shorter range surface-to-surface missiles such as Scuds.39 Within this 

framework of uncertainty, an overview of those nations that could 

potentially possess nuclear-capable ballistic missiles is in order. 

Of the existing nuclear armed nations currently of concern, 

Russia and China possess both land and sea based ballistic missile 

systems capable of conducting a HEMP attack on the United States.40

In a June 2003 report to Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence 

assessed that North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan possessed a range of 

nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, with North Korea fi nalizing a 

limited range ICBM capability.41 The report also cited Syria as having 

a domestic Scud production program, as well as a development 

program to produce longer range Scud variants.42 Possession of 

nuclear weapon and ballistic missile capability are the entry level 

requirements to threaten the United States with a HEMP attack. 

But suffi cient technical expertise must be available to integrate the 

systems together, along with a degree of confi dence that the system 

will perform as required. Countries that possess a domestic ballistic 

missile manufacturing program undoubtedly possess suffi cient 

technical expertise to do so. How then does the United States intend 

to meet these threats?

U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGIES.

The mutually supporting NSS and National Strategy for 

Homeland Security (NSHS) aim to provide an integrated, 

comprehensive, strategic framework that simultaneously seeks to 

create and seize opportunities to strengthen national security and 
79

prosperity as well as provide a secure foundation for on-going global 

engagement.43 Central features of both strategies either contribute to 

the prevention of a HEMP attack on the U.S. homeland or establish 

suitable frameworks to enable national preparedness, should such 

an attack occur. 

Two of the central objectives of the NSS are to “strengthen 

alliances to defeat global terrorism” and “work to prevent attacks 

against the United States and its friends and to prevent the enemies 

of the United States from threatening it or its allies and friends with 

WMD [weapons of mass destruction].”44 Many of the initiatives that 

support these objectives directly and indirectly contribute to the 

prevention of a HEMP attack on the United States homeland. 

Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work 

to Prevent Attacks.

The NSS recognizes the dangers created by the nexus between 

terrorists, state sponsors of terrorism, and WMD.45 The al-Qaeda 

organization sought to acquire WMD with enormous enthusiasm 

and remains a target of particular interest to the United States.46 The 

continued interdiction of its sanctuaries, the explicit elimination of 

the distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly aid or 

harbor them, and the emphasis on the prevention of the transfer 

of WMD and their means of delivery to terrorist organizations 

contribute directly to the prevention of a HEMP attack on the 

United States by state-supported terrorists. The NSS framework 

also seeks to prevent the use of WMD through the execution of 

three broad elements: counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and 

effective consequence management. There have been substantial 

developments in the execution of each that contribute to the efforts 

to prevent a HEMP attack on the United States.

Counterproliferation.

Ongoing proactive nuclear and ballistic missile counterproliferation efforts are providing substantial dividends that 

contribute to the prevention of a HEMP attack. First, the intelligence 
80

efforts to unmask the extent of the nuclear proliferation network 

created by A. Q. Kahn provide an excellent example of on-going 

initiatives to strengthen counterproliferation efforts.47 Similarly, the 

decision to implement an earlier deployment of an initial groundbased interceptor and improved ballistic missile tracking capabilities 

will support the improved passive and active defenses called 

for in the NSS.48 Moreover, the convincing demonstration of the 

continuing effi ciency and effectiveness of America’s global precision 

strike capabilities during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is a clear 

indication that multidimensional counterforce capabilities remain 

a viable element of America’s counterproliferation capabilities. 

Such capabilities would clearly contribute to the prevention of a 

HEMP attack on the United States. Finally, the U.S. demonstrated 

willingness to conduct preemptive strikes to neutralize WMD under 

the concept of imminent defense adds an unmistakable dimension to 

the concept of deterrence for those seeking to acquire WMD.49

Nonproliferation.

Another initiative specifi ed in the NSS that is contributing to the 

prevention of a HEMP attack on the U.S. homeland is the continuing 

emphasis on strengthened nonproliferation efforts. For example, 

although the Bush administration initially decreased the emphasis 

and associated funding of threat reduction assistance to Russia in 

2002, after Congress replaced and mandated additional funding 

the following year the Bush administration fully supported the 

program.50

Strengthened nonproliferation diplomatic efforts have also been 

successful. One particularly promising multilateral diplomatic 

initiative has been the development of the Proliferation Security 

Initiative.51 This initiative combines the efforts of 11 countries 

to combat traffi cking to and from states and nonstate actors of 

proliferation concern of WMD, their delivery means, and related 

materials. 52

That initiative also provides the multilateral framework that 

supports another nonproliferation initiative identifi ed in the NSS: 

interdiction. The countries participating in the Proliferation Security 
81

Initiative agree to interdict the transfer or transport to and from 

states (and nonstate actors) of proliferation concern of WMD, 

their delivery systems or related materials, either domestically or 

internationally.53 Although aimed at the entire range of WMD, 

this interdiction protocol contributes to the prevention of a HEMP 

attack by seeking to curb the free transport of nuclear technologies, 

weapons and ballistic missile systems. 

Consequence Management.

The fi nal portion of the NSS framework that seeks to prevent the 

use of WMD on the United States, its allies, or its friends is effective 

consequence management.54 Effective consequence management, 

although primarily a preparedness concept, also contributes to the 

prevention of a high altitude electromagnetic attack. By seeking 

to minimize the effects of WMD on its people and those of allied 

and friendly nations, consequence management contributes to 

deterrence by demonstrating to the enemies of the United States that 

their WMD acquisition and employment strategies will not be worth 

the risks.55

The most signifi cant contribution to the concept of an effective 

consequence management strategy has been the creation of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the implementation 

of a comprehensive national homeland security strategy. A brief 

review of some of the on-going homeland security initiatives will 

illuminate some of the efforts that are underway and which are 

creating an effective framework to pursue national preparedness 

from the effects of a HEMP attack.

NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (NSHS)

The July 2002 NSHS is the fi rst-ever national homeland security 

strategy and provides the initial framework to secure the homeland 

from terrorist attacks.56 The three strategic objectives of this strategy 

are to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce 

America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and 

recover from attacks that do occur.57 Since the DHS is a relatively new Since the DHS is a relatively new 57
82

organization and faces an immense task of avoiding the expectation 

that it must try to defend everything, everywhere, all at once, it is 

reasonable to fi nd that its on-going initiatives do not specifi cally 

concentrate on direct protection against a HEMP attack. However, 

of the six critical mission areas created by the strategy, two of them 

offer a promising framework to reduce the vulnerability of the 

United States to such attacks. 

Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets.

The NSHS recognizes that American society and its modern 

way of life are dependent on networks of physical and virtual 

infrastructures.58 Of the eight major initiatives to protect these assets, 

systems, and functions, fi ve develop organizational or procedural 

frameworks that will contribute to the preparedness of the United 

States against the effects of a high altitude electromagnetic attack.

The creation of the DHS resulted in the assignment of a 

single accountable offi cial to ensure the United States addresses 

vulnerabilities that involve more than one infrastructure sector.59

This step integrated the assessment of threats and vulnerabilities 

for the range of interdependent critical infrastructures that support 

the United States.60 While the NSHS does not specifi cally reduce 

the vulnerability of the critical infrastructure to high altitude 

electromagnetic attack, it makes the Secretary of Homeland Security 

specifi cally responsible to assess and reduce critical infrastructure 

vulnerabilities to the effects of this type of attack. 

The NSHS also specifi es that a key role of the DHS will be to 

build and maintain a complete critical infrastructure assessment.61

This comprehensive, up-to-date analysis of the vulnerabilities and 

preparedness of key points across the critical infrastructure centers 

is designed to permit the DHS to match current threat information 

against current vulnerabilities to effi ciently direct the appropriate 

actions.62 As with the initiative to unify critical infrastructure 

responsibilities, this framework will enable homeland security 

personnel to determine the appropriate critical infrastructure 

systems that need to be protected against HEMP effects as well as a 

means to track the accomplishment of vulnerability reduction.
83

Another key initiative that supports preparedness to mitigate 

and recover from the effects of a HEMP attack is the effort by 

the DHS to construct effective partnerships with state and local 

governments and the private sector.63 As with the other elements, 

this initiative does not provide direct improvements in the effort 

to prepare the U.S. homeland against the effects of such an attack. 

However, the establishment of effective mechanisms for the federal, 

state, and local governments to partner with the private sector has 

laid the groundwork to introduce specifi c HEMP infrastructure 

improvements. 

The next homeland security critical mission area that offers 

the potential to reduce infrastructure vulnerabilities to a HEMP 

attack is the development of a national infrastructure protection 

plan. This plan provides the methodology for “. . . identifying and 

prioritizing critical assets, systems, and functions, and for sharing 

protection responsibility with state and local government and the 

private sector.”64 The effort to establish standards and benchmarks 

for the protection of critical infrastructure will be invaluable as the 

mechanism for the prioritization of appropriate HEMP hardening 

measures.

The fi nal initiative to protect critical infrastructures is the ongoing effort to develop effective protective solutions through 

effective modeling and analysis.65 Specifi cally, advanced simulations 

can assist in determining which assets, systems, and functions are 

particularly important in a series of interdependent infrastructures. 

This will support the effi cient use of scarce resources to harden 

“high payoff” portions of the infrastructure to the effects of a HEMP 

attack. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response

As with protecting critical infrastructures, there are several 

initiatives underway to support the critical mission area of 

emergency preparedness and response. This mission area seeks to 

minimize the damage and recover from terrorist attacks. The DHS 

has made signifi cant progress in the effort to consolidate multiple 

existing federal response plans under a single all-discipline incident 
84

management plan. The Initial National Response Plan, dated 

September 30, 2003, represents a “. . . signifi cant fi rst step toward 

integrating the current series of federal prevention, preparedness, 

response, and recovery plans into a single, all-discipline, allhazards plan.”66 Due to the substantial effects of a high altitude 

electromagnetic attack, the development of a plan to synchronize the 

national response to mitigate the effects and guide national recovery 

is especially critical. 

A related initiative which directly supports the execution of 

the national response effort is the creation of a national incident 

management system. This system seeks to defi ne common 

terminology, provide a unifi ed command structure, and is scaleable 

to manage incidents of all sizes.67 According to Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 5, the national incident management system 

will provide “. . . a consistent nation-wide approach for federal, state, 

and local governments to work effectively and effi ciently together 

to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, 

regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”68 Along with the creation 

of a National Response Plan, the national incident management 

system will be absolutely essential to managing the consequences 

and organizing the national recovery from the continental-wide, 

sustained collapse of substantial portions of the interdependent 

infrastructures that a high altitude electromagnetic attack would 

cause. 

A supporting initiative for the emergency preparedness and 

response critical mission area is to enable seamless communications 

among all responders.69 In the aftermath of a HEMP attack, reliable 

communications among federal, state, and local responders will 

be a key enabler of the prolonged national recovery effort. The 

development of the national emergency communications plan 

will establish protocols, processes, and national standards for 

technology acquisition. Incorporation of suitable electromagnetic 

pulse hardened communications must be a key component of this 

plan.

The DHS recognizes that it must plan carefully for military 

assistance to civil authorities to ensure that, when duly authorized 

by the President, military forces (which remain under the command 
85

of the Secretary of Defense) are effi ciently and effectively used.70

Military assistance to civil authorities may take the form of technical 

support and assistance to law enforcement (Military Support to 

Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies), assisting in the restoration 

of law and order (Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances), 

and assisting in incident management. U.S. Northern Command 

is responsible for both homeland defense and for assisting civil 

authorities when directed by the President (through the Secretary 

of Defense).71 During the massive societal upheaval that will follow 

the comprehensive, extended disruption of the nation’s critical 

infrastructure after a HEMP attack, DoD will play a critical role 

in consequence management, maintenance of civil order, and 

supporting the national recovery effort. For this reason, the planning 

and training efforts between the DHS and DoD must include the 

effects of a HEMP attack as a critical requirement.

Although both the NSS and NSHS have accomplished some 

successes that help to protect the United States from a range of 

complex threats, including HEMP, there are clearly areas that require 

improvement. Policy and strategy makers concerned with an effective 

national defense and homeland security strategy framework should 

consider the following recommendations to strengthen national 

efforts to ensure suitable and adequate prevention and preparation 

measures against a HEMP attack. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the HEMP threat grew out of the Cold War, the threat 

of this form of attack exists as long as there are nuclear weapons 

and delivery systems that may be targeted against the United States. 

Indeed, the advantages to a potential enemy of the United States may 

be increasing as the military seeks to further increase its dependence 

on commercial-based information technologies. However, the 

psychological tendency is to shrug off the implications of a HEMP 

attack because the consequences are so enormous.72 Nevertheless, 

the threat and the vulnerabilities are real and must be acknowledged, 

prioritized, and planned for by both the homeland defense and 

homeland security communities. While the Electromagnetic Pulse 
86

(EMP) Commission will present a thoroughly comprehensive list of 

recommendations in the near future, some broad recommendations 

are worthwhile presenting here.

As the Rumsfeld Commission warned, and the events of 

September 11tragically demonstrated, enemies of the United States 

will seek to attack in ways that the nation is not prepared for, using 

methodologies that have not been previously tried.73 The on-going 

effort to improve the intelligence agencies of the United States must 

continue. One particular area of emphasis for all members of the 

intelligence community should be the integration of adaptive red 

teams that are used to identify idiosyncratic methods of attacking 

the United States. 

The inevitable tension between homeland defense and homeland 

security creates a potential seam that must be recognized and 

eliminated or minimized. The efforts by U.S. Northern Command 

to craft a joint operating concept to close this seam are particularly 

promising. Similarly, the proactive relationships at multiple levels 

between the DHS and DoD indicate that both organizations are 

seeking diligently to mature their relationship. One specifi c area 

that should be developed by DoD as a matter of some urgency 

however, is a mandated series of planning sessions and simulations 

to determine the most effective and effi cient way to employ its 

resources in the aftermath of a HEMP attack. Specifi c care should 

be paid to the incorporation of the reserve component and returning 

overseas based military capabilities. Planning and prioritization 

of military assistance to civilian authorities in a post high altitude 

electromagnetic attack scenario should be of particular emphasis.

Another area of concern is that many of the remaining nuclear 

physicist personnel, specifi cally those associated with EMP, are 

retiring without a next generation to follow their lead.74 Similarly, the 

physical plant to conduct EMP testing and simulation has atrophied 

almost to the point of nonexistence.75 Building upon suggestions 

originally proposed in 1999, Congress should mandate and oversee 

the creation of an interagency, DoD-DHS led organization to 

champion the revitalization of both of these resources.76

Finally, as indicated earlier, the NSHS has made a good 

organizational start in several areas. Congress should mandate the 
87

DHS specifi cally incorporate HEMP into the appropriate initiatives 

in emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protection. 

Specifi cally, the DHS must conduct an analysis of the detailed 

vulnerabilities of various portions of the critical infrastructure to 

HEMP and, as a matter of priority, integrate selected initiatives to 

minimize critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.

CONCLUSION

Increasing proliferation of nuclear and ballistic missile technology, 

continued insecurity of fi ssile stockpiles, and the presence of capable 

adversaries dedicated to the destruction of the United States make 

a HEMP attack an increasingly likely scenario. A successful HEMP 

attack would severely damage the critical infrastructure that 

supports the national elements of power of the United States for an 

extended period of time. As such, the consequences of this type of 

attack are unacceptable. 

Implementation of the concepts contained in the NSS and 

the NSHS are achieving successes synchronizing the diplomatic, 

informational, economic, and military elements of national power 

to prevent a HEMP attack, while simultaneously establishing 

promising organizational frameworks which may help to prepare 

the United States for the consequences of such an attack. The 

approaching report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to 

the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack will provide 

extensive recommendations to mitigate the risks to the United 

States from a HEMP attack. This much is certain: the threat has not 

diminished; the vulnerabilities to this type of attack exist; there is 

much that can and must be done. 

The challenge will be for the nation and its leaders to hear 

the report, to evaluate objectively the recommendations, and to 

implement them effectively. In the end, the United States must 

ensure that, in the words of Colin Gray, it does not lose the only 

strategic resource that can never be regained: the time to act.

77

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. George W. Bush, “The NSS of The United States of America,” Washington, 

DC, 2002, p. 13.
88

2. Ibid., p. 15.

3. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, 

Military Research and Development Subcommittee, Dr. Gary Smith, Prepared 

Testimony, Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems 

and Civil Infrastructure, 105th Congress, 1st Session, July 16, 1997; available from 

http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997_h/h970716s.htm, Internet; accessed 

February 3, 2004.

4. Establishment of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States 

from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack; August 14, 2001; Available from http:

//armedservices.house.gov/reports/2001executivereports/01-08-14electromagnetic.pdf, 

Internet, accessed January 31, 2004. Specifi cally, the commission has been 

chartered to:

Assess the nature and magnitude of potential high-altitude EMP threats 

to the United States from all potentially hostile states or nonstate actors 

that have or could have or could acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic 

missiles enabling them to perform a high-altitude EMP attack against the 

United States within the next 15 years; the vulnerability of the United 

States military, and especially civilian systems, to EMP attack, given 

special attention to the vulnerability of the civilian infrastructure as a 

matter of emergency preparedness; the capability of the United States to 

repair and recover from damage infl icted on United States military and 

civilian systems by an EMP attack; the feasibility and cost of hardening 

select military and civilian systems against EMP attack.

5. Mike Frankel, Executive Director, EMP Commission, mfrankel@empc.org, 

“HEMP” electronic mail message to Thomas Riddle, thomas.c.riddle@us.army.mil, 

January 27, 2004. Mr. Frankel stated that the EMP Commission was not releasing 

any interim reports prior to its report to Congress.

6. The National Strategy for Homeland Security defi nes Homeland Security 

as “. . . a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United 

States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage 

and recover from attacks that do occur.” The Defense Planning Guidance defi nes 

Homeland Defense as “The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, 

domestic population and critical defense infrastructure against external threats 

and aggression.” 

7. National Communications System, Technology and Standards Division, 

Telecommunications: Glossary of Terms, August 7, 1996, available from http://

www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-013/_1938.htm, Internet, accessed October 19, 2003.

8. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, 

Military Research and Development Subcommittee, Dr. Lowell Wood, Prepared 

Testimony, “Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems 

and Civil Infrastructure,” 105th Congress, 1st Session, July 16, 1997; available 

from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has197010.000/has197010_0f.htm. 

Internet, accessed October 19, 2003.
89

9. Carlo Kopp, “The Electromagnetic Bomb―a Weapon of Electrical Mass 

Destruction,” 1996, available from http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/

kopp/apjemp.html, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003, p. 2. Kopp has written 

extensively on the subject of EMP and how it may be used against a technologically 

dependent adversary such as the United States. Due to the relative ease with 

which such attacks may be resourced and conducted, localized, non-nuclear EMP 

attacks are a subject of increasing concern among security professionals.

10. Samuel Glasstone, and Philip Dolan, eds., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 

Washington DC, 1997, p. 518. This book has an excellent chapter on the EMP 

effects generated by nuclear weapons and is one of the foundation references on 

the overall effects of nuclear weapons.

11. Congress, “Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military 

Systems and Civil Infrastructure,” p. 6. Interestingly, the explosive yield of a 

nuclear weapon is not as critical as the design―a device of less than 10 kilotons 

(optimized for the production of particular characteristics) can have much more of 

an EMP effect than a crudely designed weapon in the megaton range.

12. Congress, Smith, p. 3.

13. Ibid.

14. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on National Security, 

Military Research and Development Subcommittee, “Threat Posed by 

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil Infrastructure,” 

105th Congress, 1st Session, July 16, 1997, available from http://commdocs.house.gov/

committees/security/has197010.000/has197010_0f.htm; Internet, accessed October 19, 

2003, p. 14. Refer to Radasky, “High Altitude EMP (HEMP) Environments and 

Effects,” NBC Report, Spring/Summer 2002; Glasstone and Dolan, for additional 

details on the factors that infl uence the specifi c distribution of the HEMP-created 

electrical fi elds on the surface of the earth.

15. Congress, Smith, p. 3.

16. Dr. William A. Radasky, “High Altitude EMP (HEMP) Environments 

and Effects,” NBC Report, Spring/Summer 2002, pp. 24–27. This is an extremely 

informative article and is highly recommended for those interested in gaining an 

initial understanding of the E1, E2, and E3 components of a HEMP pulse and the 

generation mechanism for each.

17. Congress, “Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military 

Systems and Civil Infrastructure,” p. 15.

18. Congress, Smith, p. 4.

19. Congress, “Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military 

Systems and Civil Infrastructure,” p. 16.

20. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Small Business, 

Subcommittee on Government Programs and Oversight, “Electromagnetic Pulse 

(EMP): Should This be a Problem of National Concern to Private Enterprise, 
90

Businesses Small and Large, As Well As Government?” 106th Cong. 1st Session, 

June 7, 1999, available from http://www.house.gov/smbiz/hearings/106th/1999/990601/

transcript.html; Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. 

21. George W. Bush, “The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of 

Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,” Washington, DC, February 2003, p. 6. 

Critical Infrastructures are systems and assets, whether physical or 

virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of 

such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, 

national economic security, national public health or safety, or any 

combination of those matters.

22. Congress, “Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military 

Systems and Civil Infrastructure,” p. 20.

23. Bush, “The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructures and Key Assets,” p. 6.

24. Congress, “Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military 

Systems and Civil Infrastructure,” p. 35

25. Ibid., p. 34.

26. Institute for Science and International Security, “Nuclear Weapons 

Programs Worldwide: An Historical Overview,” available from http://www.isisonline.org/mapproject/introduction.html, Internet, accessed February 10, 2004, p. 

1. South Africa remains the only country to have succeeded in developing a 

nuclear weapon and then subsequently dismantling its weapons program. Three 

members of the former Soviet Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) inherited 

nuclear weapons but claim to have returned the weapons to Russia and declared 

themselves to be non-nuclear states. 

27. Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassifi ed Report to Congress on 

the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and 

Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1 Through June 30, 2003,” available 

from http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm, Internet, accessed 

February 24, 2003, p. 6.

28 Institute for Science and International Security, “Nuclear Weapons 

Programs Worldwide: An Historical Overview,” available from http://www.isisonline.org/ mapproject/introduction.html, Internet, accessed 10 February 2004, p.1.

29. Natural Resources Defense Council, “Iran Develops Nuclear Technologies 

in Secret for 18 Years,” December 12, 2003, available from http://www.nrdc.org/

nuclear/iaeaairan.asp, Internet, accessed February 10, 2004.

30. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Iran Signs Additional Protocol 

on Nuclear Safeguards,” December 18, 2003, available from http://www.iaea.org/

NewsCenter/News2002/iranap20031218.html, Internet, accessed February 10, 2004.

31. Bernard Levy, “Abdul Qadeer Khan,” Wall Street Journal, February 17, 

2004, p. A20.
91

32. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Crimes,” Washington Post, February 5, 2004, p. A20.

33. Ibid.

34. Greg Easterbrook, “The Atomic Club: If the Bomb is so Easy to Make, Why 

Don’t More Nations Have It?” New York Times, January 4, 2004, p. 4.1. 

35. Rensselaer Lee, “Nuclear Smuggling: Patterns and Responses,” Parameters, 

Spring 2003, available from http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/03spring/

lee.htm, Internet, accessed November 10, 2003.

36. Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 

“Executive Summary, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile 

Threat to the United States,” July 15, 1998, available from http://www.fas.org/irp/

threat/missile/rumsfeld/index.html, Internet, accessed February 1, 2004. 

37. Ibid.

38. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 

Military Research and Development Subcommittee, “Electromagnetic Pulse 

Threats to U.S. Military and Civilian Infrastructure,” 106th Cong. 1st Session, 

October 7, 1999. Available from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/

has280010.000/has280010_0.htm; Internet, accessed September 22, 2003, p. 68.

39. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Small Business, 

Subcommittee on Government Programs and Oversight, “Electromagnetic Pulse 

(EMP): Should This be a Problem of National Concern to Private Enterprise, 

Businesses Small and Large, As Well As Government?” 106th Cong. 1st Session, 

June 7, 1999. Available from http://www.house.gov/smbiz/hearings/106th/1999/

990601/transcript.html, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. 

40. National Intelligence Offi cer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, “Foreign 

Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015 (Unclassifi ed 

Summary of the National Intelligence Estimate),” December 2001, available from 

http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/bmthreat-2015.htm, Internet, accessed January 10, 2004.

41. Director of Central Intelligence, “Unclassifi ed Report to Congress on 

the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and 

Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1, Through 30 June 2003,” available 

from http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm, Internet, accessed 

February 24, 2003, p. 6.

42. Ibid.

43. George W. Bush, “The National Strategy for Homeland Security,”

Washington, DC, July 2002, p. 5.

44. George W. Bush, “The NSS of The United States of America,” p.1.

45. Ibid., p.6.

46. Ibid.

47. George J. Tenet, “Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” February 5, 

2004, available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publicaffairs/speeches/2004/tenetgeorgetow
92

nspeech02052004.html, Internet, accessed February 24, 2004. Also, George W. Bush, 

“President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,” February 

11, 2004, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/print/

20040211-4.html, Internet, accessed February 24, 2004.

48. Bradley Graham, “U.S. Missile Defense Set To Get An Early Start,” 

Washington Post, February 2, 2004. Also George W. Bush, “The NSS of The United 

States of America,” p. 15.

49. Bush, “The NSS of The United States of America,” p. 15.

50. Rensselaer Lee, “Nuclear Smuggling: Patterns and Responses,” Parameters, 

Spring 2003, available from http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/03spring/

lee.htm, Internet, accessed November 10, 2003.

51. White House, “Fact Sheet on Proliferation Security Initiative,” September 

4, 2003, available from http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-bin/client/modele.pl?se

ssion=dae.1024958.1064417927&modele=jdc_34, Internet, accessed September 24, 

2003.

52. Ibid. The PSI is cited by the White House as being consistent with the 

statement of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992 and 

recent statements of the G-8 and the European Union that more consistent and 

coherent efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD.

53. Ibid.

54. Bush, “The NSS of The United States of America,” p. 14.

55. Ibid.

56. George W. Bush, “The National Strategy for Homeland Security,” 

Washington, DC, July 2002, pp. iii–iv, vii. The NSHS broadly defi nes terrorism as 

“. . . any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare 

that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or governments.” 

The NSHS defi nition covers the use of nuclear weapons and “foreigners, acting in 

concert with others, on their own, or on behalf of a hostile state.” Presumably then, 

any HEMP attack conducted by persons other than the regular military of a hostile 

state could be considered a terrorist attack.

57. Ibid., p. vii.

58. Ibid., p. ix.

59. Ibid., p. 31.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., p. 33.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., p. ix.

64. Ibid., p. 33.

65. Ibid.
93

66.Department of Homeland Security, “Initial Response Plan Fact Sheet,” 

Washington, DC, October 10, 2003, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?t

heme=43&content=1936&print=true, Internet, accessed February 24, 2004.

67. Bush, “The National Strategy for Homeland Security,” p. 43.

68. George W. Bush, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HPSD-5,” 

Washington, DC, February 28, 2003, available from www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?

theme=42&content=4961, Internet, accessed January 20, 2004.

69. Bush, “The National Strategy for Homeland Security,” p. 43.

70. Ibid., p. 44.

71. Ibid.

72. Colin S. Gray, “Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror,” Parameters, 

Spring 2002, p. 9.

73. Montgomery C. Meigs. “Unorthodox Thoughts about Asymmetric 

Warfare,” Parameters, Summer 2003, p. 8. Meigs posits that the al Qaeda attacks 

on September 11, 2001, demonstrated the terrorist’s ability to combine asymmetry 

(techniques lacking a common basis of comparison) with an unorthodox approach 

to apply a capability (idiosyncrasy). Specifi cally, Meigs describes the terrorist 

attacks as the use of an asymmetric weapon combined with an idiosyncratic 

approach: “. . . the use of unique, one-time cellular teams and support structure 

formed for this particular operation, combined with stealth and surprise and 

culminating in an idiosyncratic approach by terrorists inserting themselves into 

the cockpits of airliners.” Meigs also observes that standards of living worldwide 

depend on technical systems that are susceptible to idiosyncratic threats and 

suggests that the operational patterns of al Qaeda indicate further attacks using 

idiosyncratic techniques and asymmetric means.

74. Wood.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, New York, 1999, p. 16.

95

CHAPTER 5

IRAQ, 2003-04, AND MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-18:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN ENDS AND MEANS

Lieutenant Colonel James D. Scudieri

This chapter presents a comparison of the linkage of strategic 

ends with operational ways and means between current operations 

in Iraq in 2003-04 and the British campaign in Mesopotamia in 1914-

18. The two campaigns took place literally over the same ground. 

The United States now, and Britain then, confronted signifi cant 

challenges in the projection and maintenance of military power in 

the Middle East. Moreover, the two great powers inherited daunting 

civil-military requirements.1

This chapter considers the conduct and integration of both 

military and post-confl ict operations. It will begin with a discussion 

of each campaign, analyzing its strategy. What strategic imperatives 

necessitated the initiation of military operations in this far-fl ung 

corner of the world? What strategic assumptions dictated operational, 

sometimes tactical, ways and means allocated for execution? In 

particular, how did strategy change over time? Did it change during 

the course of operational execution of both military and post-confl ict 

operations? 

Historical analysis often carries the burden of demonstrating 

clear lessons. This comparative analysis did not set out to prove any 

specifi c “lessons learned.” Rather, the author believes the value of 

history lies in its ability to provide “points of departure” for problem 

solving. The course of research and interpretation of evidence 

has unearthed signifi cant insights into the British experience in 

comparison to the American experience now ongoing. This chapter 

is too late to affect what has already transpired in Iraq in 2003, 

but it should provide insights relevant to the continued American 

presence in Iraq and for future deployments. 

MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-18: SWEEPING SUCCESS, DISASTER, 

AND RECOVERY

The British campaign in Mesopotamia during the First World 

War was primarily an Indian Army operation. British rule in India 
96

represented a unique aspect of the age of imperialism. British India 

encompassed what today are India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.2

Britain’s control in India underwent drastic revision following the 

Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The mutiny ended the political role of the 

Honourable East India Company. From this point, a select, chosen, 

British aristocracy governed India and controlled the Indian Civil 

Service (ICS). Its members could not own land in India or participate 

in trade. Unlike their contemporaries in Britain, they obtained their 

jobs through open, competitive examinations.3

The cabinet in London appointed a viceroy as senior head. He 

did not rise from within the ranks of the British-Indian aristocracy, 

and thus, in that sense was even more an outsider. The Viceroy was 

answerable to His Majesty’s Government with a supervisory chain 

that went back to the Secretary of State for India at the India Offi ce in 

Britain, who was a Cabinet Minister, and hence ultimately answerable 

to Parliament. Viceroys, who operated with excessive independence, 

faced recall.4 This political system granted the Viceroy considerable 

latitude, understandable in an age of limited communications.5 The 

Viceroy had a council of fi ve or six members, of whom one-third 

to one-half were outsiders in the same sense as he.6 This council, 

a critical component of British rule in India, originally included a 

military member.7

The Secretary of State for India also selected a Commanderin-Chief, India. The Commander-in-Chief, India was separate 

from the British Army’s Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Field 

Marshal Lord Kitchener’s tenure as Commander-in-Chief, India in 

Khartoum between 1899-1906 marked three milestones. Following 

the elimination of the three presidency armies of Bengal, Bombay, 

and Madras in 1895, he integrated all regiments within a single 

scheme of numbering and titles. The second established nine 

permanent divisions with fi xed brigades. The third abolished the 

military member of the Viceroy’s Council after a bitter, internecine 

political struggle with the Viceroy, Lord Curzon. The viceroy and 

commander-in-chief became the most powerful men in India.8

Britain’s leaders did not expect large-scale Indian Army 

participation in a world war. Diplomatic reconciliation with Russia 

in 1906 removed the long-time fear of a Muscovite invasion, but 
97

the turbulent kingdom in Afghanistan and volatile border tribes 

provided the Indian Army with suffi cient missions, considering 

its size. Thus, the North West Frontier and internal order were the 

principal missions, in accordance with extant constitutional practice, 

whereby the army’s principal role was defense and the maintenance 

of internal order.9 Moreover, the Indian Army did not possess the 

force structure or organization for distant expeditionary operations, 

especially against a modernized, regular army. 

Strategy and Conventional Operations In Mesopotamia.

There was neither intent nor plan to conduct operations in 

Mesopotamia upon the outbreak of the First World War. However, 

on the outbreak of war, the government of India and His Majesty’s 

Government discussed the participation of the Indian Army in 

imperial missions beyond South Asia. India agreed to provide troops 

to France and Aden.10 Subsequently, they sent an expeditionary force 

to East Africa as well. 

The region fi rst entered the strategic realm on August 25, 1914, 

with a requirement for the India Offi ce to prepare a ground force to 

guard the scattered refi neries of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company from 

Abadan Island, and gunboats to secure the Shatt-al-Arab estuary.11

This mission in modern parlance was a force deterrent option 

(FDO). The 16th Indian Brigade Group under Brigadier General 

W. S. Delamain reached Bahrain on October 23, 1914. Mesopotamia 

entered the strategic formula in October with the requirement for 

precautionary action to show British goodwill for the Arabs in the 

event of war with Turkey.12 Britain’s primary strategic aim was not 

to protect the oil fi elds. Rather, it was to show support for the Gulf 

sheikhs; to impress the Mesopotamian Arabs, who respected only 

tangible victory; and to ensure that the Arabs did not join the Turks 

in a jihad.

13 The British also worried about the sympathies of their 

Indian Muslim troops.14

Britain declared war on Turkey on November 5. In a contingency 

operation, the 16th Brigade landed at Fao on November 6 and secured 

the Shatt-al-Arab on the 14th. Delamein was under the overall 

command of Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Barrett, commander-
98

in-chief of Indian Expeditionary Force D, even though the parent 

6th Indian Division would not be complete until mid-December. 

Nonetheless, the British then decided to advance on Basra in order 

to reinforce success. Boldness paid off when Basra fell on November 

22. Operations continued north to ensure the port’s security, and the 

British took Qurna on December 9. 

The decision to advance on Baghdad itself lies at the heart of 

the controversy over British strategy.15 Both the viceroy and the 

commander-in-chief, India agreed that the forces available in India 

could not exceed a two-division corps due to other commitments: 

II Indian Corps under Lieutenant General John Nixon with the 6th 

and 12th Indian Divisions.16 There would be no reinforcements. This 

buildup to two divisions alone took until April 1915, and the two 

divisions even then still were not at 100 percent strength, especially 

in transport.17

Indian Expeditionary Force D resumed its advance in May 1915. 

Nixon had replaced Barrett on April 9 in command of operations, 

while Major General Sir Charles Townshend’s 6th Indian Division 

spearheaded the offensive. British victories in spite of severe 

environmental conditions, paltry logistical capability, and the 

hardships were extraordinary. Amara fell on June 3; Nasiriya, on 

July 25; and Kut al Amara, on September 28. 

The string of triumphs ceased at Ctesiphon on November 21, when 

the Turks repulsed all British attacks. At this point the 6th Indian 

Division was nearing collapse. Indeed, Townshend’s assessment 

of its state led to a revised plan to withdraw to Kut-al-Amara and 

accept a siege if necessary.18 Belated reinforcements would then aid 

the 12th Indian Division to rescue the 6th Indian Division and raise 

the siege. Unfortunately, the Turks stymied every attempt of the 

relief force, now under the command of Lieutenant General Sir. P. 

H. N. Lake, to break through.19 Townshend’s surrender of the halfstarved remnants of 6th Indian Division at Kut on April 29, 1916, 

turned success into disaster.20

Failure alone should not be the mere criteria of a strategy’s 

wisdom. Hindsight makes an indictment of the British insistence 

to push on to Baghdad in 1915 relatively easy. Such criticism fails 

to take account of the changing imperatives of strategy over time, 
99

especially during wartime. This chapter needs to emphasize fi ve 

points. First, British decision and strategy making took careful 

note of operations in other theaters. British strategists were keen 

to assess second- and third-order effects with Afghanistan, the 

North-West Frontier, Persia, Arabistan, Arabia, Egypt, Gallipoli, 

and the Caucasus.21 Strategists also understood the fi ckle nature 

of Arab support, which rallied to the winner and plundered the 

loser. Second, the Mesopotamian Campaign brought the Indian 

Army to a state of strategic overextension.22 It was a secondary 

theater, a sideshow among several sideshows, that existed in an 

environment of insuffi cient troops and resources.23 The Indian 

Army was balancing the demands of France, Egypt, and East Africa, 

while simultaneously executing an unprecedented expansion.24

The exploits of Indian Expeditionary Force D through November 

1915 had been truly admirable. Indeed, they led to the third point. 

Continued victory bred an underestimation of the Turks. Obviously 

surprised by the British incursion into Mesopotamia, the Turks 

rebounded, so the British faced a revitalized foe at Ctesiphon.25

Fourth, inadequate logistics capability fi nally broke down. Indian 

Expeditionary Force D’s combat service support was inadequate 

from the campaign’s start. River transportation was a concern from 

December 1914 and only deteriorated thereafter.26 Continued tactical 

and operational success never rested on a fi rm structure. The costly 

repulse at Ctesiphon broke the back of the administrative services. 

There was an inadequate appreciation how tactical and operational 

success rested upon an effi cient port operation at Basra and a robust 

transportation system to project military power and sustain it.27 One 

effect was a collapse in medical support.28

Two aspects of this logistical breakdown warrant further 

comment. Strategic decisionmakers and operational commanders 

and staff maintained a parsimonious, peacetime obsession with 

“economy,” creating “an indisposition to forward or press demands” 

regardless of need, and too often in an atmosphere of isolation 

from front-line realities. They did not abandon this obsession with 

economy after the war started, despite the fact that Parliament had 

already approved funding of the Indian Army’s expenses on all 

overseas missions conducted on behalf of the Empire.29 A number 
100

of operational commanders and staff offi cers also squelched those 

who asked for additional resources. The Parliamentary commission 

convened to investigate the disaster at Kut thus commented sharply 

on the glaring failure to anticipate and expedite fi xes.30 Administrative 

confusion resulting from two differing systems, Indian and British, 

exacerbated matters.31 Kitchener’s elimination of the military 

member of the Viceroy’s Council forced the Commander-in-Chief, 

India and his staff to do both jobs, since the administrative structure 

and system still functioned as if there were two separate offi ces.32

The Commander-in-Chief, India could not possibly perform both 

jobs effectively with active operations on three continents and in the 

midst of its greatest expansion in its history. 

Another defi ciency which the Parliamentary Commission cited 

specifi cally was the unprecedented volume of correspondence 

among senior offi cials marked as “private.” The Commission 

viewed this practice with undisguised concern. They concluded that 

this departure from practice in effect “dispossessed” the staffs from 

their superiors. The Commission believed that the staffs could have 

worked solutions for the logistical shortfalls more easily and quicker 

than otherwise happened.33

Finally, the decision making process which pushed Indian 

Expeditionary Force D into a march on Baghdad was unlike 

anything His Majesty’s Government and the Government of India 

had ever anticipated. The balance in relationships between the 

Government of India and the India Offi ce had broken down. The 

responsibility to capture Baghdad rested with Nixon; his political 

advisor, Sir Percy Cox; and the Commander-in-Chief, India Sir 

Beauchamp Duff, with the support of Viceroy Lord Hardinge of 

Penshurst. Together they instituted a major policy change refl ecting 

their assessment, without the proper degree of consultation with the 

Secretary of State for India and the India Offi ce in England. This gap, 

in turn, resulted in a dearth of information among British cabinet 

members. The Parliamentary Commission concluded that the 

Home Government in London lacked an appreciation of the scope 

of Nixon’s instructions from Duff as far back as April-May 1915, 

which had told him to resume the advance. Moreover, pushing onto 

Baghdad constantly appeared in their discussions.34 There was not 
101

necessarily a conspiracy by the Government of India; events moved 

quickly. The communications fl ow between Mesopotamia, India, 

and London left ample opportunity for confusion.35

Deliberate, painstaking reorganization and buildup took place 

before the British resumed the offensive. The British War Offi ce 

assumed operational control from February 1916 and all policy and 

management from July 1916.36 Lieutenant General Sir F. S. Maude 

replaced Lake on August 28, 1916. The British captured Baghdad 

in March 1917 with seven divisions in two corps supported with a 

robust theater support structure. Indeed, the Indian Army defeated 

two Turkish corps in 6 weeks.37 Even then, the British did not 

continue the advance north for another 8 months, capturing Tikrit 

in November 1917 and Mosul only in October 1918. Originally 

starved of troops and materiel, the Indian Army eventually reached 

a strength of 420,000 in Mesopotamia.38

“Post-Confl ict” Operations in Mesopotamia.

There was no more of a plan to conduct post-confl ict operations 

than there was an operational plan to achieve victory. British 

intervention in Mesopotamia created a political vacuum once the 

Turks withdrew. Moreover, when the Turks departed, they left a wake 

of urban destruction by ensuring nothing of use and/or value fell 

into enemy hands. The British then implemented a highly-successful 

reconstruction operation. Certain aspects survived through the postwar period of mandate until Iraq became independent in 1930. 

The Arabs were receptive to British overtures. The large Turkish 

administrative machinery had existed largely on paper. Recognized 

authority rested upon the village headman, tribal sheikh, and 

local seiyid.

39 Thus, local and imposed institutions had remained 

separate and distinct. The British could still not take Arab support 

for granted. Arab loyalty went to the winner; any loser was a prime 

subject for plunder. This reality spelled the difference between 

relative tranquility and a line of communications subject to constant 

harassment. The Turks did use Arab irregular units but these 

generally participated in conventional operations. There was no 

concerted Turkish effort against British lines of communications. 
102

The threat was the Arab interest in booty.40 The British also had to 

show the will to remain in the areas they conquered to maintain 

Arab support. Turkish retribution in a reoccupied area would have 

been merciless. 

Certain aspects of “reconstruction” refl ected military necessity. 

For example, Arthur Lawley, a Red Cross Commissioner, visited 

Basra and Amarah in early 1916 in response to a request for 

assistance from the Viceroy. Lawley noted that Basra had an 

adequate water supply, an effective “anti-fl y” crusade, and sound 

sanitation. The inhabitants had to conform to these regulations 

and benefi ted from them.41 Basra was the primary seaport of 

debarkation in Mesopotamia, so the British built numerous wharves, 

warehouses, railroads, etc. Basra was just one example of massive 

British investment in infrastructure which demonstrated the will 

to stay over the long haul and the generosity to make permanent 

improvements. 

Basra eventually set the example for the rest of Mesopotamia’s 

major cities, but the expansion of reconstruction operations all 

over the country was a major resource challenge following the 

fall of Baghdad. Politicians in London wanted to preserve the 

”existing administrative machinery” with participation from local 

representatives, thus reducing the British presence to an advisory 

function. This idea was not viable. There was no existing machinery 

of government, and Arabs did not come forward initially. Besides 

assurances of no Turkish return, they awaited news of British 

intentions as to the post-war government in the Mesopotamian 

Valley.42

The British progressed well beyond projects of military necessity. 

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Wilson, himself a Civil Commissioner, 

proudly recorded the growth of a civil administration behind and 

on the fl anks of the army. Its mission was clearly to replace the 

Turkish administration, “to make good by successive instalments 

[sic] the promises of liberty, justice, and prosperity so freely made to 

the Arab inhabitants at the very outset of the campaign.”43 Gertrude 

Bell, a civil servant who visited Mesopotamia in early 1916 from 

Egypt, typifi ed this dedication. Her visit to Mesopotamia became 

permanent. She commented on February 8, 1918, “We are pledged 

here. It would be an unthinkable crime to abandon those who have 

loyally served us.”44
103

The fi rst British action upon entering Basra was to establish 

“public order” in the city. The Turkish police chief and his staff were 

gone; looters had sacked the city within 48 hours of their departure. 

British and Indian military police were patrolling the streets within 

hours of the British entry into Basra on November 22, 1914, but they 

were few in number. Wilson acknowledged the challenges in forming 

a permanent police force. Initially, offi cers were Moslem Indians 

from the Punjab. They successfully established civil peace by April 

1915 and extended these urban patrols to Amara a few weeks later, 

then to Naziriya.45 Upon occupying Baghdad, the British conducted 

house-to-house searches for weapons and prioritized occupation of 

road connections and bridges.46 They supplemented military police 

and troops with two forces. Local headmen formed small patrols in 

the smaller towns. The British recruited an irregular, district police 

to patrol the hinterlands. Their name roughly came from the Persian 

for night watchmen. These district police proved highly successful, 

relieving the army of the need to provide many road and river 

patrols.47

An important step in the establishment of a viable civil 

administration was the painstaking collection, organization, 

and systematization of information. Reassigned to the Political 

Department, Gertrude Bell played a key role here. She classifi ed 

tribal data and other details, beginning with information obtained 

from the Intelligence Department, then adding updates based upon 

the continued British advance. By February 1917, she could claim 

that her offi ce had not only organized a mass of data, but all tribal 

and some other material was available in offi cial circulars. Thus, it 

had compiled an exact accounting of the country as the British found 

it.48 The process had taken 11 months. 

Perhaps the soundest success story was in the legal system, which 

demonstrated by daily action the British reputation for fair, impartial 

justice. Senior Judicial Offi cer and barrister Lieutenant Colonel S. G. 

Knox presided with a temporary/provincial Code of Law, using 

a combination of Indian and Turkish law, from April 1915. After 

the fall of Baghdad in March 1917, courts conducted business with 

an “Iraq Occupied Territory Code” in Arabic. These replaced all 

military courts for cases not involving the safety of the armed forces. 
104

Signifi cantly, the British used the sheikhs and religious leaders in the 

administration of justice, integrating both tribal custom and Islamic 

law. This system formed the basis for a unitary Iraqi court system.49

British civil administration became increasingly effective. In 

the summer of 1917 the senior Political Offi cer became the civil 

commissioner in Baghdad, who had deputies in the other major 

cities. Civil administrators remained under military authority.50

The junior offi cials were quite young, often captains and majors 

from the Indian Army.51 Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs from the Indian 

Political Department became the head of a Revenue Department. 

A separate Customs Department fell under Mr. C. R. Watkins, who 

came from the Imperial Indian Customs Service. The British also 

fostered the development of a press with the establishment of The 

Basra Times on November 29, 1914. It was a government paper until 

commercialization in 1921. Later, The Baghdad Times published in 

English and Arabic, becoming an Arab government press in 1921. A 

major from the Indian Medical Service began a civil medical system 

on December 30, 1914, and became the fi rst civil surgeon. The port 

health and quarantine services, a civil service which helped the 

army, dealt with plague in the winter of 1916 and the spring of 1917, 

and the 1918 infl uenza outbreak, which did not hit Mesopotamia as 

hard as it did Persia and Europe.52

A viable currency system became a necessity in the light of 

developing revenues from taxation and customs duties. The British 

began by setting up branches of the Imperial Bank of Persia which 

dealt in rupees, rather than gold as in Arabia. They still faced the 

challenge of limited acceptance of paper notes, especially in Baghdad. 

Constant assessment and timely response precluded a currency 

crisis and passed a rigorous audit. The British even implemented an 

interim postage stamp system.53

Finally, the British effort at reconstruction in Mesopotamia 

included a rough, embryonic form of what today would be termed 

interagency operations and coordination with nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs). Thus, Lawley commented favorably upon 

the military cooperation he received. Indeed, he commented that 

Mesopotamia saw a “fresh recognition” by army authorities of 

the Red Cross as an integral part of the military medical service.54
105

However, in general there remained a tension between the civil 

administration and the army throughout operations in Mesopotamia. 

First, running the civil service was a major drain on military 

manpower. Townshend commented in late 1915 that he asked in 

vain for the return of his British soldiers to 6th Indian Division who 

were functioning as policemen, clerks, and sundry augmentees to 

help run and protect the river transport.55 The civil administration 

drew heavily on personnel from India: the Indian Army, the reserve 

of offi cers, civil service, Imperial and provincial police forces, as well 

as those who had been serving in the Sudan, Egypt, and Britain. The 

other major tension resulted from differing attitudes towards the 

Arabs. Civil administrators, whether civilian or military, eventually 

spent years dealing with the general staff and military departments 

who remembered only Arab hostility, theft, and rapacity.56 However, 

military offi cials learned that fi ning was a more effective retaliation 

and deterrent against Arab marauders than burning and shelling 

villages.57

The British campaign in Mesopotamia began as a strictly limited 

operation. Excessive ambition led to disaster, the fall of Kut in April 

1916. An advance to Baghdad in 1915 was indeed a failure in matching 

ends and means―the proverbial bridge too far. Paul K. Davis titled 

his 1994 book Ends and Means aptly. However, the modern reader 

cannot appreciate how the Government of India in particular 

was sensitive to any threat of jihad. The threat was no chimera.58

Driving a political and social wedge between the Arabs and Turks 

was crucial in Delhi’s view, and that course of action demanded 

military success and support for the Arabs. Thus, the need for Arab 

cooperation became an obsession.59 The prize would be favorable 

repercussions in Mesopotamia, Persia, Afghanistan, the North West 

Frontier, and within India itself. This imperative appeared all the 

more critical in the light of the failed Gallipoli expedition and the 

periodic delays in the advance on Baghdad. Basra alone did not 

meet the strategic imperative.60 Unfortunately, the Indian Army, 

as an imperial strategic reserve, already had expended its available 

manpower. The Indian Army was in too many locations when the 

Government of India needed more troops to capitalize upon success 

and achieve a decisive victory. Overwhelming political need drove a 

strategy without commensurate means. 
106

The end of the First World War was merely a passing event for the 

civil administration. Mesopotamia became a British mandate under 

the League of Nations. Much work remained. The religious question 

was signifi cant.61 Achieving a lasting political settlement would 

prove diffi cult in the wake of regional diplomatic contradictions 

such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration. 

The former divided the Ottoman provinces among the Entente. 

In general, France obtained Syria and Lebanon. Britain received 

Palestine, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, though Jerusalem originally 

was supposed to be under international jurisdiction. Britain in 

essence compromised previous commitments to the Arabs. The 

Balfour Declaration complicated matters even further with its 

favorable stance on the establishment of a Jewish national home 

in Palestine. The British also were unable to fi nd a viable successor 

ruler within Iraq. They chose Feisal, the third son of Sherif Hussein 

ibn Ali, Amir of Mecca and King of the Hejaz.62 Nonetheless, the 

British Mesopotamian Campaign demonstrated the successful, 

simultaneous conduct of conventional combat and reconstruction 

operations. 

IRAQ, 2003: THE STRATEGY OF PREEMPTION

This comparative analysis views the invasion of Iraq in March 

2003 as a comprehensive strategy for the Global War on Terrorism, 

the Middle and Near East, and the wider view of foreign policy, since 

all are interrelated.63 The clear focus of the Global War on Terrorism 

is upon radical, Islamic fundamentalism. Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM in Afghanistan was a retaliatory strike. Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM is a different case altogether. It targeted a potential 

ally of Islamic terrorists like al-Qaeda. Regime change removed a 

major destabilizing element in the region, in particular for Israel, 

Kuwait, and Iran. In the long run, American intervention to help the 

Iraqi people could demonstrate the viability of a representational 

form of government in Arab Moslem states. Toppling the Saddam 

dictatorship and Ba’athist oligarchy sent a clear, if radical, warning to 

other potential foes, e.g., North Korea, Iran, and Syria.64 Preemption 

would also eliminate any weapons of mass destruction and punish 

Saddam Hussein for defi ance of UN resolutions.65
107

The Osama bin Laden tape of early January 2004 supports 

this interpretation. He was disappointed that Arab rulers failed 

miserably to resist American efforts in Operations ENDURING 

FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, torpedoing any chance of a great 

Islamic rising. In Iraq American and coalition forces have begun 

to turn the tide against a poorly-supported insurgency. Worse, he 

views the “capitulation” of Iran, Libya, and even Syria as a most 

unsatisfactory, global strategic situation.66

The Rolling Campaign Start.

The American military conducted detailed, systematic, 

continuous planning prior to the invasion of Iraq. Indeed, the 

campaign may have been the most planned operation since D-Day 

on June 6, 1944, and Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, although 

plans changed constantly during the fi nal months and weeks.67 Two 

aspects of that planning warrant particular examination. The fi rst 

concerns the implications, tactical and logistical, of the so-called 

rolling start. The second concerns the nature and degree of prewar 

planning for Phase IV or post-confl ict operations. 

There was considerable controversy about the operational 

ramifi cations of the rolling start. The inability to land the 4th Infantry 

Division (Mechanized) in Turkey in order to launch an attack from the 

northern front represented a major loss of combat power. However, 

commanders demonstrated that adequate combat forces were on 

the ground to execute decisive operations. However, success does 

not mean that more combat power was not a requirement. Indeed, 

the sheer rapidity of success with so few troops perhaps resulted 

in a psychological misunderstanding of the depth of their defeat on 

the part of the Iraqis. This chapter, however, will focus more on the 

effects on logistics and post-confl ict operations. 

The most glaring defi ciency for the conduct of decisive 

operations that emerged from the rolling-start was a failure in 

logistics. Generally speaking, bulk fuel, ammunition, food, and 

water suffi ced, albeit to different degrees; habitual sustainment was 

an overall challenge. The timely delivery of Class IX repair parts 

was an especially-glaring failure.68 Logisticians at all echelons lacked 
108

timely knowledge of actual requirements, visibility of where items 

were in the pipeline, and an effective transportation network.69 There 

was no deliberate, tiered establishment of a logistics architecture of 

direct support and general support units at corps and theater levels. 

Worse, logistics units had no priority in the deployment sequence.70

The sheer effort required for the results obtained, and the handto-mouth existence which ensued in certain commodities, do not 

represent acceptable standards.71 While Iraq was different from 

Afghanistan, the repetition of certain logistical challenges suggests a 

failure to integrate lessons learned from one operation to another.72

Post-Confl ict Operations.

There was considerable discussion about the challenges 

of reconstructing an Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s defeat well 

before the war commenced. Writer James Fallows has articulated 

convincingly that nearly everything that has occurred in Iraq since 

the fall of Saddam’s regime was the subject of prewar discussion and 

analysis, laid out in detail and in writing for decisionmakers. Those 

discussions began in October 2001.73

The breadth and depth of prewar analysis are impressive. One 

think tank assessed potential human problems following war.74 An 

exceptionally-detailed study identifi ed four broad categories for 

post-confl ict reconstruction: security, governance and participation, 

justice and reconciliation, and social and economic well-being.75 The 

U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute study laid out a 

detailed mission matrix for Iraq with a transition phase beginning 

during the Decisive Operations phase.76 Begun in October 2002, 4 

months elapsed before the study’s publication in February 2003. 

Commentators often view the document as a superb analysis of 

lessons learned in Iraq. Yet the authors’ intent was to publish clear 

guidelines prior to the invasion.77 The State Department Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs began a comprehensive, classifi ed analysis 

in March 2002, which became the “Future of Iraq Project.”78 It 

concluded that reconstruction would require a long-term, expensive 

commitment.79

Two observations emerge from an unclassifi ed analysis of the 

U.S. Government’s prewar strategic planning. First, the plan for 
109

the post-confl ict phase, due to factors of time and the focus on 

decisive military operations, was inadequate for the sheer scope 

of the mission, which, in fact, occurred. A “rolling-start” campaign 

with its emphasis on rapid “decisive action” and “shock and awe” 

could not focus with minute detail on the establishment of effective 

bureaucratic administration and the execution of essential public 

services over the long haul. However, of greater signifi cance were 

faulty assumptions at strategic level which refused to credit and 

accept the detailed, prewar post-confl ict planning.80 One writer 

contends that Pentagon plans for postwar Iraq rested on three 

assumptions―all of which turned out false.81 Others have echoed the 

assessment concerning false planning assumptions.82

What did all this mean on the ground? In short, the conception 

of the “rolling-start” did not understand or rejected the notion that 

Phase IV operations would require more troops than Phase III. Hence, 

there were no provisions for deployment of robust follow-on forces 

to assume a signifi cant security mission, e.g., more combat units and/

or a military police brigade with appropriate subordinate elements. 

Instead, troops intended to participate in decisive operations, whose 

deployment the Pentagon had delayed, became de-facto security 

forces upon arrival in Iraq. Most were already too late to prevent 

much of the looting, but they did little to stop what looting was still 

occurring upon arrival.83 The decision of Paul Bremer, head of the 

Coalition Provisional Authority, to disband the Iraqi armed forces 

exacerbated diffi culties. De-Ba’athifi cation of the Iraqi military did 

not require total disbandment of the army. Granted, numerous 

Iraqi forces simply melted away, but internal disintegration does 

not explain the entire story. Disbandment created a pool of armed, 

unemployed Iraqis who became part of the problem.84

Likewise, the plan should have “packaged” a signifi cant force 

of combat support and combat service support units to begin 

the humanitarian, stability, and support operations. Admittedly, 

fi nding the correct mix and number of units was a daunting task―

and will remain so. But there was no realistic alternative. The lack 

of international support reduced UN participation to a minimum. 

Moreover, NGOs did not fl ee Iraq only in the wake of the latest terror. 

They had largely abandoned Iraq as far back as mid-1992.85 Those few 
110

present in 2003 lacked on-the-ground experience.86 Coalition troops, 

in fact, did well in humanitarian operations―in large measure due 

to the preparation for and study of worst-case scenarios.87 However, 

the Combined Forces Land Component Commander lacked the 

ground forces and the direction to inaugurate other post-confl ict 

operations with a fi rm hand.

American military capability in the 21st century is clear. This 

superiority notwithstanding, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM before it, appear as attempts 

to wage war “on the cheap.” Stated differently, Phase III decisive 

operations now require fewer troops than Phase IV. However, while 

the former wins the war, the latter wins the peace. 

LESSONS LEARNED

A comparison of the First World War’s Campaign in 

Mesopotamia by British forces and the current American/coalition 

operation in Iraq highlights differences as well as similarities. In 

the interest of balance, this chapter will begin with the differences. 

First, there is little comparison between the levels of strategic and 

operational planning of the two campaigns. The British had no 

intent of operating in Mesopotamia in August 1914. They eventually 

formulated and executed a contingency operation a mere 3 months 

later in November 1914. The American operation came after 

meticulous planning, albeit subject to considerable change and with 

certain, signifi cant, misconceived assumptions. 

Second, conventional, military or “decisive” operations 

proceeded along different lines. The British had to advance in 

distinct phases, in particular after the disastrous surrender of 

Townshend in Kut in April 1916. Two years and four months passed 

from the initial British landing in the Shatt-al-Arab to the capture 

of Baghdad. Conversely, the American offensive was a single, 

sweeping campaign that involved a swift advance to Baghdad and 

the rapid overrunning of the entire country. The conventional Iraqi 

defense was feeble compared to expectations―the absence of urban 

fi ghting a pleasant surprise. President George Bush declared major 

combat operations over in 6 weeks. The shock came later. 
111

Third, the British faced an easier task in the conduct of posthostilities operations for one distinct reason. Ineffective Turkish rule 

over the Arabs left viable, local institutions. The British were able 

to capitalize on these local institutions and link them with British 

organization and concepts of justice, as well as the rule of law to 

establish political and social order. Their major task was simply to 

demonstrate Britain’s intention to remain. The Americans faced a 

far more daunting task. The Iraqi people were not just venturing 

into unexplored ground. A quarter-century of unprecedented fear 

and repression had left Iraqis psychologically paralyzed in every 

way, and utterly unprepared to do anything in a cooperative 

manner. Newfound freedom confl icted with fear of the past and 

the unknown.88 Expatriate Iraqi population elements frankly misled 

planners and/or decisionmakers and bred misconceptions about 

how to proceed effectively.89

However, some fascinating similarities emerge from this 

comparative analysis. First, both campaigns had to conduct postconfl ict operations as a result of successful combat operations. 

Granted, the initial basic strategies appear to exhibit drastic 

differences in scale. The British originally intended a peripheral 

operation to protect friendly Arab rulers and develop pro-British 

sentiment to preclude successful, Arab-Turkish holy war. The 

American goal of regime change in 2003 was far more ambitious 

from the start. But both fi lled a political vacuum. 

Second, this chapter concludes, rather harshly in some minds, 

that both the Mesopotamian Campaign through 1916 and the Iraqi 

Campaign in 2003 were logistical failures. Logistics exerted such 

signifi cant constraints and restraints as to inhibit commanders at the 

tactical level. Both the British in 1914-15 and the Americans in 2003 

took considerable risks, given inadequate logistics in the theater. 

Interestingly, transportation shortfalls fi gured prominently in both 

campaigns: boats for river transport in Mesopotamia, and trucks for 

ground line haul and air transport in Iraq. Mesopotamia scandalized 

the British with the utter breakdown of medical services. In Iraq the 

breakdown lay in selected supply and services, especially in Class IX 

repair parts, although asset visibility and distribution management 

in general failed to meet expectations. 
112

Third, combat operations triumphed singularly against the 

enemy. The Turks in late 1914-early 1915, and again in 1917-18, 

and the Iraqis in 2003―were simply no match for their opponents. 

But these triumphs did not end the fi ghting. Both the British and 

Americans still faced chronic threats to their lines of communication. 

This threat differed slightly in scope and origin. The principal 

British foe was the Arab raider, interested in plunder and preying 

on the weak, losing side. As ultimate British success became more 

evident, this raiding petered out. The Americans faced a more 

fanatical, ideologically-motivated threat, which crystallized into an 

insurgency, one which the American and coalition partners appear 

to be gradually winning as of January 2004.90 However, both the 

British in 1914-18 and the Americans in 2003-04 were fortunate 

that their opponents had no comprehensive plan to target lines of 

communication. Otherwise, already-stretched supply lines might 

well have collapsed. 

Fourth, neither the British nor the Americans took suffi cient 

note of post-hostility requirements in planning. Indeed, both 

governments, in 1917 and 2002-03, expected short periods of 

transition to Arab self-rule. Both views were extremely optimistic, 

if not myopic and fanciful. Defeat of the enemy army brought the 

fall of the state and left a power vacuum. Both campaigns also 

demonstrated excessively-optimistic expectations of Arab support, 

both domestically “in country” and internationally in the region. 

Fifth, both the British in Mesopotamia and the Americans in 

Iraq instituted largely ad-hoc post-confl ict operations. The British 

in Mesopotamia capitalized on a wealth of available talent in 

offi cials who had decades of experience in India, Egypt, the Sudan, 

and knowledge of the Persian Gulf region. They were also able to 

develop procedures in the Basra vilayet fi rst, before moving onto 

Baghdad. The Americans faced a more diffi cult mission, and lacked 

a similar pool of long-experienced personnel. Nonetheless, adaptable 

soldiers, many with previous experience in the Balkans, exercised 

initiative and devised suitable methods at local level. The effort still 

appears more halting and, indeed, amateurish in comparison. This 

statement in no way diminishes the phenomenal accomplishments 

of troops who identifi ed a need and set to work with zeal. The 
113

comment underlines the abject failure to prepare at strategic and 

operational levels for a comprehensive nation-building operation. 

A dire result, even a year following the invasion, is a damaging 

insurgency. Another after effect has been the sheer ignorance on the 

home front and in the international community of what the coalition 

forces already have accomplished. 

Thus, the recent British after action report for Iraq not surprisingly 

concluded that a great deal of advance planning must occur “a 

long time ahead of a decision to undertake the military option” 

of intervention.91 A signifi cant mitigating factor for Iraq has been 

that sheer secrecy worked against the ability to conduct in-depth, 

interagency planning,92 as the British Mesopotamian “private” 

correspondence had stymied full cooperation.

Sixth, security became the primary post-confl ict mission 

requirement. In both Mesopotamia and Iraq, the interval between the 

defeat of the enemy’s armed forces with the collapse of any residue 

political authority, and the occupation of key facilities and nodes by 

friendly forces was critical. The majority of the looting took place 

during this period of unmistakable power voids in both confl icts.93

Seventh, and perhaps most signifi cantly, the armed forces, mainly 

the Army, became the primary tool of action. The Indian Army in 

1914-18 and the U.S. Army and coalition forces in 2003 conducted 

nation-building because there was no one else able to do so. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

This comparative analysis suggests several important 

recommendations for senior leaders. First, expeditionary operations 

by U.S. forces to problem areas of the world will likely continue 

in the 21st century. American political leadership may determine 

another regime change to be necessary. Intervention may occur in a 

failed state. Whatever the reason, U.S. armed forces must be ready 

to conduct both decisive combat and post-confl ict operations in a 

theater simultaneously. Hence, post-confl ict operations require the 

same depth and breadth of joint and combined/coalition planning 

before operations commence as that devoted to the conduct of decisive 

operations, as well as the added complexity of integrated and 

synchronized interagency planning. 
114

Moreover, plans for the Middle and Near East should avoid the 

temptation to overestimate the scope of potential Arab support for 

any Western intervention operation.94 Such support for Western 

action, regardless of the justice or necessity, cannot overcome 

historical suspicion and resentment. However, more effective 

information operations can mitigate the effects. 

Second, even the best efforts of the UN and the dedication of NGOs 

and international organizations will be unable to accomplish much 

in the early stages. The death of a state, no matter how oppressive 

or how feeble, will be a traumatic experience. Invariably there will 

be signifi cant infrastructure challenges, due to destruction, damage, 

or simple nonexistence. The U.S. Army will remain the primary 

instrument of post-confl ict operations during initial intervention 

and for an indeterminate period thereafter. Frankly, no one else has 

the resources to do the job. 

Third, the primary post-confl ict mission is to establish security. 

This requirement almost always will necessitate a dual task, the 

simultaneous conduct of decisive operations with military operations 

other than war (MOOTW) law-and-order missions. A political and 

societal power vacuum marks this sensitive period. The sooner the 

occupying force establishes presence, the fewer the losses to wanton 

looting. 

Fourth, Army logistics requires signifi cant overhauling in order 

to sustain the warfi ghter effectively in the 21st century. The vision 

for the fi xes exists; the issue is funding.95 The “bottom-line” is that 

the logistics doctrine which won the Cold War and the First Gulf 

War is not fl exible enough for short-notice, expeditionary warfare. 

Best-business practices, which created effi ciencies in the 1990s, have 

proven incapable of delivering “just-in-time” logistics support. The 

necessary technological enablers were absent. Such tools exist, but 

are expensive. These effi ciencies must combine with more fl exible 

and responsive support for “reach-back” sustainment to provide 

proper support forward. Even when a proper system is in place, 

experience in both Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI 

FREEDOM suggests the need still for larger stocks in units for shortterm use followed by sustainment from the strategic, wholesale 

supply system. However, a theater-level logistics structure will most 
115

likely still be required. Moreover, this sustainment pipeline can also 

no longer assume 100 percent security of all lines of communication 

“from factory to foxhole.” Finally, Army logistics unit structure 

requires considerable streamlining. There are too many levels for 

expeditionary warfare. 

Fifth, the experience of expeditionary warfare to the world’s 

problem areas over the last decade has highlighted signifi cant 

shortfalls in Army force structure. Simultaneous operations in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, Kosovo, Bosnia, and the Sinai have severely taxed 

active and reserve components alike, given the requirements for 

both initial-entry and follow-on forces. The strains began in 1995 

with the onset of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. The addition of 

Afghanistan and now Iraq, which equates to a major theater of war 

given the numbers deployed, has nearly broken the system. This 

dilemma is the result of an army force structure geared to fi ght a 

Cold War gone “hot,” during which the nation would have time for 

a deliberate mobilization. The need now is to respond to generally 

short-notice, then simultaneous, open-ended, expeditionary and/or 

imperial-policing operations.

The Total Army requires radical restructuring between active 

and reserve components. This restructuring is not about saving 

Army divisions. Rather, it must deal with the entire range of combat, 

combat support, and combat service support units, their specifi c 

type, and the proportional alignment among active and reserve 

components in order to optimize the capability desired both to 

implement national policy, and in accordance with the deployment 

guidelines of the Secretary of Defense’s Memorandum dated July 9, 

2003, and entitled Rebalancing Forces. The answers must address 

not only rebalancing the current ratio, but also the potential need to 

raise new units. For example, the ratio of transportation truck, water 

purifi cation, maintenance, or general supply units may alter between 

reserve and active components without changing the total number. 

Other requirements are small, extremely low-density organizations 

with highly-specialized capabilities that can facilitate deployment 

or conduct signifi cant infrastructure tasks during the early stages 

of post-confl ict operations. The former category includes the array 

of transportation units related to movement control, as well as 
116

other logistics units which execute port support activities. The latter 

category includes diverse units like vertical (construction) engineers, 

facility/utility engineers, engineer fi re fi ghting detachments, and the 

rarely-mentioned railroad units. 

Sixth, there is need for closer, deeper integration between the 

Departments of State and Defense. Though not preferred, the 

British experience in Mesopotamia and the American experience in 

Iraq―and virtually every “small war” in the 20th century for that 

matter―has demonstrated that the military must remain in charge 

of initial post-confl ict operations, not only to ensure security, but 

also to conduct a host of noncombat missions for which the Army 

alone possesses the capability. These missions must begin while decisive 

operations are still ongoing. Moreover, their duration is uncertain. 

Finally, the nature of confl ict in the 21st century has spotlighted the 

need for a doctrine of interagency operations in a deployed theater.96

This chapter also recommends that such doctrine recognize the 

initial preeminence of the Department of Defense in an operational 

theater, to include the commencement of reconstruction missions, 

then to highlight guidelines to determine the optimal period to hand 

over proponency to the State Department. Such a stage would still 

involve a security mission, etc., but the senior authority would be the 

American ambassador or some other civilian authority. 

This comparative analysis also highlights the utility of history. 

There is no evidence planners looked at the British operations, as 

well as a number of other experiences. They should have. The British 

campaign foreshadowed many problems the Americans would face. 

A summary of the most critical at strategic level follows. 

The strategic imperative to match means with ends to set the stage 

for operational success is paramount. The British failed to do so, and 

that failure culminated operationally following the demoralizing 

defeat at Ctesiphon on November 22-24, 1915―a defeat that resulted 

in the disastrous surrender of 6th Indian Division at Kut on April 

29, 1916. U.S. and coalition forces wielded overwhelming material 

and technological superiority against a qualitatively-inferior foe in 

Iraq in 2003. This military dominance did not convert to the requisite 

number of “boots on the ground” to initiate post-confl ict operations 

effectively. The failure to establish immediately a comprehensive 

security was especially glaring. 
117

The utter lack of timely strategic guidance regarding any postconfl ict operations, and/or nation-building in both campaigns 

exacerbated the disconnect between ends and means. Only the 

selfl ess, timely initiative of military forces in theater prevented 

potential civil-military cataclysms of signifi cant proportions. 

Another painful lesson was the direct relationship between 

effective combat power and sound logistical arrangements. The 

British administrative apparatus was never robust until the major 

reorganization following the Kut fi asco. The absence of a host of 

combat support and combat service support units in Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM was a calculated risk. American units in 2003 

would have been hard pressed to continue Phase III decisive 

operations much longer than they did. Up to that stage, the risk 

appeared tolerable. Afterwards, the lack of these units underlined 

the woeful inadequacy of plans and hence preparedness to conduct 

post-confl ict operations. The United States cannot afford to repeat 

such mistakes in the campaigns that will inevitably occur in the 

coming decades of the 21st century, otherwise confi rming the words 

of philosopher George Santayana, “Those who cannot remember the 

past are condemned to repeat it.”97

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. This chapter has restricted its research to unclassifi ed sources on Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM. Open-source research for an ongoing campaign greatly 

complicated attainment of a comprehensive understanding of the linkage between 

ends, ways, and means, but such an approach facilitates frank debate with wider 

dissemination. 

2. For example, the current Afghan-Pakistani border is nothing more than the 

Durand Line of 1894. It originally demarcated the border between Afghanistan, 

the Amir’s territory, and the fi ercely independent tribes of the famed North West 

Frontier. 

3. Philip Mason, The Men Who Ruled India, New York, 1985, pp. 207-208. This 

book is a rework of two earlier volumes, The Founders and The Guardians, published 

in 1953 and 1954, respectively. Philip Mason also published under the pseudonym 

Philip Woodruff. 

4. T. A. Heathcote, The Indian Army: The Garrison of Imperial India, 1822-1922, 

New York, 1974, pp. 18-19. 

5. The potential for great autonomy has signifi cant relevance with regard to 

the Mesopotamian Campaign; this chapter will return to this topic later. 
118

6. Mason, The Men Who Ruled India, p. 208. 

7. Historians fi nd periodic reference to the term “Governor-General-in 

Council” which articulated the legality of the decisions reached by the Government 

of India. The term can be confusing because the senior British offi cial previous to 

the Indian Mutiny was the Governor General. 

8. Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Offi cers, 

and Men, New York, 1974, pp. 397-399. Kitchener insisted that there should be only 

one senior military man ito advise the Viceroy. 

9. Brigadier General F. J. Moberley, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., P.S.C., History of 

the Great War Based on Offi cial Documents: The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 4, 

London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Offi ce, 1927, p. 31. Constitutional practice is 

more appropriate than constitutional law since a small number of Indian Army 

units had deployed overseas for the Egyptian Campaign of 1882 and the First 

Sudan Campaign of 1884-85. 

10. For Indian Army operations on the Western Front, see Lieutenant Colonel 

J. W. B. Merewether, C.I.E., and Lieutenant Colonel Sir Frederick Smith, Bart., The 

Indian Corps in France, London, 1918; reprint ed., Dallington, England, 1996. 

11. Paul K. Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and 

Commission, London, 1994, p. 31. 

12. Moberley, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 1, pp. 83, 95. 

13. Davis, Ends and Means, p. 50. 

14. Moberley, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 1, p. 112. The Indian Army’s 

composition did not refl ect Indian society proportionally in the sense that senior 

offi cials recruited based upon their concept of the “martial races,” whom they 

deemed made the most suitable soldiers. 

15. The Government of India provided the higher direction at this stage. They 

were subject to the same procedures discussed above. 

16. Indian Expeditionary Force D became II Indian Corps, because I Indian 

Corps was in France. 

17. There were subtle differences between an Indian division and a British 

division, though both had twelve battalions in three brigades. Neither had a 

regimental structure as in continental European divisions. The major difference 

was that that an Indian division consisted of nine Indian and three British 

battalions. The Indian battalions had similar organization to the British, but 

a smaller authorized strength. Division troops allocations also varied. Indian 

divisions had to await the availability of British fi eld artillery brigades, since 

the only Indian artillery was mountain artillery, the famous screw guns. Indian 

divisions were also almost wholly reliant on pack animals for transport. 

18. Major General Charles Vére Ferrers Townshend, My Campaign, 2 

vols., New York, 1920, Vol. 1, p. 298, Vol. 2, pp. 7-8; Moberley, The Campaign in 

Mesopotamia, Vol. 2, p. 134; Davis, Ends and Means, p. 141. 
119

19. A. J. Barker, The Bastard War: The Mesopotamian Campaign, 1915-1918, 

New York, 1967, p. 208, has a map with notes which effectively summarize the 

challenges of the relief force. Barker’s book in Britain was published under the title 

of The Neglected War. 

20. Townshend’s conduct as a prisoner of the Turks caused great outrage in 

England. This debate has often clouded the phenomenal accomplishments of his 

leadership of 6th Indian Division through the Battle of Ctesiphon. For example, 

perhaps the most impassioned work remains Russell Braddon, The Siege, New 

York, 1969. 

21. Moberley, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, traces this linkage throughout its 

four volumes. 

22. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 2, briefl y discusses the general state of Indian military 

exhaustion. 

23. BEF operations in France in 1914 crippled the small regular army; the 

Territorial Army took a beating in 1915. Kitchener’s New Armies would not be 

ready until mid-1916, bloodily baptized at the Somme on July 1, 1916. 

24. F. W. Perry, The Commonwealth Armies: Manpower and Organization in Two 

World Wars, Manchester, England, 1988, pp. 87-92, contains a succinct discussion 

of the demands upon Indian Army manpower and the expansion effort up to 

1916. Perhaps the biggest hurdle in the expansion of the Indian Army was the 

availability of bi-lingual, British offi cers. The language of command in the Indian 

Army was Urdu, not English. 

25. The British now faced a majority of native Turkish troops, rather than the 

regular Arab units, who came mostly from Syria and Mesopotamia. 

26. Moberley, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 2, p. 18; Great Britain, 

Parliament, Commissions, Mesopotamia Commission: Report of the Commission 

Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia 

Together with a Separate Report Together with a Separate Report by Cdr. J. Wedgwood, D.S.O., M.P. and Appendices, by Cdr. J. Wedgwood, D.S.O., M.P. and Appendices, 

London, 1917, pp. 18-19, 36, 43-57, passim, pp. 102-103. 

27. Maj. R. Evans, M.C., P.S.C., A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 

London, 1926, pp. 45, 54-55, contains a succinct overview of this overextension and 

the linkage between troop strength and the logistic capability to support them. 

28. Mesopotamian Commission, pp. 63-95, represent 33 pages on the collapse of 

the medical services alone. 

29. Ibid., pp. 74, 103-107. 

30. Barker, The Bastard War The Bastard War, p. 112, cites one specifi c example which typifi es , p. 112, cites one specific example which typifies 

the attitude. See, too, Mesopotamian Commission, p. 61. 

31. Martin Swayne, In Mesopotamia, London, 1918, p. 29. 

32. Mesopotamian Commission, pp. 98-99. 

33. Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
120

34. Ibid., pp. 17-18, 20; Moberley, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 1, pp. 238-

239. Davis, Ends and Means, p. 71, emphasized the India Offi ce’s knowledge gap as 

6 weeks behind during this particular time period. 

35. This issue is complex and complicated. The point is the issue’s contributory 

factor. Space precludes a more detailed discussion. 

36. Formal transfer of authority from India to the British War Offi ce did not 

change the fact that India still provided the bulk of habitual sustainment out of the 

port of Bombay. 

37. Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Burne, D.S.O., Mesopotamia: The Last Phase, 

London, 1936, pp. 55, 113-10. 

38. Ibid., p. 109. 

39. Gertrude Bell, The Arab War: Confi dential Information for General Headquarters 

from Gertrude Bell, Being Dispatches Reprinted from the Secret “Arab Bulletin”, n.p., 

1940, pp. 9-10. The comments appear in the “Arab Bulletin” dated October 5, 

1916. 

40. Moberley, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 1, pp. 163, 271; Vol. 2, pp. 47; 

Vol. 3, pp. 3-4, 56, 199. 

41. Honorable Sir Arthur Lawley, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., A Message from 

Mesopotamia, London, 1917, pp. 2-3, 17, 32-33. 

42. Moberley, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 3, p. 254; Lieutenant Colonel 

Sir Arnold T. Wilson, Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 1914-1917: A Personal and Historical 

Record, Oxford, England, 1930; reprint ed., New York, 1969, pp. 240-241. 

43. Wilson, Loyalties, pp. xi-xii. 

44. Gertrude Bell, D.B.E., The Letters of Gertrude Bell, 2 vols., New York, 1927, 

Vol. 2, p. 444. 

45. Wilson, Loyalties, pp. 12-13, 65. 

46. Moberley, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 3, p. 254. 

47. Wilson, Loyalties, p. 65. Wilson’s exact statement was optimistic. The 

British still had to commit troops for security missions, especially cavalry. 

48. Bell, Letters, pp. 370, 378, 397-398. 

49. Wilson, Loyalties, pp. 67-69, 144. British success made the Turkish system 

appear even more heinous and foreign to the Arabs. 

50. Moberley, The Campaign in Mseopotamia, Vol. 4, p. 26. The British also 

appointed Military Governors. 

51. Edmund Candler, The Long Road to Baghdad, 2 vols., Boston, 1919, Vol. 1, 

pp. 277-279. Candler was a war correspondent in theater. 

52. Wilson, Loyalties, pp. 69-73, 289. Dobbs was an Indian Civil Service (ICS) 

veteran who had traveled extensively in Mesopotamia and Persia before the war. 

He had also served on the Russo-Afghan Boundary Commission. 
121

53. Ibid., pp. 283-287, 321-322. 

54. Lawley, A Message from Mesopotamia, Vol. 4, p. 99. 

55. Townshend, My Campaign, Vol. 1, pp. 226-227. 

56. Wilson, Loyalties, pp. 12, 54. 

57. Moberley, The Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 3, pp. 367. 

58. See Peter Hopkirk, On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Plot to Bring 

Down the British Empire, Oxford, England, 1995, on the Germano-Turkish attempt 

to ignite jihad in India during the First World War. This book was published in the 

United States with the title Like Hidden Fire. 

59. Moberley, The Campaign for Mesopotamia, Vol. 1, p. 139. 

60. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1. The British, in fact, exaggerated the potentially dire 

consequences. There was surprisingly little effect in the Muslim world after the 

evacuation of Gallipoli and the fall of Kut. British Offi cial History, Vol. 2, p. 309. 

61. Wilson, Loyalties, p. 236. 

62. Feisal led the Arab Northern Army during the Arab Revolt. He became 

King of Iraq after the war, but this marriage of ruler and ruled turned out to be an 

unhappy one. 

63. “Beyond Iraq,” The Stratfor Weekly Online, January 21, 2004 [journal online]; available from http://www.stratfor.com; Internet; accessed January 23, 2004, 

appeared after the author wrote this section. It, too, sees American intervention 

in Iraq with multiple, strategic purposes; their analysis: to demonstrate the ability 

to conduct extensive military operations to conclusion, despite casualties, and a 

geopolitical victory to change several Arab countries’ behavior given Iraq’s central 

position in the region. 

64. Tom Friedman, writer and commentator, Television interview by Tim 

Russert, September 20, 2003. Friedman provided a foundation of sorts to develop 

these ideas. The author tied together the multiple objectives for war. 

65. The issues of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Saddam 

Hussein’s chronic defi ance of UN resolutions have become highly politicized, 

both domestically and internationally. The author believes they are too narrow in 

scope as a solitary casus belli. 

66. “Bin Laden Tape: Honesty and Gloom,” The Stratfor Weekly Online, 

January 7, 2004 [journal on-line]; available from http://www.stratfor,com; Internet; 

Accessed January 14, 2004. The article’s assessment sees two likely al Qaeda 

actions, the assassination of President/General Pervez Musharref of Pakistan and 

the overthrow of the Saudi regime. The issue of future, direct attacks on the United 

States remains open, but unlikely in its view. 

67. Strategic and operational planning in the years after the Gulf War of 1990-

91, plus the preparations for this particular war, account for the scope and depth 

of planning. 
122

68. Several logisticians disagree with this assessment. The ideas in this 

paragraph are based in part on remarks made by a speaker participating in the 

Commandment’s Lecture Series and “OEF/OIF Logistics Lessons Learned,” 

lecture, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, January 6, 2004. This 

informal discussion among members of the Class of 2004, staff, and faculty 

crystallized further the writer’s estimate. This conclusion remains the author’s. 

69. Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Effectiveness of Logistics 

Activities during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting 

Offi ce, 2003, pp. 2-4, 14-17, 19-22, underlines the problems in asset visibility and 

theater distribution. 

70. Eric Schmitt, “Army Study of Iraq War Details a ‘Morass’ of Supply 

Shortages,.” The New York Times Online, February 3, 2004 [newspaper on-line]; 

available from http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/03; Internet; accessed February 9, 

2004; and David Wood, “Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems in 

Iraq,” Newhouse News Service, January 22, 2004 [service on-line]; available from 

http://www.newhouse.com; Internet; accessed January 23, 2004. Schmitt references 

the Army study by the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth. Wood cites 

mostly the Army G-4’s assessment. 

71. A recent study cited the primary cause as a lack of “common metrics” 

between warfi ghters and logisticians. Gerry J. Gilmore, “Military’s Logistics 

System Found Wanting in Iraq War,” American Forces Press Service, January 

21, 2004 [service on-line]; available from http://www.afi snews_senderADTIC.MIL; 

Internet; accessed January 23, 2004. 

72. These similarities fi gure prominently in air transport fl ow, ground 

transportation, and Class IX repair parts. Generally speaking, the key problems 

were also asset visibility and theater distribution. General Accounting Offi ce, 

Defense Logistics, pp. 4, 23, cited a failure to incorporate lessons learned from 

Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. 

73. James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” The Atlantic Monthly, January/

February 2004, pp. 54, 56. 

74. Sarah Graham-Brown and Chris Toensing, Why Another War? A Background 

on the Iraq Crisis, n.p., 2002, pp. 2, 7, 14. Iraq had an impressive welfare state, which 

began to unravel in 1990 with the start of the Iraq-Iran War. The study viewed a 

public health emergency as the most likely critical challenge and the most frequent 

cause of death, not hunger, especially for children under age 5. 

75. Ten critical recommendations followed the four broad categories. This 

particular analysis also recommended preparation for humanitarian support 

beyond a year. Reinforcing these suggestions were eight clearly articulated 

“Lessons Learned” from previous operations, ranging from Haiti to Afghanistan. 

Frederick Barton and Bathsheba Crocker, A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for a 

Post-Confl ict Iraq, n.p., 2003, pp. 11-25. 

76. Transition itself consists of four sub-phases: Security, Stability, Build 

Institutions, and Handover. The matrix lays out no less than 135 tasks for 
123

execution: 35 critical, 32 essential, and 62 important ones. Conrad C. Crane and W. 

Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military 

Forces in a Post-Confl ict Scenario, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003, pp. 

44-47. The Matrix itself is on pp. 63-72. 

77. The specifi c source is currently based on nonattribution. 

78. Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” pp. 56-58. 

79. George Packer, “Letter from Baghdad: War after War,” The New Yorker, 

November 24, 2003, p. 62. Packer noted that the State Department included 16 

groups of Iraqi exiles. 

80. Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” p. 54; Packer, “Letter from Baghdad,” p. 

67. 

81. These were that oil would fund reconstruction, Iraqi troops would help 

keep the peace, and resistance would fade quickly. Indeed, he termed the situation 

in September 2003 as “Superbowl Jihad.” A nonattributable source believes that 

Elliott was able to talk to several points of contact within the Army to draw these 

conclusions. Michael Elliott, “3 Flawed Assumptions about Postwar Iraq,” Time, 

September 22, 2003, pp. 30-31. 

82. The ideas in this sentence are based on remarks made by a speaker 

participating in the Commandment’s Lecture Series. He cited fi ve: rapid 

establishment of a new Iraqi government, viability of surviving Iraqi security 

forces, volume of international assistance available, a rapidly-resuscitated 

economy, and little degree of Iraqi resentment. These could be due to political 

bias, which ignored intelligence reports and analysis; strategic priorities required 

a rapid campaign with a small footprint; and/or simply erroneous assumptions 

honestly made. 

83. Packer, “Letter from Baghdad,” p. 64. 

84. Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” p. 74. 

85. Graham-Brown and Toensing, Why Another War? p. 7. 

86. ”Iraq at Peace,” Peace Watch, Vol. 9, April 2003, p. 2. 

87. Packer, “Letter from Baghdad,” p. 62. 

88. See Cynthia E. Ayers, “Iraqi Resistance to Freedom: A Frommian 

Perspective,” Parameters, Vol. 33, Autumn 2003, pp. 68, 78-79; Packer, “Letter from 

Baghdad,” pp. 81-83. 

89. Packer, “Letter from Baghdad,” p. 62. 

90. There is much discussion over the Army need to “rediscover” 

counterinsurgency techniques. See Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The 

U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, 2002. A good perspective at tactical level which does not deny the 

ever-present element of uncertainty is Peter Maas, “Professor Nagl’s War,” The 

New York Times Online, January 11, 2004 [newspaper on-line]; available from http:

//graphics7.nytimes.com/images/dropcap/u.gif. Internet; accessed January 14, 2004. 
124

91. Great Britain, Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future, 

p. 69. The format is that of a slide presentation. 

92. Packer, “Letter from Baghdad,” p. 64. 

93. The Iraq portion in this paragraph is based on remarks made by a speaker 

participating in the Commandment’s Lecture Series. 

94. In the case of Mesopotamia, see the frank admission in Moberley, The 

Campaign in Mesopotamia, Vol. 1, p. 88. 

95. David Wood, “Military Acknowledges Massive Supply Problems in 

Iraq,” Newhouse News Service, January 22, 2004 [service on-line]; available from 

http://www.newhouse.com; Internet; accessed January 23, 2004. 

96. In other words, develop a document which would form the doctrinal 

foundation at interagency level above Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency 

Coordination. William Flavin, “Planning for Confl ict Termination and Post-Confl ict 

Success,” Parameters, Vol. 33, Autumn 2003, pp. 95-112, provides a starting point 

for discussion. 

97. Santayana wrote these words in The Life of Reason, cited in Robert 

Andrews, Mary Biggs, and Michael Seidel, Columbia World of Quotations, New 

York: Columbia University Press, 1996, available from http://www.bartleby,com/66/

29/48129.html. 
125

CHAPTER 6

WAGING PEACE:

ECLIPSE IN POSTWAR GERMANY AND IRAQ

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth O. McCreedy

The decision for war usually rests on rational calculations that 

confl ict will create satisfactory conditions to achieve strategic 

objectives. The scale of the objective, Clausewitz suggests, defi nes 

the character of the war. The character of the war, in turn, inevitably 

dictates the peace that follows. As war drives toward fulfi lling its 

terrifying logic, Clausewitz argues, passions overthrow reason, 

violence spirals, and stakes grow. Statesmen must assemble the 

ways and means to achieve the desired ends. So great is the effort 

required to wage war, so high the costs, that it can consume political 

and military leaders who thus often fail to look beyond the fi ghting. 

Yet such vision is the most signifi cant requirement of strategists: 

It is not enough to win the war―they must also win the peace to 

secure broader policy objectives, without which the sacrifi ces of war 

have no meaning. This effort demands the appropriate application 

of ways and allocation of means as does the war that precedes it. 

Waging peace requires a level of planning, commitment, and exertion 

consistent with the ends pursued in the war. Failure in waging war 

can have disastrous results, more often than not the price of a fl awed 

ends-ways-means assessment. Similarly, failure in waging peace 

will undermine the sacrifi ces of war and wrest defeat from victory 

by undermining the achievement of broader policy aims for which 

military forces have waged (or should have) the confl ict.

In May 1943, Allied staff offi cers in London began working 

on a complex plan that arguably had as signifi cant an impact on 

the postwar world as its more famous companion, Operation 

OVERLORD. The plan became ECLIPSE, the operation that governed 

the occupation of Germany by the western allies. Sixty years later, 

the Combined Forces Land Component planning staff titled its plan 

for postwar operations in Iraq ECLIPSE II. As present day operations 
126

unfold, Operation ECLIPSE offers a lens through which to examine 

its successor. It brings into sharp focus the extent to which planners 

and policymakers anticipated the requirements for successful postconfl ict operations, the assumptions underlying their plans, and the 

way the United States postured itself to conduct postwar operations. 

Despite distinct differences in the circumstances of both Operations 

ECLIPSE and ECLIPSE II, there exist fundamental commonalities 

in the challenge of defi ning and balancing ends, ways, and means 

in such a manner as to advance national interests. While a perfect 

correlation does not exist between the circumstances that pertained 

in the two events, each ECLIPSE operation offers instruction about 

how to think about, plan, and conduct postwar operations.

OPERATION ECLIPSE

On February 12, 1944, General Dwight Eisenhower received 

the celebrated directive to “enter the continent of Europe and 

. . . undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the 

destruction of her armed forces.” What historians understandably 

tend to ignore is a less ringing passage entitled: “Relationships with 

Allied Governments―the Re-establishment of Civil Governments 

and Liberated Allied Territories with the Administration of Enemy 

Territories.” Allied staffs planning postwar operations must have 

eagerly looked here for long-awaited policy guidance, only to fi nd 

that: “Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects 

at a later date.”1 In fact, policymakers were unable to defi ne the 

desired end state beyond the immediate objective of defeating 

and occupying Nazi Germany. Not unusually for a politician, 

President Franklin Roosevelt preferred to keep his options open, 

and not surprisingly, he vacillated between competing visions of a 

retributive and realist peace. More importantly, he had to consider 

the demands of maintaining a wartime coalition: So long as the 

decision hung in the balance it was folly to raise troublesome issues 

arising from competing visions of the postwar order.2

Responsibility for conducting the war resided with the War 

and Navy Departments. Left undefi ned was which government 

agency would bear responsibility for planning and administering 
127

the peace. Roosevelt’s ideological preference for civil administration 

over military government suggested that he would turn to the 

Department of State to meet this requirement. The New Dealers 

who surrounded Roosevelt refl exively viewed the military with 

suspicion and were sensitive to any hint of imperialism or militarism 

in American policy. From April to December 1943, a debate raged 

within the Roosevelt administration over the propriety of military 

government. The Army’s provost marshal general reported that, at a 

cabinet meeting in early 1943, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes 

“denounced our military government plans as ‘imperialistic’ and the 

President told the Secretary of War by memorandum that he thought 

the government of occupied territories was a civilian rather than a 

military matter.”3 However, events in North Africa after Operation 

TORCH underlined the practical fact that the State Department 

lacked the capacity for planning and conducting such a complex 

task. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, Secretary of State Cordell Hull 

had established an advisory committee to consider postwar foreign 

policy. Most important was the work of a number of subcommittees 

that met periodically to address economic reconstruction, postwar 

European structures, and security issues. The last sub-committee 

included representatives from the War and Navy Departments, 

the fi rst interagency body to consider postwar policy.4 The work of 

these committees abruptly ended in June 1943 when the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, wrestling with how to deal with liberated territories 

in the wake of Operation TORCH, brought postwar policy into 

the War Department by establishing the Combined Civil Affairs 

Division under Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy. The State 

Department had representation on this committee, but there is no 

evidence that it used this venue to shape policy.5

The most signifi cant product of the Combined Civil Affairs 

Division was CCS/551, the “Directive for Military Government 

in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender,” issued to Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces on April 28, 1944. 

This order vested in the supreme commander the authority and 

responsibility for governing occupied Germany and established 

basic principles for him to follow. Because the directive applied 

only to the presurrender period, however, signifi cant questions as 
128

to the policy the United States intended to pursue and the military’s 

role in postwar occupation remained unanswered. In the absence 

of political decisions, commanders and staffs remained in limbo 

about the ends the President was pursuing and the instruments of 

national power he intended to apply. Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, 

Bedell Smith, sought guidance by posing a series of questions to 

the Combined Chiefs of Staff about postwar German government, 

economy, and partition. He emphasized: “On the answers to these, 

and to many other kindred questions, long-term planning depends.” 

He reminded the chiefs that “the problem is not one that can be 

handled piecemeal or a solution extemporized hurriedly in the last 

stage of the operation.”6 Events 60 years later proved him correct.

Within months of D-Day, Supreme Headquarters Allied 

Expeditionary Forces had to grapple with the practical problems 

of conducting postwar operations before a policy existed to govern 

such operations. On September 18, 1944, following the Allied 

capture of the fi rst German town, Eisenhower issued a proclamation 

announcing that “Allied Military Government is established in 

the theater under my command to exercise in occupied German 

territory the supreme . . . authority vested in me as Supreme 

Commander . . .”7 Small military government detachments would 

travel immediately behind the lead elements of advancing forces 

and begin the process of political and physical reconstruction under 

the direction of division, corps, and army commanders executing 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces directives.8

Although many saw victory in Europe as imminent by December 

1944 (at least prior to the German’s Ardennes offensive), the U.S. 

Government still did not have a coherent postwar policy, nor 

had it worked out the ways or means that it would require in the 

postwar period. At the initiative of new Secretary of State Edward 

Stettinius, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy formed the StateWar-Navy Coordinating Committee to consider postwar policy.9

This committee’s deliberations and policy recommendations 

were instrumental in preparing Roosevelt for Yalta in January 

1945, where the Soviets, British, and Americans proclaimed their 

“infl exible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism 

and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the 
129

peace of the world.” To do so, they intended to oversee the complete 

disarmament, demilitarization, and denazifi cation of Germany.10

In May 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) fi nally issued JCS 

1067, the fi rst formal national guidance for the conduct of postwar 

operations, to Eisenhower in his capacity as Commander, U.S. Forces 

European Theater. By its provisions, the U.S. Army would occupy 

Germany and treat the Germans as a defeated enemy. Occupation 

forces would exercise limited control over the economy and limit the 

distribution of goods and foodstuffs to levels necessary to prevent 

disease and unrest. Orders strictly forbade fraternization between 

soldiers and Germans, while the troops oversaw the thorough 

extirpation of Nazism and militarism. As General Lucius Clay, 

later military governor, observed, “there was no doubt that JCS 

1067 contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our 

operations in Germany during the early months of occupation.”11

With the ends that the government aimed to pursue fi nally 

articulated, the ways available to achieve those ends had received 

little or no assessment. After North Africa, the U.S. Army explicitly 

received primary responsibility for planning and conducting 

postwar operations.12 There was little interaction with other 

potential players such as State and Treasury; there assuredly 

was no interagency process beyond general policy discussions in 

the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to coordinate the 

application of various approaches to accomplishing strategic ends. 

The one-dimensional nature of postwar planning was clear in the 

case of General Clay. In early 1945, Eisenhower had selected Clay 

to oversee military government operations as his deputy.13 Before 

departing for Europe, Clay met with the President, Secretary of War 

Henry Stimson, and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall 

to receive instructions. He did not meet with anyone from the State 

Department. He later recalled: “As I look back, I fi nd it amazing that 

I did not visit the State Department or talk with any of its offi cials. . . 

No one at that time advised me of the role of the State Department in 

occupation matters or of its relationship to military government, and 

I am inclined to believe that no one had thought it out.”14

Despite its instrumental role, the army remained uncomfortable 

with postwar operations as a long-term mission. After V-E Day, the 
130

War Department immediately began pressing for an early transition 

from military to civil government in occupied Germany. According 

to Clay, Eisenhower sought to create an “organization which could 

be transferred to civilian control on 24-hours notice.” Marshall, who 

had experienced the short-lived occupation of Germany in 1919 at 

fi rst hand, was especially sensitive to the possibility that a public 

clamor to “bring the boys home” would curtail postwar operations.15

Eisenhower sent a memorandum to Stimson setting a target date for 

the transition to civil control by June 1, 1946. The new President, 

Harry Truman, approved this objective without consulting 

Secretary of State James Byrnes. Byrnes, believing adamantly that 

his department was a policymaking organization, not an operational 

entity, deftly maneuvered behind the scenes to forestall State’s 

assumption of primary responsibility for the occupation.16 As a 

result, the June 1, 1946, date for transition came and went without 

remark, while the War Department retained responsibility for 

governing Germany until 1949.17

With the ends settled and the ways defi ned as residing solely 

with the military instrument of power, it remained for the military 

to plan, coordinate, and execute the application of means to achieve 

strategic and political objectives. This effort had begun in March 

1943, despite the policy void, as prudent military planning when the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Chief of Staff Supreme Allied 

Commander (COSSAC) to draft contingency plans for a sudden 

German collapse or surrender. The result was Operation RANKIN.18

RANKIN assumed an unopposed occupation of Germany and 

avoided discussing administration of the occupied territory by 

either civil or military authorities.19 After completion of RANKIN, a 

postwar planning cell continued to develop staff studies and papers 

that served to advance thinking about post-hostilities operations 

and raise relevant questions and issues to policy-makers.20

As D-Day approached, planning shifted from preparations 

for a sudden Nazi collapse to considerations for the period after a 

military campaign that resulted in the occupation of Germany. In 

this environment, there was an explosion of postwar planning by 

the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces staff that 

resulted in a new plan in October 1944, TALISMAN. TALISMAN 
131

addressed disarmament, disposal of war material, control of German 

prisoners of war, care of Allied prisoners of war, and denazifi cation 

as the major postwar tasks.21 Conspicuously missing was specifi c 

guidance on how the Allies would administer occupied Germany, 

by whom, and what fate awaited the defeated state. Soon after 

completion of the plan, SHAEF, believing its codeword had been 

compromised, renamed it ECLIPSE.22

The ECLIPSE Plan consisted of two phases. The primary phase 

focused on physical occupation and would occur simultaneously with 

the terminal combat operations of OVERLORD. In the second phase, 

ECLIPSE would stand alone as the Allies solidifi ed their control of 

occupied areas, disarmed the Wehrmacht, enforced surrender terms, 

established law and order, and redeployed Allied forces into defi ned 

national zones of responsibility. ECLIPSE also directed commanders 

to “complete establishment of Military Government throughout 

the sector.”23 Attached memoranda provided detailed guidance on 

surrender procedures, labor policies, procedures for handling Allied 

prisoners of war and displaced civilians, mechanisms for disarming 

the German armed forces, and guidance for establishing military 

government.24

The military possessed ample means to execute these tasks. On 

V-E Day, 61 U.S. Army divisions were in Germany and available to 

execute ECLIPSE. This made the security mission relatively simple: 

Units dispersed and assumed responsibility for assigned areas. The 

territory that a division might receive the mission of covering could 

be extensive. The 78th Infantry Division, for example, was responsible 

for an area of 3,600 square miles, while the 70th Infantry Division 

covered 2,500 square miles.25 Commanders usually decentralized 

command and control down to companies and assigned them to 

guard frontiers, key installations, bridges, banks, and utilities, 

and to provide reaction forces to respond to disturbances, looting, 

or criminal activity. U.S. forces performed various other special 

security functions. For instance, the 26th Infantry Regiment of the 

1st Infantry Division guarded the prisoners and proceedings at the 

Nuremburg Trials for a year, while a tank battalion and infantry 

regiment guarded the huge treasure trove of Nazi-looted items 

found in a mine near Merkers. 26
132

The troops also implemented ECLIPSE plans to secure prisoners 

of war, demobilize the German Army and dispose of war materiel. 

This was a huge task. By April 15, 30,000 German soldiers were 

surrendering daily to the western allies; by early May, more than 

fi ve million German prisoners of war were in Allied hands. Because 

plans had anticipated only 900,000 prisoners by the end of June, 

there were signifi cant shortfalls in logistics, facilities, and guards. 

As an example of what this could mean at the tactical level, a fi rst 

lieutenant commanding 300 troops found himself charged with 

guarding 37,000 Germans at Bad Kreuznach.27 More daunting than 

security were the logistics challenges of dealing with this many 

prisoners, especially providing them rations. Seven million rations 

were required daily in Germany to feed U.S. soldiers and prisoners 

of war; this rate of consumption could not be supported. SHAEF 

cut rations for Allied personnel by 10 percent. It also authorized 

a distinction between “prisoners of war” who had surrendered 

prior to V-E Day and “disarmed” German military forces who had 

surrendered after May 9. This allowed circumvention of the Geneva 

Convention requirement that prisoners of war receive the same 

rations as their captors; disarmed Germans were given less than 

Allied soldiers. 

To deal with the problem and provide manpower to assist 

in restoring essential services, SHAEF ordered the discharge of 

German prisoners of war who were coal miners, transportation and 

utility workers, police, and farmers on the condition that they had 

no SS connections and posed no security risk. The units charged 

with running the prisoner of war compounds seized on this order 

“to discharge as many as possible, as fast as possible, without a great 

deal of attention to categories,” according to one G-1 inspection 

report. To aid this process, local commanders established discharge 

centers and reception points at railheads, and transported prisoners 

of war to the areas from which they had been inducted.28 Remaining 

prisoners were organized into labor companies and assigned to 

American commands to assist in reconstruction efforts ranging from 

clearing rubble, to burying the dead, to removing wire obstacles 

and minefi elds. This was done under the “labor reparation policy” 

whereby the Allies determined to use German labor to assist in 

rebuilding devastated areas of Europe.29
133

The other signifi cant task involved in disbanding the German 

armed forces was disposing of the equipment and munitions that 

littered battlefi elds, collected at depots, and fi lled bunkers and 

production facilities throughout Europe. Only souvenir hunters 

had paid attention to captured enemy equipment before V-E Day, 

except in the case of new technology for technical intelligence 

exploitation. After the German surrender, the ECLIPSE plan charged 

Army quartermasters at all levels with recovering and disposing of 

German war materiel. They initially gave priority to destruction 

of enemy chemical and munitions stocks.30 According to the Third 

Army history of the occupation, “Large quantities of explosives 

were crated and dispatched to the port of Bremerhaven where 

they were disposed of by being dumped into the sea, while other 

shipments of ammunition were distributed among Allied Nations as 

a form of reparation.”31 For captured weapons and equipment, they 

applied the model used by the U.S. Army for disposal of surplus 

war materiel. Ordnance units established huge depots to receive 

the collected materiel; one near Wurzburg contained up to 17,000 

vehicles. Each piece of equipment required inspection, cleaning, 

maintenance, and processing before it could be sold, shipped, or 

destroyed. The total effort to dispose of materiel and munitions 

placed further stress on increasingly scarce resources of personnel as 

demobilization gathered pace.32

Perhaps the most politically sensitive and in sheer scope the 

largest task was that of caring for and assisting millions of displaced 

persons to return to their homes throughout Europe. Agreements 

reached at the Yalta Conference required military commanders “to 

employ all practicable means to transport United Nations displaced 

persons to agreed locations where they could be transferred to 

national authorities.”33 U.S. forces were overwhelmed by the sheer 

numbers of displaced persons they faced: There were an estimated 

2.3 million in American occupied areas on V-E Day. This represented 

but a portion of the “unprecedented mass migration of civilians 

and soldiers” that was taking place in Europe. In addition to seven 

million displaced persons throughout Germany, there were 12 to 

14 million refugees and hundreds of thousands of German soldiers 

from eastern Germany fl eeing the Soviets.34 Units encountered large 
134

and small groups of refugees daily as they advanced into Germany. 

Commanders initially emphasized caring for the almost universally 

malnourished and ill they found. They arranged housing for them 

in former German barracks, prisoner of war camps, schools, and 

private residences (unsympathetic American troops forced out the 

German owners, if necessary), and they issued them food from 

captured stores, supplemented by U.S. military rations. Army 

medical teams conducted an intense public health campaign among 

the displaced persons to contain feared outbreaks of typhus and 

other communicable diseases. Third Army Chief of Staff General 

Hobart Gay captured this concern in his journal on April 10, 

1945: “The situation reference displaced persons continues to be 

aggravated . . . . Most of them are like animals, or worse, and unless 

force can be used on them to ensure reasonable sanitary measures, 

it would appear that disease, perhaps something bordering on 

a plague, is in the offi ng.”35 Among other actions, the Twelfth 

Army Group established a “cordon sanitaire on the Rhine” to dust 

displaced persons with DDT before they left Germany.36 U.S. forces 

slowly sorted displaced persons by nationality and moved them 

into camps to facilitate the process of repatriation. Tactical units 

provided logistical and security support to the UN Refugee Relief 

Administration (UNRRA) which administered these facilities. These 

displaced persons represented a serious threat to order. Accounts 

of the occupation are replete with reports of drunkenness, looting, 

arson, rape, and murder by displaced persons celebrating their 

freedom and seeking to exact revenge on the Germans.37 By October 

1945, over 2,000,000 displaced persons had been repatriated out of 

the American zone. 

Allied occupation forces also faced an enormous challenge 

to organize reconstruction efforts to restore basic services and 

prevent a humanitarian disaster resulting from famine, epidemic, 

or exposure. Engineer units rebuilt and repaired roads, bridges, 

electric plants, sewage treatment facilities, and waterworks. When 

Bonn was captured, for instance, virtually all public services were 

nonfunctional. Within days, gas, water, and electric service had been 

restored to parts of the city, and within months, street cars were 

again operating. 38 Elsewhere water purifi cation units provided safe 

drinking water. Engineers also demolished German fortifi cations, 
135

gun emplacements, bunkers, and minefi elds. Construction units 

worked to improve living conditions of occupation forces by 

winterizing billets and building recreational facilities.39

Military commanders also were responsible initially for 

establishing political authority, implementing denazifi cation, and 

directing reconstruction. At the strategic level, denazifi cation had 

perhaps the greatest political interest. The Allies were determined 

to stamp out any vestige of the Nazi Party in Germany. Eisenhower 

signaled the importance attached to this effort in a speech in the fall 

of 1945, when he stated: “The success or failure of this occupation will 

be judged by the character of the Germans 50 years from now. Proof 

will come when they begin to run a democracy of their own and we 

are going to give the Germans a chance to do that, in time.”40

The primary instruments for executing this policy were the 

military government detachments charged with fi nding acceptable 

non-Nazi public offi cials and the Counter Intelligence Corps soldiers 

whose mission it was to fi nd and arrest Nazis. An immediate 

problem the occupation faced was how to defi ne “Nazi.” Was it 

related to length of membership, rank, or did it apply to every party 

member regardless of activity? Guidance was unclear initially. The 

Counter Intelligence Corps, according to one special agent, was 

“given orders to arrest all Nazis from Ortsgruppenleiter on up, all on up, all 

Gestapo, all SD, all SS from Gefreiter up.”41 Military government 

detachments, desperate to fi nd qualifi ed personnel to assume 

responsibility for running German cities, counties, and states tended 

to be more forgiving. Historian Earl Ziemke, who participated in 

the occupation, observed: “Competent non-Nazis were among the 

rarest commodities everywhere in Germany . . . ; in the managerial 

and professional groups they were practically nonexistent.”42

It was diffi cult enough to fi nd someone with requisite skills to 

undertake administrative responsibility for a town; the problem was 

complicated infi nitely by the need to identify a politically untainted 

qualifi ed applicant. This fundamental difference in orientation could 

lead to confl ict. The daily report from one military government 

detachment read: “Having trouble with CIC. Do not believe 

security threatened so have concentrated on assuring food, proper 

administration, and property protection on the assumption these 

will prevent unrest. Have done these at the expense of looking into 

past activities of present civil servants.”43 Candidates were vetted 
136

against black-white-gray lists prepared by the Offi ce of Strategic 

Services and investigated by Counter Intelligence Corps agents.44

When the glare of media attention was turned on the occupation, 

it became politically intolerable to be perceived as “coddling” Nazis, 

and policy hardened. At the direction of Eisenhower, military 

government personnel made an intense effort to screen all Germans 

seeking employment or assistance from the occupation forces. 

Military government detachments administered a questionnaire (the 

Fragebogen) to all Germans seeking employment or assistance from 

the occupation forces. Effectively, this amounted to the entire adult 

population of the American zone, or some 13,000,000 Germans, 

creating an immense administrative burden. The chief historian of the 

U.S. High Commissioner for Germany observed: “The assignment of 

going over the 13 million completed forms, investigating the validity 

of the data furnished, and deciding on the action to be taken in each 

individual case was positively overwhelming.”45

While specialized military government detachments existed 

to assist in executing this task, by April 1945 the area of occupied 

territory exceeded their capability, and army commanders formed 

provisional detachments using antiaircraft, fi eld artillery, and 

signal troops.46 Soldiers were transferred from other duties and 

assigned to assist the military government detachments. Even with 

this augmentation, little headway could be made in reducing the 

backlog. Ultimately, 1.65 million Fragebogen were screened before 

General Clay succeeded in passing responsibility for this task to 

newly constituted German courts. Of the 1.65 million questionnaires 

screened, U.S. offi cials judged 300,000 to be Nazis, eligible only 

for employment as common labor.47 Eisenhower was willing to 

accept diminished administrative effi ciency in return for thorough 

denazifi cation. Military Government Law Number 8, effective in 

September 1945, “made it mandatory to dismiss anyone who had 

ever been a member of the Nazi party for whatever reason from any 

position save one of ordinary labor.”48 Patton’s well-documented 

clashes with Eisenhower on this issue resulted in Patton’s removal 

from command of Third Army in October 1945. Patton recorded 

in his diary on September 29, 1945, the result of a meeting with 

Eisenhower in which they discussed the presence of Nazis in the 

government of Bavaria: “So I called Harkins at 0630 and told him to 
137

remove Schaeffer, Lange, and Rattenhuber and all members of their 

ministries in any way tainted with Nazism regardless of the setback 

it would give to the administration of Bavaria and the resultant cold 

and hunger it would produce―not only for the Germans but also for 

the DP’s. This seemed to make everyone happy except myself.”49

What stands out in an examination of postwar planning and 

operations in Germany are the time and resources that were 

devoted to it. Although policy decisions defi ning political ends 

were slow to emerge from politicians preeminently concerned 

with holding together a wartime coalition, British and American 

military commanders in Europe realized their likely role in postwar 

operations early on (although they may not have liked it), and even 

developed an appreciation for the fact that postwar tasks might 

coexist uncomfortably with combat operations.50 Military leaders 

took prudent measures to supply the means for postwar operations 

during the war by fi elding specialized postwar units, military 

government detachments, and providing them expert training, 

doctrine, and organizations. ECLIPSE planners, given a considerable 

period to refi ne their estimates, generally anticipated requirements 

accurately. Worst-case scenarios of a Nazi resistance movement 

failed to develop and the magnitude of destruction and population 

turmoil were understated in the plans. But the ECLIPSE plan ignored 

no signifi cant tasks that emerged in the postwar period. There is no 

evidence the ECLIPSE plan made assumptions that wished away 

postwar problems in order to redeploy forces rapidly to the Pacifi c 

or quickly return them to the United States for demobilization, 

despite the obvious political and military benefi ts that would accrue 

from such actions. Ends, ways, and means were aligned to support 

a prolonged postwar operation in Germany to secure a long-term 

peace.

OPERATION ECLIPSE II

Nearly 60 years after ECLIPSE, American political and military 

leaders again confronted the requirement to defi ne ends, identify 

ways, and assemble the means to advance national objectives 

beyond the short-term one of “regime change.” American soldiers 

again found themselves responsible for the practical problems 
138

arising from their position as the most available means for waging 

peace and maintaining order in the wake of combat.51

On March 19, 2003, after months of military preparations, 

political maneuvering in Congress and the Security Council, and 

alternating Iraqi acts of defi ance and compliance, the American-led 

coalition launched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. When announcing 

the beginning of hostilities, President George W. Bush defi ned 

the coalition’s objectives in the following terms: “To disarm Iraq, 

to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.”52

With diplomacy exhausted and economic sanctions a demonstrable 

failure, the President settled on the military “to apply decisive force” 

to achieve his ends. Signifi cantly, the President also had articulated a 

postwar vision for Iraq; in a speech on February 26, 2003, he declared 

America’s objective to be a “free and peaceful Iraq.” He noted that 

achieving this would not be easy and pledged the “sustained 

commitment” of the United States to the effort. Hearkening back to 

1945, the President recalled that:

After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, 

we left constitutions and parliaments. We established an atmosphere of 

safety, in which responsible, reform-minded local leaders could build 

lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that once bred fascism and 

militarism, liberty found a permanent home.53

Not burdened by the requirement to hold together a disparate 

wartime alliance that Roosevelt had confronted, Bush went to war 

with clearly articulated ends. 

Before the war, the President also designated the instrument he 

would employ to secure his policy objective of a secure, prosperous, 

reconstructed, and democratic Iraq. On January 20, 2003, he issued 

National Security Presidential Directive 24 and explicitly assigned 

responsibility for the conduct of postwar operations to the Defense 

Department. Although such efforts ostensibly were to be interagency 

in approach, under Pentagon leadership, the military instrument 

of power became the chosen way through which the President 

proposed to achieve his strategic ends, just as it had for Roosevelt. 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quickly established the Offi ce 

of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) under the 

leadership of retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner. 
139

Garner put together a team of 200 former military, foreign service, 

academic, and corporate personnel and began developing plans.54

Despite requirements to reestablish a political system, provide aid 

and assistance, create a sound banking system, and a multitude of 

other tasks that touched expertise across the expanse of the U.S. 

Government, Rumsfeld refused to allow the effort to reach out from 

the Pentagon.55 As a result, ORHA did not integrate work done by 

the State Department in its “Future of Iraq” project that began in 

March 2002, nor did it pay any attention to wargames conducted by 

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) the summer before.56 Garner’s 

organization was where the various instruments of national power 

were supposed to come together and function in a coordinated 

fashion in the few short weeks before combat operations began. It 

did not happen. Its work on humanitarian assistance was extensive, 

refl ecting concerns aroused by U.N. predictions of thousands 

of refugees and widespread shortages of food and water in the 

wake of serious fi ghting.57 Planning for civil administration and 

reconstruction, however, remained vague. In late February, ORHA 

conducted a rehearsal at Fort McNair. One observer reported “I got 

the sense that the humanitarian stuff was pretty well in place, but the 

rest of it was fl ying blind.”58

In the absence of a coherent interagency approach, the military 

made its own preparations based on a doctrinal appreciation that 

planning must address postwar requirements, just as the Army 

had done in 1942.59 Military planning for what became Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM reportedly began in earnest in summer 2002 at 

the President’s direction. Commander of the U.S. Central Command 

General Tommy Franks tasked Combined Forces Land Component 

Commander Lieutenant General David McKiernan and his staff to 

prepare plans for ground operations, including confl ict termination 

operations. Their planning initially focused on the tough questions 

of assembling the military force to topple the regime, building 

the support structure to sustain operations, and synchronizing 

the effects of joint fi res and maneuver to achieve a rapid, decisive 

victory. Phase IV (postwar stability and support operations) received 

less attention as it depended more on national policy decisions, was 

less critical for decisive combat operations, and remained outside 
140

the “comfort zone” of most military decisionmakers.60 Policy 

guidance to shape Phase IV emerged only gradually from the offi ce 

of Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith. According to an after 

action review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that was leaked, this 

guidance failed to refl ect any interagency planning between the 

Defense and State Departments.61 Indeed, Feith’s efforts remained 

tightly contained within a small circle in the Pentagon, because of 

the political sensitivity of planning for the war against Iraq and, 

perhaps, because of a widely reported rift between Rumsfeld and 

Secretary of State Colin Powell over Iraq policy.62

With the military instrument of power established as the means 

of achieving the administration’s ends, DoD began assembling 

forces for implementation. Central to this process were several 

assumptions that soon became unquestionable within the Pentagon. 

Principal among these was the belief within the Offi ce of the 

Secretary of Defense that the Iraqis would view the coalition as a 

liberating force. They then would rise up to hasten the collapse of 

the regime and assume responsibility for sustaining public safety, 

administration, and basic services. According to dismissed Army 

Secretary Thomas E. White, Feith “had the mind-set that this 

would be a relatively straightforward manageable task because 

this would be a war of liberation, and therefore the reconstruction 

would be short-lived.”63 Similarly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense Joseph Collins stated in late February 2003: “We’re not 

coming in to punish or to occupy Iraq. We’re coming in to liberate 

the country and create the conditions where the Iraqis can create a 

highly functioning democracy on their own.”64 The Pentagon thus 

based force planning and deployments on assumptions that military 

operations could accomplish this aim rapidly once Saddam and 

Ba’athist party apparatchiks were deposed, by building on existing 

Iraqi governmental and security structures. 

Initial responsibility for postwar operations would necessarily 

fall to the military, which would need to begin addressing postwar 

tasks from the moment U.S. forces crossed into Iraq. However, 

signifi cant military power was not available immediately to conduct 

stability and support operations designed to avert humanitarian 

disaster, restore critical infrastructure, and provide the environment 
141

for creation of a free, democratic Iraq. Admittedly a major effort did 

occur at the outset to preserve the Iraqi oil fi elds. Only after combat 

operations were complete could the efforts of the four coalition 

divisions and three combat brigades, together with large numbers of 

theater and corps support units, focus on postwar tasks. 

DoD had shaped this force to achieve success in bringing down 

Saddam’s regime, not for postwar efforts. Deputy Secretary of 

Defense Paul Wolfowitz dismissed estimates that the army would 

need more troops for postwar operations than combat operations 

as “outlandish.” He went on to say that “It’s hard to conceive that it 

would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than 

it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender 

of Saddam’s security forces and his army. Hard to imagine.”65

Yet, when confronted by the anarchy that occurred in the wake of 

Saddam’s collapse, American troops were stretched too thinly to 

respond in a timely manner to contain the violence and destruction. 

Former CENTCOM commander General Anthony Zinni, who 

had expressed concern before the war that the new plans called 

for two fewer divisions than plans he had developed, observed in 

testimony to Congress that “The reason we had those two extra 

divisions was the security situation. Revenge killings, crime, 

chaos―this was all foreseeable.”66 The perspective of historian 

John Gaddis is illuminating, offering perhaps the best critique of 

the administration’s approach not only to Iraq, but the wider war 

on terrorism. He argued that the President, in pursuing a decisive 

battle, another “Agincourt” in his war on terror, could secure victory. 

He warned of the risks, however: “The trouble with Agincourts . . . 

is the arrogance they can encourage, along with the illusion that 

victory itself is enough and that no follow-up is required.” The Bush 

strategy, Gaddis asserted, ultimately relied “on getting cheered, not 

shot at.”67

The Pentagon assembled the means for implementing the 

President’s vision of a democratic and stable Iraq under two principal 

headquarters: ORHA and Combined Forces Land Component 

Command (CFLCC) until it transitioned to a Combined Joint Task 

Force as planned in June. However, according to participants in the 

planning effort at CFLCC, there was virtually no contact between 
142

military planners and the ORHA, despite the latter organization’s 

supposed subordination to Central Command. Matters did not 

improve when Garner and his staff deployed to Kuwait on March 16, 

3 days before the war began. Rather than accepting facilities on the 

same installation as the CFLCC, Garner leased a hotel in Kuwait City, 

which given travel restrictions might have been in another country. 

The divide continued to widen.68 The CFLCC saw the contributions 

of the ORHA as coming too late to be helpful in shaping plans, while 

they viewed its headquarters and staff as isolated from the realities of 

combat operations. The ORHA, for its part, felt marginalized by the 

military and without necessary resources. There was neither unity 

of effort nor unity of command in implementing a postwar strategy. 

Unlike Eisenhower, Franks does not appear to have involved himself 

directly in planning or executing postwar operations.

The arrival of Garner and his team in Iraq weeks after coalition 

forces had occupied Baghdad further exacerbated problems in 

transition to postwar operations. ORHA was then glacially slow 

in getting organized. In fairness, the conditions they faced were 

daunting. The convention center in which Garner’s team established 

operations was covered in dust and debris; the small ORHA staff 

had to clean it themselves and set-up operations from the groundup with little assistance from military forces. Nonetheless, it did 

not convey a message to Iraqis, the insurgents, the international 

community, military commanders on the ground, or the American 

public that anyone had a fi rm grip on the situation. There were no 

military government detachments following combat troops into Iraq 

as they had in Germany; civil affairs units in the country were too 

few and lacked the detailed preparation that had characterized their 

predecessors in Germany. 

Garner appeared increasingly hapless in the face of mounting 

reconstruction tasks and a deteriorating security situation. In his 

defense, the damage to the infrastructure was much greater than 

anticipated, in part due to widespread looting and the wholesale 

collapse of Iraqi civil institutions, including the ministries that 

ORHA was counting on to accomplish day-to-day administration.69

The Bush administration therefore accelerated the timeline to 

replace Garner, and in May the President appointed Ambassador 
143

Paul Bremer to head ORHA’s successor, the Coalition Provisional 

Authority, to “oversee Coalition reconstruction efforts and the 

process by which the Iraqi people build the institutions and 

governing structures that will guide their futures.”70 While Bremer 

continued to report to Secretary Rumsfeld, he also had the status of 

special assistant to the President. 

With looting, blackouts, insurgent activity, and the organizational 

disarray of security and reconstruction efforts, Iraqis were uncertain 

whether the Coalition had a plan, much less was executing one. The 

result was a loss of momentum, the appearance of fl awed planning 

and preparation, and the frittering away of the psychological 

impact gained through decisive combat operations by indecisive, 

disorganized, and unsure postwar operations. The effects that 

the speed and precision which had destroyed the regime might 

have inspired instead dissipated in what many observers, Iraqi, 

American, and international, viewed as a bungled transition to 

peace operations. Iraqis soon were suspicious that such ineptitude 

could only be deliberate, an excuse to lengthen the occupation. One 

Iraqi told Robert Stefanicki, a Polish journalist, that “Americans 

took over Iraq in 3 weeks but they have not been able to restore the 

electricity in 3 months. What kind of power is that? They promised 

us democracy, but where is the government . . . After the war with 

Kuwait, Saddam rebuilt Iraq in 4 months.” Stefanicki concluded: 

“Three months after the end of the war, Iraqis express a growing 

sense of disappointment in the new American order―or, to be more 

precise, the lack of order. There is no dictatorship, but there is also 

no electricity, work, safety, or government.”71

The administration answered its critics by arguing in effect that 

things could have been a lot worse. Wolfowitz, when asked by the 

interviewer if there was anything he would have done differently in 

the prewar planning for the postwar, responded: “You mean all this 

terrible planning that prevented oil fi elds from being destroyed, that 

prevented humanitarian crises, that prevented fortress Baghdad, 

that prevented weapons from being used against Israel . . . I get a 

little tired of all these things we didn’t plan for when there was so 

much good planning that prevented all these thing that these critics 

predicted.”72
144

With the complete collapse of domestic Iraqi institutions, the fi rst 

priority for postwar reconstruction was creation of an “atmosphere 

of safety.” This has proved problematic for coalition forces and 

has had a signifi cant impact on the pace, costs, and perceptions of 

progress. Flawed assumptions that overestimated the coalition’s 

ability to destroy pro-regime forces quickly came into play, as 

potential sources of resistance melted into the population in the 

face of the speed and fi repower of the coalition offensive. Equally 

troubling was the impression of widespread anarchy in the streets of 

Baghdad created by widespread looting in the wake of the regime’s 

disintegration.73 The coalition served as a lightning rod, attracting 

radical Islamic fi ghters from throughout the region, exacerbating 

the security problem. The porous borders with Syria and Iran 

readily allowed al Qaeda and other terrorist groups to join the 

fi ght. According to commander of ground forces in Iraq Lieutenant 

General Richard Sanchez, “We did not expect instability before we 

arrived here. We did not expect the old Iraqi army to disappear and 

the political and economic structures to shut down. That was clearly 

a surprise.”74 Faced with what appears to be a protracted insurgency, 

Dod has been compelled to extend tours and maintain high numbers 

of troops in Iraq, while casting about for more international assistance 

and accelerating formation of Iraqi police and military forces. 

Perhaps most emblematic of the problems the coalition faced in 

Iraq was that of reconstruction. As part of its postwar preparations, 

the administration let a $680 million contract with Bechtel for 

reconstruction projects, $230 million of which was earmarked for 

restoration of the electric grid. The plan assumed that precision 

bombing would limit damage and allow relatively rapid restoration 

of essential services. Planners failed to take into account the 

depths to which Iraq’s infrastructure had fallen after years of 

mismanagement, underinvestment, and a decade of international 

sanctions. Bomb damage, although relatively slight, proved diffi cult 

to repair; and looting in the wake of the fall of Baghdad decimated 

an already fragile infrastructure. The collapse of the power grid 

serving Baghdad and much of the rest of Iraq became a symbol of 

the failure of the reconstruction effort. Despite concerted coalition 

efforts to restore power, prewar levels of electrical production were 
145

not reached until October. The blackout apparently was caused by 

a massive power surge when American forces accidentally severed 

high-voltage lines near Baghdad International airport.75

The Bush administration’s request to Congress for funds to 

rebuild Iraq recognized the magnitude of the problem by asking for 

over $12 billion for reconstruction projects alone. Also, $5.7 billion 

was requested “to rehabilitate and upgrade Iraq’s electric power 

infrastructure.” In addition, $3.7 billion was requested for water and 

sewer system projects, $2.1 billion to modernize the oil industry, and 

over $700 million for projects to rebuild and improve transportation 

networks.76 Iraq continues to consume many more resources―time, 

manpower, and fi nancial―than initially estimated, largely due to 

the decrepit state of the infrastructure and the stultifying effects 

of 3 decades of fear, brutality, statism, and ineffi ciency on the Iraqi 

people, factors undermining their initiative and sense of individual 

power.

OPERATIONS ECLIPSE AND ECLIPSE II―A COMPARISON

There are obvious differences in the conditions that existed 

in Germany and Iraq as the victors implemented the Operation 

ECLIPSE plans for postwar military operations. The fi rst ECLIPSE 

operation occurred amid the total destruction of the Nazi regime 

and the utter devastation and prostration of Germany. There was 

no fi ght left in the German people after nearly 6 years of virtually 

total war―and any inclination to resist was extinguished quickly by 

the presence of millions of Allied soldiers on the soil of Germany 

(and for those in the western zones of occupation the specter of 

Soviet occupation always held out a worse fate). No insurgency 

emerged under these conditions. As a result, security operations for 

the American occupation forces largely involved law enforcement 

tasks, especially since the constituted German police fi rst had to 

be denazifi ed. Politically, Germany comprised a homogeneous 

population and the occupation did not have to deal with different 

ethnic and religious factions vying for power. The chief challenge 

for the western allies was the permanent and complete eradication 

of all vestiges and manifestations of the Nazi Party, no matter how 
146

much more diffi cult that might make day-to-day administration of 

occupied Germany. The democratization process was aided because 

Germany was familiar with the basic processes of democracy from its 

experiences in the Weimar republic and in late imperial Germany, as 

well as a rich cultural heritage of local representative governments; 

democratization did not represent a cultural leap. 

There were some in the west, however, who wondered if 

“Teutons” were capable of democracy. The most dramatic condition 

that faced the occupation was the sheer magnitude of the destruction 

and dislocation that had occurred in the course of 6 years of total 

war. A large percentage of the European population had been 

displaced; millions were homeless; the specter of famine was real; 

infrastructure throughout the continent was in shambles; fi nancial 

and legal institutions were shells; and industry was fl attened or 

given over to wartime production. Great cities lay in ruins and abject 

desperation characterized the conquered German population. The 

German people were self-reliant, industrious, well-educated, and 

inspired by desperation; they took the rebuilding of their country 

on their shoulders and willingly supplied the labor to clear rubble 

and restore infrastructure. National Socialism had not sapped the 

initiative from people or stifl ed the spirit of entrepreneurship.

Dramatically different conditions pertained in Operation ECLIPSE 

II. Precision weapons and a lightning campaign did not fl atten the 

country in the way that years of mass bomber attacks, unrestricted 

urban warfare, and massive artillery barrages had leveled Germany. 

Instead, Iraq suffered from a more insidious deterioration arising 

from years of neglect, the effects of a years of international economic 

sanctions, and the systematic pillaging of the country by those who 

benefi ted from Ba’ath Party rule. Decades of colonialism followed by 

nearly a half-century of despotic abuse had deprived the people of 

belief in their capabilities to effect their own futures. Moreover, Iraq 

was the invention of post-World War I imperial gerrymandering, 

incorporating disparate peoples within the geographic borders of 

a 20th century ideal of ancient Mesopotamia. Sunni Muslims lived 

tensely amidst the peoples and shrines of the rival Shi’ia faith; while 

the Kurds, losers in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, existed 

uneasily stateless at the confl uence of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. This 
147

cultural heterogeneity was not leavened by a shared ideological 

commitment to liberal ideals of compromise, federalism, or personal 

rights; but represented instead a real source of friction and a potential 

source of fi ssure. 

The rapid overthrow of the regime without the attendant death 

and destruction of its adherents, as was the case with Nazi Germany, 

defi ned the conditions that would shape execution of Operation 

ECLIPSE II. First, it allowed the nucleus for a resistance to survive. 

The pampered class, the Ba’ath Party faithful, had nothing to lose 

once ousted from power and so undertook armed opposition to 

both the Coalition occupation and Iraqi supporters of a new political 

order in the country. Coalition policy underscored their exile from 

power by the announced program of de-baathifi cation. Their only 

option then was resistance, either passive or active. When the 

Ba’ath loyalists were joined by an infl ux of Islamist militants from 

throughout the Muslim world seeking to engage the Americans, the 

primary problem faced by those conducting Operation ECLIPSE 

II quickly became security. The reconstruction challenge, while 

daunting, is manageable, especially with the resources the Bush 

administration and international donors have made available, but 

it is greatly complicated by the diffi cult security situation. The 

Coalition’s inability to conduct an orderly demobilization of the 

military and get control of weapons and explosives in the wake 

of fi ghting further exacerbated the problem. Other issues that 

challenged ECLIPSE operations in Germany, such as displaced 

persons and the potential for famine and disease did not arise in 

Iraq to any great extent, in part because of preparation and planning, 

but more because of the rapidity of operations and lack of collateral 

damage that would cause an exodus of refugees from cities.

Perhaps the most signifi cant condition that pertained in both 

cases was that each operation occurred within a broader context, 

both emerging as defi ning battles in wider struggles: Germany 

in the Cold War, and Iraq in the Global War on Terrorism. Both 

places assumed tremendous symbolic importance and represented 

the centerpieces of long-term strategies to confront totalitarian and 

nihilistic ideologies. “Losing” the postwar peace was unthinkable in 

either situation and justifi ed immense expenditure of resources and 

effort sustained over time.
148

IMPLICATIONS FOR WAGING PEACE

The ECLIPSE experiences indicate that the United States 

possesses outstanding capabilities for waging war, but U.S. postwar 

operations over the past 2 decades have had an ad hoc nature that 

is fundamentally ineffi cient, costly, and open-ended. The challenge 

for policy makers is not only to articulate strategic ends, identify 

appropriate ways, and allocate suffi cient means, but also to link 

ends, ways, and means to produce a coherent strategy. If the policy 

objectives (the ends) are unclear or undefi ned, the strategy may well 

defi ne the policy―for better or worse. Conversely, if the strategy is 

fl awed, the attainment of policy goals will be threatened. Clausewitz 

argued “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching 

it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their 

purpose.“77 He also urged statesmen not to take the fi rst step toward 

war without considering the last, to ensure that they had a coherent 

strategy to link ends and means. 

Operation ECLIPSE and the planning for the occupation of 

Germany present the case of a military strategy seeking policy. 

Allied military leaders planned for and resourced postwar 

operations in the absence of a policy defi ning what such operations 

would be asked to accomplish. In Iraq, the situation was reversed. 

The policy was established in some detail before initiation of 

hostilities. The President publicly laid out his postwar objectives on 

several occasions. However, the strategy to achieve the policy was 

hampered severely by fl awed planning assumptions, the failure 

of the U.S. Government to apply suffi cient resources to the task to 

ensure decisive results, the limited time for integrated planning, 

and a lack of interagency coordination. The latter defi cit points out a 

common failing in both ECLIPSE operations, a failure to identify and 

apply all appropriate ways to achieve the desired ends. 

For American military offi cers, the centrality of planning in 

this process seems self-evident. Military offi cers learn carefully 

defi ned decisionmaking processes; daily operations and exercises 

then reinforce that instruction. It is axiomatic to military personnel 

that these planning techniques are universally relevant to all 

situations. It often comes as a professional shock for them to learn 
149

that policymakers do not necessarily share the same confi dence in 

planning as a means of preparing for the future. Winston Churchill 

wrote his Foreign Secretary in 1942: “As you know, I am very doubtful 

about the utility of attempts to plan the peace before we have won 

the war.”78 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld apparently shares 

Churchill’s reservations about the limits of planning. According to 

Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, Rumsfeld’s “big strategic 

theme is uncertainty . . . . The inability to predict the future. The 

limits on our knowledge and the limits on our intelligence.” Feith 

related that as a result if someone told Rumsfeld, “’Let me tell you 

what something’s going to look like in the future,’ you wouldn’t get 

to your next sentence!”79

This reluctance to predict the future confl icts with the imperative 

for careful planning that under girds highly complex military 

operations. As General Bedell Smith warned during the ECLIPSE 

planning, “The problem is not one that can be handled piecemeal or a 

solution extemporized hurriedly in the last stage of the operation.”80

Yet this is precisely the approach policymakers, who want 

maximum fl exibility to react to changing domestic and international 

considerations, often prefer. By 1943, with the United States well in 

the war, Churchill overcame his doubts about planning the peace, as 

he astutely initiated operations in the Mediterranean and elsewhere 

with a clear eye on the future and the need to posture the British 

Empire to deal with threats that might emerge in the wake of the 

defeat of the Third Reich. The magnitude of the task of winning the 

war and the necessity of holding together the coalition, however, 

limited the public enunciation of postwar goals by the Big Three 

until 1945, creating opportunities for military leaders to prepare 

plans and build organizations that could then implement policy 

decisions. Suffi cient ways and means were present in the context of 

total war to achieve postwar objectives as they emerged. 

In general terms, the Bush administration also recognized what 

it wanted to accomplish in undertaking to overthrow Saddam 

Hussein’s regime. It marshaled suffi cient ways and means to gain 

an overwhelming military victory in a limited war but, in trying 

to minimize forces committed to the operation, it failed to provide 

adequate ways and means to wage peace successfully. Political 
150

considerations limited the scope of postwar planning, shaped 

assumptions that downplayed resources required to achieve stated 

objectives, and failed to establish either unity of command or unity 

of effort to link military operations with political, economic, and 

informational operations to achieve a rapid decision in the wake of 

fi ghting. 

The experiences of ECLIPSE I and II also suggest that postwar 

operations are complex civil-military endeavors that require clear 

lines of authority. In postwar Germany, Eisenhower received 

undisputed command of the U.S. occupation. He exercised this 

authority through Clay, whom he purposefully endowed with the 

title “Deputy Commander” to connote the level of responsibility 

he was giving him. While Eisenhower reported through the Army 

Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, he had sole responsibility 

for the conduct of postwar operations. This is in stark contrast to the 

confused state of affairs that exists in ECLIPSE II. DoD separated 

responsibility for postwar operations just weeks before the initiation 

of combat operations in a way seemingly calculated to sow confusion 

and cause a lack of unity of effort. Secretary Rumsfeld quickly formed 

the ORHA to oversee reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and 

the transition of Iraq to a representative form of government under 

the rule of law. Garner, however, did not have the power or stature 

to pull things together quickly; and Franks failed to exercise powers 

as a theater commander to impose order on disjointed postwar 

efforts.81

At a tactical level, the ECLIPSE experiences indicate that the 

military means necessary to achieve decisive postwar results may 

not be equivalent to the means required to prevail on the battlefi eld. 

In Germany, as in Iraq, the force that began executing postwar 

operations was largely the same as that which conducted the 

war. In World War II, the presence of 61 divisions, augmented by 

specialized military government detachments, meant that suffi cient 

means were available in Europe to dominate both the combat and 

postwar battlefi elds, but the Pentagon, in conducting the war in Iraq, 

made a conscious decision to move away from an overwhelming 

force model.82 Given advances in technology, the forces needed to 

gain decisive results in the combat phase may be inadequate to wage 
151

peace decisively. Smaller maneuver forces can fi ght and win with 

precision fi res and timely, accurate intelligence. 

However, this lethal combination is vulnerable when the mission 

shifts to peace operations with their demand for presence, human 

intelligence, civil affairs, and information operations. Waging peace 

requires an overwhelming force on the ground, especially in its 

early phases.83 Numbers matter, because it takes soldiers conducting 

patrols in neighborhoods and responding rapidly to unrest to achieve 

security and stability; precision fi res cannot substitute for troop 

presence. In addition to taking and holding terrain, information 

dominance becomes critical in the postwar period, not just for its 

military utility in providing information to support force protection 

and security, but for its ability to shape public opinion, disseminate 

information to the populace, counter enemy propaganda, and build 

cultural and political awareness in the occupying force to gauge 

effects of actions. Finally, economic and political means from other 

government agencies necessarily become more critical given the 

objectives of most postwar operations―economic suffi ciency and 

political stability.84

This is perhaps the most important lesson of ECLIPSE: postwar 

operations do not fall just within the purview of DoD. The decision 

to go to war involves a calculus that the application of force will 

set the conditions that allow the nation to achieve its policy aims. 

Statesmen must link the fi rst step, going to war, to the last step, 

ordering the resulting peace to ensure the achievement of policy 

objectives.85 This requires the wielding of all instruments of national 

power in a coordinated campaign on a battlefi eld where force is not 

the primary determinant of success.86 Such an integrated effort did 

not occur in either ECLIPSE operation. 

After ECLIPSE, policymakers sought to institutionalize the 

informal consultations that had developed in various subcommittees 

and in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee through the 

National Security Act of 1947 that created the National Security 

Council. ECLIPSE II exposed an interagency planning process that 

continues fundamentally to be fl awed. National Security Presidential 

Directive (NSPD) 24 made DoD the lead agency for postwar 

operations, but that seems to have translated into a perception by 
152

other agencies that Iraq is the Pentagon’s show; actions by various 

members of the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense appear to have 

reinforced that belief. As a result, other than the CIA’s active 

involvement in all aspects of the war (especially the search for 

weapons of mass destruction) and the Agency for International 

Development’s actions to posture American and international aid 

efforts to forestall a potential humanitarian disaster in the wake of 

fi ghting, other key agencies in the government were conspicuously 

absent from planning and execution of postwar missions. 87 The 

National Security Council (NSC) system failed to act forcefully as an 

effective vehicle for interagency cooperation, and when the National 

Security Advisor attempted to carve out such a role for herself and 

the NSC staff, a strong Secretary of Defense quickly quashed the 

attempt.88

The state of the current national security structure is reminiscent 

of DoD prior to Goldwater-Nichols. It is time for wholesale changes 

in the culture of government to inculcate an interagency spirit that 

transcends departmental parochialism. Interagency training, a 

common doctrine for planning and management, and removal of 

barriers to information and communication are essential to build 

mechanisms for interagency cooperation and truly joint planning 

and operations. The time is ripe for a revision of the National 

Security Act of 1947, itself a product of the realization of the need 

for interagency coordination exposed by World War II, to create 

an organizational structure and culture able to seamlessly and 

simultaneously bring all instruments of power to bear at strategic, 

operational, and tactical levels. 89 In order to do so, the means must 

be adequate to the task. Only in this way can policy and strategy be 

linked to ensure that the nation wages peace with the same focused 

intensity as it wages war.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. Directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force from 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, February 12, 1944, N-15823, “Summary of Directives,” 

archival collection, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

2. The Allies established the European Advisory Commission, (EAC) in 

December 1943 as a result of an understanding reached at the Moscow Conference. 
153

The EAC was directed to look at postwar issues and make “recommendations to 

the three governments upon European questions connected with the termination 

of hostilities.” Despite its charter, the group did not prove useful as a policyforming body; however, its discussions provided a forum for the Allies to probe 

each other’s objectives and draft language for such matters as the surrender 

document, occupation zone protocol, and coalition control machinery. The 

American representative, Ambassador John Winant, was disturbed by what he 

viewed as the group’s impotence in defi ning larger policy matters. U.S. Army, 

“Planning for the Occupation,” Frankfurt, Germany, 1946; reprinted as Special 

Text 41-10-62, U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, GA, n.d., pp. 33-35; 

and Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944-1946, United 

States Army in World War II, Special Studies, Washington, DC, 1975, p. 131.

3. Gullion to Jenkins, February 6, 1943, quoted in Harry A. Coles and Albert K. 

Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, United States Army in World War 

II, Special Studies, Washington, DC, 1964, p. 27. 

4. Alexander S. Cochran, Jr., “Planning for the Treatment of Postwar Germany, 

1943-1946,” unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Kansas, 1972, p. 14.

5. Cochran, p. 23.

6. Letter to CCS from Chief of Staff, SHAEF, February 10, 1944, Civil Affairs 

Division Decimal File 380.7―Germany; quoted in Ibid., p. 42.

7. Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory . . . A Commentary on 

the Law and Practice of Belligerent Occupation, Minneapolis, MN, 1957, pp. 42-44.

8. These were designated as “H” or “I” detachments. They “advanced 

with the front line troops posting proclamations, removing Nazi offi cials, and 

replacing them with non-Nazis, frequently in six or seven localities a day.” Earl 

F. Ziemke, “Improvising Stability and Change in Postwar Germany,” Robert 

Wolfe, ed., Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany 

and Japan, 1944-1952, Carbondale, IL, 1984, p. 56. See also Harold Zink, American 

Military Government in Germany, New York, 1947, pp. 58-59, for a discussion of 

the organization of civil affairs detachments. Over 7,000 offi cers and men were 

assigned to the European Civil Affairs Division and organized in three provisional 

regiments of 10 companies each. Two of the regiments were designated to 

occupy Germany, the other one to provide civil affairs teams to assist local 

governments in liberated areas. Merle Faisod, “The Development of American 

Military Government Policy during World War II,” Carl J. Friedrich, ed., American 

Experiences in Military Government in World War II Experiences in Military Government in World War II, New York, 1948, pp. 23-41. Hajo , New York, 1948, pp. 23-41. Hajo 

Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies, Washington, 

DC, 1947, pp. 7-10; Ziemke, Army in the Occupation of Germany, pp. 3, 68-70. On 

the scenes of destruction that met Allied commanders and their efforts to impose 

order and establish security, see Harold Zink, American Military Government in 

Germany, New York, 1947, pp. 40, 170-172; John Gimbel, A German Community 

under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-1952, Stanford, CA, 1961, pp. 37, 68.
154

9 Historians have argued that SWNCC was the forerunner of the National 

Security Council. Its formation was a tangible indication that key cabinet 

secretaries recognized that formulation of postwar policies was inherently an 

interagency problem. According to Alexander Cochran, SWNCC “represented 

the fi rst formal acknowledgement by the military and civilian departments that 

the planning for the treatment of postwar Germany was a joint problem which 

had to be conducted in a coordinated manner with agreed upon responsibilities.” 

Cochran, p. 100. Interestingly, for the National Security Council parallel, SWNCC 

had a joint secretariat, affording it a mechanism to coordinate actions with the 

JCS and other governmental departments. The working group was formed by 

departmental deputies like James C. Dunn of the State Department’s Post War 

Programs Committee and Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy, and included 

General John Hilldring, Chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff―

veterans of the ad hoc planning groups that had come before. Cochran, p. 102.

10. The Big Three also announced their intent to extract reparations. See the 

Tripartite Agreements of the Yalta Conference in Appendix A of Diane Shaver 

Clemons, Yalta, New York, 1970, pp. 295-296. At Potsdam, following V-E Day, the 

Allies got more specifi c in the “Protocol on Proceedings,” agreeing that the goals 

of occupation were “The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany 

and the destruction of the Nazi party, in order to convince the German people of 

its total defeat and prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life 

on a democratic basis.” The Protocol also called for decentralization of German 

economic power, with emphasis on fostering agriculture and “peaceful domestic 

industries.” Cochran, p. 129.

11. Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany, Westport, CT, 1950, p. 19. The history 

of JCS 1067 [“Directive to the Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces of Occupation 

Regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately 

Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post Defeat)”] is long and 

complex. The fi rst version was sent to Eisenhower on September 24, 1944. It was 

presented to the European Advisory Committee in January 1945 as the American 

proposal for a policy for occupied Germany. Following Yalta, the directive 

underwent a number of revisions and was ultimately issued to Eisenhower in 

his capacity as Commander, U.S. Forces Europe on May 14, 1945, as JCS 1067/8. 

Ziemke, pp. 101-102, 208-214. The text of JCS 1067/8 is printed in Holborn, pp. 

157-172.

12. In North Africa, the State Department was given responsibility for civil 

administration of occupied territories. State established the Offi ce of Foreign 

Relief and Rehabilitation Operations and the Offi ce of Foreign Territories to 

conduct the operation. Political questions and disputes over priority of shipping 

and supplies created numerous points of friction between civil administrators and 

General Eisenhower. Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, Commander of Army 

Service Forces, observed in April 1943 that, “We have had the opportunity to learn 

a real lesson from North Africa which lesson to me is that you cannot separate 

the handling of civil affairs from military operations in areas in which military 
155

operations are under way, and that an attempt to do so in a hostile country would 

be disastrous.” Somervell to McCloy, April 3, 1943, quoted in Cole and Weinberg, 

p. 65. As a result, at the urging of Secretary of War Stimson, President Roosevelt 

directed that the Army become the lead agency in civil administration of liberated 

and occupied territories. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall told 

a subordinate that the State Department and other civilian agencies “were very 

unhappy about the fact that the Army, and not they, were going to have this 

problem in the wake of battle . . . .” He also stated that only the bad experience 

Eisenhower had in North Africa in the wake of Operation TORCH with all the 

civilian agencies that had fl owed in and competed for scarce resources had 

convinced Roosevelt that military government would be necessary. 

The President himself had come to this conclusion without any pressures 

at all by the War Department . . . but . . . nobody else in the cabinet, 

except perhaps Mr. Stimson and Mr. Knox, had any sympathy with the 

President’s decision, and . . . some cabinet members . . . had great doubts 

about the wisdom of giving to soldiers the amount of political power and 

infl uence to be exerted by [the Civil Affairs Division of the Army General 

Staff] in the years ahead.” 

Hilldring interview, March 30, 1959, quoted in Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: 

Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945, New York, 1973, pp. 457-458. See also Ziemke, 

pp. 10-13; and Holborn, pp. 12-13. Despite this decision, the Army continued 

to attempt to place limits on the mission. General Hilldring assured Assistant 

Secretary of State Dean Acheson in late 1943 that:

The Army is not a welfare organization. It is a military machine whose 

mission is to defeat the enemy on the fi eld of battle. Its interest and 

activities in military government and civil affairs administration are 

incidental to the accomplishment of the military mission. Nevertheless, 

these activities are of paramount importance, as any lack of a condition 

of social stability in an occupied area would be prejudicial to the success 

of the military effort.

Hilldring to Acheson, November 9, 1943, quoted in Coles and Weinberg, p. 153.

13. John McCloy had written to Eisenhower in late 1944 telling him that the 

War Department was recommending “that the government of Germany should 

be instituted on a military basis . . . . [with] single, undivided responsibility in 

the military commander.” McCloy made it clear that the commander would be 

Eisenhower. He went on to state that he intended to suggest the appointment 

of Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson to act as a civilian advisor to assist 

Eisenhower in administering the peace. Secretary of War Stimson convinced 

Roosevelt, however, that Patterson was too important to the War Department 

to lose at this time. Stephen E. Ambrose, Supreme Commander: the War Years of 

General Dwight D. Eisenhower General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Garden City, NY, 1970, p. 602. In March 1945, with , Garden City, NY, 1970, p. 602. In March 1945, with 

no one yet appointed to supervise the day-to-day operations of the occupation 

government, Eisenhower wrote the Army’s G-1 telling him that he had “heard 
156

a rumor that Lucius Clay may become available for assignment to a theater. If it 

should develop that this is so, I have a very urgent need for him . . . .My idea is that 

he would be the Herbert Hoover of this war and would have the job of handling 

civil affairs in Germany.” Eisenhower to Somervell, March 14, 1945, in Alfred D. 

Chandler, Jr., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, the War Years, Vol. 4, 

Baltimore, MD, 1970, p. 2528. Clay, an Army engineer, had been detailed early in 

the war to serve as the War Department’s representative to the War Production 

Board and Offi ce of Lend Lease. Ultimately, he had become the deputy to Director 

of War Mobilization James F. Byrnes. Clay thus was positioned admirably to be 

selected for assignment as the Deputy Military Governor of Germany. As he later 

recalled, “I was considered in the War Department to have had perhaps as much 

experience dealing with civilian agencies of the government as anybody in the 

military establishment.” The later ascension of Byrnes to Secretary of State made 

the choice especially fortuitous for smoothing coordination between State and 

War. Cochran, p. 122. 

14. Clay, p. 6.

15. Ibid., p. 56. Forrest Pogue, Marshall’s biographer, concluded: 

Letters between Marshall and Eisenhower and memoranda between 

Stimson and Marshall about the approaching postwar situation refl ected 

the fact that they thought in terms of 1919―that American public opinion 

would demand a recall of troops from abroad, that a demand would 

be made for a sharp cutback in the armed forces, that a resurgence of 

isolationism would bring a revulsion against stationing American troops 

abroad to be caught up in Europe’s quarrels, and that fi nal arrangements 

would be made at a peace conference.

Pogue, p. 574. 

16. James Dunn, voiced State’s position at the time: “The Department of State 

is a policy organism of the Government and is therefore not equipped to carry out 

operations certainly not on such large scale as would be required in dealing with 

the German problem.” Cochran, p. 141.

17. Byrnes accomplished this co-opting of the military by appointing the 

chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff as Assistant Secretary of 

State for Occupied Areas to develop occupation policy, and leveraging his own 

strong personal relationship with Truman. Cochran, p. 141. See also John Gimbel, 

The Origins of the Marshall Plan, Stanford, 1976, p. 26; and Gimbel, “Governing 

the American Zone of Germany,” Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans as Proconsuls, pp. 

92-93. Byrnes’ relationship with General Clay from the days when Clay was his 

deputy in the War Mobilization Offi ce also afforded him valuable entree into the 

Offi ce of Military Government. Cochran, p. 122.

18. Ibid., pp. 22, 34. A structure for postwar planning was created in the 

Army staff and in combined headquarters. The War Department had formed a 

Civil Affairs Division in the Army in 1942 and established a school for military 

government in Charlottesville, VA. Then in March 1943, General Marshall 
157

directed the formation of the Civil Affairs Division of the General Staff, an 

initiative stemming largely from his own experiences with occupation duty in the 

Philippines in 1902 and in Europe after World War I. See Pogue, pp. 455-457. In 

Europe, General Morgan, Chief of Staff of COSSAC, created the European Civil 

Affairs Division (ELAD). With the establishment of SHAEF in February 1944, 

ECAD became the G-5 Division. Within the Operations Section of the G-5, separate 

civil affairs sections for each country in the area of operations prepared plans 

for occupation or liberation, as appropriate. The German Country Unit (GCU), 

formed in March 1944, was the principal postwar planning organization in G-5. 

The GCU was manned by 150 British and American offi cers, bringing a combined 

perspective to their postwar deliberations, something that was missing at the 

national level. The GCU drafted plans to assume responsibility for governing 

Germany at national, regional, and local levels. This served as a mechanism for 

training military government detachments for the specifi c tasks that they would 

have to perform. According to Harold Zink, the offi cial historian for the U.S. High 

Commissioner of Germany, the GCU “actually succeeded in drafting a series of 

plans which had a considerable bearing on the actual occupation of Germany.” 

Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955, New York, 1957, p. 20. Zink 

apparently was a member of the German Country Unit at one time, his book, 

American Military Government in Germany, is dedicated to “Brother Offi cers on the 

Board of Editors, German Country Unit, SHAEF”).

19. Planners addressed three “cases” under which RANKIN might be 

executed: a rapid collapse of resistance; a sudden German decision to retreat to 

pre-war borders; and unconditional surrender. The latter, labeled RANKIN-C, 

was viewed as the most likely scenario and was fi nalized at the end of October 

1943. “Planning for the Occupation,” pp. 21-24. On October 30, 1943, the RANKINC draft was issued as a planning directive to the U.S. First Army Group and the 

British Twenty-First Army Group. Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military 

Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953, Frankfurt, Germany, 1953, p. 189.

20. Most importantly, the RANKIN planning began to build the staff 

organizations capable of undertaking the work of planning the peace. For 

example, Major General C. A. West, Deputy G-3 of COSSAC, told his staff, “We 

cannot wait for policy to be laid down by the United Nations. It is essential that 

we should prepare now, as a matter of urgency, papers on all these problems,” 

listing armistice terms, disarmament, displaced persons, prisoners of war, 

martial law, disposal of captured war material, and coordination of movement 

and transportation. Major General C. A. West, Memorandum, January 14, 1944, 

subject: “Operation RANKIN-C,” quoted in Frederiksen, p. 36.

21. TALISMAN also went into much greater detail than RANKIN in assigning 

specifi c missions to various commands and detailing force movement and 

positioning. See note 24 below. “Planning for the Occupation,” pp. 60-61.

22. RANKIN-C called for 25 divisions; TALISMAN increased the requirement 

to over 39. Ibid., pp. 64-67, 69.
158

23. Once resistance ended, plans called for the Twenty-First Army Group 

(UK) to assume responsibility for the designated British zone of occupation in the 

north, and the Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups (U.S.) for the American zone of 

occupation in the south. The army groups were to establish four military districts 

in each zone to set the conditions for transition to Tripartite Control. The Supreme 

Commander would preside over Berlin as a separate district. The plan also 

anticipated a requirement for redeployment of “surplus U.S. and British forces 

not required for occupational duties in Germany” from ports in France. Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, Operation ECLIPSE: Appreciation and 

Outline Plan, Section I, paragraphs 67-70, 10 November 1944. See also ECLIPSE 

Appreciation and Outline Plan, Section VI, Task 6.

24. Eight of these accompanied the ECLIPSE Outline Plan; SHAEF published 

the rest as they were completed and approved. The fi rst memorandum contained 

the “Instrument of Surrender” or instructions to surrendering German forces to 

implement the terms agreed to by the Allies. These were general in nature, directing 

disarmament of all German armed forces, authorized activities of German military 

personnel, and procedures for safeguarding materiel, records, equipment, and 

facilities. It also mandated German cooperation and assistance in removing 

obstacles to land, sea, and air movement. Appendices to the memorandum 

contained special orders to German military commanders requiring them to 

furnish the Allies specifi c information and admonishing them to cooperate and 

protect facilities and equipment pending disposition instructions. Appendix H 

provided for sanctions against violators of the terms of surrender. These included 

military measures, judicial and police measures, and “repressive” measures such 

as destruction of property and hostages. Only the Supreme Commander could 

authorize “repressive” measures, with the exception that Allied forces could 

force “civilian or military persons to accompany military parties into buildings or 

areas suspected of being mined or booby trapped, or on trains and other forms of 

transportation liable to be damaged by sabotage . . . ” Memorandum Number 1, 

“Instrument of Surrender; Orders to German Military Authorities to Supplement 

Instrument; Sanctions in Event of Delinquency,” November 25, 1944, in ECLIPSE 

Appreciation and Outline Plan.

Memorandum 5 established rules governing labor in the postwar period and 

instructed army group commanders to use German labor as available, including 

disarmed German military and paramilitary personnel. Memorandum Number 

5, “Labor,” March 2, 1945, revised April 28, 1945, in ECLIPSE Appreciation and 

Outline Plan.

Memorandum 8 assigned army group commanders “responsibility for the 

safety, recovery, care, maintenance, administration, and evacuation of all United 

Nations Prisoners of War . . . in their respective zones of operation.” The SHAEF 

G1 was designated as the Supreme Commander’s executive agent on prisoner of 

war matters and the memorandum directed him to attach personnel to the army 

groups to assist them in executing this task. The memorandum also established 

policies and procedures for the army groups to follow to deal with these liberated 
159

prisoners. Memorandum Number 8, “The Care and Evacuation of Prisoners 

of War in Greater Germany under ‘ECLIPSE’ Conditions,” March 25, 1945, in 

ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan. Memorandum 14 addressed control 

of displaced persons (DPs). It estimated that there would be 3,685,000 DPs in 

the American and British zones, with another 3,405,000 in the Russian zone. The 

memorandum reminded commanders that “The care of these people and their 

ultimate disposition is an international problem of the fi rst magnitude, affecting 

in varying degrees the governments of nineteen countries.” It instructed them to 

employ “all available resources at the disposal” of the Allies forces to ensure the 

DPs were cared for properly. The memorandum further directed commanders to 

establish assembly centers to control movement of displaced persons and establish 

border controls. It further instructed them to ensure separation of German refugees 

from Allied displaced persons. Memorandum Number 14, “Control of Displaced 

Persons,” ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan. The estimates of DPs in the 

plan were fairly accurate. By October 1945, 2.3 million DPs had been repatriated 

from the American zone. Frederiksen, p. 75.

Memoranda 9 through 11 addressed disarmament of German ground, air, and 

naval forces respectively. The local Allied commander was tasked to safeguard 

and control German war materiel. Annexes to the memoranda delineated specifi c 

materials that the Allies would confi scate and identifi ed those materials that the 

Germans could retain, including ambulances, trucks, (one per 100 soldiers for 

supply), horse-drawn vehicles, draft animals, and their harnesses. Memorandum 

Number 9, “Primary Disarmament of the German Land Forces and Short Term 

Disposal of Surrendered War Material,” November 25, 1944; Memorandum 

Number 10, “Primary Disarmament of German Air Forces Opposing Us and 

Short Term Disposal of Surrendered War Material”; and Memorandum Number 

11, “Primary Disarmament of German Naval Forces, Short Term Disposal of 

Surrendered Naval War Material and Naval Demolitions,” January 5, 1945, in 

ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

Memoranda 12 and 13 provided instructions on civil affairs operations in 

liberated countries and military government operations in Germany respectively. 

Civil affairs guidance was provided on each country. Military government was 

designated as the responsibility of the Supreme Commander, with the army group 

commanders acting as his agents in their zones of responsibility. He would exercise 

“supreme legislative, executive and judicial rights of an occupying power, subject 

to the rules of International Law.” The tasks identifi ed for military government 

were substantial. They were to enforce the terms of surrender, establish and 

maintain law and order, and apprehend war criminals. Additionally, it had the 

mission to “care, control, and repatriate” displaced citizens of the United Nations 

while providing “minimum care necessary to effect control of enemy refugees 

and displaced persons.” Military government was also charged with elimination 

of Nazism, fascism, and militarism. Military government detachments were 

empowered to retain “and establish suitable civil administration to the extent 

required to accomplish the above objectives.” Specifi c procedures for military 
160

government were contained in the Military Government Handbook published by 

the SHAEF G-5. Signifi cantly, units were reminded:

Military government of Germany is a command responsibility. In the 

initial stages of the advance into Germany military government will 

be carried out on an ad hoc basis in accordance with the tactical areas 

of command. As the situation stabilizes it will be possible to establish 

Military Districts, which will correspond in general with German 

administrative boundaries. 

Memorandum Number 12, “Digest of Civil Affairs Considerations in Liberated 

Countries,” December 28, 1944; and Memorandum Number 13, “Digest for 

Military Government and Occupation of Germany,” December 28, 1944, in 

ECLIPSE Appreciation and Outline Plan.

25. Ziemke, p. 320. 

26. Third Army, ”Mission Accomplished: Third United States Army 

Occupation of Germany,” Frankfurt, Germany, 1947, p. 25. According to historian 

Earl Ziemke, “The company was widely viewed as the ideal unit for independent 

deployment because billets were easy to fi nd and the hauls from the billets to 

guard posts and checkpoints would not be excessively long.” Ziemke, pp. 229, 

320.

27. Ziemke, pp. 241-243. SHAEF addressed the shortfall in guards by assigning 

13 antiaircraft battalions to provide security. Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. 

Ambrose, eds., Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts Against Falsehood, Baton 

Rouge, LA, 1992, p. 9. 

28. Ziemke, pp. 293-294; Frederiksen, pp. 89-90. 

29. Brian Loring Villa, “The Diplomatic and Political Context of the POW 

Camps Tragedy,” in Bischof and Ambrose, eds., Eisenhower and the German POWs, 

p. 69; Frederiksen, p. 53; Ziemke, p. 294.

30. Frederiksen, p. 86.

31. Third Army, p. 61.

32. Julian Bach, Jr., America’s Germany: An Account of the Occupation, New 

York, 1946, p. 41; Third Army, pp. 61-62.

33. Frederiksen, pp. 73-75. 

34. See Bischof and Ambrose, pp. 2-6, for an excellent discussion of this 

situation.

35. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940-1945, Boston, 1974, p. 682. 

36. Ziemke, pp. 195, 286. 

37. Ibid, pp. 61, 75, 205, 236-237, 252. In Marburg, 

Displaced persons continued to loot after military government 

arrived because German police lacked jurisdiction over them and 
161

because some local unit commanders apparently sanctioned it. 

Military authorities stepped in only after the displaced persons 

began to threaten the security of the local area by robberies and 

murders. They stopped looting by putting the displaced persons into 

camps where they could be observed, controlled, and then processed 

for repatriation. 

Gimbel, pp. 37, 61. See also Frederiksen, p. 11.

38. Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American 

Occupation, New York, 1959, p. 50. 

39. Third Army, pp. 52-53.

40. Stephen E. Ambrose, “Eisenhower and the Germans,” in Bischof and 

Ambrose, eds, Eisenhower and the German POWs, p. 35. 

41. Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, America’s Secret Army: The Untold Story of 

the Counter Intelligence Corps, New York, 1989, p. 225. 

42. Ziemke, p. 182. 

43. Ibid., p. 151. 

44. See also Zink, p. 170; and William B. Dallas, “The Role of Counterintelligence 

in the European Theater of Operations during World War II,” Master of Military 

Arts Thesis, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1993, p. 

75. 

45. Ibid., p. 159.

46. Ziemke, pp. 194, 236. In the absence of military government troops, 

responsibility for military government often rested in the hands of tactical 

commanders such as a lieutenant who, after his tanks occupied a town, reported 

that he “selected me a mayor who lived in that big house yonder―and he’s doing 

all right.” Davidson, p. 49. Tactical troops posted the occupation ordinances 

and the SHAEF proclamation, established population control measures such as 

roadblocks and curfews, and conducted security patrols. When Leipzig fell on 

April 19, 1945, V Corps designated the commander of the 190th Field Artillery 

Group to take control of the city of one million inhabitants and gave him 3 fi eld 

artillery battalions, 4 security guard detachments, and a provisional military 

government detachment, 16 offi cers, 24 enlisted men, to administer the city and 

provide security. Frederiksen, p. 10.

47. Davidson, p. 130. 

48. Clay, p. 69.

49. Quoted in Blumenson, p. 785.

50. Talk about ECLIPSE conditions.

51. Nadia Schadlow argues persuasively that “Civilian leaders supported 

the Army’s leadership over governance operations largely because of a lack of 

alternatives. Political leaders realized that the Army was the only agency capable 
162

of accomplishing reconstruction in the midst of and aftermath of combat.” Nadia 

Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” Parameters, Autumn 2003, p. 88.

52. President George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation,” March 19, 2003; 

available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html, Internet, 

accessed October 15, 2003.

53. President George W. Bush, Speech to American Enterprise Institute, 

February 26, 2003; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/iraq/

20030226-11.html, Internet, accessed October 17, 2003. After the war, in his speech 

on the USS Lincoln, the President sounded the same themes:

We have diffi cult work to do in Iraq. We’re bringing order to parts of 

that country that remain dangerous. We’re pursuing and fi nding leaders 

of the old regime, who will be held to account for their crimes. We’ve 

begun the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons . . . . We’re 

helping to rebuild Iraq, . . . And we will stand with the new leaders of 

Iraq as they establish a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The 

transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth 

every effort.

Bush, “Address on USS Lincoln,” May 1, 2003; available at www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html, Internet, accessed September 15, 2003. 

54. As the New York Times put it, Garner was “in charge of everything the 

American military is not: feeding the country, fi xing the infrastructure and creating 

. . . a democratic government.” Jane Perlez, “Nucleus of a Postwar Government 

Forms in Kuwait,” New York Times, April 4 2003, reprinted in International Herald 

Tribune; available at http://www.iht.com/articles/92109.html, Internet, accessed 

September 11, 2003. The composition of the leadership team at ORHA represented 

various backgrounds. Tim Carney, former ambassador to the Sudan was named 

to head the Ministry of Interior; Kenneth Keith, former ambassador to Qatar, 

would lead the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Robin Raphel, former ambassador 

to Tunisia, would direct the Ministry of Trade. In addition, regional supervisors 

were named to direct regional humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts. 

These were directed by General (Ret.) Bruce Moore in the North; General (Ret.) 

Buck Walters in the South; and Barbara Bodine, former ambassador to Yemen in 

the central part of Iraq, including Baghdad. James Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” 

The Atlantic, January/February 2004, p. 65.

55. Journalist George Packer noted the enormous political sensitivity of 

negotiations in the United Nations in January-February 2003, and quotes one 

ORHA offi cial, Drew Erdmann: “How much diplomacy would there have 

been at the U.N. if people had said, ‘The President is pulling people out of the 

Departments of Agriculture and Commerce to take over the whole Iraqi state?’ 

That’s the political logic that works against advance planning.” George Packer, 

“Letter From Baghdad: War After the War―What Washington Doesn’t See in 

Iraq,” The New Yorker, November 24, 2003, p. 64.
163

56. Many have argued that Secretary Rumsfeld and Under Secretary of 

Defense Douglas Feith systematically blocked dissenting voices from ORHA, 

whatever their level of expertise. For example, Packer states that contact with 

Thomas Warrick, the director of the “Future of Iraq” project, was specifi cally 

forbidden by Secretary Rumsfeld, who intimated that he was acting at the request 

of the Vice President. Packer, p. 62. James Fallows has an extensive account of the 

detailed planning that was done in the Future of Iraq project beginning in March 

2002, a year before ORHA was formed. In addition he describes a CIA-sponsored 

war game in May 2002 to consider post-Saddam scenarios. The exercises reportedly 

highlighted the risk of disorder in the wake of the collapse of the regime, the 

complexity of the WMD hunt, and the diffi culty of creating a workable Iraqi 

government given “that rivalries in Iraq were so deep, and the political culture 

so shallow.” Fallows reports that “Representatives from the Defense Department 

were among those who participated in the fi rst of these CIA war-game sessions. 

When their Pentagon superiors at the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense found out 

about this, in early summer, the representatives were reprimanded and told not to 

participate further.” Fallows, pp. 56-58. In another case, a meeting between a retired 

Air Force colonel who had conducted an extensive study of Iraq’s infrastructure 

and Deputy Assistant Undersecretary of Defense Joseph Collins was abruptly and 

unexplainably cancelled. The offi cer concluded: “It became clear that what I was 

really arguing was that we had to delay the war . . . I was saying ‘We aren’t ready, 

and in just 6 or 8 weeks, there is no way to get ready for everything we need to 

do.’” Ibid., p. 70. 

57. ORHA administrator Jay Garner was selected principally because of his 

experience in humanitarian operations. In the aftermath of Operation DESERT 

STORM, then Lieutenant General Garner commanded Operation PROVIDE 

COMFORT to resettle Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq and provide them 

humanitarian assistance. In this task, “he combined vision with a practical ability 

to get things done.” Adam Curtis, ”Iraq’s interim administrator,” BBC News 

Online; available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/Americas/2924201.stm, 

Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. MSNBC reported on April 24, 2003, that 

“Garner is expected to repeat what he pulled off for the Kurds, namely restoring 

law and order to a region where chaos reigns.” Rachel Elbaum, “Iraq meets the 

new boss,” MSNBC; available at http://www.msnbc.com/news/900794.asp?cp1=1, 

Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. For humanitarian response, see also 

Andrew Natsios, USAID Administrator, “Special State Department Briefi ng 

on Iraq Reconstruction,” March 25, 2003; available at http://www.centcom.mil/

CENTCOMNews/Transcripts/20030328.htm, Internet, accessed January 16, 2004.

58. Packer, p. 62.

59. Joint doctrine states that “military plans and operations must focus both 

on achieving the political objectives and on establishing the military conditions 

necessary to sustain the objectives following cessation of military operations. 

This calls for planning based on the desired end state, ensuring that the longerterm postconfl ict environment called for by U.S. political objectives is preserved 
164

following conclusion of military involvement. Military plans at all levels should 

include consideration of conditions under which confl ict termination and 

termination of military involvement can be executed.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint 

Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” Joint Publication 1, April 13, 1995, 

II-5. Current joint doctrine also directs its readers to “View confl ict termination not 

just as the end of hostilities, but as the transition to a new posthostilities phase 

characterized by both civil and military problems.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint 

Doctrine for Campaign Planning,” Joint Publication 5-00.1, January 25, 2002, p. II-5. 

60. This focus on combat operations is not unique to Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM. General Maxwell Thurman related that when he became commander 

of U.S. SOUTHCOM a few months before Operation JUST CAUSE: “I did not even 

spend 5 minutes on Blind Logic [the post-confl ict plan].” As he refl ected back on 

the events leading up to JUST CAUSE he concluded, “The least of my problems 

at the time was Blind Logic . . . . We put together the campaign for JUST CAUSE 

and probably did not spend enough time on the restoration.” Quoted in William 

Flavin, “Planning for Confl ict Termination and Post-Confl ict Success,” Parameters, 

Autumn 2003, p. 108. 

61. Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. Rushed Post-Saddam Planning,” Washington 

Times, September 3, 2003, p. 1. Feith established a highly compartmented Offi ce 

of Special Plans to prepare postwar plans and policy. According to one Air Force 

offi cer who worked in the Near East/South Asia Bureau of Feith’s Policy offi ce 

in OSD, “She and her colleagues were allowed little contact with the Offi ce of 

Special Plans and often were told by the offi cials who ran it to ignore the State 

Department’s concerns and views.” Jonathan S. Landay and Warren P. Strobel, 

“Lack of Planning Contributed to Chaos in Iraq,” Knight Ridder Newspapers; 

available at http://www.miami.com/ mld/miamiherald/6285256.htm, Internet, accessed 

September 11, 2003.

62. Packer, p. 62.

63. Ibid.

64. Quoted by Bob Kemper, “Bush Sees Wide Post-War Peace: Iraq Defeat 

Would Open Door to Democracy in Region, He Says,” Chicago Tribune, February 

27, 2003; available from www.voy.com/134586/9.html, Internet, accessed September 

11 2003. Vice-President Cheney echoed the same view in an interview with Tim 

Russert just before the war: “. . . I really do believe that we will be greeted as 

liberators . . . The read we get on the people of Iraq is there is no question but what 

they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the 

United States when we come to do that.” Quoted in Fallows, p. 65.

65. Packer, p. 63; Fallows, pp. 65, 72-73. 

66. Zinni’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 

February 11, 2003, is a masterful review of the complexity of postwar operations 

and a strong pitch for an integrated interagency approach. He noted that he 

had directed a planning effort to address postwar considerations when he was 

in command: “Not only to identify the problems or what had to be done, but I 
165

didn’t want the military to be stuck with this problem, as is always the case. We 

did that. I must say with mixed results. I can’t say I had enthusiastic support from 

all agencies, but I did from some and it helped us identify some of the problems.” 

Anthony Zinni, “Statement of Gen. Anthony Zinni,” Transcript of Hearing of 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 11, 2003; available at http://

www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/HearingsPreparedstatements/sfrc-021103.htm#AZ, 

Internet, accessed October 24, 2003.

67. John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign Policy, 

No. 133, November/December 2002; reprinted in Volume I, Readings, Course 2: 

“War, National Security Policy and Strategy,” August 27-October 24, 2003, U.S. 

Army War College, p. 373.

68. ORHA offi cials reportedly drafted a list of key sites in Baghdad that 

would require security when the city fell. Although they submitted this list to 

CFLCC, it was lost in the press of managing combat operations; and in the absence 

of personal relationships among planners, there was no follow-up by ORHA. 

Packer, p. 64.

69. A retired Air Force colonel, Sam Gardiner, presented results of his study 

of the Iraqi infrastructure to a Rand Corporation forum in January 2003. He 

concluded that, despite precision bombing, the fragile water, sewage, electrical, 

and public health systems would collapse as a result of any war or its aftermath. 

Fallows, p. 70.

70. Ari Fleischer, Statement by Press Secretary, May 6, 2003; available at http:

//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030506-5.html, Internet, accessed 

September 15, 2003.

71. Another Iraqi asserted, “Americans are withholding gas and electricity 

on purpose. They want to break us, so we’ll accept any government. But we will 

not let that happen. Iraq is not Afghanistan. Our patience is running out.” Robert 

Stefanicki, “Iraq, Three Months After the War,” Gazeta Wyborcza, Warsaw, Poland, 

July 10, 2003, available at World Press Review, http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/

1361.cfm, Internet, accessed September 11, 2003. 

72. For an administration view, see Paul Wolfowitz, “Building a Free and 

Democratic Iraq is Going to be a Huge Victory in the War on Terror,” Jerusalem 

Post, September 26, 2003, available at http://www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/

Sep2003/e20030930220472.html, Internet, accessed September 30, 2003.

73. Time reported:

To cope with the mounting lawlessness―which threatens to turn into a 

free-for-all for armed gangs, and an orgy of retributive violence against 

those associated with the regime . . . , the U.S. has called for the Iraqi 

bureaucrats who previously policed the city and ran its basic services to 

come forward and help restore order. Soldiers have been ordered to stop 

looting where possible, but their primary focus remains securing the city 

from hostile combatants.
166

Tony Karon, “Anarchy in Baghdad,” Time, April 11, 2003; available at http:

//www.time.com/time/world/printout/0,8816,442987,00.html, Internet, accessed 

September 15, 2003.

74. Richard Lloyd Parry, “Frankness in Coalition Front Line,” London Times, 

September 17, 2003, available at www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Sep2003/

earlyBirdHome/html, Internet, accessed September 18, 2003. The intensity of the 

security challenge may be gauged in part by the fact that in the 4th Infantry Division 

Sector, U.S. troops killed 600 and arrested 2,500 guerrillas by early October. 

Michael O’Hanlon, “Turning of the Tide?” Washington Post, October 7, 2003, p. 

25, available at www.us.army.mil/portal/jhtml/earlyBird/Oct2003/earlyBirdHome/html, 

Internet, accessed October 8, 2003. 

75. Rajjiv Chandrasekaran, “Crossed Wires Kept Power Off in Iraq: Prewar 

Planning Failed to Assess State of Infrastructure,” Washington Post, September 25, 

2003, p. 1. 

76. Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Tells How Billions of Dollars Would Rebuild Iraq,” 

Washington Post, September 25, 2003, p. 25.

77. Clausewitz, On War, Book I, Chapter I, p. 99. It is important to note, as , Book I, Chapter I, p. 99. It is important to note, as 

Michael Howard has, that Clausewitz’ principle is “honored more often in the 

breach than in the observance. Normally the priorities are reversed. In spite of 

himself the strategist fi nds that his plans are being shaped by immediate military 

and political necessities, which cumulatively shape the object of the war.” Michael 

Howard, “British Grand Strategy in World War I,” in Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand 

Strategies in War and Peace, New Haven, CT, 1991, p. 31.

78. Michael D. Pearlman, Warmaking and American Democracy: the Struggle over 

Military Strategy, 1700 to Present, Lawrence, KS, 1999, p. 9.

79. Fallows, p. 53.

80. Letter to CCS from Chief of Staff, SHAEF, February 10, 1944, Civil Affairs 

Division Decimal File 380.7―Germany; quoted in Cochran, “Planning for the 

Treatment of Postwar Germany,” p. 42.

81. The naming of Ambassador Paul Bremer to head the Coalition Provisional 

Authority with the rank of Presidential Envoy reporting directly to the Secretary 

of Defense did little to unify the effort. The CENTCOM Commander, General 

Abizaid, now directs stability and security operations in Iraq through a Combined 

Joint Task Force organized around V Corps headquarters; Ambassador Bremer 

has no direct authority over these forces, and there is not an effective mechanism 

for coordinating the activities of the CPA and the CJTF.

82. The regime would be toppled by about 130,000 coalition troops in 

total. This was accomplished not by seizing and holding territory―at least 

until the Third Infantry Division reached Baghdad―but by decisive maneuver, 

information superiority, and precision strike throughout the battlefi eld. In 

effect, IRAQI FREEDOM brought to life Joint Vision 2020 which calls for “full 

spectrum dominance―achieved through the interdependent application 
167

of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics and full 

dimensional protection.” No one can deny that the force assembled for the fi ght 

met the requirements for achieving decisive combat effects, but this force proved 

incapable of achieving “full spectrum dominance” once major combat operations 

had ended. The debate that occurred between Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki 

and senior leaders of the Defense Department, most stridently, Deputy Secretary 

of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, underscored the confl ict over planning assumptions 

and force-sizing for postwar operations. Clearly Wolfowitz, speaking for Secretary 

Rumsfeld, prevailed in asserting a view that U.S. and coalition forces could shift 

responsibility for security quickly to extant Iraqi police and elements of the Iraqi 

army that would reject Saddam Hussein and refuse to resist coalition military 

operations. These assumptions proved invalid when, rather than standing and 

fi ghting, elements of the Iraqi Army most loyal to the regime, notably the Special 

Republican Guard and the Saddam Fedayeen, melted into the population and 

constituted the basis for insurgent operations. “I suppose on refl ection the thing 

that probably surprised me the most is the ability that the so-called Fedayeen 

Saddam people had to terrorize and frighten the rest of the Iraqi people and 

cause them to not come over to the other side,” Rumsfeld said in answer to a 

question from the audience. Associated Press, “Rumsfeld Surprised by Saddam 

Loyalists,” October 10, 2003; available at http://start.earthlink.net/newsarticle?ca

t=9&aid=D7U3KUF02_story, Internet, accessed October 10, 2003. In part, their 

ability to do so may have been a result of the refusal of Turkey to grant transit 

rights to the 4th Infantry Division, Mechanized, forestalling rapid occupation of 

northern Iraq, especially the area around Tikrit. The assumptions about postwar 

manpower requirements also proved invalid when Iraq fell into anarchy in the 

wake of the sudden collapse of authority and in the absence of a countervailing 

authority. And they proved invalid when the infrastructure, carefully preserved 

by precision engagements, proved so decrepit and fragile that it collapsed under 

the strain of looting, stress, and lack of maintenance. As Anthony Cordesman 

observed, “The same strategy designed to deliver a carefully focused attack on the 

regime did not provide enough manpower to simultaneously occupy and secure 

the areas that the Coalition liberated and fell short of the manpower necessary 

to occupy the country.” Anthony Cordesman, “Iraq and Confl ict Termination: 

The Road to Guerrilla War?” Washington, DC, July 28, 2003, p. 8, available at 

http://www.csis.org/features/Iraq_Confl ictTerm.pdf http://www.csis.org/features/Iraq_Confl ictTerm.pdf, Internet, accessed October 24, , Internet, accessed October 24, 

2003.

83. A comparison of the two ECLIPSE operations indicate that there is a 

window of opportunity in the wake of major combat operations to establish 

security and control quickly. After total war, when an enemy state has been so 

thoroughly defeated that there is no fi ght left in its army or people, this window 

is broad. It is relatively narrow after a limited war pursued for limited ends, when 

a regime collapse may leave an undestroyed will to resist in the population as a 

whole or in signifi cant parts of the society. Dr. Conrad Crane, of the Army War 

College faculty, told a reporter that “insights from successful occupations suggest 

that it is best to go in real heavy and then draw down fast.” Fallows, p. 65. Crane 
168

and Dr. Andrew Terrill presciently observed in their prewar study on postwar 

Iraq that,

Initial Iraqi gratitude for the destruction of the Saddam dictatorship 

is likely under most circumstances, but many Iraqis will nevertheless 

assume that the U.S. intervened for its own purposes and not primarily 

to help them. U.S. forces therefore need to complete occupation tasks as 

quickly as possible and must also help improve the daily life of ordinary 

Iraqis before popular goodwill dissipates. Even the most benevolent 

occupation will confront increasing Arab nationalist and religious 

concerns as time passes.

Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and 

Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Confl ict Scenario, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 2003, p. 2. Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM demonstrates that an inadequately resourced, poorly planned and 

executed confl ict termination operation can threaten to undermine a decisive 

military victory. A Carnegie Endowment for International Peace study of nationbuilding concluded that “Few national undertakings are as complex, costly, and 

time consuming as reconstructing the governing institutions of foreign societies. 

Even a combination of unsurpassed military power and abundant wealth does not 

guarantee success, let alone quick results.” Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, “Lessons 

from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building,” Carnegie Endowment 

for International Peace, May 2003; available at http://www.ceip.org/fi les/pdf/P.PDF, 

Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. The Army must reexamine force structure, 

training, and doctrine in light of the need to not only fi ght and win wars, but also 

to wage decisive peace operations to secure the policy objectives for which the war 

was undertaken. 

84 Former CENTCOM Commander, Anthony Zinni called for “fl ooding” Iraq 

“with civilian administrators,” stating “I think you need a Bremer and a Bremerlike team at every provincial level . . . . You need a political, economic, security, 

humanitarian piece at every level.” Quoted in David Gergen, “The Fierce Urgency 

of Iraq,” U.S. News and World Report, October 13, 2003.

85. Clausewitz emphasized that “the fi rst step” in war not be taken “without 

considering the last.” Clausewitz, Book 8, Chapter 3A, p. 706. 

86. As a Center for Strategic and International Studies white paper observed 

in March 2002, “Given the sheer complexity of post-confl ict reconstruction 

efforts, developing a clear strategic plan of action at the outset is critical to 

success . . .Developing a common set of objectives across the U.S. Government is of 

paramount importance to creating unity of effort.” Michele Flournoy, “Interagency 

Strategy and Planning for Post-Confl ict Reconstruction,” Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, March 27, 2002, available at http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/

strategy.pdf, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003.

87. In 1997, President Clinton, responding to similar shortcomings in Bosnia 

and Kosovo, had signed PDD 56, directing that State, Defense, CIA, Treasury, and 
169

other agencies take tangible steps to improve “the planning and management 

of complex contingency operations.” Among other things, PDD-56 mandated 

establishment of a training regime, a mechanism for capturing lessons learned, 

interagency rehearsals, and implementation of interagency planning procedures. 

Specifi cally, it directed “that a political-military implementation plan . . . be 

developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating U.S. Government 

actions in a complex contingency operation.” “The Clinton Administration’s 

Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision 

Directive, May 1997,” White Paper; available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/

pdd56.htm, Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. PDD-56 failed to live up to its 

promise, however. A Rand Corporation study concluded “only the military is 

likely to hold up its end.” The study also noted that “Civilian departments have 

often confused plans with schedules, and think plans are not worth the effort. 

Moreover, some offi cers in the State Department have an aversion to plans, which 

they see as impediments to the ambiguity and fl exibility required for successful 

negotiations.” Daniel Byman, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Barnard, and 

Matthew Waxman, Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination 

with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations, Rand Corporation, 2000, 

Chapter 8, p. 3, available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1185.ch8.pdf, 

Internet, accessed September 22, 2003. See also William P. Hamblet and Jerry G. 

Kline, “Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations,” 

Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 2000, p. 96. See also Rowan Scarborough, “Study Hits 

White House on Peacekeeping Missions,” Washington Times, December 6, 1999, 

available at http://www.fas/org/irp/offdocs/pddd/991206-pdd.htm, Internet, accessed 

September 22, 2003. Other governmental agencies lacked the structure, resources 

and culture that the military brings to planning. PDD 56 was widely ignored and 

then quietly scrapped by President Bush when he took offi ce. 

88. The Bush administration announcement in October 2003 of plans to create 

the Iraq Stabilization Group in the National Security Council to provide improved 

postwar interagency planning and coordination died in the wake of opposition 

from Secretary Rumsfeld, but it represented an appreciation at the highest levels 

of the lack of interagency coordination. The Washington Post reported that,

The new group . . . is intended to remove a bottleneck in decisionmaking by identifying and resolving problems faced by the U.S.-led 

occupation . . . . “It is to facilitate Bremer and to get him what he needs, 

whether it’s policy guidance, whether it is to fi x a problem in Washington 

between . . . two agencies that are not in sync and he can’t fi x it from the 

fi eld,” a senior administration offi cial said.

Peter Slevin and Mike Allen, “New Group to Intended to Speed Iraq Efforts,” 

Washington Post, October 7, 2003, p. 1. See also William R. Hawkins, “Cheap 

Hawks and Weak Brigades,” Washington Times, October 8, 2003, p. 17; Joseph 

L. Galloway, “A Tough Assignment for Rice,” Miami Herald, October 9, 2003; 

David Ignatius, “. . . and the Infi ghting,” Washington Post, October 10, 2003, p. 

27. Anthony Cordesman concluded in July 2003 that among the reasons that 
170

confl ict termination failed was the lack of “a coordinated interagency approach to 

planning and executing peacemaking and nation-building before and during the 

war: as The National Security Council failed to perform its mission.” The NSC, he 

observed, “acted largely in an advisory role and did not force effective interagency 

coordination.” Cordesman, p. 11.

89. The author recognizes the many problems inherent in this proposal. 

Standing in the way of either a Goldwater-Nichols type reform of the interagency 

or a new National Security Act are bureaucratic, cultural, constitutional, and 

institutional barriers. Interagency programs that drain scarce manpower and funds 

from what State, Treasury, Commerce, and other departments perceive as their 

core missions engender bureaucratic inertia that blocks effective action. Masters of 

the bureaucratic process know how to give the appearance of cooperation without 

committing limited resources to make it reality, especially when their agency does 

not directly benefi t. Congress, moreover, is often loath to direct the executive in 

specifi cs of how he directs national security operations, choosing instead to exercise 

oversight through multiple committees that do not themselves possess a coherent 

unifi ed national security perspective. Nonetheless, there has been a gradually 

increasing pressure for reform. The Scowcroft Commission urged in 2000 that steps 

be taken to invigorate the interagency process. See John Deutch, Arnold Kanter, 

and Brent Scowcroft, “Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process,” 

in Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future, Cambridge, MA, 2000, pp. 265-

284. This call has been echoed in a recent CSIS Study entitled “Beyond GoldwaterNichols.” See Clark A. Murdock, Michele A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, 

and Kurt M. Campbell, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New 

Strategic Era,” March 2004. Senate Bill 2127, introduced on February 25, 2004, by 

Senators Lugar and Biden represents an initial effort at legislation to make the 

interagency process more potent. After decrying the ad hoc nature of governmental 

responses to nation-building requirements, Senator Lugar argued in presenting 

the bill that, in an environment of “sustained instability,” it is imperative that the 

United States “have the right structures, personnel, and resources in place when 

an emergency occurs.” He noted that “the military has led post-confl ict operations 

primarily because it is the only agency capable of mobilizing large amounts of 

people and resources for these tasks.” His legislation proposes to change that 

by: 1) creating a Stabilization and Reconstruction Coordinating Committee in 

the National Security Council chaired by the National Security Advisor with 

representatives from State, USAID, Commerce, Justice, Treasury, Agriculture, 

and Defense; 2) establishing an Offi ce of Stabilization and Reconstruction in the 

State Department under a Coordinator appointed by the President and reporting 

directly to the Secretary of State; 3) authorizing the Secretary of State to establish 

a Response Readiness Corps with both active and reserve elements that he can 

mobilize rapidly; and 4) urging the Foreign Service Institute to work with National 

Defense University and the Army War College to establish an educational and 

training program for civilian and military personnel to develop competencies and 

shared procedures for conducting stability and reconstruction operations. If this 

legislation was accompanied by funding for new positions and organizations in 
171

the State Department, an all-important fi rst step would be taken. With a cadre in 

the State Department directly sharing equity in post-confl ict operations with DoD, 

a venue for meaningful interagency cooperation and planning would be in place.

173

CHAPTER 7

THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE:

HAS IT BEEN ABUSED IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR?

Colonel George A. Brinegar

We have all seen the world change, and change with an intensity and rapidity 

that an earlier generation might not have believed. This change has brought us 

challenges and opportunities. As a Nation, we must grasp these challenges and 

seize these opportunities. 

General Creighton Abrams1

Chief of Staff of the Army, 1974

Creighton Abrams’ statement did not occur in the aftermath of 

September 11, 2001, but in the turmoil of the last days of the Vietnam 

War. Abrams, the chief of staff of the Army, provided these words 

in his “Posture of the Army Statement” before the Committee on 

Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, in 1974. However, 

these same words seem equally appropriate in the midst of the 

Global War on Terror and the instabilities of the 21st century. 

Abrams clearly understood the critical mistake of his war and time, 

but, more importantly, he also had a clear vision for victory in future 

wars.

In the fi nal days of the Vietnam War, Abrams initiated a strategy 

whereby the U.S. Army would never go to war without substantial 

mobilization of the reserve component. This strategy has become 

widely accepted as the Abrams Doctrine. Now the United States 

fi nds itself in another potentially long war, the Global War on Terror. 

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has executed a “partial 

mobilization” of soldiers from the reserve component to meet the 

demands of this war. In the third year of the Global War on Terror, 

has the Department of Defense (DoD) abused the Abrams Doctrine 

to the extent that too many reserve soldiers have mobilized? This 

chapter examines the genesis of the Abrams Doctrine, analyzes 

current mobilization trends of the Army Guard and Army Reserve, 

and describes the effects of this current “partial mobilization” on 
174

employers, families, recruiting, and retention. Finally, it makes 

recommendations and observations for the future. 

THE DIFFICULT YEARS PRECEDING THE ABRAMS 

DOCTRINE: 1960S

Lyndon Johnson astounded the Defense Establishment with his refusal 

to call up the reserves . . . 

Lewis Sorley2

Historian, 1991

To understand the rationale for the Abrams Doctrine, one 

must take a step back to the 1960s and the early years of the U. S. 

intervention in the Vietnam War, where American leaders made 

decisions that “set the course” for failure. In 1965,

Lyndon Johnson astounded the Defense Establishment by his refusal to 

call up the reserves to support expansion of the war in Vietnam, perhaps 

the most fateful decision of the entire confl ict. Johnson’s refusal was 

apparently motivated in part by reluctance to spread the effects of the 

war through the population—certainly many more families and virtually 

every town and city would be affected by a call-up of any proportion, 

with a much different class cross-section and much greater political 

impact than draft calls affecting only those who could not engineer a 

deferment.3

The second-and third-order effects of the President’s refusal to 

utilize the reserves in this war were disastrous. First, as the Army 

was trying valiantly to expand to meet the demands of the war, 

the “pool” of reserve leaders and soldiers was “off limits.” To fi ll 

this void, active duty offi cers and NCOs, receiving premature 

promotions, could expect numerous rotations to the combat zone. 

Second, the reserve component, not a part of the deploying Army 

team, soon became demoralized and bitter. As understood now, it 

would take years to restore reserve component morale. In effect, 

the government told devoted reservists and guardsmen, who for 

years had trained for mobilization, to stay home with absolutely no 

expectation for combat. Further, to make a bad situation worse, the 

reserves quietly watched much of their equipment go out the back 
175

door for cross-leveling to satisfy the demands of the active Army 

trying to prosecute a war without disturbing the American public.4

There is no doubt that the decision not to mobilize the reserves 

drastically impacted the entire Army.

Arguably, the most disastrous effect of not mobilizing the 

reserves was the perception that nobody cared in “Hometown 

America.” Lewis Sorely, clearly states the nature of the problem: 

Lyndon Johnson’s policy of trying to fi ght the war on the cheap, on 

the sly almost, and without involving the larger community [reserve 

component], meant that the general populace had no stake in it, and 

hence no motivation to ensure that the sacrifi ces of those who did serve 

were in some way validated by the eventual outcome.5

Equally disastrous was the unknown number of individuals joining 

the reserves with only one desire: to avoid military conscription 

and probable deployment to Southeast Asia. Lacking motivation 

for military service, many of these soldiers and offi cers did nothing 

but “bide their time,” awaiting the end of their initial enlistment 

and subsequent discharge. With no “callup” of the reserves by the 

President, reserve units were quickly fi lling with members of less 

than full dedication to professional military training and service.

To complicate an already complex situation Army-wide, 

standards in the reserves began to falter drastically as the likelihood 

of mobilization and deployment signifi cantly decreased. So at this 

point, collectively, both the active and reserve components’ readiness 

and motivation for service was deteriorating at an overwhelming 

rate. Even worse, resentment between those on the active side, 

with near term deployment to war as a guarantee, and the reserve 

members, with no fear of future deployment, festered. 

Lack of utilization of the reserves was spoiling the entire Army 

and would take decades to overcome. In fact, this huge divide 

between the active and reserves, those going to war and not going to 

war, grew to such an extent, that even today, 30 years later, it is a key 

issue in the 2004 presidential election. Sadly, erasing the memories 

of this ugly divide will take several more years and possibly another 

decade.
176

THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF AN ARMY IN CRISIS: 1972-1974

The Nation and its well-being must be kept foremost, and must not be 

hazarded by purely parochial concerns. 

General Creighton Abrams6

Chief of Staff of the Army, 1974

On October 12, 1972, General Creighton W. Abrams became the 

26th chief of staff of the U. S. Army. An offi cer who had seen combat 

in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam was now the point man for 

an Army in crisis. Abrams clearly knew his Army was in deep 

trouble. General Frank Mildren, who had been a division, corps, 

and land forces commander, provides a clear glimpse of this period: 

“The image of the Army was at an all time low. The public had no 

confi dence in the Army. They blamed the Army for all our ills . . . 

The morale was probably lower than its been for many years in the 

active Army.”7

This situation was no surprise to the new chief. He had 

commanded at all levels from troop to corps, to army staff level, and 

was no stranger to the Washington bureaucracy. Moreover, to his 

credit, he knew the reserves through his time as the Deputy Assistant 

Chief of Staff for the Reserve Component in the late 1950s. Now his 

new position would requires superb leadership for an Army in the 

“fi nal death throes” of its ugly experience in the Vietnam War. 

To understand Creighton Abrams fully, one must look 

beyond his illustrious military record. His keen insight into the 

American people, in combination with his superior military skills 

and understanding of force structure, led to his strong belief in 

the importance of utilization of the reserve component. Several 

situations provide a glimpse inside the man, and one of these is his 

action prior to assuming the duties as Chief of Staff of the Army, 

while awaiting Senate confi rmation. According to Major General D. 

C. Smith, Deputy Chief of Staff for Information-Army Staff, Abrams 

and his family went on a vacation to “drive the country.” Abrams 

delighted in conversations with all who would talk to him, from gas 

station workers to shop attendants. He had a great faith and respect 

for the common people and American society. He sincerely believed 
177

the Army was a part of that society. During this trip, he confi rmed in 

his own mind the essential strength of this country and the common 

sense and wisdom of the average American.8 Abrams understood 

both the importance and strength of the “will” of the public. This 

factor would quietly, but consciously, play an important role in his 

thoughts in regard to mobilizing the reserve during time of crisis. 

THE INTENT AND EMERGENCE OF THE ABRAMS 

DOCTRINE: THE 1970S

They’re not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves. 

General Creighton Abrams9

as heard by General John Vessey

Abrams had survived the most diffi cult years and was now in a 

position to affect the Army’s future. Lieutenant General Donn Starry 

provided an interesting insight into Abrams, the strategic leader, 

during an interview for the U.S. Army Oral History Program. He 

explained that although Abrams was not a political scientist, he was 

a soldier and a realistic leader who uniquely understood the Army’s 

mission and the military’s relation to the Nation.10 In 1972, Abrams 

brought a new and refreshing perspective as the Army’s chief. This 

was easily enhanced by his in-depth knowledge of both the Army’s 

active and reserve components. He quietly began to build a strategy 

for the “Total Army” (Army, Army Reserve, and Army National 

Guard). 

His strategy for the future “Total Army” relied heavily on 

the entire Army (active and reserve). In fact, he boldly made the 

following assertion during his “Posture of the Army Statement” in 

1974 in testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

House of Representatives: 

We consider the Total Force structure, both active and reserve 

components, in developing requirements for initial reinforcement and for 

mobilization. Obviously, we rely heavily on reserve component forces. 

We can make no plans to fi ght in a major confl ict without considering 

their early mobilization and commitment.11
178

Thus, the Abrams Doctrine that provides for the utilization of the 

reserve as an important component in Army capabilities was born.

Abrams’ methodology was twofold. First, his increased reliance 

on the reserve could quickly increase the Army’s strength. Abrams 

committed himself to increasing the Army from a 13-division 

structure to a 16-division structure, while maintaining the 785,000 

active duty endstrength. Utilization of the reserves allowed the 

Army to reach this goal.12 Second, reliance on the reserves also 

enabled Abrams to capitalize on an intangible Clauswitzian factor, 

the “will” of the American people, which he deeply understood. 

General John Vessey, who would later become the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, remarked the following about Abrams’ feeling 

toward the American people: 

He thought about that [appreciation for the kind of a nation America 

was] an awful lot, and concluded that whatever we’re going to do we 

ought to do right as we are a Nation. Let’s not build an Army off here in 

the corner someplace. The Armed Forces are an expression of the Nation. 

If you take them out of the national context, you are likely to screw them 

up. That was his lesson from Vietnam. He wasn’t going to leave them 

in that position ever again. And part and parcel of that was that you 

couldn’t go to war without calling up the reserves.13

Thus, in August of 1974, Abrams signed a memorandum to the 

Army leadership providing his direct guidance: “We [with the full 

support of the Secretary of Defense] are committed fi rmly to the 

essential task of bolstering the readiness and responsiveness of the 

reserve components, integrating them fully into the Total Force.”14

The Army was to entrench maximum utilization of the reserves 

deeply into the strategy for future war. Today, there is no doubt 

that the Army relies heavily on the expertise, leadership, and sheer 

numbers provided by the reserves.

APPLICATION OF THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: 

MOBILIZATION OF THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT 

SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

Today [March 19, 2003], we are in the midst of one of the longest periods 

of mobilization in our history...As we prepare to give the Nation 
179

more options in the Global War on Terror, additional Guardsmen and 

Reservists are being mobilized. 

Thomas Hall15

Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Reserve Affairs, 2003

It is now almost 30 years since General Creighton Abrams was 

the Chief. Nevertheless the Abrams Doctrine continues to live in 

U.S. military strategy. In fact, in 2001, the United States found itself 

again involved in another possibly long and costly war. However, 

the lessons and hardships of the Vietnam War are still vividly clear 

for DoD and particularly the Army. One of the lessons learned, 

maximum utilization of the reserves, remains a signifi cant part 

of military strategy. In the Global War On Terror, the application 

of the Abrams Doctrine, with regard to the “partial mobilization” 

of the reserves, has continued at a feverish pace since September 

11, 2001. In fact, using the authority of Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 

12302, “partial mobilization,” the President can activate up to one 

million reservists (all services) for up to 2 years. The President issued 

Executive Order 13223 on September 14, 2001, authorizing “partial 

mobilization,” in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th. 

This Executive Order remains in effect today.

In the third year into the Global War On Terror, however, has 

the United States overly relied on the Abrams Doctrine, specifi cally 

within the Army? Has the mobilization of so much of the reserve 

component impacted negatively on recruiting and retention for years 

to come? What are the effects on civilian employers and the reserve 

component families? These questions are essential to understand the 

future of reserve forces in national strategy.

THE CURRENT PACE AND TREND OF MOBILIZATION

America’s part-time troops will shoulder a much larger share of the 

front-line burden in Iraq next year [2004] than they do now, according 

to a troop-rotation plan announced Thursday [November 6, 2003] by the 

Pentagon. 

Dave Moniz16

Journalist, 2003
180

Limited mobilization occurred during the Vietnam War. In fact, 

approximately 5,000 soldiers (42 units) were mobilized from the 

Army Reserve. Likewise, Executive Order 11406 federalized up to 

24,500 soldiers (12,234 actually activated) in the Army Guard. Even 

though the 1967 Army Reserve endstrength was 261,000 (418,000 

for the Army Guard), the vast majority of this large manpower 

pool never mobilized for combat in Vietnam. In order to put this 

in context for today, Figure 1 depicts the current breakdown of the 

Total Army which is composed of 47 percent active duty Army 

soldiers, 33.1 percent Army Guard soldiers, and 19.9 percent Army 

Reserve soldiers.

USAR

ARNG

Active Army

47

19

33

Source: Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Figure 1. Fiscal Year 2003, Total Army.

The number of reserve soldiers mobilized for the Vietnam War 

pales in comparison to the current mobilization pace for the Global 

War on Terror. This appears in the numbers as reported by the 

Department of Defense. Since “Partial Mobilization Authority” on 

September 14, 2001, (as of February 9, 2004), the Department of 

Defense has mobilized over 238,000 Army reserve soldiers.17 Some 

critics’ claim that a large number of these soldiers have mobilized 

multiple times, a claim widely believed. As of February 2004, this 

was simply not true. In fact, less than 3 percent of the Army reserve 

soldiers mobilized have been mobilized multiple times in the Global 

War on Terror.18 Table 1 depicts the number of soldiers mobilized 

and the number of soldiers mobilized multiple times. 
181

ARNG USAR TOTAL

Mobilized as of February 2004 141,765 96,790 238,555

Multiple Activations 4,465 1,850 6,315

Source: Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Table 1. Soldiers Mobilized Since September 14, 2001.

Figure 2 depicts a signifi cant trend of utilization of reservists from 

September 2001 to October 2003. Heavy reliance on the reservists 

in the Global War on Terror is quite apparent. The Pentagon’s 

chief spokes-person Lawrence DiRita highlighted this reliance in 

reference to Iraq, in November 2003. He explained that by spring 

2004, reservists will represent 37 percent of the Total Force in Iraq 

compared to 22 percent in November 2003. This equates to 39,000 

reserve soldiers, many of whom serve in the three National Guard 

brigades that will be on duty in Iraq by spring 2004.19 Simply stated, 

the reserve of the Army has been and will continue to be a key player 

in the Global War on Terror. 

Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct

01 02 03

250,000

200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000

0

Source: Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs

Figure 2. Recent Mobilization Trend.
182

MOBILIZATION AND THE EFFECT ON THE EMPLOYER

It’s a dilemma, by the way, that we’ve faced since the founding of our 

Country. When the winds of war were stirring in 1776, John Adams, a 

lawyer in Boston wrote to a minister in Boston, ‘we must all be soldiers 

now’. 

Paul Wolfowitz20

Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2002

DoD must counter the effects of mobilization on the employers 

of reservists, if the United States intends to maintain a strong and 

fl exible reserve force. America’s reserve system requires traditional 

training of 1 weekend per month and 15 consecutive days of training 

per year. Reserve soldiers rely on their civilian occupation for the 

remaining 326 days a year. Thus, the Army is not the reserve soldier’s 

primary source of income. Of course, with every mobilization, 

soldiers demobilize and return to civilian jobs. In general terms, 

satisfaction of the employer weighs heavily on the mind of the 

reservist.

As the nation pursues the Global War On Terror and the 

Army’s execution of the Abrams Doctrine, what is the employer’s 

perspective? Consider two sets of data: fi rst, the most comprehensive 

study is the “Reserve Employer Survey,” a study conducted by DoD 

between 1999 and 2000. Although the survey occurred prior to the 

Global War On Terror, most would agree that it provides the greatest 

insight into the 21st century reserve soldier/employer relationship. 

The second source of data is the “Status of Force Surveys” initially 

conducted in May 2003. The Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness directed these surveys (conducted three 

times per year) to gather information with regard to current and 

critical issues. Both sources provide DoD and the Army leadership 

with critical information so that mobilization decisions will not rest 

on generalizations or widespread misconceptions.

The “Reserve Employer Survey” rested on interviews conducted 

with 2,037 large and small employers nationwide. Employers used 

in the survey came from two sources: a representative list of U.S. 

employers and a list of employers provided by DoD’s seven military 

reserve components.21 The survey yielded the following fi ndings:
183

• 93 percent of employers expressed favorable attitude toward 

reserve service.

• 96 percent of employers were satisfi ed with their reservistemployee.

• 92 percent of employers have fl exible policies to accommodate 

absences.22

However, tougher issues arise with long-term reservists’ absences 

from the workplace. Consider these fi ndings: 

• A majority of employers indicated that absence due to military 

obligations were too long.

• Nearly 50 percent felt that absences over 14 days caused 

problems [in the workplace].

• 80 percent of employers were affected by absence of more than 

30 days.

• The impact was greater on smaller businesses; the most serious 

effect was increased workload on co-workers.

• More than one-third felt that increased reliance on the reserve 

component will cause problems in the workplace in the 

future.23

As the Army continues to exercise the Abrams Doctrine, it cannot 

afford to neglect the interests of the employers. It is no surprise that 

this survey provided these simple but critically important requests 

from employers to lessen problems in the workplace. The top three 

requests were:

1. Receive copies of reservist’s orders.

2. Receive offi cial notifi cation from the military service.

3. Receive longer notifi cation times (with rationale for 

deployment and likely duration, which provides improved 

workload planning for employers, possible lower costs and 

decreased resentment).24

DoD designs the “Status of Force Surveys” as concise, web-based 

questionnaires to gather critical information regarding current 

issues (health care, employer support, activation process, intent to 
184

reenlist, etc.). These surveys, integral to DoD’s Human Resources 

Strategic Plan, are intent at improving both policy and practice. This 

random internet survey in May 2003 elicited over 25,000 responses. 

Nearly half of those responding were reservists (all services) 

activated within the previous 24 months.25 Their responses to the 

survey questions below provide considerable insight. The numbers 

in the parentheses indicate the percentage of Army National Guard 

(ARNG) or U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) soldiers responding in the 

respective category.

Q.10.f. In your opinion, how does your civilian supervisor view 

your participation in the National Guard/Reserve?

Very-Somewhat Favorable: (56percent ARNG)/(58percent USAR)

Somewhat-Very Unfavorably: (10percent ARNG)/(12percent USAR)

Q.159.a. For your most recent activation, how much of a problem 

was employer support at the beginning of the activation 

for you or your family?

Not a Problem-Slight Problem: (79percent ARNG)/(76percent USAR)

Serious-Very Serious Problem: (7percent ARNG)/(9percent USAR) 

Q.159.b. For your most recent activation, how much of a problem 

was getting the same job back after returning for you or 

your family?

Not a Problem-Slight Problem:(86percent ARNG)/(84percent USAR)

Serious-Very Serious Problem: (8percent ARNG)/(8percent USAR)

Q.159.d. For your most recent activation, how much of a problem 

was loss of civilian job after returning for you or your 

family?

Not a Problem-Slight Problem:(91percent ARNG)/(92percent USAR)

Serious-Very Serious Problem: (6percent ARNG)/(4percent USAR)26

Both of these sources fail to express a signifi cant problem in the 

reservist/employer relationship, but the surveys also suggest that 

this relationship is delicate. DoD must consider employers in the 

current and future execution of the Abrams Doctrine because reservist 
185

morale and livelihood depend on this sensitive relationship. As the 

data also suggests, effi ciently organized and executed mobilizations 

can mitigate many of the challenges faced by these employers and 

their employees. DoD and the Army must minimize the sacrifi ces 

made by reservists’ employers through effi cient communication and 

predictability (i.e., military orders, expected time-line, etc.). 

Even though “only 6 percent of all businesses in the United 

States employ reservists,”27 this relationship between employer and 

employee is critical to the ability to execute the Abrams Doctrine and 

for its continued prosecution of the current Global War on Terror. 

So far DoD has not yet abused the Abrams Doctrine according to 

employers. However, DoD and the Army leadership must dedicate 

themselves to forming and nurturing a strong “Total Army/

Employer Team.” If either member of this team loses credibility, 

successful execution of the mobilization process will become 

problematic. More importantly, the result will jeopardize the Army’s 

ability to prosecute the Global War On Terror. 

MOBILIZATION AND THE EFFECT ON THE RESERVE 

COMPONENT FAMILY

We cannot continue to rely on our reservists who now comprise 

approximately half our force [all services], if their families are not ready 

for the stresses and strains of separations and long deployments. 

COL James Scott II28

Director of Family Policy

OASD-RA, 2003

The execution of the Abrams Doctrine directly affects reservists’ 

families. Of course, the execution of the “partial mobilization” in the 

Global War on Terror has directly impacted the lives of thousands 

of Guard and Reserve spouses and children. In order to determine 

if DoD has gone too far in the magnitude of current mobilization, 

this author used the most current and comprehensive spousal 

assessment, the “2002 Survey of Spouses of Activated National 

Guard and Reserve Component Members,” commissioned by the 

Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

(OASD-RA).29
186

Caliber Associates conducted this mail survey from August 

through November 2002. Spouses of 4,002 soldiers, activated for 

scheduled or unscheduled mobilization periods, responded to the 

survey. All mobilizations came after September 11, 2001. Listed 

below is a summary of the key issues identifi ed by this survey.

• Although [family] support is strong for many units, all 

families are not being reached.

• Loss of income can be a factor during mobilization, but not all 

families suffer fi nancial hardship. In fact, many families make 

more money during mobilization.

• Some “high risk” families are more likely to need support, 

but may be the least likely to seek support. These families are 

newly married, with young children, and often isolated.

• Strong [family] programs at the unit level are most 

effective.30

Close scrutiny of these issues leads to three observations that 

indirectly effect the successful execution of mobilization. First, 

many families have seen an increase in income with mobilization 

(55 percent of families in Army Reserve received an increase; 65 

percent of Army Guard families received an increase). As a result, 

the generalization that all mobilizations are a detriment to family 

income is simply not true. Second, “high risk” soldiers/families 

exist and their identifi cation prior to mobilization is critical. The 

challenge is to assist the soldier in overcoming the problem prior 

to mobilization, in order to avoid discharge due to an inability to 

deploy. Third, despite widespread media comments, many families 

of reservists are “working through” the challenges of mobilization 

and doing well. In fact, survey wide, 61 percent of the spouses said 

they were either coping well or very well. Again, another widespread 

generalization is simply not true, that is, not all families suffer 

tremendous and highly signifi cant trauma with the mobilization of 

an immediate family member.31

Reliance on the Abrams Doctrine requires the Army’s commitment 

to building readiness at the unit level in the Army reserves. The data 

cited in this survey indicates there are many dedicated and devoted 
187

families coping with both scheduled and unscheduled mobilizations 

in a commendable manner. Although there are challenges in 

reservists’ family readiness, the data from this survey does not 

support the generalization that current mobilizations collectively 

abuse the families of Army reservists.

MOBILIZATION AND THE EFFECT ON RECRUITING 

AND RETENTION

The National Guard sees no indication that the homeland security mission 

or the War on Terrorism is having any serious impact on recruiting. 

LTG Steven Blum32

Chief National Guard Bureau, 2003

The author utilized the most current data available, fi scal yearend 2003 results, to address the impact on recruiting and retention 

in the midst of a “partial mobilization.” Both the Army Guard and 

Reserve met endstrength for 2003, staying below the attrition ceiling, 

as depicted in Table 2. In fact, the Army Guard has met endstrength 

requirements for the past seven consecutive years. 

Attr

Rate

Ceiling

Actual

Attrition

% Authorized Rate

Number

Component Authorized Actual +/-

ARNG 350,000 351,091 1,091 100.30% 18.00% 17.20%

USAR 205,000 211,890 6,890 103.40% 28.60% 20.60%

Component +/- Ceiling

Source: Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

Table 2. Army Reserve Component Retention, Fiscal Year 2003.

Endstrength is critical, but attrition may be just as important. 

Figure 3 depicts the recent attrition history (Fiscal Year 93-Fiscal 

Year 03) for both the Army Guard and Army Reserve. Figure 3 

indicates Army Guard attrition negatively increased in 2001 and 

2002, with positive and signifi cant decreases in 2003. Army Reserve 

attrition has been on a consistent and positive decline since 2001 and 

that trend continues through 2003. 
188

Figure 3. Army Reserve Component Attrition, Fiscal Years 1993-2003.

Initial indications reveal that the Army is not abusing the 

Abrams Doctrine to the extent of reaching a “point of diminishing 

return” in reserve recruiting and retention. However, this positive 

news must not encourage complacency. Several underlying issues 

deserve consideration. First, are soldiers staying in the reserve 

component “willingly” or staying because of “stop loss” orders? 

The reserve “stop loss” policy is much different than that used by 

the active Army. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower/

Reserve Affairs) has approved reserve component “stop loss” 

effective with unit alert for mobilization through 90 days following 

demobilization. 

Second, how many reservists are currently deployed, but 

will not re-enlist following demobilization? The only indicator of 

such disenchantment is a survey commissioned by DoD of 40,000 

reservists (all services) in Iraq, July 2003. Defense under Secretary 

for Personnel David Chu explained the results of the survey to 

the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives 

on November 5, 2003. Referring to the survey data, he explained 
189

that 66 percent of the 40,000 reservists in Iraq had intentions of reenlisting.33

Third, the Global War on Terror continues with no end in the 

near term. As a result, meeting endstrength in 2003 provides no 

guarantees for 2004 or 2005. Acting Secretary of the Army Les 

Brown provides insight into the future of retention in the reserve 

component. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, in November 2003, Brown indicated no problems in 

retaining soldiers in the reserves, but indicated that it still may be 

too early to realize the effects.34 Republican Senator from Arizona 

John McCain countered, “They’re not ready to stay in at this kind 

of deployment schedule, [and] might as well be in the Regular 

Army.”35

The initial indication is that men and women will continue to 

enlist and reservists will continue to re-enlist during this large-scale 

execution of the Abrams Doctrine in the Global War on Terror. Thus, 

the Army is not abusing the Abrams Doctrine, and recruiting and 

retention goals continue to be met. 

Overall, the current status of the reserve of the Army is positive. 

On the other hand, DoD and the Army cannot afford to “bask in the 

sun” of initial good news. Fortunately, the Secretary of Defense has 

identifi ed several challenges related to mobilization issues identifi ed 

with employers, family, and the reserve soldiers themselves. Given 

the feverish pace of the current mobilization, DoD and the Army 

must work quickly to identify fi xes and viable alternatives to achieve 

a healthy Army reserve component for the 21st century.

2004 AND BEYOND: THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE 

ABRAMS DOCTRINE

Reserves and Guardsmen were called up three or four months before 

they were needed, to fi nd out they were not needed, and many were 

given only fi ve days’ notice, rather than the goal of thirty days, which 

really isn’t fair to them. And it’s not fair to their families or their 

employers. And that’s not right. . . . We need to fi x it, and we’re in the 

process of getting it fi xed. 

Donald Rumsfeld36

Secretary of Defense, 2003
190

The Secretary of Defense admits there are several problems 

that require correction in the mobilization process. This especially 

is signifi cant to maintain the reserves as a healthy and key player 

in the “Total Army.” To this point in the Global War on Terror, the 

Abrams Doctrine has not been abused. But, all must acknowledge 

the existance of a sensitive relationship among the reserve unit, 

citizen soldier, their families, and their employers. Accordingly, 

this author’s purpose in the following paragraphs is to suggest both 

recommendations and observations for the future to avoid reaching 

a point of “diminishing return” in the nation’s investment in their 

reservists. 

Mobilizations Must Be More Effi cient and Better Communicated.

Maximizing technology for effi ciency and organization is 

critical to improving the mobilization process. The combatant 

commander must receive the reserve soldier without delay, while 

providing predictability for the family and employer. An example of 

capitalizing this technology is the Reserve Component Automation 

System (RCAS). One critical asset of this system is the ability to 

query mobilization data. Chief Information Offi cer for National 

Guard Bureau Maureen Lischke explains that a recent test of this 

system dramatically increased the speed and effi ciency of unit 

mobilizations. With further improvements, mobilization-processing 

time can be decreased by 60 percent.37

Is the RCAS the answer? The evidence is not clear, but the 

potential exists to leverage “state of the art” technology so that the 

reserves can be mobilized quickly and effi ciently. During peacetime, 

at least a portion of the DoD budget must be invested into the 

mobilization process. All agree that the United States is without a 

peer in regard to weaponry, but is the technology to get the reserve 

soldier to the “fi ght” the best the 21st century technology has to 

offer? The answer is clearly “No!” DoD must dedicate effort, time, 

and dollars toward an effi cient and timely mobilization process.

Equally important is the timely communication of accurate 

and organized information from DoD and the Army to the reserve 

soldier, family, and employer. This information is crucial and has 
191

direct impact on decisions in the workplace and home. An alert 

notice that advises the soldier, family, and employer of the possibility 

for near-term mobilization, must be accurate, timely, and clear. The 

subsequent “mobilization order” must articulate the situation, 

benefi ts, requirements, and likely duration of the mobilization. As 

a critical information tool for the spouse and fi rst line supervisor 

at the work place, this mobilization order cannot consist of endless 

acronyms for the military bureaucratic system. Communicating a 

team building attitude at the beginning equates to long-term success 

for all; the Army, soldier, family, and employer. Most importantly, 

an inclusive attitude of professionalism and sincere concern by the 

Army exhibits a dedication to the Abrams Doctrine and the reserve 

force.

 Employers, Predictability, and the Reserve System. 

The Nation should assume that employers, although dedicated 

Americans, must consistently maintain a profi t in order to stay 

active in their respective business. With the continued reliance 

and current trend of utilization of the reserves, the time has come 

for the political leadership to advocate a form of tax credit for 

those employers who hire members of the reserve component. 

This tax credit would provide a direct compensation from the U.S. 

Government to employers to offset the cost of temporary employees, 

additional training, and increased workload in the absence of 

mobilized employees. No one questions the loyalty and dedication 

of American employers, but this tax credit could signifi cantly offset 

the cost of this loyalty and dedication while most importantly 

decreasing resentment between the reserve soldier (employee), 

employer, and the federal government. This is a delicate balance, 

but one that is crucial to national security. As a result, this tax credit 

for employers can be considered an investment in the defense of the 

nation.

Predictability for the reserve soldier, employer, and family is 

paramount. Furthermore, mobilizing a reservist for more than 2 

years in a 6-year time frame may be counterproductive. The key is 

developing a rotational system to maximize both predictability and 
192

fairness. This rotational system must identify specifi c reserve units, 

for a specifi ed time frame with a priority for mobilization. Examples 

of a rotational system already exist across the U.S. Military. These 

examples include “Air and Space Expeditionary Force rotations” 

and Army division/brigade rotations for the Balkans. Adapting 

these examples to build an Army reserve component rotational 

model must become reality. When units are not on the priority 

list for mobilization, units should focus on military education and 

continued individual/collective soldier skills qualifi cation. Granted, 

this rotational system may not work for all units, but it could easily 

incorporate the Guard/Reserve battalions, brigades, and divisions. 

DoD and the Army now must examine sincerely the relationship 

between recruiting and retention on the one hand, and the reserve 

soldier’s deployability on the other. It is no longer a question of 

“if” the reserve soldier will be mobilized, but “when.” Indeed, 

the increasing likelihood of mobilization could contribute to a 

decrease in recruiting and retention. Furthermore, the Army reserve 

component must review its current personnel realistically to identify 

soldiers who are a higher risk than normal of not having the ability 

to mobilize. This review of personnel will impact retention directly. 

On the other hand, discharging the soldier prior to mobilization due 

to a family or an employment issue will avoid the waste of precious 

time during an actual activation for long-term service. Although 

such dismissals are harsh, these problems typically do not improve 

with time. Subsequently, at the point of mobilization, the soldier 

cannot mobilize. Worst of all, the reserve soldier does not reach the 

combatant commander.

What Next after the Enhanced Brigades Are Used.

In support of DoD and the Department of the Army, the National 

Guard Bureau established 15 priority combat brigades. These 

“enhanced brigades” have received priority in overall resources, 

training, and equipment, as compared to other guard combat forces. 

Thus, they maintain a higher rate of readiness. Of course, these units 

and soldiers should expect to deploy in relation to a higher state of 

readiness in time of confl ict. 
193

On the other hand, the lesser priority guard combat units 

primarily make up eight National Guard divisions. These units 

perceive a less likelihood for mobilization due to less modern 

equipment, limited funding, and increased amount of train-up 

time following mobilization but prior to deployment for actual 

combat. But, surprisingly, before the enhanced brigades and prior to 

September 11, 2001, parts of these divisions mobilized for “military 

operations other than war,” and deployed to the Balkans. In fact, 

the 49th Armored Division, Texas Army National Guard, was the 

fi rst guard division headquarters to mobilize and deploy since the 

Korean War, with a 9-month deployment to Bosnia in 2000. Since 

then, several other Guard divisions have completed rotations in the 

Balkans.

Now, in 2004, and after prosecution of a manpower intensive 

struggle in the Global War on Terror, DoD and the Department of 

the Army are reaching a key decision point. Elements of the vast 

majority of all the enhanced brigades now have been mobilized and 

deployed since 1999 for service in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Sinai, 

Bosnia, Kosovo, and global force protection missions or will deploy 

in the very near term. At a higher state of readiness, these units and 

soldiers should have expected to deploy. 

But what reserve combat units are next to mobilize for the Global 

War on Terror? The Guard divisions are the only remaining option. 

Were these units expecting to mobilize for combat, short of World 

War III? Were their family members and employers expecting them 

to mobilize for war? Although these questions cannot be analytically 

answered, the decision has been made. In fact the Headquarters of 

a Guard division, the 42nd Infantry Division, New York National 

Guard, will deploy as a part of Operation IRAQ FREEDOM, rotation 

3, in late 2004 along with the 256th (Louisiana) and 116th (Idaho) 

Enhanced Separate Brigades and the 278th (Tennessee) Enhanced 

Armored Cavalry Regiment. Additionally, elements of Guard 

divisions will deploy to “plus up” this rotation in Iraq, with the 

potential of a Guard division to Afghanistan in the near term.

Thus, DoD has set the precedent for the potential mobilization of 

any and all reserve units enhanced or otherwise, for peacekeeping, 

limited, and full-scale war. In other words, and regardless of 

resourcing levels, the question has become “when” will the reserve 
194

unit mobilize, not “if.” In the very near term, this will be the true 

test of the Abrams Doctrine. This requires an even closer scrutiny 

of the reaction of the employers, family members, and the overall 

reserve system. How much stress can this sensitive equation of 

support at home (family plus employer) sustain before permanent 

damage occurs to the overall reserve system in the form of declining 

retention, readiness, and overall support of the American people for 

their hometown reserve unit? At present, this author cannot answer 

these critical questions in full, but guarantees that the answers are 

critical to the future execution of the Abrams Doctrine and, more 

importantly, the overall readiness of the Army’s reserve.

America’s Aversion to Reserve Component Causalities.

One must assume with the execution of the Abrams Doctrine, 

the reserve of the Army will have casualties. In actuality, these 

causalities in the reserves, both wounds and death are occurring 

now in the Global War on Terror. This leads to the question, “In 

the eyes of the American public, is there a difference in a casualty 

from the active duty ranks and a casualty from the reserve ranks?” 

This author provides an unquantifi able “yes.” A casualty from the 

reserves is not seen as a regular Army soldier by his community. 

For example, prior to mobilization, the reserve soldier was the 

hometown banker, high school math teacher, or the downtown 

policeman. Although mobilized and deployed to a combat zone, this 

reserve soldier still is perceived by his fellow township as a member 

of the local community, not a soldier or a warrior. The leadership of 

both DoD and the Army must be aware of the risk of causalities and 

the public perception when executing the Abrams Doctrine.

Next comes the question, “How many causalities can a hometown 

guard unit take before it becomes unacceptable to the conscience 

of the local community?” Qualifi edly, this question cannot be 

answered, but the lesson is that there is a signifi cant risk with the 

execution of the Abrams Doctrine. One must only go back 13 years 

to Operation DESERT STORM, where during a missile attack, a 

comparatively large number of reservists became causalities from 

one specifi c geographical location of the United States. Although 

the war ended soon after this incident, the caution still remains just 
195

as valid: The Abrams Doctrine does not come risk free today in the 

Global War on Terror or in the future.

Department of Defense Strategy for the Way Ahead in Utilization 

of the Reserves.

DoD has begun to develop a new strategy for the use of reserve 

forces in the future. The beginning of this new strategy is a result of 

the formal “Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National 

Defense,” in December 2002.38 As a follow-up, each U.S. military 

service is to re-evaluate force structure, utilizing the Secretary of 

Defense’s new planning metrics in his July 9, 2003, memorandum, 

“Rebalancing Forces.” The new metrics are twofold: reduce the 

need for involuntary mobilization during the early stages of a rapid 

response (the initial 15 days) and limit involuntary mobilization to 

reasonable, sustainable rates (not more than 1 year in every 6).39

In response to these new metrics and the organization of a 

new strategy for the use of reserve forces, the Offi ce of the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs prepared a 

lengthy report, “Rebalancing Forces, Easing the Stress on the Guard 

and Reserve,” in early 2004. This report provides a review of each 

service’s rebalancing initiatives, within the intent and new metrics 

per the Secretary of Defense. Overall, the services’ rebalancing 

of force structure is based upon a three-fold approach: resolve 

stressed career fi elds in the reserve component (i.e., civil affairs, 

police, intelligence, air crews, special forces); employ innovative 

management practices in the reserve component; and enhance early 

responsiveness in the reserve component.40 As per the executive 

summary of this report, “It has become evident that the [current] 

balance of capabilities in the active and reserve components is not 

the best for the future. There is a need for rebalancing to improve 

the responsiveness of the force and to help ease stress on units and 

individuals with skills in high demand.”41

CONCLUSION

Although this rebalancing strategy has a well-meaning intent, it is 

important to remember that many of these processes and structural 
196

changes require legislative action and years of fi scal planning and 

spending to result in execution. The intent to increase predictability 

and reduce stress on the reserves is an ambitious goal during this 

manpower intensive endeavor of Global War on Terror. So, is this 

new strategy and method of executing the Abrams Doctrine practical 

in 2004 or 2005? No, but it does begin to modify the Abrams Doctrine 

for the new demands of the 21st century and not just a strategy to 

reorganize the same assets and limited funding of the past. Have the 

real core challenges and stresses of the reserves in the post-Cold War 

era been identifi ed clearly? Before development of a new strategy for 

utilization of the reserves, DoD must undertake a thorough analysis 

of the current Abrams Doctrine “in action.” The modifi cations must 

be for the new era and not forged from Cold War mentality.

DoD’s current relook at the reserve force in regard to manning 

and management must be more unique for the future war fi ght. 

Current restructuring initiatives cannot rest on old solutions and 

only for execution in full-scale war. Forming new units of reserve 

soldiers willing to participate in specifi c reserve units with a higher 

than normal readiness rate and expectation for early deployment 

is another generation of the enhanced brigades. In contrast, other 

initiatives appear to address the real issues: simpler approval 

processes which equate to increased predictability, judicious and 

prudent use of the reserves, and linking duration of a mobilization 

period in relation to effectiveness. Again, these are admirable 

initiatives, but most importantly, they require earnest commitment 

to the reserve forces by DoD in the form of sincere effort and a 

signifi cant portion of the Defense budget.

The Army reserve component system has a critical role in national 

security. The intent is to provide trained and ready reserve soldiers/

units to the civilian authority and combatant commander to achieve 

required objectives. For this reason, the United States maintains 

a professional reserve force. This is why sincere analysis and 

improvements must be periodically made in regard to the Abrams 

Doctrine and the overall mobilization process of the reserve of the 

Army. As of now, in the Global War on Terror, collectively there 

is not a signifi cant overall negative effect on recruiting, retention, 

family, or employer. However, research also shows that the citizensoldier concept is fragile, requiring special care, and modifi cation for 
197

a new era. This Nation’s Army reserve component force has no peer 

in the world, but requires continuous analysis.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. Creighton W. Abrams, “The Posture of the Army,” Posture Statement 

presented to the Committee on Armed Services House of Representative 93d 

Cong., 2d sess; Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974, p. 1. 

2. Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in 

Warfare,” Parameters, Summer 1991, p. 37.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.,p. 38.

5. Ibid.,p. 39.

6. Abrams.

7. Frank T. Mildren, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Glick and Lieutenant 

Colonel Lightner, U.S. Army Oral History Program, U.S. Military History Institute, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, February 24 , 1976, p. 29.

8. Dewitt C. Smith, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Bradshaw and Lieutenant 

Colonel Sweet, U.S. Army Oral History Program, U.S. Military History Institute, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 17, 1975, p. 16.

9. John W. Vessey, Jr., quoted in Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton

Abrams and the Army of His Times, New York, 1992, p. 364.

10. Donn A. Starry, interviewed by Colonel Bergen, Lieutenant Colonel 

Collison, Lieutenant Colonel Burleson, U.S. Army Oral History Program, U.S. 

Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, December 14, 

1976, p. 1.

11. Abrams, p. 10.

12. Sorley, Thunderbolt, pp. 363-365.

13. Ibid., p. 364.

14. Ibid., p. 365.

15. Thomas F. Hall, “Statement before the Personnel Subcommittee,” Senate 

Committee on Armed Services in connection with Reserve Component issues, 

Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 19, 2003, p. 7.

16. David Moniz, “Guard, Reserves to be 37% of U.S. Force in Iraq ’04,” USA 

Today, November 7, 2003, p. A8.

17. U.S. Department of Defense, Offi ce of Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs, Washington, DC, point of contact: Mr Dan Kohner.

18. Ibid.
198

19. Lawrence DiRita; quoted in Eric Schmitt and Tom Shanker, “Reserve and 

Guard Ordered To Alert More Troops For Iraq,” New York Times, November 20, 

2003, p. 2.

20. Paul Wolfowitz, Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense, Speech to the 

National Guard and Reserve Caucus Breakfast, Washington, DC: Department of 

Defense, November 8, 2002, p. 3.

21. U.S. Department of Defense, News Release, “Results of Reserve Employer 

Study Compiled,” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 1, 2002, p. 1.

22. Ibid., p. 2.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 3.

25. U.S. Department of Defense, “Status of Forces Survey,” Washington, DC: 

Department of Defense, May 2003.

26. Ibid.

27. U. S. Department of Defense, “Results of Reserve Employer Study 

Compiled,” p. 2.

28. James L. Scott II, “Statement of the Director for Individual and Family 

Policy,” presented to the Personnel Subcommittee of the Armed Services, 

Washington DC: Offi ce of Assistant Secretary For Reserve Affairs, Manpower and 

Personnel, 2003, p. 2.

29. U.S. Department of Defense, “2002 Survey of Spouses of Activated 

National Guard and Reserve Component Members,” Washington, DC: Offi ce of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 2002.

30. Ibid., Executive Summary, p. 3.

31. Ibid., p. 2.

32. H. Steven Blum; quoted in Bob Haskell, “National Guard Meets Its 

Recruiting and Retention Goals,” On Guard, Newspaper of the Army and Air National 

Guard, November 6, 2003, p. 1.

33. David Chu, quoted in Rick Sisk, “Half of Troops Say Re-Up Is Out,” New 

York Daily News, November 6, 2003.

34. Les Brownlee, quoted in Eric Schmitt and Tom Shanker, “Reserve and 

Guard Ordered to Alert More Troops For Iraq,” New York Times, November 20, 

2003.

35. John McCain, quoted in Schmitt and Shanker.

36. Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in James O. Kievit and Thomas P. Murray, 

“Citizen-Soldiers in a 21st Century Army At War,” Center for Strategic Leadership 

Issue Paper, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, October 2003, p. 1.

37. Maureen Lischke, quoted in Reggie Saville, “New System: Mobilization 

Faster, Easier,” On Guard Newspaper of the Army and Air National Guard, November 

2003, p. 14.
199

38. U.S. Department of Defense, “Review of Reserve Component Contributions 

to National Defense,” Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2002.

39. U.S. Department of Defense, “Rebalancing Forces, Easing the Stress on the 

Guard and Reserve,” Washington, DC: Offi ce of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Reserve Affairs (Readiness, Training, and Mobilization), January 15, 

2004, p. v.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

201

CHAPTER 8

THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE:

TOTAL FORCE FOUNDATION OR ENDURING FALLACY?

Colonel Brian D. Jones

In December 2002, following the successful completion of 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the Secretary of Defense, Donald 

Rumsfeld, stated that the “Total Force” policy (e.g., the existing active 

component/reserve component force balance) was “hampering his 

ability to deploy forces” and suggested that he would seek changes.1

The primary issue of force balance revolves around the necessity of 

activating specifi c capabilities that reside in the reserve component 

to enable the active component to conduct combat operations. 

Structurally, active component forces cannot deploy to combat 

without activating key reserve component capabilities, a sometimes 

cumbersome and politically overt act. Following a similarly 

frustrating experience in the subsequent planning and execution of 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Rumsfeld issued a memorandum on 

July 9, 2003, requesting a review of the composition of the active and 

reserve components. 

Addressed to the secretaries of the individual service departments, 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries 

of Defense, the memorandum tasked the respective addressees to 

review the force balance with a view towards structuring each to 

reduce the need for involuntary mobilization during the fi rst 15 days 

of a rapid response operation (or for any alerts to mobilize prior to 

the operation); to structure forces to limit involuntary mobilization 

to not more than one every 6 years; to establish a more rigorous 

process for reviewing joint requirements to ensure appropriate force 

structure; to validate requests for forces to provide timely notice 

of mobilization; and to make mobilization and demobilization 

more effi cient.2 Although much of the requested review deals with 

reserve mobilization procedures, the request to structure each 

component (e.g., the active component and the reserve component) 
202

to “reduce the need for involuntary mobilization” caused quite a 

stir in the reserve community.3 Although the primary intent of the 

proposed rebalancing was purportedly to allow quicker responses 

to international crises, reserve advocates saw it as a threat to the 

foundations of the Laird “Total Force” policy and commensurately as 

a threat to their relevance, resourcing, recruitment, and retention.4

The Laird “Total Force” policy, referred to informally as the 

“Abrams Doctrine,” has just exceeded 30 years as a fundamental 

basis for the Department of Defense’s (DoD) force structure and 

manning policy. During this period it has become institutionalized 

in doctrine and accepted as the unquestioned foundation of 

the active-reserve balance of forces.5 The Abrams Doctrine has 

principally rested on force structure considerations and constraints 

that General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff in the early 

1970s, confronted in the post-Vietnam era. Abrams’ actual intention 

in advocating this policy represented an attempt both to save force 

structure and resource reserve forces adequately. 

Despite that fact, the two perceptions most often associated today 

with the “Total Force” policy are the necessity of gaining popular 

support for committing U.S. forces to combat, and a hidden intent 

in the active-reserve force structure to limit presidential powers. The 

necessity of gaining popular support has resulted in two interrelated 

beliefs: that it is necessary to mobilize the reserves to obtain popular 

support for military action; and conversely, that the President must 

obtain popular support before mobilizing the reserves. The second 

perception is that the “Total Force” policy aimed expressly with 

“malice aforethought” to limit the powers of the president.6 Various 

constituencies have adopted these perceptions after the fact, and they 

are actually fallacies. At the same time, a third function―that of 

limiting prolonged combat―was a desired outcome. 

The impacts that a protracted war on terror imposes on the 

reserve force structure are diffi cult to predict. Yet, the present 

situation requires, and the current Abrams Doctrine provides, both 

a convenient and a necessary starting point. In arriving at a future 

“Abrams” Doctrine, compromise, the main component in achieving 

a solution in the past, provides a remarkable and applicable 

ingredient for a future solution.
203

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is correct that some aspects 

of the Abrams Doctrine need discarding, but it is important to retain 

the essential core in formulating a new “Total Force” policy. Any 

new “Abrams” Doctrine must arrive at a force structure appropriate 

to today’s threat, while ensuring the continued relevance of the 

reserve component. At the same time, a new “Abrams” Doctrine 

must continue to perform the “confl ict limiting” function that it now 

provides. 

ARRIVING AT THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: THE INTENT

The principle architect of the army’s portion of the “Total 

Force” policy that evolved from the nation’s Vietnam experience 

was Abrams.7 A well-respected, highly decorated soldier, Abrams 

was as gruff personally as he was shrewd politically. His tour of 

duty, tragically cut short by cancer, coincided with several separate 

political forces that allowed him to shape the post-war army to 

match his vision of the desirable future force. These political forces 

were both international and domestic, and together they provided 

Abrams with a near-perfect window of opportunity. 

Internationally, the United States was seeking support from its 

allies to share the burden of containing the Soviets―especially on 

the ground in Central Europe. Coincidentally, the economic and 

political recovery of Western Europe made it a more practical time 

for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies to assume 

a larger portion of alliance defense, especially in areas related to 

this area of interest.8 Additional host nation support capabilities 

for traditional military police duties, transportation support 

requirements, and general rear area roles would facilitate a reduction 

of active American combat service and combat service support 

units without a loss of combat capability. For Abrams, additional 

host nation support translated to allowing the total number of U.S. 

soldiers in Europe to remain constant, while the number of combat 

units expanded as personnel spaces previously required for combat 

support and combat service support forces declined. 

Domestically, legislative pressure to reduce the size of active 

forces and to reinvigorate the role of the reserves increased 

signifi cantly following Vietnam.9 Budgetary reductions, together 
204

with the increased costs of fi elding an all-volunteer army and 

predictable post-war pressures to reduce the military seemed to 

justify cutting the active duty force structure. Abrams, however, 

thought that reductions in active duty forces were the last thing 

the Army needed, as it shifted its focus back to Europe and the 

Soviet threat. Fortunately, newly appointed Secretary of the Defense 

James Schlesinger supported Abrams’ desires to resist pressures to 

downsize the Army. He was willing even to expand the number of 

combat divisions provided Abrams did not raise the total end strength 

of the active Army. Signifi cantly, these two also agreed that the 

Army’s reserve forces would again resource and train in conjunction 

and coordination with active forces.10

This led to the formulation of the “Round Out” concept, which 

aligned reserve combat and combat support/combat service support 

elements with active divisional combat units and thereby preserved 

active component manpower spaces for expanding combat forces. 

Coupled with personnel space savings from host nation support 

overseas, this innovative concept allowed Abrams to carve out three 

more division headquarters and their associated combat elements 

from current end strength.11

Abrams’ recommended solution to the seemingly divergent 

requirements of the active and reserve constituencies was both 

simple and brilliant. He expanded the active structure to provide 

more combat divisions by relying on the reserve forces to provide 

unit-level fi ll. This allowed him to expand and then maintain the 

combat strength of the active army at 16 divisions and also promised 

the Army could resource those specifi c “round-out” reserve force 

units in a fashion comparable to their active brethren.12 Additionally, 

he moved the remaining bulk of the Army’s combat support and 

combat service support units into the reserves. Thus, the active Army 

would rely on alliance members for such support before reserve 

forces could arrive for a confl ict in Europe. Again, this approach 

ensured that these particular reserve forces would receive resources 

appropriate to their deployment timelines. 

There was, however, a “catch” associated with this approach. 

The combined results of these actions meant that, in order to fi ght 

a lengthy or serious confl ict with active forces, especially outside of 
205

Europe, the President would have to call up the combat support/

combat service support assets from the reserves. As an example, 

theater support infrastructure―such as the transportation terminal 

brigades and battalions needed to provide the military interface at 

commercial seaports of embarkation, deployment support brigades 

to assist with loading the equipment on commercial transportation, 

and port security companies to provide security at military ocean 

terminals―now existed only in the reserve structure.13 Since upwards 

of 95 percent of the Army deploys to large scale contingency 

operations by sea, such deployment support units must mobilize 

early to support the movement of the active heavy combat forces.14

Despite the assertions of some critics, Abrams’ motivation 

primarily to preserve a large regular Army should not be a matter 

of historical debate. Dr. Conrad Crane points out, that on assuming 

the position of chief of staff of the Army as it returned from Vietnam, 

Abrams commanded a force undergoing a traumatic transition. 

Facing a signifi cant drawdown, the shift to an all-volunteer armed 

force, and a desire for ethical reform from the rank and fi le of an offi cer 

corps who believed the Vietnam war had weakened service integrity, 

Abrams’ primary goals were to establish an active force structure that 

maintained 16 division fl ags while increasing the readiness of the reserve 

components.15

Retaining, even increasing, divisions was more important than any 

other consideration for Abrams. At that time, divisions were the 

accepted metric for discussing, funding, and opposing the similarly 

constructed Soviet threat in Europe. To achieve the number of 

divisions in the structure he desired, he had to reinvigorate the 

reserve forces. This was realistic and a political necessity based on 

the domestic environment. 

A second intended outcome of the “Total Force” policy was 

for selected elements of the reserves to be resourced in a manner 

commensurate with and in consonance with the active forces. 

The Cold War forced the Army’s components into a symbiotic 

relationship, since “the Cold War was partly responsible for this 

increased reliance because the Soviet threat appeared overwhelming 

and the cost of maintaining large active forces was prohibitive.”16 The 
206

nature of the Soviet threat provided relevance and a focus that was 

diffi cult to deny. By tying reserve resources to the active components’ 

ability to meet and defeat this threat, the Abrams Doctrine provided 

the former a mission focus that imparted credibility to their resource 

arguments and enabled the successful execution of their retention 

and recruitment efforts. The Abrams Doctrine provided the reserves 

with relevancy, and it is from that relevancy that the remaining three 

“Rs” draw their support.17 Such relevancy is a fundamental necessity 

for the reserve components and a source of continuing debate in the 

post-Cold War era. 

The Abrams Doctrine seemingly addressed each constituency’s 

most serious needs. For Abrams and the active component, it allowed 

the manning of more pure combat formations, while keeping the costs 

associated with that force relatively low. For the reserves, it provided 

relevance for political and bureaucratic leverage, promised access 

to resources, and resulted in retention and recruiting advantages. 

Thus, it was a politically crafted compromise solution to structuring 

the force, which continued to operate long after the conditions that 

necessitated its inception had changed dramatically. Of course, as 

with many intended policy outcomes crafted by governments, there 

have been unintended consequences as well.

THE POLITICS OF MEANING: THE ASSOCIATED 

PERCEPTIONS 

Although designed to address “programmatic” issues, the 

Abrams Doctrine became associated with some signifi cantly 

different perceptions over the intervening years. In fact, one of 

the disconcerting aspects of the Abrams Doctrine is that each of 

its constituencies has developed its own largely unchallenged 

interpretation of the doctrine. Academics, buttressed by the 

arguments of a number of authors, see the policy as an attempt 

to limit presidential powers. Some of these as well as others, 

including military offi cers, see the Abrams Doctrine as an argument 

for obtaining popular support prior to mobilization. Still others, 

particularly members of the reserve components―specifi cally the 

National Guard and its many supporters―have interpreted it as a 

necessary precursor to military action: 
207

The Total Force policy of 1973 was designed to gain popular support for 

military operations from the American public by mobilizing the National 

Guard from its thousands of locations across the United States when 

needed.18

In popularizing this interpretation they have helped legitimize 

this sentiment, and subsequently raised the linkage between 

mobilization and popular support to near canonical status. 

Likewise, some associate the active component, fairly or unfairly, 

with a supposedly subtle attempt to limit presidential powers by 

promulgating a dependence that lies at the heart of the Abrams 

Doctrine.19 The restrictive interpretations on American military 

interventions associated with both the Weinberger and Powell 

Doctrines allegedly have their lineage in the structural limitations 

conceived by Abrams.20 Yet, curiously, nowhere in Abrams’ 

contemporary papers, nor in public statements made at that time, is 

there a single hint that Abrams’ intended obtaining popular support 

or of imposing incidental constraints on the powers on the executive 

branch as outcomes of the new “Total Force” policy. 21 Nonetheless, 

each of these articulated beliefs about the Abrams Doctrine retains 

a signifi cant number of adherents and therefore warrants a closer 

examination.

Mobilization and its Relationship to Popular Support.

That there is a linkage between mobilizing the reserves and 

committing and maintaining the will of the people in support 

of a war remains a generally accepted belief. Advocates of this 

line of thinking make either or both of two arguments: fi rst, that 

mobilization of the reserve forces results in obtaining or increasing 

popular support for an intended military action; and, second, 

conversely, that the President must fi rst obtain the support of the 

people in order to mobilize the reserves. It represents a somewhat 

confusing tautology. Theoretically, its roots rest on the writings of 

Prussian theorist, Carl von Clausewitz.

Clausewitz posits that there exists a remarkable trinity in war 

composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity; the play of 

chance; and the interaction of policy. Specifi cally, he states that 
208

these three aspects mainly concern the people, the commander and 

his army, and the government.22 He describes the requirement for 

leaders in war to keep these three “aspects” balanced so the policies 

pursued in regards to one do not occur without regard for their 

effects on the others. In effect, he admonishes governments for trying 

to go to war without the support of the people. Most probably the 

result of his own and Prussia’s experience in the Napoleonic wars, 

the application of his theoretical construct to a modern democratic 

government still merits consideration. Although Clausewitz does 

not guarantee that the preparation and thoughtful orchestration 

of all three elements to draw forth and appropriately direct the 

maximum power of a nation will guarantee victory, he implies that 

failing to manage the relationship of the trinity properly will lead to 

defeat.23

More so than the current all-volunteer force, the reserves, 

providing representation from numerous small communities 

across the country, seem to represent the mechanical linkage that 

integrates the key Clausewitzian trinity of the people with the other 

two elements. In fact, Colonel Harry Summers’ book, On Strategy, A 

Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, presents a powerful argument , presents a powerful argument 

that the U.S. government ignored the “remarkable trinity” (and 

other Clausewitzian theory) and suffered defeat in Vietnam as the 

will of the people drifted from the policy of the government and the 

actions of its army. As Summers argues, someone

. . . needed to tell him [the President] that it would be an obvious 

fallacy to commit the Army without fi rst committing the American 

people. Such a commitment would require battlefi eld competence and 

clear-cut objectives to be sustained, but without the commitment of the 

American people, the commitment of the Army to prolonged combat 

was impossible.24

In this belief, Summers was not alone. Many defense analysts and 

military leaders agreed that President Lyndon Johnson’s decision 

was fateful. In fact, it has become a common and oft- repeated 

rationale for the defeat in Vietnam.

The lesson learned by the American military in Vietnam involves 

the third leg of Clausewitz’s “remarkable trinity,” the people. The 

consensus, particularly acute among Army offi cers, seems to suggest 
209

that the American people have a duty and a role in the authorization of 

force beyond that delegated to their elected representatives in Congress 

and the President. This conviction can be summed up by the statement 

that war is a shared responsibility between the people, the government, 

and the military. 25

Abrams’ belief was that the direct result of Johnson’s decision not 

to mobilize the reserve forces led not only to defeat, but to serious 

damage to each of the Army’s structural components. Many observers 

thus assert that Abrams’ chief legacy is that he and his colleagues 

became committed to an early mobilization of the reserves. 

Does Mobilization Ensure Popular Support?

The objective of ensuring popular support for future wars was not 

in any of General Abrams’ writings at the time that the “Total Force” 

policy came into effect. Ensuring that the passions of the people 

became engaged and remained focused on the outcome of a confl ict 

as a result of this structural forcing function apparently arose through 

interviews and writings after the fact. Lewis Sorley was one of the 

fi rst authors to discuss this objective in depth in his 1992 biography 

of Abrams. Summers makes a similar argument in his book offering 

a Clausewitzian analysis of the Vietnam War. Although he does not 

cite Abrams or the Abrams Doctrine, Summers asserts that for most 

of U.S. history, the support of the American people was imbedded 

deeply into the very force structure of the American military.26

He stresses the necessity of mobilizing the reserves by citing the 

theoretical basis of Clausewitz’s trinity. However, there are critics 

who would argue that Summers’ application of the trinity is too 

broad in nature; and that “the concept of the “remarkable trinity” is 

a basis for the practical political-military analysis of particular wars, 

not a description of the social structures―which may alter over 

time―that support war.”27 By raising the tendencies of the trinity 

to dogmatic status, Summers’ interpretation is certainly open to 

criticism. 28

Regardless of the views concerning the validity of the theoretical 

linkage between reserve mobilization and obtaining popular support, 

the question remains: Is mobilization of the reserve component 
210

an effective methodology for ensuring support of the war effort? 

A review of the effect of mobilizing and deploying reserve forces 

since Vietnam indicates that obtaining and maintaining popular 

support rests on a number of factors. In regards to the mobilization 

prior to the Gulf War and its impact on popular support, one author 

suggests: 

Although the public rallied behind President Bush in August when he 

announced the American military intervention, popular support for 

his Persian Gulf policies soon fell sharply. The mobilization of large 

numbers of guardsmen and reservists had no impact on that precipitous 

drop in public support. Opinion polls showed that the American people’s 

support for Bush’s Persian Gulf policy was not restored until U.S. forces 

began combat operations.29

A similar trend occurred during the air war over Kosovo. In fact, popular 

support has more to do with the results than with the type of components 

involved.

The truth is remarkably simple. When the U.S. achieves victory in a just 

cause, the public applauds the use of force. When it loses―worse, still, 

when America is defeated or runs away (as in Somalia or Vietnam)―the 

public reasonably says the use of the military was a mistake.30

In hindsight, the fact that the United States remained heavily 

engaged in Vietnam for 9 years (with a belief that achieving victory 

was possible for at least 6 of those years) before withdrawing seems 

to support such a contention. Also in hindsight, it is now apparent 

that such conditional support is not peculiar to democracies. 

Gunther Lewy concluded in his review of Vietnam that a mixture 

of propaganda and compulsion offers a totalitarian regime an 

advantage in a war for limited objectives.31 However, the Soviet 

experience in Afghanistan illustrates that any unsuccessful war that 

drags on for a long time will inevitably lose the backing essential for 

its successful pursuit.32

A review of peacekeeping missions from this same time frame 

reveals similar results with respect to support and mobilization. 

Although his work focuses specifi cally on the infl uence of casualties 

on public policy, James Burk concludes from an examination of 

peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon and Somalia that public support 
211

was neither as unsteady, nor as critically contingent on the absence 

of casualties as many have claimed.33 Interestingly enough, Burk’s 

conclusions are that public approval or disapproval for such 

missions largely is set before casualties are incurred. This is signifi cant 

in that he asserts that the political leadership is more responsible for 

popular support of military operations than other factors. He bases 

this assertion upon a study that concludes that public support for 

military deployments rests heavily on consensus (or its absence) 

among political leaders.34 Max Boot concurs that the public is willing 

to “go along,” if the elites in government and the media remain 

favorably disposed.35 In fact, the belief that activating the reserve 

component ensures the support of the people may be nothing more 

than a well-propagated myth. Accepting, then, that mobilization 

does not equate to popular support, the question remains: To what 

degree is popular support necessary prior to mobilization? 

Mobilization as a Prerequisite? 

A variant of the popular support argument is that the president 

must fi rst gain the popular support of the people prior to initiating 

military operations. However, popular support cannot be a limiting 

factor, and to make such support a prerequisite for action would be 

to paralyze the political leadership. One commentator agrees:

As for explaining its failures or half-successes since World War II, even 

thoughtful general offi cers declared that to have victories, you must 

have the political will―and that means the will of the administration, 

the congress, and the American people. All must be united in a desire 

for action. If accepted, such an extreme pre-condition―a unity that has 

escaped the United States in every major war except the World Wars―

means that the civilians will always disappoint the military and the 

soldiers will always have an excuse.36

In the history of American arms, popular support rarely has occurred 

before hand, and certainly has not been a guarantee after the action 

begins. Were it a prerequisite to action, the United States would 

have engaged in few, if any, of the wars that have made it a great 

power. This is so in limited confl icts, in peacekeeping operations, or 

in “crusades.” 
212

The quest to obtain the ever-elusive goal of popular support for 

military action will not result necessarily from any single event and 

cannot be guaranteed under most circumstances. Mobilization does 

not result in obtaining popular support. Popular support is not a 

prerequisite to military action. There are too many variables in the 

dynamic equation that determines the relationship of mobilization, 

presidential decisions, and making popular support to assign 

outcomes with any degree of certainty.37 The supposedly irrefutable 

argument of the role of reserves as a linkage among the trinity, 

although politically attractive, remains both dubious and unproven. 

Effective political leaders able to reach a policy consensus, or at 

least able to maintain consensus long enough to initiate action on 

favorable terms, possess power suffi cient to take the nation to war, 

including mobilization of reserve forces. Hence, the belief that a 

cause and effect relationship exists between mobilizing the reserves 

and ensuring popular support possesses little validity, just as the 

idea that popular support is necessary prior to acting is equally 

without basis. To continue to accept either of these arguments serves 

no purpose in formulating a future policy.

Tying the President’s Hands?

Related to the argument that the President must gain popular 

support prior to mobilizing the reserve component is one that the 

active dependence on reserve mobilization came about specifi cally 

from a desire to limit the President’s ability to commit the nation to 

war. Lewis Sorley, based on an interview he conducted with then 

General (Retired) John Vessey in 1988, argues that the general was 

the originator of the characterization of the Abrams Doctrine as 

being designed with “malice aforethought.”38 He details what in 

Vessey’s belief was an unmistakable effort on the part of Abrams to 

tie deployment of active forces to the mobilization of the reserves not 

in order to gain popular support, but to force the President to seek 

approval prior to acting. It is tough to argue with an authority like 

Vessey, although Crane raises doubts based on the time elapsed, the 

lack of any contemporary documents to support the assertion, the 

seriousness of formulating and disguising the intent of such an act, 
213

and the characterization of Abrams’ service made by Schlesinger.39

Correctly, Crane points out that “interpretations that the true 

motivation for the new force structure was purposefully concealed 

from civilian decisionmakers or that the justifi cation was only created 

after the fact to preserve current policy are both troubling.”40

Regardless of the intent, it appears that most presidents have 

not been constrained in their actions, with or without this supposed 

infl uence of the Abrams Doctrine. Other attempts at restraining 

executive branch power, such as the Weinberger or Powell Doctrines 

or the War Powers Resolution have had little impact on the exercise 

of presidential discretion. As Jeffrey Record points out

. . . with the exception of Jimmy Carter, they [recent Presidents] have 

displayed a greater propensity to intervene in foreign civil wars than did 

their pre-Vietnam predecessors. Reagan sent U.S. forces into Lebanon and 

Grenada. Bush intervened in Panama, the Philippines, and Somalia. And 

Clinton has intervened in Haiti and Bosnia. In none of these instances 

were fundamental U.S. security interests at stake or was a White House 

full-court press mounted to mobilize congressional and public opinion 

on behalf of intervention.41

The question of whether the Abrams Doctrine aimed at curtailing 

executive branch powers is actually moot. It clearly does not. It is 

nothing more than an inconvenience, which is one reason the current 

Secretary of Defense is trying to change it. In fact, the lore associated 

with its design may be more harmful than it is worth, as Elliot 

Cohen (among other scholars) has noted: “This was, nonetheless an 

extraordinary effort by the military to limit the choices available to 

their civilian masters, to tie the hands of policymakers through the 

seemingly technical manipulation of organizational structures.”42

It is only natural that the civilian leadership would interpret 

such an effort to undermine civil-military relations as extremely 

disingenuous. However, the evidence would indicate that the 

accepted belief of a malice aforethought simply is not accurate.

THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE’S TRUE LEGACY! 

Abrams’ intent is being misinterpreted and others have obscured 

its true legacy. The unseen and often overlooked brilliance of the more 
214

subtle, associated outcome of the Abrams Doctrine is not that it uses 

the reserves as a forcing function in limiting the active component’s 

commitment in an action, but in its clever method of leveraging the 

reserves to get the active component out of an action. The use of the of an action. The use of the 

reserves does not cause the President to reconsider the commitment 

of forces when weighing matters of national security. Nonetheless, 

with its presence in 2,700 communities across all 54 states and 

territories, the mobilized and committed reserve components bring 

the political pressure of their elected representatives to bear to end

a crisis that appears to be unsuccessful.43 This effect may be even 

more necessary with an all-volunteer force than it was with a draftee 

force. 

Abrams witnessed the death and debilitating effects on both 

the nation and on the Army through 9 years of feckless action in 

Vietnam. His World War II experiences assisted him a great deal in 

realizing the impact of failing to introduce reserve forces on ending 

the Vietnam War. In fact, Abrams’ legacy is not in preventing the 

United States from going into another Vietnam, but in ensuring that 

its military actions do not remain indecisive for prolonged periods 

as a result of congressional inaction. His design ensured that a 

mobilized reserve component would generate the political focus 

on future wars refl ective of the mobilized reserves’ representative 

community basing. 

This interpretation would change Summers’ assertion that 

“without without the commitment of the American people, the commitment the commitment of the American people, the commitment 

of the Army to prolonged combat was impossible” to “with the 

commitment of the American people, the commitment of the 

Army to prolonged combat was impossible.”44 The misperception 

that Abrams sought to undermine the executive’s constitutional 

authority is ironic. In fact, his design strengthened the constitutional 

role of Congress. Additionally, by removing doubts about the 

motives associated with this policy, it reinforces Schlesinger’s 

characterization of Abrams as the epitome of a “good servant.”45

If there is a forcing function imbedded in the design of the force 

structure instituted by the Abrams Doctrine, the confl ict curtailing 

function may be it.
215

THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE

Current international and domestic political pressures differ 

markedly from those of 30 years ago, and although they may be more 

familiar, they are no less pressing. Internationally, the disappearance 

of the Soviet threat, the continued decline in the defense budgets of 

traditional allies, the public opposition to U.S. policies by numerous 

international and nongovernmental actors, the rise of transnational 

terrorism, and the hesitance of other nations to provide forces and 

access to assist the U.S. form a different context for force planning.46

The sometimes-public resentment of what former allies now choose 

to interpret as unilateral or hegemonic actions by the United States 

is also causing a decrease in host nation and allied force support. 

These international tensions are both lessened and exacerbated 

by domestic realities. Given these changes in the threat and in the 

international and domestic environments, the future direction of the 

Abrams Doctrine requires careful deliberation. 

Although improbable, it remains possible that the compromise 

Abrams conceived has no future. The impacts that a protracted war 

on terror will have on the reserve force structure are diffi cult to 

predict. Yet change is necessary, and the current Abrams Doctrine 

provides both a convenient and a necessary starting point. The 

actual intent, central to Abrams’ compromise then and to any 

compromise now, focuses on ensuring reserve component relevance 

and on an active-reserve force balance within a constrained endstrength. While maintaining relevance is vital, equally critical is the 

balancing of force capabilities across the range of military operations 

and in consonance with overseas, homeland defense, and homeland 

security missions. In attaining this balance, it is likely that only a 

future “confl ict curtailing” function merits retention from the design 

of the current active-reserve force. Nonetheless, it is possible that 

the hardest question surrounding the future direction of the Abrams 

Doctrine is the one Rumsfeld did not ask: Is balancing the force 

really all that is required? In arriving at a future “Abrams” Doctrine, 

compromise, the main component in achieving a solution in the 

past, provides a remarkable and applicable ingredient for a future 

solution.
216

THE FUTURE AND RESERVE COMPONENT RELEVANCE

Without the specter of a Soviet invasion of Europe, and following 

the failure of reserve combat units to be employed during Operation 

DESERT STORM, the relevance of portions of the reserve forces came 

into question. This was highlighted in 1997 when the Quadrennial 

Defense Review did not even mention the specifi c utilization, 

integration, or modernization of the reserves. 

This was due primarily to the active component view of the National 

Guard combat units as a strategic reserve, In other words, the two major 

theater war scenario involved only the active component divisions. 

National Guard combat units would only be called upon in such a 

scenario if the confl ict was not resolved within a specifi ed time frame, 

or if active forces were required to redeploy to another confl ict. Based 

on existing deployment practices, National Guard combat units would 

deploy to theater 45-60 days after mobilization, and would be committed 

only when the situation was under control. Basically, the National Guard 

was viewed as less “relevant” to future war fi ghting requirements.47

Largely driven by budgetary requirements, reserve supporters 

allege that the active forces attempted to relegate the reserve combat 

unit contributions to post-combat periods in an effort to avoid 

modernization costs.48 This is a practical demonstration of how 

relevance translates to resources for the reserve forces, and this 

rift developed into a fraternal bureaucratic fi ght of such particular 

ferocity that both the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the National 

Defense Panel commented adversely.49 Clearly, this type of infi ghting 

weakens the symbiotic relationship and reserve relevance once born 

and nurtured by the Soviet threat.

Relevance remains a concept that even the active force wrestles 

with openly. The recently appointed Army Chief of Staff adopted 

the motto of “Relevant and Ready” as the theme of his tenure. 

Relevance for the reserves, and the resources, retention, and 

recruiting that are its downstream effects remain a foundation of 

the future Abrams Doctrine. The United States can obtain structural 

relevance by linking reserve component units to complementary 

active capabilities, by including unique supplementary capabilities 

in the reserves, or by assigning homeland defense or homeland 
217

security roles to the reserves. Whatever missions or roles assigned to 

the reserves, it is imperative that they be linked to the “Total Force,” 

and be related directly to the capabilities required to face the current 

threat. Relegating a sizable portion of the reserves to unrealistic 

missions or seldom-used functions will destroy their relevance. The 

destruction of their relevance will only serve to destroy the subtle 

curtailing function they provide, as unnecessary or seldom-used 

capabilities do not require mobilization. The relevance of the reserve 

forces, a foundation of the future force design, cannot be jeopardized. 

However, retaining relevance without building a balanced force is 

meaningless as well.

THE FUTURE AND FORCE BALANCE

Several factors now infl uencing the balancing debate do not 

align as easily as those that faced Abrams in 1973. The advent and 

success of the all-volunteer force now acts as a huge impediment 

towards any near-term or future growth of the active component. 

Regardless of critics of a “poverty draft” or of questions surrounding 

the future availability of a suffi ciently qualifi ed recruiting pool, the 

all-volunteer force is providing the necessary human raw material 

to fi ll the military’s force structure.50 In fact, the largest argument 

against the all-volunteer force and a tremendous dampening factor 

in expanding the active component is its cost. Recruiting, training, 

retaining, and supporting the retirement of an active duty service 

member is expensive when considered in the context of other DoD 

costs. 

As defense budgets decline, personnel costs compete with 

modernization costs in each service’s budget. Modernization costs 

continue to rise all too quickly, prompting one defense industry 

executive to joke that by 2054, it will require the entire defense budget 

to purchase a single aircraft.51 This competition for defense dollars 

explains why the Secretary of Defense examined the reduction of the 

active Army to just eight divisions as recently as 2001.52 He initially 

envisioned a division of labor between the active and reserve forces 

that maintained the current modernization direction by reducing the 

size of the active force and increasing the utilization of the reserve 
218

force. In effect, he rebalanced the force to assign more missions 

requiring mobilization to the reserves to preserve modernization for 

the active force. 

This approach explains why the Army and DoD’s leadership 

remain opposed to recent congressional efforts to raise the size of 

the Army’s active component by two divisions without a reasonable 

guarantee that Congress will sustain the additional funding for 

such an increase in force levels for the foreseeable future.53 Neither 

Congress nor the Army seems willing to reduce procurement 

funding. Nonetheless, the impacts of the budgetary pressures to 

reduce the active forces led to a commensurate reliance on the 

manpower of the reserves. Interestingly, while the active forces 

declined from 18 to 10 divisions, the reserve forces retained all 8 of 

their divisions, not counting 15 enhanced separate brigades. Critics 

maintain that, in an effort to preserve the current 10 divisions at all 

costs, the active forces focused modernization funds on the “core 

competency” of fi ghting and winning a conventional war and 

encouraged an increased role in stability and support operations 

for the reserves as necessitated by the requirements of the National 

Security Strategy and the emerging threat environment.54

The renewed threat of transnational terror organizations and the 

emerging necessities of fi rst responder duties as part of homeland 

security missions for the reserve forces make the balancing debate 

even more complex. In the past, the selected transfer of what the 

military terms military operations other than war critical active 

forces to the reserves (e.g., civil affairs, military police, and engineer 

vertical construction assets) had little noticeable effect or impact 

domestically.55 However, as the deployment requirements for 

reserve forces compete with both disaster response and anticipated 

homeland defense requirements, tensions experienced throughout 

the active and reserve force structure are refl ected among state-level 

political leadership.56 For example, skills now required by the active 

forces may not be replaced in reserve formations or be replaced 

by skills that are not as easily recruited, retained, or utilized by 

the states’ leadership. The transfer of military police, medical, 

vertical construction, or civil affairs specialties (i.e., those required 

for fi rst responder duties) now is much noticed. As a result, when 
219

the senior leadership of the Army openly discusses the possibility 

of transferring nearly 125,000 manpower spaces with many of 

the aforementioned skills back into the active forces to fulfi ll the 

Secretary of Defense’s rebalancing tasking, it only serves to heighten 

these tensions.57 Couple these pressures with those now being voiced 

over the extended and repetitive deployment of reserve forces and 

the higher casualty rates these forces are experiencing in Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM’s stability and support operations, and the 

pressures to reexamine the reserve’s role in overseas deployments 

in regards to homeland defense and security missions grow even 

more.58

Balancing active and reserve structure and capabilities between 

the current international and domestic environments in consideration 

of the National Security Strategy admittedly is a diffi cult proposition. 

An active force supported by a three-tiered reserve (including units 

earmarked, recruited, and retained specifi cally for expeditionary 

actions, homeland defense, and homeland security) is one proposed 

concept.59 However, any action to limit employment of portions 

of the reserve force to hostile environs overseas may undermine 

the confl ict curtailing function that mobilization provides. Such 

steps require a careful balancing of district representation among 

the reserve forces earmarked for deployment to preserve this 

vital function. Clearly, the active component must accomplish 

its immediate missions without reliance on the reserves. Just as 

clearly, the reserves require a degree of redundancy of active force 

capabilities that are complementary, supplementary, and neither 

too expensive nor too specifi c to retain in the active forces. This new 

total force structure cannot be skewed towards combat operations, 

but requires capabilities that address the entire spectrum of confl ict 

distributed prudently across each component. Balancing the force is 

a complicated and politically delicate act indeed.

Regardless of the force balancing solution derived, the new 

Abrams Doctrine must preserve the existence of complementary and 

supplementary capabilities resident in both active and reserve forces 

in case changes in the strategic environment require an unforeseen 

and rapid expansion of the defense capabilities of the nation. The 

multiple defense challenges refl ected in the attacks on the World 
220

Trade Center, the Anthrax scare, and in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

provide excellent examples of just how diverse a force structure the 

United States requires. 

THE SPIRIT OF THE ABRAMS DOCTRINE: THE WAY AHEAD

Retention of the Abrams Doctrine as originally designed and 

now executed is no longer feasible, but incremental modifi cation is 

preferable to discarding a policy that retains desired qualities at this 

point in time. Whether divisions or brigade combat teams become 

the “coin of the realm” for measuring the size of the active forces is 

not as important as ensuring that the capabilities required to project, 

sustain, and conduct combat operations suffi cient to defeat the most 

likely enemies balance properly amongst the components. The combat 

curtailing function provided by ensuring that the congressional 

representatives of the mobilized reserves scrutinize the actions of 

committed forces remains a key quality that necessitates retention 

in any future force structure. Americans would ignore this function, 

not understood fully in the aftermath of the bitter defeat of Vietnam, 

at considerable peril in the future. Integral to designing the future 

force balance is redefi ning the desired role of the reserves in direct 

support of the active forces overseas, in support of homeland defense 

requirements, and in support of homeland security requirements. In 

accomplishing this, the relevance of the Army’s reserve component 

in performing the diverse military missions envisioned by the 

original Abrams Doctrine remains essential to recruit, retain, and 

resource the reserve force. 

Just as modifying the current Abrams Doctrine necessitates the 

retention of key qualities, so too does it require the elimination of 

several associated perceptions. The perception that structurally 

tying the deployment of the active force to the mobilization of the 

reserves creates or ensures a degree of popular support is a myth. 

It should be discounted. Structurally tying mobilization of the 

reserve component to employment of the active force has little, if 

any, demonstrated effect on presidential decisionmaking. Since 

there is little supporting evidence to justify this belief, the Army 

should refute loudly the “malice aforethought” claims related to its 
221

supposedly nefarious attempt to restrain presidential power through 

structural design. When crafting the new “Abrams” Doctrine, all 

concerned should take particular care that the motivations, intent, 

and processes are visible and “transparent,” thereby avoiding the 

types of negative connotations that gain the military an array of 

academic and political critics for no sound reason. 

Possibly, the larger question is the one Secretary Rumsfeld did 

not ask: What is the fundamental relationship of the reserves to 

the active force in the future? Rather than merely examining the 

balance, perhaps the entire reserve-active force relationship needs 

revisiting. Depending on how one views the current war on terror 

(e.g., as a relatively short-term operation or as an open-ended 

commitment that may last 50-100 years), the solution to this question 

may require a structural adjustment more far reaching than a mere 

rebalancing of the force. A long-term requirement for continually 

mobilizing reserve forces may not be possible with the all-volunteer 

force. In all likelihood, the reserve forces possess a “tipping point” 

which extended deployments will trigger that will either compel 

soldiers to choose a nondeployable arm of the future reserve force, 

or cause them to opt not to serve. Neither option bodes well for a 

viable active-reserve relationship to continue in anything close to 

its present form. Even if DoD modifi es the reserve force to include 

the three-tiered framework cited above, the challenges in designing 

a single force that could perform the diverse roles of homeland 

security, homeland defense, and providing relevant augmentation 

to the active combat forces are incredible. The global war on terror, 

which began by the physical destruction of the twin towers, may 

have wrecked conceptually the active-reserve relationship that has 

endured for decades. If nothing else, it revealed that the activereserve compromise forged in the 1970s is no longer applicable to 

today’s threat environment, and hints that rebalancing the force may 

not solve the problem in its entirety. What, then, is the way ahead? 

 The Army consumes a vast amount of internal leadership and 

bureaucratic energy fi ghting battles over roles and missions once 

defi ned by an ingenious compromise. That DoD and Army leadership 

has allowed this landmark compromise, known as the Abrams 

Doctrine, to exist in name only for the past 12 years is understandable, 
222

given the changing nature of the international security environment. 

The current Secretary of Defense appears to be examining options 

for a solution to this problem. But a solution requires willingness to 

compromise by all parties; and the fundamentally political nature of 

this dilemma means that compromise remains the main ingredient 

in formulating a solution to the rebalancing effort. Compromise will 

be possible only if the fi nal goal is kept fully in mind, and only when 

all those creating other subordinate goals, developing personal 

agendas, or inserting personal priorities remember that “an army’s 

function is not to serve itself, but its society.”60 Even if compromise 

is achieved in revising the current Abrams Doctrine, there remains a 

lingering sense that this is but the fi rst step in redefi ning the activereserve relationship required in the future security environment. 

Secretary Rumsfeld is correct that some aspects of the Abrams 

Doctrine need discarding, but it is important to retain the essential 

core in formulating a new “Total Force” policy. Any new “Abrams” 

Doctrine must arrive at a force structure appropriate to today’s threat 

while ensuring the continued relevance of the reserve component. At 

the same time, a new “Abrams” Doctrine must continue to perform 

the “confl ict limiting” function that it now provides. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. Bruce Jacobs, “Lessons Lost?” National Guard Magazine Online, March 

2003. Jacobs is one of several authors from the National Guard Association of the 

United States that are attacking Rumsfeld’s policy initiative. He offers a vigorous 

argument relying on his own, and Lewis Sorley’s) summation of the post-Vietnam 

events that led to the establishment of the Abrams Doctrine.

2. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “Rebalancing Forces,” 

memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretaries of Defense, Washington, DC, The 

Pentagon, July 9, 2003.

3. Jacobs, p. 5. 

4. Randy Pullen, “Keep The Reserves In The Fight,” Strategic Studies Institute 

Newsletter, October 2003; and Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active 

Reserve Integration in Wartime,” Parameters, Summer, 1991, pp. 35-50. Both offer 

a general summary of the benefi ts gained by the reserve component forces based 

on the Abrams Doctrine.

5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine for Mobilization Planning,” Joint 

Pub 4-05, Washington, DC, Joint Staff, June 22, 1995, pp. 14-16. This publication 
223

illustrates the acceptance of the Abrams Doctrine. It states that the “Total Force 

Policy is one fundamental premise on which our military force structure is built. 

It was institutionalized in 1973 and caused a shift of substantial military roles and 

missions to the Reserve Component along with resources necessary to maintain 

high levels of readiness, especially in units that are needed early in a crisis.” 

Additionally, Lewis Sorley, in “Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration 

in Wartime,” p. 48, refl ects that after the passage of years, the active component 

came to depend on the reserves “so much so that it became an article of faith―as 

Abrams had planned―[that] the Army could not go to war without them.” 

[Emphasis added]

6. Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime,” p. 45.

7. Technically, the complete “Total Force” policy was offi cially named for the 

then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Over the years, perhaps because it had the 

greatest impact on and implications for the Army, it has become more common to 

simply refer to it as the “Abrams Doctrine.” 

8. Simon Lunn, “Burden Sharing in NATO,” Royal Institute of International 

Affairs, Chatham House Papers #18, London, 1983, p. 15. Lunn discusses the 

potential advantages to the United States of the then resurging post-war Western 

European economies.

9. Lewis Sorley, Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of his 

Times, New York, 1992, p. 365. Sorley provides an excellent summary of the 

political environment facing Abrams at the time. See also Richard Lock-Pullen, 

“An Inward Looking Time: The United States Army, 1973-1976,” The Journal of 

Military History, No. 67, April 2003, pp. 483-512.

10. Ibid., p. 365.

11. Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime,” 

pp. 45-47. Sorley cites an interview he conducted with General William DePuy, 

U.S. Army retired, where DePuy claimed to have conceived the “roundout” 

concept.

12.Ibid., p. 45.

13. Joint Pub 4-05, p. IV-8. 

14. The statistics concerning the Army’s deployment by sea are based on 

remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant’s lecture series, U.S. 

Army War College, AY 2004. 

15. Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat 

in Southeast Asia, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, p. 5. 

Dr. Crane bases his fi ndings upon the contemporary sources located in Abrams’ 

personal papers stored at the U.S. Army Military History Institute. 

16. Charles E. Heller, Total Force: Federal Reserves And State National Guards, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994, p. 1.
224

17. Pullen, “Keep The Reserves In The Fight,” p. 2. Pullen discusses the 

necessity of relevancy in rebuilding, and indirectly, in maintaining) the reserve 

forces. Heller’s Total Force also covers this topic extensively on pp. 30-35.

18. National Guard Posture Statement, FY 2000, Appendix B: “Constitutional 

Charter of the Guard,” p. 3, as quoted in Spencer W. Robinson, The Role of the Army 

National Guard in the 21st Century; Peacekeeping Vs. Homeland Security, Monterey, 

2002, p. 18.

19. Elliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in 

Wartime, New York, 2002, p. 186.

20. Ibid., p. 204. Additionally, see F. G. Hoffman, Decisive Force, The New 

American Way of War American Way of War, Westport, CT, 1996, pp. 100-101; and Max Boot, , Westport, CT, 1996, pp. 100-101; and Max Boot, Savage Wars 

Of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, New York, 2002, pp. 318-335. 

21. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam, pp. 5-6. Crane states that, although Abrams’ 

subordinates later claimed he also had a long-term vision to ensure that no 

president could ever fi ght another Vietnam without mobilization, that claim is 

neither clarifi ed nor supported by available documents. 

22. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter , trans and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter 

Paret, Princeton, 1976, p. 89.

23. James O. Kievit and Thomas P. Murray, “Citizen Soldiers in a 21st Century 

Army At War,” Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper, Vol. 09-03, October 2003. 

24. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, 

Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982, p. 13.

25. Hoffman, Decisive Force, p. 30.

26. Summers, On Strategy, p. 13.

27. Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, “Reclaiming the 

Clausewitzian Trinity,” Parameters, Autumn, 1995.

28. In fact, Bassford and Villacres continue (on page 5) by suggesting that 

Summers’ advocacy of a “social” trinity formed by the people, the government, 

and the army is such an alteration of Clausewitz’s initial concept as to recommend 

it be referred to as the “Summersian trinity.”

29. Charles J. Gross, American Military Aviation in the 20th Century: The 

Indispensable Arm, College Station, TX, 2002, p. 260. Although such sentiment is 

forgotten now, Gross cites numerous sources to support the assertion that the fi rst 

Gulf War was a contentious and divisive issue until hostilities commenced.

30. Humphrey Taylor, “Win in Kosovo And The Public Will Approve,” The 

Wall Street Journal, June 1999, p. A26.

31. Guenter Lewy, America In Vietnam, New York, 1978, p. 43.

32. Hoffman, Decisive Force, p. 32.

33. James Burk, “Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: 

Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 114, No. 1, 

Spring 1999. 
225

34. Ibid., pp. 5, 12. He summarizes Eric V. Larsen’s argument from Casualties 

and Consensus, Santa Monica, 1996. See also Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, pp. 327-

330.

35. Boot, Savage Wars of Peace, p. 329.

36. Cohen, Supreme Command, p. 204.

37. If nothing else, Alan Beyerchen’s discussion of Clausewitz’s writings with 

respect to nonlinearity illustrates these points rather adeptly. See Alan Beyerchen, 

“Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security, 

Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992, pp. 59-90. 

38. Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active Reserve Integration in Wartime,” 

p. 45.

39. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam, pp. 5, 21.

40. Ibid., p. 20-21.

41. Jeffrey Record, The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1998, p. 10.

42. Cohen, Supreme Command, p. 186.

43. Robinson, The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century, p. 19. 

Robinson is used to cite the number of communities and states/territories. See also 

Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western 

Power, New York, 2001, p. 442, for his discussion of constant political audit.

44. Summers, On Strategy, p. 13. 

45. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam, p. 5.

46. This is predominantly general knowledge, but these ideas are themes 

gathered from the in-class discussions of Seminar 7, U.S. Army War College, 

during Academic Year 2004.

47. Robinson, The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century, p. 49.

48. Ibid., p. 57.

49. Ibid., p. 51. 

50. Claire Shaeffer-Duffy, “Uncle Sam Hustles to Keep the Ranks Filled,” 

National Catholic Review Online, December 30, 2003.

51. Stan Crock, “Less Bang from the Pentagon’s Bucks” Business Week Online,

March 29, 2002. Crock cites a comment attributed to Norman R. Augustine, 

referred to anecdotally as “Augustine’s Law.” It states that in 1983, Lockheed 

Martin Chairman and CEO Augustine looked at the trajectory of per-unit costs for 

jet fi ghters and the trajectory of increases in the defense budget and formulated 

something he dubbed “the First Law of Impending Doom or the Final Law of 

Economic Disarmament.” He [Augustine] wrote back then: “In the year 2054, the 

entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be 

shared by the Air Force and Navy 3 1/2 days each per week except for leap year, 

when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.”
226

52. David Pyne, “New Army Brigade Plan is Dangerous,” Military.Com,

November 5, 2003.

53. Jim Garamone, “Army Chief ‘Adamantly Opposes’ Added End 

Strength,” Defense Link, January 29,2004. Gammarone, writing for the Armed 

Force Information Service, was one of many who cited the Army’s concern with 

Congress giving the “military an unfunded order―meaning that the service must 

take the money from other areas to fund the requirement.”

54. Robinson, The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century The Role of the Army National Guard in the 21st Century, pp. 57-59. , pp. 57-59.

55. Record, The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning, p. 21. 

56. As an example, see Mike Madden, ‘’Mobilization for Iraq Hits W. Va., 

Kentucky Hard” The Herald Dispatch, February 27, 2003. 

57. This comment is based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the 

Commandant’s Lecture Series, AY 2004. 

58. Robert Burns, “Most U.S. Iraq Deaths Are Reservists.” Comcast News,

January 1, 2004.

59. Philip Gold and Erin Solaro, “Wrecking . . . and fi xing the Reserves.” 

Washington Times, October 15, 2003.

60. Cincinnatu, Self Destruction: The Disintegration And Decay Of The United 

States Army During The Vietnam Era, New York, 1981, p. 44. This book, because its 

views represent a distinctly different perspective of the Army as an institution and 

of the offi cer corps in Vietnam, should be required reading for every offi cer. 
227

CHAPTER 9

SECURE THE VICTORY:

IS IT TIME FOR A STABILIZATION 

AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND?

Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Ashworth

Take up the White man’s burden–

And reap his old reward:

The blame of those ye better,

The hate of those ye guard.

Kipling

Why is the U.S. Army so reluctant to change? Have past 

victories made leaders fearful of disrupting a good thing? 

Unfortunately, history is full of examples of military organizations 

that were victorious one day but defeated the next. The current 

transformation of the U.S. Army into a leaner, lethal and more 

rapidly deployable force is impressive. However, is this effort 

developing the appropriate force to solve the current and future 

national requirements? According to Joint Vision 2020, the ultimate 

goal of the U.S. military is to achieve “full spectrum dominance―the 

ability of U.S. forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with 

multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and 

control any situation across the full range of military operations.”1

This dominance requires the ability to conduct military operations 

in both combat and noncombat situations.2

The military operations that destroyed the Iraqi Army in two 

Persian Gulf Wars have demonstrated the dominant combat 

capabilities of the United States. On the other hand, the tragic 

outcome of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Mogadishu and the 

current instability in Iraq creates doubt as to whether the United 

States dominates military operations other than war. In light of 

this disparity, why would any adversary develop forces to attack 

America’s strength―direct combat. This is especially true since the 

U.S. military appears to fi nd it diffi cult to defeat opponents that 
228

prefer to fi ght with asymmetric responses. To better fi ght both types 

of confl ict, a proposal has been made to establish a Stability and 

Reconstruction Joint Command.3 Considerable debate has occurred 

whether a new command is the proper solution. The purpose of 

this chapter is to review the strategic environment the United 

States confronts, discuss the options the nation has in controlling 

all phases of confl ict within this strategic environment, and suggest 

the benefi ts that a new force structure including a Stabilization 

and Reconstruction Joint Command would provide the Army in 

achieving a ready and relevant “full spectrum” force. 

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

After the overwhelming success of the American-led coalition 

against Iraq in Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM, 

the likelihood that an enemy would challenge the United States in 

direct combat has decreased signifi cantly. Max Boot, an historian 

of military operations other than war, claims that, “The United 

States is so far ahead of any rival in all the underlying components 

of power: economic, military, technological, or geopolitical that 

scholars describe the international scene as unipolar.”4 With the 

strength of the economy and the rapid advances in technology in 

American society, the gap between the U.S. military and its nearest 

competitor seems to be increasing. This gap makes direct combat 

less likely or at least provides the nation with signifi cant warning 

of an emerging military competitor. However, technological and 

economic advantages do not guarantee peace nor do they ensure 

that the United States will not confront enemies that will fi nd other 

means to attack the nation. Two obvious threats to national interests 

have emerged. 

The fi rst threat is the proliferation and potential use of weapons 

of mass destruction by rogue states or nonstate actors, such as 

terrorist organizations. According to the National Security Strategy, 

“. . . the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their 

determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available 

only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater likelihood 

that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make 
229

today’s security environment more complex and dangerous.”5 U.S. 

nuclear retaliation will not deter such actors because they claim no 

particular sovereignty and view their cause as a greater concern 

than the population they supposedly represent. These organizations 

increasingly have become more diffi cult to fi nd and target. 

The second threat, terrorist attacks against American and allied 

citizens, similar to September 11, 2001, provides an example of 

the use of unconventional means that overcomes an opponent’s 

inability to meet the U.S. military on the battlefi eld. Boot reminds us, 

“It is likely that the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade 

Center and the Pentagon are only a taste of what America can expect 

in the future.”6 Terrorism is an inexpensive but effective weapon to 

adversaries having minimal training and military capabilities. 

Although much of the world disapproves of such methods, 

terrorist organizations will continue to use these means to attack 

the citizens of the United States and their economy that depends 

on stable markets and world trade. Section IV of the U.S. National 

Security Strategy stresses the importance of free markets and free 

trade to America’s prosperity.7 Producing chaos and disrupting 

international stability hinders American prosperity and therefore 

provides a potential means to defeat the United States indirectly 

or at least force America to leave a particular region. To protect the 

country from these threats within the nation’s borders, the current 

administration created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

and expanded its intelligence agencies. What has the military done 

to meet such threats beyond America’s borders? 

TRANSFORMATION VERSUS THE EXPECTED THREAT 

The military is attempting to transform to meet these threats 

and develop the forces required for future combat. According to 

Joint Vision 2020, the goal is “the creation of a force that is dominant 

across the full spectrum of military operations―persuasive in peace, 

decisive in war, preeminent in any form of confl ict.”8 Therefore, to 

dominate across the full spectrum of confl ict, the Army must always 

be trained, rapidly deployable, and capable of operating in all four 

phases of joint campaigns―deter (phase I), seize initiative (phase 
230

II), decisive operations (phase III), and transition to civil control 

(phase IV). These phases exist whether the military operation 

involves combat or military operations other than war. The current 

transformation programs are designed to produce a modular and 

more rapidly deployable force. This will greatly improve the U.S. 

military’s ability to tailor appropriate forces and deliver them into a 

theater faster. However, will military leaders produce a force trained 

to operate in both combat and noncombat situations? 

MILITARY MISSION AND FORCE STRUCTURE MATCH 

If the military is responsible for fi ghting the nation’s wars, then 

its force structure should meet the requirements associated with all 

phases of operations. Phase IV operations require skill sets to handle 

stability and reconstruction operations. Both are different from the 

standard tasks of closing with the enemy and securing objectives 

by force, that are more realistic in Phases II and III. If the United 

States is unable to handle all phases concurrently, should America 

consider itself a global hegemony? Any future adversary would 

logically focus its efforts on defeating the United States in the phase 

that it has the least capabilities. 

Comparing the Army force structure against tasks in all 

campaign phases, the Army has forces that excel during the fi rst 

three phases, while it attempts to jerry-rig forces to meet Phase IV 

requirements. Special Operations Command forces and forward 

deployed forces provide the nation with strong capabilities to deter 

(phase I) potential enemies. By infi ltrating into unstable regions 

and living with the people, Special Operations Command’s soldiers 

provide intelligence needed prior to confl ict. Training in language, 

regional traditions, and cultures assist Special Forces in carrying 

out this mission. In fact, special operations teams often stabilize 

hostile situations before combat occurs, and thus save the United 

States the expense of armed confl ict.9 If confl ict is unavoidable, the 

costs of training these operatives and their limited numbers make 

it impractical to use them in long, direct combat with the enemy. 

However, these specialists continue to assist in a supporting role 

as combat forces enter into the theater. Forward deployed combat 
231

forces have a stabilizing infl uence on the world as demonstrated 

by the years of peace in Europe after World War II, on the Korean 

peninsula since 1953, and currently in Afghanistan. 

As recent history has shown, the U.S. military handles Phase 

II and III operations quickly and decisively. Military forces now 

have the capability to deploy and defeat the enemy in a matter of 

weeks. This is a dramatic improvement over past wars that took 

several months just to prepare for combat. However, as Frederick 

Kagan points out, “The Rumsfeld vision of military transformation, 

therefore, is completely unbalanced. It will provide the U.S. with 

armed forces that do one thing only, even if they do it superbly well. 

They will be able to identify, track, and destroy enemy targets from 

thousands of miles away and at little or no risk to themselves.”10

However, the Army currently has no designated force to 

transition (Phase IV) from combat into civilian control. It attempts 

to adapt itself into the peacekeeping role upon completion of 

combat operations, claiming that soldiers are adaptable and have 

the fl exibility to switch mindsets. But soldiers typically have little 

experience or training for both types of missions. One academician 

argues that the United States has experienced trouble in the past 

by its “. . . failure to create the capability to address the immediate 

aftermath of serious confl icts [that] undermine our ability to convert 

military victory into lasting success.”11 To achieve lasting success, 

post-confl ict operations take time. These operations are key to 

securing the victory. Military forces that remain in the area after 

the confl ict has terminated visually represent to the indigenous 

population America’s resolve and stabilize the new government. 

The military also provides security to nongovernmental agencies 

that are critical to reestablishing humanitarian services.12 Therefore, 

is the transformation effort eliminating an American vulnerability 

or improving capabilities where it already has an overwhelming 

advantage?

A dilemma occurs when other commitments require the United 

States to pull its military forces from a region before true change 

has occurred. The administration continues to place additional 

tasks on the military, “Today America faces equivalent tasks―

battling terrorists, narco-traffi ckers, and weapon proliferators, and 
232

ensuring open access to not only the oceans, but also the skies and 

space.”13 Even with multiple missions and the open-ended tasks of 

post-confl ict operations, the military still seems to be reluctant to 

improve capabilities to conduct Phase IV operations. High-intensity 

warfare happens in a matter of days or weeks, while reconstruction 

and stability operations involve decades. This has made it diffi cult 

to stabilize one region and reconstitute military forces for future 

combat missions. 

This phenomenon is neither new nor unique. The U.S. military 

found itself involved in Phase IV operations after the Mexican War 

in 1847, after the Civil War, in the Philippines after the SpanishAmerican War, in Europe after the two World Wars, and in the 

numerous small scale contingencies since the end of the Cold 

War.14 Nor can the United States expect a decrease in post-confl ict 

operations anytime soon. “Looking ahead, the possibilities for 

more U. S. intervention of some kind are well known: a chaotic 

post-Castro Cuba, a collapsing North Korea, and disintegration in 

Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola. . . . Haiti 

remains a failed state.”15 Because of the global American economy 

that depends on stability for future growth, most of these areas will 

require an American presence to stabilize the political situation. 

OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS 

OTHER THAN WAR

Since the strategic environment predicts that the American 

military will continue to conduct stability and reconstruction 

operations after combat and support peace operations when 

national interests dictate, what options are available? The fi rst 

option is to continue with the status quo. Generally, this would keep 

the focus on training combat skills with a short, roughly “90-day” 

training cycle for military operations other than war just prior to a 

deployable unit entering into theater. A second option would be to 

adjust the mission essential task lists for combat units to incorporate 

a balance of noncombat and combat tasks to prepare the unit to 

handle both types of missions. The third option would be to create a 

new force specifi cally tailored to handle all military operations other 

than war missions, while leaving the remaining forces to train and 
233

execute combat.

Some may argue another option exists where the military would 

transfer these missions to the United Nations, contractors, or other 

government agencies. However, the United States cannot rely on 

any of these organizations, and therefore this is an infeasible option. 

The United Nations has shown its inability to develop consensus in 

policy and execution of peace operations, as in Mogadishu, or its 

unwillingness to operate in potential unstable environments, such as 

witnessed in Iraq. Outside sources or other government agencies do 

not possess security elements suffi cient to protect their employees 

adequately. Therefore, the military appears to be the best means 

available to handle peace and Phase IV operations.16

FOCUS ON COMBAT WITH 90-DAY TRAINING CYCLES 

FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 

Many believe the current approach most effectively utilizes 

the forces available. However, this concept relies largely on the 

ability of the American soldier to adapt to changing mission 

requirements. Although modern-day soldiers are adaptable, should 

young Americans confront dangerous situations where they have 

had limited prior training? If this is true, why train at all? Leaders 

owe soldiers the maximum amount of time possible to prepare for 

deployments and the training resources to rehearse effectively their 

expected missions. 

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Walsh conducted research in 1998 to 

determine the impact that military operations other than war had on 

combat readiness. His overall fi ndings were that units preparing for 

such missions were training less for their combat mission.17 These 

fi ndings were typical of all units requiring training on tasks not 

performed during normal training cycles. His results also discovered 

other weaknesses in the current approach. 

This approach affects the noncommissioned offi cer. Are future 

Army noncommissioned offi cers going to be the experts of their 

military occupational specialty or the jack-of-all-trades? They 

cannot become experts if they are doing combat training one day 

and providing humanitarian support the next. Combat skills are 
234

too perishable. When one adds the rapid changes in computer 

software and advancements in military equipment, every day 

away from training for combat makes noncommissioned offi cers 

less profi cient in preparing their soldiers and their unit for combat. 

Often, units must leave their primary weapon systems at home and 

conduct operations in high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles 

(HMMWVs) to carry out peace operations. Being away from their 

combat equipment hinders their ability to train for even basic 

preventive maintenance and conduct weapons qualifi cation. 

Much of the dilemma of conducting peace operations and training 

is the manpower required to execute military operations other than 

war tasks and the differences between these two missions. There is 

not suffi cient time to complete all the peace operation tasks and train 

at the same time for combat. Warfi ghting deals with destruction and 

killing. Peace operations usually focus more on rebuilding, stability, 

and diplomacy. When combat forces deploy for combat, the opposite 

effect occurs as 100 percent of the time is spent on improving combat 

skills. Therefore, if the two missions are incompatible, why is the 

Army willing to degrade its combat force accomplishing noncombat 

tasks?

More detrimental to warfi ghting skills is that often the soldier 

does not realize the importance of the tasks he is required to perform. 

Walsh’s survey concluded that the majority of leaders surveyed 

were “willing to neglect 20 percent of their METL [mission essential 

task list] tasks to train for military operations other than war tasks.”18

The latter has become so commonplace that leaders feel these skills 

are more important than combat tasks. This view probably indicates 

that these soldiers felt they had a greater opportunity to deploy for 

noncombat rather than combat missions, and thus they should train 

accordingly. This mindset could lead to an unprepared Army for 

future wars.

Recovery time is also an issue. The survey concluded “at least 7.5 

weeks to 13 weeks as the reconstitution time necessary to recover 

the training element of readiness.”19 This is time a unit needs to 

be fully operational to conduct its primary combat mission after 

returning from a deployment. If the same combat unit conducts 

multiple noncombat missions, the reconstitution time would 
235

most likely increase as a greater percentage of combat trained 

leaders would have departed the unit since solid combat training 

had occurred. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Cherry, in a strategic 

research paper published in 2000, determined that total time lost 

to a combat unit’s warfi ghting training was closer to a year after 

its return from deployment away from home station. As a result, 

extended peace operations affected the combat profi ciency of three 

units―the recovering unit, the deployed unit, and the unit preparing 

for deployment.20

Finally, are the soldiers executing the jobs they were recruited for 

or even trained on during basic training? Soldiers enter the service 

expecting to defend their nation in combat. However, the nation is 

increasingly asking them to conduct peace operations. Lieutenant 

Colonel Colleen McGuire’s strategic research paper in 2001 stresses 

the difference, “Soldiers admit that operations in Somalia, Bosnia, 

and Kosovo were not the life they expected when they joined the 

Army or graduated from their entrance training into the service. 

They expected to be ready for battle―not escorting children to 

school. Many were not trained to handle domestic disputes among 

foreign civilian populations.”21

BALANCE MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LISTS TO COVER 

COMBAT AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN 

WAR TASKS 

Since rapid train-ups for peace operations are disruptive to combat 

readiness, others have suggested that the best solution is to balance 

unit METLs between combat and noncombat tasks. Colonel Lloyd 

Miles, in his 2002 strategic research paper, claimed that, historically, 

constabulary forces that spent the majority of their time conducting 

stability operations could not maintain their warfi ghting ability. 

They would prove ineffective if there was an increase in hostilities 

in the region.22 But does training for combat, then deploying for 

peace operations do any better in a unit’s preparation for combat? 

Units deployed for military operations other than war prior to 

conducting combat training center rotations were noticeably weaker 

at combat tasks. “According to a former National Training Center 
236

observer/controller and opposing force commander, observers at 

the training center are noticing an absence of fundamental skills and 

abilities at every level. Many believe the only solution is to increase 

the frequency of training.”23 Balancing unit METLs would reduce 

combat training, not increase it.

In McGuire’s paper, a considerable number of former battalion 

commanders and staff offi cers believed that training for peace 

operations negatively impacted combat readiness.24 Several of the 

Army’s fi eld manuals stress the importance of training to maintain 

the force capable of deploying to fi ght the nation’s wars. Never 

can the Army afford not to train and maintain the highest levels of 

readiness. With a focus towards combat preparedness, would peace 

operation tasks ever receive suffi cient priority in training these tasks 

suffi ciently? Walsh raises the additional point that, “much of the 

Army doctrine and Joint doctrine indicates that [military] operations 

other than war are diffi cult and challenging and that they require 

skills beyond those developed in our normal training tasks.”25 With 

a different mindset―killing versus peaceful diplomacy―and the 

incompatibility of tasks between combat and peace operations, this 

option becomes less attractive, unless the unit’s tasks were similar to 

begin with.26 This is not the case with the majority of combat forces.

DEVELOP A NEW FORCE WITH PRIMARY MISSION 

TO HANDLE MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Numerous documents discuss the option of creating a separate 

military force tailored to handle peace and Phase IV operations. In 

1998, Colonel Don Snider built a case on returning a constabulary 

force to the U.S. Army. He proposed that the Army “create a 

constabulary force using roughly 15,000 active duty structure spaces 

. . . [which] would have roughly the combat equivalent of three MP 

brigades.”27 This new force would perform most of the noncombat 

operations, allowing the majority of the Army to focus on the combat 

mission. 

Cherry proposed the creation of a U.S.-based, corps-sized 

engagement force to handle small-scaled contingencies. This corps 

would support peace operations and allow the rest of the Army to 

focus on warfi ghting. It would become the nation’s expert in civil-
237

military, multinational, and information operations. Along with 

small-scaled contingency deployments, it would provide a school to 

train soldiers on peace operations.28 Two authors from the National 

Defense University recently published a joint planning document, 

“Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” 

that recommended the creation of the Stability and Reconstruction 

Joint Command as a method to adjust today’s military structure to 

better handle stability and reconstruction operations.29

Opponents of the formation of such a command often state the 

concern that the Army has about increased end strength. However, 

is end strength the critical factor in the Army’s reluctance to form 

the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command? Most of those 

in favor of this new command claim this structure could come 

from current forces, thus eliminating concerns about increased end 

strength. Certainly today’s force restructuring to “units of action” 

aims at identifying spaces that the Army potentially can eliminate. 

But even if military leaders proposed an increase in active duty 

personnel, the present end strength is still 300,000 less than the Army 

had at the end of the Cold War. Increases of 30-50,000 would more 

than provide adequate force manning for this joint command and 

still maintain the Army at a strength less than the Cold War Army. 

One could certainly justify increased costs to the country, if this new 

force structure better served the nation’s vital interests than what is 

available now. 

The 1999 Congressional Budget paper, “Making Peace While 

Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of the U.S. Military 

Participation in Peace Operations,” concluded that peace operations 

affected combat readiness and proposed an increase of 20,000 

soldiers to handle military operations other than war missions.30

In late January 2004, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld used 

emergency powers to authorize an increase of 30,000 soldiers to 

temporarily cover shortfalls created by stability and reconstruction 

operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries.31 Although this 

is only a temporary measure, legislators do not seem to be upset 

over this increase in Army end strength. Thus, the opportunity may 

exist to fund an increase in the military personnel in response to the 

new demands created by the war on terror.32

Opponents have suggested that having two forces within the 
238

Army is ineffi cient.33 Listed above were several reasons why one 

force attempting to do both missions does not represent the most 

effective means of conducting peace operations while preparing 

for future combat. On the other hand, the Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Joint Command would still be a military force, and 

assigned soldiers would have to maintain the same standards as the 

rest of the Army, the only difference being its emphasis on training 

and conducting post-confl ict and peace operations. Operations 

in Kosovo provided examples where soldiers specifi cally trained 

in peace operations deployed faster and performed considerably 

better than combat forces. Given the political sensitivity of such 

missions, America must have its best trained soldiers executing 

these missions.34 If the Army expects infantrymen to maintain skills 

different from those of a supply clerk, why should it look on forces 

specifi cally designated to handle peace operations differently that 

combat units? In this high operating temp (OPTEMPO) environment 

the military is experiencing, the United States cannot afford, “. . . a 

mind-set characterized by one civilian Pentagon offi cial as ‘We just 

do combat, and stability ops is a sideline’.”35

SKILLS REQUIRED FOR STABILITY 

AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

“Secure the Victory” is the motto of the Civil-Affairs branch of 

the U.S. Army, and this is exactly what peace operations accomplish 

for America.36 Throughout history, soldiers have stabilized regions 

as countries transform their form of government.37 No matter how 

technologically advanced the military becomes, transition requires 

a visible deterrent to reduce the violence as the new government 

develops.38 In today’s rapid and decisive combat environment, this 

visible post-confl ict presence may be even more important since a 

large portion of the adversary’s population may not have witnessed 

the defeat of their own conventional military forces or personally 

experienced the effects of war.39

Public opinion also affects peace operations and therefore requires 

soldiers who understand the importance of maintaining positive 

public support. The globalization of the world economy, along 

with America’s views towards human rights, will continue to keep 
239

the United States involved in regional confl icts.40 The Army needs 

soldiers who possess the skills found in Joint Pub 3-07.3 and Army 

FM 3-07 to execute peace and phase IV operations effectively.41

Soldiers in stabilization and reconstruction units must have 

persistence. Nation-building takes time and enemies must 

understand America’s resolve.42 Soldiers must be comfortable 

working with the population, even if this produces a greater risk of 

casualties.43 Force protection measures typically restrict American 

soldiers from integrating with the local community. Combat forces 

tend to look at the population as dangerous and fear that locals 

support the enemy. This philosophy handicaps success in nationbuilding.44

Another reason why combat forces cannot maintain the expertise 

required for peace operations is that not all such operations are 

the same. FM 100-23 lists three types of peacekeeping operations: 

“support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. 

In simple terms, support to diplomacy seeks to prevent confl ict; 

peacekeeping attempts to maintain the peace; and peace enforcement 

attempts to establish peace.”45 Because of the unique requirements of 

each mission, it is unrealistic to believe that combat forces training 

for war would gain the experience to handle the complexities of 

these peace operations. 

USING THE STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND

If the military created the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint 

Command, this new command would receive the mission for all 

peace operations, including Phase IV operations in campaigns 

involving combat. This shift in responsibilities would allow combat 

forces to focus totally on training or executing combat. As Snider 

states, “The Army’s mission for the foreseeable future is as clear 

as it is daunting: to be prepared simultaneously at both ends of 

the confl ict spectrum―high-intensity power projection operations 

in regional theater war and constabulary operations of extended 

duration.”46 This new command would provide strategic leaders the 

ability to manage both “ends of the confl ict spectrum” and never 

lose focus of providing the nation a well trained combat force. 

Examples of Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command 
240

responsibilities would include the majority of the military forward 

presence forces. For example, this unifi ed command would include 

all units currently in Korea. These forces would not have the combat 

power of the 2nd Infantry Division. However, they would have the 

capability to rapidly receive and sustain combat forces onto the 

Korean Peninsula, should war start. The command’s mission of 

deterrence and demonstrating America’s resolve would continue 

to force adversaries to decide whether negotiating settlements 

peacefully were in their best interests instead of facing the combat 

capabilities of the United States. Should increased violence become 

the enemy’s choice, then combat forces would rapidly enter into 

the theater, engage the enemy until successful mission completion, 

and depart the theater to refi t for future combat. While in theater, 

this new command would support the joint task force commander 

by securing lines of supplies and communications, and continue to 

work with the local population in areas no longer requiring combat 

forces. When combat forces depart, this new headquarters would 

receive command of the units in the area to continue Phase IV and 

other peace operations. Stability and reconstruction units would 

remain in theater until either the United Nations assumes command 

of the rebuilding mission or stability returns to the point that the 

new government assumes responsibility for its own security efforts. 

Bradley Graham, a Washington Post Washington Post correspondent, notes, “The idea correspondent, notes, “The idea 

is that the stabilization and reconstruction force would serve as a 

kind of bridge between the end of major combat operations and 

the point at which a civilian-led, nation-building effort is up and 

running. . . .”47

Using the current IRAQI FREEDOM scenario with this new 

command, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command 

would have become involved from the beginning of planning best to 

execute transition operations. The command would have deployed 

into theater as a supporting command to the Combined Forces Land 

Component Commander. Deployment phasing considerations 

would include suffi cient Stabilization and Reconstruction Command 

structure to assume responsibility for occupied territory as coalition 

forces moved towards and secured Baghdad. Once all combat forces 

had completed their deployment into theater, remaining stabilization 

and reconstruction forces would fi nish their deployment. By May 
241

2003, this new command would have received most of the security 

responsibilities of southern Iraq and Mosel areas, with a much 

smaller combat force required to focus on the counterinsurgency 

mission in the Sunni Triangle.48 The military would have redeployed 

the majority of three combat divisions back to the United States and 

refi t these divisions for future combat operations. The Stabilization 

and Reconstruction Joint Command would publish annual rotation 

schedules, with the majority of these follow on units mobilized from 

the reserve component. 

As ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM required the 

U.S. military to extend the transition phase, it raises a question to the 

nation―How long can America afford to keep combat forces tied up 

in post-combat operations? While executing this mission, is America 

preparing these forces for its next adversary? Adjusting force 

structure to create a unifi ed command with the direct responsibility 

of post-combat operations seems a more effi cient means to prepare 

for both operations in the future.

IMPLEMENTING THE STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION 

COMMAND INTO CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE

How large should the new Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Joint Command force structure be? The Army should fi rst decide 

the required size force and the type of units needed for expected 

future combat scenarios. If IRAQI FREEDOM were the standard, 

then a combat force of approximately four divisions reinforced with 

required artillery, logistics, and communications units attached 

should be the size of the force. The military can afford to maintain such 

a small combat force due to transformation efforts that continually 

improves its rapid deployment capabilities and its ability to execute 

modern warfare quickly and decisively. To plan for unexpected 

contingencies, possibly another similar corps using a mix of active 

and reserve component divisions should more than cover any remote 

situation where two wars occur near simultaneously. These forces 

train at the combat training centers and maintain their equipment 

in a high state of readiness because when called, they execute! The 

military would direct additional reserve units for combat missions if 
242

world events presented an increased need for combat forces. Special 

Operations Command force structure would increase to provide 

each geographical component commander suffi cient soldiers to 

keep a forward presence, collect vital intelligence towards potential 

adversaries, and support the training of friendly militaries in their 

area of operations. 

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command would 

command all other forces. This headquarters should recommend 

the force structure required to meet its missions, but in general, 

this command would be the largest part of the Army. A key 

component to this new force structure is the development of the joint 

headquarters directing noncombat operations. Although the Army 

will provide the majority of personnel within this unifi ed command, 

this headquarters must plan and coordinate with all services to best 

utilize limited resources.49

Along with this new headquarters, Chapters 3-5 of “Transforming 

for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations” provides a detailed 

list of the required forces and how to create this stabilization and 

reconstruction capability.50 This document recommends a force of 

two division-equivalents, with at least one being from the active 

component. This force would have the ability to grow larger by 

incorporating additional reserve component units if events required 

an expanding American military presence. This new command 

must have active duty forces capable of immediate deployment as 

well as a large reserve component to cover potential increases in 

mission requirements and to provide for the rotation of initial entry 

forces. These forces would be modular, reducing the need to deploy 

entire divisions if a smaller force is suffi cient. The command should 

be able to forecast rotation schedules well in advance, aiding to 

predictability for many reservists. 

Adjustments will have to be made to ensure the correct mix of 

civil affairs, military police, psychological operations, and other 

key post-confl ict military operation skills are available in the 

active duty component. “Overwhelmingly, civil affairs soldiers are 

reservists. Their real-world job experience gives them an edge in 

performing Army tasks,” said Lieutenant General James R. Helmly, 

Commanding General, Army Reserves. “Hands-on nation-builders, 
243

they focus on infrastructure improvements: getting utilities up and 

running, working with contractors and overseeing the bureaucracy 

that distributes food, clothing, and water to civilians.”51 Active 

duty units must develop these skill sets to provide immediate 

support to the civilian population after combat has degraded 

existing infrastructure. This support aids in securing the victory as 

much as defeating enemy conventional forces. Homeland defense 

requirements would also be the responsibility of the Stabilization 

and Reconstruction Joint Command. Local National Guard units 

would handle the majority of these operations; however, the new 

command could reinforce them with active component units if the 

threat expands. 

A transformation of this magnitude is not unprecedented. 

Frederick Kagan, reminds us, “In the mid-1970s the U.S. abandoned 

the draft and recruited an all-volunteer professional military.”52 The 

nation questioned this sociological transformation but executed 

it with great success. “The shift should echo President John F. 

Kennedy’s establishment of the Peace Corps at the height of the 

Cold War, with the ring of new responsibilities for the U.S. and our 

determination to fulfi ll them.”53

DEVELOPING A STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 

FORCE INSTITUTE 

When not deployed, stability and reconstruction personnel should 

be gaining expertise in post-confl ict operations through education. 

The U.S. military should create a Stability and Reconstruction 

Institute where experts would educate future leaders in the art 

of Phase IV and peace operations, and offer lessons learned to 

American allies. Students would master regional expertise, customs, 

and language skills, all key capabilities for military operations 

other than war. According to Colonel Miles, “At this school, lessons 

learned could be taught to a large number of trainees, and doctrine 

could be established. It is realistic to believe that the UN would also 

support such a university with skills obtained by other countries.”54

The institute would consolidate expertise from the international 

community to develop viable solutions to improve noncombat 
244

operations.

The institute could also support the development of Phase IV 

military operations plans. Over a period of time the institute would, 

“. . . create an institutional cadre of highly skilled and motivated 

experts, adequately trained and fi nanced, whose careers will be 

devoted to operating in politically chaotic situations. The American 

people do not desire to remain in these countries any longer than 

required, but no one should underestimate the time necessary to 

establish a transition to stability.”55 The institute would provide 

senior strategic leaders with more realistic time tables and critical 

event checklists to better plan exit strategies.

CONCLUSION

America is new to the role of global hegemony. However, 

being new to this role has not reduced the goals of the United 

States. According to the National Security Strategy, “. . . the United 

States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefi ts of 

freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope 

of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every 

corner of the world.”56 With such an aggressive foreign policy, 

the military can expect to become involved in numerous regional 

confl icts as our nation attempts to learn and administer the duties as 

the global policeman. 

History indicates that whatever program America adopts to 

transform its armed forces, her enemies will react to level the playing 

fi eld. Kagan states, 

The search for an indefi nite American “asymmetrical advantage,” 

requires not merely a revolution in military affairs: it also requires a 

fundamental revolution in human affairs of a sort never seen before. It 

requires that America continue to change her armed forces so rapidly 

and successfully that no other state can ever catch up―indeed, that no 

other state in the world would try.”57

The current transformation program relies on maintaining an 

overwhelming advantage in a single area of confl ict―direct combat. 

A more benefi cial goal of transforming America’s national defense 

is to achieve full spectrum dominance by creating a force structure 
245

capable of achieving superiority in war and peace. The concept of a 

Joint Stabilization and Reconstruction Command is a feasible option 

to solve America’s reluctance to engage in the increasing number 

of military operations other than war missions without degrading 

combat profi ciency. If the military ever wanted to change, the time 

to act has never been better. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. Henry H. Shelton, “Joint Vision 2020, America’s Military: Preparing for 

Tomorrow,” Washington, DC, June 2000, p. 6. 

2. The use of the U.S. military for missions other than direct combat has led 

to the creation of many terms that are similar but not exactly alike. Listed below 

are several of the terms and their defi nition that are used in this chapter and the 

quoted references: 

Constabulary Operations: Term used to describe post-confl ict nationbuilding operations in Japan and Germany after World War II. Military forces 

were assigned the mission to provide security and law enforcement during the 

reconstruction process of these two nations.

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW): “The use of military 

capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military 

actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of 

national power and occur before, during, and after war.” Joint Doctrine for Military 

Operations Other Than War, Joint Publications 3-07 Operations Other Than War, Joint Publications 3-07, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of , Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, June 16, 1995, p. GL-3.

Noncombat Operations: Term with an identical meaning as MOOTW. 

Includes “all aspects of military operations that focus on deterring war and 

promoting peace.” Doctrine for Joint Operations, Joint Publications 3-0, Washington, 

DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 2001, p. I-3. The four goals of noncombat 

operations include deter war, resolve confl ict, promote peace, and support U.S. 

civil authorities. Ibid., p. I-2.

Peace Operations: “Encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace 

enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish 

and maintain peace.” Ibid., p. GL-15.

Phase IV Operations: Final phase of a standard joint campaign. This 

phase “enables the Joint Forces Commander to focus on synchronizing and 

integrating joint force activities to bring operations to a successful conclusion, 

typically characterized by self-sustaining peace and establishment of the rule 

of law. Part of this phase may be to ensure the threat is not able to resurrect 

itself . . . and transfer control to civilian authorities.” Ibid., p. III-21. Often this 

phase is called the Transition Phase. 
246

Post-Confl ict Operations: Often called Posthostilities Operations. Includes 

all activities required to stabilize the region and transfer control to the national 

government after major combat has ended. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

for Peace Operations, Joint Publications 3-07.3, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

February 12, 1999, pp. I7-I9. 

Reconstruction Operations: A subset of tasks performed during post-confl ict 

operations that focus on the rebuilding of a nation-state after the removal of that 

state’s previous form of government. Reconstruction may include the political, 

economic, judicial, and military means of the country. 

Smaller Scale Contingency: “A regionally centered crisis based on a less 

compelling national interest or threat than those involved in a Major Theater of 

War. Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military 

operations short of major theater warfare . . . .” The Joint Staff Offi cer’s Guide 2000, 

JFSC Publication 1, Norfolk, VA: Joint Forces Staff College, 2000, p. G-72.

Stabilization Operations: “The promotion and protection of US national 

interests by infl uencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the 

operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, 

cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.” The goal is to 

sustain regional and global stability. Stability Operations and Support Operations, 

Field Manual 3-07 Field Manual 3-07, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February 20, , Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February 20, 

2003, pp. 1-2.

3. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, eds., “Transforming for Stabilization 

and Reconstruction Operations,” Washington, DC, November 12, 2003, pp. 1-122. 

4. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American 

Power, New York, 2002, p. 349.

5. George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of 

America,” Washington, DC, September 2002, p. 13.

6. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, p. 348.

7. The National Security Strategy makes it clear that, 

A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing 

prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth 

supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher 

incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic 

and legal reform, and the fi ght against corruption, and it reinforces the 

habits of liberty. 

We will promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond 

America’s shores. . . . We will use our economic engagement with other 

countries to underscore the benefi ts of policies that generate higher 

productivity and sustained economic growth. 

Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” p. 17.
247

8. Shelton, “Joint Vision 2020,” p. 1. Also the military is looking to become 

more expeditionary. “No longer do U.S. war plans envision slow buildups and 

prolonged fi ghting. Instead, as the invasion of Iraq demonstrated, the Pentagon 

is counting on rapid preparation and swift victory, with fewer combat troops 

needed as a result of advances in technology and improved coordination among 

the military services.” Bradley Graham, “Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar 

Peacekeeping Forces,” Washington Post, November 24,2003, p. 16.

9. The introduction of U.S. Special Operations Command Pub 1 provides an 

excellent summary of the many missions special operations forces are prepared 

to execute. Specially supportive of military operations other than war, “SOF can 

assist a nation in creating the conditions for stable development―thereby reducing 

the risk of or precluding armed confl ict. . . . SOF works closely with the host nation 

government, military forces, and population to assist them in solving their own 

problems. . . .” USSOCOM Pub 1: Special Operations in Peace and War, MacDill AFB, , MacDill AFB, 

FL: HQ, U.S. Special Operations Command, January 25, 1996, pp. iv-v.

10. Frederick W. Kagan, “Lengthened Shadows III: The Art of War,” New 

Criterion, Vol. 22 No. 3, November 2003, p. 9. 

11. Jeffery E. Garten, “Urgent: The U.S. Needs to Create a Colonial Service,” 

Foreign Policy, September-October 2003, p. 63.

12. “Military support of diplomatic activities improves the chance for success 

in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating 

resolve to achieve viable political settlements. As a part of Peace Operations . . . 

the military may conduct operations in support of diplomatic efforts to establish 

peace and order before, during, and after confl ict.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations,” p. I-3.

13. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, p. 349.

14. Colleen L. McGuire, “Constabulary Training for a Full-Spectrum Force,” 

Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 9, 

2001, pp. 4-5. 

15. Garten, “Urgent: The U.S. Needs to Create a Colonial Service,” p. 64.

16. “For combat units, the skills required for peace operations are oftentimes 

not those required for combat. Training and execution of such operations detract 

from combat training, and consequently from warfi ghting skills. Nevertheless, 

these operations constitute a critical, proactive component of national security 

activities, and the Army is best suited to conduct them.” Louis Caldera and Dennis 

Reimer, “A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 2000,” 

Washington, DC, February 1999, p. xv.

17. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Walsh, U.S. Army War College, conducted 

a survey of former tactical unit commanders from the 1997 and 1998 U.S. Army 

War College classes and found that “the trend indicates that units in the fi eld are 

doing less preparation for their primary warfi ghting mission. . . . Also, less time 
248

is being allocated to METL skills, while the special [M]OOTW ramp-up training 

is increasing dramatically.” Michael J. Walsh, “Operations Other Than War and 

Its Impact on Combat Training Readiness,” Strategic Research Project, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, July 20, 1998, p. 11.

The same study found most leaders felt preparation for MOOTW missions helped 

the unit but could not cover all the key tasks they would be required to execute. 

During the noncombat deployment, combat training was degraded further. The 

survey showed “more than 60% of the respondents stated that compared to home 

station the training opportunities while deployed were less to non-existent. Since 

METL related training is very perishable and must be maintained and sustained, 

. . . this information indicates a much greater training effort is required to achieve 

full METL capability.” Ibid., p. 12. More often, unit training primarily focused 

on individual skills like weapons qualifi cation, common skills training, and 

physical fi tness. Collective tasks were minimal at best. Degradation of skills was 

particularly noticeable above the platoon level of operations. Ibid., pp. 13-15.

18. Ibid., p. 26. 

19. Ibid., p. 27.

20. “Predictably, while units train for and execute small-scale contingencies, 

warfi ghting skills atrophy and combat profi ciency declines. More importantly, 

while units are caught in the cycle of preparing for, executing, and recovering 

from small-scale contingencies, they are essentially unavailable for major theater 

wars. This recent phenomenon threatens the Army’s ability to successfully 

accomplish its primary mission―fi ghting and winning two near simultaneous 

major theater wars.” Timothy D. Cherry, “Engagement Force: A Solution to our 

Readiness Dilemma,” Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army 

War College, June 20, 2000, p. 2.

Lieutenant Colonel Cherry also included a study conducted by the U.S. 

Center for Army Lessons Learned on the effects of peace operations on combat 

unit readiness. Time requirements for peace operations go well beyond the actual 

deployment. Units tend to stop training on their warfi ghting mission when they 

are designated for peace operations. This is often from 2 to 6 months in advance 

and usually required up to 6 months upon return to home station to recover 

equipment, complete personnel changes, and begin to train back on the normal 

training cycle. Therefore a combat unit loses a majority of the year beyond the 

designated deployment period. Deployments affect three units, the deployed unit, 

the unit returning from deployment, and the unit training as a replacement unit. 

Also affected are stay-behind units who often must add fi llers in personnel and 

equipment, reducing their combat capabilities. “The Effects of Peace Operations 

on Unit Readiness,” Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned, 

February 1996, p. A7.

21. McGuire, “Constabulary Training for a Full-Spectrum Force,” p. 3.

22. Colonel Lloyd Miles agrees that currently U.S. military forces are not trained 

to effectively handle peace operations. However, establishing constabulary forces 
249

(units specifi cally assigned the mission to provide security and law enforcement 

during the reconstruction process) is not the solution to the problem. He proposes 

that current military forces add more peace operations tasks to unit mission 

essential task lists, and redistribute active component and reserve component 

force structure because the U.S. Army does not have the end strength to man two 

specialized organizations. He also claims that constabulary forces cannot maintain 

their warfi ghting ability, thus creating a situation where they could not handle a 

rapid increase in hostilities in a unstable region. Lloyd Miles, “Back to the Future: 

Constabulary Forces Revisited,” Strategic Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

U.S. Army War College, July 3, 2002, pp. 14-16.

23. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Cherry discusses in his strategic research 

paper how the standard training cycle for combat units has declined since the 

Persian Gulf War of 1991. Units that trained for combat are now disrupted by 

expanding peacekeeping operations, and the long deployments away from 

training areas such as the combat training centers are reducing the expertise 

soldiers and units have in fi ghting as members of a combined arms team. Cherry, 

“Engagement Force: A Solution to our Readiness Dilemma,” pp. 4-5.

24. McGuire, “Constabulary Training for a Full-Spectrum Force,” p. 11.

25.Walsh, “Operations Other Than War and Its Impact on Combat Training 

Readiness,” p. 2.

26. Lieutenant Colonel Cherry provides details on the diffi culties experienced 

with the warrior mindset conducting peace operations. He does a great job 

listing the differences in warfi ghting tasks versus tasks covered in smallerscaled contingencies. Cherry, “Engagement Force: A Solution to our Readiness 

Dilemma,” pp. 7-8.

27. Don M. Snider, “Let the Debate Begin: The Case for a Constabulary Force,” 

Army Magazine, June 1998, p. 14.

28. Cherry, “Engagement Force: A Solution to our Readiness Dilemma,” p. 11. 

29. Their overall conclusions recommended “creating two joint military 

headquarters to organize units critical to the stabilization and reconstruction 

mission and source them with two division-equivalents of joint assets to execute 

these missions. . . . The fi rst division-equivalent should be mostly active personnel; 

the second division-equivalent can include a large component of reserve 

personnel. . . . Each division would . . . be fl exible, modular, scalable, and rapidly 

deployable with four brigade sized S&R Groups that include military police, civil 

affairs, engineers, medical, and PSYOPS supported by a tactical combat capability. 

. . . These forces would be America’s experts in coordinating with multiagency 

civilian response teams, international organizations, and UN Peacekeeping Forces. 

Binnendijk, “Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” pp. 

121-122. 

30. “Making Peace While Staying Ready for War: The Challenges of the U.S. 

Military Participation in Peace Operations,” Washington, DC: U.S. Congress 

Congressional Budget Offi ce, December 1999, p. 9.
250

31. Pauline Jelinek. “Surprise: Rumsfeld Authorizes 30,000 more Soldiers.” 

The Sentinel, Carlisle, PA, January 30, 2004, p. A4.

32. Many legislators believed “. . . on the ruins of the U.S.S.R., American 

defense offi cials and civilian experts were already talking of the ‘strategic pause’ 

and the ‘peace dividend’ that were supposed to follow that epochal event. 

Defense budgets dwindled and effi ciency became the watchword in the Pentagon 

and on Capitol Hill.” Kagan, “Lengthened Shadows III: The Art of War,” p. 7. 

The military’s transformation effort was based on “efforts to reduce the defense 

budget in the 1990s in order to expand the ‘peace dividend.’ “. . . The goal was to 

make the Pentagon more effi cient and to use the funds recouped by the effi ciency 

to support transformation.” Ibid. Adding to force structure does not reduce costs, 

and therefore the military had a reluctance to ask for additional troops to handle 

peace operations. 

33. Such a proposal comes in the face of traditional U.S. 

Army opposition to the idea of establishing forces focused on 

peacekeeping. Army offi cials have argued that combat troops 

can be used for peacekeeping when necessary and that traditional 

units with recovery-related skills can be cobbled onto combat 

divisions to meet postwar demands. . . . In the past, Army 

authorities have argued that they do not have enough troops to 

maintain separate combat and peacekeeping forces. They also 

have worried that units focused on postwar policing would be 

viewed as stepchildren of the main Army, leading to morale and 

performance problems. Graham, “Pentagon Considers Creating 

Postwar Peacekeeping Forces,” p. 16. 

34. Lieutenant Colonel McGuire provides an example of how a military 

police battalion was able to deploy to Kosovo effectively with 12 days of notice. 

Their training was similar to the situation they faced in Kosovo. Therefore, 

soldier’s morale remained high as they were performing the mission they were 

trained for. On the other hand, an infantry battalion deploying to the same region 

was extremely ill prepared and performed poorly in Kosovo. Soldiers were 

demoralized, confused about their mission, and potentially damaged the political 

environment they were sent to improve. McGuire, “Constabulary Training for a 

Full-Spectrum Force,” pp. 7-8.

35. Graham, “Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces,” p. 16.

36. “Without their work, a battlefi eld triumph may amount to little. Hence the 

civil affairs motto: ‘Secure the Victory’.” Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, p. 333. No 

administration would send service members into combat if they knew the same 

force would have to return to fi ght again in the future. Post-confl ict operations 

ensure that the political goals achieved by combat remain in place, and new 

methods of government and law enforcement have the opportunity to develop.

37. “In fact, occupation duty is generally necessary after a big war in order 

to impose the victor’s will on the vanquished. . . . Only boots on the ground 

can guarantee a lasting peace.” Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, p. 338. Boot also 
251

reminds us, by historical example, that claiming victory and departing the area 

prior to effective change taking place only means you will be required to face 

the problem again. “Successful state building starts by imposing the rule of 

law . . . as a precondition for economic development and the eventual emergence 

of democracy. Merely holding an election and leaving is likely to achieve little, as 

the U.S. discovered in Haiti after 1994.” Ibid., p. 346.

38. Kagan makes a good point why the ground soldier must be present before 

a nation can successfully end the confl ict. “If the enemy knows that all he will face 

is a barrage of precision-guided munitions, he will fi nd countermeasures―digging 

too deeply for the weapons to penetrate, jamming or blinding U.S. reconnaissance 

assets, etc. . . . This type of warfare was ineffective in the German strategic bombing 

of Great Britain in World War I and II and the strategic bombing campaigns of 

North Vietnam.” Kagan, “Lengthened Shadows III: The Art of War,” pp. 15-16. 

Ground forces restore the peace over a country that has seen its government 

and military overthrown. “Even in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, ground 

forces or the threat of their use played the decisive role in bringing the enemy 

to surrender.” Ibid., p. 16. This has worked in the past and little seems to have 

changed in human conditioning to think this phenomenon will change anytime 

soon. “. . . Only ground forces can execute the peacemaking, peacekeeping, and 

reconstruction activities that have been essential to success in most of the wars 

America has fought in the past 100 years.” Ibid.

39. “But today’s rapid decisive operations use relatively small forces in quick 

campaigns, as shown in this year’s march to Baghdad. Yet the very haste of that 

battlefi eld victory has led to uncertainty as U.S. troops struggle to restore stability 

in the vacuum left by the toppling of Dictator Saddam Hussein.” Vince Crawley, 

“DoD Advised to Form Two Multiservice Postwar Units,” Army Times, December 

15, 2003, p. 10.

40. Many Americans feel we have an obligation as the world’s most prosperous 

nation to aid others in need. “The American public . . . understands that the United 

States can and must share with allies the burden of policing selected confl icts 

in regions of mutual interests.” Snider, “Let the Debate Begin: The Case for a 

Constabulary Force,” p. 15. It is this public moral position that plays into many 

of the decisions to get involved in confl icts like Somalia, Kosovo, and Haiti. “It is 

usually the moral component―in this case, Iraqi atrocities against Kuwaitis―that 

convinces Americans to take up arms.” Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, p. 340.

41. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Peace Operations,” and U.S. Department of the Army, “Stability Operations and 

Support Operations.” There are other manuals that provide information on these 

topics; however, these two specifi cally focus on the differences in peace operations 

(peacekeeping vs. peace enforcement), stability requirements (such as dealing 

with insurgencies, handling displaced civilians, terrorism, and establishing 

humanitarian operations), and reconstruction (reestablishing law, creating 

judicial means to support law enforcement, military-civil affairs, coordinating 

with international actors, establishing legitimacy to new local governments, and 

transfer of power to that government). 
252

“Winning the Peace Act,” a bill developed by the 2003 House of 

Representatives provides key skill sets that the nation’s strategic leaders believe 

are important to stability and reconstruction operations. “Any person involved 

in reconstruction efforts of such a state must have extensive cross-cultural 

training and the ability to communicate effectively in the language of that state. . 

. . Reconstruction Services include security and public safety, establishing justice 

systems, establishing governance and participation, and economic and social wellbeing.” U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Bill, “Winning the Peace Act of 

2003,” 108th Congress, 1st Session, May 16, 2003, pp. 3-4.

42. Boot stresses the importance of American resolve if the nation ever expects 

to infl uence change in small-scale contingencies. “Short-term occupations . . . are 

unlikely to fundamentally alter the nature of a society.” Boot, p. 345. He claims if 

the country’s support is strong enough to get involved in the confl ict, then support 

should remain, even if casualties occur. This resolve tends to make Americans less 

of a target. “If foreign enemies know that killing a few Americans will drive the 

U.S. out of their country, they are far more likely to target American soldiers or 

civilians.” Ibid., p. 328. 

43. Peace operations deal with getting the population to establish trust in the 

military presence. Max Boot provides a great example where U.S. forces missed 

the point. 

In the aftermath of the bombing campaign, a multinational peacekeeping 

force was sent to occupy Kosovo, including a U.S. contingent . . . [the] 

U.S. Army risk-adverse mentality impeded attempts to establish a 

durable peace. American troopers seldom ventured outside their 

fortifi ed compound, Camp Bondsteel, while wearing their forbidding 

“battle rattle”―body armor, Kevlar helmets, the works. This impeded 

their ability to interact with local civilians, gather intelligence, and spread 

goodwill―prerequisites for a successful occupation. British soldiers, by 

contrast, looked more confi dent and approachable in their berets and 

rolled-up sleeves.

Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, p. 327. Boot raises another point when considering 

risk and casualty avoidance. “No one expects a big city police department to win 

the ‘war on crime.’ The police are considered successful if they reduce disorder, 

keep the criminal element at bay, and allow decent people a chance to live their 

lives in peace. In the process a few cops are likely to die, and, while this is a 

tragedy to be mourned, no one suggests that as a result the police should go home 

and leave gangsters to run the streets.” Ibid., p. 346. It is therefore imperative that 

police forces are formed, trained, and supervised to control local crime. However, 

until this force is created, crime reduction and citizen security is a critical mission 

of the stability and reconstruction force. 

44. William S. Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation Warfare,” January 15, 

2004, states:
253

One key to success is integrating our troops as much as possible with the 

local people. Unfortunately, the American doctrine of “force protection” 

works against integration and generally hurts us badly. Here’s a quote 

from the minutes of the seminar: “There are two ways to deal with the 

issue of force protection. One way is the way we are currently doing it, 

which is to separate ourselves from the population and to intimidate 

them with our fi repower. A more viable alternative might be to take the 

opposite approach and integrate with the community. That way you 

fi nd out more of what is going on and the population protects you.” 

The British approach of getting the helmets off as soon as possible may 

actually be saving lives. What “wins”’ at the tactical and physical levels 

may lose at the operational, strategic, mental and moral levels, where 

Fourth Generation Warfare is decided. Martin van Creveld argues that 

one reason the British have not lost in Northern Ireland is that the British 

Army has taken more casualties than it has infl icted. This is something 

the Second Generation American military has great trouble grasping, 

because it defi nes success in terms of comparative attrition rates.

Available from http://www.antiwar.com/lind/index.php?articleid=1702. 

45. Peace Operations. Field Manual 100-23, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

the Army, December 30, 1994, p. 2.

46. Snider, “Let the Debate Begin: The Case for a Constabulary Force,” p. 15.

47. Graham, “Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces,” p. 16.

48. “More than 75 percent of the violent incidents and sabotage have taken 

place in only four of the 18 provinces,” General John Abizaid said. “His plan is to 

disengage our forces from stabilized areas and turn security in those areas over 

to U.S.-trained Iraqi forces.” Vince Crawley, “U.S. Troops Go on Offensive in 

Troubled Iraqi Provinces,” Army Times, October 6, 2003, p. 20.

49. This “. . . new force would have its own headquarters to help ensure postwar 

operations are not overlooked in prewar planning.” Graham, “Pentagon Considers 

Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces,” p. 16. Just as stability and reconstruction 

force structure covers the current ineffi cient post-confl ict operations, so will the 

Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command headquarters, ensuring all plans 

have adequate details during phase IV of the operation. 

50. Binnendijk, “Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Operations,” pp. 39-84. Binndedijk and Johnson propose the transformation of 

the military to create units with the specifi c focus on stability and reconstruction 

missions. These forces would having two joint commands with one primarily in 

the active component directing current stabilization and reconstruction operations, 

while a second (primarily reserve component) organizing and coordinating future 

and follow-on stability and reconstruction operations. The military could deploy 

such forces to provide a forward presence and allow the enemy the opportunity 

to negotiate a settlement prior to United States sending combat units into the 
254

region. Along with being a visible deterrent, units assigned to this new command 

would establish logistics bases that may provide combat forces an early advantage 

should they be forced to deploy into the theater. Their proposal used historical 

and Rand Corporation studies to determine the number of peace operations the 

United States could expect in the future and therefore design a force capable of 

executing all these missions without requesting support from combat forces. Their 

research determined the two active duty divisions force (roughly 18,000 soldiers 

each) was the best sized force to handle expected contingencies with little or no 

increase to end strength. “. . . a brigade-sized force is a bare minimum but will 

be too small if tomorrow’s world is as turbulent as today’s. A corps-sized force 

is close to ideal, but may be more than the traffi c would bear. A two divisionequivalent force would provide a solid range of capabilities and a relatively high 

level of insurance, including a capacity for medium S&R missions in two major 

theaters of war.” Ibid., p. 51.

51. Jane McHugh, “Reserve Chief: Civil Affairs Not Suited for Regular Army,” 

Army Times, October 20, 2003, p. 31.

52. Kagan, “Lengthened Shadows III: The Art of War,” p. 5. 

53. Garten, “Urgent: The U.S. Needs to Create a Colonial Service,” p. 65. Once 

the decision is made to implement, the Army should aggressively determine the 

required changes and execute. Along with the mentioned Kennedy’s initiative, 

Garten adds, “The magnitude of the change in national direction should be 

equivalent to when President Harry S. Truman launched . . . large-scale foreign 

aid and technical assistance programs to Greece and Turkey in the face of new 

communist threats.”Ibid., p. 65. 

54. Miles, “Back to the Future: Constabulary Forces Revisited,” p. 3. The 

goal would be to improve coalition peace operations, and this institute would be 

a meeting ground for international expertise to discuss issues. Students would 

be primarily Americans. However, allies would attend, as they do most U.S. 

universities. Rumsfeld said, “I think it would be a good thing if our country was 

to provide some leadership for training of other countries’ citizens who would like 

to participate in peacekeeping.” Graham, “Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar 

Peacekeeping Forces,” p. 16.

55. Garten, “Urgent: The U.S. Needs to Create a Colonial Service,” p. 65. 

56. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 

Introduction.

57. Kagan, “Lengthened Shadows III: The Art of War,” p. 12. 
255

CHAPTER 10

NATION BUILDING:

A BAD IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME?

Lieutenant Colonel Burt K. Thompson

Our military requires more than good treatment. It needs the rallying 

point of a defi ning mission and that mission is to deter wars―and win 

wars when deterrence fails. Sending our military on vague, aimless 

and endless deployments is the swift solvent of morale. We will not 

be permanent peacekeepers, dividing warring parties. This is not our 

strength or our calling.1

Governor George W. Bush,

September 1999

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board Task Force addressing 

the transition to and from hostilities . . . Our military expeditions to 

Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursions in the 

global war on terrorism.2

It appears that the United States has once again come full circle in 

regards to the use of military force in support of national objectives, 

in this case specifi cally nation-building. During the last presidential 

campaign, then Governor George W. Bush’s line was “an explicit 

condemnation of Clinton/Gore foreign policy―specifi cally that the 

White House had stretched the military too thin with peacekeeping 

missions in Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans.”3 Bush argued that 

President William Clinton had failed to understand that the primary 

mission of the military was deterrence, combat, and winning the 

nation’s wars. The “‘Let me tell you what else I’m worried about’ 

line proved to be among the most popular in his stump speech, 

guaranteed to evoke an eruption of applause from the conservatives 

who packed Bush’s campaign rallies.”4

But, it seems now that the Bush administration has come faceto-face with the challenges presented by the terrorist attacks on 

September 11, 2001. Thus it has adopted a more realistic set of 

objectives. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) describes this 

new world where America is threatened less by conquering states 
256

than by failing ones, and where confl ict is more likely to occur 

within countries than between them.5 The strategy recognizes that 

threats can suddenly emerge as state weakness, rather than strength, 

spreads confl ict and chaos. It argues that an environment of failed 

states, terrorism, weapons proliferation, and political chaos may 

have outgrown Cold War institutions and policies designed to deter, 

fi ght, and win against a different set of dangers.6

For over 50 years, the U.S. military has focused on fi ghting major 

wars and the ability to mass the required land, sea, and air power to 

engage a global adversary. But times have changed and as the NSS 

states, “it is time to reaffi rm the essential role of American military 

strength.”7 Ironically, while preparing for a conventional war, the 

United States has routinely engaged its forces in smaller-scale 

operations. The military combated terrorism, fought insurgencies 

and counterinsurgencies, conducted non-combatant evacuations 

from war zones, strengthened friendly governments, provided 

humanitarian assistance, and executed countless peacekeeping 

operations. But as retired Marine General Anthony Zinni argues, 

“still trying to fi ght our kind of war―be it World War II or DESERT 

STORM―we ignore the real warfi ghting requirements of today. My 

generation has not been well-prepared for this future, because we 

resisted the idea.”8 President Bush has acknowledged the recent 

trends as well and points out that “operations other than war” 

have moved from the sidelines to center court and in the process 

have raised legitimate questions about the structure and roles of 

America’s armed forces. 

A recent memorandum from Acting Under Secretary of Defense 

Michael W. Wynne further illustrates that operations other than war 

have truly left the sidelines. He has directed that a Defense Science 

Board Task Force be formed to look at the issue of transitions to and 

from hostilities. The memorandum states that U.S. armed forces 

are capable of projecting force and achieving conventional military 

victory. However, “we Americans will encounter signifi cant 

challenges following conventional military success as we seek 

to ensure stability, democracy, human rights, and a productive 

economy.”9

The purpose of this chapter is to address issues associated with 

an NSS that have increased the likelihood that the United States will 
257

involve its military in post-confl ict operations, to include nationbuilding. The chapter will examine current policies regarding 

stability operations, provide a brief survey of America’s historical 

experiences in nation-building and their relevance today, and 

examine issues specifi cally associated with the use of conventional 

forces in nation-building. Finally, it will examine options and make 

recommendations that could enhance the potential for success in 

such operations in the future. 

WE DON’T DO OCCUPATIONS? LESSONS FROM THE PAST

Every time they do a post-war occupation, they do it like it’s the fi rst 

time, and they also do it like it’s the last time they’ll ever have to do it. 

We can’t change the mistakes we made of Iraq, but we can try to avoid 

them in the future.10

Although nation-building is not new to the Army, it has always 

been a controversial mission for the American military, especially 

over the past 3 decades. “The United States military has engaged 

in these non-traditional operations throughout its history, far more 

often than it has waged conventional warfare.”11 The Army has 

directly supervised the creation of new governments in many beaten 

states, while performing countless nonviolent and nonmilitary tasks 

and missions. What is remarkable are the similarities between 

nation-building efforts in these contingencies. Two of the most 

familiar success stories are Germany and Japan at the end of World 

War II. There are, however, other cases that get less attention, such 

as the Mexican War, reconstruction at the close of the Civil War, the 

Spanish American War, and World War I. Recent interventions that 

included governance responsibilities in the post-confl ict phase took 

place during the Cold War as well. They include the Dominican 

Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, as well as Somalia 

in 1993, Haiti in 1994, and the Balkans in 1995. More recent examples 

that deserve considerable scrutiny include operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. In fact, in over 13 instances since the 1800s, soldiers, under 

the theater commander’s operational control, have supervised and 

implemented political and economic reconstitution.12

A short historical review of the relevant operations illustrates 

the scale and frequency of post-confl ict and occupation operations 
258

as well as the level of exposure and experience the U.S. military 

has had in such operations. One can easily distinguish recurring 

themes and lessons―temporary government, population control in 

general, suppression of residual resistance, resettlement of displaced 

noncombatants, rejuvenation of supply and distribution systems, 

infrastructure repair and institutional reform.13

The Spanish American War illustrates several themes that 

resonate today. The Army conducted the Spanish American War 

with little preparation for post-confl ict operations. In performing 

administration duties, the Army learned the limitations of its 

operational doctrine and the requirement for political compromise. 

In post-hostility operations the military had to deal with the full 

range of modern politico-military problems: political intelligence, 

control of guerrilla forces, military government, the arming of 

indigenous forces, and their terms of political settlement.14

Although the Spanish American War consisted of rather quick 

and decisive combat operations, the post-confl ict operations were 

long and complex. This early act of nation-building has many 

similarities to the conditions that U.S. military forces are facing in 

Iraq today. To illustrate the point, the following description of the 

events in Cuba following the Spanish American War could be used 

to illustrate post-confl ict operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

(OIF) today. 

The close of the war with Spain did not settle the Cuba problem. As a 

result of years of rule and fi ghting, conditions in the island were in a 

deplorable state when the fi ghting ended . . . [T]he United States was 

committed to turning Cuba over to its people. But to have withdrawn 

before economic and political stability was established would have 

been both folly and evasion of responsibility. A provisional government 

supported by an army of occupation therefore was set up. It began at 

once the many tasks involved in the tremendous job of rehabilitation 

and reform: feeding and clothing the starving; care of the sick; cleaning 

up the accumulated fi lth of centuries in the cities; restoring agricultural 

and commercial activity; disbanding the Cuban Army and paying its 

veterans; organizing municipal governments, local guards, and courts; 

building roads and other public works; establishing schools; and in 

general, preparing the people for self-government.15
259

Additional lessons that are relevant today include transition 

operations occurring simultaneously with combat operations, 

command decisions required of military leaders, the necessity 

to have U.S. soldiers fulfi lling civil affairs responsibilities, the 

requirement to establish effective relationships with a multitude of 

ethnic groups, and the necessity for a balanced approach between 

force and restraint in dealing with the populations.16

The constabulary operations in Germany at the end of World 

War II provides an excellent example of the Army’s ability, in a 

relatively short period of time, to establish and train a force with 

specialized skills that can execute post-confl ict operations. Planning 

began early to determine the best way to accomplish the occupation 

duties in both Europe and Japan. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 

who understood the importance of the occupation, approved the 

establishment of a Military District Constabulary in the two Military 

Districts in Germany.17 The Army established a School of Military 

Government to assist in the preparation of offi cers and enlisted men 

to ensure that American soldiers were not falling into operations 

where they were forced to learn on the fl y.18

One can draw many parallels in comparing the experiences 

of the U.S. military through World War II with what is occurring 

in Afghanistan and Iraq today. Both involved similar noncombat 

tasks that required highly trained and disciplined forces, extensive 

interaction with local offi cials and civilians, decentralized operations, 

different leader and staff skill sets, relationships with governmental 

agencies and nongovernmental organizations, and restraint through 

the minimum use of force. It would be benefi cial to reexamine 

the constabulary operations in postwar Germany and Japan for 

applicability in today’s post-confl ict operations in both Afghanistan 

and Iraq. 

Postwar success in both Germany and Japan obviously owed 

much to the highly developed economies of both nations. However, 

nation-building is not principally about economic reconstruction. It 

must have a signifi cant aim of political transformation as well, which 

only serves to confi rm the U.S. inability to install viable democracies 

in Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan.19 

Although one could write volumes about operations in Panama, 
260

Somalia, Haiti, and in the Balkans, this chapter presents only a few 

observations. One of the most apparent observations is that each 

subsequent operation by the United States has been larger in scope 

and more ambitious than its predecessor. Operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq confi rm the trend. Themes common to these operations 

include tactically oriented planners and commanders unprepared for 

the chaos of Phase IV operations; the campaign plans lacked details 

on Phase IV operations, and the plan was distributed after hostilities 

began; diffi culties in balancing humanitarian/peacekeeping roles; 

diffi culties of transitions; mission expansion into nation-building; 

importance of long-term commitment; a “top-down” approach 

to the reconstruction; and the absolute necessity for interagency 

planning.20

In Iraq the United States “has taken on a task with a scope 

comparable to the transformational attempts still under way in 

Bosnia and Kosovo and a scale comparable only to the United 

States occupations of Germany and Japan.”21 A statement made by a 

former member of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) illustrates 

the challenge U.S. forces face in Iraq, “The Messiah could not have 

organized a suffi cient relief, reconstruction, or humanitarian effort 

in that short a time.”22

Most observers agree that planning for the reconstruction phase 

in OIF was not as advanced as the planning undertaken by Central 

Command for the fi rst three phases of the war. Although one could 

attribute this to Carl von Clausewitz’s fog or friction, it more likely 

represents a lack of acceptance or realization of the importance of the 

political and economic reconstruction of Iraq as an integral part of 

the war or use of faulty assumptions in the planning phase.23

THEMES/LESSONS

If there is any lesson to be learned from our “post-confl ict” involvement 

in Iraq to date, it is that we have failed to adequately learn the lessons 

from previous such experiences.24

The American experience with post-confl ict and occupation 

operations is so extensive that one can easily distinguish recurring 

themes. Listed in this section are some of the common themes and 
261

the salient lessons of the past. Obviously the list is not inclusive, but 

it emphasizes many of the issues discussed above. A review of after 

action reports from each operation suggests that these should not be 

new lessons. The themes and lessons break down into the following 

categories: 

• Planning:

– Limitations of phased planning and a plan predominantly 

focused on combat operations. 

– Faulty planning assumptions.

– Planners avoiding the “Phase IV dilemma”.

– Inadequate planning for Phase IV operations.

– Failure to clearly identify who is responsible for winning the 

peace. 

– Underestimating post-confl ict security requirements.

• Preparation:

– Failure to institutionalize knowledge gained in stability 

operations.

– Failure to integrate salient lessons into our doctrine, our 

training, and our future planning for future operations.25

– Lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities resulting 

in agencies being inhibited and not making the proper 

investments needed to do these tasks better. 

– Failure to regard soldiers with experience in the fi eld of postconfl ict operations as national assets, to be retained, rewarded 

for service, trained further, and placed in positions to utilize 

their skills.26

– Understanding historical/cultural contexts.

• Execution:

– “Mission creep”―expansion of the mission into nationbuilding.

– Active Component/Reserve Component mismatches.

– Combat Support/Combat Service Support shortages.

– Diffi culty with transition to civilian agencies.

– Infrastructure repair and institutional reform.

– Force protection during transition.

– Reestablishing the rule of law.

– Rapid rebuilding of basic infrastructure.
262

These lessons and many others from recent post-confl ict 

reconstruction operations highlight the consistent mistakes that 

can and must be avoided. A clear lesson is the importance of preconfl ict planning, preparation, communication, and coordination. 

Anticipating and preparing for the countless tasks required in 

countries emerging from confl ict is onerous, but must be undertaken 

before the fi ghting starts if post-confl ict reconstruction efforts are to 

be effective once the hostilities cease. Simply “noting” lessons is not 

enough; we must “learn” from these lessons. The United States and 

the international community must commit the resources, military 

might, manpower, and time required in Iraq. The United States 

faces a “Phase IV dilemma” in Iraq; it cannot stay forever, it cannot 

leave, and it cannot afford to fail! What makes success in these types 

of operations even more critical is that America’s international 

credibility is on the line.27

SUPERPOWERS DON’T DO WINDOWS

It’s the most diffi cult leadership experience I have ever had. Nothing 

quite prepares you for this.28

General Eric K. Shinseki

Since the attacks on September 11, many Republicans have come 

to view stability operations as even more relevant to American 

national security. In fact, based on the number of soldiers engaged 

in peacekeeping, it has become the fastest-growing mission for the 

U.S. military. “We could take or leave peacekeeping operations 

in the 1990s as witnesses by our hasty departure from both Haiti 

and Somalia. The sense was that although pulling out might be 

regrettable in terms of local conditions it was justifi able because 

the two countries were not seen as a security threat to the United 

States.”29 It has become obvious now that failed states such as 

Somalia and Afghanistan are potential havens for terrorists, and 

even though the United States has signifi cant forces engaged in 

peacekeeping operations, there may be more in the future. 

General Eric Shinseki’s observations about his preparation 

for a peacekeeping operation is a common one. Peacekeeping 
263

operations in general, and post-confl ict operations in particular, are 

controversial missions, and the Army has done little to prepare for 

them. To make matters worse, the institutional resistance in both 

the State and Defense Departments has been signifi cant as neither 

department considers nation-building among its core missions. 

There is signifi cant cultural resistance in the military to any tasks that 

are not combat related. As the Stability Force (SFOR) commander, 

Shinseki felt that he confronted a “cultural bias” in the military and 

specifi cally in the Army. Army doctrine-based training prepared 

him for warfi ghting and leadership, but “there was not a clear 

doctrine for post confl ict stability operations.”30 This absence of a 

doctrine for an institution that is doctrine-based presents a challenge 

when you walk into in peacekeeping environment. You are in a kind 

of “roll-your-own situation.” This is a revealing statement from a 

senior army general. The most remarkable fact, however, is that he 

is not alone in his opinion; other senior offi cers who served in Bosnia 

made similar assessments.31

Although the Army’s performance in Bosnia is generally 

considered an overwhelming success, many senior offi cers believe 

that they were not prepared for the experiences they encountered 

in Bosnia. Were they trained? The answer is yes, but the training 

predominately encompassed the art of warfi ghting and high-intensity 

confl ict. But after the initial deployment in Bosnia and after the 

prospects of conventional warfare had faded, it became increasingly 

obvious that the skills acquired by individual soldiers up to general 

offi cers were not adequate for the challenges confronted in Bosnia.32

The most signifi cant shortfall in a training strategy that 

predominately focuses on preparation for major combat operations 

with little regard for post hostility operations is in the area of 

readiness. Arguably, the capability of U.S. armed forces to support 

and accomplish America’s national security requirements is the 

ultimate measure of readiness.33

TRAINING READINESS: JUST ENOUGH AND JUST IN TIME

It is undeniable that training is an essential prerequisite for 

effective military operations. The same is true for post-confl ict 

stability operations. The U.S. military can no longer afford to train 
264

for war and adapt for peace. The military must stay prepared to 

fi ght and win the nations wars, and retain the “capacity” to execute 

peace operations when called upon to do so.34 It would not be a 

stretch to say that the Army’s actions in preparing for and executing 

peacekeeping operations adhere to the following model: “Train for 

war adapt for peace, with just enough and just in time!”

In reality, like combat operations, 

. . . the U.S. has learned that the key elements of successful stability 

operations are well trained and disciplined soldiers under the command 

of skilled and competent leaders. Although American soldiers are highly 

trained and possess combat skills that are easily transferable to the needs 

of post-confl ict operations they still require the time to adapt to the nature 

of the operation, its rules of engagement and its terms of reference.35

Another factor that impacts on training readiness is the duration 

of the stability operation. Lengthy involvement in peacekeeping 

operations degrades combat skills and has a signifi cant impact on 

combat readiness. As a result, the trend is that combat troops are 

used for peacekeeping only when necessary and those additional 

units, with post-confl ict related skills, are “cobbled” onto combat 

divisions as required to meet postwar demands.36 However, in most 

cases, armed forces ill-prepared for the job at hand quickly adapted, 

fi gured out what they had to do, and did it with great success.37

Although it is admirable that U.S. troops and leaders are agile 

and can “fi gure it out,” they should be put in that position only by 

exception. 

Morale problems stemming from prolonged deployments, 

equipment that wears out too quickly, and decreased combat training 

levels, increase when troops execute noncombat operations. Further 

exacerbating the military’s declining readiness is the tendency to 

pull troops with high demand special skills from nondeployed 

units. A mission may affect nondeployed units as well because they 

will not be able to train properly due to critical skill shortages.38 The 

concept of training readiness is well-understood in the U.S. Army, 

but as Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated, readiness for what 

happens after the fi ghting stops is just as important.39

If military training for post hostilities is just enough and just in 

time, is Army doctrine any better? The Army is a doctrine-driven 
265

institution, but the one area of doctrine it lacks is in post-confl ict 

operations. In Bosnia, Army doctrine was largely inadequate in an 

environment where American commanders had to wrestle with the 

political, diplomatic, and military demands of stability operations. 

Almost from the inception of Implementation Force operations, 

commanders found themselves in uncharted waters. Major General 

William Nash described the problem as an “inner ear problem.” 

Having trained for 30 years to read a battlefi eld, the general offi cers 

were now asked to read a “peacefi eld.”40 The requirement to train 

and develop senior leaders to read the “peacefi eld” and participation 

in stability operations has largely escaped consideration.

The Army must place greater emphasis on the education of its 

offi cer corps. Education must begin at the offi cer basic course and 

continue at all levels of the Professional Military Education system. 

Offi cers at all grades will benefi t from a focus on post-confl ict 

stability operations. Today’s offi cers are likely to be involved in other 

than war operations on multiple occasions throughout their service. 

Geopolitical and cultural training should also represent a signifi cant 

educational effort, and all offi cers should maintain profi ciency in a 

foreign language throughout their careers. 

General offi cers interviewed in a 1999 study conducted by the 

U.S. Institute of Peace singled out senior service colleges as the place 

where leadership training for stability operations should occur 

and where the most curriculum development is needed. These 

institutions must place greater emphasis on operations other than 

war, geopolitical issues, and cultural awareness.41

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) must embrace the 

entire training effort for stability operations, and the Army must 

incorporate these skills in its training base for captains, majors, 

lieutenant colonels, and colonels. A doctrinal set of principles for the 

conduct of post-confl ict operations deserves attention. Along with 

the doctrine, the training must crystallize the fundamentals of this 

new skill set.

Clearly, there is a need to strike a balance. The United States 

cannot afford to win the war but lose the peace. To win both the war 

and the peace will require that the Army must review its institutional 

training base and build on this foundation without signifi cantly 
266

reducing conventional training, while at the same time integrating 

new training aimed at supporting 21st century peace operations.42

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

We have to stop making nation-building a political football and recognize 

that it’s a national competency we need to foster that we’re not going to 

be able to avoid these kinds of activities.43

So, how does the Army handle this political football called nationbuilding? According to Max Boot, the Army must deal with the task of 

“imperial” policing. He states that, though it is not a popular duty, it 

is vital to safeguarding U.S. interests in the long run, as are the more 

conventional warfi ghting skills. “The Army brass should realize that 

battlefi eld victories in places like Afghanistan and Iraq can easily be 

squandered if they do not do enough to win the peace.”44

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations 

Joseph J. Collins provides another perspective. Collins states that 

there is a “strong notion that the military exists to deter, fi ght, 

and win wars, that’s it, and any other use of the military is some 

kind of borderline abuse.” He points out that war and recovery 

are inseparable and occur almost simultaneously. “People in the 

military have to realize that this is part of the strategic environment. 

And you do not get to pick your strategic environment. You don’t 

always have the choice to play the game the way you would like to 

play it. You have to adapt to the situation.”45

The United States has yet to discover a workable stabilization 

strategy for use against large populations that avoids signifi cant troop 

commitments. Several countries have proposed personnel policies 

that seek to avoid the painful arithmetic of large deployments. They 

conduct extended tours of duty using deployed forces built around 

short-service conscripts or volunteers. This may be a viable option, 

but so far most Western countries have chosen to rely on their 

professional armies, and the United States is no different.46 Although 

there are many possible force structure options to deal with posthostilities operations, this chapter will look at three alternatives that 

warrant consideration. The three options are the steady state option, 

the specialized peacekeeping force, and the adaptable multi-purpose 

unit options. 
267

If It’s Not Broke, Don’t Fix It.

The steady state option is straightforward and varies little from 

the Army’s current mode of operation in dealing with post-confl ict 

and peacekeeping operations. In essence, the Army would continue 

to be a “switch hitter.” Many in the Army feel that what the Army 

is doing now is working, that there is no need for change and that 

soldiers must continue to train for the high end of the spectrum. 

Generally those in favor of the status quo realize that operations 

other than war with their associated challenges will require 

signifi cant pre-deployment training.

The military has demonstrated that it can adapt to operations 

other than war while ramping up for deployment. However, the 

challenges experienced during the deployments to Afghanistan and 

Iraq have rendered the “just enough training, just in time” option 

obsolete. There is not ample time prior to deployment to train soldiers 

and leaders in the skills sets required for nation-building operations. 

So, if the status quo is not acceptable what are the options available? 

The remainder of this section will focus on the two options that are 

getting the most attention by the Department of Defense (DoD): 

specialized peacekeeping forces and multi-purpose units.

Specialized Peacekeeping Units. 

During speaking engagements in 2003-04 at the U.S. Army 

War College, three senior level general offi cers responded to the 

following question: Is it time for the Army to establish specialized 

peacekeeping units or commands to respond to post hostility 

challenges? They all felt strongly that this was not a good idea for 

the following reasons: The Army would lose deterrence value; there 

would not be enough specialized forces; and those forces that existed 

would be overworked. All stated that the Army must improve in 

both its effectiveness and effi ciency, but they were not proponents of 

specialized peacekeeping forces.47

Interestingly, in a Washington Post article titled “Pentagon article titled “Pentagon 

Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces,” Bradley Graham 

argued that the Pentagon is looking at creating dedicated military 
268

forces that could be dispatched to trouble spots around the globe to 

conduct peacekeeping and reconstruction after confl icts. “The idea 

is to forge deployable brigades or a whole division out of engineers, 

military police, civil affairs offi cers, and other specialists critical to 

postwar operations.”48 The new stabilization and reconstruction 

force would bridge the gap between the end of decisive combat and 

the point at which a civilian-led, nation-building effort is up and 

running.

The force would be distinct from a proposed NATO rapidresponse force and apart from the United Nations (UN). The 

standing constabulary force would consist of troops from a range 

of countries―but led and trained by the United States. 49 Secretary 

of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that “it would be good for 

the United States to provide leadership to train other countries who 

desire to participate in peacekeeping. The result would be a cadre 

of people who are trained, equipped, organized and ready to work 

with each other.”50

Defense offi cials note that Secretary Rumsfeld’s proposal is 

consistent with the aim of limiting U.S. military overseas deployments. 

Though it would specialize a small number of American troops 

in peacekeeping, it would also seek to enlist other countries to 

contribute the majority of troops, with the promise of training by the 

United States. Creating a standing international peacekeeping force 

led and trained by the United States would also allow the Pentagon 

to exert considerably more control over peacekeeping than in the 

past. This proposal has attracted signifi cant opposition from senior 

Army leaders. 

Another proponent of permanent constabulary forces is retired 

Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the head of the DoD Transformation 

effort. He argues that the United States needs a permanent postconfl ict stabilization force, but it must be on an equal footing with 

combat units. Although many of the elements that would make up a 

post-confl ict force such as engineers and military police are already 

found within the military, their mere existence does not necessarily 

constitute a post-confl ict capability without proper organization and 

command and control.51

During a conference in December 2003, the Fletcher Center 

for Technology and National Security Policy looked at the issues 
269

associated with Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations and 

addressed the idea of standing peacekeeping forces. The attendees 

made the following proposals:52

• Create two standing Joint Stabilization and Reconstruction 

Commands, one active component and one reserve component 

division equivalents.

• Stabilization and Reconstruction Joint Command plans, trains, 

exercises, develops doctrine and deploys to areas of responsibility 

(AOR).

• Maximize jointness with Army lead.

• The forces should be:

- Capable of operating in hostile environments.

- Capable of operating under a Joint Command or as a separate 

Joint Task Force.

- Modular, scalable, tailorable for mission, embedded

interagency.

• Provide link to nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and 

contractors to hand off to civilian leadership for nation-building.

Although the option of using specialized forces explicitly for postconfl ict operations is attractive, it is not the most optimal solution. 

As Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, troops that are profi cient in 

their warfi ghting skills are essential in both the decisive operations 

and stabilization stage. As we are discovering in Iraq, without 

security peace will not follow and progress will not be made. Based 

on current trends, it is unlikely that a specialized peacekeeping force 

could meet the future demands of post-confl ict operations. There 

simply would not be enough of the specialized forces to go around, 

once again resulting in cobbling forces together at the last minute. 

Another option is the adoption of multipurpose units. 

Multipurpose Units. 

Considering the future realities the Army will certainly face, 

multipurpose units make sense. Chief of Staff of the Army General 

Peter Schoomaker’s unit of action initiatives are more relevant to a 

multipurpose versus a specialized approach to stability operations. 
270

The multipurpose units would maintain agility by mixing and 

matching subordinate forces according to the needs of the mission 

resulting in a modular plug and play, multicapable outfi t. The 

multipurpose units appear to be a valid option for the force the 

Chief of Staff of the Army envisions. This multipurpose unit option 

allows more emphasis on focused training at all levels, including the 

leadership. The concept requires that a set of key nation-building 

tasks be identifi ed, guidance provided to units, and these essential 

tasks be added to unit Mission Essential Task Lists (METL).

Adding noncombat focused tasks to unit METL challenges 

the conventional wisdom, and many feel that it will shift the 

primary focus of training away from warfi ghting. Combined with 

the multipurpose unit approach, the ability to plug and play and 

identify the essential post-confl ict tasks would ensure that the U.S. 

Army would be postured to meet National Security Strategy (NSS) 

demands to provide ready and trained units to execute missions 

across the full-spectrum of confl ict. Dr. Conrad Crane provides an 

excellent list of recommendations that may assist the Army in better 

preparing itself to operate in “a future of continuous and cumulative 

SSCs [small scale contengencies].”53

• Create truly multicapable units structured, trained, and 

committed to both winning in Major Theaters of War and 

handling the stability portion of contingencies.

• Increase the ability of units at all levels to train for, plan, and 

execute stabilization phase tasks.

• Ensure adequate focus on the planning and execution of 

stabilization phase tasks at the U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. 

• Conduct a complete review of the Army’s overall combat 

support/combat service support force structure and based on 

the review realign force structure between active and reserve 

components. 54

Although the list is certainly not all inclusive, the failure to 

address any of the issues will have signifi cant implications for the 

Army. Regardless of the force structure strategy, the Army selects 

the essential task to improve and sustain the combat profi ciency of 

our Army and its capability to execute critical stability tasks. “One 
271

thing is certain, the post-confl ict mission is too important and too 

hard to rely on cobbling forces together enroute to the objective.”55

CONCLUSION

Our primary mission is not to fi ght and win the nation’s wars, 

though that’s our most important mission. We exist to serve the 

nation, however, the nation wants us to serve wherever and 

whenever we are needed.56

 General Kevin P. Burns

General Byrnes sums it up best. Ultimately the armed forces will 

do what the nation wants and will serve whenever and wherever 

they are needed. However, the objective “is not to ignore postconfl ict challenges―shrinking from intervention, ousting regimes 

without consideration for their replacement, or performing only 

half-hearted reconstruction planning.”57

The challenges of preparing the armed forces to fi ght in major 

regional confl icts and other military operations will require fl exible 

and adaptive doctrine and a force structure that can meet the 

dangers of a post-9/11 world. The basic tenets of our military policy 

and force structure focus should remain conventional land warfare. 

The United States clearly needs the capabilities that come with welltrained and equipped land forces. As long as it is the policy of this 

nation to respond to the types of operations the Army is currently 

engaged in, it should build forces of suffi cient size and with the 

capability to operate across the full spectrum.58

The multipurpose force approach will provide the fl exible, 

adaptive doctrine and force structure required in the increasingly 

complex post-confl ict environment. As this chapter illustrates, the 

specialized force approach to post-confl ict and nation-building 

operations is not the most optimal solution. It is unlikely that 

a specialized force could meet the future demands of stability 

operations. However, multipurpose forces that are trained, 

equipped, with leaders who are committed to both winning in Major 

Theaters of War and handling the stabilization phase of small scale 

contingencies will ensure progress towards U.S. security goals. 
272

Recently the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness told a group of defense correspondents that, in order 

to prevent future wars, the U.S. military is in the nation-building 

business to stay, and it seems unlikely that the Army will not 

continue to play a signifi cant role in the future.59 Like the Cold War, 

the global war on terror and its increased requirement for postconfl ict intervention is likely to preoccupy the United States for 

decades, and we must be prepared.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10

1. George W. Bush, “A Period of Consequences,” September 23, 1999; available 

from http://citadel.edu/pao/addresses/pres_bush.html; Internet; accessed February 27, 

2004. 

2. Michael W. Wynne, Under Secretary of Defense “Terms of Reference―

Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force Addressing Transition to and from 

Hostilities,” memorandum for Chairman of the Defense Science Board, 

Washington, DC, January 23, 2003.

3. Terry M. Neal, “Bush Backs Into Nation Building,” available from 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/; Internet; accessed December 16, 2003.

4. Ibid.

5. George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of 

America,” Washington, DC, 2002, p. 1.

6. Alan Sorenson, “The Reluctant Nation Builders,” Current History, December 

2003, p. 409. 

7. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” p. 29. 

8. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American 

Power, New York, 2002, p. 331. 

9. Wynne, “Terms of Reference―Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force,” p. 1.

10. Michael Moran, “Peacekeeping Revisited, Again: The ‘p’ Word Gets 

Another Look,” September 4, 2003; available from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/

3070613/; internet; accessed December 12, 2003.

11. Lawerence A. Yates, “Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, 

Patterns and Recurring Themes,” Military Review, July-August 1997, p. 2. 

12. Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” Parameters, Autumn 

2003, p. 2. 

13. Roger Spiller, The Small Change of Soldiering and American Military 

Experience, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003, p. 8. 
273

14. Virgil Ney, The United States Soldier in a Nonviolent Role: An Historical 

Overview, Fort Belvior, VA, 1967, p. 46.

15. Ibid., pp. 50-51.

16. Conrad C. Crane, Landpower and Crises: Army Roles and Missions in SmallerScale Contingencies During the 1990s, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2001, p. 37.

17. Timothy D. Cherry, “Engagement Force: A Solution to Our Readiness 

Dilemma,” Strategy Research Project, Carlisle PA: U.S. Army War College, June 

20, 2000, p. 9. 

18. Spiller, The Small Change of Soldiering, p. 8. 

19. James Dobbins, “Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the 

World’s Only Superpower,” Rand Review, Summer 2003, p. 23. 

20. Fredrick Barton and Bathsheba Crocker, “A Wiser Peace: An Action 

Strategy for a Post-Confl ict Iraq,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, January 2003, pp. 12-13, 14-25.

21. Dobbins, “Nation-Building,” p. 23.

22. Mark Fineman, Robin Wright, and Doyle McManus, “Preparing for War, 

Stumbling to Peace―U.S. Is Paying the Price for Missteps Made on Iraq,” Los 

Angeles Times, December 24, 2003, p. 1. Statement made by Judith Yaphe, a former 

CIA analyst who attended a planning session at the National Defense University 

to address how to win the peace in Iraq once the war is over.

23. Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” p. 6. 

24. James Dobbins, “Next Steps in Iraq and Beyond,” Rand, September 2003, 

p. 1. Testimony presented before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 

September 23, 2003.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Barton and Crocker, p. 26.

28. Howard Olsen and John Davis, “Training U.S. Army Offi cers for Peace 

Operations: Lessons from Bosnia,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report,

October 29, 1999, p. 1.

29. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush 

Assessment,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Assessment, 2003, p. 28.

30. Olsen and Davis, “Training U.S. Army Offi cers for Peace Operations,” p. 2.

31. Ibid. 

32. Ibid. 

33. Jack Spencer, “The Facts About Military Readiness,” Free Republic, 

December 24, 2003, p. 1. 
274

34. James A. Schear, “Peacekeeping Policy: The Defense Department View,” 

U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda, No. 2, April 1998, p. 12. 

35. Ibid., p. 12. 

36. Bradley Graham, “Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping 

Forces,” The Washington Post, November 24, 2003, p. 1.

37. Boot, p. 341. 

38. Spencer, “The Facts About Military Readiness,” p. 2.

39. Sorenson, “The Reluctant Nation Builders,” p. 410. 

40. Olsen and Davis, “Training U.S. Army Offi cers for Peace Operations,” p, 2.

41. Ibid., p. 10.

42. Ibid. 

43. Wen Stephenson, “Nation-Building 101,” Frontline: Truth, War, and 

Consequences, September 26, 2003, p. 9. Web interview with James Dobbins on his 

assessment of the U.S. operation in Iraq and what past experience teaches us.

44. Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 

2003, p. 8.

45. “Pentagon Offi cial Speaks out on Rebuilding Afghanistan―and Maybe 

Iraq,” National Journal, November 26, 2002, p. 4.

46. James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” 

Parameters, Winter 1995, p. 29.

47. The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by several General 

Offi cers participating in the Advanced Strategic Arts Program (ASAP) Lecture 

Series at the U.S. Army War College, 2003-04.

48. Graham, “Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces,” p. 1. 

49. Ibid. 

50. Ibid., p. 2. 

51. Alex Massie, “Pentagon’s Peace Mission,” November 30, 2003; available 

from http://news.scotsman.com/international.cfm; Internet; accessed January 5, 2004, 

p. 2.

52. “Transforming Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,” Fletcher 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, December 2, 2003, p. 5. 

53. Crane, Landpower and Crises, p. 37.

54. Ibid.

55. Alex Massie, “Pentagon Establishes New Force for Future Invasions,” 

November 30, 2003. Available from http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/

article5324.htm. Internet; accessed February 4, 2004, p. 1. 
275

56. General Kevin P. Byrnes, “Remarks at the Department of the Army 

Civilian Luncheon,” during Association of the United States Army Annual 

Meeting, Washington, DC, October 8, 2003, p. 2.

57. William W. Mendel, “U.S. Forces: Many Roles in the 21st Century,” Foreign 

Military Studies Offi cer Publications, November 25, 2004, p. 8.

58. Len F. Picotte and Thomas R. Holmes, “Amphibious Forces: The 911 

Number has Never Been Busier. So Now What?” Marine Corps Gazette, March 18, 

2003, p. 1.

59. Dale Eisman, “Top Defense Offi cial Defends U.S. Military’s Role As 

Peacekeeper,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, November 15, 2000.

277

CHAPTER 11

SEABASING AND SHIP-TO-OBJECTIVE MANEUVER 

AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JOINT FORCE 

COMMANDER

Lieutenant Colonel Stuart L. Dickey

The developing concept of “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver” within 

the U.S. Marine Corps relates to parent concepts―“Expeditionary 

Maneuver Warfare,” “Operational Maneuver From the Sea,” and “Sea 

Based Logistics.” Specifi cally, recent studies focus on determining 

the operational reach capabilities of U.S. Marine expeditionary units 

and expeditionary brigades in the 2015 timeframe. This represents the 

projected date for the fi elding of multiple systems, vessels/vehicles, 

and equipment necessary for implementation of these concepts. 

The objective then is to: Analyze the operational reach of ship-toobjective maneuver as determined by recent studies; determine what 

the Marine Corps aims at achieving with this capability; determine 

what the naval services need to do for ship-to-objective maneuver to 

become an operational reality; and, determine what this capability 

offers national leadership and joint force commanders. 

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps published a White Paper in 

the early 1990s entitled “Forward . . . From the Sea.” It signaled 

a signifi cant shift for the U.S. Navy away from traditional blue 

water operations to addressing growing threats in the littorals. 

It also signaled a closer doctrinal relationship to the U.S. Marine 

Corps, which has always focused on the littorals. The foundation of 

the Marine Corps has been its expeditionary capabilities, coupled 

with an institutionalized expeditionary mindset, culture, and 

structure. Its relationship with, and dependence on, the Navy makes 

“Forward . . . From the Sea” even more signifi cant in its focus 

on closer cooperation between the two services to maximize 

capabilities and develop new approaches to meet current and future 

threats. 

In 1997, the U.S. Marine Corps developed the concept of 

operational maneuver from the sea. This applied the tenets of 
278

maneuver warfare to sea space. This concept views the sea as 

maneuver space, not an obstacle. Naval amphibious forces have 

use of the sea for positional advantage, thus preventing the enemy 

from dictating the location of attack. The concept aims at creating 

dilemmas that force the enemy to defend the length of his coast or 

littoral area and at the same time provide American naval forces 

the option to strike at the time and place of their choosing.1 The 

principles of operational maneuver from the sea are:

• A focus on operational objectives.

• The use of the sea as maneuver space.

• The generation of overwhelming tempo and momentum.

• The pitting of strengths against weaknesses.

• The emphasis of intelligence, deception, and fl exibility.

• The integration of all organic, joint, and combined assets.2

The Marine Corps developed the concept of expeditionary 

maneuver warfare subsequent to operational maneuver from the 

sea. It represents the Corps’ overarching warfi ghting doctrine 

encompassing the tenets of operational maneuver from the sea, 

while refi ning and expanding them. The Marine Corps considers 

expeditionary maneuver warfare its capstone concept that supports 

its direction for the 21st century. It sees expeditionary maneuver 

warfare as the union of its core competencies, maneuver warfare 

philosophy, expeditionary heritage, and the concepts by which it 

will organize, deploy, and employ forces.3 Imbedded within these 

concepts are the concepts of seabasing, ship-to-objective maneuver, 

and sustained operations ashore. 

Seabasing represents the enabling concept of expeditionary 

maneuver warfare and operational maneuver from the sea and, 

specifi cally, ship-to-objective maneuver. It is integral to “Sea Power 

21,“ the Navy’s vision for the 21st century.4 Its fundamental basis 

is the creation of vessels, systems, and capabilities that allow for 

prolonged sustainment of forces ashore from fl oating logistics bases 

at sea. Such an approach eliminates the need for an operational pause, 

while logistic support is delivered to shore. This logistics sea base 

would have its location over the horizon. Seabasing is more than just 

logistics, however. It is the projection platform from which forces are 
279

launched, commanded, sustained, reconstituted, and transported. It 

cannot be a single ship or capability. Rather, it must be a system of 

systems built on capabilities in the maritime prepositioning forces, 

future, navy amphibious ships, and other capabilities. The tenets of 

seabasing are:

• Primacy of the sea base: over the horizon positioning, reduced 

or eliminated footprint ashore.

• Reduced demand: sea based support, technology 

improvements, lighter forces ashore.

• In-stride sustainment: network-based, automated logistics 

 for maneuver units.

• Adaptive response and joint operations: expanded missions, 

 joint support.

• Force closure and reconstitution at sea: building and restoring

 combat power. 5

The most signifi cant capabilities that seabasing enables are 

assured access and rapid force projection. Seabasing is dependent 

on neither host nation support nor benign deep-water ports. As 

the chief enabler of expeditionary maneuver warfare and shipto-objective maneuver, it also addresses the problems raised by 

antiaccess defenses by allowing maneuver forces to avoid them. If 

such defenses prove robust, then seabasing supports forcible-entry, 

antiaccess operations as well as joint follow-on forces.6

Maritime prepositioning force, future, is to seabasing what 

seabasing is to expeditionary maneuver warfare and ship-to-objective 

maneuver. It represents the fundamental capability that makes them 

work. Of all the capabilities under development to support “Marine 

Strategy 21,” “Sea Power 21,” and the “Naval Operating Concept for 

Joint Operations,” it is the closest to being truly transformational. 

Its ships will have the capability for at-sea arrival and assembly of 

units, direct support of the assault echelon of the amphibious task 

force, now known as the expeditionary strike group, long-term seabased sustainment for the landing force, and at-sea reconstitution 

and redeployment of the force. A number of new technologies 

are under development to support seabasing: selective on-load 

and off-load, internal ships systems (i.e., automated warehousing, 
280

item/pallet/container operations, roll-on/roll-off systems, and 

fl ow patterns), external ship systems (i.e., ramps, lighterage, and 

other craft interfaces), modular system/sub-system concepts, and 

aircraft interface technology.7 The ability for a Marine expeditionary 

brigade to be operational from the sea base within 7 to 10 days from 

initial deployment could alter signifi cantly the initial conditions 

of a confl ict.8 This is the operational objective of ship-to-objective 

maneuver as enabled by seabasing.

Ship-to-objective maneuver is the tactical extension of 

operational maneuver from the sea. It projects forces ashore in 

fi ghting formation without the need for a beach lodgment. It treats 

the sea as maneuver space and uses it as a protective barrier as well 

as a high-speed avenue of approach. It places forces ashore and 

inland at multiple points, thus creating a dilemma for the enemy and 

expanding the tactical and operational options for the joint forces or 

Marine air ground task force commander. Its forces will move via 

surface and air lift to objectives inland. Maneuver units take only 

minimum essential logistics support and rely on resupply from the 

sea base. The joint force can expand the logistical footprint ashore 

as the mission requires, particularly if sustained operations ashore 

occur. The intent aims at providing “the joint force commander with 

forces optimized for forward presence, engagement, crisis response, 

and warfi ghting that will achieve his operational objectives.”9

APPLICATION10

The Marine Corps currently has the capability to conduct 

limited ship-to-objective maneuver operations. Task Force 58’s 

performance during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is the most 

recent example. Analysis conducted by the Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command entitled “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver

Concept of Operations” addresses future ship-to-objective 

maneuver operational capabilities.11 The basis for this study derives 

from the “Defense Planning Guidance.” Planning and execution of 

the scenario within established parameters achieved the following 

results:

• Forces operated from a sea base located 25 nautical miles over 

the horizon. 
281

• This sea base consisted of six amphibious ships and six ships 

in the maritime prepositioning force, future; six high speed 

vessels; organic heavy surface lift; and 28 aircraft operating 

spots. 12

• The two smaller marine air/ground task forces organized 

into a surface lift task force and a vertical lift task force. Each 

consisted of two reinforced infantry battalions. The surface 

force was mechanized. The vertical lift task force consisted of 

light infantry with light armored vehicles.

• Day 1 put 4,861 personnel and 558 vehicles ashore. Day 2 

put the reserve battalion ashore, for a total of 6,753 personnel 

and 886 vehicles at surface task force and vertical task force 

objectives. 

• The vertical assault executed in four waves and carried 

personnel, equipment, supplies, and the combat service 

support detachment. During one period of darkness (7 hours 

and 45 minutes), 195 sorties of MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft 

and 76 sorties of CH-53E heavy lift helicopters delivered 

2,153 marines, 25 light armored vehicles, 170 vehicles, and 

supporting equipment to an objective located 85 miles inland 

(a total of 110 nautical miles from the sea base). Fifty-three 

sorties of AH-1/UH-1 attack and utility helicopters and 32 

joint strike fi ghter sorties supported this effort by providing 

escort support, command and control, close air support, and 

naval surface fi re support direction. 

• The surface lift task force conducted forcible entry operations 

during the hours of darkness in a mined environment using 

four lanes per battalion. The surface assault consisted of 

three cycles and a total of 76 expeditionary fi ghting vehicles, 

30 landing craft air cushion, and 18 landing craft utility 

(replacement) sorties. It landed the following personnel and 

equipment at its objective during one period of darkness:

- 2,708 Marines

- 76 expeditionary fi ghting vehicles13

- 50 light armored vehicles

- 22 M1A1 tanks
282

- 2 assault breacher vehicles14

- 8 expeditionary fi re support systems15

- 6 lightweight 155mm howitzers

- 180 HMMWVs

- 26 medium tactical vehicle replacements.

• The Marine expeditionary brigade closed a force of over 

13,000 Marines within a 7-day period, using multidimensional 

strategic lift assets that included:16

- Self-deploying aircraft: 30 joint strike fi ghter (short 

take-off, vertical landing version), 48 MV-22s, 5 EA6Bs or its future replacement, 12 KC-130s, and 314 

personnel. 

- Commercial airlift: 22 747s transporting a total of 9,094 

personnel.

- Strategic lift: 48 C-17s carrying 20 CH-53s, 9 UH-1s, 18 

AH-1s, aviation ground support equipment, critical 

low-density/high-demand cargo and 182 personnel. 

This force completed at-sea arrival and assembly with 

the sea base using MV-22s and high-speed vessels. 17

A second study, entitled “Mission Area Analysis, Operational 

Reach-2015,” has analyzed the ability of a Marine expeditionary 

force-sized Marine air/ground task force to project combat power 

ashore. While the study incorporated surface lift capabilities, its 

primary focus was vertical lift capabilities and limitations in a shipto-objective maneuver scenario, using MV-22 and CH-53E platforms 

with accompanying escort aircraft. The purpose of the landing was 

to ensure a rapid, orderly, and tactical build up of combat power 

ashore. These characteristics become critical when assessing the 

effectiveness of the plan as ranges extended. The study analyzed 

distances from 25 to 200 nautical miles to answer the questions 

“how much, how far, and how fast.”18 This study’s primary focus is 

vertical assault capabilities. It also confi rms, however, that suffi cient 

current and projected surface lift capabilities exist to conduct shipto-objective maneuver related surface assaults.19

This scenario used 78 MV-22s and 28 CH-53Es for the vertical 

assault portion of the base landing plan.20 A total of 732 sorties 
283

would land the entire force at a vertical assault objective located 95 

miles from the sea base (397 sorties for the assault forces, 205 sorties 

for the combat trains, and 130 sorties for the combat service support 

detachment). This put 3,823 marines and sailors, plus 479 vehicles or 

pieces of equipment, ashore in a 2-day period. This included 4,000 

gallons of fuel and the artillery battalion’s basic load of ammunition, 

plus 1 day of allowance.21

These two studies confi rm that the Marine Corps will be 

capable of projecting large mechanized forces ashore via surface lift 

platforms from sea bases located approximately 25 nautical miles 

over the horizon. It is the ability to project and sustain forces over the 

horizon from a sea base that differentiates current capabilities from 

future ones. These studies also calculate that the operational range 

of regimental-sized vertical assault forces culminates at 110 nautical 

miles from the sea base. Since it is the vertical assault that comprises 

true ship-to-objective maneuver capabilities, the following study 

analyzed the capabilities of a smaller force by looking at extended 

range operations for the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special 

Operations Capable) [MEU (SOC)].22

The results of this study, entitled “MEU (SOC) Extended Range 

Operations,” suggest that a reinforced infantry company-sized force 

package has an operational range of 200 nautical miles from the sea 

base, 90 more nautical miles than the regimental-sized forces in the 

previous two studies. The risk factors identifi ed in this study focus 

on conditions that could prevent its successful operation: weather 

conditions, availability of aircraft, availability of appropriate type 

ships, deck management issues such as suffi cient deck spots and 

rotations, and embarkation issues. This study concluded that, while 

such missions are possible, they have an almost zero percent margin 

of error, particularly in terms of aircraft operational readiness. This 

type of mission depends on two KC-130J aerial refueling platforms, 

a distinguishing factor between it and other studies. According 

to the maintenance and readiness parameters used for this study, 

vertical assault aircraft meet mission requirements 80 percent of the 

time, while fi xed-wing aircraft meet requirements 50 percent of the 

time.23

This last study focused on Marine expeditionary brigade 

seabasing and thus is entitled “Seabasing Concept of Operations.” 
284

It rests on the classifi ed version of “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 

Concept of Operations,” but extended the campaign to 22 days and 

stressed logistics to determine overall requirements.24 It represents 

the fourth in a series of sea-based operations in-process reviews 

and builds on the conclusions of the previous three. It supports the 

fi ndings and conclusions of ship-to-objective maneuver concept of 

operations, while identifying additional areas that require further 

refi nement. This study organized its fi ndings in three main areas: 

movement conclusions, sustainment conclusions, and overall “takeaways.”

The movement conclusions validated that initial assaults are 

feasible within periods of darkness. Vertical assaults took 7.4 

hours to complete and surface assaults took 6.6 hours to complete. 

Embarkation management and confi guration is critical to the assault 

and directly related to deck spot utilization. Additionally, the 

synergistic effect of the combined capabilities of the expeditionary 

strike group and the maritime prepositioning group signifi cantly 

enhanced rapid buildup ashore.25 Both vertical and surface assaults 

were challenging, but supportable.26

Sustainment conclusions indicate that forces ashore can be 

suffi ciently resupplied by air. Intermodal packaging―one of the 

critical capabilities provided by the future ship designs in the 

maritime propositioning force, future―is essential. It would allow 

for improved packaging, greater quantities, and better visibility of all 

items, particularly the smaller items that tend to get lost in the mass 

of supplies that are critical for embarkation and logistics, i.e., slings, 

nets, drums, etc. This future capability would improve seaborne 

warehousing, retrieval, and loading capabilities signifi cantly, and is 

one of the critical elements of sea based logistics. It directly relates to 

embarkation effi ciency and deckspace management. 27

The most signifi cant fi ndings in this section concern fuel 

consumption and identifi ed that problem as the biggest logistical 

challenge of ship-to-objective maneuver. It applies to both the 

platforms used to project forces ashore and the forces themselves. 

Due to substantial vertical and surface lift requirements, lift 

platforms use more fuel then forces ashore.28

Thus, the major insights from this Marine expeditionary brigade 

seabasing analysis are:
285

• Ship-to-objective maneuver concept of operations is basically 

sound, but it is a work in progress that requires continuous 

updating.

• One-hundred-ten mile ship-to-objective maneuver is 

supportable.

• Embarkation is the key to the assault.

• Intermodal packaging and slings are critical enablers that 

require accurate warehousing visibility.

• Synergism between expeditionary strike groups and 

the maritime prepositioning group represents a critical 

requirement. 

ANALYSIS

The Marine Corps’ stated objective is for the “sea base to develop 

to the point where it is able to support fully a Marine expeditionary 

brigade with an air-delivered and sustained battalion-size maneuver 

unit out to 200 nautical miles from the sea base with some elements 

to 240 nautical miles. Small tailored units could be supported at 

ranges greater than 240 nautical miles to the full range of naval 

supporting fi res, air and missile defense, within limits of logistics 

reach.”29 The distances depend on the projected operational ranges 

of the MV-22 Osprey and the expeditionary fi ghting vehicle.30 The 

results of the studies, however, fall somewhat short of these ranges, 

but nonetheless demonstrate a considerable capability for a joint 

force commander. 

Essentially, ship-to-objective maneuver is a precision strike 

capability on a large scale. In line with the Department of 

Defense’s focus on long-range precision attack operations, it is 

heavily dependent on improved intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance capabilities across all three spectrums of warfare―

tactical, operational, and strategic. While the Marine Corps controls 

most aspects of its own tactical and operational intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance requirements, it has no control 

of the military and intergovernmental agencies that provide the 

highest levels of strategic intelligence. The planning assumption that 

these agencies will not only be able to provide the high resolution of 

intelligence required, but will also be fully dedicated and focused 
286

on providing that intelligence “real time” to naval forces involved in 

ship-to-objective maneuver operations is tenuous. This potentially 

could debilitate the ability to make sound planning assumptions; 

in other words, not to assume away enemy capabilities or create 

friendly ones that do not exist. It remains to be seen how this affects 

the ultimate operability of ship-to-objective maneuver.31

High-volume naval surface fi re support also is essential in 

ship-to-objective maneuver. It may be even more critical than in 

conventional amphibious operations because some trade-off in 

ground-based fi re support may be necessary for vertical assault 

forces and their need for operational level fi re support. The logistical 

footprint and sustainment requirements of ground-based fi res 

also present a challenge.32 The Marine Corps’ development of the 

lightweight 155mm howitzer and the expeditionary fi re support 

system represent attempts to address this problem. The Navy 

is developing the advanced gun system for its next generation 

destroyer, the DD(X), to support ship-to-objective maneuver forces 

at the ranges and distances required.33

Fundamental changes in logistics support and organization may 

be among the most signifi cant issues related to ship-to-objective 

maneuver. The Marine Corps is approaching this problem from 

two directions. One approach involves increased effi ciency and 

effectiveness through internal restructuring. The other rests on 

the actual reduction of requirements ashore. The development 

of integrated logistics consolidates maintenance and logistics 

functions at higher echelons to reduce combat requirements. Future 

combat service support aims at shifting many logistics functions 

and responsibilities from the units to the Marine air/ground task 

force combat service support element, minus aircraft maintenance. 

This would allow unit logistics offi cers to focus on requests and 

coordination with the combat service support element instead of 

focusing on internal logistics support. Conceptually, this potentially 

reduces the logistics section of an infantry battalion from 50 to 

10 marines.34 Such a reduction in personnel ashore would result 

from reduction in demand resulting from future technologies that 

allow for more effi cient vehicles, and increased visibility of logistic 

and maintenance requirements. The hope is to reduce the Marine 

expeditionary brigade sea-based fl ow-in-echelon table of equipment 
287

by more then 50 percent. If sustained operations ashore require more 

support, then it is phased gradually into theater and ashore. 

Opponents of the integrated logistics concept argue that ground 

combat is about effectiveness, not effi ciency. They contend that 

combat demands redundancy at all levels―personnel, equipment, 

supplies, and maintenance capabilities. This is a greater concern 

for the motorized and mechanized units that have larger logistical 

and maintenance requirements. And while this concept may be 

appropriate, even necessary, for a vertical assault task force, it 

eventually may result in problems for surface assault task forces 

comprised of heavier units (expeditionary fi ghting vehicles, tanks, 

trucks, artillery, light armored vehicles). How the Marine Corps 

resolves and incorporates these issues into future ship-to-objective 

maneuver operations will be critical to their sustainability and 

overall success. 

Naval countermine capabilities are essential for littoral 

operations. Amphibious forces must be able to clear lanes through 

the shallow water zones (10 to 40 feet depth), as well as the surf 

zone/craft landing zone (0 to 10 feet depth). Such capabilities must 

allow for in-stride breaching without disrupting the momentum 

of the surface assault. The goal is to create four transit lanes per 

battalion and eight littoral penetration points per regiment.35 The 

joint force commander and the Navy have responsibility for the sea 

area from the sea base to the beach exits. The Marine Corps has it 

from the beach to the objective. This concept requires all landing 

craft air cushion, expeditionary fi ghting vehicles, and landing 

craft utility (replacement) to have a common tactical picture that 

electronically displays cleared lanes through the breached areas, 

backed-up by visual markings. “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver 

Concept of Operations” states that “negotiating a marine minefi eld 

in a GPS [global positioning system]-denied environment at night 

in Sea State III could be challenging.”36 This may be the greatest 

understatement ever written in a military publication. 

It further states that the Marine expeditionary brigade must have 

the capability of conducting reconnaissance on 32 potential littoral 

penetration points, even though as few as eight may eventually be 

used.37 Littoral penetration points can be 500 meters apart. Littoral 
288

penetration sites are notionally fi ve kilometers wide and separated 

by approximately three kilometers. This equates to over four-anda-half miles of shoreline. This is a daunting requirement even with 

the combined assets of navy seal and marine force reconnaissance 

teams.

Operation DESERT STORM exposed U.S. countermine 

capabilities as lacking, and these capabilities have not improved 

suffi ciently since then. “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept 

of Operations” suggests that “technological advances will 

likely [emphasis added] support remote clandestine detection, 

classifi cation, identifi cation, marking, and monitoring of mines and 

obstacles at sea and ashore.”38 A recent U.S. Government Accounting 

Offi ce (USGAO) report states that current forces “are not effectively 

capable of breaching and clearing mines in very shallow water near 

the shore.”39 The Navy’s mine warfare section, N752, identifi es the 

area between the surf zone and the craft landing zone as being 

the most defi cient―not necessarily the very shallow water zone 

as the USGAO report suggests. This happens to be the area where 

responsibilities for countermine operations shift from the Navy 

to the Marine Corps, tactically referred to as a seam. It is also the 

area that allows for less expensive mines to have greater antiaccess 

potential. The impact of this has not gone unnoticed by either the 

Marine Corps or the Navy. Part of the problem relates to money and 

resource priorities, while the other relates to science and technology. 

This is a critical vulnerability for surface assault forces in ship-toobjective maneuver operations. Finding an affordable solution that 

the Marine Corps agrees with, and the Navy supports, is critical. 

Strategic airlift, military and civilian, remains essential in 

expeditionary maneuver warfare and ship-to-objective maneuver 

operations to transport personnel and equipment to advance 

bases. Even with multiple means of force projection, including 

self-deploying aircraft, high speed vessels, and Navy amphibious 

shipping, the scenario in “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept 

of Operations” requires 22 747s and 49 C-17s to rapidly transport 

required personnel to the advance base. There, they get on high-speed 

“connectors” for transport to the sea base. This is not an exorbitant 

amount of aircraft if U.S. Transportation Command is not supporting 
289

multiple concurrent strategic lift missions. It might become a fi ght 

for resources, however, during a large-scale time-phased force 

deployment contingency. And, as the Army is reorganizing into a 

more modular expeditionary force, it puts even more emphasis on 

strategic lift requirements to get forces into theater. This situation 

may not be different from current joint requirements, but it is worth 

exploring from a joint perspective. 

The one glaringly obvious fact about ship-to-objective maneuver 

operations is their absolute reliance on signifi cant amounts of vertical 

lift assets and capabilities, much more so than either current ground 

or amphibious operations require. Ship-to-objective maneuver, 

as envisioned, depends on the capabilities of the MV-22 and the 

CH-53E (service life extension program) and the ability to conduct 

continuous large-scale air assault operations, exponentially larger 

then anything the Marine Corps is currently capable of performing. 

The studies analyzed in this chapter provide specifi c and accurate 

data on lift requirements for initial assaults and subsequent resupply 

fl ights, but do not consider sustained operations ashore in a high 

casualty environment. Even though surface lift will transport many 

casualties, considering the myriad combat scenarios possible, it is 

realistic to expect that the majority of casualties will require vertical 

lift to get from the objective to casualty collection points to await 

surface lift to the sea base. The worst-case scenario would entail 

concurrent assault insertions with multiple casualty missions and 

stretch already thinly stretched lift assets even further. 

Increased reliance on all Marine air platforms makes the Marine 

Corps air component even more integral to the Marine air/ground 

task force concept. The Marine Corps defends its aviation arm on a 

regular basis against both military and political critics who see it as 

a redundant asset. Critics argue that it runs contradictory to joint 

concepts and intent for the Marine Corps to have its own airspace 

and, specifi cally, fi xed-wing aircraft. The Marine Corps has been 

successful so far, but as jointness continues to permeate the services 

and the U.S. Congress, it may become a more tenuous position. 

Ship-to-objective maneuver adds strength to the argument for the 

Marine Corps. But in order to carry the necessary weight to win the 

argument, ship-to-objective maneuver must prove itself not only 

successful, but also vital to joint operations. 
290

Surface lighterage is another lift asset critical to ship-to-objective 

maneuver. Current capabilities will not meet future requirements. 

Even with the purchase of more high speed vessels, the service life 

extension of the landing craft air cushion, and the introduction of 

the landing craft utility (replacement), more and better types of 

lighterage must be purchased or produced in order to meet the full 

range of requirements, especially logistical. These vessels require 

the capability to marry-up to maritime prepositioning force, future, 

ships and conduct in-stride replenishment in sea state III conditions. 

Ship-to-objective maneuver is as dependent on these types of surface 

lift assets as it is on vertical lift assets. And as increased reliance on 

air makes the Marine air wing more integral to the Marine Corps 

and its Marine air/ground task force concept, increased reliance 

on navy surface lift has the same effect on the Navy-Marine Corps 

relationship. In fact, it is one of the few areas in the military that 

begins to achieve the joint objective of dependence rather than 

interoperability. 

At the moment, however, there is a disconnect between the two 

services. While lighterage to support ship-to-objective maneuver 

operations is a priority for the Marine Corps, the Navy has several 

acquisition project priorities, and surface lift is not at the top of that 

list. The Navy must put more emphasis in this area if it is to see the 

realization of “Sea Strike” as laid out in its “Naval Transformation 

Roadmap.”40

Over-the-horizon and long range communication is essential 

for ship-to-objective maneuver operations. This is a recognized 

critical capability and is proving to be one of the most challenging. 

It requires aerial retransmission platforms with wide and narrow 

band satellite communication capability. MV-22s equipped with the 

joint tactical radio system can communicate via narrow band ultra 

high frequency satellite communications. Both vertical and surface 

assault forces require wide area and local area network capabilities 

in order to receive the current operational and tactical pictures. 

The intent is for situational awareness at all levels to be achieved 

through battlefi eld visualization made possible by the current 

operational and tactical pictures. The increased command and 

control and intelligence requirements of ship-to-objective maneuver 
291

make it essential that these are always available. Database backups 

and redundant communication systems supposedly ensure this 

happens.41 Intelligence is dependent on “unprecedented amounts 

of detailed and accurate information” which it achieves through 

reachback connections to joint and national agencies and which 

requires their cooperation.42 Ship-to-objective maneuver requires 

vast communications pathways to make this happen. Even with 

FORCEnet, there is still a chance for competing requirements to 

impact command and control, communication, and intelligence 

capabilities.43 In this regard, ship-to-objective maneuver makes 

itself dependent on the same amount of “exquisite intelligence” 

that Network-centric warfare does in a number of circumstances. It 

is arguable whether such levels of intelligence are achievable. Even 

if they are, dependence on such information provides a cautionary 

warning. There is a difference between developing these capabilities 

and maximizing their effectiveness, and developing operational 

concepts that are too dependent on them. 

IMPLICATIONS

Current studies demonstrate that a Marine expeditionary 

brigade-sized force will be capable of conducting ship-to-objective 

maneuver operations out to 110 nautical miles from a sea base 

located 25 miles over the horizon. While ship-to-objective maneuver 

operations consist of both surface and vertical assault forces, it 

is only the vertical assault force that is capable of achieving this 

110 nautical mile range during the fi rst period of darkness. Both 

forces consist of two infantry battalions. The surface assault force is 

mechanized, and the vertical assault is infantry-pure. Naval surface 

fi re support, air assets, and inherent mortar and artillery capabilities 

provide fi re support for both. Both forces are capable of logistical 

sustainment from the sea base, although continued sustainment of 

the vertical assault force by air assets alone will prove challenging, 

but feasible. Extended range operations beyond this 110 nautical 

mile limit are possible with smaller forces. A reinforced company of 

approximately 250 Marines is capable of conducting vertical assault 

operations out to 200 nautical miles from the sea base. 
292

The Marine Corps considers seabasing and ship-to-objective 

maneuver transformational capabilities, but it provides its own 

perspective on the nature of transformation. The Marine Corps 

considers something transformational if it invents a new capability 

that did not exist, or it makes an existing capability better by orders 

of magnitude. It identifi es four pillars of transformation: operational 

change, institutional agility, leap-ahead technology, and acquisition 

and business reform.44 In this context, seabasing is certainly a 

transformational capability. Whether or not ship-to-objective 

maneuver meets these parameters is arguable. Regardless, the 

capability to project and sustain elements of a Marine expeditionary 

brigade-sized force or a reinforced company from a sea base as 

far as 110 or 200 nautical miles, respectively, provides joint force 

commanders multiple operational and tactical options that do not 

currently exist.

How signifi cant is it that current projections fall short of the 

stated 200-240 nautical mile ranges? It is not signifi cant at this point. 

It would be another matter if the Army and Marine Corps were 

developing similar capabilities and were involved in a bidding war 

over which one had the greater operational reach capability. But 

they are not, nor is this within the realm of Army roles and functions. 

Besides, the Army is busy enough trying to make itself modular so 

that it can task organize much along Marine Corps lines. And as this 

concept matures, real operational data and tactics, techniques, and 

procedures no doubt will expand operational reach. It will take trial 

and error, combined with technological modifi cations and ingenuity, 

to overcome the design limitations that currently limit lift ranges. 

In the interim, providing combatant commanders with innovative 

capabilities to prevent hostilities before they begin, gaining decisive 

tactical results that have operational and even strategic impact, and 

laying the foundation for further operational expansion are the 

objectives.

The critical capabilities required to make seabasing and shipto-objective maneuver realities are the current technologies being 

developed (or not) to support it. The previous analysis discusses 

these technologies, along with strengths, weaknesses, and additional 

requirements. Transformational capabilities begin as concepts 
293

that equipment and doctrine then are developed to support, not 

the other way around. Seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver 

identifi ed the need for capabilities provided by such vehicles as 

the MV-22 and expeditionary fi ghting vehicle, just as amphibious 

operations identifi ed the need for amphibious tractors and new 

classes of amphibious ships prior to World War II. The issues of 

suffi cient additional lighterage, naval surface fi re support, and mine 

countermeasure capabilities remain questionable, if not contentious, 

and must be resolved for seabasing and ship-to-objective maneuver 

to realize full operational effectiveness. Despite this, the cooperation 

between the Marine Corps and Navy in this endeavor is almost 

unprecedented, not only between themselves but also among the 

services as a whole. The massively expensive acquisition programs 

of both services in support of seabasing and ship-to-objective 

maneuver provide proof of this.

Is it worth it? The naval services seem to think so, especially the 

Marine Corps. It appears to be betting the farm on it, considering 

the prices tags of the MV-22 Osprey and the expeditionary fi ghting 

vehicle (which costs more than an M1A1). But does this mean that 

the Marine Corps envisions itself conducting only ship-to-objective 

operations from over-the-horizon sea bases? The answer is no, but 

it does believe that the ability to do this exponentially enhances 

current capabilities that will continue to be available to combatant 

commanders and national decisionmakers.

A larger question is what, exactly, a Marine expeditionary brigadesized unit conducting ship-to-objective maneuver operations at these 

distances can accomplish. This question must be kept in context. The 

concept of seabasing allows not only for initial ship-to-objective 

maneuver operations, but also, and perhaps more importantly, for 

the follow-on expansion into sustained operations ashore if required. 

The capabilities discussed herein offer little beyond an operational 

or tactical raid, even at the expeditionary brigade level. This would 

be true if an operation consisted solely of initial assault forces with 

limited sustainment and without the ability to be reinforced. But the 

concept of ship-to-objective maneuver operations aligns very much 

with the Marine Corps building block concept of Marine air/ground 

task forces. That is, Marine expeditionary units can be built into 
294

expeditionary brigades that can become expeditionary forces as the 

situation develops. So, too, are surface and assault forces capable of 

being supplied and reinforced from the sea base which, in turn, is 

capable of being replenished from its reachback sea and air lines of 

communication. The entire system of systems allows for incremental 

build up and sustainment of forces ashore if sustained operations 

ashore become necessary. If used properly and in a timely manner, 

however, the real intent of ship-to-objective maneuver is to prevent 

the situation from growing into sustained land combat, or, as 

previously stated, to “signifi cantly alter the initial conditions of a 

confl ict.”45 Forces of this size, fl exibility, and reach inserted at the 

right place and time should be able to do this and more. 

As previously stated, seabasing is a potentially transformational 

capability that extends beyond logistical sustainment from a sea 

base. It is a fl oating command and control and power projection 

system comprised of disparate, but interconnected, components 

dispersed over potentially hundreds of miles of ocean, and reaching 

back thousands of miles to the continental United States. It could 

allow for strategic, operational, and tactical fl exibility heretofore 

unseen in warfare. There is much to be done in order for this 

capability to be fully realized, but all things must have a beginning. 

What must be emphasized is the importance of this concept to the 

entirety of the U.S. military and national decisionmakers, not just the 

Navy and Marine Corps. As the U.S. military moves towards more 

expeditionary-type forces and fewer permanent overseas bases, the 

ability to project, sustain, and command forces from the sea will take 

on even greater signifi cance for all the Services. 

In order for seabasing to realize this level of inter-service 

capability, all of the services must be involved in its development. 

The Navy and Marine Corps will develop seabasing and ship-toobjective maneuver over the next few decades to operationally and 

tactically useable levels. And these will have joint applicability, 

particularly seabasing. Special operations units, Army, and even 

Air Force and allied/coalition partners will be able to leverage these 

capabilities. But, with only two services contributing monetarily to 

the development of these concepts, they may not realize their full 

potential across the joint spectrum. 
295

Prepositioning programs and vessel design is the critical nexus 

for comprehensive joint seabasing operations. The requirement 

is not for service chiefs to refocus all of their efforts and budgets 

on seabasing compatibility. This is unnecessary and unrealistic. 

Prepositioning compatibility is the most important critical enabler. 

If the other services would partner now with the naval services, they 

could develop future maritime prepositioning ships and capabilities 

that meet their service-specifi c requirements for expeditionary 

seabasing operations. Such prepositioning forces could create a joint 

sea base from which to project, sustain, and command air, land, and 

sea forces without the restrictions of excessive land-based assets and 

requirements. These forces would retain fl exibility across all three 

levels of warfare at levels currently unknown. Such capabilities do 

not preclude traditional land-based sustained operations ashore 

when needed. These forces will have multi-role capabilities. But if 

seabasing can be developed to the level that such operations are not 

necessary, or at least to the point that two-thirds of all forces can 

operate and sustain themselves from the sea base, why put them 

ashore? 

Is this hyperbole, political naivete, or both? Hopefully, none 

of the above. The realities of service budget battles, priorities, and 

parochialism are understood. The future is unknown, as is the size 

of future defense budgets. Day-to-day realities and political agendas 

get in the way of good ideas, even visionary ones sometimes. Selling 

this idea is no easy task, but neither was moving beyond horses, sails, 

and prop-driven airplanes. Seabasing is not a panacea, but is offers 

one of the best options to future force projection, forward presence, 

and warfi ghting challenges. Of all the concepts currently being 

developed by the services, it is the most far-sighted and applicable 

to joint warfi ghting enhancement. 

Chapter Five of the National Security Strategy states that, in order 

to support preemptive options, America must continue to transform 

its military forces to ensure the ability to conduct “rapid and precise 

operations to achieve decisive results.”46 Expeditionary maneuver 

warfare, operational maneuver from the sea, seabasing, and ship-toobjective maneuver support this directive perhaps better than any 

other current capability or initiative among the services or within 
296

the Department of Defense. And, as the concept and technologies 

mature into reality, the applications for the joint force commander 

and for all the services increase. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 11

1. Colonel Arthur J. Corbett, “The Family of Concepts,” Marine Corps Gazette,

October 2003, p. 20.

2. U.S. Marine Corps, “Operational Maneuver From The Sea,” Marine Corps 

Concepts Paper, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, 

U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, January 1, 

1997, p. 20.

3. U.S. Marine Corps, “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare,” Marine Corps 

Capstone Concept, Marine Corps Concepts Paper, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command, November 10, 2001, p. 1.

4. Corbett, “The Family of Concepts,” p. 20.

5. U.S. Marine Corps, “Seabased Logistics,” Marine Corps Concepts Paper, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, June 3, 1998, p. 1. 

6. Corbett, “Family of Concepts,” p. 20.

7. U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003,” 

Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 

Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2003, p. 50.

8. Ibid., p. 21.

9. U.S. Marine Corps, “Ship-To-Objective-Maneuver (STOM) Concepts of 

Operations (CONOPS),” Marine Corps Concepts Paper, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command, March 3, 2003, pp. iii, 1-2, 1-3.

10. This section discusses the results of four studies on ship-to-objective 

maneuver and seabasing conducted by the Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command. It also contains information obtained from the Navy’s N75 Section, 

Director, Expeditionary Warfare. These studies examine the projected capabilities, 

limitations, and operational reach of Marine expeditionary brigade and Marine 

expeditionary unit (special operations capable)-sized Marine air-ground task 

forces using technology, equipment, vessels, and vehicles both in operation today 

and intended to be operational by 2015. 

11. The force disposition and composition derive from a baseline 2015 Marine 

expeditionary brigade formed using a nonstandard organizational construct 

consisting of two separate, smaller Marine air/ground task forces within a larger 
297

Marine air/ground task force (a similar construct was used by TF-58 in OEF). It 

consists of two expeditionary strike groups carrying two Marine expeditionary 

units (special operations capable) and a fl ow-in echelon (a new term connected 

to these concepts) of one infantry regiment, one air component element, and 

one brigade service support group. All arrive in theater within seven days 

of notifi cation and are ready to execute at D+5. Ship-to-objective maneuver 

operations do not commence until D+8. Expeditionary strike groups have replaced 

amphibious ready groups and consist of amphibious ships, surface combatants, 

and an attack submarine. This makes it a self-contained strike force instead of the 

previous three-ship amphibious lift force. The fi rst expeditionary strike group is 

currently in work-up and is commanded by a Marine. U.S. Marine Corps, “Shipto-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations,” pp. iii, 1-3, V.

12. The Australians have built the prototype high speed vessel. It is a catamaran 

design, capable of speeds over 40 knots, and ranges of 1,200 nautical miles fully 

loaded and 3,000 nautical miles empty. It carries a signifi cant numbers of personnel 

and rolling stock, but it has no berthing facilities for troops. Modifi cations are 

being explored to make it capable of carrying helicopters and heavier land vehicles 

(tanks). The landing craft air cushion has been in service since 1986. It carries 60-

plus tons at 40 knots for 200 nautical miles. There are currently 74 in operational 

status, with 10 in reduced operational/nonoperational status. They are about to 

enter a service life extension program that will signifi cantly increase the vessel’s 

capabilities and will extend its expected service life another 30 years. This is vital to 

the success of ship-to-objective maneuver. Additionally, a heavy lift landing craft 

air cushion is being studied to meet over-the-horizon surface lift requirements. 

This vehicle could have a 100 percent increase in lift capacity for armored vehicles, 

internal capacity for 75-100 troops, and the capacity for 400 troops with personnel 

transport modules. The landing craft utility (replacement) will be a signifi cant 

improvement over the current slow and limited ship-to-shore version. It will be 

an over-the-horizon capable craft that can carry 160 to 200 long tons at ranges of 

approximately 1,000 miles and will be capable of speeds in excess of 11 knots in 

Sea State 3. These lighterage platforms are critical for the implementation of shipto-objective maneuver. Department of the Navy, “Naval Expeditionary Warfare, 

Naval Amphibious Warfare Plan, Decisive Power . . . Global Reach,” Washington, 

DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Expeditionary Warfare Division, June 1, 2002, 

pp. 58, 59, 61, 62.

13. The expeditionary fi ghting vehicle, formerly know as the advanced 

amphibious assault vehicle, is the replacement for the Marine Corps’ current fl eet 

of amphibious assault vehicles. Its water planing design gives it waters speeds 

up to 20 knots, with extended range capabilities either at sea or on land. It can 

transit 25 nautical miles over water, and then range approximately 250 miles on 

land at speeds up to 45 miles per hour. It carries a Mk 44 Mod 1 30mm automatic 

gun and a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. It carries 17 combat equipped Marines 

or 5,000 pounds of cargo. Department of the Navy, “Decisive Power . . . Global 

Reach,” p. 33. The Marine Corps plan is to procure 1,013 expeditionary fi ghting 
298

vehicles, but this is currently under consideration. The program’s milestones are 

for low-rate initial production in FY 2005, initial operational capability in FY 2008, 

and full operational capability in FY 2018. This will occur sooner if the decision is 

made to procure fewer vehicles. U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Concepts and 

Programs 2003,” p. 112.

14. The assault breacher vehicle is a full-tracked, armored engineer vehicle 

designed to conduct in-stride breaching of minefi elds and complex obstacle. It 

is built on a modifi ed IPM1 tank chassis and includes a full width mine plow, 

two-line demolition charges, ground marking system, remote control kit, and a 

weapons station. Procurement is anticipated to begin during FY 2006. U.S. Marine 

Corps, “Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003,” p. 115.

15. The expeditionary fi re support system is still in the conceptual stage. It 

will become the fi nal system of the fi re support triad consisting of the lightweight 

155mm howitzer and the high mobility artillery rocket system. It will be the 

primary indirect fi re support system for the vertical assault element in ship-toobjective maneuver and will be transportable by tiltrotor aircraft or helicopter. The 

best guess at this point is that it might look something like a modernized 120mm 

mortar system. However, the integrated production team is currently conducting 

studies and market research of potential material solutions. U.S. Marine Corps, 

“Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003,” p. 117.

16. The Marine expeditionary brigade forms an element of the expeditionary 

strike force. This strike force consists of a carrier strike group, expeditionary strike 

group, and the maritime prepositioning group. U.S. Navy warships include two 

nuclear-powered carriers (CVN), fi ve cruisers (CG), two destroyers (DDX), two 

nuclear attack submarines reconfi gured to carry 154 tactical land attack missiles 

and modifi cations for special forces units (changing the classifi cation from SSBN to 

SSGN), two attack submarines (SSN), two amphibious assault ships, multipurpose 

(LHD), two amphibious transport dock ships (LPD), and two dock landing ships 

(LSD). These forces form the entirety of the sea base from which naval power is 

projected, supported, and sustained. It closes into the joint objective area within 

a seven-day period. U.S. Marine Corps, “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of 

Operations,” p. 2, conclusion.

17. Ibid., pp 1- 2, conclusion.

18. The scenario includes three regimental landing team objectives, two surface 

assault (Objectives A and C) and one vertical assault (Objective B). The initial 

distances from the sea base to the objectives are 37 (Objective A), 86 (Objective B), 

and 31 (Objective C) nautical miles. An additional nine nautical miles are factored 

into Objective B for evasive maneuvers and obstacle avoidance, making the total 

distance 95 nautical miles for vertical assault forces. U.S. Marine Corps, “Mission 

Area Analysis, Operational Reach―2015, Final Report,” Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command, June 2, 2000, pp. 3, 7. 

19. The scenario lands fi ve infantry battalions (three mechanized and two 

truck-mobile), four tank companies, four light armored reconnaissance companies, 
299

three artillery battalions, two combat engineer companies, and four low altitude 

air defense platoons at Objectives A and C within one period of darkness. Combat 

trains and combat service support detachments land the next day. This accounts 

for a total of 11,162 Marines and 3,498 vehicles and pieces of equipment between 

the two objectives. (U.S. Marine Corps, “Operational Reach―2015,” pp. 1-5) Surface 

assaults are an integral component of expeditionary maneuver warfare and shipto-objective maneuver. And, while future capabilities like the expeditionary 

fi ghting vehicle, high speed vessel, landing craft air cushion (service life extension 

program), and landing craft utility (replacement) greatly enhance this capability 

by making over-the-horizon operations possible, the fact remains that surface 

assaults do not provide the capability to conduct pure ship-to-objective maneuver 

operations as envisioned by the Marines Corps’ future concept. Only vertical 

assault capabilities attain the power projection and operational reach distances 

envisioned by ship-to-objective maneuver, which is why this study focuses on 

them. 

20. The Marine Corps is buying 360 MV-22s based on its operational 

requirements document. These 72 aircraft represent 20 percent of the fl eet. It is 

currently planned for the Air Force to buy 50 and the Navy to buy 48, although 

the Marine Corps is fi elding them much earlier then the other two. Nonetheless, 

the eventual fi elding of these additional aircraft should potentially expand the 

options available for ship-to-objective maneuver and other operations in the joint 

environment. Concerning the CH-53E (service life extension program), recent 

decisions occurring after the publications of these studies have changed this plan. 

A new aircraft, not a rebuild, will replace the current CH-53E fl eet. It will look 

much like the current aircraft and will probably be called the CH-53F. However, 

since this is not yet defi nitive, it will continue to be called the CH-53E (service life 

extension program) in this chapter. It will be a one-for-one replacement of the 

current “echo”’ fl eet which is a total of 154 aircraft. These 28 aircraft represent 18 

percent of the fl eet. Brigadier General Granville R. Amos, USMC (ret), Aviation 

Requirements, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, telephone 

interview by author, January 14, 2004.

21. U.S. Marine Corps, “Operational Reach―2015,” p. 5.

22. In this scenario, the MEU(SOC) supports special operations forces 

conducting direct strike operations. A reinforced company conducts a raid to 

seize a blocking position in support of the main effort. The force package includes 

253 marines (includes four HMMWVs, crew-served and anti-tank weapons, and 

60mm mortars), 12 MV-22s, 6 joint strike fi ghters, 4 CH-53E (service life extension 

program) heavy lift helicopters, 4 AH-1Z attack helicopters, 3 UH-1Y utility 

helicopters, and 2 KC-130J aerial refueling planes. The inclusion of aerial refueling 

capabilities distinguishes this study from the previous one. The “Operational 

Reach―2015” scenario uses only inherent aircraft ranges and ground refueling 

for helicopters where possible. Major Robert J. Stevenson, USMC, Mission 

and Analysis Branch, Studies and Analysis Division, Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command, “Mission Area Analysis, MEU (SOC) Extended Range 
300

Operations, Executive Summary,” results of study presented in brief format to 

Brigadier General S. T. Helland, Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation, 

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, November 13, 2003, slides 14, 15. 

23. Ibid, slide 31.

24. U.S. Marine Corps, “Mission Area Analysis, MEB Sea Basing, IPR #4, 

Revised Base Case,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, 

U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, November 

20, 2003, p. 4. 

25. Ibid, p. 46.

26. This section supports use of the landing craft air cushion as the maritime 

prepositioning force, future, landing craft because it proved to get the job done 

by almost 1.5 hours quicker then the other two future technologies used for this 

study. Twenty percent of this is due to landing constraints on displacement craft, 

and 80 percent is due to the greater speed of the landing craft air cushion. Ibid., p. 

29.

27. Ibid., p. 59.

28. In this extended scenario with its continuous lift and resupply 

requirements, the expeditionary strike group runs out of fuel at S+12 (S day is 

the commencement of ship-to-objective maneuver operations). The reachback 

capability of the sea base allows for the expeditionary strike group to be resupplied, 

and there are other sources of fuel, specifi cally the maritime preposition group. 

While this does not shut down ship-to-objective maneuver operations, it does 

highlight their additional logistical considerations, the importance of accurate 

logistical planning, and the requirement for sea lines of communication to be fully 

operational to adequately support extended over-the-horizon ship-to-objectivemaneuver operations. Ibid., pp. 64, 68. 

29. Draft, “Seabasing Concept of Operations,” Department of the Navy, 

Expeditionary Warfare Division, U.S. Marine Corps, Expeditionary Force 

Development, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, January 30, 2003, 

p. 3.3.

30. Major Robert J. Stephenson, Mission Area Analysis Branch, Studies and 

Analysis Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, interviewed 

by author, December 9, 2003, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, VA. 

31. Recent events in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM highlight this problem. 

“The division’s ability to infl uence the theater and national intelligence collection 

activity was limited. A shortage of theater collection platforms was aggravated by 

the use of these collectors for deep missions at the expense of maneuver units. . . . On 

the high-tempo battlefi eld, the highly centralized theater intelligence architecture 

proved too slow and cumbersome to be tactically relevant.” Lieutenant Colonel 

Michael S. Groen, 1st Marine Division G-2, “Blue Diamond Intelligence: DivisionLevel Intelligence Operations During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM,” Marine Corps 

Gazette, February 2004, p. 25.
301

32. U.S. Marine Corps, “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations,” 

pp. 1-9.

33. The future destroyer, DD(X), will carry two 155mm advanced gun systems. 

This will fi re the long range land attack projectile, a boost-glide GPS-guided round 

that provides a high degree of accuracy but is not considered a precision-guided 

munition. The maximum range of this round is classifi ed. The advanced gun 

system fi res 10 rounds a minute and the DD(X) will have a 600-round magazine 

which may be increased to 1,000 rounds. The plan is to build 24 DD(X)s, with two 

per expeditionary strike group. The fi rst one should be operational in FY13. The 

advanced gun system also has counterbattery radar capability. An interim round, 

the extended range munition, is being developed to meet current requirements 

until the advanced gun system and long-range land attack projectile are fi elded. It 

is fi red from 5”/62 naval guns. This program is currently experiencing diffi culties 

and is behind fi elding schedule. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are conducting 

long-term research on electromagnetic energy to fi re both ship and land vehicle 

weapons systems. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Seng, USMC, N753G, NSFS 

Requirements, Expeditionary Warfare Branch, U.S. Navy, interview by author, 

December 15, 2003, Headquarters, U.S. Navy, Washington, DC. 

34. U.S. Marine Corps, “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations,” 

pp. 1-12.

35. New amphibious control measure terms are used for operational maneuver 

from the sea and ship-to-objective maneuver operations. Littoral penetration areas 

are possible geographic objective areas along a coastline, potentially separated by 

hundreds of miles. The intent is to provide options for the strike group or joint 

force commander while increasing the dilemma for the enemy. Littoral penetration 

zones divide a littoral penetration area into several axes of advance. Littoral 

penetration sites are segments of coastline within the littoral penetration zone that 

vertical or surface assault forces cross en route to their objectives (in amphibious 

assault terms, it is the point where they go “feet dry”). Littoral penetration points 

are points within the littoral penetration sites where surface assault vehicles 

transition from waterborne to landborne movement. These can accommodate a 

single craft or a unit in column. If terrain allows, these are expanded to allow units 

to pass through in tactical formation. 

36. U.S. Marine Corps, “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations,” 

pp. 11-5.

37. Ibid., pp. 1-10.

38. Ibid., pp. 11-15.

39. Navy Acquisitions, Improved Littoral War-Fighting Capabilities Needed, 

Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, October 2003, obtained from 

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Strategic Initiatives Group website http:

//hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/PP&O/SIG/TopSight/tsfi n.htm; accessed November 14, 

2003. 
302

40. These differing priorities are highlighted in the statements made in March 

of 2003 before the Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Service Committee, 

U.S. House of Representatives, by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the 

Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. The U.S. Marine Corps statement 

refers to its 3.0 Marine expeditionary brigade amphibious lift requirement, the seabasing concept, and the need for “new” lighterage to support it [emphasis added], [emphasis added], 

the need to integrate amphibious lift with maritime propositioning forces, “Sea 

Strike,” LPD-17, and the LHD-8 (the new refi t referred to as the “plug-plus”). 

The U.S. Navy statement refers to none of these. It refers to “Sea Power 21” only 

twice, both times in rather general terms. It also makes no mention of “Naval 

Power 21,” the document that speaks to Navy/Marine future concepts, vision, 

and cooperation. The U.S. Marine Corps statement does not specifi cally mention 

“Naval Power 21” either, but its concepts run throughout the document.

41. U.S. Marine Corps, “Ship-to-Objective Maneuver Concept of Operations,” 

pp. 1-9.

42. Ibid, pp. 6-9.

43. FORCEnet seeks to digitally integrate Navy and Marine Corps 

communications systems, sensors, weapons, and platforms, including ships, 

airplanes, and land vehicles. It will be a WEB-enabled network intended to be the 

umbrella under which the naval services operate. Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor, 

“FORCEnet is Navy’s Future: Information-sharing, From Seabed to Space,” Armed 

Forces Journal, December 2003, pp. 50, 51. 

44. Lieutenant Colonel Rich Webster, USMC, Transformation Branch, Futures 

Warfi ghting Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, “Marine 

Corps Transformation,” briefi ng slide 5, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

College, November 18, 2003. 

45. U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Concepts and Programs 2003,” p. 21.

46. George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of 

America,” Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, p. 16.
303

CHAPTER 12

IS THE AIR COMPONENT COORDINATION ELEMENT (ACCE)

EMBEDDED IN THE COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT 

COMMAND (CFLCC) HQ A MODEL FOR FUTURE CONFLICT?

Colonel Byron H. Risner

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in Iraq and Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM in Afghanistan changed the Air Force “foot-print around 

the world . . . substantially,” said Roche. The service set up “new 

bases and renewed relationships” and proved “remarkably fl exible in 

adapting to these new demands.” Roche said that “teamwork and trust” 

made Gulf War II a coordinated “warfi ghting effort from planning to 

execution.” One example was the joint planning effort of the Air Force 

and Army to iron out air-ground coordination problems that surfaced 

during Operation Enduring Freedom. As a result, USAF placed an air 

component coordinating element―led by then Major General Daniel P. 

Leaf―with the land component commander for Gulf War II.

Air Force Magazine

November 2003

WHAT IS THE CFLCC-ACCE?

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was the fi rst confl ict where the Combined 

Force Air and Space Component Commander (CFACC) created air 

component coordination elements within the component headquarters 

and each of the functional counterparts (land, maritime, and special 

operations). As part of other operations, the Air Component Commander 

had air component coordination elements embedded in Coalition Joint 

Task Force (CJTF)-180 and CJTF-Horn of Africa. During Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM, the Coalition Force Land Component Commander-Air 

Component Coordination Element (CFLCC-ACCE) deployed to Camp 

Doha, Kuwait, and formed a part of the coalition forces land component 

commander staff. 

At the headquarters in Kuwait, an Air Force Major General led the air 

component coordination element. Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley, 

CFACC during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, selected Major General Dan 

Leaf to serve as the air component coordination element director to the 
304

land component staff. At the time, Leaf was working at the Pentagon as 

Air Force’s Director of Operational Capability Requirements. He received 

clear guidance regarding command relationships as well as roles and 

missions for his position. Leaf attended orientation at Shaw Air Force 

Base in late January 2003 where he was briefed on Central Command Air 

Forces (CENTAF) Operation IRAQI FREEDOM plans. At the same time, 

Leaf assembled a core staff of ten offi cers and two enlisted personnel for 

deployment to Camp Doha.1

Figure 1 depicts the various command and coordination 

relationships between the ACCE and other elements in theater. It is 

important to note that the ACCE Director remained under operational 

control to the Coalition Forces Air Component Commander during 

all operations. 

Coordination

OPCON

Coordination

Senior USAF

Offi ccer

COMUSCENTAF CFACC

9ASETF/CC D/CFACC

AFFOR ACCE Staff

ACCE Director

Surface Commander’s HQ

Figure 1. Surface Commander, CFACC, ACCE, and AFFOR 

Command and Coordination Relationships2

MISSION AND INTENT

The mission and intent of the ACCE was defi ned in the November 2002 

U.S. Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF) Concept of Operations 

as follows: The Air Component Coordination Element is the primary 

facilitating authority between the surface commander and the CFACC. It 

facilitates the interaction of the surface commander’s and air component 

commander’s functions within standard operating procedures (SOPs), 
305

and in the absence of SOPs, aids in establishing cross-communication 

between the functionals. The ACCE will serve as a conduit of information 

fl ow and will facilitate coordination between the Combined Air Operation 

Center (CAOC) and the headquarters’ functionals. The ACCE will also 

provide airpower expertise to support mission planning and execution. It 

is important to note that the ACCE does not and will not replace, replicate, 

and/or circumvent normal request mechanisms already in place in the 

surface commander’s staff.3

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the CFACC’s concept also 

intended to insert representation at a level commensurate to staff 

principals on the CFLCC staff. With the ACCE mission statement as 

a guideline, the Kuwait CFLCC-ACCE developed its own mission 

statement: “Provide command-to-command level presence in the 

CFLCC. Provide operational level assessment and coordination of 

CFLCC planning and execution to ensure integration with the Air 

Component Commander’s air operation plan and operational intent 

to meet Joint Force Commander guidance.”4

Major General Leaf further provided more specifi c guidance to 

members of the ACCE in a Director’s intent statement: 

The CFLCC-ACCE Director’s intent is to provide a continuous fl ow of 

effective, operational level communication between the CFACC and 

CFLCC. This requires CFLCC-ACCE team participation in all aspects 

of CFLCC’s planning and execution cycles to represent the CFACC’s 

operational vision and intent. Essential planning and execution 

cycles include long-range plans, future operations, Deep Operations 

Coordination Cell, intelligence, and fi re support element. The team will 

keep the CFLCC-ACCE Director informed of key issues that may impact 

combined/joint operations at the theater operational level and provide 

input during CFLCC working group meetings to ensure CFACC/

CFLCC coordination. Additionally, the team will support at least one 

position on the Coalition Operations and Intelligence Center fl oor as the 

CFACC representative.”5

The CFLCC-ACCE had mission statements and directives that clearly 

defi ned the role the ACCE would play in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

while supporting Lieutenant General McKiernan and his staff. At the time 

there was no Joint or Air Force doctrine that defi ned the ACCE to those 

who did not have the USCENTAF ACCE concept of operations. 

The CFLCC-ACCE deployed to Camp Doha, Kuwait, on February 

4, 2003. Leaf’s 10-person team fell in on the Air Force element that had 
306

been in place at McKiernan’s Headquarters since December 2003. This 

four-person element was part of the normal 90-day Air Expeditionary 

Force rotation that provided the CFLCC staff with support for sustained 

operations in the defense of Kuwait. Organization and manning for Leaf’s 

ACCE refl ected the USCENTAF concept of operations with the ten person 

increase required when combat operations are likely. Table 1 displays the 

manning for the CFLCC-ACCE.6

Headquarters Element:

# Grade Position

1 O-8 ACCE Director

1 O-4/O-3 Executive Offi cer

1 E-6/E-5 Info Management Specialist

1 E-4 Personnel Security Offi cer

Plans/Ops/Intel Element:

# Grade Position

3 O-4/O-3 Air Ops Planners (Strike, Mobility, Airspace)

3 O-4/O-3 Intel

Table 1. AFLCC-ACCE Manning.

One of the key components of the CFLCC-ACCE was that for the fi rst 

time the Director was to be a general offi cer with equal rank to key staff 

principals on the CFLCC staff. Major General Leaf modifi ed the actual 

rank structure of the CFLCC-ACCE during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. 

He personally selected his staff to included two colonels (one as Deputy 

Director), three lieutenant colonels, and two majors. Although not an 

original manning requirement, the ACCE Director selected a space/

information operations expert as part of his staff. This member worked 

all aspects of space, information operations, and counter command and 

control activities. This selection reaped signifi cant dividends as the ACCE 

received positive feedback from both the CFLCC information operations 

and space cells. A key factor was that the individual had experience with 

multiple counter C2 systems and special access programs, as well as 

experience working with the Army.7

The CFLCC-ACCE initially set up to operate and support CFLCC’s 

prewar battle rhythm. Once the war began, the Army’s combat 
307

rhythm immediately demanded a 24-hour operational presence 

for ACCE members and the need to be immediately available. This 

required the senior ACCE staff to move into the CFLCC “War Room” 

as well as additional presence in the operations center. The CFLCCACCE went from one person manning the CFLCC Operations fl oor 

to two and three during combat operations. The ACCE worked in 

this confi guration until redeployment on April 20, 2003.8

CFLCC-ACCE: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM ISSUES.

The ACCE quickly established its relevance and value to McKiernan’s 

staff, breaking down existing institutional barriers. In accordance with the 

ACCE concept of operations, the organization’s manning did not include 

representatives of sister services or coalition partners. As operations 

progressed, the ACCE quickly became an element that refl ected the 

coalition/joint operation it supported. During the course of Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM, the CFLCC-ACCE absorbed Navy, Marine, and 

coalition personnel to provide critical liaison with the CFLCC staff. Some 

of these personnel already were attached to the CFLCC staff but migrated 

to the ACCE during the confl ict. 

CFLCC and ACCE staff members felt that the arrival and standup of 

the ACCE occured late in the planning cycle. Once established at Camp 

Doha, ACCE personnel had to spend valuable time in order to understand 

CFLCC’s ground plan. Members who deployed in January missed the fi nal 

planning stages of the ground plan, as well as the last exercise prior to 

combat operations. Thus, the ACCE arrived at a critical transition period 

where CFLCC was preparing for combat operations, one that was less 

than optimal for both staffs. In addition, some ACCE members had not 

been “read in” on higher classifi ed portions of both CFACC and CFLCC 

plans. This delayed them from understanding fully the IRAQI FREEDOM 

operational ground and air plans. Moreover, ACCE members did not 

have the opportunity to review the Master Air Attack Plan or meet and 

interface with key members of the Combined Air Operations Center 

(CAOC) at Prince Sultan Airbase, Saudi Arabia. Members of the ACCE 

required briefi ngs on CFACC plans as well as interface with members of 

combat operations, combat plans, airlift, space, intelligence, and battlefi eld 

coordination detachment elements. It is from these key air operations center 

elements that the ACCE receives and communicates vital CFACC/CFLCC 

information. The CFLCC-ACCE required a single point of contact in the air 

operations center to facilitate proper routing of ACCE queries, information 
308

requests, and important issues. CFACC remedied this diffi culty in early 

March 2003, when he established an ACCE help desk at the Prince Sultan 

air operations center. 9

Information exchange between the ACCE and CFLCC Future 

Operations Cell and the Deep Operations Coordination Cell was 

critical during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The coordination 

between the ACCE and these two cells was key to ensuring 

synchronization between CFLCC and CFACC planning. Early on, 

members of the Deep Operations Coordination Cell, the Future 

Operations Cell, and CFLCC staff were unfamiliar with the 

wartime ACCE and initially expected the ACCE to be a “battlefi eld 

coordination detachment in reverse.”10

Joint Publication 3-30 defi nes the battlefi eld coordination 

detachment as:

The Army component commander establishes a battlefi eld coordination 

detachment to act as the interface between the component commander 

and the JFACC. The BCD is collocated with the JFACC’s staff in the 

joint air operations center. The battlefi eld coordination detachment 

processes land force requests for air support, monitors and interprets 

the land battle situation in the joint air operation center, and provides 

the necessary interface for the exchange of current operational and 

intelligence data. The battlefi eld coordination detachment expedites 

the exchange of information through face-to-face coordination with 

elements in the joint air operations center, and coordinates air defense 

and airspace control matters. Immediate and emergency airlift requests 

are passed to the battlefi eld coordination detachment via the airlift 

advanced notifi cation/coordination net by theater airlift liaison offi cers. 

The battlefi eld coordination detachment is organized into sections 

which are incorporated throughout the joint air operations center (e.g., 

plans, intelligence, operations, fusion, air defense artillery and Army 

management, and airlift). 11

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.3 (Counterland) defi nes the battlefi eld 

coordination detachment as:

The senior Army liaison element to the Theatre Air Control System 

and is located in the air operations center. The battlefi eld coordination 

detachment processes the land component’s air support requests, to 

include air interdiction target nominations and requests for preplanned 

close air support. The battlefi eld coordination detachment processes the 

ground component’s target nominations and acts throughout planning 
309

and execution to ensure proper representation of ground component 

priorities in the overall process. The battlefi eld coordination detachment 

acts as the primary conduit for real-time and near real-time requests for 

air interdiction targeting from the ground component. Such requests 

fl ow up the Army chain of command to the highest echelon, then fl ow to 

the air operations center via the battlefi eld coordination detachment. It 

is also the battlefi eld coordination detachment’s responsibility to inform 

the various ground commanders of which nominated targets were or 

were not included on the target list for incorporation into the air tasking 

order and the approval status of preplanned close air support requests. 

This feedback loop is critical, as ground commanders must know which 

requested targets did or did not meet the joint force commander’s priority 

requirements for air attack. During the execution process, the battlefi eld 

coordination detachment provides current ground picture information 

to the air operations center on both friendly and enemy ground forces.12

Since the ACCE and the air operations center battlefi eld coordination 

detachment had little initial interface to defi ne clearly each element’s 

function and responsibility, there was some confusion on the part of both the 

staffs regarding who to use as the source for CFLCC/CFACC interface. This 

caused friction in the CFLCC staff when the ACCE would not have certain 

information the staff thought it should possess. The ACCE felt that CFLCC 

could have obtained this information through the battlefi eld coordination 

detachment. At times, this caused the ACCE to be consumed with issues 

that drew them away from their primary duties. In turn, members of the 

battlefi eld coordination detachment suffered similar frustrations when 

the ACCE would call to get information from them that it should have 

obtained from the air operations center staff. The Operations Chief of the 

air operations center battlefi eld coordination detachment fi nally had to 

instruct his staff to stop answering information requests from the ACCE 

and informed the ACCE to contact the appropriate air operations center 

staff section.13 This clearly highlights the importance of the ACCE 

and battlefi eld coordination detachment staffs coordinating early 

to clearly defi ne and deconfl ict the roles and responsibilities of each 

element. Once they have established roles they must communicate 

that information to the CFLCC and combined air operations center 

staffs to avoid confusion. Because the battlefi eld coordination 

detachment and ACCE did not possess suffi cient manning, and little 

coordination between the elements had occurred prior to the confl ict, 

diffi culties were exacerbated. The less than optimal manning of 

the battlefi eld coordination detachment was an issue Lieutenant 
310

General McKeirnan acknowledged as one that needed addressing in 

future contingencies.14

Command and Control (C2) systems interoperability and 

knowledge was a basic requirement for the CFLCC-ACCE team to 

function smoothly. C2 systems and databases were a concern for 

both staffs. The need for common joint C2 systems was apparent 

as their lack occasionally hampered operational level decision. 

Some systems were common to both CFACC and CFLCC, but the 

majority were not. The air operations center used Theater Battle 

Management Command Systems, while CFLCC utilized Command 

and Control Personal Computer and Automated Deep Operations 

Coordination Systems. The lack of a fully functional theater battle 

management command system in the Kuwait operations center was 

of particular concern for the deep operations coordination cell as it 

did not provide the deserved level of detail on the air tasking order.15

From the CFLCC-ACCE perspective, the digital collaboration tool 

system purchased by the Army and CENTCOM performed poorly. 

Less than 10 percent of the users actually utilized the tool; it was a 

large bandwidth consumer and frequently locked up. Access to and 

training in common operational and tactical pictures and chat instant 

messaging tools were essential to CFLCC-ACCE effectiveness. 

CFLCC and CFACC did not use the same chat systems or servers; 

CFACC used internet relay chat, Microsoft chat, and zircon chat, 

while CFLCC used Microsoft and internet relay chat. Lack of 

interoperability between those chat systems decreased functionality, 

reduced effectiveness, and increased workload. As an example, the 

ACCE intelligence section was not able to communicate in real time 

with the CFLCC intelligence staff or the battlefi eld coordination 

detachment at the air operations center.16

Since the ACCE works for the CFACC, equipment provided 

by the CFLCC was minimal. The CENTAF ACCE concept of 

operations assumed more host component support than was 

available. The ACCE members found that they lacked suffi cient 

numbers of classifi ed computers, web based common operational 

picture software for the air and ground picture, and equipment that 

allowed them to access weather information throughout the theater, 

as well as operating bases of coalition aircraft. The CFLCC-ACCE 

did not arrive with theater information sources such as telephone 
311

directories and key web sites. The team had to invest a great deal 

of effort in building an information base during the initial stages of 

deployment.

Finally, parts of the CFLCC staff felt that the CFLCC-ACCE 

departed rather abruptly. The ACCE had no predefi ned exit 

strategy, and some CFLCC staff members felt there was no overlap 

for transition to Phase IV operations.17 Though several manning, 

training, and equipment shortfalls challenged the CFLCC-ACCE 

as a result of the quick activation and deployment, the ACCE and 

CFLCC staff adapted and responded quickly prior to and during 

combat operations. Equipment had to be improvised, processes 

needed to be established, and operating procedures had to be 

developed. In the end the ACCE was able to provide the Director 

with situational awareness and processes required to effectively 

represent the CFACC to CFLCC.

CFLCC-ACCE RECOMMENDATIONS

Lieutenant General [Ronald] Keys said an important innovation was 

creation in Kuwait of the Air Component Coordination Element headed 

by Major General Daniel P. Leaf. He served as personal representative of 

the Combined Force Air and Space Component Commander (CFACC)―

USAF Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley―to the Coalition Force 

Land Component Commander (CFLCC), Army Lieutenant General 

David D. McKiernan.

Leaf’s job, Keys said, was to “straighten out the special kinks that happen 

during a fast-moving war.” In addition, he went on, “every major land 

force had an ACCE with them, and their job was, if their priorities weren’t 

being looked at properly, or there was going to be a change to the ground 

scheme of maneuver, or there was something happening on the air side 

that the land force needed to know, they got that.”

The position was crucial in the opening hours of the war, when the 

decision was made to launch the ground forces without a preceding air 

war. Air operations were supposed to start March 22. When timetables 

were advanced, communication between the CFACC and the CFLCC 

was critical. The new position “paid us big benefi ts because of the fl uid 

nature of this war,” said Keys.

Air Force Magazine

June 2003
312

As Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations Lieutenant 

General Keys stated, the ACCE is a “key innovation” lauded by both 

Army and Air Force leaders. The following recommendations should be 

incorporated where applicable.

The ACCE has recently been included in Joint Doctrine. The current 

ACCE defi nition is in Joint Publication 3-09.3 (released November 2003):

Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE). The Air Force 

component commander establishes an ACCE to interface and provide 

liaison with the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) or 

commander, Army forces. The ACCE is collocated with the JFLCC staff. 

The ACCE is the senior Air Force element assisting the JFLCC staff 

in planning air component supporting and supported requirements. 

The ACCE interface includes exchanging current intelligence and 

operational data, support requirements, coordinating the integration of 

AFFOR/JFACC requirements for airspace control measures, joint fi re 

support coordinating measures, and CAS. The ACCE is organized with 

expertise in the following areas: plans, operations, intelligence, airspace 

management, and airlift. The ACCE is not an air support operations 

center or tactical air control party, but acts as the AFFOR/JFACC 

senior liaison element and can also perform many air support planning 

functions.18

Joint Publication 3-06.3 is the recently revised manual for Joint 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS). While 

the document mentions the function of the ACCE, Joint Publication (JP) 

3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, does not. The 

ACCE defi nition does contain some overlap with duties of the battlefi eld 

coordination detachment; specifi cally when addressing the coordination 

of joint fi re support control measures and close air support. The need 

for coordination between the ACCE and the battlefi eld coordination 

detachment prior to confl ict is critical to prevent any confusion that may 

arise between the staffs. The ACCE, by defi nition, is much more than a 

coordinating element for close air support, and joint doctrine should refl ect 

this fact. Thus, it should form a part of the CFACC organization in Chapter 

Two of the next revision of Joint Pub 3-30. The ACCE concept is so new that 

current Air Force and Army doctrine does not mention it. The Air Force is 

currently revising AFDD 2-1.3 (Counterland) to include the function and 

purpose of the ACCE.19 Army doctrine will need to include the ACCE 

in appropriate FM 100 series publications, specifi cally FM 100-13. 

The CENTAF ACCE concept of operations should be distributed 

and made available to CFLCC and other components that would 
313

receive support from an ACCE. This would make the CFLCC staff 

and others aware of the ACCE mission and functions, as well as the 

expected support required for the ACCE.

In future operations, the Air Force should identify the ACCE 

Director as early as possible. This would allow him to select his team 

and allow it to prepare properly for deployment. Predeployment 

processing for the CFLCC-ACCE presented challenges that made 

an expedient departure diffi cult. Since they deployed late in the 

planning process, ACCE members had to spend valuable time 

“catching up.” Being familiar with the air and ground plan as well 

as coordination with the air operations center and the elements 

mentioned earlier are absolute necessities. CFLCC-ACCE personnel 

initially had diffi culty establishing relationships with appropriate 

air operations center action offi cers as the air operations center 

action offi cers were not familiar with the ACCE mission. Since 

the ACCE relies heavily upon information from the air operations 

center, it is important the air operations center staff be ready to 

support the ACCE and the CFLCC mission. Early identifi cation 

and notifi cation would also facilitate determining equipment and 

security requirements. Chemical gear, cots, body armor, computers, 

and classifi ed phones were equipment some ACCE members had to 

acquire once they arrived at Camp Doha. The ACCE needs support 

from either the closest air component installation or CFLCC. Doing 

so would allow the ACCE to begin operations with minimal lost 

time.20

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM manning requirements for the 

CFLCC-ACCE require adjustment to take advantage of the full 

spectrum of air and space capabilities. Listed below are the desired 

base manning requirements for the CFLCC-ACCE identifi ed in the 

CFLCC-ACCE After Action Report (AAR):

• Director―Brigadier General desired.

• Deputy Director (Rated)―Colonel.

• Chief of Staff―Lieutenant Colonel.

• Executive Offi cer (any AFSC)―Major/Lieutenant Colonel.

• Air Operations Center (AOC) functionality expertise (Rated)―

Major/Lieutenant Colonel.
314

• Tactical air operations expertise tailored to the situation 

(Major-Lieutenant Colonel mix)

 — 1 Airlift

 — 1 Multi-role fi ghter/bomber

 — 1 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)

 — 1 Space/Information Operations

• Information Systems Offi cer (expert in COP/CTP 

management)―Captain/Major.

• Comm/Computer―Staff Sergeant/Captain.

• Intelligence Offi cer and NCO―Major/Technical Sergeant.

• Personal Security Offi cer (PSO) detail for Director. 

• Administration―Technical Sergeant.

While the CFLCC-ACCE maintained a team approach and worked for 

the CFACC, it was necessary to assign ACCE team members to several 

CFLCC functional areas. Future CFLCC-ACCE teams may fi nd it benefi cial 

to assign individuals to the following responsibilities: 21

• Plans:

 — Maintain visibility on all CFLCC long range planning.

 — Maintain contact with air operations center strategic 

planners and battlefi eld coordination detachment plans.

 — Ensure CFACC equities are represented.

 — Attend all CFLCC planning group meetings.

 — Inform the ACCE Director of potential confl icts, issues, 

and opportunities.

• Future Operations:

 — Maintain visibility on the 48–144 hour fi ght.

 — Maintain contact with air operations center plans chief 

and battlefi eld coordination detachment plans.

 — Attend all CFLCC planning team meetings.

 — Read all fragmentary orders and screen for CFACC

 issues.

 — Inform ACCE Director of potential confl icts, issues, and 

opportunities.

• Deep Operations Control Cell:

 — Maintain visibility on all targeting issues in the Deep 

Operations Control Cell.

 — Maintain contact with CAOC Guidance, Apportionment, 
315

and Targeting Chief, Master Air Attack Plan Chief and 

battlefi eld coordination detachment plans.

 — Attend Combat Assessment Board, Daily Effects Board, 

and Effects Working Group.

 — Be aware of and coordinate all airspace coordination 

measures, including fi re support coordination line, 

forward boundary, and joint special operations areas.

 — Be aware of the Time Sensitive Target process.

 — Inform the ACCE Director of potential confl icts, issues 

and opportunities.

• Fire Support Element―Ops Floor Current Operations:

 — Conduct 24/7 operations on the CFLCC Ops fl oor.

 — Maintain contacts with air operations center Chief of 

Combat Ops, air operations center Fire Support Element, 

and battlefi eld coordination detachment operations.

 — Prepare products as necessary for battle updates.

 — Monitor Air Tasking Order execution for situational 

awareness.

 — Keep the ACCE Director informed of any current ops 

issues that require his attention.

• Space and Information Operations.

 — Serve as a key CFACC interface with other service space 

and information operations agents.

 — Coordinate the functional capability of information 

operations systems used by the CFACC.

 — Interpret function and service of the information from our 

space systems.

• Information Operations:

 — Work with local information management staff on 

connectivity.

 — Ensure that the systems required to build situational 

awareness are working.

 — Ensure the ACCE team is trained and able to utilize the 

information.

 — Coordinate with Component command C-6 section for 

service.
316

A member of an Army study that evaluated the operational and 

strategic conduct of CFLCC operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

recommended that the ACCE improve its focus on the processes within the 

air operations center system. There were times when information received 

by the CFLCC staff through the battlefi eld coordination detachment and 

other air operation center elements confl icted with information received 

through the ACCE.22 Proper coordination between the ACCE and 

battlefi eld coordination detachment and the robust manning 

structure mentioned above will allow the ACCE to better assist with 

the Army’s planning process. ACCE members with functional area 

expertise placed in these areas will be able to jointly integrate Air 

Force kinetic and non-kinetic multipliers with proper connectivity 

and liaison with the air operations center. 

CFLCC personnel should always strive to obtain information 

through established doctrinal processes and avoid shortcutting 

proper channels by using the ACCE for answers. Staff members 

must be cognizant of the fact that ACCE current operations offi cers 

do not have “action” or execution authority and avoid the tendency 

to make platform-based support requests rather than maintaining 

an effects focus. ACCE personnel must be well-informed as to the 

proper doctrinal channels for information fl ow and assist/guide 

the CFLCC staff. Additionally, they must rapidly learn the internal 

workings of the Army staff in order to understand unique terms 

of reference and be familiar with the internal operations center 

processes. LTG McKeirnan’s staff continually sought quantitative 

portrayal of CFACC contribution to the fi ght. Presence of the ACCE 

may have amplifi ed this desire as the ACCE struggled to balance 

providing that picture while focusing on future operations. The air 

component must improve capability to rapidly capture and distribute 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coverage, air tasking 

order sortie generation and battle damage assessment mission report 

data.23 By having a well-coordinated communication path between 

the air operations center, the land component commander’s staff, 

and the battlefi eld coordination detachment, the ACCE will be able 

to provide the Army with accurate and timely information on both 

kinetic and non-kinetic efforts of the air component. 

Air Force and Army air to ground coordination during Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM was a huge success. A joint close air support 

conference held at McKiernan’s headquarters prior to the start of 
317

hostilities was critical in establishing common close air support 

procedures. The Operation IRAQI FREEDOM environment was 

particularly complicated in that the theater area contained multiple 

boundaries and command and control agencies. Close air support 

special instructions must be completed and distributed by the air 

component prior to the conference in order to allow ample time to 

review the execution level details at the conference. The kill box/grid 

square method of deconfl icting fi res also worked well; the ACCE 

ensured that the Army staff fully understood the kill box concept. 

Buy in was complete at all levels by the end of offensive operations. 

The urban close air support construct for air operations in and around 

Baghdad demonstrated close coordination between the ACCE and 

CFLCC staffs. Coordination on zones, subsections, and key facility 

location was extremely important in developing this phase of the 

operation. The ACCE presence during planning and execution was 

a key factor in Army acceptance of using longitude and latitude 

gridlines when designating the fi re support coordination line. 

Initially, phase lines oriented around geographical features marked 

this critical deconfl iction tool. Due to the speed of the operation along 

with the wide use of global positioning systems, laptop mapping 

systems, and aircraft navigation systems, latitude and longitude 

gridlines were used as the approved method for designating the fi re 

support coordination line. The ACCE recommends that all future 

joint training and exercises use this procedure.24

CFLCC-ACCE: DID IT WORK?

CFLCC Commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan 

stated that the CFLCC-ACCE “worked very well” and viewed 

the ACCE as a valuable “plug-in” to his staff. He emphasized the 

importance of having both the permanent Joint Air Force billets 

on his staff as well as the ACCE available during Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM. Although he frequently spoke directly to Lieutenant 

General Moseley on component commander issues during Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM, he felt the relationship between his staff and the 

ACCE was extremely benefi cial and greatly added to the success of 

his ground forces. 25
318

To summarize, overwhelmingly, Army and Air Force members 

involved with the CFLCC-ACCE agreed that the concept is one that should 

continue and be improved upon for future operations. The ACCE is a 

valid entity and was a subtle but important contributor to CFLCC success 

during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The CENTAF concept of operations 

is sound, and the ACCE concept provides critical Army/Air Force linkage. 

General Leaf felt the CFLCC-ACCE provided two principal advantages: 

First, presence in the CFLCC headquarters and activities. Physically being 

present in the CFLCC headquarters diffused many issues before they 

became roadblocks to joint operations. By being present as ground plans 

and operations developed, his ACCE was able to convey the air perspective 

to CFACC personnel with greater clarity and understanding than an 

e-mail, briefi ng, or phone call. The ACCE provided this air perspective 

to McKiernan’s staff without circumventing the battlefi eld coordination 

detachment process. On several occasions, Leaf’s staff referred questions 

to the battlefi eld coordination detachment in order to exercise the proper 

doctrinal processes and communication channels. Likewise, the battlefi eld 

coordination detachment referred the ACCE to the air operations center 

for questions that should be addressed by that staff. It is clearly evident 

that prior coordination between the ACCE and the battlefi eld coordination 

detachment is crucial to prevent confusion regarding the roles and 

responsibilities of each element.

Second was the unique perspective that presence provided. 

Embedding the ACCE within CFLCC gave the ACCE a unique perspective 

that required discipline to remain objective and retain the role of CFACC 

representative.26 ACCE members need to be accessible and involved 

joint team players, while at the same time avoiding becoming de 

facto members of the CFLCC staff. This is an important balance; 

the ACCE cannot treat the Army staff as an adversary, but must 

fi rmly present the air component perspective and defend its 

methods and priorities. Two critical decisions were central to ACCE 

success: 1) Providing directors with suffi cient rank to function as 

representatives for the CFACC; and 2) the related decision to have 

the ACCE Directors remain within the CFACC’s chain of command 

as opposed to becoming part of the host component staff.27

The ACCE concept should be used as a model for the future 

and be improved upon to make it an even more robust and viable 

element for the CFLCC staff. With a dedicated effort to address and 

solve the doctrine, manning, and equipment issues mentioned, the 
319

ACCE will remain a relevant entity for joint warfi ghting success in 

the 21st century. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 12

1. USCENTAF, “Kuwait CFLCC Air Component Coordination Element (KACCE), Operation IRAQI FREEDOM After Action Report,” April 28, 2003. 

2. USCENTAF, “Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE) Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS),” November 13, 2002.

3. Ibid.

4. USCENTAF, “ACCE Operation IRAQI FREEDOM After Action Report.”

5. Ibid.

6. USCENTAF, “ACCE CONOPS.”

7. USCENTAF, “ACCE Operation IRAQI FREEDOM After Action Report.”

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Lieutenant Colonel Eugene Smith, U.S. Army, Assistant CFLCC DOCC 

Chief during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, interviewed by author, December 11, 

2003, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

11. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Command and Control for Joint Air Operations,”

Joint Pub 3-30, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 5, 2003.

12. U.S. Air Force, “Counterland, AFDD 2-1.3,” Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force 

Doctrine Center, August 27, 1999.

13. Lieutenant Colonel Karl Wingenbach, U.S. Army, COAC BCD Operations 

Chief, interviewed by author, February 10, 2004.

14. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, U.S. Army, CFLCC Commander, 

interviewed by author, December 18, 2003, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

15. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Black, U.S. Army, CFLCC DOCC Chief during 

OIF, telephone interview by author, January 27, 2004.

16. USCENTAF, “ACCE After Action Report.”

17. Lieutenant Colonel Smith interview.

18. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close 

Air Support (CAS),” Joint Pub 3-09.3, Washington DC, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

September 3, 2003.

19. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Connolly, “Request for ACCE Information,” 

electronic mail message to Lieutenant Colonel Byron Risner, October 28, 2003.

20. USCENTAF, “ACCE After Action Report.”
320

21. Ibid.

22. Colonel Jim Embrey, U.S. Army, OIF Army Strategic Study member, 

interviewed by author, December 17, 2003, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

23. USCENTAF, “ACCE Operation IRAQI FREEDOM After Action Report.”

24. Ibid.

25. Lieutenant General McKiernan interview.

26. USCENTAF, “ACCE After Action Report.”

27. Ibid.
321

CHAPTER 13

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 

STATES: DEVELOPMENT OF GRAND STRATEGY

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Reilly

The fundamental purpose of national security strategy is to 

provide a comprehensive framework that balances the ends, ways, 

and means of the elements of national power to achieve national 

security and to protect, preserve and promote a way of life. When 

successful, this process results in the development of a grand 

(unifying) strategy that combines values and interests with a strategic 

appraisal that leads to a series of national policies articulated in a 

unifying strategy. This strategy then serves as a unifying document 

for the national government.1

This chapter will examine the origins and development of 

national security strategy in the United States. It will examine the 

requirement and the content of the annual report the President 

and his advisors develop and submit to Congress, as mandated by 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This chapter will then outline 

and analyze the 1987, 1988, 1994, 1998, and 2002 National Security 

Strategy reports. The purpose is to determine whether or not they 

achieve the intent of Goldwater-Nichols by providing a unifying 

(grand) strategy for the nation. These fi ve reports represent new 

or signifi cant changes in the thinking and direction of U.S. national 

security strategy.

THE BACKGROUND: A HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE 

One of the fundamental ways to achieve national security is to 

provide the required government institutions and mechanisms that 

organize the defense establishment, unify the armed forces, harness 

science to military purposes, mobilize military manpower, and 

distribute the cost of defense across the national economy.2 For most 

Americans, the golden age of isolationalism ended on December 7, 

1941, with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. With the end of World 
322

War II came the realization that the United States and the world had 

entered a new era of global ideological competition.3 For the United 

States, this journey towards defi ning and refi ning a national security 

structure and strategy began during the Second World War. But the 

U.S. Government fi rst formally articulated a national strategy in the 

National Security Act of 1947.

The end of the Second World War brought two fundamentally 

different political philosophies to the fore in the debate over the 

future course of American’s role in the world. The fi rst resulted from 

an older conservative political culture that feared that development 

of a strong national security state would endanger the basic values, 

principles, and institutions associated with American democracy. 

Inherent in this approach was a belief that a strong national security 

structure would waste resources, regiment the nation’s youth, and 

concentrate too much authority in the national government, in 

particular the military. This group also feared that the creation of a 

strong executive branch would undermine the basic constitutional 

balance between the Congress and the executive branch.4

The second was a new philosophy of national security that 

believed the United States must pursue an active role in world 

events. This approach stressed that the United States had entered 

an era of total war and the new threats required a new degree of 

military vigilance and preparedness in which all of the nation’s 

resources were mobilized for the defense of America. Furthermore, 

they believed it was not possible to separate the defense of American 

liberties from the defense of liberties everywhere in the world.5 “Peace 

and freedom were indivisible, so that American leadership had no 

choice but to safeguard the country’s security by safeguarding the 

security of the free world in general.”6

In the end, as in all political processes in a democratic society, the 

debate between these fundamentally different philosophies ended 

in a compromise. The formulation of strategy is not a rational and 

systemic process. In fact, it is an intensely political process from 

which national strategy emerges after protracted bargaining and 

compromise.7

The roots of the National Security Act of 1947 trace back to the 

preparations for and execution of military operations during the 

First and Second World Wars and battles between the executive and 
323

legislative branches of government, as well as internal differences 

inside the War Department and between the War Department 

and the Department of the Navy.8 The primary fault lines were 

arguments between the Army and Navy over the role of airpower, 

the realization that the nation’s security structure could no longer 

rest on one organizational structure for peace and a different 

one for war, interservice disagreements over postwar roles and 

missions, the collapse of the peacetime national security planning 

and decisionmaking structure, the lack of a true Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

and the fundamental need to unify the armed services under a single 

department of defense headed by a cabinet rank civilian secretary.9

In recognition of the need for greater unity, coordination, and 

integration for national defense, Congress enacted the National 

Security Act in July of 1947. This act established the modern 

American national security structure by creating a host of new 

agencies, including the National Security Council, National Security 

Resources Board, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff.10

It also created the National Military Establishment by merging 

the Department of War and the Department of the Navy. This 

new executive branch agency was to be headed by the Secretary of 

Defense, a cabinet rank civilian secretary. His offi ces would consist 

of three autonomous executive departments, the Army, Navy, and 

Air Force, as well as several other staff and coordinating boards.11

The 1947 National Security Act was not without controversy and 

political infi ghting, especially between the Army and Navy, which 

stood to lose autonomy and status, and the Congress, which stood 

to lose access and infl uence. While the Secretary of Defense was to 

be the principal assistant to the President on national security issues, 

Congress limited his authority, power, and the size of his staff.12

The service secretaries retained their cabinet-level status, were full 

voting members of the National Security Council, and possessed 

direct access to the President.13 The net result was a weak Secretary 

of Defense and a less than effi cient national defense structure.

The fi rst major change to the National Security Act of 1947 was 

the codifi cation of amendments into the National Security Act 

of 1947. These removed the service secretaries from the National 

Security Council, clarifi ed their subordination to the Secretary of 
324

Defense, and established the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, who would not possess command authority or the right to 

vote with the Joint Chiefs.14 The net result signifi cantly strengthened 

the powers of the Secretary of Defense by making him “the central 

fi gure in coordinating the activities of the three services, who were 

to continue to be separately administered, but not merged.”15

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 continued the trend 

of unifying the armed services. It further refi ned the relationships 

between them and the Secretary of Defense. The military departments 

were to be “separately organized” rather than “administered,” and 

were placed under the “direction, authority, and control” of the 

Secretary of Defense.16 Congress also explicitly granted the Secretary 

of Defense the authority to reorganize the military departments, 

and defi ned the chain of command as running from the President 

through the Secretary of Defense to theater commanders. This act 

also authorized the creation of specifi ed and combined or unifi ed 

commands and provided the Chairman with voting power on the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff.17

THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 

Act of 1986 is the most comprehensive defense reorganization 

package since the National Security Act of 1947. The act was the 

fourth major revision of the 1947 National Security Act and the third 

post-World War II reorganization of the Department of Defense. 

With this act, the 99th Congress sought to strengthen civilian control 

of the Department of Defense, improve military advice to civilian 

leadership, clarify the authority and responsibilities of the combatant 

commanders, improve strategy formulation and contingency 

planning, and provide for more effi cient use of defense resources.18

One of the potentially far reaching changes contained in the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act was the requirement for the President to 

submit an annual report to Congress that detailed the national 

security strategy of the United States.19 The report should provide a 

comprehensive description and discussion of the following:
325

• The worldwide interest, goals, and objectives of the United 

States that are vital to the national security of the United 

States.

• The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national 

defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter 

aggression and to implement the national security strategy of 

the United States.

• The proposed short-term and long-term uses of political, 

economic, military, and other elements of national power 

of the United States to protect or promote the interests and 

achieve the goals and objectives of the United States.

• The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to 

carry out the national security strategy of the United States, 

including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities 

of all elements of national power of the United States to 

support the implementation of the national security strategy.

• Such other measures as may be helpful to inform Congress on 

matters relating to the national security strategy of the United 

States.

• Each national security strategy report shall be transmitted in 

both classifi ed and unclassifi ed form.20

The intent of the 99th Congress was to focus discussions and 

debates on national security strategy by requiring the President 

to codify a grand strategy in terms of national interests, goals, 

objectives, and values; its coherence in terms of relating ends, ways, 

and means; the integration of the element of national power; and its 

time horizon.21 “In theory, at least to the reformers, a clearly written 

strategy would serve the Congress better on the needs for resources 

to execute the strategy, thus facilitating the annual authorization 

and appropriation processes, particularly for the Department of 

Defense.”22
326

AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON NATIONAL 

SECURITY STRATEGY

The Reagan administration developed and published the fi rst 

two national security strategy reports during its fi nal 2 years. Both 

reports provided the world a uniquely American view on national 

security strategy. Since Congress did not pass the GoldwaterNichols Act until late 1986, the National Security Strategy report of 

1987 covered only a limited period of time and refl ected current U.S. 

strategic thinking and direction.23 This fi rst report contained several 

fundamental components now considered integral to any discussion 

of U.S. national security strategy. The Reagan administration’s 

fi rst report contained sections that outlined the current thinking 

on American national security strategy. The sections were titled: 

An American Perspective; Fundamentals of U.S. National Security 

Strategy; U.S. Foreign Policy; U.S. Defense Policy; Executing the 

Strategy; and Looking Forward to the 1990s. 

In “An American Perspective,” the Reagan administration argued 

that it had already “laid the foundation for a more constructive and 

positive American role in world affairs by clarifying the essential 

elements of U.S. foreign and defense policy.”24 Furthermore, the 

administration suggested that it had also objectively reviewed and 

adjusted U.S. policies to refl ect the “dynamics of a complex and 

ever-changing world.”25

In “Fundamentals of U.S. National Security Strategy,” the 

administration highlighted the leadership role the United States 

had assumed following the Second World War and argued that this 

role would continue into the future. The 1987 report also established 

the now familiar concept of identifying and using national interests 

as a guiding principle of American strategy. It identifi ed the fi ve 

U.S. interests as: The survival of the United States as a free and 

independent nation, with its fundamental values and institutions 

intact; A healthy and growing U.S. economy; The growth of freedom, 

democratic institutions and free market economies throughout 

the world, linked by a fair and open international trading system; 

A stable and secure world, free of major threats to U.S. interests; 

and The health and vigor of U.S. alliance relationships.26 The report 
327

detailed fi ve major objectives in support of the articulated national 

interests of the United States.27 It identifi ed the Soviet Union as the 

“most signifi cant threat to U.S. security and national interests.”28

It also recognized international terrorism as an additional threat, 

“which is particularly insidious in nature and growing in scope.”29

This report also outlined three distinct elements of U.S. strategy 

aimed at containing the Soviet Union. The fi rst, “U.S. Defense Policy,” 

involved the forward deployment of military forces required to 

deter and contain Soviet expansion. The second, “U.S. International 

Economic Policy,” involved economic recovery programs for 

Western Europe and Japan and established U.S. leadership in 

establishing and managing the international monetary system, 

while encouraging regional and global free-trade agreements. The 

fi nal element, “U.S. Policy Toward the Third World,” included 

both economic and security assistance to counter Soviet efforts to 

establish Marxist-Leninist regimes.30

The section on U.S. Foreign Policy, described how in general 

terms, the United States worked to sustain its foreign policy goals 

by fostering the growth of democracy and global economic vitality. 

This section focused on the continuity of basic goals, instruments 

of foreign policy, international economic policy, and political and 

informational elements of power. It also included a sub-section 

describing America’s regional policies; however, these were focused 

on the contributions of the military instrument of power.31

The largest section of the 1987 report, “U.S. Defense Policy,” 

detailed the administration’s strategy for the military containment 

of the Soviet Union. The tenets of the then current U.S. defense 

strategy included taking advantage of U.S. strengths and Soviet 

weaknesses, maintenance of strategic deterrence, arms control, 

maintenance of conventional deterrence, space support of national 

security, intelligence support of national security, and low intensity 

confl ict. Taken together, the sections detailing foreign policy and 

defense policy demonstrated the administration’s strong emphasis 

on military power for achieving U.S. goals and objectives and 

protecting national interests.32

The 1987 Report concluded by restating the reasoning behind 

identifying the Soviet Union as the principal threat to the United 

States as well as global peace and stability. It clearly and succinctly 
328

highlighted the fundamental differences in economic, social, and 

political beliefs, the Soviet expansionist policies, the unprecedented 

Soviet military build-up and its threat to the United States and its 

allies, and the link between the Soviet Union and the growth of 

global terrorism. While the report also briefl y warned that the United 

States must not neglect other destabilizing international threats and 

problems which could seriously damage U.S. interests, it failed to 

detail specifi c regions, nations, or threats.33

The fi rst National Security Strategy provided a clear view of current 

American strategic thinking. The report described how the United 

States viewed itself in the world. It contained a comprehensive 

description of U.S. national interests, goals, and objectives 

and provided a description of U.S. foreign policy, worldwide 

commitments, and the national defense capabilities required for 

the United States to the Soviets. While it provided a comprehensive 

description of both the short-term and long-term uses of military 

of power, it failed to articulate a methodology for integrating other 

elements of national power into a comprehensive strategy.

This report refl ected the Reagan administration’s strong 

emphasis on the military, almost to the exclusion of the other 

instruments. Taken as a whole, it detailed a comprehensive strategic 

approach towards containing the Soviet Union. However, it failed to 

fully integrate the other elements of national power into the strategic 

equation and also failed to provide a true global perspective. 

Therefore, the 1987 Report did not meet the intent of the GoldwaterNichols Act of providing a grand strategy for the United States.

The 1988 National Security Strategy report represented the fi rst 

true grand strategy submitted to the Congress as a result of the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. With the dual challenges of the 

federal budget and international trade defi cits on the political 

agenda,34 the Reagan administration made two major changes in 

the 1987 report. The fi rst was to emphasize the role of all elements 

of national power into a national strategy.35 The second was to 

develop and present separate strategies for each region.36 This 

report consisted of fi ve sections: Historical Dimensions of U.S. 

National Security Strategy; Fundamentals of U.S. National Security 

Strategy; Power, Policy, and Strategy; Integrating Elements of 
329

Power into National Security Strategy; and Executing the Strategy.37

Nevertheless, the overarching strategy still rested on continuing the 

policy of containing the Soviets.38

In “Historical Dimensions of U.S. National Security Strategy,” the 

administration argued that U.S. security strategy had changed little 

since World War II. It argued that U.S. core interests and objectives 

had remained consistent and that the combination of the elements 

of national power had always been important contributors to the 

nation’s past, present, and future security.39

“Fundamentals of U.S. National Security Strategy” contained fi ve 

national interests.40 While the report made slight modifi cations of the 

1987 report, the national interests articulated in the two documents 

remained basically identical. This report also articulated a set of fi ve 

major objectives in support of stated American interests, and these 

objectives also remained fundamentally the same as those contained 

in the 1987 Report.41

The 1988 report also identifi ed the Soviet Union as the principal 

threat to United States and to global security interests. The report 

did acknowledge that as a result of changes in leadership style, 

the Soviet Union had succeeded in projecting a more favorable 

international image and that proposed domestic reforms and foreign 

policy initiatives had given rise to hopes for fundamental changes in 

Soviet behavior. The report acknowledged that threats to American 

and international interests also existed in the Middle East, Central 

and South America, and Southeast Asia, as well as the continuing 

threat created by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.42

The 1988 report contained two major additions. The fi rst was an 

emphasis on the elements of national power to provide an integrated 

strategy.43 In “Power, Policy, and Strategy,” the administration 

provided a clear vision of how the nation could use the elements of 

American national power to protect and further national interests. 

This section also described how U.S. diplomatic, defense, and 

economic policies could also contribute to achieving U.S. goals 

and objectives.44 The second major addition was to outline a set of 

separate strategies for each region of the world. In the section on 

integrating elements of power into national security strategy, the 

administration provided a concept for integrating the elements of 
330

U.S. national power into a strategy designed to achieve U.S. goals 

and objectives on a regional basis.45

The second National Security Strategy report provided a clear and 

comprehensive U.S. strategy. It contained the basic framework of 

values, interests, and national security objectives still in use today. 

It described how the United States intended to use the elements of 

national power to achieve its stated security goals. Most signifi cantly, 

it provided integrated strategies for achieving and sustaining global 

goals and objectives. In the fi nal analysis, the 1988 Report met the 

intent of Goldwater-Nichols by providing the Congress a grand 

strategy for the United States. 

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT 

AND ENLARGEMENT

The Clinton administration published its fi rst national security 

report in June 1994, nearly 18 months into its fi rst term.46 This report 

represented the fi rst true post-Cold War concept of U.S. security 

strategy and was the fi rst signifi cant change in American security 

strategy since 1987. It refl ected a radically altered global landscape, 

the organization of the executive branch under the Clinton 

administration, and the existing political climate in Washington, 

DC, and the nation.47

The 1994 National Security Strategy report contained four sections: 

Introduction; Advancing Our Interests Through Engagement and 

Enlargement; Integrated Regional Approaches; and Conclusions. 

It refl ected a clear change in the direction and thinking of how the 

United States should work to achieve its national security goals and 

objectives. It also established three central goals, which were to be in 

all seven Clinton administration National Security Strategy Reports: 

to sustain American security with military forces that are ready 

to fi ght; bolster America’s economic revitalization; and promote 

democracy abroad.48

In the introductory section, the new administration 

acknowledged that a new era had dawned. The “end of the Cold 

War and the dissolution of the Soviet empire brought about a 

radically transformed security environment” and a “corresponding 

period of great promise, but also great uncertainty.”49 It articulated 
331

that the United States was the preeminent global power and that 

its leadership in the world had never been more important. This 

section also highlighted the rise of transnational terrorism, narcotics 

traffi cking, environmental degradation, rapid population growth, 

and refugee fl ows as threats to global and U.S. security.50

The largest and arguably most important section of the 1994 

report was “Advancing Our Interests Through Engagement and 

Enlargement.” This part of the strategy detailed the administration’s 

direction and strategic thinking. It stressed the need to use preventive 

diplomacy and selected engagement as the primary tools for achieving 

U.S. goals and objectives. This section also contained a sub-section 

highlighting the administration’s tangible accomplishments over its 

fi rst 17 months in offi ce.51 This report also refl ected a much broader 

defi nition of “security” than used by earlier administrations. With 

the new strategic environment and the lack of clear military threats 

to the nation’s physical security, the administration defi ned security 

as “protecting our people, our territory, and our way of life.”52 The 

strategy aimed at taking advantage of the “opportunities to make 

the nation more safe and prosperous, as well as protecting it from a 

new class of security threats.”53

The 1994 report contained only three fundamental national 

security goals: enhancing U.S. security; promoting prosperity at 

home; and promoting democracy.54 “There is a simple elegance 

in using only three national security goals to integrate all of the 

governments efforts to advance U.S. interests.”55 “Integrated 

Regional Approaches” highlighted the administration’s approach 

towards the world’s regions by providing broad regional objectives. 

It articulated that U.S. policy toward each of the “world’s regions 

refl ects our overall strategy tailored to its unique challenges and 

opportunities.” This section highlighted the application of U.S. 

strategy to each of the world’s regions—“our broad objectives 

and thrust, rather than an exhaustive list of all our policies and 

interests.”56 This approach failed to provide a detailed strategy 

for integrating the elements of national power required to secure 

regional U.S. goals and objectives.

The 1994 National Security Strategy Report refl ected a major shift 

in U.S. security thinking and direction. It contained a comprehensive 
332

description of the national security interests, goals, and objectives 

of the United States and provided a description of the foreign 

policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities 

necessary to deter near-term and long-term threats. It also provided 

a thorough description of the short-term and long-term uses of 

the elements of national power to protect and promote American 

interests. Finally, it described the necessary balance between the 

elements of national power required to achieve U.S. security goals 

and objectives. In the fi nal analysis, through the dual strategy of 

preventive diplomacy and selective engagement, the 1994 National 

Security Strategy report met the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act 

by providing a grand strategy.

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY

The Clinton administration published its second National 

Security Strategy report in October 1998. This report refl ected 

the administration’s recognition of increased global economic 

interdependence, the Balanced Budget Agreement, the results of the 

1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, and an increasing awareness of the 

challenges presented by domestic terrorism.57 It contains four basic 

sections: Introduction; Advancing U.S. National Interests; Integrated 

Regional Approaches; and Conclusions.58 The 1998 report was similar 

in both structure and substance to the 1997 National Security Strategy 

report and retained the three core U.S. objectives of enhancing U.S. 

security, bolstering America’s economic prosperity, and promoting 

democracy abroad.59 In general, differences between the two reports 

were of matters of emphasis and degree.60

In the introductory section, the Clinton administration clearly 

established the national and international security environments 

which have and will continue to undergo signifi cant changes. “The 

security environment in which we live is dynamic and uncertain, 

replete with a host of threats and challenges that have the potential 

to grow more deadly, but also offer unprecedented opportunities 

to avert those threats and advance our interests.”61 It described 

the challenges and opportunities of globalization, highlighted the 

importance of continued U.S. engagement, and outlined how the 
333

administration would implement the strategy to achieve the three 

core objectives of U.S. national security. 

“Advancing U.S. National Interests” is the most important and far 

reaching section of the report. The overall strategy remained based 

on three national objectives: enhancing security; bolstering economic 

prosperity; and promoting democracy abroad.62 It also established 

the precedence for categorizing U.S. national interests as either vital 

interests, important national interests, or humanitarian and other 

interests.63 This section also outlined current and future threats 

to U.S. interests: regional or state-centered threats; transnational 

threats; spread of dangerous technologies; foreign intelligence 

collection; and failed states.64 Finally, it highlighted the Clinton 

administration’s continued focus on strategy implementation built 

around the concepts of shaping the international environment, 

responding to threats and crises, preparing now for an uncertain 

future, and promoting prosperity.65 Each of these areas contained an 

array of policy tools and objectives designed to achieve U.S. national 

security. 

Similar to the 1994 Report, the section on integrating regional 

approaches highlighted the administration’s approach towards the 

world’s regions by providing broad regional objectives. However, 

this report provided a more coherent approach to attaining and 

maintaining U.S. goals by outlining the administration’s strategy 

of enhancing security, promoting prosperity, and promoting 

democracy in each region.66

The 1998 National Security Strategy report refl ected the continuing 

trend of major shifts in U.S. national security thinking. This report 

contained a comprehensive description of U.S. national security 

interest, goals, and objectives. This included categorizing U.S. 

interests as vital, important, or humanitarian and other. It provided 

a detailed description of the foreign policy, national defense 

capabilities, and worldwide commitments necessary to achieve U.S. 

goals and objectives. It demonstrated a more focused and integrated 

regional approach when compared to the 1994 report and, in the 

fi nal analysis, provided Congress a grand strategy for the United 

States.
334

A NEW AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON NATIONAL 

SECURITY STRATEGY

The Bush administration published its 2002 National Security 

Strategy report in September 2002. It clearly refl ected the new 

administration’s views on U.S. national security, unparalleled U.S. 

power, the changing strategic environment, and the terrorist attack 

on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. This report 

contained nine sections67 that outline the administration’s national 

security strategy. It represented a fundamental break with the 

strategic thinking and direction of the United States. This strategy 

seeks to increase security and economic development by using 

unrivaled U.S. power and infl uence to expand freedom and open 

societies around the world. The underlying theme of the strategy 

is clearly captured in Bush’s introductory letter: “The United States 

will use this moment of opportunity to expand the benefi ts of 

freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of 

democracy, development, free market, and free trade to every corner 

of the world.”68

The 2002 report deviates from the precedence of articulating clear 

national interests as the guiding principle for U.S. strategy. Instead, 

it offers three goals for U.S. national security that are identifi ed at the 

end of the following quote: 

The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American 

internationalism that refl ects the union of our values and our national 

interests. The aim of the strategy is to help make the world not just safer 

but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and 

economic freedom, peaceful relations with other nations, and respect for 

human dignity.69

This report identifi es rogue nations and transnational terrorist 

networks and their supporters as the principal threat to U.S. and 

global security interests. It outlines a strategy for defending the 

United States against these enemies and for defending and preserving 

peace on a global scale. This strategy is built on the foundation of 

strengthening, maintaining, and developing new alliances against 

rogue nations and global terrorism. It also recognizes that the United 
335

States will be the lead nation in this campaign, and that it must and 

will shoulder this burden.

The section on “Working With Others to Defuse Regional 

Confl icts” argues that “concerned nations must remain actively 

engaged in critical regional disputes to avoid escalation and 

minimize human suffering” and “that since the United States is a 

concerned nation, it will be involved in regional disputes, along with 

friends and allies, to alleviate suffering and restore stability.”70 It 

recognizes that the United States has fi nite resources and establishes 

two strategic principles for U.S. involvement. The fi rst principle is 

“the United States should invest time and resources into building 

international relationships and institutions that can help manage 

local crises when they emerge.” The second principle is “the United 

States should be realistic about its ability to help those who are 

unwilling or unready to help themselves. Where and when people 

are ready to do their part, we will be willing to move decisively.”71

This section identifi es the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, South Asia, 

Indonesia, parts of Latin America, and Africa as areas of importance 

to U.S. and global security.

The section on “Igniting a New Era of Global Economic 

Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade” outlines the Bush 

administration’s strategy for enhancing a strong world economy. 

This strategy outlines seven policies designed to generate higher 

productivity and sustained economic growth and details the U.S. 

plan for enhancing global trade by providing a ten-point strategy for 

promoting free trade.72 

The 2002 National Security Strategy report is profoundly different 

from earlier reports in its tone. Two statements and one theme not 

only demonstrate this fundamental shift in U.S. strategic thinking 

and tone, but they are also frequently highlighted by segments 

of the world community who see the United States attempting to 

establish global hegemony. The two statements are contained in the 

document’s opening section, “Overview of America’s International 

Strategy.” The opening assertion that the “United States possesses 

unprecedented―and unequaled―strength and infl uence in the 

world”73 frequently is combined with the statement that “the aim of 

this strategy is to help make the world not just safer, but better.”74

When one views these two statements through the lens of the 
336

international community and combined with recent and ongoing 

U.S. military operations, it is diffi cult to argue that the United States 

prefers multilateral over unilateral action.

A new emphasis on and broader defi nition of “preventive war” 

or “preemptive attack” remains the most controversial aspect of the 

report. The strategy proposes expanding the accepted concept of 

true preemption—striking fi rst against an imminent, specifi c, and 

near certain attack—to the far broader concept of striking fi rst to 

prevent a longer-term threat from even developing. (And in fact, 

the United States has conducted two major preventive military 

operations to date.) This broader defi nition of “preventive war” 

violates accepted international norms developed to prevent these 

destabilizing approaches to confl ict resolution. It also runs the risk 

of establishing a new international precedent that other nations may 

adopt.

In broad terms, the current Bush administration strategy has a 

“reality versus rhetoric” mismatch that is unsustainable in its current 

form. Continued reliance on the military instrument of power, 

combined with the broader defi nition of “preemptive attack,” is 

simply unsustainable from economic, political, and especially 

military aspects. This current mismatch points to a potential lack 

of balance in the ends, ways, and means construct that enables the 

successful execution of a national security strategy.

The 2002 National Security Strategy report refl ects another clear 

shift in U.S. security thinking and direction. This change was once 

again driven by the changing character of the threats facing the 

United States. While it is more descriptive than previous National 

Security Strategy reports, it does provide a comprehensive set of U.S. 

national interests, goals, and objectives. It provides a description of 

the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense 

capabilities of the United States required to deter near-term and 

long-term threats. This report also provides a description of the 

short-term and long-term uses of the elements of U.S. national 

power. It recognizes that the United States has limits to its national 

resources and provides a strategic balance between the various 

elements of national power in order to achieve U.S. security goals 

and objectives. In the end, while this report is different in form and 
337

structure from past reports, it meets the intent of Goldwater-Nichols 

and provides a grand strategy to the Congress of the United States.

WHAT DOES THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 

ACCOMPLISH?

The National Security Strategy report serves three primary 

purposes. First, it serves as a strategic communications document; 

second, it is a unifying document for the executive branch; and third, 

it serves as the fundamental statement of the President’s agenda.

As a strategic communications document, the National Security 

Strategy report fulfi lls two primary purposes. The fi rst is to 

communicate a grand strategy to the Congress. This strategy should 

provide the basis for the development of a common understanding 

between the executive and legislative branches on the strategic 

environment, the administration’s intent, the basis for determining 

the allocation of national resources, and the uses of the elements 

of national power to achieve U.S. goals and objectives.75 Second, it 

communicates the direction of U.S. national policy to a wide range 

of international and domestic audiences. International audiences 

include allies, friends, and neutral nations, as well as existing 

and potential adversaries. Domestic audiences include political 

supporters and opponents, all of the various special interest groups, 

the defense and nondefense industrial base, as well as the American 

public.76

As a unifying document for the executive branch, it aims at creating 

an internal consensus on foreign, defense, diplomatic, and economic 

strategy. “Every new and second-term administration faces this 

challenge as it transitions from campaign to governance, particularly 

if foreign policy has not been a major issue in the campaign.”77 This 

consensus theoretically is accomplished through the National 

Security Council and the interagency processes as the report is 

developed, staffed, and approved. As the fundamental statement of 

the president’s overall agenda, the annual National Security Strategy

report represent the cornerstone of an administration’s strategic 

direction, encompassing the allocation of national resources and 

the uses of the elements of national power to protect U.S. national 
338

interest and lead to the attainment of global and domestic U.S. goals 

and objectives. 

While the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires the submission of an 

annual National Security Strategy report, the track record is decidedly 

mixed. Arguments have been made to revise Goldwater-Nichols to 

require a biannual submission of the report during the second and 

fourth years of an administration. 

Three trends become readily apparent when studying the various 

national security strategy reports and their development. First, 

incoming administrations have limited time to prepare their fi rst 

report. This already diffi cult timeframe can be complicated further if 

the incoming President has not fi nalized his cabinet, or the Congress 

has yet to act on the incoming administration’s nominations. Second, 

the intense iterative nature of the interagency process itself has 

resulted in signifi cant delays in submitting the report to Congress. 

Finally, a biannual process would provide all participants involved 

in the process the time necessary to assess the effectiveness of the 

current national security strategy and study alternative approaches 

prior to restarting the current annual process. These points provide 

the basic evidence necessary to consider revising Goldwater-Nichols 

and requiring the submission of a biannual National Security Strategy 

report.

CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions about the development of U.S. national 

security strategy can be drawn from this chapter. First, there is no 

overarching consensus on the appropriate grand strategy for the 

United States. This is due to the necessary political processes and 

compromises resident in any democratic form of government. “After 

all, grand strategy is really the idea of allocating resources to create 

in both the short-term and long-term various instruments of power, 

instruments with which the nation then provides for its defense and 

the furtherance of its aims in the world.”78

Second, since the publication of the fi rst National Security Strategy

report in 1987, the United States has undergone several fundamental 

changes in strategic thinking and direction. These adjustments have 

been driven by changes in administrations as well as changes in 
339

the international and national security environments. Third, while 

different administrations have made adjustments to U.S. goals and 

objectives, our national interests have stood the test of time and 

remain consistent, even in the face of radically different international 

and national security environments.

Finally, even though the “most evolved democracy in the world 

has the most cumbersome national security decisionmaking process, 

ineffi ciency is the price the founding fathers imposed for domestic 

accountability.”79 This process has stood the test of time and 

protected U.S. national interests through some dramatic changes in 

the international and national landscapes.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13

1. Robert H. Dorff, “A Primer in Strategy Development,” Joseph Cerami and 

James Holcomb, eds., U.S. Army War College Guide To Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, pp. 14-15.

2. Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National 

Security State, 1945-1954, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 3.

3. Ibid., p. 2.

4. Ibid., p. 464.

5. Ibid., p. 465.

6. Ibid.

7. Don M. Snider, “The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic 

Vision,” Joseph Cerami and James Holcomb, eds., U.S. Army War College Guide To 

Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, p. 129.

8. Hogan, pp. 23-67.

9. Ibid.

10. Melvyn P. Leffl er, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman 

Administration and the Cold War, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992, 

p. 175.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 176.

13. Ibid.

14. Congressional Record, Daily ed., September 15, 1950, p. 15124.

15. Frank N. Trager, “The National Security Act of 1947: Its Thirtieth 

Anniversary,” Air University Review, November-December 1977, p. 6. 
340

16. Public Law 85-599, U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 

85th Congress, 2nd Session, Vol. 1, 1959, 592, §2.

17. Ibid.

18. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., “The DoD Reorganization Act of 1986: Improving 

The Department Through Centralization and Integration,” Douglas T. Stuart, ed., 

Organizing for National Security, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

2000, p. 66.

19. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 

Conference Report (99-824), p. 5. 

20. 50 U.S.C. 402, Title I of the National Security Act of 1947.

21. Snider, p. 128.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p. 131.

24. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1987, p. 1.

25. Ibid., p. 1.

26. Ibid., p. 5.

27. For a detailed look at the Major Objectives in Support of U.S. Interests, see 

“National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1987, pp. 4-7.

28. Ibid., p. 6.

29. Ibid., p. 7.

30. Ibid., p. 6.

31. Ibid., pp. 9-18.

32. Ibid., pp. 19-32.

33. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

34. Snider, p. 131.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1988, p. iii.

38. Ibid., p. 1.

39. The Reagan administration added the element of geography to the other 

four basic elements of national power. “National Security Strategy of the United 

States,” January 1988, p. 2.

40. Ibid., p. 3.

41. Ibid., pp. 3-5. 

42. Ibid., pp. 35-40.
341

43. Snider, p. 131.

44. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1988, pp. 7-23.

45. Ibid.

46. See Snider, pp. 133-134, for a description of the reasons for the delay.

47. Ibid., p. 134.

48. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1994, p. i.

49. Ibid., pp. 1-3.

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., pp. 5-18.

52. Snider, p. 135.

53. Ibid.

54. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1994, p. 5.

55. Snider, p. 135.

56. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” July 1994, p. 21.

57. Snider, p. 136.

58. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1998, p. i.

59. Ibid., p. iii.

60. Snider, p. 136.

61. “National Security Strategy of the United States,” January 1998, p. 1.

62. Ibid., p. 6.

63. For a complete description of the three categories, see “A National Security 

Strategy for a New Century,” October 1998, pp. 5-6.

64. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

65. Ibid., pp. 8-31.

66. Ibid., pp. 37-57.

67. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” October 

2002, p. vii.

68. Ibid., p. iv.

69. Ibid., p. 1.

70. Ibid., p. 9.

71. Ibid.

72. For a description of these seven policies, see “The National Security 

Strategy of the United States,” October 2002, p. 17. For a description of the ten 

points, see ibid., pp. 18-20.
342

73. Ibid., p. 1.

74. Ibid.

75. Snider, p. 130.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid., p. 138.

79. Gabriel Marcella, “National Security and the Interagency Process: Forward 

into the 21st Century,” Joseph Cerami and James Holcomb, eds., U.S. Army War 

College Guide To Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001, p. 

124.
343

CHAPTER 14

THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF TRANSFORMATION

Colonel Robert E. Scurlock, Jr.

War is a special activity, different and separate from any other pursued 

by man. This would still be true no matter how wide its scope, and 

though every able-bodied man in the nation were under arms. An army’s 

military qualities are based on the individual who is steeped in the 

spirit and essence of this activity; who trains the capacities it demands, 

rouses them, and makes them his own; who applies his intelligence to 

every detail; who gains ease and confi dence through practice, and who 

completely immerses his personality in the appointed task.

Carl Von Clausewitz, On War

As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop 

the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new 

challenges and to unexpected circumstances. We must transform not 

only the capabilities at our disposal but also the way we think, the 

way we train, the way we exercise, and the way we fi ght. We must 

transform not only our armed forces but also the Department that serves 

them by encouraging a culture of creative and prudent risk taking. 

We must promote an entrepreneurial approach to developing military 

capabilities, one which encourages people to be proactive, not reactive, 

and anticipates threats before they emerge.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld

Transformation Planning Guidance

April 2003

. . . the essential nature of war has not changed. Wars are fought by men, 

and there has been no discernible difference in the fundamental nature 

of man over the past fi ve thousand years of recorded history. Because the 

nature of man has not changed, neither has his basic objective when he 

turns to war: the employment of lethal instruments to force his will upon 

other men with opposing points of view.

Colonel N.T. Dupuy, 

Understanding War, 1987
344

The transformation of the U.S. military and the Department 

of Defense (DoD) represents a complex process which has been 

evolving since the end of the Cold War. Successful transformation 

will require a cultural change that focuses on producing forces 

that, when integrated with all elements of national power, will 

achieve desired effects to defeat any enemy’s capabilities. The 

Army Transformation Roadmap suggests that the nation requires 

a joint force that can meet the strategic mandates established by 

the National Security Strategy (NSS) and further elaborated in 

the Defense Planning Guidance, the Quadrennial Defense Review, the 

Transformation Planning Guidance, and the Joint Operations Concepts.

1

These documents provide the framework and concepts to determine 

the future path the military seeks, but it is the human dimension of 

transformation―the educated, well-trained, values-oriented service 

member―that will have the greatest impact on the transformation 

process. Technology is an enabler and a catalyst for change, but it is 

the practitioner of war that will determine how the technology will be 

employed to achieve desired effects and that will affect the cultural 

changes required to adapt to the changing security environment.

Transformation is commonly used to describe changes in 

organizations and equipment, but it has greater impact on the culture 

and members of the force. It is less important to change the things 

that forces use to make war than it is to change the way forces think 

about the effects they produce when using them. Transformation 

is an intellectual process and must begin with the mind of the 

leader. The leader must understand the emerging environment as 

projected in Joint Vision 2020, Defense Planning Guidance, and other 

assessments, and must comprehend the adjustments that will be 

required to operate effectively in that environment. If the services 

fi eld new equipment and adopt new organizations but continue to 

think about the application of force in the old ways, then there is no 

material advantage. According to the DoD Planning Guidance: 

Transformation is a process that shapes the changing nature of military 

competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, 

capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation’s 

advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain 

our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the 

world.2
345

Transformation is incomplete if the focus is primarily on 

technology or organizational change rather than leadership and 

service culture. The numerous transformation documents at DoD 

and Army level clearly articulate all the components required 

for change. How does the nation ensure transformation remains 

on course? What are the proper transformational concepts? The 

changes in the strategic environment in the post-Cold War era, the 

predominance of the information age, and the introduction of new 

technologies such as precision munitions, stealth aircraft, advanced 

sensors, and digitization of the battlefi eld demand that the joint force 

transform to meet potential capabilities of future adaptive enemies. 

The intent of this chapter is to examine transformation in terms of 

the human dimension, provide some recent examples of how the 

transformation concepts have evolved, and offer recommendations 

to ensure the transformation effort proceeds on a logical path. 

Transformation is a strategic process that should rest on sound 

strategic theory and principles. Its concepts derive from historical 

lessons learned. When examining insights garnered from previous 

confl icts, it is diffi cult to isolate how military actions affected 

political objectives without a holistic view of the factors involved. 

Colin Gray, in his book, Modern Strategy, asserts that “there is an 

essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history 

because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and 

strategy changes.”3 Gray presents 17 dimensions of strategy that 

provide an excellent framework to understand past confl icts and 

their implications for transformation. The human dimension and 

strategic culture are essential to gaining an understanding of this 

process. Gray posits, “Tactical achievement has meaning only in 

terms of operational intention and strategic effect.”4 As statesmen 

and military leaders glean lessons learned from case studies as well 

as recent operations, they need to avoid focusing on tactical level 

successes and shortcomings. Instead, they need to evaluate case 

studies holistically and focus on the human dimension and strategic 

culture of both their forces and those of the enemy.
346

TRANSFORMATION CONCEPTS

Neither policies nor machines will determine the history of tomorrow. 

Man is the measure of all things . . . This, then, is the ultimate battlefi eld: 

the hearts and minds of men. 

Hanson W. Baldwin

Joint Publication 3-16, p. III-1

The Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command, with input from 

the services, developed the Joint Operations Concepts to support the 

Defense Planning Guidance. The intent of this initiative was to provide 

the services with a series of concepts to form the framework for how 

joint forces might operate in the future. The Joint Operating Concepts, 

the joint functional concepts, and the enabling concepts attempt 

to refi ne this framework to guide the integration of a broad range 

of military capabilities. A kluge of services does not make a force 

joint. People make it joint by internalizing the joint concepts. These 

concepts represent an effort to link the “strategic guidance with the 

integrated application of joint force capabilities.”5 The major cultural 

shift in this concept is that the joint forces focus on defeating a broad 

range of potential enemy capabilities across the spectrum of military 

operations and not on any one specifi c threat. This conception of 

future combat operations requires a transformation in the fashion 

in which the United States conducts joint military operations. The 

continuous transformation process outlined in the Joint Operations 

Concepts is the tool the DoD will use to assess proposed systems, defi ne 

required capabilities, and validate joint warfi ghting requirements. 

It has major implications on the “development and acquisition of 

future capabilities across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 

leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.”6

This concept is an attempt to overcome service parochialism 

and organizational culture in order to achieve the interdependence 

of joint forces. To defeat future potential capabilities that enemies 

might possess, this joint warfi ghting concept postulates that 

the future joint force must be fully integrated, expeditionary, 

networked, decentralized, adaptable, decision-superior, and lethal. 

By adapting the forces to counter potential enemy capabilities, 
347

the concept envisions a force that can “achieve full spectrum 

dominance―the ability to sense, understand, decide, and act faster 

than any adversary in any situation.”7 Hence, the effectiveness of 

the joint force ultimately hinges on the human dimension which 

comprises the sensors, the decisionmakers, and the ones employing 

the capabilities to achieve the desired effects. 

The Army’s transformation strategy is to transform the Army 

culture through leadership and adaptive institutions, develop 

capabilities by conducting experimentation, analysis, and capabilities 

assessments in collaboration with the other services and Joint Forces 

Command, and then build the transformational capabilities into 

the joint force through training, exercises, and simulations, as well 

as evaluating these capabilities in real world operations whenever 

possible.8 This approach requires a global joint expeditionary land 

force that is ready, deployable, and designed to fi ght as part of the 

joint force on land, so the Army must focus on how it will contribute 

to winning the joint warfi ght―not on moving the old force faster.9

This concept forces the services to depend on each other. These 

collaborative efforts enhance trust and cooperation. Both are part of 

the human dimension.

TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES

A transformed mindset is one that can handle the chaotic and uncertain 

situations created by the collapse of political, economic, and security 

systems. Leaders must be able to operate in countries that have no 

effective governments, where the enemy and front lines are not easily 

identifi able, and rules of engagement are confl icting. Our forces are 

expected to deal with terrorists, drug traffi ckers, warlords, militant 

fundamentalists, and paramilitary units―and still be able to overcome 

large maneuver formations and formidable defense systems.

Brigadier General (Ret) David L. Grange

In accordance with the Joint Operations Concept, the Army’s 

transformation plan is to develop modular brigade-sized force 

packages that can provide the combatant commander with a tailored 

force, supported with the required capabilities designed to produce 
348

effects against enemy capabilities instead of a specifi c threat. These 

force packages are organized into maneuver and support units of 

action, with the command and control units of employment. These 

units are tailorable to allow the Joint Task Force Commander the 

capability to assemble and fi ght with powerful, lethal, agile units as 

part of a joint force to produce the desired effects against the enemy. 

This requires a balance of capabilities, resources, and risk. Hence, 

given the interdependency among the services, thinking “joint” is 

essential to mission success.

The concept of effects-based operations is an effort to provide 

a framework to achieve an effect on the human dimension of the 

enemy. According to the U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Effects-Based 

Operations (EBO) is a process for obtaining a desired strategic 

outcome, or effect, on the enemy through the synergistic and 

cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary 

capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.”10 This 

approach recognizes that technology alone is not the driving force in 

campaigns. Only people can make EBO coherent.

Decision support tools such as the Operational Net Assessment 

and the Collaborative Information Environment serve as a ready 

source of information for the combat commanders and can 

assist staffs much like eavesdropping on radio nets to gain an 

understanding of what is happening on the battlefi eld to anticipate 

possible requirements of support without hindering operations of 

the element in the fi eld. The same is true with joint intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts. These efforts must provide 

the commanders and staffs not in direct contact the ability to monitor, 

gain understanding of the situation, and anticipate requirements 

and changes to the plan without distracting the element in contact. 

Such tools allow the commander to gain situational awareness and 

visualize the battlefi eld without being obtrusive on the subordinate 

element engaged in the fi ght. Commanders must avoid centralized 

control “from afar” because this will have a detrimental effect on the 

immediate action and will undermine the initiative and confi dence 

in the networked sensor system to assist the element in contact. The 

informational picture given does not present the full situation that 

the commander on the ground has since he is aware of the human 
349

and psychological factors which interact with the force. It is the 

uncertainty and friction that he must overcome to defeat the enemy. 

Understanding the limitations of technology is a critical component 

of usage. Hence the leader is the centerpiece of the process because 

he/she must utilize the input from these decisionmaking tools and 

apply his/her experience, intuition, and understanding of the human 

dimensions to make a determination on what actions to take. 

When today’s technology is working properly, it allows the 

commander to maintain situational awareness and exercise battle 

command from great distances and while on the move. The 

commander’s presence forward is still as critical to battlefi eld 

success as it was during the days of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, 

Grant, Lee, and Patton, among others.11 A senior commander in 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM stated in a recent lecture that he felt 

he needed to meet face to face with his commanders routinely. He 

felt his “physical presence forward” was the best way to gain a 

“common view of the enemy,” a personal assessment of the friendly 

situation on the ground, and to ensure his commanders had a clear 

understanding of his intent for future operations. More importantly, 

he stated he felt he could gain a better sense of the fatigue, morale, 

confi dence, and other psychological factors that may have been 

affecting his commanders and soldiers.12 Decision support tools and 

other technologies are enablers in the battle command process, but 

they cannot replace the importance of the physical presence of the 

commander on the battlefi eld or the value of human interaction in 

understanding and overcoming the psychological friction in war.

When the services introduce new technologies, they are rarely 

mature enough to exploit their full potential capability for the 

battlefi eld. User innovation in employing the new technology, 

providing feedback to refi ne the technology and its application, 

and the continued assessment and improvement of employment 

techniques provide the most dramatic results. A historical example 

of the innovative use of technology designed for one purpose 

effectively employed in another role is the German 88mm Air Defense 

Artillery gun, which the Germans employed as a fi eld expedient 

anti-tank weapon throughout World War II. A recent example of 

such a development is the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) 
350

now used to conduct precision fi res. This new capability resulted 

from an innovative approach to employing the Global Positioning 

System, originally designed as a military navigational aid. The Air 

Force adapted it for use as a guidance system, matched with small, 

powerful computer chips and a moveable fi n system that allowed the 

munitions to “fl y” within three meters of the desired target in an allweather environment.13 Once developed, the Air Force adapted it for 

use from multiple delivery systems. This innovative approach to use 

a “spin-off” technology to develop new capabilities, combined with 

the creative approach to maximize its employment, allowed forces 

to achieve effects with fewer rounds while causing less collateral 

damage.

The challenge in this process is to balance the capital investment 

directed toward the future force with the resources needed for 

the current force. Some technologies or concepts may provide the 

opportunity to advance capabilities for the current force. There are 

systems in place to devote valuable resources toward such “highrisk, high-payoff technologies” based on “urgency of warfi ghter 

needs and the maturity of enabling technologies.”14 A recent article 

based on a new report to Congress argued that, “the Pentagon is 

producing and even fi elding billions of dollars’ worth of weapons 

that have not been adequately tested. . . .”15 Such large expenditures 

suggest the need for concern in maintaining a balance of resource 

expenditure for current technology versus testing, evaluating, and 

improving these systems to provide the capabilities required for 

future forces. The senior leadership uses judgment and counsel to 

determine the proper balance of what soldiers need today versus 

what capabilities future forces will need to provide for national 

security. The experienced, well-grounded professionals are what 

will make this process successful. Military leaders must constantly 

remind the defense community that technology is not a “golden 

key” to success at any level. Service personnel are the hedge against 

the friction and fog of war that prevails during a campaign.
351

LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE

In the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment we face 

for the foreseeable future, if we were to choose merely one advantage 

over our adversaries it would certainly be this: to be superior in the 

art of learning and adaptation. This is the imperative for a culture of 

innovation in the U.S. Army. 

Brigadier General David A. Fastabend

To provide the combatant commander a cohesive modular 

force with the required capabilities, the Army must focus on its 

core competencies which are to train and equip soldiers, to grow 

leaders, and to provide relevant and ready land power capability to 

the combatant commander and the joint team.16 The Army already 

has initiated actions to transform its culture through actions such 

as force stabilization and unit manning initiatives. To avoid the 

formation of ad hoc units, the establishment of cohesive teams that 

work and train together is key. These initiatives will allow the core 

elements of the Army’s modular force packages, the units of action, 

and units of employment to maintain cohesive teams with welldeveloped tactics, techniques, and procedures. These teams learn 

each others’ strengths and weaknesses through tough, realistic 

training and exercises in order to maximize their strengths and 

minimize weaknesses. This will increase confi dence in leaders, 

systems, and themselves to provide combatant commanders with 

capabilities required on the battlefi eld.

Leader development and joint professional military education 

are critical components in assuring the seamless integration of the 

joint force. Focusing on leader development is necessary to adjust 

to a volatile, complex, uncertain, changing environment and the 

possibility of rapidly adapting enemies that U.S. forces may face in 

the future. The educated and well-trained leader, whom the Army 

encouraged to be innovative and fl exible, is a basic requirement to 

focus Army culture on defeating competent and adaptive enemies, 

while integrating his force’s capabilities into the joint warfi ghting 

team. As Williamson Murray points out: 
352

Perhaps the most important enabler of transformation and innovation 

in the past has been the culture of the military organizations that have 

grappled with an uncertain and ambiguous future, a future made more 

complex and diffi cult by tactical, operational, and technological changes, 

the impact of which are almost impossible to predict under peacetime 

conditions. . . . If the American military does not desire to repeat the 

mistakes of the past, then it needs to create a learning culture, where 

intellectual preparation is as prized as tactical preparation.17

This view is equally true today. An educated and learning culture 

is especially important as the Army works through organizational 

change, while confronting adaptive enemies. Soldiers are employing 

sophisticated equipment and are facing increasingly more complex 

tasks. They must be able to work with joint, interagency, and 

multinational partners across the spectrum of operations in a 

changing security environment. It is the human dimension―the 

educated, well-trained, values-oriented service member―in this 

process that will determine the success of transformation to meet 

these demands.

TRAINING, EXERCISES, WARGAMING AND SIMULATIONS

Everyone has now seen that we fi ght as a joint team. Therefore, how can 

we best go about improving upon our already existing training to further 

bring in the notion and the concepts of joint? Here is our ultimate end 

state of training transformation: no individual, no unit, no staff would 

ever deploy into combat without fi rst having experienced the rigors and 

the stress of their joint responsibilities in a robust and realistic training 

environment. 

Dr. Paul W. Mayberry

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Readiness

The services conduct numerous exercises and simulations to 

hone their skills and refi ne tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

These events provide the opportunity to evaluate different forms 

of operations against a variety of enemy forces under a wide range 

of environments. Conducting tough, realistic training has been 

a hallmark of the U.S. military as well as a major contributor to 
353

recent successes. The Combat Training Centers, with their aggressor 

forces and diffi cult terrain, provide a unique testing and training 

environment. Conducting joint training to “train as we fi ght” will 

be a critical factor in developing soldiers who can employ the 

capabilities required by future combatant commanders.

When examining the enemy and his potential capabilities, U.S. 

forces need to ensure that “Red teaming” provides a thinking, 

adapting adversary that resembles not only the enemy of today 

but those expected in the future. The Red forces must not be mirror 

images of U.S. forces with the same values and expected behaviors. 

Moreover, training should include a level of realism that forces 

soldiers to appreciate the impact of casualty evacuation, extended 

operations that press the limits of the maintenance and resupply 

systems, refugee control, large numbers of enemy prisoners of war, 

consequence management from exposure to a weapon of mass 

destruction, loss of critical assets, and the loss of key leadership. 

Forces should exercise these events so leaders can think through 

solutions and work through issues before having to perform these 

functions on the battlefi eld. Too often these events are omitted 

from training because they are time consuming and diffi cult. 

Additionally, weather extremes, harsh terrain, and complex and 

urban environments should be among the variables used in training 

to evaluate systems and concepts.

There are limits to how well simulations can replicate the human 

dimension involved in warfi ghting, but they provide for larger force 

involvement in a terrain and resource constrained environment. 

Simulations provide a method to work through various scenarios in a 

combination of live, constructive, or virtual environments to achieve 

training objectives. An example of this effort is the Joint National 

Training Capability, which will combine training at the various 

major service training areas. This will allow service components to 

fi ght as a joint team through networked systems and synchronized 

efforts, with the aim of achieving joint training objectives and testing 

various joint capabilities.18

There are new developments in the embedded training 

technology and automated teaching software systems known as 

intelligent tutoring systems. These technologies would either be 
354

built into new systems or developed in stand-alone systems that 

replicate the equipment that soldiers use. These systems will allow 

training in various scenarios without major resource expenditure 

by using digital terrain representations. The goal for these new 

systems is to allow individual and collective mission planning and 

rehearsal.19 These systems allow for soldiers to progress at their own 

pace commensurate with their level of skill and experience. This 

contributes to providing a learning culture by giving soldiers the 

tools to hone their skills and prepare for future operations.

There is no substitute for actual maneuver and live-fi re training 

to train forces and validate concepts and doctrine. The German 

experience in the interwar years prior to World War II provides 

a historical example commonly used to demonstrate effective 

transformation. The Versailles Treaty placed severe restrictions on 

German military manpower, equipment, and planning headquarters. 

Despite these restrictions, the Germans were able to develop a doctrine 

that incorporated mechanization and air power, and emphasized 

rapid operations. They also enhanced their ability to operate in a 

more decentralized fashion by placing radios in a large number of 

their tanks. They had superior training programs, conducted fi eld 

exercises and maneuvers, and conducted war gaming. There was the 

full participation and open, honest sharing of ideas that encouraged 

innovation, and thorough evaluation of lessons learned that enabled 

their transformation to be successful at the tactical level.20 They 

effectively adapted their tactics, techniques, and procedures based 

on lessons learned and validation of concepts in actual combat 

operations over the two years prior to their invasion of France and 

the Soviet Union. Had they used a framework similar to Gray’s 17 

dimensions to view their experiences holistically, they might have 

avoided strategic failure. The United States continually should assess 

and reassess both friendly and potential enemy capabilities and not 

lose focus on the strategic factors of transformation. Otherwise it 

may make the same mistakes as the Germans, who emphasized 

transformation at the tactical level but failed to put enough effort on 

the strategic implications of transformation. 
355

CASE STUDIES THAT SUPPORT CURRENT CONCEPT 

DEVELOPMENT

The key organizational transformation for the Army is the 

construct of modular, brigade-sized units of action. These units 

are intended to be self-suffi cient, highly-trained and skilled in their 

core competencies with the ability to leverage current technology, 

and adept at using emerging technology. This core element may 

require capabilities not resident in the unit of action. To minimize 

the negative effects of creating an ad hoc unit, the sooner the task 

organization can occur and the unit can train, rehearse, and operate 

together, the sooner the team can form up and prepare for combat. 

The team will perform much more effectively, if it can conduct 

situational training exercises to ensure its members know how to 

integrate their skills and capabilities into the effort, and can validate 

its tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

An example of a capability not resident in a unit of action 

might be military dog teams. This capability proved valuable in 

Kosovo and Afghanistan for both explosive detection and crowd 

control. Linguistic and cultural expertise is another capability that 

is diffi cult to have resident in a unit of action. Prior to entering into 

a confl ict, it is benefi cial to conduct mission readiness exercises to 

prepare soldiers for the kinds of situations they might encounter. 

This helps familiarize them with language differences and how to 

deal with the local population. This proved of great value in Iraq, 

when intelligence initially identifi ed a target at one location. Then 

after soldiers seized that target and questioned those at that location, 

they discovered the target was just a few houses away. Without the 

ability to communicate effectively with the local population, the 

mission could have failed completely. Instead, because of the quick 

thinking of the leader and the integration of the language capability, 

units achieved success.

The above incident highlights the need for effectively engaging 

and gaining the trust and confi dence of the local population. In 

Kosovo, small units spent much time familiarizing themselves with 

the local population in small villages. Patrols immediately would 

recognize new people or trusted local inhabitants would point out 
356

the “bad people” so units could preempt them. Many locals in Iraq 

have identifi ed improvised explosive devices before they could 

harm U.S. soldiers or pointed out troublemakers before they could 

instigate further trouble. This trust must go both ways, as guerrillas 

may end up targeting those who are assisting U.S. forces, which has 

been happening in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING 

FREEDOM. Infusion of human interaction on the battlefi eld is crucial 

to strategic success.21

Additionally, the Army needs to conserve valuable resources 

by not trying to homogenize itself into a force with the most 

technological and expensive weapons now. Soldiers need the right 

weapons and equipment to provide suffi cient capabilities required 

by the combatant commander, but there needs to be a balance of 

resources consumed in mass production now rather than waiting 

for technology to mature and the equipment refi nement process to 

work. The slow fi elding timelines and the long lag time required to 

produce new systems may cause a lack of adequate resources to fi eld 

the force with updated equipment in the future. 

The efforts to transform concepts, capabilities, people, and 

organizations need to remain fl exible, adaptable, and versatile. These 

areas need to provide a broad range of capabilities that are rapidly 

developed, rigorously tested, experimented with, and evaluated by 

the users under realistic conditions. Capabilities should be modifi ed 

to fi x defi ciencies and updated to incorporate any new technological 

improvements. If the Army can fi eld these items to a small number 

of units of action and continually improve them when certain items 

need to be fi elded in mass to deal with a future major crisis, then the 

Army could produce and fi eld the best, most trusted, most advanced 

pieces of equipment available at the time. 

An example is the current body armor. Units like the 75th Ranger 

Regiment started using ceramic body armor in the late 1980s and 

early 1990s. The initial versions had only a front ceramic plate and 

the vest came up high on the neck. After use in many training events 

and exercises, the rangers discovered they had diffi culty fi ring their 

weapon in the prone position because of the way the armor cut 

into the neck. In addition, the rangers needed back plates to protect 

the vital areas of gunners in vehicles or those fi ring crew served 
357

weapons, where their backs were exposed. Once Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM began, U.S. forces were on the fourth or fi fth generation 

of improvements. The large amounts of armor vests fi elded today 

have the benefi t of the iterative improvements which resulted from 

ranger-user input. This demonstrates the importance of involving 

the user, the human dimension, early and continually throughout 

the process.

There are numerous examples in recent operations that suggest 

how to adapt lessons learned into the current design of units of 

action. The initial deployment of forces into Kosovo for Operation 

JOINT GUARDIAN II contained elements of a mechanized 

brigade combat team, task organized with an airborne battalion. 

The command and control element, Task Force Falcon, combined 

a division staff element with the brigade combat team staff, and 

incorporated unit and individual augmentation, as well as unit 

liaisons from multinational units to fi ll various staff functions. Task 

Force Falcon coordinated the efforts of the numerous multinational 

forces by assigning forces to areas of operations best suited to their 

mobility, capabilities, and cultural compatibility. Troops from 

Russia, Poland, Greece, and Italy operated throughout the American 

sector. Russian and U.S. soldiers conducted joint patrols at the 

squad level on different occasions and built trust among the Serbian 

and Albanian civilian populations. This required technical and 

procedural interoperability considerations such as communications 

and battle drill rehearsals, so the units could function as a team in 

response to hostile actions. The human interaction and innovation of 

junior leaders assisted in identifying required capabilities to form a 

cohesive multinational team that produced the desired effects in this 

culturally diverse situation.

The battalion task forces that occupied the American-led sector 

were task organized with airborne and Bradley infantry companies, 

M1A1 equipped armor companies, Paladin-equipped artillery 

batteries, combat engineer companies, and various elements of 

combat support and combat service support elements based on 

requirements in their areas of operation. In addition, Task Force 1-26 

Infantry established Camp Montieth out of a former Serbian artillery 

camp, which was a smaller base camp adjacent to Gnjilane, the 

largest city in that sector. Forces on Camp Montieth consisted of over 
358

26 different units to include Navy Seabees, an Army, Navy, and Air 

Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal composite detachment, and a 

host of combat support and combat service support units with camp 

command and control under Task Force 1-26 Infantry. This ad hoc

task force continued to change structure and rotate forces in and out 

throughout its 6-months tour. Units performed numerous functions 

which were not in their normal core competencies. Composite 

squads ensured that proper expertise was available to provide the 

manpower to maintain the presence patrols required to secure a 

safe and stable environment that would allow the United Nations 

and the numerous nongovernmental and humanitarian assistance 

organizations to complete their missions. This is similar to the 

techniques used to complete normal combat engineer functions with 

a limited number of engineers. For example, in normal operations 

a core of engineer subject matter experts guide and supervise other 

nonengineer soldiers in the execution of engineer-related tasks. 

Additionally, 1-26th Infantry had just completed an organizational 

change and major weapons systems transitions while preparing for 

operations in Kosovo and while deployed to Kosovo. In early 1999, 

the battalion transitioned from M2A1 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to 

M2A2 enhanced Bradley Fighting Vehicles and converted to the 

Limited Conversion Division XXI (LCD XXI) confi guration, which 

resulted in the loss of one maneuver company. The unit transitioned 

from the M60 machinegun to the new M240B machinegun in 

September of 1999, while conducting stability and support operations 

in Kosovo. The unit transitioned numerous senior leaders during 

the preparation, deployment, and initial execution of operations, to 

include the commander and all fi eld grade offi cers. The fl exibility and 

adaptability accompanied by intense training and lessons learned 

during initial execution of assigned missions helped elements of 

this diverse task force form into a cohesive team. The stabilization 

and unit manning initiatives that the Army is implementing today 

will mitigate the risks associated with turbulence in the manning, 

equipping, and organizing of a unit while preparing to deploy or 

while undergoing complex military operations.22

Some of the nuances of this operation were the integration of live 

digital transmission from an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) fl own 

out of Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia directly into the tactical 
359

operations center of Task Force 1-26 Infantry. The rudimentary means 

to direct its fl ight once the UAV was airborne was by telephone to 

the operator in Macedonia. This new technology allowed the force 

to monitor more of the sector during the short fl ight times when 

the UAV was available. With signifi cant improvement in UAV 

technology since its use in 1999, these systems have now become 

an integral source of technology in both Operations ENDURING 

FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. This unit also had a tactical 

local area network established within 10 days of establishing Camp 

Montieth. The networking of forces with the main base at Camp 

Bondsteel provided redundant communications to the limited radio 

reception that resulted from the mountainous terrain and extended 

distances the units operated in. The network allowed soldiers limited 

internet and electronic mail access as well. Although the network 

was established with emerging technology with limited bandwidth, 

it allowed the Army to develop capabilities into major innovations 

in how forces operate today. Ongoing operations now employ chat 

rooms, email, and net meeting capability to assist with command 

and control.

Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada provides an example 

of how organizations can ignore problems and overlook their 

failures to provide professed capabilities. Individuals, who wrote 

after action reports that presented a critical view of intelligence 

failures and portrayed the military in a negative light, were 

threatened with career-ending evaluations for presenting their 

negative perspectives.23 In the age of Network-Centric warfare 

and the information age with use of the internet, young soldiers 

and leaders are conducting informal correspondence with other 

military members through email and unoffi cial chat rooms. They 

are able to pass on their valuable experiences and lessons learned in 

a more personal and immediate forum. Although there are dangers 

in propagating unsanctioned interpretations of lessons learned, it is 

important to get all members involved in the process to achieve the 

best results. The services need honest, constructive input on how to 

improve unit capabilities to achieve desired effects in the future.

An example of an existing standing joint task force headquarters 

that can provide lessons learned from previous operations and 

exercises is the forward deployed U.S. Army Southern European 
360

Task Force in Vicenza, Italy. Although predominately an Army 

manned headquarters, it is structured to provide the European 

Command (EUCOM) commander with the Joint Task Force core 

that is prepared to accept joint and multinational elements as well as 

individual augmentees to fi ll critical positions when mobilized. The 

Southern European Task Force headquarters established the Southern 

European Task Force Infantry Brigade, and received the requirement 

to be prepared to provide a Joint Task Force headquarters deployable 

within 72 hours in January 1994. In August of 1994 it deployed 

and became the nucleus for the Joint Task Force for Operation 

SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda. Since this initial deployment as the 

core of a Joint Task Force headquarters, Southern European Task 

Force has conducted annual Battle Command Training Program 

training exercises, in addition to numerous real-world deployments, 

integrating joint forces, and integrating augmentees which allowed 

them to develop tactics, techniques and procedures, and formulate 

relationships with joint and multinational units and organizations. 

The concept development for a Standing Joint Forces Headquarters 

can use the lessons learned from the numerous experiences of units 

like Southern European Task Force. The cohesive core staff element 

with the habitual relationships developed over time reduced the 

negative effect of building an ad hoc team to deal with a crisis 

situation.

CONCLUSION

The human dimension will have the greatest impact on the 

transformation process. Transformation is an intellectual process 

for which technology is an enabler and a catalyst for change. The 

practitioner of war is the one who innovates and determines how 

these technologies will be employed to produce the desired effects 

on enemy capabilities. The key to this cultural change required for 

transformation is in educating and training leaders, encouraging 

innovation and full participation in the process by all members 

of the services. The leadership with the experience, intuition, and 

understanding of the human dimension will make the systems of 
361

war successful. It will require honest and realistic evaluation of 

organizational changes and doctrine, acceptance of new technologies, 

and adoption of new processes, while maintaining fl exibility and 

adaptability to adjust to a changing environment and potentially 

changing enemy capabilities. 

The Army appears to be moving in the right direction with 

the modular brigade construct that intends to form cohesive core 

teams, reduce ad hoc formations, and implement force stabilization 

and unit manning initiatives. Human interaction on the battlefi eld 

by interoperable forces using innovative approaches for achieving 

effects remains the key to success. People, organizations, and doctrine 

determine how the joint forces will transform. Those involved in 

the transformation process can learn valuable lessons from past 

confl icts. The evaluation of each case study should be viewed 

holistically, based on the framework of sound strategic theory and 

principles, so the correct lesson can be extracted from the complex 

context of specifi c events. Immature technologies and developing 

concepts presented in the above case studies demonstrate how user 

innovation and continual reassessment of lessons learned can evolve 

into future concepts and capabilities. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

DoD should conduct continual reassessment of strategic aims; the 

technologies available to conduct the war; and the tactics, techniques, 

and procedures used to prosecute the war. More importantly, joint 

forces must be able to maintain the fl exibility and agility to make 

timely changes to affect the outcome of the war. The United States 

needs to focus on learning the right lessons from its past confl icts by 

examining not only what went right, but also by examining what 

went wrong and what adjustments potential adversaries have made 

as a result of U.S. actions. The human dimension of transformation 

is the critical factor in this process. The institutional Army has 

developed effective educated, well-trained, values-oriented service 

members, and this must continue despite the high operational 

tempo. The services need to create a learning organizational culture 

that encourages innovation and the willingness to take prudent 
362

risks. Forces need to be able to apply the required capabilities, at the 

right time and place to produce the required effects to defeat future 

enemy capabilities.

The joint force needs to invest more in the human dimension 

versus focusing on high-dollar platforms. It needs to fi nd a way 

to reduce the weight and bulk of the soldiers’ load since they are 

required to carry more high technology equipment, almost all of 

which requires batteries. It needs to develop effective hybrid fueled 

vehicles or some similar more fuel effi cient variant. These vehicles 

need to be more durable and require less maintenance to reduce 

the logistics tail required to support their effort, which will assist in 

reducing the forward footprint. Forces need to identify capabilities 

not immediately required in the area of operations, bringing in 

only what is needed and calling forward resources as the situation 

requires, reducing force protection and sustainment requirements. 

This change in thinking requires the trust and confi dence that 

engaged forces will receive the necessary capabilities and resources 

in time to produce the desired effects. The continued effort in training 

and operating as a joint force, with a focused effort in developing 

innovative solutions and encouraged by a military with a learning 

culture, will ensure this process remains on a logical path.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 14

1. U.S. Army, “Transformation Roadmap 2003,” p. ix.

2. Department of Defense, “Transformation Planning Guidance,” April 2003, 

p. 3.

3. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (New York, 1999, p. 1. Gray elaborates 

on p. 9, “. . . [As] tactical forms of war alter with political, economic, social, 

and technological change, war and strategy retain their integrity as distinctive 

phenomena.” Gray presents his 17 dimensions on p. 24, and he further argues, based 

on his analysis of Clausewitz and Michael Howard, that “strategy can be thought 

of usefully as having many broad, pervasive, and interpenetrating dimensions.” 

He clusters his 17 dimensions into three categories: The fi rst is “People and 

Politics,” which comprises people, society, culture, politics, and ethics. The second 

category, “Preparation for War,” includes economics and logistics, organization 

(including recruitment, training, and most aspects of armament), information and 

intelligence, strategic theory and doctrine, and technology. The fi nal category, 

“War Proper,” composes of military operations, command (political and military), 
363

geography, friction (including chance and uncertainty), the adversary, and time.” 

Gray demonstrates the importance of strategic culture on p. 25, stating 

. . . while historical experience as interpreted by and for the present 

day is probably best considered in the (strategic) culture. For example, 

while U.S. strategy today can be said in part to be a product of American 

historical experience, that strategy is also the product of how Americans 

today choose to interpret their country’s historical experience.

4. Ibid., p. 25.

5. Department of Defense, Joint Operations Concepts, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Offi ce, November 2003, p. 1. The Joint Operating Concepts

are derived from the Defense Planning Guidance and “describe how a Joint Force 

Commander will plan, prepare, and execute joint operations across the full range 

of military operations.” Joint Operating Concepts, currently defi ned as Major 

Combat Operations (MCO), Stability Operations (SO), Homeland Security (HS), 

and Strategic Deterrence (SD), will 

guide the development of joint tasks and ultimately desired joint 

capabilities required for success. These documents then further refi ne 

these concepts in joint functional concepts, currently defi ned as Command 

and Control, Battlespace awareness, Force application, Focused logistics, 

and Protection, that integrate related military tasks to attain capabilities 

required across the range of military operations. The Army structures 

transformation within the context of these joint concepts. 

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) Concept 

Primer, October 2003, states, 

Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) is a virtual aggregation 

of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructure, and processes to 

create and share the data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, 

execute, and assess joint force operations and enable a commander to 

make decisions better and faster than the adversary. 

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(JISR) Concept Primer (JISR) Concept Primer, October 2003, states, “Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and , October 2003, states, “Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (JISR) is a net-centric approach to the management of intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, aimed at supporting the demands 

of the joint war-fi ghter across all domains and all levels of war.” U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, Operational Net Assessment (ONA) Concept Primer, October 2003, states, , October 2003, states, 

“Operational Net Assessment (ONA) provides a methodology and framework 

used to develop a coherent, relevant, and common understanding of the operating 

environment, of the adversary as an adaptive entity within that environment, and 

of ourselves.”

6. Ibid., p. 3.

7. U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) Concept 

Primer, September 2003, p. 1.
364

8. U.S. Army, “Transformation Roadmap 2003,” pp. ix-x.

9. Douglas A. Macgregor, Transforming Under Fire: Revolutionizing How 

America Fights, Westport, CT, 2003 p. 8.

10. U.S. Joint Forces Command Online Glossary, available from the internet 

at http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm; Internet, accessed February 12, 2004. 

U.S. Joint Forces Command, Draft Effects-Based Operations (EBO) Concept Primer, 

September 2003, pp. 3-5, states, “Effects-Based Operations (EBO) has four 

components: knowledge superiority, an effects-based planning process, dynamic 

and adaptive execution, and accurate and timely effects-based assessment.” 

Strategic effects describe the desired change in the enemy’s behavior, often a 

coercion, deterrence, or stabilization. Operational-level effects describe changes 

in the enemy’s ability to operate coherently, i.e., the denial of the enemy’s ability 

to use key capabilities or elimination of the enemy’s operational options. Tactical 

effects describe the way we [the United States] affect key enemy systems, i.e., 

the reduction of the enemy’s integrated air defense systems to independent, 

uncoordinated, individual platforms through disrupted connections to target 

acquisition radars.”

11. Gary B. Griffi n, “The Directed Telescope: A Traditional Element of 

Effective Command,” Combat Studies Institute Report, 1985; available from http:/

/www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Griffi n/GRIFFIN.asp; Internet, accessed March 

8, 2004.

12. The experiences and ideas related in this paragraph are based on remarks 

made on January 7, 2004, by a senior leader who participated in Operation IRAQI 

FREEDOM to the Advanced Strategic Arts Program students and a briefi ng given 

on Battle Command dated December 16, 2003. Van Creveld’s statement reinforces 

this position, 

. . . any given technology has very strict limits. Often the critical factor is 

less the type of hardware available than the way it is put to use . . . victory 

often depends not so much on having superior technology at hand as 

on understanding the limits of any given technology, and on fi nding a 

way of going around those limitations . . . dependence on technology 

inevitably creates vulnerabilities that an intelligent enemy will not be 

slow to exploit. The opportunities for doing so, moreover, increase rather 

than diminish with the complexity of the technology in use.

Martin van Creveld, Command in War Command in War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 

1985, p. 231. Van Creveld cites the following source for this idea: P. T. Rhona, 

Weapon Systems and Information War, Seattle, WA, 1976, pp. 10-14.

13. Phil Craig, “The Technology That Changed War,” Public Broadcasting 

System Online, Available from Internet, http://www.pbs.org/wnet/innovation/

episode4_essay1.html. Accessed March 7, 2004.

14. U.S. Army, “Transformation Roadmap 2003,” pp. 7-12.
365

15. David Wood, “Pentagon Regularly Shortcuts Operational Testing Of 

Weapons, Report Says,” February 12, 2004; Newhouse News Service Online 

at www.Newhouse.com; available from http://www.newhousenews.com/archive/

wood021204.html; Internet, accessed February 12, 2004.

16. The Army core competencies listed in the U.S. Army, “Transformation 

Roadmap, 2003,” p. 1-1, are “train and equip Soldiers and grow leaders” and 

“provide relevant and ready land power capability to the combatant commander 

and the joint team.”

17. Dr. Williamson Murray, “Transformation And Professional Military 

Education: Past As Prologue To The Future,” National Security Challenges for the 

21st Century, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2003, pp. 16-17.

18. Dr. Paul W. Mayberry and interviewer Jordan Fuhr, “Training 

Transformation,” Military Training Technology Online. Vol. 8, Issue 4, 

November 19, 2003. Available from Internet, http://www.mt2-kmi.com/archive_

article.cfm?DocID=267. Accessed February 10, 2004, p. 3.

19. Patrick Chisholm, “Tutoring for Future Combat,” Military Training 

Technology Online, Vol. 8, Issue 3, September 8, 2003: Available from http:

//www.mt2-kmi.com/archive_article.cfm?DocID=219; Internet, accessed February 10, 

2004.

20. James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, Lawrence, KS, 1992, p. 198. “The 

evolution of German tactics depended largely on the success of the maneuvers and 

war games in which the Germans tried out the new concepts.” Corum attributes 

the superior training programs for the German success at the beginning of the 

Second World War (p. 205).

21. These accounts of actions in Iraq are taken from electronic mail 

correspondence with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Russell, a battalion commander 

operating in Tikrit, Iraq.

22. These accounts are from my experience as the commander of 1-26 Infantry 

from June 29, 1999, to June 15, 2001, and from accounts recorded in the 1999 

edition of the 1-26 Infantry Annual Historical Review, as part of the 1st Infantry 

Division Annual Historical Record.

23. This reference on after action reports and failure to allow critical reports 

after Operation URGENT FURY is from personal observations and conversations 

with participants in this operation.

367

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ERIC L. ASHWORTH is a U.S. Army fi eld artillery lieutenant 

colonel and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 

2004. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in 

CONUS, Korea, and Germany over the past 22 years. Most recently, 

Lieutenant Colonel Ashworth commanded the 2nd Battalion, 18th 

Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He currently serves at the 

Pentagon in the Offi ce of the Chief of Staff of the Army. Lieutenant 

Colonel Ashworth holds a master’s of science degree in computer 

science from Texas A&M University.

GEORGE A. BRINEGAR is a Texas Army National Guard armor 

colonel and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2004. 

He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in both 

the active and reserve components of the Army. Most recently, 

he commanded 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment 1st Infantry 

Division, Fort Riley, Kansas. He currently serves as the Chief of Staff, 

36th Infantry Division. Colonel Brinegar is a 1982 graduate of Texas 

A&M University and holds a master’s degree from Tarleton State 

University and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the U.S. 

Army War College.

STUART L. DICKEY is a U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant colonel and a 

graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2004. Commissioned 

in 1983, he has served as a tanker and a MAGTF offi cer. He 

currently serves as a strategic planning offi cer at EUCOM, Stuttgart, 

Germany. 

BRIAN D. JONES is an U.S. Army infantry colonel and a graduate of 

the U.S Army War College Class of 2004. He has served in a variety 

of command and staff positions in CONUS and Korea over the past 

21 years. Most recently he commanded 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry 

(Mechanized) at Camp Hovey, Republic of Korea. He currently 

serves as the commander of 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort 

Carson, Colorado.
368

STEVEN W. KNOTT is a U.S. naval aviator and a graduate of the 

U.S. Army War College Class of 2004. He has served in a variety of 

aviation assignments including seven extended deployments to the 

Mediterranean and Persian Gulf areas of operation. Most recently, 

he commanded Helicopter Combat Support Squadron eight based 

in Norfolk, Virginia. A 1982 graduate of Hampden-Sydney College 

and a 1991 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, Commander 

Knott holds a BA degree in history and MA degree in national 

security affairs, respectively. He currently serves at the Bureau of 

Naval Personnel, Millington, TN.

KENNETH O. MCCREEDY is a U.S. Army military intelligence 

corps lieutenant colonel and a graduate of the U.S. Army War 

College Class of 2004. He has served in a variety of command and 

staff positions in the United States and Europe over the past 22 

years. Most recently he commanded the 201st Military Intelligence 

Battalion at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and served as the Professor of 

Military Science at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia. He 

currently serves in the Offi ce of Force Transformation in the Offi ce 

of the Secretary of Defense. A 1976 graduate of Washington and Lee 

University, Lieutenant Colonel McCreedy also holds a doctorate 

and masters degree in American history from the University of 

California, Berkeley.

WILLIAMSON MURRAY is currently professor emeritus of history 

at Ohio State University. He has served as the Harold Johnson 

Professor of Military History at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. 

Murray is also the author and editor of a number of major works, 

the most recent of which is A War to Be Won, Fighting the Second World 

War, published by Harvard University Press.

JOHN D. NELSON is a U.S. Army Strategy, Plans, and Policy Offi cer 

(Functional Area 59) and a graduate of the U.S Army War College 

Class of 2004. He was commissioned as a Combat Engineer before he 

was career fi eld designated as a strategist. He has served in a variety 

of command and staff positions in the United States, The Republic 

of Korea, and Europe over the past 21 years. His most recent 

assignment was the Chief of Force Planning and Integration in the 
369

War Plans Division, G3, Headquarters Department of the Army 

in Washington, DC. He currently serves as the Director of Plans 

and Policy, J5 for Joint Task Force Six, Fort Bliss Texas. Lieutenant 

Colonel Nelson holds a master’s degree in civil engineering from 

Virginia Polytechnic Institute, a master’s degree in military arts and 

sciences from the School of Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College, and a master’s degree in 

strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College.

THOMAS P. REILLY is a U.S. Army Strategist (Functional Area 

59) and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2004. He 

has served in a variety of command and staff positions in CONUS, 

Europe, Asia, and the Middle East over the past 24 years. His most 

recent assignment was as the Chief of War Plans, C5, Coalition 

Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) during Operations 

ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Lieutenant Colonel 

Reilly holds a master’s degree in public administration from 

Western Kentucky University, a master’s degree in military art and 

science from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War 

College. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. prior to joining the faculty 

of the U.S. Army War College.

THOMAS C. RIDDLE is a U.S. Army information systems 

management lieutenant colonel and a graduate of the U.S. Army 

War College Class of 2004. He has served in a variety of assignments 

in CONUS and Europe over the last 22 years. Most recently, he 

served as the Operations Offi cer for the Information Operations 

section, Army Operations Center, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, 

the Pentagon. He currently serves as the Deputy Director for 

Information Management at the Inter-American Defense Board 

and Inter-American Defense College, Washington, DC. Lieutenant 

Colonel Riddle holds a master’s degree in computer resources and 

information management from Webster University.

BYRON H. RISNER is a U.S. Air Force aviator and a graduate of the 

U.S Army War College Class of 2004. He has served in a variety of 

command and staff positions in the United States and overseas over 
370

the past 22 years. He most recently commanded the 15th Air Support 

Operations Squadron and served as the division air liaison offi cer 

for the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Stewart, Georgia. 

He currently serves as the commander of the 609th Air Operations 

Squadron, CENTAF, Shaw AFB, South Carolina. Colonel Risner 

holds a master’s degree in human resource management from 

Chapman University and a master’s degree in strategic studies from 

the U.S. Army War College. 

JAMES D. SCUDIERI is a U.S. Army ordnance lieutenant colonel, 

logistician (Functional Area 90), and graduate of the U.S. Army War 

College Class of 2004. He has served in a variety of command and 

staff positions in the United States, Germany, and Korea. His most 

recent assignments include the G-4 for 10th Mountain Division 

(Light Infantry) and battalion commander, 710th Main Support 

Battalion, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). He currently 

serves as Chief of Plans, 1st Corps Support Command (COSCOM), 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Lieutenant Colonel Scudieri holds 

doctorate and master’s degrees in history from the City University 

of New York. 

ROBERT E. SCURLOCK, Jr., is a U.S. Army infantry colonel and a 

graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2004. He has served 

in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States 

and Europe over the past 24 years. Most recently he commanded 

1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) at 

Schweinfurt, Germany, and served as Chief, Current Operations, 

Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. 

He currently serves as the Deputy G-3, V Corps, Heidelburg, 

Germany. A 1982 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Colonel 

Scurlock also holds a master’s degree in computer science from the 

U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

BURT K. THOMPSON is a U.S. Army infantry lieutenant colonel and 

a graduate of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2004. Over the past 

20 years he has served in a variety of command and staff positions 

in CONUS, Korea, the Middle East and Hawaii. Prior to attending 
371

the U.S. Army War College, he commanded the 2nd Battalion, 35th 

Infantry Regiment, and served as the G3 of the 25th Infantry Division 

(Light), Schofi eld Barracks, Hawaii. He currently serves as a strategic 

planner in the Joint Staff, J5, War on Terror Directorate. Lieutenant 

Colonel Thompson is a veteran of Operations JUST CAUSE and 

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. He is a graduate of Norwich 

University and holds a master’s degree from the School of Advanced 

Military Studies, a Master’s of Science Degree in administration 

from Central Michigan University, and a master’s degree in strategic 

studies from the Army War College.