Number 59, January 1996

Nuclear Smuggling:
*How Serious a Threat?

by James L. Ford
Conclusions:

The unprecedented leakage of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union (FSU) in 1994  signaled a clear shift inthe nature and significance of the nuclear smuggling problem.

The apparent pause in leakage in 1995 does not provide much comfort since conditions in the FSU conducive to nuclearleakage remain relatively unchanged.

The barrier once faced by a rogue state or a terrorist group to the acquisition of a sufficient amount of special nuclearmaterial to construct a nuclear weapon (or some other nuclear device) has been breached and is no longer as formidable.

The U.S. government has recognized that the current threat is very serious and that it could get a lot worse.
Critics believe that the U.S. government has not responded adequately to the nature and seriousness of the threat.
**Historical Aspects of Illicit Transactions Involving Nuclear Materials

	Cases of illicit transactions in nuclear materials have occurred over the last 20 years virtually throughout the world, toinclude the United States.  Of the 450 reported attempts of illegal trafficking recorded by the Department of Energy through1994, most proved to be nothing more than profit-motivated scams involving bogus material, perpetrated by opportunists.  
	The unprecedented leakage of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union (FSU) in 1994 signaled a clear shift inthe nature and significance of the nuclear smuggling problem. While recognizing that the reporting was incomplete and ofmixed   reliability, there were increases observed in the numbers of attempted transactions including the number ofparticipants and in the types and quantities of materials offered for sale.  The apparent pause in the leakage of nuclearmaterials in 1995 is welcome, but does not provide much comfort because conditions in the FSU conducive to nuclearsmuggling remain relatively unchanged and substantial leakage (still unrecovered) may have already occurred.      

**Understanding the Threat:  Not Just a Bomb**

	Experts agree that obtaining a sufficient amount of special nuclear material (SNM) is the single most difficult challengein the construction of a nuclear weapon.  The technical difficulty and expense of acquiring such material provided theprincipal barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Although still a significant challenge,that barrier has now been breached and is no longer as formidable.  
	But the possibility of a rogue state acquiring enough SNM to construct one or more rudimentary nuclear weapons isnot the sole threat, nor perhaps the one that is the most likely or worrisome.  Other possibilities include rogue states and evensubnational groups using nuclear materials to construct an improvised nuclear device (IND), or a radiological dispersaldevice (RDD).  An IND is designed to produce a nuclear explosion but has a lower yield than an actual weapon. An RDDproduces a conventional explosion designed to scatter radioactive materials over an area to contaminate it and spread fearand insecurity among its inhabitants.  This not only broadens the threat in terms of available material and technology, butincreases the number of potential proliferators and the likelihood of an incident.  Delivery on target also has been simplified,especially in terms of an IND or RDD; it is not necessary to have sophisticated military aircraft or missile delivery systems.Terrorists can load one of these devices into a van and deliver it on target, in much the same manner as occurred at the WorldTrade Center in New York City or at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
	The steep increase in observed nuclear smuggling activity, and the mounting concern expressed by the national securitycommunity, raise some fundamental questions: What is going on?  Why is it occurring?  Who is involved?  Where is itoccurring?  What does the future hold?  And finally, what does it mean to our national security?  

**What Is Going On:
The Nuclear Smuggling Problem

	Germany is on the front line of the current trafficking in illegal nuclear material and offers an ominous picture of whatis going on. The trends revealed over the last few years are disturbing to law enforcement officials: sharp increases in thenumber of incidents; ever greater numbers of cases believed to involve genuine nuclear materials, as opposed to frauds orscams; and only a small number of seizures of nuclear material in cases where it was believed to be present.
	In essence, a black market in nuclear materials has arisen in the FSU, most notably in Russia.  The stolen materialsrange from highly-enriched uranium and plutonium, the so-called sensitive nuclear materials which are the key ingredientsof a nuclear weapon, to nuclear reactor and submarine fuel, and other materials associated with the nuclear industry suchas lithium, beryllium, radium, palladium and others.  In 1994, police authorities in Germany and elsewhere in Europeconfiscated SNM in proliferation-significant (greater than microgram) quantities for the first time outside the FSU.
	Intelligence and law enforcement experts, in both the United States and abroad, agree that these are worrisome trendsbut that, to date, there has not been a single documented case of stolen nuclear materials actually reaching a *bona fide*customer.  Most have ended in arrests, the result of sting operations by law enforcement authorities and a lack ofprofessionalism by part-time thieves.  This type of smuggling can be described as "supply-driven."  It is characterized bythefts of relatively small quantities of material by non-professionals, often involving "insiders," who have access to a supply,but probably do not have a customer at the time of the theft. 

**Why Is It Occurring:  
Loosened Control and Opportunism

	 The collapse of the Soviet Union was so swift and so complete that it left a void in the government, economic and socialinfrastructure of Russia and other successor states.  As a result, activities that once were very tightly monitored by the KGBand other control organs of the State, are no longer watched over so carefully.  This is the case with respect to the protection,control, and accountability of the FSU's nuclear material, especially that outside the control of the military.  In addition, thecurrent restructuring brought on by the Soviet collapse has adversely affected the FSU's vast nuclear arms and researchcomplex, idling many highly skilled scientists and leaving others with scarcely enough money to care for their families' basicneeds.  This scenario has been repeated in the military sector as well, transforming segments of the once-privileged Sovietmilitary-scientific-industrial elite into a newly disenfranchised underclass--with a difference: it still retains access to nuclearmaterials and nuclear weapons.

**Who Is Involved:  The Newly Disenfranchised**

	Most reported nuclear smuggling cases to date have involved opportunistic thieves, "insiders" within the vast Russiannuclear complex who have taken something of perceived value to which they had access, and tried to sell it for personal gain. Some acted individually, while others co-opted a small number of accomplices.  Lacking a comprehensive analysis, it isdifficult to say just what motivated these people to act--perhaps need in some cases, but most assuredly greed and the hopeof making big money in others.
	The role of organized crime in nuclear smuggling is unclear. The so-called Russian mafia has reportedly been engagedin  cases involving the smuggling of nuclear-associated materials such as beryllium, but to date, in no known case withweapons-usable materials, according to law enforcement authorities.  Some believe that it may be just a matter of time beforeorganized crime will begin to deal in weapons-usable materials, while others believe that it may already be happening andthat law enforcement authorities simply have not detected it.  Still others believe that the Russian mafia would be ill-advisedto shift its focus from current high-profit, low-risk crime to the smuggling of nuclear materials, an activity that would surelyresult in high-level domestic and international countermeasures.  However, one cannot discount the possibility that, at somefuture date, the Russian mafia may conclude that the expected profit from nuclear smuggling operations outweighs theperceived risks.

**Where Is It Occurring:  Europe and Elsewhere**

	Of special interest is the role played by the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whose territories haveserved a trans-shipment function for material leaving the FSU enroute to other parts of Europe. To date, most of the recentseizures of nuclear and nuclear-related materials have taken place in Europe, with Germany accounting for the largestnumber by far outside Russia, followed by other countries in Central Europe. American citizens, to include businessmen andeven U.S. Government officials, have also been approached both at home and abroad about buying such materials. Furthermore, if the Russian mafia does become involved in nuclear smuggling at some future date, it already conducts illegalactivities in the United States, and so can take advantage of an existing infrastructure for transborder smuggling and extortionrings which could be expanded to include nuclear materials.
	Some analysts are concerned because they have heard of few nuclear smuggling activities along the traditional traderoutes from Russia into neighboring countries where they would expect to see such trafficking, specifically along the southernroutes into Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, as well as along the far eastern routes into Mongolia and China.  Law enforcementand intelligence officials readily admit that they need much better information on these areas before they can conclude thatsuch activities have not taken place.

**What Does the Future Hold:  
Smuggling as Supply- or Demand-Driven 

	A more troubling concern than the "supply-driven" smuggling previously discussed, and one that is not measurable fromevidence accumulated so far, is "demand-driven" nuclear smuggling (representing a specific request from a client state orgroup).   U.S. government studies have concluded that the demand for nuclear materials and weapons is indeed presentamong the world's would-be proliferant states, and perhaps among sub-national groups seeking items on behalf of othersor for themselves.  Demand-driven nuclear smuggling would be characterized by an acquisition network involving a complexmixture of government, quasi-government, private business and front organizations, both legitimate and covert--not unlikethe network put together by Iraq in assembling its nuclear capabilities.  Identification of such a network and specifically itsintended use is made extremely difficult by the fact that legitimate government acquisitions through official channels takeplace simultaneously with and may even mask illegal acquisitions through covert channels.  This denies authorities the fullpicture and intent of a concerted effort on behalf of a would-be nuclear state or sub-national group.
	While the focus of this discussion is on special nuclear materials, another aspect of this problem--the possible theft ofan actual nuclear weapon--    cannot be ruled out under present conditions in the FSU.  In at least one reported instanceinvolving strategic missiles, however, Russian troops deserted their missile battery in the field while they all went foragingfor food to eat. Whereas most observers regard nuclear weapons in the Russian strategic arsenal as still relatively secure inthe hands of the military, there is concern for the security of the large number of widely dispersed storage sites for tacticalnuclear weapons.  
	Concern over the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials remains the key focus, however.  Russiais  currently dismantling thousands of nuclear weapons under  agreements with the United States.  This creates additionalstockpiles of special nuclear material which then must be transferred from military to civilian custody--widely regarded asmore lax than that in the military.  With the disappearance of much of the old Soviet infrastructure for control of nuclearweapons and materials, security of these items--from transport through storage--continues to suffer because a new systemof Western-style administrative control and accountability has not been fully instituted in its place.  

**What Does This Mean for U.S. National Security:  Beyond the Threat

	U.S. leaders have already recognized that the current threat is very serious, and that it could get a lot worse.  TheDepartments of State, Defense, Energy, Justice (FBI) and Treasury have been in the forefront of efforts to address the manyfacets of the nuclear proliferation problem.  Major initiatives range from Summit talks and Gore-Chernomyrdin discussionsto the Energy Department's Lab-to-Lab initiative and the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,sometimes referred to as the Nunn-Lugar Program.  Under this program, some $1.2 billion has been identified for a varietyof nonproliferation projects in the FSU nuclear successor states, including about $250 million for "Chain of Custody"projects (e.g., safe and secure transport and storage of fissile material) which will help to counter illegal trafficking in nuclearmaterials. The FBI and Customs Bureau have expanded their overseas presence and increased their coordination, educationand training programs with foreign counterparts.  In spite of  measurable progress, critics maintain that the U.S. governmentstill has not responded adequately to the nature and seriousness of the threat.  The encouraging news is that there may stillbe time in which to act, as evidenced by the apparent lull in 1995; a real deluge of sensitive nuclear materials is not yetapparent, nor is the active involvement of organized crime.  

Recommendation:

	The U.S. government must break through its present threshold of effort and create, in conjunction with its internationalpartners--both West and East--a comprehensive plan of action for stemming the trickle of illegal transactions in nuclearmaterial before it becomes a flood.

**About the Author**

James L. Ford is a Senior Visiting Fellow at National Defense University's Center for Counterproliferation Research.  Heis on detail from the Department of Energy where he last served as Associate Deputy Director for the Office ofNonproliferation and National Security.  He can be contacted at (202) 475-0875, Fax (202) 475-1012, or Internet e-mail[email protected].

**Nuclear Smuggling Cases in Germany**

Total Cases	
    Frauds
Believed True
Material Seized1991	
 41	1992	
158
59
99
18
1993	
241
118
123
21
1994
267
85
182
19
Source: CSIS Global Organized Crime Project

**Weapons-Usable Samples Recovered in 1994

May	 
June	
August	
September	
December	5.6 grams (g) of plutonium-239 (99.75%pure) in Tengen, Germany.
0.8g of uranium-235 (88% enriched) in Landshut, Germany.
350g of plutonium-239 (87% pure) in Munich, Germany.
Slightly more than 1g of plutonium,said to be fit for military use (uncon- firmed), in Verona, Italy.
2.7kg of uranium-235 (88% enriched) in Prague, the Czech Republic. 
Source: CSIS Global Organized Crime Project

***"There is now a clear and present danger that the essential ingredients of nuclear bombs could fall into the hands of radicalstates or terrorist groups."*

Statement of Dr. John P. Holdren, Chairman of the President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, beforethe Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings in August 1995.NOTE

**|Return to Top | Return toStrategic Forum Index |Return to Research and Publications|

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members andguests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and theNational Defense University faculty.  These include reports oforiginal research, synopses of seminars and conferences,the resultsof unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

Editor - Jonathan W.*********************