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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

MIAMI DIVISION

CASE NO.:

ANTHONY RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff, 

v.

AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY 

VENTURES, LLC,

a Foreign Limited Liability Company,

Defendant.

________________________________/

COMPLAINT & DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff, ANTHONY RAMIREZ (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Ramirez”), by and through 

undersigned counsel, files this Complaint against Defendant, AMERICAN 

TECHNOLOGY VENTURES, LLC (“Defendant” or “ATV”), and states as follows:

NATURE OF THE SUIT

1. This action is brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) to 

recover from Defendant overtime compensation, liquidated damages, declaratory relief, 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other damages permitted by law. 

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

2. Mr. Ramirez was an hourly-paid employee who performed services on 

behalf of Defendant in Miami-Dade County, Florida.

3. ATV is a foreign limited liability company located in Miami, MiamiDade County, Florida, and which, at all times relevant, performed work in Miami-Dade 

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County, Florida.

4. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court, as the claims are brought pursuant to 

the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., hereinafter “FLSA”), 

to recover unpaid overtime wages, an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, to 

obtain declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

5. Venue is proper in this Court, as the actions giving rise to this lawsuit 

occurred in Miami-Dade County, Florida.

FLSA COVERAGE

6. At all times material hereto, Defendant was, and continues to be an 

“employer” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

7. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was an “employee” within the 

meaning of the FLSA. 

8. At all times material hereto, Defendant was Plaintiff’s “employer” within 

the meaning of the FLSA. 

9. At all times material hereto, Defendant was, and continues to be, an 

“enterprise engaged in commerce” or in the production of goods for commerce as defined

by the FLSA.

10. At all times material hereto, Defendant was primarily engaged in 

providing motor vehicle customization, upholstery, fabrication, and similar services to

customers in and around Miami-Dade County, Florida.

11. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was “engaged in commerce” within 

the meaning of § 6 and § 7 of the FLSA, but not for purposes of the Motor Carrier Act.

12. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was engaged in the “production of 

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goods for commerce” and subject to the individual coverage of the FLSA, but not for 

purposes of the Motor Carrier Act.

13. At all times material hereto, Defendant had two (2) or more employees 

handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that had been moved in or 

produced for commerce, such as seats, fabrics, automotive parts, tools, etc., but which 

had come to rest within its warehouse location in Miami-Dade County, Florida. 

14. At all times material hereto, the work performed by Plaintiff was directly 

essential to the business performed by Defendant, in that Defendant could not operate its 

business without Custom Fabricators and Mechanics like Plaintiff.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

15. Mr. Ramirez worked for Defendant under the title of Custom Fabricator 

and Mechanic from on or about November 11, 2019, through May 26, 2020.

16. Mr. Ramirez always worked in Miami-Dade County, Florida, and his

activities were at all times controlled and closely supervised by Defendant’s managers 

and supervisors.

17. Mr. Ramirez had no authority to hire or fire employees of ATV.

18. Mr. Ramirez had no authority to discipline employees of ATV.

19. Mr. Ramirez had no authority to determine the schedules to be worked by 

any employees of ATV, or to change the schedules.

20. Mr. Ramirez had no authority to set rates of pay for other employees or 

agents of ATV.

21. Mr. Ramirez had no input into performance reviews of other employees 

or agents of ATV.

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22. All of Mr. Ramirez’s major decisions had to be cleared in advance by one 

of ATV’s supervisors.

23. Mr. Ramirez was closely monitored by ATV’s managers and supervisors 

at all times.

24. Mr. Ramirez followed procedures established by ATV and did exactly as 

he was instructed to do.

25. Mr. Ramirez’s duties were to perform custom fabrication and mechanical

services on behalf of Defendant’s clients.

26. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment, Defendant regularly required 

Plaintiff to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week.

27. Defendant hired Plaintiff at an hourly rate of $20.00 per hour.

28. Plaintiff regularly worked fifty-four (54) or more hours per week for 

Defendant.

29. Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff full and proper overtime compensation

for all hours worked over forty (40) per week during the above-noted time period.

30. When Plaintiff worked more than forty (40) hours in a given work week, 

Defendant failed to properly pay him for all overtime hours worked. 

31. Defendant routinely paid Plaintiff at a straight time rate instead of a timeand-a-half rate for overtime hours that he worked, or paid him nothing at all for such 

hours.

32. Plaintiff should have been compensated at the rate of one-and-one-half 

times Plaintiff’s regular rate for all hours that Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) 

hours per week, as required by the FLSA, throughout his employment.

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33. Defendant tried to characterize Mr. Ramirez as an “independent 

contractor.”

34. Mr. Ramirez was, however, an hourly-paid employee of ATV, and not an 

independent contractor in any way.

35. Mr. Ramirez worked for ATV subject to hours that were strictly 

prescribed and controlled by ATV.

36. Mr. Ramirez’s lunch breaks and other breaks were dictated by ATV.

37. Mr. Ramirez had no opportunity for profit or loss depending on his skill 

as a custom fabricator or mechanic.

38. The services rendered by Mr. Ramirez were an integral part of ATV’s 

business.

39. ATV had total control over the manner in which Mr. Ramirez performed 

his work.

40. Defendant violated Title 29 U.S.C. §207 in that:

(a) Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) hours in one or more workweeks for 

his period of employment with Defendant;

(b) No payments or provisions for payment have been made by Defendant to 

properly compensate Plaintiff at the statutory rate of one-and-one-half times 

Plaintiff’s regular rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per 

work week, as provided by the FLSA; and

(c) Defendant failed to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA.

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41. Prior to violating the FLSA, Defendant did not consult with an attorney 

to evaluate whether Plaintiff’s actual job duties and pay structure rendered him exempt 

from recovering payment for all overtime worked under the FLSA.

42. Prior to violating the FLSA, Defendant did not consult with the 

Department of Labor to evaluate whether Plaintiff’s actual job duties and pay structure 

rendered him exempt from recovering payment for all overtime worked under the FLSA.

43. Prior to violating the FLSA, Defendant did not consult with an accountant 

to evaluate whether Plaintiff’s actual job duties and pay structure rendered him exempt 

from recovering payment for all overtime worked under the FLSA.

44. Based on the allegations in Paragraphs 41-43, above, Plaintiff is entitled 

to liquidated damages, as Defendant has no objective or subjective good faith belief that 

its pay practices were in compliance with the FLSA.

45. Plaintiff has retained the law firm of RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A. 

to represent him in the litigation and has agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its 

services.

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF 29 U.S.C. §207 OVERTIME COMPENSATION

46. Plaintiff reincorporates and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 45 of the 

Complaint as though set forth fully herein, and further alleges as follows: 

47. Plaintiff is entitled to be paid time-and-one-half his regular rate of pay for 

each hour worked in excess of forty (40) per work week. 

48. During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff regularly 

worked overtime hours, but was not paid full and proper time-and-one-half

compensation for all hours worked. 

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49. Plaintiff was not an exempt employee as defined by the FLSA, and was 

instead an hourly-paid, non-exempt employee as defined by the FLSA.

50. As a result of Defendant’s intentional, willful, and unlawful acts in 

refusing to pay Plaintiff time-and-one-half his regular rate of pay for each hour worked 

in excess of forty (40) per work week in one or more work weeks, Plaintiff has suffered 

damages, in addition to incurring reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 

51. As a result of Defendant’s willful violation of the FLSA, Plaintiff is 

entitled to liquidated damages. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that judgment be entered in his

favor against Defendant, and that this Court:

a. Declare, pursuant to the FLSA, that the acts and practices complained 

of herein are in violation of the maximum hour provisions of the 

FLSA;

b. Award Plaintiff overtime compensation in the amount due to him for 

time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week;

c. Award Plaintiff liquidated damages in an amount equal to the 

overtime award; 

d. Award Plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees and costs and expenses of 

the litigation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b);

e. Award Plaintiff pre-judgment interest; and order any other and further 

relief that the Court deems just and proper.

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JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues so triable as a matter of right by 

jury.

DATED this 10th day of July, 2020.

Respectfully Submitted, 

By: /s/Noah E. Storch

Noah E. Storch, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 0085476 

RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A.

10368 W. SR 84, Suite 103

Davie, Florida 33324

Telephone: (866) 344-9243

Facsimile: (954) 337-2771

E-mail:noah@floridaovertimelawyer.com

Trial Counsel for Plaintiff

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