UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

CASE NO: 20-CV-60633 SMITH

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF ALASKA, ARIZONA, 

CALIFORNIA, COLORADO, CONNECTICUT, DELAWARE, DISTRICT OF 

COLUMBIA, FLORIDA, HAWAII, IDAHO, ILLINOIS, INDIANA, IOWA, MAINE, 

MARYLAND, MASSACHUSETTS, MICHIGAN, MINNESOTA, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, 

NEW HAMPSHIRE, NEW MEXICO, NEW YORK, NORTH CAROLINA, OHIO,

OKLAHOMA, OREGON, PENNSYLVANIA, RHODE ISLAND, VERMONT, 

VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON, AND WEST VIRGINIA IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT

VINCENT J. MORRIS, STEVEN SIMMONS, 

YOLANDA UPTON, and MICHAEL LUZZI, on 

behalf of themselves and all others similarly 

situated, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION d/b/a PHH 

MORTGAGE SERVICES, on its own behalf and as 

successor by merger to OCWEN LOAN 

SERVICING, LLC, a New Jersey Corporation, and 

OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, a Florida 

Limited Liability Company, 

Defendants.

_________________________________

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .....................................................................................................1

BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................................3

ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................................4

I. THE CURRENT PROPOSED SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE IT IS NOT 

FAIR, REASONABLE OR ADEQUATE ......................................................................................4

A. THE RELIEF PROVIDED TO CLASS MEMBERS VIOLATES VARIOUS STATES’ LAWS ...............5

1. The Unwritten Amendment of Mortgage Contracts Violates the 

Statute of Frauds in Many States and Will Cause Mass Confusion ............5

2. PHH Seeks the Ratification of Fees That Violate States’ Laws and 

Regulations ..................................................................................................8

3. The Unwritten, Mass Amendments Undermine Some States’ 

Interests in Ensuring that Mortgage Contracts and Amendments are 

Recorded ......................................................................................................9

4. The Proposed Settlement’s “Safety Valve” Provision Will Force 

Borrowers to Sign Documents Contrary to Their Interests .........................9

B. With PHH Able to Charge Excessive Fees for the Life of the Loan, the One-Time 

Payment to Class Members is Inadequate .............................................................10

1. Some of the Class Members’ Awards Will Go to Late Fees.....................11

2. Requiring Former PHH Class Members to File Claim Forms Will 

Result in Fewer Payments to Borrowers....................................................11

3. Former PHH Borrowers Are Bound by the Proposed Settlement 

Even If They Do Not Submit a Claim .......................................................12

4. Providing for Unclaimed Settlement Funds to Revert to PHH Is 

Unfair and Unreasonable ...........................................................................13

5. PHH’s Claim That it Would Not Permit These Forms of Payments 

Without Fees is Suspect.............................................................................13

6. For the Court to Determine Adequacy, PHH Should Reveal the 

Range of Payments and the Average Payment for Class Members...........14

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C. The Proposed Settlement Fails to Treat Class Members Equitably.......................14

1. The Proposed Settlement Treats Current PHH Borrowers Less 

Favorably than Former PHH Class Members............................................15

2. The Proposed Settlement Penalizes Low- and Moderate-Income 

Consumers..................................................................................................16

II. THE CASES RELIED ON BY THE SETTLING PARTIES, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR, THE 

MCWHORTER SETTLEMENT, DO NOT JUSTIFY THE PROPOSED CLASS ACTION 

SETTLEMENT HERE .............................................................................................................16

A. Notice to the Attorneys General of the Settlement in McWhorter, Provided 

Pursuant to CAFA, Does Not Amount to State Approval of that Settlement .......17

B. No State Approved of The McWhorter Settlement and the Settling Parties 

Misrepresent the Communications with State Regulators in McWhorter .............18

C. Differences from the McWhorter Settlement Demonstrate Why the Proposed 

Settlement Terms Require Further Scrutiny ..........................................................19

CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................20

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Bennett v. Behring Corp.,

737 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1984) ...................................................................................................4

CFPB et al. v. Ocwen Financial Corp. et al.,

No. 17-cv-80495 (S.D. Fl.)........................................................................................................7

Cibula v. Seterus Inc.,

No. 50-2015-CA-01090-XXXX-MB (Fla. 15th Cir. 2019).......................................................8

Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp.,

517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007) ......................................................................................2

In re Salem Mortg. Co.,

783 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1986) ...................................................................................................17

McWhorter v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,

2019 WL 9171207 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2019) .................................................................. passim

Poertner v. Gillette Co.,

618 F. App’x 624 (11th Cir. 2015) ..........................................................................................13

State of Alabama et al v. PHH Mortgage Corporation,

18-cv-00009 (D.D.C. 2018).......................................................................................................7

Waddell v. U.S. Bank National Association,

395 F. Supp. 3d 676 (E.D.N.C. 2019)........................................................................................9

Wilson v. DirectBuy, Inc.,

2011 WL 2050537 (D. Conn. May 16, 2011)............................................................................2

Zamber v. American Airlines, Inc.,

2019 WL 2262914 (S.D. Fl. 2019) ..........................................................................................13

FEDERAL STATUTES

15 U.S.C.

§ 1692, et seq. ............................................................................................................................3

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28 U.S.C.

§ 1715.........................................................................................................................................2

§ 1715(b)....................................................................................................................................2

§ 1715(f)...................................................................................................................................17

STATE STATUTES

Texas Finance Code

§ 392.303(a)(2) ..........................................................................................................................8

STATE REGULATIONS

3 NYCRR

§ 419.5(b)...................................................................................................................................8

RULES

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23..................................................................................................................... 14-15

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ........................................................................................................................2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (e)(2)...................................................................................................................4

Fed.R.Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D) ..............................................................................................................15

MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES

Attorney General Ashley Moody Press Release, Attorney General Moody Secures 

More Than $11 Million to Address Ocwen Mortgage Servicing and 

Foreclosure Issues (Oct. 15, 2020)............................................................................................7

CFPB, Bulletin 2020-02-Compliance Bulletin and Policy Guidance: Handling of 

Information and Documents During Mortgage Servicing Transfers, 85 Fed. 

Reg. 25,281 (May 1, 2020)........................................................................................................6

CFPB, CFPB Sues Ocwen for Failing Borrowers Throughout Mortgage Servicing 

Process, Press Release (April 20, 2017),...................................................................................8

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Compliance Bull. No. 2017-01 (July 31, 2017)................................4

Nat’l Consumer Law Center, Why Services Foreclose When They Should Modify 

and Other Puzzles of Servicer Behavior: Servicer Compensation and Its 

Consequences (Oct. 2009) .......................................................................................................11

S. REP. NO. 109-14 (2005)................................................................................................... 2, 17-18

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INTRODUCTION

The proposed settlement in this case (“Proposed Settlement”) shows the danger of a class 

action settled too quickly – here within five months of commencement and during a worldwide 

pandemic. Instead of providing adequate relief to almost one million borrowers nationally, the 

Proposed Settlement will allow Defendants, PHH Mortgage Corporation and its predecessor 

corporation, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen”) (collectively “PHH” and with Plaintiffs, “the 

Settling Parties”), to profit from excessive and likely illegal future fees that class members will be 

required to pay throughout the life of their mortgage loan. The Proposed Settlement purports to

permit PHH – through an unwritten, mass amendment to over 650,000 mortgage contracts – to 

charge excessive, unnecessary and likely illegal fees to borrowers, in violation of some states’ laws 

which prohibit these types of fees, as well as most states’ statute of frauds. PHH receives all of 

this in exchange for a paltry, and for some class members illusory, monetary payment. Nothing 

could be more unfair, unreasonable or inadequate and thus, we urge the Court to reject the 

Proposed Settlement.

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The Attorneys General of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 

District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 

Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New 

York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, 

Washington, and West Virginia (the “Attorneys General”), in their capacity as amici curiae, 

hereby urge this Court to reject the proposed class action settlement in this case.1 The Attorneys 

General investigate and take enforcement action on behalf of the public interest in their respective 

 1 The Attorneys General submit to the Court’s jurisdiction only as amici, and the submission of this brief is without 

prejudice to the States’ ability to enforce and investigate claims related to the issues in dispute. 

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States, and they have relevant experience in bringing consumer harm to light and crafting 

appropriate remedies. Approximately 76% of the putative class members are residents of the States 

that join in this amicus brief.2

 

The Attorneys General perform a unique role for the Court by addressing the fairness of 

class action settlements. This role is recognized in the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 

U.S.C. § 1715, which requires parties to provide information to the Attorneys General about the 

proposed settlement before the fairness hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b). This provision “is intended 

to combat the ‘clientless litigation’ problem by adding a layer of independent oversight” and 

permit Attorneys General to object to inequitable settlements. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 34 (2005).

Because of this role, courts have frequently recognized that the opposition of a number of 

Attorneys General weighs strongly against a proposed class action settlement. See Figueroa v. 

Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1328 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (explaining that the appearance 

and objection of the Attorneys General as amicus curiae “distinguishes this case from other class 

actions” and that “[t]he vigor and substance of the objections presented counsels against a finding 

favorable to the parties on this [Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)] factor”). Another court, rejecting a proposed 

class action settlement, recognized that the amicus brief of the Attorneys General should be viewed 

as “a placeholder for many absent class members’ objections.” Wilson v. DirectBuy, Inc., 2011 

WL 2050537, at *9 (D. Conn. May 16, 2011) (citing Figueroa, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1328). 

The Attorneys General submit this amicus brief because of genuine concerns about the 

reasonableness, adequacy and fairness of the Proposed Settlement that involve the very problems 

 2 This percentage is based on the list of class members attached to Defendant’s Motion For Finding of Compliance 

with the Notice Requirements of the Class Action Fairness Act, ECF Doc. 51. An estimated 713,199 of the 940,884 

class members are residents of the amicus States. 

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Congress sought to address through CAFA. Based upon this authority, the Attorneys General set 

forth below their objections and respectfully request that the Court reject the Proposed Settlement.

BACKGROUND

The class members own homes subject to mortgages3 currently or formerly serviced by

PHH. Am. Compl. (ECF Doc. 11) ¶ 1. PHH has engaged in the practice of charging certain 

“processing fees” or “convenience fees” when the borrowers make a payment on their mortgage 

over the phone with a live operator, over the phone via an interactive voice response system 

(“IVR”), or online. Id.; see also Stipulation of Settlement and Release (“Stipulation” or “Stip”) 

(ECF Doc. 46-1) at 1; Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement and 

Certification of the Settlement Class (“Prel. App. Mot.”) (ECF Doc. 46). No processing fees are 

charged if borrowers mail in a check or if borrowers sign up for automatic monthly debits from 

their checking accounts. Stip. at 8. The proposed class consists of 659,304 mortgage loans for 

943,706 borrowers. Prel. App. Mot. at 16. Approximately 20% of the class have had their loans 

transferred to another mortgage servicer (“Former PHH Borrowers”); the remaining 80% are still 

serviced by PHH (“Current PHH Borrowers”). Id. at 8.

Plaintiffs allege that the processing fees charged by PHH are illegal and improper because 

neither the mortgages themselves nor applicable statutes authorize such fees. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. As 

the Settling Parties highlight in the Stipulation, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 

(“CFPB”) issued guidance in 2017 illustrating how these fees could violate the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. See Stip. at 2 (referencing the 2017 

CFPB guidance). In that guidance, the CFPB concludes that mortgage servicers who meet the 

definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA violated the Act when “they charged fees for 

 3 Unless specified otherwise, the Attorneys General use the term “mortgage” to mean both the note and the 

mortgage. 

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taking mortgage payments over the phone to borrowers whose mortgage instruments did not 

expressly authorize collecting such fees and who reside in states where applicable law does not 

expressly permit collecting such fees.”4

 

In the original complaint filed on March 25, 2020, Plaintiff Vincent Morris brought Florida 

consumer law and breach of contract claims that sought relief for a class limited to residents of

Florida. See generally Compl. (ECF Doc. 1). The parties agreed to mediation in April 2020. Stip. 

at 3. The Settling Parties indicate they involved the plaintiffs from other lawsuits against PHH in 

two mediation sessions in May 2020; however, those plaintiffs declined to participate in further 

settlement negotiations. Id. On July 24, 2020, Plaintiff Morris filed an amended complaint adding 

a federal FDCPA claim, adding three additional Plaintiffs who reside outside Florida, and dropping 

the Florida-specific Consumer Collection Practice Act and unjust enrichment claims. Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 16-26, 42-52. Approximately one month after Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint (and five 

months after they initiated the case), on August 25, 2020, the Settling Parties filed a stipulation 

containing proposed class action settlement terms, and Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval. 

See generally Stip.; Prelim. App. Mot. The Settling Parties acknowledge that no federal appellate 

court has ruled on the legality of PHH’s processing fees at issue here. Stip. at 2-3. 

ARGUMENT

I. THE CURRENT PROPOSED SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE IT IS NOT 

FAIR, REASONABLE OR ADEQUATE

Before approving a proposed class action settlement, the Court must determine that a class 

action settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and is not the product of collusion. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 23 (e)(2); Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1984). The Proposed Settlement 

 4 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Compliance Bull. No. 2017-01 at 4 (July 31, 2017), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201707_cfpb_compliance-bulletin-phone-pay-fee.pdf. 

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fails to satisfy these factors because its unwritten mass amendment permitting PHH to charge 

exorbitant fees is a windfall to PHH and violates most states’ laws. Class members receive a 

nominal monetary amount in exchange for PHH’s ability to profit from thousands of dollars-worth 

of future and likely illegal fees to be charged to these class members. The Attorneys General are 

also concerned about the speed with which this case was settled. This has deprived the Court – and 

the Attorneys General – of the ability to determine the adequacy, fairness and reasonableness of 

the settlement. Many of the Attorneys General’s questions about the Proposed Settlement – the 

actual amount each borrower will receive (see Part I.B.6, infra); how much of the settlement credits 

go to late fees (see Part I.B.1, infra); the amount of the reverter (see Part I.B.4, infra) – are left 

unanswered because the discovery process was cut short.

5 In light of these factors, the Attorneys 

General urge the Court to reject the Proposed Settlement.

A. THE RELIEF PROVIDED TO CLASS MEMBERS VIOLATES VARIOUS STATES’ LAWS

The crux of the Proposed Settlement is the unwritten, mass amendment of 659,304 

mortgage loans (for 943,706 borrowers). Prel. App. Mot. at 16; Stip, ¶ 5.3. As proposed, this 

unwritten amendment purports to authorize much of PHH’s current mortgage payment fee 

structure. For the reasons below, such amendment would violate states’ laws and practices, and 

thus should not be approved by the Court.

1. The Unwritten Amendment of Mortgage Contracts Violates the Statute of 

Frauds in Many States and Will Cause Mass Confusion

 5 The Settling Parties assert that PHH produced “thousands of pages of documents” before the Proposed Settlement 

was reached. See Prel. App. Mot. at 3. However, given that this is a class that includes almost a million people, 

thousands of pages is not a large amount and instead indicates that inadequate information has been provided by the 

parties in support of the Proposed Settlement. 

(Footnote Continued on Next Page)

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The Settling Parties’ proposal for the unwritten and mass amendment of mortgages violates 

the statute of frauds in most states and territories in the Union.6

 In most states, contracts involving 

an interest in real property, such as mortgages and related promissory notes, must be in writing 

and signed by both parties.7 Similarly, most states apply the statute of frauds to mortgage 

modifications and amendments.8 Thus, for the Proposed Settlement to be enforceable in most 

states, the proposed mortgage amendments must be in writing and signed by both parties. 

The statute of frauds ensures that there is clarity about the ownership and indebtedness of 

a key component of our economy: private property. But the Proposed Settlement, with unwritten 

amendments to over 650,000 mortgages, will result in mass confusion, especially if PHH ever 

transfers the mortgage servicing rights. Although PHH may be the borrowers’ servicer now, 

chances are that will change in a few years as “[s]ervicing transfers are common.”9 Mortgage 

servicing transfers are particularly problematic because mortgage servicers routinely fail to 

properly transfer loan documentation to the new servicer.10 An unwritten, key amendment to the 

mortgage will substantially increase the likelihood of errors by the new servicer. 

 6 In its December 11, 2020 “Response to Letter to the Court from Attorneys General or New York and Minnesota,” 

(ECF Doc. 102), the Settling Parties contend that the statute of frauds argument is already before the court. 

However, the Settling Parties cite to ECF Doc. 67, a motion filed by Matthew Thompson on Sept. 29, 2020. Given 

the Court’s Oct. 29, 2020 order requiring Mr. Thompson to refile his objection jointly with the other intervenors, it 

is unclear that the statute of frauds argument is actually before the Court. Additionally, even if it was, the Attorneys 

General have a special interest in ensuring that states’ laws are not violated by class action settlements. 

7 Attached as Exhibit 1 to this amicus brief is a state-by-state list detailing the legal authority which provides writing 

requirements for mortgage contracts under state statutes of frauds.

8 The attached Exhibit 1 also provides state legal authority regarding the application of statutes of frauds and related 

requirements to mortgage modifications. 

9 CFPB, Bulletin 2020-02-Compliance Bulletin and Policy Guidance: Handling of Information and Documents 

During Mortgage Servicing Transfers, 85 Fed. Reg. 25,281 (May 1, 2020), available at

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2020-09151/p-8. 10 See id. at https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2020-09151/p-12 (“In supervisory examinations conducted since 

2014, the Bureau has continued to find weaknesses in compliance management systems and violations of Regulation 

X related to mortgage servicing transfers. Specifically, the Bureau has seen inadequacies in servicers' policies and 

procedures for transferring all the loan information and documents to the new servicer in a timely and accurate 

manner.”)

(Footnote Continued on Next Page)

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All borrowers bear the risk of PHH committing servicer errors, not just class members, and 

the Proposed Settlement appears to significantly increase the risk that such errors will occur. PHH 

has not explained how its electronic systems will track and distinguish between those mortgages 

subject to the unwritten, mass amendment and those that are not. Given the abysmal servicing 

history of both PHH and its predecessor, Ocwen, this is a cause for concern. Ocwen has been the 

subject of various state regulatory enforcement actions for its deficiencies in mortgage servicing

and recently settled regulatory actions with 29 states and the District of Columbia for its failure to 

comply with servicing laws and regulations.

11 In 2018, PHH entered into a $45 million settlement 

with 49 State Attorneys General and 45 state mortgage regulators for improper mortgage 

servicing.12 In the past decade, New York’s Department of Financial Services has entered into 

five consent orders or agreements with Ocwen and PHH for their servicing failures.13 In 2017, the 

CFPB sued Ocwen for serious mortgage servicing errors. See CFPB et al. v. Ocwen Financial 

Corp. et al., Ind. No. 17-cv-80495 (S.D. Fl.).14 In its motion for partial summary judgment, filed 

in June 2020 (ECF Doc. 630), the CFPB alleged that:

“. . . as shown by its own corporate records—and confirmed in discovery 

responses and testimony—Ocwen serviced at least hundreds of thousands 

of mortgage loans, in many instances for years, using inaccurate 

 11 Ocwen Financial Corporation, 2019 Annual Report (Form 10-K) (filed Feb. 26, 2020), avaliable at

https://shareholders.ocwen.com/sec-filings/sec-filing/10-k/0001628280-20-002312 12 See Consent Judgment, State of Alabama et al v. PHH Mortgage Corporation, 18-cv-00009 (D.D.C. 2018), ECF 

Doc. 58, avaliable at https://tinyurl.com/yxzj2tww. Interestingly, the servicing standards from the settlement 

required PHH to list on its website a list of fees that it can charge. See Consent Judgement, Exhibit A, § VI.A.1 

(avaliable at https://tinyurl.com/yyb8qfu9). Therefore, the Proposed Settlement’s requirement that PHH post its fees 

to its website is not new relief to the class but should have already been in effect as a result of the 2018 Consent 

Judgment. See Stip. § 5.1.3; Prel. App. Mot. at 9. 13 See Consent Order to Ocwen Financial Corporation, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC for the following dates: March 

27, 2017, Dec 22, 2014, Dec. 5, 2012, and Dec, 15, 2011, avaliable at 

https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/enforcement_actions_mortgage. 14 The Florida Attorney General joined the CFPB’s action against Ocwen but recently settled separately with Ocwen 

and is no longer a part of the CFPB’s action. See Attorney General Ashley Moody Press Release, Attorney General 

Moody Secures More Than $11 Million to Address Ocwen Mortgage Servicing and Foreclosure Issues (Oct. 15, 

2020), avaliable at 

http://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/78ECA4D9079FEDEC852586020048D5FC.

(Footnote Continued on Next Page)

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information. Ocwen serviced many borrowers’ loans using the wrong loan 

terms (for example, the loan’s interest rate), the wrong amounts owed in 

principal and interest, and the wrong amounts owed for escrow.” 

(Id., p. 1).15

If history is any guide, PHH will likely have difficulty in implementing an unwritten, mass 

amendment, and will likely charge fees to borrowers not members of the class. Without a document 

to point to, these borrowers will have an uphill battle in fighting any unauthorized fees. 

2. PHH Seeks the Ratification of Fees That Violate States’ Laws and Regulations 

The Proposed Settlement’s purported authorization of fees of $6.50 to $19.50 violates some 

states’ prohibition against charging fees in excess of actual costs. For example, section

392.303(a)(2) of the Texas Debt Collection Act prohibits a debt collector from using unfair or 

unconscionable means that employ certain practices, including: 

“collecting or attempting to collect interest or a charge, fee or expense incidental to 

the obligation unless the interest or incidental charge, fee, or expense is expressly 

authorized by the agreement creating the obligation or legally chargeable to the 

consumer.”

See Texas Finance Code § 392.303(a)(2).

Moreover, under New York’s mortgage servicing regulations, even when fees are 

permitted by the mortgage contract, those fees must be “reasonably related to the cost of rendering 

that service.” 3 NYCRR § 419.5(b). Finally, there are some states where convenience fees in 

excess of actual costs could be a violation of the state’s unfair, deceptive or abusive practices act 

(“UDAP”). See e.g. Cibula v. Seterus Inc., No. 50-2015-CA-01090-XXXX-MB at *14 (Fla. 15th 

Cir. 2019) (finding plaintiffs asserted a claim under Florida’s Deceptive, Unfair Trade Practices 

Act by stating defendant’s failure to disclose that the fee charged was higher than actual costs); 

 15See generally, CFPB, CFPB Sues Ocwen for Failing Borrowers Throughout Mortgage Servicing Process, Press 

Release (April 20, 2017), avaliable at https://tinyurl.com/y3p5eq6l.

(Footnote Continued on Next Page)

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see also CFPB, Compliance Bulletin 2017-01: Phone Pay Fees, avaliable at

https://tinyurl.com/y3vpdqao.

16

Here, Settling Parties have provided no evidence that the fees at issue are authorized or 

reasonably related to actual costs. Indeed, in alleging that PHH does not pass the entire fee on to 

the third-party processors but “retain[s] a considerable portion thereof,” Plaintiffs appear to 

acknowledge that PHH’s processing fees are in excess of actual costs. Am. Compl. ¶ 26. If that is 

the case, these fees are unlawful under state law, rendering the Proposed Settlement unreasonable. 

3. The Unwritten, Mass Amendments Undermine Some States’ Interests in 

Ensuring that Mortgage Contracts and Amendments are Recorded

States and localities generally require mortgages to be recorded to ensure clarity about 

ownership and a property’s indebtedness. States and localities also collect recording fees. 

Similarly, in some states, loan modifications are recorded.17 But the Proposed Settlement’s 

unwritten, mass amendment deprives those states of the clarity and income that comes with 

recording a modification. The Court should not approve a settlement that undermines some states’ 

interests in the accurate recording of mortgage modifications.

18 

4. The Proposed Settlement’s “Safety Valve” Provision Will Force Borrowers to 

Sign Documents Contrary to Their Interests

Likely recognizing the illegality of an unwritten, mass amendment, the Settling Parties 

include a “safety valve” in the Proposed Settlement: if the unwritten, mass amendment is deemed 

ineffective under any state or federal statute, law or regulation, “the settlement class member 

 16 The Attorneys General recognize that in some states, courts have rejected UDAP claims for convenience fees. See 

e.g. Waddell v. U.S. Bank National Association, 395 F.Supp.3d 676 (E.D.N.C. 2019). 17 Shawn M. Yesner, Loan modifications can help borrowers keep their homes, Andrews’ Bank & Lender Liab. 

Litig. Reo., at *1 (July 20, 2009) (“Loan Modifications typically are recorded in the county public records to provide 

notice to third parties that the terms of the original recorded mortgage were modified.”) 18 The Court should be aware that there is a discrepancy in what the Stipulation states is to be amended and what the 

proposed notice states will be amended. In the Stipulation, the Settling Parties agree that both the notes and 

mortgages will be amended to include language that permits convenience fees. Stip. ¶ 5.3. In the proposed notice, it 

only states that the note will be amended. Stip., Ex. A, p. 2. 

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agrees to execute any and all documents as may be necessary to authorize such convenience fees 

under such statute, law or regulation...” Stip. § 5.3. Putting aside the issue of how such a clause 

could be enforced, PHH should not be permitted, through an opt-out class action settlement, to 

bind borrowers to affirmatively signing documents counter to their interests. If the Settling Parties 

need this safety valve, then this should be an opt-in settlement: each borrower is bound by the 

settlement only if he or she signs a written, individualized amended mortgage after being informed 

about the precise amount of compensation he or she will receive from the settlement. 

B. With PHH Able to Charge Excessive Fees for the Life of the Loan, the OneTime Payment to Class Members is Inadequate

The unwritten, mass amendment to the mortgage contracts enables PHH, and subsequent 

mortgage servicers, to charge fees in the amount of $6.50 to $19.50 per month for the remaining 

life of the loan. For many borrowers, this could be 20 or 30 years of monthly fees, or anywhere 

from $1,560 (20 years of fees at $6.50 per month) to $7,020 (30 years of fees at $19.50). In 

exchange, class members only receive a one-time payment that is a small percentage of the 

monthly fees they paid. The Attorneys General estimate the maximum any class member could 

receive is $166.95, assuming that PHH retained the full amount of the convenience fee19 and before 

attorney fees are deducted.20 Many class members will receive much less. 

Given the amount that PHH will be permitted to charge over the life of the loan vis-à-vis 

what class members may get in return, the Proposed Settlement is inadequate on its face. But in 

addition to the paltry amount class members may receive, other facts render the Proposed 

 19 As the intervenors note in their Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Settlement (ECF Doc.. 94) 

(“Int. Opp.”), the payment is not 28% or 18% of the fees actually paid. It is less. It is 28% or 18% of the amount 

that was pure profit to PHH. Int. Opp. at 7. 

20 This amount was reached assuming the class member paid $17.50 every month for the longest period for which 

relief could be given, 53 months. This subclass only receives 18% of the money retained by PHH. The resulting 

formula is: (17.50 x .18) x 53 = 166.95.

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Settlement inadequate, including that some of the relief will go to late fees and that any unclaimed 

settlement money reverts to PHH. 

1. Some of the Class Members’ Awards Will Go to Late Fees

Another example of the settlement’s benefit to PHH, at class members’ expense, is that 

settlement credit is applied to late fees first. Prel. App. Mot. at 8. Class members whose loans are 

still serviced by PHH – which is approximately 80% of the class – will not receive a check. Instead, 

their mortgage accounts will be credited the amount of their awards, with late fees being paid 

before any credit is applied to the unpaid principal balance. Id. While late fees are permissible 

under most mortgage contracts and become a debt the borrower owes, paying this debt before 

paying down the principal is less beneficial for borrowers. Additionally, unlike payments to 

principal, which are made to the owner of the mortgage, late fee payments are solely an income 

stream for servicers.21 This is why in many government loan modification programs, servicers are 

required to waive all late fees.22

Again, because of the speed of the settlement and the lack of any meaningful discovery, 

the Court and the Attorneys General are left in the dark regarding how much of the settlement will 

be applied to PHH’s late fees, which is essentially a payment to itself, not to class members. The 

more the settlement fund goes to late fees, the more inadequate the Proposed Settlement becomes. 

2. Requiring Former PHH Class Members to File Claim Forms Will Result in 

Fewer Payments to Borrowers

 21 Nat’l Consumer Law Center, Why Services Foreclose When They Should Modify and Other Puzzles of Servicer 

Behavior: Servicer Compensation and Its Consequences, p. 17 (Oct. 2009) (“Most PSAs permit servicers to retain 

fees charged to delinquent homeowners. . . . Examples of these fees include late fees. . . “) 22 The Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”), the federal government’s voluntary modification 

program which was in existence from 2009 to 2016, required servicers to waive all late fees when offering a 

modification. See HAMP Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages, v.5.1 §§ 6.3.1.1., 9.3.2 (May 26, 2020) 

(prohibiting capitalization of late fees and requiring waiver of late fees and similar charges upon the borrower 

receiving a permanent modification). In addition, HUD, through its Federal Home Administration (“FHA”) 

modification program known as FHA-HAMP, requires servicers to forgive all late fees when modifying the loan. 

See HUD Mortgagee Letter 2008-21 (Aug. 14, 2008) (FHA Loss Mitigation Program Update). 

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By requiring Former PHH Borrowers to submit a claim form, less money will be distributed 

to class members. The Settling Parties argue that a claim form is necessary because in McWhorter

v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 2019 WL 9171207 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2019), where checks were 

automatically issued and no claim form was required, nearly 50% of those checks went uncashed. 

Id. However, according to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), when a claim form is involved, 

only 9% of class members return the form.23 Thus, if PHH requires a claim form, likely only 9% 

of Former PHH Borrowers will return the form.24 Here, the class consists of 943,706 members, 

with 20% of the class – or 188,741 individuals – Former PHH Borrowers. A 50% check-cashing 

rate – without a claim form – would mean 94,370 Former PHH Borrowers would receive monetary 

compensation. If the Settling Parties are permitted to institute a claim form roadblock, and 

assuming a 9% return rate, only 16,987 Former PHH Borrowers would receive compensation.

25 

Checks can – and should – be mailed directly to the borrowers’ current address without a 

claim form. Presumably, many of the Former PHH Borrowers within the class live in the home 

subject to the mortgage. But in case they do not, PHH can confirm the current address with the 

new servicer. While this may take more effort on PHH’s part, it will ensure that more Former PHH 

Borrowers receive their monetary award. 

3. Former PHH Borrowers Are Bound by the Proposed Settlement Even If They 

Do Not Submit a Claim

Under the Proposed Settlement, Former PHH Borrowers who do not file a claim form, and 

thus do not receive compensation, are still bound by the Proposed Settlement’s terms. Stip. § 

 23 FTC, Consumers and Class Actions: A Retrospective and Analysis of Settlement Campaigns, p. 1 (Sept. 2019), 

avaliable at https://tinyurl.com/y5k5h6zt. 24 Id. 25 Settling Parties hide numbers essential to evaluating the adequacy, fairness and reasonableness of the proposed 

settlement. The Settling Parties only provide that 20% of class members will receive a check. The more important 

number though is how many mortgages are tied to that 20% figure (because class members who are co-borrowers 

will likely only receive one check). Because we do not have that number, the Attorneys General can only give an 

estimate. But even with that number, the disparity between a 50% return rate and 9% return rate will be stark. 

Case 0:20-cv-60633-RS Document 120 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/01/2021 Page 17 of 28
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4.7.3.2. Similarly, failure of Former PHH Borrowers to cash the check will also constitute a release 

of their claims. Stip. § 4.9. It is inherently unfair to bind individuals to a radical change in their 

mortgage contract if they do not receive compensation or notice of the change.

4. Providing for Unclaimed Settlement Funds to Revert to PHH Is Unfair and 

Unreasonable

Another inadequacy of the Proposed Settlement is that unclaimed settlement funds revert 

to PHH, a provision that is not beneficial to class members and is disfavored in consumer class 

actions. Poertner v. Gillette Co., 618 F. App’x 624, 630 n.6 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that reverter

provisions are “potentially problematic because they deprive the class of benefits that the 

defendant is willing to pay.”); Zamber v. American Airlines, Inc., 2019 WL 2262914, *20 n. 5(S.D. 

Fl. 2019) (noting that “clear-sailing” or “kicker” clauses, while not outright prohibited, “might be 

a subtle sign that the class is not getting as good a deal. . . .”).

The amount of the $12.6 million settlement fund that will revert to PHH could be 

substantial since Former PHH Borrowers, who must file a claim form to receive a check, constitute 

20% of the class. Stip. § 4.7.3.2. As demonstrated above, only a small percentage of class members 

can be expected to file a claim form, resulting in even more money to revert back to PHH. It is 

also important to note that the amount that could revert to PHH might well exceed 20% of the 

$12.6 million. Depending on the amount paid in fees by the Former PHH Borrowers – information 

not disclosed by the Settling Parties – it is possible that a disproportionate amount of the $12.6

million settlement fund will go to the Former PHH Borrowers, resulting in a much larger reverter 

to PHH than the Settling Parties are currently disclosing. 

5. PHH’s Claim That it Would Not Permit These Forms of Payments Without Fees 

is Suspect 

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PHH states that, if unable to charge fees, it would not provide its borrowers phone-based 

and online payment services. Joint Response to Intervenors’ Opposition to Motion for Preliminary 

Approval (“Joint Response”) (ECF Doc. 97) at11. But its own actions prove otherwise. In states 

that prohibit such fees, PHH continues to offer, free of charge, payment by phone and online. Id. 

Indeed, it’s in PHH’s interest to facilitate borrowers’ payments and avoid delinquencies.

6. For the Court to Determine Adequacy, PHH Should Reveal the Range of 

Payments and the Average Payment for Class Members

The Proposed Settlement cannot be found adequate because the Settling Parties have failed 

to provide information regarding the actual amounts class members will receive. In addressing the 

adequacy of the settlement amount, the Settling Parties deal only in percentages. Thus, they state 

that 80% of the class members will receive 28% of the portion of the convenience fee that was 

PHH’s profit and 20% of the class members will receive 18% of the portion of the convenience 

fee that was PHH’s profit. In fact, because a pro rata amount will be deducted for attorney fees, 

the total amount received by class members will be even less than these percentages. The actual 

amount that class members will receive is necessary to assess the adequacy of this amount vis-àvis the mortgage amendments that authorize excessive fees for the life of the loan held by class 

members. The use of percentages also hides the potential amount that will revert back to PHH for 

Former Borrowers who do not submit claim forms. The Settling Parties have this information. The 

Proposed Settlement cannot – and should not – be approved without a review of actual numbers. 

C. The Proposed Settlement Fails to Treat Class Members Equitably 

That the Proposed Settlement treats Former PHH Borrowers better than Current PHH 

Borrowers is unfair and a clear violation of Rule 23 which requires equitable treatment among 

class members. Additionally, the Proposed Settlement is unfair because low- and middle-income 

borrowers unnecessarily bear the cost of PHH’s fees. 

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1. The Proposed Settlement Treats Current PHH Borrowers Less Favorably than 

Former PHH Class Members

The Proposed Settlement fails to treat all class members equally, a factor courts must 

consider under the 2018 Amendments to Rule 23. F.R.C.P. 23(e)(2)(D) (courts can only approve 

a settlement after considering whether “the proposal treats class members equitably relative to 

each other”). Here, there are clear distinctions between two types of class members– Current PHH 

Borrowers and Former PHH Borrowers. Current PHH Borrowers are disadvantaged by the 

Proposed Settlement. As stated above, Current PHH Borrowers do not receive a check. Instead, 

their account will be credited, with late fees being paid before any principal is paid. But Former 

PHH Borrowers, at least those who return the claim form (see Part I.B.2, supra), will receive a 

check, providing them with the benefit of the present value of money. This check, which the 

Former PHH Borrower can use as he or she sees fit, is significantly better than the credit to late 

fees received by a Current PHH Borrower. 

In addition, the injunctive relief disadvantages Current PHH Borrowers. The Proposed 

Settlement would effectively amend the mortgage agreements of borrowers whose loans are 

currently serviced by PHH and permit PHH to charge those borrowers thousands of dollars of fees 

over the remaining life of the loan. See Joint Response at 13.26 As a result, Former PHH Borrowers,

whose mortgages have been transferred to another servicer, may not be subject to the additional, 

likely illegal fees, imposed by PHH for servicing the mortgage. Id. Similarly, under the Proposed 

Settlement, Former PHH Borrowers do not have to give up their breach of contract, FDCPA or 

 26 The Intervenors dispute the Settling Parties’ assertion that Former PHH Borrowers’ mortgage contracts will not be 

amended. The Attorneys General agree with the Intervenors that the Proposed Settlement appears to require 

unwritten, mass amendments to both Current and Former PHH Borrowers. But for purposes of analyzing the equity 

between different class members, the Attorneys General will assume that the Settling Parties are correct. 

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UDAP claims to obtain a payment. But Current PHH Borrowers do. Because of inequitable 

treatment, the Court must reject the Proposed Settlement. 

2. The Proposed Settlement Penalizes Low- and Moderate-Income Consumers

PHH does not charge fees when the borrower mails in a check or where a borrower sets up 

an automatic debit from his or her bank account. Stip. at 8. But there are costs associated with both 

of these payment methods. Where payment is made by check, an employee must open the 

envelope, record the receipt of the check in the PHH system and the check must be deposited. 

Establishing and maintaining the technology behind automatic debits also have a cost.27 These two 

forms of payment are usually used by borrowers with enough of a cushion in their bank accounts 

that they do not need to worry about a bounced check or insufficient funds.

PHH only charges fees to borrowers who need the extra time to make their monthly 

mortgage payments. See Prel. App. Mot at 10 (noting that these payment methods “may help latepaying borrowers”). These are likely borrowers who live paycheck-to-paycheck, do not have a 

cushion in their bank accounts, and need the extra time afforded by the payment grace period28 to 

collect the monthly mortgage payment.29 The Attorneys General are concerned about our states’ 

low- and moderate-income borrowers being asked to compensate PHH for services that highincome borrowers are given for free. Such differential treatment is unfair and grounds for rejecting

the Proposed Settlement.

II. THE CASES RELIED ON BY THE SETTLING PARTIES, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR, THE

MCWHORTER SETTLEMENT, DO NOT JUSTIFY THE PROPOSED CLASS ACTION 

SETTLEMENT HERE

 27 Presumably, the technology used for automatic debits is the same or similar to the technology used when the 

borrower makes a payment online through his or her account. The latter comes with a $7.50 fee, but the former 

comes with no fee. 

28 The FHA and GSE uniform Note and Security Instruments provide a 15-day grace period before charging late 

fees. 

29 To the extent the Settling Parties contest this assertion, PHH should provide this data to the Court. PHH has the 

origination files for class members which include homeowners’ income at the time they applied for the loan. 

Case 0:20-cv-60633-RS Document 120 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/01/2021 Page 21 of 28
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The Settling Parties cite to a string of cases to argue that unwritten, mass amendments of 

contracts are common. See Joint Response, p. 12-13. But only two of those cases, McWhorter and 

In re Salem Mortg. Co., 783. F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1986), involved mortgages and the issue of whether 

a state’s particular statute of frauds requires a mortgage modification to be in writing. In In re 

Salem, the Sixth Circuit fails to state whether the mass amendments – which significantly benefited 

the property owners by decreasing the interest rates and eliminating unlawful fees – were unwritten 

and not recorded. While McWhorter did permit an unwritten, mass amendment, there are 

substantial differences between the McWhorter settlement and the Proposed Settlement. As a 

result, the Settling Parties’ extensive reliance on McWhorter in an effort to convince the Court to 

accept the Proposed Settlement is misplaced. See Prelim. App. Mot. at 4.

A. Notice to the Attorneys General of the Settlement in McWhorter, Provided 

Pursuant to CAFA, Does Not Amount to State Approval of that Settlement.

The Settling Parties make much of the fact that the Attorneys General received notice of 

the settlement in McWhorter and did not object to that settlement. However, a party’s compliance 

with CAFA’s notification requirements does not amount to an approval of a settlement by the 

federal or state officials who receive the notification. CAFA makes clear that the notice of a

settlement provided in one particular case does not bar federal or state officials from challenging 

class action settlement terms proposed in a different case. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(f) (“Nothing in this 

section shall be construed to...impose any obligations, duties, or responsibilities upon, Federal or 

State officials.”). CAFA’s legislative history reiterates the optional nature of the Attorneys 

General’s participation. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 33 (2005) (“Thus, federal and state officials will 

be notified about proposed settlement and have an opportunity to get involved if they think it is 

appropriate but will not be required to do so.”) 

Case 0:20-cv-60633-RS Document 120 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/01/2021 Page 22 of 28
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In contrast, Amici States are fulfilling their role here to “provide a check against inequitable 

settlements” by raising significant concerns to the attention of the Court. Id. at 35. The fact that 

the Attorneys General did not file an opposition in McWhorter has no legal bearing on the 

reasonableness, adequacy or fairness of the Proposed Settlement in this case. 

B. No State Approved of The McWhorter Settlement and the Settling Parties 

Misrepresent the Communications with State Regulators in McWhorter

The Settling Parties do not accurately present the communications between the State 

Attorneys General and defense counsel in the McWhorter case, the same defense counsel in this 

case, Michael R. Pennington of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, and by doing so, they 

incorrectly imply that the Attorneys General approved the McWhorter settlement. See e.g. Joint 

Response at 9 (Intervenors “now ask this Court to allow their views to preempt those of every 

other Settlement Class Members and government regulator.”); Prel. App. Mot. at 2 (the McWhorter

settlement “was considered by all of the relevant state and federal mortgage regulators who 

carefully reviewed the proposed terms of the Stipulation of Settlement and Release sent to 

them...”); Id. at 5 (“[O]n Eleventh Circuit law, the court granted final approval of the McWhorter

settlement, without the objection from any federal or state regulator.”); Transcript of October 29, 

2020 Hearing, at 32:11-17 (Plaintiffs’ counsel stating that “[n]ot one regulator objected to the note 

amendment... but what about the actual regulators that got the notice? They didn’t say a word.”). 

Rather, the Attorneys General believed the proposed McWhorter settlement to be 

problematic. Contrary to the Settling Parties’ suggestion, the Attorneys General did not implicitly 

approve of any aspect of the McWhorter settlement, and made that clear in communications with 

Mr. Pennington. On July 19, 2018 a group of State Attorneys General emailed Mr. Pennington to 

inquire about certain aspects of the proposed McWhorter settlement. See Declaration of Sarah 

Petrie (“Petrie Decl.”), Ex. 2. The email stated that the Attorneys General’s “discussion, or any 

Case 0:20-cv-60633-RS Document 120 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/01/2021 Page 23 of 28
19

subsequent inaction by the States may not be presumed to be, construed, or interpreted as an 

affirmative approval of, support for, or objection to the terms of the settlement. Any representation 

or implication to the contrary would be deceptive.” Id., Ex. 2, p. 5. Yet, despite such clear language, 

Settling Parties, as shown above, continue to present to this Court that the state regulators’ decision 

not to formally bring concerns to the McWhorter Court is of significance. It is not and, as Mr. 

Pennington was expressly warned, to imply otherwise is deceptive.

Two subsequent inquiries about the settlement were emailed to Mr. Pennington, on August 

14, 2018 and on September 10, 2018, but they went unanswered. Id., Ex. 3. Mr. Pennington did 

respond to a third inquiry, sent by the Attorneys General nearly a year later, on June 17, 2019, 

which requested a loan-by-loan audit of the amount of processing fees charged to borrowers. Id. 

Ex. 2, pp.1-2. Mr. Pennington essentially rejected the Attorneys General’s request and stated that 

“loan-by-loan amounts were not necessary to determining whether the $9.7 million aggregate 

settlement amount was fair and reasonable....” Id.

At no point during communications with Mr. Pennington did the Attorneys General 

indicate that they approved or were in support of the McWhorter settlement. In fact, the Attorneys 

General specifically instructed Mr. Pennington not to draw such inferences. The Court should 

reject the Settling Parties’ reliance on McWhorter and any attempts to suggest that State Attorneys

General approved of that settlement. 

C. Differences from the McWhorter Settlement Demonstrate Why the Proposed 

Settlement Terms Require Further Scrutiny

The Settling Parties have stated that the Proposed Settlement “is structured on same [sic.] 

overall framework as the McWhorter settlement.” Prel. App. Mot. at 2. The Settling Parties further 

allege that the settlement reached in this case “is far superior to the approved McWhorter

settlement as it is much greater in total amount, compensates greater amount of class members 

Case 0:20-cv-60633-RS Document 120 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/01/2021 Page 24 of 28
20

over a longer class period, provides enhanced injunctive relief, and seeks a lower percentage of 

attorneys’ fees and smaller class representative awards from the fund.” Id. at 7. However, when 

compared to McWhorter, the Proposed Settlement is far worse for class members in the following 

ways:

• The Proposed Settlement provides considerably less monetary 

relief to class members. The McWhorter settlement fund was for 

$9.7 million for of 250,194 individuals with 183,832 loans. 

McWhorter, ECF Doc. 49, pp. 8 & 9, providing an average payment 

of $39 (before cost and fees). The Proposed Settlement has a $12.6 

million settlement fund for 943,706 class members with 659,304 

loans, Prel. App. Mot. at 16-17, providing an average payment of 

$13;

30

• The Proposed Settlement allows for the unclaimed settlement 

funds to revert to PHH, see Stip., § 4.10. The McWhorter

settlement did not contain a reverter and instead provided for a cy 

pres award of unclaimed funds to Homes for Our Troops, a 

nonprofit organization. McWhorter, ECF Doc. 49-1, § 4.7;

• The Proposed Settlement requires Former PHH Borrowers to 

file a claim form. Stip. § 4.7.3.2. See Part I.B.2, supra;

• The Proposed Settlement binds Former PHH Borrowers even if 

they do not file a claim form or they fail to cash their checks.

Stip. §§ 4.7.3.2 & 4.9. See Part I.B.3, supra;

• The Proposed Settlement contains a “safety valve” if the 

unwritten, mass amendment is deemed illegal. Stip. § 5.3. See 

Part I.A.4, supra.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Attorneys General respectfully request that the Court 

reject the Proposed Settlement because it is not fair, reasonable or adequate. 

 30 Again, as noted throughout this brief, the actual amount each class member will receive is less than what we 

estimate given the deductions for attorney fees and the fact that the calculation is not based on what each class 

member paid in convenience fees but rather the profit PHH retained from that payment.

Case 0:20-cv-60633-RS Document 120 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/01/2021 Page 25 of 28
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Dated: January 28, 2021

LETITIA JAMES

Attorney General

State of New York

_/s/Elizabeth M. Lynch _

ELIZABETH M. LYNCH

Assistant Attorney General

NY Atty. Reg. No. 4229399

(admitted in the S.D.Fl via pro hac vice, ECF 

Doc. 16)

Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection

28 Liberty Street

New York, NY 10005

(212) 416-6314

elizabethm.lynch@ag.ny.gov

ATTORNEY FOR

STATE OF NEW YORK

CLYDE “ED” SNIFFEN, JR.

Acting Attorney General of Alaska

1031 West 4th Avenue, Suite 200

Anchorage, AK 95501

MARK BRNOVICH

Attorney General of Arizona

2005 N. Central Ave.

Phoenix, AZ 85004-1592

XAVIER BECERRA

Attorney General of California

1300 I Street

Sacramento, CA 95814

PHILIP J. WEISER

Attorney General of Colorado

1300 Broadway, 10th Floor

Denver, CO 80203

Dated: January 28, 2021

KEITH ELLISON

Attorney General

State of Minnesota

___/s/Mawerdi Hamid__

MAWERDI HAMID

Assistant Attorney General

MN Atty. Reg. No. 0393130

(admitted in the S.D.Fl via pro hac vice, ECF 

Doc. 107)

445 Minnesota Street

Suite 1400

St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2131

(651) 728-7096 

mawerdi.hamid@ag.state.mn.us

ATTORNEY FOR 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

DANA NESSEL

Attorney General of Michigan

P.O. Box 30212

Lansing, MI 48909

DOUGLAS J. PETERSON

Attorney General of Nebraska

2115 State Capitol

Lincoln, NE 68509

AARON D. FORD

Attorney General of Nevada

100 North Carson Street

Carson City, NV 89701

JANE E. YOUNG

Deputy Attorney General of New Hampshire

33 Capitol Street

Concord, NH 03301

Case 0:20-cv-60633-RS Document 120 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/01/2021 Page 26 of 28
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WILLIAM TONG

Attorney General of Connecticut

165 Capitol Avenue

Hartford, CT 06106

KATHLEEN JENNINGS

Attorney General of Delaware

820 N. French Street

Wilmington, DE 19801

KARL A. RACINE

Attorney General for District of Columbia

400 6th Street NW

Washington, DC 20001

ASHLEY MOODY

Attorney General of Florida

3507 E. Frontage Road, Suite 325

Tampa, FL 33607

CLARE E. CONNORS

Attorney General of Hawaii

425 Queen Street

Honolulu, HI 96813

LAWRENCE WASDEN

Attorney General of Idaho

P.O. Box 83720

Boise, ID 83720-0010

KWAME RAOUL

Attorney General of Illinois

100 W. Randolph, 12th Floor

Chicago, IL 60601

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General of Indiana

200 West Washington Street, Room 219

Indianapolis, IN 46204

TOM MILLER

Attorney General of Iowa

1305 E. Walnut St.

Des Moines, IA 50319

HECTOR H. BALDERAS

Attorney General of New Mexico

201 Third St. NW, Suite 300

Albuquerque, NM 87102

JOSH STEIN

Attorney General of North Carolina

P.O. Box 629

Raleigh, NC 27602

DAVE YOST

Attorney General of Ohio

30 E. Broad St., 14th Floor

Columbus, OH 43215

MIKE HUNTER

Attorney General of Oklahoma

313 N.E. 21st Street

Oklahoma City, OK 73105

ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM

Attorney General of Oregon

1162 Court Street NE

Salem, OR 97301

JOSH SHAPIRO

Attorney General of Pennsylvania

16th Floor, Strawberry Square

Harrisburg, PA 17120

PETER F. NERONHA

Attorney General of Rhode Island

150 South Main Street

Providence, RI 02903

THOMAS J. DONOVAN, JR.

Attorney General of Vermont

109 State Street

Montpelier, VT 05609

MARK R. HERRING

Attorney General of Virginia

202 North 9th Street

Richmond, VA 23219

Case 0:20-cv-60633-RS Document 120 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/01/2021 Page 27 of 28
23

AARON M. FREY

Attorney General of Maine

6 State House Station

Augusta, ME 04333

BRIAN E. FROSH

Attorney General of Maryland

200 Saint Paul Place

Baltimore, MD 21202

MAURA HEALEY

Attorney General of Massachusetts

One Ashburton Place

Boston, MA 02108

ROBERT FERGUSON

Attorney General of Washington

800 Fifth Ave., Suite 2000

Seattle, WA 98104

PATRICK MORRISEY

Attorney General of West Virginia

State Capitol, Bldg. 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305

Case 0:20-cv-60633-RS Document 120 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/01/2021 Page 28 of 28