Report to Congressional Requesters

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

May 2005 NASA

More Knowledge 

Needed to Determine 

Best Alternatives to 

Provide Space Station 

Logistics Support 

GAO-05-488 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-488.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 

512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-488, a report to 

congressional requesters 

May 2005

NASA

More Knowledge Needed to Determine 

Best Alternatives to Provide Space 

Station Logistics Support 

NASA’s 2004 assessment identified significant challenges associated with 

using alternative launch vehicles for space station assembly and operation. 

According to previous studies and our discussions with industry 

representatives, these challenges would likely preclude using alternative 

vehicles for assembly missions. However, NASA’s assessment was 

insufficient to conclude that the shuttle was the best option for logistics 

support missions prior to the proposed retirement of the space shuttle in 

2010. NASA relied primarily on headquarters expertise to conduct the 

informal assessment, and while we recognize that the extensive experience 

of its senior managers is an important element in evaluating alternatives, 

NASA officials did not document the proceedings and decisions reached in 

its assessment. As a result, the existence of this assessment of alternatives 

cannot be verified, nor can the conclusions be validated. 

NASA is currently evaluating responses from a September 2004 request for 

information from various commercial space transportation industries that 

could provide launch services to support space station operations, following 

retirement of the shuttle in 2010, until the station’s planned retirement in 

2016. NASA officials indicated that a commercial launch capability to 

support space station operations is possible prior to the proposed shuttle 

retirement in 2010, but stated that this capability would not eliminate any of 

the scheduled space shuttle flights. NASA is also re-examining its 

requirements for the type of scientific research to be conducted on the space 

station as well as the manifest requirements of the space shuttle. Combining 

the information gathered from commercial industry and a better definition of

space station and shuttle requirements, NASA officials agree there is an 

opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of alternatives, 

especially for logistics missions late this decade. 

2000 2010 2020

International

Space Station

Proposed

commercial

and/or

foreign cargo

Space shuttle

Space shuttle 

return to flight

Space shuttle 

proposed retirement

Space station

assembly complete

Human research

complete

28 flights scheduled in manifest Unknown

Development Operational capability

Source: NASA; GAO (presentation).

The National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration’s (NASA) 

space shuttle fleet has been key to 

International Space Station 

operations. Since the grounding of 

the fleet in February 2003, Russia 

has provided logistics support. 

However, due to the limited 

payload capacity of the Russian 

space vehicles, on-orbit assembly 

of the space station stopped. 

In May 2004 and in February 2005, 

NASA testified before the Congress 

that it had assessed using 

alternative launch vehicles to the 

space shuttle for space station 

operations. NASA concluded that 

using alternatives would be 

challenging and result in long 

program delays and would 

ultimately cost more than returning 

the space shuttle safely to flight. 

Yet uncertainties remain about 

when the space shuttle will return 

to flight, and questions have been 

raised about NASA’s assessment of 

alternatives. GAO was asked to 

determine whether NASA’s 

assessment was sufficient to 

conclude that the space shuttle is 

the best option for assembling and 

providing logistics support to the 

space station. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that NASA 

take action to ensure that its 

current assessments of alternatives 

for providing logistics support are 

comprehensive and fully 

documented and that the 

assessments are completed before 

investments are made in 

commercial space transportation. 
Page i GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 3 

NASA’s 2004 Assessment Was Based on Insufficient Knowledge for 

Concluding Space Shuttle Was Best Launch Option, but 

Opportunities Now Exist for More Detailed Study 7 

Conclusions 10 

Recommendation for Executive Action 10 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 11 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 13 

Appendix II Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 15 

Appendix III Challenges of Using Alternative Vehicles 17 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 18 

Figures 

Figure 1: Space Shuttle Endeavour Docked to the International 

Space Station 4 

Figure 2: International Space Station Operations Support until 2016 6 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

Abbreviations 

AAS Alternate Access to Station 

ATV Automated Transfer Vehicle 

HTV H-II Transfer Vehicle 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

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reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

May 18, 2005 

The Honorable Ken Calvert 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, 

 Committee on Science 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Sam Brownback 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher 

House of Representatives 

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) space 

shuttle has been the primary vehicle for delivering components for 

assembly and providing logistics support to the International Space 

Station. NASA grounded the space shuttle fleet following the Space Shuttle 

Columbia accident in February 2003, leaving the space station dependent 

on Russia to provide crew rotation, crew rescue, and logistics support. 

However, due to the limited payload capacity of Russian space vehicles, 

on-orbit assembly of the space station has halted. NASA plans to return 

the space shuttle to flight by mid 2005 and resume space station assembly 

and logistics missions. 

In May 2004 and again in February 2005, NASA testified before the 

Congress that it had assessed using alternative launch vehicles for 

completing space station assembly and providing logistics support. 

According to NASA officials, their assessment showed that using 

alternative launch vehicles would introduce unacceptable operational 

risks, technical challenges, long program delays, and would ultimately cost 

more than returning the space shuttle to flight. Therefore, NASA 

concluded that the space shuttle’s unique capabilities provided the best 

available option for these missions. Despite these testimonies, concerns 

have been raised about NASA’s conclusions, both within Congress and the 

industry. Due to the uncertainty regarding when the space shuttle would 

return to safe flight and concerns that additional flights would be needed 

to support assembly and logistics operations, you asked us to determine 

whether NASA’s assessment of alternatives was sufficient to conclude that 

the space shuttle is the best option for completing assembly and providing 

logistics support to the space station. 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

To conduct our work, we obtained and analyzed agency documentation 

and interviewed NASA officials responsible for managing the launch 

services, space shuttle, and space station programs within NASA 

headquarters as well as program managers at NASA centers involved in 

space shuttle and space station operations. We also interviewed 

commercial space transportation contractors and reviewed pertinent 

documentation related to expendable launch vehicles. In addition, we 

reviewed NASA’s request for information for commercial space 

transportation services, which it issued in September 2004, and its plans 

for assessing the responses to this request and follow-on activities. We 

conducted our work from August 2004 through April 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. For a complete 

description of our scope and methodology, see appendix I. 

In early 2004, NASA performed an informal assessment of alternative 

launch vehicles that was incomplete and did not provide a clearly 

documented rationale to conclude that the space shuttle was the best 

option to support space station operations. NASA identified significant 

challenges associated with using an alternative to the space shuttle for 

space station assembly, which could preclude these missions from 

consideration. However, the assessment conducted by NASA did not 

include an analysis of the schedule impacts or costs associated with using 

alternative launch vehicles for logistics missions later this decade. While 

we recognize that the extensive experience of its senior managers is an 

important element in evaluating alternatives, NASA relied primarily on 

headquarters expertise to conduct the informal assessment. NASA officials 

did not document the proceedings and decisions reached in its 

assessment. As a result, the existence of this assessment of alternatives 

cannot be verified, nor can the conclusions be validated. 

NASA is currently evaluating responses from commercial industry on 

capabilities of alternate launch services for providing cargo launch 

services to and the ability to return items from the space station. 

Additionally, NASA is re-examining its requirements for the space station 

and space shuttle. With this information from commercial industry and 

more definitive space station requirements, NASA officials agreed that 

there is an opportunity to perform a detailed analysis of alternatives to 

determine if any planned space shuttle missions to perform logistics, prior 

to the shuttle’s retirement, could instead make use of commercial launch 

services. 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

This report makes recommendations aimed at better positioning the 

agency to determine the best available options for providing logistics 

support to the space station and ensuring that NASA’s current analyses of 

alternative launch vehicles are comprehensive and fully documented. In 

written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our 

recommendations. 

NASA and its international partners—Canada, Europe, Japan, and 

Russia—are building the space station to serve as an orbiting research 

facility. The space shuttle is the primary vehicle supporting the assembly 

and resupply of the station. Figure 1 shows the Space Shuttle Endeavour 

docked to the International Space Station. Following the Columbia 

accident in February 2003, the NASA Administrator grounded the space 

shuttle fleet pending an investigation into the cause of the accident. The 

administrator appointed the Columbia Accident Investigation Board to 

determine the cause of the accident and to make recommendations for 

improving the safety of the space shuttle before it could return to flight. 

The board issued its report in August 2003 with 29 recommendations for 

improvement—15 of which must be implemented before the space shuttle 

can return to flight. NASA plans to return the shuttle to flight in July 2005. 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

Figure 1: Space Shuttle Endeavour Docked to the International Space Station 

While the shuttle has been grounded, space station crew transfers and 

logistics resupply have depended on Russian Soyuz and Progress vehicles.1

Europe and Japan are also developing logistics cargo vehicles to support 

space station operations later this decade. These Russian, European, and 

Japanese vehicles are launched on expendable rockets. The European 

Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV), scheduled to be available for missions 

to the space station in 2006, is being designed to rendezvous and dock 

with the space station’s Russian Service Module. The Japanese H-II 

Transfer Vehicle (HTV) is scheduled to be available in 2008 and will fly 

within the proximity of the space station to be caught by the station’s 

robotic arm before being berthed to the space station. The ATV and HTV 

also carry less cargo than the shuttle. 

 1

 Soyuz vehicles are used primarily to ferry crew to and from the station. Progress vehicles 

are used to resupply and reboost the station. 

Source: NASA.
Page 5 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

Because the Russian Soyuz and Progress are the only vehicles currently 

available and carry significantly less payload than the space shuttle, 

operations are generally limited to transporting crew, food, potable water, 

as well as propellant resupply for reboosting the space station to higher 

orbits. Launches of space station assembly elements and large orbital 

replacement items for maintenance have effectively ceased. 

From 2000 to early 2004, NASA performed two studies that focused on the 

potential use of commercial launch vehicles to provide logistics services to 

the space station. In a 90-day study conducted in 2000, NASA determined 

that no commercial logistics service for the space station was possible at 

that time, as no launch vehicles possessed the critical capabilities 

necessary to provide logistics services, including automated rendezvous 

capabilities. As a result of this study, NASA decided to solicit and fund a 

more detailed review of concepts designed to provide logistics services to 

the space station. The Alternate Access to Station (AAS) study contracts 

were awarded in July 2002, with 1-year contracts given to four contractors. 

In summer 2003, these contractors presented architectures that relied on 

existing domestic or international expendable launch vehicles. In the fall 

of 2003, the contracts were extended, and the contractors were asked to 

address larger cargo delivery capabilities and “downmass” (e.g. returning 

research materials to earth) requirements were added for the return of 

cargo. This study ended in January 2004 with the contractors briefing on 

their study results, at which time NASA concluded that developing a 

domestic capability to meet most of the space station cargo service needs 

was possible within 3 to 5 years. 

In January 2004, the President announced a new Vision for Exploration 

that called for retiring the shuttle in 2010, requiring NASA to find an 

alternative to support space station operations through 2016 by the end of 

the decade. The President called for a shift in NASA’s long-term focus, 

envisioning that NASA will retire the space shuttle after nearly 30 years of 

service as soon as assembly of the International Space Station is 

completed, planned for the end of the decade, and will develop a new crew 

exploration vehicle as well as launch human missions to the moon 

between 2015 and 2020. In essence, NASA’s implementation plan holds 

aeronautics, science, and other activities at near constant levels and 

transitions funding currently dedicated to the space station and space 

shuttle programs to the new exploration strategy as the space station and 

space shuttle programs phase out. The vision also changed the space 

station’s on-board research focus. Originally, the space station was to be 

used for conducting experiments in near-zero gravity to include life 

sciences research on how humans adapt to long durations in space, 
Page 6 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

biomedical research, and materials-processing research. Under the new 

vision, the research will be focused on determining the effects of long 

duration space travel on humans and developing countermeasures for 

those effects, with the goal that the space station research necessary to 

support human explorers on other worlds would be complete by 2016. 

Figure 2 shows NASA’s proposed plan for operational support of the space 

station until 2016. 

Figure 2: International Space Station Operations Support until 2016 

2000 2010 2020

International

Space Station

Proposed

commercial

and/or

foreign cargo

Space shuttle

Space shuttle 

return to flight

Space shuttle 

proposed retirement

Space station

assembly complete

Human research

complete

28 flights scheduled in manifest Unknown

Development Operational capability

Source: NASA; GAO (presentation).
Page 7 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

According to program officials, NASA’s 2004 informal assessment 

concluded that alternative launch vehicles would present operational 

risks, technical challenges, and long program delays and would cost more 

than returning the space shuttle to flight, making the space shuttle the best 

option for both assembly and logistics missions through the end of the 

decade. According to previous studies and our discussions with 

commercial industry representatives, the time involved for developing an 

alternate capability would probably preclude assembly missions from 

consideration. However, NASA did not have sufficient knowledge to 

support its conclusion regarding logistic support missions. Specifically, 

NASA did not perform a comparative cost analysis that considered the 

schedule impacts or associated costs of planned space shuttle operations. 

Furthermore, NASA officials did not document these informal proceedings 

and decisions reached; therefore, the thoroughness of any assessment of 

alternatives cannot be verified, nor can their conclusions be validated. 

NASA is currently evaluating responses from commercial industry on 

different ways to provide logistics services to and from the space station. 

NASA’s re-examination of its requirements for the space station and space 

shuttle, coupled with the cost information of alternatives obtained from 

commercial industry responses, provide NASA with a basis for performing 

a detailed analysis of alternatives to determine if any planned space 

shuttle logistics missions could be performed by or complemented with 

commercial launch vehicles later this decade. 

As a result of the informal assessment, NASA outlined a number of 

technical challenges to using an alternate vehicle for space station 

support, especially for assembly missions where the space shuttle’s crew 

and remote manipulator arm perform key functions. Appendix III provides 

a discussion of these challenges. NASA officials stated they used the AAS 

study, which concentrated solely on logistics support missions, as the 

foundation for its 2004 informal assessment. In a summary of that study, 

NASA reported that the AAS contractors projected the cost to develop an 

alternate launch capability would be approximately $1 billion, take 3 to 5 

years to develop, and require $2 to $3 billion per year for operations. We 

held discussions with commercial industry representatives who concurred 

with this time frame to develop an alternate capability to support space 

station operation. Since a majority of the space station assembly missions 

are scheduled within the next 3 years, these types of missions could 

preclude the use of an alternative vehicle. 

NASA’s 2004 

Assessment Was 

Based on Insufficient 

Knowledge for 

Concluding Space 

Shuttle Was Best 

Launch Option, but 

Opportunities Now 

Exist for More 

Detailed Study 

Technical Challenges 

Difficult to Overcome for 

Assembly Missions, but 

Cost Comparison of Later 

Logistics Missions 

Insufficient 
Page 8 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

However, NASA did not have sufficient knowledge to conclude that the 

shuttle was the best option for logistics missions prior to its retirement of 

the shuttle in 2010. NASA officials stated that the technical challenges for 

developing an alternative vehicle could be overcome, but probably not 

before the 28 missions scheduled through 2010, of which 8 are for 

logistics, including 5 of the last 7 missions. However, we found no 

evidence of analyses performed by NASA to compare the cost and 

schedule impact of using alternate launch systems with the scheduled 

space shuttle program costs, to include the cost of returning the space 

shuttle to flight. We recently reported that the majority of NASA’s budget 

estimates for returning the space shuttle to flight had not been fully 

developed.2

 In fact, NASA officials stated that they did not compare 

estimated costs for developing alternative launch vehicles against budget 

estimates for the 28 space shuttle flights currently planned to support the 

space station, which total more than $22 billion between fiscal year 2005 

and fiscal year 2010. In addition, NASA has also requested $1.8 billion for 

crew and cargo services over the same time frame to purchase commercial 

services using existing and emerging capabilities, both domestic and 

foreign. In its fiscal year 2006 budget request, NASA indicated that such 

commercial services are expected to be available not later than 2009 and 

that these services are a key element in the future of the space station 

program. 

In addition to lacking sufficient knowledge with regard to the use of 

alternatives for logistics missions, NASA did not document the 

proceedings and decisions reached in its 2004 assessment. Specifically, the 

agency did not record the processes it followed and therefore did not 

capture the basis of the decisions reached. When asked about the details 

of the assessment, NASA officials indicated that the informal assessment 

was based primarily on the expertise within the headquarters and they did 

not formally document the decision paths. While we recognize that the 

extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in 

evaluating alternatives, the existence of any formal assessment of 

alternatives covering the entire range of missions for space station support 

cannot be verified, and the agency’s position on the space shuttle being the 

best option cannot be validated. 

 2

 GAO, Space Shuttle: Cost for Hubble Servicing Mission and Implementation of Safety 

Recommendations Not Yet Definitive, GAO-05-34 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2004). 

Informal Assessment Was 

Not Documented 
Page 9 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

NASA received 26 responses from a September 2004 request for 

information that asked for, among other things, input from the commercial 

space industry regarding capabilities and market interest for missions for 

providing cargo launch services to, and the ability to return items from, 

the space station. This request for information had similar characteristics 

as the AAS study, which also had as its objective to explore the 

development of alternative cargo “upmass” and “downmass” support for 

the space station. The responses are being evaluated, and NASA plans to 

seek more detailed information from the commercial launch industry for 

additional study or development work in June 2005. According to NASA 

officials, the responses from industry with regard to space station logistics 

support have been very promising. The officials indicated that it might be 

possible to have a developed and certified capability to provide 

commercial cargo launch service to the space station prior to space 

shuttle retirement late this decade, rather than only after its retirement. 

However, we were told these services would not eliminate any of the 

scheduled space shuttle flights, but only augment the capabilities of the 

space shuttle. 

While these responses are being evaluated and knowledge is being 

gathered, NASA is also reviewing the space station research requirements 

and re-examining the planned manifest for the 28 space shuttle flights in 

an attempt to better align their missions to the Vision for Space 

Exploration. According to NASA’s fiscal year 2006 budget submission, the 

agency is examining configurations of the space station that meet the 

needs of the new vision and the international partners with as few space 

shuttle flights as necessary. 

Combining the information gathered from commercial industry and a 

better definition of space station requirements, NASA officials agreed 

there is an opportunity to perform a more comprehensive assessment of 

alternatives, especially for the logistics missions late this decade. 

According to a recent revision of NASA’s internal guidance, the most 

important aspect of formulating a program technical approach is 

conducting a thorough analysis of alternatives.3

 NASA guidance defines an 

analysis of alternatives as a formal method that compares alternatives by 

estimating their ability to satisfy mission requirements through an 

effectiveness analysis and by estimating their life cycle costs through cost 

 3

 NPR 7120.5C: NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements, 

March 22, 2005. 

NASA’s Current Request 

for Information from 

Commercial Industry and 

Requirements Review 

Presents an Opportunity to 

Perform a More Detailed 

Analysis 
Page 10 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

analysis. The results of these two analysis are used together to produce a 

cost-effectiveness comparison that allows decision-makers to assess cost 

and effectiveness simultaneously. An analysis of alternatives broadly 

examines multiple elements of program alternatives (including technical 

performance, risk, life cycle cost, and programmatic aspects), and is 

typically an important part of the formulation studies. 

NASA views a thorough analysis of alternatives as an important aspect in 

the formulation of a program technical approach. While we recognize that 

the extensive experience of its senior managers is an important element in 

evaluating alternatives, NASA did not have the full breadth of knowledge 

necessary to perform a comprehensive assessment of alternative launch 

vehicles to enable it to conclude the space shuttle was the best option to 

support space station operations. However, NASA’s recent request for 

information from industry offers the agency an opportunity to enhance its 

knowledge of alternatives to the space shuttle for providing logistics 

support for the space station and to explore the use of alternatives to the 

existing space shuttle manifest currently under review. Although alternate 

vehicles would not be available for missions to the space station until later 

this decade and difficult to use for assembly missions, several of the space 

shuttle’s final flights are planned logistics support missions that might be 

conducted using alternative launch vehicles. By completing a 

comprehensive analysis, NASA could also identify the feasibility and risks 

associated with an alternative means of providing logistics support to the 

space station in case delays occur requiring extension of the planned 2010 

date. Furthermore, a comprehensive and thoroughly documented analysis 

of launch requirements and launch alternatives can provide NASA with 

comparative cost information and afford the agency the opportunity to use 

its resources more effectively and efficiently. This is particularly important 

now since the space station and space shuttle programs will be competing 

for limited resources. 

To better position the agency to determine the best available option for 

providing logistics support to the space station, we recommend the NASA 

Administrator take the following three steps: 

• Direct current efforts to explore other space launch options to utilize a 

comprehensive and fully documented assessment of alternatives that 

matches mission requirements, and associated manifest, with the 

launch vehicles expected to be available; 

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 
Page 11 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

• As part of this assessment, (a) determine the development and 

operation costs associated with these potential alternatives and (b) 

perform a detailed analysis of these alternatives to determine the best 

option for delivering the logistics cargo required for space station 

operations prior to and after space shuttle retirement; and 

• Ensure this assessment is completed before any NASA investments are 

made for commercial space transportation services to the space 

station. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our 

recommendations and stated that the agency seeks to fully explore space 

launch options for assuring access to the space station in conjunction with 

its retirement planning for the space shuttle. NASA plans to document its 

acquisition strategy through a NASA Headquarters Acquisition Strategy 

Meeting prior to release of a request for proposal for commercial space 

station cargo services later this summer. In addition, NASA said it will 

evaluate the cost and capabilities of the proposed transportation system to 

meet space station and agency needs, as well as the needs of its partners. 

NASA also said that its acquisition strategy will be consistent with space 

station requirements, international partner agreements, and available 

funding. 

We are encouraged that NASA has taken steps to pursue a deliberate 

alternative cargo transportation system assessment. However, NASA 

should not limit documentation of this effort to the acquisition strategy 

meeting, but should also document the decision paths leading up to that 

event and throughout the evaluation of the transportation systems 

proposed by contractors responding to NASA’s request for proposals. This 

approach should identify the decision makers involved and provide a fully 

documented rationale of the acquisition processes as NASA analyzes all 

alternatives to determine the best options for delivering the logistics cargo 

for space station operations. NASA’s comments are reprinted in appendix 

II. 

As agreed, unless you publicly announce the contents earlier, we plan no 

further distribution of this report until 15 days from its issue date. At that 

time, we will send copies to the NASA Administrator; the Director, Office 

of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will also 

make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 12 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions 

about this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix 

IV. 

Allen Li 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 13 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

To determine whether NASA conducted a detailed assessment of 

alternatives to the space shuttle for completing assembly and providing 

logistics support to the International Space Station, we: 

• Obtained and analyzed pertinent NASA documents and briefing slides 

related to the International Space Station, space shuttles, and other 

launch alternatives, such as Expendable Launch Vehicles, including: 

European Space Agency Segment Specifications for the Automated 

Transfer Vehicle; Specification for the Japanese H-II Transfer Vehicle; 

International Space Station Payload Integration and Assembly 

Sequence specifications; Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle 

configurations; space station and space shuttle status, history, and cost 

briefings; Return to Flight Status Briefings; and, Alternate Access to 

Station briefings. 

• Reviewed previous GAO reports on NASA, the Space Shuttle Program, 

International Space Station Program, and best practices in many areas 

and multiple agencies. We also reviewed reports from the 

Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Research Service, Office 

of Management and Budget, and the Planetary Society, and Russian 

Space Program. 

• Interviewed officials responsible for managing the programs within the 

Space Operations Mission Directorate at NASA headquarters, as well as 

program managers at Johnson Space Center, Texas. We also 

interviewed NASA officials at Kennedy Space Center, Florida, who are 

responsible for processing space station payloads and integrating those 

payloads with the launch vehicles. We interviewed contractors at 

Boeing Launch Services and Lockheed Martin Space Systems and 

reviewed pertinent documentation related to expendable launch 

vehicles for space station assembly and logistics support. We also 

reviewed NASA’s request for information related to commercial 

industry interest in providing that capability and NASA’s plans for 

assessing responses to the request for information and follow on 

activities. For this, we interviewed NASA officials within the Space 

Operations Mission Directorate and at Johnson Space Center, Texas. 

We also interviewed Air Force officials from the Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle Program. We also received, reviewed, and analyzed 

follow-up written and oral comments from several individuals at these 

locations and NASA’s Science Directorate. 

To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials at NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Johnson Space Center, Texas; and 

Kennedy Space Center, Florida. These centers were chosen because they 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 14 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

maintain primary responsibility for conducting space shuttle and space 

station operations on a day-to-day basis. The offices we met with at 

headquarters and each of these centers included space station program 

officials, space shuttle program officials, NASA Launch Services Office, 

the International Space Station Payload Processing Directorate at 

Kennedy Space Center, and Space Shuttle Program Integration Office at 

Kennedy Space Center. We also visited the Boeing Launch Services, Inc., 

in Huntington Beach, California, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, 

Florida; Boeing Commercial Space Systems in Research Park, Huntsville, 

Alabama; and Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company in Littleton, 

Colorado, and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida. 

We conducted our work from August 2004 through April 2005 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 15 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

Appendix II: Comments from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Appendix II: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Page 16 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 
Appendix III: Challenges of Using Alternative 

Vehicles 

Page 17 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

According to NASA officials involved in the 2004 assessment, 

accommodating a transition to other launch vehicles would create 

significant challenges that drive risk, schedule, and costs. NASA officials 

stated the space station elements were designed and built to take 

advantage of the more benign launch environment in the space shuttle’s 

cargo bay, to be removed and repositioned by the space shuttle’s robotic 

arm, and then connected together by the space shuttle crew during space 

walk activities. The following outlines the major challenges NASA 

identified: 

• There would be a need to develop a new process to assemble the space 

station using only the space station crew and without the benefit of the 

space shuttle remote manipulator arm. 

• Using another launch vehicle would require the redesign and retesting 

of space station elements already built due to the change in launch 

environment. NASA officials stated the space shuttle launch 

environment, with respect to vibration and g-force exerted on the 

payload, cannot be duplicated on an expendable launch vehicle. 

• A new, unique transfer vehicle would need to be developed in order to 

rendezvous and dock assembly elements with the space station. For 

logistics cargo support, two transfer vehicles are currently being 

developed for logistics mission to support space station operations, the 

European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and the Japanese H-II 

Transfer Vehicle (HTV). These vehicles, much like the Russian 

Progress vehicle, have a limited cargo capability when compared to the 

space shuttle. The ATV, scheduled to be available for missions to the 

space station in 2006, is being designed to rendezvous and dock to the 

space station via the Russian Service Module. The HTV is scheduled to 

be available in 2008 and will fly within the proximity of the space 

station to be caught by the space station’s robotic arm before being 

berthed to the space station. 

• A carrier to go inside the new transfer vehicle to replicate the space 

shuttle attach points would need to be developed. 

• According to these officials, in order to meet volume requirements, the 

payload fairings would have to be modified from the current 5-meter to 

a 6-meter version to accommodate the larger diameter payloads to the 

space station during assembly missions. 

Appendix III: Challenges of Using Alternative 

Vehicles 
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 18 GAO-05-488 Space Shuttle Alternatives 

Allen Li (202) 512-4841 

Staff making key contributions to this report were Jim Morrison, 

James Beard, Rick Cederholm, Karen Sloan, and T.J Thomson. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(120368) 
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