CONTENTS 

SECTION I: SPACE SHUTTLE SAFETY ENHANCEMENTS 

OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................................. 1 

RETURNING THE SPACE SHUTTLE TO FLIGHT ...................................................................................... 1 

IMPROVEMENTS IN TECH EXCELLENCE, COMMUNICATIONS & DECISION-MAKING ............. 3 

SPACE FLIGHT LEADERSHIP COUNCIL ................................................................................................. 3

RETURN TO FLIGHT TASK GROUP ........................................................................................................ 4

SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM MISSION MANAGEMENT TEAM ................................................................. 5

NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER ........................................................................................... 8

RENEWED COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE............................................................................................ 9

SPACE SHUTTLE PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS.................................................................... 11 

REINFORCED CARBON-CARBON WING PANELS AND NOSE CAP ........................................................... 11

WING LEADING EDGE STRUCTURAL SUBSYSTEM ................................................................................ 12

RUDDER SPEED BRAKE ........................................................................................................................ 12

FOREIGN OBJECT DEBRIS.................................................................................................................... 14

CLOSEOUT PHOTOGRAPHY PROCESS .................................................................................................. 1 5

LAUNCH PAD GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ..................................................................................... 17

FIXED AND ROTATING SERVICE STRUCTURES..................................................................................... 17

UPPER HINGE COLUMN BEARING......................................................................................................... 18

GASEOUS OXYGEN VENT ARM .............................................................................................................. 18

GASEOUS HYDROGEN VENT ARM ......................................................................................................... 18

CRAWLER TRANSPORTER .................................................................................................................... 18

RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING CRITICAL SHUTTLE DEBRIS SOURCES................................. 21 

PREPARING THE EXTERNAL TANK ........................................................................................................ 21 

BIPOD REDESIGN ................................................................................................................................ 22

LIQUID HYDROGEN INTERTANK FLANGE .............................................................................................. 2 4

LIQUID OXYGEN FEEDLINE BELLOWS ................................................................................................... 24

PROTUBERANCE AIR LOAD RAMPS ...................................................................................................... 25

ENHANCED IN-FLIGHT IMAGERY .......................................................................................................... 26

NON-DESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION ........................................................................................................ 26

July 2005 CONTENTS i
 

THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM CERTIFICATION................................................................................ 27

THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM VERIFICATION & VALIDATION .......................................................... 27

SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER MODIFICATION............................................................................................ 29

BOLT CATCHER.................................................................................................................................... 29

BOOSTER SEPARATION MOTOR IGNITER ............................................................................................. 30

IDENTIFYING, INSPECTING AND REPAIRING TPS DEBRIS DAMAGE IN FLIGHT..................... 33 

IMPROVING IMAGERY, DATA COLLECTION FOR SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCH AND LANDING .................... 33 

GROUND-BASED IMAGING OF LAUNCH ................................................................................................ 3 3

CAMERAS ............................................................................................................................................ 35

CAMERA LOCATIONS ........................................................................................................................... 36

CAMERA RESOLUTION ......................................................................................................................... 37

CAMERA OPERATIONS PLAN ................................................................................................................ 37

TAKING THE HIGH GROUND ON ASCENT IMAGING............................................................................... 38

RADAR TRACKING ............................................................................................................................... 39

WING LEADING EDGE INSTRUMENTATION ........................................................................................... 40

ENHANCED SHUTTLE-BASED CAMERA VIEWS...................................................................................... 43

EXTERNAL TANK-MOUNTED CAMERA ................................................................................................... 44

SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER CAMERAS .................................................................................................... 46

EXTERNAL TANK UMBILICAL WELL DIGITAL STILL CAMERA ................................................................ 47

CREW HANDHELD PHOTOGRAPHY........................................................................................................ 48

DIGITAL SPACEWALK CAMERA............................................................................................................ 49

IN-FLIGHT INSPECTION AND REPAIR .................................................................................................. 50

THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM ON-ORBIT REPAIR TECHNIQUES ....................................................... 52

TILE..................................................................................................................................................... 55

REINFORCED CARBON-CARBON .......................................................................................................... 57

ACCESS............................................................................................................................................... 58

FUTURE WORK..................................................................................................................................... 58

CONTINGENCY SHUTTLE CREW SUPPORT ............................................................................. 59 

CAIB RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................... 61 

July 2005 CONTENTS ii
 

SECTION II: THE STS-114 MISSION 

STS-114 MISSION OVERVIEW ................................................................................................ 65 

STATION RESUPPLY HIGHLIGHT DISCOVERY’S MISSION .................................................................... 65 

TIMELINE OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................. 69 

MISSION OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................ 75 

LAUNCH AND LANDING ........................................................................................................... 77 

LAUNCH............................................................................................................................................... 77

ABORT-TO-ORBIT ............................................................................................................................... 77

TRANSATLANTIC ABORT LANDING ..................................................................................................... 77

RETURN-TO-LAUNCH-SITE .................................................................................................................. 77

LANDING ............................................................................................................................................. 78

MISSION PROFILE................................................................................................................... 79

STS-114 DISCOVERY CREW ................................................................................................... 81 

KEY MISSION PERSONNEL ...................................................................................................... 85 

RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING .................................................................................................. 87 

UNDOCKING, SEPARATION AND DEPARTURE ....................................................................................... 90

SPACEWALKS ......................................................................................................................... 91 

EVA 1................................................................................................................................................... 91

EVA 2 .................................................................................................................................................. 98

EVA 3 .................................................................................................................................................. 99

PAYLOAD OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................. 103 

RAFFAELLO MULTI-PURPOSE LOGISTICS MODULE............................................................................... 104 

EXTERNAL STOWAGE PLATFORM-2 ...................................................................................................... 104 

MATERIALS INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION EXPERIMENT................................................................ 105 

July 2005 CONTENTS iii
 

EXPERIMENTS (DSOs AND DTOs) .......................................................................................... 107 

DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES 

DSO 206 - EFFECT OF SPACE FLIGHT ON BONE, MUSCLE AND IMMUNE FUNCTION ............................. 107

DSO 490B - BIOAVAILABILITY AND PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF PROMETHAZINE DURING 

SPACE FLIGHT, PROTOCOL B ............................................................................................................... 107

DSO 493 - MONITORING LATENT VIRUS REACTIVATION AND SHEDDING IN ASTRONAUTS................. 107

DSO 498 - SPACE FLIGHT AND IMMUNE FUNCTION ............................................................................ 108

DSO 499 - EYE MOVEMENTS AND MOTION PERCEPTION INDUCED BY OFF-VERTICAL AXIS 

ROTATION (OVAR) AT SMALL ANGLES OF TILT AFTER SPACEFLIGHT ................................................... 108

DSO 500 - SPACE FLIGHT INDUCED REACTIVATION OF LATENT EPSTEIN-BARR VIRUS ...................... 108

DSO 504 - MICROGRAVITY INDUCED CHANGES IN THE CONTROL OF MUSCLES ................................. 109

DETAILED TEST OBJECTIVES

DTO 805 - CROSSWIND LANDING PERFORMANCE .............................................................................. 109

DTO 848 - ORBITER THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM (TPS) REPAIR TECHNIQUES ............................. 110

DTO 850 - WATER SPRAY BOILER COOLING WITH WATER/PGME ANTIFREEZE ................................... 110

SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA .................................................................................................... 111 

SHUTTLE ABORT MODES...................................................................................................................... 111

RSLS ABORTS ..................................................................................................................................... 111

ASCENT ABORTS ................................................................................................................................. 111

INTACT ABORTS.................................................................................................................................. 111

RETURN TO LAUNCH SITE.................................................................................................................... 111

TRANSOCEANIC ABORT LANDING........................................................................................................ 112

ABORT TO ORBIT................................................................................................................................. 112

ABORT ONCE AROUND ......................................................................................................................... 112

CONTINGENCY ABORTS ....................................................................................................................... 113

ABORT DECISIONS .............................................................................................................................. 113

SHUTTLE ABORT HISTORY................................................................................................................... 114

RSLS ABORT HISTORY: 

(STS-41 D) JUNE 26, 1984 .................................................................................................................. 114

(STS-51 F) JULY 12, 1985 ................................................................................................................... 114

(STS-55) MARCH 22, 1993................................................................................................................. 114

July 2005 CONTENTS iv
 

(STS-51) AUG. 12, 1993...................................................................................................................... 114

(STS-68) AUGUST 18, 1994................................................................................................................ 114

ABORT TO ORBIT HISTORY: 

(STS-51 F) JULY 29, 1985................................................................................................................... 114

SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES .......................................................................................................... 114

SPACE SHUTTLE SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS ........................................................................................ 116

HOLD-DOWN POSTS ............................................................................................................................ 118

SRB IGNITION ..................................................................................................................................... 118

ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION ................................................................................................... 119

HYDRAULIC POWER UNITS.................................................................................................................. 119

THRUST VECTOR CONTROL ................................................................................................................. 120

SRB RATE GYRO ASSEMBLIES ............................................................................................................. 121

SRB SEPARATION................................................................................................................................ 121

SPACE SHUTTLE SUPER LIGHT WEIGHT TANK .................................................................................... 122

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................... 123 

MEDIA ASSISTANCE ............................................................................................................... 133 

MEDIA CONTACTS .................................................................................................................. 135 

July 2005 CONTENTS v
 

FIGURES 

SHUTTLE ON PAD ............................................................................................................................ 2 

RETURN TO FLIGHT TASK GROUP.................................................................................................... 4 

MISSION MANAGEMENT TEAM CONDUCTS TRAINING ..................................................................... 5 

THE MISSION MANAGEMENT TEAM ................................................................................................. 7 

RUDDER SPEED BRAKE ................................................................................................................... 13 

ACTUATOR INSPECTION USING X-RAY ANALYSIS ........................................................................... 13 

ACTUATOR INSTALLATION ON DISCOVERY ..................................................................................... 13 

REDUCTION OF TEMPORARY WORKSITE DEBRIS ............................................................................ 14 

FOREIGN OBJECT DEBRIS BAG/CAN ............................................................................................... 15

TOOLS AND MATERIALS PROPERLY STOWED .................................................................................. 15 

ENHANCED STILL IMAGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SIMS) ................................................................ 16 

LAUNCH COMPLEX 39 ..................................................................................................................... 17 

CRAWLER TRANSPORTER VEHICLE ................................................................................................. 19

EXTERNAL TANK AREAS OF EMPHASIS ............................................................................................ 21 

BIPOD ATTACHED ........................................................................................................................... 22 

BIPOD UPRIGHT.............................................................................................................................. 22 

BIPOD INSTALLATION ..................................................................................................................... 23 

TPS APPLICATIONS ........................................................................................................................ 28 

BOLT CATCHER ............................................................................................................................... 30 

SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER SEPARATION........................................................................................... 31 

SHORT-RANGE TRACKING CAMERA ................................................................................................ 34 

LONG-RANGE TRACKER ................................................................................................................... 34 

KINETO TRACKING MOUNT TRACKER.............................................................................................. 35 

MLP DECK ....................................................................................................................................... 36 

PAD PERIMETER.............................................................................................................................. 36 

SHORT-RANGE CAMERA CONFIGURATION....................................................................................... 36 

MEDIUM-RANGE CAMERA CONFIGURATION .................................................................................... 37 

LONG-RANGE CAMERA CONFIGURATION ......................................................................................... 37 

WB-57 AIRCRAFT ........................................................................................................................... 38 

SRB SEPARATION ........................................................................................................................... 38 

July 2005 CONTENTS vi
 

MIDCOURSE RADAR (MCR)............................................................................................................. 39 

NATIONAL CENTER FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH (NCAR) SITE .................................................... 40 

WING LEADING EDGE IMPACT DETECTION SYSTEM ........................................................................ 41 

WING LEADING EDGE IMPACT DETECTION SYSTEM (DIAGRAM) ..................................................... 42 

CAMERAS ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE BOOSTERS, EXTERNAL TANK AND ORBITER ............................. 43 

SHUTTLE ORBITER-BASED PHOTOGRAPHY FOR STS-114 ASCENT ................................................... 44 

EXTERNAL TANK CAMERA OVERVIEW.............................................................................................. 45 

ET RING CAMERA HOUSING INSTALLED .......................................................................................... 46 

SRB-MOUNTED CAMERAS ............................................................................................................... 46 

FORWARD SKIRT AFT-POINTING CAMERA PROTOTYPE HOUSING ................................................... 46 

CAMERA CONFIGURATION: THIRD FLIGHT & SUBS ........................................................................ 47 

RIGHT-HAND UMBILICAL WELL ....................................................................................................... 47 

DIGITAL UMBILICAL STILL CAMERA SYSTEM.................................................................................. 48 

EVA FLASH MECHANICAL DESIGN ................................................................................................... 49 

ORBITER BOOM SENSOR SYSTEM INSTALLED ON STARBOARD SILL ............................................... 50 

INSPECTION SENSORS.................................................................................................................... 53 

ITVC CAMERA ................................................................................................................................. 54 

TILES ON DISCOVERY, PART OF THE ORBITER THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM ............................. 56 

RCC TILE CRACKS .......................................................................................................................... 57 

REINFORCED CARBON-CARBON ON THE WING’S LEADING EDGE ON DISCOVERY ............................ 58 

CAIB BOARDMEMBERS ................................................................................................................... 61 

STS-114 (LF1) OVERVIEW TIMELINE ............................................................................................... 72 

ORBITER BOOM SENSOR SYSTEM (OBSS) ...................................................................................... 76 

RAFFAELLO MULTI-PURPOSE LOGISTICS MODULE (MPLM) ............................................................. 76 

SPACE SHUTTLE DISCOVERY PREPARES TO DOCK WITH INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION ........... 77 

DISCOVERY LAUNCH ....................................................................................................................... 78 

DISCOVERY LANDING AT THE SHUTTLE LANDING FACILITY ............................................................ 79 

DISCOVERY CREW (STS-114) ......................................................................................................... 82 

COMMANDER EILEEN COLLINS ........................................................................................................ 83 

PILOT JIM KELLY ............................................................................................................................. 83 

SOICHI NOGUCHI............................................................................................................................ 84 

STEPHEN ROBINSON ....................................................................................................................... 84 

July 2005 CONTENTS vii
 

ANDREW THOMAS........................................................................................................................... 85 

WENDY LAWRENCE ......................................................................................................................... 85 

CHARLES CAMARDA........................................................................................................................ 85 

RENDEZVOUS PITCH MANEUVER START.......................................................................................... 88 

SHUTTLE BELLY-UP ......................................................................................................................... 88 

800MM LENS CLOSE-UPS ............................................................................................................... 88 

CONDITION OF DISCOVERY’S TILES................................................................................................ 88 

ZVEZDA WINDOWS.......................................................................................................................... 89 

400mm & 800mm CAMERA VIEWS................................................................................................ 90 

TOOLS FROM THE TOOL STOWAGE ASSEMBLY ................................................................................ 92 

DTO 848 PALLET CONFIGURATION.................................................................................................. 93 

EMITTANCE WASH APPLICATOR ..................................................................................................... 93 

EMITTANCE WASH APPLICATOR ..................................................................................................... 93 

CAULK GUN AND SCRAPERS ........................................................................................................... 94 

EXTERNAL STOWAGE PLATFORM ATTACHMENT DEVICE (ESPAD).................................................... 95 

GPS ANTENNA AND ITS LOCATION .................................................................................................. 96 

REROUTING POWER TO A CONTROL MOMENT GYROSCOPE ............................................................. 96 

PRIMARY POWER CABLE ROUTING MAP ......................................................................................... 97 

TPS REPAIR ASSETS AND DTO PLAN ............................................................................................... 98 

LOCATION OF FOUR CMGs .............................................................................................................. 99 

CLOSE-UP OF CMGs ........................................................................................................................ 99 

A REPLACEMENT CONTROL MOMENT GYROSCOPE .......................................................................... 100 

INSTALLATION AT CAMERA PORT 9 ................................................................................................ 100 

EXTERNAL STOWAGE PLATFORM-2 ................................................................................................. 101 

MISSE #1 AND #2........................................................................................................................... 101 

MISSE 5.......................................................................................................................................... 102 

STS-114 PAYLOAD BAY CONFIGURATION ........................................................................................ 104 

MPLM RAFFAELLO ........................................................................................................................... 105 

 

July 2005 CONTENTS viii
“This cause of exploration and discovery is not an option we choose; it is a desire written in 

the human heart...” 

– President George W. Bush, Feb. 4, 2003 

RETURNING THE SPACE SHUTTLE TO FLIGHT 

NASA will return Space 

Shuttles to flight with a mission 

on the Shuttle Discovery this 

summer. The crew of seven is 

charged with a busy to-do list, 

including testing new safety techniques and 

delivering much-needed supplies to the 

International Space Station. Discovery's launch 

is targeted for July 13 with a launch window 

that extends through July 31, 2005. 

But Return to Flight is more than a single 

mission. It launches a new era of human 

exploration that's far-reaching but focused, 

ambitious but affordable. Return to Flight 

illustrates NASA's ability to learn from 

mistakes and its determination to prevent new 

ones. And it pays tribute to a crew of seven 

brave astronauts on the Space Shuttle 

Columbia, who two years ago gave their lives 

in the pursuit of the knowledge that comes 

from exploration. 

Following the Columbia accident on 

February 1, 2003, the independent Columbia 

Accident Investigation Board conducted a 

thorough, seven-month inquiry. The CAIB 

issued its findings and recommendations in 

August 2003, in a comprehensive report. 

The board determined that the physical cause 

of the accident was a breach in the Shuttle’s 

left-wing leading edge caused by a piece of 

insulating foam that fell off the External Tank 

during the climb to orbit. This foam block, 

weighing approximately 11⁄2 pounds and about 

the size of a suitcase, struck a portion of the 

wing covered in a dark, grey substance called 

Reinforced Carbon-Carbon, part of the Shuttle's 

heat-shielding Thermal Protection System. The 

damage allowed superheated air to penetrate 

the wing’s interior and to weaken the structure, 

eventually causing Columbia's breakup 40 miles 

above central Texas, 16 minutes before landing. 

Even before the CAIB final report laid out 15 

recommendations to be completed before Space 

Shuttle missions could resume, the agency 

began the process of returning the Shuttle to safe 

flight by forming a team to plan for Return to 

Flight. The resulting document – reviewed and 

updated as those recommendations are 

addressed – is called NASA's Implementation 

for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond. 

NASA did not stop by addressing only the 15 

recommendations specified to be implemented 

prior to flying the Space Shuttle again. Another 

14 recommendations from the Board are being 

implemented as well by NASA. 

Additionally, the agency has gone above and 

beyond the CAIB recommendations with a list 

of 15 corrective actions known as “Raising the 

Bar” to make the Space Shuttle safer than it has 

ever been. 

These initiatives combined mean NASA is 

addressing 44 issues leading to Return to Flight. 

July 2005 OVERVIEW 1
An independent group was 

formed by the NASA 

Administrator to evaluate 

how NASA is addressing the 

CAIB recommendations. This

Return to Flight Task Group

is conducting an 

independent assessment of 

NASA’s implementation of 

those recommendations as 

they relate to the safety and 

operational readiness of 

Space Shuttle Discovery’s 

upcoming mission, 

designated STS-114. 

With long-range planning in 

the form of the Vision for 

Space Exploration

announced in January 2004, 

the agency is beginning a 

new chapter in its history. It 

is recommitting itself to 

excellence in all aspects of its 

programs by strengthening 

its culture and improving 

technical capabilities. 

Space Shuttle Columbia and 

its seven-person crew are 

never far from the hearts and 

minds of those 

rededicated to making 

human space flight as safe as 

possible. NASA’s strategies 

for safely resuming Shuttle 

flights are detailed in this 

section covering Space 

Shuttle Return to Flight 

safety enhancements. It 

serves as a guide to how 

NASA – its government and 

contractor workforce – has 

eliminated the potential for 

debris that could damage the 

Space Shuttle. It also details 

how the agency plans to 

identify, inspect and repair 

damage in flight, if needed, 

while improving technical 

excellence, internal 

communications and 

decision-making. And – in 

the very unlikely event that 

it's needed – the agency is 

providing a plan for keeping 

a Space Shuttle crew safe 

until a rescue mission could 

be launched. 

NASA is committed to 

returning the Space Shuttle 

to flight -- safely -- to fulfill 

its mission in the Vision for 

Space Exploration. 

July 2005 OVERVIEW 2
IMPROVEMENTS IN TECHNICAL EXCELLENCE, 

COMMUNICATIONS AND DECISION-MAKING 

Two groups play a major role in 

the decisions associated with 

NASA's Return to Flight effort: 

NASA's Space Flight Leadership 

Council and the independent Return to Flight 

Task Group. 

In parallel with Return to Flight activities after 

the Columbia accident, a team was formed to 

review the Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board’s report and recommendations to 

determine applicability across the agency. This 

agency-wide group was led by Al Diaz, 

Associate Administrator for Science and 

culminated in its team report: "A Renewed 

Commitment to Excellence.” 

Additionally, the agency established the NASA 

Engineering and Safety Center, which focuses 

more attention and resources on engineering 

excellence throughout the agency. Though 

based at the NASA Langley Research Center, 

Hampton, Va., this group has membership 

based at agency field centers that are integrated 

and involved with engineering reviews, 

challenges and decisions throughout the 

agency. 

While hardware changes were ongoing, internal 

management and organizational structures 

were reviewed and updated as appropriate. The 

Space Shuttle Program Mission Management 

Team was one of those scrutinized the most 

following the Columbia accident and has 

undergone a complete review and restructure 

under the leadership of Deputy Shuttle Program 

Manager Wayne Hale, who will chair its 

meetings each day throughout a Shuttle flight. 

More detail on each of the above organizations 

is below and available on the Internet at 

www.nasa.gov and other sites. 

SPACE FLIGHT LEADERSHIP COUNCIL 

The Space Flight Leadership Council (SFLC) is 

the group in charge of the agency's Return to 

Flight efforts. Established before the Space 

Shuttle Columbia accident, the SFLC is regularly 

briefed on the overall activities and progress 

associated with Return to Flight. When the Space 

Shuttle Program defines a course of action 

addressing a CAIB recommendation or other 

major program issues, the next step is to brief the 

SFLC during periodic meetings. The SFLC is fully 

briefed and approves, if necessary, the actions to 

be taken. Additionally, the SFLC assess overall 

cost, schedule and policy issues. 

The members are: 

• Walter H. Cantrell (co-chair) – Dep. Chief 

Engineer for Independent Technical 

Authority 

• William Readdy (co-chair) – Associate 

Administrator for Space Operations 

• Bryan O'Connor – Chief Safety and Mission 

Assurance Officer 

• James Kennedy – Kennedy Space Center 

Director 

• Jefferson D. Howell – Johnson Space 

Center Director 

• David King – Marshall Space Flight Center 

Director 

• Thomas Donaldson – Stennis Space Center 

Director 

• Michael Kostelnik – Dep. Associate 

Administrator for International Space 

Station and Space Shuttle Programs 

July 2005 TECH/COMM IMPROVEMENTS 3
RETURN TO FLIGHT TASK GROUP (STAFFORDCOVEY) 

During the investigation following the Columbia 

accident, the NASA Administrator determined it 

was in the public interest to establish the Return 

to Flight Task Group. Co-chaired by former 

astronauts Tom Stafford and Richard Covey, the 

group is conducting an independent assessment 

of NASA’s actions to implement the 

recommendations of the Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board (CAIB), as they relate to the 

safety and operational readiness of STS-114. As 

necessary to their activities, the Task Group 

consults with former members of the CAIB. 

While the Task Group was not chartered to 

assess the adequacy of the CAIB 

recommendations, it does report on the 

progress of NASA’s response to meeting the 

intent of the recommendations and offers 

observations on safety or operational 

readiness, as appropriate. 

The Task Group draws on the expertise of its 

members and other sources to provide its 

assessment to the Administrator and has held 

meetings and made site visits, as necessary, to 

accomplish its fact-finding. 

Functioning solely as an advisory body, the Task 

Group established three panels in areas related to 

its work. The panels report their findings and 

recommendations to the full Task Group during 

periodic plenary sessions. 

In order to reflect a balance of views, the Task 

Group consists of non-NASA employees and 

one NASA non-voting, ex officio member: the 

Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety and 

Mission Assurance. Members of the Task Group 

and panels were chosen from among industry, 

academia, and government with recognized 

knowledge and expertise in fields relevant to 

safety and space flight. 

Figure 1 Return to Flight Task Group 

July 2005 TECH/COMM IMPROVEMENTS 4
SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM MISSION 

MANAGEMENT TEAM 

During Space Shuttle missions, the Shuttle 

Mission Management Team is responsible for 

oversight of the operations teams during prelaunch and in-flight. The countdown and flight 

operations are conducted by the operations 

teams according to rules and procedures 

approved by SSP Management well prior to 

real-time events. 

While the Mission Operations team leads all 

nominal flight operations, the MMT provides 

guidance to the operations teams for situations 

that fall outside normal operations, and also 

redefines programmatic priority when in-flight 

issues or off-nominal conditions result in 

conflicting priorities. 

Up to and including Columbia’s STS-107 

mission, actions were biased toward the 

immediate decision-making required of in-flight 

operations, which did not adequately address 

the concerns of individual engineers, the quality 

of risk assessments, and pedigree of engineering 

assessments. 

Figure 2 Mission Management Team conducts training 

The MMT conducts training from the Mission Control Center 

in preparation for Discovery's Return to Flight. 

July 2005 TECH/COMM IMPROVEMENTS 5
Now, the Mission Management Team is fully 

engaged and trained to focus on clearer 

communication processes centered on bringing 

out differing opinions; maintaining awareness 

of decisions that impact the remainder of the 

flight; and ensuring an understanding of the 

roles and responsibilities of team members and 

supporting working groups and teams, 

including data sharing processes and required 

milestones to support real-time operations. 

To ensure that all issues are identified, 

cataloged and resolved more effectively, a 

process has been established whereby the 

Program’s Systems Engineering and Integration 

Office will maintain an integrated anomaly list, 

which will be briefed and reviewed at each 

day’s MMT meeting. Each issue (or anomaly) 

will be assigned to a specific office or 

organization for technical evaluation and will be 

subject to an independent risk assessment by 

Safety & Mission Assurance. 

The MMT includes one Shuttle Program S&MA 

core member, and three institutional S&MA 

advisory members from the Johnson Space 

Center, Kennedy Space Center and Marshall 

Space Flight Center. Additionally, the MMT has 

added the Space Shuttle System Technical 

Warrant Holder as a core voting member 

representing the NASA Independent Technical 

Authority. 

Additional improvements were made to MMT 

internal processes and procedures, including 

more clearly defining requirements for MMT 

meeting frequency and the process for 

requesting an emergency MMT meeting. NASA 

now will conduct daily MMT meetings 

beginning with the launch minus two (L-2) day 

MMT. 

Membership, organization, and chairmanship of 

the preflight and inflight MMT have been 

standardized. Space Shuttle Program Deputy 

Manager Wayne Hale will chair both phases of 

the MMT – preflight and on-orbit. Membership 

has been expanded and augmented with each 

MMT member trained in clearly defined 

processes for support and problem reporting. 

Formal processes have been established for the 

review of findings from ascent and on-orbit 

imagery analyses, post-launch hardware 

inspections, ascent reconstruction, and all other 

flight data reviews to ensure timely, effective 

reviews of key data by the MMT. 

Procedures for flight MMT meetings have been 

standardized through the use of predefined 

templates for agenda formats, presentations, 

action item assignments, and readiness polls. This 

ensures that communication and resolution of 

issues are performed in a consistent, rigorous 

manner. 

As part of an overall agency effort to examine 

and enhance the safety culture within NASA, 

Behavioral Science Technology (BST) was hired to 

assist with understanding and improving culture 

specifically in the areas of communication, 

individual consideration, management credibility 

and decision-making. Locally led implementation 

teams and former flight directors were invited to 

observe and assess the MMT process and offer 

recommendations. This ongoing effort has led to 

more efficient resolution of critical issues and 

more open communication among MMT 

members. 

Extensive research on improving communications led to a redesigned MMT meeting room – 

designated the MMT Command Center – which 

provides increased seating capacity and 

communications improvements. Included is a 

video-teleconferencing capability, a multi-user 

collaboration tool, and a larger room allowing 

space for more subject experts and MMT 

members. 

July 2005 TECH/COMM IMPROVEMENTS 6
A large “C” shaped table now seats all 

members of the MMT and invites open 

communication by eliminating a hierarchical 

seating arrangement. The MMT Command 

Center has been operational since 

November 2004. 

To ensure adequate back ups, at least two 

people have been trained to fill each MMT core 

position for Return to Flight. This protects the 

integrity of the integrated MMT process 

against any core individuals’ inability to 

perform his or her role for any reason. 

Verification of each flight-specific team will be 

presented at the appropriate Flight Readiness 

Review traditionally held approximately two 

weeks prior to launch. 

The evolution of the MMT is from what 

previously was an operationally-oriented, 

problem-solving team to a critical decisionmaking management body. Technical 

engineering sub-teams perform the 

engineering root-cause analysis, technical 

problem-solving, and identify options and 

make recommendations to the MMT. This has 

resulted in more focused decision-making by 

the MMT and better utilization of the expertise 

of the MMT membership. 

Any action items defined during missions now 

contain clear delineation of the responsibility 

of each, which has eliminated some of the preColumbia duplication and confusion over roles 

and responsibilities, particularly in the area of 

in-flight anomalies. 

Risk management is now a major 

consideration at each MMT meeting. Each 

identified hazard is required to have a risk 

assessment performed and presented, so the 

appropriate risk versus risk tradeoffs can be 

discussed and dispositioned. Figure 3 The Mission Management Team 

THE MISSION MANAGEMENT TEAM: 

July 2005 TECH/COMM IMPROVEMENTS 7
NASA ENGINEERING AND SAFETY CENTER 

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center is an 

independent organization chartered in the 

wake of the Columbia accident to serve as an 

agency-wide technical resource focused on 

engineering excellence. The objective of the 

NESC is to improve safety by performing indepth independent engineering assessments, 

testing, and analysis to uncover technical 

vulnerabilities and to determine appropriate 

preventative and corrective actions for 

problems, trends or issues within NASA’s 

programs, projects and 

institutions. The NESC 

draws upon engineering 

expertise within NASA and 

includes partnerships with 

other government agencies, 

national laboratories, 

universities and industry. 

The objective of the NESC is 

to improve safety by 

performing various

independent technical 

assessments of issues within 

NASA programs. A multidisciplined team of experts, 

assembled specifically to address the issue at 

hand, conducts each of these technical 

assessments. This approach has been modeled 

after the “tiger team” concept often used by 

programs to solve challenging problems. Other 

services and activities of the NESC are: 

Technical Inspections – Used to evaluate the 

technical adequacy of a particular area within 

a program, even if a problem has not yet been 

detected. Examples of potential inspection 

areas include: math models, analytical tools, 

manufacturing procedures, test procedures, 

vehicle processing, troubleshooting techniques, 

manufacturing tooling, ground support 

equipment, or special test equipment. 

Technical Consultation – An independent 

evaluation of a specific technical item by 

representatives of the NESC. This is provided 

when the scope of a problem or concern does 

not warrant a full assessment. In addition, a 

technical consultation also can be provided 

when an NESC member joins an existing review 

team or monitors an existing operation or 

process. 

Technical Support – The NESC provides support 

by making its network of experts 

and resources available to 

programs, projects and NASA 

centers. Technical support is 

funded by the requesting 

organization and would not be 

considered an NESC endorsed 

activity. The NESC remains 

independent of the activity, and 

any individuals called upon by the 

requesting program or NASA 

center does not perform an 

independent technical assessment 

on the same issue. 

Technical Advocacy – This role 

provides technical expertise, testing or analysis 

in support of Safety & Mission Assurance 

organizations, institutional engineering, and 

programs and projects as necessary. The NESC 

promotes positive actions taken by individuals, 

programs or projects to correct identified 

technical inadequacies. 

Dissenting Opinions – The NESC cultivates an 

environment that encourages and seeks out 

dissenting opinions. In order to encourage this 

open environment, and soliciting alternative 

perspectives, the NESC established a process for 

addressing dissenting opinions. As a matter of 

practice, each independent technical review, 

assessment and analysis seeks dissenting 

opinions for review and evaluation. These 

July 2005 TECH/COMM IMPROVEMENTS 8
dissenting opinions are documented and 

dispositioned in each report and/or briefing. 

RENEWED COMMITMENT TO EXCELLENCE 

An agency-wide team, under the leadership of 

Al Diaz, Associate Administrator for Science, 

was commissioned to assess the broader 

implications of the Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board's Report on activities 

agencywide. The final Diaz Team Report, "A 

Renewed Commitment to Excellence" was 

released on January 30, 2004. 

The team concluded that 85 of the 193 

recommendations, observations and findings 

of the CAIB Report were applicable across the 

entire spectrum of NASA's activities. The 

implementation plan for the Diaz Team Report 

can be found on the Internet at: 

http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/58676main_Implementation 033004 FINAL.pdf

July 2005 TECH/COMM IMPROVEMENTS 9
July 2005 TECH/COMM IMPROVEMENTS 10
SPACE SHUTTLE PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS 

REINFORCED CARBON-CARBON 

WING PANELS AND NOSE CAP 

During re-entry into Earth’s 

atmosphere and traveling more than 17,000 

miles per hour, the Space Shuttle’s exterior 

temperatures can reach up to 3,000 degrees 

Fahrenheit (1,600 Celsius). 

To protect the Orbiters, all external surfaces are 

covered with various types of Thermal 

Protection System (TPS) materials. The main 

types of thermal materials are Reinforced 

Carbon-Carbon (RCC), low- and hightemperature reusable surface insulation tiles, 

felt reusable surface insulation blankets and 

fibrous insulation blankets. 

RCC is used on the wing leading edges, the 

nose cap and an area just behind the nose cap 

on the lower surface (chin panel), and the area 

immediately around the forward 

Orbiter/External Tank structural attachment 

points. Each wing leading edge consists of 22 

RCC panels, numbered from 1 to 22 moving 

outboard on each wing. Because of the shape 

of the wing, each panel is unique in size and 

shape. 

The basic RCC composite is a laminate of 

graphite-filled rayon fabric, further filled with 

phenolic resin and layered - one ply at a time – 

in a unique mold for each part, then cured, 

rough-trimmed, drilled and inspected. To 

prevent oxidation, the outer layers of the 

carbon substrate are covered in a .02 to .04-

inch-thick layer of silicon carbide in a chamber 

filled with argon at temperatures up to 3,000 

degrees Fahrenheit. 

Previous flight history showed that RCC 

components have been struck by objects, but 

never resulted in a complete penetration. Postflight RCC component inspections for cracks, 

chips, scratches, pinholes and abnormal 

discoloration were primarily visual, with tactile 

evaluations (pushing with a finger) of some 

regions. Minor repairs to the silicon carbide 

coating and surface defects were completed at 

Kennedy Space Center, Florida. 

At the time of the STS-107 mission, most of the 

panels on Columbia’s left wing were original 

parts (built in the 1970s). Only panel 10-left, 

T-seal 10-left, panel 11-left and T-seal 11-left had 

been replaced (along with panel 12 on the right 

wing). Minor surface repairs had been made to 

several panels and T-seals on both wing leading 

edges. 

After the Columbia accident, the Columbia 

Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) submitted 

findings to NASA recommending nondestruction evaluation (NDE) inspection, repair 

and/or replacement of all wing leading edge 

panels and associated attachment hardware prior 

to Return to Flight. 

The Kennedy Space Center Space Shuttle 

processing team began removing and inspecting 

all wing leading edge panels on the three 

remaining Shuttles. Beginning in 2003, batches 

of panels from the wing leading edge and the 

nose caps, expansion seal and chin panel were 

removed from the vehicles and sent to Lockheed 

Vought in Dallas, for NDE inspection. 

The traditional NDE methods employed 

included: 

• Through-Transmission Ultrasound (TTU) on 

all accessible areas. 

• Film-based radiology (X-ray) of RCC corners 

where TTU could not be performed. 

July 2005 PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS 11
• Sampling of the coating using eddy current 

to determine the silicon carbide coating 

thickness. 

In addition to these traditional NDE methods 

performed at the vendor for Return to Flight, 

KSC conducted advanced NDE using Flash 

Thermography and Through Transmission 

Thermography on all accessible areas of the 

RCC panels including the wing leading edge, 

the nose cap, expansion seal and chin panel of 

the RCC. This advanced method utilized 

infrared imaging to characterize internal flaws. 

All of these NDE inspections sought to identify 

internal hidden flaws in the RCC and the outer 

silicon carbide conversion coating. Any 

suspect findings would have required 

additional NDE, including digital radiography 

and/or computed tomography. Findings then 

are submitted to an engineering team for 

evaluation to determine if requirements are 

met. 

It is now a requirement that after Return to 

Flight and between every mission, flash 

thermography is performed on the critical 

areas of wing leading edge, the nose cap, chin 

panel and expansion seal, in addition to the 

visual and touch tests. Other advanced NDE 

methods may be used if warranted. 

While some minor repairs were performed at 

KSC, all necessary repairs and refurbishment to 

RCC panels was performed by the vendor in 

Dallas. 

Additionally, the nose cap on each vehicle was 

inspected and only Endeavour’s had silicone 

carbide coating damage that required its 

removal and replacement with a spare. 

WING LEADING EDGE STRUCTURAL 

SUBSYSTEM 

The Space Shuttle processing team performed 

modifications to the lower two inches of the 

front spar to prevent any flow or heat from 

getting inside and behind the wing edges during 

launch and landing. The spar is the primary 

load-carrying structure in the wing to which 

each of the 22 panels is attached. 

Flow restrictors, comprised of a pair of 3/8-inchdiameter knitted Inconel wire springs wrapped 

in a Nextel fabric sleeve and stuffed with Saffil 

batting, were added across the four-inch box 

beam located in the lower RCC access panels 5 

through 13. This reduces the effects of 

temperature on the spar in the event of a breach 

in the panel or adjacent T-seal. 

Also for this reason, a thick strain isolator pad 

was bonded to the lower spar cap and to the 

forward-facing corrugations of the spar. Also, 

the “horse collar” gap filler was redesigned to 

add a 0.50-in-diameter sleeve at the inner mold 

line end to increase additional sealing capability 

in the event of partial tile loss. 

RUDDER SPEED BRAKE 

The Rudder Speed Brake (RSB) is part of the 

Shuttle’s tail assembly. Located on the trailing 

edge of the vertical stabilizer, the RSB provides 

directional and speed control of an Orbiter. The 

RSB is driven by four actuators powered by a 

drive shaft. Like a traditional aircraft, the rudder 

swings from side to side to steer the Orbiter as it 

descends through the atmosphere. It also 

functions as a speed brake to slow the Orbiter 

down. When braking is needed, the sides of the 

rudder vertically split into two separate surfaces 

and flare out to provide air resistance. 

July 2005 PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS 12
Figure 1 Rudder Speed Brake 

The Rudder Speed Brake consists of two 

panels, four actuators and a drive shaft 

In late 2002, internal corrosion was discovered 

in the body flap actuators of Atlantis (OV-104). 

Following the finding, the body flap actuators 

onboard Discovery (OV-103) were inspected 

and also found to be corroded and in need of 

refurbishment. Space Shuttles also use the 

same type of actuator in their RSB assembly. 

Because of the component commonality, 

NASA elected to inspect and refurbish the RSB 

actuators. The RSB actuators became an issue 

because corrosion inside the units could result 

in jamming of the RSB. 

During the refurbishment of Discovery's RSB 

actuators, it was discovered that planetary 

gears in actuator No. 4 had been installed 

inverted. Gears in Discovery's other actuators 

also showed pitting and wear. Furthermore, 

X-ray analysis of replacement stock actuators 

revealed actuator No. 2 to have its planetary 

gear improperly installed, as well. 

Figure 2 Actuator inspection using X-ray analysis 

Following identification of the corrosion and 

planetary gear issues, actuators from all three 

Orbiters were returned for refurbishment to 

their original manufacturer, Hamilton 

Sundstrand. Included in the refurbishment 

service were replacement actuator No. 2 and 

Discovery's original actuators. During the 

refurbishment process, Hamilton Sundstrand 

was in charge of quality control and ensuring 

proper reassembly of the actuators. 

Upon the return of replacement actuator No. 2, 

the entire set of replacement actuators was 

installed on Discovery. This was the first time in 

Space Shuttle Program history that complete 

installation of the RSB components was 

performed entirely at Kennedy Space Center. 

Figure 3 Actuator installation on Discovery 

July 2005 PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS 13
While the amount of corrosion originally 

found on the actuators was only minor, a flight 

limit has been placed on the components. For 

the initial Return to Flight missions, the 

actuators will be restricted to five flights. 

However, the actuator flight limits could be 

raised to seven missions if post-flight 

inspections show they are in good condition 

and working properly. 

FOREIGN OBJECT DEBRIS 

Beginning in 2001, debris at Kennedy Space 

Center (KSC) was divided into two categories: 

“processing debris” and foreign object debris 

(FOD). FOD was defined as debris found during 

the final or flight-closeout inspection process. 

All other debris was labeled processing debris. 

This led to the perception that processing debris 

was not a concern. 

NASA and United Space Alliance (USA), 

subsequently have changed work procedures 

to consider all debris equally important and 

preventable. Rigorous definitions of FOD that 

are the industry standard have been adopted 

(from National Aerospace FOD Prevention, 

Inc.). These guidelines and industry standards 

include FOD, Foreign Object Damage, and 

Clean-As-You-Go. FOD is redefined as "a 

substance, debris or article alien to a vehicle or 

system which would potentially cause 

damage." 

KSC chartered a NASA/USA team selected for 

its experience in FOD-related disciplines 

including processing, quality, and corrective 

engineering; process analysis and integration; 

and operations management. The team began 

by fact-finding and benchmarking to better 

understand the industry standards and best 

practices for FOD prevention. Members visited 

the Northrup Grumman facility at Lake 

Charles, La.; Boeing Aerospace at Kelly Air 

Force Base, Texas; Gulfstream Aerospace in 

Savannah, Ga.; and the Air Force’s Air 

Logistics Center in Oklahoma City, Okla. At 

each site, the team studied the FOD prevention 

processes, documentation programs, and 

assurance practices. 

Armed with this information, the team 

developed a more robust FOD prevention 

program that not only responded to a Columbia 

Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 

recommendation, but also raised the bar by 

instituting additional improvements. The new 

FOD program is anchored in three fundamental 

areas of emphasis: 

• Eliminate various categories of FOD, including 

“processing debris,” and treats all FOD as 

preventable and with equal importance. 

• Re-emphasize the responsibility and authority 

for FOD prevention at the operations level. 

• Elevate the importance of comprehensive 

independent monitoring by both contractors 

and the Government. 

Figure 4 Reduction of temporary worksite debris 

USA also has developed and implemented new 

work practices and strengthened existing 

practices. This reduces the chance of temporary 

worksite items or debris to migrate to an out-ofsight or inaccessible area, and it serves an 

important psychological purpose in eliminating 

visible breaches in FOD prevention discipline. 

July 2005 PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS 14
Figure 5 FOD Bag/FOD Can 

FOD “walkdowns” have been a standard 

industry and KSC procedure for many years. 

These are dedicated periods during which all 

employees execute a prescribed search pattern 

throughout the work areas, picking up all 

debris. USA has increased the frequency and 

participation in walkdowns, and also has 

increased the number of areas regularly 

subjected to them. USA also has improved 

walkdown effectiveness by segmenting 

walkdown areas into zones. Red zones are all 

areas within three feet of flight hardware and all 

areas inside or immediately above or below 

flight hardware. Yellow zones are all areas 

within a designated flight hardware operational 

processing area. Blue zones are desk space and 

other administrative areas within designated 

flight hardware operational processing areas. 

Figure 6 Tools and materials properly stowed 

Additionally, both NASA and USA have 

increased independent monitoring of the FOD 

prevention program. USA Process Assurance 

Engineers regularly audit work areas for 

compliance with such work rules as removal of 

potential FOD items before entering work areas 

and tethering of those items that can be removed 

(e.g., glasses), tool control protocol, parts 

protection, and Clean-As-You-Go housekeeping 

procedures. NASA Quality personnel 

periodically participate in FOD walkdowns to 

assess their effectiveness and oversee contractor 

accomplishment of all FOD program 

requirements. 

The new FOD program’s effectiveness is 

measured by a set of metrics to guide 

improvements. FOD walkdown findings are 

tracked in the Integrated Quality Support 

Database. This database also will track FOD 

found during closeouts, launch countdowns, 

post-launch pad turnarounds, landing operations, 

and NASA quality assurance audits. “Stumbleon” FOD findings also will be tracked. For all 

metrics, the types of FOD and their locations will 

be recorded and analyzed for trends to identify 

particular areas for improvement. Monthly 

reports to management will highlight the top five 

FOD types, locations, and observed workforce 

behaviors, along with the prior months’ trends. 

CLOSEOUT PHOTOGRAPHY PROCESS 

Before areas inside and outside of the Space 

Shuttle and its External Tank/Solid Rocket 

Booster stack are sealed for flight, closeout 

photographs are taken in order to visually 

document the area at the last moments of access. 

In part, these photos document differences 

between actual hardware configuration and 

engineering drawings. This includes 

photography of the Orbiter, Space Shuttle Main 

Engine, Solid Rocket Boosters and External Tank. 

Because of the complexity of the Shuttle’s 

engineering drawing system, the CAIB 

recommended the photo closeout system be 

reviewed and upgraded due to potential for 

errors. 

July 2005 PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS 15
Portions of these requirements were met by the 

existing closeout photo process, the KSC 

Quality Data Center film database and the 

digital Still Image Management System (SIMS) 

database. However, prior to the digital 

photography upgrade, images were difficult to 

locate and retrieve, because the process 

required substantial cross-referencing of 

sources. 

NASA formed a Photo Closeout Team from 

the Agency’s engineering, quality and 

technical communities to identify and 

implement necessary upgrades to the 

processes and equipment involved in vehicle 

closeout photography. The Photo Closeout 

Team divided the CAIB recommendation into 

two main elements: 

• Increase the quantity and quality of closeout 

photographs. The Photo Closeout Team led an 

extensive review of existing and potential 

closeout photo requirements. The multicenter, NASA and contractor team established 

a revised set of requirements, including 

improved closeout photography of tools for 

Extravehicular Activity (EVA) contingency 

configurations and middeck and payload bay 

configurations. General closeout photography 

also is being performed at the time of the 

normal closeout inspection process. The team 

also reviewed the closeout photo process, 

which prompted improved formal 

photography for KSC-generated 

documentation, mandatory photography of 

discrepancies, a standard baseline for photo 

equipment and photo quality standards. 

Figure 7 Enhanced Still Image Management System 

(SIMS) 

July 2005 PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS 16
Each of these requirements was incorporated 

in the photo process. To ensure a 

comprehensive and accurate database of 

photos, NASA initiated a training and 

certification program so that all operators 

understand and meet the requirements. The 

ongoing process continually audits photos 

submitted for archiving. 

• Improve the retrieval process through a 

user-friendly, Internet-based graphical 

interface system. NASA enhanced the Still 

Image Management System by developing a 

web-based graphical interface allowing the 

engineering community access to Shuttle 

closeout images. Users now can easily view 

photos of Orbiter elements and systems. 

Filters also can be used to limit the search to 

desired photos. These enhancements enable 

managers quick and intuitive access to 

relevant photos, improving their responses 

to contingencies.

Programs were established to train and certify 

Quality Control Inspectors, Systems 

Engineering personnel and end-users at the 

Johnson Space Center (such as engineers in the 

Mission Evaluation Room inside Mission 

Control). The SIMS database also is used as a 

tool in conjunction with launch simulation 

scenarios to enhance engineering and mission 

management training. 

LAUNCH PAD GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 

Launch Complex 39, Pads A and B originally 

were built in the 1960s for the Apollo program. 

Both were used to launch manned spaceflights 

during Apollo, Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz and Space 

Shuttle missions. Each was designed to support 

the concept of mobile launch operations, which 

means the launch vehicle is transported to the 

launch pad by large, tracked crawlers for final 

processing toward launch. 

Figure 8 Launch Complex 39 

FIXED AND ROTATING SERVICE STRUCTURES 

Key pad service structures were mobile during the 

Apollo era, but for the Space Shuttle, two 

permanent service towers were installed at each 

pad – the Fixed Service Structure (FSS) and the 

Rotating Service Structure (RSS). 

The FSS stands 347 feet from ground level to the 

tip of its lightning mast and includes three 

retractable swing arms providing services or 

access to the Shuttle on the pad. 

The RSS rotates around the orbiter and is 

retracted before launch and provides protected 

access to the Orbiter for installation and servicing 

of payloads at the pad. 

Launch Pad 39B is designated the Return to 

Flight launch pad. To correct the critical debris 

issue that existed on the pad structure, all of the 

old zinc coating was removed from the two 

service structures using abrasive blasting with a 

coal slag grit called “black beauty.” The 

structures were re-coated with a layer of zinc 

paint and an inorganic topcoat. The coating 

systems on the wing covers of the RSS was 

changed from the inorganic topcoat to a layer of 

epoxy, and a coating of polyurethane sealant, 

which significantly reduces the porosity and 

prevents future oxidation and debris. 

July 2005 PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS 17
During modifications in 2003, Launch Pad 39A 

received an upgraded electrical power system 

and new safety tie-off points. In 1992, all metal 

structures were abrasive blasted to remove 

oxidation and repainted as part of corrosion 

control. 

UPPER HINGE COLUMN BEARING 

Further reviews of the launch pad system 

indicated the load on the upper hinge column 

bearing at the top of the hinge between the 

Fixed Service Structure and Rotating Service 

Structure was 20 percent over the designed 

weight. The hinge materials were redesigned 

to increase their strength. 

GASEOUS OXYGEN VENT ARM (“BEANIE CAP”) 

The Gaseous Oxygen (GOX) Vent Arm, located 

265 feet above the launch tower, includes duct 

tips that were redesigned to provide more 

efficient delivery of heated gaseous nitrogen. 

The vent arm extends over the External Tank 

during prelaunch loading of hydrogen and 

oxygen to provide a means of preventing ice 

formation on the ET nose cone. Ice formation 

presents a debris concern to the tile and wing 

leading edge panels on the Shuttle. The vent 

arm has a system of heaters and tubing (ducts) 

that direct heated gaseous nitrogen to the ET 

nose cone vents to warm the gaseous oxygen 

and then carry it away from the Shuttle. The 

new tips as well as a large section of ducting 

has been built and installed to preclude any ice 

debris concern at the top of the External Tank. 

GASEOUS HYDROGEN VENT ARM 

The Gaseous Hydrogen Vent Umbilical 

provides a means of safely transporting 

hazardous gaseous hydrogen, vented during 

cryogenic loading from six hours through 

launch, away from the External Tank to the 

facility vent system. The vent line and 

umbilical system is located 215 feet up the 

launch tower and attaches to the tank’s intertank 

flight umbilical carrier plate, which provides a 

vent for the liquid Hydrogen tank portion of the 

External Tank. It also provides a connect point 

for the tank’s pneumatic and electrical systems. 

At liftoff on a previous Shuttle mission (STS-108) 

the Vent Line/Carrier Plate Assembly contacted 

the launch tower structure upon retraction into 

the tower latching mechanism. Several pieces of 

the assembly broke off, which led to a concern 

that debris could possibly contact the Shuttle as 

it lifts off the pad. 

A review of the problem revealed that allowable 

wind conditions for a Shuttle launch could 

provide enough push to drive the vent line into 

the launch tower if the wind was from a certain 

direction and velocity. To prevent it from 

occurring again under any conditions for a 

Shuttle launch, the launch tower structure was 

modified by enlarging the opening that the vent 

line enters by about nine inches to allow the 

Vent Line/Carrier Plate Assembly to safely 

enter the tower structure and engage the 

latching mechanism under all launch conditions. 

CRAWLER TRANSPORTER 

Before Return to Flight, NASA’s two Crawler 

Transporter vehicles underwent replacement of 

the 456 tread belt “shoes” on each vehicle. Each 

of the vehicles has eight belts, and each belt has 

57 shoes. Each shoe is 71⁄2 feet long and 11⁄2 feet 

wide and weighs approximately 2,100 pounds. 

Most shoes on the transporters dated back to 

1965, when they were built and first put into 

service for Apollo launches. 

July 2005 PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS 18
KSC system engineers and technicians worked 

on the sprockets and rollers on each belt before 

the new shoes were installed. Welding repair 

and inspection of some of the sprockets and 

manufacture of some of the rollers were 

performed in the Launch Equipment Support 

Facility. 

Other upgrades or modifications recently 

completed on the transporters included 

completing electrical rewiring of the motor 

control center and installation of new driver 

cabs, mufflers, radiators and ventilation systems. 

Figure 9 Crawler Transporter vehicle 

July 2005 PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS 19
July 2005 PROCESSING IMPROVEMENTS 20
PREPARING THE EXTERNAL TANK 

About six hours before Space 

Shuttle Discovery’s launch, its 

bright orange 15-story-tall fuel 

tank is loaded with 535,000 gallons 

of liquid hydrogen and oxygen. 

Just before liftoff, these super cold liquids mix to 

generate fuel for the Shuttle’s three main engines, 

which gulp it at a rate equal to emptying the 

average size backyard swimming pool in 20 

seconds. 

Discovery’s tank, designated ET-121, has been 

redesigned over the course of the last 24 months 

through testing and implementation of 

improvements that eliminate the chance of 

Shuttle-damaging foam coming off during launch 

and the climb to orbit. It is undoubtedly the 

safest, most reliable tank ever built. 

The External Tank’s aluminum skin is a tenth of 

an inch thick in most places and is covered with 

polyurethane-like foam averaging an inch thick, 

which insulates the propellants, prevents ice 

formation on its exterior, and protects its skin 

from aerodynamic heat during flight. About 90 

percent of the foam is applied via automated 

systems, while the remainder is sprayed on 

manually. 

Figure 1 External tank areas of emphasis 

July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 21
A specially formed piece of foam protecting the 

Shuttle’s forward attach point was determined 

to have fallen off during Columbia’s launch on 

Jan. 16, 2003, which struck the left wing. This 

allowed the penetration of superheated air into 

the wing’s interior, weakening the structure. 

This damage eventually caused the loss of 

aerodynamic control 16 minutes before landing 

on Feb. 1, 2003. 

Even before the formal report of the Columbia 

Accident Investigation Board was released, 

NASA began modifications to reduce the risk 

from falling debris during ascent. Several safety 

improvements and foam application process 

changes are now followed to ensure nothing 

larger than .03 pound comes off the tank. 

These changes and improvements include 

removal of the foam around the bipod fitting of 

the forward attach point; installing a small 

video camera on the liquid oxygen feedline to 

document launch; reversing bolts on the flange 

of the tank's mid-section along with a new 

spraying procedure for that area; redesigning 

three bellows on the 70-foot liquid oxygen 

feedline to the main engines; and implementing 

a more defined foam spraying procedure on the 

structural support for the tank's aft orbiter 

attachment struts. 

NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in 

Huntsville, Ala., is home to the Space Shuttle 

Propulsion Office, which manages the tank 

project overseen by prime contractor Lockheed 

Martin Space Systems Co., in New Orleans at 

the Michoud Assembly Facility. 

BIPOD REDESIGN 

The External Tank’s forward Shuttle attach 

fitting – called the bipod – was redesigned to 

eliminate the large insulating foam ramps as a 

debris source and replace them with electric 

heaters. 

The ramps were in place to prevent ice buildup 

– another potential debris source – on the two 

bipod fittings, which connect the tank to the 

Orbiter through the Shuttle's forward attach 

strut. 

Figure 2 Bipod attached 

Development of this redesign concept actually 

began after some insulating foam from the left 

bipod ramp area came off during the October 

2002 launch of Space Shuttle Atlantis on the 

STS-112 mission. During launch of Columbia on 

its STS-107 mission in January 2003, a similar 

loss prompted NASA's Office of Space 

Operations (then Office of Space Flight) to 

mandate a redesign of the bipod ramp. 

The foam ramps were wedge-shaped blocks 

hand sprayed and hand carved to the desired 

dimensions of about 30 inches by 14 inches by 

12 inches to fit over the bipod fittings during 

the tank’s final stages of preparation. 

Figure 3 Bipod upright 

After the Columbia accident, engineering 

analysis and dissection of existing bipod ramps 

indicated that hand-spraying over the complex 

geometry of the fittings was prone to producing 

July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 22
voids and defects that contribute to foam loss 

during ascent. 

The bipod redesign eliminates the foam block 

allowing the fitting to be mounted atop a new 

copper plate threaded with four rod heaters 

placed below each fitting. This prevents ice 

formation when the tank is loaded with 

extremely cold cryogenic liquid hydrogen fuel. 

The copper plate with heaters is sandwiched 

between the fitting and an existing thermal 

isolating pad, which reduces heat loss from the 

copper plate into the extremely cold liquid 

hydrogen tank. 

The heaters are cartridge-type heaters .25 inches 

in diameter and 5 inches in length with a wire 

coil inserted into a tube filled with magnesium 

oxide. Each heater will operate until launch and 

can produce up to 300 watts of power at 120 

volts AC. They will be powered and monitored 

through connections in the Ground Umbilical 

Carrier Plate, which separates when the Shuttle 

is launched. 

Control of the heaters will be through groundbased Programmable Logic Controllers that 

will vary the heater power based on 

temperature sensors co-located with the heaters 

at the copper plates. Additional temperature 

sensors on the bipod fittings will monitor the 

fitting temperatures to ensure they stay above 

freezing. To minimize the potential for a launch 

scrub, the heaters and temperature sensors 

have built-in redundancy to permit operation 

even in the presence of certain hardware 

failures. 

Although the original bipod fittings were 

covered with foam ramps, the bipod spindles, 

which connected the fittings to the struts, 

remained exposed. These spindles rotate to 

account for tank shrinkage that occurs when it 

becomes extremely cold. These spindles each 

contained a heater element, which no longer is 

required. Elimination of the heaters allowed for 

smaller end covers made from titanium on the 

fitting. These already are capable of 

withstanding higher temperatures caused from 

aerodynamic heating. 

Figure 4 Bipod installation 

The new bipod design also requires additional 

cabling to operate the heating system. It 

includes four circuits on each bipod (totaling 

eight) that run from the External Tank Ground 

Umbilical Carrier Plate to the heaters under the 

bipod fitting. 

This new design is an alternative derived from 

three original redesign options proposed by the 

project office to the Space Shuttle Program in 

May 2003. 

A variety of verification tests have been 

performed to ensure the redesign will meet the 

requirements for safe flight. Structural tests at 

Michoud verified the redesign’s capability to 

withstand maximum loading. Two thermal 

tests at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., verified the 

heater system’s ability to prevent ice formation. 

Ten wind tunnel tests at Arnold Air Force 

Base’s Engineering Development Center, Tenn., 

demonstrated the new design’s capability to 

withstand maximum aerodynamic loads 

without generating debris. 

The Thermal Protection System team developed 

a two-step closeout process to improve the 

manual spray technique. Verification and 

validation of this new process was 

accomplished on a combination of high-fidelity 

mockups and on an existing External Tank test 

article in a real production environment. 

July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 23
The bipod redesign is being retrofitted on the 

eight existing tanks and implemented on all 

new tanks. This work is being done by 

Lockheed Martin Space Systems at Michoud. 

Delivery of the first retrofitted tank to the KSC 

was on Jan. 5, 2005. 

LIQUID HYDROGEN (LH2) INTERTANK FLANGE 

While the External Tank Project Office worked 

through the redesign of the bipod fitting and 

the elimination of its foam ramp, a top-tobottom assessment was conducted in parallel to 

examine all areas where the tank’s foam insulation could potentially come free during flight. 

A result of this process led to new requirements 

for the joint connecting the liquid hydrogen and 

liquid oxygen tanks. The area between the two 

is known as the intertank and basically is the 

structural connection. Flanges are the joint that 

functions much like a tab, or seam on a shirt, 

which are affixed at the top and bottom of the 

intertank. After the flange is bolted to the LH2 

and LO2 tanks, the area is insulated with foam. 

Testing and analysis revealed that gaseous 

nitrogen used to purge the intertank area could 

potentially turn to liquid when exposed to the 

extreme cold of the liquid hydrogen, which is 

minus 423 degrees. Once liquid nitrogen is 

formed inside the intertank area it can seep into 

any voids, or spaces, in the foam adjacent to the 

flange near the liquid hydrogen tank. During 

launch as pressure builds and heating occurs, 

the liquid nitrogen rapidly returns to a gaseous 

state and leaks past the flange bolt threads and 

nuts on the hydrogen side. This phenomenon is 

known as cryogenic ingestion and permits 

small foam pieces, or divots, to fall off the tank. 

To prevent this, the flange bolts have been 

reversed and Loctite applied to the threads, 

which restricts liquid Nitrogen leakage. 

Additionally, a new mold injection foam 

closeout process of the intertank stringers was 

instituted to provide technicians with a less 

complex base, which reduces possible spray 

defects. 

Another phenomenon – cryogenic pumping – is 

caused when surface air is pulled into foam 

voids as the tank is being fueled. Again, 

external pressure changes during launch cause 

the air to expand and push foam divots off the 

tank. 

With these in mind, an enhanced closeout, or 

finishing, procedure was instituted, which 

includes improved foam application to the 

intertank ribbing area as well as to the upper 

and lower area of the flange. The improved 

process allows technicians to apply a higher 

quality product through process verification 

and more stringent controls. These controls 

include engineering evaluation of processing 

parameters; real-time and video surveillance of 

the process; and dissection/evaluation of 

“flight like” witness panels. 

New requirements established by the Space 

Shuttle Program allow debris from this area to 

be no more than .03 pound of mass. 

LIQUID OXYGEN (LO2) FEEDLINE BELLOWS 

The next area on the External Tank judged as a 

potential debris source during the Space 

Shuttle's climb to orbit was a portion of the 

liquid oxygen feedline, which includes joints 

known as bellows. There are five bellows along 

the 17 inch diameter feedline assembly, which 

extends externally 70 feet along the right side of 

the Liquid Hydrogen tank up and into the 

intertank, and then to the bottom of the liquid 

oxygen tank. 

The liquid oxygen feedline has five bellows. 

The bellows allow for fabrication and 

installation tolerances, differences in thermal 

expansion between the line and the tanks, and 

relative motion during flight. Two bellows are 

internal to the intertank, the space between the 

liquid oxygen tank and the hydrogen tank, and 

three bellows are on the outside of the tank. 

July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 24
Two of the outside bellows are near the aft end 

of the External Tank and the last outside 

bellows is located near the top of the hydrogen 

tank. 

In searching for any area of potential debris, the 

Space Shuttle Program determined that the 

original design of the three external bellows 

could permit ice to form around the outside of 

the bellows and ultimately that ice could be 

shaken free during launch and potentially 

damage the orbiter. Though this ice liberation 

typically occurs at relatively low speeds during 

the initial stages of liftoff and the climb to orbit 

due to vibration, the potential still exists for ice 

and frost to come off later when it would be a 

more hazardous debris source. 

This prompted a redesign of the bellows to 

promote condensate runoff and to prevent the 

formation of ice. Initially, a foam skirt around 

the bellows rain shield was extended to divert 

condensate. This modification, called the "drip 

lip," squared off the edge of the rain shield and 

allowed the condensate to "drip off." 

The previous configuration of the feedline 

bellows was susceptible to significant ice 

formation when moisture in the air contacted 

the cold surface of the un-insulated bellows. 

Photographs taken before launch indicated ice 

formation. 

Though it was decided that the drip-lip 

configuration would be flown on STS-114, the 

External Tank Project Office continued to 

pursue the option of a heater for the bellows. 

The installation of the heater was planned for 

the third Return to Flight tank, ET-119. 

However, new information from the debris 

studies, performed by the Space Shuttle 

Systems Engineering & Integration Office, 

indicate that ice from the liquid oxygen bellows 

poses a debris concern to the Orbiter. Therefore, 

it was determined to add a heater to the 

bellows for STS-114-Return to Flight to reduce 

ice formation. 

The bellows heater is a copper-nickel alloy 

metal strip heater, similar to heaters used on 

the Solid Rocket Motor joints, which will keep 

the bellows area slightly warmer than freezing, 

about 40 degrees Fahrenheit. The heater strips 

are about 53 inches long - the circumference of 

the bellows - and about 0.5 inches wide. The 

two heater strips are covered and joined by a 

silicone gasket that allows the heater to be 

bonded between the bellows rain shield and 

end shield. Tabs placed at intervals on the 

heater assist in its placement on the bellows 

and allow pull tests to verify the strength of the 

adhesive bond. 

For STS-114, the heater will be placed on the 

bellows nearest the liquid oxygen feedline 

fairing. The heater will be turned on shortly 

after the liquid oxygen tank begins fast fill 

(about T-5 hours and 10 minutes) and turned 

off as the countdown resumes at the T-9 minute 

mark by the ground support equipment that 

operates prior to launch. 

The new modifications significantly reduce the 

potential for ice buildup on the bellows, which 

improves the overall safety of the tank. 

PROTUBERANCE AIR LOAD (PAL) RAMPS 

The top-to-bottom assessment of the External 

Tank’s Thermal Protection System led to reevaluation of other areas in which foam 

insulation is prone to loss. One of those was the 

existing design of the Protuberance Air Load 

(PAL) ramps designed to prevent unsteady air 

flow underneath the tank’s cable trays and 

pressurization lines. 

Two PAL ramps exist on each External Tank. 

One is near the top of the liquid oxygen tank, 

close to the nose cone, while the other is below 

the intertank, near the top of the liquid 

hydrogen tank. They consist of thick, manually 

sprayed layers of foam, which could provide a 

source of debris. The forward 10 feet of the LH2 

PAL ramp was removed and replaced to allow 

July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 25
access to the LH2 intertank flange area to 

implement foam closeout improvements. 

An extensive evaluation that included careful 

dissections to collect data on existing PAL 

ramps determined location, size and frequency 

of any voids which are known to promote foam 

separation due to expansion of trapped air or 

gases during ascent. 

Over the course of six months, seven 

enhancement sprays were performed on highfidelity mockups to develop a new spray 

process, which proved through non-destructive 

evaluation that not only were fewer voids 

formed, but those that did form fell into the 

acceptable range for flight safety. 

After comparing all of the data gathered and 

analyses performed, it was decided that the first 

two tanks PAL ramps are safe to fly using the 

current application process with detailed 

scrutiny of evaluation applied. 

An enhanced spray process is in work for 

future tanks, as well as continued work in 

developing redesign options including 

elimination of the ramps; reducing the ramps’ 

sizes by two thirds; or building a trailing edge 

“fence” on the back side of the cable tray, which 

would act like a nozzle throat and prevent 

unsteady flow in that area. 

ENHANCED IN-FLIGHT IMAGERY 

A tiny camera mounted on the External Tank’s 

liquid oxygen feedline fairing will provide realtime views of the orbiter’s underside and wing 

leading edges as well as portions of the tank. 

Several locations were evaluated to provide the 

best possible video documentation, while 

ensuring that the camera itself would not 

become a debris source. 

An identical camera flew once before on a tank 

during Atlantis’ October 2002 mission. That 

camera was located in a different location near 

the top of the liquid oxygen tank and provided 

only a partial view of the orbiter and tank. That 

location was chosen for the dramatic launch 

and ascent views offered during the first two 

minutes of flight until obstructed by the plume 

effect from the Solid Rocket Booster separation 

motor. 

The new location maximizes the field of view 

and minimizes the chance of the plume 

associated with the SRB separation. 

NON-DESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION (NDE) 

One of the leading methods for evaluating the 

performance of redesigns, modifications and 

upgrades to the Space Shuttle systems – 

particularly the External Tank – is known as 

non-destructive evaluation (NDE). 

Detecting defects nondestructively in manually 

applied foam presents a unique challenge. Not 

only is the foam low in density, which makes it 

difficult to differentiate defects such as voids 

from the surrounding porous material, but the 

foam also is irregular making it difficult to 

differentiate defects from natural variations in 

the foam. 

A team investigated a dozen non-destructive 

inspection methods from industry and 

academia before selecting terahertz imaging 

and backscatter radiography. 

Confidence in these new approaches was 

initially established by testing a wide variety of 

samples with different defect types and sizes. 

Terahertz imaging and backscatter radiology 

were used on the Protuberance Air Load (PAL) 

ramps on the first two flight tanks (ET-121 and 

ET-120). These results provided added 

confidence in the foam application quality. 

Further refinement of the terahertz and 

backscatter technologies capabilities to detect 

thin voids and defects in more complex foam 

areas continues, but is a promising tool for 

reviewing the foam application process without 

damaging the foam itself. 

July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 26
THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM 

CERTIFICATION 

With non-destructive evaluation (NDE) as one 

method for determining the quality of foam 

application on the External Tank, assessments 

of the test verification process were conducted 

for any critical failure possibility. 

The team developed a comprehensive plan to 

review and document Thermal Protection 

System (TPS) verification data used to certify 

the tank’s structural integrity as well as debris 

generation potential. The plan called for a 

detailed review of each failure possibility, 

critical flight environments and all other 

applicable test data. 

This approach identified possible deficiencies 

or areas requiring additional data. One of these, 

for example, focused on understanding internal 

defects of foam and their potential to generate 

debris. To address this issue, additional 

dissection data was gathered to characterize the 

internal structure of the foam. A flight tank 

converted into a test article that never would fly 

a mission provided the perfect source for most 

of these dissections. Next, a test program was 

initiated to develop data on what type and size 

of internal defect would be acceptable under 

new debris requirements. 

This new plan led to several key decisions, 

including approval of the redesigned bipod TPS 

and the fly “as is” determination for first flight 

tank’s PAL ramps. 

THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM (TPS) 

VERIFICATION & VALIDATION 

One of the more complex approaches to 

certifying the changes and improvements to the 

External Tank before flight is to identify the 

scope of TPS process verification and validation 

efforts. 

This process control dictated the establishment 

of prerequisites for TPS manual sprays and 

identified process verification and validation 

requirements with careful monitoring of their 

incorporation into the Return to Flight effort. 

An integrated process control for the various 

foam processes was instituted as well as a plan 

for all tanks in production. After establishing 

manual spray requirements, tests and 

dissections were identified that would confirm 

the process used to certify the foam for flight. 

Tank dissections, defect testing and margin 

assessments followed. 

The early work, obviously, concentrated on 

mandatory improvements to the first two flight 

tanks (ET-121 and ET-120). Attention also was 

paid to items that were desired on these first 

tanks, while looking toward longer range TPS 

improvements.

July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 27
Figure 5 TPS Applications 

July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 28
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER MODIFICATION 

BOLT CATCHER 

Part of the Return to Flight effort included 

identifying every possible area of the Space 

Shuttle stack (including the Orbiter, External 

Tank and Solid Rocket Boosters) where 

potential debris sources existed. One of those 

identified for redesign was the “bolt catcher” 

fixed to the forward, or top, of the boosters 

where they attach to the External Tank. These 

retainers are designed to capture severed bolts 

when the boosters separate from the tank 

approximately two minutes after launch. 

Each Shuttle is launched with two bolt catchers, 

which are located on the boosters. At booster 

separation, pyrotechnic devices fire to break the 

bolts that hold them to the tank. The forward 

bolt is vertically attached to both the Solid 

Rocket Booster and the External Tank. The 

canister-like bolt catcher captures the part of the 

bolt that is retained with the External tank; the 

other half of the bolt remains with the booster, 

secured within the forward skirt thrust post. 

Though the bolt catcher is mounted on the 

External Tank, it is considered part of the Solid 

Rocket Booster element design. 

The original bolt catcher design consisted of an 

aluminum dome welded to a machined 

aluminum base and bolted to the External Tank’s 

fittings. It is about 12 inches tall, 8 inches in 

diameter and weighs about 11 pounds. The 

inside of the bolt catcher is filled with a metal, 

honeycomb-like energy absorber to limit the 

impact of the bolt as it is captured. 

The bolt, known as a separation bolt, is about 25 

inches long, approximately 3 inches in diameter 

and weighs about 70 pounds. It has a groove, or 

separation plane, about 11.5 inches from the top 

that allows it to break when the pyrotechnic 

devices fire. 

The part of the bolt that remains on the Solid 

Rocket Booster is inspected after flight to ensure 

the break was clean. The bolt catcher and the 

bolt half it captures disintegrate along with the 

External Tank upon reentry some 45 minutes 

after launch. 

Following the Columbia accident, a series of 

tests were performed by the Solid Rocket 

Booster Project Office at NASA’s Marshall Space 

Flight Center to replicate the loads, or the forces, 

to which the bolt catcher is subjected during 

launch. The testing and analysis revealed the 

bolt catcher had a safety margin that was 

slightly less than had been previously assessed 

and required by the Space Shuttle Program, 

which is 1.4. To achieve the desired safety 

margin, a redesign effort was undertaken, 

incorporating a comprehensive testing program. 

However, a review of all available still 

photography and video coverage of the 

separation on the External Tank revealed that 

the bolt catchers functioned properly on all 

flights. 

The redesign of the bolt catcher housing now 

means the unit is made from a single piece of 

aluminum forging, thus eliminating the weld 

from the original design. In addition, the wall 

thickness on the catcher was increased from .125 

to .25 inches using a much stronger aluminum 

alloy (AL7050). 

The internal energy-absorbing material also was 

swapped to one that better absorbs the energy 

into the bolt catcher when the bolt is released. 

The original material was a corrugated sheet of 

aluminum wrapped spirally to attain the 

cylindrical shape that fit into the bolt catcher. 

The new design has a more open cell texture, 

much like a bee’s honeycomb. 

July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 29
Figure 6 Bolt catcher 

The thermal protection material also is being 

changed from the original super lightweight 

ablator to a machined cork covered with a 

protective paint finish. An ablator or ablative is 

a material that erodes to dissipate heat, 

offering a potential for debris during liftoff. 

Machined cork was selected as its replacement 

because it has a strong adhesive system that 

has a proven record of success in other areas 

on the Solid Rocket Booster. A layer of hypalon 

paint will protect the cork from moisture. 

The External Tank attachment bolts and inserts 

– those that hold the bolt catcher in place – also 

were resized from three-eighths inch to ninesixteenths inch, which adds strengthen to this 

area. 

A series of static, dynamic and environ-mental 

tests of the redesigned bolt catcher then were 

conducted to determine the design loads and 

demonstrate the bolt catcher met, or exceeded, 

the 1.4 factor of safety requirement. 

The aft end of the Solid Rocket Booster is 

attached to the External Tank by three struts, 

made out of Inconel 718 and designed to react 

to lateral loads induced during flight. The 

struts are made in two halves and are held 

together by aft separation bolts housed inside 

the struts. When the boosters separate from the 

Tank, the bolts are fractured at a predetermined 

spot by a pyrotechnic device, thus splitting the 

bolt. 

The two halves of the bolt are caught inside the 

strut halves by honeycomb energy absorbers on 

each end of the struts. During the past year, the 

Booster Project tested the strut honeycomb to 

confirm its capability and its load transfer 

characteristics. The tests revealed that 

modifications to the existing hardware were not 

needed because the current configuration is 

robust and there are no load or strength 

concerns. 

BOOSTER SEPARATION MOTOR IGNITER 

Immediately after the Solid Rocket Boosters 

separate from the External Tank, igniters called 

booster separation motors ignite and push the 

boosters away from the tank and Space Shuttle. 

These igniters have been redesigned to 

minimize the risk to the Shuttle. 

At booster separation, forward and aft motors 

ignite to serve as small thrusters to prevent the 

boosters from contacting the tank or Shuttle. 

Each of the two Shuttle boosters has eight 

separation motors, which are small solid fuel 

rocket motors designed to provide 18,000 

July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 30
pounds of thrust in less than 0.8 seconds. 

At separation, a pyrotechnic charge lights the 

motor igniter, which also consists of solid 

rocket propellant. The igniter instantly ignites 

the motors’ solid propellant. 

The current redesign effort was initiated in 

2003, when erratic performance was noted 

during open-air igniter testing. The test 

program was designed to qualify new 

suppliers for igniter propellant ingredients. A 

government and contractor anomaly resolution 

team of engineers concluded that the igniter 

solid propellant was fracturing. The propellant 

cracks caused erratic performance 

characteristics, including excessive peak 

pressures, pressure oscillation, and shortened 

burn time. 

Based on the potential for erratic igniter 

performance to affect BSM ballistic 

performance and produce debris, the igniter 

Return to Flight team, consisting of NASA, 

United Space Alliance, and Pratt and Whitney 

engineers, determined that the igniter should 

be redesigned before the Shuttle returns to 

flight. 

The team established the overall ground rules 

for RTF: elimination of all propellant damage 

mechanisms; qualification of the new design 

for flight and, installation of BSMs with the 

new igniter design for STS-114 and subsequent 

vehicles. Testing on the redesigned igniter 

began in June 2003 beginning with testing of a 

broad range of design concepts. The test team 

chose a final design, which has since 

undergone 53 tests. 

Design changes include beveling the solid 

propellant grain configuration; modifying the 

retainer design; and, modifying the adapter to 

direct loads to the center of the retainer plate. 

These efforts were undertaken with a parallel 

activity to tighten controls on propellant and 

material suppliers. 

Figure 7 Solid Rocket Booster separation 

Solid Rocket Booster separation motors ignite 

two minutes after launch pushing the boosters 

away from the Shuttle 

July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 31
July 2005 RECOGNIZING & ELIMINATING DEBRIS SOURCES 32
IMPROVING IMAGERY, DATA COLLECTION FOR 

SPACE SHUTTLE LAUNCH AND LANDING 

Documenting the Space Shuttle’s 

launch has been enhanced to now 

include a minimum of three 

different views from ground sites 

as well as aircraft-based video from 

angles never before available. These additional 

views and cameras will provide much higher 

fidelity footage for engineers assessing whether 

any debris came off the External Tank during the 

first two minutes of flight when the vehicle 

encounters the highest aerodynamic portions of 

the ascent. A total of 107 ground and aircraftbased cameras will document Discovery’s launch 

and climb to orbit. 

The Ground Camera Ascent Imagery System was 

upgraded following the Columbia accident and 

also will include ship and ground-based radar to 

compliment the strategically placed cameras. 

Changes include additional camera sites, upgrades 

to the cameras themselves, implementation of 

High Definition Television (HDTV) for quick look 

analysis, and mirrored server capability to more 

easily and quickly allow the sharing of imagery 

between KSC, JSC, and Marshall. 

GROUND-BASED IMAGING OF LAUNCH 

Before 2003, four short-range tracking cameras 

were used on the launch pads, at camera site two 

east of the pad, and at camera site six northwest 

of the pad. 

Remotely controlled from the Launch Control 

Center adjacent to the Vehicle Assembly 

Building, one camera focused on the top half of 

the Shuttle and one focused on the bottom half. 

Camera site six views the hydrogen vent arm 

(above the tank) as it swings off the tank and also 

the underside of the Orbiter’s left wing. Camera 

site two views the area between the orbiter and 

the tank to observe any potential debris or ice 

that might fall. 

TYPE NO. 

Infrared (IR) 2 

High Speed Digital Video (HSDV) 2 

70 mm 3 

High Definition (HDTV) 19 

National Television Standards 

Committee (NTSC) 20 

35 mm 29 

16 mm 32 

TOTAL 107 

LOCATION TYPE NO. 

Launch Pad 39B 16 mm 30 

(Launch platform & launch 

tower) 

Launch Pad Perimeter 16 mm 2 

35 mm 5 

Short Range Tracking Sites 

(3) HDTV 3 

 35 mm 6 

Medium Range Tracking 

Sites (6) 70 mm 1 

 NTSC 1 

HSDV 2 

35 mm 7 

HDTV 6 

Long Range Tracking Sites 

(11) 70 mm 2 

NTSC 4 

 HDTV 5 

 35 mm 11 

WB-57 Aircraft (2) Infrared 2 

 HDTV 2 

Operational Television 

(OTV) HDTV 3 

NTSC 9 

Public Affairs NTSC 6 

TOTAL 107 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 33
Figure 1 Short-range tracking camera 

For Return to Flight, there are three camera sites 

designated one, two and six. Two new cameras 

have been added for camera site one, located 

northeast of the launch pad. The addition of this 

tracker ensures a view of the underside of the 

right wing as well as the area between the 

External Tank and the Orbiter to track any debris 

during its roll maneuver just after launch. All 

camera sites have two film and one HDTV video 

cameras. 

The short-range tracking cameras have 200-mm 

focal length lenses and are loaded with 400 feet of 

film, running 100 frames per second. In addition 

to the film cameras around the launch pads, there 

are 42 fixed cameras with 16-mm motion picture 

film. 

Medium-range trackers are located at six sites: 

Three along the coast and three near the Launch 

Complex 39 area. Placement at these sites 

provides three views for triangulation, to better 

characterize any suspect area. These cameras 

have 800-mm and greater lenses, running 100 

frames per second. Three of the cameras have 400 

feet of film and two have 1,000 feet. The 

additional tracking cameras have 150-inch lenses, 

with 1,000 feet of film. Five of six sites also have 

HDTV video cameras. 

Figure 2 Long-range tracker 

Five long-range trackers have existed north and 

south of the pads, from Shiloh and Playalinda to 

Cocoa Beach, ranging from 14 miles north to 20 

miles south. These additions will reach as far 

north as Ponce de Leon Inlet, 38 miles from the 

launch pads, and south to Pigor, 11 miles from 

the pads. One of the cameras previously located 

at Patrick Air Force Base has been converted to 

be transportable and moved to a location north 

of the pad. 

All the cameras have 400-inch focal length and 

100 feet per second capability to provide more 

data points to better track any debris. 

Two of the cameras are part of the Distant Object 

Attitude Measurement System (DOAMS), 

located at Playalinda Beach and the Cocoa Beach 

area. A refurbished five-meter focal length 

telescope recently was installed in the Cocoa 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 34
Beach location. Each of these camera sites also 

will have HDTV video cameras. 

A unique feature of the tracking telescopes is a 

robotic camera manned by a technician sitting on 

top and gently manipulating a joystick to map the 

Shuttle’s track through the sky. 

CAMERAS 

A variety of cameras and lenses are used to 

support ascent imaging, including film and 

digital cameras. 

• 35mm film cameras are used at the pad and on 

short, medium and long range camera sites 

and provide the highest resolution dictating 

they are the primary imagery to meet the 

minimum size requirements for debris 

identification during ascent. 

• HDTV digital video cameras are co-located 

with many of the 35mm cameras and provide 

quick look capability. The digital video data 

provides the ability to conduct expedited postlaunch imagery processing and review (quick 

look) before the film is processed and 

distributed. 

• National Television Standards Committee 

(NTSC) – backup for sites without HDTV. 

• 70mm motion picture film cameras provide 

“big sky” views. 

• 16mm motion picture film cameras are used on 

the Mobile Launch Platform and Fixed Service 

Structure of the launch pad. 

• Other cameras are located throughout the 

launch pad perimeter and other locations 

providing additional quick look views of the 

launch. 

Cameras are either fixed or mounted on a 

tracker. A variety of trackers are used at the 

different camera sites, the predominant tracker 

being a Kineto Tracking Mount (KTM) tracker. 

All of the trackers within close proximity to the 

launch pads are remotely controlled. The 

remaining trackers are remotely or manually 

controlled on-site. 

Figure 3 Kineto Tracking Mount tracker 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 35
CAMERA LOCATIONS 

The ascent ground cameras provide imagery 

from the launch platform and on the launch 

tower itself, as well as from short, medium and 

long-range sites as mentioned above. 

Twenty-two 16mm cameras are on the Mobile 

Launch Platform... 

Figure 4 MLP Deck 

...and eight 16mm cameras are on the launch 

tower (Fixed Service Structure). 

Figure 5 Pad perimeter 

The three short-range camera sites are located 

within the pad perimeter approximately 422 to 

432 yards from the launch pads and include two 

35mm cameras and an HDTV camera. These 

sites provide coverage during the early phases of 

a launch to image individual portions of the 

Shuttle stack. Once the vehicle clears the launch 

tower, these cameras can capture larger portions 

of the Shuttle, but lose the ability to image and 

track small debris. 

Figure 6 Short-range camera configuration 

Eleven medium-range sites are located 

approximately one to six miles away from the 

launch pads – seven used for Pad 39A and six 

for Pad 39B. The medium-range sites each have 

a 35mm camera while 10 of the 11 incorporate 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 36
HDTV cameras. Medium-range cameras are used 

during the early phase of ascent and continue to 

be used until the distance to the Shuttle becomes 

too far to identify and track debris. 

Figure 7 Medium-range camera configuration 

Eleven long-range sites are located approximately 

four to almost 40 miles away from the launch 

pads, and support both pads. All of the sites have 

35mm cameras, and two have 70mm cameras. Five 

of the 10 sites have HDTV cameras. Long-range 

cameras are used during early phases of ascent to 

identify and track debris and continue to be used 

as long as the vehicle is visible. 

Figure 8 Long-range camera configuration 

CAMERA RESOLUTION 

• Liftoff to 30 seconds: Objects of 1 inch in 

diameter or larger, 0.5 foot linear accuracy of 

debris source and impact location 

• 30 seconds to 60 seconds: Objects of 3 inches 

in diameter or larger, 1 foot linear accuracy of 

debris source and impact location 

• 60 seconds to 90 seconds: Objects of 8 inches 

in diameter or larger, 3 foot linear accuracy of 

debris source and impact location 

• 90 seconds to booster separation: Objects of 15 

inches in diameter or larger, 5 foot linear 

accuracy of debris source and impact location 

CAMERA OPERATIONS PLAN 

All of the cameras are checked pre-launch, and 

then activated on launch day to capture the 

ascent imagery. After launch, the 70mm, 35mm 

and 16mm films are collected and transported to 

a central location at the Kennedy Space Center 

before being flown to an off-site processing 

facility to be developed and copied for delivery 

to the Johnson Space Center in Houston and the 

Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, 

Alabama. The delivery occurs in two steps: one 

delivery the day after launch and the second 

delivery two days after launch. 

The Quick Look video imagery – HDTV and 

other formats – is collected and distributed 

within the first few hours after launch and 

provided to the image analysis facilities at 

Kennedy, Johnson and Marshall via a mirrored 

server available for review anywhere between 

one and eight hours after launch. 

About one hour after launch, the Quick Look 

imagery consists primarily of views from the 

short-range cameras and is reviewed by all of 

the imagery analysis teams. Quick Look imagery 

consisting of HDTV imagery from the medium 

and long-range sites will be retrieved and made 

available to the imagery analysis teams and 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 37
Thermal Protection System experts 

approximately eight hours after launch. 

TAKING THE HIGH GROUND ON ASCENT 

IMAGING 

NASA has implemented use of an aircraft-based 

imaging system taking advantage of agency 

WB-57 aircraft based near the Johnson Space 

Center in Houston. The WB-57 Ascent Video 

Experiment (WAVE) will be used on an 

experimental basis during the first two postColumbia Space Shuttle flights and provide both 

ascent and entry imagery to enable better 

observation of the Shuttle on days of heavier 

cloud cover and areas obscured from ground 

cameras by the launch exhaust plume. WAVE 

was initiated to develop the technical and 

operational capabilities of obtaining video of the 

Shuttle during launch from an aircraft, which will 

supplement ground cameras to obtain three 

useful views. 

Figure 9 WB-57 aircraft 

WAVE includes a 32-inch ball turret system 

mounted on the nose of each WB-57 aircraft. The 

turret houses an optical bench providing 

installation for both High Definition Television 

and infrared cameras. Optics consists of an 

11-inch-diameter, 4.2 meter fixed focal length 

lens. The system can be operated in both auto 

track and manual modes from a command and 

control system in the cockpit, which includes 

monitors for all three cameras, switch panels and 

joysticks. All footage will be recorded on board 

and returned for processing and evaluation 

shortly after the Shuttle launch. 

The two imaging cameras are a HDTV color 

camera (Panasonic AK-HC900) and a Near 

Infrared camera (Sensors Unlimited SU640SDV 

1.7RT/RS-170). Both share a Celestron fixed 

field-of-view telescopic lens. In addition, a 

National Television Standards Committee 

(NTSC) color acquisition camera will be used to 

track the Shuttle during ascent. 

Approximately two days before launch the two 

WB-57 aircraft will fly from Ellington Field in 

Houston to Patrick Air Force Base in Florida. 

Two and a half hours before launch, the aircraft 

will take off from Patrick and enter a holding 

pattern. One will be positioned north of the 

Shuttle’s flight path and one will be positioned 

south. The aircraft will be in communication 

with a WAVE Operations Officer in the Range 

Operations Control Center who in turn will be in 

communication with the chairperson of the 

imagery team in the Launch Control Center. 

Figure 10 SRB separation 

Twenty minutes before launch the aircraft will 

enter their final circuit, and about five minutes 

before launch will begin recording video. The 

WAVE requirement is for imagery acquisition 

from 60 seconds after liftoff to 15 seconds after 

booster separation. However, plans are for the 

aircraft to track the vehicle from liftoff through 

Main Engine Cut Off (MECO), which occurs 8 1⁄2 

minutes later. The two aircraft should be about 

23 miles (37 kilometers) from the Shuttle at 

booster separation. 

After launch, the aircraft will return to Patrick, 

and the video will be retrieved from the onboard 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 38
recorders and transported to Kennedy. There it 

will be loaded on the mirrored servers about 

eight hours later. 

The WB-57 aircraft operate out of Ellington Field 

near Houston under direction of JSC. They are the 

only two WB-57’s still flying today. Identified as 

NASA 926 and NASA 928, the high altitude 

weather aircraft can fly day and night with a range 

of approximately 2,500 miles. Two crew members 

in pressurized suits pilot the plane to altitudes in 

excess of 60,000 feet and the aircraft can carry a 

payload of about 6,000 pounds. 

RADAR TRACKING 

For future Shuttle missions, a new wideband and 

Doppler radar tracking system has been 

implemented for adequate detection of debris 

during launch and ascent. Three radars now will 

digitally record tracking data of the Shuttle from 

launch until signal is lost with the primary 

timeframe of interest being launch plus 60 

seconds to launch plus two minutes. 

Data from each radar site will be stored on a hard 

disk and backed up on CDs/DVDs, as will be the 

boresight video used by the radar operators to 

help track the vehicle. 

The three radar systems that will be in place for 

launch include one C-band and two Doppler 

X-band. 

The Wideband Coherent C-band Radar provides 

high spatial resolution of debris events, and can 

detect debris events within the Shuttle vehicle 

stack. This radar – called the Navy Midcourse 

Radar – formerly was located at Roosevelt Roads 

Naval Station in Puerto Rico. It now resides at the 

site formerly occupied by the National Center for 

Atmospheric Research, north of Kennedy. 

Figure 11 Midcourse Radar (MCR) 

The two Weibel Continuous Pulse Doppler 

X-band Radars provide velocity and differential 

Shuttle/debris motion information. Correlation 

of these two data sets over the three geometries 

provided for the debris radar system optimizes 

the insight and probability of detection for very 

faint debris targets. These radar systems will be 

located on ships – one mounted on a booster 

recovery ship downrange of the launch site, and 

the other on a ship south of the ground track. 

The radars are capable of resolving debris at or 

greater than observed signal strength of minus 

50 decibels per square meter (dBsm). Shuttle 

debris sources have been characterized as 

typically falling within in the minus 30 dBsm to 

minus 45 dBsm range. The X-band and the 

C-band radars were tested in August 2004 

during the launch of the Delta II/Messenger 

spacecraft from the National Center for 

Atmospheric Research (NCAR) site intended to 

permanently house the systems. 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 39
Figure 12 National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) site 

The radar data will be analyzed at the NCAR site 

with the C-band data being available in near realtime, while the X-band data (screen captures) will 

be sent from the ships via satellite link to the 

NCAR site. The southern ship is expected back in 

port 6 hours after launch, and the data will be 

transported immediately to the NCAR site. 

WING LEADING EDGE INSTRUMENTATION 

Though impact monitoring is not a requirement 

for future Shuttle flights, NASA chose to 

incorporate sensors along the Orbiter wing 

leading edges to compliment Thermal Protection 

System inspection by measuring, recording, and 

transmitting acceleration data to a laptop 

computer on the flight deck for early 

transmission to Mission Evaluation Room 

engineers in the Mission Control Center. 

Each wing now has 88 sensors embedded behind 

the protective Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panels. 

Sixty-six acquire acceleration data and 22 gather 

temperature measurements during the Shuttle’s 

launch phase. The temperature sensor data is 

used to calibrate the impact sensors. 

Sensor units made up of three accelerometers, an 

internal and external temperature sensor and 

battery will measure, record and transmit 

acceleration and temperature data, along with 

battery voltage to a laptop computer in the crew 

compartment via a combination of relays and 

cabling. 

Prelaunch, the sensor units are loaded with 

command files that contain the Greenwich Mean 

Time (GMT) of launch. Shortly before launch, 

the units enter trigger mode and at liftoff are 

activated via a G force switch to begin storing 

and processing ascent accelerometer data stored 

at 20,000 samples-per-second-per-channel within 

the unit’s internal memory. Temperature and 

battery voltage data is stored every 15 seconds. 

Ten minutes after launch – after the External 

Tank separates – continuous data collection will 

stop. Each sensor unit will process the data to 

determine the peak acceleration forces that 

particular sensor experienced during ascent. 

This summary data, once downlinked to the 

ground, will be screened and compared to 

threshold criteria to determine whether any 

potential impact events occurred. 

After processing the data, the system will enter 

on-orbit mode, meaning only six sensor units 

will collect acceleration, temperature and battery 

voltage. The other units will become idle. The 

specific units in each mode will rotate 

throughout the flight in order to maximize the 

battery life of the sensors. 

About 11⁄2 hours after launch (completion of the 

post post-insertion timeline), the crew will 

connect the wing leading edge system laptop to 

the onboard computer network and the software 

will begin to download data from each sensor 

unit. Commands are sent through the laptop to 

the 44 sensor units and will download 

acceleration, temperature and voltage data for 

each sensor. 

A small amount of raw data from liftoff also will 

be downloaded to be used as a baseline for 

calculations on the ground. Throughout the 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 40
remainder of the flight, the sensor units will be 

commanded every six hours to download G force 

peaks, time of occurrence, voltage and 

temperature files. 

As the data files are written to the laptop, they 

will be extracted from the laptop via ground 

control by operators in Mission Control and 

placed on a server for access and evaluation by 

experts. 

Based on the data evaluation of summary data, 

additional raw data can be requested for areas of 

interest. Raw data can also be requested based on 

findings from telemetry or other imagery 

sources. A command will download the specific 

time period needed for further evaluation. Data 

from each sensor unit is downloaded at a rate 

equivalent to two minutes for .5 second of raw 

data to the laptop, so a complete set of raw data 

will not be downloaded to the laptop. 

Post-landing, ground operations personnel at 

Kennedy will download the remaining raw data 

for archival and analysis. 

Figure 13 Wing Leading Edge Impact Detection System 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 41
Figure 14 Wing Leading Edge Impact Detection System (Diagram) 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 42
ENHANCED SHUTTLE-BASED CAMERA VIEWS 

New and modified cameras on the Space Shuttle 

solid rockets, External Tank and on Discovery 

will greatly increase the views available to verify 

that there is no hazardous debris or damage 

during ascent. 

The cameras increase the capability to monitor 

the ascent environment, including debris, and 

verify the health of the Shuttle's Thermal 

Protection System and the redesigned portions of 

the External Tank. 

Enhancements include reinstating previously 

used digital cameras on the Shuttle Solid Rocket 

Boosters; adding a new video camera to the 

External Tank; adding a new remote electronic 

still camera on the underside of the Shuttle to 

replace a previous film camera in that location; 

and creating new procedures for crew handheld 

digital photography of the tank. Handheld 

cameras used by crew members also have been 

modified to allow them to take digital images 

that can be processed onboard the Shuttle as well 

for transmission to the ground. 

Figure 1 Cameras on the Space Shuttle boosters, External Tank and Orbiter 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 43
Together, these steps are part of a project known 

as the Enhanced Launch Vehicle Imaging System 

(ELVIS). Several new and modified cameras will 

fly on Discovery’s Return to Flight Space mission, 

STS-114, while additional steps will be phased in 

over several future flights. 

Also on STS-114, a new handheld digital camera 

and flash will be available to spacewalkers. The 

digital camera can be used to take electronic 

images of any exterior surfaces of the Shuttle 

while spacewalking. 

Together, these measures respond to two 

recommendations made by the Columbia 

Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). 

The tank-mounted camera provides 

supplementary imaging to that gained through 

in-flight inspection with the Orbiter Boom and 

Sensor System to satisfy recommendation R3.4-3. 

That recommendation called for NASA to provide 

a capability to obtain and downlink highresolution images of the underside of the Orbiter 

wing leading edge and forward section of both 

wings' thermal tiles. On later Shuttle flights, 

beginning as early as STS-115, additional cameras 

added to the solid rockets will provide better 

views of the wings during ascent. 

The use of handheld digital cameras by the crew 

to document the External Tank after it is 

jettisoned and the new electronic still camera on 

the Orbiter underside during STS-114 satisfy 

recommendation R3.4.2, which called for NASA 

to provide a capability to obtain and downlink 

high-resolution images of the tank after it has 

separated from Discovery. 

EXTERNAL TANK-MOUNTED CAMERA 

A television camera has been installed on the 

exterior of the External Tank located several feet 

above the right bipod area in the liquid oxygen 

feedline fairing housing. The camera and 

associated equipment are the same as used on 

one previous Space Shuttle mission as a 

technology demonstration – STS-112 in October 

2002. However, the position and view of the 

camera have been changed to provide greater 

visibility of the Shuttle’s underside and tank. 

Figure 2 Shuttle Orbiter-Based Photography for 

STS-114 Ascent 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 44
Figure 3 External Tank Camera Overview 

The camera is a Sony XC-999 secured in a 

modified, space-hardened housing. It is about the 

size of two C batteries laid end-to-end and is of a 

type commonly referred to as a "lipstick" camera. 

The camera's views will be transmitted to the 

ground in real time via the ground 

communications station at Merritt Island, Fla., 

during the Shuttle's climb to orbit. 

The transmission occurs through an electronics 

package located within the central part 

(intertank) of the ET, which 

joins the oxygen and hydrogen tanks. The 

electronics box houses batteries, a 10-watt 

transmitter and other equipment. The signal is 

sent to the ground via antennas located on the 

exterior back side of the tank, almost directly 

opposite the camera's location. 

The new ET camera is expected to remain in the 

same configuration as used during STS-114 for all 

subsequent missions. 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 45
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER CAMERAS 

Previously used cameras – one on the left solid 

rocket and one on the right – have been 

reinstated to provide views of the ET intertank 

for STS-114. The cameras are located in the same 

locations as on several previous Shuttle flights. 

The cameras are located just below the nosecone 

of each booster and do not provide real-time 

views during launch. Their imagery is recorded 

for playback after their retrieval from the Atlantic 

Ocean. 

Future plans, beginning several missions after 

STS-114, include installing two additional 

cameras on each booster. One camera will be 

located at the ET attach ring, about one-quarter of 

the way up each rocket. Another camera will be 

added to the forward skirt of each booster, where 

each rocket's nose cone and main body intersect. 

The forward skirt cameras will look aft to provide 

views of the Shuttle wing leading edges. The ET 

attach ring cameras will look forward to provide 

views of the wing and fuselage underside tiles. 

All future cameras will record imagery onboard 

the rockets for viewing after they have been 

recovered. They will not provide real-time 

television views during launch. 

Figure 4 ET Ring Camera Housing Installed 

Figure 5 SRB-Mounted Cameras 

Figure 6 Forward Skirt Aft-Pointing Camera Prototype 

Housing 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 46
Figure 7 Camera Configuration: Third Flight & Subs

EXTERNAL TANK UMBILICAL WELL 

DIGITAL STILL CAMERA 

For STS-114, a 35mm still camera previously 

located in the right umbilical well on the 

underside of the Orbiter on previous Shuttle 

flights has been replaced with a Kodak DCS760 

digital still camera. The new camera will take 

digital images of the tank after it has separated 

from the Orbiter and feed them to a laptop 

computer in the crew cabin. The crew then will 

downlink those images to Mission Control for 

analysis early in the flight. 

The left umbilical well will continue to have two 

film cameras as has been flown on previous 

missions to gather movie imagery for use in 

analysis after it has been returned to Earth. 

Figure 8 Right-Hand Umbilical Well 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 47
CREW HANDHELD PHOTOGRAPHY 

The crew's procedures in photographing the 

External Tank after it has separated from the 

Orbiter have been modified to use a digital still 

camera Kodak DCS760. The handheld digital 

camera has been flown on many past missions, 

but never before has been used for imagery of 

the tank after launch. Previously, imagery of the 

tank was taken by the crew using a handheld 

film camera and saved for analysis after the 

Shuttle's return to Earth. 

The handheld digital images of the tank taken on 

STS-114 and subsequent flights will be transferred 

to a laptop computer and then transmitted to 

Mission Control early in the mission for analysis. 

Along with the photography taken by the 

umbilical well digital camera, the handheld digital 

images will assist ground technicians in 

characterizing the condition of the tank as it was 

jettisoned. They will assist in characterizing any 

foam loss and verifying the flight operation of 

tank design changes that have been made. 

To photograph the tank, the Orbiter will be 

pitched over shortly after the tank has separated 

to optimize its view from the overhead cabin 

windows. This maneuver will be done a few 

minutes earlier during STS-114 than on previous 

flights. The earlier maneuver will allow the crew 

to photograph the tank while it is closer, 

improving the resolution of the imagery. 

Figure 9 Digital Umbilical Still Camera System 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 48
DIGITAL SPACEWALK CAMERA 

A new handheld digital camera for use by 

spacewalkers outside of the vehicle will be flown 

on STS-114 and subsequent flights. Previously, all 

handheld cameras used by spacewalkers outside 

the vehicle had been film cameras. The new 

Extravehicular Activity (EVA) camera is a Kodak 

DCS760 camera, the same camera used for digital 

imagery inside the Shuttle cabin, with some 

modifications made to equip it for use in the 

vacuum and extreme temperatures of space. The 

modifications included a change of lubricants for 

the camera and a thermal protective covering. 

A flash unit also will be available for use with the 

digital camera during spacewalks. The flash has 

been modified to remain in an air-tight housing 

for use in the vacuum of space. 

Digital images taken during a spacewalk are 

stored in the memory of the camera and later 

brought back inside the Shuttle cabin. Then, they 

are fed into a laptop computer in the cabin and 

transmitted to Mission Control. The digital EVA 

camera may be used to provide images of an 

inflight repair performed during a mission, to 

assist an EVA inspection of potential damage or 

other reasons. 

Figure 10 EVA Flash Mechanical Design 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 49
IN-FLIGHT INSPECTION AND REPAIR 

In addition to improved cameras on the ground 

and on the Space Shuttle, Discovery’s astronauts 

will conduct close-up, in-flight inspections with 

cameras, lasers, and human eyes. 

The primary tool for on-orbit inspection will be a 

50-foot-long Space Shuttle robotic arm extension 

and associated sensors, known as the Orbiter 

Boom and Sensor System (OBSS). While the 

Shuttle’s remote manipulator system (SRMS) is 

capable of inspecting part of the thermal 

protection system on its own, the OBSS is 

needed to extend that reach to all critical areas of 

the Shuttle’s wing leading edge and the Shuttle’s 

belly. 

The OBSS was assembled by MD Robotics of 

Brampton, Ontario, Canada, which 

manufactures remote manipulator systems for 

both the Shuttle and the International Space 

Station. The OBSS combines two 20-foot-long 

graphite epoxy cylinders originally 

manufactured as Shuttle arm replacement parts. 

At one end of the boom is a modified electrical 

grapple fixture, and on the other end are the 

imagery systems. The upper and lower booms 

are joined by a rigid joining fixture, which has 

an attached modified flight releasable grapple 

fixture that will be used to hand the boom from 

the Station arm to the Shuttle arm during 

docked operation at the complex. Electrical and 

data cables run the length of the boom, 

providing power for the sensors while allowing 

imagery to be transferred through the Shuttle’s 

wiring system to laptop computers and 

downlink systems in the crew cabin. 

Figure 11 Orbiter Boom Sensor System Installed on Starboard Sill 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 50
For STS-114, the imagery systems will include a 

Laser Dynamic Range Imager (LDRI), a Laser 

Camera System (LCS) and an Intensified 

Television Camera (ITVC). The LDRI and ITVC 

are attached to the boom using a standard Pan 

Tilt Unit (PTU) that will allow them to be pointed 

at their targets. The LCS is hard-mounted to the 

side of the boom just behind the other two 

instruments. 

Manufactured by Sandia National Laboratories, 

Albuquerque, N.M., the LDRI is comprised of an 

infrared (not visible to the human eye) laser 

illuminator and an infrared camera receiver. The 

LDRI can be used to provide either two- or threedimensional video imagery data; the twodimensional imagery may be seen by the Shuttle 

crew on orbit, but three-dimensional data will 

need to be processed on the ground after being 

downlinked via the Shuttle’s high-bandwidth Ku 

antenna system that transmits the video through 

the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System 

(TDRSS). 

The ITVC is the same low-light, black-and-white 

television camera used in the Space Shuttle’s 

payload bay. The two imagery systems may not 

be used simultaneously. 

The LCS, manufactured by Neptec of Ottawa, 

Ontario, Canada, is a scanning laser range finder 

developed for use aboard the Space Shuttle. The 

LCS can be used as a 3D camera or to generate 

computer models of the scanned objects, accurate 

to a few millimeters at distances of up to 10 

meters. Unlike the LDRI, the LCS data is not 

video, but instead are files collected on a 

dedicated laptop. 

The data is processed on the ground after being 

downlinked through the Orbital 

Communications Adapter (OCA) - a high-speed 

computer modem that uses the Shuttle’s Ku 

antenna system to transmit the data through the 

TDRSS. 

During STS-114, Discovery is scheduled to 

rendezvous and dock with the International 

Space Station on Flight Day 3. As the Shuttle 

pursues the Station on Flight Day 2, the astronaut 

crew will conduct a thorough inspection of 

Discovery’s wing leading edges and nose cone 

using the OBSS. Three crew members will take 

turns, working in pairs, to operate the Shuttle’s 

robotic arm from the aft flight deck, unberth the 

OBSS from its cradles on the starboard side of the 

payload bay and conduct the inspection. 

Since the LDRI and LCS distance to its target 

must remain within 10 feet to ensure image 

quality and because the arm and boom must not 

contact any of the Shuttle’s surfaces in the 

process, the astronauts use a combination of 

automated and manual arm operation modes. 

The surveys are done using automatic mode with 

the astronauts monitoring its progress. The 

astronauts will use the manual arm operation 

mode to move the OBSS from the end of one 

sequence to the start of the next. 

Mission planners expect the Flight Day 2 survey 

of Discovery’s wing leading edges and nose cap 

to take about seven hours to complete, assuming 

a maximum scan rate of four meters per minute 

(21⁄2 inches per second). The scans will be broken 

into 60- to 90-minute blocks, or sequences, 

corresponding with specific areas of the Shuttle’s 

thermal protection skin. Engineering experts on 

the ground will review the data both in real time 

and after processing on the ground to identify 

any areas that need additional scrutiny. 

Discovery’s robotic arm is expected to be used 

without the boom on Flight Day 2 to conduct 

video inspections of the upper tile surfaces using 

the arm’s end effector camera. The next day, 

during the Shuttle’s rendezvous with the Station, 

as Discovery reaches a point 600 feet below the 

Station, the crew will perform a Rendezvous 

Pitch Maneuver, a three-quarter-foot per-second 

backflip, so that its underside faces the Station. 

The Station crew will use digital still cameras 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 51
with 400 and 800 millimeter lenses and a detailed 

plan to photographically map the Shuttle’s 

underside for about 90 seconds before it 

continues on to docking. The images will be sent 

to Earth for inclusion in the collection of data that 

will be used by the Mission Evaluation Room 

(MER) and Mission Management Team (MMT) to 

evaluate the condition of the thermal protection 

system. That data will be part of the compilation 

of imagery to allow mission managers to make 

decisions on how the mission should proceed. 

After docking and welcome ceremonies are 

complete, Shuttle and Station crew members will 

work together, lifting the OBSS out of the cargo 

bay using the Space Station Remote Manipulator 

System (SSRMS) and handing it to the Shuttle 

arm for use in additional surveys the following 

day. The Station arm, also known as Canadarm2, 

will be brought into play because the geometry of 

the combined Shuttle-Station configuration 

results in obstructions that prevent the Shuttle 

arm from maneuvering the OBSS out of its cargo 

bay cradles. The STS-114 flight plan identifies 

Flight Day 4 as an additional day for docked 

surveys, if required, using the OBSS, either to 

complete parts of the survey that time would not 

allow on Flight Day 2, or to supplement the 

survey with “stop-and-stare” scans of sites of 

potential interest. Some of Discovery’s crew will 

reserve time for these detailed inspections for the 

last half of Flight Day 4 while other crew 

members are making preparations for the first 

spacewalk, which will, among other things, test 

thermal protection system techniques, tools and 

devices. 

After the in-flight data, images and personal 

reports from the crew are relayed to the ground, 

engineers and imagery experts will process and 

integrate the information with that recorded 

during launch and the climb to orbit. The Space 

Shuttle Program’s Systems Engineering and 

Integration Office (SE&I) will work closely with 

the MER to review and evaluate the information 

and provide separate damage assessments for 

tiles and the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon panels of 

the wing leading edges and nose cap. Their 

evaluations and assessments will be presented to 

the MMT, which is expected to decide by Flight 

Day 6 whether a spacewalk is needed for an 

up-close, in-person inspection that could be 

followed by a hands-on repair. 

At this writing, spacewalk designers are actively 

evaluating a variety of options for placing 

astronauts close enough to allow detailed 

inspection and repair of suspected thermal 

protection system damage. Several different 

challenges need to be met to enable a 

spacewalker to perform these tasks. 

THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM 

ON-ORBIT REPAIR TECHNIQUES 

Prevention is NASA’s first line of defense against 

damage to the Space Shuttle’s TPS, which 

defends the vehicle and its occupants against the 

3,000-degree, Mach 25 buffeting of re-entry. But 

quelling debris from the External Tank and Solid 

Rocket Boosters cannot eliminate all the threats to 

the Shuttle’s tiles and reinforced carbon-carbon 

wing leading edge panels. On orbit, orbital debris 

(or space junk) and micrometeoroids also are 

capable of causing damage. 

Although the STS-107 crew had no tested tools or 

materials available to address the type of damage 

inspectors have deduced was present during 

Columbia’s re-entry, NASA lost little time in the 

months following the accident beginning work 

on viable repair strategies. A Vehicle Inspection 

and Repair Orbiter Flight Techniques Panel "tiger 

team" of experts from the TPS engineering, 

mission operations and extravehicular activity 

organizations at JSC, working in collaboration 

with their counterparts at other NASA centers 

and with contractors, made significant progress 

in identifying the issues that needed to be 

addressed, and in devising means of addressing 

them. The tiger team was able to define 

preliminary criteria for damage that must be 

repaired on orbit, identify all critical areas that 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 52
must be reached for inspection, identify 

candidate on-orbit repair materials capable of 

withstanding the stress of entry, and design 

initial tools and techniques that would allow 

spacewalkers to repair critical damage to both 

tiles and reinforced carbon-carbon segments. 

In November 2003, direct responsibility for 

leading these development projects was assumed 

by the Space Shuttle Program. The Space Shuttle 

Program divided and assigned this work to four 

separate but interactive project teams in its 

Orbiter Project Office. These teams were given 

responsibility for managing design and 

development of an orbiter boom and sensor 

system, a set of wing leading edge sensors, a tile 

repair system, and an RCC repair system. The 

work of all these teams is ongoing, and is divided 

into two phases: systems that can be ready to 

meet the CAIB recommendations in time for the 

Shuttle’s Return to Flight, and long-range projects 

that have the potential to further enhance the 

detection and repair needs if given more time. 

Figure 12 Inspection Sensors 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 53
The TPS repair systems developed to date fall 

into two basic categories, mechanical or chemical, 

and each type has advantages and disadvantages. 

Mechanical systems rely on prefabricated 

materials and fasteners that connect them to the 

Shuttles’ existing protection systems. Chemical 

systems rely on materials that are applied in a 

raw form and develop a chemical adhesive bond 

when applied to the existing protection systems; 

these must cure in place before being subjected to 

re-entry conditions. Mechanical installation 

methods can be tested and validated on Earth, 

while chemical methods will require testing in 

space to validate application techniques and 

material hardening. A Detailed Test Objective 

(DTO) for tile repair is being designed for the 

STS-114 mission, and will test those tile repair 

tools, techniques and materials that are mature 

enough in orbit. This DTO will use a series of task 

boards in the aft section of the Shuttle's cargo 

bay. The task boards will be returned to Earth for 

inspection and tests of their ability to withstand 

the stresses of entry. At this time, three repair 

methods are scheduled to be tested on STS-114 – 

two outside the Shuttle in the cargo bay and one 

inside the crew cabin.

Figure 13 ITVC camera 

• Neptec Laser Camera System (LCS) 

• Triangulates 3D position with a small diameter scanning laser beam 

• Sandia Laser Dynamic Range Imager (LDRI) 

• Illuminates the FOV with modulated laser light. Images on a camera CCD are processed to provide depth 

information. 

• Designed & flown as an integrated package with an ITVC and pan & tilt unit (PTU) 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 54
TILE 

Space Shuttle Program managers recently 

reviewed the progress of tile repair development 

teams and selected three options for continued 

short-term evaluation. 

The first is a design revived from incomplete 

1970s work to develop an ablative material that 

could fill gaps caused by tiles that were lost or 

damaged during launch. Ablative materials, like 

those used on heat shields that protected early 

space vehicles in the Mercury, Gemini and 

Apollo programs, are meant to burn away 

partially during atmospheric re-entry. Engineers 

revived the ‘70s formula for a silicone-based, 

cure-in-place ablative material and further 

refined it to fill cavities in tile or to substitute for 

missing tiles. 

The silicone-based material, now known as 

Shuttle Tile Ablator-54 (STA-54), is manufactured 

in two parts – a base material and a catalyst – and 

mixed together during application using a CureIn-Place Ablative Applicator (CIPAA). This 

applicator system consists of an EVA backpack 

with tanks to separately contain the base and 

catalyst components under pressure, paired hoses 

to transport the components to the damaged area, 

and an applicator gun that uses a static mixer to 

combine the materials as they are extruded into a 

cavity. Astronauts apply the material – which has 

a consistency similar to cake frosting when 

dispensed -- using the CIPAA. Since the material 

is sticky and intended to adhere to tile, tools such 

as foam brushes and tampers are used to smooth 

the repair material without sticking. In addition, 

the ablative material expands when heated, so 

astronauts will under-fill cavities to protect 

against excessive expansion that could disturb 

the normal plasma flow across the Shuttle’s tile 

surface. The STA-54 material cures and hardens 

over a period of 24 to 48 hours. 

The second method is known as emittance wash 

application, which uses a repair material being 

developed primarily for shallow tile damage but 

also is useful as a primer to improve STA-54 

adhesion to tile substrate. The silicon tiles used in 

the Shuttle’s thermal protection system both reject 

heat and insulate. The white silicon substrate 

provides insulation, while the black reaction-cured 

glass (RCG) coating rejects heat. The ability of a 

material to reject heat is measured in terms of its 

“emissivity.” The RCG coating on tiles has a high 

emissivity value, while the white substrate has a 

lower emissivity value, especially as temperatures 

rise. The science behind the emittance wash repair 

involves replacing a damaged tile’s coating to 

restore its ability to reject the high temperatures of 

atmospheric entry. 

NASA has developed and will test on STS-114 an 

emittance wash, which is fine-grit silicon carbide 

(SiC) granules mixed with a room temperature 

vulcanizing (RTV) material. Using a dauber-like 

applicator, the emittance wash can be applied to 

exposed tile substrate. The emittance wash wicks 

into the tile substrate, providing a strong 

adhesive bond, and a high emissivity, or heat 

rejection value. For small, shallow areas of 

damage, replacing the RCG coating with the 

emittance wash will restore enough heat rejection 

capability for safe entry. For larger or deeper 

gouges, the emittance wash may be used as a 

primer for STA-54. Its ability to wick into the tile 

substrate encourages a stronger bond between 

the tile and the STA-54 repair material, as well as 

protection along the edges of the repaired area 

when they are underfilled to allow for ablative 

swelling. 

The third method is a mechanical repair that uses 

insulating blankets to fill cavities that are then 

covered by an overlay of carbon silicon carbonate 

installed using augers that penetrate directly into 

healthy tiles. The overlay system consists of Saffil 

insulation blankets, pre-packaged in a variety of 

shapes and sizes, which provide radiant heat 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 55
protection when installed in the cavity. A thin 

(0.03 inches) overlay cover made of a hightemperature resistant, flexible material such as 

carbon-silicon carbide -- which can hold its shape 

as a shield against plasma flow -- is installed over 

the damaged tile and insulation blanket using 

augers screwed directly into adjacent healthy 

tiles. Around the edges, between the overlay and 

the existing tile, a fabric gasket is used to prevent 

hot gasses from penetrating beneath the overlay. 

The materials and tools for applying either repair 

system are continuing to be evaluated in 

laboratory tests, simulated zero-gravity tests and 

human-thermal vacuum tests. While tests of 

STA-54 at ambient atmospheric pressures and 

temperatures went as expected, the material 

exhibited a tendency to bubble when applied in a 

vacuum and temperatures approximating those 

of space. Materials tests are continuing to 

evaluate whether STA-54 can be applied in a 

manner that allows for relatively uniform bubble 

sizes and distribution throughout a given repair. 

Both STA-54 and the overlay system have passed 

preliminary tests in Arcjet facilities that can 

mimic the heating and dynamic pressure of 

atmospheric re-entry, but additional testing is 

continuing. 

Figure 14 Tiles on Discovery, part of the orbiter Thermal Protection System 

In the Orbiter Processing Facility, STS-114 Mission Specialist Charles Camarda looks closely at 

the tiles on Discovery. At left is Cindy Begley, lead EVA flight controller. The tiles are part of the 

Thermal Protection System on the orbiter. 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 56
REINFORCED CARBON-CARBON 

Space Shuttle Program managers recently 

reviewed the progress of RCC repair 

development teams and selected two options for 

continued short-term evaluation. One option is a 

pre-ceramic polymer designed to repair small 

cracks and coating losses on the exterior of the 

RCC panel, while the other is mechanical in 

nature, designed for repairing holes that 

penetrate through an RCC panel. 

Figure 15 RCC tile cracks 

• ITVC 

• Good flexibility as a general survey tool 

• Low resolution, inherent image defects 

• Able to detect small defects under specific conditions 

• LCS 

• Provides very detailed 3-dimensional information 

• Shown to operate while translating 

• LDRI 

• Valuable performance as both a 2D & 3D imager 

• Picture shows an intensity image laid on top of range image, 

although it appears fuzzy to the untrained eye, it gives a wealth 

of data 

The crack repair option uses a pre-ceramic 

polymer sealant impregnated with carbon-silicon 

carbide powder, together known as NOAX (short 

for Non-Oxide Adhesive eXperimental). It is 

designed to fix the most likely type of damage 

caused by small pieces of foam coming off the 

redesigned external tank. NOAX can be used at 

any RCC location, and does not require any 

physical modification of the RCC before affecting 

a repair. It is expected to repair cracks or coating 

losses up to .02 inches wide and 4 inches long, 

but cannot be used to repair holes. The repair 

procedure for this material may require a 

separate heating capability for application 

and/or curing. This could be accomplished by an 

astronaut installing an EVA heater to the 

damaged area of the RCC to prepare the surface 

for application of the repair material. A selection 

of hand tools similar to putty knives would be 

used to work the material into the crack and to 

smooth the surface of the repair. Early testing on 

the ground has shown promising results that 

heating the damaged area and the material may 

not be required to achieve the desired result. 

The mechanical “plug” option consists of round, 

thin (0.03-inch), flexible 7-inch-diameter carbonsilicon carbide cover plates that are designed to 

flex up to 0.25 inch to conform to the shape of the 

wing leading edge RCC panels, and a hardware 

attachment mechanism similar to a toggle bolt, 

known as TZM. Twenty to 30 unique plug sizes 

and shapes are needed to provide coverage for all 

possible RCC panel damage locations. If the hole 

is not as large as one inch, the astronauts would 

use a Pistol Grip Tool (PGT) and special bit to 

drill out the hole. Astronauts would select the 

appropriate cover plate at the work site, connect 

the plate to a TZM bolt, and then insert the folded 

bolt through the hole. By tightening a fastener 

that extends through the cover plate to the TZM 

bolt, the astronaut will unfold the toggle inside 

the RCC panel and tighten it until the cover plate 

conforms to the exterior shape of the RCC 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 57
Figure 16 Reinforced Carbon-Carbon on the wing’s leading edge on Discovery 

In the Orbiter Processing Facility, members of the STS-114 crew take a close 

look at the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon on the wing’s leading edge on Discovery. 

panel. After ensuring any gap between the 

cover plate and the RCC panel is within 

tolerances, the astronaut would apply a thin 

bead of uncured NOAX sealant around the 

edge of the repair as extra protection against 

plasma infiltration. The plug concept has the 

potential to repair damage up to six inches in 

diameter. 

ACCESS 

Access to damaged sites will be accomplished 

through a variety of means, depending on 

whether the Shuttle is at the International Space 

Station. 

On Station missions, techniques are being 

developed that will allow robotic arm operators 

to undock and reposition the Shuttle for a 

Station-based spacewalk repair. Spacewalkers 

would be positioned at the work site by the 

Station’s robotic arm using a Portable 

Articulating Foot Restraint (PAFR). 

For non-Station missions, access may be gained 

through the use of the Shuttle’s robotic arm or 

the arm and its 50-foot boom extension, or 

through use of the Shuttle Aid for 

Extravehicular Rescue (SAFER). A variety of 

candidate work platforms are in preliminary 

stages of development and continue to be 

evaluated. 

FUTURE WORK 

Several other repair concepts have been 

proposed for both tile and RCC repair. These 

include flexible adhesive patches and small 

area repair plugs for RCC, and hardening of the 

existing tile system coating. Researchers at a 

variety of NASA centers and contractor 

laboratories are continuing to develop these 

approaches for possible use in the next several 

years. 

July 2005 IDENTIFYING & REPAIRING DAMAGE IN FLIGHT 58
CONTINGENCY SHUTTLE CREW SUPPORT (CSCS) – 

‘SAFE HAVEN’ 

NASA initiated a study to 

determine the feasibility of 

rescuing a stranded Space 

Shuttle crew at the International 

Space Station (ISS) in the unlikely 

event damage would prevent the safe re-entry 

of the vehicle. The ISS Program conducted an 

extensive evaluation of the Station’s capability 

to provide provisions and life support to a 

Shuttle crew as part of an agency self-imposed 

contingency case that would ensure a second 

Shuttle was far enough along in processing to 

be launched to rescue the stranded crew. 

This Contingency Shuttle Crew Support 

(CSCS) – also known as safe haven – would be 

used only as a last resort to return the crew of a 

critically damaged Shuttle. In the unlikely 

event all new safety measures were 

unsuccessful, and a Shuttle docked to the ISS is 

deemed unsafe for return to Earth, NASA 

would consider using CSCS to rescue the crew. 

The most significant part of the flight rationale 

for a safe Return to Flight has been the work to 

modify the Shuttle’s External Tank to reduce 

as much as possible the shedding of debris that 

could harm a Shuttle during launch. 

Additionally, NASA developed a suite of 

inspection capabilities and repair techniques 

that will detect critical impacts and provide 

repair options to the crew should any damage 

occur. 

CSCS is one of NASA’s “raise the bar” 

initiatives added to the 15 Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board recommendations for 

Return to Flight. Under the guidance of the 

Space Flight Leadership Council, the ISS 

and Space Shuttle Programs have made the 

necessary preparations for this option to be 

available for the first two Shuttle flights 

(STS-114 & STS-121). 

Those preparations include investigating ways 

to appropriately build up critical systems and 

consumables onboard the Station. The plan has 

been reviewed by the Return to Flight Task 

Group even though it was not a formal Return 

to Flight recommendation by the CAIB. 

Data collected from the first two missions 

should provide enough information to validate 

the tank’s redesign and, combined with other 

additions and inspection tools, could alleviate 

the need for processing a second orbiter to 

support CSCS. However, no final decision on 

whether to continue to pursue CSCS capability 

for future flights will be made until the data 

from STS-114 and STS-121 is scrutinized. 

The CSCS scenario allows the visiting crew of a 

critically damaged Shuttle to live onboard the 

Space Station until a rescue Shuttle can be 

launched. The crews would transfer all of the 

consumables from the damaged Shuttle to the 

Station. Once the Shuttle consumables are 

depleted, the unmanned Shuttle will be 

remotely commanded to undock by Mission 

Control in Houston and burn up in the Earth’s 

atmosphere. 

In the meantime, the next Space Shuttle in the 

launch processing flow at the Kennedy Space 

Center in Florida will become the rescue vehicle 

and work will focus on it launching and arriving 

at the Station before consumables run out. The 

number of days the Station can support a 

stranded Shuttle crew would be determined, in 

part, by the consumables already on board, plus 

July 2005 SAFE HAVEN 59
what is brought up with the Shuttle. The level 

of consumables onboard the Station, including 

food, water, oxygen and spare parts, will be 

reviewed and provided up until the day of the 

first Shuttle launch to define the CSCS 

capability for that particular mission. 

NASA’s plan of crew support in a contingency 

calls for a subset of the STS-121 crew to 

support STS-114 and a subset of the STS-115 

crew to support STS-121. The contingency 

flights are designated STS-300 and STS-301, 

respectively. The crew members that would 

support a CSCS case are: 

STS-300 

Steve Lindsey, Commander and backup 

Remote Manipulator System operator 

Mark Kelly, Pilot and prime Remote 

Manipulator System operator 

Mike Fossum, Mission Specialist 1 and 

Extravehicular 2 

Piers Sellers, Mission Specialist 2 and 

Extravehicular 1 

STS-301 

Brent Jett, Commander 

Chris Ferguson, Pilot and backup Remote 

Manipulator System operator 

Joe Tanner, Mission Specialist 1, Extravehicular 

1 and prime Remote Manipulator System 

operator 

Dan Burbank, Mission Specialist 2 and 

Extravehicular 2 

The Soyuz spacecraft at the Space Station will 

remain the emergency rescue vehicle for the ISS 

Expedition crew. 

Detailed biographies on the astronauts is 

available at: http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/

July 2005 SAFE HAVEN 60
CAIB RECOMMENDATIONS 

When the Columbia Accident 

Investigation Board issued its 

final report in August 2003, 

NASA already had committed 

to responding to its 

recommendations. Additionally, 

the Space Shuttle Program imposed upon itself 

a list of actions above and beyond the CAIB 

findings to ensure the Shuttle would fly safer 

than ever before through the rest of its planned 

life to complete assembly of the International 

Space Station. 

The independent 13-member Board offered 29 

total recommendations in its 248-page report, 

including 15 to be addressed before Return to 

Flight. The report was the result of a sevenmonth investigation by the members, 

approximately 120 investigators, 400 NASA and 

contractor employees, and more than 25,000 

searchers who recovered Columbia's debris.

Figure 1 CAIB boardmembers 

From left to right are board members G. Scott Hubbard, Dr. Douglas D. Osheroff, 

Dr. James N. Hallock, Maj. General John Barry, Dr. Sally Ride, 

Rear Admiral Stephen Turcotte, Board Chairman Admiral (retired) Hal Gehman, 

Brig. General Duane Deal, Steven Wallace, Maj. General Kenneth W. Hess, 

Dr. John Logsdon, Roger E. Tetrault, and Dr. Sheila Widnall. 

July 2005 CAIB RECOMMENDATIONS 61
The 15 CAIB Return to Flight 

recommendations: 

( ) - References the report section for which 

each recommendation applies. 

1. Initiate an aggressive program to 

eliminate all External Tank Thermal 

Protection System debris-shedding at the 

source with particular emphasis on the 

region where the bipod struts attach to the 

External Tank. (R3.2-1) 

2. Initiate a program designed to increase the 

Orbiter's ability to sustain minor debris 

damage by measures such as improved 

impact-resistant Reinforced CarbonCarbon and acreage tiles. This program 

should determine the actual impact 

resistance of current materials and the 

effect of likely debris strikes. (R3.3-2) 

3. Develop and implement a comprehensive 

inspection plan to determine the structural 

integrity of all Reinforced Carbon-Carbon 

system components. This inspection plan 

should take advantage of advanced nondestructive inspection technology. (R3.3-1) 

4. For missions to the International Space 

Station, develop a practicable capability to 

inspect and effect emergency repairs to the 

widest possible range of damage to the 

Thermal Protection System, including 

both tile and Reinforced Carbon-Carbon, 

taking advantage of the additional capabilities available when near to or docked 

at the International Space Station. The 

ultimate objective should be a fully 

autonomous capability for all missions to 

address the possibility that an 

International Space Station mission fails to 

achieve the correct orbit, fails to dock 

successfully, or is damaged during or after 

undocking. (R6.4-1) 

5. Upgrade the imaging system to be capable 

of providing a minimum of three useful 

views of the Space Shuttle from liftoff to at 

least Solid Rocket Booster separation, along 

any expected ascent azimuth. The 

operational status of these assets should be 

included in the Launch Commit Criteria for 

future launches. Consider using ships or 

aircraft to provide additional views of the 

Shuttle during ascent. (R3.4-1) 

6. Provide a capability to obtain and downlink 

high-resolution images of the External Tank 

after it separates. (R3.4-2) 

7. Provide a capability to obtain and downlink 

high-resolution images of the underside of 

the Orbiter wing leading edge and forward 

section of both wings’ Thermal Protection 

System. (R3.4-3) 

8. Modify the Memorandum of Agreement 

with the National Imagery and Mapping 

Agency to make the imaging of each Shuttle 

flight while on orbit a standard 

requirement. (R6.3-2) 

9. Test and qualify the flight hardware bolt 

catchers. (R4.2-1) 

10. Require that at least two employees attend 

all final closeouts and intertank area handspraying procedures. (R4.2-3) 

11. Kennedy Space Center Quality Assurance 

and United Space Alliance must return to 

the straightforward, industry-standard 

definition of “Foreign Object Debris” and 

eliminate any alternate or statistically 

deceptive definitions like “processing 

debris.” (R4.2-5) 

July 2005 CAIB RECOMMENDATIONS 62
12. Adopt and maintain a Shuttle flight 

schedule that is consistent with available 

resources. Although schedule deadlines 

are an important management tool, those 

deadlines must be regularly evaluated to 

ensure that any additional risk incurred to 

meet the schedule is recognized, 

understood, and acceptable. (R6.2-1) 

13. Implement an expanded training program 

in which the Mission Management Team 

faces potential crew and vehicle safety 

contingencies beyond launch and ascent. 

These contingencies should involve 

potential loss of Shuttle or crew, contain 

numerous uncertainties and unknowns, 

and require the Mission Management 

Team to assemble and interact with 

support organizations across 

NASA/Contractor lines and in various 

locations. (R6.3-1) 

14. Prepare a detailed plan for defining, 

establishing, transitioning, and 

implementing an independent Technical 

Engineering Authority, independent safety 

program, and a reorganized Space Shuttle 

Integration Office as described in R7.5-1, 

R7.5-2, and R7.5-3. In addition, NASA 

should submit annual reports to Congress, 

as part of the budget review process, on its 

implementation activities. (R9.1-1) 

15. Develop an interim program of closeout 

photographs for all critical sub-systems that 

differ from engineering drawings. Digitize 

the closeout photograph system so that 

images are immediately available for 

on-orbit troubleshooting. (R10.3-1) 

July 2005 CAIB RECOMMENDATIONS 63
July 2005 CAIB RECOMMENDATIONS 64
STS-114 OVERVIEW: 

SHUTTLE INSPECTION, STATION RESUPPLY HIGHLIGHT 

DISCOVERY’S MISSION 

The Return to Flight Space 

Shuttle mission will take 

America's flagship spacecraft 

back into orbit more than two 

years after the Columbia 

accident. The launch will be a 

dramatic display of smoke, fire, and sound -- 

and the fulfillment of a promise made to the 

families of the Columbia astronauts: that 

NASA would honor their memory by 

continuing their quest for knowledge.

Discovery is targeted for launch July 13 with a 

launch window that extends to July 31 from 

Launch Pad 39B at NASA's Kennedy Space 

Center. 

Discovery's crew of seven astronauts is led by 

Commander Eileen Collins (Col., USAF, Ret.), 

America's first female spacecraft commander. 

Joining her will be Pilot James Kelly (Lt. Col., 

USAF), and Mission Specialists Soichi Noguchi 

(So-wee-chee Nah-gu-chee), representing the 

Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA); 

Stephen Robinson and Andrew Thomas, both 

civilian mechanical engineers; Wendy Lawrence 

(Captain, USN); and Charles Camarda 

(Kah-mar-da), a civilian aerospace engineer. 

Though a veteran astronaut, Collins will fly a 

mission like no other, a unique test flight that 

will serve as a foundation for every Shuttle 

mission to follow. The mission will debut and 

test new designs incorporated into the Shuttle's 

external fuel tank and processes that eliminate 

the likelihood that future Space Shuttle flights 

could suffer damage similar to Columbia. New 

cameras and techniques will photograph the 

tank during launch and after it is jettisoned from 

the Shuttle to allow engineers to evaluate the 

performance of those new designs. 

The mission also will debut a variety of new 

techniques to ensure the health of the Shuttle 

heat shield can be confirmed in space. New 

ground and flight camera and sensor systems 

will observe the Shuttle environment during 

launch and in orbit. New techniques will be 

used for in-flight inspection. New methods 

under development for repair of the Shuttle's 

heat-shielding Thermal Protection System will 

be tested. Also, Discovery will deliver a 

pressurized cargo container full of supplies to 

the Space Station and a key spare part that 

Collins and her crew will install during one of 

the mission's three spacewalks. 

Noguchi and Robinson will take those 

spacewalks. They’ll test Shuttle heat shield 

repair material and techniques, replace one of 

the Station’s control gyroscopes, restore power 

to another and install a work platform for future 

in-orbit construction. 

Lawrence is in charge of the transfer of supplies 

and equipment to the Station. She and other 

crew members will operate the Shuttle and 

Station robotic arms. The arms are used to assist 

spacewalks, install equipment and inspect the 

orbiter's thermal protective tiles. 

Thomas will be the primary operator for the 

Shuttle’s robotic arm as it uses a new boom 

extension to perform an unprecedented 

inspection of the Shuttle’s heat shield. He also 

will serve as the choreographer from inside the 

July 2005 MISSION OVERVIEW 65
Shuttle cabin during three spacewalks the 

STS-114 crew will perform. 

Camarda will share Space Shuttle robotic arm 

duties with Thomas. He also will prepare 

rendezvous and navigation equipment and 

help Lawrence transfer supplies to and from 

the Station. Using both the Station's robotic 

arm and the Shuttle's robotic arm at times, the 

mission will involve some of the most complex 

space robotics work ever performed. 

The mission itself goes by many names. Most 

commonly, it is called STS-114. STS stands for 

"Space Transportation System" -- an early 

moniker for the Space Shuttle Program -- and 

its number refers to the order in which the 

mission was planned. It also happens to be, in 

order of flight, the 114th mission in the history 

of the Space Shuttle Program. 

Because of its role in supplying the 

International Space Station, the mission also is 

referred to as LF-1, or Logistics Flight 1. 

Discovery also has a second name; engineers 

inside NASA often refer to it as OV-103, which 

stands for Orbiter Vehicle-103. 

The top priority of the flight is to inspect all of 

the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) heat 

protection material on Discovery’s wing 

leading edge panels. Another high priority is 

sending to the ground for evaluation data 

gathered during launch by 176 sensors 

mounted inside the wing panels. 

En route to the Station the day after launch, the 

crew will use what will be a 100-foot-long 

robotic arm, the 50-foot Shuttle arm tipped 

with a 50-foot-long Orbiter Boom and Sensor 

System (OBSS), to inspect critical heat shield 

areas. The boom is tipped with two types of 

lasers and a high-resolution television camera. 

It will be used to inspect key areas of 

Discovery’s wings and nose, the areas that are 

subjected to the most intense heat during 

re-entry, for damage. 

Another inspection will be performed by the 

Station’s crew as the Shuttle moves in to dock to 

the complex on the third day of the flight. About 

600 feet away from the Station, Collins will fly 

the Shuttle through a slow backflip, allowing its 

underside to face the Station for a minute and a 

half. During that time, the Station crew will snap 

a precise set of still, digital images using highmagnification lenses to document the heat 

shield's condition. Soon after, those images will 

be transmitted to the ground for analysis. 

On the fourth day of the mission, more than 

21⁄2 years since a Shuttle has delivered supplies 

to the Station, the crew will use the Station’s 

robotic arm to lift an Italian-built cargo module 

named Raffaello, technically known as a MultiPurpose Logistics Module (MPLM), out of the 

Shuttle cargo bay and attach it to the Station. 

They then will begin to transfer several tons of 

supplies and equipment to the Station for use by 

the Station's Expedition 11 Crew, Commander 

Sergei Krikalev (Kree'-kah-loff) and Flight 

Engineer John Phillips. This will be the third trip 

to the Station for Raffaello, the second of three 

such cargo carriers to be put into service. 

Raffaello flew aboard Endeavour on STS-100 

and STS-108 in 2001. In addition, Discovery and 

its crew will transfer water to the Station for use 

in a variety of applications. 

The first spacewalk will take place on the fifth 

day of the mission. Each of the three spacewalks 

scheduled for Robinson and Noguchi is planned 

to be 6 1/2 hours long. The first spacewalk will 

include a demonstration of techniques for 

repairing two types of Shuttle heat shield 

materials: the RCC segments that protect the 

Shuttle’s nose cone and wing edges and the 

thermal tiles that provide heat protection for the 

spacecraft's bottom. Another technique for 

repairing RCC will be tested inside the Shuttle. 

Two additional heat shield repair techniques 

under evaluation will be carried aboard 

Discovery, but not tested on the first mission. 

During the first spacewalk, the crew also will 

July 2005 MISSION OVERVIEW 66
make connections that will restore power to a 

Station gyroscope that has been out of service 

since a circuit breaker failed in March. 

A second spacewalk will take place on the 

seventh day of the flight and be dedicated to 

the replacement of one of the Station’s four 

Control Moment Gyroscopes (CMGs). Each 

spinning almost 10 million times a day, the 

gyroscopes provide a method of maintaining 

the Station’s orientation in orbit using electrical 

power instead of rocket thrusters. Noguchi and 

Robinson will remove from the Station a 

washing machine-sized gyroscope that 

experienced a mechanical failure of its spin 

bearing on June 8, 2002. Mounted inside the 

Station’s central Z1 Truss, the gyroscope will 

be replaced with a new unit delivered on 

Discovery in a protective canister called the 

Mission Peculiar Equipment Support Structure 

(MPESS). With this new gyroscope installed, 

and the gyroscope repowered on the first 

spacewalk, all four of the Station's gyroscopes 

will be restored to operation. Although the 

Station has operated well with only two 

functioning gyroscopes, all four will be needed 

as its assembly resumes and its size increases. 

Each CMG is four feet in diameter, weighs 620 

pounds and consists of a large, flat wheel 

rotating at a constant speed of 6,600 

revolutions per minute. 

July 2005 MISSION OVERVIEW 67
July 2005 MISSION OVERVIEW 68
TIMELINE OVERVIEW 

FLIGHT DAY 1: 

• Following launch, Discovery’s crew sets up 

the on-board laptop computer network, 

checks out the Shuttle Remote Manipulator 

System (SRMS) and conducts Detailed Test 

Objective (DTO) 850, Water Spray Boiler 

Cooling with Water/PGME Antifreeze. 

• The crew begins the Shuttle Remote 

Manipulator System (SRMS) checkout. 

• Overnight, Mission Control will downlink 

data from the Discovery’s Wing Leading 

Edge (WLE) sensors for analysis by 

engineers looking for sites of potential 

debris impacts during launch. 

FLIGHT DAY 2: 

• The Shuttle crew completes SRMS checkout 

and installs the centerline camera in the 

Orbiter Docking System. 

• The crew grapples and unberths the Orbiter 

Boom & Sensor System (OBSS) and conducts 

an SRMS/OBSS survey of Discovery’s wing 

leading edges and nose cap. 

• The Shuttle’s Ku band antenna is deployed. 

• The crew begins a checkout of the 

rendezvous tools. 

• The crew plays back handheld launch video 

of the External Tank. 

• The crew conducts photography of the 

Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) pods. 

• Orbiter Docking System (ODS) is extended. 

• The crew performs system checks on the 

Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) 

spacesuits and tools in preparation for 

upcoming spacewalks. 

• The crew berths the OBSS. 

• The crew surveys Discovery’s upper surfaces 

and the crew cabin using the SRMS. 

FLIGHT DAY 3: 

• The crew begins the final stage of rendezvous 

operations as Discovery closes in for docking 

with the International Space Station. 

• Discovery performs the Rendezvous Pitch 

Maneuver, enabling the Space Station crew to 

photograph Discovery’s thermal protection 

systems. 

• Discovery docks with the Space Station. 

• The Shuttle and Station crews open the 

hatches and shake hands. 

• The crews begin transferring cargo from 

Discovery to the Station. 

• The crew uses the Space Station RMS 

(SSRMS) to grapple the OBSS and hands it off 

to the SRMS. 

FLIGHT DAY 4: 

• The crew grapples the Raffaello MultiPurpose Logistics Module (MPLM) with the 

SSRMS, unberths the MPLM from Discovery 

and installs it on the Unity module’s 

Common Berthing Mechanism (CBM). 

• The SSRMS ungrapples from the MPLM and 

begins its walk-off to the Mobile Base System 

(MBS). 

• The crew uses the OBSS to conduct a survey 

of Discovery’s heat-protection tiles. 

• The crew activates the MPLM and ingresses. 

• The crew configures tools for the first 

spacewalk and begins Extravehicular Activity 

(EVA) pre-breathe. 

July 2005 TIMELINE 69
• The crew transfers EVA tools and 

equipment to the Shuttle airlock. 

• The crew performs a checkout of the 

Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue. 

• The hatches between Discovery and the 

Space Station are closed and Discovery’s 

cabin is depressurized to 10.2 pounds per 

square inch (psi) in preparation for the first 

spacewalk, to be done from the Shuttle 

airlock. 

FLIGHT DAY 5: 

• Final preparations begin for the first 

spacewalk. 

• The Shuttle crew begins the first spacewalk 

from the Shuttle airlock. 

• Hatches between Discovery and the Space 

Station are opened. Two crew members 

move to the Station to perform SSRMS EVA 

support. Transfer activity resumes. 

• The spacewalkers perform Shuttle Thermal 

Protection System Emittance Wash 

Applicator (EWA) and NOAX (Non-Oxide 

Adhesive eXperimental) sample repair DTO 

848 in Discovery’s payload bay. 

• The External Stowage Platform-2 (ESP-2) 

Attachment Device (ESPAD) is unberthed 

from Discovery and installed onto Quest. 

• The GPS antenna is removed and replaced 

on the S0 Truss. 

• The spacewalkers reconfigure power cables 

in the Z1 Truss to restore power to control 

moment gyroscope to. 

• The crew uses OBSS to scan damaged 

reinforced carbon-carbon samples on the 

DTO pallet. 

• The Shuttle and Station hatches are closed, 

and the spacewalking astronauts ingress 

Discovery’s airlock. 

• Shuttle and Station hatches are reopened. 

• The Station crew makes preparations for the 

Control Moment Gyroscope (CMG) removal 

and replacement. 

FLIGHT DAY 6: 

• Transfers continue from Discovery to the 

Space Station. 

• Procedures are reviewed for the second 

spacewalk, EVA tools are checked out and 

EVA pre-breathe begins. 

• Hatches between Discovery and the Space 

Station are closed and the Shuttle cabin is 

depressurized to 10.2 psi. 

FLIGHT DAY 7: 

• The second spacewalk begins. 

• Hatches between Discovery and the Station 

are reopened. Two crew members move to 

the Station to perform EVA SSRMS support, 

and transfers resume. 

• Spacewalkers remove and replace CMG 1, 

then perform a checkout of the new CMG. 

• Shuttle and Station hatches are closed and the 

spacewalkers ingress the Shuttle airlock. 

• New Station CMG 1 is started. 

• Shuttle and Station hatches are opened. 

FLIGHT DAY 8 

• Transfers resume between Discovery and the 

Station. 

• Discovery’s crew conducts its in-flight news 

conference. 

• The crew begins its off-duty period. 

• The Shuttle crew reviews procedures, 

configures tools and begins pre-breathe for 

July 2005 TIMELINE 70
tomorrow’s third spacewalk from the 

Shuttle airlock. 

• Shuttle and Station hatches are closed. The 

Shuttle cabin is depressurized to 10.2 psi in 

preparation for tomorrow’s third spacewalk. 

FLIGHT DAY 9: 

• The third spacewalk of the mission begins. 

• Hatches between Discovery and the Station 

are opened. 

• Spacewalkers install an external camera and 

illuminator on P1 Truss. 

• SSMRS grapples and unberths ESP-2 from 

Discovery’s payload bay. 

• Two MISSE experiments are retrieved from 

the Quest airlock, and a new MISSE is 

installed at the top of the P6 Truss. 

• SSRMS delivers ESP-2 to ESPAD, and 

spacewalkers install. 

• Transfers continue between Shuttle and 

Station. 

• SSRMS ungrapples ESP-2 and maneuvers to 

MPLM. 

• Hatches between Discovery and Station are 

closed, the spacewalkers re-enter the Shuttle 

airlock and the third EVA ends. 

• Hatches between Discovery and the Station 

are opened. 

• SSRMS grapples MPLM for tomorrow’s 

unberth from Unity. 

FLIGHT DAY 10: 

• The crew egresses and deactivates MPLM. 

• MPLM is uninstalled from Unity. 

• Rendezvous checkout begins. 

• The MPLM is berthed in Discovery’s 

payload bay. 

• The SRMS maneuvers the OBSS to handoff 

position. 

• The SSRMS grapples the OBSS from the RMS. 

• OBSS is berthed in Discovery’s payload bay. 

FLIGHT DAY 11: 

• Discovery and Station crews bid farewell and 

close their hatches. 

• Centerline camera is reinstalled. 

• Discovery undocks and separates from the 

Station. 

• Shuttle crew off-duty period begins. 

FLIGHT DAY 12: 

• Discovery crew performs Flight Control 

System checkout and begins cabin stowage in 

preparation for tomorrow’s landing. 

• Crew performs Reaction Control System hot 

fire and reviews tomorrow’s deorbit timeline. 

• KU Band antenna is stowed. 

FLIGHT DAY 13: 

• Discovery’s crew begins deorbit preparations. 

• Payload bay door is closed for entry. 

• Deorbit burn occurs. 

• Landing occurs at Kennedy Space Center. 

July 2005 TIMELINE 71
TIMELINE 

Figure 51 STS-114 (LF1) Overview Timeline 

July 2005 
July 2005 TIMELINE 
July 2005 TIMELINE 
MISSION OBJECTIVES 

The STS-114 mission’s top 

priority is to inspect all of the 

reinforced carbon-carbon heat 

protection material on 

Discovery’s wing leading edge 

panels and to downlink data from the 176 

wireless impact sensors mounted inside the 

wing panels for evaluation on the ground. The 

on-orbit inspections will be carried out using a 

variety of methods, including umbilical well 

and hand-held photography of the external tank 

after it is jettisoned, and an Orbiter Boom 

Sensor System (OBSS) with lasers. 

Figure 1 Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) 

Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) inspects 

reinforced carbon-carbon of wing leading 

edge 

Second on the list of priorities is inspecting all 

of the Shuttle’s silicon-based tiles. The third 

highest priority is to transfer water from the 

Shuttle to the Station for use by the crew. 

Other mission objectives include (in order of 

priority): 

• Perform Detailed Test Objective 848 – 

Orbiter Thermal Protection System Repair 

Techniques (see "Spacewalk" and "Detailed 

Supplementary Objectives and Detailed Test 

Objectives" sections in this kit for more 

details) 

• Transfer critical middeck items from the 

Space Shuttle to the Space Station 

• Perform removal and replacement of the 

Control Moment Gyro-1 (CMG-1) using the 

Station arm 

• Return the failed CMG-1 to the Lightweight 

Mission Peculiar Equipment Support 

Structure Carrier (LMC) using the Station arm 

• Berth the Multi-Purpose Logistics Module 

(MPLM) Raffaello to the Station's Unity 

module using the Station arm; activate and 

check out the MPLM 

• Transfer critical items from the MPLM to the 

Station 

• Return the MPLM to Discovery's payload bay 

using the Station arm 

Figure 2 Raffaello Multi-Purpose Logistics Module (MPLM) 

Canadarm2 berths the Raffaello Multi-Purpose 

Logistics Module (MPLM) to the International 

Space Station’s Unity module 

• Install the External Stowage Platform-2 

(ESP-2) 

• Transfer and install the Human Research 

Facility-2 rack in the Station's Destiny lab 

• Transfer mandatory cargo 

• Transfer required cargo 

• Remove and replace Hyzod cover on Node 1 

nadir hatch window 

July 2005 MISSION OBJECTIVES 75
Figure 3 Space Shuttle Discovery prepares to dock 

with International Space Station 

• Remove and replace S0 Global Positioning 

System (GPS) antenna No. 2 

• Install Video Stanchion Support Assembly 

(VSSA) at the external camera port No. 9 

location 

• Install the external television camera group 

No. 3 to the VSSA on camera port No. 9 

• Perform Materials International Space 

Station Experiment (MISSE) Passive 

Experiment Container (PEC) 5 deployment 

• Perform MISSE PEC 1 and 2 retrieval 

• Perform orbiter middeck payload operation 

activities to support powered payload daily 

status checks 

• Perform critical U.S. and Russian daily Space 

Station payload activities as required to 

prevent loss of science 

• Remove the ESP-2 Flight Releasable Grapple 

Fixture (FRGF) and return in the Starboard 

Tool Stowage Assembly (may be deferred if 

the spacewalk is behind schedule) 

• Perform Joint Airlock flush with 

scrubber/filter 

• Transfer remaining cargo 

• Perform middeck sortie payload activities 

• Reboost the Space Station with the Shuttle to 

no more than 357 kilometers (192.8 nautical 

mile) average orbital altitude 

• Perform spacewalk get-ahead tasks (see 

"Spacewalk" section) 

• Perform U.S./Russian payload research 

operations 

• Perform Space Station Structural Life 

Validation and Extension 

• Rotate Resupply Stowage Platform to 

evaluate the redesigned drive pins and verify 

the ease of on-orbit rack tilting (only if crew 

time available) 

• Perform imagery survey of the Space Station 

exterior during the Shuttle fly-around after 

undocking (if propulsive consumables are 

available) 

• Perform Detailed Test Objective 805 

operations (see section on "Detailed 

Supplementary Objectives and Detailed Test 

Objectives") 

July 2005 MISSION OBJECTIVES 76
LAUNCH AND LANDING 

LAUNCH 

As with all previous Space Shuttle launches, 

Discovery on STS-114 will have several modes 

available that could be used to abort the ascent 

if needed due to engine failures or other 

systems problems. Shuttle launch abort 

philosophy aims toward safe recovery of the 

flight crew and intact recovery of the orbiter 

and its payload. Abort modes include: 

Abort-To-Orbit (ATO) – 

Partial loss of main engine thrust late enough 

to permit reaching a minimal 105 by 85 

nautical mile orbit with orbital maneuvering 

system engines. 

TransAtlantic Abort Landing (TAL) – 

Loss of one or more main engines midway 

through powered flight would force a landing 

at either Zaragoza, Spain; Moron, Spain; or 

Istres, France. For launch to proceed, weather 

conditions must be acceptable at one of these 

TAL sites. 

Return-To-Launch-Site (RTLS) – 

Early shutdown of one or more engines, and 

without enough energy to reach Zaragoza, 

would result in a pitch around and thrust back 

toward KSC until within gliding distance of 

the Shuttle Landing Facility. For launch to 

proceed, weather conditions must be forecast 

to be acceptable for a possible RTLS landing at 

KSC about 20 minutes after liftoff. 

Figure 1 Discovery Launch from KSC 

Space Shuttle Discovery launches from 

Kennedy Space Center on STS-105 on 

Aug. 10, 2001. 

July 2005 LAUNCH & LANDING 77
LANDING 

The primary landing site for Discovery on 

STS-114 is the Kennedy Space Center's Shuttle 

Landing Facility. Alternate landing sites that 

could be used if needed due to weather 

conditions or systems failures are at Edwards 

Air Force Base, California, and White Sands 

Space Harbor, New Mexico. 

Figure 2 Discovery landing at the Shuttle Landing Facility 

Space Shuttle Discovery lands at the Shuttle Landing Facility in Florida on Aug. 22, 2001. 

July 2005 LAUNCH & LANDING 78
MISSION PROFILE 

CREW 

Commander: Eileen Marie Collins 

Pilot: James M. Kelly 

Mission Specialist 1: Soichi Noguchi 

Mission Specialist 2: Stephen K. Robinson 

Mission Specialist 3: Andrew S. W. Thomas 

Mission Specialist 4: Wendy B. Lawrence 

Mission Specialist 5: Charles J. Camarda 

LAUNCH 

Orbiter: Discovery (OV-103) 

Launch Site: Kennedy Space Center Launch Pad 39B 

Launch Date: No Earlier Than July 13, 2005 

Launch Time: 3:51 p.m. EDT (Preferred In-Plane launch time for 7/13) 

Launch Window: 5 Minutes 

Altitude: 122 Nautical Miles (140 Statute Miles) Orbital Insertion; 

190 NM (218 SM) Rendezvous 

Inclination: 51.6 Degrees 

Duration: 11 Days 19 Hours 32 Minutes 

VEHICLE DATA 

Shuttle Liftoff Weight: 4,522,992 pounds 

Orbiter/Payload Liftoff Weight: 267,825 pounds 

Orbiter/Payload Landing Weight: 226,885 pounds 

Software Version: OI-30 

Space Shuttle Main Engines: 

SSME 1: 2057 

SSME 2: 2054 

SSME 3: 2056 

External Tank: ET-121 

SRB Set: BI-125 

RSRM Set: 92 

July 2005 MISSION PROFILE 79
SHUTTLE ABORTS 

Abort Landing Sites 

RTLS: Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility 

TAL: Primary – Zaragoza; Alternates Moron and Istres 

AOA: Primary – Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility; Alternate White Sands 

Space Harbor 

Landing 

Landing Date: No Earlier Than July 25, 2005 

Landing Time: 11:05 a.m. EDT 

Primary landing Site: Kennedy Space Center Shuttle Landing Facility 

PAYLOADS 

Control Moment Gyroscope 

External Stowage Platform-2 

Raffaello Multi-Purpose Logistics Module (including the Human Research Facility-2 rack) 

July 2005 MISSION PROFILE 80
DISCOVERY CREW – STS-114 

The STS-114 crew

named in August 2001 with four 

ed 

g that decision, the core Shuttle crew 

members – Commander Eileen Collins, 

alists Stephen 

Robinson and Soichi Noguchi – were joined by 

ilable at: 

 was first Pilot Jim Kelly and Mission Speci

Space Shuttle astronauts join

by three International Space 

Station crew members. After the

Columbia accident, a decision was made to

rotate Station crews on Russian Soyuz 

spacecraft rather than on the Shuttle. 

Followin

Andrew Thomas, Wendy Lawrence and Charles

Camarda in November 2003. 

Short biographical sketches of the crew follows 

with detailed background ava

http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/Bios/

Figure 1 Discovery Crew STS-114 

In orange launch and entry suits (from left to right): James M. Kelly, pilot; Andrew S. W. Thomas, 

mission specialist; Wendy B. Lawrence, mission specialist; Charles J. Camarda, mission specialist; 

and Eileen M. Collins, commander. Wearing Extravehicular Mobility Units used for spacewalks 

are (left to right) Stephen K. Robinson and Soichi Noguchi, mission specialists 

July 2005 CREW 81
July 2005 CREW 82

ins is a veteran of three 

pace flights and a second-time Commander 

y 

 is 

ing to 

Commander Eileen Coll

s

who has overall responsibility for the on-orbit 

execution of the mission, Orbiter systems 

operations, and flight operations including 

landing the Orbiter. In addition, she will fl

the Shuttle in a procedure called the 

rendezvous pitch maneuver while Discovery

600 feet below the Station before dock

enable the ISS crew to photograph the Orbiter's 

upper surfaces and underbelly thermal 

protection system. She will dock and undock 

Discovery from the Station as well. 

Figure 2 Commander Eileen Collins 

Pilot Jim Kelly is flying for the second time and 

will be responsible for systems operations and 

e 

m 

s 

elly 

he 

assisting in the rendezvous for docking to the 

Station. In addition, he is both a Shuttle arm 

operator and a Station arm operator. As such, h

will participate in the Orbiter's thermal 

protection inspection by helping to maneuver 

the Shuttle robot arm and its Orbiter Boo

Sensor System extension and its suite of camera

and sensors. During the three spacewalks, K

will maneuver the EVA crew and hardware 

with the Station arm. He will also participate in 

transferring cargo from the Space Shuttle to t

Space Station. 

Figure 3 Pilot Jim Kelly 
July 2005 CREW 83

Mission Specialist 1 (MS1) is Japan Aerospace 

Exploration Agency (JAXA) Astronaut Soichi 

Noguchi, who will make his first venture into 

space. His main objective is to lead and 

perform three Extravehicular Activities 

(EVAs), or spacewalks, as EV1 along with his 

spacewalking colleague, Stephen Robinson. 

Testing will include new techniques for 

repairing potential damage to the Orbiter's 

thermal protection system. He will also replace 

one of the large ISS gyroscopes that control the 

orientation of the Station and will help install 

and activate an External Stowage Platform 

(ESP-2) for the housing of spare parts for the 

Station. Noguchi will sit on the flight deck for 

launch and the middeck for entry. 

Figure 4 Soichi Noguchi 

Mission Specialist 2 (MS2) is Astronaut 

Stephen Robinson, a veteran of two space 

flights who will serve as the Flight Engineer on 

STS-114, adding a second set of eyes on Orbiter 

systems for the Commander and the Pilot on the 

flight deck during launch and landing. In 

addition to these duties, he also serves as a 

member of the spacewalk team. As EV2, 

Robinson will perform three spacewalks along 

with Soichi Noguchi, during which they will test 

Shuttle thermal protection system repair 

techniques, replace one of the large ISS 

orientation gyroscopes, and install and activate 

an External Stowage Platform on the Station's 

Airlock. 

Figure 5 Stephen Robinson 

Mission Specialist 3 (MS3) is Astronaut Andrew 

Thomas, a veteran of three space flights. He will 

be the lead Shuttle robotics officer for the 

inspection of the Orbiter's thermal protection 

system using a new boom extension outfitted 

with sensors and cameras. He will also serve as 

the Intravehicular Activity (IV) crewmember 

helping to suit up and choreograph 

spacewalkers Soichi Noguchi and Stephen 

Robinson during their three spacewalks. 

Thomas will move the Shuttle’s 50-foot-long 

robot arm and lock it onto the Orbiter Boom 

Sensor System (OBSS). Thomas, Pilot Jim Kelly, 

and Mission Specialist Charlie Camarda will 

maneuver the boom along the leading edges of 

the wings and nose cap to collect detailed 

imagery with lasers and a video camera. 

Thomas will also be on the middeck for launch 

and the flight deck for entry and landing. 
July 2005 CREW 84

Figure 6 Andrew Thomas 

Mission Specialist 4 (MS4) is Astronaut Wendy 

Lawrence, a veteran of three space flights, who 

will serve as the lead for transferring supplies 

from the Shuttle's cargo module to the Station. 

She will also perform ISS robotics duty for 

thermal protection inspection and the 

spacewalks, and assist with the rendezvous. 

Figure 7 Wendy Lawrence 

As a Station arm operator, she will maneuver 

her crew members and hardware during the 

three spacewalks. During the rendezvous, 

docking and undocking, she will manage 

computers, lasers, cameras, and the Orbiter 

Docking System. Lawrence will be seated in the 

middeck for launch and landing. 

Mission Specialist 5 (MS5) is Astronaut Charles 

Camarda, who will make his first flight into 

space. His duties include Shuttle robotics, 

assisting in the external inspection of the 

Orbiter's thermal protection system, 

photography and television support, and 

computer operations. Camarda will also be 

heavily involved in logistics and transfer 

operations from the Shuttle to the Station. 

During the Orbiter's thermal inspection using 

the new Orbiter Boom Sensor extension, he will 

operate the robot arm, lasers, cameras, and 

computers, and will downlink all of the data to 

the Mission Control Center (MCC) in Houston. 

During the rendezvous and undocking, he will 

help manage the lasers, cameras, computers, 

and the Orbiter Docking System. Camarda will 

be seated in the Shuttle's middeck for launch 

and landing. 

Figure 8 Charles Camarda 
July 2005 KEY PERSONNEL 85

KEY MISSION PERSONNEL 

KEY CONSOLE POSITIONS FOR STS-114 

FLIGHT DIRECTOR CAPCOM PAO

Ascent Leroy Cain Ken Ham 

Rick Sturckow (Wx) 

James Hartsfield 

Orbit 1 Paul Hill (Lead) Steve Frick Rob Navias 

Orbit 2 Tony Ceccacci Julie Payette Kelly Humphries (Lead) 

Planning Cathy Koerner Shannon Lucid Kylie Clem 

Entry Leroy Cain Ken Ham 

Rick Sturckow (Wx) 

James Hartsfield 

ISS Orbit 1 Bryan Lunney Charlie Hobaugh n/a 

ISS Orbit 2 Mark Ferring (Lead) Mike Massimino n/a 

ISS Orbit 3 Joel Montalbano Steve Swanson n/a 

Mission Control John McCullough n/a n/a 

Korolev, Russia Ginger Kerrick 

Mark Kirasich (backup) 

KSC Launch Commentator – George Diller 

NASA Launch Director – Mike Leinbach 

NASA Test Director – Jeff Spaulding 

MISSION AND PROGAM MANAGERS 

Space Shuttle Program Office (NASA) 

Manager, Space Shuttle Program – Bill Parsons 

Deputy Manager, Space Shuttle Program – Wayne Hale 

Manager, Shuttle Safety and Mission Assurance – Terry Wilcutt 

Manager, Shuttle Flight Operations and Integration – John Shannon 

Manager, Shuttle Systems Engineering and Integration – John Muratore 

Manager, Shuttle Management Integration and Planning – John Casper 

Manager, Shuttle Strategic Planning Office – Lee Norbraten 

Manager, Orbiter Projects Office – Steve Poulos, Jr. 

Deputy Manager, Orbiter Projects Office – Ed Mango 
July 2005 KEY PERSONNEL 86

Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 

Deputy Manager, Space Shuttle Program – Denny Kross 

Manager, Launch Integration – Gregory C. Johnson 

Director of Shuttle Processing – Mike Wetmore 

Launch Director – Mike Leinbach 

Discovery Vehicle Manager – Stephanie Stilson 

STS-114 Payload Manager – Scott Higginbotham 

Chief Engineer – Charlie Abner 

STS-114 Shuttle Test Director – Jeff Spaulding 

United Space Alliance (USA) 

United Space Alliance Vice President and Program Manager – Howard DeCastro 

USA Vice President and Deputy Program Manager, Houston Operations – Loren Shriver 

USA Vice President and Deputy Program Manager, Florida Operations – Bill Pickavance 

USA Space Operations Management 

United Space Alliance President and Chief Executive Officer – Mike McCulley 

United Space Alliance Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer – Brewster Shaw 
RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING 

Discovery’s approach to the 

International Space Station 

during the STS-114 rendezvous 

and docking process will i

an unprecedented maneuve

back-flip pirouette -- ena

Station residents to take digital photographs o

the Shuttle’s thermal protection system. 

With Discovery’s C

nclude 

r -- a 

bling 

f 

ommander Eileen Collins at 

 about 

t 

the controls, Discovery will perform the 

360-degree pitch-around with the orbiter

600 feet below the Station. The flip will take abou

nine minutes to complete, offering Expedition 11 

Commander Sergei Krikalev and Flight Engineer 

John Phillips about 93 seconds of photography 

time to capture images of Discovery. 

1. 

The images recorded during the Rendezvous 

Pitch Maneuver (RPM) are among several new 

inspection procedures designed to detect and 

determine the extent of any damage the 

orbiter’s protective tiles and Reinforced 

Carbon-Carbon surfaces might have sustained. 

The sequence of events that brings Discovery to 

its docking with the Station begins with the 

precisely timed launch of the orbiter, placing the 

Shuttle on the correct trajectory and course for its 

two-day chase to arrive at the Station. During the 

first two days of the mission, periodic engine 

firings will gradually bring Discovery to a point 

about 91⁄2 statute miles behind the Station, the 

starting point for a final approach. 

2. 

Figure 2 Shuttle belly-up

Figure 1 RPM start

3. 

Figure 3 800mm lens close-ups

4. 

Figure 4 Condition of Discovery’s tiles

1. Discovery begins the RPM at a distance of 600 feet from the ISS 

tion by the ISS crew 

ry’s wheel well doors 

s tiles

2. Discovery presents its heat-resistant tiles for photographic inspec

3. An 800 mm lens provides more detailed close-ups of sensitive tile areas around Discove

4. Space Station crew members use a digital camera and 400 mm lens to photograph the condition of Discovery’

July 2005 RENDEZVOUS & DOCKING 87
About 21⁄2 hours before the scheduled docking 

time on Flight Day 3, Discovery will reach that 

point, about 50,000 feet behind the ISS. There, 

Discovery's jets will be fired in a Terminal 

Initiation (TI) burn to begin the final phase of 

the rendezvous. Discovery will close the final 

miles to the Station during the next orbit. 

Rendezvous Approach Profile 

Space Shuttle Rendezvous Maneuvers 

OMS-1 (Orbit insertion) - Rarely used ascent 

abort burn. 

OMS-2 (Orbit insertion) - Typically used to 

circularize the initial orbit following ascent, 

completing orbital insertion. For ground-up 

rendezvous flights, also considered a 

rendezvous phasing burn. 

NC (Rendezvous phasing) - Performed to hit a 

range relative to the target at a future time. 

NH (Rendezvous height adjust) - Performed 

to hit a delta-height relative to the target at a 

future time. 

NPC (Rendezvous plane change) - Performed 

to remove planar errors relative to the target at 

a future time. 

NCC (Rendezvous corrective combination) -

First on-board targeted burn in the rendezvous 

sequence. Using star tracker data, it is 

performed to remove phasing and height errors 

relative to the target at Ti. 

Ti (Rendezvous terminal intercept) - Second 

on-board targeted burn in the rendezvous 

sequence. Using primarily rendezvous radar 

data, it places the orbiter on a trajectory to 

intercept the target in one orbit. 

MC-1, MC-2, MC-3, MC-4 (Rendezvous 

midcourse burns) - These on-board targeted 

burns use star tracker and rendezvous radar 

data to correct the post-Ti trajectory in 

preparation for the final, manual proximity 

operations phase. 

As Discovery closes in, the Shuttle’s 

rendezvous radar system will begin tracking 

the Station and providing range and closing 

rate information to the crew. During the final 

approach, Discovery will execute several small 

mid-course corrections at regular intervals 

with its steering jets. That will place Discovery 

at a point about 1,000 feet directly below the 

Station at which time Collins will take over the 

manual flying of the Shuttle up the R-Bar, or 

radial vector toward the complex, the 

imaginary line drawn between the Station and 

the Earth. 

Figure 5 Zvezda windows 

Station crew members will use Earth-facing 

windows in the Zvezda Service Module to 

take photographs during the Rendezvous 

Pitch Maneuver 

She will slow Discovery's approach and fly to a 

point about 600 feet directly below the Station 

for a period of station-keeping to wait for the 

proper lighting conditions. The rendezvous is 

designed so that there will be as little glare as 

possible on the surfaces of the Shuttle. 

July 2005 RENDEZVOUS & DOCKING 88
On a verbal cue from Pilot Jim Kelly to alert the 

Station crew, Collins will command Discovery 

to begin a nose-forward, three-quarter-of-adegree-per-second back flip. As the Shuttle 

passes 145 degrees into the maneuver, Kelly 

will tell Krikalev and Phillips to begin their 

photography of Discovery. The Station 

residents will shoot from the Shuttle’s tail to its 

nose to avoid any residual glare. The 

photography will be performed out of windows 

6 and 7 in the Zvezda Service Module with 

Kodak DCS 760 digital cameras and 400mm 

and 800mm lenses delivered on a Russian 

Progress cargo ship to the Station in March. An 

additional digital camera was delivered as a 

replacement on a subsequent progress cargo 

ship in June. The camera replaced one of the 

two cameras delivered in March that had failed. 

Figure 6 400mm & 800mm shuttles 

Mapping sequences will provide thorough 

coverage of Discovery’s thermal protection 

system 

Figure 7 400mm & 800mm FOVs 

The digital camera with the 400mm lens will be 

used to capture imagery of the upper surfaces of 

the Shuttle with a two-inch resolution. The other 

camera with the 800mm lens will be used to 

concentrate on Discovery’s belly, capturing 

pictures of the nose landing gear door seals, the 

main landing gear door seals and the elevon 

cove with one-inch analytical resolution. There 

should be enough time for two sets of pictures. 

After docking is complete, the photos will be 

downlinked through the Station’s Ku-band 

communications system for analysis by systems 

engineers and mission managers. 

When Discovery is 215 degrees into the 

maneuver, Kelly will direct the crew to stop 

its photography. Discovery will then complete 

its rotation, returning to an orientation with its 

payload bay facing the Station. 

Collins will then move Discovery to a point 

about 400 feet in front of the Station along the 

direction of travel for both spacecraft, known as 

the velocity vector, or V-Bar. Kelly will provide 

Collins with navigation information as she 

slowly inches the Shuttle toward the docking 

port at the forward end of the Station’s Destiny 

Laboratory. Mission Specialists Wendy 

Lawrence, Steve Robinson and Charlie Camarda 

also will play key roles in the rendezvous. 

Robinson will operate laptop computers 

processing the navigational data, while 

Lawrence and Camarda share roles in operating 

the laser range systems and Discovery’s docking 

mechanism. 

Using a view from a camera mounted in the 

center of Discovery's docking mechanism as a 

key alignment aid, Collins will precisely center 

the docking ports of the two spacecraft. She will 

fly to a point where the docking mechanisms are 

30 feet apart, and pause to check the alignment. 

For Discovery's docking, Collins will maintain 

the Shuttle's speed relative to the Station at 

about one-tenth of a foot per second (while both 

Discovery and the Station are traveling at about 

July 2005 RENDEZVOUS & DOCKING 89
17,500 mph), and keep the docking mechanisms 

aligned to within a tolerance of three inches. 

When Discovery makes contact with the 

Station, preliminary latches will automatically 

attach the two spacecraft. Immediately after 

Discovery docks, the Shuttle's steering jets will 

be deactivated to reduce the forces acting at the 

docking interface. Shock absorber-like springs 

in the docking mechanism will dampen any 

relative motion between the Shuttle and the 

Station. 

Once that motion between the spacecraft has been 

stopped, Camarda will secure the docking 

mechanism, sending commands for Discovery's 

docking ring to retract and to close a final set of 

latches between the two vehicles. 

UNDOCKING, SEPARATION AND DEPARTURE 

Once Discovery is ready to undock, Camarda 

will send a command to release the docking 

mechanism. At initial separation of the spacecraft, 

springs in the docking mechanism will push the 

Shuttle away from the Station. Discovery’s 

steering jets will be shut off to avoid any 

inadvertent firings during the initial separation. 

Once Discovery is about two feet from the 

Station, with the docking devices clear of one 

another, Kelly will turn the steering jets back on 

and fire them to very slowly move away. From 

the aft flight deck, Kelly will manually control 

Discovery within a tight corridor as the orbiter 

separates from the Space Station, essentially the 

reverse of the task performed by Collins just 

before Discovery docked. 

Discovery will continue away to a distance of 

about 450 feet, where Kelly will initiate a 

maneuver to fly the Shuttle directly above the 

Station. At that point, he will fire Discovery’s jets 

to depart the vicinity of the Station for the final 

time. If propellant permits, mission control may 

decide in real-time that discovery can perform a 

full fly-around of the station similar to previous 

missions. 

July 2005 RENDEZVOUS & DOCKING 90
SPACEWALKS 

The STS-114 and Expedition 11 

crews will work together to 

accomplish three spacewalks, 

also know as Extravehicular 

Activities or EVAs, that focus 

on Space Station assembly and 

repair tasks. One spacewalk will include tests 

of two Shuttle Thermal Protection System 

repair methods. 

Each of the spacewalks by Soichi Noguchi and 

Steve Robinson will last approximately 6 hours, 

30 minutes. They will be conducted from the 

Space Shuttle Discovery’s airlock, thus becoming 

the 26th, 27th and 28th Shuttle-based EVAs in 

support of Space Station assembly. Assuming a 

July launch date, once the STS-114 work is done 

there will have been a total of 61 Space Station 

assembly spacewalks. 

These will be the first spacewalks for both 

astronauts. Noguchi will be designated EV1, 

and will wear the spacesuit marked by red 

stripes on its legs. Robinson will be designated 

EV2, and will wear a spacesuit that is all white. 

Since all three EVAs will be carried out from the 

Shuttle airlock, Discovery’s crew will close the 

hatches to the Station the night before each EVA 

and lower the Shuttle’s cabin pressure from 14.7 

psi to 10.2 psi to help purge nitrogen from the 

bloodstreams of the spacewalkers. About the 

same time, Noguchi and Robinson will don 

masks and pre-breathe pure oxygen for 1 hour 

to begin the nitrogen purge and protect against 

“the bends.” Noguchi and Robinson also will 

perform final configuration of the tools and a 

new digital camera they will use on the next 

day’s spacewalk. 

The next day will begin with the start of final 

EVA preparations when the spacewalkers don 

their Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) 

spacesuits. They will complete the nitrogen 

purge and pre-breathe pure oxygen in the 

spacesuits for 75 minutes prior to 

depressurizing the airlock. After the 

spacewalkers have exited and closed the hatch 

behind them, the Shuttle crew will repressurize 

Discovery and open the hatch to the Station so 

that the two crews can work together to support 

their colleagues outside. 

Figure 1 Tools from the Tool Stowage Assembly 

STS-114 Mission Specialists Soichi Noguchi 

(left) and Stephen Robinson look at tools from 

the Tool Stowage Assembly. 

EVA 1 

The first spacewalk will take place on Flight Day 5 

of the mission. The jobs at hand will be trials of two 

thermal protection system repair methods, 

replacement of a GPS antenna, and get-ahead tasks 

for the Space Station assembly spacewalks on 

Flight Days 7 and 9. 

After exiting Discovery’s airlock, Noguchi and 

Robinson will do their initial setup for the 

spacewalk. This setup period will include a trip 

to the Space Station’s Quest airlock on the 

Station’s robotic arm for Noguchi to open the 

hatch and provide an emergency entrance point. 

The crew lock portion of Quest will have been 

depressurized by the Expedition 11 crew the 

night before. Quest’s outer hatch will remain 

open until all three EVAs are completed. 

July 2005 SPACEWALKS 91
Noguchi will close a thermal cover over the 

open hatch before returning to Discovery’s 

payload bay to begin the thermal protection 

repair tests, known as Detailed Test Objective 

848 (DTO 848). 

For DTO 848, the two spacewalkers will assist 

one another side-by-side in Discovery’s cargo 

bay at a pallet carrying a variety of damaged 

Shuttle tiles and Reinforced Carbon-Carbon 

(RCC) samples. Noguchi and Robinson will 

have half an hour each to perform their DTO 

tasks, with 25 additional minutes allocated for 

cleanup at the tests. 

Figure 2 DTO 848 Pallet Configuration 

Noguchi will work on tile repair, demonstrating 

the use of an Emittance Wash Applicator (EWA) 

and associated tools. The EWA is a dauber-like 

applicator, used to apply the sticky, caulk-like 

mixture of fine-grit silicon carbide (SiC) granules 

and room temperature vulcanizing (RTV) 

material to exposed tile substrate. Other tools 

used with this repair technique include foam 

brushes to cover areas that the larger EWA 

applicator cannot, and wipes to remove excess 

material from spacesuits, gloves or tools. His 

part of the DTO will be considered fully 

successful if one 4-by-4-inch area of exposed 

substrate is covered, but additional areas for 

repair are available if time allows. 

Figure 3 Emittance Wash Applicator 

Figure 4 Emittance Wash Applicator 

Emittance Wash Applicator dispenses a 

mixture of fine-grit silicon carbide (SiC) 

granules and room temperature vulcanizing 

(RTV) material 

In this application, an emittance wash would be 

used to repair shallow tile damage. The silicon 

tiles used in the Shuttle’s thermal protection 

system both reject heat and insulate. The white 

silicon substrate provides insulation, while the 

black reaction-cured glass (RCG) coating rejects 

heat. The ability of a material to reject heat is 

measured in terms of its “emissivity.” The RCG 

coating on tiles has a high emissivity value, while 

July 2005 SPACEWALKS 92
the white substrate has a lower emissivity value, 

especially as temperatures rise. The science 

behind the emittance wash repair involves 

replacing a damaged tile’s coating to restore its 

ability to reject the high temperatures of 

atmospheric entry. The emittance wash wicks 

into the tile substrate, providing an adhesive 

bond, and a high emissivity, or heat rejection 

value. For small, shallow areas of damage, 

replacing the RCG coating with the emittance 

wash will restore enough heat rejection 

capability for safe entry. 

Figure 5 Caulk gun and scrapers 

A caulk gun and scrapers will be used to 

dispense a Non-Oxide Adhesive 

Experimental (NOAX) repair material into a 

simulated reinforced carbon-carbon crack 

Afterward, Robinson will work with the RCC 

crack repair technique. He will use a spacehardened caulk gun to dispense a pre-ceramic 

polymer sealant impregnated with carbonsilicon carbide powder, together known as 

NOAX (short for Non-Oxide Adhesive 

eXperimental). Using one of two caulk guns in 

the crack repair kit, Robinson will dispense the 

material onto one of two pallets, similar to those 

used for plastering. He will then use one of two 

scrapers, similar to putty knives, to work the 

crack repair material into a pre-damaged RCC 

sample mounted in the DTO pallet. There are 

four cracks and two gouges on the RCC sample, 

and his portion of the DTO will be deemed 

successful if one crack and one gouge are 

repaired. 

NASA materials experts have estimated that 

cracks or coating damage as small as 2 inches 

long and .02 of an inch wide in some locations 

on the Shuttle’s wing leading edge could result 

in catastrophic damage to that wing. The crack 

filling method is designed to fix the type of 

damage most likely to be caused by small pieces 

of foam coming off the redesigned external tank. 

NOAX can be used at any RCC location, and 

does not require any physical modification of 

the RCC before affecting a repair. It is expected 

to repair cracks or coating losses up to four 

inches long, but cannot be used to repair holes. 

While NOAX initially was thought to need a 

heater to prepare the RCC surface for 

application and post-application curing, recent 

tests on the ground have shown promising 

results that heating the damaged area and the 

material may not be required. No heaters will be 

used in the STS-114 tests. 

After the DTO 848 tasks are complete, the 

spacewalkers will work to clean up the work 

area around the DTO pallet before moving on to 

their assembly get-ahead work. The lid to the 

sample box will be left open until the end of the 

EVA to allow the OBSS sensors to scan the 

damaged samples in the box. 

Removing the External Stowage Platform-2 

(ESP-2) Attachment Device (ESPAD) from its 

Lightweight Multi-Purpose External Support 

Structure (MPESS) and installing it on the side 

of the Space Station airlock will be the first of 

July 2005 SPACEWALKS 93
those get-ahead tasks. ESPAD is a two-part 

mechanism, with one part containing the 

active ESPAD claw, which will provide a 

temporary structural connection for the ESP-2 

when it is first installed. The other half is 

passive and will remain connected to ESP-2, 

eventually being grabbed by the claw and then 

firmly bolted to the active member. They’ll be 

assisted by Jim Kelly and Wendy Lawrence 

inside the Space Station, operating the Station’s 

robotic arm, and by Andy Thomas inside the 

Shuttle, who will relay information and 

instructions from Mission Control. 

Figure 6 External Stowage Platform Attachment Device (ESPAD) 

The active half of the External Stowage 

Platform Attachment Device (ESPAD) 

installed on the Quest Airlock Module 

Robinson’s first job will be to install an 

Articulating Portable Foot Restraint (APFR) 

into the Latching End Effector (LEE) of the 

Station’s 80-foot-long robotic arm. As a freefloater still, he will verify that the ESPAD claw 

is open. He will move a pivoting strut out of 

the way so that he can remove the first of three 

bolts which hold the active ESPAD in place for 

launch. He’ll return the strut to its original 

position, and then use a Pistol Grip Tool 

(PGT), which is a portable drill modified for 

use in space, to release mounting locks for the 

Enhanced Universal Truss Attachment System 

(EUTAS) that will be used to attach the active 

ESPAD member to the airlock structure. 

The mounting locks are installed pre-flight to 

prevent vibrations from damaging the EUTAS 

mechanism. The EUTAS uses two knuckled 

hand-tightening knobs; both can gimble and one 

can slide to ensure good alignment with the 

structural members to which they’ll be attached. 

Once the EUTAS locks are released, he will step 

into the foot restraint on the end of the Station’s 

robotic arm and use the PGT to loosen the last 

two ESPAD launch bolts. After separating the 

active and passive members, the Station arm will 

be commanded to move Robinson and the 

ESPAD from the cargo bay to the Quest airlock 

trunnions and soft dock the ESPAD with 

Noguchi available for guidance. Robinson will 

hand-tighten the two EUTAS bolts and verify 

they are tightened well enough to temporarily 

hold it in place. Then, he’ll use the PGT to finish 

tightening the bolts and engage their locking 

mechanisms. Noguchi will deploy the strut and 

attach it to a fitting on the Quest airlock. At this 

point, the ESPAD will be ready to structurally 

accept the ESP-2 on the third spacewalk of the 

mission. 

During this same period, Noguchi’s first job will 

be to pre-route the 20-foot-long primary cable 

that will connect the ESPAD to power 

connections on the end cone of the Unity 

connecting module. First, he’ll collect the 

primary and secondary ESP-2 cables from their 

launch stowage location in the cargo bay and 

move hand-over-hand via handrails to the 

junction of the Unity module and the Station’s 

truss structure near the Destiny module. At the 

Crew Equipment Translation Aid (CETA) spur, 

which bridges the gap between Unity and the 

truss, he will temporarily stow the secondary 

cable and move to the Unity end cone adjacent 

to Destiny’s end cone with the primary cable. 

He’ll connect one end of the primary cable to a 

July 2005 SPACEWALKS 94
jack on Unity and stow the rest of the cable on 

a handrail for later attachment on EVA3. 

Next, Noguchi will move back to the Quest 

airlock, open the thermal cover, and retrieve an 

Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) bag 

containing a Global Positioning System (GPS) 

antenna and another bag containing Control 

Moment Gyroscope (CMG) get-ahead 

equipment and stow them at the Station 

toolbox on the side of the airlock. With this 

complete, he’ll move to the ESPAD installation 

location to help Robinson. 

Figure 7 GPS antenna and its location 

A Global Positioning System (GPS) antenna 

(above) and its location on the International 

Space Station truss (below) 

Once the ESPAD is installed, Noguchi will 

remove a broken GPS antenna that faces space 

on the port side of the S0 truss. He’ll move 

hand-over-hand to the worksite after collecting 

the ORU bag containing the replacement 

antenna. Once at the worksite, he will remove 

some wire ties that were installed on STS-110 in 

April 2002 to corral some Multi-Layer Insulation 

(MLI) that had been interfering with the 

antenna, and move the MLI out of the way. He’ll 

detach two power and data connectors, use a 

PGT to release four bolts and lift the failed 

antenna out of its bay and stow it on a handrail. 

He’ll pull the new antenna out of the ORU bag, 

soft dock it where the old antenna had been and 

use the PGT to drive three bolts and secure the 

antenna. Then, he’ll attach the two power and 

data cables, reinstall the MLI and tie it down out 

of the way using the wire ties. Last, Noguchi 

will take the ORU bag with the failed GPS 

antenna to the CETA cart on the space-facing 

side off the truss and temporarily stow it there. 

Figure 8 Rerouting power to a Control Moment Gyroscope 

Swapping a cable from one jack to another on 

a Z1 truss patch panel will allow spacewalkers 

to reroute power to a Control Moment 

Gyroscope 

July 2005 SPACEWALKS 95
At the same time, Robinson will retrieve tools 

that will be used in the CMG-1 replacement 

EVA on Flight Day 7 and take them up to the 

Z1 section of the truss, on the space-facing side 

of the Unity module. He’ll first perform a 

patch panel swap of an electrical connector 

that will restore power to CMG-2 which has 

been inactive since March when a Remote 

Power Control Module (RPCM) failed. He’ll 

install a temporary handrail strap and fold 

down a lighting stanchion, tethering it to a 

handrail to get it out of the way so that he and 

Noguchi will be able to remove the failed 

gyroscope and install a replacement. 

Figure 9 Primary power cable routing map 

Routing map for the primary power cable to 

External Storage Platform-2 

The last job of the EVA will be to route the 

50-foot-long secondary cable for ESP-2, a task 

that will require both spacewalkers. While 

Noguchi repositions the CETA cart on top of the 

truss, Robinson will retrieve the cable from its 

temporary storage location on the CETA spur 

and move over to S0 truss Bay 3. Noguchi will 

push his head and torso into Bay 3, and 

Robinson will feed the split end of the cable to 

him. Inside the truss, Noguchi will detach one 

connector, mate it to one of the the secondary 

cable connectors, and mate the other connector 

to its jack. Robinson then will position the 

secondary cable along several struts and 

handrails and temporarily position the other 

end on a handrail near the ESP-2 installation 

location. 

The two then will collect all of their tools and 

clean up the payload bay before returning to the 

Shuttle’s airlock. Meanwhile, the rest of the 

shuttle crew will return to Discovery and close 

the hatches to station to allow the spacewalkers 

to depressurize the airlock from the outside and 

open the hatch. They will then reenter the 

shuttle’s airlock with their tools, completing the 

EVA when the hatch is closed and 

repressurization begins. 

July 2005 SPACEWALKS 96
July 2005 SPACEWALKS 

Fi 

TPS Repair Assets and DTO Plan 

TPS 

Breakdown Type of Repair Purpose Manifested Tools Example Picture or Illustration Quantity Planned S

DTO Ac

Tile Repair 

Emittance Wash 

Repair (and Ablator 

Repair Primer) 

Repair: "shallow gouges", coating damage (Primer: prime damage surface prior to Ablator Repair)

Emmitance Wash Applicator (EWA), w/ SiC and RTV-511 (major component of STA-54 "PartA" only)

3, temperature dependent coverage, each unit with ~100 sq. in. (cold) to ~300 sq. in. (ambient) 

Yes - 

sample 

PL

Ablator Repair "Deep gouges", missing tiles Cure-In-Place-Ablator Applicator (CIPAA), w/ curing repair material, STA-54 ("PartA" and "PartB") 2, each unit with 600 cubic in. usable volume No 

Supporting Hand Tools/Hardware 

STS-114: 1set STS-121: 1set, plus some additional spares

No 

Overlay Repair Cover for any tile damage Overlay and supporting equipment 1, (12 in. by 25 in.) No 

RCC Repair Crack Repair Spalled coating, gouges, cracks, possibly small holes Crack Repair Gun loaded w/ Crack Repair Material (NOAX 3124D) STS-114: 3 manual guns (5 oz each); STS-121: 3 pneumatic guns (15 cubic in. each) Yes - 

sample 

PL

Supporting Hand Tools 2 sets, 1 transfer bag 

Yes - 

sample 

PL

Plug Repair Larger holes in RCC or "bruised" RCC 

Plug coverplates and attachment mechanisms (assembled on-orbit); current plan is to use NOAX 3124D as sealant 

STS-114: 13 Plug Coverplates and 4 attachment mechanisms, plus 1 assembled Plug for IVA demo; STS-121: 19 Coverplates and 4 attach mech *Note: better coverage for 121 than 114

Yes 

IVA o

Supporting Hand Tools 2 sets Yes 

IVA o
EVA 2 

The sole objective of EVA 2 on Flight Day 7 will 

be the removal and replacement of a failed 

Control Moment Gyroscope from the Station’s Z1 

truss. The old CMG failed in June 2002; since 

then, the Station has used the remaining three 

CMGs to maintain and adjust the Station’s 

attitude, or orientation, relative to the Earth. At 

this stage of the assembly sequence, two CMGs 

are sufficient to control the Station’s attitude. The 

third functioning CMG provides the necessary 

amount of redundancy, or backup. However, later 

in the assembly sequence, the Station will become 

less symmetrical and a minimum of three CMGs 

will be needed to maintain attitude. So, four 

healthy gyroscopes will be needed to control the 

Station’s orientation relative to the Earth and offer 

a backup if another gyroscope were to fail. 

Each gyroscope weighs 620 pounds and is about 

the size of a washing machine. Each has a reaction 

wheel that spins at a constant speed of 6,600 

revolutions per minute. Flight controllers on the 

ground can use guidance and navigation software 

to reposition the direction of the gyros’ spin axes. 

Repositioning these axes causes the CMGs to 

generate torque. This torque is transferred to the 

Station’s structure, counteracting the gravitational 

and drag forces to maintain attitude or to induce 

changes to the Station’s orientation. 

Figure 11 Location of four CMGs 

Location of four CMGs are located on the 

International Space Station’s Z1 truss 

Figure 12 Close-up of CMGs 

After exiting the Shuttle airlock, Noguchi and 

Robinson will make sure their spacesuits and 

tools are in order and work their way handover-hand to the Z1 truss. Noguchi will step into 

an APFR on the Space Station’s robotic arm, 

which again will be controlled by Kelly and 

Lawrence. The pair will work together to peel 

back and secure the multilayer insulation 

thermal shroud covering CMG-1. After 

receiving confirmation from Andy Thomas 

inside the Shuttle and Mission Control, Noguchi 

will disconnect four power and data cables and 

tie them out of the way. Next they will loosen 

the bolts holding the CMG in its support 

structure; Noguchi will loosen four bolts and 

Robinson two bolts using PGTs. When all six are 

loosened, Robinson will wiggle the CMG to 

make sure it is not binding. Each spacewalker 

then will remove two launch shims designed to 

provide a snug fit for the CMG in it’s support 

structure. Noguchi will remove four captive 

bolts and Robinson two, then lift the CMG out 

of its cradle. Robinson will use his helmetmounted video camera to send inspection views 

of the cavity to Mission Control for evaluation. 

Kelly and Lawrence will use Canadarm2 to 

swing Noguchi and the failed CMG back to 

Discovery’s payload bay and the Lightweight 

Mission Peculiar Equipment Support Structure 

Carrier (LMC). While Noguchi is in transit, 

Robinson will move back to the cargo bay and 

July 2005 SPACEWALKS 98
position two “ball stacks,” which are 

temporary holding arms, to the CMG carrier. 

When Noguchi arrives with the old CMG, the 

pair will secure it to one of these ball stacks. 

After the failed CMG is temporarily secured, 

Noguchi and Robinson will loosen six bolts, 

remove four shims and six bolts, then lift the 

new CMG out of the LMC and place it on the 

second ball stack. Then, they install the failed 

CMG in the opening vacated by the new CMG 

on the cargo bay carrier, tightening three bolts 

and two adjustable shims each with PGTs. 

Figure 13 A replacement Control Moment Gyroscope 

A replacement Control Moment Gyroscope is 

prepared for launch aboard Discovery 

Still on the end of the Station’s robotic arm, 

Noguchi will hold the new CMG while 

Robinson disconnects it from the ball stack 

holding it to the CMG carrier. Arm operators 

will maneuver Noguchi and the new CMG to 

the Z1 truss, where Noguchi will insert the 

new CMG into the empty cavity. Meanwhile, 

Robinson will move back to the Z1, managing 

tethers and reporting clearances to help the 

robotic arm operators. Once the new CMG is 

“soft docked” in its cavity (no shims are 

required), Noguchi will tighten four bolts and 

Robinson two. After applying the right amount 

of torque to the bolts using PGTs, the pair will 

secure the new attitude control device. In 

careful coordinating with ground controllers, 

Noguchi will mate four connectors to the jacks 

in the Z1 truss. 

He and Robinson then will reinstall the thermal 

shroud over the new CMG, reinstall the 

floodlight, and move back to the cargo bay for 

cleanup and return to the Shuttle airlock. 

EVA 3 

Robinson and Noguchi will work together on all 

tasks for the third and final spacewalk of the 

mission, to be conducted on Flight Day 9. On tap 

are installation of a camera and illuminator 

package on the port truss structure of the 

Station, installation of ESP-2, retrieval of two 

Materials International Space Station 

Experiment (MISSE) packages and the 

installation of one new package, MISSE 5 – the 

first such experiment to have battery power and 

wireless data transmission capabilities. Several 

get-ahead tasks for future spacewalks may be 

accomplished if time allows. 

Figure 14 Installation at Camera Port 9 

A television camera, lighting unit and Video 

Stanchion Support Assembly bracket will be 

installed at Camera Port 9 

After exiting the Shuttle airlock with the camera 

group and ensuring their suits and tools are 

ready, Noguchi will go to the Video Stanchion 

Support Assembly (VSSA) in the cargo bay to 

retrieve the stanchion, while Robinson removes 

an orbiter power cable from ESP-2 in 

July 2005 SPACEWALKS 99
preparation for it’s removal. Noguchi will 

remove two launch bolts and float with the 

stanchion to the port side of the Shuttle’s 

docking system, positioning it so that 

Robinson can remove several bolts holding a 

connector-protecting dummy box. Next, 

Robinson will install the camera group in its 

stanchion and secure it with three bolts using a 

PGT. Together, they will move hand-overhand to the Camera Position 9 worksite at the 

end of the P1 truss on the Earth-facing side. 

Noguchi will position the stanchion and use a 

PGT to engage one bolt that anchors the 

package to the truss. While Robinson removes 

one end of the power and data cables from 

dummy jacks on the VSSA, Noguchi will 

remove dust caps from the real jacks on the P1 

truss and then mate the three cable connectors 

to the appropriate jacks. Robinson will remove 

a protective cover from the illuminator and 

unlock the camera’s pan and tilt mechanism. 

Figure 15 External Stowage Platform-2 

External Stowage Platform-2 is installed on 

the External Stowage Platform Attachment 

Device and Quest Airlock 

During the camera group installation task, 

Kelly and Lawrence will use the Station’s 

robotic crane to grapple the ESP-2 in 

Discovery’s cargo bay and move it into 

position alongside the Quest airlock, where its 

ESPAD attachment mechanism was installed 

during EVA 1. Once the ESP-2 is in position, 

Robinson and Noguchi will help Kelly and 

Lawrence carefully guide the ESP-2, and verify 

that the ESPAD claw and latches are open and 

ready to latch. When Thomas inside the orbiting 

complex gives a “go,” Noguchi can drive the 

capture claw closed using a PGT. With the claw 

firmly grasping ESP-2, the spacewalkers will 

manually close three lock-down bars on the Vshaped guides that helped steer it into place. 

Once the lock-down bars are closed, Noguchi 

and Robinson each will use PGTs to drive the 

locking bolts until they are secure. Robinson will 

retrieve and connect the primary and secondary 

power cables that were pre-positioned during 

EVA 1. The pair will wrap up their tasks by 

performing surveys of the newly installed spare 

parts rack and its power connections with their 

helmet-mounted cameras. 

Figure 16 MISSE #1 and #2 

Two Materials International Space Station 

Experiment packages will be removed from the 

Quest Airlock and returned to Earth for 

examination 

The last planned task of EVA 3 is the retrieval of 

two materials exposure experiments and the 

installation of a new one. 

Robinson will use handrails to move to the end 

of the Quest crew lock and take photos of the 

July 2005 SPACEWALKS 100
MISSE 2 experiment package before closing the 

experiment housing, releasing two PIP pins 

and removing the suitcase-like package. He’ll 

place MISSE 2 in the Quest crew lock for 

temporary storage, then go to the MISSE 1 

location. There, on the Earth-facing side of one 

of the dog house-shaped oxygen tanks 

mounted on the exterior of Quest’s equipment 

lock, he’ll perform the same steps on MISSE 2 

and close the airlock thermal cover. 

Meanwhile, Noguchi will go to the Station 

airlock and retrieve a spare tether, a clamp and 

MISSE 5. 

Moving along handrails, he’ll travel to the 

uppermost point on the Space Station, the top 

of the P6 truss that holds the two large banks 

of American solar arrays. There, he’ll install 

the clamp on a handrail on the P6’s aft 

trunnion and lock MISSE 5 in place. Noguchi 

will turn the suitcase-like experiment insideout, exposing its material samples to space. 

He’ll ensure that the wireless antennas that 

will be used to transfer data are deployed. 

Those antennas function in the same way that 

the Station’s amateur radio antennas do, and 

will allow commands to be sent to the 

experiment package. Telemetry from the

experiments will be transmitted every three 

minutes to the United States Naval Academy 

near Washington, D.C. or other amateur radio 

receiving stations around the world. 

Noguchi will verify that the electronics are 

turned on before heading back to the Quest 

hatch. 

Robinson will take care of one minor job on his 

way back to help Noguchi close the Station 

airlock hatch and clean up Discovery’s cargo 

bay. He’ll go to the newly installed ESP-2 and 

remove a Flight Releasable Grapple Fixture 

(FRGF) that would be in the way of an ORU 

installation planned for STS-121. He’ll stow the 

FRGF in a Tool Stowage Assembly in the 

payload bay for the return home. 

Figure 17 MISSE 5 

The first powered Materials International Space 

Station Experiment package, MISSE 5, will be 

installed at the top of the P6 truss 

After Robinson repressurizes and opens the 

shuttle airlock, Noguchi will stow several tools 

and safety tethers in the Station airlock, and 

close the hatch and thermal cover and head back 

to the payload bay. Robinson will check the 

payload bay to be sure all equipment and tools 

are accounted. The pair then will re-enter the 

Shuttle airlock and close the hatch on the 

mission’s final planned spacewalk. 

July 2005 SPACEWALKS 101
July 2005 SPACEWALKS 102
PAYLOAD OVERVIEW 

Space Shuttle Discovery will 

carry a variety of payloads. The 

flight will carry 29,725 pounds 

of equipment and supplies in its 

cargo bay to the International 

Space Station. When Discovery 

lands, it will return with 25,121 pounds of 

equipment in its cargo bay. Additional items 

will be carried on the Space Shuttle middeck 

including supplies, food, water and clothing 

for the crew. 

The cargo bay measures 60 feet long and by 15 

feet diameter and can carry the cargo equivalent 

to the size of a school bus. Under the Space 

Flight Operations Contract with United Space 

Alliance, Boeing performs the form, fit and 

function of any cargo that goes into the payload 

bay. The addition of the 50-foot boom and its 

suite of sensors called the Orbiter Boom Sensor 

System are considered to be part of the orbiter 

and are not considered part of the payload 

weight listed above. 

Figure 1 STS-114 Payload bay configuration 

July 2005 PAYLOADS 103
MULTI-PURPOSE LOGISTICS MODULE (MPLM) 

“RAFFAELLO” 

The primary payload for this flight is the Italianbuilt Multi-Purpose Logistics Module, named 

Raffaello. The MPLM is a pressurized cargo 

container used to transport racks, equipment 

and supplies to the International Space Station. 

The MPLM is removed from the Space Shuttle 

cargo bay using the Station’s arm and connected 

to the International Space Station using the 

Common Berthing Mechanism, which locks it in 

place with an airtight seal on the nadir side of 

the Station’s Unity Module. The MPLM has a 

length of 22.4 feet and a diameter of 14.8 feet. 

The MPLM weight at launch, with the cargo it 

contains, will be 18,166 pounds. The planned 

MPLM weight for return to Earth is 

approximately 19,754 pounds. 

Figure 2 MPLM Raffaello 

Multi-Purpose Logistics Module Raffaello in 

the Space Station Processing Facility. 

Raffaello is the second MPLM built by the 

Italian Space Agency, serving as a reusable 

logistics carrier and primary delivery system 

to resupply and return station cargo requiring 

a pressurized environment. 

EXTERNAL STOWAGE PLATFORM-2 (ESP-2) 

Another item carried in the payload bay is the 

External Stowage Platform-2 (ESP-2). ESP-2 is an 

external pallet that can securely hold up to eight 

critical spare parts or Orbital Replacement Units 

for the Station. ESP-2 is a cross-bay carrier since 

it spans the width of the cargo bay and is used 

primarily to transport items to the Station. The 

astronauts will install ESP-2 during a spacewalk 

on the ninth day of the mission. 

A third item carried in the payload bay is called 

the Lightweight Multipurpose Experiment 

Support Structure Carrier (LMC), which will be 

used to transport a replacement Control 

Moment Gyroscope (CMG) and the failed CMG 

on orbit back to Earth. The LMC also will carry a 

large box with a lid, called a Detailed Test 

Objective, that astronauts will open up to 

conduct several tile and Reinforced CarbonCarbon (RCC) panel repair experiments while 

on orbit. The experiment will check the proof of 

concept of one tile and one RCC panel repair 

method. The LMC is a cross-the-bay carrier as 

well. Astronauts will temporally park the old 

CMG on the side of the LMC via a tether, 

remove the new one and install it, and then put 

the old CMG in the same spot as the new CMG 

when launched. 

All three payloads will have electrical power 

drawn from the Space Shuttle for heaters to 

maintain the proper thermal environment while 

on orbit. A switch removes MPLM power 

electronically causing Remotely Operated 

Electrical Umbilical to disconnect, while the 

crew will have to physically disconnect power 

connectors to the ESP-2 and LMC. 

July 2005 PAYLOADS 104
MATERIALS INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION 

EXPERIMENT (MISSE) 

The only way to test how materials will 

perform in space is to test them in space. 

Laboratories can simulate only one or two 

space environmental factors at a time. 

When Shuttle mission STS-105 lifted off from 

the Kennedy Space Center on Aug. 10, 2001, it 

carried the MISSE payload. The initial 

Materials International Space Station 

Experiment consisted of two "suitcases" 

(MISSE 1 and 2) full of materials that were to 

undergo an 18-month exposure test in space. 

The cases, called Passive Experiment 

Containers (PECs), were clamped to the 

exterior of the International Space Station by 

astronauts during a spacewalk. MISSE is the 

only externally mounted U.S. experiment to fly 

on the International Space Station. 

Space is an extremely hazardous vacuum filled 

with lethal radiation, storms of 

micrometeoroids, extreme variations of 

temperature and all manner of man-made 

debris. Any one or a combination of these can 

damage or even destroy unshielded satellites 

and other spacecraft. 

About 1,500 samples were tested on MISSE 1 

and 2. The samples include ultralight 

membranes, composites, ceramics, polymers, 

coatings and radiation shielding. In addition, 

components such as switches, solar cells, 

sensors and mirrors will be evaluated for 

durability and survivability. Seeds, plant 

specimens and bacteria, furnished by students 

at the Wright Patterson Air Force Research 

Laboratory, are also being flown in specially 

designed containers. 

During STS-114, astronauts will remove the 

original MISSE PECs (1 & 2) from the Station 

and install MISSE PEC 5. Like the myriad of 

samples in MISSE PECs 1 & 2, MISSE PEC 5 

will study the degradation of solar cell samples 

in the space environment. PECs 1 & 2 will be 

returned to NASA Langley Research Center 

where they will be opened in a clean room and 

contents distributed to researchers for study. 

Additionally, MISSE PECs 3 and 4 will be 

launched on STS-121 (July 2005) and placed in 

the same location that 1 and 2 previously 

occupied. PECs 3, 4 and 5 will all remain on 

orbit for one year to continue to study the effects 

of space exposure on various materials. The 

MISSE PECs are integrated and flown under the 

direction of the Department of Defense Space 

Test Program’s Human Space Flight Payloads 

Office at NASA’s Johnson Space Center. 

July 2005 PAYLOADS 105
July 2005 PAYLOADS 106
EXPERIMENTS 

DSOs AND DTOs 

Detailed Supplementary 

Objectives (DSOs) are space 

and life science investigations. 

Their purpose is to: 

• Determine the extent of physiological 

deconditioning resulting from spaceflight 

• Test countermeasures to those changes 

• Characterize the environment of the Space 

Shuttle and/or Space Station relative to 

crew health 

Detailed Test Objectives (DTOs) are aimed at 

testing, evaluating or documenting Space 

Shuttle systems or hardware, or proposed 

improvements to the Space Shuttle or Space 

Station hardware, systems and operations. 

Such experiments assigned to STS-114 are 

listed below. 

DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY 

OBJECTIVES 

DSO 206 

EFFECT OF SPACE FLIGHT ON BONE, MUSCLE 

AND IMMUNE FUNCTION(PRE/POST FLIGHT 

ONLY) 

The primary objective of this study is to 

investigate the basic mechanism of the effects 

of spaceflight on the musculoskeletal system 

and immune function during long-term 

spaceflight. The accumulation of these baseline 

data will lead to the development of 

countermeasures for physiological changes of 

musculoskeletal system and immune function 

during long-term spaceflight. 

DSO 490B 

BIOAVAILABILITY AND PERFORMANCE 

EFFECTS OF PROMETHAZINE DURING SPACE 

FLIGHT, PROTOCOL B 

Promethazine (PMZ) is the anti-motion sickness 

medication of choice for treating space motion 

sickness (SMS) during Shuttle missions. The side 

effects associated with PMZ include dizziness, 

drowsiness, sedation and impaired 

psychomotor performance, which could affect 

crew performance of mission operations. Early 

reports from crew members indicate that these 

central nervous system side effects of PMZ are 

absent or greatly reduced in microgravity. The 

pharmacokinetics and bioavailability of 

medications administered in microgravity may 

be different than on Earth. This could 

significantly alter drug efficacy as well as 

severity of side effects for a given dosage. 

Therefore, systematic evaluation of PMZ 

bioavailability, effects on performance, side 

effects and efficacy in the treatment of SMS are 

essential for determining optimal dosage and 

route of administration of PMZ in flight. 

DSO 493 

MONITORING LATENT VIRUS REACTIVATION 

AND SHEDDING IN ASTRONAUTS 

The premise of this DSO is that the incidence 

and duration of latent virus reactivation in 

saliva and urine will increase during spaceflight. 

The objective is to determine the frequency of 

induced reactivation of latent viruses, latent 

virus shedding and clinical disease after 

exposure to the physical, physiological and 

psychological stressors associated with 

spaceflight. 

Spaceflight-induced alterations in the immune 

response become increasingly important on long 

July 2005 EXPERIMENTS 107
missions, particularly the potential for 

reactivation and dissemination (shedding) of 

latent viruses. An example of a latent virus is 

herpes simplex type-1 (HSV-1), which infects 

70 to 80 percent of all adults. Its classic 

manifestations are cold sores, pharyngitis, and 

tonsillitis. It usually is acquired through 

contact with the saliva, skin or mucous 

membranes of an infected individual. 

However, many recurrences are asymptomatic, 

resulting in shedding of the virus. 

DSO 498 

SPACE FLIGHT AND IMMUNE FUNCTION 

(PRE/POST FLIGHT ONLY) 

Astronauts face an increasing risk of 

contracting infectious diseases as they work 

and live for longer periods in the crowded 

conditions and closed environments of 

spacecraft such as the International Space 

Station. The effects of spaceflight on the 

human immune system, which plays a pivotal 

role in warding off infections, is not fully 

understood. Understanding the changes in 

immune function caused by exposure to 

microgravity will allow researchers to develop 

countermeasures to minimize the risk of 

infection. 

The objective of this DSO is to characterize the 

effects of spaceflight on neutrophils, 

monocytes and cytotoxic cells, which play an 

important role in maintaining an effective 

defense against infectious agents. The premise 

of this study is that the space environment 

alters the essential functions of these elements 

of human immune response. 

Researchers will conduct a functional analysis 

of neutrophils and monocytes from blood 

samples taken from astronauts before and after 

the flight. They will assess the subjects' presand post-flight production of cytotoxic cells 

and cytokine. 

This study will complement previous and 

continuing immunology studies of astronauts' 

adaptation to space. 

DSO 499 

EYE MOVEMENTS AND MOTION PERCEPTION 

INDUCED BY OFF-VERTICAL AXIS ROTATION 

(OVAR) AT SMALL ANGLES OF TILT AFTER 

SPACEFLIGHT (PRE/POST FLIGHT ONLY) 

Sensorimotor adaptation to the absence of 

gravity during orbital flight leads to perceptual 

and motor coordination problems upon return 

to Earth. Researchers hypothesize that there are 

adaptive changes in how the central nervous 

system processes gravitational tilt information 

for the vestibular (otolith) system. Eye 

movements and perceptual responses during 

constant velocity off-vertical axis rotation will 

reflect changes in otolith function as crew 

members readapt to Earth's gravity. The time 

course of recovery will be a function of flight 

duration. 

The purpose of this study is to examine changes 

in spatial neural processing of gravitational tilt 

information following adaptation to 

microgravity. Post-flight oculomotor and 

perceptual responses during off-vertical axis 

rotation will be compared with pre-flight 

baselines to track the time course of recovery. 

Comparison of data from short-duration and 

long-duration (International Space Station) crew 

members will allow researchers to assess the 

effect of flight duration. 

DSO 500 

SPACE FLIGHT INDUCED REACTIVATION OF 

LATENT EPSTEIN-BARR VIRUS (PRE/POST 

FLIGHT ONLY) 

The effects of microgravity, along with 

associated physical and psychological stress, 

decrease Epstein-Barr virus (EBV)-specific T-cell 

immunity and reactivate latent EBV in infected 

B-lymphocytes. DSO 500 will examine the 

July 2005 EXPERIMENTS 108
mechanisms of spaceflight-induced alterations 

in human immune function and latent virus 

reactivation. Specifically, this study will 

determine the magnitude of 

immunosuppression as a result of spaceflight 

by analyzing stress hormones, performing 

quantitative analysis of EBV replication using 

molecular and serological methods and 

determining virus-specific T-cell immune 

function. 

DSO 504 

MICROGRAVITY INDUCED CHANGES IN THE 

CONTROL OF MUSCLES (PRE/POST FLIGHT 

ONLY) 

Microgravity-induced detriments in muscle 

function may be mediated through two factors: 

1) changes in muscle mass and mechanical 

properties, and 2) the control of muscles by the 

central nervous system. While there have been 

a number of studies addressing the atrophy 

and fiber type change in astronauts, the effects 

of microgravity on the control aspects of 

muscles have received little attention. The 

proposed work is directed toward filling this 

knowledge gap by focusing on the 

microgravity-induced changes in the neural 

control of muscles. 

The overall goal of this project is to investigate 

the effects of microgravity on the neural 

control of motor units with a given muscle and 

the coordination of a group of muscles 

controlling a given joint. The primary 

objectives for this experiment are: 

1. Document the effects of microgravity on 

the control of motor units in an antigravity 

muscle of the leg. 

2. Study the effects of microgravity on a hand 

muscle. 

3. Study the effects of microgravity on the 

activation of a group of muscles controlling 

one joint. 

4. Determine the course of recovery after being 

re-exposed to gravity. 

DETAILED TEST OBJECTIVES 

DTO 805 

CROSSWIND LANDING PERFORMANCE (DTO OF 

OPPORTUNITY) 

The purpose of this DTO is to demonstrate the 

capability to perform a manually controlled 

landing in the presence of a crosswind. The 

testing is done in two steps. 

1. Pre-launch: Ensure planning will allow 

selection of a runway with Microwave 

Scanning Beam Landing System support, 

which is a set of dual transmitters located 

beside the runway providing precision 

navigation vertically, horizontally and 

longitudinally with respect to the runway. 

This precision navigation subsystem helps 

provide a higher probability of a more 

precise landing with a crosswind of 10 to 15 

knots as late in the flight as possible. 

2. Entry: This test requires that the crew 

perform a manually controlled landing in 

the presence of a 90-degree crosswind 

component of 10 to 15 knots steady state. 

During a crosswind landing, the drag chute will 

be deployed after nose gear touchdown when 

the vehicle is stable and tracking the runway 

centerline. 

July 2005 EXPERIMENTS 109
DTO 848 

ORBITER THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM 

(TPS) REPAIR TECHNIQUES 

For this DTO, STS-114 crew members Soichi 

Noguchi and Steve Robinson will conduct a 

spacewalk side-by-side in Discovery's cargo 

bay at a pallet carrying a variety of damaged 

Shuttle tiles and Reinforced Carbon-Carbon 

samples. Noguchi will work on tile repair, 

demonstrating the use of an Emittance Wash 

Applicator and associated tools. Robinson will 

work with the reinforced carbon-carbon. (See 

"Spacewalk" section for more details.) 

RCC Repair Objectives:

– Evaluate the working life/workability 

of the NOAX (Non-Oxide Adhesive 

Experimental) Crack Repair material 

application. 

Tile Repair Objectives:

– Emittance Wash Applicator – 

Demonstrate application of the 

Emittance Wash material onto a 

damaged sample tile. 

DTO 850 

WATER SPRAY BOILER COOLING WITH 

WATER/PGME ANTIFREEZE 

Water spray boilers, after spraying water, 

freeze every time auxiliary power units are shut 

down and remain frozen for unpredictable 

amounts of time. A solution is to replace water 

as the cooling fluid in the water spray boiler 

tank with an azeotropic mixture of 53 percent 

water and 47 percent propylene glycol 

monomethyl ether (PGME). Tests done at White 

Sands Test Facility in New Mexico show that a 

water/PGME mixture is not likely to freeze in 

the conditions seen on orbit. A water/PGME 

mixture turns to slush at about -40 degrees 

Fahrenheit and freezes at -54 degrees F. 

The plan is to fill only water spray boiler No. 3 

water tank with a water/PGME mixture for 

STS-114 and STS-121. The primary objective is 

to confirm ground test results for water spray 

boiler in the post-ascent, high-vacuum, zero-G 

environment. A secondary objective is to 

confirm coolant usage is within predictions. 

The pilot will perform the water spray boiler 

cooling verification. 

July 2005 EXPERIMENTS 110
SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 

SHUTTLE ABORT MODES 

RSLS Aborts 

These occur when the on-board Shuttle 

computers detect a problem and command a 

halt in the launch sequence after taking over 

from the Ground Launch Sequencer and before 

Solid Rocket Booster ignition. 

Ascent Aborts 

Selection of an ascent abort mode may become 

necessary if there is a failure that affects 

vehicle performance, such as the failure of a 

Space Shuttle main engine or an orbital 

maneuvering system. Other failures requiring 

early termination of a flight, such as a cabin 

leak, might also require the selection of an 

abort mode. There are two basic types of 

ascent abort modes for Space Shuttle missions: 

intact aborts and contingency aborts. Intact 

aborts are designed to provide a safe return of 

the orbiter to a planned landing site. 

Contingency aborts are designed to permit 

flight crew survival following more severe 

failures when an intact abort is not possible. A 

contingency abort would generally result in a 

ditch operation. 

Intact Aborts 

There are four types of intact aborts: abort to 

orbit (ATO), abort once around (AOA), 

transoceanic abort landing (TAL) and return to 

launch site (RTLS). 

Return to Launch Site 

The RTLS abort mode is designed to allow the 

return of the orbiter, crew and payload to the 

launch site, Kennedy Space Center, 

approximately 25 minutes after liftoff. 

The RTLS profile is designed to accommodate 

the loss of thrust from one Space Shuttle main 

 engine between liftoff and approximately four 

minutes 20 seconds, at which time not enough 

main propulsion system propellant remains to 

return to the launch site. An RTLS can be 

considered to consist of three stages--a powered 

stage, during which the Space Shuttle main 

engines are still thrusting; an External Tank 

separation phase; and the glide phase, during 

which the orbiter glides to a landing at the 

Kennedy Space Center. The powered RTLS 

phase begins with the crew selection of the RTLS 

abort, which is done after solid rocket booster 

separation. The crew selects the abort mode by 

positioning the abort rotary switch to RTLS and 

depressing the abort push button. The time at 

which the RTLS is selected depends on the 

reason for the abort. For example, a three-engine 

RTLS is selected at the last moment, about 3 

minutes, 34 seconds into the mission; whereas 

an RTLS chosen due to an engine out at liftoff is 

selected at the earliest time, about 2 minutes, 

20 seconds into the mission (after solid rocket 

booster separation). 

After RTLS is selected, the vehicle continues 

downrange to dissipate excess main propulsion 

system propellant. The goal is to leave only 

enough main propulsion system propellant to be 

able to turn the vehicle around, fly back toward 

the Kennedy Space Center and achieve the 

proper main engine cutoff conditions so the 

vehicle can glide to the Kennedy Space Center 

after external tank separation. During the 

downrange phase, a pitch-around maneuver is 

initiated (the time depends in part on the time of 

a Space Shuttle main engine failure) to orient the 

orbiter/external tank configuration to a headsup attitude, pointing toward the launch site. At 

this time, the vehicle is still moving away from 

the launch site, but the Space Shuttle main 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 111
engines are now thrusting to null the 

downrange velocity. In addition, excess orbital 

maneuvering system and reaction control 

system propellants are dumped by continuous 

orbital maneuvering system and reaction 

control system engine thrustings to improve 

the orbiter weight and center of gravity for the 

glide phase and landing. 

The vehicle will reach the desired main engine 

cutoff point with less than 2 percent excess 

propellant remaining in the External Tank. At 

main engine cutoff minus 20 seconds, a pitch 

down maneuver (called powered pitch-down) 

takes the mated vehicle to the required 

external tank separation attitude and pitch 

rate. After main engine cutoff has been 

commanded, the external tank separation 

sequence begins, including a reaction control 

system translation that ensures that the Orbiter 

does not recontact the External Tank and that 

the Orbiter has achieved the necessary pitch 

attitude to begin the glide phase of the RTLS. 

After the reaction control system translation 

maneuver has been completed, the glide phase 

of the RTLS begins. From then on, the RTLS is 

handled similarly to a normal entry. 

Transoceanic Abort Landing 

The TAL abort mode was developed to 

improve the options available when a Space 

Shuttle main engine fails after the last RTLS 

opportunity but before the first time that an 

AOA can be accomplished with only two 

Space Shuttle main engines or when a major 

orbiter system failure, for example, a large 

cabin pressure leak or cooling system failure, 

occurs after the last RTLS opportunity, making 

it imperative to land as quickly as possible. 

In a TAL abort, the vehicle continues on a 

ballistic trajectory across the Atlantic Ocean to 

land at a predetermined runway. Landing 

occurs about 45 minutes after launch. The 

landing site is selected near the nominal ascent 

ground track of the orbiter to make the most 

efficient use of Space Shuttle main engine 

propellant. The landing site also must have the 

necessary runway length, weather conditions 

and U.S. State Department approval. The three 

landing sites that have been identified for a due 

east launch are Zaragoza, Spain; Moron, Spain; 

and Istres, France. 

To select the TAL abort mode, the crew must 

place the abort rotary switch in the TAL/AOA 

position and depress the abort push button 

before main engine cutoff. (Depressing it after 

main engine cutoff selects the AOA abort mode.) 

The TAL abort mode begins sending commands 

to steer the vehicle toward the plane of the 

landing site. It also rolls the vehicle heads up 

before main engine cutoff and sends commands 

to begin an orbital maneuvering system 

propellant dump (by burning the propellants 

through the orbital maneuvering system engines 

and the reaction control system engines). This 

dump is necessary to increase vehicle 

performance (by decreasing weight), to place the 

center of gravity in the proper place for vehicle 

control and to decrease the vehicle's landing 

weight. TAL is handled like a nominal entry. 

Abort to Orbit 

An ATO is an abort mode used to boost the 

orbiter to a safe orbital altitude when 

performance has been lost and it is impossible to 

reach the planned orbital altitude. If a Space 

Shuttle main engine fails in a region that results 

in a main engine cutoff under speed, the Mission 

Control Center will determine that an abort 

mode is necessary and will inform the crew. The 

orbital maneuvering system engines would be 

used to place the orbiter in a circular orbit. 

Abort Once Around 

The AOA abort mode is used in cases in which 

vehicle performance has been lost to such an 

extent that either it is impossible to achieve a 

viable orbit or not enough orbital maneuvering 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 112
system propellant is available to accomplish 

the orbital maneuvering system thrusting 

maneuver to place the orbiter on orbit and the 

deorbit thrusting maneuver. In addition, an 

AOA is used in cases in which a major systems 

problem (cabin leak, loss of cooling) makes it 

necessary to land quickly. In the AOA abort 

mode, one orbital maneuvering system 

thrusting sequence is made to adjust the postmain engine cutoff orbit so a second orbital 

maneuvering system thrusting sequence will 

result in the vehicle deorbiting and landing at 

the AOA landing site (White Sands, N.M.; 

Edwards Air Force Base; or the Kennedy Space 

Center). Thus, an AOA results in the orbiter 

circling the Earth once and landing about 

90 minutes after liftoff. 

After the deorbit thrusting sequence has been 

executed, the flight crew flies to a landing at 

the planned site much as it would for a 

nominal entry. 

CONTINGENCY ABORTS 

Contingency aborts are caused by loss of more 

than one main engine or failures in other 

systems. Loss of one main engine while 

another is stuck at a low thrust setting may 

also necessitate a contingency abort. Such an 

abort would maintain orbiter integrity for inflight crew escape if a landing cannot be 

achieved at a suitable landing field. 

Contingency aborts due to system failures 

other than those involving the main engines 

would normally result in an intact recovery of 

vehicle and crew. Loss of more than one main 

engine may, depending on engine failure 

times, result in a safe runway landing. 

However, in most three-engine-out cases 

during ascent, the orbiter would have to be 

ditched. The inflight crew escape system 

would be used before ditching the orbiter. 

Abort Decisions 

There is a definite order of preference for the 

various abort modes. The type of failure and the 

time of the failure determine which type of abort is 

selected. In cases where performance loss is the 

only factor, the preferred modes would be ATO, 

AOA, TAL and RTLS, in that order. The mode 

chosen is the highest one that can be completed 

with the remaining vehicle performance. 

In the case of some support system failures, such 

as cabin leaks or vehicle cooling problems, the 

preferred mode might be the one that will end 

the mission most quickly. In these cases, TAL or 

RTLS might be preferable to AOA or ATO. A 

contingency abort is never chosen if another abort 

option exists. 

The Mission Control Center-Houston is prime for 

calling these aborts because it has a more precise 

knowledge of the orbiter's position than the crew 

can obtain from on-board systems. Before main 

engine cutoff, Mission Control makes periodic 

calls to the crew to tell them which abort mode is 

(or is not) available. If ground communications 

are lost, the flight crew has on-board methods, 

such as cue cards, dedicated displays and display 

information, to determine the abort region. 

Which abort mode is selected depends on the 

cause and timing of the failure causing the abort 

and which mode is safest or improves mission 

success. If the problem is a Space Shuttle main 

engine failure, the flight crew and Mission 

Control Center select the best option available at 

the time a main engine fails. 

If the problem is a system failure that 

jeopardizes the vehicle, the fastest abort mode 

that results in the earliest vehicle landing is 

chosen. RTLS and TAL are the quickest options 

(35 minutes), whereas an AOA requires about 

90 minutes. Which of these is selected depends 

on the time of the failure with three good Space 

Shuttle main engines. 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 113
The flight crew selects the abort mode by 

positioning an abort mode switch and 

depressing an abort push button. 

SHUTTLE ABORT HISTORY 

RSLS Abort History: 

(STS-41 D) June 26, 1984 

The countdown for the second launch attempt 

for Discovery’s maiden flight ended at T-4 

seconds when the orbiter’s computers detected 

a sluggish valve in main engine No. 3.The 

main engine was replaced and Discovery was 

finally launched on Aug. 30, 1984. 

(STS-51 F) July 12, 1985 

The countdown for Challenger’s launch was 

halted at T-3 seconds when on-board 

computers detected a problem with a coolant 

valve on main engine No. 2. The valve was 

replaced and Challenger was launched on 

July 29, 1985. 

(STS-55) March 22, 1993 

The countdown for Columbia’s launch was 

halted by on-board computers at T-3 seconds 

following a problem with purge pressure 

readings in the oxidizer preburner on main 

engine No. 2 Columbia’s three main engines 

were replaced on the launch pad, and the flight 

was rescheduled behind Discovery’s launch on 

STS-56. Columbia finally launched on 

April 26, 1993. 

(STS-51) Aug. 12, 1993 

The countdown for Discovery’s third launch 

attempt ended at the T-3 second mark when 

onboard computers detected the failure of one 

of four sensors in main engine No. 2 which 

monitor the flow of hydrogen fuel to the 

engine. All of Discovery’s main engines were 

ordered replaced on the launch pad, delaying 

the Shuttle’s fourth launch attempt until 

Sept. 12, 1993. 

(STS-68) August 18, 1994 

The countdown for Endeavour’s first launch 

attempt ended 1.9 seconds before liftoff when 

on-board computers detected higher than 

acceptable readings in one channel of a sensor 

monitoring the discharge temperature of the 

high pressure oxidizer turbopump in main 

engine No. 3. A test firing of the engine at the 

Stennis Space Center in Mississippi on 

September 2nd confirmed that a slight drift in a 

fuel flow meter in the engine caused a slight 

increase in the turbopump’s temperature. The 

test firing also confirmed a slightly slower start 

for main engine No. 3 during the pad abort, 

which could have contributed to the higher 

temperatures. After Endeavour was brought 

back to the Vehicle 

Assembly Building to be outfitted with three 

replacement engines, NASA managers set Oct. 2 

as the date for Endeavour’s second launch 

attempt. 

Abort to Orbit History: 

(STS-51 F) July 29, 1985 

After an RSLS abort on July 12, 1985, Challenger 

was launched on July 29, 1985. Five minutes and 

45 seconds after launch, a sensor problem 

resulted in the shutdown of center engine No. 1, 

resulting in a safe "abort to orbit" and successful 

completion of the mission. 

SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES 

Developed in the 1970s by NASA's Marshall 

Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Ala., the 

Space Shuttle Main Engine is the most advanced 

liquid-fueled rocket engine ever built. Its main 

features include variable thrust, high 

performance, reusability, high redundancy and 

a fully integrated engine controller. 

The Shuttle’s three main engines are mounted 

on the orbiter aft fuselage in a triangular pattern. 

Spaced so that they are movable during launch, 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 114
the engines are used – in conjunction with the 

Solid Rocket Boosters – to steer the Shuttle 

vehicle. 

Each of these powerful main engines is 14 feet 

(4.2 meters) long, weighs about 7,000 pounds 

(3,150 kilograms) and is 7.5 feet (2.25 meters) in 

diameter at the end of its nozzle. 

The engines operate for about 8 1/2 minutes 

during liftoff and ascent -- burning more than 

500,000 gallons (1.9 million liters) of super-cold 

liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen propellants 

stored in the huge External Tank attached to 

the underside of the Shuttle. The engines shut 

down just before the Shuttle, traveling at about 

17,000 mph (28,000 kilometers per hour), 

reaches orbit. 

The main engine operates at greater 

temperature extremes than any mechanical 

system in common use today. The fuel, 

liquefied hydrogen at -423 degrees Fahrenheit 

(-253 degrees Celsius), is the second coldest 

liquid on Earth. When it and the liquid oxygen 

are combusted, the temperature in the main 

combustion chamber is 6,000 degrees 

Fahrenheit (3,316 degrees Celsius), hotter than 

the boiling point of iron. 

The main engines use a staged combustion 

cycle so that all propellants entering the 

engines are used to produce thrust or power -- 

more efficiently than any previous rocket 

engine. In a staged combustion cycle, 

propellants are first burned partially at high 

pressure and relatively low temperature -- then 

burned completely at high temperature and 

pressure in the main combustion chamber. The 

rapid mixing of the propellants under these 

conditions is so complete that 99 percent of the 

fuel is burned. 

At normal operating level, the engines 

generate 490,847 pounds of thrust (measured 

in a vacuum). Full power is 512,900 pounds of 

thrust; minimum power is 316,100 pounds of 

thrust. 

The engine can be throttled by varying the 

output of the pre-burners, thus varying the 

speed of the high-pressure turbopumps and, 

therefore, the flow of the propellant. 

At about 26 seconds into launch, the main 

engines are throttled down to 316,000 pounds of 

thrust to keep the dynamic pressure on the 

vehicle below a specified level -- about 580 

pounds per square foot or max q. Then, the 

engines are throttled back up to normal 

operating level at about 60 seconds. This reduces 

stress on the vehicle. 

The main engines are throttled down again at 

about seven minutes, 40 seconds into the 

mission to maintain three g’s – three times the 

Earth’s gravitational pull – again reducing stress 

on the crew and the vehicle. This acceleration 

level is about one-third the acceleration 

experienced on previous crewed space vehicles. 

About 10 seconds before Main Engine Cutoff or 

MECO, the cutoff sequence begins; about three 

seconds later the main engines are commanded 

to begin throttling at 10 percent thrust per 

second to 65 percent thrust. This is held for 

about 6.7 seconds, and the engines are shut 

down. 

The engine performance has the highest thrust 

for its weight of any engine yet developed. In 

fact, one Space Shuttle Main Engine generates 

sufficient thrust to maintain the flight of 2 1/2 

747 airplanes. 

The Space Shuttle Main Engine is also the first 

rocket engine to use a built-in electronic digital 

controller, or computer. The controller will 

accept commands from the orbiter for engine 

start, change in throttle, shutdown, and monitor 

engine operation. In the event of a failure, the 

controller automatically corrects the problem or 

safely shuts down the engine. 

NASA continues to increase the reliability and 

safety of Shuttle flights through a series of 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 115
enhancements to the Space Shuttle Main 

Engines. The engines were modified in 1988, 

1995, 1998 and 2001. Modifications include 

new high-pressure fuel and oxidizer 

turbopumps that reduce maintenance and 

operating costs of the engine, a two-duct 

powerhead that reduces pressure and 

turbulence in the engine, and a single-coil heat 

exchanger that lowers the number of post 

flight inspections required. Another 

modification incorporates a large-throat main 

combustion chamber that improves the 

engine’s reliability by reducing pressure and 

temperature in the chamber. 

After the orbiter lands, the engines are 

removed and returned to a processing facility 

at Kennedy Space Center, Fla., where they are 

rechecked and readied for the next flight. Some 

components are returned to the main engine’s 

prime contractor, Rocketdyne Propulsion & 

Power unit of the Boeing Company, Canoga 

Park, Calif., for regular maintenance. The main 

engines are designed to operate for 7.5 

accumulated hours. 

SPACE SHUTTLE SOLID ROCKET 

BOOSTERS 

The two SRBs provide the main thrust to lift 

the Space Shuttle off the pad and up to an 

altitude of about 150,000 feet, or 24 nautical 

miles (28 statute miles). In addition, the two 

SRBs carry the entire weight of the External 

Tank and Orbiter and transmit the weight load 

through their structure to the mobile launcher 

platform. 

Each booster has a thrust (sea level) of about 

3,300,000 pounds at launch. They are ignited 

after the three Space Shuttle main engines' 

thrust level is verified. The two SRBs provide 

71.4 percent of the thrust at liftoff and during 

first-stage ascent. Seventy-five seconds after 

SRB separation, SRB apogee occurs at an 

altitude of about 220,000 feet, or 35 nautical 

miles (40 statute miles). SRB impact occurs in 

the ocean about 122 nautical miles (140 statute 

miles) downrange. 

The SRBs are the largest solid-propellant motors 

ever flown and the first designed for reuse. Each 

is 149.16 feet long and 12.17 feet in diameter. 

Each SRB weighs about 1,300,000 pounds at 

launch. The propellant for each solid rocket 

motor weighs about 1,100,000 pounds. The inert 

weight of each SRB is about 192,000 pounds. 

Primary elements of each booster are the motor 

(including case, propellant, igniter and nozzle), 

structure, separation systems, operational flight 

instrumentation, recovery avionics, 

pyrotechnics, deceleration system, thrust vector 

control system and range safety destruct system. 

Each booster is attached to the External Tank at 

the SRB’s aft frame by two lateral sway braces 

and a diagonal attachment. The forward end of 

each SRB is attached to the External Tank at the 

forward end of the SRB’s forward skirt. On the 

launch pad, each booster also is attached to the 

mobile launcher platform at the aft skirt by four 

bolts and nuts that are severed by small 

explosives at liftoff. 

During the downtime following the Challenger 

accident, detailed structural analyses were 

performed on critical structural elements of the 

SRB. Analyses were primarily focused in areas 

where anomalies had been noted during 

postflight inspection of recovered hardware. 

One of the areas was the attach ring where the 

SRBs are connected to the External Tank. Areas 

of distress were noted in some of the fasteners 

where the ring attaches to the SRB motor case. 

This situation was attributed to the high loads 

encountered during water impact. To correct the 

situation and ensure higher strength margins 

during ascent, the attach ring was redesigned to 

encircle the motor case completely (360 degrees). 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 116
Previously, the attach ring formed a C and 

encircled the motor case 270 degrees. 

Additionally, special structural tests were done 

on the aft skirt. During this test program, an 

anomaly occurred in a critical weld between 

the hold-down post and skin of the skirt. A 

redesign was implemented to add 

reinforcement brackets and fittings in the aft 

ring of the skirt. 

These two modifications added about 450 

pounds to the weight of each SRB. 

The propellant mixture in each SRB motor 

consists of an ammonium perchlorate 

(oxidizer, 69.6 percent by weight), aluminum 

(fuel, 16 percent), iron oxide (a catalyst, 0.4 

percent), a polymer (a binder that holds the 

mixture together, 12.04 percent), and an epoxy 

curing agent (1.96 percent). The propellant is 

an 11-point star-shaped perforation in the 

forward motor segment and a doubletruncated-cone perforation in each of the aft 

segments and aft closure. This configuration 

provides high thrust at ignition and then 

reduces the thrust by about a third 50 seconds 

after liftoff to prevent overstressing the vehicle 

during maximum dynamic pressure. 

The SRBs are used as matched pairs and each 

is made up of four solid rocket motor 

segments. The pairs are matched by loading 

each of the four motor segments in pairs from 

the same batches of propellant ingredients to 

minimize any thrust imbalance. The 

segmented-casing design assures maximum 

flexibility in fabrication and ease of 

transportation and handling. Each segment is 

shipped to the launch site on a heavy-duty rail 

car with a specially built cover. 

The nozzle expansion ratio of each booster 

beginning with the STS-8 mission is 7-to-79. 

The nozzle is gimbaled for thrust vector 

(direction) control. Each SRB has its own 

redundant auxiliary power units and hydraulic 

pumps. The all-axis gimbaling capability is 8 

degrees. Each nozzle has a carbon cloth liner 

that erodes and chars during firing. The nozzle 

is a convergent-divergent, movable design in 

which an aft pivot-point flexible bearing is the 

gimbal mechanism. 

The cone- shaped aft skirt reacts the aft loads 

between the SRB and the mobile launcher 

platform. The four aft separation motors are 

mounted on the skirt. The aft section contains 

avionics, a thrust vector control system that 

consists of two auxiliary power units and 

hydraulic pumps, hydraulic systems and a 

nozzle extension jettison system. 

The forward section of each booster contains 

avionics, a sequencer, forward separation 

motors, a nose cone separation system, drogue 

and main parachutes, a recovery beacon, a 

recovery light, a parachute camera on selected 

flights and a range safety system. 

Each SRB has two integrated electronic 

assemblies, one forward and one aft. After 

burnout, the forward assembly initiates the 

release of the nose cap and frustum and turns on 

the recovery aids. The aft assembly, mounted in 

the external tank/SRB attach ring, connects with 

the forward assembly and the orbiter avionics 

systems for SRB ignition commands and nozzle 

thrust vector control. Each integrated electronic 

assembly has a multiplexer/demultiplexer, 

which sends or receives more than one message, 

signal or unit of information on a single 

communication channel. 

Eight booster separation motors (four in the 

nose frustum and four in the aft skirt) of each 

SRB thrust for 1.02 seconds at SRB separation 

from the external tank. Each solid rocket 

separation motor is 31.1 inches long and 

12.8 inches in diameter. 

Location aids are provided for each SRB, 

frustum/drogue chutes and main parachutes. 

These include a transmitter, antenna, 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 117
strobe/converter, battery and salt-water switch 

electronics. The location aids are designed for a 

minimum operating life of 72 hours and when 

refurbished are considered usable up to 20 

times. The flashing light is an exception. It has 

an operating life of 280 hours. The battery is 

used only once. 

The SRB nose caps and nozzle extensions are 

not recovered. 

The recovery crew retrieves the SRBs, 

frustum/drogue chutes, and main parachutes. 

The nozzles are plugged, the solid rocket 

motors are dewatered, and the SRBs are towed 

back to the launch site. Each booster is 

removed from the water, and its components 

are disassembled and washed with fresh and 

deionized water to limit salt-water corrosion. 

The motor segments, igniter and nozzle are 

shipped back to ATK Thiokol for 

refurbishment. 

Each SRB incorporates a range safety system 

that includes a battery power source, 

receiver/decoder, antennas and ordnance. 

Hold-Down Posts 

Each solid rocket booster has four hold-down 

posts that fit into corresponding support posts 

on the mobile launcher platform. Hold-down 

bolts hold the SRB and launcher platform posts 

together. Each bolt has a nut at each end, but 

only the top nut is frangible. The top nut 

contains two NASA Standard Detonators 

(NSDs), which are ignited at solid rocket motor 

ignition commands. 

When the two NSDs are ignited at each holddown, the hold-down bolt travels downward 

because of the release of tension in the bolt 

(pretensioned before launch), NSD gas 

pressure and gravity. The bolt is stopped by 

the stud deceleration stand, which contains 

sand. The SRB bolt is 28 inches long and 

3.5 inches in diameter. The frangible nut is 

captured in a blast container. 

The solid rocket motor ignition commands are 

issued by the orbiter’s computers through the 

master events controllers to the hold-down 

pyrotechnic initiator controllers on the mobile 

launcher platform. They provide the ignition to 

the hold-down NSDs. The launch processing 

system monitors the SRB hold-down PICs for 

low voltage during the last 16 seconds before 

launch. PIC low voltage will initiate a launch 

hold. 

SRB Ignition 

SRB ignition can occur only when a manual lock 

pin from each SRB safe and arm device has been 

removed. The ground crew removes the pin 

during prelaunch activities. At T minus five 

minutes, the SRB safe and arm device is rotated 

to the arm position. The solid rocket motor 

ignition commands are issued when the three 

SSMEs are at or above 90 percent rated thrust, 

no SSME fail and/or SRB ignition PIC low 

voltage is indicated and there are no holds from 

the LPS. 

The solid rocket motor ignition commands are 

sent by the orbiter computers through the MECs 

to the safe and arm device NSDs in each SRB. A 

PIC single-channel capacitor discharge device 

controls the firing of each pyrotechnic device. 

Three signals must be present simultaneously 

for the PIC to generate the pyro firing output. 

These signals--arm, fire 1 and fire 2--originate in 

the orbiter general-purpose computers and are 

transmitted to the MECs. The MECs reformat 

them to 28-volt dc signals for the PICs. The arm 

signal charges the PIC capacitor to 40 volts dc 

(minimum of 20 volts dc). 

The fire 2 commands cause the redundant NSDs 

to fire through a thin barrier seal down a flame 

tunnel. This ignites a pyro booster charge, which 

is retained in the safe and arm device behind a 

perforated plate. The booster charge ignites the 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 118
propellant in the igniter initiator; and 

combustion products of this propellant ignite 

the solid rocket motor initiator, which fires 

down the length of the solid rocket motor 

igniting the solid rocket motor propellant. 

The GPC launch sequence also controls certain 

critical main propulsion system valves and 

monitors the engine-ready indications from the 

SSMEs. The MPS start commands are issued by 

the on-board computers at T minus 6.6 seconds 

(staggered start--engine three, engine two, 

engine one--all about within 0.25 of a second), 

and the sequence monitors the thrust buildup 

of each engine. All three SSMEs must reach the 

required 90 percent thrust within three 

seconds; otherwise, an orderly shutdown is 

commanded and safing functions are initiated. 

Normal thrust buildup to the required 90 

percent thrust level will result in the SSMEs 

being commanded to the liftoff position at 

T minus three seconds as well as the fire 1 

command being issued to arm the SRBs. At 

T minus three seconds, the vehicle base 

bending load modes are allowed to initialize 

(movement of 25.5 inches measured at the tip 

of the external tank, with movement towards 

the external tank). 

At T minus zero, the two SRBs are ignited 

under command of the four on-board 

computers; separation of the four explosive 

bolts on each SRB is initiated (each bolt is 28 

inches long and 3.5 inches in diameter); the 

two T-0 umbilicals (one on each side of the 

spacecraft) are retracted; the on-board master 

timing unit, event timer and mission event 

timers are started; the three SSMEs are at 100 

percent; and the ground launch sequence is 

terminated. 

The solid rocket motor thrust profile is tailored 

to reduce thrust during the maximum dynamic 

pressure region. 

Electrical Power Distribution 

Electrical power distribution in each SRB 

consists of orbiter-supplied main dc bus power 

to each SRB via SRB buses A, B and C. Orbiter 

main dc buses A, B and C supply main dc bus 

power to corresponding SRB buses A, B and C. 

In addition, orbiter main dc bus C supplies 

backup power to SRB buses A and B, and orbiter 

bus B supplies backup power to SRB bus C. This 

electrical power distribution arrangement allows 

all SRB buses to remain powered in the event 

one orbiter main bus fails. 

The nominal dc voltage is 28 volts dc, with an 

upper limit of 32 volts dc and a lower limit of 

24 volts dc. 

Hydraulic Power Units 

There are two self-contained, independent 

HPUs on each SRB. Each HPU consists of an 

auxiliary power unit, fuel supply module, 

hydraulic pump, hydraulic reservoir and 

hydraulic fluid manifold assembly. The APUs 

are fueled by hydrazine and generate 

mechanical shaft power to a hydraulic pump 

that produces hydraulic pressure for the SRB 

hydraulic system. The two separate HPUs and 

two hydraulic systems are located on the aft end 

of each SRB between the SRB nozzle and aft 

skirt. The HPU components are mounted on the 

aft skirt between the rock and tilt actuators. The 

two systems operate from T minus 28 seconds 

until SRB separation from the orbiter and 

external tank. The two independent hydraulic 

systems are connected to the rock and tilt 

servoactuators. 

The APU controller electronics are located in the 

SRB aft integrated electronic assemblies on the 

aft external tank attach rings. 

The APUs and their fuel systems are isolated 

from each other. Each fuel supply module (tank) 

contains 22 pounds of hydrazine. The fuel tank 

is pressurized with gaseous nitrogen at 400 psi, 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 119
which provides the force to expel (positive 

expulsion) the fuel from the tank to the fuel 

distribution line, maintaining a positive fuel 

supply to the APU throughout its operation. 

The fuel isolation valve is opened at APU 

startup to allow fuel to flow to the APU fuel 

pump and control valves and then to the gas 

generator. The gas generator's catalytic action 

decomposes the fuel and creates a hot gas. It 

feeds the hot gas exhaust product to the APU 

two-stage gas turbine. Fuel flows primarily 

through the startup bypass line until the APU 

speed is such that the fuel pump outlet 

pressure is greater than the bypass line's. Then 

all the fuel is supplied to the fuel pump. 

The APU turbine assembly provides 

mechanical power to the APU gearbox. The 

gearbox drives the APU fuel pump, hydraulic 

pump and lube oil pump. The APU lube oil 

pump lubricates the gearbox. The turbine 

exhaust of each APU flows over the exterior of 

the gas generator, cooling it, and is then 

directed overboard through an exhaust duct. 

When the APU speed reaches 100 percent, the 

APU primary control valve closes, and the 

APU speed is controlled by the APU controller 

electronics. If the primary control valve logic 

fails to the open state, the secondary control 

valve assumes control of the APU at 112 

percent speed. 

Each HPU on an SRB is connected to both 

servoactuators on that SRB. One HPU serves as 

the primary hydraulic source for the 

servoactuator, and the other HPU serves as the 

secondary hydraulics for the servoactuator. 

Each servoactuator has a switching valve that 

allows the secondary hydraulics to power the 

actuator if the primary hydraulic pressure 

drops below 2,050 psi. A switch contact on the 

switching valve will close when the valve is in 

the secondary position. When the valve is 

closed, a signal is sent to the APU controller 

that inhibits the 100 percent APU speed control 

logic and enables the 112 percent APU speed 

control logic. The 100 percent APU speed 

enables one APU/HPU to supply sufficient 

operating hydraulic pressure to both 

servoactuators of that SRB. 

The APU 100 percent speed corresponds to 

72,000 rpm, 110 percent to 79,200 rpm, and 

112 percent to 80,640 rpm. 

The hydraulic pump speed is 3,600 rpm and 

supplies hydraulic pressure of 3,050, plus or 

minus 50, psi. A high-pressure relief valve 

provides overpressure protection to the 

hydraulic system and relieves at 3,750 psi. 

The APUs/HPUs and hydraulic systems are 

reusable for 20 missions. 

Thrust Vector Control 

Each SRB has two hydraulic gimbal 

servoactuators: one for rock and one for tilt. The 

servoactuators provide the force and control to 

gimbal the nozzle for thrust vector control. 

The Space Shuttle ascent thrust vector control 

portion of the flight control system directs the 

thrust of the three Shuttle main engines and the 

two SRB nozzles to control Shuttle attitude and 

trajectory during liftoff and ascent. Commands 

from the guidance system are transmitted to the 

ATVC drivers, which transmit signals 

proportional to the commands to each 

servoactuator of the main engines and SRBs. 

Four independent flight control system channels 

and four ATVC channels control six main 

engine and four SRB ATVC drivers, with each 

driver controlling one hydraulic port on each 

main and SRB servoactuator. 

Each SRB servoactuator consists of four 

independent, two-stage servovalves that receive 

signals from the drivers. Each servovalve 

controls one power spool in each actuator, 

which positions an actuator ram and the nozzle 

to control the direction of thrust. 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 120
The four servovalves in each actuator provide 

a force-summed majority voting arrangement 

to position the power spool. With four 

identical commands to the four servovalves, 

the actuator force-sum action prevents a single 

erroneous command from affecting power ram 

motion. If the erroneous command persists for 

more than a predetermined time, differential 

pressure sensing activates a selector valve to 

isolate and remove the defective servovalve 

hydraulic pressure, permitting the remaining 

channels and servovalves to control the 

actuator ram spool. 

Failure monitors are provided for each channel 

to indicate which channel has been bypassed. 

An isolation valve on each channel provides 

the capability of resetting a failed or bypassed 

channel. 

Each actuator ram is equipped with 

transducers for position feedback to the thrust 

vector control system. Within each 

servoactuator ram is a splashdown load relief 

assembly to cushion the nozzle at water 

splashdown and prevent damage to the nozzle 

flexible bearing. 

SRB Rate Gyro Assemblies 

Each SRB contains two RGAs, with each RGA 

containing one pitch and one yaw gyro. These 

provide an output proportional to angular 

rates about the pitch and yaw axes to the 

orbiter computers and guidance, navigation 

and control system during first-stage ascent 

flight in conjunction with the orbiter roll rate 

gyros until SRB separation. At SRB separation, 

a switchover is made from the SRB RGAs to 

the orbiter RGAs. 

The SRB RGA rates pass through the orbiter 

flight aft multiplexers/ demultiplexers to the 

orbiter GPCs. The RGA rates are then midvalue- selected in redundancy management to 

provide SRB pitch and yaw rates to the user 

software. The RGAs are designed for 20 

missions. 

SRB Separation 

SRB separation is initiated when the three solid 

rocket motor chamber pressure transducers are 

processed in the redundancy management 

middle value select and the head-end chamber 

pressure of both SRBs is less than or equal to 50 

psi. A backup cue is the time elapsed from 

booster ignition. 

The separation sequence is initiated, 

commanding the thrust vector control actuators 

to the null position and putting the main 

propulsion system into a second-stage 

configuration (0.8 second from sequence 

initialization), which ensures the thrust of each 

SRB is less than 100,000 pounds. Orbiter yaw 

attitude is held for four seconds, and SRB thrust 

drops to less than 60,000 pounds. 

The SRBs separate from the external tank within 

30 milliseconds of the ordnance firing 

command. 

The forward attachment point consists of a ball 

(SRB) and socket (ET) held together by one bolt. 

The bolt contains one NSD pressure cartridge at 

each end. The forward attachment point also 

carries the range safety system cross-strap 

wiring connecting each SRB RSS and the ET RSS 

with each other. 

The aft attachment points consist of three 

separate struts: upper, diagonal and lower. 

Each strut contains one bolt with an NSD 

pressure cartridge at each end. The upper strut 

also carries the umbilical interface between its 

SRB and the external tank and on to the orbiter. 

There are four booster separation motors on 

each end of each SRB. The BSMs separate the 

SRBs from the external tank. The solid rocket 

motors in each cluster of four are ignited by 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 121
firing redundant NSD pressure cartridges into 

redundant confined detonating fuse manifolds. 

The separation commands issued from the 

orbiter by the SRB separation sequence initiate 

the redundant NSD pressure cartridge in each 

bolt and ignite the BSMs to effect a clean 

separation. 

SPACE SHUTTLE SUPER LIGHT WEIGHT 

TANK (SLWT) 

The super lightweight external tank (SLWT) 

made its first Shuttle flight June 2, 1998, on 

mission STS-91. The SLWT is 7,500 pounds 

lighter than the standard external tank. The 

lighter weight tank allows the Shuttle to deliver 

International Space Station elements (such as 

the service module) into the proper orbit. 

The SLWT is the same size as the previous 

design. But the liquid hydrogen tank and the 

liquid oxygen tank are made of aluminum 

lithium, a lighter, stronger material than the 

metal alloy used for the Shuttle's current tank. 

The tank's structural design has also been 

improved, making it 30 percent stronger and 

5 percent less dense. 

The SLWT, like the standard tank, is 

manufactured at Michoud Assembly, near New 

Orleans, by Lockheed Martin. 

The 154-foot-long External Tank is the largest 

single component of the Space Shuttle. It stands 

taller than a 15-story building and has a 

diameter of about 27 feet. The External Tank 

holds over 530,000 gallons of liquid hydrogen 

and liquid oxygen in two separate tanks. The 

hydrogen (fuel) and liquid oxygen (oxidizer) 

are used as propellants for the Shuttle's three 

main engines. 

July 2005 SHUTTLE REFERENCE DATA 122
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

A/L Airlock 

AA Antenna Assembly 

AAA Avionics Air Assembly 

ABC Audio Bus Coupler 

AC Assembly Complete 

ACBM Active Common Berthing System 

ACS Assembly Contingency System 

ACS Atmosphere Control and Supply 

ACS Attitude Control System 

ACSM Attitude Control System Moding 

ACU Arm Computer Unit 

AEA Antenna Electronics Assembly 

AOH Assembly Operations Handbook 

APAS Androgynous Peripheral Attach System 

APAS Androgynous Peripheral Attachment System 

APCU Assembly Power Converter Unit 

APDS Androgynous Peripheral Docking System 

APFR Articulating Portable Foot Restraint 

APM Attached Pressurized Module 

APPCM Arm Pitch Plane Change Mode 

AR Atmosphere Revitalization 

ARCU American-to-Russian Converter Units 

ARIS Active Rack Isolation System 

ARS Air Revitalization System 

ARS Atmosphere Revitalization Subsystem 

ASCR Assured Safe Crew Return 

ATA Ammonia Tank Assembly 

ATCS Active Thermal Control System 

ATU Audio Terminal units 

AUAI Assembly Contingency System/UHF Audio Interface 

AVU Advanced Vision Unit 

AVU Artificial Vision Unit 

AVV Accumulator Vent Valve 

BBC Bolt Bus Controller 

BC Bus Controller 

BCDU Battery Charge/Discharge Unit 

BCU Bus Controller Unit 

BDU Backup Drive Unit 

BG Beta Gimbal 

BGA Beta Gimbal Assembly 

BGDTS Beta Gimbal Deployment Transition Structure 

BGHS Beta Gimbal Housing Subassembly 

BIT/BITE Built-In Test/Built-In Test Equipment 

BMRRM Bearing Motor and Roll Ring Module 

BSP Baseband Signal Processor 

July 2005 Acronyms/Abbreviations 123
C&C Command and Control 

C&DH Command and Data Handling 

C&M Control and Monitor 

C&T Communications and Tracking 

C&W Caution and Warning 

C/A Coarse/Acquisition 

C/L Crew Lock 

CA Control Attitude 

CAS Common Attach System 

CBM Common Berthing Mechanism 

CCAA Common Cabin Air Assembly 

CCD Cursor Control Device 

CCMS Concentric Cable Management System 

CCTV Closed Circuit TV 

CDRA Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly 

CDRS Carbon Dioxide Removal System 

CDS Command and Data Software 

CETA Crew and Equipment Translation Aid 

CEU Control Electronics Unit 

CGBA Commercial Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus 

CheCS Crew Health Care System 

CHX Condensing Heat Exchanger 

CMG Control Moment Gyroscopes 

COAS Crew Optical Alignment Sight 

COTS Commercial Off The Shelf 

CR Change Request 

CSA Canadian Space Agency 

CSA Computer Systems Architecture 

CSCI Computer Software Configuration Item 

CVIU Common Video Interface Unit 

CVT Current Value Table 

CVV Carbon dioxide Vent Valve 

CWC Contingency Water Collection 

CWC Contingency Water Container 

DAIU Docked Audio Interface Unit 

DC Docking Compartment 

DCP Display and Control Panel 

DCSU Direct Current Switching Unit 

DDCU DC-to-DC Converter Unit 

DDCU-E DC-to-DC Converter Unit – External 

DDCU-I DC-to-DC Converter – Internal 

DLA Drive Locking Assembly 

DMS-R Data Management System-Russian 

DPA Digital Pre-Assembly 

DPS Data Processing System 

DSO Detailed Supplementary Objective 

DTO Detailed Test Objective 

July 2005 Acronyms/Abbreviations 124
E/L Equipment Lock 

EACP EMU Audio Control Panel 

EACP EV Audio Control Panel 

EAIU EMU Audio Interface Unit 

EATCS External Active Thermal Control Subsystem 

ECLSS Environmental Control and Life Support System 

ECU Electronic Control Unit 

ED Engagement Drive 

EDDA EMU Don/Doff Assembly 

EEATCS Early External Active Thermal Control Subsystem 

EFGF Electrical Flight Grapple Fixture 

EIA Electrical Interface Assembly 

EMU Extravehicular Mobility Unit 

EPS Electrical Power System 

ESA External Sampling Adapter 

ESP External Stowage Platform 

ESPAD External Stowage Platform Attachment Device 

ESSMDM Enhanced Space Station Multiplexer/Demultiplexer 

ESU End Stop Unit 

ETVCG Pg 3-4 

EUTAS Enhanced Universal Truss Attachment System 

EVA Extra Vehicular Activity 

EV-CPDS Extra-Vehicular – Charged Particle Directional Spectrometer 

EVR Extravehicular Robotics 

EVSU External Video Switching Units 

EWA Emittance Wash Applicator 

EXPRESS EXpedite the PRocessing of Experiments to the Space Station 

EXT External 

FC Firmware Controller 

FCC Flat Collector Circuit 

FCV Flow Control Valve 

FD Flight Day 

FDIR Failure, Detection, Isolation, and Recovery 

FDS Fire Detection Suppression 

FET Field Effect Transistors 

FGB Functional Cargo Block 

FPU Fluid Pumping Unit 

FQDC Fluid Quick Disconnect Coupling 

FRD Flight Requirements Document 

FRGF Flight Releasable Grapple Feature 

FWCI Firmware Configuration Items 

GFE Government Furnished Equipment 

GFI Ground Fault Interrupter 

GLONASS Global Navigational Satellite System 

GNC Guidance, Navigation, and Control 

GPS Global Positioning System 

GUI Graphical User Interface 

July 2005 Acronyms/Abbreviations 125
HC Hand Controller 

HCA Hollow Cathode Assembly 

HDR High Data Rate 

HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air 

HGA High Gain Antenna 

HHL Hand Held Lidar 

HPGT High Pressure Gas Tank 

HRF Human Research Facility 

HRFM High Rate Frame Multiplexer 

HRM High Rate Modem 

I/O Input/Output 

IAC Internal Audio Controller 

IAS Internal Audio Subsystem 

IAS Internal Audio System 

IATCS Internal Active Thermal Control Subsystem 

IATCS Internal Active Thermal Control System 

IDA Integrated Diode Assembly 

IDRD Increment Definition and Requirements Document 

IEA Integrated Equipment Assembly 

IELK Individual Equipment Liner Kit 

IFHX Interface Heat Exchanger 

IMCS Integrated Mission Control System 

IMV Intermodule Ventilation 

INT Internal 

IOC Input/Output Controller 

IOCU Input/Output Controller Unit 

IP International Partner 

IRU Inflight Refill Unit 

ISA Internal Sampling Adapter 

ISPR International Standard Payload Racks 

ISS International Space Station 

ISSPO International Space Station Program Office 

ISSSH International Space Station Systems Handbook 

ITCS Internal Thermal Control System 

ITS Integrated Truss Structure 

IUA Interface Umbilical Assembly 

IVA Intra-Vehicular Activity 

IVSU Internal Video Switch Unit 

JEU Joint Electronic Units 

Lab Laboratory 

LAN Local Area Network 

LCA Lab Cradle Assembly 

LCA Loop Crossover Assembly 

LCD Liquid Crystal Display 

LDI Local Data Interface 

LDR Low Data Rate 

LDU Linear Drive Unit 

LED Light Emitting Diode 

July 2005 Acronyms/Abbreviations 126
LEE Latching End Effector 

LFDP Load Fault Detect Protect 

LFDP Load Fault Detection Protection 

LGA Low Gain Antenna 

LLA Low Level Analog 

LMC Lightweight Mission Peculiar Equipment Support Structure Carrier 

LT Low Temperature 

LTA Launch-To-Activation 

LTL Low Temperature Loop 

LTU Load Transfer Unit 

LVLH Local Vertical Local Horizontal 

MA Mechanical Assembly 

MAM Manual Augmented Mode 

MBM Manual Berthing Mechanism 

MBS Mobile remote servicer Base System 

MBSU Main Bus Switching Units 

MC Midcourse Correction 

MCA Major Constituent Analyzer 

MCAS MBS Common Attach System 

MCC Mission Control Center 

MCC-H Mission Control Center-Houston 

MCC-M Mission Control Center-Moscow 

MCDS Multifunction Cathode Ray Tube Display System 

MCS Motion Control System 

MCU MBS Computer Unit 

MDM Multiplexer/Demultiplexer 

METOX Metal Oxide 

MFCV Manual Flow Control Valve 

MFSC Marshall Spaceflight Center 

MHS MCU Host Software 

MIP Mission Integration Plan 

MISSE Materials International Space Station Experiment 

MLI Multi-Layer Insulation 

MMT Mission Management Team 

MPESS Lightweight Multi-Purpose External Support Structure 

MPEV Manual Pressure Equalization Valve 

MPLM Multi-Purpose Logistics Module 

MPM Manipulator Positioning Mechanism 

MRL Manipulator Retention Latch 

MRS Mobile Remote Servicer 

MSD Mass Storage Device 

MSG Microgravity Science Glovebox 

MSS Mobile Servicing System 

MT Mobile Transporter 

MT Moderate Temperature 

MTCL MT Capture Latch 

MTL Moderate Temperature Loop 

MTS Module to Truss Segment 

MTSAS Module to Truss Segment Attachment System 

MTWsN Move To Worksite number N 

July 2005 Acronyms/Abbreviations 127
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NCC Nominal Corrective Combination 

NCG Non-Condensable Gas 

NET No Earlier 

NIA Nitrogen Interface Assembly 

NIV Nitrogen Isolation Valve 

NTA Nitrogen Tank Assembly 

NOAX Non-Oxide Adhesive Experimental 

OBSS Orbiter Boom Sensor Systerm 

OCA Orbital Communications Adapter 

OCJM Operator Commanded Joint Position Mode 

OCPM Operator Commanded POR Mode 

OCS Operations and Control Software 

ODS Orbiter Docking System 

OIU Orbiter Interface Unit 

OIV Oxygen Isolation Valve 

OMI On-Orbit Maintainable Items 

OMS Orbital Maneuvering System 

OPP OSVS Patch Panel 

OPS Operations 

Ops Operations 

ORBT Optimized RBar Targeting 

ORCA Oxygen Recharge Compressor Assembly 

ORU Orbital Replacement Units 

OSVS Orbiter Space Vision System 

OTD ORU Transfer Device 

P&S Pointing and Support 

P/L Payload 

P1 Port 1 

PAS Payload Attach System 

PBA Portable Breathing Apparatus 

PC Personal Computer 

PCA Pressure Control Assembly 

PCBM Passive Common Berthing System 

PCC Power Converter Controller 

PCG Protein Crystal Growth 

PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Adapter 

P-Code Precision Code 

PCP Pressure Control Panel 

PCR Portable Computer Receptacle 

PCS Portable Computer System 

PCT Post-Contact Thrusting 

PCU Plasma Contactor Unit 

PDGF Power and Data Grapple Fixture 

PDIP Payload Data Interface Panel 

PDRS Payload Deployment and Retrieval System 

PDU Power Drive Unit 

PEHG Payload Ethernet Hub Gateways 

PFCS Pump and Flow Control Subassembly 

July 2005 Acronyms/Abbreviations 128
PFE Portable Fire Extinguisher 

PGBA Plant Generic Bioprocessing Apparatus 

PGSC Portable General Support Computer 

PGT Pistol Grip Tool 

PJAM Prestored Joint Position Autosequence Mode 

PM Pump Module 

PMCU Power Management Control Unit 

POA Payload/ORU Accommodation 

POR Points of Reference 

POST Power On Self-Test 

PP Planning Period 

PPA Pump Package Assembly 

PPAM Prestored POR Autosequence Mode 

PPRV Positive Pressure Relief Valve 

PRLA Payload Retention Latch Assemblies 

Prox-Ops Proximity Operations 

PRPV Positive Pressure Release Valves 

PTCS Passive Thermal Control System 

PTU Pan/Tilt Unit 

PVCA Photovoltaic Controller Application 

PVCE Photovoltaic Controller Element 

PVM Photovoltaic Module 

PVR Photovoltaic Radiator 

PVTCS Photovoltaic Thermal Control System 

PWR Payload Water Reservoir 

QD Quick Disconnect 

RCG Reaction-Cured Glass 

R/P Receiver/Processors 

RACU Russian-to-American Converter Units 

RAIU Russian Audio Interface Unit 

RAM Random Access Memory 

RAMV Rheostat Air Mix Valve 

RBI Remote Bus Isolators 

RBVM Radiator Beam Valve Module 

RF Radio Frequency 

RFCA Rack Flow Control Assembly 

RFG Radio Frequency Group 

RGA Rate Gyros Assembly 

RHC Rotational Hand Controller 

RHX Regenerative Heat Exchanger 

RJMC Rotary Joint Motor Controller 

RMS Remote Manipulator System 

RPC Remote Power Controller 

RPCM Remote Power Controller Module 

RPDA Remote Power Distribution Assembly 

RPOP Rendezvous and Prox-Ops Program 

RS Russian Segment 

RSP Resupply Stowage Platforms 

RSR Resupply Stowage Rack 

July 2005 Acronyms/Abbreviations 129
RSTS Rack Standalone Temperature Sensor 

RSU Roller Suspension Unit 

RT Remote Terminal 

RTD Resistive Thermal Devices 

RTV Room Temperature Vulcanizing 

RWS Robotic Workstation 

S&M Structures and Mechanisms 

SARJ Solar Alpha Rotary Joint 

SASA S-band Antenna Support Assembly 

SAW Solar Array Wing 

SCA Switchgear Controller Assembly 

SCI Signal Conditioning Interface 

SCU Service and Cooling Umbilical 

SCU Sync and Control Unit 

SD Smoke Detector 

SDO Solenoid Driver Output 

SDS Sample Delivery System 

SEM Shunt Electronics Module 

SFCA System Flow Control Assembly 

SFU Squib Firing Unit 

SGANT Space-to-Ground Antenna 

SiC Silicon Carbide 

SIGI Space Integrated Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation 

System 

SJRM Single Joint Rate Mode 

SM Service Module 

SMCC Shuttle Mission Control Center 

SOC State of Charge 

SPCE Servicing Performance and Checkout Equipment 

SPDA Secondary Power Distribution Assembly 

SPDM Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator 

SPG Single Point Ground 

SRMS Shuttle Remote Manipulator System 

SSAS Segment-to-Segment Attach System 

SSC Station Support Computer 

SSC Subsystem Computer 

SSMDM Space Station Multiplexer/Demultiplexer 

SSOR Space-to-Space Orbiter Radio 

SSP Space Shuttle Program 

SSP Standard Switch Panel 

SSRMS Space Station Remote Manipulator System 

SSSR Space-to-Space Station Radio 

SSU Sequential Shunt Unit 

STCR Starboard Thermal Control Radiator 

STES Single Locker Thermal Enclosure 

STS Space Transportation System 

SVS Synthetic Vision System 

July 2005 Acronyms/Abbreviations 130
TA Thruster Assist 

TBD To Be Determined 

TC Terminal Computers 

TCCS Trace Contaminant Control Subassembly 

TCCV Temperature Check Control Valve 

TCS Thermal Control System 

TCS Trajectory Control Sensor 

TCTV Temperature Control and Check Valve 

TD Translation Drive 

TDRS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite 

TDRSS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System 

TEA Torque Equilibrium Attitude 

TFR Translation Foot Restraints 

THC Temperature and Humidity Control 

THC Translational Hand Controller 

TI Transition Initiation 

TORU Teleoperator Control Mode 

TORVA Twice Orbital rate +Rbar to +Vbar Approach 

TRC Transmitter Receiver Controller 

TRRJ Thermal Radiator Rotary Joint 

TSP Twisted Shielded Pairs 

TTCR Trailing Thermal Control Radiator 

TUS Training Umbilical System 

TV Television 

TVIS Treadmill Vibration Isolation System 

TWMV Three-Way Mixing Valve 

UDG User Data Generation 

UHF Ultra-High Frequency 

UIA Umbilical Interface Assembly 

UIP Utility Interface Panel 

ULCAS Unpressurized Logistics Carrier Attach System 

UMA Umbilical Mechanism Assembly 

UOP Utility Outlet Panel 

USOS United States Orbital Segment 

VAJ Vacuum Access Jumper 

VBSP Video Baseband Signal Processor 

VCP Video Camera Port 

VCSA Video Camera Support Assembly 

VDS Video Distribution Subsystem 

VDS Video Distribution System 

VDU Video Distribution Unit 

VES Vacuum Exhaust System 

VGS Video Graphics Software 

VRCV Vent/Relief Control Valve 

VRIV Vent/Relief Isolation Valve 

VRS Vacuum Resource System 

VRV Vent/Relief Valve 

VSC Video Signal Converter 

VTR Video Tape Recorders 

July 2005 Acronyms/Abbreviations 131
WETA Wireless video system External Transceiver Assemblies 

WHS Workstation Host Software 

WLE Wing Leading Edge 

WRM Water Recovery and Management 

WS Water Separator 

WVA Water Vent Assembly 

ZSR Zero-g Stowage Rack 

July 2005 Acronyms/Abbreviations 132
MEDIA ASSISTANCE 

NASA TELEVISION TRANSMISSION 

NASA Television is carried on an MPEG-2 digital signal accessed via satellite AMC-6, at 72 degrees 

west longitude, transponder 17C, 4040 MHz, vertical polarization. For those in Alaska or Hawaii, 

NASA Television will be seen on AMC-7, at 137 degrees west longitude, transponder 18C, at 4060 

MHz, horizonal polarization. In both instances, a Digital Video Broadcast (DVB)-compliant 

Integrated Receiver Decoder (IRD) (with modulation of QPSK/DBV, data rate of 36.86 and FEC 3⁄4) 

will be needed for reception. The NASA Television schedule is available on the NASA Television 

website, at: 

www.nasa.gov/ntv 

NASA TV's digital conversion will require members of the broadcast media to upgrade with an 

'addressable' Integrated Receiver Decoder, or IRD, to participate in live news events and interviews, 

press briefings and receive NASA's Video File news feeds on a dedicated Media Services channel. 

NASA mission coverage will air on a digital NASA Public Services ("Free to Air") channel, for which 

only a basic IRD will be needed. 

The schedule for television transmissions from the orbiter and for mission briefings will be available 

during the mission at Kennedy Space Center, Fla.; Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala.; 

Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, Calif.; Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas; and NASA 

Headquarters, Washington, DC. The television schedule will be updated to reflect changes dictated 

by mission operations. 

Status Reports 

Status reports on countdown and mission progress, on-orbit activities and landing operations will be 

produced by the appropriate NASA news center. 

Briefings 

A mission press briefing schedule will be issued before launch. During the mission, status briefings 

by a flight director or mission operations representative and Mission Management Team members 

will occur every day. The updated NASA television schedule will indicate when mission briefings 

are planned. 

July 2005 MEDIA ASSISTANCE 133
Internet Information 

Information is available through several sources on the Internet. The primary source for mission 

information is the NASA Web, part of the World Wide Web. This site contains information on the 

crew and its mission and will be updated regularly with status reports, photos and video clips 

throughout the flight. NASA’s Return to Flight web address is: 

http://www.nasa.gov/returntoflight

The NASA Web's address is: 

http://www.nasa.gov/

Information on other current NASA activities is available through the Today@NASA page: 

http://www.nasa.gov/news/highlights/ 

The NASA TV schedule is available from the NTV Home Page: 

http://www.nasa.gov/multimedia/nasatv/MM_NTV_Breaking.html 

Resources for educators can be found at the following address: 

http://education.nasa.gov 

July 2005 MEDIA ASSISTANCE 134
PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONTACTS 

HEADQUARTERS - WASHINGTON, DC 

Allard Beutel 

Public Affairs Officer 

Space Operations 

202-358-4769 

Melissa Mathews 

Public Affairs Officer 

Space Operations 

202-358-1272 

Katherine Trinidad 

Public Affairs Officer 

Space Operations 

202-358-3749 

Debbie Rahn 

Public Affairs Officer 

International Partners 

202-358-1638 

David Mould 

Assistant Administrator 

NASA Public Affairs 

202-358-1898 

Dean Acosta 

Deputy Assistant Administrator 

NASA Public Affairs 

202-358-1400 

Bob Jacobs 

News & Multi-Media Director 

202-358-1760 

Dave Steitz 

Public Affairs Officer 

202-358-1730 

Robert Mirelson 

News Chief 

202-358-4495 

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER 

FLORIDA 

Bruce Buckingham 

News Chief 

321-861-7642 

Jessica Rye 

Public Affairs Specialist 

Space Shuttle 

321-867-2468 

Tracy Young 

Public Affairs Specialist 

International Space Station 

321-867-9284 

JOHNSON SPACE CENTER 

HOUSTON, TX 

James Hartsfield 

News Chief 

281-483-5111 

Kyle Herring 

Public Affairs Specialist 

Space Shuttle Program Office 

281-483-5111 

Kylie Clem 

Public Affairs Specialist 

International Space Station Program Office 

281-483-5111 

Kelly Humphries 

Public Affairs Specialist 

Mission Operations & Engineering 

281-483-5111 

Rob Navias 

Program and Mission Operations Lead 

281-483-5111 

July 2005 MEDIA CONTACTS 135
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER 

HUNTSVILLE, AL 

Dom Amatore 

Public Affairs Manager 

256-544-0034 

June Malone 

Public Affairs Specialist 

Space Shuttle Propulsion 

256-544-0034 

STENNIS SPACE CENTER 

BAY ST. LOUIS, MS 

Linda Theobald 

Public Affairs Officer 

228-688-3249 

Paul Foerman 

News Chief 

228-688-1880 

Rebecca Strecker 

Public Affairs Specialist 

228-688-3346 

AMES RESEARCH CENTER 

MOFFETT FIELD, CA 

Mike Mewhinney 

News Chief 

650-604-3937 

Jonas Dino 

Public Affairs Specialist 

650-604-5612 

DRYDEN FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER 

CALIFORNIA 

Alan Brown 

News Chief 

661-276-2665 

Leslie Williams 

Public Affairs Specialist 

661-276-3893 

GLENN RESEARCH CENTER 

CLEVELAND, OH 

Lori Rachul 

News Chief 

216-433-8806 

Katherine Martin 

Public Affairs Specialist 

216-433-2406 

LANGLEY RESEARCH CENTER 

HAMPTON, VA 

H. Keith Henry 

Deputy, Office of Public Affairs 

757-864-6120 

UNITED SPACE ALLIANCE 

Mike Curie 

Space Flight Operations Contract 

281-483-9251 

321-861-3805 

Kari Fluegel 

Houston Operations 

281-280-6959 

Tracy Yates 

Florida Operations 

321-861-3956 

BOEING 

Ed Memi 

Media Relations 

Boeing NASA Systems 

281-226-4029 

July 2005 MEDIA CONTACTS 136
July 2005 MEDIA CONTACTS 137