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22–704 PDF 2005

OVERSEAS SECURITY: HARDENING SOFT TARGETS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 10, 2005

Serial No. 109–45

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

THOMAS COSTA, Professional Staff Member

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

ANDREW SU, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on May 10, 2005 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Egan, Ambassador Wesley W., ret., chairman, 2003 Foley Accountability

Review Board; Ambassador John W. Limbert, president, American Foreign Service Association; and Joseph Petro, executive vice president

and managing director, Citigroup Security and Investigative Services,

Citigroup ........................................................................................................ 96

Egan, Ambassador Wesley W. .................................................................. 96

Limbert, Ambassador John W. ................................................................. 103

Petro, Joseph ............................................................................................. 113

Ford, Jess, Director, International Affairs and Trade Division, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Greg Starr, Deputy Assistant Secretary

for Countermeasures, Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Foreign Missions, U.S. Department of State; Ambassador Prudence Bushnell, Dean,

School of Leadership and Management, the George P. Shultz National

Foreign Affairs Training Center, U.S. Department of State; and Keith

Miller, Director, Office of Overseas Schools, U.S. Department of State .. 11

Bushnell, Ambassador Prudence .............................................................. 43

Ford, Jess ................................................................................................... 11

Miller, Keith .............................................................................................. 53

Starr, Greg ................................................................................................. 27

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Bushnell, Ambassador Prudence, Dean, School of Leadership and Management, the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of .............................. 46

Egan, Ambassador Wesley W., ret., chairman, 2003 Foley Accountability

Review Board, prepared statement of ......................................................... 99

Ford, Jess, Director, International Affairs and Trade Division, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of .............................. 14

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio, prepared statement of .................................................................... 7

Limbert, Ambassador John W., president, American Foreign Service Association, prepared statement of .................................................................. 106

Miller, Keith, Director, Office of Overseas Schools, U.S. Department of

State, prepared statement of ....................................................................... 55

Petro, Joseph, executive vice president and managing director, Citigroup

Security and Investigative Services, Citigroup, prepared statement of ... 116

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 3

Starr, Greg, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Countermeasures, Bureau

of Diplomatic Security and Foreign Missions, U.S. Department of State:

Letter dated July 14, 2005 ....................................................................... 71

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 31

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OVERSEAS SECURITY: HARDENING SOFT

TARGETS

TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Duncan, Dent, Kucinich, and

Ruppersberger.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel;

Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Robert A. Briggs, clerk;

Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; and Jean Gosa,

minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations

hearing entitled, ‘‘Overseas Security: Hardening Soft Targets’’ is

called to order.

In 2002 terrorists assassinated an American diplomat in front of

his home in Amman, Jordan. Lawrence Foley, an employee of the

U.S. Agency for International Development, was a dedicated public

servant working to bring economic growth and humanitarian aid to

a troubled region. But to his terrorist attackers, he was political

symbol and a ‘‘soft target.’’

Recognizing a growing threat to U.S. personnel, the Department

of State has done a great deal to harden embassies and missions.

State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, under the leadership of General Charles Williams, has pursued an ambitious, riskdriven program to construct secure new facilities and retrofit or reconfigure older work spaces to reduce vulnerabilities.

But as embassy and consulate compounds are fortified, U.S. Government personnel and their families living and working outside

those walls draw the aim of criminals and terrorists looking for the

next tier of targets. So hardening official buildings is not enough.

The security of soft targets hinges on the harder tasks of building

personal awareness and sustaining institutional vigilance. Adding

cement to the physical plant is an easy part. Precious lives depend

on strengthening protections for America’s human capital abroad.

In a report for the subcommittee released today, the Government

Accountability Office [GAO], concludes the State Department has

not yet developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies

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safety and security requirements or the resources needed to better

protect U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats

abroad. Despite recommendations by several panels since the late

1980’s, programs to enhance security outside the embassy walls remain a porous patchwork. No hands-on antiterrorism training

course is required for U.S. personnel and dependents going overseas. Host nation cooperation varies widely. Federal departments

and agencies do not effectively or consistently monitor personal security programs.

These desultory efforts are too easily overwhelmed by the powerful human tendency to conclude, ‘‘It can’t happen to me,’’ or ‘‘If it’s

going to happen, there’s nothing I can do about it.’’ Defeating the

myths of invulnerability and inevitability requires teaching government employees and their families how to recognize threats, how

to take reasonable precautions, and how to handle themselves appropriately in menacing situations. Those lessons need to be reinforced regularly as part of a strategic focus that links embassy security and personnel safety to harden today’s soft targets against

the very real threats waiting outside.

The horrific terrorist attack on the school in Beslan, Russia last

year reminded the world once again that terrorism is blind to

moral boundaries. Terrorists recognize no zone of safety for the innocent. American officials and their families abroad must be

equipped to maintain a perimeter of personal safety wherever they

go.

Despite many studies, numerous recommendations, several efforts and some progress, our witnesses this afternoon will describe

just how much must still be done to shield America’s soft target

abroad. We look forward to their testimony.

At this time the Chair recognizes Mr. Duncan.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this very important hearing.

I am sitting down here only because I have some other meetings

set up, so I am not going to be able to stay for the whole hearing.

I will stay for as long as I can. Mr. Chairman, I admire the way

you handle this subcommittee. I think you are one of the finest

chairmen that I have ever worked with in my years in the Congress, and you have turned this subcommittee into an extremely

important subcommittee dealing with very important topics.

I will say this. We have seen in history, wars started over the

killing of one citizen of one nation by a citizen from another nation,

so we have to do everything possible to protect our citizens so passions do not become inflamed and so we do not get into wars we

should not get into.

On the other hand, I recall Governor Gilmore, who chaired the

President’s Commission on Terrorism and what to do about it, in

his cover letter to the President, he said we must resist the urge

to seek total security, because it is not achievable and it will drain

resources away from things that are attainable.

So the key question is what does both common sense and intelligence tell us about what is achievable? We cannot protect every

American citizen from every conceivable threat that is out there.

But what can we do that is realistic, that is cost effective? We need

to not just do anything and everything that anybody can think of

because it has the word ‘‘security’’ attached to it. I think that is

why this hearing is important: what is achievable and what is reasonable at the same time. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I particularly thank you for your very

thoughtful words.

Mr. Kucinich, welcome, the ranking member of the subcommittee.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Good afternoon to all

of the witnesses.

The safety and security of our Nation’s Ambassadors, foreign

service officers, civil servants, and their families concern this subcommittee and concern me deeply. The number of incidents of

international terrorism against so-called ‘‘soft targets’’ is rising,

and Congress should assist the State Department in every way it

can so our diplomats can continue their invaluable work of representing America’s values and ideals around the world.

While I believe the State Department is doing all it can to protect its employees abroad, it continues to play fast and loose with

the Congress. Mistakes made in last year’s annual survey of international terrorism and the decision by the Department to simply

not include the statistics in the report anymore are deeply troubling.

By all accounts, violence around the world is rising sharply. According to the National Counterterrorism Center, there were 651

incidents of terrorist acts last year that killed nearly 2,000 people.

Violence directed against Americans and disapproval of our Nation’s foreign policy actions are at an all-time high. Those people

who are at our embassies are on the front lines. Whether on the

battlefield or not, they are on the front lines. They know quite well

just how vulnerable of a target they are.

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The administration needs to have an open and honest dialog with

Congress and the American people concerning the security of those

who work overseas for the United States of America. We need to

have all of the facts in front of us and we need to hold the State

Department accountable for its actions. However, improving overseas security is not just about better counterterrorism strategies,

increased surveillance, driver training courses or evacuation drills.

The real issue is money and where our priorities lie. The President’s fiscal year 2006 budget request for the Department of Defense is $419.3 billion. Last week Congress approved the $82 billion

supplemental for fiscal year 2005 for the Department of Defense for

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the fiscal year 2006 budget request for the State Department was just $13.3 billion, or 31 times smaller than

that for the Pentagon. No wonder there is no money left over for

overseas security, our Nation’s coffers are totally depleted. The State Department is asking for only $15 million a year to protect soft targets, including just $10 million to increase security

at American and international schools abroad. Meanwhile, the Pentagon is asking for $7.8 billion for a missile defense program, a program which has repeatedly failed basic tests and where there is no

end to spending in sight. I voted against the President’s request for

supplemental funds and am a strong opponent of the missile defense program, but I am a strong proponent of the men and women

who serve in the State Department. I have visited many of our embassies. I know the level of dedication of the people who work for

our government. I know they are serving this country honorably,

and the least we can do is make sure that we provide for their security.

In my opinion, more of these precious resources need to be spent

on physical capital modernization, technology and increased resources for public diplomacy at our embassies, consulates, and

posts abroad. Too many of our State Department offices overseas

are in shabby condition, overcrowded, and lack modern communications technology such as Internet and e-mail. We cannot keep trying to solve 21st-century problems with 20th-century thinking.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I hope this

subcommittee is going to do everything it can to protect our diplomatic corps.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. The Chair would agree with much of what the ranking member said about the need to spend more. I know that would

be welcome on the part of the State Department. And I agree with

his comments about the patterns of global terrorism. The report

needs to include the statistics and it needs to have those statistics

analyzed and tell us what they mean. We have already written to

the Secretary voicing that view.

At this time let me just take care, while I have Members here,

to be official.

I ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee

be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that

the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statements in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

I recognize the first panel, Mr. Jess Ford, Director, International

Affairs and Trade Division, U.S. Government Accountability Office;

Mr. Greg Starr, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Countermeasures,

Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Foreign Missions, U.S. Department of State; Ambassador Prudence Bushnell, Dean, School of

Leadership and Management, the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, U.S. Department of State; and Mr.

Keith Miller, Director, Office of Overseas Schools, U.S. Department

of State. We welcome all of our panelists and invite them to stand.

As you know, we swear in all of our witnesses.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. I note for the record that all of the witnesses have

responded in the affirmative.

We will start with you, Mr. Ford.

STATEMENTS OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS AND TRADE DIVISION, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; GREG STARR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT

SECRETARY FOR COUNTERMEASURES, BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND FOREIGN MISSIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AMBASSADOR PRUDENCE BUSHNELL,

DEAN, SCHOOL OF LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT, THE

GEORGE P. SHULTZ NATIONAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS TRAINING

CENTER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND KEITH MILLER,

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OVERSEAS SCHOOLS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the report we

are releasing today on State’s efforts to protect U.S. officials and

their families from terrorist attacks outside the embassies. U.S.

Government officials and their families living and working overseas

are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials

have been attacked, and 23 fatally, by terrorists outside the embassy.

As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S.

embassies, concerns are growing that terrorist groups are likely to

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focus on soft targets, such as homes, schools and places of worship.

Recent terrorist attacks against housing complexes in Saudi Arabia, a school in Russia and places of worship in Turkey illustrate

the growing threat.

Our report addresses four issues: whether State Department has

a strategy for soft target protection; an assessment of State’s efforts

to protect U.S. officials and their families against terrorist attacks

while traveling to and from work; State’s efforts to improve security at schools overseas attended by children of U.S. officials; and

issues related to protection of U.S. officials and their families at

their residences. I will also discuss the recommendations in our report.

The State Department has a number of programs and activities

to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and

surveillance detection. However, the State Department has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and

security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials

and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State Department officials have raised a number of legal,

management, and resource challenges related to developing and

implementing such a strategy but they have agreed one is needed.

The Department has indicated to us that they are now in the process of developing such a strategy.

State has not fully implemented one of the most important safeguards against terrorist attacks while employees travel to and from

work: counterterrorism training. Three State-initiated investigations in terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside the embassies found officials lacked the necessary hands-on training in such

areas as surveillance detection and defensive and evasive driving

techniques that could have saved their lives. The investigations

recommended that the State Department provide hands-on

counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures

to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. However,

we found that the State Department has not fully implemented all

of these recommendations. For example, State’s hands-on

counterterrorism training course is still not required, and Ambassadors, DCMs, and regional security officers are not fully trained

to implement State’s counterterrorism procedures.

In addition, the accountability procedures monitoring activities

and checklist developed in 2003 designed to promote personal security were not being followed at any of the five posts we visited. In

response to congressional directives, State instituted a program in

2003 designed to improve the protection of U.S. officials and their

families at schools from terrorist threats. This multi-phase program provides basic security hardware such as shatter-resistant

window film, alarms, and radios, and additional protective measures designed based on the threat levels in the country. The first

two phases are focused on Department-sponsored schools which

have previously received grant funding from the State Department.

State has also been provided money to support non-Departmentsponsored schools with American students. However, during our

visits to the five posts, regional security officers were unclear about

which schools qualified for security assistance and what resources

13

would be provided to the schools in which just a few American children are enrolled.

State’s program to protect U.S. officials and their families at residences is largely designed to deter crime. To reduce the terrorist

threat, some posts limit the number of U.S. officials living in a specific apartment building. At the post we visited, surveillance detection teams were used to protect schools in residential areas. Several regional security officers told us the use of surveillance detection teams could provide greater deterrence to potential terrorist

attacks. However, State’s current guidance limits the use of surveillance detection teams for these purposes.

We made several recommendations to the State Department designed to improve the safety and security of U.S. officials and their

families. We recommended that the State Department develop its

soft target strategy to include a determination of the full scope of

responsibilities and the legal and financial ramifications of securing U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy; that they

develop corresponding protection programs and activities and integrate the elements of the soft target strategy into embassy emergency action plans. We also recommended that the State Department bolster its training and compliance procedures to include

making counterterrorism training mandatory at critical and highthreat posts.

We also recommended that the State Department fully implement the personal security accountability system in response to the

2003 Accountability Review Board’s report and develop accountability standards that help ensure compliance at all overseas posts.

This concludes my opening statement. I would be happy to answer any of your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Ford.

[NOTE.—The GAO report entitled, ‘‘Overseas Security, State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect

U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies,’’ may

be found in subcommittee files.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Starr.

STATEMENT OF GREG STARR

Mr. STARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is the statement limited

to 5 minutes?

Mr. SHAYS. No, we let it roll over another 5 and you will be gaveled down at 10.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I

am honored to be before you today with my distinguished colleagues, Ambassador Bushnell, Keith Miller, and Jess Ford from

GAO.

I would first like to say we appreciate the GAO’s report and the

hard work that went into this effort. Prior to addressing the report’s findings, I believe it would be useful to provide the subcommittee some background information on our global security programs to put the soft targets program into perspective.

For many years, but especially since the East African bombings,

diplomatic security, and many other elements, the Department of

State has rolled out a robust array of security and counterterrorism

programs to address the threat of terrorist attacks against U.S.

diplomatic facilities and our personnel and our families overseas.

The modern incarnation of the diplomatic security service and

vast majority of our programs originated with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Attack Act of 1986.

Our efforts were reenergized following the East Africa bombings

of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. The tragic

attacks of September 2001 are often referred to as the event that

catapulted terrorism into the forefront of U.S. policy. However, our

real call to action was the 1998 bombings of our embassies. Funding and legislation following those acts provided many of the tools

we use today to address global terrorism against U.S. officials, facilities, and our families abroad.

A linchpin of our overall strategy has been programs to harden

our embassies and consulates, seen as the traditional symbols of

U.S. overseas presence. We used funding in 1999, 2000, and 2001

to implement security upgrades and enhancement of our facilities

to the extent possible, but we simply could not erase critical

vulnerabilities such as lack of setback and weak-blast resistance.

Since then, we have engaged in long-term capital construction program, which members discussed, which is generously funded by

Congress to replace 180 of our most vulnerable facilities. American

embassies and consulates are more than just symbolic targets, they

are essential platforms from which we conduct diplomacy, consular

affairs, commerce and trade, security, law enforcement, global

health issues, and a myriad of other national security programs in

foreign countries.

As the administration and Congress have so aptly recognized,

protection of the homeland needs to start abroad, not just at our

borders. Although historically the vast majority of catastrophic attacks and threats tend to be aimed at our official facilities, al

Qaeda and other terror groups will attack soft targets when other

more hardened assets prove too difficult.

Well before the global al Qaeda threat, we implemented programs to protect and educate our foreign and civil service officers,

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their family members, and private American citizens on the terrorist threats overseas. These programs are not solely managed by my

service, Diplomatic Security, but cut across many Department elements and continue to be refined today to address the global threat

against our interests.

Many of these programs lie outside the scope of the GAO report

before you, but they deserve mention in your consideration of the

overall security posture. A critical element of our program to protect our employees, their families and official facilities, and a key

element of our soft target strategy, is our security law enforcement

and intelligence relationship with host government entities. Host

country police, security, and intelligence forces are in many instances the first line of defense in protecting us against potential

threats. Cultivating and developing liaison relationships with host

government security services is a core function of regional security

officers and other elements within the mission.

RSOs spend a great deal of time and energy working on improving the capabilities of the local police. In many locations, the police

and security services are excellent; but overall, the capabilities are

uneven. The diplomatic security Antiterrorist Assistance Program,

or ATA, is an essential element in helping partner countries combat terrorism with the training, equipment and technology they

need to carry the fight to the terrorists. ATA training for host government security officials not only helps to ensure the safety of our

American diplomats, but all Americans traveling into these countries.

When we look to our own security resources, we start with the

offices of the regional security officers. Today we have 500 RSOs

at nearly 200 missions worldwide. Many of these positions were

created following lessons learned from the East African bombings.

Each RSO serves as the professional adviser to the chief of mission

on all security matters, and together with the chief of mission, they

are responsible under law and regulation for the security of the

personnel under their charge.

One of the most important functions an RSO performs is developing post-specific briefings and security programs tailored to the

threat environment. Every diplomatic mission has thoroughly researched and categorized threat ratings for transnational terrorism, indigenous terrorism, political violence, crime, counterintelligence and technical intelligence threats. The first four drive resources for security programs on everything from residential security and local guards to the surveillance detection programs, protection of key mission officials, extensive briefings for staff and families, private sector liaison, and physical security of all of facilities,

armored vehicles, and staffing levels. RSOs serve on the Emergency Action Committee at every post and play a core role in the

development of these emergency action plans. The emergency action plans play prominently in deciding how posts and the Department address all types of situations and threats. In today’s world,

the plan covers a wide spectrum, including terrorist threats and

bombings, chemical, biological or radiological incidents, aviation

and natural disasters, authorized or ordered departures, and post

evacuations.

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These plans are exercised at our missions and are routinely part

of the post-specific security briefing program for employees and

family members. Overseas schools have always been closely linked

with the overall security of the missions, and we expect this relationship to grow even closer. Overseas schools attended by family

members are now being formally added to our emergency action

plans, and future post-specific emergency action plans will include

physical security features, security plans and procedures and emergency drills at the schools themselves.

It is telling that in a recent study by the Foreign Service Institute, 87 percent of our officers and families serving overseas for 15

years or more will have served at a post that has experienced a crisis as we define them in our emergency action plans. We do not exercise because something might happen, we exercise because crises

will happen.

Turning specifically to the GAO report, the recommendations,

and the protection programs for personnel when they are not in an

embassy or consulate. The Department has commenced several

new programs and enhanced existing ones based on our experiences, results from accountability review boards, inspector general

recommendations, and in response to the advice give to us from

GAO.

We deeply appreciate the past and continued support of Congress

in this ongoing effort. In this GAO report entitled ‘‘State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect Americans Outside the Embassy,’’ GAO is stating we could do more. GAO

is correct, and has identified in its recommendations a few key

areas that we can improve on.

However, I believe it is important to provide some clarification

of the existing programs that we have in place to give you a sense

of the importance we attach to the issue, the time we spend on it,

the level of effort and funding it takes to protect our employees and

families overseas in places other than hardened facilities.

In the past 7 years, we have accomplished the following: delivered over 1,500 armored vehicles to our posts overseas to provide

the ability to transport our people in safety in heightened threat

conditions; instituted a comprehensive chemical, biological, and radiological protection program, providing escape masks and equipment for our overseas personnel; provided local guards, roaming

patrols and react teams at our residences according to the threat

readings, costing in excess of $100 million a year.

Let me skip to one part that we must discuss, and that is the

management of security issues and crisis management that stems

from the top, the chief of mission. Every Ambassador and Consul

General today understands his security responsibilities. Emergency

action plans are implemented almost weekly in some corner of the

world, and one of the most important tools and visible signs of the

efforts made to protect our employees and families are the evacuations.

When the threat is too high, trip wires are crossed, or political

violence or local instability too dangerous, we move nonessential

families and employees out of harm’s way. On average, regrettably,

we have one authorized or ordered departure from a post every 31⁄2

weeks for the past 16 years. A sign of the times is the large numVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:40 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22704.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ber of posts we currently have in drawdown or unaccompanied status.

Beyond that, sir, let me skip to the one recommendation I think

we must agree with from GAO which is that we have to move from

a system of briefing our personnel to training our personnel. It is

a sign of the times that we believe we must increase the trade craft

that we give our people, and give them better tools when they go

overseas.

The terrorism threat against our people and facilities remains

high. We must equip our people to respond to that.

I think I will cut it at that point.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there anything that you left out that is important

to share?

Mr. STARR. I will be happy to address your questions after opening statements.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Starr follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I do want to say, I don’t think the GAO said you

could do more, I think they were saying you must do more.

Mr. STARR. We must, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador Bushnell, were you in Kenya during the

time of the attack?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. That’s correct. I was the U.S. Ambassador at the time.

Mr. SHAYS. So this is more than just theory.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PRUDENCE BUSHNELL

Ambassador BUSHNELL. This is more than just theory. I thank

you for inviting me to testify. This is the first time I have been

asked to do so since al Qaeda bombed the American embassies in

Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. I greatly appreciate your attention to the issue of overseas security, and I would like to give

you a summary of my written testimony.

While the GAO report addresses so-called soft targets, and its

recommendations, if implemented, would strengthen overseas security in general, an attack on family members or employees serving

under chief-of-mission authority is a nightmare beyond belief,

whether it occurs at a hard or a soft-target.

Nairobi was a case in point. The bomb that exploded in our parking lot on August 7 killed 213 people instantly and wounded 5,000

more. We suffered a 50 percent casualty rate in the embassy, and

the remaining 50 percent had no 911, no police, no fire department,

no rescue squad and no ambulance. Kenya, like over half the countries to which Department personnel are assigned, is a developing

country. On a normal day, medical facilities are inadequate. On

August 7, they were overwhelmed.

Survivors in our building, including a high school student and a

college intern, regrouped on the front steps and voluntarily returned to what was a death trap to tend to the injured, dig colleagues out of the rubble and carry out the dead. For the first critical 24 hours, we were alone on our own. The heroism of the entire

community was extraordinary, and I think you would have been as

proud as I was.

Although American employees of the embassy were given the opportunity to curtail their assignments, an option unavailable to our

Kenya colleagues, few chose to leave. Instead, some of the wounded

returned, often with shards of glass still embedded in them. We

lost two moms, and their surviving children remained in school.

Trauma and sorrow permeated the community. Absent counseling

and other services available at home, parents, students, teachers,

and community members relied upon one another for support and

healing.

The impact of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombing circled

the globe. The U.S. foreign affairs community is a small one, and

work is not just a job, it is a family commitment. So August 1998

for us was September 11th.

Since that day, the Foreign Service Institute and other elements

of the Department of State have done much to prepare people to

live in a far more dangerous world. All American entry-level employees receive basic security training incorporated in orientation

programs for civil and foreign service employees and locally enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:40 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22704.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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gaged staff, including foreign service nationals. Employees from

other agencies attend the mandatory introduction to working in an

embassy course.

Security and crisis management training is also embedded in all

of FSI’s, the Foreign Service Institute’s trade craft classes, including those provided to foreign service nationals. For senior-level employees, we have created a crisis leadership seminar which focuses

specifically on the skills necessary during a crisis, and we are planning a similar one for mid-level employees.

The security overseas seminar which concentrates on life in overseas environment, is mandatory for all Federal employees and recommended for eligible family members. A similar age-appropriate

program, Young SOS, is offered to young family members grades

2–12. At post, people receive briefings tailored to the host country,

as well as hands-on training for briefing teams out of Washington.

In addition, crisis management teams fan out across the world to

help emergency action committees exercise their emergency plans

biannually.

With our encouragement, foreign service nationals are participating. Where we can, we also include overseas schools and appropriate host government officials.

Are we satisfied that we are doing is enough? No. The GAO report makes the point that more rigorous DSAC training should become mandatory for everyone going to critical threat posts, and I

agree. Colleagues have raised additional discussions, such as more

defensive and evasive driving training because road accidents remain the No. 1 source of death overseas amongst Americans, better

preparation for chemical or biological attacks, and greater coverage

of emergency procedures.

As the GAO report points out, leadership is key.

Counterterrorism, security and crisis-management issues take up

more than any single topic at both the Ambassadorial and DCM

seminars. Chief of missions are explicitly advised in the letter from

the President, ‘‘I expect you to take direct and full responsibility for

the security of your mission and all the personnel for whom you are

responsible, whether inside or outside the chancery.’’ Everyone

takes this very seriously.

The Ambassadorial seminar emphasizes that responsibility and

the leadership role of the chief of mission and spouse toward the

entire community not just within the embassy. Attention to the institutions that support the community, such as schools or employee-sponsored recreation clubs, comes with that role.

For the 2005 series of Ambassadorial seminars, we have redesigned the aspect of the program devoted to security,

counterterrorism and crisis management, and we will continue to

refine the design.

Embassy leadership is now more aware and better prepared for

crises than we were in the past. No one wants to go to the number

of funerals and memorial services my colleagues and I attended;

and if we do, we want to be able to truthfully say ‘‘I did my very

best’’ when we look into the eyes of grieving survivors and family

members.

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The incremental changes offered by the GAO report will, I think,

improve security, but I would like to suggest three more profound

challenges.

One, finding the right balance between living vigilantly and normally. People do not stay on high alert for long periods of time.

Scare tactics are ultimately self-defeating, and administrative mandates such as checklists risk becoming rote exercises. To use a metaphor, our challenge is to ensure people are looking both ways before they cross the street, becoming neither paralyzed nor indifferent to the oncoming traffic.

Two, maintaining a consistency of funding and attention to security issues. In his report to Congress in 1998, Admiral Crowe noted

that, ‘‘The boards were especially disturbed by the collective failure

of the U.S. Government over the past decade to provide adequate

resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions to

terrorist attacks in most countries around the world. Responsibility

for this failure can be attributed to several administrations and

their agencies, including the Department of State, the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, as well as

the U.S. Congress.’’

The times have changed, thank heaven, since that report was

written. I appreciate Congress’ support of the Department and the

security of its people, and I fervently hope it will continue.

No. 3, changing the ethos and the image of the Department of

State. Today, 64 percent of Department employees overseas and 87

percent of foreign service generalists with 15 years or more of service can count on experiencing evacuation, civil unrest, kidnapping,

natural disasters, assassination, terrorist attacks, biochemical attacks, and other crises listed in the foreign affairs handbooks, and

yet the old stereotype of Department employees as men in striped

pants, which I saw recently in an article, continue. We have to

change that perception.

My colleagues are fiercely patriotic, willing to put themselves

and their families at risk in order to make a difference on behalf

of the American people. They deserve to thrive. At the very least,

they deserve our best efforts to keep them safe.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate what you are doing and hope we can

continue to count on you and your fellow subcommittee members

as our partners and our advocates. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bushnell follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Ambassador. I am so grateful you were

invited to participate. And I apologize that this is the first time you

have had a chance to be able to express what is a powerful statement and one which we will look forward to understanding better.

Mr. Miller.

STATEMENT OF KEITH MILLER

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department’s soft target programs for overseas schools.

The mission of Overseas Schools is to ensure the best possible education for the dependents of U.S. Government employees abroad.

Presently, we provide grant and technical assistance to 191 schools

in 132 countries. And, interestingly, the enrollment in these schools

is 103,000 children, of whom 28,000 are U.S. citizens.

Security in overseas schools has long been a concern of our office.

When our regional educational officers travel overseas, they consult

with regional security officers to encourage coordination with

schools in reviewing security plans and otherwise assisting the

schools with security issues. The Department has sent cables to all

overseas posts in 1998, 2001, and again in 2003, directing the regional security officers to collaborate on security issues.

The Office of Overseas Schools published an emergency procedures manual, which was reviewed by the Bureau of Diplomatic

Security, which provides a checklist of security items and procedures the schools can use to frame their local emergency plans, and

that manual was sent to all posts with the encouragement to work

with schools in updating their security plans.

In the Department’s Fiscal Year 2003 Appropriations Act, Congress provided funds to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations for security enhancement grants to overseas schools. And to

carry out this mandate, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations asked our office and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to

participate on the soft targets working group chaired by Overseas

Buildings.

Our office advises the committee on school matters and has acted

as the vehicle for sending security enhancement grants to overseas

schools. During the past 2 years, we have sent grants in two

phases totaling over $27 million to schools assisted by the Department of State, always in accordance with their needs as determined

by the regional security officers.

Phases 3 and 4 of the soft targets program address security enhancement needs of overseas schools that do not have a preexisting

grant relationship with the Department.

The GAO report on overseas security says the full scope of the

school program has not yet been determined. This process is essentially complete for phases 1 and 2 and is underway for phase 3.

The soft targets working group has requested and is analyzing information from posts to determine our priorities for phases 3 and

4.

The report further notes that schools are not tied to emergency

plans. Our regional educational officers report very positive comments from the school administrators we visit about the cooperation they receive from post personnel on security matters, and I understand that some of the schools are presently integrated into the

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post security plans, and efforts are underway to bring all of the

others into the post-emergency plans.

What more needs to be done to better secure overseas schools?

From our perspective the single best way to improve security in

these schools is for the regional security officers to enhance their

already close contact with school officials, to advise on security

measures, and keep them fully informed about security matters.

In closing, I would like to say that the response from the overseas schools receiving assistance has been extremely positive.

School boards and school heads have been universally appreciative

of this generous and critically important support from the U.S.

Government.

Thank you, and I look forward to responding to your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you so much, Mr. Miller.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I am thinking of all of the statements in context not

of Mr. Ford’s work, but more in terms of Ambassador Bushnell’s

comments, because I am haunted by one thing you said. I am

haunted by a number of things you said, actually, but one, the concept that 24 hours later you were still all alone. It makes me want

to understand what you meant by that.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Sir, it was the ultimate irony that the

airplanes carrying the rescuers broke down, both of them, so rescuers were 15 hours late, and so was the medical evacuation plan. It

was just a series of snafus.

Mr. SHAYS. And there is no doubt in our minds this was an attack by al Qaeda; correct?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. The morning of the bombing we did not

know. It was the very good work of the FBI that came in immediately that ultimately found evidence, traced the evidence into the

Muslim community in Kenya, and found the al Qaeda connection.

Mr. SHAYS. And your reference to the fact that it was August 8?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. August 7.

Mr. SHAYS. August 7, 1998. And for you and for our country, you

are saying it should have been our September 11, 2001?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. For the foreign affairs community, it was

our September 11th. Because we are such a small service and we

move all of the time, we know one another. Our children play together, we serve together. Nairobi was a medium-threat post. Dar

es Salaam was off the map. If this could happen in two such safe

posts in terms of terrorism, it could happen anywhere.

Mr. SHAYS. And al Qaeda, seeing no significant response for

handiwork at our embassies, was a huge message that either the

United States was incapable or unwilling to confront their actions

which was, in my judgment, a very huge incentive to continue in

a bigger scale, and to interpret that, even with September 11, we

might respond in kind of an anemic way.

I guess my point to you is it should have been, and I say this

to me as well, it should have been September 11th for all of us because the State Department is part of our family. They are our outreach to the rest of the world. It is a very poignant thing that you

have told us.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Thank you for your words, Mr. Chairman. They are—I have been waiting a long time to hear them, as

have the people behind me. I appreciate that.

Mr. SHAYS. We will see how we can remedy that even more.

This is what I would like to do. Mr. Starr, I would like you to

tell me what you believe GAO was saying as succinctly as possible.

And then, Mr. Ford, I want you to respond whether anything was

left out or whether the intensity of a certain part was left out.

By the way, Mr. Starr, you are in charge not just of personnel

security in terms of the training that GAO made reference to, but

also the hardened targets? All security.

Mr. STARR. At the moment I am acting. Yes, I am in charge of

it all.

Sir, I believe the most salient point in the GAO report was a

combination of what Congressman Duncan said that we have to

find out what that balance is and what we can best do with the

resources we are given. I think what GAO has specifically pointed

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out to us is we need to move and prepare our people better before

they go overseas and while they are overseas.

We have engaged in briefing programs for many, many years for

our people. And FSI and Ambassador Bushnell have been doing a

wonderful job. But at critical posts, we need to give them handson training, how to avoid terrorist attacks, how to recognize terrorist attacks, how to get out of them when they happen. That is the

single most salient point that the GAO report hammers home for

us.

Mr. SHAYS. Tell me the other points that were made that you

think need to be mentioned.

Mr. STARR. GAO talks about accountability and how they would

like to see some accountability systems built into our programs. We

have in fact, as GAO noted, modified some of our evaluation forms

for our employees so if they are not paying attention to security

regulations, they can be written up on that. GAO’s point is they believe that checklists should be—personal accountability checklists

should be put into place.

But Ambassador Bushnell and I believe checklists become perfunctory and we have to work with that GAO recommendation and

come up with something that promotes personal accountability,

that brings our people to a realistic understanding of what they

need to be aware of, and also we cannot put them on alert 24 hours

a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. We have to find that balance.

Mr. SHAYS. You are kind of qualifying her point. One is better

training at home and overseas, better accountability. Is the third

issue the whole concept of a checklist?

Mr. STARR. Personal accountability is what Jess and the GAO

are talking about. We agree with personal accountability. We have

to find ways to get people to better take their personal security seriously. One of the recommendations the GAO made, the checklist,

we feel there are some downsides to that.

Mr. SHAYS. Having been in the business of politics 31 years at

hearings, when I get people when I was in the State government

or now in the Federal Government, your job is not to filter out

what resources you have and then you make the best of it. That

is your job when you are given it, but your job is not to shield me

from the reality. If we are not giving you the resources, you are not

being unfaithful to me or the administration, you are doing your

job. You are under oath. You have that requirement.

If you prevent me from knowing what you need and therefore

you do not claim it as a need, I will not be able to do my job and

this subcommittee will not. You made reference to the fact with the

resources you have available. I think GAO is saying what you need

to do, and we need to figure out how to get you those resources.

Mr. STARR. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador, what do you think the report was saying? Any add-ons or qualifiers to what Mr. Starr said?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. One of the things that for me was missing from the report is looking——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me do this first. You are going to have a chance

to say what should have been in the report because that is a great

question, but what was in the report, do you think the issue—and

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I think you have a sense why I am asking this question; I want

to see what is getting through to the Department that GAO is saying, and then we will talk about disagreements and how you might

have written the report to include some other things.

One is the better training at home and overseas. The other is the

issue of accountability as raised by Mr. Starr. Do you think there

are other issues that GAO was saying that State needs to pay attention to?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. The overall tone of the report was to say

that State Department is not doing enough to protect safe targets.

As I said in my statement, I think the report gives some excellent

incremental suggestions. I think there are challenges that go beyond those incremental suggestions.

Mr. SHAYS. That is helpful to have you make that point as well.

Mr. Miller, I know you look at it more from one perspective, but

would you add anything else? Then I am going to ask Mr. Ford to

say whether he is in agreement.

What do you think the GAO is basically saying in addition to not

doing enough to deal with the soft targets and not doing the kind

of training at home and overseas for them when they are overseas?

And finally, the whole issue of accountability. Is there anything

else you would add to that?

Mr. MILLER. Training or involvement of school officials in the

emergency action plans and in the crisis management training

would be helpful to give them the necessary information to improve

their security.

Mr. SHAYS. You are seeing it from your position of being in

charge of the schools?

Mr. MILLER. Correct. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Ford, would you add anything or choose to emphasize it differently?

Mr. FORD. The key points in our report have been mentioned.

Mr. SHAYS. In this last line of questioning? Not whether they

mentioned the statement. Do you concur with the answers you

have just heard?

Mr. FORD. Yes. I concur that the State Department recognizes in

areas of training and accountability, there are some steps it can

take to improve the current situation based on what we said in our

report.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t like the word ‘‘can.’’

Mr. FORD. Whether they are actually implementing the suggestions at this point, and I heard something today that I was not

aware of regarding the inclusion of the schools in the emergency

evacuation plans which at the time we did our work, we had not

seen that in the actual plans themselves. Assuming they have done

that, that is a step in the right direction because that is one of our

recommendations.

Mr. SHAYS. Maybe it is part of your training to not be offensive.

You say they can do it. Isn’t your report saying that they need to

do it?

Mr. FORD. Absolutely. Specifically we talked about the need for

hands-on training. We thought that ought to be made mandatory

for every critical post overseas, and if they have the resources, they

should reach down for the high-threat posts.

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Mr. SHAYS. Say that again.

Mr. FORD. They have different categories of vulnerability that

they have assigned to each post. With regard to terrorism, they

have three categories based on threat: critical threat, high threat

and medium threat.

We have a chart in our report that outlines the number of posts

that are in those categories, and, given the resource requirements

with making mandatory training, we felt one way to prioritize that

would be to start with the critical-threat posts first.

Mr. SHAYS. I have to say, listening to this, if I was someone

under high threat, I would like the training too, with all due respect.

Mr. FORD. The issue is resources. The Department indicated it

needs to spend more money on training.

Mr. SHAYS. I feel like I am getting covered up with a web. It is

good that you are telling me there is critical and medium and high

threat, but is your report only saying they need to be trained for

those that are critical, or are you saying all of them need to be?

Mr. FORD. I think all of them need to be. I think—we’re talking

about prioritizing what should happen first, and we felt that critical threat should be first.

Mr. SHAYS. And it’s your testimony that critical is not being done

right now?

Mr. FORD. I’m not—I saw the numbers in the statement from Mr.

Starr. I don’t know if that covers all of the critical threat posts. I

don’t believe it does, but I’d defer to him on that.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Is there any other point that you want to make

before we go back to the other witnesses here?

Mr. FORD. Yes. I think there’s some other areas that I think the

Department should explore that, based on the——

Mr. SHAYS. That are in the report?

Mr. FORD. That are in the report that I—for example, the use of

surveillance detection teams overseas. There was some uncertainty

at the post we visited about how much of those teams could actually be used.

Mr. SHAYS. And describe to me without disclosing anything that

we don’t want to disclose, but when you make reference to surveillance teams, what do you mean? Do you mean people going overseas to review vulnerabilities? Do you mean looking out for bad

characters? What do you mean?

Mr. FORD. Yes, basically the latter. These are teams that are

trained to do those type of things.

Mr. SHAYS. And so one of the recommendations is that we should

make better use of them and use them more often?

Mr. FORD. Yes. We met with—virtually every regional security

officer that we met with at the five places we visited indicated that

those teams can provide value added to protecting areas that are

outside the embassy to the extent they have resources to do so.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So basically we have: Not doing enough to protect soft targets. And then ways to deal with that one is better

training home and abroad, and accountability. And you are adding

surveillance teams to that list that wasn’t mentioned, that we

should make better use of surveillance teams, correct?

Mr. FORD. That’s correct.

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Mr. SHAYS. Anything else you want to add to that list?

Mr. FORD. I think the other area really gets more into the strategic outline of what soft target strategy ought to be. This gets into

an issue of what set of requirements that the Department is now

studying which will have resource implications. And basically we

have a recommendation that the Department basically put out that

strategy, lay out the requirements and the resources that are going

to be required to implement it. And this will be tied directly to

schools and perhaps other facilities outside the embassy.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. This is all very helpful, and I thank you.

Mr. Starr and also Ambassador and Mr. Miller, is there anything

that you think the GAO should have spoken to in terms of

vulnerabilities? It’s really Ambassador made that point. But is

there anything, Mr. Starr, that you think the subcommittee needs

to know? We’re not looking to tell terrorists what are vulnerable,

but areas where improvement needs to be made that might not

have been made by the GAO.

Mr. STARR. Sir, if there’s one point I would like to make, it is

that we thank the GAO for looking at the soft targets, and we do

think there’s improvements to be made. But I think sometimes

there’s the mistake that al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations

are moving toward soft targets, they are moving away from our

hard targets, and the fact is that we see as many, if not more,

threats every day at our hard targets, and we see the type of attacks that they would like to undertake, which are catastrophictype attacks, car bombs and things like that, which would not just

injure one or two people or maybe five in a residence or in a car,

but catastrophically, as we saw in Nairobi, you know, we had 222

people there killed and 5,000 injured. So we have to strike a balance between looking closely at protecting our people in soft targets, but not losing our focus on protecting our hard targets at the

same time.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador, what was left out that you would like

this subcommittee to be aware of?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. I would like as much help as possible

from the Congress and any report that comes out on security of our

employees overseas to underscore the danger of their mission so

that we can begin to counteract this notion that somehow we are

leading exotic and glamorous lives at taxpayers’ expense. Sixty-four

percent have faced crisis, and these include our Foreign Service national employees overseas; 87 percent of people who have been in

for 15 years or more. I would defy any organization to come up

with that statistic. So any time there is a mention for need of force

protection, which we do have, it would certainly help our cause in

changing both ethos and image to underscore those statistics.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Miller, any comment you would like to make?

Mr. MILLER. I don’t think I can add to the GAO’s recommendations.

Mr. SHAYS. But schools represent a soft target, right?

Mr. MILLER. They certainly do.

Mr. SHAYS. Based on what happened in Russia, I think you, Mr.

Starr, would agree that was catastrophic?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir.

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Mr. SHAYS. So we’re not suggesting that soft targets can’t be catastrophic either.

Mr. STARR. No, sir. We’re just suggesting that we have both to

look after.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. And I think that’s important.

I’m just going to summarize. I am hearing a report by GAO that

has basically acknowledged that we are doing pretty good at dealing with hard targets. That wasn’t the focus of your report, but the

acknowledgment that we are doing well, but we could—and from

the first panel, that we could be doing obviously better with more

resources.

But we are hearing that, in your report, Mr. Ford, you basically

said we are not doing enough to deal with soft targets; that we

need to have better training for employees both at home and

abroad for them when they go overseas. We’re hearing that we

need to pay more attention to accountability, and we may need to

flesh that word out a little better; that you believe that surveillance

teams, Mr. Ford, need to be better utilized, excuse me, GAO does.

And we’re hearing as well that there needs to be a strategic focus,

which ties in, Mr. Starr and the Ambassador’s point, but ties in

with your point: If you have a strategy, you are able to know how

to allocate limited resources. And resources will always be limited.

In my judgment, the resources are too limited in terms of protecting sites.

And I would just say for the benefit of Mr. Ruppersberger, who’s

joined us, who serves on the Intelligence Committee—and I might

add he was appointed to the Intelligence Committee as a freshman

Member, which is quite, I think, an honor and opportunity for

him—that Ambassador Bushnell was there when the Kenyan

bombing took place, pointed out that the loss was 50 percent, pointed out that for 24 hours they basically were on their own because

relief teams couldn’t get in for a variety of reasons, and pointed out

to the subcommittee that basically September 11th for State Department happened on August 7, 1998; and that she said this is

the first time she’s been able or invited to even testify about this

experience in spite of the fact that she was the Ambassador, which

is a failure on our part. And my only comment back to her is that

September 11th began for all Americans on that day, if not sooner.

At this time, Mr. Ruppersberger, I would give you the floor.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Sure. First, I apologize. I had another hearing, and I have another hearing at 3:30.

Mr. SHAYS. Apologies are never required.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, I think so, because this is a very important issue. And for those of us who have traveled to different

parts, we understand what’s going on as far as security, especially

with our State Department, but other people, too, who work for

other agencies, really non-military but military also, a lot of these

areas that are difficult areas where families aren’t even allowed to

be there because of how difficult they are.

I don’t know—and stop me if I’m repeating—but what has been

our program or our plan with respect to our host nations and working with our State Department and having them to assign somebody? To just rely on them is one thing, because you don’t control

them, but to assign manpower to work with us that we can help

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train them to help protect us. Can you discuss that issue, Ambassador? And then we will go down.

Mr. Starr, why don’t you do that.

Mr. STARR. Sir, we have a—in my earlier testimony, we do rely

on the host country’s security and police forces to a great extent

overseas, but we find their response to us uneven. In many cases

they are exceptionally good and exceptionally devoted, have highly

trained people, and have an overlapping web of forces that include

intelligence forces and security forces and police forces that help

protect us. In other cases where we are less successful, where they

are not as professional, the RSO spends a great deal of time working with the local police to try to get protection.

We have programs such as the Antiterrorism Assistance Program

where we try to give those countries assistance where we identify

there is a need that they can help themselves and help us and help

other Americans. There are other programs out there like the INL

programs that the State Department has to professionalize the police also.

Overall, I would say that in many places we have excellent response, but in many places it is less than excellent, and we work

to try to improve it where we can.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do we have standards in all countries that

involve host nations and training, or does that go country to country?

Mr. STARR. It’s primarily country by country, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Is that on purpose, or is that just because

we haven’t put a standard together?

Mr. STARR. I think it’s on purpose, sir. The Geneva Convention

primarily assigns the responsibility for protection at diplomatic facilities to the host country. Where we identify that they are incapable or have weaknesses, we try to train them and try to get them

to improve.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What percentages of countries are incapable of giving us the security that we need?

Mr. STARR. Sir, I would say that every country tries to give us

security that they can. I would say that—I would be hazarding a

guess, sir, but my guess would be that at least 30 percent of the

countries out there, it is less than fully professional.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How about from an intelligence perspective? I mean, basically it seems to me that your best offense is intelligence. Do you have that through the State Department? I

mean, are you working with other agencies? Is that part of your

security component, the intelligence end?

Mr. STARR. We work very closely with the Intelligence Community, sir, yes.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. In dealing with issues involving our own

personal security or U.S. security?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Now, have you discussed the Overseas Security Policy Board?

Mr. STARR. No, sir, we did not.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Why don’t you explain what that is, and

who the members of the Board are, and does the Board meet, and

what happens at the meetings?

65

Mr. STARR. The Overseas Security Policy Board is a Board of security directors of those agencies that are present in our overseas

community. We have representation from the Defense Department,

AID; and at this point the Intelligence Community is on it, CDC,

FAA, FBI, Justice Department. I believe there are 22 members on

the Overseas Policy Board at this point. We meet approximately

once every 2 months. We develop policies for security overseas,

technical, physical, counterintelligence policies. We publish them in

what is called the 12-FAH, Foreign Affairs Handbook. Those standards are applied to all agencies serving overseas under a Chief of

Mission.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do you think that Board can do more? Do

you think they are doing what they are convened to do?

Mr. STARR. I think it is an exceptionally good group, sir. I think

that we do meet often enough, and we are cognizant enough of our

protective responsibilities that we look constantly at evolving

threats. And I think that’s what our challenge is.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So sharing of information and strategies?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. How about the Soft Targets Working

Group? Have you discussed that here today?

Mr. STARR. Very briefly, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What agencies are a member of the group,

and how often does that meet?

Mr. STARR. At the moment, on one particular committee on residential security, we have a Soft Targets Working Group under the

OSPB, and it is—as I understand it, it is State Department,

USAID, and I believe it is DOD that is working with us on that

as well.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Representatives from all the different countries?

Mr. STARR. No, sir. This would be looking at the agencies under

the OSPB and looking at what standards we want to write or improve for residential security.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Now, you also, I think, in your testimony,

you stated that overseas personnel have been on a heightened

threat alert status since 1998; is that correct?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. Is there a danger that long-term stress

will be detrimental to job performance? Are you seeing that now?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. Ambassador Bushnell commented specifically on that during her testimony, that it is very difficult to find

that balance between having somebody on alert 24 hours a day, 7

days a week, 365 days a year, and trying to find that balance and

not burning our people out.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Now, again, I don’t want to repeat because

I didn’t come in. The recommendations—I mean, we have these

hearings, and one of the frustrations about being here is that you

don’t see implementation. Now, what, if anything—and let me go

down the row. What, if anything, would you like to see to implement the resources or a system or move further where we need to

go, because most of us who have traveled to the different parts of

the world, and some of those very dangerous. There is a lot of anxiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:40 Aug 16, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\22704.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ety with those people that live there with their families. What, is

it about resources? And let me start, Mr. Miller, and go right down.

Mr. MILLER. We have already gotten $27 million into the schools

in a fairly short period of time, and the Department has asked for

$15 million in each of the next 2 fiscal years. So, in our judgment,

we’re getting the resources. It’s our job then to get the money out

and put it to good use.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Are the resources being used effectively? Is

the money being used to do the right thing? Would you like to see

a better standard? Do you think we have a standard that is working?

Mr. MILLER. I think we have a good standard. This is always

monitored and supervised and recommended by the regional security officers at post who are the experts on security. So we feel that

there is a good monitoring process.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. Ambassador?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. I’m going to be a broken record here.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That’s OK.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Anything that will portray the Department of State as what it is, which is an agency of civilian employees who are facing danger at—on a constant basis. That means

public recognition for what we are facing. That means the training

for what we are facing, the recruiting for what we are facing, the

understanding among family members of what they face, the resources, and the force protection for what we face.

I would also add that I think we need to look very, very carefully

at other agencies, because if there’s anybody who gets it, it is the

employees in the Department of State. People who are parachuted

into posts from the middle of the United States, from one agency

or another, are actually the most vulnerable of our people. And we

need to focus, those agencies need to focus, on how they’re selecting

people, how they’re training people to go overseas, and how they’re

holding people accountable for their own safety overseas.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I know under Colin Powell’s leadership

there was a lot of emphasis put on capital improvements. Is that

continuing on under Condoleezza Rice?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. That is continuing.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. All of the programs that former Secretary Powell began are continuing under Secretary Rice, I’m delighted to say.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK, good. Mr. Starr.

Mr. STARR. Sir, I’m going to be very specific. I agree with the

GAO’s assessment that we need to move from a system where we

brief our people, both domestically and once they are overseas, to

where we train our people. In 2003 and 2004, we trained 239 officers in the antiterrorism training before they went overseas for

high and critical-threat-level posts.

That’s not enough. We also augmented that course specifically to

address Iraq-specific types of threats. Since 2003 we have put 1,193

people that went to Baghdad and the four regional posts through

that specific training. I would like to see more training for our people, as the GAO report said, prior to going to high and criticalthreat-level posts.

67

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. So you feel that’s probably one of the

highest priorities is the training?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. I feel that’s the biggest bang for the buck.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Should it just be in difficult areas, or just

all members of the State Department that are going overseas as a

curriculum that needs to be put forward to these employees?

Mr. STARR. As we move, sir, every 2 to 3 years, I think that

every member of the State Department should get this training. I

think that GAO has correctly identified that we need to start with

our critical and high-threat posts.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Yes, I agree with that. I think—again, I want to repeat some things I said earlier.

Mr. SHAYS. You said what?

Mr. FORD. I agree, first of all, that training is a critical issue that

needs to be addressed at the Department, as I mentioned earlier.

But I also think it ought to include all the other non-Department

employees that are going to be stationed overseas, and of which

that’s about two-thirds of the number of people who are currently

assigned.

I also think that there should be a clear set of requirements laid

out for on the soft targets program that clearly spells out what

we’re going to cover, how much it’s going to cost, and what the pros

and cons of the various requirements might be.

I think that we need to continue to encourage accountability

mechanisms, because unfortunately at the five posts that we visited in the course of doing this work, we found that compliance

with some of the basic tenets of security awareness was not being

followed.

I understand the issue regarding stress, but I also think that

there was some due diligence on the part of people overseas that

they tend to become complacent about, and they are potentially at

risk, in my view. So I think that these accountability mechanisms

are also important.

I guess the last thing I would like to mention is the issue of surveillance detection activities that can be used to help safeguard facilities outside the embassy walls, and I think the Department

should look into that with regard to what type of resources could

be applied to help safeguard those other assets besides the embassy

itself.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How about the cost factors on what you

just talked about, any idea?

Mr. FORD. I’m sorry?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The cost factors, the money.

Mr. FORD. Again, the Department has indicated to us that it

would cost a lot of money to fully implement a lot of these requirements, but we haven’t seen what the requirements are yet. We understand the working group that was cited earlier is looking into

that issue with regard to what those requirements would be and

what the associated costs would be. So I don’t know exactly how

much that is, but I think the Department should lay that out.

Mr. SHAYS. If the gentleman would yield.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Sure.

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Mr. SHAYS. When they say it would cost a lot of money, they are

not being specific in terms of how much it would, in fact, cost?

Mr. FORD. Again, I’m going to defer to Mr. Starr. I understand

that at one time the Department was proposing, I believe, to expand the training courses that—on hands-on training earlier this

year, and I forget the exact amount that they had identified. I believe it’s in our report. But it was in the neighborhood of $5 to $6

million. That’s the only cost number that I’ve seen related to this

overall issue.

Mr. SHAYS. Before I go to the professional staff, Mr. Costa, I

would just want to mention this and then see if there’s any objection to what I’m saying: That it’s fairly clear State has not defined

soft target, that State lacks a soft target protection strategy. And

this is the third one which may, in fact, not be true. State has not

fully incorporated schools into emergency plans. So I guess, Mr.

Starr, would you agree with all three of those, or would you dispute

any of it?

Mr. STARR. I believe, sir, that in our emergency action plans, the

last rewrite of it, which was going on while this GAO study was

under way, we have, in fact, got the latest version that fully incorporates schools into our emergency action plans. So I think we

have addressed that one.

Your other two questions, sir?

Mr. SHAYS. State has not defined soft targets.

Mr. STARR. We have—it’s a difficult question for me, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say something. How long have you been

doing this job?

Mr. STARR. Twenty-five years, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. But in this responsibility that you have now.

Mr. STARR. One year, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. You are not going to be able to do everything

that you have to do in 1 year. This is not a judgment of you. It

is trying to understand, and have the confidence that you understand, what remains to be done. We think of our job sometimes as

a catalyst.

Mr. STARR. We are, in fact, writing a soft target strategy exactly

as GAO suggests.

Mr. SHAYS. Good. How about the definition of soft target? Are we

still kind of wrestling with that?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. Primarily from the standpoint that there’s

a soft target in terms of protection of our personnel that we serve,

send overseas, and where they are soft targets. And then there’s

the much larger soft target universe of American companies, businesses, other types of soft targets that we do not control. And our

program’s trying to provide those soft targets with information,

from programs such as the Overseas Security Advisory Council.

So we have sort of a dichotomy in the soft targets, the ones that

we’re specifically responsible for, that we fund programs for, that

we give training to, and then the larger soft targets universe which

I believe you will be hearing on your second panel, American businesses and Americans overseas.

Mr. SHAYS. Before I give Mr. Costa some time for questioning,

I need to be clear. When we talk about critical, high, and medium

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targets, I assume that was at the individual and not at the location. Is it more location than individual?

Mr. STARR. More country, more post-specific, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. So a country is a critical or a high or medium?

Mr. STARR. Usually the actual city that we have the establishment in.

Mr. SHAYS. That qualifies my comments about—so, for instance—and is there anything below medium, or everybody is medium? Norway would be medium?

Mr. STARR. For global terrorism, sir, we really don’t look at anybody as below medium.

Mr. SHAYS. I think that’s fair, because at one time we didn’t

think Kenya would have been—we would not have called it high

or critical probably at one time. So, OK. I’m going to be asking

when it’s my turn, and then we will get to the next panel, I will

be asking you each, is there any question that we should have

asked that we didn’t? Any question that you will regret not having

been asked, and we will find out later we should have asked the

question? So I am asking you to think about what that might be.

Sometimes the most important part of the hearing is the question

we never thought to ask that you need to answer. And you have

a solemn oath to do that. So don’t leave anything unanswered here.

Mr. Costa.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first question is about the Overseas Policy Security Board

and Overseas Security Advisory Council. According to the Foley

ARB, they were going to look at the need for a potential special

commission in the manner of the Inman report to look at soft targets broadly, look at training and so forth. As a response to the

ARB, the Department said they would look at that recommendation

and come back. What was the result, if you know, of that assessment of the recommendation?

Mr. STARR. As I understand it, the Overseas Security Advisory

Council convened a few working groups to look specifically at the

standards dealing with what we consider soft targets: Our residences, our residential policy, other policies in terms of protection

of personnel away from the post. We did a review on it. We did,

in fact, change the standards having to do with residential security.

We reviewed them from what they had been in 1998, and I believe

the consensus was that there wasn’t a need for a special look at

it after that. I believe that’s what happened with that.

Mr. COSTA. So I guess the followup question then would be what

is the status, then, of coming up with an all-encompassing strategy

given the results of the Overseas Policy Security Board and Overseas Security Advisory Council? How is that coming together?

Mr. STARR. We are, in fact, in the process of drafting a strategy

for the State Department in terms of protection of soft targets.

Once we have that strategy fleshed out, we will put it all through

the State Department clearance process, but also bring it to the

Overseas Security Policy Board, which I think is the appropriate

place with the experience to look at that strategy, give us comments on it, and determine whether or not what we’re doing is appropriate.

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Mr. COSTA. Can you make sure we get a copy of that strategy

as we move forward?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. We are—the report language, I think, requires us to give it to you by June 15th, I believe.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. COSTA. OK. Thank you.

Ambassador, your comments in your report was finding a right

balance between living vigilantly and living normally. And I guess

my question for all the panelists would be, how do we do that? How

do we find the right balance between living vigilantly and living

normally? Mr. Ford. Ambassador.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. In some respects I have to go back to

what I keep saying: We have to recognize the reality of what it is

that Foreign Service people are facing. Therefore, you begin, A,

with an understanding when you join the Department of State that

you are getting yourself into a dangerous occupation. B, you begin

your training. There’s the street, lots of traffic, look both ways.

Right? You turn your head to the left, you turn your head to the

right. So you begin to train people so that some responses become

absolutely automatic.

I think it is also a leadership issue in which we begin to look at

what does the leadership need to do or learn in terms of how people pulse? You cannot keep people in a hot environment all the

time. Sometimes they need to leave. Maybe they need a place to

recreate which is very, very safe.

This is a new world for us. It’s going to take time. I think there

are answers out there, there are people who have done a lot of research, and we need to begin to look in that research, but we’re

never going to do it until and unless we recognize the kind of business we are in.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you.

Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Yes. I would like to comment on that. I think that,

again, based on the trips we took to five posts, there are some

things that staff overseas, I think, need to be reminded of from

time to time, and a lot of it has to do with basic self-awareness,

awareness of what’s around you, your work habits in terms of when

you go to work, the way you go to work. And I also believe that

given the high level of turnover at overseas posts and the fact that

many of the people that have served there are non-State Department people, that the supervisor level at the post needs to make

that a priority to reinforce security awareness to their staffs, because, again, unfortunately, we talked to quite a few people overseas at these posts, and while they all acknowledge that they receive the training—the briefings and some training in headquarters, a lot of them told us, frankly, they weren’t following some

of the basic precepts that they should be following.

So there needs to be reinforcement. I believe that reinforcement

should be at the senior level at each of the embassies, and I think

that it ought to encompass all of the employees there, not just the

State Department. I think the State Department employees we

interviewed tended to be a little more aware than some of the others.

Mr. SHAYS. I would like to just pursue that because it was mentioned more than once. Ambassador, in Kenya, was the average

about what it is in other places, about 50 percent non-State Department, or were most in Kenya State Department?

92

Ambassador BUSHNELL. State Department representation was

about one-third of the mission; two-thirds to overseas generally are

other agencies.

Mr. SHAYS. So it was typical of the averages. I was understating

it then.

So you have people from the FBI, from Commerce, from Environmental Protection potentially, from the Agency, frankly, and others, no secret. You have people from lots of different responsibilities. Now, Mr. Starr, are they given the same training that would

be given? There’s always sometimes a question of whether the Ambassador has the kind of control over these individuals that you

need to. But are they given the same kind of training, or are they

kind of on their own?

Mr. STARR. Two-part answer, sir. At the current time when we

are doing the briefing program for the most part for most of our

people that are going overseas, agencies have the ability to either

self-certify that they give the same type of briefings that we give

at the Foreign Service Institute, the security overseas seminar or

the SAFE program, or their personnel attend the Foreign Service

Institute training programs before they go overseas. So in certain

agencies, if it’s an FBI agent who is already trained in

counterterrorism, who already has a lot of that training, the FBI,

Justice Department may self-certify that their people have the level

of training. AID people or people from CDC or other agencies that

don’t have that thing attend our Foreign Service Institute and the

training programs.

Mr. SHAYS. When they’re overseas?

Mr. STARR. And when they’re overseas, they are briefed exactly

the same as every single person who comes into post. Every person

under the Chief of Mission gets an arrival briefing when they come

in and the refresher briefings.

Mr. SHAYS. I think Mr. Costa still needs you to answer his question. But let me pursue this question that I’m asking now. Ambassador, is there anything you would add to the non-State Department employees?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. In theory, the Chief of Mission can agree

or not agree to allow every person who works for the Federal Government to the post. We run the Ambassadorial seminar, and one

of the things that I urge the people going through the Ambassadorial seminar to do is to deny country clearance, as we call it, to

people who have not—other agencies who have not gone through

mandatory training, and that’s the way we can control that.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Thank you.

Mr. STARR. Sir, may I add one thing? The DSAC training that

we are doing, the specific security, antiterrorism training that we

give to everyone before they go to Iraq, that is for every single

agency going to that country under Chief of Mission.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Mr. Costa.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you. Just, Mr. Starr and Mr. Miller, the question again was how do you teach people to find the right balance

between living vigilantly and normally? And, Mr. Starr and Mr.

Miller, if you could also address that perhaps from the point of

view of children as well? But, Mr. Starr?

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Mr. STARR. I believe that’s the difference between briefing and

training. I believe that when you train somebody and you refresh

them often enough, they don’t have to be vigilant 24 hours a day,

but they are engrained with the right types of habits. It is that example that Ambassador Bushnell pointed out: When you get to a

street, you look both ways. If you are trained to do it, you will do

it. If you are trained to pick up countersurveillance training, I

think you will have a better chance of doing it. And that, I think,

is the real difference between a briefing program and actual handson training before you go overseas.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you.

Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. When you are working with children, the best way

is to model it. It’s the way you conduct yourself as parents and the

way you conduct yourself as school officials.

There’s the danger of overdoing the comments about danger. I

sometimes think of the pictures of missing children on milk cartons

in the morning. I think we sometimes do more harm than good.

And so my answer is training the adults to provide the proper modeling for children.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you.

I would just like to point out, I actually had the opportunity to

take the DSAC training several years ago. It was very impressive.

And based on my experience as well, I see particularly the first few

days of that training as being pretty critical to anybody going overseas. I can’t emphasize that enough.

And I’m done. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. So, let me end by asking: Is there anything that we

should have asked that we didn’t? First off, no, let me do this. Is

there anything where you disagree with anything another panelist

has said that you just want to put on the record? I will conclude

that you don’t disagree if I don’t get this answer. So you understand the importance of answering that question. Silence means

you agree.

Is there anything, Mr. Ford, that you heard that you just feel

needs to be stated that you disagree with?

Mr. FORD. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Starr.

Mr. STARR. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. No.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. No.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Then finally this last question: Is there anything we need to put

on the record that we haven’t? We will start with you, Mr. Miller.

We didn’t talk much about schools. I will tell you one reason we

didn’t. I didn’t choose to talk about vulnerabilities at schools. I’m

not going to, some of it is intuitive, but frankly that’s a discussion

I will make sure that my staff has with you. I don’t care to have

publicly discussed all the ways that schools could be vulnerable.

But is there anything on the record you want to put on? Anything

you want to put on the record?

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Mr. MILLER. Well, I’d put on the record that it’s been a long time

coming that there is this kind of interest in schools and the protection, and it’s come very, very generously, in our opinion, and our

office and these schools overseas are appreciative. We’ve had a 100

percent positive response. And we all know that there’s a lot more

to be done, and I think we’ve gotten off to a good start.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Mr. Chairman, I can’t resist, so here

goes. How do we recognize and take care of the psychological impact on employees and family members of living constantly with

the stress of possibly being a soft or hard target? Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, do you think there is something we can do that

we are not doing?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. I think there’s a great deal of literature

on how human beings react to extreme stress. I found out when I

was trying to figure out what in the world was happening to my

community in Kenya after the bombing. And that literature that

exists in—with the military, that exists with the people who deal

with disasters has not yet moved into the mainstream or the Department.

Mr. SHAYS. So we deal with how other professions deal with

stress like this, the military and so on. And their point is they are

in the line of fire, and we need to be doing that for the State Department and other people who work in the embassies. That’s what

I’m hearing you say?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Both to use what the knowledge we have

and the best practices that are out there; and also, if there is not

knowledge or best practice, to try and find it from our group, because what happens to us ultimately happens to the American people.

Mr. SHAYS. So what I’m hearing you say just—and correct me if

I’m wrong. I’m hearing you basically say there are people who have

gone through this experience that aren’t being spoken to, not being

consulted with, not being asked, not being monitored in some cases.

And I’m hearing you say that there’s scars out there that haven’t

healed.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Possibly damage. There are also things

we could learn from other people. But to suck it up and move on,

which is essentially what we do, is to not learn a whole lot nor to

appreciate the possible toll that it’s taking, or even to celebrate

what people have gone through and withstood.

Mr. SHAYS. You have given me a lot to think about, thank you,

and my staff.

Mr. Starr, anything we need to put on the record?

Mr. STARR. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And I think—was I going the wrong way? Mr.

Ford.

Mr. FORD. Given the previous comment made by Ambassador

Bushnell, I’m not sure who sits on the working group for the State

Department soft-target strategy, but I’m wondering whether someone with the background that she’s articulated ought to be considered to be a part of that other than just the security experts. So

my comment has to do with making sure that the people who are

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going to make future decisions on what our strategy is going to be

have taken into consideration some of those perspectives.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say in my own words what I’m hearing

you basically say is on that council, if we are just having people

who have a military police background and not include issues that

the Ambassador’s raised, then it’s a committee that may need to

be expanded or——

Mr. FORD. Well, I’m not sure of the makeup of the working

group, but—I would defer to Mr. Starr. But I believe that if, in fact,

they don’t have someone on that working group that has some

awareness of that perspective, that perhaps they ought to consider

including them so you will have a little broader discussion on it.

Mr. SHAYS. Great. Thank you.

I think this panel has been very helpful to the subcommittee,

and we do appreciate each and every one of you being here. And,

Ambassador, particularly thank you for your candidness and for

giving this hearing a bit more reality. Thank you very much.

Thank you all. Thank you all for your good work and your service

to a magnificent country. Thank you.

Our next panel and final panel is Ambassador Wesley W. Egan,

retired; Ambassador John W. Limbert; and Mr. Joseph Petro, executive vice president and managing director, Citigroup Security and

Investigative Services, Citigroup.

So, Ambassador Egan, we have you right there. That’s good. You

can stay standing because I’m going to swear you in. As you know,

this being an investigative committee, we swear in all our witnesses and ask you to raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record all three witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

I will just point out that your entire statement will be submitted

into the record. Also, you may have heard points that you—from

the first panel that you wish to incorporate in your statements, so

feel free.

We are just going to go as you sit. Ambassador Egan, we will go

with you first. I don’t know why I said retired. I never think of Ambassadors as retired. OK.

Ambassador EGAN. It does happen. You actually do have that

title.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Ambassador EGAN. Well, technically you don’t carry the title in

a formal way for life unless you retired at the rank of career Ambassador.

Mr. SHAYS. I got you.

Ambassador EGAN. But if you served as a Chief of Mission on one

or more occasions, the title is often extended as a courtesy.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, thank you all for your work. And you are an

excellent panel. We look forward to your testimony. Ambassador

Egan, you go first.

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STATEMENTS OF AMBASSADOR WESLEY W. EGAN, RET.,

CHAIRMAN, 2003 FOLEY ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD;

AMBASSADOR JOHN W. LIMBERT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN

FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION; AND JOSEPH PETRO, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND MANAGING DIRECTOR,

CITIGROUP SECURITY AND INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES,

CITIGROUP

STATEMENT OF WESLEY W. EGAN

Ambassador EGAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, in 2003 I chaired an accountability review board to examine

the circumstances of the October 2002 murder of Laurence Foley,

the USAID executive officer at the American Embassy in Amman,

Jordan. I’d like to summarize the testimony I submitted earlier in

response to your invitation to testify this afternoon.

Our board made two recommendations. The first was that the

Secretary of State convene a special commission to make recommendations to improve the personal security of all personnel

serving abroad under the authority of the Chief of Mission regardless of department or agency affiliation. The second recommendation was that the embassy in Amman take several specific steps to

improve personal and residential security.

I believe the Department and the embassy accepted and have

begun to implement most of those post-specific recommendations. I

also understand that the Department has decided to implement

some of those recommendations at other overseas posts.

With respect to the first recommendation, however, the Department of State informed the Congress in June 2003 that it agreed

with the spirit and the intent of the recommendation, but that it

did not agree that it was necessary to convene a special commission. Rather, the Department reported that the existing Overseas

Policy Security Board and the Overseas Security Advisory Council

would be asked to review the Department’s implementation of our

recommendations and to advise whether it would be worthwhile to

convene such a commission. I do not know what action those

groups have taken or recommended.

This recommendation, the first recommendation, reflected our

concern that there are no government-wide standards for briefing,

training, or selecting U.S. Government personnel and contract employees for long-term or temporary duty at posts with a high or

critical threat rating for terrorism. This is especially troubling

when you consider that there are over 50,000 people in 180 countries working at over 260 diplomatic and consular facilities, and

that over 50 percent of those facilities are now rated as subject to

a high or critical threat for terrorism.

At the time of the board’s visit to Amman in February 2003, the

embassy was a good example of a modern, busy, high-threat and

growing multiagency post. The Ambassador’s staff included 140 direct hire American personnel representing 10 Federal agencies and

departments, over 350 personnel on temporary duty, more than 70

contract employees, over 200 family members, and approximately

200 Jordanian staff. In addition, the embassy compound was one

of the first constructed to Inman standards as recommended in the

1985 report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas

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Security, the Inman Commission. In short, the embassy was a fortress.

We found, however, that despite a high level of security awareness, personnel under the authority of the Chief of Mission for

whose security and well-being the Ambassador bears ultimate responsibility had not received the same or in many cases even similar security preparation before arriving at post. Personnel who arrived in Amman directly from other overseas assignments often received no special security preparation at all. Most contract employees received little or no security-related training or preparation unless required by their contracts. And there was no mechanism to

ensure that different agency contracts included such a requirement.

For most of those who received security training, it was not specific

to Jordan.

The embassy post report made no mention of security considerations or the growing terrorist threat. The Ambassador, his regional security officer, and the rest of his senior staff did not generally know what, if any, security preparation American staff and

dependents had received before arriving at post. And yet, all Americans at post, regardless of their employment status and department or agency affiliation, were vulnerable to the same threat.

There had been a marked increase in threat reporting available

to the embassy beginning with the millennium plot in 1999, which

indicated a growing threat against American targets outside the

heavily protected chancery compound. The reporting was sufficiently credible that the Community Counterterrorism Board called

for a special community advisory, a special Intelligence Community

advisory, on Jordan in early 2002. That advisory underscored that

these threats deserved special attention. The frequency of guidance

from post management to embassy personnel and the larger American community on how to respond increased as a result. There

were approximately 25 such advisory communications to personnel

and the American community between February and December

2002. The specificity, tone, and nature of the countermeasures recommended, however, did not change notably.

We were also troubled that, despite the increasing threat, many

Washington officials and embassy personnel considered personal

security a matter of personal choice. In my view, this reflects an

attitude probably more common among civilian than military personnel that we cannot afford.

The killing of an American representative overseas is not a personal or a private matter. Personnel selected for assignment overseas, but especially for duty at high and critical-threat posts,

should be just as accountable for their conduct when it comes to

personal security preparedness as they are for other aspects of

their professional and personal behavior.

Over the years we have made our facilities harder to attack, so

it’s not surprising that the vast majority of attacks against U.S.

Government personnel have occurred outside our protected buildings and facilities. Tragically, when they are outside their hardened offices, which is where most of their most important work is,

in fact, done, they are soft-targets. And, sadly there have been several ARBs convened since our work in 2003.

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By temperament and training some personnel deal effectively

with threatening environments, and some do not. Before 1985, existing groups in the foreign affairs community had been unable or

unmotivated to make sweeping changes such as those recommended by the Inman Commission. So, too, we thought an

Inman-like commission could challenge the foreign affairs community to look at recruitment, training and assignments, personal security countermeasures, and the accountability of personnel for the

implementation of such measures in new ways to improve the ability of our people to survive in an increasingly hostile overseas environment. Inman helped us harden our facilities. We thought we

needed something like the Inman Commission to help us harden

our personnel.

No combination of security awareness, training standards, preparedness, or accountability can guarantee the protection of our

people and our facilities. Human nature being what it is, security

is inconvenient, especially for those unaccustomed to being targets.

And there’s no doubt that those who attack us will be quick to

modify their tactics in response to our countermeasures. My colleagues and I thought, however, that we had identified problems

that were widespread and that required a new approach. It may

well be that 20 years after the work of Admiral Inman’s commission, existing tools like the Overseas Policy Security Board and the

Overseas Security Advisory Council can design an effective interagency approach for the protection of those who represent us

abroad. I don’t know, but there is no doubt in my mind that we

need to do better.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Ambassador. And thank you for your

good work.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Egan follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF JOHN W. LIMBERT

Ambassador LIMBERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of

the 13,000 members of the American Foreign Service Association

[AFSA], I thank you for this opportunity to share our views with

the subcommittee on the crucial matter of protecting soft targets

overseas.

Let me first note that AFSA speaks as the independent voice of

the Foreign Service. We do not speak for the State Department or

for any foreign affairs agency. We do not clear our statements with

anyone in the executive branch. Our first concern is always the

safety——

Mr. SHAYS. I have to ask you, what is that like after so many

years of having to clear it?

Ambassador LIMBERT. It’s very unusual.

Mr. SHAYS. You must go through some kind of mental anxiety or

something.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Habits of a career are difficult to break,

sir, but perhaps the bad news is that in a few months I have to

go back into the regular system, so I’ll have to relearn.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m sorry. I’m sure you will get it right back real

quick.

Ambassador LIMBERT. But it’s fun while it lasts.

Mr. SHAYS. Enjoy it.

Ambassador LIMBERT. But our first concern is always the safety,

the well-being, and security of those men and women who represent our country overseas.

For those of us in the Foreign Service, the term ‘‘soft target’’ is

a euphemism. What we are talking about is the murder, kidnapping, and maiming of our colleagues, our spouses, and our children

in school buildings and buses, in homes and cars, in recreation centers and places of worship, and in restaurants and shops as we live

our daily lives with all those activities that we take for granted

here in this blessed land. We take these threats seriously, and we

take them personally. And so, Mr. Chairman, we very much welcome and appreciate your holding these hearings.

Four days ago we added three names of friends killed in the line

of duty to the memorial plaques in the lobby of the State Department. These plaques now contain 218 names. Although I would like

to say never again, I’m almost certain that we will be adding more

names in the future.

AFSA’s concerns about embassy security took on new urgency

after the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es

Salaam. We note the sobering findings of the Accountability Review Board investigating those attacks that the, ‘‘emergence of sophisticated and global terrorist networks aimed at U.S. interests

abroad have dramatically changed the threat environment.’’

Mr. Chairman, in plain English that means it’s gotten a lot more

dangerous out there. Now places that were once considered safe are

no longer so.

Mr. SHAYS. You know, I just have to interrupt you again. I’ve

never heard someone in the State Department say ‘‘in plain

English’’ before. So this is——

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Ambassador LIMBERT. Well, as you pointed out, sir, I’d better not

get used to it.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I’m sorry.

Ambassador LIMBERT. The report said that terrorists could strike

us anywhere. And they did. They hit us in Amman, in Islamabad,

in Aden, and even in New York City and Washington.

AFSA applauds the work of administrations in the Congress for

their diligence in improving the security of our missions since 1998,

but the work of protecting our people is far from done. Mr. Chairman, as we made our workplaces harder to attack, we knew that

terrorists would target families in places that did not have the

same protection. And they did just that in Islamabad, Istanbul,

Bali, Amman, and Riyadh.

AFSA thanks the Congress, particularly the appropriations committees of the House and Senate, for recognizing that protection

goes beyond the bricks and wire of our chanceries. These committees required the Department of State to develop plans to protect

soft targets and provided funding to begin the process.

Mr. Chairman, before continuing I need to say that I’m not a security specialist, but I do have 32 years experience in the Foreign

Service, mostly in the Arab and the Islamic world, and have served

in places such as Tehran, Algiers, and Baghdad. With that caveat,

I would like to discuss some of our concerns on behalf of all our

members posted abroad.

Our Foreign Service world is never without risk. Now, we cannot

eliminate that risk, but we can at least recognize its existence. For

example, we need to think about the risk at places such as the

Protestant International Church in Islamabad, Pakistan, where

terrorists murdered embassy worker Barbara Green and her 17-

year-old daughter Kristin Wormsley in March 2002.

We frequently use hotels for meetings, for housing officials on

temporary duty and congressional and staff delegations. These

places and the many schools our children attend are all in the private sector. As such, there may be limits to what the U.S. Government can do, but we cannot ignore them, and we should make sure

our security strategy includes them.

A word about schools. AFSA welcomes Congress’s attention to

school security, but we also ask for consideration of school buses,

school bus stops where children gather. We understand that, when

the GAO team recently met with families overseas, these last two

areas were of very high concern. The appalling 2004 attack on Russian children in Beslan showed us that terrorists no longer consider schools to be off limits.

AFSA supports State’s plan for protecting overseas schools, and

urges its continued funding and review as conditions change, for

we must always review, change, and improve our procedures because the terrorists will certainly change and improve theirs.

Leadership is key to safety. Chiefs of Mission overseas set the example by seeking protection for the people who work for them.

These overseas leaders also need the support of leaders in the administration and in Congress, for if we are to hold accountable our

Chiefs of Mission in accordance with their letters of instruction

from the President, then it is not too much to ask that we also hold

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accountable those in the Department and in OMB who must support their efforts.

Finally, instructions, security requirements, and methods of enforcement must all be clear and consistent whether they come from

Washington or from the leadership at a post.

Sporadic attention to the security of our personnel from terrorist

attacks sends the message that we do not take terrorism seriously

and do not care about the safety of our people.

Absent those, we cannot make overseas duty 100 percent safe,

nor can the Foreign Service represent the people overseas by staying in fortresses. Under these conditions, AFSA urges the Department to take whatever measures are necessary to provide safety

and security to our people, all of them, overseas. We also urge Congress to support the Department in providing that safety and security so vital to our people and our operations. This funding and

support should be consistent. Our world is not getting safer.

Mr. Chairman, if people lose interest after a few years and support dries up and if we relapse into old ways of doing business,

more of our colleagues will die. I guarantee it.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my appreciation to you

for listening to the views of the men and women of the Foreign

Service on this very important issue. We thank you for requesting

the GAO study and for conducting this hearing. We also ask that

you continue to review this area as oversight responsibility to see

that the protection of soft targets continue.

Thank you. I am happy to answer questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Limbert follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Petro, while you are executive vice

president and managing director of Citigroup Security and Investigative Services, I will just note for the record from 1971 to 1993

you were special agent and senior executive for the U.S. Secret

Service where you had numerous operation and management positions. Basically you supervised the Presidential and Vice Presidential Protective Divisions in the Washington field office. We

thank you for your service then and your insights now.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH PETRO

Mr. PETRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am here today representing private industry, to discuss the important issue of protecting both our citizens when they travel, work and live abroad,

and our business facilities located around the world. I am also here

representing Citigroup, where I served as executive vice president

and managing director of our company’s Global Security Investigative Services.

Citigroup is the world’s largest financial services company,

formed in 1998 with the merger of Travelers Group and Citicorp.

Today Citigroup employs nearly 300,000 people. We operate in over

100 countries and serve more than 200 million customer accounts.

We also have been operating in some countries for over 100 years.

The daily functioning of the world economy depends on the

American financial services network of companies like Citigroup. It

is critical to maintain a safe environment for our businesses, especially in this time of heightened threats and actual events of terrorism directed against Americans and American interests. The private sector is vital. The private sector is at risk, and the private

sector must be involved in any solution.

American businesses cannot adequately protect themselves

against a terrorist attack or effectively anticipate or prepare for

new security risks without good intelligence. The ability to protect

our companies is seriously hampered by this lack of reliable, timely

and actionable information. The strict definition of what is a soft

target can be debated but American customer-facing businesses are

potential targets wherever they are located.

Unlike government facilities such as embassies and military

bases, a bank branch is either open or closed. Customers must

have easy access, and there must be identifiable signage. Citigroup

businesses operate in nearly 12,000 facilities around the world. To

adequately harden these buildings present serious challenges, and

in many instances there are practical, physical or business limitations.

There are some reasonable precautions that the private sector

can implement on its own to lower the risk of terrorism. Erecting

barriers to prevent vehicle access, removing unnecessary company

signage, screening visitors, moving noncustomer interfacing businesses to low-profile facilities, dispersing key business functions,

increasing security guard presence, extending perimeters, and effective training all contribute to providing a safer environment for

our people and businesses.

However, there are at least two realities that make it difficult to

protect soft targets.

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First, a sufficiently motivated attacker may eventually outsmart

any static defense. This is an operational reality even for a highly

defended site.

Second, even in today’s high risk environment, sustaining a high

level of security indefinitely is just not possible. There is a tendency for anxiety levels to reduce as time passes between attacks.

This tendency for complacency affects both the private and the

public sectors.

Protection against terrorism must be a shared responsibility between American business and the government. We can no longer

work in isolation. The private sector is limited in the types of defensive measures that can be implemented, and needs the government’s cooperation to effectively serve our security interests. We

are prepared to take appropriate physical protective measures, but

sharing risk assessment expertise and meaningful intelligence information would improve our security posture.

We are aware that the State Department has no authority and

lacks the resources to protect private U.S. citizens traveling or residing abroad. Large multinational companies understand the unrealistic restrictions on business travel that would have to be imposed to completely protect every U.S. national traveling abroad. I

believe the private sector fully understands these risks. In those instances when an employee must travel to a dangerous country,

there is a question that must always be asked: How important is

this trip? When a trip is determined to be business critical, there

are ways to minimize the risk. Limiting the time in the country,

using reliable and secure ground transportation, carefully planning

the schedule and limiting its distribution, maintaining a low profile

and employing security professionals when required are all simple,

common sense precautions.

The private sector, its employees and customers directly benefit

from the number of programs sponsored by the State Department

to better help us understand the risks in foreign countries and to

help us establish practical solutions to mitigate those risks. One

such program is the Overseas Security Advisory Council [OSAC].

Established in 1985 by Secretary George Shultz, OSAC has become

one of the best examples of a private-public partnership that really

has worked. Today, more than 3,300 U.S. companies with operations overseas belong to OSAC. Information is freely shared with

the private sector in efficient and multiple ways. The OSAC security Web site receives nearly 2 million inquiries a month from the

private sector. Trained intelligence analysts use briefings, reports,

studies and other media to provide up-to-date information to our

companies. There are more than 100 local OSAC country councils

that provide services directly to our in country staff, regardless of

their nationality. These services are provided to the private sector

without charge, and any company with overseas operations may

join OSAC.

We in the private sector recognize the inherent risk associated

with doing business outside the United States. Risk management

is an integral part of our business decisionmaking process. The risk

of being a soft-target does not eliminate the need for U.S. companies to operate in foreign countries. By continuing to work in partnership with companies like the State Department, the CIA, the

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FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, we believe that

these risks can be better understood, better managed and significantly reduced.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing. I look forward to answering any of your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Petro follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Petro. I just note for the record that

the GAO staff and State Department have kept people here to listen to your testimony, and I appreciate that. And Mr. Starr in particular, thank you for staying.

I am going to start off by having the staff director of the subcommittee and the counsel to the subcommittee, Mr. Halloran, ask

questions.

Mr. HALLORAN. May I ask each of you to respond to testimony

you heard in the first panel, particularly the GAO findings and recommendations and the observations of other witnesses.

Ambassador EGAN. From my perspective, the most important aspect of the problem is that it be approached on an interagency

basis, on a comprehensive basis, on a mandatory basis, and with

strict terms of accountability, both for those in positions of authority and post management with staffs under their jurisdiction, and

also on the part of individual U.S. Government employees, regardless of their payroll authority to the implementation of those countermeasures.

I feel quite strongly and I speak for the interagency members of

my Accountability Review Board, I think, it is important I think to

note that board, and it is typical of the way these boards are constituted, included only two Foreign Service officers, one of whom

was the Executive Secretary, a specific individual nominated by the

DCI, and other staff with military and law enforcement and USAID

backgrounds. So these boards are not State Department boards. As

a result the recommendations from those boards, and I think the

first recommendation of our report in March 2002 is typical of that,

tend to take a rather catholic, interagency, comprehensive view of

such things.

I also cannot emphasize enough that the issue is not just training or training as opposed to briefing, but in my view it is also related to recruitment, selection and assignments. There are some

people who should not be sent to serve in some of the most dangerous environments, and we should not go about the process casually of creating liabilities for ourselves.

I agree very much with the comment of my friend and colleague

Ambassador Bushnell that any and all attention to these issues

with respect to both hardened facilities and what are, as John said,

called soft targets, any and all attention that helps provide the resources and in some cases the change of attitude required to protect our people overseas in a better way I think is probably welcomed by any of us with experience in the foreign affairs community.

Mr. HALLORAN. Ambassador Limbert.

Ambassador LIMBERT. AFSA certainly welcomes what GAO did,

and we work closely with them. What is the most remarkable piece

for me is something many of us have known for a long time, and

which they discovered. Perhaps the key to all this is a cultural

change in our service, in our mission, a cultural change which inculcates a necessity for safety and protection of the whole community.

The best work of our Chiefs of Mission, the best work of our wonderful colleagues from the Diplomatic Security Service, will go for

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naught if people are not listening and if you do not inculcate that

culture right from the beginning.

They spoke about training Ambassadors, Chiefs of Mission. If by

the time somebody becomes an ambassador he does not instinctively know that he is responsible for the safety of his entire community, something is wrong and it is too late. That is in fact what

the GAO found when it went overseas, and that is probably for us

the most significant part of the report.

Mr. PETRO. What I found interesting about the early testimony,

first I heard nothing that I did not agree with. I think most of it

was very correct. What I did find interesting was that many of the

issues that the government and in particular the State Department

is dealing with, the private sector is dealing with in quite the same

way. We certainly are very sympathetic, and it is a very interesting

issue between briefing and training, in how we brief or train our

people when they go and live in other countries, particularly high

risk countries.

We are also dealing with the whole issue of balancing vigilance

and normalcy. That is a huge business issue in terms of where we

put our attention. I am often reminded in the company we do have

a business to run. That is why we are there. We obviously have to

provide a safe environment for our business and people but we are

there to conduct business. That sometimes is not so easy in a difficult place.

Mr. SHAYS. Do they have to remind you often of that?

Mr. PETRO. No. There is a bias in the private sector that people

in the public sector do not understand that and we do. We do.

And the other difference in the private sector is we also have to

balance risk with the cost to reduce them. There are a lot of costs

that are evaluated as we balance those risks and whether or not

we want to put people in certain places. That is the human cost

and the reputational cost and all of the various costs that may be

associated with a particular decision.

Risk assessment and making decisions on where the private sector wants to operate overseas has become a very complex issue.

Mr. HALLORAN. Thank you. Let me start the other direction because you mentioned the tension between vigilance and normalcy.

Can’t vigilance be normalcy? Given the threats we face, the question is in the cycle we face between crisis, response, recommendations and forget it, what you call the tendency to complacency. How

do you break that cycle and raise the normalcy bar?

Mr. PETRO. I think it has been broken. Normalcy today is not

what it was 3 or 5 years ago. It is a much higher vigilance in terms

of protecting our facilities and our employees. That has changed at

least for our lifetimes.

The issue of being vigilant, any company that was in New York

City on September 11th is certainly well aware of how important

it is to be vigilant, not just in terms of business continuity and

being able to reconstruct a business, but in protecting our employees and having policies and procedures that create an environment

where our employees feel safe, feel comfortable and are not afraid

to come to work.

Mr. HALLORAN. Ambassador, how do you level out the cycle between crisis response and trying to forget it is all out there?

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Ambassador LIMBERT. It is an excellent question because when

it translates into a drying up of resources and attention and support, then in my view we are inviting another catastrophe. We

build some more facilities, we put in technology, and a few years

later we forget. Maybe there has not been an incident for a couple

of years, we forget about it and get hit with something bigger and

worse.

I worked in counterterrorism before September 11th, in the interval between 1998 and September 11th, and we also talked about

draining the swamp in Afghanistan. To be very frank, we did not

know how big the swamp was. To paraphrase what was said in

‘‘Jaws,’’ we need a bigger boat to get that swamp drained. So yes,

consistency of funding, so 1 and 2-year efforts, and not just funding

but support.

These things are not easy. It is not all money. Management is

there, too. For example, in my last posting in West Africa, we had

motion sensors, security cameras, we had barriers that went up

and down automatically. In 3 months those things did not work

any more. The heat, the humidity, the dust ate them alive. The

technology, the local infrastructure would not support it. So you

wait 6 months for a technician to come out and fix these things,

and it turned out the subcontractor, the supplier who put the thing

in, had gone bankrupt and left no specifications.

This really is not money. A lot of money has been spent. This is

management and leadership as well to make sure this thing is

done right. That is why I said, to repeat, thank you for holding

these hearings and thank you for the oversight.

Ambassador EGAN. I am not comfortable with the effort to make

a distinction between vigilance and normalcy. In my 31 years in

the service, I spent 26 of those overseas, and vigilance was a normal part of living and working in those overseas environments.

Some of them in the old days were considered quite low threat.

Today they are quite high threat. But it is not like getting on the

Metro and coming to work in a metropolitan area. It is a different

way of living and working, and it therefore imposes different requirements and levels of responsibility on the individuals engaged

in that. So it is a distinction I would not be interested in pursuing

very far.

John is absolutely correct, our most valuable resource in our representation overseas are the people who do it for us, not the buildings, not the bricks and mortar. I think one of the most difficult

challenges is how you manage those official communities overseas

in such a way that you can maintain that vigilance at a constantly

effective level in such a way that people are still capable of doing

the jobs they have been sent there to do. If they are not capable

of achieving that equilibrium in their own person, then I think you

have to ask whether or not they should be there.

Certainly the threats are in the aggregate much greater today

than they were 10 or 15 years ago, and yet the size of our overseas

nonmilitary presence is much greater today than it was 10 or 15

years ago.

Mr. HALLORAN. Finally, let me pursue the area of risk communication. We had some discussions back and forth to the State Department about elements of the GAO report and what would be in

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this hearing in terms of communicating risks and information that

might not be classified but was considered sensitive enough that it

probably should not be discussed in a forum like this. But in the

environment in which we live, what would you see as the essential

elements of risk communication? What do people need to know

about the risk, despite the fact that we might be telling people

about those risks?

We know where schools are. Terrorists, bad people, know school

bus routes that do not vary that often. How do you make that balance?

Ambassador EGAN. I don’t think the process of establishing the

level of risk is particularly difficult. I don’t think the process of establishing standards to meet that risk is necessarily that complicated either. We have done it to a very large extent in many of

our buildings, either in terms of new construction standards or in

terms of buildings that we went back and rebuilt.

The number of recommendations from a variety of accountability

review boards and other groups that have been implemented and

implemented successfully make a difference. I think the weakest

link in the chain is creating the environment in which people take

that guidance, training, advice, responsibility, seriously.

It is not essentially a money issue. It costs money to train people.

It costs money to brief people. It costs money to put surveillance

detection units on the street. It costs money to put static guards

on residences. It costs money to fortify our missions, but you do not

want those diplomatic facilities to be fortresses from which our representatives never emerge, and you also want people to know that

if they do not, to put it starkly, follow the rules with respect to

what the community thinks the way they should act in such an environment, that there will be a price to pay for not following those

rules and it should not be allowed to go to the lengths where that

price is a human life. It is very much a personnel, management,

accountability responsibility issue I think at this stage of the game.

Ambassador LIMBERT. I could not agree more. I would just point

out our starting point today is very different from what it was 20

or 30 years ago. The world is just a lot more dangerous. On April

26th, the State Department issued a public announcement for

American citizens warning them of dangers in the border towns in

northern Mexico where apparently there is drug warfare going on

between gangs and these shootouts, about 30 people have been

killed, 30 U.S. citizens kidnapped or killed in the past 8 months,

and the violence has spread as far as the bridges going across into

the United States.

Now our children go to school. We have five posts along the border. The children of the families stationed there go to school in the

United States. They cross those bridges every day. That is the kind

of world that we are in. This is not terror and this is not even terrorism. We have not gotten into areas other than terrorism.

Crime is out there, civil instability is out there. All of these

things affect our people. This is what we are looking at. This is

why I go back and say we welcome the attention of the GAO and

the subcommittee to all of these issues which will protect our people overseas.

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Mr. PETRO. Official travelers overseas are not the only ones subject to high risk. In the past year, two of our own employees were

killed in bombings of bank branches, one in Argentina and one in

Greece. The private sector is not immune to this either. We agonize

over a lot of the same decisions as the State Department.

One of my big concerns is that we may not fully understand the

risk in certain countries, cities and neighborhoods. Some are obvious, and some are not so obvious. We are very dependent on information we can get from official sources about risk because we are

obviously dealing with issues like employee anxiety, the ability of

our employees to feel comfortable when they come to work, whether

that is in New York City or Amman, Jordan. There are issues in

both those kinds of places. So we are dealing with that all over the

world.

Many of our own business decisions have to be based on those

kinds of risk assessments. But without good solid information,

those risk assessments may not be correct.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, gentlemen.

First, Mr. Petro, getting into this issue of vigilance and normalcy,

working with Secret Service, it has always amazed me that they

can do their job for such a long period of time. My mind would

start to wander and I would be thinking of something else. Is there

a method to which you train people? There is nothing normal about

why you are on duty. It would just help me understand. Are they

doing their work for 2 hours and off for 2 hours, or are they on 8

hours straight looking at everyone and anticipating the worse?

Mr. PETRO. Certainly in the Secret Service vigilance is the name

of the game. The reason that the Secret Service I believe is able

to maintain a high degree of vigilance all of the time is really training. The Secret Service puts a tremendous amount of effort and resources into training so that responses become instinctive and they

do it sort of automatically. It is like what the Ambassador said earlier about looking left and right at a street. Under stress, people

will act/react instinctively. If you are properly trained, hopefully

that instinct will be good.

Mr. SHAYS. When the person is not on duty, do they still think

that way?

Mr. PETRO. When I was off duty, I was always looking around,

yes. No, it is a very difficult thing to compartmentalize. When I

was in the Secret Service, you worry about your responsibility all

the time, whether you were there or not there.

I feel the same way working in the private sector as well. I think

we have to worry about things that keep not just the company safe,

but the employees safe, and it is a huge responsibility for a company like Citigroup.

Mr. SHAYS. During the war in the Gulf in 1991, we Congressmen

and Congresswomen were instructed not to stop right behind a car

at a redlight in case people got out so we would have some possibility of getting around the car or something. There were other things

that you were told, and then you find yourself doing that instinctively. Is some of this almost a habit?

Mr. PETRO. If you are trainable enough, it becomes a habit. If

there is a lesson, and what I have heard from almost everyone, is

training. Training and repetitive training. You cannot just train

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someone once and send them off to a foreign post and expect them

to maintain that level of instinctive behavior. It has to be repetitive.

Mr. SHAYS. So, for instance, knowing not to be right close to a

car, other things that I am not aware of that you would tell someone, they would just do it and it would become normal? They do

things that tend to be helpful if they were attacked?

Mr. PETRO. It is things like that, like being attentive. You should

be attentive and notice things. Someone mentioned

countersurveillance. You ought to be aware of your surroundings

all the time. You can train someone to do that, and it becomes instinctive. You automatically do that when you step out of a building. You pay attention to what is around you.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador Egan, from the first panel what was the

point you agreed most strongly with and disagreed most strongly,

whether Mr. Ford, Mr. Starr, Ambassador Bushnell or Mr. Miller,

anything they said you strongly agreed or disagreed with?

Ambassador EGAN. I most strongly agreed with the sentiment expressed in the report and the testimony of each member of the

panel, this is an area of security that needs to be addressed in a

way other than business as usual. Whether there are attitudinal

changes, procedural changes, selection changes, there seemed to be

a fairly broad consensus on that and I think that consensus is correct and I think it is important that it be sustained.

What I felt was addressed less effectively in the report and in

part by the other witnesses, but that is also because they were representing particular capacities, is the broadness of the issue and

the extent to which every American employee that represents this

country overseas is vulnerable to the same risk. The terrorist does

not care what your payroll authority is. Larry Foley was not selected, was not targeted because he was the executive officer of

USAID, he was targeted because he passed across their screen. He

was put under surveillance for no more than 2 or 3 days. His personal security habits were found to be weak, and he was easily

killed.

Mr. SHAYS. By weak, you mean doing the same thing each day?

Ambassador EGAN. His habits were predictable. His timing and

route to work were predictable. He was a very effective USAID

agency security officer. He worked closely with the RSO. He

worked closely with the AID Director. He reminded USAC staff of

effective countermeasures, but he felt he had reached a stage in his

life that he didn’t want to have to live that way any more and he

paid an extremely high price for it.

Accountability works both ways. You can talk until you are blue

in the face about getting people, for example, to vary their times

and routes to work. But if the embassy staff meeting is every

morning at 8:15, it is not going to have much of an effect. I think

not the weakness but the area not of sufficient focus is that we are

not just talking about State Department officials, we are talking

about every civilian and military representative under the Chief of

Mission who represents this country overseas, and that is where I

think we are probably weakest.

Mr. SHAYS. Were you surprised there was a killing in Jordan?

When you heard this, did you say, my God, not a surprise?

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Ambassador EGAN. Well——

Mr. SHAYS. Not even that it was successful, just the attempt?

Ambassador EGAN. I was surprised because I did not realize the

extent to which the environment in Jordan and the region had

changed with respect to Americans since I left Amman in July

1998. My feeling about that environment was unfortunately still reflected in a lot of language in the consular information sheet, the

poster board, etc., that gave people the information that certainly

by the standards of the Middle East and certainly by the standards

of Beirut or Damascus, Amman is pretty safe duty and it is a great

post for families.

The other side of that coin is beginning in December 1999, the

intel reporting on American specific threats and especially threats

to American targets outside of that embassy was like a drum roll.

Now it is easy to say that when you look back over 3 years of intel

and retrospect, but it was sufficiently alarming that the community

in Washington gathered and put out a special Intelligence Community advisory documenting the nature and credibility of these

threats and waving a flag that people needed to pay attention.

During that same period, two Israeli diplomats were wounded in

an assassination attempt. The Deputy Director of the Jordanian Intelligence Service escaped an attempted assassination by a bomb in

his car. An American embassy employee was roughed up in a street

demonstration. The signals were pretty clear. If I had been following that intelligence for 3 years, I probably would not have been

surprised.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Limbert.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Well, there was not much that we really

disagreed with in the report or in the statements. The only thing

which struck me as a little odd was the report referred to the need

to train Chiefs of Mission to be more aware of protection. I don’t

think that is the key. As I mentioned earlier, by the time someone

becomes Chief of Mission in our service, I am sure he or she are

already very well aware of those responsibilities.

Mr. SHAYS. Sometimes the Chief of Missions might be a political

employee.

Ambassador LIMBERT. That is true, but it is hard to speak to

them in this setting.

Mr. SHAYS. That is totally out of order.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Congressman, we would very much wish

it otherwise.

Mr. SHAYS. I can’t wait until you get back to the State Department and they watch what you are saying here.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Exactly.

Mr. SHAYS. I am being a little facetious. It is important that you

elaborate because what I am hearing you say, if you have been

around a few times through the State Department, and you are

now Chief of Mission, there is no excuse. In other words, it has

been embedded in them by all their experiences.

So now is there a weak link here when it comes to the potential

of political appointees, not that we should not make political appointees, but does that speak to the fact that they need a different

kind of training?

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Ambassador LIMBERT. Yes, sir. The best Chief of Mission I ever

worked for was a political appointee.

Mr. SHAYS. That is important to put on the record.

Ambassador LIMBERT. But his strength was knowing the

strength of his staff and the strength of his deputy and security officer, the strength of the people who worked for him who—and he

knew instinctively this is what he had to do. But these things

about safety and security, they appear so simple. Vary your times,

vary your routes. Do not wash your car, so if someone was tampering with it you will see the fingerprints on the body of the car. It

is very simple stuff apparently, but very difficult to inculcate into

our culture. That is what we are really talking about is this cultural change where these things matter and we start them from

the beginning and everyone is responsible for safety and security.

Mr. SHAYS. I happen to believe that people should get incredible

training, and if you deter in terms of normalcy or vigilance, I go

with vigilance. They are going to have to learn to have that be normal. I happen to believe in the work that I do and the observations

I make. Maybe that needs to be qualified.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Sir, I agree with you and my colleagues

that without vigilance at our overseas posts there can be no normalcy.

Mr. SHAYS. In some cases you need professionals who do security,

maybe sometimes to drive the car so that the individual does not

drive, and I realize the Ambassador does not drive but there may

be the need to have regular employees be driven, and I think that

happens. So that is one area that they do not have to be vigilant

on top of all of the other ways that they have to think.

Mr. Petro, maybe you can speak to that. Doesn’t that sometimes

speak, though, to having professionals do some part of the vigilance

so you don’t have to do everything?

Mr. PETRO. I think as a practical matter that is the best way to

do it, but it is not all that practical or attainable. That is the reality. But of course that would be the best.

Mr. SHAYS. So you do it for some and not for everyone.

What do you agree with most and disagree with most?

Mr. PETRO. Two things. The discussions earlier today on training

is what I would agree with most. There is no question about that.

The training should be a high priority across the board.

The thing I would comment on, and I would first like to say I

appreciate the opportunity that the private sector is here. I think

that is an important statement that the risks that our Foreign

Service and other American officials face overseas is a real one and

we all admire their dedication and what they do for our country.

But also we have private sector people all over the world traveling

and living in foreign countries.

I think the whole definition of soft-targets——

Mr. SHAYS. I need to get more focus. I am asking the question

you agree with most.

Mr. PETRO. I agree most with the training issue. I would like to

amplify on some of the things discussed earlier and perhaps not

discussed specifically, and that is the whole issue of the role of the

private sector in this issue of protecting U.S. citizens abroad. I

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think it is an important issue. I think it says something that the

private sector was actually invited to this hearing to speak.

Al Qaeda, from what I have read, has two stated objectives. One

is to destroy the U.S. economy and the other is to kill Americans.

One of the reasons that Mr. Foley was killed was because he was

an American. We have a lot of Americans all over the world.

The other issue is the threat to Americans is not really just overseas. The threat today has no borders. Americans are at risk not

just overseas but also here. I think as this process develops in

terms of developing procedures and training for our Foreign Service

representatives, I would like to see the private sector also involved

in this so the benefit of that progress can also be given to the private sector.

Mr. SHAYS. That triggers a question. Having come from the public sector, is there anything you learned that you think was very

helpful to you in the work that you do now?

Mr. PETRO. What I learned from the private sector?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. Having been in the private sector, is there any

different perspective that would have been helpful to you when you

were in the public sector? I don’t know if there is. If so, I would

like to make it a part of the record.

Mr. PETRO. That is a good question. The priorities in the private

sector are different than in the government. The private sector is

there to serve the shareholders and make money. That is the stated objective and that is their priority in terms of providing good

shareholder value and return on investment.

That emphasis I think has been altered in the last several years,

and certainly one of the things that I learned as I became more and

more involved in the private sector, is there is a sensitivity to not

just making money but also protecting the assets of the company,

which includes its people. I think the private sector has recognized

the importance of that and is willing to invest large sums of money

which ultimately affect earnings, invest a large amount of money

to put in programs and procedures to protect their employees.

Mr. SHAYS. In some ways have resources been more available in

the private sector than the public sector?

Mr. PETRO. I am not sure I would compare the two. You have a

different set of calculations. There is a whole series of processes to

go through in the government to get budgets approved and so forth.

In a similar way there are processes in the private sector. From

what I have experienced, it has been easier to get things approved

in the private sector than it was in the public sector.

Mr. SHAYS. The general concept is 3 pass on a decision in the private sector and 11 in the public sector. It makes for a lack of accountability or even a sense that you had a play in the decision.

I am prepared to have counsel ask questions, and I would ask

if there is any answer you want to put on the record before we adjourn?

Mr. HALLORAN. I just wanted to ask if any of you had a comment

about Mr. Starr’s rather diplomatic response when he was asked

about host nation support and his educated guess was 30 percent

were unprofessional or not of professional standard in terms of support they could provide to the embassy in terms of their law enforcement cooperation and support. We have seen that as well.

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Some nations otherwise sophisticated or Western just do not think

there is a war on terrorism, and do not see the kind of external

security that our embassy might require.

What are your experiences in terms of the variability of host nation support and the importance that has on soft target protections.

Ambassador EGAN. I was Ambassador for the first time in a

small country called Guinea-Bissau. It was called Portuguese Africa in the early 1980’s, 1983; 95 percent of my American staff were

non-State Department. There was no local intelligence law enforcement or security capability on the part of the host government.

That was 22 years ago. It was a very safe working environment.

Jordan has one of the most sophisticated intelligence services I

have ever worked with. They are very, very good and we use them

a lot. The relationship is an intimate one, as is the relationship

with the local security and law enforcement officials, the equivalent

of the FBI. They were flabbergasted at Larry Foley’s death. The

two guys that did it, one Libyan and one Jordanian, supplied and

instructed by al-Zarqawi, were not even on their screen and it took

them 2 weeks to find them.

Cairo, which when I served there as the Deputy Chief of Mission

during the Gulf war, was our largest embassy in the world with

2,500 staff. Again, an intimate relationship with Egyptian intelligence, law enforcement and security personnel and even during

the first Gulf war, a reasonably comfortable environment in which

Americans could serve despite the fact that one American was

wounded in an attack on an embassy van driven by an embassy

driver with an embassy security officer in the front seat bringing

a group of employees in from a consolidated housing complex.

But those were different times. A security environment in that

part of the world is different now. The risks are greater, and our

exposure is greater.

I cannot comment on Mr. Starr’s 30 percent figure. Suffice it to

say, in the case of Jordan the confidence of the services was superb, and they were surprised at Larry’s killing. In the case of

Guinea-Bissau there were no services and we did not have a problem.

Ambassador LIMBERT. The biggest change I have seen over the

last 30 years, or 20 years perhaps, is, and this is a good lesson that

we have learned, is that we know now, we have a better sense now,

when we should pull people out or when we should have fewer people there or when we should not have families in a position. Part

of the equation are the capabilities and the willingness of our hosts

to fulfill their responsibilities under international law. 26 years

ago, I was involved in the capture of our embassy in Tehran. It was

very clear in retrospect, looking back, that we were defenseless

against the kind of thing that happened. And the book’s solution

was we all should have been gone and maybe two or three people

left there. But this is obviously one of the hardest things we do.

You make the judgment and then put, fit your people that are

there, how many people do you send, how many people do you send

families in, and the country’s willingness to respond to those kinds

of factors is a huge factor.

Ambassador EGAN. Clearly I do not have the in-depth experience

in foreign countries as my colleagues do, but I have worked on a

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superficial basis in 80 or 85 countries, in my former career, so I

have some sense of how governments react to security issues and

how they support the Secret Service when we bring people into

their country.

My assessment is that in most cases, and I guess the 30 percent

is maybe a reasonable number, is not that these countries do not

want to do it for us, they just cannot. They do not have the resources. It is not possible. It is not any reflection on their feelings

toward the United States, it is just that they cannot do it.

Mr. SHAYS. What should we put on the record that we have not?

Is there any question you are prepared to answer that we should

have asked?

Mr. PETRO. I will just reiterate that first of all, thank you for the

opportunity for the private sector to be here. If there was a question I would like to see asked or at least a statement put in the

record, it is I think Americans are at risk everywhere, and Americans are Americans, whether official Americans or nonofficial

Americans, and I would like to see whatever comes out of these

hearings at least have some impact on the private sector.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Mr. Chairman, I am sure I will think of

something at 2 a.m.

Mr. SHAYS. You can contact the subcommittee, maybe not at 2,

but we can put it in the record.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Of course. With all seriousness, perhaps

the question out there that remains, the question that remains is

how do we ensure followup and implementation of all these good

things that we are doing to protect soft-targets, that the good steps

translate into protection and they translate into followup? That I

did not hear or at least I did not hear it taken up.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough.

Ambassador EGAN. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, I cannot resist

commenting on your point about political appointees.

Mr. SHAYS. I was reacting to Ambassador Limbert’s point.

Ambassador EGAN. I would say in many cases political appointees are more sensitive to some of these concerns because the

environment is newer to them. They do not fall into the trap of

those in the career service after 25 or 30 years, yes, yes, we have

done that. Yes, yes, I know how that works. Often they ask more

difficult questions and are more impatient with the bureaucratic

response.

Mr. SHAYS. That last point I can agree with.

Ambassador EGAN. Second, please keep the attention focused on

this issue, long term, yourself, other members of the subcommittee

and the full committee and other Members of Congress because it

is important to all of you and to all of us.

Finally, I think the key is there has to be a professional price

paid for lack of attention to security. If you do not qualify in a language, a particular language, you will not get the assignment and

you may not get the promotion. If you do not qualify in terms of

the way you handle your own personal security, the personal security of your family and your sense of responsibility for your colleagues, then there ought to be a professional price paid for that

as well.

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Mr. SHAYS. That is a very nice way to end this hearing. This has

been a very educational hearing, first and second panel both. I

thank you for your service to your country.

And when you do a good job in the private sector, you are serving

Americans as well and it is important that you provide products

that we all enjoy and help us be more efficient. That is equally important. I thank you for your service to our country and for your

participation on this panel.

With that, we adjourn the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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