UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

SCANZ TECHNOLOGIES, INC., fka 

EQUITYFEED CORPORATION, A 

Canadian (Quebec) Corporation 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

JEWMON ENTERPRISES, LLC, a Florida 

limited liability corporation; TIMOTHY 

SYKES, an individual; ZACHARY 

WESTPHAL, an individual; TIMOTHY 

BOHEN, an individual; MILLIONAIRE 

PUBLISHING, LLC, a Florida limited 

liability corporation; MILLIONAIRE 

PUBLISHING, LLC, a Colorado limited 

liability corporation; MILLIONAIRE 

MEDIA, LLC, a Florida limited liability 

corporation and STOCKSTOTRADE.COM 

INC., a Delaware corporation, 

Defendants. 

Case No. 20-cv-22957-RNS 

NON-FLORIDA DEFENDANT TIMOTHY BOHEN’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW 

SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP 

200 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 4700 

Miami, FL 33131 

Tel.: 305 577 7000 

Fax: 305 577 7001 

Counsel for Defendant Timothy Bohen 

Case 1:20-cv-22957-RNS Document 39 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 1 of 19
-iTABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... ii 

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

II. FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS MOTION TO DISMISS ................................................. 2

III. RELEVANT STANDARD ................................................................................................ 3

IV. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 5

A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Mr. Bohen ....................................... 5

1. The Complaint fails to establish a prima facie case of personal 

jurisdiction .................................................................................................. 5

2. No Set of Allegations Can Subject Mr. Bohen to this Court’s 

Jurisdiction .................................................................................................. 8

B. The Complaint Fails to State Viable Claims for Relief Against Mr. Bohen ....... 12

V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 13

Case 1:20-cv-22957-RNS Document 39 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 2 of 19
-iiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s) 

Cases 

Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pagés Morales, 

368 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2004) ...............................................................................................13 

Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Florida Cmty. Coll., 

77 F.3d 364 (11th Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................................13 

Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 

123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997) ...............................................................................................12 

Cramer v. Florida, 

117 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 1997) ...............................................................................................12 

Daimler AG v. Bauman, 

571 U.S. 117 (2014) ...............................................................................................................8, 9 

Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 

114 F.3d 162 (11th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................12 

Ferrell v. Durbin, 

311 F. App’x 253 (11th Cir. 2009) ..........................................................................................13 

Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 

218 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2000) .................................................................................................4 

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 

564 U.S. 915 (2011) ...................................................................................................................8 

Hasenfus v. Secord, 

797 F. Supp. 958 (S.D. Fla. 1989) ...........................................................................................10 

Jaramillo v. Naranjo, 

No. 10-21951-CIV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138887 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 30, 2014) 

(Torres, Mag. J.).........................................................................................................................9 

Lee v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 

No. 18-21876-Civ, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186340 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2018) 

(Scola, J.) ...................................................................................................................................5 

Magluta v. Samples, 

256 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2001) ...............................................................................................12 

McCullough v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 

268 F. Supp. 3d 1336 (S.D. Fla. 2017) ......................................................................................8 

Case 1:20-cv-22957-RNS Document 39 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 3 of 19
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

(continued)

Page(s) 

-iiiMeier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 

288 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................4 

Moreno v. Carnival Corp., 

No. 19-cv-22900, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4663 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2020) 

(King, J.) ..................................................................................................................................13 

Oceanic Research & Salvage Co. 1, LLC v. Emerging Sci. & Techs. Grp., Inc., 

No. 17-80162-CIV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151351 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 18, 2017) 

(Marra, J.)...........................................................................................................................6, 7, 8 

Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Clarke Modet & Co., Inc., 

515 F. Supp. 2d. 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (Moreno, J.) ..............................................................10 

Polskie Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe Transport A/S, 

795 F.2d 968 (11th Cir. 1986) ...................................................................................................4 

Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 

178 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) ........................................................................4, 7 

Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 

94 F.3d 623 (11th Cir. 1996) .....................................................................................................4 

Snow v. DirectTV, Inc., 

450 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................7 

St. Martinus Univ., NV v. Caribbean Health Holding, LLC, 

No. 19-22278-CIV, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33457 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2020) 

(Altonaga, J.) ..............................................................................................................................8 

Tavakoli v. Doronin, 

No. 18-21592-CIV, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43188 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2019) 

(Altonaga, J.) ............................................................................................................................10 

Taylor v. Moskow, 

No. 16-20222-Civ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215766 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2017) 

(Scola, J.) .................................................................................................................................10 

United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 

556 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) ....................................................................................... passim

Waite v. AII Acquisition Corp., 

901 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................5 

Case 1:20-cv-22957-RNS Document 39 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 4 of 19
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

(continued)

Page(s) 

-ivYMD Records, LLC v. Ultra Enters., Inc., 

361 F. Supp. 3d 1258 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (Ungaro, J.) ................................................................13 

Statutes 

Fla. Stat. § 48.193 ............................................................................................................................5 

Other Authorities 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) ........................................................................................................3, 5, 12, 13 

Case 1:20-cv-22957-RNS Document 39 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 5 of 19
I. INTRODUCTION 

Timothy Bohen does not belong before this Court or in this case. Plaintiff acknowledges 

that Mr. Bohen is not a Florida resident. Plaintiff fails to allege conduct specific to Mr. Bohen 

taking place or having an effect in Florida. Instead, Plaintiff seeks to hale Mr. Bohen before this 

Court on the basis of a purported conspiracy. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege when or how 

Mr. Bohen joined the conspiracy or what overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy took place in 

Florida. 

These pleading deficiencies notwithstanding, no set of allegations can render Mr. Bohen a 

participant in the alleged conspiracy or subject him to this Court’s jurisdiction. Critically, 

Mr. Bohen did not have a relationship with any of the defendants during the dates relevant to the 

Complaint’s conspiracy allegations. As explained below, Mr. Bohen first became a consultant to 

defendant StocksToTrade.com, Inc. (“STT”) in April 2016. He, therefore, could not have entered 

into a conspiracy, as alleged in the Complaint, in connection with the execution of the “license 

agreement” 1 in “the spring of 2013” or its “Termination Notice” in “late April of 2015.” Compl. 

¶¶ 26, 30. 

Equally dispositive, Mr. Bohen’s exhibited sworn declaration negates his participation in 

the alleged conspiracy. The declaration confirms that Mr. Bohen has never been aware of and has 

never knowingly used any product or software owned or developed by the Plaintiff. The 

declaration also confirms that Mr. Bohen never entered into an agreement with any of the 

defendants, within or outside of Florida, to “misappropriate” or “utilize” Plaintiff’s product or 

1

 The Complaint does not attach a copy of the alleged “license agreement.” Mr. Bohen is 

not a party to that “license agreement” and has no knowledge of its content. In an effort to narrow 

the issues in this Motion, undersigned counsel requested a copy of the “license agreement” from 

Plaintiff’s counsel. Plaintiff’s counsel refused to provide the document. 

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software. The declaration further confirms that, to the extent Mr. Bohen may have unknowingly 

used such “misappropriated” product or software, Mr. Bohen was unaware at the time that the 

product belonged to the Plaintiff or may have been misappropriated from the Plaintiff. 

Because Plaintiff does not, and cannot, allege an actionable conspiracy claim against 

Mr. Bohen, it cannot establish this Court’s personal jurisdiction over Mr. Bohen or state viable 

claims against him. The Complaint must be dismissed. 

II. FACTS RELEVANT TO THIS MOTION TO DISMISS 

Plaintiff is a Canadian corporation with its principal place of business in Quebec, Canada. 

Compl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff has no known offices or presence in Florida. Plaintiff has never registered 

to do business in Florida.2

Mr. Bohen is not a Florida resident. Id. ¶ 7. While the Complaint identifies him as a 

resident of Minnesota, see id., in actuality Mr. Bohen resides in Michigan. See Bohen Declaration, 

attached as Exhibit A, ¶ 2. Mr. Bohen was born in Michigan and has resided his entire life in 

Michigan; he has never been a Florida resident. Id. Mr. Bohen has never had a Florida driver’s 

license; has never registered to vote in Florida; has never had an office, a phone number, or mailing 

address in Florida; and has never owned property in Florida. Id. ¶ 3–6. 

Mr. Bohen has never performed work for, provided services to, or otherwise had any 

relationship with Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 18. Prior to April 2016, Mr. Bohen had no involvement with any 

of the other defendants. Id. ¶¶ 7–11. In April 2016, Bohen Asset Management, LLC (“BAM”), a 

Michigan entity owned by Mr. Bohen, began providing consulting services to defendant STT. Id. 

¶ 8. In November 2016, BAM ceased providing consulting services to STT and Mr. Bohen became 

2

 A search of the public records maintained by the Florida Division of Corporations on 

www.sunbiz.org confirms there is no entity registered to do business in Florida matching 

Plaintiff’s name. 

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an STT salaried employee, working from Sheridan Michigan. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. Mr. Bohen continues to 

work in that capacity to date. Id. ¶ 9. Outside of his relationship with STT, Mr. Bohen is not and 

has never been employed by any of the other defendants. Id. ¶ 10. Mr. Bohen has never owned 

an interest or held management positions in any of the corporate defendants. Id. ¶ 11. 

Mr. Bohen has never traveled to Florida in connection with BAM’s consulting services to 

STT or his employment responsibilities at STT. Id. ¶ 17. Mr. Bohen is not party to the “license 

agreement” described in the Complaint or its “Termination Notice,” nor did he participate in the 

negotiation or execution of either document. Id. ¶ 13. As explained above, Mr. Bohen became 

involved with STT after April 2016 and, therefore, was not involved with any of the defendants in 

the “spring of 2013,” when the “license agreement” was entered into, or in “late April of 2015,” 

when the “Termination Notice” was executed. Compl. ¶¶ 26, 30. See also Bohen Decl. ¶¶ 13. 

Mr. Bohen, accordingly, was not a party to the conspiracy alleged in the Complaint to have formed 

in or around the “spring of 2014” and “late April of 2015.” 

Mr. Bohen is not aware that any of the defendants allegedly misappropriated Plaintiff’s 

product or software prior to or after April 2016. Bohen Decl. ¶¶ 14–15. Since BAM’s involvement 

with STT in April 2016, Mr. Bohen has never agreed or cooperated, within or outside of Florida, 

with any of the defendants to misappropriate or utilize Plaintiff’s product or software. Id. ¶ 15. 

Mr. Bohen is not aware of and never knowingly used in any capacity, whether as an STT employee 

or as BAM’s sole member, any product or software owned or developed by the Plaintiff, including 

those defined in the Complaint as “Scanz Assets” and “Scanz Trade Secrets.” Id. ¶ 15. 

III. RELEVANT STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of personal 

jurisdiction. “A court without personal jurisdiction is powerless to take further action.” United 

Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). “A plaintiff seeking the exercise of 

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personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the 

complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” United Techs. Corp. v. 

Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 

1214 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). If a plaintiff makes a prima facie case and “the defendant 

challenges jurisdiction by submitting affidavit evidence in support of its position, ‘the burden 

traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting 

Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002); Posner, 178 

F.3d at 1214). The “plaintiff is required to substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in the 

complaint by affidavits or other competent proof, and not merely reiterate the factual allegations 

in the complaint.” Polskie Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe Transport A/S, 795 F.2d 968, 972 (11th 

Cir. 1986); Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000). 

“A court must conduct a two-part inquiry when deciding the issue of personal jurisdiction.” 

Future Tech., 218 F.3d at 1249: 

First, the court must determine whether the applicable state statute governing 

personal jurisdiction is satisfied. If the requirements of the long-arm statute are 

satisfied, then the court must inquire as to, (1) whether defendant has established 

sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with the state of Florida; and (2) whether the 

exercise of this jurisdiction over defendant would offend “traditional notions of fair 

play and substantial justice.” 

(quoting Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626, 630–31 (11th Cir. 1996)). This 

two-step inquiry applies both to cases founded on diversity jurisdiction, see Mazer, 556 F.3d at 

1274, and to federal-question cases “arising under a statute that is silent regarding service of 

process.” Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 626. 

“The reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida law.” Mazer, 556 F.3d 

at 1274. As explained by the Eleventh Circuit, Florida’s long-arm statute subjects defendants to 

personal jurisdiction in two ways: 

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First, a defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction 

over suits that arise out of or relate to a defendant’s contacts with Florida—for 

conduct specifically enumerated in the statute. Second, a defendant is subject to 

general personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over any claims against a 

defendant, whether or not they involve the defendant’s activities in Florida—if the 

defendant engages in substantial and not isolated activity in Florida. 

Waite v. AII Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted) 

(citing Fla. Stat. § 48.193); accord Lee v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 18-21876-Civ, 2018 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186340, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2018) (Scola, J.). 

IV. ARGUMENT 

The Complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(2) because this Court lacks personal 

jurisdiction over Mr. Bohen, or in the alternative under Rule 12(b)(6) because it fails to state viable 

claims against Mr. Bohen. 

A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Mr. Bohen 

While acknowledging that Mr. Bohen is not a Florida resident, Plaintiff seeks to extend 

this Court’s jurisdiction over him on the conclusory assertion that Mr. Bohen has “significant 

business ties to South Florida and engaged in the conspiracy described in th[e] Complaint in 

Florida.” Compl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff advances no particularized assertion as to Mr. Bohen’s conduct in 

Florida or role in the alleged conspiracy. Instead, the Complaint lumps Mr. Bohen together with 

the other defendants, making generalized assertions common to all defendants that fail to 

distinguish Mr. Bohen’s individual conduct allegedly subjecting him to this Court’s jurisdiction. 

See, e.g., id. ¶ 18–22, 39 et seq. This fails on numerous grounds. 

1. The Complaint fails to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction 

To make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction over Mr. Bohen, a non-resident defendant, 

Plaintiff must allege jurisdictional facts specific to him. The Complaint fails to do that. It offers 

no detail of Mr. Bohen’s alleged “significant ties to South Florida” or conduct in Florida giving 

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raise to any of the Complaint’s nine counts.3 The Complaint merely includes Mr. Bohen among 

the group of “defendants” and then alleges indistinctively that the “defendants” engaged in certain 

conduct spanning several years and numerous states. Courts routinely dismiss complaints with 

similar factual allegations. See, e.g., Oceanic Research & Salvage Co. 1, LLC v. Emerging Sci. & 

Techs. Grp., Inc., No. 17-80162-CIV, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151351, at *7–8 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 18, 

2017) (Marra, J.) (dismissing complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction because “[b]y lumping 

the Defendants together and failing to provide a factual basis to distinguish their individual 

conduct, the Complaint fails to give Defendants fair notice of the factual basis for the claims 

asserted against them”) (citing Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) 

(dismissing complaint as “shot-gun pleading” because it was “replete with allegations that ‘the 

defendants’ engaged in certain conduct, making no distinction among the fourteen defendants 

charged, though geographic and temporal realities make plain that all of the defendants could not 

have participated in every act complained of”)). 

Further, Mr. Bohen is a named defendant in all nine counts—all of which are premised on 

the “license agreement” between defendant JewMon Enterprises, LLC (“JewMon”) and the 

Plaintiff. In fact, the core allegation undergirding all nine Counts is that the defendants allegedly 

misappropriated and used for financial gain Plaintiff’s product or software protected under the 

“license agreement.”4 As explained above, however, Mr. Bohen is not a party to the license 

agreement or otherwise bound by its terms, and none of the Counts allege conduct specific to 

3

 While the Complaint numbers its Counts I through X, it fails to include a Count IX. 

4

See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 35 (“in or about May of 2018, Scanz concluded that the Sykes market 

analysis platform . . . had progressed to containing a virtually identical ‘look and feel’ as compared 

to the most important core features embraced by the Scanz Assets, the Scanz Trade Secrets and 

the associated Scanz product offerings that were embraced by the express terms of the license 

agreement”). 

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Mr. Bohen that would subject him to this Court’s jurisdiction. As in Oceanic Research, the “lack 

of specificity in the allegations directed towards [Mr. Bohen] in [Counts I–X] . . . make it 

impossible to determine whether a basis for personal jurisdiction exists as to” him. 2017 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 151351, at *8–9. Therefore, “Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of personal 

jurisdiction over [Mr. Bohen] in these Counts.” Id. at * 9. 

Nor is the allegation that Mr. Bohen participated in a conspiracy with the other defendants 

sufficient to make a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Again, there is no allegation of 

conduct specific to Mr. Bohen. Rather, Plaintiff argues in conclusory fashion that the “defendants” 

engaged in non-descript acts “within this jurisdiction,” Compl. ¶ 19; that this action arises from 

“activities of the defendants in Florida,” id. ¶ 20; that the “defendants . . . acted conspiratorially . 

. . within and outside Florida,” id. ¶ 21; and that the “defendants” conspired in an undisclosed place 

and time to “market, offer to sell and then actually distribute products inside and outside of the 

State of Florida.” Id. ¶ 22. This will not do. See Snow v. DirectTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1318 

(11th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal and finding allegation that defendants “have committed, and 

conspired to commit, acts and have acted alone and in concert to commit acts within the State of 

Florida” was “vague and conclusory” and “insufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal 

jurisdiction” under a conspiracy theory) (citing Posner, 178 F.3d at 1217–18 (finding a plaintiff’s 

vague allegations of a conspiracy insufficient to establish an actionable conspiracy subjecting the 

defendant to personal jurisdiction)). 

Because Plaintiff fails to meet its initial burden to make a prima facie case of personal 

jurisdiction, this Court should dismiss the Complaint without considering the materials attached to 

this Motion or any material Plaintiff submits in opposition. See Oceanic Research, 2017 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 151351, at *10 (dismissing complaint without “consider[ing] the additional material 

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submitted by the Parties,” reasoning: “Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to meet their 

initial burden to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over the non-resident 

individual Defendants in the Complaint, the burden never shifted to Defendants or then back to 

Plaintiffs.”). 

2. No Set of Allegations Can Subject Mr. Bohen to this Court’s Jurisdiction 

Even if the Complaint were to establish a prima facie case on jurisdiction—it does not—

dismissal of Mr. Bohen is warranted because no set of allegations can subject Mr. Bohen to this 

Court’s general or specific personal jurisdiction. 

The Complaint fails to allege jurisdictional facts sufficient for this Court to exercise general 

personal jurisdiction over Mr. Bohen. In fact, the Complaint acknowledges that Mr. Bohen is not 

a Florida resident, see Compl. ¶ 7, thereby negating the exercise of domicile-based general 

personal jurisdiction. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (“For an individual, 

the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile”) (quoting 

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011)). Beyond domicile 

in the forum, “the Supreme Court has provided two other instances in which the exercise of general 

jurisdiction over an individual is proper: where the individual consents to the forum’s jurisdiction, 

and where the individual is present within the forum when served with process.” McCullough v. 

Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1336, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (alteration added; 

citations omitted); accord St. Martinus Univ., NV v. Caribbean Health Holding, LLC, No. 19-

22278-CIV, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33457, at *25-26 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2020) (Altonaga, J.). 

Neither instance has occurred here;5 therefore, general personal jurisdiction over Mr. Bohen is 

lacking. 

5

 While not at issue here, courts in this District have questioned the constitutional validity 

of tag jurisdiction after the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler. See Jaramillo v. Naranjo, No. 

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Specific personal jurisdiction also is lacking. As explained above, Plaintiff does not allege 

conduct specific to Mr. Bohen taking place or having an effect in Florida. Rather, the Complaint 

relies on a “conspiracy” theory to extend this Court’s jurisdiction over Mr. Bohen. Plaintiff alleges 

that Mr. Bohen entered into a conspiracy with the defendants to “misappropriate” and then 

“utilize” Plaintiff’s product or software. Compl. ¶ 39. According to Plaintiff, the conspiracy began 

in “the spring of 2013,” when Plaintiff and JewMon entered into the “license agreement” with 

defendants intending on “pirating” Plaintiff’s product or software. Id. ¶¶ 26, 39. The conspiracy 

allegedly continued into “late April of 2015,” with defendants “agreeing to mislead [Plaintiff] . . . 

at and following execution of the Termination Notice falsely leading [Plaintiff] to believe that each 

of the[] defendants had no intention to utilize” the pirated product or software. Id. ¶¶ 30, 39. Other 

than describing Mr. Bohen as a “part-time trader” and “agent in fact for all defendants,” id. ¶ 7, 

Plaintiff fails to explain what steps Mr. Bohen took, or when he took them, to join the alleged 

conspiracy. 

Plaintiff’s attempt to rely on a conspiracy theory to extend jurisdiction over Mr. Bohen 

fails on several grounds. First, as a threshold matter, Plaintiff does not allege, as it must, the 

commission in Florida of a single overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Mazer, 556 F.3d 

at 1281 (Florida’s “long-arm statute can support personal jurisdiction over any alleged conspirator 

where any other co-conspirator commits an act in Florida in furtherance of the conspiracy”) 

(emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord Tavakoli v. Doronin, No. 18-21592-CIV, 2019 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 43188, at *21 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2019) (Altonaga, J.) (describing the elements of 

civil conspiracy in Florida as: “(1) an agreement between two or more parties; (2) to do an unlawful 

10-21951-CIV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138887, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 30, 2014) (“At first blush, 

this recent and material limitation on the exercise of general jurisdiction would severely undercut 

the constitutional basis for tag jurisdiction over foreign defendants.”) (Torres, Mag. J.). 

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act; (3) doing an overt act to further the conspiracy; and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of 

the acts done under the conspiracy”) (internal quotation and citation omitted)). 

The Complaint should be dismissed for this reason alone and because it fails to allege 

conduct “clearly connect[ing] [Mr. Bohen] to a conspiracy made or carried out in Florida.” Mazer, 

556 F.3d at 1282. “[F]or a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant 

based on the actions of co-conspirators[,] [a] plaintiff must allege an actionable conspiracy claim 

and the non-resident defendant’s participation.” Taylor v. Moskow, No. 16-20222-Civ, 2017 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 215766, at *12–13 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2017) (Scola, J.) (citing Platypus Wear, Inc. v. 

Clarke Modet & Co., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 2d. 1288, 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (Moreno, J.) (“[The] 

evidence is not sufficient to demonstrate [defendant’s] involvement in the conspiracy for purposes 

of establishing personal jurisdiction over him.”)). A complaint’s “factual allegations ‘must at least 

make out a colorable, factually supported claim.’” Id. at *13 (quoting Hasenfus v. Secord, 797 F. 

Supp. 958, 962 (S.D. Fla. 1989)). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to do this. 

Second, as Mr. Bohen establishes in his declaration, he did not participate—and indeed 

could not have participated—in the alleged conspiracy. For one, Mr. Bohen had no relationship 

with any of the defendants until after April 2016. Bohen Decl. ¶¶ 7–11. Thus, he could not have 

entered into a conspiracy, as alleged in the Complaint, in connection with the execution of the 

“license agreement” in “the spring of 2013” or its “Termination Notice” in “late April of 2015.” 

Id. In other words, Mr. Bohen could not have entered into a conspiracy to misappropriate 

Plaintiff’s product, which allegedly formed one to three years before Mr. Bohen had a relationship 

with any of the defendants. Faced with similar facts, the court in Mazer dismissed a complaint for 

lack of personal jurisdiction because the alleged co-conspirator was not “involved in a FloridaCase 1:20-cv-22957-RNS Document 39 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 15 of 19
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based agreement to steal—i.e., involved in a meeting of the minds with at least one other 

coconspirator—before the time of the theft.” 556 F.3d at 1282 (emphasis in original). 

Nor could Mr. Bohen have participated, after April 2016, in a conspiracy to “utilize” 

Plaintiff’s stolen product or software. Such a conspiracy would require an allegation that 

Mr. Bohen not only agreed to “utilize” the already-stolen product or software in Florida, but also 

that he knew at the time he agreed to “utilize” them that they were stolen. Beyond the Complaint 

failing to allege either fact, Mr. Bohen’s Declaration disputes both. Mr. Bohen confirms that: (i) 

he never agreed with the defendants “within or outside of Florida, to ‘misappropriate’ or ‘utilize’ 

Plaintiff’s product or software,” Bohen Decl. ¶ 15; (ii) he is “not aware of and ha[s] never 

knowingly used in any capacity . . . any product or software owned or developed by the Plaintiff,” 

id.; and (iii) if he “unknowingly used a ‘misappropriated’ product or software belonging to the 

Plaintiff . . . [he] was unaware at the time of the product or software’s provenance, that it belonged 

to the Plaintiff, or that it may have been misappropriated from the Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 16. 

Accordingly, as in Mazer, Mr. Bohen’s lack of “knowledge of the illicit character of” Plaintiff’s 

product or software negates his participation in a conspiracy. 556 F.3d at 1283 (finding that 

plaintiff “failed to establish directly that [defendant] entered into a conspiracy knowingly to 

purchase stolen blueprints that was either formed or in any way carried out in Florida”). 

In sum, Plaintiff’s Complaint “does not allege viable facts from which the inference could 

reasonably be drawn that [Mr. Bohen] was part of a conspiracy either engineered in Florida or 

pursuant to which a tortious act in furtherance was committed in Florida.” Id. Thus, dismissal is 

warranted because Mr. Bohen “is not subject to conspiracy-imputed personal jurisdiction under 

Florida’s long-arm statute.” Id. 

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B. The Complaint Fails to State Viable Claims for Relief Against Mr. Bohen 

Even if this Court were to have personal jurisdiction over Mr. Bohen, dismissal is 

warranted under Rule 12(b)(6) for the reasons set forth in defendants Zachary Westphal’s and 

STT’s Motion to Dismiss filed contemporaneously with this Motion. Specifically, as established 

in Mr. Westphal’s and STT’s Motion to Dismiss, which is hereby adopted by reference, Counts I–

X fail to plausibly state a claim for relief and Counts I and II are time barred. 

The Complaint should be dismissed on the additional ground that it is an impermissible 

shot-gun pleading because it is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously 

connected to any of its nine Counts, which are averred against all eight defendants, with no 

specification of which defendant is responsible for which act or omission. See Magluta, 256 F.3d 

at 1284 (dismissing complaint “replete with allegations that ‘the defendants’ engaged in certain 

conduct, making no distinction among the fourteen defendants charged”); Chudasama v. Mazda 

Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.9 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding a shotgun pleading where “a reader 

of the complaint must speculate as to which factual allegations pertain to which count”); Cramer 

v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1261-63 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting “that the district court, acting on its 

own initiative, should have stricken” the complaint at issue as “a rambling ‘shotgun’ pleading that 

is so disorganized and ambiguous that it is almost impossible to discern precisely what it is that 

these appellants are claiming”); Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 164 

(11th Cir. 1997) (describing a complaint that “offered vague and conclusory factual allegations in 

an effort to support a multiplicity of discrimination claims leveled against 15 defendants” as a 

“prototypical ‘shotgun complaint’”). 

Further, Count II partly incorporates the allegations of Count I, and Counts IV–VI, VIII, 

and X incorporate all of the allegations of Counts I and II. This is impermissible under Circuit 

precedent. See Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pagés Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1330 n. 22 (11th 

Case 1:20-cv-22957-RNS Document 39 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 17 of 19
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Cir. 2004) (finding a shotgun pleading where “[m]any [counts] adopt the material allegations of 

the preceding counts or paragraphs such that some counts appear to state more than one cause of 

action”); Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Florida Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 

1996) (“allegations of fact that may be material to a determination of count one, but not count four, 

are nonetheless made a part of count four . . . it is virtually impossible to know which allegations 

of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief”). 

Finally, the Complaint is a shot-gun pleading because it “begins each count by 

incorporating the [thirty seven] paragraphs of general factual allegations into each subsequent 

claim for relief, making no effort to marshal those allegations for the particular claim being 

asserted.” Moreno v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-cv-22900, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4663, at *5 (S.D. 

Fla. Jan. 10, 2020) (King, J.) (quotation omitted); see also YMD Records, LLC v. Ultra Enters., 

Inc., 361 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1264 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (dismissing complaint because “[e]very factual 

allegation is incorporated by reference into every count”) (Ungaro, J.) (citing Ferrell v. Durbin, 

311 F. App’x 253, 259 (11th Cir. 2009)). 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Bohen respectfully requests that this Court enter an order 

dismissing the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative under 

Rule 12(b)(6). 

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Dated: October 5, 2020. Respectfully submitted, 

SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP 

200 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 4700 

Miami, FL 33131 

T.: 305 577 7000 

By: /s/ Raúl B. Mañón 

Raúl B. Mañón (FBN 18847) 

(raul.manon@squirepb.com) 

OF COUNSEL: 

Gabriel Colwell 

(admitted pro hac vice) 

SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP 

555 South Flower Street, 31st Floor 

Los Angeles, CA 90071 

Joseph A. Meckes 

(admitted pro hac vice) 

SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (US) LLP 

275 Battery Street, Suite 2600 

San Francisco, CA 94111 

Counsel for Defendant Timothy Bohen 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on the 5th day of October, 2020, I electronically filed this Motion with 

the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. 

/s/ Raúl B. Mañón 

Case 1:20-cv-22957-RNS Document 39 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2020 Page 19 of 19