GAO-05-864R Aviation Security 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

July 22, 2005 

Congressional Committees 

Subject: Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully 

Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure Flight Program 

Testing in Initial Privacy Notices, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More 

Fully Inform the Public 

As you know, we have been reviewing the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to develop and implement the 

Secure Flight program. The purpose of Secure Flight is to compare information on 

domestic airline passengers against information on known or suspected terrorists to 

identify passengers who should undergo additional security scrutiny. As we reported 

in February and March 2005, to develop Secure Flight, TSA has been conducting tests 

to compare data from airline reservation systems, such as name and flight number, 

with data from the government’s consolidated terrorist watch lists, which include 

names of known and suspected terrorists.1

 We also reported that TSA has been 

testing the use of selected data available from commercial data sources—private 

companies that maintain records on individual names, addresses, phone numbers, 

and other information—as a means of verifying the accuracy of passenger-provided 

data. In this letter, we report on key aspects of TSA’s disclosure of its use of personal 

information during commercial data testing for Secure Flight as required by the 

Privacy Act, and TSA’s actions to more fully disclose its use of personal information. 2

We will continue our assessment of Secure Flight privacy protections as part of our 

ongoing review of the Secure Flight program. 

Results in Brief

During the course of our ongoing review of the Secure Flight program, we found that 

TSA did not fully disclose to the public its use of personal information in its fall 2004 

privacy notices as required by the Privacy Act. In particular, the public was not made 

fully aware of, nor had the opportunity to comment on, TSA’s use of personal 

information drawn from commercial sources to test aspects of the Secure Flight 

 

1

For more on the Secure Flight program, see GAO, Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but 

Risks Should Be Managed as System is Further Developed, GAO-05-356 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005) and GAO, Aviation 

Security: Measures for Testing the Impact of Using Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program, GAO-05-324 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2005).

2

Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a). The Privacy Act provides 

safeguards against an invasion of privacy through the misuse of records by federal agencies and allows citizens to learn how 

their personal information is collected, maintained, used, and disseminated by the federal government.
Page 2 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

program. In September 2004 and November 2004, TSA issued privacy notices in the 

Federal Register3 that included descriptions of how such information would be used.4

However, these notices did not fully inform the public before testing began about the 

procedures that TSA and its contractors would follow for collecting, using, and 

storing commercial data. In addition, the scope of the data used during commercial 

data testing was not fully disclosed in the notices. Specifically, a TSA contractor, 

acting on behalf of the agency, collected more than 100 million commercial data 

records containing personal information such as name, date of birth, and telephone 

number without informing the public. As a result of TSA’s actions, the public did not 

receive the full protections of the Privacy Act. 

On June 10, 2005, we briefed TSA on our concerns about privacy protection issues 

related to Secure Flight testing. TSA officials stated that they recognized the merits of 

GAO’s concerns, and on June 22, 2005, the agency published revised privacy notices 

to more fully disclose the nature of tests being conducted.5

 The revised notices 

clarified the purpose of commercial data testing for Secure Flight and expanded the 

categories of records and individuals covered by the system of records as it applied 

to commercial data tests. In moving forward, TSA officials stated that they will put 

procedures in place to ensure that prior to making any change in testing procedures, 

the TSA Privacy Officer and TSA counsel would be consulted to determine whether a 

change to TSA’s privacy notices would be required to inform the public. TSA officials 

also stated that no adverse consequences resulted from the use of commercial data 

because the data were used only in a test environment and not to make passenger 

prescreening decisions prior to actual flights.6

 TSA officials further stated that data 

collected from commercial sources will not be used during the initial operation of 

Secure Flight, which is expected to begin in late 2005 or early 2006. TSA is, however, 

considering the use of such data in the future, if the data can be shown to improve 

the ability of Secure Flight to identify known or suspected terrorists. 

In its written comments to a draft of this letter, DHS reiterated that it recognized the 

merits of the issues raised by GAO, and that TSA acted immediately to address them. 

DHS also affirmed its commitment to adhere to the letter and intent of the Privacy 

Act and applicable policies on privacy protections. DHS further stated that the DHS 

Chief Privacy Officer is assessing the handling of passenger information and 

commercial data during Secure Flight testing and will, if appropriate, make 

recommendations to strengthen privacy protections. DHS also provided technical 

comments on the draft, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

 

3

System of Records Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,345 (Sept. 24, 2004); Privacy Impact Assessment, 69 Fed. Reg. 57,352 (Sept. 24, 2004); 

Notice of Final Order for Secure Flight Testing, 69 Fed. Reg. 65,619 (Nov. 15, 2004).

4

The Privacy Act requires that an agency publish a system of records notice in the Federal Register upon establishment or 

revision of the existence and character of any system of records. See § 552a(e)(4). The notices also addressed requirements of 

the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, which requires agencies to conduct a privacy impact 

assessment before developing systems that collect, maintain, or disseminate information in an identifiable form, and the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163, which requires public notice of agency information 

collection proposals, which in this case was the proposed order to the airlines to provide passenger name records. 

5

70 Fed. Reg. 36,320 (June 22, 2005).

6

Passenger prescreening is the identification of aviation passengers that may pose a security risk before they reach the 

passenger screening checkpoint at airports. 
Page 3 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

Background 

Following the events of September 11, 2001, and in accordance with the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act,7 TSA took action to enhance passenger prescreening 

operations. In March 2003, TSA began developing a new Computer-Assisted 

Passenger Prescreening System, known as CAPPS II, as a means of enhancing 

security through passenger prescreening. However, following our review of this 

program in February 2004, and a DHS internal review, DHS canceled CAPPS II’s 

development in August 2004, due in part to concerns about privacy issues.8 That same 

year, TSA announced plans to develop a new passenger prescreening program known 

as Secure Flight. Under the Secure Flight program, TSA plans to take over from 

commercial airlines the responsibility for comparing information on domestic airline 

passengers against information on known or suspected terrorists. In addition, 

Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,9

establishing requirements that TSA assume this passenger prescreening 

responsibility. 

As part of Secure Flight’s development, TSA contractors conducted tests to identify 

data elements needed to make accurate comparisons between airline reservation 

system data and government watch list data. TSA contractors also conducted tests to 

determine if the use of commercial data could improve the results of watch list 

comparisons. To accomplish this, TSA collected information from airline reservation 

systems—including passenger name, flight reservation date, and flight number—for 

passengers who flew during June 2004. This type of information is contained in the 

passenger name record (PNR). Also, to test the use of commercial data, TSA 

contractors collected and used commercially available data maintained by private 

companies. Commercial data providers maintain databases that contain personal 

information, such as name, address, phone number, date of birth, and social security 

number, among other identifiers. 

The Privacy Act regulates federal agencies’ use of personal information and allows 

citizens to learn how their personal information is collected, maintained, used, and 

disseminated by the federal government.10 The act applies to personal information 

maintained by federal agencies or their contractors in a “system of records” from 

which records are retrieved by name or other personal identifier.11 The Privacy Act 

requires agencies to disclose information to the public regarding the collection of 

personal information through a system of records notice (SORN) published in the 

 

7

Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 136, 115 Stat. 597, 636-37 (2001). 

8

 For more information on the CAPPS II program, see GAO, Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening 

System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges, GAO-04-385 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004). 9

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4012, 118 Stat. 3638, 3714-19, requires that 

TSA begin to assume performance of the passenger prescreening function within 180 days after the completion of testing. 

10Many provisions of the Privacy Act are based on fair information practices—a set of internationally recognized privacy 

protection principles—including the requirement to keep collection of personal information limited, to specify the collection’s

precise purpose, to limit the use of collected data, to notify individuals subject to data collection, and to give those individuals 

the opportunity to access the information collected about them and request corrections.

11Government contractors are bound by the Privacy Act provided they are operating a system of records on behalf of an agency 

to accomplish an agency function. § 552a(m). 
Page 4 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

Federal Register.

12 This notice must be issued upon establishment or revision of any 

system of records, and it must address specific types of information and “routine 

uses”—the specific uses planned by the agency—for the records contained in the 

system. More specifically, a SORN is to include a system’s name and location, the 

categories of individuals included, the categories of records maintained, the use of 

records, the policies and practices regarding storage and maintenance of records, and 

agency procedures whereby individuals can be notified that they are subject to 

having their data collected, among other requirements.13

Scope and Methodology 

To assess key aspects of TSA’s disclosure of its use of personal information during 

commercial data testing for Secure Flight as required by the Privacy Act, we reviewed 

the provisions of the Privacy Act and the Secure Flight privacy notices, including the 

SORN and privacy impact assessment. As TSA developed and conducted its 

commercial data tests, TSA provided us with the statement of work, contract, 

contract modifications, test plans, and draft test results. We analyzed these 

documents and met with TSA officials and TSA contractors responsible for Secure 

Flight testing to discuss the scope and methodology of commercial data testing. In 

addition, we also met with DHS and TSA officials to discuss Secure Flight privacy 

notices and privacy issues we identified related to commercial data testing. We also 

compared TSA’s amended privacy notices, issued on June 22, 2005, with the fall 2004 

privacy notices with regard to the issues addressed in this report. We did not evaluate 

whether TSA made any uses beyond testing of personal information it collected. We 

also did not review other aspects of privacy related to Secure Flight testing, including 

TSA’s internal controls for monitoring compliance with Privacy Act requirements. We 

will continue to assess privacy protections as part of our ongoing review of the 

Secure Flight program. We conducted our work in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards from February 2005 through July 2005. 

TSA’s Disclosure of Its Use of Personal Information from Commercial 

Sources Was Not Consistent with Privacy Act Requirements 

Descriptions of how TSA planned to use personal information from commercial 

sources during Secure Flight testing, as published in the Federal Register in 

September 2004 and November 2004, differed in scope from how the data were 

actually used. As a result, the agency did not provide appropriate disclosure about its 

collection, use, and storage of personal information as required by the Privacy Act. 

For example, TSA collected and stored commercial data records even though TSA 

stated in its privacy notices that it would not do so.

 

 

12Apart from the Privacy Act, the E-Government Act requires agencies to describe similar privacy protections in a privacy impact 

assessment, which addresses what information is to be collected, the intended use of the information, with whom the 

information will be shared, what notices or opportunities for consent would be provided to individuals regarding what 

information is collected, how the information will be secured, and whether a system of records is being created. 

13See § 552a(e)(4). 
Page 5 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

TSA’s Scope and Objectives of Commercial Data Testing Differed from Fall 2004 

Public Disclosure Notices

In September 2004, TSA published its SORN for Secure Flight testing in the Federal 

Register, as required by the Privacy Act, disclosing its plans to use personal 

information during Secure Flight testing.14 However, the way TSA’s contractors used 

information to conduct commercial data tests differed from the usage disclosed in 

TSA’s fall 2004 privacy notices. Specifically, TSA’s contractors used PNR data 

supplemented with commercial data to determine if commercial data could be 

effective in eliminating incorrect matches against the government’s consolidated 

terrorist watch lists. However, in its fall 2004 privacy notices, TSA did not identify its 

plans to supplement PNR data with commercial data. 

In testing the usefulness of commercial data to enhance watch list comparisons, a 

TSA contractor verified passenger identities and then added commercial data to 

PNRs in order to make them as complete as possible for comparing against terrorist 

watch lists. To carry out these steps, a TSA contractor sent three commercial data 

providers approximately 240,000 names, which included 43,000 names from a subset 

of the June 2004 PNR data and variations of those names, to obtain commercial data 

for testing. According to TSA officials, this approach obscured the identities of those 

individuals represented in the PNR data in an attempt to protect their privacy. For 

example, the name John Doe, an actual passenger, could have been included in the 

names sent to commercial data providers along with such variations as Jon Doe, John 

Dough, and J. Doe. As requested by a TSA contractor, the commercial data providers 

sent back to the contractor records matching those names, which totaled over 100 

million records. These records included information on individuals who did not fly in 

June 2004 and included data elements beyond those requested by TSA’s contractor.15

According to TSA, its contractors used data elements requested for testing, such as 

names, dates of birth, address information, and phone numbers received from the 

commercial data providers, in an attempt to verify the identities of those represented 

in the PNR data. Following the identity verification process, the commercial data 

records that were determined to be the best match were then used to fill in data 

elements that were missing from the PNR data. In turn, these supplemented PNRs 

were provided to TSA for enhanced matching against data from the terrorist watch 

lists. 

TSA's statement of work for commercial data testing, which was posted on the 

Federal Business Opportunities Web site on January 26, 2005,16 indicated the 

agency's plans to use commercial data to supplement the PNR data and to provide 

 

14This discussion focuses on our assessment of TSA’s description of its test in its fall 2004 SORN, as required by the Privacy Act, 

and Notice of Final Order. Because TSA similarly described its test in its fall Privacy Impact Assessment, our discussion 

generally applies to TSA’s fall privacy impact assessment as well.

15The TSA contractor that purchased commercial data requested data elements such as name, date of birth, gender, and 

telephone number, among others. The TSA contractor also received other data elements as well, such as social security 

numbers, but TSA officials said these data elements were not used during testing. 

16Federal Business Opportunities, Jan. 26, 2005. http://www2.eps.gov/servlet/Documents/R/1090245/552071 (accessed July 6, 

2005). 
Page 6 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

the enhanced PNRs to the government for matching against data from the terrorist 

watch lists.17 TSA also described in more detail its methods for supplementing these 

records in test plans of March 17, 2005, and April 5, 2005, and its draft final test 

results report of May 10, 2005. However, these latter documents were not released to 

the public. 

TSA Did Not Collect, Use, and Store Data in Accordance with Privacy Act 

Requirements

In testing the use of commercial data, TSA’s contractors collected, used, and stored 

personal information from commercial sources in ways that were inconsistent with 

disclosures in TSA’s fall 2004 privacy notices as discussed below. As a result, the 

public did not receive the full protections of the Privacy Act. Specifically, TSA did not 

fully inform the public of: (1) the subjects of data collection, (2) the types of personal 

data to be collected, (3) the full purpose of collecting the data, (4) policies and 

practices regarding storage and maintenance of the data, and (5) how those subject 

to having their personal data collected could access and amend their data. 

First, under the Privacy Act, agencies must disclose the categories of individuals on 

whom records are collected and maintained and the agencies’ procedures for 

notifying individuals, when requested, if information collected pertains to them. 

TSA’s commercial data testing involved more individuals than disclosed in its original 

privacy notices. The fall 2004 privacy notices stated that only those who were 

passengers on domestic flights in June of 2004 would be subject to collection. 

However, additional individuals who may not have flown during June 2004 were 

subject to having data collected if their names were similar to the names of 

individuals represented in PNR data. 

 

Second, the Privacy Act requires disclosure of the categories, or types, of information 

collected and maintained by an agency in a system of records. A TSA contractor 

collected types of data for commercial data testing other than those TSA publicly 

disclosed in its fall 2004 privacy notices. In describing information to be collected and 

used for the system, the privacy notices refer only to PNR data to be obtained from 

airlines. Although TSA’s contractors collected or used personal information from 

commercial sources for Secure Flight testing, the privacy notices stated that only 

“authentication scores and codes” would be obtained from commercial data 

providers. While PNR data are directly related to a passenger’s reservation and travel 

itinerary, commercial data may include a wide variety of other personal information, 

such as social security numbers, credit reports, and gender, among other information. 

Third, the Privacy Act specifies that information collected for one purpose may not 

be used for another purpose without notice to, or consent of, individuals subject to 

having their data collected. TSA’s contractors used commercial data for purposes 

 

17 Although the statement of work was publicly available through the Federal Business Opportunities Web site, any revisions or 

amendments to the SORN would need to be published in the Federal Register to conform to Privacy Act requirements.
Page 7 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

that TSA did not disclose in its fall 2004 privacy notices. The privacy notices stated 

that TSA would use commercial data to identify PNR data that was incorrect or 

inaccurate. However, in addition to the publicly disclosed purpose, a TSA contractor 

used commercial data to fill in data that were missing from the PNR data, such as full 

name. The contractor also used the commercial data to capture additional 

information not consistently found in PNRs, such as date of birth. 

Fourth, pursuant to the Privacy Act, agencies must disclose their policies and 

practices regarding storage, retrievability, access controls, retention, and disposal of 

records containing personal information. TSA did not indicate how it would access, 

retrieve, retain, and dispose of the commercially obtained personal data or how it 

would apply controls regarding the maintenance of such data. In addition, TSA's 

privacy notices stated that TSA would not store commercially obtained personal data. 

However, TSA and TSA contractors did store this data based on two separate data 

collection activities that compiled more than 100 million commercial data records. 

Fifth, under the Privacy Act, agencies must disclose their procedures for allowing 

individuals to access any records pertaining to them and provide a means for 

contesting the content of such records. While TSA offered airline passengers who 

flew during June 2004 an opportunity to access or request to amend their PNR data, 

they did not make a similar provision for individuals represented in the commercial 

data that was collected. TSA collected more than 100 million commercial data 

records during commercial data testing. As a result, an unknown number of 

individuals whose personal information was collected were not notified as to how 

they might access or amend their personal data.18

 

On June 10, 2005, we briefed TSA on these concerns about privacy protection issues 

related to Secure Flight testing. TSA officials stated they recognized the merits of 

GAO’s concerns, and on June 22, 2005, the agency published revised privacy notices 

to more fully disclose the nature of tests being conducted. TSA officials further stated 

that the use of commercial data was limited to testing and did not involve 

determinations affecting any individuals. Specifically, officials stated that they did not 

use test data in making passenger prescreening decisions or to provide information 

on potential terrorist activity to law enforcement officials.19 While it appears that no 

determinations were made by TSA with regard to air travel by specific individuals on 

whom it had collected data, these people were unable to exercise their rights of 

access to their information. In addition, these individuals, as well as the general 

public, were not informed as to how personal information would be used and did not 

have the opportunity to comment on TSA’s use of the data. 

 

18The TSA contractor did not determine how many individuals were represented in the more than 100 million commercial data 

records it received. 

19We did not assess whether there were any resulting effects on individuals. 
Page 8 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

TSA Issued Revised Privacy Notices and Plans to Further Address Secure 

Flight Privacy Issues 

TSA issued revised privacy notices on June 22, 2005, to clarify and describe with 

greater particularity who was subject to having their data collected, and the type of 

data collected, during Secure Flight commercial data tests. In its revised notices, TSA 

clarified that the Secure Flight test system of records includes individuals identified 

in commercial data purchased and held by TSA contractors, and that the Secure 

Flight test system of records included PNRs that were enhanced with certain 

commercial data elements which were provided to TSA (commercial data that was 

purchased and held by TSA contractors). In addition, the notices identified that the 

purpose of the Secure Flight test includes testing the government’s ability to verify 

the identity of passengers, and to improve the efficacy of watch list comparisons by 

making passenger information more complete and accurate using commercial data. 

The notices further stated that commercially obtained personal data were stored in at 

the Office of Transportation Vetting and Credentialing (OTVC) in Annapolis Junction, 

Maryland; the OTVC assessment facility in Colorado Springs, Colorado; and at a 

contractor’s headquarters in McLean, Virginia. The data were stored on magnetic 

disc, tape, digital media, CD-ROMs, and may also have been retained on paper. TSA's 

revised notices also identified that all persons may request information about them 

contained in the system of records by writing to the TSA Privacy Officer. 

Although TSA did not fully disclose its plans to use personal information in its fall 

2004 privacy notices as required by the Privacy Act, TSA officials stated that steps 

were taken by the agency and the agency’s contractors to secure the commercial data 

obtained to ensure that personal information was not inappropriately accessed 

during testing. For example, according to TSA officials, they sent commercial data 

providers names using a secure file transfer protocol and e-mail, and data were 

loaded into a database on test and analysis computers in a secure lab and locked in a 

safe when not in use. TSA officials also stated that the discs containing PNR data 

enhanced with commercial data are being stored in a secure government safe at 

OTVC in accordance with the data-handling policy developed and approved by TSA’s 

Privacy Officer. TSA officials also stated that access to personal information was, and 

continues to be, limited to only those TSA employees and contractors who have a 

“need to know,” and each employee and contractor associated with the Secure Flight 

training has completed mandatory privacy training prior to beginning work on the 

program. We have not assessed the adequacy of TSA’s security controls for 

commercial data testing as part of this review. 

Finally, TSA officials stated that as the Secure Flight program moves from a testing 

environment to operations, which is expected to begin in late 2005 or early 2006, they 

will take additional steps to protect privacy. For example, TSA officials stated they 

will put procedures in place to ensure that prior to making any change in testing 

procedures, the TSA Privacy Officer and TSA counsel would be consulted to 

determine whether a change to TSA’s SORN and privacy impact assessment would be 

required. TSA officials further stated that the agency will defer any decision on how 
Page 9 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

commercial data might be used by Secure Flight, if at all, until the completion of the 

test period, assessment of the test results, and publication of subsequent privacy 

notices announcing the intended use of such commercial data. TSA officials stated 

that the agency does not plan to use personal information collected from commercial 

sources during the initial operations of Secure Flight, but will consider the use of 

such data in the future if the data can be shown to improve the ability of Secure 

Flight to identify known or suspected terrorists. 

Concluding Observations 

Because the Secure Flight program involves, by design, personal information, it is 

important that TSA be vigilant with respect to individual privacy protections and fully 

disclose uses of personal information prior to accessing such data. In its fall 2004 

notices, TSA informed the public of its plans to use personal information during 

Secure Flight testing, including the use of commercial data in a limited manner. 

However, these initial notices did not fully describe how personal information would 

be collected, used, and stored for commercial data testing. As a result, individuals 

were not fully informed of their personal information being collected and used, nor 

did they have the opportunity to comment on this or become informed on how they 

might exercise their rights of access to their information. Although TSA did not fully 

disclose its use of personal information prior to beginning Secure Flight testing, the 

agency recently issued revised privacy notices to more fully disclose the nature of 

these tests, and address the issues identified in this letter. Issuing the revised notices 

is an appropriate step to more fully inform the public of its use of personal 

information. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided a draft copy of this letter to DHS for its review and comment. On July 

21, 2005, we received written comments on the draft letter which are reproduced in 

full in Enclosure I. DHS generally agreed with our findings, and stated that TSA acted 

immediately to address the issues identified in this letter. DHS also affirmed its 

commitment to adhere to the letter and intent of the Privacy Act and applicable 

policies on privacy protections. DHS further stated that its Chief Privacy Officer 

initiated an assessment of TSA’s handling of passenger information during Secure 

Flight commercial data testing. In addition, DHS stated that it had shared 

information regarding its privacy efforts with Congress, air carriers, and privacy 

groups, and stated that GAO reviewed all testing parameters prior to TSA’s 

commencement of commercial data testing in mid-March 2005. Finally, DHS 

described data security controls that it put in place to protect commercial data from 

unauthorized access and to prevent system abuses. DHS also provided technical 

comments on the draft, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

We believe that DHS’ stated commitment to adhere to the letter and intent of the 

Privacy Act and applicable policies is an important step in addressing privacy 

protections, and we look forward to the results, including recommendations, if any, 
Page 10 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

of the DHS Chief Privacy Officer’s on-going privacy assessment related to commercial 

data testing. Regarding DHS’ assertion that GAO reviewed all testing parameters prior 

to TSA’s initiation of commercial data testing, we were not able to fully assess TSA’s 

plans for commercial data testing prior to the initiation of testing because TSA did 

not provide to GAO its complete test plans or related details from the testing 

contractor until April 2005. Further, while we believe stakeholder coordination 

related to privacy protections is important, TSA is ultimately responsible for fully 

disclosing its use of personal data during testing to the public in accordance with 

Privacy Act requirements. Finally, we did not review the effectiveness of TSA’s 

reported security controls related to commercial data. 

* * * * * 

We are sending copies of this letter to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Director of the Transportation Security Administration, and the 

Assistant Administrator for Secure Flight/Registered Traveler. Copies of this letter 

will be made available to others upon request. In addition, the letter will be available 

at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this letter, please contact us at (202) 

512-3404 (berrickc@gao.gov) or (202) 512-6240 (koontzl@gao.gov). Other key 

contributors to this report were Amy Bernstein, John de Ferrari, Christine Fossett, 

Brent Helt, R. Denton Herring, Adam Hoffman, David Hooper, Thomas Lombardi, C. 

James Madar, David Plocher, and Jamie Pressman. 

Sincerely yours, 

Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Linda D. Koontz, Director 

Information Management Issues 
Page 11 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Chairman 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Judd Gregg 

Chairman 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Co-Chairman 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Conrad Burns 

Chairman 

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Aviation 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Arlen Specter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on the Judiciary 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins 

Chairman 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 
Page 12 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

The Honorable David R. Obey 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Harold Rogers 

Chairman 

The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

 

The Honorable Christopher Cox 

Chairman 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Don Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable James L. Oberstar 

Ranking Democratic Member 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Chairman 

Committee on Government Reform 

House of Representatives 
Page 13 GAO-05-864R Aviation Security

Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 
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(440372)