Statement Before the Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Commission 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:30 a.m. EDT 

Monday, July 18, 2005 MILITARY BASES 

Observations on DOD's 

2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure Selection Process 

and Recommendations 

Statement of David M. Walker 

Comptroller General of the United States 

GAO-05-905 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-905.

To view the full product, click on the link 

above. For more information, contact Barry 

W. Holman at (202) 512-5581 or 

holmanb@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-905, a statement 

before the Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission 

July 18, 2005

MILITARY BASES

Observations on DOD's 2005 Base 

Realignment and Closure Selection 

Process and Recommendations 

DOD established and generally followed a logical and reasoned process for 

assessing its bases and considering potential BRAC actions. The process was 

organized in a largely sequential manner with an emphasis on ensuring that 

reliable data were obtained and used, with special audit assistance from 

military service audit agencies and the DOD Inspector General. Despite 

some overlap in data collection and other phases of the process, the three 

military departments and seven joint cross-service groups generally followed 

the sequential BRAC process to evaluate facilities and functions, and identify 

recommendations in their respective areas. DOD’s analytical process also 

addressed requirements of the BRAC legislation regarding the certification 

of data, basing its analysis on its 20-year force structure plan and 

emphasizing use of military value criteria as a primary basis for decision 

making—including consideration of such facets as homeland defense and 

surge capabilities—-which the Congress added for emphasis in 2005. 

GAO did, however, identify a number of issues with the proposed 

recommendations that may warrant attention by the BRAC Commission. 

For example, while GAO believes savings could be achieved from DOD’s 

proposals, there are certain limitations associated with the magnitude of the 

savings projected by DOD. About 47 percent, or $2.5 billion of DOD’s 

projected net annual recurring savings is associated with eliminating jobs 

currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing endstrength, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned to other 

areas, which may enhance capabilities but also reduce or eliminate dollar 

savings available for other uses. Sizeable savings are also projected from 

efficiency measures and other actions related to a variety of 

recommendations, but underlying assumptions have not been validated and 

may be difficult to track and achieve over time. GAO also identified many 

recommendations requiring far longer periods of time for savings to offset 

the costs associated with implementing the recommendations than was 

typical in the 1995 BRAC round, raising questions about the cost/benefit 

ratio of selected recommendations. 

There are significant implementation challenges that lie ahead, to the extent 

proposed recommendations are approved, which could have a bearing on 

the ultimate savings realized and overall success of the BRAC round. They 

include the need for (1) transition planning to minimize the adverse impacts 

on operations, including steps to mitigate the potential loss of specialized 

human capital skills; (2) mechanisms to monitor implementation of 

recommendations in line with approved actions, along with mechanisms to 

ensure the tracking and periodic updating of savings that DOD expects from 

implementing the recommendations; (3) plans to address and adequately 

fund environmental restoration of unneeded property in order to expedite 

property transfer and put property to productive reuse; and (4) assistance 

for both losing and gaining communities affected by BRAC 

recommendations, including costs to DOD and other federal agencies. 

On May 13, 2005, the Department of

Defense (DOD) submitted 222 base 

realignment and closure (BRAC) 

recommendations, involving an 

unprecedented 837 BRAC actions, 

to the Defense Base Closure and 

Realignment Commission for its 

review. DOD expects the 

proposals, if approved, would 

generate net annual recurring 

savings of about $5.5 billion 

beginning in fiscal year 2012 and 

net savings of nearly $50 billion 

over a 20-year period, despite an 

expected cost of over $24 billion to 

implement the recommendations. 

The Commission is charged with 

reviewing these proposals and 

submitting its own list to the 

President by September 8, 2005. 

The Commission requested GAO to 

provide testimony before the 

Commission summarizing the 

results of its report, issued on July 

1, 2005, on the 2005 BRAC process. 

This statement presents GAO views 

on (1)whether DOD’s selection 

process in developing BRAC 

actions was logical and reasoned, 

(2) selected issues regarding the 

recommendations, and (3) certain 

challenges associated with 

implementing the BRAC 

recommendations, if approved. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making new 

recommendations in this 

statement. However, in its July 1, 

2005 report on the BRAC process 

(GAO-05-785), GAO recommended 

that DOD establish mechanisms for 

tracking and updating BRAC 

savings estimates. DOD agreed. 
Page 1 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to provide you with the 

results of our work on the defense base realignment and closure (BRAC) 

2005 selection process and recommendations. First, I would like to 

commend you, Mr. Chairman, and your fellow Commissioners for 

undertaking the very important, complex and controversial task of 

reviewing the Department of Defense’s (DOD) list of proposed 

recommendations and recognizing you have to forward your 

recommendations to the President in September of this year. I am well 

aware that your task is especially demanding, given the limited time in 

which you have to do your work and the broad scope of your 

responsibilities. However, I would like to point out that your work is of 

critical importance since, while reasonable people can and will differ on 

specific recommendations, it is clear that DOD must reduce its excess 

support infrastructure in order to generate savings for higher priority 

needs, including the military and business transformation efforts in light of 

21st century trends and challenges. 

We have frequently reported in recent years on the long-term challenges 

DOD faces in managing its portfolio of facilities, halting degradation of 

facilities, and reducing unneeded infrastructure to free up funds to better 

maintain enduring facilities and meet other needs. Because of these longstanding issues, DOD’s management of its support infrastructure has been 

included in our list of high-risk areas since 1997. While the previous four 

rounds of closures and realignments have helped reduce excess 

infrastructure and generate savings, DOD’s infrastructure costs continue 

to consume a larger-than-necessary portion of the DOD budget, and as a 

result, DOD has not been able to devote funds to more critical needs. 

While the 2005 BRAC round affords the department an additional 

opportunity to further reduce infrastructure and generate savings, it will 

not, in itself, be sufficient to stem the overall rising costs of DOD’s 

operations and much more will need to be done to transform the 

department. It is critical that DOD continue to search out ways to reduce 

unnecessary spending and significantly improve its business processes. 

Further, it must recognize that tough choices need to be made in 

connection with a variety of initiatives (e.g., weapons systems) and areas 

(e.g., health care) that are not affordable or sustainable over the longer 

term, given our large and growing long-term deficits. Moreover, reducing 

unnecessary defense costs and creating more efficiency within DOD is an 

important step in addressing the nation’s growing fiscal imbalances. Over 

the long term, the nation’s growing fiscal imbalances, if left unchecked, 

will ultimately impede our economic growth; have an adverse impact on 
Page 2 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

our future standard of living; and in due course, affect our ability to 

address key national and homeland security needs. These factors create 

the need to make choices at a national level that will only become more 

difficult the longer they are postponed. 

Now, if I could turn your attention to the specifics of the 2005 BRAC 

round. On May 13, 2005, the Secretary of Defense publicly announced his 

list of recommended realignment and closure actions. The department’s 

list consists of 222 recommendations involving an unprecedented 837 

closure and realignment actions—including 33 major base closures and 30 

major realignments, plus numerous other closures and realignments. The 

department expects that these recommendations, if approved, would 

generate net annual recurring savings of about $5.5 billion beginning in 

fiscal year 2012 and nearly $50 billion in net present value savings over a 

20-year period, despite an up-front expected cost of over $24 billion to 

implement those recommended actions. In my testimony today, I will 

address (1) whether DOD’s selection process in developing the 

recommended actions was logical and reasoned; (2) selected issues 

regarding the recommendations that the BRAC Commission may wish to 

consider as part of its analysis of DOD’s recommendations; and (3) certain 

challenges we see in implementing DOD’s proposed BRAC 

recommendations, if they are approved. 

To analyze the BRAC selection process and the proposed 

recommendations, we monitored various aspects of the process as it 

evolved over time leading up to and following the public release of the 

Secretary of Defense’s recommendations. We sought to assure ourselves 

that DOD followed a logical, reasoned, and well-documented decisionmaking process leading to the proposed recommendations. With the 

approval of the large number of recommendations occurring in the final 

weeks of the process, the broad scope and complexity of the 

recommendations, and the limited time available for us to report our 

results, we generally focused greater attention following the 

announcement of the proposed closures and realignments on those issues 

affecting more than one recommendation than on issues pertaining to the 

implementation of individual recommendations. However, as time 

permitted, we visited selected installations to better gauge the operational 

and economic impact of the proposed recommendations. We generally 

experienced good access to relevant documentation and to key senior 

officials and staff involved in the BRAC process. 

My statement is based primarily on our July 1, 2005, report on the 2005 

BRAC selection process and recommendations, which was provided to 
Page 3 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

you at that time.1 Our work was performed in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

DOD’s decision-making process for evaluating its facilities and studying 

potential recommendations was generally logical, well documented, and 

reasoned, although there were delays in making the supporting data 

available to the Commission and to the public after the Secretary 

announced his proposed recommendations on May 13, 2005. DOD 

established a structured and largely sequential process for obtaining and 

analyzing data that provided an informed basis for identifying and 

evaluating BRAC options. At the same time, initial difficulties in obtaining 

complete and accurate data in a timely manner often added to overlap and 

varying degrees of concurrency between data collection efforts and other 

steps in the process. That notwithstanding, DOD’s process relied on 

certified data2

 and the use of various analytical models to evaluate the 

data. Further, as the military services and joint cross-service groups 

assessed the importance of installations, facilities, and functions, they 

were consistent in following the key considerations set forth in the BRAC 

law—such as military value—although they varied somewhat in their 

analytical approaches based on unique aspects of the functions being 

evaluated. As Congress mandated, DOD prepared and considered its 20-

year force structure plan in completing its BRAC analysis.3

 Further, DOD 

focused on the military value selection criteria as the predominant 

decision-making factor, including legislatively mandated emphasis for this 

BRAC round on such elements as homeland defense and surge capability. 

As in previous rounds, military judgment was also interwoven throughout 

the process. While the effort to ensure the accuracy of the voluminous 

amounts of data used in the process proved challenging for the services 

and joint cross-service groups, the DOD Inspector General and the military 

service audit agencies played key roles in pointing out data limitations, 

fostering corrections, and improving the accuracy of the data used in the 

process through their validation efforts, and generally found the data 

sufficiently reliable to support BRAC decision making. 

 1

 GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations 

for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785 (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005). 

2

 During the BRAC process, data were certified by senior officials at DOD offices and 

installations. Each official certified that the information was accurate and complete to the 

best of his or her knowledge and belief. 

3

 P.L. 101-510, section 2912(a)(1)(A) required DOD to develop a 20-year force structure plan 

as the basis for its BRAC analysis. 

Summary 
Page 4 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

While we believe savings could be achieved, there are certain limitations 

associated with DOD’s savings projection. Much of the projected net 

annual recurring savings (47 percent) is associated with eliminating jobs 

currently held by military personnel. However, rather than reducing endstrength levels, DOD indicates the positions are expected to be reassigned 

to other areas, which may enhance capabilities but also reduce or 

eliminate dollar savings available for other uses. Furthermore, about $500 

million of the net annual recurring savings is based on business process 

reengineering efforts, but some assumptions supporting the expected 

efficiency gains have not been validated; while savings are likely to be 

realized, the precise magnitude of the savings is uncertain. For example, 

one of DOD’s recommendations—to create fleet readiness centers in the 

Navy by integrating different levels of maintenance to reduce repair time—

is estimated to yield $215 million in net annual recurring savings as a result 

of overhead efficiencies, but such assumptions have not been validated 

and actual savings likely will be shaped by how the recommendation is 

implemented. We have also identified issues regarding lengthy payback 

periods associated with some proposals, which is the time required to 

recoup up-front investment costs for closing or realigning a facility or 

function and vacating lease space. Collectively, the issues we identified 

suggest the potential for reduced savings that are likely to be realized in 

the short term during the implementation period, which could further 

reduce net annual recurring savings realized in the long term. The shortterm impact is that these reduced savings could adversely affect DOD’s 

plans for using them to help offset the up-front investment costs required 

to implement the recommendations and could further reduce or eliminate 

the amount of dollar savings available for transformation and 

modernization purposes. 

Significant challenges lie ahead for implementing BRAC recommendations 

that I would like to bring to the Commission’s attention—challenges that if 

not adequately met, could greatly affect how successful the BRAC round 

will be viewed retrospectively. First, a need exists for proper transition 

planning to minimize the impact of the loss of specialized human capital 

skills in implementing recommended actions for ongoing defense 

operations. For example, if the decision is made to close the Naval 

Shipyard Portsmouth, Maine, with the expected loss of skilled personnel 

associated with maintaining nuclear-powered submarines at the shipyard, 

these skills, which Navy officials stated may take up to 8 years to fully 

develop, will need to be replicated at other shipyards assuming the future 

workloads. A similar concern was expressed by Army officials exist 

regarding the planned closure of Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Second, as 

we previously recommended, DOD needs to establish mechanisms to 

monitor implementation of the recommendations, including the tracking 
Page 5 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

and periodic updating of savings estimates. This was not a routine practice 

in the previous BRAC rounds. Third, DOD needs to ensure that it has plans 

to adequately address and fund the environmental restoration of unneeded 

property in order to expedite property transfer to other users. Our prior 

work on the previous rounds has shown that environmental restoration 

constraints have delayed the services from rapidly transferring unneeded 

property to other users that can put the property to productive reuse. 

Finally, as has been the practice in previous rounds, there will likely be a 

need for assistance from various sources for communities losing large 

numbers of jobs and personnel as a result of BRAC recommendations. 

This time, assistance will also be needed by communities faced with a 

significant influx of personnel, if the relevant BRAC recommendations are 

approved, including costs to DOD and other federal agencies. 

The legislation authorizing the 2005 BRAC round, enacted as part of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, required DOD to 

give priority to selection criteria dealing with military value and added 

elements of specificity to criteria previously used by DOD in prior BRAC 

rounds.4

 In large measure, the final criteria closely followed the criteria 

DOD employed in previous rounds, with greater specificity added in some 

areas, as required by Congress. To ensure that the selection criteria were 

consistently applied, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

established a common analytical framework to be used by the three 

military departments and the seven joint cross-service groups.5

 Each 

service and group adapted this framework, in varying degrees, to its 

individual activities and functions in evaluating facilities and functions and 

identifying closure and realignment options. Despite the diversity of bases 

and cross-service functions analyzed, each of the groups was expected to 

first analyze capacity and military value of its respective facilities or 

functions, and then to identify and evaluate various closure and 

realignment scenarios and provide specific recommendations. The 

analysis relied on data calls to obtain certified data to assess such factors 

as maximum potential capacity, current capacity, current usage, excess 

capacity, and capacity needed to meet surge requirements. 

The military value analysis consisted of assessments of operational and 

physical characteristics of each installation, or specific functions on an 

 4

 P.L. 107-107, Title XXX (Dec. 28, 2001). 

5

 The seven joint cross-service groups were Education and Training; Headquarters and 

Support Activities; Industrial; Intelligence; Medical; Supply and Storage; and Technical. 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

installation related to a specific joint cross-service group’s area of 

responsibility. These would include an installation’s or function’s current 

and future mission capabilities, physical condition, ability to 

accommodate future needs, and cost of operations. This analysis also 

relied on data calls to obtain certified data on the various attributes and 

metrics used to assess each of the four military value criteria and permit 

meaningful comparisons between like installations or facilities with 

reference to the collective military value selection criteria. 

The scenario development and analysis phase focused on identifying 

various realignment and closure scenarios for further analysis. These 

scenarios were to be derived from consideration of the department’s 20-

year force structure plan, capacity analysis, military value analysis, and, as 

appropriate, the exercise of military judgment through consideration of 

transformational options, applicable guiding principles, objectives, or 

policy imperatives identified by individual military services or joint crossservice groups. 

The BRAC 2005 round is different from previous base closure rounds in 

terms of number of actions, projected implementation costs, and 

estimated annual recurring savings. While the number of major closures 

and realignments is just a little greater than those in individual previous 

rounds, the number of minor closures and realignments, as shown in table 

1, is significantly greater than those in all previous rounds combined.6

DOD data indicate that over 200,000 military and civilian personnel jobs, 

exclusive of personnel returning from overseas locations, will be affected 

by the implementation of the DOD’s BRAC recommended actions, if they 

are approved. Further, it is likely that thousands of contractor personnel 

will be similarly affected. 

 6

 DOD defines a major closure as one where plant replacement value exceeded $100 

million. DOD defines plant replacement value as the cost to replace an existing facility 

with a facility of the same size at the same location, using today’s building standards. DOD 

defines a major base realignment as one with a net loss of 400 or more military and civilian 

personnel. 
Page 7 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

Table 1: Comparison of BRAC 2005 with Previous Rounds

Dollars in billions

 Major bases 

Round Closure Realignments

Minor closures 

and realignments

Total 

actions Costs

Net annual 

recurring 

savings

1988 16 4 23 43 $2.7 $0.9 

1991 26 17 32 75 5.2 2.0 

1993 28 12 123 163 7.6 2.6 

1995 27 22 57 106 6.5 1.7 

Total (for previous BRAC rounds) 97 55 235 387 $22.0 $7.2 

Total (for 2005 BRAC round) 33 30 774 837 $24.4 $5.5 

Source: DOD. 

The large increase in minor closures and realignments is attributable 

partly to actions involving the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and 

Air National Guard and vacating leased space. 

DOD’s projected cost to implement the proposed actions is $24.4 billion 

compared to a $22 billion total from the four previous rounds through 

2001, the end of the 6-year implementation period for the 1995 BRAC 

round.7

 The increase in costs is due partly to significant military 

construction and moving costs associated with Army recommendations to 

realign its force structure, and to recommendations to move activities 

from leased space onto military installations. For example, the Army 

projects that it will need about $2.3 billion in military construction funds 

to build facilities for the troops returning from overseas. Likewise, DOD 

projects that it will need an additional $1.3 billion to build facilities for 

recommendations that include activities being moved from leased space. 

 7

 We most recently reported that these costs were $23.3 billion through fiscal year 2003 and 

they excluded an estimated $3.6 billion in costs that are needed to complete environmental 

cleanup at BRAC bases in future years. Also, they did not include about $1.9 billion in costs 

incurred by other DOD and federal agencies to provide assistance to communities and 

individuals affected by BRAC as a result of prior BRAC rounds. GAO, Military Base 

Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and Closures, GAO-05-138

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005). 
Page 8 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

DOD’s decision-making process for evaluating its facilities and studying 

potential recommendations was generally logical, well documented, and 

reasoned, although there were delays in making the supporting data 

available to the Commission and to the public after the Secretary 

announced his proposed recommendations on May 13, 2005. In 

establishing the framework for the 2005 BRAC round, DOD provided 

overall policy guidance for the BRAC process, including a requirement that 

its components develop and implement internal control plans to ensure 

the accuracy and consistency of their data collection and analyses. These 

plans also helped to ensure the overall integrity of the process and the 

information upon which OSD considered each group’s recommendations. 

OSD also established a common analytical framework used by each 

military department to analyze its service-unique functions and by each of 

the seven joint cross-service groups to analyze its common businessoriented functions. The military departments and each joint cross-service 

group adapted this framework, in varying degrees, to its individual 

activities and functions in evaluating facilities and functions that shaped 

its analysis. The process began with a set of sequential steps by assessing 

capacity and military value, developing and analyzing scenarios, then 

identifying candidate recommendations, which led to the final list of 

recommendations. Military judgment also played a role throughout the 

process. Figure 1 illustrates the overall sequential analytical process 

generally employed to develop BRAC recommendations. 

DOD Developed a 

Generally Logical and 

Reasoned Process for 

Making BRAC 

Decisions 
Page 9 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

Figure 1: Analytical Process Leading to BRAC Recommendations 

a

A scenario is a proposal that has been declared for formal analysis by a military department or joint 

cross-service group deliberative body and is officially accounted for and tracked by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD). 

It must be noted, however, that while the process largely followed the 

sequential process, initial difficulties associated with obtaining complete 

and accurate data in a timely manner added to overlap and varying 

degrees of concurrency between data collection efforts and other steps in 

the process. To assist in the process for analyzing and developing 

recommendations, the military services and joint cross-service groups 

used various analytical tools that helped to ensure a more consistent 

approach to BRAC analysis and decision making. For example, all of the 

groups used the DOD-approved Cost of Base Realignment Actions 

BRAC results

Process inputs

Over 1,050 BRAC scenariosa mostly developed 

from January through March 2005 

Many ideas and proposals developed as starting points

for potential BRAC consideration and analysis

2005 BRAC legislation required recommendations be based on 

– certified data 

– 20-year force structure plan 

– military value selection criteria 

Capacity

analysis 

including surge 

Military value

analysis 

including

homeland

defense

Scenario

development

including DOD’s

transformational

and joint options

Scenario

analysis

including costs

and savings

Military

judgment 

Analytical framework

About 400 proposed recommendations 

as April 5, 2005 

 222 recommendations submitted

to BRAC Commission on

May 13, 2005 

Source: GAO.
Page 10 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

(COBRA) model to calculate costs, savings, and return on investment for 

BRAC scenarios and, ultimately, for the final 222 BRAC recommendations. 

DOD has used the COBRA model in each of the previous BRAC rounds 

and, over time, has improved upon its design to provide better estimating 

capability. In our past and current reviews of the COBRA model, we found 

it to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential costs and 

savings among various BRAC options. 

The BRAC process follows a historical analytical framework with many 

elements of the process being carried forward or building upon lessons 

learned from previous rounds. For example, the selection process 

essentially followed a framework similar to that employed in previous 

BRAC rounds, with more specificity in selected military value areas like 

surge and homeland defense as required by Congress. At the same time, 

DOD incorporated into its analytical process other legal considerations for 

formulating its realignment and closure recommendations. As required by 

BRAC legislation, DOD certified the data used in the selection process and 

based its recommendations on the congressional specified selection 

criteria, its 20-year force structure plan, and gave priority consideration to 

the military value criteria. 

DOD collected capacity and military value data that were certified as to 

their accuracy by hundreds of persons in senior leadership positions 

across the country.8

 These certified data were obtained from corporate 

databases and from hundreds of defense installations. In total, DOD 

projects that it collected over 25 million pieces of data as part of the BRAC 

process.9

 Given the extensive volume of requested data from the 10 

separate groups (3 military departments and 7 joint cross-service groups), 

we noted that the data collection process was quite lengthy and required 

significant efforts to help ensure data accuracy. In some cases, 

coordinating data requests, clarifying questions and answers, controlling 

database entries, and other issues led to delays in the data-driven analysis 

DOD originally envisioned. As such, some groups had to develop strategybased proposals. As time progressed, however, these groups reported that 

they obtained the needed data, for the most part, to inform and support 

their scenarios. At the same time, because of data limitations, a few of the 

 8

 Each official who submitted data for BRAC analysis certified that the information was 

accurate and complete to the best of his or her knowledge and belief. 

9

 Noted by the Secretary of Defense in his testimony before the BRAC Commission on May 

16, 2005. 

BRAC Process 

Incorporated Key 

Legislative Requirements 
Page 11 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

joint cross-service groups relied on some data from commercially 

available databases to support their decision making. While it was 

difficult for these data to be validated in a fashion similar to most other 

DOD collected-data, the data came from widely used databases and were 

approved by the chairs of the relevant joint cross-service groups. 

Each of the military services and the seven joint cross-service groups 

considered DOD’s 20-year force structure plan in its analysis. DOD based 

its force structure plan for BRAC purposes on an assessment of probable 

threats to national security during a 20-year period beginning with fiscal 

year 2005. DOD provided this plan to Congress in March 2004, and as 

authorized by the statute, it subsequently updated it 1 year later in March 

2005. Based on our analysis, updates to the force structure affected some 

ongoing BRAC analyses. For example, the Industrial Joint Cross-Service 

Group reassessed its data pertaining to overhauling and repairing ships 

based on the updated force structure and decided that one of its two 

smaller shipyards—Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor or Naval Shipyard 

Portsmouth—could close. However, as you know, much debate continues 

over the size of the Navy’s future force structure. 

DOD gave primary consideration to its military value selection criteria in 

its process. Specifically, military value refers to the first four selection 

criteria: an installation’s current and future mission capabilities, condition, 

ability to accommodate future needs, and cost of operations. The manner 

in which each military service or joint cross-service group approached its 

analysis of military value varied according to the unique aspects of the 

individual service or cross-service function. These groups typically 

assessed military value by identifying multiple attributes or characteristics 

related to each military value criterion, then identifying qualitative metrics 

and measures and associated questions to collect data to support the 

overall military value analysis. For example, figure 2 illustrates how the 

Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group linked 

several of its military value attributes, metrics, and data questions to the 

mandated military value criteria. 
Page 12 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

Figure 2: Selected Attributes, Metrics, and Data Questions Used to Assess Military Value for Major Administrative and 

Headquarters Activities 

a The BRAC military value criteria are the first four BRAC selection criteria. 

b Military value attributes are characteristics of each criterion. The major administrative and 

headquarters activities subgroup used a total of 14 military value attributes. 

c Military value metrics are measures for the attributes. The major administrative and headquarters 

activities subgroup used a total of 20 military value metrics. 

d The major administrative and headquarters activities subgroup used a total of 31 data call questions. 

Based on congressional direction, there was enhanced emphasis on two 

aspects of military value—an installation’s ability to serve as a staging area 

for homeland defense missions and its ability to meet unanticipated 

Leased and temporary space occupied.

Military value

criteriaa Sample data call 

questionsd

Whether an activity has a written statutory 

requirement for a specific location—either 

within 100 miles of the Pentagon or remains 

at current location. 

Military value

metricsc Military value

attributesb

For each building of administrative space, is 

building owned or leased?

For each building of administrative space, is it 

a temporary building?

Percentage of total administrative space in 

largest single location.

How many blocks of contiguous, vacant, 

administrative space in defined space ranges 

are located on your installation?

Key relationships 

in D.C. area 

Ownership/

type of space 

Vacant 

administrative 

space 

1) Current and future 

 mission capabilities. Statutory

requirement 

2) Availability and

 condition of land, 

 facilities, and 

 airspace.

3) Ability to 

 accommodate 

 contingency, 

 mobilization, surge, 

 and future total force 

 requirements. 

4) Cost of operations 

 and manpower 

 implications. 

Leased, 

temporary 

and/or owned 

Single/ multiple 

locations 

Total usable 

square feet of 

leased space 

Blocks of 

contiguous 

administrative 

space 

Workforce

pay factors

For each installation, what is the 2004 locality

pay rate for the GS pay schedule? Locality pay

Source: GAO analysis of Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group data.
Page 13 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

surge.10 Each military department considered homeland defense roles in 

its BRAC analysis and coordinated with the U.S. Northern Command—a 

unified command responsible for homeland defense and civil support. Our 

analysis shows that all three military departments considered homeland 

defense needs, with the Air Force recommendations having the most 

impact. According to Air Force officials, the U.S. Northern Command 

identified specific homeland defense missions assigned to the Air Force, 

which it incorporated into its decision-making process. Navy officials 

likewise discussed the impact of potential BRAC scenarios on the Navy’s 

maritime homeland defense mission with U.S. Northern Command, U.S. 

Strategic Command, and the U.S. Coast Guard. In this regard, for example, 

the Navy decision to retain Naval Air Station Point Mugu, California, was 

influenced, in part, because the U.S. Coast Guard wanted to consolidate its 

West Coast aviation assets at this installation for homeland defense 

purposes. According to Army officials, most of the Army’s role in 

supporting homeland defense is carried out by the Army National Guard. 

The U.S. Northern Command reviewed the recommendations and found 

no unacceptable risk to the homeland defense mission and support to civil 

authorities. 

DOD left it to each military service and joint cross-service group to 

determine how surge would be considered in its analysis. Generally, all 

the groups considered surge by retaining a certain percentage of 

infrastructure, making more frequent use of existing infrastructure, or 

retaining difficult-to-reconstitute assets. For example, the Technical Joint 

Cross-Service Group set aside 10 percent of its facility infrastructure for 

surge, while the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group factored additional 

work shifts in its analysis. The military services retained difficult-toreconstitute assets as the primary driver to satisfying the statutory 

requirement to consider surge capability. Both the Army and Navy gave 

strong consideration to infrastructure that would be difficult to 

reconstitute, such as large tracts of land for maneuver training purposes or 

berthing space for docking ships. For example, the Navy has a finite 

number of ships and aircraft and would likely have to increase operating 

tempo to meet surge needs. The Air Force addressed surge by retaining 

sufficient capacity to absorb temporary increases in operations, such as 

responding to emergencies or natural catastrophic events like hurricane 

damage, and the capacity to permanently relocate all of its aircraft 

stationed overseas in the United States if needed. 

 10 Homeland defense and surge considerations are in the military value selection criteria 2 

and 3, respectively, as reflected in P.L. 101-510, section 2913(b)(2)&(3). 
Page 14 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

As noted earlier, the BRAC process used in 2005 followed a historical 

analytical framework with many elements of the process being carried 

forward or building upon lessons learned from previous rounds. We have 

noted previously in examining lessons learned from prior BRAC rounds 

the general agreement that this framework has served the BRAC decisionmaking process well, even as improvements were made to the process for 

each BRAC round.11 If future BRAC rounds are held, as suggested by the 

Secretary of Defense in transmitting his 2005 BRAC recommendations to 

the Commission, we believe it will be important to document lessons 

learned from this round to determine what actions might be needed to 

strengthen the process for the future. We believe that will be especially 

important given the broad range of realignment actions proposed for this 

BRAC round, compared with previous rounds. 

The DOD Inspector General and the services’ audit agencies played an 

important role in ensuring that the data used in the BRAC analyses were 

accurate and certified by cognizant senior officials. Through extensive 

audits of the capacity, military value, and scenario data collected from 

field activities, these audit agencies notified various BRAC teams of data 

discrepancies for corrective action. The audit activities included validation 

of data, compliance with data certification requirements employed 

throughout the chain of command, and examination of the accuracy of the 

analytical data. While the auditors initially encountered problems with 

regard to data accuracy and the lack of supporting documentation for 

certain questions and data elements, most of these concerns were 

resolved. In addition, the auditors worked to ensure certified information 

was used for BRAC analysis. These audit agencies also reviewed other 

facets of the process, including the various internal control plans, the 

COBRA model, and other modeling and analytical tools that were used in 

the development of recommendations. 

We identified issues regarding various DOD’s recommendations that may 

warrant further attention by the BRAC Commission. The issues we are 

highlighting in this statement relate to cost and savings estimates, lengthy 

payback periods for many recommendations, and efforts to move DOD 

organizations out of leased space onto military bases. Other issues are 

further discussed in our July 1, 2005, report on the 2005 BRAC process. 

 11 GAO, Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds, NSIAD-97-151 

Washington D.C.: July 25, 1997). 

DOD Audit Agencies 

Helped to Improve the 

Accuracy of Data Used 

during the BRAC Process 

Issues Related to 

DOD’s 

Recommendations 
Page 15 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

DOD projects that its proposed recommendations will produce nearly $50 

billion in 20-year net present value savings, with net annual recurring 

savings of about $5.5 billion. While we believe the 2005 BRAC process 

could produce savings for DOD, we must emphasize that the majority of 

the projected savings are related to a small percentage of the 

recommendations (see app. I). Also, a large portion of projected savings 

are related to military personnel reductions but the lack of planned endstrength reductions reduces dollar savings available for other purposes. 

Also, we believe there is uncertainty regarding the magnitude of savings 

likely to be realized in other areas, given unvalidated assumptions 

regarding expected efficiency gains from business process reengineering 

efforts and projected savings from sustainment, recapitalization, and base 

operating support.12 Table 2 summarizes the projected one-time cost, the 

cost or savings anticipated during the 6-year implementation period for the 

closure or realignment, the estimated net annual recurring savings, and the 

projected 20-year net present value cost or savings of DOD’s 

recommendations.13

Table 2: Projected Costs and Savings from BRAC 2005 Recommendations 

Fiscal year 2005 constant dollars in millions

DOD component One-time (cost) 

Net implementation 

(cost) or savings 

Net annual 

recurring (cost) or 

savingsa

20-year net present 

value (cost) or savingsb

Army ($9,963.4) ($8,519.1) $497.6 ($3,038.6) 

Navy (2,099.8) 440.7 753.5 7,713.7 

Air Force (1,883.1) 2,635.5 1,248.5 14,560.3 

Joint cross-service groups (10,466.1) 1,372.8 2,985.1 29,569.1 

Total ($24,412.4) ($4,070.1) $5,484.7 $48,804.5

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

 12 Sustainment refers to recurring maintenance and repair activities necessary to keep 

facilities in good working order. Recapitalization refers to major renovation or 

reconstruction activities (including facility replacement) needed to keep facilities modern 

and efficient in an environment of changing standards and missions. Base operating 

support refers to a collection of day-to-day programs, activities, and services, such as food 

services, grounds maintenance, and custodial services, needed to keep the bases and 

installations in running order. 

13 These projections exclude environmental restoration costs, which historically have not 

been included in BRAC costs and savings analyses because restoration is a liability that 

exists regardless of whether a base is closed, but are included in implementation budgets 

once BRAC recommendations have become binding. 

Issues Related to Projected 

Savings 
Page 16 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

a

Projected annual recurring savings after the 6-year implementation period. 

b

DOD used a 2.8 percent discount rate to calculate net present value. 

Table 2 also shows the Navy, Air Force, and joint cross-service groups all 

projecting net savings within the 6-year implementation period, as well as 

significant 20-year net savings. In contrast, because of the nature of the 

Army’s proposed actions and costs, such as providing infrastructure for 

troops returning from overseas and the consolidation and recapitalization 

of reserve facilities, the Army does not achieve net savings either during 

the implementation period or within 20 years. 

As figure 3 shows, 47 percent of the net annual recurring savings can be 

attributed to projected military personnel reductions. About 40 percent 

($2.1 billion) of the projected net annual recurring savings can be 

attributed to savings from operation and maintenance activities, which 

include terminating or reducing property sustainment and recapitalization, 

base operating support, and civilian payroll. 
Page 17 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

Figure 3: Estimated Net Annual Recurring Savings 

Note: Analysis does not include data from one classified recommendation. 

Furthermore, about $500 million of the “other” savings is based on 

business process reengineering efforts, but some of the assumptions 

supporting the expected efficiency gains have not been validated. Also, a 

significant portion of the projected savings involving sustainment and 

recapitalization is for space being vacated as functions and activities are 

moved from one base to another. However, in various instances, plans for 

the vacated space are uncertain as is the magnitude of the projected 

savings. 

Much of the projected net annual recurring savings (47 percent) is 

associated with eliminating positions currently held by military personnel; 

but end-strength levels will not be reduced as DOD indicates the positions 

are expected to be reassigned to other areas. Without reducing endstrength levels, there are no dollar savings from military personnel that 

Military Personnel Savings 

47%

Civilian personnel 

$1,271

24%

Military personnel

$2,530

13%

Sustainment and recapitalization

$457

Base operations support

$400

9%

7%

Source: GAO.

All other savings

$699

Dollars in millions
Page 18 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

can be applied elsewhere. At best, these freed-up resources could be 

viewed as a cost avoidance, if the resources are redeployed to an area of 

need and, as a result help offset any expected congressional action to 

otherwise authorize an increase in end-strength. On the other hand, if an 

increase in end-strength is not planned and you are simply redirecting the 

freed-up resources to another area of need, it could be viewed as 

enhancing capabilities and achieving more effective utilization of your 

personnel resources, not dollar savings. 

For example, although the Air Force projects net annual recurring savings 

of about $732 million from eliminating about 10,200 military positions, Air 

Force officials stated the active duty positions will be reassigned to relieve 

stress on high demand career fields and the reserve positions to new 

missions yet to be identified. Likewise, the Army is projecting savings from 

eliminating about 5,800 military positions, but it has no plans to reduce its 

end strength. Finally, the Navy is projecting it will eliminate about 4,000 

active duty military positions, which a Navy official noted will help it 

achieve the end-strength reductions already planned. As we noted during 

our review of DOD’s process during the 1995 BRAC round, since these 

personnel will be assigned elsewhere rather than taken out of the force 

structure, they do not represent dollar savings that can be readily 

reallocated outside the personnel accounts.14 Not recognizing that these 

are not dollar savings that can be readily applied elsewhere could create a 

false sense of savings available for use in other areas traditionally cited as 

beneficiaries of BRAC savings, such as making more funds available for 

modernization and better maintenance of remaining facilities. 

DOD is also projecting savings from the sustainment and recapitalization 

of facilities that are scheduled to be demolished, as well as from facilities 

that might remain in DOD’s real property inventory when activities are 

realigned from one base to another. For example, the Industrial Joint 

Cross-Service Group is claiming about $20 million in annual recurring 

savings from the recapitalization of facilities at installations responsible 

for destroying chemical weapons at three locations recommended for 

closure.15 However, the Army had already expected to demolish these 

chemical destruction facilities upon completing the destruction of the 

chemical weapons at each site and the Army has not identified future 

 14 GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations for Closure 

and Realignment, GAO/NSIAD-95-133 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 14, 1995). 

15 The sites are the Newport Chemical Depot, Indiana; Umatilla Chemical Depot, Oregon; 

and Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah. 

Sustainment, Recapitalization, 

and Base Operating Support 

Savings 
Page 19 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

missions for these installations. As a result, we do not believe it is 

appropriate for the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group to claim any 

recapitalization savings related to these installations. 

DOD is also projecting savings from the recapitalization and sustainment 

of facilities in cases where functions or activities would be realigned from 

one base to another. However, it is not clear to what extent the proposed 

realignments would result in an entire building or portion of a building 

being vacated, or if entire buildings were vacated, whether they would be 

declared excess and removed from the military services’ real property 

inventory. Our analysis shows that the supply and storage group’s 

recommendations project about $100 million in sustainment and 

recapitalization savings from realigning defense distribution depots. The 

group estimates its recommendations will vacate about 27 million square 

feet of storage space. Supply and storage officials told us their goal is to 

vacate as much space as possible by rewarehousing inventory and by 

reducing personnel spaces, but they do not have a specific plan for what 

will happen to the space once it is vacated. In addition, until these 

recommendations are ultimately approved and implemented, DOD will not 

be in a good position to know exactly how much space is available or how 

this space will be disposed of or utilized. As a result, it is uncertain how 

much of the estimated $100 million in annual recurring savings will 

actually occur. 

DOD projected net annual recurring savings in the “other” category as 

shown in figure 3 include about $500 million that is based on business 

process reengineering efforts. Our analysis indicates that four 

recommendations—one from the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group and 

three from the Supply and Storage Joint Cross-Service Group—involve 

primarily business process reengineering efforts. However, the expected 

efficiency gains from these recommendations are based on assumptions 

that are subject to some uncertainty and have not been validated. 

Our analysis indicates that $215 million, or 63 percent, of the estimated net 

annual recurring savings from the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group 

recommendation to create fleet readiness centers within the Navy is based 

on business reengineering efforts that would result in overhead 

efficiencies. Although the data suggest there is the potential for savings, 

we believe the magnitude of the savings is somewhat uncertain because 

the estimates are based on assumptions that have undergone only limited 

testing. Realizing the full extent of the savings would depend on actual 

implementation of the recommended actions and modifications to the 

Navy’s supply system. The industrial group and the Navy assumed that 

combining depot and intermediate maintenance levels would reduce the 

Savings Based on Business 

Process Reengineering 
Page 20 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

time needed for an item to be repaired at the intermediate level, which in 

turn would reduce the number of items needing to be kept in inventory, as 

well as the number of items being sent to a depot for repair. These 

assumptions, which were the major determinant of the realignment 

savings, were reportedly based on historical data and pilot projects and 

have not been independently reviewed or verified by the Naval Audit 

Service, the DOD Inspector General, or us. 

Furthermore, our analysis indicates that $291 million, or about 72 percent, 

of the net annual recurring savings expected from the Supply and Storage 

Joint Cross-Service Group’s three recommendations are also based on 

business process reengineering. In the COBRA model, the savings are 

categorized as procurement savings and are based on the expanded use of 

performance-based logistics and reductions to duplicate inventory.16

Supply and storage group staff said that these savings accrue from 

reduced contract prices because the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) will 

have increased buying power since it is responsible for purchasing many 

more items that before were purchased by each of the services. In 

addition, savings accrue from increased use of performance-based 

agreements,17 a key component of performance-based logistics. The group 

estimates DLA can save 2.8 cents on each contract dollar placed on 

performance-based agreements. In addition, savings result from 

reductions in the amount of stock that must be held in inventory. Supply 

and storage staff said that these savings are attributable to reductions in 

the cost of money, cost of stock losses due to obsolescence, and cost of 

storage. The group estimates that together these factors save about 17 

percent of the estimated value of the acquisition cost of the stock that is 

no longer required to be held in inventory. These savings estimates, for the 

most part, are based on historical documentation provided by DLA, which 

time did not allow us to validate. The extent to which these same savings 

will be achieved in the future is uncertain. As noted above, how these 

actions are implemented could also affect savings. We are concerned that 

this is another area that could lead to a false sense of savings and lead to 

premature reductions in affected budgets in advance of actual savings 

being fully realized, as has sometimes occurred in past efforts to achieve 

savings through business process reengineering efforts. 

 16 Performance-based logistics is defined as the purchase of weapon system sustainment as 

part of an integrated weapon system package based on output measures, such as weapon 

system availability, rather than input measures, such as parts and technical services. 

17 Performance-based agreements are defined as the negotiated agreements between the 

major stakeholders that formally document the performance and support expectations and 

resources to achieve the desired outcome. 
Page 21 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

While furthering transformation was one of the BRAC 2005 goals, there 

was no agreement between DOD and its components on what should be 

considered a transformational effort. As part of the BRAC process, the 

department developed over 200 transformational options for stationing 

and supporting forces as well as for increasing operational efficiency and 

effectiveness. The OSD BRAC office narrowed this list to 77 options, but 

agreement was not reached within the department on these options, so 

none of them were formally approved. Nonetheless, each service and joint 

cross-service group was permitted to use the transformational options as 

appropriate to support its candidate recommendations. Collectively, these 

draft options did not provide a clear definition of transformation across 

the department. The options ranged from those that seemed to be service 

specific to those that suggested new ways of doing business. For example, 

some transformational options included reducing the number of Army 

Reserve regional headquarters; optimizing Air Force squadrons; and colocating various functions such as recruiting, military and civilian 

personnel training, and research, development and acquisition and test 

and evaluation, across the military departments. In contrast, some options 

suggested consideration of new ways of doing business, such as 

privatizing some functions and establishing a DOD agency to oversee 

depot-level reparables. 

While the transformational options were never formally approved, our 

analysis indicates that many of DOD’s recommendations reference one or 

more of the 77 transformational options as a resulting benefit of the 

proposed actions. For example, 15 of the headquarters and support 

activities group recommendations reference the option to minimize leased 

space and move organizations in leased space to DOD-owned space. 

Likewise, 37 of the Army reserve component recommendations reference 

the option to co-locate guard and reserve units at active bases or 

consolidate guard and reserve units that are located in proximity to one 

another at one location. Conversely, a number of the scenarios that were 

initially considered but not adopted reference transformational options 

that could have changed existing business practices. For example, the 

education and training group developed a number of scenarios—

privatizing graduate education programs and consolidating undergraduate 

fixed and rotary wing pilot training—based on the draft transformational 

options, but none were ultimately approved by the department. 

Many of the 222 recommendations DOD made in the 2005 round are 

associated with lengthy payback periods, which, in some cases, call into 

question whether the department would be gaining sufficient monetary 

value for the up-front investment cost required to implement its 

Transformation Cited as 

Justification for Many 

Recommendations despite 

Lack of Clear Agreement 

on Transformational 

Options 

Some Proposals Have 

Lengthy Payback Periods 
Page 22 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

recommendations and the time required to recover this investment. Our 

analysis indicates that 143, or 64 percent, of DOD’s recommendations are 

associated with payback periods that are 6 years or less while 79, or 36 

percent, of the recommendations are associated with lengthier paybacks 

that exceed the 6-year mark or never produce savings. Furthermore, our 

analysis shows that the number of recommendations with lengthy payback 

periods varied across the military services and the joint cross-service 

groups, as shown in table 3. 

Table 3: Payback Periods for BRAC Recommendations by DOD Component 

 Payback period 

DOD component 

Number of 

recommendations Immediate to 6 years 7 to 9 years 

10 years and 

greater Never

Army 56 26 3 22 5 

Navy 53a 45 2 6 0 

Air Force 42 29 6 7 0 

Education and training 9 5 0 3 1 

Headquarters and support 

activities 

21 14 2 5 0 

Industrial 17 13 3 1 0 

Intelligence 2 0 2 0 0 

Medical 6 3 1 2 0 

Supply and storage 3 3 0 0 0 

Technical 13 5 5 3 0 

Total 222 143 24 49 6 

Percentage 100 64 11 22 3 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

While the DOD BRAC report lists 21 Navy recommendations, several of these have multiple actions, 

thus bringing the total to 53 recommendations. 

As shown in table 3, the Army has five recommendations and the 

education and training group has one recommendation that never 

payback, as described below: 

• Army realignment of a special forces unit from Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina, to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida; 

• Army realignment of a heavy brigade from Fort Hood, Texas, to Fort 

Carson, Colorado; 

• Army realignment of a heavy brigade to Fort Bliss, Texas, and infantry 

and aviation units to Fort Riley, Kansas; 

• Army reserve component consolidations in Minnesota; 
Page 23 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

• Army reserve component consolidations in North Dakota; and 

• Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group’s establishment of 

Joint Strike Fighter aircraft training at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. 

According to Army officials, these five recommendations have no payback 

because, in part, they must build additional facilities to accommodate the 

return of about 47,000 forces currently stationed overseas to the United 

States as part of DOD’s Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy 

initiative. According to the education and training group, its one 

recommendation with no payback period is due to the high military 

construction costs associated with the new mission to consolidate initial 

training for the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft for the Navy, the Marine Corps, 

and the Air Force. 

We also identified some portions of DOD’s individual recommendations 

that are associated with lengthy payback periods for certain BRAC actions 

but are imbedded within larger, bundled recommendations. The following 

example illustrates this point. 

• A proposal initially developed by the Headquarters and Support 

Activities Joint Cross-Service Group to move the Army Materiel 

Command from Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, 

had more than a 100-year payback period with a net cost over a 20-year 

period. However, the proposal did not include some expected savings 

that if included, would have reduced the payback period to 32 years. 

Concurrently, the group developed a separate proposal to relocate 

various Army offices from leased and government-owned office space 

onto Fort Sam Houston, Texas, which would have resulted in a 3-year 

payback period. The headquarters group decided to combine these two 

stand-alone proposals into one recommendation, resulting in an 

expected 20-year net present value savings of about $123 million with a 

10-year payback. 

Fifteen of the Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service 

Group’s recommendations include a one-time savings of over $300 million 

from moving activities from leased space onto military installations. 

These recommendations, if approved, would reduce total DOD leased 

space within the National Capital Region18 from 8.3 million square feet to 

about 1.7 million square feet, or by 80 percent. While our prior work 

 18 The National Capital Region includes Washington, D.C.; the Maryland counties of 

Montgomery and Prince George’s; and the Virginia counties of Fairfax, Loudoun, and 

Prince William and the City of Alexandria, Virginia. 

Vacating Leased Space 
Page 24 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

generally supports the premise that leased property is more expensive 

than government-owned property, the recommendations related to 

vacating leased space also raise questions about a limitation in projected 

savings and impact on local communities. 

The one-time cost savings represents costs expected to be avoided in the 

future by moving from leased facilities into government owned and 

protected facilities rather than upgrading existing leased space to meet 

DOD’s antiterrorism/force protection standards.19 According to a DOD 

official, after the June 1996 Khobar Tower bombing incident in Dhahran, 

Saudi Arabia, the department created a task force of mostly engineers to 

develop minimum force protection standards for all DOD-occupied 

locations. The official also stated that the standards were not the result of 

a formal threat assessment. The force protection standards for leased 

buildings apply only where DOD personnel occupy at least 25 percent of 

the net interior usable area; only to the portion of the building occupied by 

DOD personnel; to all new leases that are executed on or after October 1, 

2005, and to leases renewed or extended on or after October 1, 2009. 

Initially, the joint cross-service group prepared military value data call 

questions that could determine whether a leased location met the force 

protection requirements. However, group officials stated that most of 

these questions were discarded because of inconsistencies in how the 

questions were answered. As noted in our July 1 report, we have also 

learned that the Pentagon Force Protection Agency will shortly begin 10-

month antiterrorism and force protection vulnerability assessments of 

about 60 DOD-occupied leased buildings in the National Capital Region. 

One could question whether this action should not have been completed 

prior to recommending a broad-based divestiture of leased space.20 

Another significant issue related to the leased space, at least in the 

National Capital Region, is the impact of such a major divestiture of leased 

space on community infrastructure. Four of the Headquarters and Support 

Activities Joint Cross-Service Group’s recommendations involve moving 

personnel from leased space to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, increasing Fort 

 19 Unified Facilities Criteria: DOD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings (UFC 4-

010-01, 8 Oct. 2003). 

20 After DOD’s recommendations were published, we obtained data from the General 

Services Administration indicating that leased termination costs associated with 10 leases 

that are scheduled to expire after the BRAC implementation period would be 

approximately $76 million. 
Page 25 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

Belvoir’s population by about 10,700.21 The recommendations include 

military construction projects to build facilities for these personnel on 

Fort Belvoir. In addition, the recommendations include $55 million to 

improve roads and other infrastructure in the area surrounding the base. 

However, it is uncertain at this time whether this will be sufficient to fully 

support the impact on the surrounding community’s infrastructure or the 

likelihood that local governments will seek federal assistance to help 

communities reduce the impact—costs that will have the effect of 

increasing one-time costs and offsetting short-term savings from the 

recommendations. 

While we realize that the BRAC Commission is charged with reviewing 

DOD’s proposed list of recommended BRAC actions and submitting its 

own list to the President by September 8, 2005, there are significant 

challenges ahead for implementing BRAC recommendations which I 

would like to bring to the Commission’s attention—challenges that will 

likely affect how successful this BRAC round could be viewed historically. 

These challenges include the need for (1) transition planning to minimize 

the impact of the loss of specialized human capital skills in implementing 

recommended actions on ongoing defense operations; (2) mechanisms to 

monitor implementation, including the tracking and periodic updating of 

savings that DOD expects from implementing BRAC recommendations; (3) 

plans to address and adequately fund environmental restoration of 

unneeded property in order to expedite property transfer and put property 

to productive reuse; and (4) assistance for both losing and gaining 

communities affected by the BRAC recommendations. 

A significant challenge facing the department is the need for transition 

plans to address the human capital skills that are likely to be lost and in 

need of replacement in order to provide for uninterrupted operations as 

BRAC recommendations are implemented. In its cost and savings 

analyses, the department estimated in most instances that, as a standard 

factor in its COBRA model, about 75 percent of the personnel at a facility 

being closed or realigned would move to the gaining installation receiving 

the mission or workload. 

However, in some cases, this percentage may be overstated resulting in 

less actual movement than anticipated, which may in turn present 

challenges for gaining bases. For example, Industrial Joint-Cross Service 

 21 The Intelligence Joint Cross-Service Group is also proposing to move about 8,500 

personnel to Fort Belvoir. 

Significant Challenges 

Ahead for 

Implementing BRAC 

Recommendations 

Transition Plans for 

Minimizing Disruption of 

Operations due to Loss of 

Specialized Skills 
Page 26 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

Group officials told us that based on the Navy’s prior experience in closing 

shipyards, they did not expect many personnel to move to other shipyards 

if the Portsmouth shipyard were closed. They further told us that because 

it takes about 8 years for personnel to become fully proficient in 

maintaining nuclear-powered submarines, this would present a challenge 

for the other yards to replicate the loss in skills due to the unwillingness of 

workers to move with the relocated workload. Officials at Fort 

Monmouth, New Jersey, expressed similar concerns regarding the planned 

closure of the base and plans for a large portion of the work to be 

transferred to the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. Information 

provided by these officials suggest that the potential loss of a large 

retirement age population must be balanced against the impact on ongoing 

mission activities providing real-time assistance to warfighters and 

transformation initiatives.

In other cases, the loss of personnel skills at a location may cause some 

concern but may not be as difficult to reconstitute. For example, DOD 

projects that about 7,400 personnel would move under the proposal to 

consolidate the Defense Finance and Accounting Service from 26 to 3 

sites. While the actual number of personnel that may move is unknown, a 

Defense Finance and Accounting Service official stated that the 

accounting skills required are available at the receiving sites. Our analysis 

indicates that over 4,590, or 62 percent, of the workforce at the 26 sites are 

classified as accounting-related civilian positions at General Schedule 

grade 11 or below. 

Should there be recommendations where the loss of personnel is 

extensive, particularly for those skills requiring extensive education, 

training, and experience, it could prove challenging to the department to 

satisfactorily provide for the replacement of these critical skills. In this 

regard, it is important that the department develop transition plans that 

would recognize the loss of human capital skills and provide for 

replacement capability to minimize disruption of ongoing defense 

operations. Without such a plan, the department could be at risk in

providing the necessary support to our military forces. 

As noted in our July 1, 2005, report, the department has proposed various 

BRAC actions involving business process changes and other actions, such 

as in joint basing, where likely savings will very much depend on 

implementation actions, the details of which are yet to be developed. We 

believe it will be important that DOD monitor implementation of these 

actions to ensure compliance with proposed actions. With respect to 

savings estimates, we believe it is also critical that the department devise a 

Mechanisms for 

Monitoring 

Implementation and 

Tracking and Updating 

Savings Estimates 
Page 27 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

mechanism to track and periodically update its savings estimates from the 

final recommendations in order to provide not only Congress but the 

public with a full accounting of the dollars saved through the BRAC 

process. Our interest in this area is evidenced by our recommendation in 

our July 2005, report to provide for this. However, given the problems in 

tracking savings from the previous rounds, and the large volume of BRAC 

actions that are more oriented to realignments and business process 

engineering rather than closures, along with our concerns about claimed 

military personnel savings, we believe it is of paramount importance that 

DOD put in place a process to track and periodically update its savings 

estimates. 

In accordance with long-standing DOD practice in previous rounds, 

estimated environmental restoration costs for bases undergoing closure or 

realignment are not included in DOD’s cost and savings analyses. Such 

costs are excluded for comparative purposes based on DOD’s position that 

restoration is a liability that the department must address regardless of 

whether a base is kept open or closed. Nevertheless, DOD did give 

consideration to such costs in addressing selection criterion 8, and 

included available information on estimated restoration costs as part of 

the data supporting its BRAC recommendations. DOD data indicate that 

estimated restoration costs for its 33 major base closures would be about 

$949 million, as shown in table 4. 

Plans for Addressing 

Environmental Restoration 
Page 28 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

Table 4: Estimated Environmental Restoration Costs for DOD’s Recommended 

Major Base Closures 

Dollars in millions 

Military service Number of major closures 

Estimated environmental 

restoration costsa

Army 14 $723.3 

Navy 9 154.5 

Air Force 10 71.3 

Total 33 $949.1 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

a

Estimated costs include some costs not specifically reported in DOD’s May 2005 report to the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. While the Army and Navy generally reported 

these costs, the Air Force did not but its costs were noted in supporting documentation. 

As shown in the table 4, the Army is expected to incur the largest share of 

estimated restoration costs due to the proposed closure of several 

ammunition plants and chemical depots. While the DOD BRAC report 

does not specifically identify the potential for additional restoration costs 

at DOD installations, available supporting documentation does identify 

some additional costs. For example, the Army estimated that range 

restoration at Hawthorne Army Depot could cost between $27 million to 

$147 million in addition to the $383 million reported and included in the 

estimates in table 4. Further, the Army recognizes that additional 

restoration costs could be incurred at six additional locations that have 

ranges and chemical munitions, but these costs have not yet been 

determined. 

More recent environmental restoration cost data indicate that the 

estimates are increasing. As noted in a June 2005 Congressional Research 

Service report,22 the estimates for the recommended 33 major base 

closures have increased by nearly $600 million to over $1.5 billion. 

Estimated costs to complete environmental restoration now exceed $100 

million at each of the following proposed major closures: Hawthorne 

Army Depot, Nevada ($465 million); Otis Air National Guard Base, 

Massachusetts ($373 million); Fort Monroe, Virginia ($201 million); and 

Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah ($180 million). 

 22 Congressional Research Service, Military Base Closures: Role and Costs of 

Environmental Cleanup, (Washington, D.C.: June, 27, 2005). The report used information 

from the Department of Defense, Defense Environmental Programs Annual Report to 

Congress for FY 2004, dated April 2005. 
Page 29 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

Service officials told us that the projected cost estimates for 

environmental restoration are lower, in general, than evidenced in 

previous rounds, because the environmental conditions of today’s bases 

are much better than those closed or realigned in previous rounds, 

primarily because of DOD’s ongoing active base environmental restoration 

program. Nonetheless, our prior work has indicated that as closures are 

implemented, more intensive environmental investigations occur and 

additional hazardous conditions may be uncovered that could result in 

additional, unanticipated restoration and higher costs. Finally, the 

services’ preliminary estimates are based on restoration standards that are 

applicable for the current use of the base property. Because reuse plans 

developed by communities receiving former base property sometimes 

reflect different uses for the property, this could lead to more stringent 

and thus more expensive restoration in many cases. 

While it is uncertain at this point what the ultimate restoration costs at 

BRAC-affected bases will be, it is likely that environmental restoration has 

the potential to slow the transfer of unneeded base property freed up by 

the BRAC process to communities surrounding those bases. Our prior 

work has shown that environmental restoration is the primary impediment 

to the transfer of unneeded property to others for reuse. In our January 

2005 report23 we noted that, as of September 30, 2004, the reasons why 

most of the 140,000 acres from the prior four rounds remained 

untransferred were due to issues regarding environmental restoration. 

Such delays in the transfer of property have adverse effects on BRAC 

communities, as this property cannot be put to productive reuse. In this 

regard, we believe it is critical that the department adequately plan for and 

fund environmental restoration requirements to provide for the expedited 

transfer of unneeded property to others for subsequent reuse. 

The recommended actions for the 2005 BRAC round will have varying 

degrees of impact on communities surrounding bases undergoing a 

closure or realignment. While some will face economic recovery 

challenges as a result of a closure and associated losses of base personnel, 

others, which expect large influxes of personnel due to increased base 

activity, face a different set of challenges involving community 

infrastructure necessary to accommodate growth. These communities 

may likely require assistance from various sources to help them address 

 23 GAO, Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and 

Closures, GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005). 

Assistance for BRACAffected Communities 
Page 30 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

the many challenges facing them as they plan for either economic recovery 

or infrastructure growth as a result of recommended BRAC actions. 

DOD data indicate that most economic areas across the country are 

expected to be affected very little by DOD’s recommended actions, but a 

few could face substantial impact. Almost 83 percent of the 244 economic 

areas affected by BRAC recommendations fall between a 1 percent loss in 

employment and a 1 percent gain in employment.24 However, for some of 

these areas, the projected impact is fairly significant, ranging up to a 

potential direct and indirect loss of up to nearly 21 percent. In this regard, 

six communities—Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico; Hawthorne Army 

Depot, Nevada; Naval Support Activity Crane, Indiana; Submarine Base 

New London, Connecticut; Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska; and Ellsworth 

Air Force Base, South Dakota—had negative employment impacts ranging 

from 8.5 percent to 20.5 percent. 

Our prior work has shown that a variety of factors will affect how quickly 

communities are able to rebound from the negative economic 

consequences of closures and realignments. They include such factors as 

trends associated with the national, regional, and local economies; natural 

and labor resources; effective planning for reuse of base property; and 

federal, state, and local government assistance to facilitate transition 

planning and execution. Our prior work has shown that most 

communities surrounding closed bases in the previous rounds have been 

faring well in relation to key national economic indicators—

unemployment rate and the average annual real per capita income growth 

rates.25 In our January 2005 report, for example, we further reported that 

while some communities surrounding closed bases were faring better than 

others, most have recovered or were continuing to recover from the 

impact of BRAC, with more mixed results recently, allowing for some 

negative impact from the economic downturn nationwide in recent years. 

The 2005 round, however, also has the potential to significantly affect a 

number of communities surrounding installations, which are expected to 

experience considerable growth in the numbers of military, civilian, and 

 24 Some of the recommendations had multiple actions that affected more than one 

economic area. 

25 GAO, Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and 

Closures, GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005); GAO, Military Base Closures: 

Progress in Completing Actions from Prior Realignments and Closures, GAO-02-433

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2002); and GAO, Military Bases: Status of Prior Base 

Realignment and Closure Rounds, GAO/NSIAD-99-36 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 1998). 
Page 31 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

civilian support personnel. DOD indicated that about 20 installations are 

expected to experience a net gain of over 2,000 military and civilian 

personnel. This is particularly evident for several Army bases, such as Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia which is expected to have a net gain of over 20,000 

military and civilian personnel, where personnel increases are likely to 

place additional demands on community services, such as providing 

adequate housing, schools, and other infrastructure support, for which the 

communities may not have adequate resources in the short term. 

Based on the experience from the previous BRAC rounds, we believe it is 

likely that additional federal costs are likely to be incurred, although these 

costs are not required to be included in DOD’s cost and savings analyses, 

for providing assistance to BRAC-affected communities. These costs 

include transition assistance, planning grants, and other assistance made 

available to communities by DOD and other federal agencies. As we 

reported in January 2005,26 in the previous four BRAC rounds, DOD’s 

Office of Economic Adjustment, the Department of Labor, the Economic 

Development Administration within the Department of Commerce, and the 

Federal Aviation Administration provided nearly $2 billion in assistance 

through fiscal year 2004 to communities and individuals, and according to 

DOD officials, these agencies are slated to perform similar roles for the 

2005 round. We believe it is important that those agencies that have 

traditionally provided assistance are prepared and adequately budget for 

the necessary funds to provide assistance to those communities affected 

by the BRAC 2005 process. As previously discussed, the number of bases 

in the 2005 BRAC round that will gain several thousand personnel from the 

recommended actions could increase pressure for federal assistance to 

mitigate the impact on community infrastructure, such as schools and 

roads, with the potential for more costs than in the prior rounds. 

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions 

you or other members of the Commission may have at this time. 

For further information regarding this statement, please contact Barry W. 

Holman at (202) 512-5581. Individuals making key contributions to this 

statement include Nelsie Alcoser, Shawn Arbogast, Raymond Bickert, 

Andrew Edelson, Mike Kennedy, Glenn Knoepfle, Nancy Lively, Warren 

Lowman, Tom Mahalek, David Mayfield, Richard Meeks, Hilary Murrish, 

 26 GAO, Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and 

Closures,GAO-05-138 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 2005). 

Contact and 

Acknowledgments 
Page 32 GAO-05-905 Military Bases 

Charles Perdue, Robert Poetta, Jim Reifsnyder, James Reynolds, and Laura 

Talbott. 
Dollars in millions 

Recommendation 20-year net present value savings

Realign to establish Navy Fleet Readiness Centers $4,724.2

Realign supply, storage, and distribution management 2,925.8

Realign Eielson Air Force Base, AK 2,780.6

Close Cannon Air Force Base, NM 2,706.8

Realign Pope Air Force Base, NC 2,515.4

Realign to create joint basing 2,342.5

Realign Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND 1,982.0

Consolidate/co-locate active and reserve personnel and recruiting centers for Army and Air 

Force 

1,913.4

Realign inventory control points and consolidate depot-level reparable procurement 

management 

1,889.6

Close Ellsworth Air Force Base, SD 1,853.3

Close Submarine Base New London, CT 1,576.4

Consolidate Defense Finance and Accounting Service 1,313.8

Consolidate transportation command components 1,278.2

Close Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME 1,262.4

Close Fort Monmouth, NJ 1,025.8

Realign maneuver training 948.1

Close Brooks City-Base, TX 940.7

Realign to establish Combat Service Support Center at Fort Lee, VA 934.2

Close Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA 910.9

Close Fort McPherson, GA 895.2

Close and realign Naval Station Ingleside, TX, and Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX, 

respectively 

822.2

Realign various medical activities by converting inpatient services to clinics 818.1

Total savings from recommendations listed above $38,359.6

Total savings from all BRAC 2005 submitted recommendations $48,804.5

Percentage of recommendations listed above of all recommendations 79%

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Appendix I: 20-Year Net Present Value 

Savings from the Top 10 Percent of DOD’s 

BRAC 2005 Recommendations 

(350728) 
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