Number 54, November 1995

**Russia's DumaElections:
*Why they should matter to the United States*
by Ellen Jones and James H. Brusstar
**Conclusions**
- Russia's legislative elections, scheduled for 17 December, have only limited legalsignificance, because most power is concentrated in the presidency.  However,the elections will be viewed in Moscow as an indicator of the popular mood andwill serve as a surrogate presidential primary.
- All indications are that the parliamentary election will not represent a fair soundingof the electorate. Virtually all participants in the election process will use the leversthey control to manipulate the outcome: from buying signatures, to obstructingcompetitors' access to the media, to tampering with the vote count after theelection. 
- Government attempts to influence the outcome of the parliamentary electionsprobably will temper, but not neutralize, the anti-Government and anti-Yeltsinsentiment of the electorate.  However, it is still too early to assess the likelihood ofthe Communist/nationalist sweep predicted by reformists like Yegor Gaydar.  
- If hardliners do particularly well in the December elections and use their enhancedposition in the new Duma to publicly challenge Boris Yeltsin, this could set thestage for another legislative/executive crisis.

**Significance of the Legislative Elections 

	The two-year terms of both the lower houses (State Duma) and upper house(Federation Council) are due to expire in December.  However, the only electioncurrently scheduled is for the State Duma.  The chances are remote that elections to anew Federation Council will be on the ballot this December, primarily because Yeltsinfiercely opposes an upper house directly elected by the people and has vetoedlegislation mandating upper house elections. 
	The Duma elections have limited significance from a legal standpoint. Thebicameral legislature--thanks to the Constitution drafted by the executive branch andadopted through a referendum in 1993--has little legal authority.  In fact, over the pasttwo years, the executive branch has ruled with very little direct interference fromparliament. When the legislature adopts measures distasteful to the executive, Yeltsingenerally vetoes the legislation and issues a presidential decree on the issue. Regardless of the outcome of the election, the legislature can do little to effect directchanges in policy.  
	 The December elections, however, have symbolic significance that goes wellbeyond the parliament's ability to directly affect policy.  

- First, Duma elections--in particular the party list vote, which will determine themakeup of half of the Duma's 450 deputies--will be seen by the Moscow politicalelite as a rough measure of which political forces enjoy the most popular support. Inthat sense, the Duma elections are a test of the legitimacy of the Yeltsin regime. Thepattern of populist support revealed through the elections will also play a role in theformation of future political alliances.  
- Second, because several of the parties vying in the legislative election areassociated with presidential contenders, the elections will function as a kind ofpresidential primary, shaping perceptions within the Moscow political elite andKremlin insiders as to the probable outcome of the June presidential elections.  
- Third, if one group or coalition manages to sweep the elections and gain anoverwhelming majority, it would be in a position to override a presidential veto orinitiate impeachment proceedings--moves that could pave the way for a replay ofthe executive-legislative conflict that ended in Yeltsin's attack on the old parliamentin the fall of 1993.  

**Weakness of Democracy  

	Although the mere holding of elections is a positive step towards thedevelopment of democratic practices, the election process itself has highlighted thefragility of democracy in Russia. It has also demonstrated how deeply ingrained are thehabits of bureaucratic politics and authoritarian thinking inherited from the Soviet era.  
	Perhaps the most telling indicator of the weakness of democratic values is thecontinued doubt over whether elections will be held at all.  During the summer and fallof 1993, key Moscow power-brokers, led by selected members of Yeltsin's entourage,were trying to strike a deal to extend the powers of both the parliament and Presidentfor an additional two years, perhaps even longer.  The deal, however, never came tofruition. The law governing Duma elections was adopted last June; and the campaignprocess has moved forward, leading most Russians to conclude that the parliamentaryelections will actually take place in December.  
	However, there are still lingering doubts about whether  parliamentary electionswill be held, especially in light of President Yeltsin's precarious  health.  Uncertaintiessurrounding Yeltsin's condition or a flare-up in the Chechen fighting could be used tojustify a postponement.  Additionally, some reformists--fearing a hardline sweep--aswell as the Supreme Court are challenging the constitutionality of the electoral law,which (if successful) could entail a postponement of the ballot.  Even the chairman ofthe Constitutional Court has raised the possibility of invalidating the election results ifso many parties fail to make the five-percent cutoff in the party list vote that the winnersrepresent less than half of the voters.
	Even if the elections go forward as scheduled, these continuing uncertaintiesreveal a strong perception that Yeltsin, his advisors, and even the parliament viewelections as optional.  This ambivalence about the elections also demonstrates theextent to which Russia's leaders see democratic procedures as alternate venues for thetraditional power struggle between competing elites.  

**Election Process: The State Duma

	Duma election laws provide for both a party list vote and single-seat districts. In both cases, a minimum of 25 percent of the registered voters must participate tomake the election valid.  
	Half of the 450 Duma deptuies will be selected through a party list, in whichvoters will cast their ballots in favor of a party (vice an individual candidate).  To geton this portion of the ballot, a political group must have not only registered itscomplete slate of candidates with the Central Electoral Commission, but also (byOctober 22) collected 200,000 signatures (with no more than 7 percent from a singleprovince).  Parties that receive at least five percent of the party list vote in theelection will be allocated a portion of the 225 seats.  For instance, a party receivingtwenty percent of the party list vote will be allocated 45 seats plus twenty percent ofthose seats remaining from those parties that failed to break the five percent cutoff. It is possible that many parties will fail to break the five-percent cutoff, with thoseparties that do falling heir to a large number of unallocated seats.  
	The other half of the State Duma--225 deputies--will be elected in single-seatdistricts.  To get on the ballot, candidates must have collected (by October 22)signatures equal to one percent of the total number of voters in the district. There willbe no run-off elections; the candidate with the most votes is declared the winner.  Asin the 1993 elections, many candidates for single-seat districts positions are likely torun as independents, although they can elect to formally join a faction after the newlegislature convenes.
	This means that the political correlation of forces in the lower house will not beimmediately clear from the formal announcement of the election results.  However,the indicator that matters most, in terms of public perceptions of who won and wholost, is the percentage the party wins in the party list race.  Parties that do well herewill be seen as the winners of the legislative elections, even though other groupsmay have done much better in the single-seat districts and can later claim theallegiance of a larger Duma faction.
**Fair Elections Not Likely**

	All indications are that the parliamentary election will not represent a fairsounding of the electorate.  The Central Electoral Commission has the reputation forpartisanship and many believe it may manipulate the vote count.  One astute Moscowreformer warned that election observers will not be able to stop or even detectmanipulation of voting results at the center.  
	These fears were reinforced when the Commission refused to register theYabloko Party (a moderate reformist party headed by Grigorii Yavlinsky and running inopposition to Yeltsin policies) and the Derzhava Party (headed by former VicePresident Alexander Rutskoy, who led the unsuccessful attempt to foil Yeltsin's 1993dissmisal of the old parliament).  Although the Russian Supreme Court overruled theCommission, the incident reflected the high-handed approach many commentators inRussia have predicted the Commission would take.   
	Indeed, virtually all participants in the election process will use the levers theycontrol to manipulate the outcome: from buying signatures, to obstructing competitors'access to the media, to tampering with the vote count after the election.  To somedegree, the effects of these activities might cancel each other out. For instance, aconservative regional boss will use his clout to cheat in favor of those supporting him,while a provincial chief with ties to Viktor Chernomyrdin will use his clout to assistChernomyrdin's party at the expense of the hardline opposition.  
	Chernomyrdin's party, however, controls the most levers and has already showna willingness to use them.  Party officials are using the state-run media to providefrequent and positive coverage of party activities.  Last summer's gubernatorialelections in Sverdlovskalso provide an indication of the willingness of theChernomyrdin party to make use of state funds to the advantage of Our Homecandidates.  Although these efforts were not successful in ensuring a victory for theircandidate (who ultimately lost), they surely added substantially to his percentage of thevote and attest to the low level of effectiveness of legal curbs on unfair electionpractices, as well as the inability of election day monitors to ensure fair elections. 

**Key Political Parties****Party****Leaders(s)****Foreign Policy**1.      Russian Democratic	Choice -- United DemocratsYegor GaydarPartnership with the West2.      YablokoGrigorii YavlinskyPartnership with the West3.   Our Home Is RussiaViktor ChernomyrdinPartnership with the West; Great Power Restoration4.   Congress of Russian Communities (KRO)Yuri Skokov & Alexander LebedGreat Power Restoration; Moderate Nationalist5.   Communist Party of the Russian FederationGennadi ZyuganovGreat Power Restoration; Create a Single Union State; Nationalist6.   Agrarian PartyMikhail LapshinGreat Power Restoration; Create a Single Union State; Nationalist7.   Liberal Democratic PartyVladimir ZhirinovskyGreat Power Restoration; Ultranationalist8.   DerzhavaAlexander RutskoyGreat Power Restoration; Restore USSR borders; Ultranationalist**Opposition Victory?**

	Given the volatility of the Russian electorate, election predictions--even thoselimited to the party list portion of the Duma election--are meaningless at this earlystage of the campaign.  Around half of the voters have not yet decided which party tovote for and may not make up their minds until the eve of the elections.  Turnoutpatterns, difficult to determine in advance, will also affect election outcomes.  For thesereasons, current survey results--which suggest that conservative forces are favored byaround forty percent of those voters who express a party preference--are not a goodguide to election outcomes.  
	Nonetheless, some political commentators are predicting a sweeping oppositionwin in December.  One reform-minded journalist stated privately that he would considerit a "democratic victory" if the Communists and nationalists won "only" 60 percent of theDuma seats.  The strong Communist showing in recent provincial races, coupled withthe defeat of the Government-supported candidate in the Sverdlovsk gubernatorialelections, has fueled such speculation.
	A strong opposition showing in the Duma elections could destabilize executive-legislative relations. Yeltsin has a history of taking major personal offense at anyindependent political body, even if it really doesn't represent much of a legal threat tohim.  If the hardline opposition does well in the December elections and uses itsenhanced position in the new Duma to publicly challenge Yeltsin, this might set thestage for another 1993-style legislative vs executive crisis.
	In any event, a strong hardline showing in December will likely strengthen thearguments of those Yeltsin insiders who are pressing the President to cancel the Junepresidential elections.  A strong showing by retired General Alexander Lebed'sCongress of Russian Communities party would be particularly threatening to thePresident's entourage, because Lebed's charismatic personality makes him perhapsthe strongest potential challenger for the presidency.  

**Recommendations**

	The election season poses a dilemma for the United States, which has astrong stake in both the democratic process and the victory of political moderates. Given the deep alienation of the Russian electorate, it is highly unlikely that eitherGovernment-sponsored candidates or those parties with close ties to Western-stylereform will do well if the elections are free and fair.  A case could be made for turninga blind eye to any manipulation and cheating that favors reformists and centrists likeChernomyrdin's party or for quietly endorsing cancellation of the presidentialelections entirely, to avoid the risk of a hardline Russian president with virtuallyunlimited power.  
	On the other hand, election fraud and/or cancellation of the presidentialelections would represent major--perhaps fatal--blows to already fragile democraticinstitutions.  Moreover, an increasingly assertive Russia is probably inevitable, evenif opposition gains in the legislative election are limited and Yeltsin somehow clingsto power (legally or illegally) beyond June 1996.  These considerations would argueagainst actions or words that would endorse or encourage any further setbacks to thedemocratic process in Russia. 
Ellen Jones, from the Defense Intelligence Agency, and James H. Brusstar, a senior fellow at theInstitute for National Strategic Studies, are specialists in Russian security policies, decision-making procedures, and constitutional developments.  This paper is a result of their research todate, including a recent research trip to Russia.  For more information contact James H. Brusstarat (202) 287-9219 ext. 525; Fax (202) 287-9475; Internet: [email protected].  Opinions,conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of theauthor and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies,National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other government agency.

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