a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

July 2005 AFGHANISTAN 

RECONSTRUCTION

Despite Some 

Progress, 

Deteriorating Security 

and Other Obstacles 

Continue to Threaten 

Achievement of U.S. 

Goals

GAO-05-742
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-742.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact David Gootnick 

at (202) 512-3149 or Gootnickd@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-742, a report to 

congressional committees 

July 2005

AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating 

Security and Other Obstacles Continue to 

Threaten Achievement of U.S. Goals 

The United States spent $720 million on nonsecurity-related assistance to 

Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. Approximately 75 percent paid for 

reconstruction activities, with the remainder supporting humanitarian and 

quick-impact projects. Conversely, in 2002-2003, humanitarian and quickimpact assistance accounted for more than three-fourths of U.S. spending. 

The United States continued to be the largest donor, contributing about 38 

percent of the $3.6 billion pledged by the international community. 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Reconstruction

Humanitarian/quick impact

2002 2003 2004 

Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

512

138

174

76

182

538

U.S. humanitarian assistance benefited vulnerable populations in fiscal year 

2004. Further, the United States increased reconstruction assistance to 

Afghanistan and made notable progress in several sectors through its 

“Accelerating Success Initiative”. Although progress varied among sectors, 

the United States did not meet all of its targets due to security and other 

obstacles. For example, USAID intended to rehabilitate or build 286 schools 

by the end of 2004. However, owing to poor contractor performance and 

security problems, by September 2004 it had completed only 8. 

As in 2002-2003, complete financial information was not readily available, 

and USAID lacked a comprehensive strategy to direct its efforts. Further, 

USAID did not consistently require contractors to fulfill contract provisions 

needed to ensure accountability and oversight. USAID also did not 

systematically collect information needed to assess the progress of its major 

projects. Moreover, measures provided by the embassy to decision-makers 

in Washington did not comprehensively portray progress in each sector or 

the overall U.S. program. 

Deteriorating security, increased opium production, and delayed funding 

continued to obstruct U.S. reconstruction efforts in fiscal year 2004 and 

threatened the achievement of U.S. goals. Deteriorating security rendered 

large areas inaccessible to the assistance community, and the continued rise 

in opium production undermined legitimate economic activity. In addition, 

most assistance funds were not available until nearly 6 months into the fiscal 

year, preventing USAID from accelerating reconstruction efforts. 

In October 2001, coalition forces 

forcibly removed the Taliban 

regime from Afghanistan, 

responding to their protection of al 

Qaeda terrorists who attacked the 

United States. Congress 

subsequently passed the 

Afghanistan Freedom Support Act 

of 2002 authorizing funds to help 

Afghanistan rebuild a stable, 

democratic society. The act 

directed GAO to monitor the 

implementation of U.S. 

humanitarian, development, and 

counternarcotics assistance. This 

report analyzes, for fiscal year 

2004, (1) U.S. obligations and 

expenditures, (2) progress and 

results of assistance efforts, (3) 

assistance management and 

coordination, and (4) major 

obstacles that affected the 

achievement of U.S. goals. 

To better assess progress toward 

achieving U.S. policy goals, and to 

provide a basis for planning future 

reconstruction, GAO recommends 

that the Administrator of USAID 

(1) establish a performance 

management plan complying with 

USAID directives, (2) require future 

contractors to develop 

performance plans, and (3) more 

completely communicate 

performance information to 

decision-makers in Washington. In 

its comments, USAID generally 

concurred with our 

recommendations and stated that 

improvements to its performance 

measurement process were 

underway. 
Page i GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

U.S. Spending in 2004 Focused on Reconstruction 10

U.S. Assistance Benefited Afghanistan, but Accelerated 

Reconstruction Did Not Meet All Targets 16

Lack of Security, Opium Cultivation, and Funding Delays Obstructed 

Reconstruction and Threatened Achievement of U.S. Goals 55

Conclusions 63

Recommendations for Executive Action 64

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 64

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 66

Appendix II: Obligations and Expenditures by U.S. Agencies and 

International Donor Pledges, Fiscal Year 2004 70

Appendix III: Sector Level Performance Indicators 73

Appendix IV: Opium Production and Counternarcotics Efforts in 

Afghanistan 84

Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 86

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements 90

Tables Table 1: Development Indicators for Afghanistan Compared with 

Averages for Low-Income Countries and The United 

States 7

Table 2: U.S. Quick-Impact Projects in Afghanistan for fiscal years 

2002 through 2004, by Funding Source 19

Table 3: Obligations and Expenditures for Humanitarian and 

Reconstruction Assistance by U.S. Agencies, Fiscal Year 

2004 70

Table 4: Major Donors’ Reported Pledges for Assistance to 

Afghanistan as of November 16, 2004 70

Table 5: Agriculture Sector Measures Reported to the Afghanistan 

Interagency Operations Group in Fiscal Year 2004 73

Table 6: Agriculture Sector Performance Measures and Status 

Reported by Chemonics International Inc. 74
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Table 7: Democracy and Governance Sector Measures Reported to 

the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group in Fiscal 

Year 2004 75

Table 8: Democracy and Governance Sector Performance 

Measures and Status Reported by Management Systems 

International 75

Table 9: Economic Governance Sector Performance Measures 

Reported to Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group in 

Fiscal Year 2004 76

Table 10: Economic Governance Performance Measures and Status 

Reported by Bearing Point 77

Table 11: Education Sector Measures Reported to Afghanistan 

Interagency Operations Group in Fiscal Year 2004 78

Table 12: Education Sector Performance Measures and Status 

Reported by Creative Associates International, Inc. 78

Table 13: Health Sector Measures Reported to Afghanistan 

Interagency Operations Group in Fiscal Year 2004 79

Table 14: Health Sector Performance Measures and Status Reported 

by Management Sciences for Health 80

Table 15: Infrastructure Sector Measures Reported to the 

Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group in Fiscal Year 

2004 81

Table 16: Infrastructure Sector Performance Measures and Status 

Reported by Louis Berger Group, Inc. 82

Table 17: Objectives for Assistance to Afghan Women Contained in 

U.S. Legislation 83

Table 18: Opium Production in Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 

2002–2004 84

Table 19: Major Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 

2001-2005 84

Figures Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan Including Provinces and Major 

Roads 6

Figure 2: Political History of Afghanistan, 1749–2005 8

Figure 3: Expenditures by Type, Fiscal Years 2002-2004 11

Figure 4: Nonsecurity-Related U.S. Agency Expenditures in 

Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2004 13

Figure 5: Map of USAID Funding Obligations by Province, Fiscal 

Year 2004 15

Figure 6: Percentages of Assistance to Afghanistan Pledged by 

United States and Other Donors for 2004 16

Figure 7: Agriculture 20
Contents

Page iii GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 8: Democracy and Governance 23

Figure 9: Economic Governance 26

Figure 10: Education 29

Figure 11: Health 32

Figure 12: Infrastructure 35

Figure 13: Women’s Initiatives 38

Figure 14: Major U.S. Interagency Afghan Assistance Coordination 

Mechanisms Used in Fiscal Year 2004 50

Figure 15: Consultative Group Structure 2004 53

Figure 16: UN Security Risk Maps, June 2003 and October 2004 56

Figure 17: Timeline for Funding of Reconstruction in 

Afghanistan 62

Abbreviations

APEP Afghanistan Primary Education Program

ARG Afghanistan Reconstruction Group

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

DOD Department of Defense

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

MSH Management Sciences for Health

MSI Management Systems International

OFDA Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

OTI Office of Transition Initiatives

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

QIP Quick Impact Projects

RAMP Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program

REACH Rural Expansion of Afghanistan’s Community-Based Health 

care 

REFS Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services Program 

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USAID United States Agency for International Development

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately.
Contents

Page iv GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction
Page 1 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 28, 2005 Leter

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar

Chairman

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Foreign Relations

United States Senate

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Lantos

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

In 2001, when U.S. and coalition forces removed the Taliban regime from 

power in Afghanistan, the country faced the task of rebuilding itself. 

Almost a quarter century of war and years of drought had destroyed 

Afghanistan’s government, judicial, economic, and social institutions and 

its transportation, health, and other infrastructure. To help rebuild the 

country and create a stable Afghan society that would not be a threat to 

itself or others, in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 the United States spent $900 

million on humanitarian and reconstruction projects. In June 2004, we 

reported that U.S. humanitarian and short-term assistance over the 2-year 

period had helped Afghanistan’s vulnerable population but that longer-term 

reconstruction efforts achieved limited results in creating a stable Afghan 

society.1

 Delayed U.S. funding, small staff size, inadequate working 

conditions, and a lack of a comprehensive strategy impeded progress; at 

the same time, security deteriorated and opium production increased. In 

October 2003, to speed reconstruction and produce visible signs of 

progress before Afghanistan’s first presidential elections in 2004, the 

United States implemented the “Accelerating Success in Afghanistan” 

initiative. 

The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 directs the U.S. Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) to monitor U.S. humanitarian, reconstruction, 

1

GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have 

Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed, GAO-04-403, (Washington, D.C.:

June 2, 2004).
Page 2 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

and counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan.2 To meet this requirement 

and provide Congress with a comprehensive accounting of U.S. 

nonsecurity related assistance to Afghanistan for fiscal year 2004, we 

analyzed (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures, (2) the progress and results 

of U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction efforts,3

 (3) the management of 

U.S. assistance and mechanisms to coordinate U.S. and international 

assistance, and (4) the major factors that obstructed the advancement of 

the assistance effort and the achievement of U.S. policy goals.

To address these issues, we collected and analyzed information from the 

U.S. Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, 

State, and the Treasury; the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID); the United Nations (UN); the Afghan government; and 

nongovernmental organizations and private contractors responsible for 

implementing U.S. government–funded projects. We analyzed data on 

obligations and expenditures by U.S. government agencies providing 

assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. We conducted reliability 

checks of the financial data provided by U.S. agencies and determined that 

the data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our analysis. To 

determine the reliability of the data, we contacted each of the agencies 

providing assistance and each of the offices within each agency responsible 

for managing specific components of the assistance, cross-checked and 

corroborated the financial information provided, and created a 

consolidated financial database of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan. This 

effort was necessary because there is no single, consolidated source of 

obligation and expenditure data for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan. 

Because U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is provided as part of a larger effort 

by the international community, we also analyzed information on the 

contributions of other donors.4

 In addition, we traveled to Afghanistan in 

2

Title I of Pub. L. 107-327 pertains to humanitarian, reconstruction, and counternarcotics 

assistance; Title II, to security assistance; and Title III, to miscellaneous provisions. As 

mandated by the act, this report focuses on Title I-related assistance. For the purposes of 

this report, humanitarian assistance refers to the provision of emergency assistance that 

meets needs for adequate water, sanitation, nutrition, food, shelter, and health care. Quickimpact projects refer to short-term assistance that helps Afghanistan transition from 

humanitarian to development assistance—that is, to longer-term reconstruction projects.

3

In the report, we refer to progress as the status of individual development activities such as 

the construction of a school, and result is defined as a significant, intended, and measurable 

change in Afghanistan, its institutions, or other entities that impact the Afghan people.

4

In this report, “international community” is defined as the collective grouping of bilateral, 

multilateral, and international assistance agencies and nongovernmental organizations.
Page 3 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

October 2004 to examine U.S. assistance-related operations in the country. 

While in Afghanistan, we spoke with officials from U.S., UN, and 

nongovernmental organizations; private contractors; and the Afghan 

government; however, the number and location of project sites we visited 

in Afghanistan were limited owing to Department of State security 

restrictions. We conducted our review from August 2004 through May 2005 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

(For further details of our objectives, scope, and methodology, see app. I.)

Results in Brief In fiscal year 2004, the focus of U.S. spending in Afghanistan shifted from 

humanitarian and quick-impact assistance to reconstruction. Of the $1.4 

billion that the United States obligated for nonsecurity-related assistance to 

Afghanistan in 2004, about $720 million was spent. Approximately 75 

percent of that amount—$538 million—paid for reconstruction contracts, 

with the remainder supporting humanitarian and quick-impact projects 

such as the construction of wells. In contrast, humanitarian and quickimpact assistance accounted for more than three-fourths of U.S. spending 

in fiscal years 2002-2003. Among U.S. agencies, USAID provided the largest 

amount of nonsecurity-related assistance in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004, 

accounting for about 82 percent of total U.S. expenditures for 

reconstruction, humanitarian, and quick-impact projects. About two-thirds 

of USAID’s obligations supported local projects in Afghanistan’s 34 

provinces, with Kabul and Kandahar provinces receiving approximately 70 

percent of these funds, mainly for roads. Overall, as in 2002-2003, the 

United States was the largest donor of assistance to Afghanistan, 

contributing about 38 percent of the $3.6 billion pledged by the 

international community for 2004.5

U.S. humanitarian and quick-impact assistance and the acceleration of 

reconstruction programs benefited Afghanistan’s vulnerable populations 

and local communities in fiscal year 2004; however, due to security and 

other obstacles, the United States did not meet all of its reconstruction 

targets. The United States provided food and other emergency assistance 

to refugees and other vulnerable populations, primarily through USAID and 

the Department of State. In addition, the number of USAID and Department 

of Defense (DOD) quick-impact projects managed through provincial 

5

Donors vary in their definition of pledges. The United States reports only money that has 

been appropriated, while other donors report amounts that may be a statement of intentions 

but have not necessarily been mobilized.
Page 4 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

reconstruction teams increased owing to the addition of USAID’s QuickImpact Program and DOD’s Commanders’ Emergency Response Program. 

Reconstruction progress and problems encountered during the 

Accelerating Success in Afghanistan initiative varied among sectors. 

Despite notable progress, particularly in the democracy and governance 

sector, such as the successful presidential election, the U.S. government 

did not meet all of its 2004 targets or project objectives. For example, in the 

education sector, the U.S. government intended to rehabilitate or build 286 

schools by the end of 2004, but by September 2004 it had substantially 

completed only 8 new structures and refurbished about 77 others. 

Likewise, in the health sector, the U.S. government aimed to construct or 

rehabilitate 253 clinics by the end of 2004, but by the end of September, 

owing to, among other things, Afghan ministries’ insistence on new 

construction rather than refurbishment, poor contractor performance and 

security problems, had rehabilitated none and substantially completed only 

15 new structures. 

Problems associated with the management and coordination of U.S. 

assistance to Afghanistan impacted the assistance effort in fiscal year 2004.

Despite partial improvements to U.S. tracking of financial data after the 

publication of our 2004 report, complete and accurate information was still 

not readily available; consequently, U.S. efforts to plan, assess progress, 

and make informed resource allocations were impaired. As in fiscal years 

2002-2003, USAID lacked a comprehensive operational strategy to direct its 

efforts in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004, although the agency was 

developing a strategy for 2005. Further, USAID did not always require 

contractors to fulfill contract provisions such as work plans needed to 

ensure contractor accountability and facilitate USAID oversight. Although 

USAID regulations require missions to establish systems for measuring 

progress toward intended objectives, we found that USAID did not 

systematically use available tools to collect the information needed to 

assess the progress or results of its major projects or its overall program. 

Moreover, the measures that the embassy provided to decision makers in 

Washington did not comprehensively portray progress or results in each 

sector or the overall U.S. program. Meanwhile, although U.S. interagency 

assistance coordination occurred daily in 2004, the Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Group, a new advisory group in Kabul, lacked a clear 

mission, which led to some confusion between it and USAID assistance 

contractors. Finally, problems associated with coordination between the 

Afghan government and donor nations, including the United States, 

continued to occur in 2004. 
Page 5 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

As in fiscal years 2002-2003, several factors obstructed U.S. reconstruction 

efforts in fiscal year 2004 and threatened the achievement of overall U.S. 

goals. Deteriorating security in some regions rendered large areas 

effectively inaccessible to the assistance community; despite efforts by 

U.S., Afghan, and international forces, attacks against aid workers, Afghan 

security forces, and international forces increased. Further, a continued 

rise in opium production undermined legitimate economic activities and 

the establishment of the rule of law. According to UN and U.S. reports, drug 

trafficking revenues equaled approximately 50 to 60 percent of 

Afghanistan’s gross domestic product over the 2002-2004 period and 

provided support to factional and antigovernment groups. Finally, funding 

delays continued to negatively impact the U.S. assistance effort in 

Afghanistan in 2004. Most assistance funds were not available until nearly 6 

months into the fiscal year, preventing USAID from accelerating 

reconstruction efforts.

We are recommending that USAID take several steps to improve the 

management and assessment of U.S. reconstruction efforts and to provide 

a basis for planning future reconstruction projects. The steps should 

include (1) establishing a performance management plan that complies 

with USAID directives, (2) clearly stipulating in all future reconstruction 

contracts that contractors are to develop performance management plans 

specific to the work they are conducting, and (3) more completely 

communicating the performance information obtained from the 

performance management plans to executive branch decision-makers in 

Kabul and Washington.

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense 

and to USAID to obtain their comments. The Departments of State and 

Defense declined to comment on the report. USAID commented that in 

general it found the report to be a comprehensive and detailed assessment 

of the U.S. civilian reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan during fiscal year 

2004. USAID concurred with the report’s recommendations and indicated 

that it has made progress in improving its strategic planning and 

performance measurement processes. USAID also provided information on 

more recent activities and technical comments, which we incorporated 

where appropriate.

Background Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, landlocked country with limited natural 

resources, bordered by Pakistan to the east and south; Tajikistan, 

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the north; and Iran to the west 
Page 6 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

(see fig. 1). At 647,500 square kilometers, Afghanistan is slightly smaller 

than the state of Texas; its population, estimated at between 24 and 30 

million, is ethnically diverse, largely rural, and mostly uneducated. The 

country is divided into 34 provinces.

Figure 1: Map of Afghanistan Including Provinces and Major Roads 

Ring road

Badakhshan

Balkh

Kandahar

Ghazni

Zabol

Lowgar

Baghlan

Bamian

Samangan

Nangarhar

Paktia

Ghowr

Paktika

Oruzgan

Daykondi

Khowst

Nurestan

Sar-e-pol

Laghman

Konar Kapisa

Faryab

Badghis

Jowzjan

Kondoz

Parvan

Panjshir

Takhar

Vardak

Herat

Nimruz

Helmand

Farah

Source: GAO.

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TA JIKISTAN CHINA

IRAN

INDIA

Kabul
Page 7 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Afghanistan is one of the world’s poorest countries. As table 1 shows, 

development indicators published by the World Bank and the UN rank 

Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every category, including nutrition; 

infant, child, and maternal mortality; life expectancy; and literacy. 

Table 1: Development Indicators for Afghanistan Compared with Averages for Low-Income Countries and The United States

Sources: The World Bank and UN.

a

Data as of most recent year available.

b

Low-income countries are defined as countries with an annual per capita gross national income of 

less than $765. (Afghanistan’s 2003 per capita gross national income was $250.)

Over the last two decades, political conflicts ravaged Afghanistan (see fig. 

2). Factional control of the country following the withdrawal of Soviet 

troops in 1989, coupled with the population’s fatigue of fighting, allowed a 

fundamentalist Islamic group, the Taliban, to seize control of the country. 

Although the Taliban regime provided some political stability during the 

late 1990s, its destructive policies, highlighted in its repressive treatment of 

women, and its continuing war with the opposition Northern Alliance 

further impeded international aid and development. 

Indicator Afghanistana

Average for low-income 

countriesb United States

Infant mortality 115 per 1000 live births 82 per 1000 live births 7 per 1000 live births

Under 5 mortality 172 per 1000 live births 126 per 1000 live births 8 per 1000 live births

Maternal mortality 1,600 per 100,000 live births 671 per 100,000 live births 17 per 100,000 live births

Life expectancy (years) 45 males/44 females 57 males/59 females 75 males/80 females

Percentage of children 12-23 months 

immunized against diphtheria 

30 percent 64 percent 93 percent

Percentage of population undernourished 70 percent 25 percent N/A

Percentage of population with access to safe 

water 

23 percent 75 percent 100 percent

Percentage of population with access to 

adequate sanitation

12 percent 41 percent 100 percent

Literacy—age 15 and over 43 percent males/

14 percent females

68 percent males/

48 percent females

97 percent males/

97 percent females
Page 8 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 2: Political History of Afghanistan, 1749–2005

a

The Durrani tribe ruled most of present-day Afghanistan from 1749 through 1978.

In December 2001, less than 2 months after U.S. and coalition forces 

forcibly removed the Taliban regime, a 9-day international summit in Bonn, 

Germany, established a framework for a new Afghan government.6

 This 

framework, known as the Bonn Agreement, focused on writing a new 

constitution by the end of October 2003 and holding democratic elections 

by June 2004.7

 The agreement was endorsed by the UN Security Council on 

December 6, 2001, through UN Resolution 1383. 

In December 2002, the United States passed the Afghanistan Freedom 

Support Act of 2002, authorizing increased assistance to Afghanistan. The 

U.S. goal is to firmly establish Afghanistan as a democratic nation 

inhospitable to international terrorism and drug trafficking and cultivation, 

at peace with its neighbors, and able to provide its own internal and 

external security. U.S. efforts in support of this goal are intended to help 

create national security institutions, provide humanitarian and 

reconstruction assistance, and reinforce the primacy of the central 

government over Afghanistan’s provinces. The act strongly urged the 

1740 1980 1990 2000 2010 1900 1970

Source: GAO.

1749

Durrania 

tribe 

begins 

rule

1919

Afghan 

independence 

from British 

control

1979

Soviet 

invasion

1989

Soviet 

withdrawal

2002

Transitional 

government 

established 

through 

loya jirga

2001

U.S. and 

coalition 

forces 

remove 

Taliban

2004

Constitution 

ratified;

Hamid Karzai 

elected President 

of Afghanistan

1978-1992

Communism

1996-2001

Religious 

fascism: 

Taliban

Transitioning 

to democracy

1973-1978

Military 

dictatorship

1919-1973

Monarchy

1749-1919

Internal 

upheaval and 

British 

imperialism

1992-1996

Anarchy 

and 

civil war

6

This report refers to the Afghan Interim Authority and the Transitional Islamic State of 

Afghanistan as the government of Afghanistan.

7

Presidential elections were held in October 2004. National Assembly and provincial 

elections are scheduled for September 2005.
Page 9 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

President to designate a coordinator within the Department of State to, 

among other things, be responsible for (1) designing an overall strategy to 

advance U.S. interests in Afghanistan; (2) ensuring program and policy 

coordination among U.S. agencies; (3) coordinating assistance with other 

countries and international organizations; and (4) ensuring proper 

management, implementation, and oversight by agencies responsible for 

assistance programs.8

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 9 provides U.S. 

assistance to underdeveloped countries through UN agencies, 

nongovernmental organizations, and private contractors. The main 

organizational units responsible for managing USAID’s reconstruction 

programs and operations in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004 were the 

agency’s mission in Kabul, Afghanistan; the Bureau for Asia and the Near 

East; and the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 

Assistance through the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of 

Food for Peace, Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and Office for 

Democracy and Governance.10 Other U.S. government agencies provided 

additional assistance, including DOD through its provincial reconstruction 

teams (PRT) located at sites throughout Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2004, 

the 12 U.S.-led PRTs11 ranged in size from 60 to 100 civilian and military 

personnel, including civil affairs units, force protection soldiers, and 

representatives of the Departments of Agriculture and State and USAID. 

The teams are intended to deliver assistance that advances military goals 

and enhance security, to increase the reach of the Afghan central 

8

Pub. L. 107-327, section 104(a).

9

USAID is the principal U.S. agency that provides foreign assistance to countries recovering 

from disaster, escaping poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms.

10The Bureau for Asia and the Near East is one of four USAID geographic bureaus that are 

responsible for activities in the countries within the geographic region. The USAID mission 

in Kabul, Afghanistan, falls under the jurisdiction of the bureau. The Bureau for Democracy, 

Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance’s mission is to save lives, alleviate suffering, support 

democracy, and promote opportunities for people adversely affected by poverty, conflict, 

natural disasters, and a breakdown of good governance. OTI provides short-term assistance 

to pre- and post-transition countries experiencing significant political change or facing 

critical threats to stability and democratic reform. 

11As of June 2004, the U.S. supported PRTs included: Parwan, Asadabad, Jalalabad, Gardez, 

Khost, Qalat, Kandahar, Lashkar Gah, Tarin Kowt, Ghazni, Farah, and Herat. Coalition and 

NATO forces supported 3 other PRTs: Mazar-e-Sharif, Konduz, and Bamian. 
Page 10 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

government in the provinces and allow assistance agencies to implement 

projects. 

In spring 2003, DOD, recognizing the lack of progress in the U.S. effort in 

Afghanistan, drafted a political-military strategy for Afghanistan. The 

strategy did not include reconstruction. The strategy was vetted by the 

National Security Council and approved by the President in June 2003. At 

the time, Department of State and USAID officials drafted a plan to 

increase funding and expedite reconstruction efforts, particularly in 

infrastructure, democratization and human rights, and security. This plan 

served as the basis for the Accelerating Success in Afghanistan Initiative 

announced by the U.S. government in September 2003. The initiative was 

designed to be implemented in advance of the Afghanistan Presidential 

elections scheduled for June 2004. The U.S. government planned to provide 

$1.76 billion for the initiative, targeting approximately $1 billion of this 

amount for elections, major and secondary road construction, health and 

education programs, economic and budget support to the Afghan 

government, senior advisors and technical experts, and private sector 

initiatives. The remaining $700 million was to fund efforts to build the 

Afghan National Army, train and equip the police force, expand the 

counternarcotics program, and establish rule of law.

U.S. Spending in 2004 

Focused on 

Reconstruction

In fiscal year 2004, the focus of U.S. spending in Afghanistan shifted from 

humanitarian and quick-impact assistance to reconstruction. Of the nine 

U.S. government departments and agencies involved in assistance to 

Afghanistan, USAID provided the largest amount of nonsecurity-related 

assistance. The largest investment went to USAID’s infrastructure sector, 

which received approximately half of the agency’s total obligations for 

Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. About two-thirds, or $922 million, of 

USAID’s obligations supported local projects in Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, 

with Kabul and Kandahar provinces receiving approximately 70 percent of 

these funds, mainly for roads. The United States provided the largest share 

of international assistance to Afghanistan, contributing about 38 percent of 

the $3.6 billion that the international community pledged for 2004.

U.S. Spending Shifted to 

Longer-Term 

Reconstruction

The focus of U.S. spending in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004 shifted from 

humanitarian and quick-impact assistance, such as building wells, to largerscale reconstruction. The U.S. government obligated about $1.4 billion and 

spent approximately $720 million on nonsecurity-related assistance to 
Page 11 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Afghanistan; the largest percentage of this amount was spent on 

reconstruction, especially infrastructure projects.12 In contrast to fiscal 

years 2002-2003, when more than three-fourths of U.S. spending was for 

humanitarian and quick-impact assistance, approximately 75 percent— 

about $538 million—of the 2004 expenditures supported reconstruction 

and development projects. The remaining amount was spent on 

humanitarian and quick-impact projects. (See fig. 3)

Figure 3: Expenditures by Type, Fiscal Years 2002-2004

12For the purposes of this report obligations are defined as amounts of orders placed, 

contracts awarded, services received, and similar transactions during a given period that 

will require payments during the same or future period. Expenditures are defined as the 

issuance of checks, disbursement of cash, or electronic transfer of funds made to liquidate a 

federal obligation.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Reconstruction

Humanitarian/quick impact

2002 2003 2004 

Fiscal year

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO analysis of agency data.

512

138

174

76

182

538
Page 12 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

USAID Provided Most U.S. 

Funding

Of the U.S. government departments and agencies providing assistance in 

Afghanistan, USAID spent the largest amount, about $587 million, for 

reconstruction, humanitarian, and quick-impact projects. The Department 

of State spent the next largest amount, about $70 million, primarily for 

assistance to refugees. DOD spent approximately $45 million for 

nonsecurity-related assistance, chiefly small projects through the 

Commanders’ Emergency Response Program. Six other U.S. government 

agencies also provided some assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. 

(See fig. 4 for agency percentages; for more details, see app. II.)
Page 13 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 4: Nonsecurity-Related U.S. Agency Expenditures in Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2004

a The $242 million for infrastructure includes major infrastructure, such as roads, as well as schools 

and clinics.

About half—$497 million—of USAID’s fiscal year 2004 obligations for 

reconstruction in Afghanistan supported the rebuilding of infrastructure. 

This amount includes $448 million obligated for large infrastructure 

projects, such as roads, of which USAID spent approximately $236 million. 

To build schools and clinics, USAID obligated $49 million, of which it spent 

0

20

40

60

80

100

USAID $587

State $70

Defense $45

Other U.S. 

agencies $18

Source: GAO analysis based on U.S. agency data.

10%

6%

3%

82%

41%

17%

13%

14%

4%

4%

3%

4%

$20

$22

$23

$23

$97

$85

Economic governance

Humanitarian/Quick Impact

Democracy and governance

Other

Health

Agriculture

FY 04 U.S. government expenditures 

by agency

(Dollars in millions)

FY 04 USAID expenditures 

by sector

(Dollars in millions)

Infrastructurea $242

$75

Education
Page 14 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

less than $6 million. USAID and DOD obligated $44 million and $47 million, 

respectively, through the PRTs, mainly for small-scale infrastructure 

projects. 

Kabul and Kandahar 

Received Most U.S. 

Assistance

In an effort to expand the reach of the Afghan government—a major U.S. 

and Afghan government priority—USAID directed about two-thirds, or 

$922 million, of its obligations13 to local projects in Afghanistan’s 34 

provinces, with Kabul and Kandahar provinces receiving approximately 70 

percent of these funds (see fig. 5). The remaining funds went to national 

programs, such as government reform initiatives. USAID directed the 

majority of the funds obligated for Kabul and Kandahar—approximately 

$527 million of a total $647 million—toward road construction.14 In 

addition, DOD distributed approximately $47 million throughout the areas 

covered by the PRTs, the majority of them near Afghanistan’s border with 

Pakistan.

13USAID does not maintain expenditure data by province.

14The U.S.-funded Kabul-Kandahar highway passes through multiple provinces.
Page 15 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 5: Map of USAID Funding Obligations by Province, Fiscal Year 2004 

United States Remained 

Largest International Donor

As in previous years, the United States provided the largest share of 

international assistance to Afghanistan, contributing about 38 percent of 

the $3.6 billion pledged by the international community for 2004. (See fig. 6; 

for 2004 pledges by donor, see app. II.) The U.S. share for 2001-2003 was 

about 34 percent of the approximately $9.7 billion pledged by the 

Source: GAO.

Badakhshan

Balkh

Kandahar

Ghazni

Zabol

Lowgar

Baghlan

Bamian

Samangan

Nangarhar

Paktia

Ghowr

Paktika

Oruzgan

Daykondi

Khowst

Nurestan

Sar-e-pol

Laghman

Konar Kapisa

Faryab

Badghis

Jowzjan

Kondoz

Parvan

Panjshir

Takhar

Vardak

Herat

Nimruz

Helmand

Farah

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

INDIA

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TA JIKISTAN CHINA

IRAN

More than $200 million

USAID activity in each province

$10-$25 million

$5-$10 million

Less than $5 million

Kabul
Page 16 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

international community. According to the Center on International 

Cooperation, as of February 2005, donors had obligated about 29 percent, 

or $3.9 billion, of the $13.4 billion pledged since 2001.

Figure 6: Percentages of Assistance to Afghanistan Pledged by United States and 

Other Donors for 2004

Note: Donors vary in their definition of pledges. The U.S. pledge amount represents obligated funds, 

while other donors report amounts that may represent only statements of intent.

U.S. Assistance 

Benefited Afghanistan, 

but Accelerated 

Reconstruction Did 

Not Meet All Targets

U.S. humanitarian and quick-impact assistance benefited vulnerable 

populations and returning refugees; however, the success of efforts to 

accelerate large-scale reconstruction varied. USAID provided almost $60 

million in emergency assistance, including food aid, and the Department of 

State provided about $60 million to assist refugees in fiscal year 2004. In 

addition, the U.S. government obligated approximately $120 million for 

small-scale, quick-impact projects such as the construction of wells and 

bridges.15 Further, the United States accelerated its major reconstruction 

8%

38%

28%

6%

6%

6%

8% World Bank ($285 million)

United States ($1,383 million)

United Kingdom ($216 million)

Japan ($200 million)

Asian Development Bank ($205 million)

32 Other donors combined ($1,010 million)

European Commission ($294 million)

Source: GAO.

15This includes $29 million obligated by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives.
Page 17 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

programs to increase visible progress before the 2004 Afghan presidential 

elections. However, progress and results in each of the reconstruction 

sectors—agriculture, democracy and governance, economic governance, 

education, health, infrastructure, and gender—varied, as did the problems 

each sector faced. 

U.S. Government 

Responded to Ongoing 

Humanitarian Crisis

In fiscal year 2004, the U.S. government provided food and other 

emergency assistance to Afghanistan’s vulnerable populations and assisted 

the return of refugees. Afghanistan suffered its sixth year of drought and 

produced a below-average harvest, and the percentage of people in need of 

food aid rose from 20 percent in 2003 to an estimated 37 percent in 2004. In 

addition, approximately 900,000 refugees returned to Afghanistan, with 

more expected to return in coming years owing to the closing of refugee 

camps operated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 

Pakistan.16

USAID’s Office of Food for Peace, through the UN World Food Program 

(WFP), provided Afghanistan with 79,330 metric tons of wheat and other 

emergency food assistance (valued at $49 million) in fiscal year 2004,17

which equaled approximately 25 percent of the international food 

assistance that WFP requested during that time period. In addition, USAID, 

through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, provided almost $10 

million in other emergency assistance in fiscal year 2004, compared with 

$137.8 million in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. According to USAID, the office 

supported transitional shelter for refugees; the return of internally 

displaced persons; winter programs, such as snow clearance and road 

rehabilitation; and emergency funds to respond to the ongoing drought.

The Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 

(PRM) provided almost $63 million to help refugees, compared with $234 

million in previous years. PRM provided more than half of the 2004 funding 

through the UNHCR to support traditional assistance, such as shelter and 

education for refugees. In addition, the agency facilitated out-of-country 

registration and voting so that Afghan refugees living in Pakistan and Iran 

16Approximately 4.2 million Afghan refugees live in Pakistan and Iran. This is equivalent to 

15 percent of the population presently living in Afghanistan.

17WFP is the UN’s major provider of food assistance. Most U.S. food is provided through 

WFP. USAID provided this assistance through Pub. L. 480, Title II.
Page 18 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

could vote in the October 2004 Afghanistan presidential election. PRM also 

provided funds through the International Committee of the Red Cross and 

UN Children’s Fund, as well as about $17 million in direct grants to 

nongovernmental organizations. These grants provided shelter, water and 

sanitation, health care, education, and economic assistance and training to 

refugees and internally displaced people. PRM provided funding for the 

construction of 5,900 shelters; however, as of September 30, 2004, 8,000 

shelters were still needed.

USAID and DOD Continued 

Quick-Impact Efforts

In fiscal year 2004, USAID and DOD continued efforts to respond rapidly to 

small-scale reconstruction needs in Afghanistan. USAID launched the 

Quick-Impact Program (QIP), supplementing the activities of the existing 

Office for Transition Initiatives, and DOD launched the Commanders’ 

Emergency Response Program (CERP) to operate alongside its Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program (see table 2). 

The aims of these programs is to extend the reach of the Afghan central 

government through benefits to rural communities and to facilitate the 

transition to longer-term reconstruction programs. Although CERP and 

OHDACA funds address humanitarian needs, the projects are determined 

by the tactical need to obtain the support of the populace and are primarily 

tools for achieving U.S. security objectives. Since 2002, the U.S. 

government has programmed almost $136 million for about 3,600 smallscale, quick-impact projects through USAID and DOD. 

CERP and QIP funds worked in tandem through the PRTs in fiscal year 

2004, with CERP funding smaller projects costing less than $20,000 on 

average and QIP funding larger, more expensive projects. DOD regulations 

allow PRT commanders to approve the use of up to $25,00018 in CERP 

funds for the rapid implementation of small-scale projects, such as 

providing latrines for a school or a generator for a hospital. USAID 

representatives at PRTs used QIP funds for larger, more complex projects 

such as local roads, bridges, and government buildings. To ensure 

accountability and long-term sustainability, USAID regulations require that 

the mission, before granting approvals for QIP projects, conduct technical 

assessments and ensure Afghan government involvement in projects. DOD 

does not require similar assessments for CERP-funded projects.

18More expensive projects, such as providing vehicles or communication systems to the 

local police, required approval from the brigade, joint task force, or Central Command.
Page 19 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Table 2: U.S. Quick-Impact Projects in Afghanistan for fiscal years 2002 through 2004, by Funding Source

OHDACA = Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Assistance Program

CERP = Commander’s Emergency Response Program

OTI = Office for Transition Initiatives

QIP = Quick-Impact Program

Sources: Department of Defense and USAID. 

Progress in Accelerated 

Reconstruction Projects 

Varied by Sector

Efforts to accelerate existing USAID programs in each reconstruction 

sector—agriculture, democracy and governance, economic governance, 

education, health, and infrastructure—achieved varying degrees of 

progress toward project objectives and accelerated targets. Efforts to

Agency Goal of implementing projects Program

Estimated total

project cost

Estimated

average

project cost

Projects

begun

Projects

completed

DOD To achieve U.S. security objectives by improving 

DOD visibility, access, and influence with military 

and civilian counterparts; building security in 

host nation; generating goodwill for DOD to 

enhance U.S. ability to shape regional security; 

bolstering host nation disaster response; and 

readying U.S. military personnel.

OHDACA $25,344,192 $61,515 412 355

To enable U.S. military commanders in 

Afghanistan to address humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction by carrying out programs that will 

immediately assist the Afghan people.

CERP 39,707,370 17,152 2,315 Not tracked

USAID To support the rehabilitation and political 

stabilization in postconflict Afghanistan, 

increasing the Afghan government’s 

responsiveness to citizens’ needs, increasing 

citizen participation in democratic processes, 

and increasing the capacity of the Afghan media.

OTI 41,876,468 65,844 636 451

To link communities with district, provincial, and 

central governments by conceptualizing, 

planning, and implementing projects. Projects 

include water systems, road-related activities, 

rehabilitation and construction of government 

and public buildings.

QIP 28,968,217 137,944 210 58

Total $135,896,247 $38,034 3,573
Page 20 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

promote gender equity in each sector also demonstrated varying levels of 

progress. 

Figure 7: Agriculture

Although the 2004 Accelerating Success initiative targets for the agriculture 

sector were generally met or exceeded, the contractor failed to integrate 

project activities, thus limiting the project’s results.19 To address the needs 

of the agriculture sector, USAID implemented the Rebuilding Agricultural 

Markets Program in 13 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, concentrating the 

program’s activities on physical infrastructure, rural finance, and 

agricultural technology and market development.20 USAID signed the 

Goal: Enhance food security and increase incomes of Afghanistan’s rural population

Objectives: Increase agricultural productivity and output

 Increase incomes through effective linkages between producers, processors, 

and markets

USAID program: Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP)

Funding: Total contract ceiling: $153 million; FY 2004 obligations: $41.7; FY 2004 

expenditures: $22.9 million

Contract dates: Start: July 3, 2003

 End: July 2, 2006

Implementer: Chemonics International, Inc.

The agriculture sector has historically generated 80 percent of Afghanistan’s export earnings but uses antiquated methods of 

production. Periodic drought and 23 years of conflict have reduced agricultural production by 50 percent and left many farmers with 

insurmountable debt. The government also lacks staff trained in modern agricultural practices and management and is unable to pay 

competitive salaries. Specific problems include inadequate and inefficient irrigation systems, lack of credit institutions, limited market 

opportunities, uncompetitive agriculture products, poor technical support for farmers, and a lack of agricultural inputs.

Sector background

Agriculture

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and Afghan government data.

19See appendix III, table 5 for a list of the targets.

20In addition to the primary contract with Chemonics, RAMP is being implemented through 

cooperative agreements with Land-O-Lakes, the Central Asian Development Group, IF 

Hope, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Page 21 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

program’s $153 million primary 3-year contract on July 3, 2003. The 

contractor, Chemonics International, Inc., was to use a “market chain” 

approach to improve the operations of, and linkages between, the market 

chain components (i.e., farmers, processors, transporters, input suppliers, 

creditors, regulators, wholesalers, and retailers).

As of September 2004, Chemonics had implemented numerous activities 

through subcontracts and grants with 40 organizations, including local and 

international nongovernmental organizations, private firms, and 

international organizations. The progress of these activities as reported by 

Chemonics is as follows:

• Physical infrastructure. By September 2004, over 320 kilometers of 

irrigation canals, approximately 230 irrigation structures, and about 160 

kilometers of farm to market roads had been rehabilitated. In addition, 

nearly 120 market structures such as retail market stalls and grain and 

vegetable storage sheds had been constructed.

• Rural finance. Over 1,100 loan officers had been trained, and more 

than 8,000 loans had been disbursed.

• Agricultural technology and market development. About 565,000 

farmers were served by extension services; over 4,000 women being 

trained in poultry management; over 20,000 chickens had been 

distributed to women; and more than 3,675,000 livestock had been 

treated, vaccinated, or both.

Data provided by Chemonics and U.S. government interagency 

performance reports indicated the program generally met or exceeded all 

of the Accelerating Success targets established for the sector; however, the 

program did not address a key program objective. We found that 

Chemonics had not integrated individual activities to achieve project 

objectives or focused its efforts on the improvement of market chains. 

USAID and Chemonics officials told us in October 2004 that although many 

activities had been implemented, most projects were stand-alone 

agricultural infrastructure efforts (e.g., road and canal rehabilitation) and 

did not focus on improving the marketing of commodities or the integration 

of market chain components. Consequently, during its first 15 months, the 

project’s progress in strengthening Afghanistan’s market chain was limited. 

An internal evaluation of the Chemonics effort was conducted by USAID 

mission staff in Kabul in mid-fiscal year 2004. The evaluation resulted in the 
Page 22 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

development of a new strategy and performance monitoring plan in an 

effort to refocus RAMP and better integrate program activities.
Page 23 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 8: Democracy and Governance 

Goal: Support the process of political reconstruction and conduct of free and fair elections

Contract dates: Start: March 1, 2003; End: August 31, 2005

Contract dates: Start: March 21, 2003; End: March 20, 2005

Contract dates: Start: August 1, 2003; End: June 30, 2005

Objectives: Provide strategic planning and organizational support for elections

 Provide civic education and public awareness campaign

 Improve political party capacity

 Enhance political party and civil society organizations, capacity to increase transparency and 

confidence in the electoral process

USAID program: Strengthening elections and political process

Funding: Total contract ceiling: $13.36 million; FY 2004 obligations: $9.6 million; FY 2004 expenditures: 

$1.45 million

Democracy and governance

Sector background

Years of civil wars and unrest caused frequent changes in Afghanistan’s political administration. Absent a formal justice system, traditional mechanisms 

have been used in many parts of the country, especially in rural areas, where questions of law are negotiated with local tribal leaders. The concept of a 

nation state with permanent institutions of justice and rule of law is still in the early stages of development and acceptance. In addition, although most of 

Afghanistan’s population is rural, 74 percent of its prosecutors are located in the provincial capitals.

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and other data.

Implementers: Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS), comprising

 International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES)

 International Republican Institute (IRI)

 National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI)

Goal: Support the Afghanistan government’s management of the constitutional draft process, and 

policy reform and implementation process, and coordination of executive branch ministries

Objectives: Support the constitutional process

 Support justice sector reform

 Support policy reform management

USAID program: Judicial reform

Funding: Total contract ceiling: $16.8 million; FY 2004 obligations: $4.99 million; FY 2004 expenditures: 

$3.75 million

Implementer: Management Systems International, Inc.

Goal: Provide operational and substantive support for the loya jirga and elections process

Objectives: Provide operational and substantive support to the constitutional loya jirga

 Support UNAMA in the voter registration process 

 Provide support for the October 2004 presidential elections

 Provide support for parliamentary elections in September 2005

 Conduct civic education

 Provide assistance to the Media Commission

USAID program: Loya jirga and elections process

Funding: Total contract ceiling: $45.7 million, FY 2004 obligations: $30.28 million, FY 2004 expenditures: 

$8.2 million

Implementer: The Asia Foundation (TAF)
Page 24 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

USAID’s democracy and governance program produced notable successes, 

particularly its assistance with the creation and ratification of Afghanistan’s 

constitution and with the presidential elections. However, some civic 

education programs were uncoordinated and had limited distribution. 

USAID’s fiscal 2004 democracy and governance program comprised three 

components:21

• Strengthening of elections and political process. The Consortium 

for Elections and Political Process Strengthening component addressed 

civic education and political party building. Under USAID’s Accelerating 

Success initiative, the consortium’s funding ceiling increased from $3.76 

million to $13.36 million. Grantees reported training more than 2,000 

district and village leaders in civic education, registering 46 political 

parties by the end of fiscal year 2004, and establishing eight election 

training and information centers.

• Judicial reform. In May 2004, under the Accelerating Success 

initiative, USAID increased its contract with Management Systems 

International (MSI) from $14.7 million to $16.8 million. USAID also 

revised the scope of work to focus on judicial rehabilitation and added 

court administration as an objective. MSI provided technical assistance 

and logistical support to the constitutional commission and its 

secretariat and to the constitutional loya jirga that took place in 

December 2003.22 According to USAID and MSI reports, MSI also built or 

rehabilitated 7 of 10 targeted courthouses by September 30, 2004; helped 

review, draft, and track the status of legislation; surveyed and compiled 

laws and legal texts; mapped courthouse administration functions; and 

conducted training for about 300 legal professionals.

• Loya jirga and elections logistics. USAID awarded the Asia 

Foundation a cooperative agreement to provide operational and logistic 

support for the constitutional loya jirga and elections. The award’s 

funding ceiling increased from $10 million to more than $45 million. The 

scope expanded to include assistance to the UN Assistance Mission to 

Afghanistan to conduct the loya jirga, register voters, and hold the 

presidential election. The foundation filled unforeseen gaps in the UN’s 

21See Appendix III, Tables 7 and 8 for performance indicators.

22Loya jirga is a grand council or grand assembly used to resolve political 

conflicts or other national problems. Letr
Page 25 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

efforts, as UN staff faced security restrictions that limited their ability to 

register voters and set up polling stations. According to the UN, more 

than 10 million people registered to vote, out of a total population of 

between 24 and 30 million; about 40 percent of those registered were 

women.

Despite these successes, the program faced setbacks, particularly in public 

education and courthouse construction. Parts of the civic education 

program were poorly timed. According to an evaluation commissioned by a 

USAID grantee, a listening device to enhance the public’s understanding of 

the election process was distributed late, in some cases just 1 week before 

elections and with no training, making it difficult for users to listen to all of 

the content; the evaluation found that users would have preferred to have 

received the device 2 months before the elections. In addition, there were 

delays in the project’s initiative to draft and pass legislation, due to shifting 

responsibility for legislative drafting from the Judicial Reform Commission, 

a temporary entity, to the permanent Ministry of Justice. Finally, despite a 

goal of building or rehabilitating 10 courthouses by the end of fiscal year 

2004, according to USAID and contractor reporting, only 7 were completed 

due to late funding.
Page 26 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 9: Economic Governance

Despite many achievements, problems pertaining to the selection of 

advisors and sustainability affected the economic governance program. In 

December 2002, USAID signed a 3-year, $39 million Sustainable Economic 

Policy and Institutional Reform Support program contract with Bearing 

Point, Inc., to provide technical assistance and training to the primary 

Afghan ministries concerned with economic governance issues. In April 

2004, as part of the Accelerating Success initiative, USAID increased 

funding for the contract to $95.8 million. Most of the work under the 

contract was implemented by advisors and operations staff assigned 

primarily to the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. As of August 

2004, approximately 224 advisors were working within the Ministry of 

Finance. Some of the advisors worked directly with the management of the 

ministry, others served in operational positions and were responsible for 

Goal: Support the Afghan government’s work with donors, Afghan citizens, and 

emerging governance institutions; institutionalize a set of reform measures 

necessary to maintain a stable macroeconomic environment; and promote 

the effective and sustainable planning, financing, and provision of key public 

services.

Objectives: Fiscal reform

 Banking reform

 Trade policy

 Legal and regulatory reform

 Privatization

USAID program: Sustainable Economic Policy and Institutional Reform Support

Funding: Total contract ceiling: $98 million; FY 2004 obligations: $45 million; FY 2004 

expenditures: $38.4 million

Economic governance

Sector background

In 2002, when USAID began working in the economic governance sector, key state institutions such as the central bank, treasury, and 

civil service were weak or nonexistent. In early 2004, Afghan government structures remained fragmented, with overlapping and 

unnecessary functions and cumbersome administrative systems. In addition, the government still lacked adequate control over 

customs revenues, an absence of banking and insurance services undermined the formal economy, and uncertain property rights 

impeded economic activity. 

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and other data.

Implementer: Bearing Point, Inc.

Contract dates: Start: December 30, 2002

 End: December 29, 2005
Page 27 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

carrying out the day-to-day functions of the ministry. According to the 

USAID mission in Kabul, USAID’s Inspector General, and an evaluation 

commissioned by the Afghan government, Bearing Point made progress 

toward completing the approximately 120 “contractor responsibilities” 

listed in the contract.23 Accomplishments included the following:

• Fiscal reform. Bearing Point developed a system to estimate 

government revenues; introduced a taxpayer identification number 

system; trained Afghans to develop and monitor budgets; established a 

national payments system; developed a customs broker licensing 

program, reformed customs operations and trained customs officials; 

rehabilitated and equipped customs houses and border posts; and 

developed a database of customs revenues.

• Banking reform. The contractor helped the Afghan Central Bank 

establish national and international operations via standard banking 

telecommunications networks, implement bank licensing policies and 

procedures, restructure and equip branch banks, and draft banking 

laws.

• Trade policy. The assistance provided helped the Afghan government 

streamline its business license application process, reducing the time to 

obtain a license from months to less than 1 day and reducing the number 

of required signatures from 58 to 6. In addition, the contractor also 

assisted the government in reviewing and drafting commercial decrees 

and laws.

• Legal and regulatory reform. The contractor assisted Afghan 

ministries in drafting key laws and establishing a telecommunications 

regulatory body.

• Privatization. As of October 2004, little work had been conducted in 

the area of privatization, because the Afghan government was not ready 

to privatize state-owned enterprises.

Despite these accomplishments and USAID’s efforts to adjust the program 

to meet the government of Afghanistan’s needs, the Ministry of Finance 

remained dissatisfied with the cost and quality of the assistance provided 

by some of the expatriate advisors hired under the contract and sought to 

23See appendix III, tables 9 and 10 for performance indicators.
Page 28 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

terminate it. In mid 2004, the Afghan government requested a review of the 

program. The first evaluation, completed in September 2004, found that, 

among other things, Bearing Point lacked an effective means for 

determining ministry needs.24 USAID disagreed with the evaluation’s 

findings and maintains that Bearing Point worked closely with the 

ministries receiving assistance and worked proactively to meet their needs. 

According to the Central Bank governor, the bank—the other major 

recipient of assistance under the contract—was generally satisfied with the 

assistance provided. In November, the Ministry of Finance agreed to allow 

the contract to continue until its completion date, December 2005.

In addition, in October 2004, the Minister of Finance and the Governor of 

the Central Bank were still concerned that their agencies would not be able 

to sustain operations after the program’s completion. To address this 

concern, USAID and Bearing Point initiated plans to transfer local Afghans 

working as their contractors to Afghan civil service. These individuals 

would be paid with funds provided by the international community through 

the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. In addition, the Central Bank 

began testing the abilities of its staff on a periodic basis to determine their 

ability to work in the absence of international advisors and to identify areas 

where additional training was needed prior to the Bearing Point contract’s 

completion. 

24The review resulted in an interim report in September 2004 and a final report in February 

2005. See Mohammad Qayoumi, Monitoring and Evaluation of Afghanistan Economic 

Governance Program (Kabul: 2005).
Page 29 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 10: Education

a

The APEP contract was signed in June 2003, but was effective as of January 2003.

b

USAID managed the school rehabilitation and construction component through six separate 

implementing partners.

USAID’s Afghanistan Primary Education Program (APEP) provided 

educational and teacher-training programs to help improve basic 

education; however, under the Accelerating Success initiative, very few 

schools were constructed and other components were not integrated into 

educational facilities as originally envisioned. 

USAID’s education program originally focused its efforts in four areas: 

textbook production and distribution, radio-based teacher training, 

accelerated learning, and school construction. USAID provided the bulk of 

its education assistance in Afghanistan through APEP, run by Creative 

Associates International, Inc. APEP was designed to ensure that newly 

constructed schools were functional centers of learning by providing 

textbooks, skilled teachers and opportunities for accelerating the learning 

of over-aged students. The Accelerating Success initiative increased 

Goal: Improve access to basic education nationwide and ensure that schools are 

functional centers of learning by providing the basic inputs needed to keep 

students in school

Objectives: Renovate or construct primary schools

 Address textbook shortage

 Provide radio-based teacher training

 Raise educational levels of over-aged students

USAID program: Afghanistan Primary Education Program (APEP)

Funding: Total contract ceiling: $87.9 million; FY 2004 obligations: $55.0; FY 2004 

expenditures: $19.7 million

Contract dates: Start: January 23, 2003a

 End: December 30, 2005

Education

Sector background

According to UNDP, Afghanistan has the worst educational system in the world. The Taliban replaced secular education with religious 

instruction and banned girls from school. When these policies were lifted, many children lacked the scholastic abilities normal for their 

age. At the beginning of 2003, approximately half of all enrolled students were in the first grade. UNDP estimates that 46 percent of 

school-aged children do not have access to education. In addition, nearly 80 percent of the country's schools were damaged or 

destroyed in fighting.

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and other data.

Implementer: Creative Associates International, Inc.b
Page 30 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

APEP’s funding ceiling from $16.5 million to $87.6 million, but it decoupled 

the provision of materials and training from school construction. The 

initiative introduced three additional components: in-country textbook 

production; educational support services to help reform policies, systems, 

and programmatic changes; and enhanced monitoring and evaluation. 

Progress under the APEP contract included the following:25

• Textbook production: According to the USAID Regional Inspector 

General, USAID exceeded its textbook production goal for 2004, 

producing about 16.5 million books, but distribution was delayed.

• Radio teacher training: According to the targets in the original APEP 

contract, the radio teacher training broadcasts aimed to improve the 

teaching skills of about 30,000, or about 96 percent of all primary school 

teachers by the end of 2004. Under the Accelerating Success initiative, 

the goal was reduced to reaching up to 40 percent of Afghan teachers 

nationwide. After a mid-2004 survey of, primarily, participants in U.S. 

education programs, USAID concluded that 70 to 90 percent of all 

primary school teachers were listening to the radio teacher training 

broadcasts and the number of listeners was increasing monthly. 

• Accelerated learning: APEP’s goal was to raise the educational levels 

of 80,000 over-aged students in 13 provinces and move them into ageappropriate levels by the end of 2004. Under the Accelerating Success 

initiative, the goal was expanded to 170,000 students in 17 provinces. 

Under both plans, APEP intended 70 percent of beneficiaries to be 

female students. By the end of fiscal year 2004, USAID had met its 

student enrollment objective, but less than 60 percent of students 

enrolled were girls.

• School construction:26 According to contract and grant 

documentation, targets for school rehabilitation or construction shifted 

under the Accelerating Success initiative from 50 schools to 286 schools 

by the end of 2004. By September 2004, implementing partners reported 

that 77 schools had been refurbished and 8 were substantially complete. 

25See appendix III, tables 11 and 12, for performance indicators.

26Creative Associates was not responsible for school rehabilitation and construction, 

although it was an integral part of the original APEP plan. USAID managed construction and 

rehabilitation through the infrastructure contract and a series of other construction grants. 

For further discussion, see “Infrastructure” on page 37.
Page 31 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

• Educational support services: Under the Accelerating Success 

initiative, APEP began to provide the Ministries of Education and Higher 

Education with advisors to help draft education law, improve planning 

capacity, and assess English language instruction needs. 

• Monitoring and evaluation: Under the original contract, APEP 

produced weekly or biweekly updates, quarterly progress reports, and 

an evaluation of the radio-based teacher training component. The 

expanded scope includes a national study of students trained under the 

accelerated program.

USAID also instituted several other smaller education-focused projects in 

2004. These included a $10 million teacher-training institute and literacy 

initiative and an $11 million dormitory to house between 1,100 and 1,500 

university women in Kabul. 
Page 32 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 11: Health

a

In addition to MSH’s contract, USAID made several other health-related awards. USAID awarded $5.6 

million for the social marketing component of the program to Population Services International, and 

awarded the health clinic construction component to 6 separate implementing partners. 

Despite some accomplishments, the project’s ambitious program made it 

difficult to meet targets on many fronts. To address health sector issues, 

USAID’s Rural Expansion of Afghanistan’s Community-based Healthcare 

(REACH) program, in conjunction with the Ministry of Public Health, 

established a nascent health care system and provided health services and 

training for health providers. USAID’s REACH program, implemented by 

Management Sciences for Health (MSH) under a 3-year contract, was 

designed to improve the health of women of reproductive age and children 

younger than 5 years. USAID’s Accelerating Success initiative increased 

MSH’s original ceiling of approximately $100 million to $129 million. The 

initiative expanded the scope of work to include, among other things,

Goal: Address Afghanistan’s health crisis, focusing on basic health care in rural 

areas for women and children

Objectives: Increase the number of health facilities and expand community outreach

 Improve capacity of health providers in rural areas

 Enhance public health education programs

 Improve the capacity of the Afghan Ministry of Public Health

USAID program: Rural Expansion of Afghanistan’s Community-based Healthcare (REACH)

Funding: Total contract ceiling: $129 million; FY 2004 obligations: $47.8 million; FY 2004 

expenditures: $22.41 million

Contract dates: Start: May 16, 2003

 End: May 15, 2006

Health

Sector background

Access to health care in Afghanistan is extremely limited after two decades of war and neglect. The average life expectancy is 

approximately 45 years. Obstetric care is provided in only 11 of 31 provinces, with the infant mortality rate among the worst in the 

world at 115 deaths per 1,000 live births. Almost half of Afghan children younger than 5 years are underweight for their age, and fewer 

than 40 percent receive vaccinations. The majority of rural Afghans in more than one-third of rural districts have no access to health 

care.

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and other data.

Implementer: Management Sciences for Health (MSH)a
Page 33 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

tertiary care in addition to the project’s original focus on rural health care.27

USAID and MSH noted progress in five health care areas.28 The progress in 

these areas as reported by MSH is as follows:

• Health care facilities and community outreach. The program 

reached its stated target of awarding $53 million in service delivery 

grants to more than 250 clinical facilities in 13 provinces. Service in 

these facilities covers a population of approximately 4.8 million. 

• Training for rural health care providers. The REACH program did 

not meet its fiscal year 2004 target of training 46 midwives and 2,060 

community health workers. By the end of 2004, according to 

Management Sciences for Health reports, 75 midwives were in training 

in Kabul, although none had finished the course, and almost 1,500 

community health workers had been trained. 

• Public health education programs. REACH developed a policy on 

health education with the Ministry of Public Health and helped the 

ministry develop standard health promotion messages. Management 

Sciences for Health reporting also indicated that REACH produced 

seven radio dramas and trained 21 ministry and radio staff in radio 

programming. 

• Ministry of Public Health capacity. REACH developed a national 

health management information system and played an advisory role in 

health sector reform, financing, and planning, as well as hospital 

management. The REACH program helped to create a new human 

resources department in the health ministry and to review and update 

the national human resources policy for health staff. REACH also 

contributed to the development of the National Drug Policy, the 

National Medicine Agency, and donation guidelines for drug and 

equipment donors. According to a midterm evaluation of the program, 

REACH’s efforts have been sustainable.29

27Tertiary care is specialized consultative care, usually on referral from primary or 

secondary medical care personnel, by specialists working in a center that has personnel and 

facilities for special investigation and treatment.

28See Appendix III, Tables 13 and 14 for performance indicators.

29REACH Program midterm evaluation, Kabul (Dec. 2004).
Page 34 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

• Clinic construction.30 According to contract and grant documentation, 

targets for clinic rehabilitation or construction shifted under the 

Accelerating Success initiative from 50 clinics to 253 clinics by the end 

of 2004. By September 2004, implementing partners reported that 15 

clinics had been substantially constructed and none had been 

refurbished. 

USAID’s ambitious health care program stretched the capacity of 

contractors, making it difficult to implement many projects simultaneously. 

For example, according to the December 2004 USAID-commissioned 

midterm evaluation, despite targets established in 2003, few clinics had 

communication materials designed to change the health-related practices 

of Afghans and most clinics remained focused on curative, rather than 

preventative, care. Further, the evaluation found that despite a greater need 

for community midwives than for hospital midwives, REACH developed 

the capacity to train equal numbers of hospital and community midwives. 

In addition, although the development of a national infection prevention 

program was added to the Accelerating Success initiative, the program’s 

schedule was delayed by 2 to 3 months owing to a delay in finding a 

program manager. 

30MSH was not responsible for clinic rehabilitation and construction. USAID managed 

construction and rehabilitation through the infrastructure contract and a series of other 

construction grants. For further discussion, see “Infrastructure” on page 35.
Page 35 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 12: Infrastructure

a

Although USAID managed the construction of schools and clinics under the REFS contract, it 

designated them programmatically as parts of the education (APEP) and health (REACH) sectors, 

respectively. 

USAID’s infrastructure program focused on some of Afghanistan’s large 

infrastructure needs, including construction of the primary highway and 

emergency electricity provision to four cities; however, progress has been 

limited. USAID designed the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and 

Services (REFS) program, to promote economic recovery and political 

stability in Afghanistan by repairing selected infrastructure. To ensure 

sustainability, USAID also designed REFS to strengthen pertinent 

institutions’ management capacity, and to strengthen Afghan construction 

companies’ ability to build according to international standards. The Louis 

Berger Group, Inc., implemented most of the infrastructure work through 

Goal: Promote economic recovery and political stability by repairing selected 

infrastructure and ensure sustainability by strengthening institutions 

component in several sectors.

Objectives: Lower transportation costs

 Restore electrical transmission and distribution systems

 Repair/reconstruct irrigation systems, dams/diversions and canals

 Improve the provision of water and sanitation

 Increase access to education, health, and government facilitiesa

 Strengthen Afghan Construction companies’ ability to implement 

international quality construction

 Provide employment

USAID program: Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services (REFS)

Funding: Total contract ceiling: $665 million; FY 2004 obligations: $286.9 million FY 

2004 expenditures: $226.8 million

Contract dates: Start: September 30, 2002

 End: December, 31, 2005

Infrastructure

Sector Background

Afghanistan’s infrastructure, including its roads, power, drinking water, and sanitation, is largely ruined or nonexistent. When coalition 

forces deposed the Taliban in late 2001, approximately 16 percent of Afghanistan’s roads had been paved, compared with more than 

80 percent of the roads in neighboring Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In addition, access to power is among the lowest in 

the world; only 234,000 customers in a population of 26 million are connected to the public grid. Further, more than 20 of the 34 

provincial capitals lack a functioning piped water system and collect no more than 50 percent of solid waste.

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and other data.

Implementer: Louis Berger Group, Inc. (LBGI)
Page 36 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

2004 under the 3-year REFS contract. Under the Accelerating Success 

initiative, USAID increased REFS’ funding from $143 million to $665 million 

and added 12 new awards with a collective funding ceiling of almost $400 

million.

USAID’s fiscal year 2004 infrastructure programs included the following:31

• Primary roads. USAID completed the first phase of the construction of 

the Kabul-Kandahar Ring Road, which decreased travel time between 

the two cities from several days to 6 hours. The second phase—adding 

layers of asphalt, bridges, culverts, shoulders, and signage—was to be 

complete by October 2004, but repair work continued into 2005. USAID 

also mobilized contractors and started survey work to begin the next 

section of the road, from Kandahar to Herat.

• Secondary and urban roads. By fiscal year 2004, work had begun on 

one urban road in Kabul, diverting traffic away from the U.S. Embassy, 

and one secondary road to provide access between Kabul and a 

southern city, Gardez. In addition, according to contractor reports, 

planning or construction of nine additional secondary roads began; 

however, by the end of fiscal year 2004, four were postponed due to lack 

of funding. 

• Power. To increase the power supply around Kandahar in the south, 

USAID began rehabilitation of two turbines for the Kajaki Dam. By the 

end of fiscal year 2004, USAID was negotiating for construction of a 

third turbine as well as seeking a solution to a power shortage in Kabul. 

In the meantime, USAID supplied emergency power to Kabul, Kandahar, 

Lashkar Gah, and Qalat by providing fuel for generators at the cost of 

approximately $3 million per month. 

• Irrigation. USAID began work on several irrigation projects: the 

emergency rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Saur-e-haus Dam, 

spillway, and diversion channel; rehabilitation of the Zana Khan Dam; 

the Sardeh Irrigation System; and three intake systems. By the end of 

fiscal year 2004, construction of the Sardeh Irrigation System and two of 

the intake systems had been completed. 

31See appendix III, tables 13 and 14 for performance indicators.
Page 37 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

• Water/wastewater. By September 2004, USAID had contracted for 

water availability assessments for two planned communities and for 

water system assessments and design upgrades for three provincial 

capitals. 

• Schools and clinics construction. In the initial infrastructure contract 

with the Berger Group, USAID included the construction or 

rehabilitation of 40 schools and clinics as an illustrative target to be 

achieved by the end of 2003, with an additional 60 buildings to be 

completed by the end of 2004. The actual job orders signed in July 2003 

show that the Berger Group agreed to complete 55 schools and 78 

clinics. By the end of September 2003, only 1 building was completed. 

USAID reduced the Berger Group’s responsibility to 105 buildings and in 

May 2004 provided grants to five additional organizations, with the goal 

of rehabilitating or constructing a total of 774 buildings by October 31, 

2004. In mid-2004, owing to, among other things, the education and 

health ministries’ insistence on producing new as opposed to 

refurbished buildings and a lack of progress by all implementing 

partners, USAID, according to grant and contract documentation, 

reduced its expectations to about 530 buildings32 and extended the 

completion deadline to December 2004.33 By the end of fiscal year 2004, 

the implementing partners reported having refurbished 77 buildings and 

substantially completed new construction of 23 buildings. 

Because the Accelerating Success initiative emphasized visible 

construction, in addition to time and funding constraints, USAID largely 

abandoned the REFS contract’s objective of building Afghan ministry 

capacity in 2004. The Berger Group had recruited and hired experts to 

supply intellectual capacity at the ministries of Public Works, Irrigation, 

Health and Education; however, this project was discontinued in June 2004.

32Excluding the award to the Berger Group, awards to the implementing partners for 

schools and clinics did not specify the number of buildings to be completed by the end of 

the award. The USAID contracting office supplied the original goal (774 buildings) which 

was confirmed by the regional Inspector General. However, information provided by the 

Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group lists an original goal of 877 buildings. There was 

no consensus as to the revised goal; however, the implementing partners and the regional 

Inspector General reported a revised goal of about 530 buildings.

33According to USAID, the National Security Council formally reviewed the fiscal year 2004 

school and clinic rehabilitation/construction program and changed the target to 56 schools 

and 20 clinics to be constructed or rehabilitated by the end of fiscal year 2004. The Council 

noted this September 30 deadline as a “milestone indicator” towards longer-term targets.
Page 38 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 13: Women’s Initiatives

Goal: Assist women and girls in Afghanistan in the areas of political and human 

rights, health care, education, training, security, and shelter.

Objectives: Establish or rehabilitate health care facilities

 Expand immunization programs

 Establish, maintain, and expand primary and secondary schools

 Establish vocational training and income-generation projects

 Provide special education opportunities for girls whose schooling was ended 

by the Taliban

 Provide access to higher education

 Protect against sexual and physical abuse, abduction, trafficking, 

exploitation, and sex discrimination

 Provide emergency shelters for women who face danger from violence

 Direct humanitarian assistance to widows

 Support the work of women-led and local nongovernmental organizations

 Disseminate information throughout Afghanistan on the rights of women

 Provide women's rights and human rights training for military, police, and 

legal personnel

 Support the National Human Rights Commission

USAID program: Initiatives Targeting Afghan Women and Girls

Funding: Earmarks: $60 million; USAID funds targeting women and girls: $196 

million (approximate)

Women’s Initiatives

Sector Background

Despite a progressive constitution and elected government, women in Afghanistan remain subject to traditional, restrictive customs 

that limit their safety and independence. When the Taliban took power in 1996, they instilled and brutally enforced a series of

ultraconservative measures affecting women, including prohibiting education for girls older than 8 years, limiting women's access to 

health care, restricting women's mobility outside the home, and prohibiting women's employment. While many of these practices were 

discarded when the government changed and the new constitution granted women equal rights as citizens, violence against women 

persists–including beatings, rape, forced and underaged marriages, and kidnappings–owing to traditional social customs and lack of 

enforcement of women’s constitutional rights.

Source: GAO analysis of USAID and other data.

Implementers: Numerous
Page 39 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Although U.S. agencies focused on 10 of the 13 women-centered 

objectives34 legislated by Congress,35 the overall impact of these efforts has 

not been measured. (See app. III, table 17 for progress on objectives.) 

Unlike programs for most reconstruction sectors, no overarching contract 

was let to implement women-centered programs. Instead, U.S.-funded 

programs incorporated components that advanced the social, economic, 

and political rights and opportunities of women, dedicating about $196 

million to such initiatives. For example, USAID provided more than 90,000 

girls with education equivalent to one or more grade levels through the 

APEP accelerated learning program and trained community health care 

workers and midwives through REACH. USAID also provided democracy 

and governance technical assistance, which helped over 3 million women 

register for, and vote in, the 2004 presidential elections. USAID also 

implemented other projects, such as reconstructing a women’s dormitory 

to enable more than 1,100 young women to attend university in Kabul, 

establishing a women’s teacher training institute, and, according to USAID, 

completing 3 of 17 planned women’s resource centers in provincial 

capitals. Other U.S. government agencies also incorporated women’s issues 

into their work. For example, the Department of State granted $75,000 to 

train four Afghan woman judges in civil and family law. Likewise, the DOD 

included “Principles of non-discrimination: Women in Society” and other 

pertinent classes in their curriculum for training the Afghan National 

Police. 

In addition, the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council was created to accelerate 

progress by promoting public-private partnerships between U.S. and 

Afghan institutions and mobilizing private sector resources to benefit 

women. The council raised about $135,000 of private sector funds from 

entities such as an America Online women executives group and DaimlerChrysler. These funds supplemented various U.S. government projects, 

including training of women judges, the Afghan Family Health Book, and 

community banks and microfinance loans. Many of the other projects 

sponsored by the council, such as the Women’s Teacher Training Institute, 

34Programs for women and girls against sexual abuse and trafficking, shelter for women and 

girls, and programs disseminating information on the rights of women were not specifically 

addressed in any U.S. government project. See appendix III for progress on other objectives.

35The U.S. government legislated assistance to Afghan women under the Afghanistan 

Freedom Support Act of 2002 and the Emergency Supplemental of 2004. Additional support, 

not discussed in this report, was legislated under the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act 

of 2001 (Public Law 107-81).
Page 40 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

were funded and managed through USAID. Whereas USAID’s 

reconstruction sector programs tend to target a broad range of women and 

have a national scope, many of the council-supported projects impact a 

small number of women.

Although U.S. legislation and assistance programs have included efforts to 

address the needs of Afghan women, as of the time of this report, no 

evaluation had been conducted to determine the overall impact of U.S. 

gender-related efforts.

Assistance 

Management and 

Interagency 

Coordination Problems 

Persisted

Problems associated with the management and coordination of U.S. 

assistance to Afghanistan occurred throughout fiscal year 2004. As in fiscal 

years 2002-2003, the persistence of project management problems affected 

agencies’ oversight of reconstruction contracts. U.S. financial data on 

assistance to Afghanistan remained fragmented and incomplete, and 

USAID continued to operate without a comprehensive operational strategy 

to guide its efforts. In addition, USAID did not always enforce required 

contract provisions, USAID directives, or a federal acquisition regulation 

necessary to hold contractors accountable for their performance. In 

addition, comprehensive performance indicators in most sectors were 

lacking.36 Consequently, decision makers in Washington did not receive 

meaningful information about the results of USAID–implemented projects. 

Problems with project monitoring also continued in 2004, and although 

USAID has taken steps to improve project monitoring, limited staffing and 

security restrictions reduced its ability to provide proper oversight for 

much of the fiscal year. Finally, although coordination of U.S. efforts 

occurred daily throughout 2004, the evolving roles of U.S. organizations 

and the coordination of international assistance were problematic.

Management Problems 

Impeded Oversight

During fiscal year 2004, a number of management problems negatively 

affected the U.S. agencies implementing reconstruction projects and 

prevented agency officials from providing project oversight. The tracking 

of U.S. financial data for Afghanistan assistance remained fragmented and 

incomplete. In addition, USAID continued to operate without a 

comprehensive strategy to guide its overall assistance effort. Contract 

36Performance indicators are used to observe progress and measure actual results versus 

expected results.
Page 41 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

management and performance measurement problems also impeded 

oversight. Finally, staff turnover and travel restrictions negatively affected 

USAID’s ability to provide regular on-site monitoring of project activities.

U.S. Governmentwide Financial 

Data Still not Readily Available

In fiscal year 2004, tracking of U.S. assistance financial data for 

Afghanistan improved but remained fragmented and incomplete. In June 

2004, we reported that the Coordinator for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan, 

as well as others involved in the management of the assistance effort, 

lacked complete and accurate financial data for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. 

Because of the lack of accessible and timely financial data, program 

managers were hampered in their ability to, among other things, allocate 

resources and determine whether strategic goals were being met.37

Although more information on assistance obligations was available in fiscal 

year 2004 than in previous years, U.S. agencies remained unable to readily 

supply complete and accurate financial data for programs in Afghanistan. 

There was no single, consolidated source of fiscal year 2004 obligation and 

expenditure data for U.S. assistance to Afghanistan. Consequently, as in 

2002 and 2003, the embassy and the coordinator’s office continued to lack 

complete and accurate financial data to inform their decisions. According 

to the Embassy Interagency Planning Group, numerous organizations with 

little coordination or oversight track the U.S. budgetary process for 

assistance to Afghanistan, including obligation and expenditure data. To 

address this problem, the embassy created an interagency resource office 

in November 2004 to provide better visibility over all U.S. assistance 

financial matters in Afghanistan.38

USAID Strategic Guidance 

Still Lacking 

As in previous years, USAID operated in fiscal year 2004 with an interim, 

rather than a more complete, standard strategy for its activities in 

Afghanistan. USAID directives allow the use of interim strategic plans in 

countries experiencing high uncertainty because of drastic political,

37GAO-04-403.

38Because the office was established after the end of fiscal year 2004, we did not assess its 

effectiveness.
Page 42 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

military, and/or economic events.39 In June 2004,40 we reported that 

although the USAID mission in Afghanistan developed an interim strategy 

and action plan in August 2002, these documents did not clearly articulate 

measurable goals or provide details on time frames, resources, 

responsibilities, objective measures, or the means to evaluate results for 

each of the sectors targeted by the strategy, as required by USAID 

directives.41 The mission obtained yearly waivers allowing it to postpone 

developing a comprehensive strategy until February 2005. According to 

USAID officials, the mission did not complete a comprehensive strategy in 

fiscal year 2004 because it wanted to wait until the Afghan presidential 

elections had been completed and a new government formed. USAID 

officials informed us in July 2005 that a more comprehensive strategy had 

been completed and approved by USAID management in Washington, D.C. 

Although a new strategy was completed prior to the end of fiscal 2005, 

more than 3 years have passed between the time USAID began providing 

postconflict assistance to Afghanistan and the completion of a 

comprehensive USAID assistance strategy for Afghanistan. The lack of a 

comprehensive strategy impedes USAID’s ability to ensure progress toward 

development goals, make informed resource allocation decisions, and meet 

agency and congressional accountability reporting requirements on the 

effectiveness of agency programs.

Contract Management Problems 

Reduced Oversight of 

Contractors

Contract management problems affected most reconstruction sectors, 

making it difficult to hold contractors accountable. Oversight of the USAID 

assistance contracts for Afghanistan was essential owing to the inherent

39According to USAID directives, a strategy should be developed prior to the 

implementation of assistance activities. Waivers are available for countries with special 

foreign policy interest, are valid for 1 year, and can be renewed annually. See USAID 

Guidelines for Strategic Plans (Washington, D.C.: February 1995); USAID Functional 

Series 200-Programming Policy Automated Directives System 201-Planning

(Washington, D.C.: January 2003).

40GAO-04-403.

41USAID’s guidelines and directives state that country-level strategies and plans should 

address, among other things, strategic objectives; key country-level problems; 

programmatic approaches; baseline data and targets; performance indicators and the means 

to measure progress; fundamental assumptions; and resources required to implement the 

plan.
Page 43 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

risks associated with the use of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts; the awarding 

of contracts through bidding procedures that were not fully open and 

competitive; the large initial dollar value and scope of the contracts and 

large increases in the dollar values and scopes over time; and the 

requirement to demonstrate progress quickly.42

Despite the need for strong oversight of USAID assistance contracts, we 

found that USAID did not provide adequate contract oversight, including 

holding contractors to stipulated requirements and conducting required 

annual reviews of contractor performance. 

• Agriculture. USAID did not hold its primary contractor to the 

contract’s requirement to conduct five crop subsector assessments that 

were to serve as the basis for the contractor’s annual work plans and all 

future activities. According to the contractor, it did not complete the 

assessments because USAID was pressing it to produce visible progress 

through the construction of, among other things, irrigation canals and 

farm-to-market roads by the Accelerating Success deadline. Although 

USAID documented the contractor’s lack of performance, as of October 

2004, it had not required the contractor to complete the assessments. 

• Economic governance. USAID’s regional Office of Inspector General 

reported in August 2004 that, because the contractor failed to produce 

contractually required quarterly work plans and schedules, the Office of 

the Inspector General could not determine whether the economic 

governance program was on schedule to achieve planned outputs.43

According to the Inspector General’s report, USAID officials did not 

require the contractor to produce the plans, in part because mission 

42FAR 16.101(b) groups contracts into two broad categories: fixed-price contracts and costreimbursement contracts. The specific contract types range from firm-fixed-price, in which 

the contractor has full responsibility for the performance costs and resulting profit (or loss), 

to cost-plus-fixed-fee, in which the contractor has minimal responsibility for the 

performance costs and the negotiated fee (profit) is fixed. Because the contractor has 

minimal responsibility for the performance costs, the latter type of contract requires careful 

management and monitoring. With the authority provided by AIDAR 706.302-7(b)(3)(ii), 

other than full and open competition contracting procedures were authorized by USAID 

management in February 2002 to expedite the delivery of assistance to Afghanistan. 

43USAID Regional Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Sustainable Economic 

Policy and Institutional Reform Support Program at USAID/Afghanistan, Report Number 

5-306-04-005-P, (Manila: Aug. 17, 2004). At the time of the audit, only two of the six required 

quarterly work plans were completed and neither included milestones or expected 

accomplishments.
Page 44 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

staff in Kabul lacked time to review them. To correct this problem, the 

contractor began producing quarterly work plans and schedules in July 

2004.

• Infrastructure. The use of grants instead of contracts to accelerate the 

construction of some schools and clinics in fiscal 2004 made it difficult 

for USAID to hold grantees accountable, because no-penalty causes 

were included in the grant agreements. Further, neither USAID nor its 

initial contractor developed a quality assurance plan for the school and 

clinic reconstruction effort. Such a plan could have guided USAID’s 

oversight efforts and assisted in the identification of problems. Similarly, 

although the main infrastructure contractor was required to develop and 

submit a comprehensive quality control and assurance program for the 

Kabul–Kandahar Road construction project, this was not done. 

According to a September 2004 USAID Inspector General report, USAID 

did not inspect contract quality control laboratories until 21 months 

after road construction began.44 The Regional Office of the Inspector 

General also found deficiencies in the contractor’s quality control 

program, such as untrained personnel and lack of adherence to testing 

standards.

• All sectors. Because of staffing constraints and competing priorities, 

USAID did not perform annual contractor performance evaluations in 

any sector as required by USAID policy directives in 2004 and federal 

regulation.45 The evaluations are intended to document contract quality, 

cost control, and timeliness; and inform future award decisions. 

According to USAID, five additional contracting staff were hired in early 

fiscal 2005 and efforts to conduct evaluations subsequently began. In 

addition, according to contract provisions, technical and contracting 

44USAID Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Kabul to Kandahar Highway 

Reconstruction Activities Financed by USAID/Afghanistan’s Rehabilitation of Economic 

Facilities and Services Program, Report Number 5-306-04-006-P, (Manila: Sept. 21, 200.)

45According to USAID and federal contracting regulations, contracting officers must report 

on contractor performance at least annually. USAID policy (see USAIDAR 742.1502) states 

that contracts in excess of $100,000, including individual task orders under indefinite 

quantity contracts, must be evaluated at least annually (for contracts exceeding 1 year in 

duration) and upon completion of activities, as required by FAR 42.1502. More frequent 

evaluations may be conducted if the Contracting Officer and Cognizant Technical Officer 

determine them to be in the best interests of the activity. Federal Acquisition Regulation 

36.201 also requires agency officials responsible for monitoring contractor performance to 

prepare performance evaluation reports for all construction contracts with a value of 

$500,000 or more.
Page 45 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

officers are to meet quarterly and annually with contractors to discuss 

performance and other administrative and technical issues. Although 

USAID maintains that staff met frequently with contractors throughout 

2004 and conducted in-house reviews of some of the major programs, 

most meetings were ad hoc and records of the discussions were not 

always formally documented and reported. The absence of such records 

makes it difficult to determine the nature and extent of problems with 

individual contractors or across multiple contractors’ efforts. Such 

records would also facilitate conducting annual contractor performance 

evaluations.

Performance Measurement 

Problems Plagued Programs 

The USAID mission in Kabul did not develop a performance management 

plan for 2004. In addition, performance information in several sectors was 

lacking, making it difficult to determine the results of USAID assistance. 

Finally, because of—among other problems—weaknesses in contractor 

reporting and the lack of a performance management system, the 

information reported by USAID to decision makers in Washington, D.C., did 

not accurately portray the status of each sector or the overall assistance 

effort. 

USAID directives state that performance management represents the 

agency’s commitment to manage programs with greater accountability and 

that operating units must prepare a complete performance management 

plan to manage the process of assessing and reporting progress toward 

strategic objectives.46 However, since the mission in Kabul was operating 

under a wavier that permitted it to use an interim strategy rather than a 

more comprehensive strategy, it was also allowed to operate without a 

comprehensive performance management plan. Although a performance 

management plan was not required, USAID directives state that when an 

interim strategy is used, program performance should still be measured—

country volatility may require intensive monitoring and measurement of 

program implementation.47 USAID officials stated that although a formal 

plan was not prepared, goals, indicators, baselines, and targets were 

included in major contracts. However, without a performance management 

plan that meets the requirements stipulated in USAID directives, USAID 

46USAID Functional Series 200 Programming Policy Automated Directive System 203.3.2 

Performance Management Plans.

47USAID Functional Series 200 Programming Policy Automated Directive System 201.3.4.3, 

Types of Strategic Plans.
Page 46 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

cannot develop a complete and accurate assessment of the status of its 

assistance efforts. The United States has pledged to maintain a long-term 

presence in Afghanistan, in part by increasing the number and scope of 

USAID contracts. Consequently, the need for a comprehensive plan and for 

the greater integration of performance measurement into the work of 

contractors will continue to be important in future years. Now that a new 

overall, longer-term strategy for USAID’s efforts in Afghanistan is approved, 

USAID has stated that the mission in Kabul will develop a performance 

management plan that complies with USAID directives. 

Further, USAID directives state that performance data collection should be 

integrated with implementing contractors’ activities and incorporated into 

the contractors’ work plans.48 USAID did not stipulate the requirement for 

contractors to develop sector-specific performance plans in three of the six 

major reconstruction contracts. In two of the three contracts where a 

requirement was stipulated, little information on what should be included 

in the plans was prescribed. We found problems with performance 

measures in the following sectors:

• Agriculture. The contractor was required to report to USAID on the 

status of 14 performance measures. (See app. III, table 6 for a list of the 

measures.) However, the contractor did not collect or report 

information for most of the measures, making it difficult for USAID to 

accurately determine the extent to which the program was achieving 

expected results. Efforts were underway in June 2005 to improve 

agriculture-related performance measures.

• Democracy and governance. In the grant awarded for civic education and 

political party building, USAID did not require the implementing 

partners to establish specific targets or develop performance 

management plans, making it difficult to assess whether the program 

was on schedule or achieving intended results. 

• Economic governance. For most of fiscal year 2004, the contractor did 

not develop performance measures, which would have helped USAID 

monitor the sector’s results. An Afghan government review of USAID’s 

economic governance program stated that the contractor had not 

developed a formal process for assessing advisors as required in the 

statement of work. Consequently, it was unclear how USAID or the 

48USAID Functional Series 200 Programming Policy Automated Directive System 203.
Page 47 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

contractor assessed advisors’ performance, determined whether the 

advisors’ knowledge had been transferred to Afghan counterparts (a key 

aspect of the program), or monitored the program’s progress. USAID 

officials stated that the program’s progress was tracked through weekly 

and monthly progress reports. We found that although these reports 

provided information on the status of activities, they did not contain 

specific performance indicators to determine the impact of the project. 

To correct this weakness, the contractor initiated efforts to produce 

periodic performance measures in the last quarter of fiscal year 2004.

• Health. According to an evaluation of the health sector, the 

contractor’s data management system was unable to collate data 

from service delivery subgrantees into a comprehensive picture for 

the overall service delivery effort, making it difficult for managers 

and USAID to judge progress or results.49

Owing to these weaknesses and other problems, the performance 

measures that the Kabul mission provided to decision makers in 

Washington, D.C., did not completely portray the status of each sector or 

the overall Accelerating Success initiative. For example, we found that the 

reported agriculture sector measures, such as kilometers of canal repaired, 

did not provide the information necessary to determine whether the 

program was meeting the primary objectives stated in the contract—

increasing agricultural productivity and farmers’ incomes. Likewise, the 

only two measures where reported for the democracy and governance 

sector, the number of courthouses constructed, and the number of judicial 

personnel trained. Those measures did not capture the performance of the 

diverse activities implemented in this sector. Further, the data reported in 

some sectors did not always match contractor reports. For example, 

although contractor reports indicted that 77 schools were refurbished and 

8 were substantially complete, reports provided to Washington indicated 

that only 39 schools had been constructed or rehabilitated.

Program managers need accurate operational information, including 

performance measures, to determine whether strategic objectives are 

being met.50 According to USAID officials in Washington, D.C., only 3 days 

49According to USAID, the contractor, USAID, and the Afghan Ministry of Health began 

regularly reporting from an improved information system in December 2004.

50GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
Page 48 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

were allowed for the development of the Accelerating Success 

performance measures. The measures were selected based on what USAID 

thought it could accomplish by the June 2004 target date rather than what 

was needed to determine progress and results in each sector. USAID 

conditioned meeting the targets on, among other things, the existence of a 

secure environment and the receipt of funding by July 2003. Neither of 

these conditions existed. USAID does not believe that the performance 

measures currently used are an effective way of measuring progress 

toward program objectives and plans to introduce more meaningful 

performance measures in fiscal 2006. The agency maintains that it is crucial 

to take into account lessons learned related to the difficulty of the 

reconstruction environment when developing future measures. (App. III 

presents information on the performance measures that were included in 

the main contracts for each sector and the Accelerating Success 

performance measures provided to decision makers in Washington, D.C.)

Lack of Staff and Security 

Restrictions Impeded Effective 

On-Site Project Monitoring

Throughout fiscal year 2004, staffing problems and security restrictions 

limited on-site project monitoring. Although the USAID mission in Kabul 

had more staff and better working conditions by late fiscal year 2004 than 

in previous years, staff levels and turnover continued to pose a challenge.51

Staff at the USAID mission in Kabul continued to manage a much larger 

amount of assistance than their counterparts at other missions. 

Specifically, as of June 2004, staff at the mission in Kabul managed 

approximately $27.5 million in assistance per staff member while 

counterparts at other missions managed $1.2 million per staff member. This 

ratio improved by September 2004 after USAID increased its staff from 41 

to 101. In September, the ratio was reduced to about $11.2 million per staff 

person while the average across USAID missions remained about $1.2 

million per staff person. Further, staff turnover in key positions continued 

in 2004. For example, the mission had three different directors in fiscal year 

2004. Similarly, the agriculture sector had five different technical officers in 

2004, owing to staff performance problems and delays in finding a 

permanent officer. According to USAID, the mission in Kabul also did not 

have sufficient staff in Afghanistan with the technical knowledge to 

monitor reconstruction projects. To increase technical knowledge, 10 

members of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers were assigned to the Kabul 

51In July 2004, a new compound consisting of prefabricated offices and housing units was 

completed across the street from the embassy increasing available facilities and allowing 

greater numbers of staff to be hired. Owing to security and difficult living and working 

conditions, Afghanistan is a one-year posting for Department of State and USAID personnel.
Page 49 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

mission by September 2004. To increase the recruitment pool for staff 

assigned to the USAID mission, in November 2004, USAID’s Administrator 

requested all staff to consider serving in one of four critical posts including 

Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Sudan. In addition, in order to attract and 

retain more U.S. direct hire staff for extended periods, USAID has 

increased pay incentives, such as hazard pay, cost of living, and overtime 

remuneration. 

Security restrictions limited the travel of U.S. direct-hire personnel to 

program sites outside Kabul, making routine program monitoring difficult. 

In its April 2004 risk assessment of the USAID mission in Kabul, USAID’s 

Inspector General cited the inability to travel freely to project sites because 

of security concerns as a material weakness and an overriding constraint to 

managing assistance activities in Afghanistan. For much of fiscal year 2004, 

USAID staff had limited access to project sites and depended on reporting 

from its contractors and grantees. To improve project monitoring, USAID 

contracted with a nongovernmental organization to conduct site 

evaluations; however, the contract was not signed until May 2004.

Efforts to Improve 

Coordination of U.S. 

Activities and International 

Assistance Had Varying 

Results

Although coordination of U.S. assistance efforts occurred daily throughout 

fiscal year 2004, new initiatives to improve coordination of U.S. assistance 

in Afghanistan had mixed results. Also, despite efforts by the Afghan 

government to better coordinate international donor assistance, problems 

associated with the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms persisted in 

2004. 

U.S. Efforts Were Coordinated 

through Interagency Process, but 

Initiatives to Improve 

Coordination Had Mixed Success

U.S. assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004 was coordinated primarily 

through daily meetings of the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group. 

The group included representatives from the Department of State’s Office 

for Afghanistan, USAID, DOD, and other agencies delivering assistance. 

According to Department of State officials, this formal, interagency 

committee provided a uniform process for making, and informing the 

President of, policy-level decisions and for sharing information among 

agencies. In Afghanistan, U.S. assistance was coordinated through the U.S. 

Embassy country team. (See fig. 14.) 
Page 50 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 14: Major U.S. Interagency Afghan Assistance Coordination Mechanisms Used in Fiscal Year 2004 

Note: The interagency coordination structure is based on National Security Presidential Decision 

Directive-1 (Feb. 13, 2001).

Principals’ Committee

 Composition: Secretary-level officials from U.S. departments and agencies involved in Afghanistan

 Roles: Making decisions on proposals developed by Deputies' Committee, resolving interagency disputes, 

providing information on policy, reporting to the President

 Chair: National Security Council

Meeting frequency: Monthly and as needed

Deputies’ Committee

 Composition: Deputy Secretaries from the U.S. departments/agencies involved in Afghanistan 

 Roles: Making decisions on proposals developed by the Policy Committee, resolving interagency 

disputes

 Chair: National Security Council

Meeting frequency: Weekly

Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group

Department of State (South Asia Bureau)

Office for Afghanistana

U.S. Embassy Country Teamc

Afghanistan Reconstruction Group

 Composition: Operations-level personnel from executive branch U.S. departments involved in Afghanistan

 Roles: Developing policy options on, among other things, assistance sectors to target, allocation of 

assistance funds, strategies for increasing international donor support, and the role of the PRTs

 Chair: Coordinator for U.S. Assistance/National Security Council

Meeting frequency: Weekly

Composition: Headed by the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to 

Afghanistan (ambassador rank) and six staff. 

 Roles: Daily coordinating U.S. assistance, developing policy 

options for the Operations Group and Deputies 

Committee, developing assistance budgets

Composition: Representatives of U.S. agencies with personnel 

stationed, or on temporary duty, in Afghanistan

 Roles: Daily coordinating U.S. policy and assistance efforts 

in Afghanistan

 Chair: Ambassador

Intra-agency meetings Provincial reconstruction teams

Meetings of staff within U.S. agencies including USAID 

and the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and State

Civilian officials from the Departments of State and Agriculture 

and USAID work with U.S. and foreign military personnel, 

provincial offices of the Afghan national government, and local 

community leaders to identify and implement assistance projects

1 Chief of staff, 3 sector coordinators

15 Sectoral advisor positions (10 filled as of October 2004)

4 Public affairs officers

1 Secretary

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by the Department of State (data); Nova Development (clip art).

Working committees
Page 51 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

The United States undertook several initiatives in fiscal year 2004 to 

improve coordination of U.S. assistance in Afghanistan. Specifically, the 

office of the Commander of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan 

(CFC-A) was moved to the embassy from Bagram Airbase (27 miles north 

of Kabul) to improve coordination between civilian and military efforts in 

Afghanistan. Further, according to embassy officials we interviewed and 

documents we reviewed, the Ambassador did not believe that the existing 

embassy management structure was sufficient to plan, coordinate, and 

monitor U.S. operations and did not have confidence in the accuracy of 

reconstruction assistance reporting. To improve reconstruction 

management, planning, and reporting, the ambassador created the 

Embassy Interagency Planning Group, staffed by military officers, to 

improve reporting on reconstruction projects, facilitate the development 

and execution of the Mission Performance Plan, and act as a liaison 

between the embassy, CFC-A, the Afghanistan Interagency Operations 

Group, and others. 

The Departments of State and Defense also created the Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Group (ARG) in fiscal year 2004, recruiting private sector 

and other experts to serve as strategists to the Ambassador and as sector 

advisors to key Afghan government ministries. However, the group’s 

mandate, mission, roles, and responsibilities were not delineated or 

incorporated into the embassy’s Mission Performance Plan. In addition, 

according to ARG, USAID, and Department of State officials, the ARG 

focused its efforts on criticizing USAID programs rather than providing 

constructive advice. As a result, animosity developed between the ARG 

advisors and some USAID and embassy staff. According to USAID and 

Department of State officials we spoke to, some ARG advisors did not 

coordinate Afghan ministry meetings with embassy staff or inform them 

about the meetings’ results. State and USAID officials stated that because 

separate meetings were being held, Afghan government ministries 

sometimes received conflicting messages about U.S. reconstruction 

activities. Further, some USAID contractors became confused by ARG 

advisors’ efforts to direct the reconstruction effort. For example, ARG 

advisors responsible for economic governance issues tried to direct the 

activities of USAID’s contractor for that sector. To clarify lines of authority, 

USAID informed its contractors that they were to take direction from 

USAID alone. Most U.S. officials we spoke to in November 2004 stated that 

coordination with the ARG had improved; however, the roles and 

responsibilities of the ARG remained unclear. 
Page 52 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

To enhance reconstruction efforts, the U.S. government increased the 

presence in the PRTs of civilian personnel from the Department of State, 

USAID, and other agencies. By September 2004, about 13 Department of 

State, 8 USDA, and 13 USAID representatives were stationed alongside U.S. 

military personnel in PRTs across Afghanistan.52 However, in the absence 

of a common doctrine or set of best practices for incorporating civilian 

personnel, coordination varied depending on each PRT commander’s 

priorities and personal relationships with civilian agency representatives. 

In addition, we found that stationing civilian personnel in the PRTs did not 

improve oversight of Kabul-based projects. In general, USAID personnel at 

the PRTs focused on identifying, implementing, and coordinating PRTbased, quick-impact projects. Few USAID technical officers stationed in 

Kabul used the USAID PRT staff to help monitor reconstruction projects. 

We reported that in fiscal year 2003, neither USAID officers stationed in 

Kabul nor at PRTs were able to identify the location of many Kabul-directed 

projects in the field.53 This problem persisted in 2004 despite the addition of 

a Kabul-based USAID-PRT coordinator to facilitate logistics and 

communication. 

Coordination Problems between 

Afghan Government and Donors 

Persisted

Despite some efforts by the Afghan government to coordinate assistance 

from international donors, problems associated with the effectiveness of 

coordination mechanisms persisted throughout 2004. The Afghan 

government established the National Development Framework and Budget 

and consultative groups to coordinate international assistance. The 

development framework and budget established broad national goals and 

policy direction for a reconstructed Afghanistan. The consultative groups 

were designed to assist in the planning and implementation of the national 

budget and to coordinate the international community’s independent 

efforts and political objectives. (See fig. 15.)

52The Department of State officials stationed at PRTs focus on diplomatic issues, not 

reconstruction. USDA PRT staff are to help enable, support, and foster reconstruction of the 

agricultural sector, and to help build the ability of the Afghan central government to support 

and provide services to the agricultural sector.

53GAO-04-403.
Page 53 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 15: Consultative Group Structure 2004

In June 2004, we reported that the coordination of international assistance 

and the consultative groups had not been effective.54 We found, among 

other things, that some donors independently pursued development efforts 

in Afghanistan; the international community asserted that the Afghan 

Refugees & IDPs

Education & vocational

training

Health and nutrition

Livelihood and social

protection

Culture, media, and sport

Urban management

Natural resources

management

Energy, mining and telecom Public admin and economic

management

Justice

National police, law

enforcement, and stabilization

Afghan National Army

MIne action

Disarmament demobilization

and reintegration

Counter narcotics

Monitoring and evaluation

Humanitarian affairs

Human rights

Enforcement

Transport Trade and investment Gender

Pillar I Pillar II Pillar III Cross cutting issues

Consultative Groups

Consultative Group Standing Committee (CGSC)

Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF)

(National Budget)

Advisory Groups

Source: Government of Afghanistan.

1.1 2.1 3.1

3.2

3.3

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.7

1.2 2.2

2.3

2.4

1.3

1.4

1.5

A.1

A.2

A.3

A.4

A.5

A.6

54GAO-04-403.
Page 54 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

government lacked the capacity and resources to effectively assume the 

role of coordinator; the terms of reference for the consultative groups were 

unclear and too broad; the groups were too large and lacked strong 

leadership; member commitment was uneven; and the overall potential of 

the mechanism had not been maximized. 

International coordination improved somewhat in 2004. The national 

Consultative Group Standing Committee met frequently; the Afghan 

government presented a consolidated national budget to focus 

international donations at the Afghanistan Development Forum; and more 

donors demonstrated increasing commitment to use the national budget to 

focus their assistance. However, the then Minister of Finance stated that 

some international donors continue to provide assistance based on what 

they want to provide rather than on the Afghan government’s needs. 

However, problems with the consultative groups and USAID’s coordination 

with the Afghan government persisted in fiscal 2004. According to the then 

Minister of Finance, the consultative group mechanism had not matured 

into a real decision-making forum. More than 1 year after their creation, 

most groups met infrequently and 5 of the 16 groups had not yet developed 

terms of reference to guide their efforts. Others that did not produce 

results, such as the natural resources consultative group, were effectively 

disbanded. Although USAID participated in a number of the consultative 

groups, some coordination issues remained. For example, according to 

USAID officials there were extensive contacts between USAID, 

contractors, and ministry officials, and ministries had to approve building 

designs and site locations. However, officials from the Ministries of 

Education and Health believed they had been excluded from participating 

in the management of the construction of schools and clinics. Further, the 

lack of coordination among the Ministry of Health, USAID, and the REACH 

contractor to match clinic construction site selection with the location of 

health service delivery grant activities caused a significant barrier to 

expanding the basic provision of health services. The Minister of 

Agriculture stated that he was not regularly informed about the U.S. 

agriculture program’s progress and was unable to respond to public 

inquiries about the program, increasing skepticism as to whether any 

assistance was being delivered. Similarly, according to an evaluation 

commissioned by the Afghan government, the Minister of Finance and his 

department heads had little input into the initial identification and selection
Page 55 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

of some of the USAID contracted advisors and were dissatisfied with their 

qualifications and work.55

Lack of Security, 

Opium Cultivation, and 

Funding Delays 

Obstructed 

Reconstruction and 

Threatened 

Achievement of U.S. 

Goals

In fiscal year 2004 Afghanistan’s security situation remained volatile and, in 

some parts of the country, seriously deteriorated. Attacks on assistance 

projects occurred throughout the year, resulting in project delays and the 

deaths of assistance workers. In addition, dramatic increases in opium 

cultivation continued to threaten stability in Afghanistan; efforts to reverse 

the trend, including the development and implementation of a U.S. 

counternarcotics strategy, began in late 2004. Further, delayed funding 

continued to hamper the U.S. assistance effort in Afghanistan. Most of the 

funding needed to meet June 2004 Accelerating Success initiative targets 

was not available until February, just 5 months prior to the target date.

Deteriorating Security 

Delayed Project 

Implementation, Fueled 

Instability

In fiscal year 2004 the security situation in Afghanistan was volatile and 

deteriorated in some regions. Attacks against aid workers, Afghan security 

forces, and international forces increased. According to U.S. security data 

and UN reports in August and November 2004, deteriorating security in the 

south and southeast caused large areas to be “effectively out of bounds to 

the assistance community”56 (see fig. 16). In the north—an area commonly 

viewed as the safest in the country—attacks resulted in the deaths of 

foreigners and Afghans. Direct attacks on UN compounds and convoys 

occurred in Kandahar, Konduz, and Hirat provinces as well as other 

provinces. 

55Mohammad Qayoumi, Monitoring and Evaluation of Afghanistan Economic Governance 

Program (Kabul: 2005).

56United Nations, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International 

Peace and Security, Report of the Secretary General, A/58/868-S/2004/634 (New York: 2004); 

United Nations, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International 

Peace and Security, Report of the Secretary General, A/59/581-S/2004/925 (New York: 2004).
Page 56 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 16: UN Security Risk Maps, June 2003 and October 2004

Note: As of June 2005, the total area designated as high or medium risk was approximately the same 

as in October 2004.

October 2004

June 2003

AFGHANISTAN

Low

Kabul

Risk areas

Medium

High

Source: United Nations.
Page 57 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

According to USAID, eighty-one people involved in assistance activities 

were killed in 2004. During fiscal year 2004, 70 attacks directly affected 

USAID programs, causing delays in reconstruction projects. For example, 

equipment was damaged, work was delayed, and construction workers 

were kidnapped, wounded, or killed by antigovernment forces attacking 

USAID’s highway construction project. In addition, secondary road 

projects, agricultural training programs, the distribution of vaccines and 

medicines, and the construction of schools and clinics, among other 

reconstruction projects, were delayed or terminated because of attacks. 

For example, school construction in Uruzgan, Helmand, Paktiya, and 

Ghazni provinces was at a standstill owing to security threats. 

Stability across the country in 2004 was threatened by local authorities and 

military commanders who acted with impunity and were viewed as 

responsible for a wide range of repressive activities, including acts of 

intimidation, extortion, arbitrary arrest, illegal detentions, and extrajudicial 

killings and torture, according to the Department of State, the UN, and 

human rights groups. Factional fighting among warlords in seven provinces 

in the north and the west of Afghanistan continued in 2004, resulting in the 

deaths of at least 100 combatants and civilians. Although large areas of the 

country and some warlords remained beyond the control of the Afghan 

government in 2004, the Afghan government made some progress in 

asserting its authority. For example, the Afghan President appointed new 

governors in about half of the country’s 34 provinces. However, according 

to the Department of State’s 2004 human rights report for Afghanistan, the 

government or its agents carried out extrajudicial killings.57 For example, 

on August 14, 2004, 17 bodies were discovered at the Shindand market 

place, with evidence that 6 of the 17 individuals were tortured and 

beheaded.

The United States and the international community continued to take steps 

to improve security in Afghanistan. Specifically, DOD, coalition, and NATO 

forces increased the number of provincial reconstruction teams from 4 to 

19 in 2003-2004 to enhance security for reconstruction activities. In 

addition, DOD accelerated its effort to train and deploy Afghan National 

Army combat troops. As of March 2005, 18,300 troops had been trained and 

10,500 troops had been deployed to Kabul central command and 7,800 to 

four regional commands. However, efforts to equip troops and build 

57State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Afghanistan 2004, 

Washington, D.C. (February 28, 2005).
Page 58 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

supporting military organizations were behind schedule. Further, the 

United States and Germany had trained more than 35,000 police by January 

2005, but the lack of infrastructure and equipment at the provincial and 

district levels, along with other problems, negatively affected police 

effectiveness.58 Finally, as of February 2005, about 40,000 of Afghanistan’s 

estimated 100,000 official militia forces had been demobilized;59 however, 

an estimated 65,000 to 80,000 unofficial militia fighters were still at large.60

The Department of State views the demobilization and reintegration of 

these forces as critical to improving the country’s security and succeeding 

in the international recovery effort.

Dramatic Increase in Opium 

Cultivation Threatens Stability

In 2004, dramatic increases in opium cultivation continued to threaten 

stability, reconstruction, and state-building in Afghanistan. According to 

the UN, Afghan drug production increased by approximately 25 percent 

between 2002 and 2004, owing to high returns, a growing market, rural 

poverty, political fragmentation, weak law enforcement, and deteriorating 

security.61 (See app. IV for 2002-2004 production and revenue statistics.) 

The UN estimated 2004 opium production at 4,200 metric tons, which 

represents almost 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium supply. Disease 

and drought kept the yield low; without these mitigating environmental 

factors, the U.S. government estimated that total production would have 

been more than 9,700 metric tons. 

According to the Department of State, the UN, the Afghan government, and 

others, opium cultivation, drug trafficking, and associated financial gains 

are having an increasingly harmful influence on Afghanistan society. 

Specifically, some national level officials and many district and provincial 

government leaders have some criminal connection to the opium trade. 

With opium-related revenues equivalent to 50 to 60 percent of its GDP over

58For more information on Afghan National Army and Police reconstruction, see 

Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but 

Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, GAO-05-575 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005).

59The Japanese government leads demobilization efforts.

60Official militia forces are those forces recognized as Afghan Militia Forces by Afghanistan’s 

Ministry of Defense. Unofficial forces are considered independent, illegal armed groups.

61UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004 (Vienna: 2004).
Page 59 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

the past 3 years, Afghanistan is on the verge of becoming a narco-state.62

The increase in opium production and trafficking is threatening 

reconstruction and state-building in Afghanistan, as well as the nation’s 

longer-term peace. It is undermining legitimate economic activities and the 

establishment of the rule of law and is responsible for supporting factional 

agendas and antigovernment elements, including warlords, local 

commanders, and terrorist organizations. The drug trade is also impeding 

the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants, 

because those involved in the drug economy are developing and funding 

private militias needed to run the drug business. Further, the unchecked 

development of an illicit narcotics-based economy, and the funds it 

provides to the entrenched interests of antigovernment elements in the 

provinces, exacerbates problems associated with the central government’s 

effort to extend its writ outside Kabul. 

The Afghan government and the international community have taken a 

number of actions to address the narcotics problem in Afghanistan since 

the signing of the Bonn Agreement in December 2001. These actions have 

included imposing bans on opium cultivation, drafting counternarcotics 

strategies, establishing Afghan counternarcotics police organizations, and 

launching limited eradication efforts (see app. IV for more details). U.S. 

counternarcotics efforts in 2004 were led by the Department of State’s 

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Affairs. 

Additional assistance was provided by DOD. INL obligated $36.5 million 

primarily to eradicate poppies and provide alternative livelihoods and 

spent about $8.9 million, to assist the Afghan Government’s central 

eradication force. DOD obligated $25.7 million on counternarcotics efforts 

by October 2004 and spent about $8.9 million, to train and equip the Afghan 

Government Counternarcotics Police, build a public affairs capacity within 

the Ministry of Interior, and create a counternarcotics intelligence 

organization.63

However, these and other counternarcotics efforts failed to have any 

significant impact on the cultivation and processing of opium in 2004 owing 

62A narco-state is defined as an area that has been taken over and is controlled and 

corrupted by drug cartels and where law enforcement is effectively nonexistent.

63In addition, INL and DOD obligated, respectively, about $98.1 million and $47.3 million for 

national, highway, and border police training, equipping, and infrastructure construction; 

each agency spent about $5.7 million by the end of the fiscal year. These monies were not 

directly related to the counternarcotics effort.
Page 60 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

to limited security and stability across Afghanistan. For example, as of 

October 2004, efforts led by the Afghan, UK, and U.S. governments to 

manually eradicate poppy fields failed. In 2004, eradication efforts began 

after most of the country’s opium had been harvested, primarily targeted 

producers in only 1 of 34 provinces, and resulted in the eradication of less 

than 1 percent of the hectares cultivated. Meanwhile, although a number of 

clandestine processing labs were destroyed and limited quantities of 

opiates seized, no major narcotics traffickers were arrested, and piecemeal 

training and limited funding have impeded the development of 

Afghanistan’s Counternarcotics Police. 

According to the Department of State, counternarcotics is now one of the 

top U.S. priorities. Between June and October 2004, a $776.5 million, fivepillar strategy, implementation plan, and budget for 2005 were developed. 

The budget would fund five areas: $299 million for eradication programs, 

$180 million for law enforcement, $172.5 million for interdiction, $120 

million to provide legal livelihood alternatives for poppy farmers, and $5 

million for a public information campaign. 

The 2005 strategy faces a number of challenges that may limit its success. 

• The strategy calls for a robust eradication program that includes the use 

of aerial methods. However, the Afghan government vetoed the use of 

aerial eradication, making it impossible to affect large areas quickly. 

• During our visit in October 2004, the Governor of the Afghan National 

Bank stated that eradicating 30 to 50 percent of the country’s opium 

would have a destabilizing impact on the economy. He added that the 

U.S. government had not consulted the National Bank regarding the 

economic impact of eradication. 

• U.S. officials stated that funding for the overall U.S.-led effort was 

needed in January 2005, 4 months before the beginning of the harvest 

season, but some of the funding was not available until May 2005. 

• The interdiction capabilities of the Afghan government are rudimentary 

at best, because the government lacks the laws or legal infrastructure 

needed to investigate and prosecute drug-related crimes. 
Page 61 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Delayed Funding Negatively 

Impacted Acceleration 

Efforts

Delayed funding continued to negatively impact the U.S. assistance effort 

in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. In our previous report, we noted that 

delays in fiscal year 2003 funding prevented USAID, in particular, from 

undertaking major reconstruction activities.64 As in prior years, most 

reconstruction money in fiscal year 2004 was provided through emergency 

supplemental appropriations, with smaller amounts in the agencies’ regular 

appropriations. USAID received reconstruction money through two 

appropriations (see fig. 17). In November 2003, Congress appropriated $672 

million in emergency supplemental legislation; the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) apportioned $270 million of this funding to USAID in 

late January 2004 and $372 million in early February. In addition, Congress 

appropriated $283 million in January 2004 for USAID’s fiscal year 2004 

budget for Afghanistan reconstruction. However, the first portion of these 

funds did not become available for programming by the USAID mission in 

Kabul until March 2004 owing to delays introduced by the apportionment 

processes within State, OMB, and USAID. All of these funds were for 

programs that, under the Accelerating Success initiative, had initial targets 

of June 2004, giving the agency approximately 3 to 6 months to 

demonstrate progress.65 According to USAID officials, to compensate for 

the funding delays USAID was forced to postpone the start or expansion of 

programs and move funds between programs to keep faster paced 

programs operating. 

64GAO-04-403.

65Because the presidential elections were delayed from June to October 2004, some 

accelerating success targets were adjusted first to a September deadline, and then extended 

again to December 2004.
Page 62 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Figure 17: Timeline for Funding of Reconstruction in Afghanistan 

a Pub. L. 107-38, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to 

Terrorist Attacks on the United States.

b

Pub. L. 107-115, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act.

Source: GAO analysis.

Funds became available to USAID for allocation to Afghanistan

FY (fiscal year): October 1 through September 30

FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05

2/02

$52

10/02

$40

4/03 

$265 

6/03 

$167 10/03 

$140

3/04 

$64

4/04 

$93

7/04 

$95

1/04-2/04:

$642

10/01

Operation

Enduring 

Freedom

begins

6/02

Establishment 

of the 

Transitional 

Islamic State 

of Afghanistan

12/01

Bonn 

9/11/01 Agreement

1/04

New 

Afghan 

constitution 

ratified

6/04

Original 

Accelerating 

Success 

targets

9/03

Accelerating 

Success 

announced

10/04 

Presidential 

elections 

held

9/04 

Revised 

Accelerating 

Success 

targets

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

550

600

650

Dollars in millions

MONEY

EVENTS

APPROPRIATIONS

FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05

9/17/01 

Emergency 

Response Fund 

appropriationsa

No amount 

specified 

explicitly for 

Afghanistan

1/10/02 

FY02 Foreign 

Operations 

appropriationsb

No amount 

specified 

explicitly for 

Afghanistan

1/10/02: 

FY02 Emergency Response Fund appropriations;c

$50 million was appropriated for Afghanistan from 

amounts made available in P.L. 107-38; about 

$40 million used for reconstruction 

8/2/02

FY02 

supplemental 

appropriationsd

No amount 

specified 

explicitly for 

Afghanistan 

2/20/03 

FY03 consolidated 

appropriationse

$295.5 million 

specified explicitly for 

Afghanistan in law; 

about $265 million 

used for 

reconstruction

4/16/03 

FY03 wartime 

supplemental 

appropriationsf

$167 million 

specified 

explicitly for 

Afghanistan in 

law; all used for 

reconstruction

11/06/03 

FY04 

supplemental 

appropriationsg

$672 million 

specified 

explicitly for 

Afghanistan 

reconstruction

1/23/04 

FY04 

consolidated 

appropriationsh

$405 million 

specified 

explicitly for 

Afghanistan in 

law; about 283 

million used for 

reconstruction
Page 63 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

c

Pub. L. 107-117, Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery 

from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002.

d

Pub. L. 107-206, 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response to 

Terrorist Attacks on the United States.

e

Pub. L. 108-7, Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003.

f

Pub. L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations, 2003.

g

Pub. L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction 

of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004.

h

Pub. L. 108-199, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004.

USAID continues to face funding delays in fiscal year 2005. In December 

2004, Congress passed regular appropriations for the agency, matching 

USAID’s Afghanistan budget request of $397 million; USAID officials stated 

at the time that they would be unable to fully implement programs with the 

amount of their regular appropriations and would rely on supplemental 

funding to carry out the agency’s planned activities. However, the almost 

$1.1 billion fiscal 2005 emergency supplemental appropriation was not 

passed until May 2005. USAID, Department of State, and Afghan officials 

told us that it is difficult to plan and implement large development 

programs that depend heavily on the passage of uncertain supplemental 

appropriations. 

Conclusions Afghanistan has made progress since the fall of the Taliban in October 

2001. As part of an international effort, U.S. assistance, led by USAID, 

helped Afghanistan elect its first president, return millions of children to 

school, and repatriate millions of refugees. Despite these gains, 

Afghanistan’s needs remain great. It ranks as the world’s fifth poorest 

country; half of all Afghans live below the poverty line and more than 20 

percent cannot meet their daily food requirements. Further, factional 

elements remain in control of some areas of the country, perpetrating 

crimes against citizens, and insurgents continue to infiltrate the country. 

These conditions leave the nation at risk of once again becoming a threat to 

itself and others.

The U.S. has pledged to maintain a long-term presence in Afghanistan, 

including increasing the number and scope of USAID contracts. In 2004, the 

focus of U.S. support to Afghanistan shifted from primarily emergency 

assistance to reconstruction programs, with large scopes of work and 

costs, in an effort to accelerate progress. Despite its considerable 

investment in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, USAID struggled with contract 
Page 64 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

management and project oversight. Although a long-term, country-level 

strategy was approved as of July 2005, USAID operated throughout 2004 

without a comprehensive strategy. In addition, USAID has not developed a 

performance management plan to monitor project performance, nor has it 

focused contractors’ efforts on developing project-specific performance 

plans. Without such plans, the U.S. government cannot accurately assess 

the results of its assistance efforts. Consequently, decision makers in 

Washington and Kabul cannot effectively target resources to accomplish 

the goal of creating a stable Afghan society.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To improve on existing efforts to measure and assess the progress of U.S. 

reconstruction projects toward achieving U.S. policy goals, and to provide 

a basis for planning future reconstruction projects, we recommend that the 

Administrator of USAID take the following three actions (1) establish a 

performance management plan that complies with USAID directives, (2) 

clearly stipulate in all future reconstruction contracts that contractors are 

to develop performance management plans specific to the work they are 

conducting, and (3) more completely communicate the performance 

information obtained from the performance management plans to 

executive branch decision makers in Kabul and Washington.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense 

and to USAID to obtain their comments. The Departments of State and 

Defense declined to comment on the report. USAID commented that in 

general it found the report to be a comprehensive and detailed assessment 

of the U.S. civilian reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan during fiscal year 

2004. USAID concurred with the report’s recommendations and indicated 

that it has made progress in improving its strategic planning and 

performance measurement processes. Specifically, USAID completed its 

first long-term country-level strategy for Afghanistan to cover the period 

from 2005 through 2010. The agency also indicated that it has begun 

developing a performance management plan. USAID also provided 

information on more recent activities and technical comments, which we 

incorporated where appropriate.
Page 65 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Copies of this report are being sent to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, relevant congressional 

committees, and other interested parties. We will also make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be made 

available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

on (202) 512-3149 or at gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. Other contacts and major contributors are listed in 

appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

David Gootnick, Director

International Affairs and Trade
Page 66 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 directs GAO to monitor U.S. 

humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. To meet the 

requirements of the directive and provide Congress with a comprehensive 

accounting of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan for the fiscal year 2004 period, 

we analyzed (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures, (2) the progress and 

results of U.S. humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, (3) the 

management of U.S. assistance and mechanisms to coordinate U.S. and 

international assistance, and (4) the major factors that obstructed the 

advancement of the assistance effort and the achievement of U.S. policy 

goals.

We collected data on fiscal year 2004 obligations and expenditures from the 

U.S. departments and agencies responsible for implementing U.S. 

government–funded projects in Afghanistan. These include the U.S. 

Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, Labor, 

State, and Treasury; the Broadcasting Board of Governors; the U.S. Trade 

and Development Agency; and the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID). Because no single repository contains financial 

information for all U.S. assistance in Afghanistan, we contacted each 

agency directly. For the Department of State, we contacted each bureau 

and office separately—the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; 

the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; the 

Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs; and the Office to Monitor and 

Combat Trafficking In Persons—because the Department of State does not 

have a consolidated financial reporting mechanism for programs in 

Afghanistan that tracks both obligations and expenditures. 

To distinguish funding for humanitarian and quick-impact projects from 

longer-term reconstruction funding, we requested the agencies to designate 

their funding appropriately. For USAID, we generally relied on the stated 

mission of the responsible funding bureau to determine the funds’ purpose 

unless the agency informed us otherwise. For example, we assumed that 

funding for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Office of 

Transition Initiatives was generally used, in accordance with their 

respective missions, to address emergency situations and implement quickimpact projects; funds for the offices’ various long-term projects were 

clearly marked in the financial reporting that USAID supplied to us.

To delineate the distribution of funding and projects by province, we report 

information that USAID provided from a programmatic, rather than a 

financial, database. The financial database did not include data by location, 

and the programmatic database included only province-level obligation 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 67 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

data. Because data on nationwide programs were not included in the 

programmatic database, we were unable to compare overall totals between 

the financial and programmatic databases to verify consistency. Also, 

because the programmatic database tracks only obligations, we were 

unable to determine USAID’s expenditures by province.

To assess the reliability of the obligations and expenditures data from U.S. 

agencies providing assistance to Afghanistan, we (1) interviewed officials 

at the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State, and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) regarding their methods of 

gathering, management, and use of data; (2) reviewed USAID’s financial 

audit statement; and (3) compared the data we gathered with USAID’s 

Congressional Budget Justifications and State’s 150 account 

documentation, as well as with the governmentwide Afghanistan 

assistance compiled by State’s Bureau of Resource Management. 

According to a Department of State official, the data compiled by the 

agency’s Bureau of Resource Management are not complete, owing in part 

to differences in how the agencies track data, a disconnect between 

agencies’ Washington and Kabul offices, and variation in the frequency of 

reporting. However, the Department of State relies on these data for 

decision-making purposes and to report to Congress. Based on our 

assessment, we concluded that the data on obligations and expenditures 

we collected from each agency are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of 

showing, in gross numbers, the levels of U.S. nonsecurity-related assistance 

to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. 

To assess the reliability of data for pledges by international donors, we (1) 

interviewed the Department of State official responsible for compiling 

these data based on information provided by the government of 

Afghanistan and (2) compared the data’s reliability with that of other 

information sources. We determined that the data are sufficiently reliable 

for the purpose of broadly comparing the United States’ contributions with 

those of other major donors and the combined total for all other donors. 

However, we noted several limitations in the data, notably, that they are 

self-reported by donor nations to the Afghan government. Furthermore, the 

data for larger donors are considered more reliable than the data for 

smaller donors, according to the Department of State. Owing to these 

limitations and our lack of access to donor nations’ financial records, we 

were unable to determine the reliability of the dollar amounts reported to 

have been pledged by each donor. Nevertheless, we present the reported 

pledges in appendix II for the purpose of broadly comparing the U.S. 

contributions with those of other major donors.
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 68 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

To examine the results of assistance projects through September 30, 2004, 

we focused our efforts on the major USAID reconstruction contracts 

signed prior to the start of fiscal year 2004. The contracts account for 

approximately 85 percent of the U.S.’ reconstruction expenditures for the 

fiscal year. We collected and analyzed information from the Departments of 

State and Defense, and USAID in Washington, D.C., outlining policy goals, 

basic strategies, program objectives, and monitoring efforts. We reviewed 

the periodic progress reports provided by both USAID and its 

implementing partners for all the major reconstruction projects. To assess 

the reliability of these reports, we contacted each of USAID’s cognizant 

technical officers in Kabul about the reliability of the information provided 

in the implementing partners’ reports. While they noted that security 

restrictions and the large territory in Afghanistan make monitoring 

difficult, all of the cognizant technical officers we contacted consider the 

data to be generally reliable for the purposes of providing an overall status 

of the projects. In October 2004, we traveled to Afghanistan to examine the 

implementation of USAID and Defense’s assistance-related operations. 

While in Afghanistan, we spent 12 days in the capital city, Kabul, 

interviewing officials from the Afghan Ministries of Finance, Health, and 

Agriculture; the Central Bank; the U.S. Departments of State and Defense; 

and USAID. We also met with most of USAID’s primary implementing 

partners (including the International Organization for Migration, the Louis 

Berger Group, Inc., Creative Associates International Inc., Chemonics, 

Bearing Point, the International Republican Institute, the International 

Foundation for Election Systems, Management Sciences for Health, 

Management Systems International, Population Services International, 

Technologists Incorporated, and the Asia Foundation). In addition, we met 

with the officials from the British Embassy in Kabul responsible for 

counternarcotics initiatives. In Kabul, we inspected the rehabilitation of the 

Rabia Balkhi Women’s hospital. We also spent 8 days in the Ghazni, Hirat, 

Kunduz, and Nangahar provinces, where we reviewed U.S.- funded 

projects, implemented primarily by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, 

USAID’s PRT-based staff, or Defense’s PRTs. While in these provinces, we 

met with provincial governors, district leaders, teachers, healthcare 

workers, and other community members involved in, or affected by, U.S. 

reconstruction projects. Constraints placed on our movement within 

Afghanistan by the U.S. Embassy due to security concerns limited the 

number of project sites we could visit.

To analyze the assistance coordination mechanisms developed by the U.S. 

government and the international community we met with State 

Department of State staff responsible for assistance coordination. We also 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 69 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

met with and staff from USAID, and the Departments of Agriculture, 

Commerce, Defense, U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and Treasury 

who were involved in the provision of assistance, to obtain their views on 

the coordination of assistance. In addition, we reviewed the U.S. National 

Security Strategy; the State-USAID consolidated strategic plan for fiscal 

years 2004-2009; the President’s Security Strategy for Afghanistan; the U.S. 

Embassy–Kabul Mission Program Plan; and USAID’s strategy and action 

plan for Afghanistan. Our analysis of international coordination 

mechanisms included a review of United Nations (UN) and Afghan 

government documents, including the Afghan National Development 

Framework and Budget, pertaining to the international coordination 

mechanisms utilized in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. In addition, we met 

with officials from the Afghan Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, and 

Health, and from the Central Bank to obtain their views on the evolution 

and status of the consultative group mechanism.

To analyze the obstacles that affected the implementation of U.S. 

reconstruction assistance we reviewed reports produced by the 

Departments of State and Defense, USAID, the UN, the International Crisis 

Group, and the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. To assess the 

reliability of the UN data on opium production we reviewed the 

methodology used by the UN to estimate levels of opium poppy cultivation 

and opium production. We determine that the UN data is sufficiently 

reliable for the purpose of this report. Finally, we discussed the obstacles 

and their impact with officials from the Afghan ministries of Agriculture, 

Finance, and Health; the Afghan Central Bank; the Afghan 

Counternarcotics Directorate; USAID; and the Department of State.

We conducted our review from August 2004 to May 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 70 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Appendix II

Obligations and Expenditures by U.S. 

Agencies and International Donor Pledges, 

Fiscal Year 2004 ApendxiI

Table 3: Obligations and Expenditures for Humanitarian and Reconstruction 

Assistance by U.S. Agencies, Fiscal Year 2004

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. agency data.

a

Department of Labor obligations are for fiscal years 2002-2004.

Table 4: Major Donors’ Reported Pledges for Assistance to Afghanistan as of 

November 16, 2004

(Dollars in millions)

FY 2004

Obligations Expenditures

U.S. Agency for International Development $1,163.62 $586.72

Department of State

Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration 63.89 48.33

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Enforcement

36.50 8.86

Other State agencies 14.22 12.91

Department of Defense 47.07 45.19

Department of Health and Human Services 4.98 1.80

Department of Agriculture 30.85 5.15

Department of Labor 6.70a 2.54

U.S. Trade and Development Agency 2.54 0.66

Department of Treasury 1.00 0.48

Broadcasting Board of Governors 11.77 7.51

Total $1,383.14 $720.15

(Dollars in millions)a

Country Pledge for 2004

Aga Khan $25

Asian Development Bank 205

Australia 14.9

Austria 2.4

Belgium 4.3

Canada 75.2

China 40

Denmark 27.8

European Commission 294

Finland 12
Appendix II

Obligations and Expenditures by U.S. 

Agencies and International Donor Pledges, 

Fiscal Year 2004

Page 71 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Source: Department of State.

Note: We were not able to determine the reliability of the specific dollar figures in this table. Although 

we determined that the data are sufficiently reliable for making broad comparisons between the 

contributions of the United States to those of major donors, we noted several limitations, namely (1) 

that they are affected by differences in exchange rates, (2) donors both over- and underreport owing to 

varying definitions, and (3) the data for larger donors are considered more reliable than the data for 

smaller donors.

France $37.2

Germany 96

Greece 3.6

India 90

Iran 54

Ireland 6.9

Islamic Development Bank 40

Italy 56

Japan 200

Luxembourg 1.2

Netherlands 42

New Zealand 3.3

Norway 43

Organization of Islamic Conferences 15

Pakistan 10

Poland 0.1

Portugal 1.2

Russiab 0

Saudi Arabia 160

South Korea 20

Spain 50

Sweden 39.3

Switzerland 14.8

Turkey 3

United Arab Emirates 21.7

United Kingdom 215.9

United States 1,383.14

World Bank 285

Total $3,592.94

(Continued From Previous Page)

(Dollars in millions)a

Country Pledge for 2004
Appendix II

Obligations and Expenditures by U.S. 

Agencies and International Donor Pledges, 

Fiscal Year 2004

Page 72 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

a

Figures cited relate to humanitarian and reconstruction donations only; military donor contributions 

are not included.

b

Russian assistance has consisted primarily of in-kind donations.
Page 73 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Appendix III

Sector Level Performance Indicators ApendxiI

The Accelerating Success initiative performance measures reported to the 

Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group in Fiscal 2004 were initially 

developed by USAID during a 3-day period in June 2003. The measures 

were modified during that fiscal year with input from other agencies and 

represent a subset of the measures reported for each of the major 

reconstruction contracts. The development of performance measures for 

each major contract varied. In some sectors, such as agriculture, 

performance measures were included in the contract. In other sectors, 

such as health, the measures were developed in a performance 

management plan developed by the contractor after the contract was 

awarded or, as in the economic sector, developed late in the project and 

published in periodic progress reports. The tables below describe the 

Accelerating Success performance measures reported by the Afghanistan 

Interagency Operations Group and the more detailed measures developed 

by individual contractors for the major reconstruction contracts.

Table 5: Agriculture Sector Measures Reported to the Afghanistan Interagency 

Operations Group in Fiscal Year 2004

Source: Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group.

a

Included in the Chemonics’ RAMP contract.

The RAMP contract contains 14 performance measures (see table 6), 

including program outputs such as the implementation of 615 irrigation 

projects and project outcomes such as increasing the average productivity 

of approximately 500,000 farm families by more than 100 percent. However, 

the contractor did not have systems in place to capture information for all 

measures.

Accelerating Success measures tracked 

by Chemonics and the U.S. mission in 

Kabul Sept. 2004 target

Sept. 2004

status

Km. of canal rehabilitateda 320 322

Irrigation structures rehabilitateda 232 229

Km. of farm to market roads rehabilitateda

 120 160

Loan officers trained 1,150 1,150

Livestock vaccinated/treated 3,000,000 3,679,222

Farmers served by extensiona 520,000 564,566

Market centers constructed 131 119
Appendix III

Sector Level Performance Indicators 

Page 74 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Table 6: Agriculture Sector Performance Measures and Status Reported by Chemonics International Inc.

Source: Chemonics International Inc.

No. Performance measures Sept. 2004 status

1 60 percent increase in total wheat production in irrigated and rain fed areas using improved 

agricultural inputs (e.g., seed)

Not measured

2 $250 million increased sales in local and export markets from a minimum of 5 commercial 

sub-sectors (i.e., fruit and vegetable production) 

Not measured

3 No less than 50 percent average increase in net profits for approximately 1000 Afghan 

entrepreneurs (e.g., input dealers, producers, processors) who benefit from RAMP 

assistance

Not measured

4 More than 100 percent increase in average productivity for approximately 500,000 farm 

families, through use of improved technologies and best practices, improved infrastructure, 

and access to profitable markets

Not measured

5 15 percent annual increase in average gross margin returns for 500,000 farmers' labor Not measured

6 500 village seed and plant germ plasma nurseries established by local entrepreneurs: 80 

percent operationally viable: 75 percent financially viable

Not measured

7 1000 village and regional demonstrations and field trials completed with 80 percent customer 

satisfaction

564,566 farmers served by 

extension services

8 Mass media programs established in 5 regions, with 50 percent operationally viable, 80 

percent customer satisfaction

Not measured

9 50 percent increase in net profits for approximately 1,000 commercial enterprises trained 

under the program

Not measured

10 Approximately 1,000 km of improved roads that will reduce farm-to-market transaction costs 

by 10 percent; 85 percent operationally viable (annual maintenance costs)

160 km of roads rehabilitated 

but transaction costs and 

viability not measured

11 Approximately 1000 agricultural market centers constructed, reducing post-harvest loss or 

increasing shelf life for horticultural commodities and meat and poultry products, resulting in a 

15 percent increase in productivity

119 constructed; increase in 

productivity not measured

12 Approximately 615 irrigation projects constructed to restore, maintain, or increase hectares 

within irrigation systems by 25 percent and increase agricultural production by 20 percent in 

project areas. 

229 structures rehabilitated. 

306,100 hectares receiving 

improved irrigation. Percentages 

increases not calculated.

13 Up to 1000 km of irrigation canals repaired or cleaned 322 km of canals repaired or 

cleaned

14 Financial services offices established with a total loan portfolio value outstanding of $20 

million ($5-8 million outstanding in year 1)

8400 loans disbursed, with an 

outstanding loan portfolio of $1 

million
Appendix III

Sector Level Performance Indicators 

Page 75 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Table 7: Democracy and Governance Sector Measures Reported to the Afghanistan 

Interagency Operations Group in Fiscal Year 2004

Source: Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group.

Of three primary awards for democracy and governance activities, USAID 

required only one implementing partner MSI, to develop a performance 

monitoring plan containing performance measures (see table 8). The other 

two partners, The Consortium for Elections and Political Process 

Strengthening and the Asia Foundation, were required to produce quarterly 

reports but were not required to develop specific targets or intermediate 

results. Consequently, the quarterly reports described activities undertaken 

during that time period, rather than progress achieved against specified 

targets.

Table 8: Democracy and Governance Sector Performance Measures and Status Reported by Management Systems International

Sept. 2004

target

Sept. 2004

status

Judicial facilities built 10 7 complete; 

construction underway 

on 11

Judicial personnel trained (judges, lawyers, 

and court personnel)

120 311

Performance indicators Sept. 2004 status

Consultant reports issued detailing assistance with 

approach, materials, and training for public 

education connected with the Constitutional 

Commission

Post-ratification public education responsibilities were largely transferred from MSI 

to the TAF cooperative agreement. TAF submitted a work plan for distribution of 

public education materials. Additional follow-up activities were integrated into 

judicial sector reform and public education activities in the MSI contract.

Master plan developed and implemented for Judicial 

Reform Commission (JRC) to operate effectively 

and efficiently

Since the JRC’s term was ending, MSI developed a plan to shift JRC activities to 

existing permanent institutions of government, including law reform, legislative 

drafting training activities, and capacity building.

Number and type of judicial reform products (laws, 

codes) reviewed

Project reviewed seven commercial laws and four additional laws.

Number and type of judicial reform products 

forwarded to the Ministry of Justice and President

Laws on corporations, partnerships, foreign entity recognition, asylum, passport, 

and tourism were submitted to the Ministry of Justice.

Clear contributions made to shaping a curriculum 

for training judicial personnel

Training curricula for judges and for court administration were developed. Basic 

legal text packets were compiled for 17 basic laws.

Public awareness and education strategy developed Public education strategy was revised, targeted, and updated; a survey of citizen 

knowledge and opinions of governance of Afghanistan was completed; and 14 

grants of $20,000 each were awarded for public education activities.
Appendix III

Sector Level Performance Indicators 

Page 76 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Source: Management Systems International.

Table 9: Economic Governance Sector Performance Measures Reported to Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group in Fiscal 

Year 2004

Source: Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group.

The economic governance contract did not specifically require the 

contractor to develop performance measures. Instead, it required the 

reporting of “milestones” in quarterly work plans. No quarterly plans were 

produced until July 2004; consequently, no measures were reported until 

that time. (See table 10.)

Number, frequency, and location of methods used to 

educate the public on legal reform and estimated 

number of people reached 

Public education film on justice was completed; distribution has been limited and 

ad hoc. The program changed its target from producing radio spots to producing six 

radio programs on legal reform; one radio program was developed and aired.

Reports issued detailing system modernization 

plans, pilots identified and implemented

Justice system modernization plan completed. Program identified 8 test courts. 

Flow charts and organization charts were developed for Kandahar and Parwan 

provinces.

Number of assessment follow-ups carried out after 

a site (e.g., a court or court department) is identified 

for the project’s attention by government

Follow-up assessments were completed in 11 sites.

Number of building rehabilitation plans developed Six prototype plans were developed.

Number of justice sector facilities rehabilitated Seven justice sector facilities were completed, 13 others were under way.

Reports that detail assistance provided on a data 

system for case management of human rights 

violations

Project ceased work in this area and redirected resources to other areas, owing to 

substantial funds and technical assistance that the Afghan Independent Human 

Rights Commission (AIHRC) received from other sources.

Number of human rights cases entered into data 

system

Project determined that the AIHRC was receiving more financial and technical 

support than it could absorb and redirected its resources.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Performance indicators Sept. 2004 status

Metric Target Sept. 2004 status

Approximately $300 million or 49.3 percent of Afghan 

expenditures funded by domestic revenue

$150 million by Sept. 2004 $90.7 million received

Provincial accounting and transfer systems in place in the 

provinces

34 provinces Systems active in all 34 provinces

Percentage of revenue collected in provinces transferred to 

central account

100 percent of revenue Not reported

Critical infrastructure for supporting customs collection in place No target established Not reported

Timely monthly revenue reporting from provinces No target established Reporting sporadic

Industrial parks constructed 3 parks underway by June 

2004

3 underway by September 2004
Appendix III

Sector Level Performance Indicators 

Page 77 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Table 10: Economic Governance Performance Measures and Status Reported by Bearing Point 

AFN = Afghanis

Source: Bearing Point.

a

All monetary indicators measured in dollars or Afghanis are in millions. 

Performance indicator Sept. 2004 statusa

Customs revenue $50.5

Total domestic revenue $90.7

Number of border posts 6

Number of taxpayer identification numbers issued in Kabul City 10,674

Number of taxpayer identification numbers issued in Afghanistan 12,347

Rental service tax payments collected 452

Rental services tax proceeds 38.77 AFN

Number of international funds transfers 4,307

Dollar value of international funds transfers $1,350

Independent banks established 6

Number of existing banks relicensed 2

Exchange rate (Afghani vs. U.S. dollar) 45.3

Money in circulation 35,149AFN

Number of domestic funds transfers 391

Dollar value of domestic funds transfers 4,349 AFN

Issued loan amounts $33.5

Deposit growth $116.6

Capital note transactions – Number of Bids 11

Dollar value of capital note transactions 600 M (AFN)

Dollar value of foreign exchange cash transactions $524.5

Dollar value of foreign exchange wire transactions $1,273

Number of business licenses issued 5,429
Appendix III

Sector Level Performance Indicators 

Page 78 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Table 11: Education Sector Measures Reported to Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group in Fiscal Year 2004

Source: Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group.

a

The AIOG report lists 39 schools completed; however, USAID verification visits were cancelled and/or 

delayed due to travel restriction. USAID contractor reports show only 15 schools completed.

Table 12: Education Sector Performance Measures and Status Reported by Creative Associates International, Inc.

Performance Measure Sept. 30, 2004 Target Sept. 30, 2004 Actual

Schools constructed Original goal: 517 schools by June 30, 2004;

New goal: 275 additional schools built or 

renovated, 56 schools constructed or 

rehabilitated by September 30.

39 schools constructed/rehabilitated; 230 

under construction and renovationa

Site assessments approved by MOE No targets established 274

Construction subcontracts issued No targets established 275

Construction Activity during Reporting period No targets established 230

Teachers trained through distanced 

education.

14,500 7,900

Text books printed/distributed 15 million printed 15.5 million Printed / 10.3 million 

Distributed

Accelerated learning programs established at 

the provincial level

17 Provinces 17 provinces

Students enrolled in accelerated learning 

program

170,000 169,716

Radio based teacher training reaches 

primary school teachers nationwide 

80 percent of primary school teachers listen 

to broadcasts

Listenership estimated at 70-90 percent of 

all primary school teachers

Targets Sept. 2004 status

51 master trainers trained in accelerated learning curriculum 64

680 provincial trainers trained in accelerated learning curriculum 680

6800 mentors (village trainers) trained in accelerated learning curriculum 6,800

6,800 accelerated learning classes Not reported

2,000 schools with activities Not reported

1,802 communities with activities Not reported

153 districts with activities Not reported

17 provinces with activities 17 provinces

170,000 students enrolled in accelerated learning 160,690

119,000 female students enrolled in accelerated learning (target 70% of total enrollment) 55%

340,000 grade-level equivalencies achieved in accelerated learning (2/year/student) Up to 430,966*

6,256-12,512eachers trained by radio, or 40%-80% of total primary teachers/province. (est 

920/prov) 

70%-90% of primary teachers
Appendix III

Sector Level Performance Indicators 

Page 79 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Source: Creative Associates International, Inc.

Note: These measures are the APEP contract performance measures as modified in the March 2004 

statement of work.

*The implementer reported achieving 430,966 grade-level equivalencies in their December 2004 

progress report, but did not report on this indicator in their September 2004 progress report.

Table 13: Health Sector Measures Reported to Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group in Fiscal Year 2004

MOH = Ministry of Health

Source: Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group.

a

Includes community health workers, physicians, nurses, midwives, MOH staff, and NGO staff.

At least 175 educational radio programs covering grades 1-6 (50 percent in Pashtu and 50 percent 

in Dari) produced and broadcasted

92 broadcasts between July and 

September 2004

Of 175 programs, at least 20 radio programs promoting gender-positive messages and at least 10 

radio programs containing health messages aimed at decreasing maternal mortality

Not reported

Teacher certification for radio-based teacher training established Program approved by MOE, 

enrollment begun

15 million primary level textbooks printed 16.5 million

Textbooks distributed to schools in Kabul province by March 2004 14.2 million textbooks distributed 

Nationwide distribution of textbooks completed and documented 14.2 million textbooks distributed 

Production and printing of accelerated-learning textbooks completed More than 750,000 printed and 

delivered

Distribution of textbooks to contract accelerated-learning partners completed More than 750,000 printed and 

delivered

(Continued From Previous Page)

Targets Sept. 2004 status

Sept. 2004 target Sept. 2004 status

MOH-identified site assessment completed 

(number of sites)

No target listed 265

Construction subcontract issued (no. of clinics) No target listed 186

Construction activity during reporting period No target listed 169

Clinics constructed Original goal: 360 clinics constructed

New goal as of 5/12/04 Deputies 

Committee meeting: 219 clinics; 20 

constructed by September 30

1 clinic complete. 

Construction/rehabilitation underway on 

169 clinics

No. of health workers traineda 5,454 3,995

Pharmaceuticals and commodities distributed $780,000 $697,000
Appendix III

Sector Level Performance Indicators 

Page 80 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

USAID required the health contractor, Management Sciences for Health 

(MSH), to develop implementation plans and performance monitoring 

plans. MSH reports on selected performance indicators in these plans 

semiannually. (See Table 14)

Table 14: Health Sector Performance Measures and Status Reported by Management Sciences for Health

Performance indicators Nov. 2004 status 

Total value of grants to NGOs and public institutions to expand basic package of health services 

(BPHS) delivery

$53 million in grants 

Total existing health facilities to provide BPHS in intervention areas 250 clinical facilities in 13 

provinces. 

Total new health facilities to provide BPHS in intervention areas Not reported

Total rural population in REACH provinces with improved access to health services; total women of 

reproductive age; total children under 5

Total: 4.8 million. Breakdown of 

women and children not 

reported.

Total population in REACH districts provided BPHS directly through REACH-supported facilities; total 

women of reproductive age; total children younger than 5 years

Not reported

Percentage of basic health facilities in intervention areas with at least one female clinical health worker Not reported

Total number of community health workers trained 1,721

Total number of midwives trained with national curriculum 417 enrolled

Total number of community midwives trained as skilled birth attendants using national curriculum 140 enrolled

Number of health workers who received refresher training—doctors, nurses, other health workers Curricula developed. 

Number of community health workers trained in community mapping 183

Number of shura leaders oriented to BPHS and role of community health workers Not reported

Total number of provincial hospitals receiving funding to implement Essential Package of Hospital 

Services

4

Number of women qualified to be: trained to be (a) community health workers, (b) community midwives, 

(c) midwives

Not reported

Percentage increase in household knowledge or use of (a) family planning; (b) ANC; (c) protected 

water source; (d) sanitary waste disposal

Not reported

Number of provincial health coordination committees (PHCCs) established in REACH provinces 13

Number of PHCCs able to produce an annual health services plan 8 workplans

Health facility accreditation system in place Under way

Development and adoption of a National Medicines Policy and Law Completed

Establishment of a health worker certification and registration system Under waya

Total number of policy or strategy documents endorsed by the Ministry of Health Not reported

Health finance policy Under wayb

Human resources policy Under way 

Hospital policy Completed
Appendix III

Sector Level Performance Indicators 

Page 81 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Source: Management Sciences for Health.

a

Status as of November 2003

b

Status as of July 2004

Table 15: Infrastructure Sector Measures Reported to the Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group in Fiscal Year 2004

Source: Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group.

The reported measures also provide detailed narrative about progress on 

primary and secondary road projects and ongoing power-generation 

projects. Irrigation projects are tracked as part of the agriculture sector, 

and school and clinic construction and renovation are tracked as parts of 

the education and health sectors, respectively. The measures do not track 

water and sanitation projects. See table 16 below.

National IEC/Behavior Change Communication policy and strategy Completed

Ministry of health construction protocol developed Not reported

Reproductive health policy developed Not reported

(Continued From Previous Page)

Performance indicators Nov. 2004 status 

Performance Measure September 30, 2004 Target September 30, 2004 Actual

Major roads constructed Kandahar-Herat road construction under 

way.

Kandahar-Herat (U.S. responsible for 329 

km.): Phase-II bid evaluation complete on all 

packages. Recommendation of awards on 

two of three packages posted.

Kabul-Kandahar (U.S. responsible for 389 

km.): Phase II paving progressing quickly in 

all sections. Reconstruction of old Ghazni 

bridge is nearing completion. The contractor 

has submitted a handover request for five 

other bridges.

Secondary roads constructed Work will have begun on all 12 secondary 

road projects.

All 12 secondary road projects have been 

selected, reconstruction contracts have 

been signed for 9 projects, and work has 

begun on 7.
Appendix III

Sector Level Performance Indicators 

Page 82 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Table 16: Infrastructure Sector Performance Measures and Status Reported by Louis Berger Group, Inc.

REFS = Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services.

Source: Louis Berger Group, Inc.

The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and the 2004 Emergency 

Supplemental legislated assistance to Afghan women. USAID implemented 

and tracked most of these objectives either as part of their other sector 

programs or through individual women-targeted projects (see table 17.) 

However, no gender-specific performance measures of sector programs nor 

the results of individual women-targeted projects were reported to the 

Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group.

Deliverables 2004 target Sept. 2004 status

Primary and secondary roads completed 

(km.)

500 117 km primary road completed, 359 km 

with at least one layer of asphalt; 0 

secondary roads completed, construction 

begun on 125 km

Bridges completed 20 6 under construction

Wells drilled and operational 1,250 Pump tests and locating sites underway

Irrigation dams and diversions repaired 200 Not reported

Irrigation canals cleaned and repaired 500 Not reported

Large irrigation systems 2 completed, 1 under design 3 complete, 4 in progress

Schools completed 50 8

Health facilities completed 50 15

Electric transmission/distribution systems 

completed

25 3 emergency generators in place, 3 turbines 

in process of repair or construction

Government buildings completed 20 Not reported

Wastewater and solid waste projects 

completed

7 Not reported

Institutional strengthening Completed for all waste and irrigation 

projects

Cancelled
Appendix III

Sector Level Performance Indicators 

Page 83 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Table 17: Objectives for Assistance to Afghan Women Contained in U.S. Legislation

Source: GAO analysis of public law and USAID documents.

Afghanistan Freedom Support Act

2004 Supplemental Appropriation 

Conference Report Sept. 2004 status

To assist women and girls in Afghanistan in 

the areas of political and human rights, 

health care, education, training, security, 

and shelter, with particular emphasis on 

assistance to:

To ensure that programs, projects and 

activities funded in this Act include the 

participation of women and advance the 

social, economic, and political rights and 

opportunities of women in Afghanistan

Establish or rehabilitate health care facilities Not addressed Improved hospital facilities and access 

(OTI); 15 REFS clinics.

Expand immunization programs Not addressed Maternal/neonatal tetanus elimination 

program expanded.

Establish, maintain, and expand primary 

and secondary schools

Not addressed 15 new REFS schools established.

Establish vocational training and incomegeneration projectsEstablish technical and vocational education. training as community health care workers 

and midwives.

Provide special education opportunities for 

girls whose schooling was ended by the 

Taliban

Not addressed Accelerated learning provided for 98,600 

girls.

Provide access to higher education Not addressed National women's dormitory 

reconstructed.

Protect women and girls against sexual and 

physical abuse, abduction, trafficking, 

exploitation, and sex discrimination in the 

delivery of humanitarian supplies and 

services

Establish programs for women and girls 

against sexual abuse and trafficking.

Not reported

Provide emergency shelters for women who 

face danger from violence

Provide shelters for women and girls. Not reported

Direct humanitarian assistance to widows Provide humanitarian assistance for widows Widow’s bakeries supported through WFP

Support the work of women-led and local 

nongovernmental organizations

support for Women-led NGO Grants to women-focused NGOs.

Disseminate information throughout 

Afghanistan on the rights of women

Establish programs to disseminate information 

about the rights of women

Not reported

Provide women's rights and human rights 

training for military, police, and legal 

personnel

Provide women's rights training to military, 

police, and legal personnel

INL granted $75,000 to train Afghan 

woman judges in civil and family law; ANP 

training includes "Principles of nondiscrimination: Women in Society" and 

other pertinent classes; uncertain if ANA 

includes similar training.

Support the National Human Rights 

Commission 

Not addressed $5 million in support to the Afghan 

independent human rights commission
Page 84 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Appendix IV

Opium Production and Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan ApendxiIV

Table 18: Opium Production in Afghanistan, 2002–2004

ha = hectare

mt = metric ton

Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

a

1 ha equals 2.47 acres. (The United States estimated that 206,700 ha were cultivated in 2004.)

b mt equals 2,204 pounds.

c Totals do not include at least 480,000 itinerant laborers.

Table 19: Major Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan, 2001-2005

2002 2003 2004

Net opium poppy cultivation 74,000 ha 80,000 ha 131,000 haa

Opium production 3,400 mt 3,600 mt 4,200 mtb

Farmers cultivating opiumc 1.7 million 1.7 million 2.3 million

Percentage of legal GDP 17 50 60

Provinces where opium is grown 24 28 34

Gross profits to traffickers $1.3 billion $1.3 billion $2.2 billion

Farm value of opium production $1.2 billion $1.0 billion $0.6 billion

Total $2.5 billion $2.3 billion $2.8 million

Event Date

Bonn Agreement signed; Afghanistan asks international community to help combat illegal narcotics and 

requests alternative livelihoods assistance.

December 5, 2001

President Karzai issues decree that the opium-based economy threatens national security and should be 

fought by all means.

January 2002

Interim Afghan Government issues decree on eradication of opium, offering $1750 per hectare 

compensation.

April 2002

Conference held on Security Sector Reform in Geneva; United Kingdom is designated lead nation for 

counternarcotics.

April 2002

Transitional Authority issues new ban on opium cultivation and trafficking. August 2002

Counternarcotics directorate created within Afghan National Security Council. October 2002

UN announces afghan opium harvest (3,400 metric tons). October 2002

Bonn II Agreement participants agree that the Afghan government, assisted by the international community, 

should intensify efforts to combat illicit production and trafficking of drugs.

December 2002

Ministry of the Interior Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) is created. January 2003

DEA office in U.S. embassy officially opens February 2003

Afghanistan government adopts national drug control strategy. May 2003

National drug law adopted. October 2003
Appendix IV

Opium Production and Counternarcotics 

Efforts in Afghanistan

Page 85 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Source: UN, Department of State, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, and Afghan Government Documents.

UN announces afghan opium harvest (3,600 metric tons). October 2003

International Counternarcotics Conference on Afghanistan is held in Kabul. February 2004

DEA details its Asst. Administrator for Intelligence to Afghanistan to coordinate U.S. counternarcotics policy. August 2004

Berlin Declaration: Afghanistan and the international community agree do everything necessary to reduce 

and eventually eliminate threat of illegal narcotics. President Karzai calls on Afghan farmers to fight opium 

as they would a jihad or holy war

April 2004

Afghan Central Poppy Eradication Force Established April 2004

U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan completed. September 2004

$776.5 million implementation plan for U.S. counternarcotics strategy completed. October 2004

DEA-trained National Interdiction Unit created under the Afghan Counternarcotics Police. October 2004

UN announces afghan opium harvest (4,200 metric tons). October 2004

Position of Deputy Minister for Counternarcotics created in Ministry of Interior. November 2004

President Karzai declares jihad on drugs. Pledges to destroy Afghanistan’s poppy fields within two years December 2004

Afghan counternarcotics ministry formed. December 2004

USAID publishes request for quotes for larger U.S. alternative livelihoods project to be implemented in 

2005.

December 2004

United States and United Kingdom establish Counternarcotics Vertical Prosecution Task Force. The task 

force is to train select judges, prosecutors, and police on counternarcotics and develop a secure court and 

prison for drug offenders.

December 2004

USAID Signs 3 Contracts for its Alternative Livelihoods Program February 2005

DEA deploys first Foreign Advisory Support Team to Afghanistan. March 2005

2005 Eradication Program Begins April 2005

(Continued From Previous Page)

Event Date
Page 86 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development ApendxiV
Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development

Page 87 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction
Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development

Page 88 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction
Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development

Page 89 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction
Page 90 GAO-05-742 Afghanistan Reconstruction

Appendix VI

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements ApendxiVI

GAO Contacts David Gootnick (202) 512-3149

Staff 

Acknowledgments

John Hutton, David Bruno, Miriam A. Carroll, and Christina Werth made 

key contributions to this report. In addition, Martin de Alteriis, Mark 

Dowling, Etana Finkler, Reid Lowe and Adam Vodraska provided technical 

assistance.

(320291)
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to 

www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.”

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional 

Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548