Testimony 

Before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, July 28, 2005 MASS TRANSIT

Preliminary Views on 

Options for Additional 

Fiscal Oversight of the 

Washington Metropolitan 

Area Transit Authority 

Statement of Katherine Siggerud, Director 

Physical Infrastructure Issues 

GAO-05-922T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-922T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Kate Siggerud 

at (202) 512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-922T, a testimony

before the Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

July 28, 2005

MASS TRANSIT

Preliminary Views on Options for 

Additional Fiscal Oversight of the 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority 

WMATA transports a substantial share of the federal workforce and provides 

an important means of transportation to special events that occur in 

Washington, D.C., as the nation’s capital. WMATA’s Metro Transit Police 

assists federal law enforcement agencies by providing expertise in civil 

disturbance management and explosives detection and by training first 

responders in emergency management techniques specific to transit 

environments. WMATA’s Metrorail and Metrobus are the preferred means of 

transportation in an emergency scenario requiring evacuation, and both the 

regional and the District of Columbia emergency transportation plans rely 

heavily on them. 

A regional funding panel estimated WMATA’s budgetary shortfall at $2.4 

billion for fiscal years 2006 through 2015 if WMATA were to fund many of 

the projects in its 10-year capital improvement plan. This shortfall may be 

even greater because the panel’s shortfall calculation did not include the 

costs of providing specialized transportation for persons with disabilities, as 

required under the Americans with Disabilities Act. To deal with WMATA’s 

funding shortfall, the regional panel concluded that the region needs to 

develop a dedicated source of revenue for WMATA (e.g., local sales tax) and 

that the federal government needs to provide significant contributions 

because of the benefits it receives from WMATA. However, given the large 

federal budget deficit and competing claims on federal resources, GAO 

believes WMATA may also need to reexamine its own spending priorities. 

As part of its ongoing work on WMATA’s oversight entities, GAO found that 

WMATA is subject to oversight from multiple entities that, since 2003, have 

issued hundreds of reports—which vary in scope—on a broad range of 

topics. These entities include WMATA’s Auditor General, an independent 

external auditor, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and industry 

peer review panels. The entities have made recommendations to WMATA, 

which WMATA has generally implemented or plans to implement. As part of 

its ongoing work, GAO plans to analyze these reviews in more detail to 

determine if they comprehensively identify and address WMATA’s overall 

management and operational challenges. GAO’s ongoing work will also 

cover other FTA reviews and safety reviews of WMATA’s operations. 

Congress, the administration, and GAO have long recognized the benefits of 

having spending safeguards and management oversight for entities that 

receive federal funding. If Congress decides to provide WMATA with 

additional federal funding, there needs to be reasonable assurance that the 

funds will be spent effectively. We identified several options for additional 

oversight that could be incorporated into legislation that provides additional 

federal funding to WMATA, including having WMATA officials periodically 

report to Congress on how the funding is being spent; specifying the types of 

projects for which federal funds could be used; and requiring that any 

additional federal funding be subject to FTA’s oversight programs. 

In recent years, the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority (WMATA) has faced 

serious financial and budgetary 

problems as well as continuing 

challenges related to the safety and 

reliability of its transit services. At 

the same time, ridership is at an alltime high, and WMATA continues 

to provide critical services and 

considerable benefits to the 

Washington region and to the 

federal government. 

This statement discusses (1) 

WMATA’s responsibilities for 

serving the interests of the federal 

government, including the agency’s 

role in transporting federal 

employees and visitors to the 

nation’s capital and in supporting 

homeland security for the 

Washington metropolitan region; 

(2) the current funding challenges 

facing WMATA and the options 

proposed to address these 

challenges; (3) preliminary 

information on some of the entities 

that currently provide oversight of 

WMATA and the focus of their 

recent reviews; and (4) some 

considerations and options in 

instituting spending safeguards and 

oversight of any additional federal 

assistance provided to WMATA, 

should Congress decide to provide 

such assistance. 

GAO discussed this testimony with 

WMATA and FTA officials, who 

provided comments and additional 

information that GAO incorporated 

as appropriate. 
Page 1 GAO-05-922T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

We are pleased to testify before you today on issues related to the 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) and the federal 

government. In recent years, WMATA has faced financial and budgetary 

problems, as well as continuing challenges related to the safety and 

reliability of its transit services. At the same time, ridership is at an all-time 

high, and WMATA continues to provide critical services and considerable 

benefits that support the Washington region’s economy and the federal 

government. For example, WMATA operates a transit system that provides 

an indispensable commuting option for hundreds of thousands of 

Washington-area workers, including federal government employees, 

tourists, and others who visit the region each day. 

Our statement today is based on the interim results of our work on 

WMATA. We will discuss 

• WMATA’s responsibilities for serving the interests of the federal 

government, including the agency’s role in transporting federal employees 

and visitors to the nation’s capital and in supporting homeland security for 

the Washington metropolitan region; 

• the current funding challenges facing WMATA and the options proposed to 

address these challenges; 

• preliminary information on some of the entities that currently provide 

oversight of WMATA and the focus of their recent reviews; and 

• some considerations and options in providing spending safeguards and 

oversight of any additional federal assistance provided to WMATA, should 

Congress decide to provide such assistance. 

Our work is based on our review of WMATA’s documentation of the 

transit services it provides to federal employees and others; its budgetary 

and other financial documentation; our analysis of reports on WMATA’s 

financial problems that we and others have issued; and interviews with 

officials at WMATA, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), other 

federal agencies that rely on WMATA’s services, and officials with 

expertise in the transit industry, transportation planning, and 

transportation finance. We reviewed selected reports issued by entities 

that oversee WMATA—including WMATA’s Auditor General, an 

independent external auditor, and the Federal Transit Administration 

(FTA). We also reviewed prior GAO reports on various oversight issues 
Page 2 GAO-05-922T 

related to mass transit and other areas of surface transportation. We 

conducted our work from March 2005 through July 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. We obtained oral 

comments on this statement from WMATA and DOT officials, who 

generally agreed with the information and provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated as appropriate. We also provided selected portions 

of the statement to the District of Columbia Department of Transportation, 

the General Services Administration, the Office of Personnel Management, 

the National Capital Planning Commission, the U.S. Capitol Police, and the 

U.S. Secret Service. Some of these agencies provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated as appropriate. Details of our scope and 

methodology are provided in appendix I. 

In summary: 

• WMATA transports a substantial share of the federal workforce and 

provides an important means of transportation to the special events that 

occur in Washington, D.C., as the nation’s capital and its “seat of 

government.” WMATA’s Metro Transit Police also plays an important role 

in assisting federal law enforcement agencies by providing expertise in 

civil disturbance management and explosives detection and by making 

Metrobuses available for perimeter security and for redirecting traffic at 

high-security federal events. Additionally, WMATA trains first responders 

in emergency management techniques specific to transit environments at 

its tunnel facility in Landover, Maryland, and through its training course on 

managing Metrorail emergencies. The Metrorail system is equipped with 

chemical and radiological early warning systems to alert first responders 

to potential hazardous materials incidents. In addition, both the regional 

and the District of Columbia emergency transportation plans rely heavily 

on Metrorail and Metrobus for transportation in an emergency scenario 

requiring evacuation. 

• Over the years, WMATA has faced funding challenges, and the options 

proposed to address those challenges generally include both a dedicated 

revenue source and a federal contribution. A regional panel, convened in 

September 2004, estimated that under its current revenue structure, 

WMATA would have a total budgetary shortfall of $2.4 billion during fiscal 

years 2006 through 2015 if it went forward with the projects remaining in 

its 10-year capital improvement plan, except for those that involved 

expanding the current system. We believe that WMATA’s anticipated 

shortfall may be even greater because, in calculating the shortfall, the 
Page 3 GAO-05-922T 

panel did not include the costs of providing paratransit services as 

required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).1

 These costs are 

significant; in fact, the panel estimated that these services could result in a 

shortfall for WMATA of about $1.1 billion over the 10-year period from 

fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2015, thus raising the total anticipated 

shortfall to $3.5 billion for that period. In dealing with its funding 

challenges, WMATA—unlike most other major transit systems—does not 

have a dedicated source of revenue, such as a local sales tax whose 

receipts are automatically directed to the transit authority. As a result, the 

regional panel and others have concluded that the Washington region 

needs to develop a dedicated source of revenue for WMATA. In addition, 

the panel has concluded that the federal government needs to participate 

“significantly” in addressing WMATA’s budgetary shortfall, particularly for 

capital maintenance and system enhancement, because WMATA has 

provided numerous benefits to the Washington region and the federal 

government over the years. To the extent that the federal government 

cannot provide significant additional support to WMATA because of 

competing claims on federal resources, and WMATA’s current revenue 

structure continues to be insufficient to support its planned capital 

projects, WMATA may need to reexamine its spending priorities, including 

how it will meet its ADA obligations. 

• As part of our preliminary review of WMATA’s oversight entities, we found 

that WMATA is subject to oversight from multiple entities that, since 2003, 

have issued hundreds of reports and made dozens of recommendations. 

These entities include WMATA’s Office of Auditor General, which has 

issued nearly 500 reports, including internal and investigative audits and 

reviews of contracts and pricing proposals, and an independent external 

auditor, which annually reviews WMATA’s financial statements and 

related internal controls. Additionally, FTA oversees WMATA’s major 

capital projects through the project management oversight program; FTA 

has issued 125 monthly monitoring reports on seven of WMATA’s major 

projects through this program since 2003. FTA also reviews WMATA’s 

compliance with a wide range of administrative and statutory 

requirements through its Triennial Review. In 2005, at WMATA’s request, 

panels assembled by a transit industry association conducted peer reviews 

of WMATA’s bus and rail operations. The peer review panels developed 

recommendations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of bus and 

rail operations in multiple areas, including staffing, organization, 

 1

Paratransit most often refers to wheelchair-accessible, demand-response van service for 

individuals who are unable to use the regular transit system independently because of a 

physical or mental impairment. 
Page 4 GAO-05-922T 

maintenance, and technology. WMATA has generally implemented or 

plans to implement the recommendations resulting from the various 

oversight reviews. As part of our ongoing work, we plan to analyze these 

reviews in greater detail to determine whether, taken as a whole, they 

identify systemic problems and are adequate to address WMATA’s overall 

management and operational challenges. Our ongoing work will also 

include FTA’s in-depth reviews of program or system compliance, as well 

as safety reviews conducted by external and internal entities. 

• To control costs and ensure results—especially for high-cost 

transportation infrastructure projects—Congress, the administration, and 

GAO have long recognized the benefits of spending safeguards and 

management oversight for the state and local governments and 

transportation agencies that receive federal funding. For example, certain 

federal laws have historically controlled the uses of federal transportation 

funds, including instituting “matching” requirements to ensure the use of 

some local funds for capital infrastructure projects and prohibiting the use 

of these funds for operating expenses. Several ongoing, planned, and past 

efforts illustrate the benefits of management oversight and the ways it can 

be carried out. At the local level, in the 1980s, New York City’s ailing 

Metropolitan Transit Authority was subject to increased oversight 

legislated by the state. This oversight, along with increased revenue, was 

followed by improvements in the performance of the authority’s subway 

system. We have also reported that safeguards should accompany any 

increased federal funds provided to the District of Columbia to address the 

structural imbalance between its costs and revenue-raising capacity. At the 

federal level, FTA’s project management oversight program is designed to 

help ensure that grantees building major capital projects have the qualified 

staff and procedures needed to successfully plan and carry out those 

projects. Finally, the House and Senate versions of the surface 

transportation reauthorization bill currently before Congress include 

provisions that enhance management oversight for major capital projects 

receiving federal funds. We have not fully analyzed the applicability of 

these oversight options to WMATA or evaluated their relative merits. 

However, we believe that should Congress decide to provide WMATA with 

additional federal funding in recognition of its support of the federal 

government, Congress should have reasonable assurances that the funds 

would be spent efficiently and effectively. Accordingly, we identified 

several options for writing safeguards into legislation that provides any 

additional federal funding to WMATA. These options include having 

WMATA officials periodically report to Congress on how the funding is 

being spent; specifying the types of projects for which federal funds could 

be used; and instituting additional oversight bodies for WMATA. 
Page 5 GAO-05-922T 

WMATA was created in 1967 by an interstate compact that resulted from 

the enactment of identical legislation by Virginia, Maryland, and the 

District of Columbia, with the concurrence of the U.S. Congress.2

 WMATA 

began building its Metrorail system in 1969, acquired four regional bus 

systems in 1973, and began the first phase of Metrorail operations in 1976. 

In January 2001, WMATA completed the originally planned 103-mile 

Metrorail system, which included 83 rail stations on five rail lines. The 

transit system encompasses (1) the Metrorail subway system, which now 

has 86 Metrorail stations on five rail lines and a fleet of about 946 rail cars; 

(2) the Metrobus system, which has a fleet of about 1,447 buses serving 

350 routes; and (3) the MetroAccess ADA complementary paratransit 

system, which provides specialized transportation services, as required by 

law, to persons with disabilities who are certified as being unable to 

access WMATA’s fixed-route transit system. 

Congress and the executive branch have supported considerable federal 

funding for WMATA since its inception in the 1960s, citing several reasons 

including (1) the federal government’s large presence in the area, (2) the 

attraction of the nation’s capital for tourists, (3) the overlapping needs of 

adjacent jurisdictions, and (4) the limitations faced in raising other 

revenue for transit needs. This federal funding has taken several forms 

over the years.3

 First, WMATA relied on federal funding to pay for nearly 

70 percent of the costs to build its Metrorail subway system. From 1969 

through 1999, the federal government provided about $6.9 billion4

 of the 

approximately $10 billion that WMATA spent to construct the original 103-

mile system, according to WMATA officials.5

 Second, WMATA has also 

relied on federal funding to cover more than 40 percent of its capital 

improvement costs during the last 10 fiscal years. Of about $3.5 billion that 

WMATA received from all sources for capital improvements during fiscal 

years 1995 through 2005 (as of February 2005), about $1.5 billion, or about 

 2

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact, Pub. L. No. 89-774 (1966). 

3

See GAO, Mass Transit: Information on the Federal Role in Funding the Washington 

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, GAO-05-358T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 18, 2005). 

4

In our February 2005 testimony (see GAO-05-358T), we reported information, provided by 

WMATA officials, showing that the federal government’s contribution from 1969 through 

1999 was $6.2 billion. In commenting on a draft of today’s testimony statement, WMATA 

officials told us that they had provided us with incomplete information in February 2005 

and that, in fact, the total federal contribution during those years was $6.9 billion. 

5

All dollar figures presented in this statement are in nominal dollars (not adjusted for 

inflation). 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-05-922T 

43 percent, came from the federal government, with the remaining $2 

billion, or about 57 percent, coming from the state and local jurisdictions 

that WMATA serves and from other sources. Most of this federal funding 

has come through grants administered by FTA. Finally, WMATA received 

about $49.9 million for congressionally designated projects, including a 

new Metrorail station at New York Avenue in the District of Columbia, 

during fiscal years 1995 through 2005. 

WMATA operates in a complex environment, with many organizations 

influencing its decision-making and funding and providing oversight. 

WMATA is governed by a board of directors—composed of individuals 

appointed by each of the local jurisdictions WMATA serves—which sets 

policies and oversees all of WMATA’s activities, including budgeting, 

operations, development, expansion, safety, procurement, and other 

activities. In addition, a number of local, regional, and federal 

organizations affect WMATA’s decision-making, including (1) state and 

local governments, which subject WMATA to a range of laws and 

requirements; (2) the National Capital Region Transportation Planning 

Board of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, which 

develops the short- and long-range plans and programs that guide 

WMATA’s capital investments; (3) FTA, which provides oversight of 

WMATA’s compliance with federal requirements; (4) the National 

Transportation Safety Board, which investigates accidents on transit 

systems as well as other transportation modes; and (5) the Tri-State 

Oversight Committee, which oversees WMATA’s safety activities and 

conducts safety reviews. 

WMATA’s combined rail and bus ridership totaled about 343.8 million 

passenger trips in fiscal year 2005. WMATA operates the second largest 

heavy rail transit system and the fifth largest bus system in the United 

States, based on passenger trips, according to WMATA. WMATA’s fiscal 

year 2005 budget is $1.29 billion. Of the total amount, about 76 percent, or 

$977.9 million, is for operations, including maintenance activities, and the 

remaining 24 percent, or $314.1 million, is for capital improvements. 

WMATA obtains its funding from a variety of sources, including the 

federal, state (Virginia and Maryland), District of Columbia, and local 

governments; passenger fares; and other sources. In general, WMATA 

relies on passenger fares and subsidies from its member jurisdictions to 
Page 7 GAO-05-922T 

cover the majority of its operating costs.6 Its capital funds are obtained 

from other sources, including the federal government and the state and 

local jurisdictions that it serves. Of all WMATA’s funding, less than 2 

percent is from a dedicated source. 

As the major transit agency in the national capital area, WMATA provides 

transportation to and from work for a substantial portion of the federal 

workforce and is also integral to the smooth transportation of visitors to 

the nation’s capital. WMATA also assists federal law enforcement agencies 

by providing security for high-profile events and other security-related 

expertise and services. Furthermore, the emergency transportation plans 

of the District of Columbia and the Washington region both rely heavily on 

Metrorail and Metrobus for transportation in an emergency scenario 

requiring evacuation. 

According to estimates prepared by WMATA, a substantial share of 

Metrorail’s riders, particularly at peak commuting periods, are federal 

employees.7

 Using data from its 2002 passenger survey (the most recent 

data available), WMATA estimates that approximately 35 percent of all 

 6

Metrorail has the second highest cost recovery ratio (revenues from fares per total 

operating expenses) of any heavy rail system in the nation, according to 2002 data, whereas 

Metrobus’s cost recovery ratio is ranked 17th out of the largest 20 bus systems. 

7

WMATA’s estimates do not include federal contractors and do not consider the extent to 

which federal employees use Metrobus or MetroAccess services. 

WMATA Supports 

Federal Government 

Operations by 

Providing 

Transportation and 

Security and by 

Supporting 

Emergency 

Preparedness 

WMATA’s Transit Services 

Affect Daily Federal 

Government Operations 
Page 8 GAO-05-922T 

Metrorail riders were federal employees in 2002.8 WMATA’s estimates are 

higher for peak9

 period times, when the system faces capacity constraints: 

according to the survey, approximately 41 percent of the morning peak 

period riders and approximately 37 percent of the afternoon peak period 

riders are federal employees. The federal employees who ride Metrorail to 

and from work each day represent a substantial share of federal 

employees in the Washington, D.C., region. Using an estimate based on its 

2002 passenger survey data on the number of federal employees who are 

Metrorail passengers, together with data from OPM on the number of 

civilian federal employees in the Washington, D.C., region, WMATA 

estimated that in 2002, approximately 40 percent of federal employees 

used Metrorail. 

WMATA’s operating status is an important factor in OPM’s decisions about 

the day-to-day operations of the federal government. OPM officials told us 

that WMATA is a key stakeholder in OPM’s decision to have an early 

dismissal, late arrival, or closure of the federal government, since a 

substantial portion of the federal workforce rides WMATA’s transit system 

to and from work. Those officials said that they are aware of WMATA’s 

operating constraints and take them into account when deciding to close 

the federal government. However, the officials told us that OPM makes the 

final decision and uses the safety of employees as the sole factor in its 

decision. OPM officials further noted that the functioning of the federal 

government is not dependent on WMATA’s operating status and that 

employees have other options, such as flexible work schedules and 

teleworking, available should they not be able to get to their usual 

workplace. 

 8

Like other estimates, WMATA’s estimates are subject to various forms of possible error 

that might cause the actual percentage of Metrorail riders that are federal employees to 

differ from the estimated percentage. One form is sampling error. Because WMATA 

surveyed a large sample of riders, the sampling errors associated with its estimates are 

small. All the estimates that we cite from WMATA’s 2002 passenger survey have sampling 

margins of error of less than plus or minus 0.5 percentage points at the 95 percent 

confidence level. As a result, based on sampling error alone, the chances are 95 out of 100 

that the actual percentage of Metrorail riders that were federal employees in 2002 lies 

between 34 and 35 percent. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey 

can introduce errors from other sources, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors, 

which may reduce one’s level of confidence in the estimates. In particular, the WMATA 

survey had an overall response rate of less than 28 percent. As response rates decrease, so 

does the likelihood that the characteristics of the survey respondents represent those of 

the entire universe of Metrorail riders. 

9

WMATA defines the morning peak period as 5:30 a.m. through 9:29 a.m. and the afternoon 

peak period as 3:00 p.m. through 6:59 p.m. 
Page 9 GAO-05-922T 

Executive Order 12072, issued on August 16, 1978,10 instructs federal 

agencies to consider such factors as the availability of public 

transportation and parking as well as accessibility to the public when 

evaluating and selecting federal facilities. The General Services 

Administration (GSA)—which has overall responsibility for reviewing and 

approving the acquisition of federal facilities—created a Site Selection 

Guide11 for federal agencies that implements the provisions of this 

executive order, as well as other public laws and executive orders. Within 

the National Capital Region, the National Capital Planning Commission 

also has review and approval authority over federal building construction, 

renovations, and transportation plans in the District of Columbia, and it 

has review authority only over federal sites in the Virginia and Maryland 

areas of the region. Both GSA and the commission instruct federal 

agencies to locate their facilities near mass transit stops whenever 

possible. 

The Federal Employees Clean Air Incentives Act of 199312 also encourages 

the federal use of mass transit, with specific provisions for the National 

Capital Region.13 The purpose of this act was to authorize agencies to 

create programs for federal employees to encourage their use of 

alternatives to single-occupancy vehicles for commuting. Under the act, 

the heads of agencies were authorized to establish programs for agency 

employees that would provide, for example, transit passes, space for 

bicycles, and nonmonetary incentives. 

 1043 F.R. 36869. 

11U.S. General Services Administration, Site Selection Guide (Washington, D.C.: March 

2003). 

12Codified at 5 USC § 7905. 

13Executive Order 13150, issued on April 21, 2000, implemented the act by mandating that 

federal agencies establish a “transit pass” program for federal employees in the National 

Capital Region and offer a program that allows federal employees to exclude a portion of 

their income from taxes for commuting costs, where such commuting includes mass 

transportation and vanpools. Federal employees in the National Capital Area may 

personally claim up to $1,260 per year in transit benefits for commuting purposes. 

Federal Guidance Provides 

Incentives for Federal 

Employees to Use Mass 

Transit 
Page 10 GAO-05-922T 

WMATA’s services are integral to the smooth operation of the myriad of 

special activities that occur in Washington, D.C., as the nation’s capital and 

its “seat of government.” According to a visitor transportation survey 

administered for the National Park Service, 61 percent of visitors used 

Metrorail during their visit to Washington, D.C.14 In several instances, 

ridership has been highest on days when events (1) were sponsored by the 

federal government, such as the first and second inaugurations of 

President George W. Bush and the grand opening of the National Museum 

of the American Indian or (2) occurred in Washington because it is the 

seat of government, such as political rallies. On June 6, 2004, the date of 

former President Ronald Reagan’s state funeral ceremony, WMATA 

marked its highest ridership day ever, with more than 850,000 riders. 

The federal government also relies on WMATA to provide transportation 

services outside its normal hours and routes. Some examples follow: 

• In May 2004, WMATA, along with other regional transit agencies, provided 

buses to shuttle attendees from Metrorail stations to the World War II 

dedication ceremony on the National Mall.15

• Metrobuses ran overnight between RFK Stadium and the U.S. Capitol for 2 

nights in June 2004 to enable people to pay respects to former President 

Ronald Reagan.16

• On Inauguration Day, in January 2005, WMATA opened Metro 2 hours 

early and closed it 3 hours later than normal, at the request of the 

Presidential Inaugural Committee. 

 14National Park Service, Visitor Transportation Survey (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2003). 

15The American Battle Monuments Commission and Transportation Management Services 

paid WMATA $223,320 for the use of 240 buses. WMATA charged these organizations the 

standard charter bus rate of $310.50 for the first 3 hours plus $34.50 for each additional 30 

minutes. 

16The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation paid WMATA $16,110 for the use of 20 buses. 

WMATA charged the foundation the standard charter bus rate. 

WMATA Provides 

Transportation to Special 

Events in the Nation’s 

Capital 
Page 11 GAO-05-922T 

WMATA’s Metro Transit Police supports the U.S. Secret Service by making 

available its officers who have expertise in areas such as explosives 

detection and civil disturbance management to help ensure a safe and 

secure environment before and during events involving the President, the 

Vice President, or high-level foreign dignitaries. For example, when events 

are held in venues located above Metrorail stations, Metro Transit Police’s 

explosive ordnance detection team inspects the stations to ensure they are 

free from explosives. The Metro Transit Police deployed its civil 

disturbance team at the 2005 presidential inaugural parade at the request 

of the Secret Service, which had received specific intelligence that 

protestors might attempt to breach the parade route. The Metro Transit 

Police received $299,371 in Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants for overtime associated with 

providing security for the 2005 presidential inauguration. In commenting 

on the importance of the Metro Transit Police’s security expertise, Secret 

Service officials told us that they consider the Metro Transit Police to be a 

full law enforcement partner, along with the District of Columbia’s 

Metropolitan Police Department, the U.S. Capitol Police, and the U.S. Park 

Police. 

The Metro Transit Police also provides enhanced security throughout the 

Metrorail and Metrobus system when DHS raises the threat level, which is 

communicated through the Homeland Security Advisory System.17 Since 

DHS implemented the color-coded system in March 2002, the Metro 

Transit Police has spent about $2.7 million on overtime related to 

increased threat levels, for such activities as increasing patrols of 

Metrorail stations, trains, and buses. WMATA received $632,356 through a 

DHS UASI grant for overtime costs in 2004; this grant was WMATA’s first 

reimbursement for costs associated with increased threat levels, according 

to a Metro Transit Police official. 

WMATA also supports federal law enforcement efforts by providing 

Metrobuses to the U.S. Capitol Police to establish security perimeters, 

block intersections, and reroute traffic for events that take place on the 

grounds of the U.S. Capitol, such as presidential inaugurations and State of 

the Union addresses, and at other locations where presidential and vice 

presidential events occur. The Secret Service also uses Metrobuses 

periodically to establish temporary security perimeters; for example, it did 

 17The Homeland Security Advisory System is a threat-based system that DHS uses to 

communicate to public safety officials and the public the likelihood of a terrorist attack. 

WMATA Assists Federal 

Law Enforcement 

Agencies in Providing 

Security for High-Profile 

Government Events 
Page 12 GAO-05-922T 

so along the 2005 presidential inauguration parade route. The law 

enforcement agencies that use Metrobuses are charged the same standard 

charter rate that WMATA charges all parties to rent its Metrobuses for 

special events. 

WMATA supports homeland security efforts for the Washington region and 

the federal government through a variety of efforts. It provides training for 

local and federal first responders at its tunnel training facility and has 

deployed early-warning systems to detect chemical and radioactive 

contamination in some of its underground Metrorail stations. WMATA’s 

infrastructure is key to emergency evacuation of the region, including the 

evacuation of workers in federal buildings concentrated in downtown 

Washington, D.C. 

WMATA’s emergency response training facility in Landover, Maryland, 

provides a realistic setting for fire, police, emergency, and transit 

personnel to learn how to respond to events such as collisions, fires, and 

weapons of mass destruction incidents that occur in a transit or tunnel 

environment. The facility includes a 260-foot tunnel that houses two 

subway cars positioned to resemble a wreck, as well as simulated 

electrified third rail, cabling, and lighting that appear identical to those in a 

real tunnel. Emergency personnel from across the region train at the 

center. The training center’s federal clients include the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s Hostage Rescue Team, the Federal Protective Services, and 

the U.S. Marines’ Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force. 

Additionally, according to WMATA officials, FTA’s Transportation Safety 

Institute plans to use the Emergency Response Training Facility as a host 

site for the counterterrorism training it plans to provide to transit 

agencies’ law enforcement and safety personnel. WMATA funds this 

training facility entirely out of its regular operations budget. 

WMATA is also introducing a training course on managing Metrorail 

emergencies, which will address emergency management concepts, 

techniques to respond to weapons of mass destruction attacks, and 

emergency traffic control. The course, which WMATA is funding with a 

$335,261 DHS UASI grant, will be available to first responders from the 

region, transit agencies nationwide, and FTA. 

Metrorail is equipped with a permanent chemical detection system to help 

detect hazardous substances in selected stations in the Metrorail system. 

This system, known as the Program for Response Options and Technology 

(PROTECT), acts as an early warning to safeguard first responders, 

WMATA Supports 

Emergency Preparedness 

by Providing First 

Responder Training, Early 

Warning Sensors, and 

Emergency Evacuation 

Infrastructure 

First Responder Training 

Early Warning Sensor Systems 
Page 13 GAO-05-922T 

employees, and Metrorail customers and is installed in selected locations 

in underground Metrorail stations. WMATA had assistance from the U.S. 

Departments of Transportation, Energy, and Justice in developing the 

sensor system. It received $15 million in federally appropriated funds in 

fiscal year 2002 and $1.4 million in additional funds in fiscal year 2004 

through a direct grant from DHS’s Office of Domestic Preparedness to pay 

for the installation of the sensors.18

Additionally, Metro Transit Police has distributed pager-sized devices to 

about 100 officers to wear in the Metrorail system to detect radiation. 

According to the Metro Transit Police, these pagers are worn mostly by 

officers in the downtown core because this area is considered to be at 

higher risk for attack. WMATA paid for about half of the radiological 

pagers, and the Department of Energy furnished the remainder. 

These early warning devices are important to the area’s first responders 

because if a high reading of a chemical or radioactive substance is 

detected, it is considered a potential hazardous materials or “hazmat” 

incident. In such an event, the portion of the Metrorail system involved 

could be temporarily closed, affecting traffic in the area, and local 

emergency management agencies would be notified and become 

responsible for coordinating any additional response. 

The local emergency response officials we interviewed generally prefer 

using Metrorail and Metrobus in an emergency scenario that requires 

evacuation because mass transit can move large numbers of people 

efficiently and help keep roadways clear for first responders and other 

emergency vehicles. To assist in coordinating evacuation planning across 

jurisdictions, the region’s metropolitan planning organization, the 

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, has developed 

guidance on emergency evacuation that includes the use of Metrorail and 

regular Metrobus routes as well as Metrobuses on special evacuation 

routes. The District of Columbia’s emergency evacuation plans also rely 

heavily on WMATA. Additionally, because the federal presence in the 

District is so large, the District Department of Transportation consulted 

with federal agencies in developing its emergency transportation plans. 

 18Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from 

and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States for Fiscal Year 2002, Public Law 

No. 107-117, Div. B, Ch. 4, 115 Stat. 2230, 2304. 

Emergency Evacuation 
Page 14 GAO-05-922T 

Over the years, WMATA has faced funding challenges, and options have 

been proposed to address them. Although WMATA has taken steps to 

improve its management, such as prioritizing its planned capital 

improvements, it lacks a dedicated funding source and must rely on 

variable, sometimes insufficient contributions from local, regional, and 

federal organizations to pay for its planned capital improvements. A report 

published by a regional funding panel estimated that, over the next 10 

years, under its current revenue structure, WMATA will face a $2.4 billion 

budget shortfall, due largely to expenditures planned for capital 

improvement projects—an estimate that may not fully reflect the 

magnitude of the anticipated budget shortfall. Proposed options would 

provide a dedicated funding source, such as a local sales tax, and would 

increase federal funding for capital improvements. 

WMATA and others have projected continuing shortfalls in its capital and, 

to some extent, its operating budgets. For example, in 2001, we reported 

that WMATA faced uncertainties in obtaining funding for planned capital 

spending for two of its capital programs, discussed below, the 

Infrastructure Renewal Program (IRP) and the System Access and 

Capacity Program (SAP).19 At that time, WMATA anticipated a shortfall of 

$3.7 billion in the funding for these programs over the 25-year period from 

fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2025. 

Since that time, in response to recommendations that we and others made, 

WMATA created a strategic plan, which it issued in October 2002. In 

November 2002, it documented and prioritized its planned capital projects 

in a 10-year capital improvement plan that called for spending $12.2 billion 

over the period from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2013. Then, in 

September 2003, WMATA launched a campaign called “Metro Matters” to 

obtain $1.5 billion in capital funding over a 6-year period to avert what 

WMATA believed was a crisis in its ability to sustain service levels and 

system reliability and to meet future demands for service. In response, 

WMATA and its member jurisdictions approved a $3.3 billion funding plan 

 19See GAO, Mass Transit: Many Management Successes at WMATA, but Capital Planning 

Could Be Enhanced, GAO-01-744 (Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2001) and Mass Transit: 

WMATA Is Addressing Many Challenges, but Capital Planning Could Be Improved, 

GAO-01-1161T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2001). 

Options for 

Addressing 

Anticipated Future 

Funding Shortfall 

Would Likely Include 

both Local and 

Federal Contributions 

Estimated Costs of 

WMATA’s Planned Capital 

Projects Exceed 

Anticipated Funding 
Page 15 GAO-05-922T 

for fiscal years 2005 through 2010 to help pay for WMATA’s most pressing 

short-term capital investment priorities.20

As concerns about WMATA’s anticipated funding shortfall grew, a regional 

funding panel known as the Metro Funding Panel—cosponsored by the 

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, the Greater 

Washington Board of Trade, and the Federal City Council21—was 

convened in September 2004 to study the magnitude of the shortfall, 

identify sources of funding, and evaluate options for generating additional 

revenues to address that shortfall. The panel estimated that under its 

current revenue structure, WMATA would have a total funding shortfall of 

about $2.4 billion for fiscal years 2006 through 2015 for maintaining and 

upgrading its existing system, assuming that Metro Matters was fully 

funded. As shown in table 1, the panel attributed nearly 80 percent of the 

total estimated shortfall of $2.4 billion to WMATA’s capital activities (IRP 

and SAP) and the remainder to operations activities associated with future 

capital projects as they are completed. 

 20The $3.3 billion included $1.8 billion in previously pledged funding and $1.5 billion in new 

commitments called for in Metro Matters. The $1.5 billion is largely funded by the local 

jurisdictions; however, it also includes a request for about $260 million in federal 

appropriations over the 6-year period, to be used for rail cars. WMATA officials told us that 

the federal government has not acted on the additional funding request. 

21The formal name of the panel is “Panel on the Analysis of and Potential for Alternate 

Dedicated Revenue Sources for WMATA.” See PB Consult, Inc., Report of the Metro 

Funding Panel (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 6, 2005). 
Page 16 GAO-05-922T 

Table 1: Components of the Metro Funding Panel’s Estimate of WMATA’s 

Budgetary Shortfall, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2015 

Dollars in millions 

WMATA projects or activities 

Shortfall in 

fiscal years 

Total 

amount of 

shortfall

Percentage 

of total

Infrastructure Renewal Program (IRP) 

projects 

2011 through 

2013 

$430.1 18

System Access and Capacity 

Program (SAP) projects 

2008 through 

2015 

$1,450.5 61

Operations activities associated with 

future operation of capital projects—

not including system expansion 

projects 

2006 through 

2015 

$500.8 21

Total $2,381.4 100

Source: GAO analysis of information in Report of the Metro Funding Panel, January 2005. 

Funding for the following projects and activities is included in the shortfall 

estimate: 

• IRP projects: The IRP projects occur in fiscal year 2011 through 2013, after 

the Metro Matters funding agreement expires. These projects, which 

provide ongoing maintenance and renewal of the Metrorail and Metrobus 

systems, include replacing and rehabilitating buses and rail cars, 

rehabilitating escalators and elevators, rehabilitating Metrorail stations 

and parking lots, renovating rail car and bus maintenance facilities, and 

rehabilitating electrical systems, among other things. 

• SAP projects: These projects, which are intended to increase the capacity 

of the current Metrorail and Metrobus systems to handle increased 

passenger levels, include the purchase of 130 new rail cars and 275 new 

buses; a variety of improvements to four maintenance facilities, two 

storage facilities, two new bus garages, and one replacement bus garage; 

enhancements at Metro Center, Union Station, and Gallery Place Metrorail 

stations; the construction of pedestrian connections between two pairs of 

Metrorail stations (between Farragut North and Farragut West and 

between Metro Center and Gallery Place); and 140 miles of bus corridor 

improvements, such as signal priority for buses, route delineation 

techniques using pavement materials and painted markings, and passenger 

waiting area enhancements. 

• Operating activities: Finally, the panel included a relatively small portion 

of WMATA’s operating budget in the shortfall estimate. This portion 
Page 17 GAO-05-922T 

consists of some additional operating costs associated with some of the 

capital projects. According to WMATA, these are mostly preventative 

maintenance projects, such as bus engine overhauls, bus tire 

replacements, bus parts, rail parts, and labor costs. 

Appropriately, the panel’s budgetary shortfall estimate did not include the 

portion of WMATA’s capital improvement plan that involves expanding the 

system—by adding new rail lines, for example. The projects in this portion 

of the plan, known as the System Expansion Program, are estimated to 

cost roughly $6 billion. WMATA officials told us that these projects would 

be paid for by the local jurisdictions and businesses where they would be 

built, as well as by federal grants for new transit expansion. 

In preparing its estimate of WMATA’s budgetary shortfall, the panel did 

not evaluate the need for, or priority of, individual projects in SAP and 

IRP. Likewise, we did not independently assess the suitability of including 

these projects, as a whole or individually, in the shortfall estimate. 

However, when WMATA developed its 10-year capital improvement plan 

in 2002, the projects were approved by its board of directors, which 

includes representatives from all of WMATA’s member jurisdictions. In 

addition, the IRP projects and some of the projects in SAP have been 

incorporated into the region’s Constrained Long-Range Plan for 

transportation improvements over the next 20 years by the Transportation 

Planning Board of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. 

In estimating WMATA’s budgetary shortfall, the panel did not include a 

major cost category and, thus, may have significantly underestimated the 

shortfall. The panel did not include the costs of providing paratransit 

services as required under ADA. Compliance with the act’s requirements 

may result in significant costs over the next 10 years. The panel recognized 

that including these costs, which are included in WMATA’s operating 

budget, would result in a greater budgetary shortfall. In fact, the panel 

estimated the shortfall from MetroAccess, WMATA’s paratransit system, at 

about $1.1 billion over the 10-year period from 2006 through 2015, thus 

raising the total anticipated shortfall to $3.5 billion for that period. 

However, the panel stated that funding for these services should be 

provided through a creative packaging of social service, medical, and 

other nontransportation resources in the region, rather than by WMATA. 

We believe that any estimate of WMATA’s funding shortfall should include 

Estimates of the 

Magnitude of WMATA’s 

Funding Shortfall May Not 

Be Comprehensive 
Page 18 GAO-05-922T 

the costs associated with MetroAccess because WMATA is required by 

ADA to provide paratransit services.22

In our 2001 report and testimony,23 we noted that WMATA’s funding comes 

from a variety of federal, state, and local sources, but that unlike most 

other major transit systems, WMATA does not have a dedicated source of 

nonfarebox revenue, such as a local sales tax, whose receipts are 

automatically directed to the transit authority. As far back as April 1979, 

we reported on concerns about the lack of a revenue source dedicated to 

pay the costs of mass transportation for the Washington region.24 Concerns 

about WMATA’s lack of dedicated revenues surfaced again in reports 

issued by the Brookings Institution in June 200425 and by the Metro 

Funding Panel in January 2005.26 According to the Brookings report, 

WMATA’s lack of dedicated revenues makes WMATA’s core funding 

uniquely vulnerable and at risk as WMATA’s member jurisdictions struggle 

with their own fiscal difficulties. The Brookings report and the Metro 

Funding panel report both state that the Washington region needs to 

develop a dedicated source of revenue, and they evaluate the advantages 

and disadvantages of a menu of revenue options that could support the 

dedicated revenue source—specifically, gasoline taxes, sales taxes, 

congestion charges, parking taxes, land-value capture,27 and payroll taxes. 

Observing that WMATA has provided numerous benefits both to the 

Washington region and the federal government over the years, the Metro 

Funding Panel also concluded that WMATA will require a commitment of 

new revenue sources to sustain those benefits. Accordingly, the panel 

 22The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments is currently evaluating how well 

the National Capital Region delivers paratransit services to local constituents and the 

extent to which local agencies have coordinated the provision of these services. In 

particular, the study will seek more cost-effective ways to provide the service. 

23GAO-01-744 and GAO-01-1161T. 

24GAO, Issues Being Faced by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, CED79-52 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 1979).

25Robert Puentes, Washington Metro: Deficits by Design (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 

Institution Series on Transportation Reform, June 2004). 

26Report of the Metro Funding Panel (2005). 

27Land-value capture is a tax arrangement under which incremental growth in property tax 

receipts generated in the Metrorail service areas would be shared with WMATA. 

Options for Addressing 

WMATA’s Funding 

Challenges Would 

Generally Establish a Local 

Dedicated Revenue Source 

and Include a Federal 

Contribution 
Page 19 GAO-05-922T 

recommended, among other things, that (1) WMATA’s compact 

jurisdictions of Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia mutually 

create and implement a single regional dedicated revenue source to 

address WMATA’s budgetary shortfalls and (2) the federal government 

participate “significantly” in addressing WMATA’s budgetary shortfalls, 

particularly for capital maintenance and system enhancement. 

In the current situation of large budget deficits, any additional federal 

funding for WMATA would need to be considered along with the many 

other competing claims for federal resources. To the extent that the 

federal government cannot provide significant additional support to 

WMATA, and WMATA’s current revenue structure continues to be 

insufficient to support its planned capital projects, WMATA may need to 

reassess its capital improvement plan to determine which projects could 

be undertaken within a more constrained funding level. WMATA also may 

need to consider how it will meet its obligations under ADA. 

WMATA is subject to oversight from multiple entities that have issued 

numerous reports on the agency since 2003. The scope of the reports 

varies and includes compliance reviews of specific statutory requirements, 

monthly assessments of major construction projects, and reviews of 

WMATA’s overall bus and rail operations. Specifically, WMATA’s Office of 

Auditor General has issued nearly 500 reports, including internal and 

investigative audits and reviews of contracts and pricing proposals. In 

addition, an independent external auditor, which reports to WMATA’s 

board of directors, annually reviews WMATA’s financial statements and 

related internal controls. FTA oversees WMATA’s major capital projects 

through its project management oversight program and assesses its 

compliance with a wide range of requirements through its Triennial 

Review process. In 2005, at WMATA’s request, transit industry panels 

conducted peer reviews of WMATA’s bus and rail operations. Details on 

these entities and the types of oversight they provide are presented in 

table 2. All of these entities included recommendations in their reports, 

and, in general, WMATA implemented them or has plans to implement 

them. As part of our ongoing work, we plan to analyze these reviews in 

greater detail, together with other specialized FTA reviews and safety 

reviews conducted by external and internal entities. 

WMATA Is Subject to 

Oversight from 

Multiple Entities 

Whose Reviews 

Address a Wide Range 

of Issues 
Page 20 GAO-05-922T 

Table 2: Selected Entities Providing Oversight of WMATA 

Oversight entity Type of oversight Subject of review 

Number of 

reportsa

WMATA’s Auditor 

General 

Internal audits Cash processes and revenue sources, reliability and effectiveness 

of WMATA’s paratransit contractor, workers’ compensation and 

benefits programs, escalator and elevator maintenance contracts, 

inventory management, and internal controls related to the budget 

and fixed assets 

39

 Investigative audits Preventing or detecting mismanagement, waste, fraud, or abuse 

within WMATA 

18

 Information technology 

audits 

Information technology systems that are under development; 

electronic collection of revenue (e.g. Smart Card, MetroCheck sales, 

and Internet sales) 

7

 Contract audits Cost reasonableness of sole-source contracts, contract 

modifications and cost-reimbursable tasks and contracts, oversight 

and review of engineering firms 

404

 Control selfassessments Quality of customer service within WMATA (designed to improve 

working relationships among departments within the agency) 

20

Independent external 

auditor 

Single Audit Act WMATA’s financial statements and internal controls related to these 

statements and to major federal programs 

2

FTA Project management 

oversight program 

Monthly reports on various aspects of major capital projects, 

including scheduling, budget, and performance 

125

 Triennial Review Compliance with statutory and administrative requirements in 23 

areas 

1

American Public 

Transportation 

Association (APTA) 

Peer reviews WMATA’s overall bus and rail operations 2

Total 618

Sources: GAO analysis of data from WMATA, FTA, and APTA. 

a

Numbers are for reports issued since January 2003, except for the Triennial Review, which was most 

recently completed for WMATA in September 2002. 

WMATA’s Auditor General is responsible for planning and implementing 

operational, financial, and information system audits, as well as for 

carrying out investigations to prevent or detect mismanagement, waste, 

fraud, or abuse. The Office of Auditor General also conducts audits of 

contracts to ensure they are being done in accordance with WMATA policy 

and cost-effectively. The Auditor General reports directly to the General 

Manager/Chief Executive Officer and briefs the audit committee of the 

board of directors quarterly. The Auditor General prepares an annual audit 

plan that covers most aspects of the agency. 

WMATA’s Auditor General 
Page 21 GAO-05-922T 

When deficiencies in a program are found, the Office of Auditor General 

makes recommendations for corrective actions to be taken and follows up 

on the implementation status of recommendations with the executive 

manager responsible for the program or office to which the 

recommendations were directed. If the recommendations are not 

implemented in a timely fashion, the Chief Executive’s office may 

intervene to ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken. For the 

most part, WMATA management implements these recommendations. 

The following are examples of audit reports issued by the Office of 

Auditor General in recent years: 

• Contract/Procurement Oversight. Since January 2004, the Office of 

Auditor General has issued five internal audit reports on contracting 

processes and the documentation of contracting activities. 

Recommendations were made to improve the documentation process, 

improve the administration of the cost-estimating process, and develop 

procedures to document the cost-estimating process. 

• Information Technology (IT) Renewal Program. The IT Renewal Program 

is a multiyear, multimillion-dollar initiative to renew WMATA’s IT systems 

for the next generation of service. The Office of Auditor General has 

issued six reports during the past 3 years on the implementation of this 

program, with suggestions for improving communication and ensuring that 

appropriate security measures are in place. 

• Audit of Cell Phone Usage. This review of employee cell phone plans and 

usage made recommendations for more efficient and effective cell phone 

use, which resulted in potential savings of approximately $300,000 per 

year. Additional recommendations were made to improve the 

administration of the cell phone program. 

WMATA is subject to federal financial reporting requirements under the 

Single Audit Act as amended.28 Under this act, nonfederal entities that 

expend more than specified amounts of federal awards (currently 

$500,000) are subject to either a single audit or a program-specific audit, 

which must be performed by an independent external auditor in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.29 The 

 2831 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7507. 

29GAO, Government Auditing Standards, GAO-03-673G (Washington, D.C.: June 2003). 

Single Audit Act 
Page 22 GAO-05-922T 

purpose of the Single Audit Act30 was to streamline and improve the 

effectiveness of audits of federal awards and to reduce the audit burden 

on states, local governments, and nonprofit entities receiving federal 

awards by replacing multiple grant audits with one audit of a recipient as a 

whole (or, for entities receiving federal awards under one program, an 

optional audit of that program only). 

In conducting WMATA’s annual audits under the act’s requirements, an 

independent auditor is required to (1) provide an opinion on WMATA’s 

financial statements and the Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards, 

(2) report on WMATA’s internal controls related to the financial 

statements and major programs, and (3) report on WMATA’s compliance 

with laws and regulations that could have a material effect on WMATA’s 

financial statements and major federal programs. 

For fiscal years 2003 and 2004, WMATA’s independent external auditor31

found no reportable conditions or material weaknesses in WMATA’s 

internal controls over financial reporting and the major programs 

receiving federal assistance.32 The independent auditor’s reviews of 

WMATA’s financial statements and internal controls did, however, note 

several areas of noncompliance related to requirements for grants for both 

years. When such areas of noncompliance are found, the auditor 

recommends steps for WMATA to take to correct the noncompliance. 

WMATA generally concurred with the auditor’s recommendations and 

agreed to implement them. The following are examples of noncompliance 

 30The Office of Management and Budget’s Circular No. A-133, Audits of States, Local 

Governments, and Non-profit Organizations provides implementing guidance for the act’s 

requirements and sets forth standards for obtaining consistency and uniformity for the 

audits of nonfederal entities expending federal awards. 

31See KPMG LLP, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Single Audit Report, 

Year Ended June 30, 2003 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2003) and KPMG LLP/F.S. Taylor & 

Associates, P.C., Certified Public Accountants, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority, Single Audit Report, Year Ended June 30, 2004 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 

2004). 

32A reportable condition is a significant deficiency in the design or operation of an internal 

control that could adversely affect the entity’s ability to record, process, summarize, and 

report financial data consistent with the assertions of management in the financial 

statements. A material weakness is a reportable condition in which the design or operation 

of one or more of the internal control components does not reduce to a relatively low level 

the risk that misstatements caused by error or fraud in amounts that would be material in 

relation to the financial statements being audited may occur and not be detected within a 

timely period by employees in the normal course of performing their assigned functions. 
Page 23 GAO-05-922T 

and recommendations for corrective action found at WMATA during fiscal 

years 2003 and 2004: 

• Property records for equipment purchased with a federal grant did not 

include serial numbers or prices for the equipment—as required by federal 

law.33 The auditor recommended that WMATA revise the records to 

include the required information, and WMATA agreed to do so. 

• WMATA did not correctly submit federal grant expenditure status reports. 

The auditor recommended that WMATA revise and resubmit its financial 

status reports to include total expenditures, which WMATA agreed to do. 

FTA oversees the progress of WMATA’s major capital projects through the 

project management oversight (PMO) program, which we discuss in 

greater detail later in this statement. To receive financial assistance, FTA’s 

grantees must develop and implement a project management plan that 

address each project’s scheduling, budget, performance, and other issues. 

FTA retains engineering firms to review and recommend approval of the 

plans, monitor the progress of each project against its plan, and issue 

monthly monitoring reports. The purpose of the monthly PMO monitoring 

reports is to determine whether the projects are proceeding in accordance 

with the terms of the federal grant agreements, including whether they are 

meeting standard project management requirements, such as having a 

project management plan and a quality assurance plan, meeting schedule 

milestones, and being on budget. 

WMATA’s major capital projects that are subject to PMO review 

collectively represent a substantial portion of WMATA’s capital budget. We 

reviewed PMO reports that were issued from January 2003 through May 

2005. During that time, WMATA had seven capital infrastructure projects 

that were subject to the requirements of the PMO program, including IRP, 

which, as discussed earlier, provides ongoing maintenance and renewal of 

the Metrorail and Metrobus systems; the rail car procurement program; 

and the construction of the New York Avenue Metrorail station.34 The total 

 33See 49 C.F.R. 18.32(d)1. 

34The other projects that were under review were Metro Matters, Dulles Corridor rapid 

transit (which has received funding only for the preliminary engineering phase and is being 

done in cooperation with the Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation), the 

Addison Road to Largo Town Center Metrorail extension, and the Branch Avenue storage 

and maintenance yard. 

FTA’s Project Management 

Oversight Program 
Page 24 GAO-05-922T 

cost of the projects under review was about $5 billion, according to data 

provided by WMATA. 

The monthly PMO monitoring reports that we reviewed identified 

concerns and recommended corrective actions for each of WMATA’s 

major projects under review. The concerns most commonly cited in the 

reports were related to schedules, project management plans, and quality 

assurance activities. Details on these concerns—which WMATA has taken 

steps to address—follow: 

• Schedules. The reports cited concerns pertaining to schedules for some of 

the contracts within three of WMATA’s projects. For the New York Avenue 

Metrorail station and the Largo Metrorail extension, the reports stated that 

individual components of the projects were behind schedule; however, the 

two projects—as a whole—were both completed ahead of schedule. The 

PMO reports also found that components of the rail car procurement 

program, including the rehabilitation of the 2000/3000 Series rail cars and 

the delivery of new 5000 Series rail cars, were behind schedule. 

• Project management plans. The reports stated that WMATA needed to 

submit or update project management plans for three of its projects—the 

rail car procurement program, Metro Matters, and the Infrastructure 

Renewal Program. 

• Quality assurance activities. The reports stated that procedures related 

to quality assurance required updating for three projects: Dulles Corridor 

rapid transit, the Largo Metrorail extension, and the Branch Avenue 

storage and maintenance yard. Some examples of quality assurance 

activities include having (1) written procedures that describe how to 

conduct reviews of contractor’s quality programs and (2) quality control 

coordination meetings with contractors. 

At least every 3 years, FTA is required to review and evaluate transit 

agencies receiving funds under its Urbanized Area Formula Grant 

program. The reviews focus on compliance with statutory and 

administrative requirements in 23 areas, and if grantees are found not to 

be in compliance, their funding can be reduced or eliminated.35 In 2002, 

FTA found that WMATA was deficient in the following three areas: 

 35The 23 areas include legal, financial, technical, equal employment opportunity, safety, 

security, and others. 

FTA’s Triennial Review 
Page 25 GAO-05-922T 

• Technical. Grantees must implement the Urbanized Area Formula Grant 

Program of Projects36 in accordance with the grant application master 

agreement. WMATA had not been updating the milestones in its Milestone 

Progress Reports, nor had WMATA been reporting all required information 

for its Job Access and Reverse Commute grants. 

• Buy America. Certain products used in FTA-funded projects must be 

produced in the United States. WMATA’s procurement files for buses and 

rail cars did not include required certifications indicating that these 

procurements complied with Buy America requirements. 

• Half-fare. Grantees must offer reduced fares to elderly or disabled riders 

or to those who present a Medicare card. WMATA’s system maps specified 

the base fare but did not indicate that a half-fare was available. 

FTA made recommendations for addressing the specific areas of 

noncompliance; WMATA implemented the recommendations, and the 

findings were closed in 2004. 

The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) offers peer 

reviews as a service to transit agencies to help enhance the efficiency and 

effectiveness of their operations. At the request of transit agencies, the 

association convenes panels of experts from within the transit industry, 

who travel to the transit agency under review to physically tour the 

operations, meet with staff and senior management, and review 

documentation in order to develop findings and recommendations on the 

transit agency’s operations. Following the site visit, the peer review panel 

issues a written report to the transit agency under review. 

At WMATA’s own request, APTA conducted peer reviews on WMATA’s bus 

and rail operations earlier this year, and WMATA is currently considering 

its response to the recommendations made in the peer review reports.37

The peer review panels developed recommendations to improve the 

 36The Urbanized Area Formula Grants Program provides transit capital and operating 

assistance to urbanized areas with populations over 50,000. A “program of projects” is a set 

of related projects with a common strategic goal or aim. 

37See American Public Transportation Association, Rail Operations Review for the 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (Washington, D.C.: March 2005) and 

Bus Operations Review for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 

(Washington, D.C.: June 2005). 

Transit Industry 

Association Peer Reviews 
Page 26 GAO-05-922T 

effectiveness and efficiency of bus and rail operations in multiple areas, 

including staffing, organization, maintenance and technology. For 

example: 

• Findings and recommendations in the rail peer review report focused on 

• the selection, training, and certification of employees, with 

recommendations on improving training for track and train employees 

and implementing a new reporting structure for the training 

department; 

• operations, with recommendations on increasing reliance on line 

supervisors in dealing with in-service problems and restructuring the 

current organization to create distinct line ownership functions and 

responsibilities; and 

• track maintenance, with recommendations on recertifying track 

walkers annually and increasing the number of track walkers to reduce 

the daily inspection distance to industry standards. 

• Findings and recommendations of the bus peer review report focused on 

• operations and service, with recommendations for increased street 

supervision and re-evaluation of bus route service; 

• facility maintenance, with recommendations on consolidating bus shop 

maintenance and improving follow-up procedures for bus defects; 

• staffing and training, with recommendations on eliminating high 

vacancy rates and improving training; and 

• safety, with recommendations on adhering to basic safety programs 

and enforcing personal protective equipment policies. 

As part of our ongoing work, we plan to analyze these reviews in greater 

detail to determine whether, taken as a whole, they point to any systemic 

problems and are sufficiently comprehensive to identify and address 

overall management and operational challenges. We will also broaden the 

scope of our analysis to include additional oversight reviews; specifically, 

we plan to analyze FTA’s in-depth reviews of program or system 

compliance. These include, for example, financial management oversight 

reviews, which assess grantees’ financial management systems and 

internal controls; procurement system reviews, which evaluate grantees’ 

Additional GAO Work 

Remaining on WMATA’s 

Oversight 
Page 27 GAO-05-922T 

compliance with federal procurement requirements; and drug and alcohol 

oversight reviews, which assess grantees’ compliance with FTA’s 

regulations on substance abuse management programs and drug and 

alcohol testing for transit employees. We also plan to review safety audits 

of WMATA that were conducted by internal and external entities, 

including the following: 

• WMATA’s Office of System Safety and Risk Protection. This office, which 

reports to the Department of Audit and Safety Oversight, performs internal 

safety reviews of WMATA’s operations. 

• Tri-State Oversight Committee. This committee, which is the designated 

state safety oversight agency for WMATA, requires WMATA to develop and 

implement system safety and security program plans, report accidents and 

unacceptable hazard conditions, and conduct safety reviews. The 

committee meets with WMATA quarterly to discuss safety issues and has 

the authority to mandate corrective action. 

• APTA. APTA’s bus and rail safety audits review the adequacy of transit 

agencies’ system safety program plans and the extent to which the plans 

have been implemented. 

• FTA. FTA performs audits of the Tri-State Oversight Committee to 

determine whether the state oversight agency is carrying out its safety 

oversight program and to examine ways in which the overall program can 

be improved. 

• National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). NTSB has the authority to 

conduct investigations of accidents and make recommendations. The 

NTSB is currently investigating a November 2004 crash involving two 

Metrorail trains; it expects to issue a report on the results of this 

investigation in the fall of 2005. 

In addition, we plan to review the role of WMATA’s board of directors in 

providing oversight of WMATA’s management and operations. As noted 

earlier in this statement, WMATA is governed by a board of directors—

composed of individuals appointed by each of the local jurisdictions 

WMATA serves—which sets policies and oversees all of WMATA’s 

activities, including budgeting, operations, development, expansion, 

safety, procurement, and other activities. 
Page 28 GAO-05-922T 

To control costs and ensure results—especially for high-cost 

transportation infrastructure projects—Congress, the administration, and 

GAO have long recognized the importance of instituting spending 

safeguards and management oversight for the state and local governments 

and transportation agencies that receive federal funding. For example, 

certain federal policies have historically controlled the uses of federal 

transportation funds, prohibiting the use of these funds for operating 

expenses and requiring that the federal funds be matched to ensure the 

use of some local funds for capital infrastructure projects. In addition, a 

number of past, ongoing, and planned federal and local efforts provide 

insight into the benefits of management oversight and how it can be 

carried out. For example, in the 1980s, state legislation enhanced 

opportunities for New York City’s ailing Metropolitan Transit Authority to 

generate additional revenue while providing increased oversight to ensure 

accountability. Furthermore, FTA’s PMO program is designed to help 

ensure that grantees building major capital projects have the qualified staff 

and procedures needed to successfully plan and carry out those projects. 

We have also reported that safeguards should accompany any increased 

federal funds provided to the District of Columbia to address the 

structural imbalance between its costs and revenue-raising capacity. 

Finally, the surface transportation reauthorization bills currently before 

Congress include provisions to enhance management oversight controls 

for projects receiving federal funds, including establishing a new program 

to monitor the use of federal highway funds. Although we have not 

evaluated the application of these oversight mechanisms to WMATA, we 

believe they provide a number of options for Congress to consider as it 

weighs the question of providing additional federal funding to WMATA. 

The federal government has generally discouraged federal transit grants 

from being used to fund transit operating expenses, although policy in this 

area has shifted over time.38 Landmark legislation in 1964 established a 

program of federal capital expenditure grants to state and local 

governments. 39 At that time, no grant money could be used for operating 

expenses because of concerns that such grants would discourage efficient 

operations of transit agencies and might even have the perverse effect of 

rewarding inefficient operations with funding assistance. However, that 

act was amended in 1974 to authorize federal subsidies to pay transit 

 38For transit agencies that serve urbanized areas with populations of 200,000 or more. 

39Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Public Law No. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302. 

Spending Safeguards 

and Management 

Oversight Have 

Helped Recipients of 

Federal 

Transportation 

Assistance Control 

Costs and Ensure 

Results 

Federal Programs Restrict 

Use of Funds for 

Operations and Encourage 

State and Local Spending 

through Matching 

Requirements 
Page 29 GAO-05-922T 

operating expenses, reflecting the alternative concern that limiting federal 

assistance to capital grants created incentives for local governments to 

inefficiently waste capital, such as by prematurely replacing buses. 40

During the 1990s, views on how federal transit grants could be used 

shifted again, and limits were placed on the total amount of transit formula 

grants that could be used for operating expenses. In 1998, with the passage 

of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21), transit 

agencies serving urban populations of 200,000 or more could no longer use 

funding from FTA’s Urbanized Area Formula Grants for operating 

expenses. According to FTA officials, this prohibition was instituted in 

part because federal policymakers believed that the federal government 

should pay only for the construction and maintenance of mass transit 

systems, not for their operation. However, TEA-21 did allow capital funds 

to be used for preventive maintenance, which included routine 

maintenance on rail cars and buses—activities that were previously 

classified as operations activities. After the events of September 11, 2001, 

we recommended a legislative exception to the prohibition on operations 

funding that would allow transit agencies to use Urbanized Area Formula 

Grants for security-related operating expenses.41 Transit agencies can 

spend 1 percent of formula funds on security-related operating expenses. 

The federal government has also historically used matching requirements 

in its transit and other transportation programs to stimulate local 

investment in transportation infrastructure and equipment. Currently, 

major capital transit investment programs—including the New Starts and 

Rail and Fixed Guideway Modernization programs—provide grants that 

fund up to 80 percent of a project’s total costs while requiring a local 

match of at least 20 percent.42

 40The National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974, Public Law No. 95-503, 88 Stat. 

1565. 

41GAO, Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security 

Challenges, GAO-03-263 (Washington, D.C.: Dec., 2002). 

42However, FTA continues to encourage project sponsors to request a federal New Starts 

funding share that is as low as possible. 
Page 30 GAO-05-922T 

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the New York State Metropolitan 

Transit Authority (MTA), which includes New York City Transit’s subway 

and bus systems and the Long Island Rail Road, was in a state of fiscal 

crisis and operational decay. To help salvage the system, the state 

legislature passed legislation43 that provided MTA with the flexibility to 

generate additional revenue—through issuing bonds and notes and 

through the creation of a special tax district—needed to rebuild its aging 

infrastructure. The legislation also established several oversight bodies—

which are still in place at MTA today—to help ensure that MTA’s funds 

would be well spent. They are as follows: 

• The Metropolitan Transportation Capital Review Board. Appointed by 

the governor and composed of two members recommended by the New 

York State legislature and one each recommended by the governor and the 

mayor of New York City, this board reviews and approves, once every 5 

years, MTA’s capital program plans for transit and railroad facilities. The 

plans include goals and objectives for capital spending, establish 

standards for service and operations, and include estimated costs and 

expected sources of revenue. 

• The MTA Committee on Capital Program Oversight. This standing 

committee of MTA’s board of directors has various oversight 

responsibilities, including monitoring the (1) current and future 

availability of funds to be used in the capital program plans and (2) 

contract awards made by MTA. The committee issues quarterly reports on 

its activities and findings. 

• The MTA Office of the Inspector General. This office was created as an 

independent oversight agency to investigate allegations of abuse, fraud, 

and deficiencies in the maintenance and operation of facilities. The 

Inspector General may also initiate other reviews of MTA’s operations and 

can recommend remedial actions to be taken by MTA and monitor their 

implementation. The Inspector General is appointed by the governor and 

submits annual reports of findings and recommendations to the governor. 

MTA is required to report quarterly to the Inspector General on the 

implementation status of all recommendations made in final reports. 

 43Metropolitan Transportation Authority and New York City Transit Authority—

Highways—Appropriations, ch. 314 (1981); N.Y.S. Public Authorities Law, § 1279 (1983); 

Metropolitan Transportation Authority and N.Y.C. Transit Authority—Operating and 

Capital Needs, ch. 929 (1986); Mass Transportation and Highways—Financing—Credit 

Against Mortgage Recording Tax, ch. 13 (1987). 

Assistance to the New 

York City Transit Agency in 

the 1980s Was Tied to 

Oversight Requirements 
Page 31 GAO-05-922T 

Since these oversight bodies were established, and with increased funding, 

MTA has improved its on-time performance and reliability. For example, 

the mean distance between failures has increased from less than 7,000 

miles in 1981 to nearly 140,000 miles in 2003, according to MTA. 

FTA’s PMO program was established in the 1980s to safeguard the federal 

investment in major capital transit projects, which require large 

commitments of public resources, can be technically challenging, and 

often take years to construct. This program provides a continuous review 

and evaluation of the management of all major transit projects funded by 

FTA. Through provisions such as the following, the PMO program is 

designed to help ensure that grantees building major capital projects have 

the qualified staff and procedures needed to successfully build the 

projects: 

• To receive federal financial assistance, grantees must develop and 

implement project management plans that address quality, scheduling, the 

budget, and other issues. 

• Contractors monitor grantees’ projects to determine whether grantees are 

progressing on time, within budget, and according to approved plans and 

specifications. 

• The contractors periodically report their findings and recommendations 

for any corrective actions that may be needed. 

In 2000, we reported and testified44 that FTA had improved the quality of 

the PMO program since the early 1990s, when we designated it as high risk 

because it was vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.45

We concluded that the program had resulted in benefits for both grantees 

and FTA. Grantees have improved their controls over the cost, schedule, 

quality, and safety of their projects. FTA has gained a better understanding 

of the issues surrounding complex construction projects and an increased 

awareness of potential problems that could lead to schedule delays or cost 

increases. As contractors have brought cost and schedule issues to FTA’s 

 44See GAO, Mass Transit: Challenges in Evaluating, Overseeing, and Funding Major 

Transit Projects, GAO/T-RCED-00-104 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2000) and Mass Transit: 

Project Management Oversight Benefits and Future Funding Requirements, 

GAO/RCED-00-221 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2000). 

45The PMO program is no longer designated by GAO as high risk. 

FTA’s PMO Program Helps 

Protect Federal Funds 

Spent on Major Capital 

Projects, Including 

WMATA’s Projects 
Page 32 GAO-05-922T 

attention, FTA has taken actions to help protect the federal investment 

and control projects’ costs and schedules. 

FTA officials told us that any additional federal funding provided to 

WMATA would be subject to the PMO program’s requirements only if 

those funds were distributed to WMATA through the U.S. Department of 

Transportation and FTA. Otherwise, WMATA’s spending from the 

additional funding would not likely be subject to any federal program 

oversight. 

In June 2004, we testified on the structural imbalance between the District 

of Columbia’s costs and revenue-raising capability, stating that if the 

federal government chooses to provide additional funding to the District 

to compensate for this imbalance, the government should implement 

safeguards to ensure that the funds are spent efficiently and effectively. 46

In that testimony, we stated that such safeguards should be written into 

any legislation providing additional federal assistance to the District and 

could include the following: 

• District officials should be required to report to Congress on how they 

plan to spend the federal assistance and regularly report on how it is being 

spent. 

• Congress may consider further specifying the types of projects for which 

federal funds could be used or including a matching requirement to ensure 

that some local funds continue to be used for infrastructure and capital 

requirements. 

The House and Senate versions of the surface transportation 

reauthorization bill that are currently in conference committee contain 

provisions aimed at improving the financial integrity and project delivery 

times for surface transportation projects that receive federal financial 

assistance. For example: 

• On the transit side, both the House and Senate versions of the bill would 

increase the amount of funds available to the Secretary of Transportation 

for management oversight of mass transportation construction projects 

 46GAO, District of Columbia: Structural Imbalance and Management Issues, GAO-04-908T

(Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2004). 

We Have Suggested 

Spending Safeguards for 

Any Increase in Federal 

Funds Provided to Address 

the District of Columbia’s 

Structural Imbalance 

Surface Transportation 

Reauthorization Bill Would 

Enhance Management 

Oversight Controls for 

Projects Receiving Federal 

Funds 
Page 33 GAO-05-922T 

receiving federal funds.47 The funds would be used to review and ensure 

compliance with federal requirements for project management. To support 

the need for such enhanced oversight, the committee report 

accompanying the House bill notes that comprehensive agency oversight, 

compliance review, and technical assistance are necessary for all major 

grant programs.48

• On the highway side, both versions of the bill49 would require the Secretary 

of Transportation to establish an oversight program for the Federal-Aid 

Highway Program to promote the effective and efficient use of federal 

highway funds. As part of this new oversight program, the Federal 

Highway Administration (FHWA) would (1) review states’ financial 

management systems, (2) develop minimum standards for estimating 

project costs, and (3) evaluate state practices for awarding contracts and 

reducing project costs. In addition, highway projects receiving a certain 

amount of federal assistance—$500 million or more in the House bill and 

$1 billion or more in the Senate bill—would be subject to an increased 

level of FHWA oversight, including submitting a project management plan 

and an annual financial plan to FHWA documenting the project’s 

procedures for managing costs and schedules. 

WMATA’s service to the nation’s capital and its associated additional 

responsibilities need to be considered when determining whether a greater 

federal role in providing financial assistance to, and oversight of, WMATA 

is warranted. In the end, it is up to Congress to decide whether or in what 

form to provide WMATA with additional federal funding in recognition of 

its support of the federal government. In addition, if Congress decides to 

provide WMATA with the additional funding, it is important for there to be 

reasonable assurances that the funds will be spent efficiently and 

effectively. WMATA is already subject to oversight from multiple entities, 

but it is unclear whether this oversight is sufficient to provide such 

assurances. WMATA’s existing oversight could be supplemented by 

including safeguards in any legislation that provides additional federal 

funding. Our research has shown that a number of options are available 

 47H.R. 3 109th Cong., Engrossed House, § 3026 (2005); H.R. 3, 109th Cong., Engrossed 

Senate Amendment, § 6025 (2005). 

48House Report No. 109-12, at 421 and 422 (2005). 

49H.R. 3, 109th Cong., Engrossed House, § 1105 (2005); H.R. 3, 109th Cong., Engrossed 

Amendment Senate, § 1802 (2005). 

Concluding 

Observations 
Page 34 GAO-05-922T 

for such safeguards, although we have not fully analyzed their applicability 

to WMATA or their relative merits. The options include the following: 

• Require WMATA officials to report to Congress on how they plan to spend 

the federal assistance and regularly report on how it is being spent. For 

example, Congress could require officials to submit a plan to Congress on 

how they intend to spend the federal assistance—before any funds are 

obligated—and update this plan as circumstances or priorities change. 

• Further specify the types of projects for which federal funds could be used 

or include a matching requirement to ensure that some local funds 

continue to be used for infrastructure and capital requirements. 

• Require that any additional funding provided to WMATA be administered 

through DOT and FTA and therefore be subject to the PMO program. 

• Institute additional oversight bodies for WMATA, either through or 

independent of its board of directors. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 

to respond to any questions that you or the other Members of the 

Committee may have. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202) 

512-2834 or siggerudk@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to 

this testimony include Seto Bagdoyan, Mark Bondo, Christine Bonham, 

Jay Cherlow, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Edda Emmanuelli-Perez, Rita Grieco, 

Heather Halliwell, Maureen Luna-Long, Susan Michal-Smith, SaraAnn 

Moessbauer, Katie Schmidt, and Earl Christopher Woodard. 

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Page 35 GAO-05-922T 

To determine the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s 

(WMATA) responsibilities for supporting the federal government, we 

interviewed a wide array of federal and local officials including those from 

WMATA, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the Office of 

Personnel Management, the General Services Administration, the National 

Capital Planning Commission, the Metropolitan Washington Council of 

Governments, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Capitol Police, and the 

District of Columbia Department of Transportation. We reviewed federal 

guidance on employees’ use of, and the placement of federal buildings 

near, mass transit and local and federal emergency planning guidance. We 

also used WMATA’s estimates of federal Metrorail ridership based on its 

2002 passenger survey. Through our review of the survey methodology, 

and use of other corroborating evidence, we determined that the ridership 

estimates were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To determine the current funding challenges facing WMATA and the 

options proposed to address these challenges, we reviewed and analyzed 

the budgetary shortfall estimate prepared by the Metro Funding Panel, 

budget documents from WMATA, and prior GAO reports. We interviewed 

officials from WMATA and local transportation experts who served on the 

funding panel. 

To determine the entities that currently provide oversight of WMATA and 

the focus of their recent reviews, we interviewed WMATA officials and 

reviewed selected reports and audits that have been issued by WMATA’s 

oversight bodies since the beginning of calendar year 2003. Our review 

included the following: 

• WMATA Auditor General reports 

• FTA’s Project Management Oversight (PMO) program contractor reports 

• FTA’s most recent Triennial Review1

• The independent external auditor’s review of WMATA’s financial 

statements and internal controls as required under the Single Audit Act 

• The American Public Transportation Association’s peer review reports 

 1

The most recent Triennial Review of WMATA was in September 2002. 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Page 36 GAO-05-922T 

Although FTA carries out a number of reviews of transit agencies in 

addition to the Triennial Review and the PMO reports, we selected the 

Triennial Review because it covers grantees’ compliance with a wide 

range of statutory and administrative requirements, and we selected the 

PMO reports because this program provides oversight of WMATA’s major 

capital projects, which represent a significant part of WMATA’s budget. 

For this statement, we did not analyze any oversight entities or reports 

related to safety, such as those of the Tri-State Oversight Committee, the 

National Transportation Safety Board, or the American Public 

Transportation Association. We plan to address these, as well as FTA’s 

additional compliance reviews, as part of our ongoing work. 

To identify applicable examples of spending safeguards and management 

oversight of any additional federal assistance provided to WMATA, should 

Congress decide to provide such assistance, we reviewed prior GAO work 

on surface transportation funding and management oversight, as well as 

other documents on transportation planning and finance, and interviewed 

officials with expertise in the transit industry, transportation finance, and 

transportation planning. 

(542067) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER