[Cite as State v. Parker, 2015-Ohio-4101.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO ) CASE NO. 13 MA 161 

) 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE ) 

) 

VS. ) OPINION 

) 

WILLIE PARKER ) 

) 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ) 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from the Court of 

Common Pleas of Mahoning County, 

Ohio 

Case No. 2012 CR 723 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed. 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Paul J. Gains 

Mahoning County Prosecutor 

Atty. Ralph M. Rivera 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

21 West Boardman Street, 6th Floor 

Youngstown, Ohio 44503 

For Defendant-Appellant: Atty. Rhys B. Cartwright-Jones 

42 N. Phelps St. 

Youngstown, Ohio 44503-1130 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Carol Ann Robb 

Dated: September 30, 2015
[Cite as State v. Parker, 2015-Ohio-4101.]

WAITE, J. 

{¶1} Appellant Willie Parker appeals a Mahoning County Common Pleas 

Court conviction following jury trial on two counts of rape and twenty counts of gross 

sexual imposition (“GSI”). The indictment charged Appellant with twenty counts of 

rape and twenty counts of GSI for alleged acts that occurred over the course of two 

years. Appellant argues that the indictment failed to present sufficient details as to 

which facts correlated with which charge. Additionally, Appellant contends that the 

lengthy timespan of the alleged acts was not properly narrowed. Appellant was 

provided with a bill of particulars which supplemented the indictment and provided 

sufficient details of the allegations. As we held in State v. Billman, 7th Dist. Nos. 12 

MO 3, 12 MO 5, 2013-Ohio-5774, an otherwise sufficient indictment is not made 

insufficient when exact dates of incidents alleged to occur over an extended period of 

time are not provided, so long as specific dates and times do not constitute elements 

of the offense. 

{¶2} Appellant also argues that the indictment charged him with an “absurd” 

number of counts. However, Billman, supra, also holds that no inherent defect exists 

when a defendant is charged with numerous counts of the same offense over a 

defined period of time. Finally, Appellant challenges his conviction both as against 

the sufficiency of the evidence and its manifest weight. Although the parties’ 

witnesses presented somewhat conflicting stories, even the defense witnesses 

appeared to corroborate the victim’s accusations. As the record is devoid of any 

evidence that the jury clearly lost its way in a manner creating a manifest injustice, 
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we will not disturb its verdict. Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments are without merit 

and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Factual and Procedural History 

{¶3} The victim in this matter is Appellant’s goddaughter as well as his 

daughter’s former best friend. While the victim was in seventh and eighth grade, 

Appellant would pick up his daughter, the victim and another girl from school and 

drive them to his house. In the late evening, he would drive the victim and her friend 

home, first dropping the friend off so that he and the victim remained alone in the car. 

{¶4} While driving the victim home, he would pull his car off to the side of the 

road and perform various sexual acts on her. Specifically, she accused him of 

kissing her, touching her breasts, and inserting his finger into her vagina. The victim 

alleged that these acts occurred on more than twenty occasions from September 1, 

1999 until September 28, 2001. The victim stated that the abuse ended when she 

and Appellant’s daughter had a falling out and she no longer visited Appellant’s 

home. 

{¶5} The victim never spoke of the incident until she was 21 years old. At 

that time, she began suffering from non-epileptic seizures and was treated at the 

Cleveland Clinic. During one visit to the clinic, the victim began crying and told her 

mother that Appellant had hurt her, but she then had a seizure and stopped talking. 

She never provided her mother with details, but began to see a therapist. While at 

the therapist’s office, the victim noticed a flyer advertising a group for sexual assault 
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victims. When she inquired about the group, the therapist asked her if she had been 

sexually abused, and the victim answered in the affirmative. 

{¶6} The therapist referred the victim to the group. Shortly thereafter, the 

victim learned that the statute of limitations had not run. She filed a police report 

accusing Appellant of sexual abuse. After interviewing the victim and Appellant, the 

state charged Appellant with twenty counts of rape, a felony of the first degree, and 

twenty counts of GSI, a felony of the fourth degree. Following jury trial, Appellant 

was convicted on two counts of rape and twenty counts of GSI. He was sentenced to 

ten years per rape count, to be served concurrently, and eighteen months per gross 

sexual imposition charge, also to be served concurrently. The sentences for rape 

and GSI were ordered to run consecutively, for an aggregate total of eleven and a 

half years of incarceration. Appellant filed a timely appeal. 

First Assignment of Error 

The trial Court erred in allowing the case to proceed based on an 

indictment that assured convictions in violation of the double jeopardy 

clauses of the U.S. and Ohio Constitutions. 

{¶7} As only about half of the states have grand jury proceedings, the “Fifth 

Amendment right to a grand jury does not apply to state prosecutions.” Billman, 

supra, at ¶20, citing State v. Fulton, 57 Ohio St.2d 120, 122, 566 N.E.2d 1195 (1981); 

Miller and Wright, Criminal Procedures: Prosecution and Adjudication, 207-213 (3rd 

Ed. Aspen Ed. Wolters Kluwer 2007.) Thus, our discussion will be limited to 

applicable Ohio law. 
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{¶8} In Ohio, a person accused of a felony is “entitled to an indictment 

setting forth the ‘nature and cause of the accusation’ pursuant to Section 10, Article I 

of the Ohio Constitution.” State v. Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 170, 478 N.E.2d 781 

(1985). 

{¶9} An indictment [or information] is sufficient “if it can be understood 

therefrom”: 

(A) That it is entitled in a court having authority to receive it, though the 

name of the court is not stated; 

(B) If it is an indictment, that it was found by a grand jury of the county 

in which the court was held; * * * 

(C) That the defendant is named, * * * 

(D) That an offense was committed at some place within the 

jurisdiction of the court, * * * 

(E) That the offense was committed at some time prior to the time of 

finding of the indictment * * *. 

State v. Billman, 7th Dist. Nos. 12 MO 3, 12 MO 5, 2013-Ohio-5774, ¶21. 

{¶10} Several Ohio statutes also address indictments. Crim.R. 7 requires an 

indictment to contain the identifying number of the charged statutory violation. R.C. 

2941.08 lists ten types of defects that will not affect an indictment’s validity. These 

include: “omitting to state the time at which the offense was committed, in a case in 
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which time is not of the essence of the offense,” “stating the time imperfectly,” and 

“other defects or imperfections which do not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of 

the defendant upon the merits. R.C. 2941.08(B), (C) and (K). Pursuant to R.C. 

2941.03 - .06, a single indictment may be used to charge multiple offenses. 

{¶11} Failure to timely object to the sufficiency of the information in the 

indictment limits appellate review to a plain error analysis. State v. Horner, 126 Ohio 

St.3d 466, 473, 2010-Ohio-3830, paragraph three of the syllabus; State v. Frazier, 73 

Ohio St.3d 323, 332, 652 N.E.2d 1000 (1995); State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 

2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215. It is well established that, “notice of plain error ‘is 

to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to 

prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” Billman at ¶25.

{¶12} A three-part test is employed to determine whether plain error exists. 

Id. at ¶25, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). 

First, there must be an error, i.e. a deviation from a legal rule. Second, 

the error must be plain. To be “plain” within the meaning of Crim.R. 

52(B), an error must be an “obvious” defect in the trial proceedings. 

Third, the error must have affected “substantial rights.” We have 

interpreted this aspect of the rule to mean that the trial court's error 

must have affected the outcome of the trial. 

Billman at ¶25. 

{¶13} Appellant claims that his indictment was so vague it invited convictions 

that would violate the double jeopardy clause. Appellant asserts that the indictment 
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failed to specify the acts associated with each count. He also argues that the acts 

were vaguely stated to have occurred during a lengthy period, September 1, 1999 to 

September 28, 2001, which is insufficient to place him on notice of the charges 

against him. Appellant argues that the “absurd number of counts” charged against 

him was the result of prosecutorial misconduct. He asserts that the state lacked 

sufficient evidence to support twenty convictions. Essentially, Appellant argues that 

the state led the jury to decide the case under a theory of “where there is smoke 

there must be fire.” 

{¶14} In response, the state compares and contrasts the facts of this case to 

several other Ohio cases. The state highlights the similarities between the instant 

case and Billman, supra, and asserts that in Billman, we stated that an indictment is 

not defective merely because it charges a defendant with multiple charges of the 

same offense. The state distinguished the present case from the Sixth Circuit’s 

decision in Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626 (6th Cir.2005), with which we 

specifically disagreed in Billman. Accordingly, the state urges that Appellant’s 

indictment conformed to Ohio law and adequately placed him on notice of the 

charges he faced. Regardless, Appellant has not met his burden of showing that 

some prejudice was suffered as a result of his allegedly vague indictment. The state 

also asserts that the record does not support Appellant’s allegation of prosecutorial 

misconduct. 

{¶15} When evaluating the sufficiency of an indictment, it is necessary to 

determine whether it meets the requirements of R.C. 2941.03. This indictment 
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specified the name of the trial court, the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court. 

Thus, R.C. 2941.03(A) is met. Second, the indictment revealed that the Grand Jury 

was comprised of residents of Mahoning County, the county where the court was 

held, in accordance with R.C. 2941.03(B). Third, as required under R.C. 2941.03(C), 

Appellant’s name is listed as the defendant. Fourth, the indictment stated that the 

incidents occurred within Mahoning County, pursuant to R.C. 2941.03(D). Fifth, in 

accordance with R.C. 2941.03(E), the date of each offense (between September 1, 

1999 and September 29, 2001) precedes the date of the indictment (July 12, 2012). 

As all of the requirements of R.C. 2941.03 are met, the indictment is not facially 

defective. 

{¶16} As to Appellant’s specific arguments, we have addressed almost 

identical issues in two previous cases. In Billman, the appellant was charged with 

two counts of GSI and two counts of rape against one minor child, and two counts of 

attempted rape and six counts of GSI against a second minor child. The indictment 

alleged that the incidents involving the first victim occurred between January 1, 2011 

and October 28, 2011. The incidents involving the second victim allegedly occurred 

between January 1, 2006 and October 28, 2011. After trial, the appellant was 

convicted on two counts of rape and ten counts of GSI. He was acquitted on one 

count of GSI and the remaining attempted rape charges were not submitted to the 

jury. The appellant appealed and presented arguments similar to those made by 

Appellant in the instant case. He argued that the range of times in which the 
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incidents occurred was vague, the indictment was duplicative, and that the indictment 

contained insufficient facts to specify which events comprised the charges. 

{¶17} On review, we affirmed Billman’s conviction. Just as in the instant 

case, the appellant was limited to a plain error review. After finding that the 

indictment was facially sufficient, we addressed the appellant’s arguments. We held 

that an indictment and bill of particulars “need not provide specific dates and time 

where date and time is not an element of the offense charged.” Id. at ¶28. In so 

doing, we noted that child victims often have difficulty providing exact dates, 

particularly when the incidents occurred repeatedly over a lengthy period of time. 

{¶18} While both of Billman’s victims testified that the conduct occurred 

numerous times and provided the details of each event and what specific conduct 

occurred, we emphasized that there is no inherent defect in an indictment that 

charges a defendant with multiple counts of the same offense if the conduct was 

repeated over a defined period of time. Further, we noted that the state provided a 

bill of particulars that specified which acts were performed on the victims. Lastly, we 

addressed the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Valentine, supra. As noted by the state, we 

observed that Valentine does not rely on Ohio law and “the decision has been 

distinguished in every subsequent Sixth Circuit decision that cites it on this issue.” 

Billman, supra, at ¶34. 

{¶19} We also addressed the sufficiency of an indictment in State v. Stefka, 

7th Dist. No. 10 MO 7, 2012-Ohio-3004, 973 N.E.2d 786. In that case, the appellant 

was charged with thirty-nine counts involving sexual acts committed against three 
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minor victims. He was charged with twenty-six counts of rape (four with a 

specification) and thirteen counts of GSI. He requested and received a bill of 

particulars which described the type of conduct that supported each charge. On 

appeal, he presented arguments similar to those presented by Appellant in the 

instant case. 

{¶20} In Stefka, we reiterated that specific times and dates need not be 

provided when they are not an element of the charged offense. Further, we stated 

that “cases involving sexual abuse of children often cannot be charged with a high 

level of specificity with regard to the time of the abuse.” Id. at ¶50. In Stefka, the 

indictment and bill of particulars differentiated the counts by detailing the type of 

conduct, how it started, and how long it lasted. We specifically acknowledged that 

the state chose to only bring twenty-six charges against the appellant, when the 

evidence supported several more counts because the appellant committed different 

acts against all three victims each weekend for three months. 

{¶21} Turning to the instant matter, we first address Appellant’s concerns 

regarding the timeline provided within the indictment. As stated above, it is wellestablished in Ohio that an exact time or date is not required when these are not an 

element of the charged offense. Clearly, time and date are not elements of either 

charged offense, rape and GSI. As previously noted, there is usually great difficulty 

in obtaining exact dates when the victim was a minor at the time of the abuse. We 

acknowledge the difficulty in determining an exact time or date of any individual 

incident when the abuse occurred over a long period of time. Even though the victim 
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is now an adult, she was a minor at the time of the abuse and the record reflects that 

the abuse occurred every school day during the victim’s seventh and eighth grade 

years, from September 1, 1999 until September 28, 2001. Thus, in accordance with 

our decisions in Billman and Stefka, the range of dates, here, does not create a 

defect in the indictment. 

{¶22} Next, we consider the alleged vagueness of the acts associated with 

each count. The indictment contained a total of forty counts. Each count included a 

range of dates the incidents occurred and addressed each element of the 

corresponding offenses. Absent from the indictment is information about the specific 

conduct involved in the incidents. However, the state filed a bill of particulars which 

provided this information. As to counts one through twenty (the rape counts), the 

state specified: 

On or about or between September 1, 1999 and September 28, 2001, 

at multiple locations in and around Youngstown, Mahoning County, 

Ohio, [Appellant] did engage in sexual conduct with [the victim], and 

purposely compelled her to submit by force or threat of force, by 

inserting his fingers into her vagina on multiple occasions, and she was 

only in the 7th and 8th grades, he was her godfather and would pick her 

up from school. 

(7/18/13 Bill of Particulars.) 

{¶23} As to counts twenty-one through forty, the bill of particulars stated: 
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On or about or between September 1, 1999 and September 28, 2001, 

at multiple locations in and around Youngstown, Mahoning County, 

Ohio, [Appellant] did have sexual contact with [the victim], not his 

spouse and purposely compelled her to submit by force or threat of 

force, by inserting putting [sic] his mouth on her breasts on multiple 

occasions, and she was only in the 7th and 8th grades, he was her 

godfather and would pick her up from school. 

(7/18/13 Bill of Particulars.) 

{¶24} As the indictment and the bill of particulars comply with the law outlined 

in Billman and Stefka, this indictment sufficiently described which acts led to which 

counts. The fact that Appellant committed the same conduct repeatedly over a long 

period of time does not burden the state with the duty to spell out every detail of 

every incident. 

{¶25} Appellant’s final two arguments will be addressed together. He claims 

that the indictment vaguely states that the conduct occurred twenty times. He also 

argues that the forty counts led the jury to decide the case under a theory that “where 

there is smoke there must be fire.” We first note, as we did in Stefka, that the 

testimony in this case indicates that the state could have charged Appellant with 

more than forty counts. If the victim’s testimony is believed, the abuse occurred 

every school day for two years. Theoretically, conduct committed every school day 

for two years could support over a hundred counts. Thus, this record does not 

support Appellant’s claim that he was overcharged. 
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{¶26} Accordingly, the record demonstrates that the indictment and the bill of 

particulars provided Appellant with sufficient detail to place him on notice of the 

charges against him. We cannot find plain error in regard to the indictment. As such, 

Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is overruled. 

Second Assignment of Error 

The trial Court erred in entering convictions against the defendant 

absent sufficient evidence and/or in contribution of the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

{¶27} Appellant has challenged his conviction as to both the sufficiency of the 

evidence and its manifest weight. A sufficiency of the evidence review questions 

whether, “after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Smith, 7th Dist. Nos. 02 CA 227, 02 CA 231, 

2004-Ohio-4285, ¶10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 

(1997); State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). Thus, sufficiency is 

a test of adequacy. Thompkins at 386. Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to 

sustain a conviction is a question of law. State v. Sloane, 7th Dist. No. 06 MA 144, 

2009-Ohio-1175, ¶54, citing State v. Robinson, 162 Ohio St. 486, 124 N.E.2d 148 

(1955). 

{¶28} Even if a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, a reviewing 

court may find the conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Thompkins at 387. When a reviewing court determines whether a conviction is 
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against the manifest weight of the evidence, a broader test is used. State v. Greiner, 

7th Dist. No. 05 BE 27, 2007-Ohio-1390, ¶7. Under the manifest weight test, “[t]he 

court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, 

considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in 

the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of 

justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. at ¶8, citing 

Thompkins, supra, at 387; State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 

(1st Dist.1983). 

{¶29} Appellant was convicted on two counts of rape in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(2) which states that: “[n]o person shall engage in sexual conduct with 

another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or 

threat of force.” Appellant was additionally convicted on twenty counts of GSI in 

violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) which provides that: 

No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the 

offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual 

contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have 

sexual contact when any of the following applies: 

(1) The offender purposely compels the other person, or one of the 

other persons, to submit by force or threat of force. 

{¶30} Appellant urges that the victim’s statements were too vague to support 

his convictions. Appellant particularly takes issue with the victim’s unsupported 

allegation that the incidents occurred more than twenty times. Further, Appellant 
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asserts that both of the state’s witnesses testified that the victim had never discussed 

twenty incidents of rape or gross sexual imposition with anyone prior to filing charges. 

In fact, Appellant notes that the testimony shows the victim had denied such conduct 

even occurred to two separate people. 

{¶31} The state argues that the victim gave very specific testimony regarding: 

the place where the incidents occurred (in Appellant’s car), the events leading up to 

the incidents (while driving her home from school he would pull the car over and 

perform the acts), the conduct (he would fondle her breasts, kiss her, and insert his 

fingers into her vagina), the length of time (five to fifteen minutes), and the frequency 

of the incidents (every time he drove her home). Further, the state highlights the 

testimony of Jamal and Michale Hoey who both testified that, while she refused to 

discuss the extent of the abuse, the victim had told them abuse had occurred. As the 

jury was in the best position to judge the witnesses’ credibility, the state contends that 

the manifest weight of the evidence supports Appellant’s convictions. 

{¶32} The first witness presented by the state was the victim’s mother. She 

testified that the victim began to experience seizures around her twenty-first birthday 

and was taken to the Cleveland Clinic on at least one occasion. At some point during 

a visit to the clinic, the victim began crying hysterically and stated, “Willie hurt me,” 

but then went into a seizure before she could provide specific details. (Tr., p. 369.) 

The mother explained that the victim later entered counseling and eventually 

reported the incident to the police. 
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{¶33} The victim testified next. She explained how the abuse began, what 

conduct it entailed, and how it ended. She began by explaining that Appellant would 

pick his daughter, herself, and another girl up at school and drive them to his house. 

Appellant would take her and the other friend home late in the evening, dropping the 

other girl off first so that only the two of them remained in the car. While driving her 

home, Appellant would pull over on the side of the road towards the end of a street 

where there were no houses. She testified that once the car was stopped, he would 

touch her breasts underneath her bra with both hands, kiss her, and insert his fingers 

into her vagina. She stated that this occurred every time he took her home, which 

was five days a week, and would last for five to fifteen minutes. She testified that he 

repeated the conduct on at least twenty occasions. 

{¶34} She also testified to a specific incident when a police car pulled behind 

them and Appellant stopped what he was doing and acted as though he was 

checking his car. When he pulled away the police car did not follow. She testified 

that the incidents stopped all together after she and his daughter had a falling out 

and she no longer went to the house. She explained that she never told anyone 

about the abuse because she was afraid. 

{¶35} The victim testified that she first spoke of the incident shortly after she 

began experiencing non-epileptic seizures when she was twenty-one years old. She 

stated that while receiving treatment for the seizures at the Cleveland Clinic she 

finally told her mother about the incidents but did not provide details. Shortly 

thereafter, she entered a treatment group for victims of sexual offenses and filed a 
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police report a few months later. Around the time she filed the report, she testified 

that she told Michale and Jamal Hoey about the abuse for the first time, but she did 

not give them specific details. Sometime after confiding in the Hoeys, she argued 

with them and no longer considered them friends. 

{¶36} Amanda Canteras, the victim’s therapist, testified that the victim 

inquired about a poster on the wall which advertised a group for sexual assault 

victims. Canteras asked the victim if she had been sexually abused and the victim 

responded in the affirmative. The victim confided that she was abused from ages 

thirteen to fourteen. She further testified that the victim alleged that the man abused 

her while giving her a ride home. 

{¶37} Detective David Lomax testified that the victim told him she had been 

sexually abused inside a car. She provided street names where the abuse took 

place. When asked if the victim described specific acts, Det. Lomax stated that the 

victim specified that he kissed her, fondled her, and touched her vagina with his 

fingers. He stated that the victim told him that the abuse occurred more than twenty 

times. He testified that Appellant was brought in for an interview and told Det. Lomax 

“I don’t remember it happening that way.” (Tr., p. 565.) However, Appellant did not 

offer a further explanation. 

{¶38} Jamal Hoey testified next. He stated that the victim told him and his 

sister, Michale, that she had been molested by a family friend when she was 

younger. The victim told him that she was touched in an inappropriate way and felt 

“nasty” about it. (Tr., p. 684.) He explained that when describing the abuse, she 
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motioned a “swipe” across her chest. (Tr., p. 684.) He asked her if the man 

penetrated her and she said no. He clarified that he only asked if the man had sex 

with her, not whether he penetrated her with his fingers. He admitted that he did not 

remember her response when he asked if the man had fondled her. 

{¶39} Michale Hoey testified that the victim told her that she was sexually 

abused when she was younger and she never told anyone about it before. The 

victim told her that the man had brushed up against her breasts and it made her feel 

“nasty and dirty.” (Tr., p. 710.) Unlike her brother, Michale stated that she 

specifically asked whether the man used his fingers to penetrate her or fondled her, 

and the victim denied such conduct. However, she also testified that the victim told 

her that the man had kissed her and taken her virginity. 

{¶40} Appellant argues that the victim vaguely stated that the act occurred 

twenty times, which is insufficient to prove her allegations. This argument appears 

irrelevant, as the jury found him guilty of only two counts of rape. In addition, it is 

noted that the victim testified the acts all occurred every school day for approximately 

two years. As to the twenty counts of GSI, the jury’s verdict on the rape counts 

clearly demonstrates that the jury gave careful consideration to any vagueness in the 

victim’s allegations. 

{¶41} Appellant next argues that the only evidence that weighs in favor of a 

conviction is the victim’s testimony. This argument is clearly contradicted by the 

record. In addition to the victim’s testimony, several witnesses provided testimony in 

support of a conviction, including the victim’s mother, the victim’s therapist, and Det. 
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Lomax. Further, although the Hoeys testified on behalf of the defense, they both 

acknowledged that the victim had previously told them of the abuse. Although they 

testified that the victim denied certain conduct occurred and failed to provide specific 

details, their testimony tends to support the jury’s finding that at least some instances 

of abuse occurred. 

{¶42} The victim herself gave very specific details when she testified as to the 

acts. She provided a time range of September 1, 1999 to September 28, 2001. 

While this is a lengthy range, she has maintained from the beginning that the conduct 

occurred every school day during her seventh and eighth grade years, thus the range 

is in accordance with her claims. She provided a specific location where the conduct 

took place, as she not only testified that the acts occurred in Appellant’s car when 

parked on the side of the road, but specifically described this area as near the end of 

specifically named streets where no houses had been built. She provided that the 

incidents occurred at night, and she testified that each incident lasted approximately 

five to fifteen minutes. She also testified that during one incident, a police car pulled 

behind them and Appellant pulled back onto the road and drove away. 

{¶43} The victim also discussed Appellant’s specific actions. She testified 

that he would place both hands under her shirt and bra and touch her breasts. He 

would kiss her and insert his fingers into her vagina. Lastly, she testified that 

Appellant was her godfather, which appears to have been introduced to show his 

authority over her. 
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{¶44} The victim’s basic allegations were confirmed through the testimony of 

Amanda Canteras, Det. Lomax, and Jamal and Michale Hoey. Each testified that 

she told them that she had been repeatedly sexually abused as a youngster by a 

family friend when he took her home in his car. Although she did not discuss specific 

details with each person, the witnesses’ testimony tends to confirm her basic 

allegations. Accordingly, we find that the state presented sufficient evidence to 

support the convictions. 

{¶45} We next turn to Appellant’s manifest weight argument. Importantly, 

every witness who testified, with the exception of Appellant’s daughter, stated that 

the victim told them that she had been abused. As this case did not involve 

eyewitness or physical evidence, the victim’s credibility and the witnesses’ 

corroboration of her allegations had impact. The victim was able to provide specific 

details about the allegations both in her police interview and at trial. Her story 

remained unchanged, which is significant in light of her highly specific details. 

Further, her story to others, while it may not have included specific detail, did involve 

an accusation against a family friend (Appellant is her godfather), an older man 

(Appellant is unquestionably older than the victim), and a car (the abuse occurred 

while he drove her home). We also note that because the jury found Appellant guilty 

of only two out of twenty rape counts, this suggests that the jury carefully considered 

her testimony and did not fall victim to Appellant’s smoke and fire theory. 

{¶46} Further, key witnesses for the defense, Jamal and Michael Hoey, 

contradicted themselves and each other at times. First, Jamal testified that the victim 
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denied penetration, but he admittedly believes that penetration means sexual 

intercourse and not digital or oral penetration. He acknowledged that he did not 

specifically ask the victim if the abuser had digitally penetrated or fondled her. 

Michale then testified that she specifically asked the victim about digital penetration 

and fondling and the victim denied such conduct. However, Michale then testified 

that the victim told her that the man had kissed her and took her virginity. Jamal also 

testified that at least some sexual contact may have occurred as he acknowledged 

the victim made a swiping motion across her chest when describing the abuse. 

While Jamal may have interpreted this motion as mere contact with her chest, it 

would be reasonable for a jury to interpret the motion as indicating sexual contact 

with her breasts. Finally, it is clear from the record that the Hoeys dislike the victim 

and it was their personal belief that she was a liar. 

{¶47} As the jury was in the best position to judge the witnesses’ credibility 

and we find nothing in the record to suggest that the jury’s verdict created a manifest 

miscarriage of justice, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

Conclusion 

{¶48} As an indictment that charges multiple counts of the same conduct is 

not inherently defective and the indictment at issue conformed to Ohio law, the 

indictment was sufficient to give Appellant notice of the charges against him. The 

victim’s statements to police and her testimony support the number of counts 

charged against Appellant. Finally, the victim and several other witnesses presented 
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sufficient credible evidence of the abuse and Appellant’s witnesses tended to 

corroborate the victim’s story. This record demonstrates that the jury gave careful 

consideration to the credibility of each witness. Accordingly, Appellant’s assignments 

of error are without merit and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in full. 

Donofrio, P.J., concurs. 

Robb, J., concurs.