J.S29043/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 IN RE: ADOPTION OF: B.J.F.- Z., A/K/A B.F.-Z., A MINOR : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

: APPEAL OF: T.F. : : : No. 1900 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered November 16, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Or phans’ Court

at No. CP-02-AP-0000100-2015 IN RE: ADOPTION OF: I.J.F.-Z., A/K/A I.F.-Z., A MINOR : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

: APPEAL OF: T.F. : : : No. 1901 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered November 16, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Or phans’ Court

at No. CP-02-AP-0000101-2015 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, and FITZGERALD, * JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MAY 05, 2016 T.F. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders dated Novem ber 12, 2015, and entered on November 16, 2015, granting the peti tions filed by the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Fami lies (“CYF”) to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to her minor children, B.F.-Z. (born in June of 2011), a male, and I.F.-Z. (born i n February of 2013), a

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.J.S29043/16

- 2

-

female (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). 1
We affirm. We adopt the trial court recitation of the relevanthistory of this case. See Trial Ct. Op., 1/8/16, at 2-6 (unpaginated). Importantly, on June 11, 2015, CYF filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mother to the Children. On June 25, 2015, October 8, 2015, and N ovember 12, 2015, the trial court held hearings on the petitions. In orders dated November 12, 2015, and entered on N ovember 16, 2015, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights. 2 On December 4, 2015, Mother timely filed notices of appeal, along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A. P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On December 21, 2015, this Court sua sponteconsolidated the appeals. Mother raises the following issues on appeal: I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in finding that Allegheny County Chil dren, Youth and Families proved by clear and convincing evidence grounds for the involuntary termination of

. . .

1 In these orders, the trial court also terminated t he parental rights of J.A.Z., the Children’s father (“Father”), and any unknown father, pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Neithe r Father nor any unknown father has filed an appeal or is a party to the pre sent appeal.

2 See In re L.M. , 923 A.2d 505, 508-09 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating a n order is not appealable until it is entered on the docketwith the required notation that appropriate notice has been given)

.J.S29043/16

- 3

- Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8)[?] II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that Allegheny County Children, Youth and Families met its burden of prov ing that termination of . . . Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the [C]hildren pursu ant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) by clear and convincing eviden ce[?] Mother’s Brief at 6. In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating pa rental rights, we adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretio n standard when considering a trial court’s determina tion of a petition for termination of parental rights. As i n dependency cases, our standard of review requires a n appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are suppo rted by the record. In re: R.J.T. , 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010). If the factual findings are supported, app ellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely becau se the reviewing court might have reached a different conc lusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or i ll-will. Id. As we discussed in R.J.T. , there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appel late courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial ju dges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing a nd often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding th e child and parents. Therefore, even where the factscould support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgm ent; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long a s theJ.S29043/16

- 4

- factual findings are supported by the record and th e court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re S.P. , 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012) ( some citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J. , 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come t o a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision re garding the termination of parental rights with regard to any o ne subsection of Section 2511(a). In re B.L.W. , 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) ( en banc ). We will focus our review on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination (a) General rule.— The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on a ny of the following grounds: * * * (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the chi ld to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental we ll-J.S29043/16

- 5

- being and the conditions and causes of the incapaci ty, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be rem edied by the parent. * * * (b) Other considerations.— The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and wel fare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such a s inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing a nd medical care if found to be beyond the control of t he parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuan t to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequ ent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b). This Court has explained that the focus in terminat ing parental rights under Section 2511(a) is on the parent, but under S ection 2511(b), the focus is on the child. In re C.L.G. , 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) ( en banc ). The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under S ection 2511(a)(2) as follows.

[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides [the] statutory groun d[] for termination of parental rights where it is demonstr ated by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions an d causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” . . . [The Supreme Court] has addressed incapacity suffic ient for termination under § 2511(a)(2):J.S29043/16

- 6

- A decision to terminate parental rights, never to b e made lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can seldom be more difficult than when termination is based upon parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as parentally un fit as one who refuses to perform the duties. In re S.P. , 616 Pa. at 326-27, 47 A.3d at 827 (citation omitt ed). Instantly, the record substantiates the trial court ’s assessment of the evidence regarding Mother’s incapacity to parent Ch ildren, and her inability to remedy the conditions and causes of her incapaci ty to parent Children, which we adopt herein. SeeTrial Ct. Op. at 7-8 (unpaginated). In her brief, Mother argues that the trial court er red in finding that the grounds for termination existed under Section 2511( a)(2). She acknowledged her mistakes with Children and recogni zed that she needs to make better and healthier choices regarding smoking and using drugs and alcohol. Mother’s Brief at 13-15. This Court, how ever, has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts towardsthe reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. In re A.L.D. , 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002). A “parent’s vow to cooperate, a fter a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availa bility of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” Id. As the trial court’s factual findings, including Mother’s longstanding r ecalcitrance, are supported by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions ar e not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion, we affirm the tri al court’s decision withJ.S29043/16

- 7

-

regard to subsection (a)(2). In re S.P. , 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d at 826-
27. Next, we review the termination of Mother’s parent al rights under Section 2511(b). Our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and wel fare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotiona l needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpr eted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, secur ity, and stability.” In re K.M. , 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M. , [533 Pa. 115, 122, 620 A.2d 481, 485 (1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental b ond. In re K.M. , 53 A.3d at 791. In re T.S.M. , 620 Pa. 602, 628-29, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). The trial court considered the needs and welfare of the Children and set forth its bond-effect analysis at length. SeeTrial Ct. Op. at 9-10 (unpaginated). Again, as the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations are supported by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not erroneous, we affirm the trial court’s decision with regard to subsection (b). In re S.P. , 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d at 826-27. Mother argues that Children recognize her as their mother and engage in a loving relationship with her. Mother’s Brief at 21. As we stated in In re
Z.P. , 994 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Super. 2010), a child’s life “ simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle theJ.S29043/16

- 8

-

responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125 (citation omitted). Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his or her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill hisor her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillm ent of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M. , 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders terminating Mother’s parental rights. Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 5/5/2016On June 10, 2015, the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and

Families ("CYF"} filed petitions for involuntary termination of the parental rights of the natural parents of 

### I. F-Z. and B. F-Z, (''the children"). Appellant, 

# TW F. ("Mother''} is the natural mother of the Children. Hearings on the petition to terminate parental rights ("TPR") were held on June 25, 2015, October 8, 2015 and November 12, 2015 regarding both Children. At the time of the June 25, 2015 "show up" hearing, the Children had been in care for over 15 months. At the conclusion of the November 12, 2015 hearing, I found CYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination existed and that termination best served the needs and welfare of the Children. Accordingly, on November 12, 2015, I issued Orders terminating the parental rights of the natural parents to the Children. Mother timely appealed and filed her l 925(b} Statements. Judge Cathleen Bubash January 8, 20 l 6 OPINION 1900 WDA 2015 1901 WDA 2015 

### T

.. F., Natural mother Superior Court Nos: APPEAL OF: TPR CP-02-AP-0000100-2015 & CP-02-AP-000010l-2015 I.F~Z. and 

### B. F-Z. IN RE: ADOPTION OF: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHAN'S COURT DIVISION Circulated 04/19/2016 02:09 PMI Neither named father nor any unknown father participated in the proceedings but each had counsel who

participated. Mother has two other children who are not part of these proceedings. An older daughter lives with her biological father and has not been adjudicated dependent. A young er sibling has al so been removed from Mother. That child has been adjudicated dependent at C P- 02-DP-0001055-2015. Mother ha s refused to name that child's father. Statement of Facts BF-Z. was born on 6/2/11 and IF-Z. was born on 2/14/ 13.28 The family first became involved with CYF in July of 2013 after a domestic dispute. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 40). CYF again became involved in November of 2013 after receiving a call regarding Mother's homelessness, neglect of the children, and unresolved drug and alcohol issues (TR. 10/8/15, p. 41). Although she was very resistant to assistance, Mother was provided with intensive crisis in-home services on December 12, 2013. Mother was given a Family Service Plan {"FSP") on December 17, 2013 which she signed on January 3, 2014. The goals set forth under the FSP were: I) recovery from substance abuse; 2) eliminate verbal and physical family abuse; 3) supervision of children. including baby gates and appropriate caregivers; 4) appropriate medical and dental care , including immunizations; 5} maintain contact and cooperate with CYF; 6}meet basic needs of food and clothing; 7) safe living conditions and

Matters Complained of on Appeal Mother raises identical issues in both appeals. She avers that I abused my "discretion and/or erred as a matter of law in finding that Allegheny County Children, Youth, and Families proved by clear and convincing evidence grounds for the involuntary termination of Birth Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a)(2), (5), and (8)." She further avers that I abused my "discretion and/or erred as a matter of law in concluding that Allegheny County Children, Youth, and Families met its burden of proving that termination of Birth Mother's parental rights would meet the needs .ond welfare" of the children, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l (b). For the reasons set forth below, my decision to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children should upheld and my Orders be affirmed. 1Little progress was made in Mother's parenting. For example, during an inhome visit by CYF the two year old son fell down 

### the stairs. Mother did not go to the child when he fell, remaining sitting on a couch. When asked why she did not go to him, Mother answered, "Boys fall". (TR. I 0/8/15, p. 42-44). CYF then provided Mother with baby gates but she would not utilize them. Further, Mother continued to engage in domestic violence, including a December 24, 2013 incident involving a knife where Mother was the aggressor. The Children were present during that incident. (TR. 10/8/ 15, p. 44-45). 1 n-home services remained in place until February of 2014, when they were discontinued due to Mother's non-compliance. The subject Children were removed from Mother's care on February 18, 2014 pursuant to an Emergency Custody Order due to concerns of neglect, parenting deficiencies including medical neglect, inadequate supervision, no food in home, and Mother's unresolved substance abuse and mental health issues. (TR. 6/25/ 15, p. 72). Bryn Albee, the caseworker who was present when the Children were removed, testified that Mother's home smelled of marijuana and alcohol and no food was found in the home. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 45-46). Mother was highly agitated, combative, overly rough with her infant, and verbally abusive. She refused a requested urine screen. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 83-85). The Children were placed into emergency foster care. CYF filed a Dependency Petition on February 25, 2014 and the Children were adjudicated dependent on March 27, 2014. (TR. 10/8/15 , p. 47). later that month, the Children were moved to the foster home where they still reside with preadoptive foster parents. Mother did not attend the next two FSP meetings scheduled on March 26, 2014 and August 14, 2014. (TR. 10/8/15 , p. 48). A pattern of missed or cancelled drug screens and missed appointments required by the FSP followed and

housing; 8) understand age appropriate behavior and expectations for children. (TR. l 0/8/ 15, p. 49-52).Mother otherwise refused to cooperate with the agency. (TR. 10/8/15, 

### p. 56-57,

60-6 I). Mother often could not be reached by phone. Over the fifteen months between removal of the Children and the first TPR hearing, Mother made little progress toward meeting the majority of the FSP goals set 

### for her. Additionally, Mother failed to be forthright with her caseworkers or the court. She claimed to be attending parenting classes at McKeesport Family Support Center but would not provide releases for CYF to acquire information on her attendance. Once she did sign the release, CYF found there was no record of her attending. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 54). Mother also refused to attend a domestic violence class after the December 24, 2013 incident and, in fact, did not attend until September of 2014. (TR. 10/8/ 15, p. 58). Moreover, Mother has stated that she does not understand how domestic violence might affect her Children. (TR. l 0/8/ 15, p. 58). Mother did not attend domestic violence classes from September 14, 2014 until March 15, 2015, which she asserted was due to incarceration. Her time in jail was, however, only from December 7, 2014 through January 13, 2015. (TR. 6/25/ 15, p. 40-41 )

. After refusing to attend her first scheduled court-ordered psychological evaluation on May 30, 2014, Mother was evaluated by Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D. of Allegheny Forensic Associates on October 22, 20 l 4, at which time she was minimally cooperative. Dr. Rosenblum diagnosed Mother with Oppositional Defiant Disorder and Adjustment Disorder. He recommended that she seek mental health treatment once a week, as well as anger managemen t

. Mother did not complete her intake for mental health until May of 2015. (TR. 6/25/15, p. 15, 29-30). Mother has been provided throughout these proceedings with two weekly supervised visits with her Children. Due to her inconsistent attendance, Mother was required to prov i de 24 hours notice of whether she would attend a scheduled visit t o avoid the C h ildren being transported and subsequently4 In her infant son's separate dependency matter, Mother demonstrated her continued lack of judgment and lack of

credibility by colluding with a great-aunt to retain custody of that child against court orders, despite the woman's inappropriateness as a care-giver. After suggesting the great-aunt take custody, Mother then referred to her as unsafe. This subterfuge resulted in the baby being left by the great-aunt in the care of an unknown person. See TR. l0/8/15, p. 95-101. 3 This behavior changed and improved after the filing of the TPRs when Mother began taking her parenting classes more consistently. Mother has requested that her parenting classes continue as she believes they are helping her and the evidence supports that. (6/25/15 T. p. 34-35, 49-50) It was only after the filing of the TPR petitions on June l 0, 2015 that Mother's behavior with the Children began to improve. (TR. l 0/8/ 15, p. 157). Much of Mother's behavior remains troubling and her credibility has not improved. Mother has told her caseworkers that she lives independently, but has refused to show them her lease despite being requested to do so. (TR. l 0/8/ 15, p. 65; TR. 11 

### I 12/ J 5, p. 42, 73). Mother, who has a history of domestic violence, has denied being in a new relationship but has changed her social media "stotus" to "in a relationship' 1 and has adopted the last name of a man she refers to as a neighbor. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 89-91; TR. 11/12/15, p. 28, 30-31).4 Mother remains inconsistent in attending meetings with the service providers and will focus only on meeting her housing goals. She will not address other FSP goals, such as parenting issues. She refuses to understand why CYF became involved. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 85-86}. Especially troubling considering her disappointed. (TR. 10/8/15, p. 65). Of the 190 visits Mother was offered, 133 were completed. Of those, only 78 began on time, and 35 visits were cancelled due to no confirmation from Mother. (TR. l 0/8/ 15, p, 155- 156). Susan Rosati, case specialist, testified that during visits, Mother was often inattentive to the Children, did not interact with them, and spent most of her time "on her phone." (TR. 6/25/15, p. 

### 44).3 Often, when she was asked by the Children to read to them or to play, she declined. (TR. l 0/8/15, p. 165). Mother often displayed a negative attitude toward the staff. (TR. l0/8/ 15, p. 157). Mother left her infant in an unbuckled car seat on a table when she left the visiting room without securlnq anyone to watch the baby. (TR. 10/8/ 15, p. l 60- 1 6 l).CYF se eks t o t er minat e Mother' s p are n t al r ights und e r 2 3 Pa

. C.S

.A.

§25 11 ( a )( 2 } , ( 5 ) , a nd ( 8 )

. T h e st atut e p rov id es f o r t h e i nvo lu n ta ry te r m i nat i on o f pa re nt a l ri g ht if th e pe titi o n e r ca n est a bl is h a n y o n e o f t h e follow i ng g rou n d s:

" 25 1 l

. ( a) G e n e ra l rul e

. - Th e ri g hts o f a p are nt in re gard t o a child may b e t e rmi n at e d aft er a pe tit ion f il e d on any of th e fo llo w i ng g rou n d s:
* ** ** * * * Di sc u ss i o n hi st o ry , Moth er ha s c on tin ued to st at e t o h er ca sewo r ke r , Bryn A l b e e , that she do e s not und e rstand how her dome stic v iolen c e affe cts t he C hi l dre n. (TR. 10/8/15, 

### p. 58) At tri a l, a number o f witnesse s te st i f i ed , includ i ng D r. N ei l Ro se nblu m who condu cted a serie s of indi v idual as s es sm ents , e val uati ons and i nte ract io n a l interviews with Mother a nd the Childre n , and the f o ster pare nts and th e Children. His ex pert reports were al so adm i tted int o e vid e nce. Dr

. R ose nb l u m t esti fied that t h e Ch ildren w ere bo n de d to t he ir fo st er pare nts and saw th e m a s role mod e l s

. (TR

. 10/8/ l 5 , p

. 118-12 I]

. H e t est i fi e d t h at the Children had n o strong atta c hment to Mo t her but d i d have a stro n g atta c hm e nt to the foster pa ren ts

. (TR

. 10/8/ 15 , p

. 12 9

- 134)

. D r

. R os enb lum f u rt her te stifi e d that t e rmination an d ad o p t ion would en h a nce the C hild ren ' s st a b ility and be th e "be st c h o ic e for the Children and the c hoi ce th at wo uld b e m ost
c o n sisten t w it h t he i r need s and welf a re. " (TR. 10/8/ 15 , p. 136 ). He t e stifi e d t hat th e att a c hm ent to the fo st er paren ts was t he Chi l d ren 's primary att achmen t and that it w o uld b e w o rs e f o r th e Ch ild re n t o lo se t h eir fo ster p a re n ts t h a n it would be to lo se Moth e r. (TR. 10/8/15 , p. 14 2 -1 4 8)

.

. Ad d it ionall y , Dr. R ose nb lu m t est i f ied t h at M othe r' s d enial of her me n t a l he al th i ss u e s a s we ll as h e r d e nial o f t h e ri sk f act o rs s h e was creat i ng f o r h e r C hildren ; limit h e r a bility t o co rrect h e r p arentin g defic i e n ci e s. H e t estif ied that , sinc e M o t he r' s me nt a l co n d iti ons and attitude s continue to exi st, the Child re n
wo ul d co ntin ue t o be at r i s k i f i n h er c a re

. (TR. 10/8/ 15 , p

. 1 2 4 , 1 39 -1 40 ).The record in this matter reveals Mother's repeated and con t inuing

incapacity to care for her Children so as to be reunited with them. Close t o two years have passed since these young Children were removed from Mother's Once the statutory grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights have been shown by clear and convincing evidence, the Court must next consider the next step of the process and determine whether the termination would meet the needs and welfare of the child under sub-section 251 l (b): (b) Other considerations.-The court in terminating the rights of 

### a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(l), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are firstinitiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition."

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 251 I. (emphasis added) (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under 

### a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,(Pa. Super. 2006) 

### ****** (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

### * * * * * * (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.The testimony establishes that Mother was offered a multitude of services

to assist her in remedying the conditions which led to the removal of her Children. lt also demonstrates that she did not actively participate in those services and, in fact, often refused to participate or lied about her participation. Grounds for terminating parental rights are not limited to affirmative conduct, but may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95(Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, Mother was provided care. The youngest has spent more than half of her life in placement. Mother did not meaningfully or consistently participate in the FSP process until after the TPR petitions were filed, more than fifteen months after her Children were removed. The conditions which led to the removal continue to exist. Mother has, throughout these proceedings, demonstrated a lack of understanding of the consequences of her actions on her Children. Mother has failed, and often belligerently refused, to communicate and cooperate with CYF or to address the majority of the issues which led to the removal of her Children. Despite Mothe(s recent efforts, she has not been able to meet her FSP goals to a degree that return of the Children to her care would be appropriate or feasible. Additionally, any progress she has made did not occur until June of 2015, after the filing of the TPR petitions and more than fifteen months after her Children were placed in foster care. As the Superior Court has acknowledged: "The application of Section (a){8) may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems that had led to removal of her children. By allowing for termination when the conditions that led to removal continue to exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child's life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable to perform the actions necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future." fn re J.F.M., 7 I A.3d 989, 997 (Pa. Super. 2013}.ti m e t o re medy th e co nditi o ns which l e d to re mova l a nd c ho s e n ot t o do so unt il

th e C hil dre n h a d be en i n c a re or ov e r 1 5 m o nth s

. I fo u nd that, eve n i f Mothe r wa s off e red additi on al serv ic es and more t i me , s he wo u l d no t b e a bl e to
re medy the con diti o n s in a re ason a ble a mount of ti me

. I n d e t e rmi ni n g t hat t e r m inat io n o f M o th e r' s pa ren ta l r i gh ts b est serve d the
n e eds and w e lfare of h e r Children , I cons id ered the history of t he case p res ent e d b y h er ca sewo r kers an d I re li ed h eav ily u pon t h e t e stimo n y of D r. Neil R os enblum , w h o c o m p leted num e rou s evaluation s in this cas e

. In his M ay 30 , 2 014 evaluati o n, D r. Ro sen blum foun d the C h ildre n to be t hri v in g , and p ri ma ril y att ac h e d w i t h t h ei r pre-ad op t ive fost e r pa ren ts. wi t h whom they have a p rimary bond and who th e y ref e r to as Mo m a nd D ad. H e f o u nd t he ir att ac h ment wi th Moth er t o be m u c h le ss st ro n g when he p e rformed
a n int era ction a l evalu ation on O ct o ber 2 2 , 2014 , a n d o pined t h at t he tra uma of los ing the i r re l ati o ns hip w i th t h e ir M o th er w oul d b e less seve re t han what t hey
wo u l d s uff e r s h o ul d t hey be re m ov e d from t h e ir fost er p are nts

. D r. R ose n blum
co n cl ud ed th at t e rmin atio n o f M o th e r' s pare ntal ri g h ts an d adop ti o n b y t h e f o st e r pa re n ts w a s i n the best i nt e rest o f th e Ch i ld re n

. I agre ed, findin g t he
ev iden ce cl ea rl y e st a bli s h ed th at t e r mi n ati o n o f M ot he r 's ri gh ts t o th e C hil d re n b est serv e d t h ei r n eeds and we l fa re

. I re cog ni ze th at th e s e C hil d ren h ave a re l ati on s h i p w it h Mo th er and I do
no t doubt th e s in c e r ity of Moth e r' s l ov e f or h er C h il d ren

. H ow e v er, a pa ren t ' s
e mo t ional bond w i t h he r C h ild ren i s only one of m an y factors t o be c on s i de re d in d e t e r m i n i ng what i s in t h e bes t int e rest of th e C hild ren. " I n t a n g ibl es s uch a s love, c om f ort. s e c u rity , and st ab i lity are i n vo lve d i n the in q uiry into ne ed s and
w e lf a re of th e c h i ld ." In re C. M .S

. , 884 A.2 d 1284, 128 7 ( Pa. Sup e r

. 2 005 ). I n t h i s ty p e of ca s e, t h e re i s a d i c h o t o m y when a bo n d m ay e xi st betw e en a p a rent and c h i l d , b ut t h e p a rent i s e ith e r unwill in g o r u n a ble t o s at isfy t h e m i nim u m
req ui rem e nts o f p a ren t ing

. The i ss u e is n ot wh e t h er t he re i s a b o n d t h at exi sts

. b e twee n the pa re n t a n d ch ild t h at wo u ld be h a r m f u l if s ev e re d ; t h e i ss u e i s w hati s in the child' s best intere sts and w elfare und e r the t o t ality of t he circ u ms tan ces.

In re T.D

. , 949 A. 2d 9 10 , 9 2 0- 92 1 (P

a.S u pe r

. 2008 } H e re, D r

. R ose nblum credib l y d es crib e d th e l ac k of b on d the Ch i ld re n have w it h M o ther a nd th e de stabiliz i n g eff e ct t e r m inati o n o f t he b o n d with fos t e r pa re nts w oul d have on th e Ch il dren

. (T R. 1 0/8/ 15 , p

. 144

- 14 5 ). B as ed o n Dr

. Ro se nblum ' s evaluati o ns a nd t e stimon y, vi ew ed i n lig h t of t h e ot h e r ev iden c e pre se nt e d , I f ound t hat s ev e ring the b on d w i th Mot h e r would be l e ss detrim e nta l and trau m ati zing t o t h e C hil d re n and wo uld bes t s e rve t h e i r ne e d s
an d wel fa re b as e d on the t o tality o f th e ci rcum stan ces

. T h e C hild re n h ave b e e n li vi n g t og e th er i n a stab l e an d lov i ng h om e s i nc e F e bruary o f 2 014 , a s i g nifi c ant part of th e ir yo ung li ves

. A lt houg h th e C h il d re n may hav e so m e b ond with Moth e r, t h e i r p ri mary b o nd a n d att ach ment i s w i t h t he ir fo st e r p a re nts w h o are re ad y , w illin g , an d ab le t o a d op t th e m

. C l e arly , t h e Ch i ld ren ' s em o ti o na l, e du c atio na l an d me di ca l n eeds a re all b e ing me t i n t h i s hom e an d , i n fact , re m ova l f ro m t h i s h o me w o u l d b e h ar mf u l to th em

. Pri o r t o filin g for t e rminati o n , CY F made mo re t ha n re as o n a b le e ff o rts ke ep M ot h e r w i t h h e r Ch il dren, and to re u n it e Mot he r w it h t h e m after re moval, efforts
w h ich M o th e r a cti v e ly a n d stu bbo rnl y res i st e d u n ti l m u c h t oo l at e

. T he C o mmonwea l th i s req u ired t o m ake reasonab l e e ff orts at re u nifi cat i on , b u t i t "d o e s not h ave an ob li g at i o n t o ma ke s u ch e ffo rts i n d efin it e ly
. T h e Co m m o n we alt h ha s a n int e re st n o t o nl y in f a mil y re u n ifi c at i o n b u t a l s o i n e a ch
c hild ' s ri g h t to a st a b l e , saf e, an d h e a lt hy e nv ironmen t, a nd the two int e rests
mu st b ot h b e co n s i d e re d. " In r e A d o p tion o f M

.E.P. , 8 25 A. 2d 12 66

, 12 7 6 ( Pa

. S u pe r 2003

)

. T he re co rd de m o n strat es th at f orcin g these Ch il dre n t o wa it a n y l on ge r fo r st ab ili ty wo uld n o t b e i n t h e i r b est in t erests. I n li g ht o f M o ther' s
u nre liabl e e ffo rts, th ese C h il dren 's ne e d fo r a pe r m a n e n t

. st a bl e, a nd l ov in g h o m e must t a ke pre cedence

.D ate : I J, 

### BY THE C OURT: Co n cl u si o n Aft e r a ca re ful revi ew of th e e vi d e n ce, I fou n d that CY F had cl ea rl y a n d
c o n vi ncin g ly e st a bl is hed gro und s 

### for te r m i nati o n und e r 23 P a

. C.S

. A. 

### § 2 51 l (a)( 2 ), (a)(5), and (a)(8) and t hat term i nation of Mother' s p are nt a l rights be st s erve s th e n e ed s and w e lfare o f both c hildre n

. Fo r th e s e reas o ns , m y Orders shoul d b e affirme d

.