United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Public Affairs, Region I

475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19401

Phone: 610/337-5330 Fax: 610/337-5241

Internet: dps@nrc.gov or nas@nrc.gov

I-97-11 January 31, 1997

Contact: Diane Screnci FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Neil A. Sheehan

NOTE TO EDITORS:

The attached confirmatory action letter was issued to

Consolidated Edison by the Nuclear Reglatory Commission staff

this afternoon (1/31).

enc: as stated
S. E. Quinn 2

January 31, 1997

License No. DPR-26

CAL No. 1-97-002

Mr. S. E. Quinn

Vice President - Nuclear Power

Consolidated Edison Company of

New York, Inc.

Indian Point Unit 2

Broadway and Bleakley Avenues

Buchanan, NY 10511

Dear Mr. Quinn:

SUBJECT: CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER 1-97-002

On January 26, 1997, Indian Point 2 was shutdown when it was determined that

three of the four feedwater regulating valves would not close upon demand.

Subsequent investigation of the internals of these valves found extensive

scoring of the valve plugs and cages as well as a buildup of a predominately

iron-based foreign material that prevented closure of these valves. We

understand that your investigation to date has indicated that this foreign

material, an abrasive grit used to prepare the inner surface of the high

pressure turbine during the early 1995 outage, is the probable cause of the

failure of the valves to close upon demand. Furthermore, this abrasive

material was found in other areas of the feedwater system and also caused the

failure of a heater drain pump in June 1995, as well as damage to another

heater drain pump this past week.

The NRC is concerned with the potential safety implications of this apparent

common mode failure of multiple feedwater regulating valves, which also serve

a safety function in isolating the feedwater system during particular design

basis events. Moreover, we are concerned that this foreign material intrusion

occurred over 1-1/2 years ago and previously led to a significant equipment

failure, but was apparently not adequately evaluated such that the full extent

of condition and its impact on the plant was known and appropriately addressed

at that time.

Pursuant to a telephone conversation between yourself and Richard Cooper of my

staff on January 31, 1997, it is our understanding that you and members of

your management and technical staff will meet with my staff in Region I prior

to the restart of Indian Point Unit 2. During that meeting, you should be

prepared to discuss:

1) the scope of your efforts to determine the root causes of the FRV

failures, and subsequent observed damage to other balance of plant

components;

2) the basis for your confidence that the identified root causes completely

encompass the failure mechanisms and the physical damage observed in the

failed components;

3) the scope of your corrective actions to ensure that you have identified

all affected equipment and the safety impact on that equipment; and that

you have identified the location of all foreign material, and have

appropriately removed it. Should you not have confidence that all

material has been removed, provide your basis for restart of the plant

in recognition of this condition;

4) the safety significance of this event;
S. E. Quinn 3

5) the root causes of your failure to more broadly evaluate the extent of

condition of the foreign material intrusion during your evaluation and

corrective action pursuant to the June 1995 heater drain pump failure.

In this discussion, also include information about other indicators that

may have previously existed that were additional precursors to this

event.

Pursuant to Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, and 10 CFR

2.204, you are required to:

1. Notify me immediately if your understanding differs from that set forth

above.

2. Notify me if for any reason you cannot complete the actions within the

specified schedule and advise me in writing of your modified schedule in

advance of the change.

3. Notify me in writing when you have completed the actions addressed in

this Confirmatory Action Letter.

Issuance of this Confirmatory Action Letter does not preclude issuance of an

Order formalizing the above commitments or requiring other actions on the part

of the licensee. Nor does it preclude the NRC from taking enforcement action

for violations of NRC requirements that may have prompted the issuance of this

letter. In addition, failure to take the actions addressed in this

Confirmatory Action Letter may result in enforcement action.

The response directed by this letter are not subject to the clearance

procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork

Reduction Act of 1980, Pub.L. 96-511.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of

this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Hubert J. Miller

Regional Administrator