“SADDAM IS IRAQ: IRAQ IS SADDAM” 

by 

Jerrold M. Post, M.D. and Amatzia Baram, Ph.D. 

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 17 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 

“Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam” 

Jerrold M. Post, M.D. and Amatzia Baram, Ph.D. 

November 2002 

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF

Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist 

the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of 

mass destruction. Copies of No. 17 and previous papers in this series are

available from the USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault 

Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427. The fax number is (334) 953-

7530; phone (334) 953-7538. 

Counterproliferation Paper No. 17 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: 

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

Contents: 

Page

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii 

The Authors............................................................................................... iii 

Introduction..................................................................................................1 

Political Personality Profile. ........................................................................1 

Saddam’s Psychological Characteristics: Malignant Narcissism. ..............9 

Saddam at the Crossroads..........................................................................15 

Threats to Saddam’s Survival After the Conflict ......................................22 

Fault Lines in the Family...........................................................................25 

Strengthening International Support..........................................................32 

Buying Off Superpowers: Russia as an Example .....................................43 

A “Return” to Islam As A Survival Technique .........................................50 

Why Weapons of Mass Destruction ..........................................................53 

Use of International Crises: 

Sustaining Power and Weakening Internal Threats.......................................58 

Conclusion .................................................................................................60 

Notes..........................................................................................................63 

i
Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do 

necessarily not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. 

Government, Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation 

Center. 

ii
The Authors 

Dr. Jerrold Post is Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and 

International Affairs, and Director of the Political Psychology Program at 

the George Washington University. Dr. Post has devoted his entire career 

to the field of political psychology, coming to George Washington after a

21-year career with the U.S. government where he founded and directed 

the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior. At

George Washington, he co-founded and directs the George Washington 

University Institute for Crisis and Disaster Management. Dr. Post

received his B.A. magna cum laude from Yale College. After receiving 

his M.D. from Yale, where he was elected to Alpha Omega Alpha, honor 

medical society, he received post-graduate training in psychiatry at 

Harvard Medical School and the National Institute of Mental Health, and 

in international studies from Johns Hopkins. A practicing psychiatrist, he 

is a Life Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association, a member of the 

American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, and the American College

of Psychiatrists. A leading expert on Saddam Hussein, Dr. Post has 

testified before the House Armed Services Committee and the House 

Foreign Affairs Committee on Saddam’s personality and political 

behavior. He is a frequent commentator on national and international 

radio and television on world events, and he is the co-author of When

Illness Strikes the Leader: The Dilemma of the Captive King, Yale, 1995, 

and Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred, Yale, 1997. 

Dr. Amatzia Baram is a professor of Middle Eastern History at the 

University of Haifa, Israel. He received his Ph.D. in Middle Eastern 

Studies from The Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1986. He is the 

author of Culture , History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq: 

1968-1989, (London; Oxford; New York, 1991); Building Toward Crisis:

Saddam Husayn’s Strategy for Survival (Washington, DC, 1998), and joint 

editor of Iraq’s Road to War (New York, London, 1993). He has also 

published numerous articles, monographs and chapters in academic 

magazines and volumes, as well as in encyclopedias. Recently Dr. Baram 

also presented a position paper and provided testimony on Saddam 

Hussein and Weapons of Mass Destruction, to the U.S. House of 

Representatives Hearing on “Combating Terrorism: Preventing Nuclear 

iii
Terrorism,” Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans 

Affairs and International Relations of the Committee on Government 

Reform, Washington DC, September 24, 2002. 

iv
v

Saddam is Iraq . . . 1

“Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam”1

Jerrold M. Post, M.D.2

 and Amatzia Baram, Ph.D.3

Introduction 

Identified as a member of the “axis of evil” by President George W.

Bush, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq continues to pose a major threat to the

region and to Western society. Saddam has doggedly pursued the 

development of weapons of mass destruction, despite U.N. sanctions 

imposed at the conclusion of the Gulf crisis. To deal effectively with 

Saddam Hussein requires a clear understanding of his motivations, 

perceptions, and decision-making. To provide a framework for this 

complex political leader, a comprehensive political psychology profile has 

been developed, and his actions since the crisis analyzed in the context of 

this political psychology assessment. 

Political Personality Profile 

Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq, has been characterized as “the 

madman of the Middle East.” This pejorative diagnosis is not only 

inaccurate but also dangerous. Consigning Saddam to the realm of 

madness can mislead decision makers into believing he is unpredictable 

when in fact he is not. An examination of the record of Saddam Hussein’s 

leadership of Iraq for the past 34 years reveals a judicious political 

calculator, who is by no means irrational, but is dangerous to the extreme. 

Saddam Hussein, “the great struggler,” has explained the extremity of 

his actions as president of Iraq as necessary to achieve “subjective 

immunity” against foreign plots and influences. All actions of the 

revolution are justified by the “exceptionalism of revolutionary needs.” In

fact, an examination of Saddam Hussein’s life and career reveals this is 

but the ideological rationalization for a lifelong pattern: all actions are 

justified if they are in the service of furthering Saddam Hussein’s needs 

and messianic ambitions. 
2 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

Painful Beginnings—The “Wounded Self” 

Saddam Hussein was born in 1937 to a poor peasant family near 

Tikrit, some 100 miles north of Baghdad, in central-north Iraq. But the

central lines of the development of Saddam Hussein’s political personality 

were etched before he was born, for his father died of an “internal disease” 

(probably cancer) during his mother’s pregnancy with Saddam. His 12 

year old brother, too, died (of childhood cancer) a few months later, when 

Saddam’s mother, Sabha, was in her eighth month of pregnancy. 

Destitute, Saddam’s mother attempted suicide. A Jewish family saved 

her. Then she tried to abort herself of Saddam, but was again prevented

from doing this by her Jewish benefactors. After Saddam was born, on 

April 28, 1937, his mother did not wish to see him, strongly suggesting 

that she was suffering from a post-partum depression. His care was 

relegated to Sabha’s brother (his maternal uncle) Khayrallah Talfah 

Msallat in Tikrit, in whose home Saddam spent much of his early 

childhood. At age three Saddam was re-united with his mother. In the 

meantime, Sabha married a distant relative, Hajj Ibrahim Hasan.4

 Hajj

Ibrahim, his stepfather, reportedly was abusive psychologically and 

physically to young Saddam5

 during the first several years of life, which 

are crucial to the development of a healthy self-esteem. 

The failure of the mother to nurture and bond with her infant son, and 

the subsequent abuse at the hands of his stepfather, profoundly wounded

Saddam’s emerging self-esteem, impairing his capacity for empathy with 

others, producing what has been identified as “the wounded self.” One 

course in the face of such traumatizing experiences is to sink into despair,

passivity and hopelessness. But another is to etch a psychological

template of compensatory grandiosity, as if to vow, “Never again, never 

again shall I submit to superior force.” This was the developmental 

psychological path Saddam followed. 

From early years on, Saddam, whose name means “the One who 

Confronts,” charted his own course and would not accept limits. 

According to his semi-official biography, when Saddam was only ten 

years old, he was impressed by a visit from his cousin who knew how to 

read and write. He confronted his family with his wish to become

educated, and when they turned him down, since there was no school in 

his parents’ village, he left his home in the middle of the night, making his

way to the home of his maternal uncle Khayrallah in Tikrit in order to 

study there.6

 It is quite possible that Saddam somewhat embellished his 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 3

story, but there is no mistaking his resentment against his mother and 

stepfather that emerges from it. 

Khayrallah Inspires Dreams of Glory 

Khayrallah was to become not only Saddam’s father figure but also 

his political mentor. Khayrallah had fought against Great Britain in the 

Iraqi uprising of 1941 and had spent 5 years in prison for his nationalist

agitation. He filled the impressionable young boy’s head with tales of his 

heroic relatives, his great grandfather and two great uncles who gave their 

lives for the cause of Iraqi and Arab nationalism, fighting foreign 

invaders. He conveyed to his young charge that he was destined for 

greatness, following the path of his heroic relatives and of heroes of the 

Medieval Arab-Islamic world. Khayrallah, who was later to become 

governor of Baghdad, shaped young Hussein’s worldview, imbuing him 

with a hatred of foreigners. In 1981, Saddam republished a pamphlet 

written by his uncle entitled Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: 

Persians, Jews, and Flies. 

Khayrallah tutored his young charge in his view of Arab history and 

the ideology of Arab nationalism. Khayrallah himself did not join the

Ba’ath party, but his worldview was close to its ideology. For the teenaged Saddam, joining it in 1957 was thus a natural choice. Founded in 

1940, the Ba’ath party envisaged the creation of a new Arab nation 

defeating the colonialist and imperialist powers, and achieving Arab 

independence, unity, and socialism. 

Ba’ath ideology, as conceptualized by its intellectual founding father, 

Michel Aflaq, focuses on the history of oppression and division of the 

Arab world, first at the hands of the Mongols, then the Ottoman Turks, 

then the Western mandates, then the monarchies ruled by Western

interests, and finally by the establishment of the “Zionist entity.” 

Thus inspired by his uncle’s tales of heroism in the service of the Arab

nation, Saddam has been consumed by dreams of glory since his earliest 

days, identifying himself with Nebuchadnezzar, the King of Babylonia (not 

an Arab, but seen by many in Iraq as such and certainly as a great Iraqi) who

conquered Jerusalem and exiled the Jews in 586 B.C. Saddam was also 

fascinated by the exploits of Saladin (a Muslim Kurd regarded by many 

Arabs as an Arab) who regained Jerusalem in 1187 by defeating the 

Crusaders. But these dreams of glory, formed so young, 
4 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

were compensatory, for they sat astride a wounded self filled with a

profound self-doubt. 

Saddam was steeped in Arab history and Ba’athist ideology by the

time he traveled with his uncle to Baghdad to pursue his secondary 

education. The schools, a hotbed of a combination of Arab nationalism 

and Iraqi pride, confirmed his political leanings. In 1952, when Saddam 

was 15, Nasser led the Free Officer’s revolution in Egypt and became a 

hero to young Saddam and his peers. As the activist leader of Pan

Arabism, Nasser became an idealized model for Saddam, stating that only 

by courageously confronting imperialist powers could Arab nationalism be 

freed from Western shackles.7

At age 20, inspired by Nasser, Saddam joined the Arab Ba’ath 

Socialist Party in Iraq. In those days the party was still strongly proNasser, seeing in him by far the most promising leader of the pan-Arab 

movement. Indeed, a few months after Saddam joined the party in Iraq, 

the Syrian branch turned to Nasser for a Syrian-Egyptian union and, upon 

his demand, even agreed to disband itself. In the 1960s relations between 

the resuscitated Ba’ath and Nasser deteriorated, and the United Arab 

Republic split up, even though both still claimed to believe in the 

unification of all the Arab states. But when Saddam joined the party all 

this was still unimaginable: Nasser was the hero. 

Saddam quickly impressed party officials with his dedication. 

Known as a “street thug,” he willingly used violence in the service of the 

party, and was rewarded with rapid promotion. Two years later, in 1958, 

apparently emulating Nasser, Army General Abd al-Karim Qassem led a 

coup d’etat which ousted the monarchy. But unlike Nasser, Qassem did 

not pursue the path of pan-Arabism, and turned against the Ba’ath party. 

The 22-year-old Saddam was called to Ba’ath Party headquarters and 

given the mission to join a small team assigned to assassinate Qassem.

The mission failed, reportedly because of a crucial error in judgment by 

the inexperienced would-be assassins. But Saddam’s escape to Syria, first 

by horseback and then by swimming across the Tigris, has achieved 

mythic status in Iraqi history. 

During his exile, Saddam went to Egypt where he completed his high 

school education and started to study law, receiving a small allowance 

from Nasser. While in Cairo, he engaged in illegal Ba’ath party activity 

there (the party had disbanded itself and was banned in the UAR). This 

won Saddam Nasser’s wrath, but the Egyptian leader was keen to keep a 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 5

radical anti-Qassem activist on his side, and refrained from any harsh 

measures. 

Saddam returned to Iraq after the Ba’ath took over in Baghdad in 

February 1963. In March 1963 the party came to power also in Damascus. 

In Baghdad, Saddam then became a middle-level operative in the party’s 

security apparatus. Afalq, the ideological father of the Ba’ath party, 

admired young Hussein, but Saddam still had a long way to go to get to 

the top. In November 1963 the party lost power in Baghdad, and Saddam 

and his comrades were arrested, then released, remaining under 

surveillance. In July 1968 they came to power again through a military 

coup d’etat. 

Rivalry with Assad to be Supreme Arab National Leader 

Rivalry over who is the true representative of the Ba’ath party and the

rightful leading elite of the Arab world, the Ba’ath regime in Damascus or 

the underground party in Baghdad, emerged in 1966, but it reached a 

political crescendo soon after the Iraqi Ba’ath came to power for the 

second time in 1968. At first, this was a three-way struggle between 

Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad, but Abd al-Nasser’s death in September 

1970 left only two contenders. 

Until Saddam became president, in 1979, this was a contest for 

legitimacy and Arab leadership essentially between an Iraqi duo: Vice 

President Saddam Hussein and his boss and distant relative, President 

Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, on the one hand side, and President Hafez al-Assad 

in Damascus on the other. Afterward this became a more bitter and 

acrimonious sparring between Saddam and Assad. Some thawing in the 

late 1990s notwithstanding, the split and rivalry persisted until the death of 

the Syrian leader in 2000. 

Back in July 1968, with the crucial secret assistance of military

intelligence chief Abdul Razzaz al Naif, Saddam helped mount a 

successful coup in 1968. In gratitude for services rendered, within two 

weeks of the coup, Saddam had arranged for the capture and exile of Naif, 

and subsequently ordered his assassination. It is important to observe that 

Naif was ambitious, and that after he was ousted and exiled he was

engaged in anti-regime activity. In 1970 Saddam ousted Minister of 

Defense Hardan Abd al-Ghafar al-Tikriti, another senior and an ambitious

associate, and a year later he had him assassinated. In 1979 Saddam 

forced his senior partner, President Bakr, out of office and made himself
6 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

president. Three years later the elderly ex-president died, widely believed 

to have been poisoned by his young successor. 

The ousters and later assassinations represent a recurring pattern

where Saddam has turned on friends and broken commitments throughout 

his career. He has a flexible conscience: commitments and loyalty are 

matters of circumstance, and circumstances change. If an individual, or a 

nation, is perceived as an impediment or a threat, no matter how loyal in 

the past, that individual or nation will be eliminated violently without a 

backward glance, and the action will be justified by “the exceptionalism of

revolutionary needs.” Nothing must be permitted to stand in “the great 

struggler’s” messianic path as he pursues his (and Iraq’s) revolutionary 

destiny, as exemplified by this extract from Saddam Hussein’s remarkable 

“Victory Day” message of 8 August 1990.8

 

This is the only way to deal with these despicable Croesuses who 

relished possession to destroy devotion . . . who were guided by 

the foreigner instead of being guided by virtuous standards, 

principles of Pan-Arabism, and the creed of humanitarianism. . . . 

The second of August . . . is the legitimate newborn child of the 

struggle, patience and perseverance of the Kuwaiti people, which 

was crowned by revolutionary action on that immortal day. The 

newborn child was born of a legitimate father and an immaculate

mother. Greetings to the makers of the second of August, whose 

efforts God has blessed. They have achieved one of the 

brightest, most promising and most principled national and PanArab acts. 

Two August has come as a very violent response to the harm that 

the foreigner had wanted to perpetrate against Iraq and the

nation. The Croesus of Kuwait and his aides become the 

obedient, humiliated and treacherous dependents of that foreigner 

. . . What took place on 2 August was inevitable so that death 

might not prevail over life, so that those who were capable of 

ascending to the peak would not be brought down to the abysmal 

precipice, so that corruption and remoteness from God would not 

spread to the majority . . . Honor will be kept in Mesopotamia so 

that Iraq will be the pride of the Arabs, their protector, and their 

model of noble values. 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 7

Capable of Reversing His Course 

Saddam’s practice of revolutionary opportunism has another 

important characteristic. Just as previous commitments must not be 

permitted to stand in way of Saddam’s messianic path, neither should he 

persist in a particular course of action if it proves to be counterproductive 

for him and his nation. When he pursues a course of action, he pursues it 

fully; if he meets initial resistance, he will struggle all the harder,

convinced of the correctness of his judgments. Should circumstances 

demonstrate that he miscalculated, he is capable of reversing his course. 

Yet, he sticks to his guns on the strategic level: he never gives up a dream. 

He will wait until circumstances change, and then he’ll strike again. In

these circumstances of a momentary reversal he does not acknowledge he

has erred but, rather, that he is adapting to a dynamic situation. The three 

most dramatic examples of the revolutionary pragmatism and ideological 

flexibility concern his ongoing struggle with his Persian enemies. 

Yields on Shatt al Arab To Quell the Kurdish Rebellion 

In March 1975, Saddam signed an agreement with the Shah of Iran, 

splitting the disputed Shatt aI-Arab waterway along the thalweg line, thus 

stipulating Iranian sovereignty over the Iranian (eastern) side. This he did 

in return for Iran’s ceasing to supply the Kurdish rebellion. In 1970 

Saddam signed an autonomy agreement with the Kurds, but in 1973 he 

declared that the Ba’ath party represented all Iraqis, that the Kurds could 

not be neutral, and that the Kurds were either fully with the people or

against them. 

In 1975 he destroyed the Kurdish autonomy and established a pseudoautonomy, fully controlled from Baghdad. 

In 1979 he made the same point in regard to the Communist Party of 

Iraq, with whom he had a common “Patriotic Front.” “Are you,” he asked 

them, “with us in the same trench, or against us?” Then he cracked down 

on them with full force, imprisoning, torturing and executing many. 

Indeed, this is another of Saddam’s basic principles - “He who is not 

totally with me is my enemy.” 

By 1975, the war against the Kurds had become extremely costly, 

having cost 60,000 lives in one year alone. Demonstrating his revolutionary

pragmatism, despite his lifelong hatred of the Persians, Saddam’s urgent 

need to put down the Kurdish rebellion took (temporary) precedence. 

The loss of the Shatt al Arab waterway continued to rankle, and in
8 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

September 1980, sensing Iran’s military weakness as well as confusion in

the Iranian political system, he declared the 1975 agreement null and void. 

Saddam then invaded Khuzistan-Arabestan province. There were 

additional reasons for the invasion: fear of domestic Shi’i unrest for one, 

but there may be little doubt that revanche was a major consideration. At

first the Iraqi forces met with little resistance. However, following an

initial success, Iran stiffened and began to inflict serious damage not only 

on Iraqi forces but also on the Iraqi cities. It became clear to Saddam that 

the war was counterproductive. 

Attempts to End the Iran-Iraq War

In May-June 1982, Saddam’s forces were beaten out of much of the

areas they had occupied. He then reversed his earlier militant aggression 

and attempted to terminate hostilities, ordering a unilateral withdrawal 

from some other previously seized areas and offering a ceasefire.

Khomeini, who by now was obsessed with Saddam, would have none of

it, indicating that there would be no peace with Iraq until Saddam no 

longer ruled Iraq. The Iran-Iraq War continued for another bloody 6 

years, taking a dreadful toll, estimated at more than a million casualties on 

the two sides. 

In 1988, an indecisive ceasefire was agreed to, with Iraq sustaining a 

military advantage. Saddam may have been able to reach a peace

agreement, but this would have necessitated a return to the 1975 

agreement, including renewed recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the 

eastern side of the Shatt al Arab. Saddam refused to make this concession, 

indicating that he would never yield, and that he would never withdraw

from some Iranian territory he still held. 

Reversed Policy on Disputed Waterway 

But revolutionary pragmatism was to supersede this resolve, for

Hussein was planning a new war, against a new enemy. He desperately 

needed the 500,000 troops tied up on the Iraqi-Iranian border, and he was

in dire need of strategic depth. On August 15, 1990, thirteen days after he

conquered Kuwait and found himself facing an ominous American troop 

buildup, Hussein agreed to meet Iranian conditions, promising to

withdraw from Iranian territory and, most importantly, agreeing to share 

the disputed Shatt al Arab waterway. Never is a short time when 

revolutionary pragmatism dictates, which was important to remember in 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 9

evaluating Saddam’s vow of 1990 to never relinquish Kuwait, and his 

continued intransigence to Western demands. 

Reversal of Hostage Policy 

The decision to release all foreign hostages fits this pattern. As with

other misdirected policies in the past, Saddam initially pursued his hostage

policy with full vigor, despite mounting evidence that it was 

counterproductive. When it became clear to him that it was not protecting 

him from the likelihood of military conflict, as initially conceived, but was 

actually unifying the international opposition, he reversed the policy. The 

announcement followed an especially strong statement by Secretary Baker 

concerning the use of “decisive force,” but the anger of his former ally, the 

Soviet Union, was undoubtedly important as well. Moreover, the timing 

was designed not only to play on perceived internal divisions within the 

United States but also to magnify perceived differences in the international 

coalition. As it turned out, releasing the hostages did not help, but it 

seemed like a good idea, and the chance that it would prevent the attack 

against him was sufficient for Saddam to do it. 

Saddam’s Psychological Characteristics: Malignant Narcissism 

The labels “madman of the Middle East” and “megalomaniac” are 

often affixed to Saddam, but in fact there is no evidence that he is 

suffering from a psychotic disorder. He is not impulsive, only acts after 

judicious consideration, and can be extremely patient. Indeed, he uses 

time as a weapon. 

While he is psychologically in touch with reality, he is often 

politically out of touch with reality. Saddam’s worldview is narrow and 

distorted, and he has scant experience outside of the Arab world. His

only sustained experience with non-Arabs was with his Soviet military 

advisors, and he reportedly has only traveled outside of the Middle East

on two occasions, a brief trip to Paris in 1976 and another trip to 

Moscow. 

Moreover, he is surrounded by sycophants, who are cowed by 

Saddam’s well-founded reputation for brutality and who are afraid to 

contradict him. He has ruthlessly eliminated perceived threats to his 

power and equates criticism with disloyalty. 
10 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

In 1979, when he fully assumed the reins of Iraqi leadership, one of 

his first acts was to execute 21 senior officials whose loyalty he 

questioned. The dramatic meeting has been captured on film of his senior 

officials in which the 21 “traitors” were identified while Saddam watched, 

smiling broadly and luxuriantly smoking a Cuban cigar. After the “forced

confessions” by a “plotter” whose family had been arrested, the remaining 

senior officials formed the execution squads. 

In 1982, when the war with Iran was going very badly for Iraq and 

Saddam wished to terminate hostilities, Khomeini, who was personally 

fixated on Saddam, insisted there could be no peace until Saddam was 

removed from power. At a cabinet meeting, Saddam asked his ministers 

to candidly give their advice, and the Minister of Health suggested 

Saddam temporarily step down, to resume the presidency after peace had 

been established. Saddam reportedly thanked him for his candor and 

ordered his arrest. 

His wife pleaded for her husband’s return, indicating that her husband 

had always been loyal to Saddam. Saddam promised her that her husband 

would be returned. The next day, Saddam returned her husband’s body to 

her in a black canvas bag, chopped into pieces according to one story.

This powerfully concentrated the attention of the other ministers who were 

unanimous in their insistence that Saddam remain in power. 

Sometimes he wants frank advice, but it is difficult to tell when he

truly means it. The prudent inclination is to give him the advice one 

believes he really wants to hear. When his mind is made up, he leaves no 

room for the slightest dispute. Thus, he is deprived of the check of 

independent counsel from his leadership circle. This combination of 

limited international perspective and a sycophantic leadership circle has,

in the past, led him to miscalculate. 

Exalted Self Concept: Saddam is Iraq, Iraq is Saddam 

Saddam’s pursuit of power for himself and Iraq is boundless. In 

fact, in his mind, the destiny of Saddam and Iraq are one and 

indistinguishable. His exalted self-concept is fused with his Ba’athist 

political ideology. He believes Ba’athist dreams will be realized only 

when the Arab nation is unified under one strong leader. In Saddam’s

mind, he is destined for that role. 

Saddam’s grandiose self-image and self-absorption is so extreme that 

he has little capacity to emphasize with others. In many ways, he sees his 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 11

advisers and inner circle as extensions of himself. This bears on the 

special meaning of loyalty to Saddam. For Saddam, loyalty is a one-way 

street. He can turn abruptly against individuals of whom he has become 

suspicious despite their demonstrated total loyalty throughout their career. 

His fundamental distrust and wariness is so extreme that he is loath to trust 

anyone fully. He feels at ease only around people who owe their jobs and 

positions to him, and thus owe him great respect and loyalty, or people who 

belong to a population group in Iraq that cannot seriously aspire to power. 

To the first category belong people like his own sons but also the members 

of his security system whom he molded for many years in his own image, 

and who totally owe their careers and special advantages to him. 

Saddam feels ill at ease around people with careers that were not 

developed under his patronage, and especially people with higher 

education and professional credentials. Exceptions to this are Tariq Aziz, 

Foreign Minister, who has a PhD from the University of Pennsylvania and 

Dr. Sa’dun Hammadi, Speaker of the Parliament, who has an MA from the 

University of Baghdad. Saddam is comfortable with these men because, 

in addition to being a Christan (Aziz) and Shi’ite (Hammadi), they totally

owe their careers to him.

No Constraint of Conscience 

In pursuit of his messianic dreams, there is no evidence he is

constrained by conscience. His only loyalty is to Saddam Hussein. 

When there is an obstacle in his revolutionary path, Saddam 

eliminates it, whether it is a previously loyal subordinate or a previously 

supportive country. 

Unconstrained Aggression in Pursuit of His Goals 

In pursuing his goals, Saddam uses aggression instrumentally. He 

uses whatever force is necessary, and will, if he deems it expedient, go to 

extremes of violence, including the use of weapons of mass destruction. 

His unconstrained aggression is instrumental in pursuing his goals, but it is 

at the same time defensive aggression, for his grandiose facade masks 

underlying insecurity. 

Paranoid Orientation 

While Hussein is not psychotic, he has a strong paranoid orientation. 

He is ready for retaliation, and, not without reason, sees himself as
12 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

surrounded by enemies. But he ignores his role in creating those enemies, 

and righteously threatens his targets. The conspiracy theories he spins are 

not merely for popular consumption in the Arab world, but genuinely 

reflect his paranoid mindset. He is convinced that the United States, 

Israel, and Iran have been in league for the purpose of eliminating him, 

and finds a persuasive chain of evidence for this conclusion. His minister 

of information, Latif Nusayyif Jassim, who was responsible for 

propaganda, his Vice President, Taha Yasin Ramadan, his Deputy 

Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Izzat Ibrahim, and 

more generally speaking, his internal security apparatus probably helped

reinforce Saddam’s paranoid disposition and in a sense are the 

implementers of his paranoia. 

It is this political personality constellation of a messianic ambition for

unlimited power, an absence of conscience, unconstrained aggression, and 

a paranoid outlook which makes Saddam so dangerous. Conceptualized 

as malignant narcissism, this is the personality configuration of the 

destructive charismatic, who unifies and rallies his downtrodden 

supporters by blaming outside enemies. While Saddam is not charismatic, 

this psychological stance is the basis of Saddam’s particular appeal to the

Palestinians who see him as a strongman who shares their intense antiZionism and will champion their cause. 

Views Self as One of History’s Great Leaders 

Saddam Hussein genuinely sees himself as one of the great leaders of 

history, ranking himself with his heroes: Nasser, Castro, Tito, Ho Chi 

Minh, and Mao Zedong, each of whom he admires for adapting socialism 

to his environment, free of foreign domination. Saddam sees himself as 

transforming his society. He believes youth must be “fashioned” to 

“safeguard the future” and that Iraqi children must be transformed into a

“radiating light that will expel” traditional family backwardness. Like

Mao, Saddam has encouraged youth to inform on their parents’ antirevolutionary activity. As God-like status was ascribed to Mao, and giant 

pictures and statues of him were placed throughout China, so too giant 

pictures and statues of Saddam abound in Iraq. Asked about this cult of 

personality, Saddam shrugs and says he “cannot help it if that is what they 

want to do.” 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 13

Probably Over-reads Degree of Support in Arab World 

Saddam Hussein is so consumed with his messianic mission that he

probably overestimates the degree of his support in the rest of the Arab 

world. He psychologically assumes that many in the Arab world,

especially the downtrodden, share his views and see him as their hero. He 

was probably genuinely surprised at the fairly wide condemnation of his 

invasion of Kuwait. He was right, though, when it came to many 

Jordanians, Palestinians and Syrians.

Political Personality Shapes Leadership Style 

Saddam’s leadership and operating style can be summarized in what 

Regis Matlak has dubbed “Saddam’s Rules for Survival: 9

1. Innocence is No Defense; Guilt is More Secure: Although not 

necessarily the first recourse, Saddam has ordered execution 

of innocent officers to insure the removal of all coup plotters 

rather than be vulnerable to a residual threat. On the other 

hand, official complicity in crimes, that is to say “authorized” 

corruption, arbitrary arrest, and “official” torture and 

mutilation, are required to establish bona fides. 

2. Be Eternally Agnostic on Matters of Family and Loyalty: For 

Saddam, it is an article of faith to be vigilant on appointments 

to coup-sensitive positions in his personal bodyguard and the 

broader palace-controlled personal, protective infrastructure.

3. Never Trust a Fellow Conspirator. 

4. Beware Dangerous Liaisons: Saddam believes a coup plotter 

with luck and audacity is more likely to succeed than a 

conspirator with an extensive organization. 

5. Pre-empt the Building of Personal Power Bases or Political 

Factions, Particularly in Military and Security Organs: 

Despite key assignments being restricted to family members

and other members of the Tikrit power structure, Saddam does 

not permit a long tenure in any one position. Saddam views 
14 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

the establishment of a single independent power base as a de 

facto challenge to his leadership. 

6. Disregard “Intelligence” at Great Peril: Saddam takes 

seriously the human and technical information gathered from

his pervasive intelligence and security networks. Saddam has

also learned that acting on such intelligence with leniency has 

led the same conspirators to try again at a later time. 

7. Redundancy is “Security Effective,” if not Resource Efficient: 

There exist visible and shadowy organizational structures 

mean to pre-empt, control, or react to threats to regime

stability. This security apparatus is well practiced at

penetrating military and intelligence centered cabals. 

8. Trojan Horses and Other Deceptions: Saddam is not content 

to pursue only those who actively plan his removal. He also 

seeks out those who might be tempted to join a coup

conspiracy if given the opportunity. This is done both 

through setting up “disloyal” senior offices to gather

potential coup plotters, as well as the “perceived” Trojan

Horse where a friend or family member hears unfavorable 

commentary about Saddam or the regime and is unclear 

whether this is a regime test knowing that if it is and they

don’t turn the person they will pay the price. 

9. A Cult of personality and A Perception of Invulnerability: 

Saddam and the regime have fostered a cult of personality. 

One of the primary objectives, at least for Saddam, is to create 

a perception that only Saddam can save Iraq from internal 

chaos, anarchy, and foreign encroachment; that Saddam and

the regime are everywhere and all-powerful; and that it is

futile to even think beyond Saddam. Saddam icons are 

located everywhere. 

10. Retribution is Good: Individuals must know that there will 

be a high price to pay for taking action against Saddam. This

characteristic is so strong in Saddam’s operating style that it 

serves to define Saddam’s response to betrayal or attack. 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 15

Saddam at the Crossroads 

It is not by accident that Saddam Hussein has survived for more than 

three decades as his nation’s preeminent leader in this tumultuous part of 

the world. While he is driven by dreams of glory, and his political 

perspective is narrow and distorted, he is a shrewd tactician who has a sense 

of patience. He is able to justify extremes of aggression on the basis of

revolutionary, pan-Arab and anti-imperialist needs. Yet, if the aggression is

counterproductive, he has shown a pattern of reversing his course when he 

has miscalculated, waiting until a later day to achieve his destiny. His drive 

for power is not diminished by these reversals, but only deflected. 

Saddam Hussein is a ruthless political calculator who will go to

whatever lengths are necessary to achieve his goals. His survival in

power, with his dignity intact, is his highest priority. Soviet Foreign 

Minister Yevgeny Primakov, after meeting him in Baghdad during the 

Gulf War, suggested that Saddam was suffering from a “Masada 

Complex,” which would cause him to jeopardize Iraq rather than

compromise with other nations, preferring a martyr’s death to yielding. 

This is assuredly not the case. Saddam has no wish to be a martyr, and 

survival is his number one priority. A self-proclaimed revolutionary 

pragmatist, he does not wish a conflict in which Iraq will be grievously 

damaged and his stature as a leader destroyed. 

Moreover, Primakov summed up his visit to Baghdad stating that 

Saddam had a sense of confidence in his military due to the technical 

superiority of his land forces in the Iran-Iraq war.10 After all, Saddam 

reportedly felt that his chances of survival, even victory, or maybe a 

respectable draw, were excellent. 

However, another aspect of a “Masada Complex” suits him well, that

of frequently feeling that formidable hostile forces are besieging him. 

When he and his spokesmen argue that Iraq had little choice but to attack 

Kuwait in 1990, they explain that Kuwait had been conspiring with the 

U.S. to destroy Iraq, and an escape forward was the only way to save

regime and country. 

At the same time, however, Saddam also complained that the U.S. 

gave him a carte blanche to attack Kuwait, and when he took it at its face 

value the U.S. pounced on him. 

However, one wonders, if he knew the U.S. was adamant about 

destroying him, how could he possibly believe anything they told him?
16 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

Should he not have suspected a trap in anything the Americans were 

telling him? 

Saddam’s advisors’ reluctance to disagree with Saddam’s policies 

contributes to the potential for miscalculation. Nevertheless, his

advisors, by providing information and assessments, are able to make

significant inputs to the accuracy of Saddam’s evaluation of Iraq’s 

political/military situation. 

While Saddam appreciated the danger of the Gulf crisis, it did provide 

the opportunity to defy the hated outsiders, a strong value in his Ba’ath 

ideology. He continued to cast the conflict as a struggle between Iraq, 

leading the “Camp” of the decent and patriotic Arabs, the true Muslims 

and honest people in the world at large, against the United States. Further, 

he argued it as a struggle between the “Slave of God” Saddam Hussein 

versus the “Infidel” and “Imperialist” George Bush. When the struggle

became thus personalized, it could enhance Saddam’s reputation as a 

courageous strongman willing to defy the imperialist United States. 

When President George H. W. Bush depicted the conflict as the 

unified civilized world against Saddam Hussein, it hit a tender nerve for 

Saddam. Saddam has his eye on his role in history and places great 

stock in world opinion. If he were to conclude that his status as a world 

leader was threatened, it would have important constraining effects on

him. Thus the prospect of being expelled from the United Nations and of

Iraq being castigated as a rogue nation outside the community of nations 

would be very threatening to Saddam. The overwhelming majority 

supporting the Security Council resolution at the time of the conflict 

must have confronted Saddam with the damage he was inflicting on his 

reputation as a leader, despite his defiant rhetoric dismissing the 

resolutions of the United Nations as reflecting the United States’ control 

of the international organization. 

Defiant rhetoric was a hallmark of the conflict and lent itself to 

misinterpretation across cultural boundaries. The Arab world places great

stock on expressive language. The language of courage is a hallmark of 

leadership, and great value is attached to the very act of expressing brave 

resolve against the enemy, in and of itself. Even though the statement is 

made in response to the United States, when Saddam speaks it is to 

multiple audiences. Much of his language is solipsistic and designed to 

demonstrate his courage and resolve to the Iraqi people and the Arab and 

Islamic worlds. There is no necessary connection between courageous

verbal expression and the act threatened. Nasser gained great stature from
Saddam is Iraq . . . 17

his fiery rhetoric. Moreover, the fiercely defiant rhetoric was another 

indicator of the stress on Saddam, for the more threatened Saddam feels, 

the more threatening he becomes. 

By the same token, Saddam probably hears the Western words of 

President Bush through a Middle Eastern filter. When a public statement

of resolve and intent was made by President George H. W. Bush, Saddam 

may well have discounted the expressed intent to act. 

This underlines the importance of a private channel to communicate 

clearly and unambiguously. The mission by Secretary of State Baker 

afforded the opportunity to resolve any misunderstandings on Saddam’s 

part concerning the strength of resolve and intentions of the United States

and the international coalition. There may be no doubt that, even though 

he refused to deliver President Bush’s letter to Saddam, Tariq Aziz, who 

met with Baker in Geneva, delivered the message that the letter contained.

Still, Saddam remained inclined to believe that the U.S. would not 

attack.11 This, like his more general assessment that invading Kuwait was

a safe bet, demonstrates Saddam’s predilection for wishful thinking. 

The Iran-Iraq War and Gulf Crisis Promote Saddam to World-Class Leader 

Until he invaded Iran Saddam Hussein had languished in obscurity, 

overshadowed by the heroic stature of other Middle Eastern leaders such 

as Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Ayatollah Khomeini. But, with the

invasion of Iran, he assumed the role of the defender of the Arab world

against the Persian threat “the Guardian of the Eastern Gate” of the Arab

homeland. But when the war was over, his economy was in shambles,

his population was seething as a result of a crisis of unfulfilled socioeconomic expectations, and his prestige in the Arab world was lower 

than it had been before he invaded Iran. In the Gulf crisis, at long last, 

Saddam was exactly where he believed he was destined to be, a worldclass political actor on center stage commanding world events, with the 

entire world’s attention focused upon him. When his rhetoric was 

threatening, the price of oil rose precipitously and the Dow Jones 

average plummeted. He was demonstrating to the Arab masses that he is

an Arab leader (qa’id) of historical proportions with the courage to defy 

the West and expel foreign influences.

Now that he was at the very center of international attention, his 

appetite for glory was stimulated all the more. The glory-seeking Saddam 
18 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

would not easily yield the spotlight of international attention. He wanted 

to remain on center stage, but not at the expense of his power and his

prestige. Saddam would only withdraw if he calculated that he could do 

so with his power and his honor intact and that the drama in which he is 

starring would continue. 

Honor and reputation must be interpreted in an Arab context. Saddam 

had already achieved considerable honor in the eyes of the Arab masses for 

having the courage to stand up to the West. It should be remembered that, 

even though Egypt militarily lost the 1973 war with Israel, Sadat became a

hero to the Arab world for his willingness to attack, and initially force back, 

the previously invincible forces of Israel. Qadhafi mounted an air attack 

when the United States crossed the so-called “line of death.” Even though 

his jets were destroyed in the ensuing conflict, Qadhafi’s status was raised

in the Arab world. Indeed, he thanked the United States for making him a 

hero to the third world.12 Thus, so too, Saddam could find honor in the

1990-91 confrontation. He could even sustain very heavy casualties, 

provided that the battle would end with a draw, or with a defeat that could 

somehow be presented as a draw. And a draw with the U.S. in itself would 

be a kind of victory. 

Saddam’s past history reveals a remarkable capacity to find face saving 

justification when reversing his course in very difficult circumstances. 

Insisting on total capitulation and humiliation could drive Saddam into a 

corner and make it impossible for him to reverse his course. He would only 

withdraw from Kuwait if he believed he could survive with his power and 

his honor intact. 

By the same token, he would only reverse his course if his power and 

reputation were threatened. This would require a posture of strength, 

firmness and clarity of purpose by a unified civilized world, demonstrably 

willing to use overwhelming force if necessary. The only language 

Saddam Hussein understands is the language of power. Without this 

demonstrable willingness to use force, even if the sanctions were biting

deeply, Saddam was quite capable of putting his population through a 

sustained period of hardship. 

It was crucial to demonstrate unequivocally to Saddam Hussein that

unless he withdrew, his career as a world-class political actor would be 

ended. The announcement of a major escalation of the force level was

presumably designed to drive that message home. The U.N. resolution 

authorizing the use of force unless Iraq withdrew by January 15 was a 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 19

particularly powerful message because of the large majority

supporting the resolution. 

The message almost certainly was received. In the wake of the 

announcement of the increase in coalition force levels in November 1990, 

Saddam intensified his request for “deep negotiations,” seeking a way out 

in which he could preserve his power and his reputation. This, however, 

could only be achieved had he managed to pressure the United States to

agree to leave a meaningful Iraqi presence in Kuwait, as well as to start 

pushing Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza. 

Alternatively, both he and his lieutenants had to be fully convinced 

that if Iraq did not withdraw they would lose power in Baghdad or, at 

least, be on the brink of losing power. That President Bush sent Secretary 

of State Baker to meet one-on-one with Saddam was an extremely 

important step. Yet, even the Geneva meeting failed to convince Saddam

that the U.S. would go to an all-out war. In the interim leading up to the 

meeting, and following it, the shrewdly manipulative Saddam continued to 

attempt to divide the international coalition. 

Considering himself a revolutionary pragmatist, Saddam is, at heart, a

survivor. Even if in response to the unified demonstration of strength and 

resolve he did retreat and reverse his course, this would only be a 

temporary deflection of his unbounded drive for power. It was a certainty 

that he will return at a later date, stronger than ever, unless firm measures 

were taken to contain him. This underlined the importance of strategic 

planning beyond the immediate crisis, especially considering his progress

toward acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. If blocked in his overt 

aggression, he could be expected to pursue his goals covertly through 

intensified support of terrorism.

Saddam will not go down to the last flaming bunker if he has a way

out, but he can be extremely dangerous and will stop at nothing if he is 

backed into a corner. If he believes his very survival and reputation as a 

world-class political actor is threatened, Saddam can respond with 

unrestrained aggression, using whatever weapons and resources are at his 

disposal, in what would surely be a tragic and bloody final act. 

Why Saddam Did Not Withdraw from Kuwait 

In the political psychology profile prepared for the congressional

hearings on the Gulf crisis in December 1990, recapitulated above, it was 

observed that Saddam was by no means a martyr and was indeed the
20 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

quintessential survivor. The key to his survival in power for 22 years was 

his capacity to reverse his course when events demonstrated that he had 

miscalculated. We believed he could again reverse himself if he concluded 

that unless he did so his power base and reputation would be destroyed, and 

if by so doing he could preserve his power base and reputation. 

How can it be, then, that this self-described revolutionary pragmatist, 

faced by an overwhelming array of military power that would surely deal a 

mortal blow to his nation, entered into and persisted in a violent 

confrontational course? Cultural factors probably contributed to his

calculation and miscalculation. As pointed out above, Saddam may well 

have heard President Bush’s Western words of intent through a Middle 

Eastern filter and calculated that he was bluffing. It is also possible he 

downgraded the magnitude of the threat, likening the threatened response 

to the characteristic Arab hyperbole. Even though he expected a massive

air strike, he undoubtedly was surprised by the magnitude of the 

destruction wrought on his forces. 

But more importantly, the dynamic of the crisis affected Saddam.

What began as an act of naked aggression toward Kuwait was transformed

into the culminating act of the drama of his life. Although he had 

previously shown little concern for the Palestinian people, the shrewdly

manipulative Saddam had wrapped himself and his invasion of Kuwait in 

the Palestinian flag. The response of the Palestinians was overwhelming. 

They saw Saddam as their hope and their salvation, standing up defiantly 

and courageously to the United States to force a just settlement of their 

cause. This caught the imagination of the masses throughout the Arab 

world and their shouts of approval fed his already swollen ego as he went

on a defiant roll. 

Intoxicated by the elixir of power and the acclaim of the Palestinians

and the radical Arab masses, Saddam may well have been on a euphoric 

high and optimistically overestimated his chances for success. For

Saddam’s heroic self-image was engaged as never before. He was fulfilling 

the messianic goal that had obsessed him--and eluded him--throughout his

life. He was actualizing his self-concept as leader of all the Arab peoples, 

the legitimate heir of Nebuchadnezzar, Saladin, and especially Nasser. 

His psychology and his policy options became captives of his rhetoric 

and self image. He became so absolutist in his commitment to the 

Palestinian cause, to not yielding even partially over Kuwait until there 

was justice for the Palestinian people, and U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 

had been complied with according to the Arab interpretation, that it would 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 21

have been extremely difficult for him to reverse himself without being 

dishonored, and to lose face in the Arab world was to be without authority. 

Unlike past reversals, these absolutist pronouncements were in the full 

spotlight of international attention. Saddam had, in effect, painted himself 

into a comer. The Bush administration’s insistence on “no face-saving”

only intensified this dilemma. 

Not only, then, had Saddam concluded that to reverse himself would 

be to lose his honor, but he also probably doubted that his power base 

would be preserved if he dishonorably left Kuwait. It is suggested here 

that, in his confused thinking, Saddam at the same time doubted that the 

U.S. would go to war at all, and he also believed that, even if the U.S. did

attack, having no stomach for the heavy casualties, it would certainly

sustain, it would stop its offensive and start negotiating. Moreover, 

Saddam also doubted that the aggressive intention of the United States

would be limited by the border of Iraq. For years he had been telling his 

people that a U.S.-Iran-Israeli conspiracy was in place to destroy Iraq and 

remove him and his regime from power. 

Earlier, Foreign Minister Aziz had indicated “everything was on the 

table,” but by late December the semblance of diplomatic flexibility had

disappeared, and Saddam seemed intent on challenging the coalition’s 

ultimatum. Saddam, in our estimation, had concluded that he could not 

reverse himself and withdraw without being dishonored. He had 

concluded that he needed to risk entering conflict to demonstrate his 

courage and to affirm his claim to pan-Arab and Islamic leadership as well 

as to traditional Arab values of manly valor (al-futuwwa, al-muruwwa) 

and honor (al-sharaf).13

Saddam expected a massive air campaign and planned to survive it.

In the succeeding ground campaign, he hoped to engage the U.S.

“Vietnam complex.” As he had demonstrated in the Iran-Iraq War, his

battle-hardened troops, he believed, could absorb massive casualties, 

whereas the weak-willed United States would not have the stomach for 

this, and a political-military stalemate would ensue.14

By demonstrating that he had the courage to stand up against the most

powerful nation on earth, Saddam’s credentials as pan-Arab leader and a 

manly hero alike would be consolidated and he would win great honor. In 

the Arab world, having the courage to fight a superior foe can bring 

political victory, even through a military setback. 

Sadat had won great honor in 1973 by his leading the attack against 

previously invincible Israel, even though Egypt lost the military conflict. 
22 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

Indeed, his enhanced prestige permitted him to approach Israel as equal 

negotiating partner, and ultimately led to the Camp David Accords. 

Saddam’s political hero and model, Nasser, gained great honor for

confronting the imperialists in the 1956 Suez campaign. Even though he 

lost militarily, politically he was the winner, and this is how history

remembered him. In 1967 Nasser was totally routed, and this destroyed 

his reputation and started his way downhill, but Saddam was certain that

this could not happen to him.

Saddam hoped to consolidate his place in history as Nasser’s heir by 

bravely defying the U.S. and, if there was no other way, confronting the 

U.S.-led coalition. On the third day of the air campaign, his minister of 

information, Latif Nusayyif Jassim, declared victory. To the astounded 

press he explained that the coalition expected Iraq to crumble in 2 days. 

Having already survived the massive air strikes for 3 days, the Iraqis were

accordingly victorious, and each further day would only magnify the 

scope of their victory. 

It was revealed in January that under Saddam’s opulent palace was a 

mammoth bunker, fortified with steel and pre-stressed concrete. The 

architecture of this complex is Saddam’s psychological architecture: a 

defiant, grandiose facade resting on the well-fortified foundation of a siege 

mentality. Attacked on all sides, Saddam remains besieged and defiant, 

using whatever aggression is necessary to consolidate his control and 

ensure his survival. 

Threats to Saddam’s Survival After the Conflict 

Iraqi domestic support for Saddam Hussein was drastically eroded 

after the Gulf War. By late 1996 a series of betrayals, failures and 

disappointments had left him in a more precarious domestic position that 

at any time since March 1991. A principle of Saddam’s leadership that 

has always been true has, if anything, been intensified in the post-war 

period. In particular, ensuring his domestic stability and eliminating

internal threats to his regime is Saddam’s central concern, and, in a clash 

between his international position and internal security, internal security 

will win out. Moreover, precipitating international crises can strengthen 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 23

Saddam’s internal position. The most damaging consequence of a setback 

internationally that proves him to be a failure as a leader is the consequent

reduction in his internal prestige and threats to his regime’s stability. 

Five events could lead his power base to seriously question Saddam’s 

ability successfully to lead Iraq: 

• If Saddam’s actions were to provoke the West to conduct a 

sustained powerful military campaign that destroyed

important elements of his military power. This could happen 

if Iraq was unable to mend its fences with at least some of its

Arab sisters, with Turkey and some great powers. 

• If he could not demonstrate to his power base that he will soon 

be able to bring to an end, or, at least, to substantially erode 

the U.N. inspections regime and with it the oil embargo. 

• If he were unable to guarantee the functioning of the national 

economy and to continue to support the relatively extravagant 

life style of his bodyguards and ruling elite. 

• If he were unable to retain Iraq’s WMD arsenal. 

• If he were to lose the propaganda campaign he has waged 

within Iraq. 

Accordingly, in addition to attempting to strengthen internal

vulnerabilities, he also has worked assiduously to strengthen his 

international position, both with his “far abroad,”—Russia, France, and 

China—as well as his “near abroad,” Middle Eastern neighbor states. 

Weakened Military 

Immediately after the conflict terminated in March 1991, the military,

Saddam’s major source of support, was gravely weakened, its once proud 

reputation as the most powerful military in the Gulf shattered, its ranks 

and material depleted, and its morale destroyed. 

• Declarations of victory and medals distribution 

notwithstanding, the Iraqi armed forces, including the 

Republican Guard, became disillusioned with Saddam. 

• The standard of living for soldiers had reached the lowest level 

ever. Logistical supplies were unavailable for the most part. 
24 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

• They saw the no-fly zone over the north and south as

humiliating. Moreover, Kurdish control over much of the 

north was a painful reminder that Iraq was powerless and at 

the mercy of the United States. 

• The UN sponsored weapons inspections were a continuing 

humiliation and demonstration of Saddam’s lack of control 

over Iraq’s sovereignty. The sanctions were perceived as a 

serious detriment to the national economy and security. 

• This, and the military defeat, led to a rising tide of desertions,

which was one of the reasons for Baghdad’s decision to 

demobilize units. The armed forces shrank from over one 

million to just over 400,000. 

• The rising tide of disillusion and resentment led to repeated 

coup attempts. 

• In March 1995, two regular army brigades suffered severe losses 

from clashes with Jalal Talabani’s Kurds and The Iraqi National

Congress (INC), further humiliating Saddam and the military. 

Fractures in Tribal Loyalty 

Within the larger Sunni tribal system there were signs of weakening 

solidarity. Of the five most important Sunni tribes, that had been the core 

of Saddam’s support, and were in leadership roles throughout the military, 

four fell under suspicion. 

A 1990 plot involved Jubbur members of the Republican Guards and 

regular army units. Jubburis live in Saddam’s home-town, Tikrit, as well 

as south of Baghdad and south of Mosul. Officers of the ‘Ubayd tribe, in 

and around Tikrit, were purged in 1993-1994, and very prominent 

members of another Tikriti tribe, the Jawa’inah, were purged in 1993 for 

an alleged plot. Al-Bu Nimr (of the Dulaym tribe) in and around Ramadi 

revolted against Saddam in 1995 and were crushed viciously by Udayy 

Saddam Hussein and his Saddam’s Martyrs militia. 

Frictions within Saddam’s al-Bu Nasser tribe compounded problems. 

By late summer 1996 five “houses” within the tribe had grievances with 

Saddam or his family. Parts of the Majid branch were at odds with the

dictator, including the Kamils, Saddam’s paternal cousins and sons-in-law 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 25

whom his bodyguards gunned down soon after they returned from 

Amman, Jordan after having defected there in August 1995. Also having 

grievances were The Haza’, the Ibrahim Hasans (Saddam’s half brothers), 

the Bakrs (the extended family of the late president), and the Msallat (the

extended family of Saddam’s maternal uncle). 

While Jubburis, Dulaymis and ‘Ubaydis, as well as members of the 

partly alienated “houses” in albu Nasser continue to serve in Republican 

Guard and key security positions, they have been removed from the most 

sensitive positions and are closely watched. Overall, the threat of a largescale tribal uprising remains remote, but when the regime is on the verge 

of collapse, many in these tribes and “houses” are likely to defect. When

it comes to Shi’ite Tribes in the south, while many of them are 

collaborating with the regime, only few, if any, are fully committed. All 

are going through the motions of expressing unbound loyalty to the 

Historical Leader Saddam, but, at the first sign of disintegration, many 

will remain on the sideline to see where the wind is blowing and will 

easily switch sides. Many years of hardship in the volatile Iraqi

countryside has taught them harsh lessons.

Fault Lines in the Family 

Udayy Saddam Hussein 

The temperament and unconstrained behavior of Saddam’s elder son 

Udayy, born in 1963, has been a continuing issue. He has a reputation as 

the “bad boy” of Iraq, and is greatly feared among the population of

Baghdad. He has been involved in several widely publicized incidents, 

but Saddam had regularly either overlooked Udayy’s excesses, or, if the 

event was too public to ignore, dealt with it in the mildest of manner. In

1988 Udayy murdered Saddam’s valet, Hanna Jojo, because the latter 

would not stop shooting in the air. Udayy was hosting Suzanne 

Mubarak, and the shooting interfered with the party. Udayy had had an 

account to settle with Jojo, who had facilitated a love affair between 

Saddam and Samirah Shahbandar, the wife of Nur al-Din Safi, an official 

in Iraqi Airways. 

Eventually Saddam had her divorce her husband and marry him. The 

ex-husband was promoted to chairman of the board and general manager 

as a consolation prize. He also received an apartment in the luxurious 28 
26 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

April housing complex near al_Karkh Quarter in Baghdad.15 In 1986

Samirah gave birth to Ali Saddam Hussein. 

The whole affair angered Saddam’s first wife, and maternal cousin, 

Sajidah to no end, and Udayy supported his mother in the dispute. Udayy 

beat the valet to death in full view of all the guests. As a result of this, 

Saddam jailed Udayy and put him on trial for murder but family members 

of the victim “pleaded for leniency” saying that Udayy’s deed was “the 

will of God,” and thus he ought not be punished. Saddam released and 

exiled Udayy to Switzerland, where he lived with his uncle. A few 

months later Udayy was declared persona non grata by the Swiss 

authorities because he attacked a Swiss policeman. Udayy returned to Iraq 

where he began reintegrating himself into the Iraqi power elite. He

became the de-facto minister of youth, the czar of the Iraqi media and 

sports, and, in early 1995, his father allowed him to establish a militia 

force, Fida’iyyi Saddam (Saddam’s Martyrs). This was a most unruly 

crowd, badly trained, poorly armed, and remarkably dilapidated, but they 

were his to play with. 

In 1995 Udayy shot his maternal uncle, Watban Ibrahim Hasan, in the 

leg. Watban was at the time no less than the minister of the interior, in 

charge, among other responsibilities, of the police and General Security 

(al-Amn al-‘Amm). The near-lethal confrontation was the culmination of

at least two years of acrimonious political struggle, partly in the full glare 

of the Iraqi media, for prestige and power and, possibly, for wealth. This 

created a major crisis between Saddam and his half brothers, two of whom 

he had re-integrated into his security system only five-six years earlier,

returning them to favor after they had been dismissed and were 

unemployed from 1983 to 1989. 

The night before the Udayy-Watban shooting incident, General

Hussein Kamil defected with his brother, Saddam, their wives, who were

Saddam Hussein’s daughters, and a few cousins. Hussein Kamil was, at the

time, in charge of the formidable Military Industrialization Organization 

(MIO) and one of the people responsible for the fearsome Special Security 

Organization (al-Amn al-Khass, SSO) that was responsible for concealment 

of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). His brother was a colonel 

in the Special Republican Guard. Once in Amman they started a series of 

revelations regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destructions that created a

major crisis between the regime and the U.N. The most important 

information revealed related to Iraq’s biological weapons. 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 27

Udayy was the main reason for this defection. Prior to the defection 

he threatened Kamil’s life if the latter would not cease his attempts to retake control over very lucrative assets Udayy had snatched from him 

while Kamil was recuperating from a brain surgery. According to some 

reports Udayy was also very involved—indeed central—in orchestrating 

the murder of Hussein Kamil and his brother after they returned in

February 1996. There is no doubt however that Saddam ordered the 

murder of Kamil and his brother ensuring though that those who did the 

killing took responsibility for it. The most remarkable fact about the

assassination was that members of the hit team were carefully chosen to 

represent the five generations of Saddam’s khams.

16 Saddam made

sure that five generations of his family (Kamil was Saddam’s cousin) 

would be involved in the murder, as this is the canonical structure of a

tribal khams. 

Saddam perverted the tribal code, though, because traditionally a 

khams never turns against its own members – the most it does is 

disassociate itself from the member. Additionally, Kamil’s father was 

innocent because he never left Iraq, and so the blood feud should not have

extended to him. Moreover, according to tribal custom, women are never

involved in blood revenge, yet Hussein Kamil’s sisters and other female 

members of his immediate family were also victims of the carnage. By 

making sure that so many members of the family were involved in the

murders, Saddam deflected guilt from himself and so made it extremely 

difficult for an embittered extended family member to single him out as 

the target of a retributory blood feud. 

Even before that, however, Saddam was outraged when he came to

realize the havoc his elder son was wreaking on his political-security 

system. He dismissed Udayy of all his duties and even burned down a 

garage in the Presidential Palace compound housing a few of his son’s 

most cherished, and expensive, vintage cars. This was the second time

Udayy’s recklessness placed his father at a disadvantage, but Saddam was, 

and apparently still is, unwilling to fully neutralize his elder son. 

In December 1996 in an assassination attempt on Udayy, his car 

was raked with automatic gunfire. This left him bedridden for at least 

six months with both his legs paralyzed.17 By 2002 he seems to have 

recovered from most of the adverse effects of his injury. No less

importantly, his father reinstated him in all his previous duties, including 

control over the Fida’iyyun, now a 20-30,000 strong force, better 
28 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

equipped, and trained by the semi-professional General Muzahim Sa’b 

Hasan, a member of the clan. 

One of the first things Udayy did once he was again the political master 

of a large militia was to turn on the weakest element in Iraqi society, 

women. As reported by a number of sources, some of them usually reliable, 

under his orders the Fida’iyyun started to round up young women accused 

of prostitution and behead them in public, usually near their own homes. 

This may be Udayy’s way of absolving himself of widespread charges of 

wanton promiscuity and, at the same time, indulging in his usual sadism. 

Udayy’s humanitarian organization has also specialized in cutting out

tongues of people accused of slandering the president.18

Since 1998 Udayy has thus been free to sabotage his father’s system

for the third time. To limit his elder son’s ability to do damage, however, 

and to humiliate him, Saddam promoted Qusayy, Udayy’s younger brother,

above him and implied in this way that Qusayy is the heir apparent. 

Qusayy 

While Udayy is part of Saddam’s problem, Qusayy is part of the 

solution. As reported to one of the authors (AB), even as teenagers the 

two brothers were very different from each other. Udayy was out of 

control, widely flaunting his privileges, while Qusayy was disciplined and 

hard working. Saddam could not but notice it. Since 1989 Saddam has

been preparing Qusayy for the duty of czar of internal security. To create 

a perfect team of security overlords, he asked his son to build the villa for 

the man who was then in charge of the security system, General Abd 

Hamid Mahmud (or Ihmid Hmud). The two got along very well, and 

today they are at the helm together. 

They are in charge of the SSO, the most formidable of all Iraqi 

security bodies, and in charge of security inside all security bodies. 

They are in charge of the Himaya and the Special Republican Guard 

(SRG). 

The president’s security rests mainly on them, but they are also in

charge of the more lethal links of Iraq’s non-conventional weapons in 

terms of concealment and deployment. Qusayy and Mahmud must 

authorize any movement of any military unit. When Saddam gives the 

order to launch non-conventional missiles they will be the ones to do it,

and there is a good chance they would. The SSO is the most disciplined 

organization in Iraq. 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 29

Qusayy is also the supreme authority when it comes to “prison 

cleansing,” the execution of hundreds of political prisoners to make 

room for new ones in Iraq’s crowded prisons. He is also the one who 

authorizes executions of military and security officers suspected of

disloyalty. Since 2001, Qusayy has also been a member of the Regional

Leadership of the Ba’ath party in Iraq, and Deputy Secretary of its 

important Military Bureau, the al-Maktab al-‘Askari.19 According to the 

constitution, the chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council 

(RCC), who is also the president of the state, must come from among the 

RCC members, and RCC members must be coming from among the 

wider body of the party’s all-Iraqi Regional Leadership (RL). Thus, the 

promotion of Qusayy to the RL is to be seen as the first step toward his 

inclusion in the RCC and, eventually, his promotion to the RCC 

Chairmanship and President. According to unconfirmed reports, Udayy, 

too, presented his candidacy to the RL, but failed. If true, then his anger

and frustration are likely greater than ever. 

Strategic Shift 

The family disarray culminating in Hussein Kamil’s defection and

assassination, the decline of Udayy and of Saddam’s half brothers signaled 

a certain change of strategy. No longer could the loyalty of the extended 

family be unquestioningly relied upon. Rather, it was necessary to 

strengthen the Ba’ath party and rely more centrally on long standing party 

loyalists and on more distant members of the tribe, and the coalition of 

tribes. By 2002, the minister of defense is no longer a cousin. Rather, he 

is General Sultan Hashim al-Ubaydi from Mosul. The Minister of Oil is 

General Amir Muhammad Rashid al-Ubaydi. The director of Military 

Industrialization is Abd al-Tawab al-Mulla Huwaysh. All these jobs were 

held one time or another by either or both of Saddam’s cousins Hussein 

Kamil and Ali Hasan. The commander of the Republican Guard is 

General Sayf al-Din Fulayyih from the town of Rawa and a party old

timer. The ministry of the interior, a very sensitive security duty that was 

held until 1995 by Watban, was given to an old party hand, Muhammad 

Zimam Abd al-Razzaq al-Sa’dun, a Sunni Arab but hailing from the 

Sa’dun clan of the south. 

In a less formal fashion, Saddam also brought back into his political 

“kitchen” the most senior party member in Iraq, Dr. Sa’dun Hammadi, 

who, for many years, had been languishing in the political desert as 
30 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

member, then Speaker of the National Assembly. Udayy and Qusayy, 

too, are sometimes summoned to the “kitchen.” Cousin Ali Hasan alMajid is almost always there as well. But this inner circle is more

balanced than before. In the first place, Ali Hasan is a party old timer.

Secondly, other members are all old party hands: Tariq Aziz (whom 

Udayy had attacked viciously a few times before, demanding his 

ousting), Izzat Ibrahim, who since 1991 has been Deputy Chairman of

the RCC, and Vice President Ramadan.20 

It should be emphasized that some distant cousins, and many tribe 

members and Tikritis are still placed in very important security positions, 

and they are indispensable as a security shield for the regime. However, 

save for Qusayy, the role of the extended family has clearly been reduced 

and the party old timers are becoming more prominent in the political 

arena and in the seam between the political and security realms, the 

ministries of defense and the interior. 

To placate Udayy, in 2002 Saddam reportedly agreed to imprison 

briefly a few of the sons of some party luminaries, Tariq Aziz’s son being 

one of them. The reason was, apparently, corruption, but more likely it

was their business competition with Udayy. But this did not change the 

overall picture. By mid 2002 Saddam relied on a more balanced partyTikriti-tribe-family power base than in the early 1990s. 

Redemption and Restoration of Morale Courtesy of the Kurds 

In late August 1996 Saddam Hussein authorized elements of the 

Republican Guard to attack the Kurdish city of Irbil following the Patriotic 

Union of Kurdistan (PUK)’s securing of limited military assistance from 

Iran. The Guard smashed the PUK and the U.S.-backed INC, as well as

some CIA operations in Kurdistan. The seizure of Irbil was a major 

success for Saddam. 

This triumph, coming after a series of setbacks and reminders of their 

diminished status, restored the morale of the Republic Guard and their 

faith in Saddam. It demonstrated the regime was still very much in control 

and was a major power throughout the country. It also showed the 

fractioned nature and impotence of the opposition movements in Iraq and 

was a powerful demonstration of the risk of rising against Saddam. 

This was a major turning point for the regime in terms of restoring its 

power position. Had the Guard not taken Irbil it is likely that Saddam’s 

support would be so undermined that his position would have been in 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 31

grave jeopardy. Now, however, Saddam could take the risk of accepting

the humiliating UNSC Resolution 986. 

U.N. Resolution 986 

Facing an imminent economic collapse in 1996, Saddam was forced 

to accept U.N. Resolution 986, the so-called oil-for-food deal. This 

represented a great humiliation because it glaringly infringed on the

national sovereignty of Iraq, and indirectly on Saddam’s personal honor. 

Saddam also feared such a partial measure would undermine international 

pressure to lift all the sanctions imposed on Iraq following the Gulf War. 

As long as the suffering of the Iraqi people could be alleviated through the 

oil-for-food resolution, he feared the embargo might stay on forever. 

Despite such fears, Saddam had no choice but to accept the 

recommendations of his economic advisers. On November 25, 1996, Iraq 

announced its acceptance of the Resolution. What made it possible for

him to swallow this was the military success in Irbil, as well as the 

exposure of a military coup d’etat and the execution of the revolutionaries. 

This increased his deterrence of further opposition actions in the country 

as a whole, and in the armed forces in particular. Whether or not the oilfor-food resolution was judged to be a humiliation, at least, he could 

reason, immediately thereafter none dared to try another coup. 

These two events highlight Saddam’s vulnerability in the summer of 

1996. He needed a way to restore the Iraqi military, particularly the 

Republican Guard’s, morale and to demonstrate his own strength and 

power among his own people. 

Advantages from accepting Resolution 986 were considerable. The 

sale of oil greatly improved Iraq’s international and regional standing. 

That the food and medicines distributed to the population alleviated the 

people’s suffering was less important than the fact that, from now on, 

Saddam could save the sums he had had to spend on food for his 

impoverished people. The disadvantages were minor by comparison, for 

credit for the increase in supplies went mainly to the regime, not to the 

U.N. It did diminish the regime’s ability to trumpet as loudly as before the 

suffering of the Iraqi people. 

Thus it may well be that the crisis Saddam provoked with the U.N. in 

October-November 1997 over UNSCOM inspections may well have been 

prompted by fear that the humanitarian issue would no longer be an issue, 

and that the embargo would remain. In reality, the Iraqi regime still 
32 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

trumpeted the suffering with considerable success, with the help of 

Western humanitarian groups. 

Full cooperation with UNSCOM would be out of the question, for 

this would mean disclosing voluntarily his remaining advanced weapons 

technological secrets. Retaining a WMD program has always been central 

to Saddam’s leadership concept. Thus, Saddam stuck to his twin goals to 

retain his WMD program and to get the embargo lifted. 

Strengthening International Support 

In the events leading up to the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam had been 

extremely isolated, misjudging the impact of his actions not only upon his 

Arab neighbors, the so-called “near abroad,” but also on major 

international actors on whose support he had previously been able to 

count, especially Russia and France. Grandiose and assumptive, 

ethnocentric, and surrounded by compliant sycophantic advisers, he had 

regularly seriously miscalculated both the risks of his actions and the 

degree of his support. His foreign policy initiatives since have 

demonstrated a much surer and more sophisticated hand. 

Petrodollars to Buy International Support 

Since the end of the Gulf War and the establishment of the Northern

and Southern No-Fly-Zones, Saddam’s political priorities were, not 

necessarily in the following order, to end the embargo and to end the 

Western patrols over the zones. A lower priority was to reoccupy the 

autonomous Kurdish region. Since the George W. Bush administration 

came to office, Saddam’s main priority shifted to the prevention of an

American military offensive against him. A very important part of

Saddam’s campaign to achieve at least most of his priorities has been a 

diplomatic and economic “love offensive” directed mainly at his previous

enemies. Faithful to his modus operandi inside Iraq, Saddam also has 

been adding threats that an attack on Iraq will meet with a ferocious 

reaction against American interests.21

The main tool in Saddam’s “love offensive” has been Iraq’s growing 

buying power as a result of the accumulation of petrodollars in Saddam’s 

personal coffers and in Iraq’s New York Security Council escrow account. 

Other tools, important as well, have been an ostentatious “return” to Islam 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 33

and high profile support for the Palestinian intifadah that erupted in 

September 2000. 

The Near Abroad

In his diplomatic efforts towards the “near abroad,” Saddam has been

quite effective. He has achieved a reduction of tensions with his lifelong 

enemy, Iran. He has accomplished a significant rapprochement with both 

Saudi Arabia and Syria, the latter especially significant given Syria’s 

recent membership in the U.N. Security Council. For economic and 

political reasons, even Jordan’s distance from and tensions with Iraq have 

been reduced. Saddam’s strong embrace and support of the Palestinian 

cause has been of great assistance in his courtship of these previous

estranged Arab neighbors. Turkey’s economic losses because of the 

sanctions against Iraq, $6-7 billion annually because of the embargo, 

coupled with their joint interests in countering their restive Kurdish 

populations, have led Turkey to resist actions that would magnify IraqiTurkish tensions. Recognizing these areas of joint interest, Iraq has 

intensively pursued a diplomatic offensive to draw Turkey closer to it and 

away from the United States. 

Events of 1997-1998 continued to shore up Saddam’s position. While 

in the past Iraqi politics were driven primarily by internal politics and 

factors, it has been external factors that have begun opening up new 

opportunities for Iraqi policies and helped to ameliorate Saddam’s domestic 

problems. His immediate neighbors have had the greatest impact. 

Syria 

The most telling case in terms of Saddam’s modus operandi when he 

feels weak and under great threat is provided by his tremendous resolve to

mend his fences with his oldest Middle Eastern rival, President Hafiz al 

Asad and his regime. The years 1997-1998 saw the beginning of a new 

relationship between the two countries. Saddam extended an olive branch 

to Asad and the latter reciprocated in kind. Although ties were mainly 

limited to economic and diplomatic areas, this relationship was the

beginning of Iraq’s acceptance back into Middle Eastern politics.22

In November 2000 Syria announced the establishment of full 

diplomatic relations with Iraq. Less than three months later, in early 

January 2001, Syria announced that “all Syrians can from now on travel to 

Iraq without any restrictions and all passports will not bear the ‘excluding 
34 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

Iraq’ sign.”23 By the end of January 2001 Vice President Taha Yasin 

Ramadan visited Damascus at the head of a large and very senior

delegation, including the ministers of trade, foreign affairs, and transport

and communication. They were received, first, by Prime Minister Dr. 

Muhammad Mustafa Miru, and later by President Bashar al Asad. 

In the first meeting the Syrian Prime Minister made a very significant 

announcement, the full meaning of which started to unfold soon afterward, 

but by mid 2002 more could still be expected to be implemented: 

“You will find in Damascus hearts that have been supportive of 

fraternal Iraq. The two countries are bound by historical, deep 

and continuous relations. We are bound by pan-Arab ties . . . 

Syria has much love and amity to Iraq . . . Syria is opposed to all 

forms of pressure and unjust siege imposed on dear Iraq. Syria is

always prepared to extend all requirements of the fraternal Iraqi 

people, so that will be able to face the circumstances they are 

experiencing. Syria considers this a pan-Arab duty.”24

Syria’s objection to the embargo was not new, but the speech was the

official – if not explicit – announcement of the re-opening of the old 

Kirkuk-Banyas crude pipeline, as well as the re-opening of more-or-less

regular civilian flights to Baghdad in contravention of UNSC 

resolutions.25 Furthermore, Prime Minister Miru’s promise to “extend all 

requirements” could easily be construed as a promise to smuggle military

spare parts and technology into Iraq. Under President Hafiz al-Asad no 

such promises were ever made. 

Upon Vice President Ramadan’s visit the two countries signed a freetrade agreement. Ramadan, it should be remembered, was one of the most 

extreme anti-Syrian politicians in Baghdad during the previous three 

decades. According to the agreement, the mutual trade volume was to

grow from $500 million in 2000 to around $1 billion in 2001.26 By the

end of February 2001, the Syrian minister of transportation, Makram 

Ubayd, and Minister of Communication, Muhammad Radwan, arrived at 

the head of a large delegation to Baghdad where they were to complete the 

discussions over the new economic agreements. 

Not surprisingly, the Syrian ministers expressed the hope that “the 

unjust embargo would be lifted as soon as possible.”27 At the same time 

President Bashar Asad called for the lifting of sanctions imposed on Iraq,28 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 35

and both countries agreed to set up a technical committee to study plans to 

construct a new pipeline between them.

29 The two countries also signed 

an agreement for bilateral cooperation on maritime, air and land transport, 

railroads, communications and information services. This included, among 

other issues, joint land transport and maritime transport companies.30 

According to some reports, in 2001 mutual trade actually reached almost 

$2 billion.31 These reports seem inflated, but even if the trade volume 

reached only $1-1.5 billion, most of it Syrian products sold to Iraq, this 

was of huge benefit to the Syrian economy. 

In August 2001 relations were upgraded further by a visit to Baghdad 

of Syrian Prime Minister Miru. Large economic delegations continued to 

arrive in Baghdad from Damascus in 2002 as well, and by the middle of 

that year it was estimated that the annual value of trade exchange between 

the two countries would exceed $3 billion.32 

Sometime in late 2001 or early 2002, Syria started a regular air 

service to Baghdad, in breach of UNSC resolutions. In June 2002 Iraq 

reciprocated by opening its air space for Iranian flights to Syria and in the 

opposite direction.33 This could provide a new route for Iran to send 

weapons to Hizballah in Lebanon after Turkey started to cause difficulties. 

But this is not all. 

Since November 18, 2000, the old Kirkuk-Banyas oil pipe line that 

had been shut down by the Syrians in April 1982 in order to cripple the 

Iraqi war effort against Iran was reopened. A few months earlier, in

August 2000, a rail connection for smuggling Iraqi oil to Syria was 

opened. The old pipeline started delivering between 100-200,000 barrels 

a day.34 On a number of occasions, President Bashar Asad promised the

United States to put the controversial pipeline under the control of the

U.N. This would have enabled the U.N. to supervise Baghdad’s exports 

and place oil revenues from the pipeline under the control of the oil-forfood program, but Iraqi oil continued to flow to Banyas unsupervised at 

least until August 2002. To make detection more difficult, Syria has 

been using the Iraqi oil for its own consumption, selling Syrian oil 

abroad instead.35 

It has to be borne in mind that the late 1990s and the first years of the 

new millennium were typified by a deep economic recession in Syria. 

Thus, for example, its GDP growth in 1999 was negative: -1.8%, and in 

2000 it rose to 2.5%, thanks to the rise in world oil prices and the injection 

of Iraqi oil, but even this growth was less than that of the population. In 

1999 the gross national income per capita in current dollars was just 
36 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

$2,920. All exports were $5.3 billion. An addition of close to $0.5 billion 

was very, very substantial. Also, in 2000, Syria’s external debt was $25.6 

billion, and debt service, $344 million.36

The illicit sales of Iraqi oil provided Asad’s regime with urgently

needed foreign currency, probably at the value of $400 million annually.

No less importantly, selling Syrian agricultural and light industrial 

products to Iraq at around $1 billion annually in 2001 represented a huge

boost to Syrian economy. To further cement the newly found friendship, 

in June 2002 Iraq sent large amounts of relief aid to Syria to help in the 

aftermath of a dam collapse, as well as medical teams. Iraq pledged 

continued support. 

It is hardly surprising, then, that President Hafiz al-Asad and his

successor son both chose to bury, even if only momentarily, the old rivalry 

with its twin Ba’ath regime from Baghdad. From Saddam Hussein’s point 

of view this was no easier. While there is hardly any doubt that he 

remained extremely suspicious vis-à-vis his old nemesis in Damascus, and 

while it is quite possible that he still harbors a lust for revenge, political

necessity overcame all other calculations. 

Saddam needs to smuggle his oil abroad because this is the only way 

he can earn large sums for his own private coffers. Likewise, Saddam 

needs Syrian support against the USA and, if he will manage to improve 

relations sufficiently, he may even expect Syria to smuggle into Iraq 

essential spare parts for his aging military hardware and perhaps even nonconventional technology. This is a further demonstration of his ability to 

postpone his revenge and normalize relations even with bitter enemies, if 

“the exceptionalism of revolutionary needs” so dictate. 

Iran

After taking power in 1997, Iranian president Khatami sought to 

improve relations with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, something that worried 

Saddam a great deal. However, hindered by internal politics those

relationships have not had the expected impact, which left more room for 

an improvement of Iraqi-Iranian relations. 

Still, unlike the relatively smooth rapprochement with Damascus and 

Ankara, relations with Iran, while generally improving between 1991 and 

2002 were still rather bumpy. This is not surprising. In the first place, 

eight years of war in which both sides lost hundreds of thousands of men 

and the propaganda attacks against the “hateful Zoroastrian Persians” were 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 37

no less vitriolic than those against Israel, a rapprochement could have been 

expected to face great difficulties. 

Moreover, the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War left certain issues 

unresolved, and this made things far worse. In the first place, tens of 

thousands of Iraqi prisoners of war remained in Iran and a few thousand 

Iranian prisoners remained in Iraq. Secondly, Iran refused to return 148 

Iraqi airplanes flown there during the Gulf War for shelter. Last, but not 

least, Iran supported, albeit in a limited fashion, the Shi’i anti-regime 

revolt of March 1991 and it has continued to support the Iraqi-Shi’i 

guerilla groups. 

Iraq, for her part, has supported the Iranian anti-regime Mujahidin 

Khalq guerillas. Both guerilla bodies have been attacking government

installations in the rivals’ capitals and sometimes in other areas, especially 

in the Shi’i south. By mid-2002, neither side is ready to give up the 

terrorist/guerilla tool for fear that the other would retain and use it. 

Having signed only a ceasefire agreement in 1988, it is surprising that 

a slow rapprochement has taken place at all. From Saddam’s viewpoint, 

burying the hatchet with the Iranians has been a very high priority. 

Confronting both the Americans and British and the Iranians was

something that Iraq could simply not afford. Also, Iranian cooperation 

over oil smuggling was very useful to Iraq. Finally, as long as mutual 

relations do not reach rock bottom, Saddam may reasonably expect that 

the Iranian support for the Shi’i underground will be limited. The

aggregate result is a very baffling cocktail of mutual acts of sabotage, 

mutual verbal attacks, mutual calls for improving relations and occasional 

mutual visits of foreign ministers and other officials. There were a few 

fairly large-scale exchanges of prisoners of war, especially in 1998, and 

Iranian pilgrims have been allowed to spend a week in Iraq, visiting the 

holy places of Najaf, Karbala, and Kazimayn (a Baghdad suburb where

two Shi’i imams are buried). This pattern started to develop in the late 

1990s.37 By mid-2002, things remained essentially the same.

38 

Throughout the 1990s the Iranian regime was also opposed to an 

American presence in the Gulf as well as to American attacks against 

Iraq.39 This was not out of sympathy for Saddam. Rather, it would seem

that a weakened Iraq, somewhat isolated, is the preferred Iranian choice. 

Indeed, in street demonstrations, alongside the traditional shouting “Death 

to America” and “Death to Israel” the Iranian masses still shout, 

occasionally, also “Death to Saddam.” 
38 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

However, there were no terrorist activities from either side for a few 

months. When Saddam restrained himself for this short time and 

refrained from attacking Iran, from August 2000 to February 2001, no 

“death to Saddam” slogans were heard in Iranian public rallies. 

However, in April 2002 when Baghdad called for an oil embargo, Iran’s 

political and religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, urged all Islamic 

countries to suspend oil exports to the U.S. for one month. Baghdad 

actually suspended U.S. sales and Saddam complained that Iran failed to

follow suit. 

In 1980 Saddam Hussein could not have tolerated a twilight-type of 

relationship with Iran. Khomeini’s support for his domestic opposition 

was seen as intolerable. Yet, a decade later Saddam appears to have 

learned to live with such ambivalence. 

Turkey 

Turkey supported the international coalition against Iraq in 1991. 

Yet, Saddam was happy to cooperate with it a short while after the war 

over the smuggling of oil through southern Turkey. Turkish-Iraqi 

economic ties saw a quantum leap since December 1996. This was when 

Kirkuk oil started to flow again through the old pipeline and Turkey 

started to reap legitimate oil transit revenues. With the oil-for-food

resources, Iraq started to purchase large quantities of Turkish products, 

and Turkish businessmen started to frequent Baghdad in large numbers. 

Just before the invasion of Kuwait, Turkey’s annual exports to Iraq 

amounted to around $400 million. In 2000 it reached already almost the

same annual rate as in 1990, $375 million, and in 2001 it almost doubled 

to $710 million.40 By the end of 2001 it was estimated that in 2002

Turkey would be exporting to Iraq products at a level of $2 billion.41 Bear 

in mind that before the Gulf War, Iraq was Turkey’s number one trade 

partner. Not surprisingly, Turkish businessmen involved in trade with Iraq 

often voiced their protest against the international embargo and called 

upon their government to increase efforts to lift the sanctions.42 The

government could hardly remain unimpressed. 

Turkey’s strong ties to the United States and insistence on working 

with the U.S. on Iraqi matters are a great source of frustration for 

Baghdad. Turkish military forays into autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, too, 

elicit bitter condemnations from Baghdad. Even though Saddam is no 

longer in control of Kurdistan, such forays are seen in Baghdad as 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 39

infringing on its sovereignty. Finally: the Iraqi regime is very critical of

the strategic cooperation between Turkey and Israel. 

At the same time, though, Saddam is aware that Ankara would like to 

have sanctions lifted because it too has suffered from the cut-off of trade 

and oil trans-shipment revenues from Iraq. He is doing everything in his 

power to wet the Turkish appetite, including an open call to breach the 

embargo. In 1997 the two countries signed an agreement to lay a 1,300 

kilometer natural gas pipeline. Additionally, the Turks are deeply wary of

the possibility that, if the Iraqi regime is toppled, the Kurds will declare 

independence. This will provide Turkish Kurds with a successful example 

and might result with a renewed Kurdish revolt. The Turks also are often 

unhappy with the indecisive way in which the Iraqi Kurds are stamping 

out the PKK, the Turkish Kurdish rebels in Iraqi Kurdistan. 43 

Saddam is pragmatic enough to take full advantage of all these 

nuances. The lure of his business and the fear of Kurdish independence 

being his main charm points in Ankara, he is playing it up continuously. 

Jordan 

While it did not participate in the international anti-Iraqi war 

coalition and was unwilling to confront Iraq politically either, since the

early 1990s Jordan has consistently distanced itself from Iraq. This it did 

in order to mend its fences with the U.S. and to make peace with Israel. 

This represented a major blow to Saddam’s efforts to end his 

international isolation. 

When Hussein Kamil defected in 1995 he went to Jordan, where King 

Hussein publicly supported the notion of a regime change in Iraq. This 

support for the Iraqi opposition, however, appears to have diminished

significantly as Jordan remains heavily dependent on Iraq for cheap oil 

and trade.44 

By 2002 Jordan was carrying out regular flights to Baghdad four 

times a week, in breach of UNSC resolutions.45 Jordanian “popular” 

delegations are visiting Baghdad regularly, and expressing support for 

Saddam and vitriolic criticism of the United States. It would seem, then,

that much like Turkey, Jordan, too, is getting the best of both worlds. It 

keeps excellent relations both with the United States and Israel. Jordan 

receives U.S. economic aid; and thwarts, as best it can, Iraqi attempts to 

smuggle weapons through its territory to the Palestinians. There is no 
40 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

recent evidence that they allow illicit goods into Iraq, and yet Jordan

continues to receive cheap oil from Saddam and to trade with Iraq. 

Saddam is fully aware of the Jordanian practice, but he does not seem 

to care. For him, Jordan is an important avenue to the outside world. 

Even more importantly, securing Jordan’s objection to an American attack

against him is now his top priority. Jordanian complicity with a U.S. 

offensive will mean his immediate demise, as it will provide the U.S. with 

the most effective bridgehead from where to launch the attack and prevent 

him from launching his own missiles against Israel. 

Saudi Arabia 

Until March 2002 the Saudis remained opposed to the Iraqi regime

and moved to improve relations with Iran as a counter to Iraq in the region 

should the United States not be able to live up to its commitments of 

security, or should the Saudi regime be compelled to ask the American 

forces to leave the country. 

The first deviation from this stance occurred in late 1997 and early 

1998. Some Saudi newspapers started to call for leniency toward Iraq 

and against American attacks. In December 1997 Prince Abd Allah 

called upon the GCC states to “overcome the past with its events and 

pains.”46 This was interpreted as a call for a rapprochement with 

Saddam’s Iraq. 

Prince Abd Allah’s mother hails from the Syrian-based Shammar 

tribe. He has always been closer to Syria than his half brother, King 

Fahd. This may have been one reason for his position. By late 1997 

Iraqi-Syrian relations were already improving and a tilt toward Iraq was 

no longer seen in Damascus as a hostile move. The Crown Prince had to 

reverse his policy for a while due to pressures from the U.S. and Kuwait, 

but not for very long. 

In March 2002, in the Beirut Arab Summit, Saudi Crown Prince

Abd Allah hugged and kissed Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, Saddam Hussein’s

Deputy Chairman of the RCC, in front of the world’s TV cameras. 

This signaled the beginning of the end of more than a decade of bitter

hostility. However, as early as January 2001 the Saudis already 

established a border crossing with Iraq and set up a trade office at Ar’ar 

in Northern Saudi Arabia. It expected to boost exports to Iraq to about 

$600 million in 2001 from about $200 million in 2000. The Saudis
Saddam is Iraq . . . 41

have been exporting mostly western goods to Iraq, which left Saudi 

Arabia with a sizeable profit.47 

This could be one of the avenues through which Iraqi entrepreneurs 

imported illicit goods like expensive cars. Unlike other such avenues, 

however, at least this one did not serve to smuggle in tank and artillery 

spare parts. Since 1999 Saudi companies have been participating in the 

Baghdad International Fair.

48 Saudi Arabia, however, has not gone on

record demanding an end to the embargo, and it continues to allow U.S. 

fighter planes to use its territory to patrol the Southern No Fly Zone. 

The Abd Allah-Izzat hug was not motivated by any economic 

considerations either. It would seem that the Saudis sought this way to 

secure an Iraqi commitment not to challenge Prince Abd Allah’s Peace 

Plan at the summit. Possibly, they also chose to burry the hatchet with

Saddam to placate a large anti-American constituency back home. The 

latter, rather than economic considerations, seems also to be the reason 

for the Saudi decision to deny the U.S. any use of its territory if it 

decides to attack Iraq. 

Yet this again demonstrated Saddam’s shrewd politics. He knew how 

to exploit his assets in the most effective fashion. He recognized the antiAmerican sentiment in Saudi Arabia. He also identified Prince Abd 

Allah’s need to receive unanimous support in the Beirut summit and not to 

be embarrassed by any dissent. He exacted his price, a hug, but he, too, 

paid a price. The hug represented also Saddam’s readiness to forgo past 

hates, and ostensibly, to forgive the Saudis their past “betrayal,” when

they supported the coalition against him in 1991. 

Other Gulf States 

In Spring 2002, the United Arabs Emirates (UAE) ratified a free trade 

agreement with Iraq that had been signed in November 2001. The most 

significant feature of this deal is that the six members of the Gulf CoOperation Council (GCC) will merge their markets into a customs union 

in 2003. This will give Iraq open access to the entire GCC market. By 

mid-2002 the UAE was already one of Iraq’s biggest economic partners in 

the region. 

The only Gulf state that, by mid-2002, was still hostile to Saddam’s

regime was Kuwait. Despite Iraq’s alternating offers of “friendship” and 

undisguised threats, Kuwait has steadfastly refused to improve bilateral 

relations. In January 2002 Saddam offered to allow Kuwaiti officials to 
42 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

visit Iraqi prisons to prove there are no Kuwaiti POWs being held. 

Kuwaiti officials refused and continue to be highly critical of the Iraqi 

regime. It seems that Kuwait is also sympathetic to the idea of an 

American-inspired violent regime change in Baghdad. If so, Kuwait is the 

only Arab state to support openly such a military operation. 

Egypt 

Egypt was the main Arab participant in the anti-Iraqi coalition of

1990-91. And yet, Iraqi-Egyptian relations started to pick up significantly 

the moment Iraq’s buying power surged. Trade became meaningful again 

in 1999. In January 2001, Iraq and Egypt signed a free trade zone 

agreement. Indeed, 2001 saw such agreements signed between Iraq and 

most Arab countries. According to Iraq’s Trade Minister, Muhammad 

Mahdi Salih, upon his visit to Cairo, the mutual trade in 2000 reached $1.2

billion, triple the 1999 figure. The minister expressed the hope that in 

2001 the volume would go beyond $2 billion.49 

The Iraqi Minister of Trade, Saddam’s chief economic adviser, is not 

a shy man. He made it very clear to the Egyptian media that “lifting [the] 

international sanctions imposed on Iraq will provide Egypt an opportunity 

to export further goods and products to the Iraq market, a matter that 

would lead to increasing the volume of trade between the two countries.” 

The Iraqi Minister explained that when the embargo is lifted, Iraq’s oil 

revenues would reach $30 billion annually. This, he pointed out, was “a 

matter that would open the door for a real upsurge in trade between Egypt 

and Iraq.” Egypt, he added, ranked first among Arab countries that have

trade relations with Iraq. Egypt ranked fourth among Iraq’s world trade 

partners after France, Russia, and China, in that order.50 

There was a political price to pay, and the Egyptian foreign minister 

Amr Musa was more than happy to pay it. While Egypt will not accept 

any infringement on Kuwait’s sovereignty, he said, “It is in the interest of 

all Arabs to forget the past and turn a new chapter.” Musa spoke also 

against any support for the Iraqi opposition and insisted that Egypt was

keen on promoting relations between Iraq “and all Arab states.” In other

words, Egypt was willing to mediate between Iraq on the one hand, and 

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the other.51 

Since 2000, large Egyptian delegations consisting of senior officials, 

sometimes cabinet ministers, and up to 200 businessmen each have been

frequenting Baghdad. Egypt also organized an Exhibition of its products 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 43

in Baghdad. Not surprisingly, upon the opening ceremony Vice President 

Ramadan exacted the usual price when he subjected the Egyptian visitors

to an attack on the U.S. “stupid administration” in his opening remarks.52

The Far Abroad

Ultimately though, it was the Far Abroad that “came to Saddam’s 

rescue.” France, Russia, China, and more distant Arab countries, such as 

Egypt, were able to put pressure on the U.N., particularly the United States 

and Great Britain. These countries took up the fight that sanctions were 

hurting the Iraqi people more than the regime and that lifting sanctions 

was the only way to alleviate their suffering, creating a sense that 

Washington, not Iraq, was increasingly isolated. 

• Russia continues to speak out against using force to bring 

about resolution to the Iraq situation. 

• France continues to actively speak out against sanctions, even

though it is more inclined than Russia to search for common 

ground with the United States. 

• China opposes the sanctions, but is usually more passive than 

Russia and France. 

His patient diplomacy towards Russia and France, both of which have 

significant economic interests in an Iraq freed of economic shackles, have

permitted Saddam to challenge the UNSCOM inspections regime with 

relative impunity, knowing these Security Council powers could be 

counted upon to weaken reprisals against Iraq. China, too, has supported 

his beleaguered regime in international forums. 

Buying Off Superpowers: Russia as an Example 

Hardly did the oil pumps in Kirkuk started to send crude again 

through the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline to the Mediterranean port of Dortyol in 

December 1996, when Saddam Hussein probably realized the magnitude

of his blunder in rejecting previous U.N. offers to enter into oil-for-food 

arrangements. The moment Iraq started again to sell oil on the world 

market and earn petrodollars, even though the money went into the escrow 

account in New York, it became a huge asset. Saddam could not order
44 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

everything he wanted since all Iraqi contracts have been monitored by 

U.N. Security Council 668 Committee. 

For example, when Iraq ordered dual-use items, they were usually 

rejected by the Committee or placed on hold. 

Still, Iraq was, and still is, at liberty to order humanitarian goods from

whomever it wished. Very quickly this became Saddam’s most important

tool in his “love offensive” that was designed to buy off great powers as 

well as small and poor nations. One demonstration of the newly acquired 

Iraqi popularity was the Iraqi annual trade fair in the fall of 2000: some

1,450 firms from 30 countries, many of them in the West, laid out their 

wares there.53 

Even rich countries like France or major super powers like China and

Russia could not ignore the lure of Iraqi buying power. It ought to be 

borne in mind that Iraq owes Russia at least $7 billion, and France at least 

$4 billion. An end to the embargo may mean that Iraq could pay it back. 

Iraqi sources made no secret of the fact that they were using this power to 

bribe the great powers and move them to support the Iraqi cause. When 

one power would balk and refuse to obey Iraqi instructions, senior Iraqi 

officials would openly threaten that state with economic retaliation. 

However, when it has come to clear cut violations of Security Council 

Resolutions, no country, including Russia and China, has dared so far to 

back Iraq against the United States. 

The Iraqi buying power and promises for lucrative oil field 

development contracts seemed to be at least one of the reasons that 

persuaded Russia, France, and China to show a more sympathetic position 

to Iraqi demands at the U.N.54 Indeed, in an anti-embargo gathering in 

Moscow, Yevgeny Primakov, a senior Russian Middle East expert, 

parliamentarian and ex-Prime Minister, made it very clear that “we would 

like Baghdad to create a regime of preferential treatment for Russian 

entrepreneurs.” 

A Russian foreign ministry spokesman disclosed that Russia’s overall 

losses as a result of the Gulf crisis and embargo against Iraq amounted in 

mid-2001 to $30 billion. Russia constantly has been pushing for, in the 

words of the foreign ministry “new approaches to the problem of Iraq.”55 

Russia also objected strongly to the American patrolling of the no-fly 

zones in Iraq’s north and south. Thus, for example, in January 2001, the 

Russian Foreign Ministry declared, “the establishment of the so-called nofly zones over that country [Iraq] is absolutely illegitimate.”56 In
Saddam is Iraq . . . 45

exchange for these sympathetic Russian positions the Iraqis gave them 

some lucrative contracts, including the development of large oil fields.57 

By 2001, not surprisingly, Iraq’s leading trade partners were, in the 

following order: France, Russia, China, and Egypt.58 By mid-August 

2002, the world media gave wide publicity to a new economic agreement 

in the making between Russia and Iraq. In itself, it did not come as a 

surprise, but its order of magnitude was truly staggering: $40 billion. The 

information came from the Iraqi Ambassador to Moscow, Abbas Halaf. 

No doubt this was yet another Iraqi initiative designed to create 

tension between Russia and the U.S. and make it more difficult for the 

latter to attack Iraq, but the Russian government did not deny the 

information. The agreement reportedly is for five years and includes new 

cooperation in fields like oil, irrigation, agriculture, transportation, and 

electricity. According to American sources this deal represents a breach 

of the previously agreed international sanctions on Iraq.59

Occasionally, the Iraqi government also threatened other European

countries with economic retaliation if their position in the U.N. were not 

sufficiently pro-Iraqi.60 Poland, too, was forced to change its position and

criticized the U.S. and Britain for their no-fly-zone monitoring activities. 

Indeed, the Iraqi threats were so effective that it took no more than eight 

days to change the Polish position, after they had implied support for an 

American-British attack on Iraqi ground-to-air battles.61 

There may be little doubt that the Iraqi tactic, combining punishment 

(that not always was needed) and temptation, has been quite successful. 

Even countries whose trade relations with Iraq were rather limited, like 

Switzerland and Norway decided to open special offices in Baghdad, 

clearly an important diplomatic achievement for Saddam.

62 

Saddam’s Propaganda Campaign in the USA 

Already in the early 1990s Saddam realized that he could not rely on 

greed when it comes to persuading the U.S. administration to lift the 

embargo. There is little doubt that many American oil companies and 

business men would have liked to do business with Iraq, but American

political inhibitions in that respect were so powerful that the only deals have 

been the legitimate ones, within the framework of the oil-for-food program. 

However, very early on, Saddam identified a promising avenue in the 

United States. Rather than greed, in the United States it was more 

promising to turn to idealism. His propaganda machine has been using the
46 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

suffering of the Iraqi people as a political asset. A large number of wellwishing humanitarian organizations were caught in his net. Having 

allowed them to visit Iraq and often provide humanitarian aid, he took 

advantage of their fear that any criticism of his regime would result with 

denying entrance visas. Most humanitarian bodies also were ill prepared. 

They had very limited acquaintance with the Iraqi social, economic, and 

political system. Saddam thus managed to use them as his emissaries to 

the American public. 

These delegations did not realize, or were unwilling to realize that 

most of the responsibility for the massive death and malnutrition of the 

children of Iraq was Saddam’s. They reported the suffering, often greatly 

exaggerating it, taking the Iraqi propaganda machine data at face value,

but they did not report the true reasons for it. Their conclusion was

uniformly that the embargo should be immediately abolished.63 

Totally illogically, in an about face, Saddam also tried to lure into his 

camp the “America’s impoverished citizens” by offering the American 

poor $95 million in economic support.64 The American public remained

unimpressed. The surprising aspect of this generous offer was the fact that

the humanitarian organizations working in Iraq ignored it, even though 

$95 million could help many, many malnourished Iraqi children. 

This offer exposed a very powerful characteristic in Saddam’s 

personality. Saddam believes almost blindly in the power of money and 

economic incentives to win and secure the loyalty of his people. Money 

gifts and perks are as important in his system as is terror. Indeed, 

Saddam’s system is defined by his own people as a combination of “terror 

and enticement” (al-tarhib wal-targhib). Saddam’s generosity at the 

expense of his people was repeated on a much larger scale when he also

promised the Palestinians one billion Euro (around $940 million) from the 

New York Escrow in support of the Intifadah. 

Unlike the American public, however, the Palestinians, for whom

such help was, obviously, far more meaningful, were filled with 

enthusiasm. It seems to have escaped them that this offer represented

cynicism incarnate. Saddam was fully aware that the security Council 

could under no circumstances agree to such a request, because the Escrow

was created in order to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi, not the 

Palestinian people. 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 47

Busting the Embargo 

After Saddam reversed his initial decision to reject U.N. Security 

Council Resolution 986, once the Iraqi oil started to flow again to the 

world’s markets, the Iraqi president was under some pressure to 

demonstrate to his followers that the embargo, if not dismantled, was, at 

least, dissipating. Doing this took time, but Saddam and his advisors 

eventually proved their competence. The embargo’s main purpose, to 

prevent Saddam from being the sole arbiter where Iraq’s oil revenues would 

go, is still very much alive, but he managed to shatter some of its restraints. 

Eroding the oil embargo has been done essentially on four different 

levels. By far the most important one was a substantial increase in the 

amount of oil smuggled out and sold illegally. The smuggling route 

through Turkey by tanker lorries has been functioning almost since the 

end of the Gulf War, but this was a limited avenue due to obvious 

logistical limitations. 

Oil sales to Jordan, too, to the tune of around 100,000 barrels per day, 

started a short while after the Gulf War except that they were approved by 

the United Nations. The official reason provided was that this was the 

only way that Iraq could repay its national debt to Jordan of about $800 

million, but after a few years this debt was paid back in full, yet the

arrangement continued. 

By the late 1990s the Iraqi leadership felt the need to perform a 

quantum leap in its illicit oil sales. Indeed, this happened through two 

new avenues. One was the Syrian pipeline, and the other was a maritime 

route from a specially constructed oil terminal south of Basra through the 

Shatt al-Arab, hugging the Iranian coast within Iranian territorial water

and then crossing the Gulf to the ports of the Arab Emirates.65 By early

2001 the most reasonable assessment of how much the Iraqis were 

smuggling, excluding the U.N.-approved Jordanian part, came from Dubai 

and cited the quantity of 350,000 barrels a day. If this rate was to continue 

throughout the year, and the current prices for a smuggled oil barrel, 

around $12, roughly half the world market price, was to remain the same, 

then the annual revenue that is expected to go into Saddam’s private 

pocket is around $1.5 billion.66 This was, indeed, a quantum leap as 

compared to the assessment of Iraq’s illicit revenues of $600 million for 

the year 2000.67

Another avenue through which Iraq managed to earn illegal 

petrodollars was through a surcharge of between 15-30 cents per barrel 
48 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

that it forced its clients to pay even though this was in contravention of 

Security Council resolutions. The United States and United Nations made 

efforts to stop it but only with partial success. The international economic

press reported that many companies were ready to pay the surcharge. 

Usually those were small intermediates that bought the Iraqi oil and resold 

it to the larger companies.68 

Iraq has been busting the embargo also in the realm of imports: from 

new cars and luxury goods to spare parts for Iraq’s military. Finally, there 

are numerous reports that Iraq has bought legitimate goods but paid more 

than they were worth, the difference being handed back by the producers 

to Saddam’s men. This, too, has gone into his private coffers.

It was just as important to the Iraqis to actually bust the embargo, as it

was to boast about it. After all, importing illicit goods and illicitly selling 

oil to get the currency for it was only one, if very important aspect of the 

Iraqi policy. The other was to demonstrate it to their own people and to 

the world at large in order to boost domestic morale and, at the same time, 

dishearten the U.N. and the United States. 

Thus, for example, Under Secretary of the Foreign Ministry Nizar 

Hamdoon said to a Western reporter in Baghdad in early 2001, “Many 

people and businesses [in the world] are doing business with Iraq 

regardless of the sanctions regime . . . Practically, the sanctions regime is 

crumbling.”69

The Palestinians: Every Suicide Bomber Is Protecting Saddam 

In Saddam’s eyes, the Palestinian intifadah that started in September 

2000 is the best guaranty against an American attack, because it keeps the

Arab world volatile, and threatens the moderate Arab regimes. The higher 

the flames, the more difficult will it be for the U.S. to attack him. As 

Saddam sees it, if, as a result of a large-scale Palestinian terrorist operation

(“mega-terrorist operation,” as it is called in Israel) the Israeli side will 

lose its inhibitions and perform a massacre, all the better for Iraq. Such an 

atrocity could guarantee American paralysis over Iraq for a long time. 

Seen from Saddam’s viewpoint, the intifadah should continue indefinitely 

and even, if possible, escalate upwards. 

This demonstrates again one of Saddam’s most salient characteristics, 

namely his willingness to fight his battles at the expense of others, be it 

the Iraqi people or the Palestinians. In other words, Saddam is ready to 

fight Israel until the last Palestinian. 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 49

The ways in which he is trying to stoke up the glowing embers of the

intifadah are varied. In the first place, Saddam is the only Arab and Islamic 

head of state who repeatedly, vociferously and unequivocally is promising 

the Palestinians to “liberate Palestine” for them “from the [Jordan] River to

the [Mediterranean] Sea.” He is even more specific when he is promising to 

destroy the State of Israel and exile the Jews back to where they came from. 

No wonder that he is defined in Iraq as the Latter-Day Saladin who would 

liberate Palestine from the Jews the way his great predecessor liberated it 

from the yoke of the Christian Crusades.70 

Having made such a sweeping promise, Saddam feels that he feels 

that he has a right to demand of the Palestinians to continue the intifadah

and even to upgrade it.71 Saddam has also been preparing the tool for the 

liberation of Jerusalem and Palestine: he has been establishing the 

Jerusalem Army (jaysh al-Quds). This is a twenty-one division strong 

army, which, due to its poor equipment and reluctant manpower, can never 

hope to liberate Jerusalem, or anything else, but it can serve as cannon 

fodder if the Americans attack Iraq.72 

But Saddam does not satisfy himself with bombastic promises and an 

army that will never arrive. Unlike his military, that is in terrible shape,

his coffers are full. Thus, Saddam has been giving financial support to 

families that lost their sons or daughters in the Palestinian intifadah. At

first those were sums of $10,000 for each family that lost its son or

daughter. Later families whose sons or daughters became suicide bombers 

started to receive $25,000. The checks were handed over in small 

ceremonies by Saddam’s representatives, members of the pro-Iraqi Ba’ath

party or of the pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation Front (ALF). On such occasions

a poet would recite a panegyric praising Saddam, people would call for 

Saddam to bomb Israel, and certificates would be given to the families in 

addition to the check. 73 

In addition, Iraq informed the Palestinian authority and public that it

had asked permission from the Security Council to dedicate one billion 

Euros (around $940 million) from its New York Escrow to the

intifadah.74 

There are other forms of support that, while not substantial, are still 

serving Saddam’s propaganda machine. For example, a few of the intifadah 

wounded have been hospitalized in Baghdad.75 Also, Iraq sent a number of 

lorries through Jordan and the Jordan River bridges to the West Bank full of 

humanitarian goods. Israel allowed these lorries to cross over.
50 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

It is hardly surprising, thus, that Saddam is highly popular with the 

Palestinians. As reported by a foreign correspondent, in one case he

witnessed a mother of a young man who died in a confrontation with the

Israeli troops shouted, “Saddam is the father of all the Arabs! He is the

bravest example of how an Arab leader should be.” Palestinian babies are

named after Saddam and people call upon him to strike at Tel-Aviv again 

as he had done in 1991 crying, “Dear Saddam, Hit, Hit Tel-Aviv! 

(Saddam ya habib, udrub udrub Tal-Abib).”76 

A “Return” to Islam As A Survival Technique 

Since 1989-1990, Saddam Hussein’s image in Iraq, and in large parts 

of the Arab world, is no longer that of a secular leader. Personally he may 

very well be such. However, Saddam is a cynical politician. Sometime 

towards the later stages of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) he realized that 

there was a shift in the Iraqi public towards more religiosity. He also had 

to defend himself against Khomeini’s public accusations that he was an 

atheist (mulhid) and an enemy of Islam. This is when he started to employ 

Islamist rhetoric. 

This rhetoric took a quantum leap immediately following the invasion 

of Kuwait and the beginning of the American troop buildup in Saudi

Arabia. He realized that his only help can come from the Arab and 

Islamic world and he believed that this world was far more religious and

fundamentalist than him and his regime. His analysis in that respect was 

essentially correct. Since August-September 1990, Saddam has been 

presenting himself as the Slave of God (Abd Allah) who knows what God 

wants of him, of the Iraqis, of the Arabs and Muslims. His whole speech 

style started to sound like that of a militant preacher (khatib) at a Friday 

sermon in the mosque. 

Furthermore, he presented himself as a latter-day Mahdi who came to 

purge Islam and return it to its original pristine purity as it used to be

during the Prophet’s day. Along the same line he promised to eradicate all 

corruption and destroy all the corrupt leaders of the Islamic world, headed 

by the Kuwaiti and Saudi (but also Egyptian, Syrian and other) ruling 

elites. He accused the Kuwaiti shaykh of unimaginable sexual corruption 

and committed himself to put it to an abrupt end. All this did not help him 

much militarily then, but he has continued along the same lines 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 51

undisturbed. His anti-American rhetoric is part of it and, more often than 

not, is using Islamic symbolism. 

Why? Because even as early as 1990-91, this already won him 

tremendous admiration amongst Muslim fundamentalists in the Middle 

East. Probably the most interesting admirer he had was Shaykh Buyud 

Tamimi, leader of the Islamic Jihad Bayt al-Maqdas in Amman. This was, 

and still is, the most radical Islamist movement in Jordan. Shaykh Tamimi

had attacked him during the Iraq-Iran War, but in 1990 he called him “the 

New Muslim Caliph Marching From the East.” There is no doubt that the 

shaykh was well aware that in his life style Saddam was not a religious 

man, but he believed that Saddam’s rhetoric was a good beginning and

that eventually he would become a good Muslim. Furthermore, Saddam 

represented to him, and to many others like him, the military might of 

resurgent Arab Islam, whatever his personal conduct. Indeed, Saddam 

became an Islamist, at least rhetorically speaking, two or three years

before Osama bin Laden did, and their styles are very similar. 

But this is not all. In 1994 Saddam introduced into Iraq the 

Qur’anic punishment of severing the right hand for the crime of theft. 

He then added to it the amputation of the left leg in the case of

recidivists. He forbade the public consumption of alcohol in Iraq. In the

late 1990s he introduced the death sentence, in most cases by 

decapitation with a sword, for the “crimes” of prostitution, 

homosexuality, and providing a shelter for prostitutes where they can 

pursue their occupation. This has been implemented in most part

without proper trial and already a few scores of young women have been 

beheaded in front of their homes.

On the cultural level a few million Qur’an books were printed in 

Iraq and given free and people are being forced to attend Qur’an 

courses in many walks of society, starting with schools. In the same 

vein, a law issued in the late 1990s made it possible to release Muslim

prisoners who learned the Qur’an in jail.77 Qur’an courses could be a 

very positive experience, except that compelling people to take them is

a clear departure from the party’s old tradition of separation of state 

and mosque.

78

Since 1989, Saddam has demonstrated to one and all that he is 

praying five times every day like a devout Muslim. He will now stop

government meetings and meetings with foreign diplomats, retire to

another room, either pretending to pray or actually pray, then return to 

the meeting. 
52 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

According to an extensive report by the prestigious al-Sharq al-Awsat

that came out in five parts between January 6–10, 2001, the new emphasis 

on religious studies at all levels of education, including in universities has 

even been enhanced by the end of the 1990s to the extent that it reportedly 

“has disrupted the education program.” Women in Iraq are finding 

themselves, “under pressure to wear a veil.”79 This report was corroborated

by an independent report by the Associated Press in February 2002. 

That the regime is using mosque preachers for anti-American

propaganda is nothing new. Even the fact that all public ceremonies are 

opening with a prayer is no longer an innovation. But the fact that more

and more female party members are donning the veil is indeed new. An 

Iraqi weekly magazine, al-Zaman, asked Iraqi actresses, “Why don’t you 

don the veil and pray?” If lamented that these actresses have been 

following “the suggestions of Satan,” with their “nakedness and hot 

kisses.” One can see more and more portraits of the president kneeling in 

prayer. The President of Saddam University for Islamic Studies, 

Muhammad al-Sa’id, praised the regime for “communicat[ing] the Islamic 

thought to people through television, radio, newspapers and seminars.”80 

Another component of the Islamization campaign is the construction 

of extravagant mosques. Thus, for example, Saddam Mosque, under 

construction since 1999 and located on the way to the International 

Airport, will be the biggest or second biggest in the Middle East after the 

one in Mecca. Saddam already has built the Mother of All Battles Mosque 

in central Baghdad, a very unusual architectural creation. Surrounding the 

dome are eight minarets. Four of them are shaped like Scud Missiles 

sitting on a launching pad, the other four like anti-aircraft guns. 

Inside of the mosque lies a Qur’an inscribed, as reported, in the blood 

of the Iraqi leader. The visitors are told that Saddam donated no less than 

50 pints of blood to write the holy book. Shaykh Qaysi, the mosque’s 

preacher, explained, “Our leader, the great believer, Saddam Hussein, 

always called on people to go back to religion and real values . . . He is

our example, our school in religion and faith. Our great project now is to 

start teaching the sayings of the Iraqi president in universities.” 

Western journalists report, however, that many Iraqis privately 

complain about the exorbitant amount of money invested in building these 

mosques.81 The mosque’s preacher must have been fully aware of the 

implication of what he said, namely, that Saddam is encouraging his

people to see him as something between a Mahdi and a prophet. 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 53

Last but not least, the regime is worried about Shi’i loyalty in the case 

of a military confrontation with the United States. General religiosity that 

applies to both the Sunni and Shi’i creeds is believed to help, but Saddam 

feels the need also for some special gestures towards the Shi’a in

particular. Most notably, since the rise of Ayat Allah Khomeini to power 

in Iran, Saddam “nationalized” the main Shi’i occasions and presented 

himself as the genetic offspring of the first and third Shi’i Imams, Ali and

Al-Hussein, and of the Prophet.82 

In January 2001, Udayy Saddam Hussein declared that he is 

studying “Shi’ite rite in depth” and Shi’ite thinking in general, and he 

criticized his own ministry of religious endowments for not building 

enough mosques in the Shi’i areas.83 It is not clear how helpful all these

religious practices have been to Saddam, but they do show how flexible 

he is in his approach to his own ideology, tossing it overboard whenever

expediency dictates. 

At the same time, however, Saddam has not tossed overboard his 

associate and supporter of many years, the Christian Deputy Prime

Minister, Tariq Aziz. Apparently, this would look like total capitulation to 

the Islamic fundamentalists, and this is where concessions stop. Also, 

there are Christians among his bodyguards. It would be a mistake to 

arouse their wrath. However, it should be remembered that loyalty with 

Saddam Hussein is a one-way street, and only those who are seen to be 

serving him with total loyalty will survive. 

Why Weapons of Mass Destruction? 

Beginning in 2001, apparently in response to the Bush 

administration’s declaration of resolve to change the regime in Baghdad, 

Saddam started meeting regularly and publicly with his nuclear scientists. 

In these meetings he and his scientists have been dropping hints that can 

only be interpreted as intended to tell the United States that, in a case of an 

attack on Iraq, the latter may have some nuclear surprises up its sleeve. 

Thus, for example, when Saddam met with his Head of the atomic 

energy organization, Dr. Fadil Muslim al-Janabi and his men in February 

2001, he told them, “the bottom line is to defend Iraq. In so doing, we 

defend the Arab nation. . . . We will never hesitate to possess the 

weapons to defend Iraq and the Arab nation.”84 In a similar meeting a 

few months later, Dr. Janabi made a pledge in the name of his 
54 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

organization, “We swear to be a formidable force . . . in the service of Iraq 

and its proud people when the confrontation and noble battle against the 

Zionists and the Americans would start.”85

It is very clear that to Saddam, the first reason for developing nonconventional weapons is to deter external enemies. Not only the USA is

considered as an enemy. On Iraq’s Eastern front there is Iran, with a long 

history of confrontations and with three times Iraq’s population and 

territory. To the north there is Turkey, with a bigger population and land 

area, in possession of a much larger and better-equipped armed force. Iraq 

is locked in an unresolved dispute with Turkey over the water of the 

Euphrates. Indeed, in May 1990 Saddam threatened Turkey’s Prime 

Minister, Yilderim Akbulut, asserting that Turkey is exposed now that 

NATO has begun falling apart. 

But Saddam’s modus operandi implies that such weapons are 

necessary also for domestic purposes, and for regional offensive purposes. 

In the first place, the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, 

especially in March 1988, which caused widespread panic in Iraqi 

Kurdistan, proved to be an extremely effective weapon against an 

unprotected population. It is not far-fetched to suggest that, in the case of 

another wide scale Shi’i revolt in the south, a few chemical bombs or 

artillery shells on a densely populated area may be used to nip in the bud 

any popular revolt. 

Biological and nuclear weapons are far less useful in a domestic 

context because they contaminate an area for a long time. Such weapons, 

however, are very useful for anyone aspiring to regional hegemony and 

international recognition as a great power. Indeed, in April 1990 Saddam 

already threatened Israel with annihilation, stating that, “I shall burn half

of Israel,” an idea unthinkable without weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). 

There is every reason to believe that, when he has a number of 

nuclear weapons, he will be rattling them and offering every Arab and

Islamic State that requested his protection the Iraqi nuclear umbrella. In

fact, even before he became a nuclear power, Saddam already promised

the Arabs such an umbrella against Israel and even promised Arafat to use 

the Iraqi missiles in order to push Israel out of Jerusalem and the 

Palestinian territories. 

In a 1979 meeting between Saddam’s younger half brother, Watban 

Ibrahim Hasan, and Iraqi nuclear physicist, Ali al-Shaharastani, his sibling 

said that Iraq needed nuclear arms “to change the map of the Middle 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 55

East.” It is not clear what exactly this meant, but it could conceivably 

mean an Iraqi takeover of the Arab side of the Persian Gulf, and Iraqi 

leadership of the Arab world. 86 Finally, in his on-going quest for prestige 

and authority with his army officers, Saddam needs WMD to demonstrate 

to them that he has a decisive war-winning instrument. Saddam can be 

trusted to rub it into his officers’ heads that they are of secondary 

importance to his WMD in achieving military ends.

To Saddam, nuclear weapons, and WMD in general, serve as a 

double-edged sword that can cut both ways. First, for a person with the 

tremendous insecurities of Saddam Hussein, these weapons offer a kind of 

security that cannot be matched by any other way. Especially since his 

military was grievously wounded by the 1991 conflict, such weapons have

become all the more important to him. Moreover, defying the

international community on this matter is a regular reminder to the 

military that he has not and will not capitulate. 

To make sure that these weapons are always at his disposal and can 

be used ruthlessly and indiscriminately without any qualms and inhibitions 

exactly when and where he wants them employed, he has placed them in

the hands of the SSO under the control of his son, Qussay. The SSO is 

made up of the people who are closest to him by blood, indeed most of 

them hail from his own tribe, and they are regarded, together with the 

Himaya, as the most disciplined and obedient to him. In other words, 

these people, who will be the ones to initiate nuclear, biological, chemical,

and/or radiological weapons use, are the closest to what one would see as 

an extension of Saddam’s self. After all, he has molded these people in 

his own image. 

Weapons of mass destruction also provide Saddam with an extremely 

potent tool to fulfill what, in his own mind, is his manifest destiny. With

them, he may be able to unify all the Arab lands under his leadership, to 

put Israel in its right place and to become a world leader no less important 

than any leader of the world’s great powers. Since 1990 he has also been 

aspiring to be recognized as the single most important Islamic leader. Is it

any wonder, then, that Saddam has been so reluctant to part with his 

weapons of mass destruction, even though this obstinacy has cost him, 

between 1990 and 1997, at least $100 billion and still limits him greatly in 

terms of his inability to control most of his petrodollars. 
56 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

Weapons Inspections 

Despite tactical retreats in Oct-Nov 1997, and Jan-Feb 1998, Iraq 

succeeded in winning important concessions on the sanctions front 

relating to weapons inspections. This was crucial in continuing to build 

Saddam’s support among the Iraqi people. It was seen as a victory. The 

embargo is dissipating slowly, and yet Saddam did not have to give up 

his remaining weapons of mass destruction. 

Today the Iraqi people have an improving standard of living, many 

aspects of the embargo are gone, Saddam has his WMDs, and his power 

elite feels more empowered, solidifying Saddam’s position in Iraq. 

Saddam’s message on sanctions has changed over the years. While 

still defiant in the face of the west, he now claims that sanctions are a 

disaster, so full of holes there is no point in continuing with them. 

Sanctions fatigue is an argument commonly used by outside observers in 

support of lifting sanctions. Increasing international dissent on sanctions, 

by France, Russia, and China as well as by some Arab states, continues to 

strengthen Saddam’s argument that there is no real point to sanctions 

anymore. Russian, French, and Arab pressures persuaded the United 

States not to adopt military measures to force Saddam to accept the 

weapons inspectors after they left in December 1998. 

Following intense pressure from France, Russia, and China, a 

compromise was reached ultimately allowing Iraq to export as much oil as 

they wanted while the international community (ineffectively) continued 

to limit imports. This compromise has dramatically weakened the impact 

of the international sanctions. 

Saddam, nevertheless, continues his propaganda by claiming that

sanctions have seriously limited medical supplies to the Iraqi people 

resulting in untold deaths. Meanwhile, he continues to rebuild his

military machine. 

In the fall of 1997 U.N. weapons inspectors were refused entry to 

“presidential sites” on the basis that it would “impugn national dignity and 

sovereignty.” Although weapons inspectors claimed that Saddam used 

these presidential sites as storage facilities for his WMD arsenal, there 

were no inspections. This defiance of the international inspection regime

bolstered Saddam’s image internally. 

Indeed, when UNSCOM left Iraq in December 1998 and was not 

allowed back, this was a major victory for Saddam in the eyes of many 

Iraqis. The United Nations had been forced out of Iraq, and Saddam was 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 57

unscathed. Until forced to reverse policy in late 2002, the challenge to the 

UNSCOM inspections regime in particular had strengthened his internal 

support, diminishing the internal threat, as he demonstrated his ability to 

weaken and challenge the international coalition and still retain the

coveted WMD program. The divisions within the United Nations that 

Saddam helped promote were so deep that Saddam concluded that he was

essentially immune to U.N. reprisals for pursuing unconventional weapons

programs. It may be no coincidence that since 1999 there have been no 

meaningful coup attempts. Officers who might have challenged a leader 

perceived to be a loser did not dare challenge a leader who challenged 

President Clinton for eight years and emerged victorious. The

reimposition of inspections in 2002, under threat of war by the U.S. and 

U.K., may cause some Iraqis once again to reevaluate their support 

Return to International Community / Change of Image 

Saddam has continued to work to increase his standing in the 

international community, seizing on opportunities to change his image, 

including bolstering his image within the Arab community. 

• In October 2000 a hijacked Saudi airliner landed in Baghdad. 

All passengers were released unharmed and returned to their 

home countries resulting in a great deal of international praise 

for Saddam Hussein. 

• The offer in January of 2002 to allow Kuwaiti officials to

inspect Iraqi prisons, which was turned down, was a 

calculated step to garner international favor. 

• The unrest of the Palestinian people following Sharon’s visit 

to the Temple Mount was another opportunity Saddam 

capitalized on. Saddam spoke out against the visit unlike 

many of his Arab counterparts who were hindered in doing so 

because of their relationships with Israel and the United

States, earning him a great deal of admiration in the Arab 

world. Saddam has pledged $881 million (USD) from oil 

revenues for the Palestinian people. 

• In October 2000, signaling the change in Iraq’s position in the 

Arab community, it was invited by the Arab League to 
58 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

participate in their annual meeting for the first time since the 

invasion of Kuwait. 

• In August 2000, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez bucked 

international convention and traveled to Iraq to meet with 

Saddam Hussein. He was the first head of state to visit Iraq

since the Gulf War, again signaling Iraq’s growing acceptance 

in the international community. 

• As of January 2001 humanitarian flights began arriving daily 

from abroad. Iraqi airlines began operating (even in the no-fly 

zones), and oil-production recovered to pre-war levels. Food 

rations have increased, power cuts are less severe, drinking 

water and sewer services are dramatically improving. 

• Baghdad International Airport re-opened in the Fall of 2000, 

another sign of normalcy returning. 

The Use of International Crises: Sustaining Power and 

Weakening Internal Threats 

Saddam has found that, in times of domestic unrest, international 

crises are helpful in his retaining power in his country, and allow him to 

stunt the growth of the internal opposition. Naturally, whenever he 

triggered an international crisis Saddam also believed that very quickly he

would emerge from it not only intact but also victorious, with tremendous

prestige and authority, at least in the Arab world. But even when this latter 

hope was dashed, he managed to pull through by switching his modus 

operandi from trouble-making to trouble-shooting. 

This was the case in 1980, when he tried to solve the Shi’i problem 

by attacking Shi’i Iran. Even before that, in 1977, he tried to deflect Shi’i 

anger by accusing Syria of plotting to mass murder Shi’i pilgrims in

Karbala. This brought relations with Syria to a new low. 

In 1990 he invaded Kuwait in order to “escape forward” from a

desperate economic crisis that resulted from a very dangerous crisis of 

expectations inside of Iraq. The paradox during the last few years is that 

over this time the foreign arena saved him from very serious domestic 

problems by eroding the embargo and giving him much diplomatic 

support. France, Russia, China and some Arab states have demonstrated 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 59

to one and all inside of Iraq that, to them, Saddam is a legitimate leader 

and that he is gradually winning the diplomatic battle against the U.S. 

This strengthened his position inside of Iraq. 

In short, national emergencies he fabricated helped him a great deal in 

his efforts to terrorize his own population. It is not clear whether, had he 

known that the international crisis he was going to initiate would cost him 

years of hardship, he still would have initiated it. After all, years of 

hardship produce their own domestic dangers. Still, so far, whenever he 

grossly miscalculated the risk, he also managed to wriggle out of the 

danger zone he created for himself. This he did mainly through patient, 

pragmatic foreign policies that looked like the complete or partial reversal 

of his previous behavior of high stakes gambling. He relied on foreign 

countries, mostly Russia and France, but even the U.S. once, to save him, 

and he was never wrong. His string of foreign policy successes, while

gradual and earned through patience and long-term planning, strengthened 

him domestically. 

Even when he challenged a world power, he always managed to 

manipulate other major powers, and some Arab states, getting them to

support him and prevent his downfall. For Saddam, success is not limited

to the elimination of domestic opposition. Such elimination is only a precondition to achieve his great ambitions on the Middle East and world 

arenas. However, in order to be able to become a world class leader he

needs, in the first place, to control the domestic scene, and in his mind

control means absolute control, namely, the complete elimination of any 

opposition. In order to achieve that, Saddam has always been ready to 

confront anybody, including world powers. 

Saddam has found that international crises are helpful in his 

retaining power in his country, and his string of foreign policy 

successes have allowed him to stunt the growth of the internal

opposition. For Saddam, success primarily means strengthening his 

domestic position even if at the expense of his international position. 

The most damaging outcome of any crisis is one that shows him as a

failure as a leader. Thus Saddam regularly promotes international 

crises to shore up his internal position. 

While assuredly Saddam’s position today is much weaker than it was

on the eve of the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, he has demonstrated a more

sophisticated leadership both in terms of internal security vulnerabilities, 

and in terms of diplomacy both with his Arab neighbors, the “near abroad” 

as well as with his “far abroad” and has accomplished a great deal to 
60 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

reduce his vulnerabilities and to strengthen his position, both internally 

and internationally. 

Conclusion 

Saddam’s survival in power is his continuing goal. There is no 

possibility that he would accept exile, one of the possibilities being 

discussed as of this writing. A life out of power is death for Saddam. A 

rational calculator who can bob and weave and is astutely Machiavellian 

he has shrewdly managed to sustain the loyalty of his military and to 

weaken the international opposition. 

That he has been sophisticated and better attuned to the context of his 

leadership both internally and internationally does not however lessen a

still persistent danger, that when Saddam is backed into a corner, his 

customary prudence and judgment are apt to falter. On these occasions he 

can be dangerous to the extreme, violently lashing out with all resources at 

his disposal. The persistent calls for regime change may well be moving 

him into that dangerous “back against the wall” posture. 

The setting afire of the Kuwaiti oil fields as he retreated in 1991 is an 

example which might well be repeated with his own Iraqi oil fields, as if 

to say, “If I can’t have them, no one will.” Moreover, with his back to the 

wall it is probable he would attempt to use his chemical and biological 

weapons against Israel and against U.S. armed forces in the region. 

The question then will be the degree to which he can continue to 

sustain the loyalty of his senior military commanders or whether they can be 

induced to disobey Saddam when placed in extremis in order to safeguard 

their own futures. The explicit statement of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld

suggests Iraqi military officers may be allowed to play a role in the

reconstruction of a post-war Iraq, but if they become involved in WMD, all 

such bets are off. Similary, President Bush’s recommendation that senior 

military commanders disobey Saddam’s orders is aimed at splitting Saddam 

from his senior leadership. 

That he might lash out on the way out is not to imply that conflict 

should be avoided, for a nuclear-armed Saddam would in his estimation 

have taken a quantum leap in power, and his already swollen ego would be

all the further enlarged. One could well anticipate a game of nuclear 

threats and counter threats within the region, especially towards Israel, as 

he did in 1990 when he threatened “to burn half of Israel.” It is likely that 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 61

Saddam would attempt to dictate oil prices internationally and would 

likely enter a state of permanent nuclear brinkmanship. 

Saddam can be expected to move with great vigor in his diplomacy

to constrain his Near Abroad, his Arab neighbors and Turkey, from 

joining an opposing U.S.-led coalition, and to enlist support from his Far

Abroad in weakening U.N. resolutions. The greater the degree that the 

conflict can be seen as Saddam versus the United States, the more he will

use this to bolster his image in the radical Arab world for having the 

courage to confront the United States. On the other hand, he very much 

wishes to be seen as a respected world leader, and a broad coalition 

would dampen that possibility as well as having a decisive impact on his 

senior military leaders. 

Of one thing we can be sure, this is not a man who will go “quietly

into that good night, but will rage, rage, rage at the passing of the light.”
62 . . . Saddam is Iraq 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 63

Notes 

1. This assessment draws extensively on “Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political 

Pschology Profile” by Jerrold M. Post, M.D. presented in testimony to hearings on the 

Gulf crisis by the House Armed Services Committee, December 5, 1990 and the Foreign 

Affairs Committee, December 12, 1990, and Building Toward Crisis: Saddam Hussein’s 

Strategy for Survival, Amatzia Baram, 1998, The Washington Institute for Near East 

Policy. 

2. Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs, The 

George Washington University, Washington, D.C. 

3. Professor of Middle Eastern History, University of Haifa, Israel 

4. The details of Saddam’s pre-natal and early childhood history are based on an 

extensive interview with Nasimah, an elderly member of the Jewish family that saved 

Sabha’s life and looked after her just before and after she gave birth to Saddam, 

conducted in Tel Aviv on February 2, 1991. These details were confirmed again by 

Nasimah’s son, Yigal, in a telephone conversation on July 1, 2002. For more details see 

a report by Peter Waldman of Amatzia Baram’s 1991 interview with Nasimah in The 

Wall Street Journal, February 7, 1991. Also: Amir Iskandar, Saddam Hussein, 

Munadilan wa Mufakkiran wa Insanan (Paris: Hachette, 1980), 15-19. 

5. See, for example, Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie, Saddam Hussein and the 

Crisis in the Gulf (New York: Times Books, 1990). Also: personal interviews. In an 

interview with his biographer, Saddam exposed his hate for his step-father that seems to 

corroborate these interviews. See Iskandar, Ibid., 353. 

6. Ibid., 22-25. 

7. For Saddam’s admiring, yet not un-ambivalent approach to Nasser, see Amatzia 

Baram, “Saddam Hussein and Nasirism”, in Orient (Hamburg), 3/2000, 461-472. 

8. FBIS, Near East Report, 8 August 1990. 

9. Matlak, Regis, Inside Saddam’s Grip. NSSQ. Spring 1999. 

10. Yevgeny Primakov, Voing Kotorvi Moglo ne Byt (Moscow, no date), 32. 

Saddam has been reported to believe that the United States leaders, including President 

Bush in 1990, were adverse to taking major casualties and he depended on his forces in 

Kuwait to inflict enough casualties to make the U.S. sue for a compromise peace. See 

Avigdor Haselkorn, The Continuing Storm (New Haven, CT: Yale U. Press, 1990). 

11. Based on an interview in 1999 in Washington, D.C. with a senior ex-UNSCOM 

official who, in his own turn, interviewed General Hussein Kamil in Amman. Kamil was 

with Saddam when the first bombs fell on Baghdad. 
64 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

12. DeHart, James and Jerrold Post. Responding to Qaddafi. The Christian Science 

Monitor, January 7, 1992. 

13. See Amatzia Baram, “Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies 

1991-96”, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol 29 (1997), 13-14. 

14. See Amatzia Baram, “Calculation and Miscalculation in Baghdad”, in Alex 

Danchev and Dan Keohane, International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict 1990-91 

(NY-Oxford: St. Martin’s Press and St. Antony’s College, 1994), 44-46. 

15. Al-Majalla (London), Sept 5-11, 1999, 31-41. 

16. See Baram, op. cit., 15 for a detailed breakdown of the assassins and their 

family lineage. 

17. For details see Amatzia Baram, Building Toward Crisis: Saddam Hussein’s 

Strategy for Survival (Washington, D.C., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 

1998), 8-20. 

18. For example, UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 

57th Session, Questions of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ... 

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, Mr. Andreas 

Mavrommatis (N.Y.: 16 January 2001), 11. Mavromatis does not identify which internal 

security body is responsible, though, for the decapitations; but see Le Monde, April 3, 

2001. For an account of the Feda’iyyin practice of cutting out tongues, and the RCC 

decree ordering the execution of “prostitutes” and homosexuals, and the decapitation of 

others connected with prostitution, see, Amnesty International, Annual Country Report 

on Human Rights: Iraq, May 2002, as quoted by The Washington Kurdish Institute, June 

6, 2002 (www.kurd.org). 

19. Al-Hayat (London ), June 18, 2001, 2, in FBIS-NES GMP20010618000048 , 

June 18, 2001. 

20. For example, Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Main Service in Arabic, March 

12, 2001, in FBIS-NES GMP20010312000090, March 12, 2001. And for more see 

Baram, Building Toward Crisis, 37-44. 

21. For example: Saddam on Victory Day, Baghdad Radio, August 8, 2002; Taha 

Yasin Ramadan, Radio Baghdad, August 17, 2002. 

22. For details of the period 1991-1998, see Baram, Building Toward Crisis, 87-96. 

23. Reuters from Damascus, January 4, 2001. 

24. Damascus Syrian Arab TV-TV1 in Arabic, January 29, 2001, in FBIS-NES 

gmp20010129000218, January 29, 2001. Also Damascus Syrian Arab Republic Radio in 

Arabic, Jan. 29, 2001, in FBIS-NES GMP20010129000105, Jan. 29, 2001. 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 65

25. Reuters from Damascus, Jan. 4, 2001. 

26. HaAretz, Feb. 1, 2001. 

27. Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Main Service in Arabic, Feb. 28, 2001, FBISNES Serial GMP 2001 0228000169, Feb. 28, 2001. 

28. Reuters, Feb. 28, 2001. 

29. AFP from Baghdad, March 1, 2001. 

30. Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Main Service in Arabic, March 1, 2001 in 

FBIS-NES Serial GMP 2001 0302000013, March 2, 2001. 

31. MENA Report.com, May 27, 2002. 

32. Iraq Press, June 25, 2002. 

33. Iraq Press, June 3, 2002, in WKI (Washington Kurdish Institute), June 4, 2002. 

34. Iraq Press, June 10, 2002 as reproduced by Washington Kurdish Institute, June 

11, 2002. Reuters, March 7, 2001, Evelyn Leopold reporting from the UN. And see 

report by Peg Mackey from Dubai, Reuters, Feb. 14, 2001, according to which the oil 

flow to Syria was then 170,000 barrels per day. Also AP from Baghdad, January 23, 

2001, in WKI (Washington Kurdish Institute), January 23, 2001. 

35. Barbara Crossette, The New York Times, March 7, 2001. AFP, Brussels, Feb. 

27, 2001. 

36. The World Bank Group, Syrian Arab Republic Data Profile 

(http:devdata.worldbank.org) update April 2002; The World Bank Group, Syrian Arab 

Republic at a Glance (http://www.worldbank.org) update Sept, 20, 2001. 

37. For details see, Amatzia Baram, Building Toward Crisis: Saddam Hussein’s 

Strategy for Survival (Washington, DC, The Washington Institute, 1998), 97-108. 

38. In 2002 the number of pilgrims allowed doubled to about 7000 a week when 

compared to 2001. This was still about 1⁄2 the number allowed in 1978, when mutual 

relations were at their best. See, AFP, June 28, 2001. See there also, visit of Minister of 

Culture Hamad Yussif Hammadi to Iran. And, for mutual sabotage, see for example a 

Shi’i attack in Baghdad reported by the Iraqi authorities and blamed on Iran. AFP, from 

Baghdad Nov. 25, 2001. Despite the accusations the two sides were still expressing a 

wish for improved relations and pilgrims were still allowed to cross the border. 

39. See for example, Dr. Kazim Jalali of the Iranian Majlis, Entekhab (Tehran, 

Internet version) in Persian, Nov. 26, 2001. 

40. Turkish Daily News, June 26, 2002. 
66 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

41. Anatolia, Nov. 2, 2001. 

42. Turkish Daily News, Jan. 24, 2001. 

43. For details, see Baram, Building Toward Crisis, 109-122. 

44 Ibid., 123-136. 

45. Iraq Press, June 3, 2002, in WKI (Washington Kurdish Institute), June 4, 2002. 

46. Jordan Times, Dec. 24, 1997. 

47. Reuters, Jan 24, 2001, in Washington Kurdish Institute, Jan. 24, 2001. 

48. UPI, from Baghdad, June 24, 2002. 

49. Xinhua (the official Chinese News Agency), Feb. 14, 2001, in Washington 

Kurdish Institute, Feb. 14, 2001. MENA, in English, Jan. 18, 2001, in FBIS-NES- Serial 

GMP 2001 0118000178, Jan. 18, 2001. 

50. An interview by Salih to MENA, in English, Cairo, Jan. 18, 2001, in FBIS-NES 

Serial GMP 2001 011 8000028, Jan. 18, 2001. 

51. MENA, in English, Jan. 18, 2001, in FBIS-NES Serial GMP 2001 0118000172, 

Jan. 18, 2001. 

52. Baghdad Republic of Iraq TV, in Arabic, April 3, 2001, in FBIS-NES Serial 

GMP 2001 0403000241, April 3, 2001; Xinhua, April 2, 2001. 

53. Jason Burke, The Observer, Jan. 21, 2001. 

54. See for example Iraq’s Trade Minister, Muhammad Mahdi Salih threatening 

France that “it will not be given preference in trade transactions...because of its support 

of the stupid anti-Iraq draft resolution on sanctions”. On the other hand the minister 

promised that “Syria, Jordan, Turkey and Russia will be given priority...in the upcoming 

stage in appreciation of their stands rejecting the wicked US-British draft resolution”. 

Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Main Service in Arabic, July 9, 2001, in FBIS-NES 

Serial GMP2001 0709000143, July 9, 2001. See also Babil, Internet version in Arabic, 

July 9, 2001, implied threat, urging China and France to reconsider their “opportunistic” 

position regarding the new sanction proposal in the Security Council. 

55. Associated Press, from Moscow, April 9, 2001. 

56. See Moscow’s “extremely negative reaction” to these patrols, Moscow Interfax 

in English, reporting a foreign office communiqué, Jan. 30, 2001, in FBIS-NES Serial 

CEP2001 013000 0151, Jan. 30, 2001. 
Saddam is Iraq . . . 67

57. Note for example, Russian “penetration” into the West Qurna field, to the 

chagrin of the European powers. See Andrew Boroweic, The Washington Times, Jan. 18, 

2001. 

58. Xinhua, April 2, 2001. 

59. HaAretz, Aug. 18, 2002, 1, 3. 

60. See for example, threats by Baghdad’s al-Thawra, March 1, 2001: “The Italian 

Government must rectify its position of which we have taken note.” Denouncing the 

Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini, the party daily added, “the stupid statement [by 

Dini] will affect relations between the two countries.” 

61. See Trade Minister Muhammad Mahdi Salih announcing that Iraq is lifting the 

restrictions on imports from Poland after the Polish government modified its position on 

the US-British “aggression” against Iraq. Iraq had decided to stop its commercial 

dealings with Poland and Canada on Feb. 20, 2001. The Polish government “officially 

clarified...it does not support or back” the air patrols.. Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio 

Main Service in Arabic, Feb. 29, 2001, in FBIS-NES Serial GMP 2001 0228 000129, 

Feb. 28, 2001. 

62. For Switzerland, see Reuters, from Baghdad, Feb. 1, 2001; note Norway’s 

opening an embassy, an announcement by Foreign Minister Thorbjoen Jagland, quoted 

by Simeon Kerr Countries, Jan. 26, 2001, in Washington Kurdish Institute, (WKI @ 

Kurd.org), Jan. 26, 2001. 

63. For an example of such a delegation, see details of a US Muslim delegation 

calling for the end of sanctions, Dawn, April 8, 2001. Other such groups are for example, 

Voices in the Wilderness, and even some UN agencies. For an analysis of the causes of 

the suffering and its results see Amatzia Baram, “The Effect of Iraqi Sanctions: Statistical 

Pitfalls and Responsibility”, in Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 2, Spring, 2000, 195-

223. 

64. AFP, from Washington, DC, Jan. 17, 2001. 

65. See for example, AFP, from Dubai, Feb. 5, 2001 quoting British officials in the 

Gulf. 

66. Peg Mackey, Reuters, from Dubai, Feb. 14, 2001. The assessment was that 

close to 150,000 barrels a day went through Turkey, 170,000 barrels a day went through 

Syria and the rest through Iranian territorial waters and some illicit exports to Jordan. A 

somewhat more liberal assessment puts the Iraqi earnings from illicit oil sales at around 

$2 billion. See Financial Times, Feb. 6, 2001. 

67. Reuters, Feb. 6, 2001. 

68. See Financial Times, Feb. 6, 2001. 
68 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

69. Toronto Star, Feb. 3, 2001. 

70. See for example, Udayy Saddam Hussein’s aide, Dr. Adib Sha’ban interviewed 

by Qasim Bakri in Baghdad, al-Tayyibah Panorama in Arabic, Feb. 23, 2001, in FBISNES Serial GMP 2001 0228000166126, Feb. 28, 2001. And see, Major General Ibrahim 

Khalil Ibrahim, Commander of the Al-Aqsa Appeal Parade: al-Jumhuriyya (internet 

version) in Arabic, Jan. 3, 2001. And see Vice President Ramadan promising to 

“liberate” Palestine from “the River to the Sea.” Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Main 

Service, in Arabic, Jan. 9, 2001, in FBIS-NES Serial GMP 2001 0109000120, Jan. 9, 

2001. And for Saddam himself promising to evacuate all the Jews from Greater Palestine, 

except those who were there by 1948, Baghdad Republic of Iraq, TV, in Arabic, Feb. 6, 

2001, in FBIS-NEW Serial GMP 2001 0206000164, Feb. 6, 2001. 

71. See his speech at a cabinet meeting, Baghdad Republic of Iraq, TV, in Arabic 

Nov. 25, 2000, in FBIS-NES Serial GMP 2000 1125000160, Nov. 25, 2000. 

72. See for example, al-Qadisiyya (internet version), in Arabic, March 12, 2001. 

73. See for example, Baghdad Republic of Iraq TV, in Arabic, Feb. 9, 2001, in 

FBIS-NES Serial GMP 2001 10209000194, Feb. 9, 2001. 

74. AFP, Jan. 24, 2001. 

75. The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 2, 2001. 

76. See, for example, Nidal al-Mughrabi, reporting from Gaza, Reuters, Jan. 17, 

2001. 

77. Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Jan. 10, 2001, 3, in FBIS-NES-Serial GMP 2001 

0110000146, Jan. 10, 2001. 

78. For more details see, Amatzia Baram, “Re-Inventing Nationalism in Ba’thi Iraq 

1968-1994: Supra-Territorial and Territorial Identities and What Lies Below,” in 

Princeton Papers, fall, 1996, Vol. 5, 29-56. 

79. Al Sharq al-Awsat, January 6-10, 2001, Quoted by FBIS-NES Serial GMP 2001 

0119000060, Jan. 19, 2001. 

80. Mariam Fam, AP from Baghdad, Feb. 2, 2002. Others have made similar 

observations about more people frequenting mosques and more veils seen in the streets of 

Baghdad. See Kim Ghattas, BBC, April 25, 2002. 

81. Kim Ghattas, BBC, April 25, 2002, and Hala Jaber, Sidney Morning Herald, 

Nov. 11, 2001. 

82. See Baram, “Re-inventing Nationalism,” The Princeton Papers, op. cit.
Saddam is Iraq . . . 69

83. Al-Quds al-Arabi (London), Jan. 10, 2001, 3, in FBIS-NES-Serial GMP 2001 

0110000146, Jan. 10, 2001. 

84. Baghdad Republic of Iraq TV, in Arabic, Feb. 1, 2001, in FBIS-NES Serial 

GMP 2001 0227000217, Feb. 27, 2001. 

85. Babil, (internet version in Arabic), July 8, 2001. 

86. For details about Saddam’s non-conventional strategy see, Amatzia Baram, “An 

Analysis of Iraqi WMD Strategy” in The Non-Proliferation Review (Summer 2001), Vol. 

8, No. 2., 25-39. 
70 . . . Saddam is Iraq 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

 The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established in 1999 to 

provide education and research to the present and future leaders of the 

USAF, to assist them in their activities to counter the threats posed by 

adversaries equipped with weapons of mass destruction 

Barry R. Schneider, Director 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

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Editor, The Counterproliferation Papers 

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Saddam is Iraq . . . 71