Interim Decision #2939 

MATTER OF LUNA 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

A-24616710 

Decided 6' Board April 26, 1983 

(1) New York will recognize, as a matter of comity, a divorce rendered in the Dominican 

Republic where the Dominican court's jurisdiction was based on the domicile of one of 

the parties. 

(2) Henceforth, a pronouncement of a divorce for cause by an official of theCivil Registry 

of the Dominican Republic, unless irregular on its face, will be accepted as prima facie 

OVidOlnei, of compliance with the time and notice requirements of Dominican divorce law. 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Antonio C. Martinez, Esquire Ronald LeFevre 

324 West 14th Street Appellate Trial 

New York, New York 10014 Attorney 

Br: fillihollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Dunne, Mont, and Vacca, Board Members 

The lawful permanent resident petitioner applied for visa preference 

classification for the beneficiary as her spouse under section 203(a)(2) of 

the Irntnigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(2). In a decision 

dated July 18, 1982, the District Director denied the petition. The petitioner has appealed. The appeal will be sustained_ 

The petitioner is a 27-year-old female, a native and citizen of the 

Dominican Republic. She was admitted to the United States for permanent residence on December 29, 1974, at New York, New York. The 

beneficiary is a 27-year-old native and citizen of the Dominican Republic. 

The petitioner and beneficiary were married to each other in New York 

City on December 29, 1978. Both the petitioner and the beneficiary 

were previously married. To establish the legal termination of their 

prior marriages, the petitioner submitted copies of divorce decrees and 

pronouncements from the Dominican Republic purporting to terminate 

each of them. 

The District Director denied the petition on the ground that the 

petitioner's marriage is invalid because the beneficiary's divorce in the 

Dominican Republic would nut be recognized by the state of New York 

because the benefiCiary did not appear in the proceedings before the 

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Dominican Court in person or through counsel, but that judgment was 

entered against him' by default. The District Director relied upon our 

decision in Matter of Rodriguez, 15 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 1975). 

The District Director correctly noted that the validity of i marriage 

generally is determined according to the law of the place of celebration. 

Matter of Gamero, 14 I&N Dec. 674 (BIA 1974); Matter of Levine, 13 

I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1969); Matter of P—, 4 I&N Dec. 610 (BIA; A.G. 

1952). Thus, the validity of the petitioner's present niarriage to the 

beneficiary depends upon whether New York would recognize the 

Dominican divorce purporting to terminatd the beneficiary's prior 

marriage. 

The general rule is that a decree of divorce valid where rendered is 

valid everywhere and will be recognized either under the "full faith and 

credit" clause of the United States Constitution, or in the case of divorces 

rendered in foreign countries, under the principle of comity, provided 

that recognition would not contravene public policy. 27B C.J.S., Divorce, 

sections 326-333 (1959). A foreign court must have jurisdiction to render 

a valid decree, and the applicable tests of jurisdiction are ordinarily 

those of the 'United States, rather than of the divorcing country, and a 

divorce obtained in a foreign country will not normally be recognized as 

valid if neither of the spouses had a domicile in that country, even 

though domicile is not a requirement for jurisdiction under the divorcing 

country's laws. 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, sections 964-65 

(1966); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1419 (1967). 

The domicile of the parties has long been recognized as the primary, if 

not the exclusive, basis for the judicial power to grant a divorce. See 

Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North 

Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). New York recognizes divorces rendered 

in foreign countries based on domicile of one of the parties. Sorensen v. 

Sorensen, 219 App. Div. 344, 220 N.Y.S. 242 (1927); Quintana v. 

Quintana, 101 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1950); see also Annot., supra, 

New York, unlike many other states in the United States, will recognize a divorce decree rendered in a foreign country not based on domicile of either of the parties provided there is some physical presence on 

the part of at least one party within the jurisdiction of the court rendering the divorce, and some type of appearance or submission to jurisdiction by the other party. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 262 

N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 

971 (1966); see also Matter of Rodriguez, supra; Matter of Li Ganoza, 15 

I&N Dec. 593 (BIA 1976); Matter of Moncayo, 14 I&N Dec. 472 (BIA 

1973). 

With respect to the beneficiary's divorce, the record contains a decree 

of divorce entered on A ugnst 15, 1978, purporting to grant a divorce on 

grounds of incompatibility of character to Gisela Pena Hernandez 

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Interim Decision #2939 

(plaintiff), "Dominican, of legal age, married,, dressmaker, residing in 

Santiago . . . against her legitimate husband Mr. Leoncio Dania Luna 

Castro, personal circumstances unknown, who did not appear at the 

hearing in spite of having been legally summoned . . . ." The judgment 

further reflects that the parties were married in the municipality of 

Tenares on July 3, 1976. Thus, it is clear from the judgment that the 

beneficiary's divorce was based on the domicile of the plaintiff in that 

action. Therefore, the District Director was in error in relying upon 

Matter of Rodriguez, supra, which pertains only to divorces granted in 

foreign countries not based on domicile of the parties. 

We now turn to the question whether the beneficiary's divorce was 

timely pronounced under Dominican law. Article 17 of the Dominican 

law of divorce, Law 1306-bis, Civil Code of the Dominican Republic, 

requires the spouse who obtains a divorce for cause to have the divorce 

pronounced and registered by an official of the Civil Registry within 2 

months. Under Article 19 of that law, a plaintiff who fails to have the 

divorde pronounced and registered by an official of the Civil Registry 

loses the benefits of the divorce_ Since 1976 we have examined Dominican divorces for compliance with the requirement for timely pronouniemerit. We have made our decisions based on the evidence submitted by 

petitioners (Matter of Brantigan, 11 I&N Dee. 493 (BIA 1966); Matter 

of Annang, 14115iN Dec. 502 (BIA 1973)) and the law as provided by the 

United States Library of Congress. We have been frustrated in this 

endeavor by incomplete translations of the law (Matter of Tagle, 15 

I&N Dec. 595 (BIA 1976)); inaccurate translations of the law (Matter of 

Hann, 18 I&N Dec. 59 (BIA 1981) and Matter of Hann, 18 I&N Dec. 

196 (BIA 1982)); poor quality translations of official documents (Matter 

of Lucero, 16 I&N Dec. 674 (BIA 1979)); and piecemeal presentation of 

the various provisions of Dominican law pertaining to this issue. Matter 

of Harm, supra; Matter of Zorrilla, 18. I&N Dec. 378 (BIA 1983). 

The result has been frequent modification of precedent decisions based 

on the new information. Recently, we have held that the 2-month time 

period for pronouncement of a Dominican divorce for cause, referenced 

in Articles 17 and 19, begins to run from the expiration of the 2-month 

time allowed for appeal, which begins to run from the time the defendant is notified of the judgment. Matter of Zorrilla, supra. In other 

words, in order for such a divorce to be valid, it must be pronounced and 

registered between 61 and 120 days from the date the defendant is 

notified of the judgment of divorce. 

The record in this case does not reflect the date the defendant was 

notified of the judgment. Therefore, we cannot determine the period 

within which the divorce must have been pronounced. Further, of 

approximately 100 eases presently pending before the Board which will 

turn on the validity of a Dominican divorce, none contains documents 

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establishing this date. While it is possible that all of these divorces are 

invalid because they were untimely pronounced, we doubt it because 

most of them were pronounced within 120 days from the date judgment 

was rendered, which would make it mathematically impossible for them 

to have been pronounced late under Article 19, even assuming the defendant was notified of the judgment on the day it was rendered. We think 

the explanation for the absence of the date of notification in all these 

cases is that the pronouncement of a divorce is generally accepted in the 

Dominican Republic as evidence of compliance with the time requirements for such pronouncementsA translation provided to us by the Library of Congress reflects that 

Article 17 of the Dominican law of divorce provides: 

Art. 17. The spouse who obtained a divorce judgment issued by a court of last instance 

of a judgment which has become final, except if an appeal on cessation which.suspends 

the effects of the judgment has been Bled, is under the obligation to appear before the 

Official of the Civil Registry, within two months, in order to have the divorce prdmaimed and the judgment registered in the Office of the Civil Registry, provided the 

other party is summoned by the bailiff in order that ho (oho) may appear before the 

Official of the Civil Registry to hear the pronouncement of the divorce. 

Para. The Official of the Civil Registry shall not pronounce the divorce nor transcribe 

the judgment unless the formalities provided for in article 548 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure have been complied with and evidence that the other party was mullioned to 

appear to hear the pronouncement adt as provided above in this article is presented [to 

him]. The Official of the Civil Registry which pronounces a divorce without complying 

with the above provisions shall be subject to dismissal [from his employment] without 

prejudice to the civil liability that may exist. 

Article 548 provides: 

Art. 548. Judgments declaring the suspension to an act of opposition, the cancellation of 

the registration of a mortgage, payments or anything that must be executed by a third 

party of against the latter, shall not be executable by said third parties of against them, 

even after the term of appeal is lapsed , unless the attorney of the party executing the 

judgment issues a certificate stating the date on which the defeated party was, notified 

of the judgment, and upon issuance by the court clerk of a statement to the effect that 

the judgment of the court is neither opposed nor has been appealed. 

The "Pam." of Article 17 quoted above provides that the official of the 

Civil Registry shall not pronounce or transcribe a judgment of divorce 

unless there has been compliance with Article 548. In the context of 

Article 17, the "third party" referenced in Article 548 is the Official of 

the Civil Registry who is called upon to pronounce and register a divorce. 

Article 548 prohibits "execution" (pronouncement in this instance) by 

that official without proof of the date the defendant was notified of the 

judgment and a statement from the clerk of court to the effect that the 

judgment is not opposed and has not been appealed. 

Thus, these two provisions combine to require that the Official of the 

Civil Registry have, before pronouncing a divorce, the evidence neces388 
Interim Decision #2939 

sary to determine compliance with the time and notice requirements for 

pronouncements of divorces. In view of his official position and the fact 

that the statute requires that he have the evidence, presumably he will 

not pronounce a divorce where that evidence does not establish compliance with the time and notice requirements of the law. Therefore, 

henceforth, we will accept a prciouncement of a divorce by an official of 

the Civil Registry, unless irregular on its face, as prima facie evidence 

of compliance with the time and notice requirements of Dominican divorce 

law. Of course it can be rebutted if the Service has evidence of failure to 

comply with these requirements. 

In this case, the record reflects that the beneficiary's divorce was 

pronounced on November 21, 1978, 98 days from the time the judgment 

was rendered. The, pronouncement is not irregular on its face, and there 

is no evidence of record which suggests that it was untimely. Therefore, 

we will accept it. 

With respect to the petitioner's prior divorce, the record contains a 

judgment of divorce entered on February 18, 1976, granting Modesto 

Antonio Ramirez Lugo and Emma Ramona Fernandez Fabre a divorce 

on grounds of mutual consent. The judgment reflects that both spouses 

were Dominican and domiciled in Santiago, Dominican Republic. The 

judgment also reflects that their attorney appeared at the hearing in 

their behalf. Thus, the petitioner's mutual consent divorce was also one 

based on domicile. The record reflects that it was pronounced on March 

4, 1976. See Matter of Lucero, 16 I&N Dec. 674 (BIA 1979). Therefore, 

we conclude that the petitioner's prior divorce would also be recognized, 

as a matter of comity, by-the state of New York. 

We have reviewed the file and see no other basis upon which the visa 

petition might properly have been denied. Accordingly, the appeal will 

be sustained and the visa petition will be approved. 

ORDER The appeal is sustained and the visa petition is approved. 

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