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MOVING BEYOND THE FIRST FIVE YEARS: EVOLVING THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS TO BETTER SERVE STATE, LOCAL, AND

TRIBAL NEEDS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

INFORMATION 

SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK 

ASSESSMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 24, 2008

Serial No. 110–108

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

AL GREEN, Texas 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

PETER T. KING, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

DAVID DAVIS, Tennessee 

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

JESSICA HERRERA-FLANIGAN, Staff Director & General Counsel 

TODD GEE, Chief Counsel 

MICHAEL TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

ROBERT O’CONNOR, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND 

TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT 

JANE HARMAN, California, Chairwoman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY, Pennsylvania 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio) 

DAVID G. REICHERT, Washington 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania 

PETER T. KING, New York (Ex Officio) 

THOMAS M. FINAN, Director and Counsel 

BRANDON DECLET, Counsel 

NATALIE NIXON, Deputy Chief Clerk 

DERON MCELROY, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment .................................................................. 1

The Honorable David G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 2

WITNESSES

Mr. Matthew Bettenhausen, Executive Director, California Office of Homeland Security, State of California: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

Ms. Juliette N. Kayyem, Under Secretary for Homeland Security, Executive 

Office of Public Safety and Security, Commonwealth of Massachusetts: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 16

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 18

Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, Director and Associate Vice President, Homeland Security Policy Institute, George Washington University: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 25 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 28

(1)

MOVING BEYOND THE FIRST FIVE YEARS: 

EVOLVING THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE 

AND ANALYSIS TO BETTER SERVE STATE, 

LOCAL, AND TRIBAL NEEDS 

Thursday, April 24, 2008

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, 

AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Harman, Carney, Perlmutter, Reichert, 

and Dent. 

Ms. HARMAN. The subcommittee will come to order. Good morning everyone. The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on Moving Beyond the First Five Years: Evolving the Office 

of Intelligence and Analysis to Better Serve State, Local and Tribal 

Needs. After a string of missteps by the current administration, the 

next one must get information sharing right. ‘‘Success’’ means figuring out what data to share, putting the technology in place to do 

so, and establishing the right rules for access. Of course, each step 

must happen within the bounds of privacy laws and constitutional 

protections. This is crucial, because it is unlikely that the next 

President, a DHS Secretary, FBI director or someone in the wider 

Intelligence Community will prevent the next terrorist attack. 

Instead, a diligent police or sheriffs officer somewhere in America 

during the course of his or her daily work will see something or 

someone out of place and guided by timely, accurate and actionable 

information will connect the dots that will unravel a plot in the 

making. My ranking member did something just like that, it wasn’t 

a terror plot, but it was a very serious crime in his area some years 

back. 

To this end, this subcommittee has made it an imperative to improve intelligence and information sharing for our first preventers. 

If we don’t make it work for these people and for the State Homeland Security advisors who work with them, some of whom are facing me, then we will have failed to do what we set out to do 5 years 

ago in the Homeland Security Act. As the Department of Homeland 

Security faces its first Presidential transition, we find its Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis at a crossroads. 
2

DHS has taken positive steps to forge a more constructive and 

responsive relationship with State, local and tribal customers it 

serves. Positive steps have been taken. In Minneapolis, on a Monday, for example, I learned from MNJAC, the Minnesota Joint 

Analysis Center of a weekly conference call from DHS to link Fusion Centers together. This is very positive. Unfortunately, we 

never heard about it from DHS, but one of the local Fusion Centers. 

But on the other hand, it has been a struggle to integrate fully 

local law enforcement representatives into the Interagency Threat 

Assessment Coordination Group or ITACG. The Department and 

specifically, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, seems to have 

pursued a variety of missions without a clear focus. 

In my view, this is not entirely the Department’s fault. What was 

originally envisioned by many of us who were co-authors of the legislation as a robust intelligence shop for the Department in 2002 

was restructured by President Bush in 2003 when he set up the 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center, TTIC, later to become the National Counterterrorism Center, outside of DHS. 

Having lost the key function shortly after its creation, I&A has 

struggled to redefine its intelligence mission. It advertises itself as 

the primary provider of Federal Homeland Security information to 

State and local customers, claim to go create a new kind of Homeland Security intelligence. 

I&A also claims to play the role of educator, rolling out a basic 

level intelligence training course for department intelligence analysts and their State and local customers with mid- and senior-level 

courses on the horizon. But the aggressive schedule that Under 

Secretary Allen and his team have described of deploying department analysts and liaisons to State and local Fusion Centers 

around the country has so far been only moderately successful. 

In addition, in my view, DHS has approached management of the 

National Applications Office, the NAO far too casually. Let me be 

clear, as a member who has fought for years to assure that foreign 

intelligence surveillance complies with strict legal safeguards, I 

will not permit the Department to task the Nation’s spy satellites 

for domestic purposes unless and until it provides a clear legal 

framework to Congress. 

It is our job today to assess the Department’s progress and to 

help the next administration get it right. The witnesses before us, 

all of whom are good friends of mine, and I am so happy to see you 

all hail from State government and academia. Each will address 

how DHS and its intelligence shop can make improvements to get 

it right now and after January 20, 2009. 

I hope the Department of Homeland Security is listening. The 

benchmarks that the witnesses describe for us today will guide the 

oversight work of this subcommittee for the remainder of this session and through the transition to next year. Let me welcome you 

and tell you how pleased I am that you are here and how important this hearing is, and I now yield to the ranking member for any 

opening remarks. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Good morning, and 

thank you for taking some time to be with us this morning. I just 

came from a briefing down the hallway on the upcoming Olympics 
3

in Canada, just above the Washington, Canadian border. So my 

district is east of Seattle so it is of interest to me. 

This morning they talked about, you might be familiar with some 

of the terminology that we are using here in the U.S. integrated 

security, and an integrated planning, a partnership between the 

State’s officials, the local officials and the RCMP and Federal. I 

have had opportunities to work with most of those in my previous 

career. So we are not the only ones trying to work on this and find 

the answers to gathering people together to protect the citizens of 

the United States, and of course, the citizens of Canada, who are 

our good friends. 

Today’s hearing is a part of a series of hearings—Moving Beyond 

the First Five Years. The theme is about improving the Department’s efforts to secure our homeland through integrated cooperation. I believe that is why and what we in the Department are 

working to do everyday. I want to thank you and all the members 

of the Department of Homeland Security for what you do each and 

every day to keep this Nation safe. 

While the first 5 years, the Department has seen some uneven 

progress and that is to be expected, the fight against terrorists has 

not been without success. The Department and Federal agencies 

have made significant progress in information sharing and standing up such institutions as the National Counterterrorism Center, 

NCTC, partially because of these efforts are Federal, State and 

local governments have been successful at preventing planned attacks on the United States and against the United States’s interests. 

Aside from the obvious successes there have been substantial internal improvements over the years at DHS and in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. While examining this process, it is important to note that this is an office that was created from scratch 5 

years ago and was substantially reorganized just 2 years later. 

Additionally, last year, this office was again given new direction 

in the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act. In other words, 

after being created from scratch, the office was reorganized and 

then subjected to major legislation. According to a press release 

from Chairman Thompson these series of hearings are also focused 

on preparing for the next administration and the future of the Department. 

It is clear to me that what the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

needs is to have some time to focus on its core mission without another major reorganization by the next administration. The Department of Homeland Security has a clear State and local mission, 

and must have some stability in order to ensure these missions are 

carried out. 

One thing that Congress should do to help the Department of 

Homeland Security with their mission is to consolidate oversight 

with over 80 committees and subcommittees that have oversight, 

over components at the DHS, it is a wonder that the Department 

of Homeland Security has been able to achieve anything over the 

past 5 years. 

While this subcommittee has been working to oversee some of 

the legislative improvements that we recently implemented, the 

Department is looking internally at its own flaws. One example of 
4

this that is often cited is CENTRA, the CENTRA Report, that was 

commissioned by Under Secretary Allen himself to help improve 

the Office of Intelligence and Analysis’ outreach and service to the 

State and local communities. 

Furthermore, Under Secretary Allen recently began the Homeland Security State and local community of interest which is a virtual intelligence group that has won praise within the State and 

local community as major improvement in information sharing. 

While these are but a few recent efforts, I would like to hear today 

from our witness on improvements that they have seen and what 

improvements still need to be made. 

Thank you again for being here, thank you, Madam Chair for the 

time and I yield. 

Ms. HARMAN. I thank the ranking member. Other members of 

the subcommittee are reminded that under the committee rules 

opening statements may be submitted for the record. 

It is now my pleasure to introduce our witness. Our first witness, 

Matt Bettenhausen, is the Homeland Security security advisor to 

California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and is the director of 

the California Office of Homeland Security. He previously served as 

the Department of Homeland Security’s first director of State and 

territorial coordination where he directed the Department’s efforts 

with State, territorial and tribal governments. 

He served on several White House senior policy coordinating 

committees and worked on implementing Homeland Security presidential directives. From January 2000 to January 2003, Mr. 

Bettenhausen served as the deputy governor of Illinois. As that 

State’s Homeland Security director, he is someone I work with 

often and enjoy. I would love to report to everybody that California 

is a bit safer because Matt is in the position that he is. 

Massachusetts is fortunate that our second witness, Juliette 

Kayyem, who just completed the Boston Marathon in a little over 

4 hours—that makes me upset—is the first Under Secretary for 

Homeland Security for the Commonwealth. She serves as the liaison between the Governor’s Office and all Federal, State and local 

agencies on Homeland Security. She is responsible for developing 

State-wide policy with a focus on preventing, protecting, responding 

to and recovering from any and all critical incidents. She also has 

direct oversight over the Massachusetts National Guard. 

Ms. Kayyem comes from her position from Harvard’s John F. 

Kennedy School of Government, where she has been a lecturer in 

public policy. Since 2001, she has been a resident scholar at the 

Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for science and international affairs, serving most recently as executive director for research. She 

is an expert in homeland security and terrorism, I know this, and 

teaches courses on law, homeland security and national security affairs. 

She and I served together on the National Commission on Terrorism, which before 9/11, reviewed how the government could prepare better for the growing terrorist threat and predicted a major 

attack on U.S. soil which sadly came to pass. 

Our third witness, Frank Cilluffo, who is here with his daughter, 

on Take Your Daughter To Work Day—Where is his daughter? We 

want to welcome you—He leads George Washington University’s 
5

homeland security efforts on policy, research, education and training. He directs the Homeland Security Policy Institute, which has 

a research agenda that has spanned domestic terrorism 

radicalization, disaster management, emergency preparedness, 

pandemic influenza, intelligence and information sharing. Along 

my travels in the security field, he is someone who is always part 

of the panels we put together to try to learn the subject matter better. 

Mr. Cilluffo joined GW in April 2003 from the White House 

where he served as special assistant to the President for Homeland 

Security. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks he was appointed by the 

President to the newly created office of homeland security and 

served as the principal advisor to Governor Tom Ridge. 

Prior to his White House appointment, Mr. Cilluffo spent 8 years 

with CSIS in senior policy positions with a Homeland Security 

focus. 

Ms. HARMAN. Without objection, all of your full statements will 

be inserted in the record. I now ask Mr. Bettenhausen to summarize your statement for 5 minutes. There is a time clock, so it will 

start blinking red just as you get to 5 minutes. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW BETTENHAUSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Thank you, Chairwoman Harman, Ranking 

Member Reichert, members of the subcommittee. We greatly appreciate the opportunity to have this discussion and conversation 

today about information sharing and terrorism prevention. We certainly are proud to call you one of California’s very best and very 

own, Madam Chairwoman. We appreciate all of your support and 

leadership as well as the entire committee for their encouragement 

for support and leadership which has happened not only over the 

course of tragic events of 9/11, but since then, with the creation of 

the Department. 

Ms. HARMAN. We will give you an extension of time if you want 

to continue to talk about how great the subcommittee is. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Thank you, I appreciate that. 

I think and I agree with the ranking member in my conversation 

with Chairwoman Harman before the committee too, we have to be 

careful as we look at the 5 years, and we move through the elections and the transition that we don’t continue to reorganize and 

shake these things up. We have got to start solidifying actual action and implementation, and that is one of the things that I would 

like to emphasize here today. 

This is all about cooperation and partnerships. I got into Washington, DC late last night having spent some time with our friends 

and partners in Canada in British Columbia. Governor 

Schwarzenegger has recognized that he wants to have a close, and 

cooperative, and collaborative relationship with them and certainly 

with the upcoming winter Olympics that is critical. 

Borders are to longer defined simply by geography. California is 

on the border with Canada. Our ports of entry in Los Angeles, our 

airports, the shared maritime interests that we have in trade is the 

key to the Asian Pacific corridor and the ports that we share in 
6

bringing goods into the United States and driving the economy are 

critical. 

That idea of cooperation, coordination and collaboration is the 

emphasis that I would like to have in my overall remarks, because 

this is a philosophical point that we need to continue to emphasize 

with our Federal partners. Prior to 9/11 terrorism prevention, terrorism prosecution, terrorism internationally was exclusively the 

province of our Federal Government. We realized after 9/11, terrorism prevention is everybody’s business. It is State and local government, it is across disciplines, it is individual citizen’s business. 

I have given a number of examples in my written testimony from 

individual citizens. The worker at the Circuit City who noticed a 

training video and reported it in. The idea of ‘‘See something, say 

something.’’ That attack on Fort Dix. 

We also have State and local officers in Torrance, California who 

are investigating convenience store robberies which they were committing as it turns out in a model of Federal, State and local cooperations. A cell that was operating, committing the convenience 

store robberies to get the financing in order to do attacks on Jewish 

synagogues, military recruiting depots and National Guard Armories in Los Angeles. It was terrorism prevention in action. But it 

was the action of States and locals that uncovered this. They are 

the most important first responders and first preventers in a terrorism prevention. Until we truly and fully treat them as full and 

equal partners in the terrorism prevention mission, we are not 

going to be successful. 

So what I would like to talk about in terms of how we do this 

in making sure that State and locals are full and equal partners, 

I do go back to the theme of enlist, entrust and empower. We must 

enlist our local first responders and first preventers. There are only 

tens of thousands of Federal law enforcement agencies in this country across all the Federal agencies. But there are hundreds of thousands, nearly a million sworn law enforcement officers, security 

guards who are doing this. These locals are excellent and capable. 

We have to overcome the fact that our Federal agencies are not 

used to even working with each other, the walls that we have broken down, but most importantly working with us, and understanding what we can provide. It is not just that we have information requirements, we are probably their most important information producers. We have to collect and connect the dots if we are 

going to prevent the next terrorist act. 

We must entrust. We have to approve security clearances. We 

have to have a presumption of sharing information. It has to be not 

just about prosecution, it has to be just not about law enforcement. 

You need to value what we have, it should not be that we are considered as a nuisance to this mission. We must be brought in as 

full and equal partners in this collaborative relationship. Trust us, 

entrust us. 

Finally empower us. I think the President’s national strategy on 

information sharing is a step in the right direction. Your 9/11 implementation bill lays the foundation, both for the finishing of this 

administration and the next administration, but it is critical for 

sustainment and funding for these things to encourage us to have 

the analysts to support our front line first responders who are out 
7

there day in and day out protecting the public and preventing terrorism. 

I see that my time is up, so I thank you for the opportunity to 

be here and I look forward to your questions. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bettenhausen. 

[The statement of Mr. Bettenhausen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MATTHEW BETTENHAUSEN

APRIL 24, 2008

Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to discuss the critical role State and local public safety agencies play in preventing terrorism and how the Office of Intelligence and Analysis can do more to enlist, entrust 

and empower our first preventers. 

Let me begin by taking a moment to acknowledge the Chairwoman’s commitment 

to enhancing the preparedness of local communities for both intentional and natural 

disasters. Your leadership and role in overseeing the Department of Homeland Security has paid significant dividends. You and your colleagues have not been afraid 

to ask the difficult questions and the sense of urgency this committee has brought 

to homeland security issues has been a catalyst for productive change within the 

Department and at the operational level. 

This morning, I want to share with you why we need to enlist, entrust and empower State and local preventers and how invaluable fusion centers are to California’s homeland security strategy. The progress being made by the Department of 

Homeland Security and the Department of Justice in this effort is noteworthy. Congress has also provided sound policy direction and the resources to ensure an effective network of fusion centers is built with the capability of protecting our communities and critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks. It is also important to recognize that our best efforts to share information will be in vain without a firm commitment at all levels of government to ensure fusion centers and analysts institutionalize policies to protect privacy and civil liberties. Finally, I want to highlight 

some of the areas where the Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis can 

do more to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of fusion centers. 

STATE AND LOCAL FIRST PREVENTERS

Prior to 9/11, State and locals were all too often an afterthought in 

counterterrorism efforts. This has proven to be a hard mindset to change. Many of 

our Federal partners underestimate the unique capabilities of State and local public 

safety agencies. There has been progress on enfolding locals into the 

counterterrorism effort, but we are not there yet. For this reason, I take every opportunity to remind my Federal partners that, as counterterrorism efforts evolve, 

we must work with our first preventers to uncover the recruitment, fundraising 

(money-laundering), networking and operational planning of Islamic extremists in 

the United States. 

Early in my career, I realized the need to enlist State and locals in our 

counterterrorism efforts. It was in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, 

while I was serving as a Federal prosecutor in Chicago. My colleagues and I in the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office were busy looking through international flight data for a global nexus. In the meantime, an Oklahoma Highway Patrol trooper stopped a yellow 

1977 Mercury Marquis without a license plate. The driver of the car was Timothy 

McVeigh. The alert trooper arrested McVeigh for carrying a loaded firearm. Three 

days later he was identified as the man being sought in the nationwide manhunt. 

The Olympic Bomber case is another example of the critical role of local preventers. As the committee knows, Eric Rudolph conducted a series of bombings 

across the southern United States, which killed three people and injured at least 

150 others. He declared that his bombings were part of a guerrilla campaign against 

abortion. Despite the efforts of the FBI, Rudolph was ultimately arrested by a local 

police officer in North Carolina who was on a routine patrol and observed Rudolph 

scavenging for garbage in a dumpster behind a Save-A-Lot store. 

In a more recent case, the Fort Dix Six, a group of six radical Islamist men allegedly plotting to stage an attack on the Fort Dix military base in New Jersey, were 

arrested by the FBI on May 7, 2007. They were subsequently charged with planning 

an attack against U.S. soldiers. The alleged aim of the six men was said to be to 

‘‘kill as many soldiers as possible.’’ Local law enforcement was alerted to the group 
8

1 Abujihad was convicted March 5, 2008, of providing material support to terrorists and disclosing classified national defense information. His sentencing is set for May 2008 and he faces 

up to 25 years in Federal prison. 2On November 29, 2007, Shareef changed his original plea and pled guilty to plotting a grenade attack on a Rockford, Illinois mall. 

when one of the suspects requested that a neighborhood electronics store convert a 

video tape to DVD that depicted the suspects firing weapons and shouting jihadist 

slogans in the Poconos. Store employees notified law enforcement, which identified 

and monitored the suspects until arresting them. 

Closer to home for the Chairwoman is the Torrance Case. In this case, Kevin 

James, a Muslim convert, founded a radical Islamic group called Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam 

Is-Saheeh (JIS), Arabic for Assembly of Authentic Islam, from his cell in Folsom 

Prison in California. James recruited fellow inmates to join a prison based terrorist 

cell and recruit both released inmates and new recruits to join his mission to kill 

those he considered infidels in the Los Angeles area. The break in the case came 

when local police officers in Torrance, California, arrested two men in connection 

with a string of armed robberies at convenience stores. During the investigation, the 

local police officers noticed Islamic extremist materials during one of their searches. 

With this new evidence, authorities began to unravel their more sinister intentions 

to attack military recruiting stations and Jewish sites in Los Angeles. Late last 

year, Kevin James pled guilty to ‘‘conspiracy to levy war against the United States 

through terrorism’’ and faces up to 20 years in Federal prison upon release from 

State prison. 

International cases also rely on leads generated by local preventers. As was the 

case when local police in the United Kingdom discovered suspicious U.S. Navy information after arresting Babar Ahmad, the leader of a terrorist support cell and a 

computer specialist working on the now defunct Azzam.com, an Islamist extremist 

website. The previously classified information, planned movements of a U.S. Navy 

battle group, was found in Ahmad’s room at his parent’s home in London. After the 

discovery of these documents, officials in the United Kingdom alerted the FBI. U.S. 

authorities subsequently issued search warrants upon e-mail accounts associated 

with the Azzam.com websites and discovered e-mail communications from Abujihad 

(formerly known as Paul Hall) dating from late 2000 and the Fall of 2001 from his 

personal and military based e-mail accounts. Information gleaned through the original search ultimately led to the arrest of Abujihad.1 During the investigations of 

Abujihad, and his onetime roommate, Derrick Shareef,2 investigators learned of a 

discussion between the two to carry out a sniper attack on a military installation 

in San Diego. 

These are just a few of the many cases where State and local public safety officials have been at the center of our national and international counterterrorism efforts. These examples underscore how State and locals are in the best position to 

discover and disrupt Islamic extremist activity in our communities. 

CALIFORNIA’S STATE TERRORISM THREAT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM

To determine an accurate depiction of our adversaries, their intentions, and their 

capabilities, California moved quickly after 9/11 to establish a Terrorism Threat Assessment System. The State Terrorism Threat Assessment System (STTAS) is responsible for regional and statewide information collection, analysis and sharing activities. The STTAS is comprised of four Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment 

Centers (RTTAC) and one State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC). The 

RTTACs are located in San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay Area and Sacramento. These locations mirror the Federal Bureau of Investigation areas of responsibility within California and are comprised of a mixture of State, local, and 

Federal public safety agencies. 

The State fusion center is designed to provide California’s senior leaders with: situational awareness of identified threats; visibility of, and coordination with, the critical infrastructure of the State; and constant access to the latest local, State and 

national information analysis products and assessments. The STTAC provides: 

statewide assessment products; information tracking and pattern analysis; geographic reporting linkages; and connections with the latest national information 

from the FBI, DHS and other Federal agencies. 

The Regional fusion centers: integrate the intake, analysis, fusion, and synthesis 

of intelligence information with an emphasis on terrorist threat intelligence; identify 

patterns and trends that may be indicative of emerging threats; and provide relevant, timely and actionable intelligence products for the region. The RTTACs establish policies to share and exchange terrorism-related information and intelligence 
9

products with public and private sector organizations having public safety and infrastructure protection responsibilities. 

There are currently 15 personnel assigned, or pending assignment, to the STTAC 

from a mix of State agencies, including the State Office of Homeland Security, the 

California Highway Patrol and the California National Guard. The regional fusion 

centers vary in size from 15 individuals in the Sacramento and San Diego RTTACs, 

40 individuals in the Los Angeles RTTAC, and 44 individuals in the San Francisco 

Bay Area RTTAC. 

The State and regional centers are supported by a network of Terrorism Liaison 

Officers (TLOs) and a secure web-based information sharing system to distribute 

and receive information. The TLOs serve as the local public agency and private entity point of contact for all terrorism-related issues. At the local level, law enforcement and public safety agencies are designating TLOs who are trained in the review 

and assessment of local reporting and in conducting outreach to other public safety 

agencies, critical infrastructure operators and community groups. The TLO is the 

local agency point-of-contact for all terrorism-related alerts and suspicious activity 

reports, requests for information, warnings and other notifications from regional, 

State or Federal homeland security agencies. The TLOs review local-agency reports, 

manage local reporting and initiate or respond to requests for information. The 

TLOs have an ongoing relationship with other local agencies, especially those with 

daily contact in the community, and develop relationships with critical infrastructure sites within their respective jurisdictions, establishing a personal connection 

with their security and management staff. 

California has trained over 4,300 TLOs through a formal training program, approved and certified by both DHS and California Commission on Peace Officer 

Standards and Training (POST). We have also expanded the TLO program to include an initial group of over 70 individuals representing State agencies in Sacramento who will be connecting State government directly to the STTAC. 

With the support of the Federal homeland security grants, our future investments 

will include: (1) expanding the existing threat assessment analytical capabilities at 

the fusion centers; (2) expanding the training of Terrorism Liaison Officers; (3) expanding the existing State-wide information sharing technology platform; (4) expanding law enforcement counter-terrorism case de-confliction efforts; and (5) enhancing public and private sector information sharing partnerships. 

STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS NEED FEDERAL SUPPORT

I first want to recognize the initiative the Department of Homeland Security has 

taken to embed DHS Intelligence Analysts in State and regional fusion centers. This 

effort is to be applauded. Similarly, I would be remiss if I did not recognize the contribution of the FBI Special Agents in Charge in California for their partnership and 

support of California’s fusion centers. In particular, cooperation by the Los Angeles 

FBI office resulted in space being donated to house the Los Angeles area analysts. 

This collaboration continues, as the Los Angeles RTTAC is being ably led by Ms. 

Leslie Gardner of the FBI. I cannot underscore enough the value of these partnerships to the overall success of our fusion centers. 

The National Strategy for Information Sharing (Strategy) is also praiseworthy, as 

it provides clear and concise direction to all levels of government. The Strategy recognizes the critical role of State and local first responders and first preventers in 

preventing acts of terrorism. Being enfolded by this strategy validates the unique 

perspectives of State and local public safety agencies and represents a much needed 

change away from a Federal-centric approach to combating terrorism. 

We are committed to quickly implementing the Strategy and I am pleased to report that one of the key elements—suspicious activity reports—is being piloted in 

California by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The goals of the pilot program are to standardize internal processes and institutionalize counter-terrorism 

throughout the LAPD. The collection of this data will enable the LAPD, and other 

departments, to develop a measurement tool for terrorism-related behavior and activities to identify indicators of emerging threats. 

The establishment of the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordinating Group 

(ITACG) is another positive step being taken by DHS. The ITACG has the potential 

to bring a State and local perspective to products produced by the Intelligence Community. The ITACG also has the potential to enhance our ability to turn information analyzed at the national level into action at the operational level. However, 

more work needs to be done to better define the information requirements of the 

Intelligence Community from State and local public safety agencies. Locals need 

clearer direction on the types of information that should be shared. 
10

At the operational level, fusion center analysts have been pleased with the Department of Homeland Security’s deployment of the Homeland Security Information 

Network (HSIN), a system for sharing sensitive analytical products. Under Mr. 

Charlie Allen’s leadership, the Department has improved both the timeliness and 

the quality of the HSIN products. Responses to requests for information from State 

and local agencies have also been more timely. 

Another positive development has been the establishment of the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community Interest (HSIN–SLIC). The HSIN–

SLIC provides a secure forum for analysts from over 43 States and 6 Federal agencies to directly share information with each other. The forum is also supported by 

weekly threat teleconferences. Early feedback has indicated that this is one of the 

more promising venues to share information horizontally and to identify emerging 

national threats. 

FUSION CENTERS’ ROLE IN PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Fusion centers should also be leveraged to enhance critical infrastructure and prevention capabilities. DHS should act on the recommendations made by the State, 

Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC) to establish the critical infrastructure and key resource desks (CIKR Desk) at State fusion centers. (see attachment). As the SLTTGCC noted, the key function of the 

CIKR Desk in fusion centers would be the integration of threat, vulnerability, and 

consequence data to develop information products for public safety and private entities with security responsibilities. 

In California, fusion centers are being utilized to extend training to our private 

sector partners. At the Governor’s direction, the requirements for licensed security 

professionals were modified to mandate enrollment in a 4-hour terrorism-awareness 

training program. This common sense policy change will ultimately provide terrorism training to the approximately 400,000 licensed security professionals in California. We have also implemented a terrorism-awareness training program amongst 

professional and trade associations to ensure that they have current trend and pattern information, threat assessments and connectivity to their RTTAC. Additionally, 

the State fusion center is working closely with the agricultural industry to protect 

this critical resource by formulating an initiative with the California Department of 

Food and Agriculture to deliver a 1-day TLO course to each of the 58 county agriculture commissioners. Furthermore, a partnership is being formed with the State’s 

Rural Crime Task Force to train its members in terrorism awareness and California’s information sharing protocols. 

The RTTACs have been working closely with my office to identify, prioritize and 

protect the State’s broad array of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR). 

These efforts have been closely coordinated with a broad group of private-sector 

partners—those entities that own and operate the bulk of the State’s assets and resources. Such partnerships include site owners and operators, first responders, public and private organizations and associations, and other levels of government, including local, State, Federal, and tribal partners. 

The Automated Critical Asset Management System (ACAMS) is a Web-enabled information services portal which helps our State and local governments build critical 

infrastructure/key resource (CI/KR) protection programs. ACAMS provides a set of 

tools and resources that help law enforcement, public safety and emergency response personnel: collect and use CI/KR asset data; assess CI/KR asset 

vulnerabilities; develop all-hazards incident response and recovery plans; and build 

public/private partnerships. ACAMS is a secure, online data base and data base 

management platform that allows for the collection and management of CI/KR asset 

data; the cataloguing, screening and sorting of this data; the production of tailored 

infrastructure reports; and the development of a variety of pre- and post-incident 

response plans. The Department of Homeland Security provides ACAMS for free 

and ACAMS is used in more than 32 States and territories. 

PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

In all of these efforts, we are fully committed to protecting California’s residents 

and respecting their privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. Our fusion centers must 

comply with our Federal and State Constitutions, laws, regulations and policies regarding the protection of privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. Because protecting 

these rights is so fundamentally important to our democracy and our office’s mission, we established the State Terrorism Threat Assessment Advisory Group 

(STTAAG) to provide independent and informed advice. The STTAAG is comprised 

of a broad and diverse membership of Californians who bring a wide range of expe-
11

3 National Strategy for Information Sharing, October 2007. 

riences including public safety, national security, community service, communications, and academia. 

The STTAAG Chair is Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, Dean of the Pacific McGeorge 

School of Law and a former CIA and NSA General Counsel. The Vice Chair is Craig 

Manson, who previously served as Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife and Parks 

in the U.S. Department of the Interior and as a Judge in the Sacramento County 

Superior Court. The membership also includes Rabbi Abraham Cooper of the Simon 

Wiesenthal Center, Dafer Dakhil of the Omar Ibn Al Khattab Foundation, prominent members of the Sikh community, the California Broadcasters Association, and 

representative from various public safety organizations. 

Over the past year, we have formalized the existence of the STTAAG through the 

adoption of a charter. This charter reflects the two primary objectives of the group—

providing independent advice on privacy, civil rights and civil liberties issues; and, 

on how our organization can engage the people we serve is a constructive dialog on 

who we are and what we are doing to enhance their collective security in a manner 

which respects their individual liberties. 

Along these lines, we co-hosted an outreach event with the Simon Wiesenthal 

Center last November. A substantial number of my senior staff, along with our Federal and local partners in Los Angeles, spent several hours with Southern California 

business, community and religious leaders. We provided them with information on 

the terrorist threat, the measures that we are taking to mitigate that threat and 

the role of the citizen in planning for and preventing terrorist attacks against our 

homeland. It was an incredibly positive session and we hope to host similar events 

on annual basis around the State. 

BUILDING A MORE ROBUST AND SUSTAINABLE NETWORK OF FUSION CENTERS

In previous hearings this subcommittee reviewed the findings of the February 20, 

2008 fusion center report issued by CENTRA Technology, Inc. The report focused 

on three areas in need of improvement: (1) identifying the priority information 

needs for both the Department and for State and local fusion centers; (2) streamlining the process for responding to requests for information; and (3) enhancing the 

open source analytical capabilities of analysts in State and local fusion centers. In 

general, the Department has acknowledged that these are indeed areas that should 

be acted upon. 

I look forward to working with the Department to assist them in their effort to 

offer additional open source training opportunities for our first preventers. We are 

also committed to ensuring timely and accurate responses to requests for information. The Department should be certain that requests initiated, and responsed to, 

by regional fusion centers are carbon copied to State fusion centers. This will ensure 

States have optimal situational awareness and enhance their ability to identify 

emerging trends. Additionally, the Department should be clear in issuing their priority information needs and provide routine feed back to State and locals that contribute information to the Intelligence Community. 

To be effective, fusion centers must be staffed with well trained and properly 

cleared personnel. The National Strategy for Information Sharing acknowledges the 

importance of personnel and states, ‘‘the Federal Government will support the establishment of these centers and help sustain them through grant funding, technical 

assistance, and training.’’3 Congress also recognized the value of staffing fusion centers in passing H.R. 1, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 

Act (9/11 Act), which explicitly allows States and locals to utilize homeland security 

grants to hire personnel to staff fusion centers. 

Notwithstanding the urgent operational need and unequivocal legislative intent, 

the Department has continued to issue guidance (Information Bulletins 235 and 

281) regarding the use of Federal funds under the State Homeland Security and 

Urban Area Security Initiative Grant programs which has been extremely counterproductive and detrimental to State and local efforts to build and sustain a network 

of fusion centers and contravenes the clear intent of Congress. I urge the committee 

to eliminate the unduly burdensome and detrimental guidance. 

State and locals have invested a lot of time, money and personnel in terrorism 

prevention and have absorbed the vast majority of the costs for prevention, protection and infrastructure preparedness with State and local funds. Creating, establishing and sustaining fusion centers has been a success story. Staffing them with 

qualified, cleared analysts has been and remains a challenge. These analysts and 

fusion centers also clearly work to the benefit of the Federal Government by allowing for better information sharing and real time communication during a crisis. 
12

Putting unnecessary restrictions on funding while we are still in the developmental stage of the fusion centers and information sharing is unwise. The lack of 

analysts will have adverse consequences on our infrastructure protection efforts, including their review of classified information and providing information back to 

DHS’s Infrastructure Protection Directorate. California is conducting a number of 

comprehensive reviews with the Department, and fusion center analysts are assisting in these efforts. We have also developed and invested significant resources in 

the identification and training of several thousand TLOs at government and private 

agencies throughout the State. Without a functioning fusion center system, the information gathered by these TLOs will be at risk of not being collected, as the system needs constant attention and skills refreshment. 

As I mentioned earlier, embedding DHS personnel in regional and State fusion 

centers is a positive development. DHS should take every opportunity to replicate 

the success of this initiative by detailing analysts from other components of the Department. Fusion centers and should be the logical base of operations for DHS’s Protective Security Advisors, rather than being assigned to Secret Service field officers. 

Additionally, Congress has provided additional resources to the Department to deploy Mass/Surface Transit Security and Aviation Security analysts. These personnel 

would also be good candidates to embed in regional and State fusion centers. Indeed, all agencies and Departments with either law enforcement or emergency response capabilities should have a significant presence at regional fusion centers. 

Currently the United States Coast Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the 

Drug Enforcement Agency participate in California’s regional fusion centers. Our 

prevention, analytical and information sharing capabilities could only be enhanced 

by a sustained commitment from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency, the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives Agency, and Transit Security 

Administration. 

As we build this nationwide matrix of connected State and local fusion centers 

staffed by a multi-disciplined analysts from the public safety field, it remains important to ensure that barriers to information sharing from traditional Federal, State 

and local law enforcement agencies are appreciated and reduced consistent with the 

necessary protection of privileged information. We are building a new capability 

across the country, focused on prevention, and the key to its success must be the 

widest possible exchange and access to analysts and information. Great progress has 

been made, but work remains on demonstrating that Homeland Security professionals and first responders in the fusion centers are equal and relevant partners. 

DHS should also expedite the fielding of the Homeland Security Data Network 

(HSDN) system to the State fusion center. This long awaited project is a needed improvement to California’s information sharing and analytical capabilities, as the 

HSDN system will allow the STTAC and OHS analysts access to some levels of classified information and connectivity with the RTTACs and DHS at the classified 

level. 

Finally, security clearances—both in terms of availability and proper level—remain an issue for State and locals. Perhaps the most recent and best example I can 

provide you with is the classification of the new Presidential Homeland Security Directive regarding cyber security at the Top Secret level. Unfortunately, the Department has not recognized the need to issue Top Secret clearances to State and local 

public safety officers—even when those individuals bear the responsibility of implementing national security directives. 

Again, thank you for this opportunity to be here today. I will be happy to take 

your questions. 
13

ATTACHMENT
14
15
16

Ms. Harman. I think we may frame your oral testimony. It is 

the core mission of subcommittee. I would just add that your example of Torrance, California is one we all know. We had a hearing 

in Torrance, which is in my congressional district, about how successful that was. 

Ms. Kayyem, please summarize your testimony in 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, UNDER SECRETARY 

FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF PUBLIC 

SAFETY AND SECURITY, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Ms. KAYYEM. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Harman and 

Ranking Member Reichert. I am also pleased to be here. I will take 

Matt’s compliments of the subcommittee and continue. 

I think it is great this subcommittee is thinking about the future 

and also thinking about how to make what is already there better, 

rather than shifting around again, because from the State perspective, enough shifting so to speak. We need to sort of make a plan 

and stick with it. 

In my written testimony, I discuss our Fusion Center. What it 

is, what it is doing, how it conceptualizes itself. It will be very different from California’s many Fusion Centers in other States. I 

think that is good and right. 

I think given the threats and the particular concerns of any 

given State and any given governor considering crime or whatever 

else that we don’t want one size doesn’t fit all. We don’t want to 

think of Fusion Centers as these sort of new intelligence beasts not 

linked to the public safety entities that they have to contribute to. 

I actually compliment the law enforcement intelligence relationship that exists in most Fusion Centers. I think when the media 

says those Fusion Centers are just doing criminal analysis, that is 

actually right. We need to make it all hazards, all threats and 

make it integrated into the public safety community. 

So with my time, let me talk about quickly what works and what 

is not working on a very specific level and then how we might 

think about it in the future. I&A and DHS, in its intelligence functions, has to think in the world that exists now where is their 

value added, because we have so many players in this realm. We 

have the JTTF in our State, which is excellent. We have any other 

number of counterterrorism, antiterrorism units. So what is their 

value added? Basically their value added is with the States and 

locals and their consumers. 

What has worked in that regard is we actually have an I&A specialist. She had been a member of the Fusion Center in our Fusion 

Center. It is great. I have one person to go to. The quagmire that 

is DHS for a lot of us, it is answered by one person. She may not 

have all the answers, she knows how to get them to me. Requests 

for information come back quickly. We have particular threats in 

our State. We have high profile people coming to the universities. 

We need to know stuff fast. I can go to one person. I don’t have 

to come down here, and figure out who to talk to. I think that is 

great. The CENTRA report promoted that. To the extent, you can 

get more of them into Fusion Centers, it makes a lot of sense. 
17

What ought to be fixed? The truth is that as a consumer of the 

intelligence at I&A is pushing out. That is our Fusion Center in 

many respects. There are three main problems right now. One is 

and I say it in my written testimony, that the intelligence apparatus here in the District of Columbia sometimes, I think, lives by 

the motto ‘‘publish or perish’’, the academic model. 

There is just too much, it is not helpful to me from the prospective of a State Homeland Security advisor. Great examples of relatively public example. This year alone we have seen an increase 

in the Osama bin Laden tapes. The content is not that interesting. 

It is the same tape over and over. But as we reach this transition 

and certainly a Presidential transition over the course of this year, 

what I want it know as a consumer of the intelligence, because I 

can hear about the tapes on CNN, is how is DHS thinking about 

this? How is I&A thinking about what this means for transition? 

Are we worried? Should I be worried? Are these more or less? It 

is the kind of intelligence themes rather than the fact of it that 

matters more to me. Because based on the Osama bin Laden tape, 

we are not going to recommend from an operational level to ramp 

up the State Police or to get MEMA active, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency activated. That is what I think thematically. We have the JTTF for specific investigations. 

Secondly, grants. You know, I won’t talk about grants except for 

one thing, I can not wake up rationally one day and be told by 

DHS that 25 percent of my Homeland Security funds have to be 

spent on IED prevention and response planning. When I haven’t 

been told that the year before, but more importantly, I&A has 

never told me that. The grants are not matching the intelligence. 

So I wake up thinking how am I going to tell this to the people 

who want the money. That is a huge problem. 

Third, treating us maturely, just picking up on what Matt said. 

The spy satellite falling from earth was not a movie for many of 

us, it was real. What we were getting was just not helpful from an 

operational perspective. That is how we are view ourselves. We are 

just making operational recommendations. I don’t have fire trucks. 

We are just saying react. 

It was not helpful, let’s just say. Whether the Department of Defense, or Department of Homeland Security or, as I say in my written testimony, the Secretary of Agriculture is in charge, I could 

care less. What I wanted to know and what wasn’t provided to me 

is how operationally should we be thinking about this? We were 

treated like kids, I mean immaturely. 

Boston Globe has a banner headline about it and I don’t have 

any good advice to give to either the governor or down to the operational entities except for cross your fingers and let’s hope DOD 

shoots it down. That is not helpful. So in terms of the maturity factor, I would really push that. So that is how those changes would 

make a lot of sense for the next administration in terms of what 

I need as a consumer of intelligence. My written testimony gets 

into some other aspects of the Fusion Center. Thank you very 

much. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Ms. Kayyem follows:]
18

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JULIETTE N. KAYYEM

APRIL 24, 2008

It is an honor to testify in this important matter, ‘‘Moving Beyond the First Five 

Years: Evolving the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to Better Serve State, Local 

and Tribal Needs.’’ It is especially an honor to be here in front of Chairwoman Harman, who has not only been an exceptional leader in this field, but a friend and 

mentor to me as well. 

I hope my testimony today will highlight some of the exceptional work performed 

by our Commonwealth Fusion Center, provide guidance for how this committee 

might think about the relationship between the States and the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) regarding intelligence efforts, and provide some thoughts 

on what does and does not work in the structure that now exists. Since this committee is already familiar with many of the challenges facing fusion centers, including continuing funding by homeland security grants, I will focus my discussion instead on themes and priorities. Of course, like every other homeland security advisor, I worry about sustainability and continued funding of the State’s many efforts, 

but enough said in that regard. 

The last time I testified before this committee, I was a lecturer at the Kennedy 

School of Government, and my focus then was on how the Federal Government 

could better collect and analyze intelligence. For the last year, I have served as the 

Under Secretary of Homeland Security for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In 

this position, I report to Secretary of Public Safety Kevin Burke. In addition, I am 

Governor Deval Patrick’s federally designated homeland security advisor. In many 

respects, the status of my position reflects the trends and changes within homeland 

security on both the Federal and State level. Just as Hurricane Katrina painfully 

taught us that a Department solely focused on terrorism may be at risk of undervaluing threats brought by mother nature, a State homeland security apparatus not 

aligned with the daily needs of public safety entities or first responders could not 

survive or remain relevant. 

In this capacity, then, Governor Patrick and Secretary Burke charged me and our 

public safety agencies with evaluating the status of homeland security in the State 

to promote successful integration of our public safety and emergency management 

operations. Our legacy is in ensuring that policies and practices better protect our 

citizens from harm, wherever it may arise. So, first and foremost, this meant requiring that the State had plans and policies in place to guide the significant homeland 

security funds coming to the State, whether they be for interoperability, evacuation 

planning, resource management, recovery efforts or, as I will highlight here, intelligence efforts. 

The Commonwealth Fusion Center, the CFC, is, by Executive Order, the State’s 

designated fusion center and was established in October, 2004. The Boston Regional 

Intelligence Center, the BRIC, serves as the UASI’s primary fusion entity, and we 

continue to ensure that both of their efforts are cooperative and, to the extent practicable, not duplicative. DHS needs to ensure that limited resources, capabilities and 

information do not unnecessarily create competition, but ensure cooperation. We 

have a very good working relationship with the BRIC, and the Boston police for that 

matter. DHS can play a very useful role in ensuring that resources are shared to 

create a unified system. 

The CFC is, like most fusion centers, part of our State police, reporting through 

the chain of command to the Colonel of the Massachusetts State Police (MSP). 

While in the past newspaper articles and commentators have decried the fact that 

many fusion centers are joint tasked—intelligence and law enforcement based—I 

think those concerns are ill-founded. Indeed, I can’t imagine a structure in which 

a fusion center was not, in major respects, focused on traditional crime analysis, 

providing information to localities and receiving important criminal trends from 

them in return. A fusion center that was solely terrorism focused could not sustain 

itself, not given the intelligence that is out there nor the competing needs of Governors and Mayors who are, as we are, concerned about crime. Because traditional 

crime often serves as a means for more nefarious or dangerous activities, we have 

to focus our efforts holistically. The true power that resides at the State and local 

level of law enforcement vis-a`-vis terrorism prevention is not some grand new intelligence mission, but rather a culture of sharing the product of the good work that 

has been going on for years. The information that police officers routinely collect in 

the course of their normal duties is the same information that may identify terrorist 

financing or a pre-operational cell. It is also, it should be noted, the same information that a local chief can use to identify criminal hotspots or emerging trends. 
19

To that end, we are working to put information and tools in the hands of State 

and local law enforcement that will enable them to detect and track precursor 

crimes as well as other trends. The Statewide Information Sharing System, or 

SWISS, has been funded by our homeland security dollars and while available and 

utile to all contributing departments, it will drastically enhance the CFC’s homeland 

security and traditional crime missions. The dual-use concept is thoroughly ingrained in our homeland security strategy so that we might both meet head-on and 

mitigate the challenge of sustainability. Indeed, our fusion center is so integrated 

into the workings of the MSP that it is financially sustained wholly as part of the 

current operational costs of the MSP. While homeland security funds focus the 

CFC’s efforts and training, we are not presently facing a wholesale crisis or the potential loss of analysts as is occurring in other fusion centers. 

What is interesting here, however, is that not until recently has there been a discussion by DHS with States and localities on how the Federal Government could 

access that information in a strategic manner. A recent article in the Los Angeles 

Times highlights the LAPD’s efforts to utilize some standardized form that would 

serve as a trigger for suspicious reporting to DHS. That was a local effort, and to 

our knowledge the most proactive attempt to treat what the fusion centers are doing 

as relevant to Federal threat gathering. We do not need a State-by-State capacity 

to access information about specific investigations or persons; indeed, once an individual jurisdiction sends information to the FBI under Guardian, we no longer have 

‘‘peeking’’ ability. What we need is a system in which the trends or activities that 

are reported to the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) are done so in 

a systematic way, and made transparent to those who would need to know the information. Without that capability, the efforts on the State level will be of little value 

to DHS. 

The CFC has, like most fusion centers, been an evolving entity. I sometimes imagine it like Goldilocks, searching for the ‘‘just right’’ fit. Ours began, like many of 

the post-9/11 entities, as an answer to the call from the Federal Government to help 

prevent the ‘‘next 9/11.’’ The changes that have occurred in the CFC, and that will 

continue to occur, happen because of the unique needs of our State and the changing nature of the intelligence we receive. 

So, what I want to lay out here are my thoughts at this moment in time, with 

an eye to guiding this committee, as well as DHS, on bettering our collective efforts 

in the future. The CFC was one of the pilot fusion centers in the recent CENTRA 

report, and we learned a lot in that process. Where I critique, it is only to urge a 

more thoughtful assessment for the future; where I compliment, it is to provide, 

however anecdotally, some evidence where efforts ought to be sustained. 

To begin, it might be helpful to simply lay out who is, and isn’t, at the fusion center now and what they do. The core of the CFC is staffed with MSP personnel, who 

first and foremost are responsible to their chain of command. Representatives from 

other agencies include one Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) analyst, one agent 

and one analyst from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, one 

counter-drug analyst from the Massachusetts National Guard, one analyst from the 

Department of Correction (currently deployed to Iraq), one representative from DHS 

I&A, one police officer from CSX railroad, and a Geographic Information Systems 

specialist from the U.S. Army Civil Support Team. In addition, several MSP troopers under the direct command of the CFC, and therefore the Executive Office of 

Public Safety and Security, are assigned to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 

(JTTF) for specific investigation support. 

The primary focus for today’s hearing is on the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 

and how it works with State fusion centers. We are fortunate to be a State with 

a designated I&A analyst. She had previously worked at the fusion center, and so 

her knowledge of it, and the State itself, has been a tremendous asset. 

She is, for the fusion center, and for me specifically, our one stop shopping. While 

she may not have every answer at hand, she knows how to get it for us. We should 

not underestimate how important that is. DHS, for any State, can be both amorphous and large. In Massachusetts alone, the DHS entities—from ICE, to Coast 

Guard, to FEMA, to a critical infrastructure analyst, to chemical industry regulators, to TSA—are all professional, but from the perspective of a State, are also too 

numerous to count. While FEMA has taken the lead on trying to integrate these 

entities, the truth is that their mission and chains of command so vary that it can 

be difficult. For us to have one liaison that can tap into, at the very least, intelligence efforts at DHS, and across the Federal Government, has proven exceptionally helpful. There are, after all, 16 Federal agencies that make up the Intelligence 

Community, all attempting to assess the persistent and evolving threats this Nation 

faces. It may be, one wonders, too many for the Federal Government; it is certainly 

too many for a single State. As one of our fusion center analysts noted, our I&A 
20

analyst provides a mechanism to reach into the ‘‘quagmire’’ and get the information 

and resources needed by the State. 

This is particularly true in one aspect of our needs: Requests for Information 

(RFI). Working with the CFC and the BRIC, and due to the CENTRA assessments, 

I&A submitted recommendations for creating a process which would efficiently serve 

the State’s needs. This process was concluded before the CENTRA report findings, 

but is supported by that report. While I cannot disclose the details of the requests 

we have made, they have revolved around unique aspects and threats to our State 

and to Boston, whether they be related to critical infrastructure or visits by foreign 

dignitaries. I&A provides connectivity and rapid response for us; some requests are 

returned with information within hours of being relayed. This information can then 

be utilized to guide operational planning by the State police or local law enforcement. 

There are other benefits, including access to secure cell phones for State designees 

and getting through the red tape that often is involved in security clearances. Indeed, in a recent trip I took to Paraguay, a Nation that has a relationship with the 

State’s National Guard, our I&A analyst was able to successfully transition our security clearances to the State Department with 1 day’s notice. 

Thus, the physical presence of a single person who can tap into DHS, who knows 

why we are asking and what it means for the State, has gone exceptionally far in 

our relationship with DHS regarding intelligence efforts. 

However, it is in the CFC’s role as a consumer of intelligence that many of the 

more persistent difficulties arise. First, the CENTRA report, which I have studied, 

places tremendous emphasis on making intelligence more accessible to States and 

localities. That is an important effort. But, while DHS focuses these efforts on ensuring that the quantity of information getting to us continues to flow, we are likely 

similar to many other States in wondering whether we aren’t at risk of threat assessment fatigue. 

Let me put this another way. We have placed so much focus on ensuring that intelligence flows horizontally and vertically from and to State and Federal Governments that we may be at risk of the intelligence version of the often quoted academic trajectory: publish or perish. The quantity of information coming to us, often 

without much reference to either its strategic or tactical relevance, is overwhelming. 

As a State, we are left in a bit of a dilemma: distribute the information and risk 

triggering responses that are not justified by the validity of the intelligence or simply close-hold the information and be at risk of recreating the very stovepipes this 

whole effort was meant to destroy. Thus, while DHS assesses its own intelligence 

capabilities in the years to come, and under a new president from either party, the 

quality of the intelligence being shared has got to be an essential aspect of that conversation. 

A relatively public example may be helpful. In 2008, there have been a number 

of Osama bin Laden audiotapes. We received notification of each of them by DHS 

(as well as by the FBI) but also, I must admit, by CNN. Their substance, for those 

of us who follow these things, was nothing novel: the literal rantings of the terrorist 

against everything associated or affiliated with the United States. But, as we all 

know, we need to remain exceptionally vigilant during times of democratic transition; both Spain and the United Kingdom were victims of terrorist attacks immediately before or immediately after a change in government. So while the fact of the 

tapes didn’t seem to raise anything new in our mind, and the literal statements 

didn’t seem particularly worrisome, as more and more audiotapes came out (and 

may continue to be released), we would want to be in a position to know how the 

Federal Government is assessing this, how are they thinking through this summer 

and fall of transition, and whether we shouldn’t be doing the same. It is that kind 

of strategic guidance that would be helpful. 

I am relatively confident that any information that is worthy of a preliminary or 

criminal investigation will be properly vetted and analyzed by our JTTF, where 

many of our CFC troopers work. But, for the majority of information, call it white 

noise or background atmospherics, we are simply consumers, not quite able to decipher whether there is any strategic relevance to so much information, but pretty 

confident that our operational assessments will not change. 

Second, and this is not something we can fix on the State level, DHS needs to 

ensure that the kinds of guidance we are receiving from other DHS entities or other 

Federal entities is aligned with the very intelligence we are receiving from I&A. 

Most recently, the States received guidance and priorities for the major State homeland security grant cycle, which concludes in May. This is the major grant that 

States and the UASIs receive to support first responder capabilities. While we know 

that IEDs continue to be a threat in Iraq and against our soldiers abroad, no intelligence we had received from DHS or any Federal entity prepared us for the explicit 
21

1http://www.mass.gov/

?pageID=eopssubtopic&L=3&L0=Home&L1=Homeland+Security+-

%26+Emergency+Response&L2=State+Homeland+Security+Strategy&sid=Eeops.

focus that the grant now has on IED prevention, protection, and response planning. 

To be clear, this is an important effort, one that needs attention and one that we 

have and will continue to address, in particular with our critical infrastructure program, which I will discuss further in a moment. But, by explicitly focusing on IEDs, 

we were left wondering whether we proverbially didn’t know what we didn’t know. 

Or, for another example, the Buffer Zone Protection grants are annually distributed 

to critical infrastructure sites to buttress prevention and law enforcement efforts. 

At the same time, some specific industries—say telecommunications or water purifying sites—will be chosen for site visits. From what we know, on the State level, 

these industries are chosen without us knowing why, and certainly without the industry knowing why. It may be, as I believe now, that DHS is doing due diligence 

and ensuring that States focus on many different sectors. But, since there is no intelligence to decipher why a specific industry is chosen, or in one case in our State, 

a specific site, we are left explaining to our private sector partners to simply accept 

the designation, trying to assure them that they are not at increased risk. 

This gets me to the final comment on the challenges of our ‘‘consumer’’ role. Intelligence can be inherently vague and hard to define; with it, comes a tremendous 

amount of responsibility. While we continue to live with threats, from terrorists or 

bad actors or even from mother nature, the knowledge of those threats demands 

that those of us who work and respond to them act professionally and in a reasoned 

fashion. When intelligence goes from atmospherics, to potentially a real threat, we 

need to ensure that the very processes we have put into place are utilized and reinforced. This was made entirely clear from our recent responses to the potential consequences of an NRO spy satellite falling to earth. From my perspective, I don’t 

really care if the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security or even 

the Secretary of Agriculture, if he is so inclined, is designated the principal Federal 

officer for an event. The concern is that, as the other homeland security advisors 

shared information they were receiving in that 2-week period leading up to the successful Defense Department downing of the satellite, it was clear that we simply 

didn’t have a unified notion of how we ought to prepare our public safety agencies, 

let alone the public. There was also a lack of a reality check in all the chaos that 

could answer whether the real issue at hand was one of a danger to the public for 

emergency management planning purposes, or a danger to our national security in 

that secret information might be disclosed if pieces of the satellite fell in adversary 

hands. It was in that vacuum that, I believe, each State likely planned differently, 

based on information that we all believed was probably not forthcoming. Perhaps 

it was because there was confidence that the Defense Department would successfully shoot down the satellite, or perhaps because the trajectory couldn’t actually be 

determined, or maybe we knew less because the trajectory never made its way to 

New England, but it was in that vacuum that both paranoia and gossip gets started, 

and when confidence in the entire process gets undermined. The States must be 

treated as mature partners in these intelligence efforts. 

As we look forward as well, I want to add two important efforts into the mix of 

how we should be thinking of DHS and I&A intelligence functions in the future. We 

need to continue, as we do in all homeland security efforts, to provide policies and 

practices that will be dual-use and respond to many hazards. Thus, as we think 

about the legacy of fusion centers and their continuing viability, one of the major 

arenas where they will and can provide unique value is in critical infrastructure assessments. In the past, our State’s critical infrastructure assessments were locally 

based, providing the State with hundreds of potential and vulnerable sites, ranging 

from nuclear facilities to local high schools. Both are, of course, important, but we 

had no mechanism to focus these efforts on risk reduction and, from the perspective 

of the State, response needs. 

Specific intelligence against a particular site, and our response to that information, is different than the kind of analysis we are now supporting through the fusion 

center in Massachusetts. Indeed, many of the homeland security dollars going to the 

CFC are now supporting training and efforts related to creating a unified critical 

infrastructure assessment tool, known as ACAMS, which is supported by DHS. We 

know, and explicitly express in the Commonwealth’s State Homeland Security Strategy,1 that in order to effectively carry out their missions, public safety officials and 

policymakers need a comprehensive understanding of the vulnerabilities of assets, 

systems, networks, and functions that provide critical services to the people of the 

Commonwealth. This knowledge will drive public safety and public policy decisions 

regarding preventative and protective measures, as well as response activities to 
22

natural and man-made incidents. We are committed to understanding and assessing 

risk in the Commonwealth by ranking what assets are in the State based upon their 

vulnerabilities, whether they are likely to be under threat, and how their destruction, through any means, would impact the State. ACAMS and the CFC provide a 

State-wide, coordinated approach to the identification, prioritization, and protection 

of critical infrastructure and key resources that can be shared with important stakeholders and emergency response personnel. For this to be a successful effort, we 

must also partner with I&A to ensure that their strategic knowledge is shared and 

disseminated. 

Another such critical infrastructure initiative that has recently begun to take 

shape at the CFC in regard to critical infrastructure is a relationship between the 

CFC and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). At the recent fusion center 

conference in San Francisco, it was brought to our attention that there exists an 

NRC database cataloging suspicious activities reported by utility companies 

throughout the country. Being a State with one active nuclear power plant and two 

others in bordering States that affect Massachusetts’ communities within the 10-

mile emergency planning zone, we were intrigued by this information and the opportunity to further our critical infrastructure protection efforts utilizing the NRC database. We have reached out to the NRC and are beginning a process in which the 

NRC, the CFC, and our emergency management agency will communicate on issues 

of suspicious activity involving radiological threats. 

I believe that these efforts, in conjunction with DHS and I&A, are really the foundation of a legacy for fusion centers nationwide. Not simply because we can better 

prevent and respond to terrorist threats against our critical infrastructure, but also 

because we can know, beforehand, how we might prioritize any number of important 

public safety and public policy needs. 

Finally, and this is something that I know Chairwoman Harman promotes, we 

need to continue to demand that fusion centers are as transparent as possible, ensuring that they serve our important public safety needs in a democratic society. 

There will always be a tension between liberty and security, but the tension need 

not impede honest discussion and even evaluation. I believe, as someone who began 

her career in the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, and someone who has 

written extensively in this regard, that we may never permanently settle this issue, 

but we must always be prepared to have the discussion. Before I came to work for 

the Commonwealth, my notion of what was going on in the intelligence world was 

not always a benign one. 

The balance at the CFC and in the State we are trying to achieve now has made 

us reexamine our efforts, our policies, and our transparency. In response to the most 

recent ACLU examination of fusion centers, we vowed to provide a reply with an 

honest assessment of where we were and where we hoped to be in the future. That 

letter is attached for your review. We are, in addition, promoting a privacy council 

to ensure that we have the benefit of outside council not on specific investigations, 

but on how the State’s public safety agencies might better balance their important 

public safety mission with the rights of our citizens. I am confident that we are closer now, but I am also confident that the world is changing so quickly and access 

to information, databases, and technology is so rapidly evolving, that we can not 

simply rest on such assurances. Such advice need not just apply to the fusion centers, but perhaps to any entity that utilizes intelligence and information sharing as 

a prevention, protection, and mitigation tool. As information becomes more readily 

available, and the risks (as well as the benefits) are more easily multiplied, we must 

formalize structures and policies that embrace the debate, rather than deny or ignore it. We are not alone in our State, and to the extent that DHS can serve as 

a model or provide the very practices we all are seeking to achieve, we will ensure 

that we will take the proper steps to protect privacy and civil liberties, while continuing to utilize the mechanisms of intelligence and analysis that help protect our 

citizens from critical incidents. 

I hope I have provided you with useful information to assess and enhance DHS 

I&A. I have discussed the issues that are at the forefront of the CFC’s concerns; 

which we know also hit home with many other fusion centers. Efforts on the part 

of DHS and the Federal Government to address the issues that were raised today 

offer a solid basis for making improvements and continuing useful efforts by I&A. 
23

ATTACHMENT
24
25

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Cilluffo. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO, DIRECTOR AND ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT, HOMELAND SECURITY POLICY INSTITUTE, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, 

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will be very brief, not my strong 

suit. As you know, I have never had an unspoken thought. I want 

to pick up on a couple of themes we have heard here and expand 

on two or three that I think are significant. 
26

Firstly, that the title of the hearing is spot on. That should be 

the priority of I&A at the Department of Homeland Security. I am 

not sure they have seen it that way thus far. 

While it has become a cliche, timely, accurate and well informed 

intelligence and information products shared both vertically and 

horizontally, at all levels of government are more important than 

ever to inform us about threats, solutions and responses. 

Collectively these capabilities build our understanding of the adversary. We tend to focus so much on the indication and warning. 

The reality is we need to know the context by which this fits in and 

it is sort of looking for the needle in the haystack. So I think there 

has been too much emphasis on the warning side and not enough 

on the broader strategic function. Not only at the State and local 

level, but at the Federal level as well. 

Collection is sexy. We all like to steal secrets and we all like to 

have secrets. The reality is what does it mean? How can you use 

it? Is it usable and how do we operationalize it—I think is the real 

issue we need to be working toward. 

While I agree with Matt and Juliette there has been some 

progress, and I think the national strategy is a good case in point 

of that, at least in theory if not fully in practice. At least people 

are now at a point where they understand. I think everyone is getting to the recognition of the need to share vis-a`-vis the old needto-know model. 

When I sit down with my State and local authorities, whether 

they are in the intelligence shops at NYPD or LAPD or any city 

throughout the United States, two common themes keep coming 

back to me. One, without a seat at the table in Washington, they 

cannot, as much as we talk about it, be true partners in the intelligence and information-sharing process. At the same time, the 

maximum of think globally, act locally should apply to all of our 

efforts here. 

Much of the information that is collected from State and local authorities don’t find its way into any national pictures or frameworks or assessments. Many of the products that the national community is providing don’t meet the very specific needs that their 

State and local authorities have. So I sort of see three approaches 

that DHS I&A can take to try to remedy this approach. 

Firstly champion, champion, champion. Serve as the champion 

for State and local in Washington and within the Beltway, setting 

standards, designing customer driven intelligence products and 

processes. In essence, readjusting the entire requirement setting 

process to meet their needs. This includes I&A inserting itself into 

the national intelligence priority framework, a very elite table, but 

I think they should have a voice in that. 

I personally believe that I&A has spent too much time proving 

that they deserve to be a member of the IC and not enough on 

some of the customers, which is their true, real differentiator at 

State and local. Secondly, it should enable its State and local partners. To me, the big gap is not the bricks and mortars, it is analytical capacity. 

We need to ensure that an analytical capacity, people. Ultimately 

this is all about people. We need to start investing in people and 
27

make those capabilities and capacities available to our State and 

local partners. 

We love Fusion Centers, they are positive, and they are good and 

there have been very positive developments there, some better than 

others. What we really are missing is what comes out of that. That 

is more of a data collection focus. I would like to see greater analysis. I would like see how that can be strung up together. This is 

where I&A play a very important role to take regional approaches. 

What are we seeing in one area, what are we seeing in another and 

how do we can put those pieces together. 

I listed a bunch in my prepared remarks of new products that 

I think would be helpful. Much of them focused on understanding 

the adversary, because quite honestly, there is still a dearth of 

that. I think that some of these deliverables can and should be 

done instantaneously. It is not in the United States, it is really 

what are we seeing overseas? What trends are important? What indicators are important? How can that be factored into suspicious 

activity reporting at the local level? What are we seeing in terms 

of modus operandi in combat situations? What are we seeing outside of combat situations? What are the trends? I am not sure that 

that has been done effectively. 

Secondly, I think CBP is a unique aspect of DHS and that should 

be better integrated into our information sharing efforts with State 

and local. 

I think that as Juliette mentioned, some of the videos quite honestly, I think we do need more of that. We need to understand the 

terrorist narrative, not just what the actions are, but what is making them tick. How can we get to a lexicon where we can communicate with our communities? Ultimately, the solutions are going to 

be community policing, hopefully intelligence-led, and that to me 

should be a major, major priority. 

One pagers: I would like one pagers of every terrorist incident we 

have seen overseas. Simple. I would like to see one page about not 

only incidents but what about thwarted incidents and how are they 

thwarted and why were they thwarted? This is something that I 

think could be very valuable. If DHS I&A doesn’t provide it, 

Madam Chairman, and I realize this may be outside of the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, perhaps others, such as FBI and NCTC 

should be given the authority and responsibility to do so. 

On the enabling side my colleagues said it much better than I 

ever could, but let me recognize the importance of privacy. This 

shouldn’t be an afterthought, it shouldn’t be a perfunctory last 

paragraph in every document. It needs to be part and parcel. It is 

not just the civil liberties and civil rights communities inside government, but the broader civil rights communities should have a 

voice. Even if we all can come to some conclusion, it won’t work if 

it doesn’t have the trust of the community. Trust and confidence 

is at the bottom of all of this. That includes the communities that 

ultimately we all serve. So I would just highlight that, accentuate 

that and I will stop at that. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]
28

1 National Strategy for Information Sharing, The White House, October 2007, http://

www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing/.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO

APRIL 24, 2008

Chairwoman Harman, Ranking Member Reichert, and distinguished Members of 

the Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. The role of intelligence is the lifeblood in the campaign against terrorism and other threats. Your 

leadership in examining intelligence issues as they relate to the Department of 

Homeland Security better serving State, local, tribal and other stakeholders is to 

be commended. This should be the primary mission of the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis. 

Officials at the State, local, and tribal levels and their counterparts in the private 

sector are often the first preventers and responders to terrorism and other security 

threats. Timely, accurate and well-informed intelligence and information products, 

shared vertically and horizontally with all responders at all levels of government, 

are more important than ever in order to inform them about threats, solutions and 

responses. Collectively, these capabilities build our understanding of the adversary. 

Already, we have made some headway toward this end in theory, if not entirely in 

practice. A National Strategy for Information Sharing exists.1 We are moving toward creating an effective Information Sharing Environment—one supported by a 

culture based on a ‘‘need to share’’ rather than merely a ‘‘need to know.’’ Notably, 

the National Strategy references the crucial role of State, local and tribal partners 

in an effective counterterrorism effort. However capable our intelligence apparatus’ 

may be, this is ultimately an exercise in risk management; intelligence simply has 

limitations. Intelligence estimates, for example, are just that: analysts are not and 

cannot be expected to be clairvoyant. 

In the course of my work as the Director of The George Washington University 

Homeland Security Policy Institute, I have worked with a range of State and local 

intelligence and law enforcement officials. Two common themes have emerged 

among my discussions with them: without a seat at the table in Washington, they 

cannot be true partners in the intelligence and information sharing process; and at 

the same time, the maxim of ‘‘think globally, act locally’’ should apply. 

Information collected by State and local partners does not always make it into national intelligence assessments, while the products they receive often do not meet 

their unique needs. The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis has the potential to remedy this through three steps. First, the Office 

should champion State, local, and tribal stakeholders within the Beltway, setting 

standards and designing customer-driven intelligence products and processes, such 

as the National Intelligence Priority Framework. Second, it should enable its State 

and local partners by investing in analytical capabilities in existing information 

sharing venues like Fusion Centers and operationalizing that intelligence. Finally, 

it can work to integrate fully intelligence collection and analysis at all levels of government, producing the first truly all-source, all crimes and all-hazards domestic 

threat assessment. Respecting and preserving civil rights and civil liberties is crucial in all of this, and the Department’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

should be at the forefront of these efforts, consulting and incorporating to the fullest 

extent possible the views of the broader civil rights and civil liberties community. 

CHAMPIONING STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL STAKEHOLDERS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Just as many law enforcement duties and policies are the purview of State and 

local governments, so too should many corresponding intelligence functions. While 

Federal agencies rightly should be concerned with transnational threats against our 

homeland, allies and interests abroad, relying solely on Washington, DC-based agencies for State and community-based intelligence needs ensures local requirements 

and concerns do not receive the priority they deserve. No one has a better grasp 

of communities and their particulars than local officials and partners. Thus, while 

products such as National Intelligence Estimates and programs such as personnel 

rotations to different intelligence details are important at the national level, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis should ensure State and local partners receive the 

priority they deserve by representing them at the national and homeland security 

planning tables, setting priorities and requirements and designing products that 

meet the unique needs of these partners. 

That said, intelligence and analysis on terrorist tradecraft including weapons, financing and modus operandi currently used in combat environments and other tar-
29

2The regional approach has merits beyond the intelligence context. See, for example, Regionalizing Homeland Security: Unifying National Preparedness and Response, The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, June 30, 2006, http://www.gwumc.edu/

hspi/pubs/hspiregion.pdf.

gets of terrorism far from our own municipalities can be useful for domestic purposes. Knowing what and who we face abroad can serve as a positive tool for creating policies, fine tuning tactics, and collaborating on threat indicators among 

other responses at the local level. As past events have indicated, our geographic isolation from regions frequently affected by terrorism is but a small impediment to 

those seeking harm against our homeland. The need to think globally and act locally 

necessitates creating a mechanism whereby State and local partners are kept in the 

loop regarding national intelligence assessments of international terrorism and 

transnational crime. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis should ensure partner 

agencies and officials receive current national intelligence assessments that can be 

integrated into State and local law enforcement practices. 

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis should also take the lead in designing new 

intelligence products such as the following: • Regional Threat Assessments, produced by Fusion Centers incorporating intelligence gathered at the State and local levels across a geographic region, would 

focus on trends in suspicious activity, radicalization, threats to critical infrastructure and other local concerns.2 Such assessments would, for the first time 

in many cases, not only make State and local authorities aware of threats and 

key vulnerabilities in neighboring jurisdictions, but also in those across the 

country. Besides raising awareness of terrorist and criminal indicators throughout different jurisdictions, Regional Threat Assessments would indicate similarities and differences in how State and local authorities collect intelligence, as 

well as in what they are collecting. Similarly, these assessments would allow 

State and local officials to compare threats at a broader level, thereby enabling 

them to more easily spot trends between different jurisdictions. The Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis would prove vital to ensuring that information collected at the local level is fed into relevant analysis and that the analytical capacity is in place to turn the intelligence into products to be shared among disparate jurisdictions. • Along with Regional Threat Assessments, other threat assessments incorporating intelligence gathered overseas that is directly relevant to State and 

local responders would be produced. These products would include information 

on threats to the homeland arising overseas, trends in radicalization and 

counter-radicalization abroad and intelligence collected at U.S. borders by Federal agencies. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, for example, is a unique Department of Homeland Security asset and information collector that should be 

better incorporated into the intelligence capacities of local and State partners 

with points of entry within their jurisdiction. The Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis should act as that enabler. Another example of a best practice that 

should be further disseminated and replicated is the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) which bring together Canadian and U.S. border security 

agencies at 23 locations. Intelligence gathered abroad is already available; what 

is needed is for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to ensure national collection assets collect the information needed by all levels of government, and that 

products provided to State and local responders meet their unique needs. • A virtual library of key documents, statements, video propaganda, and other 

materials produced by our adversaries would be established and maintained by 

the Office of Intelligence and Analysis for its State and local partners. This 

would provide State and local responders with a better understanding of our adversaries’ intentions, capabilities, and tactics, but also the narratives they use 

to spread their appeal—information needed to identify and counter 

radicalization and emerging threats in their own communities. It could also 

help State and local responders develop a lexicon for effectively discussing 

issues of terrorism and radicalization with their communities. In particular, 

they need more and better analysis, providing a multidisciplinary understanding of our adversaries’ motivations, thoughts, and plans. While indications 

and warnings of possible attacks are vital, better understanding of our adversaries will allow our first responders to move toward preempting and disrupting 

terrorist activities before they take shape. 

• Incident reports providing background on and summaries of international and 

domestic terrorist actions (including actual incidents and those that were 

thwarted) would be produced and collected by the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis and placed into a virtual data base that would supplement the virtual 
30

library. These incident reports would inform State and local partners of terrorist activity and trends outside their jurisdictions. Two examples of open 

source terrorism incident data bases are the National Consortium for the Study 

of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland and the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s Terrorism 

Knowledge Base. 

• Information gathering and reporting processes would be standardized by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis through requirements setting. The Los Angeles 

Police Department, for example, recently introduced Suspicious Activity Reports 

(SARs) for its officers to report in detail any kind of potential terrorist-related 

activity, which fits seamlessly into their daily operations. Department officers 

have been receiving training in what kinds of suspicious activities to look for 

based on a 65-item checklist which includes indications that someone conducted 

surveillance on a government building, tried to acquire explosives, openly espoused extremist views or abandoned a suspicious package, for example. SARs 

represent a best-practice that could be used at the State and local levels across 

the country to feed information into customer-driven products like the Regional 

Threat Assessments. These best-practices are already being implemented by 

State and local responders; what is needed now is for the Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis to act as a champion of the SARs in order to implement the program with other partners in a manner that promotes information sharing as 

broadly as possible. Analysts from the Office of Intelligence and Analysis could 

take a SAR, for example, and fuse it with other intelligence including that from 

Fusion Centers, and create a product that is broad but recognizes both a community’s unique aspects as well as incorporating regional and national trends. 

This is not meant to be a comprehensive list, but to illustrate some of the information products and resources that State and local responders need—and are not 

necessarily receiving—in order to secure their communities. By championing its 

State and local partners at the national level, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

can set new priorities and requirements at all levels of government in order to 

produce these vital and currently overlooked products. While this may be beyond 

the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, it is important to note that if the Office of Intelligence and Analysis does not take on this role, then others such as the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation or the National Counter Terrorism Center should be given 

the authority and responsibility to do so. 

ENABLING STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL FIRST PREVENTERS & RESPONDERS

Ultimately, the solutions to terrorism and related threats will be local in nature—

through localized analysis, community policing, and counter-radicalization that 

starts from the ground up. More than just setting requirements and providing products needed by State and local entities, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis must 

enable and empower State and local responders to be true partners in information 

analysis and sharing—that is, in fighting terrorism. 

This means, first and foremost, investing in analytical capacity. Throughout our 

country’s intelligence community, there is an emphasis on collection over analysis. 

This is especially true with regard to the State and local levels, where many responders lack the resources or capacity to conduct analysis on their own. The New 

York Police Department and the Los Angeles Police Department offer two exceptions 

to the rule: both departments have developed effective intelligence collection and analytical capabilities, to their great credit. While there may be a few other exceptions, 

most municipalities and States do not have the resources to develop similar capabilities on their own, nor necessarily should they. This is not to say that stop-gap 

measures do not exist. For example, a wealth of open source information concerning 

our adversaries worldwide is available to State and local officials by the Department 

of Homeland Security through the Universal Adversary internet portal, a tool that 

is not yet well known. Training and educating State and local consumers of intelligence analysis on how best to make use of tools such as this is also important. 

State and local responders often do not have much luck when turning to avenues 

of information sharing with the Federal Government. Facing a virtual alphabet soup 

of State and Federal offices and agencies to contact, it is often difficult to even know 

where to turn. Even when it is clear, analytical capacity is usually given second billing after collection. Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis 

Tomarchio, for example, noted in recent testimony that the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis now has 23 officers deployed and serving in Fusion Centers around the 
31

3Focus on Fusion Centers: A Progress Report. Testimony of Principal Deputy Under Secretary 

for Intelligence and Analysis Jack Tomarchio Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, 17 April 2008. 4LEAP: A Law Enforcement Assistance and Partnership Strategy: Improving Information 

Sharing Between the Intelligence Community and State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement.

Prepared at the request of Congressman Bennie G. Thompson, House Committee on Homeland 

Security, pp. 10–12. 5See for example, NETworked Radicalization: A Counter-Strategy, The George Washington 

University Homeland Security Policy Institute and The University of Virginia Critical Incident 

Analysis Group, http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/reports/NETworked%20RadicalizationlA 

%20Counter%20Strategy.pdf.

country.3 While this is a positive step, it should be noted that this amounts to a 

little more than a third of an analyst per Fusion Center, excluding municipal police 

departments. To remedy this, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis should continue 

to deploy its own analysts to Fusion Centers and other points of cooperation, working to build out the analytical capabilities of these organizations. The burden of 

championing, enabling, and integrating the capabilities and goals of State and local 

partners should not fall to the Department of Homeland Security alone. Rather, sustained, long-term investment of both capital and personnel resources by the White 

House, various cabinet and sub-cabinet agencies, along with this and other Congressional bodies is necessary to increase the analytical capacities of and access for 

State and local partners. Unfunded mandates are not the answer, and it is important that Congress remain cognizant of the need for sustained investment in this 

area over the long run. 

The key goal of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, however, should not be 

to continue the trend of top-down driven analysis. Instead, it should work to develop 

the analytical capacity from the bottom-up, by providing the required resources and 

training, disseminating lessons learned and best practices at home and abroad, and 

by identifying and filling gaps in capabilities for its State and local partners. For 

example, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis could enable State and local officials 

to gain hands-on experience through international partnerships and exchanges, 

most of which are outside the financial reach of State and local responders. Working 

with their counterparts overseas, State and local officials can gain greater understanding of how terrorists operate internationally, what counterterrorism approaches are being implemented abroad, what radicalization and counterradicalization look like on the ground, and on-the-scene situational awareness.4

While some information such as a better understanding of our adversaries will 

likely come from the national intelligence community, intimate knowledge of local 

communities will not be found in Washington, DC. State and local law enforcement, 

fire fighters, emergency medical services and others are truly on the front line 

against terrorism; they are not only the first to respond to an attack but, knowing 

their communities best, are the best-placed to identify and thwart radicalization and 

emerging plots before they become critical threats. Though terrorist threats are 

often transnational in nature, the solutions are primarily local. While the brick-andmortar infrastructure of Fusion Centers and related entities are important, it is people who are critical—individuals trained and prepared to conduct intelligence analysis and intelligence-led community policing. 

These last two are essential. I have often said that in the struggle against terrorism, we cannot simply kill or capture our way to victory, but instead must utilize 

all instruments of statecraft to undermine the appeal of our adversaries’ narrative.5

This is as true abroad as it is at home. Here, we cannot rely on the hard edge of 

policing by arresting our way to security. Instead, through community policing and 

engagement—earning the trust of communities, informing the public, identifying 

suspicious activities and signs of incipient radicalization, and discerning and diminishing grievances—we can undermine the appeal of our adversaries’ narrative at 

home as well as abroad. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis can play a role not 

just by enabling and empowering State and local responders to develop their own 

analytical capabilities, but also by disseminating good work being done in the field 

of community engagement at the Federal level. 

BRINGING STATE, LOCAL, AND FEDERAL TOGETHER

Like much of the Department of Homeland Security since its inception, the role 

and structure of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis has evolved over time. The 

Office’s integration within the Federal intelligence community as well as with local 

and State partners is both necessary and challenging. It is important to remember 

that this integration is a process, the end of which we have not yet reached. As we 

look to ways to better integrate all levels of government, to enable and empower 
32

6See for example the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the 

U.S. Homeland, http://www.dni.gov/presslreleases/20070717lrelease.pdf. 7 An Historical Review of the Constitution and Government of Pennsylvania (1759). 

State and local responders, and create a customer-driven intelligence environment, 

the Office of Intelligence and Analysis will develop the capability to produce a truly 

powerful intelligence product: a comprehensive National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 

addressing threats to the homeland, both foreign and domestic. 

Currently, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) provides, among other products, high-level estimates of global trends.6 Within the NIC, however, there is no 

National Intelligence Officer (NIO) or deputy NIO from the Department of Homeland Security. This means that a domestic threats security perspective, including 

systematic input from State and local officials, is not fully provided. The quick fix 

of a deputy NIO from the FBI did contribute to the July 2007 NIE on threats to 

the homeland. Looking to the future, however, the responsibility for domestic threat 

assessments ought to reside outside of the Intelligence Community. 

Within the larger discussion of the evolving role of the Office of Intelligence and 

Analysis, privacy protections must play a central role. Protecting civil rights and 

civil liberties must not be an afterthought to the discussion of how to effectively collect, share and disseminate intelligence. Rather, ensuring the privacy of Americans 

should be part-and-parcel with the intelligence and analytical objectives and goals 

of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis. As more agencies at all levels collect and 

share information on more facets of our lives at the community level, the opportunity for even the well-intended to cause privacy violations increases. This is problematic not only from the standpoint of an ordinary citizen concerned with their privacy, but also from an operational perspective. If communities view first responders, 

for example, as intelligence collectors with too broad a mandate, a lack of trust will 

develop, making it impossible for first responders to fulfill their primary roles and 

closing off an important avenue of information sharing with their communities. As 

Benjamin Franklin noted well before intelligence became a specialized discipline, 

‘‘Anyone who trades liberty for security deserves neither liberty nor security.’’7

By establishing clear and transparent guidelines on the protection of civil rights 

and liberties, and by designing and providing appropriate training to State and local 

partners, community-based intelligence programs will not be marred and undermined by concerns of the potential for privacy violations. 

For any new intelligence or information sharing program, or collaborative effort 

through the Department of Homeland Security to be successful, it is critical for the 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis to build trust and confidence with public and private partners across all governmental levels to better serve its customers. That 

credibility will allow the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to serve three key functions for its State and local partners: serve their intelligence needs; enhance their 

creativity, resources and potential; and advocate within the Beltway for enhanced 

cooperation, funding and other critical resources to help State and local partners 

better serve their communities. Enhanced intelligence capabilities across local, 

State, regional and national levels will lead to better community security and ultimately our Nation’s security. 

It is important not to get lost in the bureaucratic weeds. What we’re talking about 

here today is simple: finding ways to making the good work being done by responders at all levels of government easier and better by connecting all of their efforts 

together. Since it takes a network to defeat a network, it is essential that we enhance our Nation’s responders’ interconnectivity and information-sharing capacity. 

This is one of the most powerful force multipliers for homeland security. 

With that in mind, there is a need to de-mystify intelligence and its role in policymaking. As we all know, a little black box with unearthed secrets that is accessible 

to only those with a sufficient security clearance simply does not exist. Intelligence 

should play a supporting function—a means to an end rather than an end in and 

of itself. But those intelligence means are critical to providing national and community-based officials alike with the necessary tools to enable closer cooperation, more 

informed decisionmaking and more nuanced policymaking. It is the people, not the 

programs, that are doing the work—and it is in people that the Office of Intelligence 

and Analysis should be investing. 

I wish to thank the committee and its staff for the opportunity to testify before 

you today, and I would now be pleased to try to answer any questions that you may 

have.
33

Ms. HARMAN. Each of you anticipated most of my questions. I 

thought your testimony was excellent and now we will go to the 

questioning round and I am yielding myself 5 minutes. 

Mr. Bettenhausen, enlist, entrust and empower, I think, will become the new committee mantra. Any objections? When we print 

our coin, if we ever print such a thing, that is what it is going to 

say, so thank you for that. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Hopefully I will get that first challenge coin. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Coordination, collaboration, cooperation. 

Ms. HARMAN. There we go. We will have a committee meeting on 

that later. We will put that on the back, then. 

More seriously, we have been fighting here, I don’t think that is 

an incorrect word to get the ITACG, and you all are familiar with 

it. It was set up as a creation in order to accommodate State and 

local participation, because the NCTC did not want that participation directly as part of it, you can correct me, but at any rate, my 

view was set up to accommodate State and local participation. We 

have had this long fight about how many people to include, whether they need clearances, whether they gets desks and pencils, what 

role they play, whether the products they work on should show the 

fact that they are part of the NCTC, et cetera. It has been difficult 

and it required a legislative fix. Language was added to the 9/11 

Act last year to compel their inclusion. It took a long time, things 

are getting better. We are moving in a proper direction. I would 

argue that it could only go up. Nonetheless in talking with Mike 

Leiter, the new head of the NCTC, he has told us on the record and 

in meetings of the value added by this participation. Example, 

when there was a ricin incident in Las Vegas, he pointed out it was 

the State and local participants who said that the product describing that should describe what ricin looks like, and how much of it 

is harmful, and what you do about that. It seems obvious to me, 

but apparently the intelligence product that had been written at 

30,000 feet didn’t include that. So it didn’t give direct guidance to 

State and local and tribal partners about what to do. 

I appreciated your comments, Juliette, about being treated like 

children. State and local partners are the people who are going to 

uncover the next terror attack. It is not going to be me, and it probably isn’t going to be you—although it might be—but those are the 

folks, like Sheriff Reichert who need to have the actionable information. So we have to get this right. 

I just want to give each of you an opportunity for more comment 

on this. I appreciated, Frank, your addition of privacy concerns. It 

is certainly my view and certainly the committee shares it that 

those have to be built in on the front end. It is not something you 

add later. The way I put it, is that privacy and security are not a 

zero sum game. You either get more of both or less of both. Ben 

Franklin actually said that a long time ago, even before you skip. 

It wasn’t an idea that you generated. So could you each respond 

to this notion of full inclusion, what it really means, at least in 

terms of the Federal agencies that we directly regulate and what 

about privacy. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Thank you. I share your concern and I also 

share frustration. That should not have been an 18-month battle. 

It was appalling the amount of time wasted by leadership at the 
34

State, local and Federal level to get State and locals a seat at that 

table. It was common sense. That is time we are not going to get 

back. It should not have been that way. Most of the Federal agencies supported it. Some did not. But that battle is now over, thanks 

to your intervention on the grant funding. We have to get the Department to fix this. 

We are going into an election period, a transition period. These 

Fusion Centers are new, there is a shortage of analytical capability 

in Federal agencies and there is also at the State and local. At the 

same time, we have DHS telling us either come up with your own 

State funds or lay off those analysts, and push them out the door 

in the midst of this high-risk environment. The need to develop 

these capacities and capabilities is appalling and more time wasted. 

Since information bulletin 235, I am appalled when I think about 

how much time we have wasted arguing over an information bulletin when our time could be spent on improving actual products, 

preparedness an protection activities. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. Ms. Kayyem. 

Ms. KAYYEM. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Is your microphone on? 

Ms. KAYYEM. Excuse me, let me go back. On this sort of why do 

States need this information as sort of key players, and that is 

what I think is often forgotten. Your ricin incident is perfect. What 

does it look like? It is because we have the capacity to get out to 

the people who are going to actually walk in the front door and say 

something. We can distribute that information and we have databases. It is bringing the Intelligence Community down a notch from 

wars and the stuff over there and the threats and IEDs. 

There is local and State emergency management, public safety 

people who are going to walk in the front door and what do you 

want them to know? On my publisher scenario it really puts the 

States in a dilemma. The lack of tactical or strategic advice given 

by DHS on the information coming out. I say I, it is not me, the 

Fusion Center, whoever is in the dilemma of either distributing intelligence that might trigger operational reactions that are not validated by the intelligence itself. 

If I send out a Hamas leader was killed, let’s all be worried. I 

don’t know how that will be interpreted by a local police chief. So 

I have either that dilemma or we hold onto it and then we are creating the very stovepipes that this whole venture meant to destroy. 

So it is a dilemma for us. If we could bring the Intelligence Community—I say down, but that may not be right. Why do we want 

to know this? It is not just because we just want to be in the know. 

There is actually operational needs that we have. 

On the civil liberties—I am embarrassed that I talk too fast, your 

timer went off when you spoke, I wonder if you have an in. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mine is off now. 

Ms. KAYYEM. No, but on the privacy issue it is something I have 

been focused on in my previous capacity. We are embarking on a 

privacy council, and it is not just intelligence. The way the technology is changing means that people have to have assurances that 

we are looking at this, that this is at the front end, because if 

something goes wrong and it inevitably will, we don’t want to be 
35

following the last crisis. We want to be in a position where we can 

regroup, say it was either a mistake or consistent with our guidelines, but have the policies and practices in place now so they can 

guide people who are not lawyers, who do not think about this 

every day as they shouldn’t. We guide them in how they deal with 

these issues in the future. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Cilluffo. I apologize to 

my colleagues, I’ll let you go over your time also if the answer does 

that. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. I’ll try to be brief. I don’t think it is a very sexy 

issue. It is requirement setting. It is customer service. That requires, as Juliette was saying, bringing the intelligence down. But 

I think we have a lot to learn from the military environment where 

you are, the J2 and J3, the intelligence and operations in separation. Finally there was some recognition, and this is important to 

understand what intelligence is, it is a means to an end. It is not 

the end in and of itself. 

We tend to talk about it that it is, itself, the end. It supports 

something, whether it is policy or budget priorities or operations or 

diplomacy. It is a support function. I think it really comes down to 

requirements setting. 

I do feel that there are some elite tables that State and locals 

should have a voice at. I am not sure they should be directly representative of, say, the national intelligence priority framework, 

but someone needs to be their advocate, someone needs to be their 

champion, someone needs to speak for them, and someone who 

speaks for them has to understand them. What makes them tick 

everyday? 

We don’t want to create little black boxes that are specifically for 

terrorism. It better work in a day-to-day function environment, not 

something totally unique and different. 

One other thing that I think is important here, there still is this 

belief and I think we have to demystify to some extent what intelligence is. There still is this belief, if I only had my TSCI clearances, I would have all the answers. I don’t want to compromise 

a secret there, because it is not. It ain’t there. 

The reality is we need to recognize the limitations of intelligence 

on collection and analysis. These are estimators, they are not clairvoyants we don’t have all the answers. So to me it is requirement 

setting, it is getting the customer to drive that. That is not easy 

either. Once the customer has to actually start and think about its 

specific needs, they are going to find it is not an easy business, but 

it has to happen that way. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Reichert. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to go out to a 

little bit bigger picture. I think we are all in agreement that we 

don’t want to see any major reorganization occur. We are all nodding our heads on that one. 

I will share a little story with you. Back when I was the sheriff, 

I made some trips here to Washington, DC and worked with Vice 

President Al Gore and his group on a project called Safe Cities. We 

were one of the ten in the Nation named a Safe City although we 

were a county. We were the only county in the country a member 

of this group and it had to do with gun safety. 
36

Well, as the administration changed then, not too long after that 

there was discussion about ending safe cities which was a very, 

very successful program. So what we had to do to fight to keep this 

program in place under a different administration, the name had 

to be changed. That is the only way that we were able to keep it. 

People might recognize this, it changed to Project Safe Neighborhoods. So that came from Safe City. 

So what my concern is, and what we are all worried about is reorganization. How do we, and maybe you already have begun discussions with DHS leadership and others that you know, how do 

we minimize any efforts or attempts to reorganization? Or what 

have you done or what should we be doing to prevent major reorganization? I think this will be—all of the things that you all have 

talked about so far this morning will be the death knell for all of 

us and the progress that we have made. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Let me address a couple of those. We, as the 

National Governance Association of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, meet regularly with the Department. We as a full 

group met last April with the Department of Homeland Security 

last April, we will be back here in May. Over a year ago we had 

already started those discussions about transition. 

Again, it is really more of an afterthought that is still happening 

about what about your most important customers the State and 

locals? How can you serve us better? The central report that Charlie Allen had done is a good look at how these things need to be 

done. We are almost getting in too late in the transition process 

with this particular administration in terms of what they are doing 

and how they are going to move it forward. 

There is a national Homeland Security consortium, we have put 

together a white paper which will share with the committee that 

addresses some of the key transition issues. The congressional research service and our friend John Rollins came out with an excellent report on transition as well. This is going to require it, because 

Homeland Security is bipartisan. Actually, I would say it is a nonpartisan issue. So whoever the nominees are going to be, we want 

to start working early on with their potential leadership to talk 

about these potential transition issues, because we do not want to 

be caught in a transition exposure by being disorganized. 

September 11 itself was a transition attack. The 1993 World 

Trade Center attack was a transition attack with the second month 

of the Clinton presidency. The transfer of power from Blair to 

Brown in the United Kingdom saw an attack. We saw the attack 

in Spain. This is going to require early on and particularly after 

the election results are known, immediately working with them. 

Emphasizing again, let’s not reorganize this thing to death, let’s 

work on making sure what is working right, continues to work 

right, and how do we improve what is broken? 

Ms. KAYYEM. I would just add simply a new leadership at the 

Department of Homeland Security to ask a question of each of 

these entities, but in particular I&A. What do you do that no one 

else does? We don’t have to reorg for that question. What is your 

value? I mean, it is a simple Kennedy School question, but it actually helps. We think about that all the time because with crime, 
37

and everything else going on, and no money and schools, what are 

we doing that is something that no one else is doing? 

I think I&A is forced to answer that question, we are the answer. 

That is it. Then you figure out what their priorities are going to 

do, how they treat us maturely or your three things. Then also, 

how they get into resiliency, what I call resiliency intelligence. 

What are the things that are long term that we should be thinking 

about in terms of critical infrastructure, aging infrastructure and 

other issues like that? I think if the entity rather than being told 

to change, move or whatever else, that is simple. What is your mission statement and then I think we go from there, that no one else 

could have. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. To build on some of Juliette’s points, I think the 

value added was more Harvard Business School than The Kennedy 

School. 

First, I think it is very helpful to look at it. Form should always 

follow function. The reality is what are the mission areas? What 

needs to be met? What are the customers defining as the mission 

areas and what needs to be met. From there we can play with the 

boxes and the org charts, whether it needs to be reorg’d or not. I 

am not sure it does. What I would suggest is to look at what the 

mission is, and if it is not being met, give someone the wherewithal 

to meet that mission. 

I would also argue that it shouldn’t be an inside-the-beltway 

process. This has to be organic and some point there has to be with 

the top down bottom and the bottom up come together. We haven’t 

even discussed the integrate side. At some point, that is where we 

need to get. 

On the actual transition planning, they actually have, I think, 

based on briefings I have received, done some interesting work. I 

have got a pretty radical view in terms of some of how this can be 

improved in the future. I feel that all deputy secretaries should be 

career civil servants. 

The one thing that the United Kingdom handled quite well, the 

Home Secretary just got her first JTAC briefing, the first intelligence briefing, literally 3 hours before the prevented incident. The 

reality is home office and the agencies that are running that, the 

ops guys are much more like the military. You can be promoted but 

you are a civil servant, so no gaps in terms of what it is doing. So 

those are my quick thoughts. 

Mr. REICHERT. If I could make one quick comment. I want to encourage you to continue with your efforts. The only reason that this 

project that I talked about changed from Safe Cities to Project Safe 

Neighborhoods and continued on was pressure by the local sheriffs, 

police chiefs, mayors and city councils. Keep up the good work. 

Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Reichert. I have to say I totally 

agree with your thrust here. Mr. Carney. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you all for showing up today. This is pretty remarkable to have your experience 

and insight here. My question actually gets more to the heart of 

how the relationships work between the Federal Government and 

the State agency. Do you find it evolving, improving, devolving, not 

getting any better? 
38

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. You know sometimes you feel like you have 

made three steps forward and then you wonder whether you have 

made two steps or four steps back. It is evolving, but it is getting 

better. There is an emphasis here on DHS today, but this is beyond 

DHS. The Federal Bureau of Investigation also has a responsibility 

to be better sharing the information and looking after the customer 

focus, because as Director Molar has said, it is not just about prosecution. This is about preemption and prevention. That is what we 

must be doing and that requires a different mindset. 

Mr. CARNEY. Right. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. I spent most of my career as a Federal prosecutor and I understand this is a sea change in the way that they 

are doing business. There are cultural and bureaucratic roadblocks 

that are still there. This requires an attitude that we are going to 

have these partnerships, and it will be full and equal, and we want 

to share. Sometimes that is personality driven. You can have a special agent in charge where things are going swimmingly with all 

of your partners and that can change overnight with somebody else 

who comes in. 

If we establish the precedent, the requirements, the need for 

these partnerships and that is expected, that is the gold standard, 

and nothing less will be allowed or you will be removed from that 

office or be downgraded with your rating. If we don’t have that attitude, you are going to have problems. We have it easier outside the 

beltway. Where the rubber meets the road, we can often get together and resolve some of these bureaucratic issues and work to 

have a clear sight of our mission of the realities of what must be 

doing and how we can do in a common sense way. That also requires changes from on top. 

Mr. CARNEY. I agree. Something of the pavement and the Beltway that prevents common sense from interfering with what we 

are doing here. 

Frankly you are right, I think if the folks working the problem 

would check the egos at the door we would get more done. 

Ms. KAYYEM. When I took this job, I don’t think I had any idea 

if I just thought about DHS. I agree with you, FBI is there. We 

have a very excellent SAC and the JTTF that works. So from the 

DHS entities alone and I think I listed them, we have ICE, Coast 

Guard, FEMA, a critical infrastructure analyst, chemical industry 

regulators, TSA and my I&A person and Coast Guard who report 

up a totally different structure. We are trying to manage it. 

Now rightfully, I think DHS is around more of the emergency 

management side, on the FEMA side more regionally focused. But 

Coast Guard is its own beast and it always will be I think. But 

from the management perspective of the State, it can get very difficult. So I sort of applaud efforts to have DHS figure out what 

their family looks like so when they react to a State it is helpful. 

I will tell you I have DHS people in the State that other DHS people don’t know about. That is how it works. These chemical industry guys come in and it can he be amorphous and unmanageable. 

It is through personality and phone calls that you are able to do 

it. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Very, very briefly. I think it clearly has improved 

since 9/11. The problem is everyone is in the business now, every-
39

one is a producer or a customer, that it gets confusing. There is a 

pandemic of plans. There is a lot of tactics and a lot of strategy, 

but a lot of doctrine that is missing, that is the big gap. I would 

also argue that it needs to come from the bottom up. That is where 

we have to invest in capacity for State and local, largely analytical. 

There has been some emphasis on the hard edge, meaning law 

enforcement. There are other customers who need to be part of at 

least the information loop and informed. EMS, hospitals, firefighters, where do they fit in this process in a way that is cognizant 

with constitutionality but also privacy issues. 

The real point that Juliette hit on, we wrote a very long report 

that I think about three people read, although Senators Collins and 

Lieberman, I think, did move it into legislation. We have to go regions on the intelligence side, we have regions. We need a regional 

footprint that can coordinate the full panoply in assets that the Department of Homeland Security has in support of State and local. 

I am not suggesting that they assume that role, but I really do feel 

if they were one big fix it is in the field. All the big fixes are always 

in the field and opportunities are in the field. I would regionalize 

DHS. 

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. I will probably have questions later. 

Ms. HARMAN. We will have a second round of questions. This is 

fascinating. 

Mr. Perlmutter, you were here before I gavelled the hearing. I 

just explained that to Mr. Dent. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Sorry, Charlie. 

A couple questions. As I am listening to the testimony, it kind 

of reminds me of an old science class I had, with the beaker. It, 

kind of, comes down, and there is a narrow neck, and then it goes 

out like that. 

Just listening to the conversation, I am trying to figure out, assuming we have intelligence-gathering capacity up here, we have 

all these law enforcement and first preventers, first responders 

down here, who is in that narrow—I mean, there has to be some 

channel of communication. Who is in that narrow neck? 

Are you, Mr. Bettenhausen? 

Are you, Ms. Kayyem? Are you the narrow neck? 

I am trying to figure out how, in a sensible way, do we channel 

up the information from local law enforcement agencies and channel through down to the local law enforcement agencies the intelligence-gathering capacity of the Federal Government. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. It is an apt picture. Sometimes, though, I 

will turn that upside down, too, because, again, this is a bottomup. They really need to be at the top of the chart, though, at the 

same time. 

But I think what you are looking at and where that focal point 

needs to be is the State and regional fusion centers. What you 

heard from all of us saying here, too, is all of the agencies need to 

be represented there. It is an investment that they need to make 

in it, because we can overcome a lot of the stovepiping of information, because, look, we are not going to come up with a be-all, endall one system that is going to fit everybody’s needs. It is probably 

better if we actually have people who are controlling that. Because 

then, again, that gets to the privacy, civil liberties. Everybody 
40

doesn’t have access to that information, but somebody who is 

trained and responsible for that and from that agencies will have 

it. 

So, but if you have all of them sitting next to each other, sharing 

information from both top-down and bottom-up, those fusion centers are the ideal place to do that. Juliette—we have better information-sharing with components of DHS in the field and in these 

fusion centers than the directions that they are getting from headquarters. Sometimes we get the information before them. So that 

is where—it shouldn’t be individuals. 

The beauty of most of these fusion centers, too, is it is not owned 

by a particular State, Federal or local. It is a shared entity. It is 

about that cooperation and collaboration. That is why it is the perfect vehicle to have people there. 

The other thing is, when you have them sitting and working together, there are things that get resolved and also solved just by, 

you know, the happenstance of, ‘‘Oh, by the way, you know, we 

have this going on’’; ‘‘Huh, funny, I have seen the same thing in 

another part of the State.’’ So having them there and integrating 

across Federal agencies, across State agencies and local agencies, 

that is how you ensure those globs of information get shared. 

But you also have to—it is not just about collecting all these 

dots. You have to have the analysts and the personnel, as all three 

of us have talked about, and the Chairs of your Homeland Security 

Committee, in riding DHS to allow us to prioritize the use of grant 

funds to have that analytical capability. 

Because the ricin example is a perfect example of how State and 

local perspective can help. The Virginia Tech shooting was another 

example, where the Virginia State Fusion Center immediately was 

able to get information out from the bottom-up that this is not a 

terrorism-related-in-a-broader-sense incident, this is not something 

requiring every university to start being worried about multiple attacks. 

That is the value. We can get this information all the way up to 

the President and the White House with truly accurate information 

and not having to get phone calls from five different Federal agencies about what is going on with something. 

Ms. KAYYEM. Sir, when you ask about intelligence, there are two 

types, in my mind. 

One would be the actionable intelligence or investigation intelligence. What we have done, which I think works, is the members 

of the Commonwealth Fusion Center who serve on the JTTF—actually, in, you know, the org chart, but this matters—are members 

of the Commonwealth Fusion Center and not of the State Police 

generally. So we view it as there are Fusion Center folks as part 

of the JTTF. 

So that information flow, whether it is specific investigations or 

whatever else, the principals get briefed quarterly on—we will get 

the phone call, basically, because of the relationship with the SAC 

if something imminent is happening. 

You know, there is a lot of hoax stuff out there right now. The 

SAC will call and say, you know, we are sort of looking into this, 

we think it is a hoax because the FBI in Detroit had something like 
41

this too, where some guy is just trying to get money from us, but 

we just wanted to let you know. 

On the intelligence theme, the transition stuff that we are all 

coming back to and whatever else, that is the kind of information 

that, you know, more analysts and the quality of the intelligence 

is going to matter a lot to make the fusion centers and DHS relevant in this world. Because the truth is, once it is actionable or 

once it is a specific investigation, it really is—and rightfully so for 

privacy reasons, for investigation reasons because it is going to go 

before a court at some stage—a JTTF or FBI matter. DHS recognizes that and needs to, sort of, understand why I keep going back 

to what is their value added. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. I mean, they covered it beautifully. The only thing 

is I, kind of, do like the beaker analogy. It needs to change, though. 

DHS I&A should be, at this point, in the interim, that point where 

it is the—they need to be the champion, the enabler and, ultimately, the integrator in terms of adding value until we actually 

get the bottom-up that we are all looking for. 

But personalities matter; they really matter. This is a people 

business, and much more so. Trust and confidence can’t be written 

into legislation. It can’t be put on a document. That is something 

where you are in a foxhole, you have scar tissue, you have been 

through experiences, you have been through good, bad, ugly and 

everything else. This business, in particular, is run on trust and 

confidence more than any other. 

So how do we get to the point where people aren’t exchanging 

business cards, as we all know, when the balloon goes up, but rather get to know one another as individuals, translate from individuals to institutions, and personalities into processes, realizing that 

that will change. But don’t underestimate the people factor. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Cilluffo, I can’t help but observe that trust and 

confidence would help Congress, too. We would get a lot more done. 

Mr. Dent. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here this morning. 

Mr. Cilluffo, on page 2 of your testimony you stated that DHS 

should send out, ‘‘current National Intelligence Estimates that can 

be integrated into State and local law enforcement practices.’’ You 

also ask that DHS make available for its partners a virtual library 

of key documents, statements, video propaganda and other material produced by our adversaries. 

I think one of the complaints we have been hearing from local 

law enforcement is that DHS is putting out a lot of products, as 

you know, that don’t reflect current intelligence or law enforcement 

imperatives. I think Ms. Kayyem may have alluded to that a little 

bit. So there is a little bit of conflict between what I thought the 

two of you had said. 

In light of that, don’t you think that supplying the data that you 

describe could create a, kind of, information overload for first responders? I would like to hear from both you two, because there 

seemed to be a little bit of conflict in your testimony on that particular point. 
42

Mr. CILLUFFO. There may be some disagreement, but I am trying 

to focus what I think is the ‘‘so what’’, the ‘‘what matters.’’ I mean, 

when we look at metrics in this environment, I like Juliette’s example, publish or perish, but there is also pay for the pound. I mean, 

we literally—it is not more product, it is better product, it is different product. We need the analytical capacity to be able to absorb 

that to meet operational needs. 

I still go around, and the reason, I guess, I am invited by all the 

major city entities to talk about national security issues, is very 

few people really understand the adversary. They understand their 

communities, but until you understand the adversary, you have 

two separate worlds, one that is over there, one that is over here, 

and what are we protecting against? 

Mr. DENT. I guess the question is, what would you suggest, then, 

to better tailor the resources of these needs to reflect the priorities 

of local law enforcement I guess is the issue? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Yeah, let them set the requirements. That is the 

idea, that State and local authorities and tribal leaders would actually set the intelligence requirements and the cycle, so it is meeting 

their specific needs. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Let me just add one point with this that I 

think directly meshes what Frank is talking about and what we 

are talking about. 

We need the access to this information. It doesn’t mean that I 

need to overload the cop on the beat in his morning call with all 

this information. But, you know, the things that we are recovering 

overseas, are they pictures of infrastructure in our State? What are 

their tactics? Those kind of things our analytical people need to be 

able to reach back and look into. We have seen the returns on targets. We have received the return of the planning and things. So 

our ability to have access in the knowledge base, it needs to be 

there. 

Then what we have to do is be smarter about it to make sure 

that we are not overloading both the individual at the street operational level and their policymakers and the policymakers above us 

with too much information. 

But I am the last one here to encourage and say that we are getting too much, because we will sort through that. We are not getting enough, or at least the right kind of things. But if we have 

the access to it completely, it also helps us. 

Ms. KAYYEM. I am not sure if there is disagreement or not, but 

let me just get back to where—from the perspective of, sort of, the 

State consumer, which I have been focusing on in particular, is the 

quality of what we are getting—maybe it is Frank’s point—the 

quantity is overwhelming. It has become sometimes white noise to 

us. Really, I would actually say, if less and better, I am happier. 

Because the truth is—and we may disagree on this. Because 

there is so much going on in the world, and I think the bin Laden 

tapes is a good example. I mean, I got the bin Laden tapes. Right? 

I can watch CNN and get the bin Laden tapes. Right? From our 

perspective, it is, how is DHS actually thinking about what is going 

on as we enter this summer? It is transparent to me, because I talk 

to Frank and hear from Tom and others and get the reports from 

Congressional Research Service and elsewhere. But why is that not 
43

coming from the very entity that ought to be thinking about this, 

in terms of the quality of the intelligence? 

I would hope—and I don’t know on the example about whether 

something that is captured or some intelligence that we get, sort 

of, focused on, you know, a critical infrastructure facility in Massachusetts, that we would be notified of it. Maybe I am, you know—

I actually think I have been in situations in which we are. 

I think when it gets to the point of, okay, this is Massachusettsspecific or someone is visiting our State and there is some concern 

about them, at least so far, and as far as I know, of course, whenever we talk about this, that is the part that is working, when it 

has ‘‘Massachusetts’’ written on it. It is the other stuff that is going 

on that I am less confident of, because, you know, we don’t know. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Can I just build on two quick points? Because I 

think it is relevant. 

I mean, if you take the military example, what is provided to the 

very pointy end of the spear, the men and women who are really 

in harm’s way, they are provided information in a certain format 

that literally means life or death in that particular situation. But 

there is other information that is provided to so many others along 

the way that need to be taken into consideration. I don’t want the 

soldier necessarily worrying about that. He has enough to worry 

about, and he has a job to do. So that, I think, is maybe one way 

to think about it. 

Secondly, metrics, metrics, metrics. What gets measured gets 

done, but are we measuring what matters? Here I think it gets 

back to the same issue. To put it into a law enforcement context, 

as Mr. Reichert would know much better than me, do you want 

more informants or sources, or do you want an informant or source 

who actually knows something? We often get more, but I want the 

one who is inside the decision-making chain or the loop of an organization or an enterprise, so we can bring it down. So that is 

maybe the differential there. 

Mr. DENT. Can I ask just one quick yes-or-no question? 

Ms. HARMAN. Yes. 

Mr. DENT. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

On page 5 of your testimony, you discussed LAPD and NYPD developing their own intelligence collection, and we have heard from 

NYPD over the years here. 

Do you think that local law enforcement officials should detail officers overseas to engage in intelligence collection in foreign environments? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. I fully endorse the component of the LEAP report 

that this committee put out that, yes, we should have foreign liaison officers overseas, not for intelligence collection per se. Now, 

NYPD, LAPD, maybe they are tripping up sources vis-a`-vis where 

they fit in with the other alphabet soup of agencies overseas. But 

clearly, from learning and being embedded with local law enforcement, you would benefit greatly. 

Ms. KAYYEM. I am afraid I don’t have a yes-no answer to that. 

We don’t have it. I think there are real problems to it in terms of, 

sort of, everyone bumping into each other, and don’t have intentions of doing it. But I don’t know enough about New York and 

LA’s programs to say whether generically we should do it. 
44

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Yes. But it should not just be about intelligence collections. It is that relationship and partnerships and fellowships of learning what they are seeing and risks and threats. 

Because we are in a very small world, and what you are seeing 

overseas isn’t far from our shores, as we saw on 9/11. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you all. I thought the testimony was superb, and the answers to questions is superb. 

That is why, if members want to ask another round of questions, 

we will stay here to do that. I promise that my questions will not 

exceed, including your answers, 5 minutes. 

Let me first say I had an epiphany when—I think it was Matt 

who said that everyone is a producer and everyone is a customer. 

Did you say that? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. I think that it was Frank. 

Ms. HARMAN. Ah, it was Frank. Matt coined all our new terms. 

Juliette had the other piece of what is special here, which is where 

is the value added. 

I just want to observe—and when you respond to the one question I am going to ask you, please comment on this too—that I 

think that I&A may be trying to play too many roles here. It had 

a core mission ripped out, which was the Federal Fusion Center 

function, which I mentioned in my opening remarks, and it has 

been trying since then to find many places that can fit in, when, 

in fact, if it would focus on value added, it might be a much more 

effective part of DHS. That is my thought, from what you all said. 

My question is about the private sector. No one really mentioned 

that. I think it was Frank who talked about EMS and hospitals. 

But I want to observe that in Minneapolis, the other day, we went 

to the Mall of America. We saw there a very impressive director 

of security, who has an office of 100 people, who is running an operation in the largest, or one of the largest—in area, it is the largest mall in North America. I don’t know that it has the most retail 

stores. Only my daughter, the shopper, would know that. 

But at any rate, his operation, which is tied into the Fusion Center and other law enforcement agencies in Minnesota, seems very 

effective. He showed us a tape that they made—they have many 

surveillance cameras there—of an individual who clearly, from this 

tape, was casing this mall. Turned out to be of foreign origin, and 

it is a longer story. 

But, at any rate, I was impressed. None of you has really addressed how you integrate or how one should integrate private-sector efforts with what you do. So that is my question. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Unfortunately, I didn’t have Frank’s clock 

that stopped when summarizing my testimony. But one of the 

things that I did want to emphasize—because that is critical. 

Our critical infrastructure, most of it, is in the private sector’s 

hands. In my written testimony, one of the things that we are advocating for and what the National Governors Association and 

State and Local Working Group on Infrastructure Protection has 

advocated is there needs to be a critical infrastructure/key resources desk in every Fusion Center, so that, one, you know what 

critical infrastructure do you have, what are the potential cascading effects, as well as meshing together threat information so 
45

that it matches the vulnerability and potential consequences that 

you could have to an attack on critical infrastructure. 

One of the things that Governor Schwarzenegger also did in California was our licensed security professionals and security guards 

in California are required to have 8 hours of training. The Governor, showing his vision and leadership on this, said, look, we 

ought to change that so that they get at least 4 hours of those 8 

hours as terrorism awareness. One, so that they can recognize 

operational surveillance. Because we know that they have to do 

target selection, they have to do this, there is that operational 

cycle. If we can catch on early, we can preempt and prevent. 

That is putting—you know, in looking at scale and scope for California, there are 400,000 just-licensed security professionals out 

there. Linking them in not only with their eyes and ears so they 

know what to look for, more importantly how to report it back into 

the Fusion Center process so that we can understand and say, hey, 

we may have something going on based upon a series of incidents 

at chemical plants, shopping malls, whatever. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Other comments. 

Ms. KAYYEM. Yes. 

Ms. HARMAN. In 1 minute, between you. 

Ms. KAYYEM. The critical infrastructure/key resources desk is 

key. It is, I think, a really legacy function of the fusion centers, 

whether you have nuclear facilities or LNG terminals, which we 

have. That is going to be, I think, one of the core future functions 

of the Fusion Center-Homeland Security relationship. 

What we are trying to do, and what I think DHS has been actually very helpful on, is this ACAM system, which is an automated 

critical infrastructure system. It had a different name in California. 

But by having one tool that we are all, sort of, monitoring critical 

infrastructure off of, we are putting all the data in, we are working 

with our private-sector partners, we then have a basis to determine 

whether we should be nervous or not, from the State perspective. 

Because if I look at my critical infrastructure list, it is over 300. 

It is every high school. I love high schools; I care about high 

schools. But from the perspective of, is the Governor going to be 

terribly worried that there is going to be no energy in New England if something happened in the port, they are different. They 

are different kinds of worries. So that is a program that has helped 

very well. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

My time has expired. So hopefully, Mr. Cilluffo, you have nothing 

to add? 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Yes. 

Ms. HARMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Reichert. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

One quick question. I know it was really a struggle for me, as 

a sheriff, to participate in all the Federal task force entities that 

exist. You are always being asked to be a part of this FBI task 

force or HIDTA task force or you name it. You want to provide a 

body to that effort. The same goes with the fusion centers and 
46

JTTF, et cetera. So the funding issue has really always been a sensitive one and one that we have all struggled with. 

What is your opinion on the Federal Government’s responsibility 

and role as it relates to assisting local and State agencies in providing funding for fusion centers and task forces? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Very much appreciate that question. 

There is a significant role that the Federal Government needs to 

be making. There is a misperception here in Washington, DC, that 

somehow $5 billion in Federal grant funding made available to 

State and locals on an annual basis somehow is supporting all of 

the State and local public safety efforts. It is almost too much to 

say it is a drop in the bucket. 

You know, you are not recognizing the fact that, you know, what 

changed after 9/11 is that terrorism prevention and protection is 

everybody’s business. There is a lot of personnel and resources that 

we, as State and locals, are pouring into this particular effort. The 

Federal Government needs to support us with that. 

That is why it is important, with the grants for the analytical 

components of our fusion centers, for them to support it. Because 

there is also a misunderstanding. There is this belief that somehow 

these fusion centers are only for the benefit of State and locals. It, 

again, ignores that philosophical that you don’t understand what 

we do as State and locals and what your sheriff’s office can help 

provide them. These are there to support the national terrorism 

prevention mission. It is also all crimes, all hazards, to make our 

communities, our States, our Nation safer and better-prepared. 

That is why the Federal Government has an obligation to help 

support these, because it is to their benefit as well. It is not just 

for the benefit of State and local. It is ignoring all of the other 

things we are paying, whether it is corrections and prisons and the 

officers on patrol and all the TLOs, terrorism liaison officers, we 

trained and who fulfill this and support that national mission. That 

is why we need that Federal funding. 

The best example is, you know, does the Federal Government 

have urban search and rescue teams? Do they have hazardous material teams? No, they don’t. They are in our communities at the 

State and local level. They become national assets in a time of 

emergency. 

That is why that grant funding we use to buy the equipment and 

do the training. But we pay for the personnel. If the Federal Government had to then create their own USAR teams to sit around 

like the Maytag repairman waiting for a national emergency, it 

would cost you a lot more than the $5 billion a year. Plus, you are 

losing the benefit of them saving lives and property day-in and 

day-out, 24/7/365. 

Ms. KAYYEM. I actually have nothing to add to that, because that 

was great. 

Mr. REICHERT. I almost felt like I should ask the question, run 

over there real quick and answer myself. 

But thank you for that. I wanted that on the record. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Did I miss anything you would say as a 

sheriff? 

Mr. REICHERT. You hit it right spot on. Thank you. 
47

Ms. HARMAN. See, we do this vertical integration right here. 

Here he is. 

Ms. KAYYEM. I will add one other quick thing on the grants, because the IED thing is not helpful to us, from a State perspective, 

25 percent. I mean, we have people so nervous right now for reasons that aren’t supported by the intelligence, as I related in the 

oral testimony. 

I actually thought what is going on in the port grants—I know 

it is not in this jurisdiction, but just something to think about—

what is going on in the port grants and obviously in SAFECOM 

were really helpful exercises for the State. Because, as you know, 

we have to distribute our money 80/20. But to be told by the Feds 

that the State has to come up with a plan, and it is your plan because I am a Commonwealth and I have crazy radio systems all 

over the place, and come up with a plan about how you are going 

to fix it, tell us how you are going to fix it, have an integrated plan, 

we will approve the plan and then release the money, and then you 

spend the money according to the plan, great, great process. I love 

it, because the complaining fire chief in a small jurisdiction who 

doesn’t get what he wants, I say, not part of the plan. 

The port folks are doing the same thing with the trade resiliency. 

You have to come up with the plan first for your port money—we 

have $4 million this year—about how you will resume trade, how 

you will be resilient. Then all the jurisdictions mad at us, mad at 

the State, because they are not going to get everything they want, 

they can apply for grants according to the plan. It works great from 

a management perspective and a security perspective. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. I also caution, because I see a trend toward 

trying to require matches, whether it is soft or hard, and that is 

a mistake. There is not enough money there, based on what we are 

already contributing as State and locals, and to throw that match 

requirement on in these budget times, these economic circumstances—and, more importantly and fundamentally, it ignores 

that this is a Federal responsibility. If they want those assets to 

become national assets in times of disaster and catastrophe, you 

have to help us support it, support and build them. 

Mr. REICHERT. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Perlmutter. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks. 

Just, No. 1, I want to thank the panelists. It has been an excellent discussion, and just appreciate, you know, the knowledge and 

the fact that you have lived this subject. You can tell from your testimony. 

Switch gears a little bit and talk about open source opportunities 

or reports and just whether you think that is something that the 

Intelligence Community, DHS should be focusing on, whether we 

should be providing any legislation concerning open source reports. 

Then, you know, if you have a privacy aspect to it, I would like to 

hear that too. 

Mr. CILLUFFO. Well, in my prepared remarks I did highlight the 

importance and significance of open source. I think a vast majority 

of this information is. Its collation that gets a little complex, but 

in terms of the information itself, is publicly available if you know 

where to look for it. 
48

The adversary relies entirely, if we are talking about al Qaeda 

or terrorism, on the Internet. So they need that to sustain their 

own operations. So they are tipping off many of their intentions, capabilities, plans and the like. 

If you look back during the Cold War, the amount of resources 

we have devoted—war colleges popped up, defense universities 

popped up—to understand the Soviet Union, we haven’t even come 

close to understanding this adversary. We do so at our own peril. 

They are not madmen. They are not crazy. We have to actually understand. To me, open source can play a huge role in that. 

I think some of the better products are actually open source. One 

of the better DHS products is called The Universal Adversary, and 

I am not sure you guys have even seen it. It is not a very wellknown product, because it is open source. 

That is something we also have to change. If it has that marking 

with a code word on it, we think it is better. That doesn’t mean 

it is better. The reality is just because—it is how it was collected. 

I don’t want to get into the whole process of what collection, what 

markings are and classification. 

But the vast majority of this stuff is available and should be. We 

need to devote the education, the resources and time to do it. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Open source is very important because you 

can pull a lot of this together. Sometimes we get more timely information from reading the news reports than we do in getting the 

products. I mean, you know, the National Intelligence Estimate, we 

were reading about what was in there in the paper for a week before we ever even got a briefing from DHS on it. That is frustrating, and that has to change. 

But open source is critical. The CENTRA report—I don’t think it 

requires legislation, in direct answer to your question. But the 

CENTRA report that Charlie Allen and DHS I&A commissioned 

talks about the importance of open source. In fact, they have started a couple pilot training programs. We were pleased to have one 

of them in California in our Sacramento Regional Threat Assessment Center. It was very useful. It was well-received. 

So it is the kind of customer service that the customers are saying, hey, we want more of this. So it needs to be at the top of their 

priority, and they should be funding—you know, now they are 

struggling, well, how do we continue this pilot and move this on? 

Well, you know, when it is meeting that need and it is being greeted warmly and with success, well, then we need to prioritize and 

do it. Because it is a critical part of the operations. 

It was followed up by the ODNI’s conference, open source conference here in Washington, DC, that we attended and I spoke at. 

Because that is very important, to be able to access and use that 

information and get a better understanding of our adversaries. 

The importance, again, of that counter-narrative that Frank is 

talking about, in terms of making sure that we don’t have 

radicalization occurring in our own communities, what are the 

issues to prevent that from having traction and preventing true assimilation and integration of our very diverse populations in the 

United States. 

Ms. KAYYEM. Then, finally, just consistent with this, I think that 

the push I think a lot of States are making now to put the privacy 
49

and first amendment and retention-of-information rules at the 

front end will not impede the open source, I am pretty confident 

of that, but will provide assurances to a public that doesn’t often 

know what we are doing. I mean, you know, it is just fusion centers 

are—if you even know what it is, what is it doing and stuff. 

So, you know, maybe I am in the publish or perish mode, but I 

am, like, overwhelming people with, like, here is our privacy guidelines, here is—just because I want people to know that we have 

them, that we are not not thinking about this. If you can get that 

out there at the front end, then the other stuff sort of flows from 

it, and then they are consistent. 

You know, the ACLU remarks about fusion centers, you can’t 

hide from them, they are out there. They represent, whether it is 

the ACLU or people’s feeling about intelligence, which I often can 

have sometimes too, they represent a core feeling by many Americans. We can’t pretend like the debate is going to go away. We 

have to, sort of, take it on front end and say, we are also rational 

people who recognize the importance of this. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 

Thank you to the colleagues on this subcommittee and to our witnesses. I thought the testimony and the Q&A were excellent. 

We feel good about the direction we are taking. Glad the message 

is being received out and about in the country. We want to continue to work with the three of you, specifically, on ways to satisfy 

the customer better and get I&A and DHS to fulfill its core mission 

better. 

Hearing no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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