AD-A286 442

. STRATEGIC FORUM

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NUMBER 12, NOVEMBER 1994

Moving from Theory to Action 9 -0

NATO in the 1990s I1 943 II ii I~ II I I li[IIi 3

' Backgroilnd

Conference Conclusions

Three major challenges face the Alliance: (1) the

The United States trans-Atlantic tie is United States has not yet fully decided on its role in

under stress. If not carefully tended to, the Europe; (2) the European Union (EU), despite the

re4ationship could erode. As an example, if rhetoric, has not yet forged a common foreign and

Ewopeans continue to reduce their armed forces' security policy; (3) Russia is unclear on its future.

* readiness levels, it becomes increasingly difficult These uncertainties impact on the Alliance's future

for the United States to justify maintaining as NATO faces pressures from the East to expand

100,000 troops in a high state of readiness, through the Partnership for Peace (PFP) programs and

0 Diverg6nces in perceptions and on standing up CJTF for out-of1area activities.

expectationr abound not only among Allies, but

ti also among PFF partners an the role of PFP and What is the future of the trans-Atlantic

expanding the Alliance. As a result, Alliance relationship?

machinery is being pulled in many directions.

* NATO faces challenges in coordinating The trans-Atlantic relationship mnght be described as

command anangements with the UN and under pressure. Some Europeans believe that the

Western European Union (WEU) as well as United States has not yet fully decided on its role in

with partners in standirng up Combined Joint Europe, while others still see the United States as

Task Forces (CJTF). Without effective "hegemonic." In contrast, soi e Americans see

coordination, out-of-area activities can prove less Europeans as "irresponsible," argue for greater "burdenthan effective, sharing," and find the EU's inability to develop a

• A great danger to NATO's legitimacy common foreign and security policy a continuing irritant.

and relevance stems not only from perceptions of On the European sid 3, there seems to be more focus

institutional competitiveness but also from on narrow national interests. This is most evident in the

NATO's participation in increasingly unpopular significant unilateral reductions in military force levels

out-of-area activities. Hence, it may become more in recent years, the present "hollowing out" of those

difficult to maintain public support for NATO'S already deficient forces, and significant reductions in

Article F function. readiness. For example, Germany's decision to reduce

- the readiness of the Bundeswehr'3 main defense forces to

About this Conference of 1989. Though the confeence provided no definitive

On September 16-18, 1994 the Institute for National answers to the major questions of 'he day, it did shed

Strategic Studies (INSS) and the US Mission/NATO co- light on the Alliance's 1995 agenda.

sponsored its 1 Oth annual Strategic Studies For more information contact MG (Ret.) John

Corference in Knokke-Heist, Belgium. Bringing Sewall at (202) 287-9211, FAX (202) 287-9475 or

together defense and security experts from 31 Internet: SEWALLJ@NDU.EDU; or Dr. Jeffrey Simon

countries, the meeting focused on the issues at (202) 287-9219, ext. 524, FAX (202) 287-9475 or

challenging the Alliance five years after the revolutions Internet: SIPLON.\J@NDU.EDU.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those Q-eth-eauthors and do not

necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies(.ational Defense University,"the Department of

Defense, or any other government agoncy.

94 0 S IA D'In QUAITY INIPEOTED
PAGE 2 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES ', u ýaui #12, NOVEMEER 1994

within 180 days raises questions about U.S. forces. PFP peacekeeping activities become routine, the logical

Some Americans ask why the United States should question will be what next? The Czechs, for example,

maintain 100,000 U.S. troops at a high state of readiness suggested that they attach military liaison officers to

and cost, while Germany and other NATO members NATO's major subordinate commands in order to better

reduce readiness and save resources. In summary, coordinate Czech military activities with the Alliance. "readiness" is now measured in months and weeks, The Poles noted thsir desire to expand their military

rather than hours and days. European armed forces are, cooperation from peacekeeping activities to include their

in effect, becoming "l.ollow," and countries are lowering general defense forces. The Estonian noted, "You cannout

readiness levels, tie a knot with only ode hand," that PFP was a two-way

On the U.S. side, there are serious questions from street, and that NATO financial resources and political

the heartland about why the United States should support would be necessary to sustain PFP momentum.

continue to bother with NATO, now that tLte Cold War

is over. NATO's reputation is also coupled with PFP's Relationship to Other NATO

changing American public and Congressional attitudes Organizations.

toward peacekeeping (since Somalia), and will suffer

adversely from increasing association with these out-of- There was consensus to retain the North Atlantic

area activities. Cooperation Council because it remained useful as a

consultative forum and provided the means to coordinate

Partnership For Peace (PFP) as a Route to NATO political, economic, and scientific activities. As to the

Enlargement. Partnership Coordination Center (PCC) at Mons, some

fundamental organization problems remain. According

The January 10-11, 1994 Brussels Summit adopted to the January 1994 Summit terms of reference, the PCC

Partnership For Peace (PFP) in response to the thorny does not work for SACEUR, But for the North Atlantic

problem ot NATO's expansion eastward, NATO adopted Council (NAC) and reports to the International Military

PFP to avoid making any decision on immediate Staff (at Evere). The PCC can only "coordinate" each

expansion because no consensus then existed within the partner's Individual Partnership Program (IPP) activities

Alliance. It seems now that, although FFP did postpone related to search and rescue, humanitarian assistance,

the enlargement question, the issue is again on NATO's and peacekeeping operations. Yet, since PFP partners

front burner because of Partner insistence, see their activities as a means to achieve interoperability

Some participant critics suggested that President and entry to full membership, they will push the PCC to

Clinton's European policy is flawed, and that PFP is coordinate military activities that are broader than its

really a "Policy fbr Postponement." Though PFP bought mandate-such as developing interoperable general

the Administration some time to get expansion right, it defense forces. Funding remains a problem. Not only

is now time for the United States to make its case. does the source of PCC fundip-, remain unclear, but

Should the United States fail in that regard, the issue of' national contributions to PFP are voluntary. It is

the U.S. leadership role in Europe is once again in anticipated that "sponsors" should donate financial

question. resources to support PCC activities.

Though Alliance consensus appears to exist on PFP A new issue is the possibility of establishing force

as the route to enlargement, there does not yet appear to goals for the Partners that would lead to NATO

be any consensus about which specific Partners should interoperability and an accompanying annual defense

be admitted first, nor on the timing, criteria, or review with perhaps modified Defense Planning

resources to implement enlargement. Some participants Questionnaires (DPQs). This scenario will immediately

even expressed the wishful hope that PFP might make draw fire from France, which feels that such review

membership unnecessary ',br some countries, almost to procedures would be a "back door" attempt to get France

save the Alliance from having to make the choice. into the integrated military command. Some in the

One participant noted three reasons why Spain had International Staff (IS) believe such force goals would

much to offer as a model fbr NATO expansion. First, also dilute and undermine the already well-established

Spain entered NATO in 1982 over the strong force planning process for the Alliance at 13 (16 minus

opposition of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- France, Spain, and Iceland).

lics (U.S.S.R.) (Andrei Gromyko threatened to target

Spain with nuclear weapons if'it joined NATO). Second, What will NATO's evolving relationship be with

NATO helped Spain make the transition from an Russia?

authoritarian system to democracy. Third, at the time of'

accession, Spain's armed forces were five to six years The Russian participant argued that Russia is more

short of operational readiness, isolated firom the West (EU and NATO) than was the

Some Central and East Europeans noted that once Union of' Soviet Socialist Republics. Although Russia
,F-,nrcawk. .raom #12, NOVEMBER 1994 INSTrrUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES PAGE 3

has joined PFP and Duma Parliamentarians participate that the CJTF makes it easier to separate U.S. from EU

in North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) seminars, these interests, which could erode U.S. support for 100,000

activities, in Russia's view, do not. conform with stability U.S. fbrward-stationed troops. Second, CJTF means that

requirements. in fact, as a Cold War holdover, NATO NATO is in the business of peacekeeping. To the degree

shares a very poor image in Russian society. Russian tha. peacekeeping operations are unpopular in the U.S.,

nationalists equate closer cooperation with NATO as American support for the Alliance could similarly erode.

"treason." Most Rus-ians view NATO's enlargement as As Europeans reduce their"readiness" levels and require

further exclusion, not integration, of Russia fron the U.S. to provide logistics, C1', and strategic lift, this

Europe. also could signal that "lighter" U.S. forces are necessary.

Recognizing that NATO has an image problem in Third, the issue of just how CJTF will link with the

Russia, some participants noted that NATO needs to WEU remains to be worked out.

train public information officers and establish a fullfiedged information office in Moscow. Unfortunately. Can NATO survive and adjust to its new

France has blocked this NATO effort and the French Peacekeeping and Crisis Management role?

embassy in Moscow has become the de facto conduit for

NATO infformation to Russia. While public support for NATO as an krticle 5

NATO's relations with Russia suggest that while insurance policy exists in people's minds, NATO is being

enlargement is on the NATO agenda, Russia must be judged by what it does, not by what it i4,. As a result, it

dealt with through the NACC, G-7, or bilaterally. The is becoming increasingly difficult to translate general

challenge will be how to integrate Russia into European American support for NATO into support for resources.

institutions and peace operations while it remains Peacekeeping has grown unpopular in the U.S.

opposed to NATO expansion to include Central European Congress as a result of' Somalia and the situation in

states. Bosnia. Since NATO's 1992 decisions to periform

peacekeeping operations to support the CSCE and U.N,

What is the status of the European Security and NATO has engaged in such operations. If' NATO

Defense Identity (ES•DI) and prospects for the NAOhseggdiIuhoeain.I'NT Combined Joint Task Force? continues to attach a priority (and increasingly its

identity) to peacekeeping, popular support for the

The concept. of' separable but not separate Alliance could erode.

capabilities is necessary to avoid expensive duplication NATO has utilized its integrated military command

and to allow some non-NATO members to engage while during the maritime arms embargo against Serbia and

permitting others not to engage. Areas of'fbcus involve: Montenegro (Sharp Guard) and the no-fly zone over

using existing national and NATO assets (such as ships Bosnia-Herzegovina (Deny Flight) in former Yugoslavia.

or aircraft) to avoid expensive duplication; using existing In both cases, France operated under SHAPE's

NATO commani structures (with designated CJTF integrated military command. In addition, NATO

"separable" staff personnel); and developing political- recently has engaged in many other "firsts." It has

military structures to provide planning advice to the engaged in actual combat operations, operated out of'

WEU Council. area (in Hungarian airspace and Albanian territorial

Since May 1994, the WEU has established associated waters), participated in joint NATO/UN planning and

partnerships with nine Central and East European operations, and taken part in joint NATO/WEU

members. Joint WEU Council sessions are convened operations.

with associated partners and the experience has been Nonetheless, all has not been without difficulty. The educational fbr both sides. In conformance with the 1992 UN, with some 18 operations and 70,000 soldiers, is

Petersberg Declaration to make tbrces operational for clearly suffering from overreach. An urgently needed

peacekeeping, the WEU has taken on the following area for improvement is in cooperation between NATO

tasks: setting up the Mostar police force; participating and other institutions. One such grouping involves

in the Adriatic maritime embargo of Montenegro (Sharp and cooperation , whe s ating i n ch

Guard); establishing a Danube maritime embargo force; NATO-WEU cooperation, whereby to satisf' the French

and establishing a Working Group to deal with CJTF C' and potential non-NATO participants, we could

arrangements. undermine NATO's integrated command. A second

At the January 1994 summit, NATO agreed to grouping involves NATO-CSCE cooperation, where by

"-3tablish CJTF to address new missions, to affirm ESDI, transplanting unique NATO capabilities (e.g., early

to provide a rapidly deployable command and control warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management) to

element., and to facilitate non-NATO contributions. The the CSCF, we could inadvertantly erode NATO's

CJTF con( has a number ofissues. One is the CJTF relevance. A third issue involves different perceptions

relationship to the Alliance's purpose. Though Article 5 between NATO and the UN on the use of force,

was NATO's central purpose, out-of-area activities create impacting heavily on military doctrine and rules of'

new and greater demands. One unintended danger is engagement.
PAGE 4 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES ! Ao1,m i;JN #12, NOVEMBER 1994

Policy Recommendatlonc

Policymakers might consider the following steps:

* The United States needs to demonstrate that ture of the Alliance. Besides NATO PFP activities,

PFP is not a "Policy for Postponement" but for the West should expand on democracy programs of

eventual NATO enlargement. The United States the Council of Europe and CSCE, and encourage

must decide- on timing, criteria, and resources fbr active participation of non-governmental organimembership-and lead the Alliance. zations (NGOs) in that effort.

* NATO needs to mount a significant educational 9 NATO needs to ensure effective coordination

and public affairs offensive in Russia in order to with the WEU, CSCE, and United Nations by

address fundamental misperceptions about the na- implementing the CJTF concept.

The S"HAT•GIC - FOAUMJ provides summaries of work by members m NDU Press publishf-s

and guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the monographs, reports and

National Defense University faculty. These include reports of original F books related to U.S national

.- research, synopses of seminars and conferences, the results of security Its publications are sold by the

unclassified war games. and digests of remarks by distinguished Government Printing Office For

speakers information call (202) 475-1913.

-Thar',C ý. I NDU Press ,I.

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Washington, D.C. 20319-6000 *

i I i i I i i I I I I i i ,,A , .. .