IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 1, 2016

VERNON LOCKHART v. COMMISSIONER OF THE TENNESSEE 

DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 140472I Ben H. Cantrell, Senior Judge

No. M2016-00083-COA-R3-CV – Filed December 21, 2016

This appeal arises from a civil forfeiture. Vernon Lockhart (“Lockhart”) was charged 

and later convicted on a number of criminal counts related to the distribution of large 

amounts of marijuana. The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security 

(“the Department”) declared as forfeited certain of Lockhart‟s properties alleged to be 

derived from illegal drug transactions. An Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”) found 

in favor of the Department by a preponderance of the evidence, a decision which was 

affirmed on appeal by the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). 

Lockhart appeals to this Court, arguing, in large part, that the evidence used against him 

should have been suppressed and that the ALJ and Trial Court erred by failing to conduct 

an analysis of his suppression issue independent of the resolution of that issue in the 

criminal court proceedings. We hold, inter alia, that the ALJ‟s order of forfeiture was 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence and that the doctrine of collateral estoppel 

bars Lockhart from re-litigating whether the evidence should have been suppressed as 

that issue has been resolved finally on appeal in his criminal proceedings. We affirm the 

judgment of the Trial Court upholding the ALJ‟s order declaring Lockhart‟s designated 

properties forfeited to the state.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed;

Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. NEAL 

MCBRAYER and BRANDON O. GIBSON, JJ., joined.

Vernon Elliott Lockhart, pro se appellant.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, Grant C. Mullins, Assistant 

Attorney General, and, Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor General, for the appellee, the 

Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security, Commissioner.
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OPINION

Background

The detailed history of Lockhart‟s criminal investigation and trial is set 

forth in the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals opinion State v. Lockhart, No. M2013-

01275-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5244672 (Tenn. Crim. App. September 8, 2015), perm. 

app. appeal denied Jan. 20, 2016. Lockhart was convicted at the trial court level of 14 

counts, three of which for money laundering were overturned on appeal. Lockhart‟s most 

ardent and persistent argument, both in the criminal matter and in this civil forfeiture 

matter now before us, is that the evidence used against him was gathered unlawfully and 

should be suppressed. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals in Lockhart, among 

other things, disagreed with Lockhart‟s suppression-based arguments while affirming

most of Lockhart‟s convictions. 

An asset forfeiture hearing was held in March 2013. The ALJ subsequently 

entered an order which stated, in part, as follows:

1. Beginning in January 2006, the 18th and 20th Judicial District Drug Task 

Forces along with the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) 

conducted an investigation of Claimant, along with several other 

individuals, through the use of wiretaps, for drug trafficking of large 

amounts of marijuana.

2. The investigation revealed that Claimant devised and conducted an 

elaborate operation wherein he, or one of his co-conspirators, would travel 

across the country to purchase large quantities of marijuana and bring it 

back to Nashville for resell.

3. As a part of this elaborate operation, Claimant used several companies to 

conceal and/or launder the money he made through his illegal drug 

transactions. These companies were Pyramid Engineering, Reconstruction 

Management Group, VEL Properties and VEL Trucking, LLC.

4. The investigation culminated in the issuance of numerous search 

warrants

5. On March 9, 2009, a 2005 GMC Sierra Engineering truck pulling a 

gooseneck trailer and driven by Cheyenne Davis was stopped by the 

Tennessee Highway Patrol for a traffic violation. A K-9 narcotic officer 

alerted to the truck. The truck and trailer were searched and the trailer was 

cut open. It was found to contain approximately 550 pounds of marijuana.
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6. Inside the truck the officers found a TomTom GPS device and an Aspire 

I Acer laptop with accessories along with several telephones. These items 

were seized.

7. After the search of the truck and trailer, the officers began executing 

search warrants on the various properties identified as the stash houses 

owned by the claimant.

8. Claimant also owned several homes that were used as “stash houses” to 

hide the large quantities of marijuana.

9. The main location for storing the marijuana was a home, owned by VEL 

Properties, located at 6960 Old Hickory Boulevard, Nashville, Tennessee 

(6960 OHB). Other properties known as “201 Cude Lane” and “Pulley 

Road aka „The Country‟”, along with his residence at 5225 Rustic Way, 

Mt. Juliet, Tennessee were also used as “stash houses”.

10. The search warrant executed on Claimant‟s residence at 5225 Rustic 

Way, Mt. Juliet, Tennessee yielded ledgers that were discovered in the 

home. These ledgers were determined by officers to reflect transactions 

representing the sale of 5,702 pounds of marijuana and income from those 

sales in the amount of Two million eight hundred thirty four thousand eight 

hundred twenty seven dollars ($2,834,827.00).

11. As a result of the search of the Claimant‟s home, numerous items were 

seized. Among those items were an outdoor surveillance system, a 1999 

Chevrolet SK1 pickup truck containing 10 pounds of marijuana, furniture 

from the dining room, living room, kitchen, and master bedroom, tools and 

golf clubs. The officers also discovered a hidden $154,000.00 in US 

currency hidden in the home.

12. Claimant was indicted and eventually convicted of fourteen (14) felony 

counts. (The factual allegations in the indictments and Claimant‟s 

convictions are found at exhibits 2 A -3B of the technical record and 

incorporated herein in their entirety by reference). Claimant was sentenced 

in January 2013, to ninety four (94) years in prison.

13. Claimant, during the time of the investigation, had no legitimate source 

of income. In fact, the only income tax records that he filed reflected 

income in the amount of $8,189.00 for the 2006 filing year.

14. Detective Herb Kajihara, of the Nashville Police Department testified 

on behalf of the Department of Safety. His testimony is found to credible.

15. Claimant did not appear nor testify at the hearing. Claimant presented 

no proof to rebut the testimony or evidence introduced by the Department.

16. Claimant had a prior conviction for the sale of marijuana.

17. The Department of Safety has shown by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the [sic] [a]ll of the listed property and currency seized were 
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either acquired through criminal activity or through the facilitation of drug 

sales as a part of this extensive drug trafficking operation.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ANALYSIS

1. The State bears the burden of proof in this case, and must therefore 

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the seized currency is 

subject to forfeiture, pursuant to law. Failure to carry the burden of proof 

operates as a bar to the proposed forfeiture. TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-11-

201(d)(2); Rule 1340-2-2-.15, TENN. COMP. R. & REGS., Rules of the 

Tennessee Department of Safety.

2. “Everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in exchange 

for a controlled substance in violation of the Tennessee Drug Control Act 

of 1989, . . . all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys . . . 

used, or intended to be used, to facilitate any violation of the Tennessee 

Drug Control Act . . .” are subject to forfeiture under the law. TENN. 

CODE ANN. § 53-11-451(a)(6)(A).

3. T.C.A. §53-11-451(a)(2) provides that “all raw materials, products, and 

equipment of any kind which are used, or intended for use, in 

manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing or 

exporting any controlled substance in violation of the Tennessee Drug 

Control Act are subject to forfeiture.[”]

***

10. Claimant‟s record of drug activity is highly probative factor in the 

forfeiture calculus. U.S. v. $67,220.00 in United States Currency, 957 F.2d 

280 (6th Cir. 1992). The Department of Safety has shown by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the Claimant was engaged in the sale of 

illegal drugs and that the property and currency seized was derived from 

those illegal drug transactions. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that 

the subject properties and currencies shall be forfeited to the Seizing 

Agency, the 18th and 20th Judicial District Drug Task Forces, for 

disposition as provided by law.

An initial amended order was entered in August 2013, and a final order was entered in 

February 2014. The matter was appealed to the Trial Court. The Trial Court affirmed the 

ALJ. In its December 2015 Memorandum and Order, the Trial Court found and held:

This cause is before the Court on the petition of Vernon Lockhart 

challenging the Department of Safety and Homeland Security 
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Commissioner‟s action in declaring a forfeiture of a large amount of real 

and personal property. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322. The basis for the 

forfeiture was the petitioner‟s use of the property in the conduct of an 

extensive criminal enterprise or its acquisition with proceeds derived from 

that enterprise. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-401, et. seq.; 53-11-451 

(“Tennessee Drug Control Act”).

The petitioner does not challenge the preponderance of the evidence 

in the record of the criminal activity or its relationship to the property; the 

defense is based on his assertion that the evidence should have been 

excluded because it was acquired by the use of illegal wiretaps or GPS

monitoring.

The Commissioner asserts that the exclusionary rule does not apply 

in this civil forfeiture proceeding, and, in any case, that the criminal courts 

of Davidson and Wilson counties have decided that the evidence was 

admissible in separate criminal prosecutions. The record contains written 

orders from both courts overruling the petitioner‟s motions to suppress the 

evidence.

The Court finds that the exclusionary rule does apply in an 

administrative hearing considering a civil forfeiture. See Ware v. Green, 

984 S.W.2d 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Williams v. State Dep’t of Safety, 

854 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Even the case cited by counsel for 

the Commissioner supports the applicability of the exclusionary rule in this 

case. In Holmes v. Owen, 1998 WL 70644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), the Court 

of Appeals noted that a question might still exist as to the application of the 

exclusionary rule in a “purely civil” case, but that the rule did not apply to a 

civil forfeiture proceeding, which the Court characterized as a penalty for 

illegal activity.

That being said, however, the Court is of the opinion that the agency 

did not err in admitting the evidence in reliance on the orders of the 

criminal courts. The rules of evidence in the Administrative Procedures 

Act allow evidence not admissible in Court to be admitted if it is “of a type 

commonly relied on by reasonably prudent men [sic] the conduct of their 

affairs.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-313(1). With the Criminal Courts‟ 

decisions that the evidence should not be suppressed, it was reasonable to 

rely on these decisions without conducting an independent analysis of the 

various cases dealing with the exclusionary rule.1

 

1

The decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court overruling the motion to suppress has now been 

affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. See State v. Lockhart, 2015 WL 5244672, slip op. filed in 

Nashville September 8, 2015. Further, the Court is aware that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be 

dispositive regarding the exclusionary rule, however the Tennessee Supreme Court has not taken action 

regarding the criminal cases as of the date of entry.
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The Court is of the opinion that the Department of Safety and 

Homeland Security‟s decision to declare the property in question forfeited 

to the state is supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the record.

It is, therefore, ORDERED that the petition for judicial review is 

hereby dismissed at the cost of the petitioner.

(Footnote in original). Lockhart filed a timely appeal to this Court.

Discussion

We restate and consolidate the issues Lockhart raises on appeal into the 

following two dispositive issues: 1) whether the ALJ erred in finding, and the Trial Court 

erred subsequently in affirming, that the Department met its burden, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, necessary to declare Lockhart‟s properties forfeited; and, 2) whether the 

Trial Court erred in declining to reverse or remand on the basis that three of Lockhart‟s 

convictions were overturned on appeal by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.

Our Supreme Court has discussed forfeiture as follows:

Forfeiture is defined as “[t]he divestiture of property without 

compensation.” Black‟s Law Dictionary 722 (9th ed. 2009) (Forfeiture). 

In the context of this case, the divestiture occurs because of a crime and 

title to the forfeited property is transferred to the government. Id. At first 

blush, forfeiture appears to be an amalgam of a civil and a criminal 

proceeding. Indeed, some Tennessee decisions have described forfeiture 

proceedings as “quasi criminal in nature.” Garrett v. State Dep’t of Safety, 

717 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Tenn. 1986) (italics in original); Reece v. Lawson, 

No. 01A01-9310-CH-00439, 1994 WL 171056, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 

6, 1994). However, later decisions by the United States Supreme Court and 

by this Court clarify that forfeiture actions are in rem, regarding the 

property; while they proceed parallel to criminal prosecutions and are 

“based upon the same underlying events,” they are civil in nature. U.S. v. 

Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 274, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); Stuart 

v. State Dep’t of Safety, 963 S.W.2d 28, 34 (Tenn. 1998). Because 

forfeiture proceedings are considered civil, “[t]he State has a less onerous 

burden—that of proving only by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

property is subject to forfeiture. This is to be contrasted with the State‟s 

burden in criminal proceedings—proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Stuart, 963 S.W.2d at 33 (citations omitted).
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***

In Tennessee, while forfeiture is permissible, it is not favored: “The 

public policy of this state as expressed in the state constitution opposes 

forfeitures for convictions of crimes unless specifically provided for.” 

Hays v. Montague, 860 S.W.2d 403, 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (citing 

Whisnant v. Byrd, 525 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tenn. 1975), overruled on other 

grounds by Logan v. Winstead, 23 S.W.3d 297 (Tenn. 2000); Fields v. Met. 

Life Ins. Co., 249 S.W. 798, 798 (Tenn. 1923)). “Forfeitures are not favored 

by the law.” Redd, 895 S.W.2d at 335; see also Wells, 198 S.W.2d at 643 

(“Forfeitures are not favored.”). Consequently, “statutes authorizing 

forfeitures are to be strictly construed.” Watson, 361 S.W.3d at 555 (citing 

Redd, 895 S.W.2d at 335); see also Wells, 198 S.W.2d at 643 (“Forfeiture 

statutes are to be strictly construed.”).

State v. Sprunger, 458 S.W.3d 482, 492-94 (Tenn. 2015) (footnotes omitted).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 (2015) provides in relevant part:

(h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for 

further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the 

rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the administrative 

findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly 

unwarranted exercise of discretion; or

(5)(A) Unsupported by evidence that is both substantial and material in the 

light of the entire record.

(B) In determining the substantiality of evidence, the court shall take into 

account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight, but the court 

shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of 

the evidence on questions of fact.
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Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-314 (c)(2015) provides further:

(c) A final order, initial order or decision under § 50-7-304 shall include 

conclusions of law, the policy reasons therefor, and findings of fact for all 

aspects of the order, including the remedy prescribed and, if applicable, the 

action taken on a petition for stay of effectiveness. Findings of fact, if set 

forth in language that is no more than mere repetition or paraphrase of the 

relevant provision of law, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit 

statement of the underlying facts of record to support the findings. The 

final order, initial order or decision must also include a statement of the 

available procedures and time limits for seeking reconsideration or other 

administrative relief and the time limits for seeking judicial review of the 

final order. An initial order or decision shall include a statement of any 

circumstances under which the initial order or decision may, without 

further notice, become a final order.

We first address whether the ALJ erred in finding, and the Trial Court erred 

subsequently in affirming, that the Department met its burden, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, necessary to declare Lockhart‟s properties forfeited. Lockhart argues in his 

brief on appeal: “Mr. Lockhart submits that the issues concerning the wiretaps and 

extensions require a greater discussion and are the most extensive issues herein the case; 

as the determination thereof, required suppression of all of the proof, hence essentially 

leaving no bases or evidence warranting forfeiture.” The Trial Court, citing Tenn. Code

Ann. § 4-5-313 (allowing evidence not admissible in Court in Administrative Procedures 

Act cases if it is “of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the 

conduct of their affairs”), held that it was reasonable that the ALJ did not conduct an 

independent analysis of Lockhart‟s suppression issues, instead relying on the criminal 

courts‟ decisions. We respectfully reject this reasoning. Another court‟s analysis of a 

legal issue cannot properly be regarded as “evidence.”

The Trial Court also observed, however, that the Davidson County 

Criminal Court, as affirmed by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, overruled 

Lockhart‟s motion to suppress. The Trial Court pointed out that the Tennessee Supreme 

Court had not taken any action with respect to the criminal cases so it did not hold that 

collateral estoppel applied. We are under no such limitation, because on January 20, 

2016, shortly after the Trial Court‟s final judgment was entered, the Tennessee Supreme 

Court denied permission to appeal in State v. Lockhart, and the United States Supreme 

Court denied certiorari. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, therefore, may be applicable.
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Our Supreme Court has discussed the doctrine of collateral estoppel as 

follows:

Collateral estoppel is an issue-preclusion doctrine developed by the 

courts. Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 534 (citing Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 

456 U.S. 461, 480, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); Morris v. 

Esmark Apparel, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)). This 

doctrine “promotes finality, conserves judicial resources, and prevents 

inconsistent decisions,” id. (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 

S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Gibson v. Trant, 58 S.W.3d 103, 113 

(Tenn. 2001); State ex rel. Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 178 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2000)), by barring “the same parties or their privies from 

relitigating in a later proceeding legal or factual issues that were actually 

raised and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding,” id. at 534-35 

(citing Barnett v. Milan Seating Sys., 215 S.W.3d 828, 835 (Tenn. 2007) 

superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Freeman v. Gen. 

Motors Co., No. M2011-02284-SC-WCM-WC, 2012 WL 5197672, at *5 n. 

3 (Tenn. Workers‟ Comp. Panel Oct. 22, 2012); Massengill v. Scott, 738 

S.W.2d 629, 631-32 (Tenn. 1987); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Holland-Am. 

Ins. Co., 671 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tenn. 1984)); see also Restatement 

(Second) of Judgments § 27 (1982) (“When an issue of fact or law is 

actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the 

determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive 

in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a 

different claim.”). To prevail on a claim of collateral estoppel, a party must 

establish:

(1) that the issue to be precluded is identical to an issue 

decided in an earlier proceeding, (2) that the issue to be 

precluded was actually raised, litigated, and decided on the 

merits in the earlier proceeding, (3) that the judgment in the 

earlier proceeding has become final, (4) that the party against 

whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or is in 

privity with a party to the earlier proceeding, and (5) that the 

party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full 

and fair opportunity in the earlier proceeding to contest the 

issue now sought to be precluded.

Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 535 (emphasis added).
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Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnold, --- S.W.3d ---, 2016 WL 5491022, at *3 (Tenn. Sept. 29, 

2016) (footnote omitted).

Applying the elements of collateral estoppel to the facts of this case, we 

conclude that Lockhart is barred from re-litigating his claims regarding suppression of 

evidence. Lockhart, the same individual in both this civil forfeiture case and the criminal 

case, already has had the full and fair opportunity to challenge the admission of the 

incriminating evidence, and he took that opportunity. The Tennessee Court of Criminal 

Appeals rejected Lockhart‟s arguments relative to suppression, and that judgment now is 

well and truly final as our Supreme Court has denied Lockhart‟s request for permission to 

appeal and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. In his brief, Lockhart 

contends as follows:

Mr. Lockhart submits that all material aspects of the issues relative 

suppression were presented, however, never fully addressed by the 

Criminal Courts. Further, the Criminal Courts decisions were clearly in 

error and result in a substantial injustice in which the ALJ-Chancery 

Courts‟ should have conducted their own independent analysis of the 

claims. As set forth in the criminal courts, before the ALJ and as set forth 

in the Chancery Court, as well as, included here are the positions as to why 

the exclusion and/or otherwise suppression of the wiretap evidence should 

have been required, inclusive of that before, but not considered, by all 

courts.

Lockhart‟s disagreement with the criminal courts‟ decisions regarding his suppression 

claims does not require us to revisit legal issues already decided finally by our sister court

and on which permission to appeal has been denied by our Supreme Court and the United 

States Supreme Court denied certiorari. The question then becomes whether the other 

elements of collateral estoppel are present. It is beyond dispute as already discussed that 

all the necessary elements of collateral estoppel are present here. We hold that the 

doctrine of collateral estoppel bars Lockhart from re-litigating the issue of whether the 

incriminating evidence used against him should have been suppressed.

Having addressed the admissibility issues, we move next to address 

whether the Department met its burden for forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence. 

The Trial Court, in its final judgment, stated: “The petitioner does not challenge the 

preponderance of the evidence in the record of the criminal activity or its relationship to 

the property; the defense is based on his assertion that the evidence should have been 

excluded because it was acquired by the use of illegal wiretaps or GPS monitoring.” The 

ALJ heard testimony from Detective Herb Kajihara of the Nashville Police Department 

who was assigned to Lockhart‟s case. Detective Kajihara testified to the drugs and 
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weapons found at Lockhart‟s residence as well as the “drug ledgers” used by Lockhart. 

The ALJ specifically found Kajihara to be a credible witness. As noted by the Trial 

Court, Lockhart did not and still has not challenged the preponderance of the evidence as 

found by the ALJ and Trial Court if the evidence is not excluded. As already held in this 

opinion, the evidence properly was not excluded. Having carefully reviewed all the 

evidence, we agree with the Trial Court that the Department‟s decision to declare 

Lockhart‟s property in question forfeited is supported not only by evidence that is both 

substantial and material as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322(h)(5)(A) but by a 

preponderance of the evidence. The ALJ‟s order, quoted above, adequately and 

independently fulfills the statutory directives.

The next and final issue we address is whether the Trial Court erred in 

declining to reverse or remand on the basis that three of Lockhart‟s convictions were 

overturned on appeal by the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. In State v. Lockhart, 

the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the state had failed to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Lockhart purchased the relevant items (a Chapparal boat, 

a 1965 Chevy Impala, and home theatre seating) with intent to conceal the proceeds. On 

the other hand, this present civil action is governed by a different statute with different 

elements required to be proven not by a reasonable doubt standard but instead by a 

preponderance of the evidence standard. Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-11-451 (a)(6)(A) (2008)

2

provides that the following are subject to forfeiture:

(6)(A) Everything of value furnished, or intended to be furnished, in 

exchange for a controlled substance in violation of the Tennessee Drug 

Control Act of 1989, compiled in part 3 of this chapter, this part and title 

39, chapter 17, part 4, all proceeds traceable to the exchange, and all 

moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used, or intended to be used, 

to facilitate any violation of the Tennessee Drug Control Act;

The evidence is not only substantial and material but supports by a 

preponderance of the evidence forfeiture of the property under the statute. We hold that 

the difference in the evidentiary standards and statutory requirements means that reversal 

on three money laundering counts does not serve to preclude forfeiture of Lockhart‟s 

property given the evidence contained in this record. We affirm the judgment of the Trial 

Court.

 

2

In 2012, this section was amended to add “or controlled substance analogue.”
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Conclusion

The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded to 

the Trial Court for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against 

the Appellant, Vernon Elliott Lockhart, and his surety, if any.

____________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE