COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CLIFFORD MURRAY,

Plaintiff;

vs.

SOURCE RECEIVABLES 

MANAGEMENT, LLC, 

Defendant(s).

Case No.: 

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 

JURY TRIAL FOR:

1. VIOLATIONS OF THE

TELEPHONE CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT [47 U.S.C.§

227 ET. SEQ.]

2. VIOLATIONS OF THE

FLORIDA CONSUMER

COLLECTION PRACTICS ACT

[FLA. STAT.§§ 559.55-559.785)

3. VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR

DEBT COLLECTION 

PRACTICES ACT

[15 U.S.C. § 1692 ET. SEQ.]

Plaintiff, CLIFFORD MURRAY (“Plaintiff”), through her attorneys, alleges 

the following against Defendant, SOURCE RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT, 

LLC, (“Defendant”):

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. Plaintiff brings this action seeking damages and any other available

legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of SOURCE 

RECEIVABLES MANAGEMENT, LLC, (“Defendant”), in negligently, 

knowingly, and/or willfully communicating with Plaintiff in connection with the 

collection of alleged debts in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 

(“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C.§ 227 et. seq., the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act 

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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 2

("FCCPA''), FLA. STAT.§§ 559.55-559.785 and the Fair Debt Collection 

Practice Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. 1692 et. seq.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

2. Jurisdiction of this Court arises under 47 U.S.C. 227 and 28 U.S.C. § 

1337. Declaratory relief is available pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. 

Venue in this District is proper in that the Defendant transacts business here

3. Further, Plaintiff resides in Miami-Dade County, Florida.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff, CLIFFORD MURRAY (“Plaintiff”), is a natural person 

residing in Hialeah, Florida.

5. Upon information and belief, the Defendant, is a corporation engaged 

in the business of collecting debt in this state and in several other states, with its 

principal place of business located in North Carolina. The principal purpose of 

Defendant is the collection of debts in this state and several other states, and 

Defendant regularly attempts to collect debts alleged to be due another. 

6. Defendant is engaged in the collection of debts from consumers using 

the mail and telephone. Defendant regularly attempts to collect consumer debts 

alleged to be due to another. Defendant is a ‘‘debt collector’’ as defined by the 

(“FCCPA”).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

7. Within one year prior to the filing of this action, Defendant contacted 

Plaintiff to collect money, property or their equivalent, due or owing or alleged to 

be due or owing from a natural person by reason of a consumer credit transaction 

and/or "consumer debt.".

8. Defendant constantly and continuously called Plaintiff at her

telephone number ending in (786) 461-0373. Defendant placed scores of calls to 

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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 3

Plaintiff often calling multiple times in a single day from telephone numbers (786) 

542-5233, (786) 713-2450 and (786) 713-2168.

9. Defendant communicated with Plaintiff with such frequency as to be 

unreasonable under the circumstances and to constitute harassment.

10. Within one year prior to the filing of this action, Defendant 

communicated with Plaintiff with such frequency as to be unreasonable under the 

circumstances and to constitute harassment.

11. The natural and probable consequences of Defendant’s conduct was to 

harass, oppress or abuse Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the alleged 

debt.

12. On or about October 21, 2019, Plaintiff answered one of Defendant’s 

calls and advised an agent that Defendant was to cease placing any further calls to 

Plaintiff and her cellular telephone. Despite these clear instructions, Defendant 

continued to place its autodialed collection calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone 

therreafter.

13. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant placed at 

least four (4) autodialed collection calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone after 

Plaintiff had revoked consent to receive such calls on his cellular telephone.

14. Defendant and/or its agent(s) used an “automatic telephone dialing 

system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1) to place these aforementioned 

collection calls to Plaintiff. The dead air that the Plaintiff experienced on the calls 

that he received (i.e., when Plaintiff answered there was several seconds where no 

other person was on the other end) is indicative of the use of an automatic 

telephone dialing system.

15. This “dead air” is commonplace with autodialing and/or predictive 

dialing equipment. It indicates and evidences that the algorithm(s) being used by 

Defendant’s and/or its agent’s autodialing equipment to predict when the live 

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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 4

human agents are available for the next call has not been perfected and/or has not 

been recently refreshed or updated. Thus resulting in the autodialer placing a call 

several seconds prior to the human agent’s ability to end the current call he or she 

is on and be ready to accept the new connected call that the autodialer placed, 

without human intervention, to Plaintiff. 

16. The dead air is essentially the autodialer holding the call it placed to 

Plaintiff until the next available human agent is ready to accept it. Should the call 

at issue been manually dialed by a live human being, there would be no such dead 

air as the person dialing Plaintiff’s cellular telephone would have been on the 

other end of the call the entire time and Plaintiff would have been immediately 

greeted by said person.

17. Defendant’s calls constituted calls that were not for emergency

purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).

18. Defendant’s calls were placed to a telephone number assigned to a 

cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls 

pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).

19. As of October 21, 2019, when Plaintiff first demanded that Defendant 

cease placing its calls to her cellular telephone, any such consent for Defendant to 

place its autodialed calls (assuming it existed in the first place), was revoked by 

Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” 

to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system on his cellular 

telephone pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). 

20. As a result of Defendant’s alleged violations of law by placing these 

automated calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone without prior express consent, 

Defendant caused Plaintiff harm and/or injury such that Article III standing is 

satisfied in at least the following, if not more, ways:

a. Invading Plaintiff’s privacy;

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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 5

b. Electronically intruding upon Plaintiff’s seclusion;

c. Intrusion into Plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his cellular 

telephone;

d. Impermissibly occupying minutes, data, availability to answer 

another call, and various other intangible rights that Plaintiff has as to 

complete ownership and use of his cellular telephone;

e. Causing Plaintiff to expend needless time in receiving, answering, 

and attempting to dispose of Defendant’s unwanted calls.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227)

21. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this 

Complaint as though fully stated herein.

22. Defendant violated the TCPA. Defendant’s violations include, but 

are not limited to the following:

(a) Within four years prior to the filing of this action, on multiple 

occasions, Defendant violated TCPA 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii) which states in 

pertinent part, “It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States . . . to 

make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the 

prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing 

system or an artificial or prerecorded voice — to any telephone number assigned to 

a . . . cellular telephone service . . . or any service for which the called party is 

charged for the call.

(b) Within four years prior to the filing of this action, on multiple 

occasions, Defendant willfully and/or knowingly contacted Plaintiff at Plaintiff’s 

cellular telephone using an artificial prerecorded voice or an automatic telephone 

dialing system and as such, Defendant knowing and/or willfully violated the 

TCPA.

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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 6

23. As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff is

entitled to an award of five hundred dollars ($500.00) in statutory damages, for 

each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B). If the Court finds 

that Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA, Plaintiff is entitled 

to an award of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500.00), for each and every 

violation pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).

24. Plaintiff is also entitled to seek injunctive relief prohibiting 

such conduct in the future.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violations of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 

559.55—559.785)

25. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of 

this Complaint as though fully stated herein.

26. Defendant violated the FCCPA. Defendant’s violations include, 

but are not limited to, the following:

a) Defendant violated FLA. STAT. § 559.72(7) by willfully

communicating with a debtor or any member of his or her family with 

such frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass a debtor or her or 

his family, or willfully engage in other conduct which can reasonably be

expected to abuse or harass a debtor or any member of her or his family.

27. Defendant’s conduct as detailed above were done willfully, for the 

purpose of harassing Plaintiff to pay the alleged debt.

28. As a result of the foregoing violations of the FCCPA, Defendant is 

liable to Plaintiff for actual damages, statutory damages, and attorney’s fees and 

costs.

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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 7

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violations of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq)

29. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference into this cause of 

action all of the above paragraphs as though fully stated herein. 

30. Defendant violated the FDCPA. Defendant’s violations include, but 

are not limited to the following:

a) Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692d by engaging in any 

conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, 

or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt;

b) Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692d(5) by causing a telephone 

to ring or engaging engaging any person in telephone 

conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, 

abuse, or harass any person at the called number.

 31. Defendant’s acts, as described above, were done intentionally with the 

purpose of coercing Plaintiff to pay the alleged debt. 

 32. As a result of the foregoing violations of the FDCPA, Defendant is 

liable to Plaintiff for actual damages, statutory damages, and attorney’s fees and 

costs, and, such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.

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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 8

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that judgment be entered

against Defendant for the following:

a) An injunction prohibiting Defendant from contacting Plaintiff on 

Plaintiff’s cellular telephone using an automated dialing system pursuant to 47 

U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A); and

b) As a result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), 

Plaintiff is entitled to and requests five hundred dollars ($500.00) in statutory 

damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B); and

c) As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 

U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiff is entitled to and requests treble damages, as provided 

by statute, up to one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500.00), for each and every 

violation pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C); and

d) Actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1) and FLA. STAT.

§ 559.77(2) for the emotional distress suffered as a result of both the intentional 

and/or negligent FDCPA and FCCPA violations, in amounts to be determined at 

trial and for Plaintiff.

e) Statutory damages from Defendant pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 

1692k(a)(2)(A) and FLA. STAT. § 559.77(2); and

f) Costs and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692k(a)(2)(A) and FLA. STAT. § 559.77(2); and

g) Awarding Plaintiff any pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as 

may be allowed under the law; and

h) For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and 

proper.

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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 9

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff, CLIFFORD MURRAY, hereby demands a trial by jury in the 

present action.

CRUMLEY LAW FIRM, P.A.

Dated: June 16, 2020

Benjamin H. Crumley

CRUMLEY LAW FIRM, P.A.

Florida Bar No.: 18284

Post Office Box 6018

Jacksonville, FL 32236

Telephone: (904) 359-5544

Facsimile: (904) 485-8422

Email: ben@cwbfl.com

Attorney for Plaintiff

 By: ______________________

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