Russian Urban Tactics:  Lessons from the Battle for Grozny by Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office
Note
Background
Conclusions
**Initial Troubles. When the Chechen troubles began, the Russian Army had been operating with little moneyand bare bones logistical support. It had not conducted a regiment- or division-scale field training exercise inover two years, and its battalions were lucky to conduct field training once a year. Most battalions weremanned at 55% or less. Approximately 85% of Russian youth were exempt or deferred from the draft, forcingthe army to accept conscripts with criminal records, health problems or mental incapacity. The Russian Armylacked housing for its officers and had trouble adequately feeding and paying its soldiers. It invadedChechnya with a rag-tag collection of various units, without an adequate support base. When the Chechensstood their ground, the sorry state of the Russian Army became apparent to the world.
	Before invading with regular forces, the Russians had trained and supplied the rebel Chechen forcesthat were hostile to the incumbent Chechen government. A force of 5,000 Chechen rebels and 85 Russiansoldiers with 170 Russian tanks attempted to overthrow the Chechen government with a *coup de main* bycapturing Grozny "from the march" as they had in years past captured Prague and Kabul. They failed and lost67 tanks in city fighting.

**A Second Mistake.**Instead of regrouping and waiting to regain surprise, Russian leaders ordered the armyinto Chechnya with no fully ready divisions. The Russian Army was forced to combine small units and sendthem to fight. Infantry fighting vehicles went to war with their crews, but with little or no infantry on board.In some cases, officers drove because soldiers were not available. Intelligence on the situation in Grozny wasinadequate. Only a few large-scale maps were available, and there were *no* maps available to tacticalcommanders. To make matters worse, because the city was not surrounded and cut off, the Chechengovernment was able to reinforce its forces throughout the battle.
	When the Russians first attempted to seize Grozny the last day of 1994, they tried to do it with tanksand personnel carriers but without enough supporting infantry. The available infantry had just been throwntogether, and many did not know even the last names of their fellow soldiers. They were told that they werepart of a police action. Some did not have weapons. Many were sleeping in the carriers even as the columnsrolled into Grozny. Tank crews had no machine gun ammunition. Lax preparation for this assault reflectedthe attitude of the defense minister, General Pavel Grachev, who had boasted earlier that month that he couldseize Grozny in two hours with one parachute regiment. So the Russians drove into Grozny expecting tocapture the city center and seat of government with only token resistance.
	But, tanks and personnel carriers, in the city without dismounted infantry support, were easy targetsto antitank gunners firing from the flanks or from above. The initial Russian armored columns wereswallowed up in the city streets and destroyed by Chechen gunners.
	After losing 105 of 120 tanks and personnel carriers the Russians fell back to consolidate for thelong, building-by-building battle.

**Planning for Urban Combat.** Russian intelligence missed the rapid construction of robust Chechendefenses in Grozny. The Russian columns, moving on parallel but nonsupporting axes, were cut off anddestroyed by Chechen forces. Russian planners concluded that high-tempo mounted thrusts to seize defendedcities are both ineffective and unjustified in terms of the attrition of personnel and equipment. They concludedthat contemporary urban combat requires the following steps. 

- All approaches to the city must be sealed off while detailed reconnaissance proceeds. 
- Key installations and buildings on the outskirts of the city must be taken once artillery hassuppressed defenders and assault positions have been occupied.
- The city's residential, industrial and central sections must be taken successively.
- Trapped enemy units must be eliminated, mines cleared, weapons collected and military control andcurfew established.

	These steps obviously suggest to planners that the first objective should be major industrial plants onthe outskirts of cities covering axes into the city. Because such plants, with their concrete and stone walls andunderground rooms and passages, are ideal for a lengthy, stubborn defense they must be captured before thecity can be attacked. Within the city, attacking forces must anticipate (1) defending tanks and direct-fireartillery in corner buildings or behind breaks in walls, (2) dismounted infantry on any story of buildings, (3)snipers and artillery observers in high-rise buildings, attics, and towers.
	Collateral damage, not a major consideration when fighting on foreign soil, becomes a particularworry when fighting in your own cities where your own people live.

**Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.** The Russians did their initial planning on 1:50,000 and1:100,000 scale maps. They lacked necessary, detailed, larger-scale maps in scale 1:25,000 or 1:12,500.Essential aerial photographs were not available for planning, because Russian satellites had been turned off tosave money and few aerial photography missions were flown. Lower-level troop commanders never receivedvital aerial photographs and large-scale maps.
	Despite the unclear intelligence picture, planners failed to take elementary precautions or to forecasthow the Chechens might defend the city. As the Russian columns moved to Grozny, they were surprised bysnipers, road blocks and other signs of Chechen determination to defend the city.

**Storm Groups and Detachments.** Soviet and Russian tactical methodology called for organizing stormgroups and storm detachments for city fighting. A storm group is usually a motorized rifle companyreinforced with a tank platoon, artillery battery, mortar platoon, AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher platoon,engineer platoon and chemical troops. It advances with a covering and consolidation group (a motorized rifleplatoon reinforced with antitank guns, grenade launchers and 82mm mortars) and an obstacle clearing party(combat engineers and mine-sweeping tanks). A storm detachment is usually a motorized rifle battalionreinforced with at least a battalion of artillery, a tank company, an engineer company, an air defense platoon,flamethrower squads and smoke generator personnel. Artillery and air support are available from divisionassets.
	Although storm groups and detachments were formed for urban combat following the New Year'sEve defeat, their formation was often counterproductive because it destroyed what unit integrity existed inplatoons, companies and battalions and gave commanders more assets than they could readily deploy andcontrol. It would have been better to use the standard tactical unit, then reinforce it with select weaponssystems where needed. For example, a motorized rifle platoon could field storm squads and cover and supportsquads, and a motorized rifle company could field storm platoons and cover and support platoons. The coverand support units would pin the enemy down by fire while the storm unit attacked. After the attack, the coverand support unit would become a reserve.

**Early Lessons.** The Russians successfully used direct-fire artillery, RPGs, automatic grenade fire andmachine gun fire to pin-down the Chechens while attacking through smoke to seize a building. They tossedgrenades through windows and doors before entering.
	Engineers effectively blew entry ways into the walls. Two three-man combat teams cleared eachroom. Once a building was captured, it was prepared for defense. Sewer approaches and enemy approachpaths were mined and booby trapped.
	Since the battle for a city continues non-stop, the Russians learned that they needed fresh troops andadequate reserves. Soviet doctrine called for a 4:1 advantage in troops for urban combat. Some 60,000Russians and 12,000 Chechens fought in Grozny, yet the Russian's 5:1 advantage was sometimes not enough,because they had to guard every building that they took.
	The Russians also learned that troops need to wear something distinctive (and easily changeable)during the assault to avoid fratricide.

**Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.** Soviet and Russian tactics specified that tanks would lead the assaultin city fighting followed by infantry fighting vehicles and dismounted infantry. Tank columns would move inherringbone formation along city streets. This proved disastrous in Grozny where the high density of antitankweapons threatened armored vehicles, while the depression and elevation limitations of Russian tank gunskept them from engaging targets located in basements or in the upper floors of multi-storied buildings.Antiaircraft guns, such  as the ZSU23-4 and 2S6, were effective against these targets. In Grozny, tanks andpersonnel carriers were formed into armored groups used to seal off captured areas, serve as a counterattackforce, provide security for rear installations and support advancing infantry from outside the range of enemyantitank weapons.
	The Russians began to take special precautions to protect their tanks and personnel carriers. Besideskeeping them behind the infantry, they outfitted some with a cage of wire mesh some 25-30 centimeters awayfrom the hull armor. These cages can defeat the shaped charge of the RPG-7 antitank grenade launcher, aswell as protecting the vehicle from a Molotov cocktail or a bundle of antitank grenades. The Chechens fieldedantitank hunter killer teams which moved toward the sound of engine noise to kill armored vehicles withvolley RPG-7 antitank fire from above, the flanks and behind. The Russians learned to counter these teamsby establishing ambushes on all approach routes and then running vehicles into selected areas as bait.
	City fighting in Grozny required much larger stocks of hand grenades, smoke grenades, demolitioncharges and disposable, one-shot antitank grenade launchers (similar to the U.S. light anti-ank weapon) thanexpected. Each infantry soldier needed a rope with a grappling hook for entering buildings. Light-weightladders were also very valuable for assaulting infantry. Trained snipers were essential, but were in shortsupply.
	Tank-mounted and dismounted searchlights were useful for night assault in the city. Searchlights (aswell as pyrotechnics) temporarily blinded enemy night-vision equipment and dazzled enemy gunners. Theyproduced a psychological attack against the enemy, while helping prevent fratricide in the assault.

**Artillery.** The Russians learned that conventional artillery fires are best used while approaching the city andwhile capturing the city outskirts. Then, they would deploy the bulk of their self-propelled artillery indirect-fire support of tanks and infantry. Because massed artillery fires create rubble in the very areas throughwhich a force wants to advance, direct-fire is preferable. Direct fire can be conducted  by guns, howitzers,multiple rocket launchers and the 82mm Vasilek automatic mortar. When Russian forces arrived at Grozny,they had few fire support coordinators and forward air controllers. Motorized rifle officers were not skilled inadjusting indirect artillery fire, but could readily aim and adjust direct fire.

**Air Power.**  The Russians used a lot of fixed-wing aircraft, but they were of limited tactical value in Grozny.They were used to provide support while artillery was moved into range. Because air strikes could not beprecisely targeted, attack fighter bombers concentrated on large "free-fire" zones. Fixed-wing aircraft provedof more value in attacking targets outside the city.
	Helicopter gunships were of much more value. They were used against snipers and weapons in theupper floors. The helicopters flew in behind captured high-rise buildings and would "pop-up" to engage thesetargets, but had to fly to and from the engagement area using the shelter of captured buildings.

**Smoke and Tear-Gas.** Smoke and white phosphorus rounds were useful in Grozny. White phosphorus,which burns upon explosion, creates a smoke  screen and, because smoke is essential for movement in cityfighting, every fourth or fifth Russian artillery or mortar round fired was a smoke or white phosphorus round. The Russians point out a side benefit of white phosphorus is that white phosphorus smoke is toxic andreadily penetrates protective mask filters. White phosphorus is not banned by any treaty. Tear gas grenadeswere also useful in the fighting in Grozny.
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