Humanitarian Assistance 

and Conflict in Africa

David R. Smock

UNITED STATES

INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Summary v

Foreword vii

1 Introduction 1

2 The Problem: Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict 2

3 The Complicating and Compromising Context 4

4 What Should Be Done? 6

5 Discussion of Three Cases 11

6 Critical Issues Requiring Attention 13

Symposium Participants 16

About the Author 17

About the Institute 18

CONTENTS
Humanitarian assistance provided in recent

years by nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs) in Africa has saved hundreds of

thousands of lives. While the value of these efforts

is increasingly recognized and appreciated, some

analysts have begun to assert that this kind of assistance on occasion exacerbates conflict rather

than contributing to peace. The urgency of this issue led the United States Institute of Peace to organize a day-long symposium in October 1995. 

The most direct negative impact occurs when

warring forces gain control of supplies intended

for civilians, either through imposing levies or

through theft. More indirectly, when international

NGOs meet the needs of civilian populations, the

government and rebels are freed to use their resources for war-making. Humanitarian assistance

may also unintentionally convey negative ethical

messages. 

NGO representatives at the symposium pointed

out the complicated and sometimes compromising context in which their organizations must operate. NGOs largely function as implementing

agents for donor governments and the United Nations. Since these donors are often not well informed about field conditions, they may impose

unrealistic restrictions and inappropriate mandates

on NGOs with whom they contract. Moreover,

emergency situations usually do not permit time

for the requisite planning to avoid all negative consequences. In any case, the positive outcomes from

providing humanitarian assistance almost always

outweigh the negative outcomes.

Symposium participants identified eight major

steps NGOs can take to minimize or eliminate the

negative impact of humanitarian aid: (1) improve

planning; (2) assess need more accurately; (3) analyze the consequences of agreements negotiated to

gain access to needy populations and obtain security for NGO personnel; (4) provide aid that will

have the longest term benefit to particular targeted

groups; (5) contract for independent monitoring

and evaluation of assistance programs to reduce

mismanagement and the diversion of supplies; (6)

make the empowerment of local institutions a high

priority; (7) coordinate closely with other assistance organizations operating in a particular crisis

situation; and (8) deploy human rights monitors

to help protect local populations from exploitation

and repression by the fighting factions. 

While political neutrality is a time-honored

principle, most faithfully observed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, several symposium participants asserted that some conflicts in

Africa require political involvement by NGOs.

Some also argued that NGOs should provide humanitarian assistance only when local populations

and factions agree to conditions that will ensure

the most effective use of relief supplies.

Many agreed that the provision of humanitarian

assistance could be an endless and futile process

unless accompanied by efforts, probably spearheaded by other bodies, to build peace. The symposium ended with a shared conviction that despite the travail that Africans have recently

suffered, African people are generally resilient and

hopeful. Africans will continue to grapple with

their issues and make progress in promoting

peace. International NGOs should remain engaged with Africans on this journey.

v

SUMMARY
vii

The good work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in recent conflicts in such

countries as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia is

well known—providing food, shelter, medicine,

and a host of other materials and services under

extremely difficult conditions. But does humanitarian assistance in some cases actually exacerbate

conflict? And if so, what can NGOs and the international community do to eliminate or mitigate

such effects?

At the request of several concerned NGOs, the

United States Institute of Peace organized a symposium on this issue, “Humanitarian Assistance

and Conflict in Africa,” in October 1995. This report summarizes the discussions and conclusions

of the symposium. 

That meeting in fact represents the intersection

of two program streams for the Institute. The first

is the Institute’s growing involvement with nongovernmental organizations. We focused on the

burgeoning role of NGOs in international conflict

at the “Managing Chaos” conference, which was

part of our tenth anniversary celebration in December 1995. Since then, we have formally

launched an initiative that I have been pleased to

direct with the assistance of Pamela Aall, program

officer in the Institute’s Education and Training

Program. This effort aims to provide a clearinghouse for Institute programs involving or impacting

on NGOs, coordinate activities among programs

and initiatives, and identify projects in which the

Institute can make a unique contribution to NGO

activities in conflict management. Much of this

work is done through an interprogram working

group on NGOs, chaired by Aall, that brings together Institute staff having significant experience

with NGOs to share information and plan further

efforts. 

Through informal consultations with NGO representatives and meetings such as the symposium

reported here, we are identifying new ways to respond to the needs of these organizations as their

pivotal role in international conflict resolution

evolves. For example, the Education and Training

Program is developing conflict resolution training

seminars geared specifically to the needs of the

NGO community, in addition to its current practice of including representatives from major international NGOs in the International Conflict Resolution Training (ICREST) programs.

Throughout the history of the Institute’s Grant

Program we have made a number of grants to

NGOs. Among these, grants to the Catholic Relief

Services and the World Peace Foundation seek to

clarify the roles NGOs are playing, and might play,

in early warning of emerging international conflicts. A grant to CARE-Canada will help that organization, along with some academic partners,

FOREWORD
think through more systematically the role of

NGOs in situations of international conflict.

The second major program stream comprises

the set of activities the Institute initiated relating to

Africa. David R. Smock, coordinator of our African

activities and director of our Grant Program, organizes these efforts. Under his leadership, the Institute engaged in Track II diplomacy involving Somali leaders and, more recently, Sudanese.

Institute conferences have also focused on conflict

resolution in South Africa and ways to promote implementation of the peace accords in Mozambique. A conference a year ago on the U.S. role in

peacemaking in Africa generated a book co-edited

by Smock and Africa specialist Chester A. Crocker

entitled African Conflict Resolution: The U.S.

Role in Peacemaking, published recently by the

United States Institute of Peace Press.

In deciding to organize the symposium on “Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa,” we carefully

considered the advice of Julia Taft and her colleagues at InterAction—a coalition of 150 American

humanitarian relief, development, and refugee organizations working internationally—and other

NGO representatives. We thank them for their

help and encouragement.

HARRIET HENTGES

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

viii
I

n recent years humanitarian assistance provided in situations of war and disaster by donor

governments, international organizations like

the United Nations (UN), and, particularly, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in situations

of war and disaster has saved hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of lives. The provision of food and medical supplies to refugees, displaced persons, and those near the battlefields in

Somalia, Rwanda, Zaire, Mozambique, Angola,

Liberia, Sudan, and elsewhere constitutes one of

the most heroic and life-preserving activities of our

time. Major NGOs like CARE, Save the Children,

Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and many

less well known organizations have been on the

front lines relieving desperate human suffering in

Africa. 

While the international community increasingly

recognizes and appreciates the value of these efforts, some analysts have begun to assert that humanitarian assistance on occasion exacerbates

conflict rather than contributing to peace. No one

questions that the value of this assistance far outweighs its occasional negative consequences, but

members of the assistance community find it necessary nevertheless to address the issues these analysts have raised. They want to assess the extent of

the damage and consider how to eliminate or minimize these negative consequences.

The urgency of this issue led the United States

Institute of Peace to organize a daylong symposium in October 1995 attended by forty experts

from NGOs, the State Department/U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID), the UN, universities, and think-tanks. Participants discussed

and debated assistance issues, with the principal

dialogue occurring among representatives of seventeen NGOs. In some respects the conversation

was painful, because no one likes to concede that

the highly acclaimed humanitarian assistance to

Africa has some negative externalities. Nevertheless, the importance of maintaining the integrity of

such endeavors led everyone to engage in an open

dialogue. Symposium organizers confined the discussion to Africa both because Africa has featured

so prominently in recent humanitarian assistance

operations and to focus the conversation.

The format of the discussion consisted of three

presentations followed by several hours of discussion. The first presenter, Mary Anderson, president

of The Collaborative for Development Action, has

been the leading analyst of this issue. She explored

particular ways in which humanitarian assistance

provided by NGOs in Africa at times contributes to

conflict rather than peace. Next, Julia Taft, president of InterAction, the umbrella organization for

American NGOs engaged in international relief

and development, discussed the kinds of problems facing NGOs that make these negative externalities so difficult to redress. Finally, John Prendergast of the Center of Concern recommended

creative ways to address these problems.

1

1INTRODUCTION
Anderson asserted that although NGOs do

not generate conflicts, they sometimes contribute to and reinforce violent conflicts

pre-existing in the societies where they work. The

negative impacts of humanitarian assistance comprise two basic types: the first results from the

transfer of resources, and the second involves “the

ethical message conveyed by the provision of 

assistance.” 

In the case of resource transfer, the most direct

impact occurs when warring forces and armies

gain control of supplies provided for humanitarian

assistance, either by imposing levies on humanitarian assistance operations or by stealing supplies. A

more indirect impact occurs when NGOs meet the

needs of civilian populations, which frees the warring factions to use their resources for war-making.

“Resources under the control of one or another

warring faction help buttress the power and continuing legitimacy of that warring faction,” Anderson said. Intergroup tensions are also reinforced

when NGOs provide external resources to some

groups and not to others. For instance, NGOs hire

people from certain groups and not others. When

NGOs have more funds than local governments,

that creates an imbalance between external resources and domestic resources, making it difficult

for local institutions to build for peace. Also,

NGOs hire away much of the best talent from domestic agencies. 

Illustrating some of these issues in relation to

Sudan, Prendergast wrote recently: 

In the context of Sudan, questions about the use

of aid to underwrite Khartoum’s war efforts remain unanswered. To what extent is the international community assuming the public welfare responsibilities of the Sudanese government,

thereby freeing resources for the war? Are aid

flights from Khartoum to the south supplying soldiers in the government garrisons rather than

civilians in need? Is money spent in the pursuit of

aid projects providing the government with a

source of hard currency used to prosecute the

war, and are donated food stocks in the north freeing Sudan production for export (reports say up

to a million tons of northern Sudanese sorghum

may be exported [in 1995] alone)? [John Prendergast, “Tie Humanitarian Assistance to Substantive

Reform,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July/August 1995, p. 42.]

Anderson next discussed the second type of

negative impact humanitarian aid can have, which

involves the ethical messages NGOs sometimes

convey. “When we negotiate with the parties who

are at war with each other in order to gain access to

the civilians behind the lines they control, when

we hire armed guards to protect our staff and our

delivery of goods in order to be able to operate in a

highly volatile and dangerous situation, when we

use the stories of war atrocities to educate and

fund raise back home, we become part of the conflict and we convey an implicit message that it is legitimate for arms to decide who gets access to humanitarian assistance,” Anderson said. NGOs also

sometimes express solidarity with groups engaged

in armed struggle against repressive regimes,

thereby indirectly reinforcing the conflict. Moreover, the moral legitimacy that accrues to a faction

because of support received from international

NGOs sometimes makes that faction less willing to

engage in peace negotiations.

NGOs send complicated and compromised ethical messages, Anderson argued, insofar as their

operations are now increasingly intertwined with

those of official agencies. Donor governments and

UN agencies increasingly rely on NGOs as their

field agents. Moreover, NGOs now collaborate

2

THE PROBLEM

Humanitarian

Assistance 

and Conflict

2
3

with military forces in the delivery of humanitarian

supplies. This raises questions about the nongovernmental and pacific character of NGOs and

also suggests they may be adopting some elements

of military operating style. Moreover, the military

preoccupation with logistics and delivery systems

may replace and in turn undermine local capacities to carry out locally initiated developmental activities. The predominant military presence can

also undermine civilian control, which in turn

slows peacebuilding.
J

ulia Taft, while noting that tens of millions of

people are alive today because NGOs delivered resources to them and advocated for

peace, justice, and human rights protection, acknowledged the seriousness of the problems Anderson identified. However, Taft urged that these

problems be considered in context, since NGOs

are not free agents. NGOs largely function as implementing agents for the UN and donor governments, and this imposes severe constraints on

their independence. In the case of the UN, member

states govern that body, which limits the freedom

of its agencies and in turn of NGOs under contract

to those agencies. For example, when atrocities

were occurring in Rwanda in the spring of 1994,

the government of Rwanda, which was complicit

with these atrocities, was sitting as a member of the

Security Council, which was considering actions to

halt the genocide. 

As for donor governments, they are compromised because they engage in arms sales and have

complicated trade linkages. Donors continue to favor relief aid at the expense of longer term development, which is where the real answers lie.

Donor priorities in turn largely dictate NGO programs. Moreover, donor governments often prefer

that NGOs distribute relief aid in the form of food

exported from donor countries, which thereby

benefits donor country farmers, even though local

economies would more likely benefit from purchases of local food. 

Emergency situations usually do not permit

time for the requisite planning. To avoid many of

the problems Anderson identified, Taft continued,

NGOs must preplan extensively. They must involve local officials in planning, train local relief

workers in-country, and pre-position stocks to

which relief agencies have access. But these steps

are usually not feasible in an emergency. Moreover,

the existence of Hutu militias in the camps in

Goma, Zaire, the teenage bandits in Liberia and Somalia, and warlords in many countries create confusing and unfamiliar environments in which

NGOs must function. NGOs must continually remind themselves that the situation they confront is

not their situation. It belongs to the local people,

and NGOs must ask local people how to deal with

it. This means developing local partnerships and

investing resources in training. 

Other participants offered additional insights

regarding the complicating context in which international NGOs must operate in Africa. To avoid exacerbating conflict, it is essential to support moderates and work with local groups that are working

for peace. But how can NGO staff consistently differentiate the good guys from the bad guys, particularly in the chaotic conditions that often surround emergencies? It is not always possible to

intervene without fueling local rivalries. Moreover,

some NGOs, like Church World Service, are not

operational, in that they provide money to local

partners who direct the relief projects. When an

NGO is not directly operational, it may have even

less control over whether its resources exacerbate

conflict. 

Focusing attention exclusively on the negative

impact of humanitarian assistance neglects the

positive effects, which also have to be considered.

Peter Shiras of InterAction stated, “To simply present the negative side of either ‘taxation’ or theft by

the belligerents is an incomplete recitation of what

is obviously a much more complex reality.” Some

types of negative effects may be a cost of doing

business in such difficult circumstances. “We need

to distinguish between those factors we can influence and those we cannot, and then look at ways

in which we can really minimize the factors we can

3

THE COMPLICATING

AND COMPROMISING

CONTEXT

4
5

affect, like theft and taxation,” Shiras said. But

NGOs cannot agonize over factors they cannot

control or affect, such as relief assistance freeing

up local resources for war-making. 

Donor governments and the UN frequently are

not well informed about field conditions, and, in

turn, they often impose unrealistic restrictions and

inappropriate mandates on NGOs with whom

they contract. Michael Bryans of CARE-Canada

noted that new conditions also make standard operating procedures inapplicable. NGOs are “finding themselves in perverse situations, like CARECanada running a Rwandese refugee camp in

Zaire, five percent of whose residents are almost

certainly genocidal killers.” 

Susanne Riveles of Lutheran World Relief

pointed out that NGOs’ humanitarian imperative

requires immediate responses to save people from

starvation. This pressure does not permit the careful analysis and preplanning required to avoid

some of the negative by-products of humanitarian

assistance. 

Political chaos, transition, or authoritarianism

encountered in countries like Liberia, Somalia,

Rwanda, and Sudan pose major contextual difficulties for NGOs. In some cases, like Somalia, the

government has disappeared and the state has collapsed, noted Hussein Adam of the College of the

Holy Cross. Conventional approaches no longer

work when NGOs have to confront factions and

fighting, as in Liberia and Somalia. In those countries factions and alliances shifted constantly and

war maneuvers were difficult to track. 

Russ Kerr of World Vision International emphasized how confusing these situations are for

NGOs. NGOs must do better at sharing information so they can understand the political agendas

of various factional leaders and warlords, the territory they control, and the level of their popular

support. As an example Kerr cited the difficulty

NGOs had in comprehending and interacting with

the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)

during the Mozambique civil war. Ultimately, humanitarian relief can succeed only when it is

linked to initiatives aimed at resolving political differences among the factions in conflict. NGOs

themselves need not be involved in peace negotiations, but their long-term goal must be the generation of peace.

Understanding and addressing the often

chaotic political dynamics undergirding these conflicts is critical to successful interventions. Angela

Raven Roberts of UNICEF said members of the age

group from six to twenty-six are becoming “the

fodder for conflicts of the future: They have been

marginalized, disenfranchised, thrown out of history, thrown out of culture, and thrown out of economics. [It is these people] who are going to be the

perpetuators of new conflicts in the future.” Francis Deng of the Brookings Institution stressed that

the international community needs to hold African

governments, like the Sudanese government, accountable when they fail to shoulder responsibility

for their citizens, since that failure is what precipitates humanitarian crises.
Planning 

The first requirement to reduce the negative externalities of humanitarian assistance is improved

planning, John Prendergast said. NGOs and agencies must assemble capable and well-prepared

teams that are ready for deployment. A good example of such a team is the rapid response team

UNICEF is currently organizing for deployment in

any new emergency. CARE and other NGOs are exploring how they might pre-position experienced

personnel in situations deemed likely to explode.

To facilitate this, they can employ experts on the

country in crisis on a short-term basis to provide

training and advice on how to minimize the negative consequence of humanitarian assistance. Having ethnological and sociological expertise within

an agency can help that agency develop appropriate population profiles before an emergency

erupts. Risk mapping in advance can make emergency responses much more efficient and reduce

the mistakes that sustain or exacerbate conflict.

The development of an effective information system is also critical. Careful preplanning can minimize dislocations of populations, which is important because military factions can usually

manipulate aid to displaced populations more easily than aid to those who remain in their homes.

Prendergast said that donors should require operating agencies to demonstrate short- and

medium-term plans of action as a condition for receiving support. “Many agencies responding to the

mass exodus of Rwandans into Zaire and Tanzania

were not fully aware of the political and military

structures that were quickly being reconstituted in

the camps, and, in turn they were not prepared to

cope with them,” he said. Much of the difficulty

NGOs have encountered in these camps resulted

from this lack of early preparedness, he asserted.

Accurate Assessments of Need

Factional authorities typically inflate population

figures and exaggerate food requirements because

this creates a surplus that is easy to divert, Prendergast pointed out. As a result, unofficial markets for

the trade of stolen commodities emerge as a factor

NGOs need to be on the lookout for. For example,

where do the commodities go? Who sells them?

Who gets the money? Who else benefits? 

Agencies need to ascertain the factors that create vulnerability: What causes the food system to

break down or people’s health to deteriorate?

Those undertaking assessments often interview

the wrong people. NGOs frequently accept

skewed and biased reports given by local informants. An important corrective would be to interview women, who are typically excluded from

these assessments but who know more about

household needs. 

Accurate surveys sometimes lead to unanticipated conclusions. In Somaliland an assessment

following the resumption of conflict in 1994 discovered that most of the displaced people were

able to fend for themselves. A major relief effort

might have only added fuel to the conflict. “Limiting involvement to active monitoring may be the

most helpful response in some situations,” Prendergast said. 

Access and Security

In the process of negotiating humanitarian access,

NGOs and agencies often give weight to political

balance and expediency rather than objective and

independent assessment, according to Prendergast. “This is further complicated when humanitarian diplomats capitulate to the invocation of sovereignty by host governments,” he said. For example,

4

WHAT SHOULD BE

DONE?

6
7

governments like Sudan’s often insist that aid

agencies meet their alleged food requirements as

the price for access to rebel-held areas. Belligerents

are most likely to offer access routes because of the

advantages their armies can gain from the arrangement. “Warring parties often use negotiated access

agreements to build credibility in international circles and deflect criticism about their war tactics.” 

Commercial channels offer one innovative way

to gain access to food deficit areas in conflict situations. The World Food Program sells commodities

to Somali merchants in Mombasa, Kenya, and contracts with them to transport the goods to designated sites in Somalia. The merchants are responsible for gaining access, which along

with security is largely assured

through clan protection. Another effective approach is to bring supplies

across a variety of entry points from

bases in neighboring countries. 

“Using various cross-border channels and small ports, and even beach

landings like those employed in Somalia in 1992, lessens agency dependence on large-scale distribution 

networks that are vulnerable to extortion,” Prendergast said.

Humanitarian agencies have an

understandable preoccupation with

security, which, however, generates several problems. In Somalia in 1992 the UN and NGOs 

focused too much attention on agency security

rather than on finding alternative distribution

strategies that could have reduced security requirements. The military protection currently being

provided in the Rwandan refugee camps by two

battalions of Zairian soldiers hired by the UN on

contract has not addressed fundamental problems. Law and order have improved, Prendergast

said, but the underlying source of regional insecurity (mixing civilian refugees with militia who are

guilty of genocide) has not been addressed 

successfully. 

Selection and Targeting of Aid

Donors need to select types of aid carefully, Prendergast said. It is more tempting to steal and divert

certain kinds of inputs than others. For instance,

rice is a high-value food item in Somalia, and at the

peak of the crisis it was attractive to looters, while

other types of grains were just as nutritious but did

not have the same resale value. Similarly, medicines can be stolen and then usually resold for

cash. Other problematic aid strategies involve

those that respond only to symptoms and promote dependency, as opposed to those that encourage self-reliance. Also, in some cases strong

reasons may exist for giving aid to armies or rebel

groups so they do not divert aid away from local

populations.

Prendergast noted that donors still generally

prefer to finance relief assistance while other kinds

of aid could more effectively prevent conflict. 

Sustainability ought to be the overriding principle,

he said. “External responses to emergencies

should be driven by what already works at the 

local level: the structures already in place and supported by the community, and the indigenous social welfare mechanisms and kinship exchange

processes already functioning.” 

Thomas Alcedo of CARE reaffirmed the need to

shift the balance from relief to development. Although it is more difficult to obtain grants and contracts for development projects and they attract

less media attention, such projects address root

problems and are less likely to contribute to 

conflict than the simple provision of relief supplies, he said.

Another key component of successful targeting

is to direct aid to those most adversely affected by

the conflict. Navigating along critical fault lines of

gender, class, and ethnic/clan identity “is a critical

ingredient in minimizing the offtake of aid by the

warring factions,” Prendergast said. Local leaders

cannot always be relied on to target those most in

Donors need to select types of aid

carefully. . . . For instance, rice is a highvalue food item in Somalia, and at the peak of

the crisis it was attractive to looters, while other

types of grains were just as nutritious but did

not have the same resale value.
need, because their decisions are likely to be influenced by “relations of entitlement based on a combination of political and ethnic considerations, as

well as social debts that villagers are thought to

owe leaders and various elites in the community.”

Experience in places like Ethiopia during the l980s

convinced many donors that NGOs should deliver

commodities directly to famine-affected populations rather than relying on host governments

when those governments are parties to the conflict. In many crisis situations, local authorities

have proven to be more predatory than helpful in

distributing assistance.

The use of family ration cards is one important

remedial step. Moreover, women generally should

receive food aid and be heavily involved in the

planning process, according to Prendergast, because they are usually the custodians of family welfare. In some places alternative planning and distribution structures have been adopted. For

instance, in southern Sudan the World Food Programme has instituted local relief committees,

which are popularly elected bodies responsible for

much of the planning and distribution of aid. In

the Rwandan camps in Zaire, attempts have been

made to promote women’s groups as well as technical committees to oversee health and water issues, in order to bypass the military structures. 

These measures help empower the community,

which should be a key objective of humanitarian

assistance. In so far as these measures increase local control and local accountability, they help reduce diversion of aid. Factional leaders may still

approach local relief committees and negotiate for

a certain share of the food, but at least this kind of

diversion is negotiated and open. 

Cost Standardization

In addition to diversion of supplies, the excessive

amounts of money paid to local authorities and

factions for supplies and equipment often fuel conflicts. Prendergast said the UN and NGOs need to

cooperate closely to keep payments at reasonable

levels. All agencies operating in Baidoa, Somalia,

collaborated to reduce the amounts paid to rent

vehicles. In Rwanda, Save the Children-UK organized NGOs to set price controls on housing,

transport, and local salaries. In Sudan, NGOs and

donors cooperated to undermine that government’s

efforts to manipulate foreign exchange rates to its

advantage. 

Independent Monitoring

The deployment of field monitors helped dramatically reduce the amount of diversion in both

Rwanda and Angola, Prendergast said. He quoted

one NGO representative as saying that monitoring

is monotonous and boring, but critical in cutting

down mismanagement and diversion. The more

sophisticated warring parties become in manipulating aid to serve their war-making purposes, the

more essential it is that agencies regularly evaluate

the effects of their interventions. Monitoring and

evaluation can help NGOs gauge the proper levels

of aid and the appropriate groups to target.

Empowerment of Local Institutions and

Capacity Building

Several participants identified empowerment and

capacity building as the most important remedial

strategies. Prendergast noted that according to the

Geneva conventions, the responsibility for the welfare of civilian populations rests with local authorities. NGOs can encourage these authorities to live

up to their responsibilities. If they fail to do so, relief and development agencies need to challenge

them. In addition, NGOs can help local authorities

build their capacities. He cited several examples of

capacity building, including the development of

district councils in Somalia, the strengthening of

the humanitarian branches of the rebel movements in southern Sudan, and assistance to government ministries in post-genocide Rwanda. 

Joel Charney of Oxfam America said international actors, including American NGOs, too frequently think foreigners must parachute in to save

local people in places like Somalia. Most relief,

UN, and military officials in Somalia assumed that

all Somalis were out to cheat them and that no

worthy Somali partners could be found. In contrast, the Oxfam philosophy is to give highest priority to finding local NGOs with whom Oxfam and

other international NGOs can work, and with

some effort they did find effective Somali organizations. International intervention in Somalia resembled a military logistical exercise more than an 

8
9

attempt to empower Somalis to cope with their 

crisis, Charney said.

Engagement requires coordination and constant vigilance. Prendergast said NGOs and other

agencies must consistently challenge checkpoints,

shakedowns, searches, and other abuses by any of

the warring parties. One long-time observer of Sudan concluded that whatever reforms the Sudan

People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) has made to adhere to human rights and humanitarian principles

have resulted from pressure exerted by NGOs and

donors.

The building of local capacity requires sustained

engagement and training

by NGOs. The Swedish Life

and Peace Institute has

training centers in Garowe,

Jowhar, and Baidoa where

it pairs international trainers with Somali counterparts to help create district

councils. In Ethiopia the

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is helping build local

capacity of woreda councils to manage food security, natural resource protection, and disaster 

prevention. 

Strong local NGOs can provide some of the

greatest insurance against the local manipulation

of relief supplies by military factions. To play this

role, local NGOs need encouragement and support from international NGOs, Adam said.

Granted, some local NGOs, like some in Somalia,

have profit-making agendas or may even behave

more like pirates than like servants to those in

need. Hence, international NGOs have to be careful in selecting their local partners. But many indigenous NGOs in Somalia are run by professionals whose motives are as altruistic as those of

American NGOs. Since Somalia has little governmental structure, local NGOs may begin to fill

much of the void. Adam pointed to the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) as a model of what a local

NGO can do to provide relief and stimulate development during wartime. The SPLA could usefully

model itself on ERA’s operations, he suggested. 

African governments often inhibit and stifle local NGOs because they regard them as threats to

governmental authority and control. Taft indicated

that international NGOs, through their relationship with local NGOs, offer them legitimacy and

protection, which helps shield them against controls imposed by their own governments. 

While donors and NGOs consistently give lip

service to capacity building, Alcedo pointed out,

they do not generally give it high priority in their

field operations. Capacity building should be directed at both local NGOs and local governmental

structures to enable them to

solve their own

problems. The

development of

local capacities is

the only alternative to what

seems like an unending process

of foreigners

parachuting in to

each new crisis

spot. Another

speaker added

that local institutions may also cope more successfully with factional leaders and troops that are misusing relief supplies. 

Human Rights Monitoring

While it may be controversial for NGOs to monitor

human rights and engage in human rights issues,

Prendergast said, human rights monitoring, human rights advocacy, and human rights capacity

building should be critical components in the international response to African conflicts and emergencies. “The mandates of most operational agencies prevent them from speaking out aggressively

and publicly on human rights issues, but many of

these agencies provide valuable information to human rights groups privately,” he said. In the future,

NGOs need to coordinate more closely among

themselves on human rights issues. For instance,

when Medecins Sans Frontiers withdrew from

Ethiopia in 1984 and again from the Rwandan

refugee camps in Zaire in 1994 to protest human

rights abuses, other agencies remained. Such differing responses can create confusion both 

Strong local NGOs can provide some

of the greatest insurance against

the local manipulation of relief supplies

by military factions. To play this role,

local NGOs need encouragement and

support from international NGOs.
10

internationally and locally. Quietly coordinating

who stays and who goes and blows the whistle

could significantly advance the cause of human

rights, Prendergast said.

Coordination

At the outset of a major emergency that draws

dozens of agencies to the scene, coordination and

a rational division of responsibility are critical, in

part to avoid manipulation by warring factions,

Prendergast said. The UN’s Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) should take the lead in

coordinating operational agencies and developing

an appropriate division of labor. If the major agencies can agree on a coordination mechanism, their

leadership by example can influence others. 

Lionel Rosenblatt of Refugees International, quoting the late Fred Cuny, said this kind of coordination requires a single strong leader, similar to the

role played by the UN in the person of Sir Robert

Jackson in Cambodia. 

But coordination is far from easy. As Kevin McCort of CARE-Canada noted, NGOs disagree over

major issues, such as the degree of risk to which

they will subject their staff. Donors and operating

agencies may convey conflicting messages to the

international public about the nature of a particular crisis and the most suitable response. Donor

governments often respond to domestic political

agendas both in interpreting and in responding to

crises, which may put them at odds with DHA and

the operating agencies. 

Anderson pointed out that it is usually easier to

coordinate the external actors among themselves

than to coordinate them with local authorities and

local NGOs. The full empowerment of local institutions may not be compatible with strong leadership from DHA or any other external actor. 

The interests and agendas of NGOs are not always consistent with those of donors and local

African governments. David Shinn of the U.S. Department of State reported growing nervousness

over the increasing and, some would say, excessive

power of NGOs in humanitarian emergencies. On

the other side, Roberts observed, NGOs must

sometimes collaborate closely among themselves

to stand up to donors and the local government

on issues about which they feel strongly. 

InterAction, as the umbrella organization for

American NGOs operating internationally, is helping these NGOs develop strategies for field coordination, Taft reported. Hopefully, international

NGOs based in Europe will be included in the

process later on. 
11

Recent emergencies in Sudan, Somalia, and Sierra

Leone illustrate many of the issues discussed.

Sudan

In Sudan, according to Prendergast, there have

been massive diversions of relief supplies; civilians

have been used as shields by the various armed

factions; favoritism exhibited by certain NGOs in

the distribution of relief supplies has intensified

the conflict; and the warring factions have consistently violated humanitarian principles. To combat

these problems, the agencies operating in Sudan

now engage the factions almost daily, urging and

pressuring them to behave more responsibly. Recent progress is evident in persuading the southern rebels to adopt and begin to adhere to the

Geneva conventions and other humanitarian principles, including the Convention on the Rights of

the Child. The coordinating body, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), has also achieved very impressive progress in introducing a new system to assess local food requirements. In the past, poor

assessments enabled the military factions to divert

or steal large quantities of relief supplies. The current assessments do not merely measure food requirements, but also consider food within the total

economic context. 

OLS has made some progress in strengthening

local authority structures as part of the relief operations. Women-led distribution planning structures

are now functioning in some localities. This emphasis on female leadership sometimes conflicts

with local tradition, but it is consistent with women’s predominant roles in household and food

economies. Limited progress has also been made

in strengthening the civilian relief wings of the two

southern rebel organizations. Human rights monitoring has also been introduced. Although the success of these measures will have to be evaluated

over time, they do represent dramatic progress

over five years ago. At that time UN and NGO relief

campaigns disastrously undermined local production, and relief supplies were regularly stolen or 

diverted.

Will Thach, formerly of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), affirmed some of

the progress that has been made. The new food

economy surveys in southern Sudan are a dramatic improvement over past practice. Local relief

committees effectively involve local Sudanese in

decisions regarding both food distribution and the

process of distribution. Coordination among agencies, in sharp contrast to what happens in Rwanda,

is impressive. On the other hand, Thach said he

has been disappointed by his experience with the

relief wings of the southern rebel organizations.

They were too closely linked and controlled by the

military factions, with military needs usually given

paramount consideration. The most depressing

factor is that, despite the efficiency of relief operations, humanitarian assistance has not brought

peace, Thach said. Relief agencies struggle to promote local food security and then military operations undermine the progress made. Based on his

frustrations in both southern Sudan and Rwanda,

Thach said, “Speaking as a person who has spent

time in the field, there was hardly a day that I or

one of my colleagues didn’t think or make the

comment that we should pull out altogether, that

what we were doing was a mistake.”

Deng underscored the culpability of the government in Khartoum. He said that the government in

Khartoum manipulates the differences among the

rebel factions and strives to undermine the relief

effort, in the belief that humanitarian aid to the

south only augments the fighting strength of the

southern rebels. 

5DISCUSSION OF

THREE CASES
Somalia

The most notable feature of the relief operation in

Somalia in late 1995 was the degree to which the

Somali Aid Coordination Body succeeded in promoting collaboration among the operating agencies. This coordinating body developed a code of

conduct that guides humanitarian operations in

Somalia. Consistent with this code, development

activities in the post-emergency phase will be provided only on condition that safety can be assured

for agency personnel and supplies. Many donors

and NGOs have withdrawn from Somalia because they have become

frustrated and question

the effectiveness of their

assistance. As already

mentioned, much relief is

now efficiently delivered

through commercial

channels, using indigenous networks. This experiment needs to be evaluated to draw lessons for

other relief operations. UNDP, the designated lead

agency in Somalia, concentrates on gathering and

sharing information and closely monitoring 

developments. 

Stephen Tomlin of the International Medical

Corps emphasized the value of the Somali Aid Coordination Body, which has given the UN, donors,

international NGOs, and Somali NGOs an opportunity to share information and be heard. Prior to

December 1994, when it was moved from Nairobi

to Europe, this body was an effective clearinghouse for field operations. 

Sierra Leone

Symposium participants hope that lessons learned

from Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda can be applied

in Sierra Leone, site of the most recent humanitarian crisis in Africa. Roberts urged DHA and collaborating NGOs to grasp the nature of the conflict

and the warring parties more successfully than

they did in other African crises. NGO staff must

produce accurate background information and incorporate it in their plans. “Let’s find which of

these relief strategies could work for Sierra Leone

and which we, as the responsible and caring community, are willing to try out in Sierra Leone,”

Roberts said.

Will Lynch, until recently Catholic Relief Services’ (CRS) manager of relief services in Sierra

Leone, lamented the failure of international planning commissions on Sierra Leone to consult with

those with field experience and operational responsibility in the

country. These

commissions

have also failed to

engage local

NGOs in either

planning or operations. Assessment missions

typically fail to visit the areas of greatest need because those places are dangerous. It is encouraging, however, that international NGOs have been

incorporated in the DHA-sponsored assessment

mission for Sierra Leone, Taft said. One role these

NGOs can play is to insist that the assessment mission fully comprehend the political dynamics underlying the conflict, and not merely plan the logistics of a relief operation. William DeMars of the

University of Notre Dame recommends that assessment teams make direct contact with the rebel

group, not just with the government in Freetown. 

Unfortunately, not all NGOs operating in Sierra

Leone have been willing to sign the code for humanitarian operations drafted by CRS, ICRC, and

others. This generates inconsistency, Lynch noted.

On the other hand, NGOs collaborated successfully in eliminating the original distortions and inflation in the list of displaced persons reportedly in

Freetown, he said. By hiring local chiefs at the rate

of $100 per month to verify the lists, they reduced

the census of displaced persons from 750,000 to

287,000. This helped substantially reduce the diversion and theft of relief supplies. 

12

Assessment missions typically fail

to visit the areas of greatest need

because those places are dangerous. 
13

Political Neutrality

One of the time-honored and cardinal principles of

humanitarian assistance, best exemplified and

practiced by the ICRC, is political neutrality. But,

Roberts asserted, NGOs and donors can no longer

avoid the political issues by claiming neutrality.

The fact that several current wars are wiping out

whole populations and ways of life makes it essential that NGOs confront the political dimension. As

Deng noted, NGOs have to recognize that their

work is linked to the challenge of peace, because

the most important humanitarian objective is to

end wars. And yet, although many wars seem

senseless, others are waged in pursuit of just ends.

When a war is fought to challenge the severe oppression of a minority group, can NGOs merely

claim neutrality and confine their attention to 

humanitarian assistance?

Prendergast argued that the humanitarian community has to be fully aware of the politicization of

its activities. Although rarely intended, the actions

of NGOs often influence both the military and political dimensions of conflicts. DeMars noted that

neutrality might work for organizations like the

ICRC in cases of traditional interstate conflict, and

also in civil wars where the warring parties look

like little states. However, in the case of failed

states, like Somalia and Liberia, where the multiple

factions each lack the internal coherence of a state,

it is an open question how the ICRC model of neutrality can be adapted to fit. DeMars continued, 

“A generic problem for aid operations in failed

states is that the boundary between the political

and humanitarian erodes. CARE-Canada has genocidal killers in its refugee camp in Zaire, and whatever CARE does affects the fate of the killers and

their hostages, and has a dramatic effect on the

politics. So CARE is stuck in a situation where it

loses its ability to maintain its humanitarian character by keeping politics at bay and having someone else handle politics.”

Underscoring the inevitability of political involvement, DeMars argued that successful peacemaking requires the international community to

combine humanitarian relief and political involvement, but ideally different sets of actors would

handle the two dimensions. “Successful humanitarian operations require that somebody else, not

the agencies providing relief assistance, is doing

the heavy lifting politically,” DeMars said. “When

no one else is doing that, the NGOs get stuck in situations where their humanitarian personnel become targets of the warring parties. That is one

thing that happens when the distinction between

humanitarian and political erodes; it is always 

ambiguous.”

Conditionality

It is a well-established practice that donors place

conditions on development and security assistance. But, Prendergast said, “humanitarian assistance to areas of the world not thought to be of 

vital strategic importance has largely been exempt

from such overt conditions.” Agencies on the

ground, however, continuously experiment with

conditionalities, often outside standard operating

frameworks. Humanitarian assistance is the major

outside resource for many war-torn areas, and in

turn the suspension of humanitarian assistance

can serve as a significant lever on the warring factions. Before NGOs impose conditions or threaten

to suspend aid, however, they must elicit the views

of the local populations, Prendergast said. They

should canvass local civilians about the magnitude

of abuses committed by factions and whether to

impose conditions or terminate assistance. NGOs

could ask local populations whether to go public

about the abuses, recognizing that this might 

6CRITICAL ISSUES

REQUIRING ATTENTION
require their organizations to withdraw or run the

risk of being expelled. Or should the agencies continue their aid and remain silent?

Thach argued in favor of putting conditions on

the provision of humanitarian assistance. When a

factional leader abuses local civilians or obstructs

and diverts the delivery of supplies, NGOs have a

responsibility to object and not be complicit.

NGOs have to be faithful to their own mandates

and principles. 

Consultation with factional leaders might generate agreement on a code of conduct to be observed by both military and civilian leaders as a

condition for continuing assistance. The UN and

rebel leaders in southern Sudan have reached such

an agreement whereby assistance could be reduced or suspended if humanitarian assistance is

misused on a significant scale or if other abuses are

observed.

On the other hand, NGOs are not lone operators, Kerr pointed out. They depend on donations

from home populations and contracts from donor

governments and international organizations. If

these contributors do not support conditionality

and threats of withdrawal, then NGOs cannot take

independent action. Many NGOs depend completely on continued donor support.

The imposition of conditions and threats of

withdrawal are pointless unless all the NGOs operating in a particular locale are

united. But Taft

described the difficulty NGOs have

had in developing

a common front

in terms of

whether to continue their operations in Somalia

and in the Rwandan camps in

Zaire. In the case of the camp in Goma, twelve

agencies threatened to withdraw, but representatives of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) reminded them that if they departed,

other NGOs were waiting to replace them so that

their withdrawal would have no material impact. 

While conditionality may sound appealing to

those at NGO headquarters, one participant

pointed out, NGOs cannot in good conscience terminate food shipments to women and children at

risk of starvation. Compassion dictates against

conditionality. NGOs have to accept some diversion of supplies as the price for getting lifesupporting supplies to those at great risk. Conditions, the participant continued, usually hurt most

those the NGOs most want to help. 

Professionalism and Training

The lack of professionalism among more marginal

NGOs adds to the negative impact of humanitarian assistance. Some NGOs are more interested in

convincing their donors that they are productively

engaged with an emergency than they are in assuring them that their work is productive and conducted responsibly. 

Roberts emphasized that all NGOs need to train

field staff more effectively as a means of ensuring

effectiveness and responsible action. Field staff are

placed in increasingly demanding positions and

they need training not only in logistics but in microeconomics, anthropology, and micro-politics. In

addition, new research needs to be widely disseminated among NGO staff to ensure that they base

operations on the most current knowledge and insights. NGOs need to acquaint themselves, for 

example, with a recent 

Oxfam-UK publication entitled Organizational Response to Conflict as a

step toward professionalizing their staff and operations, Roberts said. Another participant urged

dissemination of recent research in what might be

termed the anthropology

of war. Furthermore, field

staff whose capabilities are

limited to the movement and delivery of supplies

cannot handle the ethical dilemmas and political

complications of operating in a camp in Goma or

in 

Somalia, she said. 

As satellite communication to remote areas improves, staff can access Internet and receive ongoing training while in the field. Kerr recommended

14

When a factional leader abuses

local civilians or obstructs

and diverts the delivery of supplies,

NGOs have a responsibility to object

and not be complicit.
that NGOs develop a set of papers considered 

essential reading before staff engage in any dialogue or negotiations with the local populace, government, or factions. Providing field staff with current information on the political and military

dynamics of a conflict situation will help them

avoid blunders and miscalculations that could

jeopardize the mission. 

Public Information

One reason NGO staff do not discuss the negative

externalities of humanitarian assistance more

openly is their concern that donors and the press

might misunderstand or exaggerate the seriousness of the problem and cast doubt on the whole

enterprise of humanitarian assistance. McCort indicated that the Canadian public is increasingly

aware of the negative side of humanitarian assistance, but remains supportive. NGOs need to

make a commitment to engage the public and the

press, he added. The positive stories need to be

told without denying the failures. The media need

to be shown the problems and dilemmas NGOs

and others confront in the field. Another participant suggested that a forum similar to this one be

organized to permit dialogue between NGOs and

the press about the successes and shortcomings of

humanitarian assistance, making it clear that on

balance the outcome is overwhelmingly positive. 

Peacebuilding

Some NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance

want to play expanded roles in promoting peace.

As stated earlier, humanitarian assistance must be

supplemented by peacemaking, whether by governments or international organizations. But there

may be new peacemaking roles for NGOs as well.

Kerr urged that NGOs share information on the

state of the conflict. They could develop a common

vocabulary and taxonomy to help them communicate about “changes in the conflict or a famine or

an economic collapse or a state of violence.” Such

communication would prepare them for new situations they are about to face and enable them to be

more effective actors in relation to peacemaking.

Prendergast expressed confidence that NGOs

can play new peacemaking roles well beyond the

sharing of early warning information. Because

NGOs are engaged at the grass roots, they can effectively promote participatory dialogue as a first

step toward local and regional conflict resolution

and peacemaking. NGOs can help build the

bridges among communities that are so critical to

peacebuilding and to post-conflict reconciliation. 

The longer-term process of peacebuilding is

aided through the strengthening of civil society.

Rudy von Bernuth of Save the Children said building local institutions that can support participatory democratic processes and pluralism is the

best way to ensure a lasting peace. NGOs contribute to this process when they establish effective

partnerships with local institutions, including 

local NGOs. 

The goal for local institutions and their international NGO partners must be to establish the rule

of law and responsible governance in troubled

African states. Once these strategies are in place,

African societies can handle their crises without

collapse or violent upheaval. 

The symposium ended with a shared conviction

that, despite the travail Africans have recently suffered, African people are generally resilient and

hopeful. They will continue to grapple with their

issues and in time peace will be more the rule than

the exception. International NGOs must remain

engaged with Africa through this journey. DeMars

said, “Religious NGOs can talk about faithfulness;

secular NGOs can talk about a new kind of solidarity, the solidarity of staying with these communities as they sort their way into the future. A future

will emerge, and we want to be with them to discover that.” Africans have not lost hope, and they

will continue to experiment with new approaches.

International NGOs need to remain their partners.

15
Pamela Aall, United States Institute of Peace

Hussein Adam, College of the Holy Cross

Thomas Alcedo, CARE

Mary Anderson, Collaborative for Development

Action

James Bishop, InterAction

Katherine Blakeslee, USAID

Michael Bryans, CARE-Canada

Polly Byers, USAID

Joel Charney, Oxfam America

William DeMars, University of Notre Dame

Francis Deng, Brookings Institution

Jennifer Douglas, USAID

Jeanne Downen, CARE

Karen Elshazly, American Refugee Committee

Dina Esposita, Save the Children

Harriet Hentges, United States Institute of Peace

Russ Kerr, World Vision International

Lauren Landis-Guzman, Save the Children

David Loudon, World Relief Corporation

Will Lynch, Catholic Relief Services

Kevin McCort, CARE-Canada

Gwendolyn Mikell, United States Institute of

Peace

Cheryl Morden, Church World Service/Lutheran

World Relief

Rosemary O’Neill, U.S. Department of State

John Prendergast, Center of Concern

Susanne Riveles, Lutheran World Relief

Angela Raven Roberts, UNICEF

Lionel Rosenblatt, Refugees International

Andrea Scharf, Catholic Relief Services

David Shinn, U.S. Department of State

Peter Shiras, InterAction

David Shorr, Search for Common Ground

David Smock, United States Institute of Peace

Julia Taft, InterAction

Will Thach, formerly International Committee of

the Red Cross

Stephen Tomlin, International Medical Corps

Rudy von Bernuth, Save the Children

SYMPOSIUMPARTICIPANTS

16
17

David R. Smock is director of

the Grant Program and coordinator of the Institute’s activities

on Africa. Smock was a staff

member of the Ford Foundation in 1964–80, serving in

Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and

Lebanon, as well as in New

York. He served as director of the South African

Education Program, a scholarship program that

brings black South African students to U.S. universities, in 1975–80. During that time he was also

vice president for program development and research for the Institute of International Education

in New York. In 1986–89, he was executive associate to the president of the United Church of Christ,

after which he became executive director of International Voluntary Services, supervising development projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Smock edited Making War and Waging Peace:

Foreign Intervention in Africa and co-edited with

Chester A. Crocker African Conflict Resolution:

The U.S. Role in Peacemaking, both of which

were published by the United States Institute of

Peace Press. He is author or editor of six other

books, most of which are on African topics.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by

Congress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including

research grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services,

publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. Crocker

Vice Chairman: Max M. Kampelman

President: Richard H. Solomon

Executive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Distinguished Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University

Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C.

Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University 

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame

Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei

Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee

W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts 

University

Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C.

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio

Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

Ervin J. Rokke, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University

Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

18
Peaceworks No. 6. First published February 1996.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author or conference participants alone. 

They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

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Phone: 202-457-1700

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UNITED STATES

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Washington, DC 20005 Peaceworks No. 6