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22–903 PDF 2005

DHS COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR DETECTION

EFFORTS, PART I & II

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF 

NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 19, 2005 and APRIL 20, 2005

Serial No. 109–10

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania, Vice Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Ranking 

Member 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL 

ATTACK

JOHN LINDER, Georgia, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California (Ex Officio) 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (Ex Officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and 

Biological Attack .................................................................................................. 1

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Prevention 

of Nuclear and Biological Attack ........................................................................ 2

The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security .......... 22

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 24 

The Honorable Donna M. Christensen, a Delegate in Congress From the 

U. S. Virgin Islands ............................................................................................. 67 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 31

The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of California .......................................................................................................... 66

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California ................................................................................................ 34

The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts ........................................................................................ 36

The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas ....................................................................................................... 30

The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton, Delegate in Congress From the 

District of Columbia ............................................................................................. 68

The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Connecticut ............................................................................................. 60

The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Connecticut ....................................................................................................... 57

FOR THE RECORD 

Prepared Statement of Mr. David M. Abshire, President, Center for the 

Study of the Presidency ....................................................................................... 26

WITNESSES 

Part I, April 19, 2005

Dr. Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs, Harvard University 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Dr. Fred Ikle ́, Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12 

Colonel Randy Larsen (Retired USAF), Chief Executive Officer, Homeland 

Security Associates, LLC 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 14

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 16
Page

IV

Part II, April 20, 2005

Mr. Vayl Oxford, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, 

Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 49

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 51 
(1)

DHS COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR 

DETECTION EFFORTS, PART 1 

Tuesday, April 19, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR

AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK, SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in Room 210, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Linder [chairman of the 

subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Linder, Lungren, McCaul, Cox (ex officio), Langevin, Markey, Dicks, Harman, Norton, Christensen and 

Thompson (ex officio). 

Mr. LINDER. The committee will be in order. We are here for a 

discussion of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Organization, soon to 

be renamed, we hope. Here comes our Ranking Member. 

I would like to welcome our distinguished panel today who, it is 

to be hoped, will help us to better understand how to organize the 

Federal Government to prevent the release of a nuclear device in 

a U.S. city. This was once an unimaginable threat, but it is now 

real, and it is not going to go away. Should America need to respond to such attack, the Federal Government will have failed the 

American people. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the Department of 

Homeland Security to coordinate the government’s efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to radiological and nuclear terrorist threats. It is obvious, however, that the full task of protecting America against nuclear terrorism is not just centered on 

the Department of Homeland Security, but rather is shared by several entities including the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice 

and State. It strikes me that with all the efforts in nuclear nonproliferation and counterproliferation conducted by the government, it remains unclear how these efforts are being coordinated, 

let alone who is in charge. 

These are just a few of the many answers we will seek from today’s panel of witnesses. Their charge today is to help us understand the rules and responsibilities of the principal partners and 

to provide us with any suggestions to better mitigate the nuclear 

threat. 

The President’s fiscal year 2006 budget has a request of 227 million for this program, which was recently placed by Secretary 

Chertoff as a high priority within his office. Missions of the new 

office include detecting and preventing attempts to import or use 
2

nuclear or radiological materials; working with Federal, State and 

local governments and the private sector to coordinate nuclear detection; developing and deploying detection equipment at ports of 

entry, transportation routes, critical infrastructure and in urban 

environments. In addition, the Bush administration stated that 

through this office our overseas and domestic programs to defeat 

nuclear terrorism will work together to contribute to the Nation’s 

nuclear defense. 

Clearly, protecting the Nation involves a multifaceted approach 

that begins with efforts overseas to reduce the inventory of nuclear 

weapons and material and to prevent them from falling into the 

hands of terrorists, which is in part managed by the Department 

of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The Department of Energy also is responsible for securing those materials via 

the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Similarly, nonproliferation 

efforts are also managed by the State Department’s Proliferation 

Security Initiative. 

Protecting our borders is another facet of preventing nuclear terrorism. Currently overseas efforts to screen cargo for nuclear materials are managed by the DOE through its MegaPorts program. 

DHS has also led the effort to place radiation monitors at this Nation’s most vulnerable points of entry. 

Given the intent of terrorists, the accessibility of nuclear material, and the unlimited ways in which terrorists could smuggle a 

weapon or nuclear material through America’s borders, a nuclear 

terrorist attack is highly conceivable. I agree with the January 05 

report that stated that the most worrisome trend has been an intensified surge by some terrorists groups to obtain weapons of mass 

destruction. I intend to see to it that this committee takes this 

threat very seriously. We plan to be vigilant and ensure that the 

DHS and other responsible departments are working constructively 

toward measurable actions to prevent a nuclear incident in the 

United States. 

Ultimately, it will fall on this government to reject the usual bureaucratic barriers and turf battles between competing Federal 

agencies in the area of homeland security. If it fails on that front, 

it will, in the end, fail in its primary responsibility, which is to protect the people of this country. As such, we all owe it to America’s 

public to work together and to mitigate this threat as effectively as 

possible. 

Mr. LINDER. I now recognize my Ranking Member Mr. Langevin 

for any statement he would like to make. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to take 

this opportunity to recognize our distinguished witnesses today and 

thank them for being here this morning. In particular, I am 

pleased to see my former professor Dr. Allison at the witness table. 

Dr. Allison, welcome. And I look forward to your testimony, and 

I am actually reading your book right now, Nuclear Terrorism: The 

Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, and I highly recommend it to 

the committee. 

But in this post-9/11 era, preventing terrorist groups obtaining a 

nuclear weapon must be our government’s number one national security priority. Given the advancement of technology and the stated 

intentions of Al-Qa‘ida and like-minded groups, the possibility that 
3

a terrorist will obtain a nuclear weapon is very real, and one that 

we ignore at our peril. 

This morning’s hearing will focus on the Department of Homeland Security’s latest attempt to address the nuclear terrorist 

threat, proposed Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO. According to Secretary Chertoff, the DNDO will be the primary office 

of the U.S. Government to develop a global nuclear detection architecture including the development and deployment of a domestic 

nuclear detection system. And while I applaud Secretary Chertoff 

for taking this important first step, I do have concerns about 

whether the DNDO as proposed will be able to adequately execute 

its stated missions. 

I look toward hearing the witnesses share their expertise on the 

following issues: Given the fact that DHS’s Science and Technology 

Directorate has spent time and effort on nuclear detection, what 

value added will the DNDO bring to the Department? 

Second, is the DNDO as proposed an adequate last line of defense, and if not, what measures need to be taken to ensure they 

can prevent a nuclear weapon or components from entering the 

country? 

And also, what are the critical areas that the DNDO must address immediately to begin the process of mitigating the nuclear 

terrorist threat? 

Now, I agree with Dr. Allison’s assessment that nuclear terrorism is a preventable catastrophe, but if we continue to move at 

the pace we are moving, we increase the chances that our country 

will not be as secure as it can and must be from the deadliest of 

all potential attacks. And I think today’s hearing will help us better understand how the DNDO should be set up and what its priorities should be, which will be important as we move forward with 

authorizing legislation. 

I must, however, take this opportunity to express my disappointment with the pace and process being employed on this issue. With 

the markup on DNDO legislation scheduled for tomorrow, I fail to 

see how we can possibly incorporate good ideas and significant concerns that may come out of the hearing today or tomorrow, and I 

think all of the members of this subcommittee would be better 

served by a process that allows for meaningful reflection and input 

on the issues and the legislation before us. 

But again, I do want to thank all of our witnesses this morning, 

and I look forward to your testimony. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, the 

Chair of the full committee, for a comment. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses. This is 

a very timely and important hearing. I join you, Mr. Chairman, in 

welcoming three men who are going to help us understand better 

not only the threat of nuclear terrorism, but, more importantly for 

the purposes of today’s hearing, the way in which the Department 

of Homeland Security should organize itself to address this threat. 

Preventing terrorists from ever gaining the capability to detonate 

a nuclear weapon is of utmost importance to our Nation. The use 
4

of a nuclear device by terrorists is something that this committee 

and our country can never accept. The Homeland Security Act of 

2002 requires the Department of Homeland Security to lead the 

United States Government’s efforts to develop countermeasures to 

terrorist nuclear threats. The Department and our government 

have made progress in this area since 2002, but coordinating these 

efforts across the country and around the globe remains a significant challenge. 

In his fiscal year 2006 budget, President Bush has proposed the 

creation of a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office within the Department of Homeland Security. And last week Secretary Chertoff notified me and this committee that he intends to establish such an office with the Director reporting directly to him. The President’s 

2006 budget has set aside nearly a quarter billion dollars for this 

proposed office. By design it would coordinate U.S. efforts to prevent terrorist organizations from smuggling nuclear materials for 

a nuclear weapon into our country. 

It is clear that effectively protecting our Nation from a terrorist 

nuclear threat requires not only domestic detection efforts, but, indeed, global coordination, and one of the questions that I hope we 

can address at today’s hearing is whether the proper focus of the 

Department of Homeland Security is on a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office focused on the deployment of technology in our country, 

or rather, whether such deployment should be part of an overall 

global effort that is focused on arresting the development of these 

terrorist capabilities as far overseas as is possible. 

Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for convening this hearing, and 

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

Mr. LINDER. I thank the gentleman. 

Does the gentleman from Mississippi seek to make a statement? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes 

Mr. LINDER. Okay. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to 

welcome our panel of distinguished witnesses for this hearing this 

morning. 

Preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons should be 

a priority for our Nation and for our government, a priority that 

cannot be ignored or put off until tomorrow. If we are to deal with 

the threat of nuclear terrorism properly, our Nation needs a layered defense. That first layer requires securing weapons-grade nuclear material at the source, and the second requires that adequate 

detection systems and response protocols are in place. 

Unfortunately, the Bush administration has not taken this 

threat seriously enough and is not aggressive enough in implementing either line of defense. Today we will look at the administration’s latest proposal on that front to create a Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office within the Department of Homeland Security. 

I would like to hear from the panel of witnesses on this proposal. 

Specifically, I am interested in the answers to the following questions: Will the proposed DNDO, as it is called, have the resources 

and capabilities to protect our Nation against nuclear terrorism? 

What should be the level of involvement of other Federal agencies 

in the DNDO? Does the proposal provide for that involvement? Is 

the Information Analysis Directorate robust enough to provide 
5

DNDO with the intelligence support it needs? I have my doubts. 

But I hope you can shed light on this also. What measures can be 

taken at our ports and border crossings to deter terrorists from 

bringing in nuclear weapons? 

In closing, I must say that I agree with your assessment, Dr. Allison, that the threat of nuclear terrorism is a challenge to our will 

and conviction, not our capabilities. In addition to that, I want you 

to also speak on whether or not the private sector is being utilized 

to its fullest advantage in helping us deal with that. I have talked 

to different members of the private sector, and they would love to 

participate more, but I would love to hear from your testimony. We 

must move with a great sense of urgency to make our country more 

secure from the gravest of all threats facing our country. 

I yield back. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank the gentleman. 

In keeping with the rules of our full committee, if any other 

member seeks to make a statement, they may do so in writing. We 

will make it part of the record. 

We turn now to our witnesses in the first panel. Dr. Graham Allison is the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. In the first term of the 

Clinton administration, Dr. Allison served as Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Policy and Plans, where he coordinated DOD strategy 

and policy toward Russia, Ukraine and other states of the former 

Soviet Union. 

Dr. Fred Ikle ́ is a distinguished scholar at the Center For Security and International Studies. Dr. Ikle ́ was formerly the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy during the Reagan administration. 

He recently served on the Defense Science Board’s Task Force on 

Preventing and Defending Against a Clandestine Nuclear Attack. 

Colonel Randy Larsen is the CEO of Homeland Security Associates. Colonel Larsen previously served as the founding director of 

the Institute For Homeland Security and the chairman of the Department of Military Strategy and Operations at the National War 

College. 

Welcome, all. 

Dr. Allison, you may begin. 

STATEMENT OF GRAHAM ALLISON, DIRECTOR, BELFER 

CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 

HARVARD UNIVERSITY 

Mr. ALLISON. Thank you very much. It is a great honor to be 

here. 

Mr. LINDER. Is your microphone turned on? 

Mr. ALLISON. Sorry. Is that better? 

I brought a short written statement, just one page. If they 

could—did you hand it around to the Members, please, sir? I gave 

it to the staffer here. You did? Yes. Okay. 

Just three questions as a way of getting started. 

I appear here as an individual, not on behalf of any organization 

that I have been associated with in the past or currently, and I 

commend the committee for your seriousness about addressing this 

issue. 
6

I would say as a way of just being brief about it that there are 

three core questions, and I try to identify them here. First, were 

President Bush and Senator Kerry right when they answered the 

question in the first of the Presidential debates, what is the single 

most serious threat to American national security? They both said 

nuclear terrorism, and I believe they both got it exactly right. Vice 

President Cheney actually picked up this theme as a centerpiece of 

his stump speech in the last month of the campaign. And here is 

what he said, stumping around Ohio, the State from which my wife 

comes. He said, quote, the biggest threat we face now as a Nation 

is the possibility of terrorists ending up in the middle of one or our 

cities with deadlier weapons than have ever been used against us 

before, capable of threatening the lives of hundreds of thousands 

of Americans. And then here is the punchline. That is the ultimate 

threat. For us to have a strategy that is capable of defeating that 

threat, you have got to get your mind around that concept, close 

quote. 

So I would say the place to start with respect to this subject is 

the Vice President’s good suggestion that to have a strategy for defeating it, you have got to get your mind around the concept. And 

the place I suggest to start is by thinking about a nuclear bomb 

going off in one of our cities. And I gave you, just for fun, a little 

target chart that comes from the Website that is associated with 

this book on nuclear terrorism that I have published. It is called 

nuclearterrorism.org. You can put your Zip code into it and see 

what the bomb that Dragon Fire warned was in New York City 

just a month after 9/11 would do in your own neighborhood. 

Did all the Members get copies? Congressman Cox, have you got 

them? Okay. Great. 

You all are familiar with this, but I think the point is that it 

seems so abstract that one ought to think about it actually occurring and ask what it is we wish we would have done previously. 

And if it were to occur for the absence of something that we could 

credibly have done, you know, what excuse are we going to offer? 

So I would say that is actually the right place to start, and what 

I try to do in this book on nuclear terrorism is help us as ordinary 

thinking citizens get our minds around this concept in order to 

have a strategy, a strategy that will ultimately, I think, be successful if we pursue it to the point of reducing the likelihood of such 

a disaster to nearly zero. So that is point one. 

Point two. In a serious strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism, 

where is the point of the greatest leverage? And a number of you 

have already spoken to this point in your initial statements and in 

your previous hearings. The point of greatest leverage strategically 

is to lock down and eliminate weapons and materials at the source. 

As Senator Nunn rightly says, that is the place where it is hardest 

for the terrorists and easiest for us. Every mile you get away from 

the source, it gets easier for the terrorists and harder for us. 

In this nuclear terrorism book, I quote former Senate leader 

Howard Baker, whom I served with on the Baker-Cutler Task 

Force that issued a report in the end of 2000, beginning of 2001. 

And Senator Baker, who was not previously associated with this 

issue, chaired this committee and visited Russia and the former Soviet Union on several occasions, and he testified to the Senate For-
7

eign Relations Committee, quote, it really boggles my mind that 

there could be 40,000 nuclear weapons, or maybe even more, in the 

former Soviet Union poorly controlled and poorly stored, and that 

the world isn’t in a near state of hysteria about this danger, close 

quote. This is on page 9 of the book. 

Now, Senator Baker is not a hysterical person, you can be sure, 

but looking at the facts, he says, rightly in my view, well, here we 

are now, as I report in the book, this is now as of the end of the 

first term of the Bush administration, 13 years after the end of the 

former Soviet Union, 12 years into Nunn-Lugar, where do we stand 

in terms of performance? And on Page 147 I say, and this is from 

DOE evidence, we are less than half the job done of securing weapons and material at the source in the former Soviet Union, quote, 

leaving 44,000 potential nuclear weapons’ worth of highly enriched 

uranium and plutonium vulnerable to theft, so less than half the 

way done at this point. 

I would say, as several of the Members have suggested, that is 

an unacceptable outcome, and that, in terms of a strategy, we 

should look at all the points of leverage, and the point of greatest 

leverage is locking down at the source. 

Point three, where does the specific topic here today rank? And 

the question of improving technological capabilities for detection 

and identification of the source of nuclear weapons or fissile material, where does that rank in a multilayered, 360-degree strategy 

for preventing nuclear terrorism? 

I myself am a very conservative person. I believe that as a country we should have a very conservative posture with respect to defense. We should have all layers that we can appropriately buy, 

and all azimuths, all degrees in which we are protecting ourselves. 

So while I do not believe that detection and identification ranks 

anywhere close to importance in terms of locking down and securing and eliminating and preventing production of nukes, so in an 

overall strategy this is a level three topic rather than a level one, 

I would say that it is an important topic, a very important topic. 

And if I could just make one final point. Between identification 

of a bomb or the radioactive debris that emerge or that remain 

after a bomb on the one hand, and on the other, detecting radioactive material that may be coming into the country, the first nuclear forensic, as it is called, that allows one to appropriately attribute to the source the source of a bomb that went off in one of 

our cities seems to me to be again, in terms of relative importance 

as the question was asked, much more important. And this becomes vitally important today as we think about the story of North 

Korea. 

If North Korea sells plutonium, which it is currently making, to 

bin Laden, and bin Laden brings plutonium to Washington, and a 

nuclear bomb destroys the Capitol, we need to know for sure what 

was the source of that material. And we should now, I believe, be 

adopting a very aggressive deterrent strategy with respect to that, 

in effect saying what John Kennedy said during the Cuban missile 

crisis, which is it would be the policy of our government to regard 

a bomb that explodes on our territory as if it were launched by the 

party, particularly North Korea, that was the originator of the material, and that we would respond with a full retaliatory effort. 
8

* Graham Allison is Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He served as Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense under President 

Reagan and as Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Clinton. 1Draft article pending publication in Technology Review—not for circulation. 

So I think this is a very important topic, and I think this organization that is being stood up is a very important piece of this. But 

I am trying to put it in a larger context. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Dr. Allison. 

[The statement of Mr. Allison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. GRAHAM ALLISON, DIRECTOR, BELFER CENTER, 

SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

1. Were President Bush and Senator Kerry correct during the first presidential 

debate of last fall’s campaign when they answered the moderator’s question ‘‘what 

is the single most serious threat?’’ Both answered: nuclear terrorism. They answered correctly. 

2. In a serious strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism, where is the point of greatest leverage? Answer: locking down and eliminating weapons and materials at the 

source. In Senator Sam Nunn’s felicitous formulation, ‘‘Acquiring weapons and materials is the hardest step for terrorists to take, and the easiest for us to stop. By 

contrast, every subsequent step in the process is easier for the terrorists to take, 

and harder for us to stop.’’ 

3. Where does improved technological capability for detection and identification of 

the source of nuclear weapons or fissile material rank in a multi-layered, 360 degree 

strategy for preventing nuclear terrorism? Answer: while not the most important, 

nonetheless an important layer in any serious multi-layered defense. 

TECHNOLOGY FOR NUCLEAR ACCOUNTABILITY 1

GRAHAM ALLISON

Scenario 1: If North Korea launched a nuclear-armed missile that devastated an 

American city, how would the U.S. government respond? The state-sponsored attack 

would fit within the Cold War paradigm. The certain American response would be 

an overwhelming retaliation aimed at destroying Pyongyang, Kim Jong Il’s known 

nuclear and missile programs, and North Korea’s million-man army. Such a response would result in enormous collateral damage killing millions of North Koreans. Despite reservations about the morality of such a response, Cold War nuclear 

doctrine recognized—and accepted—unintended deaths of innocents. Whomever occupied the White House during such a nuclear attack would understand this also. 

Scenario 2: If North Korea were discovered to have wittingly sold a nuclear bomb 

to Al-Qa‘ida, who smuggled the weapon undetected to destroy an American city, how 

would the U.S. government respond? Through the prism of a post-nuclear 9/11, if 

such a redline were crossed today, the U.S. government would launch an overwhelming response against North Korea. 

Scenario 3: Now imagine a nightmare in which a nuclear bomb is smuggled into 

the U.S. by an unknown terrorist group and detonated in Manhattan or Los Angeles 

killing hundreds of thousands of Americans, but the U.S. government is uncertain 

where the bomb came from and who delivered it. 

The logic of deterrence requires a deterrer and an identified deterree. In Henry 

Kissinger’s formula: ‘‘Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it, 

and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor. Moreover, deterrence is the 

product of those factors and not the sum. If any one of them is zero deterrence 

fails.’’ An adversary with no known return address might calculate it could escape 

retaliation. In Scenario 3, as an American city lies smoldering, if Osama bin Laden 

announced that he had ordered the action, how would the U.S. respond? If the 

American government knew where bin Laden was, it would already be there. 

The terrorist nuclear weapon that destroyed an American city, or the material 

from which the bomb was made, would almost certainly have originated in a state. 

Fortunately, producing highly-enriched uranium or plutonium—the essential ingredients of a nuclear bomb—requires a multi-billion dollar, multi-year undertaking beyond the capability of non-state terrorists. After a nuclear 9/11, the U.S. government 
9

will be eager to exact swift vengeance. But against whom? It must first determine 

who was responsible for the attack. Did a state make and deliver the bomb, or willingly sell it to terrorists who did? The weapon could have been stolen from someone 

who had no intention of losing. Indeed, the material could conceivably have come 

from American stockpiles. In the first instance, identification would provide a bullseye for overwhelming retaliation. In the second, the certainty that the weapon was 

stolen from a Russian or Pakistani arsenal would generate a demand for the immediate global lock-down of all nuclear weapons and materials. 

The technological prerequisite for rethinking today’s unthinkable is nuclear 

forensics: the ability to identify the bomb’s source from radioactive debris left after 

an explosion. Building on Cold War techniques, the Pentagon has developed new 

methods to collect samples from ground zero of a blast, measure such data as isotopic ratios and the efficiency of the fuel burn in the detonation, and compare that 

information to known nuclear databases to determine the origin of the materials involved in the attack. 

Much is already known about foreign nuclear materials, collected from Cold War 

military tests, commercial transactions, scientific exchanges, and covert means. But 

recent allegations about the uranium hexafluoride Libya turned over when it renounced its nuclear weapons program illustrate gaps in our knowledge. The U.S. intelligence community believes that North Korea was the source. But according to 

informed press reports, they reached that determination by the process of elimination—not identifying the uranium directly, but rather ruling out other known 

sources. The goal of the robust nuclear forensics capability we need must be to identify 

nuclear material definitively and quickly. The National Research Council’s 2002 

study, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering 

Terrorism, concluded that: ‘‘The technology for developing [post-explosion nuclear attribution] exists but needs to be assembled, an effort that is expected to take several 

years.’’ Establishing this capability should be a top American priority, since effective 

deterrence requires convincing potential perps that the U.S. will be able to identify 

the culprit. 

Graham Allison, director of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs, is the author of Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe.

For more information go to www.nuclearterrorism.org.

A New York Times Notable Book of the Year and a Foreign Affairs Bestseller 

Nuclear Terrorism:

The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe

GRAHAM ALLISON

The central but largely unrecognized truth is that nuclear terrorism is preventable. As a fact of physics: no highly enriched uranium and plutonium, no fission nuclear explosion, no nuclear terrorism. It is that simple. While vast, the amount of 

fissile material is finite (and the challenge of producing more too difficult for anyone 

but states). Technologies for locking up dangerous material are well developed. The 

choke point in preventing nuclear terrorism is thus denying terrorists access to nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material at the source. 

The agenda to achieve this objective is ambitious yet feasible. A serious campaign 

to prevent nuclear terrorism should apply a doctrine of Three Nos: No Loose Nukes, 

No New Nascent Nukes and No New Nuclear Weapons States. • No Loose Nukes: requires securing all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 

material, on the fastest possible timetable, to a new ‘‘gold standard’’. The U.S. 

and Russia should develop this standard jointly, act immediately to secure their 

own materials, and call on the leaders of other states to do the same. All states 

that possess weapons-usable nuclear materials, even non-nuclear weapon states, 

must be included in an international coalition to guarantee the security of such 

materials from theft by terrorists or criminals groups. Nuclear Terrorism presents a plan for a Global Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism to achieve this 

goal. 

• No New Nascent Nukes: requires no new national capabilities to enrich 

uranium or reprocess plutonium. This effort should begin with intrusive inspections of suspected nuclear sites as required by the Non- Proliferation Treaty’s 

Additional Protocol. But two other elements must be added: a prohibition on the 

production of fissile material and actual enforcement mechanisms. Iran today 

poses a crucial test to this principle. Nuclear Terrorism outlines a strategy for 

persuading Iran to stop now. 
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• No New Nuclear Weapons States: draws a line under the current eight nuclear powers and says unambiguously: ‘‘No more.’’ The test case for this principle is North Korea. Nuclear Terrorism outlines a strategy for freezing North 

Korea’s nuclear activity and backing it down step by step.
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Mr. LINDER. Dr. Ikle ́. 

STATEMENT OF FRED IKLE ́ , CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. IKLE ́. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The DNDO organization—. 

Mr. LINDER. Is your microphone turned on? Thank you. 

Mr. IKLE ́. The DNDO is a great step forward in pulling an organization together with all the relevant departments and agencies. 

It awaits a new venture in government organization because 

DNDO will have to depend on the collaboration of independent, 

quite independent, departments, agencies and their recourse to get 

full cooperation essentially with the President. They don’t have 

power to order DOD or FBI people around. So the support by this 

committee for the discipline in this organization and collaboration 

will be essential. 

The prevention of this kind of disastrous attack of nuclear terrorism, of course, also has to depend on the contributions of defense, like in the Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI, or like in 

the activities by the Special Forces to support, depend on the contribution of the FBI and so forth. So to pull this together makes 

a great deal of sense. 

Important also that—and this you may want to consider in your 

follow-up legislation—that tests and exercises be conducted and reported back to this committee so you know whether the work has 

really been done in the field, not just discussions in interagency 

meetings. 

To put this organization together took about 9 months, which 

is—in peacetime may be appropriate, but if we feel we are in an 

emergency, it seems to be a long time. And we don’t want to lose 

another 9 months before we get going with practical work in the 

field. 

Now, how do we know that a terrorist group or a country is preparing to introduce a nuclear device on U.S. territory, or for that 

matter on a U.S. base abroad? As Graham Allison rightly points 

out, the first line of defense is as close to the source of nuclear material as you can get, and that has to be worked on more vigorously. But we have seen many setbacks in our nonproliferation effort, and we have to be prepared for other setbacks, and that is 

where this kind of a last line interference comes in that DNDO is 

focused on. 

The structure of DNDO provides for good links with the National 

Director of Intelligence, with the Intelligence Community, and that 

is the way it should be. And DNDO is not an intelligence organization, with one very important exception. DNDO is the only organization that, according to its charter, promises to focus on the development of more advanced transformational, as they call it, detection equipment. 

Department of Energy in theory can do that and has done some 

work on that. But—and some work has been done in Department 

of Defense Advanced Technology Office. But there has been no sufficiently coordinated vigorous effort, and if that is not done, then 

DNDO cannot help the Department of Defense, with their Special 

Forces looking for nuclear weapons, give them more advanced 

equipment so they can find it in the Afghan mountains. It cannot 
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help the Coast Guard to do a better work on detecting these things 

in containers. 

The text of the draft, the DNDO charter, puts a great deal of emphasis properly on this transformational research. What I am worried about is the execution of it. This is a peculiar type of research, 

unlike the work that has been done, in part sponsored by the 

Homeland Security Committee chaired by Chairman Cox, and by 

the subcommittee here in the biological weapons area, where good 

work has been done in the pharmaceutical industry and NIH and 

the Centers For Disease Control and the private sector. The private 

sector has been mentioned by Mr. Thompson. 

That is possible in the field of biological weapons where there is 

a seamless connection between health care, health work on pharmaceuticals and biological protection. In the nuclear detection field 

you deal with essentially two elements, plutonium and uranium, 

and the way these can be put to weapons. And the only really competent organizations to advance our capability for detection are our 

laboratories, Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia and so on. And what 

we need to do is to pull these laboratories together like we did for 

the Manhattan Project initially, like we did in a different context 

pull these things for the Apollo Project, with one manager that can 

run it with a flexible budget, can attract the best people. 

It is sad to report, but the number of the best scientists in the 

laboratories that could have worked on the detection equipment 

have left because of funding that dribbled in was so constrained, 

so limited, the encouragement they got was not adequate. We want 

to get the best scientists to work so that we can help out way out 

on the front line as well as in the last defense line to detect these 

things. If you cannot fund them, there is nothing you can do about 

it. And there are promising ideas, but they are lying fallow because 

they have not been properly funded and managed. 

Now, I don’t know whether this hearing is the time to go into full 

detail on this in the budget that is required. It probably could start 

at 100 million, but for the other work there is a quarter billion set 

aside, and the rest of the DNDO activity will require money as well 

to work with the present instrumentation to set up the architecture 

abroad and at home. 

So eventually a larger budget and a long-term budget will be 

needed. And in my view, a manager has to be found who should 

report preferably to the Homeland—to the Secretary of the Homeland Security Department, not to a lower tier in the DNDO organization. 

We have gone through this effort for a long time. The Defense 

Department and the Defense Science Board study, 8 years ago, 

that argued we should do this research, nothing was done. There 

was a follow-on study in 1981. Nothing was done. Finally, the Defense Science Board did another study, and you have the report; 

chaired by Dr. Wagner, has met with the members of your committee. And that is an excellent charter for this. But Richard Wagner and I have been going around the organization, departments 

and agencies and trying to stimulate the research, so far without 

much luck and success. So in a way you are the last line of the offense to get this going, Mr. Chairman. 
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* Fred C. Ikle ́ is a Distinguished Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

Washington, D.C. He was Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Reagan Administration. 

†Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Preventing and Defending Against Clandestine Nuclear Attack (June 2004). 

I will be pleased to elaborate further on the organizational details which are very important for this key piece of R&D activity 

for all departments, not only Homeland Security 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Dr. Ikle ́. 

[The statement of Mr. Ikle ́ follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE FED C. IKLE ́, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to address the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. This new organization, located within the Homeland Security Department, has been proposed in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2006. 

DNDO properly has the word ‘‘detection’’ in its name. It is focused on the last line 

of defense to protect the United States from a terrorist use of nuclear weapons that 

is directed against our national territory. The possibility of a clandestine use of a 

nuclear weapon against our homeland is not a new idea; it has been mentioned 

since the beginning of the nuclear age. But as a serious threat it has emerged only 

during the last decade or so, and in particular since 9/11. 

It is the global proliferation of nuclear weapons technology that has made this 

threat increasingly serious. And since the break-up of the Soviet Union we have 

faced a growing danger that nuclear bombs and materials might be acquired by terrorist organization. The initial US response has been the Nunn-Lugar program 

which has now been restructured as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. 

These efforts, and other measures to curb nuclear proliferation, have accomplished 

a great deal. But none could give full assurance against a clandestine delivery of 

a nuclear bomb for a terrorist attack. 

The seriousness of this cataclysmic possibility has become increasingly apparent. 

Hence, the need for a last-line of defense—the mission of DNDO. Defense experts 

have proposed better detection measures for some time. Already in 1997, the Defense Science Board spelled out the need for a serious R&D program to improve our 

technical detection capabilities. Unfortunately, there was no follow-up; and now, 

eight years later we are still unprepared. The establishment of DNDO is a statement of good intentions, but without vigorous follow-up, competent management, 

and—Mr. Chairman—strong Congressional support, I fear we will encounter more 

delays. 

DNDO is a unique organization with few parallels. I cannot think of another executive branch organization that seeks to pull together so many government departments and agencies in a cooperative effort for so complex a mission. Keep in mind 

that the cooperation required will be essentially voluntary. Short of an appeal to the 

President, the person who will head DNDO cannot order the other components to 

carry out their tasks. 

Such an endeavor has to overcome several hurdles. It can deteriorate into an endless series of interagency meetings. Differences about priorities might not be resolved. Budget requests might be delayed. The most competent people might become 

discouraged and move on to more promising jobs. 

All these setbacks have already been experienced during the Administration’s deliberations that led up to DNDO. I mentioned the 1997 Defense Science Board study 

which lacked follow up. Four years ago, a new Task Force of the Defense Science 

Board addressed the problem of clandestine nuclear attack again. Chaired by Dr. 

Wagner, this Task Force prepared a thorough guide for the actions that ought to 

be taken.† During the last couple of years, the findings of this report were briefed 

to all departments and agencies that have some responsibility in this area. The bureaucratic obstructions were appalling. Bureaucrats called for more grand studies, 

more interagency meetings, and some even argued that better detection instruments 

were impossible since our technology for radiation sensors had reached the limits 

of physics. 

After all these attempts to get a serious effort underway, it is fortunate that we 

have now a well thought-out organizational structure set down in DNDO’s charter. 
15

With the President’s endorsement, and with the full backing and monitoring by 

Congress, we might—at last—succeed. 

Now let me turn to a major part of the DNDO structure which, for the long term, 

is the most important part: the R&D program for the ‘‘transformational’’ development of sensors and other essential technology. Without better instruments to detect 

smuggled nuclear weapons, all the operational DNDO components will be unable to 

do their job. Without Better knowledge and techniques to identify the source of the 

smuggled nuclear weapon, the deterrent effect of our defenses will be greatly diminished. Indeed, these techniques of identification—called ‘‘forensics’’—are crucial to 

avert a mistaken retaliatory strike that would get the United States into a war with 

a nation that did neither attack us, nor lend any support to the terrorists who attacked us. 

Better sensors and forensics are the heart of the matter. And the inter-agency effort that produced the proposed structure for DNDO is very clear on this. Yet, the 

way in which it describes the management of this ‘‘transformational’’ R&D will not 

get the job done. It says: 

‘‘Nuclear detection R&D will be coordinated via interagency representation on 

the DNDO R&D Coordinating Council with budget authority remaining in departments/agencies.’’

This approach will at best produce fractured and fragmented research efforts, 

greatly slowed down by innumerable interagency meetings. 

Chairman Linder, you Subcommittee is concerned both with nuclear and biological attack. To limit the impact of biological attacks, great scientific progress has 

been made with vaccines and other medical interventions. And much of this research was done in different research centers, at universities, and by the pharmaceutical industry. This was appropriate given the multifaceted nature of biological 

threats and the seamless connection between health care and biological warfare defense. 

But for nuclear sensors and forensics, the scientific research on will not succeed 

with small research grants, parceled out hither and yon to every applying think 

tank or university. These sensors and forensics deal with two elements: plutonium 

and enriched uranium, not with dozen of diseases. And they must be focused on the 

ways either or both of these elements can be used to cause a nuclear detonation. 

Only the government weapons laboratories have the experience, the classified data, 

and sixty years of historic knowledge to work effectively on this problem. 

The management of ‘‘transformational’’ R&D effort must be inspired by the way 

we managed the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Project. These successful programs were not run by endless interagency meetings in Washington that presided 

over budget constraints and bureaucratic deadlines for dozens of little contracts. 

Last summer, the Homeland Security Department’s research sponsorship on nuclear 

sensors was done through 135 contracts—one hundred and thirty five! (Some of 

these, to be sure, produced useful results.) 

The country needs a superbly qualified single manager for this work (as was the 

case for the Manhattan Project), a generous long term budget with flexibility, all 

to support an integrated team effort bringing together the professional strengths 

and the scientific assets of Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia, Oak Ridge, Argonne, and 

reaching out to specialists at universities and support for prototype production by 

industry. 

This Laboratory-centered program, of course, needs to be in continuing contact 

with the many potential users of the sensors. (The use of the forensic capacity must 

remain centralized for the US government.) The physicists at the laboratory will 

have to tailor their effort to the needs of the Coast Guard, border control, DOD’s 

Special Forces, the Navy’s work for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), special needs of the FBI and CIA, and so on. 

Your Subcommittee, Chairman Linder, will have to play a strong supportive and 

guiding role to ensure success for the ‘‘transformational’’ R&D envisaged by the 

DNDO proposal. Without much better sensors and forensics, DNDO cannot succeed, 

it will just remain a bureaucratic artifact. This is why I put so much stress on a 

laboratory-centered R&D program, run by a manager in the style of the Apollo or 

Manhattan Project. To this end, the legal, administrative and budgetary details still 

have to be worked out, a job that your able staff (in cooperation perhaps with OMB 

could accomplish in a couple of days. 

To sum it up, the Domestic Nuclear DETECTION Office is a great step forward 

in America’s struggle against nuclear terrorism. But without an ‘‘Apollo Project’’ on 

sensors, there won’t be much hope for detection and DNDO will become the Domestic Nuclear DISCUSSION Office. 

Forgive me, Mr. Chairman, for pressing this point so hard. Witnessing ten years 

of fumbled and failed effort have diminished my sense of patience, a little.
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Mr. LINDER. Colonel Larsen. 

Colonel Larsen, may I say that Dr. Allison must walk out the 

door at 10:30 to catch a plane. 10:45. Okay. 

STATEMENT OF RANDY LARSEN (RETIRED USAF), CHIEF 

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HOMELAND SECURITY ASSOCIATES, 

LLC 

Colonel LARSEN. I will make my remarks short. I seem to have 

the same problems with that, as I hear many of the Members, the 

word ‘‘domestic.’’ Prior to 9/11, intelligence worked outside our borders, and the FBI primarily worked inside, and that doesn’t seem 

to apply so much anymore. We see a change there. 

I worry about this office when everything I know about trying to 

prevent a nuclear terrorist attack on an American city, the majority of that activity is going take place outside our borders. So I am 

concerned about that word ‘‘domestic,’’ and I think the global perspective a far better one there. 

My other great concern that I see here is the problem with who 

is in charge. We have heard many different places mentioned. Now, 

you know, if you want to have a hearing on missile defense here, 

you could basically call two people, one of them appointed by the 

Secretary of Defense that manages the program, one appointed by 

the President and confirmed by the Senate, an under secretary that 

manages a $7.7 million budget. Two people here. 

If you wanted to have a hearing about who was protecting us 

from biological weapons, there are 26 Presidentially-appointed, 

Senate-confirmed individuals, and none of them has it for a fulltime job, and they work in 12 different agencies. No one is in 

charge. And I would say that it is somewhat similar for who is in 

charge of defending us from a nuclear attack. And now we are adding two new offices to that already long list that you would have 

to call up here, Secretaries of Energy, Defense, all that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. Now we are going to add DNDO. And the 

intelligence reform bill says we are going to create this new office 

within 18 months, unless the President says he doesn’t want it, 

called the National Counterproliferation Center. I actually like the 

charter of that a little bit better, I think, even though it is going 

to be under the DNI. I like that charter a little bit better maybe 

than this Nuclear Detection Office that is inside DHS. 

I am not saying that I am against detection. I am all for it. I am 

probably the only person in the room that carries a detector with 

them. I have one. You know, you can buy these for under 100 

bucks. The problem is this will not detect a nuclear weapon. If you 

had a nuclear weapon, if you had a Mark 15 sitting up there in 

front of you, this won’t go off. It won’t even go off for a dirty bomb. 

But it will go—if a nuclear explosion goes off at the other side of 

the Pentagon, you know, then this would. It takes a really hot 

thing. 

So detection capabilities is—it can be cheaper, it can be extremely expensive. The problem that we all have that we discussed 

at Wye River is what is that next generation? How good will it 

really be? 

The third thing that is important to me is where we would put 

the detectors. So let us say we go—and Mr. Ikle ́ sure knows a lot 
17

more about detectors than I do, and he is the person you should 

ask those technical questions to. But I am the strategist guy. I am 

the guy that thinks about the bad guy all the time. 

So where would I want to deploy these really good detectors? 

Maybe not on our borders. Maybe it should be where Dr. Allison 

says. Most of that stuff is stored in the Soviet Union. When it 

leaves there—you know, this is kind of like remember in the Vietnam War we used to have million-dollar airplanes bombing $300 

trucks on the Ho Chi Minh trail? It would have been simpler to 

bomb those trucks up at Hanoi before they left the depots. 

So I am more concerned about where that material would come 

from is where I might want to put my detectors, because we have—

I mean, well, let us face it. If you had an arsenal of three nuclear 

weapons, and you are a terrorist organization, are you just going 

to put it in a shipping container and say, hey, send it to Chicago? 

You know, I would put it inside a Gulfstream and fly it across into 

the United States. I would put it in a ship. You know, open press 

says Al-Qa‘ida may have up to 80 ships. I would put it in a ship 

and drive it into a port. It would never get to your detector you got 

there in your screening place. You know, set it off in Long Beach 

or Los Angeles. Or I would set it off in New York just as it is pulling into port. What good is the detector going to do there? 

There are 7,000 miles of unguarded border here. So you say, 

well, we are going to put those detectors at these major crossing 

points. They are not stupid. You know they will get a four-wheeldrive vehicle and drive it from Canada through Minnesota on one 

of those logging roads through there. 

So I am for detection. I guess my question is where we are going 

to deploy it. And it is not domestically, so that is my problem with 

the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. 

The last comment I want to make is, I am sure, one you have 

all read, but I think it is worthy of repeating, and it is from the 

WMD Commission report. And I quote, we would like to emphasize 

that the United States has not made collection on loose nukes a 

high priority, unquote. And it bothers me, Mr. Chairman. I think 

it should bother this committee. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you, Colonel. 

[The statement of Colonel Larsen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF COLONEL RANDALL J. LARSEN, USAF (RETIRED), FOUNDER

AND CEO HOMELAND SECURITY ASSOCIATES, LLC 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to comment on the newly created 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. 

Of all the potential terrorist threats America will face during the next several decades, only two have the capability of bringing a super power to its knees, biological 

and nuclear. Notwithstanding the name of this subcommittee, I must tell you, at 

this time there is no way to prevent biological attacks on the American homeland. 

As we discussed last month at the Committee’s Wye River off-site, the biotechnical 

revolution of the past decade combined with the fact that the majority of pathogens 

suitable for biological weapons exist in nature make it physically impossible to prevent such an attack. Therefore, the focus for biodefense must be early detection, 

rapid response, and recovery. If properly prepared, we will be able to prevent a bioterrorist attack from becoming a social, economic, and political catastrophe. Without 

sufficient preparation, little can be done in the midst of a crisis to lessen the consequences of an epidemic. 

On the other hand, our efforts to protect America from the threat of nuclear terrorism must not be primarily focused on detection nuclear materials inside our own 

borders. The priority must be on preventing any terrorist organization from obtain-
18

ing highly enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium. That is why I am concerned about the limited scope of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in the Department of Homeland Security. 

The newly created DNDO is certainly a worthwhile initial effort, but not the strategic program we require. The two greatest shortfalls are clearly identified in the 

title of the new office: domestic and detection. The word domestic leads me to believe 

its focus will be inside US borders. Most of the nuclear material that we must contain is outside US borders, the vast majority in the states of the former Soviet 

Union. Additionally, detecting nuclear material inside our borders is the last step 

in a long process, and what I would describe as a desperate effort with low probability of success. 

On the other hand, I will say that DNDO is a worthwhile initial step, because 

it may serve to improve interagency cooperation amongst the wide variety of players 

involved in preventing nuclear terrorism on our homeland. I applaud this initiative, 

but must ask, are we doing enough to identify and secure the sources of weaponsgrade fissile material that could be used to build a terrorist weapon? To me, this 

should be the top priority. 

If Al-Qa‘ida, or any other sophisticated terrorist organization gets their hands on 

highly-enriched uranium, they can most probably build a bomb. Any terrorist organization capable enough to obtain this material is probably smart enough to transport it to an American city without detection. 

Some would say we should spend more money on detection capabilities. I do not 

believe that this should be a high priority—from both scientific and operational perspectives. In an unclassified hearing I cannot comment on certain facts, but for 

those who will try to convince you about the current capabilities, I suggest you ask 

them one question: ‘‘Why can’t you find the nuclear weapon that is located just 16 

miles from Savannah Georgia?’’ An Air Force B–47 dropped it there on February 

5, 1958. It is reported to be 60 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. 

Regarding funding research and development efforts for new technologies, I am 

a little more optimistic, yet, as we discussed at Wye River, trying to get a straight 

answers about the feasibility of such new capabilities is not easy. My bottom line 

on radiological detection is that it is most likely a better return on investment to 

focus on research and development rather than more deployment of current capabilities. 

My bottom-line on the establishment of the DNDO is that I support the initiative, 

but question why it is limited to domestic efforts. I think most of us in this room 

agree that a nuclear-armed terrorist is the most troubling of all threats to our 

homeland. 

If we agree that this is true, then I must ask you who is in charge of preventing 

such an attack, because, I do not know. If you wanted to have a hearing on what 

is being done to prevent such an attack, who would you have to call to testify? The 

Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, 

to name just a few. In other words, no one is in charge. 

If I asked you who was in charge of missile defense in this country, you could 

point to one person who has been appointed by the Secretary of Defense to manage 

the program and a Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed Under Secretary who 

is responsible for an annual budget of $7.7 billion. It is very clearly known who is 

responsible for the program to defend against a delivery system, but who is in charge 

of defending against the weapon?

Frankly, I don’t lose any sleep worrying about intercontinental missiles delivering 

nuclear weapons on American cities, but I do worry about nuclear weapons being 

delivered in small trucks, because that is the most likely delivery method for a terrorist organization. 

I am also not convinced that a massive, new deployment of current or the nextgeneration radiological detectors at border crossings and ports will make us more 

secure. First of all, a nuclear explosion on a ship that was just pulling into one of 

our large ports means the weapon would have reached a high-value target. Second, 

why do we think that a terrorist will cooperate and bring a nuke through one of 

our largest ports? I would bring it across the border in a privately owned jet aircraft, a small boat (we have 95,000 miles of shoreline in America) or in a four-wheel 

drive vehicle across the 7,000 miles of unguarded border. Building a Maginot Line 

of radiological detectors would make us no more secure. In fact, it would divert 

funds from higher priority programs, and make us less secure. 

The answer to the threat of nuclear terrorism is preventing the terrorists from 

getting their hands on weapons-grade material. The majority of this effort will be 

accomplished outside of the US borders through programs that are not receiving the 
19

political and fiscal support they deserve. I do not see how the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office will solve this problem. 

Mr. Chairman, I conclude my brief remarks with what I believe to be the most 

troubling statement in WMD Commission Report. ‘‘. . . we would like to emphasize 

that the United States has not made collection on loose nukes a high priority.’’ 

Mr. Chairman, what could possibly be a higher priority?

Mr. LINDER. It appears that we have some agreement among the 

three witnesses that this is not a domestic issue as much as it is 

a global issue. 

Dr. Allison, you said the first thing we should do is get rid of nuclear weapons. Do we start with ours, or do we start with the Soviets’? 

Mr. ALLISON. I said the first thing we do is lock them down and 

eliminate them where we cannot lock them down adequately at the 

source. As I tried to argue in my book, human beings actually know 

how to lock things down we don’t want people to steal. How much 

gold does the U.S. lose from Fort Knox? Not 1 ounce. How many 

treasures does Russia lose from the Kremlin armory? None. Why 

should icons in the Kremlin armory be more secure than material 

from which a terrorist could make a nuclear bomb? It makes no 

sense. No sense. 

And so I am for locking them down wherever they are, including 

ours, which can be done a little bit better, but that is not mainly 

the problem. The problem is in Russia, it is in Pakistan, it is in 

risky research reactors in Uzbekistan, places where guys could get 

enough material to make a nuclear bomb. And where I can’t lock 

it down to that standard, and in a way that I am comfortable, I 

would try to clean it out of there, so getting the material out of 

these other places and destroying it where I can. 

So this is not for eliminating American nuclear weapons. This is 

about preventing terrorists getting nuclear material or a nuclear 

bomb which they could use to blow us up. 

I may have misspoken. I apologize. 

Mr. LINDER. Are you confident that we know where all this material is? 

Mr. ALLISON. I believe that Porter Goss has testified for the first 

time publicly on this, that, no, he believes that—he and CIA believe that more than a bomb’s worth of material is missing from 

the Soviet Union, and they do not know where it is. I believe we 

know where almost all of the weapons and materials are, and I believe that we can motivate the leaders of other countries who know 

also a lot about what is within their countries to get on board to 

a program that would lock all weapons and materials down to a 

gold standard, and to do so on the fastest technically feasible timetable. 

I believe we should be assisting them to the extent that we could 

in Nunn-Lugar if they needed assistance, but we mainly need to be 

motivating them. As I argue in the book, if Putin is securing Russian nuclear weapons as a favor to us, we have got the wrong picture. He should be thinking about the Chechens who blew up those 

kids in Beslan. If they get a nuclear bomb or material from which 

to make a nuclear bomb, they are not coming first to New York or 

Washington. They are coming first to Moscow. So he has got to feel 

this as an existential threat for himself. And ditto for Musharraf. 
20

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Ikle ́, you said that whoever heads up this office 

will not have the power to instruct the Department of Energy or 

the Department of Defense. Should they? 

Mr. IKLE ́. The office should have a—within itself or separate a 

structure that can work effectively with the Department of Energy. 

Mr. LINDER. Is your mike on? Is that mike on? We are streaming 

this on the Internet, so we want to make sure that we are on 

microphones. 

Mr. IKLE ́. Thank you. 

In a proposed structure, the normal hierarchical authority, the 

Secretary of Defense can tell his people in the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the military what tasks to do, when to deliver 

and so on. I don’t see that in this organization. 

I don’t think it is practical to bring together these large, independent, separate departments, DOE, Department of Defense and 

so on, and to give somebody the authority in this particular field 

to give orders and instructions. They have to do it, I guess, through 

the Secretary of Homeland Security, who would then call the Secretary of Defense and say, will you please tell your people to deliver X and Y that they agreed to do in DNDO. 

I think with goodwill and with congressional pressure and monitoring, I think it is feasible. To get started I see no alternative way. 

You do not want to create a new department to pull this together. 

We have the Homeland Security Department already pulling a lot 

of entities together, and it is not an easy job. 

Mr. LINDER. Colonel Larsen, you mentioned that these detectors 

ought not probably be on United States soil. How many points in 

the world are we concerned about? 

Colonel LARSEN. I think Dr. Graham could probably answer that 

question better than I, but I am not saying we shouldn’t have detectors on U.S. soil. I mean, they are cheap, many of them. There 

are a bit of—they can work. Advertise them, have an information 

campaign. It is a bit of a deterrent, but I sometimes think that it 

would just deter them from bringing them through the ports and 

taking the weapons somewhere else. 

But I think that the source of the material, you can’t make highly enriched uranium and plutonium anywhere. There is only so 

many places. Unfortunately there are some places we can’t put 

them, like in North Korea or in Iran or in other places. But I think 

that the stockpiles, the enormous stockpiles we are talking about, 

we have to make them as secure as possible, and I think detection 

could help us 

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Ikle ́, did you want to respond? 

Mr. IKLE ́. If I could just add a point here. In fact, we do not have 

adequate detectors. We do not have them, and unless we get to 

work on it, we will not have them. The detectors we now have, you 

have to be very close. You cannot see through a container; it is 

shielded and so forth. 

As to the nuclear materials, for the time being the places where 

they could be produced we can list in a book, but there are going 

to be more. There are going to be more because of the evolution of 

the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The project on mixed oxide 

fuels, it is a whole chapter by itself. It will distribute plutonium 

that could be converted to bombs throughout the world as it is now 
21

planned in the Department of Energy. It requires almost a separate hearing to look into that. But the technology is spreading for 

making these fissile materials, so we can no longer count, unfortunately, on getting to a few sources and stopping it there, valuable 

and important as that is to do now 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. My time has expired. 

Dr. Allison, did you wish to make a comment? 

Mr. ALLISON. Yes, very quickly, because I think where we disagree may be as helpful for the committee as where we agree. 

I mainly agree here, but I would say that first a strong point of 

agreement, the research and development that would produce better detectors is certainly a good idea wherever you deploy them. 

And currently the physics of this problem was well illustrated in 

that ABC test that they performed on a television show that some 

of you saw that I was one of the witnesses in. Basically just the 

physics of the problem makes it easier for the hider and harder for 

the seeker. So if I start with the highly enriched uranium from 

which I could make a bomb smaller than a football, and if I stick 

it inside a lead pipe, as the ABC people did, and if I put that in 

a camera bag, the chances of detecting that with the current technologies we have, current, is nearly zero. I can take a picture of 

a cargo container and notice that there is a large metal object in 

it, but unless I open up the container and look in the box and look 

to see what is inside the pipe, I am not with this detector or any 

detectors we currently have. 

Now, is that given by nature, or is that a state of the current 

technology? Dr. Ikle ́ rightly says it is a state of the current technology. What is America going to count on in the war on terrorism? 

Technology is one of our assets. So I would say this is a very important arena for moving forward. 

On the second point where I slightly disagree with Fred, my second—I proposed in this book for prevention three No’s, the doctrine 

of three No’s, the second of which says no new nascent nukes. I believe it is in the capacity of the U.S. Government to build a global 

consensus that we are simply not going to let people produce any 

more fissile material on a national basis. So, now, that means Iran, 

and it means dealing with North Korea. But I think you deal with 

those two problems, and then maybe 20 years from now there will 

be some new fancy technology that allows people to make nuclear 

bomb material in their bathtub or in their basement. But fortunately technology is on our side right now. Nobody has invented an 

easy way to create fissile material. It is a multibillion-dollar, 

multiyear, substantial investment. So I would, for example, in the 

case of Iran, not let Iran ever operate enrichment and reprocessing 

facilities. And I sketch out a strategy for trying do that in the book 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, 

again, thank you for your testimony here today. 

Dr. Allison, if I could, on that last point, we are talking about 

the technology, and I agree with you, by the way, that, yeah, the 

technology of today may not be able to adequately detect weaponsgrade plutonium or highly enriched uranium, but hopefully the detectors of tomorrow will. And clearly we all know the statistics, the 
22

fact that technology squares approximately every 18 months. So 

that in and of itself should provide evidence to the fact that we 

could and should pursue better detection equipment. 

If I could turn to the fact that there are three ways that terrorists might obtain nuclear weapons or material. One is to steal it; 

the other is for it to be given to them by some rogue state; or third 

is for them to develop it on their own. That was the last point that 

you touched on. 

Right now Mother Nature does not make it easy for us to develop 

weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium. So on that 

point, what do we need to worry about with the technology of tomorrow that a terrorist would pursue? What do we need to be 

watching for that would make it easy to produce weapons-grade 

plutonium or highly enriched uranium? Are there things that—we 

know what technology to look for now, the aluminum tubes, other 

things that if a state or terror groups were trying to obtain that 

type of material, we would know what they are up to. What are the 

types of things that we need to be aware of in terms of technology 

of tomorrow that would indicate terrorists trying to pursue an easier method of using weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched 

uranium? 

Mr. ALLISON. That is an excellent question, and it becomes very 

complex, and I am not the best expert on this. I think there are 

a number of people at the weapons labs who actually track this as 

an issue. 

I would say, first, it is quite possible that there will be some 

technological breakthrough that will make it a lot easier to make 

highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Should that occur, we will 

have a different problem. But right now, fortunately, on the supply 

side there is a choke point. 

Secondly, as Dr. Ikle ́ says, as we think about civilian nuclear cycles, including mixed oxide fuels, mixed plutonium, I start from the 

question in what ways can this assist terrorists who want to make 

a nuclear bomb, and what can we do to make sure that as these 

processes are designed, we minimize that risk? And I would say 

that indeed as one watches the plutonium reprocessing that has 

been going on, I see no sense in this whatever. I think that if we 

are—in the one instance in which what we are doing is stimulating 

Russian elimination of plutonium, I am in favor of. But as a general proposition, the notion that the British are continuing to reprocess plutonium for the Japanese and store it makes no sense to 

me, because when it is in the spent fuel, it is not dangerous; when 

it gets loose, it is. So I would say that is the arena. 

I think the second point of your question, which is very important, what we have learned—everybody should study the A.Q. 

Khan case. Everybody should study this very carefully. I have a 

reasonable starting point in my book, but I think we are going to 

learn more about this every week. And here the father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, as you know, set himself up as the first global 

nuclear black marketeer, sourcing globally the ingredients from 

which he made nuclear bombs. So he sold them nuclear bomb designs out of China, a very good nuclear bomb design actually. He 

sold them uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock out of North Korea. 

He sold them equipment for centrifuges out of Malaysia. He had 
23

South African scientists working on their bomb programs and some 

materials in their warehouses. He was running his money out of 

Dubai. I mean, this was a pretty amazing global—globalization is 

a fantastic process. He took full advantage of it. 

So I think the notion of—go back to what I think Congressman 

Cox mentioned, if I got it right, the notion that there has got to 

be some global engagement in an international effort in which nations declared this to be illegal. Fortunately, that process has been 

moving forward, in which there is great cooperation on export control. So, as Colonel Larsen was saying, we are looking at every border when things go across. We are looking at dual-use items. I 

mean, there is a huge, huge agenda of work in that arena. And one 

that we are working on, but I would say not with—I mean, it is 

kind of like with all deliberate speed rather than, holy Moses, this 

could actually be happening. But this was the case. I mean, the 

facts about the A.Q. Khan case in Libya are now 100 percent understood, because we have an opportunity for American officials to 

go and, you know, see the scene completely. 

Colonel LARSEN. Let me—just two brief comments about the 

technology, because I think sometimes there is a misconception. Dr. 

Graham and I have never built a nuclear weapon. But, Dr. 

Graham, if you and I had 100,000 pounds of highly enriched uranium and $100,000, you suppose we could make a crude bomb? I 

have no doubt in my mind. 

So there is no new technology that is going to give this to AlQa‘ida or a terrorist. They already have that new technology. And 

then there is this technology you were mentioning, like Moore’s 

law, that, you know, it doubles in speed, or the computers is every 

18 months. Well, remember, that is computers; it is not detection 

capability. Physics don’t change every 18 months, and that is my 

concern. 

So I understand we have got to have some R&D to look at this, 

but the basic physics will not change, and finding a weapon is very 

difficult. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, I have additional questions, but my time is 

running out, so I will hold them for a second round. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank the gentleman. 

Does the Chairman wish to inquire? 

Mr. COX. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The testimonies that the three of you have provided have laid out 

the problem very, very neatly. 

Dr. Allison, you began with the global nature of this problem and 

the importance of controlling materials worldwide. Dr. Ikle ́, you 

warned us that we need better sensors and forensics. What we 

have in hand is not adequate. And Colonel Larsen, he told us that 

even if we do have good technology, we need to think about how 

and where we are deploying it, because putting it only at major 

border crossings will be inadequate, and that we would be better 

off trying to look at the source of these materials rather than scouring the whole planet or our whole country indiscriminately. 

That suggests to me two things; first, that we need to think 

about the role that intelligence plays in all of these decisions. And 

I don’t see an element in the proposal for DNDO to integrate intelligence. Second, the D in front of DNDO may necessarily constrict 
24

us in ways that nobody really wants, because this problem has its 

ultimate focus in the United States, but it is not at all about something that is going on uniquely in our country. And so coordinating 

these efforts globally seems to be very key. 

There is—if not a third aspect of this problem, there is a corollary to these two problems, and that is that we have got to make, 

I take it, some budget choices. If we were to give the President the 

money that he asked for, the nearly quarter of a billion dollars, we 

would have to make some immediate budget choices about whether 

to buy a whole lot of today’s technology in a hurry or whether to 

spend that money on developing something better. So I wonder if 

you could critique or complement, if you choose to do so, the precise 

proposal that is before us from the administration, and I think 

from the Department, in the form of the President’s budget and a 

letter from the Secretary of Homeland Security for a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office rather than a nuclear terrorism prevention 

office to tackle that problem perhaps more generally. 

Dr. Ikle ́. And I hope to hear from you each of you. 

Mr. IKLE ́. I have been somewhat involved in the birth of this organization, and my guess is the ‘‘D,’’ the domestic, is there because 

it was the Homeland Security Department that took on the initiative to do something about it. 

Mr. COX. If I may stop you right there, one of the concerns I have 

had in other areas of homeland security is this notion that somehow it is not of interest to the Department of Homeland Security 

if there is an attack on the USS Cole. It is impossible for what is 

now the second largest Cabinet department to have a handle on its 

number one priority, the prevention of terrorism, if it is constricted 

to the domestic United States in terms of its intelligence. 

Mr. IKLE ́. The intelligence—actually, there are several paragraphs in the proposal that is in front of me—there have been different proposals floating around referring to coordination of intelligence with the Director of National Intelligence. I think that, with 

proper management, that will be taken care of naturally. Like the 

Department as a whole, HSD, this organization would be plugged 

into the intelligence organization. 

Mr. COX. Well, I do want to focus again on this notion that the 

Department of Homeland Security is somehow restricted in its outlook to the territory of the United States. Because if we have by 

design a Nuclear Detection Office, then we are going to assume the 

solution to the problem without continuing to question what the 

problem is or how to attack it, and all that DNDO will be is a 

project and we will see how fast we can pour money into the deployment of the specific technology that we have chosen to put at 

our major crossing points. 

Mr. IKLE ́. Right, I fully agree. And I was guessing the word ‘‘domestic’’ is there because maybe some lawyer in the Department of 

Homeland Security being involved in the drafting said, ‘‘you have 

to stick to the domestic.’’ 

Mr. COX. The statute certainly doesn’t require that. 

Mr. IKLE ́. Prior to this effort, the Secretary of Defense—I am 

breaking some confidence here and getting out some news—contacted the Secretary of Homeland Security for a joint effort. He was 
25

turned down, so that was too bad. But at least now the Homeland 

Security Department decided to move ahead. 

I would think you have the power to change it and NNDO, National Nuclear Detection Office, might be a better name and clear 

up some of this confusion and ambiguity. I totally agree with you. 

It has to work abroad as well as on our borders and within our territory. 

Mr. COX. If we could just hear from the other witnesses, Mr. 

Chairman, I have no further questions. 

Colonel LARSEN. The disconnect seems to be in the charter of this 

committee, which says ‘‘nuclear counterproliferation and detection.’’ 

So I think we are trying to put that whole role on this new office 

in DHS, when what Congress passed here last year for the budget, 

I mean the Intelligence Reform Act, creates this new office, the National Counterproliferation Center. 

So to me that seems that new thing under DNI—of course, they 

got 18 months to stand that up, which I think is too long, in my 

opinion. The original bill said 12 months. It got extended to 18. But 

that might give us a better chance of having someone in charge of 

the whole thing, and maybe this just should be the Nuclear Detection Office to do the R&D. 

We have folks at S&T, at DHS, doing R&D on MANPADS, what 

is the best which way to beat that kind of threat we are facing or 

whatever, and they are doing that. Maybe that is what this office 

should focus on, is the R&D effort for detection. Wherever we put 

them, take the word ‘‘domestic’’ out. I am happy with that. But I 

don’t think it fits well, this office, for your full charter, because you 

start with the word counterproliferation. 

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Allison, did you wish to comment? 

Mr. ALLISON. Yes, I agree with both of these comments and 

would just push it a little bit further. 

To Congressman Cox’s question, if you start with what are the 

jobs to be done and then, because we always had the problem with 

domestic and foreign and then we get slightly confused about, okay, 

well, the jurisdiction of this committee or this department, but I 

think it is worth it to start with the logic of the issue and then 

work your way back. 

You would like, in the first instance, to be able to detect and 

therefore seize nuclear material that could be used to make a 

bomb, that might be on its way to become a bomb. Where would 

you like to detect it? Wherever you can detect it. And where would 

you like to seize it? Wherever you can seize it. So when it is crossing the border in Russia, when it is going across Bulgaria, if it is 

on the seas, if it is at the port, if it is New York City, wherever 

it is, if you had a piece of technology for doing that, do you want 

to have a stamp on it that says this one can only be used domestically and this one can’t be? So it is a global problem, and it should 

have a global solution. 

Secondly, right now, we actually have people that do this. As I 

described in my book, The Dragon Fire Incident, we thought that 

there was a nuclear bomb in New York City a month after 9/11, 

so they dispatched to New York City the nuclear NEST teams. Who 

are these? These are nuclear experts that go with the current technologies, whatever they are, to look for any signs of radioactivity. 
26

Now, as I said before, because of physics, they have a hard problem, because if I am trying to hide it I have a much easier job than 

they if they are trying to seek it out. So the technology changes 

over time. 

But there are people that are now doing this; and there are people, for example, Special Forces guys, who are looking around in 

Afghanistan now. Are they not looking for nuclear weapons material? Excuse me, of course they are. I mean, that is not a classified 

fact. That is obvious. If they are not, they are not doing their job. 

So whatever capabilities we have ought to be a national capability. 

So I agree with that very, very strongly. 

On the third point, if you were going to call this—if I were naming or whatever, ‘‘national’’ makes a whole lot more sense. 

Fourth, if you go back to Colonel Larsen’s first point, one of the 

problems with this whole game is, if you ask who is in charge of 

preventing nuclear terrorism, it is either all hands go up or no 

hands go up. But there is nobody for whom that is their job when 

they get up in the morning, that is their job when they go home 

at night, and that is their job if something terrible happens. But 

that is not the task of this group. 

I think for the structure of this organization, if it were able to 

speed the research activity that is now going on to improve the 

quality of detection for whoever is using it, an intelligence agent 

who is out somewhere or Special Forces, PSI ships that are on the 

sea as well as somebody at a port or the nuclear NEST teams when 

they come to look in one of our cities looking for something, I would 

say that is perfectly fine. And this if this is not adequately integrated with those, I think it will end up being an aside. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

Does the gentleman from Mississippi wish to inquire? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

The panel pretty much agreed that, in terms of the threat of nuclear terrorism, we have to find the weapons grade material at the 

source and at some point create an adequate detection system. I 

heard a little disagreement on whether that should be a private 

sector detection system or a publicly operated detection system, 

and whether we use the research labs or what have you to help 

with that. Can you kind of share where you think the private sector falls within this detection effort in terms of the whole nuclear 

identification and threat? 

Dr. Allison, we will go with you. 

Mr. ALLISON. I think Dr. Ikle ́, who has thought a lot about this, 

in his proposal for some more Apollo-like or some manager of the 

whole project within and making use of what is known in all of our 

national weapons labs is a big piece of this, and I don’t have my 

mind fully around that. 

But I have a second observation, and it is not well-grounded, but 

I would say that, from my conversations with at least some people 

in the private sector and given the extent to which the game of 

finding highly enriched uranium and plutonium is a game of, in the 

first instance, physics and then the embodiment of physical capabilities within the laws of physics that allow for detection, I would 

be very interested in either as that unit or independently of it trying to stimulate private initiatives in this arena. Because I think 
27

you have got a lot of inventiveness there. And whether it would be 

by—I tried to think a little bit about this—maybe by saying here 

is some parameters of the current detection capability, and if you 

can think of a better way to skin this cat, there would be a potential for—mean, there would be a buy of a certain number of things. 

I think in the bio area, some of the most interesting initiatives 

that have come forward is when people think, okay, I can go do it 

my way differently than the structured way. 

So I would be interested in finding a way to have as part of it 

some engagement of the private sector initiative, not by funding 

their research in advance but by telling them we were going to buy 

a certain amount of stuff, and if you come up with a great gizmo, 

come and present it for review. 

Mr. IKLE ́. The private sector is already engaged. The Homeland 

Security Department has let out many small contracts and some 

larger ones to the think-tanks, to industry people for making contributions, and I could see further contributions coming from the 

private sector, especially for things which, not getting into deep 

classified stuff, but which refer to the deployment, to the defense 

ability, the gates through which you take the containers or what 

have you or making cheaper products once the products have been 

designed. 

But you have to be on guard not to let that dominate the whole 

effort for getting advanced sensors which we need so badly. The 

real capability is with the laboratories. They have worked for 60 

years on plutonium, highly enriched uranium and making these 

materials into weapons and combining it, and they have the classified information, they have the experience, they know from their 

intelligence experience over 60 years how other countries go about 

it, how terrorists plan to go about it. They can put together larger 

teams, and they have the laboratory material to work on it. They 

must take the lead. 

Now they will spin out some new ideas for detecting highly enriched uranium, describe the shielding, which Graham Allison 

properly referred to, which prevents us from finding it now. There 

are ideas for finding uranium despite that, but they need to be 

worked on at the labs. 

Then once you have design, particularly industry can make 

cheaper prototypes, can produce the 1,000 items, if you need so 

many, much cheaper than the labs. The labs are not doing the production. But you need a driving center where the basic development begins, and that, in my view, has to be the laboratory, and 

I think all the experts who have looked at this would agree with 

it. 

Colonel LARSEN. I agree. The basic science needs to be done at 

the labs. But, as you said, doctor, a lot of good scientists left there 

in frustration. We would certainly need a program to get some of 

the folks back there. Basic science needs to be done there, and then 

turn it over to industry. 

Mr. LINDER. If the committee would indulge me, I would like to 

submit for the record a statement by Dr. David Abshire, President 

of the Center for the Study of the Presidency. 

In his statement—I would like to ask the witnesses just to comment on this. In his statement, for the record, he said ‘‘The Na-
28

tion’s defense against covert delivery of nuclear weapons remains 

an unnecessary Achilles heel.’’ He further elaborates that ‘‘as part 

of the solution, any plan must not only involve deployment of detectors but weapons interdiction capabilities. This would imply that 

the DNDO should have an operational element to its mission, 

which it does not. Is persuasion its only option? A rather large 

task, considering the key partners of this office are DOD, DOE and 

State.’’

PREPARED STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD OF DAVID M. ABSHIRE, PRESIDENT, CENTER

FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY

Toward a Coordinated and Comprehensive Defense Against the Smuggled 

Nuclear Weapons Threat

Thank you for the opportunity to submit these comments to the House Committee 

on Homeland Security. You are to be commended for taking up such a critically important issue as ‘‘DHS Coordination of Nuclear Detection Efforts.’’ Dr. Fred Ikle ́, appearing before your Committee today for this hearing, is responsible for my involvement and that of the Center for the Study of the Presidency in this issue. Dr. Richard Wagner of Los Alamos National Laboratory advises the Center in this regard 

and is a vital asset to our work. He would bring enormous value to your Committee’s deliberations on this subject and I hope that he can testify before you in the 

future. 

In the course of this hearing, you will find that detecting and defending against 

covert nuclear attack remains the job of more than just the Department of Homeland Security. Yet, the advent of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is promising. I would like to address the difficulties ahead in pursuit of a more comprehensive defense, the pros and cons of DNDO in this context, and the value of taking 

a more inclusive approach to devising, developing, and deploying a layered defense 

against the ominous threat posed by smuggled nuclear weapons and global terrorism. 

The likelihood of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon increases 

with every passing day. Professor Allison will make this case before your committee 

with disturbing clarity. There can be little doubt that, if in possession of a nuclear 

weapon, most terrorist groups would exhibit little reluctance to use it against an 

American city. 

A major investment has been made over the years in missile defenses to diminish 

the threat from nuclear weapons owned by nation-states and delivered by ballistic 

missiles. Yet, at the same time, the nation’s defense against covert delivery, something even Oppenheimer warned against over 50 years ago, remains an unnecessary 

Achilles’ heel. Consider that over two million pounds of illegal drugs were successfully interdicted crossing our borders last year. The presence of such drugs in the 

marketplace suggests an enormous tonnage penetrates our borders undetected. A 

terrorist requires the amount of highly enriched uranium the size of a grapefruit 

to kill thousands of Americans almost instantly. 

Unfortunately, there is no straightforward solution to the smuggled nuclear weapon threat. It requires defense in depth. This includes not only development and deployment of better detectors. It overarches the following: • Global nonproliferation initiatives, • Bolstered intelligence operations to detect terrorists’ nuclear-related activities, 

• Greatly strengthened weapons interdiction capabilities, • Enhanced opportunities to be exploited during the crucial period between 

warning and attack, and 

• Improving post-attack recovery response capacities and enhanced forensics. 

Necessary forensic capabilities—in combination with better detectors—are among 

the principal areas deserving increased R&D attention.

Accelerate R&D Across the Executive Branch

Key to developing and deploying a layered defense in depth entails better technologies for detecting the presence of a nuclear device or materials. The establishment of Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is an extremely positive step in 

improving detection and will provide an organization which, adequately funded, can 

do much to accomplish the above. Considering the rising likelihood and potential 

devastation of the threat concerned, it is worth asking whether DNDO will improve 

deployed detection technology as much and as quickly as possible. DNDO’s charter 
29

and authorities are sound, but progress should be measured by how well this initiative overcomes the challenges of physical science as well as the realties of political 

science.In other words, how DNDO is organized, structured, and managed significantly affects its ability to deliver. 

Three challenges at the nexus of physical science and political science illustrate 

the point and offer options for way forward: 

1. To deal with such a difficult scientific, technological, and operational issue requires innovation, free thinking, continuity of effort, creativity and simultaneous 

risk taking. The government’s conventional approach to research and development 

(R&D) rarely resembles these traits. 

2. The anti-nuclear smuggling R&D task is further challenged by the fact that 

many different government organizations have important and legitimate roles in 

confronting the threat, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice.And 

each of these agencies requires the same leap in nuclear weapon detection capability 

to be most effective. 

3. Those most needed to contribute to this challenge reside across a diffuse set 

of research institutions, including universities, national laboratories, and private industry, the latter often within small, thinly-financed firms. It has generally been 

found that truly creative research is best pursued by maintaining close coupling between the researchers and those dealing with day-to-day operational challenges.

Employ Proven RDT&E Management Attributes

The government generally found success when it separated the effort to solve a 

specific problem from every-day research, development, testing, and evaluation 

(RDT&E) process. As we understand it, DNDO is intended to do this. Its success 

depends on its ability to emulate key features of previously successful efforts to 

bridge government, academia, and industry to make rapid leaps in technical capabilities using what today we call transformational and evolutionary R&D. Examples 

include the Manhattan Project, the Apollo Project, the U–2, SR–71 and F–117 at 

the ‘‘Skunk Works,’’ and the Strategic Defense Initiative. 

The Center for the Study of the Presidency began a project on the issue of accelerating R&D for a more comprehensive defense against the smuggled nuclear weapons threat in April 2004. That project will issue a brief summary and review of the 

management characteristics that made such models as the Manhattan Project, SDI, 

and the Skunk Works successful. I would be happy to share the findings with you 

and the Committee once available. 

A mini-Manhattan Project today should focus specifically on the detection of nuclear weapons and materials. The creation of a mini-Manhattan Project leading to 

a capability to detect the presence of nuclear weapons and materials could be conducted without seriously disrupting the framework of the planned DNDO and could 

have an enormous impact on America’s and the world’s future security. Key features 

of past successes include the personal commitment of the President and Vice President, a permeating sense of sustained urgency, and a strategy in which: 

• high-risk, high-payoff developments are pursued, hedging against possible 

failure with alternative approaches carried in parallel 

• R&D reaches from basic research through to fieldable prototypes; 

• the R&D is done mainly outside of government by large, integrated, multidisciplinary, R&D teams with forceful and experienced leaders, and with: 

• wide latitude to achieve broad, ambitious, mission-level goals 

• freedom to change R&D objectives and approaches quickly and flexibly, 

as the R&D proves what is feasible 

• direct, frequent, working-level contact between users and R&D people 

• the expectation of continued involvement to achieve both near-term milestones and long-term goals 

• the role of senior, centralized government leadership is to set broad goals, secure funding, and provide freedom of action for the R&D teams by cutting red 

tape for them; and 

• the ability is provided to waive certain procurement and personnel regulations designed to conduct ordinary government research and development. 

That DNDO will report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security is a positive sign. In addition to that, and in addition to personal commitment from the 

President and Vice President, a small group should be established within the White 

House staff to provide clout and top-cover for the exceptional R&D approach and 

to assure coordination of nuclear-related cross-departmental activities and the provision of appropriate support by agencies and departments throughout the federal 

structure.

Apply New Concepts of Deterrence
30

While classic nuclear deterrence fails in confronting this threat, it is wrong to believe that terrorists are undeterrable. The concept of mutually assured destruction 

(MAD) depended upon a fear of retaliation, even with accidental launch. Today’s 

smuggled nuclear threat, however, must instill in the terrorist a fear of failure. A 

nuclear device would represent an enormously precious asset to a terrorist organization. An effective strategy seeks—via several means, hence a layered defense—to 

disrupt the enemy’s planning and operations cycles, thereby reducing the attacker’s 

confidence in their ability to conduct a successful attack. Thus by strengthening and 

continually changing our defensive tactics, the threshold against which a potential 

attacker must measure the likelihood of success can be substantially raised. This 

offers the concomitant benefit of requiring an enemy to conduct more complex operations involving more people with more resources and more communications over a 

longer period of time, thereby increasing the likelihood of discovery. 

Creating a legitimate fear of failure, however, contributes to only half of an effective deterrent. If a potential perpetrator possesses the fissile material intended for 

delivery, a proliferator permitted it. While the nation’s attention would rightly turn 

to mitigating and containing the impact of a nuclear device were one or more detonated in an American city, all those complicit in the attack would not have died in 

carrying it out. The source of the nuclear material must be held responsible for allowing it into those hands. Finding the source requires excellent nuclear forensic capabilities, which we lack today. Credibly attributing the material to a source and 

threatening retaliation can complicate the potential perpetrator’s ability to obtain 

nuclear material in the first place. 

But what if it’s an accident? What if the proliferator is a careless nation, perhaps 

too unstable or otherwise insufficiently committed to guarding its nuclear material? 

Central to MAD during the Cold War was the stated intention held by both the U.S. 

and the Soviet Union that accidental launch constituted an attack and would elicit 

retaliation. While disproportionate on its surface, it resulted in an effort on both 

sides to act as better stewards of their deadly stockpiles. Nonproliferation regimes 

remain vital today, perhaps more than ever during the Cold War. Today’s realities, 

however, must inform the message we send to proliferators about the consequences 

of their actions.

Final Thoughts

Secretary Chertoff’s Homeland Security Advisory Council established a Task 

Force on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Effect (WME) on U.S. Soil. Exhibiting 

an encouraging mix of experts inside and out of government Norm Augustine Chairs 

the Taskforce’s subgroup on the air domain while former Secretary James Schlesinger chairs the land group and I chair the sea subgroup. Under the chairmanship 

of Lydia Thomas, this new Taskforce, slated to report out in October to the Secretary, holds promise of addressing several of the challenges cited above. Charged 

with assessing current defensive efforts and mapping a layered defense in depth to 

prevent the use of WME, the Taskforce can be expected to inform the development 

and role of the DNDO. Mr. Vayl Oxford, acting director of DNDO for the Department of Homeland Security is assigned to my subgroup as one of the subject matter 

experts. His testimony tomorrow I am certain will add productively to your committee’s constructive oversight. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts with you and I look forward to meeting with you and the committee in the future.

Mr. LINDER. Would you care to comment on that? Colonel 

Larsen? 

Colonel LARSEN. I am not sure I can in an open hearing. 

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Ikle ́? 

Mr. IKLE ́. Yes. It is a good suggestion. I have worked with Dr. 

Abshire on this problem. He has been very much engaged, as a few 

of my other colleagues, and he is pointing in the right direction. It 

is an Achilles heel. You need operational capability. I mentioned 

earlier in my testimony the need for exercises, tests to get going, 

which have to be briefed back to your committee so you can make 

sure something goes on. 

What I am worried is that the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

becomes a domestic nuclear discussion organization and they don’t 

really work the things in the field and they don’t work the project 
31

in the laboratories. They parcel out small grants here and there for 

keeping private industry happy, and we are not moving forward. 

This has been going on, and many of us have been watching it, for 

4 years, if not longer, and in some ways for 7 years. We knew what 

had to be done. 

There is one more point to be made on the improved detection 

sensors and forensics, on which we all agreed they are desirable. 

It may take several years, and if the time comes when proliferation 

poses new challenges because of the fuel cycle changes or whatever, 

when that time comes, we need to be ready. If you don’t start now, 

we will not be ready 10 years from now. 

The Department of Defense, when they develop a new airplane, 

they have to plan 10, 20 years ahead. Missile defense has been in 

the works for a long time. These things cannot be done in 6 

months. 

Mr. ALLISON. We should have started 4 years ago. We need to 

start now. I haven’t seen Abshire’s proposal, though I generally 

think of him as a pretty sensible fellow, so I don’t know quite what 

he means by ‘‘operational.’’ 

I think I would be dubious about this organization as I don’t see 

it having any kind of authority that would look like an active intelligence or active police authority. I think it has got to be hooked 

up with—you know, if it hears that there is a nuclear bomb or has 

some reason to believe there is a nuclear bomb in Boston, I hope 

they are going to send the NEST teams, because those are the 

operational people that do that now, and they should be doing it. 

If it is a question of intercepting and arresting somebody, that is 

either going to be inside the country, the FBI, or outside, CIA. 

So I am not quite sure what the ‘‘operational’’ is. I think the notion of testing and even actually red-teaming, where they notice 

how easy it is to do things, which are embarrassing, but those are 

the things you learn from. 

The reason why we know that Los Alamos has had problems is 

because the former seal groups test them from time to time, and 

almost every time they test them they overwhelm the security system. So you learn from that, gee, we got to get our security system 

better organized. It is embarrassing, but it is the only way I think 

you learn. 

Mr. LINDER. Does Mr. McCaul wish to inquire? 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Allison, I have read your book on nuclear terrorism. It is an 

eye opener, and I think you lay out an excellent strategy for dealing with this real problem we have. 

Al-Qa‘ida stated publicly they have the right to kill 4 million people, 2 million children, and they are not going to accomplish that 

by just flying airplanes into buildings. So that really raises the 

issue of the prospect of a nuclear bomb going off in the United 

States. 

I went to the Houston Port Authority about 2 weeks ago, and I 

was glad to see that the radiological sensors will be put in place 

in the short term. But that is really our last line of defense. I am 

also concerned about between the ports of entry, where you have 

a lot of the smuggling going on in this country. 
32

Of course, in your book, Dr. Allison, you raised the issue of nuclear briefcases, nuclear bombs that could be about the size of a 

bale of marijuana coming across over our border. In terms of the 

technology on the border itself with these types of sensors between 

the ports of entry, I don’t know what could be done in that prospect. 

But, secondly, beyond that, as Chairman Cox mentioned, the 

issue of intelligence, to me that really is the key to the prevention 

aspect, dealing not with our last line of defense but our first line, 

detecting this material. With Dr. Kahn being the master 

proliferator, I think it very difficult to secure nuclear materials 

that may be out there, but I think the intelligence route is the best 

line of defense. 

Lastly, I just want to point out, I agree the domestic name was 

probably phrased by a lawyer in the Homeland Security Department who thought their charge was with domestic affairs only, but 

I do think the national term is more fitting. And I don’t know if 

the idea of this National Counterproliferation Center, it seems to 

me it would be somewhat duplicative if it couldn’t be sort of 

merged into one organization. 

I wanted to get Dr. Allison’s comment on the first question and, 

Dr. Ikle ́, your comment on the second. 

Mr. ALLISON. On the first question, on intelligence, I think you 

are absolutely right that the intelligence is the longest pole. The 

chances of finding something if you don’t have a clue about it are 

very, very, very low. So I think what Randy—what Colonel Larsen 

reminded us, the WMD Commission report is a good report, and it 

says rightly that we basically have not invested heavily in the kind 

of intelligence capabilities we would like if nuclear terrorism were 

the problem. So that is a big, big, big issue. I would say it is first 

at the top. 

On your point about between the major portals of entry, this is 

the kind of another one of the dirty little secrets about this whole 

picture, but I say provocatively that we remain a country almost 

without borders. So terrorists who are bringing a nuclear bomb or 

material for a bomb into the country are going to come through a 

highly protected port or portal where they get inspected, and if we 

build the fence higher, higher and higher and have 100 miles with 

no fence, what happens? 

We have actually run this experiment down by San Diego. So we 

have a huge fence and no one comes to the fence, amazingly, but 

more people come than came before, because they come around the 

fence. 

Down in Houston, the BHS numbers for 2004 have 65 percent 

more people, 65 percent more illegals, coming into the country in 

2004 than in 2002 right after 9/11. So you would say there is something not serious about this. I would say this is not the topic for 

this hearing, but I think it is absolutely an appropriate topic for 

a committee that is charged with Homeland Security to say, is this 

working? 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Your comment on the organizational structure? 

Mr. IKLE ́. Right. The Proliferation Center, if it is set up, would 

be a twin of the National Nuclear Detection Office, we have it 
33

named as of now, NNDO, and could be melded together. But I 

think the proliferation goes into somewhat different—could be just 

two parts, a twin structure. Proliferation gets into other questions 

of diplomacy, of working on Iran with the Europeans and so on. 

Then to carry out some of the implementation, like the PSI, Proliferation Security Initiative, where you want to board ships and 

check for nuclear weapons, then you need the things that DND or 

NNDO is supposed to develop and exercise and do research on. But 

if you put it together or not, I think I have no fixed view on that. 

I do think it is important to take a long-term view of getting better technology so we can, 10 years from now, cope with the new 

proliferation dangers which are coming. We see them coming down 

the pike, the new ways of using plutonium fuel, that the Department of Energy has a program with hundreds of millions in collaboration with Russia, which I don’t think has been looked at 

carefully from the point of view of proliferation. 

So these things are coming and you do want to be prepared, and 

that is where we want to engage our best talent in the best location, to repeat myself, in Department of Energy laboratories, with 

proper management. 

We have had too much in the last few days, the last few years, 

when work was done on sensors, parceled out, small research 

projects, to universities, to some of the labs, and the whole thing 

was not put together. It hangs together, because, as I say in my 

written testimony, you are talking about two elements, plutonium 

and uranium developed in the lab 63 years ago, studied there for 

60 years, how to make them into bombs. And because it hangs together, you can come up with new ideas. And let me remind you 

again, there are ideas that are not being worked on for finding 

highly enriched uranium, despite the shielding. This is a life-saving 

device for our country. Let us work on it. Let’s empower the people 

to do the right research project. 

Mr. MCCAUL. I see my time has expired. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentleman from Washington. 

Mr. DICKS. I want to thank the witnesses here today. 

I am troubled somewhat on this organizational point that Colonel 

Larsen made. Don’t we have to sort out whether it is going to be 

the National Counterproliferation Center that is going to take the 

lead on this or is it going to be the domestic or National Nuclear 

Detection Office? Colonel, what is your advice to us here? 

Colonel LARSEN. Thank you for asking that. I really wanted to 

comment on that. I realize markup is tomorrow. 

Mr. DICKS. That is a question also in my mind. Why are we rushing to judgment here on one the most important issues when we 

haven’t had a chance to look at the bill? To me, we ought to take 

time and get this one right. 

Colonel LARSEN. You asked my opinion, so I will give it to you. 

The National Counterproliferation Office should be in DHS, and 

the detection office should be a sub-unit under it. If you look at the 

charter of what it says here, it says this subcommittee is nuclear 

and biological counterproliferation detection and all those other 

things. It is right here. 

That is why I was so pleased when I saw this subcommittee created. I go, they got it right. This is good. 
34

So now you got this initiative that Congress passed, the President signed, and said, well, okay, maybe we should have this National Counterproliferation Office. We agree that nuke and bio are 

the biggest threats we face to our homeland. Why not put the National Counterproliferation Center in DHS and give it some real 

authority to really do a new job? Most of this is just 22 agencies 

we stapled together, probably the right move, but now to give it a 

real mission for protecting us. 

So you asked for my opinion. I gave it to you. 

Mr. DICKS. Anybody else have a comment here? 

Mr. ALLISON. Well, I haven’t thought my way all the way 

through this, but I actually like Colonel Larsen’s suggestion. I 

think that what you have here, to the extent that this is an office 

that helps organize and fund research so that we improve the technologies and capabilities for everybody, whoever they are, using 

them globally, whether they are used by Special Forces or by NEST 

or by a guy at the port, that part I think makes sense. 

But I think that Colonel Larsen has a very good point, in my 

view, which is you try to think about what this National Nonproliferation Center will be, assuming that it is, because it is now 

just an item on a piece of paper. The proposition that it might work 

within this structure I think is—haven’t worked my way through 

it. 

Mr. DICKS. I would suggest, and if I could have the attention of 

the chairman, to me it seems like it would be better for the chairman and the chairman of this subcommittee, Mr. Linder, to sit 

down with the top people in the administration, and hopefully keep 

the Democrats advised, and work out this thing. 

I think having two separate offices doesn’t make any sense. Obviously, one of them is going to be looking more in the intelligence 

arena, and one of them could be doing the R&D on the detection 

equipment. That may make sense. I even like Colonel Larsen’s idea 

better of putting them together and making the DNDO a sub-unit 

of the National Counterproliferation Center. 

Mr. COX. If the gentleman would yield, I agree with that as well; 

and, in fact, completely independently, several of us have reached 

that same conclusion. The balkanization that Colonel Larsen described in his testimony is the enemy. The reason we have a Department of Homeland Security is to get a grip on such things. 

Just to the gentleman’s point about working with the administration, we had a discussion about this yesterday with Michael Jackson, who is, as you know, the deputy at DHS. I expect that the administration is going to be moving with alacrity on these concepts. 

The law that we passed in Congress doesn’t say where NCP is 

located, so the President could choose to put it in the Department 

of Homeland Security. I do think there is an awful lot of discussion 

about putting it under the DNI. Putting these things together 

would be very, very sensible. 

Our authorization bill is going to take a very long time. Whether 

we ever get to conference with the Senate, for example, is still up 

in the air. Meantime, real life is going to be preceding well ahead 

of these events, so the only reason the committee is moving forward with our process is so we can weigh in on this. 
35

Mr. DICKS. But why would we go ahead and try to authorize? As 

I understood it, we are going to try to authorize DNDO tomorrow. 

Why wouldn’t we straighten this thing out first and then do this? 

It seems to me we ought to wait before we make a decision to 

authorize this until we see what the overall situation is. I think we 

should take a little time here in order to get this thing right. And 

I think the suggestions that have been made here today are helpful. But I don’t see how we can do that and have the kind of consultation we need to have in order to do it by tomorrow. 

Mr. COX. If the gentleman would yield, we are only working in 

subcommittee tomorrow. We intend to be with this problem for a 

long time, and I think we will be with it for the entire year. 

Mr. DICKS. So you say we could fix this in full committee? 

Mr. COX. Absolutely. And not only that, but it will be months I 

think before we go to conference with the Senate. 

Mr. LINDER. Dr. Ikle ́, did you want to comment on that? 

Mr. IKLE ́. Yes, I am concerned about timing, and I agree with 

you, Congressman Dicks, we should do this very carefully. But it 

took 9 months, in fact, if you count all the phases, about a year 

to get this DNDO organization together. I would prefer you let the 

organization go ahead. It is not that formal. It can be changed, 

amended, something else can be added. But let’s get started. We 

have been talking about this for 4 years without getting started 

with the long-term research. 

Mr. DICKS. Are you talking about getting started on doing the 

R&D? 

Mr. IKLE ́. R&D, exactly. 

Mr. DICKS. I don’t have a problem with that. I think that makes 

sense. 

Mr. IKLE ́. You could have that under Homeland Security as it is 

in DNDO, or you could have it in a separate center. Then you can 

sort out whether you want to merge proliferation with the interdiction and detection effort. 

Much of the counterproliferation, of course, is done in the Department of State, it is foreign policy, and I wouldn’t be surprised 

if the Department of State would not want to go along with having 

all of that put under the Homeland Security Department. 

But these things can take a long time to sort out, and the main 

thing is to start going with the long-term R&D and with some of 

the exercises that the organization, as it exists, could do. I think 

we all agree exercises are important so we can learn more, and 

then maybe amend it and develop it further a year from now. 

Mr. DICKS. Dr. Allison, I just want to make one final point: Still 

the most important thing we could do is to spend the money to 

fund Nunn-Lugar, to accelerate the program to get these materials 

in the Soviet Union under control. What are those dates again? We 

could do it in 3 years or is it 13 years under the administration’s 

approach? 

Mr. ALLISON. I think that the point of greatest leverage is locking down or eliminating material at the source, so every mile away 

from that source it is harder for me to find it and easier for the 

terrorists to pursue it. 

In that effort, the Nunn-Lugar money is a very important piece 

of the picture, but the diplomacy and actually presidential and sec-
36

retarial muscle is even more important. What President Bush and 

President Putin did at Bratislava by putting nuclear security up at 

the top of the agenda was a great step in the right direction. President Bush should have this on his agenda when he goes to Moscow 

on May 9. He should have it on his agenda when he meets with 

him in July at the G–8. The question should be, here is a timetable 

of the securing of material that could blow up Moscow and Washington, so where do we stand with respect to this? 

As I say, if you are asking how can you explain that some objects 

of art are more secure in the Kremlin armory than nuclear bombs, 

that this is a historical accident and an accident, that we shouldn’t 

find it acceptable. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Lungren, do you seek to inquire? 

Mr. LUNGREN. I know we only have a few minutes left for Dr. 

Allison, so it looks like the panel here on this side has reached a 

consensus that nonproliferation appears to be the number one issue 

and the most effective way; and, secondly, R&D is extremely important. 

So let me talk about the third part, and that is actual installation or utilization of nuclear detection devices. 

I am trying to get a sense from the three of you what do you 

think the quality of current technology is, number one; number 

two, does that mean that we ought to put significant amounts of 

money in installing nuclear detectors as they already exist, or 

should that money be better spent for further R&D; and, third, if 

in fact we are going to expand the utilization or installation of already existing technology based nuclear detectors, where would you 

emphasize their use or their placement right now? 

Dr. Allison? 

Mr. ALLISON. Excellent question. I would suggest—I will give you 

my answer, but I would say the committee could actually ask DHS 

or even GAO to go and conduct a test to see how easy or how hard 

it is to bring in nuclear material into the country through a port 

and through unmonitored ports; and I think the conclusion that 

you would find from that is that, with the current equipment currently operated, the odds of finding something, absent an intelligence lead in advance, are very, very low. 

Now I don’t know exactly, therefore, what the current installation program—what problem it is the answer to. I think it may be 

the answer to the problem for why it is that four separate people 

inspect my airline ticket when I go to National to see if it matches 

my driver’s license, as if I were seriously trying to do something 

I would not be able to go on the Internet buy a phony driver’s license, which I can, and that I would fail to coordinate it with the 

name on my ticket. 

I would say this is a great version of dumb security, dumb security, and I would say there is a huge number of these, huge. 

Now the business argument that can be made for it is this is 

really about reassuring people. People are not too smart maybe, 

and so if the guy inspects them four times they think somehow 

they are more secure. It doesn’t work for me, but I would say that 

is the best argument I can make for it, if you are trying to make 

a rational argument. 
37

So as between installation, other than for reassurance, at least 

on the basis of what I understand about the current capabilities for 

the seekers versus the hiders and seriousness about research and 

development, in which I do believe if we are serious about it 5 

years from now we will have something that works a whole lot better. So actually you could have the NEST teams—this would actually be a very interesting discussion and probably should not be an 

open hearing—but have some folks from the NEST teams come and 

explain how hard, how easy it is for them to find nuclear material 

if they know it is in a city. They will tell you, as is a fact, it is 

not a secret about this, that if they don’t have a clue about which 

building—say you know it is in Congress, you know it is one of the 

Houses of Congress, can you find it? Answer, very, very unlikely. 

If I know it is in Cannon on the second floor, I got a somewhat better chance, and again it depends on the shielding. 

Mr. IKLE ́. I am kidding, but it is becoming dangerous as he kept 

talking. 

You are absolutely right, Graham Allison, on the dumb ways of 

handling it. 

There is a smart angle, in answer to your question, about what 

deployment should we do now with the thoroughly inadequate sensors until we have better ones. It does make sense to put additional 

hurdles against the terrorists. Why? Because then they have to 

mount a larger operation. It may take two guys, it may take somebody having to get a forged I.D. card, or it will take shielding that 

is heavy, that can be seen. So you increase the chances for a normal, human-type intelligence to find something. You help our current intelligence capability somewhat by imposing obstacles to the 

movement and introduction of these nuclear weapons so that you 

force the terrorist team to mount a larger effort, and if they mount 

a larger effort, your chances of discovering it go up. That is the 

smart use of current installations. 

Beyond that, I think that the thrust of your question—I would 

put most of the resources to improve the detection capability on the 

transformational R&D, as it is called in the charter. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Colonel Larsen. 

Colonel LARSEN. As I mentioned earlier, I agree with what they 

said. If I had better technology for detectors, I would put it where 

the stockpile is in the former Soviet states to make sure it doesn’t 

leave there. We have got 95,000 miles of shoreline and 7,000 miles 

of borders. I am going to just bring it across someplace other than 

a big port. So detectors should be where it is all sitting right now, 

to make sure it doesn’t leave there. I think that is the best expenditure. 

Mr. ALLISON. I apologize very much, Mr. Chairman and members, that one of the rules at Harvard is that I have to go and teach 

my class. So I appreciate very much the chance to be here with you 

and would be happy to follow up on an individual basis or if people 

have specific questions, because I think what you are about is 

something hugely important. 

I thank you for the honor of being here. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you for being here. 

Does the gentleman from Massachusetts wish to inquire? 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. 
38

Mr. ALLISON. I apologize very much to my good friend and person 

whom I greatly admire, Congressman Markey. 

Mr. MARKEY. I thank you very much for coming, Dr. Allison. 

So just so you all understand, we are going to be voting on this 

bill tomorrow. The Democrats have yet to see the bill. We don’t 

have a copy of the bill in our hands, and we are being asked by 

5 o’clock this afternoon to submit amendments to a bill that we 

haven’t seen yet. So we have to draft the amendments, but we 

don’t have the bill that would then make it possible for us to 

amend the bill, but the deadline is 5:00 this afternoon, which is not 

a good process for a subject that is so important. 

Then, tomorrow, we will hear from the administration on the bill, 

although the Democrats will have already had to have submitted 

their amendments to the bill that we haven’t seen yet. 

Then after the administration testifies, regardless of what they 

testify to, then we will then mark up the bill immediately after the 

administration testifies without any ability on the part of the 

Democrats to then amend, to formulate any amendments, based 

upon what the administration said. 

So that obviously is a very flawed process on what the President 

says is the single most important issue facing America. It just is 

not the way in which we should be conducting this. 

I can understand where that might be the case if we were talking about drilling in the Arctic Refuge or some other issue, but this 

is the most important issue. The Democrats don’t have a copy of 

the bill. Our ability to amend expires tonight at 5:00 without having seen a copy of the bill, and then the administration will testify 

tomorrow. 

Mr. COX. If the gentleman will yield, I believe the gentleman was 

perhaps not present when Mr. Dicks and I had a conversation earlier on this topic. The administration is going forward with these 

proposals in real life. 

Mr. MARKEY. No, no, no, I heard the whole conversation. I am 

only talking about tomorrow. 

Mr. COX. Insofar as the procedure is concerned, I don’t believe 

it is any restraint on any member offering any amendment in subcommittee markup. It is simply a convenience if you want your 

amendment distributed before the hearing, to have it turned in by 

a certain deadline. 

Mr. DICKS. Why can’t we see the bill, Mr. Chairman? This is a 

situation where we haven’t had a chance to look at the bill. 

Mr. COX. There will simply be a committee print. There is right 

now before us, it is my understanding—you have what we have 

which is to say while you don’t have leg language, you have something written in plain English which is better, because it is in leg 

counsel. The only reason it is not before you in bill language is that 

it is in leg counsel. 

Mr. MARKEY. But why wouldn’t we mark up on Thursday? In 

other words, why wouldn’t we have a bill circulated to all the members? Because I don’t know if the Republicans have a copy of the 

bill either. I assume they don’t. 

Mr. COX. I will yield to the gentleman, it is his time, and we 

ought to discuss this without burdening our witnesses with it, but 

I am certain that Chairman Linder and certainly I will make every 
39

effort for all the members on both sides so that we can do this collaboratively and collegially. There is no rabbit in the hat here, I assure you. 

Mr. MARKEY. But there is no collaboration, I might say. We 

haven’t seen the bill. Our deadline is 5:00. We were told we had 

a guillotine—why have a 5 o’clock deadline? Why not have us be 

able in real time, after the administration testifies tomorrow, when 

the bill is now before us, to then be able to amend it based upon 

what the administration testifies? 

Mr. LINDER. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. MARKEY. I will be glad to. 

Mr. LINDER. I think the chairman made it clear that the 5 o’clock 

deadline was not the end of time to submit amendments. You will 

be able to do that during the markup tomorrow. But the 5 o’clock 

deadline was so we could distribute to all the members of the subcommittee a copy of what you might propose. 

Mr. MARKEY. When will we have a copy of the bill? 

Mr. LINDER. This evening, I expect. This afternoon. 

Mr. MARKEY. Before or after the deadline? 

Mr. LINDER. We are hoping at 2 o’clock. 

Mr. MARKEY. And why is it we are going to mark up the bill immediately after the administration testifies, instead of the members 

then having the ability, at least for one day, to think about what 

the administration recommended and then trying to draft a bill either reflecting what they said or, conversely, adjusting what they 

said because the committee did not react positively to their presentation? Why would we immediately go into a process that made it 

almost impossible for us to intelligently and thoughtfully respond 

to what the administration’s recommendations were to us? 

Mr. COX. If the gentleman would yield, I really don’t want to 

have this discussion before these witnesses, because their testimony is very valuable and I think we ought to be inquiring of the 

topic at hand. But I will say that this schedule of subcommittee 

and then subsequently full committee hearings and markups is 

driven by the floor date that we have for an authorization bill. 

I think our choice is simply whether we wish to exclude this from 

the authorization bill, which is something that we can definitely do, 

but we have got to be on the floor for our scheduled time for an 

authorization bill in order to be there before the appropriators, in 

order to make sense of this process. 

So we will be doing legislation throughout the year. It is entirely 

possible that we will simply excise this altogether from the bill if 

we don’t have any committee sense of where we want to go with 

it. I think we need to take this topic up in real time simply because 

it is happening, whether we involve ourselves with it or not as the 

Congress in real time, in real life, in the executive branch. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. If the gentleman will yield, I would just like to 

be on record in echoing the sentiments of my colleagues, that I 

don’t think it is too much to ask that we put this off for a day so 

we can at least have an opportunity to look at the bill and offer 

responsible amendments and then proceed with the process. I think 

there have been a number of questions that have come out of this 

hearing that have been very valuable and helpful and could very 
40

easily be included in a proper amendment to make the bill even 

stronger. So I would request that the chairman consider that. 

Mr. LINDER. I will consider that. The time of the gentleman has 

expired. 

Do the witnesses have just a little bit more time for another 

round of questions? 

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I beg the indulgence of the chairman. I actually didn’t use much of my time. 

Mr. LINDER. You actually used it all. 

Mr. MARKEY. I mean, I yielded much of it to the chairman of the 

full committee so he could make his points, and I did defer and 

tried not to interrupt him. The consequence was I then lost my 

time. I would just ask, out of courtesy, because it was a colloquy 

that I felt was important for the committee to engage in and the 

chairman of the committee did participate in it, as did the chairman of the subcommittee, that I be allowed to ask some substantive questions. 

Mr. LINDER. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. MARKEY. I thank you. 

My first question would be, wouldn’t you have liked to have had 

a copy of the bill before you came here to testify? 

No, I am going to leave that. 

The administration right now is actually proposing a new round 

of nuclear bunker busters, kind of baby nukes, while we are telling 

the rest of the world they should begin to dismantle their nuclear 

weapons programs wherever they might exist. Do you see any problems with that, with the administration pushing for a new nuclear 

weapons system while we tell the rest of the world that they should 

not engage in it at all? 

Mr. IKLE ́. Congressman Markey, on your first question, which 

you withdrew, I did get a copy of official use only presidential directive. So since it is official use only, I can share it with you, 

which tells me the essence of the DNDO, though not until bill form. 

On the rest, it is not for me to comment on that issue. 

On the second question you raised about the earth-penetrating 

nuclear weapons, contrary to what many of my friends or colleagues in the Department of Defense argue, not all of them, I am 

not in favor of it, for the following reason: Less that it will stimulate proliferation, I don’t think that is one of the results, but more 

that it is a waste of effort and money. Because if the President 

should decide to use a nuclear weapon to go after a bunker that 

contains nuclear weapons, it is almost 100 percent sure that the 

nuclear weapon will first have been used against us. 

I can’t imagine the current or future Presidents wanting to terminate the non-use period that lasted for 60 years to go after an 

uncertain bunker. I can’t imagine that decision. 

But if we have been attacked, heaven forbid, by a nuclear weapon, say from Korea, a missile, or they attacked Japan, then I don’t 

think we would care that much about using one of the existing 

large yield weapons, even though they cause much more casualties 

than we would ever want to cause. 

So this fine-tuned, clean nuclear weapon use for that contingency 

seems to be a very unlikely event and therefore not worth the cost 

and effort. 
41

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. 

Colonel Larsen, I don’t know if you followed the story that ABC 

was able to bring into the country several kilograms of depleted 

uranium. You probably followed that story. 

My question to you is, while I am supportive of new detector 

technology or screening algorithms as part of long-term efforts to 

improve our capabilities in this area, I think that the Department 

of Homeland Security should be focusing much more closely on 

short-term, less-expensive solutions, such as moving the detectors 

closer to the sample and other engineering measures that would 

improve the signal-to-noise ratio. Do you agree with that? 

Colonel LARSEN. The problem is, sir, I don’t know how to move 

it closer to the sample, I guess is the problem. Six million containers come in this country. How are you going to—when I put it 

inside that small box, inside that 40-foot steel container, the physics is not there today to get that signature you are looking for. 

Perhaps in the future—I am not the physicist here—there would 

be some technology, but today—sat in this same seat in February 

for the Budget Committee, and I pointed out to them the gamma 

detectors outside the building, you know, are not a very good investment of many taxpayer dollars. When they get the nuke this 

close, who cares if we know it is here? It is too late. The fact is, 

that is pretty much the case with our ports today. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LINDER. I would like to ask both of you this question: Some 

years ago, the government got involved in a very expensive project 

to outline and discover the human genome, very important research, and it will be very valuable in the future for health care 

and medicine. After many billions of dollars were spent, an upstart 

company with private investments and 1/20th of the money beat 

them to the task. Are there private investors out there who are 

seeking to make a lot of money off detection technology moving 

ahead on the challenge and do they have the latitude, I guess, to 

do that? 

Mr. IKLE ́. There are some ideas that you get from private companies and even from graduate students in physics. They mostly have 

to do with the deployment of the sensors, how to cope with the millions of containers and so on. Some are very clever ideas, and those 

should be garnered by the long-term transformational research 

project. They should have eyes and ears open to the physics professors in all the universities who can contribute, even to the students, and certainly to private companies for the deployment. 

For the essential part, it seems to me unlikely that a private 

company could do the research with the knowledge about how you 

can build a nuclear explosive and the experience with the plutonium and enriched uranium that you do have accumulated in the 

labs. So I think is a contributory role, but it is not the central, 

leading role, in my view. 

Colonel LARSEN. I am not sure I am qualified to answer that one, 

what the civilian capacity is. The only concern I would have is all 

of the knowledge required to develop those sorts of new detectors, 

if that knowledge somehow got to the bad guys, then they would 

know how to counter them. So I think I agree, back to what we 
42

originally said, was the labs is probably the best place for the hard 

science, and then turn it over perhaps for the production capability. 

Mr. IKLE ́. Exactly. One more point, forensics was mentioned as 

important. We all agree for deterrence it is essential, and that gets 

very much into the classified domain and it has to be done in a centralized place in the U.S. Government. 

Mr. LINDER. You mentioned transformational research three or 

four times this morning. Can you give us an indication in this open 

session in which direction it is going in? 

Mr. IKLE ́. That name is in the charter which—that was worked 

on for a year, and that is why I use it, because people are familiar 

in this area. Which way is it going this year? 

Mr. LINDER. Which direction the research is headed for? Is it better detection? What are we looking for? 

Mr. IKLE ́. The ability to detect a plutonium-based weapon at 

much greater distances, at much greater speed, a combination of 

the two, so you can run 10,000 containers through a gate and you 

can check each one with enough confidence of finding it. The ability, which we do not have now, to detect uranium-based bombs, 

which are more difficult to detect because uranium doesn’t emit 

these signals. 

The ability beyond this is a point we hadn’t mentioned. It is very 

important to use active interrogation. You send radiation into the 

container. You have to do that carefully so you don’t hurt the crews 

on the ship and so on. But you have to be prepared for it. 

We may get kind of a 9/11 wake-up call in this area, and we are 

certainly willing to do much more than we want to do now, which 

is do things with certain political risks. Then you have to be technologically prepared to do this active interrogation that can aid you 

much further in finding things. 

So it is a combination of these new initiatives which intellectually have been thought about but haven’t been worked out yet so 

we can use it. 

Mr. LINDER. Thank you. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and again, gentleman, 

I want to thank you for your testimony, because I think a number 

of important things have come out of this hearing today. In fact, 

a lot of questions have been raised. 

I would like to get to one of the most important in my mind, 

which is, before we rush to create and authorize this DNDO office, 

I think the last thing we want to do is take a feel-good measure 

and lead ourselves to believe we are actually accomplishing something of substance. 

So the question I have is, would we be better served by, instead 

of authorizing a DNDO office, keeping its responsibilities, dividing 

it up and keeping its scientific research work, the R&D work, in 

the S&T directorate under Homeland Security, and would we be 

better off keeping the other responsibilities of DNDO in the National Counterproliferation Center in working with that, rather 

than creating another layer of bureaucracy? Are we reinventing the 

wheel, so to speak, by moving to create and authorize a DNDO office? 
43

Mr. IKLE ́. This is an important question, and the S&T office, of 

course, has in a way the responsibility now in Homeland Security. 

But while they have done very useful things, they have not moved 

ahead on a vigorous transformational research program. They 

signed off. 

I am sure they were represented in this interagency drafting 

process of the DNDO charter that we have in front of us, and they 

signed off on this. It is repeated three times in that charter, the 

importance to do the transformational research under the aegis of 

DNDO. 

Why is that more advantageous? It brings in the Department of 

Defense as a direct link. The Department of Defense has considerable research experience and research capabilities and the experience in guiding complicated research that has to go on for many 

years that can help the people in S&T to do it effectively. It brings 

in the Department of Energy in a more direct way than it is now 

brought in Homeland Security. Homeland Security is not a research establishment so much as a conglomerate of the agencies 

that existed before. 

For this very important, long-term research effort, you want to 

get all the help you can get from the Department of Energy, the 

Department of Defense; and I think DNDO does pull this together. 

So I would go the DNDO route. 

Again, I think this could even be an outcome of your legislative 

deliberations. It can be a vehicle to get started next week or next 

month at least or this summer. They are set to get started. Let 

them get started, and a year from now you can make a different 

bill or put it in the bill. 

I am not even sure DNDO requires, Mr. Chairman, requires a 

bill. It is an interagency organization that would be helped by legislation, but it may not be essential for its start. I don’t know. It 

is not my expertise. 

Colonel LARSEN. I think it is a very interesting question; and the 

real answer to it is, who do you want in charge of preventing a nuclear attack on America? Do you want it to be the Director of National Intelligence? The current bill says—I don’t know, the Chairman said something about he wasn’t sure where the National 

Counterproliferation Center would sit. The piece of legislation I 

read said that the Director of the Counterproliferation Center 

would work directly for the DNI. That tells me where it would be. 

So should that be the office over in intelligence that has the biggest 

responsibility for preventing a nuclear attack on America, or should 

it be in the Department of Homeland Security? When you answer 

that question, that tells you where it should be. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. If you could just finish that point, what is your 

recommendation on that point? Who should be responsible? 

Colonel LARSEN. I must tell you, I found out about this hearing 

on Friday, and I spent a lot of time thinking about it over the 

weekend, and I think frankly I need a little more time to think 

about that. I don’t want to shoot from the hip, because I think it 

is such a critically—I would be happy to take that for the record 

and think about it for a week and send you something back, because I think it is a critically important question. 
44

What I do know is, I would like one organization, as much as 

possible, in charge. I know you can’t perfectly do that in this town. 

Colonel LARSEN. But I would like—I think this committee would 

like to be able to call one person up here and say, what are you 

doing to prevent a nuclear attack. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I agree with that and I would like you to take 

that for the record if you could. I would be interested in hearing 

your input. 

Mr. IKLE ́. One suggestion here. We may have—I am sure it is on 

this side, not on your side—worked under some confusion about the 

Nonproliferation Center. The way I understand it, it is to do better 

work on intelligence collecting regarding proliferation, the Khan 

network, what the Libyans are doing, what Iran is doing. There 

has been a—as you know, a proliferation center in the CIA for a 

long time. And this would be to elevate it. That is, the intelligence, 

not the diplomatic work that is done by the State Department on 

proliferation, not the interdiction work that is done by the Defense 

Department. And we have been talking about this proliferation 

center as if it would do—everything was our mistake—as if it 

would do everything on proliferation. The way it is understood it 

is intelligence, and I think it should be left in the intelligence organization. Then the intelligence has to feed into DNDO, DOD, State 

Department. And as to who is in charge for preventing a nuclear 

attack on the United States, I think it is the Commander in Chief. 

Colonel LARSEN. I don’t think that is quite the way the bill reads, 

though. That may have been the intention. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I want to thank you gentlemen for your testimony. And on that point, Colonel Larsen, what you stated on that 

question that I posed to you, that you needed about a week to 

think about it. I think that is another indication as to why we 

should not be marking up the bill tomorrow and we should have 

additional time to work through this issue. 

Colonel LARSEN. I don’t mean to be hurting my nonpartisan credentials here, but I really would. I would like to give you a good 

answer to that and I just don’t feel like I want to do that right at 

this moment. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Lungren, no questions. 

Mr. Markey. 

Mr. MARKEY. I thank you so much, Colonel, for your comment. 

The ‘‘congressional expert’’ is an oxymoron. We are only experts 

compared to other Congressmen. Once a real expert shows up, then 

we are not experts anymore. And that is why we have hearings and 

that is why we have the administration in tomorrow, so that we 

can hear from the experts on the subject, and, then as congressional experts, try to make the best judgement which we can. And 

so that is the—you know, the kind of conundrum that we have 

right now in terms of the processing of this legislation. 

What are the other measures, in your opinion, that the Bush administration should be taking to minimize the risk that nuclear 

weapons material could be smuggled into the U.S. for use against 

us in a terrorist attack? 

Could you just give us, could you each give us your 1-minute 

summary list of the measures you would like the Bush administra-
45

tion and the Congress to take to keep these materials out of our 

country? Just tick them off for us. 

Colonel LARSEN. I can give you the short list for me, is there is 

more than 130 research reactors out there that have highly enriched uranium. The one at the University of Wisconsin could make 

three Hiroshima-sized bombs. I think we ought to police that up as 

quickly as possible. Most of that is outside of the United States. 

The things that I think all three of us have talked about in the 

former Soviet states is securing that and eliminating it when possible, the cooperative threat reduction sort of programs that I don’t 

feel that have perhaps had the priority that they should have. 

Mr. IKLE ́. I would agree and add to that that it doesn’t make 

sense to free the export of highly enriched uranium for creating 

medical supplies where it is not necessary. That is an arcane provision. Congressman Markey, you have been involved in stopping 

that and I am on your side on that. It is totally unnecessary, the 

export of HEU to Canada for creating medical supplies. I think it 

was called the Burr amendment last time around. It is in the energy bill that is floating around there. 

Mr. MARKEY. And why is that dangerous? 

Mr. IKLE ́. Well, it is not super dangerous, but it is just not needed. It is not the right signal to give. And on the HEU and research 

reactors, I was trying to get rid of those when I was director of the 

Arms Control Agency in the 1970s, and we are still not there. We 

have been very slow moving, and I hear from back channels that 

the Department of Energy is still slowing it down again. 

So these are easy things to do. They are probably not the most 

important. The important ones have been mentioned, about exerting influence and pressure on the Government of Russia to protect 

itself and us by better locking up the systems, the fissile material. 

And upgrading the intelligence; that has been already mentioned 

in the WMD Commission, and hopefully will be implemented. 

And then last, let me mention it once more, the long-term research to give us better tools than old-fashioned radiation detectors. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. 

Mr. LINDER. Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. Tell us about this global nuclear detection plan. They 

talk about an architecture for global detection beyond just doing research and development on what we are going to do in the United 

States. Secretary Ikle ́, what do you see as part of this global architecture? 

Mr. IKLE ́. I am afraid I have not seen a description of it. I am 

not sure I can answer that. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, what should it have? 

Mr. IKLE ́. Well, one is the intelligence that is multifaceted. 

Human intelligence has been very important for the Khan system; 

other events that helped us unravel the Libyan connection, and 

then one led to another. That is one of the achievements of the Intelligence Community. 

And then our failures, which the WMD Commission and the classified appendix—which I haven’t seen, but I am sure you can consult—get into. 
46

So that is the general intelligence field, all sources, overhead, 

HUMINT, political intelligence, what have you. 

And then once we have more powerful detectors, 10 years from 

now, hopefully, we might then place those in many areas and find 

things that are moving that shouldn’t be moving. But that cannot 

be designed yet, because we don’t know how good these improvements will be 10 years hence 

Mr. DICKS. This also, unless you are doing it in space, would require the cooperation of other countries. And I think this is a subject that hasn’t been mentioned much today. But if you think about 

intelligence, one of the things that you must have is cooperation between the Central Intelligence Agency and all these other international agencies, doing similar work in their own countries. And 

to me, that kind of cooperation is extremely important if you are 

going to have, as you mentioned, the kind of HUMINT intelligence 

necessary to be effective here. 

Colonel LARSEN. It would also take cooperation within the U.S. 

Government. It was not long ago, a matter of days I would say, 

that a container got hit overseas for a radiological thing, and it was 

2 years later until DHS found out about it. So part of that architecture is just communicating with our—inside our own government. 

That certainly needs to be in place. 

Mr. DICKS. Should TTIC be involved here, too? I mean, this is 

the intelligence—. 

Colonel LARSEN. TTIC doesn’t exist anymore. It has now been 

taken over by the National Counterterrorism Center, I think. It is 

actually gone now. 

Mr. DICKS. That is good to know. So in the legislation, TTIC is 

taken out and this new thing represents the entire—has this become the entire intelligence function for the Department? 

Colonel LARSEN. Talking to the folks who—I don’t work there, 

but talking to the folks who work out there closely, they see good 

progress there, and that they actually have a National Joint Terrorism—you are familiar with the JTTF system. Well, they have 

the National JTTF sitting out there, and there is a lot of communication. 

Now, there is still, you know, those problems about, well, you 

know, you don’t have the right clearance I need for my agency. We 

live in tribes in this town, you know, and NSA is one tribe and CIA 

is another tribe and DOD is another tribe, and sometimes we don’t 

communicate well between those tribes. They are trying to improve 

it out there, but I think that is a step forward out there. But TTIC 

is gone, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman 

Mr. LINDER. That concludes this morning’s hearing. I want to 

thank both of you for spending a couple of hours with us. The information you gave us is valuable and we are grateful. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(47)

DHS COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR 

DETECTION EFFORTS, PART II 

Wednesday, April 20, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR

AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK, SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m., in Room 

210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Linder [chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Linder, Shays, Simmons, Cox (ex officio), Langevin, Dicks, Harman, Norton, Christensen, and Thompson (ex officio). 

Chairman LINDER. The committee will come to order. I would 

like to welcome our distinguished witness, who it is hoped will shed 

some light on the proposed Domestic Nuclear Detection Office within the Department of Homeland Security. Currently the full task 

of protecting our Nation from a nuclear incident is shared by the 

Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice and State. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, however, requires the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate the government’s efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to radiological and 

nuclear terrorist threats and the President’s fiscal 2006 budget proposal proposes $227 million funding for the DNDO within the Department. 

It is no secret that the terrorists would not hesitate to acquire 

and use a nuclear device on American people. In fact it was just 

reported this morning in the press that Abu Zarqawi may have already obtained a nuclear device or bomb. Given the radioactive nuclear threat, this government should take very seriously its responsibilities in the area of nonproliferation and counterproliferation 

and ultimately to reject its traditional turf battles and bureaucratic 

obstacles. I, for one, refuse to put the American people in the position, again, asking what if. 

Instead I expect this subcommittee to work toward ensuring that 

the relevant Federal agencies operate on the same page. We will 

be asking, among other questions, whether DNDO can take all of 

these competing interests and coordinate their respective efforts. 

Ultimately, we must all work toward a common goal, which is to 

ensure that a nuclear incident in the United States remains a 

worst case scenario and not a reality. 

I now recognize my ranking member, Mr. Langevin, for a statement. 
48

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Oxford, welcome, 

and I look forward to hearing your testimony here today. 

This hearing is the second of the Department of Homeland Security proposal to create a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. After 

hearing from our panel yesterday, I think we can all agree that the 

nuclear terrorist threat is real and is going to require both short 

and long-term solutions. According to Secretary Chertoff, the 

DNDO will be the primary office responsible for developing these 

solutions, including overseeing the deployment of radiation portal 

monitors at our ports and border crossings to developing a nuclear, 

a global nuclear detection architecture. 

Secretary Chertoff should be commended for taking the steps to 

create this office. But after hearing from our witnesses yesterday, 

it is clear that you have some major challenges facing you, Mr. Oxford. 

I look forward to hearing how the Department plans to address 

these challenges, specifically the administration’s budget request, 

which seems to fall far short of what is required to conduct the necessary research and development programs to ensure our country 

has the best nuclear detection equipment deployed to our ports of 

entry. 

Second, what is the administration’s domestic nuclear detection 

strategy and how does the DNDO fit into the larger picture? Also, 

given the large S&T role that the DNDO is expected play, what 

value added will this office bring to DHS or are we just creating 

another level of bureaucracy? 

How will DNDO interact with the National Counterproliferation 

Center? I believe our government needs a national office to focus 

on the nuclear terrorist threat but without the appropriate structure, adequate funding and a detection strategy, the DNDO will 

not reach its full potential to be the policymaking office Secretary 

Chertoff intends it to be. As a result, our Nation will not be as secure as it must be from the deadliest of all threats that we currently face. 

I look forward to hearing our witness address these and other 

issues of interest to our subcommittee members. 

I would also like to take a moment to thank our chairman for 

his responsiveness to the concerns that were raised yesterday 

about the proposed timing of the markup of the DNDO legislation. 

Several of us felt that it was important to allow more time to hear 

from our witnesses and incorporate their suggestions and concerns 

into our consideration of the legislation. I am pleased that the 

markup has been postponed to accommodate a more meaningful 

deliberation on this issue. I appreciate Chairman Cox and Chairman Linder’s willingness to work with us on this issue. 

Again, Mr. Oxford, I want to welcome you here today. Thank you 

for being with us and I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman LINDER. Does the ranking member of the full committee seek to make a statement? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, very briefly. 

I look forward to the testimony of Mr. Oxford, which as you know 

is a continuation of hearings we had yesterday. I also want to compliment our chairman for hearing the concerns of the committee 
49

and making adjustments in some of the meetings for the committee 

in the future. But I also want to hear from Mr. Oxford how he expects to operate this administration some $1 or $2 million short of 

what actually is required to operate. The DNDO has potential, but 

there are some conflicts. I look forward to working with this committee on trying to separate those conflicts so we can move forward. 

Apart from that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony. 

Chairman LINDER. I thank you. 

Mr. Vayl Oxford is Acting Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, reporting to the Secretary of Homeland Security. He was also Acting Director of Department of Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency and the Department of 

Homeland Security. Prior to his appointment to DHS in October of 

2003, Mr. Oxford served as the Director for Counterproliferation at 

the National Security Council. His responsibilities include the establishment of the national policy and priorities for CP that has 

been codified in the national strategy for combating weapons of 

mass destruction and in the President’s proliferation security initiative policy. 

Mr. Oxford, we are happy to have you. Welcome. Any statements 

you may have we would make part of the record without objection, 

and you may proceed in any way you seek. 

STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD, ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC 

NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE 

Mr. OXFORD. Good afternoon, Chairman Linder, Ranking Member Langevin and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It 

is my pleasure to come before you today to share with you our 

progress in establishing the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

within the Department. 

Protecting the United States from nuclear threats is a job the 

Department of Homeland Security cannot work alone. I would first 

like to thank our partners in the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the State 

Department for their help in establishing DNDO, and for their 

commitment for ensuring its future success. 

President Bush has made strengthening the Nation’s capability 

to detect and interdict nuclear weapons or illicit nuclear materials 

a critical national priority. To defend against this threat we must 

develop a robust layered defense, each layer designed to reduce the 

terrorist’s ability to use such threats against us. The Nation must 

move toward strengthening this defense by developing and deploying an integrated detection and reporting infrastructure and to continue to improve that infrastructure over time. 

On April 15, 2005, just last week, the President directed that the 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office be established within DHS 

under the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of 

Homeland Security. 

The DNDO is a jointly staffed national office created to establish 

strong linkages across the agencies and consolidate efforts within 

DHS for the deployment of a national nuclear detection system. 

The mission of the DNDO is to serve as the primary entity to ensure that the Federal Government develops, acquires and supports 
50

the deployment of a domestic system to detect and report attempts 

to import or transport a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material intended for illicit use. The DNDO will facilitate collaboration among members of the interagency and components of DHS 

and bring together developers, operators and information providers 

to produce a single entity focused on this threat. 

The DNDO’s immediate strategic objectives include conducting 

an aggressive evolutionary and transformational development and 

research program to improve detection capabilities, to develop the 

global architecture infrastructure, to establish mechanisms for effective sharing and use of nuclear detection-related information 

and intelligence to maintain continuous awareness: and to establish standards, response protocols and training across the Federal, 

State and local levels. 

Some of our key challenges within the mission and interagency 

nature of DNDO would provide a unique opportunity to fully integrate the government’s approach to a serious threat by combining 

research, development, acquisition and operational support responsibilities. 

Key challenges are, the nuclear detection research development 

test and evaluation which will emphasize acceleration of research, 

development and the fielding of nuclear detection capabilities. 

To do this, DNDO will manage two separate RDT&E activities. 

The first will focus on the near term, which is defined as a 0—to 

5-year time period, to develop capabilities that directly meet operational user needs to detect materials of concern. A major component of this development process is the focus on high fidelity test 

and evaluation, as well as user in the loop operational testing. 

One of DNDO’s major goals is to fully validate systems performance of legacy and newly developed systems so that we have a complete understanding of the effectiveness of the detection architecture. 

DNDO will also manage a transformational research and development initiative intended to provide high payoff advances in capabilities. This transformational R&D will not be driven directly by 

operational requirements. Rather, these improvements are intended to provide capabilities that could potentially be so great as 

to provide new operational concepts or leap ahead technical capabilities. 

A second key challenge is the development of the global detection 

architecture. The DNDO will develop the global detection architecture to be highly effective against the nuclear threat while continuing to seek the goal of not impeding commerce or the flow of 

people. 

This development will be done with active input and collaboration with our interagency partners, who in turn will be responsible 

for the deployment of detection equipment overseas and around the 

Nation’s military installations. DNDO is responsible for developing 

an overall global architecture that assesses and links the programs 

across the departments to ensure that the Nation proceeds with a 

single comprehensive prevention and detection strategy. 

A third key challenge is a critical important goal of DNDO, and 

that is in the area of information analysis. In this case our goal is 

to enhance effective sharing and use of nuclear detection-related in-
51

formation and intelligence and to integrate this information with 

information from all mission related deletion systems to provide a 

greater overall awareness. By fusing international and domestic information streams and intelligence information, the DNDO will be 

able to provide a better informed decision making environment. 

Additionally, it is the vision of this office to have an aggressive 

red teaming assessments activity that fully assesses the operational and technical performance of the deployed architecture in 

order to offer insights that lead to more effective systems and operational procedures. 

In conclusion, the effort to counter the threat of a nuclear attack 

against our Nation is one of our most critical missions. The establishment of the DNDO will greatly increase our ability to address 

this mission through a consolidation of national efforts, the establishment of a global architecture and deployment strategy and for 

providing assurance of appropriate alarm resolution and response 

capabilities. 

The vision for DNDO is to set the global layered nuclear defense 

strategy and architecture for nuclear detection and reporting and 

to be fully aware of the efforts of the U.S. Government across the 

spectrum of nuclear defense. 

This concludes my prepared statement. With the committee’s 

permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the 

record. 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Langevin and members of the subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and I will be happy to 

answer any of your questions at this time. 

[The statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT MR. VAYL OXFORD, ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC

NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Introduction 

Good afternoon, Chairman Linder, Ranking Member Langevin and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee. It is my pleasure to come before you today to share 

our progress in establishing the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within 

the Department of Homeland Security. 

Protecting the United States from nuclear threats is a job that the Department 

of Homeland Security cannot succeed at working in isolation, and I first want to 

thank our partners in the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the 

Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their tireless dedication to establishing the DNDO and their commitment to supporting the Office to 

ensure its success.

DNDO Mission and Objectives 

President Bush has made strengthening the Nation’s capability to detect and 

interdict nuclear weapons or illicit nuclear materials a critical national priority. Few 

will argue with the view that the threat posed by terrorists possessing nuclear or 

radiological weapons is one of the gravest that confronts the Nation. To defend 

against this threat, we must develop a robust layered defense, each layer of which 

must reduce a terrorist’s ability to use such threats against us. The Nation must 

move toward strengthening this defense by developing and deploying an integrated 

and robust detection, reporting, and response infrastructure, and continue to develop improvements to this infrastructure over time. 

In recognition of the magnitude of the danger posed by the nuclear threat, multiple organizations within the Department of Homeland Security and across other 

Departments have initiated programs to prevent these weapons from being used 

against the Nation and its interests. While these efforts are each individually important components to defend against the threat, it is now necessary to integrate our 

Nation’s nuclear detection capability that guarantees a coordinated response. To optimize and advance these efforts, on April 15, 2005, the President directed that the 
52

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) be established within DHS, under the 

authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

The DNDO is a jointly-staffed, national office created to consolidate efforts within 

DHS and establish strong linkages across the agencies for the deployment of a national nuclear detection system. The mission of the DNDO is to serve as the primary 

entity to ensure that the Federal Government develops, acquires, and supports the 

deployment of a domestic system to detect and report attempts to import or transport a nuclear device or fissile or radiological material intended for illicit use. In 

its creation, it not only will facilitate collaboration among members of the interagency and components of DHS, but, more importantly, among the developers, operators, and information providers to produce a single entity focused on this threat.

The DNDO has the following strategic objectives: • Conduct an aggressive evolutionary and transformational research and development program to improve probability of detection by integrating and deploying current technologies and improving those capabilities over time; 

• Develop the global detection architecture and ensure linkages across Federal, 

State, and local agencies; 

• Enhance the effective sharing and use of nuclear detection-related information and intelligence in conjunction with other Federal Government information 

sharing activities; 

• Maintain continuous awareness by analyzing information from all mission-related detection systems; 

• Enhance the nuclear detection efforts of Federal, State, and local governments and the private sector to ensure a coordinated response; and 

• Establish standards, response protocols, and training across the Federal, 

State, and local levels to ensure that detection leads to timely response actions.

Key Challenges: 

The mission space of the DNDO provides a unique opportunity within DHS across 

the Federal Government to more fully integrate the counterterrorism community’s 

approach to a serious threat. DHS will work holistically to combine research and 

development, acquisition, and operational support into a single office. By bringing 

together all of these efforts as well as the joint activities within our interagency 

partners, the DNDO will be able to ensure that the technology requirements of operational entities are efficiently prioritized and addressed. Moreover, DNDO will ensure that technologies under development are quickly transitioned to the field. Further, all technologies being deployed will have the necessary accompanying training 

materials, and response protocols will be established and adopted prior to deployment.This will ensure that deployed equipment is properly used and alarm information is reported to response agencies when appropriate. More importantly, this office 

is charged with the responsibility of working with our partners to establish effective 

information and intelligence sharing mechanisms for nuclear detection information 

that span the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and other government agencies. Coupled with this responsibility is the focus on establishing and 

maintaining continuous awareness by analyzing information from all DNDO mission-related detection systems both domestically and internationally.

Nuclear Detection Research. Development. Test. and Evaluation: 

The DNDO will place a large emphasis on accelerating the research and development of nuclear detection technology. To accomplish this, the DNDO will manage 

two separate RDT&E programs, each with a unique and complimentary mission. 

The first of these efforts provides near-term (five years or less) improvements in deployed capabilities, directly meeting requirements of operational users. 

The DNDO has established a Joint Requirements Board with membership including each of the operational users within DHS and across the interagency to formalize the process of collecting and prioritizing technology requirements. These requirements directly drive the goals of this evolutionary RDT&E program, focusing 

on providing spiral development of current capabilities. 

These programs will focus on improving and rapidly transitioning capabilities that 

address threat materials of greatest concern. A major element in the DNDO development process is the focus on high-fidelity test and evaluation as well as user in 

the loop operational testing. One of the office’s major goals is to fully validate systems performance of legacy and newly developed systems so that we have a complete understanding of the effectiveness of the detection architecture. When coupled 

with red teaming efforts, we will be able to effectively assess the health of our national nuclear detection system. 

Meanwhile, the DNDO will manage a large transformational research and development program intended to provide high-payoff advances in capabilities. This 

transformational R&D will not be driven directly by operational requirements. Rath-
53

er, these improvements are intended to provide new capabilities that could potentially be so great as to provide new operational concepts for current system components. As these transfonnational technologies mature, they would likely be 

transitioned into an evolutionary systems development program.

Global Detection Architecture: 

A second objective of the DNDO will be to develop the global nuclear detection 

architecture that will be highly effective against the threat and still avoid impeding 

the legitimate flow of commerce and people. This development will be done with active input and consultation with interagency partners responsible for deployments 

of detection equipment overseas and around the Nation’s military installations. This 

detection architecture must be a multi-layered in nature. It must start with an understanding of the international programs and agreements that help secure all 

weapons-usable materials overseas, and continue with layers of nuclear detection 

capabilities at international borders and ports-of-departure overseas, domestic portsof-entry and the Nation’s borders, and, finally, within the Nation and around highrisk or high-value locations. The DNDO recognizes the great strides that have already been made, including the Department of Energy’s Materials Protection, Control and Accountability, Second Line of Defense, and MegaPorts programs, the Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the Department of 

State’s Export Control and Border Security Program and Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, and multiple DHS efforts to develop capabilities for detection, 

interdiction, search, and response domestically, such as the DHS Radiation Portal 

Monitor program and pilot programs in New York and Charleston. While this is by 

no means intended to be a comprehensive list of the government’s efforts, it underscores the importance that the Nation has placed on defending against this threat. 

The DNDO is now responsible for developing an overall global architecture that assesses and links these programs in an effort to ensure that the Nation proceeds with 

a single, comprehensive prevention and detection strategy.

Information Analvsis: 

An equally important goal of the DNDO is to enhance the effective sharing and 

use of nuclear detection-related information and intelligence, and to integrate this 

information with information from all mission-related detection systems to provide 

a greater overall awareness. By fusing the international and domestic information 

streams and intelligence information, the DNDO will be able to provide a betterinformed decision-making environment, enabling more effective alarm resolution, 

trend analysis, and threat awareness. This information analysis capability will be 

integrated with a detailed understanding of the systems performance of existing and 

to be deployed systems to increase our awareness and confidence in the global detection capability and effectiveness. Additionally, it is the vision of this office to have 

an aggressive red teaming system assessment activity that fully assesses the operational and technical performance of the deployed architecture in order to enhance 

our awareness of the adequacy of our screening process and to provide insights that 

lead to more effective systems and operational procedures.

DNDO FY 2006 Budget and Key Initiatives 

As a new office, the DNDO-related budget for Fiscal Year 2005 includes approximately $100 million through the Directorate of Science and Technology appropriated 

funding for radiological and nuclear countermeasures and will oversee $80 million 

appropriated to Customs and Border Protection for the Radiological Portal Monitor 

Program. The President’s FY 2006 Budget includes requests for DNDO-related activities through the Directorate of Science and Technology ($227 million), and will 

oversee resources requested for Customs and Border Protection ($125 million), and 

the U.S. Coast Guard ($7 million)—for a total of $359 million.Additionally, the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness request includes 

$600 million for Targeted Infrastructure Protection grants, some of which may be 

allocated to DNDO-related State and local equipment acquisition based on the results of the architecture development activity. 

The budget request includes $5 million to supplement the joint development of a 

global nuclear detection architecture that will support the acquisition and deployment of the domestic nuclear detection system. 

The request includes approximately $12 million to establish systems engineering 

efforts to integrate research, development, testing, and acquisition across the program. This includes the development of a comprehensive systems engineering master plan. 

A total of $80 million will be directed toward ongoing evolutionary research and 

development efforts for improved passive and active detection technologies and support systems, and an additional $82 million will allow for the initiation of a major 
54

program on transformational research and development to potentially lead to revolutionary changes in detection capabilities. 

Approximately $26 million of the request is for technical and operational testing 

and systems effectiveness assessments. This includes construction and operation of 

the Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex (Rad/

NucCTEC), the capacity for additional operational test and evaluation, exercises, 

and demonstrations, and the formation of a red teaming and net assessments program. 

Nearly $23 million in funding is to be directed for technical support to operations 

in the areas of expert analysis and support for alarm resolution; collection and coordination of intelligence and detection information for technical analysis, threat assessment, decision support, and archiving;and development of technical standards, 

draft protocols, procedures, and concepts of operation. 

Finally, the $125 million included as part of the CBP request and the $7 million 

requested by the U.S. Coast Guard will be devoted to acquisition of equipment to 

be deployed by the respective agencies, consistent with the overall strategy developed by the DNDO.

DNDO Organization 

To meet this expanded mission and address the key challenges I have outlined, 

the DNDO will consolidate functions within DHS and establish strong linkages 

across the interagency. Multiple agencies share the resources and expertise necessary for the success of the office, and, while DNDO will be located within DHS, 

it will be jointly staffed with detailees from several Departments.

Relationship with DHS and Interagency Partners 

The vision for DNDO is to set the global strategy and architecture for nuclear detection and reporting and to be fully aware of the efforts of the U.S. Government 

across the spectrum of nuclear defense. However, DNDO will not execute all of the 

programs in this area. For example, DNDO will lead the development of the overall 

technology roadmap for nuclear detection technologies but will not execute Department of Energy or Department of Defense research, development, and testing and 

evaluation programs. Likewise, it will not be responsible for implementing DOE 

(e.g. MegaPorts), DOS, or DOD portions of the global nuclear detection architecture 

but will be instrumental in setting the strategy for that implementation, for conducting test and evaluation as available of systems that may be deployed though 

those initiatives, and, to the extent possible, assess the effectiveness of the deployed 

architecture through red teaming and other means. DNDO will develop response 

protocols and facilitate the alarm to response timeline but will not actually respond 

to alarms. DNDO will not conduct field operations or award or administer Federal 

grants to State and local governments or emergency responders. The Office will not 

take over any of the functions that the Homeland Security Operations Center 

(HSOC) currently performs. However, DNDO will remain informed of those efforts 

as well as other efforts to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism in order to more 

effectively carry out its responsibilities.

Conclusion 

The effort to counter the threat of a nuclear attack against the Nation is one of 

the Department’s most critical missions. The establishment of the DNDO will greatly increase our ability to address this mission through a consolidation of National 

efforts, establishment of the global architecture and deployment strategy, and by 

providing assurance of appropriate alarm resolution and response capabilities. I am 

proud to have shared with you today how the Department and its interagency partners will realign themselves to counter the threat posed by nuclear devices and materials. 

I look forward to working with you on this subcommittee in a continuing effort 

to confront the threat posed by this threat to the Nation. 

This concludes my prepared statement. With the committee’s permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the record. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Langevin, and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for your attention 

and will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Chairman LINDER. Thank you very much. 

Yesterday in our hearing we were told pretty much across the 

board that the most important thing we can do is lock down known 

supply, particularly starting in Russia, and the further away from 

here the better. 

Who is working on that now and how will you change that? 
55

Mr. OXFORD. Again, as part of the layered defense strategy, the 

responsibility for fissile material security and in some cases destruction, falls within the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program 

and others, handled mostly through the joint ventures of the Departments of Energy, Defense and State. As joint partners within 

this office, that is a very important layer of our defense that we 

will be fully cognizant of and be fully supportive of their endeavors. 

However, I am doubtful about our ability to have similar protocols 

in other countries beyond Russia and the former Soviet states 

where, again, control of fissile material in places such as Pakistan 

and North Korea may pose different challenges. 

Chairman LINDER. The new level of technology, past the 10-yearold technology, does that get us further, a longer reach in terms of 

detecting things? What kinds of changes do you expect? 

Mr. OXFORD. First of all, as I mentioned, the aggressive program 

we have under way will begin deployment of next generation technology in fiscal year 2006. This capability being brought to bear 

gives us the abilities to discriminate nuclear-related materials and 

to distinguish from the false alarms and the naturally occurring radioactivity materials that we currently detect. Our current systems 

have high sensitivity rates, but they sense anything that has a radioactive response, so there are a lot of nuisance alarms. 

The new systems that can do spectroscopic identification will 

allow us to dismiss the nuisance alarms, while also identifying the 

alarming material we care about. It will give us significant improvement in capability primarily against the plutonium threat. It 

will give us marginal increase against the highly enriched uranium 

threat. It will give us only slight increases in performance over 

heavily shielded material, but again we have active programs 

under way that are several years down the road to address that. 

Chairman LINDER. Does the new technology allow us to be further away from the source of the radioactivity and still detect it 

that we currently can with our current technology? 

Mr. OXFORD. Actually the deployment strategies we have at least 

at our points of entry within the country, land borders and seaports, would allow retrofits into the existing deployment locations. 

It is a cost-saving measure. Where we have current deployment at 

either cargo container or land crossings, we would do a retrofit into 

those actual locations. 

We are essentially working within that same infrastructure. The 

true answer is we don’t get a lot of increased range, but we get a 

lot of increased discrimination capability. 

Chairman LINDER. Randy Larsen was here yesterday and suggested that a Gulfstream jet that could fly at 500 feet could come 

over virtually any one of our borders with a cargo full of radioactivity. Will we ever be able to see anything to detect something like 

that? 

Mr. OXFORD. First of all, in this forum I don’t want to talk a lot 

about vulnerabilities. But I will tell you that one of our charters 

within DNDO is to do the balanced trades across our vulnerability 

space to do risk-based planning to look at where we are most vulnerable. 

Right now we are focused on land border crossings, and major 

seaports, those are obvious smuggling routes. So it is vital to have 
56

coverage there. But there is also the air and the maritime corridor 

to worry about. We have to look at that from a risk-based perspective and come up with concepts for working that across the interagency partnership. 

Chairman LINDER. You answered most of our questions we had 

at a private meeting. I thank you for that. 

I will yield now to my ranking member, Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Oxford, one of our witnesses from yesterday, Colonel Randy 

Larsen, stated that the government does not have a nuclear terrorism strategy, and particularly it lacks a domestic nuclear strategy. I am concerned that the government is focusing on the solution before we know the problem that we are trying to solve. If we 

learned one thing from 9/11 and other Al-Qa‘ida attacks it is that 

the terrorists attack very quickly. Therefore it is important for us 

to have a forward looking strategy to ensure that we can enhance 

our posture against the terrorists. 

My question to you is what is the DNDO’s role in the development of a nuclear terrorist strategy, and does the DNDO plan to 

develop a domestic strategy? If so, when do you expect it to be completed? 

Mr. OXFORD. I thank you for the question. One of our key challenges and one of the things I have put in our near-term milestones 

is the development of the global architecture and defensive strategy. It is not just domestic. It is global in nature by agreement 

with our interagency partners. The partnership that is brought to 

bear will look at this from a global basis, to include the overseas 

requirements that we think need to be bolstered in some cases. 

For example, air cargo screening overseas is in some cases something that we think may be very critical as part of our global detection architecture deployment. Domestically, then, we would be responsible for implementing that architecture. I have set a milestone of March 2006 to have a baseline architecture in place to 

which we can all be responsive. I don’t expect that to be static. I 

expect it to be dynamic in nature, and that we continue to red 

team that to make sure we don’t find gaps in the architecture as 

it evolves. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As you know, the legislation that we recently 

passed to implement many of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations included a provision establishing a National 

Counterproliferation Center, presumably under the direction of the 

DNI. How does the DNDO plan to interact with this new 

Counterproliferation Center, and what will be the respective roles 

and responsibilities of each? Can we ensure effective and consistent 

coordination while simultaneously avoiding redundancy and overlapping layers of bureaucracies? 

Mr. OXFORD. I think the new organizations that are coming out 

of the intelligence reform will be major contributors and partners 

with us. We have an active program already, for example, responding to the press reports this morning. We have a Nuclear Assessment Program that now falls under DNDO that is an active component of doing day-to-day intelligence analysis and assessments of 

the day-to-day raw intelligence reporting and doing assessments 

similar to what you are talking about. 
57

They have an active engagement with the existing Intelligence 

Community and will now expand that to the NCTC and the 

Counterproliferation Center as it gets up and running. We would 

expect this to be a very collaborative relationship. 

We bring in specialists to look at behavioral aspects of the nuclear threat, the technical aspects of the nuclear threat and the 

operational likelihood of some of those things. So we are looking 

hard now at the Nuclear Assessment Program as it currently exists 

to find out how it may be expanded to include collaboration with 

the entities you are referring to. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I still have additional time. So I will ask, Dr. 

Fred Ikle ́ from CSIS in yesterday’s hearing believes that the most 

important component of the DNDO is the long-term research and 

development of the next generation of detection sensors. In your 

testimony, you state that this office will conduct transformation research, but your budget calls for a total of $162 million research 

and development. 

Now I am a member of the Armed Services Committee, and I can 

tell you that the DOD budget requests for the upcoming fiscal year 

for just operational research is $1.1 billion. I know the DHS plans 

to leverage DOD resources and research expertise in the DNDO. 

But how do you expect the DNDO to be the lead Federal office for 

development of a domestic nuclear detection system with a $162 

million research and development budget? How far will $162 million allow DHS to get in the development of the next generation 

of equipment? 

Mr. OXFORD. Let me respond to that in two ways. First of all, the $162 million is divided between spiral development, which would 

give us near-term solutions, the 0 to 5-year solution, and the transformation R&D. 

As I have already indicated, we will start deploying new systems 

as early as next year that give us the increases that the chairman 

mentioned or asked about earlier. As part of the $162 million, there 

is about $82 million that is the first year start-up of this transformational research and development program. Contrary to comments that were made in the hearing yesterday, it is not managed 

through an interagency coordination council. It is a separate research and development program that we have fenced within 

DNDO to give us this long-term edge. 

We are going to review, based upon the needs of that program, 

what our 2007 requests should be. Again, this is a start-up organization. We recognize that we need to get the program started next 

year and then reflect on what the needs of the outyears should be. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LINDER. Would the gentleman from Connecticut wish 

to be recognized? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Mr. Oxford. From reading your resume, I understand that in the early 

1990s you were at DNA, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and then the 

Defense Special Weapons Agency and Director for 

Counterproliferation, again, in the mid-1990s. 

Many years ago I was involved in nuclear counterproliferation 

activities. It seems to me that the model that we had in those days 
58

was a model where certain sovereign states had nuclear technologies, certain states, what we called the rogue states, were able 

to surreptitiously obtain some of those technologies and materials 

and were able to develop or try to develop weapons capabilities, in 

some cases with superpower assistance, usually clandestine or not 

disclosed. 

So the model implied pressuring certain sovereign states to cease 

and desist the activity or encouraging superpowers who had those 

businesses or organizations within their borders to cease and desist 

on the assistance. It occurs to me today that we have got a new 

model or at least an important new variation in what went before, 

which includes all of the above, but it also includes the theft or 

purchase of nuclear weapons and technologies by organizations 

that are not sovereign states, and therefore not subject to the same 

tools of pressure or manipulation, are not afraid to commit suicide, 

have no homeland that is threatened by their activities. My basic 

question is, are you confident that the U.S. Government has organized for this new model? That is point one. 

Point two, has the U.S. Intelligence Community adjusted itself to 

the new model? 

Then my third question is, in the field of information sharing 

how are we doing? 

Mr. OXFORD. Let me start with point one in terms of whether we 

have adjusted to the new paradigm. I, too, worry about the way we 

do intelligence analysis and that we have had a community for 

many, many years that equated the nuclear threat to a missile program. 

I can’t tell you right now that I think the Intelligence Community has made that shift. I think we have to insist that the convergence of the counterterrorism approach with the traditional weapons analysis approach has to be done. I think DNDO brings us to 

the table, and gives us the opportunity to be a catalyst to require 

that, because we have got to look at this from both a perspective 

weapons program in a nation state as well as the potential that 

they may choose alternate delivery means besides a ballistic missile. 

It is not only the organizational issue, but it is also the addition 

of an organization like DNDO to serve as a catalyst within the 

community to make sure we are getting the right assessments and 

that we get the right components of the Intelligence Community 

working together across those lines. 

The Counterproliferation Center is a step in that direction. If we 

can get the NCTC and the Counterproliferation Center working together, especially responding to our needs in the nuclear field, because we are a consumer of intelligence, therefore we would also 

be a catalyst for the right assessments. I think it allows your first 

two points to start to come together. 

On the information sharing, we have a major challenge to be able 

to take highly classified information all the way down to the unclassified level, because one of our major challenges that I have yet 

to address today is the fact that, as part of our architecture we 

may see a need to have detection capabilities domestically at the 

State and local levels. We want to do that in an informed way. We 
59

want to be able to share information with them. Whether you call 

it threat information or not will remain a matter for discussion. 

We have got to be able to give them insights in terms of how 

they would be reacting to this threat and, likewise, the flow has got 

to come back in the other direction; the response protocols that we 

work with State and local entities. So we will have to work across 

all of these elements to make sure that this information is flowing 

adequately. 

As I mentioned, the Nuclear Assessment Program that already 

exists is a very strong component of the current nuclear assessment process within the interagency architecture. The same office 

that I am referring to has as routine customers the FBI, the State 

Department, the Energy Department, et cetera. They call upon this 

entity to do the assessment of those kinds of nuclear threats. We 

have got to make that a central key, as I have already mentioned, 

with the Counterproliferation Center and others. 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a follow-up 

question, but I will wait for the next round. 

Chairman LINDER. Does the gentleman from Mississippi wish to 

inquire? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Oxford, on yesterday we heard testimony from the private sector indicating their 

willingness to help with developing new technologies, especially 

around the area of detection. I would like to get from you whether 

or not you feel the Department is providing enough encouragement 

to the private sector for the development of those technologies, and 

to what extent our own labs are either hindering that ability or encouraging that ability to take place. 

Mr. OXFORD. First of all, I am very encouraged by the interaction 

right now between our Federal laboratory system and private industry. As the chairman mentioned, I am also the Acting Director 

for HSARPA within DHS, Science and Technology. We have been 

very aggressive in this manner. We have numerous private industries involved in radiation detection development right now. 

For example, the next generation technology I mentioned earlier, 

we currently have 10 separate private vendors that are the result 

of an intense competition where we had over 50 different contractors submit proposals for developing these next generation systems. 

We will take them to the test evaluation center that I mention in 

my statement in July where they will undergo extreme testing. 

Part of this collaboration has been the national laboratories 

which have developed some of the components, as well as some of 

the software algorithms. There has been a mutual relationship that 

has evolved through the work that we have done within DHS to 

bring more innovation together within our contracting practices. 

We bring private industry and the national laboratory structure 

closer together than you sometimes see in the other departments. 

I am encouraged by that relationship, and I don’t see the two competing with each other. 

Mr. THOMPSON. On another front, it does not appear that officials 

of the CIA will be detailed to this new office. Have you made some 

assessment as to whether or not their presence is needed or whether or not it poses a problem? 
60

Mr. OXFORD. Right now we are still doing that assessment. The 

initial assessment is that with programs like the Nuclear Assessment Program, the intelligence community is already part of 

DNDO and their direct connectivity into this community. We probably don’t need to have a fully embedded CIA staff member as long 

as the connectivities are as strong as they are right now. We continue to have discussions, for example, with the NCTC to explore 

whether mutual exchanges of liaisons make sense. We will continue to explore that. The head of our office of operational support 

has been directed by me to go and visit with each of these intelligence organizations and come back with options for how this relationship ought to grow. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I guess that is, my real concern is if doing an informal structure will work or does it have to work to be something 

more formalized from our standpoint? 

Mr. OXFORD. I think from our perspective we can work the relationship either through MOAs or MOUs to make this happen. I 

think a more close coupling in terms of having direct involvement 

in the Intelligence Community could be an impediment to DNDO 

in the long run, because if we become part of the IC it puts certain 

restrictions on our ability to operate overseas and with some private sector entity. So I would caution against a direct coupling with 

the Intelligence Community, but we have to have the right collaboration. 

Chairman LINDER. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from 

Connecticut wish to inquire? 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Oxford. Thank you for being here. 

Thank you for your work. Thank you for your service to our country. 

I am intrigued by the radiation detection equipment worn by border guards. When we were in Los Alamos about a year and a half 

ago. They showed us some of the equipment that was being used 

and they put it next to radioactive material and it didn’t work. 

They said, you know, we never were consulted, you know, and so 

that got my attention. Could someone bring enough radiological 

materials across a land border to make a dirty bomb? 

Mr. OXFORD. Let me again do the comparison I did a few minutes 

ago. If it were a border crossing where we had the existing equipment you are talking about and if it were unshielded radioactive 

material sufficient for a dirty bomb, we would detect it. That is one 

of the things we can detect material that is highly emitting. 

Mr. SHAYS. The issue though is unshielded? 

Mr. OXFORD. Correct. 

Mr. SHAYS. I was on the floor just to deliver a statement and 

hear your statement but not hear the response to that question. 

Let me just ask, a suitcase in a trunk of a car with a lead box containing cesium or cobalt for medical equipment, would that be detected? 

Mr. OXFORD. Probably not with existing systems. As I mentioned 

earlier, the systems that we are going to deploy will give us better 

discrimination capability. We hope to start deploying those next 

year. 

Mr. SHAYS. Who develops detection capabilities now? Is it DOD, 

DOE or DHS? Which one is it? 
61

Mr. OXFORD. Right now for the border crossings it is all DHS. It 

has been a legacy mission, legacy within the last several years of 

Customs. That responsibility now conveys to DNDO. 

There have been special programs within DOE and DOD for 

some of their research responsibilities where they have developed 

equipment. DOE has also, through their Mega Ports Program, negotiated some acquisition of equipment for overseas deployment. 

However, for domestic deployment it is primarily DHS through 

Customs that has developed and manufactured the equipment. 

Mr. SHAYS. I won’t tell you the government building I went into, 

but I went into a government building with someone who a week 

and a half before had had a stress test and alarms went off. Someone was asked, did anyone have a stress test? 

Does that represent fairly sensitive equipment that could determine that? I mean, this was someone walking into a building. 

Mr. OXFORD. Again, the challenge in most cases is not the sensitivity. It is the discrimination the ability to discriminate between 

false alarms and nuisance alarms versus being able to identify the 

threat materials that we are most interested in. In that case it was 

a sensitivity issue that it was able to detect that, but you would 

have detected anything whether it is a legitimate threat or not. 

Mr. SHAYS. So you were saying I shouldn’t be impressed. I was 

kind of impressed that a radioactive material that was put in the 

body of someone a week and a half before that should kind of, you 

know, filter out over time, that in this government building it was 

detected. You are saying don’t be impressed with that? 

Mr. OXFORD. Not really. That is something that, in fact, is a routine issue that we worry about that causes a lot of the false alarms 

I mentioned because it is a legitimate radiation source that we 

have to deal with. Some of the deployments of radiation pagers 

cause a problem in that regard, because some of those can pick 

those up as well. Then we have to figure out how to assess the individual who just triggered the alarm. It is not a sensitivity issue in 

that case, it is discrimination. 

Mr. SHAYS. With discrimination, are we able to determine different types of radioactive material? 

Mr. OXFORD. Through the spectroscopic identification we are able 

to identify the isotopes that we want to worry about and those that 

we can to dismiss. 

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Thank you for your responses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LINDER. Does the gentleman from Washington wish to 

inquire? 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome our 

witness. Let me ask you this. We had a big discussion yesterday 

about whether this should be the National Nuclear Detection Office 

or the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Which one would you 

prefer? 

Mr. OXFORD. If I were king for a day, anybody would want to 

have full authority over everything. However, there are some practical limits. 

Mr. DICKS. Why did they put ‘‘Domestic’’ in this name? 

Mr. OXFORD. I think it was primarily because of where the emphasis will be on the deployment, as opposed to the planning. So 
62

it is a misnomer, it is confusing. I know Chairman Cox has had 

some discussions with our Deputy Secretary about this very subject. 

The focus of the office includes centralized planning, but decentralized execution, and the ‘‘Domestic’’ name may be problematic 

over the long run unless we just get the message out. We will deploy domestically but we will plan globally. 

Mr. DICKS. All right. Now in talking about setting up a global architecture—and that is part of your assignment, is that not correct? 

Mr. OXFORD. Correct. 

Mr. DICKS. How are you going about that? 

Mr. OXFORD. Again, we have an interagency team as part of the 

system engineering and system architecture piece of our organization. We will do this through a national laboratory team that will 

be exploring components of the architecture. We have two industrybased teams that are exploring the architecture. We will take the 

output from those processes, bring it into the interagency team 

within DNDO, and actually create the global architecture we would 

like to see deployed. 

Mr. DICKS. In order to have a global architecture, if you are 

going to go beyond the United States, unless it is in space, you are 

going to have to get other countries to cooperate, is that not true? 

Mr. OXFORD. That is true. That is why, again, bringing together 

the people that are already working overseas, DOE and the State 

Department, as part of this collaboration to find out where it is 

practical to strike some of these deals are so important, first of all, 

we have to decide where we want the capability overseas and then 

we need to figure out what agreements need to be in place. That 

is why some people are confused why State Department should be 

part of this, but we think part of their overseas presence and experience has got to be in the office. 

Mr. DICKS. I can see in container security, the CSI, the Container Security Initiative, you have to be overseas. And if you really are going to do this job you want to inspect these containers before they get to the United States. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. OXFORD. Absolutely. Not only that, but you want to know 

how well the detection works overseas. Part of our concept is to go 

overseas and assess the health of that architecture, how well are 

those countries operating the systems and how well they work, so 

that we have a full appreciation for how well the material has been 

screened before it heads toward our borders. Just deploying overseas isn’t sufficient without knowing how well it works. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. I want to go back to something you said earlier 

just to make sure I understand it. The National 

Counterproliferation Center is in the Director of National Intelligence. There was concern yesterday from our outside witnesses 

that, you know, this is maybe duplicative. Are you going to sort out 

what they are going to do and what you are going to do? 

Mr. OXFORD. Absolutely. 

Mr. DICKS. Again, I assume you will be doing most of the intelligence gathering because you are in the intelligence office. 

Mr. OXFORD. We consider ourselves a consumer of that intelligence. We get the raw intelligence and we do some of the special 
63

nuclear assessments within the Nuclear Assessment Program. 

They will be a coupled activity that will feed off of each other. 

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you this. There was a National 

Counterproliferation Center in CIA. Is this then spun off to the Director of National Intelligence, or does the CIA still have a National Counterproliferation Center? 

Mr. OXFORD. The counterproliferation activity that I was aware 

of within CIA was the Counterterrorism Center. 

Mr. DICKS. Counterterrorism Center. I misspoke. 

Mr. OXFORD. I think they have now become coupled. Again, I 

don’t have all of those details. 

Mr. DICKS. But, again, just say it again, what are they going to 

do? You are going to get raw intelligence, they are going to get raw 

intelligence? What is the difference? What are they going to do that 

you are not doing, and what are you going to do that they are not 

doing? 

Mr. OXFORD. We are going to sit down with them now that they 

are merging and figure out how these two programs get coupled. 

Mr. DICKS. So you think this is something that needs to be sorted 

out? 

Mr. OXFORD. Absolutely. 

Mr. DICKS. And that if somebody in the administration has to 

work out and Congress may want to take a look at it once you decide what you have done here? 

Mr. OXFORD. The recommendation we made to the Secretary and 

to others is we will not break anything that is in existence works. 

We need to figure out what these things are. 

Mr. DICKS. This hasn’t been created? 

Mr. OXFORD. Right. We need to start it, correct. 

Mr. DICKS. I have been around here a long time, worked on defense appropriations for 27 years. We have wasted a ton of money 

on R&D and programs. I hope you are getting some advice from 

Defense and DOE about how you do these—and DARPA, about 

how you do these research programs. Or are we just starting this 

up, a new babe? 

Mr. OXFORD. No, in fact, Congressman, that is the value of having DOD and DOE specialists inside the office, because they are 

staffing the office with people that understand system engineering, 

tests and evaluation. These are some of the strength, of those departments that we are bringing into the office to make sure we do 

these things accordingly. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LINDER. Thank you. Would the gentleman from California seek to inquire? 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Oxford. I want to add to what I know my colleagues have already said. Congratulations to the Department of 

Homeland Security for leading this effort to give us a focus on the 

prevention of nuclear terrorism. 

Our interest is in making sure that the Department of Homeland 

Security really undertakes this mission and that it does so in an 

integrated rather than piecemeal fashion. 

Let me begin with what may be the capillary rather than the 

jugular, but it has gotten a whole lot of discussion since our recent 
64

hearing with outside witnesses, and that is the question of whether 

we are domestic, national or global or what are we. 

I do think that the name of a program or an organization is important to the extent that it conveys the sense of mission. In the 

19th century we had a Department of War, and there was no question what its mission was. Ultimately, we refined that mission so 

that in addition to making war we were going to make war by air, 

land and sea. But the Department of Defense, whatever else you 

want to say about it, has a clear understanding of its essential mission. 

I am very, very concerned in the early days of the Department 

of Homeland Security that we also establish a clear sense of mission. The purpose that Congress had in mind in creating this new 

department, which is already the third largest in our Executive 

Branch, was to end the Balkanization and the dispersal of responsibility. 

Now that we know that the mission of the Department of Homeland Security is first and foremost preventing terrorism, and we 

also know that nuclear terrorism is either the or one of the two 

major consequent terrorist events that could occur, given the 21st 

century state of technology as we know it, it is vitally important 

that we have a focal point for this mission. What is proposed as the 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is, in fact, according to your 

presentation today, going to have a global architecture. 

So I would think it misleading if we were to call it the Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Organization, and equally I would think it misleading if we were to call it the National NDO. I mean, maybe I 

am missing something, but I was an English major in college and 

spent a little time on linguistics and semantics and so on. 

What is the difference between national and domestic? I mean, 

I think I understand the Nation to be the United States of America 

and I think I refer to domestic to be United States of America. So 

that sounds nearly synonymous to me. 

We don’t want to confuse people, and if we want a sense of mission that we are going to go overseas and find these terrorists, and 

we are going to track the nuclear materials first and foremost at 

their source, then we shouldn’t have an implicit mission that is focused merely on the deployment of technology within our own borders. 

So that is some of what we wanted to discuss with you today. 

In addition to having a global focus, it is my hope that this mission within the Department of Homeland Security will have a significant intelligence component, because after all, the purpose of 

nuclear detection is the prevention of nuclear terrorism, and prevention equates directly with intelligence, and yet it seems that the 

current DNDO proposal completely excludes intelligence from any 

part of its organizational structure. 

I would hope that that is still under discussion and we are still 

thinking about that and it won’t be a mere integration of agencies, 

because if it is then what we will find is that we have created in 

the Department of Homeland Security just one more seat at the 

table, one more element to be coordinated and the job will be even 

more difficult than it was before we had this department. 
65

So I invite your comment on these things. I hope that you can 

give us some comfort that we will in fact have a global focus, that 

the deployment of technology and sensors in the United States will 

not be the essence of what we are doing here, but merely a part 

that we will be the focal point, rather than merely a participant in 

a governmentwide effort, and that the responsibility for this mission will, in fact, reside in DHS. 

I invite your comments. 

Mr. OXFORD. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I don’t know how I could 

come up with a better name myself as well. We spent a lot of time 

discussing it. There was actually another name early on in the 

cycle—it was a the National Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. We 

have made some progress to get it down. 

Mr. COX. Just a humble submission, we are all putting our entries in the hat here. I just dropped that first adjective, you know; 

I don’t like ‘‘Global’’ or ‘‘World’’ either. That bothers me for different reasons. I mean, this ought to be a U.S. effort, but I just 

would get rid of the adjective. 

We are focused on preventing nuclear terrorism. Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Office or something would be fine with me. But 

clearly what we need is an understanding of whether we are looking inward in a defensive crouch or whether we are reaching out 

and also making our job easier by getting the source of that—. 

Mr. OXFORD. We really are looking out as part of the layered defense strategy, to make sure we take into account all of those overseas activities, while also accounting for the fact that not every one 

of those layers can be 100 percent successful. We seek to improve 

the kinds of equipment that we deploy overseas, with regards to 

the actual effectiveness of those systems as we deploy them and we 

also continue to assess those systems as we test and deploy them 

overseas. 

So, again, working with DOE and others overseas as part of the 

global architecture should give us a lot of hope that we are going 

to improve the performance of systems overseas and, through information sharing and intelligence process make sure that we understand how well overseas material is screened before it heads towards the U.S. Clearly, there is a goal to make the domestic system work well as well. 

Mr. COX. With the chairman’s indulgence, I would just ask one 

additional question. The NCP, which we have got what remains of 

18 months to establish, as Mr. Dicks was pointing out, has very 

relevant objectives. Where in the government NCP is going to end 

up is still the President’s decision. 

Is it under consideration that NCP be established within DHS 

with DNDO or whatever we are going to call it as an operational 

element? 

Mr. OXFORD. I have not had any specific discussions on that 

point. I know it has been raised over the last day or so. I haven’t 

talked to the Secretary directly on that subject. Again, as I mentioned before, I think a very close working environment with them 

is important. But to become part of the Intelligence Community for 

DNDO would hamper some of its developmental and international 

abilities. 
66

I would like a close relationship without being considered part of 

the IC because of some of those inherent limitations. 

Chairman LINDER. Does the gentlewoman from Virgin Islands 

wish to inquire? You were here. I am sorry, the gentlewoman from 

California. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My appreciation to you 

and the ranking member for holding a very interesting set of hearings, and to the full committee for realizing that the nuclear threat 

is a huge priority, not just for this committee, but for our country. 

I want to state a couple of things that I haven’t been able to for 

the record and this committee, because I have not been here at the 

precise time to get called on, but I am today. 

First of all, I have great confidence in the new Secretary. I think 

Michael Chertoff is going to be able to get his hands around an 

agency that has had a very slow start. Part of that is our fault because the construct for it is so ambitious. 

But nonetheless, I think the way he is going to focus on intelligence policy and operations is the right focus. I am very pleased 

with the start, and that includes many of the folks who are in this 

agency and trying to do the right thing. So congratulations to you, 

too, Mr. Oxford. 

The second thing I wanted to say is that as one who has focused 

a lot on reorganizing in order to confront and defeat the threats 

that face us in the 21st century, I think organization obviously 

matters. I think the names of things matter and where the boxes 

are matter. But I think more important than the organization is 

mobilizing the political will to act. That is really what I want to 

ask Mr. Oxford. 

In today’s ‘‘Washington Times,’’ there is a report, an article 

which leads with this, ‘‘Recurrent intelligence reports say Al-Qa‘ida 

terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has obtained a nuclear device or 

is preparing a radiological explosive or dirty bomb for an attack.’’ 

It then goes on to say the sourcing may be unreliable, but surely 

this is of concern and the possibility that al-Zarqawi could have 

such a device is of urgent concern. 

So my question of Mr. Oxford is this. Yesterday’s witnesses made 

absolutely clear, and I agree with them, what kind of threats we 

are facing. I also believe, and I think you do too, that we have a 

lot of capability in our government and elsewhere to confront those 

threats. 

But if they are as serious, as I think they are and you think they 

are and the members of this committee thinks they are, why don’t 

we have the political will to make this the highest priority in our 

country and to focus many more resources and brain cells on dealing effectively with the nuclear threat? 

Mr. OXFORD. First of all, let me address the fact that we have 

been following the report that you are citing for approximately a 

year and a half. There have been a variety of reports of that nature. We have been working on this closely with the rest of the 

community and with the Defense Department. I sent an inquiry 

over to Defense today to ask them what they were doing to follow 

up. I haven’t gotten an answer back from them yet. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. 
67

Mr. OXFORD. It is something we get involved with. Through the 

Nuclear Assessment Program we follow a monitor, and it goes into 

an analytical data base so that we can do trend analysis over time. 

I think the resource issue is an interesting one. When we conceived of DNDO over the last 6 months or so, and as we worked 

across the boundary conditions, we recognized in the first year we 

really need to do the architecture work. We really need to put the 

strategy in place, as opposed to just coming to the Congress with 

a very large budget and not being able to defend its intention. 

Again, as we ramp up to the fiscal year 2007 budget submission, 

we will be putting this into perspective. I don’t know what the 

numbers will be, but I would not expect them to be flat, in terms 

of our needs and our request, because the more we look at this, the 

more we will have an appreciation for what needs to be done. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I surely support strategy. I think that is 

what we have lacked in the Homeland Security Department. But 

I don’t think it is just a question of resources meaning money. I 

don’t think you do either. You have said strategy matters. I think 

it is also a question of focus, not yours personally, but this country 

tunes out information about the nature of this threat. We can’t 

tune it out. We tune it out at our peril. 

So I just put on your plate and certainly on Secretary Chertoff’s 

plate and on the plate of this committee the need to find the handle on how to get the public to focus on this in ways that they 

haven’t and to get the urgency of the threat and our need to respond in a strategic, informed way out there, so that should something terrible happen or, better yet, should something terrible be 

threatened and we can find the clues to block it, we act. 

Mr. OXFORD. If I could address that in a couple of ways, first of 

all I’d like to assure you how seriously this is being taken within 

the Department right now. This was the first topic that the new 

Secretary took on when he came into the office. The very first 

morning after being sworn in we had a meeting on DNDO with the 

Secretary. 

Separately, we do have a major goal to broaden the awareness 

of this activity, throughout State and local governments. We are 

working now through our Office of Domestic Preparedness to figure 

out how to migrate awareness of the capabilities and the ability to 

respond to this in a much broader way through those channels. 

We have also looked at proposing a nuclear detection interdiction 

exercise as the next prevention component of a TOPOFF exercise, 

we need to put that on the table. We need to start planning right 

now so that it coalesces our efforts in this area. 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say how 

much I appreciate the thoughtful answers of this witness. 

Chairman LINDER. Does the gentlewoman from Virgin Islands 

wish to inquire? 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Oxford. A little bit different kind of a question, I 

guess, many security experts believe that terrorists are more likely 

to use a dirty bomb to carry out an attack. Given the abundance 

of radiological material available in this country, what steps are 

being planned? What steps do you think the government should be 

taking to secure domestic radiation sources? 
68

Mr. OXFORD. First of all, the responsibility for much of that falls 

with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We are in direct contact 

with them to discuss their participation within the office to include 

not only having staff members within DNDO, but also active sharing of the data bases that they are proposing to establish that 

would monitor the licensees and the actual movement of materials. 

If they are going to have a legitimate movement of a nuclear 

source, we need to be apprised ahead of time so that we can notify 

people that this will take place. 

Again, most of that would fall under the NRC, but, we are in direct contact with them on that accord. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Are all of the sources identified as far as—. 

Mr. OXFORD. I think we have a pretty good handle on those that 

we are most concerned about. They fall under multiple categories. 

We have pretty good controls those that project the highest threat. 

Again, this is done through a series of both Federal licensing program through the NRC, and in some cases the States, have taken 

on the licensing responsibilities for safeguarding and reporting on 

the status of those sources. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. I really meant to bring the testimony from 

the previous hearing that we had, and I forgot. But as I recall, not 

only does Customs and Border Patrol have some responsibility with 

regard to nuclear material and detecting it, but I think State does 

as well. 

Now, they are not, what, two of the agencies that are a part of 

the national or the domestic DNDO, right? 

Mr. OXFORD. DNDO. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. If they are not included within the DNDO, 

why? 

Mr. OXFORD. Actually, they are. We will have 11 assigned people 

from the Bureau for Customs and Border Protection in the DNDO 

as part of the joint office. We are working across the other components of DHS as well. So we are going to have 10 people that are 

coming from Customs directly into the office. We also have a senior 

liaison from the State Department that is coming into the office to 

be our bridge back to the State Department and all the interests 

overseas. So, they both are directly working in the office. 

Mrs. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LINDER. The gentlewoman from the District of Columbia wish to inquire? 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much. I apologize that I was stuck 

in another hearing and unable to hear all of this testimony. I read 

the testimony. I am particularly interested in this area, so much 

concern has been expressed, so many worst case scenarios are out 

there. 

At the same time, we have just created the new Office of National 

Director, we are talking about the National Counterproliferation 

Center. This is really a hearing to get us to understand the structure and how it fits in. You could help me—if you could help me 

to understand, just judging from your testimony, what I see happening here. Everyone is afraid that things will begin bumping into 

one another as we try in good faith to separate what needs to be 

done and to somehow get it all together. 
69

As I read your testimony, it seems to me that you are coordinating a startup technology operation, and this is why I say so. I 

need you to tell me if this is right or wrong. You say on page 3 

that you will be—that DHS will be working holistically to combine 

research and development acquisition and operational support out 

of a single office. 

Now, if you move on to page 5, you speak about how this—how 

your office actually seeks to create transformational R&D and, 

therefore, will not be driven directly by operational requirements. 

You say that these—that the transformational aspect of what you 

are doing is essentially so great it could provide new operational 

concepts altogether. 

Then you helpfully state on page 8, what you will not do. You 

indicate again the focus on technology, speaking about a road map 

for nuclear detection technology, but will not execute. Then you go 

on to name these agencies, Department of Energy, Department of 

Defense, agencies that are already involved in this. It sounds to me 

as though you were part of a—and I can understand this and you 

are careful in trying to make clear what it is you can do, what indeed you won’t do or won’t attempt to do. But I don’t see—I really 

don’t see any part of you that is operational. 

I can understand why it should be in DNDO and the need for 

DHS to coordinate all of the various agencies that must be involved 

that we are talking about detecting nuclear threat before we arrive 

on shore, but I don’t understand why the word ‘‘operational’’ should 

be here at all. 

I can understand at the table would be people who would have 

to operationalize some of what seems to me you are leading us in 

doing, and that is developing a true basis to detect these threats 

abroad. So I understand why. 

I suppose my question is, why don’t you say that? Why does operational get into this at all? Are you not essentially, as I said when 

I began, coordinating the startup of a new technology, a new approach to detecting the nuclear threat before it arrives in our country, and keeping in touch with the operational actors so that becomes integrated as becomes appropriate? 

Mr. OXFORD. And I apologize if any of the words in there are 

misleading, but we try to be very clear to say that what we are 

doing is operational support. We do not actually conduct the operations, but we provide, for example, support to alarm resolution. If 

Customs or if an overseas location gets an alarm on their detection 

systems, we provide support to those operations to help them with 

resolving those alarms, to find out is it a threat alarm or is it a 

nuisance alarm. 

So there is an operational support element in that regard. Operational support also extends to the sharing of information across 

this architecture so that we can enable people to conduct better operations. So we don’t physically conduct the operations. For example, if we get a real nuclear alarm, we immediately invoke the 

FBI’s law enforcement authorities. They conduct the search in conjunction with DOE assets, but we will be there to trigger in a much 

more time compressed fashion the transition from alarm to response, that response being the actual operations. But we will not 
70

do the search ourselves. So we try to be careful by making that 

operational support, and I apologize if there is language 

Ms. NORTON. So by operational support, you mean you provide 

the expertise, the technological expertise that may be necessary? 

Mr. OXFORD. Or information that better informs operations in 

the field. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much for that clarification. 

Chairman LINDER. Chairman Cox? 

Mr. Simmons, would you like to inquire? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I remind myself that the answer to the previous question as to 

whether we have adjusted to the new model or the new paradigm 

of counterproliferation was, as I recall, we are not there yet. Is that 

what you said? 

Mr. OXFORD. I think that is fair. 

Mr. SIMMONS. We are not there yet. And I agree with that. And 

I think that underlies the seriousness of the situation that we face. 

The ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Thompson, asked 

a question about the Central Intelligence Agency and other entities 

and whether they would be represented in the Nuclear Detection 

Office, and I like the chairman’s title for it. Let us get rid of ‘‘domestic.’’ That sounds like something that might be based from our 

homes. From the Latin ‘‘domus.’’ I was an English major, too. So 

Nuclear Detection Office. 

I don’t understand how we can be fully effective in detecting or 

in being involved in developing technologies for detection or for 

warning these sorts of things without having the Intelligence Community and their representatives embedded within the system. 

I think you said that close coupling would be an impediment. Is 

that correct? Close coupling with these agencies might represent an 

impediment because perhaps if the traditional rules and regulations that cover the FBI, the CIA, et cetera, et cetera. And I guess 

my response to that, Mr. Chairman, is that if coupling—if this 

agency, this new organization’s coupling with the Intelligence Community in an area this important and this significant is an impediment, then we need to know why. It could well be that the impediment is the rules and regulations that this Congress and others 

have placed on the Intelligence Community over the years that 

have rendered them useless. Well, I shouldn’t say that, but certainly rendered them ineffective to prevent 9/11 and rendered them 

ineffective to do the weapons of mass destruction analysis on Iraq. 

And so if in fact these rules and regulations and these restrictions 

are an impediment to the Intelligence Community to the point that 

they are an impediment to you, then that seems to me to be a serious issue worth pursuing. 

My friend and colleague from California said maybe it is an issue 

of political will. I don’t think the political will is lacking. I think 

there may be bureaucratic politics and inertia, a lack of risk taking, opposition from groups that traditionally have opposed the Intelligence Community. But all of this underlies my fundamental 

concerns and my second set of questions, which is, are we in the 

zone? Are we in the cycle? Is your organization somehow within the 

intelligence cycle at least when it comes to requirements? Do you 

feel that the requirements that you have to do your job to prevent 
71

this country from being hit by a radiological attack from somebody 

like Mr. Zarqawi, are you sufficiently embedded in the cycle that 

you feel comfortable you can do your job? 

I am not sure that you are. So I would love to hear that you are. 

Mr. OXFORD. Let me suggest that maybe I was too subtle in my 

previous answer. When I was suggesting coupling, I was referring 

to some of the discussions which suggested that maybe the two organizations be combined. Becoming part of the Intelligence Community—that is, if DNDO were part of the Intelligence Community—I think may be an impediment to the broader mission. I 

would argue to be separate from the Intelligence Community. That 

is why I used the term coupled. In that term, I was talking about 

being fully integrated. I think the relationship has to be there. 

That is not the impediment I was worried about. 

Mr. COX. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. SIMMONS. Of course. 

Mr. COX. I appreciate the gentleman asking the question. I also 

agree with Mr. Oxford that at least for this member it was too subtle, and even with your expanded explanation I don’t understand 

why it is that if this were all done, for example, under the rubric 

of IA, and if counterproliferation were a specific function, and if 

DNDO, if that is what we are going to call it, were an element of 

that, it wouldn’t work. 

Mr. OXFORD. It may work in that case as opposed to a separate 

independent organization outside of DHS. The integration of this 

office within DHS, and the IA component will mature through the 

Secretary’s review. We could certainly explore options in that regard, but I was just looking at this as a stand-alone organization 

that merged the mission of DNDO with an intelligence component. 

I think there would be some problematic issues in that regard. 

With regard to how we can do this inside the Department, I think 

there is a variety of alternatives. In that regard, I think it is okay. 

Mr. SIMMONS. I thank the Chairman. 

Chairman LINDER. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think that was an important discussion we just had, and I think we need to explore that 

further. So I thank both Mr. Simmons and Mr. Cox for their comments and your answers, Mr. Oxford. 

The question I had, I wanted to turn back to the issue of the detectors and the—in terms of budget requests. And the witnesses 

from yesterday’s hearing had also raised concern that DNDO is domestically focused. And I know that your testimony states that 

DNDO will develop global detection architecture. But, again, the 

administration’s request is $5 million, this effort. So how much 

progress is DNDO going to be able to make in developing this global framework for the $5 million budget request? 

The second part, with respect to detectors, I would like to ask 

you about the next generation detectors, and so I want to get this 

point clarified, because you said that you will be able to deploy detectors early next year. But the committee has been briefed by Customs that this technology is not yet ready to be deployed because 

DHS has determined which spectroscopic technology is going to be 

used. So once the technology is chosen, these detectors must be produced, and that certainly is going to take some time. In addition, 
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the next generation technology really isn’t ready for deployment, 

and DHS has not determined what technology in fact is going to 

be used. So, therefore, DHS in all reality is years away from deploying the next generation sensors. 

Now, if this—and, by the way, it is also twice as expensive, and 

so they are not going to be able to actually deploy many detectors 

in the first place. For example, the total cost to deploy the current 

detectors is $496 million, and the cost to fully deploy next generation detectors is going to be somewhere in the area of $1.2 billion. 

And this is according to CBP. So how many next generation detectors are you going to actually be able to deploy with $80 million 

in your request? 

Mr. OXFORD. Let me give you some recent information. As I was 

coming over here today, our Deputy Secretary was having the briefing on the acquisition strategy associated with these next generation systems. We have committed to the Secretary to have these 

systems start low rate production as early as May of 2006. Now, 

Customs’ concern is that these have not yet gone through the full 

test series. That test series begins in July. 

We have 10 separate contractors developing systems using this 

new technology. They will go through a very rigorous testing program, which to be honest has never been done before. Legacy systems have never been tested to the extremes that we are going to 

test these systems in July. Out of those test, we will do a down select of those 10 vendors to three, with one or two going into low 

rate production in 2006. 

The current limitation to these systems is the manufacturer of 

the sodium iodide crystals. This new capability is based on the 

availability of these crystals that give us the isotopic discrimination. We are capitalizing the manufacturing at one location and potentially coming up with a second source. Beginning in 2007, we 

would actually be able to go into a more robust deployment of the 

next generation system. 

The acquisition strategy we put in front of the Deputy today is 

still a hybrid acquisition approach in fiscal year 2006, and the total 

request in 2006 was $125 million. The $80 million you referred to 

was actually the 2005 appropriation. There is $125 million in the 

2006 request. Right now our position is about $71 million of that 

will be dedicated to next generation systems. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman LINDER. Chairman Cox. 

Mr. COX. Thank you very much. Mr. Oxford, I wonder if I could 

dig into some of the questions that you are on the threshold of having to decide, not with respect to the organization within DHS, but 

actually what to do by way of deploying detection devices technology. Our witnesses from outside alerted us to two problems and 

I am sure you are thoroughly familiar with and have given great 

thought to. 

One is that we have roughly 380 ports of entry in the country, 

and even if we had ideal technology positioned at each of those 

ports a terrorist would presumably be clever enough to get a 4X4 

and drive across a logging road in Minnesota to bring the needed 

radiological material in the country and wouldn’t be foolish enough 

to drive through a major port of entry. 
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Second, the existing technology, including everything on the 

verge of deployment, is simply inadequate to the task so that it is 

very easy to defeat if one takes measures that we might anticipate 

that terrorists would take if they were smart terrorists to shield 

their radiological material from detection. That raises at least one 

question you have got to decide. 

I appreciate your comment just on those problems and the nature 

of them, but the question I know you are wrestling with, among 

others, is, with respect to technology: Buy now so we can deploy 

immediately or invest now so that we can deploy later. Given the 

weaknesses in the defense that we will erect even if we were to deploy at all today, does it make more sense for us to invest the 

greater portion of our budget in better technology so that we can 

have a better rather than a poorest defense? 

Mr. OXFORD. You are exactly right, Mr. Chairman. We struggle 

with these trades every day. The way we like to look at this is trying to balance coverage versus capability, and coverage does provide us some deterrent value. The whole layered defense strategy 

has got to complicate the terrorist’s planning to the point where it 

really makes it hard for them to decide what to do, giving us additional operational opportunities to direct their activities. It is a 

tough trade across the land space, the air space, and the maritime 

corridors as well. 

I believe that the spectrum of RDD versus plutonium versus 

HUE argues that we need to have better systems than what we 

call the middle of the road, the spectroscopic systems that give us 

a lot of increased capability in that regard. 

Directly on the heels of the system, I would like to say that within 2 years I will be in here telling you that we have better systems 

to detect the shielded materials. We have several activities under 

way that will get us to the detection of shielded materials, and we 

would like to be going out and narrowing the field to develop those 

systems and produce them in about 2 years. 

We are not resting on just today. We have an active program to 

look at dual energy sources that give us the ability to interrogate 

high-Z materials, high density materials so we can know that there 

is shielding material in cargo. The next step then would be able to 

actually discriminate what that cargo is. 

The trade across the fixed income, as you have already suggested, is a very tough one, but we think we have got to put something in place as we build towards a more robust system. 

Mr. COX. Finally, I hope that you will take to heart the concerns 

that have been expressed from a variety of perspectives about the 

importance of integrating intelligence with what we are doing, because keeping track of what terrorists are actually focused on, 

given that there are significantly fewer of them than there are people on earth and things to protect in our own country, is significantly better payback than investing our money in detection 

around the country on the theory that they might come any time, 

anywhere, any place. 

I would ask you whether or not there is a system in place in the 

Department of Homeland Security to help us make the trade-off 

from a money standpoint between intelligence and between overseas interdiction and covert efforts to identify terrorist capabilities 
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and intentions on the one hand and investing in the deployment of 

technology on the other hand. 

I ask that because it seems to me there may be a fallacy built 

into the architecture of DNDO as conceived, and that is an a priori 

assumption that we are just going to deploy this technology, that 

that is the mission, whereas the real mission should be preventing 

nuclear terrorism. And if that were the mission, we might be thinking every day about is this dollar better spent putting a radiation 

portal monitor in place or better spent locating what terrorists are 

doing with radiological material outside our borders or attempting 

to bring it in. 

Mr. OXFORD. And I think that is exactly what the concentrated 

effort within DNDO is going to bring to the table for the first time, 

the collective insights of the various departments that have been 

working these problems separately to sit down and figure out what 

the elements of this strategy need to be, is the deployment of a detection architecture domestically the necessary next step or is it 

just part of a broader strategy? People often look at the development of a strategy as a delaying tactic, but in this case I think it 

has got to be the way we explain, not only how we execute this 

problem but how we tie together the various elements of the operational community and the intelligence community to solve the 

problem. And until we have been able to espouse that theory and 

that strategy, we could have these kind of discussions for the next 

5 years, and the panel that met yesterday has told you what that 

has gotten us so far. We have essentially talked about this for 8 

years and have done very little. 

Mr. COX. Well, Mr. Chairman, I feel very comfortable and confident knowing that Mr. Oxford with his experience in DOD and at 

NSC and the Air Force is in charge of tackling these problems. 

Thank you very much for your assistance today. 

Chairman LINDER. Thank you, Mr. Oxford. You have been very 

helpful, and we are grateful. Thank you. 

Mr. OXFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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