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98–810PDF 2005

IRAN: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF

STATE-SPONSORED TERROR

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST 

AND CENTRAL ASIA

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND 

NONPROLIFERATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 16, 2005

Serial No. 109–36

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chair 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Vice Chair 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

YLEEM POBLETE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DAVID ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

MATT ZWEIG, Staff Associate

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NONPROLIFERATION

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

DARRELL ISSA, California, Vice Chairman 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

TOM SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DON MACDONALD, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member 

GREG GALVIN, Staff Associate 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Matthew Levitt, Director, Terrorism Studies Program, The Washington 

Institute for Near East Policy ............................................................................. 13

William J. Daugherty, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Government, Armstrong 

Atlantic State University, Savannah, Georgia, former Iranian hostage ......... 32

Major Steven Kirtley (USMC, Ret.), former Iranian hostage .............................. 37

Ms. Lynn Smith Derbyshire, family member of Captain Vince Smith, killed 

in bombing of Marine barracks in Beirut, 1983 ................................................ 41

Yonah Alexander, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 

and Director, International Center for Terrorism Studies ............................... 44

Richard H. Morefield, former Iranian hostage ...................................................... 62

Rocky Sickmann, former Iranian hostage ............................................................. 62

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and Chair, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central 

Asia: Prepared statement .................................................................................... 4

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation: Prepared statement ............................................ 8

Mr. Matthew Levitt: Prepared statement .............................................................. 16

William J. Daugherty, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................... 35

Major Steven Kirtley (USMC, Ret.): Prepared statement .................................... 40

Ms. Lynn Smith Derbyshire: Prepared statement ................................................ 43

Yonah Alexander, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ...................................................... 47

(1)

IRAN: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF 

STATE-SPONSORED TERROR 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND CENTRAL ASIA AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

AND NONPROLIFERATION,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:10 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(Chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia) 

presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

Central Asia is called to order. Thank you so much. 

September 11, 2001 will be forever ingrained in our collective 

consciousness as one of the most vicious terrorist attacks against 

our Nation. However, we have been victimized by the international 

terrorist network since November 4, 1979, when Iranian militants 

overran the United States Embassy in Tehran, and innocent Americans were taken hostage, some held for 444 days. 

I would like to thank Dr. Daugherty and Major Kirtley for being 

here today, and we are honored by their presence. 

Since that day and the muted United States and international 

response to this provocation, the Iranian regime has increasingly 

viewed terrorism as a tool for legitimate means to further its ideological and strategic aims. This includes exporting the revolution, 

assisting Islamic terrorist organizations and other groups worldwide, especially in the Middle East; attacking Israel, and attempting to sabotage the political process, destabilizing the governments 

of the more pragmatic and reformist Arab countries. 

The creation of a free and democratic Iraq and Afghanistan and 

the pursuit of peace and stability between Israelis and Palestinians 

through democratic means are efforts that contradict the Islamic 

aspirations of the Iranian regime. In response, Iran has opted to 

prevent the attainment of these policies by supporting terrorist organizations and pursuing policies that act against United States 

national security interests. 

One of the chief instruments for the implementation of these 

policies has been the terrorist organization, Hezbollah, which, since 

its inception, has been trained, financed, and supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iran provides Hezbollah with 

2

funding, safe haven, training, and weapons that have been estimated by some at more than $80 million per year. 

Iran has supplied Hezbollah with weapons that have dramatically and drastically increased both the quality and the quantity of 

their arsenal. According to public reports, this includes up to 

13,000 artillery rockets, several hundred Iranian missiles and Syrian mortars, and at least one recent account of the use of an unmanned aerial vehicle supplied by Iran over Israeli territory. 

In return, Hezbollah has helped advance Iranian interests 

through continued terrorist attacks against the United States and 

our allies in the region. Hezbollah has been linked to the 1983 attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon. I would like to welcome Ms. Lynn Smith Derbyshire, who is representing the families 

of the victims of this deplorable attack. 

Hezbollah has also been linked to the bombings of the United 

States Embassy and the Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984. Three 

Hezbollah operatives were accused of the 1985 hijacking of TWA 

Flight 847, and Hezbollah operatives have also been linked to the 

June 1996 truck bombing of the Khobar Towers U.S. Military 

Housing Complex in Saudi Arabia. 

Iran has used Hezbollah to assert a global reach that has been 

expanded into the Western Hemisphere. We witnessed the 1992 

bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and the July 1994 

bombing of the AMIA Jewish Community Center also in Buenos 

Aires. Since that fateful day in 1994, there has been a marked increase in Islamic extremist activity in our own back yard. 

Today, numerous public reports have stated that Hezbollah has 

been a critical component of Iran and Syria’s efforts to destabilize 

Iraq, with the goal of establishing a political and armed presence 

there. According to public reports, thousands of Iranian-sponsored 

clerics and Iranian intelligence agents have been deployed throughout Iraq to gather intelligence on our United States forces. According to these reports, they have included members of a terrorist faction with a close link to al-Qaeda. However, it is not the first time 

that Iran has closely cooperated with al-Qaeda and its constituent 

elements. 

In December 2001, Matthew Levitt, one of our witnesses today, 

detailed the beginning of al-Qaeda’s links with Iran. He said:

‘‘According to U.S. intelligence reports, Osama bin Laden’s 

operatives approached Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security agents in 1995 and again in 1996 offering to join forces 

against America.’’

Mr. Levitt added:

‘‘In fact, phone records obtained by U.S. officials investigating 

the 1998 Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania revealed 

that 10 percent of the calls from the compact and satellite 

phones used by bin Laden and his key lieutenants were to 

Iran.’’

According to the 9/11 Report, terrorist mastermind Al Zarqawi is 

believed to have obtained safe haven in Iran in the past. Testimony 

from defendants in the Kenya and Tanzania U.S. Embassy bombings indicate that al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, with Iranian assistance, 

3

have had strategic meetings throughout the years in Sudan and 

elsewhere. This is just the tip of the iceberg. 

Iran’s fondness for using terrorism as statecraft against Western 

nations and our interests has also seen Israel as a primary target. 

The threat to Israel, our only true democratic ally in the region, 

has grown with Iran’s increasing involvement in the West Bank 

and Gaza in support of Palestinians’ terrorist campaigns. Through 

Hezbollah, it is reported that Iran has not only enhanced its cooperation with Hamas’s organizational infrastructure, but it is also 

working to build a terrorist infrastructure and operational cells in 

those areas. 

In June 2001, Iran sponsored the support for the Palestinian 

Intifada. It was a conference which brought together Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front 

for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. Subsequently, it 

has been reported that Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas activists have attended terrorist training camps in both Iran and Lebanon under the guidance of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. 

The January 2002 seizure by Israeli naval commandos of the 

Karine-A, with its cargo of over 50 tons of Iranian weapons and explosives, revealed the network of cooperation between elements of 

the Palestinian Authority and the terrorist regime in Iran. 

Of increasing concern is that the dramatic increase in Iranian 

support for terrorist organizations has coincided with the expansion 

of Iran’s conventional military capabilities, its biological and chemical weapons capabilities, its ballistic missile development, and its 

pursuit of nuclear capabilities. The rapid expansion of Iran’s unconventional weapons program, in particular, its nuclear program, 

combined with its support for terrorist organizations worldwide, 

raises the prospects of a potential transfer of chemical, biological, 

or nuclear materials or components to terrorist organizations from 

Iran. 

President Bush and Secretary of State Rice have made it clear 

that international pressure is important and, indeed, necessary to 

change Iran’s policies. This, however, can only be effective if our allies are committed to containing the Iranian threat and holding 

Iran accountable for its sponsorship of terrorism and its pursuit of 

deadly, unconventional weapons. 

We have seen how delays and inaction by the international community have led to an increased threat and an emboldened enemy. 

This was the case in 1979 when we sought international support 

and consensus to punish Iran for the Embassy seizure and actions 

against our American hostages. This was also the case in July 

1992. At the G–7 Summit, the United States proposed a strong condemnation of the Iranian proliferation efforts, its sponsorship of 

terrorism, and its human rights abuses. Amidst European opposition, this censure never took place. 

During the 1990s, repeated appeals by the United States to our 

allies to follow a dual-containment policy toward Iran and Iraq 

were rejected by the European countries and Japan. They preferred 

to continue their policy of constructive dialogue, increasing their 

economic assistance to Iran and their investments there. 

4

At the G–7 Summit in Ottawa in 1995 and in Lyons in 1996, 

some measures related to counterterrorism cooperation were adopted but, again, failed to mention any Iranian involvement in the 

global terrorist network. 

Ten years later, I am encouraged by recent actions by companies 

to divest from Iran’s energy sector. However, we cannot, we should 

not, and we must not stop there. Given Iran’s pursuit of a clandestine nuclear program, because of its support of Hezbollah and other 

terrorist organizations, because of its continued interference in 

Iraq, we can no longer have the luxury of indecision. There is still 

time, but we must act quickly to deny Iran the technology, the assistance, and the financial resources it needs to pursue its unacceptable behavior. 

I believe that the Iran Freedom Support Act, that my colleagues 

and I introduced last month, provides the necessary tools to hold 

the Iranian regime accountable for its actions, to induce compliance, and to weaken the regime while at the same time supporting 

the human rights dissidents and pro-democracy forces in Iran. 

I look forward to moving it quickly through the Congress, and I 

thank all of our witnesses for being here today and for their efforts 

on behalf of our U.S. national security concerns. And with that, I 

would like to yield to the Ranking Member, my Co-Chair, Mr. Ackerman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIR, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

September 11, 2001 will be forever ingrained in our collective consciousness as 

one of the most vicious terrorist attacks against our nation. However, we have been 

victimized by the international terrorist network since November 4, 1979, when Iranian militants overran the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and innocent Americans were 

taken hostage—some held for 444 days. 

I would like to thank Dr. Daugherty and Major Kirtley for being here today. We 

are honored by your presence. 

Since that day, and the muted U.S. and international response to this provocation, the Iranian regime has increasingly viewed terrorism as a legitimate means 

to further its ideological and strategic aims. 

This includes: ‘‘exporting the Revolution;’’ assisting Islamic terrorist organizations 

and other groups worldwide, especially in the Middle East; attacking Israel and attempting to sabotage the political process; and destabilizing the governments of the 

more pragmatic and reformist Arab countries. 

The creation of a free and democratic Iraq and Afghanistan, and the pursuit of 

peace and stability between Israelis and Palestinians through democratic means, 

are efforts that contradict the Islamist aspirations of the Iranian regime. 

In response, Iran has acted to prevent the attainment of these policies by supporting terrorist organizations and pursuing policies that act against U.S. interests. 

One of the chief instruments for the implementation of these policies has been the 

terrorist organization Hezbollah, which, since its inception, has been trained, financed, and supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

Iran provides Hezbollah with funding, safe haven, training, and weapons that 

have been estimated by some at more than $80 million per year. 

Iran has supplied Hezbollah with weapons that have drastically increased both 

the quantity and quality of their arsenal. 

According to public reports, this includes up to 13,000 artillery rockets, several 

hundred Iranian missiles and Syrian mortars, and at least, one recent account of 

the use of an unmanned aerial vehicle supplied by Iran over Israeli territory. 

In return, Hezbollah has helped advance Iranian interests through continued terrorist attacks against the United States and our allies in the region. 

Hezbollah has been linked to the 1983 attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks in 

Lebanon. 

5

I would like to welcome Ms. Lynn Smith Darbyshire who is representing the families of the victims of this deplorable attack. 

Hezbollah has also been linked to the bombing of the U.S. Embassy and the Embassy annex, in Beirut in 1984. 

Three Hezbollah operatives were accused of the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, 

and Hezbollah operatives have also been linked to the June 1996 truck bombing of 

the Khobar Towers U.S. military housing complex in Saudi Arabia. 

Iran has used Hezbollah to assert a global reach that has extended into the Western Hemisphere. We witnessed the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina and the July 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish Community Center, also in 

Buenos Aires. 

Since that fateful day in 1994, there has been a marked increase in Islamist extremist activity in our own backyard. 

Today, numerous public reports have stated that Hezbollah has been a critical 

component of Iran and Syria’s efforts to destabilize Iraq, with the goal of establishing a political and armed presence there. 

According to public reports, thousands of Iranian-sponsored clerics and Iranian intelligence agents have deployed throughout Iraq to gather intelligence on U.S. 

forces. 

According to these reports, these numbers have included members of Ansar alIslam, a terrorist faction with close links to Al-Qaeda. 

However, it is not the first time that Iran has closely cooperated with Al-Qaeda 

and its constituent elements. In December 2001, Matthew Levitt, one of our witnesses today, detailed the beginning of al-Qaeda’s links with Iran. 

He said: ‘‘According to U.S. intelligence reports, Osama bin Laden’s operatives approached Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) agents in 1995 and 

again in 1996, offering to join forces against America . . . In fact, phone records obtained by U.S. officials investigating the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania revealed that 10 percent of the calls from the Compact-M satellite phone used 

by bin Laden and his key lieutenants were to Iran.’’

According to the 9–11 Report, terrorist mastermind al-Zarqawi is believed to have 

obtained safe haven in Iran in the past. 

Testimony from defendants in the Kenya and Tanzania U.S. embassy bombings, 

indicate that Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, with Iranian assistance, have had strategic 

meetings throughout the years in Sudan and elsewhere. This is just the tip of the 

iceberg. 

Iran’s fondness for using terrorism as statecraft against Western nations and interests has also seen Israel as a primary target. 

The threat to Israel, our only truly democratic ally in the region, has grown with 

Iran’s increasing involvement in the West Bank and Gaza, in support of the Palestinian’s terrorist campaign. 

Through Hezbollah, it is reported that Iran has not only enhanced its cooperation 

with Hamas’ organizational infrastructure but is working to build a terrorist infrastructure and operational cells in those areas. 

In June of 2001, Iran sponsored the ‘‘Support for the Palestinian Intifada’’ conference which brought together Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic 

Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command. 

Subsequently, it has been reported that Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas activists have attended terrorists training camps in both Iran and Lebanon under the 

guidance of Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. 

The January 2002 seizure by Israeli naval commandos of the Karine-A, with its 

cargo of over 50 tons of Iranian weapons and explosives, revealed the network of 

cooperation between elements of the Palestinian Authority and the terrorist regime 

in Iran. 

Of increasing concern is that the dramatic increase in Iranian support for terrorist organizations has coincided with the expansion of Iran’s conventional military 

capabilities, its biological and chemical weapons programs, ballistic missile development, and its pursuit of nuclear capabilities. 

The rapid expansion of Iran’s unconventional weapons programs, in particular its 

nuclear program, combined with its support for terrorist organizations worldwide, 

raises the prospect of a potential transfer of chemical, biological, or nuclear materials or components to terrorist organizations from Iran. 

President Bush and Secretary of State Rice have made it clear that international 

pressure is important and necessary to change Iran’s policies. 

This, however, can only be effective if our allies are committed to containing the 

Iranian threat and holding Iran accountable for its sponsorship of terrorism and 

pursuit of deadly unconventional weapons. 

6

We have seen how delays and inaction by the international community has led 

to an increased threat and an emboldened enemy. 

This was the case in 1979 when we sought international support and consensus 

to punish Iran for the Embassy seizure and actions against our American hostages. 

This was also the case in July 1992. At the G–7 summit, the United States proposed a strong condemnation of Iranian proliferation efforts, its sponsorship of terrorism and its human rights abuses. Amidst European opposition, this censure 

never took place. 

During the 1990s, repeated appeals by the U.S. to its allies to follow a Dual Containment Policy toward Iran and Iraq were rejected by the European countries and 

Japan. They preferred to continue their policy of ‘‘constructive dialogue’’, increasing 

their economic assistance to Iran and their investments there. 

At the G–7 summit in Ottawa in 1995 and in Lyon in 1996, some measures relating to counter-terrorism cooperation were adopted but, again, failed to mention any 

Iranian involvement in the global terrorist network. 

Ten years later, I am encouraged by recent actions by companies to divest from 

Iran’s energy sector. However, we should not and cannot stop there. 

Given Iran’s pursuit of a clandestine nuclear program; its support for Hezbollah 

and other terrorist organizations; its continued interference in Iraq, we no longer 

have the luxury of indecision. 

There is still time but we must act quickly to deny Iran the technology, assistance, and financial resources it needs to pursue its unacceptable behavior. 

I believe the Iran Freedom Support Act, my colleagues and I introduced last 

month provides the necessary tools to hold the Iranian regime accountable for its 

actions; to induce compliance; and to weaken the regime while supporting the 

human rights dissidents and pro-democracy forces in Iran. 

I look forward to moving it quickly through the Congress. 

I thank all of our witnesses for being here today and for their efforts on behalf 

of U.S. national security.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you 

for calling today’s hearing. This is a topic that you have been exceptionally dedicated to very consistently throughout your career in 

the Congress, and I appreciate that the first Subcommittee hearing 

of this new Congress deals with Iran and its sponsorship of terrorism because it seems to me that Iran has long been a problem 

in search of a policy. 

I think everyone in this room could recite the grand litany of 

crimes committed by Iranian-sponsored terrorists. In fact, we will 

hear today from some victims and family members who have suffered directly from Iranian-sponsored terrorism. I remember 

marching with them in 1981 as a much-younger State Senator in 

New York’s ticker-tape parade, and they applauded all of us because they thought we were the hostages. 

We could also all probably discuss in great detail our understanding of Iran’s nuclear program and why it is a threat to us and 

our friends in the region. We could decry in loud voices the violations of human rights that the mullahs in Tehran commit against 

their own people and chastise them for their obstruction of true 

democratic reform. But we have been doing all of those things as 

long as I can remember, and it has helped us not one bit because 

we do not have a policy. 

Sure, we have the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, although under 

which no one has ever been sanctioned. Instead, we have a grand 

bargain with our European and Japanese friends: If they will pretend to take our concerns about Iran seriously, we will pretend to 

enforce our laws. In the meantime, Iran inches ever closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

On the terrorism front, Iran’s support for Hezbollah has become 

so clear to the international community, that even the Palestinians 

7

are complaining about Hezbollah’s interference in the territories, 

yet our European friends cling to this bizarre idea that Hezbollah 

is actually a legitimate political party, and they refuse to list them 

as a terrorist organization. 

So in Iran, we have exactly what we thought we had in Iraq: A 

State with enormous wealth in natural resources, significant WMD 

capabilities and the means to deliver them, and the use of terrorist 

organizations as an instrument for state policy. But what continues 

to amaze me is the stunning lack of urgency with which the Bush 

Administration has approached this problem. 

I will be the first to admit that our policy options toward Iran 

are unappetizing, at best. We have limited diplomatic leverage with 

them since we do not talk with them directly—except in limited circumstances—and an invasion is, I think, beyond what we could 

handle at the moment, given our current situation in Iraq. Even 

limited air strikes at nuclear facilities would have only marginal effect on Iran’s nuclear program since we do not know where all of 

it is hidden, and we would not be able to assess how much damage 

we have actually done to the program. Besides, such attacks would 

bring with them international opprobrium as well as Iranian retaliation against our troops in Iraq and probably against our ally, 

Israel. 

So that leaves us with multilateral diplomacy, a game the Bush 

Administration has been loathe to play and at which they have 

shown very little proficiency. If a nuclear-armed Iran is ‘‘very destabilizing,’’ as the President has said it is, then we need to make 

that clear to the European Union, Russia, and to China. 

In short, Iran needs to become urgent for the Administration before it will become urgent for anyone else. We need to do the hard 

work of convincing nations who do not share our views on nonproliferation that it is in their interests for Iran not to have a nuclear weapon. If the Administration does not start making the effort necessary to get diplomacy to work, then we should all start 

thinking about how to contain a nuclear-armed Iran. 

I thank you, Madam Chair, and I look forward to hearing from 

our distinguished witnesses. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Ackerman. I would 

like to yield for opening remarks to Congressman Ed Royce of California, the Chair on the Subcommittee on International Terrorism 

and Nonproliferation. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chair, for conducting this joint 

hearing of the two Subcommittees, and let me say, you have done 

a fine job with the Middle East and Central Asia Subcommittee. 

This is my first hearing as Chairman of the International Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcommittee, and I look forward to 

working with my colleagues on this Subcommittee, including our 

Ranking Member, Brad Sherman. 

The 9–11 Commission and others have warned us against fighting the concept of ‘‘terrorism’’ in the abstract and treating it as 

some generic evil. This vagueness, the 9/11 Commission Report

tells us, blurs any counterterrorism strategy. The current threat, 

the Commission noted, is, in fact, Islamist terrorism. Even more 

clarity is brought about when we focus on state sponsors of terrorism, as we are doing today. The State Department calls Iran the 

8

‘‘most active state sponsor of terrorism.’’ This recognition allows for 

a different set of policy tools to be used, which we will be discussing today. When the state sponsor of terrorism is striving for 

nuclear weapons, then we really have the need for a laser focus. 

As we will be highlighting today, the United States has faced terrorism well before 9/11. The Iranian takeover of our Embassy in 

Tehran and the Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah attacks took a great 

human toll, as we will hear from our witnesses. But for many reasons, terrorism was a focus for only a few in the White House and 

Congress. After 9/11, it was a scramble to understand al-Qaeda and 

a scramble to understand Wahhabism and other previously largely 

ignored threats. It is now our responsibility to focus on these challenges as never before, while resisting what I would call ‘‘easy answers and simplistic solutions.’’ Just as this problem has been a 

long time in the making, we are going to be at this, seeking solutions, for a long, long, long time. 

I think we have got a pretty good sense of the severity of the Iranian terrorist threat that we face. A few years ago, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage said, ‘‘Hezbollah may be the A-team of 

terrorists, and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the B-team.’’ Our former 

Director of Central Intelligence shared this assessment in 2003, 

calling Hezbollah a notch above al-Qaeda organizationally, in part 

because of its deadly ties with Iran. This challenge has not lessened since then. 

The 9–11 Commission and others have advocated a multifaceted 

approach to combating terrorism. This applies to state sponsors of 

terrorism, for sure. The Iranian regime should feel our pressure, 

militarily and otherwise. But the Iranian people, fortunately, are 

not our enemies, as much as Iranian militants would like them to 

hate what they call the ‘‘Great Satan.’’ We need to reach out even 

more to Iranians, doing a better job with public diplomacy efforts. 

Radio Farda, for one, is underfunded. The strategy used there is 

not as robust as that employed by Radio Free Europe and Radio 

Liberty in creating an engaged listenership back in eastern Europe, 

and it is frustrating that reform has not come along very far in 

Iran. It has been actively repressed, but that should not reflect 

badly on the great majority of frustrated Iranians. For those of us 

that have listened in to these radio broadcasts and have been a 

part of public diplomacy efforts, we understand that 95 percent of 

Iranians on the ground have little interest in backing Hezbollah 

and other terrorists and have a very different view of what they 

would like to see for the future of the people of Iran, and, frankly, 

we need a dialogue about that as well. And I thank you, Madam 

Chair, again. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NONPROLIFERATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Today, the House Subcommittees on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation (ITN) and Middle East and Central Asia held a joint 

hearing to examine Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism for the past 25 years. The following is the opening statement of ITN Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce: 

‘‘The 9/11 Commission and others have warned against fighting ‘terrorism’ in the 

abstract, treating it as some generic evil. This vagueness, this useful report noted, 

blurs any counter-terrorism strategy. The current threat, the Commission report 

9

noted, is Islamist terrorism. Even more clarity is brought about when we focus on 

state sponsors of terrorism. The State Department calls Iran the ‘most active state 

sponsor of terrorism.’ This recognition allows for a different set of policy tools to be 

used. When this state sponsor of terrorism is striving for nuclear weapons, we have 

the need for a laser focus. 

‘‘The U.S. faced terrorism well before 9/11. The Iranian takeover of our embassy 

in Tehran and Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah’s attacks took a great human toll. But 

for many reasons, terrorism was a focus for only a few in the White House and Congress. After 9/11, it was a scramble to understand al Qaeda, Wahhabism and other 

previously largely ignored threats. It its now our responsibility to focus on these 

challenges as never before, while resisting easy answers and solutions. Just as this 

problem has been a long time in the making, we are going to be at this, seeking 

solutions, for a long, long time. 

‘‘We do have a pretty good sense of the severity of the Iranian terrorist threat 

we face. A few years ago, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage said, ‘Hezbollah may 

be the A-team of terrorists and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the B-team.’ Our former 

director of central intelligence shared this assessment in 2003, calling Hezbollah a 

notch above al-Qaeda organizationally, in part because of its deadly ties with Iran. 

This challenge has not lessened since. 

‘‘The 9/11 Commission and others have advocated a multifaceted approach to combating terrorism. This definitely applies to state sponsors of terrorism. The Iranian 

regime should feel our pressure, military and otherwise. But the Iranian people, fortunately, are not our enemies, as much as Iranian militants would like them to hate 

what they call the Great Satan. We need to reach out even more to Iranians, doing 

a better job with public diplomacy efforts. Radio Farda, for one, is under-funded. It 

is frustrating that reform has not come along very far in Iran, it has been actively 

repressed, but that should not reflect badly on the great majority of frustrated Iranians, whom I suspect have little interest in backing Hezbollah and other terrorists.’’

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Royce. 

I would like to recognize your Ranking Member on the Subcommittee, Mr. Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Madam and Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Congressman Ackerman, for holding these hearings. I look forward to other joint hearings, as I believe the jurisdictions of the 

two Subcommittees will overlap throughout the 109th Congress. 

I also served as the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on 

Terrorism and Nonproliferation, and during the 108th Congress it 

was a little frustrating, first privately and then publicly and then 

more publicly. I urged our Subcommittee to have hearings on Iran’s 

nuclear proliferation program. So today is an outstanding day because after 2 years of pushing for such hearings, we had hearings 

on a closely related subject, first in the morning at the Full Committee and now in the afternoon at this joint Subcommittee hearing. I hope soon we will have similar hearings where the Administration can join us once they have their team in place for the second term. 

As I said this morning in this room, there is a lobbying organization that has been accused of stealing a memorandum embodying 

America’s foreign policy toward Iran. I know these charges are 

false because America has no policy toward Iran. This has been a 

bipartisan, decade-long phenomenon. Clinton did not have a policy 

toward Iran. Bush does not have a policy toward Iran. It is perhaps 

less forgivable that we do not have a policy after 9/11 and then 

after the revelations that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. 

It is often cited that Iran is the number one state sponsor of terrorism, as identified by our State Department. Yes, but they are 

number one by a mile. No other country comes close. I want to 

commend the Chair for inviting Matt Levitt of the Washington InVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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stitute for Near East Policy and thank him for his testimony, which 

details Iran’s involvement with basically all of the major players in 

Middle East terrorism. 

We can only reflect on how dangerous it will be for Iran to develop nuclear weapons, far more dangerous than North Korea possessing them, because Iran is not only a nondemocratic State; Iran 

has the tendency to commit grave acts of terrorism, and it has the 

ambition to influence activities around the world, or, at least, 

throughout the Middle East. And when I say ‘‘Iran,’’ I mean those 

elements that appear to be in control of that Government’s national 

security policy. Obviously, the people and much of the Government 

are different. 

Now, Iran has been helping all of the Middle East terrorist organizations, from Hamas to Hezbollah and al-Qaeda. Iran is the common link between many of these organizations. Iran will fund, harbor, train, equip, and otherwise assist, it seems, almost any terrorist, Sunni or Shiite, as long as that terrorist is striking at enemies in a way which they believe furthers their national interests. 

If you believe that Iran and Sunni Islamists will never get along, 

you are wrong. If you believe Iran and al-Qaeda will never get 

along in projects to kill Americans, you are wrong. They have done 

so in the recent past, and if they think they can get away with it, 

they will keep doing it. 

We should also reflect that if Iran has nuclear weapons, even if 

we were to develop a Star Wars system to repel intercontinental 

ballistic missiles, it is not difficult to smuggle a nuclear weapon 

into our country inside a bail of marijuana. You do not need to be 

a rocket scientist to do it. One of the most disturbing approaches 

that Iran has to terrorism is the use of diplomats, which gives 

them just one more cover. 

So what do we do about this menace? Clearly, we need good law 

enforcement to try to stop those terrorist plans that are hatched, 

but more importantly, we need to get Iran out of the terrorism 

business and out of the business of developing nuclear weapons, 

and we can do that, and we do not have to invade, and I do not 

think we will have to bomb. But we need to lead the civilized 

world. It means we have to tell our friends, from the Japanese to 

the Malaysians, the French to the Germans, that if they want a relationship with us, they must put containing and altering Iran’s 

policies at the top of their agenda. 

Now, we have the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. I commend the 

Chairwoman for introducing a bill that would strengthen that act, 

but the act is useless in the hands of a Clinton or a Bush Administration that seeks in every way to cover their eyes and cover their 

ears and ignore $33 billion of identified and more billions dollars 

of unidentified investments in Iran’s oil sector. 

We have sent our troops into Iraq, 1,200 of them have died, all 

to deal with a weapons-of-mass-destruction program that was almost insignificant compared to what we face from Iran. We need 

to be willing to inconvenience multinational corporations with the 

same intensity that we were willing to send 1,200 of our best and 

finest to their greatest sacrifice. That is why I will soon introduce 

legislation—and this will parallel the Chair’s legislation, which I 

have proudly co-sponsored—to reimpose a total embargo on Iranian 

11

goods coming into the United States. I think the palates of everyone in my district can get by with Russian caviar, and a need to 

import Iranian caviar has not been demonstrated. 

We need to fund radio broadcasting, and one of the best ways to 

do it is to provide satellite time to the many private sector radio 

stations that are supporting democracy. We need to explicitly apply 

our existing sanction laws to subsidiaries of United States businesses incorporated in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, et cetera. I 

should note that Halliburton announced 10 days ago that they are 

winding down operations in Iran. They are not going to sign any 

new contracts. But what Halliburton said was, ‘‘We are not doing 

it because we are concerned about U.S. law or U.S. policy; we are 

just not making a profit in Iran.’’

A couple of quick points. We need to authorize the President to 

withhold funds from those international institutions that provide 

loans to the Iranian Government. More than a billion dollars, much 

of it our money, has been sent in the form of loans to Iran since 

2000. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I thank the gentleman from California. 

I would like to yield for our last opening statement to my Florida 

congressional colleague, Katherine Harris. Thank you, and then we 

will introduce the witnesses once we come back from a vote. Thank 

you. Ms. Harris. 

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you so very 

much for extraordinary work in this arena and particularly in exposing the state-sponsored terror. 

I wish to move forward and talk about this issue. For about a 

quarter of a century, Iran’s extremist establishment has sowed the 

seeds of terror and despotism and destruction throughout the Middle East, and in light of its nuclear ambitions, the shameful history 

serves as a deeply troubling prelude to the Iranian regime’s future 

designs upon the region. Fervently committed to spreading its revolution of terror and oppression, the Iranian regime has not only 

threatened its neighbors with invasion, but it has also engaged in 

the alarming practice of targeting foreign dissidents, from political 

leaders to public opponents. 

Moreover, the terrorists have relied upon this regime as a reliable source of safe harbor and support. The Iranian regime must 

recognize that these policies of murder, disruption, and destabilization will lead to increased economic and political isolation from the 

world. 

Working in concert with our allies, the United States must send 

this regime an emphatic message that its policies of harboring terrorists and supporting terrorism-related activities must end once 

and for all. Working in concert with our allies, we should evaluate 

the utility of the tough new sanctions. We should also send a 

strong message to Iran’s democratic reformers that the United 

States stands with them, just as it stood with the brave citizens of 

Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Diplomacy still has time to work in this case, yet diplomacy cannot succeed unless the United States and its allies insist upon a 

12

core set of principles, including an end to the regime’s undermining 

of the Middle East peace process through its sponsorship of terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah. Moreover, we must not permit the Iranian Government to interfere with the development of 

a free, democratic, and prosperous Iraq. 

I look forward to today’s testimony and give my heartfelt, belated 

condolences to Ms. Derbyshire, as well as my deep gratitude to 

Captain Smith, Major Kirtley, and Dr. Daugherty for their service 

to our Nation. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ms. Harris. 

We have a vote on the Floor, and when we come back, I will be 

introducing Dr. Daugherty, Major Kirtley, Ms. Derbyshire, Professor Alexander, and Dr. Levitt. So the Subcommittee is momentarily adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., a recess was taken.] 

Mr. TANCREDO [presiding]. Dr. William Daugherty is presently 

an Associate Professor of Government at Armstrong Atlantic State 

University in Savannah, Georgia. Dr. Daugherty joined the faculty 

of AASU in September 1996, after having served for more than 17 

years in the Central Intelligence Agency as an operations officer. 

During his career with the CIA, Dr. Daugherty served in operational assignments in the Middle East, the Caribbean, and Europe, specializing in counterterrorism. He was one of 53 American 

diplomats held hostage by Iranian militants while serving in the 

United States Embassy in Tehran, 1979 to 1981. Dr. Daugherty 

completed his active duty in the Marine Corps in 1974 and completed his reserve obligation in 1986, with the rank of Major. 

Major Steve Kirtley joined the Marines in June 1977, and in August 1979, with just 3 months as a watch stander at the United 

States Embassy in Tehran, then-Corporal Kirtley and his fellow 

Americans were taken hostage and held as prisoners of war for 444 

days. After attending Marine Officer Candidates School in August 

1990, he was sent on an advance party to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. After a long and distinguished career, Steve Kirtley retired from the Marine Corps in July 

2002. 

Ms. Lynn Smith Derbyshire is the sixth of nine children of retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Keith Smith and Mrs. 

Shirley Smith. She was raised in a military family and spent her 

childhood moving around the United States. Lynn currently works 

part time as a writer for the Smithsonian National Air and Space 

Museum. She resides in Oak Hill, Virginia, with her husband, 

Charlie, and their two children, Kaia and Chandler. Their son is 

named Chandler Vincent Smith Derbyshire in honor of her oldest 

brother, Captain Vincent Smith, who was killed in the terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983. 

Professor Yonah Alexander is currently a Senior Fellow at the 

Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies, as well as a member of the 

board of regents. Concurrently, he is Director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and Co-Director of the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies. Professor Alexander has appeared 

on many television and radio programs in over 40 countries. His 

13

numerous articles and interviews were published in both the 

United States and in the international press. 

Matthew Levitt is Director of the Terrorism Studies Program at 

the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, specializing in terrorism and U.S. policy. Prior to joining the institute, Levitt served 

as an FBI analyst, providing tactical and strategic analysis in support of counterterrorism operations. 

We will start with Mr. Levitt, and thank you all, first of all, for 

joining us today, and we are anxious to hear your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW LEVITT, DIRECTOR, TERRORISM STUDIES PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 

FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. LEVITT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair Ros-Lehtinen, 

Chairman Royce, Ranking Members Ackerman and Sherman, and 

distinguished Members of the Middle East and Central Asia and 

International Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcommittees. 

Thank you all for this opportunity to appear before you today and 

discuss the threat of Iranian state-sponsorship of terrorism. 

My oral remarks this afternoon are pulled from a much more detailed written testimony, so if I may, I would like to ask that that 

written testimony be included in the official record. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Without objection. 

Mr. LEVITT. United States intelligence officials regularly describe 

Iran as the ‘‘foremost state sponsor of terror.’’ In fact, that message 

was reiterated just this morning in congressional testimony before 

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Indeed, Iran’s support 

for Lebanese Hezbollah alone justifies these conclusions. Hezbollah, 

a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, was responsible for more 

American deaths than any other terrorist organization until September 11th. 

According to U.S. authorities, concern over the threat posed by 

Hezbollah, in particular, is well placed and continues today. According to the FBI, and I quote:

‘‘Many Hezbollah subjects based in the United States have the 

capability to attempt terrorist attacks here, should this be a 

desired objective of the group.’’

And in the CIA’s assessment, and again I quote:

‘‘Hezbollah, as an organization with capability and worldwide 

presence, is al-Qaeda’s equal, if not a far more capable organization.’’

That capability is a direct result of Hezbollah’s intimate ties to, 

and training and funding at the hands of, Iranian security and intelligence services. 

I would like to focus today on Iranian sponsorship of terrorism 

intended to undermine prospects for Israeli-Arab peace, on the terrorist activities of Iranian intelligence operatives themselves, and 

on Iranian activity in Iraq. 

Today, Iran and its proxies are intent on undermining the best 

chance for progress toward peace since peace talks crumbled in 

2000. Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa Martyrs, and others, all at Iran’s behest, are currently attempting to torpedo the 

14

nascent peace process. In late January, Hassan Nasrallah and 

Khaled Mish’al, leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas, respectively, met 

in Beirut where they declared that resistance against Israel was 

the only option until all of Palestine was liberated. This was even 

as cease-fire talks were in process. 

And Palestinian officials are worried. ‘‘We know that Hezbollah 

has been trying to recruit suicide bombers in the name of the alAqsa Martyrs Brigades to carry out attacks which would sabotage 

the truce,’’ said one Palestinian official. Another Palestinian official 

said it intercepted e-mail communications and bank transactions 

indicating that Hezbollah has increased its payments to terrorists. 

‘‘Now they are willing to pay $100,000 for a whole operation, 

whereas in the past they paid $20,000, then raised it to $50,000.’’ 

Another Palestinian security official added, ‘‘Hezbollah and Iran 

are not happy with Abbas’s efforts to achieve a cease fire,’’ referring to Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian President, ‘‘and resume 

negotiations with Israel. That is why we do not rule out the possibility that they might try to kill him if he continues with his policy.’’

Iranian agents have long been directly involved in acts of terrorism themselves and in concert with Hezbollah networks, beyond 

the terrorist activities carried out independently by its proxy 

groups. Indeed, Iranian operatives are well known for conducting 

surveillance of future potential sites for attacks. For example, in 

1998, Iranian agents were spotted conducting surveillance of 

United States interests in Khazakstan. In 1997, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported detailed Iranian plots targeting United 

States interests in Tajikistan. 

In Southeast Asia, members of the Hezbollah network were behind a failed truck bombing targeting the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok in 1994, as well as a series of other terrorist plots in the region 

throughout the 1990s, were intimately tied, and most of them originally recruited by, Iranian intelligence agents there. 

Another well-known example is the involvement of senior 

Hezbollah operatives and Iranian agents in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. Ahmad Ibrahim al-Mughassil, who is 

wanted by the FBI for his role in that attack, is believed to enjoy 

safe haven in Iran today. Several of the Hezbollah operatives in 

that attack received training in Iran. According to the indictment, 

the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, Syria, served as ‘‘an important 

source of logistics and support for Saudi Hezbollah members traveling to and from Lebanon.’’

In the fall of 2003, law enforcement officials in Britain questioned a carload of Iranians claiming to be tourists after they were 

spotted filming buildings tied to the Jewish community in London. 

A year later, Swiss authorities traced a similar apparent attempt 

to surveil a Jewish target in Geneva to an Iranian diplomatic mission there. 

Iranian intelligence operatives have engaged in activity in support of potential terrorist operations here in the United States as 

well. Last June, two security guards working at Iran’s mission to 

the United Nations in New York were kicked out of the country for 

conducting surveillance of New York City landmarks in a manner 

incompatible with their stated duties. A U.S. counterintelligence ofVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ficial said at the time, ‘‘We cannot think of any reason for this activity other than this was reconnaissance for some kind of potential 

targeting for terrorists.’’

This fits Iranian modus operandi, as highlighted by former FBI 

Director Louis Freeh. In the late 1990s, Freeh would later write, 

the FBI wanted to photograph and fingerprint official Iranian delegations visiting the United States because ‘‘the MOIS, the Ministry 

of Intelligence and Security, was using these groups to infiltrate its 

agents into the U.S.’’

Iran also maintains ties, as was noted earlier, with al-Qaeda. 

Several al-Qaeda operatives were allowed to travel through Iran 

with great ease in the period leading up to September 11th. Entry 

stamps were not put in the Saudi operatives’ passports at the border, though at least eight of the September 11th hijackers transited 

the country between October 2000 and February 2001. The 9–11 

Commission reported a persistence of contacts between Iranian security officials and senior al-Qaeda figures and drew attention to 

an informal agreement by which Iran would support al-Qaeda 

training with the understanding that such training would be used 

‘‘for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United 

States.’’ There are many other examples of these types of cooperation. I will highlight just one more. 

In September 2001, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, now known for his 

activities in Iraq, met an associate named Mohamed Abu Dhess in 

Iran and instructed him to commit terrorist attacks against Jewish 

or Israeli facilities in Germany. Iran is apparently a common and 

convenient place for meetings between Sunnis affiliated with global 

Jihadist groups and other terrorist organizations. A leader of a 

Jihadi organization in Pakistan is said to have reported that person-to-person contacts with other groups, sometimes with fighters 

from Hamas and Hezbollah, who are frequently met in Iran. 

And, finally, Iranian and Hezbollah elements are very active 

today in Iraq. While Iranian ministers have asserted that Tehran 

has not encouraged the Iraqi insurgency nor permitted suicide 

bombers to cross the border, their actions indicate otherwise. As recently as this past December, a group calling itself the Committee 

for the Commemoration of Martyrs of the Global Islamic Campaign, which is affiliated with the IRGC, had registered more than 

25,000 ‘‘martyrdom-seeking volunteers’’ to partake in the insurgency facing United States-led forces in Iraq. The group used the 

commemoration of a monument to the 1983 Hezbollah attack that 

killed 241 U.S. servicemen as a recruiting drive for future suicide 

bombers. 

According to King Abdullah of Jordan, more than 1 million Iranians crossed the Iraq-Iran border to vote in the recent election, 

some of whom were trained by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and 

are members of militias that could conduct post-election attacks. 

Reporting from Iranian dissident groups suggests that the IRGC’s 

Qods Force has established an armed underground of cells in 

southern Iraq. And most recently, just a few days ago, Iraq’s interior minister announced that 18 members of Lebanese Hezbollah 

were detained in Iraq on charges of terrorism. 

In conclusion, Iran is, indeed, the world’s foremost state sponsor 

of terrorism. The sheer scope of Iranian terrorist activity is reVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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1See, for example, George Tenet, ‘‘External Threats to U.S. National Security,’’ Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 6, 2002 2State of the Union Address, Chamber of the U.S. House of Representatives, The United 

States Capitol, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2205, available online at http://

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202–11.html 3 ‘‘Blair Says Iran Must Not Hinder Peace in Middle East,’’ AP, February 8, 2005

4See Matthew Levitt, ‘‘Hizbullah’s African Activities Remain Undisrupted,’’ RUSI/Jane’s 

Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor, March 1, 2004 (posted online February 4, 2004); 

Matthew Levitt, ‘‘Smeared in Blood, Hezbollah Fingerprints All Over Globe,’’ The Australian, 

June 9, 2003; Ely Karmon, Fight on All Fronts: Hezballah, The War on Terror, and the War 

in Iraq, Policy Focus No. 46, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2003

markable, including both terrorism carried out by Iranian-sponsored terrorist groups and by Iranian agents themselves. But the 

Iranian terrorist threat is especially dangerous since it threatens 

key United States security interests and American citizens alike. 

First, Iran and its proxies present a direct threat to the United 

States, both at home and abroad, including U.S. and coalition 

forces overseas. Consider the Iranian security personnel caught 

surveilling targets in New York. 

Second, Iran, along with its primary proxy, Hezbollah, is the single most dangerous threat to the prospects of securing Arab-Israeli 

peace. Consider Palestinian fears that Iran and Hezbollah are actively trying to torpedo the nascent cease-fire and possibly assassinate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. 

Third, Iran is fully engaged in undermining coalition efforts in 

Iraq. Note the infiltration of Hezbollah operatives there. 

It is critical, therefore, that the international effort to rein in 

Iran’s nuclear weapons program include an equally concerted effort 

to forestall its state sponsorship of terrorism. Failure to do so guarantees Iran and its proxies will continue to undermine Israeli-Arab 

peace negotiations, conduct surveillance of United States, Israeli, 

and other targets for possible terrorist attacks, and destabilize 

Iraq. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MATTHEW LEVITT, DIRECTOR, TERRORISM STUDIES

PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

INTRODUCTION

CIA officials regularly describe Iran as ‘‘the foremost state sponsor of terror.’’ 1

President Bush reaffirmed this assessment in his recent State of the Union address, 

saying, ‘‘Today, Iran remains the world’s primary state sponsor of terror.’’ 2 And earlier this month, British Prime Minister Tony Blair echoed the U.S. government’s 

perception of Iran, saying Iran ‘‘certainly does sponsor terrorism. There is no doubt 

about that at all.’’ 3

To be sure, Iran’s support for Lebanese Hezbollah alone justifies these conclusions. Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, was responsible for more 

American deaths than any other terrorist organization until September 11. Highlights of Hezbollah’s record of terror attacks include suicide truck bombings targeting U.S. and French forces in Beirut (in 1983 and 1984) and U.S. forces again 

in Saudi Arabia (in 1996), its record of suicide bombing attacks targeting Jewish 

and Israeli interests such as those in Argentina (1992 and 1994) and in Thailand 

(attempted in 1994), and a host of other plots targeting American, French, German, 

British, Kuwaiti, Bahraini and other interests in plots from Europe to Southeast 

Asia to the Middle East.4

According to U.S. authorities, concern over the threat posed by Hezbollah is well 

placed. FBI officials testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 

February 2002 that ‘‘FBI investigations to date continue to indicate that many 

Hezbollah subjects based in the United States have the capability to attempt terVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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5 ‘‘Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States,’’ Hearing Before the 

Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, February 6, 2002 (see response 

number 3 to ‘‘Questions for the Record’’ on page 339 of GPO print edition) 6 ‘‘Threats to National Security,’’ Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee of the 

United States Senate, February 12, 2003 7Scott Wilson, ‘‘Lebanese Wary of a Rising Hezbollah,’’ The Washington Post, December 20, 

2004, A17 8Susan Weinstein et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al, United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 00–2601 (RCL), February 6, 2002

rorist attacks here should this be a desired objective of the group.’’ 5 Similarly, CIA 

Director George Tenet testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2003 that ‘‘Hezbollah, as an organization with capability and worldwide presence, is [al-Qaeda’s] equal, if not a far more capable organization.’’ 6 That capability 

is a direct result of Hezbollah’s intimate ties to—and training at the hands of—Iranian security and intelligence services. 

Iran’s terrorist activities can be split into several primary categories. First, Iran 

actively seeks to undermine prospects for Israeli-Arab peace. Second, Iran sponsors 

terrorist groups of global reach, including funding, training, arming and proving 

safe haven to their members. Third, Iranian intelligence operatives are themselves 

engaged in terrorist activity on their own and in cooperation with terrorist groups, 

including surveillance of U.S. interests at home and abroad. This includes efforts 

to destabilize regimes not to Tehran’s liking, particularly in the Middle East, as evidenced most recently by Iranian activity in Iraq. 

Each of these categories of terrorist activity deserves attention, and I will touch 

on each of them today. For two reasons, however, my focus today will be on Iraniansponsored terrorism targeting Israel and the peace process. 

First, the death of Yasser Arafat and election of Mahmoud Abbas as the new 

president of the Palestinian Authority mark a positive turning point in Palestinian 

politics. Meanwhile, Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide bombers now find it much 

harder to bomb Israeli buses and cafes now that a security barrier—built roughly 

along the Green Line separating Israel and the West Bank—prevents their easy 

entry into Israeli cities. Add to this the forthcoming Israeli redeployment from the 

entirety of the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank, and even the pessimist sees 

the opening of a window of opportunity. That window will quickly slam shut, however, in the face of continued terrorist attacks against Israel. Coming off four and 

a half years of incessant attacks, Israeli tolerance for negotiating peace in the face 

of ongoing terror is nil. The entire project, therefore, is premised on the assumption 

that the ceasefire announced at last week’s Sharm al-Sheikh summit will hold. Iran 

and Hezbollah are doing everything in their power to see that it fails. 

Second, focusing on Iranian terror targeting Israel and the peace process, on 

which there is far more open-source information available compared to Iran’s other 

terrorist activities, allows me to highlight the depth of Iran’s involvement in terrorism. 

1. TARGETING ISRAEL AND THE PEACE PROCESS

FUNDING. Iran has long been believed to fund Hezbollah to the tune of at least 

$100 million per year. Recently, Western diplomats and analysts in Lebanon estimated Hezbollah receives closer to $200 million a year from Iran.7 The increase is 

likely due to Iran’s keen interest in undermining prospects for Israeli-Palestinian 

peace (and, in general, further destabilizing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), and 

Hezbollah’s growing role as Iran’s proxy to achieve this goal. Hezbollah’s success in 

funding and training Palestinian groups may well explain the increase in funding 

since Iran is known to employ a results-oriented approach to determining the level 

of funding it is willing to provide terrorist groups. As a U.S. court noted in 

Weinstein v. Iran, the period of 1995–1996 ‘‘was a peak period for Iranian economic 

support of Hamas because Iran typically paid for results, and Hamas was providing 

results by committing numerous bus bombings.’’ 8 Iranian funding to terrorist 

groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad (most often funneled via Hezbollah) increases 

when they carry out successful attacks and decreases when they fail, are thwarted 

or are postponed due to ceasefires or other political considerations. Unlike most terrorist groups, which need to focus much time and attention on raising, laundering 

and transferring funds, Iran’s largesse provides Hezbollah with a sizable and constant flow of reliable funding. By all accounts, Hezbollah operates under no revenue 

constraints; indeed, it often serves as a middleman funneling funds from Iran to 

other terrorist groups such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah Tanzim, 

and others. 

18

9Douglas Frantz and James Risen, ‘‘A Secret Iran-Arafat Connection is Seen Fueling the Mideast Fire,’’ The New York Times, March 24, 2002. 10Douglas Frantz and James Risen, ‘‘A Secret Iran-Arafat Connection is Seen Fueling the 

Mideast Fire,’’ The New York Times, March 24, 2002. 11Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson, ‘‘Suicide Bombers Change Mideast’s Military Balance,’’ Washington Post, August 17, 2002. 12 ‘‘Iran as a State Sponsoring and Operating Terror,’’ Special Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Israel, April 2003, 

available online at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/iran.htm 13 ‘‘Iran as a State Sponsoring and Operating Terror,’’ Special Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Israel, April 2003, 

available online at http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/iran.htm 14 ‘‘Iran and Syria as Strategic Support for Palestinian Terrorism,’’ (Report based on the interrogations of arrested Palestinian terrorists and captured Palestinian Authority documents), 

Israel Defense Forces, Military Intelligence, September 2002, available online at http://

www.intelligence.org.il/eng 15 ‘‘The Financial Sources of the Hamas Terror Organization,’’ Israel Foreign Ministry, July 

30, 2003 http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0nmu0 16 ‘‘Terrorist Group Profiler,’’ Canadian Secret Intelligence Service (CSIS), June 2002, Author’s 

personal files; See also Stewart Bell, ‘‘Hamas May Have Chemical Weapons: CSIS Report Says 

Terror Group May be Experimenting,’’ National Post (Canada), December 10, 2003 17Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood 

and Islamic Jihad (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 88 18Diana Campuzano et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, United States District Court for 

the District of Columbia, Civi Action No.: 00–2328 (RMU), January 2003

Iran actively supports Hezbollah’s involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 

and its support of Palestinian militants. U.S. officials contend that, shortly after 

Palestinian violence erupted in September 2000, Iran assigned Imad Mughniyeh, 

Hezbollah’s international operations commander, to help Palestinian militant 

groups, specifically Hamas and PIJ.9 Mughniyeh features prominently on the FBI 

list of most wanted terrorists, and is the subject of a sealed U.S. indictment for his 

role in the 1985 TWA hijacking. According to a former Clinton administration official, ‘‘Mughniyeh got orders from Tehran to work with Hamas.’’ 10 In fact, in the 

March 27, 2002, ‘‘Passover massacre’’ suicide bombing, Hamas relied on the guidance of a Hezbollah expert to build an extra-potent bomb.11

Iran also provides terrorist groups with direct financial and operational support 

for military activities. According to a December 2000 Palestinian intelligence report 

confiscated by Israeli authorities, Iran transferred $400,000 directly to Hamas’s 

Qassam Brigades to specifically support ‘‘the Hamas military arm in Israel and encouraging suicide operations,’’ and another $700,000 to Islamic organizations opposed to the PA.12 A confiscated Palestinian document describes a May 19, 2000, 

meeting between the Iranian ambassador to Syria and representatives from Hamas, 

Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah at the Iranian Embassy in Damascus. According to the 

report, ‘‘during the meeting the Iranian ambassador demanded that the above-mentioned persons carry out military operations in Palestine without taking responsibility for these operations.’’ 13 According to another Palestinian intelligence document dated October 31, 2001, officials from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah 

had been meeting in Damascus ‘‘in an attempt to increase the joint activity inside 

[i.e. in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza] with financial aid from Iran.’’ The meeting 

was held ‘‘after an Iranian message had been transferred to the Hamas and Islamic 

Jihad leaderships, according to which they must not allow a calming down [of the 

situation] at this period.’’ The Iranian funds, the report added, were to be transferred by Hezbollah.14

While estimates of Iran’s financial assistance to Hamas vary, there is consensus 

that the sum is significant. According to Israeli estimates, Iran contributes around 

$3 million a year in direct aid to Hamas.15 Canadian intelligence cites Canadian Secret Intelligence Service (CSIS) assessments that Iran transfers somewhere between 

$3 million to $18 million a year to Hamas. According to the CSIS report, ‘‘in February 1999, it was reported that Palestinian police had discovered documents that 

attest to the transfer of $35 million to Hamas from the Iranian Intelligence Service 

(MOIS), money reportedly meant to finance terrorist activities against Israeli targets.’’ 16 Palestinian sources estimate Iranian assistance to Hamas ‘‘at tens of millions of dollars.’’ 17 According to experts testifying in the case of Diana Campuzano 

et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian financial support to Hamas in 1995 

totaled $30 million and ranged from $20 million to $50 million annually between 

1990 and 2000.18 According to expert testimony in another case involving a Hamas 

attack and Iranian support for Hamas, Susan Weinstein et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al, ‘‘the Islamic Republic of Iran gave the organization at least $25–

50 million in 1995 and 1996, and also provided other groups with tens of millions 

19

19See Testimony of Patrick Clawson and Reuven Paz in Susan Weinstein et al v. The Islamic 

Republic of Iran et al, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action 

No. 00–2601 (RCL), February 6, 2002. Some estimates are much higher. According to court documents in the case of Leonard Eisenfeld, et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al, ‘‘Hamas 

acknowledges support from Iran in the amount of $15,000,000 per month, funds which support 

both terrorism and a broad range of welfare activities as part of its program. See Leonard 

Eisenfeld, et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al, Civ. United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia, No. 98–1945 (RCL), 2000 20 Ali Nouri Zadeh, ‘‘Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority Meet in Iran,’’ alSharq al-Awsat (London), June 8, 2002 21Douglas Frantz and James Risen, ‘‘A Secret Iran-Arafat Connection Is Seen Fueling the 

Mideast Fire,’’ New York Times, March 24, 2002 22 ‘‘Iran Expands its Palestinian Control; Offers al-Khadoumi Five Million Dollars,’’ al-Watan

(Kuwait), December 13, 2004 23 ‘‘Senior Fatah Militant in Lebanon Directed and Financed Serious Terror Attacks in Territories and Israel,’’ Press Release Communicated by Israeli Prime Minister’s Media Advisor, May 

26, 2002, at http://www.imra.org.il 24Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood 

and Islamic Jihad (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 88 25 ‘‘Terrorist Group Profiler,’’ Canadian Secret Intelligence Service (CSIS), June 2002, Author’s 

personal files; See also Stewart Bell, ‘‘Hamas May Have Chemical Weapons: CSIS Report Says 

Terror Group May be Experimenting,’’ National Post (Canada), December 10, 2003

of dollars to engage in terrorist activities. In total, Iran gave terrorist organizations, 

such as Hamas, between $100 and $200 million per year during this period.’’ 19

Iran’s policy of increasing funding to terrorist groups when they carry out successful attacks is especially clear from its interactions with PIJ. Until Palestinian officials released Islamic Jihad bomb makers and terrorist recruiters from their jails 

in 2000 and 2001 (following the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks), Islamic 

Jihad had failed to carry out a successful, quality attack in a long time. Almost 

every plot failed, either due to incompetence or successful counterterrorism operations. Once their key operatives were released from jail, however, Islamic Jihad 

terrorist activity soon picked up sharply. In early June 2002, Iran’s Ayatollah Ali 

Khamenei met with Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Shallah on the sidelines of a 

Tehran conference convened in support of the Palestinian intifada. Khamenei 

pledged to separate Iran’s funding for Islamic Jihad from that of Hezbollah and to 

increase its funding by 70 percent ‘‘to cover the expense of recruiting young Palestinians for suicide operations.’’ 20 U.S. officials, having affirmed that Islamic Jihad 

is ‘‘financed and directed by Iran,’’ also noted that, in the period following the onset 

of violence in September 2000, Tehran instituted an incentive system in which millions of dollars in cash bonuses are conferred to the organization for successful attacks.21

Other circumstances can also affect the level of funding Iran provides terrorist 

groups. As noted above, Iranian funding of Palestinian terrorist groups increased at 

the outset of the Palestinian Intifada in late 2000. In the wake of the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Hezbollah reportedly received an additional $22 million from Iranian intelligence to support Palestinian terrorist groups and foment instability.22 Similarly, in the wake of 2004 Saudi crackdown on al-Qaeda terror financing emanating from within the Kingdom, funding for Hamas from within Saudi 

Arabia all but dried up since many of the radical jihadist financiers funding alQaeda supported Hamas as well. Following the loss of these funds, Hamas is believed to have accepted an emergency budgetary supplement from Iran to tide the 

organization over until alternative means could be found to transfer funds from the 

Kingdom to Hamas. This financial support was likely forthcoming due to Hamas’s 

successful militarization of the Intifada that followed the failure of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in 2000. 

TRAINING. On top of funding terrorist groups targeting Israel and the peace 

process, Iranian training camps run by Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP–GC) dot the Syrian and Lebanese 

landscapes, where Hezbollah and Iranian trainers have schooled a motley crew of 

Palestinian, Kurdish, Armenian, and other recruits in a variety of terrorist and intelligence tactics. For example, several of the terrorists who carried out the 1996 

Khobar Towers bombing were recruited in Syria and trained in Hezbollah camps in 

Lebanon and Iran.23

Palestinian legislator and scholar Ziad Abu-Amr notes that Iran provides 

‘‘logistical support to Hamas and military training to its members.’’ 24 According to 

a Canadian intelligence report, ‘‘Hamas has training camps in Iran, Lebanon, and 

Sudan. Hamas camps in Lebanon are said to be under Iranian supervision.’’ 25

Perhaps the best known case of Iranian agents training Palestinian terrorists is 

the case of Hassan Salamah, the Hamas commander who was the mastermind beVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
20

26Transcript of ‘‘Suicide Bomber: The Planning of the Bloodiest Suicide Bombing Campaign 

in Israel’s History,’’ CBS 60 Minutes, October 5, 1997 27 ‘‘Iran Establishes Rocket Training Centers in Lebanon,’’ Middle East Newsline, August 8, 

200228 Nicholas Blanford, ‘‘Report Claims Iran Running Beka’a Training Camp,’’ Daily Star (Beirut), August 13, 2002. This article also appeared in Arabic in the Beirut daily An Nahar 29The Beka’a Valley terrorist training program was apparently the result of a secret meeting 

in the Tehran suburb of Darjah on June 1, 2002. The meeting occurred just in advance of the 

previously mentioned two-day conference convened in Tehran (June 1–2) in support of the Palestinian intifada. See Blanford, ‘‘Report Claims Iran Running Beka’a Training Camp.’’ 30Sean O’Neill, ‘‘Terror Training ‘Run by Hardline Mullahs,’ ’’ Daily Telegraph (London), August 12, 2002 31Sean O’Neill, ‘‘Terror Training ‘Run by Hardline Mullahs,’ ’’ Daily Telegraph (London), August 12, 2002 32 ‘‘Iranian Activities towards Inflaming the Palesitinian Intifada,’’ Israel Security Agency, December 2002 (author’s personal files). 

hind the string of suicide bus bombing carried out by Hamas in February and 

March 1996. Both in his statements to Israeli police and an interview on CBS’s ‘‘60 

Minutes,’’ Salamah noted that after undergoing ideological indoctrination training in 

Sudan he was sent to Syria and from there transported to Iran on an Iranian aircraft to a base near Tehran. Osama Hamdan, Hamas’s representative to Iran at the 

time, met Salamah in Tehran, after which Salamah underwent three months of 

military training at the hands of Iranian trainers. With the help of a translator 

(Salamah did not speak Farsi and his trainers did not speak Arabic well), Salamah 

trained to use explosives, automatic weapons, hand grenades, shoulder-fired missiles, ambush techniques, how to deactivate land mines and extract their explosive 

material, and how to build trigger mechanisms for bombs. By his own statement, 

Salamah received all his military training in Iran.26

Iran also runs terrorist training camps of its own in Lebanon, aside from the Iranian-funded camps Hezbollah operates there. In August 2002, Tehran was reported 

to have financed camps under General Ali Reza Tamzar, commander of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) activity in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley. These camps 

were designed to train Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and PFLP–GC 

terrorists in the use of the short-range Fajr-5 missile and the SA–7 antiaircraft 

rocket.27 The IRGC training program, which reportedly costs Iran $50 million annually, also trains Lebanese and Palestinian terrorists to carry out ‘‘underwater suicide operations.’’ 28 While training terrorists in the Beka’a Valley, the IRGC and 

MOIS simultaneously run several terrorist camps in Iran.29 As of August 2002, 

more than seventy foreign recruits—mostly Arabs—were reportedly undergoing vigorous training under the command of the IRGC’s Qods Force in two camps.30 At 

least fifty were being trained at the Imam Ali Garrison in Tehran while another 

twenty-two were being trained at the Bahonar Garrison, a Qods Force base located 

north of Tehran. Trainees were instructed to hide their connection to Iran and were 

warned by a Qods commander that ‘‘subsequent to September 11, our activities have 

become more sensitive.’’ 31

Iran actively recruits Palestinians for terrorist training in its camps as well. 

Israeli authorities had arrested two Palestinians, Shadi Jaber and Jihad Ibrahim 

Albasha, upon their return from Iran. According to the information they provided, 

the Iranian Committee for Aiding Wounded Victims of the Intifada had been working with Palestinians to find potential terrorist recruits among those wounded in 

what was then already 17 months of violence. Iran arranged for free travel, medical 

treatment and terrorist training for Palestinians who then returned to the Palestinian territories to establish terrorist cells. Among those involved in the recruitment drive, according to Albasha, were Iranian Ambassador to Jordan Nosratollah 

Tajik, PA Minister of Detainees and Freed Detainees Affairs Hisham Abdel al 

Razek, and senior Hezbollah operative Najafi Abu Mahadi. Additionally, Israeli authorities informed foreign diplomats in Israel in February 2002 that Iran had been 

transferring money to terrorists in the West Bank and Gaza for the purchase of 

weapons, and that terrorists affiliated with PA Chairman Yasser Arafat’s own 

Fatah Tanzim militia had traveled to Iran for training. Meanwhile, Iran continued 

to play on the frustration and anger of Israeli Arabs via its Hezbollah and Palestinian proxies to collect intelligence on Israel and courier weapons and funds to terrorist cells.32

Hezbollah has also engaged in a proactive effort to recruit Israeli-Arabs to provide 

intelligence on Israel and logistical support for terrorist operations. Israeli authorities have broken several cells of Israeli-Arabs associated with Hezbollah and other 

‘‘Lebanese groups,’’ including a four-person cell suspected of passing ‘‘computer programs, maps, various objects and documents which may constitute intelligence’’ 

21

33 NA, ‘‘Israel Arrests Arabs Spying for Lebanese Groups,’’ The Daily Star (Beirut), August 

6, 2002 34Dina Kraft, ‘‘Seven Israeli Arabs Charged with Spying for Lebanese Guerillas,’’ AP 

Worldstream, November 29, 2000 35 ‘‘Hezbollah (part 1): Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach 

Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria,’’ Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at 

the Center for Special Studies, Israel, June 2003; and author interview with intelligence sources, 

July 2003. 36 Anna Driver, ‘‘Israel Says al Qaeda Active in Palestinian Areas,’’ Reuters, August 5, 2003. 37 NA, ‘‘IDF abducts Force 17 Member in Gaza, Arrests 4 Hamas activists,’’ Ha’aretz Daily, 

January 2, 2002 38Lenny Ben-David, ‘‘Iran, Syria and Hezbollah: Threatening Israel’s North,’’ Jerusalem Issue 

Brief, vol 2, no 3, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 18, 2002 39Lenny Ben-David, ‘‘Iran, Syria and Hezbollah: Threatening Israel’s North,’’ Jerusalem Issue 

Brief, vol 2, no 3, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 18, 2002 40Lenny Ben-David, ‘‘Iran, Syria and Hezbollah: Threatening Israel’s North,’’ Jerusalem Issue 

Brief, vol 2, no 3, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, July 18, 2002 41 Arieh O’Sullivan, ‘‘Report: Iran Sent Arms to Hizbullah on Aid Planes,’’ The Jerusalem Post, 

January 8, 2004 42Sharon Sadeh, ‘‘EU Says Karine-A Affair Changed Mideast Conflict,’’ Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), 

February 7, 2002. 43 A ‘‘senior U.S. official’’ confirmed then-Israeli defense minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer’s contention regarding Mughiyeh’s role, see Nora Boustany, ‘‘Yugoslavia’s Search for Truth,’’ WashContinued

through the village of Ghajjar (which straddles the Blue Line separating Israel and 

Lebanon) to groups in Lebanon in exchange for drugs and weapons.33 Similarly, a 

Hezbollah operative recruited a terrorist cell of Israeli Arabs from the Galilee village of Abu Snan, which was uncovered by Israeli authorities as the group was 

planning kidnapping operations that would have targeted Israeli soldiers.34

According to statements by captured operatives and other information made public by Israeli intelligence, Hezbollah and Lebanon-based operatives from Iran’s IRGC 

have recruited a network of rogue Fatah cells to serve as Hezbollah’s West Bank 

cadres.35 Hezbollah is particularly well known for its skill at manufacturing and 

placing sophisticated roadside bombs, a skill the group has now transferred to the 

West Bank and Gaza. Aside from Hezbollah’s role in the aforementioned 2002 tank 

bombing, Israeli authorities discovered a type of mine that had previously been used 

only by Hezbollah in Lebanon in Hebron in mid-2002. Israeli authorities conducting 

a search in Hebron during that same month arrested Fawzi Ayub, a Hezbollah operative who had entered the territories by sea using a Canadian passport.36

Hezbollah operatives working with Force 17 colonel Masoud Ayad in Gaza reportedly directed small arms and mortar attacks against Israeli civilians in Gaza.37 In 

June 2002, Israeli authorities conducting a search in Hebron arrested a Hezbollah 

operative who had entered the country on a Canadian passport.38 The arrest of this 

individual coincided with the discovery in Hebron of mines previously only used by 

Hezbollah in Lebanon.39 Hezbollah and the IRGC are more active in Lebanon than 

ever, including recruiting, training, and dispatching a cell of Palestinians which 

killed 7 Israelis in a cross-border raid on the northern Israeli community of Metsuba 

in March 2002.40

SMUGGLING WEAPONS. Iran also ships and smuggles weapons to a variety of 

terrorist groups. Iranian cargo planes deliver sophisticated weaponry, from rockets 

to small arms, to Hezbollah in regular flights to Damascus from Tehran. These 

weapons are offloaded in Syria and trucked to Hezbollah camps in Lebanon’s Beka’a 

Valley. In January 2004, Iran reportedly took advantage of the international humanitarian aid effort to assist earthquake victims in Iran to supply weapons to 

Hezbollah. Cargo planes reportedly flew to Iran from Syria filled with aid supplies, 

and returned full of weapons for Hezbollah.41

Iranian involvement in the Karine-A weapons smuggling ship—intercepted by the 

Isareli Navy in the Red Sea in January 2002—is well documented. The White House 

described evidence of Iran’s role in the Karine-A incident as ‘‘compelling,’’ a conclusion echoed in the statements of Director of Central Intelligence Tenet, senior State 

Department officials, and even European officials. Speaking before the European 

Parliament in Strasbourg in February 2002, European Union head of foreign affairs 

Javier Solana described the Karine-A as ‘‘the link between Iran and the PA,’’ adding 

that ‘‘such a connection had not existed for many years.’’42 Hezbollah’s role in the 

affair is also well known. Not only did Iran arrange for Hezbollah external operations commander Imad Mughniyeh to purchase the Karine-A, but Mughniyeh’s 

deputy, Haj Bassem, personally commanded the ship that met the Karine-A at the 

island of Kish (south of Iran) and oversaw the ship-to-ship transfer of the Iranian 

weapons.43 But the link extends to Hamas as well. 

22

ington Post, February 13, 2002. See also Matthew Lee, ‘‘Top Israeli Security Official Calls Palestinian Arms Ship Probe ‘Absurd,’ ’’ Agence France Presse, January 10, 2002. 44 Author interviews 45 Bill Gertz, ‘‘Intelligence Agency Highlights Threat of Anti-American Terror in Tajikistan,’’ 

Washington Times, December 9, 1997 46Paul Quinn-Judge, ‘‘Stalking Satan: As Their Leader Offers Friendship, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Keep a Menacing Watch over Their Backyard,’’ Time, March 30, 1998 47 ‘‘Iran and Syria as Strategic Support for Palestinian Terrorism,’’ (Report based on the interrogations of arrested Palestinian terrorists and captured Palestinian Authority documents), 

Israel Defense Forces, Military Intelligence, September 2002, available online at http://

www.intelligence.org.il/eng 48 ‘‘Iran and Syria as Strategic Support for Palestinian Terrorism,’’ (Report based on the interrogations of arrested Palestinian terrorists and captured Palestinian Authority documents), 

Israel Defense Forces, Military Intelligence, September 2002, available online at http://

www.intelligence.org.il/eng 49 ‘‘Israeli navy intercepts ship with bomb-making materiel’’ Agence France Presse—English, 

May 22, 2003 and ‘‘Israel seizes boat with Hezbollah expert’’ United Press International, May 

22, 2003 and ‘‘Israel intercepts weapon ship allegedly bound for Gaza’’ Xinhua News Agency, 

May 22, 2003 50 Hatina, Meir. ‘‘Islam and Salvation in Palestine.’’ The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern And African Studies.’’ Tel Aviv University. Tel Aviv: 2001. 51 ‘‘Khameini: ‘Zionists had close relations with Nazis.’ ’’ Jerusalem Post. April 25, 2001. 

According to U.S. officials, Iran offered the PA a substantial discount on the arms 

in return for being allowed to run a hospital in Gaza and other social-welfare organizations in the Palestinian territories. By these means, Iran hoped to gain a foothold of its own in the Palestinian territories, through which it could build grassroots 

support, propagate its anti-Israel message, collect intelligence on the activities of 

U.S. officials, and provide direct support to Hamas and PIJ—an established Iranian 

modus operandi.44 Outreach to the Palestinians in this fashion would follow efforts 

by Iran elsewhere to use humanitarian and diplomatic footholds as a cover for IRGC 

or MOIS operatives collecting intelligence and supporting local terrorist groups. In 

1997, a Defense Intelligence Agency report detailed a similar Iranian initiative in 

Tajikistan; MOIS had been collecting information on the U.S. presence there and 

possibly engaging in ‘‘terrorist targeting.’’ 45 In 1998, another such plan came to 

light in Kazakhstan, where three Iranians were arrested for espionage, possibly in 

support of a terrorist attack against U.S. interests.46

The Karine-A episode stood out not only due to the magnitude and audacity of 

the quantity of arms Iran attempted to smuggle (more than fifty tons of weapons 

valued at over $2 million were destined for Palestinian militants in this one plot), 

but due to the quality of these weapons as well. The weapons seized aboard the 

Karine-A were described as ‘‘force multiplier weapons systems’’ that would have 

drastically shifted the balance of power between Israeli forces and Palestinian militant groups. The weapons included 107 and 122 mm rockets and launchers with 

ranges of up to twenty kilometers, antitank launchers and 120 mm mortars and 

mortar bombs, antipersonnel mines, small arms and ammunition, and more. Some 

of these arms still bore serial number markings revealing they were produced in 

Iran in 2001, including PG–7 Tandem and PG–7 Nader antitank rockets, and YM3 

antitank and YM1 antipersonnel mines. While carried out by Hezbollah, the entire 

operation was financed by Iran.47

While by far the biggest smuggling plot Iran funded, the Karine-A is by no means 

the only one. Hezbollah and the PFLP–GC were both involved in other maritime 

smuggling efforts involving the Santorini and the Calipso-2, which between them 

made three successful smuggling runs to Gaza and the Egyptian Sinai—once in November 2000 and twice in April 2001—before a fourth attempt was thwarted by the 

Israeli Navy in May 2001.48 On May 21, 2003, the Israeli Navy intercepted the Abu 

Hassan, a fishing vessel bound for Gaza on which Hezbollah was attempting to 

smuggle CD’s featuring bomb making instructions and explosives, weapons, detonators for rockets and a radio-activation system for remote-control bombs to Palestinian militants.49

GENERAL SUPPORT. Tehran has also hosted terror conferences in Iran to garner international support for Palestinian terrorism. During the first of these conferences (October 14–22, 1991), a fatwa was issued that decreed any discontinuation 

of jihad for the liberation of Palestine was forbidden and unlawful 50. 

Usually around 40 Muslim countries are in attendance, but more importantly, so 

are representatives from every Palestinian terrorist group. During the April 2001 

conference, leading terrorist attendees designated by the United States included 

Ahmad Jibril of the PFLP, Ramadan Shalah of PIJ, Khaled Meshaal of Hamas, and 

Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah.51 At the April 2001 conference, Ayatollah Ali 

Khamenei announced, ‘‘There is evidence which shows that Zionists had close relaVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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52 Ibid. 53 ‘‘Iran reformist says state of Israel must be eliminated.’’ Agence France Presse. 22 April 

2001. 54 ‘‘Hezbollah, Hamas Leaders Meet, Agree ‘Resistance’ Only Option,’’ Global News Wire—Asia 

Africa Intelligence Wire, Copyright 2005 BBC Monitoring/BBC , BBC Monitoring International 

Reports, January 31, 2005 55 ‘‘PA officials say Hezbollah is trying to disrupt cease-fire,’’ Reuters and Haaretz Service, 

February 9, 2005 56Mohammed Daraghmeh, ‘‘Israel agrees to remove West Bank roadblocks in first fruit of 

landmark truce,’’ AP, February 9, 2005 57Khaled Abu Toameh, ‘‘PA Fears Hizbullah to Target Abbas,’’ The Jerusalem Post, February 

9, 2005 58 ‘‘Iran Ordered Slaying of Kurdish Leaders: German Prosecutor,’’ AFP, May 27, 1993

tions with German Nazis and exaggerated statistics on Jewish killings.52 ’’ Ali Akbar 

Mohtashami, a member of the ‘‘reformist’’ faction of the Iranian parliament and a 

founder of Hezbollah who is suspected of engaging in a number of terrorist attacks, 

rationalized terrorism by describing Israel as the ‘‘knife in the heart of the Islamic 

world,’’ and saying, ‘‘It is time for the people to resist the aggressions of the great 

powers and especially their illegitimate representative in the region, which must be 

eliminated.’’ 53

Today, Iran and its proxies are intent on undermining the best chance for 

progress toward peace in over four year. The death of Yasser Arafat and election 

of Mahmoud Abbas as the new president of the Palestinian Authority mark a turning point in Palestinian politics. Meanwhile, Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide 

bombers suddenly find it much harder to bomb Israeli buses and cafes now that a 

security barrier—built roughly along the Green Line separating Israel and the West 

Bank—prevents their easy entry into Israeli cities. Add to this the forthcoming 

Israeli redeployment from the entirety of the Gaza Strip and the northern West 

Bank, and even the pessimist sees the opening of a window of opportunity. But 

Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—all at Iran’s 

behest—are currently attempting to torpedo the nascent peace process. In late January, Hassan Nasrallah and Khaled Mish’al, the leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas respectively, met in Beirut where they declared that resistance against Israel was the 

only option until all of Palestine was liberated.54 And Palestinian officials are worried. ‘‘We know that Hezbollah has been trying to recruit suicide bombers in the 

name of al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades to carry out attacks which would sabotage the 

truce,’’ said one Palestinian official. Another Palestinian official cited intercepted email communications and bank transactions indicating Hezbollah increased its payments to terrorists. ‘‘Now they are willing to pay $100,000 for a whole operation 

whereas in the past they paid $20,000, then raised it to $50,000.’’ 55 Just hours after 

the announced ceasefire, members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades fired on a car 

near a West Bank Jewish settlement and then attacked the army unit sent to investigate the shooting.56

Indeed, Palestinian officials have gone so far as to warn that Iran and Hezbollah 

may try to assassinate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. A Palestinian security official said, ‘‘Hezbollah and Iran are not happy with Abbas’s efforts to achieve 

a cease-fire with Israel and resume negotiations with Israel. That’s why we don’t 

rule out the possibility that they might try to kill him if he continues with his policy.’’ 57

2. IRANIAN TERRORIST ACTIVITY

Iranian agents have long been directly involved in acts of terrorism themselves 

and in concert with Hezbollah networks, beyond the terrorist activities carried out 

independently by the proxy groups sponsored by Tehran. One of the earliest cases 

on which information is publicly available is the German indictment of Iran’s thenintelligence minister in 1997 in the infamous ‘‘Mykonos case.’’ Two Iranian intelligence officers and two Hezbollah operatives carried out the assassination of four 

leaders of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (DPIK), an Iranian dissident 

group.58 To be sure, one of the most significant modus operandi that runs through 

all of Hezbollah’s global activities—financial, logistical and operational—is that at 

some level all Hezbollah networks are overseen by, and are in contact with, senior 

Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon and/or Iranian officials. 

Moreover, as one U.S. government official once put it to me, ‘‘Hezbollah cells are 

always a bit operational.’’ For example, Hezbollah operatives in Charlotte, North 

Carolina, responded directly to Sheikh Abbas Haraki, a senior Hezbollah military 

commander in South Beirut. At the same time, Hezbollah procurement agents in 

Canada who coordinated with the Charlotte cell worked directly with Haj Hasan 

24

59 United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al. United States Court of Appeals for the 

Fourth District. 60 United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al. United States Court of Appeals for the 

Fourth District; .Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘In the Party of God, Hizbullah Sets Up Operations in South 

America and the United States’, The New Yorker 28 October 2002. 61 United States v. Mohamad Youssef Hammoud, et al. United States Court of Appeals for the 

Fourth District. 62Transcript of Canadian Secret Intelligence Service (CSIS) transcript for Wednesday, May 

26, 1999, author’s personal files. 63Thomas W. Lippman, ‘‘US embassies still vulnerable-State Dept.,’’ Chicago Sun-Times, August 5, 1999; Comments of Patrick Clawson in ‘‘Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Impact of One-Year-Old Iranian Government.’’ Transcript provided by Federal News Service, May 

26, 1998. 64 Bill Gertz ‘‘Intelligence agency highlights threat of anti-American terror in Tajikistan,’’ The 

Washington Times December 9, 1997. 65Phlippino judicial and intelligence documents, author’s personal files, including: People of 

the Philippines versus Pandu Yudhawinata, Criminal case No 99–2013, Republic of the Philippines, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 117, Pasay City, November 1999. 

Hilu Laqis, Hezbollah’s chief procurement officer who operates closely with Iranian 

intelligence.59

While the Hezbollah members in Charlotte ran an interstate cigarette smuggling 

ring, Mohammed Hassan Dbouk and his brother-in-law, Ali Adham Amhaz, ran the 

Canadian portion of this network. Their activities were funded in part with money 

that Laqis sent from Lebanon, in addition to their own criminal activities in Canada 

(e.g., credit card and banking scams).60 Among the items that they purchased in 

Canada and the US and smuggled into Lebanon—at some of which very likely 

ended up in the hands of Iranian agents—were night-vision goggles, global positioning systems, stun guns, naval equipment, nitrogen cutters and laser range finders. The Canadian Hezbollah network also sought to take out life insurance policies 

for Hezbollah operatives committing acts of terrorism in the Middle East.61 According to a wiretapped conversation with another member of his cell that was summarized by Canadian intelligence, ‘‘Dbouk referred to a person down there [in Southern 

Lebanon] . . . who might in a short period of time go for a ‘walk’ . . . and never 

come back, and wondering if Said [the other cell member] could fix some papers and 

details . . . for him (person) and put himself (Said) as the reference.’’ 62

Mohammad Dbouk, the one-time head of the Canadian procurement cell, underwent terrorist training in camps in Iran at the hands of the IRGC before serving 

Hezbollah in Canada. Upon his return to Lebanon from Canada, Dbouk provided 

pre-operational surveillance for Hezbollah attack squads working under the cover of 

Hezbollah’s satellite al-Manar television station. The pre-operational footage he took 

was used to plan Hezbollah attacks on Israeli positions prior to the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and the live footage of the actual attack was then used to 

produce propaganda videos of the type seized in the homes of the Charlotte cell 

members. 

Iran is known for using humanitarian and diplomatic footholds as a cover for 

IRGC or MOIS operatives. These operatives are tasked with collecting intelligence 

and supporting local terrorist groups under the cover of humanitarian activities. For 

example, in 1998 Time magazine reported about an Iranian initiative in 

Khazakstan. In 1997, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report quoted in the 

Washington Times detailed Iranian plots targeting U.S. interests in Tajikistan involving kidnappings, threats and the casing of U.S. diplomats by Iranian intelligence operatives.63 According to the November 1997 DIA report, ‘‘The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security has been collecting information on the U.S. presence in Tajikistan.’’ 64

In Southeast Asia, members of the Hezbollah network behind a failed truck-bombing targeting the Israeli embassy in Bangkok in 1994, as well as a series of other 

terrorist plots in the region throughout the 1990s, were intimately tied to Iranian 

intelligence agents. Comprised almost entirely of local Sunni Muslims but supervised by a Lebanese Shi’a Hezbollah operative named Abu Foul, the network was 

led by Pandu Yudhawitna who was himself recruited by Iranian intelligence officers 

stationed in Malaysia in the early 1980s.65

Another example is the involvement of senior Hezbollah operatives and Iranian 

agents in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. Ahmad Ibrahim alMughassil, who is wanted by the FBI for his role in the Khobar Towers bombing, 

is believed to enjoy safe haven in Iran. Several of the Hezbollah operatives received 

terrorist training in Iran, and the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria, served as 

‘‘an important source of logistics and support for Saudi Hezbollah members travVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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66 USA v. Ahmed Al-Mughassil, et al, United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, May 2003 67FBI Press Release, June 21, 2001, available online at http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/

presslre01/khobar.htm 68Louis J. Freeh, ‘‘American Justice for Our Khobar Heroes,’’ Wall Street Journal, May 20, 

200369 Rohter, Larry. ‘‘Defector Ties Iran to 1994 Bombing of Argentine Jewish Center.’’ New York 

Times, November 7, 2003, Section A, pg. 9. 70 Ranzoni, Alvaro. ‘‘The Teheran Connection.’’ Panorama. April 10, 2003. 71 Argentine court proceedings investigating the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina 

and the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires (the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina, or AMIA) in 1992 and 1994 respectively, National Federal Court on Criminal and Correctional Matters No. 9, Court Office No. 17, Judicial Branch of the Nation, Federal Judge Juan 

Jose Galeano, Federal Court Clerk Jose F. M. Pereyra, Buenos Aires, March 5, 2003 (hereafter 

referred to as AMIA Indictment) 72 Ranzoni, Alvaro, ‘‘The Teheran Connection,’’ Panorama (Italy), April 10, 2003. 73Mark S. Steinitz, ‘‘Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America,’’ Policy Papers on the 

Americas, Vol. XIV, Study 7, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2003 74 AMIA Indictment, Expert Opinion of Bruce Hoffman 75 AMIA Indictment, Expert Opinion of Ariel Merari 76 Rohter, Larry. ‘‘Defector Ties Iran to 1994 Bombing of Argentine Jewish Center.’’ New York 

Times. Section A, pg. 9. November 7, 2003. 77Daniel Sobelman, ‘‘Jordan Uncovers Iranian Plan to Initiate Attacks on Israel,’’ Ha’aretz

(Tel Aviv), February 5, 2002. 

eling to and from Lebanon.’’ 66 According to the indictment of the terrorists behind 

the attack, ‘‘the attack would serve Iran by driving the Americans from the Gulf 

region.’’ 67 Former FBI director Louis Freeh has said that FBI agents interviewed 

six of the Hezbollah members who carried out the attack, and ‘‘all of them directly 

implicated the IRGC, MOIS and senior Iranian government officials in the planning 

and execution of the attack.’’ 68 Throughout these and many other cases, a key common thread is the direct contact each cell maintains to senior Hezbollah and/or Iranian intelligence operatives. 

Perhaps the best documented example of the operational relationship Iran maintains with Hezbollah is Tehran’s role in the bombing of the Buenos Aires Jewish 

community center (Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina, or AMIA). According to 

Abdolghassem Mesbahi, a high-level Iranian defector, the decision to bomb the 

AMIA building was made at a meeting of senior Iranian decision makers on August 

14, 1993.69 The meeting reportedly included the Supreme Leader Ali Hoseini 

Khamenei, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi, Rafsanjani, former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Vlayati, the Head of Intelligence and Security in Khamenei’s Bureau, Mohammed Hjazi, former Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian, and Iranian secret service agent Mohsen Rabbani.70 According to Argentinean court documents, 

the Argentinean intelligence service (SIDE) believes that Khameini issued a fatwa

concerning AMIA. This fatwa was then handed down from Fallahian to Imad 

Mughniyeh, the ‘‘special operations’’ chief of Hezbollah. Mughniyeh worked in conjunction with Rabbani, who was able to help orchestrate the plan for the bombing 

clandestinely under the guise of heading the Iranian Cultural Bureau at the Iranian 

Embassy in Buenos Aires.71 Rabbani attempted to buy a Renault-Trafic model van, 

the same model that was used in the bombing, and is suspected of being involved 

with several commercial activities through fictitious or undercover enterprises on 

behalf of Iranian intelligence.72 Investigators also uncovered records of phone calls 

between the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires and suspected Hezbollah operatives 

in the triborder area who operated out of a mosque and a travel agency there.73

According to expert opinions included in the Argentinean court document, it is 

well known that Hezbollah operatives often receive training in Iran.74 In addition, 

Hezbollah prefers outside operatives to local contacts when running its major operations in other countries. These operatives generally are more trustworthy and better trained.75 The terrorists that conducted the AMIA bombing would have had 

greater difficulty operating without the operational support of Iran, which reportedly included the bribing of then Argentinean President Carlos Menem with a payment of $10 million dollars to keep Iran’s involvement quiet.76

Jordan’s King Abdullah II highlighted another Iranian operation when he visited 

President Bush on February 1, 2002. The King reportedly presented the president 

with evidence that Iran had sponsored no fewer than seventeen attempts to launch 

rockets and mortars at Israeli targets from Jordanian soil.77 This was, according to 

the King, an Iranian plot aimed at undermining the Jordanian regime and opening 

a new front against Israel. Detained Hezbollah, Hamas, and PIJ terrorists had apparently admitted to having been trained, armed, and funded by Iranian instructors 

at Hezbollah camps in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley. 

26

78 ‘Iranian Intelligence Activity in Uganda ,’ Israeli intelligence report, author’s personal collection; corroborated in separate author interview with Israeli intelligence official, Tel Aviv, July 

200379 ‘Iranian Intelligence Activity in Uganda ,’ op cit 80Mark Hosenball, ‘‘Exclusive: A Threat to British Jews,’’ Newsweek, October 20, 2003 81 Ellis Shuman, ‘‘Hizbullah Planning to Kidnap Israeli in Africa,’’ Israel Insider, October 27, 

2003; confirmed to the author in interviews with Israeli officials 82 ‘‘Nigeria Hold Iran Diplomat as Spy,’’ Reuters/SABC News—South Africa, February 2, 2004 83 Arieh O’Sullivan and Margot Dudkevitch, ‘‘Iranian Spies on Israeli Embassy,’’ The Jerusalem Post, September 20, 2004 84Marry Weiss and Niles Lathen, ‘‘2 ‘Tape’ Worms Booted; Iran Spies in N.Y.,’’ The New York 

Post, June 30, 2004

Like its recruitment of Palestinians to train in Iran, Tehran recruited trainees 

among African Shia as well. According to Israeli intelligence, ‘‘in recent years, many 

foreign students, including [students] from Uganda and other African countries, are 

sent to study theology in Iranian universities’’ as a means of recruiting and training 

them as Hezbollah operatives or Iranian intelligence agents.78

For example, in late 2002, Ugandan officials arrested Shafi Ibrahim, a leader of 

a cell of Ugandan Shi’as working for Iran and possibly Hezbollah. Ibrahim’s partner 

was Sharif Wadoulo, another Ugandan Shi’a wanted by authorities in his homeland 

but believed to have fled to an unnamed Gulf country. Under questioning, Ibrahim 

confirmed that he and a group of African students first traveled to Iran in 1996 on 

scholarships to study theology at Razavi University in Mashhad. Ibrahim and 

Wadoulo then underwent intelligence and sabotage training in 2001 at two facilities 

in the Amaniyeh area of north Tehran. Together with new Lebanese Hezbollah 

trainees, they were taught to use small arms, produce explosive devices, collect preoperational intelligence, plan escape routes, and withstand interrogation techniques. 

The students were given fictitious covers, money, and means of communication, then 

‘‘instructed to collect intelligence on Americans and Westerners present in Uganda 

and other countries.’’ In common with Hezbollah networks in Southeast Asia, which 

have similarly strong ties to Iranian intelligence, Ibrahim and Wadoulo were also 

told ‘‘to recruit other Ugandan civilians for similar assignments.’’ 79

Iranian operatives are also well-known for conducting surveillance for future potential attacks. In the fall of 2003 law enforcement officials in Britain questioned 

a carload of Iranians claiming to be tourists after they were spotted filming buildings tied to the Jewish-community in London. According to Newsweek, a year earlier, ‘‘Swiss authorities traced a similar apparent attempt to surveil a Jewish target 

in Geneva to an Iranian diplomatic mission.’’ 80

Such activity on the part of Iranian agents is not at all uncommon. In October 

2003 Israeli intelligence thwarted an Iranian plot to kidnap Israeli businessmen and 

political leaders in Africa. A Mossad warning specified increased Iranian intelligence 

activity targeting Israelis in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania.81 A 

few months later, in February 2004, an Iranian diplomat was taken into custody 

by Nigerian police for spying on the Israeli embassy, the Nigerian Petroleum Corp 

towers, the British Council, and the Defense Ministry and Army headquarters in 

the capital of Abuja. An Israeli official confirmed that ‘‘a digital camera was found 

in his possession, with surveillance pictures of the embassy and several other international and local official buildings in the capital.’’ 82

In a similar case, in September 2004, an Iranian agent was spotted surveilling 

the Hyatt Regency Hotel that houses the Israeli and Japanese embassies in Baku, 

Azerbaijan, and was arrested by local authorities. Israeli security personnel detected 

the Iranian videotaping the building, who claimed to be recording the building ‘‘for 

its beauty’’ but had filmed not windows or vistas but exits, entrances, access routs 

and a local police station. According to Israeli authorities, ‘‘it is believed the detention of the Iranian in Baku has foiled a larger operation to collect intelligence on 

Israeli targets.’’ 83

Iranian intelligence operatives have also engaged in activity in support of potential terrorist operations in the United States. In June of last year, two security 

guards working at Iran’s mission to the United Nations were kicked out of the country for conducting surveillance of New York City landmarks in a manner ‘‘incompatible with their stated duties.’’ A U.S. counterintelligence official said at the time, 

‘‘We cannot think of any reason for this activity other than this was reconnaissance 

for some kind of potential targeting for terrorists.’’ 84 This fits known Iranian modus 

operandi, as highlighted by former FBI director Louis Freeh. In the late 1990’s, 

Freeh would later write, the FBI wanted to photograph and fingerprint official IraVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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85Louis J. Freeh, ‘‘American Justice for Our Khobar Heroes,’’ Wall Street Journal, May 20, 

200386The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

Upon the United States, available online at http://www.9–11commission.gov/report/index.htm 87Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair, ‘‘Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force 

Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations,’’ The Council on Foreign Relations, October 

2002. Available online at http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=5080 88 ‘‘For a Few Dollars More: How al Qaeda Moved into the Diamond Trade,’’ Global Witness, 

April 2003, available online at http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/show.php/en.00041.html 89 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, June 1, 2003; A European intelligence official subsequently confirmed 

this report in an interview with the author, September 2003. 90David E. Kaplan, Angie Cannon, Mark Mazzetti, Douglas Pasternak, Kevin Whitelaw, 

Aamir Latif, ‘‘Run and Gun,’’ U.S. News and World Report, September 30, 2002, p. 36. 91 ‘‘Treasury Designates Six Al-Qaeda Terrorists,’’ US Department of the Treasury press release (JS–757), September 24, 2003. Available online: http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/

js757.htm 

nian delegations visiting the U.S. because ‘‘the MOIS was using these groups to infiltrate its agents into the U.S.’’ 85

3. IRANIAN TIES TO AL QAEDA

While the 9/11 Commission found no evidence that Iran or Hezbollah had advance 

knowledge of the September 11 plot, the commission’s report does note that Iran 

and Hezbollah provided assistance to al-Qaeda on several occasions. For example, 

al-Qaeda operatives were allowed to travel through Iran with great ease. Entry 

stamps were not put in Saudi operatives’ passports at the border, though at least 

eight of the September 11 hijackers transited the country between October 2000 and 

February 2001. The report also noted a ‘‘persistence of contacts between Iranian security officials and senior al-Qaeda figures’’ and drew attention to an informal 

agreement by which Iran would support al-Qaeda training with the understanding 

that such training would be used ‘‘for actions carried out primarily against Israel 

and the United States.’’ Indeed, al-Qaeda operatives were trained in explosives, security, and intelligence on at least two occasions, with one group trained in Iran 

around 1992, and a second trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley in the 

fall of 1993.86

Hezbollah depends on a wide variety of criminal enterprises, ranging from smuggling to fraud to drug trade to diamond trade in regions across the world, including 

North America, South America, and the Middle East, to raise money to support 

Hezbollah activities. Published reports suggest that al-Qaeda and Hezbollah have 

formed tactical, ad-hoc alliances with a variety of terrorist organizations to cooperate on money laundering and other unlawful activities.87

Hezbollah is also believed to raise significant funds by dealing in so-called ‘conflict 

diamonds’ in Sierra Leone, Liberia , and Congo, a practice that al-Qaeda has reportedly copied (in this case not as a means of raising funds but to protect them from 

asset forfeiture and securely transfer them worldwide) using the model and contacts 

established by Hezbollah.88

On February 15, 2002, Turkish police arrested two Palestinians and a Jordanian 

who entered Turkey illegally from Iran on their way to conduct bombing attacks in 

Israel. The three were members of the al-Qaeda linked group Beyyiat el-Imam, 

fought for the Taliban, received terrorist training in Afghanistan, and were dispatched on their mission by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi fled Afghanistan after 

the U.S.-led military campaign began, and was living in Tehran under the protection of Iran long after news of his link to the three terrorists arrested in Turkey. 

Prior to the war in Iraq, Zarqawi had reportedly returned to the Ansar al-Islam 

camp in northern Iraq run by his Jund al-Shams lieutenants. There, he enjoyed safe 

haven and free passage into and out of Ansar-held areas.89 Zarqwai was said to be 

back in Iran as of October 2003, where he continued to operate with the full knowledge of the regime in Tehran until moving his base of operations and tactical focus 

to Iraq.90

In September 2003, when the Treasury Department designated Zarqawi and several of his associates as ‘‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’’ entities, the department released information revealing that Zarqawi not only has ‘‘ties’’ to Hezbollah, 

but that plans were in place for his deputies to meet with Asbat al-Ansar, Hezbollah 

‘‘and any other group that would enable them to smuggle mujaheddin into Palestine’’ in an effort ‘‘to smuggle operatives into Israel to conduct operations.’’ 91

Zarqawi received ‘‘more than $35,000’’ in mid 2001 ‘‘for work in Palestine,’’ which 

included ‘‘finding a mechanism that would enable more suicide martyrs to enter 

28

92 ‘‘Treasury Designates Six Al-Qaeda Terrorists,’’ US Department of the Treasury press release (JS–757), September 24, 2003. Available online: http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/

js757.htm 93 ‘‘President Shares Thanksgiving Meal with Troops,’’ text of President George W. Bush’s remarks to troops and families, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, November 21, 2001, 

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011121–3.html 94 Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper 

Collins, 2003), p. 211 95Peter Finn, ‘‘Al-Qaeda Deputies Harbored by Iran: Pair Are Plotting Attacks, Sources Say,’’ 

Washington Post, August 27, 2002. See also ‘‘According to Reliable Arabic Security Sources, Arrested Members of al-Qaeda Uncovered, Iran Harboring Bin Laden’s Aides,’’ al-Sharq al-Awsat 

(London), August 29, 2002 96Peter Finn, ‘‘Al-Qaeda Deputies Harbored by Iran: Pair Are Plotting Attacks, Sources Say,’’ 

Washington Post, August 27, 2002. See also ‘‘According to Reliable Arabic Security Sources, Arrested Members of al-Qaeda Uncovered, Iran Harboring Bin Laden’s Aides,’’ al-Sharq al-Awsat 

(London), August 29, 2002 97Testimony of Richard A. Clarke before the United States Senate Banking Committee, October 22, 2003, available online at http://www.senate.gov/?banking/lfiles/clarke.pdf 98 Richard Clarke, ‘‘Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al Qida: 

Status and Prospects,’’ National Security Council Memo, January 2001, available online at 

http://www2.gwu.edu/?nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/index.htm 

Israel’’ as well as ‘‘to provide training on explosives, poisons, and remote controlled 

devices.’’ 92

According to the Treasury Department, Zarqawi also met an associate named 

Mohamed Abu Dhess in Iran in early September 2001 ‘‘and instructed him to commit terrorist attacks against Jewish or Israeli facilities in Germany with ‘his 

[Zarqawi’s] people’.’’ 93 In fact, Iran is apparently a common and convenient meeting 

place for radical Sunnis affiliated with global jihadist groups and other terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah. In Pakistan, the leader of a jihadi or- ganization there openly admitted to having ‘‘person-to-person contacts’’ with other 

groups, adding, ‘‘sometimes fighters from Hamas and Hezbollah help us.’’ Asked 

where contacts with groups like Hamas and Hezbollah are held, the Pakistani answered, ‘‘a good place to meet is in Iran.’’ Offering insight into the importance of 

interpersonal relationships between members of disparate terrorist groups, he 

added, ‘‘We don’t involve other organizations. Just individuals.’’ 94

Several terrorist threats have been thwarted because of information found in safe 

houses which are known to have been in direct contact with al-Qaeda personnel in 

Iran. Saif al-Adel, Saad Bin Laden and others were in Iran and therefore tied, in 

some way or another, to the bombings in Riyadh. There were apparently al-Qaeda 

plots to assassinate members of the Saudi royal family, at least two plots targeting 

Saudi ministries, and now it has been discovered—in the safe houses in Saudi Arabia—that they were using the country as a base to plot many more attacks. Indeed, 

already in 2002 reports emerged that Iran was providing safe haven to senior alQaeda fugitives who head the group’s military committee, as well as to dozens of 

other al-Qaeda personnel.95 An Arab intelligence officer was quoted as saying that 

some al-Qaeda operatives were instructed to leave Iran, but were told that ‘‘they 

may be called on at some point to assist Iran.’’ 96

None of this is new. In the period leading up to the 1998 East Africa embassy 

bombings, ten percent of Osama Bin Laden’s satellite phone calls were made to 

Iran. From the testimony of Ali Mohammed and other captured al-Qaeda operatives, 

meetings were known to be periodically set up by Iran and al-Qaeda. 

Former National Security Council terrorism czar Richard Clarke testified that ‘‘al 

Qaeda is a small part of the overall challenge we face from radical terrorist groups 

associated with Islam. Autonomous cells, regional affiliate groups, radical Palestinian organizations, and groups sponsored by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are engaged in mutual support arrangements, including funding.’’ 97 Indeed, in a January 

25, 2001, memo recently declassified and now made available to the public by the 

National Archives, Clarke noted that ‘‘Al-Qida has recently [January 2001] increased its contacts with the Palestinian rejectionist groups, including Hizbollah, 

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.’’ 98 Significantly, each of these is sponsored 

by Iran. 

4. RADICALIZATION

Beyond training and arming Hezbollah, Iran bankrolls the group’s well-oiled propaganda machine as well. Al-Manar is the official television mouthpiece of Hezbollah, 

and is used by Hezbollah and Iran to radicalize Muslim youth and glorify violence, 

especially in the contexts of Israel and Iraq. Called the ‘‘station of resistance’’—it 

serves as Hezbollah’s tool to reach the entire Arab Muslim world to disseminate 

propaganda and promote terrorist activity. Al-Manar glorifies suicide bombings, 

29

99 Jorisch interview with Lebanese Hezbollah expert, October 11, 2002 in Avi Jorisch, Beacon 

of Hatred: Inside Hezbollah’s al-Manar Television (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for 

Near East Policy, 2004), Page 32. 100 Nicholas Blanford, ‘‘Hezbullah Sharpens Its Weapons in Propoganda War,’’ Christian 

Science Monitor, December 28, 2001 101 Robert Fisk, ‘‘Television News Is Secret Weapon of the Intifada,’’ The Independent (London), December 2, 2000 102 Ali Nuri Zada, ‘‘Iran Raises Budget of ‘Islamic Jihad’ and Appropriates Funds to Fighters,’’ 

al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), June 8, 2000 103 ‘‘Hizbollah Inaugurates Satellite Channel via ArabSat,’’ al-Ra’y (Amman), May 29, 2000, 

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 31, 2000

calls for attacks targeting Israel, coalition forces in Iraq, and the United States, and 

seeks to create a radicalized constituency that is as likely to seek out terrorist 

groups themselves to join their ranks as they are to be sought after and recruited 

by these groups. 

At the time of al-Manar’s founding in 1991, the station reportedly received seed 

money from Iran and had a running budget of $1 million.99 By 2002 its annual 

budget had grown to approximately $15 million.100 Middle East analysts and journalists maintain that most of this funding comes from Iran.101 Avi Jorisch, author 

of Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hezbollah’s al-Manar Television, writes that ‘‘Iran provides an estimated $100–200 million per year to Hezbollah, which in turn transfers 

money to al-Manar, making Iranian funding of the station indirect.’’ 102 This was 

confirmed by former al-Manar program director Sheikh Nasir al-Akhdar who asserted that al-Manar receives a large portion of its budget through subsidies offered 

by Hezbollah.103

According to one official in al-Manar’s Art Graphic Department, al-Manar’s music 

videos are meant to ‘‘help people on the way to committing what you call in the 

West a suicide mission. [They are] meant to be the first step in the process of a 

freedom fighter operation.’’

The United States has been a primary target of al-Manar programming and is depicted as a global oppressor. In a speech broadcast on al-Manar, Hezbollah Secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah stated, ‘‘Our enmity to the Great Satan is complete 

and unlimited. . . . Our echoing slogan will remain: Death to America!’’ One video 

features an altered image of the Statue of Liberty. The statue’s head has been 

transformed into a skull with hollow eyes, her gown dripping in blood. Instead of 

a torch, she holds a sharp knife. After asserting that the United States ‘‘has pried 

into the affairs of most countries in the world,’’ the video ends with the slogan, 

‘‘America owes blood to all of humanity.’’

Al-Manar often juxtaposes sacred Islamic text with images of ‘‘martyrdom’’ to incite its viewers to support and even carry out acts of terror. In one video, Qur’anic 

verses are sung in somber, quiet tones and scrolled across the screen while footage 

in the background shows U.S. and Israeli flags being burned, demonstrators waving 

a ‘‘Down with U.S.A.’’ sign, a suicide bomber recording his valediction, victims and 

rescue personnel scrambling in the aftermath of a suicide bombing, and similar images. 

Indeed, al-Manar takes its case for suicide operations straight to the people. Viewers are told that ‘‘the path to becoming a priest in Islam is through jihad.’’ Potential 

bombers are implored to focus their attention on the afterlife and on judgment day 

‘‘instead of getting preoccupied with our lives here on earth.’’ Mothers are encouraged to give up their sons for God, country, and the blessings of the afterlife, to prepare them ‘‘for battle knowing that their blood will mix with the soil.’’ In the eyes 

of Hezbollah, ‘‘this belief in judgment day is the most powerful weapon in the face 

of technology and advanced weaponry.’’ Such belief ‘‘drives fear into the heart of the 

Israeli soldier as he sits in his tank, while God guides [Hezbollah’s] bullets and 

rockets to their targets.’’

Al-Manar also encourages Iraqi insurgents to attack U.S. troops as well. One 

video lambastes U.S. troops in Iraq with the following lyrics: ‘‘Down with the mother 

of terrorism! America threatens in vain, an occupying army of invaders. Nothing remains but rifles and suicide bombers.’’ The video ends with an image of a suicide 

bomber’s belt detonating. 

Echoing and Iranian message, Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah 

made the following remarks in a speech given one week before coalition forces 

launched Operation Iraqi Freedom (as broadcast on al-Manar, the organization’s 

Beirut-based satellite television station): ‘‘In the past, when the Marines were in 

Beirut, we screamed, ‘Death to America!’ Today, when the region is being filled with 

hundreds of thousands of American soldiers, ‘Death to America!’ was, is, and will 

stay our slogan.’’

30

104Testimony of E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business 

Affairs, Department of State, to the Senate Banking Committee, September 25, 2003 105 Amos Harel, ‘‘ ‘The PA Steals from Me, Hams Takes Care of Me,’ ’’ Ha’aretz, June 27, 2002 106 Nidal al-Mughrabi, ‘‘Analysis: Hamas Plays Key Role in Palestinian Uprising,’’ Reuters, 

August 1, 2001 107 ‘‘Interpal, Part I,’’ Special Information Bulletin, Intelligence and Terrorism Information 

Center at the Center for Special Studies, Israel, December 2004, available online at http://

www.intelligence.org.il/eng/sib/12l04/interpal.htm 108Susan Weinstein et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al, United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 00–2601 (RCL), February 6, 2002 109Some of the most detailed information on Iranian activity in Iraq comes from Iranian dissident sources tied to the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), some of which I include below. While the 

MEK is itself a designated terrorist organization, its intelligence has proven accurate in the past 

(especially regarding Iran’s nuclear weapons program) and should therefore be reviewed and 

considered useful lead information. 110 Raymond Tanter ‘‘Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq’’ PolicyWatch #827 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 15, 2004. 111 Raymond Tanter ‘‘Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq’’ PolicyWatch #827 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 15, 2004. 112 ‘‘Hezbollah Threatens Aussies,’’ The Australian, October 26, 2004 113 ‘‘Lebanese Hezbollah members detained in Iraq: minister’’ Agence France Presse—English, 

February 9, 2005. 

Another vehicle Iran uses to radicalize society and breed future terrorists is the 

nefarious propaganda machine Hamas runs through its social-welfare institutions. 

According to the State Department, ‘‘Hamas has used its charities to strengthen its 

own standing among Palestinians at the expense of the Palestinian Authority.’’ 104

Indeed, a report submitted to then-PA Chairman Yasser Arafat in June 2000 described a meeting in Damascus at which Iranian officials and Hamas leaders agreed 

‘‘to use the dawa in the battle for public opinion.’’ 105 Palestinian analysts readily 

concur that Hamas has a ‘‘project to impose itself as an alternative to the Palestinian Authority although it kept that approach hidden and undeclared.’’ 106

Iranian funding of Hamas not only serves to radicalize Palestinian society, it also 

provides Hamas with a much needed logistical support structure. An Israeli analysis 

concluded that one of the ways Hamas dawa institutions serve as the group’s terrorist support apparatus is ‘‘by creating jobs and employment opportunities for them 

(and sometimes also for their family members) in many ‘charitable societies’ and 

other institutions which comprise its civilian infrastructure.’’ In so doing, the group 

provides the operatives an apparently ‘‘legal cover.’’ 107 In its ruling finding Iran responsible for a 1996 Hamas suicide bus bombing that killed American citizen Ira 

Weinstein, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia found that 

the money Iran gave Hamas ‘‘among other things, supported Hamas terrorist activities by, for example, bringing Hamas into contact with potential terrorist recruits 

and by providing legitimate front activities behind which Hamas could hide its terrorist activities.’’ 108

5. IRANIAN AND HEZBOLLAH ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ

Iran has been proactively involved in undermining U.S. and Coalition interests in 

Iraq for months. Iranian clerics, agents from the IRGC, and Hezbollah operatives 

have all been involved in undermining U.S. efforts in the region by radicalizing the 

population, gathering intelligence, and taking steps to garner support for their 

cause.109

Since May 2003, more than 2,000 Iranian-sponsored clerics have reportedly 

crossed the border from Iran into Iraq. These clerics bring with them incitement 

materials such as books, CDs and tapes to distribute to the Iraqi people in an effort 

to promote militant Islam. Furthermore, Iranian dissident sources maintain that 

the IRGC’s Qods Force established armed underground cells in southern Iraq, a 

Shi’i dominated area.110

However, Iranian clerics and the IRGC’s Qods Forces were not the only ones infiltrating Iraq. Iranian dissident sources maintain, and U.S. intelligence confirms, that 

Iran ordered Hezbollah to send agents and clerics across a major portion of southern 

Iraq. These Hezbollah operatives entered Iraq both from Syria and Iran. Originally, 

these operatives were thought to have numbered approximately 100.111 In October 

2003, Australian media reported that ‘‘Australian Security Intelligence Organization 

had received specific information of a threat from Hezbollah to attack Australian 

forces in Iraq.’’ 112 More recently, on February 9, 2005, the continuing threat posed 

by Hezbollah operatives in Iraq was confirmed with the announcement by Iraq’s Interior Minister Falah al-Naquib that eighteen members of Hezbollah were detained 

in Iraq on charges of terrorism.113

31

114 ‘‘Iraqi Defense and Interior Ministers Accuse Iran of Terrorism Against Iraq, Threaten Retaliation within Iran,’’ interview with Al-Sharq, 5 May 2004. Translated by MEMRI, 22 July 

2004. http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP75004; Struck, Doug, 

‘‘Official Warns of Iranian Infiltration; Iraqi Government Worries That Old Enemies Are Exploiting Open Borders,’’ Washington Post, 26 July 2004, A14. 115 ‘‘Official Warns of Iranian Infiltration; Iraqi Government Worries That Old Enemies Are 

Exploiting Open Borders,’’ 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Raymond Tanter ‘‘Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq’’ PolicyWatch #827 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 15, 2004. 119 Raymond Tanter ‘‘Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq’’ PolicyWatch #827 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 15, 2004. 120 Raymond Tanter ‘‘Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq’’ PolicyWatch #827 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 15, 2004. 121 ‘‘Iran Hard-Liners Mark 1983 Attack on U.S. Marines,’’ Reuters, 2 December 2004. 122Samii, Bill, ‘‘Iran Splits Hairs on Suicide Bombings,’’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Iran 

Report vol. 7, no. 43, 7 December 2004. 123Wright, Robin and Perter Baker, ‘‘Iraq, Jordan See Threat To Election From Iran; Leaders 

Warn Against Forming Religious State,’’ Washington Post, 8 December 2004, A01. 124 Ibid. 

In a recent interview, Hazim Shalan, the Iraqi Defense Minister, declared ‘‘[t]he 

country that penetrates the borders the most and encroaches the most on Iraq is 

Iran,’’ and that Iran remains ‘‘the first enemy of Iraq.’’ 114 He charged in an interview that Iran has established military positions on the Iraqi-Iranian border, sent 

spies and saboteurs into the country, and even infiltrated the new government.115

For example, in April, a Sudanese man was caught trying to contaminate drinking 

water in Diwaniyah, 100 miles south of Baghdad. It was proven later that the man 

had Iranian intelligence contacts.116 Shalan went on to say, ‘‘They are coming from 

Iran, from Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. We don’t accuse the governments, but 

we think they are not doing enough at the borders to prevent infiltration,’’ adding 

he ‘‘wouldn’t be surprised if there is an intelligence component here. A lot of countries are sending spies.’’ 117

IRGC and Hezbollah agents have also been involved in intelligence-gathering efforts in Iraq. Iranian dissident sources contend that Hezbollah operatives have been 

involved in surveying coalition assembly centers and tracking the movement of coalition vehicles. Hezbollah agents are reported to have taken videotape of various locations throughout Iraq.118 Additionally, according to a September 2003 Washington 

Times report, Iran deployed IRGC agents to Najaf in order to gather intelligence 

on American forces.119

Hezbollah has established charitable organizations in Iraq to aid its recruitment 

efforts, a tactic that the organization used before in southern Lebanon. Iranian dissident sources also contend that the IRGC’s Qods Force has established medical centers and local charities in cities as widespread as Najaf, Baghdad, Hillah, Basra, 

and al-Amarah in order to gain support from the local population.120

A disconnect exists between Iranian statements and actions concerning attacks on 

Americans. While Iranian ministers have asserted that Tehran has not encouraged 

the Iraqi insurgency nor permitted suicide bombers to cross the border from Iran 

to Iraq, certain actions indicate otherwise. As recently as December 2004, a group 

calling themselves ‘‘The Committee of the Commemoration of Martyrs of the Global 

Islamic Campaign,’’ which is affiliated with the IRGC, has registered more than 

25,000 ‘‘martyrdom seeking’’ volunteers to partake in the insurgency facing U.S.-led 

forces in Iraq.121 The head of public relations for the group, Mohammad Ali Samadi, 

stated that their actions were in accordance with a message from Supreme Leader 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Furthermore, on December 2, 2004, the group used the 

commemoration of a monument to the 1983 Hezbollah attack that killed 241 U.S. 

servicemen as a recruiting drive for suicide bombers.122

Even King Abdullah II of Jordan has accused Iran of meddling in Iraqi affairs. 

According to the King, more than 1 million Iranians crossed the Iraq-Iran border 

to vote in the recent Iraqi election. He added, some of these people were trained 

by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and are members of militias that could conduct 

post-election attacks.123 The expressed concern that an Iraqi Islamic republic could 

further destabilize the Gulf region saying, ‘‘If pro-Iran parties or politicians dominate the new Iraqi government a new ‘‘crescent’’ of dominant Shiite movements or 

governments stretching from Iran into Iraq, Syria and Lebanon could emerge, alter 

the traditional balance of power between the two main Islamic sects and pose new 

challenges to U.S. interests and allies.’’ 124 This would functionally ‘‘propel the possiVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
32

125 Ibid. 

bility of a Shiite-Sunni conflict even more, as you’re taking it out of the borders of 

Iraq,’’ he said.125

CONCLUSION

Iran is indeed the world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism. The sheer scope of 

Iranian terrorist activity is remarkable, including both the terrorism carried out by 

Iranian-supported terrorist groups and by Iranian agents themselves. But the Iranian terrorist threat is especially dangerous since it threatens key United States security interests and American citizens alike. 

First, Iran and its proxies present a direct threat to the United States both at 

home and abroad, including U.S. and coalition forces overseas. Consider the Iranian 

security personnel caught surveilling targets in New York. Second, Iran, along with 

its primary proxy, Hezbollah, is the single most dangerous threat to the prospects 

of securing Arab-Israeli peace. Consider Palestinian fears that Iran and Hezbollah 

are actively trying to torpedo the nascent ceasefire and possibly assassinate Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas. Third, Iran is fully engaged in undermining coalition efforts in Iraq. Note the infiltration of Iranian agents and the recent announcement that eighteen Hezbollah members have been arrested there. 

It is critical that the international effort to rein in Iran’s nuclear weapons program include an equally concerted effort to forestall its state sponsorship of terrorism. Failure to do so guarantees Iran and its proxies will continue to undermine 

Israeli-Arab peace negotiations, conduct surveillance of U.S., Israeli and other targets for possible terrorist attack, and destabilize Iraq.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Levitt. 

Dr. Daugherty? 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. DAUGHERTY, PH.D., ASSOCIATE 

PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, ARMSTRONG ATLANTIC 

STATE UNIVERSITY, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, FORMER IRANIAN HOSTAGE 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. I would like to thank you for this opportunity 

to provide the Congress with some observations about United 

States policy toward the Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Iran, with respect to that Government’s conduct and sponsorship of 

international terrorism, and to share with you some reminders of 

that time 25 years ago when 52 Americans, indeed, the entire 

United States, was held hostage by that regime. I have submitted 

a full written statement to the Committee, and I would ask that 

it be admitted into the official record,——

Mr. TANCREDO. Without objection. 

Mr. DAUGHERTY [continuing]. And with your leave, I will just 

read a brief summary of that. 

The capture of the United States Embassy in 1979 was, and 

must be considered, the first act of state-sponsored terrorism 

against the United States in modern times, but it was not the last. 

Certainly, there is no question but that Iran, since that time, has 

used its own intelligence and security agencies to conduct acts of 

terrorism while also providing essential training and resources to 

terrorist groups, enabling them to attack United States citizens 

and interests. 

The undeniable truth is that the United States Government has 

utterly failed to hold Iran accountable in any sustained and effective manner for its direct role in the cumulative deaths of over 275 

American citizens and the wounding of well over 600 more. Moreover, the United States Government has failed to undertake any 

action with the force or impact sufficient to deter the Iranian GovVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
33

ernment from conducting terrorism against our interests. The absence of any credible response has served only to encourage the 

continuation of Iranian-sponsored terrorism; nor have those of us 

who are victims of Iranian terrorism received any justice from 

those acts. 

On the 4th of November 1979, Iranian militants attacked the 

United States Embassy in Tehran, capturing 66 American citizens, 

all but 3 of whom were diplomats accredited to and accepted by the 

Iranian Government. The Government of Iran subsequently assumed control of the American hostages and provided all of the assistance and support necessary, including the use of prisons and 

other governmental facilities and resources. 

Fifty-two of the captured Americans, including myself, were held 

for nearly 15 months, denied our freedom by a deliberate policy decision on the part of the Government of Iran. We were subjected 

to psychological and physical abuses, mock executions, and threats 

of trials as war criminals, treatment that has been thoroughly documented elsewhere. I personally endured 425 days of solitary confinement, as well as a series of hostile interrogations, some sessions lasting over 12 hours. When I was released, I weighed 132 

pounds, so I had lost almost 50 pounds in captivity. 

Our families suffered greatly as well, never knowing the conditions of our captivity, nor having any assurances that their loved 

ones would be released. Because the Iranian Government held me 

completely incommunicado, my family went for over a year without 

knowing whether I was dead or alive. The stress took a terrible toll 

on my mother’s health, from which she has never completely recovered. 

Upon our return to the United States, President Reagan informed the world that future acts of terrorism against American 

citizens would be met with, and I quote, ‘‘swift and effective retribution.’’ This threat was tested in April 1993 when Hezbollah 

sent a truck bomb into the American Embassy in Beirut. Seventeen 

Americans were killed, along with 46 others. The United States 

Government knew which terrorist group did it. They knew where 

their headquarters and training facilities were located. Despite 

hard intelligence of the Iranian Government connection, our Government took absolutely no action in response to the destruction of 

our Embassy in Beirut. 

As detailed in the opening statements by Madam Chair, Iran and 

Hezbollah continued to conduct acts of terrorism against American 

interests in Beirut. During all of those acts, the American Government took absolutely no action at all. It thus became clear by 1984, 

with the destruction of our second Embassy in Beirut following the 

destruction of the Marine barracks, to Iran and Hezbollah that 

they could act without fear of any consequences from the U.S. Government. 

There then began a succession of American citizens taken hostage by Hezbollah, including my good friend and colleague, Bill 

Buckley, who was the CIA Station Chief. Bill Buckley was tortured 

and suffered a terrible death. 

The response to these kidnappings by the Reagan Administration 

was such that it resulted in the Iran-Contra scandal, which did not, 

it may fairly be said, enhance the credibility of any American deVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
34

terrence in the eyes of the Iranians or their surrogates in 

Hezbollah. Yet from 1979 until today, our Government has never 

made Iran pay in any substantial manner for these acts. In response to the capture of the Embassy in Tehran, unilateral sanctions were imposed, but these have done absolutely nothing to 

deter Iranian terrorism and very little to punish the regime for any 

acts of terrorism it has conducted. 

From 1979 until September 11, 2001, the United States Government policy was to look at acts of terrorism only as a law enforcement issue, and while it is true that a very small number of terrorists from Iranian-sponsored groups have been arrested and brought 

to trial, the overall effect of our policy was that Iran, as a government, and the great majority of the perpetrators of the actual terrorist acts have escaped any punishment. Convinced that it need 

have no fear of retribution or penalty, terrorism has been, and remains, a central component in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. 

Despite Iranian responsibility for these American deaths and 

Iran’s continued hostility, there are elements in the Department of 

State who have strongly resisted any attempts whatsoever to hold 

Iran accountable for their actions. In this, they see any positive act 

or statement on the part of any Iranian official, no matter how 

minor, as a clear sign that the Iranian Government wishes better 

relations. 

While there are sound reasons why a friendly and productive relationship with Iran is desirable, the reality is that the radical fundamentalists who have firm control over the key institutions of 

government—the foreign, defense, and interior ministries, the Revolutionary Guards, and the intelligence and security services—have 

always been, and remain, adamantly opposed to the resumption of 

any relationship with the United States Government. Yet apparently this has not been understood by those who, for some indecipherable reason, somehow cannot bear the thought of not having 

a relationship with Iran. The facts simply remain that you cannot 

force another state to be friends with you if that other state does 

not wish to. 

The Congress today has an opportunity to influence, through legislation, a policy that will, at long last and way overdue, back up 

United States rhetoric with concrete action. Iran is still the leading 

sponsor of terrorism, and Hezbollah and Hamas still pose a threat 

to United States lives and interests. Without question, Hezbollah 

cells outside the Middle East pose a potential danger to American 

citizens and other interests should the regime choose to so direct 

them. American deaths at the hands of Iranians or its surrogates 

have gone unpunished, despite tough language by every Presidential Administration, from Jimmy Carter to the present. Likewise, Americans held hostage, either by the regime itself or by its 

surrogates in Hezbollah, have received no justice. 

The United States economic sanctions were, for all practical purposes, eviscerated by permitting foreign-based subsidiaries of major 

corporations to have a business-as-usual status with Iran, for clearly the Iranians well knew that they were dealing with American 

corporations. I note that within the last several weeks, a number 

of companies have altered their course and have announced their 

35

intention to withdraw from Iran. The United States has an opportunity to, likewise, alter its course with regard to Iran and with regard to justice and compensation for United States victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism. 

It is time for the U.S. Government to implement a strong and 

firm policy that matches its rhetoric so that the Iranian regime 

fully comprehends that any future acts of terrorism against United 

States citizens and interests will, in fact, be met with the ‘‘swift 

and effective retribution’’ promised by President Reagan. It is time 

for Iran to be called to account not by pronouncements merely deploring Iranian terrorism but by clear, sustained, and overwhelming action for its past as well as any future violations of 

international law. And it is time for American victims of Iranian 

terrorism, like those of us who were held hostage by the Iranian 

Government, to receive the justice that is, quite literally, two decades delayed. The Congress can see that this happens, and I ask 

you today to take the steps necessary to do so. Thank you very 

much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Daugherty follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. DAUGHERTY, PH.D., ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF

GOVERNMENT, ARMSTRONG ATLANTIC STATE UNIVERSITY, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, FORMER IRANIAN HOSTAGE

Thank you for this opportunity to provide the Congress with some observations 

about United States policy towards the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 

with respect to that government’s conduct and sponsorship of international terrorism, and to share with you some reminders of that time 25 years ago when 52 

Americans, indeed the entire United States, was held hostage by that regime. 

The capture of the United States embassy in 1979 and subsequent imprisonment 

of American diplomats was directly contrary to the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations, of which Iran was a signatory. This was and must be 

considered to be the first act of state sponsored terrorism against the United States 

in modern times. But it was not the last. Since 1983 the Department of State has 

annually labeled Iran as the world’s most significant perpetrator of terrorism. There 

is no question but that Iran has used its own intelligence and security agencies to 

conduct acts of terrorism (including political assassinations) while also providing essential training and resources to terrorist groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestine Islamic Jihad, Saudi Hezbollah, and Hamas, enabling them to attack United 

States citizens and interests. 

The undeniable truth is that the United States Government has utterly failed to 

hold Iran accountable in any sustained and effective manner for its direct role in 

the deaths of over 275 American citizens and the wounding of over 600 more. Moreover, the United States Government has failed to undertake any action with the 

force or impact sufficient to deter that the Iranian Government from conducting terrorism against our interests. The absence of any credible response has served only 

to encourage the continuation of Iranian sponsored terrorism. Nor have those of us 

who are victims of Iranian terrorism received any justice from those acts. 

On the 4th of November, 1979 Iranian militants attacked the United States Embassy in Tehran capturing 66 American citizens, all but three of whom were diplomats accredited to and accepted by the Iranian Government. Ignoring international law, the Iranian regime in the person of the Ayatollah Khomeini, quickly 

gave official sanction to the actions of the militants. The Government of Iran subsequently assumed control of the American hostages and provided all assistance necessary to sustain our captivity, including the use of prisons and other Governmental 

facilities and resources. 

Fifty-two of the captured Americans, including myself, were held for nearly 15 

months, denied our freedom by a deliberate policy decision on the part of the Government of Iran. We were subjected to psychological and physical abuses, mock executions, and threats of trials as ‘‘war criminals,’’ treatment that has been thoroughly 

documented elsewhere. I personally endured 425 days of solitary confinement, as 

well as a series of hostile interrogations with some sessions lasting well over 12 

hours. Our families suffered greatly as well, never knowing the conditions of our 

36

captivity nor having any assurances that their loved one would be released. Because 

the Iranian Government held me completely incommunicado, my family went over 

a year without knowing whether I was dead or alive. The stress took a terrible toll 

on my mother’s health, from which she has never completely recovered. 

Upon our return to the United States, we were hosted at the White House by 

President Reagan on January 27th, 1981. At that time, the President informed the 

world that future acts of terrorism against American citizens would be met with 

‘‘swift and effective retribution.’’ This threat was tested in April of 1983 when 

Hezbollah sent a truck bomb into the American embassy in Beirut, killing 17 Americans and 46 others. The United States Government knew which terrorist group did 

it and where their headquarters and training facilities were located. Despite hard 

intelligence of the Iranian Government connection, absolutely no action was taken. 

On October 23rd, 1983, the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut was truck bombed 

by Hezbollah with 241 Marines killed and scores wounded. Secretary of State 

George Schultz argued for that ‘‘swift and effective retribution,’’ while Secretary of 

Defense Casper Weinberger argued against it. The President in fact ordered an air 

strike but—amazingly—at the last minute the Secretary of Defense cancelled it 

without notification to the President. In 1984 the newly built US embassy in East 

Beirut was car bombed by Hezbollah, again without any meaningful US Government response. Thus, it became clear to Hezbollah that they could act without fear 

of consequences. 

There then began a succession of American citizens taken hostage by Hezbollah 

in Beirut, including my friend and colleague, CIA station chief Bill Buckley, who 

was tortured and ultimately suffered a terrible death. The response to these 

kidnappings by the Reagan administration resulted in the Iran-Contra scandal, 

which did not, it may fairly be said, enhance the credibility of an American deterrence in the eyes of the Iranians or their surrogates in Hezbollah. And in 1996 an 

Iranian-supported group bombed the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 and 

wounding over 350. 

Yet from 1979 until today, our Government has never made Iran pay in any substantial manner for these acts. In response to the capture of the embassy in Tehran, 

unilateral economic sanctions were imposed, but these did nothing to deter Iranian 

terrorism and little to punish the regime for past acts. Meanwhile, European allies 

have traded aggressively with Iran. From 1979 until September 11th, 2001, the 

United States looked at acts of terrorism only as a law enforcement issue. And while 

a very small handful of terrorists from Iranian Government sponsored groups have 

been arrested and brought to trial, the overall effect of this policy was that Iran 

as a government and the great majority of the perpetrators of the actual terrorist 

acts have escaped any punishment. Convinced that it need have no fear of retribution or penalty, terrorism has been and remains a central component in the foreign 

policy of the Islamic Republic. 

Among the common threads running through these acts is the Iranian embassy 

in Damascus, Syria, where Iran’s ambassador serves as the conduit for Iranian support to Hezbollah and Hamas. His role is no secret to the Syrian Government, by 

whose grace this support is enabled. Hezbollah has, as discussed, deliberately and 

successfully, targeted American citizens, while Hamas, by dint of their suicide 

bombers, has victimized Americans traveling in Israel. Iranian Government support 

to these groups includes the provision of funds, training, arms, and explosives. The 

truck bombs used in Beirut came via Damascus. (Thus, the Syrians have a secondary responsibility for the American deaths, but they have not been held to account, either.) In the 1990s, the Iranian ambassador to Damascus was one of the 

leaders in the capture of our embassy in Tehran in 1979. I know him well, for he 

was my principle interrogator. After the takeover of the embassy, he went on to 

serve as a deputy foreign minister, a position in which he also played a significant 

role in the bombings of our embassy and our Marines in Beirut. He continues to 

serve in the Iranian Government today, without any penalty or cost from the United 

States. 

Despite these American deaths and Iran’s continued hostility, there are elements 

in the Department of State who have strongly resisted attempts to hold Iran accountable for their actions. In this, they see any positive act or statement on the 

part of any Iranian official, no matter how minor, as a sign that the Iranian Government wishes better relations. While there are sound reasons why a friendly and productive relationship with Iran is desirable, the reality is that the radical fundamentalists who have firm control over the key institutions of Government—the foreign, 

defense, and interior ministries, the Revolutionary Guards, and the intelligence and 

security services—have always been and remain adamantly opposed to the resumption of any relations with the United States Government. Yet apparently this has 

37

not been understood by those who, for some indecipherable reason, somehow can’t 

seem to bear the thought of not having a relationship with Iran. 

For example, in the summer of 1980, after we had been held hostage for nearly 

ten months with the attendant humiliation to the United States, a senior State officer advocated telling the Iranian Government that if they would let us go, the US 

would be willing to have a relationship on any grounds the regime wanted. Leaving 

aside the groveling tone of the suggestion, it showed a complete lack of understanding that the militants captured the embassy precisely because they wanted no 

relationship with the United States, a position that was fully endorsed by the Government of Iran. 

In late 1999, in an effort to seek a rapprochement with the Iranian regime, the 

Clinton administration made multiple concessions to Iran, including a partial lifting 

of sanctions, an apology for past American actions against Iran(!), an agreement for 

cultural exchanges, the removal of Iran from a list of countries trafficking in narcotics, and permitting the delivery of spare parts for the Iranian fleet of Boeing aircraft (which have a military capability). The Iranian response was that the United 

States had not done enough. The lesson that has yet to be learned in some circles 

in Washington is that you cannot be friends with a government that has absolutely 

no wish to be friends with you. And nothing within the ruling circles of Iran has 

changed since. It is still ‘‘death to America’’ for the radicals. 

The Congress today has the opportunity to influence, through legislation, a policy 

that will—at long last and way overdue—back up United States rhetoric with concrete action. Iran is still the leading sponsor of terrorism, and Hezbollah and Hamas 

still pose a threat to US lives and interests. Without question, Hezbollah cells outside of the Middle East pose a potential danger to American citizens and interests, 

should the regime choose to so direct them. American deaths at the hands of the 

Iranians or its surrogates have gone unpunished, despite tough language by every 

presidential administration from Jimmy Carter to the present . Likewise, Americans 

held hostage either by the regime itself or by its surrogates in Hezbollah have received no justice. United States economic sanctions were for all practical purposes 

eviscerated by permitting foreign-based subsidiaries of major corporations to have 

a ‘‘business as usual’’ status with Iran, for clearly the Iranians well knew they were 

dealing with American corporations. I note that within the last several weeks that 

a number of companies have altered their course and have announced their intention to withdraw from Iran. The US has an opportunity to, likewise, alter its course 

with regard to Iran and with regard to justice and compensation for US citizens victimized by Iranian Government sponsored terrorism. 

It is time for the United States Government to implement a firm and strong policy 

that matches its rhetoric, so that the Iranian regime fully comprehends that any 

future acts of terrorism against United States citizens and interests will in fact be 

met with the ‘‘swift and effective retribution’’ promised by President Reagan. It is 

time for Iran to be called to account—not by pronouncements merely deploring Iranian terrorism but by clear, sustained, and overwhelming action—for its past as 

well as any future violations of international law. And it is time for American victims of Iranian terrorism, like those of us who were held hostage by the Iranian 

Government, to receive the justice that is quite literally two decades delayed. The 

Congress can see that this happens and I ask you today to take the steps necessary 

to do so. 

Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN [presiding]. Thank you. Amen. 

And now we would like to hear from Major Steven Kirtley, 

United States Marine Corps, retired, former Iranian hostage as 

well. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR STEVEN KIRTLEY (USMC, RET.), 

FORMER IRANIAN HOSTAGE 

Mr. KIRTLEY. Thank you, ma’am. Madam Chair, Members of the 

Committee, it certainly is my honor to be able to speak to you 

about my imprisonment at the hands of the Government of Iran 25 

years ago and my continued personal battle against terrorism. 

For most of America, the war on terror is recognized as starting 

on September 11, 2001, but, for me, it really started on November 

4, 1979, when myself and 65 other Americans were taken and held 

hostage by the Government of Iran for a period of 444 days. During 

38

this 444-day period, I consider myself to be one of the really lucky 

ones. 

I was a single, 21-year-old Marine Corporal who volunteered to 

go to the American Embassy in Tehran out of a sense of excitement 

and duty. I had been at the Embassy for almost 3 months before 

the takeover, so I had some understanding of the level of hostility 

felt toward Americans in Iran. I say I was lucky because I did not 

endure the interrogations that lasted days and weeks, like my good 

friend, Charles Scott, and others. I say I am lucky because I did 

not have to endure the repeated beatings and physical torture, like 

my good friend, Mike Metrinko, and others. I did not have to endure weeks and months and, in some cases, over a year of solitary 

confinement, like my good friend, Bill Daugherty, here, and others. 

I did not have a wife and the three great sons that I have now, 

so I did not have to endure the daily threats against my family and 

the daily threats that I would never be able to see them again, like 

my good friend, Phil Ward, and others. 

I was lucky in that I only had to endure the terror of mock firing 

squads. One of these occurred on the day I was taken. I was in uniform, and after a short period of being held in a small building, a 

group of three Iranians came in, lifted me to my feet, and untied 

my feet and removed the rope from around my body and upper 

shoulders and arms, leaving my hands tied behind my back. They 

blindfolded me and led me down a sidewalk where they stopped me 

in front of what I knew was a blank brick wall. They turned me 

so my back was to the wall, pushed me back a couple of steps until 

I could just feel the wall with my hands, and then let go of me. 

It is hard to convey the terror I felt at that time. Needless to say, 

it was a new feeling. I remember the deafening noise of the crowd 

running around the Embassy compound and the anarchy. I remember standing there asking myself how much this was going to hurt 

and trying to steady my legs so I would not bring discredit upon 

my Marine Corps uniform. I also remember the relief at being led 

back to the same small building and tied up again. This was just 

the first of a number of these mock executions endured by all of 

us, including my good friends, Rocky Sickmann and Dick Morefield, 

sitting behind me. 

I remember my fight with food poisoning and the hopelessness 

and anger of not being allowed to go to the toilet in the middle of 

the night, banging and banging, to try and get someone to come 

and unlock the door and let me crawl up the stairs to relieve myself and not being able to wait any longer. Once the guards did 

come, I had the added task of cleaning myself, washing my clothes 

and putting them back on wet before the long trip back down the 

14 stairs to my cell, and there are others who can tell you the same 

type of story. 

I was shocked to watch one of my fellow hostages try to kill himself in front of me and one of our captors because the interrogations, threats, and psychological strain was too much. I remember 

what he said before he ran full speed and dove head first into a 

protruding concrete corner trying to end his life. I remember holding his head in my arms and checking to make sure there was no 

dirt on his skull as I folded his torn scalp back over his exposed 

skull. I remember my relief as he opened his eyes and sitting there 

39

with him in my arms thinking how lucky I was not to be suffering 

the same as he was. 

I remember a trip from Esfahan to Tehran when one of our captors fell asleep at the wheel, ran off the road in the middle of the 

desert, and rolled the van he was driving and I was riding in twice. 

I remember thinking I was about to die while I was handcuffed to 

a fellow hostage and tumbling around in the van like a bingo chip. 

As I stumbled out, and the rest of us stumbled out, of what was 

left of the van, I was amazed that I was alive and only my leg and 

shoulder hurt. My buddy was not so fortunate and went the next 

6 months with a broken shoulder blade. And we considered ourselves to be lucky to be alive. 

I only had to endure the day-to-day threats that we would all be 

tried and summarily executed. I did not consider these to be idle 

threats, as there was a constant schedule of demonstrations outside 

of the Embassy compound when we were held there. The guards 

made a point of telling us how we were being protected from the 

mob of over 500,000 waiting to tear us all apart. 

I remember being put in one of the most notorious prisons in 

Iran and listening to the screams from the torture of men, women, 

and even children and wondering if and when it would be my turn. 

Mostly, as a youngster, I remembered the despair I had at not 

knowing what was ever going to happen to us. 

I am here today because America paid the Iranian Government 

their ransom, and they let us go. 

Over the past 25 years, for obvious reasons, I have read about 

Iran and follow Iranian politics with some interest. Our release in 

1981 was brought about by the overt rewards to the Iranian Government. The ransom paid for our release does not take into account the immense increase in stature the Iranian Government experienced, and continues to experience, as a result of their successful belittlement of the United States Government. 

Although I know it by heart, I will not go over the history of 

Iran’s continued involvement in terrorism over the past 25 years. 

It has been explained here. 

The current ‘‘Islamic fundamentalist’’ leadership appears to be at 

least as tyrannical as the former Shah, if not more, and the Iranian 

people are beginning to tire of it and rise up to pursue their own 

freedom. I follow the current Iranian situation as related to the nuclear program with some interest and would conjecture that maybe 

the mullahs are inviting a United States attack because they know 

it is the only thing that can bring their country together under 

their oppressive rule. Regardless, the past political policies of the 

United States Government in responding to Iranian involvement in 

acts of terrorism would appear to only embolden them to further 

their efforts and actions. 

I, and we, appreciate the opportunity we have had to share with 

you our experiences during those 444 days and how it has affected 

our lives and continues to affect the lives of Americans today. Dr. 

Daugherty, Rocky, and Dick, and I sit before you today on behalf 

of the remaining survivors and their families to shed light on our 

struggle and to ask you for justice. We are well aware of what has 

been done over the past 25 years as it relates to Iran, and we are 

40

very interested to see what is going to happen next. Thank you 

very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kirtley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MAJOR STEVEN KIRTLEY (USMC, RET.), FORMER IRANIAN

HOSTAGE

Ms. Chairwoman and Members of the Committee: 

It is my honor to be able to speak to you about my imprisonment at the hands 

of the Government of Iran 25 years ago and my continued personal battle against 

terrorism. 

The war on terror is now inextricably linked to the events of September 11th. A 

day that is seared into America’s and the world’s memory. It was a day that terrorism touched Americans at home and haunts us still. 

But the war on terror did not start when Al Quaeda executed its attack on the 

U.S. on September 11, 2001. It began on November 4, 1979 when the Iranian government held me and 65 other American citizens hostage. 

On that day, we became the first victims of terrorism. We were taken captive by 

an entire government and literally lived in fear for our lives for 444 days. 

I was one of the lucky ones. I was a 21-year-old Marine corporal who volunteered 

to go to the American Embassy in Tehran out of a sense of excitement and duty. 

I had been at the Embassy for almost three months before the takeover, so I had 

some understanding of the level of hostility felt toward Americans. I say I was lucky 

because I did not endure interrogations that lasted days and weeks like my good 

friend Charles Scott and others. I did not have to endure repeated beatings like my 

good friend Mike Metrinko and others. I did not have to endure weeks and months, 

and in some cases over a year, of solitary confinement like my good friend Bill 

Daugherty and others. I did not have a wife and three great sons as I do now, so 

I did not have to endure the daily threats against my family and the threats that 

I would never see them again like my good friend Phil Ward and others. 

I was lucky in that I only had to endure the terror of mock firing squads. One 

of these occurred on the day I was taken. I was in uniform and after a short period 

of being held in a small building, a group of three Iranians came in and untied my 

feet and removed the rope from around my upper arms and chest, leaving my hands 

tied behind my back. They stood me up, blindfolded me and led me down a sidewalk 

where they stopped me in front of what I know was a brick wall. They turned me 

so my back was to the wall and pushed me back a couple of steps until I could just 

feel the wall and they let go of me. It is hard to convey the terror I felt. Needless 

to say, it was a new feeling. I remember the noise of the crowd and the anarchy. 

I remember asking myself how much this would hurt and trying to steady my legs 

so as not to bring discredit to my uniform. I also remember the relief at being lead 

back to the same small building and tied up again. This was just the first of a number of these Mock executions we all endured. 

I remember my fight with food poisoning and the hopelessness and anger of not 

being allowed to go to the toilet in the middle of the night. Banging and banging 

to try and get someone to unlock the door and let me crawl up the stairs to relieve 

myself and not being able to wait any longer. Once the guard came I had the added 

task of cleaning myself, washing my clothes and putting them back on wet before 

the long trip back down the 14 stairs to my cell. Others can tell you the same story. 

I was shocked to watch one of my fellow hostages try to kill himself in front of 

me and one of our captors because the interrogations, threats, and psychological 

strain was too much. I remember what he said before he ran full speed and dove 

head first into a protruding concrete corner trying to end his life. I remember holding his head in my arms and checking to make sure there was no dirt ‘‘in there’’ 

as I folded his torn scalp back over his exposed skull. I remember my relief as he 

opened his eyes and thinking how lucky I was not to be suffering as he was. 

I remember a trip from Esfahan to Tehran when our one of our captors fell asleep 

at the wheel, ran off the road in the middle of the desert and rolled the van twice. 

I remember thinking I was about to die while being handcuffed to a fellow hostage 

and rolling around in a van like a bingo chip. As I stumbled out of what was left 

of the van, I was amazed that I was alive and only my leg and shoulder hurt. My 

buddy went the next six months with a broken shoulder blade. We considered ourselves lucky to be alive. 

I only had to endure the day-to-day threats that we could all be tried and summarily executed. I did not consider these to be idle threats as there was a constant 

schedule of demonstrations outside of the embassy compound when we were held 

41

there. The guards made a point of telling us how we were being protected from the 

mob of over 500,000 waiting to tear us all apart. 

I remember being put in one of the most notorious prisons in Iran and listening 

to the screams from the torture of men, women, and even children, wondering if and 

when it would be my turn. 

Mostly I remember the despair I had at not knowing what was ever going to happen to us. 

I am here today because America paid the Iranian Government their ransom and 

they let us go free. 

Over the past 25 years, for obvious reasons, I have read about Iran and follow 

Iranian politics with some interest. Our release in 1981 was brought about by overt 

rewards to the Iranian Government. The ransom paid for our release does not take 

into account the immense increase in stature the Iranian Government experienced 

as a result of their successful belittlement of the United States Government. Although I know it by heart, I will not go over the history of Iran’s continued involvement in terrorism over the past 25 years. The current ‘‘Islamic Fundamentalist’’ 

leadership appears to be at least as tyrannical as the former Shah, if not more, and 

the Iranian people are beginning to tire of it and rise up to pursue their own freedom. I follow the current Iranian situation as related to their nuclear program with 

some interest. Maybe the mullahs are inviting a U.S. attack because they know it 

is the only thing that can bring their country together under their oppressive rule. 

Regardless, the past political policies of the United States Government in responding to Iranian involvement in acts of terrorism would appear to only embolden them 

to further their efforts and actions. 

We appreciate the opportunity to share with you our experiences during those 444 

days, how it has affected our lives and continues to affect the lives of Americans 

today. Dr. Daugherty and I sit here before you today on behalf of the remaining survivors and their families to shed light on our struggle and to ask you for justice. 

We know what’s been done over the past 25 years . . . we’ll watch with interest 

to see what happens next. 

Thank You

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We thank you for your service 

and the sacrifices that you and your family have made. 

We are very pleased to recognize Congressman Jim McCreary of 

Louisiana, who is listening in. Thank you, Jim, for coming. 

And now I would like to recognize Ms. Lynn Smith Derbyshire, 

the family member of Captain Vince Smith, killed in the bombing 

of the Marine barracks in Beirut, 1983. Thank you, Ms. 

Derbyshire. 

STATEMENT OF MS. LYNN SMITH DERBYSHIRE, FAMILY MEMBER OF CAPTAIN VINCE SMITH, KILLED IN BOMBING OF MARINE BARRACKS IN BEIRUT, 1983

Ms. DERBYSHIRE. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have prepared a 

written statement which I have submitted, but with your permission, I would like to set that aside and just speak to you from my 

heart. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, and all of your statements will 

be made a part of the record without objection. Thank you. 

Ms. DERBYSHIRE. The issue of terrorism is important to America 

simply because we are American and we value our freedom. And 

I know the issue is important to you, as Congressmen and Congresswomen. You have said so eloquently already. It is important 

because it is your job, but the issue is important to me for a different reason. 

On October 23, 1983, the Beirut barracks in Lebanon was 

bombed by Hezbollah, and 241 United States servicemen were 

killed that day, and many others were wounded. Among them was 

a blond, blue-eyed, bow-legged, helicopter pilot. His name was Captain Vince Smith. His buddies called him ‘‘Vinny,’’ and they knew 

42

him for his practical jokes and his penchant for playing football on 

fall afternoons. His family called him ‘‘Vince.’’

Vince was my oldest brother. I was in church on Sunday morning, and when I came home from church, my neighbor said to me, 

‘‘You need to come in the house and watch television.’’ Well, obviously, that was bizarre. Nobody watched television on Sunday back 

then. I went into her house, and the television coverage of the 

bombing was there, and I saw among the rubble as they were pulling out the bodies that it looked to me as if the building had been 

destroyed the way a child would destroy his Play-Doh or his Tinker 

Toys. 

You will see on the screen a picture of my brother. He is the one 

on the far right. He is shaking the hand of Admiral McCain. Vince 

was about to go off to the Naval Academy. My father was receiving 

an award that day, and we had all been there for the ceremony, 

and the little girl in the middle is me. 

Vince was my protector. He was the calm, unifying force in a 

family that needed unity. Vince was an American, and he was a 

Marine, and Vince was a man of justice. I do not know who said 

that time heals wounds, but that person was an idiot. Time does 

not heal wounds; only hope can do that. 

The Government of Iran has been perpetrating acts of terrorism 

and supporting terrorist organizations long enough. We need to 

stop them. We need to do everything in our power to deter future 

acts of terrorism so that other little girls will not have to watch 

their brothers die. 

The bill before you today will impose greater sanctions on Iran, 

which have already been described. We need to do this. This is one 

tool in the box that we need to use against Iran. We need to use 

every tool in the box. You cannot build a house with just a hammer; you need a saw as well. 

There is also another piece of legislation being introduced called 

the Justice for Marine Corps Families-Victims of Terrorists Act, 

which will be referred to the Judiciary Committee, and this is another tool that we can use to impose accountability on this rogue 

nation. Together, the two pieces of legislation will make it harder 

for terrorists to raise and distribute funds to perpetrate further 

acts of terror. 

Terrorists get away with murder because we let them. They keep 

doing it because it gives them power. In order to deter more crimes 

of terrorism, the consequences must be serious, serious enough that 

they will decide that it is not worth it. We must make it cost them 

so much that they will stop. Every time there is another terrorist 

attack, my heart is sliced open again, and I have to grieve Vince 

all over again. They have been named already. 9/11 was not the beginning, and, unfortunately, it was not the end. There must be an 

end. 

Mya Angelou said that ‘‘history, despite its wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, but if faced with courage, it need not be lived 

again.’’

Ladies and gentlemen, we must face today with courage. The 

events of October 23, 1983, have been repeated far too many times 

already. Far too many people have died. Look at me closely. As you 

look at me, you are gazing into the face of the unrelenting grief of 

43

the American people who have lost someone they love at the hands 

of state-sponsors of terrorism, and when the time comes to cast 

your vote, I beg you to remember the pain you see in my face and 

know that it is also reflected in the faces of my mother and my father, who could not be here today, and all of the other family members of the men who died in Beirut. 

The prophet, Jeremiah, says that Rachel is weeping for her children. She refuses to be comforted for her children because her children are no more. And God says to her, ‘‘Restrain your voice from 

weeping because there is hope for the future.’’

I am before you today as a woman weeping for my brother, and 

I am begging you to give me a reason to hope for my future and 

the future of my young children. I have a son, and I have named 

him for my brother, and I do not want my son to grow up in an 

America where he has to be afraid. 

We are not free. We are in bondage to our fear. Look around at 

the security. You cannot get into our national treasures, our monuments, our Capitol. We are afraid, and we are afraid because it 

hurts so much. 

Ladies and gentlemen, pain left unhealed ferments into hatred, 

and we can ill afford to become a Nation of hatred because then 

we will be the terrorists. People who hate commit acts of terrorism. 

We must have healing, but in order to have healing, we must first 

have hope, and we will only have hope when there is justice, and 

in order to achieve justice, we must fight, and fighting takes courage. 

I beg you to be men and women of courage. And, President Bush, 

if you are listening, I beg you to be a man of courage. 

We must stop the spiraling vortex of injustice, and we must reverse its flow. Justice brings hope. Hope leads to healing, and only 

if there is healing will there be freedom. If Vince were here, he 

would be sitting here giving you testimony, along with Mr. Kirtley 

and Mr. Daugherty. But he cannot be here, and in his name and 

to honor his memory, I ask you to do everything that you can to 

bring justice. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Derbyshire follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. LYNN SMITH DERBYSHIRE, FAMILY MEMBER OF

CAPTAIN VINCE SMITH, KILLED IN BOMBING OF MARINE BARRACKS IN BEIRUT, 1983

Mr. Chairman: 

I would like to thank you, and the members of the two Subcommittees represented here for allowing me the opportunity to speak today regarding the ‘‘Iran 

Freedom Support Act’’. I deeply appreciate all that you do to govern our land, and 

I know that the work is both time-consuming and arduous. The issues before us are 

heavy, and we need to look at them. 

The issue of stopping state sponsored terrorism is important to many Americans, 

simply because they are Americans, and as such, they care. This issue is important 

to you, because you are Representatives of Congress. But for me, it’s different. A 

state sponsor of terrorism, specifically the government of Iran, has ripped a hole in 

my life that can never be repaired. 

My oldest brother, Capt. Vincent Smith, along with 240 other Marines and servicemen, was murdered by the terrorist group, Hezbollah, who were both financially 

and materially sponsored by the government of Iran. 

Vince was one of 241 United States Marines and service personnel killed when 

Hezbollah terrorists transformed an ordinary truck—one that looked exactly like the 

usual truck that carried water to the base—into a 12,000 pound bomb and detonated it in the barracks, demolishing the concrete and steel building as if it were 

made of play-doh and tinker toys. My family and I hovered by our television sets, 

44

weeping as we sat by the phone, waiting for news of the brother, father, son, and 

husband that we cherished. It took three weeks to search through the rubble and 

identify all the bodies. Twenty-one years later there is still a gaping hole in our 

lives and our hearts. Twenty-one years later there is still no justice. 

The government of Iran has been perpetrating acts of terrorism, and supporting 

terrorist organizations long enough. We need to stop them. We need to do everything and anything in our power to deter future acts of terrorism against Americans, and in our world. Passage of the Bill before you today, will impose greater 

sanctions on the government of Iran, which is one tool America can use to deter 

them from their heinous crimes. 

A companion Bill is being introduced in Congress today, called the ‘‘Justice for 

Marine Corps Families-Victims of Terrorism Act’’. This Bill, which will be referred 

to the Judiciary Committee, will allow the families and the victims of the Beirut 

Bombing to perfect and enforce pending claims against the government of Iran. Together, the two pieces of legislation will make it harder for terrorist states to raise 

and distribute funds to perpetrate further acts of terrorism. We need to come at 

them from both angles—making it harder for them to perpetrate crimes, while holding them responsible for the crimes they have already committed. I would urge the 

members of these two subcommittees to join with members of the Judiciary committee in support of this legislation. Likewise, I will be urging members of the Judiciary committee to support the ‘‘Iran Freedom Support Act’’. 

In order to deter more crimes of terrorism, there must be serious consequences. 

Terrorists continue to terrorize because they can. We have not held them accountable for their crimes, so they continue to build bombs, and they continue to murder 

and maim our loved ones. 

George Santayana said, ‘‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to 

repeat it.’’ As family members of the courageous men killed in Beirut, we have 

adopted the motto, ‘‘Our first duty is to remember,’’ because we know this truth, 

and we are determined not to let history be repeated in this case. We must do everything in our power to prevent the terrorists from continuing their evil acts of terrorism. We must stop them before they murder someone you love. 

My brother Vince was dear to me. His murder was an incalculable, immeasurable 

loss, which affects me every single day. I ask you, Congress, to pass these two bills, 

and to work tirelessly to affect whatever additional legislative changes are necessary, to impose such hardship on the government of Iran, that they will have no 

choice but to stop their wanton killing, to own up to their crimes, and to make restitution for those already committed. 

Again, thank you for hearing me today. I am respectfully, 

Lynn Smith Derbyshire

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so very much for an emotional 

and enlightening testimony and for sharing your grief with us. I 

am a proud co-sponsor of the other bill that you had mentioned as 

well. 

Ms. DERBYSHIRE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I am sure Vince lives every day 

in your heart, and he will be remembered by all of us as well for 

the ultimate sacrifice. 

Ms. DERBYSHIRE. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Lynn. 

And now I would like to recognize Dr. Yonah Alexander, the Senior Fellow of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and the Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies. Thank 

you, Dr. Alexander. 

STATEMENT OF YONAH ALEXANDER, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

POTOMAC INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, AND DIRECTOR, 

INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TERRORISM STUDIES 

Mr. ALEXANDER. I would like to thank the Chairs and distinguished Members of the Subcommittees for affording me the opportunity to share some of my observations. 

45

After listening to the very moving statements by the victims of 

terrorism, I would like to share with you that several days ago, I 

met with a colleague, a General, a former General of the Israeli 

Army, who lost his son. He did not lose his son on the battlefield 

in Israel. He died on September 11 in the World Trade Center. He 

happened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time. That is the 

nature of terrorism. 

Since I was away on travel, I did not prepare a written statement, but with your permission, I would like to leave for the Members several publications that focus on the Iranian issue, and, hopefully, they will be useful. 

One is the first issue of Terrorism: An International Journal

(1977). Twenty-eight years ago, I had the Ambassador of Iran to 

the U.N. prepare an article. He wrote on the problem of international terrorism at the U.N. and actually criticized the United 

Nations for its inability to define ‘‘terrorism.’’ So 28 years later, we 

are still dealing with who are the terrorists, and the use of different terms and concepts, such as ‘‘guerrilla fighters’’ and ‘‘insurgents’’ and ‘‘freedom fighters,’’ are being used interchangeably by 

policymakers and the media. So this issue would be considered 

once again, if there is a change of regime in Iran. 

A second publication, The United States and Iran: A Documentary History, relates to the hostage situation, the United States and 

Iran, that we prepared as a result of the takeover in Tehran. We 

simply wanted to find out what happened to the 100 years of relationship history between the United States and Iran. And, again, 

today, we are still dealing with Iranian terrorism. We are encouraged that the Congress of the United States is providing legislation 

which is really critical to deal with this challenge effectively. 

Since we are dealing with state-sponsored terrorism, I would like 

to submit, with your permission, a report which I prepared with 

my colleague 20 years ago that was submitted to the Committee on 

the Judiciary in 1985. The debate is going on within the policymaking community and the academic community whether the war 

involved state-sponsored terrorism, especially after the collapse of 

the Soviet Union. Moreover, the fact that we are gathered today to 

discuss the role of Iran is obviously very critical. 

I would like also to submit a study that we prepared on al-Qaeda 

and bin Laden that was published before 9/11. Simply, we did not 

see the writing on the wall, and, hopefully, if we can learn from 

history, perhaps we can avoid some of the mistakes of the past in 

the future. 

And, finally, as a result of a study in Buenos Aires on the AMIA, 

I would like to submit also a report that 10 years after the attacks, 

we do not have any definitive results in connection with the role 

of Iran in Argentina, the attack on the Israeli Embassy in 1992, 

and the attack on the AMIA in 1994, as was mentioned before. 

Since, in the interest of time, I wish to suggest that if we desire 

to reduce the threat of terrorism, then we must deal with education 

in hatred. On the basis of a recent trip to Israel last January, if 

we are going to have bin Laden—you probably know about the 

dolls that are being sold throughout the Middle East and now in 

Europe—we will be unable to deal with the problem effectively. 

46

Actually, with all of the euphoria about the Middle East peace 

discussions, there is no doubt that even if a Palestinian State will 

be created side by side with Israel, there are going to be groups, 

such as the Hezbollah and the Hamas, with the support of Iran, 

that will try to undermine the peace process. We are already facing 

terrorism for the next 100 years because of education in hatred. 

The second picture shows a television dish that was prepared by 

prisoners in Israel in order to be able to receive the propaganda 

from Al-Manar in Lebanon. The third picture is not a lesson in Karate. This is actually preparation for terrorist activities in an 

Israeli prison, which would lead them to use, of course, in suicide 

bombings by both men and women. 

Today, we are looking at the Iranian connection. We are looking 

at an Islamic connection. If I may, I would like to suggest that we 

have to look at the situation in a broader perspective, meaning that 

although many of the activities were perpetrated by Islamic-based 

terrorist groups, we have to be concerned about terrorism from the 

extremist ideological groups, right and left, and so on. The attack 

in Oklahoma City in 1995 was perpetrated by an extremist American. 

I would also like to suggest that we have to look at other state 

sponsors of terrorism, such as Cuba. A few days ago, I discussed 

the issue of the Cuban connection with terrorists in Latin America 

with my colleagues at the University of Miami. I must report to 

you that if we ignore Latin America and the tri-border area of Argentina and Brazil and Paraguay, which I visited a couple of 

months ago, we would not be able to reduce the threat of terrorism. 

So, again, we have to look at the challenge in a broader perspective, not only on the Islamic issue. And clearly we have to make 

sure that we do not vilify Islam. We have to find ways to reform 

some of these Muslim countries that are being targeted by Islamic 

terrorism of al-Qaeda and the Iranian connection. 

What can be done? Obviously, each and every segment of our 

community can play a role. Congress must provide the leadership. 

Civil society in general can play a role, such as the academic community and the professional organizations. We have to understand 

that terrorism against one is terrorism against all, and we have to 

mobilize both the civilian and the military communities to confront 

the problem. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Alexander follows:]

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF YONAH ALEXANDER, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, POTOMAC INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, AND DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TERRORISM STUDIES


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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I so agree with what 

you have said, and related to Castro, we recall that Castro was in 

Iran just a few years ago, and he made a statement and very inflammatory speeches, and he said, among many other things, together Iran and Cuba can bring the United States to its knees, and 

the support that they have given to all of the terrorist organizations. 

You also mentioned a very important point, which is the propaganda machine by Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations that 

are anti-Semitic, anti-Western, and the incitement that fuels and 

translates into terrorist activities. For example, Freedom House 

just released a report a few weeks ago on the dissemination of antiUnited States and anti-Western propaganda by the Government of 

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the mosques here in the United 

States. I would imagine that there is going to be an immediate and 

there should be an immediate and unconditional response by the 

United States to make sure that we remove such material and that 

requires our U.S. allies to curtail this venom because it is a primary component of our U.S. counterterrorism efforts worldwide. So 

thank you, Dr. Alexander, for bringing that up. 

Mr. Levitt, I wanted to ask you, in your written testimony, you 

refer to the presence of Hezbollah operatives in North Carolina. 

What is the extent of Hezbollah operations in the United States 

and those of other Iranian-sponsored groups, and what are the 

linkages between the United States cells and the Canadian procurement cell, and what are their targets, what are their goals, or 

who are their goals, and what do you mean when you say that each 

cell maintains direct contact with senior Hezbollah and/or Iranian 

intelligence operatives? That is certainly chilling testimony that 

you had presented to us. 

Mr. LEVITT. Thank you very much. I had the honor of serving as 

the Government’s expert witness in that case in North Carolina a 

couple of years ago. It was very revealing in terms of the extent 

of Hezbollah’s presence in the United States and North America 

because of the Canadian aspect, and I think it should be taken as 

a case in point as insight. The presence of Hezbollah in this country is something that is not widely available in open-source information, but even just from the little bit that is available, it is clear 

that there are several cells. 

The FBI has testified, as I mentioned earlier, that should it become the interest of Iran and Hezbollah leaders, it is the FBI’s position that groups like Hezbollah and Hamas—both Iranian sponsored—could conduct attacks here if that was their desire. 

Members of the Charlotte cell went out for shooting range training. They had been trained in Lebanon. The prosecution showed 

pictures that they had in their homes of the RPG and other 

manpads, shoulder-fired missiles, that they had been trained to use 

in Lebanon. 

The Charlotte cell was operating in direct contact with a 

Hezbollah military commander from Berjul Barashne, a Hezbollah 

stronghold in southern Beirut, a gentleman named Sheikh Abbas 

Harake. They were connected to a dual-use procurement cell in 

Canada. That cell was operating under the authority of Haj Hasan 

Hilu Laqis. Until this trial, Laqis’s name was not available in openVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
54

source literature, but he was known to people in the Government 

long beforehand as Hezbollah’s chief procurement officer. It is believed that anything that Hezbollah gets through Laqis’s procurement network, which is a global network, goes to Iran as well. 

Another expert witness in the Charlotte case demonstrated how 

the type of dual-use technologies that these cells here in North 

America procured enhanced Hezbollah’s operational capabilities 

and demonstrated how their capabilities, in fact, did improve at 

that exact period. They did things like engaging in credit card 

scams. They purchased the Social Security numbers and used the 

accounts of Middle Eastern students who returned to the Middle 

East, making it very, very difficult for law enforcement to recognize 

that their identities were, in fact, false. 

In many cases, they just went to the DMV and informed that 

they had moved and were changing their name. No questions were 

asked. They were given new legal driver’s licenses under all kinds 

of names. 

In one case, members of the Canada network talked about taking 

out life insurance policies in Canada for Hezbollah suicide bombers 

who would ‘‘go for a walk in southern Lebanon—’’ this is shortly 

before Israel withdrew to the blue line ‘‘—and would never come 

back.’’

We need to be very, very concerned about Hezbollah’s presence 

worldwide. The Europeans today were supposed to discuss whether 

or not to ban Hezbollah. All indications are that, at France’s lead, 

they will not, which is extremely disturbing not only because the 

EU is a member of the quartet, and the Palestinians and Israelis 

agree that there is no greater threat to the peace process than Iran 

and Hezbollah, but also because Hezbollah is proactively engaged 

in operations in Germany. German intelligence reports that there 

are at least 800 Hezbollah operatives in that country alone. 

One U.S. intelligence official that I interviewed for something 

that I was writing told me, at one point, ‘‘The bottom line is this: 

Hezbollah has procurement, logistical and financial, cells worldwide.’’ None of these cells that he knew of, he told me, is divorced 

from operational activity. Every Hezbollah cell, he told me, has 

some operational role, and if you look at how Hezbollah carried out 

the attacks in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, we have a case 

study of just how that works. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

I would like to ask the few witnesses here who have personal experience, either directly or through family members, What did your 

personal experience with the Iranian militants tell you about the 

nature of this enemy that we are facing, and the nature of Iraniansponsored terrorism? Dr. Daugherty? 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. The first word that comes right to mind is that 

it is unrelenting. The role that America played in Iran for a number of years was used quite effectively by the fundamentalists during the revolution against the Shah in 1977, 1978, 1979. And 

America assumed, in the eyes of the Iranians, in fact, a much more 

sinister role than our policy actually entailed. This anti-Americanism has become entrenched not only within the ranks of the 

fundamentalists, but it is almost a key to their ability to remain 

in power. They use anti-Americanism as a call to unify the country. 

55

They use anti-Americanism as a way to deflect from the internal 

problems—economically, developmentally—that Iran is experiencing. 

In this respect, there is no chance that it is going to go away 

with this fundamentalist regime. There is no chance that they are 

going to ease up on it. In many respects, it is their key to remaining in power. I think this is one reason why a chance of a rapprochement with the United States and Iran is, for the time being, 

out of the question. After 25 years of demonizing the United States, 

they are not in a position to turn around and tell the Iranian people that now it is time to be friends with the American Government. 

We are too valuable to them as enemies, and we will continue 

to be their enemy until this regime, one way or another, disappears, and what appears to be the wishes of the broader Iranian 

population in terms of throwing off oppression, becoming more open 

to the West, and having a normal relationship with the Western 

world, including the United States, is able to come to pass. That 

is why I say it is unrelenting, and it will be for the foreseeable future. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Any others? 

Mr. KIRTLEY. Ma’am, I cannot think of anything. Bill and I have 

discussed and talked about this. I really do think it is a great 

media ploy for the despots that run the country right now, and 

they do use it very effectively to keep the people infuriated and following their line. 

Ms. DERBYSHIRE. I would just like to add that I have a very close 

friend who is an Iranian woman whose family escaped from Iran 

when she was a girl. We have sat up late often over our cups of 

coffee and talked about these things. 

I cannot address it from a political point of view, but personally, 

on a personal level, from the heart, her mother is still in Iran, and 

she talks to her mother on the phone, and her mother says to her, 

‘‘When are they going to rescue us?’’

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Very powerful. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Royce? 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Chairwoman. I did want to ask a question of Professor Daugherty. You were a counterterrorism officer for 

18 years and taught that as well. My question to you is that we 

realize that developing atomic weapons is a national priority for 

Iran, and there are issues of perceived prestige and issues of security. But what national interest, real or imagined, is there for Iran 

in developing this network of support for terrorism? Can you explain that? 

Then the other question I was going to ask you is, what evidence 

do we have of Iranian support for insurgencies in Iraq right now? 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Let me address the second issue first just very 

briefly. The best information that I have seen is that there are well 

over a thousand members of the Revolutionary Guards, Iranian intelligence officers, that infiltrated into southern Iran which have 

connections with Moqada al-Sadr and his militia. Al-Sadr’s militia 

has received an enormous amount of weaponry and resources from 

the Government of Iran. And it is worth noting that some months 

ago, when the United States Marines went against the militia beVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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fore the militia agreed to disarm, there again were a number of 

Marine deaths, and I think they can be directly laid at the doorstep 

of Iran. 

The Iranians see a great opportunity in the coming to power of 

the Iraqi Shi’a. They are very manipulative. They will exercise, indirectly control in various ways, again, mostly through the provision of resources but as well as training and the actual presence 

of Iranian intelligence officers. I think this is a situation where if 

Iran chooses to pull that trigger, they can be greatly destabilizing 

to our efforts in southern Iraq and ultimately to the new democratically-elected Government of Iraq, and I think this is a very serious 

issue. 

Mr. ROYCE. What national interests are served by them supporting terrorism? 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Simply, it is an extension of their foreign policy. 

Things that they cannot get through overt diplomacy, things that 

they cannot achieve for what they would see as the benefit to their 

country, they believe they are able to achieve by force. Certainly, 

when it comes to the United States, the ability of them to use terrorism to diminish United States interests, to diminish the prestige 

and influence of the United States, to perhaps sway Middle Eastern governments that might be more likely to support United 

States interests, if they can inject an element of fear into that relationship, make other Middle Eastern governments perhaps sit back 

and question whether or not they should have a close relationship 

with the United States, all of these things can eventually work 

against our interests and to the interests of the Iranians. 

Mr. ROYCE. When we look at arms trafficking and drug smuggling, some of the other things that we are investigating in the 

Paraguay, Brazil, Argentine region—the tri-border region—do we 

see in that the fingerprints of the Iranian Government? Or is it 

just Hezbollah that is building up that network? Or do you find, 

through their Embassies and through other contacts, evidence that 

Iran itself is engaged in building that terrorist network in the triborder area? 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. That is not necessarily my area of expertise, 

but I will comment that Hezbollah really cannot exist without Iran. 

It is the right arm of Iran in terms of any international terrorism, 

and when it is inconvenient for the Government of Iran to use terrorism, then its tool is Hezbollah. Hezbollah does not act independently—at least, to my knowledge, it does not—and it is very much 

an arm of the Iranian Government. 

Mr. ROYCE. Hezbollah is a surrogate. Do we have direct evidence, 

and maybe I should ask Dr. Alexander this, Do we have direct evidence or the fingerprints of Iranian Embassy officials and so forth 

on Hezbollah activity, either in Latin America or in the Middle 

East? 

Mr. ALEXANDER. Absolutely. For the past 20 years, I tried to follow what is happening in the region, and a couple of months ago, 

I had the opportunity to be in Argentina, including the tri-border 

region. I would be delighted to submit some report on the ongoing 

research that we have to link up the Hezbollah, as well as the Iranian connection with their Embassies. 

57

There is no doubt, for example, as to their role in attacking the 

Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and AMRA in 1994. The 

evidence is there. Unfortunately, because of internal problems in 

Argentina, we cannot resolve the problem, but there is no way that 

Hezbollah, which operates in dozens of countries around the 

world—it is almost second to al-Qaeda that operates probably over 

80 countries around the world—would operate, especially in major 

activities, without the knowledge and the approval and the support 

of the Iranian Government and its top echelon leadership. 

Mr. ROYCE. And the strongest piece of hard evidence on Iranian 

cooperation with al-Qaeda; what would you offer——

Mr. ALEXANDER. Well, I think Matt Levitt referred to some of the 

meetings that took place in the past, Mugniyeh, Hezbollah’s director of external operations, met with Zawahiri. Currently there are 

probably dozens, if not hundreds, of al-Qaeda operatives who have 

found a safe haven in Iran. And it is in the interest of Iran to utilize terrorism as another tool in the struggle for power. In other 

words, terrorism is the great equalizer. They do not have to face 

the United States eyeball-to-eyeball to fight us, but they can resort 

to terrorism whenever they think it would be useful. It is the costbenefit relationship. 

Earlier I mentioned Fidel Castro. Madam Chair mentioned correctly that when Fidel Castro visited the Middle East, he visited 

Libya and Iran, and made the statement that he would bring us 

to our knees if they will cooperate with Iran. So what better way 

that the Iranians might consider working with Fidel Castro, which 

is very close to the shores of the United States, to instigate attacks 

in this country and around Latin America? 

By the way, just one more word, if I may, on state-sponsored terrorism. We have to look at the historical record of the role of Cuba, 

for 40 years, how they tried to operate in Latin America, Africa, 

and the Middle East. So, again, state-sponsored terrorism is alive 

and well and kicking and we have to consider the responses very 

seriously. 

Mr. ROYCE. The same modus operandi. Thank you, Madam 

Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Royce. 

So pleased to yield to our Ranking Member, Mr. Ackerman, my 

good friend. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the Chair. Madam Chair, I think this 

has been one of the most powerful, factual, and gut-wrenching 

hearings that we have had that I can remember in my 22 years 

here. It puts a very personal face on the issue that we are talking 

about and raises such huge questions of why do we stand around 

pretending to be impotent when we really can, if we came up with 

a policy, do something to affect what is going on? 

I would like to direct this question to Mr. Daugherty, if I may. 

It is my understanding that after the release of the hostages from 

Iranian captivity, that American companies were compensated for 

property that was seized by the Iranian Government. Is that accurate? 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Under the Algiers Accord, sir, the agreement 

was the banks that were involved in the deal that had investments 

in Iran that lost those investments, the banks basically came out 

58

100 cents on the dollar with no losses at all. There was a tribunal 

set up for American corporations to adjudicate the claims. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So we made sure, in effect, that America’s corporate interests were 100-percent made whole. 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Either through the amount of money that they 

received in compensation or the ability to take those losses off in 

terms of taxes, yes, the American corporations, as well as the 

banks, have been fully compensated. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So this country stood behind its business community. 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. It is hard not to come to that conclusion at 

times, sir. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The second part of that same question: Correct 

me if I am wrong, but it is also my understanding that despite the 

fact that American citizens who were the victims of terrorism, both 

by Iran and other countries, have sued successfully in United 

States courts for damages, but that those of you who were hostages 

held in Iran during those horrific 444 days are prohibited from 

suing for damages. 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Yes, sir. That is correct. That was put in the 

terms of the accords. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. How did this come about? 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. My understanding is it was something of almost 

a casual, let us throw the Iranians another incentive to take the 

deal. Contrary to what the State Department now claims, there 

was no discussion with our families. The families did not give permission for this provision to be put in there. It was a surprise to 

us when we got off the airplane to learn that the provision was in 

there. We were very surprised by it. I believe that there was a certain amount of unfairness, given the nature of the corporations and 

the banks to make good on their losses but no provision for us. 

I would like to point out that the Algiers Accord basically was 

negotiated at gunpoint. Under international law, any agreement 

that is negotiated under duress really has no validity. The State 

Department has maintained all along that there is a certain sanctity to these accords. There is a provision also in the accords, sir, 

that says the United States will not interfere in Iranian internal 

affairs. But if we are to promote democracy in Iran, if we are to 

support organizations or nongovernmental organizations or other 

methods to help the Iranian people throw off their oppressors, to 

reverse the direction of their Government, and to come join the 

family of nations, technically any of our efforts in that regard 

would put us in violation of the Algiers Accords. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It would seem to me, then, having seen, as the 

country did, President Bush’s inaugural in which he said, I paraphrase, to the captive peoples of the world, that if you stand up for 

freedom, we will stand with you, that that is a violation of the Algiers Accord. 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Technically, it would be. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I do not understand, and I will just apologize for 

our Government. I am probably not the right person to do it, but 

somebody should, to apologize for the treatment that hostages and 

families and victims suffer while the Government of our great 

country protects the corporate interests and not the personal interVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:30 Jul 18, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\021605\98810.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ests of its citizens and would even have such an agreement. It 

seems to me that if you negotiate an agreement with a gun to your 

head, that is not anything that can be upheld in any court of law 

because you do not have two willing parties to the agreement. 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. You can understand our great surprise and dismay when the State Department and the Justice Department appeared in court against us to argue the case that Iran would have 

argued had they chosen to defend that case. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, I am sorry we were on their side. 

You know, it seems to me, listening to the full testimony of the 

panel, that Iran really needs us more than anything else, and as 

the party that continues to play the needed party, that we become 

the enablers of their terrorism, and I think we have to give that 

an awful lot of thought as we proceed with our policy deliberations. 

It was earlier today that we heard a suggestion that the international community should set up a tribunal similar to the one 

that was established for Sierra Leone in order to build a case 

against Iran for its support of terrorism. What do you think about 

this approach? Should the U.S. pursue it? Mr. Levitt? 

Mr. LEVITT. I think any action is positive action, and inaction 

just tells state sponsors of terrorism and the groups that they sponsor that they can continue with their activities, as you have heard 

from just about everybody on this panel. From Hezbollah to alQaeda, we have heard time and again, and the 9–11 Commission 

made very clear, that the terrorists see when we do not respond 

and take that weakness into consideration when they plan future 

attacks. 

I do not think that a tribunal is going to be effective. That is not 

my litmus test. My litmus test is whether or not we are trying to 

find creative options for dealing with a very difficult problem and 

doing everything we can, even if any given option is only going to 

move us a little forward, a few inches forward. 

Militarily, I do not think that is a particularly wise option with 

Iran, given that it is ironically the greatest sponsor of terrorism, 

on the one hand, and, on the other hand, has a population that is 

perhaps the most pro-Western in the greater Muslim world. And 

the one thing, as, I think, Professor Daugherty said, that would 

unite them is if there were to be some type of overt foreign intervention. I think that a tremendous amount of covert activity is 

called for. 

I think that diplomatically there is much, much more that can 

be done, both targeting Iran and targeting our allies who are insufficiently activated on the issue of Iran and its state sponsors, and, 

again, I point to the Europeans, in particular, and their lack or 

failure to list Hezbollah on their terrorist organizations list, even 

though members of Hezbollah are on that list, as if the members 

who are recruited, trained, and funded are somehow disconnected 

from the group. There is clearly much more that we can do. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Just following up on that notion, there are some 

that have suggested today that we perhaps run a blockade, an economic blockade, on Iran. The success of that, if it is a wise move 

at all, would probably require the cooperation of countries that you 

have already mentioned and others in Europe that we can think of. 

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clusion that cooperation is something that we are not going to get. 

Is this because of commercial interests and both corporate and national greed on behalf of some of the countries in Europe that may 

be doing a lot of business? 

Mr. LEVITT. I think the Oil-for-Food scandal demonstrates how 

powerful an incentive money can be. I think that certainly is a factor. I think it is also a factor that different states, including some 

of our closest allies, do have interests of their own and prioritize 

them differently and interpret threats differently. Even within this 

country, there are those who believe that terrorist groups should 

be divided up into those who are very directly threatening and targeting us today, whether or not they have in the past, and those 

that some would say are not. 

I have had arguments with people in the Administration here, 

academics, all kinds of people in our country who say that we 

should deal with Hamas and Hezbollah differently than we deal 

with other terrorist groups. And I think that that is ridiculous not 

only because there are links between all of these different groups, 

not only because these groups should be held accountable for their 

horrible past actions, as we have heard about today, but because 

if we had dealt with al-Qaeda by that litmus test for many years, 

we would have done even less than we did prior to 9/11, and the 

devastating effects could have been even worse. 

We need to deal with people and states and organizations who 

engage in terrorism not because of who they are attacking. As Professor Alexander said, not because of the political reason upon 

which they justify their actions, however legitimate their political 

goals may be, but simply the use of terrorism is a delegitimizer; the 

use of terrorism is beyond the pale. 

Ms. DERBYSHIRE. May I add something? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Sure. 

Ms. DERBYSHIRE. I think that whatever it is we do, we need to 

send a message that they cannot get away with it, and right now 

we are not doing anything that sends that message. They are using 

terrorism as a tool because it works for them. It gives them power. 

We have to take that away. 

My understanding of the situation is not complete. I am not an 

expert like these other people. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Oh, yes, you are. 

Ms. DERBYSHIRE. But it looks to me like their Achille’s Heel is 

financial. 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Sir, can I make one observation? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Sure. 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Let me just bring home what state-sponsored 

terrorism has done in this very building. When I came to Washington in 1979, you could walk the Capitol grounds 24 hours a day. 

The Capitol police were inside. There were no guards. There were 

no fences. There was no electronic security. At 3 o’clock in the 

morning, you could come and look at this building. You could walk 

into the rotunda at 3 o’clock in the morning and look at this building, which is the symbol of democracy in the world. And at the 

height of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union had the ability to 

destroy us many times over, 24 hours a day, you could come into 

this building and freely look at what democracy means. 

61

And now state-sponsored terrorism has caused the barricades to 

go up, has caused—here is this new visitors’ center, all of the extra 

security. The Soviet Union, with the power to destroy us, never did 

to this building what state-sponsored terrorism has done. 

Mr. KIRTLEY. Sir, you mentioned the effects of an international 

tribunal, and I will make a couple of points and then try to tie it 

all together. 

Mr. Royce asked a question about what the national interests are 

in Iran developing nuclear capabilities, and what the national interests are of Iran in being a state sponsor of terrorism, and I think 

this is one of the shortcomings, maybe, of certainly the State Department and probably of some Americans overall. The people that 

are running Iran certainly, I would say, have a different thought 

process and think of national interest in a much different light 

than we think of it, than the State Department and our elected 

leaders think of it. I will make that point, and I am sure Dr. Alexander and Dr. Levitt will agree. 

When we go to this international tribunal, I would agree that 

any step forward is progress, but I also would say that talk without 

accountability is useless. Tell me what, over the past 25 years, 

America or any of the world leaders have done to make Iran believe that it is not in their best interest to develop a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, I guess the short answer might be Iraq. 

However, having done or having been doing Iraq, I think it becomes harder to sell either the U.N. or the international community or any component thereof that we are dealing with a Middle 

Eastern country with connections to international terrorist groups 

and al-Qaeda, that has weapons of mass destruction that they are 

developing, and has bad intentions all around. It seems to me, we 

speak from a position of weakness brought on by our loss of a lot 

of credibility in that situation, and that hurts us. That hurts us 

tremendously as far as our prestige and our ability to really do 

some good in the world. 

Just a comment on Dr. Daugherty’s observation. I remember the 

social studies teacher who came to Washington. I brought my kids 

down here, my own kids, and marveled in the fact that I could 

drive my car right up to the front steps of the Capitol of the United 

States and walk inside at 10 o’clock at night without anybody asking me who I was because I wanted to see the Capitol of the free 

world and show it to my children. 

You know, terrorists cannot win a war, but it is also possible to 

be nibbled to death by ants, and the faster we have a policy to deal 

with this, the better off everybody is going to be. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Ackerman. 

To close this hearing, I would like to ask two other witnesses just 

to come forward and make some closing remarks on our behalf, and 

that is Rocky Sickmann and Dick Morefield, who were also hostages, and I would like to recognize them and address our Subcommittee and close the hearing for us. Push the little button 

there. 

62

STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. MOREFIELD 

Mr. MOREFIELD. Thank you, Madam Chair, for the opportunity. 

You have seen me in the back there nodding and bobbing like the 

choir. I would like to give you two insights from my experiences, 

one that goes back to Uruguay, back to the 1960s. 

I saw a beautiful, little democracy destroyed by the first urban 

terrorism, the Tupermaros. It took Uruguay two generations to recover from their inability to cope with terrorism at that time, and 

I came to the conclusion at that time that terrorism is the ultimate 

weapon of mass destruction. It makes it possible for a small group 

that cannot win its aims, either by military or political means, to 

force its agenda on either a segment of a country or an entire country. I have seen this also in Colombia, and I think I am seeing this 

also in Iran. 

The reason why Iran uses state terrorism is because it is cheap, 

and it works. The only way we can combat it is basically to stand 

up to it so that it does not work and make it more expensive. 

Now, let me give you one other insight from when I was along 

the Caspian border right after the failed rescue attempt. It was one 

of the few times I was able to talk to the guards, and I was trying 

to find out why Russia was the Little Satan, and we were the 

Great Satan. I said, ‘‘Russia is on your border. They have invaded 

you once before. Why?’’ They never could give me an answer until 

I asked them. I said, ‘‘You do not understand the United States. 

I wish you could come to the United States so you could understand it.’’ And he said, ‘‘Oh, no. I do not want to go to the United 

States. I must be corrupted.’’ And that gave me the key. The reason 

why we are the Great Satan is because we are a multicultural, 

democratic, open society, and that is what the people in power in 

Iran fear, and that is what somehow the Iranian people are going 

to have to overcome. And with those two insights, I will turn it 

over to Rocky. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Rocky? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Madam Chair? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Just for the record, let it be recorded that the 

minority concurs happily with the late-noticed, additional witnesses, and we are happy that they are here. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I saw his head bobbing, and I just felt like 

he wanted to talk. [Laughter.] 

Thank you. Rocky? 

STATEMENT OF ROCKY SICKMANN 

Mr. SICKMANN. Madam Chair, I am not prepared to really expound on the situation, although I can only think back to seeing 

that picture that day, that November 4th, where I, along with 

other fellow Marines, had shotguns pointed to rows of Iranian 

women as they had broken through the basement window, and 

they brought the women in first, knowing that the Marines probably would not have shot upon them unarmed. Of course, at that 

time, we were told not to fire our weapons. Tear gas was thrown. 

They removed themselves. And I think back, and especially after 

9/11, I have told friends that I wonder what would have happened 

had I fired that November 4th of 1979. That young Marine, along 

63

with the others, accidentally pulled the trigger and started a bloodbath. 

Would we have had, and would we be here now, had we taken 

the accountability to make Iran be responsible for their actions? 

That haunts me over and over and over. 

As Ms. Derbyshire had mentioned, she has a friend, an Iranian 

friend. My son’s best friend is an Iranian, and I teach—I have 

three wonderful children and a wonderful wife of 25 years next 

year, but I teach my children, when they are born, to love, not to 

hate. When I was held for 444 days, outside my window I would 

hear the young children of Iran—that was 1979—‘‘Death to America.’’ And it is 2005, and it is still ‘‘Death to America.’’

So it continues to haunt me, When do we take action? When do 

we show Iran that what they did on that day should never happen, 

not only Iran but the rest of the world? So that is why I am here 

because, you know, it is our future, and something needs to be 

said, a policy and a procedure. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We did not hear then, and I hope that we are 

listening now. Thank you to each and every one of you for your 

powerful testimony, and thank you to the Members for being here. 

The Subcommittee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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