[Cite as In re M.P., 2023-Ohio-925.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE M.P. :

: No. 111608

A Minor Child :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 23, 2023

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Juvenile Division

Case No. DL21107413

Appearances:

Gregory T. Stralka, for appellant. 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Jordan Mason, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant M.P., a minor (d.o.b. 12/04/2006), brings this 

appeal challenging the juvenile court’s delinquency findings on seven counts of rape 

and two counts of gross sexual imposition. Specifically, M.P. argues that the juvenile 

court erred in admitting evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 803(4) and erred in finding 

him delinquent on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 because they were based on insufficient 
evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence. After a thorough review 

of the record and law, this court affirms. 

I. Factual and Procedural History

M.P. was charged with seven counts of rape in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(2), first-degree felonies (Counts 1-5, 8, and 9), and two counts of gross 

sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), third-degree felonies (Counts 

6 and 7).

This case involves four minor child victims who are all siblings: M.J. 

(d.o.b. 7/21/10), a male; Ch.J. (d.o.b. 2/11/2015), a male; Ca.J. (d.o.b. 11/25/2013), 

a male; and K.J. (d.o.b. 2/23/2016), a female. M.P. is a paternal uncle to the 

children. M.P. was accused of sexually assaulting all of the minor children between 

2019 and 2020, while the children were in his care. The children discovered that all 

of them were experiencing sexual assault at the hands of M.P. and eventually alerted

their mother, F.M. (“Mother”), who promptly took action to report the conduct. The 

victims’ father is currently incarcerated. 

At arraignment, M.P. denied the allegations of the complaint and was 

placed on home detention with electronic monitoring and ordered to have no 

contact with the alleged victims or Mother.

As trial neared, the court held an in camera hearing to determine the 

competency of the victims to testify as witnesses. M.J.’s ability to testify was not in 

question. The court found that Ca.J. and Ch.J. were competent to serve as witnesses. 

K.J. was determined incompetent to testify and disqualified. 
Prior to trial, the state also filed a notice indicating that, pursuant to 

Evid.R. 807, it intended to introduce at trial statements made by K.J., and the court 

held an admissibility hearing. After the hearing, the court issued a journal entry 

finding that the state did not satisfy all elements required for Evid.R. 807 and 

forbade the state from using witnesses to bring in K.J.’s statements. 

Trial commenced on March 9, 2022. 

Shannon Hanrahan, an intake child protection specialist from the sex 

abuse unit of the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services 

(“CCDCFS”), testified regarding her involvement with this matter. She stated that 

after she received the case, she contacted Mother and scheduled interviews. After 

the individual interviews with each child victim, Hanrahan informed Mother that 

she would be making a referral for the children to get medical exams and counseling 

services. Mother did not wait for the referral and immediately took them to the 

emergency room. On direct-examination, Hanrahan went through her notes from 

the interviews with each victim. 

The oldest victim, M.J., who was ten years old at the time of the 

interview, told Hanrahan that “his uncle [M.P.], who he described as a teenager, 

made him do stuff to his private area at [M.P.]’s house in his room.” (Tr. 88.) M.J.

detailed that when he was eight or nine years old, M.P. made him “suck his private 

part and made him hump pillows” and that M.P. had placed his penis in his buttocks. 

M.J. specified that the contact was “inside” of his buttocks and that it hurt. (Tr. 88.) 

M.J. told Hanrahan that the conduct occurred more than once but was not able to 
give a specific number of times. In 2019, M.J. was sent to Florida to live with his 

grandparents because he was acting out, which his family presumed was because his 

father was recently incarcerated. When M.J. returned from Florida, M.J. learned 

from Ca.J. and Ch.J. that M.P. had been sexually abusing them as well. 

The youngest, K.J., who was four years old at the time of the interview, 

was “pretty difficult” to interview. (Tr. 91.) She denied that anyone ever touched 

her vagina or buttocks, denied being forced to touch anyone else’s “private,” and 

denied that anyone put their mouth on her vagina or buttocks. However, when M.P.

was discussed, she specifically stated that “[M.P.] told her to have sex with Ca.J.” 

Hanrahan emphasized that K.J. herself used the word sex, but was not able to 

describe what sex was. K.J. also revealed that M.P. has told her in the past “don’t 

tell mommy[.]” (Tr. 91.) 

Ch.J., who was five years old at the time of the interview, disclosed that 

“[M.P.] put his wee wee in his butt” and specified that it was inside of his buttocks, 

and that it happened three separate times. (Tr. 92-93.) He also revealed that Ca.J.

and K.J. “humped” and that Ca.J. “ate [K.J.’s] butt” and that M.P. “put his wee wee 

in Ca.J.’s booty.” (Tr. 92-93.) He noted that M.P. threatened to kill him if he told 

on him. On cross-examination, Hanrahan revealed that Ch.J. also referenced an 

incident when he was one year old where M.P. “had him pump [sic] a pillow and had 

sex with him.” (Tr. 105-106.) 

Ca.J., who was six years old at the time of the interview, told Hanrahan 

that “[M.P.] touched his private part with his hand and it happened at his house.”
(Tr. 94.) He denied that anyone ever put their mouth on his penis or buttocks, but 

did reveal that M.P. “put his wee wee in [Ch.J.’s] booty” and that M.P. touched K.J. 

on her private part, and “put his wee wee in [K.J.]’s koochie and booty.” (Tr. 94-95.) 

Ca.J. also stated that M.P. threatened to kill him for telling anyone. 

Hanrahan also interviewed M.P. at his home, who was 13 years old at 

the time of the interview. M.P. denied all allegations. He told Hanrahan that he’s 

never been inappropriate with the children. He admitted that he babysat the victims 

but noted that he never helped them in the bath or bathroom, that he never changed 

any diapers, that he never cooked for the kids, and that they played games like hideand-seek and tag. He did, however, reveal that Ca.J. and K.J. “did inappropriate 

stuff with each other” including “humping with their clothes on.” (Tr. 97.) M.P.’s 

mother, who was present for the interview, noted that she would often FaceTime 

M.P. while he was babysitting and “never saw anything inappropriate going on.” (Tr. 

98.) M.P. then noted that the victims’ Mother had many boyfriends that were in and 

out of the home and that the child victims are “big liars,” and that Mother is 

“inconsistent with the story she keeps telling everyone.” (Tr. 98.) M.P.’s counselor 

was also present and stated that M.P. had never displayed any inappropriate sexual 

behaviors or got in trouble at school for inappropriate behavior. 

Hanrahan ultimately testified that at the conclusion of her 

investigation, she found that the disposition was substantiated. 

Angella McMahan and Kate Burns, the University Hospitals Sexual 

Assault Nurse Examiners (collectively “SANE nurses”), testified regarding their 
respective examinations of each of the victims. McMahan examined M.J. and K.J.

while Burns examined Ch.J. and Ca.J. Both SANE nurses testified regarding their 

qualifications, the history-taking process, and the specific examinations they 

performed on each victim. 

Mother testified that prior to M.J. going to Florida, she often dropped 

M.J. off at M.P.’s house but eventually he stopped going. Ca.J. and Ch.J. also went 

over a few times. Eventually, M.P.’s family home caught on fire and M.P. and M.P.’s 

mother came to stay with Mother and the child victims at their home. She testified

that M.P. and the children had a great relationship and that she often left M.P. alone 

with the child victims. She stated that he was alone with them in the upstairs 

portions of the house very often because the kitchen and bathroom were being 

redone, so the children could not walk downstairs due to the floor being torn apart. 

Regarding M.J., Mother testified that she sent him to Florida because 

he was threatening suicide and she could not control him. She stated that he went 

from being “a good kid at school to fighting all the time, bad grades, watching 

porno,” and that he tried to jump out of a window. (Tr. 115.) She stated that sending 

him to Florida was a last resort. 

Three out of the four child victims, M.J., Ca.J., and Ch.J. all testified. 

M.J., the oldest, testified that M.P. “made me touch his private part and hump stuff 

and nasty stuff.” (Tr. 136.) He testified that M.P. put his penis inside of his buttocks 

three times, “almost inside,” that he did not want this to happen, and that it 

“hurted.” (Tr. 137.) 
Ca.J. testified that M.P. put his penis in his buttocks four times, that 

he did not want him to do that, and that it made him feel “weird.” (Tr. 155.) He also 

testified that M.P. made him have sex with K.J. and that he saw M.P. place his penis 

in Ch.J.’s buttocks. Ca.J. ultimately testified that he did not initially tell anyone 

about any of the above activity because M.P. “said he was gonna stab me with a knife 

or slap me.” (Tr. 158.) On cross-examination, when asked what “sex” meant, Ca.J. 

kind of shrugged his shoulders, but on redirect, clarified that when he stated that 

M.P. made him have sex with K.J., he meant that he put “his private part” in “her 

private part.” (Tr. 162.) 

Ch.J. testified that he saw M.P. make Ca.J. “pump [sic][K.J.]” and put 

his penis in Ca.J.’s buttocks. (Tr. 170.) He testified that M.P. said to Ca.J., “if you 

don’t have sex with [K.J.], I will kill you, then I will slap you, then I’m gonna tell your 

mommy you was having sex with your sister.” (Tr. 172.) Ch.J. was unable to identify 

what sex was but was adamant that M.P. made Ca.J. and K.J. engage in it. He 

identified that when K.J. was on top of Ca.J., he saw both of their “private parts”

touching. Ch.J. also admitted that once, M.P. put his penis inside of his buttocks, 

that he didn’t want M.P. to do that, and that it hurt him. 

Following the trial, the court issued a journal entry stating that it was 

holding its decision in abeyance until March 16, 2022. On this date, a hearing was 

held and the court adjudicated M.P. delinquent on all charges and ordered the 

probation department to prepare a predispositional report and refer M.P. for a sex 
offender assessment. M.P. was placed in the juvenile detention center until the 

dispositional hearing. 

M.P.’s dispositional hearing was held on May 4, 2022. The trial court 

sentenced M.P. to a term at the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“ODYS”) for a 

minimum of one-year, with the potential that he be kept until his 21st birthday on 

Counts 1, 5, and 8, which were all run consecutively. On Count 7, he was sentenced 

to six months at ODYS, with the potential that he be kept until his 21st birthday.

This count was run concurrently. The trial court did not impose any additional time 

for Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6. The trial court, however, suspended the ODYS 

commitment and placed him on community-control supervision for a period of two 

years, and required him to instead present to the Butler County Correctional Facility 

to complete services there, including sex offender treatment and 75 hours of 

community service. 

M.P. appealed, assigning four errors for our review. 

I. The decision of [the] trial court finding the Appellant delinquent was 

not supported by admissible evidence as defined under Rule 803(4) of 

the Ohio Rules of Evidence. 

II. The decision of the trial court finding the Appellant delinquent on 

Counts 3 and 4 was not supported by sufficient evidence. 

III. The decision of the trial court finding the Appellant delinquent on 

Counts 1 and 2 was not supported by sufficient evidence. 

IV. The decision of trial court finding the Appellant delinquent on 

Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
II. Law and Analysis

A. Evid.R. 803(4)

In his first assignment of error, M.P. argues that the trial court erred 

in admitting evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 803(4).

The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the trial court’s sound 

discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. 

Simmons, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98613, 2013-Ohio-1789, ¶ 18, citing State v. 

Frazier, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97178, 2012-Ohio-1198, ¶ 17. An abuse of discretion 

occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a 

matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio 

St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. Such an abuse “‘“implies that the 

court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”’” State v. 

Montgomery, 169 Ohio St.3d 84, 2022-Ohio-2211, ___N.E.3d___, ¶ 135, quoting 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting 

State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). 

Hearsay is ‘“a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted.’” Simmons at ¶ 19, quoting Evid.R. 801(C). Hearsay evidence is 

inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions outlined in the rules of 

evidence. Id., citing Evid.R. 802. The instant matter implicates Evid.R. 803(4),

which allows hearsay statements that are
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing 

medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or 

the inception or general character of the cause or external source 

thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 

On appeal, M.P. disputes the admissibility of the victims’ statements 

to Hanrahan, McMahan, and Burns. Since the SANE nurses and the CCDCFS 

specialist are different roles, we review each individually.

We first turn to M.P.’s assertion that the testimony of CCDCFS worker 

Hanrahan could not have fit into the Evid.R. 803(4) exception. This court has 

previously found that statements made to CCDCFS employees in the same role as 

Hanrahan were admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 803(4), so long as the statements 

were received for purposes of diagnoses and treatment. See, e.g., In re V.H., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111186, 2022-Ohio-3432, ¶ 27; State v. Schentur, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 108448, 2020-Ohio-1603, ¶ 45; State v. Jeffries, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 106889, 2018-Ohio-5039, ¶ 16; State v. Fears, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104868, 

2017-Ohio-6978, ¶ 46; State v. Diaz, 2016-Ohio-5523, 69 N.E.3d 1182, ¶ 49 (8th

Dist.). In cases of sexual assault, “a description of the encounter and identification 

of the perpetrator are within the scope of statements for medical treatment and 

diagnosis.” In re D.L., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84643, 2005-Ohio-2320, ¶ 21, citing 

State v. Stahl, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22261, 2005-Ohio-1137, ¶ 15; see also Fears at 

¶ 45 (noting that “[t]he determination regarding whether the alleged perpetrator has 

access to the child victim necessarily involves a treatment plan insofar as it ensures 

the child is free of the abuse”). Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court has also noted 
that “the identity of the perpetrator, the age of the perpetrator, the type of abuse 

alleged, and the time frame of the abuse” are all within the realm of “medical 

diagnosis.” State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422, 2017-Ohio-9423, 108 N.E.3d 1, 

¶ 143, citing State v. Arnold, 126 Ohio St.3d 290, 2010-Ohio-2742, 933 N.E.2d 775, 

¶ 32. In Fears, this court explained:

In sexual assault cases involving young victims, there is often testimony 

from a child advocacy social worker. And courts have acknowledged 

the “dual role” — medical diagnosis/treatment and 

investigation/gathering of evidence — of social workers who interview 

a child who may be the victim of sexual abuse. See State v. Arnold, 126 

Ohio St.3d 290, 2010-Ohio-2742, ¶ 33, 933 N.E.2d 775. Only those 

statements made for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment are 

admissible under Evid.R. 803(4). State v. Muttart, 116 Ohio St.3d 5, 

2007-Ohio-5267, ¶ 46, 875 N.E.2d 944 (regardless of whether a child 

less than ten years old has been determined to be competent to testify, 

the child’s statements may be admitted at trial as an exception to the 

hearsay rule if they were made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 

treatment); State v. Goza, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89032, 2007-Ohio6837, ¶ 39. Social workers are oftentimes in the best position to help 

determine the proper treatment for the minor, which treatment 

includes determining which home was free of sexual abuse. State v. 

Durham, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84132, 2005-Ohio-202, ¶ 33, citing 

Presley v. Presley, 71 Ohio App.3d 34, 39, 593 N.E.2d 17 (8th

Dist.1990).

To the extent a victim’s statement to a social worker is for investigative 

or prosecutorial purposes, the statement will not fall within the hearsay 

exception under Evid.R. 803(4). See State v. Rose, 12th Dist. Butler 

No. CA2011-11-214, 2012-Ohio-5607, ¶ 42. The fact that the 

information initially gathered by the social workers was subsequently 

used by the state in its prosecution, however, does not change the fact 

that these statements were not made for investigative or prosecutorial 

purposes. Muttart at ¶ 62. Trial courts are entrusted with recognizing 

the point at which nontestimonial (admissible under Evid.R. 803(4)) 

statements become testimonial (falling outside the hearsay exception). 

See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 

L.Ed.2d 224 (2006).
Fears at ¶ 37-38.

M.P. also disputes that the SANE nurses could have testified pursuant 

to the Evid.R. 803(4) exception. As with the testimony from the CCDCFS social

workers, this court has previously upheld testimony by SANE nurses regarding what 

the minor child victims told them, provided it was purposed for medical diagnosis 

and treatment. See In re V.H. at ¶ 27; State v. Magwood, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

105885, 2018-Ohio-1634, ¶ 44 (“The entire narrative, with the exception of the last 

paragraph, includes a detailed description of the rape and is undoubtedly made for 

purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.”); Diaz at ¶ 49; State v. Ceron, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 99388, 2013-Ohio-5241, ¶ 60; In re C.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

102675, 2015-Ohio-4768, ¶ 69. 

M.P. argues that “there was no medical diagnosis to be made from 

taking the alleged children victims to the hospital, nor was there any concerns for 

the safety of them in the home.” He argues instead that the hospital visit was strictly 

“to gather evidence for an alleged crime” and not purposed for treating or diagnosing 

the children. He also argues that the CCDCFS employee could not have been 

treating or diagnosing the children because CCDCFS was called several weeks after 

any alleged sexual activity. He directs us to the concurring opinion in Jeffries, which 

cautioned against the broad interpretation of Evid.R. 803(4) that courts allow in 

child abuse cases. Id. at ¶ 19. Nonetheless, we note that even the concurring opinion 

admits, “I am constrained by the existing state of the law to find no abuse of 

discretion occurred in this matter” and calls on the Ohio Supreme Court to revisit 
the parameters of testimony that may be elicited under this exception. Jeffries at 

¶ 28 (S. Gallagher, P.J., concurring). The Supreme Court has not visited this issue 

since Jeffries, so we continue to apply the law as it exists in this court and the Ohio 

Supreme Court. 

The record does not support M.P.’s contentions. Hanrahan, the 

CCDCFS worker, specifically testified that Mother took the children to the 

emergency room after CCDCFS conducted interviews and agreed that during these 

interviews, she was assessing the safety of the victims. She explained that her role 

as CCDCFS employee is to “investigate allegations of sexual abuse.” (Tr. 79.) As this 

court recognized in Fears, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104868, 2017-Ohio-6978,

Hanrahan, as a CCDCFS employee, holds a dual role in providing medical diagnosis 

and treatment as well as performing an investigation and gathering evidence. There 

is no evidence in this case that Hanrahan was not seeking to diagnose and treat the 

child victims in this case. 

McMahan, the SANE nurse, specifically testified that “[w]e do not do 

this medical care for prosecution. This is for treatment and care of sexual assault 

victims or patients, and that is the purpose of this charting and the care.” (Tr. 53.) 

She also testified that “whenever a patient is brought into the Emergency 

Department, I am called out as a consult to see them and to care for them” and that 

“[w]e need to know what happened to the child or the patient because it guides our 

exam, it guides medication, it guides every bit of care and treatment that we do for 

these patients.” (Tr. 15 and 25.) The victims’ statements provided to the SANE 
nurses allowed them to understand where to look for any injury or even explain the 

absence of injury. The victims reported where the assaults occurred, the nature and 

frequency of the assaults, whether they experienced pain or discomfort, whether an 

ejaculation occurred, and whether strangulation or pornography were concerns. 

This information was plainly received for the purpose of medical diagnosis and 

treatment to allow the SANE nurses to determine how to best examine and treat 

each victim. 

We have thoroughly reviewed the testimony offered by Hanrahan, 

McMahan, and Burns, and do not find any instance where the testimony offered was 

solely for prosecutorial or investigative purposes. We therefore overrule M.P.’s first 

assignment of error. 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his second assignment of error, M.P. contends that insufficient 

evidence existed to support the trial court’s finding of delinquency on Counts 3 and 

4. In his third assignment of error, M.P. contends that insufficient evidence existed 

to support the trial court’s finding of delinquency on Counts 1 and 2. For ease of 

discussion, we address both assignments of error together. 

To establish Counts 1 and 2, both of which were charges of rape, firstdegree felonies under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), the state was required to prove that M.P. 

engaged in sexual conduct, to wit: fellatio, with M.J. by purposely compelling him 

to submit by force or threat of force between April 1, 2019, and September 18, 2020.
To establish Counts 3 and 4, both of which were charges of rape, firstdegree felonies under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), the state was required to prove that M.P. 

engaged in sexual conduct, to wit: anal penetration, with M.J. by purposely 

compelling him to submit by force or threat of force between April 1, 2019, and 

September 18, 2020. 

The standard of review for issues involving sufficiency of the evidence 

in delinquency adjudications is the same as the standard for adults; the evidence is 

viewed in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether any rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In re T.N.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111367, 2023-Ohio-85, ¶ 38, 

citing In re D.C., 2018-Ohio-163, 104 N.E.3d 121, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.), citing In re 

Washington, 81 Ohio St.3d 337, 339, 691 N.E.2d 285 (1998). In conducting a 

sufficiency review, appellate courts are cautioned that the onus is on the trier of fact 

to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable 

inferences. Id., citing State v. Jones, 166 Ohio St.3d 85, 2021-Ohio-3311, 182 N.E.3d 

1161. The charge of the appellate court is to determine whether the evidence against 

a defendant, if believed, supports the convictions. Id., citing Jones at ¶ 16, citing 

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). 

Regarding Counts 3 and 4, M.P. directs us to State v. Wells, 91 Ohio 

St.3d 32, 740 N.E.2d 1097 (2001), which held that “[i]f the evidence shows that the 

defendant made contact only with the victim’s buttocks, there is not sufficient 

evidence to prove the defendant guilty of the crime of anal rape.” M.P. also directs 
us to this court’s decision in In re D.C., where this court noted that the child victim’s 

testimony (1) did not establish what he meant by his “bottom”; (2) did not indicate 

that penetration occurred; and (3) did not differentiate between merely the cheeks 

of the buttocks or the actual anal cavity. Id. at ¶ 8. We also note that R.C. 2907.01(A) 

defines “sexual conduct” as “the insertion, however slight, of any part of the body 

* * * into the vaginal or anal opening of another.” (Emphasis added.) 

We find the instant matter distinguishable from In re D.C. because the 

record in this case contains much more evidence than the record in In re D.C. We 

specifically note that, during his interview with McMahan, M.J. stated that “poop 

comes out of his bottom” and that M.P. placed his private “inside” of M.J.’s bottom. 

(Tr. 32-33.) Neither party disputes that M.J. could identify the relevant parts of his 

body. M.J. clarified to McMahan that when M.P. did this, it hurt, and that it 

happened “more than one time.” (Tr. 34.) M.J. told Hanrahan that M.P. “was 

putting his private in his butt and specified that it was the inside of his butt, and that 

it hurt, and that it occurred more than one time, but was not able to give a specific 

amount of times.” (Tr. 88.) M.J. himself testified that M.P. tried to “put his private 

part in my butt,” but when asked if he was successful, stated “not really.” (Tr. 137.) 

The state asked M.J. whether M.P. placed his private part on top of his buttocks or 

inside of it, and M.J. answered “almost inside.” (Tr. 137.) M.J. further testified that 

he did not want this to happen, that it happened three times, and that “it hurted.” 

(Tr. 138.) We note that unlike in In re D.C., M.J.’s testimony was significantly 

detailed and indeed, even the fact that M.P.’s actions hurt him would allow a trier of 
fact to conclude that penetration of the actual anal cavity occurred and that M.J.’s 

testimony that the attempt was “not really” successful could rise to the level of slight 

penetration. These critical facts were absent from In re D.C.

Regarding Counts 1 and 2, M.P. again refers us to Wells and In re D.C., 

2018-Ohio-163, 104 N.E.3d 121, and notes that the evidence was insufficient for a 

finding of delinquency on the fellatio counts because M.J.’s testimony was only that 

“[M.P.] made contact with his private part” and that no “additional testimony 

elicited from M.J. * * * specifically indicated [M.P.] penetrated the mouth opening 

of M.J. with his private part.” 

We are unpersuaded by M.P.’s contention. McMahan, reading from 

her SANE examination notes, testified that M.J. said that M.P. “made me suck his 

private.” (Tr. 34.) McMahan also showed M.J. a diagram of the human body and 

asked him to “circle where [M.P.] put his private in his body” and M.J. circled the 

mouth and the buttocks. (Tr. 36.) Hanrahan testified that during her interview with 

M.J., he told her that M.P. “made him suck his private part.” (Tr. 88.) On crossexamination, Hanrahan testified that M.J. himself used the word “suck” when 

describing the conduct. When Hanrahan asked M.J. what “suck” meant, M.J. stated 

“[t]hat he put his mouth on [M.P.]’s private.” (Tr. 108.) M.J. himself testified that 

he “touched” M.P.’s penis with his mouth, that it also happened three times, and

that he did not want that to happen. (Tr. 138.) 

After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the state, we 

find that there was sufficient evidence for the court to find M.P. delinquent of Counts 
1, 2, 3, and 4. The evidence discussed above is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to 

find beyond a reasonable doubt that M.P. engaged in the sexual conduct described 

by each count on four separate occasions. 

M.P.’s second and third assignments of error are overruled. 

C. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

In his final assignment of error, M.P. argues that the delinquency 

findings on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

As with a sufficiency analysis, a challenge to the manifest weight of the 

evidence in juvenile proceedings is accorded the same standard of review as applied 

in adult criminal convictions. In re A.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103269, 2016-

Ohio-7297, ¶ 43, citing In re N.J.M., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2010-03-026, 2010-

Ohio-5526, ¶ 34. A manifest weight analysis requires an appellate court to function 

as a “thirteenth juror” and may disagree “with the factfinder’s resolution of * * * 

conflicting testimony.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 390, 678 N.E.2d 541, citing 

Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). The 

appellate court is charged with examining the entire record, weighing the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, and considering the 

witnesses’ credibility. Thompkins at 387. In resolving conflicts in the evidence, the 

appellate court determines whether the trier of fact ‘“clearly lost its way and created 

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed, and a 

new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 

175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
M.P. does not set forth any arguments that differ from his sufficiency 

challenge to the same counts. In his brief, he restates that “the necessary testimony 

evidence did not show [M.P.’s] private part even penetrated either the anus or 

mouth of the alleged victim, M.J., of those counts.” 

In addressing M.P.’s third and fourth assignments of error, we 

reviewed the evidence proffered pursuant to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4. The evidence was 

sufficient to demonstrate that both anal penetration and fellatio happened on at 

least four occasions. 

The evidence in this case is almost exclusively testimonial and 

consists of statements from the victims. M.J.’s testimony in particular remained 

consistent when interviewed by McMahan, Hanrahan, and on the stand when 

testifying himself. We specifically note that during the initial interview with 

Hanrahan and McMahan, M.J. was unable to give an exact number of times that the 

conduct happened but noted that it happened more than once. At trial, M.J. was 

able to specify that both anal penetration and fellatio occurred three times each, 

which is not inconsistent with his prior testimony to McMahan and Hanrahan. On 

cross-examination, M.P.’s defense counsel was given the opportunity to ask whether 

anyone had coached M.J. regarding his testimony, and we cannot say anything 

significant came from this questioning. Nothing in the record allows us to conclude 

that M.J. was an unreliable witness. 

We also cannot make any other inferences from the testimony as 

presented — M.J. unequivocally and consistently maintained that the sexual 
conduct that M.P. forced him to engage in involved both his buttocks and his mouth. 

Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court clearly lost its way and 

created a manifest miscarriage of justice in adjudicating M.P. delinquent. We 

therefore overrule M.P.’s final assignment of error.

III. Conclusion

The trial court did not err in admitting evidence from Hanrahan, 

McMahan, and Burns because the evidence offered was properly found to comply 

with Evid.R. 803(4), a hearsay exception. We also find that the trial court’s 

delinquency findings on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 were not based on insufficient evidence 

and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. The 

defendant’s adjudications having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is 

terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of commitment.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR