Strategic Forum 63

Number 63, February 1996

**The Emerging U.S.System-of-Systems**

**by Admiral William A.  Owens
Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

**Conclusions**

	The things which give military forces their fighting capability are changing, and these changespoint toward a qualitative jump in our ability to use military force effectively.
	Probably relating to the way we plan, program and budget for these things, we are more adeptat seeing the individual trees than that vast forest of military capability (the system-of-systems)which the individual systems are building for our fighting forces.
	The system-of-systems depends ultimately on well orchestrated contributions of all the militaryservices.  This assumes a common appreciation of and adherence to what we are building.  Mostimportantly, it requires joint strategic and operational doctrine by which to organize, plan and carryout military operations.
**Revolutions Propel U.S. Military Toward Fundamental Change

	Three simultaneous revolutions are propelling the U.S. military toward fundamental change. Thefirst is the implosion of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and emergence of the United Statesas the sole military superpower.  We are also experiencing a related revolution--the reallocation ofresources from defense to domestic programs, which began almost a decade ago and acceleratedwith the demise of the Soviet Union.  The third is what some call the revolution in military affairs(RMA). In part because of earlier investments, particularly in electronic and computational technologies, the things which give military forces their fighting capability are changing, and thesechanges point toward a qualitative jump in our ability to use military force effectively.  It is the RMAwhich enables us to take full advantage of the opportunities posed by the first two revolutions,without compromising our national security or position as a world leader.
	What kind of changes are emerging as a result of the American RMA? They fall into three generalcategories, which, for convenience, we may call intelligence, command and control, and precisionforce:

**Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)**, involves sensor and reporting technologiesassociated with intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as the new meansby which we are able to keep track of what our own forces are doing.
**Advanced C4I**--command, control, communications,  computer applications, and intelligenceprocessing--the realm in which we convert the sensor awareness to dominant  understanding of abattle space and convert that understanding to missions and assignments designed to alter, control,and dominate that battle space.
**Precision force**.  A broad concept, in which the knowledge and orders generated from the firsttwo areas are translated into action and results.
	It is easy to miss the powerful synergy which exists between ISR, advanced C4I and precisionforce.  Look at table 1, a cross section of some of the weapons and systems in use or soon to beavailable to our fighting men and women. We tend to plan, program and budget for these things asif they were discrete capabilities. We are more adept at seeing the individual trees than that vastforest of military capability which the individual systems, because of their interactions, are buildingfor our fighting forces.  Fortunately, when you go to sea or into the field where things are actuallyhappening, you can see early signs of how it all fits together.  From this you can envision how futuresystems in the hands of well-educated and trained officers, soldiers, sailors, marines and airmenportend a qualitatively and quantitatively different military force for the country. 
	What is happening, driven in part by broad system architectures and joint operational concepts,in part by serendipity, is the creation of a new *system-of-systems*.  Merging increasing capacity togather real-time,  all-weather information continuously with increasing capacity to process and makesense of this voluminous data builds the realm of dominant battle space knowledge (DBK).  DBKinvolves everything from automated target recognition to knowledge of an opponent's operationalplans and the networks relied on to pursue them.
	The growing capacity to infuse DBK into all our forces will be coupled with the real timeawareness of their status and the understanding of what they can do with their growing capacity toapply force with speed, accuracy, and precision.  This means we will increasingly match the rightforce to the most promising course of action at both the tactical and operational levels of warfare. Further, we will have an increasing capacity to apply tailored forces faster, with more preciseweapons and over greater distances.  The advances in ISR will allow us to know the effects of ouractions--and understand what those effects mean--with far more fidelity, far earlier than anythingwe have experienced to date.  This will give our forces a great fighting advantage. This battleassessment, in turn, will make subsequent actions more effective.  As a result, we truly will be ableto operate within the opponent's decision cycle. This new system-of-systems capability, combinedwith joint doctrine designed to take full advantage of these new fighting capabilities, is at the heartof the RMA. It emphasizes a joint perspective, because the system-of-systems depends ultimately onthe well-orchestrated contributions from all the military services. This requires a commonappreciation of what we are building and, most importantly, requires common strategic andoperational doctrine by which to plan and carry out military operations.
	The RMA is inevitable.  But the speed at which it comes depends on our willingness to embracethese changes in our policy, planning and programming decisions. By accelerating the transition, wecould actualize the RMA perhaps decades before any other nation.  This is important for manyreasons; one of the most significant is that it will ensure our ability to protect ourselves whileenhancing our ability to shape the international environment, rather than simply react to it.
	This, then, is the essence of the argument in favor of accelerating the RMA. It is a bold vision anda controversial one.  Visions count, they are what move us forward and provide us the means to dealwith an unknown future. However, the professional military should not reify this vision unless itholds up to honest critique.  Let us examine the five most thoughtful criticisms that have been raised.

**Opponents Fight Back**

	The conflicts we face will remain competitions among thinking, learning, and adaptive humanbeings.  We need to recognize that any future opponent would diligently and intelligently try tocounter capabilities the system-of-systems gives us.
	History is replete with examples of how advances in military technology were eventuallycountered or matched. Yet history also has intriguing examples of real revolutions in militaryaffairs--Guderian's *blitzkrieg*, Ellis's vision of amphibious warfare, and the nuclear revolution cometo mind.  None of these provided dominance in all areas of military operations, and the edge theyprovided ultimately eroded.  But it was good to have the edge, not only because it paid off in conflict,but also because it gave leverage when implementing foreign policy.
	I believe the inherent character of the system-of-systems provides an edge in the competition ofconflict. The technology it rests upon emphasizes flexibility and adaptability. It will enable the U.S.military to know more about the flow of conflict than an opponent and to operate well within thedecision cycle of that opponent.  It will arm American forces with the means of learning faster on abattlefield (traditional or otherwise) and allow them to be more adaptable and flexible than anopponent. In other words, the coming RMA starts from the fundamental assumption shared by itscritics: war is a human contest that rewards innovation, learning, adaptability, and flexibility.

**Relying on Technology is An Achilles' Heel**

	Reliance on "information" technologies--the kind of sensors, data processing andcommunications subsystems that appear in table 1--carries the inherent vulnerability of suchtechnologies to offensive information warfare, or "hacking."
	There is, to be sure, great danger in relying on military systems that have exploitable flaws.Indeed, the characteristic that gives any system its potency--that the parts of a system enhancethe effectiveness of one another--also makes them susceptible to catastrophic failure if one oftheir central parts can be corrupted. Yet there are some aspects of the system-of-systems thatought to alleviate, if not refute, these concerns. 
	First, the people implementing the vision are far from ignorant of the danger of inherentflaws.  A great deal of thought, planning, money, and continual effort goes into reducing real orhypothetical vulnerability.  We won't wait until someone else finds a vulnerability; we will thinkand work continually to find and eliminate it first.
	Second, the computer and communications technologies on which the system-of-systems arebased are becoming less, not more, susceptible to the various forms of corruption andinterference. A race will always exist between those who try to ensure the security ofinformation-based systems and those who seek to overcome their security measures. Yet, thetrend favors the defense. In part, this is because of the relative "hardness" of the new generationsof communications equipment. Fiber optic cable, for example, has physical characteristics thatmake it inherently more difficult to "tap" surreptitiously.
	Third, there is a robust redundancy to the emerging American system-of-systems. Thisredundancy works against the possibility of breaking the whole system.  It also means that**ifthere are ways of successfully attacking parts of the system, the overall system would notcollapse but rather generate "work arounds" or gracefully degrade. In one sense, this is faintpraise; we don't want the system-of-systems to degrade at all.  In another, it suggests that anopponent would be impotent before he could defend against, counter, or defeat the capabilitieswe use against him.
	Clearly, none of this is cause for complacency; we need to continually bear in mind potentialvulnerabilities and work hard to find and end them.  Neither can a compelling case be made that the vision is flawed logically or that moving to the system-of-systems carries more practical riskthan sticking with the *status quo* and traditional way of doing things.

**It Applies Only to the Last War**

	Some argue that the system-of-systems may work only in a conflict similar to Desert Storm*,*with relatively open terrain, an inept opponent, and enough time to amass an overwhelmingforce.  Future conflicts may take place in terrain less open, against a motivated force astutely led.Urban areas, jungles, and mountains are as likely to be future battlefields as open deserts. Underthese circumstances, it is argued, the system-of-systems is less applicable, and relying on it inplace of a more "traditional" force is unnecessarily risky.
	However, the system-of-systems applies*across* the full spectrum of conflict.  It promises abetter, although different, way of doing things.  Americans will always seek  to use military forcewith speed, precision, effectiveness and minimal risk to our personnel.  The dispositions,movements, and capabilities of an opponent's forces may be easier to discern in open desert thanin downtown Mogadishu or triple-canopied jungles.  But this is no reason to refrain from tryingto discern enemy characteristics. The fact is that the system-of-systems will give us far bettercapacity to do this, and with greater effectiveness and lower risk than we currently have. Furthermore, it is obvious that it would be highly advantageous to the nation if we foundalternatives to the large manpower base and force structure which was the hallmark of ourmilitary forces during the Cold War.  The system-of-systems and RMA holds out the promise thatin the not too distant future the pointed end of the spear may be smaller, far sharper and able topierce the opponents jugular vein on the first throw.

**The System-of-Systems Reduces the Fog and Friction of War**

	Conflict is chaotic, confusing, and messy.  We will never have *perfect* understanding of abattlefield, our systems and weapons will never work flawlessly *all the time*, and the forces we askto wage war will never do everything correctly *every time.*
	The system-of-systems does not offer omniscience or omnipotence.  It has demonstrated theability to reduce the fog and friction of war and promises to do even more so in the future. Whatcounts in war is the relative influence on the opposing side of what some have called the fog andfriction of conflict. The side that can reduce the effect of that fog and friction significantly, relativeto its opponent, will win.

**It's Not Broken; Don't Fix It**

	There is considerable agreement within the Department of Defense and the services on thecentral issues: that we ought to continue to develop our capacity to understand the battle spacesin which we may operate, to improve joint operations, and continue to pursue new technologies. The real issue is the rate at which we should move and which technologies and force structures tofavor.
	The amount of money needed to accelerate the achievement of the vision is not substantial;most of the programs that drive the RMA are already funded. They will reach fruition relativelysoon, and not all of them should necessarily be accelerated.  Their significance is, after all, afunction of their interaction.  Accelerating some but not others may give only marginal gains. Some simply cannot come any faster no matter how much money and brainpower we devote tothem.
	At the center of the debate is whether we should shift resources from some programs and theforces associated with them and give it to others.  Making tradeoffs is nothing new. What is newis the rationale used for making them. In the past, we used the perception of the threat (e.g., wedeveloped new capabilities to keep ahead of our peer competitor, the Soviet Union) or  therealization that things inside the military were broken and need fixing. The Department wentthrough such a period of introspection after Vietnam.
	Now, however, neither of these rationales is particularly relevant: there is no peer competitorand we won the last war. So the Occam's razor has changed.  Today's rationales are: 1)maintaining an adequate defense today while building superiority for the 21st century; 2) whatthe American people will support and the economy can sustain over the long haul.
	The system-of-systems  is emerging as the result of these rationales.  In an increasinglyambiguous and dangerous world, where coalitions will parallel and perhaps replace alliances,and nations will look for U.S. leadership, the smart, flexible, mobile, effective forces the system-of-systems will build makes sense.

**Recommendations**

	The RMA is inevitable.  But the speed at which we adapt to it depends on recognition of whatis emerging and a willingness to embrace these changes in our policy, planning andprogramming decisions. By accelerating the transition, we could actualize the RMA perhapsdecades before any other nation.
	The amount of money needed to accelerate introduction of the system-of-systems is notsubstantial; most of the programs that drive it are already funded.  The center of the debate iswhether we should shift resources from some programs and the forces associated with them andincrease others.  Tradeoffs are nothing new. What is new is the rationale used for making them.The Occam's razor for defense has changed. Today's rationales are: 1) maintaining an adequatedefense today while building superiority for the 21st century; 2) what the American people willsupport and the economy can sustain over the long haul.

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members andguests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and theNational Defense University faculty.  These include reports oforiginal research, synopses of seminars and conferences,theresults of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks bydistinguished speakers.

Editor in Chief - HansBinnendijk
 Editor - Jonathan W. PierceNOTE

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