Black Sea Regional Security Initiatives

The Black Sea Regional Security Conference initiates an effort to create a regional sense of commonality by bringing together military and 

political leaders responsible for security issues from the Black Sea states 

and Caucasus countries. Building solid foundations for cooperation and 

stability will spur the region to develop democratically and economically. Since the end of the Cold War, nations in the Black Sea region 

have experienced radical changes. Although former Soviet republics 

gained independence, they lacked economic and political resources vital 

to building healthy states. Unresolved ethnic conflicts still haunt the 

region; they feed on instability, unhealthy competition for fossil fuels, 

and transnational issues to create a new set of problems for nations still 

struggling to fill unaccustomed roles in the international community. 

Regional leaders confront threats compounded by 9/11—terrorist networks, radical religious extremism, organized crime, human trafficking, 

illegal migration, money laundering, internal government corruption, 

narcotics and weapons trafficking—problems that perplex veteran leaders in the US and Europe. 

The Marshall Center and the Black Sea Security Program at Harvard 

University invited 60 participants representing the Ministries of Defense, 

other government ministries and think tanks in Armenia, Azerbaijan, 

Bulgaria, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, 

Turkey, Ukraine, and the US to attend. Thirteen participants had taken 

part in previous Marshall Center security studies programs. In addition 

to nurturing closer Euro-Atlantic ties, conference participants discussed 

and debated regional issues and established a network of colleagues who 

share a common understanding of defense and security issues. These 

new links will improve their ability to cooperate on resolving regional 

problems. 

The conference featured a mix of moderated plenary sessions, each 

focusing on a specific issue, and workshop sessions, where participants 

discussed joint approaches to regional problems.

Regional Cooperation: Turkey and Black Sea 

Issues

Turkey’s foreign policy, enticed by the possibility of EU membership, 

has undergone a change in the past decade. Tugged between two poles, 

the EU and Baghdad, Turkey’s relations with the US have changed as 

well. Two snapshots illustrate the contrast: In the 1990s, Turkey’s relations with its neighbors were less than perfect. Interactions with Greece, 

Iran, and Syria were problematic. Turkey directed its predominant 

foreign policy interest to Washington and the EU had limited influence 

in Ankara. In contrast, today Turkey’s relations with its neighbors, with 

the exception of Armenia, are good and Turkey’s policies, in harmony 

with the EU, diverge from the US, particularly on issues concerning the 

Middle East. 

Turkey’s new government that emerged from the November 2002 

elections energized a new foreign policy focus. The EU’s willingness 

to consider Turkish membership opened the floodgates of change in 

Ankara. A new atmosphere of cooperation spurred internal changes and 

reassessment of foreign policy goals. Encouraged by the incentive of 

EU membership, Turkey was ready to tackle problematic issues with its 

neighbors by opening negotiations.

Simultaneously, a number of events catalyzed new foreign policy initiatives. Turkey’s humanitarian response to an earthquake in Greece 

improved the atmosphere between the two nations. On the Cyprus 

issue, Turkey demonstrated willingness to negotiate and consider Kofi 

Annan’s proposals. In the Black Sea basin, Turkey pioneered the Black 

Sea Cooperation Initiative, which fostered cooperation between Turkey, 

Bulgaria and other states in the region and NATO. Iran and Syria, 

encouraged by the EU, opened new trade possibilities for Turkey in 

the Middle East. Finally, the US war in Iraq, with its repercussions for 

Turkey’s Kurdish population, pushed Turkey toward closer ties with the 

EU and exacerbated opposition to US policies.

Will these changes be permanent? As long as the possibility of joining the EU remains, Turkey will continue to align its policies and 

support with the EU. Turkey will continue to cooperate with the US, 

but whether it returns to its categorical support of the 1990s is still to 

be determined. 

Black Sea Regional 

Security Cooperation

Sponsors: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and the Black Sea Security

Program, Harvard University

December 6-8, 2004, Munich, Germany

Prepared by the Conference Center in close collaboration 

with the College of International and Security Studies

A Report of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Conference 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Marshall Center, the US Department of Defense, the German Ministry of Defense, or the US and German 

Governments. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES
Contemporary Black Sea Transnational Issues

In the Balkans and Caucasus, the incentive to resolve problems cooperatively has increased. Terrorism, military activities such as those in 

Chechnya, and the increased prominence of the region in a post-9/11 

world encouraged new approaches to old problems. Romania’s and 

Bulgaria’s accession to NATO membership boosted the organization’s influence in the region. The fledgling Black Sea Forum, while 

still limited in its impact, has laid groundwork for cooperation and 

confidence building.

The region presents a complicated political picture. Although differences and problems from the Cold War linger, nations increasingly 

cooperate to resolve transnational issues. Europe has greater influence, particularly in the western part of the region. While closer ties 

to Europe and integration into the Atlantic community mean peace 

and prosperity, this new orientation will change the region’s political 

systems. Democracy is spreading eastward: states with strong ties to 

Europe advocate for their neighbors further east. Indeed, this is the 

only region in the world where democracy seems to be successfully 

establishing a foothold.

If the states can develop a common approach, they will be more successful in bringing disparate elements under control. The region’s 

governments face common social and economic issues, which 

include smuggling, corruption, trafficking, sustainable development, 

and developing energy projects. Corruption and uncontrolled territories exacerbate problems. 

Russia remains an important player and must be included in regional 

initiatives. Russia must redirect its current policies that hinder the 

region’s economic development in order to weaken the elements of 

criminality rooted in sluggish economies that cannot provide citizens 

with a decent standard of living. 

International Political Institutions and Regional 

Security

To protect the region and play a larger role internationally, Black Sea 

states must coalesce into a group that shares common interests. This 

will enable international organizations active in the region to function 

more effectively. 

NATO’s expansion to the region prompted the EU to develop new 

interest in the former Soviet states. The region, for centuries a part 

of the Russian empire, still retains many ties among themselves and 

with Russia. Compared to Central Europe, the Black Sea basin has 

followed a very different path of development. 

In the past 15 years, democracy has taken root and citizens have 

become more willing to fight for their rights. Governments in the 

region must work to resolve long-standing conflicts. Active involvement by Russia, the EU, NATO and the United States could help 

frame a basis for solutions. 

The end of the Cold War transformed NATO’s role in European 

security. Between 1949 and 1991, NATO members fought against 

a common threat. They agreed on what capabilities NATO required 

and how it operated. With the disintegration of the USSR, allies 

increasingly disagreed on the nature of the new threat and how to 

effectively confront it. The Alliance’s decision to build expeditionary 

forces able to respond to crises beyond NATO territory rather than to 

threats within its territory expanded its focus. After 9/11 and the invocation of Article 5, NATO stepped forward to fill additional regional 

and functional roles as well. Through Partnership for Peace (PfP), 

NATO provided a forum to help newly independent states interested 

in NATO membership. 

Security cooperation across the Black Sea region is still embryonic, but NATO’s presence there increased with Romania’s and 

Bulgaria’s membership; 

since 2000, Georgia has 

become more involved 

with the alliance. Can 

this foothold be used 

to build bridges to the 

Caspian and beyond? The Black Sea Economic Cooperation 

(BSEC) and the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group 

(BLACKSEAFOR) are first steps, but how can the security sectors of the various states encourage further progress? Coordination 

between NATO and the EU and between security and economic 

development will encourage states to cooperatively build democratic values and stable governments. 

Counter-proliferation and Its Challenges

Given the region’s nuclear potential, instability could have dangerous 

consequences. Preventing proliferation is a priority and demands 

that regional law enforcement, customs, border guards, and the 

BLACKSEAFOR actively cooperate. 

Ukraine has renounced its nuclear capability; it pursues a course of 

non-proliferation, complies with international procedures, and has 

established expert oversight of dual-purpose technologies. However, 

although Chernobyl has been shut down, five nuclear power plants 

still operate and Ukraine continues to use nuclear energy. 

The region must also be concerned about WMD. Middle Eastern 

terrorists may be tempted by the oil and natural gas resources, tanker 

traffic on the Black Sea, and new pipelines. Ukraine’s intelligence 

service has shed its police functions and redirected its focus to intelligence and counterintelligence. With the turbulence of the November 

2004 elections in the past, Ukraine should be able to monitor regional 

risks and threats more accurately. 

Crisis Management Cooperation in Regional 

Security: BSEC's Contribution to Regional 

Security and Stability

The Black Sea region need not exist in a state of perpetual conflict. 

The area has a long tradition of communication; future development 

can build upon cultural interactions. Recent international interest 

should reinforce closer cooperation. History demonstrates that most 

conflicts are not resolved by military means; rather, conflicts are 

settled by a mix of political, economic and social measures that intertwine national, regional and international cooperation.

In 1992, 11 states established BSEC to encourage development 

and diversification of economic interaction. Through a network 

of regional institutions, BSEC aims to improve communications 

and secure peace and stability. A network of institutional structures enabled BSEC to take on new tasks that not only encourage 

cooperation, but also give members a role in Europe’s institutional 

Can NATO's foothold be 

used to build bridges to 

the Caspian and beyond?
architecture. BSEC has fostered political and economic cooperation, 

encouraged greater dialogue, and improved stability. 

Although initially BSEC did not envision a peacekeeping or crisis 

management role, in June 2002, in a statement looking forward to 

the future, BSEC representatives encouraged its Council of Ministers 

of Foreign Affairs “to consider ways and means of enhancing the 

contribution of the BSEC to strengthening security and stability in the 

region.” BSEC is actively working to combat organized crime and to 

provide assistance in natural disasters. The EU can reinforce BSEC’s 

efforts by focusing more attention on the organization, including it in 

more ministerial meetings, and fostering closer business ties.

Despite considerable political support, a chronically small $1.2 million annual operating budget has prevented BSEC from contributing 

substantially to the region’s revitalization. Many member countries 

can’t afford to send representatives to meetings. The Soviet heritage 

lingers and states flounder as efforts to develop economies fail to 

produce desired results. On the more positive side, Romanian and 

Bulgarian membership in NATO and Greece’s effort to focus EU 

attention on the Black Sea should garner much-needed outside attention. Further, as BSEC succeeds in developing regional cooperation 

on non-controversial issues (such as disaster relief), confidence in 

the organization should increase. If the EU targets assistance toward 

regional rather than bilateral programs, this will reinforce cooperation. As this happens, BSEC should be well positioned to act as a 

bridge between the EU and Eurasia.

Border and Maritime Security Issues

The disintegration of the USSR and development of breakaway 

“states” allow illegal activities to propagate across porous borders 

no longer secured by traditional military and police forces. Nations 

must focus on long-suppressed problems and address the underlying 

causes in order to prevent the emergence of new, ever more serious 

threats. In many cases, international law has become murky and the 

international community has largely ignored problems. Drug trafficking or terrorist activity result; nations must respond consistently, 

proactively and with adequate resources.

All of these undefined borders and the phenomenon of “statelets” are 

rooted in problems that have long been allowed to fester. Breakaway 

regions represent an erosion of authority and create an environment 

in which drug smuggling and other problems related to terrorism 

thrive. NATO, already overstretched, should not be burdened with 

a peacekeeping role in the Black Sea region. Regional initiatives 

that include civilian peacekeeping operations, such as police, border 

guards, customs, and unarmed civilian observers, should be able to 

respond effectively.

NATO’s Vision on Maritime Security Issues in 

the Region

The common interests that link NATO and non-NATO states on the 

Mediterranean and Black Seas offer the potential to strengthen ties 

between the two groups. The geostrategic significance of the region 

makes a tempting target for terrorists. To address the threats, many of 

the regional militaries must undergo a significant transformation. 

Maritime problems will require cooperative action. Since 9/11, 

NATO forces have searched and boarded vessels in the Eastern 

Mediterranean. Under 

Turkish leadership, Russia, 

Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria 

and Georgia have established 

BLACKSEAFOR. While its primary tasks are to perform search 

and rescue operations, clear mines and protect the Black Sea environment, its success also builds ties and improves regional cooperation.

Under Turkey’s initiative, Black Sea Harmony forces patrol 

approaches to the Istanbul Straits and trail suspicious ships. Although 

this effort is still in its early stages, it offers another opportunity for 

regional cooperation.

The Portents of Partnership for Peace in Black 

Sea Regional Security

NATO created the PfP program in 1994 to improve the ability of 

non-NATO countries to act jointly with NATO forces. PfP’s success 

in implementing interoperability provided much of the impetus that 

drove NATO’s transformation. Russia’s leaders initially believed 

the program was an attempt to lure former Soviet allies away from 

Russian influence and to prepare them for NATO membership. 

However, Russia soon realized participating in PfP could provide 

leverage to influence NATO from within. Although NATO-Russia 

relations have grappled with some difficulties (particularly the crises 

in the Balkans and Kosovo), on the whole, a spirit of cooperation is 

developing. The relations between the US, Germany, France and 

Russia were strained by US/international intervention in Iraq. These 

partnerships must be re-energized as the alliance determines how best 

to help resolve the crisis.

If NATO members continue a cooperative approach to settling 

problems, the entire Black Sea region would be more secure. A 

Russian contribution to successful NATO peace-keeping efforts in 

the Balkans (for example an effort that results in refugees returning 

to their homes or a decrease in drug trafficking) could reinforce the 

NATO-Russia relationship and provide a model for future missions 

in the Caucasus. 

South Eastern Europe Initiative (SEEI) as a 

Model of Regional Cooperation under NATO 

Auspices

Could an existing model of 

regional cooperation, such 

as the Balkan peacekeeping mission, be transplanted 

to the Black Sea region? 

NATO’s outreach efforts 

include policies designed to 

bring new nations closer to the alliance. Romanian and Bulgarian 

membership in NATO demonstrates how well PfP has succeeded 

both politically and militarily. This accomplishment strengthened ties 

between NATO and the Black Sea states.

In 1999 after the intervention in Kosovo, NATO launched SEEI as 

a series of programs designed to promote regional cooperation and 

security. SEEI reinforces PfP mechanisms and builds on an established network of regional cooperation, although it stops short of 

full NATO membership. SEEI relies on member nations to initiate 

Maritime problems will 

require cooperative 

action.

NATO’s outreach 

efforts include policies 

designed to bring new 

nations closer to the 

alliance.
and lead programs with NATO acting as a support. SEEI helped the 

Balkans to focus on military reforms that would improve the states’ 

ability to cooperate with NATO. 

SEEI could provide a model for future cooperative efforts in other 

regions, particularly for the states bordering the Black Sea. To 

enable them to qualify for membership, NATO’s integration strategy 

should recognize the needs of individual countries and offer a bold 

vision that encourages states to make adjustments that will reflect 

NATO’s expectations. The momentum behind NATO’s most recent 

enlargement originated in aspirant countries, not NATO. Hungary 

and Poland were well into the reform process before NATO offered 

assistance. The Black Sea region could benefit from allied mentoring 

while they progress through the reform process. NATO will support 

the Black Sea states’ integration plans and help them improve cooperation and develop more democratic forms of government. The 

Black Sea Group already has the framework in place for improved 

cooperation and regional stability.

The Sine Qua Non of Future Regional 

Cooperation

Black Sea states must place security problems on the international 

agenda and seize every opportunity to make their voices heard in 

Brussels. Fostering a shared understanding of security concerns will 

encourage common action against threats; interdependence will 

decrease the potential for conflict. The region—with its geostrategic 

position at the crossroads of three continents—has catapulted to a 

level of importance similar to that of Central Europe during the Cold 

War. It offers NATO, the EU, and Russia a unique opportunity to 

pool efforts and bring the Black Sea states into closer contact with 

Europe. 

The nascent steps toward increased cooperation have already been 

taken. A security dialogue on non-controversial topics, such as civilmilitary relations, would be beneficial now that both US and Russia 

are involved. The dialogue could generate cooperation on other, 

more difficult issues such as drug trafficking and WMD. Successes 

and concrete achievements will reinforce common efforts to resolve 

security matters and divert attention from unresolved internal disputes. Numerous obstacles remain to be addressed. Among these 

are competition for oil transportation routes; uncoordinated membership in security and defense organizations; bilateral security disputes; 

historical animosities and mutual suspicions; and conflicting security 

agendas. However, the aspirations for Euro-Atlantic partnership create an incentive to work together. 

The organizational infrastructure exists. BSEC could expand 

to include military issues. Security organizations, such as 

BLACKSEAFOR, Black Sea Harmony and others, need to 

identify a common vision and strategic focus. Bridges to NATO 

and PfP will help manage assistance and explore the common 

challenges to security.

Conclusion

This conference provided a forum through which representatives 

of the Black Sea states developed new contacts, discussed developments with international experts and debated among themselves on 

how to define common interests and identity. Personal relationships, 

established at conferences such as this, will encourage frank discussions on issues at the core of the region’s conflicts. Cooperation 

will improve as avenues for exchanging ideas and views become 

more firmly established. Progress toward resolving long-standing 

disagreements will fuel regional development and improve NATO’s 

and the EU’s ability to work with the region.

Note: This report’s full version, with case studies of the 

region’s frozen conflicts and working group reports, is 

posted on www.marshallcenter.org.

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