Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 214 / Friday, November 6, 2009 / Notices 57525 

1Throughout this document, the phrase ‘‘licensee 

and certificate holders’’ includes licensees, 

certificate holders, permit holders, authorization 

holders, holders of quality assurance program 

approvals and applicants for a license, certificate, 

permit, authorization, or quality assurance program 

approval. 

2Throughout this document, the terms ‘‘safety’’ 

or ‘‘nuclear safety,’’ ‘‘security’’ or ‘‘nuclear 

security,’’ and ‘‘safety culture’’ are used. These 

terms refer to matters that are related to NRCregulated activities, including radiation protection, 

safeguards, material control and accounting, 

physical protection, and emergency preparedness. 

. 

Closed—10:30 a.m.–12 p.m. Management 

topics and status of data; analysis; 

Open—1 p.m.–2:30 p.m. Tour and facilities 

maintenance; 

Closed—2:30 p.m.–6:30 p.m. Cybersecurity, 

EPO, LSC status and Executive Session. 

Wednesday, December 2, 2009 

Closed—8:30 a.m.–12 p.m. Project overview 

and Project Management status; 

Closed—1:30 p.m.–6 p.m. Technical 

Progress, Development, R&D support. 

Executive Session 

Thursday, December 3, 2009 

Closed—8:30 a.m.–12 p.m. Executive 

Session, report writing, Close Out report. 

Reason for Closing: The proposal contains 

proprietary or confidential material including 

technical information; financial data, such as 

salaries; and personal information 

concerning individuals associated with the 

proposals. These matters are exempt under 5 

U.S.C. 552b(c) and (6) of the Government in 

the Sunshine Act. 

Dated: November 3, 2009. 

Susanne Bolton, 

Committee Management Officer. 

[FR Doc. E9–26784 Filed 11–5–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2009–0485] 

Draft Safety Culture Policy Statement: 

Request for Public Comments 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC). 

ACTION: Issuance of draft safety culture 

policy statement and notice of 

opportunity for public comment. 

DATES: Comments are requested 90 days 

from the date of this Federal Register 

Notice. Comments received after this 

date will be considered if it is practical 

to do so, but the NRC is able to assure 

consideration only for comments 

received on or before this date. Please 

refer to the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

section for additional information 

including questions for which the NRC 

is requesting comment. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any one of the following methods. 

Please include Docket ID NRC–2009– 

0485 in the subject line of your 

comments. Comments submitted in 

writing or in electronic form will be 

posted on the NRC Web site and on the 

Federal rulemaking website 

Regulations.gov. Because your 

comments will not be edited to remove 

any identifying or contact information, 

the NRC cautions you against including 

any information in your submission that 

you do not want to be publicly 

disclosed. 

The NRC requests that any party 

soliciting or aggregating comments 

received from other persons for 

submission to the NRC inform those 

persons that the NRC will not edit their 

comments to remove any identifying or 

contact information, and therefore, they 

should not include any information in 

their comments that they do not want 

publicly disclosed. 

Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for documents filed under Docket ID 

NRC–2009–0485. Address questions 

about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher 

301–492–3668; e-mail 

Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. 

Mail comments to: Michael T. Lesar, 

Chief, Rulemaking and Directives 

Branch (RDB), Division of 

Administrative Services, Office of 

Administration, Mail Stop: TWB–05– 

B01M, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 

0001, or by fax to RDB at (301) 492– 

3446. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Alexander Sapountzis, Office of 

Enforcement, Mail Stop O–4 A15A, U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, or by email to Alexander.Sapountzis@nrc.gov. 

SUMMARY: The NRC is issuing a draft 

policy statement that sets forth the 

Commission’s expectation that all 

licensees and certificate holders 1

establish and maintain a positive safety 

culture that protects public health and 

safety and the common defense and 

security when carrying out licensed 

activities. The Commission defines 

safety culture as that assembly of 

characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors 

in organizations and individuals which 

establishes that as an overriding 

priority, nuclear safety and security 

issues 2 receive the attention warranted 

by their significance. The Commission 

also considers nuclear safety and 

security issues to be equally important 

in a positive safety culture. The 

importance of treating safety and 

security in an equal manner within 

NRC’s regulatory framework is clearly 

evident in our mission and strategic 

goals. Experience has shown that certain 

organizational characteristics and 

personnel attitudes and behaviors are 

present in a positive safety culture. 

These include, but are not limited to, 

individuals demonstrating ownership 

and personal responsibility for 

maintaining safety and security in their 

day-to-day work activities; the 

implementation of processes for 

planning and controlling work activities 

such that safety and security are 

maintained; a work environment in 

which personnel feel free to raise safety 

and security concerns without fear of 

retaliation; prompt and thorough 

identification, evaluation, and 

resolution of nuclear safety and security 

issues commensurate with their 

significance; the availability of the 

resources needed to ensure that safety 

and security are maintained; decisionmaking processes that protect safety and 

security; clearly defined roles and 

responsibilities for maintaining safety 

and security; and the seeking out and 

implementation of opportunities to 

improve safety and security. The NRC 

expects its licensees and certificate 

holders to foster these characteristics, 

attitudes, and behaviors in their 

organizations and among individuals 

who are overseeing or performing 

regulated activities commensurate with 

the safety and security significance of 

their activities and the nature and 

complexity of their organization and 

functions. 

The NRC is requesting comments on 

the draft safety culture policy statement 

and associated questions. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

(1) Background 

The Commission has long expressed 

its expectations for safety culture in 

previous policy statements. In 1989, the 

Commission published its ‘‘Policy 

Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear 

Power Plant Operations’’ (54 FR 3424; 

January 24, 1989) to make clear the 

Commission’s expectations of utility 

management and licensed operators 

with respect to the conduct of 

operations. The policy statement stated, 

‘‘the phrase safety culture refers to a 

very general matter, the personal 

dedication and accountability of all 

individuals engaged in any activity 

which has a bearing on the safety of 

nuclear power plants.’’ The policy 

statement further stated that the 

Commission issued the policy statement 

to help foster the development and 

maintenance of a safety culture at every 

facility licensed by the NRC. 

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57526 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 214 / Friday, November 6, 2009 / Notices 

In 1996, the Commission published a 

policy statement, ‘‘Freedom of 

Employees in the Nuclear Industry to 

Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of 

Retaliation’’ (61 FR 24336; May 14, 

1996), to set forth its expectations that 

licensees and other employers subject to 

NRC authority will establish and 

maintain safety-conscious environments 

in which employees feel free to raise 

safety concerns, both to their 

management and to the NRC, without 

fear of retaliation. This policy statement 

applied to NRC-regulated activities of 

all licensees and their contractors and 

subcontractors. A safety conscious work 

environment is an important attribute of 

safety culture and is one of the safety 

culture characteristics in the draft safety 

culture policy statement. 

The importance of a positive safety 

culture for activities involving civilian 

uses of radioactive materials and other 

potential hazards has been 

demonstrated by a number of 

significant, high-visibility events worldwide that have occurred in the 20-year 

period since the Commission published 

its 1989 policy statement addressing 

safety culture in nuclear power plants. 

The events occurred across multiple 

industries including at nuclear power 

plants, fuel cycle facilities, and in other 

industries such as chemical processing 

plants and aerospace. Examples of 

nuclear industry events include those 

that occurred at the Davis-Besse Nuclear 

Power Station and the Peach Bottom 

Atomic Power Station. Workers at the 

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station 

discovered a cavity in the reactor 

pressure vessel head caused by boric 

acid corrosion. The corrosion developed 

over a period of several years but was 

not discovered before the cavity 

developed. The licensee’s analysis of 

the event identified weaknesses in the 

station’s safety culture as the root cause 

of the event. It particularly noted that 

management prioritized ‘‘production 

over safety.’’ At the Peach Bottom 

Atomic Power Station, personnel 

behaviors adverse to the security of the 

plant were identified, specifically, 

inattentiveness by security officers. 

Other licensees have had recurring 

problems resulting in violations of NRC 

regulations. Through a Commission 

confirmatory order, a fuel cycle facility 

licensee committed to having a thirdparty assessment of its safety culture to 

determine the causes of its continuing 

problems in order to establish 

appropriate corrective actions. The 

third-party assessment identified 

weaknesses in areas important to safety 

culture. In addition, weaknesses in the 

safety culture of licensees and certificate 

holders have contributed to 

unscheduled events or incidents that 

the Commission has determined to be 

significant from the standpoint of public 

health and safety. Examples linked to 

characteristics and attitudes in 

organizations and individuals 

associated with weak safety cultures 

include inadequate procedures; 

procedures not being followed; 

inadequate supervision; decisionmaking that does not ensure that safety 

and security are maintained; and 

ineffective problem identification, 

evaluation, and resolution. They have 

included medical misadministrations 

(such as giving iodine-131 to lactating 

females that resulted in the uptake by 

their infants and multiple events 

associated with prostate brachytherapy 

treatment) and overexposures arising 

from the loss of control of radiography 

or well logging sources. 

(2) Statement of Policy 

It is the Commission’s policy that a 

strong safety culture is an essential 

element for individuals, both internal to 

the NRC and external, performing or 

overseeing regulated activities. As such, 

the NRC will include appropriate means 

to monitor safety culture in its oversight 

programs and internal management 

processes. The NRC defines safety 

culture as that assembly of 

characteristics, attitudes, and behaviors 

in organizations and individuals, which 

establishes that as an overriding 

priority, nuclear safety and security 

issues receive the attention warranted 

by their significance. Further, it is 

important for all organizations to 

provide personnel in the safety and 

security sectors with an appreciation for 

the importance of each, emphasizing the 

need for integration and balance to 

achieve optimized protection. Safety 

and security activities are closely 

intertwined, and it is critical that 

consideration of these activities be 

integrated so as not to diminish or 

adversely affect either safety or security. 

A safety culture that accomplishes this 

would include all nuclear safety and 

security issues associated with NRCregulated activities including radiation 

protection, safeguards, material control 

and accounting, physical protection, 

and emergency preparedness issues 

among the issues that receive attention 

as a matter of priority. 

The Commission’s regulations are 

designed to protect both the public and 

workers against radiation hazards from 

the use of radioactive materials. The 

Commission’s scope of responsibility 

includes regulation of commercial 

nuclear power plants; research, test, and 

training reactors; nuclear fuel cycle 

facilities; medical, academic, and 

industrial uses of radioactive materials; 

and the transport, storage, and disposal 

of radioactive materials and wastes. The 

Commission carries out these 

responsibilities in numerous ways 

including through such regulatory 

activities as inspecting licensed and 

certified facilities and activities; 

collecting, analyzing, and disseminating 

information about operational safety 

and security; investigating nuclear 

incidents; and developing policy and 

providing direction on safety and 

security issues. 

The Commission believes that, 

because licensees and certificate holders 

use or provide services related to the 

use of radioactive material, they bear the 

primary responsibility for safely 

handling and securing these materials. It 

is, therefore, each licensee’s and 

certificate holder’s responsibility to 

develop and maintain a positive safety 

culture which establishes that nuclear 

safety issues and nuclear security 

issues, as an overriding priority, receive 

the attention warranted by their 

significance. Therefore, licensees and 

certificate holders should foster a 

positive safety culture in their 

organizations and among individuals 

who are overseeing or performing 

regulated activities. However, as the 

regulatory agency, the Commission has 

an independent oversight role (through 

inspection and assessment processes) 

including addressing licensees’ and 

certificate holders’ performance related 

to areas important to safety culture. 

(3) Safety Culture Concept 

In 1991, as a result of the 1986 

Chernobyl accident, the International 

Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG) 

emphasized the concept of safety 

culture for the nuclear industry in its 

report, INSAG–4, ‘‘Safety Culture.’’ 

INSAG is an advisory group to the 

International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA). The INSAG–4 definition of 

safety culture is, ‘‘that assembly of 

characteristics and attitudes in 

organizations and individuals which 

establishes that, as an overriding 

priority, nuclear plant safety issues 

receive the attention warranted by their 

significance.’’ 

Implied in the INSAG definition of 

safety culture is the recognition that 

every organization is continually faced 

with resolving conflicts among its goals 

for cost, schedule, and quality (or 

safety). The organization’s members 

(groups and individuals) also face 

conflicts among different goals in 

performing their jobs. Management 

establishes the framework (management 

systems, programs, processes) and 

communicates its priorities for resolving 

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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 214 / Friday, November 6, 2009 / Notices 57527 

conflicts among different goals. 

Members of the organization work 

within that framework and are 

influenced by management’s priorities, 

but they have their own beliefs and 

attitudes about what is important and 

make individual choices on how to 

proceed when faced with multiple 

competing goals. The INSAG definition 

emphasizes that in a positive safety 

culture, the goal of maintaining nuclear 

safety receives the highest priority in 

the organization’s and individuals’ 

decision-making and actions when 

faced with a conflict with other 

organizational or individual goals. 

The Commission modified the INSAG 

definition of safety culture which refers 

to ‘‘nuclear plant safety.’’ The 

Commission is strongly committed to 

promoting positive safety cultures 

among its nuclear reactor licensees; 

however, the Commission regulates 

many other organizations and processes 

involving civilian uses of radioactive 

materials. These regulated activities 

include industrial radiography services; 

hospitals, clinics and individual 

practitioners involved in medical uses 

of radioactive materials; research and 

test reactors; large-scale fuel fabrication 

facilities; as well as nuclear power 

plants. The Commission also regulates 

the construction of new facilities where 

operations will involve radioactive 

materials with the potential to affect 

public health and safety and the 

common defense and security. 

Therefore, by revising the INSAG 

definition of safety culture to replace 

‘‘nuclear plant safety’’ with ‘‘nuclear 

safety,’’ the Commission is emphasizing 

that it expects all of its licensees and 

certificate holders to place the highest 

priority on nuclear safety commensurate 

with the risks inherent in the regulated 

activities. 

The Commission also modified the 

INSAG definition to adequately capture 

or communicate the equal importance of 

nuclear security and nuclear safety in a 

positive safety culture. Following the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

the Commission increased its attention 

to the important role of security in 

regulated facilities whose operations 

can have an impact on public health 

and safety. The Commission issued 

orders enhancing security at its NRCregulated facilities to further ensure 

public health and safety and the 

common defense and security. One of 

the insights gained from the greater 

emphasis on security is the importance 

of incorporating security considerations 

into a safety culture and effectively 

managing the safety and security 

interface. In general, the safety and 

security interface refers to the 

organizational and individual awareness 

that the functions and goals of safety 

and security must be considered 

together so that actions to achieve either 

set of functions and goals do not 

inadvertently compromise the other. 

Therefore, to emphasize the equal 

importance of nuclear security and 

nuclear safety in a positive safety 

culture, the Commission has added 

‘‘nuclear security’’ to the safety culture 

definition. The NRC’s modified INSAG 

definition is provided in the Statement 

of Policy section above. 

(4) Stakeholder Outreach 

The Commission’s February 28, 2009, 

Staff Requirements Memorandum 

(SRM)–COMGBJ–08–0001, ‘‘A 

Commission Policy Statement on Safety 

Culture,’’ (ML080560476) stated in part 

that the staff should, as part of its public 

stakeholder outreach, reach out to all 

types of licensees and certificate 

holders. In the development of the draft 

policy statement, the NRC staff sought 

insights and feedback from 

stakeholders. This was accomplished by 

providing information in a variety of 

forums such as stakeholder organization 

meetings, newsletters, and 

teleconferences and by publishing 

questions in Federal Register Notices 

entitled ‘‘Safety Culture Policy 

Statement: Public Meeting and Request 

for Public Comments’’ (ML090260709) 

that were related to the Commission’s 

SRM. In addition, a significant 

stakeholder outreach activity was 

accomplished by a public workshop 

held on February 3, 2009, at NRC 

Headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. 

The staff reviewed and considered the 

stakeholder feedback derived from these 

different forums and incorporated it into 

the development of the draft policy 

statement and recommendations. 

(5) Safety and Security Culture 

In SRM–COMGJB–08–0001, the 

Commission also considered whether 

publishing the NRC’s expectations for 

safety and security culture is best 

accomplished in one safety/security 

culture statement or in two separate 

statements, one each for safety and 

security, while still considering the 

safety and security interface. 

Based on a variety of sources 

including document reviews and 

stakeholder feedback, the Commission 

concluded there is no one definitive 

view of this issue, but the results 

weighed heavily toward a single policy 

statement to be titled a ‘‘Safety Culture 

Policy Statement.’’ Document reviews 

and stakeholder feedback suggested that 

a single policy statement (1) builds on 

the fact that safety and security have the 

same ultimate purpose of protecting 

people and the environment from 

unintended radiation exposure and (2) 

encourages attention to the ways safety 

and security interface. For these 

reasons, the Commission determined 

that the term ‘‘safety culture’’ should 

include both safety and security. 

Safety and security have been the 

primary pillars of NRC’s regulatory 

programs. However, in the current 

heightened threat environment, there 

has been a renewed focus on security, 

and the staff has implemented a number 

of efforts to enhance security and 

strengthen the safety and security 

interface. It is important to understand 

that both safety and security share a 

common purpose of protecting public 

health and safety. In today’s 

environment, safety and security 

activities are closely intertwined, and it 

is critical that consideration of these 

activities be integrated so as to 

complement each other and not 

diminish or adversely impact either 

safety or security. Further, it is 

important for licensees and certificate 

holders to provide personnel in the 

safety and security sectors with an 

appreciation for the importance of each, 

emphasizing the need for integration 

and balance to achieve optimized 

protection. The importance of both 

safety and security in an equal and 

balanced manner within NRC’s 

regulatory framework is clearly evident 

in the Commission’s mission and 

strategic goals. 

While many safety and security 

activities complement each other or are 

synergistic, there remain areas where 

potential conflicts may arise. It is then 

imperative that mechanisms be 

established to resolve these potential 

conflicts to assure the adequate 

protection of public health and safety 

and promote the common defense and 

security. Hence, safety and security 

have implications for each other in 

connection with all aspects of nuclear 

activities. 

One potential challenge is the way in 

which individuals involved in safety 

and security activities approach the goal 

of risk mitigation and protection of 

public health and safety. The safety staff 

is typically focused on preventing errors 

that would result in an inadvertent 

accident while the security staff is 

focused on preventing deliberate attacks 

or diversion of certain materials that 

could cause harm. Another challenge is 

that the organization/facility must 

ensure that the existence of motivated 

and capable persons with ill intent is 

recognized and that the importance of 

nuclear security to prevent such persons 

from unauthorized access is understood. 

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57528 Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 214 / Friday, November 6, 2009 / Notices 

To manage these potential conflicts of 

challenges, the Agency has recently 

issued regulations on the safety/security 

interface. An overarching safety culture 

policy statement which encompasses 

security supports and further enhances 

those regulations. 

Based on the above considerations, 

the Commission concluded that a single 

policy statement would accomplish its 

goal that, as an overriding priority, 

safety issues and security issues receive 

the attention warranted by their 

significance. Although, in some cases, 

issues relating to security might be 

handled differently than issues related 

to safety. A single policy statement 

recognizes there is one overarching 

culture in an organization; however, 

safety and security functions and goals 

must be treated equally within that 

overarching safety culture. 

(6) Characteristics of a Positive Safety 

Culture 

Experience has shown that certain 

organizational attributes and personnel 

attitudes and behaviors are present in a 

positive safety culture. Therefore, in 

2006, when the NRC implemented an 

enhanced reactor oversight process 

(ROP) that more fully addressed safety 

culture, it identified and incorporated 

safety culture components that are 

overarching characteristics of a positive 

safety culture. The NRC based its 

development of the safety culture 

components on a review of a variety of 

sources of information including the 

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations; 

the IAEA; the Nuclear Energy Agency; 

the regulatory approaches of other 

domestic and international 

organizations; and the organizational 

behavior, safety culture, and safety 

climate research literature. The 

Commission presented drafts of the 

safety culture components and aspects 

in frequent public meetings and 

modified them in response to 

stakeholder feedback. 

For the purpose of this policy 

statement, the NRC modified the ROP 

safety culture components (termed 

‘‘safety culture characteristics’’) to 

explicitly address security in the safety 

culture characteristics descriptions, 

create a more generic description for 

each safety culture characteristic that 

would apply to the range of NRC 

licensees and certificate holders, and 

maintain all the safety culture concepts 

in the safety culture components. The 

staff presented the draft safety culture 

characteristics for stakeholder comment 

in a February 3, 2009, public workshop 

and on the NRC’s public safety culture 

Web site (http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/ 

regulatory/enforcement/safetyculture.html). 

Although the safety culture 

characteristics themselves are 

applicable to all licensees and certificate 

holders, there may be other examples 

that more specifically address the 

unique characteristics of a licensee’s or 

certificate holder’s environment (i.e., 

unique for medical and industrial 

applications, operating reactors, 

research and test reactors, fuel cycle 

facilities, and new reactor construction 

environments). Hence, the Commission 

recognizes that these safety culture 

characteristics are not all inclusive; 

other characteristics and attitudes in 

organizations and individuals may be 

indicative of a positive safety culture. 

However, the Commission expects its 

licensees and certificate holders to 

consider the extent to which these 

characteristics and attitudes are present 

in their organizations and among 

individuals who are overseeing or 

performing regulated activities and to 

take steps, if necessary, to foster a 

positive safety culture commensurate 

with the safety and security significance 

of activities and the nature and 

complexity of the licensee’s or 

certificate holder’s organization and 

functions. 

The following characteristics that are 

indicative of a positive safety culture, 

are relevant across the broad range of 

activities carried out by the nuclear 

industry, the Agreement States and the 

NRC, and address the importance of 

nuclear safety and security: 

• Personnel demonstrate ownership 

for nuclear safety and security in their 

day-to-day work activities by, for 

example, ensuring that their day-to-day 

work activities and products meet 

professional standards commensurate 

with the potential impacts of their work 

on safety and security. They proceed 

with caution when making safety- or 

security-related decisions and question 

their assumptions, especially when 

faced with uncertain or unexpected 

conditions, to ensure that safety and 

security are maintained. 

• Processes for planning and 

controlling work ensure that individual 

contributors, supervisors, and work 

groups communicate, coordinate, and 

execute their work activities in a 

manner that supports safety and 

security. For example, individuals and 

work groups communicate and 

cooperate during work projects and 

activities to ensure their actions do not 

interact with those of others to 

adversely affect safety or security. In 

addition, managers and supervisors are 

accessible to oversee work activities, 

including those of contractors or 

vendors, and they challenge work 

activities and work products that do not 

meet their standards. 

• The organization maintains a safety 

conscious work environment in which 

personnel feel free to raise safety and 

security concerns without fear of 

retaliation. For example, claims of 

harassment, intimidation, retaliation, 

and discrimination are investigated 

consistent with the regulations 

regarding employee protection. If an 

instance of harassment, intimidation, 

retaliation, or discrimination for raising 

a safety or security concern is identified, 

corrective actions are taken in a timely 

manner. 

• The organization ensures that issues 

potentially impacting safety or security 

are promptly identified, fully evaluated, 

and promptly addressed and corrected, 

commensurate with their significance. 

• The organization ensures that the 

personnel, equipment, tools, 

procedures, and other resources needed 

to assure safety and security are 

available. For example, training is 

developed and implemented or accessed 

to ensure personnel competence. 

Procedures, work instructions, design 

documentation, drawings, databases, 

and other job aids and reference 

materials are complete, accurate, and 

up-to-date. 

• The organization’s decisions ensure 

that safety and security are maintained. 

For example, production, cost, and 

schedule goals are developed, 

communicated, and implemented in a 

manner which demonstrates that safety 

and security are overriding priorities. 

• Roles, responsibilities, and 

authorities for safety and security are 

clearly defined and reinforced. For 

example, personnel understand their 

roles and responsibilities in maintaining 

safety and security. Programs, processes, 

procedures, and organizational 

interfaces are clearly defined and 

implemented as designed. Leaders at all 

levels of the organization consistently 

demonstrate that safety and security are 

overriding priorities. 

• The organization maintains a 

continuous learning environment in 

which opportunities to improve safety 

and security are sought out and 

implemented. For example, individuals 

are encouraged to develop and maintain 

current their professional and technical 

knowledge, skills, and abilities and to 

remain knowledgeable of industry 

standards and innovative practices. 

Personnel seek out and implement 

opportunities to improve safety and 

security performance. 

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Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 214 / Friday, November 6, 2009 / Notices 57529 

(7) Implementation of Policy 

This policy statement describes areas 

important to safety culture, but it does 

not address how the nuclear industry, 

the Agreement States, and the NRC 

should establish and maintain a positive 

safety culture in their organizations. The 

nuclear industry, the Agreement States, 

and the NRC differ in their size and 

complexity, infrastructure, and 

organizational frameworks. Therefore, a 

single approach for establishing and 

maintaining a positive safety culture is 

not possible. Nevertheless, the 

Commission expects that nuclear safety 

and security issues receive the attention 

warranted by their significance, and all 

organizations consider and foster the 

safety culture characteristics 

(commensurate with the safety and 

security significance of activities and 

the nature and complexity of their 

organization and functions) in carrying 

out their day-to-day work activities and 

decisions. 

Questions for Which NRC Is Seeking 

Input 

(1) The draft policy statement 

provides a description of areas 

important to safety culture, (i.e., safety 

culture characteristics). Are there any 

characteristics relevant to a particular 

type of licensee or certificate holder (if 

so, please specify which type) that do 

not appear to be addressed? 

(2) Are there safety culture 

characteristics as described in the draft 

policy statement that you believe do not 

contribute to safety culture and, 

therefore, should not be included? 

(3) Regarding the understanding of 

what the Commission means by a 

‘‘positive safety culture,’’ would it help 

to include the safety culture 

characteristics in the Statement of 

Policy section in the policy statement? 

(4) The draft policy statement 

includes the following definition of 

safety culture: ‘‘Safety culture is that 

assembly of characteristics, attitudes, 

and behaviors in organizations and 

individuals which establishes that as an 

overriding priority, nuclear safety and 

security issues receive the attention 

warranted by their significance.’’ Does 

this definition need further clarification 

to be useful? 

(5) The draft policy statement states, 

‘‘All licensees and certificate holders 

should consider and foster the safety 

culture characteristics (commensurate 

with the safety and security significance 

of activities and the nature and 

complexity of their organization and 

functions) in carrying out their day-today work activities and decisions.’’ 

Given the diversity among the licensees 

and certificate holders regulated by the 

NRC and the Agreement States, does 

this statement need further clarification? 

(6) How well does the draft safety 

culture policy statement enhance 

licensees’ and certificate holders’ 

understanding of the NRC’s 

expectations that they maintain a safety 

culture that includes issues related to 

security? 

(7) In addition to issuing a safety 

culture policy statement, what might the 

NRC consider doing, or doing 

differently, to increase licensees’ and 

certificate holders’ attention to safety 

culture in the materials area? 

(8) How can the NRC better involve 

stakeholders to address safety culture, 

including security, for all NRC and 

Agreement State licensees and 

certificate holders? 

To ensure efficient consideration of 

your comments, please identify the 

specific question numbers with your 

comments when applicable. When 

commenting, please exercise caution 

with regard to site-specific securityrelated information. Comments will be 

made available to the public in their 

entirety. Personal information such as 

your name, address, telephone number, 

and e-mail address will not be removed 

from your submission. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day 

of October 2009. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Cynthia A. Carpenter, 

Director, Office of Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. E9–26816 Filed 11–5–09; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[NRC–2009–0192; Docket No. 50–244; 

Renewed License No. DPR–18] 

In the Matter of EDF Development, Inc.; 

Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, 

LLC; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, 

LLC (R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant); 

Order Superseding Order of October 9, 

2009, Approving Application 

Regarding Proposed Corporate 

Restructuring 

I 

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC 

(Ginna, LLC or the licensee) is the 

holder of Renewed Facility Operating 

License No. DPR–18 which authorizes 

the possession, use, and operation of the 

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Ginna). 

The facility is located at the licensee’s 

site in Ontario, New York. The 

operating license authorizes the licensee 

to possess, use, and operate Ginna. 

II 

By letter dated January 22, 2009, as 

supplemented on February 26, April 8, 

June 25, July 27, October 15, October 19, 

October 25 (two letters), October 26, and 

October 28, 2009 (together, the 

Application), Constellation Energy 

Nuclear Group, LLC (CENG), on behalf 

of the licensee and EDF Development, 

Inc. (EDF Development) (together, the 

applicants), requested that the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC, the 

Commission), pursuant to Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 

50.80, consent to the indirect license 

transfers that would be effected by the 

indirect transfer of control of CENG’s 

ownership and operating interests in 

Ginna. The actions being sought are a 

result of certain proposed corporate 

restructuring actions in connection with 

a planned investment by EDF 

Development whereby it would acquire 

a 49.99% ownership interest in CENG 

from Constellation Energy Group, Inc. 

(CEG), the current 100% owner of 

CENG. EDF Development is a U.S. 

corporation organized under the laws of 

the State of Delaware and a whollyowned subsidiary of E.D.F. International 

S.A., a public limited company 

organized under the laws of France, 

which is in turn a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of E ́lectricite ́ de France S.A., 

a French limited company. 

Following the closing of the transfer 

of ownership interests in CENG to EDF 

Development, EDF Development will 

hold a 49.99% ownership interest in 

CENG; CEG will hold a 50.01% 

ownership interest in CENG through 

two new intermediate parent 

companies, Constellation Nuclear, LLC 

and CE Nuclear, LLC, formed for nonoperational purposes. In addition, 

Constellation Nuclear Power Plants, 

Inc., which is currently an intermediate 

holding company between CENG and 

Ginna, LLC and Nine Mile Point 

Nuclear Station, LLC, will convert to a 

Delaware limited liability company by 

operation of law and become 

Constellation Nuclear Power Plants, 

LLC, and will exist as an intermediate 

holding company between CENG and 

Ginna, LLC, Nine Mile Point Nuclear 

Station, LLC, and Calvert Cliffs Nuclear 

Power Plant, LLC by merger. No 

physical changes to the facilities or 

operational changes are being proposed 

in the application. 

Approval of the transfer of the license 

is requested by the applicants pursuant 

to 10 CFR 50.80. Notice of the request 

for approval and opportunity for a 

hearing was published in the Federal 

Register on May 6, 2009 (74 FR 21013). 

No hearing requests or petitions to 

mstockstill on DSKH9S0YB1PROD with NOTICES6