COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

CHARLES W. VINCENT 

v. Record Nos. 0416-95-1 and MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 0557-95-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 JANUARY 30, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge 

 Andrew M. Sacks (Stanley E. Sacks; Michael F. 

Imprevento; Sacks, Sacks & Imprevento, on 

briefs), for appellant. 

 Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 Charles W. Vincent was convicted in a jury trial of nine 

counts of unethical solicitation of a gift by a public employee 

having official responsibility for a procurement transaction, in 

violation of Code § 11-75 and § 11-80. On appeal, Vincent 

contends: (1) that the indictment failed to state an offense; (2) 

that Code § 11-75 is unconstitutional; (3) that the evidence was 

insufficient to prove that the defendant "willfully" violated 

Code § 11-75; (4) that the trial court erred in denying 

defendant's pretrial motion for a continuance; and (5) that the 

trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a stay of 

execution of sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm 
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the convictions. 

 I. Facts 

 Charles Vincent was elected to the Virginia Beach City 

School Board on May 3, 1994, and assumed office on July 1 of that 

year. By August he had joined the Architectural Review 

Committee, tasked with selecting architectural and engineering 

firms for subsequent contracts for work on the school system. 

 On August 29-30, Vincent met with representatives of nine 

firms who later were awarded school contracts. On September 7, 

Vincent sent a letter to each of the nine firms, who at that time 

had been notified that they were recommended by the committee for 

contracts. The letters stated in whole: 

Gentlemen, 

 It was a pleasure meeting with you, and 

representatives of your firm, when you recently 

appeared before our committee. I am pleased to have 

been a part in the selection of [your firm] for [a 

particular school project]. 

 On another matter . . . I am trying to retire (or 

at least trim) my campaign debt from the recent School 

Board election. If you would like to contribute, 

please send your checks, payable to VINCENT FOR SCHOOL 

BOARD CAMPAIGN, in the enclosed envelope. 

 Thank you for your support. I look forward to 

working with you during the next four years during my 

term of office. 

The nine letters varied only slightly. Less than two weeks 

later, Vincent sent follow-up letters reiterating the last two 

paragraphs of the first letter. The follow-up letters contained 

a notice on the bottom of the page referencing campaign 

contribution filing and reporting requirements. The first 

letters did not. 
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 On October 3, a grand jury indicted Vincent on nine counts 

of unethical solicitation of a gift. A jury found him guilty on 

all counts and recommended a fine of $200 for each count. The 

trial judge sentenced the fine in accordance with the jury's 

recommendation and further ordered that Vincent forfeit his 

school board seat. The judge stayed the execution of the fines 

pending appeal, but refused to stay the forfeiture of the public 

position. 

 II. Indictment 

 Vincent first argues that the indictment did not properly 

state an offense because the wording in the indictment did not 

parallel the wording of the statute sections he was charged with 

violating. His argument has no merit. The indictment cited Code 

§§ 11-75 and 11-80, defining both the crime and the necessary 

criminal intent. "By citation of the statute in the indictment 

appellant was informed of the essential elements of the case 

against him." Reed v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 665, 667, 353 

S.E.2d 166, 167-68 (1987). The reference to the applicable 

statute sections and the plain wording of the indictment made the 

charges against Vincent clear. The indictment sufficiently 

stated the offense. 

 Vincent also contends that Code § 11-75 is 

unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. It is neither. 

 Code § 11-75 states: 

 No public employee having official 

responsibility for a procurement transaction 

shall solicit, demand, accept, or agree to 
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accept from a bidder, offeror, contractor or 

subcontractor any payment, loan, 

subscription, advance, deposit of money, 

services or anything of more than nominal or 

minimal value, present or promised, unless 

consideration of substantially equal or 

greater value is exchanged. The public body 

may recover the value of anything conveyed in 

violation of this section. 

In order to withstand a void for vagueness challenge, the statute 

must provide a reasonably intelligent person with fair notice 

that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. Papachristou v. 

City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). Code § 11-75 

clearly delineates the kinds of activities the General Assembly 

intended to prohibit: "solicit, demand, accept, or agree to 

accept" something of value from a bidder or contractor. A 

reasonable public official or employee has sufficient notice as 

to potential wrongdoing, and the statute therefore does not fail 

for vagueness. 

 Nor is the statute constitutionally overbroad. If a statute 

can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable 

construction, the court is under a legal duty to give it that 

construction. Pederson v. City of Richmond, 219 Va. 1061, 

1065-66, 254 S.E.2d 92, 98 (1979). When statutory construction 

is required, the court must construe a statute to promote the end 

for which it was enacted, if such an interpretation can 

reasonably be made from the language used. Wollfolk v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533 (1994). 

Contrary to Vincent's assertion, the statute as written does not 
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prohibit an official who once had procurement responsibility 

from that point onward ever receiving a campaign contribution 

from anyone who once was a contractor. The statute as applied to 

the appellant can be construed narrowly so as to confine the 

period when he was a public official with procurement 

responsibility and the solicitees who were firms involved in that 

current transaction. 

III. Willful Requirement 

 At trial, the jury was instructed that a "willful" act as 

defined in the offense was "an act done voluntarily and 

intentionally, and with the specific intent to do something the 

law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey 

or to disregard the law." The instruction was given without 

objection and becomes the law of the case, thereby binding the 

parties in the trial court and this Court on review. OwensIllinois, Inc. v. Thomas Baker Real Estate, 237 Va. 649, 652, 379 

S.E.2d 344, 346 (1989); Shamblee v. Virginia Transit Co., 204 Va. 

591, 594-95, 132 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1963).1

 In the absence of direct evidence, willfulness may be 

established through circumstances. Lambert v. Commonwealth, 6 

Va. App. 360, 363, 367 S.E.2d 745, 746 (1988). "On appeal, we 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

 

 1Because it is the law of this case on appeal, we need not 

decide whether this instruction states the law inaccurately, 

although we do note in passing that the instruction as given may 

have provided the appellant with a more favorable standard than 

that to which he was entitled. 
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Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly 

deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 

443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). "[W]hat inferences are to be 

drawn from proved facts is within the province of the jury and 

not the court so long as the inferences are reasonable and 

justified." LaPrade v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 410, 418, 61 S.E.2d 

313, 316 (1950). 

 The Commonwealth proved that Vincent was provided with 

specific guidelines concerning the ethical responsibilities 

associated with his new position, and that Vincent acted in 

contradiction of the statutory prohibitions. Vincent was given a 

copy of the Virginia Beach School Board manual containing the 

school board bylaws, policies, and division regulations. This 

manual included a section specifically addressing the ethics of 

public contracting and the relevant statutory provisions. 

Vincent was also present at a special orientation meeting held 

for new school board members prior to taking office. These 

facts, taken as a whole, provide sufficient evidence to allow a 

jury to infer that Vincent's actions were willful. 

 IV. Trial 

 Vincent further assigns error to two decisions of the judge 

at trial. Vincent first contends that the judge erred in denying 

his motion for a continuance because of negative pretrial 

publicity. "The decision to grant a continuance is within the 

sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will be 
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overturned only "if it is plainly erroneous and upon a showing of 

abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice to the movant.'" 

Ohlen v. Shively, 16 Va. App. 419, 422, 430 S.E.2d 559, 560 

(1993) (quoting Mills v. Mills, 232 Va. 94, 96, 348 S.E.2d 250, 

252 (1986)). 

 The trial judge ascertained that three of the potential 

jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity. One of the jurors 

indicated that he had formed an opinion and was stricken for 

cause. The other two represented to the judge that they would be 

able to render a fair judgment based upon the evidence at trial. 

 Having empaneled a fair and impartial jury, the judge properly 

refused to grant the continuance. 

 After the sentence was pronounced, the defendant moved to 

stay execution of the forfeiture of his elected seat. Code 

§ 11-80, of which Vincent was convicted, provides that "[u]pon 

conviction, any public employee . . . shall forfeit his 

employment." Unlike the other statutes cited by Vincent, Code 

§ 11-80 does not expressly postpone removal of a public official 

from his position until the exhaustion of all appeals. In light 

of the express language of Code § 11-80, we cannot say that the 

trial court abused its discretion by denying the stay of 

execution. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the appellant's convictions. 

 Affirmed.