NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MILENKO KRSTIC,

Petitioner,

v. WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent. No. 17

- 72542 Agency No. A075

- 042

- 740

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted November 4, 2019

Portland, Oregon Before: PAEZ and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and KOBAYASHI, * * District Judge. Milenko Krstic (“Krstic”), a native and citizen of Bosnia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order of removal . We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the agency’s legal determinations, a nd we

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Leslie E. Kobayashi, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

MAR 11 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

review its factual findings for substantial evidence. Singh v. Holder , 656 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2011). We grant in part , deny in part , and dismiss in part the petition for review. Krstic raises a number of argu ments which we address below. 1. Krstic first challenges the agency’s adverse credibility determination. This claim fail s because the credibility finding was supported by at least three specific, cogent reasons. Shrestha v. Holder , 590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010)

. First, Krstic ’s claim of ignorance of the war crimes was implausible in light of the credible testimony o f the government’s expert witness. Second, his testimony regarding his weapons training and possession of weapons was inconsistent. And third, Krstic minimized the scope of his military duties. Krstic does not articulate why his post

- traumatic stress disorder should salvage the se specific inconsistencie s . 2. Krstic next objects to the agency’s imposition of the persecutor bar. Under the I mmigration and Nationality Act , “any person who ordered, incite d, assisted, or otherwise participated in” persecution of any person on account of a protected ground is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal

. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) . Krstic argues that his signing of
supp ly disbursements did not constitute participation in persecution

. A n individual’s actions must be considered along a “continuum of conduct” before deeming those actions persecutory. Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales , 4493

F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2006). This inquiry “requires a particularized evaluation of both personal involvement and purposeful assistance in order to ascertain culpability.” Id. at 927 (some citations omitted) (citing Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft , 362 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2004)). Thus, there are two questions we must address : f irst, whether Krstic was personally involved in persecution; and second, whether he purposefully assisted in that persecution. Kumar v. Holder , 728 F.3d 993, 998

– 99 (9th Cir. 2013). The government must present “threshold evidence of each element” to trigger the bar. Budion o v. Lynch , 837 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original)

. Regarding the first question , we consider “whether the petitioner’s involvement was active or passive.” Kumar , 728 F.3d at 998 (citing Miranda Alvarado , 449 F.3d at 927

– 28)). The petitioner in Miranda Alvarado

— who had served as a Quechua interpreter for Peruvian government torture squads

— exemplifies this distinction. H e was “undisputedly a regular part of interrogation teams,” and was “present and active during the alleged persecu tion [.] ” Id. at 998

– 99 ( quoting Miranda Alvarado , 449 F.3d at 928)).
T he government did not present evidence that Krstic witnessed war crimes or actively persecuted anyone. T he IJ , however, found that Krstic ’s sign ing o f fuel receipts was “ sufficient t o show that he was ‘ present and active during the alleged persecution ’ ” because that activity was “not ‘highly attenuated’” to the4

persecution. 1 As a result, the IJ concluded that the government met its burden to present a prima facie case of this element of the persecutor bar , even though Krstic was not “present and/or assisting at the killing sites” or “in a position of authority with regard to planning or inciting the executions

. ” No authority from our court supports this conclusion. Whereas Mi randa Alvarado was a key p art of the interrogation teams and was present and active during the torture sessions, Krstic did not participate in the Srebrenica murders and was neither present nor active during the killings. See Kumar , 728 F.3d at 99 8

– 9 9 (ci ting Miranda Alvarado , 449 F.3d at 928). In this respect, the government failed to present a prima facie case that Krstic was culpable under the first prong of the persecutor bar inquiry. The agency thus erred in finding that Krstic was personally involv ed in persecution

. Because the government must present threshold evidence of each element of the bar, Budiono , 837 F.3d at 1048 , this error standing alone is

1 The dissen t asserts that “Krstic personally verified the delivery of the fuel , its recipient, and its intended use” and that “[t]he government’s expert witness left no doubt that Krstic ‘authorized and verified the release of this fuel . . . for the purposes of the execution and reburial [of Muslims].’” There is no indication in the record, however, that Krstic intended that the fuel assist in the execution of the Srebrenica Massacre. Similarly, the dissent is mistaken in stating that “Krstic gave the order to release” fuel used in the genocide. The uncontested evidence established that Krstic’s signature was necessary to secure already

- ordered supplies

— not that Krstic himself gave orders to disburse fuel.5

sufficient to grant Krstic’s petition for review and remand to the BIA. As a result, we need not proceed to the second step of the persecutor bar analysis. 3. Krstic next challenges the agency’s denial of a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H). The BIA denied Krstic such a waiver because it concluded that he had “participated” in “genocide” or “extrajudicial killing” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(D). The same test for the persecutor bar applies to the section 1227(a)(4)(D) bar in determining whether an applicant for a waiver of inadmissibility is eligible for such a waiver

. See Matter of D

- R

- , 25 I. & N. Dec. 445, 452 (BIA 2011)

. For the same reasons the agency erred in finding Krstic subject to the persecutor bar, it erred here too. Krstic appears to request that we go one step further and affirmatively find that he merits a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility. But, as the government points out, it is not for this court to decide whether Krstic is entitled to relief that the statute entrusts to the Attorney Gene ral’s discretion. As a result, we grant Krstic’s petition for review on this claim and remand to the BIA to determine whether he merits a favorable exercise of discretion. 4. Finally, Krstic argues that “the BIA and IJ failed to articulate how and why t he charges of removability were proven by clear and convincing evidence.” The government counters that Krstic’s failure to raise this claim before the BIA6

means that this court lacks jurisdiction to decide the question. We agree

. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1) ; see also Sola v. Holder , 720 F.3d 1134, 1135 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) . We therefore dismiss Krstic’s petition for review on this claim. Petition GRANTED IN PART , DENIED IN PART , and DISMISSED IN PART

.K

rstic v . B arr, Case No. 17-72542 Raw linson, Cir c uit Judge , c onc ur r ing in par t and disse nting in par t:
I c onc ur in the m a

jority ’ s c onc lusion tha

t the a ge nc y ’ s a dve rse c re dibility de te rm i na tion wa s supporte d by substa ntia l e vide nc e . I a lso a gre e tha t we la c k jurisdic tion to c onside r the une x ha uste d a sse rtion of Pe t itione r M ile nko Krstic (Krstic ) tha t the a ge nc y

fa ile d to a

rtic ula te how the c ha

rge s of re m ova

bility

sa tisfie d the “ c le a r a

nd c onvinc ing e vide nc e ” sta nda rd.
Howe v e r, I re spe c tfully

disse nt from

the m a jority ’ s c onc lusion tha

t the

a ge nc y ’ s im

p osition of the

pe rse c utor ba

r a nd the a c c om

pa ny ing de nia l of a

wa ive r of ina dm i ssibility

wa rra nts a re m a nd.
As a pre lim ina

ry m a tte r it is im

porta nt to de line a te the fra m e work for

a sse ssing the a ge nc y ’ s a

pplic a tion of the pe rse c utor ba r. The gove rnm e nt ha s the initia l burde n of pre se nting “ thre shold e vide nc e ” tha t the Pe titione r ha d “ pe rsona l involve m e nt” in a

nd provide d “ purpose ful a ssista n c e ” to the pe rse c ution of othe rs. Budiono v . Ly nc h , 837 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th C ir. 2016) (c ita tion om itte d). Onc e tha t thre shold showing is m

a de by the gove rnm e nt, the burde n of proof shifts to the

a pplic a nt to e sta

blish tha t he d i d NOT e nga ge in pe rse c ution. Se e id. The

a ge nc y ’ s de te rm i n a tion tha t “ the ne c e ssa

ry e le m e nts of [the pe t itione r’ s] pe rsona l

a ssista nc e in a c ts tha

t furthe re d the pe rse c u tion of othe rs ha ve be e n e sta

b lishe d” is 

# FIL ED

MAR 11 2020
M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U

. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

1re vie we d

for substa

ntia l e vide nc e . Miranda Alv arado v . Gonzale

s , 449 F.3d 915, 929 (9th C i r. 2006). Unde r this stringe nt sta nda rd of re vie w, a de te rm ina tion

c ontra ry to tha t re a c he d by

the a ge nc y

m u st be c om

pe lle d for re lie f to be gra nte d by this c ourt. Se e Arte a

ga v . Muk ase y , 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th C ir. 2007). The m a jority m a ke s no e ffort to gra

pple with this de m a nding sta nda rd.
Inste a d, it e sse ntia lly c o n duc t s a de nov o re vie w . Appropria

te ly a pplie d, the substa

ntia l e vide nc e sta

nda rd of re vie w m a nda te s de nia l of this pe tition. The a ge nc y pre se n te d e vide nc e through its e xpe rt witne ss M ic ha e l M a c Que e n (M a c Que e n) a historia n, who te stifie d re ga

rding the B osnia

n

c onflic t, re c ords a ssoc ia t e d with the Zvornik Infa n try B riga de a nd doc um e nta tion from the Inte rna tiona l C rim ina l Tribuna l for the form e r Yugosla via . It is undispute d tha

t the Pe titione r wa s a

m e m be r of the Zvornik Infa

ntry B riga de

. M a c Que e n ha d te stifie d

a s a n e xpe rt in ove r thirty

m a tte rs involving the
B osnia n W a r. He ha d “ e xa m i ne d doz e ns of c a se s a nd lite ra lly te ns of thousa

nds of
pa ge s of witne ss a

nd pe rpe tra tor te stim ony

a nd doc um e nts subm itte d in e vide nc e ,

c onte m p ora ry doc um e nts from

the wa r.” M a c Que e n spe c ifie d tha t he posse sse d

“ the e ntire ty

of the doc um e nta tion” for the two infa ntry briga de s tha

t c om m itte d the Sre bre nic a

m a ssa c re of ove r one thousa nd M u slim

prisone rs, the la

rge st of whic h wa s Krstic ’ s Zvornik Infa ntry B riga de . Inde e d, M a c Que e n note d tha t “ m ost
2of the killings a ssoc ia te d with Sre bre nic a a c tua l ly took pla c e within theope ra tiona l

z one of the Zvornik [I] infa ntry [B ] riga de .” He a dde d tha t the C om m a nde r of the Zvornik Infa

ntry B riga de a nd two othe rs we re c onvic te d of ge noc ide a nd m a ss

m urde r. M a c Que e n re la te d tha

t the Zvornik Infa

ntry B riga d e wa s “ e xtre m e l y bure a u c ra tiz e d” with “ m e tic ulous re c ord ke e ping pra c tic e s.”
M a c Que e n pinpointe d Krstic ’ s ra nk a s tha t of “ M a jor Lie ute na

nt C o lone l” in the p osition of C hie f of Te c h nic a l Se rvic e s (Logistic s) loc a te d in the sa m e buildings a s the othe r se c tion c hie fs, a t le a st one of whic h ple d guilty to m a ss

m urde r “ w ith re spe c t to the Sre bre nic a ge noc ide .” At the tim e of the Sre bre nic a
ge noc ide , Krstic wa s “ re sponsible for m onitoring a nd a dm iniste ring a ll flows of fue l , m unitions, m otor ve hic le s, a nd we a p ons, obta ining the m

from othe r pa rts of the [A] rm y . . . a nd a ssigning the m

to the c o m

pone nt units of the Zvornik [B ] riga de .” Krstic ’ s ra

nk “ ga ve him

full m ilita

ry a uthority to give orde rs a

nd

e nsure tha

t the se orde rs we re inde e d c a rrie d out.” The re c ord re fle c ts tha

t Krstic ga ve the orde r to re l e a se “ 500 lite rs of sc a rc e D2 die se l fue l” to Lie ute na n t C olone l Popovic , who dire c t e d the ge noc ide . Inde e d,

a c onve rsa tion wa s inte rc e pte d re fle c ting “ tha t Popovic ’ s work is going to c om e to [a ] ha lt unle ss he ge ts . . . the se 500 lite rs of fue l.” Krstic pe rsona lly ve rifie d the
3de live ry

of the fue l, its re c ipie nt, a n d its inte nde d use . The gove rnm e nt’ s e xpe rt witne s s le ft no doubt tha

t Krstic “ a

uthoriz e d a

n d ve rifie d the re le a se of this fue l . . . for the purpose s of the e xe c u tion a nd re buria l [of M uslim s] .” 1 In the fa c e of this substa ntia l e vide nc e of Krstic ’ s pe rsona l involve m e nt in the m a ssa c re , it is im possible to c onc lude tha t a re sult c ontra

ry to tha t re a c h e d by

the a ge nc y

is

c om pe lle d. Se e Arte aga , 511 F.3d a t 944. I re spe c tfully

disse nt.

1 This te stim ony

re fute s the m a

jority ’ s a sse rtion tha

t Krstic did not orde r the re le a se of the fue l a

nd tha t the re c ord doe s not re fle c t Krstic ’ s inte nt. In a ny e ve nt, it wa s Krstic ’ s burde n to e sta b lish tha t he did not e nga ge in pe rse c ution, a burde n he fa ile d to sa

tisfy

. Se e Budino , 837 F.3d a t 1048. 4