### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 11, 200 6

JAM ES WES TBR OOK v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Gibson Coun ty No. H7159 Clayburn Pee ples, Jud ge

No. W2005-02459-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled May 4, 2006

The pe titioner, J ames W es t b rook, appe als the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief
, arg uing that his trial counsel was ineffec tive for failing to file a motion to suppress evide nce and for failing to call his codef

endant a s a witness at trial. F ollo wi n g o u r re v i ew, we conc lude that the peti ti o n e r h a s f a il e d to me e t h is b u r d e n o f d e mo n s tr a ti n g e ith e r

a d e f ic ie n c y in c ounsel’s perf ormanc e or r esulting pr ejudice to his ca se. Acc ording ly
, we a ffirm the post-c onviction court’s dismiss al of the pe tition.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., delivered t h e o p i n i o n of the c ourt, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE a ndJ.C. M C L IN , J J ., joined.

Har old R. Gunn, Humboldt, Tennessee, f or the a ppellant, J ames Westbrook.

Paul G. S ummers, Att orney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Sophia S. L ee, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; Ga

rry G. B ro wn , D ist

ri c t Atto rn e y Ge ne ra l; a ndJer a ld M . Ca mpb e ll, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

On September

20, 2002, a Gibson County jury convicted the petitioner of possession of .5 g rams or more of coc aine with the intent to sell or deliver , a Class B f el o n y . The trial c ourt subsequently

sentenc ed him as a Rang e I I , multipl e off ender to a $3000 fine and twelve y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. This c ourt aff irmed the petitioner’s conviction on appea l, but r emande d to the trial court f

or the e mpaneling of a jury to fix the fine. State v. James Curtis W estbrook, No. W2003-00163-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 1131, at *29 (Tenn. Crim. App. De c. 19, 2003), perm. to appeal de nied (Te nn. May 10, 2004). After re mand, an a mended judg ment was-2-

enter ed re flec ting that the pe titioner had bee n assessed a $5000 fine, which the t rial court waived due to the petitioner’s indig ent status.

Th e pr oo f at tria l e sta

bli sh e d th at the pe tit ion e r’ s a rr e st a ro se a s th e re su lt o f a

tip fr om a

c on fi de nti a l in fo rm a nt, wh o r e po rt e d to West Te nn e sse e Vi ole nt Cri me a nd Dr ug Ta sk F or c e a g e nts that the petitioner wa s selling c ocaine fro m a re sidence located at 364 J im J ackson Road in r ural Gibson County . I d. at **7-8. The home, wher e the pe titioner had bee n residing for t wo or thre e

wee ks prior to his arre st, was owned by L .J

. Woodruff, t he father of the petitioner’s g irlfriend a nd codef endant, Da

rlene Echols. I d. at **3-6. On Marc h 15, 2002, drug task forc e ag ents went to the ho me to e xec ute a

se arc h w arr a nt, sa w the pe tition e r l e a vin g the re sid e nc e , and fol lo we d h im t o Humboldt where they

stopped him, place d him under arre st, and escorted him back to the re sidence

. I d. a t ** 3- 4. Am on g the items un cov ered in these arc h w e re a n a sso rt me nt o f dru g pa ra ph e rn a lia found throug hout the home; a “dr ug ledg er,” used t o rec ord t he sale of crack c ocaine , seized from the pe tit ion e r’ s be dr oo m; a nda ba g c on ta ini ng 4. 7 g rams o f c ra c k c oc a ine hid de n u nd e rn e a th s ome sh e e ts o f tin loc a te d a

pp ro xima te ly

se ve nty y ard s b e hin d th e re sid e nc e . I d. a t ** 4- 6. F oo tprint s in the mud leading from the rear of the house to the loc ation wher e the c ocaine was hidden ma tched the tr e a d o n th e pe tit ion e r’ s sh oe s. I d. a t *6

. I n a dd iti on , Woo dr uf f te sti fi e d that prior to the a g e nts ’

arriva l he sa w the pe tit ion e r cu tti ng on a plate wh a t app e are d to be co c a ine . H e state d th a t he tol d the pe tit ion e r to re mov e the su bs ta nc e fr om his ho us e a nd that th e pe tit ion e r p la c e d th e ma te ri a l in a plastic ba g and lef

t throug h the bac k door. I d. at **6-7.

On Octobe r 6, 2004, the pe titioner filed a pro se petition f or post-conviction re lief. Among oth e r c la ims , th e pe tit ion e r alleged he was de nie d th e e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

tr ia l c ou ns e l du e to counsel’s f

ailure to file a

motion to s uppress e vidence obtained as the re sult of his alleg edly illega l
sto p, arres t, andse arc h a ndc ou ns e l’ s f a ilu re to c a ll E c ho ls a s a

de fe ns e wi tne ss at hi s tria l. P os tconviction counse l was subseque ntly appointed, and on Aug ust 26, 2005, an evide ntiary hearing w as held at which the petitioner’s trial c ounsel was the only witness.

Tria l c ou ns e l te sti fi e d h e wa s li c e ns e d to pr a c tic e la w i n Tenn ess ee a ndwa s a pp oin te d to

re pr e se nt the p etiti on e r i n h is d ru g c a se . H e sa id h e c on du c te d d isc ov e ry , r e vie we d th e dr ug ta sk forc e’s drug manual, and went over the contents of the petitioner’s file w ith the district attorney ’s offic e. Ba sed on his expertise, he saw no leg al basis to file a motion to suppress. As he r eca lled, the sea rch w arr ant spec ifically

cover ed the pe rson of the pe titioner as well as t he pre mises and property

. Howeve r, he did file a motion in li mine to exclude the evidenc e re lating to the pe titioner’s footprints, as w el l as various other pretria l motions , including one seeking the disclosure of the ide nti ty of the c on fi de nti a l inf

or ma tio n. Tria l cou ns e l tes tif ie d tha t he dis c us se d a ll the se iss ue s w ith the petitioner. He stated there was e vidence ag ainst the petitioner in addition to the coca ine

uncover ed behind the house , including statements by L .J

. Woodruff and Dar lene Echols that place d the petitioner inside the house in possession of coca ine. Trial c ounsel said he r eviewe d with the petitioner the plea

barg ain offe red by

the State, but the petitioner e lected to g o to trial.

At the conc lusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court made ora l finding s of fa ct that trial counsel wa s “fully

co m p et en t ” in his repr esenta tion and that his repre sentation “e x cee ded the-3-

standard normally

considere d to be ade quate in Te nnessee .” T h er ea ft er, on October 6, 2005, the post-conviction court entere d a written order dismissing the petition for post-conviction re lief.

AN AL YSI S

The pe titioner appea ls the dismis sal of his petition for post-conviction relief
, arg uing that the post-conviction court erre d in finding tha t trial counsel provide d eff ec t i ve re prese ntation. Spe c if ic a lly , h e arg ue s o n a

pp e a l th a t tria l c ou ns e l w a s d e fi c ien t for fai li ng to f ile a mot ion to

su pp re ss “ fo r the sto p, arr e st a ndtr a ns po rt a tio n o f the [pe tit ion e r]” a nd fo r fa ili ng to ca ll M s. Ec ho ls

as a w i t n ess at his trial. The State a rg ues that the post-c onviction court prope rly dismiss ed the petition. W e ag ree with the State.

The post-c onvi ct i o n p et i tioner bea rs the burde n of proving his alleg ations by clea r and convincing evidenc e. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110( f) (2003). When an evidentiary hearing is held in the post-conviction setting, the finding s of fac t made by the court are conclusive on a ppeal unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst them. See Tidwe ll v. St ate, 922 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Tenn. 1 9 9 6 ). W h er e a p p el l at e r ev i ew i n v o l v es p u re l y fa ct u al i s s u es , t h e ap p el l at e co u rt s h o u l d n o tre we i gh

or re evaluate the evide nce. See Henley v. Sta t e, 9 6 0 S

. W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997). How ever , re vie w of a tr ia l c ou rt ' s app lic a tio n of the la w to the fa c ts of the c a se is de novo
, with no presumption of cor rec tness. See Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tenn. 1998).

The is s u e o f in e f

f e c ti v e a s s is ta n c e o f c o u n s e l, w h ic h p r e s e n ts mi xe d q u e s ti o n s o f fac t and law, is revie wed de novo , with a presumption of cor rec tness g iven only

to the post-conviction court’s finding s of fa ct. See F ields v. S tate, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001); B urns v. State, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999) . To establish a c laim of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel, the petitioner ha s the burde n to show both that trial counsel’s pe rformance was de ficient a nd that counsel’s de ficient perf ormanc e pre

judiced the outcome of t he procee ding. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct . 2 0 5 2
, 2064, 80 L . Ed. 2d 674 (1984); see State v. Tay lor, 968 S.W .2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. A p p

. 1 9 9 7 ) ( n o t i n g t h at s am e s t an d ar d fo r d et er m i n i n g i n ef fe ct i v e a s s i s t an ce o f c o u n s el that is applied in fede ral c ases a lso applies in Tennesse e). The Strickland standar d is a two-prong
te st:

Firs t, the de fe nd a nt mus t sh ow that c ou ns e l’ s p e rf orma nc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. Th is require s showing that counsel made err o rs so serious that counse l was not functioning as the “counse l” g uara nteed the defe ndant by the Six th A mendment. Second, the de fenda nt must show that the def icient per formanc e pre

judiced the defe nse. This r equire s showing that counsel’ e rror s were so serious as to deprive the def endant of a fa ir trial, a tria l whose re sult is reliable.

466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct . at 2064.

The de fici en t p er formanc e prong of the test is satisfied by showing that “counse l’s acts or omissions wer e so serious as to f all below an objec tive standard of rea sonablene ss under pre vailing pr of e ssi on a l no rm s. ” Go a d v. Stat e , 938 S.W. 2d 36 3, 36 9 (T e nn . 1 99 6) (c iti ng Str ic kland , 4 66 U. S.-4-

at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). The prejudice prong of the test is satisfied by

showing a re asonable probability
, i.e ., a “pr obability sufficie nt to undermine confide nce in the outc ome,” that “ but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of t h ep r o c e e d ing would have be en diffe rent.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

I nit ia ll y , w e n o te th a t th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n c o u r t’ s o r d e r d e n y in g th e p e ti ti o n c o n tains no finding s of fac t or conc lusions of law. Following a post-convic tion hearing , a post-convic tion court is require d to enter written finding s of fact and conclusions of law a ddressing all g rounds for r elief. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 111 (b ) (2003); Te nn. Sup. Ct . R. 28, § 9(A). How ever , g iven the

narr ow scope of the iss ue on re view and the fac t that the post-conviction court made suff icient ora l finding s from the be nch, we conclude that the l ack of written finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law in this case is harmless. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).

The post-c onviction court made the following finding s of fac t and conclusions of law from the be nc h:

I fi ndthat [ tr ia l cou ns e l] wa s ful ly c omp e te nt in re pr e se nti ng [the pe tit ion e r]; that hi s repr esenta tion not onlymet but exceeded the s t an d ar d normally considere d to be

a de qu a te in T e nn e sse e . I

fi ndthat th e [pe tit ion e r’ s] c omp la int s r e g ard ing the le g a lit y of bo th the sto p a ndthese arc h to be wi tho ut le g a l merit. I fi nd[tr ia l c ou ns e l] f

ull y

e xplor e d a ll a ve nu e s o f d e fense a nda ll s e ttl e me nt p os sib ili tie s a ndthat hi s repr esenta tion fullycomplied with require ments of both statutory and ca se law.

We conclude that the rec ord fully supports the post-conviction court’s finding that the petitioner fa iled to show he wa s denied the e ffe ctive assistanc e of counsel. On appeal, the petitioner ba se s h is i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e c la im sole ly on c ou ns e l’ s fa ilu re to ca ll Ec ho ls a s a wi tne ss o r t o f

ile

a mot ion to s up pr e ss the pe tit ion e r’ s “st op , ar re st an d tra ns po rt a tio n” to the re sid e nc e . T ri a l c ou ns e l, howeve r, testified that he had no leg al basis for the motion t o suppress and that the sear ch wa rra nt specific ally

named the petitioner as a person to be sea rche d. The sea

rch w arr ant, which wa s made

a n e xhibi t to th e he ari ng , r e ve a ls tha t tria l c ou ns e l’ s me mory wa s a c c ur a te . F urthe rm or e , E c ho ls’ statement to the police, w hich was a lso made an e x h i b it to the hearing , does not support the pe tit ion e r’ s c la im tha t sh e wo uldha ve be e n a be ne fi c ia l wi tne ss a t hi s tria l. T he state me nt r e ve a ls that Echols told investigators that the drug s found in her f ather ’s room belong ed to her fathe r but that the drug s found in the bac k of the house be longe d to the petitioner. We also note that the pe titioner did not call Echols as a witness at t he evidentiary hearing. As such, he cannot meet his burden of sh ow ing that he wa s pre

jud ic e d a s a

re su lt o f t ri a l c ou ns e l’ s f

a ilu re to c a ll h e r a s a

wi tne ss at hi s tria l. See Bla ck v. State, 794 S.W .2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (stating that “[w]hen a petitioner

c on te nd s th a t tria l c ou ns e l f a ile d t o di sco ve r, int e rv ie w, or pr e se nt w itn e sse s in su pp ort of his de fe ns e , th e se wi tnes ses sh ould b e pr e se nte d b y the pe tition e r at th e e vid e nti ary he ari ng . A s a g ener al rule, this is the only way the petitioner c an esta

blish that . . . the fail u re t o h av e a known witness prese nt or ca ll the witness to the s tand resulted in the denial of critical evidenc e which inur ed to the prejudice of the pe titioner.”).-5- CO NC LU SION

We c on c lud e that th e pe tit ion e r h a s not me t hi s b ur de n o f s ho wi ng that he is e nti tle d to post-conviction relief on the basis of i neff ective assistance of counsel. According ly , we a ffirm the dismiss al of the pe tition for post-conviction relief

.

___________________________________ ALAN E. GL

ENN, JUDGE