GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Subcommittee on Energy

and Water Development, Committee on

Appropriations, House of

Representatives

April 2000 NUCLEAR SAFETY

Concerns With the

Continuing Operation

of Soviet-Designed

Nuclear Power

Reactors

GAO/RCED-00-97

Page 1 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Contents

Letter 5

Executive Summary 6

Chapter 1

Introduction

16

Background 16

International Nuclear Safety Assistance Efforts 20

U.S. Safety Assistance Activities 24

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 26

Chapter 2

The United States’ and

Other Countries’

Contributions to

Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed

Reactors

30

Total Donor Contributions 30

U.S. Nuclear Safety Assistance Program 33

DOE and NRC Have Unspent and Unobligated Funds 38

Future Costs of U.S. Safety Program Are Uncertain 42

Conclusions 42

Recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the Chairman

of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 43

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 43

Chapter 3

Experts Believe That

Assistance Has

Improved the Safety of

Soviet-Designed

Reactors, but More

Improvements Are

Needed

45

Experts’ Views on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors 45

Recipients Find U.S. Safety Assistance Beneficial 46

Impact of U.S. Safety Assistance Is Difficult to Measure 50
Contents

Page 2 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Chapter 4

Progress Toward

Shutting Down

Soviet-Designed

Reactors Has Been

Limited

52

Goal of International Assistance Program Was to Encourage

the Shutdown of the Highest-Risk Reactors 52

Assistance May Be Used to Justify Continued Operation of

Highest-Risk Plants 54

Donors’ Efforts to Shut Down the Highest-Risk Soviet-Designed

Reactors Have Met With Limited Success 56

Chapter 5

Management of Some

DOE and NRC Safety

Assistance Activities

Has Raised Concerns

60

Some DOE Projects Are Not Directly Related to Improving

the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants 60

NRC's Safety Program Lacks a Strategic Plan and Coordinated

Management 71

Conclusions 74

Recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the Chairman

of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 76

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 76

Appendixes Appendix I: Status of Efforts to Shut Down Highest-Risk

Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants 80

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Energy 82

Appendix III: Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission 85

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 87

Tables Table 1: DOE’s Cumulative Expenditures for the Nuclear

Safety Assistance Program Through September 30, 1999 37

Table 2: Cumulative Expenditures for the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s Safety Assistance Program Through

September 30, 1999 38

Table 3: Obligations and Expenditures for DOE’s and NRC’s

Safety Assistance Programs, as of September 30, 1999 39

Figures Figure 1: Operational Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants 19

Figure 2: Chornobyl Shelter 23

Figure 3: Countries Donating and Receiving International

Nuclear Safety Assistance, as of November 1999 31
Contents

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Figure 4: Types and Amounts of Funds for Nuclear Safety

Improvements as of November 1999 33

Figure 5: DOE’s and NRC’s Expenditures of Nuclear Safety

Funds Totaling $357 Million as of September 30, 1999 35

Figure 6: Distribution of DOE’s and NRC’s Expenditures

Totaling $357 Million to Recipient Countries 36

Figure 7: Safety Parameter Display System at Khmelnytskyy

Nuclear Power Plant 48

Figure 8: Full-Scope Simulator at Khmelnytskyy Nuclear Power Plant 49

Figure 9: Analytical Simulator Used by Ukrainian Nuclear Regulators 49

Figure 10: Status of Construction of the Chornobyl Heat Plant, as of

October 1999 59

Figure 11: Slavutych Laboratory of International Research and

Technology 67

Figure 12: Interior of the Slavutych Laboratory 68

Abbreviations

DOE Department of Energy

GAO General Accounting Office

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

MINATOM Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PHARE Poland and Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of Economy

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

TACIS Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent

States

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
Page 4 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors
United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Page 5 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Resources, Community, and

Economic Development Division

B-284374 Letr

April 25, 2000

The Honorable Ron Packard

Chairman

The Honorable Peter J. Visclosky

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Energy and

Water Development

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

This report responds to your request that we review U.S. and international efforts to improve the

safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors and assess the management of the Department of

Energy’s and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s nuclear safety assistance activities.

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further

distribution of this report until 10 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of

this report to appropriate congressional committees, the Honorable Bill Richardson, Secretary of

Energy; the Honorable Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State; the Honorable Richard Meserve,

Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of

Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please call me at (202) 512-3841 if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Key

contributors to the report are listed in appendix IV.

(Ms.) Gary L. Jones

Associate Director, Energy,

Resources, and Science Issues
Page 6 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Executive Summary

Purpose The United States and many other countries are concerned about the safety

of 59 Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors that operate in the Newly

Independent States of the former Soviet Union, as well as in other nations

throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Many of these reactors are similar

in design to the Chornobyl reactor in Ukraine that exploded in 1986,

causing the worst accident in the history of nuclear power. Deficiencies in

the design of many of these reactors pose grave safety risks, which are

exacerbated by problems affecting reactor operators, who in many cases

are poorly trained and erratically paid. In addition, many nuclear regulatory

authorities do not have the independence or effectiveness needed to

oversee safety. To mitigate these problems, the United States, many

European nations, Canada, Japan, and several international organizations

have been providing assistance since the early 1990s to improve the safety

of these nuclear reactors. The aim of this assistance is to improve the

safety of the reactors without extending their operating lifetimes and to

find replacement sources of energy so the reactors can be shut down as

soon as possible.

The Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on

Energy and Water Development, House Committee on Appropriations,

asked GAO to (1) provide information on how much money has been spent

by the United States and other countries for assistance to improve the

safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors—and the types of

assistance being provided—as well as planned U.S. expenditures; (2)

provide experts’ views on the impact of the assistance; and (3) assess the

status of efforts to close high-risk Soviet-designed reactors. In addition,

GAO was asked to assess the management of the Department of Energy’s

and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s safety assistance activities.

Background After the Chornobyl reactor exploded in April 1986, radioactive

contamination spread over Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, and fallout

was detected in the United States. The transboundary effects of the

accident raised concerns among the international community, including the

United States, about the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors, 59 of

which are currently in operation at 18 nuclear power plants.1 Twenty-five of

these reactors are of greatest concern because they fall below western

1

In addition, the Department of Energy is providing assistance to four small RBMK-type

reactors and one fast neutron reactor in Russia.
Executive Summary

Page 7 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

safety standards and cannot be economically upgraded. Located in

Armenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine,

they include 14 RBMK Chornobyl-style reactors and 11 VVER 440 Model

230 reactors. The international community, including the United States,

developed an assistance plan designed to quickly improve the safety of the

highest-risk reactors and provide longer-term safety improvements. Under

this plan, the donor countries have aimed for the earliest practicable

shutdown of the highest-risk reactors.

Responsibility for the U.S. contribution to this international safety

assistance effort lies with four federal agencies—the departments of State

and Energy, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Department of State, with assistance

from the U.S. Agency for International Development, provides overall

policy guidance for the U.S. effort, generally known as the U.S. safety

program. The Department of Energy, primarily through Pacific Northwest

National Laboratory, focuses on, among other things, improving the

physical condition of nuclear reactors and installing safety equipment,

developing improved safety procedures and training operators in the use of

these procedures, and conducting safety assessments. The Nuclear

Regulatory Commission concentrates on strengthening the independence

and effectiveness of the regulatory authorities in the countries that operate

Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors.

Results in Brief The United States and 20 other countries and international organizations

contributed about $1.9 billion to improve the safety of Soviet-designed

nuclear reactors; the United States contributed about $545 million of that

amount. The $1.9 billion includes contributions for improving operational

safety by providing better training, procedures, and equipment and

strengthening regulatory authorities. The U.S. safety program, which

provides most of its funding through the Department of Energy and the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has supplied assistance that includes

safety evaluations and reactor upgrades, training, and fire safety

equipment. Russia and Ukraine are the leading recipients of U.S.

assistance. It is uncertain how long the United States will continue its

safety assistance program. Although the Department of Energy plans to

complete its assistance efforts by 2005 at a projected cost of $709 million,

the Commission has not determined when or at what cost it will complete

its assistance efforts. Nevertheless, the State Department believes that

funding should continue for some time because the highest-risk reactors

continue to operate.
Executive Summary

Page 8 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Nuclear safety experts from 32 countries and international organizations

met in 1999 to assess the impact of the nuclear safety assistance provided

to countries operating Soviet-designed reactors. These experts concluded

that progress has been made over the past decade in strengthening nuclear

regulatory authorities, improving the operation of the nuclear reactors, and

establishing safety improvement programs. Nevertheless, they maintained

that further improvements are needed, particularly to strengthen the

independence and effectiveness of nuclear regulatory authorities.

Furthermore, the extent of safety improvements varies from country to

country. According to safety experts, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the

Slovak Republic have made the most significant progress in implementing

western safety practices, while Russia has made the least progress.

Officials from the countries operating Soviet-designed reactors that have

received U.S. safety assistance told GAO that the assistance has had a

direct impact on improving the reactors’ safety.

While safety improvements have been made, a major goal of the

international donor community has not been realized—the permanent

shutdown of the highest-risk Soviet-designed reactors. Although Ukraine

decided to shut down one of its reactors at the Chornobyl nuclear power

plant in 1996, the 25 reactors of greatest concern have continued to operate

despite the efforts of the donor countries to obtain their closure. Many

safety experts told GAO that countries will continue to operate these

reactors as long as it is in their economic interests to do so. Some of these

experts also told GAO that an unintended consequence of the safety

assistance is that it has encouraged countries to continue operating these

reactors. In May 1999, Russia’s Minister of Economy stated that

international assistance was enabling Russia to modernize its reactors,

including those that the United States and other countries want shut down

as soon as possible.

Despite the favorable views of those who have received the Department of

Energy’s and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s safety assistance, some

U.S. safety program officials, including U.S. laboratory and Commission

officials, have concerns about the management of both agencies’ programs.

The Department of Energy has funded several projects that may have

worthwhile objectives but are not directly related to improving the safety

of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. In funding these projects, the

Department has expanded the program beyond its original mission to

upgrade the reactors’ safety. These projects include international

environmental and nuclear safety centers in the United States and Russia

and laboratories in Ukraine. In addition, the Department has funded several
Executive Summary

Page 9 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

smaller projects or made other expenditures of program funds that some

program officials believed were of questionable value in meeting the

program’s objectives. Management responsibilities for the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission’s safety program are divided among different

offices. Recent internal Commission audits and reviews have reported that

this split in management responsibilities could cause duplication of effort

and miscommunication with other federal agencies participating in the

program. According to some Commission officials, the lack of coordination

and communication between different offices responsible for the

Commission’s nuclear safety assistance activities contributed to the

Commission’s inability to obligate over $500,000 in program funds that

were returned to the U.S. Treasury.

This report contains recommendations to improve the management of the

U.S. safety program and maximize the use of funds for projects directly

related to improving nuclear safety.

Principal Findings

Countries Contributed

About $1.9 Billion to

Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Nuclear

Reactors

The United States and 20 other countries and international organizations

contributed about $1.9 billion to improve the safety of Soviet-designed

nuclear power reactors. The European Union, which comprises 15 member

nations, is the largest donor, and the United States is the second largest,

with contributions totaling about $545 million. The major recipients of

assistance are Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and the Czech and

Slovak republics. The international assistance is targeted toward several

safety activities, including operational improvements, such as training

nuclear reactor personnel, supplying equipment, and strengthening

regulatory authorities.

The U.S. contribution of about $545 million is divided into two

components—$101 million for international nuclear safety initiatives

administered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

and $444 million for safety activities managed by the Department of Energy

and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. These activities include reactor

safety evaluations and upgrades, training for plant operators and regulatory

authority personnel, and fire safety equipment and materials. Eighty-six

percent of the agencies’ expenditures were related to activities in Russia

and Ukraine. As of September 30, 1999, GAO determined that the
Executive Summary

Page 10 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Department had not spent $78 million in appropriated funds carried over

from prior years. Because of the large amount of carryover funds, the

Congress reduced the Department’s fiscal year 2000 budget request for the

program by 55 percent—from $34 million to $15 million. As of the same

date, the Commission had about $9 million carried over from prior years.

Furthermore, the Commission returned over $500,000 for Ukraine-related

activities to the U.S. Treasury because the funds were not obligated within

a 2-year statutory period covering the availability of those funds. It is

uncertain how long the United States will continue its safety assistance

program. Although the Department of Energy plans to complete its

assistance efforts by 2005 at a projected cost of $709 million, the

Commission has not determined when or at what cost it will complete its

assistance efforts. Furthermore, the State Department believes that funding

should continue for some time because the highest-risk reactors continue

to operate.

Experts Believe Assistance

Has Improved Reactors’

Safety but More

Improvements Are Needed

According to the nuclear safety experts from 32 countries and international

organizations who met in June 1999 at a conference sponsored by the

International Atomic Energy Agency, the assistance provided over the past

decade to countries operating Soviet-designed reactors has improved

nuclear safety. The experts noted that these countries have strengthened

the independence and technical competence of their nuclear regulatory

authorities and made progress in implementing western safety practices

and in implementing design and operational safety improvement programs.

Despite these improvements, the experts found that the governments

operating these reactors need to do more to ensure that their nuclear

regulatory authorities have the financial resources and enforcement

authority necessary to be effective. Furthermore, safety improvements

varied from country to country and were affected by each country’s

economic conditions. According to safety experts, Hungary, the Czech

Republic, and the Slovak Republic have made the most marked safety

improvements. In contrast, Russia has made the least progress in terms of

safety improvements, and Ukraine lacks the financial resources to meet its

safety goals. According to representatives of donor and recipient countries,

the assistance has improved the safety of Soviet-designed reactors, and

U.S. assistance has been particularly helpful. U.S. safety experts cautioned,

however, that it is difficult to quantify the extent to which safety assistance

has reduced the risks of operating Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.
Executive Summary

Page 11 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Progress Toward Shutdown

of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Has Been Limited

A major goal of the safety assistance program is to shut down the highestrisk Soviet-designed reactors at the earliest possible time. Although

Ukraine decided to shut down one of the last two operating reactors at

Chornobyl in 1996 (leaving one remaining reactor operating at the plant),

all of the other highest-risk reactors have continued to operate despite the

efforts of the international community to obtain their closure.

Furthermore, it is uncertain whether Ukraine will shut down the last

remaining operating reactor at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant this year

in accordance with an existing agreement. Although the international

community obtained agreement several years ago with Bulgaria to shut

down some of its highest-risk reactors, these reactors have continued to

operate because Bulgaria has been unable to obtain adequate replacement

energy. According to Department of State officials, Bulgaria and Lithuania

recently reaffirmed their commitment to shut down several reactors in the

2004-2005 time frame.

The countries operating Soviet-designed reactors depend, to varying

degrees, on nuclear power to meet their domestic energy requirements and

believe that the reactors provide a low-cost energy supply. Each of the

reactors also employs thousands of people who do not have alternative

employment opportunities. Experts have recognized for many years that

shutting down the highest-risk reactors would require a long-term energy

strategy, which includes market reforms, adjustments to energy prices, and

the identification of both nuclear and nonnuclear forms of replacement

energy. The slow pace of economic reform in many of the countries

operating these nuclear reactors has hampered efforts to find financing for

replacement energy sources.

According to many safety experts, the countries operating Soviet-designed

nuclear reactors will continue to do so as long they perceive the operations

to be in their economic interests. Several experts also told GAO that the

safety assistance has the unintended consequence of encouraging the

reactors’ continued operation. In May 1999, Russia’s Minister of Economy

stated that international assistance was helping Russia continue its efforts

to modernize its nuclear power plants, including the highest-risk reactors.

A State Department official told GAO that the United States and other

donors are concerned about Russia’s position because the assistance was

meant to protect public health and safety in the countries operating these

reactors and throughout Europe until they could be shut down. Countries

seeking entry into the European Union, such as Bulgaria, Lithuania, and the

Slovak Republic, have an incentive to close their reactors because their
Executive Summary

Page 12 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

entry depends on their shutting down their highest-risk reactors within

agreed-upon time frames.

Management of Some U.S.

Safety Assistance Activities

Has Raised Concerns

Although the recipients of U.S. safety assistance have viewed it favorably,

U.S. program officials have raised concerns about certain aspects of the

Department of Energy’s and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s

management of their safety activities. GAO found that the Department of

Energy has funded several projects that may have worthwhile objectives

but are not directly related to improving the safety of Soviet-designed

nuclear reactors and do not meet the Department’s project selection

criteria. For example, environmental centers in Russia and the United

States—established by the Department to address nuclear waste issues—

are not directly related to improving the reactors’ safety. Similarly, GAO

questions whether nine joint research projects being performed at nuclear

safety centers in the United States and Russia are directly improving the

safety of currently operating nuclear power plants. Another project, the

Slavutych Laboratory of International Research and Technology in Ukraine,

has been described as an economic development project by a Pacific

Northwest National Laboratory official and will not directly improve the

reactors’ safety. In total, the Department has budgeted over $16 million in

safety funds to support the environmental centers, the safety centers, and

the Slavutych Laboratory, including $1.7 million to renovate and furnish the

building where the laboratory is located. The Department maintains that

the laboratory will facilitate U.S. and other countries’ efforts to shut down

the Chornobyl nuclear power plant—the top priority for the donor

countries—because it will employ about 100 displaced Chornobyl workers.

However, GAO believes that the laboratory’s influence is likely to be

limited, given that the plant employs about 6,000 people, most of whom will

be unemployed if the Chornobyl plant is closed.

In addition, several officials from the Pacific Northwest National

Laboratory told GAO that they were concerned about the Department’s

decision to fund projects that either did not improve the safety of Soviet

designed reactors or were of questionable value to the program. Although

not all of these projects involved large program expenditures, collectively

they raised concerns among U.S. laboratory officials because program

funds were being spent on low-priority activities. These expenditures

included about $1 million to partially finance the operations of offices for

departmental representatives in Paris and Tokyo; $169,000 to print

documents that had limited distribution; $16,200 to provide summer

internships for seven Ukrainian students; and about $10,000 to provide
Executive Summary

Page 13 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

robotics equipment to Ukraine for a test demonstration that Ukrainian

officials did not request or want.

Although the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has provided regulatory

assistance to countries operating Soviet-designed nuclear reactors for over

7 years, it has not developed a long-term strategic plan that clearly

identifies overall goals and schedules and measures to quantify how the

assistance is meeting these goals. According to Commission officials, they

have a short-term view of the assistance and have managed it from year to

year without a long-term strategy, particularly when it is related to Russia’s

and Ukraine’s activities. Furthermore, the Commission’s management of its

safety assistance activities is divided among different offices. Recent

internal Commission audits and reviews identified the split in management

responsibilities as a potential weakness. One of the internal audits stated

that this split in responsibilities could cause duplication of effort and

miscommunication with other agencies participating in the nuclear safety

program. According to some Commission officials, the lack of coordination

and communication between different offices responsible for the

Commission’s nuclear safety assistance activities contributed to the

Commission’s inability to obligate over $500,000 in fiscal year 1997 and

1998 program funds in accordance with a statutorily imposed 2-year period

of availability. This period expired, and the funds were returned to the U.S.

Treasury.

Recommendations To improve the management of the nuclear safety assistance program and

maximize the use of program funds, GAO recommends, among other

things, that (1) the Secretary of Energy review ongoing and proposed

projects and eliminate those that do not have a strong and compelling link

to improving the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors and (2) the

Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission integrate the assistance

activities of offices that implement nuclear safety assistance to avoid

duplication and inefficiencies.

Agency Comments GAO provided copies of a draft of this report to the departments of Energy

and State and to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for their review and

comment. The Department of Energy’s and the Commission’s written

comments are presented in appendixes II and III, respectively. The Senior

Coordinator for Nuclear Safety Assistance provided comments on behalf of

the Department of State. In general, the agencies agreed with the facts
Executive Summary

Page 14 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

presented in the report and the report’s recommendations. The agencies

provided technical comments that were incorporated in the report as

appropriate.

In commenting on the report’s discussion of program carryover balances

(unspent program funds), the Department of Energy stated that it would

continue its efforts to reduce carryover balances, and it provided clarifying

information about these balances. Both the Department of Energy and the

Department of State’s Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety questioned

GAO’s assessment of whether certain safety program projects funded by

the Department of Energy directly improve the safety of Soviet-designed

nuclear power reactors. The Department of Energy also disagreed with

GAO’s assertion that program funding for the International Chornobyl

Center (referred to in the report as the Slavutych Laboratory of

International Research and Technology in Ukraine) is not directly related

to improving the reactors’ safety. While GAO agrees that some of the

projects have value, GAO continues to believe that urgent safety needs,

such as replacing wooden fire doors with fire-resistant doors in Sovietdesigned nuclear power plants, have not been adequately addressed by the

Department’s safety effort. GAO believes that the most urgent and pressing

safety priorities should be addressed first to improve the safety of the

highest-risk reactors—a fundamental and long-standing goal of the

program. The Department of Energy commented that it would allocate

additional funds to provide fire doors for nuclear power plants in Ukraine.

Finally, the Department of State’s Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety

noted that while GAO’s recommendations were useful, they proposed to set

too narrow an objective for the international nuclear safety assistance

program. The Senior Coordinator believes that the international safety

program focuses on broader policy matters, such as the shutdown of the

Chornobyl nuclear power plant. GAO recognizes that the safety program

has broad goals and objectives. However, GAO’s recommendations would

focus limited resources on activities that directly affect the safety of Sovietdesigned reactors and on improving the management of the Department of

Energy’s and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s safety assistance

efforts.
Page 15 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors
Page 16 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Chapter 1

Introduction Chapte1r

The 1986 disaster at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine and

subsequent investigations by western safety experts raised significant

concerns about the risks involved in continuing to operate Soviet-designed

nuclear reactors. Currently, 59 reactors—located at 18 nuclear power

plants—are operating in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet

Union and in Central and Eastern Europe.1 Many of the reactors pose high

risks because of deficiencies in design, construction, safety equipment,

training for operators, and safety procedures. Problems have increased

with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the slow pace of economic

restructuring and reform, which have left these plants without adequate

resources to fully fund their safety needs. Equipment shortages are

common, many plant workers receive low or erratic pay, and the countries

operating most of the Soviet-designed reactors do not have independent

and effective nuclear regulatory organizations to oversee plant operations.

Many countries, including the United States, have been providing

assistance since the early 1990s to reduce the risks associated with these

reactors. The aim of this assistance is to improve the safety of the reactors

without extending their operating lifetimes and to find replacement

sources of energy so the reactors can be closed as soon as possible.

Background On April 26, 1986, the worst accident in the history of nuclear power

occurred at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. As a result of the accident,

the reactor core—containing approximately 200 tons of nuclear fuel—was

destroyed. Large amounts of radioactive dust, gases, and debris rose into

the atmosphere. The radioactive material contaminated more than 60,000

square miles of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Smaller amounts of material

spread over Eastern Europe and Scandinavia, and fallout was detected in

the United States. During the 2 weeks after the explosion, workers dropped

5,000 tons of various compounds, sand, clay, and lead out of helicopters to

limit the release of radioactive materials. Seven months after the accident,

the construction of a 20-story-high metal and concrete shield—known as a

sarcophagus—was completed to enclose the damaged reactor.

The transboundary effects of the Chornobyl accident raised significant

concerns among numerous countries and international organizations about

the safety of all Soviet-designed nuclear power plants. According to DOE,

Soviet-designed reactors in general exhibit deficiencies, including

1

In addition, DOE is providing assistance to four small RBMK-type reactors and one fastneutron reactor in Russia.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 17 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

insufficient protection against fire, poor-quality materials and construction,

and inadequate separation and redundancy of safety systems. Furthermore,

many of these reactors are located in countries such as Russia and Ukraine

that do not have fully independent or effective nuclear regulatory

organizations that oversee plant safety. Of greatest concern are 25 of the 59

reactors that western safety experts generally agree fall well below

accepted international safety standards and cannot be economically

upgraded. These 25 oldest reactors include 14 reactors known as RBMKs

and 11 reactors known as VVER 440 Model 230s. These reactors pose the

highest risks, according to western safety experts, because of inherent

design deficiencies, including the lack of a containment structure. The

containment structure, generally a steel-lined concrete dome, serves as the

ultimate barrier to the release of radioactive material in the event of a

severe accident. Other deficiencies in these reactors include inadequate

safety systems, insufficient safety backup equipment, unreliable systems

that control the operation of the reactor, and deficient systems for cooling

the reactor core in an emergency.

Soviet-designed reactors were built under a philosophy that emphasized

production over safety and assumed that timely human involvement would

prevent accidents. Conversely, western reactor design philosophy stressed

safety over production and sought to develop highly automated safety and

shutdown systems with minimal reliance on operators’ involvement.

Because of operational and design priorities, the designers, constructors,

operators, and regulators of Soviet-designed nuclear power plants did not

believe they needed to follow international safety practices.

The slow pace of political and economic reform following the breakup of

the Soviet Union has further degraded nuclear safety conditions in several

of these countries. Furthermore, expertise in both the design and the

operation of Soviet-designed reactors was located primarily in Russia

under the Soviet Union. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Newly

Independent States had to establish their own technical and nuclear

regulatory infrastructures. Over the past several years, however, the

working relationships between employees at plants in these countries and

the Russian organizations responsible for designing nuclear reactors have

deteriorated significantly. Other factors also contribute to safety problems,

including the following:

• Replacement parts often are unavailable, resulting in makeshift

arrangements, including the cannibalization of parts from partially

completed nuclear power plants.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 18 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

• Payments to nuclear power plants for electricity production are rarely in

cash, are sometimes delayed, and are often insufficient to pay operating

costs, let alone the costs of making safety improvements.

• Salaries for nuclear power plant operators are often not competitive

with those for other jobs, and the payment of wages at some nuclear

power plants in Russia and Ukraine has been delayed for several

months. For example, in October 1999, workers at both the Chornobyl

and Khmelnytskyy nuclear power plants had not been paid for 2 months,

according to Ukrainian officials.

• Regulators in most of these countries earn even less than plant

operators. For example, according to the head of Ukraine’s regulatory

organization, the average salary of a nuclear power plant regulator is

$40-$80 per month. As a result, the organization has difficulty hiring and

keeping employees.

Figure 1 shows the type and location of the 59 Soviet-designed reactors

operating in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union and

countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 19 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Figure 1: Operational Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants

Notes:

1. Numbers in parentheses show the total number of reactors in each country, and numbers within

symbols show the number of reactors of a specific type at a site.

2. DOE is providing assistance to five other nuclear power reactors in Russia. At one site, Bilibino, four

small-scale RBMK reactors produce both steam and electricity. In addition, one fast-neutron reactor is

located at Beloyarsk.

Types of Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors

Russian Federation

(24)

Ukraine

(14)

Kursk Germany

Czech Republic

(4)

Poland

Hungary 

(4)

Bulgaria 

(6)

Romania

Black Sea

Belarus

Latvia

Slovakia

(4)

Kazakhstan

Caspian

Sea

Balakovo

Novovoronezh

Smolensk

Kalinin

Leningrad

Chornobyl

Zaporizhzhya

South

Ukraine

Rivne

Khmelnytskyy

Moldova

Paks

Bohunice

Dukovany

Ignalina

Kola

RBMK

Operational 59

VVER 440

14

Total

213 Model

Total

11

230 Model VVER 1000

Total

14 20

Total

2

4 1

2 1

1

3

3

6

4

2

4

2 2

4

2 2

4

2

1

2

Estonia

Finland

Russia

Lithuania

Sweden

Norway

Baltic 

Sea

Georgia

Armenia Azerbaijan

Kozloduy

4

Denmark

Neth.

Bel.

France

Switzerland

Austria

Atlantic 

Ocean

1 Metsamor
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 20 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Sources: GAO’s presentation of information from DOE.

International Nuclear

Safety Assistance

Efforts

Beginning in the early 1990s—with the breakup of the former Soviet

Union—the international community coordinated efforts to address the

safety risks posed by the Soviet-designed nuclear power plants. In July

1992, a group of western industrialized nations known as the G-7 2

developed an international assistance program designed to quickly address

the most urgent safety needs at the highest-risk plants and provide for

longer-term safety improvements. The G-7 program called for immediate

measures to improve the safety of plant operations, make near-term

technical improvements based on safety assessments, and strengthen

countries’ nuclear regulatory authorities. These types of improvements

were expected to achieve early and significant safety benefits. In addition,

the G-7 program was designed to establish a basis for longer-term safety

improvements by examining the possibility of (1) replacing the highest-risk

reactors with alternative energy sources and (2) upgrading reactors of

more recent design, such as the VVER Model 1000 reactors. Under the G-7

program, the international donors of assistance have always aimed for the

earliest practicable shutdown of the highest-risk reactors. However, the G-7

program did not establish any dates for shutting down the highest-risk

reactors, nor did it directly link its assistance to the shutdown of these

reactors.

2

The G-7 comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the

United States.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 21 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Because of their proximity to the Soviet-designed reactors, the western

European countries have assumed a major responsibility for providing

safety assistance, primarily under the auspices of the European Union, a

union of 15 independent countries that was founded to enhance political,

economic, and social cooperation.3 The European Commission manages

the European Union’s assistance effort. The Commission is the European

Union’s executive body and has a staff of about 20,000. Nuclear safety

assistance is funneled through two programs administered by the

Commission—(1) Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of

Independent States (TACIS), which provides assistance to Russia, Ukraine,

Kazakhstan, and Armenia and (2) assistance to Bulgaria, Lithuania, and the

countries of Central and Eastern Europe—known as the (PHARE 4

)

program. The TACIS program, which had received over three-quarters of

the Union’s funds for safety assistance projects through 1998, has focused

on several areas, including improving reactors’ operational and design

safety, managing nuclear waste, closing the Chornobyl reactor, and

controlling nuclear materials.

In addition to the two programs managed by the European Union, the

United States and numerous other donor countries and organizations are

providing assistance through bilateral agreements with individual

countries. In 1992, a nuclear safety coordination center was established in

Brussels, Belgium, by the G-24 countries 5 to coordinate individual

countries’ assistance efforts. This center is responsible for developing and

disseminating a database that tracks international safety assistance

projects. Its secretariat also (1) prepares, in conjunction with participants,

annual country overview reports; (2) produces annual status reports on the

adoption of nuclear liability legislation in countries operating Sovietdesigned reactors; and (3) provides public information on the coordination

and cooperation processes through various publications and the Internet.

In 1993, the G-7 created a multilateral fund, the Nuclear Safety Account,

directed by its donors and administered by the European Bank for

3

The member states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,

Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

4

Also known as Poland and Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of Economy.

5

The G-24 includes the G-7 countries plus Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,

Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,

Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 22 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Reconstruction and Development, to address immediate needs for safety

improvement not covered in bilateral safety agreements. The bank’s

nuclear safety grants have conditionality clauses. Three of the

beneficiaries—Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Ukraine—agreed to accept the

funds with the understanding that they would close their high-risk reactors

under certain conditions, such as obtaining adequate replacement energy.

Russia is also a recipient of these grants, but its agreement focuses on

establishing new licensing procedures for the high-risk reactors.

The Nuclear Safety Account was initially given a 3-year period of operation.

The term was extended for another 3 years in 1996 and was recently

extended through 2002, although no additional funds are expected to be

added. The remaining tasks to be administered by the bank are (1)

completing short-term plant upgrades and implementing safety-related

activities at Chornobyl; (2) monitoring compliance with Nuclear Safety

Account agreements and their various provisions, such as those requiring

closure of the high-risk Soviet-designed nuclear power plants; and (3)

distributing funding to improve the independence and effectiveness of

regulatory authorities.

The bank also administers the Chornobyl Shelter Fund on behalf of its

donors. Similar to the Nuclear Safety Account, it provides funds through

grants. The purpose of the fund is to support projects and equipment to

assist Ukraine in transforming the existing Chornobyl sarcophagus into a

safe and environmentally stable system. The sarcophagus is an

environmental and structural hazard because it was built partially on the

remains of the ruined reactor building. It has holes and cracks, which allow

radioactive contamination to escape, and experts are concerned that it

could collapse. Figure 2 shows the shelter covering the remains of the

destroyed reactor at Chornobyl.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 23 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Figure 2: Chornobyl Shelter

Several other international organizations have participated in efforts to

improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors:

• The Nuclear Energy Agency, a semi-autonomous body within the

Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development,6 has

primarily provided information and training on nuclear law, especially

third-party liability issues, and conducted some research and

development work on RBMK reactors.

• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has provided several

safety services, including completing more than 100 safety missions to

countries operating Soviet-designed reactors and providing technical

advice on numerous safety issues, including the possible effects of Year

6

The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development provides its 29 member

countries with a setting to discuss and develop economic and social policy. The Nuclear

Energy Agency’s objective is to contribute to the development of nuclear energy as a safe,

environmentally acceptable, and economical energy source through cooperation among the

participating countries.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 24 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

2000 computer problems on the safety of these plants. In May 1999,

IAEA published a report on the safety of VVER and RBMK nuclear

power plants that focused on the scope of activities aimed at identifying

safety deficiencies and areas where future work is necessary.

• The Institute of Nuclear Power Operators—an organization established

in 1979 to enhance the safety and reliability of U.S. commercial nuclear

power plants—has played a role in transferring emergency operating

procedure technology to countries operating Soviet-designed reactors.

• The World Association of Nuclear Operators—an organization that

seeks to maximize the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants

worldwide—has provided, among other things, technical assistance and

expertise to improve safety at high-risk plants in Bulgaria.

U.S. Safety Assistance

Activities

Four federal agencies share responsibility for the U.S. nuclear safety

assistance effort—the departments of State and Energy, the U.S. Agency for

International Development (US AID), and the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC). The Department of State provides overall policy

guidance with assistance from US AID. State Department officials told us

that the goals of the U.S. program have remained the same since the

program’s inception in the early 1990s—encouraging the shutdown of the

highest-risk Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors and reducing the risk

of accidents.

DOE’s Nuclear Safety

Assistance Efforts

DOE implements a major part of the U.S international nuclear safety

assistance program with support from the U.S. national laboratories.7

DOE’s program objectives are to

• improve the physical condition of nuclear power plants and install

safety equipment;

• establish a nuclear safety culture in which safety takes priority over

power production;

• develop improved safety procedures and train operators in their use;

• conduct safety assessments that meet international standards;

7

DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. Originally created to

design and build atomic bombs, these laboratories have since expanded to conduct research

in many disciplines—from high-energy physics to advanced computing—at facilities

throughout the United States. Nine of DOE’s 23 national laboratories are multiprogram, and

the remainder are program- and mission-dedicated facilities.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 25 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

• establish regional centers for training reactor personnel and develop

simulators for training control room operators;

• develop an institutional framework for the design, construction, and

operation of nuclear plants that is consistent with international

practices; and

• address issues at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant.

DOE funds projects in several technical areas: operational safety, training,

maintenance, safety systems, safety evaluations, and legal capabilities.

DOE uses a pilot approach under which one or two plants, or in some cases

several selected plants, receive training or physical upgrades. DOE uses

this approach to create a model for other plants in a particular country. For

example, the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in Ukraine and the

Smolensk nuclear power plant in Russia were selected as pilots for fire

safety improvements, including fire doors, smoke detectors, and fireproofing materials. Several years ago, DOE initiated projects to install this

equipment at these locations, and some Smolensk-related projects are still

under way. According to DOE, a few other nuclear power plants have

received fire protection equipment, including Chornobyl (unit 3) in

Ukraine, Leningrad (units 1 and 2) in Russia, and Metsamor in Armenia.

DOE has also stressed technology transfer and training in an attempt to

ensure that the host country will continue to apply safety improvements

and training independent of U.S. assistance.

The nuclear safety program is managed at DOE headquarters by an office

director and is part of DOE’s recently established National Nuclear Security

Administration. The director has a staff of 17 technical and support

personnel. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) provides the

primary technical and management support for the program, including

contracting and administrative support. In fiscal year 1999, PNNL had 70

full-time-equivalent positions assigned to the program. PNNL maintains

satellite offices in Moscow, Russia, and Kiev, Ukraine. Other national

laboratories participating in the program include Brookhaven National

Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory. Brookhaven oversees the

installation of training simulators and implementation of training

programs. Argonne oversees the U.S. and Russian international nuclear

safety centers and provides technical assistance and project direction on

Soviet-designed plant safety evaluations.

DOE’s program involves other organizations as well. DOE has entered into

contracts with more than 90 U.S. commercial organizations to provide

assistance in implementing program activities. For example, Bechtel
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 26 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

National, Inc., has provided fire protection equipment. In addition, DOE

has entered into agreements with 16 nuclear power plants and 45 scientific

institutes and government agencies in the countries operating Sovietdesigned nuclear power plants.

Nuclear Regulatory

Commission’s Efforts

With the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the Newly Independent States

had to establish independent nuclear regulatory organizations to oversee

the safety of their nuclear plant operations. Furthermore, some of the

countries of Central and Eastern Europe that had established regulatory

organizations during the Soviet era were significantly understaffed and had

limited resources. The objective of NRC’s program is to promote the

independence and effectiveness of these countries’ nuclear regulatory

authorities, primarily through training, technical exchanges, and the use of

computer equipment and simulators. NRC has worked with these countries

to develop a legal foundation that provides for a strong and independent

regulator, which is essential for achieving and sustaining safety levels that

are consistent with international practices. According to a former NRC

chairman, one of NRC’s goals is to help improve the enforcement authority

and political stature of Russian and Ukrainian regulators so that they

command the respect of both the nuclear ministries and the utilities that

operate the power plants. He believed that strong and independent

regulatory bodies might one day be capable of exercising the kind of

authority over nuclear power operations in these countries that NRC

exercises in the United States.

NRC’s safety assistance activities have included

• training regulators in all aspects of safety reviews, licensing and

inspection procedures, and information management;

• advising on how to establish a legal basis for nuclear regulation;

• creating emergency support centers in Russia and Ukraine;

• developing a control and accounting system for nuclear materials; and

• building and establishing regulatory training programs and providing

computers and analytical equipment to support these programs.

Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on

Energy and Water Development, House Committee on Appropriations,

asked us to (1) provide information on how much money has been spent by

the United States and other countries for assistance to improve the safety

of Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors—and the types of assistance
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 27 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

being provided—as well as planned U.S. expenditures; (2) provide experts’

views on the impact of the assistance; and (3) assess the status of efforts to

close the high-risk Soviet-designed reactors. In addition, as requested, we

assessed the management of DOE’s and NRC’s safety assistance activities.

To determine the amount and type of international assistance being

provided to improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors, we obtained

data from the G-24’s nuclear safety assistance coordination center in

Brussels, Belgium. This center is responsible for maintaining a database for

international nuclear safety assistance. According to G-24 officials, each

country and international organization is responsible for the accuracy of

the information it provides to the database. However, these officials do

review the data to ensure that the information complies with reporting

requirements. We compared the amounts reported for the U.S. contribution

against the amounts reported by the U.S. agencies that participate in the

program to ensure that the data were accurate. In addition, we converted

all of the funding from either European currency units or Eurodollars to

U.S. dollars, using the following exchange rates: 1 European currency unit

equals $1.17, and 1 Eurodollar equals $1.04.

We spoke with several DOE, NRC, and national laboratory program and

budget officials on issues pertaining to uncosted and unobligated funds.8

We reviewed data on some of the largest DOE projects that had significant

uncosted funds, including full-scope simulators, safety parameter display

systems, and in-depth safety analyses. Those three types of projects

accounted for about 65 percent of DOE’s uncosted funds as of August 29,

1999. We also reviewed several smaller projects to gain a better

understanding of DOE’s continuing problems with large carryover balances

for its nuclear safety-related activities.

We obtained information from a number of sources to assess the impact of

the safety assistance. We attended the International Conference on the

Strengthening of Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe in June 1999. The

conference, which took place in Vienna, Austria, brought together

representatives from 32 countries and international organizations to

8

When DOE commits funds, appropriated by the Congress as budget authority, against a

project by awarding a contract, placing an order, or using a service, the funds are obligated.

When DOE pays the contractor, vendor, or service provider, the funds are expended or

spent. Conversely, unobligated funds represent budget authority that is available because

DOE has not yet committed it. Unspent funds include budget authority that may be either

(1) unobligated or (2) obligated but not spent.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 28 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

discuss, among other things, the status of efforts to improve the safety of

Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors. We interviewed experts from 25 of

these countries and organizations to obtain their views on the impact of the

assistance. Specifically, we met with nuclear safety officials from the

following countries that have received assistance and are operating Sovietdesigned reactors: Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,

Lithuania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine. We also met with

numerous donors of assistance, including representatives from the

following international organizations: the European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development, the G-24’s nuclear safety assistance

coordination center, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the

World Association of Nuclear Operators. We also met with officials from

the following donor countries and organizations: Austria, Canada, Finland,

France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United

Kingdom, and the United States.

In addition, we visited Ukraine in October 1999 to obtain information on

the impact of both U.S. and international assistance. We chose Ukraine

because it (1) is the largest recipient of U.S. nuclear safety assistance

funds, (2) includes Chornobyl, the site of the worst nuclear power plant

accident in history, and (3) faces severe economic hardships, which affect

decisions about shutting down the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. In

Ukraine, we visited the Khmelnytskyy nuclear power plant and the

Chornobyl nuclear power plant. During our visit, we also spoke with

representatives from several Ukrainian organizations that have received

assistance or have direct knowledge of its impact. These included officials

from Energoatom (the nuclear utility), the Ministry of Energy, and the

Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety. We also met with

officials from the International Chornobyl Center in Kiev, Ukraine, the

Slavutych Laboratory of International Research and Technology, and the

Slavutych International Radioecology Laboratory. We discussed economic

conditions in Slavutych with its mayor.

To assess the status of efforts to close high-risk Soviet-designed reactors,

we met with U.S. and international officials who are focusing on these

matters. Specifically, we met with officials from the European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development, the European Commission, the World

Bank, and the Department of State. We also discussed these matters with

representatives from countries operating the high-risk reactors, including

Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Armenia, and the Czech and Slovak

republics. Additionally, we reviewed documents produced by the European

Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as other pertinent
Chapter 1

Introduction

Page 29 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

information, such as the 1995 G-7/Ukraine memorandum of understanding

governing the shutdown of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant.

To assess the management of DOE’s nuclear safety assistance activities, we

met or spoke with program officials from DOE, as well as representatives

from PNNL, Brookhaven National Laboratory, and Argonne National

Laboratory. We reviewed project lists provided by DOE and its national

laboratories and other DOE documents that discussed project selection

criteria. To examine issues pertaining to the Slavutych Laboratory of

International Research and Technology, we met with both the director and

deputy director of the laboratory in Ukraine as well as the deputy director

of the International Chornobyl Center. We also met with other Ukrainian

officials who addressed laboratory-related issues. In addition, we had

discussions with PNNL contract specialists and project managers who are

responsible for implementing contracts with the Slavutych Laboratory.

Finally, we discussed these issues with senior DOE officials, including the

director for the Office of International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation and

the Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.

To assess the management of NRC’s nuclear safety activities, we reviewed

pertinent program files and spoke with officials from NRC’s Office of

International Programs, including its director, and Office of the Executive

Director of Operations. We also reviewed reports and other documentation,

prepared by NRC’s Office of the Inspector General and NRC’s Executive

Council, which focused on the management of nuclear safety assistance.

We provided copies of a draft of this report to the departments of Energy

and State and to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for their review and

comment. The Department of Energy’s and the Commission’s written

comments are presented in appendixes II and III, respectively. The Senior

Coordinator for Nuclear Safety Assistance provided comments on behalf of

the Department of State. Summaries of the agencies’ comments and our

responses to them appear at the end of chapters 2 and 5.

We performed our work from April 1999 through March 2000 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 30 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of SovietDesigned Reactors Chapte2r

About $1.9 billion has been contributed to improve the safety of Sovietdesigned nuclear power plants. Of this amount, the United States

contributed about $545 million, and 20 other countries and international

organizations contributed the rest. The U.S. contribution comprises two

components—$101 million to accounts established for funding

international nuclear safety initiatives, administered by the European Bank

for Reconstruction and Development, and $444 million available to the

Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to

implement nuclear safety activities. This assistance has been used to train

plant operators and representatives of national regulatory authorities, as

well as to purchase fire safety equipment. Neither DOE nor NRC has been

able to spend all of the funds it has received for the program in a timely

manner. How long the United States will continue its safety assistance

program is uncertain. While DOE’s safety activities are expected to end

around 2005, assuming certain funding levels, State Department and NRC

officials believe that U.S. assistance should continue for some time because

the highest-risk Soviet-designed reactors have not been shut down.

Total Donor

Contributions

The United States and 20 other countries and international organizations

have contributed about $1.9 billion toward improving the safety of Sovietdesigned reactors, according to data compiled by the G-24’s Nuclear Safety

Assistance Coordination Center. The majority of the assistance has been

provided through bilateral agreements with recipient countries. The

European Union is the leading provider of this assistance and obtains

funding through the contributions of member nations. The United States

contributed about $545 million of the total amount. In addition to

contributing to the European Union program, the donors have also

provided assistance through bilateral programs.

In addition to the European Union, the major donors are the United States,

Germany, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the

International Atomic Energy Agency. Together, these donors have

contributed $1.8 billion, or 94 percent of the total. Several other countries

have contributed the remaining $115 million, or 6 percent. The major

recipients of the assistance are Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and

the Czech and Slovak republics. Russia and Ukraine are targeted to receive

about $1.4 billion, or 71 percent of the total. Figure 3 identifies the donors

of the $1.9 billion contributed for international nuclear safety assistance

and shows its distribution to the recipient countries.
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 31 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Figure 3: Countries Donating and Receiving International Nuclear Safety Assistance, as of November 1999

Notes:

1. Contributions to the Nuclear Safety Account are included in the amounts shown for each donor

country.

2. The $532 million listed here as the U.S. contribution differs from the $545 million we identified

because of the method used by the G-24 to classify projects and exchange rate variables. In addition,

the G-24 data do not include amounts pledged by the United States for the Chornobyl Shelter

Implementation Plan.

3. The cumulative contributions of Austria, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development, which total less than $1 million, are not included in the figure.

a

Nuclear Safety Account funds not yet allocated to specific recipients have been divided equally

among these recipients.

b

Other recipient countries include Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova,

Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Uzbekistan.

Source: GAO’s presentation of data from the G-24’s database.

In 1992, the G-7 countries developed an emergency action plan to address

the safety problems of Soviet-designed reactors. The plan falls into three

 Received Assistance

Recipient Amount

Russia $734

Ukraine 629

Bulgaria 132

Lithuania 123

Regional/Unspecifieda 58

Slovak Republic 56

Czech Republic 50

Hungary 42

Armenia 32

NIS Regionala 26

Otherb 35

Kazakhstan 15

Total $1,930

 Pledged Assistance 

Donor Amount

European Union $753

United States 532

Germany 168

Japan 139

France 91

United Kingdom 45

Sweden 44

IAEA 43

Canada 26

Italy 25

Finland 18

Norway 14

Switzerland 13

Belgium 6

Netherlands 5

Denmark 4

Spain 3

EBRD 1

Total $1,930

Dollars in millions
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 32 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

broad categories—operational safety improvements, near-term technical

(safety) improvements, and regulatory enhancements. In general,

operational safety improvements, such as training plant personnel, can be

implemented at all plants regardless of the reactor type. Near-term safety

improvements have been implemented at specific reactors, such as the

highest-risk reactors. Such improvements include installing metal fire

doors and other fire protection material and conducting engineering

studies. Donors have also provided assistance aimed at strengthening

independent regulatory organizations through training and helping these

countries establish a legal basis for their regulatory authorities. Projects

covering a wide variety of other areas have also been funded, including

• longer-term safety upgrades that would be targeted toward more

recently designed Soviet reactors, including assistance to VVER Model

1000 reactors;

• radiation protection, which would include monitoring systems to

protect against the consequences of nuclear accidents; and

• fuel cycle activities, such as storing spent nuclear fuel and managing

radioactive waste.

Figure 4 shows how the donors’ contributions, totaling $1.9 billion, are

divided among the various types of safety activities.
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 33 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Figure 4: Types and Amounts of Funds for Nuclear Safety Improvements as of

November 1999

Note: The “Other” category includes decommissioning studies, nuclear engineering courses, and

related training and safeguards support.

Source: GAO’s presentation of data from the G-24’s database.

U.S. Nuclear Safety

Assistance Program

The U.S. contribution of $545 million has been used to provide plant safety

evaluations and upgrades, training, fire safety equipment and materials,

and regulatory assistance. Most of the U.S. assistance has been spent to

improve safety in Russia and Ukraine. However, DOE and NRC have had

problems spending appropriated program funds in a timely manner, and

NRC returned over $500,000 to the U.S. Treasury because it did not obligate

 

 4 2

 2 4

 

 

1 

 

 

4 

 

 

 

 

 perational

safety

improvements

Near term

safety

improvements

 n ancing

regulatory

regimes

 t er

Fuel cycle

 ong term

upgrades

 adiation

protection

 lement

 ollars in millions
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 34 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

these funds within a 2-year statutorily imposed period covering their

availability.

The U.S. contribution is divided into two components: $101 million to two

international accounts administered by the European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development—the Nuclear Safety Account and the

Chornobyl Shelter Implementation Plan—and $444 million in

appropriations for safety activities managed by DOE and NRC. Of this

amount, $294 million, or 66 percent, was transferred to DOE and NRC from

the U.S. Agency for International Development (US AID) through various

interagency agreements. The remainder came from direct appropriations to

DOE ($139 million, or 31 percent) and through funds transferred to DOE by

the Department of Defense ($11 million, or 3 percent).

DOE’s and NRC’s

Expenditures for Nuclear

Safety Assistance

Of the $444 million in total funding available to DOE and NRC for nuclear

safety assistance, both agencies had spent about $357 million as of

September 30, 1999. As shown in figure 5, these expenditures were for

safety improvements to nuclear power plants, plant safety evaluations,

operator training, fire safety equipment, and training and efforts to improve

nuclear regulatory authorities.
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 35 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Figure 5: DOE’s and NRC’s Expenditures of Nuclear Safety Funds Totaling $357

Million as of September 30, 1999

Notes:

1. All amounts shown above, except for regulatory enhancements, are related to DOE’s assistance

activities. Strengthening nuclear regulatory authorities is one of NRC’s assistance activities.

2. Program management includes national laboratory salaries and fringe benefits, overhead costs, and

miscellaneous costs, such as those for printing, interpreters, and travel.

3. The “Other” category includes funds for, among other things, fuel cycle safety, decommissioning, the

Slavutych Laboratory of International Research and Technology, studies to identify alternatives for

replacing and eventually closing high-risk reactors, and the international nuclear safety centers.

Sources: GAO’s presentation of data from DOE and NRC.

DOE and NRC have targeted their nuclear safety expenditures primarily to

the countries operating the most Soviet-designed nuclear power plants—

Russia and Ukraine. As shown in figure 6, 86 percent of these expenditures

$60,237

$55,125 $54,194

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

Dollars in thousands

Plant safety

upgrades

Simulators

Program

management

$36,713

Plant safety

evaluations

$44,986

Other

$32,525

Regulatory

enhancements

$34,143

Operational 

safety

$23,663

Training

$15,387

Fire 

safety

Safety category
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 36 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

have gone to those two countries. The other major recipients are the

countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Armenia.

Figure 6: Distribution of DOE’s and NRC’s Expenditures Totaling $357 Million to

Recipient Countries

Note: Expenditures for Armenia total $11.8 million, and expenditures for Kazakhstan total $1.4 million.

In 1999, Kazakhstan shut down a Soviet-designed fast breeder reactor that it had been operating since

1972.

Sources: GAO’s presentation of data from DOE and NRC.

DOE’s and NRC’s cumulative expenditures through fiscal year 1999

comprise several program elements, as shown in tables 1 and 2. DOE

incurred the bulk of its costs under three categories—

materials/subcontracts, overhead, and labor—which account for 93

percent of its total expenditures. The largest of these costs was for

materials and subcontracts, which made up 65 percent of the total. PNNL,

which administers the safety program for DOE, spent the most of any DOE

organization—$219 million. (See table 1.) NRC incurred the bulk of its total

expenditures in three categories—training, equipment, and travel—which

accounted for 84 percent of its total expenditures. (See table 2.)

Armenia/Kazakhstan

Central and Eastern

Europe

Ukraine

Russia

4%

10%

41%

45%
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 37 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Table 1: DOE’s Cumulative Expenditures for the Nuclear Safety Assistance Program Through September 30, 1999

Legend:

DOE − Department of Energy

PNNL − Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

BNL − Brookhaven National Laboratory

ANL − Argonne National Laboratory

CH − Chicago Area Office

BAO/ORNL − Brookhaven Area Office and Oak Ridge National Laboratory

a

Includes salaries, wages, fringe benefits, and pensions that are directly chargeable to the international

nuclear safety program. DOE headquarters employees’ salaries are not charged directly to the

program but are funded through DOE’s Office of Nonproliferation and National Security’s program

direction account. DOE estimated that the fiscal year 1999 salaries and expenses for headquarters

employees assigned to the international nuclear safety program totaled $1.7 million.

b

Includes the travel and per diem costs—foreign and domestic—of DOE and laboratory officials. Does

not include the travel and per diem costs of foreign nationals under the program; these costs are

included in the “materials/subcontracts.”

c

Includes directly applicable purchase orders, subcontracts (both foreign and domestic), and

consulting services. Contractor labor, travel, and overhead charges are included in this category.

d

Includes the costs of certain centralized services, such as document translation, office supplies, and

computer services.

e

Includes charges for organizational overhead, general and administrative expenses, and service

assessments.

Source: GAO’s presentation of data from DOE.

Dollars in thousands

DOE Activity

Cost element PNNL

DOE

headquarters BNL ANL CH BAO/ORNL Total

Percent

of total

Labora $23,381 $0 $10,674 $9,473 $0 $41 $43,569 13

Travelb 4,375 1,209 2,340 1,388 0 6 9,318 3

Materials/subcontractsc 156,534 8,362 32,110 4,475 10,350 0 211,831 65

Other direct costsd 6,123 1,479 4,351 509 0 0 12,462 4

Overheade 28,625 0 14,790 3,855 0 0 47,270 15

Total $219,038 $11,050 $64,265 $19,700 $10,350 $47 $324,450 100
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 38 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Table 2: Cumulative Expenditures for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Safety

Assistance Program Through September 30, 1999

a

Includes the costs of hiring contractor personnel from DOE’s national laboratories.

b

Represents the travel and per diem costs of foreign national officials.

c

Transfer and training in the use of computer programs used by NRC for safety analysis and

participation in user groups.

d

Represents NRC staff costs that were reimbursed by US AID in fiscal year 1999 for program activities

related to Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. All other staff costs were funded from NRC’s

appropriations. With the exception of fiscal year 1999, NRC did not track actual staff costs but did

estimate full-time-equivalent positions for budgeting and planning purposes. These full-time-equivalent

estimates ranged from approximately 35 in fiscal year 1994 to approximately 7 in fiscal year 1999.

DOE and NRC Have

Unspent and

Unobligated Funds

As of September 30, 1999, DOE had carried over a balance of $78 million in

appropriated funds from prior years. As shown in table 3, this figure

includes about $27 million in unobligated funds 1 and about $51 million in

funds that had been obligated but not yet spent. The large amount of

carryover funds has concerned the Congress, which reduced DOE’s request

for additional funds by more than half in fiscal year 2000. Furthermore,

NRC had carried over $9 million from prior years as of September 1999;

more than half of this amount consisted of unobligated funds and obligated

but unspent funds that NRC had received for safety activities in Ukraine. In

addition, NRC returned over $500,000 to the U.S. Treasury because the

Dollars in thousands

Cost element Amount Percent

Traininga $13,671 42

Equipment 8,588 26

Other travel paid by NRCb 3,739 11

Computer codesc 3,047 9

NRC staff travel 1,574 5

Interpreters/translation services 1,085 3

NRC staff salaries and expensesd 821 3

Total $32,525 99e

1

According to DOE, the $27 million in unobligated funds were fiscal year 1999 funds

transferred by US AID to DOE in June 1999. DOE obligated these funds by January 2000.
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

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Page 39 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

funds for Ukraine were not obligated within a 2-year statutorily imposed

period covering the availability of US AID funds transferred to the program.

Table 3: Obligations and Expenditures for DOE’s and NRC’s Safety Assistance Programs, as of September 30, 1999

Sources: GAO’s presentation of data from DOE and NRC.

As we noted in a prior report,2 DOE, PNNL, and NRC officials

acknowledged that their obligation and expenditure rates for the safety

program—particularly for Russia and Ukraine—had lagged over time. In

particular, DOE continues to have large amounts of carryover funds. In its

report on the fiscal year 2000 Energy and Water Development

appropriations bill, the House Appropriations Committee recommended

that DOE’s request for international nuclear safety assistance funds be

reduced because the program was carrying excessive balances of unspent

Dollars in thousands

Agency and

recipient

Funds

available

Funds

unobligated

Funds

obligated

Funds obligated

and spent

Funds obligated

but not spent

DOE

Ukraine $178,379 $17,262 $161,117 $134,000 $27,117

Russia 172,629 4,889 167,740 148,914 $18,826

Central and Eastern

Europe

34,243 1,209 33,034 30,558 2,476

Armenia 16,000 2,744 13,256 10,500 2,756

Kazakhstan 1,000 515 485 477 8

DOE subtotal $402,251 $26,619 $375,632 $324,449 $51,183

NRC

Ukraine $16,613 $2,550 $14,063 $11,417 $2,646

Russia 13,877 1,093 12,784 12,413 371

Central and Eastern

Europe

7,894 719 7,175 6,491 684

Armenia 1,915 82 1,833 1,299 534

Kazakhstan 1,545 82 1,463 905 558

NRC subtotal $41,844 $4,526 $37,318 $32,525 $4,793

Total $444,095 $31,145 $412,950 $356,974 $55,976

2

Nuclear Safety: Status of U.S. Assistance to Improve the Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

(GAO/RCED-97-5, Oct. 29, 1996).
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 40 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

funds from prior years. The committee noted that the program had unspent

funding balances that were double the amount of the total new funding

provided to DOE in fiscal year 1999. Ultimately, the Congress decided to

cut DOE’s fiscal year 2000 budget request for the program by 55 percent,

from $34 million to $15 million.

According to DOE, three major factors account for its current carryover

balances:

• A lag occurs between the date work is performed and the date costs are

recorded at DOE headquarters.

• Many projects are executed over several years, but the majority of the

funding for these projects is requested and received in advance for

contracting purposes. As a result, funds may be obligated during the

early years of the projects, but expenditures are spread over several

years.

• Difficulties, such as problems with customs and other unforeseen

delays, are frequently associated with doing work in the Newly

Independent States. For example, in January 1999, the United States

imposed sanctions on the Russian designer of RBMK reactors—the

Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering—after

determining that it had provided sensitive missile or nuclear assistance

to Iran. As a result, DOE’s nuclear-safety-related contracts with this

organization, totaling about $2 million, were suspended and funds,

which had been obligated, could not be spent. DOE is now deobligating

these funds for reprogramming to other projects or seeking alternative

vendors.

According to DOE, although some contracts allow for progress payments,

most payments are not made until the end of a project, when deliverables

are received and determined to be acceptable. This accounts for the lag

between the time program funds are obligated and spent. For example,

funds were obligated for projects, such as training simulators, with long

procurement cycles. As a result, although DOE obligated funds early on to

finance the projects, expenditures were to be made over several years,

creating unspent balances during the course of the projects. Thus, for

simulators and related training activities, DOE reported an unspent balance

of $22.9 million as of August 29, 1999. We found several other instances

when program funds were obligated for several years and expenditures

lagged. Examples include the following:
Chapter 2

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Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 41 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

• A fire protection project with the Smolensk nuclear power plant has

been carrying large unspent balances since the mid-1990s. According to

DOE, almost one-quarter of these funds, or approximately $1.3 million,

has remained unspent because of delays associated with Russian

contractor personnel. The DOE project manager said he believes the

funds, which have been obligated, will be spent in early 2000.

• Several other projects for developing emergency operating instructions

showed that $505,000 of $1.8 million had not been spent as of September

1999. According to PNNL officials, work had begun on these projects in

fiscal years 1994 and 1995 but had not yet been completed. Specifically,

these projects are proceeding slower than originally anticipated, and

delays have occurred during Russia’s and Ukraine’s performance of the

analyses necessary to validate the instructions. One such project, at the

Balakovo nuclear power plant in Russia, was started in December 1995,

at which time DOE obligated $120,000. As of September 1999, one half of

the funding originally obligated for the project had been spent. About

$10 million for in-depth safety analyses at five power plants in Ukraine

was unspent as of August 1999. According to a DOE official, the Ukraine

projects have been delayed primarily by a lack of technical expertise

and resources at these plants.

When we asked why NRC was unable to obligate and spend $506,000 of its

fiscal year 1997 and 1998 program funds in accordance with a statutorily

imposed 2-year period of availability, we obtained differing and conflicting

views. These funds were designated for projects and activities in Ukraine.

NRC officials provided several reasons for this problem, including (1)

abrupt changes in the management of NRC’s Russian and Ukrainian

assistance activities, (2) difficulties in adjusting the Ukrainian program to

accommodate the 2-year availability of funds, and (3) NRC’s inability to

accept US AID funding on a timely basis. According to an NRC official,

NRC did not effectively monitor the flow of funds from US AID or

coordinate efforts to ensure that the funds could be obligated or

reprogrammed. This official also stated that Ukraine has numerous

pressing needs related to the enhancement of its regulatory authority and

could have used these funds for that purpose. However, another NRC

official told us that the funds were turned back because he did not believe

that NRC staff had adequately justified the use of these funds. According to

the State Department, because NRC continues to maintain a large

unobligated balance of funds for Ukraine, US AID will not provide any

funds to support fiscal year 2000 projects or activities for Ukraine unless

some unusual requirement surfaces concerning Chornobyl’s closure.
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 42 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Future Costs of U.S.

Safety Program Are

Uncertain

Although the Department of Energy plans to complete its safety activities

by 2005, State Department and NRC officials did not have a date for

completing U.S. safety assistance efforts. According to DOE’s Strategy

Document, issued in June 1998, DOE estimates the cost to complete its

remaining safety activities at Soviet-designed reactors by 2005 at $372

million. DOE based this estimate on its plan for completing individual

safety projects at Soviet-designed reactors. For example, at the Balakovo

nuclear power plant in Russia, DOE anticipates that funds will be allocated

for in-depth safety analyses through fiscal year 2005. Once these projects

are completed, according to DOE, the program will have achieved its

objectives. The projected costs of DOE’s activities will be about $709

million. According to the director of DOE’s nuclear safety program, the

time frames could increase if anticipated funding during the next several

years is not received. However, the Department of State’s Senior

Coordinator for Nuclear Safety told us that U.S. assistance should continue

for some time because the highest-risk reactors have not been shut down

and safety culture problems remain. Such a culture implies an awareness

of, and commitment to, the importance of safety on both individual and

organizational levels. She said that the United States will be engaged for a

considerable time in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Bulgaria. Furthermore,

she believes that safety assistance should concentrate on regulatory

assistance because (1) the role of the regulator is not yet firmly established

in most of these countries and (2) strong regulatory bodies are necessary to

sustain safety improvements over the long term. In addition, assistance

should also focus on improving operational safety through training and

safety assessments.

NRC officials also said they believe the role of the regulator must continue

to be supported by the United States and other countries. However, given

the original short-term nature of NRC’s safety assistance effort, NRC has

not thus far established a long-term funding strategy. The director of NRC’s

Office of International Programs said NRC would continue to provide some

undetermined level of regulatory assistance as long as unsafe Sovietdesigned reactors continue to operate.

Conclusions A troubling aspect of DOE’s implementation of its safety assistance effort

has been a large and continuing carryover of unspent program funds. This

raises the question of whether certain projects, which contribute to the

carryover, are still viable or needed. While DOE has some plausible reasons

for the lags in spending program funds, a number of projects with slow
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 43 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

spending rates have been “on the books” for several years. In our view,

there is a question as to whether these projects are still important to

meeting the program’s objectives. In addition, NRC’s inability to obligate a

portion of its funds for Ukraine within a statutory 2-year period of

availability also raises concerns because Ukraine needs assistance in

establishing a sound regulatory infrastructure. Furthermore, according to

the State Department’s Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety, future U.S.

safety assistance will be in the realm of strengthening the nuclear

regulatory authorities in the Newly Independent States to ensure that

safety benefits are sustained and NRC is expected to play a continuing key

role in this effort.

Recommendations to

the Secretary of Energy

and the Chairman of

the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

To maximize the use of U.S. safety assistance program funds, we

recommend that

• the Secretary (1) review all DOE projects with significant carryover

balances and consider ways to accelerate the projects’ completion, to

the extent feasible, and (2) determine whether projects whose progress

has been continuously slow or limited are still viable, given the

program’s current goals and objectives and

• the Chairman consistently monitor the funding for NRC’s safety

assistance program to ensure that these funds are obligated on a timely

basis in accordance with the program’s priorities.

Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation

DOE agreed with our recommendations and said it would continue its

efforts to reduce carryover balances (unspent program funds). DOE also

provided clarifying information about these balances. The Department

stated that two of the projects we identified as moving slowly and

contributing to the carryover problem accounted for less than 3 percent of

the total unspent balances. However, DOE’s response did not cite another

type of project—in-depth safety analyses—with a balance of about $10

million (or about 12 percent of the total carryover balance) that we referred

to in the report as well. Furthermore, as stated in the report, we reviewed a

number of diverse projects to obtain a better understanding of the

Department’s continuing problems with large carryover balances for its

nuclear safety-related activities. Our recommendation to the Secretary of

Energy is intended to encourage the Department to review all of its

projects with significant carryover balances and consider ways to

accelerate the projects’ completion or determine if the projects are still
Chapter 2

The United States’ and Other Countries’

Contributions to Improve the Safety of

Soviet-Designed Reactors

Page 44 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

viable. The Department’s comments are presented in appendix II. NRC

agreed with our recommendation and its comments are presented in

appendix III.
Page 45 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Chapter 3

Experts Believe That Assistance Has

Improved the Safety of Soviet-Designed

Reactors, but More Improvements Are NeededChapte3r

In June 1999, nuclear safety experts from 32 countries and international

organizations met at a conference in Vienna, Austria, to assess the impact

of nuclear safety efforts over the past decade in countries operating Sovietdesigned reactors and to focus on future international cooperation and

assistance. The experts concluded that while progress had been made in

improving the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power plants, more

improvements are needed, especially in areas such as strengthening the

independence and effectiveness of nuclear regulatory organizations.

Officials from many countries operating Soviet-designed reactors said U.S.

assistance had a direct impact on improving the reactors’ safety. However,

according to U.S. safety experts, it is difficult to quantify the extent to

which safety assistance has reduced the risks of operating these reactors.

Experts’ Views on the

Safety of SovietDesigned Reactors

In June 1999, the International Atomic Energy Agency, in cooperation with

the European Commission and the Nuclear Energy Agency, organized the

International Conference on Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Eastern

Europe.1 The objectives of the conference were to assess the impact of

nuclear safety efforts over the past decade in countries operating Sovietdesigned reactors and to focus on areas where future international

cooperation and assistance should be targeted. The conference was

chaired by the Department of State’s Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety

and included representatives from all of the countries operating Sovietdesigned nuclear reactors and all of the major donors of assistance,

including a delegation from the departments of State and Energy and the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The safety experts from 32 countries and international organizations who

attended the conference concluded that the countries operating the Sovietdesigned reactors had made significant progress on nuclear safety issues,

such as

• strengthening the independence and technical competence of nuclear

regulatory authorities,

• demonstrating clear progress in improving the way plants are operated,

and

• establishing design safety improvement programs.

1

The Eastern European countries operating RBMK and VVER reactors were Armenia,

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine.
Chapter 3

Experts Believe That Assistance Has

Improved the Safety of Soviet-Designed

Reactors, but More Improvements Are

Needed

Page 46 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

The conference reported that the governments operating Soviet-designed

reactors need to ensure that their nuclear regulatory authorities have the

financial resources and enforcement authority required to fully execute

their missions. Furthermore, the conference concluded that significant

additional efforts—and further assistance—were required to maintain and

enhance an effective safety culture. The conference report further noted

that improvements in the design of nuclear reactors varied from country to

country and were affected by economic conditions.

According to the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna,

Austria, while the conference clearly established that safety has improved

in all countries operating Soviet-designed nuclear power plants, only

Hungary, the Czech Republic and, to a certain extent, the Slovak Republic

showed real progress in implementing western safety practices. However,

according to the U.S. representatives, Ukraine lacks the financial resources

to achieve its stated safety goals, and Russia was behind all of the countries

in terms of safety improvements and safety culture.

Recipients Find U.S.

Safety Assistance

Beneficial

Several officials from countries that have received U.S. safety assistance

provided us with their views on the quality and effectiveness of the

assistance. These officials told us that the assistance had a direct impact on

improving safety because it focused on equipment and training. The

officials cited examples of useful projects, including the following:

• The Director-General of the All-Russian Research Institute for Nuclear

Power Plant Operations (VNIIAES 2

) characterized U.S. training and

simulator equipment as effective. He noted that the U.S. assistance

complemented Russia’s own efforts to improve the safety of its reactors.

• The vice president of Armenia’s Nuclear Power Plant Company said that

U.S.-supplied equipment, specifically the safety parameter display

system, improved plant operators’ ability to systematically monitor

various safety systems. This system collects and displays safety

information at a computer workstation in the control room of a nuclear

power plant.

• A Hungarian nuclear safety official told us that U.S. safety assistance

has contributed to major changes in how plant operators view the

importance of safety.

2

VNIIAES assists nuclear power plants with startup activities, operations, and training in

Russia. It also manufactures full-scope and analytical simulators.
Chapter 3

Experts Believe That Assistance Has

Improved the Safety of Soviet-Designed

Reactors, but More Improvements Are

Needed

Page 47 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

In October 1999, we visited two nuclear power plants in Ukraine—

Chornobyl and Khmelnytskyy—and met with officials from Ukraine’s

nuclear regulatory organization and nuclear utility to obtain their views on

the impact of U.S. assistance. These officials told us that the assistance

provided by DOE and NRC was important, and they showed us functioning

safety equipment, such as full-scope simulators, fire extinguishers and

metal fire doors, and safety parameter display systems, that they received

through the U.S. safety assistance program. A full-scope simulator is a

replica of a nuclear reactor’s control room.

At Khmelnytskyy, nuclear power plant officials told us that the full-scope

simulator provided by DOE in 1998 is an excellent training tool. Before

receiving the simulator, the plant obtained all of its training through books

and the training was theoretical. Simulator training, by contrast, is practical

and “hands on.” One plant official told us that U.S.-provided simulator

training enabled plant operators to avoid shutting down the plant during an

actual safety incident because plant personnel were familiar with the

correct procedures to follow. According to these officials, they would have

lost $600,000 in potential electricity revenues if they had been forced to

shut down the plant’s operations. A Chornobyl control room shift

supervisor told us that the emergency operating instructions developed

with assistance from the United States were very valuable because they

made the operators think about the importance of safety in the day-to-day

operations of the plant. Emergency operating instructions specify actions

for operators to take in response to changes in a plant’s conditions and

allow the operators to stabilize the reactor without having to first

determine what caused the changes.

Ukrainian officials also showed us safety-related projects funded by NRC

that they said had helped strengthen the effectiveness of their regulatory

organization:

• An emergency response center at the headquarters of Ukraine’s nuclear

regulatory organization, which became operational in 1998, serves as a

countrywide coordinating center in the event of a nuclear accident.

• Analytical simulators, used by Ukrainian nuclear safety regulators for

training purposes, familiarize them with plant operations. Analytical

simulators use computer screens with graphic displays that imitate

plant systems. Operators enter computer commands to “operate”

equipment, rather than using switches and controls as they would with a

full-scope simulator.
Chapter 3

Experts Believe That Assistance Has

Improved the Safety of Soviet-Designed

Reactors, but More Improvements Are

Needed

Page 48 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Fire safety has been a component of the U.S. safety assistance program

since its inception. According to DOE, over 100 fires occurred in nuclear

power plants in the former Soviet Union from 1980 through 1988. In

response to this concern, DOE has funded a limited number of fire safety

projects at selected sites, but these projects are almost completed. Some

Ukrainian officials identified a need for additional fire safety equipment,

particularly metal fire-retardant doors, which they said are needed to

replace the wooden doors now found in Soviet-designed reactors.

According to representatives of a Ukrainian company that is manufacturing

and installing metal fire doors, the company has stopped producing the

doors because the plants cannot afford to pay for them. They said that

Ukraine plants need about 2,000 more fire doors and Russian plants also

need more doors. Figures 7, 8, and 9 illustrate safety equipment provided

through the U.S. safety assistance program.

Figure 7: Safety Parameter Display System at Khmelnytskyy Nuclear Power Plant
Chapter 3

Experts Believe That Assistance Has

Improved the Safety of Soviet-Designed

Reactors, but More Improvements Are

Needed

Page 49 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Figure 8: Full-Scope Simulator at Khmelnytskyy Nuclear Power Plant

Figure 9: Analytical Simulator Used by Ukrainian Nuclear Regulators
Chapter 3

Experts Believe That Assistance Has

Improved the Safety of Soviet-Designed

Reactors, but More Improvements Are

Needed

Page 50 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Impact of U.S. Safety

Assistance Is Difficult

to Measure

U.S. safety experts told us that although they believe the safety of Sovietdesigned nuclear power plants has improved, it is difficult to quantify the

extent to which safety assistance has reduced the risks of their operation.

According to a 1999 PNNL study, objective performance measurement is

very difficult because nuclear power plants operating in these countries

have only recently started recording and reporting standard safety

performance activities. Thus, historical data are not available to establish a

baseline for gauging the impact of improvements. Notwithstanding these

limitations, DOE has developed two sets of performance indicators. These

include (1) quantifiable measures of progress to reflect the transfer of

equipment, procedures, and software and the effectiveness of training and

(2) indicators in six key technology areas—operational safety, training,

maintenance, safety systems, safety assessments, and regulatory and

institutional policy and capabilities.

DOE has provided examples of how U.S. safety projects were being

implemented as measures of the program’s success. For example, in its

fiscal year 2001 budget request, DOE identified several quantifiable

activities, including

• training over 6,000 nuclear plant operators in programs that were based

on U.S. methodology,

• installing seven training simulators and manufacturing six additional

training simulators,

• installing safety parameter display systems at eight reactors and

manufacturing five additional systems, and

• completing fire safety upgrades at five reactor sites and conducting

upgrades at two other reactor sites.

NRC officials told us that they also gauge the program’s impact by

quantifying the results of projects, such as the number of Russian and

Ukrainian regulators who have received training from NRC. In addition, the

regulators have provided NRC with numerous examples of regulations and

regulatory-related documents that have been produced as a result of NRC’s

assistance.

A major issue that arose during the 1999 International Conference on

Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe was the use of

probabilistic risk assessments by countries operating Soviet-designed

reactors to show that plant safety had been significantly improved.

According to PNNL officials, probabilistic risk assessments have been used
Chapter 3

Experts Believe That Assistance Has

Improved the Safety of Soviet-Designed

Reactors, but More Improvements Are

Needed

Page 51 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

for about 25 years in the United States to provide insights for improving the

safety of nuclear power plants. The results of the assessments are reported

in terms of the chances, or frequencies, that certain events may lead to an

accident. The assessments, however, have limitations, and their results can

vary widely depending on the accuracy of the input data, the depth of

analysis, the software used, and the amount of peer review. According to

DOE, the value of such assessments is their systematic evaluation of the

safety of a plant’s design, not the bottom-line frequencies that they

generate. As a result, changes to the bottom-line frequencies should not be

used alone to demonstrate that safety has improved or declined, unless the

frequencies reflect the results of a complete safety assessment (performed

with valid input data, validation of computer codes, and international peer

review).

U.S. officials expressed concern that countries operating Soviet-designed

nuclear power plants were misusing the results of probabilistic risk

assessments. For example, Lithuanian officials at the safety conference

sponsored by IAEA cited bottom-line frequencies to demonstrate safety

improvements at one of Lithuania’s RBMK reactors. Several U.S. safety

experts believed that Lithuania’s presentation, based on the reactor’s safety

assessment, were misleading. According to PNNL officials, nearly all

Soviet-designed plants have had a probabilistic risk assessment performed

to some degree, and the results of these assessments are increasingly being

used to determine that the plants are now safe. The officials noted that this

practice continues despite warnings by experts that the results are

uncertain and subject to manipulation.
Page 52 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Chapter 4

Progress Toward Shutting Down SovietDesigned Reactors Has Been Limited Chapte4r

For donor countries, the goal of nuclear safety assistance continues to be

the earliest practicable shutdown of the highest-risk Soviet-designed

reactors. Although Ukraine decided to shut down one of its reactors at the

Chornobyl nuclear power plant in 1996, all of the other highest-risk

reactors continue to operate despite the efforts of the international

community to obtain their closure. The countries operating Sovietdesigned reactors depend, to varying degrees, on nuclear power to meet

their domestic energy requirements, and, in their view, the reactors provide

a low-cost energy supply. Furthermore, safety experts from several

countries and IAEA told us that the assistance provided to improve the

safety of the reactors has had the unintended consequence of encouraging

plant operators to continue operating them despite their inherent safety

flaws.

Goal of International

Assistance Program

Was to Encourage the

Shutdown of the

Highest-Risk Reactors

In 1992, the donors of safety assistance began working toward the early

shutdown of the highest-risk reactors as part of the G-7 nuclear safety

assistance program. The United States has consistently supported this

objective. The 1992 Lisbon Initiative on Multilateral Nuclear Safety, which

established the U.S. safety assistance program, also noted that these

reactors should be shut down. In addition, the Congress, in the 1992

Freedom Support Act, viewed U.S. assistance as providing short-term

upgrades to civilian nuclear power plants and seeking to shut down those

plants where economically feasible. In 1996, Ukraine shut down a reactor

at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant because it lacked the resources to

replace deteriorating reactor components. Currently, only one of the plant’s

four originally functioning reactors remains operational. However, it

appears unlikely that many, if any, of the other highest-risk Soviet-designed

reactors will be closed in the near future.

During our review, officials from Finland, France, Italy, Sweden, the United

Kingdom, and IAEA told us it was unrealistic to believe that these plants

would be shut down quickly because the countries operating them all rely,

to a certain extent, on nuclear power for their energy needs. For example,

as of 1997, the nuclear share of electricity production was 14 percent in

Russia, 47 percent in Ukraine, and 83 percent in Lithuania. Further

complicating efforts to obtain their early closure, these nuclear power

plants each employ several thousand people who do not have alternative

employment opportunities. Additionally, the plants are a primary source of

domestic heat.
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Progress Toward Shutting Down SovietDesigned Reactors Has Been Limited

Page 53 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Officials from these countries, as well as DOE and State Department

officials, have also noted that when the shutdown policy was begun in the

early 1990s, the G-7 countries believed that the countries operating these

reactors would adopt market economies and attract investment capital to

acquire replacement energy. Some of these officials said that certain

economic and political assumptions have not proved to be accurate. For

example, Ukraine has been unable to restructure its energy sector to

implement sustainable energy reforms. A nuclear safety official from

Sweden told us that the G-7 document advocating the early shutdown of

the high-risk reactors is unachievable and irrelevant, and although some

Soviet reactor designs are inherently unsafe, economic and political factors

will prevent their closure in the near future. The Department of State’s

Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety told us that no one fully understood

how much political resistance to closure would be raised by the countries

operating these reactors.

As we noted in our 1994 report,1 international nuclear safety officials

recognized that closing the highest-risk reactors would require an

integrated, long-term energy strategy. Nuclear safety assistance is

considered one part of a larger effort that must include market reforms,

adjustments to energy prices, and the identification of both nuclear and

nonnuclear forms of replacement energy. In 1993, a study by the World

Bank and other international institutions concluded that it would it would

be technically feasible to shut down the highest-risk reactors and replace

them with alternative energy sources by the mid- to late 1990s at a cost of

about $21 billion. However, a World Bank official told us that the original

estimate assumed that economic conditions in these countries would

improve. He noted that economic conditions had not improved, political

systems in some of the countries are unstable, and the amount of money

required to facilitate the shutdown of the highest-risk reactors would be

significantly greater than originally estimated.

1

Nuclear Safety: International Assistance Efforts to Make Soviet-Designed Reactors Safer

(GAO/RCED-94-234, Sept. 29, 1994).
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Progress Toward Shutting Down SovietDesigned Reactors Has Been Limited

Page 54 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Assistance May Be

Used to Justify

Continued Operation

of Highest-Risk Plants

Many safety experts told us that the countries operating Soviet-designed

nuclear power plants will continue to do so as long as they perceive the

operations to be in their best economic interests. However, safety experts

from Austria, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and IAEA told us that

the assistance provided to improve the safety of the reactors has had the

unintended consequence of encouraging plant operators to continue

operating them despite their inherent safety flaws. A United Kingdom

safety expert said he recognizes this dilemma but believes that the donor

countries must continue to reduce the risks involved in the operation of the

highest-risk plants. According to the State Department’s Senior

Coordinator for Nuclear Safety, all donor countries determined that it was

worth the risks to provide the assistance to improve the reactors’ safety

because of the known health and safety dangers posed by the operation of

the highest-risk reactors. She noted that it was later that the donors

recognized that the assistance might encourage the continued operation of

these plants.

Russia has taken advantage of international nuclear safety assistance to

bolster its claims that its highest-risk reactors are likely to operate for

many more years. In a May 1999 letter to a personal representative of the

German Chancellor, Russia’s Minister of Economy expressed his

appreciation for the safety assistance provided by the international

community to improve the safety of Russia’s nuclear power plants. He

noted that this assistance was helping Russia continue its wide-scale

efforts to modernize its plants, including the highest-risk reactors. The

Minister stated that in 1998, Russia had adopted a program of nuclear

energy development, whose principal task is improving the safety of all

nuclear power plants, including those posing the highest risks, through

2010.

The Department of State’s Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety told us

that the United States and other donors were concerned about Russia’s

position. She stated that the assistance was meant to protect public health

in the countries operating these reactors and to protect people in Europe

and other locations from needless exposure to radiation until the reactors

were shut down. In her view, the assistance was never intended to extend

the lives of these reactors, although the countries operating them never

accepted this view. The May 1999 letter made it clear, for example, that

Russia did not intend to close any of its RBMK and VVER 440 Model 230

reactors. The Senior Coordinator said that in response to Russia’s position

on closure, the donors would have to reassess their position on continuing
Chapter 4

Progress Toward Shutting Down SovietDesigned Reactors Has Been Limited

Page 55 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

to provide safety assistance to Russia. She thought the donors might focus

more attention on strengthening the role of Russia’s nuclear regulatory

organization to help it develop the ability to close the reactors that,

according to safety assessments, pose the highest risks.

Safety experts from the United States, Japan, the European Commission,

and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development told us that

the donor countries have tried not to provide equipment that could be used

to extend the lives of the highest-risk reactors. As we reported in 1996,2

however, DOE had allocated about $8.5 million to a project that transferred

western maintenance practices, training methods, and technology to staff

operating RBMK reactors. DOE stated that it was not providing any

equipment that would extend the lives of these reactors, such as larger

components or major piping or wiring systems. More recently, we found

that DOE had rejected projects proposed by Russia’s Ministry of Atomic

Energy (MINATOM) because of concerns about extending of the lives of

certain reactors. In June 1999, for example, DOE informed MINATOM that

it could not support the replacement of a main steam isolation valve at a

VVER 440 Model 230 plant because the project could extend the plant’s

operation. DOE noted that the policy of the U.S. government was to assist

in improving the safety of these plants but not to undertake activities that

would extend their lives.

According to Russian nuclear safety officials, no technical analysis or

requirement has conclusively demonstrated that the older reactors should

be shut down. They noted that it is impossible to predict how long these

reactors will continue to operate and stated that Russia is currently

studying this matter. If technical analysis demonstrates that it is possible

and economically efficient to continue to operate these plants, then Russia

will continue to do so. One official noted that it is now time to start

conducting the technical analysis, while there are still 5 to 6 years to make

a decision. However, another high-level official from Russia’s nuclear

regulatory organization told us that RBMKs are inherently unsafe and

should be shut down. According to him, a similar generalization about

VVER reactors is more difficult because they include a variety of models

and have been modified in different ways. One IAEA official told us that it

was “wishful thinking” to believe that Russia would shut down its RBMK

reactors. Another IAEA official said that no one should be surprised that

2

Nuclear Safety: Status of U.S. Assistance to Improve the Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

(GAO/RCED-97-5, Oct. 29, 1996).
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Progress Toward Shutting Down SovietDesigned Reactors Has Been Limited

Page 56 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Russia is publicly stating its intention to continue operating these reactors.

He noted that Russia has stated the same position for many years.

Donors’ Efforts to Shut

Down the Highest-Risk

Soviet-Designed

Reactors Have Met

With Limited Success

The donor countries, including the United States, believe that using the

multilateral nuclear safety fund administered by the European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development is the most probable way to link safety

assistance to a plant’s shutdown. Although the bank negotiated closure

agreements with Bulgaria and Lithuania, efforts to obtain shutdown are

tenuous. For example, Bulgaria is continuing to operate its reactors beyond

the agreed-upon time frames in the bank agreement. In 1993, Bulgaria

agreed to a phased shutdown of its four VVER 440 Model 230 reactors by

1998 in exchange for a $28 million equipment grant from the bank,

assuming the availability of adequate replacement energy. However,

Bulgaria has not had the resources to develop sources of replacement

energy. According to a high-ranking representative of Bulgaria’s nuclear

safety organization, it was very clear that the first two VVER 440 Model 230

reactors would be shut down in 2004 or 2005 because these plants have

design deficiencies that can never be fixed.

In 1994, Lithuania agreed to stop producing electricity at one its two RBMK

reactors by mid-1998 unless Lithuania’s safety authority granted a new

operating license for that reactor. The safety authority granted the license,

authorizing the plant to operate the reactor until it requires a major

upgrade. Lithuania’s government has prepared an energy strategy that

assumes the reactor will be shut down not later than 2005, but no decision

will be made on the second reactor until 2004, when a revised energy

strategy is due. According to State Department officials, recent decisions

by both Bulgaria and Lithuania to reaffirm closure conditions are

significant because they demonstrate a commitment on the part of these

countries to shut down some of their highest-risk reactors.

Agreements with Russia do not specify dates for closing its VVER 440

Model 230 or RBMK reactors. Russia has agreed to continue operating

these reactors in accordance with the results of in-depth safety analyses

being conducted for each plant, licensing extensions granted by the

Russian regulator within specified time frames, and the development of a

power sector strategy that includes measures to promote energy efficiency.

In 1998, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

concluded that there have been major difficulties getting Russian

authorities to accept the conditions established in bank agreements for

reactors’ continued operation and that Russia’s regulatory organization did
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Progress Toward Shutting Down SovietDesigned Reactors Has Been Limited

Page 57 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

not feel bound by these conditions. As a result, it was doubtful that the

safety analyses would be completed on time. A bank official told us that his

organization has limited capacity to influence closure despite the

agreements that are in place. The bank alone cannot insist that the

countries operating the highest-risk reactors shut them down. This

official—as well as other European safety experts—said the grants that the

bank provides to countries operating the highest-risk reactors are not

sufficient to be a determining factor when a country makes a decision

about closing its reactors. The bank official noted that the entire

international community of banks and governments needs to use its

collective influence to encourage closure. (App. I provides more

information on the status of efforts to obtain the closure of the highest-risk

reactors.)

Some officials noted that the most effective way to bring about the

shutdown of some reactors is through the expansion of the European

Union. The Union is considering expanding and extending its membership

to certain countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Countries that wish to

join must demonstrate their commitment to nuclear safety. This includes

the earliest possible closure of reactors that cannot be upgraded to

internationally accepted safety levels at a reasonable cost. Timetables for

closure are required to be consistent with the requirements of the Bank’s

Nuclear Safety Account agreements. Countries with high-risk reactors

interested in joining the European Union include Bulgaria, Lithuania, and

the Slovak Republic.

Shutdown of Chornobyl

Remains Uncertain

The G-7’s top priority is closing the last operating reactor (unit 3) at the

Chornobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine. In 1995, the G-7 nations and

Ukraine signed a memorandum of understanding that includes Ukraine’s

commitment to close the plant by 2000. Although the agreement does not

identify specific funding levels to help achieve closure, it does indicate that

about $2.3 billion in loans and grants were anticipated to facilitate the

shutdown of Chornobyl.

According to several U.S., European, and Ukrainian officials, the closure of

Chornobyl in 2000 is uncertain. Several impediments to closure exist,

including a lack of funding to provide replacement nuclear reactors that

Ukraine believes would compensate for Chornobyl’s closure and concerns

about the social and economic well-being of workers who would be

displaced once Chornobyl is closed. Ukraine’s First Deputy Minister of

Energy told us that the G-7 nations are not honoring their financial
Chapter 4

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Page 58 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

commitments to help Ukraine facilitate the shutdown of Chornobyl.

Furthermore, in his view, the agreement commits the G-7 countries to help

complete two nuclear power reactors in Ukraine that can provide adequate

replacement energy. He noted that in order to obtain financing for the

completion of the two plants, the European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development is requiring expensive safety improvements that will

significantly increase the cost of completing the unfinished reactors.

The First Deputy Minister said he would advise his government not to shut

down Chornobyl unless it receives adequate financial support from the G-7

nations. The head of Ukraine’s regulatory organization told us that Ukraine

will abide by its commitment to close Chornobyl. However, Ukraine

expects the G-7 nations to abide by their commitments to provide financial

assistance. The director and assistant chief engineer of Chornobyl told us

that the plant should not be closed. The director, who is responsible for

operating the entire plant and its surrounding support institutions, said that

the positions of thousands of plant employees would have to be

terminated, significantly increasing unemployment in the local area. He

noted that closure was a political issue. The assistant chief engineer said

concerns about the premature shutdown of the plant are affecting the

attitudes of Chornobyl workers toward safety. He believes that Chornobyl

requires maintenance to correct safety problems and that it would be better

to repair the old plant than to build new ones.

There are other impediments to Chornobyl’s closure. For example,

Ukrainian officials stated that the plant will not be closed until there is an

adequate supply of heat for the workers who will be performing

decommissioning activities, which could last for a few decades. Currently,

an obsolete plant is providing heat. The United States plans to spend about

$30 million to finish the construction of a new heat plant. According to

PNNL representatives, Chornobyl fire department officials have been

uncooperative and have delayed issuing fire permits for the construction

site because the Chornobyl plant’s management owes the fire department

money. They further noted that the plant’s management has not been

aggressive in trying to resolve these differences because it does not want to

shut down the plant. During our visit to Chornobyl in October 1999, the

construction of the heat plant was about 4 months behind schedule. The

U.S. heat plant project manager told us that he seriously doubted the heat

plant would be finished by the end of 2000—a delay that could jeopardize

the plant’s shutdown.
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Page 59 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

U.S. officials also expressed concern about Ukraine’s ability to contribute

to the heat plant’s construction. Ukraine is expected to contribute

approximately $7.5 million in in-kind support, including an 18-kilometer

pipeline to carry fuel to the heat plant. As we noted in our 1996 report,

Ukraine has had difficulty meeting its cost-sharing obligations under a

number of joint U.S.-Ukraine nuclear safety projects. Officials from the U.S.

embassy in Kiev and from PNNL told us that it was uncertain if Ukraine

would meet its cost-sharing obligations for the heat plant. According to the

State Department’s Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety, DOE has

recently obtained a commitment from the President of Ukraine to provide

support for the heat plant. Figure 10 shows the status of the heat plant’s

construction at the time of our visit.

Figure 10: Status of Construction of the Chornobyl Heat Plant, as of October 1999
Page 60 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Chapter 5

Management of Some DOE and NRC Safety

Assistance Activities Has Raised Concerns Chapte5r

Despite the generally favorable views of the countries that have received

DOE’s and NRC’s safety assistance, some U.S. program officials have raised

concerns about the management of both agencies’ programs. Specifically,

DOE has funded several projects that do not meet its own project selection

criteria. Although these projects may be worthwhile, they are not directly

related to improving the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. As a

result, DOE appears to have expanded the program beyond its original

mission to upgrade the reactors’ safety. In addition, DOE has funded

several other projects that have raised concerns among program officials,

who told us that the projects are of questionable value in meeting the

program’s objectives.

NRC has managed its nuclear safety assistance program from year to year

without adopting a long-term strategy. Furthermore, NRC’s program

management responsibilities are divided among several offices, making the

program vulnerable, according to NRC’s Inspector General and others, to

duplication of effort and miscommunication with other federal agencies

participating in the program. These management weaknesses contributed

to NRC’s inability to obligate over $500,000 in program funds for fiscal

years 1997 and 1998. The funds were subsequently returned to the U.S.

Treasury.

Some DOE Projects

Are Not Directly

Related to Improving

the Safety of SovietDesigned Nuclear

Power Plants

DOE established goals for its nuclear safety program and related project

evaluation criteria in three documents—its 1997 strategic plan (which

includes, as an objective, the improvement of international nuclear safety),

in a 1997 strategy document for nuclear safety, and in a March 1999 report

to the Congress on improving the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power

plants. According to the 1999 report, proposed projects are first screened

by program staff to ensure that they will improve the safety of operating

plants, prevent or contain damage to reactors in the event of accidents, and

apply established technologies. Projects that meet the screening criteria

are evaluated in more detail by program staff and host country experts,

who apply the following criteria to determine if a project meets the

program’s mission: impact on safety, cost-effectiveness, and the host

country’s commitment. On the basis of this evaluation and the availability

of resources, priorities and schedules are established for the project.

According to DOE, this process ensures that projects are consistent with

the policies and goals under which U.S. financial support is committed, the

needs of the host countries are met, and the required resources are

available.
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Several projects that we reviewed do not, in our view, meet DOE’s project

selection criteria because they do not support the mission of improving

nuclear safety. The former manager of the international nuclear safety

program at PNNL told us that some of these projects are indicative of

efforts by DOE’s program management to find new ways of expanding the

program. In his view, these types of projects may be worthwhile but should

not be funded at the expense of projects that are focused on improving the

Soviet-designed reactors’ safety—the primary objective of DOE’s effort.

The projects that we consider outside the scope of DOE’s efforts to

upgrade unsafe reactors are summarized below and fall into two areas. The

first area includes environmental and nuclear safety centers that DOE is

funding in several countries. It also includes two laboratories that were

established in Ukraine to address the social impact of closing the

Chornobyl nuclear power plant and support research on the environmental

and biological effects of the Chornobyl accident. The second area

comprises a number of projects or expenditures that either fall outside the

scope of reducing the risks of accidents or otherwise represent a

questionable use of program funds.

International Centers for

Environmental Safety

In fiscal year 1999, DOE’s international nuclear safety program allocated

$100,000 for the establishment of international centers for environmental

safety in the United States and Russia. According to DOE, the centers are

expected to provide a way for the United States and Russia to coordinate

efforts to mitigate the effects of Cold War nuclear activities on the

environment, including developing strategies to manage radioactive waste

and spent nuclear fuel. Idaho National Energy and Environmental

Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory were responsible for starting

up the centers in coordination with Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy.

DOE officials, including the director of the international nuclear safety

program, told us that the project is consistent with the goals of the nuclear

safety program because radioactive waste and environmental cleanup

issues are components of broader nuclear safety issues facing Russia.

Some Members of Congress have criticized the project because it is not

directly related to upgrading unsafe reactors. Specifically, in its fiscal year

2000 conference report, issued in July 1999, the House Committee on

Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, noted

that each year DOE seeks to expand the international nuclear safety

program beyond its original mission—to upgrade unsafe reactors.

According to the report, previous efforts to expand the program included
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international nuclear safety centers and research laboratories. The report

noted that such efforts are of particular concern because of (1) continuing

delays in implementing the original program and (2) large carryover

balances indicating that the program’s implementation is lagging.

According to DOE, the administration proposed in fiscal year 2000 that the

environmental centers be funded entirely on their own merit. The Congress

did not approve this activity and no funds are being spent in this area.

International Nuclear Safety

Centers

DOE has used program funds to support nuclear safety centers in Russia,

Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The mission of the U.S.-Russian center, which is

the largest of the three centers, is to facilitate ongoing technical exchanges

between the United States and Russia and to improve nuclear safety

technology and safety culture through joint research projects. DOE has

allocated over $20 million since fiscal year 1995 (including $8.8 million in

safety funds) to pay for research activities both in the United States and

Russia. About $1.7 million of the total has been provided to the center in

Russia to buy equipment, pay overhead costs, and supplement the salaries

of about 20 to 25 Russian scientists who work on research projects.

Currently, the centers are managing nine joint research projects, including

the preparation of a safety database. The database provides information on

nuclear power plants, research reactors, and fuel cycle facilities and is

available to the public through the Internet. According to DOE, the

database also contains important analytical information. The centers are

also involved in a variety of other projects.1

In our view, while several of the centers’ joint projects appear to involve

worthwhile research, it is questionable whether these projects directly

improve the safety of currently operating nuclear power plants. For

example, one of the projects dealing with in-depth safety assessments in

Russia may in the future be a useful part of Russia’s licensing program,

according to an Argonne National Laboratory official. Furthermore, a DOE

official told us that projects related to Russia’s nuclear research facility and

1

Projects include the measurement and review of material properties data; compilation of

information on Russian nuclear safety research facilities; experiments and computer codes;

development of advanced coupled neutronic codes; accident management technology

development for Russian nuclear power plants; validation of U.S. computer codes for

transient analysis of design-based accidents; validation of three-dimensional structural

analysis software and models; development of techniques for monitoring and diagnostics of

sensors, systems, and equipment; and development of a strategic plan for Russian nuclear

safety research.
Chapter 5

Management of Some DOE and NRC Safety

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the development of a strategic plan for safety research do not contribute to

improving the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power plants.

Lithuania and Kazakhstan have independently established safety centers,

and DOE has spent $211,800 to further the centers’ infrastructure-building

and safety culture objectives. DOE funds have been used by the Lithuanian

safety center to develop a nuclear safety Web site at the Lithuanian Energy

Institute. The Kazakhstan center was established to reduce Kazakhstan’s

technical isolation following the breakup of the former Soviet Union and

support that country’s need to close a breeder reactor that poses both

safety and proliferation risks.

International Radioecology

Laboratory

The International Radioecology Laboratory performs studies on the widescale biological and environmental effects of the Chornobyl accident. DOE

has used two sources of funds to support the development of the

laboratory. First, DOE’s Office of Environmental Management provided

about $400,000 to purchase supplies and equipment for the laboratory.

Second, PNNL, which was tasked by DOE to purchase the equipment and

supplies, spent $8,560 in safety funds during fiscal year 1999 to provide

administrative support in the areas of procurement, customs, and taxation

issues. According to the former manager of PNNL’s international nuclear

safety program, the project has no relation to improving nuclear safety, but

DOE directed PNNL to support the project because of PNNL’s expertise in

providing program support for safety activities in Ukraine. After we

brought this matter to DOE’s attention, DOE determined that no safety

funds should have been used to support this activity. As a result, DOE is

charging the $8,560 against the Office of Environmental Management’s

project account.

The Slavutych Laboratory of

International Research and

Technology

According to DOE officials, the Slavutych Laboratory of International

Research and Technology is an important component of U.S. efforts to

facilitate the shutdown of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. DOE expects

the laboratory to become self-sufficient and employ Chornobyl workers

who will be displaced when the Chornobyl nuclear power plant is closed.

At the time of our review, the laboratory had approximately 25 full-time

employees. DOE’s goal is to transform it into an enterprise that can

eventually employ about 100 people. Such a goal, however, would not

accommodate the approximately 6,000 personnel who work at the

Chornobyl nuclear power plant, most of whom will be unemployed if the

plant shuts down. DOE has allocated about $7.5 million to support the
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laboratory through fiscal year 1999, including about $1.7 million to

renovate and furnish a building that houses the laboratory.

The laboratory has relied heavily on DOE funds for financial assistance. It

has, however, also received some support from the United Kingdom, Japan,

France, and Germany. Some U.S. and Ukrainian officials questioned the

value of the laboratory, and one PNNL official described it as a

“middleman” for contract support, rather than a true laboratory that

conducts research. The laboratory has provided, among other things,

translation services and logistics support and has performed various

technical studies in areas such as computer modeling and training. The

director of DOE’s international nuclear safety program told us that the

laboratory has not done a good job of attracting clients other than DOE. He

said that if it is to become self-sufficient, it will have to develop good

business relationships with other organizations and countries.

One PNNL official told us he questioned whether nuclear safety funds

should be used to support economic assistance projects such as the

laboratory. In addition, the former chief engineer of the Chornobyl nuclear

power plant−who is also the former head of Ukraine’s nuclear regulatory

agency−told us that the use of these funds for the Slavutych Laboratory has

caused some Ukrainian officials to question DOE’s safety assistance

priorities because it is difficult to determine what the United States has

received for its investment of over $7 million. Rather than spending money

on the Slavutych Laboratory, he said the U.S. nuclear safety program could

target funds to pay the salaries of workers at nuclear plants or buy certain

spare parts needed to operate the plants more safely.

During the course of our review, 14 U.S. and Ukrainian officials expressed

their concerns to us about the Slavutych Laboratory’s business practices.

Specifically, many officials told us that there was a perception that the

laboratory’s management lacked business ethics or an understanding of

western business practices. Furthermore, several PNNL officials stated

that the laboratory routinely submitted inflated cost estimates for proposed

contracts to PNNL and other firms.

We presented these concerns to DOE, which subsequently tasked PNNL

with investigating them. In December 1999, PNNL reported that allegations

of corruption have come from various sources, including former laboratory

staff from the Chornobyl Shelter Project Management Unit who have done

business with the laboratory’s management. According to PNNL, the

employees of Westinghouse, Bechtel, Electricite de France, and Batelle
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Memorial Institute (including PNNL) who are part of the project

management unit also shared this negative perception of the laboratory.

PNNL determined that some of these allegations stem from instances when

the laboratory tried to charge the project management unit extremely high

prices for basic services, such as photocopying, equipment rentals, and

parking. According to PNNL officials, they did not find evidence to support

the allegations of corruption but did determine that the laboratory’s

management “engaged in activities that reflect their misunderstanding of

appropriate business practices in a market economy and represent a

serious misperception of what is acceptable business practice.” According

PNNL’s acting nuclear safety manager, PNNL has implemented several

corrective measures including

• funding a financial audit of the laboratory by KPMG, an international

audit firm,

• funding a project to introduce a western-style accounting system at the

laboratory, and

• amending PNNL-funded contracts to require that the laboratory’s

management and staff certify that agreed-upon salary payments have

been made and received for all work.

During our review, we found that DOE made cash payments totaling

$38,570 to the Slavutych Laboratory over 4 years. These cash payments

concerned us because of the allegations of mismanagement at the

laboratory. Furthermore, according to DOE’s accounting handbook,

adequate internal controls are required to ensure that cash payments are

controlled from the receipt of a payment to its final disposition. According

to PNNL officials, they are aware that cash payments are often indicators

of bribery or corruption but have documented cash payments to allow for

audit transparency.

Specifically, Oak Ridge National Laboratory officials made cash payments

for translation, interpreter, and support services totaling $7,044. Oak Ridge

officials said that Ukraine is a cash economy and it made sense to conduct

the transactions in this fashion. They said they requested and received

receipts for these payments. Other cash payments totaling $31,525 were

made to Slavutych Laboratory from 1996 through 1999. That amount

included $4,354 to support the Secretary of Energy’s visit in 1999 and $1,278

for a luncheon attended by the Deputy Secretary of Energy’s delegation in

May 1999. When we told the director of DOE’s nuclear safety program

about these cash payments, he said he is opposed to providing cash

payments because they present a security risk to travelers and can lead to
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paperless transactions. However, DOE’s Acting Deputy Administrator for

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation told us that Ukraine is not a credit card

society and that under certain circumstances, the use of cash is

appropriate. She noted that she had reviewed DOE’s procedures on the use

of cash payments and believed that officials acted correctly when making

these payments.

In January 2000, KPMG completed a financial audit of the Slavutych

Laboratory in order to evaluate whether the laboratory’s management had

performed any improper activities with funds received from PNNL. The

audit comprised two parts—(1) a financial audit, which covered the period

from January 1, 1999, through September 30, 1999, and (2) a review of a

number of cash payments made by PNNL to the laboratory. For the limited

period covered by the audit, KPMG did not identify any misappropriation of

funds by the Slavutych Laboratory’s management, nor did it find any

evidence that the laboratory had performed any illegal or unlawful

activities. It did note, however, that some invoices relating to 1997 PNNL

task orders were not found. The audit also found that a former laboratory

employee, who accepted cash payments of $4,334 from Oak Ridge National

Laboratory officials on behalf of the laboratory, did not immediately

deposit the dollars into a local bank where the funds would be converted

into Ukrainian currency. Rather, the employee kept the funds in U.S. dollars

longer than necessary. The managing partner of KPMG (Ukraine) told us

that the former employee appears to have kept the excess funds realized by

waiting for a more favorable exchange rate.

The audit also found that the laboratory’s office building is owned by the

Chornobyl nuclear power plant and that there is no formal lease between

the plant and the laboratory. However, the two parties have signed a 10-

year cooperation agreement under which the laboratory is allowed to use

the building for its operational activities. If the plant decided to cancel the

agreement and no longer allowed the laboratory to use the office space, the

laboratory would not be reimbursed for any expenditures made to improve

the facility. According to DOE, the laboratory has submitted a formal, longterm lease agreement that is in the process of being approved by Ukrainian

authorities. Furthermore, the laboratory and the Chornobyl nuclear power

plant are seeking to transfer ownership of the building to the International

Chornobyl Center.

The KPMG (Ukraine) managing partner told us that KPMG was unable to

perform a financial audit of the International Chornobyl Center, the parent

organization of the Slavutych Laboratory. According to KPMG officials, the
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center has been unable to provide all necessary information, primarily

because its accounting staff has changed several times. The current

accounting staff had no idea what previous accountants had been doing. As

a result, the center could not prepare a reconcilable balance sheet. DOE

had paid the center about $45,000 for translation and interpreter services as

of March 2000. Figures 11 and 12 show the exterior and interior of the

laboratory.

Figure 11: Slavutych Laboratory of International Research and Technology
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Figure 12: Interior of the Slavutych Laboratory

Other Program Projects

and/or Expenditures Raise

Concerns

During the course of our audit, several PNNL officials told us they were

concerned about DOE management’s decision to fund projects that either

did not improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors or were of

questionable value to the program. While individual projects did not

generally represent large program expenditures, the projects collectively

raised concerns because program funds were being spent on low-priority

activities.

DOE Representatives’ Offices in

Paris and Tokyo

DOE spent about $1.04 million in nuclear safety program funds to partially

finance the operations of its representatives’ offices in Paris and Tokyo

during fiscal years 1998 and 1999. According to DOE, these representatives

support the Department in a variety of activities related to nuclear safety

and nonproliferation through interactions with the European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development; the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development; and coordinating committees, workshops,

and student exchanges. The director of DOE’s nuclear safety program said

that these offices used to be funded from other DOE accounts in the Office

of Nuclear Energy. When the nuclear safety function was transferred to the

Office of Nonproliferation and National Security in 1998, the funding

responsibility was transferred as well. According to DOE, it has submitted
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a reprogramming request to fund all expenses for the Paris and Tokyo

offices from another departmental account in fiscal year 2000 and has

requested that these representatives be funded from this same account in

fiscal year 2001.

Printing Costs DOE spent about $78,000 to print a limited number of copies of a report to

the Congress on the status of the nuclear safety program. This report went

to full publication (50 copies) four different times because of changes made

by the director of DOE’s international nuclear safety program. PNNL,

which was responsible for preparing the report, assumed that the initial

draft of the report was ready for publication and printed 50 copies.

However, the director was not satisfied with the report and made changes.

This occurred three times, and each time PNNL assumed the report was

ready for publication and printed it. A DOE official told us that the reports

should not have cost more than $500 per copy, including labor and printing

costs. However, because of all the revisions, it cost about $1,554 per copy

for the 50 reports that were finally delivered. In addition, PNNL reported

that over 3 years, the program spent about $91,000 for various graphic

presentations. One of the presentations, which included about 100

overhead slides, was revised eight times for the director of DOE’s

international nuclear safety program, who was planning to give the

presentation to members of the Ukrainian parliament. At one point, the

director required changes that had to be made by a Ukrainian printing

company at a cost of about $2,500. According to DOE, although the director

never gave the presentation, several program managers have used the

documents for other presentations.

Summer Internships In mid-1999, DOE hired seven Ukrainian college students for a summer

internship program. The cost of the program was $16,200 and was paid

from nuclear safety assistance program funds. The students worked at six

locations in Ukraine, including the PNNL Adjunct Office, the Slavutych

Business Development Agency, the International Chornobyl Center, and

Kiev State University. Their work included developing database

information, translating technical manuals, and supporting energy

efficiency projects. Three PNNL officials, including the former manager of

the safety program, were concerned that the internship project, while

worthwhile in its intent, did not support the program’s overall goal of

improving the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power plants.

Furthermore, PNNL officials responsible for overseeing the internship

project and employing some of the students said that although the project

had benefits, some of the students were engaged in “busywork.”
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The director of DOE’s international nuclear safety program, who initiated

the project after meeting with some of these students at an energy

conference in Ukraine, said the internship program provided these

students with a unique opportunity to learn about western business

practices, which supported the goals of the program. He believes that all of

the students did useful work at a minimal cost to the United States.

Furthermore, DOE’s Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear

Nonproliferation said that it was important for the United States to engage

these students in activities that could be beneficial in the longer term by

promoting broad nonproliferation and nuclear safety policy goals. She

believes these students are critical to Ukraine’s future and it is important

for the United States to engage them in useful and productive activities as a

gesture of goodwill. She said she would recommend continuing the

program in the future if funds were available.

Robotics Equipment PNNL and Ukrainian officials expressed their concerns to us about the

value of robotics equipment that was shipped to the Chornobyl nuclear

power plant for a test demonstration in May 1999. The equipment was

developed to collect visual and physical data from areas in the damaged

Chornobyl reactor that are too contaminated for human access. The

robotics project has been funded as part of a joint research program

between DOE and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

DOE provided $487,000 to PNNL to modify the equipment and arrange for

its shipment to Ukraine. In addition, DOE has spent about $10,000 in

program funds over the past few months to support the transfer of the

equipment to the Chornobyl nuclear power plant.

According to two PNNL officials, Ukrainian officials did not ask for the

equipment and did not want it. After the robot was shipped and the

demonstration test was completed, the equipment was placed in storage at

Chornobyl for several months. The director of the Chornobyl nuclear

power plant said he had reservations about the equipment but was not

against its use if realistic tasks could be developed. However, the deputy

chief of the Chornobyl shelter project told us that Ukraine never requested

the robot and does not have the funds to support research for it. According

to DOE, the Chornobyl nuclear plant has recently decided to accept

ownership of the equipment for use in its decommissioning activities.
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DOE and NRC Have Spent

$1.9 Million for U.S.-Based

Interpreters

Since fiscal year 1992, NRC and DOE have spent about $1.9 million for

interpreters who live in the United States and are under contract with the

Department of State. Because the interpreters live in the United States,

NRC’s and DOE’s expenditures for the interpreters include—in addition to

standard service fees—travel and per diem costs. Neither agency has

developed a policy to determine when and whether it would be more

advantageous to hire in-country interpreters—an option that could, in

some circumstances, be more cost-efficient.

NRC estimates that it has spent about $1.1 million for interpreters hired by

the State Department but has never formally analyzed whether it might be

cost-effective to hire in-country interpreters. DOE has spent about $791,000

since fiscal year 1992 for these interpreters’ trips to Russia, Ukraine,

Bulgaria, Belgium, the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Hungary and Austria.

According to DOE, high-quality State Department translators were required

to deal with complex technical and nuclear terms, and the rate for an

interpreter’s service was $475 per day, as of November 1999. Over the past 2

years, DOE estimates it has used in-country interpreters in over 90 percent

of the cases. U.S. officials from the Kiev, Ukraine, embassy told us that a

local company charges about $140 for 8 hours of translation. Embassy

officials noted, however, that the quality of local interpreters is uneven.

The director of DOE’s international nuclear safety program asked that the

services of one particular interpreter be obtained under a PNNL contract

on very short notice in the fall of 1998 at a cost of $16,713. The former

manager of PNNL’s safety program questioned the use of a directed

contract and asked whether this approach complied with a U.S.

government policy requiring that arrangements for interpreters for senior

officials be made through the Department of State. Since that time, PNNL

has not entered into other such directed contracts, although the director

has used this interpreter under arrangements made with the Department of

State.

NRC’s Safety Program

Lacks a Strategic Plan

and Coordinated

Management

NRC has traditionally managed its nuclear safety assistance program from

year to year without adopting a long-term strategy. In the last few months,

it has started to take a longer-term approach for its activities in Russia and

Ukraine, but it is still too early to assess the impact of this new strategy.

The responsibilities for managing NRC’s program are divided among

several offices, making the program vulnerable, according to NRC’s

Inspector General and others, to duplication of effort and
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miscommunication with other federal agencies participating in the

program. According to some NRC officials, the lack of coordination and

communication between different NRC offices responsible for nuclear

safety assistance activities contributed to NRC’s inability to obligate over

$500,000 in fiscal year 1997 and 1998 program funds.

NRC Has Not Developed a

Strategic Plan

Although NRC has been providing regulatory assistance to the Newly

Independent States and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe for

over 7 years, it has not developed a long-term strategic plan that clearly

identifies the regulatory program’s overall goals, ways to quantify how well

the program is meeting these goals, and time frames for meeting these

goals. In our view, such a plan is necessary if, as the State Department’s

Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety believes, NRC will play a more

prominent role in future assistance efforts.

Several years ago, NRC officials and Russian and Ukrainian officials jointly

developed project plans and priorities, and NRC staff periodically review

the progress made in meeting these priorities. NRC staff told us that they

also periodically meet with officials from Kazakhstan, Armenia, and

Central and Eastern European countries to review projects and develop

plans for future work. Central and Eastern European safety projects are

also reviewed with US AID officials to determine the status of projects and

identify any additional resource requirements. NRC has taken a short-term

view of the assistance, particularly for Russia and Ukraine, and has

managed it from year to year without a long-term strategy.

Although NRC has provided assistance since 1992, it has not significantly

changed its management approach—described by the director of NRC’s

Office of International Programs as “cautious” and by others as being in a

maintenance mode for assistance to Russia and Ukraine. NRC is phasing

out its assistance in some countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Within

the past several months, however, NRC has revised its planning process for

assistance to Russia and Ukraine in order to obtain a longer-term

perspective. According to NRC, this effort should provide a more coherent

view of the program than has been evident in the past and should provide

additional support to sustain improvements that have resulted from NRC’s

prior assistance.
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NRC officials noted that the agency’s ability to develop a longer-term

approach to nuclear safety assistance has been complicated by concerns

about the use of NRC funds to finance the salaries of staff working on

international programs. NRC typically recovers nearly 100 percent of its

annual budget through licensing and inspection fees assessed on the U.S.

nuclear industry. As we pointed out in a prior report,2 the U.S. nuclear

industry has generally opposed the use of NRC funds to support

international activities. Over the past few years, NRC has reduced its staff

allocations and level of effort for international activities. In fiscal year 1999,

however, US AID and the Department of State allowed NRC to use a

portion of the funds US AID provides for nuclear safety assistance

activities to finance NRC staff costs related to nuclear safety activities in

the Newly Independent States. For fiscal year 2000, these staff costs are

being funded from NRC’s general fund appropriation—that portion of the

agency’s budget that is not subject to fee recovery from NRC licensees.

Management of NRC’s

International Nuclear Safety

Assistance Is Divided

The management of NRC’s international nuclear safety assistance effort is

divided between two offices—the Office of the Executive Director for

Operations and the Office of International Programs. The Office of the

Executive Director for Operations supervises and coordinates the activities

of several offices within NRC. The Office of International Programs plans

and recommends policies on international cooperation and assistance in

nuclear safety and radiation protection. The Executive Director for

Operations has responsibility for Russia and Ukraine, while the Office of

International Programs has responsibility for Armenia, Bulgaria, the Czech

Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, and the Slovak Republic. Within

the Office of International Programs, the programs for Armenia and

Kazakhstan are managed by one program manager, while a different

program manager manages the Bulgarian, Czech, Hungarian, Lithuanian

and Slovak programs. For Russia and Ukraine, the technical program

manager within the Office of the Executive Director for Operations has

overall management responsibility for assistance activities, while

responsibility for individual projects is divided among several other

additional offices. Different staff in the Office of International Programs

support the technical program manager in the administration of the

Russian and Ukrainian assistance programs.

2

Nuclear Safety: Information on the International Nuclear Regulators Association

(GAO/RCED-99-243, Aug. 6, 1999)
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The split of management activities among these offices has raised

concerns. In December 1997, NRC’s Program Review Committee found,

and NRC’s Executive Council recommended, that the agency should

develop options to integrate or consolidate the Office of International

Programs and the support office staff providing assistance in order to

minimize duplication of effort.3 In April 1998, NRC’s Office of Inspector

General observed that the lack of a management structure for the

international nuclear safety program could cause duplication because each

program requires similar activities, such as travel, funding coordination,

and reporting to US AID and the Department of State. It could also lead to

possible duplication of assistance procured through DOE’s national

laboratories and to miscommunication.

A major impact of NRC’s fragmented program management was NRC’s

inability to obligate $506,000 in fiscal year 1997 and 1998 US AID funds for

Ukraine. These expired funds were returned to the U.S. Treasury because

the money could not be obligated within a statutory 2-year period of

availability. NRC officials provided us with differing reasons as to why the

funds were not obligated. For example, some officials told us that the funds

were not obligated because of a lack of coordination and communication

between the different offices responsible for Ukrainian assistance

activities.

Conclusions In managing its nuclear safety program, DOE has funded a number of

projects that may be worthwhile in their own right but do not directly

contribute to improving the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors.

Consequently, by funding these projects, DOE is diverting limited resources

from other pressing needs. For example, we question why DOE used

program funds to create environmental centers in Russia and the United

States and to operate support offices for DOE representatives in Tokyo and

Paris. We also question DOE’s decision to allocate about $7.5 million,

including $1.7 million for building renovations and furnishings, to the

Slavutych Laboratory of International Research and Technology in Ukraine.

We believe that it is problematic that this laboratory will facilitate the

closure of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. These expenditures, as well

as others, raise questions about the program’s priorities. It was clear to us

3

The Program Review Committee and Executive Council are internal NRC groups that

periodically examine the operations and effectiveness of various NRC functions and

activities.
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during our visit to Ukraine that basic safety needs still need to be

addressed. For example, according to Ukrainian officials, there is still a

need to purchase 2,000 additional fire doors for Ukrainian nuclear power

plants, but the Ukrainians do not have the funds to do so.

Regarding the Slavutych Laboratory in Ukraine, we believe, and DOE

officials recognize as well, that if the Laboratory is to become selfsufficient and change the perception of mismanagement, it, at a minimum,

needs to establish sound accounting systems and business practices in

order to attract clients. Furthermore, for this project, as well as for other

projects where similar arrangements exist, we believe that DOE must

exercise extreme caution when paying for services and/or deliverables in

cash. We are concerned that cash payments are being made to an

organization that does not have adequate internal controls or western-style

accounting systems. We are also concerned that there is no formal lease

agreement between the Chornobyl nuclear power plant and the Slavutych

Laboratory, although it appears that efforts are now under way to clarify

this matter. DOE needs to ensure that the U.S. investment in this laboratory

is protected to the extent feasible.

Both DOE and NRC need to look for ways to increase the program’s

efficiency. For example, both agencies have made extensive use of U.S.-

based interpreters when traveling to countries operating Soviet-designed

reactors. There may be valid reasons to use these interpreters, given the

sensitive and/or technical nature of meetings. However, NRC, in particular,

has not formally reviewed its use of these interpreters, and there might be

instances when it would make sense to hire in-country interpreters and

reduce the program’s costs.

NRC’s management of the safety program also raises concerns. Without a

long-term strategic plan, it appears to us that NRC cannot effectively

manage its assistance activities because it lacks firm program goals and

time frames for meeting these goals. Furthermore, we agree with NRC’s

internal reviews, which concluded that the lack of an integrated

management approach could lead to duplication of effort and other

inefficiencies. NRC’s inability to obligate program funds in a timely manner

raises questions about its future funding requirements. If NRC is to play a

more prominent role in future assistance efforts, as the State Department’s

Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety believes, these management issues

must be addressed.
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Recommendations to

the Secretary of Energy

and the Chairman of

the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

To improve the management of the nuclear safety assistance program, we

recommend that the Secretary

• review ongoing and proposed projects and eliminate those that do not

have a strong and compelling link to improving the safety of Sovietdesigned nuclear power plants.

To improve the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s program management,

we recommend that the Chairman

• develop a strategic plan for the Commission’s nuclear safety assistance

activities that, at a minimum, establishes program priorities and goals,

ways to measure how well the goals are being met, and time frames for

meeting the goals;

• integrate the assistance activities of offices that implement nuclear

safety assistance to avoid duplication and inefficiencies; and

• consistently monitor funding requirements to ensure that funds are

obligated on a timely basis in accordance with the program’s priorities.

To help ensure that DOE’s and NRC’s nuclear safety assistance efforts are

economical and efficient, we recommend

• that the Secretary

• ensure to the extent possible that, when cash is paid for services

and/or deliverables, organizations in the Newly Independent States

have internal controls to adequately document the flow of cash from

its receipt to its final disposition; and

• clarify the lease arrangements between the Slavutych Laboratory and

the Chornobyl nuclear power plant to ensure that the U.S. investment

in the laboratory is protected to the extent possible; and

• that the Chairman

• hire in-country interpreters when feasible to do so.

Agency Comments and

Our Evaluation

Both DOE and the Department of State’s Senior Coordinator for Nuclear

Safety questioned our assessment of whether certain projects directly

improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors. The Senior

Coordinator said that while she believes our recommendations are

valuable, they set too narrow an objective for the safety assistance

program. In her view, the international nuclear safety assistance program

focuses on broader policy matters, such as the shutdown of the Chornobyl
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nuclear power plant. She noted that assistance funds are needed for

projects designed to help set up the conditions to enable shutdown, such as

the heat plant for workers decommissioning the Chornobyl reactor and

other efforts that have a small social impact, such as the Slavutych

Laboratory of International Research and Technology. While we recognize

that the safety assistance program focuses on broad goals and objectives,

our recommendations would focus limited resources on activities that

directly affect the reactors’ safety and on improving the management of

DOE’s and NRC’s safety assistance efforts.

DOE strongly disagreed with our assertion that the program funding it

provides for the International Chornobyl Center (referred to in the report

as the Slavutych Laboratory) is not directly related to improving safety.

DOE stated that it understands that the Slavutych Laboratory played a

critical role in Ukraine’s recent commitment to shut down the last

operating reactor at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. Furthermore, DOE

noted that one of the major functions of the Russian International Nuclear

Safety Center is to be a long-term voice in Russia to challenge potentially

unsafe practices at the nuclear power plants, as well as an active proponent

of creating a sound safety culture. DOE believes that the center will

eventually contribute to improved nuclear safety in all other countries

operating Soviet-designed reactors. In addition, DOE believes that about

one-half of the center’s projects directly contribute to nuclear safety

because they play a necessary part in conducting in-depth safety analyses

of nuclear reactors in Russia.

Regarding the impact of the Slavutych Laboratory on the shutdown of

Chornobyl, we continue to maintain, on the basis of our discussions with

Ukrainian officials, that the government of Ukraine will ultimately base its

decision to shut down the Chornobyl nuclear power plant on broader

economic and political factors. As noted in our report, the Slavutych

Laboratory has an eventual goal of employing 100 people. Reaching that

goal will not accommodate the approximately 6,000 personnel who could

become unemployed if the Chornobyl nuclear power plant shuts down.

Furthermore, the director of the nuclear safety program acknowledges that

the laboratory, which relies heavily on DOE funds for financial assistance,

has not done a good job of attracting clients other than DOE. If the

laboratory is to become self-sufficient, it needs to change the perception of

mismanagement and establish sound accounting systems and business

practices in order to attract clients.
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Regarding the Russian International Nuclear Safety Center, while we agree

that some of the projects are worthwhile and even important to

understanding the operation of Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors,

these projects do not directly address the most urgent safety needs at these

reactors. We continue to believe that urgent safety needs at these reactors,

such as replacing wooden fire doors with fire-resistant doors in Sovietdesigned nuclear power plants, have not been adequately addressed by

DOE’s safety effort. We believe that the most urgent and pressing safety

priorities should be addressed first to improve the safety of the highest-risk

reactors—a fundamental and long-standing goal of the program. DOE

stated in its response that it would allocate additional funds for fire doors

in Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.

Finally, DOE also noted in its response that no safety funds were used to

fund the International Radioecology Laboratory in Ukraine. As we noted in

our report, DOE spent $8,560 in safety funds related to this laboratory.

After we brought this matter to DOE’s attention, the Department

determined that no safety funds should have been used to support this

project. As a result, DOE subsequently used an environmental management

project account to pay for this effort. DOE’s comments are presented in

appendix II.

NRC agreed with all of our recommendations, and its comments are

presented in appendix III.
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Appendix I

Status of Efforts to Shut Down Highest-Risk Apendxies

Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants ApendxiI

Name of plant and

number and type of

highest-risk reactors Country

Agreed-upon date

for reactor(s) to

shut down

Conditions of

shutdown

Funding linked to

shutdown Status

Chornobyl/1RBMK

reactor

Ukraine 2000 G-7/Ukraine

agreement establishes

four- point program,

including energy

investments in

exchange for shutdown

More than $2 billion in

loans and grants

Ukraine is tying

closure to funding

for replacement

reactors and a new

sarcophagus.

Ignalina/2 RBMK

reactors

Lithuania One reactor was to

stop producing

electricity in mid1998 unless it was

granted a new

operating license.

The license was

granted.

Bank agreement was

tied to energy needs

and licensing renewal

$38 million for shortterm safety

improvements

One reactor is

licensed to operate

until it receives a

major upgrade

around 2005. A

decision on the date

of the second

reactor's closure is

scheduled for 2004.

Kozloduy/4 VVER 440

Model 230 reactors

Bulgaria Decommissioning

of two reactors was

to begin in 1998. No

dates were set for

the others.

1993 bank agreement

tied closure to

obtaining a

replacement energy

source

$28 million grant for

safety upgrades

Reactors continue

to operate. First two

reactors are to be

closed 2004-2005.

Bohunice/2 VVER 440

Model 230 reactors

Slovak

Republic

2006 for unit 1,

2008 for unit 2

European Union

accession requirement

No funding at this time Slovak Republic

decided in

November 1999 to

comply with the

European Union's

requirement for

shutdown

Metsamor/1VVER 440

Model 230 reactor

Armenia 2004 Possible loan from

bank to build gas plant

is conditioned on

closure plus no restart

of another unit that was

closed in 1988.

Loan amount

estimated at $70

million

Reactor is

operating.

Kola/2 VVER 440 Model

230 reactors

Russia No date established 1995 grant from bank

calls for annual

operating permits and

in-depth safety

analysis.

$23 million in shortterm safety upgrades

to the plant

Units are operating

under annual

permits; safety

assessments are

under way.

Continued
Appendix I

Status of Efforts to Shut Down Highest-Risk

Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants

Page 81 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Note: The “bank” is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

a

Reactor vessel steel tends to lose ductility (become more brittle) as a result of neutron irradiation. A

European Union study found that the reactor vessel's condition was satisfactory.

Source: GAO's presentation of information from the Department of State.

Kursk/2 RBMK reactors Russia No date established 1995 bank agreement

requires longer-term

operating license for

reactors. Annual

operating license is

authorized on the basis

of safety analysis

reports.

No funding associated

with agreement

Reactors are

operating (although

one reactor is

currently shut down

for repairs); safety

assessment for one

reactor is stalled

because of U.S.

sanctions imposed

on Russian

organization.

Leningrad/4 RBMK

reactors

Russia No date established 1995 bank agreement

calls for operating

permits and safety

analysis reports

$32 million for

upgrades

Units are operating;

safety assessment

for one reactor is

almost complete

Novovoronezh/2 VVER

440 Model 230 reactors

Russia No date established 1995 bank agreement

calls for safety analysis

reports and annual

operating permits. One

of the reactors was not

supposed to have

annual permits granted

beyond 2002. The

other reactor could be

operated with an

annual permit until

mid-1997 (unless

embrittlement in the

reactor vessel was

shown to be a

problema

). Beyond that

time, regulator was

required to base future

operation on cost and

technical issues.

$24 million in shortterm safety upgradesUnits are operating

under annual

permits; safety

assessments are

under way.

Name of plant and

number and type of

highest-risk reactors Country

Agreed-upon date

for reactor(s) to

shut down

Conditions of

shutdown

Funding linked to

shutdown Status

Continued from Previous Page
Page 82 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Energy AAppenednxidxeiIs
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 83 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 84 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors
Page 85 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Appendix III

Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Page 86 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors
Page 87 GAO/RCED-00-97 Safety of Soviet-Designed Reactors

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contact Gene Aloise(202) 512-3841

Acknowledgments In addition, Duane Fitzgerald, Jonathan Gill, Glen Levis, Victor Sgobba, and

Jim Wells made key contributions to this report.

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