alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
From: <Alicea.Jezebele@epamail.epa.gov>

To: "Kudlinski James F (Jim)" <Jim.Kudlinski@srpnet.com>

Date: 7/21/2010 3:43 PM

Subject: Re: SRP Request for Time Extension

Attachments: pic19368.gif; SRP ICR Extension Request.pdf

Greetings,

EPA has reviewed your extension request for the steam electric effluent

guidelines questionnaire for the following Salt River Project's (SRP)

facilities:

 Coronado Generating Station

 Desert Generating Station

 Kyrene Generating Station

 Navajo Generating Station

 Santan Generating Station

The deadline for your plant to submit Version 1 and Version 2 of the

completed questionnaire is extended to October 15, 2010. Please note

that the deadline for Part G, if applicable, is unchanged and remains

120 days after receipt of the questionnaire. No extensions are granted

for Version 3 or 4 of the questionnaire; the deadline for plants

receiving these questionnaires remains 90 days after receipt.

If you need assistance during the completion of the steam electric

questionnaire, please contact the steam electric helpline via e-mail at

steamhelp@erg.com or by phone at 1-877-353-7560.

Sincerely,

(Embedded image moved to file: pic19368.gif)

 

 From: "Kudlinski James F (Jim)" <Jim.Kudlinski@srpnet.com> 

 To: Jezebele Alicea/DC/USEPA/US@EPA 

 Date: 07/07/2010 10:43 AM 

 Subject: SRP Request for Time Extension 

Ms. Alicea:

Attached as a PDF file is SRP’s request for a time extension for

completing the CWA Section 308 Information Collection Request that was

received at our Coronado, Desert Basin, Kyrene, Navajo and Santan

Generating Stations. If you have any questions regarding this request,
please feel free to contact me at your convenience. An original

signature copy will follow via U.S. Mail.

Thank you.

Jim Kudlinski

Salt River Project

Phoenix, AZ

602-236-2351

 (See attached file: SRP ICR Extension Request.pdf)
**Exhibit 99.2**

 

 

**Report of IndependentAuditors**

 

To the Board of Directorsof AmeriCredit Corp.

 

 

Re:                   Sale and Servicing Agreement related to AmeriCreditAutomobile Receivables Trust 2001-B as of and for the year ended December 31,2002

 

 

We have examined management’sassertion about AmeriCredit Corp. and its subsidiaries’ (the “Company”)compliance with the minimum servicing standards identified in the MortgageBankers Association of America’s *Uniform Single Attestation Program for MortgageBankers*, to the extent such procedures are applicable, as of and forthe year ended December 31, 2002 included in the accompanying managementassertion (Exhibit I).  Management isresponsible for the Company’s compliance with those minimum servicingstandards.  Our responsibility is toexpress an opinion on management’s assertion about the Company’s compliancebased on our examination.

 

Our examination was made inaccordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute ofCertified Public Accountants and, accordingly, included examining, on a testbasis, evidence about the Company’s compliance with the minimum servicingstandards and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary inthe circumstances.  We believe that ourexamination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.  Our examination does not provide a legaldetermination of the Company’s compliance with the minimum servicing standards.

 

In our opinion, management’sassertion that the Company has complied with the aforementioned minimumservicing standards as of and for the year ended December 31, 2002 is fairlystated, in all material respects.

 

 

Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP

March 30, 2004

 

----

 

Exhibit I

 

Management’s Assertion Concerning Compliancewith USAP Minimum Servicing Standards

 

 

March 30, 2004

 

Re:                   Sale and Servicing Agreement related to AmeriCreditAutomobile Receivables Trust 2001-B as of and for the year ended December 31,2002

 

As of and for the year endedDecember 31, 2002, AmeriCredit Corp. and its subsidiaries have complied in allmaterial respects with the minimum servicing standards set forth in theMortgage Bankers Association of America’s *UniformSingle Attestation Program for Mortgage Bankers*(“USAP”), to theextent such procedures are applicable.

 

 
|  /s/  Clifton H. Morris |   |
|------------------------------|--------|
| Clifton H.  Morris           |
| Chief  Executive Officer     |
|                         |
|  /s/  Daniel E. Berce   |   |
| Daniel E.  Berce             |
| President                    |
|                         |
|  /s/  Preston A. Miller |   |
| Preston A.  Miller           |
| Chief  Financial Officer     |
|                              |        |  |

 

----
§ 208.62 Appeals. ( a ) *Initial appeal.* The Sponsoring Agency may appeal to the Program Manager any determination made under § 208.60 of this part to disallow reimbursement of an item of cost: ( 1 ) The appeal must be in writing and submitted within 60 days after receipt of DHS's written notice of disallowance under § 208.60 of this part.
( 2 ) The appeal must contain legal and factual justification for the Sponsoring Agency's contention that the cost is allowable.
( 3 ) Within 90 days after DHS receives an appeal, the Program Manager will review the information submitted, make such additional investigations as necessary, make a determination on the appeal, and submit written notice of the determination of the appeal to the Sponsoring Agency.
( b ) *Final appeal.* ( 1 ) If the Program Manager denies the initial appeal, in whole or in part, the Sponsoring Agency may submit a final appeal to the Deputy Assistant Administrator. The appeal must be made in writing and must be submitted not later than 60 days after receipt of written notice of DHS's determination of the initial appeal.
( 2 ) Within 90 days following the receipt of a final appeal, the Deputy Assistant Administrator will render a determination and notify the Sponsoring Agency, in writing, of the final disposition of the appeal.
( c ) *Failure to file timely appeal.* If the Sponsoring Agency does not file an appeal within the time periods specified in this section, DHS will deem that the Sponsoring Agency has waived its right to appeal any decision that could have been the subject of an appeal.
#### Jaswinder KAUR, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 00-70865.

I & NS No. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ].

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 16, 2002.

Decided May 30, 2002.

Before HAWKINS and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, Judge.*

*

 Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

Jaswinder Kaur (“Kaur”), a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“U”) order denying her application for asylum and withholding of deportation. The BIA denied the appeal principally on the grounds that: (1) Kaur’s *710testimony regarding persecution she allegedly suffered during two detentions was contradictory; (2) she failed to testify knowledgeably with respect to the political environment in Punjab and the organization to which she purportedly belonged; and (3) she offered contradictory testimony with respect to the origin of her documentary evidence.

We determine that the BIA’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. *See Mejia-Paiz v. INS,*111 F.3d 720, 723 (9th Cir.1997) (review of credibility findings is for “substantial evidence.”). The record shows that the numerous inconsistencies in Kaur’s testimony and documentary evidence cited by the BIA relate directly to and cast doubt on the circumstances central to her claims of persecution as well as her identity. C*f. Pandan v. INS,*227 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2000) (vacating BIA denial of asylum where record showed only “minor inconsistencies” related to dates and locations of events). The transcript reveals no fundamental miscommunication or evidence of faulty translation. *Cf. Maini v. INS,*212 F.3d 1167, 1176 (9th Cir.2000) (“We have long recognized that asylum hearings frequently generate mistranslations and miseommunications.”). We also decline to second-guess the IJ’s assessment of Kaur’s emotional state while testifying. *See Abovian v. INS,*219 F.3d 972 (9th Cir.2000) (An IJ is in the “best position” to make credibility findings in an asylum proceeding, because he sees the witness as the testimony is given.). Accordingly, the petition is DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
### part 5—benefits after termination
[Federal Register Volume 69, Number 199 (Friday, October 15, 2004)]
[Notices]
[Page 61292]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 04-23173]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 4850]


In the Matter of the Designation of Jam'at al Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, 
Also Known as the Monotheism and Jihad Group, Also Known as the al-
Zarqawi Network, Also Known as al-Tawhid, as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization Pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act

    Based upon a review of the Administrative Record assembled in this 
matter, and in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary 
of the Treasury, the Secretary of State has concluded that there is a 
sufficient factual basis to find that the relevant circumstances 
described in section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as 
amended (8 U.S.C. 1189, hereinafter ``INA''), exist with respect to 
Jam'at al Tawhid wa'al-Jihad.
    Therefore, effective October 15, 2004, the Secretary of State 
hereby designates that organization as a foreign terrorist organization 
pursuant to section 219(1) of the INA.

    Dated: October 8, 2004.
Ambassador Cofer Black,
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 04-23173 Filed 10-14-04; 5:00 pm]
BILLING CODE 4710-10-P
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

 

SYNEEDA L. PENLAND, : 

 : 

Petitioner, : Civil Action No.: 09-1417 (RMU) 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

RAYMOND E. MABUS, : 

Secretary of the Navy, : 

 : 

 Respondent. : 

 : 

SYNEEDA L. PENLAND, : 

 : 

Petitioner, : Civil Action No.: 09-1418 (RMU) 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

RAYMOND E. MABUS, : 

Secretary of the Navy, : 

 : 

 Respondent. : 

 : 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DISMISSING THESE CASES WITHOUT PREJUDICE BASED ON 

THE PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 

The petitioner commenced these actions on July 29, 2009. On May 19, 2010, after 

several months of inactivity in the case, the court issued an order directing the petitioner to show 

cause on or before May 24, 2010 why these cases should not be dismissed for failure to 

prosecute. Order (May 19, 2010). The petitioner has yet to file any response to the court’s 

order. 

“The authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action with prejudice 

because of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously be doubted.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 
2

U.S. 626, 629 (1962); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (authorizing the involuntary dismissal of 

actions based on the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute); LCvR 83.23 (providing that the court may 

dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to prosecute); Automated Datatron, Inc. v. Woodcock, 659 

F.2d 1168, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (observing that “[i]f district court judges are to discharge their 

heavy responsibilities effectively, their power to dismiss . . . must be more than theoretical”). 

This Circuit has cautioned, however, that dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute is a 

“harsh sanction” reserved for “cases involving egregious conduct by particularly dilatory 

plaintiffs, after ‘less dire alternatives’ have been tried without success,” Noble v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., 71 Fed. Appx. 69, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Trakas v. Quality Brands, Inc., 759 F.2d 

185, 186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). 

In accordance with these principles, the court will not dismiss the case with prejudice, but 

will instead impose the less dire sanction of dismissal without prejudice based on the petitioner’s 

failure to prosecute these actions or respond to the court’s order to show cause. An Order 

consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued this 28th 

day of June, 2010. 

 RICARDO M. URBINA 

 United States District Judge
----

Corrigendum to notice of open competitions EPSO/AD/8-16/05 to constitute a reserve of linguistic administrators (A*9 — senior conference interpreters) for the following languages: Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Maltese, Polish, Slovene and Slovak

(Official Journal of the European Union C 117 A of 19 May 2005)

(Official Journal of the European Union C 152 A of 23 June 2005)

(Official Journal of the European Union C 273 A of 4 November 2005)

(2005/C 325 A/01)

On page 35, under heading A, point II.2:

for:

read:

On page 40, under heading C:

for:

‘The closing date for inscription is 22 June 2005. Online inscription will not be possible after 12.00 noon Brussels time on that day.’,

read:

‘The closing date for inscription is 31 January 2006. Online inscription will not be possible after 12.00 noon Brussels time on that day.’

On page 40, under heading C, point 1, footnote 8:

for:

‘No later than 12.00 noon, Brussels time, on 22 June 2005.’,

read:

‘No later than 12.00 noon, Brussels time, on 31 January 2006.’

On page 41, under heading C, point 2, footnote 10:

for:

‘Postmarked no later than 22 June 2005.’,

read:

‘Postmarked no later than 31 January 2006.’

----
§ 400.215 Supplemental Guarantees. The Board will allow the structure of a guaranteed loan to include one or more Supplemental Guarantees that cover the Unguaranteed Portion of the loan; provided that: ( a ) There shall be no Supplemental Guarantee with respect to the Unguaranteed Portion required to be held by the Agent pursuant to § 400.210(c);
( b ) The Loan Documents relating to any Supplemental Guarantee shall be acceptable in form and substance to the Board; and
( c ) In approving the issuance of a Guarantee, the Board may impose any conditions with respect to Supplemental Guarantee(s) relating to the loan that it considers appropriate.
[66 FR 53080, Oct. 19, 2001]
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the quarterly report of Willbros Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Warren
L. Williams, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.

Date: November 21, 2005                            /s/ Warren L. Williams
                                                   -----------------------
                                                   Warren L. Williams
                                                   Chief Financial Officer

                                       37
May 22, 2015 

 

Mr. Paul Miller 

9286 Rolling Greens Trail 

Miamisburg, OH 45342 

Dear Mr. Paul Miller: 

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your request for an exemption. It 

explains why we can not process your request and what you should do in the next 30 days. 

Why We Can Not Process Your Request 

We entered your April 13, 2015, exemption request on behalf into the public docket 

(No. FAA-2015-0981), but we are unable to process your request any further. The 

information you sent does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For 

us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following: 

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the 

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief. 

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole. 

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption 

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you 

seek an exemption. 

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request. 

What You Should Do 

If you want us to process your request any further, you must send the information described 

earlier to reach us within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your 

petition for exemption at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 
2 

If We Do Not Hear From You 

If we do not hear from you within 30 days, we will close the docket without notifying you 

further. If you have any questions or require additional time, you may call (202) 267-9677. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Brenda Robeson 

Program Analyst, Airmen and 

 Airspace Rules Division 

Enclosure
#### In the Matter of Arkport Dairies, Inc., Petitioner. Holton V. Noyes, as Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of the State of New York, Respondent.

Crapser, Bliss, Heffernan and Schenck, JJ., concur; Hill, P. J., concurs solely upon the ground that petitioner has failed to file the bond directed by the Commissioner. It does not appear that the additional bond was in fact necessary but the statute and the Commissioner’s order in connection therewith were not followed. Informal approval had been given that the milk be sold in New York City. The city health officials had approved the dairies and the city needed the milk. The producers receive a substantially higher price if the product is marketed as fluid milk in the city. It is unfortunate that nonessential departmental rules make it necessary to interfere with the desired and desirable market.
EXHIBIT P 

CARNIVAL00125646 

Case 1:20-cv-22945-RNS Document 284-16 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/25/2022 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:20-cv-22945-RNS Document 284-16 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/25/2022 Page 2 of 2
#### Alba Taggart, Respondent, v. Solvay Process Company, Appellant.

Motion for leave to appeal to Court of Appeals denied, with ten dollars costs.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-CIV-81053-RAR

BRANDON MICHAEL RACE,

Plaintiff,

v.

DAVID ANDREW ARONBERG, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________________/

ORDER AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND DISMISSING CASE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon United States Magistrate Judge Lisette Reid’s

Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 7] (“Report”), entered on October 1, 2020. The Report 

recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff Brandon Michael Race’s Complaint [ECF No. 1], 

which alleges violations under 28 U.S.C. section 1983. See Report at 1. Specifically, 

Magistrate Judge Reid recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim 

and because it is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See id. at 2-5. 

The Report properly notified Plaintiff of his right to object to Magistrate Judge Reid’s

findings, as well as the consequences for failing to object. Id. at 5-6. The time for objections 

has passed, and Plaintiff did not file any objections to the Report. 

When a magistrate judge’s “disposition” has been properly objected to, district courts must 

review the disposition de novo. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). However, when no party has timely 

objected, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in 

order to accept the recommendation.” FED. R. CIV. P. 72 advisory committee’s notes (citation 

omitted). Although Rule 72 itself is silent on the standard of review, the Supreme Court has 

Case 9:20-cv-81053-RAR Document 10 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/26/2020 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

acknowledged Congress’s intent was to only require a de novo review where objections have been 

properly filed, not when neither party objects. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It 

does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate [judge]’s 

factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to 

those findings.”). In any event, the “[f]ailure to object to the magistrate [judge]’s factual findings 

after notice precludes a later attack on these findings.” Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th 

Cir. 1988) (citing Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 1982)). 

Because Plaintiff has not filed an objection to the Report, the Court did not conduct a de 

novo review of Magistrate Judge Reid’s findings. Rather, the Court reviewed the Report for clear 

error. Finding none, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Report [ECF No. 7] is AFFIRMED AND ADOPTED. 

2. The Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED. 

3. No certificate of appealability shall issue. 

4. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case and any pending motions are DENIED 

AS MOOT. 

DONE AND ORDERED in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, this 26th day of October, 2020.

 _________________________________

 RODOLFO A. RUIZ II

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: Pro Se Plaintiff

Counsel of record

Magistrate Judge Lisette Reid

Case 9:20-cv-81053-RAR Document 10 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/26/2020 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 32.4



Statement



Pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. §1350, the undersigned officer of Paperweight Development Corp. (the
Company), hereby certifies that to his knowledge:



| | (1) | the Companys Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended January 1, 2005 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                      |  |                               |  |                        
|--------------------- |  | ----------------------------- |  | -----------------------
|                      |  | PAPERWEIGHT DEVELOPMENT CORP.
|Dated: March 24, 2005 |  |                               |  |                        
|                      |  | /s/ Dale E. Parker           
|                      |  | Name:                         |  | Dale E. Parker         
|                      |  | Title:                        |  | Chief Financial Officer



This certification accompanies this
Annual Report on Form 10-K pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.



4