United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Steelers Keys LLC and others, 

Plaintiffs,

v.

High Tech National LLC and 

others, Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 20-22857-Civ-Scola

Omnibus Order 

Now before the Court is Rodisbel Alvarez, Randy Fieler, Kenneth Garbez, 

Juan Moore, David Slinger, and Steelers Keys, LLC’s (the “Steelers Parties”)

partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) 

(ECF No. 108) and High Tech National LLC (“HTL”), Automotive Key Controls, 

LLC (“AKC”), KAR Auction Services, Inc. (“KAR”), and ADESA, Inc.’s (“ADESA”)

(collectively, the “HTL Parties”) cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

(ECF No. 117.) 

At the outset, the Court notes that the Parties appear to agree that the 

relief sought in the Steelers Parties’ motion should be granted. (See ECF No. 

108; ECF No. 117, at 6.) While the Steelers Parties ask the Court to dismiss 

Counts VII through XVI of the Steelers’s complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), the Court notes that the Steeler 

Parties’ request is procedurally improper. A party “wishing to eliminate 

particular claims or issues from the action should amend the complaint under 

Rule 15(a) rather than dismiss under Rule 41(a).” Klay v. United Healthgroup, 

Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 Moore’s Federal Practice § 

41.21[2], at 41–32). Rule 41, “according to its plain text, permits voluntary 

dismissals of entire ‘actions,’ not claims.” Perry v. Schumacher Group of La., 

891 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 2018). The Court therefore construes the Steelers 

Parties’ motion to dismiss as an unopposed motion to amend the pleadings 

under Rule 15, to remove the identified counts: VII through XVI. See, 

e.g., Anderberg v. Masonite Corp., 176 F.R.D. 682, 686 (N.D. Ga.1997) (“When a 

party seeks to dismiss a single claim in a multi-count complaint instead of an 

entire action . . . the motion should be treated as a motion to amend the 

complaint under Rule 15(a) to delete the specific claim.”). Because the parties 

are in agreement, the Court finds good cause to grant the motion as construed. 

(ECF No. 108.) The Court deems the complaint amended such that counts VII 

through XVI are dropped from this action, without prejudice.

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1. Background

The Court turns next to the HTL Parties cross-motion for judgment on 

the pleadings. This matter has a complicated procedural history, which the 

Court recounts briefly below. On June 20, 2019, HTL and AKC filed a 

complaint against Jay Wiener in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana (the “Wiener Case”). (ECF No. 1, High Tech 

National, LLC et al. v. Wiener, 20-cv-22789-RNS, (S.D Fla.).) In their complaint, 

they alleged generally that Wiener violated certain agreements and caused 

harm to HTL and AKC by “sow[ing] discord among HTL and AKC employees” 

and by “misappropriate[ing] equipment, inventory, and trade secrets for the 

purpose of competing with HTL and AKC.” HTL and AKC amended their 

complaint on August 15, 2019, adding Rodisbel Alvarez, David Slinger, 

Kenneth Garbez, Juan Moore, and Steelers Keys, LLC as parties. Randy Fieler 

was not named in the amended complaint. Thereafter, on August 29, 2019, the 

Steelers Parties sued the HTL Parties in the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Florida alleging the HTL Parties were “attempting to 

punish former employees and those who are friendly with or have a 

relationship with, Jay Wiener” (the “Steelers Case”). (ECF No. 1, at ¶ 1.) 

On December 3, 2019, the Court entered an order transferring the 

Steelers Case to the Southern District of Indiana after finding the Steelers Case 

and the Wiener Case were “based on the same conduct and events.” (ECF No. 

41, at 1.) A week before the Court entered its transfer order, on November 26, 

the Magistrate Judge overseeing the Wiener Case in Indiana, decided the action 

pending in Indiana should be transferred to the Southern District of Florida 

(Wiener Case, ECF No. 101.) Notwithstanding the Magistrate Judge’s decision, 

the Court ordered transfer of the Steelers Case to Indiana, as the Indiana 

Magistrate Judge’s order was “not yet final.” (ECF No. 41, at 4-5.) On June 17, 

2020, the Magistrate Judge in Indiana issued an order reaffirming his decision 

to transfer the Wiener Case to the Southern District of Florida, and transferred 

the Steelers Case back to this Court. With both matters now before this Court, 

on August 3, 2020, the Court entered an order consolidating related cases, 

requiring all filings in the Wiener Case to be filed under the Steelers Case

docket number. (ECF No. 86.) On August 7, 2020, HTL and AKC filed a second 

amended complaint in the Wiener Case. (ECF No. 92.) In their second amended 

complaint, HTL and AKC asserted claims against 34 defendants. 

The instant motion for judgment on the pleadings is before the Court in

the Steelers Case. The HTL Parties advance several arguments in support of 

their motion for judgment on the pleadings. Namely, they argue that with the 

declaratory relief claims dropped, the remaining Counts I through VI are 

Case 1:20-cv-22857-RNS Document 149 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2020 Page 2 of 12
improperly joined, that Counts I through V are purely reflexive and should 

have been asserted as counterclaims in the Wiener case, and that certain of the 

remaining counts advanced by the Steelers Parties fail to state a claim as a 

matter of law. (ECF No. 117.) 

2. Legal Standard

As set forth in Federal Rule 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but 

early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the 

pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is proper where 

“no issues of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law based on the substance of the pleadings and any judicially 

noticed facts.” Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 592 F.3d 1237, 1255 

(11th Cir. 2010.) The Court must “accept all facts in the [pleadings] as true and 

view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. Essentially, a 

Rule 12(c) motion is subject to the same analysis as a motion to dismiss, 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 

1370 (11th Cir. 1998). 

Under the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the Court must accept all of 

the complaint’s allegations as true, construing them in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Although a pleading need only contain a short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, a plaintiff must nevertheless 

articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “But where the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader 

is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (internal punctuation omitted). A court must dismiss a plaintiff’s 

claims if such plaintiff fails to nudge its “claims across the line from 

conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. To obtain a judgment on 

the pleadings, the moving party “must clearly establish that no material issue 

of fact remains unresolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Bryan Ashley Intern., Inc. v. Shelby Williams Indus., Inc., 932 F. Supp. 

290, 291 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (Highsmith, J.).

3. Analysis

A. Personal Jurisdiction Over KAR and ADESA

In their motion, the HTL Parties first ask the Court enter judgment on all 

claims against KAR and ADESA on the grounds that the Court lacks personal 

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jurisdiction over either Defendant. The Complaint makes clear that KAR and 

ADESA are Delaware Corporations with their principle places of business in 

Indiana. (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 9, 12.) Accordingly, the Court finds that KAR and 

ADESA are citizens of Delaware and Indiana. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The 

complaint also states that KAR is the parent of ADESA, that KAR is responsible

for managing the operations of HTL and AKC, that ADESA provides numerous 

services related to the buying and selling of vehicles, and that ADESA, as the 

sole member of HTL and AKC, provides oversight to HTL and AKC. (ECF No. 1, 

at ¶¶ 13, 23-25.)

The Plaintiffs also provide several declarations they purport support the 

Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over KAR and ADESA. (ECF No. 126, 

Exs. A-E); see Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 557 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th 

Cir. 2009) (discussing the use of affidavits, documents, or testimony in 

challenging or supporting personal jurisdiction). These declarations appear 

focused on providing evidence that these cases should proceed in Florida 

rather than Indiana and provide little information with respect to the Court’s

potential exercise of personal jurisdiction over KAR and ADESA. For instance, 

the declarations of Juan Moore, Rodisbel Alvarez, and David Slinger, simply 

state that the declarants entered into a confidentiality agreement which was 

between the respective declarant, HTL, and “its parent companies and their 

affiliates” which to the best of the declarants’ “knowledge includes . . . ” KAR 

and ADESA. (ECF No. 126-1, at 3; ECF No. 126-2, at 2-3; ECF No. 126-3, at 2.) 

The declaration of Ken Garbez adds that ADESA “has three (3) auto-auction 

facilities in Florida” and also provides some additional information as to the 

structure of the KAR/ADESA corporate family of companies, which is also 

summarized in the Plaintiffs’ complaint. (ECF No. 126-4, at 2-3.) Finally, 

Alvarez’s declaration notes that while an employee of HTL, Alvarez “did not 

directly report to anyone from KAR” (ECF No. 126-2, at 1), while Randy Fieler’s 

declaration states that his “business unit reported directly to KAR and 

ADESA.” (ECF No. 126-5, at 2.) In their cross motion for judgment on the 

pleadings, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs’ “amorphous” pleadings with 

regards to KAR and ADESA fail to adequately allege personal jurisdiction over 

these Defendants. 

To determine whether a party has adequately alleged personal 

jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, the Court must first evaluate whether 

there is jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute and next determine 

whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1312 

(11th Cir. 2018). Florida’s long-arm statute provides two means for subjecting 

a foreign defendant to the jurisdiction of Florida courts: 1) “a defendant is 

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subject to specific personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over suits that 

arise out of or related to a defendant’s contacts with Florida—for conduct 

specifically enumerated in the statute”; and 2) “a defendant is subject to 

general personal jurisdiction—that is, jurisdiction over any claims against a 

defendant, whether or not they involve the defendant’s activities in Florida—if 

the defendant engages in substantial and not isolated activity in Florida.” Id. 

(internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original) (discussing Fla. Stat. § 

48.193). Under either form of personal jurisdiction, the defendant must have 

“‘certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the 

suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. 

(citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). The inquiry 

focuses on the defendant’s contacts with the state, and not the “random, 

fortuitous, or attenuated” contacts it has by interacting with other persons 

affiliated with the state. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). 

(1) Specific Personal Jurisdiction

First, the Plaintiffs claim that KAR and ADESA are subject specific 

jurisdiction in Florida because they “conduct business” and have “committed 

torts” in Florida, including “improperly access[ing] Garbez’s computer in 

Florida” and “hav[ing] been unjustly enriched from improper use of credit cards 

in Fieler’s name.” (ECF No. 1, at ¶ 18; ECF No. 126, at 5-6.) The Defendants 

respond that the Plaintiffs complaint and any supporting declarations are 

insufficient to prove KAR and ADESA could be hauled before Florida courts 

pursuant to a theory of specific jurisdiction. The Court agrees. 

To determine whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper, the 

Court applies a three part test in which the Court asks: 1) whether a plaintiff 

has established that its claims arise out of or relate to at least one of the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum; 2) whether a plaintiff has demonstrated 

that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the jurisdiction; and 3) if the 

plaintiff has succeeded under prong one and two, whether exercise of specific 

jurisdiction would violate notions of fair play and substantial justice. Waite, 

901 F.3d at 1313. 

The Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the Plaintiffs’ claims against KAR 

and ADESA arise out of KAR and ADESA’s contacts with Florida. In the 

Eleventh Circuit, courts find that “a tort ‘arise[s] out of or relate[s] to’ the 

defendant’s activity in a state only if the activity is a ‘but-for’ cause of the tort.” 

Id. at 1314 (quoting Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 

1222-23 (11th Cir. 2009)). Having reviewed the Plaintiffs’ complaint and the 

declarations the Plaintiffs submitted in connection with their briefing, the 

Court finds that the Plaintiffs cannot establish that KAR or ADESA’s contacts 

Case 1:20-cv-22857-RNS Document 149 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2020 Page 5 of 12
in Florida were a “but-for cause of the torts” the Plaintiffs allege. Waite, 901 

F.3d at 1315. For instance, four of the five declarations the Plaintiffs submit 

were provided by former employees of HTL (ECF No. 126-1, at 2; ECF No. 126-

2, at 2; ECF No. 126-3, at 2; ECF No. 126-5, at 1) and only Ken Garbez was a 

former ADESA employee, but he worked for ADESA in California and Las 

Vegas, only working in Florida as an HTL employee. (ECF No. 126-4, at 2.) 

Even if these Plaintiffs were employees of KAR or ADESA, the Court’s 

jurisdictional inquiry must focus on KAR and ADESA’s contacts with Florida

and not the individual Plaintiffs. Walden, 571 U.S. at 284.

Upon review, the Plaintiffs propound no facts in their complaint or in 

other papers setting forth a prima facie case that KAR and ADESA are subject 

to this Court’s specific jurisdiction, as it is their burden to do. Internet 

Solutions, 557 F.3d at 1293. Neither the Plaintiffs’ complaint, nor the Plaintiffs’ 

declarations provide factual information supporting their claims that KAR and 

ADESA committed any torts in Florida in order to potentially support a finding 

of specific jurisdiction over either entity. The Court finds nothing in the 

complaint or declarations support a finding that KAR or ADESA were a “butfor” cause of the injuries that Plaintiffs complain of in the Steelers Case’s 

surviving claims. To the extent Plaintiffs attempt to allege that KAR and ADESA 

are subject to specific personal jurisdiction because of the presence of its 

subsidiaries in Florida, that theory of jurisdiction fails as a parent corporation 

“is not subject to the jurisdiction of a forum state merely because a subsidiary 

is doing business there.” Consolidated Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 

1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000). As the Plaintiffs fail to set forth a prima facie case 

for specific jurisdiction, the Court finds that the exercise of specific jurisdiction 

over KAR and ADESA is not justified. 

(2) General Personal Jurisdiction

Next, the Court asks whether KAR and ADESA are subject to this Court’s 

general personal jurisdiction. As Florida’s long-arm statute only extends to the 

limits on personal jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause, the Court 

need only determine whether the exercise of general jurisdiction over KAR and 

ADESA would exceed constitutional bounds. Waite, 901 F.3d at 1316. In 

support of their argument that KAR and ADESA are subject to general 

jurisdiction in Florida, the Plaintiffs’ summarily state in their complaint that 

KAR and ADESA “have systematically and continuously transacted business in 

Florida, are licensed to transact business in Florida and maintain a registered 

agent in Florida, and maintain significant places of business through Florida, 

such that they can be considered ‘at home’ in Florida and in this District.” 

(ECF No. 1, at ¶ 17.) The Court does not agree. 

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A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign defendants, 

consistent with the Due Process Clause, when their “‘affiliations with the state 

are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the 

forum State.” Waite, 901 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tire 

Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (internal quotations 

omitted)). The Supreme Court explained in Daimler AG v. Bauman, that only a 

“limited set of affiliations with a forum” will render a defendant “essentially at 

home”—a corporate defendant is paradigmatically at home in the place where it

is incorporated and where it has its principal place of business. 571 U.S. 117, 

137 (2014). Outside of these paradigmatic circumstances, a corporate 

defendant will be considered at home in the “exceptional case” where it has 

operations that are “so substantial and of such a nature as to render the 

corporation at home in that state.” Waite, 901 F.3d at 1317 (discussing BNSF 

Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017)). As KAR and ADESA are not 

incorporated in Florida and do not have their principal place of business here, 

the Court must ask whether this is the type of “exceptional case” alluded to in 

Daimler that would allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction over these 

Defendants. See, e.g., Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n. 19. 

In determining whether a corporate defendant meets the exceptional case 

threshold sufficient for the Court to exercise general jurisdiction over that 

defendant, the Court must look not only at the “‘magnitude of the defendant’s 

in-state contacts’” but also at the “‘corporation’s activities in their entirety’” as 

a “‘corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home 

in all of them.’” BNSF, 137 S. Ct. at 1559 (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n. 

20). In its opinions in Daimler and BNSF, the Supreme Court set a high bar for 

meeting the exceptional case standard. See Daimer, 571 U.S. at 123 (finding 

that Daimler’s indirect subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, which was the 

biggest supplier of luxury cars in California and where that subsidiaries’ car 

sales in California comprised 2.4% of Daimler’s global sales was not sufficient

to confer general jurisdiction over Daimler in California); see also BNSF, 137 S. 

Ct. at 1559 (finding rail company with over 2,000 miles of track and 2,000 

employees in Montana was not subject to general jurisdiction there). Indeed, 

subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler, the Eleventh Circuit 

noted that a corporate defendant may only be subject to general jurisdiction in 

Florida if its corporate activities “closely approximate the activities that 

ordinarily characterize a corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place 

of business.” Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th 

Cir. 2015). 

The Court finds, based on the Plaintiffs’ complaint and the declarations 

provided by the Plaintiffs that the Plaintiffs have failed to show that KAR and 

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ADESA are engaged in business so continuous and systematic as to render 

them essentially at home, or essentially incorporated or with their effective 

principal places of business in Florida. As noted above, the Plaintiffs’ 

declarations make only cursory mention of KAR and ADESA and certainly do 

not provide information sufficient to allow this Court to determine, even taking 

all facts as true, that KAR and ADESA are essentially at home in Florida. 

Moreover, while the Plaintiff pleads that KAR and ADESA “systematically and 

continuously transact[] business in Florida, are licensed to transact business 

in Florida and maintain a registered agent in Florida, and maintain significant 

places of business throughout Florida” the Court finds insufficient the 

Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations. See Waite, 901 F.3d 1318 (finding similar 

allegations insufficient to confer general jurisdiction). 

In light of the above, the Court finds it lacks personal jurisdiction over 

Defendants KAR and ADESA. Accordingly, the Court grants the Defendants 

motion to the extent it asks the Court to dismiss all claims against KAR and 

ADESA based on want of personal jurisdiction.

B. Joinder of Counts I through VI

With the declaratory relief claims, Counts VII through XVI, dismissed, 

the Court turns to the Defendants’ argument that the remaining claims,

Counts I through VI, of the Plaintiffs’ complaint are improperly joined. In 

support of their arguments, the Defendants claim these counts have “nothing 

to do with one another” and will “involve highly individualized facts” with 

respect to each of the Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 117, at 9.) The Plaintiffs respond that 

there is a logical relationship between the remaining claims and there are 

“numerous common questions of law or fact at issue.” (ECF No. 126, at 8.)

Specifically, the Plaintiffs claim that the factual underpinning common to their 

claims is that: 1) they are residents of Miami, Florida; 2) that some of the 

Plaintiffs were former employees of HTL; and 3) that their claims arise out of 

adverse actions taken against them by the Defendants related to the 

Defendant’s firing of Jay Wiener. (ECF No. 126, at 8.) The Defendants note that 

Jay Wiener is not a party to the Plaintiffs’ complaint and the claims asserted, 

on their face, have nothing to do with Wiener’s termination. (ECF No. 128, at 4-

5.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 allows multiple plaintiffs to join in one 

action if their claims “aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series 

of transactions or occurrences; and any question of law or fact common to all 

plaintiffs will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). The Court agrees with 

the Defendants, that on the face of the Plaintiffs’ complaint, Count I, alleged by 

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Garbez; Counts II through V alleged by Steelers; and Count VI alleged by Fieler 

involve different conduct, and will involve different questions of law and fact.

In the Eleventh Circuit, courts apply a “logical relationship” test to 

determine whether claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence for 

purposes of Federal Rule 20. Smith v. Trans-Siberian Orchestra, 728 F. Supp. 

2d 1315, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (applying Republic Health Corp. v. Lifemark 

Hosp. of Fla., 755 F.2d 1453, 1455 (11th Cir. 1985)’s discussion of Federal 

Rule 13 to Federal Rule 20). Under this test, “a logical relationship exists if the 

claims rest on the same set of facts or the facts, on which one claim rests, 

activate additional legal rights supporting the other claim.” Id. As further 

explained below, the Court does not see any logical relationship between 

Garbez’s, Steelers’s, and Fieler’s respective claims against the various 

Defendants. 

The Court looks first at Count I, Garbez’s claim against the Defendants 

for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2)(C).

In support of this claim, the Plaintiffs allege that Garbez took an old company 

computer that was “slated to be recycled” with express permission from the 

Defendants and the Defendants, without authorization, accessed that 

computer “through the Team Viewer platform to monitor and obtain 

information about Garbez’s activities.” (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 50, 100.) In light of 

these facts, Garbez alleges that the Defendants violated the Computer Fraud 

and Abuse Act. 

Next, Counts II through V involve claims between Steelers and HTL for 

breach of contract; tortious interference; violation of Florida’s Deceptive and 

Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.204 et seq.; and trespass to 

chattels. In support of these claims, the Plaintiffs allege that HTL and Steelers 

entered into a lease agreement leasing certain HTL vehicles and property to 

Steelers to be used in connection with Steelers’s business. (ECF No. 1, at ¶ 39). 

The Plaintiffs allege that before that agreement was properly terminated, HTL 

breached the agreement, and wrongfully repossessed its vehicles. (ECF No. 1, 

at ¶¶ 62, 65, 69.) The Plaintiffs further allege that one of the repossessed

vehicles contained Steelers Property and that as a result of HTL repossessing 

these vehicles, Steelers lost a customer who was expected to generate 

$400,000.00 in business for Steelers. (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 66, 68.) Taking facts in 

the light most charitable to the Plaintiffs, the Court does not see any logical 

relationship between the facts and questions of law that must be adjudicated 

under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and those that the Plaintiffs will 

need to prove to support Steelers’s claims against HTL.

Finally, Count VI involves a claim for unjust enrichment by Randy Fieler 

against the Defendants. In support of this claim, Fieler claims he was issued 

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corporate purchasing cards by the Defendants to make purchases on their 

behalf. (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 80-84.) After leaving HTL, Fieler received letters from 

HTL challenging the propriety of over $200,000.00 in purchases Fieler placed 

on his corporate credit cards and demanding he reimburse HTL for those 

expenses. (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 85-89.) Fieler later received letters from Chase 

Bank claiming that Fieler was personally responsible for over $100,000.00 in 

purchases that were put on his corporate cards. (ECF No. 1, at ¶¶ 90-91.) As 

above, the Court does not see a logical relationship between the questions of 

law or fact that Fieler will need to advance to prove his claim and the questions 

of law and fact that will need to be proven by Garbez and Steelers to prove their 

respective claims. 

While the Plaintiff claims all of these actions are “based on Defendants’ 

actions in seeking revenge against Plaintiffs for their relationship with Jay 

Wiener,” the Court notes that this alleged factual commonality is immaterial as 

it is not a necessary element of any of the above-listed causes of action. (ECF 

No. 126, at 7.) The logical relationship test focuses on facts on facts which 

support multiple claims, or on “which one claim rests” that “activate[s] 

additional legal rights.” Smith, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 1319. That there may be a 

common fact between the Plaintiffs, namely that any of the Defendants actions 

may have been taken in retaliation for the Plaintiffs’ respective relationships 

with Jay Wiener is not a material element of any of their claims. The Court 

therefore finds this argument unpersuasive.

In light of the above, the Court dismisses Counts I through VI without 

prejudice. The Defendants are free to reassert these Counts as counterclaims 

in the Wiener Case currently pending before the Court, as long as it is 

procedurally proper to do so. Indeed, the Court has already found, as the 

Defendants note in their briefing, that the claims raised by the Plaintiffs in the 

Steelers Case and the Plaintiffs in the Wiener Case “substantially overlap.” 

(ECF No. 41, at 3.) 

C. Counts I through V are Purely Reflexive

The Court also finds that Counts I-V advanced by Garbez and Steelers

are compulsory counterclaims under Federal Rule 13. While the Plaintiffs 

argue the Wiener Case was not the “first-filed case,” the Court has already 

ruled on that issue. (ECF No. 41, at 3) (“The Court finds that the first-to-file 

rule applies. The Indiana action was filed first . . . [t]he Plaintiffs have not 

presented compelling reasons to defeat the first-to-file rule.”). This ruling 

constitutes law of the case. See, e.g., Guarantee Ins. Co. v. Brand Mgmt. Serv. 

Inc., No. 12-61670-Civ, 2014 WL 11531365, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2014) 

(Snow, Mag. J.). While Plaintiffs continue to make arguments in contravention 

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of this holding, the Plaintiffs have provided no reasons to persuade this Court 

to deviate from its prior ruling. 

Moreover, while Federal Rule 13 has certain exceptions pertaining to 

compulsory counterclaims, including where “the opposing party sued on its 

claim” in a manner “that did not establish personal jurisdiction over the 

pleader,” the Court finds that exception is not at issue here. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

13(a)(2)(B). Indeed, it appears that Garbez and Steelers filed a motion to 

dismiss in the Wiener Case which failed to raise arguments challenging 

personal jurisdiction. (Wiener Case, ECF Nos. 58, 59) As the Plaintiffs filed a 

responsive pleading in the Wiener Case without challenging personal 

jurisdiction, they have waived their right to that defense. Salinero v. Johnson & 

Johnson, Inc., 2019 WL 2410076, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 7, 2019) (“A challenge to 

personal jurisdiction is abandoned when a defendant fails to raise the issue in 

either a responsive pleading or Rule 12 motion.”). The Court therefore agrees 

with the Defendants that Garbez and Steelers should have asserted Counts I-V 

in the Wiener Case as compulsory counterclaims. As stated above, the Court 

dismisses these claims without prejudice, therefore the Plaintiffs are free to 

pursue these claims as counterclaims in the Wiener Case, assuming it is 

procedurally proper to do so. 

4. Conclusion

The Defendants also ask the Court to dismiss Counts I, III, VI, and VI on 

the grounds that they fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As 

the Court has dismissed claims I-VI on the grounds that they should have been 

brought in the Wiener Case, the Court declines the Defendants’ request to rule 

on whether the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under these Counts as the 

Court finds it more appropriate to adjudicate these claims in the context of the 

Wiener Case pleadings, should the Steelers Case Plaintiffs choose to reassert 

these claims in that action. 

In sum, the Court grants the Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss Counts VII 

through XVI pursuant to Federal Rule 41(a)(2), which the Court construes as 

an unopposed motion to amend pursuant to Federal Rule 15. (ECF No. 108.) 

The Court also grants in part the Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 

pleadings with respect to Counts I through VI. (ECF No. 117.) Counts I 

through VI of the Steelers Case are dismissed without prejudice, as the Court 

finds that these claims were improperly joined under Federal Rule 20, and that 

Counts I through V were compulsory counterclaims under Federal Rule 13. The 

Steelers Case Plaintiffs are free to reassert these claims, if it is proper to do so, 

as counterclaims in the Wiener Case. Should the Steelers Case Plaintiffs choose 

to reassert some or all of their claims, the Defendants may refresh their 

Case 1:20-cv-22857-RNS Document 149 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2020 Page 11 of 12
arguments, cast in light of the pleadings in the Wiener Case, as to why these 

claims are improper and must be dismissed. While this order resolves all 

claims in the Steelers Case, the Court notes that this case shall remain open

as the claims raised by the plaintiffs in the consolidated Wiener Case are still 

properly before the Court. 

Done and ordered, in chambers at Miami, Florida, on December 7, 

2020.

_______________________________

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

Case 1:20-cv-22857-RNS Document 149 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/07/2020 Page 12 of 12