1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION

CASE NO. 

LINDA PACE, individually, and on 

behalf of herself and other similarly 

situated current and former employees,

Plaintiff, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

v.

 

ACADIA HEALTHCARE COMPANY, INC.,

a Delaware Corporation, and BOWLING GREEN 

INN OF PENSACOLA, LLC, a Virginia 

Limited Liability Company, together d/b/a 

Wellness Resource Center, 

Defendants

_________________________________________/

COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPLIANT

Named Plaintiff, Linda Pace (“Plaintiff”), individually, and on behalf of herself and all 

other similarly situated non-exempt hourly-paid Behavioral Health Associates/Direct Care 

Workers (“BHAs”) as a collective, brings this Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective 

action against Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. and Bowling Green Inn of Pensacola, LLC d/b/a

Wellness Resource Center (collectively “Defendants”) and states as follows:

I. NATURE OF SUIT

1. This lawsuit is brought against Defendants as a collective action under the FLSA, 

29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., to recover unpaid overtime compensation and other damages owed to 

Plaintiff and other similarly situated hourly-paid BHAs, as defined herein.

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 1 of 14
2

2. During all times material, Defendants violated the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiff 

and those similarly situated for all hours worked over forty (40) per week within weekly pay 

periods at one and one-half their regular hourly rate of pay, as required by the FLSA.

3. Plaintiff brings this action as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

II. PARTIES

4. Plaintiff Linda Pace was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt hourly-paid

Behavioral Health Associate/Direct Care Worker in Boca Raton, Florida at all times material to 

this collective action. Ms. Pace’s consent to join form is attached as Exhibit A.

5. Defendant Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. is a Delaware Corporation with its 

principal address being 6100 Tower Circle, Suite 100, Franklin, Tennessee 37067-1509. Acadia 

Healthcare Company, Inc. (“Acadia”) owns and operates behavioral health treatment facilities 

and programs throughout the United States that specialize in treating children, adolescents, adults 

and seniors suffering from mental health disorders and/or alcohol and drug addiction. Wellness 

Resource Center is Acadia’s substance abuse treatment entity in south Florida. Acadia’s 

registered agent for service of process is CT Corporation System, 300 Montvue Road, Knoxville, 

Tennessee 37919-5546.

6. Defendant Bowling Green Inn of Pensacola, LLC d/b/a Wellness Resource 

Center, is a Virginia Limited Liability Company authorized to do business, and is currently doing 

business, in the State of Florida, with its principal place of business being located at 6100 Tower 

Circle, Suite 1000, Franklin, Tennessee 37067. Bowling Green Inn of Pensacola, LLC’s 

registered agent for service of process is CT Corporation System, 1200 South Pine Island Road, 

Plantation, Florida 33324.

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 2 of 14
3

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. This Court has jurisdiction over this lawsuit because the suit arises under 29 U.S.C. 

§ 201 et seq.

8. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because the acts and 

omissions giving rise to this cause of action occurred in this judicial district. 

IV. COLLECTIVE DESCRIPTION

9. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and the following similarly situated 

persons as a collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b):

All current and former hourly-paid Behavioral Health Associates/Direct 

Care Workers who worked for Defendants in Florida at their facilities with 

residential treatment and/or group programs for adults struggling with 

substance use disorders and co-occurring mental health issues during the 

applicable limitations period (i.e. two (2) years for FLSA violations and 

three (3) years for willful FLSA violations) up to and including the date of 

final judgment in this matter including the Named Plaintiff and those who 

elect to opt-in to this action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 

(Collectively, “the collective”).1

V. COVERAGE

10. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been an “employer” within the 

meaning of the Section 3(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

11. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been an enterprise within the 

meaning of Section 3(r) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r).

12. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Defendants have been an enterprise engaged in 

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 

203(s)(1), because Defendants have had employees engaged in commerce or in the production of 

goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials 

1 Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the Collective Description.

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 3 of 14
4

that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person and in that said enterprise has 

had an annual gross volume of sales made or business done of not less than $500,000 (exclusive 

of excise taxes at the retail level which are separately stated).

13. Throughout the statutory recovery period applicable to this action, Defendants

knew the law required that the employees who worked for them to be paid overtime for each hour 

they worked over forty (40) in any given workweek.

14. At all times material to this action, Plaintiff and those similarly situated, as 

employees of Defendants, were engaged in commerce during all times material to this collective 

action.

15. At all times material to this action, Defendants have been an “employer” of Plaintiff 

and those similarly situated, as that term is defined by §203(d) of the FLSA.

16. Defendants constitute an integrated enterprise as that term is defined in the Fair 

Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C, § 203(r) or, in the alternative, a “joint employer” as that term is 

defined under 29 C.F.R. § 791.2

17. At all times hereinafter mentioned, Plaintiff and those similarly situated were 

“employees” of Defendants as that term is defined in the FLSA and, individual employees engaged 

in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, as required by 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207.

VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

18. Defendants provide residential treatment and group programs for adults struggling 

with substance use disorders and co-occurring mental health issues, such as anxiety disorders, 

depressive disorders, bipolar disorder, personality disorders, trauma, and eating disorders 

throughout Florida, as well as other such treatment facilities and programs in other states 

throughout the United States under the Acadia umbrella.

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 4 of 14
5

19. Upon information and belief, Defendants provide residential treatment and group 

programs for adults struggling with substance use disorders and co-occurring mental health issues, 

such as anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, bipolar disorder, personality disorders, trauma, and 

eating disorders at their facilities in Boca Raton, Fort Myers, Wesley Chapel, Ocklawaha, Navarre, 

and Jacksonville, Florida. 

20. Plaintiff was employed by and worked for Defendants as a Behavioral Health 

Associate/Direct Care Worker at Defendants’ treatment center in Boca Raton, Florida during all 

times material to this action.

21. Defendants established and administered the pay practices for Plaintiff and other 

similarly situated BHAs during the three (3) years preceding the filing of this collective action. 

22. Plaintiff and other similarly situated BHAs worked in excess of forty (40) hours per 

week within weekly pay periods during the three (3) years preceding the filing of this collective 

action complaint. 

23. At all times material, Defendants had a centralized time keeping system for the 

purpose of recording the hours worked by Plaintiff and those similarly situated. 

24. Defendants had a common plan, policy and practice of refusing to pay Plaintiff and 

collective members for the all the time they spent performing work-related duties such as 

administering medications, taking blood pressure, and assisting patients, in general. 

25. Plaintiff and collective members spent time “off the clock” after the end of their 

regularly scheduled shifts performing such tasks as (but not limited to) administering medications, 

taking blood pressure, and assisting patients in general. This “off the clock” work took anywhere 

from fifteen (15) to thirty (30) minutes, and sometimes took an hour or more.

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 5 of 14
6

26. Because Plaintiff and putative collective members routinely worked forty (40) 

hours or more while “on the clock,” the “off the clock” work they performed, as described above, 

should have been compensated at the FLSA mandated overtime premium of and one half times

their regular rate. 

27. Plaintiff and collective members did perform such “off-the-clock” after their shift’s 

scheduled end times within weekly pay periods during all times material without being 

compensated at the applicable FLSA overtime rates of pay for such work times.

28. Defendants failed to “edit-in” the aforementioned “off-the-clock” work times of 

Plaintiff and collective members into their time keeping system or, otherwise compensate them for 

such unpaid “clocked-out” work at the applicable FLSA overtime rates of pay within weekly pay 

periods during all times material to this collective action, despite having knowledge of the off-theclock work and receiving the benefits of the work.

29. Defendants were aware they were not compensating Plaintiff and collective

members at the applicable FLSA overtime rates of pay for such “off-the-clock” work times within 

weekly pay periods at all times material.

30. The aforementioned unpaid “off-the-clock” claims of Plaintiff and collective

members are unified through a common theory of Defendants’ FLSA violations.

31. Defendants’ common plan, policy and practice of not compensating Plaintiff and 

collective membersfor all their compensable overtime hours at the applicable FLSA overtime rates 

of pay violated the provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).

32. Defendants’ failure to compensate Plaintiff and collective members for their 

aforementioned “off-the-clock” work times was willful and without a good faith basis.

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 6 of 14
7

33. As a result of Defendants’ lack of good faith and willful failure to pay Plaintiff and 

collective members in compliance with the requirements of the FLSA, Plaintiff and collective

members have suffered lost wages in terms of lost overtime compensation as well as other 

damages.

34. The net effect of Defendants’ common plan, policy, and practice of failing to pay 

Plaintiff and those similarly situated one-and one-half times their regular hourly rates of pay for 

all hours worked over forty (40) during all times material to this collective action, is that they

unjustly enriched themselves and enjoyed ill-gained profits at the expense of Plaintiff and 

collective members.

VII. FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS

35. Plaintiff brings this case as a 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) collective action on behalf herself 

and other similarly situated BHA’s/Direct Care Workers who worked for Defendants in Florida at 

their facilities with residential treatment and/or group programs for adults struggling with 

substance use disorders and co-occurring mental health issues to recover unpaid overtime 

compensation, liquidated damages, statutory penalties, attorneys’ fees and costs, and other 

damages owed.

36. Plaintiff seeks to pursue her aforementioned unpaid overtime wage claims against 

Defendants on behalf of herself, individually, and on behalf of herself and all other similarly 

situated Behavioral Health Associates/Direct Care Workers as a collective.

37. Plaintiff and collective members are “similarly situated” for purposes of 29 U.S.C. 

§216(b) because, inter alia, Defendants employed a common pay system that resulted in a failure 

to pay Plaintiff and collective members for all hours worked over forty (40) at one and one-half 

times their regular hourly rates of pay, as required by the FLSA.

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 7 of 14
8

38. This action is properly maintained as a collective action because Plaintiff is 

similarly situated to the members of the collective with respect to Defendants’ time keeping, pay 

practices and compensation plans, policies and practices. 

39. This action also is properly maintained as a collective action under the FLSA 

because the aforementioned unpaid “off-the-clock” claims are unified through a common theory 

of Defendants’ violations of the FLSA.

40. The collective action mechanism is superior to other available methods for a fair 

and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds 

generally applicable to collective members. The prosecution of separate actions could create a risk 

of inconsistent and varying adjudications, place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the courts 

and/or substantially impair the ability of collective members to protect their interests.

41. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the collective as her

interests are in complete alignment with those of collective members, i.e. to pursue their 

aforementioned unpaid overtime compensation claims.

42. Counsel for Plaintiff will adequately protect her interests as well as the interests of 

all putative collective members.

43. Defendants knew Plaintiff and collective members performed the aforementioned 

unpaid “off-the-clock” work that resulted in excess of forty (40) hours per week within weekly 

pay periods which required overtime compensation to be paid as required by the FLSA. 

Nonetheless, Defendants operated under a common policy and practice to deprive Plaintiff and 

collective members of such overtime compensation. 

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 8 of 14
9

44. Defendants’ conduct, as alleged herein, was willful with reckless disregard to the 

FLSA overtime requirements, which conduct caused significant damage to Plaintiff and the 

collective.

45. Defendants did not have a good faith basis for its failure to compensate Plaintiff 

and collective members for all their compensable overtime hours at the FLSA applicable overtime 

rates of pay within weekly pay periods during all times material to this action.

46. Therefore, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and collective members under the 

FLSA for failing to properly compensate them for their aforementioned unpaid overtime work 

times.

47. Plaintiff requests this Court to authorize notice to the members of the collective to 

inform them of the pendency of this action and their right to “opt-in” to this lawsuit pursuant to 29 

U.S.C. § 216(b), for the purpose of seeking unpaid overtime compensation as well as liquidated 

damages under the FLSA, and the other relief requested herein.

48. Plaintiff estimates there are over one hundred (100) putative members of the 

collective. The precise number of collective members can be easily ascertained by examining 

Defendants’ payroll, scheduling, timekeeping, personnel and other work-related records and 

documents. 

49. Given the composition and size of the collective, members of the collective may be 

informed of the pendency of this action directly via U.S. mail, e-mail, and by posting notice in all 

of Defendants’ facilities.

50. Plaintiff and collective members’ unpaid overtime compensation claims may be 

determined partially by an examination of Defendants’ payroll, scheduling, time keeping, 

personnel and other such work-related records and documents.

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 9 of 14
10

COUNT I

(Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act)

51. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as fully as if written 

herein.

52. At all times material, Plaintiff and collective members have been entitled to the 

rights, protections, and benefits provided under 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.

53. Defendants have been an “employer” engaged in interstate commerce consistent 

with 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) and 207(a). Plaintiff and collective members also have engaged in 

interstate commerce during all times material to this action.

54. At all times material, Defendants were an “employer” of Plaintiff and each of the 

collective members, as such term is defined by the FLSA.

55. Plaintiff and collective members were “employees” of Defendants within the 

meaning of the FLSA’s overtime wage requirements.

56. Plaintiff and other collective members have been similarly situated individuals 

within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) at all relevant times, as previously described.

57. As a result of the aforementioned unpaid “off-the-clock” work times of Plaintiff 

and collective members Defendants have violated the FLSA and is liable to Plaintiff and the 

collective for such unpaid overtime compensation.

58. Section 207(a)(1) of the FLSA states that an employee must be paid overtime, equal 

to at least one and one-half (1.5) times the employee's regular rate of pay, for all hours worked in 

excess of forty (40) hours per week. Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 778.315, compensation for hours 

worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week may not be considered paid to an employee unless 

that employee is compensated for all such overtime hours worked.

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 10 of 14
11

59. Through their actions, plans, policies and practices Defendants violated the FLSA 

by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate Plaintiff and collective members for all hours 

worked in excess of forty (40) per week at one and-one half times their regular hourly rates of pay 

within weekly pay periods during all times material to this Complaint, as required by the FLSA.

60. Defendants’ actions were willful with reckless disregard of clearly applicable 

FLSA provisions.

61. Defendants’ actions were not in good faith.

62. The unpaid overtime claims of Plaintiff and the collective are unified through a 

common theory of Defendants’ FLSA violations.

63. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and 

collective members have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of income and other damages.

64. Therefore, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff and other members of the collective

for actual damages, liquidated damages and equitable relief, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as 

well as reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and collective members request the Court to enter judgment in 

their favor on this Complaint and:

a) Award Plaintiff and collective members all unpaid overtime compensation against 

Defendants;

b) Find and declare that Defendants’ violations of the FLSA were willful, and accordingly, 

the three (3) year statute of limitations under the FLSA applies to this action; 

c) Award Plaintiff and collective members liquidated damages in accordance with the FLSA;

d) Award prejudgment interest (to the extent that liquidated damages are not awarded);

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 11 of 14
12

e) Award Plaintiff and the collective members reasonable attorneys’ fees and all costs of this 

action, to be paid by Defendants, in accordance with the FLSA; 

f) Award post-judgment interest and court costs as allowed by law;

g) Enter an Order designating this action as an opt-in collective action under the FLSA;

h) Enter an Order directing the issuance of notice to putative collective members pursuant to 

29 U.S.C. § 216(b) for the claims of the collective;

i) Allow Plaintiff to amend her Complaint, if necessary, as new facts are discovered;

j) Provide additional general and equitable relief to which Plaintiff and collective members 

may be entitled; and

k) Provide further relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 

Plaintiff hereby demands a TRIAL BY JURY as to all issues.

Dated: June 19, 2020. Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Alan L. Quiles .

Alan Quiles

Florida Bar No. 62431

Gregg I. Shavitz

Florida Bar No. 11398

SHAVITZ LAW GROUP, P.A.

951 Yamato Road, Suite 285

Boca Raton, Florida 33431

T. (561) 447-8888

F. (561) 447-8831

aquiles@shavitzlaw.com

gshavitz@shavitzlaw.com

& 

/s/ J. Russ Bryant

J. Russ Bryant (TN BPR #33830)

(pro hac vice application forthcoming)

Robert E. Morelli, III (TN BPR #37004) 

(pro hac vice application forthcoming)

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 12 of 14
13

JACKSON, SHIELDS, YEISER, HOLT,

OWEN & BRYANT

Attorneys at Law

262 German Oak Drive

Memphis, Tennessee 38018

Telephone: (901) 754-8001

Facsimile: (901) 754-8524

rbryant@jsyc.com

rmorelli@jsyc.com

ATTORNEYS FOR NAMED PLAINTIFF 

AND FOR OTHERS SIMILARLY 

SITUATED

Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 13 of 14
EXHIBIT A Case 9:20-cv-80971-XXXX Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/19/2020 Page 14 of 14