J-S07003-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TYREE J. WATSON,

Appellant No. 478 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 5, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002444-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E. , PANELLA, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 11, 2018

Appellant, Tyree Watson, appeals from the judgment of sentence of an 

aggregate term of 9 to 18 years’ incarceration, followed by four years’ 

probation, imposed after he was convicted by a jury of, inter alia, two counts 

each of attempted murder and aggravated assault. Appellant argues that the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and that the jury’s verdict 

was contrary to the weight of the evidence. We affirm.

Briefly, Appellant was arrested based on evidence that he shot at an 

unidentified male (“John Doe”) on a public street in Philadelphia, with one of 

his errant bullets striking an innocent bystander, Charles Gilbert. Gilbert 

suffered paralysis of his left arm from the bullet that entered his 

neck/collarbone area. Appellant was charged with attempted murder and 

aggravated assault regarding both John Doe and Gilbert, as well as single 
J-S07003-18

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counts of carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on a public 

street in Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of crime. He proceeded 

to a jury trial in September of 2016. On September 13, 2016, the jury reached 

a verdict, finding Appellant guilty of the above-stated crimes.

On January 5, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to the aggregate 

term stated, supra. He filed a timely, post-sentence motion that was denied 

on January 17, 2017. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he also 

timely complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. On June 27, 2017, the trial 

court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Herein, Appellant presents the following four issues for our review:

[I.] Is the evidence sufficient[,] as a matter of law[,] to support 

the conviction for criminal aggravated assault as set forth in 18 

Pa.C.S.[] § 2702(a)[,] graded as a felony of the first degree with 

respect to complainant John Doe or complainant Charles Gilbert?

[II.] Is the evidence sufficient[,] as a matter of law[,] to support 

the conviction for criminal attempted murder with respect to 

complainant John Doe or complainant Charles Gilbert?

[III.] Is the verdict of guilty with respect to the charge of 

aggravated assault as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 2702(a), graded 

as a felony of the first degree, against the weight of the evidence 

and so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of 

justice with respect to complainant John Doe or complainant 

Charles Gilbert?

[IV.] Is the verdict of guilty with respect to the charge of 

attempted murder against the weight of the evidence and so 

contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of justice with 

respect to complainant John Doe or complainant Charles Gilbert?

Appellant’s Brief at 7-8.
J-S07003-18

- 3 -

We have reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the parties, and the 

applicable law. Additionally, we have reviewed the thorough and wellreasoned opinion of the Honorable Giovanni O. Campbell of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dated June 27, 2017. We conclude 

that Judge Campbell’s opinion accurately disposes of the issues presented by 

Appellant. Accordingly, we adopt his opinion as our own and affirm Appellant’s 

judgment of sentence on the grounds set forth therein.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/11/18
5 0-7 00 3-/ Circulateaii2046eA044/7 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

TRIAL DIVISION - CRIMINAL 

COMMONWEALTH OF PA 

V. 

TYREE WATSON 

CP-51-CR-0002444-2012 CP-51-CR-0002444-2012 Comm v Watson, Tyree J Opinion 

7967802351 

Received 

JUN 2 7 2017 

Office .iricoords 

Appealgivaifial 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

CAMPBELL, J. June 274-714, 2017 

Procedural History 

On September 7, 2016, Appellant Tyree Watson proceeded to trial before this Court, sitting 

with a jury. On September 13, 2016, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on two counts of 

attempted murder, two counts of aggravated assault, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying 

a firearm in Philadelphia and possession of an instrument of a crime. 

A motion for judgment of acquittal was filed on January 3, 2017, and denied on January 5, 

2017, 

Also on January 5, 2017, Appellant was sentenced to 9-18 years incarceration on each 

count of attempted murder, to run concurrently, and four years of probation on the two firearms 

charges and possession of an instrument of crime, with the probationary sentences to run 

concurrent to one another and consecutive to the sentence of incarceration. The aggravated assault 

convictions merged with the attempted murder convictions for purposes of sentencing. 

Post -sentence motions were filed on January 9, 2017, and denied on January 17, 2017. 

A premature Notice of Appeal was filed on January 13, 2017. 

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2) and (3), the Court entered an order on January 23, 2017. 

directing the filing of a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, not later than twenty-one 

(21) days after entry of the order. 
A new notice of appeal was filed on January 25, 2017. 

An amended order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2) and (3), was entered an order on 

March 2, 2017. 

A Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal was filed on March 23, 2017. 

Factual History 

On the afternoon of September 28, 2011, Appellant, as seen on a store security video, was 

walking west on West Butler Street, at the corner of Pulaski Avenue and Butler, heading in the 

direction of 1811) Street. Appellant was wearing a dark t -shirt and jeans. He had a blue backpack 

and was carrying an iPad. N.T. 9/7/16, pp. 62-64; C -33a -d, C-5. As Appellant walked toward 

the intersection of 18th and Butler Streets another security video camera captured Appellant passing 

an unknown man walking in the opposite direction, then stopping to look at that man before 

removing his backpack and putting it on the steps of the Roman Grocery store, along with the iPad. 

N.T. 9/7/16, pp. 63-66, 121; C -33e -h; C-5. Appellant removed a gun from the backpack, then 

headed east on Butler Street, the way he had just come and the direction in which the man in the 

white t -shirt was heading. N.T. 9/7/16, pp. 91, N.T. 9/8/16, pp. 21-22, 24, 44, 50-51, 70-71, 75- 

77; C-5, C -33h. 

At the corner of Pulaski and Butler, the camera which first picked up Appellant, caught the 

man in the white t -shirt running east on Butler with a gun in his hand, then turning left (north) on 

Pulaski, disappearing down that street. I N.T. 9/7/16, pp. 65-66; C -33i -j. As the man in the white t - shirt ran down Pulaski, away from the intersection with Butler, Charles Gilbert, an innocent 

I Pulaski Avenue intersects West Butler Street on a diagonal, and actually runs generally northwest from Butler, 

intersecting North 18th Streets, and southeast from Butler toward North I Th Street. C-1, C- Ia. Butler at Pulaski, is a one-way street, running east. C-1, C4a. 

2 
bystander who was standing in front of 1703 West Butler on the across Pulaski on the northeast 

corner of Butler and Pulaski, between 17'h and Pulaski, was struck in the neck/collarbone by a 

bullet. N.T. 9/7/16, pp. 54-55, 68, 114, 164, 172; C -la, C-2, C -4a, C -4a, C-5. Mr. Gilbert saw 

the man in the white t -shirt running toward him holding a gun but not firing. The man running 

behind the man in the white t -shirt fired his gun and Gilbert was struck. N.T. 9/7/16, pp. 159-160, 

177-181, N.T. 9/8/16, pp. 96-98; C-7. 

Gilbert was struck in the lower left neck with the bullet trajectory extending through the 

clavicle, fracturing the mid -clavicle, with one bullet fragment lodging near the vertebral spine. As 

a result of the gunshot would he suffered paralysis of his left arm. The projectile was still in his 

body at the time of trial. N.T. 9/7/16, pp 153-155, N.T. 9/8/16, pp. 123-124. 

Under a minute later, the Roman Grocery camera back at 18'h and Butler captures Appellant 

returning from the direction of Butler and Pulaski where Gilbert was shot, placing an object back 

in the backpack, then picking up his backpack and iPad, before walking into the street and off 

camera. N.T. 9/7/16, pp. 88; C-5. 

A minute or two after the Mr. Gilbert was shot, a light Blue Mercury Grand Marquis was 

captured on the first camera as it turned from Butler onto Pulaski, heading north in the same 

direction as the man in the white t -shirt. N.T. 9/8/16, pp. 36-37, N.T. 9/8/16, pp. 120-119; C-5. 

Subsequently, during the course of the police investigation of the scene, the light blue Mercury 

Grand Marquis, was found about one block south of the scene of the shooting. N.T. 9/7/16, pp. 

94-97, N.T. 9/8/16, p. 32, 54; C -10b -d. Visible inside the car was a blue backpack like the one 

Appellant was seen with in the videos, and an iPad. C -10d. The car was impounded and later 

searched. The iPad was found to have photos of Appellant as its lock -screen and home -screen 

3 
images. N.T. 9/8/16, pp. 111-113; C-22. The car was owned by Bryan Seals, who was a long time 

neighborhood and school friend of Appellant's, who was seen walking in the vicinity of 18'1' and 

Butler after the shooting, while police were on the scene. N.T. 9/8/16, pp. 52-53. Police staked 

out the car after the shooting and at some point they saw Seals and Nafeese Moore enter the car. 

N.T. 9/8/16, pp. 28-31, 33. Police approached the men, and upon observing the blue backpack in 

the rear seat, secured the car for detectives. N.T. 9/8/16, p. 31. 

Officers Harley, Coulter, Wright and Graves, testified that they knew Appellant from 

working at Gratz High School where Appellant attended and played sports, from being assigned 

as a patrol officer in the neighborhood where Appellant lived and from being assigned as a narcotics unit surveillance officer in that neighborhood, respectively. N.T. 9/7/16, pp. 127-130, 

N.T. 9/8/16, pp. 15-17, 47-48, 65-68. Each officer testified that they responded to the scene 

following the shooting, viewed some the video inside the store, and were immediately able to 

identify Appellant as the person with the backpack and iPad. N.T. 9/7/16, pp. 131-140, 144, N.T. 

9/8/16, pp. 21-27, 50-51, 55-57, 69-72, 74; C-16, 

Discussion 

Appellant asserts the following allegations of error: 1) The evidence was insufficient to 

support the convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault; 2) the verdicts of guilty on 

the charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault were against the weight of the evidence. 

A. The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for attempted murder, 

and aggravated assault. 

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law. 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000). We must determine "whether 

the evidence is sufficient to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 

4 
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1989). We "must view evidence in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and accept as true all evidence 

and all reasonable inferences therefrom upon which, if believed, the fact finder properly could 

have based its verdict." Id. 

Our Supreme Court has instructed: 

[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude 

every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be 

resolved by the fact -finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as 

a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be 

evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier 

of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the 

evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Ratsatny, 594 Pa. 176, 934 A.2d 1233, 1236 n. 2 (2007). 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 65 A.3d 939, 943 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Moreover, a conviction may stand on circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Roscioli, 

309 A.2d 396, 398 (1973) ("Although the Commonwealth does not have to establish guilt to a 

mathematical certainty, and may in the proper case rely wholly on circumstantial evidence, the 

conviction must be based on more than mere suspicion or conjecture."); Commonwealth v. Brewer, 

876 A.2d 1029, 1032 (Pa. Super, 2005) ("[T]he fact that the evidence establishing a defendant's 

participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence 

coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of 

innocence." (quoting Commonwealth v. Murphy, 795 A.2d 1025, 1038-39 (Pa. Super. 2002)). 

1. The evidence was sufficient to find appellant guilty of each count of 

attempted murder. 

(a) The evidence demonstrated specific intent to commit murder. 

5 
Specific intent to kill can be inferred "from the manner in which the homicide was 

committed, such as, multiple gunshot wounds." Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 793 (Pa. 

2004). Specific intent to kill may also be inferred from a defendant's use of a deadly weapon on a 

vital part of the victim's body. Commonwealth v. Robertson, 874 A.2d 1200, 1207 (Pa. Super. 

2005). 

In order to sustain a conviction for attempted murder the Commonwealth must prove: 

Under the Crimes Code, "[a] person commits an attempt when[,] with intent to commit a 

specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step towards the commission 

of the crime." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). A person may be convicted of attempted murder if 

he -takes a substantial step toward the commission of a killing, with the specific intent in 

mind to commit such an act. The substantial step test broadens the scope of attempt liability 

by concentrating on the acts the defendant has done[,] and does not any longer focus on 

the acts remaining to be done before the actual commission of the crime. The mens rea 

required for first -degree murder, specific intent to kill, may be established solely from 

circumstantial evidence. The law permits the factHfinder to infer that one intends the 

natural and probable consequences of his acts[.] 

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quotation marks and some 

citations omitted). In the context of a sufficiency of the evidence claim concerning attempted 

murder: 

[I]ntent is a subjective frame of mind, it is of necessity difficult of direct proof. We must 

look to all the evidence to establish intent, including, but not limited to, [the] appellant's 

conduct as it appeared to his eyes.... Moreover, depending on the circumstances[,] even a 

single punch may be sufficient. 

Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 247 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation and brackets omitted); 

"Specific intent to kill can be proven where the defendant knowingly applies deadly force to the 

person of another." Commotnreakh v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 650 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). 

6 
Here, the evidence, read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict 

winner, demonstrated that Appellant saw the man in the white t -shirt walk past him, then made a 

conscious decision to try to kill him. Appellant stopped, put down his bag and iPad, retrieved a 

gun and gave chase, firing at least two shots at the fleeing man. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 

2016 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 516, *18 (Pa. C.P. 2016, Ransom, J.) ("Specific intent to kill can 

be reasonably inferred from the actions taken by the Appellant in leaving the scene of the 

argument, returning with a gun, shooting at [the victim] multiple times, and ultimately striking him 

in the chest."). 

In affirming an attempted murder conviction of one Thomas White, who pointed a handgun 

and fired in the direction of several neighbors, the Superior Court quoted the apt 1793 observation 

of the Supreme Court of New Jersey: 

The designs of the heart can rarely be proved in a direct manner by the testimony of 

witnesses. When a man designs to perpetrate a scheme of wickedness, he seldom 

communicates his intention unless to an accomplice; hence the intent must in most cases 

be collected from the circumstances. These may sometimes prove deceptive; but when, 

without any forced construction, they speak the intention in a language clear and 

intelligible, they may be relied on as the best evidence which the nature of the case will 

admit of. 

It is impossible to lay down any general rule, or to declare from what circumstances 

particular intentions are to be inferred. No two cases are exactly similar . . Commonwealth v. White, 323 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. Super. 1974), quoting State v. Wilson, 1 American Decisions, 216, 217, 219 N.J. 1793). 

The conduct of Appellant also provides the requisite intent for an attempted murder against 

Charles Gilbert. The transferred intent doctrine is codified in 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 303 and reads in 

relevant part as follows: 

§ 303. Causal relationship between conduct and result 

7 
* * * 

(b) Divergence between result designed or contemplated and actual result. - When 

intentionally or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the 

element is not established if the actual result is not within the intent or the contemplation 

of the actor unless: 

(I) the actual result differs from that designed or contemplated as the case may be, only in 

the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the 

injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive 

than that caused; 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303(b). 

The Supreme Court has explained: 

"The transferred intent theory provides that if the intent to commit a crime exists, this intent 

can be transferred for the purpose of finding the intent element of another crime." 

Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 533 Pa. 539, 547, 626 A.2d 133, 138 (1993). The evidence here 

demonstrated that appellant shot in the direction of Forbes even though he may have only 

intended to shoot Aitken. This evidence was sufficient to warrant the transferred intent 

instruction. Where the evidence is sufficient to support an instruction, a new trial is not 

warranted. Hence, this claim warrants no relief. 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 739 A.2d 1023, 1029-1030 (Pa. 1999). 

Here, the jury was entitled to transfer Appellant's intent to kill Burch for the purpose of 

finding the requisite mens rea for the attempted murder of Devine. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 2008 PA Super 192, 955 A.2d 441, 450 (Pa. Super. 2008) (when evidence 

established that defendant specifically intended to murder one person, intent to commit 

aggravated assault was transferred to multiple bystanders endangered by bullets). 

Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports Appellant's conviction of attempted murder. 

Commonwealth v. Leach, 2014 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2705, *13-14 (Pa. Super. Aug. 15, 2014) 

Here, it matters not that Appellant intended to kill the man in the white t -shirt, but instead 

struck Charles Gilbert. Appellant does not get a free pass because he is a poor shot. His intent is 

deemed transferred, resulting in culpability for both the attempted murder of the unknown man in 

the white t -shirt and Charles Gilbert, the innocent bystander who was left partially paralyzed by 

Appellant's errant bullet. 

8 
2. The evidence was sufficient to find appellant guilty of each count of 

aggravated assault where the evidence established that Appellant intended to inflict 

serious bodily injury and did so knowingly and recklessly. 

The Crimes Code defines the offense of Aggravated Assault 18 Pa. C.S. § 2702(a)), in 

pertinent pad: 

§ 2702. Aggravated assault. 

(a) Offense defined. --A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: 

(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury 

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting 

extreme indifference to the value of human life; 

There is no question that Appellant caused serious bodily injury to Charles Gilbert. Despite 

a layman's debate over whether Gilbert was shot in the neck or the shoulder, the medical records, 

which were entered by stipulation, establish that Gilbert was struck in the lower left neck with the 

bullet trajectory extending through the clavicle, fracturing the mid -clavicle, with one bullet 

fragment lodging near the vertebral spine. As a result of the gunshot wound, he suffered paralysis 

of his left arm. The projectile was still in his body at the time of trial. N.T. 9/7/16, pp 153-155, 

N.T. 9/8/16, pp. 123-124. 

As to the man in the white t -shirt, Appellant's actions in chasing him down the street firing 

shots at his fleeing back demonstrates an attempt to cause serious bodily injury. 

[E]vidence that Appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury to Devine was not 

necessary. The jury could properly find that when Appellant fired a number of shots at 

close range while Devine was sitting on the steps next to Burch, he took a substantial step 

toward causing serious bodily injury 

Commonwealth v. Leach, 2014 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2705, *16 (Pa. Super. Aug. 15, 2014) 

As discussed in the previous section, this intent transfers to Charles Gilbert for the purposes 

of demonstrating an attempt to cause serious bodily injury. Moreover, as to Gilbert, the evidence, 

9 
including his firing shots at the man in the white t -shirt, where Gilbert was in the line of fire, 

establishes that Appellant caused serious bodily injury recklessly under circumstances manifesting 

and extreme indifference to the value of human life. 

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he "attempts to cause serious bodily 

injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under 

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." 18 Pa.C.S. § 

2702(a)(1). "For the degree of recklessness contained in the aggravated assault statute to 

occur, the offensive act must be performed under circumstances which almost assure that 

injury or death will ensue." Commonwealth v. O'Hanlon, 539 Pa. 478, 482, 653 A.2d 616, 

618 (1995). Here, the evidence established that the first several shots fired by appellant 

narrowly missed hitting Forbes. Forbes testified that initially he believed he had been 

struck by one of appellant's bullets and was then forced to run and "zig zag" in order to 

avoid being hit by the bullets. We find that this evidence was sufficient to support the 

aggravated assault and recklessly endangering another person convictions. 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 739 A.2d 1023, 1028-1029 (Pa. 1999). See also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441, 450 (Pa. Super. 2008) (when evidence established that defendant 

specifically intended to murder one person, intent to commit aggravated assault was transferred to 

multiple bystanders endangered by bullets) 

The evidence was clearly sufficient to prove the elements of aggravated assault, beyond a 

reasonable doubt as to both the man in the white t -shirt and Charles Gilbert. 

B. The verdicts were not against the weight of the evidence. 

Appellant asserts that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. 

The Supreme Court has explained: 

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of 

the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. 

Commonwealth v. ,Whiteman, 336 Pa. Super. 120, 485 A.2d 459 (Pa. Super. 1984). Thus, 

the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 38 n. 11. [footnote omitted] An allegation that the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 648 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1994). A new trial should not 

be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

1.0 
facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Thompson, supra. A trial judge must do 

more than reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would not have 

assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of 

the trial judge is to determine that "notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly 

of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to 

deny justice." Id. 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 319-320, 744 A.2d 745, 751-752 (Pa. 2000). Further: 

The decision of whether to grant a new trial on the basis of a challenge to the weight of the 

evidence is necessarily committed to the sound discretion of the trial court due to the court's 

observation of the witnesses and the evidence. Brown, 538 Pa. 410, 648 A.2d 1177. A trial 

court should award a new trial on this ground only when the verdict is so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. Commonwealth v, Whitney, 511 Pa. 232, 512 

A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1986). A motion alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

should not be granted where it merely identifies contradictory evidence presented by the 

Commonwealth and the defendant. 

Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 612 Pa. 107, 133-134, 30 A.3d 381, 396 (Pa. 2011). 

Whether from fear or neighborhood pressure, it was clear that Charles Gilbert was a 

reluctant witness, He did not want to be there. NT 9/7/16, p. 151. A warrant had to be issued for 

his arrest to compel his appearance. He was then taken into custody in Camden, and brought to 

Court. NT 9/7/16, pp. 166-167. When testifying he suffered convenient memory lapses 

redounding to Appellant's benefit, including admitting portions of his statement and claiming not 

to remember others. NT 9/7/16, pp. 157-161. Clearly the jury was skeptical of these efforts to 

exculpate Appellant, as was this Court. 

The video tapes, the physical evidence, the events recalled by Mr. Gilbert, and Mr. 

Gilbert's prior signed statement to police (C-7), all combined to demonstrate conclusively that 

Appellant fired the shot that missed the man in the white t -shirt and struck Charles Gilbert. The 

defense efforts to undermine the video and other evidence, to exploit Mr. Gilbert's reluctance, and 

to attempt to attribute the gunshot to, variously, the man in the white t -shirt, Bryan Seals, some 

11 
unknown person or persons in Seals' blue Mercury Grand Marquis, Nafeese Moore, and someone 

who looked like Seals' father, were unavailing and did not overcome the strong evidence of guilt. 

The Court's conscience was in no way shocked by the verdicts of guilty, which were not 

at all contrary to the overwhelming weight of the relevant credible evidence. 

Conclusion 

Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth here Appellant's convictions and sentence should 

be affirmed. 

12 
Commonwealth v. Tyree Watson Case Number: CP-51-CR-2444-2012 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing upon the person(s), and in the 

manner indicated above, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. I 14: 

Defense Counsel/Party: 

James Richard Lloyd, Esquire 

1617 John F Kennedy Blvd Suite 999 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Type of Service: ( ) Personal (X) First Class Mail 

District Attorney: 

Hugh Burns, Esquire 

Office of the District Attorney 

Three South Penn Square 

Philadelphia, PA 19107 

Type of Service ( ) Personal (X) First Class Mail 

Dated: June 27, 2017 

Aug,/ 41-4, 

Vanessa A. Montone 

Judicial Secretary to 

Honorable Giovanni 0. Campbell