94946 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 248 / Tuesday, December 27, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

or the component history card or equivalent 

record do not specify a life limit for the TT 

strap, or if they specify a different life limit 

than in paragraph (e)(1), do the following: 

(i) Revise the Airworthiness Limitations 

section of the applicable maintenance 

manual or ICA by establishing a life limit of 

25,000 flights or 10 years since date of 

manufacture, whichever occurs first, for each 

TT strap P/N 2604067 and P/N 117–14110 by 

making pen-and-ink changes or by inserting 

a copy of this AD into the Airworthiness 

Limitations section of the maintenance 

manual or the ICA. For purposes of this AD, 

a flight would be counted anytime the 

helicopter lifts off into the air and then lands 

again regardless of the duration of the 

landing and regardless of whether the engine 

is shut down. 

(ii) Create a component history card or 

equivalent record for each TT strap P/N 

2604067 and P/N 117–14110, if one does not 

exist, and record a life limit of 25,000 flights 

or 10 years since date of manufacture, 

whichever occurs first. 

(3) Remove from service each TT strap that 

has reached or exceeded its life limit. 

(f) Special Flight Permits 

Special flight permits are prohibited. 

(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Safety Management 

Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this 

AD. Send your proposal to: Matt Fuller, 

Senior Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety 

Management Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

FAA, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Fort Worth, 

Texas 76177; telephone (817) 222–5110; 

email 9-ASW-FTW-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 

CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 

14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that 

you notify your principal inspector, or 

lacking a principal inspector, the manager of 

the local flight standards district office or 

certificate holding district office, before 

operating any aircraft complying with this 

AD through an AMOC. 

(h) Additional Information 

(1) Airbus Helicopters Alert Service 

Bulletin ASB BO105LS–10A–013, Revision 0, 

dated March 9, 2015, which is not 

incorporated by reference, contains 

additional information about the subject of 

this AD. For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Airbus Helicopters, 2701 N. 

Forum Drive, Grand Prairie, TX 75052; 

telephone (972) 641–0000 or (800) 232–0323; 

fax (972) 641–3775; or at http://

www.airbushelicopters.com/techpub. You 

may review the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Office of the 

Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 

Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, 

TX 76177. 

(2) The subject of this AD is addressed in 

European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 

No. 2015–0042, dated March 9, 2015. You 

may view the EASA AD on the Internet at 

http://www.regulations.gov in Docket No. 

FAA–2016–5247. 

(i) Subject 

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) 

Code: 6200 Main Rotor System. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on December 

1, 2016. 

Lance T. Gant, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–30053 Filed 12–23–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2016–4278; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–SW–022–AD; Amendment 

39–18758; AD 2016–26–01] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; 

AgustaWestland S.p.A. (Agusta) 

Helicopters 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Agusta Model AB139 and AW139 

helicopters. This AD requires 

performing operational checks of both 

hydraulic systems. This AD was 

prompted by an assessment of the 

hydraulic systems of the helicopter 

following an accident. These actions are 

intended to prevent the unsafe 

condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective January 31, 

2017. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain document listed in this AD 

as of January 31, 2017. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this final rule, contact 

AgustaWestland, Product Support 

Engineering, Via del Gregge, 100, 21015 

Lonate Pozzolo (VA) Italy, ATTN: 

Maurizio D’Angelo; telephone 39–0331– 

664757; fax 39 0331–664680; or at 

http://www.agustawestland.com/ 

technical-bulletins. You may review the 

referenced service information at the 

FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood 

Pkwy, Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 

76177. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2016– 

4278; or in person at the Docket 

Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the European Aviation 

Safety Agency (EASA) AD, the 

economic evaluation, any incorporatedby-reference service information, any 

comments received, and other 

information. The street address for the 

Docket Operations Office (phone: 800– 

647–5527) is U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations 

Office, M–30, West Building Ground 

Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matt 

Wilbanks, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

Safety Management Group, Rotorcraft 

Directorate, FAA, 10101 Hillwood 

Parkway, Fort Worth, Texas 76177; 

telephone (817) 222–5110; email 

matt.wilbanks@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

On March 11, 2016, at 81 FR 12838, 

the Federal Register published our 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), 

which proposed to amend 14 CFR part 

39 by adding an AD that would apply 

to certain serial-numbered Agusta 

Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters. 

The NPRM proposed to require, within 

50 hours time-in-service (TIS), 

performing operational tests of the 

Number 1 and Number 2 hydraulic 

systems power control modules (PCMs), 

the tail shut-off valve, the PCM1 and 

PCM2 flight control shut-off valves, and 

the emergency landing gear shut-off 

valve for correct functionality. 

Depending on the results of the 

operational checks, the NPRM proposed 

to require replacing a PCM, the tail shutoff valve, a flight control shut-off valve, 

the number 2 hydraulic control panel, 

the number 1 hydraulic module, the 

number 1 or number 2 PCM pressure 

switch, or repairing the electrical 

wiring. The proposed requirements 

were intended to prevent loss of 

hydraulic power to the flight controls 

and subsequent loss of control of the 

helicopter. 

The NPRM was prompted by AD No. 

2011–0207, dated October 20, 2011 (AD 

No. 2011–0207), issued by EASA, which 

is the Technical Agent for the Member 

States of the European Union, to correct 

an unsafe condition for certain serialnumbered Agusta Model AB139 and 

AW139 helicopters. EASA advises that 

an accident involving a Model AW139 

helicopter caused the tail rotor (T/R), 

the T/R gearbox, and part of the fin to 

detach from the aircraft, rupturing the 

hydraulic lines and draining all of the 

hydraulic fluid. According to EASA, an 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 248 / Tuesday, December 27, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 94947 

assessment of the helicopter’s hydraulic 

systems following the accident revealed 

that an operational check of the 

hydraulic systems is necessary to ensure 

its functionality. EASA advises that this 

condition, if not corrected, could lead, 

in the case of multiple failures, to loss 

of hydraulic power and subsequent loss 

of control of the helicopter. To address 

this, EASA AD No. 2011–0207 requires, 

within 50 flight hours or 2 months, 

operational checks of the power control 

modules and shutoff valves and 

reporting the results to the 

manufacturer. 

Comments 

After our NPRM (81 FR 12838, March 

11, 2016) was published, we received 

comments from one commenter. 

Request 

The commenter requested we not 

adopt the proposed AD, as it is 

unnecessary. The commenter stated that 

following the release of EASA AD No. 

2011–0207 and Agusta Bollettino 

Tecnico No. 139–269, dated September 

30, 2011 (BT 139–269), they already 

have a 600 hour/12 month inspection 

and operational check of the hydraulic 

systems as part of their maintenance 

program that covers all of the proposed 

actions in the NPRM. Finally, the 

commenter stated that the proposed AD 

would not change any of their 

maintenance procedures, but it would 

add an additional burden of required 

paper work for the same results. 

We disagree. EASA AD No. 2011– 

0207 is not mandatory for U.S. 

operators. Additionally, while an 

operator may incorporate the 

procedures described in BT 139–269 

into its maintenance program, not all 

operators are required to do so. In order 

for the corrective actions in BT 139–269 

to become mandatory, and to correct the 

unsafe condition identified in the 

NPRM, the FAA must issue an AD. 

FAA’s Determination 

These helicopters have been approved 

by the aviation authority of Italy and are 

approved for operation in the United 

States. Pursuant to our bilateral 

agreement with Italy, EASA, its 

technical representative, has notified us 

of the unsafe condition described in the 

EASA AD. We are issuing this AD 

because we evaluated all information 

provided by EASA, reviewed the 

relevant information, considered the 

comment received, and determined the 

unsafe condition exists and is likely to 

exist or develop on other helicopters of 

these same type designs and that air 

safety and the public interest require 

adopting the AD requirements as 

proposed. 

Differences Between This AD and the 

EASA AD 

The EASA AD requires reporting the 

results of the operational checks to 

Agusta, while this AD does not. The 

EASA AD also requires compliance 

within 50 flight-hours or 2 months, 

while this AD requires compliance 

within 50 hours TIS. 

Related Service Information Under 1 

CFR Part 51 

We reviewed BT 139–269 for Model 

AB139 and AW139 helicopters. BT 139– 

269 contains procedures for conducting 

operational checks of both hydraulic 

systems to confirm correct functionality. 

This service information is reasonably 

available because the interested parties 

have access to it through their normal 

course of business or by the means 

identified in the ADDRESSES section. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate this AD will affect 102 

helicopters of U.S. Registry. 

Based on an average labor rate of $85 

per hour, we estimate that operators 

may incur the following costs in order 

to comply with this AD. Performing the 

operational checks of the hydraulic 

systems requires about 2 work-hours for 

a total cost per helicopter of $170 and 

a total cost to U.S. operators of $17,340. 

If required, replacing a PCM will 

require about 3 work-hours and required 

parts will cost about $87,136, for a cost 

per helicopter of $87,391. 

If required, replacing a tail or flight 

control shut-off valve will require about 

2 work-hours, and required parts will 

cost about $7,512, for a cost per 

helicopter of $7,682. If required, 

replacing the number 2 hydraulic 

control panel will require about 2 workhours, and required parts will cost about 

$8,165, for a cost per helicopter of 

$8,335. 

If required, replacing the number 1 

hydraulic module will require about 4 

work-hours, and required parts will cost 

about $87,137, for a cost per helicopter 

of $87,477. 

If required, replacing a PCM pressure 

switch will require about 2 work-hours, 

and required parts will cost about 

$6,974, for a cost per helicopter of 

$7,144. 

If required, repairing the electrical 

wiring will require about 2 work-hours, 

and required parts will cost about $45, 

for a cost per helicopter of $215. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

helicopters identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska to the extent that it justifies 

making a regulatory distinction; and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared an economic evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 


asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
94948 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 248 / Tuesday, December 27, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2016–26–01 AGUSTAWESTLAND S.P.A. 

(AGUSTA): Amendment 39–18758; 

Docket No. FAA–2016–4278; Directorate 

Identifier 2012–SW–022–AD. 

(a) Applicability 

This AD applies to Agusta Model AB139 

and AW139 helicopters, all serial numbers 

except serial number 31007, 31094, 31293, 

31301, 31303, 31313, and 31329, certificated 

in any category. 

(b) Unsafe Condition 

This AD defines the unsafe condition as an 

inoperative hydraulic shut-off valve, which 

could result in loss of hydraulic power and 

subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. 

(c) Effective Date 

This AD becomes effective January 31, 

2017. 

(d) Compliance 

You are responsible for performing each 

action required by this AD within the 

specified compliance time unless it has 

already been accomplished prior to that time. 

(e) Required Actions 

Within 50 hours time-in service: 

(1) Perform an operational test of each 

Number 1 and Number 2 power control 

module (PCM). If the fluid level in the 

reservoir changes more than 5mm (0.196 in) 

in an hour, replace the affected PCM. 

(2) Perform an operational test of each tail 

shut-off valve. If the 2 SERVO caution 

message is not illuminated and the UTIL 

SOV2 and TR SOV indications are in the 

open position: 

(i) Disconnect the Tail Shutoff valve 

connector, HP4P1. 

(ii) Disconnect the PCM2 connectors, 

A44P3 and A44P12. 

(iii) Disconnect the TB38 terminal board 

connector, TB38P1. 

(iv) Perform a continuity test from HP4P1– 

1 to A44P12–16, from HP4P1–2 to TB38P1– 

D, and from HP4P1–4 to A44P3–6. 

(v) If there is no continuity, repair or 

replace the defective wiring. 

(vi) If there is continuity, release the test 

lever of the PCM2 to the DOWN NORM 

position. 

(vii) If the TRSVO indication stays in the 

closed position, replace the tail shutoff valve. 

(3) Perform an operational test of the PCM 

2 flight control shut-off valve as described in 

the Compliance Instructions, paragraphs 5.1. 

through 5.5., of Agusta Bollettino Tecnico 

No. 139–269, dated September 30, 2011 (BT 

139–269). 

(i) If the 2 SERVO caution message is 

illuminated: 

(A) On the hydraulic control panel, lift the 

guard of the SOV1/SOV2 switch and set it to 

SOV2 (closed position). Make sure that the 2 

HYD PRESS caution message and the HYD 2 

PRESS warning light on the hydraulic control 

panel are illuminated. 

(B) Reset the SOV1/SOV2 switch to the 

open position. 

(C) If the 2 HYD PRESS and 2 SERVO 

caution messages remain illuminated: 

(1) Disconnect the PL14P1 and PL14P2 

connectors from the hydraulic control panel. 

(2) Disconnect the A1–1P4 connector from 

the MAU1. 

(3) Disconnect the A2–1P3 connector from 

the MAU2. 

(4) Disconnect the A44P3 connector from 

the Number 2 PCM. 

(5) Disconnect the PL1P3 connector from 

the circuit breaker panel. 

(6) Perform a continuity test from PL14P1– 

J to A1–1P4–18, from PL14P1–D to PL1P3– 

q, from PL14P2–J to A44P3–5, and from 

PL14P2–T to A2–1P3–34. If there is no 

continuity, repair or replace the defective 

wiring. 

(7) If the HYD PRESS and 2 SERVO caution 

messages remain illuminated, replace the 

number 2 hydraulic power module. 

(ii) If the 2 HYD PRESS caution message 

is illuminated, the HYD 2 pressure indication 

is more than 190 bar (2,755 lbf/sq in), and the 

SOV2 shutoff valve is in the open position, 

replace the pressure switch on the Number 

2 PCM. 

(iii) If the closure of SOV 2 is indicated on 

the MFD hydraulic synoptic page, before 

further flight, replace the Number 2 PCM. 

(4) Perform an operational test of the PCM 

1 flight control shut-off valve as described in 

the Compliance Instructions, paragraphs 6.1. 

through 6.4., of BT 139–269. 

(i) If the 1 SERVO caution message is 

illuminated: 

(A) On the hydraulic control panel, lift the 

guard of the SOV1/SOV2 switch and set it to 

SOV1 (closed position). Make sure that the 1 

HYD PRESS caution message and the HYD 1 

PRESS warning light on the hydraulic control 

panel are illuminated. 

(B) Reset the SOV1/SOV2 switch to the 

open position. If the 1 HYD PRESS and 1 

SERVO caution messages remain 

illuminated: 

(1) Disconnect the PL14P1 and PL14P2 

connectors from the hydraulic control panel. 

(2) Disconnect the A1–1P4 connector from 

the MAU1. 

(3) Disconnect the A2–1P3 connector from 

the MAU2. 

(4) Disconnect the A45P3 connector from 

the Number 1 PCM. 

(5) Disconnect the PL1P3 connector from 

the circuit breaker panel. 

(6) Perform a continuity test from PL14P1– 

J to A1–1P4–18, from PL14P1–E to A45P3– 

5, from PL14P1–D to PL1P3-q, and from 

PL14P2–T to A2–1P3–34. If there is no 

continuity, repair or replace the defective 

wiring. 

(7) If the HYD PRESS and 1 SERVO caution 

messages remain illuminated, replace the 

Number 1 hydraulic control panel. 

(ii) If the 1 HYD PRESS caution message 

is illuminated, the HYD 1 pressure indication 

is more than 190 bar (2,755 lbf/sq in), and the 

SOV1 shutoff valve is in the open position, 

replace the pressure switch on the Number 

1 PCM. 

(iii) If the closure of SOV 1 is indicated on 

the MFD hydraulic synoptic page, before 

further flight, replace the Number 1 PCM. 

(4) Perform an operational test of the 

emergency landing gear shutoff valve as 

described in the Compliance Instructions, 

paragraphs 7.1. through 7.4., of BT 139–269. 

(i) If the EMERG L/G PRESS caution 

message is illuminated, the HYD 1 pressure 

indication is more than 190 bar (2,755 lbf/sq 

in), and the UTIL SOV1 (LDG GEAR EMER) 

shutoff valve is in the open position, replace 

the pressure switch on the Number 1 PCM. 

(ii) If the 1 HYD MIN caution message is 

illuminated, inspect the fluid level on the 

Number 1 PCM and inspect the Number 1 

main hydraulic system for leaks. 

(A) If the fluid level is between the FULL 

and ADD marks, or if there are no hydraulic 

fluid leaks, perform an operational test of the 

level switches. If the 1 HYD MIN caution 

message is illuminated, replace the Number 

1 PCM. 

(B) If there is a hydraulic fluid leak: 

(1) Replace all leaking parts and lines or 

repair the leak. 

(2) If the 1 HYD MIN caution message 

remains illuminated, perform an operational 

test of the level switches. 

(3) If the 1 HYD MIN caution message 

remains illuminated, replace the Number 1 

PCM. 

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Safety Management 

Group, FAA, may approve AMOCs for this 

AD. Send your proposal to: Matt Wilbanks, 

Aviation Safety Engineer, Safety Management 

Group, Rotorcraft Directorate, FAA, 10101 

Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, Texas 76177; 

telephone (817) 222–5110; email 9-ASWFTW-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) For operations conducted under a 14 

CFR part 119 operating certificate or under 

14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that 

you notify your principal inspector, or 

lacking a principal inspector, the manager of 

the local flight standards district office or 

certificate holding district office, before 

operating any aircraft complying with this 

AD through an AMOC. 

(g) Additional Information 

The subject of this AD is addressed in 

European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 

No. 2011–0207, dated October 20, 2011. You 

may view the EASA AD on the Internet at 

http://www.regulations.gov in Docket No. 

FAA-2016–4278. 

(h) Subject 

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) 

Code: 2900: Hydraulic Power. 

(i) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Agusta Bollettino Tecnico No. 139–269, 

dated September 30, 2011. 

(ii) Reserved. 

(3) For Agusta service information 

identified in this final rule, contact 

AgustaWestland, Product Support 

Engineering, Via del Gregge, 100, 21015 

Lonate Pozzolo (VA) Italy, ATTN: Maurizio 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 248 / Tuesday, December 27, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 94949 

D’Angelo; telephone 39–0331–664757; fax 39 

0331–664680; or at http://

www.agustawestland.com/technicalbulletins. 

(4) You may view this service information 

at FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, 

Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, 

Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call (817) 222–5110. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

(202) 741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on December 

9, 2016. 

Scott A. Horn, 

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–30285 Filed 12–23–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–7525; Directorate 

Identifier 2015–NM–064–AD; Amendment 

39–18727; AD 2016–25–01] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

The Boeing Company Model 747–400, 

747–400D, and 747–400F series 

airplanes; Model 757 airplanes; and 

Model 767–200, –300, –300F, and 

–400ER series airplanes. This AD was 

prompted by reports of uncommanded 

autopilot engagement events resulting in 

incorrect stabilizer trim adjustment 

during takeoff. This AD requires, 

depending on the model/configuration, 

installing an on-ground stabilizer 

autotrim inhibit system, relays and 

related wiring to open and close the 

flight control computer (FCC) analog 

output, and new operational program 

software (OPS) into the FCCs. We are 

issuing this AD to address the unsafe 

condition on these products. 

DATES: This AD is effective January 31, 

2017. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in this AD 

as of January 31, 2017. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this final rule, contact 

Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 

Attention: Data & Services Management, 

P. O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, Seattle, WA 

98124–2207; telephone: 206–544–5000, 

extension 1; fax: 206–766–5680; Internet 

https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You 

may view this referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, WA. For information on 

the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. It is also 

available on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2015– 

7525. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2015– 

7525; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Docket Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Fnu 

Winarto, Aerospace Engineer, Systems 

and Equipment Branch, ANM–130S, 

FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification 

Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: 425– 

917–6659; fax: 425–917–6590; email: 

fnu.winarto@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to certain The Boeing Company 

Model 747–400, 747–400D, and 747– 

400F series airplanes; Model 757 

airplanes; and Model 767–200, –300, 

–300F, and –400ER series airplanes. The 

NPRM published in the Federal 

Register on December 23, 2015 (80 FR 

79735) (‘‘the NPRM’’). The NPRM was 

prompted by reports of uncommanded 

autopilot engagement events resulting in 

incorrect stabilizer trim adjustment 

during takeoff. The NPRM proposed to 

require, depending on the model/ 

configuration for Model 747 airplanes, 

installing an on-ground stabilizer 

autotrim inhibit system, doing routine 

functional testing of the system, and 

doing corrective actions if necessary; for 

Model 757 airplanes and Model 767 

airplanes, installing relays and related 

wiring to open and close the FCC analog 

output that controls the stabilizer trim 

adjustment, doing routine functional 

testing of the on-ground auto stabilizer 

trim inhibit system, and doing 

corrective actions if necessary; and for 

Model 767–300, and –300F series 

airplanes, installing new OPS into the 

FCCs. We are issuing this AD to prevent 

stabilizer mistrim, which could result in 

a high-speed rejected takeoff and 

runway overrun, or reduced 

controllability of the airplane after 

takeoff due to insufficient pitch control. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the NPRM and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Support for the NPRM 

The Airline Pilots Association, 

International stated that it fully supports 

the intent of the NPRM. 

Requests To Withdraw the NPRM 

United Parcel Service (UPS) requested 

that the NPRM be withdrawn until the 

actual root cause of the unsafe condition 

can be determined and a validated and 

confirmed solution is developed. 

FedEx Express (FedEx) requested that 

we withdraw the NPRM. FedEx stated 

that the burden of the actions proposed 

in the NPRM is not justified based on 

data presented in Boeing Fleet Team 

Digest 757–FTD–22–12001 or its 

operational experience. FedEx believes 

this is an extremely isolated and 

unlikely anomaly on the Model 757 

fleet. FedEx stated that it operates over 

100 Model 757 aircraft and has 

completed over 210,000 flight cycles 

with no reports of uncommanded 

autopilot engagement. 

We disagree with the commenters’ 

request to withdraw the NPRM. The 

quantitative and qualitative risks 

analyzed for this identified unsafe 

condition present an unacceptable risk 

that must be addressed on both 

passenger and freighter models. The 

manufacturer also considers the 

condition a safety issue and has 

developed an on-ground stabilizer 

autotrim inhibit system that addresses 

the unsafe condition. We have 

determined that it is necessary to 

proceed with issuance of this AD. 

Requests To Clarify Root Cause 

Boeing requested that we revise the 

Discussion section of the NPRM. Boeing 


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