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22–571 DTP 2005

PERFORMANCE–BASED BUDGETING

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, JULY 20, 2005

Serial No. 109–10

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget

(

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/budget/index.html 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

JIM NUSSLE, Iowa, Chairman 

JIM RYUN, Kansas 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

KENNY C. HULSHOF, Missouri 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

MARIO DIAZ–BALART, Florida 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

ILEANA ROS–LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

CHRIS CHOCOLA, Indiana 

JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina, 

Ranking Minority Member 

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas 

RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana 

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine 

ED CASE, Hawaii 

CYNTHIA MCKINNEY, Georgia 

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas 

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

RON KIND, Wisconsin 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

JAMES T. BATES, Chief of Staff 

THOMAS S. KAHN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

Hearing held in Washington, DC, July 20, 2005 .................................................. 1

Statement of: 

Hon. Clay S. Johnson III, Deputy Directory for Management, Office of 

Management and Budget ............................................................................. 4

Hon. Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas .............................................................................................................. 7

Hon. K. Michael Conaway, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas .......................................................................................................... 13

Prepared statement of: 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 5

Mr. Cuellar ........................................................................................................ 10

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 14

(1)

PERFORMANCE–BASED BUDGETING 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 210, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jim Nussle (chairman of the 

committee), presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Nussle, Sessions, Chocola, 

Bonner, Ryun, Diaz-Balart, Putnam, Mack, Lungren, Crenshaw, 

McHenry, Conaway, Spratt, Baird, Neal, and Cuellar. 

Chairman NUSSLE. The Committee will come to order. The subject of today’s full Budget Committee hearing is performance-based 

budgeting. 

Good morning and welcome. Today, we are here to discuss that 

concept and how it may be applied to our own congressional budget 

process. I would imagine that performance budgeting is not a concept that is necessarily well understood or even well known by a 

majority of folks. So, as a first order of business today, and I am 

sure our witnesses will explain this, but let me try and give a 

quick, thumbnail overview of what performance-based budgeting is 

about, and then I am sure our experts will be a little bit more in 

depth in their explanation. 

In a nutshell, performance budgeting is an effort to tie the funding levels for government programs to the programs’ actual performance. The intent is to ensure that performance is routinely 

considered in funding and management decisions and that programs achieve expected results and work toward continual improvement. The practice has been utilized in various forms and 

with a varying degree of effectiveness and success by many of the 

50 States, including my own State of Iowa, as well as the Federal 

Government. 

On the Federal level, over the past decade Congress, the administration’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other executive agencies have worked to implement a statutory and management-reform framework to improve the performance and accountability of the Federal Government. Through measures such as 

the Government Performance and Results Act, the Chief Financial 

Officers Act, the Government Management Reform Act, and the administration’s performance assessment rating tool (PART); these 

are the measures that have been employed to try and accomplish 

these ends. 

According to GAO (Government Accountability Office), this 

framework has helped. It has helped to establish a basic infrastrucVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:55 Aug 31, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\DOCS\HEARINGS\109TH\109-10\HBU201.000 HBUD1 PsN: DICK
2

ture for creating high-performing Federal organizations, with a 

possible next-step strategy for restructuring budgeting practices 

with a much heavier focus on performance and results during the 

budget deliberations. I will note that in the report accompanying 

this year’s budget, we included language supporting the goals of 

performance budgeting. I will also note that there have been a few 

concerns raised over the years on this practice. Most notably that 

the use of performance budgeting could allow the executive branch 

to infringe on Congress’s control over the purse; also that the practice might be used as a means to kind of pick and choose successful, or somebody’s definition of ‘‘unsuccessful,’’ programs based on 

personal interest rather than actual performance. 

So today, we are here to take a good look at just what this practice is all about, not only its concept and intent, but also how performance criteria should be determined or are determined. Also 

how these criteria are used to measure the potential and actual 

success of programs and agencies and what measures in performance budgeting are already in use at the Federal level and what 

further implementation is needed or should be encouraged. Finally, 

what are some of the challenges of implementing performance 

budgeting at both the State and the Federal level? 

To help us in this discussion we will review the experience of 

State governments, what they have had with this process, particularly the State of Texas, a pioneer in performance budgeting. We 

will explore its impact on agency performance and funding in 

Texas, as well as implications of adapting such practices to the 

Federal Government. And that is a perfect segue to introducing our 

witnesses, all of whom are Texans and all of whom have experience 

in performance budgeting in the State prior to coming to Washington. 

First, we will hear from Clay Johnson, who is the Deputy Director for Management at OMB. Deputy Director Johnson, who served 

then-Governor Bush back in Austin, is now largely responsible for 

implementing the President’s management agenda and the administration’s plan for improving management and performance at the 

Federal Government level. In fact, it is his job, as the President 

wanted to put M back in OMB, it is Clay Johnson’s job to try and 

accomplish that. 

One of the primary components of the plan is the program assessment rating tool, or PART, which uses the practice of performance budgeting to improve both monitoring of a program’s performance and outcome measures. 

We also have two distinguished members from this committee 

from either side of the aisle: Mr. Cuellar from Texas, who has requested that we hold this hearing in the first place. We appreciate 

his leadership, he brought this to the attention of this committee 

during the markup process of the budget. He is a former State legislator who has extensively analyzed the various States’ approaches 

to performance budgeting and really has given us the ability to 

hold this discussion today, and I appreciate that leadership. Also, 

Mr. Conaway from Texas, who, prior to serving in Congress, was 

a CPA, it is nice to have a CPA on the Budget Committee. He was 

chairman of the State board of public accountancy, a State agency 

that regulates the practice of accountancy in Texas, who brings a 

3

strong business perspective to this discussion. We appreciate your 

leadership on this issue as well. 

We welcome all of you, and we appreciate your willingness to testify before your own committee. We are pleased to receive your entire testimony, and we understand that you may have some questions for each other, which will be kind of an interesting roundtable 

today because you are members of the committee. It is unusual 

that witnesses get to ask questions of one another, but I know that 

we will learn more if we have a little bit more freewheeling process 

here today, so we will see if we can accommodate that. 

With that, I will turn to Mr. Spratt for any opening comments 

he would like to make. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank you 

for calling this hearing on performance-based budgeting. It is an 

important tool for public management. It is still a very conceptual 

tool. 

I want to welcome all three of our witnesses but particularly give 

credit to Congressman Cuellar for initiating this hearing and for 

his effective advocacy here in Congress and back in Texas. Dr. 

Cuellar is an expert on performance-based budgeting, having written his Ph.D. dissertation on the topic at the University of Texas 

and having been a tireless advocate of it, and this hearing is one 

example of that. 

Having a Federal Government that does more and costs less is 

a bipartisan objective. The Clinton administration began its business by instituting the National Performance Review, which made 

380 recommendations for reinventing government after reviewing 

the operations of each executive department and the work of 11 reinvention teams and 22 agency redesign teams. The National Performance Review issued its recommendations in September 1993, 

and the President signed implementing legislation in 1994. 

President Clinton also signed into law the Government Performance and Results Act shortly after taking office. The GPRA required for the first time that every executive department and all 

Government agencies create strategic plans to support their missions and also to identify measures for determining the success or 

progress of the performance of those strategic plans and report annually on these measures. 

In its report examining the first decade of the GPRA, the General Accountability Office said, ‘‘GPRA’s requirements have established a solid foundation for results-oriented performance planning, 

measurement, and reporting in the Federal Government.’’ That is 

the foundation that we would to build upon today, and that is the 

purpose of today’s hearing. 

I want to thank, as I said, Clay Johnson for coming, and we look 

forward to working with you to put the M back in OMB—I think 

that is critically important—and Mr. Conaway as well; it is good 

to have your expertise at the Committee table today, and we look 

forward to your testimony and the questions afterwards. Thank 

you again for participating. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Thank you, Mr. Spratt. 

I ask unanimous consent that all members be allowed to put 

opening statements in this part of the record. Without objection, so 

ordered. 

4

To our witnesses, your prepared statements will be made part of 

the record, and you may summarize as you see fit. 

Let me first turn to the Honorable Clay S. Johnson, who is the 

Deputy Director for Management at OMB, and we welcome you to 

the Committee, and we are pleased to receive your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CLAY S. JOHNSON III, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and Ranking Member 

Spratt thank you very much for having me up here. As you stated, 

we all are very interested in spending the taxpayers’ money more 

wisely every year. We have to be more effective every year at 

spending the taxpayers’ money, particularly in this tight budget environment that we find ourselves in. 

Let me comment about a couple of things that I think are important to remember and to make sure we have as we try to get more 

for the taxpayers’ money and then to raise a couple of caveats, 

things that are important to remember. 

To get more for the taxpayers’ money, we have to have several 

things. We have to have a lot more information, a lot better information than we have now. We have to have good information about 

how programs are working; we have to have good, defined outcome 

measures; we have to have good efficiency measures; and we are 

in the process of providing that. We will get better and better at 

it every year. We have to have lots and lots and lots of transparency. We have to have all of this information be very public not 

only with the Congress but also with the American people. There 

has to be much more discussion and it has to be much more what 

we pay attention to, i.e., how programs are working and at what 

cost. 

We also have to have lots and lots and lots of accountability. The 

PART, the Program Assessment Rating Tool, has an accountability 

element. Programs are held accountable for the implementation of 

their recommended next steps for program improvement each year, 

whether the program is fantastic, medium, or not very good at all. 

The recent proposal for a Sunset Commission and a Results Commission to provide formal accountability for programs to come forward and explain, in the case of the Sunset Commission, every 10 

years why they should continue to exist. There are various forms 

that accountability can take. Those are just two: the Results and 

Sunset Commissions. 

We are in the process of developing a Web site for the American 

people, to hear how all programs are working or not, in English, 

for the lay people, not in OMB form of English, but in EnglishEnglish: Here is how programs are working, candid assessments of 

how they are working, and what we are doing to make them work 

better. There are many forms that accountability can take, and we 

can never have enough accountability. 

Two caveats I raise in the area of performance budgeting. It 

should not be true that performance is the only thing that drives 

budgeting. There are other considerations: priorities of the administration and the priorities of Congress. Maybe you have a program 

that works great, but it is dealing with the entire issue that needs 

5

to be dealt with, and more money is not called for. Alternatively, 

there could be a program that is working well, but it has served 

its purpose, and there is no more reason to fund that program. Occasionally, politics enters into it and we all understand that. There 

should be no slavish, automatic tie between performance and funding. 

The second caveat here is the approach to performance budgeting, the first approach, the first mind-set, and the first objective 

should be that we want programs to work. The reason to pay attention to programs is not to look for programs to get rid of. The first 

goal should be to ask does this program work or not? If it does not 

work, is there a reason why we should make it work? In other 

words, is it a proper Federal role? Is it an important priority for 

the country? And in most cases, the answers will be yes and yes, 

and the primary objective of determining, first and foremost, that 

it does not work is to figure out how to make it work better. 

At some point, we will decide we cannot make it work better, or 

there is somebody else that can do it better, that the role is better 

served by somebody else, and the decision will be made to reduce 

funding or eliminate the program. But the primary, going-in mindset, our recommendation for using performance information is that 

it should be used primarily to make programs work better. Thank 

you for having me up here today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CLAY S. JOHNSON III, DEPUTY DIRECTORY FOR

MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

I contend that agencies are better managed and achieving greater results today 

with the help of the President’s Management Agenda, but the opportunities for improvement are great. We want programs to work. We want to spend taxpayers’ 

money better every year. We want to make sure that the taxpayer’s get what they 

expect. 

One of our primary instruments for achieving this goal is the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). We use the PART to assess the performance of all Federal programs, to guide the action to improve their performance, and to make sure 

our funding proposals get the taxpayers the most for their money. With the PART, 

we are assessing programs to find out what works and what doesn’t. We ask of 

every program: 

• Does it have a clear definition of success, and is it designed to achieve it? 

• Are its goals sufficiently outcome-oriented and aggressive? 

• Is it well managed? 

• Does it achieve its goals? 

In order for a program to be effective, it must have a clear definition of success 

and measures to determine whether it is achieving it. Each program assessed with 

the PART is required to develop clear, outcome-oriented goals and targets for improving both performance and efficiency. PART analysis also helps identify a program’s strengths and weaknesses. In response to its PART assessment, a program 

identifies the specific steps it will take to improve its performance or overcome 

things that inhibit its performance. Under this model, all programs, both high and 

low performers, commit to improving each year. 

We have already begun to see success. As agencies have become better at demonstrating and focusing on results, PART ratings have improved. The percentage of 

programs rated Effective, Moderately Effective or Adequate rose from 57 percent in 

2003 to 67 percent in 2005. The percentage of programs rated Ineffective or Results 

Not Demonstrated fell from 43 percent in 2003 to 33 percent in 2005. 

The Administration is committed to holding ourselves—agencies and programs—

accountable to the American people for achieving results. One way we do this is 

through the transparency of the PART process. Currently, anyone can see the all 

completed PART questions and answers online at OMB’s website. We will also design a new website to more clearly communicate to the American people what proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:55 Aug 31, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\HEARINGS\109TH\109-10\HBU201.000 HBUD1 PsN: DICK
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grams are working, which ones are not, and what we are doing to make those programs better. 

We also need to enlist Congress more directly in holding agencies and programs 

accountable for their performance through a Sunset Commission, which provides 

regular scrutiny of Federal programs. This bipartisan commission would review 

each Federal program on a schedule established by the Congress to determine 

whether it is producing results and should continue to exist. Programs would automatically terminate according to the schedule unless the Congress took action to 

continue them. 

The Administration’s efforts to get more results for the American people are not 

only aimed at programs, they are behind the Administration’s effort to modernize 

the Federal Government’s personnel system. The Administration will soon propose 

legislation to, among other things, ensure employees are recognized and rewarded 

for their performance relative to mission-relevant goals, rather than longevity. It 

will require managers to ensure everyone clearly understands what is expected of 

them, how they are performing relative to those expectations, and how they can 

grow professionally and become even more effective each year. Continuous program 

performance improvement is possible with such personnel reforms. 

Many programs don’t achieve their intended results because they are hampered 

by uncoordinated programs designed to achieve the same or similar goal. That is 

why the Administration proposes the enactment of Results Commissions, which 

would review Administration plans to consolidate or streamline programs that cross 

departmental or congressional committee jurisdictional lines to improve performance 

and increase efficiency. Ordinarily, programs that cross such boundaries often are 

not subject to the usual performance review process, resulting in inefficiencies, lost 

opportunities, or redundancies. Results Commissions, made up of experts in relevant fields, would be established as needed to review consolidation proposals. The 

Congress would consider the Commission’s recommendations through expedited review authority. 

The Administration has set a goal to reduce the deficit in half over the next 5 

years and is working to stop growth in non-defense, non-homeland discretionary 

spending. In this context, it is even more imperative that we invest our resources 

in those programs that are performing well and those which hold the promise of performing well with reform. When we find that tax dollars can be invested with better 

result in another program, it is our responsibility to propose it. PART ratings of ‘‘Ineffective’’ or 

‘‘Results Not Demonstrated’’ were a major factor in the decision to propose a number of reforms as well as the termination or reduction of 29 programs. For instance: 

HOPE VI—The program was originally designed to address 100,000 of the severely distressed public housing units in the Nation’s urban neighborhoods. Through 

2004, 117,000 units have been demolished and HUD has approved the future 

demolitions of almost 50,000 more. The PART assessment found the program to be 

more costly than others and to take too long to produce results. So the budget redirects the funds other HUD programs. 

Juvenile Accountability Block Grants—Other than anecdotal information, there is 

little evidence the program reduces juvenile crime. The Administration proposes to 

redirect the program’s funds to other higher priority law enforcement programs. 

Migrant and Seasonal Farm Worker Training Program—The PART assessment 

found that about 60 percent of participants receive no training and instead receive 

only low-cost supportive services that other Federal programs also finance. The Administration proposes to terminate the program, as it duplicates existing programs, 

does not focus sufficiently on job training, and has poor performance accountability 

for grantees. 

Just because we propose to terminate a program like the Safe and Drug Free 

Schools State Grants program doesn’t mean we don’t want safe and drug free 

schools. In fact, it is because we care so much about having safe and drug free 

schools, and independent evaluations show that the program doesn’t help us achieve 

that, we propose to invest the program’s dollars instead in a program that will hold 

grantees accountable for spending the money in areas with the greatest need on activities that have proven successful. We want programs to work. The PART helps 

us find out whether a program is working or not and, if not, what to do about it. 

In some cases, it may be that a program is such a low priority or performs so poorly 

that that program’s funds should be allocated elsewhere. It is our responsibility to 

convince Congress we are right. If we are successful, the result will be more programs achieving the intended results on behalf of the American people.

Chairman NUSSLE. Thank you for your testimony. We look forward to having a chance to visit about this further. 

7

Mr. Cuellar. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY CUELLAR, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Spratt, 

and members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity 

where we are, all of us working toward the goal of making government more efficient, more effective, and more accountable. 

Before I get started, I certainly want to thank Clay Johnson for 

the work that he has done for the OMB. Improving the performance of our agency is a bipartisan issue that is a hallmark of good 

government, and I would like to thank him for furthering the work 

that got started back in 1993. 

I would also like to thank my friend and my fellow colleague, 

Mike Conaway, for all of his hard work that he has done on this 

particular project and the work that he did back in Texas. 

What I would like to do, Mr. Chairman, is to go over a couple 

of items. The first thing is, one of the basic premises that we have, 

what gets measured gets done. I would like to address today some 

of the items that I believe are important to shed some further light 

on our responsibility as Congress Members to provide a continuous 

level of government improvement for our fellow citizens. The answer is not complicated. It is not expensive. In fact, I believe very 

strongly that it does streamline government, encourages efficiency, 

and does reward effectiveness. The concept, of course, Mr. Chairman, like you have in your State, is performance-based budgeting 

or performance budgeting. 

Performance budgeting is a results-oriented budget tool that sets 

goals and performance targets for agencies and measures the results. Performance budgeting not only increases the capacity for 

legislative oversight, and I emphasize legislative oversight, but it 

also helps to increase the quality of services that our citizens receive. It is important that our legislative body should remain representative and responsive to the needs of the citizen. 

David Osborne and Ted Gaebler talked about the need for measurement in their book called ‘‘Reinventing Government.’’ Their 

basic premis is, if I can outline the basic premise, is what gets 

measured gets done. If you do not measure results, you cannot tell 

success from failure. If you cannot see success, you cannot reward. 

If you cannot reward success, you are probably rewarding failure. 

If you do not recognize failure, you cannot correct it, and if you can 

demonstrate results, then you can win public support for the work 

that you are doing. 

Their perspective is important because measuring the performance of a government agency is a fundamental part of our responsibility as a responsible Congress. Congress, in my opinion, has four 

exercises, four fundamental functions, if I can just outline the four 

functions of Government. 

One is law making and public policy making. Congress makes 

laws and sets public policy for the United States, No. 1. 

No. 2, we raise revenues; that is, the authority to levy taxes, 

fees, and the sale of bonds. 

No. 3, budgeting. Congress determines the activities and the purposes for which Government may spend money. 

8

The fourth one is something that is very important, and sometimes I believe we neglect it a little bit, and that is we certainly 

know the Constitution prohibits Congress from executing and enforcing the law, but Congress can independently gather information 

from the executive and judicial branches and provide this general 

oversight. 

Now, what do we mean by ‘‘congressional oversight?’’ There are 

four major purposes why we provide oversight. One is to protect 

public health and welfare. Two is to protect citizens’ freedom and 

assure access to government. Three is to preserve public property. 

The fourth is one that I emphasize, is that we assure ourselves 

that public funds are properly spent and controlled. 

Performance management in State government is not a new idea. 

In the States of Iowa, Idaho, and most of the 50 States, most State 

governments have undertaken the challenge of implementing performance-based budgeting, to different degrees, I would say. Many 

of these are innovative programs that have led to improved efficiency, transparency, which is what Clay mentioned; and, of course, 

effectiveness. This push by the State legislatures across the United 

States, in my opinion, has made those legislatures more accountable in their oversight activities. 

States that have been experiencing budget oversight have used 

performance-budgeting principles to increase their quality of services that are given to citizens. Especially when you have those deficits, it is important to make sure that we are stretching out the 

dollars and providing the best quality service to our taxpayers. 

Of course, there are different States, and I do not want to point 

out any particular one, but you can look at the State of Delaware, 

and they are doing a good job of improving the benchmarking process. You can look at the State of Utah. They have excelled in information gathering, which is, again, what Mr. Johnson said, it is 

very important, that we have the right information. You can look 

at States like Virginia for their dedication toward making the important information accessible to the public. The Virginia Results 

Web site is an excellent example of government transparency in action, and I believe the OMB is also looking at creation of a similar 

Web site, which I personally would encourage them to do, to provide that valuable tool. And, of course, I would ask you to look at 

the State of Texas. 

In the State of Texas, what I am doing, Mr. Chairman, Mr. 

Spratt, members, I am just providing some information. We have, 

for example, strategic planning for agencies. We have the amendments that we added that make up the performance-based budgeting, which includes a provision on performance rewards and penalties; performance benchmarking; customer satisfaction assessment; activity-based costing, that is, what is the cost of a unit that 

you provide; a review of agency rules also to make sure that we get 

rid of any unnecessary rules and regulations. Again, to make government more effective; paperwork reduction also; and, of course, 

investment budgeting, which is, again, what Mr. Johnson talked 

about, is that you can have an agency that is efficient, but is it 

worthwhile having a particular agency? Also, there are copies of 

some documents on some of the priority goals, benchmarks, and 

performance measures on higher education, public safety, economic 

9

development—a series of items to give you a general idea of what 

we have been looking at. 

And then, finally, there is also a bill pattern from the 1970s, 

1980s, and 1990s in the State of Texas that I want to review in 

a few minutes, at least one of them, so you can get an idea as to 

how the legislature can use that information and how it leads to 

better oversight. If I can just talk about the bill pattern, if I can 

have the next item on here. 

The bill pattern is important. I think most States have gone into 

different types of what I call ‘‘bill patterns.’’ The first is in the 

1970s, and I am looking at the department of insurance as an example. Most States, in the seventies and before that, had what we 

call ‘‘line items.’’ All they had was a line item and amount of dollars, and if you look at this type of information, you had money for 

travel, you had money for personnel, you had money for staff, for 

fire prevention coordinators; it was just a line item of information. 

Imagine yourself looking at this type of budget and what sort of 

questions would come up when an agency was coming in and asking for more money. 

If you look at the next slide also as an example, you will see the 

bill pattern evolution. Most States went through the same thing 

where they went from a line item to what they call a ‘‘program 

budget’’; that is, you had different types of programs there, and it 

provided a little bit more information, a little bit more dialogue between the agency and the legislators. 

If you look at the next one, in the 1990s in the State of Texas 

and across the United States, you have what we call the ‘‘performance-based budgeting,’’ and if you look at this type of budgeting, 

and this is what I want to emphasize, you can have information 

that is provided to the legislators, sent over to your office, but the 

question is, is it accessible? Is it in a format that you can use? I 

think that little point is very important because, otherwise, you 

will get the information, but it is not set in an easy way to understand that will lead to this. 

If you look at this bill pattern just as an example, first of all, you 

have a goal for the agency. After that, you have also the objectives 

of the agencies. Then you start going into performance measures 

also, and there, depending on what you want to add there, you will 

ask what are we doing to encourage fair competition in the insurance agency? What are the outcomes that you are looking at there? 

How fast are we doing the work? How are we providing that service? Who are we providing the service to? I would highly encourage 

the Members to start thinking about this evolution that I think we 

have seen across the United States. 

If I can go to the next part of it, you will see there that the outputs, how much money, what are we looking at, and it provides a 

different type of information that will lead to more questions. So 

when an agency is coming in and asking for more money, instead 

of just saying, ‘‘Well, here is the line item. We gave them a million 

dollars last year. This time they are asking for $1.5 million,’’ you 

can look at this information there and ask them, ‘‘Well, what results did you get out of the $1 million? How are you going to do 

it better? Can we stretch the dollar a little better?’’ Especially if we 

are in a deficit, this will help explain the work that we are doing 

10

and get more out of the agency if it is in a format where it is easy 

to be presented to the legislators. 

Now, one of the things that also I am providing here, and it is 

part of the handout also, is just a basic guide of performance information questions that any legislator can ask almost any agency, 

and as you can see, the question is, I asked the members and the 

chairman, how many times have we asked these types of questions 

to the agencies on a regular basis? How many times are the agencies ready to come in with their questions to be asked, not only the 

appropriations but in any of the other substantive committees that 

we serve? I believe if we look at these types of questions, and the 

agencies are ready to answer these types of questions, and it does 

not matter what committee you are in, I think this will lead to a 

results-oriented type of government. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Spratt, and members of the 

committee, performance-based budgeting is a results-driven method 

which encourages not only better oversight by the legislature but 

also managerial improvement because if the agencies are able to 

use these results. They can go from the headquarters in Washington all the way down to the field offices to make sure that they 

are performing the work that they are doing and, therefore, will get 

better program results. We have a responsibility to our citizens, 

and the dialogue must start with us. 

The final point: What we want to have is a performance-budgeting tool that is nonpartisan. It should not change when one administration changes over to another, and performance measures 

should not be under the influence of any partisan trends. In other 

words, it does not matter what administration is in office, it does 

not what majority or minority is running the different committees; 

we should have nonpartisan tools so we can provide the better results. We need to supply the congressional committees with information that is accurate and useful in the assessment of agencies. 

We should also use some of the States as laboratories. Your own 

State, Mr. Chairman, is a very, very good State that has done a 

lot of good work, and I think that using them as laboratories will 

help us do our job better and take the best of the work that has 

been done in different States. 

We need to encourage some sort of establishment of a performance structure for this form of congressional budget oversight. It is 

one of our constitutional duties and responsibilities to provide oversight. Ensuring budget oversight is a very important responsibility. 

And I think if we stand together and work together, I think, by 

working together, we will provide the results-oriented government 

that our taxpayers and our consumers want from us. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cuellar follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY CUELLAR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

NEED FOR A RESULTS-ORIENTED PHILOSOPHY IN THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING

PROCESS STRENGTHENING CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OVERSIGHT

Our constitutional obligations and legislative accountability have made the purpose of effective legislative oversight imperative. 

11

Chairman Nussle, the Honorable John Spratt and Members of the Committee, we 

are here today in pursuit of making government more efficient, effective, and accountable. 

Before I start I would like to thank Clay Johnson and the hardworking people 

at the OMB. Improving the performance of our agencies is a bipartisan issue that 

is a hallmark of good government, and I would like to thank them for furthering 

the work started back in 1993. I would also like to thank my friend and fellow representative Mike Conaway for his dedicated work on this project. 

WHAT GETS MEASURED, GETS DONE

I address you today in order to shed further light on our responsibility to provide 

a continuous level of government improvement for our fellow citizens. The answer 

is not complicated or expensive; in fact it streamlines government, encourages efficiency, and rewards effectiveness. The concept that I refer to is Performance Based 

Budgeting. PBB is a results oriented budget tool that sets goals and performance 

targets for agencies, and measures their results. PBB not only increases the capacity for legislative oversight, but it also helps to increase the quality of services that 

our citizens receive. It is important for our legislative body to remain representative 

and responsive to the needs of our citizens. 

David Osborne and Ted Gaebler summarized the need for measurement their 

book, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the 

Public Sector (1992): 

• What gets measured, gets done 

• If you don’t measure results, you can’t tell success from failure 

• If you can’t see success, you can’t reward it 

• If you can’t reward success, you’re probably rewarding failure 

• If you can’t recognize failure, you can’t correct it 

• If you can demonstrate results, you can win public support (Osborne and 

Gaebler 1992, 146-155) 

This perspective is important, because measuring the performance of government 

agencies is a fundamental part of our responsibility as a responsible Congress. 

A Congress Exercises Four Fundamental Functions: 

• Lawmaking and public policy making. Congress makes laws and sets public policy for the United States. This function includes fact-finding and analysis related 

to both governmental and non-governmental activities. 

• Raising revenues. Congress has authority to levy taxes, fees, and authorize the 

sale of bonds. 

• Budgeting. Congress determines the activities and purposes for which government may spend money. 

• General oversight of government. The Constitution prohibits Congress from executing or enforcing the law. But the Congress independently gathers information 

about the executive and judicial branches to aid it in its policy-making functions. 

And Congress Exercises its Oversight Powers to: 

• Protect the public health and welfare, 

• Protect citizens’ freedoms and assure access to the government, 

• Preserve public property, and 

• Assure itself that public funds are properly spent and controlled. 

PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN STATE GOVERNMENTS

Performance Budgeting is not a new idea. Most state governments have undertaken the challenge of implementing Performance Based Budgeting in their own 

agency institutions. Many of these innovative programs have led to improved efficiency, transparency and effectiveness. This push has also allowed state legislatures 

to become more accountable in their oversight activities. States experiencing budget 

shortfalls have used PBB principals to increase the quality of services given to the 

public. A lot of wisdom has been gained through the trials in our states, and almost 

all of them are ahead of the Federal Government in PBB implementation. We need 

to implement policy examples from the best states, and we need to avoid our past 

mistakes. The information is at our fingertips, we owe our citizens their due diligence. 

I urge all of you to look at what Delaware is doing to improve the benchmarking 

process, or to take a serious look at how Utah has excelled in information gathering. 

We can also look for guidance in states like Virginia for their dedication toward 

making this important information accessible to the public. The Virginia Results 

website is an excellent example of government transparency in action. It is my understanding that the OMB has proposed the creation of a similar website, and I 

would like to personally stress the need for this valuable tool. 

12

Please refer to the companion materials for examples of the work done in Texas. 

BILL PATTERN EVOLUTION

One of the most important changes occurring through the performance budgeting 

process is the inclusion of performance information in the budget itself. Having performance information included in a manner that is appropriately organized and easily understandable is an important first step. When we have this type of information 

we have a useful tool for formulating benchmarks. This information can also be valuable in determining the true budgetary costs of each individual type of service that 

we provide to our citizens. 

Agencies can use this information to justify funding levels for any specific amount 

of output. Appropriators will also have a better idea of the connection between funding and the impact of their programs. 

CONCLUSION

Performance-based budgeting is a results-driven method which encourages managerial improvement and better program results. We have a responsibility to our citizens, and the dialogue must start with us. 

• What we want to have is a performance budgeting tool that is Non-Partisan. 

It should not change when one Administration changes over to another and performance measures should not be under the influence of partisan trends. 

• We need to supply Congressional Committees with information that is Accurate 

and Useful in the assessment of agencies and programs. 

• We should use the States as Laboratories. A lot of wisdom has been gained 

through the trials in our States, and almost all of them are ahead of the Federal 

Government in PBB implementation. We need to implement policy examples from 

the best States, and we need to avoid our past mistakes. The information is at our 

fingertips, we owe our citizens their due diligence. 

• We need to encourage the establishment of a formal structure for this form of 

Congressional Budget Oversight in the Legislative Branch. It is our responsibility 

to meet this challenge. 

• We need to Stand Together and do what is best for our citizens. It is for this 

reason that we need to bring all of Congress together in the support of these necessary solutions. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I will look forward to answering your 

questions.

Chairman NUSSLE. Thank you. Can I just ask real quick while 

it is fresh in our minds, a question regarding your charts? For instance, there was a benchmark that in 180 days all cases would be 

settled. Who created that? Is that the governor, the legislature, or 

the department itself? 

Mr. CUELLAR. What we did is we had the Governor’s office, the 

executive branch, work with a body we call the Legislative Budget 

Board, and I have been thinking about who would be the agency 

to do that here at the Federal Government. They were our financial 

experts. They would work with the executive branch and basically 

negotiate what performance measures they would have. Then that 

information would be put in the bill pattern to us. Then the legislature would have to write and say, You know what? We think this 

is a little low, I think we ought to improve the measures up, or we 

think we ought to add this particular measure. So the legislature 

would come in and have the final product. 

Chairman NUSSLE. So it is statutory? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, sir. 

Chairman NUSSLE. The end result: It is statutory? 

Mr. CUELLAR. The overall scheme is we started this by working 

on the appropriations bill, but it was part of the statutory and part 

of the appropriation process also. 

Chairman NUSSLE. All right. 

13

Mr. CUELLAR. But it was basically a two-step thing where, finally, once you start talking to the Congress or to the legislature, 

and you had the legislature saying, ‘‘You know what? We ought to 

change this. Why do you have these particular results?’’ the budget 

oversight and the dialogue between the legislators and the agencies 

greatly improved. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway, welcome to your own Committee, and we are 

pleased to receive your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Spratt. I am happy to report that the witness chairs are no more 

comfortable than the Member chairs. For some reason, these things 

all slant forward. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Actually, they are very comfortable up here. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I suspect they are. At the eagle’s nest, I suspect 

they are. This is an unusual view for me. I rarely see the folks behind me, so I am glad to be here. 

I have worn both hats in the Texas scenario, in the sense that 

I am a CPA. I have got 30-plus years’ experience with dealing with 

budgets and strategic plans and, for the most part, watching them 

provide support for cobwebs and other things as they accumulate 

in the corner. I chaired the State Board of Accountancy, which is 

a regulatory agency that oversees the practice of accountancy in 

Texas. There are 55,000 to 57,000 CPAs, 10,000 firms that this 

agency is responsible for overseeing, and it worked with the Texas 

legislature through three sessions in that process. 

The manufacturer fulfillment of this piece is the toughest part, 

and by that, I mean, do we really use this as a tool to effect better 

government? I think the evidence is pretty scant that we do, in 

fact, do that. Businesses maybe do a little bit better job of it, but 

even they have a hard time making this thing work. 

As an example, something that the Committee prepared talked 

about, as a result of the PART analysis, the President’s budget for 

2006 proposed to consolidate the CDBG grants and the economic 

development assistance grants. So the PART tool used to affect 

change in the budget—we did not get that done in the budgetary 

process. The political backlash, the whole ownership of those particular programs overran that analysis piece of what was going on. 

This whole process in Texas; I saw it work, like I say, pretty 

spotty, the fact that the very worst agencies were sometimes affected by the overall review process, the analysis. The best agencies 

were rarely rewarded, and the mediocre agencies, the folks in the 

middle—that is a bad phrase—all of the agencies in the middle just 

kind of kept pumping this stuff in, and I am not sure that the decision making—in Texas, it is much less partisan. The legislative 

budget board that my colleague mentioned, the Sunset Commission, or both, Members from both sides of the House, but when you 

are in front of them testifying, as I did several occasions, and I took 

the agency through the sunset process, which happens every 13 

years as well, it is really not partisan at all. That does not weigh 

into it. 

14

Unfortunately, at our level, in this town, that is a reality we cannot ignore because we just simply will not make good decisions separate and apart from the partisan nature of how we conduct business up here. 

So the one point I would make before I shut up and answer questions is buy-in. In other words, it is easy to gloom onto these programs and to say, yes, we are doing this, but are we going to buy 

into it? Are we really going to run our business in this manner 

using these tools? And when we get the results from these tools 

that show us a direction, are we going to go that direction, or are 

we just going to simply ignore it? There will be occasions for ignoring it. Like Mr. Johnson said, sometimes you do not run everything 

on a dollars-and-cents basis, but that ought to be an informed ignore. It ought to have a rationale for saying, OK, our tools tell us 

this, but here are the reasons why we are not doing it, and those 

reasons for not doing it ought to be something other than just partisan politics and those kinds of things. 

So I think we ought to be about this process, we ought to be 

doing it, but unless we are actually going to use it. Back home in 

my barn, I have got a tool chest full of tools gathering dust. They 

are nice and pretty, and they look real fine, but if I do not use 

those tools in trying to get something done, then I am not doing 

it as efficiently as I might since I do have those tools to do it. 

So it is buy-in, and it is tough in this town to make that happen, 

given the tension between the executive branch and the legislative 

branch and then the further tension between the two parties that 

periodically swap places as to who gets to sit in the middle chair. 

So it is going to be a tough job to do, but we ought to be about it, 

but it will be hard. So with that, sir, I will yield back and be ready 

to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of K. Michael Conaway follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

INTRODUCTION

First, I would like to thank Chairman Nussle and my colleagues for arranging 

this hearing and inviting me to testify before the committee. 

As my colleague Mr. Cuellar and the Honorable Clay Johnson will testify, Congress, the Office of Management and Budget and other agencies have worked to establish various forms of Performance Based Budgeting and oversight to improve performance and accountability within the Federal Government. Specifically, the implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) reflect efforts to advance this approach to the 

Federal budgeting process. These programs represent a solid first step in the evolving implementation of performance budgeting. 

Many States, specifically in my experience, Texas, have successfully implemented 

methods of Performance Based Budgeting and oversight, such as the Legislative 

Budget Board (LBB). 

My goal in testifying before the committee today is to bring to the table a general 

discussion, from my perspective, on how facets of state budgeting and ‘‘businesslike’’ budgeting processes may be implemented in our own Congressional budget 

process. 

I have examined the budget process from a number of perspectives: as a private 

business owner, as an accountant and member of the Texas State Board of Public 

Accountancy, and as a Member of Congress. 

15

BACKGROUND

By way of background, Texas works on a biennial budget and the Texas Constitution contains provisions that limit total state appropriations. Appropriations that exceed revenue may not be made except by a four-fifths vote of each house. Basically, 

if an appropriation exceeds the budget, it will not be implemented without the legislature’s intervention. By taking this approach, the Texas Legislature has ensured 

that any piece of introduced legislation that will exceed budget limitations must be 

effective and important enough to garner votes. 

The Legislative Budget Board (LBB) was created in 1949 and requires all state 

agencies to submit their budget requests to the LBB for review and recommendations. The board is comprised of two joint Chairmen, the Lieutenant Governor and 

the Speaker of the House of Representatives; the Chairmen of the House Committee 

on Appropriations, House Committee on Ways and Means, and the Senate Finance 

Committee. Appointed members also include two House members and three Senate 

members appointed by the Speaker and the Lieutenant Governor respectively. 

Over the years, legislation has been enacted to expand the LBB’s duties to include 

evaluation of agency programs, to estimate the costs of implementing legislation and 

to establish a system of state agency performance audits and evaluations. Results 

of these evaluations are then reported to the Texas Legislature. This report is also 

made available to the public through the Texas Budget Source. 

TEXAS STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTANCY

My interaction with the State budgeting process began as a member of the Texas 

State Board of Public Accountancy (TSBPA), a state agency that regulates the practice of accountancy in Texas. In 1995, then-Governor George W. Bush appointed me 

to TSBPA. I served on TSPBA for 7 years, including more than 5 years as Chairman. During my tenure, the Texas Legislature signed into law a bill to address the 

need for government to operate more efficiently. Under the Act, referred to as the 

‘‘Self-Directed Semi-Independent Agency Project Act’’, the TSBPA became a self-directed semi-independent agency (SDSI). TSBPA and two other similar agencies are 

the focus of this pilot program to test the concept of deregulating regulatory agencies in order to enhance their efficiency. The project is expected to expire September 

1, 2009. Under this transition, the TSBPA budget was effectively taken out of appropriations process. TSBPA believes this shift allows them to take a ‘‘business-like’’ 

approach to budgeting. The SDSI structure is only appropriate for self funding agencies that receive no general revenue. 

Some points of this project are: 

• To make regulatory agencies accountable to their stakeholders. The agencies 

are also charged with operating as a business. • The regulatory agency establishes fees charged to cover all of its operations. • Sovereign immunity remains intact for enforcement and disciplinary functions. • Regulatory agencies in the project are removed from state appropriations. 

• Applicable agencies continue to collect and remit the $200 annual professional 

fee for the General Revenue Fund. 

• Agencies continue to be audited by the Office of the State Auditor and pay the 

associated costs 

• Oversight agencies, such as the LBB and the Governor’s Office of budget and 

planning are relieved of oversight responsibilities and associated costs. • Licensees become directly involved in evaluating the cost of operating the agency. 

• Reduce the state budget. 

• Reduce the number of state employees on the state payroll. (Source: Texas State 

Board of Public Accountancy Strategic Plan, FY 2005-2009) 

The Texas State Board of Public Accountancy continues to implement its budgeting oversight measures. Most recently, under the ‘‘Self-Directed, Semi-Independent Agency Project Act’’, the Board has begun to implement a review program 

whereby sponsor’s courses are systematically examined for their quality. The first 

computerized examination was offered in April of 2004 and will occur at regular intervals in the future. In its Public Accountancy Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2005-

2009, TSBPA states that, ‘‘It is the opinion of the Board that with the implementation of Self-Directed, Semi-Independent Status, the Board now has the flexibility to 

respond to the changing needs of a global profession. This will allow the Board to 

function in a more business-like manner to meet the challenges of the twenty-first 

century.’’ (Source: Texas State Board of Public Accountancy Strategic Plan, FY 2005-

2009) 

The appropriations process, including the periodic reviews of each state agency, 

treats all agencies the same. That process is essential for all state agencies that acVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:55 Aug 31, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\DOCS\HEARINGS\109TH\109-10\HBU201.000 HBUD1 PsN: DICK
16

cept any general revenues or tax funding. The appropriations process is cumbersome 

and inflexible for certain regulatory agencies. The SDSI pilot is intended to demonstrate a system of operations which allows the pilot programs to function in a 

more business-like way. By completing the missions as assigned to those agencies 

by the state legislature, the legislative and executive oversight functions are set at 

appropriate levels to determine that agencies are run efficiently and that assigned 

missions are accomplished. Burdensome and redundant oversight procedures are 

eliminated by placing more trust in the governing board that is appointed by the 

Governor. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETING PROCESS

A state form of oversight is not feasible to implement on a whole at the Federal 

level; however, there are facets that we in Congress would benefit from examining. 

These components may include: 

• An objective, timely, collection of accurate data from agencies • Accountability • Transparency to the public • A periodic review of the need of Federal agencies 

There are obviously inherent differences between the budgeting structures of 

states versus the budgeting structure of Congress. In a business, you have one 

‘‘president,’’ one goal. In the House, we have 435 different actors, 435 different 

goals, and we all have different objectives for each State we represent. However, 

there is one goal that I would like to think all of my colleagues can agree upon: 

ensuring that Federal agencies are held accountable to the taxpayers. In the current 

era of fiscal restraint, it would be beneficial for Congress to continue to pursue these 

avenues. Once again, I would like to thank my colleagues for the opportunity to testify 

today. I would be happy to answer any further questions regarding my work on the 

Texas State Board of Public Accountancy or regarding my perspectives on performance budgeting in Congress.

Chairman NUSSLE. Thank you. Let me start by taking your example and then offering it to Director Johnson, and that is the 

CDBG block grant proposal that the President made, and it is only 

by way of example because actually the one I was going to use was 

Amtrak. You could use any, and no one should use this forum as 

a way to pick on one particular program. We are trying to learn, 

so it does not matter, but let us use the one that was brought up. 

I heard, not only from my own constituents but from a number of 

Members on both sides in developing the budget, that there was 

just no way we were going to be doing what the President suggested in his budget and what the PART came up with with regard 

to CDBG as an example. 

Is that a good example of where the process breaks down? Where 

you can do all of the good work in providing the information, judging its effectiveness, determining whether a program works, determining whether there is a better way for a program to be delivered 

or a policy to be implemented, and then it breaks down at the political level? Are there other examples of this? 

This has probably got to be the biggest challenge because you 

said, as an example, first determine whether it is the Government 

role, and that is a political decision. Mike said it is partisan, and 

it is often not. Take Amtrak and CDBG and farm programs and et 

cetera, et cetera, et cetera. That is more parochial than it is political, I would suggest. So is that where this process breaks down, 

is at that level? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, there are several ways it can break down. 

Taking CDBG, one of the reasons that broke down was a lot of 

Congressmen used to be mayors, and a lot of mayors remember 

getting that CBDG money with no strings attached, and the idea 

of having strings attached to CBDG money is not popular with 

17

mayors. If you had to come up with one simple reason why that 

proposal failed, it is for that reason. 

When the CBDG program was evaluated, there were four different categories. One of them is design purpose. The score for purpose of CDBG was zero. It was not a low number; it was zero. 

There was a lot of discussion about what CDBG was supposed to 

accomplish, and we have spent $110 billion in the last 25 years 

with no defined purpose. This was pointed out by the PART. 

So the proposal would let us be more specific about what we are 

trying to do with this CDBG money. Specifically, what the program 

is theoretically supposed to do. Is it is supposed to help create economic vitality in areas where it would otherwise not exist: low-income, low-socioeconomic areas? At the same time we were looking 

at that, there were a number of other programs that deal with 

CDBG-like goals, 30-some-odd programs, and they have different 

definitions of what success is, very different definitions of what economic vitality is, so they worked at cross-purposes; they were inconsistent with each other. 

So the idea was to let us take the opportunity not only to more 

clearly define what CDBG is about, but let us look at combining 

some things with CDBG, take it from 30 programs,—I think we 

were combining 14 programs together—get it down to 3, 4, or 5 

programs and rationalize them, be much more specific. And hold 

local municipalities accountable for what they spend their money 

on. If they can spend it on the very same things—some cities spend 

it on building inspectors, which does not sound like it is directly 

related to creating economic vitality, but if that is what the city 

wants to spend it on. But they have to show, on an annual basis 

or whenever they have to come back for more money, how they 

spent the previous money and how they went about creating economic vitality with the money they got from the Federal Government. 

Cities were not interested in that and let their Congressmen 

know that, and the Congressmen who used to be mayors knew that 

they would not like that, and so huge disinterest in tightening up 

the specs and creating a more specific purpose for how we spend 

$4 or $5 billion a year. So that is one reason. People would rather 

have unfettered money, free money, than not free money. They 

would rather be held not accountable than accountable. 

A lot of money we give and spend in the Federal Government is 

given to other people to spend to do good things, and so a lot of 

the way we make programs work in the Federal Government is to 

hold local grant recipients, if you will, more accountable for how 

they spend their money. 

Adult literacy programs; we do not know what it costs to teach 

an illiterate adult how to read. We spend $500 million a year on 

adult literacy programs and cannot tell you what it costs. We have 

done this for years. We cannot tell you what it costs to teach an 

illiterate adult how to read. We do not hold local adult literacy programs accountable for taking this amount of money and producing 

a certain number of literate adults with that money, that is nuts. 

We need to figure out how we are spending this money, and if we 

are spending $500 million to teach illiterate adults how to read, we 

18

need to figure out how many people that should teach how to read 

and make sure it happens. 

So I think one overriding thing is recipients would rather get 

money where there is no accountability than get money where they 

have to be held accountable. So when you start trying to tighten 

the specs, they are going to let their Congressmen and their Senators know, and they are going to resist that, and it requires discipline, what Mike talked about. It requires discipline; it requires 

a commitment, and it requires it being a priority to really make it 

happen. 

This is a very long answer to your question. We PART’ed 20 percent of the Federal programs each of the last 4 years. By the end 

of this year, we will have PART’ed 80 percent of the programs. And 

we get some appropriations subcommittees that have welcomed the 

use of performance information. Others have not only resisted it, 

they have tried to write into law that we are not allowed to send 

performance budgets to them. 

So there is a wide range of receptivity up here on the Hill to the 

use of performance information. One of the things I hear—I just 

cannot believe it—as one of the reasons why Members and Senators resist the use of performance information is they do not like 

the hassle of having to explain why we are funding programs that 

do not work. I refuse to believe that, but that is what some people 

contend. 

Chairman NUSSLE. It was a long answer, but it was a good answer. This is where the rubber really hits the road. It is great to 

have this conversation, but we have got to figure out how to——

Mr. JOHNSON. It is what Mike talked about. There has to be the 

will to follow through. Somebody made the comment that it would 

take a generation to really fully realize this. This is not a one- or 

2-year deal. I do not know about a generation, but we have been 

working at it for 4 years. We do not have performance information 

for all of the programs yet, but we will at the end of next year. But 

it takes an institutional commitment to make this happen. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Well, under the theory that every long journey requires the first step, if CDBG, Amtrak, or whatever one you 

want to use as an example is a poster child of where it maybe is 

not working very well, what would you suggest as a poster child 

of where it has worked well? Where you have been able to put this 

up, and Congress has responded, and effective change has been 

made, and you took it from a zero or a low number to a very high 

number? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The primary use and value of the PART to date 

has been in getting programs to work better where it does not require Congress——

Chairman NUSSLE. [Laughter.] 

Mr. JOHNSON (continuing). Where we could change the focus of 

the program, where we could change the management of the program, where we could change what the definition of what ‘‘success’’ 

is. It was not meant to be a negative comment about Congress. 

Chairman NUSSLE. You are going to put Congress through a performance review next. 

Mr. JOHNSON. No, no. That was not meant to be a negative comment. 

19

Some examples of several reasons, for instance, why a program 

might fail: The Even Start program is considered to be ineffective, 

however, it is working the way it is designed to. Things are happening the way it is designed to, but the belief is that these programs working with low socioeconomic families with children between the ages of three and seven, which has been studied three 

different times nationally, has been proven to be ineffective. It is 

a nice idea; it just does not work. 

And so because PART has been used to drive us to that firm conclusion that it just does not work, the Department of Education is 

looking to take that same money and put it to effective use somewhere else. The Department does believe that focusing on reading 

skills at an early age is an important thing to do, and they are taking those monies from Even Start and putting them into early 

reading programs, or they would make that budget recommendation. 

The Juvenile Accountability Block Grant program is also considered to be ineffective. The reason it is considered to be ineffective 

is there is no defined goal. There is a lot of language about how 

great it is to focus on juvenile problems, but there is no definition 

of ‘‘success,’’ and so the money goes out, and you do what you want 

to with it. The way to make that work is to have the Congress be 

tighter about what it is we expect to have happen, and once we 

have that in the legislation or in the enabling legislation—I do not 

know if it can be done by any other way—then you have measures 

with which to hold grant recipients responsible for how they spend 

the money. 

So, in one case, stopping the program would be the response to 

deal with ineffectiveness. The other case is let us tighten up the 

specifications, and that would be the recommendation for CDBG. 

Let us tighten up the specifications, and at the same time, we have 

all of these related programs that do not make any sense and are 

not clearly defined. Put all of those together, and make it easier for 

people to come and get money to use to accomplish their desired 

goal. 

The thing that the PART does, or the program assessment does, 

it causes not just Congress, not just the appropriators, not just the 

budgeters, not just the people in the executive branch; but it causes 

all of us to start off by saying, ‘‘We are spending money. Does this 

work?’’ And if the answer is no, or in a lot of cases, I do not know, 

then we are committed to go do something about it, to not let that 

pace, that situation, persist. 

It is inexcusable for all of us to continue to allow money to be 

spent if we know that it does not serve a purpose, or if we do not 

know what purpose is served. In both of those cases, we should be 

committed to do something about it, and the kind of information 

that Henry talks about helps us do that. 

I am glad you all could come to my testimony here. Some appropriations subcommittees are very accepting of performance information and like it and have made the transition. One way to do 

it would be to try to take one that really wants to do it, take one 

or two, or take some agencies, and have them be the models. Encourage them, support them to go way ahead to get to a really advanced state of this and to show the rest of the agencies and the 

20

rest of the subcommittees how this can be done. I bet that you 

could get some fantastic best practices out there in a year or two 

because a couple of them have already made the start. Some of 

them are still very resistant, but I will bet we could find a couple 

to get out ahead of the pack and report back, ‘‘Come on in. The 

water is fine.’’

Chairman NUSSLE. And then, for my friends from Texas, my understanding is that one of the reasons why the Texas model and 

other State models seem to be somewhat more effective in accomplishing performance budgeting and using performance and results 

measurements as a way of making decisions is because there is an 

independent administrative board. There is a third entity that is 

helping to broker the decision-making process here that has power 

that is at least equal to or greater than the legislature or the executive in helping to manage this process, which we do not have. Unless you see a likelihood, I do not see a likelihood, of us creating 

yet another super agency, unless you do. Is that really the big difference between success here, that there is another agency that is 

out there? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Chairman, if I can respond to that. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Please. 

Mr. CUELLAR. This agency does not have more power than the 

legislature or the executive branch. They are part of the legislature. They work for the legislature. What they do is they work with 

the executive branch to work out the performance measures. That 

is all they do. They do that. Then we also have the State auditors 

office that comes in and verifies——

Chairman NUSSLE. Right. 

Mr. CUELLAR (continuing). That the information that has been 

provided is accurate because you do not want to get trash in and 

trash out. You want to make sure that the information is accurate. 

But the ultimate decision-makers are going to be the legislators. 

With all due respect to Clay, he is talking about the executive 

branch making a decision on their own agencies that are ineffective. 

To me, I believe that should fall on the legislature, on the Congress, because—if I can have one of the slides up there—we can 

talk about CDBG, Amtrak, or Even Start, any of the programs, and 

ask you if the legislature was ever asked any of the questions, the 

questions on the performance, the basic questions that should be 

asked by legislators, and I would ask any of the Members here if 

anybody ever asked any of those questions. 

For example, if you are talking about CDBG or talking about 

Amtrak or Even Start, did we ever ask, what is your program’s primary purpose or purposes? If you ask anybody here, Mr. Chairman, 

and I might be wrong, but did anybody ever say, this is the purpose, and if it is not the purpose, that we start getting into the dialogue where we change the purpose. Which citizens are affected? 

What are the key results that are expected from this use of taxpayers’ funds? What do we expect our cities to do? I do not think 

we are ever asked this. 

In Texas, we had contracts. Anybody that dealt with the State 

of Texas, we put performance measures. Any grants that went out 

to any of the local entities had performance measures. So we had 

21

performance measures to anybody that got State dollars, but I ask 

you, did anybody ask any of those questions? What were the results 

in the most recent years? How do you compare those results to 

your targets? 

When somebody comes in and tells me, and I do not mean this 

in a bad way, but says, ‘‘CDBG is doing a bad job,’’ or ‘‘the Amtrak 

is doing a bad job,’’ or ‘‘the Even Start is doing a bad job,’’ I appreciate their input, but I want to know that we, as a legislative body, 

ask those questions instead of somebody saying it is bad, it is ineffective, or it has out-used its purpose. I want to know why, or do 

we have an opportunity to change those goals or those primary objectives of that agency. I do not think we have done that. I really, 

sincerely do not think, and it is hard. I agree with Clay. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Take CDBG as an example. Even though the 

administration’s score under the performance analysis is a zero, 

you cannot tell me that you cannot find anywhere in the country, 

and please do not misunderstand my point in saying this—it is not 

necessarily to be argumentative, but you cannot say that this has 

never worked anywhere at any time anywhere in the country. That 

is not the case. It is not the case, even though I can certainly, and 

I think a lot of Members, can say Amtrak needs to be reformed and 

all sorts of things, but you cannot say it is not serving at least 

somebody somewhere. 

So even though under somebody’s results standard, which is subjective,—it is not ever objective, I do not think—it is always subjective, whatever standard—it is always in the eye of the beholder, 

whatever standard you put out there, but according to somebody’s 

subjective standard, these programs are working, even Even Start. 

You cannot say that no child anywhere did not get at least some 

benefit from throwing money at Even Start or that no adult did not 

learn how to read under adult literacy programs. It may not be 

working as well as somebody’s subjective standard, but you cannot 

say it has never worked for anyone anywhere. I do not think that 

is possible. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Right. I understand, but the question is, you are 

talking about somebody’s standards; I am talking about our standards, the Congress’s standards. I think we ought to set certain 

standards so we can have a healthy debate to ask those questions. 

What are the standards that we are looking at? What are the 

measures that we are looking at? What is the true purpose of Even 

Start or CDBG? What results are we getting for those billions of 

dollars that we sent down there? 

I do not think it is right that we can say, ‘‘Well, those mayors 

or those governors, all they want is the money, and we are just 

going to send it because they do not want any strings.’’ I think we 

should still, for the billions of dollars we send out or millions of dollars that we send to a particular area, I think we should know 

what we are getting out of those billions of dollars. It is our oversight, and with all due respect to anybody else, but it should be the 

Congress’s standards that we set here, and working with the executive branch, of course. It is a negotiated process. 

Mr. JOHNSON. No slight intended. 

Mr. CONAWAY. A part, though, of gathering the information and 

having the data is to understand what it costs. If it costs $100,000 

22

a year to teach somebody to read, is there an alternative to that? 

Do we hire somebody for $20,000 for 5 years to read whatever that 

person needs read? That is a ludicrous example, but if we do not 

know what things cost on a per unit basis or a per example basis 

or a per outcome basis, we do not make as informed decisions as 

we might. 

The legislature also has to resist overriding the situation. As an 

example, we did our budget there at the State agency I helped 

with—it is an accountancy board, so you would expect the budgets 

to be pretty precise—on our travel. We do have meetings we are 

going to have next year. We knew who was coming and where they 

were coming from and whether they were spending the night or 

not. So we had this pretty detailed analysis of what our budget 

number was, and we submitted that as a part of our appropriations 

request. One of the agencies somewhere in the system sent 15 

board members to Alaska for a national meeting, and it offended 

some in the legislature. 

So after all of the work was done, all of the scrubbing by the Legislative Budget Board, all of the scrubbing by the Governor, all of 

the scrubbing by the Senate finance, all of the scrubbing by the 

House Appropriations Committee, somebody added a rider right at 

the last minute that said, no matter what you spent last year, you 

can spend only 90 percent of that number, not what you budgeted, 

not what you thought your costs were going to be, but just a 10-

percent haircut, not for the agency that did the dirty deed, every 

agency. So I rarely spanked all four of my kids at the same time. 

I would spank one of them, and the other three would become angels. I will probably get in trouble. Yes, I use corporal punishment. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Your wife is here. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Spare the rod, spoil the child, and I do not have 

spoiled children, exactly. 

So the legislature has to be careful in that you set this elaborate 

process that ought to get the results, and then, with all due respect,—he was probably there—a knee-jerk reaction to one agency 

run amok, let us go after them. So the legislature has got to be 

careful about putting in overrides to the system that are not informed overrides. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Well, I want to thank you. My only point in 

this—I like the concept—my only point in this is that we are talking about the results, the results, the results, and the results are 

based on measurement. I agree with—I think it was Edward 

Demmings that said, ‘‘If you can measure it, you can improve it,’’ 

and I agree with that concept. The issue, however, is who gets to 

hold the ruler, and what is the unit of measure? If that is up to 

me, it is going to be a perfect system, to me, but it may not be to 

Mr. Spratt or to you or to somebody else. 

So I think how you hold the ruler and what the ruler unit of 

measure is, is a huge stumbling block here, I would assume, in getting this. I will give you the last word, Mr. Johnson, and then we 

will move on. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not want to dominate the last word, but I do 

have a comment on a couple of things that were said. 

Chairman NUSSLE. My last word, at least. 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. 

23

Chairman NUSSLE. I will give you my last word. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. There has to be a stated purpose. On 

the CDBG, it was the purpose score that had a zero; it was not that 

the program overall was zero. It was well managed and so forth, 

but there has to be a stated purpose to begin with, and a lot of our 

programs do not have clearly defined, stated purposes. In those 

clearly defined, stated purposes, the intended goal can be defined, 

and you can, from there, lay out the appropriate metrics. It starts 

with the legislature. So it is not some other entity that decides 

what the goals are; we will decide. We, together, will decide. 

The other point is we, in some businesses, do things that are 

very hard to measure. How do you measure the success of the Drug 

Enforcement Agency? It is not the number of interdictions. Is it the 

quality of drugs? Is it the price? It is very hard to measure. But 

shame on us if we are not always trying to find better and better 

ways to measure how we are spending the money, and we are 

going to come up with some measures on these PART scores. Some 

of them are really good. Some of them are good first steps, and next 

year we will find better measures and next year. 

That is why it is an ongoing process. It is a commitment to a way 

to run the railroad. There will be some programs that are more 

clearly defined where the metrics are better than other programs, 

but it is a mind-set more so than it is a specific series of acts that 

has to take place, and it takes that commitment that this is the 

way we want to run this ‘‘railroad,’’ and it is a journey, not a destination and you get better and better at it every year. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Thank you. Mr. Spratt. 

Mr. SPRATT. Let me share with you a little experience I have had 

with this topic that you are struggling with today or grappling 

with. Years ago, I served in the Army as a young officer in the Department of Defense working for the assistant secretary of defense. 

Mr. Laird was the Secretary of Defense, and he came up here to 

testify. This was near the end of the Vietnam War, and there were 

huge overruns on a procurement, major weapons systems, but 

there was not ability by which to measure those overruns because 

there was no baseline to begin with. Nobody had defined a baseline 

for scheduled performance or cost. 

Mr. Laird had seen something that had been done just experimentally by Booz, Allen & Hamilton, and he told the Senate when 

he was pressed that he felt sure that they could implement an acquisition process whereby there would be variance reporting: schedule, cost, performance. He did not know what he had bitten off 

until he got back to the Pentagon and found out what he had seen 

was just one small piece of a much, much bigger problem, but he 

was committed to it, and he stuck by it. I think Laird and Packwood were the best team that ever managed the Defense Department. 

I happened to work in the office where the SAR, selected acquisition report, was developed. When I came here to Congress about 

12 years later, one of the first things I did when I got on the Armed 

Services Committee was to go down and pull the SAR to see how 

the SAR was doing. And of interest to me, it looked exactly the 

same way it did 12 years before, and I eventually found out that 

because we did not use it here, partly because it was not useful, 

24

it did not become more useful. There is a circularity to it, and when 

it is used, it becomes more useful because we see what works and 

what does not work, which information is useful and valuable and 

which information is not, and it gets honed down to being an effective instrument. 

One of the problems I have with PART and, I think, with the 

GPRA (Government Performance Results Act) system, too, is Congress is not wired into it. So one of the principal users of it does 

not use it. We do not resort to it frequently. If we did, we would 

say, ‘‘This is no good. This is not the goal we set. This is not what 

we are trying to achieve. These numbers are not credible,’’ or ‘‘This 

is useful. Hey, this is good information. This is working. This is not 

working. This is where we should allocate scarce resources.’’

Let me ask you, Mr. Johnson, about DOD and OMB. Are you 

working in any way to perfect their information reporting systems 

and, in particular, that cost performance and schedule variance report? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I do not know about that particular report, 

but, for instance, a whole a lot of GAO’s high-risk items involve 

DOD, and one of the things we are doing is working with DOD and 

GAO to take each one of those items, and let us clearly define some 

of the things we have been talking about today. What is success? 

Supply chain management? What is the desired state of affairs for 

supplying chain management? What do we want it to look like, be 

like, smell like, so forth? What do we have to do to get there? What 

are the action steps we have to take to get there, and who is accountable for each one of those action steps? 

So lots of clarity, lots of accountability, and then make sure there 

is rigorous, every 6 months, every quarter, whatever, oversight that 

we are, in fact, proceeding along that action plan as designed. We 

have done that with supply chain management, and GAO is 

pleased with the product, and OMB is pleased with the product. 

Mr. SPRATT. How does it interface with GPRA? How does PART, 

your assessment system, results oversight system, interface and integrate with what was already in place? 

Mr. JOHNSON. OK. I agree with David Walker that GPRA has 

not lived up to its full potential, but it can. As you said, it has laid 

a foundation. The PART, in my mind, is the tool that helps us take 

this focus on accountability to the next level. In general, I think 

that looking at the effectiveness of an entire agency is not the proper unit of measure because of an accumulation of programs, a wide 

diversity of programs. So I think the real way to look at how an 

agency is doing is to look at how its most relevant units of measure 

are doing, i.e., the programs. 

So, to me, the PART, which focuses on programs, provides information that allows us to go into an agency and go down to the relevant unit of measure and start looking at this piece works, this 

piece does not work, we can do this to make this work better, we 

can keep this the way it is, and so forth. So I think it allows us 

to take GPRA, the focus on results, to a more meaningful level of 

detail, as you said, build on the foundation that has been laid in 

the last 10 years with the development of strategic plans by agency. 

25

Mr. SPRATT. Don’t you think somehow Congress should be wired 

into it so, No. 1, we are encouraged at the outset of inaugurating 

some new program or some new agency to define its goals so that 

we can have a baseline to come back and measure its performance 

against, and we sort of share that with you so you would have your 

goals, we would have our goals. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. I agree totally with that. We all need to 

be looking at one set of goals. I agree totally with that. 

Four years ago, we assessed 20 percent of the programs, so there 

was a little bit of performance information around, and so you 

could not sit down with a committee or an appropriations subcommittee and talk about HUD (U.S. Department of Housing and 

Urban Development) or talk about Interior because you only had 

a little bit of information. So what has happened is we are now getting a critical mass of performance information to do exactly what 

you have talked about where we can look at all of the programs 

at an agency and start looking at the potential use of this information, and one of our big stumbling blocks initially which made it 

sort of not appropriate to start dealing with Congress was we had 

resistance within the agencies. 

They were reluctant to focus on results because their feeling 

was—there was a lot of skepticism, and the thinking was all we 

want to do is to get rid of programs. They came to understand, 

after about 2 years, that it was about getting programs to work 

better, which is what they are for. So now they have embraced the 

use of performance information. So now that they are integrally involved and fully involved in developing good performance measures; now it is the time to work with Congress to get us to come 

together on agreement on what these goals are, now that we have 

good goals to even talk about or good performance measures to talk 

about. 

So I agree totally with what you are calling for. I think 3 or 4 

years ago, it would have been inappropriate to do that because it 

would not have been a very long conversation. 

Mr. SPRATT. I notice, if our numbers are correct, that of the 607 

program assessments that PART has undertaken, only 23 apply to 

the Department of Defense. Are you sort of letting Defense do its 

own internal management? Is there adequate oversight? 

Let me give you an example. We are building now the next-generation carrier, and it will cost at least twice, probably more than 

twice, what the previous carrier cost. To justify that kind of hike 

in the expenditure, we need to get lots of utility, lots of useful life, 

and lots of our cost savings out of manning levels and things like 

that in the new carrier. Is OMB looking over DOD’s shoulder to see 

that, No. 1, a baseline is established based upon what is being represented that the new carrier will do, and somebody is holding 

those responsible for pushing these expensive new systems accountable? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I do not know specifically about the carrier, but 

we do work with DOD to make sure they have defined goals, defined purposes, and how the costs match up to the benefits. I do 

know that we were helpful to get DOD to the point—I think it was 

2 years ago—where they actually canceled a weapons system. 

Mr. SPRATT. Which one? 

26

Mr. JOHNSON. It was the Comanche helicopter system. I do not 

know when the last time a weapons system was canceled. It does 

not happen very often, but the stated purpose for that helicopter 

system no longer existed, and it was decided that it could be met 

with other weapons systems, exactly the thing you are talking 

about that is hard to do at DOD. But we are working with them 

to do the kind of thing you are talking about, and there are a lot 

of influences that go into whether a weapons system is canceled or 

not, as you know, and performance and stated purpose is one of 

them. 

Mr. SPRATT. Well, take a look at the selected acquisition report. 

As I understand it, DOD, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

really has its own system. It does not rely on the SAR. They give 

us a SAR, which is sort of like giving us crumbs from the table. 

See if you think there is an adequate cost variance and schedule, 

information reporting system at DOD. I would love to talk with 

you. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Their whole acquisition process is one of the highrisk items, and it is a lot of money. That is one of the areas that 

we will lay out and work with them to define a successful state of 

affairs that we want to get to and determine an appropriate time 

frame to get there or a reasonable or realistic or aggressive, or 

whatever it will be, time frame for getting there because they want 

all of those items to be low risk, not high risk. They are very complex, as you know way better than I, and we need clarity about 

where we are trying to go with each one of them and accountability, lots of clarity, and lots of accountability. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Cuellar, you showed some interesting presentations when you put your display up about how information was 

presented to the Texas State legislature. How would you adapt that 

kind of experience to our experience here so that we have a format—you would probably have to vary it from program to program, 

but we have a format that would elicit the kind of information that 

would be useful to us, the appropriators, the authorizers, in deciding which should be pulsed up, which should be eliminated, and so 

forth? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Well, I think that the basic premise that we have 

got to look at is if we do not find a mechanism—I think this is 

what the chairman was also alluding to a few minutes ago—if we 

do not find a mechanism to get the legislature involved and working on setting those goals and those measures, then we are not 

going to know if those programs are being effective or efficient, 

whether we are getting the best bang for the dollar. The whole key 

is going to be how do we—I think your terms were, how do we get 

wired in in this work that we are doing? If we do not get wired 

in or connected in this process, then it is not going to work. We can 

have all of the will and all of the commitment, but if we cannot 

get connected and make sure that we play a role in this, it is not 

going to work. 

Just by the list of the questions that I gave, just a show-and-tell, 

the list of questions there, if we just asked every single agency 

those questions, we would be amazed. I think that probably the 

first one would probably bring a lot of debate. What is your primary purpose? If you asked that question, the agency might tell 

27

you something, and somebody at OMB might say something else. 

We might feel that it is a different purpose. If we cannot even get 

past that first question, it is going to be hard to get the rest of the 

work done also in providing our legislative oversight. 

Mr. SPRATT. Well, we have got Mr. Conaway and Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Spratt, one of the things that works in Texas, 

and I hate to keep bringing it up, but that is our example today, 

is a Sunset Commission. Now, built into the statute of every agency is a drop-dead date whereby, after 12 or 13 years, if the legislature does not renew that function, that agency, or whatever, then 

it goes away. Two years before that sunset date goes through, each 

agency is put through a very rigorous review of everything they do, 

all of their purposes, all of their standards that they are supposed 

to be meeting, all of their regulations that they have written, all 

of those kinds of things. 

Kevin Brady has got a bill that would create a Federal sunset 

commission or Federal sunset board that would help us start. Part 

of the problem is we have got an awful lot of stuff going on, $2.56 

trillion worth of stuff going on. Where do we start? Well, one way 

is to put every agency through a very rigorous self-examination, as 

well as an examination by a bipartisan group, that would force 

them to justify their existence and allow the legislature, this Congress, to take a look at each one of them and say they ought to stay 

alive or should not. So it is a helpful program. It is not perfect, by 

any stretch of the imagination. You run into all kinds of problems 

with it, but at least it gives a chance. 

The other thing it does is it allows that group to help agencies 

share best practices—the chairman mentioned best practices a 

while ago—across agencies because they become little fiefdoms 

among themselves and have resistance to some of the improvements that other agencies have made without reinventing the 

wheel. So there are a lot of positives that would help set the stage 

to go forward if we ran every agency through this program. 

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Congressman, the questions that Henry talked 

about; almost all of those questions are asked as a part of the 

PART process. What is your purpose? How are you serving your 

customer? How do you measure success? What are your results? Almost all of those questions are asked as a part of the PART process. All of that information is available to the public, the answers 

to all of those questions. They are on an OMB Web site. You have 

to be able to speak our version in English, but it is all there. 

Are there better ways to ask the 26 questions? There are about 

25 or 30 questions. Is there a 26th question? Certainly. We will figure it out, and we will get better. The PART is a good first step 

in the direction of trying to provide that information for us to talk 

about, agree on, and go from. 

Mr. CUELLAR. And what I am saying, Mr. Chairman, if you 

would allow me, is the work that they are doing is good. Clay has 

been doing an excellent job. My whole point here today is——

Mr. JOHNSON (continuing). How to use it. 

Mr. CUELLAR (continuing). How do we get the legislature to use 

that information and ask it? All of that information is available 

somewhere, but the question is, when we are making the decisions 

28

on those agencies, are we asking those questions there? If we can 

somehow get connected with the OMB where we can get that information from Clay in an easy format that is easy to understand instead of, and I am sure you will not do that to us, providing us 2 

or 3 inches of information, but in an easy format, that will go a 

long way for us to do the constitutional duty that we have, the 

budget oversight. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much, all three of you, for your testimony. I have got to go to another meeting, but I have learned a 

great deal from this, and I hope this is a beginning. We can talk 

about it further. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Mr. Chocola. 

Mr. CHOCOLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this meeting. I have not been in Congress long, but this is the 

first time that the discussion has reminded me of my previous life 

as a business owner, with performance measurements and so forth. 

One of the things I learned—maybe you just answered the question, but one of the things I learned in my previous life was there 

are different elements to the budget process. There is developing 

the budget, and there is executing the budget, and you can only 

conduct those efforts successfully if you have good information. 

And so using Mr. Conaway’s example, is there a barn with a 

dusty toolbox around here somewhere that Members of Congress 

can access? I mean, it is hard to get information on our MRA, timely, accurate information as to how we can manage our own office, 

let alone the entire U.S. Government. So is there someplace that 

you can direct us, as a Member of Congress, where we can get usable, timely information? Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Let me just say, that is the whole point I have 

been making today, is that the information is out there, and I am 

sure that Clay would say and Mr. Johnson would say that information is out there. There is a way that we can get it timely so when 

we are making the decisions, instead of saying, ‘‘Well, somebody go 

check a Web page somewhere,’’ or ‘‘Somebody send me the books 

over here,’’ there is a way that we can put this in an easy format 

for us to ask those questions and get that information, good information, then I think that would make our job easier because I 

think that is the problem. And I am just in my first 6 months here, 

so, with all due respect, my perspective is that I do not think we 

have that information in an easy format where we can look and 

make those decisions. 

If you recall, the budget format, as an example, the 1970s, 1980s, 

and the 1990s, in the 1990s format that information is there,—the 

purpose, the goals, the objectives, the performance measures—and 

like Clay said, it is a continuous refinement of those performance 

measures. They keep changing on it, but that is where the dialogue 

comes in with the Congress and the agencies. 

Mr. CHOCOLA. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. There is no one place. It does not exist like that, 

no one place. The answers to some of those general questions like 

what is the purpose, and what are your results versus your goals 

and so forth, that exists on a Web site for ready access. We are creating a lay version of that to try to bring public transparency to 

it all, again, to sort of help drive the dialogue about it. But more 

29

specific customer satisfaction numbers and turnaround time numbers; that exists in various places. 

I was having breakfast yesterday with a Senator, and he was 

complaining that on one of the agency Web site’s most recent performance information they have is from 2001, and it was just driving him nuts. Now, the information is nice, but it is 4 years old. 

It is like there is almost a purposeful goal to not give them anything that they could use to make a decision one way or the other. 

I think it would be fantastic if Congress said, ‘‘We want more information with which to make these decisions. Let us figure out 

how we can establish recency standards, level-of-detail standards, 

customer satisfaction, all of that and build toward it.’’ That would 

not be done overnight, but that would be a huge statement by all 

of us that it is that important, and we want to factor all of that 

into our decision-making process. 

Mr. CHOCOLA. When is the Web site going to be available that 

you mentioned? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we hope to do it this fall. In fact, we have 

focus groups next week to actually go talk to people to see if people 

other than ourselves think it is a great idea. We hope to do it this 

fall. 

Mr. CHOCOLA. Just one other thing. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Excuse me. But the information, in OMB terms, 

exists today and has for the last 4 years. 

Mr. CHOCOLA. Just one other thing. In my previous life, all of our 

incentives were around identifying problems and getting rid of the 

problem, solving a problem. In government, it seems that the incentive is to perpetuate problems because God forbid that we solve 

a problem because we will not fund that effort anymore. Will performance-based budgeting, do you think, effectively address that? 

Mr. JOHNSON. It can be. Again, what would you like to stop 

doing, and what would you like to start doing? These kinds of questions you ask drive actions, and that can be structured any way we 

want. 

Mr. CHOCOLA. Do you think a 2-year budget would assist in this 

effort in spending a year going through the budget and at least a 

year in oversight, which I agree that we do not focus on enough 

around here? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. We support the notion of biannual budgeting. 

Mr. CHOCOLA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman NUSSLE. What is the Web site that you have now? You 

said it is on the Web site now? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. It is OMB. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Is it OMB? 

Mr. JOHNSON. It is www.omb.gov. 

Chairman NUSSLE. OK. 

Mr. JOHNSON. We can send that to you, if you want. 

Chairman NUSSLE. We are linked to it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Very good. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Mr. Neal. 

Mr. NEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. This has been 

very helpful. 

These are hardly new concepts, I think. Certainly, President 

Carter embraced the notion of zero-based budgeting. Secretary 

30

McNamara at the Defense Department during the Kennedy-Johnson years, he embraced the notion of planned program budgeting. 

I used it in my former life, my youth, as the mayor of Springfield, 

MA. But I guess——

Mr. JOHNSON. I did not mean any negative comment about mayors. I was just kidding, sir. 

Mr. NEAL. Believe me, if you are served in those jobs, there is 

nothing anybody could say that would hurt your feelings. [Laughter.] 

But I guess I would dispute a couple of issues based upon the 

notion of the way our system is supposed to work in the constitutional galaxy. 

I think of CDBG because I know that mayors and governors tend 

to like CDBG, and one of the reasons it has worked so well, and 

I would defend it arduously, is that President Nixon had the right 

idea. The democratic majorities in the Congress had the right idea. 

On the issue of housing, it is a national problem, but it may well 

be different in Springfield, MA, than it is in San Diego, CA. Therefore, the Federal Government would acknowledge the national 

problem, but mayors, governors, and neighborhood groups would 

help with the remedy. 

Now, I think you can measure CDBG. If a community like 

Springfield had, in 1973, 14,000 substandard units of housing, and 

15 years later had 3,000 substandard units of housing, I think that 

is a very precise and exact measurement. If you can drive down the 

cost of dental problems by using some of that money to pay for a 

voluntary fluoride rinse program in the public schools, I think, for 

poor children, that is the way to do it. Since there is not a lot of 

support for putting fluorine in the water supply, you can do it with 

a voluntary program and use those dollars, and if you can determine that fewer children end up in a Medicaid program with dental needs, I think that is a success. 

I think you can measure the COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services) program that was wildly popular across the country 

as a success, largely because crime rates did go down, and even the 

smallest towns across the country were able to purchase new technology for doing a better job of combating street crime on a daily 

basis. 

Now, having said that, I acknowledge that police visibility is in 

dispute as to whether or not that does drive down crime, and that 

is a very difficult measurement. But my point, I think, here is that 

there are exact measurements. Community development block 

grant money has worked very well, and it is very popular with 

mayors and governors across the country. If you had Democratic 

mayors sitting in this room, they would say it is great. They would 

say save that. If you had Republican mayors sitting in this room, 

they would say, if they only had one program they could save, it 

would be community development block grant money because it allows them some solutions. 

Now, I also think it is important to point out that there are other 

issues where there is difficulty in measuring it, abstinence-only 

programs. The jury really is out, but the Congress keeps pushing 

money in that direction, and we have not seen the sort of success 

there based upon the investment, and I think that there would be 

31

some agreement on that. But the philosophy takes over, and instead of coming to an initiative that might work, we insist on pushing money toward something that does not work only to satisfy ourselves in a philosophic vein. 

So I think what you are talking about is very desirable, and it 

should be the continued goal of all of us here in the Congress, but 

I do want to defend performance initiatives as they relate to community development block grant money. I think you can measure 

it. There are some problems, sure, and I think Mr. Conaway mentioned something that was interesting. He said, those people who 

took off, some 15 people, to Alaska for a conference; well, you can 

measure that because the press wrote a very bad story about it, I 

assume. Congress reacted, perhaps overreacting, as we typically do, 

as you know, but, nonetheless, that builds in the accountability 

that we all desire, and I am happy to hear from you on substandard units of housing, abstinence only, COPS programs. I 

think you can measure those things. 

Yes, sir. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think you can measure. The problem with CDBG 

is it required no measurement. It did not require municipalities to 

report back and say, ‘‘Here is how I impacted these low socioeconomic areas with my money. Here is how much I spent, and 

here is the good I did with it.’’ It was not that kind of accountability. HUD has very much agreed with that, and so they are 

tightening those specs, and what the CDBG proposal was about 

was tightening those specs but also taking these other programs 

and instead of having all of these disparate programs, bringing 

them together where it could be managed effectively. We agree totally that they are measurable, but the program, as it was structured, did not call for reporting on what was happening as a result 

of the money. 

Mr. NEAL. Well, I thought that there is, if you hang around in 

political life long enough, a certain level of justice that is reached 

because I used to point out to those HUD auditors that used to regularly review the CDBG program during my time as mayor that 

they used to audit me and ask me a lot of questions, and I subsequently got elected to Congress, and then I audited and investigated them. So, in that sense, the system worked quite effectively, 

and there was a sense of justice as it played out. 

Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Chairman, I do not know if the gentleman is 

here, John Mercer, who used to be the mayor of Sunnyvale. Sunnyvale, CA, was probably one of the first cities that started doing performance-based budgeting. They were able to do the measurements 

as to the streets, how much work they did on paving. There is a 

series of areas where you can get ideas as to what sort of measurements you can get. I know that the National Conference of State 

Legislators just came out with a book called Legislating for Results 

that pretty much lays out the steps as to what staff is supposed 

to be doing, what the legislature is supposed to be doing, that could 

provide some sort of framework for the work we are doing. There 

are ways of doing this. 

I remember when I added the performance measurements for all 

of the agencies in the State of Texas—this was started under Governor Ann Richards, and the big question was, when Bush was 

32

going to come in, was he going to keep that system? He kept, and, 

in fact, he improved the system with Albert Hawkins and some of 

the other gentlemen, other folks, up there also. When Rick Perry 

came in, the same thing: It got extended, and it got improved. 

So it really does not matter if it is the Democrats or the Republicans, sir; it is a commitment that Mike talked about, making sure 

that we keep focused on the measurements. 

But the bottom line, just to give you an example, there are ways 

to measure things. When I first added the first measurements to 

all of the State agencies, the people who wore robes were the ones 

who had complaints about this, the academicians and the judges. 

Judges used to say, you cannot measure justice. Well, there are 

things that you can measure in the work that they do, the output 

that they do. Academicians also said, well, you cannot measure us. 

Well, of course, you can measure education. What are the retention 

rates? What are the graduation rates? There are a lot of things 

that you can look at. 

So there are a lot of measurements that are being used out there 

that we can use ourselves. Instead of reinventing the wheel, there 

are measurements we can use out there. Of course, it is up to us 

to decide what measurements and what goals and what purposes 

should be out there for that. So I agree with you, Mr. Neal. There 

are a lot of things we can measure out there; it is just up to us 

to decide what to use. 

Mr. NEAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Mr. Ryun. 

Mr. RYUN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want to thank you for 

holding this hearing. I think we are all very interested in a common goal, and that is how to get more bang for our buck and to 

help those who watch programs develop. 

My question relates to how do you keep from rewarding failure? 

Now, most programs here are geared towards, you know, something that we start with good intentions of helping people, and ultimately the budget continues to grow, and then there comes that 

moment of how do you then wean somebody off a program that 

they have become accustomed to. 

So my question relates to, and I guess I will start with Mr. Johnson, how do you address the problem that somebody with, again, 

good intentions to help someone, now that is no longer necessary, 

but the program is there, and they are still expecting that? How 

do you wean them off of it? 

Mr. JOHNSON. I will bet the answer is different for every program, but, in general, I think, the biggest issue is not what are we 

trying to do but how do we go about doing it; it is that tough transition period. My suggestion would be to leap past the transition 

that you are going to have to figure out how to do. 

Go out 5 years and define the new state of affairs we want to 

exist 5 years from now or 8 or 4 or something years from now and 

get everybody sort of wrapped around and enamored with that goal 

and excited about what the new state of affairs can be, and then 

say, ‘‘All right. That is where we want to go. Now, how do we get 

from here to there?’’ So all of a sudden you have got a vision, a 

long-term vision, that gets people excited, and all of a sudden the 

difficulty of getting from here to there becomes a little less. 

33

You get people a little bit more enamored with how to make 

those tough calls and how to manage through that tough weaning 

process. But in terms of specifically how you wean somebody, I 

think, at some point, you can give him interim things to go to, but, 

at some point, you just have to stop. 

Mr. RYUN. It is a lot easier probably said than done, though, because once you get dependent upon something, it is pretty hard to 

let go of it. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Right. 

Mr. RYUN. Yes, sir? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Six points, Mr. Ryun. What gets measured gets 

done. If you do not measure results, you cannot tell success from 

failure. Right now, what we are doing in Congress—what are we 

doing? We are putting money into the agencies, and we do not 

know if the money that we are putting in really works. We have 

some indicators that show that maybe it is, maybe it is not. 

The third point is if you cannot see success, you cannot reward 

it. 

The fourth point is if you cannot reward success, you are probably rewarding failure, and if you cannot recognize failure, you cannot correct it. You do not know if you are doing the right thing if 

you cannot recognize failure. 

And then the last point is if you can demonstrate results, then 

you can get public support for the results that you are doing. 

The bottom line is the way I see this is we are pumping billions of dollars. We have got what, a $2.7 trillion budget or somewhere 

around there——

Mr. JOHNSON. Six. 

Mr. CUELLAR (continuing). A $2.6 trillion budget. How do we 

know that the dollars that we are spending are for successful programs or programs that are not working or programs that have extended their lifetime already? We do not know unless we ask those 

questions. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Mr. Ryun, a couple of things. One, on the front 

end, as we begin to develop new programs or new initiatives, that 

ought to be a part of the development process. What is the end 

game? In other words, is there a point in time where we expect this 

program to have done its job, and if it does not get that job done, 

then it is going to go away? So help the recipients and the folks 

who are trying to get it done understand that there is an end in 

sight. 

But I would also harken back to the sunset issues for programs 

that we think are going to be going on forever, that they ought to 

get better every year and do a better job, but I would try to help 

set the standards up front as to what the drop-dead date of a particular program ought to be. 

Mr. RYUN. I think we can all agree that, you know, that we have 

programs that started with good intentions. They have arrived at 

maybe somewhat of a destination, but there is not the will within 

Congress to say it is time to bring closure. I think that is a problem 

that we, as Members, need to deal with. It is a hard reality, but, 

nevertheless, one that we need to address. 

A final just kind of a broad question. We have all nibbled around 

the edges on this. We, as Members, want to have good information, 

34

and yet that becomes difficult. A moment ago, you brought up the 

example of a Senator saying, ‘‘Well, that is good information, but 

it is 4 years’ old.’’ I think we are accustomed to, as Members, kind 

of dealing in sound bites. We are actually able to deal with more 

than just that, but my point is we need real-time information when 

dealing with an issue. Any suggestions as to how we can get that 

on a very quick basis, and especially our staffs because they are 

the ones that are going to help feed us with a lot of information? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think it would be a wonderful challenge to 

have to rise to. If a subcommittee or the full Committee said, ‘‘Let 

us do this. We cannot do it government-wide all at one time, but 

let us take a subset of some agencies and figure out what is a good 

set of performance information to provide to the members of the 

relevant committee—it may be Budget or Appropriations—and let 

us decide on what the information is and how timely it ought to 

be, and figure out what that is and come up with something, and 

then try to demonstrate its usefulness or not.’’ But go from there 

and try to determine that it is worthwhile doing for the rest of the 

Federal Government. That would be a really exciting thing for us 

to work on. 

Mr. CUELLAR. And I agree. You cannot ask for all of the information that is available. What we have got to do as a legislature is 

we have got to selectively decide here is what we want from the 

agencies, and this is the timing that we need this information, and 

if we are able to selectively ask what measures we want to look at 

and on a timely basis, then I would tell you it should not be 4 

years’ old, and we should be able to get that information on a more 

accurate and more timely basis. 

Mr. RYUN. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Again, just asking those questions and setting 

those parameters up ahead of time; it would be helpful to get that 

done for all new programs. For existing programs, it is going to 

take a different level of activity, level of intensity. But I like Mr. 

Johnson’s idea about creating some sort of a pilot project, a test, 

that would allow the development of it so you could create somewhat of a template for all of the agencies, although they would always have to be modified for the specifics of any one agency. 

Mr. RYUN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman NUSSLE. One idea, or just a thought. You said this 

Web site will be available in 4 months? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the information exists now. What we are 

doing is creating a Web site that assumes that the audience is 

John Q. Citizen, John Q. Taxpayer. That is what will be available 

in several months. We are trying to go through the issue of how 

to structure it and how to phrase things and how to simplify 

things. In the PART, for instance, there are 25 to 30 questions, depending on the nature of the program, that we ask of the sort that 

Henry talked about. That information exists on the Web now for 

every program that we have assessed, which is 600 as of last year 

and 850 as of a month and a half from now. 

Chairman NUSSLE. It may actually be more beneficial, because 

that is like drinking out of a fire hose when you are 600. It could 

be that when you roll this out, we may want to do some kind of 

an informal demonstration up here at the committee for Members 

35

and their staffs. It would be a good way to get some information 

about this. 

Mr. JOHNSON. On the PART information, there might be a focus 

on two or three key performance measures, but the kind of thing, 

I think, that you all and the appropriators would need is the kind 

of information that Henry is showing up here, which is much more 

detailed, quarterly updates. So it would start with this, but then 

it would be much more extensive, I think. The kind of information 

that exists now on OMB’s Web site is not the level of detail that 

you all would need to make even more intelligent budget decisions. 

We would need to decide what that is and then make it available. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Mr. Diaz-Balart. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I actually also want to thank you for having this hearing. I think it is 

a very important hearing. I also want to thank you particularly for 

this distinguished panel. The three gentlemen that are speaking to 

us today—Mr. Johnson, Mr. Cuellar, and Mr. Conaway—have not 

only a reputation of protecting taxpayers’ dollars, but I think, very 

clearly, they have a very strong record of achievement in protecting 

taxpayers’ dollars, so what they have to say is very important for 

all of us to listen to. 

Mr. Chairman, you know, but I do not know if others know, that 

my years in the State legislature could be defined as what I did 

for performance-based budgeting and for priority-based budgeting, 

and in order to try to get it done, because obviously the bureaucracies do not want to do it, and it is heavy lift for everybody, I 

came up with a rather dramatic, I understand, way to do that. 

I, basically, as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, 

which in the State senate in those days was appropriations, budget, ways and means, and finance and tax together, I told every 

agency that they had to come up with a plan to cut 25 percent of 

their budgets. I did not say that I was going to cut 25 percent of 

their budgets, but I wanted a list of priorities and a list of their 

lowest priorities and look at ways to cut administration, look at 

ways of cutting waste, and they did not want to do it, and it was 

heavy lifting. I actually still have one of the posters that was distributed throughout the capitol when I was doing that. The only 

part that upset me was the picture because it was not a very good 

picture. But, I mean, ultimately, it was a heavy lift, but we succeeded in doing some of the things, and I think, by the way, Florida 

is number one in job creation and still continues to be number one 

in job creation. 

To give you an idea as to how we were able to do that, spending 

increases in appropriations before those days were close to 10 percent increases annually. After that, as a result, I was able to decrease it to about 1 percent, an increase of 1 percent, rather dramatic. And also, because we did performance-based budgeting and 

priority-based budgeting, we were also able to fund things that 

were never funded even with 10-percent increases. 

Mr. Chairman, I just want to add that I am really impressed 

with what this administration is doing with PART. It is kind of 

hard to read through sometimes. My staff has done a really good 

job of doing it. 

Chairman NUSSLE. It is not purposeful? 

36

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. No, I understand. It is complicated stuff, but 

it is there, and I think we also need to commend, for example, the 

chairman of the Appropriations Committee and the appropriators. 

They have done a pretty good job of applying some of the information that you, Mr. Johnson, and the administration have provided. 

In this appropriations cycle, the House has terminated 99 pro- grams, and that is a savings of $4.6 billion. Where I am from, $4.6 

billion is real dough, and that is, I think, a huge tribute to what 

this administration is doing and also the fact that there is some coordination, obviously, with the appropriators. 

I think Mr. Spratt was right when he talked about that there has 

got to be a tie-in with the legislature, and I think Mr. Cuellar was 

talking about what some of those issues that we have to look at 

are: Can we do a better job in tying in with the appropriators of 

the Budget Committee to make sure that also when those standards are being developed through the PART process, that the legislature is involved in that process? From what I hear from Mr. 

Cuellar, that is pretty much what happened in Texas. There was 

a negotiative process as to what some of those measures should be, 

and that is really where the tough part comes. What can we do to 

do a better job there? How can we improve on that, because I think 

the information is available? You are right. It needs to be in a little 

bit more easy-to-understand English. But what can we do to improve that communication not only after you have done the PART 

reviews, Mr. Johnson, but also maybe before that so that there can 

be buy-in, so that there can be a better understanding? When you 

buy in, you are more likely then to make the tough decisions, and 

these are tough decisions. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think that if we had walked up 4 years ago and 

said, ‘‘Let us work together and come up with outcome goals for 

each program and efficiency measures and so forth, and we can use 

it to better budget, and we do not want to get rid of programs; we 

want to work better,’’ we would have been told to skedaddle. I 

think we have information now that is a good starting point. We 

can sit down and say, working with agencies, ‘‘Here is a good first 

cut. Now, what do you, Members of Congress, or this committee 

like about this? What is missing? What needs to be added or subtracted?’’ We have a good starting point. 

The fact that there is interest in getting buy-in in Congress is 

a really positive sign. I do not think there would have been any interest in ‘‘let us agree on what this is’’ 4 years ago, but I think the 

fact that there is a critical mass of performance information is a 

good first step. In a couple of months, 80 percent of all of the programs will have performance information. We can have a really 

good conversation on the programs, and we can get the kind of buyin you are talking about. We all have to agree on what the desired 

outcomes are for each of our programs. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Mr. Chairman, if I may also, to Mr. Conaway, 

once the information is available, what we are really talking about 

here is legislative will, are we not? That is really where the rubber 

meets the road. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Sure. That is exactly right. You know, Chris was 

talking earlier about his business life. In the business world, you 

have got a CEO that gets all of the input he wants and then makes 

37

a decision that is made. That is not the model we have here, and 

trying to be able to look your constituents in the eye and say, ‘‘I 

know you like that program, and I know you think it is doing well 

because you are getting money out of it,’’ whether it is CDBG, or 

you are in love with Amtrak, or whatever the thing is, it is having 

the will to say, ‘‘I disagree with you, and we are going to have to 

go a different direction.’’ It is much easier said than done, obviously. 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. And, Mr. Chairman, if I may, last question to 

Mr. Cuellar, I do not know if you found this, but one of the things 

that I found in the State legislature is usually the least-effective 

program, the one that can show less results, or the lower-priority 

programs seem to have the loudest advocates and the more aggressive advocates. Maybe that is why because that is how they got 

there in the first place. Is that something that you found as well? 

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, you do. But, again, by having measurements 

in place, you can certainly have a better dialogue with those people. Instead of them just coming in, ‘‘We need this, and we need 

that,’’ at least, if you have that information, and you have that information available to you in an easy format, then you certainly 

can have a better dialogue, especially when you are making budgetary decisions. 

The wonderful thing about the whole thing is, and, I think, Clay 

just hit it, Mr. Chairman, members, we have got all of the information available. I think we have got buy-in because, I think, at the 

State legislature and different places, agencies were usually afraid 

because they felt that the Congress or the State legislature was 

going to use this information to cut through programs, go after 

them to punish them. There is a punishment-and-reward system 

that should be in place, but I think, from what I am hearing, is 

we are having more agencies that understand that this can be a 

good managerial tool for them. 

You have got more buy-in by the agencies, and if that information is available, then I think it is up to us to figure out how do 

we make that connection with the legislature, with the Congress? 

What information do we use because it is out there? And I think 

the buy-in, which is very important because there is what I call an 

‘‘institutional resistance’’ can be very difficult, and I think that you 

all did the hard work to get them to buy in, and now it is up to 

us to buy ourselves into this process because it is important to do 

it. 

But I think, whether it is a mayor or whether it is a State legislature, I think all of us have done this in a previous life. Now is 

how do we use that experience from the previous lives that we 

have seen that has been successful? How do we do it here in Congress? 

Mr. DIAZ-BALART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Thank you. I would not underestimate the 

level of distraction. The mere fact that you have been on that Web 

site and have traversed through does not mean that all or most or 

even a majority of Members have done that or staff, and I will be 

the first to admit, since maybe no one else will, that I have not for 

a long time. I have been on the Web site, but it has been a long 

38

time since I have done that, and that is why I am wondering if 

some level of in-your-face is in order here. 

I think what you are suggesting here that is coming out in 4 

months, because Members tend to fly at about 30,000 to 40,000 

feet. I understand that all of the details to make intelligent decisions are down in the weeds, but if you are not even looking at the 

information at 30,000 or 40,000 feet it is even worse. I do think 

your rollout of that key information to citizens, all of us of course 

being citizens as well, and understanding or reacquainting ourselves to that information, would be a good thing to do. 

Do you see an advantage to having a rollout in addition to what 

you are doing at OMB and with the administration, but also here 

on the Hill? I would be willing to offer, with Mr. Spratt’s acquiescence and participation and all of our Members’ and staffs’ participation some type of rollout where you can demonstrate this for 

Members and staff and for other key people who want to be interested in taking a look at this. 

Mr. JOHNSON. That is a fantastic idea and opportunity. As we 

have thought about the potential use of this, the one potential use 

of this site that we come back to is a Congressman’s town hall 

meeting or a Senator’s town hall meeting where they stand up and 

they say, ‘‘I am interested in how we are spending the money. It 

is not a game of perfect, but we are working to get better, and here 

is a place to go to see this.’’ It is exactly that kind of thing, that 

little image that we have had in our mind in our efforts to try to 

construct this. 

Chairman NUSSLE. Well, we have got the equipment here to do 

something like that, so we will——

Mr. JOHNSON. That is a wonderful idea. 

Chairman NUSSLE (continuing). Be in touch, and your communication folks can be in touch, and we will try to do that. 

Mr. JOHNSON. That would be great. 

Chairman NUSSLE. I do not have any other questions, and I do 

not see any other members on the dais that have any questions. 

Mr. Cuellar or Mr. Conaway, I understand you may have had some 

questions you wanted to be able to pose for the record, if you have 

done that during your—then that is fine. 

I want to thank you very much for this opening salvo of discussion. It was your leadership, Henry, as I stated during the markup, 

that brought us to this point. It is, as Mr. Johnson stated, a journey; it is not a destination. I think we have learned that today, if 

we have learned anything. I do hope that we have taken some of 

the first steps on that journey. Even though it may not be with a 

very clear map of where exactly we are going to end up, at least, 

I think it is a worthwhile endeavor. 

So thank you for your leadership on this. We look forward to 

working with you, and we may be back here at some point in time 

this fall to look at the next iteration of this. So if there is nothing 

else to come before the Committee, without objection, we will stand 

in recess. 

[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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