United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 19, 2020*

Decided March 19, 2020

Before

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19‐3093

KIEL R. STONE,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JEFF ROSEBOOM, et al.,   

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana,

South Bend Division.

No. 3:19‐cv‐781

Jon E. DeGuilio,

Judge.

O R D E R

Kiel Stone, proceeding pro se, sued police officers, a city attorney, a jail warden,

and others, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights after he was arrested.

When he sued them, he was already restricted from filing such suits until he paid his

outstanding fines from past litigation, so the district court dismissed the case without

prejudice. That reasoning was correct, so we affirm.   

                                                 

* The defendants were not served with process and are not participating in this

appeal. We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the brief and

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).   

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 19‐3093    Page 2

Stone has filed many meritless lawsuits asserting that government agents are

trying to monitor him, poison him, or both. In the 18‐month period ending in May 2018,

Stone filed 13 such actions in the Northern District of Indiana. See Stone v. Glenn, No.

3:19‐CV‐589, ECF No. 4, at 1–3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 2019) (collecting cases). Three times

the court warned him that if he filed another meritless case, it would fine him and bar

him from filing court papers until he paid his outstanding fines and fees. See id. at 4–7.   

Stone did not heed those warnings, and he filed another similar suit. Stating that

“[e]nough is enough,” id. at 5, the district court dismissed that case, fined Stone $500,

and “restricted [him] from filing in this court until he has paid in full all outstanding

filing fees and sanctions imposed by any federal court.” Id. at 7; see Support Sys. Int’l, Inc.

v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995). The restriction did not apply to any appeals or

filings that contested imprisonment or confinement, and he could seek to modify or

rescind the order in two years. See Glenn, No. 3:19‐CV‐589, ECF No. 4, at 7. He appealed,

but after the district court denied him leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we dismissed

the case for his failure to timely pay the docketing fee. See Stone v. Glenn, No. 19‐2704,

ECF No. 13 (7th Cir. Jan. 10, 2020).   

Two weeks after the district court imposed the filing restriction, and without

paying the $500 fine, Stone filed yet another suit—this one—that reprises allegations

about clandestine government agents and those who are trying to poison him.

Although the events underlying the suit occurred in New Carlisle, Indiana, Stone sued

in the Western District of Michigan. Before screening the complaint, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B), the Western District of Michigan granted him leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. It then transferred the case to the Northern District of Indiana, reasoning that

venue was proper only there. That court dismissed the case because of his filing

restriction. Citing one of his previous meritless suits that was similarly transferred to

the Northern District of Indiana, see Stone v. Bowman, No. 3:18‐CV‐348, 2018 WL

2220291, at *2 (N.D. Ind. May 15, 2018), the court added that Stone “knows” he cannot

file suits in other districts based on claims that arose in this district. Yet the court gave

him the “benefit of the doubt” and refrained from finding that he had in fact filed this

suit elsewhere to avoid the filing restriction. It therefore did not add to the $500

sanction already imposed and unpaid.   

On appeal, Stone argues that the filing restriction is unreasonable and violates

his right to due process because he “cannot file any more lawsuits” or conduct “any

business” in the Northern District of Indiana. We will put to the side whether Stone has

forfeited a challenge to the merits of the filing restriction by forgoing his earlier appeal;
No. 19‐3093    Page 3

he loses anyway. On the merits, meaningful access to the courts is the only legal interest

he may invoke. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). And courts have ample

authority to restrict meaningless—that is, frivolous—suits through filing restrictions,

see In re Anderson, 511 U.S 364, 365–66 (1994); see also Support Sys. Int’l, Inc., 45 F.3d at

186, as long as the restrictions are narrowly tailored to the litigant’s conduct and do not

bar the litigant from the courthouse completely. See In re Chapman, 328 F.3d 903, 906 (7th

Cir. 2003); see also 45 F.3d at 186. That qualification is met here. The filing restriction

arose because three warnings failed to deter Stone from ignoring the court’s order to

desist from frivolous filings, it is time‐limited, and it excludes appeals, criminal actions,

or other filings necessary to contest imprisonment or confinement.   

In his appellate brief, Stone suggests that he purposefully filed this case outside

the Northern District of Indiana to avoid “the whole unreasonable fine” that the court

had imposed. The district court gave him the “benefit of the doubt” that this was not

the case and did not fine him. Should he do so again, Stone may not be so lucky.   

AFFIRMED