1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 20-81163-CV-MIDDLEBROOKS/Brannon

JEFFREY LAGRASSO and

DEBORAH LAGRASSO, 

 

 Plaintiffs,

v.

SEVEN BRIDGES HOMEOWNERS 

ASSOCIATION, INC. and 

RACHEL ABOUD TANNENHOLZ,

Defendants. 

 /

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendant Seven Bridges Homeowners 

Association, Inc.’s (“the Association”) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and to Strike Plaintiffs’ 

Claim for Punitive Damages, filed on August 25, 2020. (DE 21). Plaintiffs Jeffrey LaGrasso and 

Deborah LaGrasso (“the LaGrassos”) responded in opposition on September 8, 2020. (DE 26). For 

the following reasons, the Motion is denied. 

BACKGROUND

In September 2018, Plaintiffs Jeffrey LaGrasso and Deborah LaGrasso, husband and wife,

purchased a home in the Seven Bridges community in Boca Raton, Florida. (DE 1 ¶¶ 7–8, 11).

Seven Bridges supposedly features a “world class tennis facility” where residents may engage 

professional coaching services at an additional cost. (Id. ¶ 12). In October 2018, the LaGrassos 

arranged with the Association for their three minor children to take tennis lessons on separate 

courts weekday mornings from 7:30 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. for approximately $1,050.00 per week. (Id.

¶¶ 10, 13–14). Sometime between starting their lessons and November 2019, a tennis league 

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consisting of approximately eight women began to regularly harass the LaGrasso children by 

“interrupting their lessons; distracting their coaches and engaging in irrelevant conversations; 

antagonizing the LaGrasso children by walking upon the courts where they were receiving their 

instruction; taunting the children by making demeaning comments to [them] about their skill levels 

and abilities; and aggravating the children by moving their personal belongings from nearby tables 

and chairs.” (Id. ¶ 18). Mrs. LaGrasso reported the women’s conduct to the Association and the 

tennis director on several occasions to no avail. (Id. ¶ 19).

On November 22, 2019, Elana Ecker, a member of the tennis league, made demeaning

remarks to the LaGrasso children while they were receiving their morning coaching. (Id. ¶ 20). In 

response, Mrs. LaGrasso went to the tennis courts to demand that Ms. Ecker and her friends cease 

harassing her children. (See id. ¶¶ 20–21). Mrs. LaGrasso and Ms. Ecker’s conversation drew the 

attention of league members playing on nearby courts. (See id. ¶ 22). The women approached and 

surrounded Mrs. LaGrasso; a “shouting match” ensued between them while the league women 

“wav[ed] their racquets in a threatening manner.” (Id.). Security for the Association arrived on the 

scene and separated the women. (Id. ¶ 23).

On December 5, 2019, Mrs. LaGrasso received a letter from the Association, which stated 

in pertinent part that Ms. Ecker and her league mates had lodged several complaints alleging that 

Mrs. LaGrasso had physically assaulted them during the November 22, 2019 incident at the tennis 

courts. (Id. ¶ 24). The letter notified Mrs. LaGrasso that the Association’s Board had unanimously 

voted to suspend her rights to the facilities within the Seven Bridges community for three months 

pending a hearing before a compliance committee selected by the Board. (Id. ¶ 25). 

At the February 13, 2020 hearing, the compliance committee indicated that its evidence 

was limited to statements submitted by Ms. Ecker and the other women present during the incident 

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in question. (Id. ¶ 26). Mrs. LaGrasso presented video evidence showing that she did not touch 

any of the women and statements from tennis facility staff members indicating that the women 

instigated the confrontation by harassing the LaGrasso children, which they had done on previous 

occasions. (Id. ¶ 27). The day after making the statement, one such staff member was fired without 

notice or an explanation. (Id.). On February 20, 2020, Mrs. LaGrasso received a letter from the 

Association informing her that the compliance committee had unanimously voted to uphold the 

three-month suspension imposed by the Board. (Id. ¶ 28).

Thereafter, Mrs. LaGrasso began to receive “personal attacks” on an anonymous Facebook 

page she had created called “Bridges Seven.” (Id. ¶¶ 31–32). Mrs. LaGrasso created the page to 

“promote discussions about the community,” to “rally homeowner participation at HOA 

meetings,” and to provide “editorial comment and opinion about Seven Bridges.” (Id. ¶¶ 31, 33). 

The page’s content included re-posted media articles covering Seven Bridges specifically and 

recent trends experienced by homeowner’s associations generally. (Id. ¶ 32). The page also 

featured opinion-based posts that were sometimes accompanied by political cartoons. (Id. ¶ 33).

The Complaint alleges that these personal attacks primarily came from one Seven Bridges 

resident, Co-Defendant Rachel Aboud Tannenholz, and transpired over a period of five days in 

May 2020. On May 16, 2020, Ms. Tannenholz identified Mrs. LaGrasso as the administrator of 

the “Bridges Seven” Facebook page and subsequently began posting “hateful comments” on that 

page attacking Mrs. LaGrasso’s “Christian faith.” (Id. ¶¶ 9, 34–35). One such comment was “Move 

out you stupid Shikska.”1(Id. ¶ 35 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Then, on May 17, 2020, 

1

“Shiksa” is a “disparaging and offensive term applied to a non-Jewish girl or woman.” (DE 1 ¶

36). Rabbi Jack Abramowitz has described the word as “simply indefensible,” “inherently

condescending, racist and misogynistic.” (Id. (citing Jack Abramowitz, The Jewish N Word,

ORTHODOX UNION (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.ou.org/life/inspiration/jewish-n-word/)).

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Ms. Tannenholz texted Mrs. LaGrasso the message “I know who you are . . . [g]et ready to be 

exposed.” (Id. ¶ 37 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The following day, May 18, 2020, Ms. 

Tannenholz again texted Mrs. LaGrasso “[b]usted . . . [s]oooo busted I suggest you follow the real 

7b residents page you will see your name plastered on there.” (Id. ¶ 38 (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Ms. Tannenholz then made a post on the official Seven Bridges Facebook page, stating 

“[s]o apparently there is this new page up that is bashing the community and the owner of it is a 

true anti Semite . . . After much research it was found that the page is owned by a Deborah 

LaGrasso that lives on Labelle court.” (Id. ¶ 40 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

That same day, Ms. Tannenholz went to the LaGrasso’s home, rang the doorbell repeatedly, 

banged on the front door, and yelled for Mrs. LaGrasso to come outside. (Id. ¶ 41). After Ms. 

Tannenholz refused to leave the LaGrasso’s property, the police were called. (Id.). The police 

issued Ms. Tannenholz a warning, advising her that if she returned to the LaGrasso’s home, she 

would be arrested for trespass. (Id.). The next day, Ms. Tannenholz and her daughter drove to the 

LaGrasso’s home and yelled “move out, bitch!” leading the LaGrassos to hire a bodyguard. (Id. ¶¶

42–43 (internal quotation marks omitted)). On May 20, 2020, Ms. Tannenholz again drove to the 

LaGrasso’s house and yelled profanities. (Id. ¶ 44). In addition, that day, during a telephone 

conversation, Ms. Tannenholz told the LaGrassos that they “d[id] not belong” in Seven Bridges, a 

neighborhood that according to Ms. Tannenholz, is “80% Jewish.” (Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). Ms. Tannenholz advised the LaGrassos to “[m]ove to a Klan neighborhood . . . a white 

supremacist area.” (Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Ms. Tannenholz continued that if 

“[she] was hated as much as [Mrs. LaGrasso] [she] would move out” to avoid living somewhere 

where she cannot walk outside without everybody looking at her like she is “fucking crazy.” (Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

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One week after the last of the above-described episodes, Mr. LaGrasso sent correspondence 

to the Association, in which he requested that the Board “open a case and initiate its formal 

complaint and sanctioning process for the extremely disturbing, harassing and discriminatory 

conduct toward my wife and children by Rachel Aboud Tannenholz, a neighbor in our 

community.” (Id. ¶ 45 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Mr. LaGrasso advised in the letter that 

they had video and audio recordings pertaining to some of the episodes described in the letter. (Id.

¶ 46). The LaGrassos allege that the Association “took no action to investigate the matter or to 

control the conduct of” Ms. Tannenholz, whose husband apparently serves on the Board’s 

compliance committee. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 47). Instead, the Association initiated another sanctioning 

process against Mrs. LaGrasso. 

On June 12, 2020, Mrs. LaGrasso received a letter from the Association, alleging that Mrs. 

LaGrasso made certain “baseless and false” comments on her Bridges Seven Facebook page and 

had allegedly verbally assaulted Ms. Tannenholz when she was trespassing on the LaGrasso’s 

property. (Id. ¶¶ 48–49 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Association sanctioned Mrs. 

LaGrasso for the Facebook posts pursuant to the “Nuisance” and “Improper Use” provisions of 

the community’s governing documents, which seek to restrict “obnoxious . . . improper, offensive, 

hazardous or unlawful” use or activity “at any Home or Lot or in or about any portion of the 

Community.” (Id. ¶ 50). The correspondence further stated that the Board had unanimously voted 

to assess a $5,000 fine against Mrs. LaGrasso and to suspend her use of the community’s common 

areas for 330 days. (Id. ¶ 51).

On July 1, 2020, the compliance committee again conducted a hearing to review the 

Board’s sanctions, and on July 8, 2020, the Board sent a letter advising that it had decided to affirm 

the sanctions against Mrs. LaGrasso. (Id. ¶¶ 52–53).

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LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the allegations 

in a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In assessing legal sufficiency, the Court is bound to 

apply the pleading standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 

and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, the complaint “must . . . contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Am. Dental 

Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).2

“Dismissal is therefore permitted when on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction 

of the factual allegations will support the cause of action.” Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 

1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Marshall Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. 

Marshall Cty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993)).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff and assume the truth of the plaintiff’s factual allegations. See Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406 (2002); Brooks v. Blue 

Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997). However, pleadings that 

“are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions 

can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678; see also Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) 

(stating that an unwarranted deduction of fact is not considered true for purposes of determining 

whether a claim is legally sufficient). “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

2

“A court’s review on a motion to dismiss is [generally] ‘limited to the four corners of the 

complaint.’” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation 

omitted). However, it may also consider “any documents referred to in the complaint which are 

central to the claims.” Id. (citation omitted).

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will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise [the plaintiff’s] right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

DISCUSSION

The LaGrassos bring two claims against the Association under the Fair Housing Act 

(“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Count I alleges that the Association violated 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3604(b), which prohibits discrimination on account of “race, color, religion, sex, familial status, 

or national origin” in connection with “the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a 

dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith . . . .” Count II alleges 

that the Association violated 42 U.S.C. § 3617, which makes it unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, 

threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having 

exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the

exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section[s 3603–3606].” Federal courts 

have described the language of the FHA as “broad and inclusive,” “prohibit[ing] a wide range of 

conduct,” and having “a broad remedial purpose.” Ga. State Conference of the NAACP v. City of 

LaGrange, 940 F.3d 627, 631–32 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co., 

923 F.3d 1260, 1278 (11th Cir. 2019) and Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 

(1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, both claims arise out of alleged “post-acquisition 

conduct” on the part of the Association, which, as a general matter, may be actionable under the 

FHA. See id. at 632 (concluding that § 3604(b) “reaches certain post-acquisition conduct, 

including post-acquisition conduct related to the provision of services, as long as those services 

are connected to the sale or rental of a dwelling”). The singular question before the Court is 

whether the Complaint plausibly alleges violations of these two provisions of the FHA.

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I. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (Count I)

In Count I, the LaGrassos assert that the Association violated the FHA by “discriminating 

against [their] religious beliefs through a systematic strategy to assess baseless sanctions against 

them that limited their ability to use services or facilities of the community and by their inaction 

to control the conduct of neighbors . . . which also limited their ability to use services or facilities 

of the community.” (DE 1 ¶ 57). The Association argues that Count I should be dismissed because 

(1) the LaGrassos fail to allege that the Association acted against Mrs. Lagrasso because of her 

religion; (2) the Association did not interfere with any of Mr. Lagrasso’s use of the HOA’s services 

or facilities and only temporarily suspended Mrs. Lagrassos; and (3) as a matter of law, the 

Association’s alleged failure to control Defendant Tannenholz’s actions does not give rise to 

liability on its part. (DE 21 at 6–12).

To state a claim under § 3604(b) of the FHA for religious discrimination, a plaintiff must 

allege facts that demonstrate the defendant discriminated against her “in the terms, conditions, or 

privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection 

therewith, because of . . . religion . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (emphasis added). Discrimination is 

“differential,” “less favorable” treatment of similarly situated individuals. Jackson v. Birmingham 

Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 462 U.S. 

669, 682 n.22 (1983). The phrase “because of” is synonymous with “by reason of” or “on account 

of,” which, in other words, means that the protected characteristic—in this case, religion—was the 

“reason” that the defendant so acted. Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The LaGrassos maintain that the Association’s imposition of sanctions against Mrs. 

LaGrasso on two occasions amounted to discrimination on the basis of religion. (DE 1 ¶ 58). With 

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respect to the first round of sanctions arising out of the tennis court incident, the LaGrassos assert

that the Association discriminated against them on the basis of religion through its decision to 

accept the truth of the tennis league members’ allegations while refusing to consider exculpatory 

evidence presented by the LaGrassos at the hearing. (DE 1 ¶¶ 58–59). The trouble with this

assertion, as the Association points out, as far as a federal claim of religious discrimination is 

concerned, is that the facts, as alleged in the Complaint and taken as true, fail to indicate that the 

dispute between Mrs. LaGrasso and Ms. Ecker and the other tennis league members had anything 

to do with religion. (DE 21 at 6–8). 

Indeed, the 18 factual allegations concerning the tennis court incident and the Association’s 

handling of same by its Board and compliance committee do not mention the religions of the 

LaGrassos or of the tennis league members or of any particular member of the Board or compliance 

committee. Rather, the facts paint a picture of a confrontation between Mrs. Lagrasso, Ms. Ecker, 

and the other league women because of the group of women’s harassing treatment of the LaGrasso 

children during their weekday morning tennis lessons that, according to the allegations, had no 

bearing on the LaGrassos’ religious tradition. (DE 1 ¶¶ 17–22). Nor do the allegations concerning 

the Association’s handling of the complaints filed by Ms. Ecker and her league mates make any 

mention of religion as having anything to do with the underlying incident or the Board and 

compliance committee’s review thereof. (DE 1 ¶¶ 24–28). A plain reading of § 3604(b) requires 

that the alleged discriminatory conduct be “because of . . . religion . . . .” Given that there exist no 

allegations pertaining to religion with respect to the LaGrassos’ claim arising out of the tennis 

court incident and the Association’s handling of same, I find that they have failed to state a cause 

of action under the FHA based on this alleged misconduct.

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With respect to the second round of sanctions for Mrs. LaGrasso’s Facebook posts and 

alleged verbal assault, the LaGrassos likewise fail to allege facts that demonstrate that the Board 

and compliance committee’s decision to sanction Mrs. LaGrasso was because of her religion. The 

Complaint does not allege a fact concerning religion until paragraph 35 out of 54 factual allegation 

paragraphs. Even then, only passing mention is made of Mrs. LaGrasso’s “Christian faith” and the 

only allegation concerning the religious composition of the community is in a quotation by Ms.

Tannenholz describing the Seven Bridges community as “80% Jewish.” (DE 1 ¶¶ 35, 44 (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Notwithstanding, unlike the allegations concerning the tennis court 

incident, the allegations concerning Ms. Tannenholz’s conduct toward Mrs. LaGrasso in May 2020 

and the Board and compliance committee’s handling thereof, at the very least, involve religion. 

(DE 1 ¶¶ 34–53).

Again, taking the facts in the Complaint as true and drawing reasonable inferences in the 

LaGrassos’ favor, that the Association allegedly “took no action to investigate” the allegations 

raised in Mr. LaGrasso’s May 27, 2020 letter or “to control” Ms. Tannenholz’s conduct toward 

the LaGrassos but instead to ultimately fine Mrs. LaGrasso $5,000 and ban her use of the 

community’s facilities for 330 days indicate that the Association, at a minimum, treated Mrs. 

LaGrasso differently than it treated Ms. Tannenholz, suggesting discrimination “in the provision 

of services or facilities in connection with” the LaGrasso’s home, that could have been, at least in 

part, “because of religion . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). Because of this possibility, I decline to 

dismiss Count I at this stage of the proceedings as it concerns alleged FHA violations in connection 

with Ms. Tannenholz’s conduct and the second round of sanctioning.

The LaGrassos also assert that the Association violated the FHA “indirectly” by failing to 

control the religiously discriminatory behavior of fellow Seven Bridges residents—namely, Ms. 

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Tannenholz—which, in turn, limited the LaGrasso’s ability to use services or facilities of the 

community. (DE 1 ¶ 62). The Association argues that, as a legal matter, its failure to control Ms.

Tannenholz cannot serve as the basis for an FHA claim because the FHA does not protect against 

neighbor-to-neighbor discrimination on the basis of one of the protected characteristics 

enumerated in the statute. (See DE 21 at 11–12). The Parties do not cite, nor has the Court located, 

binding authority from the Eleventh Circuit or the United States Supreme Court that addresses 

whether a homeowner’s association may be liable under the FHA for its failure to address 

prohibited discrimination from one resident to another. Indeed, the issue of housing provider 

liability for resident-on-resident discrimination appears to be a developing area of the law under 

the FHA. 

In support of its position that such a claim is cognizable, the LaGrassos cite to other circuit 

court decisions and the Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) regulations, which seek to 

interpret and implement the FHA. In Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., the Second Circuit 

considered the broad language and remedial nature of the FHA and the relevant HUD regulations 

to conclude that “a landlord may be liable under the FHA for failing to intervene in tenant-ontenant racial harassment of which it knew or reasonably should have known or had the power to 

address.” 917 F.3d 109, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2019). The Francis court went on to articulate three 

elements that a plaintiff must establish to sustain an action for a housing provider’s liability under

the FHA: “(1) [t]he third-party created a hostile environment for the plaintiff . . . ; (2) the housing 

provider knew or should have known about the conduct creating the hostile environment . . . and 

(3) . . . the housing provider failed to take prompt action to correct and end the harassment while 

having the power to do so.” Id. at 121 (quoting Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment 

Harassment, 81 Fed. Reg. at 63,069) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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In the apparent absence of precedential case law in this Circuit on the viability of a housing 

provider’s liability for the discriminatory conduct of third parties, for the purpose of resolving this 

Motion to Dismiss, I am persuaded by the reasoning and rule set forth in Francis. Applying that 

rule here, I am satisfied that the LaGrassos have plausibly alleged a claim against the Association 

for its failure to respond to or seek to control Ms. Tannenholz’s allegedly discriminatory conduct. 

First, the LaGrassos plausibly allege that the third party, Ms. Tannenholz, created a hostile 

environment for them by, though not limited to, making religiously (and at least once, racially) 

charged derogatory and/or offensive comments to Mrs. LaGrasso via text message, telephone call, 

and in person and going to the LaGrassos’ home on several occasions banging on their door, 

demanding they come outside, and yelling profanities. (DE 1 ¶¶ 35–44). As to the second element, 

I find that the LaGrassos have sufficiently alleged that the Association knew of Ms. Tannenholz’s 

conduct based on Mr. LaGrasso’s May 27, 2020 letter to the Association reporting same and 

requesting that the Board “open a case and initiate its formal complaint and sanctioning process . 

. . .” (DE 1 ¶ 45). With respect to the third element, I find that the LaGrassos have plausibly alleged 

that the Association failed to take prompt action to correct and end the harassment by stating that 

the Association took no action at all in response to Mr. LaGrasso’s letter to investigate the 

allegations therein. (DE 1 ¶ 47). To the contrary, not only did the Association fail to attempt to 

resolve Mr. LaGrasso’s complaint, it instead sanctioned Mrs. LaGrasso for her allegedly 

defamatory posts on her Facebook page and supposed verbal assault of Ms. Tannenholz while she 

was trespassing on the LaGrassos’ property. (DE 1 ¶¶ 48–53). Based on these findings, at this 

stage of the proceedings, I decline to dismiss Count I to the extent that it maintains that the 

Association is liable for Ms. Tannenholz’s allegedly discriminatory conduct. 

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II. Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (Count II)

In Count II, the LaGrassos allege that the Association “intimidated” them by sending letters 

“threatening and imposing baseless sanctions and fines,” specifically in relation to Mrs. 

LaGrasso’s Facebook posts and for “defending against a trespasser.” (DE 1 ¶ 69). The LaGrassos 

also assert that the Association “interfered with the exercise and enjoyment of” their property 

rights “by refusing to undertake any action to control the behavior of third parties,” such as Ms.

Tannenholz. (Id. ¶ 73). The Association argues that Mrs. LaGrasso’s Facebook posts are not 

“rights” protected under the FHA and that the LaGrassos fail to allege facts that the Association’s 

decisions to impose sanctions against them were intentionally discriminatory. (DE 21 at 13–16).

The Association further contends that its alleged inaction to control the conduct of Defendant 

Tannenholz does not legally constitute “interference with” the LaGrassos’ use and enjoyment of 

their home. (Id. at 16–17).

As mentioned above, § 3617 of the FHA makes it unlawful “to coerce, intimidate, threaten, 

or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised 

or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or 

enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section[s 3603–3606].” 42 U.S.C. § 3617

(emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit has concluded that § 3617 does not require proof of an 

independent violation of §§ 3603–3606 to create liability. See Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 

F.2d 718, 722 (11th Cir. 1991). To state a § 3617 intimidation or interference claim, a plaintiff 

must plead factual matter that, if true, plausibly demonstrates “(1) that the plaintiff exercised or 

enjoyed ‘any right granted or protected by’ Sections 3603-3606; (2) that the defendant's conduct 

constituted interference [or intimidation]; and (3) a causal connection existed between the exercise

or enjoyment of the right and the defendant's conduct.” Moore v. Camden Property Tr., 816 F. 

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App’x 324, 335 (11th Cir. 2020). Moreover, the plaintiff must allege factual matter that, if true,

would demonstrate discriminatory animus on the part of the defendant. Sofarelli, 931 F.2d at 722 

(requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that “race played some role” in defendants' actions that 

allegedly violated § 3617).

A. Exercise or enjoyment of right protected by §§ 3603–3606

A plaintiff must first allege that she exercised or enjoyed a right under §§ 3603–3606. 

Moore, 816 F. App’x at 335. With respect to their intimidation claim, the Association argues that 

posting content on a social media platform does not constitute a right exercised or enjoyed under 

the FHA, as it does not relate to the pre- or post-acquisition conduct associated with the sale or 

rental of a home. (See DE 21 at 13–14). I agree with the Association on this point. Because I 

decline to find that Mrs. LaGrasso’s making posts on her Bridges Seven Facebook page amount 

to a right protected under the FHA, I find that the LaGrassos have failed to sufficiently allege the 

first element of an intimidation claim under § 3617.

As regarding the interference claim, the LaGrassos allege that the Association’s failure to 

“undertake any action to control the behavior of third parties,” such as Ms. Tannenholz, interfered 

with the LaGrassos’ exercise and enjoyment of their “property rights” under the FHA. (DE 1 ¶ 

73). Given that a plaintiff’s ability to use and enjoy their property rights free from discrimination 

on the basis of religion is protected by the FHA, I find that the LaGrassos have plausibly alleged 

that they exercised or enjoyed a right safeguarded by the FHA as to their interference claim.

B. “Intimidated” or “interfered with”

Though the Eleventh Circuit has not spoken to precisely what level of conduct is required 

to create liability under § 3617, district courts in the Circuit have concluded that § 3617 extends 

only to “discriminatory conduct that is so severe or pervasive that it will have the effect of causing 

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a protected person to abandon the exercise of his or her housing rights.” Lawrence v. Courtyards 

at Deerwood Assn’n, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1144 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (quoting Gourlay v. Forest Lake 

Estates Civic Ass'n of Port Richey, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1235 (M.D. Fla. 2003), vacated on 

other grounds). As to the LaGrassos’ intimidation claim, taking the Complaint’sfactual allegations 

as true, I am not satisfied that the Association’s conduct of sending letters advising Mrs. LaGrasso 

of the complaints brought against her and the Board’s proposed sanctions for such complaints 

constitutes intimidation that is of a severity as to cause the LaGrassos to abandon their housing 

rights altogether. For this reason and that stated in the above subsection, I conclude that the 

LaGrassos have not plausibly alleged an intimidation claim under § 3617.

Regarding the interference claim, consistent with my finding in Section II, I conclude that 

the LaGrassos plausibly allege unlawful interference under a hostile housing environment theory

based on the Association’s failure to respond to the LaGrassos’ allegations of religious 

discrimination by Ms. Tannenholz and instead to impose additional sanctions on Mrs. LaGrasso, 

conduct alleged to have interfered with the LaGrassos’ housing rights in a severe way. Moreover, 

I find that the LaGrassos have sufficiently alleged that a causal connection exists between the use 

and enjoyment of their property rights and the Association’s failure to address Ms. Tannenholz’s 

behavior.

C. Discriminatory animus

As detailed above, the Complaint sets forth numerous allegations describing harassing 

behavior by Ms. Tannenholz that the Association purportedly failed to address. The LaGrassos

allege that the Association’s conduct was “intentional, willful, and taken in disregard” of their

rights. (DE 1 ¶ 66). Taking this allegation as true, as well as those describing the harassment and 

the Association’s lack of response thereto, it is reasonable to infer that the Association acted with 

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discriminatory intent. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (permitting courts to “draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”). Accordingly, based on the 

foregoing and my finding that the LaGrassos plausibly allege that the Association acted with 

discriminatory animus, I will allow the interference claim to proceed.

III. Punitive Damages

The LaGrassos seek, among other forms of relief, punitive damages in the amount of 

$7,000,000, claiming that the Association’s conduct “demonstrates a reckless disregard for those 

of certain religious backgrounds,” was “willful,” and “perform[ed] with actual or implied malice.” 

(DE 1 at 16 ¶ 4). The Association has moved to strike this request for relief, arguing that the 

Complaint fails to allege facts that demonstrate and/or allow the Court to draw a reasonable 

inference that the Association’s acts of omissions were intentional religious discrimination. (DE 

21 at 17).

The FHA expressly provides for the recovery of punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) 

(“[I]f the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, the 

court may award to the plaintiff actual and punitive damages . . . .”). Punitive damages are only 

recoverable in cases of “intentional discrimination” where the defendant acted with “malice or 

with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” Kolstad v. 

Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 529–30 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“The terms ‘malice’ or ‘reckless indifference’ pertain to the [defendant’s] knowledge that it may 

be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination.” Id. at 

535. Given that punitive damages are available under the FHA in certain circumstances, and that 

the crux of the LaGrassos’ lawsuit is that the Association intentionally discriminated against them

on the basis of their religion, I decline to curtail their ability to pursue punitive damages at this 

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juncture. Whether and, if so, to what extent, the LaGrassos may be entitled to punitive damages

will be properly resolvable at a later stage of these proceedings.

CONCLUSION

Upon careful consideration of the Complaint and applicable law, and taking the LaGrassos’

allegations as true, as I must at the motion to dismiss stage, I find the LaGrassos have plausibly 

alleged §§ 3604(b) and 3617 claims under the FHA. Notwithstanding my finding that the 

Complaint can survive a motion to dismiss, I caution Plaintiffs that I seriously question whether

the factual circumstances of this dispute legitimately amount to religious discrimination. Because 

of 12(b)(6)’s lenient standard in favor of plaintiffs, however, I conclude that dismissal would be 

improper at this stage.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

(1) Defendant Seven Bridges Homeowners Association, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the 

Complaint (DE 21) is DENIED.

(2) Defendant Seven Bridges Homeowners Association, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ 

Claim for Punitive Damages (DE 21) is DENIED.

SIGNED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Florida, this 9th day of December, 2020.

Donald M. Middlebrooks

United States District Judge

cc: Counsel of Record

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