United States District Court 

for the 

Southern District of Florida 

DeCurtis LLC, Plaintiff,

v. 

Carnival Corporation, Defendant. 

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Civil Action No. 20-22945-Civ-Scola 

_______________________________________________________________________________ 

Carnival Corporation, Plaintiff,

v. 

DeCurtis Corporation and DeCurtis 

LLC, Defendants. 

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) 

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Consol. Case No. 20-21547-Civ-Scola 

Order Adopting Report and Recommendations 

Regarding Claim Construction and Summary Judgment 

In these consolidated cases, the parties’ grievances against one another 

stem primarily from alleged intellectual-property rights related to portable 

devices aimed at enhancing guest engagement in various tourism venues. 

Carnival Corporation seeks redress against DeCurtis Corporation and DeCurtis 

LLC (together, “DeCurtis”) for breach of contract, trade-secret 

misappropriation, and patent infringement (Carnival’s 2nd Am. Compl., ECF No. 

88). DeCurtis, conversely, in its complaint, seeks declaratory relief as to noninfringement and unenforceability, and damages based on unfair competition, 

tortious interference, and antitrust violations (DeCurtis’s Am. Compl., ECF No. 

87). This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Edwin G. 

Torres for a ruling on all pre-trial, nondispositive matters, and for a report and 

recommendation on any dispositive matters. (ECF No. 102.) Presently under 

consideration are Judge Torres’s report and recommendations (Rep. and Rec., 

ECF No. 267), recommending that the Court (1) grant Carnival’s opening claimconstruction brief (Carnival’s Br., ECF No. 205) and (2) deny DeCurtis’s motion 

for summary judgment regarding the invalidity of various patent claims 

(DeCurtis’s Br., ECF No. 201; DeCurtis’s Mot., ECF No. 203).1 DeCurtis has 

objected, in part, to Judge Torres’s recommendations (DeCurtis’s Objs., ECF 

No. 273), to which Carnival has responded (Carnival’s Resp. to Objs., ECF No. 

1 The three patents at issue here, which share a common specification, are U.S. Patent No. 

10,045,184 (the “’184 patent” or “system patent”) (ECF No. 205-2); U.S. Patent

No. 10,049,516 (the “’516 patent” or “door lock patent”), (ECF No. 205-3), and U.S. Patent

No. 10,157,514 (the “’514 patent or “portable wireless device patent”), (ECF No. 205-4).

Case 1:20-cv-22945-RNS Document 413 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/28/2022 Page 1 of 8
281). The Court has reviewed—de novo—the entirety of Judge Torres’s report, 

the record, the briefing, and the applicable law, and overrules DeCurtis’s 

objections (ECF No. 273), adopting Judge Torres’s report and 

recommendations (ECF No. 267) in full, finding it cogent and compelling. 

Accordingly, and for the following reasons, the Court grants Carnival’s opening 

claim-construction brief (ECF No 205) and denies DeCurtis’s motion for 

summary judgment (ECF No. 203). 

1. Background 

In his report, Judge Torres made recommendations on nine claimconstruction disputes and DeCurtis’s motion for summary judgment regarding 

invalidity. In doing so, he determined that the following terms in the identifed 

claims should all be read according to their plain and ordinary meaning, with 

no construction necessary: 

- The “storing a log” term from claims 1, 7, and 11 of the system patent; 

- The “reservation server” term from claim 2 of the system patent and 

claim 13 of the door lock patent; 

- The “portable wireless device” term from claim 11 of the portable 

wireless device patent; 

- The “processor configured” term from claim 11 of the portable wireless 

device patent. 

(Rep. & Rec. at 36–37.) Judge Torres further determined that the following 

terms should also be read according to their plain and ordinary meaning, 

without the need for additional construction, although with certain provisions 

kept in mind: 

- The “radio” term from claim 1 of the system patent and claim 13 of the 

door lock patent, “provided that the radio is understood to be a physical 

component of the access panel”; 

- The “second transceiver” term from claim 1 of the system patent and 

claim 13 of the door lock patent, “provided that the second transceiver 

may be wired or wireless”; 

- The “memory stores” term from claim 11 of the portable wireless device 

patent, “provided that the claim recites a memory capable of performing 

the recited function.” 

(Id. at 36–37.) Finally, as to the claims briefing, Judge Torres found some 

construction warranted with respect to the “each sensor” term from claim 11 

of the system patent, finding the term should be understood to mean “each 

BLE sensor.” (Id. at 27, 37.) 

Judge Torres additionally denied all aspects of DeCurtis’s motion for 

summary judgment regarding invalidity, finding as follows: 

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- The “storing a log” term is “broad but not ambiguous,” thus rendering 

claim 11 of the system patent “clear and precise enough to inform the 

public, with reasonable certainty, of the claim’s scope” and, therefore, 

not indefinite, as claimed by DeCurtis. 

- Because the “each sensor” term was constructed to mean “each BLE 

sensor,” it cannot be invalid for lack of a written description of an NFC 

sensor that is capable of commanding the change of BLE operating 

modes. (Id. at 27.) 

- Because there are genuinely disputed issues of material fact as to the 

actual contours of the lower dimensional limits of the “portable wireless 

device” term and whether a person of ordinary skill in the art can 

approach that limit without undue experimentation, summary judgment 

as to lack of enablement is not warranted. 

- Because the “processor configured” claim sufficiently conveys that 

Carnival had possession of the claimed invention at the time it filed its 

patent application, DeCurtis did not establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that this claim lacks sufficient written support as a matter of 

law. 

(Id. at 20, 27, 30, 33–34.) 

 As to Judge Torres’s recommendations regarding both the claims 

construction and DeCurtis’s summary-judgment motion, DeCurtis lodges 

objections relating to four aspects of the report. First, DeCurtis insists that 

Judge Torres erroneously rewrote the “storing a log” term in claim 11 of the 

‘184 patent under the guise of simply clarifying the only reasonable 

interpretation of the claim. (DeCurtis’s Objs. at 6–9.) As to this same term, 

DeCurtis also objects to Judge Torres’s determination that it is not invalid for 

indefiniteness and his resulting recommendation that summary judgment 

should be denied. (Id. at 6–9.) Second, DeCurtis argues that Judge Torres erred 

in finding, through his claim-construction analysis, that Carnival did not 

disavow the wired embodiment of the “second transceiver” term because he 

relied on Carnival’s mischaracterization of prior art that Carnival distinguished 

during its patent prosecution. (Id. at 10–13.) Third, DeCurtis complains that 

Judge Torres erroneously construed the term “each sensor” to mean “each 

BLE sensor” when the term should have simply been given its plain and 

ordinary meaning of “every sensor.” (Id. at 13–17.) This claim-construction 

error, says DeCurtis, was then compounded when Judge Torres concluded that 

summary judgment as to the invalidity of the associated claim is unwarranted. 

(Id. at 17–18.) Fourth, and finally, DeCurtis says Judge Torres erred in finding 

summary judgment inappropriate regarding the lack of an enabling disclosure 

for the full range of dimensions for the “portable wireless device” term. (Id. at 

19–21.) 

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2. Standard of Review

“In order to challenge the findings and recommendations of the 

magistrate judge, a party must file written objections which shall specifically 

identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendation to which 

objection is made and the specific basis for objection.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 

F. App’x 781, 783 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Heath v. Jones, 863 F.2d 815, 822 

(11th Cir.1989) (cleaned up). The objections must also present “supporting 

legal authority.” Local Mag. J. R. 4(b). Once a district court receives “objections 

meeting the specificity requirement set out above,” it must “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report to which objection is made and 

may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Macort, 208 F. App’x at 783–

84 (quoting Heath, 863 F.2d at 822) (cleaned up). To the extent a party fails to 

object to parts of the magistrate judge’s report, those portions are reviewed, at 

a minimum, for clear error. Macort, 208 F. App’x at 784 (quoting Johnson v. 

Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir.1999)). A court, in its discretion, 

need not consider arguments that were not, in the first instance, presented to 

the magistrate judge. Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009).

3. Analysis

Although DeCurtis only objected to some of Judge Torres’s findings and 

conclusions, the Court has, nonetheless reviewed the entirety of his report de 

novo. Having done so, the Court finds itself in agreement with all of Judge 

Torres’s analyses and resulting determinations. As to DeCurtis’s objections 

specifically, the Court finds them unpersuasive as set forth, with more 

particularity, below.

To begin with, the Court disagrees with DeCurtis’s position that the 

“storing a log associating each unique identifier” limitation is indefinite. Claim 

11 of the system patent describes a “guest engagement system comprising . . . 

a central server . . . storing a log associating each unique identifier of a 

portable guest device received using BLE [Bluetooth low energy] or NFC [nearfield communication] communications by a sensor of the sensor network.” (‘184 

Patent, 42:49–54, ECF No. 205-2.) The Court agrees with Judge Torres that, 

while this limitation may be broad, it is, nonetheless, not ambiguous. Indeed, 

although this claim does not specify particular data that the “log” must 

associate with each unique identifier detected by a sensor in the sensor 

network, a person of ordinary skill in the art would, as even DeCurtis’s own 

expert acknowledged, “recognize the phrase . . . require[s] that an association 

be created between ‘each unique identifier’ and some other, unidentified piece of 

Case 1:20-cv-22945-RNS Document 413 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/28/2022 Page 4 of 8
information.” (Shoemake Decl. ¶ 104, ECF No. 205-7 (emphasis added).) The 

Court agrees with Judge Torres that “as written, the claim covers a log that 

associates one data point: a detected unique identifier,” and that “[t]he only 

way in which the log could ‘associate’ that data point is to tie it . . . to at least 

one other data point.” (Rep. at 19.) The Court, conversely, disagrees with 

DeCurtis that this clarification amounts to a rewriting of the claim language. 

Further, the Court also finds DeCurtis’s arguments as to the breadth of the 

claim unavailing. Simply put, “breadth is not indefiniteness.” BASF Corp. v. 

Johnson Matthey Inc., 875 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the 

Court finds that, without more, DeCurtis has not shown that the breadth of the 

claim here—allowing for the “log” limitation to cover more than any one 

particular embodiment—amounts to indefiniteness. 

Next, the Court finds DeCurtis’s contentions regarding the scope of the 

“second transceiver” claims to miss the mark as well. Claim 1 of the system 

patent and claim 13 of the of the door lock patent describe a “guest 

engagement system comprising . . . a plurality of access panels each configured 

to control an electronically controlled door lock . . . and each access panel 

comprises . . . a second transceiver configured for communication with the 

central server.” (‘184 Patent at 40:59–62; ‘516 Patent, 42:1–3, ECF No. 205-4.) 

The Court agrees with Judge Torres that a plain and ordinary meaning of the 

claims encompasses both wired and wireless embodiments of the second 

transceiver. The Court also concurs that DeCurtis failed to meet its burden of 

establishing that Carnival disavowed a wired embodiment of the second 

transceiver during its prosecution of the patent. As pointed out by Judge 

Torres, the standard for disclaimer is “demanding,” requiring a “clear and 

unmistakable” disavowal for the doctrine to attach. (Rep. at 23 (quoting Avid 

Tech., Inc. v. Harmonic, Inc., 812 F.3d 1040, 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).) In urging 

application of disclaimer, DeCurtis points to a statement Carnival made during 

patent prosecution, distinguishing Carnival’s patent from prior art that 

Carnival said is “notably not described as having multiple wireless 

communication interfaces including ‘a radio, a first transceiver, and a second 

transceiver.’” (Schmidt Decl., Ex. L, Carnival Patent Pros., ECF No. 199-12, 12 

(emphasis in original; otherwise cleaned up).) According to the way DeCurtis 

interprets the statement, Carnival disavowed the wired embodiment of the 

second transceiver. While DeCurtis’s urged interpretation is certainly one 

possible way of interpreting the patent-prosecution statement, DeCurtis’s 

insistence, that Judge Torres erred in concluding that its preferred 

interpretation was the only reasonable interpretation, falls wide of the mark. 

Further, tellingly, DeCurtis fails to point to any other piece of evidence that 

might support its urged prosecution-history disclaimer. Avid Tech., 812 F.3d at 

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1045 (“When the prosecution history is used solely to support a conclusion of 

patentee disclaimer, the standard for justifying the conclusion is a high one.”). 

In sum, the Court finds no error in Judge Torres’s assessment of the “second 

transceiver” term and disagrees with DeCurtis that it has met the rigorous 

standard required to establish disavowal. 

Continuing, DeCurtis complains Judge Torres was led into error by 

Carnival in construing “each sensor of the sensor network,” as set forth in 

claim 11 of the system patent, as “each BLE sensor of the sensor network.” 

(Objs. at 13–17.) As a result of this claim-construction error, says DeCurtis, 

Judge Torres’s error was further multiplied when he found summary judgment 

as to the invalidity of the claim unwarranted. (Id. at 17–18.) Because the Court 

disagrees with DeCurtis as to its first point of error, the Court disagrees, as 

well, as to DeCurtis’s second point.

This part of claim 11 of the system patent describes a “guest engagement 

system comprising: a plurality of portable guest devices . . . wherein each guest 

device is configured to selectively operate according to first and second 

operating modes [and] each sensor of the sensor network is operative to 

transmit a command to a guest device in its communication range to cause the 

guest device to change operating mode between the first and second operating 

modes.” (‘184 Patent at 42:28–29, 55–56, 64–67 (emphasis added).) DeCurtis 

maintains that the phrase “each sensor” clearly and unambiguously refers to 

every sensor of the sensor network, meaning that the claim, by its plain and 

ordinary meaning, encompasses both BLE as well as NFC sensors. (Id. at 14–

15.) Accordingly, says DeCurtis, it was error for Judge Torres to construe the 

claim at all. (Id. at 13 – 16.) Or, says DeCurtis, even if construction is 

warranted, Judge Torres improperly construed “each sensor” to mean “each 

BLE sensor.” (Id. at 16–17.) The Court is not convinced.

First, to the extent DeCurtis contends that the limitation needs no 

construction or, more particularly, that the term “each sensor” need not be 

construed at all, the Court declines to consider the argument. DeCurtis raises 

this point for the first time, in its objections, neglecting to raise it before Judge 

Torres. See Williams, 557 F.3d at 1292 (“[A] district court has discretion 

to decline to consider a party’s argument when that argument was not first 

presented to the magistrate judge.”). Second, the Court finds DeCurtis’s other 

claims of error miss the mark: in light of the intrinsic evidence, Judge Torres’s 

construction does not result in an improper narrowing of the claim; it does not 

amount to an improper limitation to a preferred embodiment; and, based on 

the context, it was not error for Judge Torres to construe “each sensor” as 

“each BLE sensor” in this limitation only.

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Ultimately, the Court agrees with Judge Torres’s recommendation with 

respect to this claim. Importantly, the parties do not dispute that this claim 

limitation requires the issuance of commands for a portable guest device to 

change between BLE operating modes. Accordingly, the Court agrees with 

Judge Torres that the command to change from one BLE operating mode to 

another BLE operating mode must be accomplished using BLE communication 

protocols. And, based on the intrinsic evidence, BLE and NFC are decidedly

distinct protocols, and the claimed system uses different antennas for BLE 

versus NFC communications. (‘184 Patent at 6:12–18, 15:39–60; 42:29–35, Fig. 

6, Fig. 7H, Objs. at 13–14.) Further, the system patent describes two distinct 

types of sensors: one that is capable of communicating with the guest device 

via BLE; and one via NFC communication. (Objs. at 13; ‘184 Patent at 42:36–

46.) Accordingly, the Court agrees with Judge Torres that the sensors 

referenced in the phrase “each sensor” would only encompass sensors capable 

of BLE-communication protocols. Hence, and contrary to DeCurtis’s objections,

the Court agrees that “each sensor” should be construed to read as “each BLE 

sensor.” Because the Court agrees with Judge Torres’s construction, and 

DeCurtis’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is premised on the 

construction’s being in error, the Court also overrules DeCurtis’s objections 

regarding invalidity. 

Finally, the Court disagrees with DeCurtis’s fourth objection as well.

DeCurtis complains that Judge Torres erred in denying DeCurtis’s motion for 

summary judgment as to the invalidity of claim 11 of the portable wireless 

devise patent. As explained by Judge Torres, “the claim clearly describes a 

portable wireless device that comprises a processor, a memory, a battery, and 

two wireless communication antennas that are disposed within the cavity of a 

fully enclosed device that is small than 2.5 inches in diameter and thinner 

than (or equal to) 5/8 inches thickness.” (Rep. at 28.) Judge Torres rejected 

DeCurtis’s argument that the claim is invalid for lack of enablement or that the 

claim should be limited to two specific embodiments disclosed in the patent. 

(Id. at 29.) Instead, Judge Torres concluded that, although the claim is open 

ended, it is, nonetheless, subject to an inherent limit. (Id.) DeCurtis complains, 

at bottom, that this was in error because Judge Torres did not identify what 

that inherent limit actually is and, by failing to identify that limit, could not 

really say whether a person skilled in the art could approach that (unspecified)

limit without undue experimentation. DeCurtis’s framing of the issue dooms its 

argument.

This issue arrives before the Court in the context of a motion for 

summary judgment. Accordingly, it is DeCurtis’s initial burden to come forward 

with evidence showing that the record, even when read in the light most 

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favorable to Carnival, affirmatively establishes a lack of enablement. In 

insisting that Carnival must come forward, preemptively, with the precise 

inherent limitation of the enablement, as well as a showing that a person of 

ordinary skill in the art could implement that particular enablement limitation 

without undue experimentation, DeCurtis improperly flips the parties’ 

respective burdens on a motion for summary judgment. Read in the light most 

favorable to Carnival, the Court agrees with Carnival that DeCurtis’s own 

expert’s testimony undercuts its motion. DeCurtis’s expert concluded that “a 

person of ordinary skill [in] the art would have to engage in undue 

experimentation to achieve a device with dual antennas configured for BLE and 

NFC communications that is less than at least 1.1093 inches in diameter, and 

less than at least .3937 inches in thickness.” (DeCurtis’s Cl. Constr. Br., Ex. 9, 

Tentzeris’s Decl. ¶ 59, ECF No. 205-10, 17.) By extension, then, and certainly 

when read in the light most favorable to Carnival, a person of ordinary skill in 

the art would not have to engage in undue experimentation to achieve a device 

of those precise dimensions. And, taking the statement a step further, and still 

reading it in the light most favorable to Carnival, these dimensions could also 

be interpreted as representing the inherent limits of the open-ended claim. This 

alone is enough to show that DeCurtis failed to meet its initial burden on a 

motion for summary judgment. And so, because DeCurtis fails to establish the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact, in the first instance, Carnival is 

under no obligation to come forward with evidence establishing its own case, in 

rebuttal.

4. Conclusion

In sum, the Court overrules DeCurtis’s objections (ECF No. 273), thus

affirming and adopting Judge Torres’s report and recommendations (ECF No. 

267), granting Carnival’s opening claim construction brief (as summarized in 

section 1) and denying DeCurtis’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 

203). 

Done and ordered at Miami, Florida, on July 27, 2022.

________________________________

Robert N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge

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