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20–787PDF 2005

ZIMBABWE: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY AFTER

THE MARCH 2005 ELECTIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN 

RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 21, 2005

Serial No. 109–31

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL

OPERATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, 

Vice Chairman 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BARBARA LEE, California 

BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

MARY M. NOONAN, Subcommittee Staff Director 

NOELLE LUSANE, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

LINDSEY M. PLUMLEY, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Constance Berry Newman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ......................................................... 8

Greg Mills, Ph.D., Director-Designate, The Brenthurst Foundation, South 

Africa ..................................................................................................................... 26

Mr. Jeffrey Krilla, Africa Program Director, International Republican Institute ........................................................................................................................ 35

Ms. Shari Bryan, Regional Director, Southern and East Africa Program, 

National Democratic Institute ............................................................................ 40

Mr. David Coddington, Regional Representative, Southern Africa Office, 

Catholic Relief Services ....................................................................................... 46

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Constance Berry Newman: Prepared statement ......................... 9

Greg Mills, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................................. 30

Mr. Jeffrey Krilla: Prepared statement ................................................................. 37

Ms. Shari Bryan: Prepared statement ................................................................... 42

Mr. David Coddington: Prepared statement ......................................................... 49

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Human Rights and International Operations: Statement from the Most 

Reverend Archbishop Pius Ncube dated March 26, 2005 entitled ‘‘Political 

Abuse of Food Ahead of Parliamentary Elections’’ ............................................ 59

(1)

ZIMBABWE: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 

AFTER THE MARCH 2005 ELECTIONS 

THURSDAY, APRIL 21, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS

AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 o’clock p.m. in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. 

Smith (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The Subcommittee will come to order. 

And I am very pleased to convene this hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations. Today we will be looking at the prospects for democracy in 

one of the most troubled countries on the African continent, 

Zimbabwe. 

Zimbabwe celebrated the 25th anniversary of its independence 

this past Monday, but most Zimbabweans had little to celebrate. In 

the words of the newspaper, The Zimbabwe Standard, this southern African nation is experiencing an ‘‘unprecedented political and 

economic crisis.’’

President Robert Mugabe, a hero of his country’s independence 

struggle, has been in power since April 18, 1980, and he claims the 

last 25 years have left him wiser; however, the record doesn’t support his claim. 

Three-fourths of Zimbabweans eligible for work are unemployed. 

Many companies, including major exporters to the United States, 

have been forced to shut down due to the country’s economic dismantling. A disastrous land redistribution program has led to the 

collapse of the country’s agriculture sector. According to Catholic 

Relief Services and their testimony today, some 400,000 agricultural jobs have been lost. And while the continent of Africa is experiencing the highest economic growth in nearly a decade, 

Zimbabwe’s economy is contracting. 

The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom rates 

Zimbabwe as ‘‘repressed,’’ based on uniformly poor economic policies. Freedom House lists the country as ‘‘not free,’’ based on a severely restricted political process, which has included oppression of 

political opponents, significant limits on freedom of the press, and 

a string of manipulated elections. The World Bank Institute’s governance index rates Zimbabwe as ‘‘poor’’ across the board in categories measuring the ability of citizens to express themselves politically, to rule of law, to control of corruption. 

2

One would think, then, that the people of Zimbabwe would rise 

up and select new leadership to restore what was once one of the 

most advanced nations in Africa to its rightful position among the 

continent’s countries. However, internal and external factors sometimes combine to make such a laudable goal very difficult to 

achieve. 

More than anyone else, President Mugabe has contributed to a 

climate of fear, and heightened even further explosive racial tensions in this nation, which was formerly ruled by a White minority 

regime. Rather than take the success he achieved in 1980 and 

build on it, President Mugabe has taken the repressive path and 

has systematically violated the fundamental human rights of the 

people of Zimbabwe. 

According to the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on 

Human Rights Practices, Zimbabwe’s human rights conditions are 

among the worst. The report said, and I quote:

‘‘The government’s human rights record remained very poor, 

and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. President 

Mugabe and his ZANU–PF party used intimidation and violence to maintain political power.’’

The State Department goes on to say:

‘‘A systematic government-sanctioned campaign of violence 

targeting supporters and perceived supporters of the opposition 

continued during the year. Security forces committed at least 

one extrajudicial killing. Ruling party supporters, with material support from the Government, continued their occupation 

of commercial farms, and in some cases killed, abducted, tortured, intimidated, raped, or threatened farm occupants. Security forces, government-sanctioned youth militias, and ruling 

party supporters tortured, raped, and otherwise abused persons perceived to be associated with the opposition; some persons died from their injuries. Prison conditions remained harsh 

and life threatening. Official impunity for ruling party supporters who committed abuses was a problem. Arbitrary arrest 

and detention remained problems, and lengthy pretrial detention emerged as a problem. Infringements on citizens’ privacy 

continued. The Government continued its far-reaching ‘fast 

track’ resettlement program under which most large-scale commercial farms were designated for seizure without fair compensation.’’

It also goes on in page after page, paragraph after paragraph, to 

point out, and I just quote again briefly:

‘‘The Government continued to restrict freedom of speech 

and of the press, academic freedom, freedom of assembly, and 

the right of association for political organizations.’’

Leadership does matter, as we all know, and the parliamentary 

election this election was a test of electoral reforms guided by regional standards. According to most assessments of the electoral 

process, this test failed. 

Even before the voting began, there were serious questions about 

whether a free and fair election was even possible. Voting rolls allegedly carried hundreds of thousands of dead voters, apparently 

3

for use in rigging the election. Manipulation of district boundaries 

cut four pro-opposition constituencies in the capital and in 

Bulawayo, while three new constituencies were created in areas favorable to the ruling party. The police and army are said to have 

contributed to more subtle intimidation of voters than in the past. 

Food aid reportedly was again used to coerce hungry voters to 

maintain the political status quo. 

The opposition, Movement for Democratic Change, or the MDC, 

issued a report last week which detailed specific instances of fraud 

in the March legislative elections. In fact, the MDC has filed suit 

in the election court contesting results from 13 constituencies. It is 

estimated that more than 133,000 voters were turned away from 

the polls without being able to cast their ballots. The Zimbabwe 

Electoral Commission still has not explained the addition or subtraction of thousands of votes from 72 of the 120 constituencies. 

Now that the election is over, there are reports of reprisals 

against opposition supporters. According to The Zimbabwe Standard, the MDC supporters are being denied maize meal in one of the 

provinces as punishment for their suspected vote. If true, then this 

does not bode well for reconciliation and progress in this troubled 

nation. 

Externally, to judge when to apply quiet diplomacy and when 

stronger measures are needed has proved elusive. In the months 

running up to President Bush’s African tour in 2003, both he and 

Secretary of State, Colin Powell, made demands for President 

Mugabe to resign, and together put the Mugabe regime under intense pressure. This followed the signing into law of the Zimbabwe 

Democracy & Economic Recovery Act passed by Congress in 2001. 

However, after meeting in Pretoria with South Africa’s President 

Mbeki in July 2003, President Bush rescinded his demands for 

change in Zimbabwe, and deferred to President Mbeki’s ‘‘quiet diplomacy’’ efforts, declaring that ‘‘he was an honest broker.’’

The U.S. has not fully applied economic and political sanctions 

called for in congressional legislation, and recently reduced its levels of assistance to NGOs assisting with political party development and support to the opposition. These actions at least seem 

puzzling in light of Secretary Rice’s naming of Zimbabwe as an 

‘‘outpost of tyranny.’’ In fact, Zimbabwe is the only ‘‘outpost’’ whose 

funding for democracy and governance programs has been cut. 

In South Africa, President Mbeki and his political party, the 

ANC, has publicly supported Mugabe and the ZANU–PF while privately attempting to facilitate contact between Zimbabwe’s Government and the opposition, focusing on convincing both parties to 

agree to constitutional and legal changes. 

The wisdom of South Africa’s policy approach must be questioned. The South African Government, despite clear evidence to 

the contrary, claimed the elections were free and fair. That was 

very disappointing. There has been no measurable improvement—

in fact, there has been a steady worsening—of the political and economic environment inside Zimbabwe over the past 5 years. 

Not everybody in South Africa, however, agrees with President 

Mbeki. Zimbabwe’s democracy movement has the support of regional civil society, in particular South Africa’s Congress of Trade 

Unions and its Council of Churches. The head of the African Union 

4

observer mission called for an immediate investigation into the 

electoral fraud, and the opposition parties in South Africa which 

assisted with parliamentary election observer missions do not agree 

with the ANC’s declaration that the elections were free and fair. 

In this hearing, I look forward to a more thorough examination 

of how the United States can best bring about democratic change, 

peaceful change in Zimbabwe, and help the country address its 

worsened critical humanitarian needs, and restart the economic 

growth and prosperity its citizens so desperately need. 

As his country reached a quarter century of independence, President Mugabe honored other Africa leaders such as Sir Seretse 

Khama, Botswana’s founding father. One would hope we would follow the former Botswana leader’s example as to how to lead a nation. 

Zimbabwe should be a leading example of successful industrialization and effective modern democratic leadership. Instead, it is 

increasingly an example of how to waste the human and natural 

resources of a nation. 

Robert Mugabe was a hero to his people and to his fellow Africans for successfully standing up to racism and oppression. More 

than two decades later, however, he has so tarnished his image 

that it must now resemble the fictional portrait of Dorian Gray, 

showing an increasingly repugnant picture of a hero who has gone 

astray. 

I would like to now yield to my friend and colleague, Mr. Payne, 

for any opening comments he might have. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 

calling this important hearing. And I see the Vice Chair, who has 

had Zimbabwe as one of the principal countries during his tenure 

as Chairman. And we certainly are looking forward to prospects for 

democracy at the March 5th parliamentary elections. It is clear 

that we still have a long way to go. 

As we know, Zimbabwe has been mired in a political and economic crisis for the past few years, but the country’s long history 

is one that many in Africa look to in the past with pride, with leaders who fought against apartheid, as did President Mandela, and 

Robert Mugabe and Joshua Como were those who were hailed by 

pan-Africanists as they moved to change the White apartheid regime in Rhodesia. However, postindependence Zimbabwe clearly 

demonstrates much of the best of Africa and what Africa is capable 

of doing, but also it shows the difficulties that can occur when governance is not kept pace, as we have seen in Zimbabwe. 

Despite decades of repressive White regime, White Zimbabweans 

were embraced after independence, not chased out of the country 

or mistreated, as cynics predicted. Human rights were largely respected, and the rule of law prevailed in the country. Education became a primary principle of the Mugabe regime. And for the first 

time in an African country, education became the center of the 

country’s development, and extensive parts of the budget was provided for universal elementary education, and secondary education 

and higher education was not uncommon in Zimbabwe, taking its 

resources and put it there. 

So we have a country that post-colonial period has moved into 

education as a key to its people. Indeed, Zimbabwe had long been 

5

a model country with a stable Government and a modern economy, 

but as we have seen, as I have mentioned, and to my disappointment, in recent years conditions went from bad to worse, in large 

part due to poor leadership of President Mugabe. The once politically stable country became increasingly chaotic, and economically 

has been left in shambles. 

Human rights abuses were extensive and increasing, and the 

Government seemed to care little about the rule of law. I have tried 

desperately to engage the Government in a constructive dialogue to 

address these concerns over the years. I am resolved to help the 

people of Zimbabwe realize their dream of true freedom and independence as they fought for many years, but now are seeing it 

elude them. 

The method of redistribution of land from White landowners to 

political allies of President Mugabe was misguided and wrong; 

however, the land issue is a real problem in the region, and I am 

committed to seeing a just and equitable distribution of land 

through southern Africa, consistent with the rules of law. 

Additionally, the UK did not hold up its end of the deal in the 

Lancaster House Agreement in 1979. This ended the rule of Rhodesia, Zimbabwe’s colonial name by Ian Smith, and among other 

things laid out a procedure for land reform which was desperately 

needed to address disparities between Whites and Blacks, and to 

address poverty in general. 

Fifty percent of the land was owned by 3 percent of the population, the 3 percent White settlers owned half of the aridable land, 

the land that you could do something with. Britain and the United 

States pledged to carry out funding so that land could be purchased 

from the White settlers and redistributed, but it was based on the 

willing buyer, willing seller principle. And because only the first 

portion of the funding was actually given to Zimbabwe, the land reform process was unsuccessful because it was stopped soon after it 

began. Recently, Prime Minister Blair said that he was not responsible for the Lancaster House Agreement of 25 years ago. 

In 2001 I pushed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act through the House, with the assistance of my colleagues 

and Mr. Royce. It was signed into law at the end of 2001. The bill’s 

principle objective was to help restore rule of law, respect for 

human rights, free and fair elections, and sound economic reform. 

The legislation provided new funding for Zimbabwe if serious reforms were undertaken by the Government. The legislation did not 

punish the people of Zimbabwe, nor did it impose sanctions on the 

Government of Zimbabwe if they would cooperate and start to have 

transparency in their Government. 

Since then, U.S. policy toward Zimbabwe has been one of isolation. And given the current state of affairs, it begs the question, 

Has our policy been effective through isolation? I think our policy 

and the policy of international communities, which isolated the 

Government of Zimbabwe, as we can see has not worked. President 

Mugabe’s behavior over the last few years has been deplorable. 

However, we need not leave the continent of Africa to find examples of cases where the United States has engaged in—and even 

considered allies—dictators who have brutally opposed their people 

and driven their countries into economic and political ruin. I just 

6

cite these because it is something that we are certainly not proud 

of, but they are the facts. 

The primary history example is Mubutu of Zaire, who, with the 

help—from 1967–1997—of the siphoned off billions of dollars with 

the help of the United States Government during the Cold War, 

and was responsible for countless deaths all because he sided with 

the United States over former Soviet Union and helped us with 

covert operations against the Government of neighboring Angola in 

our assistance of the White apartheid regime of South Africa. 

Today’s example is the Beshir Government of Sudan. The regime 

of Khartoum has been considered a United States ally since 9/11 

because they said, in the war against terrorism, they would provide 

information, and we have moved to have normal relations with our 

Embassy, which had been closed until after 9/11. Meanwhile, the 

same Government headed by President Omar al-Beshir and Vice 

President Taha, has orchestrated genocide against its own Black 

population, first in southern Sudan where 2 million people were 

killed since 1993 and 4 million displaced, and now in Darfur, where 

300,000 have been killed and 2 million displaced. All of this is terrible. 

However, we need to look at consistency in our policy, which is 

certainly lacking. So we engage Mubutu and we were engaging 

Beshir, who armed the Janjaweed to kill Darfurians, yet we will 

not engage Robert Mugabe. This is yet another example of inconsistencies in our policy, in my opinion. 

But today in Zimbabwe, we have an opportunity. The parliamentary elections of March 31 were relatively peaceful, that is about 

the biggest glimmer of hope that we have seen because the previous elections were marred with violence and killings and beatings. So we have moved from that physical brutality, and I think 

that is a step in the right direction. The opposition party, MDC, the 

Movement for Democratic Change, decided not to protest the results, and didn’t see nearly the same level of violence as the last 

Presidential election held in March 2003. The ZANU–PF, the 

Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front, engaged with 

more than two-thirds majority merged with more than two-thirds 

majority. We have to remember that there are other countries 

where the democratic process is even more stifled. In Ethiopia, for 

example, the ruling party has the majority of seats in the Parliament which controls the national media. 

A few weeks ago Prime Minister Meles expelled IFIS, NDI and 

IRI, which were involved in pre-election activities and were planning to observe the upcoming elections in Ethiopia, however, we 

have not made any moves against Ethiopia because of this. The 

Eritrea, the independence press, was shut down and opposition 

kept out of the process, yet we work closely with both of these Governments. 

In Egypt, second largest recipient of United States foreign assistance, have had one-party rule for the last decade. And our greatest 

ally in the Middle East of the Islamic Governments currently is 

Pakistan, run by the general who overtook the Government. 

And so we ought to move certainly toward consistency. We must 

not condone wrong actions, but I think that one of the problems 

that we see is that we have inconsistency in our policies. I would 

7

certainly like for the people of Zimbabwe to see, perhaps, the retirement of Mr. Mugabe so that great country could move forward. 

However, I think that we must really try to engage with the Government of Zimbabwe, and hopefully, with some assistance from 

other Africa Union countries, we may be able to see a change. 

We will continue to try to work toward the benefit of the people 

of Zimbabwe, who certainly deserve much better. And also, of 

course we don’t like these redistricting plans that really cut up districts where people could be elected, however, unfortunately we see 

that also in our Texas plan and the one that is being considered 

right now really in Georgia, where the same results will occur as 

happened in Texas, where we will have less Democrats elected because of the plan which is going through the assembly and Senate 

in Georgia. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. SMITH. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Would anyone else like to be heard before we go to our witnesses? 

Ms. Lee. 

Ms. LEE. I will be very brief, and would just like to thank you 

for this hearing, and say that it is very important we listen to our 

witnesses today to really look. And I want to associate myself with 

my colleague from New Jersey’s remarks, because I do believe 

there needs to be some consistency in our foreign policy, especially 

as it relates to countries that we have a real reason to engage with, 

such as Zimbabwe. 

And a couple of things, just with regard to the elections—and I 

have been an observer in Nigeria and in South Africa, and certainly Zimbabwe’s recent election—and you laid out some of the 

issues. Of course they are of concern to myself as an election observer, but also in terms of just consistency. Many of the flaws that 

we saw in Zimbabwe, I must say, we have seen here in our own 

communities in Florida and in Ohio and in other places around the 

country. And so to base our foreign policy or a focus of our foreign 

policy on our assessment of elections and voter fraud, I think, begs 

the question: Are we going to use that same standard as we look 

at our own elections? And I think we should. 

And again, the policy of isolation, we tried that with many countries, it doesn’t work. Engaging with Pakistan and other countries, 

China; we have many examples of how engagement furthers dialogue and prevents conflicts from erupting. But yet with regard to 

Zimbabwe, we know it is not a moral democracy. But I agree with 

Mr. Payne that the policy of isolation just hasn’t worked. And I 

think this Committee should look at real strategies to develop a 

more realistic foreign policy toward Africa, especially toward 

Zimbabwe, because otherwise we are just going to continue to bash 

those countries that we don’t consider a model democracy and embrace those that we know are not model democracies but need to 

embrace for whatever reason. 

So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to welcome our distinguished first witness to the table, and that is Assistant Secretary Constance Berry 

Newman, who was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs on June 24, 2004. 

8

Prior to serving her duties, Secretary Newman served as Assistant Administrator for Africa for USAID. Before joining USAID, 

Secretary Newman served from 1998 to 2001 as a board member 

of the International Republican Institute, and in that capacity she 

participated in election and other monitoring activities in Nigeria, 

Ukraine, Russia and China. She also served as a private consultant 

to South African leaders on affirmative action and diversity, and to 

the World Bank as liaison to representatives of the South African 

National Congress, and many others. 

Let me just say, without objection, your full, very impressive 

background will be made a part of the record, and please proceed 

as you like. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. NEWMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee. I am going to summarize, but would like 

for the full statement to be made a part of the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, Madam Secretary, your full statement will be made part of the record. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify 

on the recent elections in Zimbabwe and to give my views on where 

do we go from here, the future. 

As Secretary Rice made clear, the March 31 elections for 

Zimbabwe’s Parliament were a travesty of democratic standards. 

They were not free and fair. And this was a sad day for Zimbabwe 

and for the cause of democracy in the region. 

Late last year, as you know, Zimbabwe’s civil society and democratic movement debated as to whether or not to boycott the elections. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and 

many independent groups were doubtful that Mugabe’s actions 

would lead to a tolerant, honest election, given Zimbabwe’s history. 

Well, after much deliberation, MDC made a painful choice to enter 

the race and to keep ZANU–PF from monopolizing the Parliament. 

They ran a strong race. The fact that MDC even exists, in spite of 

5 years of heavy repression, is a testament to the enduring 

strength of democratic culture in Zimbabwe. 

But back to what we know about the recent election. Unfortunately, MDC’s pre-election concerns were valid. The independent 

press is muzzled or biased, they used food as a weapon, there were 

limitations on the freedom of assembly. On election day, tens of 

thousands of voters were turned away from the polls, and the vote 

count, most certainly, was rigged. 

What does this mean for the people of Zimbabwe? Well, the result is a Parliament that will continue to do the bidding of Robert 

Mugabe, and will not speak for all of the people of Zimbabwe. This 

means the challenges of unemployment, orbiting food prices, refugees, limited investment, and continuing failure to address 

HIV/AIDS. 

Worst of all, Zimbabwe, through this period, may be on the brink 

of another food emergency. And a quick comparison to the past, 

and many of you have spoken to this, Zimbabwe used to be the 

breadbasket of southern Africa. Today, it does not, cannot, export 

9

food. It used to have one of the best health care systems: Now 

Zimbabwe’s doctors and nurses are found all over the world. And 

unfortunately, it stands out as the outlier in a part of Africa that 

has seen massive improvements in governments and economic 

management in the last decade. 

Just a few points about responses to the election. Considering the 

high stakes for the region, it was disappointing that the governments of Southern Africa Development Community failed to use 

more influence with Mugabe to guarantee the integrity of the election. Although I have said that, at the same time I must note that 

it was probably SADC influence that played a role in keeping the 

election largely free from violence, and we expect that SADC will 

continue to work for the restoration of democracy in Zimbabwe. 

We were also encouraged that the African Union observer team 

called for an investigation of irregularities. 

As for the response of the United States, we are in the process 

of reviewing and updating our sanctions regime to ensure that our 

targeted sanctions have the flexibility and teeth, and are adequate 

to the new situation. 

The individuals who abused democracy and helped to steal this 

election must be held accountable. However, it will not be our intent to impose general sanctions on Zimbabwe that will hurt the 

people or the economy. We reject any steps that would cause ordinary people to suffer from the sins of the leadership. 

We are, as you know, the largest donor of assistance to fight 

HIV/AIDS epidemic which threatens to kill 25 percent of 

Zimbabwe’s adult population. We have also intervened to prevent 

mass famine. Since 2002 USAID has provided almost $300 million 

of humanitarian assistance, and we stand ready again to assist the 

people, should the food shortages materialize. But we will not allow 

the Government to direct or control the distribution of that food 

aid. 

We also do important work to support Zimbabwe’s democratic 

culture and civil society, help for torture victims, and help for 

human rights activists. The recent elections underscore the continuing need for democracy programs in Zimbabwe. 

So I will end by just saying, ultimately it is, though, the people 

of Zimbabwe who will reclaim their freedoms, but our assistance 

can help to level the playing field and ensure that truth has a 

voice, and all people of Zimbabwe can see there is an alternative 

to intimidation and fear. 

So I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and am 

prepared to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Newman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the recent Zimbabwean elections and 

to give my views on the future of that country. 

RESULTS AND CONDUCT OF THE MARCH 31 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

As Secretary Rice made clear, the March 31 elections for Zimbabwe’s parliament 

were a travesty of democratic standards. They were not free and fair. Instead, they 

are proof that Robert Mugabe and the ZANU–PF party continue to trample on 

Zimbabwe’s democratic institutions and traditions; they continue to rule by fraud 

10

and coercion. The elections were a sad day for Zimbabwe and for the cause of democracy in the region. 

Late last year, Zimbabwe’s civil society and democratic movement debated whether to boycott the election. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 

party and many independent groups were doubtful that Mugabe would tolerate an 

honest election; they did not want MDC to legitimize a vote that was likely to be 

tainted. Their fears were not baseless: elections in 2000 and 2002 were marred by 

massive violence and fraud. 

After much deliberation, MDC made a painful choice to enter the 2005 race to 

get out the democratic message to the people, and to keep ZANU–PF from monopolizing parliament. MDC ran a strong race. It had a popular message about economics, health, and democracy, and mounted a serious campaign in every district of the 

country, drawing large crowds in urban and rural areas alike. MDC has clearly 

emerged as a mature, viable opposition party. The fact that MDC even exists in 

spite of five years of heavy repression is testament to the enduring strength of 

democratic culture in Zimbabwe 

Unfortunately, MDC’s pre-election concerns were valid. The independent press 

was muzzled; ZANU–PF candidates used food as a weapon to sway hungry voters; 

state-owned TV and radio were heavily biased; freedom of assembly was constrained; secret police attended opposition rallies taking down names. On election 

day, tens of thousands of voters were turned away from the polls. The vote count 

was almost certainly rigged and credible evidence suggests that ZANU–PF stole 

more than a dozen seats from MDC. 

CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIC CHANGE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY

The result is that Zimbabwe’s parliament will continue to do the bidding of Robert 

Mugabe but will not speak for all of Zimbabwe’s people. It lacks the legitimacy and 

the power to tackle the huge problems that are wrecking the country. It is difficult 

to overstate the size or danger of these challenges. The economy is collapsing; unemployment is more than 70 percent; food prices are going into orbit; political and economic refugees continue to flee, including some of Zimbabwe’s best educated citizens; new investment is zero; firms are facing bankruptcy; and health care is collapsing in the face of a raging HIV/AIDS epidemic. 

Worst of all, Zimbabwe may be on the brink of another food emergency brought 

on by drought and the government’s disastrous economic policies. We do not know 

the full dimensions of the emergency, since Zimbabwe has barred assessment teams 

from the World Food Programme from entering the country. However, what evidence we have strongly indicates that millions of Zimbabweans will face serious food 

shortages later this year. These people are the poorest of the poor, the real victims 

of ZANU–PF’s mismanagement and betrayal of the ideals of the Zimbabwean revolution of 1980. 

Zimbabwe is caught in a spiral of governance crisis and economic collapse. We are 

deeply worried about its fate. We all know that Zimbabwe used to be the breadbasket of southern Africa; today it exports people instead of food and depends on 

remittances to pay for vital imports. It used to have one of the best health care systems in Africa; now Zimbabwean doctors and nurses are found all over the world, 

while public health is starting to fall apart at home. Zimbabwe is no longer an engine for regional trade and growth; instead, it is a drag on the region, scaring off 

foreign investors and burdening neighbors with refugees. Zimbabwe stands out as 

the outlier in a part of Africa that has seen massive improvements in governance 

and economic management in the last decade. 

Considering the high stakes for the region, it was disappointing that the governments of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) failed to use more 

influence with Mugabe to guarantee the integrity of the election. Unfortunately we 

were not surprised by SADC’s decision not to speak out forthrightly about the obvious flaws in the election. We are not able to agree with the South African Government’s conclusion that the election results were a ‘‘credible reflection of the will’’ of 

the Zimbabwean people. This was an insult to the people of Zimbabwe. 

At the same time, SADC influence may have played a key role in keeping the 

election largely free of violence, and we expect that SADC will continue to work for 

the restoration of democracy in Zimbabwe. 

We were also encouraged that the African Union (AU) observer team called for 

an investigation of the irregularities that took place on election day. We hope that 

the AU will pursue this issue with the appropriate authorities in Zimbabwe. 

11

U.S. EFFORTS TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY, HEALTH, AND FOOD SECURITY

As for the response of the United States, we are in the process of reviewing and 

updating our sanctions regime to ensure that our targeted sanctions have flexibility 

and teeth, and are adequate to the new situation. I can’t give details about our review at this point. However, I can say that the election has reconfirmed the need 

for targeted financial and travel sanctions on regime leaders who undermine democracy. The individuals who abused democracy and helped to steal this election must 

be held accountable. 

I do not want to have my words here distorted by Zimbabwean government propaganda. The United States has not and does not intend to impose general sanctions 

on Zimbabwe that will hurt the people or economy. We reject any steps that would 

cause ordinary Zimbabweans to suffer for the sins of the ZANU–PF leadership. That 

is not our policy. 

On the contrary, we have responded generously to the humanitarian crises that 

have afflicted Zimbabwe and threatened the life of the country. We are the largest 

donor of assistance to fight the raging HIV/AIDS epidemic, which threatens to kill 

25 percent of Zimbabwe’s adult population. USAID and CDC recently launched one 

of Zimbabwe’s first anti-retroviral programs. We provide desperately needed services 

to 100 thousand orphans and other children affected by HIV/AIDS. 

We have also intervened to prevent mass famine. Since 2002, USAID has provided 

almost $300 million of humanitarian assistance. During the food crisis of 2002–04, 

U.S. government assistance fed almost five million Zimbabweans. In spite of our political differences with the Government, we stand ready to assist the Zimbabwean 

people once again should food shortages materialize later this year. But we will not 

allow the government to direct or control the distribution of that food aid. 

We also do important work to support Zimbabwe’s democratic culture and civil society. We fund voter education programs, train election monitors, support medical 

and psychological help for torture victims, and help human rights activists. Our programs aim to keep open democratic space and support a human rights culture for 

the day when democracy is restored. The recent elections underscore the continuing 

need for democracy programs in Zimbabwe. Restoring democracy and prosperity in 

Zimbabwe are long-term problems that deserve support. 

Our policy aims to empower and strengthen the Zimbabwean people. Concerned 

neighbors, compassionate donors, a critical press, and world leaders—all can and 

should play a role in giving more and technical supports to those in Zimbabwe who 

work for democracy. Ultimately, it is the Zimbabwean people themselves who will 

reclaim their freedoms, but our assistance can help to level the playing field and 

ensure that truth has a voice and all Zimbabweans can see there is an alternative 

to cronyism, intimidation, and fear.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. And thank 

you for your very clear statement, both the oral as well as your 

written statement. 

You do make the point that this election was an insult to the 

people of Zimbabwe, and as you just said, there is a process of review underway. I wonder if you might be able to tell us when that 

review will finish? 

I agree with you wholeheartedly that any sanction ever to a political repression regime that in any way mitigates or inhibits humanitarian aid is no sanction at all, it only hurts the very people 

we are trying to help, and virtually every law I think we have 

passed on human rights, whether it be trafficking or religious freedom or any other, including the act targeted at Zimbabwe, focuses 

on the perpetrators and not the oppressed. 

So the when issue, if you could. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Well, let me just say, Mr. Chairman, leading up 

to the election, there were many meetings about the what-if meetings. Now we have the election. Now there are a series of meetings, 

interagency meetings, meetings within the State Department to 

discuss what next, to question the previous approaches, to listen to 

a range of ideas, and to take the options to the highest level. We 

realize, though, that we don’t have forever with this if we are going 

12

to make an impact in the near term that will affect the people 

there. 

I would say to you that we probably owe you and the Committee, 

no later than a month from now, what our thinking is, and it may 

be even before that, given the fact that we are meeting on a regular basis on Zimbabwe. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE BY THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN TO THE

QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH DURING THE HEARING

STATUS OF THE POLICY REVIEW

We expect to complete the review by the end of May.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that very much. 

As I said in my opening, Zimbabwe is the only country that has 

been designated by Secretary Rice as an outpost of tyranny, whose 

funding for democracy and governance programs has been cut. 

North Korea, the proposal is up $2 million; Iran, $3 million; Cuba 

up $14 million over 2 years; and it is an issue that I have worked 

on very hard—the proposal calls for a $5 million increase. Burma 

$13 million for democracy. And yet the Zimbabwe account, many 

of us believe order of magnitude $12 million is needed, it is going 

to get, or at least the proposal was for $6 million, and it was cut 

to $3 million. 

I understand, and you might want to speak to this, that there 

is legislation on President Mugabe’s desk that would severely restrict civil society and groups or organizations, NGOs, that deal 

with issues of governance from receiving foreign funds, and I don’t 

know if that played or not into that calculation; and that certainly 

is another repressive tool in his tool box to stifle and gag a very 

viable opposition that is doing, I think, a tremendous amount of 

good under pressure. 

And secondly, if you could speak to the issue of reprisals, which 

we are hearing about, using food as a weapon against those—it was 

used, we understand, by many credible observers and reports, in 

the election area itself, and now we hear that there is an after-thefact reprisal of food being used as a weapon. And also, Roy Bennett, the member of the opposition party who got 12 months, or it 

was reduced to 12 months for good behavior, which has now come 

to the point—it is a couple of months ago—of being an Amnesty 

International prisoner of conscience for the mistreatment that he 

has received. How many others like him, political prisoners, members of parliamentary are languishing in prison because of their opposition and the reprisal issue? 

Ms. NEWMAN. I will start, Mr. Chairman, with the resources 

question. 

I think going forward we need to develop the strategy, and then 

determine how we allocate resources against that strategy. But 

what is true, if we have major increases, if we decide we need 

major increases, it does mean reduction someplace else; those are 

the tough questions. And yes, what we did know about the way in 

which non-governmental organizations are being tracked, and extensive questioning the extent to which they could or could not be 

effective there, did, in the back of some of our minds, influence how 

effective we thought the resources would be. 

13

But I think going forward we are going to question the whole 

strategy, and then we may decide that it is much more important 

to make democracy resources available to Zimbabwe to get ready 

for the 2008 election than some of the other places where we have 

democracy money. 

In getting back to you, we will owe you some more discussion. 

As you know we do have the 2006 budget before you, and it does 

only show I think $2 million for democracy, but it doesn’t mean 

that we won’t question that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE BY THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN TO THE

QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH DURING THE HEARING

SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS

The level of support for civil society and democracy is a key part of our policy review. We expect to complete the review by the end of May.

Mr. SMITH. I would hope—before you go on, I would hope that 

that number, especially in light of this disaster, events have overcome the budget and the whole budget submission process, including the clearance by OMB, and it seems to me that there is a crying need for additional democracy building, civil society building 

funding for Zimbabwe. And I don’t think it needs to come out of 

some important account where there is also a race against tyranny 

with democratic forces. So I would hope that we look to us—Democrats and Republicans, Senate and House—to, you know, as allies 

to try to beef it up. I don’t know it is a zero sum game, with all 

due respect. 

Ms. NEWMAN. I don’t want to mislead, too, the $2 million is for 

democracy, there is almost $33 million in the total budget, plus another $76 million for humanitarian assistance. 

Your second question had to do with reprisals and using food as 

a weapon. And it is a high priority for the Embassy and for the 

World Food Program to ensure that resources that come from the 

United States for humanitarian assistance are not used in that 

way. Now the monitoring and the assessment of the way in which 

the food is allocated probably does not give the full story. But I 

think there is a comfort level that we have that the food that comes 

from the United States is not used in that way. 

In terms of the prisoners, there was a report in February that, 

the 28th of February, that does report political prisoners, the status of political prisoners, violation of human rights. And even 

though it shows some abatement from 2002, there is still a serious 

problem about the way in which not only political prisoners are 

dealt with, but citizens in general, and it calls for strategies to address that. I don’t know if this is—okay. No other members of Parliament that we know are political prisoners, but we know enough 

to know this is an issue, has been an issue in the past. 

Mr. SMITH. Have we raised Roy Bennett’s case within the——

Ms. NEWMAN. I don’t know. I will have to—I owe you an answer 

on that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

14

WRITTEN RESPONSE BY THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN TO THE

QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH DURING THE HEARING

THE ROY BENNETT CASE

The State Department’s latest human rights report on Zimbabwe cites the case 

of Roy Bennett. Our Embassy monitors the case closely, as it does other human 

rights cases in Zimbawe. However, the Government of Zimbabwe does not respond 

positively to U.S. inquiries about individual human rights cases.

Mr. SMITH. And one final answer before I yield to Mr. Payne. 

The issue of trying to get more Africa voices and voices really 

throughout the world to speak, I just returned from the Human 

Rights Commission meeting in Geneva and was appalled at the 

lack of tyrannical governments being taken to task, including 

China. Cuba, thankfully, had a very good resolution that garnered 

support, but Zimbabwe certainly did not. And it seems to me that 

we need to redouble our efforts, especially as we just held a hearing on Tuesday in which we talked about the lack of effectiveness 

of the Human Rights Commission. If it does resolve into a reform 

that Kofi Annan was talking about, a Human Rights Council, and 

regimes like Zimbabwe need to be held to account in that form and 

not be let off the hook or enabled in their gross misdeeds. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I say, though, that we are 

feeling very positive about the African Union in many ways. And 

the fact that the Africa Union has raised the question about calling 

for investigation here shows a movement in terms of African leadership to take steps that they hadn’t taken in the past. 

Mr. SMITH. I saw that, too, and was very, very encouraged by 

that as well. 

Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Secretary, had there been any attempt to perhaps have discussions with leaders, heads of state in the region, just sort of a 

discussion about taking a position without taking a position, but 

with some of the surrounding countries about Zimbabwe, and if 

they have any suggestions or have they any concerns that they 

have expressed? 

Ms. NEWMAN. I have not had discussions since this election. But 

prior to the election, I have had conversations with the heads of 

state of Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia. It is a very touchy subject. And it has been much easier to engage them in a general discussion about democracy than what they would do about 

Zimbabwe. And frankly, a couple of the Presidents said they took 

firm stands right after the 2002 election and were chastised, so 

that they preferred the behind-the-scenes quiet diplomacy. 

Maybe now, particularly since the African Union has spoken out, 

these heads of state will be more comofortable publicly speaking 

out. 

Mr. PAYNE. I agree. I think that the outspokenness of several of 

the heads of state, they are reluctant to criticize openly, but realize 

that there needs to be changes in Zimbabwe, but the sort of noninterference. But I agree that the finding of the African Union is 

a positive step in the right direction. 

I think that one of the thoughts was, when I had discussions 

with some of the leaders, was that Mr. Mugabe might retire—a 

year or 2 ago as a matter of fact, but I see that that is still a possiVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:33 Jul 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042105\20787.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
15

bility—and that is why I think we need to keep governance programs going in Zimbabwe so that if and when he does leave office, 

that the country have people who are trained and have been involved in democracy building. 

One quick question: The judiciary system in Zimbabwe has 

upheld some of the oppositions’s positions, I believe. In general, 

how do you see the high court in Zimbabwe? 

Ms. NEWMAN. I will have to get back on—I understand there’s 

kind of a mixed record, however, that there were instances where 

the judges supported actions that are questionable on the part of 

the Government. So I think that much more work probably needs 

to be done in terms of the rule of law and the judiciary system, how 

the judges are appointed and to what extent they feel they are 

independent. 

We did recently—this last round, our democracy money went to 

Parliament and to certain committees in Parliament. I don’t think 

we funded judicial reform, but it is something that needs to be 

looked at. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE BY THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN TO THE

QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE DURING THE HEARING

ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY

As a result of intimidation and court-packing by the ruling party, Zimbabwe’s 

once independent and professional judiciary has become highly politicized. However, 

pockets of integrity remain, and some judges display independence even in highly 

sensitive political cases. Non-political cases are generally handled without bias, 

though there has been a decline in judicial professionalism because of the emigration or retirement of many experienced judges. 

Although USAID works with legal groups and parliament, we currently have no 

programs with the judiciary. The root problems with the judiciary are political and 

not amenable to mitigation through an assistance program.

Mr. PAYNE. Just finally, the church, is the church movement 

strong? I know the Anglican church is relatively strong in the country. Have they been involved in the democracy questioning? 

Ms. NEWMAN. The answer is yes. I have met with some of the 

leaders in Zimbabwe and some of the most local people questioning 

human rights generally, and the rights of the people there from the 

religious institutions. And one of the most vocal groups in South 

Africa questioning the election was the Council of Churches. 

Mr. PAYNE. Great. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Chairman Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary 

Newman, for your testimony. I think it was forceful and to the 

point. We all share frustration over the rather calculated destruction of Zimbabwe. 

A few years ago I remember attending the International Conference on Torture. The subject matter was torture used on citizens 

of Zimbabwe by the Government in order to suppress, in civil society, any opposition to the powers that were being exercised by the 

executive branch there. 

You discussed the collapse of the economy, and you attribute part 

of that to the Government’s disastrous economic policies. You don’t 

mention the land seizures specifically, but those have destroyed 

Zimbabwean agriculture. 

16

The United States has provided $300 million in humanitarian assistance since 2002. That is a big, big amount, especially given all 

the other problems on the African continent. Not many countries 

in the world would make this kind of a commitment, especially to 

a country that is self-destructing. Secretary Rice, in her confirmation hearing, called Zimbabwe an ‘‘outpost of tyranny.’’ I want to 

ask: What has that meant in terms of United States policy toward 

Zimbabwe? Has policy changed? I wanted you to maybe elaborate 

a little bit on the food-as-a-weapon topic that you touched on briefly in your statement here. 

You mentioned that food was used as a weapon during the elections, and that it was being distributed only to ZANU–PF supporters, and of course, this has been done in several past elections. 

I have got a CRS report addressing the run-up to this election that 

reports that non-governmental organizations in Zimbabwe were excluded from food distribution, and that the Government’s Grain 

Marketing Board was, in fact, the sole supplier of food. You also 

mention in your testimony that the United States will not allow 

the Government to control the distribution of food in Zimbabwe. 

Well, are we really sure we can do that, given the fact that that 

is exactly what the Government is doing in Zimbabwe? 

You also mentioned that it was disappointing that South Africa 

concluded that the election was legitimate. Well, they concluded 

that prior to the election even taking place. I like your point that 

for South Africa to do this, it was an insult to the people of 

Zimbabwe. We have long looked to South Africans to push democracy and human rights there. You mention that Zimbabwe policy 

is under review. I hope this new policy will have no illusions about 

the current South Africa Government. It is clear to me that the 

ANC is not indifferent to democracy in Zimbabwe; its Government, 

through its actions, opposes democracy in Zimbabwe. In fact, President Mbeki said the election would be free and fair even before it 

occurred. This really gives me pause. 

So instead of waiting for South Africa to do something that it has 

shown no inclination to do—that is, to defend democracy—let’s realize that if our policy is going to have a chance of making a difference, we must deal with what is, not with what we would hope 

for from our South African friends. 

I would welcome your thoughts on those issues. We have had 

this dialogue for so long with South Africa, and then as I say, to 

have President Mbeki say no, it is free and fair before the election 

even occurs, is clear that we have got to recognize the reality in 

terms of how this is going to be approached by the ANC. 

Thank you, Secretary. 

Ms. NEWMAN. I think that I will approach the topic of the policy 

first, and then food as a weapon. 

In reviewing where we have been and where we should go in the 

future, among the topics to consider is how we relate to what other 

governments believe is the right approach. And that means we 

don’t need to question the intent of President Mbeki, but it also 

does not mean that we buy into his approach. And I think that it 

is clear to all of us that what has gone on in the past didn’t bring 

about free and fair elections and has not improved the lives of the 

people. Therefore, we need to look to a new approach. And it may 

17

be in conjunction with others, but it needs to be the most effective 

way for the United States to use its power and its technical assistance to make a change here because we care about the people. I 

can come back to that, but that goes to the money that has been 

spent on food and what our approach should be in the future. 

We have gone out of our way, as we always do, not to have the 

people of the countries sacrificed because of their leaders when it 

is a matter of life and death, when it is a matter of famine. And 

we make those strong statements that we need to continue with, 

in my view, that we will not use our food and our ability to feed 

food to the people to make the policy points. 

On the other hand, it is not just in Zimbabwe, but the issue has 

also come up in Ethiopia, where we see that year after year after 

year, we are paying large amounts of money for food. It calls into 

question whether or not these countries are structuring their policy 

so that they can become food secure. In other words, there is a 

need here, if we get to a point that we can work with the governments, to emphasize the need for them to develop agriculture rather than continuing to put ourselves in a position where year after 

year we are providing famine relief and the people are in no better 

shape in the next year than they were in the previous year. 

All of this goes back to your point, that now is the time for the 

United States to question its overall strategy dealing with 

Zimbabwe, not just in terms of governance, but also in terms of 

how we relate to the humanitarian difficulties, the need for food 

and non-food assistance, and how we should go forward—not using 

the people, not sacrificing good people on the one hand, but on the 

other hand, not allowing our resources to allow that Government 

to continue operating as it has in the past. 

Mr. ROYCE. But I assume, as the Government has propped up, 

we have $300 million worth of humanitarian assistance going to 

Zimbabwe since 2002. We find out that NGOs are not allowed to 

do the distribution, it is turned over to the Government. The Government is propped up, as it goes systemically through the system 

of eviscerating the courts with forced retirement of all the independent judges. We watch step by step as the country is imploding 

and resources go through Zimbabwe’s Government through the 

international community, not just the United States, but through 

the international community. I am just saying we need a strategy; 

if we care about the people in Zimbabwe, we need a strategy. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Yes, I agree. I didn’t make it clear, however, that 

we use the non-governmental organizations, Catholic Relief Services and World Vision, those kinds of organizations, but you are 

right, you are right. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Royce. Just a point of clarification. 

When Mr. Royce said CRS, he meant Congressional Research Service and not Catholic Relief Services. Because one of these, I think 

all of us are always concerned about, is the issue of retaliation, and 

CRS and World Vision and other groups are there, and they care 

about the situation politically, but that is not their mission, as we 

all know. And I would hate to see anything inadvertently ever 

happed because Mugabe’s regime got the wrong message. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Yes. 

18

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Ms. Lee. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your testimony, and thank you for being here. 

You indicated that you are meeting every day, and that United 

States policy toward Zimbabwe is under review. We all know that 

we engage with some dictators that we like, we don’t engage with 

some we don’t like. We engage with some Presidents, duly-elected 

Presidents that we like, some that we don’t like, such as President 

Aristide. And I see a pattern that is very similar to what we saw 

in Haiti, a pattern of isolation, destabilization. Various, I think, indications to me are that, you know, the Bush Administration’s policy of regime change could be on the table as it relates to 

Zimbabwe. And so I would like to just ask you, in your discussions 

and upon your review, I mean, is this a case for ousting a leader 

and justify that ousting based on the Government’s inability and 

all the issues that we have dealt with? 

Ms. NEWMAN. I haven’t been in any of those discussions. What 

I think is fair for me, though, to say to you is what really ought 

to happen. And I think what is happening here is that the first 

level of discussion does not take into consideration the larger political issues and, in other words, what I always say to people developing policy is, bring the facts, the analysis, the data clean, bring 

the options clean and what the pros and cons of those are. Then 

the policymakers will have to look at how they come out in a larger 

context. 

And I guess I am not sure that one size fits all. I think you do 

have to go case by case and you have to say for Zimbabwe—that 

you might treat Zimbabwe and Sudan in a different way for different reasons, but so long as the going-in analysis is one that 

doesn’t fool the policymakers by being incorrect in stating what the 

facts are. 

Ms. LEE. I believe the former Assistant Secretary had suggested 

regime as it relates to Zimbabwe. And I am just curious of the 

basic fundamental elements of this foreign policy. When we get to 

that point, that is an option. 

Ms. NEWMAN. The option is that people should decide their leaders in free and fair elections. The people ought to decide. And what 

we ought to be involved in is helping to build a civil society and 

political parties so that there are free and fair elections. I think it 

is very dangerous to talk about overriding the people. 

Ms. LEE. That is good to know, that the military option is not 

on the table to oust Mugabe. Let me ask you about HIV and AIDS. 

I guess it was Wednesday’s Washington Post that carried a story 

on the devastating impact of the AIDS pandemic in Zimbabwe. And 

yet it is my understanding that the PEPFAR initiative and the 

AIDS initiative doesn’t focus much on Zimbabwe’s poor and needy, 

but mostly on other countries. And I would like to get a handle on, 

Do we work with the ministry of health in Zimbabwe? Do we have 

an active HIV and AIDS program there? 

Ms. NEWMAN. Zimbabwe has one of the largest HIV/AIDS programs for a country that is not one under the President’s initiative. 

That is at the $23 million level. The programs include prevention 

and treatment and a special program for orphans. And the lion’s 

share of this goes through non-governmental organizations. Only 

19

$1.5 million of the $23 million goes through the ministry of health. 

And I know when I was at USAID, we moved the programs out of 

the Government and through the non-governmental organizations 

to run the HIV/AIDS program. 

Ms. LEE. So do you see any siphoning off of funding though, for 

the AIDS initiative such as has been alleged in the press? 

Ms. NEWMAN. I don’t know of that. I think it is fair—we can ask 

the question. I don’t think the people who are managing it think 

that is happening, but I read the article, too, and I think it does 

call for us to question whether or not that is true. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE BY THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN TO THE

QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE DURING THE HEARING

GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE AND CORRUPTION

USAID and CDC maintain strict oversight of money spent on HIV/AIDS programs 

in Zimbabwe. We are aware of no case where money has been siphoned from a USGsupported program. 

Our HIV/AIDS assistance to Zimbabwe is channeled almost entirely through 

NGOs. One exception is an HIV/AIDS pilot program to distribute anti-retroviral 

drugs, where USAID and the CDC provide limited technical assistance to the Ministry of Health on HIV/AIDS programs. This ARV program in Zimbabwe was one 

of the first overseas ARV programs the USG launched anywhere in the world. It 

amounts to approximately $1.5 million per year.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, I 

only have one question and it is to a broader issue, I suppose, because it seems as I listen to the issues that are developed in country after country in Africa, I look for that thing that we may be 

able to eventually see as an instrument to bring about change on 

the African continent, positive change. And I guess I am wondering 

if you could help me think through what we need to do to get the 

African Union to be a much more effective organization for that 

purpose. I recognize that oftentimes it has been difficult to get 

them to intervene—certainly that is the case in Sudan—in a more 

dramatic way and a more effective way because of their hesitancy 

to say anything or do anything that would be perceived as negative 

to another African country. And they don’t want to criticize for 

fear—well, for their own reasons. What is it that we can do to 

make the AU the entity we can go to in cases like this and 

throughout Africa and rely on them to provide some leadership 

that presently certainly does not exist? 

Ms. NEWMAN. Congressman, I have a somewhat different view of 

where the African Union is today as compared with the organization African Union, the predecessor. I think now with Chairman 

Konare, President Obasanjo, and previously President Chissano, 

there is much greater accountability on the part of the African 

Union to intervene and there is much more——

Mr. TANCREDO. What do you mean a greater accountability to intervene? 

Ms. NEWMAN. As a matter of fact, at the last summit a year ago 

which I attended, they called in a number of the Presidents. They 

called in Kagame and Kabila to talk about what was going on in 

the Great Lakes. They called in President Gbagbo to talk about 

20

Cote d’Ivoire. As a matter of fact, they called in President Mugabe. 

We weren’t—outside people weren’t in those meetings, but it was 

clear to us that the leadership of the African Union was taking seriously their responsibility to call into question the behavior of others on the continent. 

The African Union NEPAD, the new partnership, has set up this 

peer review process that has just started. Ghana is the first country being reviewed under that, but it is a slow process. I think we 

should be using our resources to help them make this work, because when Chairman Konare was here last week, he did suggest 

that there is a need for them to remove some of their bureaucratic 

processes. But he said, the AU is an organization of many countries. They have to get a certain level of agreement on what it is 

that we are doing or they won’t come with us. But he did, particularly in terms of peace and security, talk about what it took in 

Darfur saying the AU has to move faster and is prepared to do 

that. 

But we need to be available to them on their terms to provide 

help in strategic planning and in support. So I just say, I think 

they are on the right path. We also have to change our behavior 

in that we need to follow their lead and help them on their terms 

and not how we think they should be helped. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Do we have any sort of strategy in place for that? 

Do we actually have a plan to strengthen the organization to the 

extent that we are able to? 

Ms. NEWMAN. It is not that sophisticated a plan, but the African 

Union has now proved that they have an office set up in Washington and one in New York. We are talking about ways in which 

we might help their office here in Washington. We are talking 

about having our Ambassador in Addis be permanently recognized 

by the African Union and a participant in their activities. So we 

are putting in a more formal way a relationship with the African 

Union that I think puts us on a different plane and allows us to 

be more helpful and not just an outside viewer of what is going 

right and wrong there. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Chairman, I would request of you to consider 

a hearing at some point in time at which we would have the African Union, people who are here, the office she said just opened, 

and any other members, so we could more thoroughly go into what 

we could do to help and what we can expect of them. Just a consideration. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Mr. SMITH. Thanks for the idea. Ms. McCollum. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair. It has been discussed but 

I want to understand what our options may or may not be. My understanding from conversations and from testimony is that many 

of the countries in the region, Malawi and Mozambique and the 

rest, they know there is a food insecurity problem and they knew 

it was coming. It is my understanding that when we were working 

with other NGOs to do our planning on what should we be anticipating the food aid needs to be, that in Zimbabwe, we were pretty 

much told, no, we don’t have a problem and that was prior to the 

election. 

Now we know that the requests will most likely be coming forward and NGOs are having great difficulty in knowing that the 

21

food is getting to those who need it. Referring back to The Washington Post article on AIDS, the same thing is true with NGOs and 

others kind of moving forward, but very carefully so that they are 

not identified and removed from the country so they can’t continue 

to do the work that they are able to do in a very limited fashion. 

They are concerned about the siphoning off of public funds for private gains. 

That means going back to—international donors are more reluctant to deal with the President. So I don’t believe in, as Ms. Lee 

was saying—she doesn’t believe in it either—regime change. But I 

keep hearing the African Union being referred to—I was in Darfur 

and I have been in some of the other areas. Africa is a very poor 

continent with a lot of challenges. We take some of the best of the 

men with leadership skills out of their communities to go in and 

help Africa intervene on behalf of herself to become a stronger continent with the countries being stronger. 

What is our commitment not only to making sure that food and 

resources are getting to where they need to be, but what is our 

strategy toward the African Union? When we were in Darfur, they 

had limitations on what they could do to intervene, but they also 

had limitations on manpower for being able to intervene. They had 

limitations of how much area they could patrol at any time. We 

keep referring to the African Union, but the African Union is only 

as strong as collectively it can be through donations to countries 

that are struggling with AIDS and food insecurity. And with what 

the European Union and Japan possibly and the United States 

puts into making the African Union function, and yet still retain 

its autonomy and its independence to truly be the African Union—

do we have a strategy? 

Ms. NEWMAN. I will take two categories of questions. On the 

first, the monitoring of humanitarian assistance: Prior to the election, President Mugabe went out of his way to show that they 

didn’t need food and I think that was for two purposes. He wanted 

his people to think that they were on top and they didn’t need the 

outside world, and secondly, he was manipulating the use of food. 

That, though, was not food and nonfood assistance that came 

from the U.S. Government. We are quite comfortable, but as I said 

earlier, we will look into it, but we are quite comfortable that the 

food that we give and the nonfood assistance that we give does go 

to the people. What is called into question, however, is are there 

certain geographic areas that have been off limits? Are there places 

in which our humanitarian aid cannot get and does that result in 

a fair distribution of the resources we have, and that we need to 

look into? But I don’t think that there is a concern that we need 

to have about corruption in the use of the food that is distributed. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE BY THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN TO THE

QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE BETTY MCCOLLUM DURING THE HEARING

LIMITATIONS ON OUR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

USAID funds feeding programs targeted at vulnerable sections of the Zimbabwean 

population such as schoolchildren and HIV/AIDS sufferers. These programs are operated by private voluntary organizations (PVOs). 

The operating environment has deteriorated over the last year, as PVOs have 

found it increasingly difficult to import food and obtain work permits for expatriate 

22

staff. However, to date the Government of Zimbabwe has imposed no geographic restrictions on these programs.

Ms. NEWMAN. The larger issue is, What kind of programs can be 

put into place in order to reduce the dependency that the people 

have on these emergency situations? And that is harder. That is 

harder to do. That also requires more front-end investment in agriculture programs and training people. But that is what the Government is trying to do now in Ethiopia. In working with the African 

Union, yes, we have a strategy. We go to almost all of the meetings. The G–8 members now have, two and three times a year, 

meetings with the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). 

There are direct conversations that are held about what are their 

needs and what way can the G–8 and the OECD countries work 

with them. It is not a science, but I think it is progressing in a 

much more sophisticated way than any of the previous relationships with the predecessor African organization. And I do really believe that the leadership on the continent, not just those in the 

leadership of the African Union, but leadership generally, is serious 

about taking responsibility. 

Just what happened in Togo and the leadership of the Economic 

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and backing off the 

coup and insisting they go to election, that didn’t come from the 

outside; that came from Africa and African leadership. So I am 

quite optimistic, I don’t think foolishly so, that what is going to 

turn the continent around are Africans themselves changing their 

own behavior and us responding to them on their terms. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Boozman. 

Mr. BOOZMAN. No questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I 

missed most of Dr. Newman’s testimony, but I want to thank you 

for being here. And I want to address my comments to the AIDS 

pandemic and the fact that Zimbabwe is not one of the receiving 

nations in terms of our contributions. Can you talk to us about the 

people of Zimbabwe and how they are being impacted because we 

are not providing the kinds of resources to address the AIDS pandemic? Can you talk to us a bit about that? 

Ms. NEWMAN. Yes, we could do more. We do know that about a 

fourth of the sexually active population is HIV/AIDS positive. 

Zimbabwe does represent one of the countries with very high percentage of people who are HIV positive. No, Zimbabwe is not one 

of the 15 PEPFAR countries, but it turns out that Zimbabwe actually is receiving one of the highest levels of money for HIV/AIDS 

programs. It is receiving $23 million. 

Ms. WATSON. Can you explain how they receive it? 

Ms. NEWMAN. Prior to the President’s initiative, the USAID—

through both global health and also through the regional programs—had money for health and money for HIV/AIDS. And the 

agreement at the beginning of the President’s initiative was that 

that money would stay for HIV/AIDS and that the President’s initiative would be over and above that. 

So now both USAID and CDC have programs in Zimbabwe. They 

cover prevention. There are 20 voluntary counseling and testing 

23

services. They are training over 200 faith-based leaders. They have 

a special program for children. There is the range of HIV/AIDS programs there in Zimbabwe. It isn’t coming through the President’s 

initiative. And yes, you know——

Ms. WATSON. What kind of impact is it making? 

Ms. NEWMAN. I can’t answer that. I need to get back to see——

Ms. WATSON. Can you? 

Ms. NEWMAN. Yes. My understanding is that over 100,000 deaths 

annually. The question is, what does this do to reduce that? And 

I don’t know the answer that. 

Ms. WATSON. I can take my answer in writing, if you will. Thank 

you so much. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE BY THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN TO THE

QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE DIANE E. WATSON DURING THE HEARING

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF OUR HIV/AIDS PROGRAMS

USAID and CDC spend more than $23 million per year to fight HIV/AIDS in 

Zimbabwe. Their programs support voluntary HIV testing and counseling; assist 

those who test positive; underwrite behavior modification and awareness campaigns; 

assist orphans and vulnerable children (more than 173,000 children have been assisted); and fund anti-retroviral therapy programs and a national prevention of 

mother-to-child transmission program (almost 49,000 pregnant women attended 

USAID-supported sites in 2004). 

As the largest HIV/AIDS donor, the United States is in the forefront of efforts to 

mitigate the epidemic in Zimbabwe, where roughly 25 percent of adults are infected 

with HIV. Our Zimbabwe programs are an important part of our larger effort to address the health crisis in the wider southern Africa region.

Mr. SMITH. Let me conclude with a few final questions if I could. 

Secretary, the issue of looking east and the look east policy that 

Mugabe has followed, going to China and going to Malaysia to 

break the economic embargo and particularly in the area of weapons, I noted that there was an AFP report that recently Mugabe 

took delivery of six more jets. An estimate of something in the 

order of $200 million was spent procuring fighter jets at a time 

when his regime could use that money for humanitarian, for 

HIV/AIDS and a whole host of other humanitarian initiatives. He 

is looking to beef up his military. Has there been any attempt 

made to engage the AU with China and with these others who are, 

again, working in a way that is completely counterproductive to 

trying to promote democratic reform and human rights observance? 

And are we doing anything to get the PRC and other countries in 

the east to have at least some respect for what this country and 

others are trying to do? 

Secondly, you said in your statement we would not allow the 

Government to distribute the food aid and that it needs to go 

through, obviously, PVOs and NGOs. What happens if they are 

kicked out, which is a concern we all have? On the NGO bill and 

I don’t know, and you may know better whether or not it has been 

signed. I know it is on his desk. In regards to issues of governance, 

it also gives the minister of public service, labor and social welfare 

absolute control over the appointment of the NGO counsel and it 

decides on registration and deregistration. 

It seems to me that indigenous human rights organizations and 

NGOs that do honest reporting and seek to speak truth to power 

are put at grave risk with this additional statute joining all the 

24

others that they have that also are very repressive in nature. This 

to me could be a serious blow to civil society. What is being done, 

again, by all interested parties, including ourselves, the AU and 

others to try to get Mugabe not to sign that bill? 

Ms. NEWMAN. I will start with the NGO bill first. He has not 

signed that bill. He has not signed it. My understanding is that 

people did go to him to let him know what would come down on 

him if he signed it. Whether he is inclined to sign it now after the 

election, I don’t know. Maybe not, maybe not, because he could figure out that it also could limit resources coming into the country 

that he may want to have come into the country. We have spoken 

out on it. I think it is clear. The provisions of it are damaging, also 

to indigenous organizations, which may not have been his intent, 

but I don’t know. 

I think when we get back, I will have to talk to the Ambassador 

to see if he has an idea of what is likely to happen, but he hasn’t 

signed it. It will be a problem if the non-governmental organizations are kicked out. You know that is always a balancing of how 

tough you get. Where do you draw the line that might cause a leader to decide you can no longer have the international organizations 

there? And is there a point which you are willing to sacrifice that 

because what is going on is so bad? 

So there is always a balancing of that. It would be our preference 

not to have the non-governmental organizations kicked out, because it is not only the provision of humanitarian assistance that 

is important, but there are also great contacts to civil society which 

can help train and develop civil society to question the Government. 

On expenditures for military purposes, as you know, this is a difficult issue everywhere—how much when you have great need? But 

countries believe they need to protect themselves. What is a legitimate balance? World Bank and IMF have data on this. I don’t 

think we need to worry too much because frankly, what has happened in Zimbabwe is they are not paying their bills. Some of these 

folks that were originally doing business are not doing business 

with them now—Libya, for example—because they are a debtor. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE BY THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN TO THE

QUESTION ASKED BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH DURING THE HEARING

U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA ABOUT ARMS SALES

In recent years, Zimbabwe has sought to break out of its international isolation 

by cultivating commercial and military ties with China. This so-called ‘‘Look East’’ 

policy has led to modest Chinese investment in agriculture and other sectors of the 

economy. It has also resulted in limited Zimbabwean purchases of Chinese weapons, 

including small numbers of military trainer aircraft. 

This relationship has been constrained by Zimbabwe’s poor creditworthiness and 

its severe shortage of foreign exchange. We do not believe that Harare’s limited 

arms purchases from China have jeopardized the regional military balance or pose 

a threat to Zimbabwe’s neighbors. For this reason, we have not approached Beijing 

on this issue.

Mr. SMITH. If I could, and maybe this is something you would 

know readily, but it is something I think we should pursue. But my 

hope would be that Louise Arbour, the High Commissioner for 

Human Rights, has weighed in or will weigh in on asking President 

25

Mugabe to not sign that bill because it would do great injury to the 

human rights fabric of what happens in his country. 

And certainly she would be interested in that. I want to thank 

you so much for your testimony, for your very, very fine and outstanding leadership on behalf of all Africa and particularly today 

for Zimbabwe. We look forward to that ongoing conversation with 

the Subcommittee and the Full Committee. And I look forward to 

hearing back from you, you said a month or less, that would be 

great. 

We do have a series of votes coming up, but I would like to introduce our next panel of witnesses, and then we will take a brief—

I understand Tom Tancredo has gone over to vote and he will come 

back. 

Dr. Greg Mills, who is the National Director of the South African 

Institute of International Affairs, and Director Designate of the 

Brenthurst Foundation, having taught at the Universities of Western Cape and Cape Town. He joined the South African Institute of 

International Affairs in January 1994 as First Director of Studies 

in July 1996 as the National Director. He has published more than 

20 books, the most recent being The Security Intersection: The Paradox of Power in an Age of Terror. He is also widely published in 

international journals and the South African and International 

Press. 

We will then hear from Mr. Jeffrey Krilla, who joined the International Republican Institute (IRI) in July 2001 as a Regional Director for Africa and he oversaw programs throughout Africa. He 

has overseen election observations in Kenya and Nigeria and led 

assessment missions to Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan, Tanzania, 

Uganda, and Somaliland. Prior to joining IRI, Mr. Krilla served as 

senior aide and attorney in the U.S. Congress for 8 years, including 

time as majority counsel for the U.S. House of Representatives 

Commerce Committee and Chief of Staff for Congressman Mike 

Pappas. 

During the time that Mr. Krilla worked for the U.S. House, he 

founded the NGO ‘‘Fill Their Shelves,’’ which provides children of 

southern Africa with educational tools needed to develop skills and 

knowledge necessary to excel in the 21st century. From 1991, he 

taught in a rural high school in South Africa, and we are happy 

to have him. He has written works, including Democracy in Africa: 

Women Need Not Apply and Small Footprint, Giant Step in Liberia. 

We will then hear from Shari Bryan, who currently directs the 

southern and east African programs at NDI. She previously served 

as Deputy Director of the Institute’s programs in central, east and 

west Africa. And she also worked at NDI’s political party as the political party expert in Nigeria and oversaw joint NDI Carter Center 

election observations missions from 1998 to 1999 polls in that country. 

Before joining NDI in Nigeria, she worked for USAID as a democracy and governance advisor in the south African Nation of Malawi. 

And finally, we will hear from Dave Coddington. He has been 

with the Catholic Relief Services since 1994 working mainly in Africa. He currently serves as the southern Africa regional representative based in Baltimore, Maryland. In that position he coordinates 

26

CRS’s work in Zimbabwe from the headquarter’s office and makes 

periodic trips to the country. 

I hate to inform you, but we have five votes so we will begin with 

our first witness and then proceed to a brief recess and then reconvene the hearing. 

Dr. Mills, if you would begin. 

STATEMENT OF GREG MILLS, PH.D., DIRECTOR–DESIGNATE, 

THE BRENTHURST FOUNDATION, SOUTH AFRICA 

Mr. MILLS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

for the opportunity and invitation to be here today. It was a long 

way to come for this presentation, but I am sure very much worth 

it. I would like to state for the record, I am no longer the National 

Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs, but 

since this Monday, the Director of the Brenthurst Foundation. Now 

during his visit to South Africa in July, 2003, President Bush declared South Africa’s President, Thabo Mbeki to be the point man, 

I quote, on Zimbabwe. 

And I asked myself the question and asked for the purpose of 

this Committee testimony: How is the point man doing, and are 

fresh tactics now called for by external—and especially non-African—players in the light of the 31st of March 2005 parliamentary 

elections in Zimbabwe? My testimony will focus on three areas or 

three questions. The first is: What has been the record of south African policy toward Zimbabwe? Why has it pursued this particular 

line of action? And is this line of action consistent with South African regional foreign policy overall and with its stated human rights 

orientation? 

The second of these questions is: What has been the impact of 

this policy on Zimbabwe? And the third of these is: What policy options? And this is where I will go through my short time available. 

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to read out my full testimony. It is 

available. I am going to briefly summarize it. In terms of its African policy, which is the centerpiece of South Africa’s foreign policy 

through NEPAD, in terms of conflict resolution, the South African 

Government has devoted considerable resources on a sustained 

basis over the last decade, including in Burundi, Congo and Sudan 

peacekeeping troops. 

The Congo settlement came about as a result of the South African-sponsored Sun City talks. Over Burundi, Pretoria has dedicated former President Nelson Mandela and then the current Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, to the task of securing a peace agreement and latterly facilitating a transitional Government and a new 

Constitution. South Africa also Chairs the AU Committee on the 

Reconstruction of Sudan. President Mbeki has acted as a mediator 

on behalf of the AU to expedite the peace process in Cote d’Ivoire. 

More indirectly, South Africa has played a supporting role in the 

recent rejection of Togo’s attempt to unconstitutional transition following President Eyadema’s death. In these and other respects, 

South Africa’s policy amounts, wittingly or not, to attempting to export its own transitional conflict resolution model and in so doing, 

South Africa has championed the objectives and principles of the 

African Union, including a commitment to promote democratic 

principles and institutions, popular participation and governance. 

27

Yet in contrast the South African’s Government policy over 

Zimbabwe has steadfastly been to avoid confrontation with Harare 

in terms of conflict resolution, instead preferring to attempt to facilitate contact between ZANU–PF and the opposition MDC. In so 

doing, Pretoria’s caution has contrasted with the profile of President Mbeki’s expansionist African visions and his commitments. 

When not quiet, Pretoria’s diplomacy has generally included expressions of support for ZANU and criticism of the MDC along with 

occasional mild rebuke of aspects of Mugabe’s policies. These attempts at facilitation have not resolved the political process and 

they have not, as we have noted earlier, resolved the economic crisis as well. This, of course, is evidence of the truism in Africa that 

the principal economic challenge in Africa is not economic at all, 

but indeed political. South African policy, however, remains consistent. Only a week ago, President Mbeki said in the South African Parliament on April 14 that although the jury was still out on 

whether Zimbabwe’s parliamentary poll was free and fair, South 

Africa’s policy toward its neighbor would remain unchanged. 

We have, he said, insisted for some time that the solution lies in 

the hands of Zimbabweans and we will persist with that position. 

Pretoria is today centered on one major short-term foreign policy 

goal when it comes to Zimbabwe: To acquire the support of both 

parties, to change the flawed Constitution—its own words—and I 

quote, ‘‘To get rid of certain legislation such as the public order and 

Security Act.’’ The tactic to achieve this consensus is through facilitating contact and talks between the MDC and ZANU–PF. 

In this, Pretoria would prefer to see the United States and everybody, and I quote, ‘‘putting pressure on and ensuring dialogue, engaging with the MDC and ZANU and not playing to the gallery.’’ 

South Africa’s policy choice of constructive engagement, described 

somewhat pejoratively as quiet diplomacy, reflects as a combination of its own political traditions its stress on compromise and negotiation, the history of race and colonialism in the region, and the 

resonance of these factors including land distribution domestically 

in South Africa and a belief that the alternatives to this policy—

including criticism of Mugabe—will only marginalize the role 

played by external powers. 

This may explain why President Mbeki has endorsed the efforts 

of the Zimbabwean Government in dealing with colonial inheritance of inequitable racial land redistribution while at the same 

time arguing that his critics are wrong if they believe that 

Zimbabwe’s leaders will simply obey what he tells them. Perhaps 

more interestingly, it raises questions about what the options are 

for ZANU–PF and MDC. Mugabe, in my opinion, holds now with 

his two-thirds majority most of the political cards, yet his aim appears to be to create a facade of stability and consensus within Parliament using the MDC while increasing his discretionary powers 

and cementing his rule through constitutional means. 

He would hope in so doing, it appears, for greater international 

acceptance and possible economic recovery through donor support 

including the IMF and through Harare’s burgeoning Chinese interest, the so-called eastward’s policy. Thus only to a limited extent, 

the future depends on whether the MDC is prepared to play along. 

And the early signs are that the MDC is prepared to play along in 

28

Parliament. And a number of policy alternatives—and this is where 

I like to conclude—arrives in the light of this assessment. 

These options have to be fundamentally cognizant of the unlikelihood of the South African Government abandoning its current policy approach. In my opinion, Pretoria will continue with sporadic 

attempts to bring the parties together, but likely only with rhetorical and peripheral success given Mugabe’s and ZANU’s obduracy. 

In the circumstances, the U.S. and other mainly Western partners 

have five options to get out of the current policy rut, and none of 

these options, Mr. Chairman, are mutually exclusive. 

The first of these options is to continue and ratchet up the current sanctions regime, widening the list of individuals coming 

under targeted sanctions. What will be the likely impact of this? 

This will, in my opinion, undoubtedly both alienate and irritate the 

Zimbabwean Government, which craves international attention and 

acceptance, and its African partners including South Africa. It was 

likely to have little impact, however, on the policy of Zimbabwe, 

given that ZANU has displayed a willingness to allow the country 

to implode economically to ensure that it stays in power. It has also 

openly, wherever it can, flouted sanctions—Mugabe’s trip to the 

Pope, being the most example, raising questions about enforcement. 

There is little doubt that targeted sanctions hurt key figures in 

the regime craving international acceptance, but even if they remain in place to maintain pressure, other forms of engagement 

should occur in parallel. The second policy option is to link progress 

and assistance for wider Africa initiatives, including support for 

NEPAD to a change in African and specifically South African policy. The likely impact of this will be, in my opinion, again, that this 

will be widely rejected by Africa as akin to throwing out the baby 

with the bathwater and may only serve to add credence to 

Mugabe’s portrayal of the crisis as having colonial or neo-colonial 

roots. 

It may make it, indeed, more for Mbeki and others to apply pressure on ZANU–PF, both for this reason and given the resonance 

that Mugabe’s argument would have within their own domestic 

constituencies. The third policy option that you have heard earlier, 

Mr. Chairman, is to target an increase in overt support for the prodemocracy movement in individuals within Zimbabwe. Now this 

could occur along similar lines to the support offered to the South 

African Liberation Movement during apartheid, including financial 

support for legal costs, institutional support of key organizations 

such as the national constitutional assembly and church bodies and 

fellowships and scholarships. 

In my opinion, the likely impact is given that the short-term 

change will come from within ZANU, this is at best a long term 

strategy for capacity institution-building. It will also serve to focus 

Zimbabwean Government’s attention and ire of these particular individuals. It also feeds into Mugabe’s rhetoric about the MDC being 

a creation of Tony Blair. Over the longer term, such civil societyoriented assistance will, however, be the platform making democracy possible. The second last policy option is to do nothing more, 

or to leave things as they are, maintaining the existing sanctions 

regime in place. Likely impact of this is as unpalatable as this may 

29

be from a Western, domestic, political and human rights perspective in the longer term. Leaving Zimbabwe to its own political and 

economic devices may permit the situation in academic parlance to 

ripen reaching a tipping point leading to radical political change. 

However, this will likely result in unacceptable widespread humanitarian catastrophe in the intervening period. And finally, what 

I believe is the most important usable and pragmatic policy option 

at the moment is what I call strategic engagement with key individuals and countries to urge reform in Zimbabwe. Now this could 

occur both through the African Union and other multi-lateral bodies such as the IMF and with bilateral American-African partners 

such as Botswana, Nigeria, Ghana, Mozambique and Uganda as 

well. 

South Africa and key members of the international African Congress could be brought on board for this option, in my opinion, and 

would welcome a change of approach from Washington. And it 

would be critical to the success of such a strategic engagement option that they work. Such a strategy would also have to involve engaging with reformist elements in ZANU–PF factions along with 

influential individuals both inside Zimbabwe and within the Diaspora. This will crucially have to involve placing on the table an attractive recovery package for Zimbabwe including on land but 

clearly conditional on political reform as well as an exit strategy for 

Mugabe. This may involve the appointment of a United States special envoy to Zimbabwe. The likely impact of this demands a level 

of sophistication and knowledge of Zimbabwe and Western policy, 

in my opinion, hitherto invisible, but it may be the best and least 

disruptive means of ensuring political change and economic and social stability in Zimbabwe in the short term. 

The absence of Western engagement on Zimbabwe will not only 

complicate the search for wider solutions to African development 

issues through NEPAD and other initiatives, but may lead to an 

increasingly Eastward’s—i.e., Chinese—orientation in select African foreign policies. 

Two sentences in conclusion. In contemplating the way forward 

for Western policy toward Zimbabwe, four issues are critical. First 

of these is to abandon any use of the terminology of regime change, 

instead suggesting change within the regime. The second of these 

related to this point: In the absence of a more strategic approach 

being adopted by the MDC, which we have seen nothing of, sadly, 

over the past 3 years, change in Zimbabwe is most likely to come 

from within ZANU–PF—particularly given the election results of 

the 31st of March. Thus the aim should be to cultivate relationships with ZANU, but importantly, not necessarily just from the 

ranks of incumbent politicians. And in so doing, identifying factions 

and encouraging reformists. 

The third point is to not wait until Mugabe’s retirement or death 

before engaging. Nor will his death or departure simply solve 

Zimbabwe’s problems. As Togo has shown, the absence of leadership does indeed create problems. And fourth and finally, and perhaps the most important issue is to ask Zimbabweans what they 

want. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mills follows:]

30

1The Brenthurst Foundation is a non-governmental think-tank dedicated to improving African 

economic performance, based in Johannesburg, South Africa. millsg@eoson.co.za EMBARGOED 

UNTIL DELIVERY, 21 APRIL 2005. 2 At http://www.southafrica.info/doinglbusiness/saltrade/agreements/bush-savisit.htm. 3SA Department of Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Plan 2005–2008, at http://www.dfa.gov.za/department/stratplan05–08.pdf. 4 At http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2005/dzum0415.htm

5 At http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2005/paha0415.htm. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GREG MILLS, PH.D., DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE, THE

BRENTHURST FOUNDATION,1 SOUTH AFRICA

During his visit to South Africa in July 2003, President George W Bush declared 

South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki to be the ‘‘point man’’ on Zimbabwe. He stated then: ‘‘I have no intention of second-guessing [Mbeki’s] tactics. We want the same 

outcome. Mbeki is the point man in this important subject, he is working very hard 

and is in touch with the parties involved, and the US supports him in his efforts.’’ 2

How is the point man doing, and are fresh tactics now called for by non-African 

players in the light of the 31 March 2005 parliamentary election in Zimbabwe? 

This testimony to the House Committee on International Relations will focus on 

three issues:

• What has been the record of South African policy towards Zimbabwe? Why 

has South Africa pursued this particular line of action—and is it consistent 

with South African regional foreign policy overall? Is South Africa’s record on 

Zimbabwe consistent with the stated human-rights orientation of South African foreign policy?

• What has been the impact of this policy within Zimbabwe?

• What policy options are there in the circumstances for other external actors? 

South African Foreign Policy: An Appraisal 

South African regional foreign policy is officially3 based on the realisation ‘‘that 

the future of South Africa is inextricably linked to the future of the African continent and that of our neighbors in Southern Africa.’’ The Republic’s engagement 

with Africa thus ‘‘rests on three pillars: Strengthening Africa’s institutions continentally and regionally vis-a`-vis the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC); Supporting the implementation of Africa’s socio-economic development programme, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 

(NEPAD); and, Strengthening bilateral political and socio-economic relations by way 

of effective structures for dialogue and co-operation.’’

Or in the words of the Foreign Minister Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma at the 2005 

Foreign Affairs Budget vote in Parliament,4

In order to meet the development needs of Africa, African leaders have 

pledged that Africans should possess their own future and development agenda. 

Nowhere more than in Africa has the need for the mobilization of resources to 

address the developmental challenges facing the people been so stark. . . . it 

is our assertion that without the necessary resources to address developmental 

challenges, the issue of conflict resolution, peace and stability will remain elusive. . . . We make bold the statement that Africans themselves must take destiny into their own hands. In this regard, Africans must themselves be at the 

forefront of mobilization of their own resources to address the developmental 

challenges facing the continent. In this context, NEPAD will only succeed to the 

extent to which Africans themselves are prepared to take possession of their 

own economic recovery and renewal.

This has incorporated a more proactive role, through the African Union, in settling African conflicts, including notably in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of 

Congo (DRC), Sudan and, more recently, Coˆte d’Ivoire. 

In each of the aforementioned cases, the South African government has devoted 

considerable resources on a sustained basis, including, in Burundi, Congo and 

Sudan, peacekeeping troops. The Congo settlement came about as a result of the 

South African-sponsored Sun City talks. Over Burundi, Pretoria has dedicated 

former President Nelson Mandela and current Deputy President Jacob Zuma to the 

task of securing a peace agreement and, latterly, facilitating a transitional government and new constitution. South Africa chairs the AU committee on the reconstruction of Sudan. In Coˆte d’Ivoire, President Mbeki has acted as a mediator on 

behalf of the AU to ‘‘expedite the peace process’’.5 More indirectly, South Africa 

31

6The constitutive act of the African Union at http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm. 

7Laurie Nathan, ‘Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy’, International Affairs, 81, 2, 2005, p.367. 8Telephonic discussion with Kingsley Mamabolo, Deputy Director-General (Africa), SA Department of Foreign Affairs, 16 April 2005. 9 At http://www.southafrica.info/doinglbusiness/saltrade/agreements/bush-savisit.htm. 

played a supporting role in the regional rejection of Togo’s attempted unconstitutional transition after President Eyadema’s death. 

In these and other respects, South Africa’s Africa policy amounts, wittingly or not, 

to attempting to export its own transitional conflict-resolution model. Indeed, South 

Africa’s championing of the objectives and principles of the African Union incorporate a commitment to ‘‘promote democratic principles and institutions, popular 

participation and good governance.’’ 6 This raises in turn general questions about the 

efficacy of external mediation in an environment especially where there is an absence of the sort of political culture and a willingness to accept fundamental, deepseated compromise of the sort that made the South African transition possible. 

The South African government’s policy has steadfastly been to avoid confrontation 

with Harare over this matter, instead preferring to attempt to facilitate contact between the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) and 

the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In so doing, Pretoria’s caution has contrasted with the profile of President Mbeki’s expansionist African vision 

and commitments. When not quiet, Pretoria’s diplomacy has generally included expressions of support for ZANU and criticism of the MDC with occasional mild rebuke of aspects of Mugabe’s policies.7

Whatever the apparent inconsistencies and contradictions between lofty principles 

and policy practice, according to one senior SA Department of Foreign Affairs official, ‘‘We believe that from our South African background that negotiations are the 

way to go. To get the Zimbabweans to do this, we believe that we have to engage 

Zimbabwe, to talk to them and to gain their confidence. Sanctions won’t remove the 

Zimbabwe government, and will not bring about a solution but rather havoc. Thus 

we looked at other options [to quiet diplomacy], but dismissed them.’’ 8

Indeed, at the time of President Bush’s African trip in July 2003, Mbeki said that 

the principal responsibility for the resolution of those challenges lay with the 

Zimbabweans themselves, noting ‘‘It is very important that they should move forward with urgency to find resolutions to these questions.’’ 9 Since the Zimbabwean 

presidential election in March 2002, this has involved a series of meetings with 

MDC and ZANU–PF representatives. Pretoria hopes that these will be resumed en 

force following the March 2005 election. 

Until now such talks have apparently had little discernable impact on the willingness of Mugabe to reign in his rhetoric or latterly to act according to the spirit and 

letter of the August 2004 SADC protocol on ‘Principles and Guidelines Governing 

Democratic Elections’. In contrast, the impact of continued political impasse on 

Zimbabwe has been marked. There has been an overall worsening of the political 

and economic environment inside Zimbabwe over the past five years. 

Politically, any concessions that President Mugabe has made in the direction of 

free and fair elections were, in the MDC’s and much of civil society’s view, overshadowed by the tightening of laws governing the electoral process, the role of civil 

society and the media. While the election appeared free-and-fair, the run-up to the 

event was in the opposition’s view wholly skewed in the incumbent’s favor and, 

given Harare’s refusal to admit foreign journalist and monitors, obscured from external scrutiny 

The attempts at facilitation have also not relieved the economic crisis, even 

though South Africa has, since 2000, supplied its northern neighbor with credits for 

food, fuel and electricity all of which have been in short supply in Zimbabwe. For 

Mugabe’s political crisis has created an economic one in which his country’s precipitous and ongoing economic decline has affected mainly the poor. Inflation remains 

very high, at around 125%, though down from the peak of around 620%. Exports 

in 2004 were US$1.7 billion, around one-third of what they were in 1997. GDP is 

little over half the 1997 figure of US$6.5 billion, mainly as a result of the government’s fast track land reform programme. The formal sector job market has shrunk 

over this period from about 1.4 million jobs to around 800,000 today. Horticulture 

and tobacco exports are now around half and 35% of their peak output respectively. 

Even more seriously, wheat, maize, milk, and soya production are all dramatically 

reduced, with the result that Zimbabwe has to rely on imports for these staple foodstuffs, pushing the price up to unaffordable levels for many in a population where 

30%+ of adults are HIV+. Importantly, the whole economic system is fraught with 

structural imbalances, with a negative interest rate discouraging saving (which exVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:33 Jul 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AGI\042105\20787.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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10 At http://www.news24.com/News24/Archive/0,6119,2–1659l1385106,00.html. 11See, for example, http://allafrica.com/stories/200305050378.html. 12See his email circular labeled ‘The Mystery of South Africa’s Position’ dated 19 March 2005. 13 ‘Mbeki says Zimbabwe policy stays’, Business Day, 15 April 2005. 14Telephonic discussion, 15 April 2005. 

plains, too, why the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange is one of the best performing in Africa), with industry kept ‘drip-fed’ on scarce foreign exchange. The rising (and 

unserviced) domestic (US$1.1 billion) and foreign (around US$3 billion) debt stock 

has demonstrated the need for the government to go continuously into the market 

to borrow and print notes to prevent collapse. 

In spite of this crisis, the regime in Harare persists partly because it has been 

able to continue to distribute largesse to key political constituents, partly due to the 

grip maintained on the opposition and civil society by the security services including 

the youth brigades, partly due to the powerlessness of MDC tactics and leadership, 

and partly due to political support for Harare from sectors inside and outside of 

Zimbabwe who are prepared to overlook ZANU–PF’s misrule precisely because they 

approve of Mugabe taking on Western powers apparently fearlessly. 

Although Pretoria has frequently asserted that it is working productively with 

both parties, MDC frustration over the South African position has boiled over on 

several occasions most notably following the Bush visit when MDC president Morgan Tsvangirai accused President Mbeki of making ‘‘false and mischievous’’ statements on political talks. Tsvangirai said that no talks were taking place and that 

Mbeki’s statement to President Bush that a dialogue had begun was ‘‘without foundation whatsoever’’. Tsvangirai said: ‘‘Statements claiming there is dialogue going 

on are patently false and mischievous. Such statements are manifestly partisan.’’ He 

said claims about talks between Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe’s party and the 

opposition were aimed at ‘‘buying time’’ for Mugabe.10

Whereas Tsvangirai has subsequently publicly supported Pretoria’s mediation 

role,11 others in his party have been less diplomatic in their observations. For example, MDC spokesman Eddie Cross has argued:12

It is now very apparent to anyone with half a brain that all is not well in 

South Africa when it comes to handling the Zimbabwe crisis. Here we have a 

situation where by every measure, the ZANU–PF led government has failed—

the economy is in tatters, half our population needs food aid, the quality of life 

for the majority has deteriorated to the point where nearly half the adult population has decamped. Almost all basic human and political rights are being 

abused and worse on a daily basis. And the regime has lost its legitimacy because of a well-known and clearly exposed record of electoral fraud and abuse. 

Yet, the leadership in South Africa and many of its apologists insist on maintaining the position that things are ‘‘improving’’ and that a ‘‘free and fair election’’ is still possible. It’s not out of ignorance. Its not because they simply want 

to be perverse. What then is the reason—the real reason for this ridiculous 

stance?

Cross has argued that Pretoria’s policy towards Zimbabwe is based on a fear of 

encouraging a split in the South Africa’s ruling tripartite alliance made up of the 

African National Congress (ANC)—SA Communist Party (SACP)—Congress of 

South African Trade Unions (COSATU) especially given the origins of the MDC in 

the Zimbabwean trade union movement. 

The South African government maintains that its policies have been relatively 

successful in the circumstances when viewed objectively against Zimbabwe’s needs 

and, in Pretoria’s view, in the absence of alternatives. For example, most recently, 

President Mbeki said in the South African parliament on 14 April 2005 that although the jury was still out on whether Zimbabwe’s parliamentary poll was free 

and fair, South Africa’s policy towards its neighbor would remain unchanged. ‘‘We 

have’’, he said, ‘‘insisted for some time that the solution lies in the hands of 

Zimbabweans and we will persist with that position.’’ 13

Other prominent South African government ministers have echoed this position. 

Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad has said 14 that the ‘‘only option for South Africa is to create the conditions for both sides to move forward together, to allow 

Zimbabweans to help themselves’’. South African policy, he said, had been focused 

on ‘‘getting the sides together to agree on the constitution and to co-operate on dealing with the economic crisis’’. He observed that ‘‘We would not do it differently [if 

we had to do it over again]. What have other powers done that is different [to SA]? 

How did they [the United States and Europe] want us to get tougher, we are not 

for regime change in Zimbabwe? Africa would not allow this. We are battling 

against forces that have taken decisions about having regime change in Zimbabwe. 

33

15See Thabo Mbeki, ‘The people of Zimbabwe must decide their own future’, Letter from the 

President, ANC Today, 3, 18, 9–15 May 2003. 16Mamabolo, op cit. 

And we are not for the so-called Milosevic option either’’. South African policy, he 

contended, ‘‘had successfully prevented civil war in Zimbabwe.’’

South African policy choice of ‘constructive engagement’—described somewhat pejoratively as ‘quiet diplomacy’—reflects thus a combination of its own political traditions and stress on compromise and negotiation, the history of race and colonialism 

in the region and the resonance of these factors including around land distribution 

domestically, and a belief that the alternatives including criticism of Mugabe will 

only marginalize the role to be played by external powers. This may explain why 

President Mbeki has endorsed the efforts of the Zimbabwean government in dealing 

with the colonial inheritance of inequitable racial land redistribution, while at the 

same time arguing that his critics are wrong if they believe that Zimbabwe’s leaders 

will simply obey what he tells them.15

Pretoria is today centered on one major short-term goal: To acquire the support 

of both parties (rather than Mugabe employing his now two-thirds majority) to 

change the ‘‘flawed’’ constitution and ‘‘get rid of certain legislation such as the 

POSA’’ (Public Order and Security Act). The tactic to achieve this consensus is 

through facilitating talks between the MDC and ZANU–PF. In this Pretoria would 

prefer to see ‘‘the United States and everybody putting pressure on and ensuring 

dialogue, engaging with the MDC and ZANU and not playing to the gallery.’’ 16

Future Zimbabwean Scenarios and Policy Options 

ZANU–PF now, post-March 2005 election, appears to hold most of the cards. It 

would, in the opinion of a number of experts, probably have won the election without its pre-election shenanigans and gerrymandering, although probably without the 

two-thirds majority it now holds. This margin is crucial to allow ZANU–PF to alter 

the constitution, a long-time Mugabe goal around which the opposition galvanised 

itself for the February 2000 referendum. 

Despite Mugabe now holding the political cards, his aim appears to be to create 

a fac ̧ade of stability and consensus within parliament and with the MDC, while increasing his discretionary powers and cementing his rule through constitutional 

means. He would hope, in so doing, for greater international acceptance and possible 

economic recovery through donor support including the IMF and through Harare’s 

burgeoning Chinese interests. 

Thus to a limited extent only the future depends on whether the MDC is prepared 

to play along. 

The opposition has two options at this stage. First, to play the ‘obstructionist parliamentarian’, not unlike the old South African Progressive Party, fighting for its 

cause from inside parliament. Even though this may find favour with those MDC 

members concerned about their livelihood in the parliamentary gravy-train, this 

type of role will likely simply serve to grant a stamp of approval to Mugabe, the 

election process and ZANU–PF’s rule. 

A second MDC option is not to enter parliament and publicly contest the election 

result, using party structures and its union base to mobilise mass protests—the 

‘Ukrainian option’. This route would certainly demonstrate the MDC’s sentiment on 

the election process and result, and display mettle comparable to that of ZANU’s. 

But the MDC has hitherto shown little capacity or stomach for this type of action, 

and it is uncertain whether Tsvangirai can make this large leap up to the plate of 

mass insurrection. 

A number of policy alternatives arise in the light of the above assessment. 

Some Policy Suggestions 

These options have to be cognizant of the unlikelihood of the South African government abandoning its current policy approach. Pretoria will likely continue with 

sporadic attempts continuing to bring the parties together but probably with only 

rhetorical and peripheral success given Mugabe’s and ZANU’s obduracy. 

In the circumstances, the US and other (mainly Western) partners have five options to get out of the current policy rut:

• Continue and ratchet up the current sanctions regime, widening the list of individuals coming under targeted sanctions. Likely impact: This will undoubtedly both alienate and irritate both the Zimbabwean government (which 

craves international attention and acceptance) and its African partners including South Africa. It is likely to have little impact on the polity of 

Zimbabwe, however, given ZANU has displayed a willingness to allow the 

country to implode economically to ensure it stays in power. It has also openVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:33 Jul 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AGI\042105\20787.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ly, wherever it can, flouted sanctions—Mugabe’s trip to the Pope’s funeral 

being the latest example—raising questions about enforcement. There is little 

doubt that targeted sanctions hurt key figures in a regime craving international acceptance, but even if they remain in place to maintain pressure, 

other forms of engagement should occur in parallel.

• Link progress and assistance for wider African initiatives including support 

for NEPAD to a change in African and specifically South African policy. Likely impact: This will be widely rejected by Africa as akin to throwing out the 

baby with the bathwater, and may only serve to add credence to Mugabe’s 

portrayal of the crisis as having colonial/neo-colonial roots. It may make it 

more difficult for Mbeki and others to apply pressure on ZANU–PF, both for 

the aforementioned reason and given the resonance that Mugabe’s argument 

would have within their own domestic constituencies.

• Target and increase overt support for the pro-democracy movement and individuals within Zimbabwe. This could occur along similar lines to the support 

offered to the South African liberation movements during apartheid, including 

financial support for legal costs, institutional support of key organizations 

such as the National Constitutional Assembly, and fellowships and scholarships. Likely impact: Given that short-term change will come from within 

ZANU, this is at best a long-term strategy for capacity- and institution-building. It will also serve to focus Zimbabwean government attention and ire on 

these individuals. It also feeds into Mugabe’s rhetoric about the MDC being 

a creation of Tony Blair. Over the longer term, such civil society-oriented assistance will, however, be the platform making democracy possible.

• Do nothing more—or the ‘leave things as they are’ alternative, maintaining 

the existing US/EU sanctions regime in place. Likely impact: As unpalatable 

as this may be from a (Western) domestic political and human rights perspective, in the longer-term leaving Zimbabwe to its own political and economic 

devices may permit the situation to ripen, reaching a ‘tipping point’ leading 

to radical political change. However, this could result in unacceptable, widespread humanitarian catastrophe in the immediate-term.

• Strategic engagement with key individuals and countries to urge reform in 

Zimbabwe. This could occur both through the African Union and other multilateral bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, and with bilateral 

US partners such as Botswana, Nigeria, Ghana, Mozambique, and Uganda. 

South Africa and key members of the African National Congress could be 

brought on board for this option and would welcome a change of approach 

from Washington—and it would be critical to the success of ‘Strategic Engagement’ to do so. Such a strategy would critically have to involve engaging with 

reformist elements in ZANU–PF factions along with influential individuals 

both inside Zimbabwe and within the diaspora. This will crucially have to involve placing on the table an attractive recovery package for Zimbabwe including on land but conditional on political reform. It may also have to include 

engineering an exit strategy for Mugabe and his close associates, including 

immunity from prosecution. All this may usefully involve the appointment of 

a US Special Envoy to Zimbabwe. Likely impact: This demands a level of sophistication and knowledge of Zimbabwe in Western policy hitherto invisible, 

but it may be the best and least disruptive means of ensuring political change 

and economic and social stability in Zimbabwe in the short-term. The absence 

of Western engagement on Zimbabwe will not only complicate the search for 

wider solutions to African development issues, but may also lead to an increasingly ‘eastwards’ (i.e. Chinese orientation) in select African foreign policies.

In contemplating the way forward for Western policy towards Zimbabwe, four 

issues are critical: First, to abandon any use of the terminology of regime change, 

suggesting instead change within the regime. Second, related to this point, in the 

absence of a more strategic approach being adopted by the MDC, change in 

Zimbabwe is most likely to come from within ZANU–PF. Thus the aim should be 

to cultivate relationships within ZANU, not necessarily just from the ranks of the 

incumbent politicians, in so doing identifying factions and encouraging reformists. 

Third, the West must plan on the basis that the situation in Zimbabwe cannot wait 

to be resolved by Mugabe’s death. Nor can the international community wait until 

his death to lay the basis of transition. As Togo shows currently, a vacuum can result in chaos. Fourth, to ask Zimbabweans what they want.

35

Mr. TANCREDO [presiding]. I am in a bit of a quandary whether 

to proceed. I think perhaps because the next bell will indicate that 

the following vote will only be 5 minutes thereafter, I will probably 

recess the Committee now. We have four more votes and then it 

will go to final passage. So I am going to guess it is going to be 

25 minutes to 1⁄2 hour. I am sorry, but you know the situation here. 

So we will hold the Committee in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH [presiding]. I would like to ask Mr. Krilla to start his 

testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JEFFREY KRILLA, AFRICA PROGRAM 

DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

Mr. KRILLA. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. Before 

I begin summarizing my remarks, I request that my statement be 

submitted into the record in its entirety. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, it will be entered in its entirety. 

Mr. KRILLA. Today’s hearing on Zimbabwe is particularly timely 

and gives us an opportunity to discuss the challenges facing that 

country as well as the challenges facing the United States Government in addressing Zimbabwe’s prospects for democracy. I serve as 

Director of the Africa division at the International Republican Institute, a nonpartisan organization which operates democracy and 

governance programs in more than 60 countries around the world, 

including a dozen in Africa. All too often, Americans pay attention 

to Africa only when the headlines tell of violence and atrocity. The 

fact that Zimbabwe is not making these sorts of headlines does not 

give us an excuse for inaction. I commend the Subcommittee for 

understanding the importance of the situation and calling this 

hearing. Zimbabwe’s recent election highlights just how far that 

country is from being a free and open multi-party democracy. Having first visited Zimbabwe in 1991 and having been closely involved 

in the election cycles there for close to 15 years, I must acknowledge that the anti-democratic forces of Zimbabwe are continually 

growing more sophisticated. 

Government measures prior to the election ensured the absence 

of a level playing field. A number of laws limit public meetings and 

gatherings and bar independent media and access to State media. 

With disturbing memories of violence serving as a constant backdrop, nonviolent forms of intimidation are increasingly effective. 

This election’s apparent decrease in physical intimidation is a preconceived tactic by the Government of Zimbabwe to create a facade 

of legitimate elections. Throughout the campaign and drought, the 

Government of Zimbabwe has used as a political tool the very food 

crisis whose existence it denies, by withholding food aid in granting 

allotments only after seeing ruling party membership cards. 

Voter disenfranchisement is another major component discrediting Zimbabwe’s recent elections. Over 100,000 Zimbabwean voters 

were turned away at the polls on election day. Furthermore, vast 

numerical discrepancies between the initial vote totals and the 

final reports show the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission halted the 

public announcement of the results and bought the Government 

time to reverse those results. We have seen how quiet diplomacy 

handles these developments and the odds of Zimbabwe democraVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:33 Jul 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042105\20787.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
36

tizing through quiet diplomacy are not good. Like Togo, Liberia and 

Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe would benefit from megaphone diplomacy, 

diplomacy that does not allow Mugabe free rein to run elections 

violating the South African Development Community’s own protocol and similar international standards. IRI has worked in countries like Ukraine, Iraq and Indonesia where we support good governance by educating people, parties, NGOs and governments on 

the values and practices of democracy. 

IRI has tried to do that in Zimbabwe by working from afar. But 

the greatest work has been done by Zimbabweans themselves. Despite the laws limiting meetings and publicity, the opposition 

party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has not only survived but grown, building a grassroots movement capable of bringing tens of thousands to its rallies and of forcing the Zimbabwean 

Government to recognize it as a significant political player on the 

landscape of Zimbabwe. I hope in light of MDC’s undeniable credibility, Robert Mugabe will think of his own legacy and begin to 

take pause. 

In the early 1980s, Zimbabwe was an African breadbasket, a 

model of agricultural development. Today Zimbabwe has descended 

into year after year of food crises. Its economy is wrecked. Millions 

depend on handouts and inflation accelerates at a disastrous pace. 

Some observers have asked why Zimbabwe has not given us a popular revolution reminiscent of Ukraine. But the political and economic environment in Zimbabwe is completely different than 

Ukraine, which saw over a decade of sustained programming from 

IRI, NDI Freedom House, and other organizations promoting democratic growth from the grassroots to the highest levels of power. 

The people of Zimbabwe have faced a total information blackout 

and for years have suffered widespread intimidation and violence, 

including reprisals in areas where opposition support is high. The 

mere sustenance of democratic forces in that country has been a 

victory that can be extended through continued support from the 

United States. Without it, the ability of Zimbabwe’s activists to 

fight for democracy will wither. 

The country’s economic problems have given rise to refugees departing for South Africa. Workers from Malawi and Mozambique 

once in demand in Zimbabwe now have to look elsewhere. 

Zimbabwe, once an anchor for regional food security, is now a drain 

on regional resources. It hurts efforts by regional organizations like 

the AU and SADC to strengthen regional democratic governance 

and economic development. 

A few brief words about how the U.S. Government should proceed from here: Number one, encourage our friends in southern Africa to be honest about the situation in Zimbabwe and to pressure 

Mugabe’s Government to adhere to protocols. Number two, work 

with regional organizations like SADC and NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, to strengthen their own systems 

of peer review to find a genuinely African solution to Zimbabwe’s 

difficulties. 

And three, ramp up U.S. Government support for democracy 

building programs to encourage the growth of political change in 

Zimbabwe. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was right to call 

Zimbabwe an outpost of tyranny. And President Bush himself has 

37

repeated the sentiment in recent remarks. We hope that Congress 

will heed these words and give full support to increasing democracy 

programming in Zimbabwe. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Krilla follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JEFFREY KRILLA, AFRICA PROGRAM DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to testify today. I request that my 

statement be submitted into the record in its entirety. 

Today’s hearings on Zimbabwe are particularly timely, and give us a valuable opportunity to discuss the challenges facing that country in the weeks and months following the recent elections. I would like discuss the challenges facing the United 

States in its support for the growth of democratic institutions in Zimbabwe. My remarks will focus on the remarkable series of abuses and repressive measures President Robert Mugabe and his ruling ZANU–PF have initiated in recent years, the 

considerable progress made by Zimbabwe’s opposition despite these abuses, and on 

the positive potential impact of increased United States support for a democratic future for Zimbabwe. 

Zimbabwe’s recent elections highlight how far that country is from being a free 

and open multi-party democracy. While the weeks and months leading up to the 

election were marked by less violence and flagrant abuse than in previous elections 

in Zimbabwe, we cannot be lulled into the belief that the relative calm indicates 

strides toward free and fair elections, or a truly open political space. There are reports that the Zimbabwe Election Commission engaged in systematic voting fraud 

on a massive scale. And in the weeks since the election, groups and individuals who 

did take advantage of the seemingly normalized campaign and voting conditions 

prior to March 31 have already suffered reprisals. Now that credentialed media observers have been required to leave the country, their visas expired, the beatings 

and arrests are now returning to Zimbabwe, as are the spiraling consumer costs and 

increased inflation—ingredients in a recipe for a large-scale humanitarian crisis. 

With or without election-day fraud itself, government measures prior to the election ensured the absence of a level playing field, and all but assured a ruling-party 

victory. A number of laws, including the notoriously repressive Public Order and Security Act, which limits public meetings and gatherings, and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), which bars independent media and access to state media, guaranteed that a fair election process could not occur. AIPPA 

provided for the formation of the Media and Information Commission, which is responsible for shutting down independent media groups, and registering and deporting journalists. The new electoral act then sanctioned implementation of a five-person electoral commission, each member chosen by President Mugabe. The electoral 

act also allowed for state-controlled voter education, military and civil servants acting as domestic observers, and an electoral system vesting power in the Electoral 

Supervisory Commission—a commission whose greatest achievement was ironically 

last year’s abysmal voter registration drive. 

Having first visited Zimbabwe in 1991 and having been closely involved in the 

election cycles there for close to fifteen years, I must acknowledge that the antidemocratic forces of Zimbabwe are continually growing more sophisticated. With 

memories of violence serving as a constant back-drop, non-violent forms of intimidation are increasingly effective. This election’s apparent decrease in physical intimidation should not be taken as an opening of political space, but rather a preconceived tactic by the government of Zimbabwe to create a fac ̧ade of legitimate 

elections. 

I will highlight a few of the blatant examples of intimidation and irregularities, 

covered in the press and related by my colleagues who directly witnessed the runup and Election Day. Throughout the campaign season and concomitant drought, 

the government of Zimbabwe has used as a political tool the very food crisis whose 

existence it repeatedly denies—withholding food aid, controlling access to seeds and 

other agricultural inputs, and granting maize allotments only after seeing ruling 

party membership cards. One ZANU–PF parliament candidate who shall remain 

nameless told a rally that those who voted the right way would have plenty to eat 

after the election. A starving population seriously detracts from hopes for a free and 

fair national election. 

Voter disenfranchisement is another major component in discrediting Zimbabwe’s 

recent elections. It is a matter of public record that more than 100,000 Zimbabwean 

voters were turned away at the polls on Election Day, despite valid registration. 

38

Furthermore, vast numerical discrepancies between the initial vote totals and the 

final reports more than suggest that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission halted the 

public announcement of results and bought the government time to convincingly reverse results that did not meet hoped-for outcomes. To give but one example, the 

Zimbabwe Election Commission initially announced that 14,812 votes had been cast 

in Manyame province, with more than 8,300 votes going to the opposition Movement 

for Democratic Change (MDC) party. The government later announced that 24,303 

votes had been cast in Manyame, a difference of nearly 9,500 votes, with ZANU–

PF the declared winner. 

Equally importantly, the government of Zimbabwe is trying to limit the capabilities of domestic organizations trying to promote human rights and democracy by depriving them of foreign contributions. It is not a violation of sovereignty to accept 

such support, which is allowed and even welcomed elsewhere, from the Republic of 

South Africa to Kenya and Nigeria. The United States and other foreign countries 

and entities have assisted Zimbabwean organizations that deal with HIV/AIDS education, agricultural development, parliamentary strengthening and other sectors 

with the full knowledge and endorsement of the Zimbabwean government. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that educate the public in human rights and democracy provide services to the people of Zimbabwe, just like their colleagues providing HIV/AIDS education. If the government of Zimbabwe limits organizations 

that promote human rights and democracy, then it is harming future funding for 

programs for HIV/AIDS, drought relief, foreign investment, and countless other efforts to improve the standard of living for all Zimbabweans. 

Needless to say, conditions in Zimbabwe do not permit the International Republican Institute (IRI) nor any of our partners to work in Zimbabwe, as we have done 

in other countries throughout Africa. We have operated within very restricted environments, including a South Africa in transition from apartheid, the post-war states 

of Angola and Liberia, and a profoundly challenged Sudan, where we largely conduct trainings outside of the country. Late in 2004, the government of Zimbabwe 

passed legislation banning foreign funding for NGOs, which makes any IRI mission 

not only difficult, and to the surprise of many but illegal. Despite these obstacles 

to democratic support systems in Zimbabwe, and to the surprise of many nonAfricanists, our U.S. Embassy and U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID) Mission in Harare, Zimbabwe remain open. Despite the ban on foreign assistance to domestic NGOs and years of methodical pressure by the Zimbabwean 

government, democratic hopes persist and the U.S. is dogged—for good reason. With 

an infusion of U.S. government support, Zimbabwe’s prospects for being removed 

from the world’s list of ‘Outposts of Tyranny’ are good—arguably better than the 

other dictatorships on Secretary of State Rice’s now-famous list. 

The fact is that if IRI, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the U.S. government, along with the United Nations and our African counterparts such as the 

South African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union, fail to devote ample resources in support of democratic forces in Zimbabwe, then prospects 

are bad. Present deplorable conditions on the ground would likely worsen as the regime is able to freely enact constitutional changes to enshrine not only President 

Mugabe, but generations of his successors. Support from neighbors, however, when 

bolstered by U.S. government involvement, would significantly strengthen 

Zimbabwe’s democratic prospects. We have seen the effects of quiet diplomacy over 

the past few years, and most recently during these elections and the likelihood for 

Zimbabwe democratizing under the guidance of quiet diplomacy are not good. Like 

Togo, Liberia, and Coˆte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe should benefit from megaphone diplomacy—diplomacy that does not allow fellow African leaders free reign in managing 

elections that fly in the face of the SADC’s own Mauritius Protocol and similar 

international standards. 

During the past 10 years, IRI has assisted democratic forces to strengthen their 

institutions and capacity. Our goal in Zimbabwe, like our goal in Ukraine, Iraq, Indonesia, and the many other IRI program countries, is to support growth of political 

and economic freedom, good governance and human rights by educating people, parties, non-governmental organizations, and governments on the values and practices 

of democracy. IRI has tried to do just that in Zimbabwe by working from afar. But 

the greatest work has been done by Zimbabweans themselves. For all IRI and other 

organizations like it do, it is the people of Zimbabwe and those courageous enough 

to challenge the anti-democratic forces who need to be supported. In many ways, 

they are dependent upon support from the United States, the United Nations, the 

African Union, and others to continue the struggle for democracy in Zimbabwe. 

This struggle is not a dying dream. As much as Zimbabwe has slid back, it has 

also made many advances. We should not take the disheartening outcome of the recent elections as an excuse to give up, but as an indication that it is now time to 

39

ramp up American support for democratic institutions in Zimbabwe. The MDC, is 

seen as a credible and viable political party in Zimbabwe, even by President 

Mugabe. The MDC has successfully participated in two parliamentary elections and 

a presidential election, despite tremendous pressure. Despite the laws limiting 

meetings and publicity, the MDC has not only survived, but grown, building a grassroots movement capable of bringing tens of thousands to its rallies and forcing the 

Zimbabwean government to recognize it as a significant political player on the landscape of Zimbabwe. The MDC campaigned in more places than ever before, and it 

is clear that the party enjoys public support. It is highly regarded by regional powers. In fact, after MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai was acquitted of treason charges 

in October 2004, he met with the leaders of South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana, Nigeria, and Ghana, to name only a few. 

Despite this growing international recognition, Zimbabwe’s neighbors have not 

done all that they could. While South Africa’s African National Congress party was 

surprisingly critical of Mugabe’s government in mid-January, initially bringing 

meaningful pressure to bear on Zimbabwe, outcry has dissipated in recent months. 

While a spokeswoman for SADC admitted that ‘‘The results that the candidates 

themselves signed at the polling stations were not the same as the results announced on national television,’’ South African President Thabo Mbeki called 

Zimbabwe’s elections ‘‘free and fair,’’ even before the election occurred. The SADC 

team declared the election ‘‘peaceful, credible and dignified.’’ These inconsistencies 

are troubling, and those relying on observer reports are left to wonder whether the 

will of the Zimbabwean people played into the election at all. 

While I hope influential neighbors, including South Africa, will speak out against 

the recurring travesty of rigged elections, I hope, too, that Robert Mugabe will think 

of his own legacy and begin to take pause. 

His rule over Zimbabwe, first as prime minister, and now as president, has been 

a period of innumerable missed opportunities. Mugabe himself spent a decade in 

prison, and years at the head of an armed rebel movement, touted as one of Africa’s 

liberating sons. But now, at the end of his life, will he be remembered for these 

early triumphs? In the early 1980s, Zimbabwe was an African bread-basket, a model 

of agricultural development. Today, Zimbabwe has descended into year after year 

of food crisis. Its economy is wrecked, and its farms are abandoned. Millions depend 

on handouts, and inflation accelerates at a disastrous pace. Prices have continued 

to sky-rocket even in the short time since the elections, and fuel shortages have 

grown even worse as well. All of Zimbabwe’s tremendous potential has been jeopardized, but could be salvaged if Mugabe and the ruling party were to allow legitimate 

elections to take place and implement substantive democratic reforms. 

In light of Zimbabwe’s potential, the need for a clear U.S. government policy and 

plan for Zimbabwe is evident. The recent renewal of the U.S. travel ban on Mugabe 

and other high-ranking officials from Zimbabwe sends a clear message of disapproval of the games being played by Zimbabwe’s leadership—but it does little to 

help the people at the grassroots, clamoring to be heard. While President Mugabe 

may vacation in Malaysia and even have a seat at Pope John Paul II’s funeral in 

Vatican City, his people continue to suffer. Only sustained and high-level U.S. government support for the growth of democratic institutions in Zimbabwe will be effective in the long run. 

Some hopeful observers have asked why Zimbabwe has not given us a popular 

revolution reminiscent of democracy’s recent victory in the Ukraine. This is a false 

analogy that prevents us from seeing the successes that have occurred. The political 

environment in Zimbabwe is completely different than the Ukraine, which allowed 

for much more political space, and saw more than a decade of sustained programming by IRI, NDI, IFES, Freedom House, and numerous other organizations promoting democratic growth from the grassroots to the highest levels of power. The 

people of Zimbabwe are much poorer. They are hungry and beleaguered; they have 

faced a total information blackout, and for years have suffered widespread intimidation and violence, including reprisals in areas where opposition support is high. But 

civil society organizations promoting democratic values have survived in spite of the 

obstacles. 

Clearly, Zimbabwe is not yet ready for a Ukrainian-style popular revolution. But 

the mere sustenance of democratic forces in that country has been a victory, a victory that can be extended through continued support from the international community led by the African Union, the United States, and the United Nations. Without 

it, the ability of Zimbabwe’s valiant activists to continue their fight for democracy 

will wither. 

All too often, Americans pay attention to Africa only when the headlines tell of 

violence and atrocity. Sudan, Coˆte d’Ivoire, and Liberia have all garnered this sort 

of negative publicity in recent months. In the case of the Sudan in particular, the 

40

United States has led the way, pledging crucial sums of aid to assist in that country’s reconciliation between the north and the south. The fact that Zimbabwe is not 

currently making the same sort of headlines does not give us an excuse for inaction. 

We need only look at other regional examples, such as the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo, to realize how vital it is that Zimbabwe’s situation not grow worse. 

The country’s economic problems have given rise to refugees departing for South Africa; workers from Malawi and Mozambique, once in demand in Zimbabwe, now 

have to look elsewhere. Zimbabwe, once an anchor for regional food security, is now 

a drain on regional resources. Zimbabwe’s status as a pariah state undermines regional stability. It hurts efforts by regional organizations like the African Union and 

the SADC to strengthen regional democratic governance and economic development. 

A few brief words in summary about how the U.S. government should proceed 

from here.

1) Encourage our friends in southern Africa to be honest about the situation in 

Zimbabwe and to pressure Mugabe’s government to adhere to SADC election 

protocols in the future.

2) Work with regional organizations like SADC and the New Partnership for 

Africa’s Development (NEPAD), to strengthen their own systems of peer review, to find a genuinely African solution to Zimbabwe’s difficulties.

3) Ramp up our support for NGOs and civil society organizations to encourage 

growth of a democratic culture in Zimbabwe.

Continued and increasing levels of U.S. government support for democracy-building programs is the best way to open political space in Zimbabwe, to stave off a 

growing strategic threat, and to ensure that the prospects for democracy in 

Zimbabwe get better, not worse. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your excellent testimony 

and for the great work you are doing and have been doing for so 

long. Having known you for so long, it is a pleasure to see you before the Committee. Ms. Bryan. 

STATEMENT OF MS. SHARI BRYAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, 

SOUTHERN AND EAST AFRICA PROGRAM, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE 

Ms. BRYAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and to the 

other Members of the Subcommittee. I am pleased to have this opportunity, and I want you to know how important those of us who 

work in Africa think this hearing is because there is far too little 

attention being paid to this country right now and the people of 

Zimbabwe who have been disappointed by their own neighborhood. 

The actions that are taken here by this Committee, and particularly by the staff who have been very active in visiting Zimbabwe 

for the last couple of years, is significant. 

I am just going to make a few points, because I think you have 

heard the same thing over and over again and the nice thing is, 

we are on the same page when it comes to Zimbabwe. I was there 

during the week of the elections and was able to see firsthand what 

was happening. And while it was a peaceful election, it was not a 

fair or a legitimate election. It goes without saying. There are some 

impressions that I took from the week there that I think are worth 

sharing. Part of this calm and peacefulness was interesting because 

it allowed the opposition to campaign in a way that it had not been 

able to before. 

And what was interesting about that is people really came out 

to see them. And I went to a couple of big opposition rallies and 

saw a couple of ruling party rallies on television. But there were 

40- to 50,000 people at stadiums. They wanted to hear what was 

going on. And the other striking difference I thought, or an interVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:33 Jul 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042105\20787.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
41

esting aspect, was that the MDC actually had very concrete platforms that they talked about at these rallies. They talked about 

health care and education and HIV/AIDS and land reform. And at 

the ruling party rallies, all you heard was a lot of rhetoric about 

Prime Minister Blair and the British and colonialism. 

So there are very stark differences in what the parties were offering as alternatives. As you know, the international press was allowed in at the last minute. And I think this was very deliberate, 

this peaceful aura, the presence of the international media as a 

way of Mugabe very much wanting to show to the world that this 

was a free and fair and peaceful election. 

It was all very much manipulated and thought through very 

carefully well in advance. But the election itself was set up in a 

way that there was no way the MDC could have won. You have 

heard some of these things already. There was an out-of-date registry with over a million names that were probably fictitious. Constituencies were gerrymandered. Polling places were reduced in 

MDC territory and increased in ZANU territory. Three million people who had moved outside of Zimbabwe were not able to vote. And 

this threat of withholding food and land was, of course, very dangerous. While the international media was there, there is no local 

media, no independent local media anymore. And then there was, 

I think most importantly, this lack of international, credible international monitors. Of course, no one from the West was allowed. 

But even the southern African delegation such as the SADC Parliamentary Forum—which is a very credible organization with high 

election standards—was not invited in this year because they had 

been critical 2 years ago. And I think the message that sends to 

Democrats in southern Africa is just devastating, really dividing 

the region between those southern Africans, for instance, who want 

to uphold international standards and regional standards and 

those who don’t. 

Just on election day, it was peaceful and quiet and we drove 

around and we think there are very few problems in terms of the 

way the election was administered. It was really in the way the 

vote was tabulated. And just of note, a group called the Zimbabwe 

Election Support Network fielded over 6,000 observers, and we 

have a copy of their statement which we would like to have entered 

into the record. Most of their observers had a hard time verifying 

the vote count. They were prevented by election authorities from 

observing the tabulation. And then everyone has alluded to this 

mysterious increase in the total number of votes that were announced 6 hours after the election and mysteriously 12 hours later, 

each constituency had another 20,000 votes and so on. And there 

has been no explanation at all. 

I think both the Zimbabwe’s election support network and the 

MDC believe that as many as 20 seats, maybe up to 40, could have 

gone in favor of the MDC had those tabulations been fair. There 

is no way to know. They will be litigated in court, but I don’t think 

the court system will respond to those in a timely way. We have 

heard a lot about the regional response. It is disappointing and we 

need to do more to encourage the southern Africa region to uphold 

their own standards of elections. In terms of the prospects for the 

42

future, I think it is grim. And unfortunately, this is not the time 

to abandon the people of Zimbabwe. 

Some people testified about what happened this Monday when 

Zimbabwe celebrated their 25th anniversary of independence. And 

President Mugabe said we have no need for Western-style democracy or aid from the West because we are looking East. I would 

suggest that for the 11 million people that live in Zimbabwe, they 

don’t agree with this. Those people are dying from AIDS and suffering from hunger. Those that have been politically silenced, I can 

tell you they don’t share his view. The people of Zimbabwe believe 

in the universal principles of democracy, they have respect for the 

rule of law and desperately want to live in a country that is free 

from violence, oppression and hunger. I think now is the time to 

redouble our efforts and support the democratic process in 

Zimbabwe. The opposition party, and I would agree with my colleague, the MDC maintains broad support from citizens in 

Zimbabwe and they should be applauded for the job that they have 

done over the last several years. 

They should be commended for agreeing to participate in these 

elections despite violence, harassment and intimidation that has 

been directed at them. They have participated bravely and they 

have organized peacefully to engage in the process, however flawed 

that might be. And I think that really deserves our recognition and 

support. After a decade of strategically supporting good governance 

in Africa and poverty reduction, we must be steadfast in our continued support to Zimbabwe, and we should continue to encourage 

adherence to international regional standards. And we need to use 

every financial and diplomatic resource to prevent the continent 

from losing yet another country to insecurity and poverty. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bryan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. SHARI BRYAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, SOUTHERN AND

EAST AFRICA PROGRAM, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the National 

Democratic Institute, I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak about the recent parliamentary elections, and the prospects for the future of democracy in 

Zimbabwe. NDI has been working with political and civic leaders for over a decade 

to assist in their efforts to advance democracy throughout the Southern Africa region. I was present in Zimbabwe during the week of the elections, and was able to 

see first-hand the political events as they unfolded in the days prior to the polls. 

I appreciate this opportunity to share information related to these recent elections 

and to highlight some of the troubling indicators I see concerning the prospects for 

democracy in the country. 

The March 2005 elections were yet another in a series of fatally flawed elections 

in Zimbabwe, and must be viewed in the context of three important issues: 1) the 

illegitimate parliamentary elections in 2000 and presidential election in 2002—both 

of which were fraught with violence and intimidation; 2) an economic and social crisis that is raging throughout the country; and 3) the weak regional response to the 

crisis and the impact it is having on democratic leaders and activists throughout 

southern Africa. 

For the past five years, Zimbabwe has held three consecutive elections that have 

shared common themes: state-sponsored violence and intimidation directed toward 

opposition leaders and their followers; an unfair electoral framework and corrupt 

election administration; a biased judiciary that has failed to adhere to the rule of 

law; limitations on freedom of speech, assembly and the independent press; and severe restrictions on civic groups engaged in voter and civic education. 

These elections were also held in the context of a country in a deteriorating state 

of economic and social crisis. Over the past five years, the standard of living for 

most Zimbabweans has fallen significantly, with 70 percent of the population now 

living under the poverty level. It is estimated that between two and three million 

43

1www.cdc.gov 

2 IRIN News, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45312, January 31, 2005. 

people have left the country as economic refugees over the last several years. 

Zimbabwe has one of the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in the world, with 24.6 

percent of all adults infected with the disease.1 Fuel shortages are common, and 

electricity and water are routinely unavailable. Many humanitarian organizations 

fear that there will be food shortages affecting millions of rural citizens at any given 

time; and in January, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, based in Johannesburg, estimated that as many as 5.8 million people (out of a population of 11.5 

million) may starve if they do not receive food aid.2

This is a bleak picture for a country that was once known as the breadbasket of 

Africa, with one of the strongest economies on the continent, a highly educated population, a revered judicial system and a thriving free press. In the last few years, 

it has faced international condemnation by the West, but little criticism from neighboring countries which are forced to deal directly with the impact of the crisis on 

a daily basis. The Zimbabwe problem has become an African problem, and ownership for resolving the situation has been assumed by the political leadership in 

southern Africa. After five years of ‘‘quiet diplomacy,’’ however, these efforts have 

failed to hold Zimbabwe to the electoral and governance standards established and 

endorsed by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the New 

Economic Partnership for Africa (NEPAD). 

The Pre-Election Period 

What set the March 2005 elections apart from recent elections in Zimbabwe was 

that they were relatively peaceful. But they were in no way fair or legitimate. 

In the two months leading up to the March polls, there was a significant change 

in the atmosphere in Zimbabwe. Seemingly out of nowhere, the opposition party, the 

Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), saw a new level of electoral tolerance that 

had not existed for years. MDC leaders and candidates were able to travel and campaign in a relatively calm, peaceful environment. There were markedly fewer incidents of police disrupting campaign rallies, and candidates were able to speak openly in areas that had long been considered ‘‘no-go’’ areas—rural constituencies that 

had been dominated and controlled by the ruling party and their armed party loyalists. However, candidates from the ruling party made frequent allusions to the past, 

reminding people that if they did not vote for ZANU–PF, there would be repercussions. 

This is very different from the past five years, when government-sponsored youth 

gangs and war veterans attacked opposition supporters, beating them, destroying 

property and in some cases killing individuals who sympathized or campaigned for 

the opposition. 

A few days before the elections I had a chance to attend two opposition rallies—

one in Harare and one in Bulawayo—and I viewed several ZANU–PF rallies on 

state television. These rallies were remarkable on several levels. First, the turnout 

and participation of ordinary Zimbabweans was extremely high. A reported 40,000 

people showed up to hear MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, speak on the Sunday 

morning before the elections. An open soccer field was packed full of supporters who 

hung on his every word, and chanted the same slogan over and over again—‘‘A new 

Zimbabwe, a new beginning’’. 

What was also remarkable was that this rally and other electoral activities held 

throughout the week were covered by scores of international media—from the Washington Post to the New York Times, CNN, and dozens of European reporters. With 

the exception of a few British-based media outlets, the government accredited dozens of print and television media—something that has not been allowed in 

Zimbabwe, as there has been a complete ban on foreign journalists for more than 

three years. 

And lastly, what was striking about these events was the stark difference in the 

political message that was delivered at MDC rallies, as compared to the message 

carried at the ZANU–PF rallies that I watched on local television. The MDC candidates set out clear positions on public policy issues, ranging from economic reform, 

to land tenure, education, and health care. Morgan Tsvangirai spoke openly to the 

crowd in Harare about the HIV/AIDs crisis, the impact it was having on the 

Zimbabwean population, and the need for everyone to use condoms. Armed with statistics and facts, these MDC positions were in marked contrast to ZANU–PF speeches and political advertisements in the newspapers, which were based largely on 

anti-British and anti-colonial rhetoric. Little attention was paid to the daily concerns of Zimbabweans. Instead, the ruling party discussed the damaging role of the 

44

3 Reginald Matchaba-Hove, Chairman of the Zimbabwe Election Support Network. 

colonial powers, with full page photos of Prime Minister Tony Blair—a message that 

still resonates with many Zimbabweans. 

The relative calm and openness during the run-up to the election, however, 

masked a manipulated process that began long ago and which is consistent with the 

ongoing, illegitimate administration of elections that Zimbabwe has had in place for 

the past five years. In the days leading up to the elections, Zimbabweans commented that ZANU–PF was so convinced they would win a two-thirds majority, that 

‘‘creating freer conditions on the eve of the election would not hurt.’’ 3

What was at stake? 

Zimbabwe’s parliament consists of 150 seats, of which 30 are appointed directly 

by the President. Of the 120 directly elected seats, the MDC had won 57 in the 2000 

parliamentary elections, and many analysts believe they would have won an additional 37 seats, had their pending electoral complaints been adjudicated by the court 

system at any point over the last five years. Going into the March elections, it was 

clear that the ruling party desperately wanted a comfortable two-thirds majority in 

parliament, which would enable them to change the constitution at will. And the 

pre-election conditions almost certainly ensured a ruling party victory. A few of 

these conditions included:

• An out-of-date voter registry—The voters roll that was used for these elections 

was out of date and could not be verified before the elections, as the complete 

voter registry was never publicly released. Many Zimbabwean analysts believe that as many as two million names out of the 5.7 million listed, were 

either fictitious or dead.

• Gerrymandered constituencies—Since the last parliamentary elections, many 

of the urban seats held by the MDC have been abolished altogether and new 

constituencies developed in rural areas where people are more sympathetic to 

President Mugabe and his ZANU–PF party. In other cases, MDC-friendly constituencies were merged with rural ones, to slightly tilt the balance in favor 

of ZANU–PF.

• Selective increase in the number of polling stations—While the number of polling stations were reduced in MDC strongholds, making it more difficult for 

voters to get to the polls in a timely manner, there was an increase in the 

number of stations in the ZANU-friendly rural areas.

• Domestic observers faced obstacles in accreditation—Civic groups were prevented from registering their over 6,000 domestic monitors until just days before the election and were required to travel to either Bulawayo or Harare 

to receive their accreditation.

• Exiled population was not able to participate in polls—Up to three million 

people have left Zimbabwe over the last several years, primarily for economic 

reasons, and most are seen as sympathetic to the MDC. These potential voters had no access to the ballot and were not able to participate in this important process.

• Land and food was used as a threat—It was reliably reported that village 

chiefs and elders, who are responsible for allocating land, threatened rural 

voters with taking back their subsistence plots if they failed to vote for 

ZANU–PF. Other reports indicated that government officials responsible for 

handing out food aid threatened to withhold food if voters were suspected of 

voting for the MDC.

• Lack of access to the media—Although international journalists were allowed 

into the country on the eve of elections, they were accredited late in the process. Independent, local media remains non-existent in the country. The only 

credible independent newspaper, the Daily News, was forced to close in 2003 

after years of harassment, bomb attacks on its offices, arrests and detention 

of reporters, and violence directed at its editor. Prior to the elections, the 

MDC was afforded a small amount of radio and television time on state-controlled stations, but it paled in comparison to the almost around-the-clock coverage of President Mugabe, ZANU candidates and ZANU rallies held around 

the country.

• Lack of credible international monitors—As in the last presidential election, 

election observers from the United States, the United Kingdom, the European 

Union and the Commonwealth were not invited or allowed in the country. 

Most disappointing in this years’ election was the blatant refusal to allow 

45

5MDC Report ‘‘The will of the Zimbabwean People Denied . . . Again’’, April 12th, 2005

4ZESN Statement, 2005 Parliamentary Elections, April 2, 2005

credible, impartial observers from southern Africa such as the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC–PF), and a civic delegation organized by the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA), because they were viewed as potential critical voices of the election process. 

Election Day 

By all reports, election day was relatively peaceful and calm, with only isolated 

reports of violence, intimidation or voting irregularities. As results were tallied and 

announced, it became clear that ZANU–PF had won an overwhelming majority, taking 78 of the directly elected seats, as compared to 41 won by the MDC. Coupled 

with the 30 seats appointed by the president, these numbers provide the ruling 

party with the two-thirds majority necessary for constitutional amendments. 

Yet, these results are highly suspect, and domestic observers, including the 

Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), which fielded over 6,000 observers nation-wide, point to the lack of transparency in a tabulation process indicating that 

large-scale fraud may have been employed to ensure a ruling party victory.4 The 

MDC asserts, in an April 12 report 5, that ballot stuffing and tabulation irregularities could affect the results in at least 20 constituencies in their favor, giving the 

opposition party 61 seats to ZANU’s 58, thus denying the ruling party of their twothirds majority. Of particular concern were three issues: 

• Voters were turned away—At least 130,000 voters, or 10 percent of all eligible 

voters, were turned away at the polls for a variety of reasons, including lack 

of identification or because their names did not appear on the list.

• Domestic observers were prevented from observing the counting process—After 

the polls closed, election authorities were required to count ballots under the 

eye of domestic observers and party poll watchers at each of the 8,000 polling 

stations and post the results for the public to view. These rules were not adhered to and many observers reported they were not permitted to view the 

counting of ballots. Some observers were locked inside polling stations while 

uniformed police communicated the voting results by telephone and radio. 

And in many polling stations results were never posted for public viewing.

• Reported turnout mysteriously increased—Hours after the polls closed, the 

government announced on state-controlled radio the total number of voters 

who voted, on a constituency by constituency basis. For example, in the electoral district of Manayme, the election authority announced that a total of 

14,812 people had voted. The following day, however, the authorities announced that 9,000 additional votes were found in the Manayme district, giving the ZANU candidate a comfortable win, with over 15,000 votes. This puzzling pattern emerged in at least 19 other constituencies, and to date, the 

Zimbabwean electoral authorities have failed to explain these critical discrepancies.

These and other discrepancies are more fully described in two reports by the MDC 

and ZESN, which I submit for the record. Overall, both organizations estimate that 

together these questionable results could have potentially changed the outcome in 

over 20 constituencies. 

The Regional Response 

Delegations from South Africa, SADC and the African Union traveled to 

Zimbabwe to observe these elections, which had been much anticipated and debated 

throughout the region for several years. Representing countries that embody democratic standards in their own constitutions and electoral laws, and armed with the 

new ‘‘SADC Principles for Democratic Elections’’ which were adopted by the heads 

of state of each SADC country in August last year, these delegations all concluded 

that the elections reflected the will of the people. 

A review of the SADC Principles for Democratic Elections suggests that these important regional standards were not met in the conduct of Zimbabwe’s March elections. As noted by ZESN in its preliminary report, the elections failed to meet the 

regional standards:

‘‘Zimbabwe’s electoral climate has been one shrouded in fear from the time 

of the 2000 parliamentary elections, as these elections were accompanied with 

extensive physical violence and a number of fatalities. This climate of fear continued during subsequent by-elections that were held. This was the background 

against which the 2002 presidential elections were held and subsequently 

46

6ZESN ibid. 

Zimbabweans have come to associate elections with physical violence. The long 

term pre-electoral period was not accompanied by overt physical violence as 

compared to the two previous elections, but incidents of intimidation were recorded as well as intra-party violence. Examples of intimidation include the 

politicization of food distribution and the partisan role of some traditional leaders. This leads to the conclusion that the pre-election period was not in compliance with the SADC Principles and Guidelines . . .’’ 6

Prospects for the Future 

The next opportunity for electoral competition in Zimbabwe will be the 2008 presidential election. Given that the ruling party claims it legitimately controls a twothirds majority in parliament, there is no way to anticipate what constitutional and 

legislative changes might be made prior to 2008. On Monday of this week, President 

Mugabe spoke at Zimbabwe’s 25th independence anniversary, saying he had no 

need for Western-style democracy or aid from the West because ‘‘we have turned 

East.’’ These remarks were made as newly acquired Chinese fighter jets flew overhead as part of the celebration. 

I would suggest that the 11 million people living in Zimbabwe, many of whom are 

suffering from hunger, dying from AIDs or who have been politically silenced, do 

not share this view. The citizens of Zimbabwe believe in the universal principles of 

participatory democracy. They have respect for the rule of law and desperately want 

to live in a country that is free from violence, oppression and hunger. Their values 

are no different from ours. 

Now is the time for the international community to re-double its efforts to support 

the democratic process in Zimbabwe. The opposition party MDC maintains support 

from a broad cross-section of Zimbabweans, and civic groups remain engaged in trying to help citizens advocate for better governance, a stronger economy and the need 

for health care, education and jobs. The MDC should be commended for agreeing 

to participate in these elections despite violence, harassment and intimidation targeted at them for the last several years. They have participated bravely and organized peacefully to engage in the electoral process, however flawed that might be. 

This effort deserves international recognition and support. 

As we have learned, democratic change does not happen overnight. Acquiescing 

to the abandonment of fundamental principles of human rights will only serve to 

further encourage autocratic tendencies in Zimbabwe and beyond. These political 

rights are not, as the government of Zimbabwe would have us believe, a Western 

export. Rather, they embody the hopes and aspirations of the Zimbabwean people, 

are guaranteed by the Zimbabwean constitution, and are endorsed by international 

and regional protocols and standards. 

After a decade of strategically supporting good governance, human rights, free 

and fair elections and poverty reduction in Africa, we must be steadfast in our continued support to Zimbabwe; we must continue to encourage adherence to international and regional standards of democracy; and we should use every financial 

and diplomatic resource to prevent the continent from losing another country to insecurity and poverty. We have learned that genuine elections are a necessary, but 

not sufficient, pre-condition for democracy. The Zimbabwean people are still waiting 

for those elections.

Mr. TANCREDO [presiding]. Thank you, Ms. Bryan. 

Mr. Coddington. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID CODDINGTON, REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE, SOUTHERN AFRICA OFFICE, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 

Mr. CODDINGTON. Thank you Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Subcommittee for organizing this hearing and inviting me to testify. I thank you. I am honored to have this opportunity. 

With your permission, I am going to summarize the main points 

but ask that the full testimony be entered into the record. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Without objection. 

Mr. CODDINGTON. Catholic Relief Services has been implementing projects in Zimbabwe since 1989 and is now one of the 

47

largest non-governmental organizations operating there, serving an 

estimated 400,000 people. 

Zimbabwe is indeed in the midst of a complex humanitarian crisis. Catholic Relief Services is continuing to respond, but our efficiency and effectiveness are being constrained. We will provide 

some recommendations about this in a few moments. 

Zimbabwe’s economy is in a shambles, counterproductive Government policies are largely to blame. The controversial 2000 Land Reform Program badly damaged the once lucrative agricultural sector, 

but traditional source of export earnings and foreign change has 

cost the economy over 400,000 jobs. The tourism sector has collapsed, and the IMF recently suspended Zimbabwe. 

The HIV/AIDS crisis is compounding the economic problems. According to UNAIDS, 1.6 million of Zimbabwe’s 12 million citizens 

were living with HIV at the end of 2003. Life expectancy decreased 

from 52 years in 1990 to 34 years today. This health crisis leads 

to other crises as family breadwinners die or fall seriously ill, and 

families are increasingly exposed to poverty and food insecurity. 

Many children and youth find themselves homeless or living in 

child-headed households. 

Yesterday’s Washington Post chronicled the dramatic effects of 

AIDS in one village in southern Zimbabwe. Our staff observed 

these effects throughout the country. If anything, the article did 

not go far enough in exploring the cascading influences of AIDS in 

Zimbabwe. In December, I visited an orphanage near Chegutu, not 

far from Harare, that cares for dozens of AIDS orphans. Staff were 

clearly dedicated to these children but worried about how they 

would continue to cope both financially and emotionally. Children 

are dropping out of school as education becomes a cost-prohibited 

luxury, and schools are critical to altering high-risk behaviors that 

fuel the HIV/AIDS epidemic and reversing the pandemic. 

The most immediate threat to Zimbabwe, however, is the food insecurity. Stocks of basic commodities, particularly their staple, 

corn, are increasingly scarce, and when available, prove far too expensive for many Zimbabweans to afford. This insecurity is fueled 

by a lack of basic food stocks, poor agricultural production, runaway inflation, and an operating environment that limits the ability of humanitarian agencies to deliver food aid and other assistance. 

In May 2004, the Zimbabwean Government projected that over 

the next year, agriculture production would be sufficient to meet 

domestic demand, and that there would even be a surplus. Simultaneously, the Government ordered the discontinuation of food aid 

importations as well as all general and many targeted feeding programs. Many experts dispute Government projections and forecast 

another food security crisis. 

Catholic Relief Services implements a variety of programming activities in Zimbabwe to respond to these crises, some of which I will 

highlight here. 

At the height of the famine relief efforts in 2002/2003, we and 

our partner organizations provided monthly nutritional assistance 

to 180,000 beneficiaries with funding from USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Food For Peace, and the U.N. World 

Food Programme. We currently provide agricultural imports to 

48

60,000 farm families with funding from the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development. And since 2002, we provided direct educational assistance to 88,000 orphans and other 

vulnerable children, thanks to the support of USAID and other donors. 

Our HIV Stride Program and other HIV/AIDS programs seek to 

assist those infected with or infected by the disease to educate the 

Zimbabweans about HIV/AIDS and to promote behavior change, 

particularly among young people. Rest assured, this aid makes a 

difference. 

Sadly, the current operating environment for NGOs in Zimbabwe 

is very frustrating. Our efforts are being severely hampered by the 

Zimbabwean Government, resulting in a significant scaling back of 

operations. To illustrate, since last August, NGOs have been subjected to unprecedented denials of work permits for international 

staff. Some organizations, such as MedAir, have had all work permit appeals rejected and were forced to leave Zimbabwe. 

Unexplained holdups in the importation of food, agricultural 

products and antiretroviral drugs have resulted in excessive delays 

or complete shutdowns of some relief interventions. Underlying 

these bureaucratic pressures is the increasingly difficult economic 

environment. And our officially low international exchange rate 

greatly inflates our operating costs. 

Finally, Government investigations of NGO activities which carry 

the threat of criminal prosecution and fines concurrent with unprecedented attacks against NGOs in the official newspaper are 

eroding our capacity to carry out efficient and effective programming. 

Based on regular input and reports from our Zimbabwe and regional office staff, Catholic Relief Services therefore respectfully 

submits the following recommendations for consideration by the 

House, and we fully support many of the suggestions put forth by 

our colleagues. 

First, the U.S. Government and the international community 

must remain engaged with the Government of Zimbabwe and support the work of respected non-governmental organizations by negotiating to remove political and bureaucratic obstacles to humanitarian assistance as a precursor to the following two recommendations. 

Second, donors, U.N. agencies or other recognized international 

bodies must advocate with Zimbabwe’s Government to permit the 

humanitarian community to conduct a comprehensive and transparent assessment of Zimbabwe’s food security situation. 

Third, the U.S. Government and international community must 

increase the emergency and developmental aid available to the 

U.N. and international aid agencies in Zimbabwe. This includes a 

significant increase in funding to prevent food insecurity and combat the AIDS pandemic. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, Catholic Relief Services emphasizes that the humanitarian situation in 

Zimbabwe is grim. The U.S. Government has a crucial role to play 

by remaining engaged with the Government of Zimbabwe to ensure 

that urgent humanitarian needs are addressed. We urge Congress 

to work with the Administration to provide adequate support and 

49

1 UNAIDS 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic

2 UNAIDS 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 

resources and build the coalitions necessary to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches the people of Zimbabwe in time to prevent further hardships. 

That said, the current operating environment must also change 

or Catholic Relief Services may find itself unable to continue fulfilling our humanitarian mission to Zimbabwe. 

Thank you for your support of the work of Catholic Relief Services and our sister relief in development agencies in Zimbabwe. I 

welcome the opportunity to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Coddington follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID CODDINGTON, REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVE, 

SOUTHERN AFRICA OFFICE, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Subcommittee, for organizing this 

hearing and inviting me to testify. I am honored to have this opportunity. 

My name is Dave Coddington. I am the Southern Africa Regional Representative 

for Catholic Relief Services, based in Baltimore, MD. Catholic Relief Services has 

been implementing projects in Zimbabwe since 1989, and is today one of the largest 

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating there, serving an estimated 

400,000 people. 

Zimbabwe’s economy was once the fastest growing in Africa, but is now in the 

midst of a complex humanitarian crisis the main causes of which include:

• an adult HIV infection rate of 24% 1, 

• four consecutive years of drought,

• triple-digit inflation,

• 50–70% unemployment

• and the lack of foreign capital necessary to access basic commodities.

Salaries are devaluing so fast that working Zimbabweans are finding it increasingly difficult to feed their families, send their children to school, care for sick relatives, or even travel to and from work. Basic commodities, when available, are becoming unaffordable even for those who consider themselves ‘‘middle class.’’

Counterproductive policies by the Government of Zimbabwe have caused these 

factors. A controversial land reform program—which began in 2000 to address what 

many Zimbabweans regard as historic wrongs and injustices—has badly damaged 

the once lucrative agricultural sector, a traditional source of export earnings and 

foreign exchange. Over 400,000 agricultural jobs have been lost in the wake of the 

land reform process. The tourism sector, once a major source of foreign exchange 

and revenue, has also collapsed. Furthermore, the IMF recently suspended 

Zimbabwe due to its failure to meet budgetary goals and financial obligations. 

According to the UNAIDS 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, 1.6 million 

of Zimbabwe’s 12 million citizens were living with HIV at the end of 2003. Life expectancy in Zimbabwe has decreased from 52 years in 1990 to 34 years in 2003. 

This health crisis cascades into other crises as family breadwinners die or fall ill 

and families are increasingly exposed to poverty and food insecurity. 170,000 

Zimbabweans died in 2003 due to AIDS, and nearly 1,000,000 Zimbabwean children 

have lost one or both parents to AIDS.2 Though the extended family is the historic 

social safety net for orphaned children, this safety net is disintegrating as the epidemic affects more and more families. Increasing numbers of children and youth are 

homeless or living in child-headed households. Yesterday’s Washington Post chronicled the dramatic effects of AIDS in one village in southern Zimbabwe. Our staff 

see these effects throughout the country. If anything, the article did not go far 

enough exploring the cascading influences of AIDS in Zimbabwe. Many children 

drop out of school as education—with its enrollment, uniform and book fees—has 

become a cost-prohibitive luxury. While the awareness and psychosocial support 

available through school is critical in altering the high-risk behavior that is fueling 

the HIV/AIDS epidemic, as more and more children drop out the prospect of reversing the epidemic among the next generation is increasingly bleak. Consequently, a 

downward spiral of economic and social conditions is gripping Zimbabwe. High-risk 

behavior fuels the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which fuels economic collapse, which fuels 

50

a breakdown in social services and education, which leads in turn to more high-risk 

behavior. 

The most immediate threat to the people of Zimbabwe is food insecurity. Stocks 

of basic commodities—particularly the staple corn—are increasingly scarce, and 

when available, are too expensive for many Zimbabwean’s to buy. There are three 

main causes of the current food insecurity: 1) a lack of food stocks and poor agricultural production; 2) runaway inflation that continuously drives up the price of food; 

and 3) an operating environment that limits the ability of international aid agencies 

to effectively target and deliver emergency food to the most vulnerable. In May 

2004, the Government of Zimbabwe projected that Zimbabwe would, over the next 

year, produce sufficient quantities of corn to feed its people, and would likely even 

produce a surplus for export. So certain was the government of its agricultural productive capacity that it told the donor community to halt food importations and 

cease all general, and some targeted, feeding programs. Many international and domestic experts argued that the government’s agricultural production projections 

were incorrect and another food crisis was likely. Last year, Zimbabwe’s estimated 

corn consumption was 1.8 million metric tons. Experts say requirements could be 

even greater this year. As of November 2004, near the end of the harvest period, 

only about 400,000 metric tons had been sold to the government’s Grain Marketing 

Board, the sole entity allowed to procure and market corn in Zimbabwe. 

Despite a recent UNICEF study showing alarming increases in infant malnutrition throughout the country, particularly in orphanages and in the south, no formal 

requests for assistance have yet been made by the government of Zimbabwe to the 

United Nations or any other donor. Many in the international community fear that 

by the time the Zimbabwean government acknowledges publicly that it has a serious shortfall in corn production, it may be difficult to quickly mount an effective 

international effort to prevent wide scale acute food insecurity. 

Catholic Relief Services’ major objectives in responding to these threats are:

1) To help communities to effectively prevent the spread of HIV and to mitigate 

its impact through increased capacity and awareness;

2) To mitigate the impact of disasters, ensuring food and economic security for 

vulnerable individuals, households and communities, particularly those affected by HIV/AIDS; and,

3) To build the capacity of local organizations and communities to advocate 

against unjust structures compromising the rights of people living with and 

affected by HIV/AIDS.

Towards these ends, Catholic Relief Services implements a variety of programming activities. For example, at the height of famine relief efforts in 2002–03, 

Catholic Relief Services and our partner organizations provided nutritional assistance to 180,000 food insecure Zimbabweans each month with funding from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Food for Peace (FFP) and the World 

Food Programme. Catholic Relief Services and our partners currently provide fertilizer and seeds to 60,000 farming families with funding from the United Kingdom 

Department for International Development (DFID). And since 2002, we have provided direct educational assistance to 88,000 orphans and other vulnerable children 

with the support of USAID and other donors. 

But the operating environment in which NGOs function in Zimbabwe is increasingly frustrating our relief efforts. Many NGOs, like Catholic Relief Services, are 

working in Zimbabwe to alleviate hunger, strengthen the livelihood strategies of 

marginalized populations, and mitigate the impact and reduce the prevalence of 

HIV and AIDS. Yet these efforts are being severely hampered by the Government 

of Zimbabwe, resulting in the scaling back of operations or departure of many 

NGOs. This is a tragic irony given that the humanitarian needs are escalating while 

resources are dwindling. If the operational environment for Catholic Relief Services 

and other NGOs in Zimbabwe does not improve, the current crisis will certainly 

deepen. 

To compound matters, beginning in August 2004, NGOs have been subjected to 

unprecedented denials of work permits for international relief and development 

workers. Some organizations, albeit a few, have seen all of their work permit appeals rejected and have had to close shop in Zimbabwe. Unexplainable delays in the 

importation of food, other agricultural products and anti-retroviral drugs have resulted in the unnecessary delays or complete shutdowns of some relief interventions. 

Underlying these bureaucratic pressures is the increasingly difficult economic environment in which an artificially low international exchange rate has greatly inflated 

the operating costs. International organizations such as CRS must exchange US dollars at the current government designated auction rate of Z$6,200 to US$1 but 

51

goods and services are generally priced at the parallel rate of Z$17,000 to US$1. 

The rent for our office space, for example, has increased by 200% within the span 

of one month. Our national staff have demanded an increase of 450% in their salaries to keep up with inflation. Finally, a series of government investigations into the 

work of international NGOs, carrying the threat of prosecution and fines, accompanied by unprecedented attacks against NGOs in the official newspaper, are eroding our capacity to carry out efficient and effective relief and development programs. 

Catholic Relief Services and our colleagues in the NGO community are committed 

to helping the people of Zimbabwe through this crisis. It is abundantly clear that 

more international resources are needed in Zimbabwe to halt and eventually reverse 

the present momentum of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and to restore dignified and sustainable livelihoods for millions who are suffering from food insecurity. But it is also 

clear that the impact of international aid in Zimbabwe is severely mitigated by the 

political environment in which NGOs are forced to function, which only the Government of Zimbabwe can change. Until these changes occur and Zimbabwe’s government allows the humanitarian community unimpeded access to the most vulnerable, 

humanitarian aid to Zimbabwe will continue to be a high-risk and costly investment. However, even given the risk, Catholic Relief Services believes foreign aid 

must continue as an act of solidarity and support for the most vulnerable and 

marginalized of Zimbabwean society. 

Catholic Relief Services therefore respectfully submits the following recommended 

actions for consideration by the House:

1) Donors, UN agencies or other recognized international bodies must advocate 

to allow the humanitarian community to conduct a comprehensive and transparent assessment of Zimbabwe’s food security situation.

2) The US Government and international community must increase the emergency and developmental aid available to the UN and international aid agencies in Zimbabwe.

3) The US Government and the international community must remain engaged 

with the Government of Zimbabwe and support the work of respected nongovernmental organizations by negotiating to remove bureaucratic obstacles 

to humanitarian assistance.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, Catholic Relief 

Services emphasizes that the situation in Zimbabwe is a serious humanitarian crisis. We believe that the US Government has a crucial role to play by remaining engaged with the Government of Zimbabwe to ensure that urgent humanitarian needs 

are addressed. We urge Congress to work with the Administration to provide adequate support and resources, and build the coalitions necessary to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches the people of Zimbabwe in time to prevent further hardships. Thank you for your support of the work of non-governmental organizations 

such as Catholic Relief Services in Zimbabwe. I welcome the opportunity to respond 

to any questions you may have.

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you all very much. 

And I apologize to you for the tag-team approach toward doing 

this, but I think—as soon as the Chairman has returned, we will 

all be here for the duration. 

Well, first, we will start off a question for Mr. Mills. The Congress of South Africa Trade Unions has expressed solidarity with 

the workers and people of Zimbabwe, but despite their influence 

within South Africa’s Government, the labor movement in South 

Africa has been unable to break through and change Mbeki Government policy toward Zambabwe. 

Are there chances that continued labor movement pressure could 

result in a major policy change for the better? What is the situation 

as you see it in terms of the amount of pressure that can be 

brought by the trade unions and their willingness to do so? 

Mr. MILLS. Thank you very much for the question. 

Well, a lot of people have speculated—a lot of people did speculate in South Africa before the election that COSATU’s in a sense 

political brinkmanship over the Zimbabwe election was part and 

parcel of a wider strategy to give itself a greater political profile, 

52

not just regionally, but also within South Africa itself. But it certainty didn’t appear to have any impact. It gained a lot of coverage 

in the news in South Africa, some internationally, but it didn’t 

change the position of the South African Government one iota with 

regard to Zimbabwe. And more to the change—more importantly, 

the Zimbabwean—the way in which the Zimbabweans carried out 

the election one iota either. 

I would not think personally that there is much prospect of a 

major policy change on the part of the South African Government. 

Since the time of President Bush’s visit—indeed, before that time, 

nearly 2 years ago, President Mbeki has consistently said that it 

is the policy of the South African Government to allow the 

Zimbabweans to solve this crisis themselves and that the South African Government would simply facilitate talks between the MDC 

and Zimbabwe. And that has been consistently the South African 

Government’s policy with regard to Zimbabwe, with sporadic attempts, however, to actually facilitate these talks. 

I don’t think that policy is going to change, whatever the pressure from COSATU, and I think for that reason, hence my suggestion that the policy change probably needs to come from those outside of the region to try and bring about the change within 

Zimbabwe itself. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Unfortunately, I was unable 

to hear your testimony, but was able to browse through it after the 

fact. But I did hear, Dr. Mills, in your opening statement, you sort 

of cemented a question that Mr. Tancredo had. You mentioned that 

there seems to be an interest and perhaps some hope within 

ZANU–PF to change the Government from within, not talking 

about outside labor unions or whatever. Have you seen any signs 

of this within the ZANU–PF party? And if so, do you have any suggestions of how we may be able to assist without messing—you 

know, without it appearing that there is the hand of the U.S., so, 

therefore, let’s remove ourselves, let’s condemn this movement because it is foreign driven, and other sensitivity of looking too close 

to the U.S.? 

Mr. MILLS. Thank you, again, for the question. 

I suggested that—my last of my five policy options, broad policy 

options to look at one of strategic engagement, not just with 

ZANU–PF, but with both ZANU–PF and the opposition, but the 

policy change would be that the Parliament engage more closely 

with ZANU–PF as a whole. 

I think what we have seen over the last year in particular, with 

all the machinations around leadership changes within ZANU–PF, 

that it is difficult to expect democracy in Zimbabwe when the ruling party itself doesn’t have democratic values in terms of the way 

in which it runs its own selection and leadership selection process. 

There appears to be—part of it is generational; part of it is factional; part of it is ethnic. But there appears to be a number of widening cracks within ZANU–PF in terms of the emergence of different factions. And I think if one was going to have a policy toward Zimbabwe which was premised more by engagement and less 

by isolation, it would have to look to see who the movers and shakVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:33 Jul 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042105\20787.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
53

ers were within ZANU–PF and attempt to engage with them to see 

what sort of role may be played from the inside in terms of getting 

change in Zimbabwe. 

There is going to be a point—probably not too distant in the future—when the leadership of Zimbabwe is going to change through 

simple generational age issues. And it will be, I think, good for the 

United States Government and other governments to be engaged at 

that point and to encourage the reformers, because they do exist, 

within ZANU–PF. 

I think what we have seen over the 4 years—and I hear what 

my fellows here say about the bravery of members of the MDC, but 

I think what we have seen over the last 4 years is that there is 

little chance of the MDC, within the current environment, being 

able to instigate political change and democracy within Zimbabwe. 

And I think that this means that you should be looking at a number of different alternatives and changing the things that you can 

most easily change, which is United States policy rather than 

South African policy. 

Mr. PAYNE. One of my visits to Zimbabwe, maybe 4 or 5 years 

ago, I guess at the time that MDC was beginning—not beginning, 

but it seemed to have peaked, evidently, 4 or 5 years ago, it seemed 

that they had something going, and it looked like at the next election that things would improve. It might have been the 2001 election, going into 2002/2003, and things sort of leveled off in the 

2003, and of course, in this one in 2005, we didn’t see much more 

progress. Now there certainly is intimidation and fraud that has 

gone on in 2005 and 2003, but the same thing went in on 2001, 

yet we did see a move forward. I mean, it has never been a level 

playing field. So I wonder what any of your opinions might be. I 

met with, you know, Morgan Tsvangirai, and it seemed that his—

this platform was sort of more anti ZANU–PF, but it wasn’t—it 

didn’t seem to be too much of a vision of what he would do, other 

than really oppose this bad regime, which we find in a lot of instances in developing countries. You find people are opposed to 

something, but then when you say, what is your plan, they really 

just want to be the leader because they think they could do a better 

job. I remember in one of my trips there meeting with opposition 

people, and at that time it was a group of women lawyers, young 

women lawyers who seemed to really have a lot going, they were 

outspoken, of course. They were very—they were beneficiaries of 

the—comparative to other African countries—better educational opportunity, and I wonder whether any of you, maybe IDI or NDI 

folks, remember any movement of women lawyers maybe 3, 4, 5 

years ago, and what seemed to have happened to that movement? 

Mr. KRILLA. Well, I can certainly address your first question, 

Congressman Payne. 

I would say, all indications on the MDC are that they have 

shown incredible resilience to survive as a party. You are very familiar with the conditions under which they have operated, and the 

fact that their leader had his passport stripped away for 2 years 

and has been under constant surveillance. It made things very difficult for him. The fact that they have been able to survive as a 

party has been a testament to that resilience. But also, the fact is 

they haven’t just survived, they have actually grown in support. 

54

And during the last election, the lead-up to the last election, you 

saw rallies of tens of thousands of individuals showing up, so you 

are seeing the support. 

In terms of platform, they definitely have been able to reach out 

to people as more than just the ‘‘not-Mugabe party.’’ At a lot of 

these rallies, they have addressed specific areas of interest, issue 

areas for Zimbabweans, whether it is jobs, crime, certainly the food 

issue, which has been so politicized by ZANU and used as such a 

weapon, has been something that they have addressed. Even issues 

of land reform are something that they are very willing to take action on in a more democratic fashion than we have seen from the 

ZANU–PF. So I think that is a credit to the MDC. I think with all 

the challenges to their leadership, there are very few MPs from 

MDC that have not spent some time in jail, and I think that is a 

testament to the environment in which they work. 

So I think that is a credit to MDC. I think we have seen a lot 

of strength and a lot of widespread platform development from 

them over the years, increasingly so, considering that, only 4 or 5 

years ago, when you were there, they were pretty new on the horizon. 

Ms. BRYAN. I would just echo that, Congressman Payne. I think, 

over the last 5 years, they have changed dramatically. They 

emerged as an alternative to Mugabe, and I don’t think they had 

positions 6 years ago. 

But one of the things I said in my testimony before you got here, 

I was out there during that week and went to a number of their 

rallies, and it was amazing the positions they laid out at these rallies, very concrete ideas about health care and education and economic development, HIV/AIDS. And I was really, really impressed, 

particularly when you compare other political parties around the 

continent, and we both work with a lot of them, and most of the 

time, they have not thought through any of these issues. 

I think they have had to do this as a way of maintaining their 

base and broadening their base, but also in attempt to show the 

rest of the world and the regional community that they are here 

to stay and that they have valid ideas. So there is, I think, a misrepresentation out in southern Africa that they have not developed 

and that they are on the decline, and I would say it is just the opposite. 

And as to your second question, the women lawyers group, I 

don’t know anything specifically, but we can certainly try to find 

out more and get back to your staff on that. 

Mr. PAYNE. And if we could find the records from that trip, it 

was some time ago. But we did meet with this group, and they 

were very outspoken. They were very sharp, they were very critical 

of the Government, they knew what they wanted to do. They knew 

that they wanted to see economic growth and really move forward 

in trying to, you know—as a matter of fact, the land issue was 

fourth, fifth down on their list of interests because they wanted to 

deal with an expanding economy rather than talk about going back 

to a parcel of land or something. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MILLS. May I add to the comments? I think I echo the words 

here as well about how difficult it has been for the MDC to be able 

55

to operate under the circumstances of the last 5 years. They are 

under continuous pressure, under threat of prosecutions, under 

threat of legal action, violence, intimidation and so on. But I think 

they are quite fundamental questions about where the MDC goes 

from this point onwards, and I think there are two broad options. 

One is the sort of old South African Progressive Party model of obstructionist parliamentarian opposition movement, with a smaller 

number, of course, of parliamentarians than they had originally, 

but that they try and work within the parliamentary environments 

to try and change Zimbabwe from within. To be honest, I don’t 

know how much effect that is going to have on the environment. 

Right now, Mugabe has two-thirds majority and has shown very 

scant regard for parliamentary and other niceties. 

The other option is of course the sort of Ukrainian option, that 

they don’t take up their seats in Parliament; but I do think that 

probably too many of the MDC parliamentarians are on the parliamentary gravy train. One of the reasons that the MDC was, in 

a sense, I think, pressurized to take part in the election was both 

from within its own party, that there are many people whose livelihood depends on a role within Zimbabwe politics. In a sense, the 

same conundrum faces them now that faced them before the election, that they are dammed if they do and dammed if they don’t. 

They were dammed if they took part in the elections, given the gerrymandering that occurred beforehand, and they were dammed by 

the international and particular regional community if they didn’t. 

And now they are dammed if they take part in Parliament, and 

they are dammed if they don’t. And it is going to take extraordinary leadership on the part of the MDC, and I am not sure—and 

this is, perhaps, where I differ with my colleagues—whether we 

have seen the sort of extraordinary leadership that it will take for 

them to actually remove themselves from Parliament and to play 

a role outside of politics. And from a South African perspective, I 

am not sure. 

And I would compare the MDC to the AMC in this regard, and 

they do have very interesting parallels in terms of their origins, of 

course, which often is overlooked in South Africa. I am sure that 

the ANC would not have taken part in the election of South Africa 

in the same conditions that the MDC did. And that is the sort of 

difference in leadership which perhaps they are going to have to 

develop if they are going to play a meaningful role in the short 

term in changing Zimbabwe. Undoubtedly, in my mind, it will play 

a very important role in the long term, but it is the short term that 

is crucial. 

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman, just one last question. Too bad every 

country doesn’t have a Nelson Mandela, we would have no problems in the world, I don’t think. However, the absence of the overt 

hardline physical behavior that we have seen in, I guess, the 2003 

elections or leading up—beginning, I guess, when this whole democracy movement started in 2001 or 2000. What do you attribute 

to the absence of overt violence on the part of the Government and 

the police authorities and the military? 

Mr. MILLS. I will have a stab at that quickly. I mean, I think the 

fact probably, principally, that the memory of the civil war in 

Zimbabwe—which was a very bloody event, this was no passive reVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:33 Jul 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042105\20787.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
56

sistance occasion—is seared into the minds of Zimbabweans. They 

know the cost of violence, and it is a very vivid and recent memory. 

And I think, secondly, related to that, that the Zimbabwean 

State apparatus, both formal and informal—both in terms of security forces, the police services, the military and so on, as well as 

in terms of the informal militia, the youth brigades, the green 

bombers and other movements—have shown scant regard for people’s lives when it comes down to it, and I think people are frightened of the consequences; there would be terrible violence in the 

country. And I think that is why the situation hasn’t developed further. 

Mr. SMITH [presiding]. Let me just ask a couple of final questions 

because you have been very patient, and again, I apologize for all 

the interruptions. As Mr. Coddington points out, the UNAIDS survey shows that 24 percent of the Zimbabweans are HIV infected. 

Are there differences between what the ZANU–PF and the MDC 

would do? One, what the Government is doing, and what the opposition party would do vis-a-vis AIDS? Is it clear what new course 

they might take to try to mitigate this horrific infection rate? 

Mr. CODDINGTON. I don’t know that I am in a great position to 

answer this, but what we need—what Catholic Relief Services 

would like to happen is for us to have some of the blockages that 

are preventing us from delivering aid efficiently and effectively to 

the people of Zimbabwe, and whether that is through the MDC or 

the ZANU–PF, certainly, we are requesting the assistance of Congress and the Administration, whoever, donors, whoever can sort of 

help us get through that. 

As far as positions on what the different parties would do to increase or decrease funding or the implementation of projects to 

HIV/AIDS, I can’t say. 

Ms. BRYAN. I think there is a tendency—and we have seen this 

in other areas—that ZANU–PF is going to use resources, whether 

it is for food aid or HIV/AIDS, selectively to individuals who will 

support them, and use it in retribution against those who support 

MDC. I don’t think MDC has an opportunity to show us what they 

would do, but I certainly think they have an articulated position, 

which is something new, and I think they have set aside individuals in Parliament who have developed policies and platforms and 

actually hired expertise to help them think through what they 

would do if they do have more leverage in Parliament or if they get 

into power. So I think it is hard to know what they would actually 

do on the ground, but I think the danger is that the current Government, in all likelihood, will use its resources selectively. 

Mr. SMITH. On the NGO bill, which I raised earlier, what is your 

sense as to whether or not that gets signed, and what are the real 

world implications if it does? 

Mr. KRILLA. Well, certainly, if it gets signed, it would be devastating to groups such as all of the three of ours at least, so that 

they wouldn’t be interested in operating on the ground, and would 

certainly not be able to. 

The challenge has been, even though the bill hasn’t been signed, 

a lot of the police forces and military have been acting as if it has 

been signed. And a lot of the NGOs, as soon as the bill was introVerDate Mar 21 2002 15:33 Jul 06, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AGI\042105\20787.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
57

duced, recognized the writing was on the wall. So you see that oppressive intent of the legislation already moving forward. 

So the challenge that we see in the oppressive environment 

would only get worse, and especially with democracy organizations 

that hope to work with local partners, it would be untenable. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Mr. Coddington. 

Mr. CODDINGTON. Yes, sir. From my perspective, the law was 

sort of open to interpretation. It was not very specific. And when 

you start getting into ideas such as human rights, our position is 

that everybody has the basic human right to develop their capacity 

to be educated, to have access to health care and so on. So are we 

in fact a human rights organization? Our partner organizations on 

the ground, human rights organizations: Is that the focus of their 

activities? And it could be interpreted that it would be difficult to 

understand if we were actually breaking the law; we are following 

the letters of this bill or this law, so it kind of put us in a challenging position to know how to act, and that was the biggest single concern to us. Plus there was the restriction of international 

funding for local NGOs. And we work almost exclusively in 

Zimbabwe through partner organizations, and most of those are not 

international organizations. They are local organizations, so if we 

apply the rules to that, the rules of the NGO and churches to that, 

saying no funding to anybody, that any organization that is involved in human rights, in governance; we didn’t know if we would 

be able to continue funding those organizations or not. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask one final question. Obviously, Bishop 

Tutu was an outspoken critic of apartheid, and I am very happy 

to say that he has also spoken out very strongly in sharp difference 

to what the South African Government has done. He has at least 

criticized the Mugabe Government. Why isn’t he and other religious leaders who were critical to bringing about reforms in South 

Africa having an impact both in South Africa and then, by extension, in Abu Dhabi? You would think that the South African Government would listen to a voice, conscience, who has been heard 

throughout now for decades when it comes to matters of human 

rights, even on something like this legislation, which obviously 

would curtail and lead to further repression of an already bad situation in Zimbabwe. Why isn’t he listened to? Because, again, we 

are all very glad to hear that he has been—even in relation to the 

most recent elections. Anyone want to handle that? 

Mr. MILLS. I think many South Africans, Mr. Chairman, would 

have the same question as you. And I think that the debate, the 

wider debate in South Africa involving Archbishop Tutu and the 

President, sometimes, and members of the AMC is an interesting 

one in terms of his ongoing role in promoting democratic norms 

and values and standards. 

I think it raises, perhaps indirectly, an interesting question 

about why the South African Government has—which I partly answered in my presentation—why South Africa has responded in the 

way that it has to Zimbabwe. It reflects partly the history of the 

region, in terms of race and the inequitable allocation of resources. 

It partly reflects the fact that there are many Africans who, grudgingly or not—both within South Africa and further afield—have a 

certain respect for Mr. Mugabe for standing up to the West in the 

58

manner that he has done, apparently, so fearlessly, however irrational that may appear, that of course relates to this history. But 

it also partly reflects in a more complicated way some of the fears 

and insecurities of liberation movements as they make the progression to political parties, as they have matured themselves and take 

in opposition forces and take in criticisms of their own style of rule. 

And I think that, for those reasons, that criticism of the Government, Zimbabwe policy by people such as Archbishop Tutu and others hasn’t really had the same effect perhaps as it had in South 

Africa. I think that it goes to the heart of core issues and insecurities about the way perhaps South Africa is transitioning itself, 

and that is why it hasn’t had the same resonance. 

Mr. PAYNE. Any of you might try to take a stab at this, too. Although the transition from the White minority rule to the majority 

rule, and it has been somewhat different in Zimbabwe as for South 

Africa, do you think that there is any sort of truth to the thought 

that, although it is not as pronounced as in Zimbabwe—but the 

question of land and land ownership is somewhat similar in South 

Africa—I mean, you know, Blacks own very little land, and perhaps 

for Mbeki, who could find that if people are saying, you know, 

change is too slow and we are still in the same position we used 

to be in, and we are not seeing any expansion of employment opportunities and so forth, that if Mbeki was very critical of Mugabe, 

there could be backlash against him and his own to say, what are 

you doing, how are you making the transition? Whites own all of 

the property and the buildings in Johannesburg, and all of the developments are owned by the former people. And so, do you think 

that may sort of have some play in the back of the minds of the 

AMC or the Mbekis? 

Mr. MILLS. Thank you, again, for the question. 

As I said earlier, I think there is a resonance domestically in 

South Africa of what is happening in Zimbabwe for reasons of race 

and reasons of history and reasons of inequality. But I do think one 

should point out that there are dramatic differences between the 

way in which the South African Government has, through very acceptable processes of governments and governance, gone about its 

land distribution program. And it is proceeding—it is not proceeding as fast as some people would like in South Africa, but that 

is also being matched with a program of Black economic empowerment in South Africa which various charters have been established. 

It is a different, completely different form of empowerment and is 

addressing the inequalities in the past that Zimbabwe has experienced. 

Mr. Mugabe did what he did in Zimbabwe precisely because he 

was running out of political options. In South Africa, the ANC has 

not, quite the opposite, run out of political options; it has increased 

its political support in South Africa, it has displayed extremely 

good and respective styles and levels of governance in what it has 

done over the past 10 years. 

So I don’t think there is this parallel that other people would 

want to point out. I think fundamentally there are two reasons, to 

rearticulate them—which I do in my talk and in my formal presentation. One is this resonance question, and the other is the fact 

that the South African Government sincerely believes, rightly or 

59

wrongly, that there is no alternative to doing what it is doing in 

Zimbabwe, that the options of imposing sanctions, the options of 

using more dramatic efforts to bring Mr. Mugabe to heel are not 

going to work. They cite the example of the Nigerians, who spoke 

up much more critically against Mr. Mugabe, essentially operating 

in the arctic circle of relevance with regard to Zimbabwe, and that 

they didn’t want that to be the case with a direct neighbor of South 

Africa, that they sincerely believe that, from South Africa’s own experience, that this is the only option and that they really have to 

allow the political space for Zimbabweans to sort out their own difficulties. 

Now one could be critical and say that this is naive in the circumstances, but that is the South African Government’s belief, that 

those are the only alternatives. 

And again, it raises the question then, if that is the South African policy, then what are the other policy options facing other 

countries? 

Mr. SMITH. I do have one additional question. Archbishop Ncube, 

as you know, has been a fierce critic of Mugabe. Without objection, 

I would like to make a part of the record a March 26, 2005 statement, Political Abuse of Food Ahead of the Parliamentary Elections, which is a statement by him and which is very powerful. 

[The information referred to follows:]

STATEMENT BY HIS GRACE, THE MOST REVEREND ARCHBISHOP PIUS NCUBE, SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

POLITICAL ABUSE OF FOOD AHEAD OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

With only days to go to the Parliamentary elections, food is being used as a political weapon in parts of rural Matabeleland. Our region of Zimbabwe has had almost 

no rain since January, and rural households are facing close to 100% crop failure. 

Families that were being sustained by World Food Programme donor food during 

2004 no longer have this lifeline. Very few stores, whether in town centres or elsewhere, have mealie meal for sale, and in any case the commercial cost of mealie 

meal is unaffordable for many of the hundreds of thousands of rural Zimbabweans 

who live in our drought-stricken regions. 

Since the World Food Programme was requested by our government to cease its 

feeding, the only source of mealie meal in many rural communities has become that 

sold by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), a government parastatal. This means 

that government effectively controls where in the country maize is available—and 

to whom. 

It is therefore of deep concern that evidence has been brought to my attention 

that in some places, GMB maize is being sold on party political lines. I have spoken 

to villagers from Insiza District in Matabeleland South, who report that GMB maize 

is being systematically denied to those perceived to be supporters of the opposition 

Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The following are a few examples of the 

political abuse of food:

• Eight villagers recounted that on 19 March 2005, GMB maize was finally delivered in their ward of Insiza. They had paid Z$ 37,000 in January in advance for 50kg bags of maize. But when they arrived with other villages to 

receive their maize, their names were among those on a long list read out of 

supposed MDC supporters. These people were publicly humiliated and sent 

away in disgrace by the local ZANU PF chairperson, who was sitting on top 

of the bags of maize. They were given their money back and were told they 

would never receive GMB maize, because it was only for ZANU PF.

• An eighty-three year old woman who looks after five orphans recounted that 

because she supports the MDC she is on the list of those who has been denied 

the right to buy food from GMB, and has been told by her local headman that 

60

unless she converts to ZANU PF she will die of starvation. Her children have 

almost nothing to eat and cry from hunger.

• A young man who used to be part of ZANU PF youth structures, but who is 

now not strongly politically affiliated, recounted how he went for training as 

a local observer for the elections last week—around 15 March 2005. When he 

returned, he was accused of being MDC as a result of training as an election 

observer, and he too is now being denied the right to buy food from GMB.

This brave and desperate group of villagers believes that in their ward of Insiza 

alone, there are 188 families that are on the MDC list and cannot buy GMB maize. 

This represents a sizeable proportion of those resident in this ward. 

It is reported that similar food abuse is occurring in other wards of Insiza. 

Furthermore, we have received reports from some other parts of Matabeleland, of 

widespread threats that if people vote MDC then their area will never see GMB food 

again.

• One of our staff was at a rally in Gwanda this week, and heard villagers 

standing one after another to recount that they had been threatened with 

being forcibly disappeared, and had been threatened with starvation, if they 

attended any MDC rally. They stated that many more people would have 

been at that rally if it was not for such threats.

• Informants returning from Tsholotsho and Binga have reported similar 

threats being uttered, and that food had become a politicised commodity.

That people are actually having food withheld, or are being threatened with this 

outcome if any party other than ZANU PF should win the election at the local levels, is a serious crime. The right to food is the most primary right of all human 

beings. Without food, people die. There is great hunger in Zimbabwe right now. It 

is clear that while this government may not wish people to starve to death, certain 

elements within government are happy to have those who do not support ZANU PF 

to suffer from hunger, anxiety, insecurity and depression. How can people thus 

afraid of starvation be free to vote for the party of their choice? 

It is an evil form of coercion to chase men and women away from food selling 

points for political reasons. Must parents in some parts of Zimbabwe now choose between belonging to the party of their choice and then having to listen to their children crying from hunger, or to join the political party that is prepared to risk the 

health of the nation’s children for political gain? What greater violence against the 

family unit can there be than to make parents choose between political freedom, and 

the well being of their children? 

It is the role of the Church to speak on behalf of those who voices are not being 

heard, and to amplify the brave voices of those prepared to speak out on behalf of 

their communities. In some parts of Zimbabwe, people are being deliberately denied 

access to food because they do not support ZANU PF. This must stop. 

The legitimacy of this election must be once more called into question ahead of 

voting day. With almost total crop failure looming in our region, to cynically use 

hunger as a weapon is to stab at the very heart of democracy. 

+ PIUS A. NCUBE 

Archbishop of Bulawayo

Mr. SMITH. He stated, when Mugabe went to Rome for the funeral of John Paul II, that this man is shameless, and that—conveying, frankly, that he knows no bounds, even in trying to put 

himself in a position where he is seen in a better light by the Europeans and others. 

It seems to me that kind of statement could trigger an up to 5-

year prison sentence that could be imposed by anyone who speaks 

out against Mugabe himself or his Government. How effectively 

has that tool of tyranny been used to stifle dissent among clerks, 

among others as well, if you criticize the Government? I remember 

the Soviets had that catch-all phrase, slander against the Soviet 

State, which was just a catch-all way of going after anyone who 

dissented. Has it been used with vigor? Is the Archbishop at risk? 

Ms. BRYAN. For some reason, I think the religious community 

has been allowed to speak fairly loudly. And there are a number 

of bishops who have been very critical. And this statement pales 

61

in comparison to some other things that he has said publically in 

Zimbabwe. I think he is brave, and a lot of these folks are brave, 

but I don’t think that Mugabe wants to go so far as to put a bishop, 

or a religious leader who is well respected in Zimbabwe in a region, 

in jail. So I have a feeling that they are going to be allowed to continue to be critical without great risk. 

Mr. KRILLA. And I would like to add, Mr. Chairman, I think that 

is one of the areas of civil society where you do see some strength. 

I think the churches have been able to work in this very oppressive 

regime, maybe not as effectively as if they had more political space 

to operate, but they are one of the few success stories, and one of 

the few areas that I think the U.S. Government can look to as they 

hope to build upon the democratic space that already exists, little 

though it may be. 

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman, I received a call, it may have been 

the same bishop, I am not sure, but Dr. Marsh knew the name because she had met with them when she visited there; was it the 

same? Well, he called me about a week before the election, or 3 or 

4 days, and he said, ‘‘Won’t you just come on over to the election?’’ 

I mean, he was honest, on a public telephone, you know, you have 

to come; you know, I know you are opposed to this kind of government, and this coming is not as easy to get on a plane and go to 

Zimbabwe. My constituents now, where is Donald Payne this week, 

where in the world is Congressman Payne? Like Matt Lauer, it was 

allowed. If I was on NBC TV, but I am not. 

But anyway, I did express to him that I—and he said, ‘‘Well, I 

can understand, and it is not an overnight thing. It is not the end 

of the world next week, regardless of what the turnout is, and this 

is a long-term project, and so perhaps after the election sometime, 

you can plan to come.’’ So listening to his rationale, I believe that 

they will continually have a steady push and will continue to try 

to reach out for groups to come and be supportive, or at least listen 

to this. 

And I agree that, you know, Mugabe really got along well with 

the former Rhodesians when they were all in bed with each other; 

they were making money. They were in the Congo, as you know, 

those settlers that got involved in the whole business after Kabila 

was there when they decided they had to go in to keep the 

Rawandans out, et cetera. But everything was cozy until the elections came up, and Mugabe saw that he was losing favor. And that 

is when he had to then turn to the land issue. But I think that 

many of the former Rhodesians are as much to blame for his behavior because they had a little, you know, cozy money-making, 

don’t-bother-me-and-I-won’t-talk-about-you deal. It doesn’t justify 

Mugabe—and then when he saw he had no other issue, he just 

pointed to the land and saying, guys, they were probably wondering what in the world is going on; this is our arrangement. 

So it is a little more than meets the eye on some of these issues, 

but I do believe and I agree with you, and it is good that the religious community—that we are going to continue to work with—is 

standing tall. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just conclude by asking Dr. Mills one final 

question. 

62

You have asserted, a real change may only coming from within 

ZANU–PF. What do you make of the tensions within ZANU during 

the election season? I mean, it has been my experience—and I do 

work on human rights, I have done that for 25 years—that there 

always are, within any dictatorship, people that you find that are 

moderates. You find them in the media, even when it is Government-controlled, who loathe what the Government is doing. And 

given the right opportunity and set of circumstances, they emerge 

and break forth. Do you see any signs of an emergence of moderation within the ruling click? 

Mr. MILLS. I don’t, Mr. Chairman, make it my job to study 

ZANU–PF all the time, but I think there is certainly—from the evidence and certainly in the preparation of this testimony to you here 

today, and in other areas of activity I have been involved in—a lot 

of evidence of people both within Zimbabwe and without that may 

be party members or that may be more generally party supporters, 

or they may just not be MDC supporters; they are somewhere out 

there in the political space, who are very critical and very liberalminded. And I think the United States would be well served by engaging them. 

And you are right, I think that when Mr. Mugabe inevitably departs the political stage, at whichever point that is, I think that the 

chance of there being dramatic change in Zimbabwe is very great. 

And I think it is incumbent on that political space to be filled very 

quickly and in a democratic manner and that the United States is 

engaged with the people who are likely to fill it. 

I think what you have seen over the last year, in terms of the 

election process, as I said earlier, within ZANU–PF—this is a party 

much steeped in the traditions of democracy itself, let alone within 

Zimbabwe at large. And certainly, I think more liberal minds and 

reformist-minded elements within ZANU–PF, if they are given very 

limited opportunity to express themselves—as I said, many have 

left the country to pursue business and other interests abroad, but 

probably would seize the opportunity to go back if the political climate changed somewhat. So I do think there is scope for greater 

engagement with those factions and with those individuals. 

Mr. PAYNE. There is one other—believe it or not, there is a proMugabe movement actually here in New York City. I don’t know 

if you are familiar with the December 12th Movement. I don’t know 

if you have ever encountered them, they are a small group, but 

they are vocal. They are very pro-Mugabe and confrontational 

when he is criticized. And so there is a—and they know how to 

lobby, you know, New York and New Jersey Congressmen to say, 

‘‘Let me ask you a question, is it fair that 3 percent of the people 

own 50 percent of the land?’’ Well, of course, the answer is, no, it 

is unfair. Well, therefore, how can you be opposed to a person—you 

know. 

So when Mr. Mugabe was in New York about 4 years ago at Riverside Church or a church in New York—I think it was a church 

up in Harlem, and people got there at 3 or 4 in the afternoon to 

get into a 7 o’clock meeting to hear him, and crowds were all 

around. Because, once again, going back to the liberation movement of standing up against Ian Smith, that kind of memory still—

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63

ment people. So it is not a simple—one of these Black and White 

issues—but it is not a simple issue in some of the communities in 

the greater New York area because the people take a simplistic approach. And governance is not simplistic, especially, as you all 

know since you all work in Africa and other developing countries, 

it is difficult to go from colonialism and try to make a transition 

to equal wealth and equal opportunity and all that. 

But I do believe that the country—like I said, one thing that was 

done well was that education was a priority for a while, and that, 

I think, people in the back of their minds know what they want. 

And I think that when the time is right—and let me assure you 

that some of these leaders that I have spoken with privately feel 

the same way we do; they just feel it is an inopportune time. But 

they simply cannot—it doesn’t serve any purpose for them to come 

out and speak forcely because, as a matter of fact, it will kind of 

get his ire up and he will even become more stubborn and resistant. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. I would agree with my friend, except to say that 

when people do enable and give individuals a free pass to commit 

human rights abuses, you know, for the victim who suffers a rape 

or a series of rapes, torture of some of the most excruciating 

kinds—and that is not whether they be a right wing, left wing, 

Communist, whatever their ideology is, they know it hurts. They 

know they suffer, and their familles know that they suffer. And 

that is one of the beauties of this Committee; we are all about trying to make sure or trying to ensure that human rights anywhere 

in the world, where they are violated, we speak out boldly, consistently, regardless of what that regime may be, regardless of what 

continent it is on and whether or not there are reforms or not and 

whether or not it happens in this country as well. 

So I want to thank our very distinguished panel. You have been 

very patient, but more importantly, you have been very, very courageous in the promotion of democracy and human rights, you and 

your organizations. So thank you so much for sharing your counsel 

and wisdom with us today. 

The hearing is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 5:25 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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