United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Public Affairs, Region I

475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19401

Phone: 610/337-5330 Fax: 610/337-5241

Internet: dps@nrc.gov or nas@nrc.gov

I-97-71 June 23, 1997

Contact: Diane Screnci FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Neil A. Sheehan

NRC PROPOSES $210,000 FINE FOR PENNSYLVANIA UTILITY

FOR SEVERAL ALLEGED VIOLATIONS AT SUSQUEHANNA PLANT

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has proposed a $210,000

fine against Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. for several alleged

violations of agency guidelines at the utility’s Susquehanna

nuclear power plant in Berwick, Pa. The alleged infractions fall

into two major areas: the misalignment of a circuit breaker for

an emergency diesel generator that left it inoperable, and plant

operators’ repeated failure to detect this problem; and the

improper deactivation of a containment isolation valve.

PP&L also has been cited, but not fined, for a nonlicensed operator’s failure to follow administrative procedures

relating to an emergency reactor shutdown system.

As a result of reports made by PP&L to the NRC, agency

staff identified the alleged violations during two inspections

conducted at the plant between June 11 and September 9, 1996, as

well as through two investigations conducted by the agency’s

Office of Investigations.

With respect to the emergency diesel generator alleged

violations, commercial nuclear power plants are required to have

multiple backup energy sources so that in the event of a loss of

power, the reactor can be safely shutdown. Susquehanna, which

has two reactors, is required to have four emergency diesel

generators available for that purpose. Nevertheless, on June 14,

1996, non-licensed plant operators failed to detect a

misalignment of a diesel generator auxiliary equipment supply

breaker, which rendered that generator inoperable.

The problem was not identified during three subsequent

weekly equipment checks. All told, the generator was out of

service for almost three weeks. However, in their equipment test

records, the operators incorrectly reported that the circuit

breaker was in the appropriate position.

Further, alarm tests that were supposed to have been done

during rounds by the non-licensed operators were listed as having
been performed when in many cases that did not occur. The

operators failed to perform the required panel alarm tests on

approximately 157 occasions between January and June 1996.

NRC found that some licensed operators did not perform

certain activities but indicated in records they had carried them

out.

NRC Region 1 Administrator Hubert J. Miller, in a letter

to PP&L, wrote that these numerous examples of both licensed and

non-licensed personnel not performing required activities, yet

documenting on records that the activities were carried out,

raise serious questions regarding the adequacy of management and

supervisory oversight at the station to ensure that management

expectations were clearly communicated, understood and followed.

Mr. Miller further wrote that, “Even though no actual

safety consequences resulted, management’s failure to effectively

communicate the expectation that activities be performed in

accordance with procedures and with attention to detail had the

potential for significant safety consequences.”

Given the number of individuals involved, the actual and

potential impact on equipment, the duration of the problem and

the lack of management and supervisory oversight that resulted in

the failure to detect this widespread condition, the NRC is

classifying these alleged violations in the aggregate as a

Severity Level II problem, which constitutes a very significant

regulatory concern.

In assessing a proposed fine of $160,000 for these alleged

violations, the NRC credited PP&L for identifying most of the

problems and for prompt and comprehensive corrective actions.

However, the NRC determined that a significant fine was

warranted, notwithstanding those PP&L actions to “emphasize the

importance of performing activities as required, maintaining

accurate records of such activities and providing appropriate

control and oversight of such activities.”

“This case represents particularly poor licensee

performance, as evidenced by 1.) the nature of the violations

associated with the Severity Level II problem, including the

inoperability of the diesel generator for almost three weeks and

the number of employees involved; 2.) the extensiveness of the

problem with inaccurate records; and 3.) the management and

supervisory failures demonstrated by these violations.

Additionally, the NRC previously issued Information Notice 92-30

on April 23, 1992, and Generic Letter 93-03 on October 20, 1993,

that described similar occurrences at other facilities. Your

actions in response to these communications did not assure that

plant personnel were properly performing their assigned duties at

Susquehanna. It is not acceptable that these types of failures

occurred in 1996.”
Regarding the improper valve deactivation alleged

violation, on July 30, 1996, a containment isolation valve was

opened and deactivated for 24 hours, rendering the valve

inoperable. The valve had been deactivated for preventive

maintenance work but without the proper actions taken to comply

with the plant’s technical specification requirements.

The problem was significant because PP&L’s incorrect

interpretation of requirements would have allowed the valve to

remain inoperable and open indefinitely.

A fine of $50,000 has been proposed for that alleged

violation.

The alleged violation which was cited but for which no

fine has been proposed involved a non-licensed operator’s failure

to follow administrative procedures for controlling the status of

equipment associated with the Standby Liquid Control System. The

system’s purpose is to shutdown the reactor during an emergency

by injecting a neutron-absorbing solution into it via the core

spray system. On June 12, 1996, the operator repositioned a

breaker switch, resulting in the de-energization of heat tracing

for an operable standby liquid control pump for 34 hours.

PP&L has 30 days to respond to the NRC’s notice of

violation. During that time, it may pay the fine or request in

writing that all or part be withdrawn.

#