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Number 145, August 1998

U.S. Nuclear Policy in the 21stCentury
by Robert Joseph and Ronald Lehman

Conclusions
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Nuclear weapons will continue indefinitely to play an    indispensable role in U.S. national security policy: as a hedge against uncertainties, to    deter potential aggressors who are both more diverse and less predictable than in the    past, and to allow the United States to construct a more stable security environment.    Recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan make it clear that nuclear weapons remain part    of the security setting. The aggressive pursuit of nuclear, biological, and chemical    weapons by states such as Iran and North Korea underscores the role of deterrence as a    central component of U.S. security strategy.

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The United States requires a credible nuclear    deterrent posture, broadly defined to include forces-in-being; capabilities for weapon    system design and production; and the ability to assure the safety and reliable    performance of the nuclear stockpile—a fundamental challenge in the absence of    underground testing. Because this posture must be both adaptable and responsive to new    threats, the national deterrent infrastructure must be treated as a strategic resource.    The posture must also incorporate a greater role for defenses in future deterrence    calculations. All of this requires trained and motivated people, as well as new ways of    thinking and considerable agility and foresightedness on the part of U.S. leaders.

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A nuclear force that is not backed by the perceived    ability and willingness to maintain and, when necessary, reconstitute important elements    will increasingly be seen as hollow. The decisions and actions that the United States    takes concerning the total force posture in the years ahead will influence decisively how    both allies and adversaries perceive the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. In turn, this    holds important implications for the overall capacity of the United States to shape the    security setting at the outset of the new millennium and to pro- vide for the    nation’s defense in a world of change and turbulence.

**Setting a New Paradigm**
Recognizing the need for a fresh, long-term look at national securitystrategy and requirements, and specifically at U.S. nuclear policy in the 21st Century,the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University and theCenter for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory broughttogether a group of experts with extensive experience in security policy and militaryaffairs. 

The participants examined the broad trends in the internationalenvironment and considered how the United States could both shape and respond to them. Aforward-looking paradigm for the nuclear dimension of U.S. security policy emerged thatbuilds on the lessons of the past while addressing the opportunities and challenges of thefuture. The paradigm is based on five elements:

1. Sweeping positive changes have occurred. The bilateral "nuclearbalance" that occupied center stage in the past no longer dominates the strategiccalculations of the United States or Russia. Yet, there remains a continuing need fordeterrence and for the retention of nuclear weapons as an essential component of U.S.national security strategy. 

2. Nuclear weapons will remain part of the global security setting. Theknowledge to build them will continue to exist; they cannot be disinvented. Even if theUnited States were to divest itself of its nuclear arsenal, other nations would beunlikely to follow suit. To the contrary, some states would gain incentives to retain oracquire nuclear weapons against a conventionally superior but nuclear-free United States.If nuclear weapons were somehow eliminated, a serious deterioration of the internationalenvironment could engender strong incentives for nuclear rearmament. A rapid andcompetitive race to rebuild nuclear arsenals could increase prospects for a devastatingwar. 

3. In the changing security setting, the nuclear weaponsinfrastructure—broadly defined to include both the operational forces and thedevelopment and production capabilities that can bring new forces into being whenneeded—takes on a heightened strategic prominence*.*This will require a greaterattention to adaptation and reconstitution. 

4. Increased engagement with Russia and China is required to foster abroader set of relationships and to strengthen the stability of nuclear postures.**Thedynamics and substantive focus of these relationships should be different from the past.As our relationship with Russia matures, we should be able to approach security concernsmore directly and find common ground to further strengthen our joint and separate but notconflicting interests. One approach that could benefit both states is consideration ofsharing early warning data and technologies—improving their warning network andimproving our missile defense capabilities. At a minimum, we should divorce ourselves fromthe past policy of mutual vulnerability, a policy built on distrust and Cold Warinsecurities that continues to inhibit normal relations. Both states must look to thefuture.

5. The paradigm recognizes that the fundamentals of deterrence have notchanged: effective deterrence will continue to depend on both real capabilities and theperception of a national will to respond to aggression. The participants concluded thatthey could place no credence in virtual deterrence. At the same time, there is anopportunity and need for a more balanced relationship among the three traditional elementsof deterrence—retaliation, denial, and dissuasion. 
**Judgments**
Turning to the principal judgments of the study, the projectparticipants reaffirmed that certain basics are enduring. Yet, the study contains much newthinking about how to pursue national security objectives, as well as new ideas on issuesas diverse as the nuclear weapons infrastructure, stockpile maintenance in the absence oftesting, and arms control. 
**Nuclear weapons will remain indispensable to U.S. security. Thethreat of war between the United States and Russia has been greatly diminished. Themotives and capabilities of our former opponent have changed fundamentally. The results ofthese changes are apparent in the radical restructuring of U.S. conventional and nuclearforces. Nevertheless, the world remains uncertain and dangerous. In this context, U.S.nuclear weapons serve to protect against an uncertain future with Russia and China, statesthat continue to value nuclear weapons for both political status and, in Russia’scase, to overcome what it sees as a growing conventional inferiority. In fact, nuclearweapons appear to play a growing role in the security policy of Russia, both indeclaratory statements and defense planning. The retention of between 10,000 and 15,000(and perhaps many more) theater nuclear weapons, the recent deployment of the SS-27 ICBM,and a continuing investment in its overall nuclear infrastructure, especially hardenedcommand and control facilities and the extensive nuclear weapons production complex, areexpressions of the importance assigned to these weapons by Russian leaders. 

The new circumstances associated with the spread of chemical andbiological weapons, as recognized in national guidance, have expanded the role of nuclearweapons to deter such use. The group concluded that U.S. nuclear weapons do play animportant role in deterring the use of NBC weapons against U.S. forces and allies byregional and rogue states. States such as North Korea and Iran do not seek nuclear weaponsbecause the United States has nuclear weapons. Rather, the motives for acquiring weaponsof mass destruction are numerous and overlapping, ranging from status and regime survival,to use as tools of aggression against neighbors, to using them to overcome the U.S.conventional superiority. 

Finally, nuclear weapons have also formed an indispensable basis forachieving stability through extended deterrence and remain important to assure friends andallies that their security is linked as fully as possible to that of our own. As with theUnited States, the overall threat to most allies has declined. Yet, from Japan and Koreain the Far East, to Germany and other NATO allies in Europe, U.S. nuclear weapons continueto reassure allies, provide stability, promote peace and, by reducing incentives (oreliminating the need) for others to acquire nuclear weapons, contribute tononproliferation goals. 
**The U.S. nuclear deterrent force must be structured to counter existingand emerging threats. The U.S. nuclear posture today can be different from the pastwhen the United States faced a much larger and more immediate threat. However, certainattributes and capabilities of the nuclear deterrent must be enduring if the United Statesis to be perceived as having the capability and will to meet the security challenges ofthe future.

To achieve a stable deterrent, experience has demonstrated that thenuclear force must possess certain fundamental characteristics: the force must be safe,secure and reliable; it must be responsive to political control and effective against thepotential targets contemplated in the strategy; and it must be survivable so that noadversary perceives vulnerabilities to exploit. To meet these requirements, the UnitedStates should retain the TRIAD of bombers, land-based ICBMs and sea-based SLBMs.Elimination of any one leg would weaken deterrence. The TRIAD remains valuable for thesame reasons it always has: the synergy of its elements provides flexibility, enhancessurvivability, and complicates defenses, thereby strengthening deterrence. Diverse basingand penetration modes also provide a hedge against a technological breakthrough by anadversary or the discovery of significant material problems with any one system.

While the participants reached consensus on almost all of theoperational assessments, including needed improvements to command and control capabilitiesand greater adaptability in planning, there was a difference expressed on theater nuclearissues. Although all supported the principle of extended deterrence, some questioned theneed for shorter-range delivery systems insofar as the TRIAD could meet all targetingrequirements. Most, however, felt strongly that to support regional deterrence the UnitedStates must retain, now and in the future, shorter-range systems, including dual-capableaircraft and sea-launched, land-attack missiles. 

The participants also emphasized the need for high level attention tofuture organizational and readiness issues, broadly defined. With the end of the Cold Warand the curtailment or cancellation of virtually all modernization programs, nuclear forcematters no longer demand the continuous involvement of senior leaders. Currentreorganization schemes within the Department of Defense leave it unclear which, if any,organization is the focal point for nuclear issues, and this lack of focus will bedetrimental to readiness.

Continued downward trends in emphasis on U.S. nuclear weapons areforecast to result in critical shortfalls in the areas of planning, weapons technicalissues, command and control, and operational test and evaluation. In addition, careermilitary personnel today generally view the nuclear career fields as being out of themainstream and having uncertain futures, posing significant obstacles to recruiting andretaining the necessary nuclear expertise. While the DoD and the Services are cognizant ofthese factors, it is imperative that senior-level attention be given to these issues todayto avoid critical deficiencies in nuclear expertise in the future.
**A confluence of factors is leading toward a greater role for denialcapabilities in the U.S. deterrent strategy. Included in the concept of denial arediverse capabilities such as active and passive defenses, as well as counterforce actionsthat deprive the enemy the benefits of his weapons. Given the growing ballistic and cruisemissile threat, coupled with the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biologicalweapons, missile defenses are at the core of denial. The participants concluded that, inaddition to defending U.S. forces and allies, the United States requires an effectivemissile defense against the emerging threat from rogue states armed with long-rangemissiles. In this context, the United States must pursue defenses of U.S. cities andpopulation with the ability to protect against at least several dozen reentry vehicles.

On the technology side, the report concludes that it will be feasibleto field effective systems, although considerable testing remains to be conducted beforeany particular system can be designated as ready. On the policy side, the projectparticipants emphasized the need to move away from a policy that accepts the totalvulnerability of our society to missile attack. Empha-sizing mutual vulnerability has acorrosive effect in political dealings with Russia and impedes better, more normalrelations. Moreover, avoiding mutual vulnerability relationships with other states anddeveloping and deploying effective defenses against such smaller-scale attacks wouldenhance deterrence. 
**The U.S. nuclear deterrent infrastructure must be capable ofmaintaining current forces, and must be sufficiently adaptive to provide new capabilitieswhen required. This judgment is based on an in-depth assessment of the weaponsinfrastructure which plays an essential role in deterrence. A strong, flexible andresponsive infrastructure is essential to make clear to potential adversaries that theUnited States could respond to any emerging threat, even with new forces if necessary, andmore rapidly than the threat could be mounted. 

One major problem identified in the report is the existing piecemealapproach to planning and funding for the deterrent infrastructure. The DoD lacks anoverall roadmap to set priorities and guide actions to ensure confidence in the future ofthe infrastructure, up to and beyond the lifetime of currently deployed systems. Theparticipants strongly recommend creating such a roadmap.
**Retaining the safety, reliability, security, and performance of thenuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing is thehighest-risk component of the U.S. strategy for sustaining deterrence. Criticalfactors affecting the stockpile include the known and unknown effects of aging, diminisheddiversity in weapons types, difficulties in maintaining expertise, and, most important,the prohibition on underground testing. The group concluded that the Stockpile StewardshipProgram is the minimum effort required, and itself remains a high-risk endeavor as aresult of an inability to validate the conclusions by nuclear testing and the need forsustained funding. Moreover, unlike that of Russia, the U.S. manufacturing complex can nolonger support the serial production of nuclear weapons. As a result, there is noimmediate hedge against the failure of an individual type. This risk can be mitigated byretaining selected types withdrawn from the active stockpile as a form of "virtualmanufacturing."
**Recommendations**- 
People are the *sine qua non* for the maintenance    of a safe, secure, and effective deterrent force. If present trends continue, it will    become increasingly difficult to attract and retain the people needed to build, operate,    and maintain the nuclear deterrent forces. Therefore, the Departments of Defense and    Energy—in cooperation with the national laboratories, relevant industries, and    universities—should develop a program to ensure that personnel with critical skills    in nuclear weapons planning, operations, design, production, and maintenance are retained,    and a suitable successor generation is developed before these key skills atrophy.

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The Department of Defense should prepare a long-term    plan encompassing specific needs for future U.S. nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and    the supporting infrastructure. A senior official within the DoD Acquisition structure    should be given overall responsibility for implementing such a plan, and for coordinating    nuclear matters within DoD and with the Department of Energy as well as other appropriate    agencies.

- 
Missile defenses will be of growing importance in the    years ahead. The United States must be able to deploy effective defenses in regions with    important interests and allies, as well as a national missile defense against the growing    threat to the United States itself. Increasingly capable missile defenses can and should    be deployed as a central component of deterrence. The United States should engage Russia    on cooperative efforts to address mutual interests in this area, including early warning,    while avoiding the pitfalls of destabilizing proposals such as "de-alerting." 

- 
The U.S.-Russian arms control approach needs to be    transformed. That approach, which focuses primarily on mechanically reducing the number of    deployed strategic weapons, conceals important imbalances in total nuclear postures. A    more sound approach is needed, one that recognizes that different nuclear weapon states    require different deterrent forces. As part of this transformation, the policy of the    United States should recognize that holding our society totally vulnerable to nuclear    attack is not in the security interests of the United States or Russia, but rather    inhibits the positive evolution of our long-term relationship. 

- 
Retaining the safety and reliability of the nuclear    weapons stockpile in the absence of underground testing is the highest-risk component of    the U.S. strategy for sustaining deterrence. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is the    minimum effort required and itself remains a high-risk endeavor. To hedge against this    risk, and the erosion of the U.S. weapons manufacturing complex, the United States must be    prepared to resume underground testing if necessary and should retain selected weapons    types withdrawn from the active stockpile.

A more detailed treatment of the key judgments discussed in this paperis contained in the recently released Executive Report of the study, U.S. Nuclear Policyin the 21st Century: A Fresh Look at National Strategy and Requirements (available on theinternet at http://www.ndu.edu). A final report will be published this fall. The viewsexpressed are those of the study participants. These views may not be shared by allparticipants and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for NationalStrategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of Defense, ororganizations with which the participants may be affiliated. Ambassador Robert Joseph isthe Director of the Center for Counterproliferation Research. Ambassador Ronald Lehman isDirector of the Center for Global Security Research. For more information call (202)685-4234.

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

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