Docket No . 108459.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PEOPLE OF TH

E STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appell

ee, v. MARC A . C LO SE, A

pp el l an t.
Opinion filed October 21, 2010.

CHIEF JU STICE F ITZ GER

ALDde l i ve red the j udg men t of th e co ur t , w ith o pinion. Justice s Freem

an, Thom

as, Ki lb ride, Garm

an, and K

armei er co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. Jus t ice Bu rk e disse nt ed, wit h op inion.

OPINI ON

Def endan t, Mar c A. Clos e, was char ged by indictment wit h one
co unt of felo ny

driv in g whi le li cense rev oked (625 ILCS 5/6–303(d) (West 2006)). The circui t cour t o f L a SalleC ounty granted defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidenc e, finding the stopof def

endan t’s veh ic le was unl awful bec au se t he o ffi

cer had no reasonabl e, ar t iculable su spicio n t hat defend ant was dr ivi ng out si de the term s of his restricted dri

vi ng p erm i t (RDP). The

appe l l ate court reversed and rem anded f or further proceedings . 389 Ill . App. 3d 228. For t he r eas ons st at ed be low, we a ffi rm t he judg ment o f the appe l l ate cou rt.-2- BACK GROUND On August 7, 200 7, defend ant wa s i n di cte d b y a L a S al l e C oun ty gr and jury o n one cou

nt of felony dr iving while li

cens e r evo ked . T he indict ment alle ged that on J une 2 4, 200 7, defend ant kno wingly dro ve a 1987 Chev

roletve hic le u po n a pu blic hi ghway in LaSal le , Ill in ois, at
a time wh en his lic ense wa s re vok ed, and t hat t he bas is for t he
rev oca ti on was a co nvictio n for dr iving

un de rt he influ en ce o f alc o ho l. The in dictment al so all

eged that defen

dant previously

had b een convi cted of t he o ffense o f driving while l icense re vok ed, and t hat t he ba sis f orthat revocation was al so a conviction f or drivi ng wh il e under the i nf l uen ce of alcohol . See 6 25 IL CS 5/1 1–501 (We st 2006 ). De fenda nt fi

led a m ot ion to quash his arrest and suppress evi dence. At the heari

ng, Of fi cer Tho mas Belsk i of t he LaSal le police dep ar t ment tes t ifi

ed t hat on S unda y, June 24, 200 7, at 7: 13 p .m. he
was on r ou t inepatro l. He ran a regis trat ion c heck of a 1987 Chev

rolet pic kup o n his mo bile computer , which discl osed t hat the licen

se of t he registered owner , defendant, had been revoked. The computer also dis cl osedt hat t he own

er h ad be en i ss ue d a n R DP, bu t did n ot discl ose t he terms of

t he RD P. Belsk i tes t ifi

ed t hat t he pe rso n dr iving the pic kup truck strongly

resem bled the photogr aph of the owne r that he
was abl e to pull up on h

is computer. Bels

ki stopped t he vehi

cl e, asked defend ant if

he was a ware hi s lic ense was re vok ed, and su bse qu en t ly arrested defend ant f

or d ri v i n g w h i l e l i cen se re v oke d. Prior to the stop, Belsk i did no t obs er ve de fendant co mmi t any tr affic violat ion. Defe nse couns el

ask ed B elski, “T he re aso n t hat you s t op ped t he
ve hic le [ wa s] be ca

us e y ou had a h un ch tha t he [de f en da nt] wa s n ot dr iving wi th i n th e p eri ods

of h i s restr ic ted d riv

in g permi t, isn’ t t hat
corre ct ?” Bel ski

answered, “

Yes, I did.” Bel

ski la ter explai ned that based o n his expe rienc e, a

n R DP i s ty pical l y i ss ue d f or wor k or hardsh ip, and p rio r t o s t op ping d efenda nt , he t oo k int o a cco unt t he day of t he week–Sunday; the tim e of day –7:13 p.m.; and defendant ’s clothi ng– a tan k top, ba seb al

l cap, a nd s ungl ass es. Relying on Peopl

e v . Johnson , 379 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 71 0 (200 8), de fe ndant argued that Off ic er Bel ski ’s h

unch that defenda

nt was dr iving outs i de the pa ram eters of hi s RDP did not pro vi

de an adeq ua te ba sis for the veh

ic le stop. The trial

court agr eed a nd granted defendant’s motion to suppress. T he Stat e su bseque ntly

fi le d a
certif i ca te of su bst an t ial imp air men t an d n o t ice o f ap pe al. Se e 2 10 I ll.1 Thoug h th e appe llate court m ajori ty q uoted a versio

n o f se ctio

n 6–303 th at ap pea red in th e 20 07 su pp lement t o Wes t’ s 2 00 6 I llino is C ompil ed St at ut es (625 ILCS 5/6

–303 ( We st Supp. 2 007)) , the

statuto ry am en dm en ts ref lect ed in the 2007 sup plement

were not effective at the time of the vehicle stop at is sue here. Ra ther, t he ve rsion of section 6–3 03 of the Illinois Vehicle Cod e s et forth in We st’s 2 006 Il

li no is Co m piled Statute s (625 ILCS 5/6–303 (West 200 6)) a pplies to the pr esent ca se and it is t hat section whic h will be cited in this opinion. We note, however, tha t the la ngu age in the version quoted by the appellate cour t majority a nd the language in the app licable ve

rsio n d o n ot diffe r in any way mate rial to the pr esent litiga tion.

-3- 2d R. 604 (a) (1) ; People v. Young, 82 Il l . 2d 234 , 247 (1 980). T he appella

te court reversed an

d reman ded for f

urther pro ceedings. 389 Ill . App. 3d at 234. The m aj ori ty expressl y de clin ed to f ol l ow Johnson an

d hel d that “ the mere ex i stenc e of an RDP does not extinguish an off

icer’s re as on ab l e a

n d a rti cul ab l e b as i s to believe t he off ic er has wi tnessed a rev

oked driver

trav el i ng on a hi gh wa y of t his st at e, in violat ion o f the provisions of the V ehi cle Code .” 38 9 I ll. App. 3d at 23 3. T he ap pe ll ate cou rt rea son ed tha t the l an gua geof
se cti on 6–3 03 o f the I lli

nois V ehicle Co de, which es t ablishes t he
o ff ense of d riving while license r evo ked , d emons t ra t es t hat t he i ssuan ce o f an RD P is a s t at ut o ry de fen se an d n o t an ad dit io na l element t hat t he Stat e i s requi red to prove. 389 Ill . App. 3d at 232-33. Accordi ngl y, “an o ffi

cer is not re quir ed t o d et er mine or ver ify t he scope o f t he r es t r ict ed dr iving pe rmit before per for ming a traf f i c s top when a rea son ab l e a rti cul ab l e b as i s ex i sts

to bel iev e the licenseof t he person beh

in d the wheel

is r ev o ke d. ” ( E mph as is in o r igin al. ) 38 9 I ll. App. 3d at 233. 1 The dissent ingjus tice woul d have fol

lowed Johnson , st at ingt ha t “in

order t o eff

ectuate a vali

d traffi c stop, *** an off

ic er must ha ve a r ea so na ble ar t ic ula b le s us pic io n t ha t t he dr ive ris op er at ingt he veh

ic le out si de the terms of h

is /her RDP.” 389 Ill . App. 3d at 23 7 (Mc Dade , J., disse nti ng)

. We allowe d de fendant ’s pe t itio n for leave to appeal . 210 Ill . 2dR. 315.-4- AN AL YSIS Scope of Revi

ew Bef ore co nsider ingt he propriety of the s uppression order, we address an ar gu men t de fen da nt r ais ed in his r ep ly brief co ncer ningt he scope of our revie

w. As n ot ed above, un

derl y i n g th e a pp el l ate cou rt ’s opi ni on was i ts a na l y sis of se cti on 6 –30 3 of the Ill in ois Veh ic le Code (625 ILCS 5/6–303 (West 2006)). Defen dant contends thatthe parties
never rai se d a sta tutor y con str uc ti on i ss ue i n v ol v i n g s ec ti on 6– 303 and t ha t t he ap pe llat e c o ur t er r ed by r ais ing t his is sue sua sp onte . See People v. Hunt , 234 Ill . 2d 49, 56 (200 9) ( appellate co urt ’s sua sp onte
consi de rati on of i ssues n

ot conside r ed by the trial court and n

ever argued by the p arti es c onsti

tuted error). Defe

ndan t further argues that because the theory under wh

ic h a c as e is tri ed

ca nn ot be ch an ge d on review(Hunt , 23 4 I l l . 2d at 5 6) , the S tate

ca n n ot rai se be fo r e t his courtan issue impro per ly conside re d by t he appe l l atecou rt. F orthese reasons, defen

dant contends that we should not consider t he meaning of secti on 6–303. We di sagree. In the tri al court, the S tate argue d, inter al ia , th at the veh

i cl e s top
was lawf ul, desp it e th e ex i ste

n ce of th e R DP . O n appe al, the S tate devel oped t his a r gu me nt , ma int ain ing t ha t t he st at ut o ry sc he me go ver ning t he issua nce o f RDP s plac es t he bu rd en o n the revoked driv er to pro duce the

RDP is sue d t o him, bu t do es no t dissipa t e t he officer’s r ea so na ble articulabl e suspi ci on that t he l

ic ense of the driv er has be en r evo ked . T he appe l l ate co ur t ag r ee d w it h t he St at e w he n it concl uded that “the m

ere exi stence of an

RDP does not extingui

sh an officer’s reasonabl

e and artic

ula ble basi s to beli eve t he o ffi cer has witne ssed a r evo ked dr iver t ra veling on a hi ghway of thi s state.” 389 I ll. App. 3d at 233. T hough the appellate court relied on se ct io n 6–3 03, a s ec ti on

of th e I l l i n oi s V eh i cl e C ode to wh i ch th e S tate di d not ex pr es sly ref

er in its ap pellat e br ief, se ct ion 6 –30 3 is pa rt and parc el of th e R DP st at ut o ry sc he me o n w hic h t he St at e g en er ally reli ed. Mo r eo ve r , se ct io n 6 –3 03 de fine s t he o ffen se at t he he ar t o f t his
cas e–d rivingwhile license r evo ked –and any holding in this case m

ust be co nsist ent wi

th th e statu te. Th us , the a pp el l ate co ur t did no t er rin
co nsider ingthis

section of

the Ill in ois Veh ic le Code and the s

tatutory
constru cti on issue, whi cht he pa r t ies ha ve fully br iefe d, is p r o pe r ly bef ore u s.-5- Mot ion to Su ppress Wh en re viewing a t rial co ur t ’s r uling o n a motion to suppress, we will ac cord g

re at def eren ce to t he t r ial c o ur t ’s fac t ua l find ing s a nd will
reverse those fi

ndi ngsonly if they are again

st t he m ani fest we i gh t of t he evi dence; butwe wil

l rev ie w de novo the

cou rt’ s ul ti matede ci si

on t o gr ant or deny t he mot ion. People v. Richardson , 234 Ill . 2d 233 , 251 (20 09) ; People v. Sutherland , 223 I l l . 2d 187 , 196-9 7 (200 6). Defend ant here does n ot c hallenge O ffi cer Belsk i’s t est imony
re gar ding the c i

rcum stan ces l eadi ng u p to the vehi cle stop. W

here no dis pute exi sts as to t he un

derly in g facts, ourt ask is to det er mine t he le gal eff ect o f those facts, i.e. , w

h eth er th e tr i al cou rt’ s u l ti mate ru ling that su ppr es si on wa s w ar ra n ted wa s c orre ct. Accordin

gly , our r evi ew pro ceeds de novo

. People v. Bunch , 2 07 I ll. 2d 7 , 1 3 ( 200 3) . T o t he ext ent di sp osi

ti on of th i s c as e tu

rn s on our re v i ew of th e a pp el l ate
cou rt ’s constru

cti on of section 6–303 of

the Ill in ois Veh ic le Code (625 ILCS 5/6–30 3 (West 2006)), review of that is sue al so proceeds de novo

. People v. Jones , 214 Il l . 2d 187 , 193 (2 005). The l aw i s s ettled tha t a veh i cl e s top c ons

ti tutes a “ se izu re” of “persons” withi

n the m eani ng of the f

ourt h a mendm en t. Brendlin v. California , 55 1 U .S. 24 9, 2 55 , 16 8 L . Ed . 2d 13 2, 1 38 -3 9, 1 27 S. Ct. 2400, 2406 ( 2007) ; Bunch , 207 I ll. 2 d a t 13

. Ac co r din gly, ve hic le stops ar e s ub

jec t t o t he fo ur t h a men dme nt’s r easonablen ess re quir ement ( Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 810, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1 996 )) , w hich we a nalyze und er t he prin ci ple s setfor t h in Terry

v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968 ) (People v. Cosby , 231 Il l . 2d 262 , 274 (2 008) ; People v. Mo ss , 217 Il

l . 2d 511 , 526 (2 005)). U nde r Terry , a police off ic er may con du ct a br i ef , i nv es ti ga tory stopof a pe rso n wher e t he off ic er reasonabl y b elie vest hat t he person has c omm itted, or is about to, co mmit a cri

me. Terry , 392 U.S. at 22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906-07, 88 S. Ct. at 188 0; People

v. Gherna , 20 3 Ill. 2d 165 , 17 7 (2 003 ); People v. Thomas , 198 Il

l . 2d 103 , 109 (2 001). The invest igat or y sto p must be just ifi ed a t its ince pt ion. Terry , 392 U.S . at 19-2 0, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. “[T]he poli ce off ic er mus t be abl e to po in t t o specif

ic and articul

abl e f act s which, t ak en t o ge t he rwit h r at io na l infe r en ce s fr o m t ho se fac t s, r ea so na bly
war ra nt that intrusion.” Terry , 392 U.S. at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. The o ff

icer’s suspici on mus

t amount to more than an-6- inart iculat e hunc h ( Terry , 392 U.S. at 22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 188 0; Gherna , 2 03 I ll. 2d a t 177 ), but need not rise t o t he le vel of su sp ic ion req

uired f or pro bab le

cause ( United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 1 04 L. E d. 2d 1, 1 0, 109 S . Ct. 1581 , 1585 ( 1989) ). In judg ing t he police off

ic er’s conduct, we appl

y a n obj ective standard: “w o uld t he fact s ava ilable to t he o ffi cer at t he mome

nt of the s ei zure *** ‘w ar r an t a ma n o f r ea so na ble cau t ion in t he belief’ t hat t he ac ti on taken wasappro priate?” T

erry , 392 U.S. at 21-22, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880; accord Thomas , 198 Ill . 2d at 109. The Terryst anda rd s have be en c odif ie d in the Code of Cri

mi nal Procedu re of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/ 107 –14 (Wes t 200 6) ), and we ap ply t he sam e standards i

n deter m i n i n g th e p rop riety

of i nve stigatory stops under arti cle I, s ection 6, of our state co nsti tut ion (Il l. Const. 1970,
ar t. I, §6). Thomas , 19 8 Il

l . 2d at 1 09;se e al so People v. Caballes , 221 Ill . 2d 282, 313-14 (2 006 ) ( re affirming cou rt ’s po sitio n t hat t he search and sei zure cl ause of our state co n sti tution s hou ld be in terpret ed i n l i m i ted l ock ste p w i th th e s ea rch an d s ei zu re c l au se of the f edera l constituti on). Defend ant do es no t dis pute t hat where a po li ce offi cer has a reasonabl e, ar t iculable basis t o be lieve tha t a dr iver is unlicens ed, t he off ic er may la wfu lly

cond uct a vehi cle stop. Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673, 99 S. Ct. 1391 , 1401 ( 1979)

. Defe ndan t argues, however, that where, as here, the off ic eris awar

e that the driver has been i ssu ed an RDP, the off ic er must have a reasonabl e, ar t icu lab le s us pic io n t ha t t he dr ive ris dr iving ou t side t he t er ms of his or her RDP in order to eff

ect a lawf ul v ehi cl e stop under Terry

. R elyi ng on the Johnson opini on, defen dant ma in tains that “[ w] hile Off

ic er Belsk i may havegues sed that Sun day af ternoon s are t imes wh en man y RD Pspr oh i

b i t dri v i n g, t h at hun ch

al one i s n ot enough to give

rise to reasonabl

e suspi ci on.” In Johnson , the a

pp el l ate courthel d, under fa

cts vi rtuall y i dentic al to the present case, that the poli ce off ic er la cked a reasonab le , ar t icu lab le suspici on to stop t he d efe ndan t’s veh ic le on a Sunday af tern oon ba se d o n t he o ffice r ’s su sp icio n t ha t t he RD P d id n o t pe rmit t he defend ant t o d rive o n Su ndays. Tho ugh re co gnizing t hat t he off ic er wa s lik ely correct in bel ie vi ng that Sunday

afternoons are tim

es when many RDPs pr ohibit dr iving, t he Johnson courtdetermi ned “ that insight was not eno ugh t o g iveri se to reasonabl

e suspi ci on.” Johnson ,2 Although driv ing wh ile li ce nse rev ok ed is gen erall y a Class A
m is de me an or , the p res ence of

oth er circ umsta nces, inc luding pr ior viola tions (as isth e case

he re) , co ul d re sul t i n a f el on y c on viction . Se e 625 IL CS 5/6– 303(d) , (d –2) , (d –3) , (d –4) , (d –5)(W est 200 6).
-7- 379 Ill . App. 3d at 712. The app ellate co ur t obs er ved t hat while the li mi ted purposes for whi

ch an RD P ma y be is su ed mak e it “le ss lik ely” that a p er son

wi th an RD P w ill be d r iving wit hin it s t er ms on a Sunday afternoon, they

do not ma

ke i t “im probable.” Johnson , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 713. Thus, the Johnson cou rt a f f i rm ed th e tr i al cou rt’ s or der qua shing th e def

en da n t’s ar re st a n d suppr es si

n g th e evi dence. Johnson , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 716. The S tate re sp on dsth at Johnson was wr ong ly decided . E cho ing t he view of the appellate m ajority h ere, t he Stat e mai

ntains t h at if, under se cti on 6 –30 3 of the Illi nois Vehi cle Code (625 ILCS 5/6–303 (West 200 6) ), t he Stat e i s not required to prove that a defen

dant was dr ivin g ou t side t he t er ms of his o r he r RD P in o rd er t o p ro ve t he off en se of d ri vi ng w hi l e l i cense re voke d, a forti ori , the of

f i cer nee d not sus pec t t hat t he pe r so n w as dr iving o ut sid e t he t er ms o f his or her RDP in o rd er t o effe ct a la wfu l vehi cl e s to p where the o ff icer has a
r ea so na ble art iculab le suspici on t hat t he driver’s lic ense h as been revoked. We agree wi

th the Stat e and overrule Johnson

. Sec t ion 6 –30 3 o f the Illinois Vehicle C od e de fines the of f en se of driv in g whi le li cense rev oked: “(a) Any pers on w ho driv

es or i s i n a ctu al ph y si cal con trol of a mot or vehicle o n any

hi ghway of thi s State at a tim

e when such perso n’s driver’s l

icense, permit or pr iv

il ege to do so or t he pr ivil ege t o o bt ain a

driv er’s l ic ense or perm

it i s revoked
orsuspen ded as prov

i de d by thi s C odeor th e l

aw of another state, ex ce pt as may be sp ec if ic al ly allowed b

y a judi ci al dr iving pe rmit , fa mily fina nc ial r es po ns ibilit y dr i v i n g p er m i t, pr oba t iona ry

lic en se t o dr ive , o r

a r es t r ict ed dr iving pe rmit is sued pursuant to t hi s Code or un de r th e l aw of another state, sha ll be g uilt y of a Class

A m isdem eanor.” 6 25 ILCS 5/6–303 (We st 2006 ). 2 In People v. Turner, 64 Ill . 2d 18 3, 185 ( 19 76 ) , t his c o ur t he ld that und er se cti on 6–3 03, the

elem en ts of th e of f en se a re “(1) the act-8- of dri vi ng a m otor v eh i cl e on the hi ghway s of thi s State, and (2) t he fac t of the revocation of

the driv er’s l ic ense or priv

il ege.” Though Turner in volv ed a m uc h e arl i er v ers i on of se ct ion 6 –30 3, t hat ver sion, li ke the one applic abl

e here, contain

ed an RDP ex

ception. See Ill. Re v. Stat . 1973, ch . 951⁄2 , pa

r. 6–3 03 ( “ [a] ny

pe rs on w ho d ri ve s a motor
ve hic le on an y hig hw ay o f t his Stat e at a t im e when hi s drivers l icense *** is revoked ***, except as m ay be al lowed by a restricted

dr iving pe rmit ***, sha

l l be gui l ty of a Cl ass A m i sdemean or”). Tu rner

did
n ot, however, expres sl

y de termi ne w het he r th e R DP e xc ep ti on consti tut es an ad dit io na l ele men t o f t he o ffen se o f dr iving wh ile li censerevoked, or is a m

atter of def

ense. The rul e applic abl

e to such determi nations is well e stablis

hed: “[I] t is the rule i n thi s State t hat where an

act is m ade cr iminal, wit h exce pt ions emb r ac ed in t he ena ct ing claus e cr eat ing t he off ense, so as t o be de sc r ipt ive o f it , t he Peopl e m ust all ege and pr ove t hat t he de fendant is not wit hin the e xcep t ions so as to show that the pr ec is e crim e has b een com

mi tt ed. In other word s, where the ex

c ep t io n is d es cr ipt ive o f t he o ffen se it must be n egatived i n orde r t o c har ge t he de fendant wit h t he of f ense . On the othe r han d, i f the exce ption, i ns tead of being
a p art o f the des cription of the off ense, m erely withdraws
ce r t ain acts or c ertai

n pe rson s f rom th e opera t ion of t he sta tute i t n ee d n ot b e n eg ati v ed , a n d i ts p osi ti on i n th e act, whether in the sa me s ec ti on

or a n oth er pa rt of th e act, is of no consequenc e. (People

v. Saltis , 32 8 I ll. 494 ; People v. Callicot t , 322 id. 390; People v. Talbot , 322 id. 416 ; People
v. Butler , 268 id. 635 ; Sokel v. Peopl e , 212 id. 238.) Exc ept ions ar e ge ne r all y

mere m atters of def en se. (Sokel v. People , supra ; Beasley

v. Peopl

e , 89 Ill. 571 ; Lequat v. People , 11 id. 330.)” People ex r el. Courtney v. Prystals ki , 358 Il l . 198, 20 3-04 (1 934). Ac cord People v. Green , 362 Ill . 17 1, 1 75- 76 ( 193 5); People v. Handzik , 410 Ill. 295 , 30 6 (1 951 ); People v. Laubscher, 183 I ll . 2d 330, 33 5 (199 8). Applying t his rule, ou r a ppe llate c ou rt in People v. Ell is , 71 I ll. App. 3d 71 9, 72 0- 21 ( 19 79 ) , he ld t hat t he excepti on in

section 6–303 “mer ely wi thdra ws pe rs ons wit h re st rict ed d riving pe rmits fro m the ope rati on of th e statu te an d i n n o sens e i s des cri

pti ve of the of f en se.”-9- In2001, the appell

ate court revi si

ted Ellis , and agai

n he ld t h at the exce pt ions in

section 6–303, i

ncl udin g the RDP exce

pt i on, are not part of t he su bst ant ive offense of d riving while license r evo ked , a nd
re ject ed t he de fendant ’s ar gument t hat t he St at e must pr ove t hat t he defend ant di

d n ot h av e a n RD P i ss ue d b y an oth er sta te

. People v. Rodgers , 322 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 19 9, 201- 03 (20 01). T he R odgers court reasoned: “[I] f

a de fendant mer ely d r ive s o n a pu blic h igh wa y wh ile his license is r evo ked , he comm its wh at is gen erall y a crim in al
ac t. Th at is, in t he t ypica l ca se , t he c o mmissio n o f the c r ime does not d

ep en d on t he inapp licabili

t y of t he exceptions. Thus, t he excepti ons do not bear on the elem ents of the o ffens e; in stead, th ey

sta te onl y th at particu lar defenda nts (t hos e wit h, e.g. , res t r ic t ed dr ivin g p er mit s) ar e p r o t ec t ed fr o m liabilit y. Because t he ex ce pt io ns me r ely w it hd r aw ce r t ain per so ns f rom t he sc ope of th e statu te, th e S tate

has n o burden t o d ispro ve them.” ( E mph as is inor igina l .) Rodgers , 322 Ill . App. 3d at 203. We agr ee w ith El l is and Rodgers t ha t t he RD P e xc ep t io n in
se cti on 6–303 is not anel em en t of the of f en se of drivi ng whi le l icense revoked. Thus, we re af

f i rm ou r ho lding in Turner tha t the el em en ts of t he of f ense are “ (1) the ac t of driv in g a mo t o rve hic le o n t he hig hw ays of thi s S tate , an

d (2 ) th e f ac t of the rev oca ti on of the driver’s l

icense or privi le ge.” Turner , 64 Il

l . 2d at 18 5. Defe ndan t concededat ora

l arg um en t tha t the RD P ex ce ption is not an el em ent of the o ff

ense , bu t co nt ends t hat t he element s o f the
o ffens e ar e o nly relevant at t rial and do not bear on w het her t he
ve hic le stop was

l awf ul und er Terryprinci

ples. We disagree. If, unde r Terry , we m

ust con sider wh

ethe r, ba se d o n t he fac t s a va ilable t o him, Off ic er Bel ski had a re aso nable, ar t iculable su spicio n t hat defend ant
co mm i tte d or was about t o commi

t a crim e, then the conduct that constitutes t he cr ime is r ele va nt

. Ac co r din gly, t o effe ct a la wfu l Terry stopo f de fe ndant on suspici on of dri vi ng wh il e lic ense rev

oked, Off ic er Bel ski wa s r eq uir ed t o ha ve a r ea so na ble ar t icu lab le su sp i ci on that defend ant was “dr iving a mot or vehicle o n t he highw a ys o f t his Stat e” and that defendant’s li censewasrevoked. Turner , 64 Ill . 2d at 185. Off ic er Bel ski

was n ot re qui

re d to ha ve a r ea so na ble ar t icu lab le
su sp i ci on th at d ef en da nt wasnot

i n com pl i an ce wi th t he t er ms o f his-10- RDP, as t ha t is no t an ele me n t o f t he o ffe ns e. We do no t imp ly, howe ve r, th at a p o lice o ffice rca nno t effe ct a la wfu l Terrystop withoutfirst ident ify

inga pa rt icular cr ime or co nsider ing whet her t he ci rcumstances he or she obse rved would s atisf

y e ach el em en t o f a particular off en se. Terrydo es no t r eq uir e t ha t lev el o f s peci f i ci ty or sus picion. An of f i cer, of cou rs e, m ay not i gn or e fac t s whi

ch woul d dis

pel
su sp i ci on of cri mi nal wrongdoing. To illus

trat e, “if the of

fi cer knows that the owner o f a v

ehicle h as a re vok ed licens e and furt her , t hat t he
owner is a 2 2-y ea r-ol d m al e, a nd the of f i cer ob serv estha

t the pe rs on dr iving t he ve hic le is a 5 0- o r60

- yea r
- o ld w o man , an y re as o na ble
su sp i ci on of cri mi nal activ ity evaporates .” Minn esota v. Pike , 551 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Min

n. 1996). Accord Armfield v. State , 918 N.E.2d 316, 32 1 n.7(In d. 2 009 ); People v. Jones , 260 Mich . App. 424, 430 n.4, 678 N.W.2d 627, 631 n.4 (2004). To further i ll ustrate, if the off ic er is aware that the t erms of the dr iver’sRD P al l ow h i m to dr iveat th

e ti me a n d p l ac e i

n qu esti on, t hen no basis exi sts f or e xecu t inga Terryst op , in t he abs ence of a ny tr affic violat ion o r suspici on of other crim

in al wrongdoing. Defend ant dir ec t s o ur at t en t io n t o se ct io n 6 –2 05 o f t he I llino is Vehi cl e Code, whi

ch sets f ort h the purposes f

or which an RDP m ay be i ssued. Sect ion 6–205 pro vides:

“[T ]he co ur t may reco mmend and t he Secre tary of Sta te in his d isc r et io n * ** may * ** iss ue ** * a r es t r ict ed dr ivin g pe rmit gra

ntin g t he pr ivileg e o f dr iving a mo t o rve hic le bet ween the petitione

r’s resi dence an d petitioner’ s pl ace o f employment or wi th in the scope of the p etit ioner’s
em pl oy men t rel ate d du ti es , or to al l ow tra ns porta ti on for t he petitioner or a household m

em ber of the pe ti ti one r’ s f am i l y f or t he re cei pt o f n ecessary me dic al care or, if the prof

essi onal
eval ua ti on i nd i ca tes , provi detran sp ortati on f ort he petitioner f oral coh ol re med i al or re h ab i l i tati on ac ti vi ty, o r fo r t he petitioner t o a t t end c lasses , a s a st ude nt , in an ac credited educational

i nsti tution ***.”

625 ILCS 5/6– 205(c) ( West 2006)

. Defend ant ma

in tains that in l igh t o f thes e establ

is hed pur pos esf ort he i ss ua nc e of an RD P, u nl es s O f f i cer Be l sk i wa s a wa re of the term s of t he RDP at t he ti

me of the ve hi cl e s top, th e of f i cer “ coul d n

ot kn ow-11- whether or n ot th e defen

dant was comm

ittin g a crim e.” Terry , howe ve r, d o es no t r eq uir e t ha t t he o ffice r“k no w” t ha t t he dr ive ris
comm ittin g a crim e. As the Suprem

e Court explai

ned: “The Fo ur t h A

me ndmen t req ui res ‘s ome m

i ni mal l evel of obje ct iv e jus

tif ic ation’ f or maki ng the stop. [Citation.] That le vel of suspi

ci o n i s c ons i de rabl

y l es s th an proof of
wr ong do ingby

a preponderance of

the evi dence. We ha ve he ld that pro bab le

ca use me ans ‘ a fai

r probabili

ty that
co nt ra band or evidence of a crime wi ll be found,’ [c itat ion] and t he lev el o f su sp icio n r eq uir ed fo ra T er ry st o p is
o bvio us ly less de manding t han t hat for pr oba bl e c ause [ci tation ].” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 10 4 L. Ed. 2d 1, 1 0, 109 S . Ct. 1581 , 1585 ( 1989)

. See also Alabama v. W

hite , 496 U.S. 3 25, 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 24 16 (19 90 ) ( r ec o gn izing t ha t r ea so na ble
su sp i ci on is a les s d ema nd ing st an da r d t ha n p r o ba ble cau se wi th respectto the quan ti t y, co nt ent and r eliabili t y of t he und er lyi

ng i nf orma tion ). Moreover, t he m

ere possibil

ity that t he RDP issued

t o d efenda nt allowed hi m to driv e at the tim

e and pl ace thatOff

ic er Bel ski

observed him do es no t ne ga t e t he o ffice r ’s r ea so na ble suspici on that defend ant
was dri vi ng on a rev oked l i cense. Pol

i ce of f i cers are “ ‘n ot required

to
rule out all

poss ibi li ty of innocent behavior’ ” bef ore ini tiatin g a Terry stop. 4 W. LaF ave, Search & Sei zure § 9.5(b ), at 481 (4th ed . 2004) , quo t ing United States v. Holland , 510 F.2d 453, 455 (9 th Ci r. 1975 ). As our own appel

l ate court has aptly

observ ed: “The purp o se o f a Terrystopi s to al l owa poli ce off ic er to in vestigate the circum

stances that pro voke

sus pi cion an d ei ther c onf i rm or di spe l his su spi cions.” People v. Ross , 31 7 Il

l . A pp. 3d 2 6, 3 1 (2 000 ). Se e al so Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 10 3 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 -26 (1983) (plural

ity op.) ( “i nve stigati ve m ethods empl

oyed sho uld be the l

east in trusive me ans reas onabl

y a vai la ble to ver ify o r dis pel the of f i cer’ s s uspici on i n a short period of ti

me ”); accord United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 686, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 615-16, 105 S. Ct. 1568 , 1575 ( 1985)

. Here, Of f i cer Be l sk i wa s a wa re th at the l i cens e of t he registered
ow ne r of the vehicle had been r evo ked and t he pe rso n dr iving the
ve hic le strongly

resem bled the photogr aph of the owne r. Viewed-12- o bje ct ive ly, t he fac t s a va ilable t o Offic er Be lsk i we r e s uffic ient to
crea te the reasonabl

e, arti cul ab l e suspici

on necess ary to eff

ect a Terry stop. Al thou gh Off

icer Bel ski was also aware that defen dant had been is sued an RDP, that factal

one woul d n ot ca us e re as ona

bl e suspici on to evaporate, and Off

ic er Bel ski

could co nduct a bri ef

i nv esti gatory st op t o ve rify or dispe l his suspicio n t hat defend ant was dr iving on a revoked lice ns e. Ac co r di ng ly, we a ffi rm t he judg ment of

th e a pp el l ate courtreversi

ng the trial

cou rt ’s or der g rant ing defendant’s m oti on to quash arr es t and suppress

evi dence an d reman din g for further procee di ngs

. Aff irmed

.

JUSTICE BURKE, di ssen ting: I would f in d that t he totality

of the ci rcumstances in t his c as e d id not amou nt to rea son

ab l e suspici

on suf f i cien t to support the stop. In
co nt r as t t o t he majo r it y, I wou l d f i nd tha t the of f i cer’ s k now l edgeof t he defendan

t’s rest ricted drivi

ng permi t (RDP ) is a relev

ant fact which must be t ake n into acc ou nt in analyzing the reasonablenes s of t he stop under Terry . Th eref ore , I res pe ctf ul ly dissent fro m the
maj ority opi ni on. The facts i

n thi s case are n

ot in dis pute. Of f i ce r Th om as Belski
was on r ou t inepa t r o l in

an un ma rked squad car i

n a resi dentia l a rea of LaS alle, I lli

nois. He r an a registrat ion check on def endant’s li

cense pl ate on h i s m obi l e com puter. Th

e com puter showed t hat t he registered owner had a

re vok ed d river ’s license a nd an RD P b ut did not sho w t he de t ails of the RDP. Af ter confi rmi ng that the photogr aph
ma tched the driv er, Off ic er Bel ski

stopped t he de fendant and arrested him for driv in g whi le li cense rev oked. As he testif

ie d l ater, p riort o t he stop, Officer B elski had a hunc h t hat t he de fendant was dr iving out si de t he sc op e o f his RDP ba sed on t he fact that it wasa Sunday at 7: 13 p .m. , t he defen

dant was weari

ng a t ank t op , ba seba ll cap, and sungl asses, and, i

n Of fi cer Belski’s ex pe r ien ce , RD P’ s a r e is su ed o nly for “work or hardshi

ps.” The major ity ho lds t hat t he facts were suf fi ci ent to suppo rt a Terry stopb ec au se

th e f ac ts k n own to the off ic er–that t he regi steredowner-13- had a r ev o ke d d r ive r ’s lice nse an d t ha t t he pe r so n d r iving t he ve hic le st r o ng ly r es emb led t he ph o t o gr ap h o f t he o wn er –s at is fi ed th e e l em en ts of the of f ense of driv in g whi le li cense rev oked. Sli p op. at 7-8, 11-12. W i th regar d to the RDP, the maj ority h olds that “Of

fi cer Bel ski was not required to have a re aso nable ar t iculable su spicio n t hat defend ant
was no t in

compl ia nce wi th the terms of h

is RDP, as that is n

ot an element of the of

f en se.” Sli p op. at 9-10 . T hi s is s o , e xplains t he majo r it y, becau se an

RDP is an exce pt ion t o t he o ffense which t he Stat e does not have to pro ve at trial . Sli p op. at 9. I disag re e wit h t he major ity’s ana lysis bec aus e it a bando ns and does not even m

ention the “tot ali

ty of the circumstances” test which t his co ur t ha s c o nsis t en t ly ap plie d t o r ev iew t he pr o pr ie t y of Terry sto ps. Th e m

aj ori ty ’s un wa rra nte d a ppl i ca ti on of a new “ el em en ts of t he o ffen se ” t es t es se nt ially perm i ts spo t -c heck s o f ever y driver who has been is sued an R

DP, without regard t o any surroun din g ci rcum stan ces

. The det er minatio n of w he ther a s eiz ur e o rst o p is r ea so na ble inv o lve s a du al in qu ir y: “wh ether the off ic er’s acti on was j ustif

ie d at it s incept ion, and w het her it w as r eas ona bly relat ed in sc op e t o t he ci rcumstances whi

ch j ustif ie d the in terference i

n the f irst place.” Terry
v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 20 L . Ed. 2d 889, 905, 88 S. Ct. 1 868, 1879 (1968). Under the fi rst pro ng, “the pol

ic e can s t o p a nd br iefly de t ain a pe rso n for inve sti gati ve purposes if the off icer has a
re aso na ble suspici on supported by articul abl e fac ts that crimi

nal
ac ti v i ty ‘m ay be af oot ,’ even

if the off ic er lac ks probab le caus e.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 ( 1989), citin g Terry , 392 U.S. at 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911, 88 S. Ct. at 1884-85. “Cour ts have u se d a v ari ety of ter m s to capture the el usi ve concept of wh

at cause is

suf fi ci ent to authorize police t o s t op a pe rso n. * ** B ut t he es se nc e of all that has been
wr i tten i s th at the total i

ty of the ci rcu m sta nc es –the w hol e picture–must be t ak en in

t o accoun t. Base d upon

that wh ole pi cture t he de t ain ing o ffice r s mu st ha ve a p ar t ic ula rized an d o bje ct ive ba sis f orsu sp ec t ing t he pa r t icu lar pe r so n st o pp ed o f cr im ina l acti vi ty.” United States v. Cortez , 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695 (1981 ). See also United

States v. Laws

hea , 461 F.3d 85 7, 85 9 ( 7t h C ir. 20 06 ) ( in eval ua ti ng the rea son ab l en es s of a Ter ry sto p, we ex am

i n e “ th e tota l i ty of th e c i rc um sta n ce s k n own to-14- t he o ffic er

at t he t im

e o f the st op ”); United States v. Jackson , 300 F.3d 740 , 7 45- 46 ( 7t h Cir. 200 2) (t he “tot ali ty of the circumstances” in cl ude the experience

of the off ic er, the behav

ior and ch aracteristi cs of a su spe ct , w het her t he locati on of the stop is a “ hi gh cri me ” area, and an officer’s pr ior dea lings with t he individ ua l o r k no wle dg e o f a cri m i na l record). Un t il t od ay’s major ity dec ision, this court hasconsi stently

applie d t he “to t ality o f the circu msta nces ” t est t o fo ur t h amendment chal le ngesof stops and sei

zures. See People v. Mo ss , 217 Ill . 2d511, 5 29-3 0 (2 00 5) (w e j udge th e rea son

ab l en es s of th e s ea rc h b y i ts particular fac t s a nd cir cumst ance s, u sing t he “t ot ality o f the circumst ances” analysi s); People v. Lee , 214 Ill . 2d476, 488 (2005) (“t he to tali

ty of the cir cu

m sta n ce s, i n cl ud i n g th e c i tizen com pl ai n t,
were certai n l y en oug h to heighten the officers’ sus picion a nd wa rr ant further investigat ion”); People v. Thomas , 198 Ill . 2d 103, 110 (2001) (“[v]iewed

as a whole, the si

tuation confronti

ng the poli

ce off ic er must be so far fr om t he o rd inary t hat any co mpet ent officer wo uld be expected to act quickly”); Peopl

e v. McGo w

an , 69 Ill . 2d 73, 78 (1977 ) (appl

y i ng th e sa me test). In lo o kin g a t t he t o t alit y o f t he cir cu mst an ce s, we mus t inc lud e in
our anal ysi s all of t he fact s kno wn t o t he off i cer pr i or to the stop. It is cl ea r f rom the Suprem e C ourt’ s d

i scus si on of t he fact s in Terrythat all surroundi

ng ci rcumstances are relevan

t, incl udin g facts wh

ic h dis pel an officer’s re aso nable su spicio n t hat t he defen dant is engaged in cr imi nal act ivity. I n Terry , t he police officer obs er ved t he de fendant
r ep ea t ed ly

pac ing in front of a st or e, pee ring i nto the s tore win dow, and co nferr ing wit h t wo ot her men. I n t he off i cer’ s exp er ience, t he defen dant’s ac tions we

re con si sten

t wi th “ cas i ng a j ob.” Th e Court he ld t hat t he s ubs eq ue nt st o p a nd s ea rc h o f the d ef endan t were
re as on ab l e u

n der the f our th am en dm en t: “We thi nk on the facts and ci

rcumstances Off

ic er McFadden detail ed be fo r e t he t r ial ju dg e a r ea so na bly pr ud en t man wo uld have been

warranted in

bel ie vi ng pe ti ti on er was ar med and thus pr es en t ed a t hr ea t t o t he o ffic er ’s sa fe t y w hi lehe was invest igat inghis susp icious behavio r. The act ions of T er ry and Ch i l ton wer e co nsist ent wit h McFa dde n’s hypo t he sis that these me n were contem

pla ting a daylight ro bber y–which, it is
r ea so na ble t o as su me, wo uld be like ly t o in vol ve the us e of-15- weapons–an

d nothing in their conduct from the time he f irst noticed them until the time he confronted them and identified hims elf as a police officer gave him suff icient reason t o negate that hypot

hesis . Alt hou gh t he t rio had d epa rt ed t he origi nal scene, there was

not hing t o ind icat e aba ndo nment of
an in tent t o commi

t a ro bbe ry at som

e poin t. Thus, when Off ic er McFadden

approached the three me

n gath ered b ef

ore t he display

window at Zucker ’s st or e he had observ ed enough to m ake i t qui te reasonabl

e to fear that t hey

were arme d; and nothing in their resp onse to h is haili

ng the m, identifying himself as a police officer, an d asking their names served

to dispel that reasonable belief

.” (Emphas es adde d.) Terry , 392 U.S. at 28, 2 0 L. Ed . 2d at 91 0, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. In the ca se at b ar, the

maj ori ty ac kn owl edge s th at “ [a] n of f i cer, of course, ma

y n ot ign ore facts whi

ch woul d dis

pel suspici on of cri

mi nal
wr o ng do in g.” S lip op . a t 10. The major ity o ffers t he fo llowing i l l us trati on o f t his p r inc iple : “ if t he o ffice ris a wa r e t ha t t he t er ms of t he dr iver’s RDP allow him t o d rive at t he t ime and plac e in que st ion, then no basis exists for executi ng a Terry stop , i

n th e a bs en ceof any t r affic vi ol ati on or suspici

on of other crim

in al wrongdoing.” Sl

ip op. at 10. The m

aj ority then

states that “

the m erepossibil

ity that t he RDP is suedto de fen

dant allowed h

im to driv e at the tim

e and pl ace that Off ic er Be lsk i o bse rve d h im does not negate the officer’s r

easona ble suspicion tha

t de f en da nt wasdri vi ng on a revoked

li cense,” an

d that “[a]l thoughOff

ic er Bel ski

was al so aware that defenda nt had b een is sued an RDP, that fact al

one w ould not cause reasonable suspicion to evapor ate .” (Em phases adde d.) Sl

i p op. at 11, 12 . Th

e m aj ori ty fails to reco gn iz e, how ever , t hat t he o ffi cer ’s kno wledg e o f the defendant’s RDP is a fa ct whi ch di spel s suspi ci on of cri

mi nal wrongdoing. T hu s, it is

relev ant to whether the offi

cer had r ea so na ble
su sp icio n t ha t t he dr ive rwa s e ng ag ed in c r imina l ac t ivit y. “Un der Te rr y , a p ol i ceof

f i cer m ay br i ef l y stopa p ers on f

or t emp orary

que st ioning if the officer has k now ledge of su ffi cient
ar t icu lab le fac t s a t t he t ime o f t he en co un t er t o cr ea t e a r ea so na ble
su sp i ci on that t he perso n i

n qu esti on h as com m i tted or i s a b out to
co mmit a crim

e.” People v. Lee , 214 Ill . 2d 476, 487 (2 005 ). If t he defend ant was drivi

ng withi n the terms of hi s RDP, he was not committing

a crime . Thus, the o ff

icer’s knowledge o f the defendant’s-16- RDP, withoutkn

owi n g th e te rm s of th e p er m i t, red uc ed the l i ke l i hood that defen

dant was comm

ittin g a cr ime . I agr ee w ith t he disse nt ing jus ticei n th e a pp el l ate court that “[d]rivi

ng on a revoked l

ic ense is not
a crime i f the i ndi vi dual i s dri vi ng wi thi n the scope of hi s/her RDP. Thus, in or der t o e ffect uat e a va lid tr affic sto p, I be liev e an off ic er must h ave a r ea so na ble ar t icu lab le s us pic io n t ha t t he dr ive ris
o per at ingthe vehicle outside the ter ms of h is/h er RDP.” ( Emphasis adde d.) 389 Il l . Ap

p. 3d a t 237 (McDade , J., disse

nti ng)

. The maj ori

ty con si dersonl y two f ac ts i n con cl udi n g th at th e f ac ts
were su f f i ci en t to cre atethe

rea son ab l e, a rticul ab l e suspici

on necess ary to eff

ect a Terrystop: ( 1) that t he l ic ense of the regis tered
owner of the veh

ic le had been re vok ed; a nd ( 2) t hat t he pe rso n dr iving t he vehi cle strongl

y rese m bl ed th e ph otograph of

the own er. Un der t he “ total

i ty of the ci rcu m sta nc es ” te st, h

ow ever , a ll of the
su rrou nd i ng f ac ts m us t be i nc l ude d i n th e a na l y sis. I n a ddi ti on to t he two facts ab ove, Off

ic er Bel ski

knew tha t: (3 ) th e re gi stered

own er of t he veh ic le had an RDP; (4) the dri

ver wasdr iv ing t he vehicle o n a Sunday at 7 :1 3 p .m .; an

d ( 5) th e dri

ver was wear i ng s ungl ass es, a baseb all c ap, and a tank top. Ta king in to ac co unt t he ad dit ional fact s no t co nsider ed by t he majo r it y, I w oul

d h ol d th at the f ac ts do not s

upp ort a f

i nd i ng of
r ea so na ble su sp icio n in

t he ca se a t bar . T he facts kn own to t he off

ic er in t his case did no t amou nt t o mo re t han a mer e “h un ch” t hat t he defend ant wa s c o mmit tin g a crim e. The f ourt h am endm ent requires that t he pol i ce of

f i cer a rtic ulate som ethi ng m ore t han an “incho at e and unparticul

arize d suspici on or ‘hunch .’ ” Terry , 392 U.S. at 27, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. “[I]n j ustif yi ng the particul

ar in tru si onthepol ice o ffi

cer must be able t o p oint t o s pec ifi c and
ar t icu lab le fact s w

hi ch , tak en toge the r wi th r ati ona l i nf ere nc esf rom those facts, reasonabl

y warrant that intrusi on.” Terry , 392 U.S. at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. “The process does not deal wi th har d ce rt ainties , bu t wit h pr oba bili t ies. L ong be f

ore th e l aw of probabi li tieswas articul

ated as such, practic al

people f ormulated
ce r t ain com

mon se ns e concl usi ons a bout h um an beha vi or; j uro rs as f actf i nde rs ar e pe rmitt ed t o d o t he sa me–and so ar e law e nfor cement off i cers .” Cortez , 449 U.S. at 418, 66 L. Ed. 2d at 629, 101 S. Ct. at 695. I agree wi

th the appe l late co ur t in Johnson , which h el d under-17- si mi la rf ac ts th at the l i m i ted al l owa bl e p urp ose s f

oran RD P “ mak e it less li kel y tha t a person with an

RDP will be dri vi ng wi thin the scope of an RD P on

a S un da y af ter n oon , but th

ey do not mak e it i m proba bl e.” People v. Johnson , 37 9 I ll . App . 3d 710 , 713 (2 008). The facts i nth e present case do not support the particularize d
su sp i ci on required f

or a sto p. See Johnson , 379 Ill . App. 3d at 713- 14. It i s enti

rel y pos si bl e that the d ef

en da nt wasdri

vi ng to or f rom work on a Su nd ay at t he t ime his vehicle was st op ped . At t he
su ppr es si on h ea ri n g, O f f i cer B elsk i ad m i tted th at h e had no wa

y of kno wing be f

ore he st op ped defend ant whet her defend ant was wo rk ing
orwhether he

had other clothes i

n hi s car. Wh il e I wou l d n ot require that the off

ic er know the exac t t er ms o f the RDP bef ore sto ppin

g a dr iver, I be lieve the re must be moresp ec i f i c f ac ts t ha n a r e p r es en t in this case to support the stop. Ac co r di ng ly, I wo uld re v er se th e j udgm

en t of th e a pp el l ate court and aff irm the trial cou rt ’s or der g rant ing defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress ev

ide nce.