UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

CASE NO.:

JACOB BYFIELD, 

Plaintiff,

vs.

TESCO EQUIPMENT, LLC,

a Foreign Limited Liability Company,

Defendant.

 ____ /

COMPLAINT & DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff, JACOB BYFIELD (“Mr. Byfield” or “Plaintiff”), by and through his undersigned 

counsel, files this Amended Complaint against Defendant, TESCO EQUIPMENT, LLC

(“Defendant” or “TE”), a Florida profit corporation, and states as follows: 

1. Plaintiff brings this action for violation of Florida’s Private Whistleblower Act, 

Section 448.102, Florida Statutes (“FWA”) and for disability discrimination and retaliation in 

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”) and the Florida 

Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (“FCRA”).

2. Plaintiff is seeking damages including back pay, front pay, compensatory damages,

punitive damages, declaratory relief, and his attorneys’ fees and costs.

PARTIES

3. Plaintiff is an adult individual who performed services for Defendant’s company in 

Broward County, Florida.
4. Defendant is a foreign limited liability company that operates and conducts 

business in Broward County, Florida, and is therefore within the jurisdiction of this Court.

5. Plaintiff, a disabled male, is protected by the ADA and the FCRA because:

a. He suffered discrimination on the basis of his disability/handicap, 

and/or perceived disability/handicap by Defendant; and

b. He was retaliated against and suffered an adverse employment action 

based on his disability/handicap, or Defendant’s perception that he was 

disabled/handicapped, and his objections to the discrimination he was forced to endure 

based on his disability. 

6. Defendant was at all material times an “employer” as defined by the ADA and the 

FCRA as it employed in excess of fifteen (15) employees.

7. Defendant, at all times material to this Complaint, employed ten (10) or more 

employees, and is a covered employer as defined by FWA.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8. This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s ADA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1331 as they arise under 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.

9. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FWA and FCRA claims, 

as they arise out of the same operative facts and circumstances as his ADA claims.

10. The illegal conduct complained of and the resultant injury occurred within Broward 

County Florida, and the proper venue for this case is therefore the Fort Lauderdale Division of the 

Southern District of Florida.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

11. On or about May 22, 2019, Plaintiff timely dual-filed a Charge of Discrimination 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and the Florida Commission on 

Human Relations (“FCHR”).

12. On January 10, 2020, the EEOC mailed Plaintiff a Notice of Right to Sue against 

Defendant, giving Plaintiff the right to bring a civil action on his disability discrimination claims 

within ninety (90) days of his receipt of the same.

13. More than one-hundred-and-eighty (180) days have passed since the filing of 

Plaintiff’s FCRA claims, rendering Plaintiff’s FCRA claims ripe for filing.

14. Plaintiff timely files this action within the applicable period of limitations against 

Defendant, and has complied with all administrative prerequisites. 

15. All conditions precedent to this action have been satisfied and/or waived.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

16. Mr. Byfield worked for TE as a Welder from 1987 until his unlawful termination 

on August 1, 2018. 

17. During his very lengthy tenure, Plaintiff was an excellent employee, with no 

significant history of non-ADA/FCRA related attendance, performance, or disciplinary issues.

18. Unfortunately, during his tenure, TE never provided Mr. Byfield with appropriate 

respiratory equipment or other personal protective equipment (“PPE”) to prevent smoke and paint 

fumes from damaging his respiratory system.

19. When Mr. Byfield performed his welding duties, he regularly inhaled noxious 

smoke, which made it difficult for him to breathe normally.

20. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) regulations require 

that all employers must provide respirators and other appropriate PPE to employees when it is 
necessary to protect their health against contaminated air (including, for example, heavy dust, 

fumes, gases, and mist) in the workplace. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.134, et seq.

21. Due to the heavy amount of gases, dusts, fog, fumes, mists, smokes, sprays, and 

vapors, etc., generated regularly on Defendant’s premises, Mr. Byfield and his co-workers at all 

times relevant required said PPE and respirators.

22. Compounding these problems, TE regularly required painters to work 

simultaneously and in close proximity to welders such as Mr. Byfield, forcing Mr. Byfield and 

other welders to inhale paint fumes too.

23. In late May of 2018, Mr. Byfield objected to his supervisors at TE that TE’s actions 

violated, inter alia, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.134, et seq.

24. The foregoing objections constituted protected activity under Section 448.102(3), 

Florida Statutes.

25. On June 6, 2018, Mr. Byfield experienced extreme shortness of breath and had to 

leave work to visit his physician.

26. Mr. Byfield’s physician performed an EKG upon Mr. Byfield, and inspected his 

lungs. Shocked by his depleted oxygen levels, the physician sent Mr. Byfield to the emergency 

room at a nearby hospital because she feared that Mr. Byfield had a serious and possibly lifethreatening condition.

27. At the hospital, Mr. Byfield was found to have a large amount of fluid inside his 

lungs.

28. Treating physicians at the hospital emergency room even commented that Mr. 

Byfield was “drowning in fluids” linked to his working conditions at TE.
29. Mr. Byfield was then referred to a cardiologist and scheduled for an appointment 

in mid-June of 2018.

30. Mr. Byfield, in the mean time, disclosed his disability to TE, and attempted to 

engage TE in a conversation about reasonable accommodation for his disability, but TE refused to 

participate in the conversation or offer any accommodation for same.

31. Mr. Byfield’s cardiologist rushed Mr. Byfield into an emergency room in order to 

have an emergency surgery to have fluid drained from his lungs and from around his heart.

32. After this procedure, Mr. Byfield was diagnosed with a large pericardial effusion 

with increasing shortness of breath and bilateral infiltrates.

33. Mr. Byfield promptly informed TE of his diagnosis, and again objected to TE that 

its actions violated, inter alia, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.134, et seq., and further objected to Defendant’s 

unlawful refusal to accommodate his disability, and/or its discrimination against him based on his 

disability.

34. The foregoing objections constituted protected activity under Section 448.102(3), 

Florida Statutes.

35. Unfortunately, on June 18, 2018, Mr. Byfield had to undergo another surgery 

because he was hemorrhaging internally.

36. Mr. Byfield informed TE of these new complications of his disability.

37. Mr. Byfield was discharged from the hospital on June 29, 2018.

38. Mr. Byfield reached out to TE to plan his eventual return to work.

39. On June 27, 2018, TE secretary, Joan, called Mr. Byfield’s wife and informed her 

that TE was going to terminate Mr. Byfield’s employment, effective August 1, 2018.
40. Joan told Mr. Byfield’s wife that the reason for TE’s termination of Mr. Byfield’s 

employment was his temporary inability to work while recovering from his procedures and 

treatment.

41. Plaintiff was fired in short temporal proximity to his objections.

42. Under Florida law, terminating an employee for objecting to a violation of law, 

rule, or Regulation, or the employee’s reasonable belief that said conduct violates same, is a 

violation of the FWA. See Aery v. Wallace Lincoln–Mercury, LLC, 118 So.3d 904, 916 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2013) (To establish a violation of the Florida Whistleblower law, an employee must establish 

that: (1) he objected to or refused to participate in an illegal activity, policy, or practice, or what he 

reasonably believed to be illegal; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse 

employment action was causally linked to his objection or refusal). All of the above elements are 

met here.

43. The timing of Plaintiff’s objections and his resulting termination creates a close 

temporal proximity between the two events.

44. Given the timing of Defendant’s adverse employment action, along with the 

surrounding circumstances, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment without good cause and 

because Plaintiff reported/objected to Defendant’s violations of the law, or what he reasonably 

believed to be a violation of law. See Florida Statute, Section 448.102(3).

45. Shortly before Mr. Byfield’s termination, he disclosed his disability to TE

management. 

46. Mr. Byfields’ health condition certainly is considered a protected disability under the 

ADA and the FCRA. 

47. Plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions of his position, but TE
believed that due to his disability, Plaintiff could not continue his employment with Defendant.

48. The ADA and the FCRA require an employer to provide its disabled employees with 

reasonable accommodation, if such reasonable accommodation would allow that employee to 

perform the essential functions of his or her job, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship. 

See Smith v. Avatar Properties, Inc., 714 So. 2d 1103, 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

49. Defendant failed to accommodate, let alone offer to accommodate, Plaintiff’s 

disability and related symptoms.

50. Defendant’s actions are the exact type of unfair employment practices that the ADA 

and the FCRA wer intended to prevent.

51. Defendant did not have a good faith basis for its actions.

52. The facts surrounding Plaintiff’s termination create a strong inference of disability 

discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA and the FCRA.

53. TE was aware of Mr. Byfield’s ADA- and FCRA-protected medical condition and his 

need for accommodation.

54. Defendant, however, being well aware of Plaintiff’s disability, surgeries, and 

treatment, discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff for requesting reasonable accommodation for 

same.

55. In short, despite the availability of reasonable accommodation under the ADA and the 

FCRA, and despite the fact that Mr. Byfield would not be prevented by his disability to any 

appreciable degree in performing the duties of a Welder, TE discriminated and retaliated against Mr. 

Byfield based solely upon his disability.

56. Mr. Byfield is an individual with a disability who, with minimal reasonable 

accommodation, was fully capable of performing the essential functions of his job as a Welder, and 
had indeed done so for decades.

57. The reasonable accommodation of some unpaid leave to recover from his procedures 

and the provision of PPE already mandated by OSHA would have permitted Mr. Byfield to perform 

his job duties and would have imposed no undue hardship on Defendant.

58. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant’s actions, and inactions, affected the “terms, 

conditions, or privileges” of Plaintiff’s employment as envisioned by the ADA and the FCRA.

59. “Reasonable accommodation” under the ADA and the FCRA may include “job 

restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or 

modification of equipment or devices . . . and other similar accommodations.” 42 U.S.C. § 

12111(9)(B).

60. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to perform his job 

duties and otherwise qualified for his position, with reasonable accommodation.

61. Defendant perceived Plaintiff as being “disabled,” and therefore unable to perform the 

essential positions of his position, despite the fact that Plaintiff had performed them for decades, and 

could perform same with reasonable accommodation.

62. Pleading in the alternative, Plaintiff’s impairment did not substantially limit a major 

life activity, but was treated by Defendant as if it did.

63. Pleading in the alternative, Plaintiff’s medical condition constituted an impairment 

that limited a major life activity only because of Defendant’s attitude toward the impairment.

64. Defendant has no non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory rationale for terminating 

Plaintiff’s employment.

65. Plaintiff was a disabled individual, or otherwise perceived as disabled by Defendant, 

during his employment. Therefore, he is a member of protected classes as envisioned by the ADA 
and the FCRA.

66. Plaintiff suffered sufficiently severe and pervasive treatment, and ultimately 

termination, because of his disability and/or “perceived disability.”

67. Plaintiff’s termination constitutes an adverse action as defined by the ADA and the 

FCRA.

68. As a result of this conduct, Plaintiff has suffered damages, including loss of 

employment, wages, benefits, and other remuneration to which he is entitled.

69. At all material times hereto, Plaintiff was ready, willing and able to perform his job 

duties with, or without reasonable accommodation. 

70. Defendant does not have a non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory rationale for allowing 

and participating in the discrimination and termination suffered by Plaintiff.

71. Any reason provided by Defendant for Plaintiff’s termination is a pretext and coverup for illegal retaliation.

72. Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of Defendant’s conduct.

73. Plaintiff has retained the law firm of RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A., to represent 

her in the litigation and has agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its services.

COUNT I - FLORIDA’S PRIVATE WHISTLEBLOWER ACT – UNLAWFUL 

RETALIATION

74. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates all allegations contained within Paragraphs 1 

through 4, 7 through 10, 14 through 24, 33, 38 through 44, 51, 68, and 71 through 73 of the Complaint 

as if fully set forth herein.

75. On August 1, 2018, Defendant illegally terminated Plaintiff from his employment in 

violation of Section 448.102 (3), Florida Statutes.
76. Plaintiff’s employment was terminated for no reason other than Plaintiff objecting to 

illegal activity, or what he reasonably believed to be illegal activity in violation of Section 448.102(3), 

Florida Statutes.

77. Plaintiff objected to a violation of a law, or what he reasonably believed to be a 

violation of law, and was terminated as a direct result of same, which constitutes a violation of the 

FWA.

78. As a result of Defendant’s intentional, willful and unlawful actions, Plaintiff has 

suffered damages, including but not limited to lost wages, lost benefits, lost employment status, as 

well as humiliation, pain and suffering and other monetary and non-monetary losses. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests a judgment in his favor and against Defendant for his

actual and compensatory damages, including, but not limited to, front pay, back pay, and emotional 

distress damages, as well as his costs and attorneys’ fees, declaratory and injunctive relief, and such 

other relief as is deemed proper by this Court.

COUNT II- DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN 

VIOLATION OF THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 

79. Plaintiff realleges and adopts the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 6, 

8 through 22, 25 through 33, 35 through 41, 43, and 45 through 73 of the Complaint as if fully set 

forth in this Count. 

80. The acts of Defendant, by and through its agents and employees, violated Plaintiff’s 

rights against disability discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act, Chapter 760, Florida 

Statutes. 

81. The discrimination to which Plaintiff was subjected was based on his disability, or 

Defendant’s perception that Plaintiff was disabled.

82. Defendant unlawfully terminated Plaintiff based on his medical condition and 
disability, and/or perceived disability.

83. Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of Defendant’s illegal conduct toward 

him.

84. The conduct of Defendant was so willful, wanton, and in reckless disregard of the 

statutory rights of Plaintiff, as to entitle him to an award of punitive damages against Defendant, 

in order to deter it, and others, from such conduct in the future. 

85. Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses 

pursuant to Section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests a judgment in his favor and against Defendant for his 

actual and compensatory damages, including, but not limited to, front pay, back pay, emotional 

distress damages, and punitive damages, as well as his costs and attorneys’ fees, declaratory and 

injunctive relief, and such other relief as is deemed proper by this Court. 

COUNT III – DISABILITY RETALIATION IN 

VIOLATION OF THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

86. Plaintiff realleges and adopts the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 6, 

8 through 22, 25 through 33, 35 through 41, 43, and 45 through 73 of the Complaint as if fully set 

forth in this Count. 

87. Plaintiff was terminated within close temporal proximity of his objection to 

Defendant that he felt he was being discriminated against based on his disability. 

88. Plaintiff’s objections constituted protected activity under the FCRA.

89. Plaintiff was terminated as a direct result of his objections to what he reasonably 

believed to be disability discrimination.

90. Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s illegal conduct, and his termination, are 

causally related.
91. Defendant’s stated reasons for Plaintiff’s termination are a pretext.

92. The conduct of Defendant and its agents and employees proximately, directly, and 

foreseeably injured Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, lost wages and benefits, future pecuniary 

losses, emotional pain and suffering, humiliation, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of 

enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses.

93. The conduct of Defendant was so willful and wanton, and in such reckless disregard 

of the statutory rights of Plaintiff, as to entitle him to an award of punitive damages against 

Defendant, to deter it and others from such conduct in the future.

94. Plaintiff is entitled to recover his reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses 

pursuant to Section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes.

95. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law for the actions of 

Defendant which have caused, and continue to cause, irreparable harm.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests a judgment in his favor and against Defendant for his 

actual and compensatory damages, including, but not limited to, front pay, back pay, emotional 

distress damages, and punitive damages, as well as his costs and attorneys’ fees, declaratory and 

injunctive relief, and such other relief as is deemed proper by this Court.

COUNT IV – DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN 

VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

96. Plaintiff realleges and adopts the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 6, 

8 through 22, 25 through 33, 35 through 41, 43, and 45 through 73 of the Complaint as if fully set 

forth in this Count. 

97. The acts of Defendant, by and through its agents and employees, violated Plaintiff’s 

rights against disability discrimination under the ADA.
98. The discrimination to which Plaintiff was subjected was based on his disability 

and/or perceived disability.

99. Defendant unlawfully terminated Plaintiff based on his medical condition and 

disability, and/or perceived disability.

100. Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct towards 

him.

101. The conduct of Defendant was so willful, wanton, and in reckless disregard of the 

statutory rights of Plaintiff, as to entitle him to an award of punitive damages against Defendant, 

in order to deter it, and others, from such conduct in the future.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests a judgment in his favor and against Defendant for his 

actual and compensatory damages, including, but not limited to, front pay, back pay, emotional 

distress damages, and punitive damages, as well as his costs and attorneys’ fees, declaratory and 

injunctive relief, and such other relief as is deemed proper by this Court. 

COUNT V – DISABILITY RETALIATION IN 

VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

102. Plaintiff realleges and adopts the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 6, 

8 through 22, 25 through 33, 35 through 41, 43, and 45 through 73 of the Complaint as if fully set 

forth in this Count. 

103. Plaintiff was terminated within close temporal proximity of his objection to 

Defendant that he felt he was being discriminated against based on his disability.

104. Plaintiff’s objections constituted protected activity under the ADA.

105. Plaintiff was terminated as a direct result of his objections to what he reasonably 

believed to be disability discrimination.
106. Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s illegal conduct, and his termination, are 

causally related.

107. Defendant’s stated reasons for Plaintiff’s termination are a pretext.

108. The conduct of Defendant and its agents and employees proximately, directly, and 

foreseeably injured Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, lost wages and benefits, future pecuniary 

losses, emotional pain and suffering, humiliation, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of 

enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses.

109. The conduct of Defendant was so willful and wanton, and in such reckless disregard 

of the statutory rights of Plaintiff, as to entitle him to an award of punitive damages against 

Defendant, to deter it and others from such conduct in the future.

110. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, or complete remedy at law for the actions of 

Defendant which have caused, and continue to cause, irreparable harm.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests a judgment in his favor and against Defendant for his 

actual and compensatory damages, including, but not limited to, front pay, back pay, emotional 

distress damages, and punitive damages, as well as his costs and attorneys’ fees, declaratory and 

injunctive relief, and such other relief as is deemed proper by this Court.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated this 25th day of March, 2020.

 Respectfully Submitted,

By: /s/ Noah E. Storch

Noah E. Storch, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 0085476

RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A.

10368 W. State Rd. 84 Suite 103
Davie, FL 33324

Telephone: (866) 344-9243

Facsimile: (954) 337-2771

E-mail: noah@floridaovertimelawyer.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff