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STRATEGIC FORUM

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NUMBER 8, SEPTEMBER 1994

The United States, NATO and the European Union •

A New Trans-Atlantic Relationship?

Workshop Conclusions which would give NATO and WEU a deployable

military capability. The French are delaying

European-U.S. relations are evolving CJTF concept development.

toward a more balanced partnership because

Europe is growing increasingly stronger, more Background . -

integrated, and more independent. The United

States, while no less committed to Europe, is now Extending European Integration to the Security Arena

taking a broader approach to its global

responsibilities. The 1991 Treaty on European Union

• The United States wants the concept of a (Maastricht) extends European integration beyond

"European Security and Defense Identity" (ESDI) the economic arena, to political, social and

implemented in such a way that it neither security integration. Yet there are mixed views on

duplicates NATO nor threatens to dismantle or the true pace and eventual depth of integration.

replace the alliance. The treaty created two new "pillars" of

* U.S. military presence in Europe remains European integration-Cooperation on Justice and

crucial. Europeans want unambiguous indications Home Affairs, and the Common Foreign and

of U.S. commitment and firm political leadership, Security Policy (CFSP). Together, with the old

but Europeans will have to accept a continuing European Community, these mechanisms comU.S. commitment that is not measured solely by prise the new European Union (EU).

the level of U.S. forces in Europe. Another product of the Maastricht Summit

* ESDI and the future U.S. role in Europe's was the decision to develop the WEU as both the

security will have to be forged into a new trans- defense component of the EU and as a means of

Atlantic relationship. NATO relations with the

Western European Union (WEU) will come to the strengthening the European pillar of NATO.

fore of U.S.-European relations, beginning with European Union leaders have charged the WEU

the Fall 1994 ministerial meetings. with developing a Common Defense Policy (CDP).

- Key to the new relationship will be NATO's The EU's CFSP and the WEU's CDP will most

Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) initiative, directly influence security relations between

About the Workshop

The Workshop focused on the future of the transThe Institute for National Strategic Studies and Atlantic relationship as well as NATO's new

the Research Institute for International Affairs of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. This

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik met during the STRATEGIC FolaUM addresses the future of the transsummer of 1994 to examine the nature and direction Atlantic relationship. For a discussion of PFP see

of trans-Atlantic relations in the post-Cold War era. STRAEMC FORUM # 1-94.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the author and do not

necesearily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of

Defense, or any other government agency.
PAGE 2 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES SrRATEGIC FORWM #8, SEPTEMBER 1994

Vaurope and the United States, both inside NATO defense budgets and forces are being significantly

and bilaterally. CFSP is intended to address all cut. Europe's military capabilities outside of

matters related to EU security. The development NATO will be very limited for a long time.

of a CDP could ultimately lead ti a common The challenge is that ESDI and U.S. involveEuropean defense capability. ment in Europe's security now have to be forged

Workshop participants noted that the security into a new, more balanced relationship. As a

character of Europe will be affected not only by result, NATO-WEU relations will likely come to

the deepening of cooperation and integration in the fore of U.S.-European relations and be a major

Western Europe, but also by the widening of topic of the fall 1994 ministerial meetings.

membership in the EU and WEU. By 1995 the EU

may gain as many as four new members, and as The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Initiative

many as four of the sixteen EU members would be

from traditionally neutral nations. The admission NATO Summit leaders called for development

of Finland would give the EU a long, open border of a concept for one or more CJTFs that can be

with Russia and the Commonwealth of used presumably for out-of-area operations by

Independent States (CIS). The WEU has NATO, or, under certain circumstances, by the

expanded so that virtually every other Council WEU. These could involve Western and nonmeeting will seat not only the nine members, but NATO forces of states who have joined NATO's

representatives from fifteen other states. Partnership for Peace Program. NATO's offer to

provide a CJTF headquarters and the requisite

The "European Security and Defense Identity" (ESDI) Concept NATO and U.S. resources to the WEU for agreed

operations provides the means by which ESDI can

ESDI is an intentionally vague concept become a reality in the near term, if only on a

reflecting the intent of NATO's European limited and semi-independent basis.

members to develop a collective identity in A CJTF is anticipated to mean a multiservice,

security and defense matters. ESDI is intended to multinational task force capable of rapid deploynot only reflect the importance of NATO but to ment to conduct limited-duration peace operations

also provide a separate identity complementary to beyond NATO's borders, under the control of

national defense policies. The growing European either NATO or the WEU. Under CJTF, the WEU

desire for ESDI is evidenced by the WEU's re- could have access to U.S. capabilities that are

awakening in 1987, the decisions at Maastricht in critical to the success of out-of-area operations.

1991, and the inauguration of the EuroCorps in

1992. ESDI has built up steam in recent years, Europeans in recent years appear to

despite Europe's problems on monetary have less confidence in the credibility of

integration and the early EC reactions to Bosnia.

In addition to its impact on the U.S. role in the U.S. commitment to Europe's

Europe, ESDI will deeply impact EU cohesion. security.

Common security and defense policies will require

a more effective EU. Workshop participants felt While the CJTF concept remains on the

that the next test of Europe's commitment to drawing board, comments by workshop

ESDI would come with the EU inter-governmental participants reinforced the conclusion that both

conference in 1996, which is to encompass a full West and East European support is generally

review of EU security and defense policies, strong. France, however, is expected to delay on

At the January 1994 NATO Summit, the CJTF issues while President Mitterrand, is in

United States and others accepted Europe's goal power and hope is dimming in NATO for

of establishing ESDI both within NATO and agreement before mid-1995. Although the French

separable from NATO. This represented a recognize the need for U.S. involvement in

reversal from earlier U.S. demarches because the European security, U.S.-French convergence on

United States had now acquiesed in Europe's issues such as CJTF will continue to work better

desire to bear more responsibility for response to in practice than in theory.

regional crisis. The WEU did not join in developing NATO's

European participants agreed that ESDI must initial CJTF concepts due to French concerns that

not be oversold. It is being forged at a time when CJTF might force them too close to NATO's
STFrTEC FORUM #8, SEPTEMBER 1994 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES PAGE 3

integrated military structure. Nevertheless, WEU Europeans were dismayed that some members

and NATO have finally begun to collaborate, of Congress have re-opened the debate on

Early indications are that the WEU plans on burdensharing while Washington is making major

a CJTF smaller than NATO's, employed in low reductions in Europe. The recent Frank-Shays

intensity scenarios such as humanitarian assist- Amendment, which did not survive in the Houseance and traditional peacekeeping. The CJTF Senate Conference Committee, would have

concept will benefit from rigorous doctrinal required that the U.S. military presence in Europe

development. CJTF has the potential to emerge as be reduced proportionally if the Europeans do not

the best way to handle crises and to avoid lapsing pay most of the stationing cost.

into repeated "ad hoc-ery" as crises arise. European participants pointed out, strongly at

times, that there are major differences between

The U.S. Commitment to Europe Europe and the Japan model on which the

Amendment was based. Among the differences

Europeans in recent years appear to have less noted were the European's majority contribution

confidence in the credibility of the U.S. to NATO infrastructure funds, the larger forces

commitment to Europe's security. This may have maintained by major European states, and the

been exacerbated by a series of successively active roles they played in operations beyond

lowered U.S. force levels in Europe, which have NATO such as in the Gulf War and the former

often been accompanied by rancorous debate in Yugoslavia.

Washington and have been revised even further Several U.S. analysts foresaw a reasonable

downward before reductions were completed. likelihood that only a small, symbolic U.S.

A U.S. force of approximately 100,000 will military presence will remain in Europe by the

provide an Army corps headquarters, portions of end of the decade. Yet U.S. forces in Europe are

the corps' support troops and 2 two-brigade shifting from a focus on deterrence to being

divisions of ground troops; 2.3 wing equivalents of heavily engaged in support of operations outside

air power; naval support forces ashore; and an of the NATO area. U.S. political polls indicate the

adequate array of bases and logistical assets for country remains torn between the burdens of

reconstitution of a larger force should it be world leadership and the promise of isolationism.

required. Some Europeans seem to be shifting their

focus from the numbers of U.S. troops to some

other indication (preferably in the form of hard

Europeans at the workshop were evidence) of a commitment to Europe's security.

dismayed that members of Congress Europeans in West Europe view U.S. military

have re-opened the debate on presence as crucial. Central and East Europeans

burdensharing... see U.S. presence as vital, and more important

than their joining NATO.

Many participants expressed a desire for Institutional Relationships and Policy Directions

greater U.S. political leadership toward directing

NATO to prevent crises, believing the United In discussing regional roles and relationships

States has a responsibility to do so. NATO would of the UN, CSCE, NATO and WEU, some

benefit from innovative policies as well as participants envisaged a framework for dealing

practical techniques, such as computer links and with crises that involved UN negotiations, CSCE

more integrated analytical capabilities, fact finding, and NATO to carry out UN/CSCE

The circumstances in which the United States requests for peace operations. When direct U.S.

will act militarily in a European crisis pose a involvement was not appropriate, the WEU, using

continuing question, as does the issue of when the a CJTF, might carry out peace operations.

Europeans will act militarily. Except for the case Discussants also addressed the idea of

of an attack on a member state of NATO, both the establishing a steering group comprised of larger

United States and the Europeans are likely to states to take the lead in developing approaches

follow strategies of selective engagement, where and solutions to important security issues. Many

the criteria for action are not determined in believed a steering group would be essential for

advance and full consensus is less certain, timely, effective development of policy direction.
PAGE 4 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES STRATEGIC FORUM #8, SEPTEMBER 1994

Policy Recommendations quate multinational cadre of commanders and

staffs familiar with and experienced in NATO

Discussions in the workshop suggest the operations and procedures.

following policy recommendations: • The Administration should rebuild public

- U.S. and European allies should articulate a support for the U.S. commitment to collective

vision of European security that clarifies the defense with Europe, including the nuclear

complementary roles and relationships of multi- guarantee, by making the case to Congress and

national institutions. the American people that the commitment in

* The United States should work with the EU Europe is in our own national interest.

and WEU to harmonize ESDI as a complement * As European security institutions grow more

to NATO. At some point, a U.S. liaison officer complex, the pros and cons of establishing a

might be provided to the WEU planning staff to steering group of larger states to develop policy

help plan for U.S. assets in support of CJTF's proposals for and coordinate the activities of

operating under the WEU. these institutions should be examined.

* The U.S. and NATO allies should encourage For more information contact LTC Charles L Barry, Institute

the rapid development of CJTF as NATO's for National Strategic Studies.

mainstay military option for crisis response. (202) 287-9210 ext 540 Fax (202) 287-9239

Regular CJTF exercises would provide an ade- Internet: BARRYC@NDU.EDU

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