* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-30271

Summary Calendar

MAURICE EASTERLY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BROCKHOEFT’S CHEVROLET, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

(95-CA-1997)

October 13, 1997

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Maurice Easterly appeals an adverse judgment on the pleadings on his Title VII 12

claim against his employer, Brockhoeft’s Chevrolet, Inc., and the denial of his request

to amend his complaint. For the reasons assigned, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Easterly alleges that he was discriminated against because of his se x when he

was terminated on March 15, 1994. Easterly claims that he was terminated because

Ronald Brockhoeft, the owner of Brockhoeft Chevrolet, believed th at Easterly was

having an affair with his daughter, Roxanne Brockhoeft. Easterly alleges that he was

pursued by Roxanne Br ockhoeft, but discouraged a relationship, informing Roxanne

that he had a girlfriend.

Easterly filed suit on December 13, 1995. On March 21, 1996 a scheduling

conference was held at which the deadline for adding new claims was set for April 30,

1996. Easterly did not move timely to amend his complaint and on May 10, 1996

Brockhoeft Chevrolet filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Finding that

Easterly’s complaint failed to state a sex discrimination or a sexual harassment claim

under Title VII, the magistrate judge, trying the matter by consent, entered judgment

in favor of Brockhoeft Chevrolet.

Easterly filed a pleading entitled Motion to Reconsider or in the Alternative

Motion to Amend Judgment, urging that his complaint be deemed sufficient to state a

sexual harassment c laim or that he be allowed to amend his complaint to add more2 Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace , 954 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1992).

3 Id.

4 Baker v. Putnal , 75 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1996).

5 Rourke v. Thompson , 11 F.3d 47 (5th Cir. 1993).

3 specific allegations. The trial judge denied the motion, finding that Easterly had failed

to submit a proposed amended complaint upon which a proper determination could be

made.

ANALYSIS

We review de novo the dismissal on the pleadings, accepting as true the

complaint’s well pleaded factual allegations. 2 Dismissal is not appropriate unless it

appears from the pleadings that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts warranting relief. 3

After reviewing the record, briefs, and applicable law, we are persuaded by and adopt

as our own the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge in the Ruling and Order

dated January 6, 1997 entering judgment in favor of Brockhoeft Chevrolet.

The standard by which we review the second issue raised on appeal, the trial

court’s denial of the request to amend the complaint, is abuse of discret ion. 4 When

judgment has been entered on the pleadings, as in the case at bar, the standards detailed

in Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply. 5 Although that rule favors

the granting of leave to amend, we have stated that “leave to amend under Rule 15 is6 Southern Constructors Group v. Dynalectric Co. , 2 F.3d 606, 612 (5th Cir. 1993).

4 by no means automatic, and we have affirmed denials when the moving party engaged

in undue delay or attempted to presen t theories of recovery seriatim to the district

court.” 6 Considering Easterly’s failure to state the specific allegations he would add

to his Title VII claim which would support relief and provide the court with a basis on

which to determine if the amendment would be futile, his failure to amend his complaint

within the scheduling order deadline, and the imminence of the trial date, we, perforce,

must conclude that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the magistrate judge

in denying Easterly’s alternative motion.

The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.