This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 1 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 2 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 3 deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 4 filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 PETER BREEN, 7 Plaintiff-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 29,849 9 STATE OF NEW MEXICO TAXATION 10 AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, 11 Defendant-Appellee. 12

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 13 James A. Hall, District Judge 14 Peter Breen 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 Pro Se Appellant 17 Law Office of Michael Dickman 18 Michael Dickman 19 Santa Fe, NM 20 for Appellee 21

MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 232 Plaintiff appeals pro se from an order dismissing Defendants’ counterclaim and 1 allowing Defendants to seek post-trial sancti ons. We proposed to dismiss for lack of 2 a sufficiently final order, and Plainti ff has filed a timely memorandum in opposition. 3 Remaining unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s memorandum, we dismiss the appeal for lack 4 of a sufficiently final order. 5 As discussed more fully in our previous notice, the right to appeal is usually 6 restricted to final judgments and decisions. See NMSA 1978, § 39-3-2 (1966); Kelly 7 Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison , 113 N.M. 231, 234-40, 824 P.2d 1033, 1036-42 (1992). 8 “For purposes of appeal, an order or judgmen t is not considered final unless all issues 9 of law and fact have been determined and th e case disposed of by th e trial court to the 10 fullest extent possible.” B.L. Goldberg & Assocs . Inc. v. Uptown, Inc. , 103 N.M. 277, 11 278, 705 P.2d 683, 684 (1985). Whether an or der is final, such that appeal is 12 statutorily authorized, is a jurisdictional que stion that this Court is required to raise 13 on its own motion. Khalsa v. Levinson , 1998-NMCA-110, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 680, 964 14 P.2d 844. 15 In our notice of proposed summary disposition we proposed to dismiss 16 Plaintiff’s appeal because the order which is the subject of the appeal only dismisses 17 Defendants’ counterclaim while all of Plai ntiff’s claims against Defendants are still 18 pending. [RP 246] We also noted that there were ongoing discovery issues pending 193 possible trial on the merits. [ See generally RP 260-283] Finally, we observed that the 1 order being appealed allows Defendants to file a motion for sanctions after trial but 2 makes no findings whatsoever as to wh ether Defendants will be entitled to any 3 sanctions at that time. [RP 246] 4 In our notice, we also proposed to reject Plaintiff’s assertion that the matter is 5 appropriate for interlocutory review pursuan t to Subsection C of New Mexico’s “Anti 6 SLAPP” (“Strategic Lawsuit Against Pub lic Participation”) statute found at NMSA 7 1978, § 38-2-9.1 (2001). See § 38-2-9.1(C) (allowing expedited appeal from “a trial 8 court order on the special motions described in Subsection B of this section or from 9 a trial court's failure to rule on the moti on on an expedited basi s”). We proposed to 10 reject Plaintiff’s assertion because to whatever extent Defendants’ counterclaim could 11 be considered a SLAPP suit as addressed inSection 38-2-9.1(A), Plaintiff received the 12 relief requested because the countercl aim was dismissed. [DS 4] See § 38-2-9.1 (A) 13 (stating that actions seeking money damages “against a pers on for conduct or speech 14 undertaken or made in connection with a public hearing or public meeting in a 15 quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of any political 16 subdivision of the state” are subject to speci al motions to dismiss, for judgment on the 17 pleadings, and motions for summary judgmen t and “shall be considered by the court 18 on a priority or expedited basis”). 194 In his memorandum in opposition, Plain tiff contends that he is entitled to 1 interlocutory appeal because the district court’s order failed to dismiss Defendants’ 2 SLAPP suit but merely convertedit to a motion for sanctions . [MIO 8-9] He argues 3 that Defendants’ counterclaim against him fo r statements made in the administrative 4 claims with the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC “) and 5 the New Mexico Human Rights Division (“HR D”) squarely fall in the ambit of the 6 Anti-SLAPP statute. [MIO 6] He then strenuously argues that the policy behind the 7 Anti-SLAPP statute requires that interlocutory review be available as a matter of right 8 to a SLAPP suit defendant such as himself. [MIO 4-8] We are unpersuaded because 9 Defendants’ counterclaim did not seek to recover against Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s 10 actions before the HRD or in any other “quasi-judicial proceeding.” Section 38-2- 11 9.1(A). 12 Section 38-2-9.1(A) is directed at laws uits filed “against a person for conduct 13 or speech undertaken or made in connecti on with a public hearing or public meeting 14 in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of any 15 political subdivision of the state.” More over, “public meeting in a quasi-judicial 16 proceeding” is defined as including “any meeting established and held by a state or 17 local governmental entity, including without limitations, meetings or presentations 18 before state, city, town or village c ouncils, planning commissions, review boards or 195 commissions.” Section 38-2-9.1(D). 16 Contrary to Plaintiff’s contentions, Defendants did not sue him “for the cost of 1 defending an administrative complaint madeto the [HRD] and the [EEOC].” [MIO 2 1] Review of Defendant’s counterclaim es tablishes that Defendants never sought to 3 recover their costs or attorney fees incurre d in appearing before the HRD or any other 4 “quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal . . . of any political subdivision.” Section 5 38-2-9.(A). [RP 73-78] Instead, they only sought to recover costs incurred in 6 defending the allegedly frivolous lawsuit filed by Plaintiff in district court. [RP 77 ¶ 7 17] 8 As Defendants’ allegations do not fall within the parame ters of Section 38-2-9.1 9 (A), we are not convinced that Plaintiff ha s a right to interlocutory review of the 10 district court’s order dismissing the counter claim yet allowing Defendants to move for 11 sanctions after trial. 12 Finally, in light of our determination that Defendants’ c ounterclaim never fell 13 within the provisions of Section 38-2-9.1( A), we decline to consider Plaintiff’s 14 citations to out-of-state authority to s upport his contention that he was entitled to 15 either outright dismissal of Defendants’ counterclaim or judgment with prejudice 16 instead of reformation of the counterclaim into a request for sanctions. [MIO 9-13] 17 Therefore, for the reasons discussed more fully in our notice of proposed 18 summary disposition, we dismiss Plaintiff’s appeal because it is not sufficiently final 197 and it is not appropriate for interlocutory review because Defendants’ counterclaim 1 does not implicate the provisions of Secti on 38-2-9.1. Based upon lack of finality, we 2 also decline to consider the merits of Plai ntiff’s contention that the district court’s 3 order is infirm because Defendants’ atto rneys lack authority to prosecute the 4 counterclaim or to defend the lawsuit. [MIO 13-14; DS 9; RP 246] 5 Conclusion 6 For the reasons set forth herein and inour previous notice, we dismiss the 7 appeal for lack of a sufficiently final order. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10

11 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 12 WE CONCUR: 13

14 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge 15

16 ROBERT E. ROBLES, Judge 178