The plaintiff c oncede s that the proper defe ndant in this action is the custodian of the 1 rec ords soug ht, the Bur eau of Prisons, and does not object to the substitution of the BOP for the United States of Amer ica. SeePl.’s Opp’n to Def.’ s Mot. for Summ. J . at 1. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

____________________________________) NO AH M OORE, ) ) P la in t if f, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 08-223 (EG S) ) UN ITED STA TES, ) ) Defendan t. ) ____________________________________) M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Pla int if f N oa h M oo re fi le d th is pro se complaint, alleg ing that the Bur eau of Prisons 1 (“B OP”) is not entitled to withhold certain re cords he reque sted under the Fr eedom of Information Ac t (“F OIA”) , 5 U.S.C. § 552. See Compl. ¶¶ 1-3. The B OP has filed an a g ency decla ration and a

motion for summary

judgme nt, which Moore ha s opposed. B eca use there is no g enuine issue of

materia l fac t and the B OP is entitl ed to judg ment as a matter of law , the defe ndant’s motion will be gr anted. BACK GR OUND After servingmore than ha lf of his 235-month prison term for traff ickingin coca ine, Moore wa s convicted of

traff ickingin heroin fr om prison and was se ntence d to an additional 200 months of imprisonment, to run consecutively to his sentence f

or coc aine tra fficking
. SeeDef .’s Mot. for Summ. J . (“MSJ ”), Ex. 1. Some of the evidenc e used to c onvict Moore in his trial on the her oin char g es wa s obtained fr om inmate telephone monitoringrepor ts (“I TMR”) thatTh e pa rt ie s u se va

ri ou s te rm s to re fe r t o th e I TM Rs. Th e pla int if f a pp e nd s I TM Rs t o 2 his complaint in conjunction with a statement by a cour t about telephone “ logs.” See Com pl. at 2 n . 1 (qu o t i n g Mays v . DEA, 234 F.3d 1324 ( D.C. Cir. 2000) and citingexhibi ts). The plaintiff also ref ers to I TMRs by

the terms “te lephone c all monitoring log s,” Compl. ¶ 1, and “te lephone call monitoring log r eports,” MSJ Ex . 6 (re fer ringto Poli cy

[si c] St atement 1380.05) . The defe ndant re fer s to the I TMRs by the terms “te lephone c all monitoring re ports,” id. Ex . 3, “telephone monitoring log s,” id. Exs. 5, 8, “ te le ph on e log s, ” Re ply at 2, 6, and

“ Inmate Telephone Monitoring Repor ts,” id. at 3, 4, 5. At one, a nd only one, point in this l itigation, the plaintiff implies a distinction between I TMRs and “telephone logs.” See Opp’n at 3 (“The seg reg ability

of the inmate te lephone monitoringrepor ts is not even an issue bec ause pla intiff does not reque st them. I nstead, plaintiff r equests to see the telephone logs, of which a great sum of them had a lrea dy

been disc losed duringplaintiff’s trial.” ) B eca use the notion of a distinction betwee n a “te lephone log ” and a n I TMR is undermined by the fa ct that the complaint appe nds I TMRs and not something diff ere nt, the fac t that the parties have not otherw ise indicated that there is a diffe renc e betwe en a te lephone logand an I TMR, and that some of the r efe renc es by the plaintiff spec ifically

cite the Prog ram Statement Numbe r of the I TMRs, seeMSJ Ex . 6, the Court proce eds her e on the a ssumption t hat the plaintiff’ s FOIA re quest was f or information memorialized in the I TMRs. Moore a lso sought other information, which is not at issue in this civil action. SeeMSJ 3 Ex . 3. -2- m em o ri al i z edM o o re ’s t el ep h o n e c o n v er s at i o n s wi tho th er s i nth e p er i o d fr o m2 0 0 0 th ro u gh 2002. Id., Ex. 6 ; see also Compl., Ex . A-1, A- 3, A-4, A- 6 (I TMRs). I TMRs are c reated as pa rt 2 of the B OP’s ong oing sur veillance of inmates to guard a g ainst illega l activity , amongother things. See MSJ at 7 (quoting60 Fe d. Reg . 19,958 (1995)) (statingthe four pur poses of the Telephone Activity

Record Sy stem). Throug h a F OIA re quest submitted in Februa ry 2007, Moore soug ht I TMRs for telephone calls made betwee n J anuar y 2003 and September

2003. Compl. ¶ 1. A searc h located 66

3
re sp on siv e I TM Rs, e a c h o f whic h w a s w ithhe ld i n f ull . M oo re a

pp e a le d th e de c isi on . M SJ Ex . 6. On appe al, the dec ision was aff irmed on the g rounds that the information was exempt from mandatory

disclosure unde r the Privac y Act by operation of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2) a nd 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(e) , and that the infor mation was exempt from disclosure unde r F I OA exemptions-3-

codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) a nd (b)( 7)(C). Id. Ex . 8. Moore’ s reque st for re consideration
wa s uns uc c e ssf

ul, a nd he br ou g ht t

his c ivi l a c tio n, se e kin g“ te le ph on e c a ll m on ito ri nglogre po rt s from January

2003 to September 2003.” Compl. ¶ 1. Moore disputes that the re cords a re e x empt fr om m and ator

y dis c los ur e un de r t

he Pr iva c y

Ac t. O pp ’n

at 3. He a lso c on te nd s th at th e B OP i s not entitled to withhold t he re quested doc uments beca use others like the m were disclosed during his criminal trial. Id. at 2. I t is not entirely clea r whe ther Moore has aba

ndoned the a

rgument that he pre sented in his complaint, that FOIA exemption (b)(7)( C) does not justify withholding the information bec ause Moor e’s inter est outweig hs any third-par ty interest in privac y , as it is not mentioned in his oppositi on. See ge nerally, id. Moore doe s not dispute that the searc h was
rea sonable or that the rec ords ar e exempt from disclosure unde r F OIA exemption (b)(2). See generally, id. DI SCU SSIO N Summary jud g me nt m ay

be g ra nte d o nly wh e re the “ ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to interrog atories, a

nd admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue of

materia l fac t and the movingparty is entitled to judgment as a matter of la

w.” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ); Burke v . Gould, 286 F.3d 513, 517 ( D.C. Cir. 2002). A mater ial fac t is one that is capa

ble of a ffe ctingthe outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 47 7 U .S. 24 2, 24 8 ( 19 86 ). A g e nu ine iss ue is o ne wh e re the “ e vid e nc e is s uc h th at a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld return a verdic t for the nonmovingparty ,” id., as opposed to evide nce that “is so one-sided that one par ty must prevail as a

matter of la

w.” Id. at 252. A cour

t consideringa motion for summary judgme nt must draw all “justifiable infe renc es” f rom the evide nce in f

avor of the nonmovant. Id. at 255.-4-

In a F OIA suit, an ag ency is entitled to summ ary

judgme nt once it bea

rs its burden of demonstratingthat no materia l fac ts are in dispute a nd that all information re sponsive to the reque st either has be en produc ed, is unidentifiable, or is ex empt from disclosure
. Stu de nts Against Genocide v . Dep’ t of State, 25 7 F .3 d 8 28 , 8 33 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 1) ; W eisberg v. D ep’t of Justice, 6 2 7 F
. 2 d

3 6 5 , 3 6 8 ( D
. C
. C i r . 1 9 8 0 )
. A c o urtm ay aw ar d s u m m ar y j u d g m e n tt o a

F O IA defe ndant solely

on the basis of infor

mation provided by

the depa rtment or ag ency

in sworn statements with rea sonably specific detail that justify the nondisclosures, de monstrate that the information withheld log ically falls within the claimed e x emption, and ar e not controve rted by either c ontrary

evidenc e in the re cord nor by evidenc e of a g ency

bad fa ith. Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 ( D.C. Cir.1981). To succe ssfully challeng e such a

showing by

the defe ndant ag ency , the plaintiff par ty must do more than mere ly establish some “meta

phy sical doubt;” rathe r, the plaintiff must come f orwa rd with “spec ific fa cts” de monstrating a g enuine issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). Her e, the B OP has filed a sw orn statement attesting that the r ecor ds Moore re quested a re exempt from mandatory

disclosure unde r the Privac y Act. SeeMSJ , Ex . 2, Affidavit of Christine Gre ene, Ma

r. 21, 2008, ¶ 13. The ag ency further attested that pursa

unt to the FOIA, a se arc h of B OP r e c or ds re ve a le d a

tot a l of 66 re sp on siv e do c ume nts , a ll o f whic h w e re be ingwi thh e ld
un de r F OIA e xemp tio ns (b )( 2) and (b )( 7) (C ), and

tha t no ne of the inf or matio n w a s r e a so na

bly seg reg able. Id. ¶ 6, 9, 10, 15, 16, 19, 21. Moore does not identify any issue with the adequa cy

of the B OP’ s se arc h, its de te rm inatio n to wi thh old inf or matio n und e r F OIA e xemp tio n ( b) (2 ), or its deter mination that no information could rea sonably be segreg ated. See ge ne ra lly , Opp’n (not-5-

c ha lle ng ingthe se arc h o r t he (b )( 2) e xemp tio ns ); see id. at 3 (statingthat the “se g reg ability of the inmate telepohne monitoring re ports is not even an issue” ). Moore c halleng es the B OP’s asser tion that the rec ords ar e exempt from mandator y dis c los ur e un de r P ri va c y

Ac t. H e c on c e de s th at se c tio n ( j) (2 ) a llo ws an a g e nc y

to e xemp t c e rt a in sy stems of rec ords that ar e maintained f or law e nforc ement purpose s, but argues that the (j) (2) exemption does not apply , stating that he“f ails to see how his re quest for me re te lephone log s has any thing to do with . . . illeg al ac tiviti es or suspec ted illeg al ac tiviti es beingconducte d, coordinated or dire cted f

rom within a Fe dera l corre ctional institut ion.” Opp’n at 3. Moore’s failure to see the c onnection does not a lter what must be the conclusion base d on the law. The re is no doubt that the BOP’s Te lephone Ac tivity Record Sy stem has bee n exempted from the mandatory

disclosure provisions of the Privac y Act. See 5 U .S. C. § 55 2a (j )( 2) and 28 C.F .R. § 16.97(e) (expressly

exempting the B OP’s Telephone Activity Record Sy stem). Moreove r, Mo or e ’s state me nt c ann ot b e c re dit e d a s g e nu ine , b e c a us e his or ig ina lly

state d inte re st i n th e se
re c or ds ste mme d f

ro m th e us e of

I TM Rs a g a ins t hi m in

his c ri min a l tr ia l f

or pa rt ic ipatin gin heroin tra ffickingfrom within a F eder al cor rec tional insti tution. SeeC o mp l
. ¶ 6 (a l l egi n g a
connec tion between the documents re quested a nd Moore’ s criminal sentenc e to 200 months of imprisonment). F OIA e xemp tio n ( b) (7 )( C) e xemp ts “ rec ords or infor mation compiled for law enfor ceme nt purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enfor ceme nt rec ords or information . . . could rea sonably be expected to c onstitut e an unw arr anted invasion of persona l privacy .” § 552(b) (7)( C). In order to properly

withhold materials under this ex emption, the def endingag ency

must establish both (1) that the information re quested wa s compiled for la w-6-

enfor ceme nt purposes and ( 2) that its disclosure would involve an unw arr anted invasion of a third party ' s privacy
. Pratt v. W ebster, 67 3 F .2 d 4 08 , 4 13 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 2) . A s a lr e a dy no te d, it is bey ond serious debate that the re cords at issue are compiled, in part, for law enf orce ment purposes. Moore makes a waiver argument, asser

ting that the B OP is not entit led to claim the (b)( 7)(C) e x emption as to the reque sted I TMRs because “similar ones” had “a lrea dy been dis c los e d at hi s tr ia l,” Op p’ n at 3, and the re c or ds he no w r e qu e sts we re pr e vio us ly “ sim ply discovera ble,” id. at 2. Moore’ s relianc e on this waiver argument is mispl ace d. When exempt information has be en re lease d such that there is a perma nent public re cord of

that information, the exemption is no longe r ef fec tive. Davis v. U

.S. Dep’ t of Justice, 96 8 F .2 d 1 27 6, 12 80 (D .C. Cir. 1991). Howe ver, Moor e has not shown that ther e is a pe rmane nt public rec ord of the information he ha s reque sted. Instead, what Moore see ks is recor ds that have not yet bee n dis c los e d —

the “ re st o f t

he te le ph on e log s” — o f t he same or

“ sim ila r” ty pe , n ot t he same
re c or ds that w e re pr e vio us ly re le a se d f

or us e at hi s c ri min a l tr ia l. O pp ’n at 3, 4. B e c a

us e the re is no perma nent public re cord of

the information Moore seeks, the e x emption is sti ll effe ctive if the ag ency can show , as it has her e, that the mate rial fa lls withi n the statutory exemption. Da v is, 968 F.2d at 1280. Moore’s a

rgument that the re cords he now see ks were subject to discover y de mand s in

his c ri min a l tr ia l ( se tti nga sid e any do ub ts a s to the a c c ur a c y of the pr e mis e ) i s equally ineffe ctive for

the same r easons. Now , it is i rre levant that the r ecor ds could have been publicly disclosed sometime in the past, bec ause the y wer e not, in fac t, publicly disclosed. In his complaint, Moore alleg ed that his “ne ed for these doc uments outweig hs any imag ined privac y

interest” that a third party may have be cause Moore’ s liberty is at stake. Compl. ¶ 6. The law doe s not support Moore’s position. Given the natur e of la w enf orce ment-7-

rec ords, the individual’s “pr ivacy interest at stake is substantial.” Sa fe Car d S e rv ., In c . v . S

.E.C. , 92 6 F .2 d 1 19 7, 12 05 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 1) . A n inva sio n o f t he ind ivi du a l’ s p ri va c y

int e re st i n (b )( 7) (C ) m ate ri a l is wa

rr ante d o nly

wh e n th at inte re st i s o utw e ig he d b y the pu bli c ’s int e re st i n disclosure. Un ite d S

tates D e p’ t of J us tic e v . R e

po rte rs C om m. for Fr e e do m o

f th e Pr ess, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989) (r equiringcourt to “ba lance the public intere st in disclosure ag ainst the int e re st C on g re ss i nte nd e d [F OIA e xemp tio n ( b) (7 )( C) ] to p ro te c t” ); Bec k v. D ep’t of Justice , 99 7 F .2 d 1 48 9, 14 91 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 3) . H e re , M oo re ha s n ot i de nti fi e d a pu bli c int e re st t o
su pp or t hi s r e qu e st; rathe r, he ide nti fi e s a pe rs on a l inte re st, his lib e rt y . Co mpl . ¶

6; see also MSJ Ex. 6 (s tatin ghis be lie f t

hat “ the re is the g re at po ssi bil ity that th e c on te nt o f t

he logre po rt

c ou ld ex[ o]norate this requeste r”) . The plaintiff’ s persona l interest is, no doubt, of para mount imp or tanc e to h im, but it

is i rr e le va

nt t o th e F OIA, wh ic h b y

law i s se ns iti ve on ly

to a pu bli c interest. Ac c or

d Na t’ l A ss’n o

f R e tir e d F

e d. Em plo y e es v . H or ne r, 879 F.2d 873, 879 ( D.C. Cir. 19 89 ) ( e qu atin ga

sh ow ingof

no pu bli c int e re st t o “ no thi ng ” wh e n b a lanc ingthe pu bli c int e re st in disclosure (b) (6) mate rial ag ainst the individual interest in privacy ). Ac cording ly , Moore’ s argument on this pointfails, as we ll. CO NC LU SION Be cause the submissions of the defenda nt demonstrate that no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sts and that it is entit led to judgme nt as a matter of law, a nd the plaintiff has not identified a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t, the defe ndant’s motion will be gr anted a nd judgme nt entere d for the def endant. A f

inal order acc ompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

/ s / EMMET G. SUL L I VAN Da t e: M ar ch 1 7 , 2 0 0 9 Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge