[J-23-2024]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

ELITE CARE, RX, LLC

v.

PREMIER COMP SOLUTIONS, LLC; 

LAUNDRY OWNERS' MUTUAL LIABILITY 

INSURANCE ASSOCIATION; UPMC 

BENEFIT MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. 

D/B/A UPMC WORK PARTNERS; 

LACKAWANNA CASUALTY COMPANY; 

AND BRICK STREET MUTUAL 

INSURANCE COMPANY

APPEAL OF: PREMIER COMP 

SOLUTIONS, LLC AND BRICK STREET 

MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

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No. 25 WAP 2023

Appeal from the Order of the 

Superior Court entered May 23, 

2023 at No. 1144 WDA 2020, 

affirming the Order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

entered June 5, 2020 at No. GD-19-

005312 and remanding.

ARGUED: April 9, 2024

OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY DECIDED: JULY 17, 2024

I agree with Justice Wecht’s well-reasoned opinion finding the panel below 

“misinterpreted Subsection 306(f.1)(5) [of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act), 77 

P.S. §531(5)] and created a state of affairs that plainly conflicts with the Act’s exclusive 

remedy provision.” Opinion in Support of Reversal at 14. Nevertheless, I would affirm 

the decision below and allow the civil action filed by Elite Care, RX, LLC to proceed based 

on the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 
[J-23-2024] - 2

The facts of this case are not in dispute.1 Appellant Insurers refused to make 

payments to Elite Care totaling $548,035.28 in prescriptions for 110 injured employees

on the basis that Elite Care was not a provider under the Act. Significantly, in a letter

dated March 16, 2018, an attorney from Premier Comp Solutions, LLC2told Elite Care 

that if it disagreed with Insurers’ decision, “its exclusive remedy is to file an Application 

for Fee Review with the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Bureau.” Complaint, 

4/9/2019, at Exhibit 1. “Based solely upon these . . . representations, and in an 

abundance of caution,” Elite Care attempted to confirm its provider status, and receive 

payment, by filing fee review petitions for each patient, as Insurers demanded. Id. at ¶30. 

But when some of those fee review determinations started to go in Elite Care’s favor, “[t]o 

Elite Care’s surprise, and in direct contrast to [Insurers’] prior representations, [Insurers] 

then appealed these decisions to a Hearing Officer and argued that the Fee Review 

process lacked jurisdiction over this issue of whether Elite Care was an agent of these 

Providers.” Id. at ¶32. “Those Hearing Officers authored Opinions and Orders finding 

that the Fee Review process lacked jurisdiction over this issue and specifically advising 

that Elite Care may wish to pursue other remedies, which may be available outside of the 

fee review process.” Id. at ¶33. Rather than appealing to the Commonwealth Court, Elite 

Care again did as instructed and filed the civil action at issue, seeking a declaration that 

it is a provider under the Act and also alleging fraud, civil conspiracy, and unjust 

enrichment. In response, Insurers filed preliminary objections, alleging, inter alia, the trial 

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Elite Care was required to seek payment 

1 As this appeal is from the trial court’s order overruling Insurers’ preliminary objections, 

we must accept as true the facts alleged in Elite Care’s Complaint. See Raynor v. 

D’Annunzio, 243 A.3d 41, 52 (Pa. 2020).

2 According to the Complaint, “Premier Comp served as the Third Party Administrator 

and/or Bill Payer for [Insurers] with respect to the claims at issue.” Complaint, 4/9/2019,

at ¶9.
[J-23-2024] - 3

through the workers’ compensation system pursuant to the Act’s exclusivity provision, 77 

P.S. §481. See Preliminary Objections of Premier Comp Solutions, LLC, at 4-5. The trial 

court overruled Insurers’ preliminary objections and the Superior Court affirmed.

Before this Court, Insurers continue to argue the trial court lacked jurisdiction over 

Elite Care’s civil action. Generally, and going forward, I agree trial courts lack jurisdiction 

over civil actions seeking payment for workers’ compensation benefits for the reasons set 

forth in the Opinion in Support of Reversal. However, I conclude judicial estoppel bars 

Insurers from advancing that argument in this particular case. 

“Judicial estoppel is an equitable, judicially-created doctrine designed to protect

the integrity of the courts by preventing litigants from ‘playing fast and loose’ with the 

judicial system by adopting whatever position suits the moment.” Sunbeam Corp. v. 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Pa. 2001). In short, it “prohibits parties from 

switching legal positions to suit their own ends.” Id. And, importantly, this Court has held 

judicial estoppel may even apply to jurisdictional arguments. See Buehler v. Philadelphia 

& R. Ry. Co., 124 A. 325, 326 (Pa. 1924) (“A defendant, in an action between the same 

parties, having procured a dismissal of plaintiff’s claim in a former proceeding, through 

the substantive defense of jurisdiction, is estopped in a subsequent action from denying 

the position there taken, the affirmative of which grounds the second action, unless the 

admission of record on which the estoppel is based is the result of fraud, accident, or 

mistake.”) (citation omitted); see also Ligon v. Middletown Area Sch. Dist., 584 A.2d 376, 

380 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (“Judicial estoppel has been applied to prevent a party from 

changing his or her position regarding jurisdiction because it suited that party’s interests.”) 

(citation omitted). 

Here, it is clear that Insurers have assumed inconsistent positions. First, Insurers 

told Elite Care it had to utilize the fee petition process within the Workers’ Compensation 
[J-23-2024] - 4

Bureau. Then, once Elite Care started succeeding before that body, Insurers appealed 

and argued the fee review hearing officers lacked jurisdiction to determine provider status.

After Insurers’ argument persuaded the hearing officers to dismiss Elite Care’s fee 

petitions, Elite Care filed a civil suit. During the civil action, Insurers again switched their 

position and argued to the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction because provider status 

must be determined through the workers’ compensation system.

Insurers admit their position has changed, but they claim the switches are simply

due to “uncertainty in the case law as to whether an entity that did not directly provide 

healthcare services to a workers’ compensation claimant was entitled to bring claims for 

reimbursement for medical bills before a Fee Review Hearing Officer or a Workers’ 

Compensation Judge.” Insurers’ Brief at 9 n.1. They specifically point to Armour 

Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (Wegman’s 

Food Markets, Inc.), 206 A.3d 660, 672 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (en banc) (provider status 

may be determined by fee review hearing officer under the Act), which distinguished and, 

to the extent it was inconsistent with its decision, overruled Selective Insurance Co. of 

America v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (The Physical 

Therapy Institute), 86 A.3d 300, 305 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (determination of provider status 

beyond scope of the fee review process). But this decision does not justify Insurers’ 

tactics.

As noted, on March 16, 2018, over one year prior to the decision in Armour 

Pharmacy, an attorney for Insurers told Elite Care its exclusive remedy was through the 

fee review process. In truth, though, Selective Insurance remained precedential at the 

time, meaning Elite Care’s fee petitions were doomed to fail because Insurers intended 

to challenge their provider status. When that in fact happened, Elite Care was instructed 

— both by then-prevailing law and by individual hearing officers — to file a civil action. 
[J-23-2024] - 5

See Physical Therapy Institute, Inc. v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review 

Hearing Office (Selective Insurance Co. of SC), 108 A.3d 957, 960 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)

(reaffirming Selective Insurance and advising that if “either party believe[s] that the other 

is effecting a fraud, it can pursue that claim in a legal action, such as a declaratory 

judgment action”); N.T. Fee Review Hearing, 5/7/2019, at 9-10 (Elite Care asserting “the 

only reason that [it] had filed in Fee Review was based upon opposing counsel’s 

statement to [it] that Fee Review was its exclusive remedy” and noting “[t]hat language 

was also mirrored in [the hearing officer’s] previous Order, which stated . . . Elite Care 

RX, LLC may also wish to pursue other remedies which may be available outside of the 

Fee Review process.”); see also Elite Care’s Trial Court Brief at 10 (observing that “even 

the workers’ compensation forum itself has agreed that [Elite Care’]s civil action is 

appropriate” and noting that “Elite Care has taken the precise legal action that the 

Commonwealth Court suggested it should in Physical Therapy”). 

Yet, in the face of that civil action, Insurers again changed positions and argued 

the trial court lacked jurisdiction. Although Armour Pharmacy may have justified Insurers’

final switch, it does not explain their earlier conduct. Instead, it seems apparent that 

Insurers continuously changed course only to avoid liability. Thus, rather than reward 

Insurers for their gamesmanship, I would apply Buehler and hold Insurers are judicially 

estopped from challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction over Elite Care’s civil action.