****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or ConnecticutAppellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and inthe Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************ORVILLE COLEY, ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE OF

LORNA COLEY) v

. CITY OF HARTFORD

(SC 19129)
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.Argued February 21—officially released June 10, 2014 Hugh D. Hughes, with whom, on the brief, was William F. Gallagher, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Jonathan H. Beamon, senior assistant corporation counsel, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion ROGERS, C. J. This appeal requires us to determine the scope of governmental immunity that is afforded to a city that has been sued for allegedly negligent conduct in connection with its police department’s response to areport ofdomesticviolence. The plaintiff, Orville Coley, the administrator of the estate of Lorna Coley (decedent), appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court’s summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, the city ofHartford. Coleyv. Hartford, 140 Conn. App. 315, 327, 59 A.3d 811 (2013). The plaintiffbrought this wrongful death action after the decedent was shot and killed afterpolice responded to areport ofdomestic violence at the apartment where the decedent resided with her daughter,JahmeshaWilliams. Theplaintiffalleges, inter alia, that the police were negligent in failing to remain at the scene for a reasonable amount of time until the likelihood of imminent violence had been eliminated, in violation of the duty allegedly imposed pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-38b1 and the Hartford Police Department Policy and Procedure entitled ‘‘Police Responseto CasesofFamilyViolence’’ (policeresponse procedures). See Hartford Police Dept. Policy and Procedure, No. 7-40 (October 1, 1986).2 Although the plaintiffraises several issues on appeal, the dispositive issue is whether the Appellate Court properly determined that any duty to remain at the scene that was allegedly owed to the plaintiff’s decedent was discretionary.3 We conclude that any such duty was discretionary and, therefore, that the defendant is entitled to immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) (B).4 Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The following uncontested facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition ofthis appeal.5 ‘‘On November 5, 2007, at approximately 8:39 p.m., Hartford police officers [Garrett] Fancher and [Zachary] Freeto
were dispatched to respond to a complaint ofdomestic violence at 47 Bolton Street. The complaint had been made by [Williams], one of the residents of 47 Bolton Street, who had called the police because the father of her child, Gerard Chapdelaine, had come to her house and attempted to gain entry and, having failed, brandished a revolver and threatened her life. ‘‘Williams lived at 47 Bolton Street with her son, a friend and Williams’ mother, [the decedent]. On the evening in question, [the decedent] had arrived at the house in her car and observed Chapdelaine threatening Williams’ life and brandishing a firearm in the front yard. [The decedent] told Chapdelaine that she would call the police if he did not leave. He responded, ‘call the cops,’ and [the decedent] drove away. By the time she returned, [O]fficers Fancherand Freeto hadarrived at 47 Bolton Street in response to Williams’ call, butChapdelaine was no longerpresent. The officers spoke with neighbors and went to Chapdelaine’s residence at 51 Bolton Street, but they were unable to find him. Williams informed the officers that Chapdelaine’s car
was illegally parked at 55 Bolton Street, and officers ticketed the vehicle and had it towed. The officers also learned that Williams had a protective order against Chapdelaine prohibiting him from threatening or harassingher, enteringherdwelling orhaving anyother contact with her. Hartford police

. . . previously had responded to incidents of domestic violence between Chapdelaine and Williams at 47 Bolton Street. ‘‘Unable to locate Chapdelaine, and aware that he had allegedly committed a family violence crime by violating a protective order, Fancher and Freeto left

. . . to prepare an arrest warrant.’’ Coley v. Hartford, supra, 140Conn. App. 317–18. Priortoleavingthescene, Officers Fancher and Freeto contacted the Interval House, a local domestic violence shelter, and spoke with a representative on Williams’ behalf. The officers also provided Williams with avictim services card containing additional resources regarding domestic violence. ‘‘Approximatelythreehourslater, atabout 12:05 a.m., officers were again dispatched to 47 Bolton Street, this time in response to areportthat amale was attempting to force entryintothe residence. Thepolice determined thatthetwo reportedincidents at47 Bolton Streetwere related, and, upon arrival at the scene, heard screams comingfromthe secondfloor. Aftersettingup aperimeter and entering the residence, police discovered that [the decedent] had been shot and killed.’’6 Id., 318.
Theplaintiffbroughtthiswrongful deathactionalleging that the defendant’s police officers were negligent in responding to the domestic violence incident at 47 Bolton Street. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the police officers: ‘‘failed to arrest

. . . Chapdelaine as required by

. . . § 46b-38b (a)’’; ‘‘failed to arrest

. . . Chapdelaine forviolating aprotective order
as required by the police response procedures’’; ‘‘left the scene before the likelihood of further imminent violence had been eliminated, in violation of

. . . § 46b-38b (d)’’; and ‘‘leftthe scene before the likelihood of further imminent violence had been eliminated, in violationofthepoliceresponseprocedures.’’Thedefendant asserted as a special defense that it is entitled to governmental immunity pursuant to § 52-557n and it subsequently filed a motion for summaryjudgment on that ground. The trial court, Rittenband, J., rendered summaryjudgment in favor ofthe defendant, concluding that the police officers’ actions were discretionary, not ministerial, and that the identifiable person-imminentharm exceptionto governmental immunityfor discretionary acts7 does not apply in the present case. The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s decision to theAppellate Court.8
In the Appellate Court, the plaintiff argued that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment in the defendant’s favor because a genuine issue ofmaterial fact existed as to whether police officers had a ministerial duty, pursuant to § 46b-38b and the police response procedures, to remain at Williams’ residence for ‘‘areasonable time until, inthe reasonablejudgment of the officer, the likelihood of further imminent violence [had] been eliminated.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.) Coleyv. Hartford, supra, 140 Conn. App. 319– 20. The Appellate Court disagreed for three reasons. First, the Appellate Court concluded that § 46b-38b (d) does not apply in the present case because that statute requires police officers to remain at the scene only when, unlike in the present case, there is no probable
cause for arrest. Id., 324. Second, the Appellate Court concluded that any duty arising under the police response procedures was owed to Williams, the victim of domestic violence, and not to the decedent. Id., 326. Finally, the Appellate Court determined that, even if it
were to assume that the defendant owed a duty to the decedent to remain at the scene under the police response procedures, the duty was discretionary and, therefore, the defendant is entitled to governmental immunity. Id., 326n.10. Forthesereasons, theAppellate Court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendant. This certified appeal followed.
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the Appellate Court improperly affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment forthe defendant. Although the plaintiffchallenges each of the three grounds for the Appellate Court’s decision, we focus our inquiry on the plaintiff’s claim that the police response procedures gave rise to
a ministerial duty to remain at the scene in the present
case. Withrespectto this claim, theplaintiffargues that the police response procedures are broaderthan § 46b38b (d) because the procedures require law enforcement personnel to remain at the scene for areasonable time in the event an arrest is not made. See footnote 2 ofthis opinion. TheplaintiffcontendsthattheAppellate Court incorrectly concluded that the duty to remain at the scene under the police response procedures was discretionary rather than ministerial.
In response, the defendant argues that the Appellate Courtproperly affirmed the trial court’s summaryjudgment in favor of the defendant. With respect to the plaintiff’s claim regarding the police response procedures, the defendant argues that, even if we were to
assume that there was a duty owed to the decedent under the police response procedures, it is apparent from the allegations in the complaint that the duty to remain at the scene was discretionary. The defendant contends, therefore, that it is immune from liability for its allegedly negligent discretionary acts under § 52-557n (a) (2) (B).
As a preliminary matter, we agree with the plaintiff that the obligation to remain at the scene in the event that an arrest is not made under the police response procedures, on its face, is broader than the obligation to remain at the scene under the statute, which gives rise to this obligation only when ‘‘no cause exists for
an arrest

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-38b (d); see footnotes 1 and 2 of this opinion. Because the police officers determined that there was probable cause to arrest Chapdelaine, and an arrest was not in fact made,
we conclude thatthe police response procedures apply inthepresentcase.9The dispositive issue inthis appeal, therefore, is whether the duty to remain at the scene
was discretionary or ministerial. See Grignano v. Milford, 106 Conn. App. 648, 659–60, 943 A.2d 507 (2008) (concluding that defendant’s duty to perform reasonable inspections ofpremisesundertown ordinance was discretionary because ordinance did not prescribe precise mannerforinspection, but dutyto warnuponmaking discretionary determination ofhazardous condition
was ministerial because ordinance prescribed manner in which warning should be issued); accord Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 323, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006) (ministerial duty may be created by city charter provision, ordinance, regulation, rule, policy, or other directive). Because we determine that the duty to remain at the scene was discretionary and, therefore, that the defendantis entitledto governmentalimmunity, wewill
assume for the purposes of this appeal only that this duty was owed to the decedent.
We begin with the applicable standard of review. ‘‘Practice Book [§ 17-49] provides that summary judgmentshallberenderedforthwithifthepleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled tojudgment as amatter oflaw.

. . . Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.

. . . [T]he ultimate determination of whether qualified immunity applies is ordinarily a question oflaw for the court

. . . [unless] there are unresolved factual issues material to the applicability ofthe defense

. . . [where the] resolution ofthose factual issues is properly leftto the jury.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bonington v. Westport, 297 Conn. 297, 305– 306, 999 A.2d 700 (2010). Because the material facts in the present case are undisputed; see footnote 5 of this opinion; we exercise plenary review over the trial court’s determination that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. See Purzycki v. Fairfield, 244 Conn. 101, 108 n.4, 708 A.2d 937 (1998) (exercising plenary review over availability ofqualified immunity because material facts were undisputed).
Certain principles governing the scope of qualifiedimmunity inform our disposition of this appeal. ‘‘[Section] 52-557n abandons the common-law principle of municipal sovereign immunity and establishes the circumstances in which a municipality may be liable for damages.

. . . One such circumstance is a negligent act or omission ofa municipal officer acting within the scope of his or her employment or official duties.

. . . [Section] 52-557n (a) (2) (B), however, explicitlyshields
a municipality from liability for damages to person or property caused by the negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion
as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law. ‘‘Municipalofficialsareimmunefromliabilityfornegligence arising out of their discretionary acts in part because ofthe danger that a more expansive exposure to liability would cramp the exercise of official discretion beyond the limits desirable in our society.’’10 (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607, 614, 903 A.2d 191 (2006). Therefore, ‘‘[d]iscretionary act immunityreflects avaluejudgmentthat—despiteinjury to a member of the public—the broader interest in havinggovernmentofficialsandemployeesfreeto exercisejudgment and discretion in their official functions, unhampered by fear ofsecond-guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 615. ‘‘The hallmark of a discretionary act is that it requires the exercise ofjudgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bonington v. Westport, supra, 297 Conn. 306. ‘‘In contrast, municipal officers
are not immune from liability fornegligence arising out oftheirministerialacts, definedas actstobeperformed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgmentordiscretion.’’ (Internalquotationmarksomitted.) Doe v. Petersen, supra, 615. ‘‘Although the determination ofwhether official acts
oromissionsareministerialordiscretionaryisnormally
a question of fact for the fact finder

. . . there are
cases where it is apparent from the complaint

. . . [that the nature ofthe duty] and, thus, whether governmentalimmunitymaybe successfullyinvokedpursuant to

. . . § 52-557n (a) (2) (B), turns on the character of the act or omission complained of in the complaint.

. . . Accordingly, where it is apparent from the complaint that the defendants’ allegedly negligent acts or omissions necessarily involved the exercise of judgment, and thus, necessarily were discretionary in nature, summaryjudgment is proper.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bonington v. Westport, supra, 297 Conn. 307–308.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the dispositive issue in the present case. The plaintiff argues that theAppellate Courtimproperlyconcludedthatanydutytoremainatthescenethatthedefendantallegedlyowed to the decedent under the police response procedures
was discretionary.11 Contrary to the Appellate Court’s determination, the plaintiff contends that the mandatory language in § III (B) (4) of the police response procedures, specifically the phrase ‘‘shall remain,’’ renders the duty to remain at the scene ministerial. The plaintiffmaintains that the police response procedures
were enactedto curtaillawenforcementdiscretionand, tothat end, theprocedures mandatethatpolice officers remain at the scene of a domestic violence incident when an arrest is not made. Insofar as the police response procedures provide that an officer shall remain at the scene ‘‘for a reasonable time until, in the reasonable judgement of the officer, the likelihood of further imminent violence has been eliminated’’; Hartford Police Dept. Policy and Procedure, supra, § III (B) (4); theplaintiffarguesthat ‘‘reasonable’’ isan objective standard of reasonableness that creates an issue for the trier of fact.
The defendant, by contrast, contends that the police response procedures at issue in the present case necessarily require the exercise ofjudgment and, therefore,
are discretionary. Specifically, the defendant argues thatthe police response proceduresvestpolice officers with discretion to determine how long to remain at the scene, that is, what constitutes a ‘‘reasonable time’’ until ‘‘in the reasonable judgement of the officer, the likelihood offurther imminent violence has been eliminated.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id.; General Statutes § 46b38b (d). Because the defendant’s allegedly negligent acts in ‘‘le[aving] the scene before the likelihood of further violence had been eliminated’’ necessarily involved the exercise of judgment or discretion, the defendant argues that it is entitled to discretionary act immunitypursuant § 52-557n (a) (2) (B). We agree with the defendant.
Webeginbyobservingthebroadscopeofgovernmental immunitythatis traditionallyaffordedto the actions of municipal police departments. ‘‘[I]t is firmly established that the operation of a police department is a governmental function, and that acts or omissions in connectiontherewithordinarilydonotgiverisetoliability on the part of the municipality.

. . . [Accordingly] [t]he failure to provide, or the inadequacy of, police protectionusuallydoesnotgiveriseto acause ofaction in tort against a city.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 180, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988). In Gordon, we concluded that the city was immune from liability for injuries stemming from an alleged shortage of police patrols because ‘‘the general deployment ofpolice officers is a discretionary governmental action as a matter of law.’’ Id. ‘‘[B]ecause a police chief’s authority to assign his officers to particular duties is deemed amatter that concerns the public safety, he may not bedeprived of his power to exercise his own discretion andjudgment as to the number, qualifications andidentity of officers needed for particular situations at any given time

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Although the issue in the present case does not
concern the deployment of police officers generally, but rather the defendant’s alleged failure to adhere to specific police response procedures, we find Gordon instructivebecause itunderscoresthe considerable discretion inherent in law enforcement’s response to an infinite array of situations implicating public safety on
a daily basis.
We now turn to the facts in the present case. ‘‘Determining whether it is apparent on the face of the complaintthatthe acts complained ofare discretionary requires an examination of the nature of the alleged acts or omissions.’’ Violano v. Fernandez, supra, 280 Conn. 322. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant was negligent in leaving the scene ofthe domestic violence dispute, 47 Bolton Street, before the likelihood of further violence had been eliminated, allegedlyinviolationofthepolice responseprocedures. Although the complaint characterizes the police officers’ actions as ministerial in nature, that is, failing to remain at the scene in violation of a clear policy directive, the police response procedures cited in the complaint required the exercise of discretion. Specifically, the police response procedures provide that ‘‘[i]n the event that an arrest is not made

. . . officers shall remain at the scene for a reasonable time until, in the reasonable judgement of the officer, the likelihood of further imminent violence has been eliminated.’’ Hartford Police Dept. Policy and Procedure, supra, § III (B) (4). In actuality, then, the gravamen of the plaintiff’s allegations is that the defendant failed to remain at the
scene for a reasonable time until, in the reasonable judgment ofthepolice officer, the likelihood offurther imminent violence had been eliminated.
Itis difficultto conceive ofpolicylanguagethatcould
more clearlycontemplate the exercise ofjudgmentbya municipal employee than is contemplated bythe police responseproceduresinthepresentcase. Ataminimum, the plaintiff would have this court ignore the police response procedures’ explicit reference to the ‘‘reasonablejudgement ofthe officer

. . . .’’ Id. In no uncertain terms, the policy requires police officers to exercise theirjudgment in evaluating the likelihood ofimminent violence. The plaintiff’s strained interpretation also disregards the discretion inherent in the determination of what amounts to a ‘‘reasonable time’’ under the police responseprocedures. Infact, thepoliceresponseprocedures define ‘‘reasonable time’’ by reference to the police officer’s discretion; it is the amount oftime until the likelihood of further imminent violence has been eliminated as determined according to the reasonable judgment of the police officer. See id.Thus, the police response procedures in the present
case explicitly require the police officer’s judgment in evaluating the circumstances in a given situation of domestic violence. Because the policy language makes the manner ofperformance expressly contingent upon the police officer’s discretion, it cannot be said that the alleged acts were to be ‘‘performed in a prescribed
mannerwithout the exercise ofjudgment

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Petersen, supra, 279 Conn. 615. We conclude, therefore, that the defendant’s allegedly negligent acts were discretionary.12
The plaintiffalso claimed at oral argument that, even conceding that the police response procedures are discretionarywithrespecttowhatconstitutesareasonable time,13 the defendant was nonetheless required to remain at the scene for some time once police officers determined that there was probable cause for arrest andanarrestwasnotmade. Theplaintiff’sclaimcenters
on the allegedly mandatory nature of the word ‘‘shall’’ in § III (B) (4) ofthe police responseprocedures, which provides that ‘‘[i]n the event that an arrest is not made

. . . officers shall remain at the scene for a reasonable time

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Thus, as we understand the plaintiff’s argument, he contends thatthe defendant had a ministerial duty to remain at the scene for some amount oftime oncethere wasprobable causeto arrest Chapdelaine.14 We disagree. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the word ‘‘shall’’ does not necessarily give rise to a ministerial duty to remain at the scene when the policy language, read in its entirety, clearly relies upon the police officer’sdiscretionindecidinghowtoperformtheallegedly ministerial act of remaining at the scene. ‘‘The mere fact that a statute uses the word ‘shall’ in prescribing the function of a government entity or officer should notbe assumedtorenderthefunctionnecessarilyobligatory in the sense ofremoving the discretionary nature ofthe function.’’ 57 Am. Jur. 2d 113, Municipal, County, School, and State TortLiability § 82 (2001). To illustrate how mandatory language does not necessarily render
a duty ministerial as opposed to discretionary, we turn to our Appellate Court’s decision in Mills v. The Solution, LLC, 138 Conn. App. 40, 51, 50 A.3d 381, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 928, 55 A.3d 570 (2012).
In Mills, the plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s summaryjudgment rendered in favor ofthe defendant,
amunicipalpolicedepartment, onthegroundofgovernmental immunity for its allegedly negligent failure to provide police protection at a carnival where the plaintiff’s decedent was fatally shot. Id., 40, 43. Specifically, the plaintiffargued thatthe defendant had aministerial dutytoprovidethepoliceprotectionthatitdetermined, in its discretion, was necessary pursuant to the statute governing police protection at places ofpublic amusement. Id., 51. General Statutes § 7-284 provides in rele-vant part that ‘‘[w]hen police protection is necessary
or required at any

. . . place ofpublic amusement

. . . the amountofsuchprotectionnecessaryshall be determined and shall befurnished by (1) the chief

. . . of the police department

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) While the plaintiff did not dispute that § 7-284 affords the defendant discretion to determine whether police protection is necessary and, if so, the amount of such protection, the plaintiff argued that ‘‘once the chief of police, in his or her discretion, determines that police protection is necessary, the chief of police then has a ministerial duty to furnish such protection.’’ Mills v. The Solution, LLC, supra, 138 Conn. App. 50–51.
Like the plaintiff in the present case, the plaintiff in Mills argued that the mandatory nature of the word ‘‘shall’’ rendered the duty to furnish necessary police protection ministerial. Id., 51. The Appellate Court rejected this argument: ‘‘We disagree with the plaintiff that the word ‘shall’ is sufficient to convert what is otherwise a discretionary act into a ministerial duty where the text of the statute leaves to the discretion of the police official how to perform the function

. . . .’’ Id. Similarly, in the present case, the police response procedures leave to the discretion of the police officer how to perform the obligation to remain at the scene ofa domestic violence crime. We find that the policy language vesting discretion with the police officerto determine what constitutes areasonable time isinextricablyintertwinedwiththepolicylanguagestating that the police officer ‘‘shall remain’’ at the scene. Accordingly, we decline the plaintiff’s invitation to parse the policy language so as to create a ministerial dutyto remain at the scene notwithstanding the discretionary performance of that duty.15
The facts in the present case are undeniably tragic, and, understandably, the parties are left questioning whetheranythingmorecouldhavebeendonetoprevent the realities that unfolded. It is, however, precisely because it can always be alleged, in hindsight, that a public official’s actions were deficient that we afford limited governmental liability for acts that necessarily entailed the exercise of discretion. ‘‘We do not think that the public interest is served by allowing ajury of laymen with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight to secondguess the exercise of a policeman’s discretionary professional duty. Such discretion is no discretion at all.’’ Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 157, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982); seeDoev.Peterson, supra, 279 Conn. 615 (‘‘[d]iscretionary act immunity reflects a value judgment that—despite injury to a member of the public—the broader interest in having government officers and employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in their official functions, unhampered by fear of secondguessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury’’ [internalquotationmarks omitted]); Wadsworthv.Mid-dletown, 94Conn. 435, 440, 109A. 246 (1920) (‘‘[t]imidity and doubt would govern [public officials’] performance of public duty if they acted in the consciousness that personal liability might follow, no matter how closely theyfollowedtheirbestdiscretion’’). Inshort, thepolice officers’ allegedly negligent acts in the present case required the exercise of discretion, and, accordingly, the defendantisimmunefromliabilityforits discretionary acts.
Forthereasonssetforthinthisopinion, theAppellate Court properly determined that the duty to remain at thesceneinthepresentcasewas discretionary. Accordingly, we conclude that the Appellate Court properly affirmed the trial court’s decision rendering summary judgment in the defendant’s favor on the ground that the defendant is entitled to immunity from liabilitypursuant to § 52-557n.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion PALMER, ZARELLA, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js., concurred.

1 General Statutes § 46b-38b provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Whenever a peace officer determines upon speedy information that a family violence crime has been committed within such officer’s jurisdiction, such officer shall arrest the person or persons suspected of its commission and charge such person or persons with the appropriate crime.

. . . ‘‘(d) It shall be the responsibility of the peace officer at the scene of a family violence incident to provide immediate assistance to the victim.

. . . In cases where the officer has determined that no cause exists for an arrest, assistance shall include

. . . (B) remaining at the scene for a reasonable time until, inthe reasonablejudgment ofthe officer, the likelihood offurther imminent violence has been eliminated.

. . .’’ Although this statute has been revised since the events giving rise to this appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2010, No. 10-36, § 5; Public Acts 2011, No. 11- 152, § 3; those revisions have no bearing on the merits of the present case. Accordingly, for purposes of convenience, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
2 Specifically, the plaintiff relies on the portion of the police response procedures which provides: ‘‘In the event that an arrest is not made, [Public Acts 1986, No. 86-337, § 2, codified at General Statutes § 46b-38b] requires that officers shall remain at the scene for a reasonable time until, in the reasonable judgement of the officer, the likelihood of further imminent violence has been eliminated.’’ Hartford Police Dept. Policy and Procedure, supra, § III (b) (4). These procedures were promulgated under statutory mandate. See General Statutes § 46b-38b (e) (1) (B) (‘‘[e]ach law enforcement agency shall develop, in conjunctionwiththe Division ofCriminalJustice, andimplement specific operationalguidelinesforarrestpoliciesinfamilyviolenceincidents

. . . [including] procedures for arrest and for victim assistance by peace officers’’). We note that although § 46b-38b (e) has been amended since the police response procedures were implemented, the statutory authorization for implementing such procedures has remained unchanged. Accordingly,

werefertothecurrentrevisionof§ 46b-38b (e).Althoughthepoliceresponse procedures have subsequentlybeen amended since their enactment in 1986,

we refer to the procedures that were in place on November 5, 2007, at the time of the alleged events in the present case.
3 The three certified questions in this appeal are as follows: ‘‘(1) Did the Appellate Court properly determine that

. . . § 46b-38b did not apply to this case?; (2) Did the Appellate Court properly determine that any duty created by the statutory scheme was not owed to the plaintiff’s decedent?; and (3) Did the Appellate Court properly determine that any duty was discretionary?’’ Coley v. Hartford, 308 Conn. 922, A.3d (2013).

4 General Statutes § 52-557n (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, apolitical subdivision ofthe state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts oromissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties

. . . . (2) Except as otherwise provided by law, apolitical subdivision ofthe state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by

. . . (B) negligentacts oromissionswhichrequirethe exercise ofjudgmentordiscretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.’’

5 We note that the trial court’s order granting summaryjudgment in favor of the defendant does not discuss the facts alleged in this case, nor does itreference anyaffidavits orsupporting documents submittedbytheparties. See footnote 8 ofthis opinion. At oral argument, the parties agreed that the facts as set forth in the Appellate Court opinion were drawn from the police reportthatthe investigatingpolice officer, GarrettFancher, andthe assisting police officer, Zachary Freeto, prepared in connection with the alleged incidents in the present case. The defendant submitted the police report as
an exhibit to its memorandum in support of the motion for summaryjudgment. See Practice Book § 17-45 (‘‘[a] motion for summary judgment shall be supported by such documents as may be appropriate, including but not limited to affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written admissions and the like’’). The plaintiff does not contest the facts as set forth in the police report,

nor does he contest the facts as recitedbythe Appellate Court. Accordingly, in our disposition of this appeal we rely on the uncontested facts in the police report, as recited in the Appellate Court opinion and as construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Coley v. Hartford, supra, 140 Conn. App. 317 n.2 (‘‘ ‘[t]he record [is] viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiff for purposes of reviewing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment’ ’’), quoting Martinelli v. Fusi, 290 Conn. 347, 350, 963 A.2d 640 (2009). Additional facts from the police report in the present

case are set forth as necessary.
6 It is undisputedthat Chapdelaine returnedto 47 Bolton Street and fatally shot the decedent.

7 We have described the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity as follows: ‘‘Discretionary act immunity is abrogated when the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer that his orherfailure to act would be likelyto subject an identifiable person to imminent harm

. . . . By its own terms, this test requires three things: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim to harm.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe

v. Petersen, 279 Conn. 607, 616, 903 A.2d 191 (2006).

8 The trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment provides in its entirety as follows: ‘‘Under [§] 52-557n (a) (2) (B), the [defendant] is not liable for discretionary acts and the officers’ decision to try and find and arrest the domestic violence perpetrator and eventual shooter, was a discretionary act. The [decedent], shooting victim, was not

an identifiable victim subject to imminent harm, [Williams] was. [Section] 46b-38b (d) requires the officers to exercise reasonable time and reasonable judgment which makes it discretionary.’’ The plaintiff did not challenge the trial court’s determination that there is no identifiable person-imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity in the present case. During oral argument in the Appellate Court, the plaintiffexplained that the decision not to appeal this aspect ofthe trial court’s decision was because, in the plaintiff’s view, the decedent would not qualify as an identifiable person under the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity. Coleyv. Hartford, supra, 140 Conn. App. 320 n.5. We express no view as to whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if taken

as true, are legally sufficient to satisfy the criteria required to overcome governmentalimmunityunderthe identifiableperson-imminentharmexception to discretionary act immunity.

9 Becausewe findthatthepolice responseprocedures applyinthepresent case, and because the third issue is dispositive, we do not decide whether the statute also operated to impose a ministerial or discretionary duty on police officers to remain at the scene for a reasonable time. We note, however, that the plaintiffconcedes that the facts in the present

case do not fall exclusively under either of the two relevant subsections of § 46b-38b. See footnote 1 of this opinion. Section 46b-38b (a) and (d), respectively, appear to prescribe distinct police responses to domestic violence disputes depending upon whether cause for arrest exists. When thereis cause for arrest, subsection (a) requires that police officers arrest the domesticviolence perpetrator. Whenthere is no cause forarrest, subsection (d) requires that police officers remain at the scene for a reasonable time. The statute does not expressly prescribe the appropriate police response when there is cause for arrest, but no arrest is in fact made because the perpetrator cannot be located. In the present case, it is undisputed that police officers were required to arrest Chapdelaine under § 46b-38b (a) upon information that he had committed a family violence crime. It is also undisputed, however, that police officers were attempting to arrest Chapdelaine but were unable to locate him. Because Chapdelaine was still at large, the plaintiff contends thatpolice officers were required under § 46b-38b (d) to remain at the scene until the likelihood of imminent violence had been eliminated, presumably uponChapdelaine’sarrest. Inessence, theplaintiffarguesthatthelegislature must have intended to require police officers to remain at the scene for a reasonable time, pursuant to § 46b-38b (d), when, as in the present case, grounds for arrest exist but no arrest is in fact made. We agree with the plaintiff that the facts in the present case reveal a potential gap in the statute. In view of our determination that the police response procedures gave rise to some type of duty to remain at the scene in the present case, however, we do not decide whether § 46b-38b (d) also required police officers to remain at the scene in the present case.
10 Although this court has recognized three exceptions to discretionary act immunity; see Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 338 and n.14, 984 A.2d 684 (2009); the plaintiff does not argue that any of those exceptions are applicable under the facts in the present case.
11 Wenotethattheplaintiffalso arguesthatthe defendanthadaministerial duty under § 46b-38b (a) and the police response procedures, respectively, to make an arrest when a family violence crime had been committed, and that the defendantviolated that duty by failing to arrest Chapdelaine. These claims do not warrant extended discussion for the following reasons. First, even ifwe were to assume that the defendant had aministerial duty under § 46b-38b (a) to arrest Chapdelaine upon information that he had committed afamilyviolence crime, it is undisputed thatpolice officers were attempting to arrest Chapdelaine. When Chapdelaine could not be found, the police officers prepared a warrant for his arrest. It would be absurd to conclude that law enforcement’s failure to arrest a suspect who cannot be located, despite reasonable efforts to do so, violates § 46b-38b (a). We therefore conclude that, as a matter of law, the defendant complied with any mandatory directive that was arguably owed to the plaintiff’s decedent under § 46b-38b (a). For these same reasons, we reject the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant violated a ministerial duty, under the police response procedures, to arrest Chapdelaine for violating a protective order. Furthermore, it bears noting that the police response procedures prescribe that when an officer has probable cause to believe that a protective order has been violated, and the violator is not present, the officer must apply for an arrest warrant. See Hartford Police Dept. Policy and Procedure, supra, § III (B) (5) (e) (‘‘[i]f the violator is not present when the officer arrives, the officer shall investigate the incident and, ifprobable cause exists, the officer will apply for an arrest warrant’’). It is undisputed that the police officers in the present case followed this procedure.

12 In support ofhis claim to the contrary, the plaintiffsubmitted the sworn affidavit ofReginald F. Allard, Jr., a ‘‘police procedure expert,’’ as an exhibit to his memorandum in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Allard’s affidavit provides in relevant part as follows: ‘‘In my opinion, [§ 46b-38b et seq. and the police response procedures] are mandatory and must be followed by municipal employees without question, and involve no discretion as to the obligation to remain at the scene of the domestic violence incident until the victim was no longer under threat.’’ (Emphasis added.) Allard’s statement that the statutory scheme and the police response procedures ‘‘are mandatory’’ and ‘‘involve no discretion’’ provide only a conclusion that, in his opinion, the police officers had a ministerial duty to remain at the scene. Allard’s opinion is thus a conclusory statement that does not create a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to the nature ofthe duty allegedly owed to the plaintiff’s decedent. See Buell Industries, Inc. v. GreaterNew YorkMutual Ins. Co., 259 Conn. 527, 557, 791 A.2d 489 (2002) (‘‘[a]lthough an affidavit by an expert may be considered in opposition to

a motion for summary judgment, conclusory affidavits, even from expertwitnesses, do not provide a basis on which to deny such motions’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Moreover, Allard’s interpretation of the police response procedures at issue in the present case is untenable. Allard’s opinion directly contradicts the language ofthe police response procedures, which provide that officers shall remain at the scene for a ‘‘reasonable time until, in the reasonable judgement of the officer, the likelihood of further imminent violence has been eliminated.’’ Hartford Police Dept. Policy and Procedure, supra, § III (B) (4). Allard’s claim that officers have ‘‘no discretion’’ disregards the clear policy language vesting discretion in the officers to determine how long to remain atthe scene basedupontheirjudgmentasto the likelihoodoffurther imminent violence. Additionally, Allard’s assertion in his affidavit that the officers must remain at the scene ‘‘until the victim [is] no longer under threat’’ ignores the explicit reference in § III (B) (4) of the police response procedures to the police officer’s judgment as to the ‘‘likelihood of further imminent violence

. . . .’’ Finally, it is telling that the expert concludes that theproceduresareministerial, yetheprovidesnoinsightintothe ‘‘prescribed manner’’ inwhichpolice officersare supposedto act. See Violanov.Fernandez, supra, 280 Conn. 318 (‘‘[m]inisterial refers to a duty [that] is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Indeed, thepolice responseprocedures do notprescribehowlong officers must remain at the scene because that duration is a variable contingent upon whether the threat of imminent violence has been eliminated, which itself is a variable contingent upon the unique facts and circumstances of the domestic violence situation. On their face, the procedures rely on the police officer’s judgment as to the likelihood of further imminent violence in a given situation. Although the defendant conceivably could have prescribed set parameters for police officers to adhere to in every situation, for instance that officers must remain at the scene for one hour, there are
no such procedures at issue in the present case. Rather, the duty to remain at the scene for ‘‘a reasonable time until, in the reasonable judgement of the officer, the likelihoodoffurtherimminentviolencehasbeeneliminated’’; Hartford Police Dept. Policy and Procedure, supra, § III (B) (4); is inherently discretionary.

13 To the extent that the plaintiff has suggested that there is a question for the trier of fact as to whether the police officers remained at the scene for a reasonable time under an objective standard of reasonableness, we disagree. Bydefinition, negligentactsarenotobjectivelyreasonable. ‘‘Imposing liability when a municipal officer deviated from an ordinary negligence standard of care would render a municipality’s liability under § 52-557n no different from what it would be under ordinary negligence. This would run counter to the purpose of governmental immunity, which is to protect a municipalityfromliabilityarisingfromamunicipalofficer’snegligent, discretionary acts unless the officer’s dutyto act is clear and unequivocal.’’Edgerton v. Clinton, 311 Conn. 217, 228 n.10, 86 A.3d 437 (2014); General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) (‘‘[e]xcept as otherwiseprovidedbylaw, apolitical subdivision of the state shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by

. . . [B] negligent acts or omissions which require the exercise ofjudgment or discretion’’).

14 At oral argument before this court, the defendant, as evidenced by the followingcolloquy, appearedto concedethatthepoliceresponseprocedures give rise to a duty to remain at the scene for at least some period of time. ‘‘The Court: The procedures do require [the police] to remain at the scene for some time? ‘‘The Defendant: Yes. ‘‘The Court: Do we know from this record whether [the police] remained at the scene? ‘‘The Defendant: Well, we do know from the record that [the police] took enough information from [the decedent] and from Williams as to what happened that day, there [is] a three page [police] report. They must have stayed for some period of time to get that information. ‘‘The Court: But they first of all have to determine whether or not there is probable cause for an arrest, I would think that [the police] would have to take information for that, but after they determined whether or not to make an arrest, it would seem that there is some requirement that they have to stay at the scene. And do we know whetherthey stayed at the scene here? Other than asking for information? ‘‘The Defendant: I guess it’s not clear as to how long they were there. ‘‘The Court: Would you agree [the police] have to stay for a certain periodof time?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes, they do have to stay for a certain period of time. Of course, it’s difficult to put a number on that

. . . .’’ It is unclear, however, whether the defendant’s statement that the police officers had to remain at the scene for some duration was a concession thattheyhadtoremainatthesceneaftertheydeterminedtherewasprobable

cause for arrest as opposed to after the police initially responded to the

scene. In the dissent’s view, the defendant’s response to the court’s inquiry at oral argument was a clear concession that police officers have a ministerial duty to remain at the scene for at least some time after there is probable

cause to arrest a suspect for a family violence crime and the arrest has not been made. We are less certain. Even if the defendant did state that police officers must remain at the scene after the probable cause determination, however, it is not necessarily also true that the defendant conceded that this duty is ministerial, as opposed to discretionary. To the extent that the defendant’s statements at oral argument arguably could be construed as a concession of the central issue in the present case regarding the nature of the duty arising underthe police response procedures, however, we are not bound by that concession. See State v. Reddick, 224 Conn. 445, 463 n.19, 619 A.2d 453 (1993) (‘‘we are not bound by ill advised concessions of any party’’); State v. Putnoki, 200 Conn. 208, 219 n.6, 510 A.2d 1329 (1986) (‘‘The state concurs with the defendant that the evidence was insufficient to supportthe trial court’s finding. We are not, however, boundbythe state’s concession.’’); State v. Avery, 199 Conn. 377, 379 n.2, 507 A.2d 464 (1986) (‘‘[w]e consider this appeal on the merits despite the state’s concession, in its brief, that the trial court had erred’’).

15 It is the dissent’s position that the duty to remain at the scene was ministerial, despite the fact that the precise manner in which the police officersperformedthatdutywas discretionary. The dissentreliesprincipally

on Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464, 356 A.2d 176 (1975), and Soderlund v. Merrigan, 110 Conn. App. 389, 955 A.2d 107 (2008). Each of these cases is distinguishablefromthepresentcase. Therefore, we donotfindthe dissent’s argument persuasive. First, the dissent relies on Wright v. Brown, supra, 167 Conn. 464, for the propositionthataministerial dutymayfollowadiscretionarydetermination. That case is inapposite. In Wright, the statute atissue requiredthe municipal canine control officer to determine whether a dog had bitten a person off of the dog owner’s premises and, upon making that determination, to quarantine the dog. Id., 466. This court concludedthat once the officermade the discretionary determination that, in the officer’sjudgment, the dog had

so bitten someone, ‘‘the subsequent duty to quarantine for fourteen days

was mandatory and, therefore, ministerial.’’ Id., 472. The statute in Wright, however, clearlydelineatedthenatureanddurationofthemandatoryquarantine; see id., 466 n.1; thus removing the canine control officer’s discretion in the performance of that duty. The police response procedures in the present case, by contrast, afford complete discretion to police officers in performing the obligation to remain at the scene of a domestic violence incident. For that reason, Wright is readily distinguishable from the present

case and does not persuade us that there was a ministerial duty to remain at the scene. We also distinguish ourAppellate Court’s decision inSoderlund v. Merrigan, supra, 110 Conn. App. 389, from the present case. In Soderlund, the Appellate Courtconcludedthatamunicipalitywasnotimmunefromliability for negligently failing to vacate an arrest warrant pursuant to a court order. Id., 397. The Appellate Court concluded that the order to vacate an arrest warrant is mandatory, not discretionary, reasoning as follows: ‘‘[T]he conduct complained ofdoes not fall within the definition ofa discretionary act because it does notinvolve the exercise ofjudgmentand discretion. Instead, the order to vacate an arrest warrant is mandatory. It does not matter how the order is vacated, but, simply put, it must be vacated.’’ Id. Relying on Soderlund, the dissent posits that regardless of how the police officers performed the duty to remain at the scene, they were required to remain at the scene. Respectfully, Soderlund does not speak to the issue in the presentcase, namely, whetherthedutytoremainatthescenewasministerial

or discretionary. The two cases are not analogous. In Soderlund, the duty to vacate an arrest warrant was ministerial because, no matter how the warrant was vacated, there was no discretion involved in the underlying duty to vacate the warrant. In the present case, by contrast, the duty to remain at the scene was inherently discretionary because that duty, in and of itself, required the exercise ofjudgment under the clear language of thepolice response procedures.