Will Russian Democracy Be Put on Hold?<p>

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STRATEGIC FORUM

INSTITUTE FOB NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Will Russian Democracy Be Put on Hold?

James H. Brusstar, and Ellen Jones.

Conclusions

• Although establishment politicians in Moscow insist that Russia is now on the way to

recovery, public support for the central government is weak. In fact the gap between

popular sentiment and government policy makers is widening.

• This development causes anxiety for those in power, who fear that the 1995 and 1996

elections will put them out of office. The crux ofthe problem, from their point of view, is

that their political future rests in riding the coattails of a popular president.

• One solution being considered is replacing Yeltsin. This desperate search for a strong leader

explains the instant political prominence of General Lebed, whose defiance of both Yeltsin

and Defense Minister Grachev led many to view him as a presidential candidate or

alternative to Yeltsin in an authoritarian succession.

• Another solution being considered is retaining Yeltsin as president by postponing

presidential elections until 1998 or beyond. Advocates of such a delay are fully aware that

the West may view their plans as a setback to democracy, but are attempting to cultivate

U.S. support for this strategy by arguing that a hardline win in 1996 would mean a complete

reversal of democratization and marketization in Russia.

• If establishment elites succeed in prolonging their tenure in power through non-democratic

means, the long-term outlook for political stability is bleak. Unless the regime modifies

policies to minimize the widening gap between establishment goals and popular aspirations,

heightened social discontent will necessitate increased reliance on repressive measures to

retain order.

• As in the past, the key to any successful attempt by government insiders to keep their

positions illegally is the military. However, the political role ofthe military under such

circumstances remains difficult to predict.

Popular Sentiment and Russian Policies

Many members ofthe establishment elite in Russia ~ anxious to attract foreign investment ~ paint a

relatively benign picture ofRussian developments and the popular mood. While acknowledging the

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poverty ofsome parts ofthe populace and the persistence of Soviet-era thinking among the older

generation, establishment insiders portray this group as a small and declining minority. They claim that a

new middle class is emerging in Russia. Most Russians, they insist, want to be "new Russians" and

reject a return to the past. Moreover, many establishment politicians have adopted an upbeat assessment

ofthe Russian economy, insisting that the lives ofmost Russians are improving and the worst is now

behind them.

The real picture, however, is more complicated and far more volatile. A new privileged class of "new

Russians" is indeed emerging, primarily those youthful, well-educated urbanites (including some former

party elites) able to take advantage ofthe new system. They are the main consumers ofthe new,

expensive stores and Western-style restaurants and nightclubs now dotting Moscow streets and creating

a boom-town atmosphere. The new-found wealth ofthis privileged class, however, has created a

widening gap between the haves and the have-nots, between "new Russians" and "old Russians."

Only a small minority ofRussians (10 to 20 percent, according to public opinion polls) see themselves

as bene-ficiaries ofthe changes introduced by Yeltsin. The remainderbwho feel that they have no

possibility of becoming "new Russians"pare growing increasingly nostal-gic for the certainty ofthe old

Soviet era. Survey results indicate that a large majority of Russians want some version ofthe old union

to be restoredp60-80 percent depending on which former republics would be included. Most feel that it

would have been better if everything had stayed as it was before 1985. Only a tiny minority (5 to 15

percent, depending on the wording ofthe survey question) would prefer to live in today's Russia.

Moreover, most Russians do not view the economic changes touted by establishment elites or by "new

Russians" as improvements. Nor is the populace particularly optimistic about the near-term future. In a

recent nationwide survey, 60% said they anticipate no improvements over the next 12 months; 57% said

that the worst times were still ahead. Only 5% thought that the worst times were behind them.

It is impossible to predict with confidence whether popular dissatisfaction will translate into social

unrest. It is also difficult, given Russians' propensity to vote for personalities rather than policies, to be

sure how these views would be reflected at the ballot box. In this sense, the widening gap between

regime policies and popular attitudes introduces elements of uncertainty and volatility into Russian

politics.

A Replacement For Yeltsin

Establishment insiders see replacing Yeltsin as one solution to popular dissatisfaction. However,

establishment elites have been unable to agree on an alternative to Yeltsin. Last year, radical reformers

were confident that - given a year or so ~ they could develop another reform-minded candidate who

could carry the "democratic" banner. The intervening months (in particular, the disappointing reformist

showing in the December 1993 elections), however, have only made them more desperate.

This desperation has increased as Yeltsin's liabilities as a national leader have become more evident.

Yeltsin's behavior during the August troop withdrawal ceremonies in Germany (his obvious inebriation

during his departure press conference, his impromptu attempt to conduct a German band, and his loud,

off-key rendition of "Kalinka") remained the talk ofthe town in Moscow several weeks after the events.

The predominant reaction is not just that Yeltsin was drunk and disorderly in public, but that his inability

to control his behavior during a sensitive foreign visit disgraced Russia.

The desperate search for a strong leader explains the instant political prominence of General Alexandr

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Lebed, commander ofthe Russian 14th Army in Moldova's break-away Dniester region. Lebed, whose

blunt talk had already won him the allegiance ofthe officers under his command, openly challenged the

political leadership in a July Izvestiya interview, describing Yeltsin as a "minus" and endorsing the

Pinochet model of military rule. When the Defense Ministry leadership (reportedly at Grachev's

instigation) tried to fire Lebed by abolishing his command, the outspoken general and his officers flatly

refused to comply with the order. Grachev was forced to retreat in a humiliating episode which tarnished

the Defense Minister's already tattered prestige even further.

Lebed's bold defiance catapulted him to instant fame in Moscow. Many Russians, alienated by the

political struggles ofthe past several years, have rejected both Yeltsin and the current opposition to him.

They are looking for a strong leader, untainted by corruption, who promises a return to the stability of

the old days. Lebed, who is now described by both friends and foes as by far the most popular general in

the army, seems (superficially, at least) to fit the bill. A wide variety of political groups looking for a

charismatic figure to further their interests are actively courting Lebed. Even reformist groups reportedly

have attempted to recruit him, despite his authoritarian and nationalist views and the fact that his

economic policies are virtually unknown. Although Lebed's political prominence may be short-lived, the

excitement he has generated in Moscow political circles attests to the desperate search for a strong ruler

and a populist leader to take Yeltsin's place.

Postponement of Elections?

Another solution being considered is to postpone parliamentary and presidential elections until 1998 or

beyond. Spearheading the campaign to postpone the elections is the reformist speaker ofthe upper

house, Shumeyko, who unveiled a proposal in June to prolong the term of both parliament and president

for an additional two years.

Reaction to Shumeyko's plan has tended to divide not along "reformist" - "conservative" lines, but along

"insider" - "outsider" lines. Most attracted to the plan are establishment insiders ~ those who (regardless

of political affiliation) see themselves as part ofthe current regime. By contrast, opposition outsiders ~

hardline leaders like Aleksandr Rutskoy who have been excluded from power ~ have denounced the

plan as unconstitutional.

In between are those who may be called "opposition insiders." This group includes members ofthe

opposition (like State Duma speaker Rybkin, leader ofthe Duma's Communist faction Zyuganov, and

leader ofthe Duma's Liberal Democratic Party faction Zhirinovskiy) who have been elected to the

legislature, but remain excluded from policy roles. They are publicly opposed to the election delay, but

might be willing to accede to it in return for key positions in government.

Although Yeltsin himself has made several recent public statements opposing the Shumeyko initiative,

many Yeltsin advisors are lobbying the President to endorse an election postponement. Yeltsin may well

reverse himself on the issue and lend his support to an election delay, particularly if economic conditions

and social disorder worsen. One Moscow reformist has said that even 1998 may be too soon for the next

elections, suggesting that the scheme to extend Yeltsin's tenure until 1998 may be just the first step of a

strategy to postpone elections indefinitely.

Fear of Hardline Victory

Those pushing for an election delay will attempt to package their proposal as a plan to promote stability

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rather than a scheme to avoid the judgement ofthe electorate. For this reason, election delay proponents

are searching for a mechanism to legitimize the delay. The problem is that there is currently no

constitutional way, short of adopting a completely new constitution, to approve an election delay. The

current terms of office for president and parliament are specified in the transitional portions ofthe

Constitution. The Constitution spells out rather stringent procedures for amending the Constitution itself,

but does not specify how these procedures apply to the transitional provisions.

Proponents of an election delay will take advantage ofthis ambiguity to argue that current terms of

office can be extended using less stringent procedures, such as approval by a simple majority ofthe

legislature, followed perhaps by a nationwide referendum. Opposition insiders in Moscow, as well as

regional elites, will attempt to extract the maximum political price for their acquiescence to this strategy.

Increased Reliance on Repressive Measures?

Regardless ofwhether and how establishment elites succeed in prolonging their tenure in power, the

long-term outlook for political stability remains bleak. One major advantage of democracy is that regular

elections tend to ensure a more responsive leadership: officials and legislators who must face their voters

are more likely to adopt policies that accord with the values ofthe majority ofthe voters.

The basic problem faced by those in power in Russia ~ both Yeltsin himself and his leadership team -is

that the goals they are pushing represent the interests of only a small minority of Russians. As long as

this is true, in order to stay in power, Moscow's political elite will have to avoid the judgment ofthe

electoratebeven ifthey find a replacement for Yeltsin. Ironically, as long as the Yeltsin team believes it

can cling to power without submitting itselfto the voters, it is far less likely to modify its policies in

such a way as to minimize the now- widening gap between establishment goals and popular aspirations.

In this scenario, heightened social discontent would necessitate increased reliance on repressive

measures to retain order. Staying in power - particularly ifthe economic decline continuesbalmost

certainly will entail major reversals of democracy: not just postponing elections and reverting to an

authoritarian succession process, but banning rallies, closing opposition newspapers, and jailing political

rivals as well.

Predicting the Military's Response

Increased reliance on coercion (whether or not it includes reversion to an authoritarian succession)

would inevitably involve increased reliance on the military. Military reliability, however, remains a key

uncertainty. Several recent surveys indicate that discontent within the military is growing. One study

dramatized the increasing polarization within the military between the "haves" (those assigned to elite

units or those who have enriched themselves through illegal sales ofmilitary property) and the

"have-nots." The military sociologist who reported these results noted the emergence ofthree distinct

social groups within the military: junior officers (who are simply searching for a way out ofthe military);

staff officers at Defense Ministry headquarters (who are well-placed to take care ofthemselves); and

field officers from major to major general (who have no alternative to military service). Within this latter

group, doubts about the move to a market economy are strong. Around 40% ofthis third group are

adherents of extreme nationalism.

Other surveys (some conducted officially in response to Defense Ministry orders and others conducted

non-officially by moonlighting military sociologists) demonstrate increasing anti- Yeltsin sentiments

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among military personnel. One survey conducted by a military sociologist from the Humanitarian

Academy in Moscow found that 45% ofthe officers voted for Zhirinovskiy's ultra- nationalist party in

the December elections (compared to less than a quarter among civilian voters). Another survey, this

time ofsenior officers, found less support for Zhirinovskiy, but high approval of General Lebed and

strong distrust for both Yeltsin and Grachev.

Political insiders appear to fully understand the discontent within the military and worry about the

military's reaction to an attempt to solve Russia's leadership problem through authoritarian means (such

as postponing presidential elections). The military's reaction to past political crises indicates that it

would not intervene unless conflict between political factions turns violent, in which case it would likely

intervene on the side that the high command perceives as most likely to promote stability. The problem

for both establishment insiders and opposition groups is that neither side can predict how the high

command will view the next crisis.

The current political situation in Russia is very similar to the situation one year ago. The problem is: the

use of force a year ago did not solve Yeltsin's problems. He did gain a new parliament that has been (at

least initially) less combative towards him, but he and the new parliament have not been successful in

garnering widespread support. Moreover, the opposition - and the Russian population as a whole -- have

become even more disenchanted with the current group of establishment insiders. Furthermore, the

military, which resisted involvement last October, remains an independent political actor. IfYeltsin does

decide to go along with those who advocate the unconstitutional postponement of electionspwhich he is

probably inclined to dophe faces the real possibility that he will not only further delay the onset of

democracy in Russia, he may also be initiating his own political demise.

Recommendations

Yeltsin's dilemma - and Russia's dilemma - also poses a challenge to the United States. The

United States has made the democratization of Russia the pivotal issue in Russian-American

relations. Any attempt by Russian political insiders to avoid a constitutional succession could

threaten the cornerstone ofthat relationship. Since Yeltsin and his advisors will probably make a

decision over the next six months on whether to adopt an election postponement strategy, the

United States should start considering now how it might respond to such an eventuality.

Ifthe United States decides that democratization must continue to be the cornerstone of

Russian-American relations, it should strongly advice President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders

that circumventing democratic processes for leadership change will endanger further

Russian-American cooperation on a broad range of issues -including economic support to Russia.

However, if the United States decides that our top priority is continued Russia-American

partnership in the international arena - and (an important corollary) that the Yeltsin leadership

is critical to this partnership — we should recognize that Russian democratization (while

remaining a long term goal) is subordinate to other matters of more immediate importance, such

as retaining the current regime in power.

This paper is a result ofthe authors' research to date including a recent research trip to Russia.

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