NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO V.C., I.C., D.C., 

C.C., E.C., J.C., and A.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0038

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD534188

The Honorable Ronee Korbin Steiner, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office, Mesa

By Suzanne Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Ingeet P. Pandya

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

FILED 07-23-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO V.C., et al.

Decision of the Court

2

¶1 Sandra M. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her 

parental rights to seven of her biological children on substance abuse and 

time-in-care grounds. Mother argues the Department of Child Safety (DCS) 

did not make diligent reunification efforts and that termination was not in 

the best interests of one of her children. Because Mother has shown no 

reversible error, the order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of V.C., I.C., D.C., C.C., E.C., 

J.C., and A.C. Both before and during the dependency proceedings, Mother 

has struggled with substance abuse, at one point admitting to using 

fentanyl every other day for an extended period of time. Father of the five 

eldest children passed away in 2017. The father of J.C. and A.C. had his 

parental rights terminated and is not a part of this appeal. In May 2021, DCS 

received a report that, in the presence of V.C., Mother’s significant other 

shot three rounds from his gun into the air during a disagreement. The 

police were called and both Mother and her significant other were arrested 

for possession of illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia. 

¶3 In July 2021, DCS took temporary custody of the children and 

filed a dependency petition alleging, as to Mother, neglect, ongoing 

substance abuse, and history of domestic violence. During the dependency 

proceedings, in October 2021, Mother tested positive for fentanyl after J.C. 

was born. A.C. was born exposed to fentanyl in November 2022. J.C. and 

A.C. had been placed in foster care while I.C. and the remaining four 

children were in familial placements. The court found the children 

dependent as to Mother in February 2022, adopting a family reunification 

case plan and ordering services. 

¶4 During the dependency, DCS offered Mother various 

reunification services, including case management, parenting classes, 

parenting time, substance abuse treatment, drug testing, and 

transportation. Mother minimally engaged in these services. She did not 

drug test, and her referrals for substance abuse treatment through Terros 

and supervised visitation through the Nurturing Parent Program (NPP) 

lapsed when she failed to participate. DCS renewed Mother’s referrals to 

each service many times to no avail; services were repeatedly suspended 

given Mother’s failure to participate. 

¶5 In November 2023, after the dependency had been pending 

for more than two years, the superior court changed the case plan to 

severance and adoption. DCS moved to terminate alleging substance abuse
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO V.C., et al.

Decision of the Court

3

and time-in-care statutory grounds, also alleging that termination was in 

the best interests of the children. The court held a one-day termination 

adjudication in February 2024, where Mother and others testified. The DCS 

case manager testified to the services provided to Mother and her failure to 

engage in, and benefit from, those services. Mother contended DCS failed 

to make a diligent effort to provide her appropriate reunification services 

and asserted that she was managing her substance abuse through 

methadone treatments.

¶6 Later in February 2024, after taking the matter under 

advisement, the court granted the motion to terminate. The court found 

DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds 

alleged, and by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in 

the best interests of the children. The court also found DCS made reasonable 

and diligent efforts to provide Mother with appropriate reunification 

services. This court has jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal pursuant 

to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Ariz. Rev. Stat. 

(A.R.S.) §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A) and 12-2101(A) and Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 

601-03 (2024).

1

DISCUSSION

¶7 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights a court must 

find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground 

articulated in A.R.S. 8-533(B) has been proven and must find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the 

child. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). Because the superior court 

“is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this court will affirm 

an order terminating parental rights as long as it is supported by reasonable 

evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App. 

2009) (citation omitted). 

I. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Finding DCS Made a Diligent 

Effort to Provide Appropriate Reunification Services. 

¶8 Mother argues the superior court erred in finding DCS made 

a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services, one of the 

four required showings for termination based on 15-months time-in-care. 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO V.C., et al.

Decision of the Court

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See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The court must “consider the totality of the 

circumstances when determining whether DCS has made diligent efforts.” 

Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23 ¶ 49 (App. 2019). At a 

minimum, DCS must “identify the conditions causing the child’s out-ofhome placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of 

success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-incare period, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make 

reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves 

difficult.” Id. at 23 ¶ 50 (citation omitted). 

¶9 As noted long ago, this obligation requires DCS to provide a 

parent with services and “the time and opportunity to participate in 

programs designed to help her become an effective parent.” Maricopa Cnty. 

Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). However, DCS “is 

not required to provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent 

participates in each service it offers.” Id. “The purpose of providing 

reunification services is to afford a parent ‘the time and opportunity to 

participate in programs designed to improve the parent’s ability to care for 

the child.’ Such efforts also enable [DCS] to evaluate a parent’s progress, or 

lack thereof, toward making reunification possible.” Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 

94 ¶ 31 (internal citation omitted). The record supports the court’s finding 

that DCS made a diligent effort to provide Mother with appropriate 

reunification services. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8) (“That the child is being 

cared for in an out-of-home placement under the supervision of the juvenile 

court, the division or a licensed child welfare agency, that the agency 

responsible for the care of the child has made a diligent effort to provide 

appropriate reunification services and that one of the following 

circumstances exist.”)

¶10 From July 2021 to February 2024 -- more than two and a half 

years -- DCS offered Mother supervised visits and case-management 

services to help her participate in, and benefit from, services. DCS also 

referred Mother to Terros for substance abuse treatment, to another entity 

for drug testing, to NPP for education and parenting skills, and for domestic 

violence counseling. On appeal, Mother argues the services were 

inadequate because “DCS (1) failed to provide visitation during a portion 

of the reunification attempt, (2) failed to help mother obtain domesticviolence counseling during a portion of the reunification attempt, and (3) 

failed to verify or request documentation of housing and employment.” She 

argues that “DCS withheld visitation during a portion of the reunification 

attempt simply because a contractor was not available to supervise 

visitation” and that “reasonable evidence does not support the court’s 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO V.C., et al.

Decision of the Court

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conclusion that DCS made a diligent effort to reunify Mother with her 

children.” The trial record shows otherwise. 

¶11 The DCS case manager testified that “[she] emailed [Mother 

domestic violence service] information several times, [] offered to call 

together when [she] was in person. [And] [] gave her several resources, 

including Chicanos Por La Causa.” Despite claiming she engaged in 

domestic violence counseling, there was no evidence that Mother contacted 

Chicanos Por La Causa or engaged in services. A prior DCS case manager 

testified that Mother did not provide DCS documentation of stable 

employment, nor did she allow DCS to assess her living situation. Mother 

also failed to engage in other services provided by DCS. Among other 

things, the trial evidence shows Mother missed more than a dozen drug 

tests between late September 2023, and late January 2024, and tested 

positive for fentanyl as recently as early December 2023.

¶12 Other testimony regarding Mother’s chronic addiction to 

fentanyl and lack of participation in services properly supported the court’s 

conclusion that “[Mother] has not established any period of sobriety 

through testing,” “she has also failed to complete domestic violence 

counseling, closed out of prior referrals for parenting classes, and has not 

provided proof of stable housing or income.” Despite Mother’s last-minute 

effort to engage in services just before the severance trial, the court further 

found that “there is a substantial likelihood Mother will not be capable of 

exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.”

¶13 For more than two and a half years, DCS offered Mother 

numerous services, including five referrals to Terros substance abuse 

treatment, eight referrals to parent-aide services through the NPP, four

referrals for a case aide and nine referrals for supervised visits. Despite 

these services, Mother asserts that “DCS failed to provide specific, 

necessary services.” The trial record, however, shows DCS provided 

Mother ample opportunities to engage in reunification efforts. Moreover, 

DCS is “not required to . . . ensure that a parent participates in each service 

it offers.” Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 353. On this record, the court 

properly could find DCS made a diligent effort to provide appropriate 

reunification services and that “Mother has failed to engage in those 

services in a meaningful way.” Thus, Mother has not shown DCS failed to 

make diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services or that 

the court erred in finding that DCS had provided appropriate services. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO V.C., et al.

Decision of the Court

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II. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Finding Termination Was in

I.C.’s Best Interests.

¶14 Mother argues that the superior court abused its discretion in 

finding that termination was in the best interests of I.C. “Termination is in 

the child’s best interests if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance; 

or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 (2018). Courts “must consider the totality 

of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination, 

including the child’s adoptability and the parent’s rehabilitation.”

Id. at 148 ¶ 1.

¶15 The superior court found the children would benefit from 

termination because “it would further the plan of adoption, which would 

provide the children with permanency and stability.” As to I.C., the 

superior court noted that termination was in the best interests of the child 

because “Mother would not be able to tend to [I.C’s] behavioral and mental 

health needs at this time or any time in the near future.” On appeal, 

Mother’s argument focuses on the fact that “DCS had [not] (1) found 

anyone willing and able to adopt I.C., or (2) could do so within a 

meaningful period of time.” However, the superior court found that I.C. is 

adoptable as defined in Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 370-71 

¶¶ 19-24 (App. 2018). “It is well established in state-initiated cases that the 

child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests

finding.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13 (2018) (quoting Demetrius L. v. 

Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 15 (2016)). Trial evidence supports the finding 

that I.C. would benefit from termination because she is currently in a

placement that is able to provide for both her basic needs and special needs

and is “adoptable.” For these reasons, Mother has not shown the court 

abused its discretion in finding that severance is in I.C.’s best interests. 

CONCLUSION

¶16 The order terminating Mother’s parental rights to V.C., I.C., 

D.C., C.C., E.C., J.C., and A.C. is affirmed.