# Peace Operations:  A Comparison of Somalia and
Haiti

Authors: David Bentley and Robert Oakley

Note:

Conclusions

About the Authors

Mandate and Advance Planning

UNOSOM II was officially established by UN Security
Council (UNSC) Resolution 814 on March 26, 1993, four
months after the U.S.-led multinational force (UNITAF)
had begun, and less than six weeks before UNOSOM II
was to take over.  Both operations were authorized under
Chapter VII of the UN charter, but UNOSOM II was
explicitly authorized to employ coercive force for a much
broader mandate, covering more territory.  Little planning
had been done by the UN, and U.S. planning on behalf of
the UN was not effectively integrated.  Despite strong
urging by the United States, no UN planners were sent to
Somalia before the arrival of the UNOSOM II Commander
and Deputy Commander in late March, 1993.

Because of this lack of planning, the top UNOSOM II
military commanders had no understanding of the
transition;  the number, capability, or concept of
employment of their forces; or the rules of engagement
(ROE).  Their staff consisted only of that assembled
hastily for them by UNITAF from its component units
which would stay for UNOSOM II and they received only
weak support from the inexperienced, undermanned, and
overworked UN Secretariat staff.  (At this time the
Secretary General's military advisor had a staff of only
two officers. Two years later, by the time planning began
for UNMIH, this office had expanded to over one hundred
experienced officers).  Given this background, it is not
surprising that UNOSOM II encountered the difficulties it
did.

Preparations for Haiti were better. The U.S.-led 
Multi-National Force (MNF) and the follow-on UN-led UNMIH
were established by UNSC Resolution 940 on July 31,
1994. The  mandates were very similar. The UN
Secretariat and the United States started planning for
UNMIH shortly after its approval eight months before
UNMIH was to take over. A 60-person UN planning team
went to Haiti in October 1994 to work with the MNF, and
experienced personnel of the UN Secretariat worked
closely with U.S. planners from the U.S. Atlantic
Command (USACOM) and the Joint Staff. There were
numerous visits and interchanges of ideas between the
U.S. and the UN, leading to a mutually approved
transition plan and a subsequent plan for on-going UNMIH
operations. This included an intensive two-week training
session in early March for UNMIH staff. Politically, the
experienced U.S. Ambassador provided continuity for the
UN in understanding and dealing with the Haitians, working
closely with both the MNF and the UNMIH. Support
from the UN Secretariat after the transition, supplemented
by USACOM, has been satisfactory. Thus, there was a
more reasonable mandate for Haiti with more experienced
and numerous planners preparing for UNMIH well in
advance.

Size and Composition of Forces; C3

For UNMIH, the force envisaged is 6,000 down from
20,000 in MNF including the 550-person U.S. Quick
Reaction Force (QRF) in U.S. camouflage  not UN
white painted vehicles and helicopters. The retention of 
550 U.S. Special Forces soldiers in Haiti's interior
provides a significant stabilizing capability UNMIH would
otherwise lack.  Some 5,500 of the 6,000 personnel were
present at the time of transition on March 31.  The 12,000-
person UNOSOM II force at the time of transition was too
much reduced in size and capability (see table); the
UNMIH force appears to be well-sized to the military
requirements of Haiti.

In Somalia, the United States and the UN badly
misunderstood the size and composition of military force
which UNOSOM II would need to maintain security, even
before the mandate was explicitly modified on June 5,
1993 to include bringing Aideed's Somali National Army
(SNA) to justice.  The psychological impact of the May 4,
1993 departure of U.S. combat forces from South
Mogadishu  with their tanks and helicopters, and their
replacement by Pakistanis without tanks emboldened
Aideed. The Pakistani unit in his territory was  weaker and
it stopped the night patrolling and other aggressive tactics
the U.S. Marines had used so effectively to maintain
dominance. It also stopped the daily dialogue with
Aideed's commanders which had been used to reduce
tensions. At the outset, UNOSOM II had serious command, control, and
communications problems, stemming from inadequate
planning, absence of clear doctrine, and inadequate
communications and liaison between HQ and component
units. There was confusion over the roles of the UN
Secretary General, the Under Secretary for Peacekeeping,
the Secretary General's Special Representative, the Turkish
Force Commander, and the U.S. Deputy Commander.
Politic-ally, the U.S. Special Representative departed
Somalia just before the UN Special Representative arrived,
leaving a substantial gap in understanding and dealing with
Somali factions.











For Haiti, the United States and UN provided effective
command, control and communications. There was little
difference perceptible in Haitian eyes between the MNF
and UNMIH. The Special Representative of the Secretary
General in Port Au Prince is a former Algerian Foreign
Minister with extensive experience in peacekeeping
operations and in personally negotiating civil conflicts
(e.g., Lebanon's civil war). He was in Haiti as early as
January 1995 to ensure a smooth transition. The UNMIH
commander, a U.S. major general, commands U.S. and
foreign units that were on the ground together for over a
month before the transition. Patrolling in both the capitol
and the interior has continued at previous MNF levels.

Use of Military Force

Neither the makeshift UNOSOM II HQ staff nor the
weak UN Secretariat had experience organizing and
commanding such a large, complex multinational
operation, the first ever authorized to use military force
under Chapter VII. There was no standard UN military
doctrine for an operation so different from the usual
Chapter VI UN peacekeeping. Nor did they understand
the unusual Somali political/cultural context well enough
to foresee that the more intrusive mandate of UNSC
Resolution 814 and the Somali perception of UN weakness
risked a major confrontation with armed Somali factions
posing a real military threat (i.e., urban guerrilla warfare).
UNITAF had achieved its mission without precipitating a
conflict, more aware of the explosive potential of the
situation on the ground and determined not to take sides or
make permanent enemies. However, UNITAF was fully
prepared, should a major confrontation come, by virtue of
the powerful, experienced U.S. contingent and because
other UNITAF component forces generally accepted and
followed standard U.S. military doctrine.

In both Somalia and Haiti, the U.S. concept was to
deploy overwhelming force; to use political dialogue to
persuade potential adversaries to avoid conflict; and to be
ready either to apply decisive force against opposition or
to exercise maximum restraint when the mission could be
successfully achieved without force. In both cases, this
concept led to unopposed landings and deployments of
forces. The isolated incidents of later resistance in both
countries were dealt with swiftly, with minimal U.S.
casualties, while political dialogue continued. The U.S. and
coalition forces in both countries quickly established a
dominating physical and psychological presence, even in
Somalia where the militancy, xenophobia, and available
weaponry of the potential opposition were far greater than
in Haiti. At the time of transfer from the United States to
the UN, the security situation in both countries was
without significant, active armed threat (although armed
banditry was present in both, it was much worse in
Somalia). In Somalia, there was a potential for major
armed opposition to UNOSOM II just below the surface.
Security  problems in Mogadishu began very soon after
UNITAF withdrew. In Haiti, security problems did not
increase during the first month of UNMIH.

Other Problems:  Disarmament and Police

There was only a vague concept of disarmament for
UNOSOM II, but it was broader and more provocative
than that practiced by UNITAF. Additionally, there were
neither plans nor resources for demobilization or job
creation for the armed militias. In fact, there was almost
no further disarmament. Moreover, heavy weapons moved
to  the interior or controlled during UNITAF were brought
back into Mogadishu. For the MNF and UNMIH, there
was a carefully thought-out common concept and plan,
begun by the U.S., that had rounded up almost all heavy
weapons and had started systematic, limited searches for
caches of small arms identified by intelligence reports as
threatening. UNMIH has continued, with the same U.S.
forces, to disarm gradually and keep weapons under
control. Neither the MNF nor UNMIH has undertaken
house-to-house searches. UNMIH has significant, although
not fully adequate plans and resources for demobilization
and job creation.

UNITAF mobilized local resources and created an
interim Somali security force of over 4,000 former police,
who, although poorly trained, assumed a useful role in
Mogadishu and other locations. UNOSOM II was much
less supportive, saw the police as a long-term civilian
function and removed the military backing provided by
UNITAF, including contingents at each police station in
Mogadishu. This left the police with little communications
and logistics, and vulnerable to the much better armed
faction militias. They melted away when combat began
between the SNA and UNOSOM II.

For MNF and UNMIH there was full joint recognition
of the urgent need for a Haitian police force. Detailed
plans developed and implemented by the MNF included the
transfer of responsibility and resources to UNMIH on
March 31. The 600 international police monitors (900
under UNMIH) and the police training academy
established by the United States, augmented by the 4,000-
member Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), became the
core of the UNMIH civilian police operation. The working
relationship between the Haitian police and U.S.  military
units (Special Forces in the interior, MP's in the capitol)
remains unchanged under UNMIH.

Long Term, Strategic Issues

One of the most serious vulnerabilities of UNOSOM
II was the intrusive mandate in UNSC Resolution 814. As
applied in practice, the mandate took on the label of
"nation building" a determined effort backed by military
force to bring into being new, formal Somali political and
administrative structures at the local, regional, and national
levels. It was assumed that Somalis needed outside 
direction and help to build new institutions rather than rebuild
on the basis of Somali tradition. UNITAF avoided such an
approach, instead encouraging Somalis find their own
institutions. The UNOSOM II effort generated major
cultural and political tensions in Somalia, including
significant military opposition from certain groups (such 
as the SNA, who felt the UN was hostile). Any realistic
hope of success would have required greater commitment
of military and economic resources and political will over
a longer period than was acceptable to the United States
and other UN member states.

The existence of albeit weak, government institutions
and a constitution makes Haiti different. Also, the
Governor's Island agreement involving  Aristide and his
opponents further defined the political parameters for
resolving conflicts. In practice these agreements have been
uncertain and elections have been postponed several times.
However, the United States, by means of an active
bilateral assistance program of over $200 million annually,
plus outstanding work by some 200 U.S. Army Civil
Affairs reservists and 1,200 Special Forces personnel, has
provided adequate near term support to make the system
work. Those efforts energized the moribund government
ministries and ensured a modicum of administrative and
social services in both Port Au Prince and the interior.
Elections for Parliament and local officials are on track for
early this summer.

The United States had the approval and cooperation of
the UN, including UNMIH, which assumed formal
responsibility on March 31, to work with the Aristide
Government on elections, creation of a new security force,
a reformed and retrained judicial system, and other issues.
The United States and the UN are endeavoring to establish
respect for human rights, democracy, honest
administration, the rule of law, and at least peaceful
coexistence between Aristide supporters and the former
regime supporters. This is not consistent with Haiti's past
and is complicated by largely subsurface tensions amongst
various Haitian groups, and between them and the United
States and UNMIH. However, in sharp contrast to
Somalia, there are no well-armed, aggressive Haitian
militias, and there is little likelihood of organized para-
military conflict with UNMIH. There is much greater
support for democratic values.

How long will it take to achieve an acceptable degree
of reform in Haitian institutions and governance, and will
the United States and the international community sustain
their involvement and investment until this has been
achieved? Some of the best-informed, most experienced
senior officials from the United States and other engaged
governments estimate that the United States and
international commitment could require roughly 10 years
rather than the March 31, 1996 date set by UNSC Res.
940 for the termination of UNMIH.