NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 13-4054

No. 13-4696

____________

KEISHA BOYD; 

CHANDAR MCDANIELS; 

AME'CHERIE CANNON,

 Appellants

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 

GARY LANIGAN, In Official Capacity and Individually; 

PAUL LAGANA, In Official Capacity and Individually; 

DARRON DAYE, In Official Capacity and Individually; 

MAYOR MARVIN BLEVINS, In Official Capacity and Individually;

MAYOR GREGORY PAUL, In Official Capacity and Individually; 

LT. EDWIN RODRIGUEZ, In Official Capacity and Individually; 

LT. DARRYL MORGAN, In Official Capacity and Individually;

LT DARRYL COBURN, In Official Capacity and Individually; 

LT. ASMAR GRAHAM, In Official Capacity and Individually; 

LT MITCHELL DOUGLAS, In Official Capacity and Individually;

JOHN DOES 1-20; JANE DOES 1-20; 

ABC CORPORATIONS A THROUGH Z

____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 12-cv-06612)

District Judge: Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise

____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 11, 2014

Before: FISHER, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
2

(Filed: September 12, 2014)

____________

OPINION

____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Keisha Boyd, Chandar McDaniels, and Ame’Cherie Cannon (Plaintiffs) appeal an 

order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing their 

amended complaint for failure to state a claim. They also appeal an order in which Boyd 

obtained a default judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm both orders. 

I

Because we write primarily for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, 

we recite only the facts and procedural history essential to our decision.

Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in state court against their employer, the New Jersey 

Department of Corrections (DOC), and former co-workers1to recover damages for 

alleged sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and military 

status. Defendants removed the complaint to the District Court. The District Court 

dismissed the complaint without prejudice, noting it “fail[ed] to satisfy the federal 

pleading standards in virtually every conceivable way.” App. at 53. Although there were 

“far too many deficiencies in the Complaint to list,” the District Court identified five 
3

specific errors for Plaintiffs to correct in an amended complaint. Plaintiffs did file an 

amended complaint, but the District Court determined that it cured only one of the five 

deficiencies: “[A]s with the initial Complaint, the Amended Complaint [was] a scattershot

of allegations that are, in the aggregate, virtually inscrutable.” App. at 116. For that 

reason, the District Court dismissed the amended complaint as well, this time with 

prejudice. Upon Boyd’s motion, the District Court amended its dismissal to preserve a 

default judgment that Boyd had obtained against Darron Daye, one of the individual 

Defendants.

Appellants filed this timely appeal.2

II

We exercise plenary review over dismissals for failure to state a claim. Gelman v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009). In so doing, we accept 

as true all factual allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 132 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006). The 

abuse of discretion standard of review governs both dismissals pursuant to Rule 8 and 

 

1 The individual Defendants were Gary Lanigan, Paul K. Lagana, Darron Daye, 

Marvin Blevins, Gregory Paul, Mitchell A. Douglas, Edwin Rodriguez, Darryl A. 

Morgan, Darryl Coburn, and Asmar Graham. 

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and exercised 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. For 

that reason, it was not required to remand Plaintiffs’ claims to state court, as Plaintiffs 

argue. See Pryzbowski v. U.S. Health, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that 

remand of state law claims to state court “was certainly an option for the District Court 

but not one that it was obliged to take”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4

denials of leave to amend a complaint. Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. LLC, 305 

F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir. 

1996).

III

Plaintiffs first challenge the dismissal of their amended complaint.3 Based on our 

independent review, we agree with the District Court that it still “lack[s] in coherence and 

logical organization, in violation of Rule 8(a).” App. at 116. It neither pleads specific 

facts for each Defendant’s liability on each claim nor does it “point to the specific legal 

provisions giving rise to each . . . claim[].” Id. And though critical, the District Court was 

quite correct in noting that the amended complaint “remains brimming with vague, 

redundant, and conclusory allegations that cannot support one or more claims for relief.” 

Id. For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the amended 

complaint.4

 

3 Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court misapplied the law in relying on a 

plausibility standard, saying no such standard exists after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544 (2007). To the contrary, we have recognized that the “plausibility standard 

is an interpretation of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8” and is the “threshold 

requirement . . . to show that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In re Ins. Brokerage 

Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 320 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation deleted) (alteration 

deleted).

4 We need not address Plaintiffs’ argument that the District Court erroneously 

dismissed their complaint under Rule 12(f), because it did no such thing. Although 

Defendants filed a Rule 12(f) motion to strike, the District Court treated Defendants’ 

motion to strike as a motion to dismiss.
5

Plaintiffs next argue that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to give 

them a second opportunity to amend. We disagree. In dismissing Plaintiffs’ initial 

complaint, the District Court identified five deficiencies that Plaintiffs had to cure in their 

amended complaint. Because Plaintiffs addressed only one of the five errors, the District 

Court reasonably presumed a second opportunity to amend would prove futile. We 

perceive no error in this determination. 

Lastly, Plaintiffs challenge the default judgment Boyd obtained against Defendant 

Darron Daye. Boyd argues that the DOC should be liable under a theory of respondeat 

superior for Daye’s default judgment. She contends that an employer is subject to liability 

for torts committed by employees acting within the scope of their employment, but she 

cites no authority for the separate proposition that an employer is liable for a default 

judgment against an employee. Furthermore, Boyd has not demonstrated that she 

preserved this issue in the District Court. Her filings in pursuance of the default judgment 

against Daye make no mention of the DOC.

5

 We will affirm the District Court’s order on 

the default judgment. 

* * *

For the reasons stated, we will affirm both orders of the District Court.

 

5 Separately, Boyd’s co-Plaintiffs, McDaniels and Cannon, claim entitlement to a 

default judgment against Daye as well, and Boyd contends the District Court’s damage 

award of $10,000 was insufficient. Because Plaintiffs have failed to identify either a 

factual error by the District Court or any legal authority for their arguments, we disagree.