Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JENNIFER A. JOAS GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Joas & Stotts Attorney General of Indiana

Madison, Indiana

JODI KATHRYN STEIN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DARCI J. MCFADDEN, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 39A05-1406-CR-255

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Darrell M. Auxier, Judge

Cause No. 39C01-1207-FA-927

December 23, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BROWN, Judge

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not 

be regarded as precedent or cited 

before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of 

res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the 

law of the case.
2

Darci McFadden appeals her sentence following the revocation of her probation. 

McFadden raises one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court abused 

its discretion in ordering her to serve eight years of her previously suspended sentence. 

We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 27, 2012, the State charged McFadden with dealing methamphetamine as 

a class A felony, conspiracy to deal in methamphetamine as a class A felony, and 

possession of methamphetamine as a class B felony. On October 25, 2013, McFadden 

pled guilty to dealing methamphetamine as a class B felony, and the State agreed to 

dismiss the remaining charges. On November 13, 2013, the court accepted McFadden’s 

guilty plea and sentenced her to ten years with ten years suspended except for time served 

and ordered that she serve the suspended portion of her sentence through community 

corrections as a term of her probation. 

During orientation at community corrections, McFadden was informed that she 

could not have over-the-counter medicines or mouthwash that contain alcohol. At some 

point, McFadden tested positive for alcohol. On February 9, 2014, McFadden, who wore 

a GPS bracelet, was out of range or was in a location not previously approved by her case 

manager, Heather Kindoll, or any other community corrections staff. 

On February 11, 2014, McFadden tested positive for Xanax, did not produce a 

prescription for Xanax, and did not inform Kindoll that she had a prescription. At some 

point, McFadden had a conversation with Kindoll about her testing positive for Xanax, 
3

and McFadden admitted to using it and said that she was stressed and overwhelmed with 

her health and her family being sent to the Department of Correction. 

Kindoll issued an administrative agreement with McFadden based upon her 

positive tests for Xanax and alcohol and her being out of range, pursuant to which 

McFadden was to obtain a substance abuse evaluation and perform twenty-four hours of 

community service. The administrative agreement was intended to “provide a sanction 

and try to keep it out of the courts.” Transcript at 11. Kindoll learned that McFadden 

went to obtain a substance abuse evaluation and that “through insurance issues she could 

not be seen by that particular therapist at that time and was offered to stay until 2 p.m. 

that afternoon to see the therapist that her insurance covered,” but McFadden did not stay. 

Id. at 16. McFadden mentioned concerns that she might not be able to afford the

evaluation, and Kindoll told her that if there was an issue to talk to her “after the fact so 

that way we can maybe discuss helping with it.” Id. McFadden did not complete either 

requirement of the administrative agreement. 

On March 27, 2014, McFadden was out of range without authorization. 

McFadden told Kindoll that she went to McDonald’s and the bank around midnight 

because she needed to obtain money to pay her brother. Kindoll told McFadden that 

“midnight was not the appropriate time to be doing that.” Id. at 13. 

On April 21, 2014, the State filed a verified petition to revoke community 

corrections/probation. The State alleged that McFadden violated probation by using 

alcohol on or about January 27, 2014, by being out of range without authorization from 
4

14:22 to 16:09 and from 18:20 to 20:48 on February 9, 2014, and by using Xanax on or 

about February 11, 2014. The State also alleged, “[a]s a sanction, [McFadden] was given 

an administrative agreement to obtain a substance abuse evaluation and to complete 24 

hours of community service,” and McFadden “failed to comply with the administrative 

agreement.” Appellant’s Appendix at 98-99. The State also alleged that she violated 

probation by being out of range without authorization from 23:54 to 00:58 on March 28, 

2014, and by failing to pay fees as directed. 

On May 21, 2014, the court held a hearing. Kindoll testified to the foregoing facts 

regarding McFadden’s violations. McFadden testified that she had some health issues 

regarding stomach pain and rectal bleeding that began four months earlier and that she 

went on leave at work under the Family Medical Leave Act beginning March 18, 2014. 

She testified that she was not aware that she consumed alcohol but that she did use 

mouthwash with alcohol and also Dayquil and Nyquil because she had a cold and was 

working twelve hours per day. 

When asked about being out of range from 2:22 p.m. to 4:09 p.m. and from 6:20 

p.m. to 8:48 p.m. on February 9, 2014, McFadden answered: “The only thing that I could 

think of on that date is where I went to [King’s Daughter’s Hospital] to get my report for 

my CAT scan for uh . . . to take down with me to Clark County.” Transcript at 24. She 

indicated that she did not know for a fact that occurred on February 9, 2014, but that it 

was her best guess. She later testified that she did not have any documentation from 

King’s Daughter’s Hospital. She testified that she told Kindoll that she went to the 
5

hospital from 2:30 to 4:00 and then to Clark Memorial Emergency Room from 6:20 p.m. 

to 9:00 p.m. 

When asked about being out of range from 11:54 p.m. to 12:58 a.m. on March 27, 

2014, McFadden testified:

Uh . . . now that I think about it, I had gotten my check, and I was off work, 

and I usually go after work to Wal-Mart to cash my check which is at four 

in the morning, but we can’t cash our checks until after midnight, so I 

figured that it would have been all right for me to go after midnight to cash 

my check so I could get electric money to my brother for the electric.

Id. at 33. McFadden agreed that she did not have permission to do that. 

She testified that at some point in time she had a prescription for Xanax, that the 

Xanax she took was leftover from her own prescription, and she submitted a Record of 

Prescriptions showing that she was dispensed Xanax on September 10, 2013. She also 

testified that she did not give Kindoll her prescription because she did not have it. 

With respect to the substance abuse evaluation, McFadden testified that she went 

to Centerstone and was told that “it would be after two before [she] could see them” and 

that she had to be at work by 4:00 and that she could not wait that long. Id. at 28. She 

testified that she called Centerstone, that they kept telling her she needed money to see 

someone, that she discussed the situation with Kindoll, and that Kindoll did not believe 

her. As for the community service, McFadden testified that she went to Goodwill and 

filled out their application packet on March 9, 2014, but Goodwill never contacted her. 

She also testified that she called an animal shelter and they told her that she needed to go 

to city hall, but she did not go because she was worried about “getting [her] health 
6

covered . . . .” Id. at 41. She testified that it was her intention to complete the evaluation 

and the community service and that she had been fairly busy with doctor visits, had been 

in a lot of pain, and had not willfully stopped paying her fees. 

 The court found that McFadden violated the terms of her community corrections 

and probation by using alcohol, by being out of range without authorization on February 

9, 2014, by using Xanax, by failing to comply with the administrative agreement, and by 

being out of range without authorization on March 27, 2014. The prosecutor 

recommended that McFadden’s entire sentence be revoked. McFadden’s counsel argued 

that “this is an extremely minor violation” and revocation of her entire sentence was very 

severe in light of the violation. Id. at 48. On May 30, 2014, the court entered an order 

revoking McFadden’s probation and sentencing her to serve eight years of her previously 

suspended sentence at the Department of Correction. 

DISCUSSION

The issue is whether the court abused its discretion in ordering McFadden to serve 

eight years of her previously suspended sentence. McFadden does not challenge the 

finding that she violated her probation. Rather, McFadden argues that her violations did 

not warrant the sanction imposed and that evidence was presented that explains and 

mitigates her violations. She points to the mitigating factors identified by the court in the 

initial sentencing order dated November 13, 2013. Specifically, she points out that the 

court had identified the mitigators of her lack of a criminal history, that she was a suitable 

candidate for community corrections, and that she was in the low-risk category to 
7

reoffend. She argues that her violations were minor and that they have no relation to the 

instant offense. She argues that she was compliant with her placement until she began 

experiencing serious health problems. She argues that she attempted to complete a 

substance abuse evaluation and took steps to participate in community service. She also 

asserts that there was no evidence presented regarding a deadline to complete the 

substance abuse evaluation or participate in community service. Lastly, she appears to 

argue that the positive urine screen for alcohol was due to her consumption of cold 

medicine. 

The State asserts that McFadden committed multiple probation violations. The 

State argues that, out of the fourteen years she could have received under the plea 

agreement, the court sentenced her initially to a ten-year suspended sentence. The State 

asserts that, “[h]aving been given this incredible windfall, [McFadden] violated multiple 

conditions of her probation, including two violations concerning drug use, which was 

related to [her] original conviction.” Appellee’s Brief at 9.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) sets forth a trial court’s sentencing options if the trial 

court finds a probation violation and provides:

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before 

termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the 

probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following 

sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without 

modifying or enlarging the conditions.
8

(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more 

than one (1) year beyond the original probationary 

period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was 

suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

The Indiana Supreme Court has held that a trial court’s sentencing decisions for 

probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard. Prewitt v. 

State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The Court explained that “[o]nce a trial court has 

exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have 

considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed” and that “[i]f this discretion were not 

afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges 

might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. An abuse of 

discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances. Id. (citation omitted). As long as the proper procedures have been 

followed in conducting a probation revocation hearing, “the trial court may order 

execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a violation by a preponderance of 

the evidence.” Goonen v. State, 705 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

The record reveals that the trial court initially sentenced McFadden to ten years 

suspended to probation and ordered that she serve the suspended portion of her sentence 

through community corrections as a term of her probation. At the probation revocation 

hearing, the trial court indicated that it gave McFadden a break. The court asked 

McFadden what it told her at the initial sentencing hearing, and McFadden stated that the 
9

court told her that she “needed to do what [she] needed to do because [she had] ten years 

over [her] head” and that if she did not do that she would go to prison. Transcript at 49. 

At some point, McFadden tested positive for alcohol. While McFadden alleges that the 

positive result was based upon her use of cold medicine or mouthwash, we observe that 

McFadden was informed during orientation at community corrections that she could not 

have over-the-counter medicines or mouthwash that contain alcohol. Twice McFadden 

was out of range without authorization, and one of those times occurred after midnight. 

McFadden also tested positive for Xanax and did not provide her case manager with a 

prescription. Further, McFadden did not complete the substance abuse evaluation or 

perform twenty-four hours of community service as required by the administrative 

agreement. 

Given the circumstances as set forth above and in the record, including that 

McFadden committed multiple violations, we cannot say that the court abused its 

discretion in ordering McFadden to serve eight years of her previously suspended 

sentence. See Milliner v. State, 890 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reinstating the probationer’s previously 

suspended sentence), trans. denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order that McFadden serve 

eight years of her previously suspended sentence.
10

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and ROBB, J., concur.