Number 66, March 1996

NATO's Responseto the ProliferationChallenge
by Robert Joseph

Conclusions

	Proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons is increasingly perceived by members ofthe North Atlantic Alliance as a political and military threat that could undermine NATO's ability toconduct essential defense missions, both in protecting Alliance territory and populations and in out-of-arearegional conflicts.

- 	Alliance progress in addressing the NBC challenge is impressive. Allies have agreed on an assessment ofthe risks, and on the security implications of, and the military requirements to meet, the growing threat.Allies have identified a set of capabilities--in such areas as intelligence, active and passive defenses, andcommand and control--needed to give NATO the ability to project power and conduct operations in anNBC environment.  

- 	The success of the NATO initiative to counter the proliferation threat, however, will only be assured whenallies make national and collective commitments to field the necessary military capabilities  and embed thethreat in the Alliance defense planning process. To succeed, Alliance leaders will also need to rethinkexisting positions on nuclear deterrence and on the need for wide-area missile defenses.

- 	NATO's ability to respond effectively to the NBC and missile threat may well be the key indicator of theAlliance's ability to adapt to the new security environment and the most important stimulus for forceplanning and defense analysis in the decades ahead.  Acquiring the capabilities to deter and defend againstthe proliferation threat is essential to the future credibility of the Alliance.
**Proliferation Challenges are Dynamic

	During the Cold War, proliferation was associated almost exclusively with nuclear weapons--viewed bythe Alliance as an important political problem, but not central to NATO security.  By the time of the Brussel'sSummit in January 1994, this view had changed fundamentally.  Mounting evidence--from post-Desert StormIraq, from North Korea and from Iran and Libya--demonstrated that potential adversaries in regions of vitalinterest were determined to acquire NBC weapons and missiles as political and military tools to advance veryaggressive, and in most cases, anti-western agendas. In the eyes of proliferant states, possession of NBCweapons would not only add to their regional stature, but would also offer an asymmetrical counter to theWest's superiority in conventional forces.  Longer-range delivery systems would optimize the political effectof brandishing NBC and, thereby, add to the value of these weapons in deterring outside intervention. 
	Previous Alliance efforts undertaken after the Gulf War were now considered insufficient to the emergingthreat, especially in the field of defense measures.  As a first step to remedy the perceived inadequacies, NATOleaders at the Brussels Summit directed the preparation of an "overall policy framework."  A comprehensiveapproach across the spectrum of political and military measures was considered essential.
	Prevention of proliferation would remain the primary goal, although NATO leaders had concluded thata determined proliferant could likely succeed. Traditional methods had not worked with states like Iraq andNorth Korea, who violated arms control commitments without detection and manipulated export controls togain access to sensitive technologies and materials. As a result, Alliance members would need to be preparedmilitarily to protect their populations and forces against the proliferation threat.
	To conduct an assessment of the threat and the appropriate response, NATO established two expertgroups.  The first, the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP), was tasked to develop the broadpolicy framework. The second, the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP), was charged with examiningthe implications of proliferation for defense planning, identifying allied capabilities to protect against the threatand recommending additional capabilities that might be required.
**Progress to Date:  Defining the Threat

	While the SGP work has been essentially descriptive in its treatment of the "political dimension" of theproliferation challenges, the work of the DGP has broken new ground.  The DGP completed the first phase ofits work in late 1994--an assessment of the potential threats to NATO to the year 2010 stemming from thegrowing proliferation in the Mediterranean and Middle East, as well as from illicit transfers of material andexpertise from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and from suppliers outside of the NATO region,such as North Korea and China. 
	The DGP risk assessment resulted in even greater common ground among NATO members, including anunderstanding of the complexity of the proliferation threat and the need to differentiate among NBC weapons,recognizing that they possess different attributes and uses.  These differences include:

-  Nuclear weapons  appear to be the most prized by proliferant states. While the utility of nuclear weaponshas been increasingly questioned in the West, proliferators appear to value highly even a small handful ofcrude weapons. Presumably,  such a capability could be used to coerce neighboring states and deter non-regional states from responding to aggression. The trend toward acquiring longer range ballistic missiles,capable of striking NATO territory in the future, may best be understood in the context of seeking thiscoercive leverage.  

-  Biological weapons , although still often considered less threatening than nuclear weapons, have emergedas a key threat.  Technical advances have undermined many of the previous assumptions about the militaryutility of BW agents.  For example, BW can now be used in a more discriminate fashion, such as againstnaval task forces or on the battlefield against such critical targets as ports and airfields. 

-  Chemical weapons  are clearly seen by proliferant states  as an effective military tool, as well as aninstrument of terror.  Even with effective defenses, the use of CW could have a dramatic effect on troopperformance and, perhaps, on the "will" to fight.  Although less effective than biological agents, chemicalscould also be employed against populations for psychological and political impact.

	The DGP assessment also produced a set of common views on the nature of an NBC-armed adversary.  Inthis case, the "strategic personalities" of the regional proliferators are assessed to be much different, and moredangerous, than those of former Soviet leaders.  In particular, such regimes would be  less likely to actaccording to the "rules" of deterrence and more prone to take risks.  Employment concepts would also likelybe much different.  NBC weapons in a regional conflict--especially chemical and biological weapons--maybest be understood as weapons that weaker states could use selectively, precisely because they offer significantpsychological, political and military advantages.  Rather than being weapons of last resort, NBC weapons couldbe weapons of choice, employed early in a manner that creates significant, possibly crippling, political andmilitary effects.
**Implications for NATO Defense

	The DGP began the second phase of its work program--identifying the security implications of NBC andmissile proliferation and the capabilities necessary to respond--by exploring several scenarios involving anNBC-armed adversary: first, threats against Alliance territory where NATO populations would be at risk;second, threats to the ability of Alliance members to intervene in regions of vital interest; and third, threats topeacekeeping and humanitarian missions in which NATO forces would be involved. 
	A number of observations emerged from this examination:

- 	The greatest threat presented by NBC and missile proliferation, at least in the foreseeable future, is todeployed forces in regional contingencies.  Therefore, NATO should give first priority to the protection ofits forces. As adversaries acquire longer-range systems, the focus of the Alliance effort may shift to theprotection of NATO populations.   

- 	NBC weapons could directly impact the outcome of an operation by disrupting coalition cohesion or byinhibiting the deployment of NATO  forces.  In particular, loss of staging areas in the theater, because ofthreats to, or actual use against host countries could compromise the Alliance's ability to prosecute thecampaign.  

- 	NATO forces will be most vulnerable to NBC attack while entering the region of conflict, when largenumbers of forces are concentrated at relatively few airfields and ports.  NBC weapons used to  disruptoperations at these facilities could have a profound influence on the ability of Alliance forces to carry outtheir missions.

- 	NBC weapons could alter the military balance in the region if their use severely degrades the capability ofNATO forces essential to the conflict.  Such degradation could be direct or indirect. For example, if NBC useoccurs or is considered likely, forces will need to operate for extended periods in protective posture, witha major decrement to combat capabilities.

- 	Uneven capabilities among coalition partners with regard to equipment and training for NBC operationsand for defending against the missile threat could offer the enemy opportunities for exploitation.

- 	Reactions by the civilian population within the theater  could also have a fundamental effect on the conductof operations.  Loss of key civilian labor, such as on docks, could profoundly degrade reinforcementrequirements.   The need to divert military resources to protect civilians could also detract significantly fromthe effectiveness of Alliance forces.  

	On the basis of these implications, the DGP identified the range of capabilities  needed to support NATO'soverall political-military objectives for dealing with proliferation.  A summary of the group's findings, releasedin late 1995, emphasized the need for the Alliance to possess a "core" set of capabilities, including:

- 	Strategic and operational intelligence, including early warning data;
- 	Automated and deployable command, control, and communications;
- 	Continuous wide-area ground surveillance to locate and track mobile targets;
- 	Remote and point CW and BW detection, identification, and warning;
- 	Extended air defenses, including against tactical ballistic and cruise missiles for deployed forces; and
- 	NBC individual protective equipment for deployed forces.

	In several of these core areas the Alliance already has or is developing the required capabilities.  In thesecases, the DGP findings give further weight to existing programs as well as  demonstrate how supplementingthese capabilities with other initiatives--such as layered Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and special munitionsfor NBC agent defeat--could assist the Alliance in meeting its objectives in discouraging, deterring anddefending against proliferation. In other core areas new initiatives will be necessary.  
**The Road Ahead:  Key Issues and Recommendations 

	The DGP is currently embarked on the third phase of its work program, assessing Alliance and nationalcapabilities with the objective of recommending specific measures to meet existing deficiencies.  The ability ofthe Alliance to take such measures will determine the ultimate success of NATO's initiative to protect againstthe NBC and missile threat.
	To succeed in fielding the required military capabilities, NATO will need to overcome a number ofobstacles. These range from the conceptual (e.g., how the Alliance thinks about the security implications ofproliferation and deterrence) to the operational (e.g., the actual commitment of resources and makingproliferation an integral element of NATO's defense planning process).  In particular the Alliance must addressfive critical issues.

-  Alliance political leaders must think differently about the proliferation threat .  In this context, the views of thenational leadership in several key allied governments are not well defined. The argument that traditionalnon-proliferation approaches are sufficient to meet the challenge may prevail in some capitals, especiallywhen decision makers are confronted with hard policy and fiscal choices.  
	In several cases, concern over undertaking new defense initiatives stems from the view that such measurescould be counter-productive if they are interpreted as an intention to provoke conflict through the preemptiveuse of force.  As the DGP work has shown, preventive efforts are essential and must be strengthened, but arenot in and of themselves sufficient. In fact, acquiring the type of military capabilities identified by the DGPwould clearly advance non-proliferation goals by devaluing NBC weapons by denying their use or mitigatingtheir effects.  Far from provocative, these prudent defense measures would likely discourage NBC and missileacquisition in the first instance.  

- The attainment of the identified military capabilities would also reinforce  NATO's nuclear deterrent.  Here, Allianceleaders must reevaluate longstanding and fundamental assumptions of deterrence.   The principal concept of thepast--deterrence based on the threat of  retaliation and punishment--is likely to be less relevant in aregional conflict involving NBC where the interests are asymmetrical and the conditions for stabledeterrence are problematic.  The threat of a nuclear response to deter NBC use simply will not be crediblein all cases.  NATO did not rely exclusively on nuclear deterrence in the Cold War, nor can it in the presentenvironment.

- While the Alliance must retain the option for an effective nuclear response, it is essential to complement NATO'snuclear forces with a mix of conventional counterforce enhancements and active and passive defenses.  Possessingthese capabilities will strengthen deterrence and further undermine the value of NBC use in the eyes ofpotential proliferators.  Deterrence through denial is a stronger foundation for NATO policy than theconcept of massive   retaliation which, under a wide range of circumstances, would be perceived asdisproportionate or otherwise inappropriate by the Alliance in time of conflict. Moreover, the identified conventional capabilities will provide the best hedge against deterrence failure, allowing NATO forces tooperate effectively in an NBC environment. 

- The Alliance will also need to rethink its longstanding position on wide-area missile defenses.  Given the spread ofincreasingly capable cruise and ballistic missiles, the threat to NATO territory is rapidly approaching.  Thusfar, the Alliance is  committed to deploying effective point defenses to protect troops against theatermissiles.  While this capability will make a major contribution to the Alliance's deterrence and defenseposture,  protection against the longer-range missile threat is essential.  Concerns about the effectivenessof British and French nuclear forces (measured in the context of deterring the former Soviet Union) andabout the political consequences of amending or abrogating the ABM Treaty have for decades dominatedthe debate and ensured opposition to developing and deploying effective territorial defenses.  With the endof the Soviet Union and the expansion of the regional NBC and missile proliferation threat, the rationalebehind these concerns requires reevaluation.  

- Finally, the Alliance will need to commit scarce defense resources in a period of declining military budgets to meet theproliferation challenges.  Commitment to acquiring these capabilities will be demonstrated only when NATOmembers fund specific programs, such as JSTARS and a THAAD-type TMD system.

	In conclusion, NATO's preparedness to deal with proliferation threats is an essential aspect of theAlliance's adaptation to the new security environment.  Alliance work to date provides the necessaryframework for success and a firm foundation on which to build.  NATO's military and political leadership mustnow follow through.     

Robert Joseph is the director of the NDU Center for Counterproliferation Research and a member of theNational War College faculty.  He was previously U.S. Commissioner to the SCC. A longer version of thisarticle appears in the Spring 1996 issue of Survival published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.NOTE

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