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1 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES NUMBER 5, AUGUST 1994

e Pending Crisis in North Africa

Conference Conclusions Background

* The weaknesses of the existing government The goal of the conference was to exchange views

leadership in Algeria point to eventual implosion, with on regional security challenges, their underlying

either a return to 1960s warlordism or seizure of power causes, and appropriate strategies for addressing them.

by Islamic radicals. A radically oriented Islamic Differing Tunisian and American perceptions of these

government would have an immediate and negative challenges soon emerged.

effect on the stability of the Maghreb. Tunisians fear The American security concern is two-tiered: the

a domino effect. shorter-term threat is the incremental spread of radical

* The Tunisians oppose concessions to Islamic Islam, ultimately capturing the region, creating a tide

activists, both in Tunisia and in Algeria. They prefer of refugee3 in France, Italy, and Spain. The longertough law-and-order measures in both countries in term threat is the possibility that radical-leaning

what they believe is a "zero-sum game." regimes would acquire weapons of mass destruction

* The Tunisians are uncomfortable with U.S. and that those regimes would disrupt the Middle East

policies ostracizing Qadhafi and Saddam Hussein, as peace process. Other American concerns included

well as official U.S. criticism of tight political and controlling state-directed terrorism and the possible

security controls by the Tunisian government. They resurgence of dormant non-Islamic radicalism by antibelieve that Washington is not focusing on the most Western and anti-U.S. figures, such as Qadhafi.

critical threat to the region's stability-the rise of The Tunisian delegation emphasized three

radical Islam as a hostile political force. concerns: (1) the inherent vulnerability of Tunisia to

* Regional security issues on which the United unwanted external political and military influ,.;nces, (2)

States has focused (proliferation of weapons of mass the imperative of sustaining successful economic and

destruction in the Mediterranean, Libyan mischief, and social reform programs, and (3) the importance of

unrest in the Western Sahara) are discounted by the playing a low-profile, intermediary role in regional

Tunisians. affairs.

About the Conference

Amid growing signs of political and economic The conference was the second in a series

crisis along the northern littoral of Africa, the Institute intended to analyze security issues in the

for National Strategic Studies and the Government of Mediterranean Basin, the initial meeting having been

Tunisia co-sponsored a conference to examine its held In April 1992 at Headquarters, Allied Forces

nature, its root causes, and its implications for the Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples, Italy. The

stability of the region. Held in May 1994 in Tunis, the 1994 Tunis meetings were held at the request of the

conference brought together security policy analysts, CINCSOUTH to examine the changing security

senior government officials, and academic specialists environment in North Africaýin particular, how threats

with extensive background in the region. to the United States and NATO might be addressed.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the author and do not

necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of

Defense, or any other government agency. They do not represent the views of the government of Tunisia.

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PAGE 2 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES STRATEGIC ioRuM #5, AUGUST 1994

Most Maghreb Union (UAM) member governments a floating lumpen proletariat.

(Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) face great External debt. Debt repayment consumes threeinternal and external problems caused b-, conflicts quarters of Algeria's annual export revenues-this at

between radically oriented states, such as Iraq and a time when the pilce of petro-chemicals, Algeria's

Libya (the fifth UAM member), and the United States primary export, is severely depressed.

and its western allies. The lawless behavior of the Islamic Radicalism. The Algerian Islamic

radically oriented states and Western political and Salvation Front (FIS) is regarded by Moroccans and

military reactions compel remaining UAM governments Tunisians as the principal threat to stability in

to make unwanted and uncomfortable choices between neighboring states. The Tunisians feel strongly that

their involvement in regional coalitions (such as UAM) the decision by the government in Algiers (responding

and their need for international (especially Western) to pressure from the military) to cancel the second

trade and support. phase of elections in December 1991 was prudent; they

As early as the 1991 Gulf War, for example, reject the suggestion that denying militant political

President Ben Ali of Tunisia risked losing valuable elements an opportunity to participate in the electoral

French and American aid because of Tunisia's refusal process could further radicalize the movements and

to participate with troops. The majority of Tunisians exacerbate the threat they already pose.

perceived the Gulf War as an unwarranted Proliferation of WMD. The North African

intervention by the United States and its coalition perspective on weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

partners in Arab affairs. Saddam Hussein, in their differs markedly from that found among Eastern Mediview, was merely redressing the regional economic terranean states. While Arab nations acknowledge that

imbalance by taking action against the arrogant, "rich" the Arab-Israeli peace process ho!Js the prospect of

ruling family of Kuwait. reducing regional military tensions, they continue to

focus on the threat they perceive to be posed by a

"The Algerian FIS is regarded by growing Israeli nuclear arsenal and the refusal of

Moroccans and Tunisians as the Washington to pressure Tel Aviv to cap their program

and consider arms control measures. The Maghreb principal threat to stability in states, however, do not consider Israel's nuclear

neighboring states." program as among their major security threats, but

they do regard U.S. preoccupation with the possible

The American participants at the Tunis acquisition of WMD by radical Arab regimes as

Conference appreciated the special role of Tunisia and misplaced.

other North African states in moderating Middle East

political and military crises by using their cultural The American Perspective

links with the region to facilitate negotiations or

mediate conflicts. Algerian mediators were involved in The U.S. delegates were less sanguine than their

negotiations to end the 1979 Tehran hostage crisis, hosts about the emerging economic-political-security

Tunis has served as headquarters of the Arab League, environment. At the same time, they did not consider

as well as the operational center for the Palestine that emerging security challenges in North Africa

Liberation Organization after both organizations were would impact directly on U.S. security interests.

expelled from other Arab countries due to inter-Arab Potential instability of centralized power.

conflicts. Morocco contributed troops to the Gulf War in Authoritarian regimes tend to be brittle. The more

1990-1991, and has served as a diplomatic bridge stable a non-democratic polity appears, the more that

between Israel and several Arab states. Respected for stability is vulnerable to the domestic challenges

his adroitness in international affairs, King Hassan II enumerated above. Centralized systems of power stand

of Morocco has frequently been the Arab choice to tallest but fall hardest.

explain Arab positions to the United States. Lack of a regional security community. The

American participants stressed the need for greater

Four Challenges Facing North Africa efforts by the regional states themselves to form a

Demographics. Despite far-reaching reforms, more tangible security union. The UAM has made

the illiteracy rate of people over age 15 hovers near 50 very little progress in achieving a consensus defining

percent in Morocco, 40 percent in Egypt, and 20 the future threat environment or toward adoption of

percent in Tunisia. Unemployment and regional measures to meet anticipated challenges.

underemployment levels are at 30 percent in Algeria

and 25 percent in Egypt. Migration of rural The Tunisian Perspective

populations to urban agglomerations is generating

serious challenges, the most immediate being declining The Tunisian formulation was more positive in

agricultural production, and social dysfunction within outlook and tone than the American. Focusing almost
S•TkATEGIC F0Rtm #5, AUGUST 1994 INSTITUTE FOR NAIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES PAGE 3

entirely on Tunisian strategies for growth and Regional Security Arrangements

development, Tunisia's clear national priorities are to: While Europeans and Americans are dimly aware

"* liberalize the nation's economic system, of the challenges confronting the states of the southern

"* reduce the population growth rate, Mediterranean, they tend too frequently to view the

"* stem the flow of population to urban centers, looming crisis as a clash of Islamic and Christian

"* improve the educational system, and, civilizations. Their chief concerns are the security

"* provide employment for graduates. problems likely to arise from North African "boat

Since the arrival of the Ben Ali government in people" fleeing Islamic repression. A second area of

1987, notable progress has been registered in all these concern to Americans and Europeans relates to

sectors. The political landscape also has evolved under weapons of mass destruction-most particularly efforts

a National Charter to permit introduction of a multi- by Libya and Algeria to acquire chemical and nuclear

party system. According to this calculus, the only weapons, as well as surface-to-surface missile systems of extended range and increasing accuracy. American significant threat to this "economics-first" strategy is ofetndragadicesngcuay.A rcn

posed by the crisis in Algeria. participants viewed the risk of nuclear proliferation as

most advanced in Algeria, which has not as yet signed

The Algerian Dimension the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and may be

Conference participants from Tunisia and the engaged in unsafeguarded activities. They fear that

United States diverged in their assessments of Algeria may become a rogue state, pursuing a

Algeria's problems. The Tunisian participants saw the clandestine nuclear weapons program.

Algerian situation as representative of a threat The Tunisian delegation, for its part, discounted

extending throughout the Middle East, but having any threat posed by Algeria's acquisition of weapons of special saliency in North Africa. The challenge is mass destruction. They expressed no distress over

aimed at the foundations of secularism and modernism, either Libya's efforts to acquire comparable systems or

which are the twin goals of states such as Tunisia. To U.S. support for Israel's nuclear program. What

recognize Islamic radicals as legitimate aspirants to interest in regional security issues arose tended to be

political power is to open a Pandora's box of troubles, directed toward the Arab Maghreb Union as a

including the removal of political boundaries between defensive alliance capable of dealing with them. On

includionang sthte. rM oovalf , si ouldIlaris bextween the other hand, there was wide recognition that the

istsreligion an state. r Moreov ould slamikel xtoreme a Union lacked solid security foundations and a common

ists rise to power, they would be likely to create a

cultural divide with the West and (as in Iran and perceived threat, and that unresolved rivalries (e.g.,

Sudan) seek to eradicate all vestiges of secular political Morocco-Algeria) vitiated cooperation on regional

parties. Hence, Tunisians support Algerian leadership security matters. Tunisia sees its true security links

in dealing firmly with religious radicals, using harsh as North-South, not East-West.

measures when necessary. Yet, most Tunisian and American participants felt

that the timing for formation of a North-South

"Terrorism and the state's 1"security community" was premature. Their shared

"reticence was the product, in part, of past failed

response to it are reducing efforts-perhaps the best-known of which was the

Algeria to a condition bordering "Conference on Security and Cooperation in the

on economic collapse and Mediterranean" (CSCM) proposal, put forward by f ,Spain and Italy in September 1990. This proposal

political paralysis. suggested building upon existing cooperative air

defense agreements between Morocco and Spain,

Several American participants emphasized the patterning new developments on the Conference on

costs to Algerian society of polarization. Terrorism and Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

the state's response to it are reducing Algeria to a CSCM was problematic in its reach. It included all

condition bordering on economic collapse and political of the Mediterranean including the Levant, and even

paralysis. The present mix of military and civilian anticipated expansion into the Gulf region. In the end,

leadership is unrepresentative, and clearly lacks CSCM proved too complex and ambiguous to be acted

legitimacy in the eyes of a growing number of upon quickly, and it ultimately collided with an

Algerians. A constructive dialogue is impera- alternative proposal put forward by France-the "Fivetive-possibly with the support of a Third Party inter- Plus-Four" initiative, later modified to include Malta,

mediary. Barring such an effort, the prospect is for a and now known as the "Five-Plus-Five" proposal. The

descent into chaos, leading to a truncated Islamic French proposal sought to link the four European

regime or a return to warlordism reminiscent of 1962 Community states of France, Italy, Spain, and

Algeria. Either outcome could present serious political Portugal, plus Malta, with the five North African

and religious difficulties for Morocco and Tunisia. states which form the Maghreb Union.
PAGE 4 INSTITUTE FC _NAL STRATEGIC STUDIES TRAMTEeIC FoRUM #5, AUGUST 1994

Policy Recommendations in Algiers to open its nuclear program to full-scope

The following policy recommendations flow from safeguards and inspection.

the conference. * The United States should propose a closer

* The United States should broaden its regional association between NATO and Maghreb militaries, to

diplomatic initiatives to include formation of a coalition encourage more frequent consultation between and

that includes France, Italy, Spain, Egypt, Morocco, and among defense ministers and chiefs of staff. A possible

Tunisia, to openly address the danger of regional site for these discussions would be AFSOUTH headpolitical instability and the potential for the spread of quarters in Naples, Italy.

political radicalism to adjacent regions.

* The United States should strengthen efforts to For information, contact Dr. William H. Lewis,

convince North Africa of the adverse consequences Institute for National Strategic Studies.

flowing from proliferating weapons of mass destruction (202) 287-9210 ext. 527 Fax (202) 287-9475

in the Middle East, including pressure on the regime Internet: LEWISW@NDU.EDU

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