Partnership for Peace:*Guaranteeing Success*by Jeffrey Simon
Note
Summary
Conclusions**About this Conference**Background
	On January 10-11, 1994 the NATO Brussels Summit inaugurated the Partnership forPeace Program. Within the past 18 months, PFP has been remarkably successful and developedfar beyond its architects' expectations. There are now 26 partners in the program, and 14 haverepresentatives in the Partnership Coordination Center (PCC) at Mons. Enthusiasm for PFP hasreached a plateau, some confusion still exists, and significant differentiation has developed inpartners' perceptions, objectives, activities, and expectations. Clarifying existing asymmetriesamong partners and between NATO and partners remains a serious challenge. Indeed, NATO'sresponse may well determine whether PFP's initial success can be guaranteed!

**Partner Differentiation and New Forms of Neutrality

	Since the PFP program was inaugurated, differentiation among the 26 partners hasbecome pronounced. Most partners *perceive* PFP as the path toward full NATO membership(e.g., Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Slovenia); some partners wish toremain "neutral" and do not intend to seek full membership (e.g., Ukraine); some partners whohad been neutral now seek modified integration with the Alliance (e.g., Austria).
	For those partners who see PFP as the path to full membership, self-differentiation hasbeen most significant. They want NATO to define the criteria and time-lines more precisely.
	For those partners who wish to remain "neutral," PFP has other purposes. For example: 
	For **Ukraine**, neutrality means seeking partner relations with NATO and theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Government is greatly constrained in its abilityto move West. Public opinion polls in 1991 indicated that 21  percent wanted Russification; in1993 support had risen to 30 percent; and in 1994, 48 percent. Ukrainian public opinion, though,is divided. In 1994, in eastern Ukraine 73 percent wanted to be in the CIS; in Kiev, 30 percent;and in western Ukraine, only 20 percent. At the same time Ukraine is under pressure from Russiato join the CIS air defense system. The Government cannot move West! This limits Ukraine's PFPpartici-pation and explains its desire to have the Organization on Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE) become a pan-European organization that links the Atlantic with Russia. Ukraineseeks a "special partnership" with NATO and sees PFP as having particular importance forUkrainian officers to seek a "common language" with NATO counterparts.
	For **Austria**, neutrality in the post-Cold War era no longer makes sense. In the Cold War,one could remain neutral from military blocs and conflicts. Today, most threats are not military innature (e.g., ethnic minority problems, refugees, nuclear reactor problems, etc.). Therefore,Austria seeks integration into multilateral structures (e.g., European Union and PFP).

**Misperceptions and Limitations of Military Cooperation
	Many partners want and expect assistance in making their armed forces interoperable--toinclude general defense forces--with NATO (e.g., Poland wants division-level troop exercisesand corps-level staff exercises; the Czech Republic wants more experience in NATO commandposts); in developing modern logistics and training methods, even though this remains a nationalresponsibility in NATO; or in building their new armed forces (e.g., Slovakia and Slovenia). 
But PFP's terms of reference state that military cooperation is confined to search and rescue,humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations. The asymmetry between NATO's terms ofreference and partner expectations needs to be reconciled if PFP's initial success is to beguaranteed. This can be achieved through: (1) a "critical review" of IPPs to tailor partners'activities to NATO objectives; (2) coordinating the Partnership Coordination Cell's 1996 and1997 exercise program which is presently being developed; and (3) making it clear that the PFPPlanning and Review Process is only for peacekeeping. 
	PFP's emphasis on military interoperability has strengthened the hand of the military andinadvertently undermined the ability of many partners to establish democratic control over theirarmed forces. Participants from Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary emphasized the difficulty ofestablishing democratic control of the military and need for assistance.  
	Participants recognized the need to establish a clear division of authority between thepresident and government, to gain parliamentary oversight of the military and defense ministrycontrol of the armed forces, and to restore prestige to the militar. Participants also noted thatthere was a need to establish a Legal Framework and Code of Conduct for professional soldiersand conscript citizens which would allow soldiers to disobey orders if they are illegal (e.g.,Germany's *Innere Fuhrung*).

**Need For Public IPPs and Clarification of NATO Criteria

	NATO should encourage partners to publish their IPPs and provide partners with moreprecise criteria and time-lines to establish more realistic expectations. 
	The 16+1 framework has encouraged confidentiality about partner's IPPs and PFPprograms and has inadvertently undermined bilateral and regional cooperation among partnerswho are competing to join NATO. The 16+1 framework and IPP confidentiality means that apartner's bilateral activities are unlikely to be included in a partner's PFP goal completion. Toovercome this problem NATO should encourage partners to publish their IPPs (as Hungary hasdone) in order to more effectively enhance bilateral military and political cooperation amongneighbors (e.g., Hungarian-Romanian military cooperation is far better than bilateral politicalcooperation). If partners do not publish their IPPs, partners are inhibited from factoring theircommon PFP goals into bilateral military activities and exercises. Transparent IPPs could facilitategood neighbor military and political cooperation. 
	Publication of IPPs also would disseminate public information to Central Europeandomestic audiences to clarify misperceptions about the program and to build support for PFP.This is needed, in part, because many societies have a low opinion of PFP. They associate it witha Russian veto on NATO enlargement and have little understanding of the program which is nowperceived to be a long-term process. Corre-spondingly, NATO needs to more effectively engagein a public information campaign to explain PFP to partner societies. 
	Most partners *expect* the forthcoming Fall 1995 NATO Enlargement Study to providespecific criteria and time-lines (to define the who and when) for becoming full members of theAlliance. They feel they need criteria and time-lines so they can rationalize their IndividualPartnership Programs. Since the NATO Study will likely not do this (e.g., more likely it will helpNATO cope with *how*  and *why*  NATO should enlarge), NATO needs to prepare partnerexpectations; and provide greater clarity in plausible goals to permit more effective IPP planning. 
	NATO needs to move partners away from quantitative-based IPPs (e.g., Poland fulfilled45 projects in 1994 and 250 in 1995) to objective-based planning. NATO needs to define andguide IPPs toward the achievement of objectives that are broader than military interoperability,such as how to train civilians to be able to execute Parliamentary control of the military. Forexample, of the 232 activities in Hungary's 1995 Work Plan, most are geared to air defense, C3I,exercises, logistics, etc. Only 4 activities are directed to "Democratic Control of Forces" and theyinclude three "exchange(s) of information among experts" and one conference.

**How Political Cooperation Can be Strengthened**

	The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was created by the November1991 Rome Summit and convenes on an *ad hoc* basis after the NAC ministerial meeting, must bestrengthened. Institutionalizing NACC's political structure is particularly important becauseNACC provides the umbrella for PFP. 
	First, NATO could follow the lead of the WEU's expanded Council and create a NorthAtlantic Council-*Plus* partners (NAC+) to meet routinely at ambassadorial and ministerial level. 
	Second, NATO could create a Political Council-*Plus* to more effectively coordinate theactivities of the recently-enlarged Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC+). 
	Third, to improve partner understanding of how the NATO headquarters works, NATOcould create one- to three-month civilian and military partner internships on the International Staff(IS) and International Military Staff (IMS) in  non-sensitive areas.  It could also more effectivelycoordinate many emergency planning activities of the Senior Civil Emergency PlanningCommittee (SCEPC) with PFP. (Hungary's 1995 IPP Work Plan has only 15 (of 232) activitiesdevoted to emergency planning.)  Not only will IPPs become more transparent, they can bebroadened to  non-provocative emergency planning (e.g. humanitarian assistance) activities andinvolve more partner civilians and politicians in PFP programs. 
	Finally, to develop broader and more in-depth understanding of NATO operations, NATOcould open the NATO Defense College to partners. Space for partners can be created by Alliessending fewer students (e.g., if the U.S., U.K., and Germany cut their student allocation fromeight to three, 15 slots would open for partners every six months). Also these changes wouldmake NATO more transparent and thereby could be useful in stabilizing Russia's relations withNATO. 
	While NATO has the opportunity to develop new political instruments in its Easternoutreach program, one danger is that the Alliance could focus more on form, rather thansubstance. If it does, NATO may miss a real opportunity to strengthen political cooperation. 

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