UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 

CASE NO. 20-14207-CIV-MAYNARD 

JERMAINE NATTOO, on behalf of himself 

and all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TPUSA-FHCS, INC., a Foreign Profit Corporation 

(d/b/a) TELEPERFORMANCE USA 

Defendant. 

________________________________________/ 

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CONDITIONALLY CERTIFY 

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND TO FACILITATE NOTICE 

TO POTENTIAL CLASS MEMBERS (DE 34) 

THIS CAUSE comes before this Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Conditionally Certify 

Collective Action and Facilitate Notice to Potential Class Members. DE 34. For the reasons set 

forth below, as well as the lenient standard applicable to this early stage, Plaintiff’s motion is 

granted. 

BACKGROUND 

On June 24, 2020, Plaintiff Jermaine Nattoo filed a Complaint on behalf of himself and 

others similarly situated against Defendant TPUSA-FHCS, Inc., a foreign profit company doing 

business as Teleperformance USA (“Defendant”). DE 1. The Complaint alleges that Defendant 

operates call centers throughout the United States and fails to pay its customer service 

representatives for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week in violation of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201. DE 1 at ¶3. The Complaint alleges the existence of an 

FLSA class as well as a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. DE 1 at ¶¶61-

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 1 of 14
Page 2 of 14

72. With respect to the FLSA, Plaintiff seeks in the Complaint to represent “all current and former 

hourly customer service representatives or other job titles who perform similar job duties who 

worked for TPUSA at any time in the last three (3) years.” Id. at ¶61. In the Motion for Conditional 

Certification, however, Plaintiff seeks to conditionally certify a more narrow class of “current and 

former similarly situated Florida call center employees of defendant, TPUSA- Inc., who were 

employed/classified as customer service representatives or sales agents or held similar job titles, 

and worked for Defendant at any time in Florida from June 2017 through resolution of this case.” 

DE 34 at ¶1 (emphasis added). In support of the Motion, Plaintiff proffers his own declaration 

along with declarations from five other individuals – India Crosske, Erica Vasquez, Sam Lamanna, 

Wislet Metayer, and Mickel Major – who say they worked as customer service representatives in 

Defendant’s Port St. Lucie and North Lauderdale offices. DE 34-2, 34-3, 34-4, 34-5, 34-6 and 34-

7. These individuals opted into the class by filing Consents to Join, DE 4, 30, 31, 32, 33, but two 

of these consents were stricken from the record based on the parties’ agreement. DE 56 (order 

granting Defendant’s motion to strike consents to join filed by Sam Lamanna and Mickel Major). 

As a result, the undersigned considers the declarations of the named Plaintiff, Erica Vasquez, India 

Crosske and Wislet Metayer in ruling on Plaintiff’s motion to conditionally certify. Vasquez, 

Crosske and Metayer will be referred to as Opt-In Plaintiffs throughout this Order. 

 Plaintiff declares that there are “at least 500 employees” that perform substantially similar 

duties who were not paid overtime for pre-and post-shift work causing them to work more than 

forty hours per week. DE 34-2 at ¶40. Plaintiff believes that if formal notice is given, current and 

former employees will opt into the lawsuit. Id. at ¶39. 

The Opt-in Plaintiffs’ declarations are virtually identical to Plaintiff’s. All state that they 

were customer service representatives or sales agents employed by the Defendant in Florida to 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 2 of 14
Page 3 of 14

make and take phone calls from Defendant’s customers at Defendant’s call centers. See e.g. DE 

34-2 at ¶4, 34-3 at ¶¶6-7, 34-4 at ¶¶5-6, 34-6 at ¶4. All claim to have been required to arrive for 

their work shifts between fifteen and thirty minutes early to perform pre-shift tasks before they 

clocked in to work. These pre-shift duties included entering through security, finding a locker to 

store their personal belongings, finding available workstations and chairs, finding available 

computers, finding and retrieving headsets, and logging into the computer by completing various 

standardized log in procedures. Plaintiffs also say they were required to remain on the phones 

during scheduled meal/rest breaks when the call center experienced high call volume, calls were 

backed up, or they were “stuck on the phone” with a customer. E.g. DE 34-3 at ¶¶8-11. In addition, 

Plaintiffs say they were required to perform work duties after clocking out for the day because 

they had to shut down their computers and programs which could take five to ten minutes every 

day. Id. at ¶24. Plaintiffs allege the Defendant did not pay them for this pre or post shift work, 

which caused them to work more than forty hours per week without the pay required by the FLSA. 

See e.g. DE 34-2 at ¶8, 34-3 at ¶8, 34-4 at ¶8, 34-6 at ¶8. 

DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff’s motion makes two requests. First, Plaintiff asks the Court to conditionally certify 

an FLSA class pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA. Second, Plaintiff requests that the 

Court “facilitate notice,” by (1) directing Defendant to provide Plaintiffs with a list of names and 

contact information of any potential class members, (2) authorizing Plaintiffs to notify these 

persons that they may join the litigation and assert claims under the FLSA, (3) authorizing potential 

class members to electronically sign consents to join, (4) requiring Defendant to post notices about 

the litigation in its Florida call centers, and (5) giving potential class members ninety days to opt 

into the class. DE 34. The undersigned addresses each of these requests in turn.

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 3 of 14
Page 4 of 14

I. Conditional Certification 

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA, the Court may issue an order conditionally 

certifying a collective action of employee-plaintiffs against their employer for unpaid minimum 

wages or unpaid overtime. Unlike a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, a collective action under the FLSA requires each putative plaintiff to affirmatively optinto the class action and those opt-in plaintiffs must be similarly situated. Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l 

Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1216-17 (11th Cir. 2001). 

The Eleventh Circuit has used a two-stage process to decide whether to certify an opt-in 

class. Reyes v. AT&T Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Hipp, 252 F.3d 

at 1219). During stage one, commonly referred to as the “notice stage,” the plaintiff must 

demonstrate a reasonable basis to believe (1) other employees of the Defendant desire to opt-in; 

and (2) these other employees are similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and pay 

provisions. Id. at 1355. These two elements have been referred to as the interest prong and similarly 

situated prong. Id. at 1356. Further, the Eleventh Circuit has stated the broad discretion afforded 

to the district court at the notice stage is constrained a bit by the leniency of the standard, so where 

discovery has not been completed and the court has minimal evidence, the typical result is that the 

motion is granted. Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1219. At stage two, the Defendant files a motion to decertify 

the class. Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1218. After a discovery period allowing the parties to determine the 

extent to which opt-in plaintiffs are interested in the litigation and factually similar, the court then 

rules on whether the class should be certified. Id. This second stage has a far more stringent 

standard of review than the notice stage’s lenient review. Id.

To satisfy the interest prong at the notice stage, a plaintiff must make a showing that other 

employees have the desire to opt-in to the putative class. Reyes, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1355. “The best 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 4 of 14
Page 5 of 14

evidence of a potential class is the existence of numerous named plaintiffs who have already opted 

in [.]” Benitez v. Balans L.C., 2010 WL 11602404, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2010). This is not a 

heavy burden on the plaintiff. Id.; see also Rojas v. Garda CL Se., Inc., 297 F.R.D. 669, 676 (S.D. 

Fla. 2013) (the burden on a plaintiff to demonstrate the “existence of other potential opt-in 

plaintiffs is not onerous”). Even the existence of just one other co-worker who desires to join the 

class is sufficient to satisfy the interest prong. Bennet v. Hayes Robertson Group, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 

2d 1270, 1283 (S.D. Fla. 2012); see also Guerra v. Big Johnson Concrete Pumping, Inc., 2006 

WL 2290512, at * 4 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2006) (the affidavit of at least one other co-worker raises 

the plaintiff’s contention that others desire to join the suit beyond mere speculation). 

Satisfying the substantial similarity prong has also been described as “not particularly 

stringent,” “fairly lenient,” and “flexible.” Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d. 1233, 

1261 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). To be conditionally certified, a plaintiff need 

only show that class members are “‘similarly situated’ with respect to their job requirements and 

with regard to their pay provisions.” Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 942 F.2d 1562, 1567-

68 (11th Cir.1991). A plaintiff does not need to show “his position is ‘identical’ to the position 

held by any other putative class member.” Reyes, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1356 (citing Grayson, 79 F.3d 

at 1096 n.2). Factual matters related to duties, locations, and other variations between putative 

plaintiffs have usually been reserved for the later stage in the process. Vondriska v. Premier Mortg. 

Funding, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (granting conditional certification 

despite factual differences in opt-in plaintiffs’ duties and titles); Pendlebury v. Starbucks Coffee 

Co., 2005 WL 84500, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2005) (granting conditional certification despite 

variation in location and time spent at different locations operated by defendant). 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 5 of 14
Page 6 of 14

Regarding the interest prong, in addition to the named Plaintiff, three other employees have 

consented to join this litigation as Opt-in Plaintiffs. DE 4, 30 and 32. They have submitted 

declarations confirming their interest in participating in the case. 34-3, 34-4, 34-6. Plaintiffs’ 

declarations state that they worked for Defendant as customer service representatives or sales 

agents during the relevant time period, their duties included making and taking phone calls to and 

from Defendant’s customers, they were hourly employees who worked before and after their shifts 

without pay, and they were not paid overtime for working more than forty hours per week. Their 

unpaid pre-shift activities included going through security, finding workstations, computers and 

equipment, and logging into their computers before they could clock into work. These pre-shift 

activities typically took fifteen to thirty minutes, and declarants were not paid for that time. 

Declarants also allege that they were required to clock out for the day before shutting down and 

turning off their computers, which often took one to five minutes. They were not paid for these 

post-shift activities either. The declarants say they were not paid overtime when they worked more 

than forty hours a week. 

Defendant submits declarations from other employees disputing these claims. DE 44-1, 44-

7, 44-8, 44-9, 44-10, 44-11, 44-12, 44-13, 44-14, 44-15, 44-16, 44-17. The declarants include HR 

representatives, customer service supervisors, and current employees who all dispute Plaintiff’s 

allegations that Defendant required workers to work more than forty hours a week without proper 

pay. Declarants Laura Cancio, Melinda Graham, Aaliyah Harris, Raymon Jones, Evince Lucien, 

Rebecca Metelus, Autumn Otto, and Danielle Paris all say that they were never required to stay 

after their shifts or before logging into their computers. DE 44-7 at ¶15, 44-8 at ¶15, 44-9 at ¶16, 

44-10 at ¶16, 44-11 at ¶16, 44-12 at ¶16, 44-13 at ¶16, 44-14 at ¶15. Declarants Jackie Julceus, 

Natalie Valentine, and Larry Sell all discuss the use of the CCMS system or “Call Center 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 6 of 14
Page 7 of 14

Management System,” which is designed to keep track of employees work times and prevent 

undocumented work post and pre-shift. DE 44-15 at ¶¶9, 23, 44-16 at ¶¶8, 21, 44-17 at ¶¶8, 12. 

Human Resource Director Stephen Butauski’s Declaration corroborates these factual contentions. 

DE 44-1 at ¶¶7-9. 

Defendant’s declarations contradict Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendant failed to 

compensate employees within the guidelines of the FLSA. However, Defendant asks the Court to 

do what it should not at this stage of the case, that is, decide facts and determine credibility based 

on competing declarations without further discovery. Further, despite Defendant’s declarations, 

case law demonstrates that the existence of just one opt-in plaintiff is enough to create a reasonable 

basis to believe that interest exists. See Bennet, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1283 (just one other co-worker 

who desires to join is sufficient to “rais[e] the Plaintiff’s contention beyond one of pure 

speculation”) (quoting Guerra, 2006 WL 2290512, at * 4); see also Rojas., Inc., 297 F.R.D. at 

676; see also Compere v. Nusret Miami, LLC, 391 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1205 (S.D. Fla. 2019). Here, 

not one, but three employees in addition to the Plaintiff have declared their interest in joining this 

litigation. DE 1, 4, 30, 32. That is sufficient to satisfy the interest prong at this stage of the case. 

Plaintiffs also have demonstrated a reasonable basis to believe other similarly situated 

employees would join this litigation. Plaintiffs submit declarations from individuals who say they 

worked as customer service representatives or sales agents for the Defendant; had certain duties in 

common; worked more than forty hours per week; and did not receive overtime pay. These 

similarities are sufficient for purposes of conditional FLSA certification. See Dybach, 942 F.2d at 

1567-68 (class members must be similarly situated with regard to their job requirements and pay 

provisions for an FLSA class to be conditionally certified); see also Reyes, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1357 

(class members were substantially similar when they shared pay provisions, shared duties, and 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 7 of 14
Page 8 of 14

worked more than forty hours a week without overtime pay); see also Vondriska, 564 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1335 (granting conditional certification during notice stage despite factual differences in opt-in 

plaintiffs’ duties and titles). 

As with the interest prong, Defendant asks the Court to look beyond the Plaintiffs’ 

declarations and consider factual differences presented by the Plaintiffs’ depositions to determine 

whether the similarly situated requirement has been met. Defendant points out, for example, that 

the Opt-in Plaintiffs worked on different customer accounts and reported different details about 

the types of activities they did without pay. Defendant also relies on the declarations it submitted 

from employees who say they were not required to engage in pre and post shift unpaid work 

activities. At this stage, however, the Court will not make credibility determinations or decide 

which side has the better evidence. Seeking a factual determination on the similarly situated issue 

“by presenting a vast amount of affidavit evidence,” shows “a fundamental misunderstanding of 

the nature of the proceedings at this stage of the litigation.” Reyes, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 1358 

(quoting Morden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2006 WL 2620320, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2006)). 

Factual determinations and decisions about credibility are best left to the decertification process. 

Simpkins v. Pulte Home Corp., 2008 WL 3927275, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2008) (certifying 

conditional class despite Defendant’s submission of its own declarations to explain “what it 

perceives as a factual differences between members of the potential opt-in class”). 

As for Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s declarations are “cookie cutter,” the Court 

notes that the declarations Defendant submits are fairly “cookie-cutter” too. Thus, the Court will 

wait until further discovery is completed to weigh credibility, examine inconsistencies and analyze 

factual differences between declarations, depositions, and other evidence in this case. At this point, 

the Court is required only to judge whether Plaintiffs’ have submitted “detailed allegations 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 8 of 14
Page 9 of 14

supported by affidavits which successfully engage defendants’ affidavits to contrary.” Grayson v. 

K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996). In this Court’s view, Plaintiffs have met this 

low burden at this stage of the case. 

Based on the evidence before it, the Court will conditionally certify and facilitate notice to 

the following proposed class: 

current and former call center employees of Defendant who 

were employed/classified as customer service representatives or 

sales agents or held similar job titles and worked for Defendant 

at any time in Defendant’s Port St. Lucie office from June 2017 

through resolution of this case. 

The Court limits the conditional class to current and former employees who worked in Defendant’s 

Port St. Lucie office because that is the office where Plaintiff and the Opt-in Plaintiffs worked. 

Plaintiffs have failed to show the existence of similarly situated employees from Defendant’s other 

offices who desire to join this litigation.1

 

II. Notice 

Defendant raises several objections to Plaintiff’s proposed Notice, which may be found in 

the record at DE 34-8. The Court addresses Defendant’s objections as follows. 

1 Sam Lamanna and Mickel Major filed Consents to Join and submitted declarations, but Plaintiffs subsequently 

agreed to dismiss these individuals from the case. DE 55. Although the parties’ pleadings suggest that Lamanna and 

Major worked in the North Lauderdale call center, only Sam Lamanna claims to have worked in the North Lauderdale 

office in his Declaration. DE 34-5 at ¶6. Major’s avers in his Declaration that he worked in the Port St. Lucie call 

center. DE 34-7 at ¶6. For its part, Defendant disputes that it even owns the North Lauderdale office. According to 

Defendant, North Lauderdale is owned by Defendant’s parent company, TPUSA, Inc., and Defendant is not 

responsible for any of the North Lauderdale employees. DE 53 at pp. 2-3, 7 (citing S. Butauski Decl. at DE 44-1). 

This Court need not resolve this issue, however. Given Mr. Lamanna’s dismissal from the case, no North Lauderdale 

employees are presently involved in the litigation, nor have Plaintiffs established that employees in North Lauderdale 

are similarly situated to them. Thus, this Court conditionally certifies a class of former and current employees who 

worked in the Port St. Lucie office only. 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 9 of 14
Page 10 of 14

A. Dissemination of Notice 

Defendant is adamant that the Notice of Conditional Class Certification be sent to the Port 

St. Lucie call center only. DE 44 at 17. This Court agrees. See fn. 2, supra. Upon review of the 

cases Defendant cites, the Court finds these authorities persuasive. For example, in Pomareda v. 

Homebridge Mortgage Bankers Corp., the court limited the scope of the notice to only Deerfield 

Beach plaintiffs because prospective opt-in plaintiffs from California and New York had not filed 

consents to join. No. 06-61864-CIV, 2007 WL 624331, at *2-3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2007)). 

Similarly, in Wynder v. Applied Card Systems, Inc., only employees who worked at the Boca Raton 

location showed interest in the litigation, nowhere else. See No. 09-80004-CIV, 2009 WL 

3255585, at *3 (S.D. Fla. October 7, 2009). In Wynder, 2009 WL 3255585, at *3. The holding in 

Wynder supports Defendant’s argument that a lack of opt-in plaintiffs from a particular location 

diminishes the likelihood that employees from that location are interested in joining. Like 

Pomereda and Wynder, the Opt-in Plaintiffs in this case worked in only one of the Defendant’s 

locations. Without a single opt-in plaintiff from elsewhere, the class must be limited to the Port St. 

Lucie office only. 

Defendant further argues that Notice should be provided only to employees working on a 

particular account in the Port St. Lucie office because that is the account the Plaintiffs worked on 

and no other account is pertinent to the litigation. DE 44 at 17. The Court rejects this request. 

Limiting notice only to employees working on a particular account would require the Court to 

ascertain facts not known with certainty at this stage of the case. Distinguishing between 

employees based on accounts worked on or assigned supervisors requires precisely the kind of 

factual analysis better made post-discovery. For these reasons, the Court will permit the Plaintiffs 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 10 of 14
Page 11 of 14

to provide notice to former and current customer service representatives who worked at the Port 

St. Lucie call center, regardless of which accounts these representatives serviced. 

B. The Lookback Period 

Defendant’s second objection is that Plaintiffs’ proposed Notice has a “lookback” period 

of three years. DE 44 at ¶18. A claim for overtime wages under the FLSA must be brought within 

two years after the cause of action accrues, unless the cause of action “arises out of a willful 

violation” on the part of the employer, in which case it must be brought within three years from 

when the cause of action accrues. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Defendant argues that any alleged violation 

of the FLSA in this case was not willful. Thus, the proper lookback period is two years and notice 

should be limited to only those individuals whose claims would have accrued during that time. DE 

44 at 18-20. 

A violation of the FLSA is “willful” if the employer knew or showed reckless disregard 

for whether its conduct was prohibited by the FLSA. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 

128, 133-135 (1988); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126 (1985). Even if 

an employer acts unreasonably, such action is not considered willful unless the employer was 

reckless in determining its legal obligations. See Powell v. Carey Int’l, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 

1175 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (emphasis added) (finding a genuine dispute of fact as to whether an 

employer acted with reckless disregard when it had sought the advice of counsel as to its 

obligations under the FLSA). 

Defendant argues their conduct did not willfully violate the FLSA because they had various 

protocols in place to prevent unpaid overtime. DE 44 at 18-19. These included providing reminders 

of time keeping policies, posting notices of the policies, and providing intranet information about 

company practices for time keeping. Id. Plaintiff agrees that protocols existed but argues that 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 11 of 14
Page 12 of 14

Defendant failed to follow them. DE 1 at ¶29. Additionally, Plaintiff states in its Reply that 

“Defendant has been investigated by the Department of Labor well over twelve (12) times, 

throughout the country, for the same FLSA violations, paying millions of dollars in back wages to 

thousands of employees[.]” DE 53 at 8. If true, such evidence might establish willfulness. At this 

stage of the litigation, the Court cannot determine facts relating to willfulness. The Court will 

therefore overrule Defendant’s request to limit notice to a two-year lookback period. Should 

discovery reveal that the alleged violations were not willful, the Court can strike the claims of any 

opt-in plaintiffs that fall beyond the two-year period at a later stage in this case. 

C. Defendant’s Other Objections 

In addition to the above objections, Defendant requests that the Notice be distributed by 

first class mail and personal e-mail only, and that notice of the litigation not be posted at the 

workplace. DE 44 at 21. Defendant requests a Forty-Five (45) day opt-in period, rather than the 

Ninety (90) day period requested by the Plaintiffs. Id. Defendant requests that the names of defense 

counsel, the names of other plaintiffs’ lawyers, and information regarding the rights and 

obligations of putative class members be included in the Notice. Id. at 22. Defendant objects to 

providing employees’ social security numbers or phone numbers to the Plaintiffs for the purpose 

of giving notice of the class action. Id. Defendant asks that the scrivener’s error on page five of 

Plaintiff’s proposed Consent to Join, which is attached to Plaintiff’s proposed Notice, be 

corrected.2

 DE 34-9 at 5. Defendant makes no objections to class members being allowed to 

electronically sign Consents to Join. 

2

 On page five of Plaintiff’s Proposed Consent to Join, there is a reference to an unrelated matter referred to in 

Plaintiff’s pleadings as Michael Dunsavage v. Aloha Pool Services, Inc., Michael A. Folz, and/or Pamela M. Folz. 

This reference must be omitted from the Notice. 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 12 of 14
Page 13 of 14

In Plaintiff’s Reply, Plaintiff agrees to the Forty-Five (45) day opt-in period, rather than its 

proposed Ninety (90) day opt-in period. DE 53 at 9. Plaintiff also agrees to send notice by personal 

email and first-class mail and agrees to add defense counsel’s names to the Notice. Id. Plaintiff 

further agrees to add a section in the Notice regarding the rights and obligations associated with 

being a putative class member. Id. Plaintiff does not address Defendant’s objections to providing 

them with social security numbers or phone numbers. Plaintiff also does not address the scrivener’s 

error on page five of the proposed Consent to Join, or Defendant’s desire to include the names of 

other plaintiff’ lawyers so potential class members will know they are not required to hired 

Plaintiffs’ counsel. 

Based on the parties’ agreement, the Court instructs as follows: (1) The Notice shall be 

distributed by personal email and first-class mail only; (2) The opt-in period shall be Forty-Five 

(45) days; (3) The Notice shall include the names and contact information of defense counsel; (4) 

The Notice shall include a section discussing the rights and obligations associated with becoming 

a member of the putative class; and (5) Putative class members may electronically sign the Consent 

to Join forms. Regarding the remaining issues, the Court sees no reason social security numbers 

and phone numbers should be disclosed. Therefore, the Court grants Defendant’s request not to 

provide that information to the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are instructed to correct any scrivener’s errors 

included in the proposed Notice. Lastly, only the names of counsel of record in this case shall be 

referenced in the Notice. The Notice shall, however, include a section explaining that putative 

class members have a right to seek independent counsel. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, it is therefore, 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 13 of 14
Page 14 of 14

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Conditionally Certify 

Collective Action and to Facilitate Notice to Potential Class Members (DE 34) is GRANTED. It 

is further, 

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Parties shall confer and file a joint proposed 

Notice to Putative Opt-In Plaintiffs incorporating the Court’s ruling within seven (7) days of the 

date of this Order. 

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Fort Pierce, Florida, this 7th day of July, 2021. 

____________________________________ 

SHANIEK M. MAYNARD 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 2:20-cv-14207-SMM Document 57 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/08/2021 Page 14 of 14