United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-1952

___________

Randal E. McCullough, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

AEGON USA, Inc.; AEGON USA Inc. *

Board of Directors; Patrick S. Baird; *

James A. Beardsworth; Kirk W. Buese; *

Tom A. Schlossberg; Arthur C. *

Schneider; Mary Taiber; James R. *

Trefz; Does 1-20; Diversified *

Investment Advisors, Inc.; *

Transamerica Financial Life Insurance *

Company; Transamerica Investment *

Management, LLC; Transamerica Life * Appeal from the United States

Insurance Company; Transamerica * District Court for the

Occidental Life Insurance Company; * Northern District of Iowa.

Marilyn Carp; Dan Kolsrud; James *

Halfpap; Jill Anderson; Jeff Rosen; *

Martha McConell; Steve Albritton; *

Mark Mullin; James McArdle; Diane *

Meiners; Daniel Fox; Investment *

Committee; Trustee of the Plan, *

*

Appellees. *

___________________ *

*

AARP, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of Appellant, *

*
1

The Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Judge of the United States Court of

International Trade, sitting by designation.

2

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa.

-2-

American Benefits Council, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 12, 2008

Filed: November 3, 2009

___________

Before BYE and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG,1

 Judge.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Randal McCullough, a participant in a defined-benefit pension plan sponsored

and administered by AEGON USA, Inc. (“AEGON”), brought suit under section

502(a)(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29

U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). He alleged that various plan fiduciaries breached their fiduciary

duties to the plan and engaged in prohibited transactions in violation of ERISA. The

district court2

 granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that McCullough

lacked Article III standing to assert his claims. We affirm on an alternative ground,

following the circuit precedent of Harley v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,

284 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2002), and its construction of § 1132(a)(2).
-3-

I.

As a result of his former employment with one of AEGON’s subsidiaries,

McCullough is a participant in the AEGON USA, Inc. Pension Plan (“the Plan”),

which is sponsored and administered by AEGON and covered by ERISA. The Plan

is a defined-benefit plan, which provides participants fixed periodic payments upon

retirement from a general pool of plan assets. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson,

525 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1999).

In October 2005, McCullough filed this action against AEGON and various

other defendants in the United States District Court for the Central District of

California. In his first amended complaint, McCullough alleged that the defendants

breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104. He asserted that

the defendants caused the Plan to invest in funds offered by AEGON subsidiaries and

affiliates and to purchase products and services from such affiliates and subsidiaries,

resulting in the payment of fees “that were higher than the norm.” McCullough also

alleged that this conduct violated 29 U.S.C. § 1106, which prohibits certain

transactions between the Plan and fiduciaries and between the Plan and parties in

interest. In addition, McCullough asserted the same claims against defendants relating

to the management of a defined-contribution plan.

McCullough sought a refund to the Plan of “all fees paid to AEGON

Subsidiaries and Affiliates by the Plan[], including disgorgement of profits,” as well

as “equitable restitution and other appropriate equitable monetary relief.” He also

sought an injunction against defendants prohibiting “further violations of their ERISA

fiduciary responsibilities, obligations, and duties,” and any other appropriate equitable

relief, “including the permanent removal of the Defendants from any positions of trust

with respect to the Plan[] and the appointment of independent fiduciaries to administer

the Plan[].”
-4-

AEGON successfully requested transfer of the case to the Northern District of

Iowa, and then moved for partial summary judgment. The parties agreed that at the

time McCullough filed his complaint, and at all times from 2001 to 2006, the Plan was

“substantially overfunded,” according to actuarial valuation reports of the Plan’s

assets and liabilities. The parties also agreed that Plan never failed to pay benefits

owed to participants or beneficiaries, and that AEGON had no intention to terminate

the Plan. In light of these facts, AEGON argued that under Harley, 284 F.3d 901,

McCullough lacked standing to assert his claims against the Plan. The district court

agreed that Harley controlled, and granted AEGON’s motion for summary judgment.

See McCullough v. AEGON USA, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 879, 894 (N.D. Iowa 2007).

The parties subsequently filed a joint stipulation of dismissal, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(a)(1)(A)(ii), dismissing with prejudice McCullough’s claims relating to the

defined-contribution plan, and the district court entered final judgment. McCullough

now appeals the grant of summary judgment, and we review de novo.

II.

ERISA provides that the Secretary of Labor and participants, beneficiaries, and

fiduciaries of an employee benefit plan may bring an action “for appropriate relief

under section 1109 of this title.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Section 1109 makes

fiduciaries of a plan personally liable to the plan for any losses resulting from their

breaches of “any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon

fiduciaries” by ERISA. Id. § 1109(a). It also empowers the court to award “such

other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including

removal of such fiduciary.” As relevant here, ERISA imposes certain duties on plan

fiduciaries in 29 U.S.C. § 1104, including the duty to act “solely in the interest of the

participants and beneficiaries” of the plan, and to act “with the care, skill, prudence,

and diligence” of “a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such

matters.” Id. § 1104(a)(1). Fiduciaries are also prohibited by 29 U.S.C. § 1106 from
-5-

engaging in certain transactions with the plan or causing the plan to engage in certain

transactions with a “party in interest.” Id. § 1106(a)-(b).

In Harley, this court concluded that § 1132(a)(2) does not permit a participant

in a defined-benefit plan to bring suit claiming liability under § 1109 for alleged

breaches of fiduciary duties when the plan is overfunded. 284 F.3d at 905-07. The

Harley plaintiffs alleged that fiduciaries of the defined-benefit plan in which they

participated breached fiduciary duties by failing to investigate adequately and monitor

properly a $20 million investment in a hedge fund, resulting in a complete loss of the

investment. The plaintiffs also alleged that the plan fiduciaries breached their

fiduciary duties by allowing the Plan to enter into a prohibited transaction under

§ 1106(b)(1) when it paid a $1.17 million fee to the hedge fund’s investment advisor.

See id. at 903-04, 908.

On appeal, this court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment

for the defendants. With respect to the failure-to-investigate and failure-to-monitor

claims, the court held that § 1132(a)(2) did not permit the plaintiffs to bring suit

because the plan’s surplus was sufficiently large that the “investment loss did not

cause actual injury to plaintiffs’ interests in the Plan.” Id. at 907. The court explained

that “a contrary construction [of § 1132(a)(2)] would raise serious Article III case or

controversy concerns,” because it would “permit[] participants or beneficiaries who

have suffered no injury in fact” to bring an action “to enforce ERISA fiduciary duties

on behalf of the Plan.” Id. at 906. The court also reasoned that “the purposes

underlying ERISA’s imposition of strict fiduciary duties” – namely, “the protection

of individual pension rights” – “are not furthered by granting plaintiffs standing,”

because the plaintiffs’ individual pension rights are “fully protected,” and “would if

anything be adversely affected by subjecting the Plan and its fiduciaries to costly

litigation.” Id. at 907. Although the court did not identify the precise text of

§ 1132(a)(2) that it was construing, we presume the court determined that the suit

would not be one “for appropriate relief” under the circumstances. On the prohibited-
-6-

transaction claim, the court did not discuss whether § 1132(a)(2) permitted the suit,

but dismissed the claim on the merits instead. See id. at 908-09.

McCullough, like the Harley plaintiffs, brought this action under § 1132(a)(2)

and asserts that the defendants are liable to the Plan under § 1109 for breaching their

fiduciary duties to the Plan under § 1104. As in Harley, the Plan is a defined-benefit

plan, and McCullough does not dispute that the Plan was “substantially overfunded”

at the time he brought suit. Unless there is a basis for this panel to disregard Harley,

therefore, McCullough may not bring his § 1104 claim under § 1132(a)(2). See Drake

v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395, 400 (8th Cir. 1987) (“One panel of this Court is not at liberty

to disregard a precedent handed down by another panel. Only the Court en banc can

take such action.”). 

McCullough also asserts a claim that the defendants were liable to the Plan

under § 1109 because they caused the Plan to engage in prohibited transactions in

violation of § 1106. The court in Harley skipped to the merits of a claim involving

§ 1106 without addressing whether a participant may bring such a claim under

§ 1132(a)(2) against a “substantially overfunded” defined-benefit plan. 284 F.3d at

908-09. McCullough does not argue, however, that a claim alleging a violation of

§ 1106 should be treated differently than one alleging a violation of § 1104, and like

the district court, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 892, we see no logical basis for a distinction.

McCullough makes two principal arguments why Harley does not preclude his

action. First, although acknowledging that Harley was decided on statutory grounds,

he argues that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision regarding Article III standing

in Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008),

undermines Harley. A limited exception to the prior panel rule permits us to revisit

an opinion of a prior panel if an intervening Supreme Court decision is inconsistent

with the prior opinion. Young v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 2000).

McCullough argues that Sprint is such an intervening decision. 
-7-

In Sprint, the Supreme Court held that “an assignee of a legal claim for money

owed has standing to pursue that claim in federal court, even when the assignee has

promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor.” 128 S. Ct. 2533. The

Court found the “history and precedent” of allowing assignees to bring suit,

particularly the “strong tradition . . . of suits by assignees for collection,” to be “well

nigh conclusive” in deciding the case, id. at 2541-42 (internal quotation omitted), but

also held that assignees “satisfy the Article III standing requirements articulated in

more modern decisions of [the] Court.” Id. at 2542. In considering whether the

assignees suffered an injury in fact, the Court acknowledged that the assignees “did

not originally suffer any injury,” but explained that the assignors “assigned their

claims to the [assignees] lock, stock, and barrel.” Id. 

Sprint also relied on the Court’s prior decision in Vermont Agency of Natural

Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), which held that a

relator possesses standing to bring a qui tam action under the False Claims Act

“because the Act ‘effect[s] a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim’

and that assignment of the ‘United States’ injury in fact suffices to confer standing on

[the relator].’” Sprint, 128 S. Ct. at 2542 (quoting Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773,

774) (alteration in original). The Court noted that in Vermont Agency, it had “stated

quite unequivocally that ‘the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in

fact suffered by the assignor.’” Id. (quoting Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773). 

McCullough contends that after Sprint, there is no constitutional concern with

interpreting § 1132(a) to permit a participant in an overfunded ERISA plan to sue

fiduciaries based on an injury to the plan. He acknowledges that unlike the assignees

in Sprint, a plan participant has not received a contractual assignment of the plan’s

claim, but he asserts that Congress has conferred an analogous right to sue in

§ 1132(a)(2). McCullough therefore contends that Sprint is inconsistent with the

holding of Harley that a plan participant may not bring an action under § 1132(a)(2)

when the plan is overfunded.
-8-

We are not convinced that Sprint sweeps as broadly as McCullough suggests.

Sprint and Vermont Agency both involved plaintiffs who were assigned claims by

parties who were originally injured. See Sprint, 128 S. Ct. at 2542; Vermont Agency,

529 U.S. at 773. Sprint also relied on the historical recognition of an assignee’s

ability to sue, 128 S. Ct. at 2536-42, and Vermont Agency relied on the “long tradition

of qui tam actions.” 529 U.S. at 775. Here, however, there is neither a long history

of recognizing suits by ERISA plan participants to sue on behalf of a plan, see Harley,

284 F.3d at 907, nor any assignment by the Plan to McCullough to sue on its behalf.

Nor does McCullough assert that § 1132(a)(2) “assigns” a claim belonging to the

government, as did the qui tam statute at issue in Vermont Agency. See 529 U.S. at

773.

McCullough suggests instead that Congress assigned a claim of one private

party (the ERISA plan) to another private party (a participant in the plan). This court

in Harley was reluctant to ascribe that intention to Congress, believing that such an

interpretation of § 1132(a)(2) raised serious constitutional concerns. If Congress

could assign an ERISA plan’s claim to a participant who is not injured, the court

wondered, then what principled reason would preclude Congress from assigning the

claim to any stranger? See 284 F.3d at 906-07 (“If the statute authorized any stranger

to the plan to bring such an action, would that suffice to confer standing? Surely not,

for ‘Article III forecloses the conversion of courts of the United States into judicial

versions of college debating forums.’”) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.

United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)). Sprint does not

purport to revolutionize the law of standing by authorizing Congress to “assign”

claims from one private party to another and thereby to create a constitutionally

sufficient injury in fact. To the contrary, the Court in Sprint thought it was the

dissenting opinion that advocated “a sea change in the law,” 128 S. Ct. at 2543, and

suggested that its holding merely assured continuity – citing, for example, that

“[t]rustees bring suits to benefit their trusts; guardians ad litem bring suits to benefit

their wards; receivers bring suit to benefit their receiverships; assignees in bankruptcy
3

Nor do we think that Sprint stands for the more general proposition urged by

McCullough that a party who suffers no injury has standing to bring an action as a

representative of an injured third-party, so long as “the party bringing suit is legally

authorized to sue.” Sprint made clear that it did not involve representational or thirdparty standing, because the plaintiffs were asserting their own legal rights under a

contractual assignment. See 128 S. Ct. at 2544. 

-9-

bring suit to benefit bankrupt estates; executors bring suit to benefit testator estates;

and so forth.” Id. Without more specific guidance from the Supreme Court that it has

expanded Article III standing as broadly as McCullough suggests – and beyond the

historically grounded examples cited in Sprint – we do not feel at liberty to disregard

this court’s more circumspect view in Harley.

3

There is another reason why Sprint does not compel us to disregard Harley.

The statutory holding of Harley did not rest solely on constitutional avoidance. The

court also reasoned that allowing participants in an overfunded plan to bring an action

under § 1132(a)(2) would not advance ERISA’s primary purpose of protecting

individual pension rights, because the pension rights of such plaintiffs are “fully

protected,” and “would if anything be adversely affected by subjecting the Plan and

its fiduciaries to costly litigation.” Harley, 284 F.3d at 907. This aspect of the prior

panel’s rationale survives, no matter how broadly one interprets Sprint and its

discussion of Article III standing.

McCullough’s second bid to avoid circuit precedent is based on a factual

distinction between this case and Harley. He contends that because this action seeks

to enjoin ongoing and future violations of ERISA, rather than just to recover losses

to a plan from a single investment transaction that allegedly violated ERISA, he

should be permitted to bring suit under § 1132(a)(2). McCullough’s factual

distinction, however, is not material to the reasoning of the prior panel. Harley

reasoned that a breach of a fiduciary duty causes no harm to a participant when the

plan is overfunded, and that allowing costly litigation would run counter to ERISA’s
-10-

purpose of protecting individual pension rights. That logic applies whether an action

alleges a single breach or a series of breaches.

Harley addressed only claims for monetary relief, and McCullough also seeks

injunctive relief under § 1132(a)(2). Given Harley’s holding that a participant suffers

no injury as long as the plan is substantially overfunded, however, we see no basis to

construe § 1132(a)(2) to authorize an action against fiduciaries of an overfunded plan

for injunctive relief, but not for the monetary relief sought in Harley. McCullough

points to cases from other circuits concluding that a plan participant may seek

injunctive relief under § 1132(a)(3), see Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich.,

505 F.3d 598, 607-10 (6th Cir. 2007); Horvath v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333

F.3d 450, 455-56 (3d Cir. 2003), but he has not relied on that section. See

McCullough, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 892 n.8. As to § 1132(a)(2), we are bound by circuit

precedent.

The balance of McCullough’s brief is a frontal assault on the reasoning of

Harley. He contends that Harley takes too narrow a view of a plan participant’s

injuries, misapplies the Supreme Court’s standing jurisprudence, e.g., Gollust v.

Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125-27 (1991), and undermines the enforcement mechanism

created by Congress in ERISA. These points echo arguments raised by the Secretary

of Labor in support of a petition for rehearing en banc in Harley. Whatever the merit

of these contentions, they challenge the decision of a prior panel, and must therefore

be addressed to the court en banc.

* * *

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
-11-

BYE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I believe the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sprint Communications Co. v.

APCC Services, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008), compels us to reach a different result

in this case than the result reached in Harley v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing

Co., 284 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 2002). I therefore respectfully dissent.

"Although one panel of this court ordinarily cannot overrule another panel, this

rule does not apply when the earlier panel decision is cast into doubt by a decision of

the Supreme Court." Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir.

1997). In order to disregard Harley, we must "explicitly identify the error or changed

circumstances and explain why a different result is justified." Jacobs v. Lockhart, 9

F.3d 36, 38 (8th Cir. 1993). For the reasons discussed below, I believe Sprint requires

us to disregard Harley.

The majority concludes Sprint does not compel us to disregard Harley because

the latter turned on statutory grounds, rather than on Article III standing, and the

statutory holding in Harley remains intact after Sprint. The notion Harley turns on a

statutory holding is dubious at best. Although Harley purported to avoid the standing

issue by interpreting the statute in a way which prohibits participants or beneficiaries

from bringing suit to recover for a loss suffered by the plan, the statute plainly and

unambiguously permits such an action. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) ("A civil action

may be brought . . . by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for

appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title."). Thus, as I pointed out in my

dissent in Harley, "we have no choice but to address the Article III question head-on."

Harley, 284 F.3d at 910 (Bye, J., dissenting).

Remarkably absent from Harley is any discussion of the statutory language it

purports to interpret in order to avoid the constitutional standing concerns. In this

case, the majority's discussion of Harley's statutory holding consists of a single
-12-

sentence speculating about the textual basis for the holding. See Ante at 5

(recognizing Harley does not identify the textual basis for its holding and merely

"presum[ing]" what it might be). As a consequence, both decisions seem to rest on

a free-floating statutory interpretation untethered to any actual statutory construct.

The resolution of McCullough's ability to sue to recover for a loss suffered by the plan

necessarily requires us to address his Article III standing, and Sprint casts

considerable doubt on the standing principles addressed in Harley.

The majority also suggests Harley's "statutory holding" rests on its conclusion

which allows plan participants to sue on behalf of the plan would not advance

ERISA's primary purpose of protecting individual pension rights, because it would

subject a plan and its fiduciaries to costly litigation. Id. at 9. The majority also relies

upon this aspect of Harley to avoid addressing Sprint's discussion of Article III

standing. This second aspect of Harley's "statutory holding," however, is also cast

into doubt directly by the Supreme Court, which has recognized the very purpose for

allowing beneficiaries and fiduciaries to sue on behalf of the plan under § 1132(a)(2)

is "the common interest shared by [participants and beneficiaries] in the financial

integrity of the plan." Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 141 n.9

(1985).

Harley held plan participants and beneficiaries cannot rely upon a loss suffered

by a fully-funded defined benefit plan to establish Article III standing to bring suit

under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) to recover for a loss suffered by the plan. The three

elements which must be present to satisfy Article III standing requirements are: (1)

the plaintiff has a concrete and particularized injury-in-fact which is actual or

imminent rather than merely conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection exists

between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) a favorable decision will likely

redress the injury. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). This

case, like Harley, turns on the presence or absence of the first element – a concrete

injury-in-fact.
-13-

Harley focused on whether the plan participants or beneficiaries themselves

suffered a concrete injury and concluded "the limits on judicial power imposed by

Article III counsel against permitting participants or beneficiaries who have suffered

no injury in fact from suing to enforce ERISA fiduciary duties on behalf of the Plan."

284 F.3d at 906. Thus, even though Harley recognized the defined benefit plan itself

suffered an injury, id. at 905, the court concluded participants and beneficiaries lacked

Article III standing because they themselves did not suffer a concrete injury.

Sprint addressed the question whether one party's concrete injury confers

Article III standing on a second party who has the right to prosecute the former's claim

pursuant to a contractual assignment. In that context, the Supreme Court indicated the

assignors' concrete injury is the focus for purposes of Article III standing, not whether

the assignees suffered an injury. See Sprint, 128 S. Ct. at 2542 (recognizing "an

assignee can sue based on his assignor's injuries."). Indeed, Sprint went one step

further by indicating the party with the right to prosecute the claim has Article III

standing despite the lack of any right to the recovery. See id. ("[Our] inquiry focuses,

as it should, on whether the injury that a plaintiff alleges is likely to be redressed

through the litigation – not on what the plaintiff ultimately intends to do with the

money he recovers."). As the dissenters noted, the majority separated "the right to

recover from the right to prosecute a claim," 128 S. Ct. at 2551 (Roberts, C.J.,

dissenting), and recognized Article III standing for the party holding the right-toprosecute "strand" of standing. Id.

Thus, Sprint indicates when A possesses the right to prosecute a claim on B's

behalf, A has constitutional standing to bring a claim arising from B's injuries; that is,

our inquiry in determining the presence of a concrete injury focuses on B's injury, not

A's. If there is no legally significant difference between the party prosecuting the

claim in Sprint (the assignees) and the party prosecuting the claim in Harley (the plan

participants), Sprint necessarily casts doubt on Harley's failure to focus on the plan's

concrete injury for standing purposes.
4

The False Claims Act provides in relevant part: "A person may bring a civil

action for a violation of section 3729 [of the False Claims Act] for the person and for

the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the

Government." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).

5

The assignment of the right to prosecute was "partial" in Vermont Agency

because both the relator and the government have the right to prosecute a claim for a

violation of § 3729. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) & (b).

-14-

A notable difference between the Harley plan participants and the Sprint

assignees is that the former obtained their right to prosecute the plan's claim pursuant

to statute, while the latter obtained their right to prosecute the assignors' claims

pursuant to contract. In Sprint, the Supreme Court discussed in detail the "history and

tradition" of allowing an assignee to prosecute an assignor's claim. See id. at 2535-41.

Admittedly, there is no similar history and tradition of allowing ERISA plan

participants to prosecute a fully-funded defined benefit plan's claim. But the Supreme

Court also noted "there is considerable, more recent authority showing that an

assignee for collection may properly sue on the assigned claim in federal court." Id.

at 2541. One of the "more recent" cases specifically discussed by the Supreme Court

was Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.

765 (2000). Id. at 2542.

In Vermont Agency, the Supreme Court addressed the standing of a party with

the statutory right to prosecute a qui tam action on behalf of the government under the

False Claims Act4

 and held it was the government's concrete injury which conferred

standing on the relator. 529 U.S. at 774. The Court noted the False Claims Act

effects a "partial assignment of the Government's damages claim," id. at 773, and

referred to the relator as "the statutorily designated agent of the United States," id. at

772. Sprint subsequently clarified the key in Vermont Agency was the "partial

assignment"5

 giving the relator the right to prosecute the claim, not the right to share

in the recovery, because in Sprint the assignees still had standing despite the fact that
-15-

any recovery would inure only to the benefit of the assignors. See Sprint, 128 S. Ct.

at 2542 (discussing Vermont Agency).

Reading Sprint and Vermont Agency together, there is no legally significant

difference between the assignees in Sprint and the plan participants here or in Harley.

Although an assignee's right to prosecute another's claim derives from contract, while

an ERISA plan participant's right to prosecute a plan's claim derives from statute, in

both instances the Supreme Court clearly instructs us as to the standing of the party

with the right to prosecute the claim turns not on whether they themselves suffered an

injury, but on whether the party holding the right-to-recover "strand" has a concrete

injury which can be redressed by the lawsuit. In Sprint it did not matter that the

assignees would not retain any of the recovery from the lawsuit. Likewise, here, it is

irrelevant as to McCullough not being entitled to any recovery from the lawsuit.

Applying Sprint and Vermont Agency to this case, then, McCullough has Article III

standing to bring a claim arising from the Plan's injuries so long as he possesses the

right to prosecute the Plan's claim pursuant to § 1132(a)(2), even though he may not

possess any of the right to recover.

The only remaining question, then, for purposes of constitutional standing in

this case, is to determine whether § 1132(a)(2) assigns to plan participants the right

to prosecute on a plan's behalf, or whether it might also give them the right to

prosecute a claim on their own behalf. For if McCullough is merely suing on his own

behalf, he still must show he suffered a concrete injury in order to establish his

standing, and the lessons taught in Sprint and Vermont Agency would have no

bearing.

The Supreme Court has already answered the question whether McCullough

can sue on his own behalf under § 1132(a)(2) – actions authorized under § 1132(a)(2)

to recover for violations of § 1109 must "inure[] to the benefit of the plan as a whole"

and cannot inure to the benefit of individual plan participants. Russell, 473 U.S. at
-16-

141; see also Conley v. Pitney Bowes, 176 F.3d 1044, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999) (indicating

"§ 1109(a) provides relief only to a plan and not to individual beneficiaries"); Wald

v. Southwestern Bell Corp. Customcare Med. Plan, 83 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir.

1996) (following Russell and holding that an individual plan participant could not sue

on his own behalf under § 1132(a)(2)). Thus, the only right granted to plan

participants and beneficiaries under § 1132(a)(2) is the right to prosecute a claim on

a plan's behalf.

Harley distinguished Vermont Agency on the grounds that "the qui tam statute

partially assigned the government's claim to the private qui tam relator; here, on the

other hand, § 1132(a)(2) contains no such assignment." Harley, 284 F.3d at 907. We

can presume Harley was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Russell,

which clearly recognized § 1132(a)(2) does not assign the right to recover for a plan's

injury to plan participants, but does give them the right to prosecute the plan's claim.

Thus, the "assignment" Harley referred to in distinguishing Vermont Agency was the

assignment of the right to recover, not the right to prosecute. Sprint makes clear the

"assignment" which mattered in Vermont Agency was the assignment of the right to

prosecute, not the right to recover. Sprint tells us, therefore, that Harley distinguished

Vermont Agency upon an incorrect premise. What mattered in Vermont Agency, and

thus what matters here, is § 1132(a)(2) statutorily assigns the right to prosecute the

plan's claim to plan participants and beneficiaries: the fact § 1132(a)(2) contains no

assignment of the right to recover is irrelevant.

Because Harley would compel a result opposite the one we reach when

applying Sprint and Vermont Agency, the Supreme Court's decisions necessarily cast

doubt on Harley. Under Sprint and Vermont Agency, McCullough's Article III

standing to sue under § 1132(a)(2) turns not on whether he suffered an injury, but on

whether the Plan suffered a concrete injury which can be redressed through this

lawsuit.

I respectfully dissent.

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