Number 36, July 1995

Ballistic Missile DefenseAn Administration Perspective
Robert G. Bell
Conclusions and Definitions
Note:
Before one delves into any defense issue one must first begin with the underlying question:  "Whatis our strategy?"
	What the Clinton Administration is doing with regard to strategic *offensive* systemsprovides an instructive context for what we're now trying to do on the strategic defensive side.
	To begin with, the Clinton Administration believes, fundamentally, that deterrence stillmatters.
	Why?  Is it because we think that Russia is going to attack us today, tonight, tomorrow,next week, next month?  No, of course not.  We're working very hard--across the board--inmany  areas, not the least of which are arms control, denuclearization and the Nunn-Lugarinitiatives, to make sure that we continue to strengthen strategic stability and assist Russia in itsdemocratic and economic reforms.
	But, a strategic partnership with Russia is not a "for sure" conclusion yet.  Thus, it isfundamental to this Administration's strategy that we are hedging against the requirement toreconstitute strategic deterrence in full form.
	This hedging strategy drives many decisions, and each of them carries a price tag.  Theseinclude: 

-  	a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that established a requirement for 3,500 strategicwarheads, with a premium on the flexibility to upload and reconstitute.
-  	a decision to keep the ICBM leg of the triad, to modernize the Minuteman III, andto keep three Minutemen wings deployed in ICBM silos.
-  	a decision to complete the D-5 Trident missile purchase, keep 14 Trident boats,and backfit the D-5 into 4 of those 14 submarines to make sure we have 14 D-5 armedTrident boats.
-  	a decision to ask Congress for a very challenging stockpile stewardship program,to make sure that our nuclear weapons are reliable, safe, and mission-capable absentfull-scale nuclear testing.
-  	a decision to commit this Administration to solving the tritium problem.
-  	a decision to spend a lot of money on START verification and monitoring ofRussia's strategic offensive modernization.

	If you don't think maintaining a deterrent hedge matters; if you think it's "over, overthere;" that Russia could never again constitute a nuclear threat to the United States, and all wehave to deal with are missile threats from regional outlaw regimes, then you can take a differentapproach and you can save a lot of money.
	But that's not what the Clinton Administration thinks.

ABM Treaty Remains Important
	In this context, I would argue that the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty matters aswell.
	Why is that?  Well, it is axiomatic that we must include, as part of our calculation of thesufficiency of deterrence, the threat we will face on the other side in terms of defenses.  Withoutthe ABM Treaty, we would require more RVs (Re-entry Vehicles) than the 3,500 level set inSTART II. So the ABM Treaty is key to our ability to ask the United States Senate to ratify thisTreaty.
	And if you believe we should go below 3,500, and we're continuing to discuss thatquestion within the Administration now, then the ABM Treaty matters even more.
	Furthermore, within the limits of the Treaty itself you have to ask yourself what are thedefenses that STRATCOM would have to confront and penetrate if we ever had to retaliate; notjust the 100 authorized ABMs, but the thousands of SAMs that could be upgraded and,increasingly, the whole new possibility of dedicated Russian Theater Missile Defenses (TMDs).
	So does that mean, then, that what we want to do is expand the ABM Treaty andtransform it through some sort of aggressive outreach effort into a "TMD Treaty," to capture andeliminate any strategic defensive threats from Russia below the level of their authorized ABMs?
	Of course not.  The ABM Treaty is not a "TMD treaty."  Does that mean "anything goes,"though?  Does that mean that you can just take any interceptor missile and hang a sign on it thatreads "TMD," and as long as we say it's a TMD, it's a TMD, period, end of case?
	Does it mean that if we see something on the Russian side that "looks like, walks like,talks like" an ABM, we have no recourse to say, "Wait a minute," if they say that's a TMD?  No. And there's a good reason for this.
	It's because the ABM Treaty has a provision, Article VI(a), that was added because theUnited States, looking at the Soviet Union, which had deployed ABMs and 10,000 surface-to-airmissiles, said, "We have to have some insurance against their ability to have a covert ABM systemin the guise of upgraded SAMs."

Determining What Constitutes TMD
	My second point is that this debate about what is a TMD and what is not a TMD goesback to the ratification hearings and the negotiations themselves.
	During the Senate hearings on the ABM Treaty in 1972, the then-director of DefenseResearch and Engineering, Johnny Foster, was asked by Senator Proxmire, "Where's the line? What is the distinction between these two?"
	He said, "If you shoot a missile interceptor at any target that goes faster than 2 kms persecond, that's an ABM."
	Now, that was a personal view, but he went on from that testimony to promulgate thatview for our programs in internal DOD guidance for years to follow.
	In 1978, the Security Consultative Commission (SCC) promulgated an agreed statementthat addressed the question of clarifying what Article VI(a) means, and what "tested in an ABMmode means."  But that is only *half* of Article VI(a).  The other half prohibits either side from"giving" *non*-ABM interceptors "the capability to counter" strategic ballistic missiles.
	Throughout the 1980's, this precise issue was at the center of internal debates within theReagan and Bush Administrations as they drafted their annual arms control compliance reports onthe Soviet Union.
	The compliance issue they wrestled with was quite specific: had the Soviet Union illegallyacquired an ABM capability by giving its SA-10 and SA-12 surface-to-air missile systems thecapability to counter strategic ballistic missiles?
	What those administrations told the Congress was that since the United States could notsatisfy itself that the Soviet Union had*not* turned the SA-10 into a covert ABM, we concludedthat the Soviet Union *may* have been violating the ABM Treaty.
	These concerns were not based on any *demonstration* by the Soviet Union of thiscapability.  Rather, it was based on our own unilateral analyses of what we thought the capabilityof that system was.
	The next step in this chronology occurred in 1991 with the Missile Defense Act of 1991,in which Congress directed the deployment of a national, treaty-compliant ABM and urged thePresident to negotiate a clarification of the TMD demarcation issue.
	That instruction was revalidated by Congress several times, and, indeed, the BushAdmini-stration conducted extensive discussions in the Ross-Mamedov Working Group.

Negotiating TMD/ABM Agreements
	At the very end of the Bush Administration, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney wrote animportant memorandum on this subject.
	This memorandum, in effect, said the following to the new Clinton Administration:  "Thisis a critical issue; it is urgent that you undertake to resolve it.  And here's our parting suggestion: We will posit a theory of what this demarcation might look like.   We would suggest that you takesix months to study this and then ensure it is applied reciprocally so there is no double standard."
	Well, we mostly did just that.  We did one thing differently, though.  We didn't adopt theexact demarcation formula that he suggested.  There was a good reason for that: no legal office,in any agency in our government, could support the Cheney proposition for how you drew thatline.
	Instead, we went to Geneva in November of 1993 and said to the Russians, here's how wethink we should draw the line:  "If you do not test a TMD against a strategic ballisticmissile"--which we then proceeded to define--"that will not be deemed to be an ABM."
	The theory here was quite simple.  No rational military organization is going to deploy asan ABM defense, at the cost of billions of dollars, a system that has not been tested to show thatit can be an ABM.
	That was really phase one of this effort, from November 1993 to the Summer of 1994. The Russians said "okay, as far as it goes."   But they said "we need more"; we need speed limitson the interceptor itself."
	We said, "Well, we don't think we agree with that, but if there are going to be speed limits,they'll have to be speed limits that permit the specific TMD interceptor systems we aredeveloping."
	So there was a second phase of this negotiation, from Summer until Fall of 1994, wherewe talked about interceptor speed limits, our speed limits.  We agreed on most, but not all, ofthose.
	Then last November, when it became evident that the negotiations had gotten stuck andwe were not going to push the Russians to accept all our speed limits, we began a third phase inwhich the talks have been suspended.
	During the last six months, we have worked very hard to make sure the Russiansunderstand there's a new Congress, there's a new attitude about missile defense, and there is a realthreat requirement that requires this Administration as a custodian of national security policy todeploy highly effective TMDs.  The tactical question, then, is now very simple:  Do theyappreciate this?
	At the May Summit in Moscow, we were able to reach agreement on a joint statement ofprinciples.  This is not a legally binding agreement that concludes the negotiations.  Rather, it is anattempt to have the two leaders say to the working level:  "Here are the basic parametersaccording to which you should try to conclude an agreed statement."
	We think this is a hopeful sign.  Russia has accepted a formula that says it is not a questionof whether a particular interceptor has some theoretical capability in a one-on-one engagementscenario against a particular RV.  The question is whether a particular TMD system poses a"realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side."  If not, it should be permitted.
	How do you define "realistic threat"?  We define "realistic threat" in the context ofoperational military considerations that take into account a number of factors, including howmany are deployed, where are they, what threat they respond to, their range and technicalcapabilities.
	Does the Summit statement mean we've had a breakthrough?  We simply don't know.

TMD Programs Continue Forward
	But we will soon find out whether the statement was meant by Russia to be hortatory orwhether, indeed, Russia will craft a new negotiating position along these lines.  We will find out,before we go back to the SCC negotiating table whether we can expect, when we get to the SCC,that there will be a new Russian position.
	In the meantime, where does that leave us on TMD?  The point I want to emphasize isthat while this is going on at the diplomatic level, all our TMD programs are going forward.
	You can take our TMD programs across the board, projected to the end of the Clintonfirst term, and there is no arms control barrier.
	Patriot PAC-3 goes forward. Corps SAM/ MEADS goes forward. Navy Lower Tier goesforward.  Concept development of the air-based options go forward. Brilliant Eyes goes forward. We certified Navy LEAP; it goes forward. THAAD DEMVAL, the whole DEMVAL test seriesgoes forward.
	So we've got time here to have a reasoned, rational debate about this.  We've got time tocomplete this effort with the Russians and get this wrapped up, tidily.  That's clearly the preferredoption.  And I hope that's the option that Congress would give us running room to complete.
	The danger of Congress stepping in to legislate a solution unilaterally  is *precisely* that it isunilateral. By attempting to enforce its demarcation solution on the executive branch through afunding restriction, Congress raises significant international legal issues, as well as constitutionalissues regarding the President's authority to interpret and apply the Treaty.  That means TMDgets embroiled in a broader separation of powers debate.  Second,  there is the  downside risk toour overall relations with Russia, including in the areas of START I and START II, by trying toend this discussion unilaterally when there isno imperative to do so because we've got *time* to finish it in a much more cooperative andreasoned way.