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20–059PDF 2005

THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAM:

THE COTECNA AND SAYBOLT INSPECTION FIRMS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 17, 2005

Serial No. 109–27

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona, Vice Chairman 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

GREGG RICKMAN, Subcommittee Staff Director 

GREGORY MCCARTHY, Professional Staff Member 

CLIFF STAMMERMAN, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

TOD HULL, Special Assistant 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

John Denson, Esquire, General Counsel, Saybolt Group ..................................... 8

Evelyn Suarez, Esquire, Williams & Mullen, representing Cotecna S.A. ........... 16

Rehan Mullick, Ph.D., former Research Officer, United Nations Office of 

the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq [UNOHCI] ........................................... 67

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: Prepared statement ............................................................................. 3

John Denson, Esquire: Prepared statement .......................................................... 10

Evelyn Suarez, Esquire: Prepared statement ....................................................... 18

Rehan Mullick, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 69

(1)

THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD 

PROGRAM: THE COTECNA AND SAYBOLT 

INSPECTION FIRMS 

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:58 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Good morning. The hearing is called to order. 

This is a hearing of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, and today’s hearing is on the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program: The 

Cotecna and Saybolt Inspection Firms. This is March 17, 2005, St. 

Patrick’s Day. Thank you very much. 

Today as part of our ongoing investigation in the U.N.’s Oil-forFood Program we will discuss the inspection firms that contracted 

with the United Nations to examine both the oil shipments from 

Iraq and the humanitarian goods that came into the country. 

Additionally, we will talk about a former official, and we will talk 

with that former official, who worked for the United Nations Office 

of Humanitarian Coordination for Iraq. That is UNOHCI. He was 

in Baghdad working for UNOHCI, and he is with us today. 

Dr. Rehan Mullick repeatedly warned of the shortcomings of the 

United Nations system for monitoring the delivery of the humanitarian supplies in the Oil-for-Food Program and reported that Saddam Hussein was diverting these goods for other uses. For his diligence, Dr. Mullick was isolated, demoted, and then let go by the 

United Nations. 

The inspection firms we are looking at today, Cotecna and 

Saybolt, were central players in the Oil-for-Food Program. These 

firms provided the gatekeepers for the transactions within the program. 

In Cotecna’s case, they were tasked with verifying that the contracted shipments of food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies actually arrived in Iraq and if they were suitable for consumption. 

In Saybolt’s case, they were tasked to verify that the contracted 

amounts of oil were actually delivered, and, in both cases, there 

were discrepancies found that complicated, confused, and corrupted 

the system. 

2

Alarmingly, though, it is what Dr. Mullick has to tell us about 

what happened to these supplies once they arrived in Iraq that is 

of immediate concern. The disclosures are revealing and deserve 

further investigation, which is what we are launching today. 

Witnesses interviewed by the Committee staff over the last year 

told of two avenues on which goods entered Iraq during this time 

period. One went through the Cotecna process, and the other avenue was an unobstructed pathway in which goods went 

uninspected and straight into the country. 

How could the U.N. simply ignore this out-of-control situation 

when the full intent of the members of the United Nations was 

that we would control the situation in order to have the outcome 

that was aimed at by these programs? 

Similarly, Committee staff have conducted interviews during the 

past year in the United States, in Europe, and in the Middle East 

with present-day Iraqi Government officials who also detailed stories of humanitarian aid diversions and undermanned or 

unobservant Cotecna inspection posts. 

Alarmingly, several witnesses interviewed by the Committee 

staff made allegations of bribes taken by Cotecna inspectors. I hope 

Ms. Suarez, who is with us today, can address some of these points. 

There are other equally alarming issues Saybolt needs to address. The Committee has received a great number of documents 

supplied by Saybolt which detail problems encountered by their inspectors. Early on, problems arose from the fact that Saybolt, in 

violation of U.N. rules, I might add, had the job of inspecting the 

oil shipments for the United Nations while at the same time being 

inspectors for the buyers of the oil. It seems like conflict of interest 

would be a mild way to categorize that situation. 

Finally, I wanted to point out our third witness, Dr. Rehan 

Mullick. Dr. Mullick was in the eye of the storm right there in 

Baghdad. He witnessed firsthand the distribution of goods from the 

Oil-for-Food Program. Until now, this was a rarely discussed issue. 

Today, however, Dr. Mullick will tell us how he had repeatedly 

warned his superiors in his office there in Baghad that Saddam 

Hussein was manipulating the entire process of food distribution, 

and that food and other goods were being diverted. We want to 

hear about that today. According to Dr. Mullick, the only transparency in the program was for the Iraqis and not for the United 

Nations. The U.N. did nothing to act on his warnings and in the 

end essentially fired him for his honesty. 

We have heard about whistleblowers in the United States. It is 

endemic that bureaucracy protect itself, and we are never going to 

make anything better in this world unless we come to grips with 

that phenomena and try to deal with these situations, with those 

people, and take those people seriously who are courageous enough 

to stand up and offer constructive criticism in disclosing wrongdoing. 

Dr. Mullick did the right thing, and he was treated as an outcast. This is wrong, and frankly, I think that recompense should 

be made to him for his treatment—or I should say mistreatment—

for admirable acts and the courage that he showed. 

The U.N., through willful blindness, chose to ignore the corruption that Dr. Mullick reported. Today, we wish to learn more about 

3

the goods which were supposed to help the Iraqi people—and that 

is what this program of Oil-for-Food was all about, trying to get humanitarian goods to people. We heard about the dying children, but 

now we are going to hear details today about how some of these 

humanitarian goods were diverted and directed elsewhere, maybe 

even to Saddam Hussein’s Army. 

Moreover, we wish to understand why the United Nations sat 

back and seemingly allowed this to occur when they had an employee, and they had someone who was credible, telling them that 

there is a problem. The United Nations, I believe, has much to answer for. Nearly 10 years after the Oil-for-Food Program, we still 

have not heard all of the answers. 

Today’s witnesses, Evelyn Suarez, an attorney for Williams 

Mullen, Cotecna’s representatives here in Washington, DC, and 

John Denson, a general counsel for Core Laboratories in Houston, 

the parent company of Saybolt, will be testifying, and finally we 

will hear from Dr. Mullick. 

I look forward to your testimony, and again I thank the two companies involved and the two witnesses who are with us today for 

stepping forward in a controversial situation to make sure that the 

events that are going to be discussed will be looked at from all 

points of view. We need your input to make sure that we fully understand what is going on. Thank you very much for being here. 

Our Ranking Member is not able to attend, Mr. Adam Schiff 

from California is recognized for that responsibility. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANA ROHRABACHER, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Today as part of our on-going investigation into the UN’s Oil-for-Food program, 

we will discuss the inspection firms that contracted with the United Nations to examine both the oil shipments from Iraq and the humanitarian goods that came into 

the country. Additionally, we will talk to a former official who worked for the United 

Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraqi in Baghdad. Dr. Rehan 

Mullick repeatedly warned of the shortcomings of the UN’s system for monitoring 

the delivery of the humanitarian supplies in the Oil-for-Food program and reported 

that Saddam was diverting these goods to other uses. For his diligence, Dr. Mullick 

was isolated, demoted, and let go by the UN. 

The inspection firms we are looking at today, Cotecna and Saybolt, were essential 

players in the Oil-for-Food program. These firms provided the gatekeepers for the 

transactions of the program. In Cotecna’s case, they were tasked with verifying that 

the contracted shipments of food, medicine and other humanitarian supplies actually arrived in Iraq and if they were suitable for consumption. 

In Saybolt’s case, they were tasked to verify that the contracted amount of oil was 

in fact delivered. In both cases, there were disparities found that complicated, confused, and corrupted the program. Alarmingly though, it is what Dr. Mullick has 

to tell us about what happened to these supplies once they arrived in Iraq that is 

of immediate concern. His disclosures are revealing and deserve further investigation. 

Witnesses interviewed by Committee staff over the last year, told of two avenues 

on which goods entered Iraq. One went through the Cotecna process, the other avenue was an unobstructed pathway in which goods went uninspected and straight 

into the country. How could the UN simply ignore this out-of-control situation? 

Similarly, Committee staff have conducted interviews during the past year in the 

United States, Europe, and in the Middle East with present-day Iraqi government 

officials who also detailed stories of humanitarian aid diversions and under-manned 

or unobservant Cotecna inspection posts. Alarmingly, several witnesses interviewed 

by Committee staff made allegations of bribe taking by Cotecna inspectors. I hope 

Ms. Suarez can address some of these points. 

4

There are other equally alarming issues Saybolt needs to address. The Committee 

is in receipt of a great number of documents supplied by Saybolt which detail problems encountered by their inspectors. 

Early on, problems arose from the fact that Saybolt, in violation of UN rules, had 

the job of inspecting the oil shipments for the UN while at the same time being inspectors for the buyers of the oil. Conflict of interest is a mild way to put it. 

Finally, I want to talk about our third witness, Dr. Rehan Mullick. Dr. Mullick 

was in the eye of the storm in Baghdad. He witnessed first-hand the distribution 

of the goods from the oil-for-food program. Until now, this was a rarely discussed 

issue. Today, however, Dr. Mullick is going to tell us how he had repeatedly warned 

his superiors in his office that Saddam was manipulating the entire process of the 

food distribution and that other goods were being diverted. According to Dr. Mullick, 

the only transparency in the program was for the Iraqis, not the UN. 

The UN did nothing to act on his warnings and in the end essentially fired him 

for his honesty. Dr. Mullick did the right thing and he was treated as an outcast. 

This was wrong and they should make recompense to him for his treatment. The 

UN, through willful blindness, chose to ignore the corruption that Dr. Mullick reported to them. 

Today, we wish to learn more about how the goods, which were supposed to help 

the Iraqi people, were diverted and directed elsewhere. Moreover, we wish to understand why the UN sat back and seemingly allowed this to occur. The UN, I believe, 

has much to answer for. Nearly ten years after the Oil-for-Food program began, we 

still do not have all the answers. 

Today’s witnesses are Evelyn Suarez, an attorney for Williams Mullen, Cotecna’s 

representatives here in Washington and John Denson, General Counsel for Core 

Laboratories in Houston, the parent company of Sabyolt. Finally, we will hear from 

Dr. Mullick. I look forward to the testimony of all our witnesses.

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, again I want to thank you and commend you for holding a hearing that allows us to explore the operation of the Oil-for-Food Program administered by the United Nations and designed to implement the policies of the Security Council and the member states. 

I hope our witnesses today will be able to shed light on several 

questions. The first: How did Saybolt and Cotecna succeed in winning the contracts to monitor the exports of Iraqi oil under the Oilfor-Food Program in Saybolt’s case, and to monitor the import of 

approved humanitarian goods in Cotecna’s case? Were improper influences brought to bear in the awarding of these contracts? 

As the Chairman and other Members of the Subcommittee are 

well aware, the United Nations is in the midst of what I understand will be extensive management reforms to make the institution more accountable, transparent and efficient. Understanding 

what happened in the past is important as it will inform these reforms. 

I would also note here, Mr. Chairman, that there have been considerable questions raised about the awarding of contracts by our 

own Government for work in Iraq, and I hope that we will consider 

this as a subject of investigation by the Subcommittee as well. 

Second, how did Saybolt and Cotecna perform their duties under 

the terms of the contract? The U.N. is a community of nations, and 

I would like to know if the U.S. and the member states who are 

paying for their services through the U.N. dues got their monies 

worth. 

Third, I would also like to know what the scope of the contracts 

were. Where do the duties of Saybolt and Cotecna begin, and where 

do they end? And in this connection, where do the obligations of 

the member states begin, and where do their obligations end? 

Fourth, if the sanctions were evaded by smuggling oil out of Iraq 

and smuggling goods into the country as we know they were, who 

5

should bear responsibility? Who crafted such a poor framework 

that begged for evasion and corruption, and who allowed that evasion and corruption to continue? 

Everything I have heard thus far through the course of the hearings by this Subcommittee and other Committees, as well as in the 

Dulfer and Volcker reports, point to a system that was designed to 

fail. The decision by the Security Council to allow Iraq to decide 

who could buy its oil and from whom it would purchase the humanitarian goods allowed under OFFP virtually guaranteed that there 

would be corruption. 

No contractor can be held liable for that systemic failure. For 

that we must hold members of the Security Council, including ourselves, to account. 

I would also like to remind my colleagues that the overwhelming 

majority of revenue gained from illicit oil shipments—73 percent—

resulted from trade protocols Iraq had with Jordan, Turkey, Egypt 

and Syria, oil shipments the United States Government knew 

about and countenanced. Another 11 percent came from the smuggling of oil to neighboring Gulf States. 

One flagrant example of this broader failure was the recent investigation that found, in February 2003, a massive oil smuggling 

operation began at the Iraqi port on the Persian Gulf. Fourteen supertankers loaded nearly seven million barrels of oil over several 

days. 

Stopping these ships once they left the port was the responsibility of a multinational force led by our Navy. For several years 

it had been successfully interdicting oil smuggling by small fishing 

boats. Stopping a supertanker should not have been a problem. 

This operation was not a secret. Companies that had legally bought 

oil under Oil-for-Food began to complain because their oil was 

being diverted to fill the supertankers. 

A U.N. overseer notified American and British Missions to the 

United Nations so they could alert the Naval force, and on February 17, 2003, Saybolt sent an email to the headquarters of the 

Naval force about the smuggling. It even named one of the ships 

involved, and Saybolt received a reply acknowledging their report. 

When the tankers left the port, nothing happened. The Naval 

force under our command did not stop it. Even the staff of the 

United States and British missions at the United Nations were 

puzzled. The oil was sold for $150 million in illegal profit. Fifty million dollars went to the Iraqi regime just before the war began. 

What was that money used for? Was it used to line Saddam’s 

pockets, or was it used to buy the weapons that have killed and 

wounded thousands of Americans and Iraqis and coalition partners? Why did the U.S. Government and our Security Council partners allow this to happen? The answer, Mr. Chairman, I believe, 

is the oil was destined for a friend, Jordan. We did not want to deprive Jordan of oil before the outbreak of war. 

Why is this known and massive evasion of sanctions relevant, a 

massive evasion of sanctions that may be larger than any corruption alleged against Saybolt or Cotecna? It is relevant because it 

demonstrates in large part why the sanctions failed and how any 

further sanctions regime must be designed. 

6

First, of course, there can be no input from the government that 

is being sanctioned. That I think was a cardinal failure of the sanctions regime against Iraq. Second, there can be no acquiescence 

and cheating by the Security Council or its members. 

The irony of the sanction regime of course, the great irony in all 

of this, is that the sanctions somehow kept Iraq from getting weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps the biggest question of all, and 

one we may never adequately answer, is how could a sanctions regime that was built to fail—and in fact did fail—somehow succeed? 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Let me note that 

many of the issues that the Minority has raised and some of which 

you raised with us today are very valid points. 

This Chairman does intend to hold hearings, number one, on the 

contracting irregularities and the total chaos of spending procedures that were part of the whole Iraqi liberation for far too long 

and may be perhaps still going on. We will find out. This Chairman 

does intend to hold hearings on that. 

In terms of the shipments of oil to Turkey and to Jordan which 

evaded, basically, the whole embargo that had been placed on Saddam Hussein, this Chairman does intend to call witnesses about 

that. We will especially call witnesses for those Government officials in the United States who initiated the policy. 

I would hope that Madeleine Albright and the other high officials 

during the Clinton Administration that initiated this policy will 

come here and explain to us exactly why this policy was decided, 

but let me note these hearings are not about sanctions. This is not 

what our hearings are about. Our hearings are about corruption 

within the U.N. The validity of sanctions is another issue. 

The fact is that the United States obviously had a policy of permitting Turkey and Jordan, for whatever reason, to receive oil that 

was contradictory to the sanctions that had been laid down in the 

embargo. Perhaps that policy decision was made because when everything balanced out, Turkey and Jordan would have been in a 

closer position to the effort against Saddam Hussein. 

I am not sure what it is, but I am going to be very happy to ask 

Madeleine Albright why that decision was made. We will ask some 

people from high up in the Administration to find out why that policy was initiated, and we might even have somebody in this Administration tell us why that policy was not changed when President 

Bush became President. 

But, this set of hearings and our focus right now today—and we 

will follow up on those other things; we will have witnesses to 

those other areas—is focused on the United Nations. There are a 

lot of people who believe the United Nations should be endowed 

with further responsibilities for maintaining the peace of the world. 

There are many people who believe the United Nations is an organization, an admirable organization, that has earned more authority in solving world affairs and in taking over issues that are 

important to the national security of the United States of America 

and relying on the United Nations for keeping the peace and protecting the interests of the free world. If that is the case, the 

United Nations has to be demonstrating that it is adhering to a 

7

level of integrity that will certainly justify the trust that we are 

putting in the United Nations. 

What we are discussing today in this set of hearings goes right 

to the integrity issue of the United Nations, and that is why we 

are holding hearings today. I think it is very important for the 

American people to understand both the strength and the weaknesses of the United Nations. 

Now, today we welcome our witnesses to this hearing. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, before you go on, because the Chairman’s comments were designed in part to rebut my own statement——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. To be totally fair, as the Chairman tries to 

be, I will be very happy to yield you a couple minutes to have your 

say, and then we will go on to witnesses. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that you 

have been very generous and evenhanded that way. 

A couple of very brief points. I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, that 

you intend to call for hearings of witnesses to look at some of the 

contract-awarding processes and some of the issues that have been 

raised about whether we can account for the funds that have been 

expended in Iraq. I think it is enormously important. 

I also appreciate your willingness, and I think it would be very 

edifying for the Committee to hear the witnesses from the Clinton 

Administration about why these trade protocols were allowed, why 

these policies were put into place. But I was even more delighted 

to hear that you would not stop there. 

Obviously, this Committee is about more than overseeing the 

prior Administration. It is probably more relevant to oversee the 

current Administration. Since the current Administration did continue those policies of allowing the evasion of the sanctions, we 

should ask why. 

Those questions may come rebounding back to us since we in 

Congress were aware as well, and we have some that are called 

upon from us also. I appreciate your willingness to look into all of 

those things. 

The main thing I would take issue with is that while I understand that the narrow focus of this hearing, and the series of hearings we are in, is on the United Nations, to say that the issue is 

not about the sanctions, I think, ignores a very large, important 

issue for this Subcommittee, which is: Why did the sanctions regime fail to accomplish keeping illicit oil from being taken out of 

the country, from manipulation of the program within the country? 

And, ultimately, how do we design a sanctions regime in the future 

that is not so easily corrupted and evaded? Because I think going 

forward, that is an enormously important question. 

That is a separate question from what management reforms, 

what structural reforms should take place in the United Nations. 

I think that is a vital question, too, but I think both of those are 

well within the jurisdiction of our Subcommittee, and I hope that 

we would explore the second question of why the sanctions failed 

overall at a subsequent investigation of the Committee. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. With that, we will call our first witness. 

8

Our first witness is John Denson, General Counsel for Saybolt 

Group of Companies, which specializes in petroleum and petrochemical inspections. He has been Saybolt’s General Counsel since 

1997. 

Mr. Denson’s prior professional practice focused on international 

legal and business matters, including the Singapore and New York 

City law offices of Coudert, and as Asian regional counsel at the 

Michelin Tire Company. I am sure you left on—no, I will not say 

any puns about leaving your treadmarks behind you. We will just 

move on from that. 

Our second witness is Evelyn Suarez, who is a partner in the 

International Section of Williams Mullen. Ms. Suarez is here representing and testifying for Cotecna Inspections, headquartered in 

Switzerland. She has approximately 25 years of experience in both 

government and private practice in international trade law with 

special focus on import and export compliance and regulation. 

We are very, very happy to have you both, and then you will be 

followed by Dr. Mullick. 

Mr. Denson, you may proceed. If you could summarize your testimony for about 5 minutes and then, Ms. Suarez, about 5 minutes, 

and then we will ask some questions, and hopefully that will get 

right to the heart of the matter. 

Mr. Denson? 

STATEMENT OF JOHN DENSON, ESQUIRE, GENERAL COUNSEL, 

SAYBOLT GROUP 

Mr. DENSON. Chairman Rohrabacher, distinguished Members of 

the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

On a personal note, we wish you all a very happy St. Patrick’s Day. 

My name is John Denson. I am General Counsel of Saybolt. You 

have asked me to speak to you today about the activities of Saybolt 

as the U.N. inspector of oil exported under the Oil-for-Food Program. 

I have already submitted a detailed written statement, so I will 

try to keep my oral comments as brief as possible, focusing only on 

a few key points, which I hope will help the Subcommittee evaluate 

all the information it has received regarding Saybolt, including almost 300,000 pages of documents we have given the Subcommittee. 

I would like to take a moment to put our performance in our oil 

inspection duties as a U.N. contractor in Iraq into context. Over the 

7 years of the Oil-for-Food Program, Saybolt inspected some 2,700 

tanker loadings at two inspection points designated by the United 

Nations at the Ceyhan, Turkey, and Mina Al-Bakr loading terminals. Saybolt also monitored the flow of oil through the pipeline 

connecting Iraq to the Ceyhan port. 

At Saybolt we are proud of our performance under this contract. 

Although living and working conditions in Iraq were extremely 

rough and Iraqi infrastructure also found wanting in very critical 

ways, Saybolt inspectors carried out their duties with a very high 

level of dedication and professionalism. Saybolt always worked in 

close coordination with the United Nations and always responded 

promptly to difficulties it encountered in the field. 

I will not take up the Subcommittee’s time with an exhaustive 

list of the challenges faced in Iraq. Suffice it to say, however, that 

9

Iraq, under the Hussein regime, was not very welcoming to foreign 

contractors. At the Government-controlled export points our inspectors had to rely upon Iraq to provide some of the basic amenities 

for living, and these conditions were spartan to say the best. 

One operational challenge, however, does merit special mention 

because it has been periodically discussed from time to time in connection with the program, and that is a lack of functioning meters 

at the Mina Al-Bakr loading facility. Although Saybolt alerted the 

United Nations to this problem from the outset of the program and 

in fact even before the program started, Iraq never did undertake 

to put into place functioning meters at Mina Al-Bakr. 

As a result, Saybolt could not measure the flow of oil into individual tankers. Instead, Saybolt had to utilize an alternative method of measurement. This method, while compliant with international commercial standards, was not as foolproof as a meter nor 

as accurate as a meter would be. 

This lack of proper metering equipment was a contributing factor 

in the two topping-off incidents in 2001 involving the tanker Essex. 

As noted in my written testimony, upon learning of these incidents, 

Saybolt immediately investigated what happened and why it happened. Our investigation found no evidence to suggest that the 

company knew of the topping-off incidents. 

The evidence indicated that the Essex loaded additional oil, approximately 230,000 barrels of oil each of the two times, after the 

Saybolt inspectors had already certified the loading amount correctly and had left the vessel to return to their living quarters. 

To prevent any recurrence, however, Saybolt immediately instituted several additional safeguards. Under the new procedures, our 

inspectors stayed on board ships until their departure. If departure 

was delayed, we placed numbered sealed caps on the vessel loading 

valves, which we again inspected prior to departure to make sure 

they had not been removed. These additional measures were effective, and we are aware of no further incidents of topping off. 

Further, the Saybolt briefing report we provided to the United 

Nations 661 Committee analyzed the likelihood that there were 

other incidents of topping off and concluded that it was extremely 

unlikely that there were any other incidents. 

As you may know, documents obtained from Iraq last year led to 

an allegation that Iraq tried to bribe one of Saybolt’s inspectors on 

the platform in connection with these two Essex loadings. I have 

personally overseen our recent investigation into this new allegation. Saybolt does not take lightly any allegation that one of its employees accepted a bribe. 

We sought to gather evidence on a global scale, and after we reviewed the documents released by Congress last month that tended 

to corroborate the allegation, we suspended the inspector in accordance with Portuguese law pending further investigation. Before we 

had the opportunity to confront the inspector, however, regarding 

that information, he resigned from his position. 

While this incident was unfortunate, I believe that the way 

Saybolt handled the investigation into the Essex incidents and the 

way it handled the allegation against its inspector is consistent 

with our reputation, our integrity and impartiality. 

10

Indeed, as noted in my written testimony, this reputation was a 

strong factor in favor of the selection of Saybolt to be a U.N. contractor in a politically-charged program. Even the Iraqis grudgingly 

admitted to one another that we had lived up to that reputation. 

One of the Iraqi documents released by Congress last month 

states that the two Essex loadings in 2001 were the only occasions 

in which Iraq was able to penetrate the tight controls of Saybolt. 

Another point of clarification that should be made relates to the 

scope of our duties as a U.N. contractor. As I mentioned, our inspectors worked at two locations. We were not tasked with monitoring exports of oil by Iraq from locations other than those two locations. Thus, Saybolt’s mandate was not to inspect all of Iraq, nor 

was it to act as a police force. Nonetheless, when we became aware 

of incidences of exports outside the Oil-for-Food Program we alerted authorities. This is also detailed in my written testimony. 

Also with regard to the scope of our duties, I would like to make 

one other point of clarification. While I have come here today to address the subjects cited in your invitation to testify, our role in 

monitoring oil exports under the program, we did perform other duties in Iraq under United Nations contracts. 

This included coordinating a series of export reports to the 

United Nations on the state of the Iraqi oil industry and monitoring the import of oil equipment, spare parts and equipment for 

use in the oil industry, which we began to do in 1998. 

As with the oil export inspection contract, we encountered and 

confronted challenges in these areas as well. For example, after the 

United Nations initially permitted us to assign only one inspector 

to monitor spare parts and equipment imports, we repeatedly 

pressed the United Nations to increase the number of inspectors 

assigned to this function. 

As the United Nations gradually increased the number to eight 

over the ensuing years of the program, we did the best we could 

to prioritize our tasks so that these few inspectors could accomplish 

as much as possible. As for the other work we did under the oil 

inspection contract, we did the best we could with the restrictions 

and difficulties we faced, and we overcame these challenges as 

much as possible with a professional and non-political focus. 

Let me close by saying that Saybolt has been in close contact 

with all of the congressional bodies investigating the program. We 

have worked hard to be responsive to all requests by these bodies, 

and we will continue to do so. 

I hope the Subcommittee has found the information Saybolt has 

provided useful, and again I thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Denson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN DENSON, ESQUIRE, GENERAL COUNSEL, SAYBOLT

GROUP

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, 

Thank you for inviting me to speak before the Subcommittee today on the role 

of Saybolt Eastern Hemisphere B.V. and its affiliates and subsidiaries (‘‘Saybolt’’) 

in the administration of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program (the ‘‘Program’’). 

As the general counsel to Saybolt, I am familiar with our role in the Program, which 

included monitoring the export of oil from specified locations in Iraq and, to a lesser 

extent, monitoring spare parts and equipment imported into Iraq for use in the oil 

11

industry and coordinating studies that oil industry experts conducted on Iraqi oil 

production and infrastructure. 

I will focus my remarks on the subject you asked me to address: the role of 

Saybolt in inspecting the exports of oil from Iraq during the Program, including the 

manner in which Saybolt interacted with the Government of Iraq and individual 

purchasers of oil under the Program. To address this subject, I will provide a chronological overview of the role of Saybolt in the Program. First, though, I must say 

that Saybolt is proud of the role it played in the Program, having monitored more 

than 2,700 loadings of oil at three authorized export locations over a period of almost 80 months. Saybolt’s work was performed by dozens of oil inspectors who were 

rotated through remote locations and required to work under circumstances that 

were frequently difficult. 

I. SELECTION OF SAYBOLT AS THE INSPECTOR OF IRAQI OIL EXPORTS UNDER THE OILFOR-FOOD PROGRAM

To understand our role in the Program, it is important to understand how we 

were selected to participate in the Program. The United Nations used a competitive 

bid process to select Saybolt as its independent oil inspection agent for oil exports 

under the Program. The sixth paragraph of U.N. Security Council Resolution 986 

(1995) directed the U.N. Secretary General to appoint agents to assist the Committee established by U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 (the ‘‘661 Committee’’) 

with the task of monitoring the quantity and quality of exports of Iraqi oil under 

the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program. Pursuant to that authority, on June 11, 1996, the 

Commodity Procurement Section of the U.N. Procurement and Transportation Division issued a request-for-proposal (‘‘RFP’’), which included a request for provision of 

independent oil inspection agents. 

Saybolt viewed the U.N. RFP as a good business opportunity to apply our almost 

100 years of experience in the inspection and analytical testing of petroleum products to a prestigious international project. We were also pleased that we would be 

contributing our know-how to a major program designed to serve the urgent humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Accordingly, on June 17, 1996, we submitted our 

Proposal to provide oil inspection services. 

As you doubtless know, the U.N. Independent Inquiry Committee’s Interim Report, issued on February 3, 2005, sets forth allegations that one or more individuals 

within the United Nations may have violated U.N. procurement policies during the 

negotiation process. What you may not know is that no procurement policies of the 

U.N. were ever provided to Saybolt, and none were made publicly available insofar 

as we are aware. Indeed, the only procurement ‘‘policy’’ of which we were aware at 

the time was the one contained in the RFP, in which the ‘‘UN reserve[d] the right 

. . . to negotiate with any of the proposers or other firms in any manner deemed 

to be in the best interest of the UN.’’

While it is unfortunate that, according to the Independent Inquiry Committee, one 

or more U.N. officials may not have followed internal U.N. policies during the procurement process, I can say with certainty that we did not engage in irregular conduct. Saybolt fully complied with the bidding instructions communicated to it by the 

United Nations. Saybolt has always understood that it was the most qualified bidder to handle the job. In particular, the specialized skills and integrity of Saybolt 

were a decisive advantage. Unlike our principal competitor in the bidding process, 

we have over a century of specialized experience in the area of oil inspections, rather than all types of inspections. Saybolt also has a strong reputation for integrity 

and impartiality in its inspection and testing services. Hiring an inspection firm 

with that reputation was important to accomplishing the task of monitoring exports 

under this politically-charged Program. In that regard, we offered inspectors with 

no connections to the Middle East region, which was desirable to the United Nations. In addition, during the bid process, the United Nations pressed Saybolt for 

a lower price, which is not uncommon in our industry when negotiating for a contract. Saybolt did lower its bid based in part on clarifications to the contract requirements that the U.N. provided. 

Accordingly, the United Nations selected Saybolt and, on August 16, 1996, Saybolt 

and the United Nations entered into an oil inspection contract (the ‘‘First Contract’’) 

with an initial term of six months, subject to extensions of six-months each, at the 

sole discretion of the United Nations. After the First Contract was extended for a 

total of slightly more than three years, another RFP process was initiated. In that 

process, Saybolt submitted a Proposal on February 11, 2000, and on May 29, 2000, 

the United Nations formally accepted that proposal and entered into a new contract 

12

1Saybolt also took on additional responsibilities over the course of the Program that did not 

involve the monitoring of oil exports. Almost a year-and-a-half after we began monitoring oil 

exports from the two designated ports, the United Nations awarded Saybolt a contract for additional inspection work related to the Program. We were asked to submit a proposal to monitor 

the storage, delivery, and utilization of spare parts that Iraq began to import for the purpose 

of maintaining and developing the Iraqi oil industry. Our proposal was accepted in a June 1998 

amendment to the First Contract. Pursuant to contracts, we also coordinated three studies of 

the Iraqi oil industry by a group of experts called for under resolutions of the U.N. Security 

Council. 

with Saybolt that governed Phases VII through XIII of the Program (the ‘‘Second 

Contract’’).1

II. SAYBOLT’S PERFORMANCE OF THE OIL INSPECTION CONTRACT

You have asked us to comment on the role of Saybolt in monitoring the exports 

of oil from Iraq. Our oil export monitoring role applied only to exports of crude oil 

from two export points authorized under the Program. Saybolt was responsible for 

monitoring the quantity of Iraqi crude oil loaded onto vessels from the Mina Al-Bakr 

offshore terminal in southern Iraq and from the port of Ceyhan in Turkey. These 

two locations were the only locations where we were asked to monitor the export 

of Iraqi oil, and they were the only authorized ports for export of oil under the Program. Saybolt was also responsible for monitoring the flow of oil near Zakho, along 

the Iraq-Turkey pipeline by which Iraqi oil was delivered to the Ceyhan port. We 

began monitoring in 1996, after receiving a Request to Commence Mobilization from 

the United Nations dated November 29, 1996. 

Method of Measuring Amount of Oil Loaded Onto Vessels 

At the designated export monitoring points, Saybolt inspectors calculated the 

quantity of oil loaded on board vessels that had been authorized by the United Nations to load oil under the Program. The United Nations informed Saybolt of which 

oil purchasers were authorized to load a specific quantity of oil using a particular 

vessel during a set time period, and Saybolt informed the United Nations of how 

much oil the vessel actually loaded. 

Normally, the measurement of the amount of oil loaded is accomplished by accurate metering at various points in the transmission chain, but this was not possible 

in Iraq due to the absence of functional metering equipment and general poor condition of the petroleum transmission infrastructure in Iraq. For this reason, Saybolt 

used alternative methods accepted in the inspection industry for situations in which 

reliable metering equipment is not available. The method used by Saybolt was specified in the U.N. contract. 

In order to determine the quantity of oil that purchasers loaded upon vessels, 

Saybolt had to obtain data about each vessel. Saybolt to used the data gathered in 

its inspection, along with the capacity and calibration charts of the vessel, in order 

to determine how much oil was loaded. Under this method, a Saybolt inspector 

would measure the on-board quantity (‘‘OBQ’’) of the vessel prior to loading. Then, 

after loading, an inspector would measure the ullage (the amount by which the vessel tank falls short of being full) and the temperature of the oil. Our inspectors analyzed this data using the calibration charts to determine how much oil had been 

loaded onto the vessel. 

Saybolt also used a standard methodology to identify and correct any imprecision 

in the vessel calibration charts. Each vessel keeps a record of the variances from 

its calibration charts, when compared with the volume measured when the oil was 

offloaded. This record becomes the ‘‘vessel experience factor’’ (‘‘VEF’’). The VEF for 

a vessel is based on the average comparison between ship measurement and shore 

measurement for the last 10 voyages. The use of a vessel calibration chart and the 

VEF is an internationally recognized method for determining the quantity of oil 

loaded onto a vessel in the absence of calibrated shore tanks and/or meters. This 

method adhered to the procedures set forth by the American Petroleum Institute 

and the Institute of Petroleum. 

In January 1999, following discussion with the United Nations, Saybolt also instituted a procedure to attempt to address potential inaccuracies in the VEF-based 

measurement system. Under this procedure, the master of each vessel was required 

to sign a statement certifying the accuracy of the records provided to Saybolt. The 

United Nations was informed of this procedure and supported its implementation. 

Finally, at the Ceyhan port, Saybolt compared amounts loaded on ships to shore 

tank measurements as an additional check. This additional check was not possible 

at the Mina Al-Bakr terminal because the shore tanks measurement system had 

been badly damaged in the Iran-Iraq ware and the Gulf War. 

13

Work Environment for Saybolt Inspectors 

To perform its oil monitoring responsibilities, Saybolt had inspection teams continuously resident at the oil export points in Iraq. In-country oil inspectors, typically 

between nine or ten individuals, generally were rotated into Iraq for two months 

and rotated out for one month. It was difficult for these Saybolt inspectors to obtain 

these necessities. 

These inspectors faced difficult living conditions. On some occasions, our inspectors at Mina Al-Bakr were stranded at the terminal without electricity and without 

water. Mina Al-Bakr also had frequent air conditioning outages, leaving inspectors 

exposed to heat that sometimes reached 130 degrees for long periods at a time. Telecommunications equipment was primitive. Because of the high cost of placing telephone calls from Iraq, communications between our inspectors and their families 

were limited. We also struggled to arrange reliable, affordable transportation to and 

from the Mina Al-Bakr terminal, as we were dependent on aged transportation vessels to go to and from that terminal. The harsh conditions in Iraq were noted in 

the reports to the United Nations and were confirmed by a United Nations IraqKuwait Observation Mission (‘‘UNIKOM’’) safety audit of the Mina Al-Bakr operations in April 1999. 

Saybolt had little control over these living conditions. The government of Iraq controlled the Mina Al-Bakr terminal, the Basrah Rest House for the Mina Al-Bakr terminal staff, and the Zakho station where Saybolt operated, and the government of 

Iraq strictly regulated the travel of Saybolt inspectors to and from these sites. The 

lodging, on-site food, laundry, security, and other subsistence-related services for 

Saybolt’s in-country oil inspection teams therefore had to be provided by the government of Iraq. The government of Iraq required that Saybolt pay for these services, 

and Saybolt ultimately agreed to pay a reasonable amount for these services. The 

United Nations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands were fully 

aware of this arrangement. 

In performing their duties, Saybolt’s inspectors were also often subjected to other 

personal risks. Nearby military operations and violent attacks were not uncommon. 

As we have all seen in news reports from that time, Iraq did not always welcome 

the United Nations or its contractors. Iraq initially resisted the very idea of an Oilfor-Food Program. This political friction between Iraq and the outside world made 

our task especially delicate, because we were associated with the United Nations in 

the eyes of Iraqis. Coping with these physically and mentally challenging working 

conditions required courage and professionalism on the part of inspectors. 

In spite of these difficulties, by the time the Program ended in 2003 after the 

overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Saybolt had acted as the United Nations monitor for 

almost seven years, and had monitored more than 2700 loadings totaling approximately 3.4 billion barrels of oil over the life of the Program. As the program was 

dismantled, the Second Contract was partially suspended on April 17, 2003, and 

was formally terminated by the United Nations on June 4, 2003. 

III. SAYBOLT’S KNOWLEDGE OF IRREGULARITIES RELATED TO THE OIL-FOR-FOOD

PROGRAM

I understand the investigations into the Oil-for-Food Program are focusing on a 

variety of reported irregularities. Saybolt’s mandate was not to inspect all of Iraq, 

and it was not to act as a police force. However, we sought to assist in the enforcement of sanctions by providing information to the responsible parties. In its role as 

a monitor of oil exports from the two specified export points and the Zakho station, 

Saybolt learned of irregularities in three areas of note: efforts by Iraq to collect port 

charges, the export of oil from locations other than the Saybolt inspection points, 

and the topping off of the tanker Essex at the Mina Al-Bakr port in May and August 

of 2001. In each instance, Saybolt sought to support the sanctions regime by communicating pertinent information to the United Nations. 

Reported Payments to Iraq by Oil Companies 

Among the irregularities under investigation are payments oil purchasers reportedly made to Iraq during the Program. Saybolt was not in a position to know about 

these payments. When Saybolt was notified by the United Nations of its approval 

of the letter of credit opened by a buyer of oil under the Program, Saybolt proceeded 

to monitor the quantity of oil loaded by the buyer, and to transmit that information 

to the United Nations. This was our role. Saybolt monitored oil, not money. 

As it monitored oil exports, Saybolt did hear about charges Iraq attempted to assess for the use of the Mina Al-Bakr port by companies who were purchasing oil 

through the Program. The port charges were reported in the press, including by 

Reuters in September 2000. During the Program, when the United Nations asked 

14

Saybolt about the port charges, Saybolt provided what information it had regarding 

the surcharges, which it had learned from oil companies. On another occasion, when 

the International Association of Independent Tank Owners (‘‘INTERTANKO’’) inquired about the legality of port charges, we informed the association that they had 

been verbally advised by the United Nations that such fees would be in violation 

of the U.N. sanctions. 

Exports of Iraqi Oil Outside the Program 

Through its work in monitoring oil, Saybolt also heard of instances of the export 

of oil through channels outside the Oil-for-Food Program. We reported those instances to the United Nations verbally and, on occasion, in writing. In November 

2000, Saybolt informed the United Nations of rumors that the Iraqi pipeline to 

Syria had been put into operation. In March 2001, Saybolt informed the United Nations that Iraq was exporting oil to Turkey outside of the Oil-for-Food Program. In 

addition, we informed both the United Nations and the MIF about apparent loadings that were taking place at Khor Al Amaya, a terminal 10 kilometers to the 

north of Mina Al-Bakr. 

Two Unauthorized Loadings of Additional Oil on the Vessel Essex in 2001

In October 2001, we also briefed the United Nations after we learned from the 

United Nations that the captain of the vessel Essex had reported two incidents of 

unauthorized ‘‘topping off’’ of the Essex at the Mina Al-Bakr terminal—one in May 

2001 and another in August 2001. Saybolt immediately investigated what happened 

and why. We conducted extensive interviews of our staff, including the Team Leader 

on the Mina Al-Bakr Platform, and reviewed all available documentation relating 

to the loadings of the vessel. Documents subsequently provided to Saybolt by the 

United Nations and others indicate that the State Oil Marketing Organization of 

Iraq (‘‘SOMO’’) had arranged to load on board the Essex a total of approximately 

500,000 barrels of oil above and beyond that which had been approved by the 

United Nations. The two additional loadings apparently took place while Saybolt inspectors were either at another end of the platform in the rest quarters or attending 

to other vessels. It is also important to recall that, as mentioned above, Iraq never 

put into place consistently functioning meters at Mina Al-Bakr. 

We promptly detailed the findings of our investigation and the bases for our conclusions in a report presented to the 661 Committee. That report is included in the 

documents previously provided to the staff of your Committee. For all of the reasons 

detailed in our report, we concluded that it was extremely unlikely that there were 

other incidents of unauthorized topping off. Nonetheless, as described in the report, 

Saybolt put into place additional procedures designed to prevent unauthorized topping off. These included having Saybolt inspectors at Mina Al-Bakr remain on board 

vessels after the loading amount had been certified until the vessels left port, to ensure there were no additional loadings. For any vessel that did not leave the port 

immediately after loading, Saybolt placed numbered seals on the vessel loading 

valves after the loading amount was certified. Before the vessel left the port, our 

inspectors returned to the vessel to ensure that the seal was still in place, with the 

same number. We are unaware of any topping off incidents occurring after we instituted these additional procedures. 

In addition, it now appears that Iraq may have compromised one of our inspectors. Over the past year, Saybolt learned of allegations that, after the second Essex

topping off incident in August 2001, Iraq had made two payments totaling approximately $105,000, to one of the Saybolt inspectors who had worked at the Mina AlBakr platform at the time of the topping off incidents. When we learned of this allegation, we again immediately opened an investigation. I have personally overseen 

that investigation, through which we made persistent efforts on a global scale to ascertain whether, in fact, Iraqi officials compromised this inspector—and whether he 

violated his commitment to act ethically and impartially in accordance with 

Saybolt’s code of conduct and to uphold our reputation for integrity and impartiality. 

Last month, after the Congress provided us with copies of Iraqi documents that 

tended to corroborate the allegation that Iraq had made the alleged payments to 

this inspector, we suspended the inspector pending a further investigation by 

Saybolt that was to have included confronting the inspector with the newly-released 

Iraqi documents. However, after receiving the suspension notice, the inspector voluntarily resigned and is no longer employed by the company. 

Our prompt and thorough responses to the allegations surrounding the Essex incidents are consistent with our reputation for impartiality and integrity in Iraq and 

elsewhere. While we consider any penetration of our tight controls to be a serious 

issue, as shown by the additional preventive measures we immediately implemented 

to address the Essex incidents and our full-scale investigation of the allegation that 

15

Iraq had made payments to one of our inspectors, these two isolated incidents need 

to be kept in perspective. Saybolt monitored nearly 2,700 loadings of some 3.4 billion barrels of oil. Even an Iraqi memo released by Congress last month acknowledged that only the buyer of the approximately 500,000 barrels of unauthorized oil 

loaded at the Mina Al-Bakr onto the Essex in 2001 was able to ‘‘penetrate the tight 

control’’ of Saybolt in Iraq. 

Allegation that Iraq Tried to Allocate Oil to Saybolt 

Finally, on the topic of reported irregularities in the Program, I should mention 

one other issue that also came up last year: the allegation that Saybolt received an 

oil allocation from Iraq. In the report released by CIA official Charles Duelfer last 

year (the ‘‘Duelfer Report’’), a document reportedly prepared by SOMO after the fall 

of the Hussein regime indicated that Iraq attempted to allocate 1 million barrels 

of oil to Saybolt during Phase 10 of the Program. We have also looked into this allegation and are not aware of any instance in which Saybolt requested or received 

an allocation. In addition, as noted in the Duelfer Report, the allocation Iraq attempted to link to Saybolt was never used to lift any oil. Therefore, it remains a 

mystery to Saybolt as to why the name of Saybolt appears on a list of unused allocations or, for that matter, on any list for allocations of Iraqi oil. 

IV. U.N. OVERSIGHT OF SAYBOLT

The Saybolt contract with the United Nations was subjected to several layers of 

external oversight: the United Nations reviewed data supplied by Saybolt, communicated with Saybolt regarding implementation issues that arose in the collection 

of that data, and audited management of the contract. 

Review of Data Supplied by Saybolt and Dialogue on Implementation Issues 

Through the use of a commercially-available electronic online database, Saybolt 

supplied U.N. offices with real-time data on loading of oil onto tankers at the 

Ceyhan port and the Mina Al-Bakr platform and on the flows of oil through the 

Iraq-Turkey pipeline at the Zakho station. We also supplied daily and weekly reports to the U.N. Oil Overseers. The 661 Committee also reviewed special reports 

Saybolt prepared, including our expert studies on the Iraqi oil industry. 

In addition, we regularly communicated with the U.N. Office of Iraq Programme 

(‘‘OIP’’) regarding implementation issues during the initial phases of our monitoring 

contract. As part of these communications, Saybolt and the United Nations carried 

on an open dialogue about problems with Iraqi infrastructure, and in particular a 

lack of fully functioning meters at monitoring stations, which required Saybolt to 

resort to an alternative method of measuring oil exports. 

U.N. OIOS Auditing of Management of Saybolt Contract 

I understand the Subcommittee recently heard testimony regarding findings expressed in a certain U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services (‘‘OIOS’’) audit report 

of Saybolt recently made public by the U.N. Independent Inquiry Committee (‘‘IIC’’). 

Saybolt welcomes the release of this and other reports. In fact, as I think your Subcommittee staff may recall, when the Chairman of the full Committee and your Senate counterpart requested copies of these audits last May, I personally recommended 

to the UN secretariat office that all audits be released, only to be told at the time 

that the UN would not allow release of these audits. 

We have always been, and will continue to be, in favor of more transparency in 

the investigation of the Program rather than less. Unfortunately, though, the IIC 

did not release the comments Saybolt and the U.N. OIP filed in rebuttal to the 

OIOS audit. As those rebuttals make clear, the OIOS auditors failed to grasp that 

the United Nations and Saybolt had entered into a ‘‘fixed price’’ contract, rather 

than a ‘‘cost plus’’ contract. Because of that fundamental misinterpretation of the 

contract, the OIOS audit incorrectly concluded that Saybolt ‘‘overcharged’’ the 

United Nations where costs turned out to be lower than anticipated, and incorrectly 

concluded that the United Nations could recover the difference. That interpretation 

and the related conclusions are wrong. As noted at the beginning of my testimony, 

the fixed contract price was the result of negotiations between Saybolt and the 

United Nations. The risk that actual costs would be higher was borne by Saybolt 

and the risk that actual costs would be lower was borne by the United Nations. 

Saybolt has produced its rebuttal comments to this Subcommittee and would encourage their public release. 

Thank you for your important work and the opportunity to address you today.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Denson. 

Ms. Suarez? 

16

STATEMENT OF EVELYN SUAREZ, ESQUIRE, WILLIAMS & 

MULLEN, REPRESENTING COTECNA S.A. 

Ms. SUAREZ. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, good 

afternoon. My name is Evelyn Suarez. I am U.S. counsel to Cotecna 

Inspection, a company headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Could you pull your microphone a little closer 

there? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Sure. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Ms. SUAREZ. I am an expert in Customs law, and my professional 

background includes service as a senior attorney in both the Chief 

Counsel’s Office and the Office of Regulations and Rulings at U.S. 

Customs. 

You have invited me to testify on behalf of Cotecna regarding its 

role as independent inspection agents for humanitarian goods in 

the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program. In particular, you have asked me 

to discuss the effectiveness of the inspections process and end user 

verification. 

My statement today will emphasize three main points. First, 

Cotecna’s responsibility was limited to the authentication of humanitarian goods under the Oil-for-Food Program. Second, Cotecna 

was not empowered by the U.N. to enforce sanctions or to police 

the Iraqi border. Third, Cotecna was not responsible for end user 

verification. 

Most people misunderstand Cotecna’s role in Iraq. Their role did 

not involve policing the Iraqi border, enforcing sanctions or performing traditional Customs inspection functions. Mr. Chairman, 

Cotecna was not the gatekeeper for the transactions of the program. Instead, Cotecna’s role was limited to authentication, a process unique to the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program. Authentication was 

a critical step in the process of getting humanitarian goods to the 

people of Iraq. 

Cotecna was contracted to provide authentication services to 

verify that the goods arriving at specified sites in Iraq under the 

Oil-for-Food Program were the goods described in the contracts approved by the 661 Committee. Authentication triggered payment to 

the suppliers. This was a very limited role. 

I direct your attention to table 1 over there showing what 

Cotecna’s role did and did not include. Authentication included four 

main processes highlighted with checkmarks on the table. First, inspection agents would compare U.N. documentation against the 

goods actually being presented to Cotecna in Iraq. Second, inspection agents visually inspected all the Oil-for-Food Program goods 

presented. 

Third, inspection agents randomly examined 10 percent of these 

goods more closely. Finally, inspection agents laboratory tested all 

food to ensure fitness for human consumption, again a term created 

specifically by the U.N. for this program. 

In contrast, the second column of the table shows that Cotecna’s 

inspection agents by contract and U.N. direction were not authorized to compel authentication or otherwise to perform any task 

with respect to goods not presented; were not authorized to interdict prohibited goods outside the Oil-for-Food Program; were not 

authorized to assess the value of the goods shipped; were not auVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:58 Jun 28, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\OI\031705\20059.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
17

thorized to verify that the food shipped was of the grade contracted 

for. 

They were not authorized to verify prices between suppliers and 

the Government of Iraq, and, finally, they were not involved in any 

of the commercial aspects of the transactions as reflected in the 

table. 

Importantly, the first two items in the second column would have 

constituted border or sanctions enforcement, which no one at the 

border performed. Iraqi Customs had no interest in enforcing a 

U.N. sanctions program, which leads me to my second point. 

Cotecna’s role was not to monitor or enforce sanctions. In fact, 

Cotecna was not authorized to stop any goods crossing the border. 

I direct your attention to table 3 showing what Cotecna did and did 

not authenticate. 

As table 3 shows, Cotecna was not authorized to monitor outbound oil, inbound oil, weapons, contraband, smuggled goods, nonOil-for-Food goods imported by the Government of Iraq and goods 

imported by private parties. Indeed, the very design of the Oil-forFood Program placed no enforcement arm or enforcement support 

at the border. 

This Subcommittee specifically asked me to address the end user 

verification process. My third main point is that Cotecna was not 

responsible for end user verification. Its sole function in end user 

verification was to notify Saybolt and the U.N. Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq when conditionally approved dualuse cargo reached the border. 

Once Cotecna had communicated this advance information, 

Cotecna’s participation in end user verification ended. It was 

Saybolt’s and the U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator’s duty to monitor 

the end use and end user. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to a question you raised 

in your opening statement. You asked about reports of bribery. I 

can say that we have no reports of bribery. If the Subcommittee 

has any examples we certainly will look into it and report back to 

the Subcommittee, but we do not have any reports of this type of 

conduct. If it occurred, we would have taken appropriate actions. 

In conclusion, Cotecna’s role was limited to the authentication of 

humanitarian goods under the Oil-for-Food Program. Cotecna’s role 

was not to monitor or enforce sanctions. It was not responsible for 

end user verification. 

Cotecna did an outstanding job under extremely difficult circumstances. The best evidence of Cotecna’s outstanding performance is the fact that the U.N., the Coalition Provisional Authority 

and the Iraqi Interim Government continued to use Cotecna’s services. 

Indeed, Cotecna is proud that it enabled desperately needed humanitarian goods to improve the lives of the Iraqi people. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Suarez follows:]

18

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EVELYN SUAREZ, ESQUIRE, WILLIAMS & MULLEN, 

REPRESENTING COTECNA S.A.


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59

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you both very much. Your companies 

are very lucky to have two articulate spokesmen to come here and 

face a congressional Subcommittee like this. 

Just a few questions for Mr. Denson. You mentioned the Essex

affair. You are suggesting that is just a one-time affair and that 

did not reflect other instances that were like this where the people 

were topping off and more oil was going out than was part of the 

contract? 

Mr. DENSON. That is right, Mr. Chairman. There were actually 

two incidents, to be more precise. In those two incidents there were 

unusual circumstances that allowed that to happen. 

Not to go into a great deal of detail that you may or may not 

want to hear about the conditions at Mina Al-Bakr, but the location of the living quarters on the terminal, the ability to observe 

the vessels while they were there from those living quarters, this 

vessel had to be placed in a certain location to make it hard to see. 

If you look at the documents very carefully and understand the 

conditions there—and this was all detailed in the report that 

Saybolt did to the 661 Committee following the Essex incidents—

it had to be a very strange combination of events to allow the topping off to occur. 

In addition, most of the vessels that were loaded under the Oilfor-Food Program left with full cargos. In other words, there was 

no room to top off. 

Based on a number of factors that we analyzed in detail at the 

time, Saybolt concluded, and we feel the U.N. also agreed, that 

there was very little likelihood of there being any other incidents 

similar to Essex. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So there just was not an opportunity for people to put more oil in than had been contracted for because almost 

every ship that came in was contracted to be full? 

Mr. DENSON. Under the Oil-for-Food Program, yes, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you know of any bribe cases other than 

this one where people were talking about with Saybolt and I guess 

it was the Essex? 

Mr. DENSON. There was. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is there any other bribe case that your company dealt with? 

Mr. DENSON. No. That was the only incident that we ever became aware of. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So there is no other paperwork someplace floating around that indicates your company was dealing 

with three or four other issues of bribery with your employees? 

Mr. DENSON. In connection with the Oil-for-Food Program, absolutely not. I have not seen them if they exist. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. I am not saying there is. I am just 

making sure that you are on the record as being sure of what you 

are saying here. 

Let me ask a little bit of Ms. Suarez here. Now, we have a vote. 

It is a 15-minute vote, so it will probably be 1⁄2 hour once we break. 

I am going to go on for a few minutes and let Adam have a few 

minutes, and then we will come back and finish up our questions 

with you and anyone else who shows up. 

60

Cotecna received this award, your award from the United Nations. Did Cotecna raise its price? People are saying that right from 

the beginning that Cotecna was not dealing on the up and up with 

the U.N. and that immediately after getting your contract that 

your own company sort of did something that was a little questionable about raising the price that you were going to do your services 

to the U.N. Is that accurate? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Mr. Chairman, Cotecna participated in a competitive retender and was awarded that contract based on its superior 

proposal based on price and its technology. 

The technology is probably a large part of the reason why the 

price was raised. This is detailed in my longer testimony. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me note there is always an excuse that 

people have of why it has to increase now. People do this throughout all the government. People have a low bid, and then they end 

up oh, now that we have the contract, by the way, we have to add 

these other things. 

By the way, that is, of course, that I am suggesting what the 

United Nations said at the time. 

Ms. SUAREZ. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure. 

Ms. SUAREZ. That was not the case. It was unusual. There was 

a very short timeframe for the negotiation of this contract. It started in the beginning of December, and it was negotiated quite heavily probably through the middle of December with the contract 

being signed on December 31. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ms. SUAREZ. The RFP was especially vague and was especially 

vague as to the technology that it wanted. 

At the very last stages of the negotiations, they insisted on the 

use of Lotus notes, which, as we detailed, is a rather unsuitable application for this type of project. In fact, it entailed quite a bit larger cost. As a result, the United Nations, before signing the contract, 

agreed to an amendment. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I have a feeling that we could talk about that 

particular issue for a long time. I am not here to verify, and you 

have certainly offered an adequate explanation. I think as I say, 

this happens so frequently with so many companies dealing with 

getting contracts that you may be absolutely right, or there may be 

some reasonable reason for skepticism here. 

We have 10 more minutes. Let me ask you one more question, 

and then I will let Adam have a few minutes. We are going to 

break for probably about 20 minutes or so. 

Ms. Suarez, in numerous interviews conducted over the past year 

with Committee investigators, our investigators have been told by 

present and former Iraqi, as well as U.N. officials, that Cotecna officials routinely accepted bribes. Our inspectors were told that. 

These are bribes at the border to allow certain materials to proceed through the border and that taking a bribe, giving a bribe to 

Cotecna employees, was not an abnormality for the situation. 

Could you respond to that? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Mr. Chairman, I have been working with this company throughout the course of these various investigations, and we 

61

have heard absolutely no reports of bribery, that any inspectors 

have taken bribes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. So the interviews that were conducted by the Committee investigators and the people who made 

these allegations to our investigators, you never heard anybody say 

that to any company official? 

Ms. SUAREZ. I have attended every single——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There have been no whistleblowers? 

Ms. SUAREZ. I have attended every single interview of Cotecna 

employees, and I have not—no investigator has raised an incident 

of bribery. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Have there ever been any complaints by anyone that your employees have been accepting bribes? 

Ms. SUAREZ. I cannot answer whether if anybody in the 

world——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That you know of. That you know of. 

Ms. SUAREZ. I am unaware of any allegations of bribery. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When congressional investigators are told 

these things, and it seems to be a pattern here, it behooves us to 

follow up. I think that this is something that we need to discuss 

further, maybe perhaps give your company some of the specifics. 

My staff is telling me that some of these charges came specifically from Iraqi Transportation Ministry officials, so let us pursue 

that in a little bit. 

Adam, do you have a couple minutes of further questions, and 

then we will come back. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Denson, let me start with you if I could. You are the General 

Counsel of Saybolt? 

Mr. DENSON. That is correct. 

Mr. SCHIFF. How many contracts were there that Saybolt had in 

this program, and who was the other contracting party? Who were 

you contracted to do work with? 

Mr. DENSON. If I understand the question, the question you are 

asking is how many contracts were under the Oil-for-Food Program 

with the United Nations? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Well, that Saybolt had exactly. 

Mr. DENSON. I do not know the exact number, but there were 

several. For a while they renewed every 6 months or so. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Were the terms of each contract the same? It was 

just the term of the contract that was renewed? 

Mr. DENSON. I believe so. To be honest with you, I do not have 

the details on each and every one of the contracts at my fingertips. 

The impression I have is that they were very similar. 

Mr. SCHIFF. The contracts were between Saybolt and what part 

of the United Nations? 

Mr. DENSON. The Office of the Iraqi Program, the OIP. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And as General Counsel, I am sure you were very 

focused during the course of this investigation on the terms of your 

contract. What does your contract say very specifically about the 

scope of the work that you were to do? 

Mr. DENSON. Well, it is not unusual for contracts—especially for 

programs that are new programs such as the Oil-for-Food Program 

was at the time—there was a lot of vagueness in it, to be honest 

62

with you. The contracts were not very specific in terms of every detail, about how it is going to be done. A lot of things were learned 

in the process of implementing the contract after the first contract 

was put into place. 

Having said that, there were very clear limitations on what 

Saybolt was expected to do under the contract. As I indicated in my 

oral testimony and in the written testimony, Saybolt was expected 

to monitor the oil leaving Iraq under the Oil-for-Food Program and 

nothing more than that. They had no obligation, for example——

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Denson, you are talking about expectations now, 

and I am interested in what the contract actually called for. I am 

similarly interested in Ms. Suarez with respect to Cotecna. 

I mean, we have seen a chart of what responsibilities you represent you had and did not have. What I want to know is, Does 

the contract agree with those characterizations? What explicitly did 

the contract say you were to do? 

Mr. DENSON. My understanding of the contracts is it required us 

to monitor oil exports under the Oil-for-Food Program and nothing 

beyond that, at least in terms of the oil inspection program. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Monitoring oil exports. If that was the language of 

the contract, that is broad enough to include a lot of things your 

chart is not doing. 

If the language is that you are supposed to monitor oil exports 

then oil exports, whether they were on the per se shipment they 

were supposed to be or whether they were illicit oil, shipments 

would be within your monitoring responsibility, so I am assuming 

you are not saying that is what the contract required. 

Mr. DENSON. That is correct. I am not trying to say that. I do 

not have the contract with me to show you exactly the wording that 

was used in the contract. Are you asking for my understanding of 

the contracts? 

Mr. SCHIFF. No, actually. You are the General Counsel. I want 

to know what the contracts said and not your understanding of it. 

If you cannot tell me today, I would like you to supply that to the 

Committee. 

Mr. DENSON. I believe we have already given the contracts themselves to the Committee, but we will be happy to go through that 

and try to analyze it with the Committee if it would like, sir. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I would like that. 

Ms. Suarez, what do your contracts say about the scope of your 

responsibilities? Do you know specifically? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Yes. We did find the contract rather vague and the 

scope of work rather vague. They created this concept of authentication, which does not really have a meaning outside this program. I described it in my testimony. 

Also it has this concept of fitness for human consumption was 

also a different standard. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Are the terms of the chart then based on your understanding of how you interpret the vague language of the contract? 

The contract then does not say, for example, that you are to compare documents accompanying the OFP with goods voluntarily presented? That is your language, not the contract’s language? 

63

Ms. SUAREZ. Mr. Schiff, you are right. The company was not 

given standard operating procedures, SOPs, when it arrived at the 

Iraqi border, and that was somewhat surprising since this was not 

the beginning of the program, and in fact Cotecna took over at a 

retender. 

Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Do you need to break? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Schiff, you will have more time when we 

come back, I promise you, to pursue this line of questioning. 

Right now I declare that this Subcommittee hearing is in recess 

at the call of the Chair. It should be about 20 minutes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This hearing is called to order. I apologize for 

keeping you folks, and I hope that your companies have you on an 

hourly retainer. No? That is too bad. 

All right. Just a couple questions, and then we will move on to 

our last witness. 

Is there any relative of any U.N. official working for either one 

of your companies? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Excuse me? Would you like me to answer the question? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Ms. SUAREZ. What was the question again? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is there anyone working for your company 

who is a relative of a senior U.N. official? 

Ms. SUAREZ. There is no one who is a relative of a senior official 

currently working for Cotecna. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That word ‘‘currently’’ certainly jumps at you, 

does it not? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When did this relative of a high level U.N. 

official leave the employment of your company? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Mr. Chairman, I think you are asking whether 

Cotecna ever employed a relative of an official at the U.N.? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Any senior official of the U.N. 

Ms. SUAREZ. Yes, of course, Mr. Chairman. Cotecna did employ 

from 1995 through the end of 1998 the son of the Secretary-General, and his name is Kojo Annan. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And what year did you get the contract with 

the United Nations? 

Ms. SUAREZ. We got the contract in 1998, and I must say I can 

unequivocally state that Kojo Annan had nothing to do with 

Cotecna getting the contract. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So he did work there from 1995 to 

1998, and then he left, and you got the contract in 1998? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Yes. We bid on the contract in October. We did not 

bid on the contract, the RFP came out October 9. We bid on the 

contract in December, and we were awarded the contract based on 

competitive bidding, based on price and merit. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This was a competed contract? There were 

other people bidding on it? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Which contract? Do you mean the Oil-for-Food contract? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Excuse me. Go right ahead. 

Ms. SUAREZ. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure what your question is. 

64

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. First of all, you got the contract in 

1998. Is that right? 

Ms. SUAREZ. That is correct. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is that January 1998, or when you were talking, when you said October/November was that——

Ms. SUAREZ. No. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. October/November of 1998 or 

December 1998? Is that what we are talking about? Did he work 

for you at that time? 

Ms. SUAREZ. He was at the tail end of a consultancy agreement. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. He had a consultancy. 

Ms. SUAREZ. Mr. Kojo Annan was—let me give you the chronology of his employment. He was employed from 1995 through 

1997. He was employed as a junior liaison officer and was promoted during that period from 1995 to 1997. 

In 1998 they required less services because they downsized his 

operations in West Africa where he was employed, and he was employed as a consultant for a period of 10 months. That consultancy 

agreement expired by its own terms at the end of 1998. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. And when he left he had a non-compete contract agreement with you? 

Ms. SUAREZ. That is correct. You have to understand that Kojo 

Annan was employed in West Africa, and at that time Cotecna was 

actively pursuing two very important preshipment inspection contracts, a preshipment inspection contract with Nigeria and also a 

destination inspection contract in Ghana. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When did he leave again? What month did 

he leave? 

Ms. SUAREZ. He left in December 1998. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So about the same time you got the 

contract he left? 

Ms. SUAREZ. That is correct. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Was he given a stipend? A lot of these 

companies sometimes will give a stipend to an employee after they 

leave. 

Ms. SUAREZ. Yes. I was trying to address that question. The company negotiated a non-compete with Kojo Annan in January, the 

beginning of January 1999, because of the competitive situation in 

West Africa where he was employed. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Does that mean that he received a stipend when he left, a certain amount of money when he left? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Under Swiss law——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Ms. SUAREZ [continuing]. One has to receive compensation for a 

non-compete to be enforceable. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And so the non-compete agreement was the 

justification for giving him how much money at that time on his 

leaving the company? 

Ms. SUAREZ. It is not a one-time fee. It is compensation for his 

agreement not to compete in an area and so he received a monthly 

amount. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And how long did that monthly amount go 

on? 

Ms. SUAREZ. I believe it went until, I would say, early 2004. 

65

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You paid him from 1998 to 2004 for not doing 

anything for you? 

Ms. SUAREZ. No. We paid him not to go to the competition in a 

very competitive environment. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How much was he being paid a month for 

this? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Around $2,500 a month. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So he was being paid maybe $30,000 a year 

about? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Probably, and he was free to seek employment elsewhere, but he had to——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Could you make sure that we get an exact 

amount on that? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Certainly. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ms. SUAREZ. In fact, I can give you a chronology of our activities 

in West Africa and why the non-compete was so important. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I guess it is a little more difficult for some 

people in other professions to understand why someone is given 

money for as long as that for not actually rendering a service, but 

I take it from what you are saying that this is a common practice 

in the industry and that nobody in the industry would wink at all 

that you had provided him about $150,000 worth of money for not 

working for you or anybody else in that given profession. 

Ms. SUAREZ. I would not find it surprising at all, given the value 

of the contracts that they were competing for. That is a very small 

sum of money given the contracts with the governments that they 

were seeking. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And how old is this young man? 

Ms. SUAREZ. He was probably, in 1995, maybe 22, but you are 

talking——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You paid a 22-year-old——

Ms. SUAREZ. A 25-year-old I would say. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. A 25-year-old? 

Ms. SUAREZ. Yes. I do not think it is surprising given the knowledge that the young man had. We have gone through this. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When he represented your company was his 

job to go and try to find U.N. business for your company? Did he 

participate in that? 

Ms. SUAREZ. No, not at all. In fact, his role was to work in Nigeria in Lagos. He did standard preshipment inspection and did work 

in Nigeria. He did some work in Ghana, but his work was restricted to West Africa. And in fact at a later time his role was 

more——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Do you know his education level? 

Ms. SUAREZ. He has a college education. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Ms. SUAREZ. He went to school in England. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I do not imagine he has much work experience considering how young he was at the time that he was 

hired by your company? 

Ms. SUAREZ. He was fresh out of school, and he was hired at a 

rate commensurate with other people fresh out of school. 

66

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you have a $25,000 stipend for him a year 

or a little bit more—you do not know just exactly, but you are 

going to get that to me—after he left. What was he making while 

he was there? 

Ms. SUAREZ. We can get you that information. We did, Mr. 

Chairman, provide the staff quite a long time ago, almost a year 

ago, with non-competes and other—not non-competes. With other 

agreements, other similar agreements. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Are you aware if this young man was 

the recipient at all of any of the, what they call, oil vouchers, but 

they are sort of oil credits that were being given there by Saddam 

Hussein? 

Ms. SUAREZ. We have no knowledge. We would not be in a position to know that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. There have been accusations of that, 

but no one has suggested that to you before? 

Ms. SUAREZ. No. We have no knowledge, no. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That was not my question. My question was: 

Has it been suggested to you before that he may have been the recipient of those? 

Ms. SUAREZ. No. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. That is different than having no 

knowledge, because maybe somebody suggested it but you did not 

have knowledge then either. 

Listen, I will have to say that everybody likes to try to use influence of people, and it is not wrong to hire the son of Kofi Annan. 

It is not wrong in and of itself. 

I think it might be a little questionable. I am a former journalist, and I would have loved to have had somebody pay me $25,000 a 

year not to work for another for 6 years, 5 or 6 years. That is pretty good. 

Ms. SUAREZ. It is not unusual for companies to enter into noncompetes when individuals have sensitive business information. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I am sure we are going to hear from a 

lot of people in your industry telling me whether that is the case. 

If it is, your company has no worry about it. It sounds a little weird 

to those of us who are not involved in the intricacies of your business. 

Of course, lawyers have certain things that they do and certain 

other businesses have certain things they do that others cannot 

fathom as being ethical, but it is because it is standard practice for 

certain professions to do things. 

With that said, I want to thank all of you. I appreciate the fact 

that you were both here, and I think the fact that you were both 

here and both willing to answer questions like the ones I just asked 

indicates good faith on the part of both of your companies. I want 

to put that in the record. 

We might have some other questions for you that we will put in 

writing, and I would hope that you could get back to us; especially 

you are going to get back with the specifics of the income level of 

the young man and exactly how much money he received from the 

company over the period of time that he was receiving money from 

the company. 

Thank you very much. We will have our next witness now. 

67

Thank you, Mr. Denson. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DENSON. Thank you. 

Ms. SUAREZ. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Our last witness is Rehan Mullick. Dr. 

Mullick worked and consulted for a number of organizations, including the U.S. Agency for International Development, the United 

Nations and Iowa State University. Currently Dr. Mullick is director of the Bridges Development Consortium, a USAID program to 

promote change in the Middle East through education and development. 

Importantly for this hearing, in 2002 Dr. Mullick was a research 

officer of the United Nations Office on Humanitarian Coordination 

in Iraq and provided expertise for the Multidisciplinary Observation Unit which, among other things, was responsible for assessing 

and monitoring humanitarian conditions in Iraq and measuring the 

impact of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program. 

I want to thank you and all of our witnesses of course, but I 

want to thank you in particular for being here, and we look forward to your testimony. We welcome your attorney as well. 

If you could boil it down to about 5 minutes of the good stuff and 

then we will have a little dialogue, and we will try to bring out 

some more in the questions and answers. Dr. Mullick? 

STATEMENT OF REHAN MULLICK, PH.D., FORMER RESEARCH 

OFFICER, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HUMANITARIAN 

COORDINATOR IN IRAQ [UNOHCI] 

Mr. MULLICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to 

thank the Committee for giving me the opportunity to be here 

today. 

I am a Pakistani-American. I received my Ph.D. from Iowa State 

University in 1999. After completing my Ph.D., I was working for 

a program affiliated with the university when, in 2000, I was contacted by the U.N. and offered a position monitoring the humanitarian conditions in Iraq and measuring the impact of the Oil-forFood Program. I arrived in Iraq in September 2000. 

We have always known that Baghdad had repeatedly rejected the 

Security Council’s offer to sell oil for the purchase of humanitarian 

supplies. It was not until December 1996 when the effects on the 

population were devastating enough, threatening the regime itself, 

forcing them to sign a memorandum of understanding with the 

United Nations. 

Later on, however, they discovered that the program offers many 

opportunities for them to use their own advantage. We are already 

aware of the regime’s ability to use Oil-for-Food contracts to exercise influence around the world, but not much has been said about 

the regime’s ability to use Oil-for-Food supplies to attain a dreadful 

and complete leverage over its own population. 

I am convinced that the regime’s influence around the world 

through Oil-for-Food contracts and its leverage over its own people 

through socially-engineered distribution of Oil-for-Food supplies 

could not possibly have happened without the cooperation of certain elements within the bureaucratic hierarchies of the United 

Nations. 

68

Enough evidence has now surfaced suggesting considerable mismanagement in the allocation of Oil-for-Food contracts. My report 

21⁄2 years ago pointed at massive discrepancies in the observation 

and distribution of humanitarian supplies in Iraq. 

Soon after I started my job, it became amply evident to me that 

a significant percentage of supplies were never distributed as the 

program intended, that many of the supplies such as trucks, pickups, 4x4s meant for humanitarian aid were diverted to Iraqi security and the military and that the program had been infiltrated by 

many Saddam loyalists. 

During the almost 2 years I was in Iraq, I repeatedly made suggestions to strengthen the observation system and the data collection necessary to insure that the program was working as intended. 

Each suggestion resulted in my supervisors reducing my job responsibilities. This continued to occur until my only job was to run 

TV projectors at staff meetings. 

I finally traveled to New York at my own expense because I was 

unable to get any U.N. official in Iraq to pay heed to the problems 

that I had repeatedly called to their attention. I alerted the U.N. 

officials in New York of what I had observed in Iraq. After I delivered my report in New York, I expected that those senior officials 

who had responsibility for the program would immediately contact 

me. In fact, I was not contacted by anyone. I heard nothing. 

Finally I was contacted and told that my contract was not being 

renewed, which in U.N. parlance meant that I was fired. I continued my effort to notify other U.N. managers of my findings and toward this end sent my report to over a dozen U.N. officials. Like 

my initial effort, this effort was met with absolute silence. 

It is sad that the U.N. administration in Iraq was allowing this 

to happen. What is even more discouraging is the fact that when 

the issues were brought to light the U.N. administration in New 

York not only systematically silenced my findings, but they fired 

me. 

To this day, despite my very difficult years with the United Nations in Iraq and equally disappointing experiences in New York, 

I have never given up on the ideals of the United Nations that epitomize global peace, equality and human dignity. 

Unfortunately, now I know from my own experience that persistent corruption in the U.N. will continue to undermine the attainment of these ideals, especially when the corruption is systematic and well orchestrated like in the Oil-for-Food Program. 

For now, I just hope that the deliberations of this Committee and 

the efforts of all of those investigating the Oil-for-Food Program 

will generate enough synergy and influence to eventually push the 

United Nations to reform, to at least have general oversight procedures that work. 

The age-old Mafia-style management where well-meaning employees are humiliated into falling in line or being fired must heed 

to a more open, transparent and democratic U.N. so that ordinary 

people like myself can go back to honest work even with the U.N. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mullick follows:]

69

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REHAN MULLICK, PH.D., FORMER RESEARCH OFFICER, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR IN IRAQ [UNOHCI] 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you members. I also would like to thank 

the committee for giving me the opportunity to be here today! 

I received my PhD from Iowa State University in 1999. After completing my PhD 

I was working for a program affiliated with the University when in 2000 I was contacted by the UN and offered a position monitoring humanitarian conditions in Iraq 

and measuring the impact of the Oil for Food Program. I arrived in Iraq in September of 2000. 

We have always known that Baghdad had repeatedly rejected the Security Council’s offer to sell oil for the purchase humanitarian supplies. It was not until December 1996, when the effects on the population were devastating enough, threatening 

the regime itself, forcing them to sign a memorandum of understanding with the 

UN. Later on, however, they discovered that the program offers many opportunities 

for them to use it to their own advantage. We are aware of their ability to use oil 

for food contracts to exercise influence around the world, but not much has been 

said about the regime’s ability to use Oil for Food supplies to attain a dreadful and 

complete leverage over their own population. 

The Regime’s influence around the world, through oil for food contracts, and its 

leverage over its own people, through socially engineered distribution of Oil for Food 

supplies, could not possibly have happened without the cooperation of certain elements within the bureaucratic hierarchies of the United Nations. Enough evidence 

has now accumulated, suggesting widespread corruption in the allocation of Oil for 

Food contracts. My report, two and a half years ago, pointed at massive discrepancies in the observation and distribution of these supplies inside Iraq. 

According to the UN itself, the humanitarian tasks in Iraq revolved around the 

following activities:

• Tracking supplies received in Iraq, to establish quantities arrived, distributed 

and installed.

• Gauge the efficiency of procurement process, arrival, distribution and installation/utilization of these supplies.

• Assess the equitability of allocation and distribution of these, Oil-for-Food, 

supplies to the end-users.

• Ascertain the adequacy of supplies to meet the humanitarian needs.

• Observe the status of the humanitarian condition, and provide special reports 

that could facilitate the release of holds on urgently needed items.

Soon after I started my job, it became amply evident to me that there were gaping 

holes in UN’s efforts to meet the above objectives. A robust, functional database on 

the use of the Oil for Food Program supplies, that one expects should have already 

been in place, was just not there. The database that existed was muddled beyond 

repair. The survey instruments deployed for observations were at best amateurish. 

The statistics quoted in the UN reports were often extrapolated with impunity and 

were often scientifically misleading. Geographical disparity in the intensity of suffering among Iraqi population (a stark reality of the southern Shia-dominated 

muhafazat of Iraq) was neither researched nor ever mentioned in any of the UN 

reports. Similarly, it was clear that large quantities of Oil-for-Food supplies were 

simply not being distributed, and yet the observation activities were narrowly focused around the distribution lists provided by the Government of Iraq. This meant 

that a lot of items that were held back or redirected by the GOI were never observed. During my tenure it Iraq I reported all my findings and observations to my 

superiors culminating in a formal report I delivered to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York . 

During the almost two years I was in Iraq I repeatedly made suggestions to 

strengthen the observation system and the data collection necessary to insure that 

the program was working as intended. Each suggestion resulted in my supervisors 

reducing my job responsibilities. This continued to occur until my only job was to 

run the slide projector at staff meetings. 

I finally traveled to New York at my own expense because I was unable to get 

any UN officials in Iraq to pay attention to the problems that I repeatedly called 

to their attention. 

I alerted the UN office in New York that: 

The Iraqi regime was using the Oil-for-Food supplies to rebuild its tattered military, to accommodate its cohorts in the procurement process, to be preferential in 

the distribution of these supplies, and to stage-mange the humanitarian catastrophe 

in Iraq in making a case for the lifting of the sanctions. 

70

The Iraqi regime had rendered the UN observation process meaningless, penetrated its information nerve centers by planting Saddam loyalists in the UN observation process. I also reported that the UN observation mechanism, failed to report 

the true humanitarian situation in Iraq, was uninterested in detecting the partiality 

of the distribution process, and was oblivious of stockpiling and redirection of these 

supplies for non-humanitarian purposes. As a result, the Iraqi military rebuilt its 

logistics by diverting thousands of trucks, pickups, 4X4s etc. that were delivered to 

Iraq under the Oil-for-Food Program. Similarly, it’ was common knowledge in Iraq 

that thousands of Toyota Camrys, and Avalons imported under the program were 

promptly gifted to the functionaries of the Iraqi Intelligence, and the Bath Party. 

Correspondingly, the Malaysian built Proton cars were offered freely to military officers at token prices. The UN was responsible to insure the proper distribution of 

these cars. 

In summary, I reported that a significant percentage of the supplies were never 

distributed as the program intended (see Attachment); that many of the supplies 

such as trucks intended to distribute food were diverted to the Iraqi military; and 

that the program had been infiltrated by many Saddam loyalists. After I delivered 

my report in New York, I expected that those senior management officials who had 

responsibility for the program would immediately contact me. In fact, I was not contacted by anyone. I heard nothing. Finally I was contacted and told that my contract 

was not being renewed, which in UN parlance meant I was being fired. I continued 

my efforts to notify other UN officials of my findings and toward this end sent my 

report to over a dozen UN officials. Like my initial efforts, this effort was met with 

absolute silence. 

I have often wondered why the UN sought me out to do the job I went to Iraq 

to do, if they were not interested in having me actually do it. I have no satisfactory 

explanation. 

It is sad that the UN administration in Iraq was allowing it to happen, but what 

is even more discouraging is the fact that when the issues were brought to light, 

the UN administration in New York not only systematically silenced my findings, 

but also, promptly allowed my contract to lapse, in effect firing me. In addition, as 

an American citizen of Pakistani origin I remain very disturbed that the UN’s administration of the Oil for Food Program undermined the national interest of the 

United States. 

Despite my very difficult years with the UN in Iraq, and equally disappointing 

experiences in New York, I have never given up on the ideals of the United Nations 

that epitomize global peace, equality and human dignity. Unfortunately, now I know 

from my own experience that persistent corruption in the UN will continue to undermine the attainment of these ideals, especially when the corruption is systematic 

and well orchestrated, like in the Oil for Food Program. Had UN chosen to listen 

to, and offer protection to those who blow the whistle on bureaucratic injustice and 

corruption, a program like Oil for Food would have worked more in the interest of 

the impoverished Iraqi people rather than their detractors. 

I just hope that the deliberations of this committee, and the efforts of all others 

investigating the Oil for Food Program will generate enough synergy and influence, 

eventually forcing the United Nations to make its oversight procedures work!

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Dr. Mullick, first of all let me suggest to you 

that you are a very good American. 

Mr. MULLICK. Thank you so much, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We are proud to have Americans like you, 

people who come from other parts of the world but have come here 

to try to show the world there is a better way and believing in our 

ideals and justice and truth and freedom. 

The fact that you were willing to stand up and basically put your 

livelihood at risk speaks very well of you, and I hope that in your 

career—as you are now working on a USAID program—I hope if 

you see some things that are not exactly right in that program that 

you will find us much more responsive than you found the United 

Nations. 

I know a lot of people think that the United Nations has this 

ideal that they were going to lead the world to a better world. I 

think the United States is going to lead the world to a better world 

because of people just like you and the fact that that is what we 

are made up of in the United States. We are made up of every race 

and religion and ethnic background, and what ties us together is 

hopefully our courage to stand up for the ideals that you are standing up for today. 

With that said, I guess what you are telling us today is that 

there was not a self-correcting policy at the U.N. The policy was 

not to take seriously the type of complaints that you had, and thus 

when the problems arose, the U.N. was not getting any better because it was not correcting those problems as people pointed them 

out. 

Mr. MULLICK. Definitely there is a lapse in oversight procedures 

at the U.N., and I think my situation, and there are some other 

whistleblowers, their situation, kind of makes it very obvious that 

U.N. has to address these issues. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Let me ask you this. There are 

things that came in, these humanitarian supplies that came in. 

You said that they were not going to where they were supposed to 

go. Where were they going? 

Mr. MULLICK. Well, actually every week, almost, there used to be 

a frenzy on the distribution lists. That is how the observers were 

sent out to observe the Oil-for-Food supplies. 

The distribution lists were something that the Government of 

Iraq were preparing and handing over to the United Nations. 

Based on that, they were using the distribution lists to send out 

the observers. 

My question was, What is happening to the things that are coming in? So I drew a graph that showed the discompensity between 

what was arriving and what was being distributed. I did question 

that, and I did not get an appropriate answer. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you had 22 percent of what was coming 

in not being distributed? 

Mr. MULLICK. Up to a certain point, yes. Up to a fourth or a fifth 

of the supplies that were coming in were not being distributed. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Where did it go? 

Mr. MULLICK. That was the question that I was raising that our 

studies, our efforts, our observations should be directed toward 

those things. 

73

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you think that these things could have 

made their way—instead of to the people who were suffering there 

in Iraq—could have been used to, for example, bolster Saddam 

Hussein’s army or his military capabilities? 

Mr. MULLICK. Definitely. Unless we had investigated and found 

otherwise, I think there was every reason to believe that they were 

being stockpiled and being used for the regime’s own purposes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And was there a chance that Saddam Hussein was making a profit off of these things that were not distributed, meaning perhaps he was selling them to some people or 

something? 

Was there that type of graft going on where the West set up the 

Oil-for-Food Program and we end up seeing Saddam Hussein selling the food rather than letting his own people have it? 

Mr. MULLICK. There were reports that some of the things, especially medicine, from the Oil-for-Food Program were available in 

other places. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me ask you this. There in your operation in Baghdad was the U.N. operation clean of Iraqi, and I say 

Iraqi, but Saddam Hussein’s infiltrators? Was his intelligence system penetrating your operation to break down the integrity of the 

operation? 

Mr. MULLICK. I had strong objections to some of the local staff 

looking at sensitive issues as end use reports, and the end use list 

that was being sent over by Cotecna was being handled by the local 

staff. 

It was common knowledge that these individuals were well-connected, and definitely I would say that, yes, a lot of Saddam——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me ask you this. Was your staff inappropriately influenced, or was it actually penetrated where there were 

some people working in your office that should not have been there 

because they had ties to Saddam Hussein? 

Mr. MULLICK. Well, I would say that with some sensitive items 

like end use observations, the purpose of observation would be 

killed if the Government of Iraq knew ahead of time what was 

going to be observed, especially with the end use Oil-for-Food supplies. Knowing the individuals that were handling it, I think that 

might have happened. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. You think it might have happened 

because there is a huge chunk, a little black hole in the chart that 

you cannot explain, and obviously the people who are supposed to 

get it are not getting it, so someone is. You have to say well, let 

us explain this or let us try to correct it. 

When you pointed that out to your superiors, as you explained, 

they began demoting you as you began to bring that up. Why do 

you think your superiors did that? Were they unduly influenced by 

the Iraqi regime, or were they just people who were bureaucratically inclined toward looking at anyone who causes them to 

have to do more work to be the enemy? 

Mr. MULLICK. I think once I was in New York and I did contact 

the United Nations office there, the silence there was even more 

mysterious for me than what was going on in Baghdad. 

In Baghdad I could have imagined it was because of the mismanagement. It might have been because of the lack of interest in 

74

the program itself, in implementing the program. But the silence 

in New York does point to something that is being—someone that 

is trying to hide some information here. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Can you tell me maybe, just to be more specific, what specific kinds of goods were a part of this hole, this 20 

percent or 25 percent hole in the operation? What kinds of goods 

were not being distributed? 

Mr. MULLICK. There was a good mix, but a lot of motor vehicles, 

trucks, things like that where you could see them on the streets, 

but they were not deported and distributed. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Trucks? 

Mr. MULLICK. Pick-up trucks, smaller vehicles 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Trucks. I thought you were going to say cotton swabs or hospital medicine. Trucks? All right. 

By the way, the trucks have not been delivered, and you cannot 

help but notice that a couple of these trucks are driving around 

every day. You are telling that to your local superiors in Baghdad, 

and they are not paying any attention to you I guess. That must 

have been very disheartening. 

Mr. MULLICK. It sure was. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. My gosh. I am glad I asked that question. 

The U.N. officials that did not answer back at headquarters back 

in New York, how high did you go with your complaints? How high 

do you know that the complaints were actually heard? 

You actually gave your report. You tried to get people’s attention. 

At what point do you really know that they heard that and ignored 

it? At what level? 

Mr. MULLICK. I started out with the Department of Peacekeeping 

Operations, the department that had originally hired me, and then 

I moved all the way up to the Internal Oversight Department that 

is responsible for these kind of oversights. To this day I have not 

heard from any of the U.N. officials. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. When you say we are talking about at 

least 20 percent that you claim or are suggesting that you were involved in the program that you did not see was distributed or what 

should have been distributed, how much are we talking about? 

We know we are talking about things like trucks and things like 

that. These are valuable pieces of equipment here. How much is 

not accounted for in terms of what was distributed? 

Mr. MULLICK. Well, I would say by the end of phase 10 we had 

spent almost $20 billion worth of things that had already come in, 

and I would say about $4 billion worth of goods were being stockpiled. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So there was $20 billion that when you 

were there was coming into this——

Mr. MULLICK. The 59 percent account. I am talking about the 

main account. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The main account for the Oil-for-Food Program. Okay. 

Mr. MULLICK. Right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Of that $20 billion, you are telling us that 

there was $4 billion, maybe even $5 billion, but $4 or $5 billion 

that just was unaccounted for. That is over how many years? 

75

Mr. MULLICK. That is up through phase 10. That would be 5 

years. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So that is 5 years. We are not talking about $5 billion every year. We are talking about $1 billion a year 

for 5 years. 

Mr. MULLICK. That is right. That is right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So we are talking about a perhaps $5 

billion loss over a 4- or 5-year period. That is not a small sum. Of course, Iraq is not a huge country, and $1 billion worth of 

goods is quite visible, is it not, and hard to miss that those goods 

were supposed to be accounted for and were not and are showing 

up around you. Is that right? 

Mr. MULLICK. That is right. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let me just note from what our witness 

is saying is what we have is blatant corruption. Blatant and visible 

corruption that was ignored by the U.N. officials on the scene. 

Even worse, was covered up by the U.N. officials on the scene by 

trying to retaliate against an honest employee who was bringing up 

the details to try to correct the situation. 

Making matters worse, when you went to the leadership at the 

United Nations headquarters there was no response. Let us say the 

actions that were taken against you in retaliation for being honest 

were tacitly affirmed by the leadership of the United Nations. 

That $1 billion a year represents, and let me note what we are 

talking about here. This is $1 billion a year that is not accounted 

for that disappeared from this Oil-for-Food Program. These are 

goods that were humanitarian aimed goods that were supposed to 

be there to make sure that the people of Iraq did not suffer as an 

unintended consequence of our attempts to make sure that Saddam 

Hussein was not replenishing his military at that time. 

Let me note that I remember over and over and over again various interest groups in this country claiming that the United States 

was intentionally engaged in starving little children. You put that 

claim parallel to the testimony that we hear today, that the United 

Nations was permitting $1 billion a year minimum just going right 

down the black hole, not being used to help those children whatsoever, perhaps being used to bolster Saddam Hussein’s regime. This 

is a travesty. 

The fact that the U.N. officials on the scene did not look at it as 

such is even more of a condemnation of the United Nations. We remember the speeches at the United Nations of people claiming that 

the United States and the West was responsible for starving those 

children, and here we go that those U.N. officials were not even 

able to act or willing to act to see that that money was going where 

it was intended to go to help those people with their humanitarian 

needs. 

Dr. Mullick, I appreciate your testimony. Again, I have been very 

laudatory of you today. I am a former journalist. The fact is that 

when we have freedom of press we rely on courageous citizens like 

yourself to get the word out so that journalists can then spread the 

word to the American people and other peoples of the free world 

to try to correct bad situations. 

It is just too bad that you have bureaucracies that whether it is 

an intentional thing or whether it is an unintentional just bureauVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:58 Jun 28, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\OI\031705\20059.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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cratic practice or whether we are talking about corruption within 

the system, it just cannot be tolerated. 

You have helped us identify this. We thank you very much. 

There is a lot of explaining on your case alone that the United Nations needs to do. It is our contention that there is a culture at the 

U.N. that needs to be changed. It is the culture. 

Any culture that would have someone like yourself step forward with what you have told us today and say $1 billion a year that 

should be going to humanitarian aid is being diverted in Iraq, and 

then instead of trying to help correct the situation, demoting the 

person who is making the complaint, any organization like that has 

a real problem in terms of their attitude and their culture, and we 

expect to see that that is changed, and that is what these hearings 

are all about. 

I thank you very much for your contributions to this effort, and 

I appreciate all the witnesses we have had today. This has been 

very enlightening. 

If you have any further trouble, especially if there is any retaliation for you coming here, you call my office and we will be much 

more responsive than your friends up in New York were. 

Mr. MULLICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Finally, yes. That means I have to be closing 

this up. I want to thank all the witnesses. I thank Dr. Mullick in 

particular. 

We were going to be providing some questions to our witnesses 

and would hope they would answer those in writing, probably to 

the other two witnesses who were here. We will be submitting 

questions to them. 

With that said, I would like to declare that this meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:48 p.m. the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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