Number 34, July 1995

ForewordConclusionsRecommendations

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### NATO ENLARGEMENT:  A RUSSIAN
PERSPECTIVE

Seven Consequences of NATO Enlargement

ONE - Deepening of the gap between Russian and
Western civilizations. Historically, this gap is the most
important concern. As NATO enlargement reflects a
consolidation of the Western (Romano- Germanic) world as
a civilization, Russia's reaction could not help but reflect the
consolidation of Russian civilization as distinct from the
Western. Any eastward growth of NATO that would leave
Russia outside the alliance would strike a severe, if not
fatal, blow to Russian westernizers and greatly encourage 
their  opponents.  It could  also  cause the 
West to lose a unique opportunity to bring Russia closer to
itself as a civilization which is the only way to solve the
West's historical task of turning Russia into an ally, rather
than an adversary.

Of course, this civilizational gap would be partly
bridged by Russia's progress on the road to economic
reforms and creation of a working market economy. But the
decision of NATO to spread over the whole of Europe
would leave Russia little choice but to assert itself as a
force, not necessarily antagonistic but certainly different
from the Western community.

TWO -  An inward reorientation of Russia.Russia would
consider its international role and national interests with
less, not more, respect for the interests of Western
countries. Although Russia has recently played by rules
established by the West trying to find a role for itself within
the international framework created by the West after the
end of the Cold War NATO enlargement  would cause it to
become a more independent player, less constrained by a
real or illusionary partnership with the West. In the absence
of strong strategic ties with the Western alliance, Russia
might well become a loose cannon in world politics. The
effect of such a reorientation on the fragile post-Cold War
international system could be very serious.

THREE -  A rebirth of the Russian sphere of influence
among the former states of the Soviet Union.  If Russia
considers itself geopolitically cut off from Europe and the
Euro-Atlantic community, it would have no choice but to
strengthen its historical sphere of influence. This would
certainly mean closer economic and military cooperation
with Belarus and Kazakhstan, cooperation that has already
started. Although Ukraine would be more of a problem,
here, too, Russia has three powerful levers especially its
close ties between Russian and Ukrainian enterprises,
Ukrainian dependence on Russian natural resources such as
oil and gas, and the presence of 11 million native Russians
on Ukrainian soil (more than 20 percent of the population
of Ukraine). One might even argue that NATO
enlargement would seriously limit Ukraine's freedom of
maneuver in foreign policy. Therefore, it would adversely
affect the geopolitical pluralism among the territories of the
former USSR.

FOUR -  A weakening of overall European security.
Although the West considers it a means of strengthening
Western security, and of providing effective security
guarantees for Central and Eastern Europe, enlargement
could deliver a severe blow to  European security as a whole. Eventually, NATO
would have to consider the entry of the Baltic states and perhaps
even Ukraine into the alliance. Russia's predictably negative
reaction, including attempts to exert pressure on Ukraine to
dissuade it from joining NATO, would certainly strain 
relations  between  Kiev and  Moscow, thus creating
conditions for new tensions between Russia and the West.
Any attempt to include Ukraine and the Baltic republics in
a larger NATO would result in a major crisis between
Russia and the West.

FIVE -  A threat to the security structure already
established after the end of the Cold War. As Vladimir
Lukin, head of the State Duma Committee on Foreign
Affairs predicts, the decision to enlarge NATO eastward
would kill prospects for the ratification of the START II
treaty in the Russian parliament and bring into question the
future of the Treaty on Conventional Armaments in Europe
and the Convention on Chemical Weapons. In his words,
"NATO enlargement is the worst idea of all those that are
connected with European security."

SIX -  An unwelcome influence on internal Russian
politics. NATO enlargement would strongly influence the
political balance inside Russia on the eve of the
parliamentary elections (scheduled for December) and
presidential elections (scheduled for June 1996) in favor of
anti-Western circles. If enlargement is adopted, those
Russians who had tried to deal with NATO would be
attacked in both electoral campaigns by anti-Western and
nationalist forces within Russia. The West could find itself
in the extremely controversial position of having to back
those in Russia who favor the postponement of elections and
even the establishment of a dictatorial regime out of fear that
elections might bring highly undesirable results for the
West.

SEVEN -  Encouragement of a new militarism in Russia.
NATO enlargement could result in the promotion of Russian
military officers who favor a stronger military posture to
key positions. They would probably position troops on the
western border of Russia and in Belarus and the Kaliningrad
area. The so-called flank restrictions of CFE would be
disregarded. All in all, NATO's eastern borders would
emerge as a new dividing line of distrust on the European continent.

The First Battle Against Expansion And
PFP

The Mamedov Visit To
Washington

NATO's Strategy of Enhanced Cooperation

The NATO strategy combining enlargement with a
parallel enhancement of cooperation with Russia could
hardly bring about the desired results because such
cooperation coupled with NATO enlargement is viewed in
Russia as an obvious contradiction: Either we trust each
other (we cooperate, making enlargement meaningless), or
we do not trust each other (cooperation becomes moot). In
the words of President Yeltsin's Security Advisor Yuri
Baturin, "The hopes for combining NATO enlargement with
the establishment of special partner relations with Russia are
fairly weak. NATO's enlargement would sap the basis for
such partnership because Russia cannot see this step as
anything but unfriendly."

The idea of a non-aggression or strategic cooperation
treaty (which in the beginning of 1994 enjoyed some support
in Moscow) now holds little promise. Such a treaty would
have to be ratified by all NATO member-states. If it is not
accepted by even one member-state, Russia would face an
enlarged NATO without any sort of strategic compensation.
Finally, it may be safely predicted that, after the decision is
adopted by NATO, the negative domestic reaction in Russia
would make it almost impossible for any government to
conduct effective talks on Russia-NATO cooperation.