IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION TWO

JOSE R. AROCA AND KIRSTIN AROCA, HUSBAND AND WIFE,

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

TANG INVESTMENT COMPANY LLC, AN ARIZONA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY,

Defendant/Appellee.

No. 2 CA-CV 2023-0046

Filed January 31, 2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County

No. S1100CV202200940

The Honorable Christopher J. O’Neil, Judge

REVERSED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Evans Dove Nelson Fish & Grier PLC, Mesa

By Trevor J. Fish, Douglas N. Nelson, and H. Lee Dove

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Teresa H. Foster PLLC, Phoenix

By Teresa H. Foster 

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
AROCA v. TANG INV. CO.

Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION

Judge Kelly authored the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding 

Judge Brearcliffe and Judge Eckerstrom concurred.

K E L L Y, Judge:

¶1 In this action to clear the title of certain real property, Jose and 

Kirstin Aroca appeal from the superior court’s dismissal of their claim 

against Tang Investment Company LLC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ariz. R.

Civ. P., and its award of attorney fees to Tang. They contend the court erred 

in determining that, because Tang’s remedy of foreclosure under a recorded 

deed of trust remained available even after the statute of limitations on the 

underlying debt had expired, the Arocas were not entitled to quiet title. For 

the reasons that follow, we reverse the court’s judgment and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 On review of the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6), Ariz. R. Civ. P., we “assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual 

allegations.” Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, ¶¶ 7-9 (2012). The 

parties here do not dispute any material facts. In 2007, the Arocas executed 

a promissory note and deed of trust wherein they promised to pay Tang 

$40,000 for value received, secured by real property in Pinal County owned 

by the Arocas. The terms and conditions of the note required the Arocas to 

make semi-annual, interest-only payments commencing in 2008, with the 

entire unpaid balance due and payable on April 30, 2012. Tang recorded 

the deed with the Pinal County Recorder’s Office. The Arocas made 

interest-only payments on the note for one year, but then stopped making 

payments and subsequently defaulted on the note in 2012. Tang failed to 

initiate collection proceedings or bring any action on the underlying debt 

for the next ten years.

¶3 Before filing their complaint in 2022, the Arocas had hired a 

title company to search Pinal County property records to identify any 

encumbrances on the property. The search revealed Tang’s recorded deed 

of trust from 2007. The Arocas sent a letter to Tang, demanding an 

“immediate release and cancelation” of that “Recorded Deed of Trust,”

asserting that Tang no longer held a security interest in the property and 

was barred from enforcing its rights under the promissory note by the sixyear statute of limitations set forth in A.R.S. § 12-548. 
AROCA v. TANG INV. CO.

Opinion of the Court

3

¶4 Tang refused to comply with the Arocas’ demand. The

Arocas subsequently brought this action for quiet title, wrongful lien, and 

declaratory relief. They sought to clear Tang’s “groundless and now 

wrongfully recorded [deed] from the title . . . because the statute of 

limitations on the underlying Note Secured by Deed of Trust . . . has run 

and the recorded [deed] is invalid.” 

¶5 In response, Tang filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for 

failure to state a claim. Tang argued that, even though the statute of 

limitations on the underlying debt had expired, the recorded deed of trust 

had not been satisfied or discharged, and Tang therefore still retained its 

remedies to foreclose on or initiate a trustee’s sale of the property securing 

it. Tang asserted that A.R.S. § 33-714, enacted in 2002, modified existing 

law and extended the statute of limitations to enforce a deed of trust beyond 

the six-year term under § 12-548. The superior court granted the motion and

dismissed the Arocas’ action to quiet title, concluding that § 33-714

superseded prior case law and extended the statute of limitations for Tang 

to initiate a foreclosure action until 2057. Tang subsequently moved for an 

award of attorney fees in the amount of $6,572, pursuant to the terms of the

deed and A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01 and 12-341. The court awarded Tang $4,929

in fees and $26.80 in costs. This timely appeal followed. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 120.21(A)(1). 

Discussion

¶6 The parties agree that the Arocas defaulted on the loan and 

that Tang is time-barred under § 12-548 from bringing an action in contract 

on the underlying debt. The issue on appeal is whether the superior court 

correctly concluded that the Arocas are not entitled to quiet title because

§ 33-714 extends Tang’s timeframe to initiate foreclosure proceedings and 

assert its remedies as to the deed of trust beyond § 12-548’s six-year statute 

of limitations. 

¶7 We review questions of statutory application de novo. See

BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC, 236 Ariz. 363, ¶ 7 

(2015); see also Manterola v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 200 Ariz. 572, ¶ 8 (App. 2001)

(“We review de novo ‘any questions of law relating to the statute of 

limitations defense.’” (quoting Logerquist v. Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 18 (App. 

1996))).

¶8 “An action for debt shall be commenced and prosecuted 

within six years after the cause of action accrues, and not afterward, if the 

indebtedness is evidenced by or founded on . . . [a] contract in writing that 

is executed in this state.” § 12-548(A)(1). In De Anza Land & Leisure Corp. v. 
AROCA v. TANG INV. CO.

Opinion of the Court

4

Raineri, 137 Ariz. 262, 266 (App. 1983), this court held that “A.R.S. § 12-548

applies to foreclosure actions as well as to actions on the underlying debt.”

See also Luu v. Newrez, LLC, 253 Ariz. 159, ¶ 9 (App. 2022) (“The limitations 

period to execute on a deed of trust is the same one that applies to the 

underlying promissory note.”); cf. ZB, N.A. v. Holler, 242 Ariz. 315, ¶ 13 

(App. 2017) (“Issues relating to the foreclosure . . . are determined by the 

law governing the underlying debt.”). We explained that a “mortgage is 

merely incidental to the debt” and, although distinguishable from the 

circumstance in which a debt is extinguished, the remedy of foreclosure 

likewise falls with the bar of the debt. De Anza, 137 Ariz. at 265; see also Atlee 

Credit Corp. v. Quetulio, 22 Ariz. App. 116, 117 (App. 1974) (“The purpose of 

a foreclosure suit is to have the mortgaged property applied to payment of 

the debt secured by the mortgage.”); Foreclosure, Black’s Law Dictionary 

(11th ed. 2019) (“[a] legal proceeding to terminate a mortgagor’s interest in 

property, instituted by the lender (the mortgagee) either to gain title or to 

force a sale in order to satisfy the unpaid debt secured by the property”

(emphasis added)). 

¶9 Furthermore, our statutory scheme relating to deeds of trust 

places a limitation on the commencement of actions against trust property: 

The trustee’s sale of trust property under 

a trust deed shall be made, or any action to 

foreclose a trust deed as provided by law for the 

foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall 

be commenced, within the period prescribed by 

law for the commencement of an action on the 

contract secured by the trust deed. 

A.R.S. § 33-816 (emphasis added).

¶10 Tang maintains on appeal as it did below, that § 33-714, 

enacted after De Anza was decided, now governs the limitations period to 

initiate foreclosure actions. Tang argues that by enacting § 33-714, the

legislature intended to supersede De Anza and codify the “two-remedy”

rule, which allows an owner to foreclose on its security even when the 

statute of limitations bars action on the debt. De Anza, 137 Ariz. at 265. 

Tang argues that, in the event § 33-714 conflicts with § 33-816, the former 

controls because it is the more recent and specific statute. Section 33-

714(A)(2), provides in relevant part:

A. The lien of any mortgage or deed of 

trust on any real property that is not otherwise 
AROCA v. TANG INV. CO.

Opinion of the Court

5

satisfied or discharged expires at the later of the 

following times:

. . . .

2. If the final maturity date or the last 

date fixed for payment of the debt or 

performance of the obligation is not 

ascertainable from the county recorder’s 

records or if there is no final maturity date or 

last date fixed for payment of the debt or 

performance of the obligation, fifty years after 

the date the mortgage or deed of trust was 

recorded. 

¶11 In dismissing the Arocas’ claim to quiet title, the superior 

court did not address § 33-816, and concluded that § 33-714 “effectively 

modified prior case law concerning the validity of the Deed of Trust and 

the availability of foreclosure as a remedy for its enforcement.” This 

allowed Tang to foreclose on the property at any time before its lien

purportedly expired on October 5, 2057.1 See § 33-714(A)(2).

¶12 We interpret statutes according to their plain meaning. State 

ex rel. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Tunkey, 254 Ariz. 432, ¶ 24 (2023) (Bolick, J., 

concurring). However, when ambiguity exists, we apply additional 

principles of statutory construction, examining “the history, context, spirit 

and purpose of the law,” to determine the legislative intent. State ex rel. 

Ariz. Reg. of Contractors v. Johnston, 222 Ariz. 353, ¶ 5 (App. 2009). 

¶13 Here, the plain language of § 33-714 sets forth an outer limit 

for the expiration of mortgage liens, but contrary to Tang’s position, it does 

not implicate the remedy of foreclosure or the timeframe in which a 

foreclosure proceeding must be initiated. Conversely, the plain language 

of § 33-816 expressly dictates that a trustee’s sale or foreclosure on a deed 

of trust must be commenced within the same limitation period that would 

apply to an action on the contract securing it. An action for debt formed by 

a contract must be brought within six years. § 12-548(A)(1). Therefore, by 

the plain language of § 33-816, a foreclosure action must also be commenced 

within six years from the time the cause of action accrues on the underlying 

1Based on the parties’ stipulation that the note had not been recorded 

with the deed, the superior court derived the maturity date through 

application of § 33-714(A)(2). 
AROCA v. TANG INV. CO.

Opinion of the Court

6

contract. See Baxter Dunaway, Law of Distressed Real Estate, § 63:61 n.5 (2023

update) (citing § 33-816 for rule that “[t]he six year statute of limitations 

applies to foreclosure actions as well as to actions on the underlying debt”). 

¶14 Even if the language of § 33-714 were ambiguous and could 

be read to possibly extend the statute of limitations for a foreclosure 

proceeding, its legislative history reveals that the legislature did not intend 

such a result. See Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., 178 Ariz. 264, 269 (1994)

(“[W]e . . . review the statute’s legislative history to find, if possible, any 

shared legislative understanding of the relevant language.”). A fact sheet 

noted that H.B. 2071, later § 33-714, was intended to address the problem 

where a mortgage has been satisfied but a “notice of satisfaction has not 

been recorded, a mortgage or lien will remain on record without a release 

even when the maturity of the lien has expired.” S. Fact Sheet for H.B. 2071, 

45th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 9, 2002) (emphasis added); see also H. 

Summary of H.B. 2071, 45th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. Apr. 4, 2002) (final bill 

summary for H.B. 2071 expressing same purpose). Additionally, § 33-714

states that it does not apply to a lien that is “otherwise satisfied or 

discharged,” indicating that the legislature intended to maintain its existing 

statutory scheme in regard to deeds of trust, which, as this court has 

previously explained, “ties ‘the limitation period for an action in rem to the 

same period applicable to an action on the contract.’” Andra R Miller 

Designs LLC v. US Bank NA, 244 Ariz. 265, ¶ 12 (App. 2018) (quoting Stewart 

v. Underwood, 146 Ariz. 145, 150 (App. 1985)); see also Diaz v. BBVA USA, 252 

Ariz. 436, ¶ 14 (App. 2022) (“[D]ischarge of an underlying debt extinguishes 

any lien or other right or interest in the property securing the debt.”).

Accordingly, nothing in § 33-714’s history suggests the legislature intended 

it to supersede § 33-816, to change the applicable statute of limitations for

initiating foreclosure proceedings, or to overrule De Anza by adopting the 

“two-remedy rule,” as Tang contends. 

¶15 Having determined that Tang’s remedies for enforcement of 

the deed of trust are barred by limitation, we turn to the issue of Tang’s 

recorded lien. Tang argues that because a quiet title action is an action in 

equity, under equitable principles, the Arocas are not entitled to that relief

until and unless they pay off their debt, even though it is barred by the 

statute of limitations. See Provident Mut. Bldg.-Loan Ass’n v. Schwertner, 15 

Ariz. 517, 518-19 (1914). However, in 1941 the legislature enacted A.R.S. 

§ 12-1104, which provides that in a quiet title action: “If it is proved that the 

interest or lien or the remedy for enforcement thereof is barred by limitation 

. . . plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment barring and forever estopping 

assertion of the interest or lien in or to or upon the real property adverse to 

plaintiff.” § 12-1104(B). 
AROCA v. TANG INV. CO.

Opinion of the Court

7

¶16 The Arocas defaulted on the note in 2012, and Tang did not 

bring suit to collect payment or initiate foreclosure proceedings on the 

property pursuant to the deed of trust within six years. Because § 33-816

required Tang to commence foreclosure proceedings within the six-year 

statutory period under § 12-548, Tang has been barred from foreclosing on 

the deed of trust or initiating a trustee’s sale of the property since 2018. And 

because Tang’s recorded deed of trust is barred by limitation, the lien has 

been discharged and the Arocas are entitled to judgment under § 12-1104 

in their action to quiet title. See Sult v. O’Brien, 15 Ariz. App. 384, 388 (1971)

(when “rights of the parties are clearly defined and established by statutory 

provisions,” equity follows the law). Accordingly, we reverse the superior 

court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

Attorney Fees

¶17 The Arocas argue the superior court abused its discretion in 

awarding Tang $4,929 in attorney fees and $26.80 in taxable costs. We will 

uphold the court’s determination as to which party is the prevailing party,

and thus entitled to attorney fees, absent an abuse of discretion. Am. Power 

Prods., Inc. v. CSK Auto, Inc., 242 Ariz. 364, ¶ 12 (2017). However, the court 

abuses its discretion if it commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary 

decision. Id. Here, because the court erred in dismissing the Arocas’ claim 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Tang did not prevail. We therefore vacate the 

award of attorney fees in favor of Tang and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this decision. See Am. Power Prods., Inc., 242 Ariz. 364, ¶ 12. 

¶18 On appeal, both parties request an award of attorney fees. 

Because we have reversed the superior court’s judgment dismissing the 

Arocas’ claim, they are the successful party on appeal. See §§ 12-341.01, 12-

341; see also Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 393-94 (1985)

(successful party on appeal includes party who achieves reversal of 

unfavorable interim order when order is central to case and issue of law 

decided on appeal is “sufficiently significant that the appeal may be 

considered as a separate unit”). Accordingly, we grant the Arocas’ request 

for their reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to §§ 12-

341.01(A) and 12-341 upon their compliance with Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. 

P. 

Disposition 

¶19 We reverse the superior court’s order dismissing the Arocas’

claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.