IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

STANFORD FOWLER, 

 

 Plaintiff Below, 

 Appellant, 

 v. 

PRATCHER KRAYER LLC, 

 Defendant Below, 

 Appellee. 

§ 

§ No. 213, 2020 

§ 

§ Court Below—Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware 

§ 

§ 

§ C.A. No. N19A-08-002 

§ 

§ 

§ 

 Submitted: January 8, 2021 

 Decided: February 15, 2021 

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and MONTGOMERY-REEVES,

Justices. 

ORDER

(1) The appellant, Stanford Fowler, appeals from the Superior Court’s 

opinion, dated May 18, 2020,1 affirming the post-trial judgment of the Court of 

Common Pleas. On August 20, 2020, this Court entered an order deferring decision 

on a motion in which Fowler contended that Samuel D. Pratcher, Esquire, should 

not be permitted to represent the appellee in this appeal (the “Disqualification 

Motion”). The appellee is a law firm of which Pratcher is a partner. The dispute in 

1 Fowler v. Pratcher Krayer, LLC, 2020 WL 2520273 (Del. Super. Ct. May 18, 2020). 
2

this litigation concerns the amount of the fee to which the appellee is entitled for 

representing Fowler in connection with a personal injury claim. 

(2) After consideration of the appellant’s arguments and the record on 

appeal, we AFFIRM on the basis of the Superior Court’s opinion. Fowler disagrees 

with the factual findings of the Court of Common Pleas, but we conclude, as did the 

Superior Court, that those factual findings are supported by the record and are the 

product of an orderly and logical reasoning process.2 To the extent that Fowler 

argues that Dawn Becker should not have been permitted to testify, review of the 

trial transcript confirms that Fowler requested permission to call Becker as a 

witness.3 Thus, he waived any objection he may have had based on that fact that 

neither party had identified her as a witness before trial. 

(3) Finally, the Disqualification Motion is DENIED. Fowler argues that 

Pratcher’s representation of the appellee law firm presents a conflict of interest 

because Pratcher, as a partner of the firm, seeks to benefit financially from the 

outcome of this case. As an initial matter, it does not appear that Fowler objected to 

Pratcher’s representation of the appellee at trial, and he therefore waived his 

2 See Shaw v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 2012 WL 3115519, at *1 (Del. July 31, 2012) (“In an appeal 

from the Court of Common Pleas to the Superior Court, the standard of review is whether there is 

legal error and whether the factual findings made by the trial judge are sufficiently supported by 

the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process. This Court applies the 

same standard of review to the Superior Court’s decision.” (citations omitted)). 

3

 Appendix to Answering Brief at B-0055-57. 
3

objection to Pratcher’s participation.4 In any event, we find that Fowler has not 

established a basis for disqualifying Pratcher in the circumstances of this case.5

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 BY THE COURT: 

 /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 

 Chief Justice 

4 Cf. Copeland v. Manuel, 1994 WL 665257, at *2 (Del. Nov. 22, 1994) (“A party who fails to 

raise a disqualification issue may not seek to set aside the results of a trial when knowledge of the 

disqualification was known to the party during trial.”); Conley v. Chaffinch, 431 F. Supp. 2d 494, 

498 (D. Del. 2006) (“Waiver is a valid basis for denial of a motion to disqualify.”). 

5 See DEL. R. PROF’L COND. R. 1.6(b)(5) & Cmt. 11 (providing that a lawyer may reveal 

information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer believes reasonably 

necessary “to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the 

lawyer and the client”).