U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

63–941 cc WASHINGTON : 2000

S. HRG. 106–621

JOINT HEARING ON SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

FOR PLAN COLOMBIA

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEES ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS; DEFENSE; AND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SPECIAL HEARING

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
(II)

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri

SLADE GORTON, Washington

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky

CONRAD BURNS, Montana

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

JON KYL, Arizona

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

TOM HARKIN, Iowa

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland

HARRY REID, Nevada

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin

PATTY MURRAY, Washington

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

STEVEN J. CORTESE, Staff Director

LISA SUTHERLAND, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES H. ENGLISH, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED

PROGRAMS

MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Chairman

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri

TED STEVENS, Alaska

(ex officio)

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

TOM HARKIN, Iowa

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland

PATTY MURRAY, Washington

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

(ex officio)

Professional Staff

ROBIN CLEVELAND

JENNIFER CHARTRAND

TIM RIESER (Minority)
(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

TOM HARKIN, Iowa

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

Professional Staff

STEVEN J. CORTESE

SID ASHWORTH

SUSAN HOGAN

GARY REESE

JOHN J. YOUNG

TOM HAWKINS

KRAIG SIRACUSE

ROBERT J. HENKE

MAZIE R. MATTSON

CHARLES J. HOUY (Minority)

Administrative Support

CANDICE ROGERS

SONIA KING (Minority)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

CONRAD BURNS, Montana Chairman

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho

JON KYL, Arizona

TED STEVENS, Alaska

(ex officio)

PATTY MURRAY, Washington

HARRY REID, Nevada

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

(ex officio)

Professional Staff

SID ASHWORTH

CHRISTINA EVANS (Minority)

Administrative Support

MAZIE R. MATTSON

SONIA KING (Minority)

(V)

CONTENTS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Page

Statement of Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State ................................. 1

Opening statement of Hon. Mitch McConnell ....................................................... 1

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3

Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy ................................................................. 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6

Statement of Senator Ted Stevens ......................................................................... 6

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7

Statement of Senator Arlen Specter ...................................................................... 8

Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein ................................................................ 9

Statement of Senator Conrad Burns ...................................................................... 10

Prepared statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg .......................................... 11

Prepared statement of Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering ................................... 16

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Statement of Gen. Charles Wilhelm, Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern

Command .............................................................................................................. 21

Counternarcotics battalion ...................................................................................... 21

Action plan ............................................................................................................... 22

Helicopters ................................................................................................................ 22

Forward operating locations ................................................................................... 22

Paramilitaries .......................................................................................................... 26

Colombia’s strategy .................................................................................................. 27

Human rights ........................................................................................................... 29

Bachilleres ................................................................................................................ 30

UH–60s ..................................................................................................................... 31

Vietnam .................................................................................................................... 32

Colombian pilots ...................................................................................................... 33

Additional committee questions ............................................................................. 34

Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg ........................................ 34

Questions submitted to Gen. Charles Wilhelm ..................................................... 35

Questions submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye ............................................... 35

Forward operating locations ............................................................................ 35

Support to Colombia ......................................................................................... 36

Military counterdrug efforts ............................................................................ 36

Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg ........................................ 37

Military effectiveness against guerrillas ........................................................ 37

Plan Colombia funding allocations .................................................................. 37

Plan Colombia helicopter assistance ............................................................... 37

Questions submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein .............................................. 37

FARC control .................................................................................................... 37

Eradication in FARC areas .............................................................................. 38

Colombian drug trade ...................................................................................... 38

Alternative production ..................................................................................... 39

Human rights abuses in Colombia .................................................................. 39

Fourth Brigade ................................................................................................. 39

Coca production in Colombia ........................................................................... 40

Air interdiction efforts ...................................................................................... 40
Page

VI

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

Statement of Ambassador Luis Alberto Moreno, Colombian Ambassador to

the United States ................................................................................................. 43

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45

Proposal for the increase of financial aid from the U.S. Government to Ecuador in the fight against drugs ............................................................................. 51

Statement of Dr. Ramon Jimenez, Attorney General for Ecuador ...................... 56

Statement of Oswaldo Antezana, Minister of Agriculture for Bolivia ................. 58

Dignity plan supplemental assistance funding request ........................................ 60

Statement of Robin Kirk, Americas Division, Human Rights Watch .................. 64

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 69
(1)

JOINT HEARING ON SUPPLEMENTAL

REQUEST FOR PLAN COLOMBIA

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2000

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS, SUB- COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILI- TARY CONSTRUCTION, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC.

The subcommittees met at 10:36 a.m., in room SD–192, Dirksen

Senate Office Building, Hon. Mitch McConnell (chairman of the

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs) presiding.

Present: Senators Stevens, Specter, Domenici, McConnell, Gregg,

Burns, Reid, Bennett, Inouye, Leahy, Lautenberg, and Feinstein.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STATEMENT OF THOMAS PICKERING, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MITCH MC CONNELL

Senator MCCONNELL. The hearing will come to order. We are

pleased to have with us the Chairman of the Full Committee, Senator Stevens.

And I do not know, Senator, whether you have any statements

you would like to make.

Senator STEVENS. Well, I know you have an opening statement.

I would say, just for the record, that this proposal that is before

us from the Administration affects three of our subcommittees, Foreign Operations, Defense and—and Military Construction.

I believe that—that as chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign

Operations, Senator McConnell should chair this and—and make

the basic recommendations. But the other—members of the other

subcommittees will be joining us too, Senator.

This is a very important subject. I think probably the most important subject we are going to deal with in the first part of this

year.

I do have a statement after you finish yours. But I—I want to

wait for your comments.

Senator MCCONNELL. OK. Thank you, Senator Stevens.

Welcome, gentlemen. When I traveled to—to Colombia, Peru and

Ecuador to examine U.S. support for regional counternarcotics programs, I was taught essentially four lessons.

One, there is no substitute for aggressive political leadership in

Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador.
2

Two, drug lords, guerrillas, and the paramilitaries are all profiting and part of the same problem. Our narco-security strategy

must reflect that fact.

Third, containing one country only shifts the problem elsewhere.

We need a regional strategy.

And, fourth, while it seems the most obvious, it seems the least

observed, the American public must be told the truth about what

lies ahead.

I am not convinced that the Administration has learned these

lessons or can pass this test.

To determine how we proceed, I think it is worth taking a look

around the region to consider what has worked.

While the Administration likes to claim credit for Peru’s success,

the truth is they succeeded largely on their own. The United States

suspended all assistance in 1991 and 1992. Nonetheless, President

Fujimori launched an aggressive broad scale assault on both the

traffickers and the guerrillas protecting their trade.

I doubt anyone would be calling Peru a success today if traffickers were in jail, but the Sendero Luminoso had stepped in to

take their place.

Critics argue that Peru’s success came at a very high human

rights price. As a result, many now argue that we—we must carefully concentrate only on the Colombian drug war and avoid any

involvement or support of efforts which target the paramilitaries or

guerrillas. Hence, we must not step up military training, support

or presence of U.S. troops.

I am already hearing soothing Administration reassurances that

Plan Colombia is a counternarcotics effort and we need not worry

about the quagmire of a counter-insurgency or military campaign.

Now, what exactly does this mean? What is the Administration

really promising in Plan Colombia?

It seems to me it is more, much more of the same thing we have

been doing already. For several years, we have provided substantial support to the Colombia narcotics police (CNP) in their attack

on coca crops and cartel.

While the CNP deserves credit for arresting kingpins and shutting down trafficking routes, coca growth and cocaine production,

as we know, have exploded. The more the Administration spends

in Colombia, the more coca is grown.

Now, we plan to offer more of the same support, but this time

to the Colombia Army. We will train two counternarcotics battalions and provide counternarcotics helicopter gunships and weapons, all the while keeping a comfortable public distance from targeting the other two major threats to Colombia and our interests.

If it has not worked so far, why will it now? I guess what I really

want to say is: Who are we kidding? Our strategy will have to

change to succeed. We cannot pretend the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army

(ELN) are not tied to traffickers.

We cannot argue that a push into Southern Colombia will reduce

drug production, as long as there is a policy of allowing the FARC

and traffickers safe haven in a demilitarized zone (DMZ) the size

of Switzerland.
3

We cannot ignore the increase in paramilitary involvement in the

drug trade. These are the same extremists with close ties to Colombian military, which we plan to train.

If the Colombian government meets the test and demonstrates

political will, the Administration should acknowledge that we are

prepared to do whatever it takes to support a serious effort that

goes after the entire problem, traffickers, guerrillas and

paramilitaries.

If we are not really committed, if we are uncertain about how involved we want to become, if we question the risks and are not confident of the results, we should quit now and save our $1.6 billion.

If we proceed, the public deserves to know that we cannot succeed overnight. In fact, I believe we will be well past this election

year before we can expect any results whatsoever. Not only should

we avoid a half-hearted effort in Colombia, we should avoid a halfbaked strategy in the region. The emphasis on Colombia must not

overshadow requirements in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. Without a

regional strategy, an attack on production in one country will only

push the problem over to another country.

Bolivia is a good case in point. In a few short years, the new government has executed a determined and effective effort to eradicate

coca and substitute alternative crops. But recently when the vice

president was in town, he made it clear that the job was not yet

done.

Any pressure on Colombia risks a resurgence in Bolivia, if alternative development, alternative opportunities are not better funded.

We have invited leaders from Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru to address their national needs. I do not view this as a choice between

support for Colombia or her neighbors. Each has important interest. All have a common stake in success.

It is disappointing that the Administration’s request does not

support an approach which makes Colombia the anchor but recognizes that this is a broader—broader partnership.

I would hope this hearing achieves a consensus so that we can

correct that course.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

When I traveled to Colombia, Peru and Ecuador to examine U.S. support for regional counter-narcotics programs, I was taught four lessons: (1) There is no substitute for aggressive political leadership in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia or Ecuador; (2)

Drug lords, guerrillas, and the paramilitaries are all profiting and part of the same

problem—our narco-security strategy must reflect that fact; (3) Containing one country, only shifts the problem elsewhere—we need a regional strategy; and the fourth

lesson, while most obvious, seems least observed, (4) The American public must be

told the truth about what lies ahead.

I am not convinced that the Administration has learned these lessons or can pass

this test.

To determine how we proceed, I think it is worth taking a look around the region

to consider what’s worked. While the Administration likes to claim credit for Peru’s

success, the truth is they succeeded alone. The U.S. suspended all assistance in

1991 and 1992. Nonetheless, President Fujimori launched an aggressive, broad scale

assault on both the traffickers and the guerrillas protecting their trade. I doubt anyone would be calling Peru a success today if traffickers were in jail, but the Sendero

Luminoso had stepped in to take their place.

Critics argue that Peru’s success came at a very high human rights price. As a

result, many now argue that we must carefully concentrate only on the Colombian
4

drug war and avoid any involvement or support of efforts which target the

paramilitaries or guerrillas. Hence, we must not step up military training, support

or the presence of U.S. troops. I am already hearing soothing Administration reassurances that Plan Colombia is a counter-narcotics effort, and we need not worry

about the quagmire of a counterinsurgency or military campaign.

What exactly does this mean? What is the Administration really promising in

Plan Colombia. It seems to me it’s more—much more—of the same thing we have

been doing. For several years, we have provided substantial support to the Colombian Narcotics Police in their attack on coca crops and cartels. While the CNP deserves credit for arresting king pins and shutting down trafficking routes, coca

growth and cocaine production have exploded.

The more the Administration spends in Colombia, the more coca is grown.

Now, we plan to offer more of the same support, but this time to the Colombian

Army. We will train two counter-narcotics battalions and provide counter-narcotics

helicopter gun-ships and weapons, all the while keeping a comfortable public distance from targeting the other two major threats to Colombia and our interests.

If it hasn’t worked so far, why will it now? I guess what I really want to say is:

Who are you kidding?

Our strategy will have to change to succeed. We can’t pretend the FARC and ELN

are not tied to traffickers. We can’t argue that a push into Southern Colombia will

reduce drug production, as long as there is a policy of allowing the FARC and traffickers safe haven in a DMZ the size of Switzerland. We can’t ignore the increase

in paramilitary involvement in the drug trade. These are the same extremists with

close ties to Colombian military which we plan to train.

If the Colombian government meets the test and demonstrates political will, the

Administration should acknowledge that we are prepared to do whatever it takes

to support a serious effort that goes after the whole problem: traffickers, guerrillas

and paramilitaries. If we are not really committed if we are uncertain about how

involved we want to become if we question the risks and are not confident of the

results we should quit now and save our $1.6 billion.

If we proceed, the public deserves to know that we can not succeed over night—

in fact, I believe we will be well past this election year before we can expect any

results.

Not only should we avoid a half-hearted effort in Colombia, we should avoid a

half-baked strategy in the region. The emphasis on Colombia must not overshadow

requirements in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. Without a regional strategy, an attack

on production in one country will only push the problem elsewhere.

Bolivia is a good case in point. In a few short years, the new government has executed a determined and effective effort to eradicate coca and substitute alternative

crops. But, recently, when the Vice President was in town, he made clear that the

job was not done. Any pressure on Colombia risks a resurgence in Bolivia if alternative development opportunities are not better funded.

We have invited leaders from Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru to address their national

needs. I do not view this as a choice between support for Colombia or her neighbors

each has important interests—all have a common stake in success. It is disappointing that the Administration’s request does not support an approach which

makes Colombia the anchor, but recognizes that this is a broader partnership.

I would hope that this hearing achieves a consensus so that we can correct that

course.

Senator MCCONNELL. And with that, let me call on my friend

and colleague, Pat Leahy, the ranking member.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Every 6 or 8 years, whichever Administration occupies the White

House, they propose to dramatically increase military aid to fight

drugs in South America.

Each time, Congress is presented with wildly optimistic predictions. We do not get very many facts with which to make informed decisions. Each time, though, we do respond. We appropriate billions of dollars. But the flow of illegal drugs just continues

unabated and even increases.
5

I recognize the great challenges facing Colombia today. I have

talked a number of times with the Ambassador from Colombia and

also with President Pastrana. I think they make some persuasive

arguments.

There is no dispute that the 40-year civil war and the violence

and the corruption associated with the drug trade has inflicted a

terrible toll on that country. I agree with the Administration and

many in Congress that the United States should try to help.

But I have very serious doubts about the Administration’s approach. They predict that by building up the Colombian Army and

eradicating more coca, the guerrillas’ source of income will dry up

and they will negotiate peace.

I suggest that it is just as likely that it will lead to a wider war,

more innocent people killed, more refugees uprooted from their

homes, and no appreciable change in the flow of cocaine into the

United States.

The Administration has requested $1.6 billion over 2 years. Seventy-nine percent of that is for the Colombian Armed Forces. This

is an institution that has a sordid record of human rights violations, corruption and even involvement in drug trafficking.

Today, while the Army’s direct involvement in human rights violations has fallen sharply—I give them credit for that—there is

abundant evidence that some in the Army regularly conspire with

paramilitary death squads who, like the guerrillas, are also involved in drug trafficking.

So I cannot support this military aid without strict conditions to

ensure that military personnel who violate human rights or who

aid or abet the paramilitaries are prosecuted in the civilian courts.

The Colombia military courts have shown time and again that they

are unwilling to punish their own. The Administration’s proposal

is for 2 years. Yet it is going to be at least that long before most

of the equipment even gets to Colombia and that people are trained

to use it.

The Colombia government cannot possibly afford to maintain this

equipment, most of which is sophisticated aircraft, so we can assume that this is only a down payment on a far longer, far more

costly commitment.

And like every previous Administration, this proposal comes with

only the vaguest of justification. Nothing in the materials I have

seen describes the Administration’s goals with any specificity, what

they expect to achieve in what period of time, at what cost, and

what the risks are to civilians caught in the middle when the war

intensifies, or for that matter, to our own military advisors.

So in that regard, Mr. Chairman, I am glad that two of the witnesses we have here are General Wilhelm and Ambassador Pickering.

Ambassador Pickering has been a friend and advisor to me for

many years. General Wilhelm is one of the most respected military

leaders that I have had the privilege to deal with in my 25 years

here.

So I look forward to what they have to say, but I must say, Mr.

Chairman, that I am a skeptic.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Leahy.

[The statement follows:]
6

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Every six or eight years, the administration that occupies the White House at the

time proposes to dramatically increase military aid to fight drugs in South America.

Each time, the Congress is presented with wildly optimistic predictions, but few

facts with which to make informed decisions. Each time, we respond by appropriating billions of dollars, but the flow of illegal drugs into the United States is

unchanged.

I recognize the great challenges facing Colombia today. There is no dispute that

a 40 year civil war and the violence and corruption associated with the drug trade

have inflicted a terrible toll on that country.

I agree with the Administration, and many in Congress, that the United States

should try to help.

But I have serious doubts about the Administration’s approach. Today’s prediction

is that by building up the Colombian Army and eradicating more coca, the guerrillas’ source of income will dry up, and they will negotiate peace.

It is just as likely that it will lead to a wider war, more innocent people killed,

more refugees uprooted from their homes, and no appreciable change in the flow of

cocaine into the United States.

The Administration has requested $1.6 billion over two years, 79 percent of which

is for the Colombian Armed Forces, an institution that has a sordid record of human

rights violations, corruption, and involvement in drug trafficking.

Today, while the Army’s direct involvement in human rights violations has fallen

sharply, there is abundant evidence that Army personnel regularly conspire with

paramilitary death squads, who like the guerrillas are also involved in drug trafficking.

I cannot support this military aid without strict conditions to ensure that military

personnel who violate human rights or who aid or abet the paramilitaries are prosecuted in the civilian courts. The Colombian military courts have shown time and

again that they are unwilling to punish their own.

The Administration’s proposal is for two years, yet it will be that long before most

of the equipment even gets to Colombia and their people are trained to use it.

The Colombian Government cannot possibly afford to maintain this equipment,

most of which is sophisticated aircraft, so this is a down-payment on a far longer,

far more costly commitment.

Like every previous administration, this proposal contains only the vaguest justification.

Nothing in the materials I have seen describes the Administration’s goals with

any specificity, what they expect to achieve in what period of time, at what cost,

and what the risks are to civilians caught in the middle when the war intensifies,

or to our own military advisors.

Maybe General Wilhelm and Ambassador Pickering, two men I admire greatly,

can give us the details.

Senator MCCONNELL. Senator Stevens.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS

Senator STEVENS. Oh, Mr. Chairman, I am going to put my statement fully in the record, if you will.

I—I do want to point out this is a request for emergency money.

As I said, it covers three subcommittees of our full Committee. It

is a new initiative. It is a new direct role for U.S. military personnel on the ground in Colombia, and it involves the establishment of new permanent forward-operating locations, effectively

bases, in Ecuador, Aruba and Curacao, a continued deployment of

U.S. military forces at those sites.

These may be the right steps to take, but they have severe consequences. I spent last week with Admiral Barrett at the Joint

Interagency Task Force East Headquarters to review operational

intelligence efforts underway to combat the flow of drugs from

Latin America.
7

In addition, I visited Special Operations Command to get General Schoomaker’s perspective on these efforts. And I look forward

to hearing from General Wilhelm today.

Whatever steps we take I think that Senator McConnell is right.

We must be prepared to address how these efforts will impact the

neighboring countries of Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama and—and

Bolivia. It does seem to me that we have some very, very serious

problems to resolve here in the Committee if we are to expect this

supplemental to survive on the floor.

And I do hope you will call on Senator Inouye, and see if he has

any comment about Defense.

Senator MCCONNELL. Yes.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR TED STEVENS

Let me begin by thanking Sen. McConnell for convening this hearing to review

the supplemental request for expanded counter-drug funding for fiscal year 2000. I

also want to thank Gen. Wilhelm for appearing today, under very short notice.

The request before the Committee proposes a significant fiscal, programmatic and

human commitment to working with the government of Colombia to combat the

growth of cocaine and heroin production and distribution.

This Committee has consistently supported, and added to, funding requested for

Department of State, Defense and intelligence community efforts to fight the war

on drugs.

This request comes to the Committee as an emergency increase for fiscal 2000.

Our hearing today will identify how these funds would be spent, and the long term

implications of this policy.

In particular, this initiative envisions a new, direct role for U.S. military personnel on the ground in Colombia, to train and assist Colombian Army units in

their combat role in fighting the counter-narcotics forces in Colombia.

This initiative accelerates the establishment of new, permanent forward operating

locations, effectively bases, in Ecuador, Aruba and Curacao, and the continuous deployment of U.S. military forces to operate from these sites.

These may be exactly the right steps to take—but they will have consequences.

Last week, I met with Adm. Barrett at the Joint Interagency Task Force East

headquarters, to review the operational and intelligence efforts underway to combat

the flow of drugs from Latin America. In addition, I visited the Special Operations

Command, to get Gen. Skoomaker’s perspective on these efforts.

I look forward to hearing Gen. Wilhelm’s perspective on these matters today.

Whatever steps we take to increase the pressure on drug activity in Colombia, we

must be prepared to address how these efforts will impact the neighboring countries

of Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama.

We need to understand the commitment of the government of Colombia this program—our Committee heard from President Pastrana last month, and I believe we

were all impressed by his personal determination.

Finally, we must decide how we will pay for this effort—not contemplated in the

bills we completed just 3 months ago, but now before the Committee as an urgent,

emergency priority.

Senator MCCONNELL. Senator Inouye, do you—Senator Burns.

STAFF. He is not——

Senator MCCONNELL. OK.

Senator Specter.

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BURNS. I am not about to step in front of a senior Senator.

Senator MCCONNELL. Well, I was calling on you because you are

the Chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee. We were

going to get—— Senator BURNS. Oh, OK. My—my statement will be very short.

Go ahead.
8

Senator MCCONNELL. Go ahead, Senator Specter.

Senator SPECTER. So will mine, providing it gets started.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER

Senator SPECTER. I want to make just a few comments about the

issue of the impact on the drug problem in the United States.

I have visited Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia on a

number of occasions over the past decade and a half and have seen

our efforts and co-sponsored the legislation to bring the military in,

but all of the expenditures which have looked to try to cut down

the supply of drugs from Latin America have been notably unsuccessful.

When there is an effort made to curtail the supply coming out

of a country like Colombia, it is like pushing air in a balloon. It

goes to Peru or to Venezuela or to Ecuador or to some other country.

When I look at $1.6 billion on an emergency supplemental, given

the problems that we have in looking at our funding for next year

when we are now in the budget process, it seems to me there has

to be a very direct connection to our national interest.

And I am concerned about the stability of Colombia. And I had

a chance recently to visit President Pastrana in December and

have talked at length with Ambassador Moreno, and applaud what

they are doing. And it is a big advance since the Supreme Court

Chambers were attacked by the guerrillas not too long ago in Colombia.

But when you take a look at what will the impact on the use of

drugs and the tremendous problems we have in this country, I

want to candidly express my concern over this kind of an expenditure.

We spent $18 billion a year on the drug problem. And $12 billion

of that is spent on fighting drugs on supply coming into this country, and street crime, which I used to participate in when I was district attorney of Philadelphia.

And we spend $6 billion on demand on education and rehabilitation. And I have long thought that we ought to be spending more

on the demand side, at least a 50/50 split in terms of a long-range

solution.

So that before I am authorized to cast my vote for $1.6 billion,

I want to see some direct effect on the serious problems of drugs

in the United States. That is an aspect that concerns me first and

foremost.

I am also concerned about the Colombian Army and I am also

concerned about the U.S. commitment.

And we have two very expert witnesses here in Undersecretary

Pickering, with whom we have all worked for many years, and

General Wilhelm. So I am prepared to listen but, candidly, it is a

high hurdle.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Specter.

Any of our colleagues on this side have an opening statement?

Senator Feinstein.
9

STATEMENT OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am

not a member of the subcommittee. I am a member of the general

Committee.

I have worked with Senator Coverdell on the drug issues for a

substantial period of time. I come from a state heavily impacted.

And I have met with the former Defense Minister of Colombia. And

Senator Stevens was good enough to provide an opportunity for us

to meet with President Pastrana.

I do not believe there are any good options. Of course, we have

got to fight drugs on both the demand side and the supply side.

However, we provide money to local jurisdictions on the demand

side to provide prevention treatment, education.

The Federal Government itself does not do that. Our total responsibility is to maintain our borders, to provide Federal law enforcement and to interdict.

The former defense minister pointed out to me how 30 to 40 percent of the land mass of Colombia is today controlled by narcoterrorists; how 1,500 citizens are held as hostages; 250 military, 250

soldiers.

Eighty percent of the cocaine is grown in Colombia, is transported via, for the most part, Mexican cartels into this country.

And I am one that believes something has to be done, that—that

we have to provide the kind of aid to an ally who has been a stalwart ally of this country, to a president who is doing his utmost

to prevent human rights abuses; to change a pattern of corruption;

and to stand tall in a situation in which it is very difficult to stand

tall.

Everyone runs. And you cannot countenance running, and face

these cartels and narcoterrorists. They understand one thing.

More pronouncedly, what is happening on the borders of this

country, the Southwest border, is the spread of the corruption from

the Southwest through the border into the United States.

With customs agents, with local public officials, the money for

bribes is so enormous and I happen to believe that it is within our

national interest to be helpful. It is not within our national interest

to see the drug cartels and the narco-terrorists penetrate this country. And believe me, they will and they are trying now.

So I have very strong feelings on this issue. And I have a very

strong belief that the Federal Government’s responsibility is enforcement, is forward placement, and is to stop this development.

The cartels are more sophisticated than they have ever been before.

Our intelligence intercepts are down because they utilize highly

encrypted computer systems. They have the most updated military

equipment. And they are on a march.

Now, we either sit back and let this march take place because

we are worried that there is not a 100 percent guarantee of success, or we are willing to play a role to back an ally that wants

to be helpful; and the victims are right here on our side of the border.

So I am in support of this. I feel very strongly that Mr. Pickering

and the General will hopefully provide as much guarantee of suc-
10

cess as they possibly can. And I—I am one that recognizes there

is no guarantee.

But I do think that the national interest is a clear one, that

when you have arrests as we have had called busts, in the colloquial, of 5 tons of cocaine, this is brought in by Mexican cartels,

produced in Colombia, and these arrests are commonplace, that we

have a huge problem.

And the supply is so great, the street price is dropping and continues to drop. And I agree, we must fight it on the demand side.

I am certainly happy to do that. Some programs work. And some

programs do not.

But we also have to make it extraordinarily difficult and prevent

its admission to this country, and so I am in support of this effort,

and I look forward to hearing the particulars.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Feinstein.

Let me—normally, when it is just a hearing of our subcommittee,

Senator Leahy and I restrict opening statements just to the Chairman and the ranking member.

I am—since we have several different subcommittees today, we

are being a little looser, but let me just remind everybody that anybody who—who does not feel the need to make an opening statement, that would not be frowned upon. And we do have a long list

of witnesses.

Senator Burns.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CONRAD BURNS

Senator BURNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I will try

to stay in my two-minute confine.

Ambassador Pickering and General Wilhelm, nice to see you, and

thank you for coming today.

Just a short statement, I chair the Military Construction Subcommittee and we have been asked to provide some of the infrastructure that they will need in their forward positioning.

I would have to say that as we move this along that we could

sit down privately and talk about the situation and if it is well

thought out, if it gets us to our mission, keeping in mind that I

have some very serious reservations as the role of the military

plays in this situation with drugs.

I think the role of the military is much different in this country

than what it is being asked to do. I would hope that we could sit

down and just visit about that because we are going to make a

sizeable investment in our areas down there.

And with the drug situation, we are going—always going to have

this drug situation in this country, folks, because we can buy—we

have the money to buy the darn stuff.

That is our biggest problem, so how do we combat that? What

we are trying to do down there and the infrastructure we will need

in order to—to carry out your mission.

And Semper Fi, General.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator Burns.

Does anyone else feel moved to make a statement on the Democratic side?
11

Senator INOUYE. Well, we feel moved, but we will respond to our

kinder instincts and—— Senator MCCONNELL. Great.

Anyone else on the Republican side feel moved to—to make an

opening?

Senator DOMENICI. I am also moved, but I am going to pass on

it.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you. We will be happy to make any

opening statements a part of the record.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on a subject of critical importance: how the United States can work with and support our partners in Latin

America in our common fight against the scourge of illegal drugs.

We will soon consider emergency supplemental funding for Assistance to Plan Colombia. The President has made this a high priority, requesting this funding within

a responsible Budget which pays down America’s debt.

I would like to commend President Pastrana for developing a national strategy

to free Colombia of the production and trafficking of drugs so he can reunify a country torn by decades of fighting. While he has asked the United States and other allies to help, Colombia itself will bear most of the cost to implement Plan Colombia.

This comprehensive strategy includes the peace process, to bring leftist forces back

into the political process; a forceful counter-drug strategy; reform of the justice system and protection of human rights, and democratization and social development.

For these reasons, I would be inclined to support rapid American assistance to

help Colombia bring this strategy to fruition.

However, I have serious concerns and questions which I believe must first be addressed. I discussed some of these issues with Ambassador Moreno yesterday, and

I will raise some of these questions here today.

The Pastrana Government has made important strides in improving respect for

human rights, not least by Columbia’s military. Columbia must follow through by

prosecuting military officers accused of extra-judicial killings and other crimes in civilian courts. Firm action must be taken to investigate and prosecute crimes carried

out by paramilitary groups, which seem to have taken on some of the military’s

‘‘dirty work.’’ In short, more needs to be done to protect human rights.

I also wonder whether a counter-drug strategy that relies on fighting insurgents

in the jungle is likely to succeed, or whether it might make more sense to first focus

on interdiction efforts to cordon off drug-producing areas. I’m also not sure I understand how military counter-narcotics operations in southern Columbia can be separated from the political fight against leftist rebels with whom President Pastrana

says he would like to negotiate.

While Columbia’s national commitment to the counter-drug effort is welcome, we

also need to ensure that our support is part of a regional approach, so we do more

than just move drug production and trafficking elsewhere in the region. And we

need to ensure that alternative development programs are economically and environmentally sustainable, so we create a real future for those willing to give up producing drugs.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I’m not sure we’re doing enough here at

home to reduce the demand for drugs. In particular, we need to ensure that everyone who wants help to escape drug addiction can get into a treatment program, and

help educate our youth to stay free of drugs. Otherwise, our efforts in Latin America

run the risk of simply raising the price addicts pay for drugs.

I look forward to hearing from Under Secretary Pickering and General Wilhelm

and Ambassador Moreno and our other witnesses so we can better understand how

to use our resources effectively in a joint effort to free our hemisphere from the

scourge of drugs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCONNELL. And, gentlemen, why do you not proceed?

Mr. Ambassador, are you leading off?

Ambassador PICKERING. I am, Mr. Chairman. And thank you

very much. I have a statement for the record.

Senator MCCONNELL. We will make it part of the record.
12

Ambassador PICKERING. And I will try to deliver a summary of

the important parts of the remarks that I have prepared.

Let me begin by saying I was very appreciative of your statement

of the four McConnell principles on dealing with drugs.

I think that they both inform and energize the kinds of approaches that we can take. And I think that they represent a potentially very strong bipartisan consensus on how to deal with this

problem.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity today to discuss the U.S. Government assistance for Plan

Colombia. I know that we are all concerned about the ramifications

of the situation in Colombia and its impact on the United States.

The importance of fighting the scourge of illegal drugs as we

have just heard from you is an issue on which we can all agree.

The cost is of, on an annual basis, 52,000 dead and $110 billion

each year due to the health costs, accidental costs, lost time and

so on. If my historical recollection is correct, these are the numbers

respectively that we lost in Vietnam and Korea.

These are a huge toll. And 75 percent to 80 percent of the cocaine

in that terrible cocktail comes from—— Senator REID. Mr. Chairman—— Ambassador PICKERING (continuing). From Colombia.

Senator REID. Mr. Chairman—Mr. Chairman.

Would you explain the 52,000?

Ambassador PICKERING. My testimony says that we had—the

cost to our society is 52,000 dead and nearly $110 billion each year.

The $110 billion is each year. The 52,000 dead, I think, is a cumulative total.

Senator REID. 52,000 who died from drug use—— Ambassador PICKERING. Exactly.

Senator REID (continuing). Or is that in the war against drugs?

Ambassador PICKERING. No. It is the people impacted by—by

the—by the drugs in this country. That is the death toll.

General WILHELM. Drug-related violence.

Ambassador PICKERING. Yes. Drug-related violence—— General WILHELM. Overdoses.

Ambassador PICKERING (continuing). Overdoses, all causes, but

related to drugs.

Senator REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.

Ambassador.

Ambassador PICKERING. Although narcotics remain the key in

our assistance to Colombia, strengthening the economy and Colombia institutions and supporting the peace process will also help to

bring about an objective of stability to the entire region and aid in

the struggle against narcotics. I am grateful, Mr. Chairman, for the

support of the Congress on this issue.

Our approach to Colombia can be one of the best examples of

what might be achieved when there is a bipartisan consensus on

pursuing our national interests abroad. I thank you all for that

consideration.

We are fortunate, as we have just heard, to be working with

President Pastrana and his Administration. After the terrible relations with the Samper Administration, President Pastrana’s tenure

offers the United States and the rest of the international commu-
13

nity a golden opportunity to work with Colombia in confronting

these threats.

President Pastrana’s commitment to achieve peace is indisputable. He has also demonstrated his willingness to root out narcotics trafficking while remaining firmly committed to democratic

values and principles.

Colombia is currently enduring a critical societal, national security and economic series of problems that stem in great part from

the drug trade and the internal conflict which is financed by that

trade.

This situation has limited the government of Colombia’s sovereignty in large parts of the country. These areas have been becoming the prime coca and opium poppy producing zones.

This problem directly affects the United States as drug trafficking and abuse cause the enormous social, health and financial

damage to our communities, which I have just described.

Over 80 percent of the world’s supply of cocaine is grown, processed or transported through Colombia. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that up to 75 percent of the heroin consumed on the East Coast of the United States comes from Colombia, although Colombia produces less than 3 percent of the world’s

heroin.

The government of Colombia has taken the initiative to confront

the challenges it faces. With the development of a strategic approach to address its national challenge called Plan Colombia, a

plan for peace, prosperity and the strengthening of the state.

It is an ambitious, but we believe realistic, package of mutually

reinforcing integrated policies.

The plan itself was formulated, drafted and approved in Colombia by President Pastrana and his team. Without its Colombian origins and its Colombian stamp, it would not have the support and

commitment of Colombia behind it. Colombian ownership and vigorous Colombia implementation are essential to the future success

of the Plan.

The U.S. government shares the assessment that an integrated,

comprehensive approach to Colombia’s interlocking challenges

holds the best promise for success.

I had the honor of meeting with President Pastrana and his team

February 13th and 14th in Colombia to discuss implementation.

We reviewed the—with the Colombians a wide array of coordination and implementation issues.

I believe with Colombia we have launched a process of continuous bilateral discussions that will refine and make more effective

our capacity to contribute to the implementation of Colombia’s policies.

Before I describe for you our proposal to assist Plan Colombia,

I want to remind you that the Plan cannot be understood simply

in terms of a U.S. contribution.

Plan Colombia is a $7.5 billion plan over 3 years, which President Pastrana has said Colombia will provide $4 billion of its

scarce resources to support. He called on the international community to provide the remaining $3.5 billion.

In response to this request, the Administration is now proposing,

and it is before you, a $1.6 billion assistance package to Colombia
14

of new monies and current funding for the years 2000 and 2001.

Our request for new monies includes $954 million in 2000 in an

emergency supplemental and $318 million in 2001 funding.

A significant share of our package will go to reduce the supply

of drugs to the United States, by assisting the government of Colombia in its efforts to limit the production, refinement and transportation of cocaine and heroin.

Building on current funding of over $330 million in fiscal year

2000 and 2001, the Administration’s proposal includes an additional $818 million funded through the international affairs programs, the function 150 account, and $137 million through defense

programs, the 050 function, in 2000; and $256 million in 150; and

$62 million through 050 in fiscal year 2001.

We are looking to the European Union and the International Financial Institutions to provide additional funding. Already, the

International Financial Institutions have committed between $750

million and $1 billion, which is focused on Plan Colombia and its

objectives.

The Departments of State, Defense, Justice and Treasury, as

well as the Agency for International Development, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, all played very major roles in proposing and crafting the 2-year

support package which is before you. They will play an essential

role in the inter-agency implementation effort.

I briefly would like now, Mr. Chairman, to focus on the key elements of the plan.

The first is boosting governing capacity and respect for human

rights. Here, the Administration proposes funding $93 million over

the next 2 years to fund a series of programs under the Agency for

International Development and the Department of State and Justice to strengthen human rights and the administration of justice

institutions.

Expansion of counternarcotics operations into Southern Colombia: With this part of the package, the Administration proposes to

fund $600 million over the next 2 years to help train and equip two

additional special counternarcotics battalions, which will move into

Southern Colombia to protect Colombian National Police as they

carry out their counterdrug mission of eradication. The program

will provide helicopters, training and intelligence support for that

activity.

The third area is alternative economic development. The Administration proposal includes new funding of $145 million over the

next 2 years to provide economic alternatives for small farmers,

who now grow coca and poppy, and to increase local government’s

ability to respond to the needs of their people.

This is an integral part of the program based on the success

which has been seen in Bolivia in its integrated program of eradicating crops and providing for alternative development.

The fourth area is more aggressive interdiction. Building on

Peru’s success in aerial and riverine and ground-based interdiction,

enhancing Colombia’s ability to interdict air, water-borne and road

trafficking is essential to decreasing the price paid to farmers for

coca leaf and to decreasing the northward flow of drugs. The Ad-
15

ministration proposes to spend $340 million on the interdiction programs.

The fifth element is assistance to the Colombia National Police.

The Administration proposes an additional funding of $96 million

over the next 2 years to enhance the Colombia National Police’s

ability to eradicate coca and poppy fields, this in addition to the

counternarcotics assistance of $158 million provided to the CNP in

fiscal year 1999.

I would like now to mention just an important aspect of what we

are dealing with in the human rights dimension. We have strongly

supported the efforts of President Pastrana and his Administration

to advance the protection of human rights and to prosecute those

who abuse them.

Complicity by elements of Colombia’s security forces with the

right wing militia groups called paramilitaries, remains a serious

problem.

Although the government of Colombia has taken important steps

in holding senior military and police officers accountable for participating in human rights violations, we believe more must and can

be done, however.

And in my talks with President Pastrana, I had the opportunity

to emphasize that and he tells me he believes that that can be accomplished.

U.S. assistance to Colombian military and police forces is provided strictly in accordance with Section 563 of the Fiscal Year

2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, the so-called Leahy

Amendment.

No assistance is provided to any unit of the security forces for

which we have credible evidence of the commission and I quote

from the act, ‘‘of gross violations of human rights,’’ unless the Secretary of State is able to certify that the government of Colombia

has taken effective measures to bring those responsible to justice.

We are firmly committed to the Leahy Amendment and have a

rigorous process in place to screen those units being considered for

assistance.

A word, Mr. Chairman, on the peace process. President Pastrana

has made bringing an end to Colombia’s civil strife through a peace

agreement with the various insurgent groups a central goal of his

Administration. He was elected on that platform.

Pastrana believes, and the U.S. Government agrees, that ending

the civil conflict and eliminating all of that conflict’s harmful side

effects is central to solving Colombia’s multi-faceted problems.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, the Administration has

been pleased by the support from both sides of the Congress that

share our concern for Colombia’s future.

At this moment, Colombia is a partner which shares our counternarcotics concerns and possesses the will to execute the needed reforms and operations.

Our challenge is as a neighbor and as a partner. And it is to

identify the ways in which the U.S. Government can assist Colombia in resolving these problems.

Concerted action now could, over time, stem the illicit narcotics

flow to the United States. Action now can contribute to a peaceful

resolution of a half-century of conflict. Action now could return Co-
16

lombia to its rightful historical place as one of the hemisphere’s

strongest democracies.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, before I close, I would like

very briefly to mention two other important supplemental requests

for which the Administration is seeking funding.

First, emergency supplemental funds are needed in Southeast

Europe in Kosovo to support crucial economic and democratic reform in the region, promote law and order in Kosovo and provide

much-needed assistance for the United Nations interim mission in

Kosovo.

Secondly, additional funding is also being requested for U.S. contributions to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Trust Fund. Our

contribution is an essential component of this initiative, to provide

necessary debt-relief for the world’s poorest and most indebted

countries.

The debt relief will enable those recipients to fund crucial poverty reduction programs, and I urge the Committee to give these

requests full and equal consideration with the support for Plan Colombia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT

Senator STEVENS. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

I want to make sure everyone understands. Those last two requests

are not before the Committee this morning.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR THOMAS R. PICKERING

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity today to

discuss U.S. Government assistance for Plan Colombia. I know that we are all very

concerned about the ramifications of the situation in Colombia on the United States.

The importance of fighting the scourge of illegal drugs is an issue on which we can

all agree. The problems in Colombia affect the lives of Americans at home and

abroad. Illegal drugs cost our society 52,000 dead and nearly $110 billion each year

due to health costs, accidents, and lost productivity. Narcotics also have a corrosive

effect on the democratic institutions and economies of the region. Although counternarcotics remains key in our assistance to Colombia, strengthening the economy and

institutions and supporting the peace process would help to bring stability to the

entire region.

I am very grateful for the support of Congress on this issue. Our approach to Colombia is one of the best examples of what can be achieved when there is a bipartisan consensus on pursuing American interests abroad. I thank you for that.

We are fortunate to be working with President Pastrana and his Administration.

After strained relations with the Samper Administration, President Pastrana’s tenure offers the United States and the rest of the international community a golden

opportunity to work with Colombia in confronting these threats. President

Pastrana’s commitment to achieve peace is indisputable. He has also demonstrated

his willingness to root out narcotics trafficking while remaining firmly committed

to democratic values and principles.

Colombia is currently enduring critical societal, national security, and economic

problems that stem in large part from the drug trade and the internal conflict that

it finances. This situation has limited the Government of Colombia’s sovereignty in

large parts of the country. These areas have become the prime coca and opium

poppy producing zones. This problem directly affects the United States as drug trafficking and abuse cause enormous social, health and financial damage in our communities. Over 80 percent of the world’s supply of cocaine is grown, processed, or

transported through Colombia. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that

up to 75 percent of the heroin consumed on the East Coast of the United States

comes from Colombia—although Colombia produces less than 3 percent of the

world’s heroin.
17

Colombia’s national sovereignty is increasingly threatened by well-armed and

ruthless guerrillas, paramilitaries and the narcotrafficking interests to which they

are inextricably linked. Although the Government is not directly at risk, these

threats are slowly eroding the authority of the central government and depriving

it of the ability to govern in outlying areas. It is in these lawless areas, where the

guerrilla groups, paramilitaries and narcotics traffickers flourish, that the narcotics

industry is finding refuge. As a result, large swathes of Colombia are in danger of

being narco-districts for the production, transportation, processing, and marketing

of these substances.

These links between narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla and paramilitary

movements are well documented. We estimate that the FARC now has 7,000–11,000

active members, the ELN between 3,000–6,000, and that there are an estimated

5,000–7,000 paramilitary members. They participate in this narcotics connection.

Much of the recruiting success occurs in marginalized rural areas where the groups

can offer salaries much higher than those paid by legitimate employers. Estimates

of guerrilla income from narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities, such as kidnapping and extortion, are unreliable, but clearly exceed $100 million a year, and

could be far greater. Of this, we estimate some 30–40 percent comes directly from

the drug trade. Paramilitary groups also have clear ties to important narcotics traffickers, and paramilitary leaders have even publicly admitted their participation in

the drug trade.

This situation is worsened by the fact the Colombian economy is undergoing its

first recession in 25 years, and its deepest recession of the last 70 years. Real gross

domestic product is estimated to have fallen by 3.5 percent last year, the result of

external shocks, fiscal imbalances, and a further weakening of confidences related

to stepped up activity by insurgent groups. Unemployment has rocketed from under

9 percent in 1995 to about 20 percent in 1999, adding to the pool of unemployed

workers who can be drawn into the narcotics trade or into insurgent or paramilitary

groups. This recession has also sapped the Colombian government of resources to

address societal and political pressures, fight the narcotics trade, or respond to its

thirty-five year internal conflict.

Plan Colombia

The Government of Colombia has taken the initiative to confront the challenges

it faces with the development of a strategic approach to address its national challenges. The ‘‘Plan Colombia—Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and Strengthening of the

State’’ is an ambitious, but realistic, package of mutually reinforcing policies to revive Colombia’s battered economy, to strengthen the democratic pillars of the society, to promote the peace process and to eliminate ‘‘sanctuaries’’ for narcotics producers and traffickers. The strategy combines existing GOC policies with new initiatives to forge an integrated approach to resolving Colombia’s most pressing national

challenges.

The USG consulted closely on the key elements that make up the Plan with Colombian leaders and senior officials. It ties together many individual approaches and

strategies already being pursued in Colombia and elsewhere in the region. The Plan

itself was formulated, drafted and approved in Colombia by President Pastrana and

his team. Without its Colombian origins and its Colombian stamp, it would not have

the support and commitment of Colombia behind it. Colombian ownership and vigorous GOC implementation are essential to the future success of the Plan.

The USG shares the assessment that an integrated, comprehensive approach to

Colombia’s interlocking challenges holds the best promise of success. For example,

counternarcotics efforts will be most effective when combined with rigorous GOC

law enforcement/military cooperation, complementary alternative development programs and measures to assure human rights accountability. Similarly, promoting respect for the rule of law is just as essential for attracting foreign investors as it is

for securing a durable peace agreement.

I met with President Pastrana and his Plan Colombia team on February 13–14

to discuss the Plan’s implementation. To underscore the importance of integrated

planning, I brought a senior counterpart team including Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Harold Koh,

Assistant Secretary Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Julia Taft, Assistant Secretary Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; Brian Sheridan,

Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations Low Intensity Conflicts; Mary

Lee Warren, Deputy Assistant for the Attorney General; and William Brownfield,

Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs. We reviewed

with the Colombians a wide array of coordination and implementation issues. I believe we have launched a process of continuous bilateral discussions that will refine

and make more effective our implementation policies.
18

Before I describe for you our proposal to assist Plan Colombia, let me remind you

that the Plan cannot be understood simply in terms of a U.S. contribution. Plan Colombia is a $7.5 billion plan of which President Pastrana has said Colombia will

provide $4 billion of its scarce resources. He called on the international community

to provide the remaining $3.5 billion. In response to this request, the Administration is proposing a $1.6 billion assistance package to Colombia of new monies and

current funding. Our request for new monies includes a $954 million fiscal year

2000 emergency supplemental and $318 million in fiscal year 2001 funding. A significant share of our package will go to reduce the supply of drugs to the United

States by assisting the Government of Colombia in its efforts to limit the production, refinement, and transportation of cocaine and heroin. Building on current

funding of over $330 million in fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001, the Administration’s proposal includes an additional $818 million funded through international affairs programs (function 150) and $137 million through defense programs (function 050) in fiscal year 2000, and $256 million funded through function 150 and $62

million through function 050 in fiscal year 2001. We are looking to the European

Union and the International Financial Institutions to provide additional funding.

The Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, as well as the Agency

for International Development, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy all played major roles in proposing and crafting

the Plan Colombia two year support package. They will all play essential roles in

the interagency implementation effort.

The Administration’s proposal for support for Plan Colombia addresses the

breadth of Colombia’s challenges, and will help Colombia in its efforts to fight the

drug trade, foster peace, increase the rule of law, improve human rights, expand

economic development, and institute justice reform. Much of the assistance for social

assistance programs will come from the International Financial Institutions (IFI),

future potential bilateral donors and Colombia’s own funds.

There has been an explosive growth in the coca crop in Putumayo, in southern

Colombia and, to a lesser extent, in Norte de Santander, in the northeast. Putumayo

is an area that remains beyond the reach of the government’s coca eradication operations. Strong guerrilla presence and weak state authority have contributed to the

lawless situation in the Putumayo. As our success in Peru and Bolivia demonstrates, it is possible to combat narcotics production in the Andean region. This

package will aid the Government of Colombia in their plans to launch a comprehensive step-by-step effort in Putumayo and Caqueta to counter the coca explosion, including eradication, interdiction, and alternative development over the next several

years.

The push into drug producing southern Colombia will give greater sovereignty

over that region to the GOC, allowing the CNP to eradicate drug cultivation and

destroy cocaine laboratories. Increased interdiction will make the entire drug business more dangerous for traffickers and less profitable. Meanwhile, funding for Plan

Colombia will support internally displaced people with emergency relief in the short

term and will fund alternative economic development to provide licit sources of income in the long term. USAID and DOJ will fund programs to improve human

rights conditions and justice institutions giving the Colombian people greater access

to the benefits of democratic institutions.

Our counternarcotics package for Colombia was designed with the benefit of

knowing what has worked in Bolivia and Peru. With USG assistance, both countries

have been able to reduce dramatically coca production. This was achieved through

successful efforts to re-establish government control and bring government services

to former drug producing safe havens. Both Bolivia and Peru combined vigorous

eradication and interdiction efforts and with incentives for small farmers to switch

to legal crops. We aim to help Colombia accomplish a similar record of success.

In doing this, we cannot, and will not, abandon our allies in Bolivia and Peru.

Their successes are real and inspired with 66–73 percent reductions of coca production in each country. But they are also tenuous against the seductive dangers of the

narcotics trade. This is why our Plan Colombia support package includes $46 million for regional interdiction efforts and another $30 million for development in

Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. These countries deserve our continued support to solidify

the gains they have striven so hard to obtain. We are not content to allow cultivation and production of narcotics to simply be displaced from one Andean country to

another.

Components of U.S. Assistance Package

The proposed U.S. assistance has five components:

Boosting Governing Capacity and Respect for Human Rights.—The Administration

proposes funding $93 million over the next two years to fund a number of programs
19

administered by the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Departments of State and Justice to strengthen human rights and administration of justice

institutions. Specific initiatives include increasing protection of human rights NGOs,

supporting human rights NGOs’ information and education programs, creating and

training special units of prosecutors and judicial police to investigate human rights

cases involving GOC officials, and training public defenders and judges. We propose

to allocate $15 million to support GOC and NGO entities specifically focused on protecting human rights. Boosting governing capacity also includes training and support for GOC anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and anti-kidnapping personnel.

Expansion of Counternarcotics Operations into Southern Colombia.—The world’s

greatest expansion in narcotics cultivation is occurring in insurgent-dominated

southern Colombia. With this package, the Administration proposes to fund $600

million over the next two years to help train and equip two additional special counternarcotics battalions (CNBN) which will move into southern Colombia to protect

the Colombian National Police (CNP) as they carry out their counter-drug mission.

The program will provide 30 Blackhawk helicopters and 33 Huey helicopters to

make the CNBNs air mobile so they can access this remote and undeveloped region

of Colombia. It will also provide intelligence for the Colombian CNBNs. These troops

will accompany and backup police eradication and interdiction efforts. They will also

provide secure conditions for the implementation of aid programs, including alternative development and relocation assistance, to those impacted by the ending of

illegal narcotics cultivation.

Alternative Economic Development.—The Administration includes new funding of

$145 million over the next two years to provide economic alternatives for small

farmers who now grow coca and poppy, and to increase local governments’ ability

to respond to the needs of their people. As interdiction and eradication make narcotics farming less profitable, these programs will assist communities in the transition to licit economic activity.

More Aggressive Interdiction.—Coca and cocaine are produced in a relatively small

area of Colombia, while the Central American/Caribbean/Eastern Pacific transit

zone is approximately the size of the United States. Enhancing Colombia’s ability

to interdict air, water-borne, and road trafficking is essential to decreasing the price

paid to farmers for coca leaf and to decreasing the northward flow of drugs. The

Administration proposes to spend $340 million on interdiction. The program includes funding over the next two years for radar upgrades to give Colombia a greater ability to intercept traffickers, and also to provide intelligence to allow the Colombian police and military to respond quickly to narcotics activity. It will support the

United States forward operating locations in Manta, Ecuador, which will be used

for narcotics related missions. These funds will also provide $46 million to enhance

interdiction efforts in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador to prevent narcotics traffickers and

growers from moving into neighboring countries.

Assistance for the Colombian National Police (CNP).—The Administration proposes additional funding of $96 million over the next two years to enhance the

CNP’s ability to eradicate coca and poppy fields. This request builds upon our fiscal

year 1999 counternarcotics assistance of $158 million to the CNP. Our additional

assistance will upgrade existing aircraft, purchase additional spray aircraft, provide

secure bases for increased operations in the coca-growing centers, and provide more

intelligence on the narcotics traffickers.

All U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia will continue to be in the form

of goods and services. The counternarcotics components of Plan Colombia will be implemented by the Colombian police and military, and there are no plans to commit

U.S. forces to implement militarily any aspect of this Plan. On the ground, our military assistance will be limited to training vetted counternarcotics units through the

temporary assignment of carefully picked U.S. military trainers.

Human Rights Dimension

We have also strongly supported the efforts of the Pastrana Administration to advance the protection of human rights and to prosecute those who abuse them. Complicity by elements of Colombia’s security forces with the right wing militia groups

remains a serious problem, although the GOC has taken important steps in holding

senior military and police officials accountable for participation in human rights violations. Since assuming office in August of 1998, President Pastrana has demonstrated his Government’s commitment to protecting human rights by the dismissal of four generals and numerous mid-level officers and NCO’s for collaboration

with paramilitaries or failure to confront them aggressively. There have also been

repeated government declarations that collaboration between members of security

forces and paramilitaries will not be tolerated. More must be done, however.
20

U.S. assistance to Colombian military and police forces is provided strictly in accordance with Section 563 of the Fiscal Year 2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act—the so-called Leahy Amendment. No assistance is provided to any unit

of the security forces for which we have credible evidence of commission of gross

violations of human rights, unless the Secretary is able to certify that the Government of Colombia has taken effective measures to bring those responsible to justice.

We are firmly committed to the Leahy Amendment, and have a rigorous process in

place to screen those units being considered for assistance.

The Government of Colombia also acknowledges the urgent need to improve physical security and protection for human rights workers and the NGOs to which they

belong. Currently, the GOC has dedicated $5.6 million to provide physical protection

to approximately 80 human rights activists and their offices. The Plan outlines

measures to strengthen the Human Rights Ombudsman’s office, as well as to establish a Permanent National Commission on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.

One of the most serious problems in Colombia, a ‘‘silent crisis’’, is the plight of

its internally displaced persons (IDPs). The scope of the problem is enormous. The

vicious conflict between paramilitaries and guerrillas is largely responsible for the

forced displacement of Colombians. As many as 300,000 persons, mostly women and

children, were driven from their homes in 1998 by rural violence. NGOs report that

Colombia has the fourth largest population of displaced persons in the world. The

USG provided, in fiscal year 1999, $5.8 million to the International Committee of

the Red Cross’s (ICRC) Western Hemisphere operations, with an additional $3 million earmarked for Colombia. Additionally, $4.7 million was contributed to the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) general fund for the

Western Hemisphere, a portion of which was used for institutional capacity building

in Colombia. Responsibility for assistance to IDPs has been assigned to the Colombian government’s Red de Solidaridad (Solidarity Network) which will work closely

with the U.N. system, NGOs, and other Colombian agencies to coordinate services

for IDPs throughout the country.

Peace Process

President Pastrana has made bringing an end to Colombia’s civil strife through

a peace agreement with the various insurgent groups a central goal of his Administration. Pastrana believes, and the United States Government agrees, that ending

the civil conflict and eliminating all of that conflict’s harmful side effects is central

to solving Colombia’s multi-faceted problems.

A peace agreement would stabilize the nation, help Colombia’s economy to recover

and allow for further improvement in the protection of human rights. A successful

peace process would also restore Colombian government authority and control in the

coca-growing region. We hope the peace negotiations going on now between the GOC

and the FARC and the GOC and the ELN prove successful. We applaud the Colombian Government’s determination to press the guerrillas to cease their practices of

kidnapping, forced recruitment of children, and attacks against the civilian population.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, the Administration has been pleased by

the bipartisan support from both houses that share our concern for Colombia’s future. At this moment, Colombia is a partner who shares our counternarcotics concerns and possesses the will to execute the needed reforms and operations. Our

challenge, as a neighbor and a partner, is to identify ways in which the U.S. Government can assist Colombia in resolving these problems. Concerted action now

could help over time to stem the illicit narcotics flow to the United States. Action

now can contribute to a peaceful resolution of a half-century of conflict. Action now

could return Colombia to its rightful historical place as one of the hemisphere’s

strongest democracies.
(21)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES WILHELM, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S.

SOUTHERN COMMAND

Senator MCCONNELL. General, go right ahead.

General WILHELM. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the

Committee, I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you Plan

Colombia, the Colombia Supplemental Request and our past,

present and future initiatives to assist Colombia and its neighbors

in their struggle against illegal drugs and the threats the drug

trade poses to their societies and to our own.

The counter-drug struggle provides the underpinning for most of

our military engagement activities in the Andean region. With regard to—to Colombia, I am encouraged by the progress that is

being made.

COUNTERNARCOTICS BATTALION

During 1999, we created—we created the first of the Colombia

counternarcotics battalions. This 931-member unit is composed of

professional soldiers, all of whom have been vetted to avoid human

rights abusers.

The battalion has been trained by members of the U.S. Seventh

Special Forces Group and is designed to interact with and provide

security for elements of the Colombian National Police during

counter-drug operations.

Tactical mobility has long been the Achilles heel of Colombia’s

Armed Forces. This battalion will be supported by an aviation element consisting initially of 18 refurbished UH–1N helicopters provided through our cooperative effort involving INL at our State Department and the U.S. Southern Command representing the Department of Defense (DOD).

These new units will focus their operations in the southern departments of Colombia, which have been the sites of recent wholesale increases in drug cultivation and production.

To assure that combined police and military units conducting

counterdrug operations have the best, most recent and most accurate intelligence, we have worked closely with Colombia while developing The Colombia Joint Intelligence Center, or COJIC as it is

commonly referred to, at the Tres Esquinas Military Complex that

abuts the southern departments. This computerized facility attained its initial operating capability on 18 December of last year.

Deliberately and without fanfare, these new organizations have

commenced operations. Their two initial forays into drug cultivation and production areas near Tres Esquinas resulted in arrests,

seizures of drugs, destruction of laboratories, confiscation of precursor chemicals and identification and subsequent eradication of

new cultivation sites.
22

ACTION PLAN

The initiatives that I have just described, we refer to collectively

as Action Plan 99. The follow-on effort, Action Plan 2000 builds on

these first-phase efforts.

If—if additional funds are provided during the coming year, we

will build two additional counternarcotics battalion and a brigade

headquarters.

With a well-trained and a fully equipped counternarcotics brigade consisting of more than 3,000 professional soldiers, the Colombian Armed Forces will be prepared to join forces with Air Mobile

elements of the National Police and reassert control over the narcotics-rich departments of southern Colombia.

HELICOPTERS

Continuing to focus on mobility and intelligence, we will provide

15 additional UH–1N helicopters, rounding out the aviation battalion.

The UH–1Ns will ultimately be replaced by UH–60 Blackhawks,

which have the range, payload, high altitude capability and survivability required by Colombia’s Armed Forces to cripple the narcotics industry and bring the remainder of the country under government control.

On the intelligence side, we will continue to develop and refine

the Colombia Joint Intelligence Center and pursue a broad range

of initiatives to improve our interdiction capabilities.

FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS

A key component of the interdiction plan, which was mentioned

by Senator Stevens, is first-phase development of the forward operating location at Manta, Ecuador.

As I had previously testified before Senator Stevens and Senator

Inouye’s Committee, this test—this facility is urgently required to

replace the capabilities that we lost when we left Panama and

closed Howard Air Force Base.

Manta’s importance stems from the fact that it is the sole operating site that will give us the operational reach we need to cover

all of Colombia, all of Peru and the coca cultivation areas of Bolivia.

Looking beyond the year 2000, we have engaged the services of

the Military Professional Research Institute (MPRI); hand-picked

and highly experienced MPRI analysts will assess Colombia’s security force requirements beyond the counterdrug battalions and

their supporting organizations.

The contract tasks MPRI to develop an operating concept for the

Armed Forces force structures to implement the concept and supporting and related doctrine.

In recent months, I have become increasingly concerned about

Colombia’s neighbors. The adverse social, economic and political

conditions spawned wholly or in part by drug trafficking and the

other corrupting activities it breeds are weakening the fabric of democracies in other nations in the region.

For this reason, while I endorse a Colombia-centric approach to

the drug problem, I caution against a Colombia-exclusive approach.
23

As we assist Colombia in making important strides to reassert

its sovereignty over its territory and to curb growing cultivation,

we should also take appropriate steps to preserve the noteworthy

success—successes achieved by Peru and Bolivia. And we should be

sensitive to emerging needs in the bordering countries of Ecuador,

Panama, Venezuela and Brazil.

This is by every measurement a regional problem. As such, I

think we must pursue regional solutions.

In summary, I am convinced that the Supplemental Funding Initiative is an important step in the right direction and not a minute

too soon.

To seize the initiative in a struggle, which according to the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, claims as many

as 52,000 lives per year, which Ambassador Pickering has already

mentioned, I urge speedy approval of the Colombia Supplemental

and increased support for the other nations in the region.

I will be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, General.

We are going to have 5-minute questioning rounds. And let—let

me just begin with a—a kind of overview statement of the last few

years.

From 1985 to 1992, why do we not just call these the ‘‘Just-sayno’’ years—if you would put this chart up?

Senator MCCONNELL. During the ‘‘Just-say-no’’ years, both the

production and use of drugs in this country declined. Then in 1992,

about the time the President when asked with regard to inhaling,

if he would have—had—if he had it to do over again, would he

have inhaled, and he said, ‘‘Sure, if I could.’’

We have the—those years in which both the production and the

use—if you could hold that up a little higher—continues to go up.

Now, excuse my skepticism, gentlemen, but here we are in an

election year in 2000. And the Administration comes up here with

a massive request, which I must say parenthetically, I am likely to

support with some revisions, but where have you been for the last

7 years?

Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador PICKERING. Let me say that the results in both Bolivia and Peru, some of which you already cited, show you some of

where we have been for the last 7 years or the last whatever years.

In the last 3 years, the Banzer Administration through real dedication has reduced cocaine production 50 to 60 percent, and that

is a conservative figure. Some say more like 70. That similar reduction levels have been——

Senator MCCONNELL. OK. You are—you are taking credit for

what happened in Peru, are you?

Ambassador PICKERING. We are, for some of it, because we had

provided assistance for it. But you are entirely right. It does not

work if the countries themselves are not prepared to gear up and

do the job.

And that is precisely what we compliment President Banzer and

President Fujimori for doing. It is not something the United States

would do alone, but it is something we can make a major contribution to.
24

Now, both of those successes are now being applied to Colombia,

but we share with you the concern, the balloon effect, that successes in Bolivia and Peru have helped to push some of this problem in the direction of Colombia.

Colombia is there. Why have we not done more in Colombia sooner? Well, we have done a lot with the Colombia National Police, but

you and I know that until 1 year ago, there was a president by the

name of Samper in Colombia, whose least interest was in cooperating and taking that personal responsibility or the national responsibility to work on drugs.

And so as a result, what has changed in Colombia is two things:

A rapid increase in production but a new president and a new team

that are willing to work on this particular problem, the way President Banzer and President Fujimori have led their countries to

work on.

So I believe, in fact, we now have a successful series of ingredients in place to work on this particular problem, and obviously you

know and I know that it takes two. It takes the country concerned,

as well as the willingness on the part of the United States to do

that. And that is why we are before you today.

Senator MCCONNELL. Well, I am a little more—and I am not as

concerned about their President as I am ours. I mean, the question

is: Where has this Administration been for the last 7 years on this

problem?

We see the statistics. They are off the charts. Now, you are—you

are telling me, Mr. Ambassador, that—that we did—we were making a significant request before this year. Well, I am looking here

at——

Ambassador PICKERING. I am not. I am saying that, in fact, there

have been significant successes within the requests that we had

made before this year——

Senator MCCONNELL. But—but there—but—but there——

Ambassador PICKERING (continuing). That there was a reason

why we did not go into Colombia.

Senator MCCONNELL. But in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, you—

you gave me a—a rationale for not making a huge request for Colombia before. But you were seeking to take credit for what has

happened in Peru and Bolivia and Ecuador.

These figures just pale in comparison to what has been dropped

on us here in an election year in an attempt obviously to—to try

to obscure what is the—the—the weakest imaginable record on—

on fighting drugs that you could conceive of over the last 7 years.

General, you are not in politics here, but you are also sitting at

the table. I wonder if you have some rationale for why all of a sudden, right now, we are getting a massive request like this to go

after a problem that—that—that—that the chart indicates has

been worsening over the last 7 years.

Ambassador PICKERING. With all respect, Mr. Chairman, the reason why we are now up with a very large request is both the character of the problem in Colombia, after many years of the Samper

Administration, a guerrilla movement and now a paramilitary

movement that are deriving enormous benefits, and so they are

seeking to spread this as widely as possible.
25

The unlimited capacity they have had to transport these drugs

through Colombia and the change in Colombian Administration, I

think, all produced very clear and self-evident reasons why we

should be putting a significant amount of money into Colombia now

to deal with this issue.

Senator MCCONNELL. Well, I—as I said, I may well support this

with modifications. The—the question remains, and you have done

the best you can with a question that simply cannot be answered,

which is: Where has this Administration been for the—for the last

7 years?

The—the truth of the matter is there has been little or no interest in the war on drugs. And both the production and the use of

it—the use of it here in the United States, the—the figures are indisputable.

Now, during his visit, President Pastrana made a commitment to

break the links between the military and paramilitary groups to

assure any soldier engaged in human rights abuses is brought before a civilian court.

Unfortunately, a panel known as the Supreme Judicial Council

continues to have the right to intervene and direct that cases be

removed from the civilian courts and considered only by the—by

the military courts.

The record shows the military justice system invariably drops

charges or fails to prosecute serious cases of abuses. I know there

are a few officers who have lost their positions, but that falls far

short of appropriate legal action.

Now, I understand that President Pastrana could issue an executive order which would forbid this Council from undermining investigation and prosecution of cases of human rights abuse. He could

do that.

I am considering language which conditions assistance on just

such an executive order. And I wonder, Mr. Ambassador, how you

would feel about that kind of stipulation in the bill?

Ambassador PICKERING. I believe that President Pastrana will

keep his commitment to us and move in that particular direction.

I think as a result, it makes it unnecessary to condition the legislation. And many countries around the world find it easier to take

initiatives than to be told by us exactly what they have to do.

They are all in the common interest and they are moving ahead.

And as you have said, President Pastrana has already begun to

take actions in dealing with this nexus between the military and

the paramilitaries, and I believe he will continue to do so.

Within the last 2 days, two more paramilitaries who occupy significant positions in their structure have been arrested in Colombia.

I also believe that the President is very serious when he has not

only relieved individuals but looked into the record of finding ways

to bring those individuals to justice if the evidence and the information is available to do so.

When I was there last week, I talked to him, as I know General

McCaffrey is talking to him this week, about taking that step that

he has committed to take, to us, to move these cases into the civilian courts.
26

Senator MCCONNELL. So the answer is no, you—you would oppose that language.

Ambassador PICKERING. I would.

Senator MCCONNELL. Yes. One quick question before going to

Senator Leahy. Mr. Ambassador and General, there is strong evidence that the paramilitaries with known ties to the traditional

Armed Forces are also profiting from the drug trade.

Although you acknowledge the paramilitaries are a problem, I

have heard no concrete discussion of how you plan to target their

trafficking or break their ties to the regular military. What should

the Pastrana government be doing to break that tie?

Ambassador PICKERING. Would you like me to start with that, if

I may?

We believe that the paramilitaries are deeply involved in the

drug trade. And that is only one of a number of reasons why they

need to be opposed and why President Pastrana should move

against them.

When I was in Colombia last week, it was made clear that in the

southern area, on which we intend to target the newly trained

units and to use them as a basis for reestablishing the government

authority that is necessary to eliminate the coca production in that

area either through fumigation or eradication by the people themselves, the paramilitaries have increased their strength, increased

their position, and increased their control and operation of the

trade.

So they are directly in the line of the government advance. To

be able to do this—and there is nothing that I have seen that in

any way, eliminates their role or indeed the effort to do that.

We have as part of our proposal before you a continuation and

expansion of a program we have undertaken with President

Pastrana to deal with the ever-present and very difficult question

of corruption.

It is also a serious problem in Colombia. I think that as you look

around there is not any problem that anybody else has that Colombia does not seem to have in one way or another. But this is important and this is within and part of the budget proposals that we

have before you.

And President Pastrana has also made it clear that he is committed in moving in this area.

PARAMILITARIES

General WILHELM. Senator McConnell, if I could pick up where

the Ambassador left off, I think there can be absolutely no doubt

that the paramilitaries are directly involved in the narcotics trafficking enterprise.

I think we can deduce that from their own admission. They have

openly acknowledged their involvements and their links with drug

traffickers.

In terms of the Colombian government’s approach to address this

linkage between the paramilitaries—the paramilitaries and the

narco-traffickers, I think it has been clearly defined by the Chief

of Defense, the Commander of the Armed Forces, General Tapias.

Sir, General Tapias has developed a 6-year strategy, which supports Plan Colombia. This is the overarching Colombia Military
27

Strategy. It is a regional strategy. The first 2 years target the

southern departments where the majority of cultivation and production takes place. Years 3 and 4 target the——

Senator MCCONNELL. Sorry to interrupt you, but how does that

help, if you still have a safe haven the size of Switzerland?

COLOMBIA’S STRATEGY

General WILHELM. OK, sir. You are discussing the Despeje region, which has—was created to provide a negotiating space with

the FARC.

Sir, the Dispeja region is not a major drug cultivation or production area in Colombia. Estimates of the total amount of coca being

grown there hover around the 10 to 12 percent range of the total

national area being cultivated.

When we consider that in the context of the growing regions in

Putumayo and Caqueta provinces, the two southern departments,

it is probable that we would target the vast majority of our efforts

to Putumayo and Caqueta anyway. It is not a primary drug cultivation area.

Sir, if I could return very briefly to General Tapias’s strategy, the

3rd and 4th years would target the central portion of the country.

And during years 5 and 6, General Tapias would then seek to reassert control over the rest of Colombia’s national land mass.

In the process, he would seek to reduce drug production by 50

percent. That strategy is actually more ambitious than the goals

stated in our own national drug control strategy, where we say that

by the year 2002, we would like to reduce the amount of narcotics

flowing through the transit zone by 10 percent and produced in the

Source Zone by 15 percent; and by the year 2007, reduce the

amount in the Transit Zone by 20 percent and in the Source Zone

by 30 percent. General Tapias’s figure, again, is 50 percent.

In putting his strategy together, General Tapias—and I discussed this in great detail during many visits. I average about a

visit every 6 weeks to Colombia. We agreed that there were two

ways that he could go with this, and these were his decisions.

He could target two modes of the apparatus that is visiting these

ills on Colombia. He could take on the paramilitaries and the insurgents directly. This would involve primarily targeting the fronts

and the mobile columns of the FARC and the 5,000 to 7,000

paramilitaries.

That would result in pitched battles. I think history proves that

it is very, very difficult to resolve insurgency strictly on the battlefield. Insurgents tend to fight at times and places of their own

choosing when the advantage is clearly theirs. We learned that in

10 years in Vietnam.

Instead, he went an alternate path, which was to target the

FARCs and the paramilitaries’ primary line of sustainment, the

narcotics trafficking industry.

We know that fully one half of the FARC fronts derive their principal financial support from their links with narcotraffickers.

The other insurgency, the ELN, about 25 percent of their operating elements have their—that same linkage.
28

The Tapias strategy involves attacking their lines of sustainment

and logistics, drying up the funds available from narcotrafficking

industry, which then in turn, I think, would disable the insurgency.

So that was his approach. That is the Colombian government’s

approach. I believe it will work.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, General.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should note for the record when we talk about whether the Administration has done anything or not, this Administration has

spent far, far more money on law enforcement than any Administration in history in combating drugs.

They have done it at the state, local and Federal level. I mention

that just so the record will be clear, and we have steadily increased

our aid to Colombia.

I would also note that law enforcement does not seem to be the

answer. We build a lot more prisons than we do schools in this

country to combat drugs, but it does not seem to do a great deal. ‘‘Just say no’’ may be the answer, but I doubt it. I will not embarrass everybody by asking those, Republicans and Democrats alike

in the room, who have never used drugs illegally to stand up.

Now, Mr. Pickering, what I do worry about, is—just like with

some of the money we spend on law enforcement, which has not

done a great deal of good other than giving us the largest prison

population of just about any country in the world—it looks to me

like we are embarking on an open-ended multi-million dollar commitment without benchmarks to say whether we are successful or

not successful.

I think of our past experience in Central America in the 1980s

when we spent billions of dollars without anybody saying whether

we were ahead or not.

Now, you said the Colombian Army is doing its best to purge

itself of human rights violators. Well, I see only about 15 or so

Army officers in 10 years that have been either prosecuted or

purged compared to, I think, thousands in the National Police.

Yesterday, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting

links between the Colombian Army and the paramilitary groups,

saying what a lot of reputable journalists have been saying for a

very long time.

When I asked the State Department a couple of years ago about

these links, they said there was no evidence to support it. Then

about a month ago, the State Department said the Colombian

Army has made a lot of progress severing these links for which

they had no evidence before.

The links are there. Why should we not condition any aid on the

Army’s assurances that its members who violate human rights or

aid or abet the paramilitaries will be prosecuted, and prosecuted in

a civilian court where they are not protected?

Ambassador PICKERING. That is what we have said. Of course, as

you know, Senator, and that is what we are pushing to get accomplished. It is, I think, important to note that the military record

has improved markedly.

Their responsibility has diminished into low single figures in the

reports of others for human rights violations. It is also, I think, important to note that the bulk of the evidence relied upon by the ex-
29

cellent human rights report came from Colombia investigators

themselves, which I think is a real advance. The fact that people

at their own peril are able, in the Colombia government, to investigate these activities and——

Senator LEAHY. But generally——

Ambassador PICKERING. Such important reports is a significant

forward step; and it leads, I think, to the basis for the next steps,

which you and we both share, which is the dismissal and——

Senator LEAHY. But——

Ambassador PICKERING (continuing). Prosecution of people so involved.

Senator LEAHY. As far as the excellent human rights report you

just referred to, General Tapias said yesterday that Human Rights

Watch conspires with drug traffickers to defame the Army. This

does not show that this commitment is foremost in his mind.

Ambassador PICKERING. I—I have not seen the report from General Tapias, but I have talked to President Pastrana, who happily

is still Commander in Chief in Colombia.

Senator LEAHY. Well, I hope so. As I said before, I have a great

deal of respect for President Pastrana, as I do for you, and for General Wilhelm.

But I am worried that some people down there may give lip service, but then when pushed to actually do something, are unwilling

to do it. And that is what worries me.

Let me ask General Wilhelm. General, if General Tapias says

that Human Rights Watch conspires with drug traffickers to defame the Army, does that show—or does that say anything about

his own commitment to human rights?

HUMAN RIGHTS

General WILHELM. Senator Leahy, I have not talked to General

Tapias since the report was announced, but I have talked to him

about this subject on many occasions.

I know him well. I am personally convinced that he is absolutely

committed to reducing these abuses. So rather than engage in generalities, let me give you a couple of specifics.

About a month ago when I was down in Bogota, General Tapias

gave me the—a list of 400 people by name, paramilitaries who had

been arrested, detained, turned over for judicial action.

Senator LEAHY. To the civilian court or to the military courts?

General WILHELM. Some of both, sir, some of both.

Senator LEAHY. The reason I ask is that military courts have

generally not done anything.

General WILHELM. Sir, that is—I think—I cannot really comment

precisely on the statistics concerning judicial impunity, but I have

heard the same thing.

But in an operational sense, the point is that they have undertaken these operations. And as a matter again of operational fact,

more than 100 operations were mounted by the security forces in

the last year against paramilitary organizations.

I cannot confirm it right now, but I received a report this morning that the Colombian Marines had mounted an operation against

paramilitaries near Salado, one of the recent sites of paramilitary
30

atrocities and that they had killed 2 and had captured 11

paramilitaries.

I am personally convinced that there are not institutional linkages between the Armed Forces of Colombia and the paramilitaries. Having said that, I cannot rule out local collusion.

Senator LEAHY. General and Ambassador, one of the problems

we have in this Committee, on both sides of the aisle—there is

enormous respect for both of you, respect that you have both

earned in your long and distinguished careers—is that we have to

rely on you, both of you, to be as careful in the scrutiny of what

is going on here as anybody. Because there is a concern among

many of us—and this has nothing to do with political ideology—

that we are buying ourselves into a never-ending tar-baby, where

ultimately we do not stop drugs and we tarnish our own reputation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STEVENS [presiding]. Thank you very much.

President Pastrana came and visited with the Committee. We

were very pleased at that and have a very high respect for him and

the changes he is trying to bring about in Colombia.

However, in the visits I have just made to the two commands I

mentioned, I found out that Colombia law prohibits sending high

school graduates or above into combat.

Now, you say you—they are training the finest soldiers in the

world. We do not train people for combat unless they have high

school degrees.

BACHILLERES

General, how can you support your statement to us that they are

the finest trained people that you have seen?

General WILHELM. OK. Senator Stevens, all right, you are making direct reference to the bachilleres, and that is correct.

As best I have been able to determine within the structure of the

Colombian Armed Forces, there have been somewhere in the neighborhood of 30,000 young Colombians who by virtue of their educational level have been exempted from military service that involved direct combat operations.

Senator STEVENS. Are you training them for this combat?

General WILHELM. Sir, we are training other—no, sir. We are not

training bachilleres, if I——

Senator STEVENS. Well, they are training conscripts, and they

stay for 12 months to 18 months, I am told. They are conscripts.

General WILHELM. No, sir.

Senator STEVENS. Sir, am I informed incorrectly that they are

not conscripts that are being trained in these Army units?

General WILHELM. The young Colombian soldiers who are being

trained in the counterdrug battalions are changed—are required to

change their status from—from conscript to professional volunteer

soldiers before entering the units.

Senator STEVENS. And they—they all—what about those who—

that have the high school diplomas?

General WILHELM. All right, sir. If I could continue with my——
31

Senator STEVENS. I have only got 5 minutes, General. I hate to

be short with you, but I am going to go vote here in a few minutes.

What about the ones that are—have the high school diplomas?

General WILHELM. OK. This is a part of the military structure

that Colombia is moving right now to reform and have been moving

on since Mr. Rodrigo Lloreda was the Minister of Defense.

Senator STEVENS. All right.

General WILHELM. One of their proposals is to—is to eliminate

the bachilleres, convert a portion of that 30,000-member structure

to professional soldiers and upgrade the quality of their Armed

Forces across the board and eliminate that particular segment of

the Armed Forces, which I think we all agree, Colombians and U.S.

friends, is a non-productive segment of the military.

Senator STEVENS. All right. Let us go on to another subject here.

On the Defense side, this request asks for $439 million to refurbish and support the helicopters. I am told $85 million of that will

refurbish helicopters; $350 million is to buy Blackhawks.

In our own Army, we are now—in the Army, the National Guard

and Marines flying older UH–1s that—than this model UH–60.

It would be much more cost-effective to continue to modify the

UH–1s. Why are we buying these Blackhawks, if this is the commencement of a program where we need the others immediately?

UH–60S

General WILHELM. First of all, sir, the Colombians considered

four options as a means to address their mobility needs.

They considered the Blackhawk option. They considered a mix of

Bell products, which would have been remanufactured UH–1s and

the AH–1W gunship. They considered a Russian option that involved MI17s and MI35s and Carmine 50s. And they considered an

option involving European aircraft built around the Augusta 129.

The Blackhawk option was felt to be best for the near and long

term for some of the reasons that I cited in my opening statement,

but——

Senator STEVENS. I agree with that too, but we are—this Committee is putting up money for our Army, our National Guard, our

Reserve to refurbish existing helicopters. What you are saying is

this operation is going to be better equipped than our own military.

General WILHELM. Well, sir, there are some limitations on what

we could do with the UH–1 inventory. To produce the Huey 2 aircraft that I think you are referring to, one of the first ingredients

is a serviceable UH–1, normally UH–1H base frame to work on.

Our inventory of those aircraft is just about exhausted. And for

the long term, when we look at life cycle maintenance and life cycle

cost, a single family of aircraft in two configurations armed in troop

carriers will be more economical for the long-term.

That is what led to the Blackhawk decision. And as I mentioned,

sir, the characteristics of their operating area, the ranges required,

the altitudes needed to confront, after the coca problem is solved,

the heroin problem.

Senator STEVENS. I have to tell you, both of you, I join Senator

Leahy to say I have great respect for both of you and in your careers.
32

But we are dealing with an industry—I am told to ask for these

figures. These are estimates that—that on the drug traffic, U.S.

traffickers get about $80 billion to $100 billion from this industry,

this drug industry. And the Colombian traffickers get $3 to $6 billion a year. The FARC guerrillas get $100 to $600 million a year.

I am told that those insurgents do not have a restriction on not

having people who have got higher degrees in their midst, that

they are probably the best equipped, the best trained, even to their

modernization in terms of communications and command and control, they are probably the best in South America today.

Now, we have got one—we are going to equip one brigade to take

on what I was told is about 25,000 of those insurgents.

Now, my one question to you is: Who goes in if this thing blows

up? Who goes in if those hand-held weapons knock down these helicopters, and we have a bunch of American-trained Colombian

forces right there in the midst of these guerrillas, these insurgents?

Who is going to get them out, General?

General WILHELM. Senator Stevens, first I need to clarify one

point. The counterdrug brigade does not target the insurgents. It

targets the——

Senator STEVENS. I understand.

General WILHELM (continuing). Narcotraffickers who support it.

Senator STEVENS. Do you think they are just going there—and

let me—25,000 trained insurgents are going to sit there and let

them pick off—cherry pick the operating arm of the drug traffickers? Oh, come on now. Who is going to go in if this blows up?

General WILHELM. That is——

Senator STEVENS. There are 800 people on the ground. Tell me

this is not a Vietnam again.

VIETNAM

General WILHELM. Sir, it is not a Vietnam again. I spent 1965,

1966, 1969 and 1970 in Vietnam, and I think I will know it when

I see it happening again. When I go to Colombia, I do not feel a

quagmire sucking at my boots.

Senator STEVENS. I am——

General WILHELM. I think we have a good——

Senator STEVENS. The guerrillas control 70 percent of the land

mass now.

General WILHELM. No, sir.

Senator STEVENS. How much would you say?

General WILHELM. Between 40 and 50 percent, and I would not

say the guerrillas control it. I would say that the government does

not control it. It is contested territory.

Senator STEVENS. Well, that was Vietnam, was it not?

General WILHELM. No, sir.

Senator STEVENS. Well, we have got to go vote, but I have to tell

you, if you do not get the drift, we are probably your best supporters in the Senate on this issue.

I want to help this President, but I do want to see a plan come

to us that is survivable and tells us what is going to happen if

something goes wrong. I do not see this here. I really do not.

And I think we are going to have stand in recess.
33

General WILHELM. Senator, I know that our time is short,

but——

Senator STEVENS. I know, General. We have to vote. Thank you

very much.

COLOMBIAN PILOTS

General WILHELM. They will become the pilots in command, and

then we will back fill the loveseats with new Colombian pilots. To

get this program underway and to really operationalize a plan in

Colombia in a responsive way, contract pilots are the right way to

go.

There are only three U.S. contract pilots involved in this, and

there is very, very clear guidance that they will not participate in

tactical missions. They oversee, what we call, safety and standardization to make sure that the training of all the flight crews is conducted to our standards and that at the end of the day, we emerge

with well-qualified and capable air crews. But we have, I think, a

good, progressive program that will fill those cockpits with Colombian aviators in a very efficient and short period of time.

Senator MCCONNELL [presiding]. Thank you, General. And finally, Ambassador Pickering, you know, we certainly agree that

Colombia has a horrible problem. It came about in part because of

the aggressive efforts in Peru and Bolivia, which achieved some

level of success. And so I get back to, in closing here, with sort of

how we began.

Are you concerned—I guess you are not or you would not be here, but ease my concern that this $600 million hammer on Colombia

does not just make a problem re-emerge in other countries and reassure me that somehow in all of this, there is a regional strategy

that deals with the entire area.

Ambassador PICKERING. There is, Senator. And there is a regional component in the plan. I, frankly, would have hoped it

would have been larger, but we all operate under constraints and

you know what those are as well as I do. But there is a regional

piece, obviously, because of the pressure being put on the problem

in Colombia. We do not want that to move back to Peru or Bolivia

or Ecuador.

So, there is an early piece, I will put it that way. At the same

time, we are building up to deal with the problem, and we are talking in the build-up in Colombia. Not in days or weeks or months

even, but probably years. The General cited some benchmark figures out 2 to 5 years from now.

But we do think we need to have an immediate and important

input of additional funding over and above the base, which they already received, to continue their activities now for Bolivia, Peru,

Ecuador and perhaps others. And I was just down to the region

and talked to a number of people about it. We all share exactly

your concern.

There is a regional strategy. The regional strategy is to fight this

on a regional basis. To increase cooperation. To make sure that all

the left hands and all the right hands know what is going on and

are working together to try to deal with this problem; and that our

funding assistance gets targeted first where the problem is worst,

but then next is second order of priority to where it might go.
34

And the Andean Region, unfortunately, has the climate, the disparities in economic status and all the other things that you know

that make it a convenient and very productive area for this kind

of activity. So, we have to work it on a regional basis.

General WILHELM. Now, Senator McConnell, might I add just a

couple of comments to the Ambassador’s response? We are very

sensitive to that, as well, so the question is what next. And in the

military, we always look at a cycle that we call action, reaction and

counteraction. We always want to control the first one and the last

one.

We have developed what we call a counter-narcotics campaign

plan, which is a regional plan. Phase one, which is about 2 years

in length, we call the regionalization and stabilization phase.

During that phase, we would work not just with Colombia, but

with the other nations in the Andean region to help them to develop the capabilities that they would need to successfully contend

with the drug threat.

Phase two we call the decisive operations phase. That is when

the nations and the region, working in a coordinated way, would

strive to drive a wedge between the various operating modes of a

narco trafficking industry. Be it cultivation, be it production or be

it transport.

Then in phase three, we would go to what we call a sustainment

phase which would emphasize intelligence collection and sharing

where the security forces of the region, both military and police,

would demonstrate the ability to adapt to the changing patterns of

activity that the narco trafficking industry has demonstrated it is

capable of doing.

This is a formal campaign plan, which has been submitted to the

Joint Staff. It is well understood, sir, and has as its foundation a

regional approach.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator MCCONNELL. Well, thank you both very much. I appreciate your coming up, and as you know, it is our plan to deal with

this request rather expeditiously. Thank you very much.

Ambassador PICKERING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were

submitted to the Departments for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

Question. President Pastrana says he wants to fight against the drug lords while

seeking to negotiate a solution to the political insurrection which has divided Colombia for decades. Is the war on drugs separable from the guerrilla war? Doesn’t the

‘‘push into the South’’ in Plan Colombia really mean stepped-up military attacks on

the left-wing guerrillas?

Answer. Drugs and the insurgency are linked financially. Narcotics money funds

the guerrillas, funds the paramilitaries, and fuels the violence that is tearing at the

fiber of Colombia. One added benefit to the increased counternarcotics efforts could

be the breaking of these financial links.

The plan’s push into southern Colombia is an effort to step-up operations against

the narcotics industry in that part of the country. Because of their links to

narcotraffickers, the guerrillas may be subject to increased police and military action. The same is true for paramilitary groups and other criminal groups who are

involved in the illegal drug industry.
35

Question. Right-wing paramilitaries, like leftist guerrillas, reportedly have ties to

drug producers and traffickers. Aren’t you concerned that military action against

the leftists will only strengthen the drug lords’ ties to paramilitary organizations

which might also allow them to ply their deadly trade?

Answer. The objective of Plan Colombia’s ccunternarcotics component is to confront and disrupt the narcotics trade. As long as they maintain connections to the

narcotics trade, the paramilitaries are valid targets for counternarcotics units, as

are the guerrillas. The plan aims to sever the financial ties between traffickers and

all illegal armed groups, regardless of the political orientation they may claim. The

paramilitaries are present protecting trafficking in the South along with the FARC.

Question. Mr. Secretary, since you are here as the Administration’s representative, I hope you won’t mind if I ask you a question outside the purview of the State

Department. In the multi-front ‘‘war on drugs,’’ are we devoting sufficient resources

to demand reduction? In particular, I am concerned that we may not be adequately

funding drug treatment programs to help those who would like to free themselves

of drug addiction. Shouldn’t we be doing more here at home as well as abroad?

Answer. I refer you to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) for

a discussion of domestic drug policy. However, there are some telling statistics on

this matter. According to information from ONDCP, one third of the fiscal year 1999

National Drug Control Budget, roughly $5.4 billion, went towards demand reduction

in the United States. The fiscal year 2001 budget contains $6 billion for demand

reduction. Clearly, these efforts in Colombia are not a trade-off. Rather, they are

complementary. It is important that the United States maintain efforts against both

supply and demand if the problem is to be brought under control.

Indications are that domestic demand reduction programs are working. In August

1999, ONDCP reported that youth drug use had dropped 13 percent in a one-year

span. The decline over that period was even more pronounced for the use of

inhalants (45 percent) and cocaine (20 percent). ONDCP also reported that drug-related murders were at a ten-year low. In short, we are doing more.

Question. While I respect President Pastranals efforts to develop a comprehensive

plan to bring peace and unity to Colombia, starting by ending the narcotraffickers’

grip on the country, can a solely national strategy truly succeed? Won’t the drug

business simply move to Venezuela or Ecuador or Brazil, just as it moved to Colombia from Bolivia and Peru?

Answer. Concerns over narcotics industry relocation are the reason that the package includes additional funds to support Colombia’s neighbors. There is also a cultural factor that mitigates the threat of large-scale migration of drug crops to those

specific countries. Like Bolivia and Peru, Colombia already had a history of coca cultivation when the industry shifted there. The shift of cultivation represented the expansion of an existing practice; not the introduction of a new one as it would in

Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador.

Question. I understand the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) is

eager to begin testing in Colombia of microherbicides (sic) which could wipe out

drug crops while leaving other plant and animal life unaffected. Has Colombia

signed the proposal to allow this U.S.-funded project to go forward? Do you consider

this a promising approach to narcotics, the ‘‘magic bullet’’ we all are hoping for?

Answer. Colombia has not yet signed the agreement to allow testing, but preliminary testing has been conducted elsewhere under other auspices. I believe that the

Government of Colombia understandably wants a high degree of confidence regarding the environmental impact of the project before moving to the next level.

The Department of State is encouraged by the early results of the mycoherbicide

project, and we believe that this is indeed a promising approach. That said, we resist labeling anything as a ‘‘magic bullet,’’ as that term can build unrealistic expectations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO GEN. CHARLES WILHELM

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE

FORWARD OPERATING LOCATIONS

Question. General Wilhelm, the request includes $38.6 million in military construction funds to support your new base, or forward operating location, in Manta,

Ecuador. Can you tell us how many U.S. military will be assigned to it on a permanent and temporary duty status and for how long the base will be used by the U.S.

military?
36

Answer. We have a 10-year access agreement with Ecuador for a Forward Operating Location on the Ecuadorian Air Force Base in Manta. We have no plans for

a permanent U.S. Base. We will have 10–12 permanent military personnel on the

ground. The number of temporary duty personnel will normally range from 100–250

depending on the counterdrug operations being conducted.

Question. General Wilhelm, last year in a similar hearing, I questioned what it

would cost to build a fully operating military base in Ecuador. Can you now tell us

what those costs would be?

Answer. We do not have any plans to build a U.S. military base in Ecuador. We

have, however, concluded a ten year access agreement with Ecuador for a Forward

Operating Location (FOL) on the Ecuadorian Air Force Base in Manta. We require

$67.4 million in facility improvements to meet U.S. operational and safety standards

at Manta. This amount includes $5.6 million for planning and design and $38.6 million for the runway, taxiway and ramp construction this year. An additional $23.2

million is required in fiscal year 2001 for vertical construction including the rescue

station, operations center, hangar, maintenance facility, and a lodging facility.

SUPPORT TO COLOMBIA

Question. General Wilhelm, this budget includes $98 million in DOD funds to support the Colombian Plan. This is in addition to the milcon money for Manta. Can

you tell us, is this the totality of DOD’s funding to support the counterdrug program

in Colombia, or are you using other funds to carry out this effort?

Answer. The $98 million does not reflect the total Department of Defense (DOD)

fiscal year 2000 funding requirement to support our counterdrug efforts in Colombia. DOD has additionally budgeted $76 million in fiscal year 2000 to support the

counterdrug program in Colombia.

Question. What is DOD’s involvement today in the counter-drug efforts in Colombia?

Answer. Department of Defense (DOD) involvement in counterdrug efforts in Colombia falls within two broad categories. We deploy aircraft and crews to Forward

Operating Locations and sites, frequently outside Colombia, to conduct detection,

monitoring and tracking missions in support of Source Zone air interdiction efforts.

We also deploy DOD personnel to conduct training missions in Colombia. [Deleted.]

Today we have a total of 26 DOD personnel deployed to Colombia providing training

support to Colombian counterdrug forces in Bogata, Tres Esquinas, and Mariquita.

These personnel are members of Joint Planning and Assistance Teams, Mobile

Training Teams, Technical Assistance Teams, and Riverine Training Teams. We

also have a three-man Subject Matter Expert team that is providing technical advice and assistance to Colombian Intelligence Specialists at the recently established

Colombian Joint Intelligence Center in Tres Esquinas. This is a snapshot. Our presence varies from day to day based on the missions that are being performed in support of the counterdrug struggle.

Question. What is SOUTHCOM’s total counterdrug budget for fiscal year 2000 (in

addition to the amounts you are requesting in this supplemental)?

Answer. Our total counterdrug budget for fiscal year 2000 is approximately $357

million. This amount is separate from the Supplemental request.

MILITARY COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS

Question. General Wilhelm, some argue that this $955 million will be ineffective

in stopping production of cocaine in the Southern Hemisphere. They argue we would

be better spending the funds educating Americans on the dangers of drug use and

treating those who are already using drugs. How do you respond to that argument?

Answer. The National Drug Control Strategy states ‘‘demand and supply reduction efforts complement and support one another.’’ Efforts to reduce the demand for

illegal drugs in the U.S. must be supported by efforts to reduce illegal drug production as well as the supply that reaches the U.S. This supplemental will support

United States Southern Command’s efforts to achieve Goals 4 and 5 of the National

Drug Control Strategy by significantly strengthening our Source and Transit Zone

counterdrug programs.

The Supplemental will provide the means to build partner nation capabilities and

enhance their efforts to eliminate cultivation, processing, manufacturing, and trafficking of illegal drugs in the Source Zone. At the same time, it will enable United

States Southern Command to continue to support counterdrug operations in the

Transit Zone. With expanded education for Americans at home, we will have effectively put a full court press on the illicit drug industry.
37

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST GUERRILLAS

Question. General Wilhelm, can a military force—even one we’ve trained and

which has helicopter mobility—really be effective against entrenched guerrillas

fighting in remote jungle areas?

Answer. I must first emphasize that we recognize clearly the limits of our involvement in Colombia. Our roles are limited to providing training, technical advice and

equipment support to Colombia’s security forces exclusively for counterdrug operations. The strict prohibition against involvement by U.S. forces in field operations

will continue in the future. That said, there is no question that given the right resources and proper training, the Colombian military can be effective against the

narcotraffickers which increasingly have symbiotic links to the Revolutionary Armed

Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN), and paramilitary organizations. Timely intelligence, aggressive planning and execution, superior mobility, and effective leadership can collectively unhinge the narcotrafficking operations

and cede the initiative to Colombian authorities. Specifically, the Government of Colombia (GOC) must increase its offensive military capability and clearly demonstrate tactical and operational superiority on the battlefield. The GOC must also

redress the needs of more than three and a half million rural and displaced Colombians by developing the infrastructure of rural areas, providing viable economic alternatives to illicit drug production, and simultaneously occupying, securing, and establishing sovereignty over contested areas of the countryside on a permanent basis.

This is a fight that can be won.

PLAN COLOMBIA FUNDING ALLOCATIONS

Question. The proposed assistance to Plan Colombia seems to devote much more

resources to counter-insurgency efforts in remote areas than to interdiction on roads

and in the air. Wouldn’t it make sense to allocate more assets to create an effective

cordon around the drug-producing areas, cutting off funds for narco-traffickers while

reducing supplies to the United States?

Answer. Plan Colombia comprehensively addresses the counterdrug (CD) problem

in a coordinated, mutually supportive manner. Attempts to cordon drug-producing

areas in Colombia by interdiction alone will not achieve a long-term solution to the

illicit drug problem. As we have learned, the drug trafficking organizations adapt

rapidly when we put pressure on key distribution nodes. Accordingly, increased emphasis to destroy the crops and labs must be accompanied by comprehensive measures to challenge the movement of drugs and precursor chemicals by land, air, sea,

or over the vast river network. A balanced, flexible, broad-based response, like that

proposed in Plan Colombia, is required; one that best uses available resources to

apply pressure by interdiction, eradication, alternative crop development, and expanded government control in the growing and processing areas of Colombia.

PLAN COLOMBIA HELICOPTER ASSISTANCE

Question. Much of the proposed U.S. assistance would be in the form of helicopters to ferry counter-narcotics units to remote locations. Don’t the narco-traffickers or associated forces have the weapons to shoot them down? Aren’t they likely

to obtain them if they don’t already have them?

Answer. [Deleted.]

Through this combination of training, employment and countermeasure suites,

coupled with common sense threat avoidance measures, Colombia’s armed forces

will be able to operate effectively when and if the FARC acquire surface to air missiles.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN

FARC CONTROL

Question. According to reports, the FARC now controls an area within Colombia

the size of Switzerland. The government has removed itself from that area as a gesture of peace, and now has little hope of returning without FARC approval. In the

meantime, the FARC earns by some accounts as much as $3 million every day from

drug traffickers in that region, and uses their territory as a staging ground for attacks on surrounding areas.

Why would the FARC ever negotiate to give up this area given the incredible benefits they now reap from it?
38

Answer. The FARC will not negotiate away the Despeje while operating from a

position of strength. Only tactical and operational success on the battlefield by Colombian security forces, combined with Government of Colombia (GOC) comprehensive social and economic reform, will set the conditions for a negotiated end to the

Despeje. To eliminate the Despeje at the negotiating table, the GOC must increase

its offensive military capability and clearly demonstrate tactical and operational superiority on the battlefield. The GOC must also redress the needs of more than

three and a half million rural and displaced Colombians by developing the infrastructure of rural areas, providing viable economic alternatives to illicit drug production, and simultaneously occupying and securing the contested area on a permanent basis.

Question. The FARC has often claimed that it supports eradication efforts, while

at the same time earning millions from drugs.

Is there evidence that the FARC is cooperating with any eradication efforts?

Answer. I am unaware of any evidence that the FARC is cooperating with eradication efforts.

ERADICATION IN FARC AREAS

Question. What incentive can we give the FARC to cooperate with eradication

within FARC-controlled territory?

Answer. The FARC has consistently demonstrated their unwillingness to cooperate with the Government of Colombia against the narcotraffickers. More than half

of the FARC fronts receive support from, and provide protection to, Drug Trafficking

Organizations (DTOs). Drug money provides a major portion of the FARC’s war

chest and is the FARC’s primary source for sustaining forces, conducting combat operations, and purchasing weapons. Despite the symbiotic links of the FARC to

DTOs, Plan Colombia contains the following incentives to reduce the increasing cultivation of coca throughout the country:

Elements 1 and 6 of Plan Colombia.—Proposes an alternative development strategy promoting agricultural and other profitable economic activity for rural farmers.

This approach is dependent on the Government of Colombia (GOC) re-establishing

the rule of law and providing security (Element 3 of Plan Colombia) in the affected

agricultural areas.

Element 1 of Plan Colombia.—Proposes increased spending by the GOC to modernize the economic base and create jobs.

Element 5 of Plan Colombia.—Funds interdiction and counterdrug (CD) programs

to effectively obstruct the flow of resources from the drug traffickers to the insurgency. FARC claims of support for interdiction efforts have been just that claims.

As Plan Colombia transitions to execution the FARC will have abundant opportunities to demonstrate their sincerity.

COLOMBIAN DRUG TRADE

Question. In the past, Colombia’s drug trade was controlled by a small number

of very large, very powerful cartels. Now, the manufacture and distribution of cocaine and heroin in Colombia is far more decentralized.

How does the Supplemental Request for Colombia attempt to address the new

challenge of going after a much more decentralized group of growers, manufacturers

and distributors of illegal narcotics?

Answer. The difficulty of locating, tracking, and intercepting drug traffickers

throughout the Andean Ridge is exacerbated by the proliferation of sophisticated

Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs). The DTOs are smaller, more adaptable, and

more mobile than traditional cartels, complicating intelligence collection efforts and

making them more difficult to target. In addition, many DTOs have symbiotic links

to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation

Army (ELN), and para-military organizations. More than half of the FARC fronts

and roughly one-fourth of the ELN fronts receive support from, and provide protection to, DTOs. The key to attacking the decentralized illicit drug trade is to target

specific nodes that, when removed, will have a negative impact on the industry as

a whole. The supplemental spending bill supports this strategy by assisting the Colombians in establishing and enhancing basic military and police capabilities such

as tactical air lift; ground, air, and riverine interdiction, and intelligence collection

and dissemination. U.S. Southern Command, in conjunction with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, is currently conducting an

analysis of the decentralized illicit drug industry to determine vulnerable critical

nodes. Results of this analysis will form the basis of the U.S. Government’s ‘‘way

ahead’’ in advising Colombia on the most effective use of the new capabilities provided through the supplemental funding bill.
39

ALTERNATIVE PRODUCTION

Question. The country of Peru used to be the world’s number one cocaine producer, but in recent years production has fallen quite a bit—down 26 percent in

1998 alone, down 56 percent overall between 1995 and 1998. Now, however, prices

for coca leaves have skyrocketed and some are worried that the temptation for farmers will be too great.

Similarly, the Bolivian government has targeted coca production with serious

eradication efforts in recent years, and the State Department now predicts that illegal coca production in that country may have fallen below 10,000 hectares in 1999,

from almost four times that amount just a year before.

Question. What alternatives have been provided to Peruvian and Bolivian farmers

to ensure that they will not now return to growing high priced coca leaves, and what

will we do in Colombia to provide those alternative crops?

Answer. The United States Department of State (DoS) administers the Alternative Crop Development Program, and I defer to them to address the specific incentives provided to Peruvian, Bolivian and Colombian coca growers. However, I can

assure you that this program is extremely important to our regional counterdrug effort. Alternative crop development programs have complemented aggressive eradication efforts in the successful reduction of coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia over

the past five years. Despite the increased price of coca leaf from new drug markets

in Europe and elsewhere, Peru was able to reduce total area under coca cultivation

by over 12,000 hectares during 1999. Much of this success is attributable to a successful alternative development program. These programs are also important because they reduce the number of violent confrontations among displaced coca farmers and provide families legitimate economic opportunities.

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN COLOMBIA

Question. Many of us are concerned about the potential for human rights abuses

in Colombia. I understand that the situation is getting better, but at the same time

a number of human rights groups have alerted us that there are still significant

problems—particularly with continuing links between drug-financed paramilitary

groups and members of the military. According to the Human Rights Watch World

Report 2000, ‘‘cooperation between army units and paramilitaries remained commonplace’’ in late 1999. The Report claims that paramilitaries kill suspected guerillas, delivering them to the army in return for weapons.

How much progress has been made in ensuring that the military is separate from

the rogue paramilitaries throughout Colombia?

Answer. While Colombia’s political and military leaders openly acknowledge evidence of some security force cooperation with the paramilitaries, they attest that cooperation is neither prevalent, institutionalized, or tolerated. President Pastrana,

Minister of Defense Ramirez, and Armed Forces Commander General Tapias have

publicly pledged to combat the illegal self-defense groups and punish all Government of Colombia (GOC) security force members found guilty of collaborating with

them. We continue to see evidence of this commitment. In February, Vice-President

Bell formed a minister-level commission to coordinate the state’s efforts against the

self-defense groups. The President will soon sign a decree authorizing summary dismissal of any military person implicated in paramilitary collaboration. In April

1999, two general officers were forcibly retired for alleged links to paramilitary

groups and a third general officer was suspended from duty for alleged links to a

paramilitary massacre and forcibly retired in November 1999. In August 1999 another general officer was relieved for failure to prevent a paramilitary massacre. Finally, from January through September 1999, in operations against paramilitary

forces, Colombian security forces killed 37, captured 188 and netted numerous

caches of illegal weapons. The U.S. Department of State has documented in its annual human rights report significant progress by the Colombian military in steadily

reducing the number of reported violations by Government security forces. Specifically, the number of confirmed human rights abuses attributed to the Colombian Security Forces has declined from 54 percent in 1993 to 2 percent in 1999. Plan Colombia ensures that the Colombian military will have the required resources and

government support to sustain their efforts to eliminate human rights violations.

FOURTH BRIGADE

Question. Can you comment specifically on allegations that the Medellin-based

Fourth Brigade has improper dealings with the paramilitaries commanded by Carlos Castano, who has apparently admitted to financing his operations from the coca

trade?
40

Answer. I do not have the facts to comment authoritatively on these allegations

nor can I confirm their reliability. [Deleted] about Fourth Brigade’s relationship

with illegal self-defense groups comes from the press, human rights organizations,

and the Government of Colombia.

COCA PRODUCTION IN COLOMBIA

Question. Coca production in Colombia has doubled in the past decade, and recent

estimates have indicated that production may be increasing at even higher rates

due to the increased productivity of new crops and a lack of eradication capability.

One of the reasons eradication efforts are falling short may be the continuing

delays in opening the Tres Esquinas airfield in Southern Colombia.

Do you have any idea when that airfield will be ready to open for eradication operations?

Answer. The airfield at Tres Esquinas is open and eradication operations are

being conducted; however, the Government of Colombia’s (GOC) eradication efforts

are hampered by three factors: —Lack of organic capability to effectively locate and attack fields under cultivation —New strains of coca with increased potency that can be harvested multiple

times in a growing season —Inadequate security in support of eradication operations, particularly in the

Putumayo and Caqueta regions.

The proposed supplemental will significantly enhance GOC eradication efforts by

funding the training and equipping of the Counternarcotics Brigade. The mission of

the Brigade will be to conduct offensive ground and air mobile counterdrug operations in conjuction with the Colombian National Police (CNP). These operations

will be focused on the principal coca producing regions of Putumayo and Caqueta.

To improve the effectiveness of aerial eradication operations from Tres Esquinas airfield, the GOC is expanding the aircraft parking ramp, increasing the number of

helicopter pads, and extending the runway by 480 meters. These improvements will

be incrementally completed by April 2001.

AIR INTERDICTION EFFORTS

Question. When the U.S. assisted in a concerted effort to stop the ‘‘air bridge’’ between Peru and Colombia, which provided much of the raw coca used in cocaine production, that air bridge was decimated. However, the delays in the Tres Esquinas

airfield, the lack of progress outfitting planes for interdiction efforts, and a large gap

that may allow planes to skirt current controls and simply re-route through Brazil

may have so far rendered similar efforts in Colombia fruitless.

What is being done, in this plan and in general, to move forward on air interdiction efforts similar to those that were so successful in Peru?

Answer. We are not satisfied with the level of U.S. support to air interdiction operations throughout the Source Zone. Since 1998, three Department of Defense

(DOD) Citation aircraft have flown [deleted]. We have to do better. The number one

limitation to providing optimum air interdiction support to Colombia is a shortage

of the right assets. Since January 1999, only one E–3 AWACS [deleted] has been

available to USSOUTHCOM, due to competing higher priorities in other theaters.

We need more than two times this number of missions. USCS provides P–3 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft for approximately [deleted] missions in the

Source Zone per month, again inadequate for consistent and effective interdiction.

The closing of Howard Air Force Base also affects our level of support to Colombia’s

interdiction program. Currently, only the Curacao Forward Operating Location

(FOL) is capable of supporting the AWACS which geographically precludes full coverage of the Source Zone. Once additional operational and safety improvements are

made at our FOL in Manta, we will be able to operate the AWACS out of it and

effectively extend detection and monitoring coverage into the Source Zone.

USSOUTHCOM has several other initiatives underway to provide more effective

U.S. support to Source Zone interdiction efforts:

Forward Operating Sites (FOS).—We are surveying airfields in Colombia and

Peru next month (April 2000) to identify possible forward operating sites. These

sites will allow highly capable D&M aircraft to deploy for short expeditionary operations with minimum personnel and equipment footprints.

USCS Deployments.—Since August 1999, USCS has deployed P–3 AEW aircraft

three times to Peru in support of air interdiction operations. [Deleted.]

Focused Air Interdiction Program.—In February of this year, we commenced a focused southern Colombia air interdiction program that will continue through June

2000. This program is designed to work specifically with Partner Nations. We will
41

review lessons learned in June and develop a sustained program to capitalize on the

coordinated efforts of DOD, the Interagency, and our Partner Nations.

Colombia Aircraft Upgrades.—The proposed supplemental funds air-to-air radar

and upgrades the communications package for two of the Colombian Air Force’s

(COLAF) C–26 Merlin aircraft. These modified aircraft will provide the COLAF the

capability to track and intercept aircraft moving cocaine from inland laboratories to

the Colombian coasts for transshipment to the United States. The supplemental also

improves COLAF tactical surveillance and intelligence capabilities by providing Forward-Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) for low-altitude, long-duration reconnaissance

aircraft.

Ground Based Radars.—TPS–43 radar systems at Iquitos, Peru and Leticia, Colombia transmit critical position and altitude information on suspected drug trafficking aircraft. The proposed supplemental improves collection from ground-based

radars (GBR) by funding upgrades to current GBR’s and fielding an additional one

at Tres Esquinas. Additionally, the Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR)

in Puerto Rico comes on line this spring and will complement the above systems in

detecting and tracking suspicious aircraft.

(43)

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LUIS ALBERTO MORENO, COLOMBIAN

AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

Senator MCCONNELL. Our next witness is Ambassador Moreno,

Luis Alberto Moreno, the Ambassador of Colombia to the United

States.

We welcome you here, Mr. Ambassador. I hope we can—since we

are kind of running late here, I hope we can keep your statement

rather short. And we will put the entire statement in the record.

Ambassador MORENO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and

distinguished members of the committee. I am pleased to appear

before you today to express my government’s views on the administration’s proposed program of emergency supplemental assistance

to Colombia.

This morning I would like to urge your support of this proposal,

to hear your views and to answer any questions you may have. I

plan to emphasize the following key factors that merit your consideration: the proposed assistance is urgently needed. The increased

assistance supports a well conceived comprehensive strategy. We

are asking the United States to help provide us with tools to do the

job of fighting drugs, not to intervene under internal conflict.

U.S. assistance will supplement the much larger commitment of

resources by Colombia and other members of the international

community.

This assistance would also support a strategy that is accurate,

equally on commitments to reduce drug production and trafficking,

to achieve peace, to protect human rights and to promote the rule

of law in our country.

I am certain you have read reports in today’s press regarding alleged links between the military and illegal arms groups in Colombia. My government is confronting this issue directly. In fact, much

of the data from our human rights report cited in these articles

comes from the Colombian’s prosecutor’s office. We are investigating these allegations of links between military personnel and

illegal arms groups. And we will continue to take strong legal action against any individuals found to have such links.

Since President Pastrana entered office in late 1988, we have

take aggressive steps to protect human rights, including the dismissing of senior military officials with poor human rights records;

selecting a chief of the armed forces with a strong commitment to

fighting human rights abuses; and declaring and enforcing a strict

human rights policy that does not tolerate any links between the

military and the illegal arms groups.

President Pastrana was elected on a platform to achieve peace in

Colombia. But upon entering office, he faced the challenges of restoring economic growth and confronting a booming drug trade.
44

President Pastrana has taken bold steps to address these inter-related problems.

First, we have embarked on a path towards peace. We hope to

achieve peace by showing the guerrillas a non-violent way to enter

Colombian society. At the same time, our negotiating position will

be backed by the strength of our country’s institutions, including

the military.

Secondly, and equally important, we have moved with determination to restore the trustworthiness of our military leadership and

the effectiveness and the morale of the troops.

Third, we have expanded Colombia’s commitment to combating

the drug trade. And President Pastrana has also attacked the economic ills that are afflicting Colombia.

Finally, to consolidate and preserve all of the expected result of

our strategy, we must focus on strengthening Colombia’s democratic institutions. We are working to improve the accountability

and effectiveness of our courts, make local governments more responsive to citizen’s needs, and to expand educational and economic

opportunities throughout Colombian society.

In spite of the gravity of our problems, we are very optimistic.

We see the problems clearly and have the will to find and implement necessary solutions. These solutions are embodied in Plan Colombia, a comprehensive, integrated strategy to address Colombia’s

inter-related problems.

Plan Colombia seeks to advance to peace process, improve the

protection of human rights, strengthen the economy, enhance

counter-drug programs, and promote democratization and social development. The Plan also calls for a total expenditure of $.75 billion over 3

years. The larger portion of this cost will be borne by Colombia— $4 billion directly by its resources and an additional $800 million

in loans from the international financial institutions. The Clinton

Administration’s proposal of $1.6 billion in assistance, and we are

also seeking funds from the international community.

In this regard, I am pleased to announce that early this summer

in Spain, there will be a donor’s conference of European Union

members. We are confident that we will also attract a level of the

support that we require.

The assistance package proposed by the Clinton Administration

is weighted heavily in favor of the kind of assistance the United

States alone can provide. In large part, the assistance package is

designed to give Colombia the tools we need to more effectively

fight drug production and trafficking.

It will enable the Colombian government to bolster counter-drug

activities in southern Colombia. And with U.S. assistance, we will

establish two new counter-narcotics battalions in the Colombian

military.

We are seeking aid from the United States to bolster our

counter-drug programs, not to help us combat guerrillas. President

Pastrana has repeatedly made it clear that Colombia is not seeking

and will not accept any direct U.S. military intervention in our internal conflict.

The U.S. assistance we need to implement Plan Colombia is

broader than counter-drug assistance alone. The aid package pro-
45

vides for humanitarian assistance to displace persons, funding for

alternative economic development programs, and assistance to help

the Colombian government improve human rights and other rule of

law programs.

Before I conclude, I would like to explain why we believe this

Committee should support the administration’s proposals. The war

on drugs is not a war in Colombia. It is a war that is being fought,

and must be fought, throughout the world.

It is true that much of the cocaine and heroine consumed in the

United States is produced in Colombia. No one regrets this more

than the nearly 40 million law-abiding and peace-loving citizens of

Colombia.

We have a responsibility to ourselves, to our children, and to our

neighbors, such as the United States, to stop the scourge of illegal

drugs. It can also be said that most of the cocaine and heroine we

are talking about is purchased and consumed illegally here in the

United States.

We know that this reality is no less regrettable for the United

States than it is for Colombia to be a source for drugs. And we recognize and appreciate the costs and sacrifices made in the United

States in the name of treatment, prevention, and law enforcement.

Our countries share the terrible burdens that illegal drugs place

on our people. General McCaffrey stated recently that over 50,000

Americans die each year due to drug abuse. At the same time, successive generations of Colombian children are growing up in a

country where profits from illegal drugs fuel daily violence, weaken

government institutions, and finance terrorist activities that

threaten human rights and the future of our democracy.

PREPARED STATEMENT

I urge you to support the administration’s proposal. I appreciate

to have the attention to all the views, and I am happy to answer

any of your questions.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LUIS ALBERTO MORENO

Introduction

Chairman McConnell, Senator Leahy, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to express my government’s

views on the Administration’s proposed program of emergency supplemental assistance to Colombia. This morning I would like to urge your support of this proposal,

to hear your views, and to answer any questions you may have. I plan to emphasize

the following key factors that merit your consideration:

—The proposed assistance is urgently needed to address the problems and responsibilities our countries share due to drug trafficking and consumption of illegal

drugs;

—The increased assistance supports a well-conceived, comprehensive strategy

based on the strong cooperation of our governments;

—We are asking the United States to help provide us with tools to do the job of

fighting drugs, not to intervene in our internal conflict;

—The U.S. assistance will supplement a much larger commitment of resources by

Colombia and other members of the international community; and, most importantly:

—The assistance will support a strategy that is anchored equally on commitments

to reduce drug production and trafficking, to achieve peace, to protect human

rights, and to promote the rule of law in our country.

First, however, I would like to address a related issue. I am certain you have read

reports in today’s press regarding alleged links between the military and illegal
46

armed groups in Colombia. My government is confronting this issue directly. In fact,

much of the data from a human rights report cited in these articles comes from the

Colombian government’s prosecutor’s office. We are investigating these allegations

of links between military personnel and illegal armed groups. And we will continue

to take strong legal action against any individuals found to have such links.

Since President Pastrana entered office in late 1998 we have taken aggressive

steps to protect human rights, including: (1) dismissing senior military officials with

poor human rights records; (2) selecting a chief of the armed forces with a strong

commitment to human fights; and (3) declaring and enforcing a strict human rights

policy that does not tolerate any links between the military and illegal armed

groups.

Conditions Confronting Colombia Today

President Pastrana was elected on a platform to achieve peace in Colombia. But

upon entering office he faced the challenges of restoring economic growth and confronting a booming drug trade. President Pastrana has taken bold steps to address

these inter-related problems.

First, we have embarked on a path toward peace. For the first time in forty years,

we have a framework and agenda for the negotiations. We hope to achieve peace

by showing the guerrillas a non-violent way to enter Colombian society. At the same

time, our negotiating position will be backed by the strength of our country’s institutions, including the military.

Second, and equally important, we have moved with determination to restore the

trustworthiness of our military leadership and the effectiveness and morale of our

troops. I have already discussed my government’s strong commitment to human

rights enforcement. This policy has had results. Allegations of human rights abuses

against the military have decreased dramatically. Still, we recognize that we must

continue to do more to protect human rights.

Third, we have expanded Colombia’s commitment to combating the drug trade.

We have continued eradication and interdiction efforts in close cooperation with the

United States. We have begun to extradite drug traffickers to the United States. We

will continue to do so. Important successes, however, such as the eradication of

nearly 130,000 acres in 1999 and arrest of several major traffickers as part of Operation Millennium do not obscure the fact that there is no miracle cure. We need a

sustained, comprehensive approach and we have a long way to go.

President Pastrana has also attacked the economic ills that afflict Colombia. With

unemployment rising and investment flows threatened, our government has made

difficult but necessary choices to stabilize the economy. We have reduced spending,

instituted banking sector reforms, accelerated privatization programs, strengthened

our pension programs, and adopted targeted stimulus programs to create jobs and

secure the social safety net. These measures, coupled with a strategy to increase

trade and investment, will provide needed opportunities for the poorest Colombians

and those displaced by internal violence.

Finally, to consolidate and preserve all of the expected results of our strategy, we

must focus on strengthening Colombia’s democratic institutions. We are working to

improve the accountability and effectiveness of our courts, make local governments

more responsive to citizen’s needs, and to expand educational and economic opportunities throughout Colombian society.

The Need for U.S. Assistance and International Help

In spite of the gravity of our problems, we are very optimistic. We see the problems clearly and have the will to find and implement necessary solutions. These solutions are embodied in Plan Colombia, a comprehensive, integrated strategy to address Colombia’s interrelated problems. Plan Colombia seeks to advance the peace

process, improve the protection of human rights, strengthen the economy, enhance

counter-drug programs, and promote democratization and social development.

President Pastrana’s Plan Colombia calls for a total expenditure of $7.5 billion

over 3 years. The larger part of this cost will be borne by Colombia—$4 billion directly from Colombia’s resources and an additional $800 million in loans from international financial institutions. The Clinton Administration has proposed $1.6 billion

in assistance, and we are seeking additional funds from the international community. In this regard, I am pleased to announce that Spain will host a donor’s con- ference for European Union members this June. We are confident that we will attract the level of support required.

The Nature of U.S. Assistance Needed

The assistance package proposed by the Clinton Administration is weighted heavily in favor of the kind of assistance the United States alone can provide. In large

part, the assistance package is designed to give Colombia the tools we need to more
47

effectively fight drug production and trafficking. It will enable the Colombian Government to bolster counter-drug activities in southern Colombia. With U.S. assistance, we will establish two new counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian military. These special military units, together with an existing, counter-narcotics battalion, will move into southern Colombia to protect Colombian National Police

(CNP) forces as they undertake counter-drug missions. Members of these counternarcotics battalions will receive extensive human rights education and training. The

aid package provides additional funding to enhance the counter-drug efforts of the

CNP.

We are seeking aid from the United States to bolster our counter-drug programs,

not to help us combat guerrilla forces. Our success against drug production and trafficking will weaken these guerrilla forces, as they rely upon the drug trade for

equipment and other support. But President Pastrana has repeatedly made clear

that Colombia is not seeking and will not accept any direct U.S. military intervention in our internal conflict.

The U.S. assistance we need to implement Plan Colombia is broader than counterdrug assistance alone. The aid package also provides humanitarian assistance to

displaced persons, funding for alternative economic developments programs, and assistance to help the Colombian Government improve human rights and other rule

of law programs. The Colombian Government and other members of the international community will provide additional assistance in these areas. As a result,

the profile of proposed U.S. assistance does not accurately reflect the overall profile

of Plan Colombia or the relative budgetary emphasis given to each function under

the Plan.

Why the Congress Should Approve the Package

Before I conclude, I would like to explain why we believe this Committee should

support the Administration’s proposal. The war on drugs is not a war in Colombia.

It is a war that is being fought and must be fought throughout the world.

It is true that much of the cocaine and heroine consumed in the United States

is produced in Colombia. No one regrets this more than the nearly 40 million lawabiding and peace-loving citizens of Colombia. We have a responsibility to ourselves,

to our children, and to our neighbors such as the United States to stop the scourge

of illegal drugs. It also must be said that most of the cocaine and heroine we are

talking about is purchased and consumed illegally here in the United States. We

know that this reality is no less regrettable for the United States than it is for Colombia to be the source of the drugs. And we recognize and appreciate the costs and

sacrifices made in the United States in the name of treatment, prevention, and law

enforcement.

It does illustrate that our countries share the terrible burdens that illegal drugs

place on our people. General McCaffrey stated recently that over 50,000 Americans

die each year due to drug abuse. At the same time, successive generations of Colombian children are growing up in a country where profits from illegal drugs fuel daily

violence, weaken government institutions, and finance terrorist activities that

threaten human rights and the future of our democracy.

I urge you to support the Administration’s proposal.

I appreciate your attention to my views. I would be pleased to answer your questions.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Your president has courageously declared the war on narco-traffickers and

certainly we all applaud that. Last year, in an effort to encourage

the FARC to participate in a peace process, your president agreed

to a demilitarized zone.

The effect of which was to concede control of a region the size

of Switzerland to the guerrillas. Do you believe the guerrillas used

this region as a base for drug production and trafficking, and would

the push into southern Colombia after that decision, and if not,

what is the likelihood that the DMZ simply becomes a safe haven

for traffickers?

Ambassador MORENO. Let me begin by saying that as General

Wilhelm said here, the cocaine that is reportedly grown in the demilitarized zone is no more than 12 percent of the total cocaine

grown in Colombia. Secondly, this area, and it is important to note

the size of our country.
48

Colombia is about the size of Texas and California combined.

This area is a very remote area where there has been very limited

government presence, and it is basically an area where the guerrillas have typically moved.

There is one thing President Pastrana offered during the campaign. It is a unilateral concession, to bring the insurgents to the

table of negotiations. And it was a bold move and a risky move, but

this was something that Colombian people voted upon. Since that

happened, I am happy to say that the negotiations with the FARC

insurgents have been moving along in a positive way.

We all know that making peace is more difficult than making

war. But the fact of the matter is that there were two or three occasions that we identified labs in the demilitarized zone which

were later taken by our national police. And we will continue to

monitor any such events.

But the purpose of our government is to keep this zone inasmuch

as the negotiations proceed, as they have been proceeding. This is,

again, as I said initially, a unilateral concession. The government

can take it away any minute it wants, and that is what is really

important, Senator.

Senator MCCONNELL. Speaking of insurgencies, moving to a different one. Last week your government announced a safe haven

policy for the ELN. How does that decision fit into an aggressive

counter-narcotics strategy?

Ambassador MORENO. Well, the area that has been discussed

with the ELN, first of all, there is not an agreement with ELN, and

I am not prepared to answer any of the specifics on any of the negotiations. As you well know, any kind of peace negotiations, to be

successful, must be treated in a secret fashion.

However, what occurred last week was basically a negotiation, or

rather an agreement, between the population in the north of Colombia where initially there had been a discussion where a demilitarized zone or transition zone will take place.

And basically what was agreed here was that there would be inputs from the society here, and also that there would be international monitoring units as well as Colombian. So, it is basically

having much more than what exists today in the south of Colombia, where the FARC has this zone.

Senator MCCONNELL. I am just going to take one more question,

because we have other Senators here who want to propound questions to you, Mr. Ambassador. Plan Colombia calls for a total of

$7.5 billion, $4 billion of which comes from your government.

What portion of the $4 billion from your government are actually

funds from the Inner-American Development Bank and the other

international financial institutions to which the United States is a

big contributor?

Ambassador MORENO. Basically, as I explained earlier in my

comments, the $4 billion is a direct appropriation over the 3 years,

and there’s $800 million that comes from the international financial institutions. One of the possibilities we are looking right now

is to precisely increase that to about $900 million, which was something that Colombia negotiated, an International Monetary Fund

(IMF) agreement, to invest in a social safety net.
49

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Senator

Inouye.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador, I can

assure you that all of us are quite concerned with your plight, and

we will do our best to be of assistance. But I was quite intrigued

by a question asked by my Chairman, Senator Stevens. Is it true

that high school graduates are deferred from entering into combat

situations?

Ambassador MORENO. That is a very important question, sir, and

let me try to explain it. We have a total army of about 120,000

men, of which about 40,000 are called conscripts.

These conscripts normally serve a period of no more than a year.

In fact, at times, they are exempt if they have voted in, or participated in, an election. That means that there is a tremendous rotation.

Under President Pastrana’s leadership, he has undertaken the

commitment to take away these conscript soldiers and change them

for professional soldiers. However, this cannot be done in a years

time. So, the plan is that it will be 10,000 soldiers of the conscripts

going out every year and 10,000 professional soldiers entering

every year.

Secondly, we also changed the fact that soldiers under 18 could

not be part of the Colombian armed forces and whoever were under

18 were dismissed from the Colombian armed forces. So, we are

moving to have a professional army and there is a lot of work being

done through fast track legislation, precisely to be able to fire and

hire people inside our military; also, to have a lot of work in the

anti-corruption area; and finally, all of the modernization.

These are some of the building blocks that we have been instituting, as well as putting human rights offices inside the military.

There used to be, when President Pastrana entered government,

about 100 human rights offices inside the military. They are now

up to 181.

Senator INOUYE. But if one has a high school diploma, he is deferred from combat activities?

Ambassador MORENO. That has been the case, and this is exactly

what we are changing, sir. Yes.

Senator INOUYE. With all the new equipment, sophisticated

equipment, you would need men and women who have training or

are trainable, with some degree of educational background, do you

not think so?

Ambassador MORENO. Absolutely, Senator. And the case with

these three counter-narcotics battalions is that they are varied

units, that they are professional soldiers with at least 5 years experience, precisely to work in this area. And of course, when it comes

to helicopters, it means that you need to train at least three different crews for each of the helicopters to serve in their different

nations.

Senator INOUYE. I have other questions, if I may submit them.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Stevens.

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Chairman, I will have some other questions, also, to submit to the formal panel.
50

Mr. Ambassador, as a friend, and you are a good friend, personally and to our country, I was very impressed with your President

Pastrana and the presentation you made to our committee. You

made it, as I said at the time, a great many friends. The deeper

we go into our plan to help you, the more some of us think that

it is flawed.

Tell me about the time frame for these battalions. How soon do

you expect those battalions to be ready to start this eradication of

these areas?

Ambassador MORENO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you

again for the wonderful meeting you hosted for us early in January

when President Pastrana was here. There’s already a counter-narcotics battalion that has finished training, and it is ready to go. It

is, today, located near the area of Tracicenas in the south of Colombia. And there are an additional two more battalions on their way.

When President Pastrana entered office, he made a very tough

decision, and that was that upon looking at the numbers of cocaine

explosion, really, in the growth of cocaine, we went, basically, 5

years ago from about 30,000 hectors to about 120,000 today. And

if you look at the numbers of cocaine, that is basically the reverse

of what used to be the case between Peru and Colombia.

So, what President Pastrana did was to make the tough decision

of involving our military. This is not an easy decision. It would not

be an easy decision in any military, but we have no choice.

Today, of the total budget of our country, about one-third is spent

on military spending. Forty percent of that is devoted for counternarcotics alone. So, we are also using our air force to do an air

interdiction. And we have already started working on this front to

be able to down planes that are carrying cocaine.

And secondly, we deployed in August of last year, a very strong

navy operation to do rivering to protect the rivers from where they

come with the chemicals that are used to make cocaine itself. And

also, to be able to patrol these rivers effectively when the cocaine

paste is later taken out and flown out of the areas.

So, the answer is yes, we have one battalion already trained, and

two are in the process of being trained now, Mr. Chairman. And

we have two more boats. I’m sorry.

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Ambassador, as you look at this operation,

the president told us that your military has gone through a substantial change also. And he selected a new general, right?

Ambassador MORENO. Yes, sir.

Senator STEVENS. Can you tell us anything about the modernization of your own military during this period?

Ambassador MORENO. Yes, sir. Some of the things I just mentioned a little while ago. First of all is the change of the conscripts

to professional soldiers to have a totally professional military by

the time President Pastrana’s term is over. That means taking

away 40,000 conscripts into professional soldiers, which implies a

substantial budget increase.

Senator STEVENS. Yes. We know about that. The difference between conscripts and volunteers.

Ambassador MORENO. Yes. So, that’s one. Secondly, in anti-corruption, there is a whole program of anti-corruption taking place

inside the military.
51

Third, we have contracted a study with National Public Research

Institute (NPRI) to do a lot of the modernization and changes in

command and control that need to take place. And last, but not

least, is the human rights training that every soldier in the Colombian military is undergoing. And in this we have trained close to

78,000 members of our military in doing this precise training. And

also to, for instance, in the counter-narcotics battalions, they went

through a very impressive program of human rights training as

well.

Senator STEVENS. One last question. Senator McConnell mentioned something that many other senators have talked to me

about, and that is the possibility of an area-wide plan that would

put the pressure on the narcotic traffickers in your country.

The feeling is they will go back to Peru or go somewhere else,

and we are going to see a kaleidoscope. What do they call it? I’m

thinking of the thing down at the beach where you try to hit

that——

STAFF. Wack-o-mo.

Senator STEVENS. Wack-o-mo. You hit there, it pops up there.

STAFF. Yes.

Senator STEVENS. You never can get them all down. But is there

any plan for an area-wide agreement? Is your country trying to

seek area-wide participation in this attempt to eradicate this

scourge down there?

Ambassador MORENO. Well, we will definitely work very closely

with our neighbors, and especially in the area of interdiction. It is

critical to work with all of the countries. Especially we are working

with Ecuador. And most of the high growing area that we have

today is pushed to the south involves very much the monitoring on

the Ecuadorian side.

It is not easy to quickly transplant the cocaine crops from one

place to the next, because it takes about 18 months before any one

crop begins. So, the monitoring is in place. We cannot prevent this

kind of situation from occurring, but I agree with you that the regional concept is very important.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

PROPOSAL FOR THE INCREASE OF FINANCIAL AID FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO

ECUADOR IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS

Ecuador, located between Colombia and Peru, suffers from somewhat different aspects of the drug problem. Due to its very low production, Ecuador has been considered as a ‘‘transit’’ country and not regarded as a priority. Nevertheless, the data

does not support this approach.

Recent data suggests that unfortunately Ecuador is becoming active in money

laundering, deviation of chemicals used in drug production and as a collection point

for internal and external distribution.

The drug problem today reveals that crimes such as money laundering, drug trafficking are connected and simultaneous. Therefore, it may be misleading to brand

some countries as producers and others as transit or consumers. To recognize the

responsibility of each is important, but insufficient if the burden is not appropriately

shared.

The drug problem has never been about frontiers or Nations. This illegal activity

has always been international, dynamic and innovative in the use of technology, and

it may move from one location to another. Therefore, we should not single out one

country as the source of the problem, nor should we expect its solution to come from

just one Nation, but rather from the combined efforts of the countries involved.
52

Ecuador’s Law 108 reiterates the will and determination to meet the formidable

challenges to fight drugs; the National Plan constitutes the main operative strategy

to identify the actions to be implemented in order to reduce drug supply and demand. It has guidelines for each sector and as well as parameters for foreign aid

and cooperation. It is also the basic reference for the National Council to Control

Drugs, CONSEP.

In its drafting process this law required an active participation and consensus of

all institutions involved in the fight against drugs. Thus, apart from being a document outlining principles and policies, the law constitutes an effective working tool

for all public and private institutions engaged in the fight against drug trafficking.

It is essential to acknowledge the principle of shared responsibility as the most

effective and fair element to face this transnational phenomenon.

For the 1999–2003 five year period, through its National Anti-Drugs Plan, Ecuador will develop programs aimed at: preventing and reducing drug consumption;

controlling illegal drug production, processing and trafficking; promoting research

and raising awareness of drug related issues; curbing money laundering, managing

assets seized in drug operations.

The CONSEP, integrated by representatives of government and private institutions involved in the fight against drugs, has requested aid from the Inter-American

Commission for Drug Abuse Control, to convene a Consultative Group and a Donors

Conference to obtain funding for the National Anti-Narcotics Plan.

The support of the United States is crucial for the full implementation of the

Plan, as part of the burden-sharing response of the international community. This

support should be proportionate to the magnitude of the challenges faced by the region and its members.

A NEW APPROACH IN ECUADOR

The northern frontier, which runs for approximately 580 km through the Provinces of Esmeraldas, Carchi and Sucumbios, and mostly along the Putumayo River,

has very particular characteristics that demand a specific strategy. The strategy

should include activities for a sustained and sustainable development.

The region is open 24 hours for border crossing, with patrol points in the international bridge of Rumichaca and in the near future in San Miguel bridge. However,

along the border there are many informal crossing points used for legitimate trade,

but that may also be used by groups linked to drug operations and related crimes.

Drugs such as heroine, cocaine in its various forms, and marihuana enter the Ecuadorian territory through land, air and sea.

The jungle in the northeastern section of the country, is used by drug cartels,

mainly foreign, to evade police control. The influence of the guerrillas from Colombia

has limited police action in the area. It has also been detected that due to a more

severe control of chemicals used in the production of drugs, the criminal organizations use chemicals not subject to control that undergo a process to obtain controlled

substances.

THE ECUADORIAN OUTLOOK IN THE REDUCTION OF SUPPLY

The data collected by the Anti-Narcotics Division of the National Police, a recently

created unit, shows that in recent years the volumes of drugs seized have increased,

as well as the number of arrests related to drugs. However, it is difficult to assess

if the drug available for export has decreased correspondingly.

We require a regional approach to this issue, supported by agreements, allowing

coordination among the various countries involved in this fight.

The final stage of the international drug trafficking culminates with money laundering, which impacts not only the economy but also the entire society and de-stabilizes the democratic institutions.

In the area of money laundering, the CONSEP established the National Division

for the Processing of Financial Information. Since 1995, 827 individuals have been

investigated for financial transactions judged to be unusual and reported by banking

institutions. The investigations on the reported irregularities are being conducted by

the Public Prosecutor.

Given this background, Ecuador expects that the Government of the United

States will consider an additional $32,390,000 in aid to be used in the implementation of the projects attached to this document which are part of the National Plan

and constitute a priority among the measures to be taken by the National Police

and Armed Forces of Ecuador in their fight against drugs in their effort to eliminate

supply to the United States and other countries. In keeping with the principles outlined at the beginning of my statement, referring to the burden sharing approach

to this hemispheric problem.
53

I would like to conclude by noting that the Government of Ecuador fully cooperates with the Government of the United States in the fight against drug trafficking.

The agreement signed by both Governments to establish the American Forward Operating Location in Manta was a crucial step in the hemispheric fight against drug

trafficking. We are confident that this contribution of the Ecuadorian Government

to the regional effort against this common threat will be dully recognized by both

the U.S. Government and the U.S. Congress.

Problems

Ecuador’s main drug related problems are:

Loosely-monitored airports, seaports, and road networks.

Low capacity to control money laundering.

Northeastern border area with Colombia is a matter of great concern. It is used

by traffickers to move both drugs and chemicals. Colombian guerrilla is present

near that country side of the border, encouraging and participating in these activities.

This situation threatens the stability and security of the region, and especially Ecuador’s security due to its current economic crisis and its closeness to guerrilla and

drug trafficking operation centers in Putumayo region.

The U.S. aide to Colombia will be more effective if at the same time it considers

to reduce the risk that the problem be moved into Ecuadorian territory, which could

be occupied by farmers to re-situate its coca crop fields and by producers to build

up new laboratories.

Besides that, due to its economic problems, the efforts of the Government of Ecuador has been not sufficient to attend the basic needs of the Ecuadorian population

in the Putumayo region, so there is an increasing risk of support to the traffickers’

activities from the Ecuadorian population living in that area.

Necessities

Therefore, Ecuador needs aid to:

Develop its security institutional capabilities to interdict illegal drugs and control

chemicals deviation.

Get equipment to interdiction operations.

Develop counter-narcotic training programs to its police and military forces, as

well as custom agents.

Improve its intelligence network.

Strengthen airport and seaport enforcement, fixed and mobile roadblocks, and

aerial reconnaissance.

Strengthen its judicial system and its financial investigation units to prosecute

traffickers, seize drug assets and reduce money laundering.

Implement alternative development programs, especially in the Putumayo region.

Implement prevention and consumption reduction programs.

PROPOSAL TO INCREASE U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ECUADOR’S DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

[IN ADDITION TO AID PACKAGE PRESENTED TO CONGRESS BY U.S. GOVERNMENT]

PROJECT BRIEF DESCRIPTION U.S. DOLLARS

REDUCTION OF DEMAND

PREVENTION NETWORK .......................... Implement government and non-government organizations in order to address drug consumption.1,500,000

TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION OF

DRUG ADDICTS.

Offer specialized therapeutical treatment to addicts, regardless of social status.120,000

DRUG MONITORING ................................ Collect data and statistics on reduction of supply

and demand of drugs.

150,000

COMMUNITY AWARENESS ....................... Information campaigns through the media to raise

awareness; establish an Information Center.

120,000

SUBTOTAL ................................. .................................................................................... 1,890,000
54

PROPOSAL TO INCREASE U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ECUADOR’S DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES—

Continued

[IN ADDITION TO AID PACKAGE PRESENTED TO CONGRESS BY U.S. GOVERNMENT]

PROJECT BRIEF DESCRIPTION U.S. DOLLARS

REDUCTION OF SUPPLY

SUPPORT TO THE ANTI-NARCOTICS DIVISION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE.Provide support to the Anti-Narcotics Division of

the National Police, with a more efficient use of

resources (financial, material and technological)

aimed at fulfilling its duties and maintaining a

standard of excellence.

Provide infrastructure, equipment to the Anti-Narcotics Division, Precincts. Provide communication equipment, IT and computers, air, land and

sea mobility, weapons and ammunition.

6,000,000

ANTI-NARCOTICS TRAINING CENTER ...... Develop a training and specialization program for

the operative and administrative levels.

Implement the departments of Training Counseling,

Multimedia and IT systems.

Integrate educational programs with Police Academies and rank and file of the Police.

1,000,000

COMMUNICATIONS AND IT ..................... Provide and test hardware and software to connect

to the information system of the Joint Intelligence and Coordination Center, JICC.

Develop and implement training in IT for police

personnel.

500,000

CONTROL DE PRESURSORES QUIMICOS

Y PRODUCTOS QUIMICOS

ESPECIFICOS.

Implements a system to control and track the kind,

quality and amount of precursores quimicos and

their use.

Develop guidelines and rules for autoridades y

ejecutores.

500,000

CANINE TRAINING CENTER ..................... Establish canine units in the North border, Provinces of Esmeraldas, Tulca ́ n, Sucumbios,

Controles Integrados, Puerto de Manta, Baeza y

Loja.

Refurbishing of canine units nationwide .................

Replacement and increase of drug detecting dogs.

Implement the system of passive dogs.

Include a budget to feed and care dogs.

Technical training to officers and troop in working

with drug detecting dogs.

1,000,000

REINFORCEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE

AND COORDINATION CENTER.

Consolidate the Intelligence and Coordination Center as the governing entity at the national level

of the anti-narcotics intelligence.

Implement an information network that would allow

the management of strategic information in a

timely fashion at the national level.

Implement a process for the selection of personnel

Carry out programs for updating and training of

personnel.

1,000,000

REINFORCEMENT OF THE SPECIAL ANTIDRUGS MOBIL GROUP—GEMA.Reinforce interdiction operations in roads and

highways.

Renovation of premises and supply of equipment

for the Special Anti-drugs Mobil Group.

Establish special anti-drug mobil groups in each

district.

Training in interdiction operations in roads and

highways.

1,000,000
55

PROPOSAL TO INCREASE U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ECUADOR’S DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES—

Continued

[IN ADDITION TO AID PACKAGE PRESENTED TO CONGRESS BY U.S. GOVERNMENT]

PROJECT BRIEF DESCRIPTION U.S. DOLLARS

REINFORCEMENT FOR THE MONEY

LAUNDERING PREVENTION UNITS.

Implement financial analysis units in Cuenca,

Tulcan, Guayaquil and Loja.

National and International link via electronic mail

with private and public institutions in charge of

money laundering.

500,000

REINFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI NARCOTICS POLICE AIR OPERATIONS.Consolidate air surveillance operations ....................

Planes, helicopters, radar equipment and heliports

in Sucumbios, Tulcan and Esmeraldas.

Training of air personnel.

6,000,000

REINFORCEMENT FOR LABORATORY ...... Implement two laboratories: Cuenca and Guayaquil

Provision of chemical reactives for field analysis of

drugs and precursos seized in police operatives.

Technological improvement of the chemical laboratory.

Training of laboratory personnel and anti-drugs operative units.

2,000,000

Alternative Social and Economic Development.Reinforcement of government actions to discourage

participation of local population in any of the

drug trafficking activities by improving social,

economic, education and health conditions in

the Putumayo region.

6,000,000

Security Measures .................................. Security operations for the support of counter narcotics operations in the border region.5,000,000

TOTAL ........................................ .................................................................................... 32,390,000

Senator MCCONNELL. OK. The limit we have—I am sorry to you

witnesses, if you will just be patient. We have two stack votes.

What I am going to recommend we do is recess the hearing and

go catch one vote at the end, the next one at the beginning, and

then we will come back. And it is my intention to finish up. So,

please——

Ambassador MORENO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCONNELL. Does anybody want to come back and ask

further questions of the Ambassador from Colombia? If not, we will

dismiss him.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, I had some questions, but I am happy

to submit them.

Senator MCCONNELL. OK. Submit them for the record.

Senator MCCONNELL. Senator Domenici.

Senator DOMENICI. OK. I have one and I will submit it.

Senator MCCONNELL. Fine.

And, Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being here. And we will get

to the next witness as soon as I return.

Ambassador MORENO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCONNELL. My apologies. Again, Senate business is

getting in the way of this hearing. All right. We have the attorney

general from Ecuador and the Bolivia minister of agriculture.

And we appreciate, very much, both of you gentlemen being with

us. And why don’t you go ahead with your statement in whichever

order you determine?
56

STATEMENT OF DR. RAMON JIMENEZ, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ECUADOR

Attorney General JIMENEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the panel, committee. It is a pleasure, and an

honor, to be here. I would like to start this short talk.

They have told me it is about 5 minutes. It is not enough time

to talk about the problems that are our problems, economic problems, social problems, with Ecuador or of any country, but I would

like to start this by recalling the words of the late Senator of the

United States of America, Robert Kennedy, when he said something like this.

I’m translating directly from Spanish into English. ‘‘I feel the

things as they are, and I ask why. I dream of the things that are

not, and I ask why not.’’

If things were as we dream they are, probably we would not be

here discussing the drug dealing problems of the world. Thank you,

Mr. Chairman.

Ecuador is a country which has had, and which is having, very,

very serious economical and social problems during the last 2

years. There is poverty. There is unemployment and under unemployment which goes up to 70 percent of the population, including

unemployment; 14 percent of unemployment and—and the rest of

unemployment.

There are many causes for that, and I am not going to repeat

them. They are well known to everybody. During the last years, the

tragedy called the Nino Current, et cetera, many, many problems

in that sense.

There is a per capita income of about $1,000 per year, and the

gross domestic product goes up to $13.6 million, which is less than

the external debt of Ecuador. Inflation has been, during the last 2

years, about 64 percent and the government is doing a lot of efforts

in order to control these things. And recently with the new

dollarization, as we call it, dollar recession system of economic and

monetary system.

In effect, still, that regarding the drug problems, Ecuador is only

a transit country. Not only various data, enough data, that reflects

that Ecuador at present has a big problem in laundering, processing and distribution to the consumption countries of the world.

And by the way, speaking about the consumption countries of the

world, I do not think that the consumer countries should be only

blamed for the problems of drugs in the world.

They say, and I do not agree, that if there were no consumption,

there would be no processing and there would be no trafficking,

and there would be no plants, crops. I say that if there were no

crops, if there were no traffic, there would be no consumption.

It is a cycle. And we have to consider it as a cycle. We cannot

individualize. We cannot put aside the countries which produce,

and we cannot put aside the countries which, apparently, are only

a transit country. And we cannot put aside the countries which

only consume or which mostly consume, like the United States of

America and Europe.

I would say that this has to be a coordinated activity all over the

world. Consumers, producers and transit countries.
57

The government of Ecuador, all the people of Ecuador, are doing

a lot of effort in order to fight drug dealings. There is the so-called

law 108, which has been in effect for about 10 years, and now it

is being reformed to bring it up to date. Review problems that we

are having, especially the great input into the laundering problems

in Ecuador. This has been done by the National Council for the

Control of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (CONSEP),

Consejo Nacional, Desustoncias Estupefaciente Eficotropica, the

National Council for drug combat.

There is a prevention, rehabilitation and very, very strong control and interdiction activities. And this, in the control and interdiction activities, is where Ecuador needs the international assistance.

And we are very, very thankful for the international assistance

that we get from the UNDCP, the United Nations International

Drug Control Program, and from the Inter American Commission

for the Control of the Abuse of Drugs (SICAD) of the Organization

of American States. But we need the help of our neighbors, Colombia. We need the help of Peru.

We are finished, as you know already, about 3 years ago all the

problems which we had were the frontier in Peru. And all the

money that was supposed to be in the hands of the people to fight

with Peru, we are now using it to build roads in Peru. To build

roads between Peru and Ecuador, I mean, in joint programs.

Senator MCCONNELL. All right.

Attorney General JIMENEZ. There is another frontier which is a

problem where we have about 580 kilometers which is open 24

hours with Colombia around the Putumayo region, which you already have heard about it. Some more data, Mr. Chairman. Important data of about 1,000 tons of cocaine production, and all the

cycle from Colombia, 50 percent goes through Ecuador. And where

does it go? It goes to the United States of America. It goes to Europe. To poison the young people of America, of the Americas.

North America, Central America, South America. But especially in

the consumer countries.

In 4 years, about 1,000 persons in Ecuador, which is a lot, and

corporations have been investigated and they have been sentenced,

because of unusual banking transactions. And there we have the

Unidad Para Procesamiento de Informacious Reservata (UPIR) or

Commission of Processing of Confidential Information, which also

belongs to the CONSEP, of which I am the president as attorney

general, which is the special investigations commission for banking

transactions.

I have 24 prosecutions a year regarding drug dealings, which is

enhanced or which are enhanced of the prosecutor general.

Senator MCCONNELL. Could I interrupt you a minute, Mr. Attorney General? The administration has only requested $2 million in

this supplemental that we’re talking about today, for your country,

on top of $11 million already in the budget.

Attorney General JIMENEZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCONNELL. Yet you just testified 50 percent of the cocaine is going through Ecuador. Do you share my view that it

might be appropriate to deal with this issue in a more regional way

than the current bill that we are having the testimony on?
58

Attorney General JIMENEZ. Definitely. I believe that it has to be

taken as a context, as a general context. I believe in the dream of

General Simon Bolivar—or they call him Simon Bolivar here in the

States. The guy in Colombia is called the Grand Colombian, as you

know, before 1830, before we got separated in different countries.

I am not saying that we have made effusion, a merge between

the countries. No. Although mergers are up-to-date in Ecuador

now, but banking mergers in order to avoid bankruptcies. But I

think that this has to be taken as a whole strategy, as a coordinated strategy.

But everything we do in only one country, because it is the big

producer, and I am for our, as we call it, the sister republic of Colombia. Everything we do, everything the international organizations do in order to increase the drug fights in Colombia will be

dropping to the southern countries. Especially to Ecuador and Bolivia.

And why do I say especially to Ecuador and Bolivia? Because in

Peru, there is a very strong government run by President Fujimori.

And he went out of the international commission of human rights.

He decided to do so. He is not part of the international commission

of human rights anymore. He decided to do so.

We are part of the International Commission of Human Rights,

and we, at the attorney general’s office of Ecuador, have about 20,

between 20 and 25, cases of human rights. And we work for human

rights in all the aspects. Not only in the drug dealing, drug trafficking, drug fighting situation, but in all aspects.

Senator MCCONNELL. Mr. Attorney General, I apologize that we

are running so late, but if you could wrap it up so we could hear

from—— Attorney General JIMENEZ. Sure.

Senator MCCONNELL (continuing). The minister in Bolivia, and

then we will get a few questions then.

Attorney General JIMENEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you so much. Mr. Minister.

STATEMENT OF OSWALDO ANTEZANA, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE

FOR BOLIVIA

Minister ANTEZANA. Let me begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this timely hearing on the U.S. anti-narcotics

policy in the Andean region and for allowing my country to express

its views regarding this very important matter. Bolivia, a country

that was, until very recently, the second largest producer of cocaine

in the world, undertook, in August of 1997, upon the swearing in

of President Gonzalo Sanchez De Lozada, the solemn commitment

to eliminate illegal coca production in the country by the year 2002.

Since Bolivia began implementing its counter-narcotics strategy,

the Dignity Plan, through education, interdiction operation and a

broad array of law enforcement programs in combination with our

alternative economic development projects, we have seen a reduction of more than 70 percent of illegal coca production. Progress

was even faster than anticipated. From 33,800 hectors of illegal

coca plantations in 1997 to 9,800 hectors today.

This translates into 250 metric tons of cocaine that will not be

produced or exported.
59

Senator MCCONNELL. You said you think you can achieve complete elimination by what date?

Minister ANTEZANA. 2002. My country has clearly shown that

once uncapable of victory in the war against drugs is attainable.

That our goals seen as utopian when first announced, is today

within reach. At this vital juncture, enhanced cooperation and assistance from the international community in support of Bolivia’s

continued progress is key to the successful completion of these efforts.

We are entering into the most critical and complex phase of the

Dignity Plan. After 29 months of record breaking levels of eradication, we are about to initiate an eradication operation in the

Yungas, the second largest coca production area in Bolivia; an insulated region with a long standing tradition of coca use and a strong

anti-government sentiment.

It is serving the Yungas culture and religious traditions in regards to coca use, it will be a daunting task demanding increased

results.

Despite the fact that in 1999, eradication and interdiction efforts

were conducted, we cannot discard possible flare-ups of social unrest in Chapare and Yungas. For example, already this year, there

was killed a Bolivian soldier in Chapare. And in just in the past

weeks, two more anti-narcotics officers were again downed in the

line of duty.

Our vigorous eradication and interdiction efforts, along with incentives for coca growers to switch to legal crops are clearly working. We, indeed, have been able to dramatically reduce vigorous

coca production. Now we must finish the job.

In his request for supplemental aid for the Andean countries, President Clinton proposed $18 million in assistance for Bolivia for

the years 2000 and 2001. We greatly appreciate the administration’s recognition that our partnership with the United States requires additional resources. At the same time, even the General Accounting Office of the U.S. Government concluded in its February

18th report that the Andean government continued to lack the resources and capabilities necessary to perform effect counter-narcotic operations.

To complete, and make permanent, the gains of the Dignity Plan,

Bolivia estimates a need of $111.5 million for fiscal year——

Senator MCCONNELL. If I could interrupt on that point, Mr. Minister, just like I did the Attorney General. Is it your view that this

package that we are currently having the hearing on, is not sufficiently regional in nature and would it be your view that it would

be more successful if greater assistance were provided to Bolivia

and to Ecuador?

Minister ANTEZANA. Ecuador? Yes. It is true. We can work together with—all the countries of the Andean region. Of course. Yes.

Senator MCCONNELL. In other words, the current amount for Bolivia is not adequate for you to finish the job?

Minister ANTEZANA. No. It’s not sufficient.

Senator MCCONNELL. OK. Go right ahead. I’m sorry.

Minister ANTEZANA. Bolivia estimates a need of $111.5 million

for fiscal year 2000, and $106.5 million for fiscal year 2001. As part

of the regular budget, the United States has already provided $48
60

million to Bolivia in fiscal year 2000, and proposed $52 million for

fiscal year 2001. This means that there is a shortfall of at least $50

million each year. In the strongest terms possible, we respectfully

request that Congress consider increasing the money set for Bolivia

in the supplemental aid package for a total of $50 million per year.

The bulk of these funds will be used in alternative development

projects and balance of payments. Integrating coca farmers into the

legal economy is the most urgent priority for Bolivia’s counter-narcotics efforts. If the government is not able to give an answer to

more than 38,000 families that will be displaced as a result of the

counter-narcotics strategy, there is a danger of serious backsliding

on the immense progress to date. Already the dramatic reduction

of coca availability has quadrupled the price of the leaf in only one

year.

The farmers of the Chapare region are just beginning to enjoy

the promise of a sustainable legal economy. There are already

105,000 examples of legal substitute crops, but much remains to be

done and achieved. The next 2 years are crucial.

The key to our sustained success in eradicating illegal coca crops

is tangible progress and development, new sources of legal products.

If the assistance proposed for Bolivian, the package is not proportionate to the success in eradication that we have achieved, there

will be enormous pressure on Bolivians to return to illicit coca production.

With current resources, we are not able to thwart such pressure.

We are not asking for open-ended assistance, but we disparately

need the amounts we requested for the next 2 years to complete

our goal. Then Bolivia and the United States can raise our hands

together as we celebrate complete victory against drug trafficking.

I would like to submit, for the record, a short detailing of the

funding request for Bolivia for the next 2 years. I am now open to

any questions you or any members of this committee might have

on this issue.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Minister. We will put your

additional material in the record.

[The information follows:]

DIGNITY PLAN SUPPLEMENTAL ASSISTANCE FUNDING REQUEST

FISCAL YEAR 2000 SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING NEEDS

[In millions of dollars]

Program U.S. regular

funding

Supplemental

requirement Total assistance

Alternative development .................................................... 14.0 53.0 67.0

Prevention and justice ...................................................... 2.8 ........................ 2.8

Eradication ........................................................................ 4.5 8.5 13.0

Interdiction ........................................................................ 24.0 2.0 26.0

Others ................................................................................ 2.7 ........................ 2.7

Total ..................................................................... 48.0 63.5 111.5
61

[In millions of dollars]

Share within

supplemental

requirement

Alternative development:

Projects:

Chapare-Yungas Social and Productive Infrastructure ........................ 7.0

Assistance Production Fund ................................................................... 4.0

Investment and Credit for Rural Enterprises ....................................... 5.0

Assistance for Agrarian Production ....................................................... 8.0

Technical Assistance Fund ..................................................................... 3.0

Subtotal ................................................................................................. 27.0

Balance of payments:

Community Compensation ...................................................................... 10.0

Alternative Development Activities USAID .......................................... 10.7

Road Infrastructure ................................................................................. 5.3

Subtotal ................................................................................................. 26.0

Total ...................................................................................................... 53.0

Eradication:

Assistance for Eradication: Personnel and equipment for DIRECO .......... 7.0

Investment: Equipment, infrastructure and topographic material for

DIRECO ....................................................................................................... 1.1

Institutional Strengthening Projects ............................................................. 0.2

Public Awareness Campaigns ........................................................................ 0.2

Total ............................................................................................................. 8.5

Interdiction:

UMOPAR—Border Security ........................................................................... 1.1

Canine Program .............................................................................................. 0.3

Communications Unit ..................................................................................... 0.6

Total ............................................................................................................. 2.0

FISCAL YEAR 2001 SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING NEEDS 1

[In millions of dollars]

Program U.S. regular

funding

Supplemental

requirement Total assistance

Alternative development .................................................... 14.0 50.0 64.0

Prevention and justice ...................................................... 2.8 ........................ 2.8

Eradication ........................................................................ 4.5 7.5 12.0

Interdiction ........................................................................ 24.0 1.0 25.0

Others ................................................................................ 2.7 ........................ 2.7

Total ..................................................................... 48.0 58.5 106.5

1 INL requested $52 million of regular funding for fiscal year 2001; if approved, then Bolivia’s supplemental requirement would be $54.5 million, instead of the $58.5 million quoted in the chart.

[In millions of dollars]

Share within

supplemental

requirement

Alternative development:

Projects:

Chapare-Yungas Social and Productive Infrastructure ........................ ............

Assistance Production Fund ................................................................... ............

Investment and Credit for Rural Enterprises ....................................... ............

Assistance for Agrarian Production ....................................................... ............
62

Share within

supplemental

requirement

Technical Assistance Fund ..................................................................... ............

Subtotal ................................................................................................. 24.0

Balance of payments:

Community Compensation ...................................................................... ............

Alternative Development Activities USAID .......................................... ............

Road Infrastructure ................................................................................. ............

Subtotal ................................................................................................. 26.0

Total ...................................................................................................... 50.0

Eradication:

Assistance for Eradication: Personnel and equipment for DIRECO .......... ............

Investment: Equipment, infrastructure and topographic material for

DIRECO ....................................................................................................... ............

Institutional Strengthening Projects ............................................................. ............

Public Awareness Campaigns ........................................................................ ............

Total ............................................................................................................. ............

Interdiction:

UMOPAR—Border Security ........................................................................... ............

Canine Program .............................................................................................. ............

Communications Unit ..................................................................................... ............

Total ............................................................................................................. ............

Senator MCCONNELL. I have just a couple of questions. First,

with regard to Ecuador, Mr. Attorney General.

Attorney General JIMENEZ. Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thanks. First, how successful is your judicial system in prosecuting and incarcerating if found guilty these

drug traffickers that you find in your courts?

Attorney General JIMENEZ. Well, we are doing a lot of effort in

bettering the judicial system of Ecuador. There are many, many

problems in the judicial system. It is not perfect. Nothing is perfect

in the world, except in heaven.

But institutions, non-government and non-profit organizations of

the world are working very hard. For instance, the world bank in

bettering the judicial system of Ecuador.

We have an agreement between the judicial power of Ecuador

and the so-called pro justicia, pro justice organization which is

sponsored by the world bank. And we are doing a great effort. I

would say we are not completely successful, but we are working towards being successful.

Senator MCCONNELL. One other question. You, of course, mentioned the transit problem through your country, and I am curious

as to how active efforts are to monitor airports, seaports and roads

in Ecuador to deal with this transit problem.

Attorney General JIMENEZ. Well, we try to be as efficient as we

can, but unfortunately we do not count on the necessary elements,

material elements to do it. That is where we need more assistance.

One more word, Mr. Chairman, just one word. One of the big efforts of the government of Ecuador is the national anti-drug plan,

1999, 2003, which was approved last year and which has had the
63

endorsement of UNCDP, seek out from the Organization of American States and many other international organizations.

And one more effort, which has been very, very important is this

I have here, the agreement of the National Congress, the agreement of the National Government of Ecuador with the United

States Air Force for the Manta Air Base which is working very

well.

And people are very happy to have the air base there, because

there is more work today in the Manave Province where they needed a lot of work. So, there are efforts that are being made, but we

need assistance. Thank you.

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you. Just one final. Senator Leahy

is going to handle the final witness who is going to be discussing

details from today’s front page Washington Post story, but I want

to conclude my part of the hearing by asking the minister from Bolivia, even though I know agriculture is your portfolio and not justice. I’m also curious, if you know, how successful you have been

in Bolivia in arresting and incarcerating drug traffickers.

Minister ANTEZANA. Well, we have good results. This is a matter

that I do not know. I do not know except the number of people, because I have my responsibility in the area of world development

and alternative development—— Senator MCCONNELL. Right.

Minister ANTEZANA (continuing). In eradication. But in the last

year, I think we catch around 40 tons of the cocaine in Bolivia, and

many, many people were arrested. I do not know exactly the number.

Senator MCCONNELL. Let me just conclude by saying to both of

you how much I appreciate your being here, and also I want to

make an observation to the minister of agriculture from Bolivia, because I understand the problem of agricultural transition.

The most unpopular thing you can do in America, that is legal,

is smoke a cigarette. I used to have 100,000 tobacco growers in my

State. We have lost about 25 percent of them since President Clinton came to office, and it is dropping daily because of the effort to

crack down on cigarette smoking in our country.

Regretfully, in the Appalachian Mountains, the most profitable

thing you can do is grow marijuana. And so we have our ongoing

efforts in my State to discourage this kind of illegal activity. The

root cause of the problem, of course, is the profitability of the plant.

So, I want to particularly commend Bolivia for the extraordinary

success that you have had in a really tough area. It is very, very

difficult to, with rural people who are otherwise rather poor, to discourage this kind of activity when it is so lucrative. So, my hat is

off. I salute you for the extraordinary success you have had in Bolivia. I hope you can keep it up, and I hope you can meet the eradication date of 2002.

So, with that, Senator Leahy is going to handle our last witness,

and I am sure his stomach is growling intensely. But if he will hold

on, Senator Leahy will be here momentarily I am told.

I want to thank you, Mr. Attorney General and you, Mr. Minister, for joining us today, and let me just say that I share your

view that we ought to take a more regional approach to the request

of the Clinton Administration.
64

And I am hopeful that our final product, which we send down to

the President, will more accurately meet the needs that you have

expressed here. And there, as if on cue, Senator Leahy arrives to

handle our last witness. Thank you both very much.

Attorney General JIMENEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCONNELL. You are up.

Senator LEAHY [presiding]. If I have any questions of these witnesses, I will put them in the record, but thank you all for being

here.

Attorney General JIMENEZ. Thank you.

Senator LEAHY. Why don’t we have the next witness come forward, please. Ms. Kirk, I am delighted to have you here. You and

Human Rights Watch have been referred to on more than one occasion today, as I do not need to tell you. Why don’t you go ahead.

STATEMENT OF ROBIN KIRK, AMERICAS DIVISION, HUMAN RIGHTS

WATCH

Ms. KIRK. Well, thank you very much.

Senator LEAHY. I know you have waited a long time for this.

Ms. KIRK. It has been very interesting. First, I want to thank the

subcommittee for inviting me, Chairman McConnell, Senator

Leahy. It is a pleasure to come here and talk with you about the

proposed aid plan to Colombia. I have a written statement that I

have submitted for the record, but I would like to just comment

briefly on a couple of things that have been said today during this

hearing.

I think I would like to make it very clear that I agree that Colombia is a matter of serious concern, not only for the United

States, but also for the international community. We believe that

this policy needs to be scrutinized very carefully, and it needs to

be scrutinized based on the facts. And that is what I would like to

discuss today.

I would like to comment on a couple of things that were said earlier today in the testimony. Three basic points. Number one, this

idea that human rights problems in Colombia, and specifically the

relationship between the military and paramilitary groups, are

simply the result of some bad apples. General Wilhelm used the

phrase local collusion with paramilitary groups.

With a great deal of respect to the General, I would simply like

to say that that is not supported by the facts. We released a report

yesterday that shows that far from local collusion, what we were

able to document is continuing ties between the military and paramilitary groups, and specifically, ties that go right through the

whole structure of the army.

We were able to document ties between paramilitaries and the

military in half of the 18 brigades that now function within the Colombian army. This is not history, this is reality. This is present

day.

It is clear that President Pastrana has made a commitment to

human rights. He has made that commitment to us in meetings.

Ambassador Moreno has also made the same commitments. We understand that there is a will, at least in terms of what Colombian

officials will say, to do more for human rights. But what we do not

see are actions on the ground.
65

There are two things that have been cited as proof that the Colombian government has made progress in combating these ties between the military and paramilitary groups, and specifically military involvement in abuses. Ambassador Pickering mentioned the

question of statistics.

That, in fact, the number of human rights violations that are directly attributable to the army, to the military in general, have decreased in recent years. That is absolutely correct.

We would agree that direct ties between the military and human

rights violations have decreased, but that does take into account

the whole question of open collaboration, collusion and support for

paramilitary groups. There are no statistics that measure that.

What there are are cases. The kinds of cases that we included in

our report that show that this collusion, this collaboration, and indeed even an open creation of paramilitary groups, continues to

occur in Colombia.

In our report, we looked into the behavior of three brigades, and

I think it is important to note that those three brigades are based

in Colombia’s largest cities. We are not talking about brigades that

are in rural areas. We are not talking about far away places. We

are talking about the capital of Colombia, Bogota. We are talking

about Medellin and we are talking about Cali.

This is far from something that is out there in the woods that

cannot be controlled or cannot be supervised. This is happening in

the heart of the Colombian army.

Secondly, both Ambassador Pickering and Ambassador Moreno

cited our report and said that it was actually a good sign for the

Colombian government and its progress on human rights, because

much of our information was based on the work of Colombia’s own

investigators. Prosecutors who work for the Attorney General’s Office.

But I would like to point out that many of those investigators

have been threatened because of their work, and have been forced

to leave Colombia. There is not an effort on the part of the Colombian government to protect them.

Secondly, I would like to comment on the question of conditions.

We welcome statements that have been made by the Colombian

government that they will support human rights, but I think it is

key to match will with measurable benchmarks that the United

States can use to see exactly what the facts are on the ground. We

cannot simply be satisfied with expressions of good will. We have

to be able to match that with real progress.

I have covered Colombia now since 1992, and every year we get

expressions of good will. Every year we get intentions, but those intentions are not backed up by real progress on human rights. Let

me just cite one example. I think it is especially appropriate for

this hearing, because it has to do with the case of a Colombian senator.

This Colombian senator, Manuel Sepeda was murdered in 1994

in the capital of Colombia, in Bogota. And the investigation done

by the Attorney General’s Office showed that this murder had been

carried out by the military, by military officers, in collusion with

paramilitary groups.
66

Until Human Rights Watch protested the fact that these officers

remained on active duty only 3 months ago, those officers continued on the payroll of the Colombian army and also continued in

working in military intelligence. And it was only until we protested

that, in fact, the investigation showed that these Colombian army

officers had killed a Colombian senator. It was only then that these

two individuals were discharged from the army. That is the kind

of progress—— Senator LEAHY. What else happened?

Ms. KIRK. Well, now they are put at the disposition of a civilian

court, but the fact is that they remained on active duty. They remained on the payroll until this became public.

Senator LEAHY. Are they before the civilian courts now?

Ms. KIRK. They are before the civilian courts, but let me just say

that these two individuals are low ranking officers. They are at the

sergeant level and what we have seen again and again is that the

Colombian government will cite statistics of officers sent to civilian

courts for trial and those officers are almost always privates or sergeants.

Senator LEAHY. Do you remember what the rank was of these

two?

Ms. KIRK. They were both sergeants.

Senator LEAHY. And was anybody else either sent to military

courts or suspended as a result?

Ms. KIRK. In this particular case, these officers told investigators

that they were acting under the orders of a general, who at that

time was the head of the ninth brigade, and that general actually

died of a heart attack in 1996. So, the case stopped investigating

him at that point. But it is clear that there was, it was not just

the actions of these sergeants, it was clear that they were acting

on orders from their commanding officer.

Senator LEAHY. I note that Human Rights Watch is well-respected and that your work has been widely quoted, by both Democrats and Republicans.

I understand that yesterday, on a Colombian radio broadcast

General Tapias accused Human Rights Watch of conspiring with

drug traffickers to defame the Army. Would you respond to that?

Ms. KIRK. Well, I think—— Senator LEAHY. Because you know I raised this question earlier.

Ms. KIRK. Yes. No. Thank you for raising it. I think it speaks for

itself. Because they do not attack us on the facts. They try to suggest that we are acting for other motives other than simply documenting the truth, but they never question our facts. And I think

that, I would like that to speak for itself.

Senator LEAHY. When you work in Colombia, what type of freedom do you have to operate? You are down there investigating

gross human rights violations. I can think of other countries in

Central and South America where people have been killed for doing

similar work. Is this a concern for Human Rights Watch?

Ms. KIRK. Well, I think it is mainly a concern because of our Colombian colleagues, because we consider Colombia the most dangerous country in the world now for human rights defenders. Luckily, people like myself, who work for international organizations,

have not lost anyone, but we have lost many of our Colombian col-
67

leagues. And in fact, Monday is the anniversary of the date of the

murder of one of the human rights defenders that I worked most

closely with in Colombia, Jesus Valle.

So, we are extremely concerned about the safety of our colleagues

in Colombia, and their ability to do just the kind of work that is

needed to document continuing human rights abuses in the country. We do face a serious problem, because these human rights

workers continue to receive threats, and continue to feel that they

jeopardize their lives, especially when they speak publicly. I feel

very fortunate, myself, to be able to speak publicly here without

being afraid when I walk out of the room. I am afraid that my Colombian colleagues, with all due respect to the Colombian ambassador, do not feel the same freedom.

Senator LEAHY. You heard Ambassador Pickering mention the

work the Army is doing to purge itself of human rights violators.

Some have noted the dismissal of 15 officers as a sign of progress.

How would you respond to that, is that a real sign of progress?

Ms. KIRK. I think we were looking at that figure the other day,

15 officers, and the only way we could kind of account for each of

the officers was to go back as far as 1990 to find exactly who they

meant by being discharged. So, in other words, in the past 10

years, 15 officers have been discharged. Most of them simply discharged.

In other words, not prosecuted for the human rights abuses that

they have been accused of doing. So, no, we do not see that as a

sign of great progress. Certainly it is welcome when officers who

commit human rights violations are discharged, but we also want

to see them prosecuted.

Senator LEAHY. How does that contrast with the National Police?

Ms. KIRK. That is an important contrast, I think, because, for instance, since General Serrano took charge of the Colombian police

in 1994, he has discharged an average of 1,000 officers every year.

That is for human rights violations, but also because of corruption

and other criminal activity.

But I think it is clear the lesson that we take from that is, number one, it is possible when there is political will to make great advances on human rights. And second, that is it possible in Colombia if the Colombian government and the commanders of the army

and the navy and the air force decide to apply the same kinds of

measures that General Serrano has done within the police.

Senator LEAHY. But I am told that prosecutors, investigators,

human rights monitors and others have had to flee Colombia, even

today, because of concern for their own safety. Is that your understanding?

Ms. KIRK. That is correct. And it is very disturbing to us. Just

at the time when, especially the United States, wants to have this

aid monitored and wants to be able to collect the human rights information that it needs, for instance, to apply the Leahy Amendment, to find that even the government’s own investigators, the

people in the Attorney General’s Office that we depend on to forward these cases, are having to flee the country.

And in fact, much of the information that we collected for this

report was taken from prosecutors who are out of Colombia and
68

who wanted, because they are committed to their jobs and committed to doing their duty, they wanted to see some accountability.

And unfortunately, their only recourse was to go to international

organizations like Human Rights Watch and see if they could not,

by talking to us about their cases, forward them within the Colombian judicial system, because most of these cases that are summarized in this report are stopped. Are essentially frozen, because the

prosecutors who were shepherding them through the judicial system have had to flee the country.

Senator LEAHY. Is the Colombian Attorney General’s Office the

major source of your information?

Ms. KIRK. We match our interviews with Colombian prosecutors

with our own interviews with eyewitnesses and other information

that we have collected from victims of violations.

Senator LEAHY. I want to make sure I fully understand this. You

have spoken about General Serrano. You spoke about the National

Police and what they have done. Are you suggesting that if the will

was there, the same could be done in the military?

Ms. KIRK. I think that is unquestionable. That the military can

take measures today that would begin to produce real results in

terms of human rights protections. One of them is simply purging

officers that have a proven record of support for paramilitary

groups.

One of the things that you will note from our report is that many

of the officers who were in charge of these units that we have tied

to paramilitary activity, not only remain on active service, but have

been promoted. In essence, rewarded for their collusion with paramilitary groups.

That is something that I think would be very evident to General

Tapias if he decided to appoint a review committee. That is one of

the conditions that we are supporting. To have an outside review

committee look at some of these cases and see who is it that really

needs to be out of uniform.

Senator LEAHY. And so to anticipate questions, would it be naive

to suggest that the Army take this on while fighting the guerrillas?

Does it diminish their ability to fight? Does it make any difference

in their ability to protect the nation?

Ms. KIRK. I think to the contrary. It would strengthen their fight

against guerrillas, because it is clear that the Colombian military

has a duty, an obligation, to protect the nation. Has a duty to fight

threats against Colombian democracy. There is no question about

that. But the only way they can protect democracy is by observing

democracy, and observing the rule of law.

When the government itself, through its military, violates law,

violates the rule of law by committing human rights violations,

they lose credibility. And I think that they would be a stronger

army, they would be more effective at defending Colombia if they,

themselves, obeyed the law.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Ms. Kirk. We will put your full statement in the record.

[The statement follows:]
69

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBIN KIRK

Chairman McConnell, Senator Leahy, Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you

for inviting me to convey to the Subcommittee our concerns about the human rights

implications of U.S. security assistance to Colombia.

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for taking the time to examine in detail

the proposed aid package to the Andean countries and specifically Colombia.

No one disagrees that Colombia faces a difficult challenge. A decades-long war

and entrenched drug trafficking have exacted a high toll. Human Rights Watch has

fully documented the abusive behavior of Colombia’s guerrillas, who kill, kidnap,

and extort money from the population they claim to represent.

At the same time, however, forces from within the state itself threaten democracy.

Paramilitary groups operating with the acquiescence or open support of the military

account for most political violence in Colombia today. Yet Colombia’s military leaders have yet to take the firm, clear steps necessary to purge human rights abusers

from their ranks.

This is not history, but today’s reality. Human Rights Watch has detailed, abundant, and compelling evidence of continuing ties between the Colombian Army and

paramilitary groups responsible for gross human rights violations, which we have

submitted to this Subcommittee. Our information implicates Colombian Army brigades operating in Colombia’s three largest cities, including the capital, Bogota ́.

Together, evidence collected so far by Human Rights Watch links half of Colombia’s eighteen brigade-level army units to paramilitary activity. In other words, military support for paramilitaries remains national in scope and includes areas where

units receiving or scheduled to receive U.S. military aid operate.

For that reason, it is crucial for the Congress to place strict conditions on all security assistance to Colombia to ensure that the Colombian Government severs links,

at all levels, between the Colombian military and paramilitary groups and prosecutes in civilian courts those who violate human rights or support or work with

paramilitaries.

I have submitted for the record additional recommendations for actions that

Human Rights Watch believes the U.S. should require the Colombian Government

to take before receiving security assistance.

The 28th of February marks the two-year anniversary of the murder of Jesu ́ s

Valle, a courageous human rights defender gunned down in his Medell’n office precisely because he worked to document links between paramilitaries and the Colombian Army. The gunmen paid to kill him are in prison. But the individuals who

planned and paid for his murder remain at large.

Even the government’s own investigators are under threat. Dozens of prosecutors

who have worked on these cases have been forced to flee Colombia because of death

threats. In 1998 and 1999, several investigators who worked for the Attorney General were murdered because of their work on human rights-related cases.

The United States has a positive message to send Colombia and should respond

to President Pastrana’s call for help. But I urge the members of this Subcommittee

to recognize that continued collusion between Colombia’s military and paramilitary

groups will only undermine the effectiveness of the aid you send and sabotage efforts to rebuild democracy.

Thank you. I would be pleased to answer any questions.

Senator LEAHY. And if there are other questions, we will provide

that for the record.

I am sorry you had to be here so long, but I hope you found this

interesting. I had to go to the floor to get a couple of judges confirmed, and we did.

Nevertheless, I was able to follow the hearing. I think it has

been worthwhile, especially as the whole Appropriations Committee will have to consider the Administration’s request.

I have some real concerns. The Administration’s plan has not

been well thought out.

It is too open ended. It guarantees that there will be U.S. troops

involved, at least indirectly, in Colombia.
70

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

Ms. Kirk, I appreciate you taking the time. I think you have

helped us with our deliberations.

Ms. KIRK. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 1:37 p.m., Thursday, February 24, the hearing

was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene

subject to the call of the Chair.]

Æ