Number 69, April 1996

Ukraine: TheSecurity
 Fulcrum of Europe?
By Roman Popadiuk
Conclusions
- 	Ukraine's national security policy appears destined to be a balancing act between NATO and Russia,maintaining its own sovereignty while acting as a bridge and stabilizing force between East and West.

- Ukraine needs both political and economic development in order to be a credible and viable regional actor,able to carry out this pivotal role, and to avoid becoming drawn into the Eastern fold.

- 	NATO enlargement should be geared towards Ukraine's ability to play a bridging role. A precipitousenlargement would raise Russian concerns, thus threatening Ukraine's own security and Moscow's relationswith the West to the detriment of overall European security.
**Historical Legacy**

	Historically, Ukraine has been both the target of and the site of various conflicts among competing empires,most notably Czarist and Soviet Russia, seeking to expand their domains or to solidify borders. Caught in thisvortex of conflict, Ukraine was able to gain freedom for approximately 10 years during the 700-odd year historyin the wake of the decline of the Kievan-Rus Kingdom in the 13th century. Emerging as an independent statein 1991, Ukraine has not forgotten its past and has geared much of its security policy on this basis.
	Ukraine faces three potential external security threats: First, a unilateral threat from Russia; second, aconcern of being caught in the crosshairs of a NATO-Russian conflict, reminiscent of its past; and, third, theeruption of irredentist claims along its borders, which were artificially created by the Soviet regime, and whichcan have claimants such as Russia and Romania, neither of which have signed bilateral treaties respectingUkraine's borders. This security triad is complicated by the zone of instability that confronts Ukraine, rangingfrom the Transdniester problem in neighboring Moldova, to the conflicts in the Caucuses to the East, as wellas in Russia itself, that can overflow to engulf it.

**The Russia Factor**

	For Ukrainian policymakers Russia poses both the most imminent as well as long-term threat to Ukraine'snational security. Prior to independence, the greater part of Ukraine had been under Russian control for over300 years. Ukrainian policymakers are well aware of the actual and potential pressures that Russia has at itsdisposal. Economically, Ukraine is dependent on Russia for oil and gas, as well as a major share of its trade.Culturally, the two peoples share many common points: religious orthodoxy, customs, similarities of languages,and a high degree of intermarriage--all of which can be positive factors in preventing open conflict, but which,on the negative side, can draw Ukraine towards Russia at the expense of Ukraine's own sovereignty. The BlackSea Fleet issue, even after a mutually acceptable division, will give Russia a presence in Crimea and thus addedleverage on Ukraine, as does the large Russian minority in Ukraine which comprises 22% of the population.Russia's geographic expanse also will guarantee Moscow a role in all regional affairs, including the Black Sealittoral, thus possibly making Russian interests compete against those of Ukraine.
	Kiev is aware that even in the optimal environment of membership in some form of Western alliance, itsexposure to Russian influences will continue. The tentacles that link both states are numerous, many of which,such as customs and languages, will not diminish over time with the internal economic development ofUkraine or its integration into the world economy.
	Kiev, therefore, has recognized the need for astute diplomacy, the main goal being not to irritate itsbilateral relationship with Russia. As a result, Ukraine has maintained a delicate balance of seeking to integrateitself into western structures, distancing itself from Russia, while also alleviating Moscow's concerns that astrong, pro-Western Ukraine will arise on its borders.
	These concerns have involved three simultaneous broad policy approaches: first, Ukraine has consistentlystated its role as a neutral, non-bloc country--as a signal to Russia of its nonhostile intentions. This continuingpolicy was stated as early as 1990, prior to independence. The emphasis is on non-bloc status--rather thanneutrality in the strict sense--since Ukraine views its security being enhanced through active, impartialinvolvement rather than in distancing itself from European issues. Ukraine has sought to translate this positioninto a positive political force binding it into the European fabric. This has been done, for example, by offeringitself as a potential mediator on issues, as it unsuccessfully sought to do in the Yugoslav conflict.  Second, Kievhas called for a new European security structure, which simultaneously serves as a rationale for its movingtowards European links and institutions without raising Moscow's suspicions. And, third, Ukraine hasassiduously parried Russian entreaties to join a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) military structure.Kiev fears Moscow's control of the CIS and its use as an instrument for the extension of Russian control intothe former republics. While Ukraine has been wary of the political and military dimensions of the CIS, it iscooperating in certain areas on the economic front. Under this strategy, Ukraine hopes to solidify its securitywhile at the same time assisting in the creation of the long-term goal of pan-European cooperation, includingRussia, which it believes will be the ultimate guarantor of its security.

**Looking West, Smiling East**

	Ukraine has carefully constructed its foreign policy in the wake of its initial setback in the flush of earlyindependence. At that time, Kiev anticipated that the West would welcome Ukraine as a prize in the post-Soviet world. Having exerted numerous resources for decades to stymy the Soviet threat, Kiev reasoned thatthe West would quickly embrace Ukraine, providing not only security but also political and economicassistance to prevent any future Russian threats.
	Kiev actively sought security assurances from the United States during former President LeonidKravchuk's May 1992, visit. The United States opposed this initiative, expressing the fear that such a stepwould invite similar demands by other states. That month Ukraine also signed the Lisbon Protocol, makingUkraine part of the START I process and, furthermore, obligating Ukraine to give up all of its 176 strategicmissiles not just the ones covered by the START I treaty.  However, that summer, Kiev began to stall on STARTI ratification, demanding security assurances as a prerequisite to any ratification. This moved the United Statesto meet many of Ukraine's concerns, culminating in the Trilateral Statement signed along with Russia inJanuary, 1994 which previewed the assurances that would be extended to Ukraine once START entered intoforce and Ukraine joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state party. Ukraine's parliament, which hadratified START I in November, 1993 with conditions, accepted the treaty without conditions in February 1994and Kiev became a signatory to the NPT late in 1994. It is expected that all nuclear warheads will be out ofUkraine by the end of 1996.
	Britain, France, and China joined in the security assurances also, thus committing the nuclear powers torespect Ukraine's independence and to refrain from the threat or use of force against Ukraine. The assurancesalso commit them to immediate UN Security Council consultations in the event of a nuclear security threat toUkraine. The results, however, were short of what some Ukrainian parliamentarians would have preferred,including one gambit aimed at committing the United States to come to Ukraine's military defense.
	Retention of the nuclear weapons was a hotly contested issue in the Ukrainian polity, mostly as a meansof leverage against any potential Russian threat and because Kiev had given up its tactical weapons by earlyMay 1992, without gaining anything in return. But Ukrainians realized that, due to not having operationalcontrol of the missiles, the maintenance costs involved, and the environmental and health threats thatdeteriorating missiles would pose, the retention of nuclear weapons was a self-defeating exercise. Kiev,however, is realistic that the assurances, while not a guarantee of its security, do give Ukraine recognition forits unilateral nuclear disarmament and acknowledge Ukraine's security concerns.
	During this time, Kiev was also seeking to build its security on a multilateral, regional basis. In 1993,Ukraine proposed a zone of stability and security in Central and Eastern Europe, stretching from the Baltic tothe Black Seas. This envisaged a loose alliance based on economic cooperation, security, settlement of borderdisputes, and the handling of national minorities issues. A series of consultations rather than formal ties wouldhave bound the members. The proposal was given short shrift in the West and by East European states whofeared it would block their goal of NATO membership and needlessly irritate Moscow. A similar Frenchproposal also failed.
	This experience--coupled with the West's pro-Russia policy, the NATO debate ending at the Polish border,and the reality of Kiev's Russian links--reinforced for the Ukrainian leadership the difficulties of moving fromunder the Russian shadow and hence the need to balance this reality with its future goal of pan-Europeancooperation. To bridge the gaps and to maintain its security, Kiev has been a proponent of a European securityconcept in which all states would participate equally. The underlying philosophy is that security is indivisible.
	Ukraine's dilemma is epitomized by its approach to NATO enlargement. Kiev has stated that it has nointention of joining NATO and will maintain strict neutrality and its nonbloc status. In this vein, Ukraine hasalso said it will not join the CIS collective security treaty. But, in a clear signal to Moscow, Ukraine has statedit sees no threat with NATO's enlargement, unlike Moscow, which would regard such a move as a threat toRussia's national interest. Ukraine has also said that no state (i.e., Russia) has the right to veto NATOenlargement.
	Kiev opposes a rapid eastward enlargement of NATO while Moscow opposes any expansion. Ukraine fearsrapid expansion would renew the tension of the Cold War, leaving Ukraine exposed to the pressures ofMoscow without the support of the West.  This would make Ukraine a buffer with all the inherent dangers thatsuch a position has historically brought for Ukraine. Ukraine's current view is that the lack of tension precludesjustification for NATO's rapid enlargement, or for that matter the creation of a CIS military bloc.
	Ukraine's NATO position, however, has not prevented it from concluding bilateral military cooperationagreements, or expanding its cooperation with NATO. In February 1994, Ukraine was the first former Sovietrepublic to sign onto Partnership for Peace (PFP) and in September 1995, it presented an Individual PartnershipProgram (IPP). Kiev has made clear that it will not limit its role to individual programs like the North AtlanticCooperation Council (NACC) and PFP.  It has also made it equally clear that such activities will not threatenRussia or lead to a Ukrainian military relationship with NATO. Along these lines, in 1992, Kiev dispatched 400plus troops as part of the UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) peacekeeping mission in Sarajevo and has alsoassigned 550 troops for the current IFOR (Implementation Force) mission which is helping implement theBosnia peace accord. Ukraine sees these roles as not only strengthening its security by linking it closer toEurope, but also as participation in a process of building a unified Europe, and gaining recognition for Ukraine.
	Kiev has balanced this approach towards the West with parallel moves towards Russia. Ukraine hasreached a number of military agreements with Russia. Some Ukrainian officials have not dismissedparticipating in a future Russian-sponsored military cooperation arrangement of Slavic peoples, while otherofficials have balanced this by not totally dismissing any future NATO membership. And, underlining theultimate balancing act, Ukraine has kept open the possibility of becoming some type of mediator in NATO'srelations with Russia.

**Ukraine's Bridging Role**

	Ukraine appears destined to continue balancing its interests between East and West and has the potentialto grow as an unofficial bridge between the two. In this environment, NATO enlargement would be seen asless a threat by Moscow, and Kiev's role could help dissolve the barriers between the West and the East,facilitating Russia's integration into the European fold. The sequencing would be important, since any hastyenlargement of NATO without a strong, intervening Ukraine could unbalance these developments, andconsign Ukraine to the Russian sphere.
	There is always the danger that Ukraine could lose some of its flexibility, but it appears to be in the interestof both sides to guarantee Ukraine's role: for Russia, because it presents a non-hostile border state; and, forNATO, because Ukraine offers itself as a means to regional security. Ukraine has a population of 52 millionon a large territory; a strategic geographic location bordering on seven countries; and agricultural andindustrial resources--putting it in an excellent position to succeed as a mediator and become an importantregional and European actor. The approach has an added domestic benefit of attenuating the philosophicalsplit between the pro-West and pro-East forces that forms a major divide in the Ukrainian polity--as witnessedby the political undercurrents for creation of some form of union with Russia. The strategy's shortcomingwould be an internal economic and political collapse of Ukraine which, because of its borders, large ethnicRussian minority, and economic ties to Russia, would make it a Russian problem and thus put Moscow in therole of finding a solution.
	Since 1994, Ukraine has taken a number of steps aimed at getting its economic house in order, as acomponent of external security.  Under former President Kravchuk there had been a strong anti-Russiacomponent in Ukraine's foreign policy aimed primarily at establishing a Ukrainian identity separate fromRussia.  His administration had viewed the potential Russian threat as a unifying element for the nascent stateand as an excuse for bypassing economic reforms which, it believed, could ignite social and politicaldislocations that Moscow could exploit. 
	The current administration of Leonid Kuchma is more realistic. It views Russia as a strategic partner andhas made maintaining good relations with Moscow a priority. Kuchma has also instituted an economic reformprogram, including freeing of prices, large and small scale privatization, and a reduction of subsidies. Thesemeasures have run into political problems in the parliament and among bureaucrats and others who regardthem as a threat to their political and economic interests.  Thus, Ukraine's reform efforts have been less thansuccessful. Kiev needs to further separate its economic relationship with Russia from its political.  Rational andbeneficial reasons for Ukrainian-Russian economic relations too often degenerate into a debilitating politicaldebate regarding Ukraine's sovereignty.

Recommendations
	Western policymakers need to focus on Ukraine as a potential solution to a security dilemma.Unfortunately, Ukraine has too often been viewed as a fragile state, subject to internal collapse, Russian control,and ill-fitted, due to history and geography, to be a true European partner. Such thinking leaves Ukraine toan Eastern bloc orientation and the question then becomes to what degree and in what timeframe. This wouldnot serve the West's, nor Russia's, and definitely not Ukraine's interests. The challenge for the West is to helpUkraine become a viable and stable regional state, which includes economic and political support and rapidextension of links with the West. It entails helping Ukraine get its bearings and strength for the eventual rolethat Kiev, irrespective of its desires, seems predestined to carry out.
- 	As the process of NATO enlargement proceeds, NATO needs to be aware of the impact this will have onUkraine's security as well as Europe's overall stability. The West should undertake a concerted effort tosupport and strengthen Ukraine and gear NATO enlargement to Ukraine's own domestic and externalabilities to maintain its security.

- 	Ukraine has the ability to play a bridging role between NATO and Russia and more effort should be putinto developing this aspect, including possibly formalizing Ukraine's stated non-bloc status in order toheighten its credibility as a bridge and as a regional stabilizing force.

- 	None of these efforts should be regarded as ends in themselves, but rather as building blocks to pan-European cooperation and integration.

Ambassador Popadiuk is a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and served as Ambassador to Ukraine1992-1993. He is currently the State Department's International Affairs Adviser at the Industrial College of theArmed Forces (ICAF).   He can be contacted at ICAF by telephoning 202-685-3984.

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