Number 162, May 1999

**Mutualism:**
***An American Strategy for the Next Century
by Hugh De Santis

President Clintonlikes to talk about building bridges to the 21st century, but there is no constructiongang on the scene. The truth of the matter is that, nearly a decade since the end of theCold War, the United States is still without a blueprint for the future. From the Bushadministration's vacuous "new world order" rhetoric to the "engagement andenlargement" effluvia of the Clinton administration, the United States hassubstituted slogans for strategy. 
Such policy drift is partly attributableto post-Cold War complacency, and partly to the triumphalist belief in the march ofliberal-democracy that permeates American foreign policy attitudes. There are, of course,differences in the way foreign affairs practitioners view the world. Neo-Wilsoniansbelieve that a rational and educable world will eventually adopt the same values. Realistsbelieve that the United States must exert its power and coopt others into joininginternational posses that the American sheriff would naturally lead. Americannationalists, so-called neo-Reaganites, contend that the United States bears a specialduty to create a peaceful and moral international order, whileneo-isolationists—America Firsters, libertarians, pacifists—oppose the politicaland economic cost of an American empire.

On the surface, these options appear to bequite different, at least in terms of what is required of the United States. Upon closerexamination, however, they are all variations of American exceptionalism, and they alldepart from the same premises about the contemporary international environment as it hasevolved since the end of the Cold War.**The Mythology of Unipolarity
Debate about the nature and implicationsof global change is bounded by two broad assumptions. First, despite the spread ofliberal-democracy, the world is far more complicated, unpredictable, and dangerous than itwas during the Cold War. Second, the maintenance of a peaceful and stable internationalsystem accordingly depends on the moral and political leadership, if not hegemony, of theUnited States. Of the two propositions, the first is unequivocally true. The assumptionthat it is up to the United States—the world's "superpower"—tomaintain peace and order in a potentially turbulent world is dubious. 

The United States has been the stabilizingforce in the transition from the bipolar order to the current messy multipolarity. It wasthe United States that rescued Kuwait from the clutches of Iraqi expansionism, producedthe Dayton accords, and bailed out Mexico in 1995, and it is the United States that istaking the lead in addressing the global financial crisis.

But the image of an American paladin isalso the product of post-Cold War hype. Increasingly, language defines politics. From NATOexpansion, to the containment of China, to the defense of human rights in Kosovo, it isthe rhetoric of unipolarity and superpowerdom that drives policy and supplies its content.Politically, the United States assumes leadership because political leaders believe theworld will plunge into chaos without it; psychologically, because it strokes the nation'svanity. 

America's friends and allies contribute tothe hype. Although foreign governments may privately grumble about American hegemony, theyhappily defer to American power in times of crisis, as they did during the Cold War,because they expect the United States to come to their aid if things go wrong. 

Post-Cold War U.S. global leadership isfurther reinforced by the myth of American exceptionalism. The original Puritan settlersand their descendants believed that they were "chosen" by God to build acommunity that others would emulate. Their descendants were uniformly convinced "thatthe entire past of the human race was only preparation for the appearance of Americansociety."

In the aftermath of bipolarism, the samereligious view inspires contemporary approaches to foreign policy, all of which aim touniversalize the American liberal-democratic experience. The political and moralbankruptcy of communism and the perceived collapse of the Asian economic model as asubstitute for free-market capitalism have rehistoricized the American national experienceand the values and beliefs that underlie it. 

Such a self-image, however, obscures thereality that we are also part of a larger process of global change that is altering ourlives as well. The world is a long way from the Promised Land of liberal-democracy.Meanwhile, as the bloom on international stock markets fades and global economic outputcontracts, the world may not look as Americanizable as it once did. But even if suchdisturbances turn out to be temporary interruptions of economic growth, it is unrealisticto believe that we are headed for a second American century, never mind an Americanempire. 

First, in contrast to its economicdominance following World War II, the United States no longer possesses the resources tofix the world's problems. Despite its recent economic vigor, its current share of worldproduction is somewhere around 20 percent, it suffers from a massive trade imbalance, itsgold reserves are roughly half that of the European Union (EU), and it is the world'slargest debtor nation. Although there have been gains in worker productivity, the factorsthat powered the economic boom of the 1990s—corporate downsizing, computerization,reduced health-care costs, and a strong dollar—are not likely to be sustained. Nor isAmerica's ability to police the world, the Clinton administration's belated defense budgetbuild-up notwithstanding.

Second, the image of global sheriff hasnot resonated with the American public—an increasing hodge-podge of special interestgroups. Although there is widespread support for the promotion of liberal-democraticvalues, NATO, and, as the polls reflected in the 1998 crisis with Iraq, selective militarystrikes, the public remains generally opposed to American intervention to resolve disputesin faraway places that are perceived to be removed from the daily concerns of Americans. 

Third, absent a global threat to peace,the United States is likely to find it increasingly difficult to marshal internationalsupport for its policies. Examples include the opposition of the United Nations and keyEuropean allies to Washington's contemplated use of military force against Iraq in 1998;and, the initial reluctance of the European allies to employ force against Serbia becauseof its actions in Kosovo. The reality is that other nations will not replicate Americanways, much less rubber stamp policy initiatives that they judge to be antithetical totheir interests. The more the assistance of other states is required to implement U.S.policy initiatives, the more they will demand a voice in the formulation of policy.**The Concept of Mutualism
If the world is truly changing, aspolicymakers say it is, and if no nation, including the United States, possesses theresources to solve or even manage the array of global problems that lie ahead, we may haveto adopt new policy orientations, including a non-American-centered framework that I call *mutualism*.

Mutualism is an interest-based rather thana norm-centered concept of international relations. It emphasizes regional rather thanglobal approaches to international cooperation, recognizes the continued importance of thenation-state, and is *ipso facto* a non-hegemonic approach to international security.Its relevance to the policymaker can be ascertained by considering its applicability tothe emerging economic, social, cultural, and politico-military trends that are shaping thelandscape of the next century.**The Global Economy
Increasingly, we live in a world ofborderless econo-mies. Developments in one area affect the lives of people everywhere. Inthe interaction among businesses as well as governments, the 19th century utilitarianbelief that the selfish pursuit of individual interests contributed to the good of thewhole society is giving way to the view that individual interests are more likely to beachieved through cooperative undertakings.

This is no abstract concept. Mutualism isevident in the privatization of state-owned enterprises, in the streamlining ofbusinesses, and particularly in the pace of mergers and acquisitions. Businessconsolidations and alliances highlight the fact that competition is becoming a function ofthe strategic choices that companies make. With few exceptions, corporations can no longerpursue a course that relies purely on the competitive forces of the market to set prices.

Increased competition and the unrestrictedmovement of capital also have made it impossible for all but a few countries to beself-sufficient. Governments have accordingly felt compelled to harmonize nationaleconomic policies. The European Monetary Union and the arrival of the *euro*exemplifythis trend. Arguably, the success of Euroland may stimulate economic integrationelsewhere, much as passage of the Single Act in 1986 and the road to Maastricht energizedthe formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Group (APEC), the North AmericanFree Trade Association (NAFTA), and the Mercado Commun del Coro Sur (MERCOSUR), the LatinAmerican common market.

To be sure, the financial crisis in EastAsia, the collapse of the Russian *ruble,* and the devaluation of the Brazilian *real*have aroused understandable worries about the viability of economic interdependence.Still, the international financial crisis has not ended the trend toward regionalcooperation. Prior to the financial crisis set in motion by Thailand's devaluation of the *baht*in July 1997, intra-Asian trade was 50 percent higher than a decade before. Althoughinternal trade has since declined, APEC remains committed to the liberal "actionagenda" that it announced at the Osaka summit in 1995, including the removal of tradebarriers by 2020. In spite of the fallout from Asia, the 34 states that convened in April1998 at the second "summit of the Americas" in Santiago continue to work towardthe formation of a "free-trade area of the Americas" in 2005. Similarly inMERCOSUR, regional cooperation has weathered the Asian-Russian crisis.

For mutualism to work, however, nationalgovernments need to be more far-sighted in the formulation of economic policy and moreflexible in its implementation. Rather than rely on self-correcting market mechanisms,central banks and international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund willneed to relax fiscal austerity requirements to ensure that borrowers and investors haveaccess to credit and tolerate periodic deviations from economic orthodoxy such as thecapital controls recently imposed by Malaysia. 

Rich states also must be tolerant oftemporary impediments to trade resulting from regional integration. The United States hasbeen concerned about the potential trade-distorting consequences of MERCOSUR. Suchconsequences are a small price to pay for new and vibrant markets that will increasinglyabsorb high value-added imports, as the history of European integration since the Treatyof Rome in 1957 abundantly demonstrates. 

The creation of a mutually beneficialinternational economic order requires a concomitant commitment on the part of developingcountries. It is equally in their long-term interest to eliminate trade-impedingconcentrations of economic power, prevent corruption, and comply with rulings by the WorldTrade Organization. 

Finally, "rules of the road" areneeded to lessen the frequency and gravity of financial upheaval and to contain the greedand excesses of an unfettered market.

Clearly, economic interdependence willnecessitate policy accommodations, especially by the United States. Mindful that itseconomic and political interests are interconnected, the United States is likely to limitthe use of sanctions in the future to cases that enjoy international support.Interdependence will also alter American leadership of the world economy. If economic andmonetary integration succeed, the European Union will share in running the internationalmonetary system with the United States. The emergence of the *euro* as an alternativereserve currency will not only help countries that trade with Europe to stabilize theirexchange rates, it will also lessen America's burden of being the central banker for theworld.**Social Inclusivism
Mutualism implies the creation of moreinclusivist national and regional communities. Greater inclusiveness will enhance theproductive capacity of societies and reduce the likelihood of social violence by those whohave not benefitted from the process of globalization. 

Because the fruits of economic growth willnot be evenly distributed by the workings of the free market, national political leaderswill need to harmonize conflicting interests among competing elements of society. To avertthe social cleavages that may result from economic insecurity, governments will need toprovide social subsidies for the disadvantaged (unemployment insurance, pensions, medicalcare, and education and technical training credits).

Governments, however, must be able toafford the cost of social programs. Without increased productivity, the cost ofmaintaining an ever-widening social net would eventually become prohibitive. Soaringwelfare costs will not only inflate budget deficits, they will also lead to higher laborcosts and job flight. The investment of public funds in education and job retrainingprograms will help to ease the social burden. The relocation of workers to expanding labormarkets will also help. So will changes in welfare legislation that reduce state benefitsfor part-time employment.

The benefits of giving more people a stakein a shared future will also pay international dividends. Excluding entire societies fromthe process of global modernization increases the risk of ethnonationalist violence,terrorism, and warfare. It will be in the interest of rich states to encourage countrieson the socioeconomic periphery to actively participate in regional social and economicintegration, as the EU has done and as Mercosur is doing.

In the long term, the development ofcohesive regional communities will improve the prospect of managing international socialproblems that globalization has exacerbated—migration, environmental decay, drugabuse, the spread of infectious diseases, terrorism. Aid-arms swaps might offer social andeconomic assistance to poor states to curtail costly military programs. Aid-nature swapsmight similarly improve the chances of preserving the global ecology—themodernization of an industrial plant, say, for reduction in greenhouse gases.**Cultural Tolerance 
Social and economic integration cannot besustained without the constructive participation of the diverse cultures that comprisethem. National and international cohesion requires sensitivity to different culturaltraditions, mores, and values. 

The revolution in communications andtransportation has accelerated the flow of people across borders, a mirror image of thewidespread movement of capital and ideas. To preserve their cultural identity, manysocieties tend to marginalize ethnic, linguistic, religious, and racial outsiders. Butcultural parochialism deprives societies of the productive labor and creative energy ofnewcomers. It also creates separatist enclaves, inviting social upheaval and internationalconflict, as seen in the Caucasus, Central Africa, and in former Yugoslavia. Somesocieties, drawing a lesson from the remarkable American tolerance of diversity, mayeventually conclude that the social and economic benefits of assimilating outsiders arelikely to exceed the perceived loss of national homogeneity. 

Cultural tolerance also requires anunderstanding of and respect for different values. It precludes political paternalism ofthe European colonialist type and the imperialism of ideas that we see from the UnitedStates. The force-feeding of American values as a condition of aid is viewed abroad as anarrogant intrusion in the affairs of other peoples. However ethical it may seem to us, itis frequently politically counterproductive. Besides, can Americans be certain that oursis the only path to a free and harmonious society? In a world of "valuepluralism," to use Isaiah Berlin's term, we must all be tolerant of the politicalchoices others make—choices, it should be emphasized, that are not God-given but areproducts of different cultural traditions and experiences.**Cooperative Security
Because the world's wealth, power, andstatus will not be proportionately distributed among its constituent nations, challengesto the existing order of the international system are likely to recur. In the post-ColdWar euphoria, international opinion counted on the United Nations to be the guardian ofworld peace. Resource constraints, conflicting national interests, and ill-definedobjectives have limited United Nations peacekeeping effectiveness. So the internationalcommunity has come to rely on the United States. But the United States lacks the resourcesand the public will to do the job indefinitely. If neither the UN nor a U.S. securitystewardship is possible, then peace must become the shared responsibility of small groupsof states, pledging to maintain order in their regions. 

In the security context, mutualismrecognizes that those states which have the most to lose from the breakdown of order intheir neighborhood have the greatest incentive to preserve order. Thus, logic and equitydictate that European states should bear the burden of establishing order in their region,starting with the former Yugoslavia. Once the Asia-Pacific states regain their economicmomentum, they should likewise begin to develop security structures in APEC and theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations that could link Northeast and Southeast Asia.

When regional or subregional securityorganizations lack the political will or the military muscle to contain destructiveactions, they may request help from outsiders. This was the case with the European allies,who were able neither to inhibit nor contain the warfare that resulted from theunravelling of Yugoslavia, and with the Gulf Cooperation Council, following Iraq'sinvasion of Kuwait. 

Some regional conflicts may threaten thewell-being of the larger international community. Iraq posed such a threat in 1990. Onecould imagine a crisis of similar magnitude if Beijing interdicted international access tothe South China Sea, or if tensions over the control of energy resources in the CentralAsia-Caucasus-Caspian Sea region led to a Russo-Iranian-Turkish war. Nominally, theresponsibility for redressing such disruptions would come under the purview of the UnitedNations. But the real decisionmaking authority would be wielded by a UN InternationalSecurity Directorate (ISD), which would have five permanent and five rotating members. 

Most conflicts will not challenge regionalstability, let alone pose a threat to world peace. As the unrest in Somalia, Rwanda, andTajikistan illustrate, violence most often results from tensions associated withnation-building or from unresolved ethnic rivalries. When states are incapable of managingtheir own affairs, and when UN mediation fails, the international community might beforced to establish some form of trusteeship to be administered by regional actors.**Return to the Future
Whatever path we take into the future, thecomplex problems posed by globalization will require a multilateral approach tostatecraft, namely, what I have dubbed *mutualism*. Eventually, Americans will haveto abandon the fantasy that they are a society that is in but not of this world and cometo terms with the reality that their fate is inextricably intertwined with that of otherpeoples.

America’s allies and friends willalso have to participate in the process. Until now, their expectations of a Pax Americanahave fostered an attitude of complacency. But today, no one can have it both ways. Keyactors in every part of the world will be forced to play a more active role in preservinginternational stability, partly because it is in their interests to do so, and partlybecause they can no longer depend on the United States to perform this task for them.Fortuitously, the growth of regional political and economic cooperation in Europe, EastAsia, and the Americas may be a harbinger of the future. For regional integration willalso contribute to security cooperation and, in so doing, increase the likelihood thatAmerica's allies and friends will respond to the global challenges that lie ahead as real,rather than, artificial partners.

Hugh De Santis is professor of international securitypolicy at the National War College, National Defense University, and is a former careerofficer in the State Department. He is the author of Beyond Progress: An InterpretativeOdyssey to the Future (University of Chicago Press, 1996).

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

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Editor - Jonathan W. PierceNOTE

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