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Number 141, May 1998

Rethinking the Role of Nuclear Weapons

by David C. Gompert

Conclusion

In the new era, the United States does notneed to rely on nuclear weapons to prevent a global challenger from upsetting the statusquo, to compensate for weakness in conventional defense, or to impress others of itspower. While the threat of nuclear response to conventional attack is no longer crucial toU.S. strategy, there is a mounting danger that rogue states might adopt this tactic todeter U.S. power projection. At the same time, the United States does need nuclear weaponsto deter not only nuclear attack but also biological attack, which could be just as deadlyand which might not be deterred by the threat of U.S. conventional retaliation. The UnitedStates should aim to reduce the importance and attractiveness of nuclear weapons, todelegimitize their use in response to conventional threats, yet also to sharpen nucleardeterrence against biological weapons. It could do this by stating that it would usenuclear weapons only in retaliation for attacks with weapons of mass destruction (WMD)�inessence, a �no-first-use-of-WMD� policy. 

Introduction

The reduction of U.S. and Russian nucleararsenals suggests that such weapons have a reduced role in world affairs. But what thatrole should be is unclear. Should nuclear weapons be available only to prevent nuclear waror, instead, to underpin global security? The two concepts have divergent implications. Ifnuclear weapons have any use beyond retaliation for nuclear attack, the danger of nuclearwar is bound to be higher. Conversely, lowering the danger of nuclear violence weakens theutility of the fear that that danger produces.

In the Cold War, the fear of nuclear warwas used by the United States to engender caution and stability. Had it not been for thatfear, the 20th century might have had three world wars instead of two. The nuclearstandoff�parity between arsenals large enough to assure mutual destruction�negated thenuclear threat of each superpower and thus the likelihood of nuclear war. Yet,simultaneously, the Americans shrewdly negated that negation, on their side, bythreatening to use nuclear weapons if need be to block any Soviet aggression. Fearing fortheir way of life, they risked nuclear war, potentially annihilation, to buttress thestatus quo. 

In a world transformed, do we still needto parlay the fear of nuclear war in order to secure U.S. interests and internationalpeace? The American way of life is not threatened; rather, it is on the march. Because themain current of change�globalization�promotes its interests and ideals, the UnitedStates no longer wants to freeze the international situation. U.S. technological andconventional military capabilities instill confidence in means other than nuclear weaponsto thwart aggression.

Should we therefore embrace the oppositeof the U.S. Cold-War philosophy about nuclear weapons, disengaging them from internationalsecurity and military strategy, reserving them strictly to ensure that nuclear war neveroccurs? Is this Humankind�s chance to eradicate nuclear fear, even if the weaponsthemselves cannot be eradicated? The problem with such a smooth and alluring idea is thatinternational peace and U.S. interests might suffer, in very real ways, if the fear ofnuclear war is nullified. 

The hot debate about whether to abolishnuclear weapons is less important than the abolitionists think. Nuclear weapons are hereto stay�period. The more practical argument over the right size of the U.S. nucleararsenal will be bracketed by a few thousand warheads at the high end and a few hundred atthe low end. That difference matters less for U.S. interests and international security,including whether nuclear weapons are used again, than the more fundamental question:Should nuclear weapons have any purpose other than to prevent nuclear war?

Let us not bureaucratically extend thedeterrence concept of the first phase of the nuclear age while claiming that the role ofnuclear weapons has shrunk simply because there are fewer of them. By the same token, letus resist the emotional urge to �retire� nuclear weapons without appraising their futurevalue in securing national interests and international peace.

The Role of Nuclear Weapons from 1945 tothe 1980s

The atomic bombs dropped on Japan were notconsidered war-fighting weapons but rather war-ending weapons. Such was the purpose,prediction, and result. The early post-war years were consumed by anxiety about theSoviets getting the bomb and wooly proposals for international control. Once the UnitedStates became threatened by Soviet nuclear weapons, a new debate began: Should nuclearweapons be used to fight wars, to deter any Soviet aggression, or only to deter nuclearwar? The passing of time�and of intellectual torch, from Dulles to McNamara toKissinger�only sharpened the dilemma. As both the potential scale of nuclear war and theperceived threat of Soviet expansion grew, both the risk of threatening to use nuclearweapons and the risk of not doing so rose. 

The option that prevailed was to rely onnuclear weapons to block Soviet aggression, back up Cold War diplomacy, and deter nuclearattack. This was manifested in employment doctrine (initially massive retaliation, thenflexible response); in weapon types, deployment, and cooperation with allies (tacticalnuclear weapons and the nuclear umbrella); in targeting (extensive and diverse); and inthe politics of U.S.-Soviet confrontation (insistence on parity, rejection of minimaldeterrence, the arms race, and nuclear brinkmanship). The chosen strategy dismissedsentiment on the Left that nuclear war must be avoided at any cost. Nuclear fear wasneeded to discourage Soviet recklessness. Lest that fear be eased, some risk of nuclearwar was worth running.

Behind the common slogan �better deadthan red� was a strategic calculus. The Soviet Union was viewed as no ordinary enemy, butas a mortal, messianic one with untold resources. Moscow wanted to revise the status quo,if not to convert the world to communism then at least to get the upper hand over theUnited States in vital regions (Europe, East Asia, the Middle East). The U.S. response wasat once conservative and high-risk. To preserve stability, apocalypse was threatened. Noone put the paradox better than Kissinger: �The enormity of modern weapons makes thethought of all-out war repugnant, but the refusal to run any risks would amount to handingthe Soviets a blank check� (*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, 1957). 

This was no bluff. The United States waswilling to initiate nuclear violence if conventional defense failed. Since the SovietUnion was judged the stronger military power, the failure of conventional defense in theevent of war had to be anticipated. So U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons to deteraggression led to preparations for actual use, (e.g., battlefield deployment, operationalplans, and training).

Although the immediate object of this U.S.doctrine of nuclear �first use� was the Soviet tank threat to West Germany, hard-nosedthinkers were comfortable with it for wider reasons. From Napoleon on, neither classicalbalance of power nor attempts at supranational authority could spare the world fromincreasingly lethal conflicts. As of August of 1945, war had become so destructive thatgreat powers had to avoid it. Sure enough, as the Cold War wore on, direct war betweengreat powers came to look less likely. But if the world were made entirely safe fromnuclear weapons�if never used first they would never be used at all�this salutary effectwould be lost. So as citizens learned to live with the bomb, defense intellectuals learnedto appreciate it.

Because nuclear weapons figured inmilitary strategy, they became important symbols of Soviet-American confrontation. As thetoken of ultimate power�the ability to destroy civilizations�each side�s nucleararsenal would be expanded and modernized as necessary to deny the other an edge that mighttip the larger, global balance. The belief that such an edge could decide the outcome ofan East-West crisis added �escalation management� (a classic Cold-War oxymoron) to theportfolio of purposes served by nuclear weapons. As a consequence, American strategistswere deaf to calls to slash the stockpile and to strip nuclear weapons of every purposebut to deter nuclear war. 

Nuclear Weapons and World Politics in theNew Era

The conditions that once led the UnitedStates to rely on nuclear weapons to shore up its strategic position and internationalstability no longer exist. Although now predominant and unthreatened, the United States isnot a status-quo power. Rather, it is a beneficiary of international change, which yieldseconomic liberalization, democratization, integration and improved security. Most of theworld�s econo-mic output, technological capacity, and military power lie within thecircle of free-market democracies�the Americas, Europe, East Asia�a community thatcontinues to expand. U.S. enemies are embattled by free-market forces, democratic idealsand truthful information. The success of the past two decades, beyond any expectation, hasdispelled the dread of instability. This promising trend is reducing the danger of thesort of world war that made this century history�s bloodiest�the danger that caused theUnited States to engage nuclear weapons in the cause of equilibrium. 

The prime mover of the favorable course ofworld politics is information technology, which is propagating investment, reform, andaccountable government. It is also increasingly crucial to power, including militarypower. A nation�s ability to create and apply information technology depends on itsopenness and its involvement in the world economy. Authoritarian nations with excessivestate economic power, however large, will be handicapped in the dominant technology of thenew era. The world�s most successful powers will likely be free-market democracies withconvergent interests and outlooks, as is now the case.

Some scholars of geopolitics believe thatclinging to its top ranking should be America�s paramount objective. But in reality, theUnited States has an increasing equity in the success of the other great powers�Japan,the European Union and, yes, China. U.S. foreign policy is designed not to limit othersbut to collaborate and grow with them. The United States need not fear any challenger tothe extent that it must use the danger of general nuclear war to help contain it, as itdid the Soviet Union.

America�s strong position is commonlyviewed as the outcome of the Cold War. But it is, more importantly, a natural and enduringcondition of the information revolution�the product of U.S. openness and the shrinking ofits government. Although the U.S. nuclear arsenal is the world�s best, it is no longer anemblem of American power. Compared to U.S. technological and economic leadership, nuclearweapons neither distinguish the United States nor reflect the essence of its strength. Sodiluting the symbolic significance of nuclear weapons cannot hurt and could help Americaninterests and image.

Non-nuclear military strength, incontrast, is integral to American power in the new era. The forces of the United Statescan defend its interests wherever required. Because the United States has begun to exploitthe new technology strategically, its lead is growing. U.S. forces are being networked,making them more lethal, less vulnerable, and capable of integrated operations. Byharnessing information technology, it has the chance to prevail in any conflict withrelatively little loss of life. The idea that the United States would risk�indeed,start�nuclear war to avoid military defeat is a detail of a chapter of history nowclosed.

With its growing conventional militarylead, the absence of a mortal enemy, and its confidence in the face of change, the UnitedStates could decouple nuclear weapons from its military strategy and foreign policywithout endangering the nation. But before redefining the purpose of nuclear weapons, wemust ask if there are any emerging non-nuclear threats that warrant the threat of anuclear response.

The Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD)

Like most technologies, dangerous orbenign, biochemical technology is spreading as the global economy integrates.Consequently, U.S. forces, U.S. allies and eventually U.S. society will be vulnerable toattack with biological and chemical weapons delivered by long-range missiles orclandestine means (which will become easier as globalization makes the United States moreaccessible). Of the two types, biological weapons present the greater danger of causaltieson a nuclear scale. Ten kilograms of anthrax is at least as deadly as a 10-kilogramnuclear explosive and is cheaper, easier to assemble, and more portable. While chemicalweapons are more likely to be used to disrupt U.S. military operations, biological weaponspose more terrible and lingering dangers to the general population, much like nuclearweapons. Initially, rogue states might threaten to use biological weapons, too, againstU.S. troops in a local war. However, as the United States neutralizes this threat byexploiting information technology�dispersing its forces and striking accurately fromafar�determined enemies will develop longer-range means to threaten U.S. forces, alliesand territory. Try as it might to arrest the spread of these weapons, the United Statesmust prepare to prevent or defend against their use.

Defense alone, with anti-missile andcounterforce weapons, cannot make American forces and citizens entirely safe from lethalbiological agents. So deterrence is crucial. If an enemy is already receiving the fullbrunt of U.S. conventional strikes when it opts to threaten biological attack, the threatof U.S. conventional reprisal will be ineffective. Since the United States has foreswornbiological and chemical weapons, that leaves nuclear deterrence.

Were the United States to declare that,with the Cold War over, nuclear weapons should be used only to deter nuclear war, there isa theoretical chance that other nations would be less inclined to obtain them. But as apractical matter, the countries whose WMD programs most worry the United States are roguestates, like Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. Since their aim is to deter U.S. conventionalattack, an American pledge not to use nuclear weapons first would not diminish theirinterest in nuclear weapons. 

Such states already assume that usingnuclear weapons against U.S. interests could trigger U.S. nuclear retaliation. They mayview biological weapons as more usable, more credible, and less risky than nuclearweapons. A U.S. pledge not to use nuclear weapons first would make them even more eager toobtain and less hesitant to brandish and use biological weapons. 

But would the United States be right torespond with nuclear weapons to a biological attack? When thousands of Soviet nuclearweapons were poised to strike, the first use of nuclear weapons by the United Statesrisked a general nuclear cataclysm. In contrast, U.S. nuclear retaliation for a biologicalattack by a rogue state would risk, at worst, another biological or conceivably a nuclearattack. Far more likely, having proven its resolve, the United States would deterescalation and prevail. By being prepared to respond to any WMD attack with nuclearweapons, and saying so, the United States is less likely to have to do so.

Of course, an actual U.S. nuclearretaliation for biological attack would be a grave, world-changing event. But it would notimperil the Nation and its global interests, let alone human viability. And it would makeless likely that *any* WMD would ever be used again�at least against the UnitedStates. 

Dull Deterrence and Sharp Deterrence

The strongest argument for a nuclearno-first-use pledge during the Cold War was that it could save us from nuclear hell. Thestrongest argument against such a pledge was that it could condemn us to Communist hell.Now that the Soviet Union is gone, neither argument is persuasive. Concepts saved in theattic from a different time, a different world, are not helpful. A fresh idea is needed. 

During the Cold War, the United Stateswould not exclude a nuclear response to any attack. It was motivated by a general concernabout the Soviet menace and a specific concern about an attack on West Germany. The formerwas the context and the latter was the focal point of U.S. doctrine on initial use. It wassurely the specific prospect that the United States might resort to nuclear weapons if warbroke out in Europe that got the Kremlin�s attention. The general U.S. unwillingness toexclude nuclear first-use reinforced the particular application.

In light of the difficulty of preventingor defending against the growing threat of biological weapons, the United States wouldmake a fateful mistake if it restricted the purpose of nuclear weapons to deterringnuclear attack. The gains from such a shift are nebulous; the cost all too clear�aninvitation to potential enemies to acquire, threaten and use biological weapons. 

We want rogue states to think thatbiological weapons cannot be used and can endanger their possessors because they couldcause a nuclear response. We want them to feel this fear quite sharply. To the extent thatthe United States fails to pinpoint this problem in defining the purpose of nuclearweapons, the fear will be dull. Current U.S. policy regarding the use of nuclear weaponsis not substantially different from its Cold War policy; it maintains ambiguity about thecircumstances under which the United States would resort to nuclear weapons. Despitegrowing U.S. conventional military superiority, even a nuclear response to conventionalattack is not excluded.

During the Cold War, given the magnitudeof the Soviet threat, both broad deterrence and focussed deterrence were required. In thenew era, the need for broad deterrence is gone and the need for sharp deterrence is acute.Yet, so far-fetched is the thought that the United States would use nuclear weapons inresponse to conventional attack that the current open-ended policy dulls deterrence. (Ifthe policy causes sharp fear, why did the United States have to warn Saddam Hussein thatuse of WMD in the Gulf War could trigger a nuclear response?) Ambiguity is sometimesuseful. In the current era, it does more harm than good. 

The United States should warn explicitlythat it might respond with nuclear weapons to WMD attacks against U.S. interests.(Chemical weapons could be included, though they are less dangerous than biologicalweapons.) To sharpen the fear to a finer point, the United States should also say that itforesees no need to use nuclear weapons except in response to WMD attacks. By declaringthat the only legitimate use of WMD (i.e., nuclear weapons) is in retaliation for WMDattack, such a policy would strengthen deterrence by underscoring that a WMD attack wouldwarrant such a response. It would further bolster deterrence by erasing the incredibleaspect of current policy�i.e., nuclear response to conventional aggression. Finally, itwould create a new threshold separating WMD from conventional warfare, which would clearlybe in the U.S. interest, what with its conventional strength and its promise never to usebiological or chemical weapons.

In its effort to stem the spread ofnuclear weapons, the United States has said, in effect, it would not use nuclear weaponsagainst states that foreswear them. But what if such a state acquires biological weapons,which can kill Americans no less than nuclear explosives? Indeed, what if it used them? Inview of this danger, the United States should explicitly retract its pledge not to usenuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that use biological weapons. Far fromundermining nuclear non-proliferation, an American pledge not to use WMD first could helpthe cause by reducing the utility of nuclear weapons. And it would underscore that any useof a weapon of mass horror would justify a response in kind.

How would such a U.S. policy work towardanother nuclear power, say, Russia or China? Now that Russia�s conventional forces areweak, it has reversed its doctrine not to use nuclear weapons first. Given its decayingcommand and control system and the possibility of political turmoil, this shift couldprove dangerous. And, Russia is maintaining its ability to assemble and use biologicalweapons. An American policy not to be the first to use WMD would both �delegitimize�Russia�s growing reliance on nuclear weapons and sharpen deterrence against its use ofbiological weapons. Similarly, the policy would preempt Chinese interest in nuclearfirst-use and in biological weapons. At present, the Chinese would likely applaud andsubscribe to such a U.S. pledge.

A U.S. doctrine to deter all WMD withnuclear weapons would require the United States to maintain no less than parity with everyother nuclear power. Deterring a biological attack by a power with a larger nucleararsenal, or by a rogue state allied with such a power, could be problematical. If,however, all other nuclear states were prepared to make do with smaller arsenals�say, athousand weapons or fewer�the requirement to deter biological as well as nuclear weaponswould not prevent the United States from doing so.

Opportunity Lost or Opportunity Taken?

One hopes the time will come when nuclearweapons can be retired. With its natural and durable advantages, the United States shouldwant this as much as any country. Nuclear weapons may be hard to outlaw, but the world canoutlive, or outgrow, the nuclear era. If the industrial age produced what Raymond Aroncalled �hyperbolic war,� perhaps the information age can reduce the scale of deadlyconflict. If, as well, the new era blesses free-market democracies with superior power,the world can become safer, and the need to rely on nuclear weapons to keep it safe canfade away.

We are not there yet. Rogue states are onthe ropes, but with WMD, unchecked, they can hang on and do great harm. Concentratingnuclear deterrence on this problem�creating a sharp fear�by limiting the purpose ofnuclear weapons to retaliation for WMD attacks, would be a step toward a world in whichnone of these weapons would ever be used again. The aim, after all, is to spare humanityfrom the horror of mass destruction, whatever the technical means of causing it. This erais promising, but also dangerous because of WMD. A new U.S. doctrine on the role ofnuclear weapons can reduce the danger and strengthen the promise.

David C. Gompert is Vice President of theRAND Corporation and served as Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia on the NationalSecurity Council Staff during the Bush Administration. The concept of nuclear first use asdiscussed herein was also the subject of an article by Mr. Gompert and Kenneth Watman andDean Wilkening published in *Survival,* vol. 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995). 

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