July 12, 2004

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairman Diaz

Commissioner McGaffigan

Commissioner Merrifield

FROM: Luis A. Reyes /RA/

Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: STATUS OF ALLEGATION PROGRAM - CALENDAR YEAR

2003 ANNUAL REPORT

In SECY-94-089, "Response to the Report of the Review Team for Reassessment of the 

NRC's Program for Protecting Allegers Against Retaliation," the staff committed to have the

Agency Allegations Advisor provide an independent annual report to the Executive Director 

for Operations that assesses the conduct of the allegation program in each office and region. 

A copy of the annual report for Calendar Year 2003 is attached for your information. The 

staff intends to place the report in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management

System public library five days from the date of this memorandum.

The report contains an assessment of the allegation program, a review of allegation data 

for adverse trends for reactor and materials licensees and contractors, and a review of the

resources expended on the follow-up of technical allegations. Because the Office of

Investigations prepares an annual report covering the follow-up of allegations involving

wrongdoing, this annual report does not specifically address activities concerning 

those allegations.

A number of significant agency activities took place last year that impact the Allegation Program

and, therefore, warrant discussion in the report. On July 27, 2003, this office approved the

transfer of allegations policy and program oversight from the Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation to the Office of Enforcement. Additionally, the Commission directed the staff to

develop an Alternative Dispute Resolution process and further guidance on creating and

maintaining a safety conscious work environment. Both of those initiatives are also discussed

in the attached report.

CONTACT: Lisamarie Jarriel, OE

(301) 415-8529
The Commissioners -2-

Overall, the allegation program has maintained the improvements realized in all areas in the

last three years. The findings from the 2003 audits and NRC’s performance measures for the

Allegation Program indicate the improvements made in reviewing, documenting, tracking, and

completing evaluations of allegations continue. The timeliness goals for communications with

allegers were met in all cases. The quality rating goal was achieved each of the last three

years. Additionally, no inappropriate disclosures of the identity of allegers occurred in the last

three years.

To effectively address an increase in the number of generic security-related allegations and the

on-going implementation of new and comprehensive security-related orders, rules, and

guidance, the Agency Allegations Advisor recommended in the attached report that the Office

of Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR), appoint an Office Allegation Coordinator to

serve as the administrative point of contact for processing and controlling allegations assigned

to that office. The staff is examining the merits of this recommended approach and evaluating

the degree to which it might enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of NRC’s handling of

allegations. The staff will provide its assessment of the approach recommended in the report

and provide staff recommendations regarding implementation or alternatives by September 30,

2004.

Attachment: Annual Report

cc: SECY

OGC

OCA

OPA

CFO
STATUS

OF

ALLEGATION PROGRAM

CALENDAR YEAR 2003

ANNUAL REPORT
CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

OVERVIEW OF THE ALLEGATION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Significant Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Allegation Program Transfer .............................................3

Alternative Dispute Resolution for Discrimination Allegations ....................3

Safety Conscious Work Environment Guidance ..............................3

Allegation Program Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Protecting the Identity of Allegers .........................................4

Timeliness Goals ......................................................4

Quality Goal ..........................................................5

Resources Expended on Allegations .......................................5

TRENDS IN ALLEGATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

General Trends .........................................................8

Allegation Trends for Selected Reactor Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

St. Lucie 1 & 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Indian Point 2 & 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Palo Verde 1, 2, & 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Oyster Creek . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Davis-Besse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Byron 1 & 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

San Onofre 2 & 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Point Beach 1 & 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Fitzpatrick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Allegation Trends for Selected Materials Licensees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Nuclear Fuel Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Allegation Trends at Vendors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

APPENDIX 1: ALLEGATIONS STATISTICS – OPERATING REACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTION OF THE ALLEGATION PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
-1-

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In SECY-94-089, "Response to the Report of the Review Team for Reassessment of the NRC's

Program for Protecting Allegers Against Retaliation," the staff committed to have the Agency

Allegations Advisor prepare an annual report for the Executive Director for Operations that

assesses the conduct of the allegation program in each NRC office and region that routinely

handles allegations. This annual report fulfills that commitment. In this report, the staff

discusses allegation trends for reactor and materials licensees and vendors, and reviews the

resources expended on following up on technical allegations. Because the Office of

Investigations prepares an annual report covering the follow-up of allegations involving

wrongdoing, this report does not specifically address activities concerning allegations of

wrongdoing.

A number of significant agency activities took place last year that impact the Allegation Program

and, therefore, warrant discussion in this report. On July 27, 2003, the Executive Director of

Operations approved the transfer of allegations policy and program oversight from the Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation to the Office of Enforcement. The Agency Allegations Advisor and

Allegation Specialists now reside in the Office of Enforcement. Additionally, the direction from

the Commission to develop an Alternative Dispute Resolution process and further guidance on

creating and maintaining a Safety Conscious Work Environment is discussed in this report.

While the NRC is fully committed to our goal of increasing public confidence through

communicating with the public, we must balance that goal with the more immediate need of

ensuring the continued safety and secure operation of nuclear facilities in our country. 

Normally, general information concerning actions taken by the agency or licensee in the

security area would be discussed in this report. However, to ensure that we are not

unnecessarily releasing information that would reveal any potential security-related

vulnerabilities, we have not included such a discussion. Nonetheless, in addition to enhancing

the security of reactor licensees through the issuance of NRC orders in CY 2003, the NRC has

taken all necessary actions to address potential security-related concerns that may have been

identified during the course of the NRC’s review of allegations. 

Overall, the allegation program has maintained the improvements realized in all areas in the

last three years. The findings from the 2003 audits and NRC’s performance measures for the

allegation program indicate the improvements made in reviewing, documenting, tracking, and

completing evaluations of allegations continue. The timeliness goals for communications with

allegers were met in all cases. The quality rating goal was achieved each of the last three

years. Additionally, no inappropriate disclosures of the identity of allegers occurred in the last

three calendar years.
-2-

As the figure to the right indicates, from calendar year (CY) 1999 through 2003 the number of

allegations received by the NRC declined slightly. In 1996, the NRC published the Policy

Statement, “Freedom of Employees in

the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety

Concerns Without Fear of

Retaliation,” to focus the industry on

the importance of creating and

maintaining a safety conscious work

environment. The NRC took other

actions as well to communicate its

expectations in this area including,

posting allegation statistics on the

NRC’s web page, speaking at

stakeholder forums, and participating

in training academies hosted by the

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. 

By the late 1990's the NRC’s and industry’s efforts began to have an impact, and in 1998 the

rising allegation trend reversed significantly. 

For their part, many licensees have used what information the NRC has shared as an

opportunity to understand why licensee employees raise issues externally rather than using

internal reporting processes. In general, licensees have been increasingly responsive in

addressing employee concerns using internal processes and, as a consequence, more

employees are using internal mechanisms and fewer issues are coming to the NRC. 

However, for some licensees the NRC continues to receive allegations in numbers that warrant

additional analysis. In preparing this report, a 5-year history of allegations was reviewed for

reactor and material licensees and vendors to identify adverse trends. Given the Commission’s

continuing emphasis on establishing and maintaining a safety conscious work environment, the

analysis focused on allegations that originated from onsite sources, either from licensee or

contractor employees, former employees and contractors, or anonymous sources. The staff

identified nine reactor sites for a more in-depth review: St. Lucie, Indian Point, Palo Verde,

Oyster Creek, Davis-Besse, Byron, San Onofre, Point Beach, and Fitzpatrick. Each of these

sites is discussed in the report. 

Two materials licensees were also the subject of allegations at a level that warranted additional

analysis; the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, and the Nuclear Fuel Services fuel cycle

facilities. No vendors or contractors were the subject of allegations in sufficient number to

warrant additional review.

Regarding general trends in the Allegation Program, although the volume of allegations in

general has declined from CY 2002 to CY 2003, the NRC received an increasing number of

allegations in some specific areas. One area in particular where increases were seen is

generic security-related allegations. Because of these increases, on-going implementation of

new and comprehensive security-related orders, rules and guidance, and the availability of the

physical facilities needed to properly handle these sensitive materials, the Agency Allegations

Advisor recommends that the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response appoint an

Office Allegation Coordinator to serve as the administrative point of contact for processing and

controlling allegations assigned to that office. 
-3-

In summary, the staff continues to emphasize addressing each allegation fully in a timely

manner and improvements seen in the implementation of the allegation program in the last

three years continue. 

OVERVIEW OF THE ALLEGATION PROGRAM PERFORMANCE

Significant Activities

A number of significant agency activities took place in 2003 that affect the Allegation Program

and, therefore, warrant discussion in this report. The transfer of the program to the Office of

Enforcement, the implementation of an agency sponsored Alternative Dispute Resolution

process for discrimination allegations, and the preparation of further Safety Conscious Work

Environment guidance are each discussed below.

Allegation Program Transfer

On July 27, 2003, the Executive Director of Operations approved the transfer of allegations

policy and program oversight from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) to the Office

of Enforcement (OE). The Agency Allegations Advisor and Allegation Specialists now reside in

OE. Implementation of the Allegation Program continues to be carried out by the appropriate

NRC program offices and regions. The transfer of the Allegation Program from NRR reflects

the fact that the scope of the program is broader than just reactor-related allegations. 

Furthermore, this move aligns the headquarters enforcement and allegations functions as they

are currently aligned in the regions.

Alternative Dispute Resolution for Discrimination Allegations

In late March 2003, the Commission directed the staff to implement many of the

recommendations of an agency task group commissioned to improve the manner in which the

NRC investigated allegations of discrimination. One recommendation, in particular, may

significantly impact the Allegation Program. The Commission directed the staff to conduct a

pilot Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Program to allow additional opportunities for the

parties to resolve their differences outside of the normal regulatory framework. ADR involves

the use of a neutral third party to facilitate discussion and settlement of the concern being

alleged. The pilot program will include the opportunity for using ADR early in the allegation

process, before the NRC conducts its investigation of the allegation. Upon implementation of

the program, allegers will be asked if they are interested in entering into the pilot process. If

agreeable, the NRC will offer to the licensee ADR, as well. The NRC will pay for the neutral

during the early ADR process. At any time, either party can exit the ADR process and, if the

alleger still wants to pursue the issue, may request an investigation by the NRC through the

normal allegation process. The staff is in the process of preparing guidance documentation

and modifying its process to implement the pilot program as directed by the Commission. 

Safety Conscious Work Environment Guidance

The Commission also directed the staff in March 2003 to prepare further guidance for licensees

on establishing a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE); that is, an environment where

employees in the nuclear industry are encouraged to raise safety concerns to their employers

or the NRC, and are protected from retaliation for doing so. The Commission’s expectations
-4-

with regard to licensees establishing and maintaining a SCWE are outlined in a May 19, 1996,

Policy Statement, “Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns

Without Fear of Retaliation.” However, the guidance provided by the policy is very broad. It

was with that in mind that the Commission directed the staff to provide further guidance. 

In the Fall of 2003 the staff formed a working group and drafted an outline of a SCWE guidance

document based on the content of the 1996 Policy Statement. This outline was published in the

Federal Register for comment and was the basis for discussion at a public meeting on February

19, 2004. While most of the stakeholders at the meeting, including representatives from the

industry and whistleblower advocates, agreed on the content of such a document, there were

many comments concerning the format and use of such guidance. The Nuclear Energy

Institute proposed to make its own guidance document, “Nuclear Power Plant Personnel -

Employee Concerns Program - Process Tools in a Safety Conscious Work Environment,”

publically available in lieu of the agency creating its own. The staff is both considering this

proposal and preparing a draft SCWE guidance document to complement the Policy Statement,

as directed by the Commission. Solicitation of further public comment is expected should the

agency proceed with its development. 

Allegation Program Performance

The Commission established the allegation program to provide a way for individuals working in

NRC-regulated activities and members of the public to provide safety and regulatory concerns

directly to the NRC. The program includes a database that allows the staff to track concerns

submitted to the NRC to ensure that the concerns are evaluated and resolved in a timely

manner, consistent with the associated safety or risk significance, and that the results of NRC’s

evaluation are communicated to the individual who submitted the concerns, when appropriate.

The performance of the allegation program is measured against goals for protecting the identity

of allegers and conducting an appropriate review of all concerns in a timely manner. It is the

goal of the agency that no alleger’s identity is inappropriately released. Timeliness goals have

been established for various stages of the process, including the convening of an initial

allegation review board to evaluate the concerns, and correspondence with the alleger

concerning both acknowledgment and closure of the concerns. The quality of the staff’s review

and its correspondence with the alleger are assessed during program audits. 

Protecting the Identity of Allegers

One element of the allegation program that is essential to its credibility is protecting the identity

of allegers to the extent possible. The agency’s goal is to have no substantiated complaints of

the inappropriate release of an alleger’s identity as determined by either the Office of Inspector

General (OIG) or the staff. In 2003, neither the OIG nor the staff substantiated an inappropriate

release of the identity of any allegers. 

Timeliness Goals

The initial allegation review board (ARB) is conducted for the purpose of reviewing the

allegation and assigning appropriate staff actions for follow-up. The program requires an initial

ARB to be held within 30 days of receiving an allegation. All of the 596 initial ARBs held in

2003 met this goal.
-5-

Initial correspondence with the alleger acknowledges receipt of the allegation and documents

the specific concerns as understood by the NRC staff to ensure agreement prior to the staff

taking further action. The goals for issuing letters acknowledging receipt of allegations are 90

percent within 30 days and 100 percent within 45 days. The 45-day goal provides an

opportunity to contact the alleger by telephone to solicit additional information prior to sending a

letter acknowledging receipt to ensure complete understanding of the alleger’s concerns. 

These goals were met in every case. Ninety-seven percent of the allegations received in 2003

were acknowledged within 30 days, and 100% within 45 days. 

Regarding timeliness goals for closing technical, non-wrongdoing, allegations; the agency’s

goals are to close 70 percent of the allegations in 150 days or less; 90 percent of the

allegations in 180 days or less; and 100 percent of the allegations in 360 days or less. As

shown in the table on the following page, all of the 374 allegations closed in CY 2003 were

closed in 360 days or less. 

Time to Close

Metric (Days) Total NMSS NRR RI RII RIII RIV

374 9 33 95 74 97 66

0  70%  150 89%-334 100%-9 85%-28 92%-87 96%-71 90%-87 79%-52

151  90%  180 96%-27 94%-3 98%-6 100%-3 96%-6 92%-9

181  100%  360 100%-13 100%-2 100%-2 100%-4 100%-5

Quality Goal

The staff instituted a quality goal for the Allegation Program in 1999. Although somewhat

subjective in nature, as part of the routine program audits the auditors review, in detail, a

sample of closed allegation files to assess their quality. Specifically, the files are reviewed to

determine if staff follow-up of allegations appropriately captures and responds to each issue

raised in 90 percent of the allegations reviewed. A ten percent smart sample of the allegations

closed in 2003 was reviewed. In all, 52 files were reviewed, and although some observations

were made to improve their overall quality, all were determined to adequately capture and

respond to the issues raised. 

Resources Expended on Allegations

The resources expended on handling allegations were also reviewed for this report. To

facilitate use of this data by the Commission, it is presented by fiscal year versus calendar year. 

It should be noted that there is some concern regarding the accuracy of these numbers. During

past audits, it was determined that often inspections into allegations are accomplished during

baseline inspections conducted under the ROP. This practice is helpful from an agency

resources standpoint, as well as because of its ability to conceal the fact that the inspector is

evaluating an allegation, thereby helping to protect the identity of the alleger. Nonetheless, 
1 Hours include time spent by the regions and NMSS on allegations concerning agreement state licensees. 

Time spent on issues concerning agreement state licensees is not tracked separately.

-6-

often the time spent by the inspector is recorded as baseline inspection activity alone and not

captured as time spent on allegation follow-up. Senior management is taking steps to address

this issue. 

Figure 3 shows those hours recorded by the technical staff as time spent addressing

allegations concerning reactor and materials licensees.1

 As reported, the hours expended on

allegation follow-up

by the staff

remained relatively

steady over the five

year period

reviewed, but

increased each of

the last three years. 

The number of hours expended per allegation can be greatly affected by the number of issues

in an allegation. To account for this, Figure 4 displays the hours expended on a concern basis.

The number of hours expended per concern is a more accurate measure and is a more

appropriate indicator of efficiency. As indicated below, the time spent by the staff following up

on each concern remains relatively unchanged between 23 and 29 hours.
-7-

Figure 5 breaks down the hours expended on allegations into the total hours expended by NRR

and each region to ascertain each office’s performance. 

Figure 6 displays the hours per concern for each office for FY 1999 through FY 2003.

Historically, NRR’s labor rate has been higher than the regions because the issues addressed

in NRR are the generic, more complex, technical issues involving the design bases and/or

licensing bases for nuclear power plants that sometimes involve a class of plants. Additionally,

it is more difficult to refer these types of issues to licensees or their contractors for review. The

regions refer a higher percentage of allegations to licensees which helps reduce their hours. 
-8-

TRENDS IN ALLEGATIONS

The NRC monitors both technical and discrimination allegations to discern trends or sudden

increases that might justify the NRC questioning the licensee as to the root causes of such

changes or trends. In preparing this report, a 5-year history of allegations was reviewed for

reactor and material licensees and vendors.

With the continuing emphasis on establishing and maintaining a safety-conscious work

environment, the staff focused on those allegations that have the potential to provide insights

into the SCWE, that is, those allegations submitted by current or former licensee or contractor

employees or by anonymous sources. The staff performs an analysis of the allegations twice a

year in support of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) mid-cycle and end-of-cycle

assessments. In addition, an analysis for a particular site or licensee may be performed

whenever allegations or inspection findings indicate it is warranted. 

The staff also conducts reviews to identify national trends for reactor and materials allegations,

shifts in users of the allegation program, and impact on the workload in the regions, NRR and

NMSS. These trends are discussed in the next section on general trends.

General Trends

National trends are of interest because they are used in developing budget assumptions, labor

rates, and in preparing operating plans. Figure 7 below shows that the 5-year national trend

has declined slightly. 

While the number of issues or concerns received declined slightly on the national level, the

figures on the following page show that impact is not evenly distributed across the regions. 

Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11 show the shift of allegation workload in the regions at the concern

level. With the NRC’s budget prepared two years in advance, budgeted resources may not

reflect the actual workload in the organization when shifts in workload occur as happens with

allegations. 
-9-

While the volume of concerns received in most regions remained steady, the number of issues

received by Region III declined in both the reactor and materials areas. This decline can partly

be attributed to resolved union/strike issues at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and

improvements to Davis-Besse’s SCWE during the 0350 Panel oversight process. A transfer of

licensees between regions also occurred in 2003. Two large fuel cycle facilities were

transferred from Region III to Region II, and all of the materials licensees in Region II were

transferred to Region I. 
-10-

To provide further insights into the areas in which the NRC is spending resources on reactorrelated allegation follow-up, Figure 12 depicts the twelve areas that represent approximately 80

percent of the issues received nationwide in 2003. 

HP - Health Physics or Radiation Protection, FFD - Fitness For Duty, EP - Emergency Preparedness

It should be noted that there has been a significant increase in the number of allegations

concerning a “chilling effect,” indicating weaknesses in the licensee’s SCWE. Furthermore,

security-related concerns continue to represent the greatest percentage of concerns received in

the NRC’s Allegation Program. 

Management Directive 8.8, “Management of Allegations,” directs NRC offices to appoint an

Office Allegation Coordinator (OAC) and establish an Allegation Review Board if their mission

and the possibility of serving as an action office so requires. Currently, the offices of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, State and Tribal Programs, and

each region has appointed an OAC to serve as the administrative point of contact for

processing and controlling allegations assigned to that office or region. The Office of Nuclear

Security and Incident Response (NSIR), responsible for developing agency policy and providing

management direction for assessment of security-related issues and incidents at nuclear

facilities, has not yet appointed an OAC. Because of the increasing number of generic securityrelated allegations (i.e., one third of all allegations currently managed by NRR fall within NSIR’s

responsibility), on-going implementation of new and comprehensive security-related orders,

rules and guidance, and the availability of the physical facilities needed to properly handle these

sensitive materials (e.g., secure phones, safes, and fax machines), the Agency Allegations

Advisor recommends that the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response appoint an

OAC. 
-11-

Figures 13 through 17 depict the distribution in NRR and the four regions of the same twelve

areas illustrated in Figure 12.

HP - Health Physics or Radiation Protection, FFD - Fitness For Duty, EP - Emergency Preparedness
-12-

Because the activities performed by materials licensees are not as homogeneous as those

performed by reactor licensees, a comparison at the “Discipline” level doesn’t produce

meaningful results. To provide further insights into the areas in which the NRC is spending

resources on materials-related allegations, the following graphs depict the nine licensee

categories that represent approximately 80 percent of the issues received nationwide and the

distribution of those issues in NMSS and the four regions.

Decom - Decommissioning Reactor or Materials Site, R&D - Research & Development Company
-13-

Figures 24 and 25 provide a breakdown of allegations received by categories of sources for the

last three years for reactor and materials allegations. For reactor-related allegations, there has

been a steady decline in allegations received from anonymous sources. Anecdotal information

might suggest this is a result of improved safety conscious work environment initiatives.

In comparing the sources for materials vs. reactor-related allegations, private citizens are a

more prevalent source for materials-related allegations and contractor employees are less

prevalent. This is logical because materials licensees’ activities are more visible to the public

and involve fewer contractors.
-14-

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Received Closed

Substantiated

FIGURE 26 - ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED BY CY

Two of the categories deserve some explanation. The source category “NRC” is used for when

the NRC staff suspects a violation of requirements is deliberate or due to careless disregard

and the Office of Investigations opens an investigation. The category “Licensee” is used for the

same kinds of issues that are reported by a licensee to the NRC. An allegation number is used

to track the follow-up on the technical and wrongdoing aspects of the issue. 

Allegation Trends for Selected Reactor Sites

As noted previously, the trending of allegations received concerning individual reactor sites is

one method the NRC staff uses to monitor the safety conscious work environment at reactor

sites. Statistics on allegations received concerning all operating reactor sites are given in the

table in Appendix 1. The allegations in the table cover the five-year period January 1999

through December 2003 and include allegations received from onsite sources only; that is,

allegations from current or former licensee employees, current or former contractor employees,

or anonymous allegers. For the purpose of this analysis, the NRC assumes anonymous

allegations are from onsite personnel.

In determining which reactor sites should receive a more in-depth review, the staff applied the

following criteria:

1) The number of onsite allegations received exceeds 2 times the median value for the

reactor industry, but does not exceed three times the median, and there is a 50 percent

increase in the number of allegations received over the previous year; or;

2) The number of onsite allegations received exceeds 3 times the median value.

For CY 2003, the median number of onsite allegations per reactor site was three. The nine

reactor sites that met one of these criteria are St. Lucie (24), Indian Point (20), Palo Verde (19),

Oyster Creek (18), Davis-Besse (17), Byron (11), San Onofre (11), Point Beach (10), and

Fitzpatrick (7). All exceeded 3 times the industry median, with the exception of Fitzpatrick,

which exceeded 2 times the median and experienced more than a 50 percent increase in the

number of allegations concerning the site. A more detailed discussion of each of these sites

follows.

St. Lucie 1 & 2

Although St. Lucie’s allegation trend over the past five years is down, the number of allegations

from the site increased in 2003 over the previous year. As illustrated by Figure 26, in fact, the

volume of allegations has been cyclic in nature, rising

then falling, then rising again, indicating the licensee’s

difficulty maintaining a sustainable SCWE. 

In October 2003, the NRC indicated to the licensee

that the number of “chilling effect” and SCWE

concerns received from the site had notably increased

and requested a review of the environment and any

actions planned to address the situation.
-15-

In response to the NRC’s letter, Florida Power & Light indicated that they also had observed an

increase in anonymous concerns raised internally from 2002 to 2003 and had, in fact, begun a

reorganization of supervisors prior to receiving the October 2003 letter. Some supervisors were

relieved of their supervisory duties, others moved between organizations, while others were

terminated. 

Subsequent to receiving the NRC’s letter, the licensee identified additional corrective actions

including, enhanced training of plant staff and supervisors, more frequent employee information

meetings to discuss objectives of planned actions, and a re-review of the results of a mid-year

SCWE survey. The review of survey findings identified specific organizations where the SCWE

was challenged. Actions were taken to address weaknesses in those organizations, including

training and counseling the supervision concerning SCWE principles and management

expectations. The licensee has indicated that they plan to conduct another SCWE survey in

2004 which will help evaluate the effectiveness of the actions they have taken to date. In

December 2003, the NRC also identified weaknesses with the manner in which the Corrective

Action Program addressed safety conscious work environment concerns. The licensee

subsequently initiated an evaluation of those concerns. 

There have been four allegations of discrimination filed in the last three years; two in 2003 and

two in 2001. All were investigated and closed unsubstantiated. The NRC will continue to

monitor the work environment at the St. Lucie site to assess the effectiveness of the licensee’s

recent actions.

Indian Point 2 & 3

As illustrated by Figure 27, allegations at the Indian Point site have decreased after a notable

increase last year. The majority of the concerns received in 2003 were in the security and

training areas. 

Issues with regard to operator training at Indian

Point date back several years. As a result of an

inspection conducted in October 2001, the NRC

issued a Yellow finding on operator requalification

training, resulting in increased NRC observations of

control room activities, individual operational

evaluations, and review of several corrective actions

taken by the licensee. In March and April 2003, the

NRC performed a Special Team inspection at Indian

Point of selected operational events and training

issues, including issues raised by allegers. The NRC inspection team determined that the

training issues were primarily prevalent from 2001 into 2002 and have been substantially

corrected. The team also noted that the Entergy Training Department is actively engaged in

identifying and resolving operational events and performance issues and addressing longstanding problems in the training program. Accordingly, the NRC Yellow finding was closed in

May 2003. The NRC has concluded, based on numerous reviews conducted, that the current

staff of licensed operators are competent to safely operate Indian Point Units 2 & 3.

With regard to allegations of discrimination, there were four raised in 2003. One did not meet

the requirements for initiation of an investigation. In order for the NRC to pursue a matter of
-16-

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

0

5

10

15

20

Received Closed

Substantiated

FIGURE 28 - ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED BY CY

potential discrimination, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.7, a certain pattern of facts, called a prima-facie

showing, must be articulated. Specifically, it must be initially established that an employee has

engaged in a protected activity, that an adverse personnel action was taken against the

employee, that management knew that the employee had engaged in the protected activity, and

that the protected activity was, in part, the reason for the adverse personnel action. The other

three allegations of discrimination raised in 2003 are still under investigation. Of the seven

discrimination allegations raised at Indian Point in 2002, a prima-facie showing of potential

discrimination was not articulated for four of them and these allegations have been closed. Two

were investigated, not substantiated, and closed, while one remains open and under

investigation. Of the four allegations of discrimination raised in 2001, two made a prima-facie

showing and were investigated, but neither was substantiated. The NRC has not substantiated

an allegation of discrimination at the Indian Point site in the past five years. The NRC staff will

continue to monitor the open allegations of discrimination, as well as the general allegation

trends at the Indian Point site.

Palo Verde 1, 2, & 3

In the early 1990's Palo Verde’s work environment was severely challenged. The large number

of allegations going to the NRC then involved a variety of organizations in the plant. In

response to that challenge, the licensee

brought senior management attention to the

issue and made a number of changes,

including training the workforce in SCWE

principles and making several enhancements

to the avenues available to the workforce to

raise issues. These changes succeeded in

vastly improving the overall SCWE. As Figure

28 indicates, the Arizona Public Service

Company is again facing a challenge. 

However, this time it primarily involves one

organization on site. The majority of the

allegations received at the NRC concern issues

in the Instrumentation & Control Department.

It is the NRC’s policy to refer certain allegations to the licensee for assessment. Referrals are

generally made to expedite an assessment of a safety concern only after discussing the

possibility of referral with the alleger. The licensee is required to assure the assessment is

conducted by qualified personnel, independent of the issue or organization in question, and

complete and accurate. In response to allegations referred to the licensee early in the year,

Arizona Public Service Company contracted an independent investigator in May 2003 to

evaluate the SCWE in the Instrumentation & Control Department. The NRC also conducted its

own review in December 2003. Both the licensee’s assessment and the NRC’s independent

review concluded that, in general, the workforce feels free to raise safety issues. However,

issues were identified by the NRC concerning employee awareness, familiarity, and perceived

effectiveness of the processes used to raise and resolve concerns. The licensee has initiated

several actions, including additional SCWE training for managers and supervisors and training

for the employees on the various processes available to them to raise concerns. The NRC will

continue to monitor actions being taken by the licensee in these areas to ensure appropriate
-17-

management attention is maintained to sustain a healthy SCWE at the Palo Verde Nuclear

Station.

With regard to allegations of discrimination for raising safety issues and engaging in other

protected activity, there have been four allegations raised in the past three years. All were

investigated by the NRC and none of the four were substantiated.

Oyster Creek

The volume of allegations concerning the Oyster Creek site continues to increase. A review of

the individual issues found no pattern or trend in the disciplines involved. Significant staff

reductions in 2002, major contract

negotiations in 2003, and, ultimately, a threemonth strike in the summer of 2003 most

likely contributed to the volume of concerns

going externally. The licensee confirmed

that in the Spring of last year, the bargaining

unit stopped coming to the Employee

Concerns Program with their issues, opting

instead to take their issues to the NRC or

local news outlets. After the strike ended,

the licensee conducted a survey of returning

personnel to identity any lingering work

environment concerns. Among those

identified, were issues concerning a 2002

fish kill which left employees feeling that their concerns were not being addressed. 

In the past two years, the NRC received seven allegations of discrimination, after receiving only

one each of the previous four years. Five of the seven were closed because a prima-facie

showing of potential discrimination was not articulated. The other two were investigated and,

based on the evidence developed during the investigation, not substantiated. 

The NRC will continue to monitor the safety conscious work environment, actions the licensee

takes to improve it, and the general allegation trend at the Oyster Creek site.

Davis-Besse

After a significant rise in allegations after the March 2002 discovery of the degraded reactor

vessel head and subsequent shutdown,

the volume of allegations concerning the

Davis-Besse site declined in 2003. The

licensee’s analyses of the degraded

vessel head identified weaknesses in its

safety culture. During the course of the

long-term shutdown, weaknesses were

identified in the SCWE and Employee

Concerns Program (ECP), as well, and

the licensee initiated corrective actions

in those areas. The agency’s oversight
-18-

of those actions was accomplished by an Oversight Panel under NRC Inspection Manual

Chapter 0350, “Oversight of Operating Reactor Facilities in a Shutdown Condition with

Performance Problems.” Throughout 2003, the NRC interviewed licensee employees and

management, observed management behavior, reviewed documentation, inspected ECP

adequacy, and evaluated allegation and ECP trends to assess the effectiveness of the

licensee’s corrective actions. 

One trend exhibited by the allegation data is consistent with other plants that have been

through an extended shutdown; namely in the Maintenance area. Not surprisingly, considering

the attention paid on the reactor vessel head issue, pockets of concern were also indicated in

Engineering and the Corrective Action Program.

There were six allegations of discrimination in 2003 concerning activities at the Davis-Besse

site. One of the six was not raised by the person who was the subject of the alleged

discrimination and was therefore not investigated and closed. Two of the six were closed

because a prima-facie showing of potential discrimination was not articulated. One allegation

was investigated and not substantiated. The remaining two allegations of discrimination raised

in 2003 are still under investigation. Of the nine raised in 2002, three were closed because a

prima-facie showing of potential discrimination was not articulated, one withdrawn at the

request of the alleger, and the others investigated and not substantiated. In mid-2001, the NRC

issued one Severity Level IV Notice of Violation for an act of discrimination. There have been

no enforcement actions for discrimination since that time. 

By the end of 2003, an NRC special inspection team had concluded that the tools the licensee

had developed to monitor the effectiveness of its safety culture and SCWE corrective actions

were appropriate and provided valuable insights. The team also concluded that the actions

taken had an overall positive effect on the environment at Davis-Besse, however, there were

indications that some managers did not fully embrace or understand the concepts of a SCWE.

Finally, the results of a survey conducted in November of 2003 raised questions regarding the

continuing effectiveness of the actions implemented to improve the safety culture and SCWE at

Davis-Besse. The survey identified key organizations where responses were less positive in

specific areas when compared to the same survey given in March 2003. These findings

resulted in additional inspection and assessment by the Oversight Panel in early 2004 and the

NRC concluded that the licensee’s corrective actions were effective.

As part of the restart authorization, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to ensure licensee

self-assessments are effective and improvements realized during the extended outage remain

in place and are further built upon to improve performance in the future. The Confirmatory

Order required that the licensee contract with independent organizations to conduct

comprehensive assessments of the Davis-Besse operations performance, organizational safety

culture, including safety conscious work environment, the corrective action program

implementation, and the engineering program effectiveness. The licensee is required to inform

the NRC of the identity and qualifications of the outside assessment organizations, as well as

the scope and depth of the assessment plans. The assessments are required before the end

of the fourth quarter of 2004 and annually thereafter for four more years and the licensee must

submit the results to the NRC, including any action plans necessary to address issues

identified.
-19-

The staff will continue to monitor Davis-Besse closely. Three resident inspectors are currently

assigned to the site and the Oversight Panel will continue to oversee the plant until operating

performance is such that Davis-Besse can be returned to the normal reactor oversight process. 

The staff will also monitor the general trend of allegations and trends in the licensee’s internal

reporting programs. 

Byron 1 & 2

As indicated in Figure 31, the volume of allegations received concerning the Byron site is

trending down, particularly in the past two years. In 2001, the NRC’s substantiation of an

allegation of discrimination resulted in the

issuance of a Confirmatory Order to the

licensee. The Confirmatory Order included an

admission by Exelon of the violation of 10

CFR 50.7, Employee Protection, and required

comprehensive corrective actions to prevent

recurrence and improve the SCWE. The

corrective actions included training of

management personnel on creating and

maintaining a work environment where

employees and contractors feel free to raise

safety issues, and extended beyond the

Byron site to the twenty-one reactor licenses

held by Exelon. 

The majority of the 2003 allegations received from Byron involved concerns associated with

operations and fitness-for-duty; in particular, fatigue issues. While allegations to the NRC

decreased in the last two years, the number of concerns being brought internally to the

licensees Employee Concerns Program increased, and also included issues in these two areas. 

The licensee has addressed concerns in both these areas. Changes to the licensee’s policy on

forced overtime in January 2004 are expected to address fatigue issues.

There was one allegation of discrimination raised in 2003 that is still under investigation. In

2001, two allegations were raised; one was substantiated and resulted in the Confirmatory

Order discussed above and the second was investigated, not substantiated and closed. The

NRC will continue to monitor the open allegation of discrimination and general allegation trends

at the Byron site, as well as the effectiveness of the actions taken in response to the

Confirmatory Order.

San Onofre 2 & 3

The number of allegations received from

onsite sources at the San Onofre site has

remained steady over the past two years,

although the 5-year period analyzed shows a

declining trend as indicated by Figure 32. The

number of allegations of discrimination,

however, has doubled each of the past two

years. Of the seven allegations of

discrimination received by the NRC in the past

three years (one in 2001, two in 2002, and

four in 2003), all made a prima-facie showing,
-20-

were investigated, but closed after insufficient evidence was found to substantiate the

allegation. 

In April 2003, the licensee contracted an outside organization to assess the safety culture,

including the SCWE, at the San Onofre site. The 2003 Nuclear Safety Cultural Assessment

included a site-wide survey of the employees in April 2003, with 62% of the workforce

participating. The survey found the overall SCWE was healthy, however, some organizations

did indicate concerns about negative reactions from management for raising concerns and

corrective actions are being taken in those organizations. Additionally, the licensee recently

conducted additional SCWE training for managers and supervisors. While the survey found

that the Employee Concern Program was a viable alternative avenue for employees and

contractors to raise concerns, it identified concerns with the effectiveness of the primary

avenue; the corrective action program. The licensee has initiated actions to address these

issues. 

A review of the subject disciplines of the allegations received in 2003 revealed a trend in the

area of Maintenance. Maintenance was also identified as an organization for management

attention by the Nuclear Safety Cultural Assessment.

The licensee continues to take actions to assess and improve their work environment, including

surveys of the safety culture and safety conscious work environment, training, and process

enhancements. The NRC will continue to monitor the licensee’s initiatives to assess their

impact on the general allegation and discrimination allegation trends.

Point Beach 1 & 2

The volume of allegations received at the NRC from the Point Beach site continues to increase. 

A review of the individual issues found no pattern or trend in the disciplines involved. In the

beginning of 2003, the licensee conducted an

independent assessment of their work

environment. A similar assessment was

conducted in 2001. The assessments included

surveys of the workforce concerning their

perception of the SCWE and the effectiveness

of the various avenues available to them to

report safety concerns. Approximately 80% of

the workforce participated in the surveys. The

report concluded that, in general, the workforce

believed their work environment was healthy. 

Although perceived as adequate, the

workforce’s perception of the Employee

Concerns Program, however, declined somewhat from 2001. The licensee took a number of

actions to address the report’s findings, including creating a corporate position to oversee the

Employee Concerns Program at each of the licensee’s sites, providing a dedicated ECP

manager at each site, improving the marketing of the programs, and refocusing the program on

safety-related concerns.

With regard to allegations of discrimination, two allegations were received in 2001, two in 2002

and two in 2003. One did not make a prima-facie showing of potential discrimination and was

closed. The remaining allegations of discrimination were all investigated and not substantiated. 
-21-

In mid-2003, the NRC inspected a licensee-identified safety issue concerning plugging of the

auxiliary circulation water system and, late in the year, issued a finding of high significance. 

Senior licensee management demonstrated their support for raising concerns by appropriately

recognizing and rewarding the employee who identified the issue. Because the NRC’s finding

negatively impacted the licensee’s incentive program, however, it also had the potential to

challenge the SCWE. Nonetheless, the licensee’s handling of this event appears to have been

appropriate. 

The NRC will continue to monitor the safety conscious work environment, actions the licensee

takes to maintain it, and the general allegation trend at the Point Beach site.

Fitzpatrick

In the last two years, the NRC has received few allegations concerning Fitzpatrick. In 2003,

however, the number of allegations notably

increased. The majority of the allegations

received involved security-related issues. 

The licensee confirmed that not all of the

employees are comfortable using the

Employee Concerns Program on site. The

NRC has engaged the licensee regarding this

increasing trend and they have taken a number

of actions to encourage their employees to

raise concerns internally. Personnel from

outside Fitzpatrick were brought in to review

the situation and determined that some

personnel did not have easy access to, nor were they effectively trained in using, the Corrective

Action Program. More computers were installed and training conducted to facilitate raising

concerns via that avenue. 

With regard to allegations of discrimination, two allegations were received in 2003, and one

each of the past two years. One of the allegations received in 2003 is still under investigation

while the other did not make a prima-facie showing of potential discrimination and was closed. 

The allegations received in 2001 and 2002 were investigated by the NRC and not

substantiated. The NRC will continue to monitor the open allegation of discrimination and the

licensee’s safety conscious work environment.

Allegation Trends for Selected Materials Licensees

Because of the small number of allegations received concerning individual materials licensees

and because of the potential for a licensee or contractor to identify an alleger, tables of

statistics on allegations concerning these two categories have not been included in this report. 

Only two materials licensees received a sufficient number of allegations in CY 2003 to discern

an adverse trend or pattern. Those facilities were the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and

Nuclear Fuel Services fuel cycle facilities and are discussed in more detail below. 
-22-

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant

Several years ago, after the NRC received a large number of technical and discrimination

allegations from the Paducah facility, the certificatee took a number of actions to improve the

SCWE, including surveying the workforce to

identify issues and concerns, improving the

Employee Concerns and Corrective Action

Programs to make them viable avenues for

raising concerns, and conducting SCWE training

for all supervisors/managers and employees. As

indicated in Figure 35, these efforts appeared to

have had a positive effect and from 2000 to

through 2002 the number of concerns being

raised externally declined. In fact, the number of

allegations in 2002 was less than half the number

received in 2000. However, last year, the number

of allegations began to increase. 

A review of the individual issues found no trend in the disciplines involved, but rather a clear

pattern of strike-related concerns. Prolonged contract negotiations and ultimately, a five-month

strike between February and June of 2003 clearly contributed to the volume of concerns coming

to the NRC. 

The number of allegations of discrimination has declined to 1 in 2003 dropping from 15 in 2000. 

That one concern was inspected and closed after it was determined upon further evaluation to

not fall within NRC jurisdiction.

The certificatee continues to focus on enhancing the SCWE. Actions were taken after the

strike to assist managers in handling returning worker issues. Continuous training is provided

to the management team on SCWE principles, expected behaviors, and retaliation

recognition/prevention. The SCWE is now a routine topic in plant safety meetings. And

specific actions have been taken within challenged organizations, including restructuring group

areas, redefining job descriptions, and revising compensation policies. 

The NRC will continue to monitor the general allegation trend and actions the licensee takes to

monitor and address challenges to the SCWE.

Nuclear Fuel Services

As illustrated in Figure 36, the volume of

allegations concerning the Nuclear Fuel

Services facility fell last year after several

years of increased activity. No allegations of

discrimination have been filed with the NRC in

the past three years. In response to a variety

of issues, the licensee took a number of

actions to enhance the safety culture on site. 

These efforts are also expected to positively

impact the SCWE. Specifically, the licensee

initiated training which includes management’s

expectations that employees report safety 
-23-

issues. A new problem reporting program was implemented in January 2003, to provide a more

user-friendly and transparent program for issue identification and resolution. A new position

was established, the duties of which include promoting a SCWE on site, bringing focus to the

issue. And finally, an assessment of the work environment was contracted to provide a clear

picture of the health of the SCWE and effectiveness of the actions taken to date.

The NRC believes these efforts have improved the SCWE at the Nuclear Fuel Services facility. 

However, there are some aspects of the initiatives which may challenge their long-term

effectiveness. The training provided to management does not appear to include some key

SCWE concepts, such as management’s expectations that supervisory behaviors be such that

employees are encouraged to raise concerns without fear of reprisal. It is unclear that the new

problem identification process is effective. It does not allow employees to raise concerns

anonymously, nor is there another avenue available for employees, other than the NRC’s

Allegation Program, by which they can remain anonymous or otherwise receive some level of

identity protection. And the problem identification process is only currently available to Nuclear

Fuel Services employees, and not contractors, such as the unionized guard force.

Nonetheless, the NRC is encouraged by the initiatives taken to date, believes they have had a

positive impact on the SCWE, and will continue to monitor the allegation trends and the

licensee’s efforts to identify areas for further improvement.

Allegation Trends at Vendors

Because none of the vendors or contractors received a sufficient number of allegations to

discern a trend or pattern, or provide insights into the work environment, more in-depth reviews

were not performed. Statistics by contractor or vendor are not given in this report because

publishing the number of allegations received has the potential of identifying the alleger.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the allegation program has maintained the improvements realized in all areas in the

last three years. The findings from the 2003 audits and NRC’s performance measures for the

allegation program indicate the improvements made in reviewing, documenting, tracking, and

completing evaluations of allegations continue. The timeliness goals for communications with

allegers were met in all cases. The quality rating goal was achieved each of the last three

years. Additionally, no inappropriate disclosures of the identity of allegers occurred in the last

three years.

As noted in the previous discussions of specific licensees, the analysis of allegations has

provided insights into the work environment at several facilities. The staff continues to take a

deliberately measured approach in addressing work environment issues with licensees,

including the preparation of additional guidance in this area. As this report indicates, the staff

continues to monitor work environment issues at several facilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Management Directive 8.8, “Management of Allegations,” directs NRC offices to appoint an

Office Allegation Coordinator and establish an Allegation Review Board if their mission and the

possibility of serving as an action office so requires. Currently, the offices of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, State and Tribal Programs, and each
-24-

region has appointed an Office Allegation Coordinator to serve as the administrative point of

contact for processing and controlling allegations assigned to that office or region. The Office

of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, responsible for developing agency policy and

providing management direction for assessment of security-related issues and incidents at

nuclear facilities, has not yet appointed an Office Allegation Coordinator. Because of the

increasing number of generic security-related allegations (one third of all allegations currently

managed by NRR fall within NSIR’s responsibility), on-going implementation of new securityrelated orders and rules, and new guidance concerning the handling and treatment of physical

protection information, the Agency Allegations Advisor recommends that the Office of Nuclear

Security and Incident Response appoint an Office Allegation Coordinator. 
-25-

APPENDIX 1

ALLEGATIONS STATISTICS – OPERATING REACTORS
-26-

Allegations Received from Onsite Sources

Site 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

ARKANSAS 1 & 2 25234

BEAVER VALLEY 1 & 2 43711

BRAIDWOOD 1 & 2 13 14 5 5 1

BROWNS FERRY 2 & 3 4 4 2 2 0

BRUNSWICK 1 & 2 11113

BYRON 1 & 2 22 14 20 12 11

CALLAWAY 6 9 6 7 3

CALVERT CLIFFS 1 & 2 6 3 2 3 4

CATAWBA 1 & 2 3 0 7 0 2

CLINTON 9 10 1 3 2

COLUMBIA PLANT 4 0 13 5 4

COMANCHE PEAK 1 & 2 55521

COOK 1 & 2 19 22 12 14 9

COOPER 2 1 8 6 8

CRYSTAL RIVER 3 4 2 2 3

DAVIS-BESSE 3 0 2 27 17

DIABLO CANYON 1 & 2 4 6 6 3 2

DRESDEN 2 & 3 3 12 32 11 3

DUANE ARNOLD 4 2 3 2 2

FARLEY 1 & 2 3 8 3 1 3

FERMI 1 4 3 4 2

FITZPATRICK 1 6 1 1 7

FORT CALHOUN 1 1 2 2 3

GINNA 2 1 0 1 2

GRAND GULF 2 3 6 6 0

HARRIS 1 & 2 3 1 1 6 1

HATCH 1 & 2 6 12 2 3 2

INDIAN POINT 2 & 3 13 20 17 29 20

KEWAUNEE 1 0 4 3 4

LASALLE 1 & 2 11 4 2 1 2

LIMERICK 1 & 2 1 2 2 7 4

MCGUIRE 1 & 2 0 1 0 0 2

MILLSTONE 2 & 3 22 8 2 7 6
Site 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

-27-

MONTICELLO 3 1 0 0 1

NINE MILE POINT 1 & 2 7 11 4 5 2

NORTH ANNA 1 & 2 0 4 1 10 1

OCONEE 1, 2, & 3 4 2 5 1 3

OYSTER CREEK 6 3 5 9 18

PALISADES 0 0 4 9 7

PALO VERDE 1, 2, & 3 4 3 3 2 19

PEACH BOTTOM 2 & 3 1 4 2 1 2

PERRY 4 7 7 5 5

PILGRIM 5 2 3 2 5

POINT BEACH 1 & 2 6 5 7 7 10

PRAIRIE ISLAND 1 & 2 3 0 0 5 2

QUAD CITIES 1 & 2 5 6 1 3 1

RIVER BEND 9 2 1 1 4

ROBINSON 1 0 1 0 0

SALEM/HOPE CREEK 1 1 3 11 6

SAN ONOFRE 2 & 3 16 15 7 11 11

SEABROOK 23363

SEQUOYAH 1 & 2 4 7 2 5 7

SOUTH TEXAS 1 & 2 13 10 4 6 2

ST LUCIE 1 & 2 36 9 25 11 24

SUMMER 1 3 3 2 4

SURRY 1 & 2 04242

SUSQUEHANNA 1 & 2 8 13 15 9 3

THREE MILE ISLAND 0 1 5 5 1

TURKEY POINT 3 & 4 11 12 11 2 3

VERMONT YANKEE 02040

VOGTLE 1 & 2 3 0 1 3 1

WATERFORD 4 2 2 7 0

WATTS BAR 6 4 4 8 2

WOLF CREEK 66410
-28-

APPENDIX 2

DESCRIPTION OF THE ALLEGATION PROCESS
-29-

DESCRIPTION OF THE ALLEGATION PROCESS

All of the regions and offices generally follow the same process in receiving, processing, and

evaluating allegations. The Allegation Coordinator is the focal point for receiving, processing,

and closing allegations and communicating with allegers. All incoming written allegations are

forwarded to the Allegation Coordinator and calls to the toll-free safety hotline are directed

automatically to the regional Allegation Coordinators according to the geographical location of

the caller, i.e., an alleger's call is directed to the region that covers the alleger’s location.

The Allegation Coordinator reviews the incoming allegations to determine whether the issues

involve reactor, material, or vendor issues and the immediacy of safety issues. An Allegation

Review Board (ARB) is scheduled on the basis of this review. The Allegation Coordinator

prepares the material for the ARBs, guides the ARB members on implementing the allegation

process, and keeps the minutes for the ARB meetings. ARBs normally meet once a week and

allegations are usually discussed within 2 weeks of receipt. Following the ARB meeting, the

Allegation Coordinator notes the directions to the staff in the allegation tracking system. The

responsible division director or a designee chairs the ARB. Other ARB participants include

technical staff and managers and, in cases involving wrongdoing, the regional counsel and a

representative from the Office of Investigations (OI) field office. Letters acknowledging receipt

of the allegation are usually sent to allegers after the ARB meets. 

The assignment of allegations for evaluation and closure varies slightly between the regions and

offices. Generally, the technical staff evaluates technical allegations and sends a copy of an

inspection report or a memorandum to the Allegation Coordinator with the result of the

evaluation. The Allegation Coordinator reviews the information and, if all of the issues have

been sufficiently addressed, prepares a closure letter to the alleger based on the information

provided. If the issues have not been addressed, the allegation and the evaluation are usually

discussed at a subsequent ARB meeting to determine what additional actions are necessary to

complete the evaluation and close the allegation.

For wrongdoing issues for which OI completes an investigation and determines whether the

allegation was substantiated, the report of investigation serves as a basis for responding to the

alleger. The responsible technical division will review the OI report and will either provide input

to or prepare a draft closure letter to the alleger. If OI does not complete the investigation to the

point at which OI can determine if wrongdoing occurred, the Allegation Coordinator prepares a

closure letter informing the alleger that because of limited resources and the relative safety 

significance of the issue, the investigation was terminated without reaching a conclusion about

whether wrongdoing occurred.
The Commissioners -2-

Overall, the allegation program has maintained the improvements realized in all areas in the last

three years. The findings from the 2003 audits and NRC’s performance measures for the

Allegation Program indicate the improvements made in reviewing, documenting, tracking, and

completing evaluations of allegations continue. The timeliness goals for communications with

allegers were met in all cases. The quality rating goal was achieved each of the last three years. 

Additionally, no inappropriate disclosures of the identity of allegers occurred in the last three

years.

To effectively address an increase in the number of generic security-related allegations and the

on-going implementation of new and comprehensive security-related orders, rules, and

guidance, the Agency Allegations Advisor recommended in the attached report that the Office of

Nuclear Security and Incident Response (NSIR), appoint an Office Allegation Coordinator to

serve as the administrative point of contact for processing and controlling allegations assigned to

that office. Given the current workload and a number of more pressing priorities, it was decided

that the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation’s Allegation Coordinator will continue to carry out

these functions for NSIR. During future budget cycles, and in close consultation with NSIR, this

recommendation will be re-evaluated.

Attachment: Annual Report

cc: SECY

OGC

OCA

OPA

CFO