This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 PHILIPP MERILLAT CORPORATION, 2 a Colorado Corporation, 3 Plaintiff-Appellee, 4 v. No. A-1-CA-36068 5 CARL R. ELKINS, as Personal 6 Representative of the Estate of 7 Fred V. Elkins, Deceased, 8 Defendant-Appellant, 9 and 10 ASPEN INVESTMENT PARTNERS, 11 LLC, a New Mexico Limited Liability 12 Company, WASHINGTON FEDERAL, 13 and ALL UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS OF 14 INTEREST IN THE PREMISES 15 ADVERSE TO THE PLAINTIFF, 16 Defendants. 17 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CIBOLA COUNTY 18 Pedro G. Rael, District Judge 19 Espinosa & Associates, P.C. 20 Richard D. Barish 21 Leonard G. Espinosa 22 Albuquerque, NM 232 for Appellee 1
Mason & Isaacson, P.A. 2 James J. Mason 3 Joshua M. Montagnini 4 Gallup, NM 5 for Appellant 6 MEMORANDUM OPINION 7 BOHNHOFF, Judge. 8
{1} Defendant Carl R. Elkins (Elkins), as personal representative of the Estate of 9 Fred V. Elkins (Decedent), appeals from an award of summary judgment in favor of 10 Plaintiff Philipp Merillat Corporation (PMC). We affirm. 11 BACKGROUND 12
{2} This is a memorandum opinion and, because the parties are familiar with the 13 facts and procedural posture of the case, weset forth only such facts and law as are 14 necessary to decide the issues raised. 15
{3} The material facts of this case are undisputed. On August 1, 2006, Decedent 16 sold sixteen tracts of land located inCibola County, New Mexico, to Aspen 17 Investment Partners, LLC (Aspen), which gave Decedent a mortgage (Mortgage) on 18 the sixteen tracts. On August 9, 2006, Decedent recorded the Mortgage and 193 concurrently assigned it to the predecessors of Washington Federal. Decedent died in 1 2007. 2
{4} Aspen subsequently defaulted on the Mortgage and also faile d to pay property 3 taxes from 2006 through 2013. OnMay 30, 2013, PMC purchased four of the sixteen 4 tracts at a tax auction. (The four tracts will be referred to as “theProperty.”) After the 5 taxes for 2006 through 2013 were paid from PMC’s payment for the Property, the 6 Property Tax Division of the State of New Mexico’s Taxation and Revenue 7 Department delivered deeds (Deeds) to PMC, granting and conveying to PMC “the 8 former owner’s interest inthe . . . [P]roperty . . . as of the date the state’s lien for 9 property taxes arose , pursuant to the Property Tax Code, that date being January 1, 10 2009. . . and that interest being subject only to perfected interests in the real property 11 existing before the date the property tax lien arose [.]” (Emphasis added.) 12
{5} In October 2013, PMC filed suit against Elkins, Aspen, and Washington Federal 13 to quiet title to the Property. On January30, 2014, Washington Federal assigned the 14 Mortgage back to Decedent’s estate. El kins thereafter brought a separate suit to 15 foreclose on the Mortgage, which was conso lidated with the quiet title action. PMC 16 obtained a default judgment against Aspen, and Washington Federal disclaimed any 17 interest in the Property. 181 The district court entered “findings and conclusions” in reaching its decision. 16 We remind the court that when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district 17 court does not make findings and instead determines only whether there are any 18 genuine issues of material fact. See Rule 1-056(C) NMRA; see also Gardner-Zemke 19 4 {6} Elkins and PMC filed cross-motions for summary judgment, disputing the 1 relative superiority of their respective interests in the Property. Elkins relied upon the 2 language in the Deeds, arguing that they stated that the Stat e’s tax lien arose on 3 January 1, 2009, and that because the Mortgage was perfected on August 9, 2006, 4 PMC’s title to the Property was subject to the Mortgage. PMC relied on provisions of 5 New Mexico’s Property Tax Code, NMSA 1978, §§ 7-38-1 to -93 (1973, as amended 6 through 2018), arguing as follows: A tax lien attached to the tracts (including the 7 Property) as of January 1, 2006, based on Aspen’s failure to pay property taxes 8 pursuant to Section 7-38-48(A). Accordingl y, PMC took title subject only to perfected 9 interests in the Property existing as of thatdate, pursuant to Section 7-38-65(A). Thus, 10 PMC concluded, it took title to the Property free and clear of the Mortgage. 11
{7} The district court granted summary judgment in favor of PMC and against 12 Elkins, agreeing with PMC that (1) a tax lien against the Property arose on January 1, 13 2006, pursuant to Section 7-38-48(A); (2) the tax lien was superior to Elkins’ 14 Mortgage; and (3) by operation of Secti on 7-38-65(A), PMC acquired the Property 15 free and clear of the Mortgage because th e property taxes were paid from the money 16 PMC paid for the Property. 1 17Co. v. State , 1990-NMSC-034, ¶ 11, 109 N.M. 729, 790 P.2d 1010 (noting that the 20 sole purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to determine whether a genuine 21 issue of material fact exists; it is not to beused to decide an i ssue of fact). However, 22 the factual recitations in the district court’s decision track PMC’s statement of 23 undisputed material facts, which Elkins did not dispute below. 19 5 DISCUSSION 1 A. Standard of Review 2
{8} “[I]f no material issues of fact are indispute and an appeal [of a grant of 3 summary judgment] presents only a question of law, we apply denovo review and are 4 not required to view the appeal in the light most favorable to the party opposing 5 summary judgment.” City of Albuquerque v. BPL W Architects & Eng’rs, Inc ., 2009- 6 NMCA-081, ¶ 7, 146 N.M. 717, 213 P.3d 1146. “Statutory interpretation is an issue 7 of law, which we review de novo.” N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. 8 Regulation Comm’n , 2007-NMSC-053, ¶ 19, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105. 9 B. Analysis 10
{9} Statutes are to be construed in accordance with their plain meaning. Cummings 11 v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C. , 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 44, 121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321 12 (“When interpreting statutes, [the courts’] responsibility is to search for and give 13 effect to the intent of the [L]egislature. . . . Our understanding of legislative intent is 14 based primarily on the language of the statute, and we will first c onsider and apply the 15 plain meaning of such language.”). In addition, “[w]e will construe the entire statute 166 as a whole so that all the provisions will beconsidered in relation to one another. 1 Statutes must be construed so that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or 2 superfluous.” Cobb v. State Canvassing Bd. , 2006-NMSC-034, ¶ 34, 140 N.M. 77, 3 140 P.3d 498 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 4 1. Section 7-38-48(A) Does Not ProvideThat a New Tax Lien Arises Every 5 Year 6
{10} Section 7-38-48(A) states: 7 [T]axes on real property are a lien ag ainst the real property from January 8 1 of the tax year for which the taxe s are imposed. The lien runs in favor 9 of the state and secures the payment of taxes on the real property and any 10 penalty and interest that become due. The lien continues until the taxes 11 and any penalty and interest are paid. The lien created by this section is 12 a first lien and paramount to any other interest in the property, perfected 13 or unperfected. The annual taxing process provided for in the Property 14 Tax Code shall continue as to any pa rticular property regardless of prior 15 tax delinquencies or of pending protests , actions for refunds or other tax 16 controversies involving the property, including a sale for delinquent 17 taxes. 18 Elkins argues that the last sentence of this statute contemplates the creation of a new, 19 separate tax lien for each unpaid tax year. We disagree. 20
{11} First, the plain language of the last sentence of Section 7-38-48(A) means only 21 that the process of annual tax accrual does not stop and insteadcontinues, even if the 22 tax is not paid in any one year or the taxpayer challenges the first year’s tax. Nowhere 23 in Section 7-38-48(A) is there any textual support for the proposition that a new tax 24 lien arises if one year’s accrued tax is not paid. 257 {12} Second, the second to last sentence of Section 7-38-65(A) provides that “[r]eal 1 property may be sold for delinquent taxes at any time after the expiration of three 2 years from the first date shown on the tax delinquency list on wh ich the taxes became 3 delinquent.” Thus, property is sold only if taxes have been delinquent for three years. 4 Under Elkins’ theory, the three-year delay would give rise to three separate tax 5 “liens.” However, the Property Tax Code refers only to “lien” in the singular, as 6 opposed to “liens” in the plural. See §§ 7-38-48, 7-38-65, 7-38-70. “When the 7 Legislature has spoken with precision on a topic[ ,] . . . it is not the proper role of the 8 judiciary to make plural that which is singular.” Rainaldi v. City of Albuquerque , 9 2014-NMCA-112, ¶ 15, 338 P.3d 94. The Deeds also refer to the State’s tax lien in 10 the singular. 11 2. Section 7-38-65(A) Does Not Prohibit the State From Selling Property to 12 Satisfy a Tax Lien That Arose More Than Four Years Earlier 13
{13} Section 7-38-65(A) states: 14 If a lien exists by the operation of S ection 7-38-48 . . . , the department 15 may collect delinquent taxes on real property by selling the real property 16 on which the taxes have become delinquent. . . . Real property may be 17 sold for delinquent taxes at any time after the expiration of three years 18 from the first date shown on the tax delinquency list on which the taxes 19 became delinquent. Real property shall be offered for sale for delinquent 20 taxes either within four years af ter the first date shown on the tax 21 delinquency list on which the taxe s became delinquent or, if the 22 department is barred by operation of law or by order of a court of 23 competent jurisdiction from offering the property for sale for delinquent 24 taxes within four years after the first date shown on the tax delinquency 25 list on which the taxes became delinque nt, within one year from the time 268 the department determines that it is no longer barred from selling the 1 property[.] 2 Elkins argues that the quoted language fro m the last sentence of Section 7-38-65(A) 3 obligated the State to sell the Property by 2010 to satisfy the tax lien created by the 4 unpaid 2006 taxes. Because the Property was not sold until 2013, he contends that at 5 that point the State could only sell it pursuan t to the “new” tax liens that he contends 6 separately arose in and after 2009. 7
{14} We disagree that Section 7-38-65(A) limits the State in its enforcement of tax 8 liens. First, the section’s initial sentence pr ovides, “If a lien exis ts by the operation of 9 Section 7-38-48, the department may coll ect delinquent taxes on real property by 10 selling the real property on which the taxe s have become delinquent.” Section 7-38- 11 65(A). There is no limit on the number of de linquent taxes that may be collected—all 12 that is required is one or more years of unpaid taxes that are at least three years old. 13
{15} Second, while Section 7-38-65(A) imposes a four-year deadline for offering to 14 sell property to satisfy a tax lie n, “[f]ailure to offer property for sale within the time 15 prescribed by Subsection A of this section shall not impair the validity or effect of any 16 sale that does take place.” Section 7-38-65(B). 17
{16} Third, the statute of limitations provi ded in the Property Tax Code, found at 18 Section 7-38-81(A), states: “Property may not be sold and proceedings may not be 19 initiated for the collection of property taxes that have been delinquent for more than 209 ten years.” Under Elkins’ construction of Section 7-38-65(A), the State could not 1 collect property taxes older than four years. This would render Section 7-38-81 2 meaningless, contrary to the aforementioned rule of statutory construction. 3 CONCLUSION 4
{17} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court. 5
{18} IT IS SO ORDERED. 6

_____________________________ 7 HENRY M. BOHNHOFF, Judge 8 WE CONCUR: 9

_____________________________ 10 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 11

_____________________________ 12 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 13