NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ZDRAVKO KOTZEV,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

CHARLES L. RYAN, in his individual

and official capacities as Director of the

Arizona Department of Corrections; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 12-16167

D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00907-FJM

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 13, 2014** 

Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Former Arizona state prisoner Zdravko Kotzev appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging

constitutional violations in connection with his incarceration and community

FILED

MAY 29 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
supervision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo

summary judgment and the district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6). Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm. 

The district court properly dismissed Kotzev’s claim for forcible spousal

separation against defendants Ryan and Butcher because Kotzev failed to allege

facts sufficient to link defendants to any constitutional violation. See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must

allege facts that “allow [ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”).

The district court properly dismissed Kotzev’s intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim because Ryan and Butcher are immune under Arizona

law. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-201.01(F) (“Any and all causes of action which may

arise out of tort caused by the director, prison officers or employees of the

department, within the scope of their legal duty, shall run only against the state.”).

The district court properly dismissed Kotvez’s § 1983 claims for damages

against Ryan acting in his official capacity because Ryan is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir.

2007) (Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 damages claims against state officials in

their official capacity).

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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Kotvez’s claims

against Ryan for injunctive and declaratory relief because those claims were moot. 

See Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1063-65 (9th Cir. 2012) (injunctive and

declaratory relief became moot upon inmate’s release from custody because he was

no longer subject to the conditions or policies he challenged).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kotvez’s motion to

amend his complaint and the motion to extend deadlines in the scheduling order

because Kotvez failed to show good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (requiring

“good cause” to modify a scheduling order); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,

Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth standard of review and

explaining that the “good cause” standard of Rule 16 controls after a scheduling

order is established, and that the inquiry turns primarily on the party’s diligence).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kotvez’s motion

for recusal. See United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010)

(setting forth standard of review and stating that judicial rulings alone rarely

constitute a valid basis for a recusal motion).

Kotvez’s contentions concerning the denial of his motion for default are

unpersuasive and unsupported by the record. 

AFFIRMED.

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