TYRONE WILLIAMS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D15-5716

_____________________________/

Opinion filed April 12, 2016.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

Mark W. Moseley, Judge.

Tyrone Williams, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Michael McDermott, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

LEWIS, J.

Appellant, Tyrone Williams, appeals the denial of his motion to correct 

illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). For 

the reasons discussed below, we affirm the order denying relief and certify conflict 

with the Fifth District’s opinion in Wilkerson v. State, 143 So. 3d 462 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2014).
2

Appellant was convicted of sexual battery by use of force not likely to cause 

serious personal injury, a second-degree felony punishable by up to fifteen years’ 

imprisonment. §§ 775.082(3)(c); 794.011(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2009). Appellant was 

sentenced to life imprisonment as a dangerous sexual felony offender (“DSFO”)

pursuant to section 794.0115, Florida Statutes (2009). Appellant contends that his 

life sentence as a DSFO1 is illegal. He relies on Wilkerson v. State, 143 So. 3d 

462 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), which held that pursuant to section 794.0115(6), where 

the minimum mandatory required by section 794.0115, Florida Statutes (2009),

exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by section 775.082(3)(c), the trial court 

is limited to imposing a twenty-five-year minimum mandatory, and a life sentence 

is not authorized. However, based upon the plain language of section 794.0115, 

we disagree with the Fifth District’s holding in Wilkerson. See Williams v. State, 

121 So. 3d 524, 530 (Fla. 2013) (noting that the plain and ordinary meaning of the 

words of a statute must control and that when a statute is clear, a court need not 

look behind the statute’s plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of 

statutory construction to ascertain intent). 

Section 794.0115(2), Florida Statutes (2009), states that a DSFO “must be 

sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 25 years imprisonment up to, and 

including, life imprisonment.” Section 794.0115(6) mandates that if the minimum 

 

1 Appellant does not challenge his DSFO designation.
3

mandatory term of section 794.0115 exceeds the statutory maximum authorized by 

section 775.082, the minimum mandatory term must be imposed. The plain 

language of the statute makes the DSFO minimum mandatory sentence any term 

between twenty-five years and life in prison, as the statute specifically states that 

the minimum mandatory is “25 years imprisonment up to, and including, life 

imprisonment.” § 794.0115(2), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). There is no 

restriction on the length of the minimum mandatory that may be imposed, other 

than that it must be between twenty-five years and life. Thus, a minimum 

mandatory life sentence is authorized by section 794.0115 regardless of the 

statutory maximum of the crime. 

This Court has read a similar “25 to life” provision, section 775.087(2)(a)3., 

Florida Statutes, to permit the imposition of a life sentence for a second-degree 

felony. In Flowers v. State, 69 So. 3d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), this Court 

held that pursuant to the 10-20-life statute, which requires a minimum mandatory 

term of “not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in 

prison” when a defendant discharges a firearm and causes great bodily harm or 

death, the trial court could impose any minimum mandatory term between twentyfive years and life for a defendant convicted of a second-degree felony. This Court 

specifically rejected the argument that section 775.087(2)(a)3. limits the minimum 

mandatory period to twenty-five years for a second-degree felony. Id. This 
4

Court’s reasoning in Flowers applies to section 794.0115 as well. Appellant’s 

minimum mandatory life sentence as a dangerous sexual felony offender is legal as 

it is specifically authorized by section 794.0115. We recognize that this holding

conflicts with the Fifth District’s opinion in Wilkerson, and we certify conflict with 

that decision.

AFFIRMED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.

THOMAS, J., CONCURS; MAKAR, J., CONCURS WITH OPINION.
5

MAKAR, J., concurring.

I concur fully, noting that the Fifth District’s decision in Wilkerson v. State, 

143 So. 3d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), cannot stand unless our supreme court 

revisits and changes course from its decision in Mendenhall v. State, 48 So. 3d 

740, 750 (Fla. 2010), whose holding our court applied to validate the trial court’s 

discretionary imposition of a “minimum mandatory life term” in Flowers v. State, 

69 So. 3d 1042, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Reasonable alternative interpretations 

of the sentencing statutes at issue in these cases exist, resulting in the 4-3 decision 

in Mendenhall as well as the interpretive conflict between this case and Wilkerson

(which did not mention Mendenhall). Absent resolution of the conflict, trial judges 

across Florida will lack uniform guidance on their sentencing discretion resulting 

in geographically incongruous results as a comparison of this case with Wilkerson

demonstrates.