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Number 142, May 1998

Bulgaria and NATO: 7 Lost Years

by Jeffrey Simon

Conclusions - Bulgaria's actions and policies on military reform between    1990 and March 1997 left the country's institutions and military largely unprepared for    integration with the Alliance.
- Bulgarian government and military officials have emerged    from the state's self-imposed isolation lacking an understanding of how far behind they    are, as well as what they need to do, to seek integration.
- Bulgaria's armed forces are only now starting to reform and    downsize. The resultant social and economic pain has yet to be felt, and the state is    likely to suffer significant political consequences.
- Some social and political figures may elect to portray the    United States and NATO as the cause of Bulgaria's social, economic, and political pain.    Bulgaria's citizens, politicians and military need NATO to better define its standards for    interoperability.
**NATO's Enlargement "Principles"**
Since the beginning of the Partnership forPeace (PFP) program in January 1994, NATO has been refining its criteria for enlargement.The *NATO Enlargement Study*, briefed in September 1995, emphasized that candidatestates should be democratic, protective of individual liberty and human/minority rights,and dedicated to the rule of law. The study also indicated that civil governments shouldcontrol their militaries, and possess certain levels of military capabilities and NATOinteroperability. 

In 1996, after three rounds of discussionswith NATO concerning prospective desires to join the Alliance, Bulgaria--under BulgarianSocialist Party rule--concluded that it did *not* want to pursue membership. Onlyafter a February 1997 change in government did Bulgaria formally announce an aspirationtoward NATO membership.

 
**Premature Quest for NATO Membership?**
Bulgaria has only recently become quiteactive in its quest for "second tranche" candidacy for NATO membership (alongwith Romania and Slovenia). Members of the new government believe that their change ofpolicy and good intentions are enough to merit serious consideration. Though Bulgaria nowappears serious in its quest, unfortunately it has lost seven years. Bulgaria is stilltrying to understand what is expected of it, and remains ill-prepared.

Part of Bulgaria's problem stems from thefact that NATO's information programs have not reached their audience. This contributes tothe fact that many responsible politicians as well as the broader Bulgarian society havean insufficient understanding of NATO. This situation has been exacerbated by the lack ofsocietal consensus as reflected in Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) opposition to NATOmembership. Because the Bulgarian leadership and society do not yet really understand howmuch time they have lost, and just how much work remains to be done, NATO needs to clearlydefine its interoperability standards.
**Assessing Bulgaria's Progress**
Bulgaria's candidacy for NATO membershipcan be assessed based upon its progress in fulfilling the following "criteria":
*****Politicalreform/democratization***. Bulgaria has held democratic elections and exhibiteda peaceful transfer of power from the Bulgarian Communist Party under Todor Zhivkov to theUnion for Democratic Forces (UDF) in 1991. Power returned to the Bulgarian Socialist Party(BSP) in 1994, and with the implosion of the Bulgarian economy in 1996, a caretakergovernment was set up under Renata Indzhova until elections returned the Union ofDemocratic Forces to power in the Spring 1997. The political system appears to work, butthe ability of the new government to implement economic reform will significantlydetermine whether or not lasting political reform can take hold in Bulgaria. If the newgovernment fails to meet popular expectations for the economy, confidence in democraticrule could wane.
*****Economic reform***.The political system experienced enormous stress in 1996 because of economic collapse. Thenew government, to its credit, has implemented the beginnings of real economic reform. Ithas introduced a currency board to stabilize the currency and has begun what likely willprove to be a painful, but hopefully successful, economic transformation.
*****Treatment of ethnicminorities***. Bulgaria's demographics suggest a declining population of about8.5 million people. Its decline is due to a high death rate, declining birthrate (only60,000 in 1997), and emigration (650,000 since 1989). The size of the Turkish minority isroughly 850,000 (10 percent) and is represented by the Movement for Rights and Freedom(MRF) party in Parliament. The issue of the Turkish minority has eased since the late1980s anti-Turk campaign of then Bulgarian Communist Party leader Todor Zhivkov, which ledto the emigration of some 300,000 Turks. With the change in government in the early 1990s,many Turks returned to Bulgaria, and the MRF pushed for the rights of Turkish citizens toserve as conscripts in the regular armed forces, rather than in the construction troops,and to become military officers. Although little appears to have been done about it, it isno longer a "visible" political issue.
*****Relations with neighbors***.While Bulgaria has shown signs that it is starting to address problems with its neighbors,there is yet much to do.
**- **Turkey**--Deep-seated distrust regarding    its Turkish ethnic minority has prevailed. Bulgarians have feared that the Turkish    minority would create a serious problem if a Greek-Turkish conflict erupted. Some saw    Turkey as a potential enemy; others, who are pro-NATO, see Bulgarian membership as    protection against Turkey. This has clearly changed with the new government which seeks    NATO membership and has actively attempted to develop trilateral cooperation with Turkey    and Romania (e.g., the October 6, 1997 trilateral agreement to combat organized crime)    with the ultimate goal of drawing in Greece to enhance subregional stability.
- **Greece**--Relations with Greece have been    traditionally close. Recent Bulgarian efforts to create trilateral cooperation with Greece    and Romania are seen as a first step to create eventual "quadrilateral" security    ties with Turkey. This is a very constructive Bulgarian effort intended to produce    security in the Balkans.
- **Romania**--Earlier Bulgarian feelings that    Romania resists contact because it wants to be seen as "Central European" have    been overcome, to some extent, by the recent trilateral cooperation. Nevertheless many    Bulgarians apparently still feel that they are "competing" with Romania for NATO    membership. 
- **Macedonia**--A bilateral Treaty of    Friendship has been delayed because of argument over the "Macedonian" language    and Macedonian "claims to Bulgaria's history." In June 1997 Petur Stoyanov    visited towns in southwestern Bulgaria and made appeals for regularized relations. This    remains an unfinished item of business that must be completed and will require some    compromise.
- **Russian Federation**--The Russian Federation    presses Bulgaria to reduce its Western commitments, even as Russia continues to have a    cultural influence on Bulgarians. Bulgaria is also heavily dependent economically (oil and    gas) on Russia. Hence, Russia's actions will likely affect Bulgaria's "sense" of    freedom of maneuver.
*****Democratic control of themilitary***. Bulgaria's experience over the past seven years has shown that theexecutive has control of the military, but changes in the government have resulted in adeclining, rather than increasing, number of members of parliament who have the experienceto exercise legislative oversight of the defense community.
**Constitution and Defense Law**--Bulgaria    has a parliamentary system with a directly elected president. As commander-in-chief, the    president exerts moral authority. This arrangement has worked thus far in Bulgaria. It was    successfully tested during cohabitation between President Zhelyu Zhelev and Prime Minister    Zhan Videnov. 

The authority of the Bulgarian executivewas successfully tested when Defense Minister Georgi Ananiev (and Prime Minister IvanKostov) relieved Colonel General Tsvetan Totomirov (now President Petur Stoyanov'smilitary adviser) as the chief of staff on June 9, 1997 replacing him with Air Force Col.Gen. Mikho Mikhov. They justified the change by introducing the principle of"rotation." Executive authority was again validated when the President relievedMajor General Angel Marin, commander of the rocket forces, after he openly criticizedmilitary reforms adopted by the government. The executive was further tested, during theprevious BSP government, when public unrest erupted in December 1996-January 1997 withBulgaria's economic collapse. The Consultative Council on National Security (whichincludes the president and prime minister, ministers of defense, foreign affairs, interiorand finance, Chief of General Staff, Parliamentary spokesman, and members of allParliamentary political parties) hammered out a common stand and decided to hold earlyelections. In sum, Bulgaria's executive arrangements appear to work, and efforts to createconsensus seem to dominate.
***Parliamentary Oversight***--The    240-member parliament is comprised of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) with 52 percent    of the vote holding an absolute majority of 137 seats. The BSP with 22 percent of the vote    has 58 seats; the MRF, l9; EuroLeft, 14; and Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB), 12. The major    weakness of the parliament regarding oversight functions lies in its lack of continuity;    roughly 100 of the UDF MPs are new, having no prior experience. Of the 240 total, only    seven MPs carry over from 1990, and only about 20 (8 percent) from the previous    parliament. A "silent" majority (an estimated 60 percent of the MPs) have never    taken the floor. In contrast to other transition states where parliamentary expertise is    slowly expanding with each Parliament, Bulgaria's seems to be shrinking. This factor    affects the quality of Bulgaria's parliamentary oversight.

The National Security Committee has 21MPs; it comprises opposition members based upon the principle of proportionalrepresentation. It has no professional staff and only three of its MPs, to include formerdefense minister Loudzhev, served in previous parliaments. Although the committee calls onthe defense minister and Chief of General Staff to testify on the defense budget, the lawon defense, and NATO, its membership lacks previous military and executive defenseexperience, discussions have been muted, and its ability to critically assess the forcestructure and budget appears limited. In addition, though the authority for intelligenceoversight resides in the National Security Committee, there is no apparent evidence ofoversight occurring. (Hence, compared with other transition states to include Romania,Bulgaria's National Security Committee is particularly weak.)

The Foreign Affairs (and Integration)Committee has 23 MPs (with two vice chairmen from opposition parties) and overseesEuropean Union and NATO integration. Assen Agov (UDF), chairman of the committee, added"integration" to the committee's name to emphasize the shift in Bulgaria'spolicy. Though its debates have been animated on issues such as the National SecurityStrategy, Macedonia, and deployment of Bulgarian troops abroad, it is important to notethat Bulgaria still lacks a consensus on NATO integration. In this regard, Bulgaria alsodiffers from Romania, as well as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary (who haveachieved candidate status).
**Defense Ministry**--Bulgaria's huge    defense ministry (of roughly 2,000-2,200 plus a General Staff of 700) still lacks    sufficiently trained personnel and the capacity to perform effective basic functions such    as transparent multi-year budgeting, long-term defense planning, and personnel management.    Bulgaria still needs to build a stable defense planning system, which requires a proper    civil service.

The defense ministry comprises threedeputy defense ministers plus the Chief of the General Staff, who according to a June 1997draft amendment, would become a deputy defense minister directly subordinate to thedefense minister. 

In theory, military intelligence,counterintelligence, and military police are no longer in the General Staff, but report tothe defense minister, not the Chief of the General Staff. (In this area, transparency doesnot yet exist and it is quite difficult to assess just what is really occurring.) In otherwords, Prime Minister Ivan Kostov is the first Prime Minister since 1989 who hastheoretical control of and access to specialized information.

Fundamentally, the defense ministry hasthe same four components that had been established between December l991 and May 1992.But, specific functions (directorates) appear to have shifted so often that it is verydifficult to assess the effectiveness of communication between civilian defense ministrybodies and the General Staff directorates. Apparent redundancy adds to the confusion andit is difficult to determine accounta- bility and to identify where responsibility liesfor the following key functions:
- the long-term budget program connected to long-term    planning.
- establishing a link between defense planning and economic    resources.
- determining the linkage between the personnel policy    performed under Deputy Defense Minister Kunchev and the personnel directorate under the    First Deputy Chief of the General Staff.
- ensuring that adequate intelligence is provided to the    defense and prime ministers.

In sum, compared to neighboring transitiondefense ministries, Bulgaria's is extremely large and very confusing. Bulgaria's 3,000person (civilian and military) defense structure is roughly twice the size of Poland;though Bulgaria's 107,000 troops are roughly one-half Poland's 218,000 troops.
*****Military capability andNATO interoperability***. Reform and restructuring of the military has not yetreally begun. In the fall of 1991 the Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) totaled 107,000 (with46,000 professionals) and it remains at that level.

The current government approved the threestage Defense Reform that envisions to cut the military to 65,000 maximum by 2010.
- The first phase was completed in 1997 when the forces were    still roughly 107,000. What did occur during the final four months of 1997 was that    roughly 60 professionals were hired. (During 1998 Bulgaria plans to hire roughly another    1,700-2,000 professionals for the forces.)
- The second phase (1998-2000) envisions the forces falling    to 75,000 in three corps. The Rapid Reaction Corps (at 70 percent manning and 100 percent    equipment) and the First and Third Army Corps in the west and east at lower manning    levels. Most of the initial cuts will be through reducing annual conscriptions from 50,000    to 30,000; and from an immediate cut of 5,000 professionals. Conscription would be reduced    from 18 to 12 months.
- The third phase reduces the force to 65,000 with plans to    modernize its inventory with the resulting savings.

Bulgaria is only now beginning the real,painful, and sensitive stage of military reform. In contrast, Hungary already has reducedits forces from 120,000 to 52,000; Poland from 405,000 to 218,000; the Czech Republic from130,000 to 58,000. The Defense and Armed Forces Bill can reduce the forces by establishingmandatory retirement for colonels at 52 years of age, and generals at 56.

Bulgaria's defense budget has beenseverely limited; and it is likely to remain so because the International Monetary Funddiscourages any increases in the defense budget which will likely be necessary formilitary reorganization. Bulgaria spent 800 million leva for military restructuring forthe period September-December 1997; the 1998 Defense Budget of 487.45 billion leva(roughly 2 percent of GDP) allocates roughly 25 billion leva (about U.S. $14 million) fortroop relocation and military reform. (Of the 25 billion, 10 billion is slated forconstruction and repair of housing; no equipment is to be purchased.)

Bulgaria operates at a disadvantage on thequestion of NATO interoperability because it has not made effective use of U.S. programsand has remained relatively isolated. While many Bulgarian officers have been trainedthrough the U.S. international military educational training (IMET) programs,military-to-military teams, and the George C. Marshall Center, they--in marked contrast toother transition states--have *not* been promoted to "visible" andresponsible positions to push reform forward. For example, the top military leadership inPoland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Romania is predominantly Western (andIMET)-trained. 

Bulgaria also operates at a disadvantagebecause it has not been very active in international peacekeeping operations. For example,while Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania have been working with IFOR/SFORsince January 1996 with units at battalion strength, Bulgaria didn't contribute any unitsuntil July 1997 when it sent a 35-man engineering platoon to join Dutch troops in SFOR(with most of the expenses to be borne by the Netherlands) with a second unit beginning inDecember 1997. It recently agreed to deploy a 28-man transport platoon, subordinate to theGreek unit, for SFOR to begin in June 1998. The result is that Bulgaria's militaryofficers, compared to other partners, have had much less day-to-day operational experiencewith NATO. Hence, there has been little or no transfer of NATO (lessons learned)experience into Bulgaria's military training, troop rotation planning, andEnglish-language experience that has been evident with the other partners.

In sum, Bulgarian politicians have takenlittle action toward Euro-Atlantic integration until recently. As a result, theirknowledge of, and experience with, NATO remains relatively limited. Though the newgovernment has taken some encouraging new steps, Bulgarians need to understand how farbehind their previous governments' actions have put them. The fact that they justifiedupcoming defense cuts as a NATO requirement (which is not the case) has createdmisunderstanding and has alienated the officer corps.

While the United States and NATO shouldstress that NATO is an "open" Alliance and that we welcome Bulgaria's desire tojoin, Bulgaria must understand that membership will only come after consistent policiesand activities have been evident. Because Bulgaria has lost seven years, we must be clearand consistent in telling Bulgaria what is expected of it and how long that road willlikely be.
****Recommendations**
- Bulgarian parliamentarians need training in defense    budgeting and other defense and intelligence matters to exert more effective oversight.    The George C. Marshall Center, which is to hold a budgeting seminar for parliamentarians,    is a first step in the right direction.
- The Defense Ministry needs help to reform. The U.K.    ministry of defense should be encouraged to provide a top-down assessment, as it has    already done for Hungary and Romania. The United States needs to coordinate its bilateral    efforts in defense budgeting, planning, and resource and personnel management.
- Since further work is needed in the downsizing and    redeploying of Bulgarian forces, military professionalism, and quality of life, U.S.    bilateral (IMET and military-to-military) activities should be focused in this direction.    We need to consistently stress the need for reciprocity if the Bulgarians want these    programs to continue (e.g., to use IMET graduates more effectively).
- Not only are NATO educational programs urgently needed, but    it also needs to be stressed that maintaining friendly relations with Russia and applying    for NATO membership are not contradictory, just as the need to cut armed forces is not a    NATO requirement.

Dr. Jeffrey Simon is a Senior Fellow atthe Institute for National Strategic Studies and the author of several books and papersconcerning NATO and NATO enlargement. He can be reached at (202) 685-2367, by fax at (202)685-3972, or by e-mail at [email protected]. 

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