Number 37, July 1995



## Ballistic Missile Defense

### The Need for a National
Debate

Robert Joseph and Keith Payne

### Conclusions

Consensus on Theater Missile Defense

There is a strong consensus in the United States
concerning the need for active defenses against theater
ballistic missiles, defined as missiles with a range of 3,500
km or less. This consensus was forged in the Gulf War,
when Iraq launched conventionally-armed missiles at Israel
and Saudi Arabia one striking a U.S. barracks, causing
one-quarter of the U.S. combat fatalities of the conflict.
Iraqi missiles were derived from the 1950's-vintage  
Scud-B missiles previously provided by the Soviet Union.
The political and military utility of even these relatively
crude missiles was not lost on other states who would use
force to achieve their own territorial and political
objectives.

Developments since Desert Storm have confirmed that
states seeking NBC weapons also seek increasingly capable
ballistic missiles as their delivery system of choice. For
example, Iran and Pakistan reportedly have been provided
Chinese technology for M-9 and/ or M-11 missiles. North
Korea has flight tested the 1000+ km-range No Dong-1,
a missile with the potential to carry NBC warheads, and
may have concluded agreements to provide the No Dong
to Iran, Libya and Syria. Indeed, according to unofficial
sources, the delivery of No-Dong missiles to Iran may
already have begun. Such transfers could have profound
implications for stability in the Middle East and Persian
Gulf areas of vital U.S. interest.

The Gulf experience and the accelerating pace of
missile proliferation have demonstrated the need for a
robust theater missile defense capability. As a result, the
United States has initiated a number of programs to protect
U.S. forces and allies from ballistic missile attack. The
"core" TMD programs of the U.S. effort include: (1)
improvements to PATRIOT (PAC-3) and the new ERINT
missile for point defense; (2) THAAD for wide-area
theater defense; and (3) AEGIS/SM-2 Block IVA for
tactical missile defense from the sea.

In addition to these core TMD programs, the Clinton
Administration has recently declared the much more
capable Navy Upper Tier system described as an
"advanced concept" for "extensive theater-wide
protection"  to be compliant with the ABM Treaty.
However, as discussed below, it is not clear how
substantially this system (as well as THAAD) has been
"dumbed-down" to make it compatible with the
Administration's view of the Treaty.

Divergence on National Missile Defense

The consensus on TMD does not exist on national
missile defense.  In fact, differences on the central issue of
defending the U.S. homeland from ballistic missile attack
are stark, influenced by widely contrasting perceptions of
the threat and the relevance of traditional arms control,
specifically the ABM Treaty, in the post Cold War
environment.

Those who oppose initiating an NMD deployment
program begin with the premise that,  presently, no
proliferant state has the capability to strike U.S. territory
with ballistic missiles. Furthermore, they contend that the
emergence of such a threat in the near or mid-term is very
unlikely. Therefore, given defense budgetary constraints,
the United States need not and should not now pursue
NMD. Moreover, NMD critics argue that if a missile
threat does emerge, the United States will be able to deter
attacks on its territory through its conventional superiority
and, if necessary, its nuclear offensive forces, as it did
during the decades of the Cold War. In fact, opponents
believe NMD would undermine deference and lead to a
new U.S.-Russian nuclear offensive arms race.

In contrast, NMD advocates point to the proliferation
of ballistic missile programs in countries hostile to the
United States. They cite, for example, the North Korean
development of two new multistage missiles. Then-Director
of Central Intelligence, James Wails, publicly
acknowledged these North Korean missiles, and noted that
they could pose a threat to "all of Northeast Asia,
Southeast Asia, much of the Pacific area, and even most of
Russia." Indeed, according to a more recent statement by
then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John Dutch, one of 
these missiles, the Taipei Dong 2, will have the potential
to strike portions of the United States. According to public
testimony by intelligence officials, these missiles could be
operational within three to five years. If the Taipei Dong
2 has intercontinental potential, is operational in five years
and armed with NBC warheads, an NMD deployment
program must be initiated now if the United States is to
escape the prospect of vulnerability to North Korean
missile threats.  Moreover, given the North's record of
selling missiles and technologies to other rogue states, the
United States could become vulnerable to unprecedented
coercion. In this context, Libya has declared its intent to
acquire missiles with which to threaten the U.S. homeland.

These and other emerging threats (e.g., the possible
sale of Russian SS-25s as space launch vehicles) make
NMD essential. NMD proponents reject as a Cold War
nostrum the notion that missile defenses would undermine
deterrence. Indeed, they insist that NMD would both
contribute to deterrence and provide an important hedge
against the increased potential for deterrence failure in the
post-Cold War era. Deterrence policies must be
supplemented by NMD because the conditions necessary
for deterrence mutual familiarity, understanding,
communication, etc.  are less likely to pertain in the
existing strategic environment than in the bipolar structure
of the past.

The absence of an effective NMD may undercut the
ability of the United States to deter regional aggressors
armed with long-range missiles. Such aggressor states may
well judge U.S. deterrence as incredible because of the
aggressors ability to launch retaliatory NBC missile
attacks on U.S. cities. Because the regional aggressor
would question the willingness of U.S. leaders to risk
possible missile attacks against U.S. territory, regional
deterrence would be weakened. NMD is therefore essential
to establish the credibility of U.S. regional deterrence
policies.

Evolution of the BMD Program

Reflective of these fundamentally different views are
the divergent approaches on NMD taken by the Bush and
Clinton Administrations. In early 1991, following the
demise of the Soviet empire, President Bush reoriented the
SDI program from defending against a Soviet first strike to
protecting against limited ballistic missile attacks. Two
events later that year validated this shift in focus. First, as
stated earlier, ballistic missiles played a major role in the
strategy of the Gulf conflict. Second, the attempted coup
in the Soviet Union raised concerns regarding command
and control of the Soviet strategic arsenal. The redesigned
program called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
(GPALS) envisioned deployment by the end of the decade
of space-based sensors and both theater missile defenses
and ground-based strategic defense interceptors (to be
followed by space-based interceptors). The number of
interceptors was  to be limited to assuage concerns that
defenses would undermine U.S.-Soviet strategic stability.
In this context, the Bush Administration made clear that the
level of strategic defenses deployed would not undercut the
credibility of the Soviet offensive strategic force.

Consistent with this shift in the U.S. program, Soviet
and then Russian leaders acknowledged the need to protect
against ballistic missile proliferation through strengthened
active defenses. Indeed, in January 1992 President Yeltsin
called for "a global system for protection of the world
community" from the missile and NBC proliferation threat.
Building on the expressed desire of both the U.S. and
Russia to work together to meet a common threat, Bush
and Yeltsin established a high level group to develop a
concept for a joint defense system and to identify areas for
cooperation. Between June and  September, the group
made progress in such areas as the possibility of sharing
early warning information. However, with the election
defeat of President Bush, this effort came to an end.

The Clinton Administration, soon after assuming
office, initiated a series of national security policy reviews,
including the DoD Bottom-Up Review to assess overall
defense requirements. The BUR recommendations on
missile defenses: (1) assigned first priority to theater
missile defenses and regional threats; (2) downgraded the
priority for TMD, changing the focus from an acquisition
program to a technology demonstration/readiness program;
and (3) gave third priority to an advanced technologies
program, designed to develop and demonstrate high payoff
technologies for TMD and NMD. Consistent with these
recommendations, the SDIO was renamed BMDO, and
restructured to focus almost exclusively on theater missile
defenses.

Downgrading the NMD program to "a hedge against a
greater long range missile threat" reflected a relatively
benign view of the threat. The probability of a deliberate
attack on the United States by Russia or China was
assessed to be "extremely low," and the likelihood of an
accidental or unauthorized launch was described as
"unlikely."  Although not excluded, the possibility of a
limited ballistic missile threat to the United States from a
third country "sometime in the first decade of the next
century" was not considered urgent or even sufficiently
significant to require an NMD deployment program. The
NMD programs in progress were either cut back (e.g.,
space-based sensors) or killed (e.g., space-based
interceptors). Other programs, such as ground-based NMD
interceptors and radars, were reduced and slowed. Funding
for the advanced technologies program was also severely
reduced, impacting directly on advanced capabilities such
as the boost-phase interceptor.

With the Republican victory in November 1994, the
positions of the Clinton Administration on BMD have
come under increased attack. Pointing to missile threats
from North Korea, Iraq and Iran, Hill leaders have
rejected the Administration's approach to both theater and
national missile defense. On TMD, Congress has objected
to negotiations which are seen as placing restrictions on
U.S. technologies which will reduce the effectiveness and
raise the costs of U.S. TMD systems. On NMD, Congress
has called for a renewed commitment to effective national
missile defenses and the Senate has directed the
deployment of a multiple-site ND system by 2003.

The Future of the ABM Treaty

Paralleling its reorientation of the BMD program from
SDI to GALS, the Bush Administration revised its
position on the ABM Treaty. Although describing the 1972
Treaty as an outdated relic of the Cold War, the
Administration indicated a willingness to accept limits on
the deployment of strategic defenses, thereby agreeing that
the Treaty could remain in effect if amended to meet the
security requirements of the post Cold War period,
including the need to counter the missile threat.

In the fall of 1992, the Bush Administration proposed
in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) a series of
formal amendments to the ABM Treaty that would have:



- eliminated restrictions on development and testing of
     ABM systems and components;
- eliminated restrictions on radars and sensors;
- eliminated restrictions on the transfer of ABM systems
     and technologies; and
- permitted additional ABM deployment sites, as well as
     additional launchers and interceptors.

The Bush Administration proposed to clarify the
demarcation line between ABM and non-ABM systems by
establishing a demonstrated, verifiable standard based on
the velocity of the target in actual tests involving
interceptor missiles. If the target exceeded the established
limit, the tested system would be considered strategic and,
therefore, bound by the restrictions of the ABM Treaty. In
this way, consistent with the original intent of the Treaty,
development, testing and deployment of TMD systems
would not be impeded.

The position of the Clinton Administration on the
Treaty was radically different from that of its predecessor.
Referring to the ABM Treaty as "the bedrock of strategic
stability," the Clinton Administration took a number of
actions to strengthen the "viability and effectiveness" of the
Treaty, including:



- withdrawing the amendments to the Treaty proposed by
     the Bush Administration;
- advocating the multilateralization of the Treaty, making
     it much more difficult to amend the Treaty in the
     future; and
- "affirming" the "narrow" interpretation of the Treaty.

On demarcation, although initially adopting the position of
the Bush Administration, the Clinton Administration has
agreed to place additional restrictions on the development,
testing and deployment of TMD systems. In short,  the
ABM Treaty  was  made  the  center-piece of the new
Administration's arms control policy.

Following the November 1994 elections, the  Clinton
Administration's position on demarcation became a focal
point for Congressional objections to the shift in U.S.
policy on the ABM Treaty in general.  The new Hill
leadership expressed its firm opposition to the additional
restrictions on defensive technologies which the
Administration has either accepted or proposed in the SCC
negotiations.  Moreover, Congress has criticized as
inadequate the Administration's consultations on these
negotiations, as well as on the issue of multilateralization.
More broadly, Hill leaders have questioned the basic
relevance of the ABM Treaty in today's security
environment a world in which the Soviet Union no longer
exists, in which the logic of the Cold War no longer
applies, and in which the foreseeable ballistic missile
threats to the United States require effective missile
defenses.

The Clinton Administration, caught between
congressional pressure and Russian intransigence, has
avoided reconvening the SCC, moving the negotiations to
higher diplomatic levels, culminating in the May Summit
in Moscow. The Joint Statement from the Summit, while
described by the Administration as moving in the direction
of Congress, is still viewed as inconsistent with the
concerns of, and positions advocated by Hill leaders. The
statement enshrines the Treaty as the "cornerstone" of
U.S.-Russian relations and commits the parties to a set of
"basic principles" to guide demarcation negotiations.

Far from resolving the contentious issues, the Summit
"principles" have been criticized as merely serving to
commit the United States to further negotiations before
deploying treaty-compliant TAD systems. For example,
the principle that TAD systems "must not lead to violation
or circumvention of the ABM Treaty" commits the U.S. to
negotiations in which it must respond to hypothetical
concerns Moscow may choose to raise not about what U.S.
TAD programs are but about what they might theoretically
become. On the basis of past experience with Soviet
negotiators who are now Russian negotiators critics have 
predicted endless filibusters over specious concerns
designed to prevent decisive action essential to develop and
deploy the defenses the United States needs.