UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

BRUCE WIBBEN,

Plaintiff, 

v. CASE NO.:

INTERBOND CORPORATION 

OF AMERICA d/b/a BRANDSMART 

A Florida Profit Corporation

Defendant.

____________________________________/

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff, BRUCE WIBBEN (“Mr. Wibben” or “Plaintiff”) files this Complaint 

against Defendant INTERBOND CORPORATION OF AMERICA d/b/a 

BRANDSMART (“Defendant” or “IC”), and states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff brings this action for interference and retaliation pursuant to the 

Family and Medical Leave Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (“the FMLA”), and 

for disability discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Chapter 760 of the Florida Civil 

Rights Act (“FCRA”). Plaintiff seeks to recover from Defendant back pay, an equal amount 

as liquidated damages, other monetary damages, equitable relief, front pay, declaratory 

relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

JURISDICTION, VENUE AND FMLA COVERAGE

2. The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1337 and the FMLA and the authority to grant declaratory relief under the FMLA, and

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq.

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3. The Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s FCRA claim, 

as it arises out of the same operative facts and circumstances as his FMLA claims.

4. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was an employee of Defendant.

5. Plaintiff worked for Defendant in Broward County, Florida, and the venue, 

therefore, for this case is the Fort Lauderdale Division of the Southern District of Florida.

6. Defendant is a Florida Profit Corporation that provides retail services in, 

among others, Broward County, Florida, and is therefore within the jurisdiction of the 

Court.

7. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant was an employer covered by the 

FMLA, because it was engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce that

employed 50 or more employees within 75 miles of where Plaintiff worked, for each 

working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks, prior to seeking leave under 

the FMLA.

8. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was an employee entitled to leave 

under the FMLA, based on the fact that he: (a) suffered from a serious health condition as 

defined by the FMLA which necessitated FMLA leave; and (b) was employed by 

Defendant for at least 12 months and worked at least 1,250 hours during the relevant 12-

month period prior to him seeking to exercise his rights to FMLA leave.

9. Plaintiff is a disabled male. At all times material, Plaintiff was protected 

during his employment with Defendant by the FCRA because:

a. Plaintiff was a disabled or “perceived as disabled” employee who 

suffered discrimination and harassment because of his disability or “perceived disability” by 

Defendant; and

b. Plaintiff suffered adverse employment action and was subjected to an 

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increasingly hostile work environment as a result of his disability or “perceived disability.”

10. Defendant was at all times an “employer” as envisioned by the FCRA.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT

11. On or around January 31, 2019, Plaintiff dual filed a Charge of 

Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and 

Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”) alleging disability discrimination 

against Defendant.

12. More than 180 days have passed since the filing of the Charge of

Discrimination

13. Plaintiff timely files this action within the applicable period of limitations 

against Defendant.

14. All conditions precedent to this action have been satisfied and/or waived.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

15. Plaintiff worked for the Defendant from April 26, 1999, until his wrongful 

termination on July 7, 2018, at which time he held the Sales Department Manager position.

16. In late 2017, Mr. Wibben began experiencing severe symptoms from what 

ultimately turned out to be a colon cancer and Atrial Fibrillation diagnosis. 

17. Atrial Fibrillation and Colon Cancer are protected disabilities under the 

FCRA, and a serious health condition under the FMLA.

18. Plaintiff informed Defendant’s management that he was suffering from 

serious medical issues that were affecting his ability to work.

19. Plaintiff notified management that he was in the process of seeking medical 

treatment to diagnose and treat his ongoing medical issues (which included, among other 

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things, bleeding, irregular heartbeat, sweating, fatigue, confusion, and drop in energy 

levels) and that he anticipated needing further time away from work for treatment for same.

20. Rather than notify him of his FMLA rights, or engage in the interactive 

process as both the FMLA and FCRA require, Defendant’s management instead chastised 

Mr. Wibben for is performance, and oftentimes sent him home, over his objections, rather 

than allow him to stay in the workplace and perform his job duties. 

21. Mr. Wibben’s objections to disability discrimination are protected by the 

FCRA.

22. Defendant’s failure to provide Mr. Wibben with proper guidance and notice 

of his FMLA rights was, alone, a clear violation of the FMLA and constituted actionable 

interference. See Patterson v. Browning’s Pharm. & Healthcare, Inc., 961 So. 2d 982, 986 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

23. On June 2018, Mr. Wibben’s medical condition had become intolerable so 

that month, he notified Defendant’s management that he would be undergoing a medical 

procedure on July 13, 2018, and would necessitate time away from work thereafter, to 

recover from same. 

24. Again, Defendant refused to provide Mr. Wibben with information 

regarding his rights under the FMLA.

25. Instead, on July 4, 2018, Defendant demoted Mr. Wibben from his position, 

just a few days before he would undergo his medical procedure.

26. Shocked, Mr. Wibben objected to the demotion, and Defendant 

subsequently terminated his employment in violation of the law.

27. Mr. Wibben’s objections do his unlawful demotion are likewise considered 

protected activity under the FCRA.

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28. Defendant’s termination of Mr. Wibben stemmed from its discriminatory 

animus toward his need for and/or use of FMLA leave and need for accommodation under 

the FCRA. 

29. The timing of his termination makes the causal connection between his need 

for FMLA, his request for reasonable accommodations under the FCRA, and his

termination sufficiently clear.

30. As a result of the foregoing, Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s FMLA 

rights.

31. Also, as a result of the foregoing, Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for 

attempting to utilize and/or utilizing proper and authorized FMLA leave.

32. Any other reason given for Plaintiff’s termination is a pretext, designed to 

cover up FMLA interference and retaliation.

33. Defendant did not have a good faith basis for its actions.

34. Defendant’s actions, including an unlawful demotion, are the exact type of 

unfair and retaliatory employment practices the FCRA and FMLA were intended to 

prevent. 

35. Additionally, the facts surrounding Plaintiff’s termination also create a 

strong inference of disability discrimination/retaliation in violation of the FCRA.

36. The Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s FCRA-protected medical condition 

and need for accommodation.

37. Defendant, however, being well-aware of Plaintiff’s condition, 

discriminated against Plaintiff for taking a short-term leave of absence to seek treatment 

for his disability. 

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38. In short, despite the availability of reasonable accommodation under the

FCRA, and despite the fact that Mr. Wibben would not be prevented by his disability to 

any degree in performing the duties, Defendant discriminated against Mr. Wibben based 

solely upon his disability. 

39. Mr. Wibben is an individual with a disability who, with minimal reasonable 

accommodation, was fully capable of performing the essential functions of his job as a

Sales Department Manager. 

40. Mr. Wibben did not need, or seek, any accommodation so drastic. 

41. Instead, as he discussed with Defendant’s management, he would simply

need a short leave of absence to set up physician appointments, undergo a medical 

procedure, and treat his protected disability. 

42. This accommodation would have imposed no undue hardship on Defendant.

43. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant’s actions, and non-actions, affected 

the “terms, conditions or privileges” of Plaintiff’s employment as envisioned by the Florida 

Civil Rights Act. 

44. At all material times hereto, Plaintiff was ready, willing and able to perform 

his job duties and otherwise qualified for his position, with “reasonable accommodation.”

45. Pleading in the alternative, Defendant perceived Plaintiff as being 

“disabled,” and therefore, unable to perform the essential functions of his position, despite 

the fact that Plaintiff could perform same with reasonable accommodation.

46. Pleading in the alternative, Plaintiff’s impairment did not substantially limit 

a major life activity but was treated by Defendant as if it did.

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47. Pleading in the alternative, Plaintiff’s medical condition constituted an 

impairment that limited a major life activity only because of Defendant’s attitude toward 

the impairment.

48. Pleading in the alternative, Plaintiff had no impairment, whatsoever, but 

was treated by Defendant as having a disability as recognized by the FCRA.

49. Defendant does not have a non-discriminatory rationale for terminating 

Plaintiff’s employment.

50. Plaintiff was a disabled individual, or otherwise perceived as disabled by 

Defendant, during his employment. Therefore, he is the member of protected classes as 

envisioned by the Florida Civil Rights Act. 

51. Plaintiff suffered sufficiently severe and pervasive treatment, and ultimate 

termination, because of his disability and/or “perceived disability.”

52. As a result of this illegal conduct, Plaintiff has suffered damages, including 

loss of employment, wages, benefits, and other remuneration to which he is entitled.

COUNT I:

UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE UNDER THE FMLA

53. Plaintiff reincorporates and readopts all allegations contained within 

Paragraphs 1-8, 15-20, 22-26, 28- 34, and 52 above.

54. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was protected by the FMLA.

55. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant interfered with Plaintiff by refusing 

to allow Plaintiff to exercise his FMLA rights.

56. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was protected from interference under 

the FMLA.

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57. As a result of Defendant’s willful and unlawful acts by interfering with 

Plaintiff for exercising his rights pursuant to the FMLA, Plaintiff has suffered damages and 

incurred reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

58. As a result of Defendant’s willful violation of the FMLA, Plaintiff is entitled 

to liquidated damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands that this court will issue a declaratory 

judgment against Defendant for back pay, an equal amount as liquidated damages, other 

monetary damages, equitable relief, declaratory relief, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, 

and any and all further relief that this Court determines to be just and appropriate. 

COUNT II:

UNLAWFUL RETALIATION UNDER THE FMLA

59. Plaintiff reincorporates and readopts all allegations contained within 

Paragraphs 1-8, 15-20, 22-26, 28- 34, and 52 above.

60. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was protected by the FMLA.

61. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff by firing 

him for his attempted use and/or use of FMLA protected leave.

62. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff was protected from retaliation under 

the FMLA.

63. At all times relevant hereto, and for purposes of the FMLA retaliation claim, 

Defendant acted with the intent to retaliate against Plaintiff, because Plaintiff exercised his

rights to take approved leave pursuant to the FMLA.

64. As a result of Defendant’s intentional, willful and unlawful acts by 

retaliating against, Plaintiff for exercising his rights pursuant to the FMLA, Plaintiff has 

suffered damages and incurred reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

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65. As a result of Defendant’s willful violation of the FMLA, Plaintiff is entitled 

to liquidated damages.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant for back pay, an 

equal amount as liquidated damages, other monetary damages, equitable relief, declaratory 

relief, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and any and all further relief that this Court 

determines to be just and appropriate.

COUNT III: 

DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 

BASED ON DISABILITY

66. Plaintiff realleges and adopts the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-6, 

9-21, 23, 25-29, 33-52 above. 

67. The acts of Defendant, by and through its agents and employees, violated 

Plaintiff’s rights against disability discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act, 

Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. 

68. The discrimination to which Plaintiff was subjected was based on his

disability, or “perceived disability.”

69. The conduct of Defendant and its agents and employees proximately, 

directly, and foreseeably injured Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, lost wages and 

benefits, future pecuniary losses, emotional pain and suffering, humiliation, inconvenience, 

mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses. 

70. The conduct of Defendant was willful, wanton, and in reckless disregard of 

the statutory rights of Plaintiff, as to entitle him to an award of punitive damages against 

Defendant, to deter it, and others, from such conduct in the future. 

71. Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation 

expenses pursuant to section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes.

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72. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate or complete remedy at law for the actions of 

Defendant, which have caused, and continue to cause, irreparable harm. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court will issue a declaratory judgment 

that the discrimination/harassment against Plaintiff by Defendant was a violation of 

Plaintiff’s rights under the FCRA; require that Defendant make Plaintiff whole for his

losses suffered as a result of the discrimination through reinstatement, or, if that is not 

practical, through an award of front pay; grant Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant for 

damages, including punitive damages; award Plaintiff his reasonable attorney’s fees and 

litigation expenses against Defendant pursuant to 760.11(5), Florida Statutes; and provide 

any additional relief that this Court deems just and appropriate.

COUNT IV:

UNLAWFUL RETALIATION UNDER FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

73. Plaintiff realleges and adopts the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1-6, 

9-21, 23, 25-29, 33-52 above. 

74. The acts of Defendant by and through its agents and employees, violated 

Plaintiff’s rights against being retaliated against for opposing disability discrimination 

under the FCRA.

75. The retaliation to which Plaintiff was subjected was based on his opposition 

to Defendant’s illegal disability discrimination, and was willful.

76. The conduct of Defendant its agents and employees proximately, directly, 

and foreseeably injured Plaintiff, including, but not limited to, lost wages and benefits, 

future pecuniary losses, emotional pain and suffering, humiliation, inconvenience, mental 

anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary losses. 

77. Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages and attorneys’ fees and costs 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses pursuant to the FCRA.

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78. Plaintiff has no plain, adequate or complete remedy at law for the actions of 

Defendant, which have caused, and continue to cause, irreparable harm. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court will issue a declaratory judgment that 

the retaliation against Plaintiff by Defendant was a violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the 

FCRA, require that Defendant make Plaintiff whole for his losses suffered as a result of 

the discrimination through reinstatement, or, if that is not applicable or practical, through 

an award of front pay and/or promotion; grant Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant for 

damages, including punitive damages; award Plaintiff his reasonable attorney’s fees and 

litigation expenses against Defendant pursuant to the FCRA; and provide any additional 

relief that this Court deems just.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable. 

DATED this 2nd day of July, 2020.

Respectfully Submitted, 

/s/Noah E. Storch

Noah E. Storch, Esq.

Florida Bar No. 0085476

 RICHARD CELLER LEGAL, P.A.

10368 W. SR 84, Suite 103

Davie, Florida 33324

Telephone: (866) 344-9243

Facsimile: (954) 337-2771

E-mail: noah@floridaovertimelawyer.com

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