**Number 151, December 1998**Central and East EuropeanSecurity*New National Concepts and Defense Doctrines*
by Jeffrey Simon

Conclusions- Following the revolutionary political    changes of 1989-1990 many Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) states adopted new national    security concepts, as well as new defense and military doctrines.  
- Most CEE states are now revising their    national security concepts and defense/military doctrines. Consensus-building on these    tasks has become more difficult because many CEE states lack the inter-agency institutions    necessary for formulating national security policy. 
- Because many of the threats and risks to    CEE security are either transnational and/or internal, and increasingly defined in    economic terms, the participation of the European Union (EU) is becoming more appropriate    and important. 
- These concepts and doctrines have become    more important for developing consensus on not only internal and external risks and    threats, but also on the means (laws and institutions) to change concepts and doctrines,    thus enhancing the legitimacy of their governments. 
**A Time of Change

Dramatic changes in the European securityenvironment since the revolutions of 1989-1990 have been challenging for both CEE andNATO. The unification of Germany in 1990, the withdrawal of Soviet Groups of Forces fromCzechoslovakia and Hungary in 1991, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in mid-1991, and thedisintegration of the former Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia in 1992, and the division ofCzechoslovakia in 1993 stimulated most CEE states to adopt new national security conceptsand new defense and military doctrines. The NATO decision in November 1991 to replace its1967 "flexible response" strategy and to adopt a new Strategic Concept alsoreflected the change in the security environment.

Further changes in the European securityenvironment continued to challenge CEE and NATO. These included the increasing perceptionthat: 
- the threat of a large-scale war no    longer existed, resulting in decreased defense expenditures and military establishments;  
- the military might be needed in disaster    relief; and  
- the need to collaborate in a wide    variety of peacekeeping missions—ranging from peace enforcement to    policing—would grow in importance.  

The impetus toward change was boosted inJanuary 1994 when the Brussels Summit agreed to enlarge NATO, initiate the PFP Program andthe Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and issue its declaration on proliferation. Changewas further evidenced in the decision in late 1995 to deploy NATO’s ImplementationForce (IFOR) to Bosnia, the July 1997 Madrid Summit invitation to three states to beginaccession talks, and the Alliance decision to prepare its own New Strategic Concept foradoption in April 1999. Although the New Strategic Concept is in the early draft stages,it will likely include: 
- greater attention to non-defense issues    such as crisis management and civil emergency planning;  
- its increasing role in peacekeeping and    the potential need to operate out-of-area; and  
- the threats posed by proliferation and    terrorism. 

The changing European security environmentand NATO actions have influenced CEE security concerns. Most CEE states are revising orwriting new national security concepts, and defense and military doctrines. Their task ismore complicated than in the early 1990s because they perceive the major challenges totheir security as being internal in nature. Most perceive security problems arising fromopen borders which often lead to illegal migration and smuggling; organized crime,ineffective police forces, and government corruption; and, ethnic minority disputes. Theseare issues that extend beyond the responsibilities and capabilities of traditionalmilitary forces and require a broader societal discussion and consensus on how to solvethese issues. 

As CEE governments are successful inbuilding a broad-based defense consensus, it will enhance their ability to develop andmaintain effective crisis management institutions, enhancing governmental legitimacy.National security and defense doctrines are a necessary framework for writing militarydoctrine which provides the rationale needed to build appropriate armed forces.

The three NATO accessionstates—Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic—feel a sense of urgency with theimpending April 1999 Washington Summit. They are convening periodic meetings of theirdefense ministers for consultation and coordination of their defense doctrines beforeaccession. 

Slovenia, Romania, and Estonia remainundeterred in their efforts to seek European integration. Slovakia and Bulgaria haveexpressed frustration and fears of isolation. They have even suggested following an optionof neutrality. Austria, a PFP member, has yet to express any formal interest in joiningNATO. 

The progress and challenges facing thethree accession states, as well as the six states just mentioned, follow.

**Three NATO Accessors**

**Hungary.** Hungary adopted itsNational Security Concept and Defense Principles in 1993. Drafting of the DefensePrinciples occurred in the Ministry of Defense (MOD), because there were not enoughcivilian experts on security and their experience was not welcomed by the military. TheDefense Principles were drafted in 1992, well *before* the National Security Conceptwas developed. When the National Security Concept was finally drafted by the ForeignMinistry (MFA), the Parliament’s six parties and Defense Committee reviewed anddebated the 13-page document. Parliament approved both documents, nearly unanimously, in1993. 

Now Hungary is repeating the process.Since mid-1997, it has been drafting new documents. The MFA is responsible for theNational Security Concept which outlines the security environment, the dangers, andresulting necessary measures. While consensus exists on the security environment,differences exist over the document’s time horizon; the military wants the documentto focus out 10 to 15 years, while the MFA prefers 2-to-3 years. The MOD will draft theDefense Strategy, with the assistance of the interior, industry, finance, and otherministries. 

While NATO membership deepensHungary’s commitment to a new security model based on cooperation, membership changesHungary’s geopolitical position from having been a western part of the East, tobecoming an eastern part of the West. Hungary will become a so-called "island"because it does not border another NATO state. It sees challenges coming from the southand east, and therefore wants to be part of NATO’s Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH)command. 

Hungary’s new Defense Doctrinereiterates the 1993 need to defend against attacks, but also addresses the need for theHungarian Defense Forces (HDF) to fulfill NATO international (Article 4 and Article 5)missions, to increase defense expenditures by 0.1 percent per year to 1.8 percent of GDPby the year 2001, and to determine where to subordinate state institutions such as theborder guard and intelligence.

**Poland.** When Poland adopted aNational Security Concept and a Defense Doctrine in 1992, the documents stressedcooperation. Poland has been drafting new documents since April 1998. The prime ministertasked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to draft a new National Security Concept.When the document is completed it will be sent to Parliament for approval. The newstrategy will stress three pillars—good neighbor relations, participation in Europeanand UN peacekeeping activities, and integration in the European Union (EU), WesternEuropean Union (WEU), and NATO. 

While NATO membership ends Poland’s"self-sufficient" defense doctrine and reduces the "gray zone" ofsecurity in Central Europe, it places Poland opposite the Russian Federation and Ukraine.Poland sees itself as the "edge" of NATO area, and as a "front-line"country. Being the NATO "strategic shield" is a challenge, and it motivatesPoland to support further NATO enlargement.

The Polish MOD drafted the new DefenseDoctrine in April-May 1998, and is coordinating the document with the MFA, Ministry ofInterior, and other ministries. The Defense Doctrine’s three parts will becoordinated with NATO. The first section stresses the need to prevent conflicts and shapethe environment; the second addresses crisis management and peacekeeping; and the thirdfocuses on coalition war. The Defense Doctrine reflects the Polish perception of being afront-line NATO state. Hence, it seeks a NATO command headquarters in Poland as a NATOguarantee of resolve.

**Czech Republic.** The Czech Republicdoes not yet have a National Security Concept, though it does have Defense and MilitaryDoctrines which were adopted in 1994. However, it is drafting three new documents. First,the Czech MFA is drafting, with defense ministry assistance, the National SecurityStrategy. It will be discussed by the new State Security Council (RBN), which convened forthe first time in June 1998. 

Second, the National Defense Strategydefines the Czech state institutions and military functions, and outlines four conditionsfrom peace to war. The government discussed and approved the Defense Strategy, which is tobe reviewed annually in March. 

Third, the 1994 National Military Strategymust be altered to allow Alliance membership reflecting a change from independent tocoalition defense, preparing for coalition tasks, becoming interoperable with NATO,removing civil protection tasks from the defense ministry, and making Czech defenseplanning compatible with NATO defense planning. An updated version of the MilitaryStrategy is being prepared for discussion in the new State Security Council andgovernment. 

**Aspiring Members**

**Slovenia.** Although Slovenia did notreceive an invitation to join NATO at Madrid, it continues to prepare for NATO accession.Slovenian disappointment has been tempered with a bid for EU accession, associatemembership in the WEU, and active engagement in the European integration process. 

In 1993 Slovenia adopted National SecurityPrinciples (not a National Security Concept) which remain valid, though the Europeansecurity environment has altered markedly. Although it has no Defense Doctrine, itnevertheless finally adopted a Military Defense Doctrine in May 1998.

Slovenia’s Military Strategy aims toshape a peaceful defense environment and ensure that the armed forces are capable ofresponding to many dangers and of operating with NATO by April 1999. 

Slovenian efforts to write a NationalSecurity Concept began in 1997 when the Defense Minister attempted to write a White Paper,but his efforts failed because he wanted it to be only a defense ministry document. Afterthe new government recently created a National Security Council under the Prime Minister,it began drafting the new National Security Concept.

Although a Military Doctrine was preparedby the defense ministry and adopted by the government on May 14, 1998, no Defense Doctrineyet exists. Producing one will not be an easy task, not only because different viewsprevail as to who should prepare and approve the document, but also becauseSlovenia’s political parties do *not* have a clear concept of defense policy. 

**Romania.** The Romanian Parliamentapproved a National Security Strategy and a Military-Defense Doctrine in 1994 which werewritten by the defense ministry. During 1998, the Romanian defense ministry General Staffdrafted a new 13-page Military-Defense Doctrine outlining the risks and threats to Romania(ranging from neighborhood instability and conflicts, proliferation of arms and drugs, andthe need for economic development) and its security and defense objectives during crisis,peace, and war. Romania remains committed to NATO integration, and participates as anassociate member of the WEU.

Romania’s defense ministry firstdrafted a new National Security Strategy with the Supreme Council of Defense (e.g.,National Security Council) in early 1997. When it was sent to Parliament forconsultations, the Parliament required some changes. It now is being discussed andcoordinated with other appropriate ministries and agencies. Once the draft NationalSecurity Strategy (NSS) is completed it will again be discussed in the Supreme Council ofDefense probably in September 1998. Then the President must sign the document and send itto the Parliament for approval. Once the NSS is approved, the Military Defense Doctrine,which was sent to the defense ministry in June 1998, will be sent to the government forapproval. 

**Estonia.** In the spring of 1996Estonia’s Parliament adopted a General Political Guideline (e.g., National SecurityConcept) which stresses the establishment of a stable democratic state, preventingconflict, and deepening cooperation with European structures such as the EU and WEU. 

The General Defense Plan (e.g., DefenseDoctrine), which is to be drafted by the defense ministry, will comprise three documents.The first reviews the strategic status of Estonia; the second describes the structure andsize of Estonia’s Armed Forces; and the third deals with preparing the state fordefense.

**Slovakia.** Slovakia does not have aNational Security Concept, in part because some politicians believe that only theministries of defense and interior should be responsible for security. Despite this,Slovakia does have a Defense Doctrine (e.g., Strategic Concept of Defense of the SlovakRepublic) that is based on the current position and needs of the Slovak Army; it does *not*take into consideration long-term projections of the political-military ormilitary-strategic environment. The Defense Doctrine was prepared in large part to conformwith Slovakia’s PFP membership.

A number of factors are likely toinfluence the preparation of Slovakia’s future National Security Concept and MilitaryDoctrine. The Slovak Republic internal factors are its national interests and objectives,the risks and threats, and the potential of the country to withstand them. Externally,Slovakia’s geopolitical position will alter significantly when its neighbors joinNATO and the EU, while it remains outside those structures. In a few years when 92 percentof Slovakia will be surrounded by EU members, Slovakia may become a point for illegalmigration toward the West and its neighbors might begin to close their borders. 

If the next NATO enlargement trancheexcludes Slovakia, it could well lead to that state’s neutrality (defined to meannon-involvement in NATO and WEU). 

**Bulgaria.** The National Assemblyapproved a new National Security Concept in April 1998, declaring that it has noterritorial claims, maintains a defensive military doctrine, and desires to join the EUand NATO. It also sees security increasingly in internal terms involving the struggleagainst organized crime, fighting corruption, and raising Bulgaria’s lowstandard-of-living.

The National Security Concept defines theprinciples which are the basis of the draft Military Doctrine which is to be presented tothe Council of Ministers for approval in the near future. The draft Military Doctrineenvisions enlarging the functions of Bulgarian Armed Forces to include peacekeeping,humanitarian assistance, and rescue functions. 

Until Bulgaria becomes a NATO member, itwill pursue a neutral regional policy toward Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Macedonia.Because of its geographic location, Bulgarian adherence to the EU and NATO is not just avital national interest, but one of survival. 
**A Neutral Partner

**Austria.** Although it participatesin the PFP, Austria remains neutral (as defined in its 1955 State Treaty) and has notexpressed a desire to join NATO, in part, because no consensus yet exists among itspolitical parties. 

Though Austria has no National SecurityConcept, its neutral national security policy stresses the goals of preventing conflict,of not becoming involved in any military conflicts if they occur, and in restoringterritorial integrity if invaded.

Austria does not have a Military Doctrine,but it does maintain so-called National Defense Principles which were drafted in the 1970sand adopted by Parliament in the mid-1980s. These principles, since the dissolution of theWarsaw Treaty Organization, are no longer valid. Despite this, Austria has made no effortsto develop a new doctrine.

**Recommendations**- Because many partners need assistance    and have requested advice in developing their National Security Concepts and Defense and    Military Doctrines, the George C. Marshall Center should hold a follow-up seminar for    partners to share information on their processes of drafting the concepts and doctrines,    institutional participation and ratification, and societal education. 
- Many partners still do not have    effective national-level institutions for planning and coordinating foreign, security, and    defense policy; or for crisis management. U.S. bilateral military education and training    programs, and military-to-military activities, could provide assistance where required.  
- Closer NATO cooperation and coordination    with EU programs could enhance the effectiveness of our assistance in meeting the needs of    many partners. 

This paper is a result of a conference hosted by theInstitute for National Strategic Studies and the Hungarian Institute for Strategic andDefense Studies held in Budapest June 11-12, 1998. Dr. Jeffrey Simon is a Senior Fellow atINSS. He can be reached at (202) 685-2367, by fax at (202) 685-3972, or by e-mail at[email protected].

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

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