United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3454

___________________________

John Gohagan; Jessica Gohagan

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

The Cincinnati Insurance Company

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

 Submitted: September 24, 2015

 Filed: January 6, 2016

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

John and Jessica Gohagan appeal the district court’s grant of summary 1

judgment to The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”). The district court

The Honorable Sarah W. Hays, Chief Magistrate Judge for the Western 1

District of Missouri, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent

of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
held that, even if both the Business Owners Package (“BOP”) and Commercial

General Liability (“CGL”) policies issued by Cincinnati covered Mr. Gohagan’s

injury, the terms of those policies prohibited a single injury from giving rise to more

than the $1,000,000 in coverage benefits the Gohagans had already received under

the CGL policy. On appeal, the Gohagans argue that they are entitled to coverage

under both the BOP and CGL policies and that the policies’ anti-stacking provisions 2

are ambiguous and therefore must be construed to allow coverage up to the

$1,000,000 each-occurrence limit of both policies, for a total of $2,000,000 of

coverage. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

In January 2012, Thomas Campbell attempted to remove a tree from a property

being developed for a residential subdivision. The tree fell on John Gohagan, who

suffered serious injuries as a result. Mr. Gohagan asserted claims against Campbell

for the injuries, and Mrs. Gohagan sought compensation from Campbell for loss of

consortium. The Gohagans reached a settlement with Campbell, which included

Cincinnati’s payment of the $1,000,000 per-occurrence limit under the Cincinnatiissued CGL policy held by Campbell and his wife. However, the Gohagans reserved

the right to litigate whether Campbell’s BOP policy, which also had a $1,000,000

each-occurrence limit, provided additional coverage. 

Although the parties stipulated to the fact that the BOP policy was in effect

when Mr. Gohagan was injured, Cincinnati contended that the BOP policy’s bodily

injury liability coverage did not apply to Mr. Gohagan because the injury did not arise

“‘Stacking’ refersto an insured’s ability to obtainmultiple insurance coverage

2

benefits for an injury either frommore than one policy . . . or from multiple coverages

provided for within a single policy.” Daughhetee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

743 F.3d 1128, 1131 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Niswonger v. Farm Bureau Town &

Country Ins. Co. of Mo., 992 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Mo. App. 1999)).

-2-
out of Campbell’s ownership, maintenance, or use of certain business premises in

Waynesville, Missouri, asthe BOP policy required. Cincinnati also argued that, even

if the BOP policy were applicable, the BOP and CGL policies’ anti-stacking

provisions limited coverage to the $1,000,000 already paid by Cincinnati under the

CGL policy.

The Gohagans and Cincinnati submitted a joint complaint for declaratory

judgment to the district court. The stipulation of facts narrowed the issues for

determination to the following: (1) whether coverage under the BOP policy was

limited to bodily injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the

specified Waynesville premises and (2) whether the BOP and CGL policies’ antistacking provisions prohibited coverage stacking,thereby limiting the combined total

of the applicable each-occurrence limit of liability to $1,000,000. After filing the

joint stipulation of facts, both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district

court granted Cincinnati’s motion. The district court determined that fact issues as

to the effective date of the BOP policy’s geographic-limitation provision prevented

summary judgment on the first issue. The court instead based its summary-judgment

grant on the second issue, finding that the language of the BOP and CGL policies

prohibited the stacking of coverage when both policies covered the same injury. The

policies thus limited the maximum coverage for any one occurrence to the eachoccurrence limit of $1,000,000. The Gohagans appeal the district court’s findings on

both issues.

II.

We review both the district court’s grant of summary judgment and its

interpretation of the insurance policies de novo. Northland Cas. Co. v. Meeks, 540

F.3d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate only when, viewing

the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue

of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

-3-
R. Civ. P. 56(c); Raines v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 637 F.3d 872, 874 (8th Cir. 2011). 

“Interpretation of an insurance policy is a matter of state law.” Progressive N. Ins.

Co. v. McDonough, 608 F.3d 388, 390 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Stan Koch & Sons

Trucking, Inc. v. Great W. Cas. Co., 517 F.3d 1032, 1039 (8th Cir. 2008)). Here,

Missouri law applies, as Missouri is the forum state, and neither party has raised a

choice-of-law claim. See id.

Because the Gohagans have already received $1,000,000 fromCincinnati under

the CGL policy, their appeal fails if the BOP and CGL policies’ anti-stacking

provisions limit the combined total of coverage for Mr. Gohagan’s injury to

$1,000,000. “The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law,” 

McCormack Baron Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Am. Guarantee &Liab. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d

168, 171 (Mo. 1999), to which Missouri courts apply general contract-interpretation

principles, Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo. 2007). 

In disputes over the meaning of contract language, “[t]he key is whether the contract

language is ambiguous or unambiguous.” Id. (quoting Peters v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas.

Co., 853 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Mo. 1993)). The exercise of interpreting an insurance

policy requires that we “ascertain the intention of the parties and . . . give effect to

that intention.” Secura Ins. v. Horizon Plumbing, Inc., 670 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir.

2012) (quoting J.E. Hathman, Inc. v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Club, 491 S.W.2d 261,

264 (Mo. banc 1973)). The intention of the parties “is presumptively expressed by

the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ of the policy’s provisions,” id.(quoting Mo. Emp’rs

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 149 S.W.3d 617, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)), “which [we]

read ‘in the context of the policy as a whole,’” id. (quoting Am. States Ins. Co. v.

Mathis, 974 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)). “In construing contractual

provisions, this court is to avoid an interpretation that renders other provisions

meaningless.” Nodaway Valley Bank v. E.L. CrawfordConstr., Inc., 126 S.W.3d 820,

827 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 

-4-
In this appeal, the Gohagans raise two argumentsin an attempt to establish that

the BOP and CGL policies are ambiguous as to the extent of coverage. Such

ambiguity, the Gohagans argue, would compel the court to construe the disputed

policy language against Cincinnati, the insurer. See Rice v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 301

S.W.3d 43, 47 (Mo. 2009) (“Ambiguous policy language must be construed against

the insurer.”).

The Gohagans first argue that the anti-stacking provisions ofthe BOP and CGL

policies are ambiguous, particularly with respect to the meaning of “aggregate

maximum limit of insurance.” The BOP policy’s anti-stacking provision, labeled

“Two or More Policies Issued by Us,” provides:

If this policy and any other policy issued to you by us or any company

affiliated with us apply to the same “occurrence” or “personal and

advertising injury” offense, the aggregate maximum limit of insurance

under all the policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of

insurance under any one policy.

(emphasis added). In turn, the anti-stacking provision ofthe CGL policy, also labeled

“Two or More Coverage Forms or Policies Issued by Us,” provides:

If this Coverage Part and any other Coverage Form, Coverage Part or

policy issued to you by us or any company affiliated with us apply to the

same “occurrence” or “personal and advertising injury” offense, the

aggregate maximum limit of insurance under all the Coverage Forms,

Coverage Parts or policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit

of insurance under any one Coverage Form, Coverage Part or policy.

(emphasis added). The declarations pages of both the BOP and CGL policies refer

to an “Each Occurrence Limit” of $1,000,000 and a “General Aggregate Limit” of

$2,000,000. However, neither policy provides a definition for “aggregate maximum

limit of insurance.” 

-5-
The Gohagans argue that, without a definition expressed in the policy, an

ordinary purchaser would understand “aggregate maximum limit of insurance” to

refer to the $2,000,000 general aggregate limit. Under such a reading, each of the two

policies would afford separately $1,000,000 of coverage for Mr. Gohagan’s injury

pursuant to the each-occurrence limit, for a total of $2,000,000 of coverage. 

Cincinnati counters that the “aggregate maximum limit of insurance” is “the sum of

all available coverage . . . , the highest applicable limit of insurance” under any one

Cincinnati-issued policy. Thus, Cincinnati argues, “the highest applicable limit of

insurance is the $1,000,000 that Cincinnati has already paid under the CGL policy.” 

While conceding thatCincinnati’s interpretation is “reasonable,” the Gohagans assert

that the existence of two reasonable interpretations evidences a lack of clarity that

obligates us to resolve the ambiguity against Cincinnati.

We see no ambiguity here. “An ambiguity exists when there is duplicity,

indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the language in the policy. Language

is ambiguous if it is reasonably open to different constructions.” United Fire & Cas.

Co. v. Titan Contractors Serv., Inc., 751 F.3d 880, 883-84 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 287 S.W.3d 687, 690 (Mo. 2009)). “A contract or

provision . . . is not ambiguous merely because the parties disagree over its meaning.”

Atlas Reserve Temps., Inc. v. Vanliner Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 83, 87 (Mo. Ct. App.

2001). 

Here, the anti-stacking provisions viewed in their entirety are unambiguous. 

By focusing solely on “aggregate maximum limit of insurance,” the Gohagans ignore

the stipulation that the aggregate maximum limit “shall not exceed the highest

applicable limit of insurance under any one policy.” In this case, the tree-falling

incident thatresulted in Mr. Gohagan’s injury representsthe “occurrence” fromwhich

our interpretation of the policies flows. Both policies have an each-occurrence limit

of $1,000,000. For the occurrence at issue, then, the “highest applicable limit of

insurance” under either individual policy is equivalent to the each-occurrence limit. 

-6-
Thus, the aggregate maximum limit of insurance under both policies combined may

not exceed the each-occurrence limit under either policy—in this case, $1,000,000. 

See Smith v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 977 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Mo. Ct. App.

1998) (applying an anti-stacking clause nearly identical to those at issue here to limit

the “aggregate maximumlimit of liability” under two policiesissued by the insurance

company or affiliate to an amount “not exceed[ing] the highest applicable limit of

liability” under either policy). Reading the anti-stacking provisions as a whole, see

Secura Ins., 670 F.3d at 861, the Gohagans therefore received the full amount of

coverage owed to them under the BOP and CGL policies when Cincinnati paid them

$1,000,000 pursuant to the CGL policy. 

 

The Gohagans next contend that, even if the anti-stacking provisions are not

ambiguous, the BOP and CGL policies still are ambiguous because the “Other

Insurance” provision in each policy establishes coverage that the anti-stacking

provision rescinds. These “Other Insurance” provisions read as follows:

This insurance is primary except [in circumstances not relevant here]. 

If this insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected unless any

of the other insurance is also primary. Then, we will share with all that

other insurance by the method described in c. below.

Section c., in turn, sets forth the following “Method of Sharing”:

If all of the other insurance permits contribution by equal shares, we will

follow this method also. Under this approach each insurer contributes

equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit of insurance or none

of the loss remains, whichever comes first.

(emphasis added). These “Other Insurance” clauses, the Gohagans argue,

affirmatively provide primary coverage under each policy, such that each policy

-7-
provides for payment in shares equal to those paid under any other policy. In other

words, the Gohagans submit that the BOP and CGL policies individually provide

“primary coverage” that the anti-stacking provisions impermissibly limit. See Seeck

v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 134 (Mo. 2007) (“Where, as here, an other

insurance clause appears to provide coverage but other clauses indicate that such

coverage is not provided, then the policy is ambiguous, and the ambiguity will be

resolved in favor of coverage for the insured.”). 

The Gohagans’ interpretation, however, again mistakenly relies on reading an

individual provision in isolation from the rest of the policy, an approach that would

leave the anti-stacking provisions meaningless. The district court correctly

determined that the “Other Insurance” provisions apply when policies covering the

same injury are issued by Cincinnati and another insurance company, not when two

policies are issued by Cincinnati. Instead, the “Two or More Policies Issued by Us”

provisions apply when policies covering the same injury are issued by Cincinnati

alone. The Gohagans’ interpretation, the district court continued, would render the

“Two or More PoliciesIssued byUs” provisions meaningless, an outcome courtsseek

to avoid when interpreting contracts. Nodaway, 126 S.W.3d at 827. We agree. The

Gohagans’ attempts to create ambiguity where none exists have failed.

III.

For the reasons set forth above, the district court did not err in finding that the

BOP and CGL policies prohibit stacking where both policies cover the same injury,

-8-
such that the maximum coverage for Mr. Gohagan’s injury is $1,000,000. We thus 3

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Cincinnati.

______________________________

As our conclusion prevents the Gohagans from receiving more than the

3

$1,000,000 in coverage Cincinnati has already paid them under the CGL policy, we

need not reach the issue of whether coverage under the BOP policy was limited to

bodily injury arising out of Campbell’s ownership, maintenance, or use of the

Waynesville premises designated in the policy.

-9-