UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ KENT VU PHAN, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. LEWIS T. BABCOCK, Judge; GORDON P. GALLAGHER, Judge, Defendants - Appellees. No. 18-1493 (D.C. No. 1:18- CV-03163-CMA) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , PHILLIPS , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Unhappy with the outcome of hi s district court proceedings, pro se PlaintiffAppellant Kent Vu Phan has file d suit against two federal judge s. 1 Specifically, Phan contends United States District of Colorado Judge Lewis T. Babc ock and United States District of Colorado Ma gistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallaghe r adjudicated his

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in t he determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is t herefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgme nt is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, howev er, for its persuasive value c onsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

1 Because Phan proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his pleadi ngs; we will not, however, serve as his advocat e or craft legal arguments on his behalf. See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

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Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 cases improperly thereby violating his rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971); the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as amende d by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 504 and 794; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 a nd 1981. In a well-reasoned and cogent order, the district court dismissed Phan’s complaint as both legally frivo lous and seeking damages from defendants who ar e immune from liability. Exercisi ng jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Whenever a plainti ff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis , as Phan has done here, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) requires the district court jud ge to screen the complaint and dismiss it if “t he action or appeal . . . is friv olous or malicious . . . or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from su ch relief.” A district court properly dismisses a compl aint as frivolous “only if it l acks an arguable basis in either law or in fact. In other words, dismissal is only approp riate for a claim based on an indisputably meritless le gal theory and the frivolousness determination cannot serve as a factfinding process fo r the resolution of disputed f acts.” Fogle v. Pierson , 435 F.3d 1252, 1259 ( 10th Cir. 2006) (cita tions and internal qu otation marks omitted). Where, as here, “the fr ivolousness determination turn s on an issue of law, we review the determination de novo .” Milligan v. Archuleta , 659 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Judges are entitled to absolute immunity, with “only two excep tions this rule: (1) when the act is not taken i n the judge’s judicial capacity, and (2) when the act,3 though judicial in nature, is take n in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Stein v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Ct. of N.M. , 520 F.3d 1183, 1195 (10th Cir. 2008) (alterations and internal quota tion marks omitted). Neither exc eption is at issue here. Therefore, Judges Babc ock and Gallagher are entitled to absolut e immunity in their handling of Phan’s cases before t hem and Phan’s claims against them are legally frivolous. Accordingly, the distric t court properly dismissed w ith prejudice the complaint against them. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order of dismissal. Further, because Phan has failed t o show “the existence of a re asoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised o n appeal,” Watkins v. Leyba , 543 F.3d 624, 627 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), we
DENY his application to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal and direct him to make full and immediate payment of a ll outstanding appellate filing fees. Phan has also titled his brief, “ Appellant’s Combined Opening B rief and Application for a Certificate of Appealability.” If he thinks h e needs a certificate of appealability to appeal the d ismissal, he is mistaken. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). We therefore DENY AS MOOT Phan’s nominal request s for certificates of appealability.

Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge