UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

THE GEO GROUP, INC. and 

GEO TRANSPORT, INC.

Plaintiffs,

v.

NETFLIX, INC.,

Defendants.

CIVIL CASE NO. 9:20-cv-80847-RJS

__________________________________/

PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY

Pursuant to this Court’s January 12, 2021 Order, Plaintiffs, The GEO Group, Inc. and GEO 

Transport, Inc., through undersigned counsel, file this notice of supplemental case law authority 

in support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Min. Order, [D.E. 50]

(Jan. 12, 2021); Pls.’ Opp. to Netflix’s Mot. to Dismiss [D.E. 38] (Sept. 18, 2020).) Specifically, 

Plaintiffs direct the Court’s attention to the following cases in which courts have held a plaintiff 

stated a claim for defamation based on allegedly false portrayals in works of fiction: 

• Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 322 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 2003) (reversing 

dismissal of defamation per se claim where plaintiff alleged he was defamed by the 

portrayal of a fictional character in the movie Hardball and rejecting defendant’s argument 

“that because Hardball is a work of fiction, it cannot reasonably be interpreted to refer to 

[plaintiff]” because the mere fact that a “story is labeled ‘fiction’ and, therefore, does 

not purport to describe any real person does not mean that it may not be 

Case 9:20-cv-80847-AMC Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/18/2021 Page 1 of 6
defamatory per se.”)1 (internal citation and quotations omitted);

• Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639–40 (2d Cir.1980) (reversing dismissal and holding 

that plaintiff stated claim for defamation where claim was based on defendant’s, an 

acquaintance of plaintiff from a previous job, publication of a fictional book with a 

character who had the same name and physical description as plaintiff); 

• Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 651 (2d Cir. 1966) (reversing summary 

judgment for the defendants on defamation claim and holding that given the numerous 

specific similarities between the plaintiff and the “fictional” character in a novel, “it is 

difficult to see how a jury could be characterized as unreasonable if it found that [the 

character] could reasonably be understood as a portrayal of plaintiff”);

• Greene v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 138 F. Supp. 3d 226, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding 

that plaintiff stated a claim for defamation where plaintiff alleged the movie The Wolf of 

Wall Street defamed him through the portrayal of a fictional character and plaintiff alleged 

sufficient similarities between himself and the film character to withstand defendant’s 

motion to dismiss with respect to the “of and concerning” element of plaintiff’s defamation 

claim); 

• Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 619 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding plaintiff Ray 

Davis stated a claim for defamation where plaintiff alleged he was defamed through the 

portrayal of a fictional character named Ray Tower in the movie Missing and noting that 

where a plaintiff claims to be defamed by a fictional character, “[t]he test is whether 

a reasonable person, viewing the motion picture, would understand the character 

portrayed in the film was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as described”); 

1 Emphases added unless otherwise noted.

Case 9:20-cv-80847-AMC Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/18/2021 Page 2 of 6
• Robinson v. Radio One, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 425, 428-30 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (holding 

plaintiff stated a claim for defamation where plaintiff alleged, he was defamed through

portrayal of radio show’s allegedly fictional character named “Henry the gay security 

guard” because defendant used plaintiff’s real first name and profession and identified

plaintiff in “sufficient detail”);

• Smith v. Stewart, 291 Ga. App. 86, 95, 660 S.E.2d 822, 830-31 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) 

(denying summary judgment where allegedly defamatory portions of fictional book could 

“be reasonably understood as describing actual facts about [] plaintiff or actual events in 

which she participated” and noting that “the test for libel is not whether the story is or 

is not characterized as “fiction,” or “humor,” but whether the charged portions, in 

context, could be reasonably understood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff 

or actual events in which she participated”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); 

• Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 111 S.W.3d 168, 175 (Tex. App. 

2003) (reversing summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff’s defamation claim and 

holding that television show’s segment about a fictional sweepstakes scam could be 

reasonably understood as “of and concerning” plaintiff where the name of the fictional 

sweepstakes company was identical to plaintiff’s name and defendant used the name in 

connection with the type of business conducted by plaintiff and noting that “an allegedly 

defamatory publication is “of and concerning” a plaintiff—even in cases involving 

fictional works—if persons who knew or knew of the plaintiff could reasonably have 

understood that the fictional character was a portrayal of the plaintiff.”) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted);

Case 9:20-cv-80847-AMC Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/18/2021 Page 3 of 6
• Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 101, 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1220 (Ill. 1996) 

(reversing dismissal of defamation per se claim based on allegations that article in 

magazine’s “fiction” section defamed plaintiff by referring to character with plaintiff’s last 

name as a “slut” and “unchaste” and noting that the test for whether statements can be 

reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts “is not whether the story is or is not 

characterized as “fiction,” or “humor,” but whether the charged portions, in context, 

could be reasonably understood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff or actual 

events in which she participated”) (internal citation and quotations omitted);

• Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) 

(upholding jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff’s defamation claim and holding that “the fact 

that the book was labeled as being a novel” does not bar “any claim that the writer or 

publisher could be found to have implied that the characters in the book were factual 

representations not of the fictional characters but of an actual nonfictional person” and 

noting “[o]f course the fictional setting does not insure immunity when a reasonable 

man would understand that the fictional character was a portrayal of the plaintiff. 

Reputations may not be traduced with impunity, whether under literary forms of a 

work of fiction or in jest.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); and

• Batra v. Wolf, No. 0116059/2004, 2008 WL 827906 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 14, 2008) (holding 

plaintiff stated a claim for defamation where plaintiff alleged that Law and Order episode 

about a judicial bribery scandal defamed him because it included a character that shared 

his first name, profession and physical characteristics and because plaintiff was the subject 

of media attention surrounding a judicial bribery scandal); and

Case 9:20-cv-80847-AMC Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/18/2021 Page 4 of 6
• Dudee v. Philpot, 2019-Ohio-3939, ¶ 24, 133 N.E.3d 590, 597-98 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019)

(holding that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether a fictional character was 

identifiable as the plaintiff for the purposes of his defamation claim and noting that “[i]n 

works of fiction, the test for identification is whether a reasonable person could 

reasonably believe that the article referred to the plaintiff after comparing the 

characteristics of the plaintiff with those of the fictional character.”)

Dated: January 18, 2021 Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Shannon B. Timmann

Shannon B. Timmann, Esq. (Fl. Bar. No. 98810)

Megan L. Meier, Esq. (Pro Hac Vice), Va. Bar 

No. 887220

CLARE LOCKE LLP

10 Prince Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

Telephone: (202) 628-7400

Email: megan@clarelocke.com

Email: shannon@clarelocke.com

Barry F. Irwin, P.C. (Pro Hac Vice Application 

Forthcoming), Ill. Bar No. 6211213

Manon L. Burns (Pro Hac Vice Application 

Forthcoming), Ill. Bar No. 632495

Irwin IP LLC

222 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 2350

Chicago, IL 60606

Phone: 312.667.6080

Email: birwin@irwinip.com

Email: mburns@irwinip.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Case 9:20-cv-80847-AMC Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/18/2021 Page 5 of 6
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served 

by CM/ECF, on January 18, 2021, on all counsel of record.

 /s/ Shannon B. Timmann

Shannon B. Timmann

Case 9:20-cv-80847-AMC Document 51 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/18/2021 Page 6 of 6