a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

July 2005 NUCLEAR SECURITY

DOE’s Office of the 

Under Secretary for 

Energy, Science and 

Environment Needs to 

Take Prompt, 

Coordinated Action to 

Meet the New Design 

Basis Threat

GAO-05-611
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-611.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or AloiseE@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-611, a report to 

congressional requesters 

July 2005

NUCLEAR SECURITY

DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for 

Energy, Science and Environment Needs 

to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to 

Meet the New Design Basis Threat 

Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade nuclear 

material generally meet existing key DOE readiness requirements. 

Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces generally comply 

with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and 

equipment standardization and that the five ESE sites had the required 

training programs, facilities, and equipment. However, GAO did find some 

weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the ability of ESE 

protective forces to defend their sites. For example, despite the importance 

of training exercises in which protective forces undergo simulated attacks 

by a group of mock terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE neither sets 

standards for individual protective force officers to participate in these 

exercises, nor does it require sites to track individual participation. In 

another example, GAO found that protective force officers at all five of the 

ESE sites reported problems with their radio communications systems. 

Specifically, according to 66 of the 105 protective force officers GAO 

interviewed, they did not always have dependable radio communications as 

required by the DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual. 

Security officials stated that improvements were under way. 

To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 

2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they will 

need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include 

transforming its current protective force into an “elite force”—modeled on 

U.S. Special Forces, developing and deploying new security technologies to 

reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack, consolidating and 

eliminating nuclear weapons material between and among ESE sites to 

reduce security costs, and creating a sound ESE management structure that 

has sufficient authority to ensure coordination across all ESE offices that 

have weapons-grade nuclear material. However, because these initiatives, 

particularly an elite force, are in early stages of development and will require 

significant commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, 

their completion by the 2008 October DBT implementation deadline is 

uncertain. 

DOE Protective Force Member 

Source: DOE.

A successful terrorist attack on a 

Department of Energy (DOE) site 

containing nuclear weapons 

material could have devastating 

effects for the site and nearby 

communities. DOE’s Office of the 

Under Secretary for Energy, 

Science and Environment (ESE), 

which is responsible for DOE 

operations in areas such as energy 

research, manages five sites that 

contain weapons-grade nuclear 

material. A heavily armed 

paramilitary force equipped with 

such items as automatic weapons 

protects ESE sites. GAO was asked 

to examine (1) the extent to which 

ESE protective forces are meeting 

DOE’s existing readiness 

requirements and (2) the actions 

DOE and ESE will need to take to 

successfully defend against the 

terrorist threat identified in the 

October 2004 design basis threat 

(DBT) by DOE’s implementation 

deadline of October 2008. 

What GAO Recommends

To ensure that DOE and ESE 

protective forces can meet the 

terrorist threat contained in the 

2004 DBT, GAO is making five 

recommendations to the Secretary 

of Energy to, among other things, 

address weaknesses with 

protective officers’ equipment and 

coordinate ESE efforts to address 

the 2004 DBT. DOE concurred 

with the report, accepted GAO’s 

recommendations and provided an 

update on actions it anticipated 

taking to address GAO’s 

recommendations. 
Page i GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE 

Readiness Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective 

Force Practices Exist 12

DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and 

Coordinated Actions to Address the New DBT Requirements by 

2008 21

Conclusions 30

Recommendations for Executive Action 30

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 31

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 33

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy 36

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 40

Tables Table 1: DOE/ESE Category I Special Nuclear Material Sites 8

Table 2: DOE/ESE Relevant Program Offices and Fiscal Year 2006 

Funding Requests for Security 8

Table 3: ESE Protective Force Deployment 10

Figure Figure 1: DOE Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request 7
Contents

Page ii GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

Abbreviations

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

DBT design basis threat 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOE Department of Energy 

EM Environmental Management 

ESE Energy, Science and Environment, DOE’s Office of the Under 

Secretary for 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

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Page 1 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

July 15, 2005 Letr

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats

and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives

The Honorable Charles F. Grassley

United States Senate

The Department of Energy (DOE) has long recognized that a successful 

terrorist attack on a site containing the material used in nuclear weapons, 

such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium, could have devastating 

consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. The risks 

associated with these materials, which in specified forms and quantities are 

referred to as Category I special nuclear material, vary but include theft for 

use in an illegal nuclear weapon; the creation of improvised nuclear 

devices capable of producing a nuclear yield; and the creation of so-called 

“dirty bombs,” in which conventional explosives are used to disperse 

radioactive material. 

Because terrorist attacks could have such devastating consequences, an 

effective safeguards and security program is essential. For many years, a 

key component for DOE security programs has been the development of 

the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies the 

potential size and capabilities of adversary forces. DOE issued its current 

DBT in October 2004 in response to recommendations in our April 2004 

report,1

 congressional criticism, and a new review of intelligence data. The 

October 2004 DBT identifies a larger terrorist threat for DOE sites than had 

previous DBTs. Consequently, DOE is not requiring full compliance until 

October 2008 in order to allow its sites adequate time to implement 

measures to defeat this larger terrorist threat. Private contractors, who 

operate DOE’s facilities, counter the terrorist threat contained in the DBT 

with a multifaceted protective system. While specific measures vary from 

site to site, a key universal component of DOE’s protective system is a 

heavily armed protective force equipped with such items as automatic 

1

See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully 

Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004). 
Page 2 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

weapons, night vision equipment, body armor, and chemical protective 

gear. 

The following two major organizations in DOE are responsible for securing 

Category I special nuclear material: 

• The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately 

organized agency within DOE, is responsible for the nation’s nuclear 

weapons programs and manages six sites that contain Category I special 

nuclear material. 

• DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and 

Environment (ESE) is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as 

energy research, basic physical science research, and environmental 

cleanup and manages five sites that collectively contain substantial 

quantities of Category I special nuclear material. 

We reported on security at NNSA sites in May 2003 and April 2004.2

 We 

found that NNSA needed to improve the management of its safeguards and 

security program and that while some action had been taken in response to 

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, additional action was needed to 

ensure that DOE’s sites were adequately prepared to defend themselves. 

Since the attacks of September 11, DOE has focused on the security of its 

NNSA sites more than it has on its ESE sites.3

 Consequently, you asked us 

to determine for the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material 

(1) the extent to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE’s existing 

readiness requirements and (2) what actions DOE and ESE will need to 

take to successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat identified in 

the October 2004 DBT by DOE’s implementation deadline of October 2008.

To determine the extent to which protective forces at ESE sites are meeting 

existing DOE readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies and other 

pertinent literature about the factors that affect the readiness of forces, 

such as military forces, that are like those defending ESE sites. We 

2

See GAO, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards and Security 

Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003) and GAO-04-623. 

3

For example, DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance examined five 

NNSA sites and only a single ESE site in a recent review. See Office of Security and Safety 

Performance Assurance, Department of Energy Protective Force Management and 

Capabilities (U) (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004).
Page 3 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

conducted structured interviews with 105 ESE protective force officers at 

the five ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear material. While 

the responses from these interviews are not projectable to the entire 

universe of ESE protective force officers, we did speak to about 10 percent 

of the total protective forces at the five sites. Even though not projectable, 

we randomly selected protective force officers to interview at each site in 

order to help assure their independence from the views of site 

management. We asked the officers questions designed to determine their 

readiness to defend the sites, including questions about their morale, 

training, and equipment. We also reviewed the training records of the 105 

officers to determine if key elements of their training complied with 

existing DOE training requirements. In particular, we reviewed selected 

firearms and physical fitness qualifications to determine if these officers 

complied with existing DOE requirements and regulations. Finally, we 

reviewed the equipment used by ESE protective forces to determine if it 

met current DOE requirements. Further details on our interview 

procedures and random selection methods are found in the scope and 

methodology appendix at the end of this report. 

To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully 

defend against the new threat identified in the October 2004 DBT by DOE’s 

implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the October 2004 

DBT and associated guidance documents. We discussed the October 2004 

DBT with officials in DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance 

Assurance and with officials in ESE’s Offices of Environmental 

Management; Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and Science. 

Finally, where available, we reviewed documents prepared by ESE officials 

on how they plan to comply with the October 2004 DBT. Appendix I 

presents a detailed description of our scope and methodology. We 

performed our work between March 2004 and July 2005 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing Category I special nuclear 

material generally meet existing DOE readiness requirements. However, we 

did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely affect the 

ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. With respect to 

current readiness, 102 of the 105 officers we interviewed stated that they 

believed that they and their fellow officers understood what was expected 

of them if the site were attacked by a terrorist group. Moreover, 65 of the 

105 officers rated themselves as highly ready to defend their site while 20 

officers rated themselves as somewhat or moderately ready. Supporting 
Page 4 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

their views, we found that the five ESE sites we visited had the required 

training programs, facilities, and equipment, and that the 105 protective 

force members whose records we reviewed generally complied with 

existing DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, 

and equipment standardization. However, we did identify some 

weaknesses. For example, despite the importance of training exercises in 

which protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock 

terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE does not have a requirement for 

individual protective force officers to participate in these exercises or a 

requirement that sites track the individual officers’ participation. While 84 

of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed stated they had 

participated in a force-on-force exercise, only 46 of the 84 protective force 

officers believed that the force-on-force exercises they had participated in 

were either realistic or somewhat realistic. Additionally, protective force 

officers often told us that they did not have frequent and realistic tactical 

training. In another example, 66 of the 105 protective force officers, at all 

five of the ESE sites, stated that they did not always have dependable radio 

communications. However, according to DOE Manual 473.2-2 Protective 

Force Program Manual, the radios protective force officers use must be 

capable of intelligible two-way communications. Site security officials 

stated that improvements were under way and would be completed this 

year. Finally, some ESE sites currently do not have the protective force 

capabilities found at NNSA sites with similar special nuclear material. 

Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA sites with Category I 

special nuclear material currently operate armored vehicles. However, only 

one ESE site with Category I special nuclear material equipped protective 

forces with such vehicles at the time of our review.

To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in the 

2004 DBT by 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they need to take 

several prompt and coordinated actions. These include the transformation 

of its current protective force into an elite force, the development and 

deployment of new security technologies, the consolidation and 

elimination of special nuclear material, and organizational improvements 

within ESE’s security program. However, because these initiatives, 

particularly an elite force, are in early stages of development and will 

require significant commitment of resources and coordination across DOE 

and ESE, their completion by the 2008 DBT implementation deadline is 

uncertain. Specifically, the status of these initiatives is as follows:

• Elite forces. DOE officials, and 85 of the 105 protective force officers we 

interviewed, now believe that the way DOE sites, including ESE sites, 
Page 5 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

currently train their contractor-operated protective forces will not be 

adequate to defeat the much larger terrorist threat contained in the 

October 2004 DBT. In response, the department has proposed the 

development of an elite force that would be patterned after the U. S. 

military’s Special Forces and might eventually be converted from a 

contractor-operated force into a federal force. However, this proposal is 

only in the conceptual phase, and completing this effort by the 2008 DBT 

implementation deadline is unlikely.

• New security technologies. DOE is seeking to improve the effectiveness 

and survivability of its protective forces by developing and deploying 

new security technologies. It believes technologies can reduce the risk 

to protective forces in case of an attack and can provide additional 

response time to meet and defeat an attack. Sixteen of the 105 

protective forces we interviewed generally supported this view and said 

they needed enhanced detection technologies that would allow them to 

detect adversaries at much greater ranges than is currently possible at 

most sites. However, a senior DOE official recently conceded that the 

department has not yet taken the formal steps necessary to coordinate 

investment in emerging security technologies and that the role of 

technology in helping sites meet the new threats contained in the 2004 

DBT by the department’s deadline of October 2008 is uncertain.

• Consolidation and elimination of materials. ESE’s current strategy to 

meet the October 2008 deadline relies heavily on the consolidation and 

elimination of special nuclear material between and among ESE sites. 

For example, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology 

plans to down-blend special nuclear material and extract medically 

useful isotopes at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory—an Office of 

Science site. This action would eliminate most of the security concerns 

surrounding the material. Neither program office, however, has been 

able to formally agree on its share of additional security costs, which 

have increased significantly because of the new DBT. In addition, 

neither ESE nor DOE has developed a comprehensive, departmentwide 

plan to achieve the needed cooperation and agreement among the sites 

and program offices to consolidate special nuclear material as we 

recommended last year in our April 2004 report. In the absence of a 

comprehensive plan, completing most of these consolidation activities 

by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is unlikely.

• Organizational improvements. The ESE headquarters security 

organization is not well suited to meet the challenges associated with 
Page 6 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

implementing the 2004 DBT. Specifically, there is no centralized security 

organization within the Office of the Under Secretary, ESE. The 

individual who serves as the Acting ESE Security Director has been 

detailed to the Office by DOE’s Office of Security and Safety 

Performance Assurance and has no programmatic authority or staff. 

This lack of authority limits the Director’s ability to facilitate ESE and 

DOE-wide cooperation on such issues as material down-blending at Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory and material consolidation at other ESE 

sites. 

In order to ensure that DOE and ESE protective forces can meet the new 

terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT, we are making five 

recommendations to the Secretary of Energy to track and increase 

protective force officer participation in force-on-force training exercises, 

correct weaknesses with protective force officers’ equipment, coordinate 

implementation of DOE’s various efforts designed to meet the 2004 DBT, 

and create a more effective ESE security organization. 

We provided DOE with a copy of our report for review and comment. DOE 

concurred with the report, accepted our recommendations, and provided 

an update on actions it anticipated taking to address our recommendations. 

While we believe that most of DOE’s anticipated actions will be responsive 

to our recommendations, we are concerned about DOE’s response to our 

recommendation that it develop a departmentwide, multiyear 

implementation plan for meeting the 2004 DBT requirements. Specifically, 

in responding to this recommendation, DOE cited only individual efforts to 

address the development of an elite force, the deployment of enhanced 

security technologies, and the consolidation of special nuclear material, 

not the development of a comprehensive plan. While each of these efforts 

is important, we continue to believe that DOE cannot be successful in 

meeting the requirements of the 2004 DBT by its deadline of October 2008 

without an integrated effort that is built around a comprehensive plan.

Background The Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment 

comprises nine program offices, including the Offices of Environmental 

Management; Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and Science and 

accounts for about 57 percent of DOE’s fiscal year 2006 budget request (see 

fig. 1). 
Page 7 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

Figure 1: DOE Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request

ESE has five sites that collectively have substantial quantities of Category I 

special nuclear material. (See table 1.) For fiscal year 2006, DOE requested 

over $300 million for security at these five sites. This represents about 70% 

of the entire security budget request for ESE. (See table 2.) Contractors 

operate all of these sites.

$13,372

ESE

$9,397

$673

Dollars in millions

Balance of DOE

Source: DOE.

NNSA
Page 8 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

Table 1: DOE/ESE Category I Special Nuclear Material Sites

Source: GAO.

Note: The two Idaho sites were consolidated as a single site, now known as the Idaho National 

Laboratory, in February 2005. In addition, federal oversight of the Idaho National Laboratory has been 

consolidated at DOE’s Idaho Operations Office. Previously, DOE’s Chicago Operations Office oversaw 

Argonne National Laboratory-West.

Table 2: DOE/ESE Relevant Program Offices and Fiscal Year 2006 Funding Requests 

for Security

Source: DOE.

Within DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, DOE's 

Office of Security develops and promulgates orders and policies to guide 

the department's safeguards and security programs. DOE’s overall security 

policy is contained in DOE Order 470.1, Safeguards and Security Program, 

which was originally approved in 1995. The key component of DOE's 

approach to security is the DBT, a classified document that identifies the 

characteristics of the potential threats to DOE assets. A classified 

companion document, the Adversary Capabilities List, provides 

additional information on terrorist capabilities and equipment. The DBT 

Responsible program office Site Location

Office of Environmental 

Management

Savannah River Site Aiken, South 

Carolina

Office of Environmental 

Management

Hanford Site Richland, 

Washington

Office of Nuclear Energy, 

Science and Technology

Idaho National Engineering and 

Environmental Laboratory

Idaho Falls, 

Idaho

Office of Nuclear Energy, 

Science and Technology

Argonne National Laboratory-West Idaho Falls, 

Idaho

Office of Science Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge, 

Tennessee

Dollars in millions 

Program office

Total budget

request

Total security

request

Security as a

percentage of total

budget request

Office of Environmental 

Management $6,505 $287 4%

Office of Nuclear Energy, 

Science and Technology 511 75 15%

Office of Science $3,463 $74 2%
Page 9 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

has been traditionally based on a classified, multiagency intelligence 

community assessment of potential terrorist threats, known as the 

Postulated Threat. The threat from terrorist groups is generally the most 

demanding threat contained in the DBT. 

DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a multifaceted 

protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, all 

protective systems at DOE's most sensitive sites employ a defense-in-depth 

concept that includes the following:

• a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting 

intruders;

• physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;

• numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers, 

vehicle inspection stations, radiation detectors, and metal detectors;

• operational security procedures, such as a “two person” rule that 

prevents only one person from having access to special nuclear 

material; and

• hardened facilities and vaults.

Each site also has a heavily armed protective force that is often equipped 

with such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, body 

armor, and chemical protective gear. These protective forces comprise 

Security Police Officers that are classified into three groups: Security 

Police Officer-I, Security Police Officer-II, and Security Police Officer-III. 

Security Police Officer-Is are only assigned to fixed, armed posts. 

Generally, very few of these officers are used at ESE sites because of the 

limited roles they can fill. Security Police Officer-IIs generally are assigned 

to posts such as access control booths, or to foot or vehicle patrols. Finally, 

Security Police Officers-IIIs are responsible for operations such as hostage 

rescue and the recapture and recovery of special nuclear material. 

According to federal regulations, Security Police Officers-IIIs have more 

demanding physical fitness and training standards than Security Police 

Officers-Is or Security Police Officers-IIs. At the ESE sites we visited, 

protective forces work for private contractors and are unionized. The 

number of qualified Security Police Officers-IIs and Security Police 

Officers-IIIs at ESE sites is shown in table 3. 
Page 10 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

Table 3: ESE Protective Force Deployment 

Source: DOE.

Protective force duties and requirements, such as physical fitness 

standards, are explained in detail in DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force 

Program Manual, as well as in DOE regulations (10 C.F.R. pt. 1046, 

Physical Protection of Security Interests). DOE issued the current 

Protective Force Program Manual in June 2000. Although protective forces 

are expected to comply with the duties and requirements established in 

DOE policies, deviations from these policies are allowed as long as certain 

approval and notification criteria are met. Following are the three types of 

deviations: 

• Variances: Variances are approved conditions that technically vary from 

DOE security requirements but afford equivalent levels of protection.

• Waivers: Waivers are approved nonstandard conditions that deviate 

from DOE security requirements that, if uncompensated, would create a 

potential security vulnerability. As such, waivers require implementation 

of what DOE calls compensatory measures. Compensatory measures 

could include deploying additional protective forces or curtailing 

operations until the asset can be better protected.

• Exceptions: Exceptions are approved deviations from DOE security 

requirements that create a safeguards and security vulnerability. 

Exceptions are approved only when correction of the condition is not 

feasible, and compensatory measures are inadequate.

In addition to complying with these security requirements, DOE protective 

systems, including protective forces, also must meet performance 

standards. For example, DOE sites are required to demonstrate that their 

protective systems are capable of defending special nuclear material 

DOE site Security Police Officers (II and III)

Savannah River Site 551

Hanford Site 241

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 

Laboratory 149

Argonne National Laboratory-West 48

Oak Ridge National Laboratory 51

Total 1,040
Page 11 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

against terrorist forces identified in the DBT. The performance of 

protective systems is formally and regularly examined through 

vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment is a systematic 

evaluation process in which qualitative and quantitative techniques are 

applied to detect vulnerabilities and arrive at effective protection of 

specific assets, such as special nuclear material. To conduct such 

assessments, DOE uses, among other things, subject matter experts, such 

as U.S. Special Forces; computer modeling to simulate attacks; and 

force-on-force exercises, in which the site's protective forces undergo 

simulated attacks by a group of mock terrorists. In addition to their use in 

evaluating the effectiveness of physical protection strategies, DOE believes 

force-on-force exercises are the most realistic representation of adversary 

attacks that can be used to train protective forces. 

Through a variety of complementary measures, DOE ensures that its 

contractors are complying with DOE’s safeguards and security policies, 

including protective force duties and requirements, and that its systems are 

performing as intended. Contractors perform regular self-assessments and 

are encouraged to uncover any problems themselves. In addition to routine 

oversight, DOE orders require field offices to comprehensively survey 

contractors' operations for safeguards and security every year. DOE's 

Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance provides yet 

another check through its comprehensive inspection program. This office 

performs comprehensive inspections roughly every 18 months at each DOE 

site that has specified quantities of Category I special nuclear material. All 

deficiencies (findings) identified during surveys and inspections require the 

contractors to take corrective action.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE security policies 

have been under almost constant reexamination and have undergone 

considerable change. For example, the department’s security polices have 

been undergoing a streamlining process for nearly 2 years. In addition, as 

we pointed out in our April 2004 report, DOE worked for almost 2 years to 

develop and issue a new DBT. When DOE issued its first post-September 11 

DBT in May 2003, we recommended that DOE reexamine it because, among 

other things, it contained a terrorist threat that was less than the threat 

identified in the intelligence community’s Postulated Threat. DOE agreed 

to reexamine the 2003 DBT and issued a revised and more demanding DBT 

in October 2004. The October 2004 DBT significantly increased the terrorist 

threat to DOE facilities and required enhanced protection strategies for 

DOE facilities. Under the new DBT, sites with Category I special nuclear 

material will not have to be fully prepared to defend their sites against the 
Page 12 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

terrorist threat contained in the new 2004 DBT until October 2008. By July 

29, 2005, DOE sites will have to forward 2004 DBT implementation plans to 

the Deputy Secretary of Energy and, within 3 months, begin submitting 

quarterly DBT implementation reports. At the time of our review, cost 

estimates were still preliminary, but security officials at ESE sites said that 

they may require collectively an additional $384-$584 million over the next 

several years in order for all ESE sites with Category I special nuclear 

material to meet the 2004 DBT.

Protective Forces at 

ESE Sites Generally 

Meet Established DOE 

Readiness 

Requirements, but 

Some Weaknesses in 

Protective Force 

Practices Exist

We found that the majority of the 105 protective force members we 

interviewed at ESE sites generally believe that they currently are ready to 

perform their mission of protecting the site’s special nuclear material. 

Consistent with that belief, the five ESE sites we visited had the required 

training programs, facilities, and equipment, and the 105 protective force 

members whose records we reviewed were generally meeting the readiness 

requirements contained in the DOE orders and federal regulations. 

However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely 

affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. These 

include protective force officers’ lack of regular participation in 

force-on-force exercises; the frequency and quality of training 

opportunities; the lack of dependable communications systems; and 

insufficient protective gear, including protective body armor and chemical 

protective gear, and the lack of armored vehicles.

Protective Force Officers 

Are Confident in Their 

Current Overall Readiness

Readiness is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as the ability of 

forces to deploy quickly and to accomplish specific goals and missions. In 

particular, DOD believes that a ready force should possess a sufficient 

number of experienced, trained, and properly equipped personnel. Through 

realistic and comprehensive training, these personnel are forged into a 

cohesive unit that can perform its tasks even under extreme conditions. 

DOE orders and federal regulations establish the framework for ensuring 

that DOE protective forces are ready to perform their mission. 

ESE protective force officers generally believe that they are ready to 

perform their mission. Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers we interviewed 

stated that they believed that they, and their fellow officers, understood 

what was expected of them should the site be attacked by a terrorist group. 

Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated the readiness of their site’s protective 

force as high, while 20 officers rated their protective force as somewhat or 
Page 13 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

moderately ready to defend the site. Only a minority of the officers (16 of 

105) we interviewed rated the readiness of their force to defend their sites 

as low. Two officers were uncertain of their forces’ readiness, and two did 

not respond to the question. 

In addition, the majority of officers we interviewed believed they and the 

protective force officers with whom they worked on a regular basis formed 

a cohesive unit that would be able to perform their most essential mission 

of protecting special nuclear material. Specifically, of the 105 officers we 

interviewed,

• 86 reported that they were satisfied with their jobs,

• 73 reported that their morale was high or at least moderately high, 

• 91 reported that protective force officers had developed the necessary 

teamwork to defend the site against a terrorist attack,

• 84 officers responded that they had a high degree of confidence in their 

fellow officers in the event of a terrorist attack, and 

• 88 reported that their fellow officers would be willing to risk their lives 

in defense of their site. 

ESE Protective Forces 

Generally Meet the DOE 

Training and Equipment 

Requirements We Reviewed

As called for in DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual, readiness is 

achieved through appropriate training and equipment. Each of the five sites 

we visited had formally approved annual training plans. Each site generally 

had the training facilities, such as firearms ranges, classrooms, computer 

terminals, and exercise equipment, which enabled them to meet their 

current DOE and federal training requirements. Furthermore, each site 

maintained computerized databases for tracking individual protective force 

officers’ compliance with training requirements. To determine if these 

programs and facilities were being used to implement the DOE 

requirements and federal regulations, we focused on three key 

areas—firearms proficiency, physical fitness, and protective force officer 

equipment. 

Firearms Proficiency DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual states that protective force 

officers must demonstrate their proficiency with the weapons that are 

assigned to them every 6 months. According to the training records of the 

105 protective force officers we interviewed, 79 had met this proficiency 
Page 14 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

requirement with their primary weapon, the M-4 or M-16 semiautomatic 

rifle. Of the 26 officers who had not met this requirement within the 6 

month time frame, 11 officers were all located at one site with 8 of the 11 

officers not meeting the requirement until 2 to 5 months after the required 

time. According to an official at this site, 7 of the 8 officers could not 

complete the requirement in a timely fashion because the site’s firing range 

was closed for the investigation of an accidental weapon discharge that had 

resulted in an injury to a protective force officer. Although the DOE 

Protective Force Program Manual provides guidance that allows for 

off-site training to meet requirements, officials noted that a stand-down of 

all firearms training prevented training requirements from being met. We 

determined that 2 of the 26 officers did not complete the requirement for 

medical reasons. We were not given reasons why the remaining officers did 

not meet the requirement.

Physical Fitness Under DOE regulations,4

 protective force personnel employed by DOE 

contractors who are authorized to carry firearms must meet a minimum 

standard for physical fitness every 12 months. There are two standards for 

such personnel—Offensive Combative and Defensive Combative. All 

Security Police Officer-IIIs, which include DOE special response team 

members, must meet the Offensive Combative standard which requires a 

1-mile run in no more than 8 minutes 30 seconds and a 40-yard 

prone-to-running dash in no more than 8 seconds. All other protective 

officers authorized to carry firearms must meet the Defensive Combative 

standard, which requires a one-half mile run in no more than 4 minutes 40 

seconds and a 40-yard prone-to-running dash in no more than 8.5 seconds. 

According to the training records of the 105 protective force officers we 

reviewed, 103 of the 105 protective force officers had met the standard 

required by federal regulation for their position. Two officers who did not 

meet the requirement were on medical restriction. The records for another 

officer showed him as having met the requirement, but additional records 

provided by the site showed the officer had completed the run in a time 

that exceeded the standard. Site officials could not provide an explanation 

for this discrepancy.

4

10 C.F.R. pt. 1046, subpt. B, app. A.
Page 15 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

Protective Officer Equipment DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual sets a number of requirements 

for protective force equipment. Among these requirements are the 

following: 

• Minimum standard duty equipment. All Security Police Officers are 

required to carry a minimum set of equipment, including a portable 

radio, a handgun, and an intermediate force weapon such as a baton. In 

addition, a mask to protect against a chemical attack must be carried or 

available to them. All Security Police Officer-IIs and Security Police 

Officer-IIIs must also have access to personal protective body armor. 

• Firearms serviceability. Firearms must be kept serviceable at all times 

and must be inspected by a DOE-certified armorer at least twice a year 

to ensure serviceability. All DOE sites with armed protective force 

personnel are required to have the services of a certified armorer who is 

responsible for inspecting, maintaining, and repairing firearms. 

• Firearms inventories. Issued firearms must be inventoried at the 

beginning of each shift, and an inventory of all firearms in storage must 

be conducted weekly. A complete inventory of all firearms must be 

conducted on a monthly basis. 

• Appropriate equipment to counter the DBT. In line with DOE’s 

performance standards, DOE protective forces equipment must be 

tailored to counter adversaries identified in the DBT. To this end, sites 

employ a variety of equipment including automatic weapons, night 

vision equipment, and body armor. 

In most cases, each site’s protective forces carried or had access to the 

required minimum standard duty equipment. Most sites demonstrated that 

they had access to certified armorers, and each site maintained the 

required firearms maintenance, inspection, and inventory records, often 

kept in a detailed computerized database. We did not, however, conduct a 

detailed inspection of these records nor did we conduct an independent
Page 16 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

inventory of each site’s firearms.5 The appropriate policies and procedures 

were also in place for the inventory of firearms. In addition, some sites 

have substantially increased their protective forces weaponry since 

September 11, 2001, or have plans to further enhance these capabilities to 

meet the 2004 DBT. For example, one site provided us with a list of 

upgrades since September 11, 2001, including new M-4 carbines, grenade 

launchers, Barrett .50 caliber rifles, armor piercing ammunition, chemical 

and biological protection suits, and decontamination kits, as well as 

additional units that use specially trained dogs (K-9 units) and portable 

X-ray machines to detect explosives. 

Some Weaknesses in ESE 

Site Protective Force 

Practices Exist

While protective forces at ESE sites are generally meeting current DOE 

requirements, we identified some weaknesses in ESE protective force 

practices that could adversely affect the current readiness of ESE 

protective forces to defend their sites. These include protective force 

officers’ lack of regular participation in force-on-force exercises; the 

frequency and quality of training opportunities; the lack of dependable 

communications systems; and insufficient protective gear, including 

protective body armor and chemical protective gear, and the lack of 

armored vehicles.

Performance Testing and 

Training

According to DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual, performance tests 

are used to evaluate and verify the effectiveness of protective force 

programs and to provide needed training. Performance tests can also 

identify protective systems requiring improvements, validate implemented 

improvements, and motivate protective force personnel. A force-on-force 

exercise is one type of performance test during which the protective force 

engages in a simulated battle against a mock adversary force, employing 

the weapons, equipment, and methodologies postulated in the DBT. DOE 

believes that force-on-force exercises are a valuable training tool for 

protective force officers. Consequently, DOE policy requires that 

force-on-force exercises must be held at least once per year at sites that 

5

Recent firearms inventories by the DOE-Inspector General have uncovered some problems 

with DOE and NNSA firearms inventories. For examples, see the following DOE-Inspector 

General Reports: Inspection Report: Inspection of Selected Office of Security and 

Emergency Operations Firearms Inventories, DOE/IG-0517, August 2001; Inspection 

Report: Inspection of Firearms Internal Controls at Los Alamos National Laboratory,

DOE/IG-0587, February 2003; Inspection Report: Firearms Internal Controls at the 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, DOE/IG-0621, September 2003. 
Page 17 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

possess Category I quantities of special nuclear material or Category II 

quantities that can be rolled up to Category I quantities.

We asked protective force members whether they had participated in 

force-on-force exercises during their service at their site and when they 

most recently had participated. Eighty-four of the 105 protective force 

officers we interviewed reported that they had participated in a 

force-on-force exercise, but 8 reported they had never participated during 

their service at the site, and 13 did not respond to this question. Of the 84 

protective force officers that had participated,

• 60 reported participating within 12 months of the interview, 

• 10 had participated within the last 2 to 5 years, 

• one had participated 13 years ago,

• one could not remember the last force-on-force he had participated in, 

and

• 12 did not respond to the question. 

We were unable to verify whether protective force officers’ recollections 

were accurate because DOE sites are not required to track individual 

participation in force-on-force exercises. However, DOE’s Office of 

Security and Safety Performance Assurance 2004 review of protective 

forces found that the average protective force officer is only likely to 

participate in a force-on-force exercise once every 4 to 6 years. DOE’s 

Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance has concluded that 

this frequency is not adequate for the training of protective forces. 

DOE’s 2004 protective force review also found that the frequency, quality, 

and rigor of performance tests and training exercises vary widely 

throughout the complex. Our interviews of protective force officers and 

protective force managers produced a similar result. For example, we 

asked protective force members whether they believed the force-on-force 

exercises they participated in were realistic and challenging. Only 23 of the 

84 protective force officers that had participated in these exercises 

believed they were realistic while 23 stated they were somewhat realistic. 

In contrast, 38 officers believed that the force-on-force exercises they had 

participated in were not realistic. Twenty officers did not respond to the 

question. In addition, 33 of the 84 protective force officers reported that 
Page 18 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

safety considerations interfered with the realism of the force-on-force 

exercises with some protective force officers stating that they were limited 

in the tactics they could employ. For example, some protective force 

officers stated that they were not allowed to run up stairwells, climb 

fences, or exceed the speed limit in patrol vehicles. Some protective force 

officers at one site reported that for safety reasons they were no longer 

allowed to deploy on the roof of a facility although this position provided a 

significant advantage over adversaries approaching the facility. Some 

contractor protective force managers agreed that safety requirements 

limited the kind of realistic force-on-force training and other forms of 

realistic training that are needed to ensure effective protective force 

performance. 

More broadly, most of the 105 protective force officers reported some 

negative attitudes about the training they had received. Specifically, 85 of 

the 105 protective force officers we interviewed identified a number of 

deficiencies with their training, especially regarding the frequency and 

quality of firearms and tactical training. The following deficiencies were 

identified:

• 43 protective force officers reported that there was a lack of adequate 

firearms training, with 13 officers noting that the only training they had 

was when they went to satisfy the semiannual DOE qualification 

requirements. Some officers also reported that they did not have first 

priority at firing ranges because other local or federal law enforcement 

agencies were using them. 

• 42 protective force members, including 16 officers who are members of 

special response teams, reported that tactical training 

opportunities—where protective force officers move, shoot, and 

communicate as a unit—at their respective sites were very limited. A 

review of the standard DOE training curricula for Security Police 

Officer-IIs showed that these officers currently receive very little 

tactical training.

Communications Equipment According to DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual, protective force 

officers must have the capability to communicate information among 

themselves. The radios these officers use must be capable of two-way 

communications, provide intelligible voice communications, and be readily 

available in sufficient numbers to equip protective force personnel. In 

addition, a sufficient number of batteries must be available and maintained 
Page 19 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

in a charged condition to support routine, emergency, and response 

operations.

Protective force officers at all five of the sites we visited reported problems 

with their radio communications systems. Specifically, 66 of the 105 

protective force officers reported that they did not always have dependable 

radio communications, with 23 officers identifying sporadic battery life, 

and 29 officers reporting poor reception at some locations on site as the 

two most significant problems. In addition, some of the protective force 

officers believed that radio communications were not sufficient to support 

their operations and could not be relied on to transfer information between 

officers if a terrorist attack occurred. Site security officials at two sites 

acknowledged that efforts were under way to improve radio 

communications equipment. In addition, some security officials said other 

forms of communications, such as telephones, cellular telephones, and 

pagers, were provided for protective forces to ensure that they could 

communicate effectively. 

Protective Body Armor DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual requires that Security Police 

Officer-IIs and -IIIs wear body armor or that body armor be stationed in a 

way that allows them to quickly put it on to respond to an attack without 

negatively impacting response times. At one site, we found that most 

Security Police Officer-IIs had not been issued protective body armor 

because the site had requested and received in July 2003 a waiver to deviate 

from the requirement to equip all Security Police Officer-IIs with body 

armor. The waiver was sought for a number of reasons, including the (1) 

increased potential for heat-related injuries while wearing body armor 

during warm weather, (2) increased equipment load that armor would 

place on protective force members, (3) costs of acquiring the necessary 

quantity of body armor and the subsequent replacement costs, and (4) 

associated risks of not providing all Security Police Officer-IIs with body 

armor could be mitigated by using cover provided at the site by natural and 

man-made barriers. According to a site security official, this waiver is 

currently being reviewed because of the increased threat contained in the 

2004 DBT.

Special Response Team 

Capabilities

Security Police Officer-IIIs serve on special response teams responsible for 

offensive operations, such as hostage rescue and the recapture and 

recovery of special nuclear material. Special response teams are often 

assigned unique equipment, including specially encrypted radios; body 

armor that provides increased levels of protection; special suits that enable 

officers to operate and fight in chemically contaminated environments; 
Page 20 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

special vehicles, including armored vehicles; submachine guns; light 

machine guns; grenade launchers; and precision rifles, such as Remington 

700 rifles and Barrett .50 caliber rifles. These response teams are also 

issued breaching tools to allow them to reenter facilities to which terrorists 

may have gained access.

Each site with Category I special nuclear material must have a special 

response team capability available on a continuous basis. However, one 

ESE site does not have this capability and, instead, relies on another 

organization, through a formal memorandum of understanding, to provide 

a special response team. This arrangement, however, has not been 

comprehensively performance tested, as called for in the memorandum of 

understanding. Site officials state that they will soon conduct the first 

comprehensive performance test of this memorandum of understanding. 

Chemical Protective Gear DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual specifies that all Security Police 

Officer-II and -IIIs be provided, at a minimum, with protective masks that 

provide for nuclear, chemical, and biological protection. Other additional 

chemical protective gear and procedures are delegated to the sites. At the 

four sites with special response teams, we found that the teams all had 

special suits that allowed them to operate and fight in environments that 

might be chemically contaminated. For Security Police Officer-IIs, 

chemical protective equipment and expectations for fighting in chemically 

contaminated environments varied. For example, two sites provided 

additional protective equipment for their Security Police Officer-IIs and 

expected them to fight in such environments. Another site did not provide 

additional equipment, but expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to 

evacuate along with other site workers. Finally, the one site that did not 

have a special response team expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to 

fight in chemically contaminated environments. However, the site provided 

no additional protective gear for its officers other than standard-duty issue 

long-sleeved shirts and the required protective masks. 

Protective Force Vehicles DOE’s Protective Force Program Manual requires that protective force 

vehicles exhibit a degree of reliability commensurate with their intended 

functions and enhance the efficiency, speed, and safety of routine and 

emergency duties under all expected weather conditions. Vehicles must be 

maintained in serviceable condition, with preventive maintenance 

performed at intervals that meet or exceed the manufacturer 

recommendations. 
Page 21 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

Nearly half (14 of 30) of the protective force officers we interviewed at two 

sites reported that patrol vehicles were old, in poor physical condition, and 

not suitable for pursuit and recovery missions. Some reported maintenance 

as a significant problem, with one officer observing that more vehicles 

were in the shop than on patrol. Some protective force officers also 

reported that door handles on patrol vehicles did not work, which made it 

difficult for them to enter and exit the vehicles. A site security official told 

us that they had never had problems with the physical condition or 

maintenance of patrol vehicles, but did note that they had experienced 

difficulties in acquiring new vehicles. 

We also found that ESE sites currently do not have the same level of vehicle 

protection as NNSA sites that also have Category I special nuclear material. 

Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA sites with Category I 

special nuclear material currently operate armored vehicles. However, only 

one of the five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material operated 

armored vehicles at the time of our review. One other ESE site was 

planning to purchase armored vehicles. 

DOE and ESE Officials 

Need to Take Several 

Prompt and 

Coordinated Actions to 

Address the New DBT 

Requirements by 2008

To successfully defend against the much larger terrorist threat contained in 

the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they 

need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include the 

transformation of current protective forces into an “elite force,” the 

development and deployment of new security technologies, the 

consolidation and elimination of special nuclear material, and 

organizational improvements within ESE’s security program. However, 

because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early stages of 

development and will require significant commitment of resources and 

coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the October 2008 

DBT implementation deadline is uncertain.

DOE Proposes Creating an 

“Elite Force” to Protect Its 

Sites in the New Threat 

Environment

DOE officials believe that the way its sites, including those sites managed 

by ESE, currently train their contractor-operated protective forces will not 

be adequate to defeat the terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT. This 

view is shared by most protective force officers (74 out of 105) and their 

contractor protective force managers who report that they are not at all 

confident in their current ability to defeat the new threats contained in the 

2004 DBT. In response, DOE has proposed the development of an “elite 

force” that would be patterned after the U. S. military’s Special Forces. 
Page 22 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

However, creating this elite force is a complex undertaking and will be a 

challenge to fully realize by the October 2008 implementation deadline. 

Even before the issuance of the 2004 DBT, DOE had become concerned 

about protective force preparedness because of intense demands placed on 

protective forces following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The 

need to increase security at DOE sites as rapidly as possible following the 

2001 attacks meant that DOE protective forces worked extensive overtime. 

DOE’s Inspector General, DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance 

Assurance, and GAO reported on the potential for large amounts of 

protective force overtime to increase fatigue, reduce readiness, and reduce 

training opportunities for protective forces.6

In recognition of this situation, in September 2003, the Secretary of Energy 

directed DOE’s Office of Performance Assurance and Independent 

Assessment, now a part of the Office Security and Safety Performance 

Assurance, to conduct a special review to determine the effectiveness of 

the management of protective forces and protective force capabilities. This 

classified review, which was issued in June 2004 and covered five NNSA 

sites and one ESE site, found that the current organization and tactics of 

DOE protective forces need improvement to deal with possible terrorist 

threats. Historically, DOE protective forces had been more concerned with 

a broad range of industrial security and order-keeping functions than with 

preparation to conduct a defensive battle against a paramilitary attacker, as 

is described in the 2004 DBT. The June 2004 review recommended a shift to 

an aggressive military-like, small-unit, tactical defense posture, which 

included enhanced tactical training standards to allow protective forces to 

move, shoot, and communicate effectively as a unit in a combat 

environment. The review also recommended more frequent, realistic, and 

rigorous force-on-force performance testing and training for the 

department’s protective forces. 

Based on this review, the Secretary of Energy proposed transforming 

DOE’s protective force that safeguards special nuclear material into an 

“elite force” with training and capabilities similar to the military’s Special 

Forces units. Subsequently, in June 2004, the Deputy Secretary of Energy 

6

Audit Report: Management of the Department’s Protective Forces, DOE/IG-0602, 

Department of Energy Office of Inspector General, June 2003; Department of Energy 

Protective Force Management and Capabilities (U), Office of Security and Safety 

Performance Assurance, (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004); GAO-04-623. 
Page 23 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

directed the formation of a Protective Forces Working Group to formally 

review missions, standards, and current protective force status as the basis 

for developing recommendations on policy, training, and equipment that, if 

enacted, could serve as the basis for creating an elite force. This working 

group consisted of representatives from DOE’s Office of Security and 

Safety Performance Assurance, NNSA, and ESE’s Office of Environmental 

Management. In August 2004, the working group recommended a set of 

near-term actions that could be used to elevate protective force 

capabilities. These included instituting more demanding medical and 

physical fitness standards, increasing tactical training, and reorganizing 

protective forces into tactically cohesive units. In October 2004, the 

working group also recommended considering federalizing DOE protective 

forces as a long-term option. In January 2005, the Deputy Secretary of 

Energy endorsed the report’s findings and directed that implementation 

actions begin.

Most protective force officers we interviewed generally support some of 

the ideas embodied in the elite force concept. Specifically, most protective 

force officers (74 out of 105) at the ESE sites we visited reported that they 

are not at all confident in their current ability to defeat the new threats 

contained in the 2004 DBT. In particular, some protective force officers 

believed that they would be outgunned and overwhelmed by the terrorist 

force identified in the 2004 DBT. In addition, some feared they could be 

surprised by a large terrorist force because of the sites’ security strategy 

and the physical layout of their sites. Some sites are already responding to 

the elite force concept by increasing tactical training, and others plan to 

institute “training relief shifts,” which will increase the amount of time 

protective force officers have available for uninterrupted training. Some 

sites also have ambitious plans for constructing new facilities to enable 

increased tactical training.

Nevertheless, despite broad support and some sites’ progress, DOE’s 

proposal for an elite force remains largely in the conceptual phase. DOE 

has developed a preliminary draft implementation plan that lays out 

high-level milestones and key activities, but this plan has not been formally 

approved by the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. The 

draft implementation plan recognizes that DOE will have to undertake and 

complete a number of complex tasks in order to develop the elite force 

envisioned. For example, DOE will have to revise its existing protective 

forces policies to incorporate, among other things, the increased training 

standards that are needed to create an elite force. This may be a 

time-consuming effort. 
Page 24 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

As we reported in April 2004, the DOE policy process emphasizes 

developing consensus through a laborious review and comment process by 

program offices. We found that this policy process contributed to the 

nearly 2 years it took the department to develop DOE’s first 

post-September 11, 2001, DBT. Likewise, DOE has been working on a 

streamlined overall security policy for nearly 2 years. Once this streamlined 

policy is formally issued, now scheduled for summer 2005, DOE’s draft 

implementation plans for an elite force call for the new policy to 

immediately undergo revision to incorporate elements of the elite force 

concept. DOE’s Office of Security has not yet identified a time frame for 

completing these actions. In addition, DOE officials believe that broader 

DOE policies will have to be revised. For example, DOE security officials, 

as well as contractor protective force managers, see some DOE health and 

safety policies and practices as an impediment because they do not allow 

the kind of realistic and physically demanding training that is required for 

an elite force. According to these officials, revising these policies will 

require broad, high-level support within DOE. Furthermore, some DOE 

protective force requirements, such as medical, physical fitness, and 

training standards are mandated by DOE regulations. Changing these 

regulations, according to a DOE security official, would require DOE to 

follow rule-making procedures. All these protective force policies and 

regulations, as well as broader DOE policies are contained in collective 

bargaining agreements between protective force unions and protective 

force contractors and in protective force contracts, which also will need to 

be modified to create the kind of elite force that DOE believes is necessary 

to defeat the 2004 DBT. 

Some site security officials recognize that they will have to carefully craft 

transition plans for currently employed protective force officers who may 

not be able to meet the new standards required for an elite force. Some of 

these officials have expressed concern about the ability of some protective 

force officers to meet more rigorous physical and training standards that 

are likely to be part of an elite force. DOE field security officials and 

contractor protective force managers likewise have expressed concern 

about finding ways for less capable protective force officers to move into 

different roles or retire from service with a sense of dignity. Because all the 

protective forces at the five ESE sites we visited operated, at the time, 

under separate contracts and separate collective bargaining agreements, 

there is no uniform benefit or retirement plan for protective forces, and 

these benefits, according to one contractor security official, differ 

considerably among sites. Some contractor protective force managers 

recognized that they needed such mechanisms as early retirement 
Page 25 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

incentives and more attractive retirement packages to make the effective 

transition to an elite force. They believed, however, that they would not be 

able to provide these mechanisms, most of which are quite expensive, 

without DOE’s help. Officials from the one protective force contractor, 

which had a placement and income protection program for protective force 

officers who could no longer meet existing DOE requirements, said that 

payouts from the program have far exceeded contributions and that the 

program will have to be restructured in the near future.

Given these complexities, DOE security officials recently told us that 

implementing all the measures associated with the elite force concept will 

take about 5 years to complete. With this time line, the development of the 

elite force will be under way by the new DBT’s implementation deadline of 

October 2008, but the full benefit of an elite force, according to DOE’s own 

preliminary plans, will not be realized until fiscal year 2010. 

DOE Believes Security 

Technologies Can Improve 

the Effectiveness of 

Protective Forces

DOE is seeking to improve the effectiveness and survivability of its 

protective forces through the development and deployment of new security 

technologies. The department believes technologies can reduce the risk to 

protective forces in case of an attack and provide additional response time 

to meet and defeat an attack. Many of the ESE sites we visited currently 

possess some advanced security technology. For example, all sites operate 

central alarm stations that often integrate hundreds of alarms and dozens 

of sensors, such as video cameras and infrared and microwave detection 

systems, as well as redundant communications systems. Some sites also 

have thermal imaging sensors, which can detect adversaries at long ranges 

and in all types of weather. Some of these sensors have data links that 

allow the information to be rapidly shared. One site deploys classified 

devices that can immobilize or delay the movement of an adversary.

DOE officials believe that additional technology can further enhance site 

security. The Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance is 

assisting sites in identifying and deploying existing technologies to enhance 

protection systems, principally through the following programs: 

• Technology and Systems Development Program. DOE has funded this 

program for many years, although funding has been reduced in recent 

years. Specifically, DOE provided over $20 million for this program in 

fiscal year 2004. However, DOE only requested $14.5 million for this 

program in fiscal year 2006–about 1 percent of the entire DOE security 

program budget. Moreover, the program has had only limited success in 
Page 26 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

developing technologies that can actually be deployed. The Director of 

DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance recently 

stated that DOE has not yet taken the formal steps necessary to 

coordinate investment in emerging security technologies to ensure they 

are deployed at DOE sites in a timely manner. 

• Site Assistance Visit Program. Immediately after the issuance of the 

2004 DBT, DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 

embarked on site assistance visits—a targeted effort to encourage the 

use of technologies that could offset the more costly 

manpower-intensive approaches needed to meet the more demanding 

requirements of the DBT. These site assistance visits focus on new and 

emerging security technologies. Each site visit lasts approximately 2 

weeks and consists of exercises and simulations designed to evaluate 

each site’s preliminary plans for meeting the new DBT and to 

demonstrate how technologies can assist in countering the 2004 DBT in 

a cost-effective manner. DOE conducted these visits between October 

2004 and April 2005. Four of the five ESE sites we examined have 

received these visits. DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance 

Assurance completed the final report on the results of the site 

assistance visits in May 2005. DOE plans to use the results of these visits 

to help justify its fiscal year 2007 budget. 

Even before the site assistance visits, ESE sites were actively considering 

advanced security technologies. For example, at least two ESE sites are 

considering installing automatic weapons that can be operated from 

remote, secure locations—known as remotely operated weapons systems 

within DOE. A few ESE protective forces also supported this push toward 

technology, especially technology that allows more timely detection of 

adversaries. Specifically, 16 of the 105 protective force officers we 

interviewed said they needed enhanced detection technologies that would 

allow adversaries to be detected and engaged at much greater ranges than 

is currently possible at most sites. 

ESE’s Strategy for Meeting 

the New DBT Relies Heavily 

on the Consolidation of 

Special Nuclear Materials

ESE’s current strategy for meeting the October 2008 deadline for 

compliance with the 2004 DBT relies heavily on the consolidation and 

elimination of special nuclear materials between and among other ESE 

sites. At all five of the ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material, 

material consolidation and elimination are important goals for the site and 

the responsible DOE program office and are inextricably tied to security 

plans. However, neither ESE nor DOE has developed a comprehensive, 
Page 27 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

departmentwide plan to achieve the needed cooperation and agreement 

among the sites and program offices to consolidate special nuclear 

material, as we recommended in our April 2004 report. In the absence of 

such a comprehensive, coordinated plan, completing some of these 

significant activities by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is 

unlikely. In particular: 

• Savannah River Site. Currently, special nuclear material is stored in 

three separate, widely dispersed areas at the Savannah River Site—an 

Office of Environmental Management (EM) site. In November 2004, EM 

directed the site to consolidate all its current and future storage of 

Category I special nuclear material into a single area by fiscal year 2007. 

This consolidation will free up over 100 protective force officers who 

currently guard facilities at the sites’ two other areas. It will also allow 

for a substantially increased protective force presence at the single 

remaining area and could save the site over $100 million in expected 

costs to implement measures to defend the site against the 2004 DBT.

• Hanford Site. Hanford, another EM site, had plans to transfer most of 

its special nuclear material to the Savannah River Site by the end of 

fiscal year 2006. However, a number of factors threaten to delay this 

transfer of material. These factors include (1) NNSA’s Office of Secure 

Transportation’s shipping and load restrictions on transporting special 

nuclear material across the United States, (2) the Savannah River Site’s 

inability to store some of Hanford’s special nuclear material in its 

present configuration, and (3) the Savannah River Site’s current lack of 

facilities to permanently dispose of Hanford’s special nuclear material. 

Faced with these challenges, EM decided in February 2005 to postpone 

shipping material from Hanford until these issues could be resolved. 

Hanford had begun planning for such a contingency, but the site will 

now have to expend additional funds of about $85 million annually to 

protect these materials against the 2004 DBT. 

• Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and 

Argonne National Laboratory-West.7

 Managed by the Office of Nuclear 

Energy, Science and Technology, the Idaho National Engineering and 

Environmental Laboratory had removed—by NNSA’s Office of Secure 

Transportation—its currently known Category I special nuclear material 

7

The two Idaho sites were consolidated as a single site, now known as the Idaho National 

Laboratory, in February 2005.
Page 28 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

from its single Category I storage facility in May 2005. Removal will 

allow a substantial number of its protective forces to transfer to the 

nearby Argonne National Laboratory-West site, which has a continuing 

Category I special nuclear material mission. These additional protective 

forces will be critical to helping the site meet the 2004 DBT. However, a 

recent DOE site assistance visit suggested that several other facilities at 

the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory may 

have some previously unrecognized Category I special nuclear material. 

Site security officials report that they are trying to resolve these issues 

with DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. If any 

of these other Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 

Laboratory facilities do have Category I special nuclear material, they 

will require additional protection, which could severely damage the 

current DBT implementation plans for both Idaho sites. In addition, 

because of its remote location, the robust design of some of its facilities, 

its large protective force, and extensive training facilities, the Idaho 

National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory is now being 

evaluated as a potential future consolidation location for NNSA 

Category I special nuclear material. 

• Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, an 

Office of Science Site, plans to eliminate its Category I special material. 

Current plans call for down-blending this material in place to less 

attractive forms and for extracting medically useful isotopes that may 

help treat certain forms of cancer. The Office of Nuclear Energy, Science 

and Technology is responsible for this down-blending program. 

However, the costs for this program have risen steeply, even without the 

additional security costs of the meeting the 2004 DBT. In addition, the 

Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology and the Office of 

Science have not formally agreed on which program office will bear the 

brunt of the estimated $53 million annual security costs required to meet 

the implementation deadline for the 2004 DBT. If these issues can be 

resolved, down-blending operations are scheduled to begin in fiscal year 

2009 and to be completed in fiscal year 2012. If down-blending 

operations do not take place, Oak Ridge National Laboratory will face 

high additional security costs—approaching an additional $43 million 

each year, according to preliminary site estimates—as long as the 

material remains on-site. 
Page 29 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

ESE’s Headquarters 

Security Organization Is Not 

Well Suited to Meet the 

Challenges of the 2004 DBT

ESE’s current organization is not well suited to meeting the challenges 

associated with implementing the 2004 DBT. First, ESE lacks a formally 

appointed senior security advisor or a centralized security organization. In 

contrast, NNSA has such a position. Specifically, Title 32 of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, which created NNSA, 

established the position of Chief, Defense Nuclear Security, to serve as the 

primary security advisor to the NNSA Administrator. The Chief is 

responsible for the development and implementation of NNSA security 

programs, including the physical security for all NNSA facilities. Over the 

past several years, ESE has recognized the need for such a position and has 

sought to fill the security advisor role through the use of employees 

temporarily detailed from other organizations. For example, beginning in 

2004, a detailee from the Office of Security and Safety Performance 

Assurance has served as the Acting Director for ESE Security. The current 

acting director was preceded by a visiting White House Fellow. However, 

the position of the Director for ESE Security has no programmatic 

authority or staff. This lack of authority limits the director’s ability to help 

facilitate ESE and DOE-wide cooperation on such issues as material 

down-blending at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and material 

consolidation at other ESE sites.

Second, ESE does not have a consolidated headquarters security office. In 

April 2005, the recently confirmed ESE Under Secretary stated that ESE 

was composed of “institutional ‘stovepipes’” and that this structure has 

hampered strategic management within ESE. ESE has explored creating a 

consolidated headquarters security office, but each of the three program 

offices we examined continues to maintain its own headquarters security 

offices. These offices, however, are organized and staffed differently. For 

example, the Office of Environmental Management’s headquarters security 

office has more than 17 professional security personnel on staff. In 

contrast, the headquarters offices of Science and of Nuclear Energy, 

Science and Technology each have only one and two security professionals 

on staff, respectively. For the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and 

Technology this situation is problematic because its security 

responsibilities are increasing with the consolidation of two of its sites into 

the Idaho National Laboratory and with the Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory’s down-blending program. Indeed, safeguards and security 

funding is a much larger percentage of the Office of Nuclear Energy, 

Science and Technology’s total budget—$75 million out of a total fiscal year 

2006 budget request of $511 million, about 15 percent—than it is for either 

the Office of Science or the Office of Environmental Management. As a 

result, according to the EM Security Director and Acting Director, ESE 
Page 30 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

security, the Environmental Management security office provides informal 

support to the other ESE programs offices, including the Offices of Nuclear 

Energy, Science and Technology and Science.

Conclusions Successfully defending against the increased terrorist threat contained in 

the 2004 DBT will require a significant coordinated effort by DOE, ESE, and 

the ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear material. While ESE 

sites are not required to meet the requirements of the 2004 DBT until 

October 2008, we believe that ESE needs to take action to correct 

weaknesses with its current training and equipment practices. Addressing 

these issues will put ESE protective forces in a better position to defend 

their sites, in the short run, while DOE and ESE press ahead on the broader 

initiatives, such as the elite force concept and materials consolidation that 

they believe will be necessary to meet the requirements of the 2004 DBT. 

While we support DOE’s and ESE’s broader initiatives, we believe that 

these initiatives cannot be successfully implemented without a more 

strategic approach. Such an approach will need to include a comprehensive 

plan for all of the initiatives DOE and ESE are considering and will need to 

be supported by a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient 

authority to ensure coordination across all ESE program offices that have 

Category I special nuclear material.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

In order to ensure that DOE and ESE protective forces can meet the new 

terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT, we are making the following five 

recommendations to the Secretary of Energy:

• Develop a requirement for individual protective force officer 

participation in force-on-force exercises.

• Require that sites track protective force member participation in 

force-on-force exercises. 

• Take immediate action to correct weaknesses in protective force 

equipment at ESE sites by providing the following where needed:

• dependable radio communications, 

• body armor, 
Page 31 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

• chemical protective gear,

• special response team capabilities, and 

• vehicles that provide enhanced protection for protective forces. 

• Develop and implement a departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced 

implementation plan for meeting the new 2004 DBT requirements that 

includes detailed plans for 

• the creation of an elite force through the revision of existing DOE 

protective force policies and practices,

• the development and deployment of enhanced security technologies, 

and

• the transportation and consolidation of special nuclear materials. 

• Require the Under Secretary, ESE, to establish a security organization to 

oversee the development, implementation, and coordination of ESE, 

and broader DOE efforts, to meet the 2004 DBT.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided DOE with a copy of this report for review and comment. DOE 

stated that it concurred with the report and accepted our 

recommendations. In that context, DOE provided an update on the actions 

it anticipated would address our recommendations. While we believe that 

most of DOE’s anticipated actions will be responsive to our 

recommendations, we are concerned about DOE’s response to our 

recommendation that it develop a departmentwide, multiyear, fully 

resourced implementation plan for meeting the 2004 DBT requirements. 

Specifically, in responding to this recommendation, DOE cited only 

individual efforts to address the development of an elite force, the 

deployment of enhanced security technologies, and the consolidation of 

special nuclear material, not the development of a comprehensive plan. 

While each of these efforts is important, as we demonstrated in our report, 

the success of these efforts requires close coordination across numerous 

DOE, ESE, as well as NNSA organizations. We continue to believe that DOE 

cannot be successful in meeting the requirements of the 2004 DBT by its 

deadline of October 2008 without an integrated effort that is built around a 

comprehensive plan. DOE also provided three additional technical changes 
Page 32 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

that we have incorporated. DOE’s letter commenting on our draft report is 

presented in appendix II.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary 

of Energy, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and 

appropriate congressional committees. We also will make copies of this 

report available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report or need additional 

information, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 

major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Gene Aloise

Director, Natural Resources

 and Environment
Page 33 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To obtain an overall perspective on how protective forces are prepared to 

defend Department of Energy (DOE) sites, we reviewed relevant literature 

focusing on Special Nuclear Materials, DOE’s protective forces, and reports 

by DOE’s Inspector General, as well as previous GAO reports. We 

conducted multiple rounds of interviews with DOE headquarters officials 

and conducted document reviews. We also met with DOE and protective 

force officials at five sites under the oversight of DOE’s Office of the Under 

Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment: Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, 

Argonne National Laboratory–West, the Savannah River Site, and the 

Hanford Site.

To determine the extent to which protective forces at Office of the Under 

Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment sites are meeting DOE’s 

existing readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies to determine 

current requirements. We also reviewed pertinent literature about the 

factors that affect the readiness of military forces. We conducted 

structured interviews with 105 ESE protective force officers at the five ESE 

sites. We took several steps to ensure that we selected protective force 

officers independently and interviewed protective force officers with 

varying levels of experience. We interviewed a nonprobability sample of 

protective force officers from all five ESE sites.1

 Even though we are not 

generalizing to the population as a whole, at each site we randomly 

selected the protective force officers to interview. Random selection 

protects against selection bias and helps assure that the officers we 

interviewed were independent of site management. Specifically, we 

obtained a complete roster of all protective force officers at each site, 

which included the name, position, area assignment, and length of service 

for each protective force officer and identified the dates and potential time 

slots for the interviews during our site visits. We submitted modified 

rosters to the security contractor with the potential interview time slots, 

and the contractor resubmitted this roster with the availability of each 

protective force officer. We then stratified protective force officers by 

position, rank, and length of service and assigned them random numbers 

from a random number table. We also assigned random numbers, in 

sequence from the random number table, to protective force officers at 

each site, eliminating random numbers to ensure that no random number 

1

Results from a nonprobability sample cannot be used to make inferences about a 

population because in such a sample some elements of the population being studied have no 

chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 34 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

was ever used twice. The random numbers assigned to protective force 

officers were placed in chronological order and officers were selected 

based on the lowest random number assigned, their availability during the 

prescribed time slots, position, area assignment, and length of service. 

Lastly, we informed the security contractor at each site of those protective 

force officers we wished to interview prior to our site visit. The structured 

interviews were administered by two-person teams to Security Police 

Officer-IIs and Security Police Officer-IIIs. We asked the officers questions 

designed to determine their readiness to defend the sites, including 

questions about their morale, training, and equipment. We also reviewed 

the training records and physical fitness qualifications of the 105 officers to 

determine if key elements of their training complied with existing DOE 

training requirements. In particular, we reviewed selected firearms and 

physical fitness qualifications to determine if these officers complied with 

existing DOE requirements and federal regulations.

Finally, we reviewed the equipment ESE protective forces use to determine 

if it met current DOE requirements. For example, we reviewed the 

minimum standard duty equipment that was employed at each site. We also 

checked to ensure that most sites’ armorers were certified as required by 

DOE and, for most sites, we inspected armories, inspection records, as well 

as firearms inventory procedures. Finally, we reviewed the types of 

equipment that some sites are evaluating and/or planning to purchase. 

To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully 

defend against the new threat identified in the 2004 DBT by DOE’s 

implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the 2004 DBT and 

associated guidance documents. We discussed the 2004 DBT with officials 

in DOE’s Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and with 

officials in ESE’s Offices of Environmental Management; Nuclear Energy, 

Science and Technology; and Science. Where available, we reviewed 

documents prepared by ESE and contractor officials on how they plan to 

comply with the 2004 DBT. We discussed DOE’s initiative to transform its 

current protective force into an elite force with DOE’s Office of Security 

and Safety Performance Assurance and security officials at all five of the 

ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material. We also discussed site 

assistance visits and their concentration on security technology with DOE 

security officials. Furthermore, we reviewed recent DOE congressional 

testimony on the role of security technology and reviewed the relevant 

portion of the fiscal year 2006 DOE budget submission. In addition, we 

discussed plans for special nuclear material consolidation with ESE 

program security officials and site security officials. Finally, we discussed 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

ESE’s security organization with DOE’s Office of Security and Safety 

Performance Assurance, ESE’s Acting Security Director, and ESE program 

security offices. We also reviewed congressional testimony given by the 

Under Secretary of Energy at his recent confirmation hearing. 
Page 36 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Energy ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 37 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 38 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 39 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security
Page 40 GAO-05-611 Nuclear Security

Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the individual named above, Don Cowan, Joyce Evans, 

Doreen Feldman, Jonathan Gill, Preston Heard, James Noel, Joe Oliver, and 

Carol Hernstadt Shulman made key contributions to this report. 

(360431)
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