Affirmed and Opinion Filed August 21, 1997

In The 

### (£a\xrt ofAppeals 

### JTtf tlj Itsirtri at Qfrxas at Dallas
No. 05-95-00951-CR JESSIE DON LEWIS, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appealfrom the Criminal District Court No. 1 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F95-73644-LH OPINION Before Justices Kinkeade, Ovard, and Chapman Opinion By Justice Ovard The trial court convicted Jessie Don Lewis of aggravated robbery and assessed a 

### sentence ofthirtyyears imprisonment. In three points oferror, Lewis asserts the evidence 

### is legally and factually insufficientto supportthe trial court'sjudgment and he was denied effective assistance ofcounsel. We affirm the trial court's judgment.BACKGROUND Angela Jones, thecomplaining witness, reported that Lewis held a gun to herhead and took herjewelry. The incident occurred at theCrest AApartments, a location noted 

### for drug-related crimes. Lewis denied robbing Jones. Instead, hespeculated Jones falsely accused him ofaggravated robbery inretaliation for his selling herfake crack cocaine.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE Inhis first point oferror, Lewis contends theevidence is legally insufficient to prove he committed aggravated robbery because the complaining witness's testimony was not credible or reliable. The State responds that Lewis's challenge is directed at credibility 

### instead ofsufficiency, and that credibility of a complainant is solely within the province of
the factfinder. 

### In his second point of error, Lewis asserts the evidence is factually insufficient to 

### support his conviction because credible and reliable testimony was presented that the complainingwitness purchasedfake crackcocainefromhim. TheStatereplies that, because credibility ofwitnesses is an issue for the factfinder to determine, the evidence is factually sufficient to support Lewis's conviction. 1. Standard ofReview 

### Inreviewing achallengeto the legal sufficiencyofthe evidence, weviewthe evidence 

### inthe lightmostfavorable to the prosecutionto determinewhetheranyrational trieroffact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

### Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Green v. State, 761 S.W.2d 824, 825 (Tex.

-2-App.-Dallas 1988, no pet.). Thefactfinder resolves conflicts in thetestimony, weighs the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Dumas v. State, 812 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). Thefactfinder is the exclusivejudge of the witnesses' credibility and the testimony's weight. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 

### 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); Dumas, 812 S.W.2d at 615. The factfinder may accept or 

### reject any orall evidence. SeeSaxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). That the appellant presents a different factual version does not render the evidence insufficient. Anderson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985),cert, denied, 479 U.S. 870 (1986). 

### When an appellant challenges the factual sufficiency ofthe evidence, we review all 

### the evidence without the prism of"in the light most favorable to the prosecution." Clewis
v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In analyzing the factfinder's determination of avital fact, we do notdecide the existence or nonexistence of a vital fact 

### nor do we decide the truth orfalsity ofproffered evidence nor do wejudge the credibility ofwitnesses. Scott v. State, 934 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, no pet.). Our 

### evaluation of the factual sufficiency of the evidence shouldnot substantiallyintrude upon the factfinder's role as the sole judge ofthe weight and credibility ofwitness testimony. See Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). As areviewing court, we 

### may not reweigh the evidence and set aside the factfinder's determination merely because
we feel that a different result is more reasonable. Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 135. Ifwe

-3-determine the factfinder's determination is against the great weight of the evidence 

### presented attrial so that itis clearly wrong and unjust, we must reverse and remand for a new trial. Id. A verdict is "clearly wrong andunjust" if it shocks the conscience or clearly demonstrates bias. Id.; Scott, 934 S.W.2d at 399. 2. Applicable Law Aperson commits robbery if, in thecourse ofcommitting theft, with intent to obtain
or maintain control of the property, he intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear ofimminent bodily injury or death. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(2) 

### (Vernon 1994). Robbery becomes aggravated if a person, in the course ofcommitting a robbery, uses orexhibits adeadlyweapon during the robbery commission. Tex. PenalCode Ann. § 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1994). Ahandgun is a deadly weapon perse. Anderson v. State, 813 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no pet.). 

### In achallenge tothe sufficiency of the evidence, positiveidentification ofadefendant 

### as the perpetrator of a crime is sufficient to support a conviction. Everett v. State, 707 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Hester v. State, 909 S.W.2d 174, 178 (Tex. 

### App.-Dallas 1995, no pet.);/owes v. State, 687 S.W.2d430, 432 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no pet.). 3. Testimony

a. State Witnesses 

### The complainingwitness, AngelaJones, testifiedthat, on the day ofthe robbery, her 

### sister Ella Campbell paged her. Campbell asked Jones to pick her up at the Crest A

-4-

### Apartments, where she was visiting. When Jones arrived at the apartment complex, she 

### parked her car and waited for her sister. When Campbell did not come to the car, Jones began to look for her. 

### A number ofpeople were standing outside. Jones saw Lewis looking at her. He asked herfor a cigarette. She told him she did not have one. Suddenly, Lewis pulled a small, black, .25 caliber automatic gun and stuckit inherface. Hepulled backtheclip, and Jones heard it click. Then he demanded: "Bitch, give me yourjewelry." Jones hesitated. 

### Lewis moved the gun toher temple and roughly pulled at aring. Because she feared that Lewis would shoot her, Jones removed her rings. 

### Next, Lewis began looking atand pulling on her blackleather coat. She told him he 

### would have to fight her for her coat. Then, Lewis asked her ifshe had any money, and she 

### replied no. He took her rings and turned around to show the bystanders what he had stolen. The bystanders reacted by laughing. 

### Meanwhile, Jones's sister arrived. Jones ran to anearby telephone booth tocall for 

### help. Lewis fled. While Jones talkedtothe 911 operator, bystanders toldherthe gunman's name was "Red Devil". When the police arrived, Jones gave them Lewis's description. 

### Lewis's sister came out ofher apartment and also talked with Jones and with the police. Jones testified thatLewis' sister told her that, ifJones would return thenext day, she would try to get herjewelry back. 

### On cross examination, Jones testified that she does not buy, sell, or use drugs. She 

### denied frequenting the Crest AApartments and stated that, except for the day she was

-5-robbed, she had not been to that apartment complex in seven years. Jones denied ever having purchased drugs, orphoney drugs, from Lewis. She also denied that shewas angry at Lewis for selling her "phoney dope." Ella Campbell testified thatshe paged Jones for aride. While waiting for her sister outside the Crest A Apartments, Campbell noticed two men infront of the complex "kind 

### offussing about something." She asked one ofthe men to notify her when her sister arrived, and she returned to an apartment upstairs. A short time later, the man found her and told her that her sister was being robbed. 

### When Campbell came down the stairs she observed Lewis, who she knew as "Red Devil", standing in front ofJones. Jones appeared to be terrified and almost in tears. 

### Campbell asked what was wrong, and Jones said that Lewis had robbed her. Campbell 

### yelled at Lewis and asked him "Whatyou doing
. . .with my sister?" He laughed and held agun in the air. Lewis left when Jones phoned the police. Before the police arrived, the bystanders told Campbell thatLewis "robbed [Jones]." 

### Approximately two weeks later, Campbell was walking down the street when Lewis 

### approached her in acar with his mother. Lewis got out ofthe car and told Campbell he and his mother wanted to talk to Jones about dropping the charges. His mother was 

### wearing Jones's rings. Campbell refused to disclose her sister's address. Charlie Law testified that, as apolice officerwith the Dallas Police Department, he 

### had patrolled the area around the Crest AApartments for approximately five years. The Crest AApartments are located in ahigh crime area. On the day ofthe robbery, he wasdriving through the Crest A complex when Jones flagged him down and told him a man had just taken her jewelry. He parked his car and walked into the complex. People were gathered outside near the laundry room. Law asked two bystanders what had happened, and they told him they had seen a robbery. Through his investigation, Law determined Lewis was the man who robbed Jones and that his street name is "Red Devil". Law also testified Jones lived in his patrol area and that he knew her because of her involvement in various disturbance calls he had worked over the years. He had never previouslyseen Jones at the Crest A apartments, and he had also never seen her buy, sell, or use narcotics.
b. Defense Witnesses Lewis testified that, although he sold Jones fake crackcocaine, he did not rob her. He stated he had a previous conviction for selling drugs and that he stays with his sister at 

### the CrestAApartments, where he smokes crackcocaine. He knew Campbell tobea"crack head" from previous occasions ofsmoking crack cocainewith her. He had never met Jones 

### before. On the day of the robbery, Jones and Campbell approached him atthe Crest A 

### Apartments. Campbell asked him, "RedDevil, wouldyou show mewhere some good dope 

### is?" Lewis gave the sisters ten rocks offake crackcocaine, andJones paidhim one hundred dollars. The sisters left the complex. 

### Jones returned approximately five minutes later. From the window of a friend's 

### nearbyhouse, Lewis observedJones talkingwithpolice. Hewas afraidto come outandtalk to the officers because he believed they would arrest him for selling fake crack cocaine. 

### Lewis stated Jones falsely accused him ofrobbing her because he had "scammed" her by

-7-selling her fake cocaine. He denied carrying a gun, which would be a violation of a condition of his parole. Linda Brown, Lewis' cousin, testified she wasvisiting the Crest A Apartments on the day of the robbery. She was aware that drugs were frequently bought, sold, and used there. Brown observed Lewis, Jones and several other people standing outside the washateria. Lewis and Jones were talking; Jones did not appear to be frightened. Lewiswas not holding
a gun. Brown saw Lewis hold out his closed fist and put something in Jones's hand in a
manner commonly used for passing rockcocaine. She did not see Jones give him anything in return. Brown also testified that she had seen Lewis and Jones together before. 3. Application ofLaw to Facts Inreviewing achallenge tothe legal sufficiency ofevidence, we view theevidence in 

### the light most favorable to the prosecution. Here, Jones positively identified Lewis as the man who placed ahandgun to her head and demanded herjewelry. She was afraid Lewis 

### would physically hurt or kill her if she did not comply. Lewis then took her five rings. Viewing this evidence inthe lightmostfavorable to the prosecution, anyrationaltrieroffact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lewis used a deadly weapon to place Jones in fear ofimminent bodily injury or death ifshe did not give him herjewelry. The evidence is legally sufficient to sustain Lewis's conviction. We overrule Lewis's first point of error. 

### In reviewing Lewis's challenge to the factual sufficiency ofevidence, we will set aside 

### the fact finding only ifit is so contrary to the overwhelming evidence as to be clearlywrong

-8-and unjust. Lewis testified that Jones falsely accused him of aggravated robbery in retaliation for his selling her fake crack cocaine. For corroboration of this evidence, he points to Brown's testimony that she observed Lewis and Jones engaged in a drug transaction. Both Lewis and Brown testified he did not have a gun. The testimony of Jones, Campbell, and Law contradicts the testimony of Lewis and Brown. Jones testified she does not use drugs and that she has never bought drugs from Lewis. She testified Lewis placed a gun to her head and forced her to give him five rings. Campbell testified she found Jones as the robbery was ending. Jones appeared terrified. When Campbell yelled at Lewis for robbing her sister, Lewis held a gun in the air. Officer Law testified that he had never seen Jones buying, selling, or using narcotics. Lewis's argument attacks Jones's credibility byplacing at issue her purported use of drugs. Although we are authorized to disagree with the factfinder's finding of a vital fact,
we are notauthorized tojudge the credibility ofwitnesses. Scott, 934 S.W.2d at 399. The trial court, asfactfinder, was free to find Jones's testimony that she did not use drugs more credible than Lewis's testimony thatJones was avindictive "crackhead" who purchased fake crack cocaine from him. We havereviewed all the evidence. Based on its great weight and 

### preponderance, we cannot conclude that the factfinder's determination that Lewis robbed Jones is clearlywrong and unjust. The trial court'sjudgment does not shockthe conscience

or demonstrate bias. 

### We overrule Lewis' second point oferror that the evidence was factually insufficient to support his conviction.INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL In his third point of error, Lewis asserts he received ineffective assistance ofcounsel when his trial attorneyfailed to object to hearsay testimony used by the State to prove he robbed Jones. The State responds the complained-of testimony was properly admissible under either the excited utterance or present sense impression exceptions to the hearsay rule. The State also responds the record as a whole shows Lewis was affordedreasonably
effective assistance of counsel. 1. Standard ofReview Weexamine ineffective assistance ofcounsel bythe standard enunciatedinStrickland 

### v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by the Texas Court ofCriminal Appeals inHernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Toprevail on anineffective 

### assistance ofcounsel claim, appellant must first establish that his counsel's representation 

### fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 

### (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Hernandez, 726 S.W.2d at 55. Appellant must then show a reasonable probability exists that adifferent outcome would have resulted but for his trial 

### counsel's professional errors. Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771; Hernandez, 726 S.W.2d at 55. 

### Appellant must prove ineffective assistance ofcounselby apreponderance ofthe evidence. Moore v. State, 694 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). The record must support a 

### claim ofineffective assistance. SeeJohnson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985).

•10-We do not judge counsel's trial decisionsin hindsight. SeeMiniel v. State, 831 S.W.2d 310, 323 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 885 (1992). We strongly presume counsel's competence. Id.; Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771. Appellant can rebut this presumption by showing his attorney's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that thechallenged actionwas notsound trial strategy. Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771; see Miniel, 831 S.W.2d at 323. We do not inquire into trial strategy unless no possible basis exists in strategy or tactics for trial counsel's actions. Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). An appellant must establish that his trial counsel's acts or omissions
were outside the range ofprofessional competence. Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771; Ross v. State, 802 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no pet.). That another attorney, 

### including appellant's appellate counsel, mighthave pursued adifferent course ofaction does 

### not necessarily indicate ineffective assistance. SeeHawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). The fundamental focus of an effective assistance inquiry must be on the fundamental 

### fairness ofthe proceeding whose result is being challenged. Strickland, 466 S.W.2d 668. Failure ofeither ofthe two prongs ofthe Strickland analysis results in failure ofthe claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. 2. Applicable Law 

### Evidence is hearsayifitis an out-of-court statement offeredto prove the truth ofthe matter asserted. Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 801(d). Hearsay is not admissible unless itmeets an

-11-exception to the hearsay rule. Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 802; see Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 803 & 804. However, most evidentiary and procedural rules are optional with each defendant. Marin
v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). A trial court need only exclude hearsay on a party's request. Id. A party must make a timely and specific objection to hearsay to preserve a complaint for appellatereview. Tex. R. App. P. 52(a); Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227, 237 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1157 (1995); Rezac v. State, 782S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Inadmissible hearsay admitted without objection is not denied probative value merely because it is hearsay. Tex. R. Crim. Evid.
802. Under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, a statement describing orexplaining anevent orcondition made while thedeclarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, is not excluded as hearsay. Tex. R. Crim 

### Evid. 803(1); Rabbani v. State, 847 S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert, denied, 509 U.S. 926 (1993). The contemporaneous nature ofthe statement makes it reliable because there is little time for the declarant to calculate misstatements or suffer memory 

### defects. Chambers v. State, 905 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Tex. App.-FortWorth 1995, no pet.) 

### (citing Rabbani, 847 S.W.2d at 560 and Kubin v. State, 868 S.W.2d 394, 396-97 (Tex. App.-Houston [1stDist.] 1993, pet. ref'd)). When adeclaranthas hadtime to reflectupon theevent and thefacts learned afterthe event, thereliability ofhis statement is diminished. Chambers, 905 S.W.2d at 330.

•12-Failure to object to admissible evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. McFarland v. State, 845S.W.2d824, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 963 (1993). Failure to object to cumulative evidence is harmless and also will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Darby v. State, 922 S.W.2d 614, 624 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd); Marlow v. State, 886 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd). 4. Application ofLaw to Facts At trial, the parties did not dispute that Lewis and Jones encountered one another outside the laundry room of the Crest A Apartments. They disagree, however, about the type of "event" that occurred. The State attempted to prove that Lewis used a gun to deprive Jones of herjewelry. Lewis attempted toestablish that, instead ofarobbery, adrug transaction occurred. His trial attorney advanced the hypothesis that Jones falsely accused 

### Lewis ofaggravated robbery in retaliation for Lewis selling her "bad dope." Although both 

### parties agree, and the record indicates, that Brown and several bystanders observed the encounter between Lewis and Jones, Jones and Lewis were the only two witnesses who testified about what they said to each other. 

### Because their testimonywas contradictory, Jones's credibility was themajor issue for the factfinder to resolve at trial. Evidence that tended to make her story more probable 

### than not would assist the factfinder in weighing the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts.

-13-On appeal, Lewis contends his attorney was negligent in allowing the State to introduce into evidence hearsay testimony that corroborated Jones's version of the event. Specifically, he argues his attorney should have objected the following testimony: Testimony of Angela Jones: State: Was the defendant anywhere in sight when the police showed up? Jones: No. His -- well, some people ran and got his sister after he robbed me. And his sister came out there and talked to me and asked me if I come back the next day she'll try to getmyjewelry back.1 Testimony of Ella Campbell: State: While you were waiting for her to come pick you up, what happened? Campbell: There were two dudes right there in front, kind of fussing aboutsomething. So Iwent backupstairs. So I told this dude to tell me when my sister drive up. So he come and told me my sister drove up. Buthetold me that the dude that pulled the gun on my sister, he was robbing her. State: But at this point, you didn'tknow who this dudewasCampbell: No. I didn'tknow right then until I got there. Testimony of Ella Campbell: State: There were still people standing around there?

Unless otherwise noted, the italicized portions ofthe quoted testimony represent the author's added emphasis.

•14-•,&^:.^?!&/iri^^*&J#^pfa^WCampbell: Yeah. Even though people said that he -- said go call the police. Everybody else started telling me after he disappeared. State: What did they start saying? Campbell: Said that he robbed yoursister and robbing ever body else. I said I know it. I said because he messed with the wrong person when he robbed my sister. He can rob anybody else, but not my sister. State: Were they using the name Jessie Lewis? Campbell: No. They said "Red Devil." Testimony of Charlie Law: State: Did any of these people come up and talk to you about what they saw or what happened? Law: Yeah, two people did. And the rest, they just continued to watch. And I approached them and I asked them what had happened. And they had seen it also. State: They saw the actualrobbery?
Law: Yes. State: Were you able to apprehend the man who did the robbery? Law: No, we didn't. State: Through your investigation, Officer Law, and in that area,were you able to determine who this person was? Law: Yes, I did.

•15-State: And that was a man that you came to know as Jessie Don Lewis? Law: Yes. All four statements are assertions of an out-of court declarant that the "event" occurring between Lewis and Jones was a robbery. The State does not contest that they are hearsay. Lewis argues the harm in not objecting to the statements is demonstrated by the following excerpt from the State's argument: State: You've got Ella Campbell's testimony about the way her sister looked afterward. She knows this man. She knows what he's capable of. You've got the testimony of the complaining witness in this case. But also you have unobjected to testimony from the officer from people who stood there in the crowd who came forward and told the officer they saw the robbery. Defense: Your Honor, I am going to object. / should have objected to hearsay at that time. It's not in the police report. There are not eyewitnesses other than the sister. State: Judge, that officer related to you that testimony. And that is nothearsay. That's deemedfullprobative value. Court: Overruled. Go ahead. State: When those people cameforward, they were as close in time as the complaining witness was. And they corroboroated [sic]thatthe robbery did, infact,godown there at the apartment complex. 

### To prevail on aclaim ofineffective assistance ofcounsel, Lewis must first establish that his counsel's failure to object to the complained-of hearsay statements resulted in 

### representation below an objective standard ofreasonableness. SeeJackson, 877 S.W.2d at

•16-tmrfs^V-^^h^m^M.i^^^i^;^

768. Because Lewis's attorney conceded during argument that he should have objected to at least one of the four objectionable hearsay statements and because the State does not argue on appeal that the attorney's failure to object was reasonable under prevailing professional norms, we willassume, without deciding, that counsel's failure to object resulted in representation below an objective standard ofreasonableness. However, Lewis must still showthat a reasonable probability exists that a different outcome would have resulted if the hearsay statements had been excluded. See id. at 771. Failure to object to admissible evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. McFarland, 845 S.W.2d at 846. The four hearsay statements all assert the same thing: a robberyoccurred. If even one of thesehearsay statements was properly admitted, evidence corroboratingJones's testimony would havebeen before thefactfinder. Therefore, Lewis would not have been prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to the damaging testimony to any substantial degree because the unobjected-to hearsay statements would have been cumulative corroboration. See Darby, 922S.W.2d at 624; Marlow, 886 S.W.2d

at 318.We determine the following testimony of Ella Campbell qualifies as a present sense 

### impression exception to the hearsay rule: "So I told this dude to tell me when my sister drive up. So he come and told me my sister drove up. But he told me that the dude that 

### pulled the gun on my sister, he was robbing her." SeeRabbani, 847 S.W.2d at 560-61. This is acontemporaneous description ofan event made while the declarant was perceiving the 

### event, or immediately thereafter. Indeed, it is a description of a robbery in progress.

-17-V! Jj^si^.t*fw^S^;^'jcj(W9^)i!ja»^ &ji«W;.vj;m.;*: -,«,



## Lewis's counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to hearsay which was properly admissible under the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. 

### BecauseevidencecorroboratingJones'stestimonythatLewisrobbedherwasproperly before the factfinder, Lewis has not shown that a reasonable probability exists that a 

### differentoutcomewouldhaveresultedifhis trial attorneyhad objectedto the complained-of hearsay statements. We overrule his third point oferror. We affirm the trial court'sjudgment.



### I JOHN OVARD v/ JUSTICE Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 90 950951F.U05

-18-, : ,/, • ::•.•:• •• .• • •••"• ••:••••'• • •••< • ••"'••'•



### (Gxmri of Appeals 

## mttl? Etstrtrt of Qkxas ai lallas JUDGMENT 

### JESSIE DON LEWIS, Appellant Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1 ofDallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 

### No. 05-95-00951-CR V. F95-73644-LH). Opinion delivered by Justice Ovard, 

### THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Kinkeade and Chapman participating. 

## Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

### Judgment entered August 21, 1997.

/Idhn ovard 

### / JUSTICE