### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 28, 200 4 STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. TE RRY WAYNE PERKI NS Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Cam pbell Cou nty No. 11652 E. Sh ane Sexton, Jud ge

No. E2003-02885-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Augu st 17, 2004

Th e app e lla nt, Te rry Wayne Pe rkins , wa s indi c te d on ch arg e s of dr ivi ng un de r the inf lue nc e , f ou rth offe nse, oper ating a motor vehic le af ter be ing de clar ed an ha

bitual motor vehicle off

ender , violation of the implied c onsent law, and driving on a re voked license . He wa s acquitted of the D.U.I . char g e. A jury convicted him of violation of the implied conse nt law and driving on a re voked license . He was sente nced to a n 11- month-and- 29-day sentenc e at 75% for the violation of the implied consent law and six mont hs at 75% for the drivi ng on a revoked li cense conviction. The two se ntence s were order ed to run c oncurr ently and the tria l court ordered the appellant to serve 15 day s of the sente nce in the county

jail, after which he w ould be re lease d on probation, and assessed a $100 fine for ea ch conviction. On appea l, the appellant c halleng es the trial c ourt’s dec ision to order him to serve 15 day s in ja il. F or

the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tria l c ou rt

.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court is Aff irm ed
J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., deliv er ed t h e o pinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W EL L ES , and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.
Ste ve Mc Ew e n, Mo un ta in C ity , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e llant T e rry

W. Pe rkins

. Paul G . Summ ers , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; El iza be th T . Ry a n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam Paul Phi llips, Dist rict Attorney Gene ral; and Scarlett W

. Ellis, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llant, State of Tenne ssee.A tra n sc rip t o f t h e trial d o e s n o t ap p e a r in the re c o rd o n a p p e a l. 1
-2- OP IN ION
Fa ctual B ackg round
Acc ording to the aff

idavit of complaint filed by the ar resting office r: 1
On 2-17-03 aff

iant [a police office r with the L aF ollette Police Depa rtment] observed . . . [t he appe llant] trave ling east on East Central Ave nue at 14 Street trave ling 66 th mph in a 40 mph zone. Affiant stopped the ve hicle on F ooth i l l Drive. The above defe ndant was f

ound to be HMVO [ h abitual motor vehicle offe nder] and have revoke d license. The defe ndant also stated that he had drank [sic] 3 or 4 beers and admitted to taking oxy co t t o ns [s ic]. The defe ndant was g iven sobriety tests which he failed. Th e defenda nt was re ad the implied conse nt law which he ref used. The defe ndant wa s ar rested and transporte d to CCS D for booking . The de fendant had two prior DUI

when c hecke d thru NCI C.
The a ppellant was subse quently indicted by the C ampbell C ounty Gra nd J ury on char g es of drivi n g u n d e r

the influenc e, fourth offense , operating a motor vehicle a fter be ing de clar ed an ha bitual motor vehicle of

fende r, violation of the implied consent law , and driving on a revoke d license. The indict ment lis te d th re e prior DU I of fe ns e s in19 93 , 1 99 7, a nd19 99 , a ll o c c ur ri ng in C a mpb e ll County

. After a jury trial, the appe llant was convic ted of violation of the im p l i ed consent law and driving on a re voked license . He wa s acquitted of the D.U.I

. char g e. A separate sentenc ing he aring was he ld on November

7, 2003. At the sentenc ing he aring , the trial court inqui re d ab o ut the appellant’ s habitual motor vehicle of fende r status. Evidently , at the time of the offense, the appellant did not realize that he ha d been de clar ed an ha bitual motor vehicle off

ender . The a

ppellant re lated to the court that he had not bee n employ ed since he had a spina l fu s i o n 16 months prior to the he ari ng . H e re c e ive s a

pp ro xima te ly

$4 05 a mon th i n s oc ia l se c urity

be ne fi ts. Th e app e llant a lso tol d the court that while he has a vehicle, he does not drive it be cause the tag s are expired and the fue l pump is broken.
At the c on c lus ionof

the he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ou rt e xpla ine d th e se nte nc e a s f oll ow s: So, let’s make sure every one understands what I ’ve done. I n count three , 11/29 at 75 perc ent with a hundre d dollar fine plus Court costs, cou n t four, six m onths at 75 pe rc e nt w itha

hu nd re d d oll ar f

ine , c on c ur

re nt wi th c ou nt thr e e , a nd that se nte nc e wi ll be for an ef fec tive one 11/29; 15 day s of that is unsuspended - - will be ser ved; the report date, De cembe r the 7th.-3-

Further, t h e t ri al court ag ree d to allow the appe llant to serve the f irst five day s of the sente nce c on se c uti ve ly , th e n a llo we d th e app e ll ant to serve the re ma ini ng te n d a y s o n w e e ke nd s. Subsequently , the appe llant filed a timely notice of a

ppeal.
Sentencing On appe al, the appe llant arg ues that the trial court erre d by ordering him to s erve 15 day s of his effe ctive 11 month, 29 day sentenc e in the county

jail. Spec ifically , he contends that the sentenc e should be reduc ed to five day s because the trial c ourt did not ma ke spec ific finding s on the rec ord as to the enhance ment and mitigating f actor s in determining the appr opriate c onfinement. F urther, he arg ues that beca

use he is “ disabled due to a severe bac k injury , and due to the non- serious nature of the c onvictions” a sentenc e of 15 day s is “unduly harsh and unjustlydeserved in re lation to the se ri ou sn e ss of the of

fe ns e .” Th e State c ou nte rs that th e mis de me a no r s e nte nc e is “ c on sis te nt w ith statutory sentenc ing pur

poses and should be a ffirme d by this Court.”
“When re viewing sentenc ing issues . . . , the appellate court shall conduc t a de novo review on the re cord of

such issues. Such re view shall be c onducted with a pr esumption that the determinations made by

the court from which the a ppeal is take n are corr ect.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). “H oweve r, the pre sumption of corre ctness which acc ompanies the trial c ourt’s ac tion is conditioned upon the aff i rm at i v e s howing in the rec ord that the trial c ourt consider ed the sentenc ing principles and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ umstances.” State v. Ashby , 823 S .W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . I n conducting our re view, we must consider the de fendant’s potential for reha bilitation, t he trial a nd sentenc ing he aring evidenc e, the pr e-se ntence report, the s entencing principles, sente ncing alternative arg uments, the nature and chara cter of t he offense, the enhanc ing and mitigating f

actor s, and the de fendant’s statements. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-103( 5), -210( b); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. We are to also rec o gn i z e that the defendant bear s “the burde n of demonstrating that the sentenc e is improper.” Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.
Misdemeanor

sentenc ing is c ontrolled by Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec t i on 40-35-302, which provide s in part that the tria l co u rt s hall impose a spec ific sentenc e consistent with the purposes a nd principles of the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 3 0 2 ( b )

. M is d e me a n o r s e n te n c in g is d e s ig n e d to p r o v id e th e tria l c o u r t w ith c o n ti n u ing juris d iction and a g reat deal of f lexi bility . See State v. Troutman, 979 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tenn. 1 9 9 8 ); State v. Ba

ker, 966 S.W.2d 429, 434 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). One convicted of a mis de me a no r, un lik e on e c on vic te d of a fe lon y , is no t e nti tle d to a pr e su mpt ive se nte nc e . Se e State v. Creasy , 885 S.W .2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

. I n mi sd e me a no r s e nte nc ing , a se pa rate se nte nc ing he ari ng is no t ma nd a tory , b ut the c ou rt is require d to provide the de fendant with a re as o n ab le opportunity to be hea

rd as to the leng th and manner of ser vice of

the sentenc e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 302 (a ). The trial c ourt retains the authority to place the defe ndant on probation either i m m ed i at el yor af ter a time of periodic or continuous confinement. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-302(e ). I n determining the pe rce ntag e of the-4-

sentenc e to be se rved in actual conf inement, the court must consider the principles of sentenc ing and the appr opriate e nhance ment and mi tigating factors, and the court must not impose such per centa g es arbitra rily . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-302(d)

. At the conc lusion of the sentenc ing he aring , the trial court did not makeany finding s of fa ct on the re cord. The Tenne ssee Supre me Court has stated that in misdemea nor sentenc ing the trial co u rt d i d n ee d n o tm ak e s p ec i fi c f i n d i n gs o f fa ct o n t h e re co rd , s o l o n g as i tap p ea rs t h e t ri al j u d ge c o n s i d e r e d th e princ ipl e s o f s e nte nc ing in the c od e a ndapp lic able e nh a nc e me nt o r m iti g a tin g fa c tor s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(d) ; Troutman, 979 S.W.2d at 274; S tate v. Russell, 10 S.W .3d 270, 278 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

. I n the ca se her ein, the appe llant was convic ted of a violation of the imp l i ed conse nt law. Under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 55-10-406(a )(3) , if the court or jury finds that the driver vio la te d th e pr ov isi on s o f the statut e wh ile drivi ng on a re vo ke d, c a nc e le d o r s us pe nd e d li c e ns e be c aus e of

a prior DU I , th e n s uc h d ri ve r c omm its a Cla ss Amis de me a no r andsh a ll b e se nte nc e d to a minimum mandatory

jail or workhouse sentenc e of f ive day s. T h e fi v e d ay

sentenc e must be s e r v e d c o n s e c u t i v e l y , d a y f o r d a y , a n d c a n n o tb e s u s p e n d e d

. T e n n . C o d e A n n . 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 6 ( a ) ( 3 )

. In the ca se her ei n , the appe llant’s license ha d been suspe nded bec ause of a prior D UI . Thus, the mandatory

minimum period of inc arc er at i on was five day s. The trial c ourt chose to e x tend that sen t en ce by

ten day s. Even thoug h the trial court failed to state the r easons f or the a dditional ten day s of incar cer ation on the re cord, w e conc lude that the appe llant has failed to de monstrate that the sentenc e wa s improper. Give n that the trial court could have require d the appellant to serve 75% of his entire 11 month, 29 day sentenc e in conf

inement, see Tenn. Code An n . § 40-35-302( b), we cannot c onclude that a n addition al t en d ay s is an “unduly harsh” or “unjustly

deserved” se ntence

. A c c o r d i n g l y, w e c o n c l u d e t h a tt h e tr i a l j u d g e d i d n o te x c e e dt h e “ w i d e l a t i t u d e o f f l e x i b i l i t y” a ff or de d h im i n mi sd e me a no r s e nte nc ing a ndtha t or de ri ng thede fendant to se rv e fi ft e e n d a y s is c on sis te nt w iththe princ ipl e s o f the se nte nc ing a c t. Conclusion
For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE