Number 57, December 1995

**Baltic Security and NATOEnlargement

Hans Binnendijk and Jeffrey Simon****Conclusion**

	Slow improvement between Russia and the Baltic states is evident, but manyremaining problems could turn to flashpoints if Russian ultranationalists come topower.
	Progress has been achieved in promoting Baltic domestic reforms and inintegrating with Western European institutions.
	The Baltic states are concerned that their security can be undercut if the NATOenlargement process appears to stop after an initial enlargement.
	The Baltic states' strategy focuses on the long-term; it is a slow process basedon building concrete security steps and economic integration.

**Three Separate Baltic States**

	The Baltic states are often discussed as a group without regard to their profounddifferences. Estonia and Latvia orient towards the Nordic states and both are primarilyLutheran. Lithuania is more Central European, has a close history with Poland, and isprimarily Catholic. Latvian and Lithuanian are Indo-European languages while Estonianis closer to Finnish. Estonia and Latvia have Russian minorities that make up 30.3percent and 34 percent of their respective 1.5 and 2.65 million populations, whileLithuania's 3.6 million population has a 9.4 percent Russian and 7 percent Polishminority.
	The Baltic states share small size, geography, and five decades as republics ofthe Soviet Union. They all seek integration with the West but fear that Russiannationalism will deny them that right. Despite their differences, they will probably sharea common fate.

**Russian Power and Baltic Security**

	Other than two decades of independence after the First World War, the Balticstates have been controlled by Russia for the past two centuries. They were occupiedby the Soviet Union in 1940 and again in 1944. Local populations were moved toSiberia by the hundreds of thousands as Russians were encouraged to settle in theregion. Borders were adjusted. While the Baltic states chose not to be included inRussia's Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), many Russians regret the loss ofthese three countries and are prepared to intervene militarily should an incident occur.Because it considers the Baltic states to be in its sphere of influence, Moscow usesintimidation against them in ways that it would not with other European states. TheRussian mafia is also prevalent in the Baltic states. It is no surprise, therefore, thatthere is a high degree of anxiety in the Baltic states about their ability to retain theirindependence, sovereignty, and Western orientation.
	The most sensitive issues are citizenship and treatment for Russian minorities.Estonia's minority is concentrated in the East while Latvia's is concentrated in itslargest cities. These two states are concerned that they will lose their sovereignty andcultural identity if they do not maintain strict citizenship laws excluding many ethnicRussians from basic political rights like voting in national elections and running for localoffice. Lithuania, however, has essentially given all of its Russians citizenship, whereasEstonia revised its laws this year to make the process even more difficult for Russiancitizens. Because the five-year residency requirement and exams on the Estonianlanguage, culture, and constitution are similar to the U.S. nationalization procedures,Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers monitoring theprocess now seem less critical. But the majority of the Russian community in Estonia issocially isolated from Estonians and generally speaks little Estonian. The hurdles forthem are high even though many have lived all of their lives in Estonia. Russiansgenerally refer to the policy as "Apartheid."
	Another sensitive issue is the border dispute between Estonia and Russia. Theborder agreed to in the 1920 Treaty of Tartu was moved westward during the SecondWorld War. Although Estonia has tentatively conceded the disputed territory to Russiain recent negotiations, it seeks reference to the Tartu Treaty in the new agreement inan effort to make Russia acknowledge that their annexation was illegal and to justify itscitizenship laws. This Russia so far has refused to do, and the negotiations seemstalled.
	While the Russian troop withdrawals from all three states have been completed,the legal aspects remain an issue in Estonia. Two treaties signed in July 1995implement the withdrawal and provide financially for 10,000 Russian officers whoremained behind. But the Estonian legislature has delayed ratifying them in anapparent effort to gain leverage over the border negotiations.
	Though troops have withdrawn from Latvia, approximately 900 Russians withtheir families remain at the Skrunda radar station, which is leased to Russia untilAugust 31, 1998, with an additional 18 months for dismantling. The March 1995European Stability Pact tasks OSCE to monitor Latvia's agreements with Russia toinclude troop withdrawal and compliance on the treatment of retired Russian militaryofficers in Latvia.
	Militarily, the most important issue for Russia is access to Kaliningrad. Thethree-year access agreement has expired and a one-year extension has been granted.Lithuania appears willing to raise the issue again in connection with its efforts to enterNATO.
	The outstanding issues between Russia and the Baltic states relate to historicalanimosities, border disputes, protection of national minorities, disposition of troops, andmilitary transit rights; in short, the traditional causes of most wars. The Baltic statessometimes take seemingly unreasonable positions to protect their fragile sovereigntywhile the Russians tend to intimidate. While relations have generally improved over thepast few years, potential flashpoints for armed conflict remain and could be ignited if anultra-nationalist comes to power in Russia.             

**Baltic Defense Capabilities**

	Baltic defense capabilities are very limited and remain burdened by the need todesign and build defense forces from scratch. All three have small professional defenseestablishments and rely on territorial defense. Estonia's total defense force comprises3,500 troops (a 2000-man Army and 1,500 Border and Coast Guards) and a 7,500-manEstonian Defense League. While Latvia's total regular forces number 6,400 (Army1,600, Navy 900, Air and Air Defense 200, and Border Guard of 3,700), Latvia's HomeGuard (Zemessardze) is much larger, numbering 16,500. Lithuania follows a similarmodel with total regular forces numbering nearly 7,000 (Army 4,300, Air Force 550,Navy 400, and a Voluntary National Defense Service--VNDS--of 1,500). The VNDSalso has 12,000 volunteers and prepares citizens for self-defense on a massive scale.
	Because the Baltic states' defense capabilities are so limited, traditional self-defense is not achievable. Hence, the general defense strategy might be defined as the"CNN defense," that is, resist for as long as possible on global television and hope toget support from the West. Partnership For Peace (PFP) is an important program inthat it helps the Baltic states to justify their military budgets and to design their forcesand provides psychological assurance of Western support. Because of their strategyand limited defense capability, the Baltics are very sensitive to CFE flank limitationswhich allow more Russian forces in the Northern flank. 

**Regional Security Relationships**

	The Baltic states believe that Russia has not completely accepted theirsovereignty. Since Russia has not apologized for past injustices--as it has to Polandfor Katyn, to Hungary for the 1956 invasion, and Czecho-slovakia for 1968--and stillrefuses to accept the 1920 Tartu Treaty recognizing Baltic independence, Russiabelieves that the use of Soviet power was legal. Though Russia accepts Balticindependence, it remains "provisional." Hence, the Baltic states believe the option of a"Finnish" model is not open to them because Russia has never accepted Balticsovereignty. Their view is that they will ultimately be either in the CIS or NATO. 
	The building blocks for security begin at the regional level. Since Balticdeclarations of cooperation were signed in May 1990, defense and security policycoordination has been developed in the Baltic Council, which created a Baltic Councilof Ministers in June 1994. Nordic ties are increasingly important. Meetings betweenBaltic and Nordic prime ministers and foreign and defense ministers have led tocooperation on airspace control, coastlines and borders, and Baltic sea rescueoperations. The Nordic countries have also aided in developing the Baltic Battalion,which is coordinated by Denmark and trains in Latvia. Lithuania's new practical militarycooperation with Poland includes a combined peacekeeping unit and an airspacemanagement regime. These ties tend to assuage lingering Lithuanian doubts thatKaliningrad could disqualify them for NATO candidacy. In sum, Poland may moreclosely tie the Baltic states generally, and Lithuania specifically, to NATO as theAlliance enlarges.      
	Lithuania and Estonia joined the Council of Europe in May 1993; Latvia joined inFebruary 1995 after fulfilling minority rights requirements. The OSCE has played auseful role in preventive diplomacy in all three states, but its work in Latvia on draftingnew citizenship laws (which were adopted in July 1994), and in Estonia in monitoringcompliance since the Jan-uary and February 1995 laws on citizenship and languagewere adopted, has helped prevent Baltic-Rus-sian conflict.
	 The European Union (EU) is crucial for the Baltic states: it ties themeconomically and politically to Europe, and psychologically it does not differentiate theBaltics from Central Europeans. The Europe Agreements signed in June 1995 give theBaltic states realistic prospects for joining the EU in the future. The Baltic states haveparticipated in the European Stability Pact and the so-called Baltic Regional Table,which has addressed minority and border questions. In June 1994 the Baltics alsoacquired Associate Partner status (with neutral Finland and Sweden, who stronglysupport Baltic sovereignty) in the Western European Union (WEU). As a result, allpartners attend WEU Permanent Council meetings bi-weekly and contribute to theWhite Paper discussion on European defense in the Permanent Council. Most see theWEU Associate Partner program as very important in their further integration intoEuropean structures; some see the WEU as a potential link to enter NATO through acircuitous route.

**The Baltic States and NATO**

	All three Baltic states seek NATO membership. Support for this policy appearswidespread. Baltic leaders, believing that only NATO provides hard security againsttheir large neighbor, do everything in their power to demonstrate their value to theAlliance. That is the main purpose of their participation in the Baltic Battalion and in theBosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) operation. They also express unanimous supportfor Russian participation in IFOR because it undermines extremist arguments aboutNATO in Russia.
	The NATO enlargement process, however, could create serious difficulties forthe Baltic states if mishandled because the process poses a dilemma. Asking the Balticstates to join could provoke Russia to take preemptive military action, as wassuggested in an October 1995 Russian Institute For Defense Studiesstudy--disavowed later by Defense Minister Grachev as not reflecting official Russianpolicy. Leaving them out could also motivate Russia to believe that the West would notrespond to aggression, as it did after the Dean Acheson speech about Korea in 1950.In addition, enlarging NATO only to the Visegrad states could harden Russian positionson the Baltic states.
	Baltic candidacy also presents a serious problem for NATO. Credibleimplementation of NATO's Article 5 for these lightly armed countries would requirenuclear deterrence and significant forward deployment of troops, a highly dangerousand expensive option in former Soviet republics. A hollow commitment, on the otherhand, could undermine the credibility of all of NATO's Article 5 commitments.
	Baltic leaders are realistic about these difficulties and recognize that NATOmembership may be a long wait. But for them it is vital that the process remain trulyopen. Lithuanian Defense Minister Linkevicius summarized their strategy as "derivingdeterrence from the process [and] going silently into NATO one project at a time."

**Advancing From Soft to Hard Security**

	U.S. strategy needs to take a series of practical steps to advance the softsecurity that has been developing in the Baltic states to harder security.  Deterrencepolicy for the West need not include military response (at least for now). Consistentwith U.S. non-recognition policy during the Cold War, we must make it clear to Russiathat if it undermines Baltic stability and security, it would be costly in economic andpolitical terms and could restart the Cold War. Correspondingly, we need to make itclear to the Baltic states that we support their long-term goal of integrating into Europe.In this vein, Secretary of Defense Perry's November 1995 visit provided an enormouspsychological boost to the Baltic states. 
	In NATO, PFP and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) are importantin creating a framework to address hard security issues. All three Baltic states areactive in PFP, which constitutes the basic framework for practical military cooperation:for participating in military exercises, preparing for peacekeeping and humanitarianassistance activities, developing defense force structures, and acquiringinteroperability and standardization. The NACC, which is larger and not as developedas the WEU Permanent Council, could be seen as an instrument to strengthen theBaltic states political interface with NATO. All partners enjoy Article 4 rights so that if athreat to their territorial integrity arises, they can turn to the Alliance to seek a peacefulresolution to the problem. The PFP process itself provides the Baltic states with anelement of deterrence, although NATO can find ways to deepen the PFP through more16 + 1 activities. These should not be just military activities, but expanded politicalactivities, to include stronger parliamentary ties. 
	The Baltic states would like to link NATO enlargement to the European Union'senlargement process. The Baltic states are doing their best to understand and meet EUand NATO standards and to demonstrate their contribution to the West by participatingin peacekeeping. For NATO enlargement, Lithuania would welcome an EU-like"invitation to negotiate" process, possibly linked to a post-IGC decision. An Estonianview of this "soft" security evolution is the desire to see "the EU flag rise over Tallinn asthe NATO flag rises over Warsaw." If the NATO "integration process" stops, it wouldcreate the appearance of the West turning its back on the Baltic states and democracycould be threatened there. 
**Recommendations**

	As the first phase of NATO enlargement takes place, NATO needs to be carefulnot to close the process that provides security for the Baltic states. 

	The United States should encourage efforts by the EU and WEU to acceleratetheir enlargement to the Baltic States and should encourage U.S. trade andinvestments as a means of security.

	Russia should be made aware that it cannot intimidate the Baltic states at willwithout paying a price, and that a Russian invasion of the Baltic states couldreignite the Cold War.

	The Baltic states need to know that flexibility on citizenship and border issueswould provide them with greater, not less, security.

	Because of scarce resources, PFP funds should be used to assist the Balticstates in maintaining more staff at the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) atSHAPE and at NATO Headquarters. 

	A broadened and deepened PFP political  program should be achieved. 

	The United States should update and expand      the mandate for U.S. mobileliaison training teams. 

This paper is the result of a trip made by the authors to Estonia and Lithuiana at theend of November 1995. For more information contact Dr. Hans Binnendijk at (202) 287-9211, or Internet: [email protected]; or Dr. Jeffrey Simon at (202) 287-9219 ext.524, or Internet: [email protected].  Both can be faxed at (202) 287-9475. Opinions,conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely thoseof the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for NationalStrategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or anyother government agency.

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