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Number 134, February 1998

The U.S. Role in Global Security

The Mayo Clinic, not the Emergency Room

by John Hillen
Conclusions

While many different proposals have been put forward outlining apost-Cold War security identity for the United States, most do not characterize anAmerican role in terms of either excessive activism or dangerous isolationism. However,some basic concepts are fundamental to outlining a practical middle path between those twopoles:
- Although many factors will influence America's decisions about when,    where, why, and how to use military force, national interests should have greater    significance than either altruistic motives or crusading impulses.  
- Absent a threat to national interests, strategic policy will be    constrained by a persistent desire among Americans to remain the premier global power    while also demonstrating a growing reluctance to bear the costs of being a global    gendarmerie. 
- The United States must take advantage of its leadership position    through various alliances, coalitions, and international organizations. The interests of    allies, the roles they wish to play, and their military capabilities, as well as a mature    understanding of the capabilities and roles of international organizations and other    transnational forces, should be important considerations in the formulation of U.S.    strategy. 
- There is only one hard and fast geostrategic rule that stands the    test of time: political actors will almost always assume roles and responsibilities that    reflect their interests and capabilities. States or international organizations which live    beyond their means or act in a way that outstrips their interests cannot sustain military    commitments. 
- Because the United States cannot lead in every facet of global    security, a new role must be fashioned. The "Mayo Clinic" role envisages America    atop a hierarchy in which the members of a cooperative system assume complementary roles    that match their roles to interests and capabilities. This system, representing good    management principles as well as sound leadership, frees the Nation to concentrate on the    more consequential military tasks of global security in which only it can lead, and yet    offers unique and decisive U.S. support for the lesser tasks of regional and local    security.  

There is an old Taoist proverb which claims that to accomplish a seriesof daunting tasks, you must know who you are, what resources you have at your disposal,and the order in which you should take on the tasks. In a global security arena —thatcalls on the United States to deter rogue states in the Persian Gulf and East Asia,balance the growing power of China, hedge against events going sour in Russia, lead andconduct all manner of humanitarian interventions in failed or failing states, lay down asecurity shield over key global systems, protect the homeland against attack, and preparefor future challenges —this proverb remains sage advice. 
**Who You Are**
America's search for a post-Cold War security identity has produced awide-ranging and fascinating debate that often resembles swinging for a pi�ata. Not onlyis every contestant equally disadvantaged in knowing where the pi�ata is or what it lookslike, but everyone is armed with the same stick with which to swing away. Given the widerange of "answers" provided, no one observer or school of thought can be said tohave a great advantage over the others in searching for this elusive target. Thus far thecontest has seen clashing civilizations, reluctant sheriffs, tempted superpowers, cominganarchies, agile strategies, benevolent hegemonies, unipolar movements, multipolarmovements, pasts as prologues, America coming home, history ending, imperatives ofleadership, and every variant of neo(add movement here)ism imaginable. The debate hasshifted the template of political camps as they relate to foreign affairs, and, against abackground of relative disinterest on the part of the body politic, provided a rich veinof ideas, plans, and visions.

Nonetheless, the practical necessities of governing narrow the choicesconsiderably and the public policy world is left to deal with fairly pragmaticalternatives that represent a middle road somewhere between the poles of isolationism andexcessive activism. In his masterpiece *Diplomacy*, Henry Kissinger proposed that theanswer to *Who You Are* can be found in a history of the always present tensionbetween America's altruistic values and calculated national interests. A modern-daystrategist, however, should not necessarily be concerned with answering *Who You Are*through a weighty historical analysis or psychological self-examination of the Americannation (although Walter McDougall's *Promised Land, Crusader State* is highlyrecommended). The day-to-day bottom line of *Who You Are* is manifested not only inthe interplay between America's crusading impulses and its need to protect nationalinterests, but in what Robert Tucker referred to as "the great issue of Americanforeign policy today. It is the contradiction between the persisting desire to remain thepremier global power and an ever deepening aversion to bear the costs of thisposition." Seen in a less pejorative light, this "contradiction" is in facta very reasonable desire on the part of the American people to have a post-Cold Warsecurity policy that preserves American involvement in global activities that benefit theUnited States but does not squander U.S. resources on an unfocused and wasteful campaignof global gendarmerie. I'd offer that the criteria for determining this equation are mostreadily found in *Which to Do* (below). 
*Who You Are also depends in large measure on who you think everyoneelse is. Identifying the roles, interests, capabilities, and sundry imperatives drivingother actors in the global arena will greatly influence the identification of an Americanrole in the world. The American role is guided by some immutable values and interests, butis not constant in and of itself. It will shift and change based upon the roles andactions of allies, potential and real adversaries, international organizations, othernongovernmental groups, and certain transnational forces. America's perception, both realand received, of the role that should be played by the likes of the UN, the Organizationon Security and Cooperation in Europe, Japan, South Africa, the Khmer Rouge, largemultinational corporations, and all other global players will shape its view of its ownrole considerably.

In all those calculations, there really is only one constant principleon which the United States can start to define its role in the global security arena: **politicalactors will most often assume roles and responsibilities that match their interests andcapabilities**. This constant may occasionally be violated, but has a way of enforcingits own equilibrium. After all, a political entity can act (usually detrimentally) in away that outstrips its interests or its capabilities for only so long. For instance, thismay be a situation at which the United States will soon arrive in Bosnia. Current U.S.policy maintains that the United States must continue to do the heavy lifting in Bosnia aslong as there is an international military force there. The rationale for staying remainsthe same as it was for going in the first place: the possibility of a brutal war in"the heart of Europe"—an area of vital interest to the United States.Nonetheless, apparently the brutality of a renewed war is not quite so imminent, and theBalkans not quite so in the heart of Europe, that the European powers are willing to stayengaged if the United States leaves or shifts to the role of junior partner. Thisincongruity of roles, responsibilities, interests, and capabilities in Bosnia is becomingmore apparent as time goes on. Thus, the question Congress recently asked the Presidentreally is: "At some point in this Bosnia intervention shouldn't we see that theultimate resolution is at least a little more important to the Bosnians and then to theEuropean powers than to the United States?" It is a fair question.

The role that the United States should play in the complex andunpredictable global environment of the post-Cold War world must be one that avoids bothdamaging isolationism and wasteful activism. To chart this middle course that carves out aunique role for the United States and, at the same time, leaves some important securityconcerns to the leadership of others, the United States must recognize that, despite"the imperative of American leadership," the United States cannot leadeverywhere. Therefore the United States must recognize that there is a hierarchy oforganizations involved in global security and that this "system" runs on oneprinciple imperative: that every actor's "jurisdiction"—its roles andresponsibilities—will generally match its interests and capabilities. In securityaffairs the United States sits atop the system. It is after all, the power with the mostfar-reaching national interests and the most potent military capabilities. Allies andinternational organizations in which the United States is involved make up the rest of thehierarchy—a cooperative system of countries and organizations who play importantsupporting roles. 

The role that the United States should assume in global security can becompared to that of the Mayo Clinic in health affairs, the FBI in law enforcement, or theSupreme Court in the judicial system. In each of these systems, these organizations assumeleadership in a hierarchy of involvement that includes organizations on more local levels.These systems conduce to order because there are clearly defined demarcations ofresponsibilities that are natural to the interests and capabilities of each level. Eachsystem has a built-in "triage" capability that allows the various organizationsin the system to discriminate between which illness should be cured where (or when), whichcrime should be investigated by whom, and which case should be tried in which court. Likethe Mayo Clinic in an unhealthy world, rather than make military house calls for everycase of insurgent heartburn or colic, the United States should support the local"doctors" who fill that function as the need arises. Moreover, the UnitedStates, as the only organization in the system capable of doing so, should be committedprincipally to leading interventions where the "illnesses" are trulyconsequential and when the unique and decisive capabilities of the American military arecritical. 

This global security system is somewhat self-enforcing, but can beupset when powers in the system act in ways that do not match their interests andcapabilities—when organizations live outside their means. A good example is theexperience of the United Nations between 1992 and 1995. Then the great powers (led by theUnited States) and an ambitious UN Secretary-General elevated the UN to a strategic rolethat put more weight on the organization then it could bear. Burdened by attempting tomanage tens of thousands of combat troops in several complex, expensive, and dangerousmilitary operations, the UN failed and was greatly discredited. The entire episodeprevented real progress on collective security and placed the UN back on the whipping postof American public opinion.

The United States, as the premier military power in the world, can helpto keep the global security system on track by clearly laying out its own military role aswell as leading powerfully and managing creatively in its alliances and in theinternational organizations to which it belongs. As is examined below, the United Statespainting itself into a corner in Bosnia and then being held hostage by its allies and thelocal factions does not satisfy the prerequisites of good leadership or effectivemanagement. The United States cannot and should not do everything. For the most part, itshould attend to larger security problems worldwide while it supports its allies andlike-minded countries who have responded first to global security needs in their ownregions. In a hierarchical and cooperative system, the role the United States plays isunique. While many countries can exercise power in local military affairs, only the UnitedStates can deter and defeat major power aggression in any region of the globe. Maintainingits primacy in this area will require a fair and honest estimation of *What You've Got*and *Which to Do*. 
**What You've Got**
Unlike the answer to *Who You Are*, the answer to *What You'veGot* is a relatively fixed target at any one time. The tools of U.S.power—economic, diplomatic/political, cultural, and military—can be measured forthe most part. While this paper deals almost exclusively with U.S. military power, severalpoints on the other manifestations of power are worth noting. First, while the UnitedStates is the unchallenged economic juggernaut of the world for now, its economic power isin relative decline. The U.S. share of world GDP has fallen from almost 50% to just over20% in the past 50 years. U.S. political and diplomatic muscle has seen a similar relativedecline since the end of the Cold War. As Kissinger noted, "America is morepreponderant than it was 10 years ago, yet, ironically, power has also become morediffuse. Thus America's ability to shape the rest of the world has actuallydecreased." The other point worth noting is that most economic and almost allcultural power is nongovernmental and (thankfully!) not controlled by government agenciesbut by hundreds of thousands of private enterprises. 

However, the federal government still has a mono-poly on strategy, bothin setting the goals and determining the means. In terms of military power, thecombination of bureaucratic momentum accumulated during the last 50 years and the searchfor the "peace dividend" has ensured that in the post-Cold War era the UnitedStates will basically have what it did during the Cold War era—only less. Detailsover force structure and budgets need not be re-hashed here. Suffice it to say that *WhatYou've Got* is currently inadequate for: 1) what the U.S. national security strategystates it is able to do today; and 2) the need to prepare for the future. The QuadrennialDefense Review did not change the fundamental problem of the Bottom-Up Review which, asAndy Krepinevich wrote, is a plan "that offers insurance we probably do not need, ata cost the Clinton defense budget cannot afford. Equally disturbing, it may not insure usagainst the security challenges that we are most likely to face beyond the five-yearcoverage period." 

Moreover, the current disconnect between ends and means in U.S.strategy is placing an undue strain on the U.S. armed forces, and, when combined with theneed to modernize, has produced the "train wreck" scenario of which so many inthe defense community speak. A force some 40% smaller than that in 1990 is expected todeter (and win if need be) two nearly-simultaneous major theater wars as well as undertakeall manner of peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and other crisis management operations.So far as I can see, it is not working and the U.S. remains quite fortunate that nocollision of events has called this bluff. Current U.S. strategy violates two of WalterLipp-mann's famous axioms. The first is that America should keep its "means equal toher purposes and her purposes equal to her means." The second axiom reflectedprudence beyond that equilibrium: that the United States should have a surplus of means asa hedge against the unexpected. In order to reach either of those stages, the UnitedStates must work to bring its means (*What You've Got*) and ends (*Which to Do*)back into balance. 

In this day and age, with budget considerations superseding any sort ofstrategic requirements, *What You've Got* remains at best a fixed constraint. Thevariables that can most readily be shifted therefore, in order to demarcate an Americanrole in global security, are those concerned with *Which to Do*. It is here that astrategist can truly operate, and it is here a strategist must appreciate that (giventhose fixed or declining resources) the essence of American statecraft in the post-ColdWar world is discrimination about where, when, why, and how to use American power. This isespecially so with military power.
**Which To Do**
The denouement of Kissinger's *Diplomacy* neatly sums up the keychallenge to U.S. policymakers in formulating a constructive and sustainable role for theUnited States in the global security arena. "Not every evil can be combated byAmerica, even less by America alone. But some monsters need to be, if not slain, at leastresisted. What is most needed are criteria for selectivity." In lieu of providingcriteria, an exercise that has been done by many elsewhere, this paper offers some guidingprinciples for ensuring there is some selectivity in the use of U.S. military power thatultimately will lead to the Mayo Clinic role.
**Separate the Wheat from the Chaff. The United States shouldprioritize its national security interests and give clear focus to vital and moreimportant national security interests rather than expending its power in may-workinterventions on the world's fringes.
**Keep Your Eye on the Ball. The absence of clear and present dangersand the CNN-effect [the influence of news media coverage on foreign policy] will causeU.S. strategists to become myopic and focus on the most likely, but least consequentialsecurity challenges. The focus should be the opposite.
**Recognize Who is On the Team and Get the Most Out of Your Players. TheUnited States leads many allies who have different interests and different capabilities.At the same time, it has unique responsibilities and capabilities unmatched by otherlike-minded states. Sound management principles would recognize that the leader should notdo everything or lead everywhere, but should support the lead efforts of others wheretheir interest is greater and their capabilities more suited.
**Know Where You're Going and Finish the Job. A U.S. military forceinvolved in any operation should be pursuing clearly defined, achievable, and sustainablegoals. The force should have the operational freedom to be the prime determinant of itsown success and should not be hostage to its environment.
**Bring the Nation Along. U.S. forces should never be deployed intodangerous operations in the absence of public and congressional support. Such supportgives the deployed forces staying power in the event of difficulties. The U.S. public isnot casualty averse in missions that are important. If the reasoning is sound, the publicand Congress will support the mission.

Dr. John Hillen, the Olin Fellow for National Security Studies at The Council onForeign Relations, presented a longer version of this paper at an NDU symposium onStrategy and the Formulation of National Security Policy, Oct. 7 - 8, 1996. For thecomplete paper, contact the author at [email protected]. 

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members and guests of the Institutefor National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University faculty. These includereports of original research, synopses of seminars and conferences,the results ofunclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguished speakers.

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