### Peace Operations Involving Regional Organizations

Author:  Edward Marks, Visiting Senior
Fellow

Note: Opinions, conclusions, and 
recommendations expressed or implied in
this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
the Department of Defense or any other government agency.

Conclusions

Regional Organizations

The end of the Cold War has diminished the seriousness
of external threats to the United States but increased their
number. Touted as a candidate for sheriff in a world without
law, the United States accepts that it has obligations but is
wary about taking on unlimited responsibility.



- Yet problems continue to erupt in a very fluid
environment.
- Multilateral crisis management under some sort of
international mandate is one attractive possibility.
- Operating under the mandate of an international
organization, however, requires advance planning and
engagement.
- Despite ongoing improvements the UN remains an
imperfect instrument.
- Regional organizations are even less capable.
      This situation has fostered renewed interest in
regionalism. Regional organizations have both advantages
and disadvantages for this role.
- The sense of "ownership" which member states feel in
regional organizations encourages a greater sense of
legitimacy in its deliberations and decisions. The more
modest scope of these deliberations and decisions tends to
allay concerns. Being more homogenous they can sometimes
more easily pro-duce consensus; have greater acceptability
by the disputants; and presumably have greater insight to
local problems and the root causes of conflict.
- However, many express concerns about their
impartiality. Apart from NATO and the EU, few regional
organizations have significant resources or effective
bureaucracies. In addition to the usual conflict of interests
among members, most regional organizations have difficulty
integrating the regional "Great Power" into their decision
making and operations. Many countries worry about the
tendency of larger powers to use regional organizations as
cover for unilateral interventions.
- This particular problem has bedeviled the OAU  since
its founding, beginning with the ambitions of Nkhruma's
Ghana and continuing with Nigerian attempts to use its mass
and riches to assume a leadership role. The future role of
South Africa is yet to be determined. On the other hand, the
ECOWAS operation in Liberia was possible only because of
Nigeria although many believe the failure to date of
ECOMOG stems from the too prominent and possibly too
partisan role of Nigeria. Elsewhere, Western reluctance to
adopt the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a
peacekeeping instrumentality certainly is based upon
skepticism about the dominant role of Russia. Partnership and CooperationConventional wisdom argues that regional organizations
are better suited to play an active role at the low end of the
peace operations scale: preventive diplomacy, mediation,
monitoring and observing, and traditional peacekeeping.
Here they offer the prospect of early preventive effort of
resolving conflicts before they escalate. The balance of
strengths and weaknesses might indicate a more consistently
useful role in crises dominated by humanitarian concerns.
Also promising is the potential of regional organizations as
legitimizing authorities for specific peace operations,
wrestling with the problem of failed states, and a culture of
cooperation for peace operations in general.These advantages, however, loom larger in theory than
in practice and most regional organizations, as presently
constituted, have difficulty in mounting effective operations
without the assistance of outside agencies, such as interested
extra-regional governments or organizations. The UN, for
all its shortcomings, has capabilities lacking in most
regional organizations and can help produce a global
perspective.A fruitful relationship already exists between the UN
and many regional organizations: 16 of them already are or
have shown interest in cooperation with the UN in peace
operations. However such cooperative arrangements are not
without implementation problems: witness the serious
command and control problems bedeviling the UN-NATO
relationship in the former Yugoslavia.Nevertheless regional organizations offer further
possibilities of enhancing the international community's
ability to deal with at least Chapter VI operations  if viewed
as  "first reaction" institutions, equipped with modestly
enhanced peacekeeping mechanisms, considered as the
potential local partners of the United Nations, and backed
by the more extensive capabilities of the UN.The Secretary-General Tries AgainUN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali is
wrestling with the problem of managing the UN's
responsibility for a growing number of threats to
international peace and security with inadequate resources
and, often, unclear mandates. In his "Agenda for Peace" he
expressed interest in the relationship between the UN and
regional organizations in the collective management of
threats to peace and security. On August 1-2, 1994 Boutros-
Ghali invited the heads of eleven major organizations to
New York to discuss this matter. On January 3, 1995 he
issued a report entitled "Supplement to the Agenda For
Peace" which calls for greater burden sharing in peace
operations between the UN and regional organizations.
Numerous General Assembly resolutions call for expanded
cooperation between the UN and regional organizations
(although they remain, as usual, somewhat vague on the
modalities and financial implications).The "Supplement" makes a clear distinction between
Chapter VI and Chapter VII activities. In essence, Boutros-
Ghali now explicitly accepts the proposition that the
Secretary-General should restrict himself to managing
Chapter VI peace-keeping while Chapter VII peace
enforcement activities should be run directly out of the
Security Council, presumably by "contracting out" more
ambitious operations to multinational forces led by major
powers with special interest in the dispute in question like
the US in Haiti or Russia in the Caucasus. Accepting the
UN's limited capability, the Secretary-General's renewed
interest in cooperation between the UN and regional
organizations may be seen as a search for partners, however
limited they themselves might also be.As the Secretary-General has repeatedly and publicly
expressed his unhappiness with the growing disparity
between the Security Council peacekeeping mandates and
the resources given to him to implement them (the
Supplement includes another plea for prompt payment of
UN assessments), UN Member States may assume that he
will continue to press these and other proposals (especially
if elected to a second term as Secretary-General).EurasiaEurope has, if anything, an over-abundance of regional
security organizations, with somewhat unclear conflict
resolution mandates.The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (ONCE) is the most inclusive regional organization.
In 1992 the ONCE adopted a peace-keeping role in the
context of conflict prevention, and made reference to
drawing on the resources of NATO, the European Union
(EU), the Western European Union (WEU), and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  The ONCE
has begun to evolve from a purely conference relationship
into a security organization by creating some operational
capability, (e.g., observer missions in Moldova, Kosovo,
and Nagorno-Karabakh).NATO is a regional bloc created for collective defense
which is now authorized to support UN and ONCE peace
operations out of the NATO area.  It was recently engaged
in Bosnia, Iraq and elsewhere and is feeling the pressure of
the tempo of these peace operations.  The confused
command and control situation in Bosnia has reflected
poorly on both the UN and NATO. There is consensus in
NATO that in future peace operations it must be in sole
command if it is to participate as an organization.NATO is considering the establishment of a Combined
Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept which would allow some
of NATO's European forces to be transferred to the WEU
for peacekeeping purposes.  The CJTF would empower the
WEU and the EU to become significant peacekeeping
contributors.  In the future, the EU may seek more
independent means of  participating in multilateral peace
operations.The Partnership for Peace program also provides a new
regional peacekeeping potential, with twenty-five partners
joining NATO's sixteen members. The Partners are
conducting joint exercises and could become a peacekeeping
force for Central and Eastern Europe.Russian desires to play a significant role in conflict
resolution in its area, if only through involvement of the
CIS in Georgia, Tajikistan and prospectively in Nagorno-
Karabakh, are not surprising.  Moscow appears interested
in obtaining a "hunting license" from the UN or the ONCE
while the West wants tighter control over both objectives
and methods if it is to authorize peace operations by the CIS
or any of its members (most notably Russia).Given these differences in perspectives and capabilities,
not to mention national interests, Western, Central, and
Russian roles and objectives will have to be melded and
integrated in some fashion if multilateral peacekeeping is to
become a useful instrument in Central and Eastern Europe.Latin AmericaThe Organization of American States (OAS), the oldest
regional security organization, has long been active in
conflict resolution, largely in prevention and mediation such
as in Nicaragua and El Salvador where it cooperated with
the UN and the United States. Its historic role in its own
hemisphere was the cause of the San Francisco debate over
the relative authority of the new global organization (the
UN) and regional bodies which produced the Chapter VIII
compromise. By assuming the responsibility for defending
democratic governments (by resolution in the 21st General
Assembly and amendment of Article 9 in the 16th Special
Session, 1992), the OAS has complicated its traditional
commitment to non-interventionism and modified its original
Rio Treaty mandate as a collective security organization
created to deal with extra-hemispheric threats. Tension
between the United States and the other members of the
OAS has been a dominant theme of OAS politics, arising
from a perception that the United States has attempted to use
the organization as a Cold War instrument (Dominican
Republic, Cuba, Grenada) or a cover for unilateral action
(Panama, Haiti).A larger role for the OAS in peace operations is
dependant on finding a mutually accommodating
understanding between the United States and its hemispheric
neighbors. The post-Cold War era offers an opportunity to
reach such an understanding, especially in light of the
spread of democratic government, regional economic
integration, and strong OAS support for democracy.AfricaThe Organization of African Unity (OAU) also has a
coherent regional identity but faces an expanding agenda of
crises with a weak organizational structure and limited
resources. It has not been very successful in crisis
management on its own, in Chad, Rwanda, or now Burundi,
and flatly refused to become involved in Liberia (leaving it
to a Nigeria-led ECOWAS), Somalia, Angola, or
 Mozambique (leaving them to the UN). Individual countries,
however, often participate in UN operations.For historical reasons the OAU insists on the
intertwined principles of the sanctity of established national
borders and non-interventionism. However the increasing
difficulty of many African governments in providing even
minimal government is producing a wave of political and
humanitarian crises forcing African governments to
reconsider these hitherto sacred principles. Effective OAU
crisis management will require more robust and competent
institutions. There have been some interesting initiatives in
this area by various African sub-regional organizations such
as ECOWAS and ISAD.The United States is attempting to invigorate the OAU
by providing funds ($3.5 million to date, and $4.5 million
authorized), advice, and technical assistance, hoping to
increase the OAU's activism and competence in regional
conflict resolution. To the extent the program is successful,
the need for outside powers to engage themselves in African
politics and developments will be reduced.Asia-PacificThere is no region wide political or security
organization. The problem of regional powers is particularly
serious in Asia where most governments work at using one
of the potential hegemons (the United States) as a bulwark
against the other two (China and Japan). Asian efforts are
limited to sub- regional bodies and the potential role for
regional organizations in peacekeeping is more likely to lie
with them or ad hoc coalitions. The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), despite its economic
orientation, has dipped its toe into peace operations by
offering its good offices to the Cambodian combatants with
evident implicit Chinese approval. ASEAN recently floated
ideas for confidence building and nuclear free zones, and
is  sponsoring the ASEAN Regional Forum but these
initiatives remain in an embryonic stage.The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) sponsored consultations on terrorism but the fear
of India's hegemonic ambitions has precluded broader
discussion. The recently created South Pacific Regional
Peacekeeping Force in Bougainville is composed only of
South Pacific island states (Australia, Fiji, etc).Middle EastThe Middle East is the least promising area for peace
operations by regional organizations. The Arab-Israeli
conflict effectively precludes the creation of a regional
organization. While both the Arab League and the Islamic
Conference could claim an "Islamic" regional jurisdiction,
neither have mechanisms or mandates to deal with inter-
Arab or Islamic conflicts. The silence of both of these
organizations in the Iran-Iraq war and when Iraq invaded
Kuwait was deafening. It is unlikely that any of the existing
Middle East regional bodies will take up a conflict
resolution role, although the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) shows some organizational promise.RecommendationsIn the words of a senior Administration official,  the
policy now is to "ratchet down expectations especially with
regard to peace enforcement, while ratcheting up
capabilities, especially at the low end of the scale...."
Achieving this objective will require greater consensus
among UN members and regional organizations as to the
criteria and processes by which peacekeeping responsibilities
will be shared. Obtaining greater consensus in this area will
require U.S. leadership, along the following lines:Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to encourage general acceptance of
regional organizations as the initial instrument of choice for "low end" peace
operations (preventive diplomacy, mediation, observer missions);A U.S. offer of technical and financial assistance to regional organizations for
creation or improvement of conflict resolution mechanisms (replicating the OAU
program);A United States reimbursable revolving fund (say $10 million) which the OAS
(our regional organization) could draw on to meet emergency conflict resolution
needs.In addition, the U.S. could lobby (bilaterally and
multilaterally) for a more formal UN relationship with
regional organizations involving the creation of a number of
UN mechanisms to provide formal UN cooperation with
regional organizations:a formal role for competent regional organizations
in Security Council deliberations under Chapters VI and
VII;a high-level focal point and a consultative
mechanism in the UN Secretariat responsible for regular
contact and planning;a UN revolving fund to finance regional
organizations' activities;stand-by arrangements for equipment and personnel;a UN technical assistance program (joint training,
SOPs, secondment of personnel, etc);coordination of national peacekeeping training
centers (Canada, Australia, Nordics) with UN programs.
     If the United States wishes to avoid the responsibility
for being the world's policeman but also wishes to see better
management of international security issues, a modest
investment along these lines in regional organizations can be
seen as a prudent investment.
- Bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to encourage general acceptance of
regional organizations as the initial instrument of choice for "low end" peace
operations (preventive diplomacy, mediation, observer missions);
- A U.S. offer of technical and financial assistance to regional organizations for
creation or improvement of conflict resolution mechanisms (replicating the OAU
program);
- A United States reimbursable revolving fund (say $10 million) which the OAS
(our regional organization) could draw on to meet emergency conflict resolution
needs.
- a formal role for competent regional organizations
in Security Council deliberations under Chapters VI and
VII;
- a high-level focal point and a consultative
mechanism in the UN Secretariat responsible for regular
contact and planning;
- a UN revolving fund to finance regional
organizations' activities;
- stand-by arrangements for equipment and personnel;
- a UN technical assistance program (joint training,
SOPs, secondment of personnel, etc);
- coordination of national peacekeeping training
centers (Canada, Australia, Nordics) with UN programs.