### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 22, 200 8 S es sio n In the Ma tter of: K.H., S.F., A.F. , & W.F. , TAR RA HOWELL AND 

### DENNIS L EE MO ODY

v. TANYA DEE BALL ARD AND 

### JO HNNY FREEMAN Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Madison County No. 45-39,883 Christy R. Little, Judge

No. W2008-01144-COA- R3-PT - Filed May 15, 2009

Th is c a se inv olv e s th e te rm inatio n of pa re nta l ri gh ts. Th e mothe r h a s a his tory o f c ri min a l a c tiv ity and past incar cer ations, including one for fac ilitation of murder, and is c urre ntl y i n carce rate d. Betwee n incar cer ations, the mother lived with her boyfriend, the fathe r of the two youngest of the mother’s five children. Themother’s boyfriend is incarc erated for raping a nd sexually abusing the mother’s two oldest daughte rs. With both the m other and her boyfriend inca rce rate d, the mother’s sister obtained cu s t o d y of the c hildren and f iled this petiti on to terminate the mother ’s par ental rights. The trial court terminated the mother ’s par ental righ ts, finding severa l grounds for termination and that termination was in the best intere st of the children. The mother appe als, arguing that th e te rm inatio n o rd e r d id n ot s a tis fy thestatut ory r e qu ir e me nts , th a t t he tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in finding that grounds for termination exist, and that termination of the mother’s pa renta l rights is not in the be st i nte re st o f the c hil dr e n. W e fi ndthat th e trial cou rt ’s or de r, wh ile le ss tha n o pti ma l, satisfies the re quirements of the statute as to one ground for termination. As to that ground, cle ar and convincing evidenc e supports the trial court’s finding, as well as the finding that termination of the mother’s pa

renta l rights is i n the childre n’s best intere st. There fore , we a ffirm.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f R igh t ; J udgm e nt of th e Juv e nileCo ur t A ff

ir me d
H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , joined.
Lanis L. Ka

rnes, Ja ckson, Tenne ssee, f or the Responde nt/Appellant Tanya Dee Ballard

. Betty St aff

ord Scott and Mary Jo Middlebrooks, Jackson, Te nnessee , for the Petitioner/Appe llee Ta rr a Ho we ll.The pe t i t i on a l s o s ought t o t er m i nat e t he par ent al r i ght s of J ohnny Fr ee m an, w ho i s t he bi ol ogi ca l f at her of 1 A .F . an d W .F . an d is l isted a s th e fa th e r o n th e b irth c e rtific a te o f S .F . F re e m a n d id n o t c o n te st th e te rm in a tio n o f h is p a re n ta l rig h ts, an d ra ise s n o issu e o n a p p e a l.

K

. H

. and S. F. ar e not at i s s ue i n t hi s appeal

. K

. H

. has r eac h ed m ajo rit y sin ce t he t r i al court t er m i nat ed 2 M o t h er’s p a re n tal ri g h t s t o he r. A s t o S.F. , t h e t erm i n at i o n pro ceed i n g s h av e b een he l d i n ab ey an ce an d M o t h er’s pare nt al r i gh t s t o her w er e n ot t er m i nat ed; S

. F. w as i n s t at e cust od y, l i vi ng i n a t hera peut i c fos t er h om e w hen t he t r i al
co u rt en t ered i t s fi n al ord er. M o t h er has an o t h er dau g h t er T

. H

. (b o rn 8 / 4 / 9 2 ), w h o li v es w i t h he r f at h er ( n o t Freem an ),
a n d w a s n o t a su b je c t o f th e ter m in a tio n p ro c e e d in g s.

M o t h er’s fat h er s ex u al l y ab u sed at l east on e d au g h t er. 3
-2- OP IN ION
F ACT S AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY This appea l involves children who we re subjected to substantial a buse, and is complicated by inadequa cies in the trial c ourt’s final or der. A t issue are the p arental rights of Respondent/Appellant Ta nya De e Ballard ( “Mother” ), the biological mother of five daughters. On Ma rc h 2 3, 20 07 , M oth e r’ s si ste r, Pe tit ion e r/Ap pe lle e Ta rr a Ho we ll ( “ Au nt” ), fi le d th is p e tit ionto terminate Mother ’s par ental rights to four of her f ive ch i l d ren, namely, daughte rs K.H. ( born

1 9/20/90), S.F . (born 1/24/01), A.F. (born 12/20/01), and W.F. (born 1/27/04). 2
After growing up in an a

busive house, Mother gavebirth to K.H. when s h e wa s fourtee n

3 year s old. She lived with her mother (“G randmother ”) until her se cond daughte r T.H. ( born 8/4/92) was a bout nine months old. Mother eventua lly moved back in w ith Gr andmother, then moved out again shortly bef

ore she turned e ighteen. Mother the n marrie d Ronald “Boo” B allard, to whom she is stil l legally marrie d. Mother’s long history of cr i minal activity began at a young age . During her troubled chi ld ho odsh e ha d a

se ri e s o f j uv e nil e of

fe ns e s. InAp ri l 19 95 , w he n s he wa s a pp ro xim a te ly eighteen, she pled guilty to twenty-four counts of forgery, for which she rec eived a ten yea r sentenc e to be serve d in Comm unity Corrections. A year later, her C ommunity Correc tions supervision was revoke d and Mother w ent to jail. In 1 9 9 9 , M o t h er pled guilty t o an off ense stemming from an inc ide nt that oc c ur

re d in19 94 . I n 1 99 4, Mo the r’ s h us band “B oo ” Balla rdmur de re d a

me nta lly c ha lle ng e d w o m a n , a n d d i s p o s e d o f h e r b o d y i n t h e w o o d s
. F o r h e r p art i c i p a t i o n i n t h e o ff

e ns e Mother pled guilty to fac ilitation of second degr ee mur der. For the f acilitation conviction, she rec eived an eight year

sentenc e. Ultimately, the sente nce s fo r b o th forgery and fa cilitation were suspended and Mother wa s relea sed and pla ced on pr obation.
Af te r h e r r e le a se fr om p ri so n, Mo the r g a ve birth t o S. F. i n J a nu a ry 2001 a ndA. F. i n Dec ember

2001. Although she was still married to “ Boo” Ballard, Mother was li ving with A.F.’s fathe r, Johnny Free man.
Du ri ng thi s ti me , M oth e r’ s two old e st daug hters , K.H . a ndT. H. , r e ma ine d li vin g intheho me share d by Gra ndmother and A unt and vis ited with Mother occ asionally. Mother talke d to K.H. andK

. H

. an d T

. H

. w ere i n i t i al l y placed in G ra n d m o th e r’ s cu st o d y
. A ft er a cou p l e o f m o n t h s, t h ey w ere 4
t r ans f er r ed t o t he ca r e of M ot her ’ s ot her s i s t er , M i s t y Bur r ow
. I n A pri l 2 005, A unt w as gi ven cus t ody of a l l fi ve of M o t h er’s da u g h t ers
. I n A u g u st 20 0 5 , T

. H

. w en t t o l i v e w i t h he r f at h er. -3- T.H. about c oming to live with her in Johnny Freema n’s hom e, along with Mother’s two younger daughter s. In April 2003, K.H. and T.H. m oved in with Mother and Freema n, when K.H . and T.H. wer e twelve and ten year s old, respe ctively. They would stay there over a year . During this time, in January 2004, the youngest daughter , W.F., was born. I n mid 2004, Mother was a gain ar rested, this ti me for se lling a controlled substance ; she had h er d au g h ters in the ca r with her at the time. Af te r that, the tw o o lde st d aug ht ers , K.H . an d T .H . w e nt t o li ve wi th Grand mothe r andAu nt. 4 Because Free man was listed as the bi ological father of the younger three daughter s, they continued to l ivewi th h im.
Af te r l e a vin g Fr e e ma n’ s h ome , K .H

. beca me a fr a id f or he r y ou ng e r s ist e rs , a ndfi na lly disclosed to Mother’s sister Misty that Freeman had sexua lly abused her and her sisters the entire time that K.H. and T.H . lived with Mother and Fre eman. The authorities wer e conta cted, and Freema n was a

rre sted in October

2004. Freema n was e ventually con victed of se xual battery, aggra vated se xual battery, rape , and ra pe of a child; he re ceive d a twenty- five year prison sentence

. There afte r, T.H. lived with her fathe r, and Mother ’s four rema ining daughters, K.H., S.F., A. F., and W .F. , w e rein A un t’ s c us tod y, liv ing in the ho me wi th Grand mothe r andAu nt.
On July 18, 2005, Mother pled guilty to the delivery and/or sale of a sc hedule I II c ontrolled substance, f

or wh i ch s h e re ce ived a se ntence of twelve year s, to be serve d with the Tenne ssee Depa rtment of Corre ctions. Mother’s probation for her prior convictions was revoke d, and she w as inc arc e rate d inMe mph is.
In M arc h 2007, Aunt, as the prospe ctive adoptive pa rent, filed the instant petition seeking te rm inatio n o f the pa

re nta l righ ts o f M oth e r a s w e ll a s Fre e ma n, wh o is thebio log ic a l f a the r o f A .F. and W.F., and is listed as the f ather on the birth ce rtificate of S.F. Denni s L ee Moody, who was presumed to be the biological fathe r of K.H. but is not listed on her birth certificate, jo i n ed i n t he petition, seeking to have his par ental rights voluntarily terminated. Mother asserted that Moody was not the biological fathe r of K. H. an d t h at Freema n was not the biological father of S.F. The unknown fathers we re se rved by publication in the Jackson Sun newspa per. Mother

later te stified that Eric Brown is the biological fathe r of S.F. and that Danny Scott is the biological fathe r of K.H

. Dann y Sc ott

sig ne d a ndfi le d a

waive r o f in ter est as to K. H. , c on se nti ng to the te rm inatio n o f h is pare ntal rights. Eric Brown c ould not be located for personal s ervic e, and notice of the petition as to him was publicized in the Bulletin Times newspape r in Bolivar.
The c ase pr ocee ded to trial on the terminati o n of Mother’ s pare ntal rights. The trial te sti mon y re v o l v e d p r i m ar i l y ar o u n d t h e g i r l s ’ l i v i n g e n v i r o n m e n td u r i n g t h e 1

- 2 y e ar p e r i o d in which they r esided with Mother and Freema n. The trial was held on July 10, 2007, and Janua ry 22, 20 08 . A t th e tim e of

tria l, M oth e r w a s st ill inc arc e rate d inMe mph is; ho we ve r, sh e wa s b ro ug ht t o thec ou rt ro om t o p art ic ipate in the tria l.I n her f orens i c i nt er vi ew , K

. H

. s ai d t hat Fre em an’s s exual abuse began t he fi r s t w eekend s he and T

. H

. m ov ed 5
to th e ir h o m e . E a c h ti m e th a t h e r a p e d h e r o r fo rc e d o th e r se x u a l c o n d u c t, F re e m a n w o u ld tell K .H . t h a t i f sh e e v e r to ld
an y b o d y , he w o u l d kil l he r, he r bab y s i st er, an d he r m o t h er. Freem an t h en w o u l d s m i l e at he r. -4- Du ri ng the c ou rs e of the tria l, the tria l c ou rt he ard te sti mon y fr om Gr a nd mot her, Aunt, Mother’s other

sister, Misty Burrow, and the s ocial worker who counsele d K.H., S .F., and A.F., and the direc tor of the counseling cente r who participated in the interviews with the children. Thetrial court he ard te stimony fr o m t h e police of fice who witnessed the f

orensic interviews with the two oldest daughters, K .H. and T.H., describing the abuse that had occ urre d in Freeman’ s home, share d by Mo the r b e fo rehe r a

rr e st. Th e of

fi c e r co mme nte d on the le ve l of de ta il re c ou nte d by th e old e st daughter , K.H., in her interview, with thorough descriptions of events and physical e vidence . When the off i ce r l at er went to Free man’s home, many of the items K.H. had de scribed w ere found – Freeman ’s u n d ergarments, pornogr aphic videota pes, an a rtificial penis a nd other sex toys, a beer bottle used as a tool of sexual assault, and the jew elry for Freema n’s “Prince Albert” penis pierc ing.
The c enter

piece , howeve r, of the Peti t i o n er ’s ca se wa s the testimony of K.H. While the questions in K

. H. ’s fore nsic interview ha d cente red on de tails of the sexua l abuse K.H . and her sisters had suff

ere d at the hands of

Freema n, her te stimony i n the trial court focused on Mothe r’s kn ow le dg e of

Fr e e ma n’ s a

bu se , a s w e ll a s Mo the r’ s a bu se a ndne gle c t of

thec hil dr e n. Inwh a t c ou ld only have be en exc eedingly diffic ult circumstance s, her testimony was c lear and spec ific.
K. H. sa id that Mo the r p e rs ua de d h e r andhe r s ist er, T.H ., to l e a ve theho me wi th Gra ndmother and A unt and go live with Mother, F ree man, S .F., and A.F. by telling them that she ha d c ha ng e d, that sh e lo ve d th e m, andthat sh e wo uldbe thebe st m oth e r the y e ve r h a d. Th e y a ll liv e d to ge the r i n a

thr e e -b e dr oo m ho me in J a c ks on , a lon g w ithse ve ra l a nim a ls.
Inthat ho me , K .H . s a id, Fr e e ma n r e pe a te dly ra pe d a ndmol e ste d he r. Som e of theinc ide nts 5
oc c ur re d w he n M oth e r w a s o ut of the ho us e wi th the yo un ge r girls, a ft e r t e lli ng K. H. to s ta y h ome with Freema n. Many of the incidents occ urre d when Mother was in the home; indee d some occ urre d when K.H ., Freema n, and Mother w er e all in t he same bed. Sometimes Mother would look at Freema n with K.H. and then turn over and close he r eye s. Other times, Mother w ould tell the older girls to go into t he bedr oom wi t h F re em an . K.H. maintained that there w as no way that Mother could not have know n of Free man’s sexua l abuse.
K.H. said that she did not talk to Mothe r about Freema n’s sexual abuse be cause Mother had sa id t o K .H . a ndhe r s ist e r, T. H. , th a t if the y e ve r t oldhe r that a ny ma n of he rs ha d to uc he d th e m, that Mo the r w ou ld k

ill the m a nd the ir sis te rs
. K. H. sa id that sh e be lie ve d M oth e r w he n s he sa id this , and that she w as af

raid of Mothe r. Mother s o m etimes talked a bout the woman Boo Ballard murdere d; with a smile on her fa ce, Mothe r would desc ribe he aring the w oman’s skull cra ck.
Mo the r f re qu e ntl y inv olv e d he r daug hte rs in he r s a le s o f i lle ga l dr ug s. Pe rs on s w ou ld c ome to the ir ho me to p ur c ha se dr

ug s, Mo the r h a d th e girls c ou nt the pil ls t o b e so ld, a ndMo the r w ou ld bring the girls with her f or drug transactions. Mother ha d t h e childre n acc ompany her for dr ug tr a ns a c tio ns so that sh e wo uldno t lo ok su sp ic iou s.-5-

K.H. re called Mothe r’s ne glect, deprivation, and physi cal a buse. The house was filthy from Mo the r p e rm itt ing thea nim a ls andtheyo un ge st c hil dr e n to e lim inate on thefl oo rs of theho us e . A ll of the c hildren we re permitted to bathe only onc e a w eek, and wash c lothes once a month. When not at school, the two oldest daughter s wer e expected to f ully care for the younge r girls, cha nging diaper s, p re p ar i n g meals, cle aning up af ter them, potty training them, and ge tting them to s leep. K.H., th en i n t he sixth grade , had to take c are of the younge r girls from immediately a fter sc hool until they finally went to sleep i n the weehours of the morning be cause Mother permitted the younger girls to sleep a ll day while K.H. wa s at school. K.H. would then w ake he rself up e arly a nd ge t h e r s e lf to th e b u s to g o to s c h o o l. K

. H

. a n d T

. H

. w e r e n o t p e r mi tt e d to e a t brea kfast bef ore sc ho ol; the y c ou ld o nly ha ve the fr e e br e akf a st pr ov ide d at sc ho ol. Mo the r andFr e e ma n w ou ld g ri ll steaks for themselves, while K.H . and the c hildren ate Ramen noodles and T una He lper.
When Mothe r wa s anger ed at K.H. and the other girls, she would have them lay down on the floor, p u t h er foot on their bac k and strike them r epeatedly with pieces of a woode n door fr ame, about the width of a

deck of car ds. She called them profane, demeaning names. Mother would burn A.F. with hot water in the bathtub, and when A.F. scre amed, Mother would dunk A.F.’s head unde r the wate r.
K.H . wa nt ed M ot her’ s p aren tal ri gh ts to be t erm in ate d, ou t o f con cern th at “ so met hi ng woul d ha pp e n” to h e r o r h e r s ist e rs
. Much of K.H .’s testimony was ec hoed by her younger sist er , T

. H. In her testimony, T.H. rec o u n te d a n in c id e n t in w h ic h M o th e r w a lk e d in to th e r o o m w h il e Fr e e man w a s to u c h in g her inappropriately; Mother simply turned around and left t he room. F ree man also molested T.H. in the bed shar ed by Free man and Mother. T.H. also said that she did not talk to Mother a bout Freeman’ s sexual a buse bec ause Mother threatened to kill the girls if any man that she wa s dating ever touched the m. An Hi sp a nic a c qu a int a nc e wo uld a lso c ome to the ho us e , tak e T. H. to a be dr oo m andmol e st he r, a ndgiv e mon e y to Mo the r, Fr e e ma n, a ndthegirls.
T.H. also testified a

b o u t M o t h er’ s involvement in selling il legal drugs, c orrobor ating K.H.’s assertion that Mother sometimes had her daughter s count t he pil ls (“hydr os”) that she was selling, that people would come t o their hom e to purcha se pi lls, and that Mother took t he childre n with her while she sold pills. T.H. describe d being prohibited fr om eating bre akfas t ex ce p t at s chool, and eating Tuna

Helper while Mother and Freema n grilled steaks for themselves. She said that Mother would strike all of the children, even the youngest, with pie ces of wood framing. T.H . also described an incident in which Mothe r pulled A.F. ac ross the floor of their van by he r hea d.
T.H. cor roborated the uncle an condition of the home, and that she and K.H. had to c lean the house and take car e of their younger sisters when they returne d home from school. Mother did not c arefo r the ir yo un ge r sis te rs ; ra the r, K. H. prima ri ly too k ca

reof the m, andT. H. he lpe d. Be c aus e T.H. wa s living wit h her f ather at the time of trial, she was una ffe cte d b y the termination pr oc e e din gs ; ne ve rthe le ss, sh e did no t wa nt he r y ou ng e r s ist e rs re turne d to Mo the r’ s c arebe c aus e she did not “wa nt them going through what we w ent through.”-6-

Mother testified in her

own def ense. She te stified about her abusive c hildh o o d and her te e na ge pr e gn a nc ie s. She de sc ri be d h e r e ff orts t o k e e p intou c h w ithhe r dau gh ter s w hil e inc arc e rate d a nd be tw e e n inc arc e ratio ns , a nd he r se lf -i mpr ov e me nt, su c h a s takin g Bib le cou rs e s, pare nting classes, and obtaining her G.E.D. S he admitted that her children w ere with her whe n she was a rre sted for se lling il legal drugs. She a dmitted “spanking” the c hildren with a piec e o f door framing, but said that she had learned better in her parenting class. Mother denie d any knowledge wh a tso e ve r o f F re e ma n’ s se xu a l abu se of he r d aug hte rs . M oth e r t e sti fi e d th a t sh e wante d A un t to c on tin ue to c arefo r the c hil dr e n u nti l sh e go t ou t of priso n an d wa s abl e to ca re fo r the m a ga in, so that they would have consistency and stability i n their lives.
Inhe r t e sti mon y, Au nt s a id that sh e was ho me sc ho oli ng K. H. be c aus e K. H. ha d p a nic attacks a s a re sult of the sexual abuse. Aunt also had a job. She hope d to adopt K.H., S.F., A.F., and W.F., and testified that she planned to go back to nur sing sc hool a fter the conclusion of the a doption pr oc e e din gs
. At the conc lusion of the trial, the trial cour t issued an ora l ruling, terminating Mother’s pa re nta l rig hts a s to K. H. , A .F, a ndW .F. Th e pr oc e e din gs a s to S.F. we rehe ld i n a be ya nc e be c aus e S.F. was in a therape utic foster home

. On M ar c h 1 0 , 2 0 0 8 , th e tria l c o u rt i s s u e d a w r itte n o r d e r

te r mi n a ti n g M o th e r ’ s p ar e n ta l ri gh ts. Th e writt e n o rd e r s tate d inpe rt ine nt p art :
8. This Court has determined by c lear and convin cing evidence that [Mother]

. . . has admitted to physic ally abusing thes e c h ildren, failing to support these children and failing to protect these children from Johnny Free man who plea d guilty to child rape. . . . 9. Termination of [ Mother’s] pare ntal rights to [K.H., A.F., and W.F.] is in the best interest of the c hild. . . . * * * 11

. Th e fo llo wi ng e vid e nc e su pport ing thi s f ind ing c umu lativ e ly constituted clea

r and c o n v incing evidenc e of gr ounds and de te rm inatio n o f the c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re st: A. [Mother] willfully abandoned he r c h il dr e nbased upon her e ngageme nt in conduct prior to inc ar ceration which exhibited a

wan t on disregar d for the c hildren. She a dmi tte d to ph ys ic a lly e xp os ing he r c hil dr e n to ill e ga l dr ug tr a ns a c tio ns
. B. Subsequent to incar cer ation, [Mother] abandone d her children in he r failure to have conta ct wi th the children to the e xtent that an inmate is allowe d. C. Mo the r a dmi tte d to phys ic a lly abu sin g an d fa ili ng to support her c hildren prior to he r inca rce ration. D. Th e Cou rt

fo und th at Mo the r k

no wi ng ly f

a ile d to protec t her children fr om the admitted sexual a buse of her live- in boyfriend, John ny Freema n. This failure-7- to protect the c hildr en from seve re a buse constitutes sever e abuse

. * * * I. Based upon cr edible testimony, the Court found that a meaningful relationship has bee n established betwee n [Aunt] and the chi l d ren. . . . [Aunt] has consistently provided a stable home e nvironment for the se c hil dr e n th ro ug h th e ye ars
. The trial c ourt then orde red that Mother’s par ental rights as to K .H., A.F., and W.F. be te rminated. Th e ord e r h e ld the te rm inatio n p ro c e e din gs re ga rd ing S.F. in a

be ya nc e be c aus e sh e wa s instate c us tod y inthe ra

pe uti c fo ste r c are . M oth e r the n f ile d a tim e ly n oti c e of

app e a l.
I S S UE S ON A P P E AL AND S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW On appe al, Mother r aises the f ollowing issues for our re view:
1. W he the r the fi na l jud gme nt andte rm inatio n o f p are nta l righ ts o rd e r c omp lie d w ith thestatut ory r e qu ir e me nts

. 2. Whethe r t he trial court erre d when it found t hat M other will fully abandone d her children ba sed upon her

engage ment in c onduct prior to incar cer ation that exhibited a wanton disregar d for the c hildren. 3. Whethe r the trial c ourt err ed when it found that Mother abandoned her children by failing to have c ontact with the childre n to the extent that an inmate is allowed. 4. Whethe r the trial c ourt err ed whe n it found t hat M other knowingly failed to protect her c hildren fr om the admitted sexual a buse of Johnn y F re em an, and is therefor e guilty of severe child abuse. 5. W he the r the tria l c ou rt e rr e d wh e n it fo un d that it is in the c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re st to t e rm inate Mo the r’ s p are nta l righ ts. 6. Whethe r the trial court err ed when it f ound that Aunt had consistently provided a stable home e nvironment for the children.
W e re vie w the tria l c ou rt ’s sp e c if ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t de novo on the record accompanied by a pr e sumpt ionof

c or re c tne ss, “ un le ss the pr e po nd e ranc e of thee vid e nc e is o the rw ise .” Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; se e In r

e M. J. B. , 140 S.W.3d 643, 654 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) . In this case , some of thetria l c ou rt ’s fa c tua l f

ind ing s a reba se d o n it s d e te rm inatio ns of thec re dib ili ty o f the wi tne sse s. T h i s Court affor ds great defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s cr edibility determinations. Se e M c Ca leb v. Satu rn Cor

p. , 910 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn. 1995) (citation omitted). We revie w the trial c ourt’s conclusions of law de novo without a presumption of cor rec tness. S. Const

ructors, Inc. v. Loudon Coun ty Bd. of Educ. , 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted).
Because Tennessee Code Annotated § 36- 1-113(c )(1) require s a heightene d burden of proof in pare ntal termination case s, we must a lso “ determine whether the fac ts, e ither as found by the trial court or as supported by the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, cle arly a nd convincingly establish the elements require d to te rminate a biological pare nt’s pare ntal rights.” In r e M. J. B. , 140 S.W.3d atM ot her a r gues t hat t he fi nal order is inad equa t e bec aus e t he “or der ” s ec t i on of t he or der doe s not l i s t t he 6
gr ounds f or t er m i nat i on, and t he s ec t i on of t he or der out l i ni ng t he cour t ’ s fi ndi ngs of f ac t a l l ude t o t he gr ounds w i t hout
s pec i fi ca l l y c i t i ng t o t he s t at ut or y pr ovi s i on. M ot her ci t es no aut hor i t y i n s uppor t of t hi s a s s er t i on, a nd w e have f ound
n o th in g w h ic h re q u ire s th a t t h e trial c o u rt’s fin d in g s o f fa c t o r c o n c lu sio n s o f la w b e in a sp e c ific p a rt o f th e o rd e r. -8- 654 (citations omitted). Thus, we must “dra w a distinction betwee n specific fac ts and the c ombined weig ht of thes e fa cts .” Id. at 654 n.35. The tria l court’s spec ific finding s of fa ct ar e pre sumed corr ect, so longas they

are s up p o rt ed b y

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Id. We “must then deter mine wh et h erthe combined we ight of these fa cts provides c lear and convinc ing e vidence supporting the trial court’ s ultim ate f actua l conclusion.” Id.
A N A L Y SIS
In Tenne ssee, procee dings on the t ermination of parenta l rig hts are g overne d by statute. To terminate pa

renta l rig hts, two elements must be proven. F irst, the exis tence of at lea st one of the statut or y g ro un ds fo r t e rm ina

tio n mu st b e sh own. T. C.A . § 36 -1 -1 13 (c )( 1) (2 00 5) ; In reD. L. B. , 118 S.W. 3d 36 0, 36 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Jo ne s v . G arre tt , 92 S.W. 3d

83 5, 83 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) . Se c on d, it mus t be pr ov e n that te rm inatin g the pa re nta l ri g hts of

the bio log ic a l pa

re nt i s in the c hil d’ s b e st i nte re st. T. C.A . § 36 -1 -1 13 (c )( 2) (2 00 5) ; In reA.W
. , 1 14 S.W. 3d

54 1, 54 5 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 3) ; In re Audre y S. , 182 S.W .3d 838, 860 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Both elements must be proven by clea r and c onvin c inge vid e nc e . T .C. A. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c )( 1) (2 00 5) ; In reV alentine , 79 S.W .3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 20 02 ). Ev ide nc e that me e ts the c le ar a nd con vi nci ng sta

nd ard e lim inate s any

su bs tanti a l do ub ts about the corr ectne ss of the conclusion drawn from the evidenc e. In reV alentine , 79 S.W .3d at 546. Specif ic F ind ings of

F act
W e fi rs t a dd re ss M oth e r’ s a rg ume nt that the tria l c ou rt ’s or de r te rm inatin g he r p are nta l righ ts faile d to c omp ly with the statut e s gov e rn ing te rm inatio n. In pa rt ic ula r, we c on sid e r the sp e c if

ic ity 6 of the trial c ourt’s findings of fa ct and c onclusions of l aw
. See In r e Ado ption o f T .L.H. , No. M2008-01408-COA -R 3 -P T , 2009 WL 152475, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2009) (citing In r e G. N. S. , No. W2006- 01437-COA-R3-PT, 2006 WL3626322, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec . 13, 2006)).

“ Be c aus e of

the gravity o f the ir

c on se qu e nc e s, pr oc e e din gs to t e rm inate pa re nta l righ ts requireindividualized dec ision making.” I n re T i f f a n y B. , 2 2 8 S

. W.3d 148, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (c iting In re Sw anson , 2 S.W .3 d 1 80 , 1 88 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ). Con se qu e ntl y, th e tria l c ou rt is require d to make spec ific findings of fact and conclusions of law on the grounds for termination and whether termination is in the best interest of the c hild. See T. C. A. § 36 -1- 113( k) (2 00 5) ; In r e Ti ff any B. , 22 8 S.W .3 d a t 15 6 (c itati on s o mitte d) ; In r e Audr e y S. , 182 S.W.3d at 861 (c itations omi tte d) . Se c tio n 36- 1- 11 3( k) state s as fo llo ws : “Th e c ou rt sh a ll en te r an or de r that ma ke s sp e c if ic findings of fac t and conc lusions of law within thirty (30) days of the c onclusion of the hea ring.” This statutory require ment is discuss ed i n s o m e detail in In r e Ado ption o f M uir , No. M2002- 02963-COA-R3-CV, 2003 W L 22794524 (Te nn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003):-9-

A tr i a l c o u rt ’ s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o m ak e f i n d i n g s o f f

a c t a n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w in te rm inatio n c a se s d if

fe rs mate ri a lly fr om i ts r e sp on sib ili ty i n o the r civil c a se s. Gene rally, trial courts, sitt ing w ithout juries, are not r equire d to ma ke findings of fac t or conc lusion of la w u n l es s reque sted in acc ordanc e with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Termination ca ses, howeve r, are another matter. Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(k) explicitly require s trial courts to “ente r an order which makes specific findings of fac t a nd c on c lus ion s o f l a w” in t e rm inatio n c a se s. Th us , tria l c ou rt s mu st p re pa rea ndfi le written findings of fa ct and c onclusions [of] law with r egar d to e very disposition of a pe tit ionto t e rm inate pa

re nta l righ ts, wh e the r the y h a ve be e n r e qu e ste d o r n ot. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(k) ref lects the Te nnessee Gene ral Asse mbly’s rec ognition of the nece ssity of indivi dualized de cis ions in these case

. In r e Swan son , 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that termination case s require d “individualized decision making”) . It also re flec ts the Gene ral Asse mbly’s understanding that f

indings of fac t and conclusions of law fac ilitate a ppellate r eview and promote the just and speedy r esolution of appea ls. Bruce v. Bruce , 801 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Because of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( k), t rial courts cannot follow the customary practice of m aking oral findings from the benc h and later adopting them by ref

ere nce in their

final orde r. When a trial court ha s not complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( k), we cannot s imp ly r e v ie w th e rec ord d e novo and dete rmine for ourselves w here the preponde ranc e of the evid en ce l i es as we would in other civil, non-jury ca ses. In acc ordanc e with In r

e D. L. B. , 118 S.W.3d at ___, 2003 WL 22383609, at *6, we must rema nd the case for the preparation of appropriate written findings of fa ct and conclusions of law

. Id. at *3 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the r equire ment that the t rial court make spec ific findings of fa ct and conc lusions of law is not a mere technica lity; rather, complianc e w it hSe c ti o n36-1-113( k) serves an important purpose. See White v. Moody , 171 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). “ Without su c h fi nd ing s a nd c on c lus ion s, thi s c ou rt is le ft to wo nd e r on wh a t ba sis the c ou rt re a c hed its ultimate decision.” In r

e M. E.W
. , N o. M2003-01739-COA- R3-PT, 2004 WL 865840, at *19 (Te nn. Ct. App. April 21, 2004). The spec ificity require ment is well illust ra t ed and explained in In r e K.N .R. , No. M2003- 01301-COA-R3-PT, 2003 WL 22999427 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2003). The In r e K.N .R. Court quoted the trial c ourt’s final termination order in its entirety, and the n observe d:
An examination of the final orde r re veals the repe titious restate ment of conc lusions of law and the re petitious rec itations of t he statutory grounds; howe ver, the re a re no findings of fac t in the final order , as require d by . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(k) , for our revie w. It must be understood that a re citation in a final orde r that a pa rent has “a bandoned the child” is a c o n clus ion of law, not a f inding of fac t. Moreover , placing the state ment (abandoned the child) following the popular phra se “the Court the re fo refi nd s” do e s n ot t rans fo rm a c on c lus ionof

la w i nto a

fi nd ing of

fa c t.I n t hi s ca s e, t he t r i al cour t ’ s or al r ul i ngs w er e no m or e s pec i fi c t han i t s w r i t t en or der , s o e xam i nat i on of t he 7

o ra l ru lin g w o u ld n o t ch a n g e th e re su lt. -10- Id. at *4. Se e als o L.D .N . v . R. B.W

. , E2005-02057-COA- R3-PT, 2006 WL 369275, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. Fe b. 17 , 2 00 6) ; In r e C.R .B. , No. M2003-00345-COA- R3-JV, 2003 WL 22680911, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2003) . Beca use the statute spe aks in terms of the tria l court’s “ order ,” we fo c us on thewritt e n o rd e r, no t th e or a l ruli ng s is su e d at th e con clusio n o f the tria l. Se e In r e 7 Ado ption o f M uir , 2 00 3 W L 2 27 94 52 4, a t *3 n. 5. If the tria l c ou rt fails to make su ff ic ie ntl y s pe c if

ic finding s , t h en the ca se must be re manded to the tria l court with instructions to make the re quired findings of fact and conclusions of law. In r e Gior gia nna H
. , 205 S.W.3d 508, 516 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 06 ) (cit a tio ns omi tte d) ; In r e Ma rr , 194 S.W.3d 490, 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) ( citations omitted).
From our rea ding of the final or der in this case , the trial court a ppear ed to f

ind five grounds for termination. We discuss ea ch of the se in turn.
Failure to Pr otec t
Th e tria l c ou rt ’s or de r o f t e rm inatio n p ro vid e d a s f oll ow s:
8. This Court has determined by c lear and convincing evide nce that [Mother]

. . . has admitted to . . . failing to protec t these childre n from Johnny Freeman w ho plead guilty to child rape

. . . . * * * 11.D. The Court found that Mother knowingly failed to protec t her c hildren from the a dmitt ed sexual abuse of her live- in-boyfrie nd, Johnny Fr e e ma n
. T h i s f

a i l u r e t o p r o t e c tt h e c h i l d r e n f r o ms e v e r e a bu se constitutes severeabuse.
The trial court failed to c ite the statutory ground to which it wa s ref erring. Cit ation of the statutory provision would have be en enormously helpful , b u t i t s o mission i s not fatal in and of itself if the rema inder of the order is sufficie ntly specific

. Her e, we can glean from the l anguagein the order that the trial court was re fer

ring to the ground codified at Tennesse e Code Annotated § 36-1-113( g)(4) , wh ic h p ro vid e s a s f

oll ow s: The pa rent or gua

rdian ha s been f

ound to have co m m i t t ed sever e child abuse as define d in § 37-1-102, under an y p rior orde r of a

court or is found by the court hearing the petition to terminate pare ntal rights or the petition for a doption to have committed severechild abuse a gainst the child who is the subject of the petition or against any sibling or half- sibling of su ch ch i l d , or any othe r child re siding temporarily or permane ntly in the home of such par ent or gua rdian.
T. C.A . § 36 -1 -1 13 (g )( 4) (2 00 5) . The de fi nit ion of se ve re c hil d ab us e in S e c tio n 3 7- 1- 10 2 in c lud e s: “The commission of any a ct towar ds the child prohibited by §§ 39-13-502–39- 13-504, 39-13- 522,T hi s o ccur r ed des pi t e pr ot es t at i on s by M ot her’ s at t orney, w hen K

. H

. began t es t i fyi ng abou t Fr eem an’s abuse , 8 th a t “M y c lien t d o e s n o t fe e l t h a t h e r d a u g h te r sh o u ld h a v e to g o th ro u g h th is a g a in .”

T he cr oss
- exam i nat i on by M ot her’ s at t orney, L ani s K ar nes , even i ncl ud ed a gr at ui t ou s unfl at t er i ng r ef er ence 9
to t h e s ix te e n -y e a r- o ld w itn e ss’ s w e ig h t. A fte r th a t, d u rin g M o th e r’ s c ro ss- e x a m in a tio n b y c o u n se l fo r A u n t, B e tty Sc ot t , t he f ol l ow i ng e xcha nge occ ur r ed:
Q [ by M s
. Sc ot t ] : J us t f or pur pos es of t he reco rd, M s. B al l ar d, how t al l a r e you? A : 5' 8, 5' 9. Q : A nd how m uch do you w ei gh? A : I ’ m not r ea l l y s ur e, 250.

M S

. KARNES : Y o u r H o n o r, I’m g o i n g t o obj ec t t o t he
re le v a n c e . N o w o m a n li k e s to tell th a t.

-11- 39-15-302, and 39-17-1005 or the knowing fa ilure to protec t the child from the c ommissi on of any such ac t towards the c hild.” T.C.A. § 37-1-102( b)(21) (C) (2005)

. The cited statutory sections re fer to v ari ou s ty pe s o f se xu a l abu se , inc lud ing ra pe , a gg ra vate d se xu a l batte ry , a ndra pe of a c hil d, a ll crimes of which Free man was c onvicted of committing against K.H

. and T.H. We gather from the order that this is t he statutory ground on w hich the trial c ourt relied.
Un fo rtun a te ly, we c a n g a the r l itt le e lse fr om the or de r w ithre sp e c t to Mo th er’s fai lure to protec t the children from Freema n. Freema n’s abuse was, of course , admitte d an d undisputed; howeve r, his pare ntal rights are not at issue in this appeal. Rather , Mother’s rights are at issue and she in no way a dmitted to a knowing failure to pr otect any of her c hildren fr om Freeman.
The trial c ourt’s “f

indings of fac t” as to Mother’ s failure to protect a re, a s in In r

e K.N .R. , littl e more than “r ecitations of the statutory grounds” pre cede d by th e phrase “the Court has d e te r mi n e d ” o r “ th e Co u rt f o und.” In re K

.N .R. , 2003 WL 22999427, at *4. As noted in In r e K.N .R. , the pre fatory phr ase doe s not transform a conclusion of law into a finding of fa ct. Id. This is particularly fr

ustrati n g w h e r eth ee v ide nce submitted to the trial court, espec ially from K.H., wa s clea

r, deta iled and def

inite, even a fter a

cross-e xamination that was une xpecte dly lengthy and aggr essive, given the fa ct that the witness wa s a sixteen- year -o ld girl who undisputedly had 8 been se xually victimized by Mother’ s boyfriend. Clarity and spec ificity in the testimony, however, 9 do no t su bs titutefo r c lari ty andsp e c if ic ity in the tria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t.
We a re c harge d on appea l with reviewing w h et h er the trial court’s findings of fac t are supported by the preponde ranc e of the evidence, and then determining whether the combined weight of these f acts a mount to cle ar and convincing evide nce to support the trial court’s ultimate fa ctual conclusion. In r

e M. J. B. , 1 40 S.W .3 d at 65 4. He re , we ask , di d th e tria l c ou rt c re dit allof the assertions by K.H. and T.H. and completely dis cre dit Mother’s blanke t denial? Did the trial court cre dit only one of the children’s assertions? We a re “ left to wonder

on what basis the c ourt rea ched its ult imate dec ision” that Mother failed to protect the c hildren fr om Freeman’ s abuse.I t i s pos s i bl e t hat t he t r i al c our t w as r el yi ng on t he a bandonm ent pr ovi s i ons , Se ct i ons 36- 1- 113( g) ( 1) a nd 36- 10 1 -10 2 (1)(A )( i v ) ( “co n d u ct p ri o r t o incarcerat i o n that ex h i b i t s a w an t o n d i sr eg ard for the w el fare o f t h e ch i l d ”) or “severe
c h ild a b u se ” u n d e r S e c tio n s 3 6 -1 -1 1 3 (g )( 4 ) a n d 3 7 -1 -1 0 2 (b )( 2 1 ).”

S ec t i o n 3 6 -1 -1 0 2 (1 )(A )(iv) p ro v i d es: 11

A pa rent o r g u ardian i s i n carcerat ed at t h e t i m e o f t h e i n st i t u t i o n of an act i o n or p roce ed i n g t o de cl are a chi l d t o be a n aba ndoned c hi l d, or t he pa r ent or guar di an has be en i nca r ce r at ed dur i ng a l l or pa r t of t he f ou r ( 4) m on t hs i m m edi at el y pr ece di ng t he i nst i t ut i on of s uch a ct i on or pr oceedi ng , and ei t her has
w ill fu lly f a il e d t o v isit o r h a s w ill fu lly fa iled to su p p o rt o r h a s w ill fu lly fa iled to m a k e re a so n a b le paym ent s t ow ar d t he s up po r t of t he chi l d for f ou r ( 4) c on s ecut i ve m on t hs i m m edi at el y pr ece di ng s uch p a re n t’s o r g u a r d ia n ’ s i n c a rc e ra tio n , o r th e p a re n t o r g u a rd ia n h a s e n g a g e d in c o n d u c t p rio r to i nca r ce r at i on t hat e xhi bi t s a w ant on di s r ega r d f or t he w el f ar e of t he chi l d.
(c o n tin u e d ...) -12- In a pare ntal termination case , in the absenc e of findings of fac t by the trial court, “ we c annot simply review the r ecor d de novo and dete rmi n e fo r o u rselves w here the pre ponderance of the evidenc e lies as wewould in other civil, non-jury c ases.” In r e Adop ti on o

f M uir , 2003 WL 22 79 45 24 , at *3 (f

oo tno te omi tte d) . The tria l c ou rt mus t ma ke thefi nd ing s o f f

a c t, n ot the app e llate court. Se e In r

e K.N .R. , 200 3 WL 22 99 94 27 , at *3. Th e re fo re , we arele ft wi th l itt le c ho ic e bu t to fi ndthetria l c ou rt ’s te rm inatio n o rd e r i ns uf fi c ie nt a s to thegr ou ndba se d o n M oth e r’s fai lur e to pr ote c t. Phy sic al A buse In its order, the trial court found that “Mother admitted to physically abusing . . . her c hildren prior to incar cer ation.” In he r testimony, Mother admitted that she at times had “spanke d ” the children w ith a piece of wood, quickly adding t hat s he had learned in a par enting class “that there are many ways to discipline your c hildren other than spankin g t h em
. ” This admis sion seemed inn oc uo us c omp are d to thea sse rt ion s b y K .H . a ndT. H. , that Mo the r str uc k the c hil dr e n on ba

resk in with wooden door framing, “swinging li ke you’r e swinging a bat,” while holding them down on the floor with her foot, and that she continued to strike the m until t hey we re “ crying re ally, rea lly hard” and begging he r to stop. Mother denied the se asse rtions. The children made numer ous other allegations against Mother that could be deeme d “physica l a buse,” and Mother de nied them all. Wa s the trial court finding that Mother did on ly what she a dmitted, i.e. , o c c a s io n a ll y “ spanking” the children w ith a piece of wood? If so, what w as the statutory ground for termination on which the trial court r elied? Clearly the trial court’ s order does not include suff

iciently specific findings of 10 fac t, or even language from which we can ascertain the s tatutory ground for termination on which thetria l c ou rt

a llu de s. Failure to Supp ort
The trial c ourt’s orde r states: “Mot her a dmitted to . . . failing to support her children prior to her inca

rce ration.” From this language , it appear s that the trial court attempted to f ind that Mother had aba ndo n ed h erch i l d re n u n d erS ec t i o n 3 6 -1 -1 1 3 (g )( 1 ) a s d ef i n ed i n S ec t i o n 36-1-102( 1)(A) (iv). 11(

. . . cont i nued) 11 T .C .A . § 3 6 -1 -1 0 2 (1 )( A )( iv ) (2 0 0 5 ). -13- This def i n i t i o n i s satisfied if, among other things, the parent “ is incarc erated at the time of the instit ution of an ac tion or proce eding to de clar e a c hild to be an abandoned child” and the par ent “ha s willfully failed to support . . . for f our (4) c onsecutive months immediately pre ceding suc h pare nt’s . . . incar cer ation.” The language in the order is insuff icient for sever al rea sons. The orde r did not ref ere nce the four- month period prior to Mother’ s incarc eratio n. Even if it had, ther e wa s no evidenc e at tria l corre spo n d i n g wi t h this finding. The household income while the c hildren lived with Mother and Fre eman was ap p arently comprised of Mother ’s disability income, Freeman’ s income fr om work, and the proce eds of Mother’s dr ug sales. Apa

rt from the a

buse suffe red by the c hil dr e n, the y w e reho us e d, c lothe d an d at lea st mi nim a lly fe d. Th e tria l c ou rt state s n o f

a c ts t o support this “finding,” and wefind none.
Failure to Contac t During Incarce ration
The fina l order a lso recites the trial court’ s finding that “[ s ]u b s eq u ent to incar cer ation, [Mother] abandone d her c hildren in her f ailure to ha ve conta ct with the childre n to the extent that an inmate is allowe d.” If this was intended to re late to a statutory ground for termination, the trial court did not cite such a

provision, and we have found no statutory ground base d on the biological pare n t’ s c o n ta c t w ith th e c h il d d u r in g in c ar c e r a ti o n
. So mec a s e s h a v e c o n s id e r e d a n in mate’s attempt to stay in contact during incar cer ation in connec tion with the issue of whether termination of t he parent’s rights i s in the best interest of the child. Se e In r e D. C.A

. , No. M2008-01279-COAR3- PT, 20 09 W L 8 37 87 7, a t *1 0 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . M ar. 30 , 2 00 9) ; In re J.C.J. , No. E2006-01756- COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 1215020, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2007). W e can only presume that thi s f ind ing re late s to thetria l c ou rt ’s be st i nte re st ana lys is.

Wanton Disregard Priorto Incarc eration Finally, t h e t rial court’s order states that Mother “ willfully abandoned he r childre n based upon her e ngageme nt in conduct prior to inc arc eration whic h exhibited a wanton disregar d for the children. She a dmitted to physi cally exposing he r childre n to illegal drug transa ctions.” The language used in the orde r indicate s that the trial court was re lying on the statutory ground of aba nd on me nt u nd e r S e c tio n 3 6- 1- 11 3( g) (1 ), a s d e fi ne d in Se c tio n 3 6- 1- 10 2( 1) (A )( iv) . T he c hil d is considere d abandone d by the par ent if the pa rent “ is incarc erated at the time of the instit ution of an a c tio n o r p ro c e e din g to de c larea c hil d to be a n a

ba nd on e d c hil d” a ndthepa re nt “h a s e ng a ge d in conduct prior to incarc eration that exhibits a wanton disregar d for the w elfa re of the child.” T.C.A. § 36-1-102( 1)(A) (iv) (2005)

. Her e, it is undisputed that Mother was inca rce rate d at the time the termination procee dings wer e instituted. More importantly, the tri al co u rt made an expre ss fac tual finding that Mother

“ a dmi tte d to ph ys ic a lly e xp os ing he r c hil dr e n to ill e ga l dr ug tr a ns a c tio ns .” Th is is s uf fi c ie ntl y specific to permit this C ourt to (a) determine if the fac tual finding is supported by the pre ponderance of the e v i d en ce , an d (b) de termine whe ther this fac tual finding amounts to clear and convinc ing-14-

evidenc e that Mother e ngaged in c onduct “that e x h i b i t s a wanton disregar d for the w elfa re of the [childre n].” This, then, is the lone gr ound in the trial court’ s termination order t h at s at i sfies the re qu ir e me nts of

Se c tio n 3 6- 1- 11 3( k) re qu iring the tria l cou rt to make “ sp e c if ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t” to support its conclusions. One ground is sufficie nt to uphold a termination of par ental rights. In r e D. L. B. , 1 18 S.W .3 d at 36 7. Th e re fo re , w e c on sid e r M oth e r’ s a rg ume nts on app e a l a s th e y r e late to this statutory ground. Jurisdi ction
Mo the r a rg ue s th a t the Ma dis on Cou nty Ju ve nil e Cou rt did no t ha ve jurisd ic tio n to te rm inate her pa renta l rights as to K.H. and S.F. because the He nderson County Juvenile Court exe rcised emer gency jurisdiction over t hese two children in 2007. We f ind no support for this assertion in the re c or d, apa

rt from a n u ne xp la ine d c omm e nt b y th e tria l c ou rt du ri ng brie f p ro c e e din gs on Au gu st 21, 2007, to the eff

ect that K.H . and S.F. had been ta ken into state custody and that the trial court did n o t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e m
. R e g ar d l e s s , t h e i s s u e i s m o o t

. D u r i n g t h e p e n d e n c y o f t his appea l, K.H. re ache d majority, and the termination of Mother’s pa renta l rights a s t o h er i s n ot an iss ue in this app e a l. F urthe r, theMa dis on Cou nty Ju ve nil e Cou rt he ld the pr oc e e din gs re latin g to S.F. in a be ya nc e a nddidno t te rm inate Mo the r’ s par e nta l righ ts t o S. F. b e c aus e S.F. wa s instate custody in a thera

peutic foster

home.
Mother also c hallenges the finality of t he order on the ground that itdoes not adjudicate the rights of petitioner De nnis Lee Moody, who joined in the pe tition i n order to surrende r his pare ntal ri gh ts a s to K. H. W e no te that th e tria l c ou rt ma de theMa

rc h 1 0, 20 08 or de r f

ina l pu rs ua nt t o Ru le 54.0 2 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure, f inding that there wa s no just cause for delay. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 54 .0 2. Th e re fo re , this Cou rt ha s ju ri sd ic tio n to he ar the app e a l. T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 3(a) . Moreove r, since the termination of Mother’ s rights a s to K .H. is not at issue in this appeal, any iss ue s con c e rn ing the tria l cou rt ’s failu reto a dju dic ate Mo od y’ s p are nta l righ ts d o n ot i mpa c t th is app e a l.
Ground s for Ter mination
Mother ar gues th at the trial court erre d in finding that grounds exist to support the termination of her

pare ntal rights. We have already determined that only one of the grounds relied upon by the trial court satisfies the re quirements of Sec tion 36-1-113(k), namely, that Mother engage d in conduct prior to he r incar cer ation that exhibited a wanton disregar d for the welfa re of her children, unde r Sections 36-1-113( g)(1) and 3 6 -1 -102(1)(A)( iv). Ther efor e, we focus on the evidenc e as it re lates to that ground.
We f irst addre ss Mother’s conte ntion that the final order is insufficient beca

use it did not find that the conduc t at issue occur red during the fo u r-month period imm ediately pr ece ding Mother’s incar cer ation, an element that she argue s is r equire d by the definition of abandonment in Section 36- 1- 10 2( 1) (A )( iv) . Se c tio n 3 6- 1- 10 2( 1) (A )( iv) pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: A par ent or gua

rd i an i s i n car cer ated at the time of the instituti on of an a ction or proce eding to decla

re a child to be an abandone d child, or the pa rent or gua

rdian ha s-15-

been inc arc erated during all or pa rt of the four (4) months immediately pre ceding the instit ution of such action or proce eding, and e ither has willfully failed to visit or has willfully failed to support or has willfully failed to make rea sonable payments toward the support of the child for four (4) c onsecutive months immediately pre ceding suc h pare nt’s or guar dian’s inca rc er ati on, or the pa re nt o r g ua rd ian ha s e ng ag e d in conduct prior to incarce ration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the
c hil d

. T.C.A. § 36-1-102( 1)(A) (iv) (2005) (empha sis added).
In the c ase of In r

e Audr e y S. , 182 S.W.3d 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), this Court addr essed whether pre- incar cer ation conduct by a biological pare nt “ that exhibits a wanton disrega rd for the welfa re of the child” must occ ur during the f our m onth period im mediately prece ding the par ent’s incar cer ation. The Audr

e y S. Court noted t hat prior case law had applied the statute inconsistently, so theCou rt

e xa min e d th e la ng ua ge a ndstr uc tur e of the statut e wi tho ut re fe re nc e to the prior c a se s. Id. at 868–69.
From the languageused in the statute and its structure , the Audr e y S. Court he ld that, to be theba sis fo r t e rm inatio n o f p arenta l righ ts, c on du c t by thebio log ic a l pa re nt that de mon str a te s a wanton disrega

rd for the welf are of the child does not ha ve to occ ur during the f our month period immed i at el y p re ce d ing the pare nt’s incar cer ation. Id. at 871. We agre e with the ana lysis of the Audrey S. Court on this issue. There fore , we hold that the trial court wa s not require d to find that Mother’s c onduct demonstrating a wanton disregar d for the w elfa re of the childre n took place during the four months immediately prec eding her incar cer ation, in or der to se rve as the basis for the trial court’s c onclusion that Mother abandoned her children a s defined in Sec tion 36-1-102(1)( A)(iv)

. The trial c ourt found that Mother e xposed her children to illegal drug t ransa ctions, and that this constitut ed conduc t exhi b i ting a wanton disrega rd for the welf are of her children. Mother denies, howe ver, that her c onduct exhibited a w ant o n disregar d for the w elfa re of her c hildren, contending that the c hildren’s re moval from her custody resulted from “conditions

. . . not cause d by . . . Mother.” She minimizes he r ar rest f or traf ficking in illegal drugs with the childre n acc ompanying her by c har ac t er i zi n g the conduc t as “a violation of probation.” This Court has previously held that “pr obation violations, repeated incar cer ation, criminal be h av i o r, subs tance abu se , a ndthe f

a ilu reto p ro vid e a de qu a te su pp ort or su pe rv isi on fo r a

c hil d c a n, a lon e or

in combination, constitute conduct that exhibits a wanton disregar d for the welfa re of a c hild.” Id. at 867–68 (citing DC

S v . J .M .F. , No

. E2 00 3- 03 08 1- CO A- R3- PT, 20 05 W L 94 46 5, a t *7 –8 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. Ja n. 11 , 2 00 5) ; In r

e C. L aC. , No. M2003-02164-COA- R3-PT, 2004 WL 533937, at *7 (Te nn. Ct. Ap p. Ma

r. 17 , 2 00 4) ; In r

e C.T .S. , 15 6 S.W .3 d 18 , 25 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 20 04 ); In r e C.W .W
. , 37 S.W.3d 467, 474–75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000))

. Mo the r c le arl y adm it ted that sh e br ou gh t th e c hil dr e n w ithhe r w hil e sh e so ld dru gs
. Moreove r, the re cord is re plete with evidenc e that Mother sold drugs out of the home that she share d with the children and that the childre n wer e int egra lly involved in her dr ug transac tions, to t he point that they wer e re cruited to c ou n t t h e h y drocodone pills t hat she sold. The te stimony of K.H. and T.H. demonstrated the childre n’s troubling level of knowle dge of dr ug terminology and usage

.T h e statute’s n o n -ex h au st i v e li st o f fac t o rs i s as fo l l o w s: 12

(1) W het her t he par ent or gua r di an has m ade s uch an adj us t m ent of c i r cum s t anc e, c onduct , or con d i t i o n s a s t o m a k e i t s a f e a n d i n t h e c h i l d ’ s b e s t i n t e r e s t t o b e i n t h e h o m e o f t he par ent or guar di an; (2 ) W h e th e r th e p a re n t o r g u a rd ia n h a s fa iled to e ff e c t a la stin g a dju stm e n t af te r re a so n a b le e ff o rts by a vai l abl e s oci al s er vi ces ag en ci es f or s uch dur at i on of t i m e t hat l as t i ng a dj us t m ent doe s not
r eas on abl y app ear poss i bl e; ( 3) W het her t he par ent or gua r di an ha s m ai nt ai ned r egul ar vi s i t at i on or ot her c ont ac t w i t h t he chi l d;
( 4) W het her a m eani ng ful r el at i on s hi p has ot herw i s e b een est abl i s hed bet w een t he pare nt or gu ar di an and t he chi l d; (5) T h e effect a ch an g e o f caret ak ers an d ph y si cal en v i ron m e n t i s l i k el y t o ha v e o n t h e ch i l d ’s
em ot i onal , ps ychol ogi ca l a nd m edi ca l c ondi t i on; ( 6 ) W h e t h e r t h e pa r e n t or gu a r d i a n , or ot h e r pe r s o n r e s i d i n g wi t h t h e pa r e n t o r g u a r d i a n , h a s s h o wn brut al i t y, phy s i cal , s exual , em ot i on al or psychol og i cal abuse , or negl ect t ow ar d t he chi l d, or a no t her chi l d or a dul t i n t he f am i l y or hous ehol d;
( 7) W het her t he ph ysi cal en vi r on m ent o f t he pare nt ’ s or gu ar di an’s hom e i s heal t hy and s af e, w het her t here i s cri m i nal act i vi t y i n t he ho m e, o r w het her t here i s such use o f al coho l o r co nt r ol l ed s ub s t ances a s m a y re n d e r th e p a re n t o r g u a rd ia n c o n siste n tl y u n a b le to c a re fo r th e c h ild in a sa fe a n d sta b le
m an n er; ( 8) W het her t he par ent ’ s or gua r di an’ s m ent al a nd/ or e m ot i onal s t at us w oul d be de t r i m ent al t o t he chi l d or pr eve nt t he par ent or gua r di an f r om e f f ec t i vel y pr ovi di ng s afe a nd s t abl e ca r e and s uper vi s i on f or t he chi l d; or ( 9) W het her t he par ent or guar di an has pa i d c hi l d s uppor t c ons i s t ent w i t h t he chi l d s up po r t gui del i nes pr om ul gat ed by t he depa r t m ent pur s uant t o § 36- 5- 101.

T en n
. C o d e A n n
. § 3 6 -1-1 1 3 (i ) ( 2 0 0 5 ). -16- Based on the recor d, it is clea r t hat t he trial court’s finding that Mother expose d her c hildren to illega l dr

ug transac tions is supported by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. T h i s co n s t i t utes conduct e xhibiting a wanton disregar d for the w elfa re of the childre n under Te nnessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102( 1)(A) (iv). Acc ordingly, we find no err or in the trial court’s conclusion that gr ou nd s e xis t to te rm inate Mo the r’ s p are nta l righ ts.
Be st Int e r e st Finally, Mother argue s that termination of her pare ntal rights is not in the best interest of the children. Te nnessee Code Annotated § 36- 1-113(i) lists the fac tors to be con sidered. The c ourt 12 is not required to a nalyze eac h fac tor in order to determine that terminating a par ent’s rights is in t he best interest of the childre n. In r e M. A.R

. , 183 S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) ( citing Sta te-17-

v . T .S. W. , No. M2001-01735-COA- R3-JV, 2002 WL 970434, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2002) ).
Mother notes t h at , s i nce be ing in prison, she has completed he r G.E.D. a s well as seve ral oth e r pa re nti ng a nda ng e r m a na ge me nt c ou rs e s. She c la ims that sh e ha s a me a nin gf

ul r e latio ns hip with all of her c hildren, that she wa s unawa re of Freema n’s sexua l abuse of the children, an d that upon her r elea se fr om prison, she will have a job and a place to live. She argue s that the evidenc e do e s n ot s up po rt

the tria l cou rt ’s fi nd ing that termin a tio n of he r pare nta l righ ts i s inthebe st i nte re st of her children.
Mother’s eff

orts at self-improve ment are to be applaude d. Unfortunately, they ar e far t oo littl e, fa r t oo late. The trial court found, and Mot her admitted, that she expose d her c hildren to illegal dr ug tr a ns a c tio ns a ndthat sh e ph ys ic a lly abu se d he r ch ildre n. Th e c ou rt a lso no te d that Mo the r i s curr ently serving a twe nty-two yea r prison sentence f

or the drug tr ansac tions and the prior fac ilitation of murder convic tion. These findings ar e supported by undisputed e vidence

. Th e re c or d a lso sh ow s th at Mo the r rec ru ite d K .H . a nd T. H. to l e ave the ir

ho me wi th Gra ndmother and Aunt, promising them that she would be the best mother t hey ever had. Howe ver, ins te a d o f p ro vid inga

lov ing ho me fo r the m, the re c or d sh ow s that Mo the r e sse nti a lly ma de the g ir ls int o h ou se ho ld s e rv ants , a c tiv e ly humil iate d and a bu se d the m, and

ind e e d p ut t

he m in fe ar f or the ir lives and those of their sisters. De spite Mother’s disavowa l of any knowledg e of se x ual abuse , the rec ord shows that, to the contra ry , she stood by as Fr eema n and other sexual predators torme nted her da ug hte rs and

thr e ate ne d th e ir

sa fe ty and that of the ir sis te rs
. Mo the r’ s fa ilure to t ake re sp on sib ili ty for he r ac tions only

mag nifies the re sulting har m to the children.
“F ew c onsequenc es of judicial a ction are so g rave as t he severanc e of natural fa mily ties.” Santosky v. Kram er , 455 U.S. 745, 787 (1982). I t is not a decision to be taken lightly

. Howeve r, on this recor d, clea

r and c onvincingevidenc e compe ls affirma nce of the trial cour

t’s conclusion that termination of Mother’ s pare ntal rig hts is in t he best intere st of K.H., A.F ., and W.F.
C ONCL US I ON
The decision of the trial court is a ffirme d. The costs of this appea l are taxed to the Appe llant Tanya Dee Ballard and he r sure ty, for which e xecution may issue if ne cessa ry.

___________________________________ HOLLY M. K IRBY, JUDGE