* Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that

have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on

the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless

expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."

Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-30324

Summary Calendar

__________________

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

Lorenzo Jefferson,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Louisiana

(CR-94-50069)

______________________________________________

October 27, 1995

Before KING, SMITH and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam * :

Lorenzo Jefferson ("Jefferson") appeals from a jury verdict

finding him guilty of conspiracy to possess crack cocaine with the

intent to distribute and use of a firearm during and in relation to

the commission o f a drug-trafficking crime in violation of 212

U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Jefferson challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. We

affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

In early October 1993, the Shreve port Police Department

received comp laints that drugs were being sold at a residence

located at 6900 Lavender Street. The police contacted a

confidential informant, who agreed to go to the house and purchase

crack cocaine. After the informant successfully purchased crack,

the investigation continued. On October 13, 1993, Deputy U.S.

Marshal Andre Fuller went undercover and purchased drugs from

Jefferson and his roommate, Cedric McKeav er ("McKeaver"), at the

residence.

On May 19, 1994, agents executed arrest and search warrants at

the home on Lavender Street. As agents approached the home, they

encountered and arrested Jefferson, who appeared to be attempting

to run. McKeaver was arrested inside the home. The search yielded

approximately 2 45 grams of crack cocaine, forty-three grams of

marijuana, two handguns, and two rifles.

Jefferson and McKeaver were indicted on five counts. McKeaver

plead ed guilty and testified for the Government at Jefferson's

trial. The jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts I (conspiracy

to possess crack coca ine with intent to distribute), III

(possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine), and V

(knowingly using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to

a drug-tr afficking crime). Jefferson appeals, challenging the1 Jefferson does not contest the jury's verdict on Count III of

the indictment.

3 sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict in Counts

I and V of the indictment. 1

II. DISCUSSION

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court

determines whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences that

may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict,

a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. U nited States v. Charroux

, 3 F.3d

827, 830-31 (5th Cir. 1993). The evidence need not exclude every

rational hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with

every conclusion except guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of

fact could find the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. United States v. Pruneda-Gonzalez , 953 F.2d 190, 193 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied , 112 S. Ct. 2952 (1992). Juries are "free to

choose am ong all reasonable constructions of the evidence."

Charroux

, 3 F.3d at 831 (quoting United States v. Chaney

, 964 F.2d

43 7, 448 (5th Cir. 1992)). In addition, a reviewing court must

accept all credibility choices that tend to support the jury's

verdict. U nited States v. Anderson

, 933 F.2d 1261, 1274 (5th Cir.

1991).

Jefferson contends that the evidence was insu f ficient to

establish that McKeaver and he engaged in a conspiracy to possess

crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. S ee 21 U.S.C. §§ 841,

846. To prove that Jefferson was involved in a conspiracy, the4

Government must establish that (1) a conspiracy to po ssess

narcotics with the intent to distribute existed; (2) the defendant

knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant voluntarily

participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Bermea , 30 F.3d

1539, 1551 (5th Cir. 1994 ), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 1113, 1825

(1995).

The indictment alleged that "[f]rom on or about October 8,

1 993 and continuing to on or about May 19, 1994,

. . . th e

defendants, Cedric McKeav er and Lorenzo Jefferson, did knowingly

and intentionally con spire" to possess crack with the intent to

distribute. Jefferson contends that his conviction for conspiracy

is invalid because McKeaver testified that the cocaine found in the

house during the May 19th search belonged solely to Jefferson and

that Jefferson and he had no agreement to sell that cocaine

together.

The Government correctly asserts, however, that McKeaver's

testimony established that a conspiracy existed within the time

period alleged in the indictment. McKeaver testified that he and

J efferson had sold "dope" together on many occasions during that

time period. He testified that each contributed money for the drug

purchases and that they split the profits on their sales. He also

admitted that the crack cocaine sold to Agent Fuller on October 13,

1993 could have been "both of ours."

Although McKeaver also testified that the cocaine found during

the search belonged to Jefferson alone and that he and Jefferson

did not always sell crack cocaine together, his testimony about the

sales in which Jefferson and he participated jointly was "not2 By not challenging his conviction for possession of crack

cocaine with the intent to distribute, which offense was based on

the crack cocaine found in the home at the time the firearms were

seized, Jefferson essentially concedes that the second element of

the section 924(c) test is satisfied. See Munoz-Fabela , 896 F.2d

at 911 (concluding that possessing with the intent to distribute

constitutes a drug-trafficking offense).

5 incredible or otherwise insubstantial on its face." U nited States

v. Gadison

, 8 F.3d 186, 190 ( 5th Cir. 1993). The jury, as final

arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses, was enti tled to

believe McKeaver's testimony regardin g the numerous occasions on

which he and Jefferson sold crack cocaine together. See id

.

The record provides other evidence from which the jury could

have reasonably inferred that a conspiracy existed within the time

frame alleged in the indictment. Agent Fuller testified that he

purchased crack from McKe aver and Jefferson on October 13, 1993.

His testimony indicates that each was substantially involved in the

sale. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury

verdi ct, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support

the co nviction for conspiracy to possess crack cocaine with the

intent to distribute. See Charroux , 3 F.3d at 830-31.

Jef ferson also challenges his firearms conviction. S ee 18

U.S.C. § 924(c). To establish an offense under section 924(c), the

Government must demonstrate that Jefferson: (1) used or carried a

firearm during and in relation to (2) an underlying drugt rafficking crime. U nited States v. Munoz-Fabela

, 896 F.2d 908,

911 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 498 U.S. 824, 111 S. Ct. 76, 112 L.

Ed.2d 49 ( 1990). 2 Although the Government must show that the

firearm played an integral part in the felony, the weapon need not6

actually be used or brandished. Id . The Government may meet its

burden by showing that the weapon facilitated or could have

facilitated the drug-trafficking offense. U nited States v. CapoteCapote , 946 F.2d 1100, 1104 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied , 112 S.

Ct. 2278 (1992).

Jefferson's argument for reversal relies solely on McKeaver's

testimony that the weapons found in the home were used for hunting.

The jury, however, was free to reject this testimony based upon a

conclusion that it was not credible. S ee United States v.

Bustamante

, 45 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 1995), petition for cert.

filed

, 64 U.S.L.W. 3069 (U.S. July 5, 1995) (No. 95-60); United

States v. Anderton , 679 F.2d 1199, 1202 (5th Cir. 1982).

Testimony at trial established that ammunition, two handguns,

a rifle, and an "assault-type" rifle were found at the home during

the search. The presence of firearms in the home of a defendant

where drugs, money, and ammunition are also found is sufficient to

establish use of the firearm as an integral part o f a drugtrafficking offense. Capote-Capote , 946 F.2d at 1104; see United

States v. Thomas

, 12 F.3d 1350, 1362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied

, 114

S. Ct. 1861, 2119 (1994). In addition, Jefferson testified that

one gun, which police found under his mattress, was used "for

protection." This evidence provides sufficient support for the

jury's verdict that the firearms were used during and in relation

to a drug-trafficking offense.

Jefferson's convictions are affirmed.