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Number 140, May 1998

Global Order and SecurityPrivatization
by Herbert Howe

Conclusions
- 
Nation-states are losing    their monopoly over military might. Private security firms are filling a void by offering    military services and security for national governments and non-governmental    organizations.

- 
The ending of the Cold    War has raised both the supply of, and often the demand for, private security    organizations. The loss of superpower patronage has weakened numerous governments and    worldwide military cutbacks are supplying the private market with vast supplies of    equipment and trained personnel. 

- 
The rising number of    insurgencies and an increase in banditry threaten not just the capabilities of some    national militaries to ensure national security and stability, but also the effectiveness    of international relief organizations.

- 
Private security firms    may be a threat to global security because they lack accountability, act as strongmen for    multinational companies, and may prolong conflicts for greater profits.

- 
Established private    security companies are able to handpick employees on the basis of proven accomplishments    and their desire for future contracts encou-rages them to insist upon proper employee    behavior. A few private security firms provide combat soldiers: many more offer    specialists in logistics, communications, procurement, intelligence, advising, and    training.

- 
Elimination of    "mercenary" behavior is impossible and probably undesirable: private groups can    offer some useful services. The international community should establish international    regulations which could ensure that private companies assist global security.

The international state system hascontrolled military might over the past 300 years. Some observers believe that a dramaticgrowth in private security could challenge this control and eventually may threaten globalorder with military force that is less accountable/controllable than state militaries. MaxWeber maintained that the modern state arose because it "successfully upheld a claimto the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of itsorder." A number of established private firms are increasingly shouldering militaryresponsibilities which once belonged to the state. Does this growth threaten globalsecurity or could it assist fragile states undergoing dramatic changes in this post-ColdWar era?

Recent demand for better security hasdriven private security’s growth. Many governments have lost ground to powerfulinsurgents, often because the demise of superpower competition lowered foreign support tonumerous governments. "Collapsed states" are a post-Cold War phenomenon andgovernments in Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, and Zaire lost significant support when theirCold War patrons withdrew their previous aid and the possibility of military intervention.National militaries, at least in Africa, have often proven incapa- ble of national defenseand have sometimes increased state instability.

While state might has declined during the1990s, insurgent capabilities have often grown. Both the Cold War and its ending saw aflood of equipment and personnel, especially from the former Soviet Bloc and South Africa(fully-assembled AK-47 assault rifles sell for about $15 in some African townships).Children are increasingly used (the various factions in Liberia’s civil war from1990-1996 employed some 6,000 children under 15 years of age, out of a total of some60,000 fighters). Insurgencies increasingly are robbing or coercing aid organizations fortheir foreign exchange, communications, and logistics (Somalian thuggery during the early1990s was a major reason for U.S. and UN military intervention). 

Possible options for African state defenseinclude African regional military forces, Western intervention, and the UN. Yet thesepossibilities either lack strong military capabilities or are unlikely to occur. 

Lacking other options, states andbusinesses, as well as insurgencies and criminal groups, increasingly are employingprivate security. While combat soldiers, or "mercenaries," have received themost attention, private firms are more likely to furnish specialists in logistics,communications, procurement, intelligence, advising, and training. Many of today’sprivate soldiers hail from highly disciplined military units (e.g., U.S. Special Forces,the British Special Air Squadron and Special Boat Service, or South Africa’sapartheid-era Reconnaissance Commando and Parachute Brigade). The majority train andadvise, rather than fight for, their foreign employers.

Private security today is far differentfrom the ad hoc organizations of the past. Many of today’s companies exhibit adistinct corporate nature, including an ongoing intelligence capability, and a desire forgood public relations. Their established character allows them to handpick each employeeon the basis of proven accomplishments. The companies’ goal of obtaining contractsencourages them to control their employees’ actions. Private firms have a large poolof qualified applicants, due to worldwide political realignments and defense cutbackssince 1989. And, many of these companies often enjoy ties with major multinational,especially mineral, companies which provide increased funding, intelligence, and politicalcontacts.
**Growth**
The growth of private military and policecapability is staggering, especially in eastern Europe, wealthy Middle Eastern states, andthreatened African states. U.S. intelligence in late 1993 estimated that some 20,000foreigners were fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Mili-tary Professional Resources,Incorporated (MPRI)* is an American firm which claims that it contains "thegreatest corporate assemblage of military expertise in the world" (it employs 17retired U.S. generals full-time). MPRI has 182 former U.S. Special Forces personneltraining and equipping the Bosnia Federation’s military force (the U.S. Governmenthas supplied over $100 million in surplus equipment to assist MPRI’s success). A widerange of private British and U.S. firms operate in the Middle East. About 1,000 ex-U.S.military now work for the *Vinnell Corporation* in training the 65,000-man SaudiNational Guard. *Executive Outcomes* is a private company that British intelligencetermed "with the possible exception of the South African army, the most deadly andefficient army operating in sub-Saharan Africa." Executive Outcomes (EO) fieldedabout 600 combat soldiers in Angola and 300 men in Sierra Leone to help defeatinsurgencies—something the government forces could not accomplish by themselves.EO’s air capabilities, including MI-8, -17 and -24 helicopters and MiG-23 fighters,supported these soldiers. U.S. State Department sources claim that over 80 privatesecurity companies operate in Angola alone; five years ago there were six.
**Objections**
Critics have generally labeled privatesecurity companies as threats to global security because of alleged nonaccountability(including a disrespect for human rights), their possible use by neo-colonial forces, anda tendency to alienate the local military. Some critics charge soldiers (or companies) offortune with incompetence, perhaps to prolong the war and thus their contracts.
****Accountability**.Machiavelli cautioned his Prince that competent mercenaries could threaten the state.Critics assume that money drives mercenaries’ actions and that greed will quicklyshred any accountability or loyalty.

Private security companies may haveseveral masters: their own government, the employing government, and possibly a privatebusiness. Once inside a country and its defense establishment, a private firm could exertpowerful leverage upon the state. Private security’s coupling with powerfulmultinational companies dramatically increases a foreigner’s power within abeleaguered state.

No effective international norms orsanctions exist. A hiring government or insurgency may have little control over a powerfulprivate security force and could hesitate to discipline its presumed allies at a time ofneed. Mercenaries often move unimpeded and unrecorded through immigration, thus lesseningchances for future investigations into alleged misbehavior. These implicit licenses forillegal behavior encouraged past mercenary groups to engage in serious violations of humanrights. Foreign military personnel often show little knowledge or sensitivity to localcustoms and institutions.

As Western governments increasingly workwith private firms, some critics worry that such cooperation may circumvent publicoversight and enforcement. The U.S. Government in 1995 reportedly sidestepped a UN embargothat proscribed state supplying of military equipment to Rwanda by hiring *Ronco,* aprivate de-mining company, to provide armored transport vehicles and explosives.
***Last Gasp of Colonialism?**Africans especially distrust private security groups (although numerous states andinsurgencies have hired them). Accusations of white neocolonial, mercenary muscle gainingcheap mineral concessions and thus threatening self-determination have some basis in fact,especially in Africa. During the 1960s, mercenaries often received financing from Westernbusinesses and fought against African governments. 
****Relations with NationalMilitaries**. Private foreign personnel—especially combat units—mayfoment bitterness, and perhaps revolt, within the national army. The hiring of privatepersonnel is an *ipso facto* judgment by the government of its own military. Theforeigners’ often vaunted military background, their often superior weaponry, andtheir higher salaries may further anger the government’s military. Foreigners invarious African conflicts (e.g., Congo, Biafra, and Sierra Leone; as well as in Papua NewGuinea) have embittered various local officers. Papua New Guinea officers mutinied in 1997against the introduction of the British-based *Sandline* military force and forcedPrime Minister Julian Chan to step down.
****Ineptitude**. Popularliterature presents two images of the mercenary: the manipulative and uncontrollablewarrior or the inept foreign soldier. Sometimes "ineptitude" is deliberate.Pilots for Nigeria during its civil war (1967-1970) deliberately failed to bomb"Biafra’s" single airport: since their salaries were based on months andnot results, their prolongation of the war procured financial gain. Sometimes theforeigners are simply incompetent. A force of some 400 east European mercenaries fought inthe former Zaire during Mobutu’s final year. Mixed military capabilities andlanguages restricted operational effectiveness and inadequate medical capability saw manyof these soldiers quickly contract malaria and dysentery.

**Advantages of Private Security******
Yet private security companies have growndespite these and other fears. They fill a military void for both Western and recipientgovernments, are relatively inexpensive, and they may offer several military and politicaladvantages.
****Filling a Void**.Private security can enter situations where Western governments presently fear to tread,especially after the world’s intervention into Somalia. President Clinton’sPresidential Decision Directive-25 summarizes the views of many governments not tointervene in areas not of vital national interest. Not coincidentally, the rise of thesecompanies is coinciding with the pullback of Western nations and the UN from peacekeepingand peace enforcing.

Private companies can perform serviceswhich governments approve of, but hesitate to attempt themselves because of political,military, or financial costs. Private companies can supply both combat soldiers andcompetent military specialists to train or advise in areas where the national militariesmay be lacking.

These companies could aid humanitariangroups which increasingly need protection from insurgents or bandits attacking reliefefforts for the money and supplies. Protection was a major rationale for U.S. and then UNintervention into Somalia—an experience which the world wishes not to repeat.Competent private protection would lessen pressure upon governments to intervene, as wellas prevent the insurgents from gaining tactically-important supplies. 
****Economy**. Economy is amajor selling point for private security. Private security has a "shadow"capability which can be quickly assembled when contracted for. Executive Outcomes has apermanent staff of 30 and yet it reportedly can deploy a fully supported battalion (about650 men) within 15 days. Paying for specialists only when needed saves considerable sumsin salary, housing, and pensions while the leasing of private equipment, especiallyairplanes and helicopters, saves storage, insurance, and maintenance costs.

Executive Outcome’s operations lendsome cred-ence to this cost efficiency. EO’s budget ($40 million yearly in Angola andfar less in Sierra Leone) appears small when compared to the national military budgets ofAngola and Sierra Leone. Angola spent an estimated $515 million on its military in 1994,while Sierra Leone spent $41 million in 1995.

Another financial aspect is that someprivate companies act as arms merchants for their home governments. A private Israelifirm, *Levdan,* trained the Presidential Guard of the Congo-Brazzaville government inthe early 1990’s. The government then purchased $10 million of Israeli militaryequipment.
****Military and PoliticalAdvantages**. Private companies offer some possible military advantages. A privateforce can start up and deploy faster than multinational (and perhaps national) forces.Additionally, it probably will have a clearer chain of command and is not subject tochanging political desires (or fears) of the contributing nations. It will not suffer thenational vs supra-national tensions which plague multinational forces. It may have morereadily compatible military equipment training and common language, and possibly greaterexperience of working together than do ad hoc multinational forces. Additionally, privateforces such as Sandline and Executive Outcomes can handpick each of their soldiers basedupon past service records.

Finally, small groups of foreignspecialists may provide some political advantages over military personnel of local orforeign governments. A private agreement carries no political IOUs and some governmentsprefer foreigners who neither understand nor represent local viewpoints (several Africanpresidents have preferred foreign personal bodyguards).
**Trends**
Several private security trends areappearing. First, a continuing supply of competent applicants and the demand by businessesand fragile states will assist the growth of this multifaceted business. Elimination ofmercenaries, a goal sought by the African Research and Information Bureau in London, wouldprove impossible to administer and would drive both buyers and sellers away from anypublic oversight.

Second, despite this overall growth,private militaries similar to Executive Outcomes appear unlikely—despite EO’sclear military successes in Angola and Sierra Leone. EO’s effectiveness was unusualfor a mercenary force: most have performed as did the East Europeans in Zaire during 1997.Possible nonaccountability of such powerful groups, the guilt-by-association that theiremployers sometimes experience, and their often-concealed links with multinational mineralcompanies worry observers about their possible destabilizing of global physical andeconomic security.

Third, governments increasingly areemploying private companies to help advance national foreign policy goals which thegovernments wish accomplished but hesitate to do themselves. MPRI has furthered U.S. goalsin the former Yugoslavia and Defense Systems Limited has done the same for the Britishgovernment.

Fourth, governments increasingly will useprivate security to augment their own military capabilities; in other words, the choice isnot between private security and governmental militaries. Multinational forces areprobably the wave of the future for African security and private groups should have agrowing role to play. Private military groupings have assisted both national and regionalmilitaries within West Africa. Executive Outcomes soldiers cooperated with Nigerian troopsduring the conflict in Sierra Leone from 1995 to 1996. The U.S.-based Pacific Architectsand Engineering provided logistical, especially helicopter, service to ECOMOG (a WestAfrican multinational force) in Liberia. The British-based Sandline military consultancysupplied unreported but important advisory and logistical assistance to Nigerian soldierswhen they ousted the widely condemned J. P. Koromah government of Sierra Leone in early1998.

Finally, small private guard forces willcontinue to expand and provide important security for multinational companies and reliefgroups. This protection hopefully will assist worldwide economic development and lessenthe need for the international community to deploy government troops to protect reliefshipments.
**Moving Toward Regulation**
Because the role of private securitycompanies is clearly growing, governments and international organizations should seek waysto regulate, rather than eliminate, them.

Most security companies operate fromWestern nations where media and government provide some control over their activities.American companies, for example, need governmental approval—the terms of which arestipulated by the Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act. An inquiringmedia can also serve as a check. Some supporters of these companies will argue that thepersonnel for these companies come from first-world, highly professional militaries.

But international regulation is necessary.Govern-ments and media may, or may not, learn of objectionable behavior and then oftenonly after the fact. Regulation would benefit responsible companies by providing them withgreater legitimacy while separating them from those truly "mercenary" groupswilling to fight for any organization capable of paying them. *International*regulation is necessary since, as Sandline itself notes, these companies "can becomevery nomadic in order to evade nationally applied legislation which they regard asinappropriate or excessive.’’

Regulation would be a multi-step processand involve *registration*, which would determine the applicant’s initialqualification, and *specific project approval*, and then operational oversight whichshould include observers from recognized human rights organizations. Finally, an *enforcement**capability* would be essential, both during the military operation to lessen abusesand then following the operation.

Numerous details need resolution (e.g.,the appropriate international regulatory body and the extent of its enforcementcapabilities). Specific problems would include client confidentiality and theclient’s need for quick action versus the regulator’s requiring time andcontractual information before granting project approval.

Governments may find it difficult to agreeto international regulation because such action would confer legitimacy upon nonstatemilitary actors. Yet the supply of private personnel and the demand for them by states andbusinesses continue to expand. Rather than engaging in futile attempts at legallyeliminating "mercenary" behavior or ignoring this growing phenomenon, the worldcommunity should channel these companies’ capabilities into assisting globalsecurity.

Herbert M. Howe is Professor of AfricanStudies at Georgetown University. A longer version of this paper will be printed in theFletcher Forum.

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members and guests of the Institutefor National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University faculty. These includereports of original research, synopses of seminars and conferences,the results ofunclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguished speakers.

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