NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RORY M. WALSH,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1584

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-1445, Judge Coral Wong 

Pietsch.

______________________ 

Decided: July 13, 2016 

______________________ 

 RORY M. WALSH, York, PA, pro se.

CHRISTOPHER KEITH WIMBUSH, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also 

represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., SCOTT D. AUSTIN; CHRISTINA LYNN

GREGG, Y. KEN LEE, Office of General Counsel, United 

States Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
2 WALSH v. MCDONALD

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, SCHALL and CHEN, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

DECISION

Rory M. Walsh appeals the final decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) in Walsh v. McDonald, No. 14-1445, 2015 WL 

5092674 (Vet. App. Aug. 31, 2015), adhered to on denial of 

reconsideration, 2015 WL 6159120 (Vet. App. Oct. 20, 

2015). In that decision, the Veterans Court affirmed the 

April 11, 2014 decision of the Board of Veterans Appeals 

(“Board”) that (1) denied entitlement to an effective date 

prior to July 27, 2004, for a 30-percent disability rating 

for residuals of a left shoulder dislocation and degenerative joint disease of the left shoulder (“shoulder condition”); and that (2) dismissed a claim for entitlement to an 

effective date prior to July 27, 2004, for service connection 

for a left ankle strain (“ankle condition”), on the ground 

that, in a decision dated May 7, 2009, the Board had 

denied the claim and Mr. Walsh had not appealed. 

Walsh, 2015 WL 5092674 at *1–2, 7. We dismiss for lack 

of jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

I.

Mr. Walsh served on active duty in the United States 

Marine Corps from February of 1978 to November of 1993 

and from January of 1996 to March of 1996. On November 30, 1993, he filed a claim for service connection for his 

shoulder and ankle conditions. On May 19, 1994, a Veterans Administration (“VA”) regional office (“RO”) granted 

service connection for the shoulder condition and assigned 

a noncompensable disability rating, effective from November 2, 1993, but denied service connection for the 
WALSH v. MCDONALD 3

ankle condition. Mr. Walsh did not appeal the May 19, 

1994 decision, which therefore became final. 

On July 27, 2004, Mr. Walsh asked the RO for an increased disability rating for his shoulder condition. He 

also asked the RO to reopen his claim for his ankle condition. In February of 2005, the RO increased the disability 

rating for Mr. Walsh’s shoulder condition to 20 percent, 

effective from July 27, 2004, but continued to deny service 

connection for his ankle condition. Mr. Walsh filed a 

timely Notice of Disagreement, and the RO issued Statements of the Case (“SOCs”) on January 25, 2006, and 

April 4, 2006, respectively. In an August 2008 decision, 

the RO granted Mr. Walsh an increased disability rating 

of 30 percent for his shoulder condition, effective from 

July 27, 2004, and granted him service connection for his 

ankle condition and assigned a disability rating of 

20 percent, also effective from July 27, 2004. On May 7, 

2009, the Board remanded to the RO the question of an 

earlier effective date for Mr. Walsh’s shoulder condition 

because the RO had failed to issue an SOC on the point. 

At the same time, the Board denied Mr. Walsh’s claim for 

an earlier effective date for his ankle condition. 

Eventually, following the Board’s 2009 decision (and 

subsequent proceedings before the RO, the Board, and the 

Veterans Court, which we need not recount), the Board 

issued its April 11, 2014 decision. Mr. Walsh appealed 

that decision to the Veterans Court, and on August 31, 

2015, the court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Veterans Court found that the Board had not erred in determining that Mr. Walsh was not entitled to serviceconnection effective dates prior to July 27, 2004, for his 

shoulder and ankle conditions. This appeal followed.

II.

Our ability to review a decision of the Veterans Court 

is limited. Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), we may 

review “the validity of a decision of the [Veterans] Court 
4 WALSH v. MCDONALD

on a rule of law or of any statute or regulation . . . or any 

interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a 

factual matter) that was relied on by the [Veterans] Court 

in making the decision.” We have exclusive jurisdiction 

“to review and decide any challenge to the validity of any 

statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof 

brought under [38 U.S.C. § 7292], and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented 

and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). However, except to the extent that an appeal presents a constitutional issue, we “may not review (A) a challenge to a 

factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or 

regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” Id.

§ 7292(d)(2). For the reasons which follow, we hold that 

Mr. Walsh has failed to present any arguments that come 

within the scope of our jurisdiction.

III.

First, the validity of a statute or regulation was not at 

issue in the Veterans Court, and the Veterans Court, in 

its decision, did not interpret any statute or regulation. 

An interpretation of a statute or regulation occurs when 

its meaning is elaborated upon by the court. Graves v. 

Principi, 294 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing 

Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 

(en banc) (superseded on other grounds by statute, Pub. L. 

No. 107-330, § 402(a), 116 Stat. 2820, 2832 (2002))). That 

did not occur in this case. Mr. Walsh argues, for example,

that he never received a statement of his appellate rights 

(i.e., VA Form 4107) after the May 19, 1994 RO decision. 

But the Veterans Court, in affirming the Board’s finding 

that he received such notice, did not rely upon an interpretation of a statute or regulation, and Mr. Walsh does 

not argue to the contrary.

Mr. Walsh does argue that his appeal presents a constitutional issue. He bases this argument mainly on the 

contention that the Veterans Court deprived him of his 
WALSH v. MCDONALD 5

rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth 

Amendment by refusing to order the VA to produce what 

he refers to as various “falsified” medical records. The 

Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. 

VI. The proceedings before the VA and the Veterans 

Court did not involve a criminal prosecution, however. 

Therefore, the Sixth Amendment does not apply. See

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 (1993) (“The 

protections provided by the Sixth Amendment are explicitly confined to ‘criminal prosecutions.’”) (citing United 

States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)). Beyond that, 

Mr. Walsh also makes allegations of misconduct against 

VA entities, VA officials, and members of the Veterans 

Court, and his briefing contains references to an alleged 

attempted murder. Although it is not clear, it appears 

that Mr. Walsh may be making these allegations in 

support of a claim that, in general, his constitutional 

rights have been violated. In any event, assuming 

Mr. Walsh’s allegations could be viewed as supporting 

arguments that come within the scope of our jurisdiction,

there is no support for them in the record. We therefore 

decline to consider them. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 

528, 536–37 (1974) (explaining that “federal courts are 

without power to entertain claims otherwise within their 

jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as 

to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial,

obviously frivolous, plainly unsubstantial, or no longer 

open to discussion”) (internal quotations and citations 

omitted); Schafer v. Dep’t of Interior, 88 F.3d 981, 989 

(Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536–37). In 

sum, Mr. Walsh has failed to raise a valid constitutional 

issue.

Finally, putting aside the allegations we have just 

discussed, we have reviewed Mr. Walsh’s opening brief 

and reply brief to determine whether, insofar as his 
6 WALSH v. MCDONALD

claims relating to his shoulder and ankle conditions are 

concerned, he has presented us with any arguments that 

we have jurisdiction to consider. We have been unable to 

find any such arguments. To the extent Mr. Walsh focuses on his shoulder and ankle conditions, his contentions 

all involve the application of law to the facts of the case. 

We thus lack jurisdiction to consider them. Sullivan v. 

McDonald, 815 F.3d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining 

that “[w]e may not review factual determinations or 

application of law to fact”); Delisle v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 

1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (same).

CONCLUSION

Because, as explained, Mr. Walsh has failed to present any non-frivolous arguments which we have jurisdiction to consider, his appeal is dismissed.

DISMISSED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.