UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4364

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

EDWARD TYRONE PIPKIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. 

(4:05-cr-01129-TLW-2)

Submitted: January 5, 2012 Decided: February 9, 2012

Before KING, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronald R. Hall, West Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. 

Carrie Fisher Sherard, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Edward Tyrone Pipkin was found guilty of participating 

in a conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to 

distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base and five or more 

kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), 

attempted robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2 

(2006), use or carry of a firearm in furtherance of a drug 

trafficking crime and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a 

crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), 2 

(2006), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e) (2006). He 

was sentenced to a cumulative custodial sentence of 444 months. 

We affirm.

On appeal, Pipkin’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Although Pipkin’s 

counsel states that he can find no meritorious issues for 

appeal, the brief filed on Pipkin’s behalf seeks our review of 

the district court’s treatment of Pipkin’s request for new 

counsel and Pipkin’s sentence. Pipkin filed a pro se 

supplemental brief asserting his discontentment with his trial 

counsel as well as other issues.

We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to 

substitute counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v. 
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Perez, 661 F.3d 189, 191 (4th Cir. 2011). Although the Sixth 

Amendment protects an indigent defendant’s right to be 

represented by counsel, “[a]n indigent defendant can demand a 

different appointed lawyer only with good cause.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We consider three factors in 

reviewing denials of motions to substitute counsel: (1) the 

“[t]imeliness of the motion;” (2) the “adequacy of the court’s 

inquiry into the defendant’s complaint;” and (3) “whether the 

attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted in 

total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.” 

United States v. Mullen, 32 F.3d 891, 895 (4th Cir. 1994) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). These factors are balanced

“against the district court’s interest in the orderly 

administration of justice.” Perez, 661 F.3d at 191 (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

We perceive no abuse of discretion on the part of the 

district court. Although the record discloses that Pipkin was 

dissatisfied with his trial counsel during portions of the 

representation, the record also discloses that the district 

court adequately inquired into the relationship and found no 

breakdown of communication. Partway through the trial, Pipkin 

informed the court that he thought counsel was doing a “pretty 

good job” and affirmed his desire to proceed with the trial 
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without a change of counsel. To the extent that Pipkin alleges 

ineffective assistance of counsel in his supplemental brief, we 

decline to entertain such allegations on direct appeal because 

our review of the record uncovers no conclusive displays of such 

ineffective assistance. United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 

192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999).

We review a sentence under a deferential abuse of 

discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 

(2007). The first step in this review requires us to inspect 

for procedural reasonableness by ensuring that the district 

court committed no significant procedural errors, such as 

failing to calculate or improperly calculating the Guidelines 

range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) 

factors, or failing to adequately explain the sentence. United 

States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 2010). We 

then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence 

imposed, taking into account the totality of the circumstances. 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We presume that a sentence within a 

properly-calculated Guidelines range is reasonable. United 

States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007). That 

presumption may be rebutted by a showing “that the sentence is 

unreasonable when measured against the § 3553 factors.” United 
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States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Our review of Pipkin’s sentencing discloses one 

procedural error. The district court incorrectly stated that 

the Guidelines range for Pipkin’s attempted robbery conviction 

was 360 months to life when in fact it was the statutory maximum 

of 240 months. However, Pipkin was sentenced to 240 months for 

the attempted robbery, to run concurrently with two other 

sentences of 360 months’ imprisonment. We review for plain 

error because Pipkin did not object to the erroneous Guidelines 

calculation. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577-78 

(4th Cir. 2010). Because the procedural error is irrelevant to 

the time Pipkin will serve in prison, it does not affect his 

substantial rights. See United States v. Ellis, 326 F.3d 593, 

600 (4th Cir. 2003). Thus, we decline to find that the district 

court’s misstatement rises to the level of plain error.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Pipkin, in writing, of the right to 

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Pipkin requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 
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counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Pipkin.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED