COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Kelsey, Pe tty and Senior Judge Clements Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

THOMAS J. DOUGHERTY MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0213-09-4 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS OCTOBER 6, 2009 SHARON M. DOUGHERTY

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF FAIRFAX COUNTY David S. Schell, Judge John K. Cottrell (Cottrell, Flet cher, Schinstock, Bartol & Cottrell, P.C., on briefs), for appellant. Sharon Dougherty, pro se . Thomas J. Dougherty (husband) appeals from an order modifying the final decree of divorce. Husband ar gues that the trial court erred in (1) finding that husband’s interests in the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnershi ps were marital property and not husband’s separate property; (2) adopting the opinion of the wife Sharon M. Dougherty’s expert regarding the value of husband’s partnership leases, when such value was speculative and founded upon assumptions which were not supp orted by the evidence; and (3 ) not adopting th e opinion of husband’s expert regarding the value of husband’s partnership leases. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
BACKGROUND As the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and because this memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, this opinion recites only those facts and

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.- 2 - incidents of the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understandin g of the disposition of this appeal. The parties married on Fe bruary 1, 1991, and they separated in March 2006. In 1989, prior to the marria ge, husband and another individu al formed a partnership called Libmot Communications Partnershi p (Libmot). Libmot’s purpose wa s to apply for broadband radio service (BRS) licenses and lease them to wireless cable operators. During the marriage, husband created addition al partnerships to ac quire BRS licenses. Husband and wife stipulated that two of those partnerships, Idaho Falls Wireless Partnership and Springfield One Partnership, were marital prop erty. Husband started two other partnerships, Springfield M-1 Partnership and Des Moines M- 1 Partnership, during the marriage. Husband contends these partnerships are his separate prop erty, while wife argues that they are marital property. The trial court initially held that the Springfield M-1 and the Des Moines M-1 partnerships were husband’s separate property because they were funded by Libmot , which was husband’s separate property. Wife filed a motion to reconsider the classifica tion of Libmot and the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships. Wife argue d that the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships were marital because they were establ ished during the marriage. The trial court agreed with wife and modified the fina l decree, holding that the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships were marital property. 1 Husband timely noted his appeal.

1 The trial court did not reconsider its opini on regarding the classifi cation of Libmot and held that Libmot was husband’s sepa rate property. The classificati on of Libmot is not at issue on appeal.- 3 - ANALYSIS Issue 1 – Classification Husband argues that the trial court erred in classifying the Springfie ld M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships as marital property. On appeal, “decisions concerning equitable di stribution rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.” McDavid v. McDavid , 19 Va. App. 406, 407-08, 451 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1994) (citing Srinivasan v. Srinivasan , 10 Va. App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990)). In late 1991, husband became a twenty percent owner in the Des Moines M-1 Partnership. In 1992, husband became a twenty percent owner in the Springfield M-1 Partne rship. Libmot paid the FCC license fees on behalf of the Des Moines M- 1 and Springfield M-1 partnerships. Aside from husband’s testimony regarding the contributi ons made by Libmot, husb and offered no further evidence of his contributions toward the Des Moines M-1 and Springfield M-1 partnerships. Initially, the trial c ourt found that the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M- 1 partnerships were husband’s separate property. However, upon wife’s motion fo r reconsideration, the trial court held that the partnerships were ma rital property. The tr ial court stated that “when the partnerships were formed during the marriage , the instant they’re formed [sic] they’re marital property.” “‘All property acquired by eith er spouse during the marriage is presumed to be marital property in the absence of satisfactory evidence that it is separate property. The party claiming that property should be classified as separate has the burden to produce satisfactory evidence to rebut this presumption.’” Stratton v. Stratton , 16 Va. App. 878, 882, 433 S.E.2d 920, 922 (1993) (quoting Stroop v. Stroop , 10 Va. App. 611, 614-15, 394 S.E.2d 861, 863 (1990)). Therefore, the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partners hips were presumed to be marital property, and husband had the burden to prove they were his separate property.- 4 - Separate property is “all pr operty, real and personal, acquire d by either party before the marriage . . . [and] all property acquired during the marriage in exchange for or from the proceeds of sale of separate property, provided th at such property acquired during the marriage is maintained as separate property.” Code § 20-10 7.3(A)(1). Husband argues that the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships are his se parate property because funds from Libmot, his separate property, were used in exchange for his acquisition of the partnerships. Wife contends husband did not present any ev idence that the partnerships were acquired in exchange for or from proceeds of the sale of Libmot. She argue s that Libmot’s payment of the filing fees for the licenses acquire d by the partnerships is not th e equivalent of Libmot being exchanged for or sold to pay for hus band’s interest in the partnerships. An exchange is defined as “the act of transferring interests, each in consideration of the other,” and a sale is define d as “the transfer of prope rty or title for a price.” Black’s Law Dictionary 645, 1454 (9th ed. 2009). We conclude ther e was no “exchange” or “sale” between Libmot and the Springfield M-1 an d Des Moines M-1 partnerships. Libmot is a partnership, which is a separa te legal entity from husband. When Libmot paid the FCC license fees on behalf of the Sp ringfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships, Libmot did not receive anything in return. The license fees were owned not by Libmot, of which husband was one of two partners, but by the Spri ngfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships, of which husband was one of five partners. Both before and after Libmot paid the FCC license fees, husband’s interest in Libmot remained at fi fty percent, and his inte rest in the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships remained at twenty percent. Husband argues that Libmot’s purchase of th e FCC license fees is similar to the stock pledge made by the husband in Gilman v. Gilman , 32 Va. App. 104, 526 S.E.2d 763 (2000). In Gilman , the husband pledged his separate shares of stock as security for a loan for a down- 5 - payment and argued that his interest in the propert y was separate because the stock pledge was in exchange for the loan proceeds. Id. at 117-18, 526 S.E.2d at 769-70. The wife argued that since the bank never obtained title to th e shares of stock, there was no exchange and the property was marital. Id. at 117, 526 S.E.2d at 769. This Court held th at a stock pledge was an exchange as contemplated by Code § 20-107.3(A)(1), and ruled, “Where no marital property, effort, or credit is involved, a stock pledge is simply a method to use separate propert y to acquire additional property. We see no equitable rationale for classifying property acquired in this manner as marital property.” Id. at 118-19, 526 S.E.2d at 770. However, unlike Gilman , there was no exchange in this case. Husband did not exchange or sell his interest in Libmot to acquire an interest in the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships. Therefore, husband did not rebut the pres umption that the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships were ma rital property, and the trial court did not err in classifying them as marital property. Issues 2 and 3 – Valuation Husband argues that the trial court erred in accepting the opinion of wife’s expert, as opposed to his expert’s opinion, on the valuati on of the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships. Husband conte nds that wife’s expert relie d on speculative assumptions and assumed facts that were not in evidence. A court may “choose among conflicting assessmen ts of value as long as its finding is supported by the evidence.” McDavid , 19 Va. App. at 413, 451 S.E.2d at 718. Here, wife’s expert explained in detail th e methodology he used and how he valued the Springfield M-1 and Des Moines M-1 partnerships. He also testifie d as to why he disagreed with husband’s expert’s opinion and assumptions. The trial court adopted the opinion of the wife’s expert, and the evidence is sufficien t to support the trial court’s finding.- 6 - Attorney’s fees Husband asks this Court to award him atto rney’s fees and cost s incurred on appeal. See O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin , 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). On consideration of the record before us, we decline to award husband his attorney’s f ees and costs on appeal.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we a ffirm the trial court’s judgment. Affirmed.