Number 70, April 1996

Regional DeterrenceStrategies for New ProliferationThreatsJerome H. Kahan
Conclusions
- 	The deterrence of armed aggression against the United States, its vital national interests, or its allies hasmoved beyond the requirements of conventional force deterrence.  The proliferation of nuclear, biological,and chemical (NBC) weapons requires a new strategy to ensure effective deterrence against their use byregional states that could not win in a conventional conflict with the United States.

- 	Because proliferation has expanded to a number of regional actors, a single strategy is unlikely to besufficient in deterring states with varied motivations, and social, economic, religious, cultural, and politicalbackgrounds.

- 	The Unified Commands--principally the Pacific, Central and European Commands--provide a ready-made framework in which general U.S.  deterrence strategies can be tailored to each proliferant state. Whilethe Unified Com-mands would shape the individual deterrence strategies, the national command authority (NCA) would retain control of key decisions.

- 	Guidelines for NBC regional deterrence should include developing credible counterproliferation postures,profiling potential adversaries,  tailoring our military capabilities to specific threats, integrating NBCpreparedness into exercises and warplans, and actively pursuing coalitions designed to deter regionalproliferators from threatening to use or using NBC weapons.

**Regional NBC Proliferation Challenges Deterrence Policy

	In his latest *Annual Report to the President and the Congress,*Secretary of Defense William J. Perry stated that"earlier assumptions that conflicts not involving the Soviet Union would be fought solely with conventionalweapons needed to be reviewed and new guidance issued."  Deterrence is at the center of this unfoldingstrategy: if nonproliferation policies fail to stop nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons acquisition,the United States needs to be able to deter use or threats of use by regional proliferators when our interests orthose of our friends and allies are threatened. From another perspective, this means that we cannot allowpotential aggressors to believe that having NBC weapons in their hands will deter the application of superiorU.S. military power, conventional or nuclear. But developing a strategy for deterring a growing and disparategroup of NBC-armed nations from using or threatening to use these weapons in ways contrary to U.S. securityinterests poses challenges that differ in kind from the problem of deterring Soviet aggression, which consumedour attention and resources for more than 40 years.**National security policy continues to be centered around the geographic regions--Europe, Pacific, MiddleEast and South Asia, and Latin America--consistent with the focus of our key security commitments, the natureof our coalitions, and the way we plan and deploy our military forces. Given the relatively small number ofknown and the potential proliferators, a country-by-country counterproliferation approach is clearly necessary.But practical results can be achieved only through developing country-oriented NBC deterrence policies withinthe substantive and organizational framework of U.S. regional security policies and programs.

**The Role of the Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs)**

	In structuring NBC deterrence strategies, the roles of the regional CINCs--notably CINCPAC, CINCCENT,and CINCEUR, within whose areas of responsibility (AORs) fall all the NBC proliferators of near-termconcern--should be given special attention.****For example, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)identified 14 NBC proliferators who either are known to have or are suspected of having nuclear, biological,or chemical weapons programs, at least over the near-to mid-term. These proliferators include: India, Pakistan,and Algeria (nuclear); Egypt, Burma, and Vietnam (chemical); Libya, Syria, and Taiwan (biological andchemical); and China, North Korea, Israel, Iran, and Iraq (nuclear, biological, chemical).**The Goldwater-Nichols Act gives the regional CINCs operational responsibility for U.S. military forces intheir AORs. In peacetime, the regional CINCs are continuously on the front line, manifesting physical presenceand political commitments. In crises, these CINCs would command U.S. forces, whether joint task forcesdeployed to contain conflicts or large-scale forces conducting major military operations. A leadership role forthe regional CINCs in countering proliferation is consistent with the principal recommendation of the recentlyissued report of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), which states that "every DoD element mustfocus on supporting the operations of the Unified CINCs."
	In shaping NBC deterrence strategies, the regional CINCs would continue to work closely with relevantfunctional commands (for example, STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, and SOCOM) and with other U.S. agencies(notably the U.S. missions in their region). Within each AOR, a CINC-led regional team would develop tailoredapproaches to deter particular countries with certain estimated NBC capabilities who might have reason to useor threaten to use these weapons in various circumstances. In doing so, they would take into account (1) thelocation of a potential NBC crisis, (2) the balance of gains and risks a potential aggressor is likely to see, (3) theinterests motivating U.S. responses and the risks we might be prepared to take, (4) the full range of military,diplomatic, and economic assets we could bring to bear, (5) the prospect of multinational action, and (6)possible conflicts between NBC deterrence and other U.S. objectives.
	Because of the high stakes involved in deterring and dealing with NBC-armed adversaries, the Presidentand the NCA would have to endorse this approach, empower the CINCs, and remain engaged to ensure thatthe strategy was implemented.  The President, through the NCA, would retain control of key decisions.
**NBC Deterrence Capabilities

	U.S. military forces represent the cutting edge of any NBC deterrence strategy, and regional strategies mustrely on this capability to be effective. If U.S. forces are not prepared to deter and counter NBC proliferation--orare not perceived to have these capabilities--the strategy will not be credible. Recognizing this challenge, theCORM report proposes that the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) set up a "combatting proliferationcoordinating committee" and that the JCS "develop a procedure for integrating the capabilities of the functionalCINCs into DoD's overall planning for combatting proliferation."
	Recently, official U.S. policy has stressed the importance of counterproliferation. The President's NationalSecurity Strategy (NSS) of July 1994 stresses that U.S. forces must "be prepared to deter, prevent and defendagainst" NBC use; must retain the capacity "to retaliate against those who might contemplate the use ofweapons of mass destruction, so that the costs of such use will be seen as outweighing the gains;" and mustdevelop the capacity to "disable" an opponent's NBC arsenal before use occurs. The latest National MilitaryStrategy (NMS) reinforces these policies and adds that the U.S. continues to "make preparations to operateeffectively in environments marked by biological, chemical, or radioactive contamination."
	The DOD Counterproliferation Initiative supports the NSS and the NMS. Some specific DOD initiativesrelated to deterring and countering NBC threats include:

- 	Issuing the so-called Deutch Report, which "identified 16 priority technologies and programs with thegreatest potential for making a contribution to the U.S. non-proliferation and counterproliferationtechnologies" in such areas as detection and characterization of NBC threats, ability to destroy or neutralizeNBC weapons, and passive and active defenses against these threats.

- 	Undertaking a review of missions and functions that proposes guidelines on CINC responsibilities anddiscusses how the services might organize, train, and equip their forces to support the counterproliferationmissions of each combatant command.

- 	Establishing a Deputy Director for Military Support at the intelligence community's Non-ProliferationCenter (NPC), assigning additional military personnel to the NPC, and requesting the Defense IntelligenceAgency to place a higher     priority on counterproliferation military intelligence.

- 	Supporting NATO's Defense Group on Prolifera-tion (DGP) in assessing proliferation risks, in evaluatingthe operational implications of proliferation, and in understanding the capabilities needed to deter andcounter NBC use.

	Despite this apparent commitment to respond to the NBC proliferation challenge, critics argue thatproliferation is not taken seriously enough or given high enough priority when it comes to defense planningand procurement.  The case is made that the United States is not zeroing in on what is needed to deter NBCuse in the two major regional contingencies (MRCs) that drive our force structure and budget--one in Koreaand the other in the Middle East, both volatile places where the NBC threat is real.  Critics believe that neitherDefense Planning Guidance (DPG) nor regional warplans reflect the detailed force requirements and conceptsof operation needed to deter NBC use and fight effectively in the event deterrence fails. They contend that suchemphasis on counterproliferation is seen as being too hard, too costly, or distracting from the traditional andmore likely mission of deterring and fighting a conventional war. For these reasons, some critics claim that themilitary services may not be structuring their forces or developing doctrine to support peacetime deploymentsand operations in areas that fall under an adversary's "NBC****shadow.''
**Guidelines for Regional NBC Deterrence

	Regardless of which side of the argument most accurately portrays U.S. counterproliferation readiness,there are steps that can be taken to enhance that readiness.  A series of principles should be considered by theCINCs, operational commanders, and defense planners in formulating and implementing a regionally orientedNBC deterrence strategy. Four such principles come to mind:
**- Adopt a Credible Stance.  Through policy statements and tangible defense decisions, the U.S. militaryshould project an image that we will have the resolve and the capability to deter and counter regional NBCthreats when our interests are challenged. In presenting our NBC deterrence strategy, we should besensitive to the importance of balancing the need for clarity and credibility against the benefits of deliberateuncertainty and flexibility. While stressing the power of U.S. conventional forces in being able to imposedeterrence, we should remain somewhat ambiguous as to the role we expect our nuclear weapons toplay--suggesting that they are the ultimate deterrence instrument we have available. We should, however,discriminate as appropriate between nuclear, biological, and chemical use by potential adversaries.  Thisbasic posture should be conveyed globally as national policy, but the regional CINCs should tailor thismessage for maximum impact on the proliferators through declaratory statements and force posturing,including counterproliferation exercises in the region with joint and combined forces.   
- 	Profile the Adversaries.  Working closely with the intelligence community, the regional CINCs shouldinstitute a process for developing and continuously updating the capabilities and the "personalities" of theNBC proliferators in their AORs. Capability assessments should track NBC programs in terms of timing,scope, ability to inflict damage, location of sites, survivability, command and control, and economicviability. Central to this approach is neither to assume that potential NBC opponents are undeterrable northat our architecture of deterrence will automatically work. Instead, we need to try to develop anunderstanding of how regional adversaries might think about deterrence and how we might best deterthem from NBC threats or use. These assessments should cover such factors as motivations for acquisition,scenarios for use, willingness to take risks, and sophistication in understanding strategic concepts. Complete and accurate analyses of all those features cannot be expected, but new focus and higher prioritymight improve our understanding. A related objective would be to develop country-specific operationalplans for regional NBC adversaries, giving the NCA a full menu of choices for applying U.S. military forceagainst NBC targets with associated effectiveness estimates, confidence levels, collateral effects, and politicalconstraints.

- Adjust Military Capabilities and Strategy.  With the regional CINCs in the lead, defense planning,procurement, training, and doctrine should be systematically reviewed and modified as necessary to deterNBC use, respond to such use, and fight in an NBC environment. This not only should be done on a nationallevel to develop generic counterproliferation capabilities, but should be evaluated vis-a-vis specific NBCadversaries over a wide range of scenarios. An annual counterproliferation "Net Assessment" should beconducted to determine the relative U.S. military position against changing NBC threats in each region. Aspart of this process, a serious commitment should be made to integrate the NBC threat into the plans forfighting the two MRCs that presently drive our force structure. These assessments should identify newtechnologies, doctrinal changes, and training requirements needed to ensure effective power projection andin-country operations against NBC-armed adversaries.  	Among the initiatives that might flow from suchanalyses are: (1) new strategies for dispersal of forces and operating from a distance; (2) preparation offorces to function with protective gear; (3) greater reliance on out-of-area basing, (4) incorporating responseto NBC threats in the Joint Assessment processes and POM  recommendations; (5) creative uses of specialforces; (6) issuance of an updated and particularized series of doctrinal publications on NBC operations;and (7) establishment of joint task force packages prepared to deal with NBC threats in the various regions.These military initiatives should be designed to deal separately with nuclear, biological, and chemicalweapons threats, with common approaches taken only when justified. Finally, defensive systems, notablytheater missile defenses but also air defenses capable of defeating advanced cruise missiles, need to bepursued vigorously as elements of our evolving counterproliferation strategy. **-  	Actively Form Coalitions.   The United States should not bear responsibility for deterring regional NBCadversaries alone. Other nations, in and outside of these regions, may well have even greater stakes thanthe United States in preventing NBC weapons from being used. Coalition support may increase thelikelihood that deterrence will work. Warnings from multiple governments targeted against an NBC-armed"troublemaker" could not easily be ignored by a regional adversary. Although NATO is beginning to moveforward in developing collective counterproliferation strategies, alliances move slowly and slip to least-common-denominator policies. While supporting NATO's efforts, the United States should developstrategic alliances with key countries who share our NBC deterrence interests, focussed on particularproliferators. The UK and France, as nuclear powers with regional interests, represent crucial allies in thiscommon effort. Russia is another candidate, along with key allies located in or near regions ofconcern--notably Japan, South Korea, Israel, Egypt, and our friends in the Persian Gulf. The CINCs shouldlead this effort, coordinating with other defense and civilian agencies.  We should pursue with eachpotential ally a systematic series of strategy discussions, wargames, intelligence exchange exercises, andcontingency planning sessions. The goal of these efforts should be to develop common bilateral principlesand procedures that can make NBC deterrence more effective. Perhaps trilateral or multinational NBCdeterrence coalitions can be formed among likeminded states.
*Although regional strategies make the most sense, solutions to the problem of deterring NBC nuclearthreats are not obvious. To move toward effective solutions, DoD must pay far more attention to this problemthan it has in recent years. There needs to be a recognition that the military challenges posed by theproliferation of NBC weapons create differences in kind, not simply differences in degree, compared with boththe Cold War nuclear challenges and the conventional contingencies currently driving our strategic planning.The stakes, risks, constraints, and uncertainties associated with this emerging problem are unique. Mistakescould be costly and potentially irreversible, even if limited NBC use occurs in a distant regional setting. It istime to think seriously about the "*new unthinkable*.''

Mr. Kahan is Director of Regional Issues at the Center for Naval Analyses. This article is excerpted from a paperprepared and presented to a National Defense University (NDU) Working Group on "New Approaches toWMD Proliferation"  and was presented at the final workshop session on June 19, 1995. 

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