IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA22-866

Filed 3 October 2023

Cumberland County, No. 21 CRS 52924

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

ANGELA BENITA PHILLIPS, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 11 May 2022 by Judge James F. 

Ammons, Jr. in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 

on 26 April 2023.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorneys General John P. 

Barkley & Hyrum J. Hemingway, for the State. 

Reece & Reece, by Mary McCullers Reece, for Defendant-Appellant.

CARPENTER, Judge.

Angela Benita Phillips (“Defendant”) appeals from judgment after a jury 

convicted her of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. On appeal, 

Defendant argues the trial court erroneously instructed the jury by including an 

instruction on the prohibition of excessive force. After careful review, we agree with 

Defendant. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial. 

I. Factual & Procedural Background

On 4 April 2021, after a verbal altercation between Defendant and Latonya 

Dunlap (“Victim”), Defendant shot Victim. On 22 June 2021, a Cumberland County 
STATE V. PHILLIPS

Opinion of the Court

- 2 -

grand jury indicted Defendant for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious 

injury. On 9 May 2022, the State tried this case before a jury and the Honorable 

James Ammons, Jr. in Cumberland County Superior Court. 

At trial, witnesses testified that the altercation began with Victim entering 

Defendant’s front porch and ended with Defendant shooting Victim while she was on 

Defendant’s front porch. During the charge conference, Defendant requested the trial 

court provide North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction-Criminal (“NCPJI”) 308.80 to 

the jury. NCPJI 308.80 is an instruction on self-defense, specifically, self-defense 

within a defendant’s home. The trial court granted the request but modified NCPJI 

308.80 to include language prohibiting the use of “excessive force.” Over Defendant’s 

objection, the trial court instructed the jury with the modified charge. On 11 May 

2022, the jury found Defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting 

serious injury. Defendant orally appealed in open court. 

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a) (2021). 

III. Issue

The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erroneously instructed the jury

by including an instruction on the prohibition of excessive force. 

IV. Analysis

This Court reviews the legality of jury instructions de novo. State v. Barron, 

202 N.C. App. 686, 694, 690 S.E.2d 22, 29 (2010). “‘Under a de novo review, th[is 
STATE V. PHILLIPS

Opinion of the Court

- 3 -

C]ourt considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of 

the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 

(2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 

316, 319 (2003)). 

An erroneous jury instruction “is prejudicial and requires a new trial only if 

‘there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, 

a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.’” 

State v. Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. 109, 116, 674 S.E.2d 707, 712 (2009) (quoting N.C. 

Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a)).

North Carolina General Statute section 14-51.2 is colloquially known as the 

Castle Doctrine. Under the Castle Doctrine:

the lawful occupant of a home . . . is presumed to have held 

a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily 

harm. . . when using defensive force that is intended or 

likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to another if 

both of the following apply: (1) The person against whom 

the defensive force was used was in the process of 

unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and 

forcibly entered, a home . . . . (2) The person who uses 

defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an 

unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act 

was occurring or had occurred.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b) (2021). In other words, it is presumed that an occupant 

of a home may use deadly force to prevent an intruder from entering the home if the 

occupant reasonably believed the intruder was trying to unlawfully enter the home. 

See id. This presumption, however, is rebuttable. Id. § 14-51.2(c). For example, an 
STATE V. PHILLIPS

Opinion of the Court

- 4 -

occupant cannot use deadly force if the intruder has “discontinued all efforts to 

unlawfully and forcefully enter the home.” Id. § 14-51.2(c)(5). 

In Castle Doctrine scenarios, excessive force1 is not prohibited. See id. § 14-

51.2(b). Indeed, the Castle Doctrine allows an occupant to use the ultimate force 

when defending his or her home: “force that is intended or likely to cause death.” Id. 

And under the Castle Doctrine, the ultimate force is presumed necessary unless the 

presumption is rebutted. See id. 

North Carolina has a “Stand Your Ground” Doctrine, as well: N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 14-51.3 (2021). See State v. Walker, 286 N.C. App. 438, 448, 880 S.E.2d 731, 739 

(2022) (labeling N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3 the “stand your ground” statute). Section 

14-51.3 states: 

A person is justified in using force, except deadly force, 

against another when and to the extent that the person 

reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend 

himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent 

use of unlawful force. However, a person is justified in the 

use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat in 

any place he or she has the lawful right to be if either of 

the following applies: (1) He or she reasonably believes that 

such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great 

bodily harm to himself or herself or another. (2) Under the 

circumstances permitted pursuant to [the Castle Doctrine].

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a). In other words, if a person is in a legally occupied place, 

that person need not retreat and may use deadly force if he or she “reasonably 

1 Excessive force is force that exceeds what reasonably appears necessary for selfdefense. See State v. Shoemaker, 80 N.C. App. 95, 102, 341 S.E.2d 603, 608 (1986).
STATE V. PHILLIPS

Opinion of the Court

- 5 -

believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm 

to himself or herself or another.” See id. The Stand Your Ground Doctrine overlaps 

with the Castle Doctrine because the Stand Your Ground Doctrine also applies in 

Castle Doctrine scenarios, i.e., self-defense situations within the home. See id. So if 

the Castle Doctrine presumption applies, deadly force is presumed necessary, and 

you need not retreat. See id. Said differently: If you reasonably believe an intruder 

is unlawfully entering your home, you have a presumed right to use deadly force 

under the Castle Doctrine, id. § 14-51.2(b), and you need not retreat under the Stand 

Your Ground Doctrine, id. § 14-51.3(a). 

In State v. Benner, the North Carolina Supreme Court discussed both doctrines

and contemplated the possibility of excessive force. 380 N.C. 621, 638, 869 S.E.2d 

199, 210 (2022). In Benner, the defendant shot and killed the victim while the victim 

was in the defendant’s home. Id. at 625, 869 S.E.2d at 202. A jury convicted the 

defendant of first-degree murder, and the defendant appealed, arguing the trial court 

erred by failing to give him a “complete self-defense instruction.” Id. at 629, 869 

S.E.2d at 205. The Court analyzed both section 14-51.2 and section 14-51.3 and 

stated that it is a:

well-established legal principle that, even though a 

defendant attacked in his own home is entitled to stand his 

ground, to repel force with force, and to increase his force, 

so as not only to resist, but also to overcome the assault, 

such an entitlement would not excuse the defendant if he 

used excessive force in repelling the assault. 
STATE V. PHILLIPS

Opinion of the Court

- 6 -

Id. at 636, 869 S.E.2d at 209 (purgandum). The Court continued: “the proportionality 

rule inherent in the requirement that the defendant not use excessive force continues 

to exist even in instances in which a defendant is entitled to stand his or her ground.” 

Id. at 636, 869 S.E.2d at 209. 

Although the Benner Court addressed an in-home self-defense scenario, its 

excessive-force language pertained only to the Stand Your Ground Doctrine. See id. 

at 636, 869 S.E.2d at 209. As mentioned, the Stand Your Ground Doctrine applies to

in-home scenarios, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a), and the Benner Court spoke in Stand 

Your Ground terms: “the proportionality rule inherent in the requirement that the 

defendant not use excessive force continues to exist even in instances in which a 

defendant is entitled to stand his or her ground,” Benner, 380 N.C. at 636, 869 S.E.2d 

at 209 (emphasis added). 

In Walker, this Court discussed Benner and stated: “That decision makes clear 

that the use of deadly force cannot be excessive and must still be proportional even 

when the defendant has no duty to retreat and is entitled to stand his ground . . . .” 

Walker, 286 N.C. App. at 447, 880 S.E.2d at 738 (emphasis added). In other words, 

the Benner prohibition of excessive force concerns the Stand Your Ground Doctrine, 

not the Castle Doctrine. See id. at 447, 880 S.E.2d at 738. We agree. 

This Court went on to compare the Castle Doctrine and the Stand Your Ground 

Doctrine. We said, “the castle doctrine statute does not obviate the proportionality 

requirement inherent to lethal self-defense; instead, it simply presumes that the 
STATE V. PHILLIPS

Opinion of the Court

- 7 -

proportionality requirement is satisfied under specific circumstances.” Id. at 448, 880 

S.E.2d at 739. Then concerning the Stand Your Ground Doctrine, we said the

defendant “could use deadly force against the victim under Subsection 14-51.3(a) only 

if it was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm, i.e., if it was 

proportional.” Id. at 449, 880 S.E.2d at 739. 

Put together: Under the Castle Doctrine, excessive force is impossible unless 

the State rebuts the Castle Doctrine presumption, but under the Stand Your Ground 

Doctrine, excessive force is possible if the defendant acts disproportionately. See id. 

at 448–49, 880 S.E.2d at 739. So in Castle Doctrine scenarios, unless the State rebuts 

the Castle Doctrine presumption, a jury cannot find that a defendant used excessive 

force. See id. at 448–49, 880 S.E.2d at 739.

Here, the trial court instructed the jury based on NCPJI 308.80, but added the 

following language: 

A defendant does not have the right to use excessive force. 

The defendant had the right to use only such force as 

reasonably appeared necessary to the defendant under the 

circumstances to protect the defendant from death or great 

bodily harm. In making this determination you should 

consider the circumstances as you find them to exist from 

the evidence including the size, age, and strength of the 

defendant as compared to the victim; the fierceness of any 

assault upon the defendant; and whether the victim 

possessed a weapon.

Defendant argues the trial court’s jury instruction incorrectly stated the law 

by including language explaining the excessive-force prohibition. Defendant argues 
STATE V. PHILLIPS

Opinion of the Court

- 8 -

the Castle Doctrine provides her with a rebuttable presumption that deadly force is 

authorized, and since no force exceeds deadly force, excessive force is impossible 

where the State fails to rebut the presumption. We agree with Defendant. 

Here, when the trial court conclusively stated that “[D]efendant does not have 

the right to use excessive force,” the trial court concluded that the State rebutted the 

Castle Doctrine presumption. But whether the State successfully rebutted the Castle 

Doctrine presumption was for the jury to decide, as a matter of fact, and the 

remainder of the equation was a matter of law. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b). If 

the jury determined the question of fact—whether deadly force was authorized

because the State failed to rebut the presumption—in the affirmative, Defendant, as 

a matter of law, did not use excessive force when she shot Victim. See id. 

The trial court could have instructed the jury this way: If the State rebutted 

the Castle Doctrine presumption, Defendant could not use excessive force to protect 

herself; but if the State failed to rebut the presumption, the proportionality of 

Defendant’s force was irrelevant. See id. Therefore, the trial court erred by 

categorically stating that Defendant “d[id] not have the right to use excessive force.” 

See id. If this case only concerned the Stand Your Ground Doctrine, the excessiveforce instruction may have sufficed. See Benner, 380 N.C. at 636, 869 S.E.2d at 209. 

But because this case concerns the Castle Doctrine, the excessive-force instruction 

was erroneous. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b). 
STATE V. PHILLIPS

Opinion of the Court

- 9 -

Further, by stating that Defendant “d[id] not have the right to use excessive 

force,” it is probable that the trial court confused the jury. Indeed, shortly after the 

trial court instructed the jury, a juror asked the court if it could “repeat the last,” to 

which the court replied, “[i]t is confusing.” A special verdict form may have helped

the jury discern the nuanced issues arising from the different self-defense doctrines. 

Because the trial court’s instruction was both erroneous and confusing, there 

is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different result if it 

received a proper instruction. See Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. at 116, 674 S.E.2d at

712. Thus, Defendant was prejudiced by the instruction and is therefore entitled to 

a new trial. See id. at 116, 674 S.E.2d at 712. 

V. Conclusion

We hold the trial court erred when it instructed the jury, and there was a 

reasonable possibility of a different result had the trial court correctly instructed the 

jury. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial. 

VACATED AND REMANDED.

Judge STADING concurs.

Judge HAMPSON dissents in a separate opinion.
No. COA22-866 – State v. Phillips

HAMPSON, Judge, dissenting.

The Castle Doctrine, applied as a statutory defense, must be viewed in the 

context of the statutory scheme in which it is found and read together with its 

accompanying statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 (Home, workplace, and motor 

vehicle protection; presumption of fear of death or serious bodily harm.); N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 14-51.3 (Use of force in defense of person; relief from criminal or civil liability); 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.4 (Justification for defensive force not available). It is not a 

stand-alone defense but is rather integrated into a defense of justification—or the 

right to stand one’s ground—in defense of person or property. Specifically, N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 14-51.3 first provides: “A person is justified in using force, except deadly force, 

against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the 

conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s 

imminent use of unlawful force.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a). That statute further 

provides two instances where deadly force may be justified:

a person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not 

have a duty to retreat in any place he or she has the lawful 

right to be if either of the following applies:

(1) He or she reasonably believes that such force is 

necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm 

to himself or herself or another.

(2) Under the circumstances permitted pursuant to G.S. 

14-51.2.

Id. These subsections, together, create the basis for the so-called “Stand-Your-
STATE V. PHILLIPS

HAMPSON, J., dissenting

2

Ground” defense. Both rely on a central unifying principle for justifying the use of 

deadly force in defense of person or property: the person “reasonably believes that 

such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm[.]” N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 14-51.3(a)(1). Unlike subsection 1, however, under subsection 2—by reference 

to section 14-51.2—when a lawful occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or workplace 

knowingly applies deadly force in defense against an unlawful breaking or entering 

or removal of a person, the lawful occupant is entitled to a presumption that they 

reasonably feared imminent death or serious bodily harm. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-

51.2(b) As such, both subsections apply the same “reasonable belief” standard, but 

under subsection 2, the lawful occupant’s belief is presumptively reasonable unless 

and until the State overcomes that presumption. 

Indeed, we have previously observed the Castle Doctrine Statute—N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 14-51.2—“functions by creating a presumption of reasonable fear of imminent 

death or serious bodily harm in favor of a lawful occupant of a home, which in turn 

justifies the occupant’s use of deadly force.” State v. Austin, 279 N.C. App. 377, 382, 

865 S.E.2d 350, 355, rev. denied, 871 S.E.2d 519 (N.C. 2022). While N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 14-51.2 provides the same self-defense protections to one acting in defense of person 

or property, it broadens the traditional notion of self-defense by removing the burden 

from a defendant to prove key elements of traditional self-defense. Id. at 380, 865 

S.E.2d at 353. 

In effect, this provision eliminates the needs for lawful 
STATE V. PHILLIPS

HAMPSON, J., dissenting

3

occupants of a home to show that they reasonably believed 

the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent 

death or serious bodily injury to themselves or others—a 

requirement of traditional self-defense. Instead, that belief 

is presumed when the statutory criteria are satisfied.

Id. at 382-83, 865 S.E.2d at 355. 

Hence, the Castle Doctrine Statute “simply provides that a lawful occupant of 

a home, workplace, or motor vehicle is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that 

deadly force is reasonable when used against someone who had or was unlawfully 

breaking into that location or kidnapping someone from that location.” State v. 

Walker, 286 N.C. App. 438, 448, 880 S.E.2d 731, 739, rev. denied 887 S.E.2d 879 (N.C. 

2023). “In other words, the castle doctrine statute does not obviate the 

proportionality requirement inherent to lethal self-defense; instead, it simply 

presumes that the proportionality requirement is satisfied under specific 

circumstances.” Id. Moreover, “the castle doctrine’s rebuttable presumption is not 

limited to the five scenarios listed in the statute.” Austin, 279 N.C. App. at 384, 865 

S.E.2d at 356. Viewed correctly, “the castle doctrine . . . is effectively a burdenshifting provision, creating a presumption in favor of the defendant that can then be 

rebutted by the State.” Id. “[I]f the State presents substantial evidence from which 

a reasonable juror could conclude that a defendant did not have a reasonable fear of 

imminent death or serious bodily harm, the State can overcome the presumption and 

create a fact question for the jury.” Id.

This is consistent with how our State Supreme Court has applied the stand-
STATE V. PHILLIPS

HAMPSON, J., dissenting

4

your-ground principles. Indeed, our Supreme Court continues to acknowledge that 

the statutory Castle Doctrine Defense and Stand-Your-Ground laws track 

consistently with the respective common law defenses including: “the wellestablished legal principle that, even though a defendant attacked in his own home 

is ‘ “entitled to stand his ground, to repel force with force, and to increase his force, 

so as not only to resist, but also to overcome the assault,” ’ such an entitlement ‘ 

“would not excuse the defendant if he used excessive force in repelling the assault,” ’ 

” State v. Benner, 380 N.C. 621, 636, 869 S.E.2d 199, 209 (2022) (quoting State v. 

Francis, 252 N.C. 57, 60, 112 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1960)).2

Furthermore, here, while Defendant contends the trial court erred by giving 

the “excessive force” instruction, Defendant’s argument ignores the trial court’s 

repeated instructions squarely placing the burden of proof to overcome the defense of 

habitation on the State. “We examine the instructions ‘as a whole’ to determine if 

they present the law ‘fairly and clearly’ to the jury.” Austin, 279 N.C. App. at 385, 

865 S.E.2d at 356 (quoting State v. Chandler, 342 N.C. 742, 751–52, 467 S.E.2d 636, 

641 (1996)). “The purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to give a clear instruction which 

2 The majority is, of course, correct that both Benner and Walker discuss these 

principles in terms of “stand-your-ground” and not expressly in terms of defense of 

habitation. However, I see that as an outgrowth of the fact that the justification defenses of 

the statutory Castle Doctrine and defense of person both fall under the umbrella of a StandYour-Ground law. The statutory Castle Doctrine simply provides an additional protection 

to the lawful occupant of a dwelling, vehicle or workplace and places the burden on the 

State to overcome the presumption.
STATE V. PHILLIPS

HAMPSON, J., dissenting

5

applies the law to the evidence in such manner as to assist the jury in understanding 

the case and in reaching a correct verdict.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341, 

346, 626 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2006). “An error in jury instructions ‘is prejudicial and 

requires a new trial only if there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in 

question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial.’ 

” Id. (quoting State v. Dilworth, 274 N.C. App. 57, 61, 851 S.E.2d 406, 409 (2020).

In this case, the trial court instructed the jury, “If the defendant assaulted the 

victim to prevent a forcible entry into the defendant’s home or to terminate the 

intruder’s unlawful entry the defendant’s actions are excused and the defendant is 

not guilty.” “The State has the burden of proving to you from the evidence beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful defense of the defendant’s 

home.” After listing the circumstances in which Defendant would be justified in using 

deadly force, the trial court further explained: “A lawful occupant within a home does 

not have a duty to retreat from an intruder in these circumstances. Furthermore, a 

person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person’s home is 

presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or 

violence.” The trial court then instructed specifically on the elements of the Castle 

Doctrine statute:

In addition, absent evidence to the contrary, the lawful 

occupant of a home is presumed to have held a reasonable 

fear of imminent death or serious harm to herself or others 

when using defensive force that is intended or likely to 

cause death or serious bodily harm to another if both of the 
STATE V. PHILLIPS

HAMPSON, J., dissenting

6

following apply. The person against whom the defensive 

force was used was in the process of unlawfully and 

forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, 

a home or if that person had removed or was attempting to 

remove another person against that person’s will from the 

home, and two, that the person who uses the defensive 

force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and 

forceful entry or forcible act was occurring or had occurred. 

In charging the jury on returning its verdict on the offenses submitted, the trial court 

instructed: “If you find from a reasonable doubt that the Defendant assaulted the 

victim, you may return a verdict of guilty only if the State has also satisfied you 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful defense of the 

defendant’s home.” “If you do not so find or have a reasonable doubt about whether 

the State has proved any one or more of these things that the defendant would be 

justified in defending the home, it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.” 

Critically, Defendant does not contend the trial court erred in any of these 

instructions. Taken as a whole, the trial court’s instructions adequately applied the 

law to the evidence, emphasized the Castle Doctrine presumption, and mandated the 

jury place the burden of proof on the State to prove Defendant was not justified in the 

use of deadly force in the face of an intruder—such that there is not a reasonable 

possibility, on the facts of this case, that the jury would have returned a different 

verdict.

Here, Defendant was entitled to the statutory Castle Doctrine presumption. 

Likewise, the State was entitled to attempt to rebut that presumption; including 
STATE V. PHILLIPS

HAMPSON, J., dissenting

7

through evidence Defendant did not actually have a reasonable fear of imminent 

death or serious bodily harm and the force exercised by Defendant was, in fact, 

excessive under the factual circumstances of this case. See Austin, 279 N.C. App. at 

384, 865 S.E.2d at 356. Thus, the trial court’s instruction on excessive force was not 

erroneous. Therefore, there was no error at trial. Consequently, Defendant is not 

entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.