Number 52, November 1995
*The Outlook For Russian Foreign Policy:*
Great Power Restoration
by James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones
**Conclusions**
- Moscow's erratic attempts to defend Russia's "vital interests"--while still clinging to the goal of globalintegration--have not worked.  Even reform-minded politicians and officials in Moscow question whether the UnitedStates will ever allow Russia a place in the international community.  
- The perceived failure of Moscow's quest for global integration, coupled with the ongoing shift in Russian politics to thenationalist and conservative end of the political spectrum, is increasing the appeal of a clear-cut alternative: GreatPower restoration.  
- Great Power restorationists--including retired General Alexsander Lebed's Congress of Russian Communities, theCommunist Party, and various "national patriotic" groups like Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's LDP--have never beenreconciled to Russia's loss of Great Power status.  Although most do not harbor hopes of regaining the militarysuperpower status of the USSR, Great Power restorationists see America's emergence as the single superpower asdestabilizing and want Russia to serve as a counterweight. 
- Great Power restorationists see regional integration--consolidating Moscow's domination of other Soviet successorstates--as a basic step toward rebuilding Great Power status and carving out an international role for Moscow based onRussian strength, not weakness.
- Even if a conservative sweep in the December parliamentary elections is averted and Boris Yeltsin manages to hold ontothe presidency after the presidential elections currently scheduled for next June, Moscow will likely adopt someelements of the Great Power approach. We can therefore expect Moscow to increase its efforts at some sort of regionalintegration even if it means antagonizing the major international powers. 

**Yeltsin's Initial Foreign Policy**

	Russia's initial foreign policy--most closely associated with Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev--viewed foreign policyprimarily as an extension of radical economic reform.  The main goal of Kremlin foreign policy was full integration intoexisting Western international organizations--both financial and defense.
	A key assumption undergirding this approach was that the only way a weakened Russia could integrate into theinternational community was through close cooperation with the U.S. and other Western powers.  Indeed, Moscow harboredstrong hopes that the West would reward Russia for withdrawing from Eastern Europe and repudiating Cold War Sovietaggression, by welcoming Russia into the international community and footing the bill for Russian economic reform.  Thisinitial policy approach also involved accepting the other Soviet successor states as equal partners, resolving differences withthem through diplomacy, and disengaging from them militarily.  
	By late-1992, however, it was clear that the initial Kozyrev strategy--relying on the United States to help Russia integrateinto the global community and transition to a democracy and market economy--was running into trouble.  Disengagingmilitarily from the other Soviet successor states proved difficult.  Many of these states proved to be little more thancontiguous pieces of real estate racked by ethnic strife and clan warfare. Russia repeatedly found itself intervening militarily,sometimes (as in the case of Tajikistan) at the request of an embattled host government.
	Relations with the United States were also disappointing.  The hoped-for economic assistance was slow in coming andmuch less than expected.  Moreover, Moscow's efforts to protect what it saw as its legitimate security interests in the otherSoviet successor states prompted charges of Russian neo-imperialism from a suspicious West.  

**Defending Russia's "Vital Interests"**

	By the end of 1993, Moscow had finally abandoned Kozyrev's pro-Western policy in favor of the notion that Russiacould entrust its security and place in the international community only to itself.  Russia's "vital interests" became thewatchword, as did the idea that Moscow should pursue a foreign policy more independent of the United States.  
	One key corollary of this approach was that maintaining exclusive Russian influence over the other Commonwealthcountries was one of Russia's vital interests. Another was that Moscow's former Warsaw Pact allies must remain eitherfriendly to Moscow or neutral.  This was clearly confirmed in the fall of 1993, when--after some initial confusion--PresidentYeltsin came out in strong opposition to any move by NATO to incorporate the Central European states.

**Trying To Have It Both Ways

	Beyond these general goals, however, there was no consensus on how to translate the principle of "vital interests" intoaction.  Moreover, official Moscow--while it may have lost hope in its earlier expectations for cooperation with the UnitedStates--never really abandoned the goal of global reintegration.  The implicit hope was that the United States would acceptRussia's more assertive defense of its national interests, without denying Moscow a place in the international community.   
	Two developments have coincided to discredit the Yeltsin regime's inconsistent defense of Russia's vital interests.  First,Russian politics have moved decidedly toward the more conservative and nationalist end of the political spectrum.  Second,developments in the international arena--in particular Moscow's marginal role in the Balkan crisis and the continuing threatof NATO expansion--have convinced even reform-minded politicians that official Moscow's rather schizophrenic approachhas little hope of winning Russia a respectable place in the international arena.

**"Great Power Restorationists"**

	Great power restorationists have a very different set of priorities than those who hoped to see Moscow integrate into theglobal community.  The highest priority of the Great Power restorationists is to assert what they see as Russia's rightful rolein the world.  They see regional integration--consolidating Mos-cow's domination of other Soviet successor states--as abasic step toward rebuilding Great Power status and carving out an international role for Moscow based on Russian strength,not weakness.  The assumption behind much Great Power restorationist thought is that America's emergence as the singlesuperpower is destabilizing and that Russia can serve as a counterweight.
	Among the more moderate of the Great Power restorationists is the Congress of Russian Communi-ties (KRO).  KRO'sprogram is relatively dispassionate, including only vague suggestions for implementing its top national security priority: "tosecure the restoration of the status of Russia as a world power."  However, the statements of KRO's co-chairman Lebed, acharismatic, retired general who achieved instant popularity through his blunt public attacks on Yeltsin and Defense MinisterPavel Grachev, are much more forthright.  For instance, Lebed (who earlier affirmed that he still sees NATO as a threat toRussia) recently accused NATO of behaving like "a big drunken hooligan in a kindergarten."  Lebed warned that NATOexpansion would force Russia to form its own military bloc and denounce treaties with the West.  
	The program of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, one of the current frontrunners in the upcoming Dumaelections, goes much further than that of KRO.  The CP states bluntly that "the foreign political roots of our misfortunes lie inthe country's subordination to the West's interests, the illegal and violent dismemberment of the Soviet Union, and the loss ofstrategic allies."  Its program advocates recreating a single union state "on a voluntary basis" and renouncing all treaties that"encroach on Russia's dignity and interests."  
	The Communists' close ally--the Agrarian Party--has incorporated many of these same themes in its program, whichreflects a similar condemnation of Yeltsin-era reforms and the role of certain circles in the West in destroying Russia'seconomy.  The Agrarians, like the Communists, advocate establishing a "single union state in accordance with the democraticwill of the people."
	Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) also traces many of Russia's current troubles to "sweet-soundingflatterers bewitched by the latest mannerism from the West."  The LDP promises a foreign policy independent of the Westthat will "decisively rebuff interference in (Russia's) internal affairs" and will resist American efforts to elbow Russia out ofthe international arms market.  He would strive to minimize the United States role in Europe (in part through a possiblestrategic alliance between Russia and Germany), while revitalizing Moscow's relations with pariah states like Iraq and Cuba.  
	The main foreign policy priority of the hardline Derzhava party, led by former Vice-President Alexander Rutskoy, is torestore Russia as a Great Power in its "natural boundaries," that is, the USSR's borders in 1975.  Derzhava's programdenounces Russia's quest to achieve acceptance in the inter-national community and promises to counter U.S. attempts atworld domination.  Derzhava, for instance, would not only unilaterally denounce the blockade of Serbia, it would send surface-to-air missiles to the Serbs to use against NATO warplanes.     
	Although many of the measures that Great Power restorationists advocate would be distasteful to Washington, theirapproach is not necessarily either anti-Western or isolationist. Most of the more moderate of the Great Power restorationists(like the Communists and KRO) would prefer friendly relations with the United States, but they will be much less willing thanthe current Kremlin to sacrifice Russian equities in the other Soviet successor states or on other issues (like arms sales andarms control) where they feel that the United States is trying to push Russia around. However, if the West responds to thisincreased assertiveness by, for instance, accelerating NATO expansion, Great Power restorationists would likely strengthenRussia's western borders militarily while reorienting Russia's foreign policy away from Europe.      
**Russia's U.S. Policy at a Crossroads**

	How likely is it that Moscow will adopt the goal of Great Power restoration and totally abandon its current attempts tocombine defense of Moscow's national interests with continued efforts to integrate into the global community?  It would betempting to argue that Moscow, badly in need of Western economic assistance, really has no viable alternative to cooperationwith the West.  In the early months of independence, Westernizers like Kozyrev argued that Russia's relative military andeconomic weakness left it with few realistic options to continued cooperation with the United States as a way of gainingacceptance as a responsible member of the world community and economic assistance in the form of IMF loans, debt relief,and foreign investment.  
	That argument may still seem valid to American observers, but most members of the Russian political elite (includingreformers) have long since rejected it, as has the Russian public. Even Russia's Westerni-zers concede that economicdisincentives to disengagement from the West no longer have an effect.  Conservatives would go much farther; they are    convinced that Western "help" is a deliberate ploy to exploit Russia's natural resources and further weaken an old adversary. It is doubtful whether the promise of Western economic aid and investment will stem the shift toward the conservative end ofthe poli-   tical spectrum and the associated Great Power policies.  
	In fact, most political observers in Moscow are convinced that some movement toward the policies advocated by theGreat Power restorationists is inevitable, regardless of who's running the Kremlin.  The only issue, they say, is how far theforeign policy pendulum will swing. 

**Do Leaders Matter?**

	This does not mean, of course, that Russian elections (in particular, the presidential elections currently scheduled for June)will have no relevance to Moscow's foreign policy behavior. Clearly, the replacement of Yeltsin by a hardline politician, likeretired General Lebed, would bring with it a very different set of challenges to the United States, if for no other reason thanmost conservative alternatives to Yeltsin would likely be more active leaders, pursuing a more coherent program--althoughnot one that we in the West might find congenial.
	Yeltsin's political demise--whether it comes as a result of medical problems or a defeat at the polls--would remove thelast of the three architects of the breakup of the USSR.  (The other two--Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk andBelarussian leader Stanislav Shushkevich--have already been voted out of office.)  Most realistic alternatives to Yeltsinwould pose much less of a brake on reintegration efforts, to bring selected Soviet successor states back into some neweconomic and/or political entity.  
	Indeed, Moscow under several of the possible conservative alternatives to Yeltsin would likely pursue a very active policyto promote a new union or confederation, encouraging popular referenda to build legitimacy for such a move.  They wouldalso be far more ruthless than the Yeltsin regime has been in employing economic and military pressure on the other formerrepublics to acquiesce to Russian regional dominance.  
	At the same time, Yeltsin--should he remain president after June of next year--is likely to adopt many of the policyobjectives of the Great Power restorationists.  Of course, Yeltsin would be reluctant to pull out of the power circlesestablished by the major Western powers--that would amount to renouncing his major claim to success in foreign policy.However, Yeltsin's primary concern has always been to retain his position of power at home. Faced with the ever increasingresentment of his foreign policies, however, it is likely that Yeltsin will try to coopt many of the positions advanced by hisopponents.  
Summary

	The Yeltsin regime's erratic response to Washington--angry threats and broken commitments followed by reneweddialogue and cooperative gestures--might be construed as providing some hope for a return to the pro-U.S. actions ofRussia's early independence days.  Such expectations, however, should be relinquished.  As one reformist official has notedprivately, the brief period of euphoria in Russian-American relations was an aberration, a time when Russia was weak andhence extremely compliant toward Washington.  Moscow's increasing assertiveness since that time, he cautioned,represents a natural correction to that earlier period of pro-Western euphoria.  
	There will also be a strong temptation over the coming months to assign much of the blame for Moscow's decreasinginterest in pleasing the United States to the vagaries of an election year.  The Yeltsin regime faces a legislative election inDecember and a presidential election in June; talking and sometimes acting tough toward the United States is a convenientmaneuver for an increasingly unpopular leadership in an election year.   
	It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that Moscow's increased willingness to counter U.S. internationalinitiatives is a temporary phenomenon.   As popular and elite sentiment continues to shift against Western-style reforms (asit almost surely will, considering the deleterious effects of these changes on the lifestyles of most Russians), the wholepanoply of foreign policy priorities associated with these reforms will become increasingly discredited.  As a resultMoscow's turn towards Great Power restoration will continue after the polls close.
James H. Brusstar, a senior fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Ellen Jones, from the DefenseIntelligence Agency, are specialists in Russian security policies, decision-making procedures, and constitutionaldevelopments.  This paper is a result of their research to date, including a recent research trip to Russia.  For moreinformation contact James H. Brusstar at (202) 287-9219 ext. 525; Fax (202) 287-9475; Internet: [email protected].  Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the author and do notnecessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, theDepartment of Defense, or any other government agency.NOTE
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