Number 161, May 1999
**Back to Bipolarity?
by Hans Binnendijk withAlan Henrikson 
A decade after the Berlin Wall was torndown and a new international system was born, the nature of that new system is not yetclear. It is a fluid and complex system that remains in evolution. But an evolution towardwhat? The past can tell us something about what might happen in the future if historicalpatterns can be discerned and applied to today’s world. History shows that thefluidity in today’s world has precedents in the early stages of each of the past fiveinternational systems. Each of those previous systems had a life cycle: there was atendency for fluidity and multipolarity to turn into rigidity and bipolarity, with thatbipolarity in turn resulting in large scale conflict (or a Cold War) and the demise of theexisting international system. Most of the past systems developed before or during theIndustrial Age. There are signs that history may be repeated in the InformationAge—and it may be moving into a more bipolar and more dangerous stage.**Five International Systems
Five international systems have existedsince the birth of the United States. We are now less than a decade into a sixth. Most ofthe previous systems, though Eurocentric, have tended to dominate world politics and theyhave become increasingly global. The five systems are summarized below. In each case, atrend toward a bipolar division and conflict can be seen.***First System: The Treaty of Utrecht toWaterloo

The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 ended theWar of Spanish Succession and ushered in a new international system based upon what may becalled a loose balance of power. The early system was multipolar, with a number of nationsforming temporary relationships with one another and with wars fought for limitedpurposes. In northern Europe, Russia (after Peter the Great) and Prussia (after Frederickthe Great) were in ascendancy as Swedish power faded, and these two new powers becamerivals. In southern Europe, France and Austria were rivals. As a result, Russia andAustria seemed to be logical allies, along with Great Britain which needed a counterweightto France. Russia and Austria together fought four small wars against France and itsallies between 1733 and 1748. These alliances were not permanent and, as the diplomaticrevolution of 1756 demonstrated, the system remained fluid. During the Seven Years War(1756-1763), alliances shifted as France, Austria, and Russia fought together againstGreat Britain and Prussia. Furthermore, Russia and Prussia found common interest in theprogressive partition of Poland later in the century, and they both stayed neutral asFrance and Great Britain fought in the War of the American Revolution. It was during theSeven Years War and the American Revolution, however, that a firmer bipolarity began totake shape centered on Great Britain and France. As Napoleon’s power grew at the turnof the century, he was still able to form fluid alliances on the continent to isolate anddefeat his enemies. The system became tightly bipolar when Britain, Russia and theirallies united against an aggressive and republican France. This clash culminated in thebattles of Borodino, Leipzig and Waterloo, where the first system ended.***Second System: Congress of Vienna to theCrimean War

A new Concert of Europe was born in Viennain 1815 ushering in the second international system which was based upon a balance ofpower designed to prevent a hegemon from arising again on the continent. Great Britainacted independently as the balancer, contributing to the fluidity of the system. Forexample, when Austria grew concerned about Russia’s policy in the Near East, theAustrians turned to Britain for help. When Russia distrusted Prussian intentions in theBaltic states, the Tsar also turned to Britain. The outlines of an underlying bipolarityexisted in the system with liberal France and Britain leading in the west and conservativeRussia, Prussia, and Austria dominating the east. Generally these ideological differencesdid not override the flexibility needed to make the Concert of Europe work. The Concertsystem kept the peace for much of the first half of the 19th Century, with most of theconflict recorded between Russia and Turkey on the periphery. The Revolutions of 1848,however, began to erode the anti-hegemonic cohesion that made the system work. A newgeneration of ambitious leaders amplified the underlying ideological bipolarity of thesystem. Conser-vative Russia’s interference in the internal affairs of Balkan statesproved unacceptable to liberal Britain and France. The second system thus ended with theCrimean War.
***Third System: The Rise of Germany to WorldWar I 

The period between the Crimean War andWorld War I best illustrates the turn toward bipolarity in the evolution of aninternational system. The third system began in a multipolar and very fluid fashion.Prussia’s Otto von Bismarck was a master manipulator and used the diplomatic freedomallowed by the new system to his advantage. In preparing for war with Denmark overSchleswig and Holstein, Bismarck first secured the support of Austria. In preparing forwar with Austria, he secured France’s neutrality. In preparing for war with France,he convinced Russia to deploy forces in such a way as to insure Austria’s neutrality.Together, his victories ensured German unification. After Bismarck’s successful wars,he designed a complex set of secret treaties that put Germany at the center of a web ofagreements with Russia, Britain, Austria, and Italy; and they effectively isolated France.This flexible set of relationships continued until 1890 when Kaiser Wilhelm II replacedBismarck. Without him, Germany was unable to manage the informal and complex alliancesystem. The formation of the Triple Entente and the Central Powers Alliance in the early1900s created a more rigid bipolar system, in which each cluster of allies drew togetherfor fear of isolation. Commitments were reinforced, armies were strengthened, war planswere made more automatic, and conflict became almost inevitable.***Fourth System: The Interwar Period

World War I and the collapse of monarchiesthroughout much of Europe led the Allies to create in 1919 a more formal, global versionof a basic security structure that had brought a degree of peace to Europe in the early19th Century. Instead of an informal Concert system with a semi-independent balancer, theycreated a League of Nations with a formal Assembly, a Council, and a Secretariat.Consistent with the older Concert system, however, states agreed to provide for collectivesecurity by aligning themselves against a potential aggressor. The point is that a fluidarrangement was created which sought to provide security without rigid alliances. TheLeague experiment with collective security failed because countries like the UnitedStates, the Soviet Union, and, until 1926, Germany were not members; and, because strictenforcement measures proposed by the French were not adopted. The League of Nations systemalso came apart because of domestic unrest, in this case caused by the Great Depressionand the totalitarianism that followed. During the 1930s, the world polarized into tworigid camps of Axis dictatorships and Allied democracies, with the United States remainingformally neutral. Weakness in the Allied camp plus a shift in the bipolar balance due tothe Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was enough to convince Hitler that achieving victorythrough aggression would work. World War II ended the fourth system.***Fifth System: The Cold War

The post-war security system, formed inpart at the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences, was the creation of the UnitedStates and its Allies who were determined to use their "second chance" to get itright. They created a new global collective security system embodied in the United Nationsthat once again relied for the maintenance of security not on rigid alliances but on thefluid alignment of nations in the Security Council. Its failing was the requirement forBig Five unanimity for any military action, and its saving grace was Article 51 of theCharter which reinforced the right to individual and collective self-defense. The earlymultipolarity of this fifth system lasted only a few years as the United States moved tocounter Soviet aggression; by April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wascreated consistent with Article 51. Bipolarity was formalized in 1955 with WestGermany’s incorporation into NATO and the formation of the Warsaw Pact, and it wasprogressively globalized with a string of U.S. security arrangements from Latin America toJapan. There were elements of economic and ideological multipolarity in play during theCold War, but from a strategic nuclear and military perspective, the international systemwas fundamentally bipolar. **Lessons from this History
Some lessons from this history may provideguidance for diplomacy today. One overall lesson is that, like complex biological systems,international systems appear to go through life cycles with a birth, flexibility in youth,more rigidity as the system matures, and a demise.

International systems tend to last two tothree generations, although the fourth (interwar) system lasted but one. Large scaleconflicts have created them and have ended them. The War of Spanish Succession,Napoleon’s defeat, the Crimean War, World War I and World War II each gave birth to anew system. Only the transition from the fifth to the sixth system escaped this tendencybecause nuclear weapons created too dangerous a prospect for major war. Post-war treatiesor conferences have created organizational structures, institutions, and rules to initiatethree of the emerging systems (the second, fourth, and fifth). 

Each of these five systems was initiallymultipolar rather than bipolar. Multipolarity made them more complex; movement in thesystem was relatively fluid; and state diplomacy could be flexible. In some cases thismultipolar fluidity was manifested in specific institutions. In the Concert of Europe, forexample, the major powers were supposed to be flexible in order to counter a potentialhegemon. The League of Nations and United Nations further institutionalized the concept ofcollective security in which nations would align themselves against any aggressor thatmight appear. In other historical cases, multipolar fluidity was set in a system withoutinternational mechanisms or organizations. This allowed Napolean and Bismarck to isolatetheir enemies.

As each of the five previous systemsmatured, a degree of bipolarity set in. This was most prominent in the 20th Century withthe rigid sets of alignments that eventually fought in World Wars I and II and with thebipolarity of the Cold War. But a similar phenomenon occurred when major powers alignedagainst France early in the 19th Century and again against Russia at mid-century. 

In at least four of the five systems,bipolarity had ideological underpinnings. Common interests bound the parties in all cases.The systems became more rigid either as a result of political turmoil or because of theuse of force by either alliance.

In some cases, the rigidly bipolar phaseoccurred late in the system’s life cycle. That was particularly true for the firsttwo historical systems. In the case of the Cold War, it occurred early and lasted fordecades. In every case it led to confrontation and in all but the last it resulted in asystem-changing war. Bipolarity was not the only factor that produced major conflict, butit provided a structure for it and appears to have made conflict more likely.**Consequences for the Sixth System **The first decade of the sixth systemrepeats the early pattern in which relations among the major actors are once again morefluid. Its characteristics have been difficult to describe simply, and so far it stillbears the title "Post Cold-War Era." Indeed, it will be difficult to give it aproper title until the system matures and its longer-term characteristics become evident.

This sixth system has had five categoriesof actors and four dominant trends, with each trend affecting these actors in differentways. This accounts for much of the complexity apparent in the new system. The dominantactors are the *market democracies.*Their ideology has become the global model andby the end of the decade, 117 of the world’s 191 nations are characterized asdemocracies. The United States remained the leader of the adapting alliances of marketdemocracies and for a moment the international system appeared unipolar as the U.S.engagement policy made American influence felt globally. States in *transition*constitute a second group that hopefully are moving toward market democracies. The mostimportant of these transition states are China, Russia, and India. Their ultimateorientation may be the most important determinant of how the more mature system will look.

The third category of states consists ofthe so-called *rogues* or rejectionist states: notably Iraq, Iran, North Korea,Libya, the Sudan, Cuba, and now Serbia. Containing their activities became the prime focusof U.S. defense policy for most of the sixth system’s first decade and defeating twoof them, nearly simultaneously, became the sizing function for U.S. military forces. Afourth category includes the *failing states*: Bosnia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Algeria,Somalia, and Haiti, to name just a few. Managing humanitarian disasters inherent in theirfailure has occupied most of America’s foreign policy attention during the decade.Finally, non-state actors have begun to take on many state characteristics. Some supportthe market democracies, such as global companies; some prey on them, like internationalcrime syndicates; and some seek to bring the market democracies down, for exampleterrorist organizations. This article considers only *transnational outlaws.*

Four worldwide trends have had bothpositive and negative effects on these five categories of actors, pulling some togetherand pushing others apart. The general result has been an increasing degree of polarizationin international politics. The table below summarizes this effect. 

The rapid *globalization* of eventsis based on new information technology and has increased the pace of events in economics,politics and military affairs. Economic globalization has brought unprecedented wealth tomost market democracies (the Asian downturn notwithstanding), and it continues to attracttransition states and to empower transnational outlaws. But rogue states tend to rejectthe cultural and some economic aspects of globalization, while the failing states are notreaping its benefits at all and fall further behind. *Democratization*has had asimilar effect. It can provide for peaceful transfers of power and attracts transitionstates like India, Russia, and South Africa. But it has deepened fissures within manyfailing states as ethnic, tribal, or religious groups simply vote with their group. 

*Fragmentation* has ironically beenstimulated by globalization as groups seek to differentiate themselves in a globalizedworld and to maximize power at the local level. This devolution of power is a phenomenonfound nearly everywhere in the world today, but it has a very different impact ondifferent actors. In market democracies, it has led to generally positive outcomes such asgreater powersharing with state governments in the United States and the concept of"subsidiarity" (decisions made at lowest possible level) in the European Union.In some market democracies with particularly difficult ethnic balances (e.g., Canada,Belgium, and Spain), the democratic process has provided safeguards for minorities and themeans to resolve disputes. However, in the most important transition states (e.g., Russia,China, and India), fragmentation has led to armed conflict (Chechnya, Xinjiang, andKashmir) or continued tension (Tibet). This in turn has led to additional politicalproblems between these transition states and the market democracies. Fragmentation alongethnic lines is now the leading cause of state failure. It provides new opportunities fortransnational criminal and terrorist organizations.

Preventing andcountering the *proliferation* of weapons of mass destruction has been a nationalpriority for the United States throughout the early years of this sixth internationalsystem. Many of the other market democracies are only now awakening to its dangers.Proliferation gives rogue states and even some non-governmental groups the ability tothreaten and possibly deter U.S. policies. It is no surprise that the issue has dominatedU.S. relations with North Korea and Iraq. The impact of proliferation on the largetransition states has been mixed, because China and Russia both supply technology and arealso threatened by it. India is one of the principal proliferators. Proliferation remainsa problem between the United States and the key transition states.

Given the evident polarizing impact ofthese four worldwide trends, one must ask whether the life cycle of the sixthinternational system is also moving in the direction of eventual bipolarity. A look atrecent relations among the major powers tends to confirm this possibility. 

The figure to the right depicts currentrelationships among the five major global powers. The United States is adapting andreinforcing its security alliances with Europe and Japan. At the same time, U.S. securityrelations with both Russia and China have been badly frayed during the past year. Thereare major differences with Russia over NATO enlargement, missile defense, proliferation,and Caspian Sea oil. The war between NATO and Serbia has dramatically increased thesetensions. There are also major differences with China over Taiwan, Tibet, theater missiledefense, human rights, espionage, and economic policy. 

As a result, China and Russia arestrengthening their security relationship with each other, overcoming countervailingfactors which might otherwise prevent a closer collaboration. The attraction ofglobalization that draws both states to the West risks being overwhelmed by policydifferences with the West. Strengthened Sino-Russian ties are based on growing suspicionsof the West, increasingly common interests, a natural arms sales relationship, andresolution of most of their Cold War ideological and border differences. Russian PrimeMinister Primakov even conceives of a loose Russian-Chinese-Indian alliance directedagainst Western dominance. At the same time rogue states like Iraq, Serbia, and NorthKorea are cooperating through technology transfers and tactics that try to thwart themarket democracies. There are also indications of increased Russian and Chinesecooperation with the rogue states.

If a new polarization takes place in thissixth international system, the pattern of alignment that emerges might look similar tothat of the Cold War, but this time it would be based more on interests than on ideology.It could be a schism between the technologically advanced haves (the market democracies)and have nots (the rest). The United States and its allies could face an informalcoalition of Russia, China, and rogue states made more dangerous by the rogues’ tiesto these two major powers. Such a coalition might use the growing capabilities oftransnational outlaws to attack U.S. interests at home without revealing fingerprints.This coalition might be more difficult to deal with and deter than our Cold War foes. Itis not a future to encourage.

A new bipolar world is not inevitable.History need not repeat itself, but current trends are leading us in that direction. Thefirst step in dealing with this potentially dangerous future is to recognize itspossibility. Once that realization sets in, our statesmen can design policies that lead usto a more benign future and our military planners can begin to hedge against a morenegative outcome. 
Hans Binnendijk is    Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies. Alan Henrikson teaches    diplomatic history at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. The    opinions in this article are their own and do not represent the views of the U.S.    Government.
The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

Editor in Chief - Hans Binnendijk

Editor - Jonathan W. PierceNOTE

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