Defense

Until the problem of slow Army deployment rates is solved, the

world’s best military runs the risk of performing poorly or failing to

achieve national political objectives in future crises. Recognizing

that the U.S. military cannot wait a decade or longer to produce new

technologies that still may not solve the rapid deployment problem,

the Army Transformation Roadmap 2003 states that the goal of

transformation is to "identify and build required capabilities

now . . . while developing future force capabilities essential to provide relevant, ready, responsive, and dominant land power to the

Future Joint Force."1 Indeed, one aspect of Army transformation

efforts is force redesign to develop an active component capable of

deploying a responsive, agile expeditionary force in the first fifteen

days of an operation.2

Much of the tonnage now devoted to Army assets must be

shipped by sea, because the capacity of U.S. strategic airlift is insufficient. Consider that each cargo ship must be individually loaded at

ports in the continental United States, sailed thousands of miles, and

offloaded at foreign ports. Loading and offloading a single cargo ship

alone can take two or three days. Shortage of cargo ships, poor

offloading facilities at foreign ports, and other problems can create

bottlenecks that considerably delay shipments. This reliance on

slow-moving cargo ships to transport weighty forces lies at the heart

of the Army deployment problem.

How the Army achieves its transformational goal of rapid

deployment depends on its perspective on weight. That is, transformation plans differ if the objective is weight reduction as opposed to

weight redistribution. Weight reduction is primarily platform-centric

and relies on technological advances in materials and network technology to deliver a single lightweight platform capable of surviving

heavy combat. Weight redistribution considers parameters other

than platform weight and the ability to distribute information in networks to meet Army goals; forces are re-structured into small, modular units, pre-positioned across the globe, and deployed in a timesequential manner. Although the second approach is less dependent

on technology, it is possible only if Army forces are considered malleable in time, space, and structure.

Overview

Army transformation is an attempt to provide future forces with

enhanced capabilities in lethality, survivability, and mobility,

both strategic and tactical. Alternatives to achieving these goals

differ in emphasis on weight and reliance on technology. That is,

transformation plans differ if the objective is weight reduction as

opposed to weight redistribution. In one approach, platform

weight is reduced to meet mobility goals. However, shedding

weight has implications for platform survivability and lethality;

previous attempts to design a single platform that is simultaneously lethal, mobile, and survivable have not done so satisfactorily. Thus, advances in materials are required to insure the survivability of a lightweight platform. Advances in network

technology are also required to make the platform more aware of

its environment. The immaturity of these technologies increases

the risks inherent in transformation based strictly on platform

characteristics.

In contrast, weight redistribution considers parameters

other than platform weight and networks to meet Army goals.

Indeed, due to the weight of support assets, replacing all combat platforms with 20-ton vehicles reduces only marginally the

overall weight of a division and corps. An alternative approach

to transformation restructures Army forces into small, modular

units, pre-positioned across the globe, and deployed in a timesequential manner. This approach, with its reduced dependency

on technology, is a practical near-term alternative and should

be pursued in parallel with technology development.

While many lessons remain to be learned from Operation Iraqi

Freedom, two already are firm and clear: air power is not a cure-all,

and large, well-armed ground forces are still needed for expeditionary warfare. However, heavy Army forces that were so important

to success in this war still lack the capacity to deploy overseas

swiftly enough.

Alternative Approaches to Army 

Transformation

by Joseph N. Mait and Richard L. Kugler

A publication of the

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

National Defense University

JULY 2004

Number 41

Horizons

July 2004 Defense Horizons 1
Joseph N. Mait (maitj@ndu.edu), is a senior research fellow and Richard L.

Kugler (kuglerr@ndu.edu) is a distinguished research professor at the Center for

Technology and National Security Policy.

A Platform-Centric Approach

As a result of transformation, Army forces will be capable of

both strategic and tactical mobility. The Army will no longer need to

mass before attacking but will mass and attack simultaneously. For

the attack to be successful, mobile Army forces must be both survivable and capable of bringing to bear sufficient firepower. The

trade-off between mobility, survivability, and lethality presents the

greatest challenge to transformation based on reducing the weight

of a single platform.

The Army already is addressing this by developing 20-ton platforms that can be deployed rapidly. The Army is currently delivering six Stryker brigade combat teams

(BCTs) to fill an operations gap

between heavy and light forces. Two

Stryker BCTs have been delivered,

one to the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry

Division (presently serving in Iraq),

and the other to the 1st Brigade, 25th

Infantry Division (light infantry).

The Army also is developing a set of

manned and unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles

collectively referred to as the Future

Combat Systems (FCS). To facilitate rapid deployment, the Stryker

family of vehicles and all FCS platforms are required to fit inside a

C–130. Whereas Stryker is designed to fill a current need, FCS is

intended to replace all platforms currently employed by the Army

over the next thirty years.

In plain terms, the FCS program is intended to give the Army

future force the mobility of existing airborne units and the firepower of existing heavy divisions. This dilemma—developing a

force with the mobility of light infantry and the firepower of

armor—has been with the Army since World War II, when Army ordnance engineers first tried to build a light tank that could be carried

by a glider and landed with parachutists and glider-borne infantry.

Since that time, the Army has struggled to produce a mobile vehicle

under 20 tons in weight that is capable of delivering impressive firepower while protecting its crew. Light tanks and infantry fighting

vehicles provide examples of how this trade-off has been achieved

over the years (see tables 1 and 2).

The light tanks, tank destroyers, and gun platforms listed in

table 1 were designed primarily to protect light infantry against

tanks and infantry supported by tanks. Thus, emphasis was placed

on lethality and survivability, not mobility. The data indicate that

light tanks became heavier as they confronted more powerful

threats. The reasons for this increase are two-fold: heavier munitions

were required to combat the more powerful threats, and more armor

was necessary to protect crews. Light tank development came to an

end in the 1950s, by which time the M41A1 light tank was almost as

large as a medium tank of World War II. Eventually, the Army abandoned the light tank concept altogether.

Alternative versions of the light tank designed to provide firepower to airborne forces emphasized mobility and lethality, not

survivability. In World War II, the Army developed the M22, which

could be carried by a glider. But the lightly armored M22 did not

provide adequate protection against enemy tanks. When the Army

tried again in the 1950s to provide firepower to airborne forces, it

sacrificed protection completely in favor of firepower and mobility.

The result was the M56 gun platform, which was a 90–mm gun

mounted on a tracked chassis with no armor for the crew. In an

extreme example, the M50 sacrificed both crew protection and

mobility in favor of firepower; it carried six 106–mm recoilless rifles and

had little armor. The assumption of

its developers was that the M50,

because of its small size, might be

able to ambush larger enemy vehicles and overwhelm them with a

massive salvo from a simultaneous

discharge of several or all of its six

recoilless rifles. (Similar thinking

has been applied to the design of the

FCS.)

In contrast to light tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles

(IFV) were designed to minimize weight and cost, and maximize protection for the infantry carried inside. The first vehicle, the 1942 halftrack, was produced in great numbers during World War II only

because the need to field some form of protection for mechanized

infantry was great and the Army had little else to offer. The half-track’s

armor was thin and could be penetrated by .50 caliber bullets, and its

front-mounted engine was vulnerable.

The Army’s first real IFV was the M44 of 1946. The M44 provided adequate protection for the infantry it carried, but at 51,000

lbs., its combat weight limited mobility and dramatically increased

cost. The M75 and M59 of 1953 weighed less than the M44 and actually provided increased protection for infantry but were too heavy to

be airlifted and could not float.

The M113 finally met the needs the Army had identified in World

War II. It was light, easy to produce in large numbers, mobile (air

transportable and capable of swimming small rivers), and capable of

protecting the infantry it carried from machine gun fire and shell

fragments. As a result, the M113 spawned a family of vehicles for such

tasks as command and control, engineering, indirect fire support

(from a mortar carried inside the vehicle), and even chemical smoke

generation. The M113 was such a success that variations of the basic

model are still in active service, and the newer M113A3 was even put

forward as an alternative to the Stryker wheeled vehicle.

What happens when designers shift the balance among firepower, mobility, and protection is indicated in table 2. The M2

Bradley IFV, for example, has significantly more firepower than the

M113 and somewhat better protection for the soldiers it carries, but

it sacrifices mobility; it is significantly heavier than the M113, and

heavier even than the M113A3, so it cannot be air dropped. (The M2

and its brother, the M3, provided significant levels of organic fire

support to mechanized infantry engaged in combat in Iraq.)

2 Defense Horizons July 2004

the Future Combat Systems

program is intended to give

the Army future force the

mobility of existing airborne

units and the firepower of

existing heavy divisions
This historical discussion sustains the general point that physical constraints require tradeoffs in platform development. If the

objective is firepower, for example, one has to pay for it with reduced

mobility or protection. The World War II half-track, for example,

served as the platform for a variety of weapons, from quad-mounted

.50-caliber machine guns to 57–mm and 75–mm anti-tank guns. That

increase in firepower came at the expense of survivability. In the

M113, the Army chose to emphasize mobility over firepower.

In recent years, the proliferation of infantry-carried, rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs) with shaped-charge warheads has

increased concern for protection. This is especially true for Strykers,

which have been deployed in Iraq. Their armor cannot withstand a

hit by an RPG. To counter the RPG threat to Strykers, so-called slat

armor has been added to the exterior. The spacing between the slats

is such that the cone of an RPG is pinched, which detonates the RPG

away from integral armor. Slat armor first proved its value in January and again, more famously, in February during a visit to Iraq by

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Disadvantages of the

armor are that it adds weight and bulk to the vehicle and must be

installed after deployment.

Although advances in technology have led to the development

of ceramic- and composite-based lightweight armors capable of surviving a hit from a medium-caliber weapon (smaller than 30 mm),

this falls short of the M1A1 Abrams' ability to withstand a 125–mm

round. Thus, increasing protection means reducing one of the factors already discussed, unless some technological breakthrough

introduces a new factor and eliminates the need for the conventional trade-offs in weight.

July 2004 Defense Horizons 3

Table 1. Light Tanks

Weight (lbs.)

Model Year Fielded Armament Combat Transport

M3 “Stuart” 1941 37 mm 28,000 25,600

M5 “Stuart” 1943 37 mm 33,100 30,800

M22 “Locust” for glider troops 1943 37 mm 16,400 14,600

M24 “Chaffee” 1945 75 mm 40,500 36,300

M18 “Hellcat”tank destroyer 1944 76 mm 39,000 35,500

M41A1 “Walker Bulldog” 1953 76 mm 51,800 44,700

M56 self-propelled anti-tank 1954 90 mm 15,750 12,500 for C–119

M50 “Ontos” gun platform 1955 six 106–mm 19,050 16,450

recoilless rifles

M551 “Sheridan” 1965 152–mm 33,460 28,525 for C–130

gun-missile launcher

M8 “Buford” 1994 105–mm gun 38,800 36,900 for C–130

Source: R. P. Hunnicutt, Stuart: A History of the American Light Tank, vol. 1, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), and Sheridan: A History of the American Light Tank, vol. 2, (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995).

Table 2. Armored Fighting Vehicles

Weight (lbs.)

Model Year Fielded Armament* Armor (inches)** Combat Transport

M3 halftrack 1942 .50 cal. 0.25 20,000 unknown

M44 1946 .50 cal. 0.50 51,000 41,000

M75 1953 .50 cal. 0.625 41,500 36,669

M59 1953 .50 cal. 0.625 42,600 39,500

M113 1960 .50 cal. 1.50 22,900 20,160 for C–130

M113A3 1990 .50 cal. 1.50 31,000 22,128 for air-drop 

with appliqué from C–130

M2 infantry fighting vehicle 1981 25 mm 1.50 50,259 42,289

M3 cavalry fighting vehicle 1981 25 mm 1.50 49,945 41,975

** Primary armament only. Armament includes more machine guns than .50–caliber machine gun for the vehicles up through the M113A3, and a machine gun in addition to the 25–mm chain gun for the M2 and M3.

** Armor is not distributed evenly around these vehicles. The figures given are for armor on the upper sides of the vehicles. Frontal armor in each case was or is heavier.

Source: R.P. Hunnicutt, Half-Track: A History of American Semi-Tracked Vehicles (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2001), and Bradley, A History of American Fighting and Support Vehicles (Novato, CA: Residio Press, 1999)
Even if a material were developed that provided the same protection as the armor on the Abrams without adding to platform weight,

the lighter platform would still be more vulnerable. A 20-ton platform,

for example, is 3.5 times less massive than an M1A1. If both are hit

with the same force, the lighter platform will be accelerated 3.5 times

faster than the M1A1, which might kill or seriously injure the crew.

Thus, a 20-ton platform, whether equipped with current or

vastly improved armor, must be more aware of its surroundings than

a tank and more sensitive to threats. The FCS program attempts to

make its platforms more aware through active protection technologies and countermine sensing. Active protection systems are

designed to sense a round and deflect or destroy it prior to penetration (using, for example, ejecting armor plates to alter trajectory) or

defeat it in some manner after penetration. The Army expects that

initial FCS platforms will be capable of defeating shaped charge

weapons, including RPGs, but the deflection of larger munitions or

kinetic-energy rounds is not expected for another decade. The development of stealth technology for ground vehicles as a means to avoid

detection also is not expected to mature for another decade.

Due to the simple trade-off between weight and speed, none of

the previous attempts to provide lethality, mobility, and survivability

within the physical limits of a single platform have done so satisfactorily. But making platforms more aware is not enough to achieve

Army goals. Awareness must encompass the battlefield. Hence, the

Army is shifting emphasis from developing only platforms to developing a system of systems. To truly meet Army goals for transformation, old constructs must change or be replaced, and new degrees of

freedom must be introduced. The present Army solution relies on the

deployment of network technologies.

A Network-Centric Approach

If conventional trade-offs are inadequate to meet Army transformation goals, new ones need to be considered. The trade-off the

Army seeks, at least euphemistically, is information for armor. However, information always has been critical to military operations.

Whether for obtaining situational awareness or conveying a commander's intent, militaries have consistently employed the most

advanced communications technologies of their day. The focus of

transformation is not so much information exploitation as it is

deploying and exploiting network-based technologies: a platformcentric approach to transformation that relies on deploying 20-ton

platforms is inherently dependent on the network to insure the platform's survivability.

The emphasis on deploying network technology on the battlefield is similar in spirit to previous efforts to bring computing technology to the battlefield. Consider, for example, the mission of fire

control. The first automated fire control system, the Field Artillery

Digital Automated Computer (FADAC), was fielded in 1959.4 The

transistor-based FADAC was essentially a special purpose calculator

that occupied 5 cubic feet, weighed 175 pounds., and consumed 700

watts. Using manually entered data, the FADAC calculated and displayed gun orders (i.e., gun deflection, quadrant elevation, fuze

time, and charge) on 16 numerical indicator vacuum tubes. Fire control capabilities were expanded and automated with the development of the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE), first fielded

in 1978.5 In 1992, the Light Tactical Fire Direction System (LTACFIRE) for light forces and the initial fire support automated system

(IFSAS) for mechanized forces were fielded to provide capabilities

similar to TACFIRE, but with considerably smaller equipment. In

1997, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS),

which relies on digital communication to conduct command and

control, replaced these systems.6

Efforts to automate the artillery fire control mission were mirrored in other branches and services, which contributed to the nowfamiliar “stovepipes.” Stovepipes, therefore, were a consequence of

the available technology, not lack of imagination. Given that the

Internet was in its infancy in the 1970s, it was difficult to plan for a

networked force.

While fire control became more automated and linked in the

early 1990s, the commercial world was becoming interconnected. By

the time AFATDS was delivered, some of its shortcomings were obvious. The maturing in the 1990s of networking technology and the

tools for its use made military employment of networks a reality, and

it is now possible to pursue the integration of stovepiped mission

applications. For example, when sensors are networked to fire control and fire control to logistics, the rate of munition resupply can

match the rate of threat removal.

The most visible application of networking to the battlefield is

the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2) system, which was first deployed with units in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Through its capabilities in position-navigation and reporting and

combat identification, and its interface to terrestrial communications, FBCB2, also called "blue force tracker," provides situational

awareness, and command and control to the lowest tactical echelons. For operations over long distances or rugged terrain, there is

also an interface to satellite communications. FBCB2 also provides a

shared common picture of the battlespace using graphics displays.

FBCB2 is a system of approximately 1,000 computers networked in a single maneuver brigade. The network is based on a

fixed set of addresses and, prior to deployment, the network must be

planned, and addresses assigned and loaded. At a hardware level,

planning entails assigning frequencies and circuits. Once operations

have commenced, network resources must be monitored and managed constantly to reconfigure the network and deactivate circuits.

The system is presently incapable of starting, operating, and gracefully degrading under all conditions without human intervention.

Network reconfiguration and deactivation are not autonomous.

Given that the network is critical to survivability, the amount of

latency (delay) is a critical parameter; reconfiguring the network

manually robs operations of precious time. Mobile ground forces

demand an ad hoc network capable of reconfiguring itself constantly

as nodes come onto or fall off the network. Unfortunately, the mobile

ad hoc network (MANET) protocols necessary to sustain the network

reliably remain under development, and the Internet Engineering

Task Force (the protocol engineering and development arm of the

Internet) has not yet established standards.

The utility of mobile, ad hoc networking has already been

demonstrated in two DARPA projects, the Small Unit Operations Situational Awareness System (SUO SAS) and FCS Communications.

4 Defense Horizons July 2004
SUO SAS is a MANET-based, networked radio designed for a unit cell

of 20 dismounted soldiers. It was successfully demonstrated in a simulated helicopter rescue at Fort Benning in October 2002 and has

since been transitioned to the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command for further development. FCS Communications demonstrated a MANET-based networked radio system for a unit cell of 20

ground vehicles and 2 aerial vehicles in a mock operation at the Army

National Guard Orchard Training Area in Boise, Idaho, in August

2003. FCS data rates were10 megabytes per second with latency on

the order of 100 milliseconds. This performance is needed to support

real-time fire control and robotic missions, yet provide low probability of detection and robustness to jamming. FCS Communications

uses both directional antennas at low frequency bands, which match

frequencies allocated for the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS),

and directional antennas at millimeter-wave frequencies.7

DARPA efforts demonstrate the maturity of the communications technology that forms the infrastructure of the FCS network but by

itself does not provide any operational

capability. Operational capability is provided by the applications executed over

the network. This capability is under

development but has yet to be demonstrated. Mobile command and control is

the focus of the Agile Commander

Advanced Technology Demonstration

(ATD) under the direction of the Army Communications-Electronics Command and DARPA FCS Command and Control program.

Further, the Department of Defense, through programs such as

the Global Information Grid8 and Transformational Communications9

are establishing the backbone to support the flow of data required for

networked communications and the data standards and databases

that will allow for data access across platforms. These programs rely

on a fixed infrastructure of landlines, wireless, and satellite communications for bandwidth and communications capability to allow

corps and division headquarters to reach back for information.

However, the immaturity of application development and execution for mobile networks raises the risk in deploying network

technology to the battlefield. Once deployed, the applications must

remain stable while the network is constantly reconfigured, because

failure of an application leaves ground forces vulnerable and

dependent on platform technologies for survivability. This is

reflected in the design philosophy for FCS survivability: don't be

seen, don't be targeted, don't be hit, don't be penetrated, and don't

be killed. The assumption is that network technologies, in combination with stealth, will confound the acquisition and targeting of U.S.

ground vehicles. When these fail, active and passive vehicle protection technologies, as well as personal protection, are required.

Army insistence that all platforms satisfy the C–130 requirement is indicative of platform-centric thinking; critics of the FCS who

point to the vulnerability of 20-ton platforms are guilty of the same

offense. A networked approach to warfare requires an integrated

approach to survivability. If transformation implies moving philosophically from a platform-centric military to one that is networkcentric, survivability encompasses the likelihood not just that a platform (and its crew) will survive a hit but that it will be targeted and

fired on in the first place. From a strategic perspective, survivability

becomes an integrated measure across the battlefield and the

mission. Advocates of network centric warfare believe that exploitation of information increases overall survivability.

In this regard, the Army approach to survivability is correct.

Removing potential threats before they have become deadly threats

and replacing large-signature ground vehicles with distributed, low

signature vehicles, some manned and some unmanned, degrades an

enemy's ability to destroy friendly forces. However, as currently conceived, this solution relies on technologies that remain immature

and untested. Framing Army transformation in terms of a system of

systems is correct, but relying heavily on network technologies to

enhance the survivability of 20-ton platforms is risky.

Although the capabilities that network technology can bring to

the battlefield are obvious, there exists little quantitative data based

on field experience to substantiate their impact. It is not yet possible to determine how many fewer

ground platforms are required as the

number of nodes on the network

increases, or how much lighter ground

platforms can be made. Increasing the

speed of transmission and the number

of unfettered transmission links certainly allows the Army to improve execution of its present missions. But no

data exists that allows one to calculate

the advantages of networking as a force multiplier. We are not suggesting that work towards this goal be stopped or slowed. However,

considerable work remains to be done.

These inherent risks prompt us to consider an alternative, nearterm approach to transformation. This approach does not rely on technology but on the disposition and organization of Army forces to redistribute rather than reduce weight.

Transformation Based on Force Structure

The lynchpin of Army transformation efforts is the requirement

that all platforms be C–130 transportable. This constraint reflects

the interpretation of the link between weight and deployment

addressed above. It drives weight down, which leads to the need for

active protection and network technologies to insure the survivability of lightweight platforms. But perhaps the goal should be to reduce

overall weight of the force, including support structures, rather than

the weights of platforms.

Even though the Army has already trimmed some assets from

its old Cold War model, the current heavy corps of three divisions and

103,000 troops still weighs one million tons (see table 3). Why do

Army forces weigh so much? Some point to the Abrams tank, Bradley

IFV, and Palladin artillery tubes as the principal reason armored or

mechanized divisions weigh fully 110,000 tons, far more than the

68,000 tons of a standard infantry division. Yet these three platforms

account for less than 20 percent (about 20,000 tons) of a heavy division’s weight while providing half its combat power and virtually all

July 2004 Defense Horizons 5

from a strategic

perspective, survivability

becomes an integrated

measure across the

battlefield and the mission
its offensive punch. The 101st Air Assault Division, which relies on

light infantry and attack helicopters and, therefore, has few tanks

and IFVs, nonetheless weighs 100,000 tons because of its many helicopters and associated support assets.

Although a heavy division and its support assets require 50 or

more cargo ships of sealift, even a 17,000-ton light division can require

nearly 40 ships. Since sailing accounts for nearly two-thirds of the time

needed to deploy forces to the Persian Gulf, and loading and off-loading only one-third, a light division may arrive in the Persian Gulf only

a few days sooner than a heavy one. Often the marginal change in

deployment is insufficient to justify the reduced combat power.

We note that replacing the existing tanks, IFVs, and artillery

tubes with 20-ton FCS vehicles

reduces the weight of a heavy division from 110,000 tons to 95,000,

approximately a 15 percent reduction. Further, due to support units,

the weight of a three-division heavy

corps (armored or mechanized)

drops by only 7 percent from one million tons to 930,000.

If light vehicles are fielded in

large numbers, a medium infantry

brigade will require about 500 C–130

sorties for its maneuver units, plus an additional 200-300 sorties for

its logistic support and sustainment stocks. Whether the Air Force is

capable of making available such a large number of sorties while

attending to all its other lift requirements is problematic at best. The

bottom line is that, even though it is reasonable for the Army to contemplate airlifting a single brigade with light vehicles swiftly into a

hot combat zone, larger formations will have to be transported by

sealift, which, unless other changes are made, will still take two to

three months.

A simple way to speed the deployment of Army forces is

increased prepositioning of Army equipment overseas. The most

likely places for future combat are, for the most part, known. Today

the Army has eight brigade sets positioned in Europe, Southwest Asia,

and Asia. It already possesses ample numbers of tanks, IFVs, artillery

tubes, and other weapons assigned to war reserves and National

Guard units that could be used to form additional prepositioned

brigade sets. Creation of another six to eight equipment sets would be

costly, but it would significantly accelerate the rate at which Army

combat forces can deploy. Ideally, such equipment sets should be

deployed afloat on ships that can sail quickly to crisis zones.

Redistributing weight through prepositioning is worthy of discussion but does not address a more fundamental issue. If the existing armored corps, at a weight of one million tons, is too big and ponderous, what type of formation or formations should replace it in

order to deploy rapidly and still fight effectively?

Consider that transformational thinking at the tactical level

aggregated individual platforms into an integrated system of

systems to create mass. Advantages derive from a system of systems

that is comparable in capability to the aggregation of mass but is

more dispersed and requires fewer resources. Applying similar

thinking at the operational level leads to capability-based combat

groups that are smaller than today's standard divisions and constructed as modules with interfaces to joint structures and with

"hooks" to allow the integration of combat groups into corps-like

structures for different missions.

Douglas Macgregor proposed restructuring a corps into four combat groups for armed reconnaissance, combat maneuver, strike, and

early-deployed support.10 Fundamental to the operational architecture

is the reduction in logistics and the recognition that fire support and

C4ISR are joint operations, not Army operations. Some of the groups,

especially the light reconnaissance strike group, are dependent on

network technology. Truly transformational benefits could be derived

if the Army were to deploy this technology into organizations designed

with the technology in mind.

However, in the mid-term,

reduced logistics can be achieved

via an armored corps of 65,000

troops in six or seven maneuver

brigades. For medium-sized contingencies, this new force should allow

a single, strong Army corps to converge and begin fighting more rapidly than now. It allows the Army, in

effect, to take a running start, rather than waiting for large, sustaining assets to deploy over a period of days and weeks.

Similar to Macgregor's proposals, the reduced corps should be

modular by design. That is, it should be able to able to deploy and fight

as a cohesive unit at its normal size of 65,000 troops, but have the

capacity to inflate to 103,000 troops when situations mandate greater

strength. For large contingencies, two of these reduced corps could

deploy in the same time that a single corps can deploy today. The

result would be more combat power for initial battles. If necessary,

extra sustainment assets could be deployed after the arrival of key

combat and support assets. Had this force been available for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army might have been able to deploy several

more combat brigades than the seven actually deployed on the first

day of the engagement. The cost would have been less logistic support

and long-term sustainment, but the benefit might have been the quick

victory sought by U.S. strategy. (The Army already has a capacity to

deploy a small corps by stripping down its parent version, but hasty

6 Defense Horizons July 2004

Table 3. Estimated Weight of Army Heavy Corps

Unit Weight (tons)

Armored cavalry regiment 2,300

3 heavy divisions 330,000

Separate heavy brigade 27,000

Corps combat support 100,000

Corps combat service support 100,000

Echelons above corps 55,000

War reserve munitions and stocks 365,000

Total 1,000,000

Source: MTMCTEA Pamphlet 700-5 "Deployment Planning Guide: Transportation Assets Required for Deployment,

(Newport News, VA, May 2001, Military Traffic Management Command).

Douglas Macgregor proposed

restructuring a corps into

four combat groups for armed

reconnaissance, combat

maneuver, strike, and earlydeployed support
improvisation compels Army forces to fight in ways other than those

for which they were trained and prepared.)

The current big corps reduces the incentive to think jointly in

terms of integrated air-ground fires and creates a rationale for postponing aggressive combat operations until the full set of big-corps

assets is on the ground. We propose the creation of a small corps as

the norm and generation of a large corps as an exception to the rule.

The Army thus would anchor its doctrine, training, and practices for

expeditionary warfare on a small corps, while still having the flexibility to employ large formations. In other words, the Army would

learn to think small in more ways than one, while retaining the

capacity to think and act big.

Can such a smaller corps be created? While the answer is

uncertain, the search for a solution should be based on the premise

that, in expeditionary wars, U.S. forces normally will fight enemies

that are less well armed and less capable than the Soviet army of the

Cold War. Moreover, the increased lethality of U.S. weapons allows

ground combat forces to destroy more enemy targets and occupy

more territory than before. As a result, the future force may need

fewer fire and maneuver assets. Above all, it will need fewer sustainment assets for prolonged conflicts, because most expeditionary

wars are likely to involve less-intense

combat, consume fewer resources, and

be shorter than the big wars of the past.

These propositions provide a basis for

thinking about structural changes that

might become possible as the information age accelerates and new technologies enter the inventory.

During the Cold War, operational

plans typically committed only about

one-half of a corps’ maneuver battalions

to the forward battle in the initial

stages. The remaining battalions were held in operational reserve and

mainly were intended to function as unit replacements for forwardcommitted units that were expected to suffer heavy attrition. This

practice remained the case even as the Army shifted from linear

defense to non-linear operations. During the famous “left hook” of

Operation Desert Storm, a surprising number of maneuver battalions

assigned to VIIth Corps and XVIIIth Corps were withheld as tactical

reserves and never saw combat.

Further, because initial attrition for future expeditionary wars

will be lower than the Cold War model, and because many forwardcommitted battalions will be able to perform their missions without

big reinforcements from rear areas, the future corps may require only

six to seven maneuver brigades. Beyond this, the introduction of

remote, standoff-fires promises to further increase the lethality of

Army forces and lessen the requirement for close-combat capabilities.

If the elimination of three combat brigades proves feasible, the

weight of a heavy corps can be reduced directly by 100,000 tons and

indirectly by another 100,000 tons by reducing support needs.

To enhance further U.S. capabilities for swift force deployment,

the creation of additional brigade sets should be combined with programs to strengthen airlift and sealift forces, and develop better military infrastructure in distant areas where operations might become

necessary. Likewise, improvements to the planning process for

strategic lift and power projection can also help, including the

improvement of processes within the Transportation Command.

The main goal here is to design a swift and agile Army corps

that can deploy quickly and fight effectively in the initial stages of an

expeditionary war. With such a new and leaner structure, the key

combat and support forces for one or two corps could arrive and

begin operations without waiting for additional, large, sustainmentoriented assets to arrive. But because this smaller corps is modular,

it could absorb such assets, when they are deployed. Thus, combat

and support assets taken away from the parent corps would remain

in the Army force posture, and could be deployed when needed. They

would help form a flexible pool of assets that would help contribute

to a modular, scalable force.

Comments and Recommendations

Transformation of the Army is a multifaceted problem with

many possible solutions. Placing the platform at the center of transformation efforts will not meet Army transformation goals in the

near term. Enhancing the platform with lightweight materials

requires considerable research and development. Even then, survivability of the platform will require new

sensor and network technology.

Although networking technology is an

attractive way to provide additional

capability to ground forces, our

research indicates that the technology

required by mobile ground forces for

these purposes is immature. Thus,

Army reliance on information technology to insure the survivability and

lethality of lightweight, mobile ground

vehicles entails high risks. Failure has

acute consequences. Ground vehicles and ground troops must bear

the brunt of any deficiencies in the network.

Deficiencies in current technologies do not negate the need to

invest in advanced technologies, such as active protection and networks. On the contrary, the capabilities they provide are applicable

to all Army ground vehicles.

As noted above, increased conventional protection can be

obtained by allowing platform weight to increase. We believe that

deployment of a network-enabled, 35-ton, ground vehicle, comparable to the Bradley IFV would provide a level of survivability with

which most troops would feel comfortable, should the network fail.

This hedge against vulnerability is important to allow troops to

train confidently with the technology and develop the tactics to

allow network-centric warfighting to reach its fullest potential.

Operational engagements are not the time to experiment wholeheartedly, in option-sacrificing ways, with untested technologies

that might go awry when confronted by the real world of wartime

fog, friction, and surprise.

The natural response to removing the weight constraint is to

question its impact on strategic mobility. However, as we indicated,

increased platform weight will have little impact on the movement of

July 2004 Defense Horizons 7

Army reliance on

information technology to

insure the survivability and

lethality of lightweight,

mobile ground vehicles

entails high risks
large force structures. Further, the Army can achieve increased

mobility using fast sealift and prepositioning equipment on land and

at sea. Most importantly, mobility is not just about speed but also

about the capabilities of what is being moved. We believe that restructuring the force will have a greater near term impact on deployability

than introducing new technology for lightweight platforms.

Creating smaller units is an obvious way to reduce weight. The

Army Chief of Staff recently proposed plans to create smaller, leaner

brigades. His proposal addresses concerns about current readiness,

not future force capabilities. Our proposal is bolder and entails

greater restructuring.

In the coming years, the Army will be called on to deploy combat

forces in varying sizes: battalions, brigades, divisions, corps, and multiple corps. Deployment problems are not the province of large forces

alone; they can arise in trying to deploy a single brigade, or even a battalion. But, as Operation Iraqi Freedom shows, these problems arise

with special magnitude when heavy, corps-sized forces are deployed. If

the Army can acquire a better capacity to deploy swiftly one or two

corps on a single occasion, it likely will be able to deploy smaller forces

or larger forces at effective rates. Regardless of whether the term

corps remains part of the vernacular, the Army will continue to anchor

its planning on corps-sized operations and use this model as a basis for

operating in big and small ways.

To conclude, we offer other recommendations for consideration

to improve Army transformation. First, the Army needs to find a way

to utilize spiral acquisition to meet the current initial operating

capabilities of FCS. One way to accomplish this is to buy initial capabilities during research and development. This would allow earlier

fielding, earlier concept development, and reduced integration risk.

This approach has significant precedents, improves the rate at which

new capabilities are developed and introduced, and has the benefits

of managing the effort as a strategy, with all the flexibility that

implies. Such a strategy could include a variety of combat vehicles

with a variety of survivability features.

More attention needs to be paid to transforming the current

force. This force has again demonstrated its importance in Iraq and

warrants continued improvement as the core of the future sustainment force. This improvement includes adequate funding, the

insertion of new technologies as they mature, and reorganization.

Technologies that enhance human performance and provide

greater protection to soldiers hold the promise of multiplying

small-unit capabilities.

The Army needs to implement a total force restructuring to

gain increased capability and reduce strain on high-demand units,

including some in the Reserve components. There should be no

sacred cows: not the Abrams doctrine, or even the active vs. reserve

construct itself. While the Army needs to retain considerable firepower organic to the service, its transformation plans can be made

more joint. The Army needs to embrace the mutually enabling capabilities derived from joint operations with aviation forces. For example, the Army should place greater emphasis on joint command and

control. Nor should Army transformation rely primarily on new

weapons systems. New combat formations and concepts, such as battle groups and joint rotational readiness, are at least as important.

In a strategic environment that will require the military to

engage in expeditionary warfare more often than ever before, the

Army will be stressed to balance its requirements for mobility, lethality, and survivability. Until now, much of the Army's focus has been on

technology, particularly, the technology required for its so-called unit

of action. But, as we have shown, simply replacing heavy platforms

with lightweight ones does little to change the total weight of Army

forces. The Army needs to give more thought to the organizational

structures within which the technology will be used. Exploiting

parameters outside a single platform enables a shift from thinking

about a collection of platforms as an aggregated mass to thinking in

terms of a system of systems. Similar thinking needs to be applied to

organizational architectures. Only by considering forces in their totality is it possible for the Army to meet future challenges.

Notes1 Army Transformation Roadmap 2003, (Washington, DC: Department of

Defense, April 2003), ix. 2 Ibid., xi.

3 In 1941, a 37–mm gun provided adequate lethality. But the M24 of 1945 carried

a 75–mm gun and the M41A1 of 1953 carried a long-barreled 76–mm gun. The M24

weighed 40,500 pounds, while the M41A1 of 1953 was significantly heavier, at 51,800

pounds.4 M. H. Weik, A Third Survey Of Domestic Electronic Digital Computing Systems, Ballistic Research Laboratories Report 1115, March 1961, pp. 254–257.

(http://ed-thelen.org/comp-hist/BRL61-f.html#FADAC, accessed December 9 2003.) 5 S. Carey, M. Kleiner, M. R. Hieb, and R. Brown, "Development of a C2 Standard

of Task Representation for C4ISR Systems, Simulations, and Robotics: Battle Management Language," 2002 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. 6 S. W. Boutelle and R. Filak, "AFATDS: The Fire Support Window to the 21st Century," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 11 (Spring 1996) 16–21. 7 JTRS is a software based radio system under development as the primary radio

for military communications. 8 See http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/org/cio/gpmlinks.html and links listed

(accessed November 4, 2003). 9 http://www.nro.gov/PressReleases/prs_rel63.html (accessed November 4 2003).

10 Douglas. A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in

the 21st Century (Westport CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).

8 Defense Horizons July 2004

Defense Horizons is published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. CTNSP

publications are available online at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/publications.html.

The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other

department or agency of the Federal Government.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

Hans Binnendijk

Director