****

Number 144, August 1998

Russia’s PeacetimeBattlefield*Presidential versus GeneralStaff Military Reform
by James H. Brusstar

Conclusions- 
President    Boris Yeltsin’s restructuring concept (approved in July 1997) for the armed forces    under the Ministry of Defense is unpopular in the military and serious obstacles have    caused several revisions. The concept may be further revised or even discarded over the    next two years. 
Yeltsin’s    indifference to the impact of military reform on readiness, and continual attempts by the    General Staff to expand military—and political—control present serious problems    for reform.
Economic    and political reformers, closely associated with Yeltsin, will continue attempts to weaken    the military’s potential political influence and reduce the military’s economic    burden on Russia.
The General Staff is    likely to publicly support "reform" even as it attempts to consolidate control    over all of Russia’s military forces. 
Rampant    crime may lead law-and-order presidential candidates to endorse the totalitarian-like    domestic command system proposed by the Chief of the General Staff. The    military—always a potential king-maker in Russian politics—would then be in a    good position to dictate the terms of its own "reform." **Yeltsin’s 1997 Concept of Reform**
Concurrent with appointingIgor Sergeyev Minister of Defense in May 1997, President Yeltsin established twopresidential commissions to make recommendations on how to proceed with reform of theRussian military forces. The first commission, under then Prime Minister ViktorChernomyrdin, was to recommend priority measures for reform and organizational changesneeded to support reform. It was also to analyze the operational costs of the Ministry ofDefense (MOD) in particular. (President Yeltsin had already limited future budgets of theDefense Ministry to 3.5 percent of the gross national product.) The second commission,under then First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubais, was to explore possible methodsthat could be used to fund the Russian military forces in the future. 
The immediateresults of the Chernomyrdin commission were a series of presidential decrees on"military reform." These decrees were aimed at restructuring, downsizing, andchanging the chain-of-command authority within the Ministry of Defense only. 
The July 1997 "military reform"decrees clearly embodied the essence of what President Yeltsin wanted to do. They focusedon the MOD itself, redesigning its chain of operational command to reduce the authority ofservice commanders-in-chief, while increasing that of the Chief of the General Staff andthe military district commanders. The Ground Forces—a major seat of resistance topolitical control since 1992—was to have been abolished and turned into twodirectorates under the General Staff. 

Under the July decrees,components of other services were to re-combine in a series of steps that would eventuallyreduce the services under the Ministry of Defense from five to three and reduce theheadquarters staffs of most existing organizations by approximately 30 percent. The newMinister of Defense emphasized the near-term increase in readiness that would be achievedin the units that were to remain and forecasted that Ministry of Defense forces would befully equipped with 21st century weapons and technology in little more than adecade. (He later changed the forecasted completion date to the year 2025.) **The General Staff’s Grand Design**
From the beginning the General Staff hadan agenda that differed from that of the President. Chief of the Gene-ral Staff, ColonelGeneral Anatolii Kvashnin, immediately became the driving force behind the Chernomyrdincommission. By the fall of last year, reports of the commission’s work indicated thatit was, in large measure, advocating the same reorganization plan that had been advocatedby two previous Chiefs of the General Staff—despite Yeltsin’s previousrejections of those plans. 

The plan reportedly called for the GeneralStaff to have peacetime and wartime control over major activities of all militaryforces—including those outside the Ministry of Defense. The General Staff is alreadycharged with developing mobilization plans and coordinating contingency wartime operationplans for the non-MOD "power" ministries, as well as taking operational controlof them in wartime. Last year, however, under the guise of military reform, the GeneralStaff reportedly again attempted to assign itself authority to approve all plans forpeacetime training, force development, and weapons procurement for the non-MOD forces. 

Kvashnin’s proposal also extended theGeneral Staff’s control to officer personnel matters within the non-MOD militaries.First, Kvashnin—as have others—called for the drastic reduction andconsolidation of military schools and training facilities throughout the variousministries on the grounds that money was being wasted on unnecessary duplication. Hisproposal called for the consolidation to take place under the MOD. At the same time, therewere calls for MOD officers to be assigned to the other ministries in order to raise theprofessionalism within those ministries. This call appears to also be based on widelyshared assessments.

The practical results of such personnelmoves, however, would be that the General Staff would gain wide control over officertraining and assignments in all Russia’s military forces. The political implicationsof such an arrangement had to be noticed by President Yeltsin.

The most threatening of Kvashnin’s"reform" proposals, however, was the plan to consolidate military controlthroughout Russia into six military districts directly under the Chief of the GeneralStaff. Presently, the districts within each of the so-called power ministries havedistinct borders and commanders who report directly to their own ministries. Kvashninproposed three changes: district boundaries in all of the power ministries be redrawn tocoincide; commanders of the non-MOD districts be subordinated to the MOD districtcommanders-in-chief; and the MOD district commanders-in-chief be given operational controlover all forces assigned to their districts. 

While President Yeltsin supported the ideaof increasing the authority of the MOD military district commanders at the expense of theservice commanders, there is every reason to believe that he would not have approved ofthe idea of subordinating districts from other ministries to the MOD district commanders.In fact, it would be completely out of character for Yeltsin to support a move that wouldconsolidate the powers of the other "power" ministries under the General Staffor any other component of the Ministry of Defense. In both the August 1991 coup againstMikhail Gorbachev and the October 1993 confrontation with the Russian legislature, theRussian (Soviet) armed forces commanders showed themselves too willing to act at variancewith their political leaders. 
**The Military Budget Battle**
More than a year ago, President Yeltsindecreed that no more than 3.5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) would beallocated to the MOD budget. The new Minister of Defense (General Igor Sergeyev) and Chiefof the General Staff General Kvashnin have accepted this restriction. Instead of fightingfor more money, they decided to extend the deadline for completing the reforms sought bythe military. When they first took over in May of 1997, the two generals accepted thatreform (usually described by Russian military analysts as reequipping the armed forceswith state of the art equipment) would be completed by the year 2010. By the fall of 1997,however, Sergeyev revised his forecast to the year 2025.

Sergeyev’s new deadline will probablybe extended further. Not only was his forecast based on the Ministry of Defense receiving3.5 percent of the GDP every year without fail, it did not take account of the socialcosts the ministry must pay when it reduces the size of its active duty force. Anotherextension, however, will result in major dissension in the MOD.

Serious questions have already been raisedas to whether the 3.5 percent ceiling itself is adequate for the reforms currentlyenvisioned. In December 1997, at a conference attended by Andrei Kokoshin (the newSecurity Council Secretary), Colonel Viktor Tkachev of the military’s FinancialAcademy said that even if Russia experienced economic growth, 3.5 percent would onlyprovide for the proper maintenance of an armed forces of 700,000. Without growth, he said,only 500,000-550,000 soldiers could be fully maintained to the standard of the armies ofWest European countries.

Tkachev maintains that Russia has a dualcriterion for optimizing the Ministry of Defense forces: (1) developing military forcesthat can protect against an external threat; and, (2) developing military forces accordingto Russia’s economic potential. He argues that failure to reconcile these conflictingaims will lead to some departments pursuing one aim while other departments pursue theother. He concludes that Russia must accept a McNamara formula of "the maximumdefense capability per dollar of expenditure." 

However, there is no indication thatYeltsin will impose a McNamara-type rule on Russian bureaucracy. Consequently, the FinanceMinistry can be expected to continue limiting MODfunding allocations—even below theamount requested by the President and authorized by the legislature. The Ministry ofDefense, in turn, can be expected to continue lobbying the president and the legislaturefor whatever money it can get. 
**The Defense Industry Battle**
Financing the military is not the onlyfunding problem connected with the General Staff’s military reform proposal. TheGeneral Staff’s plan also called for a major phased reduction in Russia’smilitary industrial complex based on the needs of the military—from 1,749 coredefense enterprises in 1997, to 667 in 2000, and 435 in 2005. However, it is unlikely thatsuch a plan could be carried out. Not only have the defense enterprises effectivelyresisted all previous top-down organized efforts towards conversion of defense enterprisesto domestic production, the Russian state has consistently failed to adequately fund thoseprograms upon which there has been agreement.

Military factory conversion programs forthe past six years have been more than disappointing, leaving factories unprepared tocontinue military production or converted to the production of consumer products. Factoryproduction orders and operation funds were severely reduced on the grounds that theproducts were no longer needed. 

At the same time, the Russian governmentreduced incentives for the factories to initiate their own local conversion programs bycontinuing to provide just enough social benefits to workers to keep them tied to theirjobs, and, by failing to provide conversion program funds promised to the factories. TheEconomic Minister, Yakov Urinson, reported that in 1995 the government provided factoriesonly 25 percent of the funds authorized in the budget for conversion programs. The figuredropped to 11 percent in 1996 and zero percent in 1997. 
**Where Does It All Stand?**
At the beginning of 1998, PresidentYeltsin put a halt to the General Staff’s grandiose plan for military reform. Nospecific public announcement was made that the plan was dead in the water, but it was. 

In the first months in 1998, PresidentYeltsin abolished the Defense Council and its staff—under which the General Staff(under the mantle of the Cherno-myrdin commission) had been preparing its program forre-organizing the militaries and industrial complex. Although Yeltsin stated that theSecurity Council would pick up responsibility for preparing plans for military reform, hepicked Andrei Kokoshin—a cautious man—to head the Security Council.Yeltsin’s recent statements that Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko would pick upChernomyrdin’s responsibilities for military reform also have an empty ring to them.

Essentially, Yeltsin has achieved what hesought to do under the rubric "military reform." He has set in motion a programfor large-scale downsizing and reorganizing the armed forces under the Ministry of Defenseand even started to reduce the size of the other "power" ministries. It isunlikely that his interest in military reform ever extended any further than this.

This does not mean, however, that thebattle for Russian military reform is over. Russian security specialists disagree over keyissues, such as the nature of the war that the military can be expected to fight in thenear future. The issue may have appeared to have been put to rest, at first, when Yeltsinapproved a Security Council Concept paper in December 1997 stating the main threat tonational security no longer comes from large-scale aggression, but from internal economicand social problems and ethnic tensions. However, disagreements with this assessment havebeen expressed from several quarters. 

Additionally, President Yeltsin’sreform decrees for the MOD have resulted in major fights within the ministry as servicesand general officers fight to protect their preserves. After Kvashnin put the long heldplan of the General Staff on the table to establish its control over the other powerministries, the fighting spread throughout the government. It did not stop when Yeltsinmade it clear that Kvashnin’s plan was politically unacceptable. In January andFebruary, the Federal Security Service attempted to extend its control over the FederalBorder Service. It is unlikely that the battle among the power ministries—and withinthe MOD itself—will end in the near future. 

Abolishing the position ofCommander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces clearly was important to President Yeltsin.Because the Ground Forces had been the largest and most politically dominant service, andhad led the MOD’s resistance to military reform, he had hoped to abolish a majorsource of the political resistance. However, it appears, that because Yeltsin perceivedKvashnin’s recommendations to be as much a threat as the Ground Forces had been, heassigned the Commander-in-Chief’s oversight functions to the office of the Ministerof Defense, not the General Staff.**** 
Russia’s Many Militaries**
There are 14 ministries and      departments within the Russian government that have military troops under their control.      The General Staff has suggested draftees be provided to only the following military      organizations:

The Ministry of Defense      (MOD)      The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)      The Federal Security Service (FSB)      The Federal Border Service (FPS)****Yeltsin’s Original Reformsfor the Ministry of Defense**

**Phase I (1997-2000)******Main Focus:****Increase readiness and technical  standards by reducing the overall force structure that has to be maintained; reduce to 1.2  million men; improve conditions for the soldiers

**Command Changes:**

Give military districts commanders  operational control of forces assigned to their districts 

Abolish Commander-in-Chief of Ground  Forces position

Establish an unified "Strategic  Missile Force" based on current components:

Strategic Missile Forces    Military Space Forces    Missile and Space Defense Force

Combine Air Forces and remaining Air  Defense Forces

Retain the Navy with four fleets and a  flotilla, but downsize

**Research and Development Policy:**

No purchases of old equipment; develop  experimental models of breakthrough technology

**Phase II (2000-2005)**

**Switch to Three Services:**

According to General Staff spokesmen,  these would be based on "spheres of combat"—ground, air/space, sea. (This  likely reflects a General Staff’s plan to align service support with operational  commands.)

**Research and Development Policy**:

Start to deliver state of the art arms and  equipment by 2005.
**The General Staff’s Military ReformProposal**
The General Staff took the lead inelaborating the idea of military reform for the Chernomyrdin commission. Thecommission’s work has not been published, but it appears it worked in generalconsonance with Yeltsin’s original tasking. The emphasis by the commission’sworking group on establishing strict General Staff control over all aspects of militaryactivity in Russia, however, was at complete variance with President Yeltsin’s desireto reduce MOD political influence. Key aspects of the General Staff proposal are asfollows: 
**Command Changes: 

Give the General Staff peacetime and  wartime control over all military forces (MOD and non-MOD) through the MOD Military  District Commanders.
**Reform of the MOD: 

Accept the reforms decreed by Yeltsin  in July 1997.
**Non-MOD Militaries: 

Reduce all Russian military forces in  a manner that does not challenge MOD political influence or destabilize the state.

**MOD:** Reduce from 1.9 to 1.2 million  soldiers**MVD:** Reduce from 257,000 to 220,000 soldiers**FSB:** Not published in Russian press**FPS:** Maintain current strength at 143,000
**Military Industrial Complex: 

Make Russia’s military industrial  complex responsive to General Staff planning requirements.
**Re-Establishing an "Iron-Hand"**
General Kvashnin’s proposal regardingmilitary districts is even more explosive when one considers that he has also recommendedthat the President divide the country into a limited number of "administrative"districts and assign a plenipotentiary representative to implement all political andeconomic decisions within those districts. It is not a far reach to conclude thatKvashnin’s administrative districts and consolidated military districts wouldcoincide.

Kvashnin’s grand reorganizationscheme is nothing short of totalitarian in nature. It will have great appeal toRussia’s "law and order" presidential candidates in the run-up to theelections in the year 2000—including Mayor Lushkov of Moscow, who has also suggestedthe idea of plenipotentiary administrative districts.
James H. Brusstar is a Senior Fellow ofthe Institute for National Strategic Studies. He can be contacted at (202) 685-2366, orvia e-mail at [email protected].
The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

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