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Number 138, May 1998

Responding to ProliferationThreats
by Mitchel B. Wallerstein

Conclusions- Iraq’s possession of biological and    chemical weapons is indicative that proliferation presents not "theoretical"    military problems but significant military threats today. 
- Countries of moderate technical    capability and economic means are readily able to develop biological weapons. 
- The development of biological weapons    can be masked by other weapons programs, as well as by dual-use technologies in legitimate    biological/pesticide manufacturing and research facilities. 
- Many states that possess biological or    chemical weapons exist in unstable regions where the possibility of U.S. or coalition    military involvement is greatest. 
- Most proliferant states aspire to    regional hegemony and perceive nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons as    asymmetrical counters to the superior conventional forces of opponents. 
- A key to deterring the use of biological    or chemical weapons lies in developing counterproliferation capabilities (e.g., protective    suits, masks, detectors, etc.) that negate the value of using such weapons against U.S. or    coalition forces. 
**Proliferation: A Case in Point**
One of the most enduring—and deeplytroubling —lessons from the Gulf War is that Iraq, a country of moderate technicalcapability and economic means, was able to move from biological weapons (BW) research todeployed weapons in only five years. Iraq possessed BW-filled munitions, including bombsand missile warheads; had the technical sophistication to weaponize three differentbiological agents; and had *forward deployed* these weapons before the start ofDesert Storm. But what is particularly shocking is that these facts were discovered notfrom mandatory Iraqi declarations to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), oreven from more than 30 highly intrusive, UNSCOM inspection missions. Rather, theinformation came to light only from the belated revelations of an Iraqi defector, HusseinKamal, who later paid with his life.

The extent and sophistication of the IraqiBW program—and the suspicions raised by Saddam’s recent efforts to preventUNSCOM inspectors from gaining access to the most sensitive sites—underscores thereality that NBC military threats are not "theoretical" military problems of thefuture; they are significant military threats *today.***The Relevance of Arms Control in Dealingwith the BW problem**
The recent UNSCOM difficulties with SaddamHussein notwithstanding, the punitive inspection and verification measures forced ondefeated Iraq were an arms controller’s dream. They include: mandatory declarations;mandatory UNSCOM interrogation of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programpersonnel; routine visits to facilities; anywhere/anytime challenge visits;anywhere/anytime sample collection for BW forensics; tagging and random inspection ofdual-use equipment; and import controls. Yet, despite all of these measures, theinherently dual-use nature of biological manufacturing facilities enabled (and may *still*enable) Iraq to hide a "warm" BW capability from UNSCOM inspectors, masqueradingit as a bio-pesticide research facility. Indeed, even while subject to the most intenseand intrusive inspection regime in history, Iraq was able to *upgrade* its capabilityto produce the BW agent, anthrax, from a crude liquid slurry to simulant powders, milledinto sizes readily respirable as a BW agent and to perform open air testing of the powder,once again by claiming that it was a bio-pesticide. Anthrax is a highly lethal biologicalagent, which occurs in nature as spores, particularly around animal stocks. Anthrax can betransmitted cutaneously, by gastro-intestinal infection, or by inhalation. Respiratoryinfection is the most lethal form of the illness.

The most immediate lesson to be drawn fromthis experience is that, whereas traditional arms control techniques have utility incounting, monitoring and verifying munitions or munitions-related equipment, such asmissile silos, artillery pieces or tanks, the arms control approach is less effective whenthe armament in question is produced substantially on the basis of *dual-use*technology, such as in the case of BW. This leads to the postulate that the more limitedthe probability of detection—or stated differently, the easier it is to mask or hidean NBC weapons capability—the less "deterrence" is gained from traditionalmeasures such as mandatory declarations, and intrusive challenge inspections. And the Iraqexample demonstrates just how easy it is to hide or mask an active BW capability. Indeed,as recent experience has demonstrated, UNSCOM has only limited ability even to verify thereliability of the declarations that the Iraqis actually have made.

Another insight is that the Iraqi BWprogram began as a hidden subset of its chemical weapons (CW) program. The technicians,munitions handlers, veterinarians, range instrumentation people, and so on, who supporteddevelopment of CW munitions, were at some point diverted to the BW program. In fact, thefirst BW agents were liquid slurries filled into CW bombs. Thus, if the CW Convention canestablish a world-wide norm against the development, testing, and stockpiling of CWmunitions, it will help to block one path for masking development of a BW program.Unfortunately, other covert paths exist, such as diverting elements of a defensivebiological R&D program, which is permitted under the Biological Weapons and ToxinsConvention, to a covert offensive BW program.
**Prudent Steps: Defense AgainstProliferation**
Many countries, in addition to Iraq,either are seeking or possess biological and chemical weapons. And many possess or aredeveloping increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, including ballistic and cruisemissiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Thus, it is accurate to state thatproliferation already has**occurred and *continues* to occur. However,non-proliferation diplomacy has not been a failure. Indeed, the record of diplomaticsuccess over the past 30 years is both substantial and impressive. But the unavoidablerealities of today’s world are that we live in an era of (a) enormous, and expanding,global trade, (b) rapidly growing indigenous, scientific and engineering capabilities inthe proliferant states, and (c) ever wider availability of dual use technology. As aresult, despite the success of efforts to *prevent* proliferation from occurring andto roll back**existing NBC missile programs, it is nevertheless the case that welive in a proliferated world. And it is no coincidence that most proliferant states existin politically unstable regions of the world, where the possibility of U.S. or coalitionmilitary involvement is greatest. This requires, in turn, that proliferation must be dealtwith not only as an arms control problem but also as a high priority defense planningrequirement.

The United States discovered manyvulnerabilities in its defensive capabilities during the Gulf War, particularly againstNBC weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. Indeed, it was only with the benefitof hindsight that the true extent to which the coalition forces "dodged abullet" (both literally and figuratively) in avoiding CW/BW threats in the Gulf Warbecame fully evident. The coalition’s ability to confront an adversary armed with NBCweapons was limited in some important ways. For example, U.S. chemical agent detectionequipment yielded too many false positives, complicating the decision on when to put on(and take off) protective gear. There was also first-hand evidence of the degradation inefficiency and overall operational tempo when soldiers were required to operate in MOPP-4protective gear, which was heavy and cumbersome, particularly in the heat of the Arabiandesert.

Ironically, although the United Statesknew that the Iraqis had an extensive CW arsenal—and had experience using chemicalweapons against Iran and Iraq’s own Kurdish minority—Saddam Hussein apparentlychose not to use the weapons, even though they, too, were forward-deployed. The reasonswhy the Iraqis decided *not*to use their available CW inventory have been thesubject of intense speculation ever since. By most accounts, warnings (including animplied nuclear threat) made prior to the conflict by then Secretary of State James Bakerand British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had some influence on Iraqi thinking. (Iraqalso may have perceived that the coalition had CW defenses superior to its own.)

The United States also knew before the warthat the Iraqis had facilities to perform research and development (R&D) on biologicalweapons. But when the coalition began planning attacks against suspected BW targets (e.g.,munitions bunkers), there was insufficient understanding of how to destroy such targetswhile limiting the collateral effects on nearby civilian populations. And, many of thesuspected BW storage sites were located, perhaps purposely, in or near heavily populatedurban areas.

International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA)-led inspections after the Gulf War also revealed an Iraqi nuclear weaponsdevelopment program of a scope and sophistication that was very different technically andmuch larger than intelligence analysis had previously identified. Iraq had succeeded inadapting semi-obsolete (1940s) electro-magnetic enrichment technology to enlarge itsfissile material stockpile—and hiding this from the IAEA. By some estimates, Iraq mayhave been six-to-nine months away from producing enough fissile material for a crudenuclear weapon.

Finally, the Gulf War saw the use of theScud missile as a political "terror weapon." Fired at U.S. troops andpredominantly against cities in Israel and Saudi Arabia, most of the missiles failed tostrike their intended targets, although a single Scud killed more Americans than any othersystem. They nevertheless were quite effective in evoking terror in the targeted civilianpopulations. Moreover, the United States discovered that its ability to find and destroythe missiles, either on the ground or in the air, also was limited. Thus, the Gulf Warprovided a substantial demonstration of the need for improved passive and active defenses,as well as counterforce capabilities, to confront a future adversary armed with NBCweapons and missile delivery systems.
**The Rationale for Counterproliferation**
Proliferant states may not be deterred bythreats of "massive retaliation" as during the Cold War—in part, becausethey may not always take them seriously. On the other hand, counterproliferation works, inpart, because it is tangible; proliferant states can observe that the threatened statepossesses the necessary protective suits, masks, detectors, and so on, and trains andexercises for their use. This forces proliferant states to recognize that the UnitedStates and its allies or coalition partners will *not*be deterred from pursuingtheir political and military objectives by the threatened use of BW or CW.

This changes the cost/benefit calculus;the substantial economic costs and national security risks associated with the developmentand/or acquisition of NBC weapons begin to substantially outweigh the perceived benefits.From the standpoint of the proliferant, if NBC weapons will not achieve their desiredobjective, or if they can be obtained only at very high cost, why seek them? Thus, bydevaluing the leverage normally associated with the possession of NBC weapons,counterproliferation complements and reinforces ongoing non-proliferation diplomacy (e.g.,the development or strengthening of non-proliferation regimes such as the Chemical WeaponsConvention), as well efforts to seek bilateral and multilateral diplomatic solutions toregional proliferation problems.

While most proliferants seek NBC weaponsbased on calculations of regional security and/or aspirations to regional hegemony, theyalso recognize the potential coercive value that such weapons could represent inconfrontations with states possessing superior conventional forces. This is particularlytrue in an era of "CNN Wars," where video images of soldiers and civilianskilled in horrible ways, and in large numbers, as a result of exposure to CW or BW couldhave significant, negative, political consequences. Thus, proliferant states may perceivethe acquisition and/or development of NBC weapons as an asymmetrical counter to anopponent with superior conventional force projection capabilities.

Of all the weapons that the United Statespotentially could face, none is more menacing than bio- logical weapons. BW can beproduced cheaply, concealed easily, and potentially can be as lethal as certain types ofnuclear weapons. BW also pose significant defense planning challenges to make certain thatU.S. and other friendly forces are able to detect advancing BW clouds on the battlefieldand to protect themselves from the effects. 
**The NATO Response to Proliferation**
In a quiet success story, a senior DefenseGroup on Proliferation was established at NATO in 1994, and through its work, NATOrecognized that proliferation can pose a direct military threat to the Alliance, and musttherefore be a central consideration in defense planning. NATO perceived the greatest riskis to deployed forces operating out of area (such as in the present example of theBalkans) where the immediate risks are likely to be the greatest. The Alliance has placedgreatest emphasis, therefore, on developing counterproliferation capabilities first andforemost to safeguard NATO’s ability to perform new roles and missions, such aspeacekeeping and peace enforcement. Having the ability to perform these new missions, inaddition to NATO’s traditional role of defending NATO populations and territory, isan integral part of NATO’s adaptation to the new security environment.

NATO’s approach to deterring thethreat or use of NBC weapons is to possess a mix of conventional, counter BW/CW defenses,and nuclear forces that can deny a potential adversary its objectives and can inflictswift and sure punishment if such weapons are used. It is predicated on the ultimatefutility—and, indeed, irrationality—of using NBC weapons against our forces orpopulations, or those of our friends and allies. 

As demonstrated most recently in Bosnia,and before that in the Persian Gulf, future wars are likely to be fought in coalition.Beyond preparing our national forces to operate in an NBC environment, the United Statesis also working with its allies and friends to develop and implement common defenseresponses to the military risks posed by NBC weapons. 
**Recommendations**
Measures such as improving chemicaldefense suits or developing new, more sensitive chemical and biological detectors are notenough. The United States, its allies, and friends must change the way they *think*about operating in an NBC environment in order to optimize the use of revolutionarytechnologies and new battlefield tactics. The following recommendations should beconsidered.
- Although we now live in a proliferated    world, the paramount goal of U.S. policy must remain the prevention of proliferation    whenever possible. 
- The United States must continue to    provide leadership in the development of robust national and multilateral defense against    BW/CW and missile-delivery threats. 
- Proliferant states must understand that    the United States and its allies cannot be intimidated because these allies possess robust    passive defenses (e.g., personal and collective protection), active defenses (e.g.,    theater missile defenses), and counterforce capabilities (e.g., the means to destroy NBC    munitions stockpiles and production facilities). 
- The United States must develop    capabilities that will allow it to defend against or respond to the use of NBC weapons on    its own terms, rather than on those dictated by an autocratic or theocratic proliferant    states. Threats to use NBC weapons must not become useful instruments of the weak to    blackmail or coerce the strong. 

Dr. Mitchel B. Wallerstein wrote thisarticle while associated with National Defense University’s Center forCounterproliferation Research as a Distinguished Research Professor. He served from1993-1997 as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy.

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by membersand guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National DefenseUniversity faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars andconferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguishedspeakers.

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