United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EST 

Thursday, September 29, 2005 

Testimony 

Before the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs, U.S. Senate

DOD BUSINESS 

TRANSFORMATION 

Preliminary Observations 

on the Defense Travel 

System 

Statement of McCoy Williams 

Director, Financial Management and Assurance 

Keith A. Rhodes 

Chief Technologist, Applied Research and Methods 

Center for Engineering and Technology 

GAO-05-998T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-998T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact McCoy 

Williams at (202) 512-6906 or Keith Rhodes 

at (202) 512-6412. 

Highlights of GAO-05-998T, a testimony to 

the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 

Senate 

September 29, 2005

DOD BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION

Preliminary Observations on Defense 

Travel System 

DTS development and implementation have been problematic, especially in 

the area of testing key functionality to ensure that the system will perform as 

intended. Consequently, critical flaws have been identified after deployment, 

resulting in significant schedule slippages as shown below. 

DTS Schedule Slippages 

GAO’s recent analysis of selected requirements disclosed that system testing 

was ineffective in ensuring that the promised capability has been delivered 

as intended. For example, GAO found that DOD did not have reasonable 

assurance that DTS properly display flight and airfare information. This 

problem was not detected prior to deployment, since DOD failed to properly 

test system interfaces. Accordingly, DOD travelers might not have received 

accurate information which, could have resulted in higher travel costs. 

DTS has corrected some of the previously reported travel problems but 

others remain. Specifically, DTS has resolved the problem related to 

duplicate payment for airline tickets purchased with the centrally billed 

accounts. However, problems remain related to improper premium class 

travel, unused tickets that are not refunded, and accuracy of traveler’s 

claims. These remaining problems cannot be resolved solely within DTS and 

will take departmentwide action to address. 

GAO identified two key challenges facing DTS in becoming DOD’s standard 

travel system: (1) developing needed interfaces and (2) underutilization of 

DTS at sites where it has been deployed. While DTS has developed 32 

interfaces with various DOD business systems, it will have to develop 

interfaces with at least 17 additional systems—not a trivial task. 

Furthermore, the continued use of the existing legacy travel systems results 

in underutilization of DTS and affects the savings that DTS was planned to 

achieve. Components incur additional costs by operating two systems with 

the same function—the legacy system and DTS—and by paying higher 

processing fees for manual travel vouchers as opposed to processing the 

travel vouchers electronically through DTS. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) 

has been working to develop and 

implement a standard end-to-end 

travel system for the last 10 years. 

The Subcommittee has been at the 

forefront in addressing issues 

related to DOD’s travel 

management practices with the 

hearing today being another 

example of its oversight efforts. 

Because of widespread 

congressional interest in the 

Defense Travel System (DTS), 

GAO’s current audit is being 

performed under the statutory 

authority given to the Comptroller 

General of the United States. 

GAO’s testimony is based on the 

preliminary results of that audit 

and focuses on the following three 

key questions: (1) Has DOD 

effectively tested key functionality 

in DTS related to flights and fare 

information? (2) Will DTS correct 

the problems related to DOD travel 

previously identified by GAO and 

others? and (3) What challenges 

remain in ensuring that DTS 

achieves its goal as DOD’s standard 

travel system? 

In addition, the Subcommittee 

asked that GAO provide a 

description of the intellectual 

property rights of DOD in DTS. 

This issue is addressed in 

appendix. I. 

Subsequent to this testimony, GAO 

plans to issue a report that will 

include recommendations to the 

Secretary of Defense aimed at 

improving the department’s 

implementation of DTS. 
Page 1 GAO-05-998T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our preliminary results of the 

Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to develop and implement a new 

standard end-to-end travel system.1

 Over 10 years ago, the DOD Task 

Force to Reengineer Travel issued a report that pinpointed three principal 

causes for DOD’s inefficient travel system: (1) travel policies and 

programs were focused on compliance with rigid rules rather than mission 

performance, (2) travel practices did not keep pace with travel 

management improvements implemented by industry, and (3) the travel 

system were not integrated. To address these concerns, DOD established 

the Project Management Office—Defense Travel System (PMO-DTS) to 

acquire travel services that would be used DOD-wide. This Subcommittee 

has been at the forefront in addressing issues related to DOD’s travel 

management practices. Continued oversight activities such as this hearing 

can help ensure that DOD achieves its long-standing goal of successfully 

implementing a standard travel management system. We look forward to 

continuing to work with the Subcommittee. 

Because of widespread congressional interest in the Defense Travel 

System (DTS), our current audit is being performed under the statutory 

authority given to the Comptroller General of the United States. Our 

testimony today is based on the preliminary results of that audit. Although 

we discussed the preliminary findings included in our testimony with DOD 

officials, we have not yet provided the department with our draft report 

for comment. Subsequent to this testimony, we plan to issue a report that 

will include recommendations to the Secretary of Defense aimed at 

improving the department’s management and oversight of DTS. 

 1

 DOD expects DTS to perform all functions related to travel or ensure that other systems 

are provided with adequate information to provide this functionality. For example, 

obligating funds associated with travel is a necessary function and DTS is expected to (1) 

make sure that adequate funds are available before authorizing travel either through 

information contained in its system or by obtaining the necessary information from another 

system, (2) obligate funds through issuance of approved travel orders, and (3) provide 

DOD’s financial management systems with the necessary information so that those systems 

can record the obligation. Since DTS is required to ensure that all travel related 

functionality is properly performed, DOD commonly refers to DTS as an “end-to-end 

system.” 
Page 2 GAO-05-998T 

Today, our testimony will focus on the following three key questions: 

• Has DOD effectively tested key DTS functionality related to flights and 

fare information? 

• Will DTS correct the internal control weaknesses and improper payments 

previously identified? 

• What challenges remain in ensuring that DTS achieves its goal as DOD’s 

standard travel system? 

In addition, for the hearing today, you asked us for a description of DOD’s 

property rights in DTS. We address this issue in appendix I. 

To address the first key question, we reviewed two key DTS flight-related 

requirements and the related testing to determine if the desired 

functionality was effectively implemented. To address the second key 

question, we analyzed (1) our prior reports and testimonies, (2) selected 

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) reports, and (3) DOD 

congressional testimonies to identify the specific problems that DTS was 

intended to resolve. We also randomly selected for detailed review travel 

vouchers and transactions drawn from the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 

(October-December 2004) to determine if DTS calculation problems 

identified by DFAS had been resolved.2

 To address the third key question, 

we discussed with the PMO-DTS the deployment of DTS as it relates to the 

transmission of data such as finance and accounting information, between 

DTS and the other systems belonging to DOD, as well as the private sector. 

We also analyzed DOD data related to the utilization of DTS throughout 

DOD. We determined that the DOD data we used as the basis for the 

preliminary evaluation in the testimony were sufficiently reliable by (1) 

performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) reviewing 

existing information about the data and the system that produced them, 

and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We 

performed our work from October 2004 through September 2005 in 

accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Details of our scope and methodology are included in appendix II. 

DTS’s development and implementation have been problematic, especially 

in the area of requirements and testing key functionality to ensure that the 

 2

 Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Statistical Operations and Review Branch, 

Military and Civilian Pay Services Defense Travel System: Results of Post Payment 

Reviews, 1st Quarter, FY 2004 (Kansas City, Mo.: undated). 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-05-998T 

system would perform as intended. Thus, it is not surprising that critical 

flaws have been identified after deployment, resulting in significant 

schedule slippages. As originally envisioned, the initial deployment of DTS 

was to commence within 120 days after the effective date of contract 

award in September 1998, with complete deployment to approximately 

11,000 locations by April 2002. However, that date has been changed to 

September 2006—a slippage of over 4 years. Our recent analysis of 

selected requirements for one key area disclosed that system testing was 

ineffective in ensuring that the promised capability was delivered as 

intended. For example, we found that DOD did not have reasonable 

assurance that flight information was properly displayed.3

 This problem 

was not detected prior to deployment since DOD failed to properly test the 

system interfaces through which the data is accessed. Accordingly, DOD 

travelers might not have received accurate information on available flights, 

which could have resulted in higher travel costs. PMO-DTS officials have 

acknowledged that the problem has existed since the implementation of 

the system. PMO-DTS officials have indicated that the problem was 

corrected in an August 2005 release of the software. We are in the process 

of following up to determine whether the corrective actions have resolved 

the problem and will include the results in our report that will be issued 

subsequent to the testimony. 

DTS has corrected some of the previously reported internal control 

weaknesses, while others remain. We previously reported that as a result 

of a breakdown in internal controls and a weak control environment, DOD 

has (1) paid for improper premium class travel, (2) failed to redeem 

unused airline tickets, and (3) paid twice for the same airline ticket when 

using the centrally billed accounts (CBA). 4

 In commenting on our reports 

and in congressional testimony, the department has stated that DTS, to 

varying degrees, will help resolve these problems. In addition to our audit 

related issues, DFAS’s Kansas City Statistical Operations and Review 

 3

 Flight information includes items such as departure and arrival times, airports, and the 

cost of the airline ticket. 

4

 GAO, Travel Cards: Internal Control Weaknesses at DOD Led to Improper Use of First 

and Business Class Travel, GAO-04-88 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24, 2003); GAO, Travel 

Cards: Internal Control Weaknesses at DOD Led to Improper Use of First and Business 

Class Travel, GAO-04-229T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 6, 2003); GAO, DOD Travel Cards: 

Control Weaknesses Led to Millions of Dollars Wasted on Unused Airline Tickets, 

GAO-04-398 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004); GAO, DOD Travel Cards: Control 

Weaknesses Led to Millions of Dollars of Improper Payments, GAO-04-576 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 9, 2004); GAO, DOD Travel Cards: Control Weaknesses Led to Millions in 

Fraud, Waste, and Improper Payments, GAO-04-825T (Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2004). 
Page 4 GAO-05-998T 

Branch has previously reported inaccuracies with DTS’s travel payments 

of airfare, lodging, meals, and incidental expenses.5

 First, although DOD 

has taken numerous actions to improve existing guidance and controls 

related to premium class travel, including system changes in DTS, our 

preliminary results indicate that unauthorized premium class travel 

continues. This continuing problem is not the fault of DTS but rather the 

lack of adherence to departmental policy. Second, as currently designed, 

DTS cannot determine whether a traveler has not used all or a portion of 

an airline ticket, unless the traveler requests that the commercial travel 

office (CTO) process a credit for the unused portion of the airline ticket. 

To address the problem, the department now requires certain CTOs to run 

unused ticket reports that identify tickets that were not used within a 

specified time period, usually 30 days past the trip date. Third, in regard to 

duplicate payment for the same ticket, we have observed that DTS is 

designed to ensure that tickets purchased through the CBA cannot be 

claimed on the individual’s travel voucher as a reimbursement to the 

traveler, thus eliminating this problem. 

Finally, we randomly sampled 170 travel vouchers6

 for the period October 

1, 2004, to December 31, 2004,7

 to ascertain if the problems previously 

reported by DFAS had been resolved. From our preliminary results for the 

attributes tested, we found that DTS calculated the lodging and meal 

reimbursements correctly based upon information provided by the 

traveler. However, we identified instances in which human error, either by 

the travelers or the authorizing officials (AO), resulted in the amount of 

reimbursement to the traveler being questionable. For example, the 

department’s policy prescribes the use of a compact car as the norm, 

unless otherwise authorized by the AO. We found eight cases in which the 

traveler rented a vehicle other than a compact without the proper 

authorization. We found no evidence that the AOs questioned why 

departmental policy was not followed. 

 5

 Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Statistical Operations and Review Branch, 

Military and Civilian Pay Services Defense Travel System: Results of Post Payment 

Reviews, 1st Quarter, FY 2004 (Kansas City, Mo.: undated). 

6

 We randomly selected 173 travel vouchers for detailed review, but at the time of our 

review, 3 vouchers had not yet been completed and submitted for review. 

7

 The vouchers selected for review were those trips in DTS where (1) the trip started on or 

after October 1, 2004, and (2) the trip ended on or before December 31, 2004. 
Page 5 GAO-05-998T 

To become the standard travel system within DOD, DTS has faced and will 

continue to face challenges—some of which are beyond the control of the 

DTS program. Our testimony today focuses on two of those challenges: (1) 

developing needed interfaces and (2) underutilization of DTS at sites 

where it has been deployed. To date, DTS has developed 32 interfaces with 

various DOD business systems and going forward interfaces will have to 

be developed with 17 additional business systems. According to the PMODTS, a reported $30 million has been spent on developing and testing the 

interfaces. Some of these systems, such as the Army’s General Fund 

System, are critical to DOD’s modernization of business systems and 

operations. According to the PMO-DTS, the availability of funding to 

develop the interfaces is uncertain. Unless these interfaces are 

successfully developed and implemented, it will be virtually impossible for 

DTS to be a truly end-to-end business system. 

The continued use of the existing legacy travel systems at locations where 

DTS is already deployed underutilizes DTS and reduces the savings the 

DTS was planned to achieve. For example, the Army has acknowledged 

that legacy systems are operating at locations where DTS has been 

deployed. As a result, DOD is spending funds on duplicative systems—

legacy systems and DTS. Additionally, because of the continued operation 

of the legacy systems at locations where DTS has been fully deployed, 

DOD components may pay DFAS a higher processing fee for processing 

manual travel vouchers as opposed to processing the travel voucher 

electronically through DTS. For example, for the period October 1, 2004, 

to February 28, 2005, the Army paid DFAS approximately $6 million to 

process 177,000 travel vouchers manually—$34 per travel voucher, versus 

about $186,000 to process 84,000 travel vouchers electrically—$2.22 per 

voucher. Overall, for this 5-month period, it cost the Army about $5.6 

million more to process these travel vouchers manually as opposed to 

electronically using DTS. 

Twelve years ago, in September 1993, the National Performance Review 

called for an overhaul of DOD’s temporary duty (TDY) travel system. In 

response, DOD created the DOD Task Force to Reengineer Travel to 

examine the process. In January 1995, the task force issued the Report of 

the Department of Defense Task Force to Reengineer Travel.8

 The Task 

 8

 DOD, Report of the Department of Defense Task Force to Reengineer Travel 

(Washington, D.C.: January 1995). 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-05-998T 

Force’s report pinpointed three principal causes for DOD’s inefficient 

travel system: (1) travel policies and programs were focused on 

compliance with rigid rules rather than mission performance, (2) travel 

practices did not keep pace with travel management improvements 

implemented by industry, and (3) the travel system was not integrated. 

On December 13, 1995, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics and the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer issued a memorandum, 

“Reengineering Travel Initiative,” establishing the PMO-DTS to acquire 

travel services that would be used DOD-wide. Additionally, in a 1997 

report to the Congress, the DOD Comptroller pointed out that the existing 

DOD TDY travel system was never designed to be an integrated system.9

Furthermore, the report stated that because there was no centralized 

focus on the department’s travel practices, the travel policies were issued 

by different offices and the process had become fragmented and “stovepiped.” The report further noted that there was no vehicle in the current 

structure to overcome these deficiencies, as no one individual within the 

department had specific responsibility for management control of the TDY 

travel system. 

To address these concerns and after the use of competitive procedures, 

the department awarded a firm fixed-price, performance-based services 

contract to BDM International, Inc. (BDM) in May 1998. In September 

1998, we upheld the department’s selection of BDM.10 Under the terms of 

the contract, the contractor was to start deploying a travel system and to 

begin providing travel services for approximately 11,000 sites worldwide, 

within 120 days of the effective date of the contract, completing 

deployment approximately 38 months later. The contract specified that, 

upon DTS’s achieving initial operational capability (IOC),11 BDM was to be 

 9

 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller): Department of Defense Travel 

Reengineering Pilot Report to Congress (June 1997). 

10 The competitor, Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS), had alleged that the 

department improperly evaluated the two offers by: (1) undervaluing the estimated savings 

to the department by EDS’s proposed accelerated DTS deployment schedule; (2) failing to 

hold “discussions” with EDS on the proposed accelerated deployment schedule; and (3) 

omitting from consideration certain department evaluation team members’ concerns about 

EDS’s staffing level for operation and maintenance of the DTS. Matter of Electronic Data 

Systems Corporation, B-280133; B-280133.2 (Sept. 3, 1998). 

11 IOC represents the first attainment of the minimum capability to effectively employ a 

system of approved specific characteristics. 
Page 7 GAO-05-998T 

paid a one-time deployment fee of $20 for each user and a transaction fee 

of $5.27 for each travel voucher processed. The estimated cost for the 

contract was approximately $264 million. Prior to commencing the work, 

BDM was acquired by TRW Inc. (TRW), which became the contractor of 

record. 

The operational assessment of DTS at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, 

from October through December 2000, disclosed serious failures. For 

example, the system’s response time was slower than anticipated, the 

result being that it took longer than expected to process a travel 

order/voucher. Because of the severity of the problems, in January 2001, a 

joint memorandum was issued by the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller) and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology & Logistics) directing a functional and technical assessment of 

DTS. The memorandum also directed that a determination be made of any 

future contract actions that would be necessary, based on the assessment 

results. In July 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 

approved proceeding with the DTS program and restructuring the contract 

with TRW. 

The TRW contract was restructured through a series of contract 

modifications which were finalized on March 29, 2002. The Government 

agreed to provide TRW consideration in the amount of about $44 million 

for restructure of the contract. TRW agreed to release and discharge the 

Government from liability and agreed to waive any and all liabilities, 

obligations, claims and demands related to or arising from its early 

performance efforts under the original contract. Northrop Grumman 

subsequently acquired TRW in December 2002, and, as such, is now the 

contractor of record. 

The first deployment of DTS was at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South 

Dakota, in February 2002. As of September 2005, DTS has been deployed 

to approximately 5,600 locations. The department currently estimates that 

DTS will be fully deployed to all 11,000 locations by the end of fiscal year 

2006, with an estimated total development and production cost of 

approximately $474 million. Of this amount, the contract for the design, 

development, and deployment of DTS, as restructured is worth 

approximately $264 million—the same amount as specified in the original 

contract that was agreed to with BDM. The remaining costs are DOD 

internal costs associated with areas such as the operation of the program 

management office, the voucher payment process, and management of the 

numerous CTO contractors. 
Page 8 GAO-05-998T 

Over the past several years, we have reported pervasive weaknesses in 

DOD’s travel program. These weaknesses have hindered the department’s 

operational efficiencies and have left it vulnerable to fraud, waste, and 

abuse. These weaknesses are highlighted below. 

• On the basis of statistical sampling, we estimated that 72 percent of the 

over 68,000 premium class airline tickets DOD purchased for fiscal years 

2001 and 2002 were not properly authorized and that 73 percent were not 

properly justified. During fiscal years 2001 and 2002, DOD spent almost 

$124 million on airline tickets that included at least one leg of the trip in 

premium class—usually business class. Because each premium class 

ticket costs the government up to thousands of dollars more than a coach 

class ticket, unauthorized premium class travel resulted in millions of 

dollars of unnecessary costs annually.12 

• Because of control breakdowns, DOD paid for airline tickets that were 

neither used nor processed for refund—amounting to about 58,000 tickets 

totaling more than $21 million for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. DOD was not 

aware of this problem before our audit and did not maintain any data on 

unused tickets. Based on limited data provided by the airlines, it is 

possible that the unused value of the fully and partially unused tickets that 

DOD purchased from fiscal year 1997 through fiscal year 2003 with DOD’s 

CBA could be at least $100 million.13

• We found that DOD sometimes paid twice for the same airline ticket—first 

to the Bank of America for the monthly DOD credit card bill, and second 

to the traveler, who was reimbursed for the same ticket. Based on our 

mining of limited data, the potential magnitude of the improper payments 

was 27,000 transactions for over $8 million. For example, DOD paid a Navy 

GS-15 civilian employee approximately $10,000 for 13 airline tickets he had 

not purchased.14

DTS development and implementation have been problematic, especially 

in the area of requirements and testing key functionality to ensure that the 

system would perform as intended. Given the lack of adherence to such a 

key practice, it is not surprising that critical flaws have been identified 

after deployment, resulting in significant schedule slippages. As originally 

envisioned, the initial deployment of DTS was to commence 120 days after 

 12 GAO-04-88 and GAO-04-229T. 

13 GAO-04-398. 

14 GAO-04-576. 

Previously Reported DOD 

Travel Issues 

Ongoing DTS Testing 

Remains a Concern 
Page 9 GAO-05-998T 

the effective date of the contract award in September 1998, with complete 

deployment to approximately 11,000 locations by April 2002. However, 

that date has been changed to September 2006—a slippage of over 4 years. 

Our recent analysis of selected requirements disclosed that the testing of 

DTS is not always adequate prior to updated software being released for 

use by DOD personnel. System testing is a critical process utilized by 

organizations to improve an entity’s confidence that the system will satisfy 

the requirements of the end user and will operate as intended. 

Additionally, an efficient and effective system testing program is one of the 

critical elements that need to be in place in order to have reasonable 

assurance that an organization has implemented the disciplined 

processes15 necessary to reduce project risks to acceptable levels in 

software development. In one key area, our results to date have identified 

instances in which the testing of DTS was inadequate, which precluded 

DOD from having reasonable assurance that DTS displayed the proper 

flights and airfares. This occurred because the PMO-DTS failed to ensure 

that the appropriate system interfaces were tested. Additionally, because a 

system requirement covering this had never been defined, there was not 

reasonable assurance that DTS displayed the accurate number of flights 

and related airfares within a given flight window.16 As a result of these two 

weaknesses, DOD travelers might not have received accurate information 

on available flights and airfares, which could have resulted in higher travel 

costs. Specific details on these two weaknesses are discussed below. 

• The DOD tests for determining whether DTS displayed the proper flights 

and airfares did not provide reasonable assurance that the proper (1) 

flights were displayed and (2) airfares for those flights were displayed. 

DTS uses a commercial product to obtain information from the database 

that contains the applicable flight and airfare information (commonly 

referred to as a Global Distribution System or [GDS]). In testing whether 

DTS displayed the proper flights and airfares, the information returned 

from the commercial product was compared with the information 

displayed in DTS and was found to be in agreement. However, the 

commercial product did not provide all of the appropriate flights or 

 15 Disciplined processes for software development and implementation include a wide 

range of activities, including project planning and oversight, requirements management, 

risk management, and testing. 

16 A flight window is the amount of time before and after a specified time and is used for 

determining the flights that should be displayed. For example, if the flight window is 4 

hours and estimated departure time is 9:00 a.m., then the flight window that is used for 

displaying available flights is from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. 
Page 10 GAO-05-998T 

airfares to DTS that were contained in the GDS. Since the PMO-DTS 

neither performed an end-to-end test17 nor made sure that the information 

returned from this commercial product was in agreement with the 

information contained in the GDS, it did not have reasonable assurance 

that DTS was displaying the proper flights and airfares information to the 

users. According to DOD officials, this system weakness was detected by 

users complaining that DTS did not display the proper flights and airfares. 

• DOD officials stated that prior to the August 2005 system update, DTS 

should have displayed 12 flights, if that many flights were available, within 

a flight window.18 DTS program officials and Northrop Grumman 

personnel acknowledged that this particular system requirement had 

never been tested because DOD failed to document the requirement until 

January 2005. Therefore, DOD did not have reasonable assurance that DTS 

displayed the required number of flights and related airfare information. 

The inability to ensure that the proper number of flights was displayed 

could have caused DOD to incur unnecessary travel cost. As we have 

noted in previous reports, requirements that are not defined are unlikely to 

be tested.19

PMO-DTS officials acknowledged that these two problems have been 

ongoing since the initial implementation of DTS. PMO-DTS officials have 

stated that the two problems were corrected as part of the August 2005 

DTS system update. We are in the process of verifying whether the actions 

taken by DOD will correct the problems. 

Of the four previously reported DOD travel problems, DTS has corrected 

one of the problems while the others remain. However, the remaining 

problems are not necessarily within the purview of DTS and may take 

departmentwide action to fully address. 

 17 The purpose of end-to-end testing is to verify that a defined set of interrelated systems, 

which collectively support an organizational core business area or function, interoperate as 

intended in an operational environment. 

18 Prior to the August 2005 system update, DTS used a 4-hour flight window for domestic 

flights and a 12-hour flight window for foreign flights. The current window is 12-hours for 

domestic flights and 24-hours for foreign destinations. 

19 GAO, Indian Trust Funds: Challenges Facing Interior’s Implementation of New Trust 

Asset and Accounting Management System, GAO/T-AIMD-99-238 (Washington, D.C.: July 

14, 1999). 

DTS Has Corrected 

Some Previously 

Reported Travel 

Problems 
Page 11 GAO-05-998T 

While DOD has taken actions to improve existing guidance and controls 

related to premium class travel, including system changes in DTS, we 

identified instances in which unauthorized premium class travel continues. 

In November 2003, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and 

Readiness) formed a task force to address our prior recommendations20

that focused on three major areas: (1) policy and controls of travel 

authorization, (2) ticket issuance and reporting, and (3) internal control 

and oversight. Subsequently, several policy changes were made to improve 

the control and accountability over premium class travel. For example, the 

approval level for first class travel was elevated to a three-star general and 

for business class travel to a two-star general or civilian equivalent. Other 

changes included strengthening the description of circumstances when 

premium class travel may be used to more clearly show that it is an 

exceptional circumstance and not a common practice. In all cases, 

approving officials must have their own premium class travel approved at 

the next level. These changes also set a broad policy that CTOs are not to 

issue premium class tickets without proper authorization. In September 

2004, the PMO-DTS made system changes to DTS that blocked seven fare 

codes that were considered to be premium class fare codes from being 

displayed or selected by the traveler through DTS. According to the PMODTS, the airline industry does not have standardized fare code indicators 

to identify first class, business class, and economy class. Subsequently, 

DOD found that economy class fare codes were being blocked using the 

seven codes and in May 2005, reduced the list to three codes. 

Despite these various changes in policy and to DTS, we continue to 

identify instances in which premium class travel is occurring without the 

proper authorization. To date, our preliminary analysis disclosed at least 

68 cases that involved improperly approved premium class travel.21 In one 

case, we found that a Department of the Army civilian employee (GS-12) 

flew from Columbia, South Carolina via Atlanta, Georgia to Gulf Port, 

Mississippi to attend a conference. On the return trip, one leg included 

 20 GAO-04-88. 

21 To assess the use of premium class travel, we obtained databases from Bank of America 

and the PMO-DTS, which provided information on the actual travel transactions and 

traveler information for the period October-December 2004. The Bank of America database 

contained all DOD transactions for the first quarter of fiscal year 2005, and the PMO-DTS 

database contained all vouchers processed by DTS for the same time period. We identified 

potentially 419 cases that could involved premium class travel. We are still in the process of 

reviewing information requested from DOD to ascertain if there are other cases of 

improper premium class travel. 

Improper Premium Class 

Travel 
Page 12 GAO-05-998T 

first class accommodations. From our review and analysis of Bank of 

America data and the travel voucher, DOD paid $1,107 for the airfare. The 

cost of a GSA city pair round trip airfare was $770. According to 

information provided by the Army, the traveler informed the Army that he 

was meeting another traveler at the destination and they were going to 

share a rental car and there were no seats available on the flight the other 

traveler had booked. Therefore, the individual selected a flight arriving as 

close as possible to the time of the traveler he was meeting. This is not a 

valid justification, and the premium class fare was not approved by the 

appropriate official. Additionally, the premium class fare occurred on the 

return flight. Furthermore, based upon our review to date, none of the 68 

cases that involved improper premium class travel had the required 

approval. 

DTS still does not have the capability to determine whether a traveler does 

not use all or a portion of an airline ticket. To address this problem, DOD 

directed that all new CTO contract solicitations require CTOs to prepare 

that unused ticket reports which identify tickets that were not used within 

a specified time period, usually 30 days past the trip date, so that they can 

be cancelled and processed for refund. Additionally, the various DOD 

components were directed to modify existing CTO contracts to require the 

CTOs to process refunds for unused airline tickets. At the five locations 

we visited22 we found that the Army and Air Force CTOs prepared daily 

and monthly reports. The Navy CTOs produced the unused ticket report 

on a weekly basis, and the Marine Corps CTOs prepared the report 

monthly. However, according to DOD officials, this requirement has not 

yet been implemented in all the existing CTO contracts. 

Our preliminary observations indicate that DTS was designed to ensure 

that tickets purchased through the CBA cannot be claimed on the 

individual’s travel voucher as a reimbursement to the traveler. As part of 

our statistical sample discussed later, we found 14 travel vouchers in 

which an airline ticket purchased with the CBA was included on the 

voucher; however, the traveler did not receive reimbursement for the 

claim. 

 22 Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.; Buckley Air Force Base, Colo.; Defense Logistics Agency, 

Va.; Headquarters Marine Corps, Va.; and Naval Operations Headquarters, Va. 

Unused Airline Tickets 

Duplicate Payments 

Related to Centrally Billed 

Accounts (CBA). 
Page 13 GAO-05-998T 

DFAS has previously reported problems with the accuracy of DTS travel 

payments. For the first quarter of fiscal year 2004, DFAS reported a 14 

percent inaccuracy rate in the DTS travel payments of airfare, lodging, and 

meals, and incidental expenses. Our preliminary analysis of 170 travel 

vouchers23 disclosed that for the two attributes that are directly related to 

the operation of the DTS system—computation of lodging reimbursement 

and meals and incidental expenses (per diem)—the DTS calculations were 

correct in all instances on the basis of the information provided by the 

traveler. However, we continue to identify numerous instances in which 

employee errors led to inaccurate reimbursements. In some cases, errors 

occurred because incorrect data were entered into DTS by the traveler. In 

other cases, the reviews by the AOs were inadequate. In regard to the AO 

reviews, our preliminary analysis indicates that approximately 66 travel 

vouchers or 39 percent were paid even though there was not reasonable 

assurance that the amount of the reimbursement was accurate. More 

specifically, 49 of 66 travel vouchers lacked adequate receipts for the 

amounts claimed. Receipts are required for all expenses of $75 or more 

and for lodging, regardless of the amount. However, for the 49 vouchers, 

we saw no evidence that the AO was provided with the appropriate 

receipts by the traveler. In one case, the traveler was reimbursed for 

expenses claimed in excess of $500, even though none of the required 

receipts were available for review and approval by the AO. According to 

DOD regulations, “the AOs signature on the expense report certifies that 

the travel was taken, that the charges are reasonable...and that the 

payment of the authorized expenses is approved.” While the signature of 

the AO signifies that the payment is approved, it falls short of ensuring that 

amounts claimed are reasonable in the cases in which receipts for airfare 

and lodging are not provided. Until the overall review process is improved, 

travel payment problems will continue to occur. 

DOD’s goal of making DTS the standard travel system within the 

department depends upon the development, testing, and implementation 

of system interfaces with the myriad of related DOD systems, as well as 

private-sector systems such as the system used by credit card company 

that provides DOD military and civilian employees with travel cards. While 

DOD has developed 32 interfaces, the PMO-DTS is aware of at least 17 

 23 We randomly selected 173 travel vouchers for detail review, but at the time of our review 

3 vouchers had not yet been completed and submitted for review. The selected vouchers 

were drawn from the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 (October-December 2004). 

Accuracy of Travel 

Vouchers 

DTS Faces Challenges 

in Achieving the Goal 

of a Standard DOD 

Travel System 
Page 14 GAO-05-998T 

additional DOD business systems for which interfaces must be developed. 

To date, the development and testing of the interfaces has cost DOD 

reportedly over $30 million. Developing the interfaces is time consuming 

and costly. Additionally, the underutilization of DTS at the sites where it 

has been deployed is also hindering the department’s efforts to have a 

standard travel system throughout the department. Furthermore, the 

underutilization impacts the estimated savings that are to be derived from 

the use of DTS departmentwide. 

One of DOD’s long-standing problems has been the lack of integrated 

systems. To address this issue and minimize the manual entry of data, 

interfaces between existing systems must be developed to provide the 

exchange of data that is critical for day-to-day operations. For example, 

DTS needs to know before permitting the authorization of travel that 

sufficient funds are available to pay for the travel—information that comes 

from a non-DTS system—and once the travel has been authorized, another 

system needs to know this information so that it can record an obligation 

and provide management and other systems with information on the funds 

that remain available. Interfaces are also needed with private-sector 

systems, such as the credit card company that provides DOD personnel 

with travel cards. Figure 1 illustrates the numerous DTS system interfaces 

that have already been developed and implemented with the department’s 

business systems. 

Interfaces Are Critical to 

Implementing an End-toEnd System 
Page 15 GAO-05-998T 

Figure 1: DTS System Interfaces Operating Today 

Figure 2 shows the DTS system interfaces that must be developed in the 

future with the department’s business systems. 
Page 16 GAO-05-998T 

Figure 2: Future DTS System Interfaces That Need to be Developed 

While DOD was able to develop and implement the interfaces with the 32 

systems, the development of each remaining interface will present the 

PMO-DTS with challenges. For example, the detailed requirements for 

each of the remaining interfaces have not yet been defined. Such 

requirements would define (1) what information will be exchanged and (2) 

how the data exchange will be conducted. This is understandable in some 

cases such as the Army General Fund Financial enterprise resource 

planning (ERP),24 which is a relatively new endeavor within the 

department and it will be some time before DOD is in position to start 

 24 An ERP solution is an automated system consisting of multiple, integrated functional 

modules that perform a variety of business-related tasks such as payroll, general ledger 

accounting, and supply chain management. 
Page 17 GAO-05-998T 

development of the interface. Additionally, the development of the DTS 

interfaces depends on other system owners’ achieving their time frames 

for implementation. For example, the Navy ERP is one of the DOD 

systems with which DTS is to interface and exchange data. Any difficulties 

with the Navy’s ERP implementation schedule could adversely affect 

DTS’s interface testing and, thereby, result in a slippage in the interface 

being implemented. The above two factors also affect DTS’s ability to 

develop reliable cost estimates for the future interfaces. 

Another challenge for DTS in achieving its goal of a standard travel system 

within DOD is the continued use of the existing legacy travel systems, 

which are owned and operated by the various DOD components. 

Currently, at least 31 legacy travel systems are continuing to be operated 

within the department. As we have previously reported, because each 

DOD component receives its own funding for the operation, maintenance, 

and modernization of its own systems, there is no incentive for DOD 

components to eliminate duplicative travel systems. 25 We recognize that 

some of the existing travel systems, such as the Integrated Automated 

Travel System version 6.0, cannot be completely eliminated because it 

performs other functions, such as permanent change of station travel 

claims that DTS cannot process. However, in other cases, the department 

is spending funds on duplicative systems that perform the same function 

as DTS. The funding of multiple systems that perform the same function is 

one of the reasons why the department has 4,150 business systems.26 Since 

these legacy systems are not owned and operated by DTS, the PMO-DTS 

does not have the authority to discontinue their operation. This is an issue 

that must be addressed from a departmentwide perspective. 

Because of the continued operation of the legacy systems at locations 

where DTS has been fully deployed, DOD components pay DFAS higher 

processing fees for processing manual travel vouchers as opposed to 

processing the travel vouchers electronically through DTS. According to 

an April 13, 2005, memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Financial Management and Comptroller), DFAS was charging the Army 

$34 for each travel voucher processed manually and $2.22 for each travel 

voucher processed electronically—a difference of $31.78. The 

 25 GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Billions Being Invested without 

Adequate Oversight, GAO-05-381 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2005). 

26 GAO-05-381. 

Underutilization of DTS 

Affects Estimated Savings 
Page 18 GAO-05-998T 

memorandum further noted that for the period October 1, 2004, to 

February 28, 2005, at locations where DTS had been deployed, the Army 

paid DFAS approximately $6 million to process 177,000 travel vouchers 

manually—$34 per travel voucher, versus about $186,000 to process 84,000 

travel vouchers electronically—$2.22 per voucher. Overall, for this 5-

month period, the Army reported that it spent about $5.6 million more to 

process these travel vouchers manually as opposed to electronically using 

DTS. 

The military services have recognized the importance of utilizing DTS to 

the fullest extent possible. The Army issued a memorandum in September 

2004 directing each Army installation to fully disseminate DTS to all 

travelers within 90 to 180 days after IOC at each installation. The 

memorandum included a list of sites that should be fully disseminated and 

the types of vouchers that must be processed through DTS. Furthermore, 

the memorandum noted that travel vouchers that could be processed in 

DTS should not be sent to DFAS for processing. In a similar manner, in 

February 2005, the Marine Corps directed that upon declaration of DTS’s 

IOC at each location, commands will have DTS fully fielded within 90 days 

and will stop using other travel processes that have the capabilities of 

DTS. The Air Force issued a memorandum in November 2004 that stressed 

the importance of using DTS when implemented at an installation. The 

Navy has not issued a similar directive. 

Despite these messages, DTS remains underutilized by the military 

services. The military services, and in particular, the Army, have taken 

steps to monitor DTS’s usage, but others, such as the Marine Corps, do not 

capture the data necessary to assess the extent to which DTS is being 

underutilized. The lack of pertinent data hinders management’s ability to 

monitor its progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard TDY 

system. 

Overhauling DOD’s financial management and business operations—one 

of the largest and most complex organizations in the world—represents a 

daunting challenge. DTS, intended to be the department’s end-to-end travel 

management system, illustrates some of the obstacles that must be 

overcome by DOD’s array of transformation efforts. With over 3.3 million 

military and civilian personnel as potential travel system users, the sheer 

size and complexity of the undertaking overshadows any such project in 

the private sector. Nonetheless, standardized business systems across the 

department will be the key to achieving billions of dollars of annual 

savings through successful DOD transformation. As we have previously 

Concluding Remarks 
Page 19 GAO-05-998T 

reported, because each DOD component receives its own funding for the 

operation, maintenance, and modernization of its own systems, 

nonintegrated, parochial business systems have proliferated— 4,150 

business systems throughout the department by a recent count. The 

elimination of “stove-piped” legacy systems and cheaper electronic 

processing, which could be achieved with the successful implementation 

of DTS, are critical to realizing the anticipated savings. 

In closing, we commend the Subcommittee for holding this hearing as a 

catalyst for improving the department’s travel management practices. We 

also would like to reiterate that following this testimony, we plan to issue 

a report that will include recommendations to the Secretary of Defense 

aimed at improving the department’s implementation of DTS. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our 

prepared statement. We would be pleased to respond to any questions you 

may have. 
Page 20 GAO-05-998T 

DOD has taken several steps to address its needs for the use of intellectual 

and tangible property in the DTS, but it has not yet completed the exercise 

of the rights it determined necessary for long-term development and 

implementation of the DTS. While the original contract awarded to BDM 

did not specifically address intellectual property rights, TRW, as the 

successor to BDM, acquired in 2001 perpetual rights to use three key 

commercial software programs to accommodate technology decisions that 

necessitated modifying some software for use in DTS. When DOD and 

TRW agreed to restructure the DTS contract, they modified the contract to 

include several key provisions that provided DOD with rights to various 

categories of intellectual and tangible property. As set out below, DOD 

officials told us that they have yet to complete the exercise of some of 

DOD’s intellectual property rights and to secure title to hardware 

necessary to meet its long-term acquisition needs, but those steps are in 

progress. 

The original DTS contract awarded in 1998 did not specifically address the 

Government’s intellectual property rights because the contract was 

structured primarily as a fixed-priced travel services contact rather than as 

a government-funded development effort. As such, the contractor was 

responsible for securing the necessary intellectual property rights in the 

commercial software and other products being used, except for those 

pertaining to existing DOD systems or used by DOD under other 

agreements.1

 The fixed price for the services would include the cost to the 

contractor to obtain or develop the necessary software, hardware, and 

technical data2

 in order to provide the required travel services to DOD. 

According to DOD officials, DOD and TRW determined in 2001 that three 

key commercial software programs used in DTS would not meet DOD’s 

requirements without modification.3

 Accordingly, in September 2001, TRW 

executed a license agreement with the firm holding the copyright to the 

 1

 Some software and technical data on existing DOD systems to be connected to DTS were 

provided to the contractor as government-furnished equipment or information. 

2

 “Technical data” means recorded information, regardless of the form or method of the 

recording, of a scientific or technical nature (including computer software documentation). 

The term does not include computer software or data incidental to contract administration, 

such as financial and/or management information. 

3

 In September 2001, DOD and TRW agreed to Modification No. 4 to Task Order No. 10 to 

require software development work and, under this modification, TRW was to provide 

DOD with a perpetual license for DTS software. 

Appendix I: Department of Defense Rights to 

Property in the Defense Travel System 

Property Rights Under the 

Original DTS Contract 
Page 21 GAO-05-998T 

software programs4 for TRW to use in developing and deploying DTS 

within DOD.5

 The firm charged TRW with a one-time fee for the rights 

under the agreement. 

Under the license agreement, TRW obtained a perpetual and exclusive 

license to use the three software programs and related software 

documentation to develop and deploy software and services for use in the 

DTS. This license includes the authority to modify the source code to one 

of the software programs. The license agreement authorizes the 

assignment of TRW’s rights under the agreement to DOD for the DTS 

project. The license agreement does not expressly condition such an 

assignment on payment of a fee. According to DOD officials, DOD has 

approached Northrop Grumman Space & Mission Systems Corp. 

(Northrop Grumman), as the successor to TRW, requesting assignment of 

those rights to DOD. In a September 22, 2005, letter to the DTS contracting 

officer, Northrop Grumman represented that they would assign its rights 

under the license agreement to DOD at the conclusion of the contract, if 

requested. 

The license agreement also provides that Northrop Grumman may 

sublicense its rights under the agreement to other entities in support of 

DTS. DOD officials told us that they believe Northrop Grumman’s 

assignment of these rights to DOD would include the authority for DOD to 

sublicense the rights to other DOD contractors for use in providing 

services related to DTS. The DOD officials noted that they are in the 

process of modernizing the DTS application to include a potential 

complete replacement of the licensed software with custom developed 

software. The officials stated that they are still evaluating whether an 

assignment of rights and issuance of any sublicenses actually would be 

needed in light of these changes. 

In the restructuring of the DTS contract, DOD and TRW agreed to address 

a number of intellectual and tangible property categories under the 

contract that DOD officials told us would satisfy DOD’s long-term DTS 

 4

 The firm represented that it holds the copyright and title to one commercial software 

program and acted as an authorized licensee with respect to the other software programs 

and certain related data. 

5

 The license agreement also authorized limited use of the software, source code and 

documentation on similar terms by the U.S. Treasury Department and included terms for 

use of the software and executable code by non-DOD federal government entities under the 

authority of “the Economy Act.” 

Property Rights Under the 

Restructured Contract 
Page 22 GAO-05-998T 

development and implementation plans. The restructured contract 

incorporated several standard DOD intellectual property rights clauses, 

but DOD is still evaluating ownership rights related to key hardware used 

in the DTS. 

The restructured contract incorporates standard DOD intellectual 

property rights clauses for a system being developed at government 

expense and it specifically gives DOD perpetual rights to DTS software. 

The perpetual rights for different categories of intellectual property 

generally depend upon the source of the funding of their development. In 

particular, the contract requires Northrop Grumman to “provide a 

perpetual license for DOD use worldwide for DTS software” in accordance 

with certain standard clauses or in accordance with standard commercial 

terms for commercial software.6

 Also, the contract incorporates a clause 

that requires Northrop Grumman to grant or obtain for the government 

royalty free, world-wide, nonexclusive, irrevocable license rights in 

technical data.7

 Further, these clauses include provisions that permit 

Northrop Grumman to assert restrictions on the government’s use, release 

or disclosure of technical data and computer software, depending upon 

the funding of their development.8

 For commercial software used in the 

DTS, Northrop Grumman has asserted restrictions applicable to 

commercial software licenses. Some of the licenses Northrop Grumman 

obtained for use of commercial software may be neither perpetual nor 

assignable to DOD, but DOD officials told us that this does not cause risk 

to the project since there are available alternative methods to acquire 

similar licenses. Table 1 sets out DOD’s rights in these categories. Finally, 

the contract incorporated a standard clause governing restrictions DOD 

may place on information it provides to Northrop Grumman for use under 

the contract.9

 6

 Specifically, these rights must be in accordance with Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulation Supplement (DFARS) clauses 252.227-7014, Rights in Noncommercial 

Computer Software and Noncommercial Computer Software Documentation, 252.227-

7019, Validation of Asserted Restrictions – Computer Software, and 252.227-7037, 

Validation of Restrictive Markings, or consistent with publicly available licenses for 

commercial computer software and documentation. 

7

 DFARS clause 252.227-7013, Rights in Technical Data – Noncommercial Items. 

8

 DFARS clauses 252.227-7013 and 252.227-7014. 

9

DFARS clause 252.227-7025, Limitations on the Use or Disclosure of GovernmentFurnished Information Marked with Restrictive Legends. This clause was added to the 

contract in June 2002. 
Page 23 GAO-05-998T 

Table 1: DOD Rights to Intellectual Property Under the DTS Contract 

Category Intellectual Property in DTS DOD Rights 

Noncommercial Technical 

Data – Government funded 

All technical data delivered to 

DOD under the DTS contract 

Perpetual Unlimited 

Rightsa

Computer Software & 

Documentation 

 

Noncommercial –

Government Funded 

Software developed under 

Task Order Numbers 10, 18, 

20, and 26 

Perpetual Unlimited 

Rights 

Commercial – Privately 

Funded (excluding 3 key 

programs discussed 

above) 

Several dozen software 

programs 

Northrop Grumman has 

restricted rightsb

 for use 

in DTS as set out in 

individual commercial 

licensesc

Source: GAO analysis based upon information provided by and discussions with the PMO-DTS. 

a

“Unlimited rights” means the government’s rights to use computer software or technical data in any 

way and to authorize others to do so. 

b

“Restricted rights” means, generally, the right to use the software on one computer at a time. TRW 

has more liberal rights than restricted rights in some of these programs. 

c

According to DOD officials, Northrop Grumman has obtained perpetual and assignable licenses for 

only some of these programs and DOD intends to assess its needs and alternative acquisition 

methods available for all commercial software as part of its long-term development and 

implementation plans. 

The restructured contract requires Northrop Grumman to provide all 

hardware (and other equipment) necessary to deliver services under the 

contract, but DOD officials told us that they are discussing delivery 

schedules and ownership rights to hardware items, principally 

configuration items. In a September 23, 2005, letter to the DTS contracting 

officer, Northrop Grumman represented that they would assign title to 

certain hardware at the conclusion of the contract, if requested. Finally, 

DOD has leased some hardware items necessary to interface with the 

airline Global Distribution Systems and it will need to evaluate the terms 

of those leases. 
Page 24 GAO-05-998T 

To determine if the Department of Defense (DOD) effectively tested key 

Defense Travel System (DTS) functionality associated with flights and 

airfares, we reviewed the applicable requirements and the related testing 

prior to the August 2005 release to determine if the desired functionality 

was effectively implemented. 

To determine if DTS will correct the problems previously identified with 

DOD travel, we analyzed past GAO reports and testimonies, selected 

Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) reports, and DOD 

congressional testimonies. In this regard, we focused on how DTS 

addresses issues related to premium class travel, unused tickets, and 

centrally billed accounts. We also randomly sampled 170 travel vouchers1

to ascertain if some of the problems previously reported upon by DFAS 

have been resolved. To be included within the selected sample, the travel 

vouchers had to be for trips that were in DTS and for travel started on or 

after October 1, 2004, and ended on or before December 31, 2004. We have 

not yet finalized our projections for the sample. To assess the use of 

premium class travel, we obtained databases from Bank of America and 

the Project Management Office-Defense Travel System (PMO-DTS), which 

provided information on the actual travel transactions and traveler 

information for the period October-December 2004. The Bank of America’s 

database contained all DOD transactions for the first quarter of fiscal year 

2005, and the PMO-DTS database contained all vouchers processed by 

DTS for the same time period. We removed all transactions that were not 

specifically airline charges, such as rail charges and commercial travel 

office fees, and then selected all fare codes that corresponded to the 

potential issuance of a premium class ticket. This resulted in 419 instances 

in which a premium class ticket could have been issued. We have not 

finalized our analysis. 

To identify some of the challenges confronting the department in making 

DTS the department’s standard travel system, we discussed with PMO-DTS 

officials their implementation strategy and reviewed past GAO reports and 

testimonies related to the department’s efforts to improve the accuracy 

and reliability of the information in its business systems. 

 1

 We randomly selected 173 travel vouchers for detail review, but at the time of our review 

3 vouchers had not yet been completed and submitted for review. 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 
Page 25 GAO-05-998T 

We briefed DOD officials on the contents of this testimony. We assessed 

the reliability of the DOD data we used for our preliminary evaluation by 

(1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) reviewing 

existing information about the data and the system that produced them, 

and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We 

determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this 

testimony. We performed our audit work from October 2004 through 

September 2005, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

To describe DOD’s property rights in the DTS we reviewed the DTS 

contract, applicable acquisition regulations, DOD intellectual property 

guidance, key DTS license agreements, and written responses from PMODTS to our questions, and we met with PMO-DTS and contracting officials 

and with their legal counsel. 
Page 26 GAO-05-998T 

For future information about this testimony, please contact McCoy 

Williams at (202) 512-6906 or williamsm1@gao.gov or Keith A. Rhodes at 

(202) 512-6412 or rhodesk@gao.gov. 

Our contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. In addition to the 

above contacts, the following individuals made key contributions to this 

testimony: Darby Smith, Assistant Director; J. Christopher Martin, Senior 

Level Technologist; Beatrice Alff; Francine DelVecchio; Francis Dymond; 

Thomas Hackney; Gloria Hernandezsaunders; Wilfred Holloway; Jason 

Kelly; Sheila Miller; Robert Sharpe; Patrick Tobo; and Adam Vodraska. 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(195071) 
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER