**The Agreed Framework with the Democratic Peoples' Republic ofKorea**
Author: The Honorable Walter B. Slocombe,                                                Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
***Note:** Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied inthis paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarilyrepresent the views of the Institute forNational Strategic Studies, National Defense University,the Department of Defense or any other government agency.
     The Agreed Framework Between the United States andthe Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) is inour interest because, if it is carried out, it will eliminate theNorth Korean nuclear weapons program.  If unchecked, thisprogram threatens two key U.S. interests stability in Asiaand checking the spread of nuclear weapons.
          The stability of Asia is critical to U.S. security andprosperity. The foundation of Northeast Asia's economicgrowth and political stability is security, and the linchpinsof security have been our commitment to our defenserelationships with South Korea and Japan. North Korea'slong-standing challenge to security and stability in NortheastAsia acquired a more ominous dimension with theemergence of a major North Korean nuclear weaponsprogram.
      Since the early 1980s, North Korea has operated a largenuclear complex, chiefly at Yongbyon.  U.S. intelligencebelieves that the purpose of the complex is the production ofweapons grade plutonium.  In addition to a small 5 MW(e)reactor in operation since 1985, a 50 MW(e) and a 200MW(e) reactor are under construction.
     We estimate that the DPRK nuclear program hadgenerated enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weaponsand was poised to leap forward in terms of plutoniumproduction.  The North Korean program represented anunacceptable threat to the United States' and our allies'interests for a number of mutually-reinforcing reasons:
- An unchecked nuclear capability in the North, coupled with its oversizedconventional force, could be used for extortion or blackmail against the ROK aswell as greatly increasing the costs of a war in Korea. A nuclear arsenal in North Korea could ignite a nuclear arms race in Asiagenerally.
Failure to curb North Korean efforts would undermine the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)safeguards system.
North Korea could export nuclear technologies and components to pariahstates or terrorists worldwide.
With upgraded missile delivery systems, which the North is developing, thenuclear threat could project across most of Northeast Asia.
                   The DPRK signed the NPT in 1985, entered into asafeguards agreement with the IAEA in January 1992 andagreed with the ROK in 1992 to denuclearize the KoreanPeninsula.  Despite these obligations, in 1989 the DPRKdefueled its 5 MW(e) reactor and reprocessed the fuel.  In1992 the DPRK refused to cooperate with the IAEA toclarify the amount and disposition of the plutonium fromthat load of fuel.  The DPRK remained out of compliancewith its NPT and IAEA obligations up to mid-1994. 
     Talks aimed at the resolution of the problem faltered. In 1993 North Korea announced it would withdraw from theNPT and then suspended its withdrawal.  In June 1994 theDPRK defueled its reactor for the second time and refusedto allow the IAEA to take steps that could have helped shedlight on the amount of plutonium removed during the earlierdefueling.  It declared it would end its IAEA safeguardsagreement, refuel the reactor, and reprocess the spent fuel. In light of these threats, acts, and the lack of progress inbilateral talks, the United States, in cooperation with theROK and other allies and friends, took steps to obtain a UNSecurity Council sanctions resolution on the DPRK. 
     North Korea declared that sanctions were, in its view,an act of war.  In light of the DPRK's massive conventionalcapability and its threats e.g. to turn Seoul into "a sea offire" we augmented our defensive capability, and inconsultation with the ROK, considered a wide range ofoptions for additional force augmentations. 
      We continued to believe, however, that a diplomaticsolution was preferable to sanctions and their consequences. In June 1994 former President Carter reached agreementwith President Kim Il-sung that the North would freeze itsprogram temporarily and return to negotiations in Geneva. After several months, the United States and DPRK signed anAgreed Framework on October 21, 1994.
     This agreement forms the basis of resolving the nuclearissue on the Korean Peninsula.  It is an agreement based onaction, not trust.  If for any reason the DPRK fails to liveup to the Framework, we retain the option of returning tothe UN for sanctions and employing additional militaryreadiness enhancements.
     Under the Agreement, the North must stop (andeventually dismantle) its nuclear weapons related programand resolve past discrepancies.  In return, the DPRK willreceive alternative energy sources, initially bunker oil forelectric generators and heat, and later more proliferation-resistant light water reactor (LWR) technology.  TheAgreement has these key features:
- The immediate shutting down and eventual      dismantling of the North's graphite-moderated reactor     program; Full compliance by the DPRK with its obligations under the NPT and its IAEA safeguards agreement before any nuclear components are delivered; Controlling the spent nuclear fuel already in North Korea by first preventing its being reprocessed, then stabilizing it for storage, and then removing it from the DPRK;
Alternate energy for North Korea in the form of     annual shipments of heavy fuel oil in amounts sufficient     to offset the 255 MW(e) of electrical power and thermal     heat lost through shutdown of the three graphite-     moderated reactors;
The formation of an international consortium to     provide two proliferation-resistant light water reactors     to replace the current graphite-moderated facilities.  The     ROK and Japan will provide the bulk of the funding.
Verified Steps in the Elimination of North Korea's Nuclear Program(100k graphic)
North Korean Alternatives(100k graphic)
     The process of normalizing diplomatic and traderelations between the DPRK and the rest of the world hasbegun with small steps, taken as the Agreed Framework isimplemented, to exchange diplomatic offices and addresstrade and sanctions issues.  It requires restoration ofdialogue between North  and  South  Korea, together  with the United States, with the objective of denuclearizing the KoreanPeninsula and, eventually, reaching a peaceful conclusion ofthe Korean War.
     The Framework Agreement goes well beyond therequirements of the NPT by requiring the North tocompletely dismantle its nuclear production program andplace all fissile material under IAEA safeguards.  Further,it provides for strict international monitoring of DPRKcompliance at all stages.  Under the agreement, North Koreais required to take, and has taken, critically important stepsbefore getting any benefit from the Unites States or othercountries.  Specifically, to date the DPRK has:
                                                        Because the actions are so striking an improvement overpast North Korean secrecy, it's worth pointing out thatNorth Korea has permitted IAEA inspectors to remainpermanently at Yongbyon with access to the reactor construction site at Taechon to implement the freeze, and verify and monitor, on a daily basis, that the freeze remains in effect.  In addition, theNorth has permitted a U.S. technical team to visit theYongbyon complex to do surveys of measures necessary tostabilize the spent fuel so it can be stored until removedfrom North Korea, as required by the agreement.  Removalwill start when the first nuclear components for the LWRsbegin to be delivered.  Obviously, continued vigilance willbe necessary, and we expect some more or less seriousbumps in the road during implementation.  But the criticalfirst step of compliance for the DPRK has beenaccomplished a verified freeze on the North Korean nuclearprogram.
     Our responsibilities under the first step were to deliver50,000 metric tons the first of annual supplies that willeventually reach 500,000 metric tons of heavy residual fueloil to North Korea, a responsibility we met on January 21,1995.  We took other required steps including limitedrelaxation of trade controls.
     Our next milestone is to formulate the Korean PeninsulaEnergy Development Organization (KEDO) to begin workon the LWR project.  Once the plant structure for the firstLWR is completed, and before any nuclear components forthe reactor are delivered, the North will have to allow theIAEA to conduct special inspections of the two waste sitesin question, resolve questions about past plutoniumproduction, and come into  full compliance  with the  NPT and fullscope safeguards requirements.
     Only when this is done will KEDO deliver and begin toinstall the nuclear components of the first LWR.  At thatpoint, the North must commence shipping the spent fuelrods from their 5 MW(e) reactor out of the country forreprocessing and safe storage.   Only when all the spent fuelhas been expatriated will KEDO complete and deliver LWR#1.  Simultaneously with the completion and delivery ofLWR #1, the DPRK will begin to disassemble and destroytheir graphite-moderated reactors and associated facilities. LWR #2 will not be completed until the last of the North'snuclear weapons related facilities are completely dismantled. As the LWRs operate, North Korea will be required toexport the spent fuel.
     Nothing depends on trust our performance will be basedon their performance.  If they don't perform, we can and inmy view we must go back  to sanctions, militaryenhancements, and international pressure.
     We face only two real choices regarding the NorthKorean nuclear weapons program.  Our choice is the agreeddeal.  Under the Agreed Framework the DPRK's nuclearprogram is halted, the IAEA resolves the nuclear past, spentfuel with 25 to 30 kilograms of plutonium is removed fromthe country, and the graphite-moderated nuclear weaponsrelated facilities are dismantled.
     The other choice is, without an agreement, the cycle ofgenerating and reprocessing plutonium is repeated,expanded, and repeated again and again until the DPRKbecomes a nuclear power producing dozens of nuclearweapons every year.  We simply could not let this happen.
     The benefits to us and to the world of peacefully endingthe North Korean nuclear weapons program far outweigh thecosts of the benefits North Korea will derive particularlywhen compared with the alternative, which would be areturn to sanctions and the risk of war, or acquiescing to anuncontrolled nuclear weapons program.*