Number 45, September 1995
Dynamics of Peacekeeping in Georgiaby Edward Marks
| Conclusions | Recommendations | Note |
Multilateral Peacekeeping in Abkhazia
	Georgia's Abkhazia situation is a characteristic example of post-Cold War intra-stateconflicts. The working relations among the various international organizations involved in theUN-sponsored peace operation in Abkhazia are of particular moment.
	Relations between the minority Abkhaz and the Georgians--tense for decades--erupted in1992 in the aftermath of the breakup of the USSR when local Abkhaz authorities attempted toseparate from the newly independent Georgia. Resulting developments were complicated if notincited by actions of the Russian Federation, particularly by those of certain military and politicalelements of the new Russia. 
	The Abkhazian separatist drive began in 1989, although the Abkhazians themselvesnumbered less than 97,000 of the nearly half million population of the region.  During theAbkhazian unrest in 1992, Georgian military forces entered Abkhazia to restore centralgovernment authority.  A cease-fire followed on July 27, 1992. But in September, the Abkhaziansbroke it and defeated the central government troops. When Georgian Head of State EduardShevardnadze shortly after that agreed to bring Georgia into the Commonwealth of IndependentStates, his appeal for CIS (read Russian) assistance was quickly granted.  Still, the existence of a*de facto* independent Abkhazia, unrecognized by anyone else, led to the deployment of a complex,multilateral set of peace operations by several international organizations: 

- The UN dispatched a number of entrants into the Georgian peacekeeping sweepstakes: aSpecial Envoy appointed by the Secretary-General; a UN Observer Mission in Georgia(UNOMIG) established by the Security Council; individual UN agencies and programs,notably the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR); and several-single issue specialmissions (e.g., one for human rights).
- CIS sent a 3,000-man peacekeeping mission to Georgia, mostly Russian troops and a fewTajiks.
- The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) formed a residentmission in Georgia that was initially concerned with the South Ossetian situation but morerecently has been seeking greater involvement in the Abkhazian situation.
- The Russian Federation (RF) began playing a bilateral role in addition to its majorparticipation in the CIS peacekeeping force.

Key Players Enter the Scene
	In 1992 the UN opened consultations regarding Abkhazia to facilitate politicalnegotiations even as the Russian Federation was fostering political discussions and a tripartitecease-fire agreement. Although the cease-fire collapsed almost immediately, the UN still sent aspecial mission to Georgia in October and opened a resident UN Mission in Tsibilisi in November.The UN also established a special Inter-Agency Humanitarian Assessment Mission under theleadership of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in January 1993. 
	The resident UN Mission in Georgia is composed of several agencies, such as the UNDevelopment Program (UNDP) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). TheMission was not created to deal with the Georgian-Abkhaz political conflict, but in recognition ofGeorgia's newly independent status. The Mission is therefore charged with normal assistanceprograms and the particular problems arising from the country's two ethnic conflicts as well.
	In May 1993 the Secretary-General appointed the Swiss Ambassador to France as SpecialEnvoy to Georgia responsible for pursuing consultations and negotiations with all the concernedparties in search of a political solution to the conflict.  Partially because of these UN efforts, thecease-fire was reestablished in July 1993. Before it collapsed again in September, the UNdeployed the advance elements of a military monitoring team to Abkhazia and authorized thecreation of the UN Observer Mission to Georgia (UNOMIG). In October, the UN sent anotherMission, this time one to look into the human rights situation in Abkhazia. 
	Meanwhile, in Geneva the Special Envoy initiated the first round of formal negotiations"under the auspices of the UN" on the political issue. The talks, which included representatives ofthe Russian Federation, OSCE, and UNHCR as well as Georgia and Abkhazia, continued atvarious venues throughout the winter and early spring, producing in April two documents signedin Moscow by both principal parties: a "Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of theGeorgian-Abkhaz Conflict" and the "Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugeesand Displaced Persons." These documents requested deployment of a peacekeeping force (toinclude a Russian contingent) and an expanded mandate for UNOMIG. 
	As the Security Council considered establishing a peacekeeping force, direct negotiationsin Moscow preempted UN action with a new Georgian-Abkhaz cease-fire that included anagreement for a CIS monitoring force. The UN, the CIS, and the RF discussed the relationshipbetween UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeepers. Then, on July 21, the Security Council approvedresolution 937 (1994)  expanding the mandate of UNOMIG to include monitoring the newcease-fire and observing the CIS peacekeeping force. The peacekeeping force deployed inAbkhazia in June 1994, primarily along the  cease-fire line, and remains there to monitor thecease-fire line and help the return of refugees. 
	The role of the OSCE is more ambiguous. The OSCE has had a resident mission inGeorgia since 1993, initially concerned with the South Ossetian separatist problem. In the springof 1994, however, the OSCE Committee of Senior Officials widened the mandate of its Missionto include the promotion of human rights in the whole of Georgia. It accomplished little untilmid-1995 when meetings with Abkhaz authorities began and efforts to launch an active humanrights program (with UNDP cooperation) followed. 
	All these players who entered the Georgia scene with different agendas were encouragedby a desperate Georgian government that, since its own efforts to resolve the problem by militaryforce had failed, turned to outsiders for help--if only to use the international community to inhibitRussian ambitions. Following the Georgian decision to join the CIS in 1993 and the emergence ofthe Chechnyan situation in December 1994 (with its obvious implications for Russian policytoward separatist movements), the objectives of Georgia and Russia have become morecompatible, and the coordination of programs and policy has improved. 

Relations Among International Organizations
	All the outside players, including Moscow, have agreed to the following elements of apolitical settlement:

- Georgian territorial integrity;
- Freedom of refugees and displaced persons to return home;
- A significant degree of autonomy for the Abkhaz people.

The most recent Security Council resolution (993\1995)--the latest of 12 on the Abkhazsituation--attempts to lay out the relationships among the various international actors:

- It expresses satisfaction with "the close cooperation and coordination between UNOMIGand CIS peacekeeping force." 
- It extends the mandate of UNOMIG. 
- It calls for continued negotiations "under the auspices of the UN with the assistance of theRussian Federation as facilitator, and with the support of the OSCE." 
- It encourages cooperation between UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force to providefor the return of refugees.
- It urges governments to contribute funds for humanitarian programs in Abkhazia.
On the ground, there appears to be the following division of labor:

- The UN Special Envoy conducts the negotiations for the political settlement, with theparticipation and assistance of the RF and the OSCE.
- The CIS monitors the cease-fire, with UNOMIG in turn monitoring the CIS.
- The Russian Federation provides the CIS force (apart from a few Tajiks) and pursuesbilateral contacts with the Abkhaz authorities and the Georgian Government. 
- The OSCE pursues a parallel consultation process focusing on human rights.
- The UNHCR attempts to arrange the care and return of refugees (both as an independentprocess and as part of the longer term settlement of the conflict).
- Other UN agencies (WFP, DHA, UNICEF, UNDP) support the peace process whilepursuing their regular assistance and development programs. 

Despite the Security Council's injunctions, the division of labor between the participants reflectstheir different agendas: 

- The UN's reluctance to take on another problem,
- The Russians' concern with a whole range of national interests in the geographic regionthey call the "Near Abroad" and their role as putative regional hegemon,
- The OSCE's effort to define its role as the most inclusive European regional organization,
- The UNHCR and other UN specialized agencies' balancing their responsibility toward theformal UN peacekeeping operation with their individual organizational mandates.

Organizational Dynamics
	The age-old problem of organizational turf battles is widespread.  For example,UNOMIG's Blue Beret officers insist on the purity of their monitoring activities. OSCE, UNHCR,and Russian representatives participate in political negotiations chaired by the Special Envoywhile, independently of the peace talks, they concentrate on more limited programs, such ashuman rights. The CIS force performs its cease-fire duties but carefully avoids taking any actionon the refugee problem, while the UNHCR grows increasingly frustrated by its inability to carryout its role--either alone or in cooperation with others. And other UN agencies continue to act assemi-autonomous organizations in their traditional manner.  Possibly most important of all, theSpecial Envoy operates separately from the conditions and activities on the ground in Abkhaziaand Georgia.
	While the refugee problem is a central question of the political discussions, the UNHCR,OSCE, and the Russians pursue independent negotiations with Abkhaz authorities, which add tothe sense of legitimacy (and maybe obduracy). These linked questions are not being negotiated asa comprehensive peace package. If peacekeeping in Cambodia exemplifies one extreme in whichall activities (political, military, economic, social, humanitarian) are fully integrated under a singlemandate and unified management, the international peacekeeping effort in Georgia-Abkhazia is atthe opposite end of the spectrum.

Does Integration Produce Synergism?
	The Cambodian experience suggests that integration of the various elements of a complexpeacekeeping operation is most conducive to the desired political resolution. Although unity ofcommand may be too rigid a concept for peacekeeping operations, unity of *purpose* is essential.In Georgia, however, the Special Envoy is conducting peace negotiations, while others areconcerned with actual refugee and human rights problems, specifically with the maintenance of thecease-fire. In other words, there may be a looming conflict between political and humanitarianobjectives, a conflict that has bedeviled many peacekeeping operations, and therefore little unityof purpose.
	Questions have also been raised as to the *bona fides* of the CIS, given the predominanceof Moscow in that organization. The current relationship in Abkhazia sets a bad precedent if itprovides the CIS legitimacy without responsibility. However the CIS is operating in Georgia inresponse to Georgian Government requests and under a UN mandate. The UN was receptive to aCIS role because of its own limitations, and the CIS was interested in partnership with the UN toobtain legitimacy and funds. The existing arrangement provides the CIS with that legitimacy, if nofunds. The CIS monitors the cease-fire (with Russian bilateral pressure on both parties to ensure itholds), while the UN monitors the monitors on behalf of the international community. In fact,after a murky role in the early days of Abkhazian activism, Russia now appears to be performingits limited peacekeeping role responsibly. 
	If the carrot for the Russians is increased legitimacy and cost sharing, the price is extensiveinternational involvement in, and consequently greater transparency of Russian activity in the"Near Abroad." Abkhazia has become a testing ground for Russian behavior in the "Near Abroad"and for the bona fides of the CIS as a legitimate regional organization. The model, of course, isthe United States role in the UN Observer Mission in Haiti. 
	On a broader level, the Russian government claims to be searching for a new relationshipwith its much smaller neighbors and argues that the overwhelming role of Russia in the CIS and inthe peace-keeping force is only a temporary reflection of the current capabilities of CIS members.By searching for a more prominent niche, the OSCE is abetting the CIS quest for legitimacy.Unfortunately, however, the peace process appears stalled. Although the Abkhazians continue toparticipate, they deny the principle of Georgian territorial integrity and continue to obstructmovement on the refugee question.
Chapter VII of the UN Charter: Regional Arrangements

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