IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

ASSIGNED ON BRIEFS JULY 20, 2010

ALVIN SEAGROVES v. STATE OF TENNESSEE and TENNESSEE

BOARD OF PROBATION & PAROLE

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 09C2386 Joe P. Binkley, Jr., Judge

No. M2009-01890-COA-R3-CV - Filed August 4, 2010

This appeal involves a prisoner who has filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the wrong

court for the second time. The instant petition was filed in the Davidson County Circuit

Court, which dismissed the petition upon concluding that it should have been filed in

Davidson County Chancery Court. The prisoner appeals, contending that the Circuit Court

should have exercised jurisdiction over the petition or transferred it to the proper court. We

affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ALAN E.HIGHERS,P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which DAVID R. FARMER,

J., and HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., joined.

Alvin Seagroves, Pikeville, Tennessee, pro se

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General,

Kellen A. Baker, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, State

of Tennessee and Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole
OPINION

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Alvin Seagroves is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of

Correction at a correctional facility located in Pikeville, Tennessee. On July 13, 2009, Mr.

Seagroves filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari in the Circuit Court of Davidson

County,seeking a review of the Board of Probation and Parole’s decision to deny him parole.

According to Mr. Seagroves’ petition, his parole hearing was on February 28, 2008, and he

was denied parole based on the seriousness of his offense. Mr. Seagroves’ petition further

stated that his appeal of the decision was denied on June 10, 2008. The petition goes on to

state:

Petitioner had filed a timely and proper writ on this matter, on June 25, 2008,

into the Circuit Court for Pikeville, Tennessee. However, after setting [sic] on

said writ for a year, the Pikeville Court, issued an order June 15, 2009,

dismissing said writ, stating, writ must be filed in Davidson County Circuit

Court.

Attached to the petition was an order from the Circuit Court of Bledsoe County, signed by

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the judge on June 15, 2009, dismissing a petition for writ of certiorari filed by Mr. Seagroves

based upon a finding that jurisdiction over the matter “lies exclusively in the Chancery Court

of Davidson County.” (emphasis added).

The Davidson County Circuit Court entered an order on August 13, 2009, dismissing

Mr. Seagroves’ petition based upon a finding that the petition should have been filed in the

Davidson County Chancery Court. Mr. Seagroves timely filed a notice of appeal.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Mr. Seagroves presents the following issues, as we perceive them, for review:

1. Whether the Davidson County Circuit Court erred in concluding that it lacked

jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the Davidson County Circuit Court erred in failing to transfer the petition to

the proper court.

For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

 Pikeville is located in Bledsoe County. 1

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III. DISCUSSION

“‘The sole remedy available when a prisoner alleges that the Board of Paroles has

acted improperly is to file a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Davidson County.’”

Settle v. Bell, No. M2007-02743-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4725599, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.

E.S. Oct. 28, 2008) (quoting Ferrell v. State, No. 01CO1-9610-CR-00454, 1997 WL 578999

at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 1997)). “Exclusive jurisdiction for judicial review of an

action of the Board of Probation and Parole lies with the Chancery Court of Davidson County

through a writ of certiorari.” Long v. Tenn. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 143 S.W.3d 787,

793 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (citing Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d 317, 319-20 (Tenn.

1995); Hopkins v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles & Probation, 60 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2001); South v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 946 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)). As such,

the Davidson County Circuit Court did not err in its conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to

consider Mr. Seagroves’ petition.

Mr. Seagroves contends that the trial court should have transferred this action to the

Davidson County Chancery Court rather than dismissing it. Tennessee Code Annotated

section 16-1-116 provides, in relevant part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court to the

contrary, when an original civil action . . . is filed in a state or county court of

record . . . and such court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, the court shall,

if it is in the interest of justice, transfer the action or appeal to any other such

court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was

originally filed. Upon such a transfer, the action or appeal shall proceed as if

it had been originally filed in the court to which it is transferred on the date

upon which it was actually filed in the court from which it was transferred.

(emphasis added). Transfer pursuant to this statute is not automatic. Turner v. State, 184

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S.W.3d 701, 705 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Elliott v. Akey, No. E2004- 01478-COA-R3-

CV, 2005 WL 975510, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2005)). The trial court determines, in

 Also relevant to this appeal, Tennessee Code Annotated section 16-2-107 provides:

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In judicial districtsthat have a separate circuit and chancery court or in districtsthat

have more than one (1) division of circuit or chancery court, if a civil cause of action is filed

in the improper court or the improper division of court within the judicial district, upon the

motion of either party, or upon the court's own motion, the civil cause of action may be

transferred to the proper court or proper division within such district.

(emphasis added).

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its discretion, whether a transfer is warranted. Id. “We use an abuse of discretion standard

in reviewing the trial court's decision not to transfer the action to the proper venue.” Hayes

v. State, No. M2009-00371-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3246626, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S.

Oct. 8, 2009) (citing Jones v. TN Dept. of Corrections, M2004-01713-COA-R3-CV, 2007

WL 1241341, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)).

We have previously recognized that where an inmate’s complaint is untimely filed and

subject to dismissal on that ground by any court hearing it, neither the interest of justice nor

principles of judicial economy would be served by transfer to another court. See Johnson

v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. M2004-01301-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 236899, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Jan. 31, 2006). A petition for writ of certiorari must be filed within sixty days from the

entry of the order of which the petitioner seeks review. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102. This

time limit is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Thandiwe v. Traughber, 909 S.W.2d 802, 804

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). “Failure to file the petition within this time limit results in the

challenged judgment becoming final, which deprives a reviewing court of jurisdiction over

the matter.” Blair v. Tenn. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 246 S.W.3d 38, 40 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2007). The party filing the petition then loses his or her right to seek judicial review because

the petition is time-barred. Hickman v. Tenn. Bd. of Paroles, 78 S.W.3d 285, 289 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2001).

As noted above, Mr. Seagroves’ appeal of the decision of the Board of Probation and

Parole was denied on June 10, 2008. He filed this petition for writ of certiorari in the

Davidson County Circuit Court on July 13, 2009. Clearly, the sixty-day period for filing a

petition for a writ of certiorari had expired long before the filing of the instant petition.

Therefore, the interest of justice would not have been served by transferring the present

petition to the Davidson County Chancery Court. Following a transfer, the petition would

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have been treated as if it was originally filed in Chancery Court on July 13, 2009. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 16-1-116 (“Upon such a transfer, the action or appeal shall proceed as if it had

been originally filed in the court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was

actually filed in the court from which it was transferred.”) As such, the petition would have

been time-barred and subject to dismissal in that court as well.

Mr. Seagroves cites Paul v. State, 75 S.W.3d 926 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) on appeal.

In Paul, an inmate filing a pro se petition for post-conviction relief inadvertently addressed

the envelope containing his petition to the wrong city. Id. at 927. He addressed it to the

Robertson County Court Clerk in “Clarksville,” rather than to the correct locale of

 We wish to emphasize that this is an appeal from the Davidson County Circuit Court’s decision 3

not to transfer the petition to the appropriate court. We are not at liberty to review the Bledsoe County

Circuit Court’s failure to transfer the petition.

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“Springfield.” Id. at 928. The envelope was returned to him and he corrected the error, but

the time for filing had expired by one day. Id. Supreme Court Rule 28, section 2(G),

provides, regarding post-conviction relief, “If papers required or permitted to be filed by

these rules are prepared by or on behalf of a pro se petitioner incarcerated in a correctional

facility and are not received by the clerk of the court until after the time fixed for filing, filing

shall be timely if the papers were delivered to the appropriate individual at the correctional

facility within the time fixed for filing.” The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed Mr.

Paul’s situation as follows:

On appeal, the sole determination before us is whether a pro se petition

delivered to the proper prison authorities within the time period fixed for filing

can be considered filed for purposes of Rule 28, § 2(G) of the Tennessee

Supreme Court Rules where the mailing address is incorrect at the time of

delivery to the prison officials. The Appellant argues that, despite his error,

the petition was timely filed on April 14, 1999, when he first delivered it to the

proper prison authorities.

In the analogous case of Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-271, 108

S.Ct. 2379, 2382, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), the United States Supreme Court

explained the purpose for allowing notices of pro se prisoners to be deemed

“filed” when delivered to proper prison authorities for mailing:

The situation of prisoners seeking to appeal is unique. Such

prisoners cannot take the steps other litigants can take to

monitor the processing of their notices of appeal ... Unlike other

litigants, pro se prisoners cannot personally travel to the

courthouse to see that the notice is stamped “filed” or to

establish the date on which the court received the notice. Other

litigants may choose to entrust their appeals to the vagaries of

the mail and the clerk's process for stamping incoming papers,

but only the pro se prisoner is forced to do so by his situation.

And if other litigants do choose to use the mail, they can at least

place the notice directly in the hands of the United States Postal

Services (or a private express carrier); and they can follow its

progress by calling the court to determine whether the notice has

been received and stamped, knowing that if the mail goes awry

they can personally deliver notice at the last moment or that their

monitoring will provide them with evidence to demonstrate their

excusable neglect or that the notice was not stamped on the date

the court received it. Pro se prisoners cannot take any of these

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precautions, nor, by definition, do they have lawyers who can

take these precautions for them. Worse, the pro se prisoner has

no choice but to entrust the forwarding of his notice of appeal to

prison authorities whom he cannot control or supervise and who

may have every incentive to delay ... Unskilled in law, unaided

by counsel, and unable to leave the prison, his control over the

processing of his notice necessarily ceases as soon as he hands

it over to the only public officials to whom he has access–the

prison authorities.

“In other words, the jailer is in effect the clerk of the [court].” Houston v.

Lack, 487 U.S. 266 at 270, 108 S.Ct. 2379. In the present case, the prison

officials at the Wayne County Boot Camp served as the “clerk of the court.”

Although the Appellant mistakenly addressed the envelope containing his pro

se petition to the wrong city, it is clear that his intention was to timely file the

petition with the Robertson County Circuit Court Clerk. He accomplished this

by delivering the petition to the prison authorities on April 14, 1999. Tenn.

Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 2(G); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 49(c). We find no case law or other

authority to support a different conclusion. As a pro se prisoner, the Appellant

had no control over the situation, lacked freedom to pursue other means, and

had no mechanism by which to confirm that the Robertson County Circuit

Court Clerk received his petition. With such a restraint, we cannot say that the

Appellant's error precludes him from seeking relief under the Act.

Accordingly, we find that the petition was timely filed.

Paul, 75 S.W.3d at 928-29.

Rule 5.06 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure similarly provides that “[i]f

papers required or permitted to be filed pursuant to the rules of civil procedure are prepared

by or on behalf of a pro se litigant incarcerated in a correctional facility and are not received

by the clerk of the court until after the time fixed for filing, filing shall be timely if the papers

were delivered to the appropriate individual at the correctional facility within the time fixed

for filing.” Mr. Seagroves argues that the reasoning of Paul should apply to his situation,

in that he inadvertently addressed his petition to the Davidson County Circuit Court rather

than the Davidson County Chancery Court. As stated above, however, even if Mr.

Seagroves’ present petition had been filed in the proper court on July 13, 2009, it would have

been time-barred. Furthermore, in Paul, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:

Although the Appellant mistakenly addressed the envelope containing his pro

se petition to the wrong city, it is clear that his intention was to timely file the

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petition with the Robertson County Circuit Court Clerk. He accomplished this

by delivering the petition to the prison authorities on April 14, 1999.

Id. at 929. Thus, the prisoner’s petition was addressed to the correct court, but simply

misstated its physical location. Here, however, Mr. Seagroves’ petition is clearly directed

to the Davidson County Circuit Court, and that is where it was ultimately filed. We decline

to extend the reasoning of Paul to redeem a petition that was directed to and filed in the

wrong court altogether.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. Costs of

this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Alvin Seagroves, for which execution may issue if

necessary.

_________________________________

ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S.

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